Government and Information Rights: The Law Relating to Access, Disclosure and their Regulation 9781784518998, 9781784518967, 9781784518981

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Government and Information Rights: The Law Relating to Access, Disclosure and their Regulation Fifth edition

Government and Information Rights: The Law Relating to Access, Disclosure and their Regulation Fifth edition

Professor Patrick Birkinshaw Emeritus Professor of Law, University of Hull Barrister at Law

Dr Mike Varney

Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Hull

BLOOMSBURY PROFESSIONAL Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 41–43 Boltro Road, Haywards Heath, RH16 1BJ, UK BLOOMSBURY and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc © Bloomsbury Professional Ltd 2019 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. While every care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of this work, no responsibility for loss or damage occasioned to any person acting or refraining from action as a result of any statement in it can be accepted by the authors, editors or publishers. All UK Government legislation and other public sector information used in the work is Crown Copyright ©. All House of Lords and House of Commons information used in the work is Parliamentary Copyright ©. This information is reused under the terms of the Open Government Licence v3.0 (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/opengovernment-licence/version/3) except where otherwise stated. All Eur-lex material used in the work is © European Union, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/, 1998–2019. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN:

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Dedications

To Jane, and Oliver Patrick Birkinshaw, Olivia Jane Larney, Grace Eva Birkinshaw and Joshua Edward Larney, our grandchildren. To my parents, Janet and Michael Varney, and my wife and daughter, Eliza and Alex Varney.

Preface

‘Transparency’ and ‘openness’ have become keywords of modern governance. When the first edition of this book was published in 1990, they were alien concepts in government. Although they are de rigueur today, that does not mean they are embedded in the actualité of government. This new edition seeks to provide the reader with a survey and analysis of the legal provisions on freedom of information, data protection, transparency and openness, privacy and secrecy: in short, the arena of information rights. The most important development since the last edition has been the Data Protection Act 2018 which incorporated the EU  General Data Protection Regulation and Law Enforcement Directive into UK law. The United Kingdom’s future relationship with the European Union has been a national pre-occupation for over three years; some might say 50 years! The Brexit outcome is still mired in uncertainty. The DPA will remain a part of the context of information rights, whatever the Brexit outcome. We live in a world in which data drives all we do, and we have come to realise the overwhelming power of data, digital corporations, social media and data users in politics, commerce and law enforcement. The Independent Commission on Freedom of Information reported in 2016 and confirmed the Freedom of Information Act 2000 as a part of our constitutional landscape. Two cases from the Supreme Court, Kennedy and Evans, have confirmed the status of the FOIA as a measure of true constitutional significance. The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 made crucial amendments to surveillance laws on intercepts and communications data, and further changes are in motion following decisions of the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. In 2017 the Law Commission in its review of the Official Secrets Acts published a consultation paper on Protection of Official Data. The case law that has transmuted the law of confidentiality into protection of personal privacy as a human right has developed dramatically. Local government has seen significant legal and administrative developments in transparency requirements. Case law has developed at a frantic pace in all of the areas that we examine. Information rights are a topic of unparalleled practical and legal importance in both the public and private sectors. There is a slight change to the book’s title for the fifth edition, to reflect the greater prominence of Government and Information Rights. We have moved the chapter on data protection and privacy to follow freedom of information, and the

viii  Preface chapter on environmental information follows as a separate chapter 3. Otherwise, the order is as it was in the fourth edition, with consequential changes to chapter numbers. Patrick Birkinshaw wrote chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10 and 12. Mike Varney wrote chapters 6, 7, 8, 9 and 11. We have endeavoured to keep abreast of changes until the end of 2018. We are grateful to Martin Parry for his expert guidance on relevant family law rights in chapter 10 and particularly chapter 11. We would also like to thank the editorial team at Bloomsbury Professional for their support and patience, in particular Kiran Goss, Jane Bradford and Peter Smith. Patrick Birkinshaw and Mike Varney Hull, January 2019 Catt v United Kingdom The decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Catt v United Kingdom (Application no 43514/15 (24/01/2019)) came too late to include in the text (see para 2.283, note 3). In finding that the police retention of data on Catt breached Art 8 ECHR, and disagreeing with the Supreme Court, the judgment has serious implications for the ambiguity of the legal criteria under which data is retained by the police in England and Wales, the effectiveness of the review procedures for the removal of such data and the potential indefinite retention of data, the chilling effect of retention and the absence of attention to the heightened level of protection it attracted as data revealing a political opinion. The court was critical of the practices of the police in not disclosing all the data held in the domestic litigation. R (P and Others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department The appeals by the Secretary of State in P and Others (paras 2.312 et seq, together with an appeal from Northern Ireland) were dismissed by the Supreme Court ([2019] UKSC 3) but on narrower grounds than those found by the Court of Appeal. The majority ruled that the disclosure schemes were in accordance with the law and legality and categorisation of offences was not disproportionate, with the exception of the double conviction rule which was insufficiently calibrated and which was capable of producing capricious results, and youth cautions. The orders in question under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 were not quashed but declared incompatible with the ECHR Art 8. The disclosure requirement in W’s case for actual bodily harm was not disproportionate. Lord Kerr issued a dissenting judgment.

Contents

Preface vii List of abbreviations  xv Table of statutes  xix Table of statutory instruments  xlvii Table of European legislation  lix Table of international legislation  lxix Table of cases  lxxi Chapter 1 The freedom of information legislation  1 Introduction and overview  1 The Commons Public Administration Committee’s investigation  10 The exemptions  11 The Information Commissioner (IC)  12 Data protection and access to information  13 Coverage 14 Codes 15 Points of significant departure from the White Paper  17 Preparing for the Act  23 How the Act works  25 The Independent Commission on Freedom of Information  157 The Scottish Freedom of Information Act 2002  160 The Welsh Assembly Code  163 Conclusion 164 Chapter 2 Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection 165 Introduction – the context of Data Protection Reform  167 Introducing DPA  172

x  Contents Data Protection Act 2018  175 Records and the common law  281 Access to Medical Reports Act 1988  284 Access to Health Records Act 1990  286 Privacy protection  286 The press and media  307 Injunctions and super-injunctions  311 Data exchange, matching and information sharing and other problems  314 Data held by the police and records  322 Duties to disclose information  350 Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 353 The eIDAS Regulation  356 Computer misuse and ‘hacking’  357 Chapter 3 Access to environmental information  361 Introduction 361 The Environmental Information Regulations 2004  362 Costs under EIR cases  398 Spatial data  398 Chapter 4 Central government  399 Introduction 399 The 1994 Code on Access (revised in 1997)  403 The use of the Ombudsman  404 The Code  407 The movement to transparency  410 Government and the internet  411 Re-use of public sector information  416 Format of documents  422 Public Records Acts as amended by the Freedom of Information Act 2000 424 Provision of information to Parliament  430 Government publicity and the media and press  442 Elections and referendums  450 Select Committees  450 Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration – Parliamentary Ombudsman 456

Contents  xi Civil servants and their duties and responsibilities to ministers  462 Official Secrets Acts 1911–1989 (OSAs 1911–1989)  467 Security classifications  471 The categories of protected information  473 The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and the Investigatory Powers Act 2016  482 Information entrusted ‘in confidence’ to other states or international organisations 501 Receipt of unauthorised information or that entrusted in confidence  502 What constitutes lawful authority?  504 Safeguarding information  506 Role of the Attorney-General and penalties  507 Police powers  508 Exclusion of public from proceedings  508 Public interest defence  508 Defence of prior publication  509 MPs and privilege  510 Legal professional privilege  511 Defence and Security Media Advisory System (D notice system)  512 Formalities, discipline, authors and the OSA 1989  513 The Official Secrets Act 1989 and the European Court of Human Rights  516 Law Commission Consultation on Protection of Official Data  521 Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 as amended  521 The law relating to the protection of confidentiality  526 Privacy protection  552 Banning broadcasting  552 Chapter 5 The European perspective  554 The Decisions and the Code on Access  562 The EC Regulation on Access (Article 255 EC)  564 Commission proposals for ‘recasting’ Regulation 1049/2001  592 The European Ombudsman  597 Brexit and future relationships concerning access  601 The Council of Europe  602 Chapter 6 Local government as providers and keepers of information 604 Introduction 604

xii  Contents New model executives for authorities  606 Executive meetings and access to information  615 Local government and administrative practice on access  621 The Local Government and Housing Act 1989  642 Standards of conduct  647 ‘Whistleblower’ arrangements – Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998  650 Commission for local administration  650 Restricting publicity by authorities  656 Quasi local government  662 Section 137 expenditure  663 Economic development  664 Local enterprise partnerships  665 Local authority loans  665 Local authorities and controlled companies  666 Urban development corporations  667 Housing action trusts  667 Council tax  667 Non-domestic rating  667 Local access forums  668 Police 669 Chapter 7 Restrictions on the use of, and access to, information by public officials and representatives  675 Central government  675 European Union  686 Local government  686 Other public bodies  715 Publication of information  716 Regulatory agencies  717 Executive agencies  717 Appointments to public bodies and terms of conduct  719 Chapter 8 Public access to information and access to meetings  720 General access under the Local Government (Access to Information) Act 1985 720 Local authority meetings  721 Public Bodies (Admission to Meetings) Act 1960  744

Contents  xiii Extension of Local Government (Access to Information) Act 1985  745 Conclusion 747 Chapter 9 Information and open government – specific areas  748 Policy and finance in local government  748 Education 754 Housing 766 Planning and the environment  771 Commercial enterprise and contracting  791 Chapter 10 Information, redress of grievance and judicial review  797 Introduction 798 Internal complaints and grievance procedures  799 Complaints 803 Remedies 810 Internal complaints procedures, ombudsmen, tribunals and courts  817 The Response to Leggatt  826 ADR and the courts  828 The Draft Public Service Ombudsman Bill  830 Redress of grievance within authorities and openness and information  831 Fair procedure, information, openness and the courts  846 Chapter 11 Litigation and information  893 In camera or private hearings  893 Protocols on police information  903 Disclosure (discovery)  903 Disclosure and judicial review  918 Public interest immunity  921 Legal professional privilege  938 Other forms of privilege  947 Freezing orders and search orders  948 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002  950 European law  950 Chapter 12 The National Audit Office and the Comptroller and Auditor General 957 The National Audit Act 1983  962 Economy, efficiency and effectiveness – the ‘three Es’  964

xiv  Contents The exclusion of policy  966 The CAG reports  969 Annex A Freedom of Information Act 2000, Schedule 1  977 Annex B List of statutory provisions concerning prohibitions on disclosure of information  999 Index 1011

List of abbreviations

ACA 1998 ACPO ADC ADR AJTC AP APO APPSI ATMRA 1988 BID BIOA BVA BVI CAB CAG CCT CDC CEARA 2007 CFI CFR CHIS CIS CJEU CLA CM CMA 1990 CO COCA 1981 CPR 1998 CPV CRB CRCA 2005 CRGA 2010 CSCI CSP CS(U)A 1992 CYPA 1933 DBIS DBS DC DCA DCLG DESO DfT DHSSPS DLO DN DO

Audit Commission Act 1998 Association of Chief Police Officers Association of District Councils alternative dispute resolution Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council adjudication panel Anton Piller order Advisory Panel on Public Sector Information Access to Medical Reports Act 1988 business improvement district British and Irish Ombudsmen Association best value authority best value inspection Citizens Advice Bureau Comptroller and Auditor General compulsory competitive tendering Commonwealth Development Corporation Consumers, Estate Agents and Redress Act 2007 Court of First Instance EU Charter of Fundamental Rights covert human intelligence sources Customs Information System Court of Justice of the European Communities Commission for Local Administration complaints manager Computer Misuse Act 1990 Cabinet Office Contempt of Court Act 1981 Civil Procedure Rules 1998 Common Procurement Vocabulary Criminal Records Bureau Commissioners of Revenue and Customs Act 2005 Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 Commission for Social Care Inspection communication services provider Competition and Service (Utilities) Act 1992 Children and Young Persons Act 1933 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills Disclosure and Barring Service data controller Department for Constitutional Affairs Department for Communities and Local Government Defence Export Services Organisation Department for Transport Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety Direct Labour Organisation decision notice designated officer

xvi   List of abbreviations DoH DP DPA 1998/2018 DPC DPIA DPP DS EA EA 1995 EA 1996 ECA ECGD ECHR ECRC ECtHR ED EDM EEA EI EIA EIP EIR 2004 EN EP EPA 1990 ERA 1996 ERO ESO EU EUC FCO FOI FOIA 2000 FSA FSA 1999 FSMA 2000 FTT FWP GDPR GEMA GMC GR GSS HA 1985/1988/1996 HAT HCA HEA 2004 HEFCE HMIC HMRC HMSO HoPS HRA 1998 HRA 2008 HSCA 2012 HSWA 1974 HSWC IAR IBB IC ICA 1985 ICC

Department of Health data processor Data Protection Act 1998/2018 Data Protection Commissioner data protection impact assessment data protection principle or Director of Public Prosecutions data subject Environment Agency Environment Act 1995 Education Act 1996 European Court of Auditors Export Credit Guarantee Department European Convention on Human Rights enhanced criminal records certificate European Court of Human Rights enhanced disclosure Early Day Motion European Economic Area environmental information environmental impact assessment examination in public Environmental Information Regulations 2004 enforcement notice European Parliament Environmental Protection Act 1990 Employment Rights Act 1996 electoral registration officer ethical standards officer European Union European Union Constitution Foreign and Commonwealth Office freedom of information Freedom of Information Act 2000 Financial Services Authority Food Standards Act 1999 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 First Tier Tribunal forward work programme General Data Protection Regulation Gas and Electricity Markets Authority General Medical Council gateway review Government Statistical Service Housing Act 1985/1988/1996 housing action trust Homes and Communities Agency Higher Education Act 2004 Higher Education Funding Council for England Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs Her Majesty’s Stationery Office Heads of Profession for Statistics Human Rights Act 1998 Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 Health and Social Care Act 2012 Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 Health and Safety at Work Commission Information Asset Register Independent Barring Board Information Commissioner Interception of Communications Act 1985 International Criminal Court

List of abbreviations   xvii ICO IFTS IN IPA 2016 IPCC IPSA IPSO IPT ISA ISA 1994 IT LAAA LED LEP LGA 1985/1986/1988/ 1999/2000/2003 LG(ATI)A 1985 LGFA 1992 LGHA 1989 LGO LGPIHA 2007 LGPLA 1980 LHO LPA LPP LSCB MO MoJ MNO MPN NAA 1983 NAO NCA NCND NDA NDPB NHSA 1977/2006 NP NRA OBR ODA OECD OGC OGL OJEC OPSI OSA 1911/1920/1989 OSC OTSL PA PA 1996 PAC PACE 1984 PASC PB(ATM)A 1960 PC PCA PCA 1967 PCC PCS PFI PHSO

Information Commissioner’s Office Information Fair Trader Scheme information notice Investigatory Powers Act 2016 Independent Police Complaints Commission Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority Independent Press Standards Organisation Investigatory Powers Tribunal intrusive surveillance (authorised) Intelligence Services Act 1994 Information Tribunal Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014 Law Enforcement Directive Local Enterprise Partnership Local Government Act 1985/1986/1988/1999/2000/2003 Local Government (Access to Information) Act 1985 Local Government Finance Act 1992 Local Government and Housing Act 1989 Local Government Ombudsman Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007 Local Government Planning and Land Act 1980 Local Healthwatch organisation local planning authority legal professional privilege Local Safeguarding Children Board monitoring officer Ministry of Justice mobile network operator monetary penalty notice National Audit Act 1983 National Audit Office National Crime Agency neither confirm nor deny Nuclear Decommissioning Agency non-departmental public body National Health Service Act 1977/2006 National Parliament National Rivers Authority Office for Budget Responsibility Overseas Development Administration Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Office of Government Commerce Open Government Licence Official Journal of the European Communities Office of Public Sector Information Official Secrets Act 1911/1920/1989 overview and scrutiny committee or Office of Surveillance Commissioners Office for Tenants and Social Landlords public authority or police authority Police Act 1996 Public Accounts Committee Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 Parliamentary Affairs Select Committee Public Bodies (Admission to Meetings) Act 1960 principal council Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967 police and crime commissioner Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards Private Finance Initiative Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman

xviii   List of abbreviations PIDA 1998 PII PNC PNQ PO PONI PPP PQ PR PRA 1967 PrO PRSRA 2011 PS PSO(W)A 2005 QD QMV Quango Quingo RIPA 2000 RPB RSS SB SC SCR SD SEN SFOIA 2002 SIAC SIC SIN SIS SLC SO SOCA SPA SSA 1989 SSFA 1998 SSFA 2001 STP TA TCEA 2007 TCPA 1990 TCSC TEU TFEU ToL TPN UA 2000 UCAS UDC UDP VFM VO WAQ WIA 1991 WP WRA WRA 1991

Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 public interest immunity Police National Computer Private notice question Parliamentary Ombudsman Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland Public Private Partnership Parliamentary Question Practice Recommendation Public Records Act 1967 Principal Officer Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 publication scheme Public Services Ombudsman (Wales) Act 2005 qualifying disclosure qualified majority voting quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisation quasi-autonomous international governmental organisation Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 regional planning body regional spatial strategy Standards Board Standards Committee serious case review standard disclosure special educational needs Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 Special Immigration Appeals Commission Scottish Information Commissioner special information notice Security and Intelligence Services Student Loans Company Standing Order Serious Organised Crime Agency Scottish public authority Security Service Act 1989 School Standards and Framework Act 1998 Social Security Fraud Act 2001 second transitional period transferred authority Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 Town and Country Planning Act 1990 Treasury and Civil Service Committee Treaty of Lisbon on the European Union Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Treaty of Lisbon transfer prohibition notice Utilities Act 2000 Universities and Colleges Admissions Service urban development corporation unitary development plan value for money valuation officer written answer question Water Industries Act 1991 White Paper waste regulation authority Water Resources Act 1991

Table of statutes

All references are to paragraph number Academies Act 2010............................... 9.51 s 5....................................................... 9.51 (2), (3)............................................ 9.51 11..................................................... 9.38 (4)................................................. 9.38 Sch 2 para 10........................................... 7.122 Access to Health Records Act 1990..........2.190, 2.214 Access to Justice Act 1999..................... 11.6 s 20..................................................... 1.263 Access to Medical Reports Act 1988..........2.190, 2.198, 11.75 s 2(1)................................................... 2.201 (2)................................................... 2.202 3....................................................... 2.203 (1)................................................... 2.199 4(1)............................................ 2.203, 2.204 (2)............................................ 2.203, 2.211 (3)................................................... 2.211 (4)............................................ 2.205, 2.208 5....................................................... 2.203 (1)................................................... 2.206 (2)(a), (b)........................................ 2.206 (3)................................................... 2.206 6(1), (2)............................................ 2.207 (3)............................................ 2.207, 2.208 7................................................ 2.200, 2.208 (2)................................................... 2.209 8....................................................... 2.212 9....................................................... 2.213 Access to Personal Files Act 1987.............2.190, 2.191, 9.52 Administration of Justice Act 1960 s 12........................................  11.4, 11.6, 11.8 (1)................................................. 11.8 (2)...............................................11.4, 11.8 Adoption and Children Act 2002..............10.92, 10.93, 11.8 Adults with Incapacity Act (Scotland) 2000................................................ 2.337 Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986................................................ 1.227 Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 ss 144–146.......................................... 2.332

Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001................................................ 12.1 ss 1–3.................................................. 2.339 ss 4–8.................................................. 2.339 ss 17–20.............................................. 2.339 s 17.............................................. 2.339, 2.340 21........................................  10.132, 10.157, 10.164 22..................................................... 10.132 23................................ 1.124, 10.127, 10.132 ss 24–32.............................................. 10.132 ss 108–110.......................................... 9.15 s 116................................................... 4.221 Sch 4................................................... 2.339 Apprenticeships, Skills, Children and Learning Act 2009 Pt 10, Ch 2 (ss 206–224).................... 10.61 Arbitration Act 1979 s 69..................................................... 10.152 Arbitration Act 1996.............................. 10.152 Pt I (ss 1–84)...................................... 1.154 s 68..................................................... 11.4 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004............ 10.65 s 12..................................................... 1.232 Audit Commission Act 1998.............  3.46, 6.70, 6.73, 6.76, 9.10, 12.2 s 1....................................................... 9.13 5....................................................... 12.8 8....................................................... 6.97 14..................................................... 9.10 15...................................................9.10, 9.11 (1)(a)............................................. 9.11 16..................................................... 12.29 17..................................................... 12.29 19A................................................... 6.94 ss 19B, 19C........................................ 6.94 s 20..................................................... 6.79 ss 21–23.............................................. 6.79 s 36..................................................... 12.2 49..................................................... 1.263 Sch 3 para 3(4)........................................ 6.185 Bail Act 1976 s 6(1)................................................... 2.318

xx  Table of statutes Bank of England Act 1998..................... 12.30 s 17..................................................... 2.340 Bank of England and Financial Services Act 2016......................................... 12.1 Pt 1 (ss 1–17)...................................... 12.8 Pt 2 (ss 18–37).................................... 12.1 Banking Acts.......................................... 11.94 Banking Act 1987................................... 2.342 s 82(1), (2).......................................... 11.37 Bill of Rights 1688–9 art 9................................ 1.105, 1.162, 2.256, 4.95, 7.2, 7.4 Biological Standards Act 1975 s 5....................................................... 1.263 Bribery Act 2010.......................  7.17, 7.21, 9.15 s 2....................................................... 9.15 3, 4................................................... 7.17 5(1)................................................... 7.17 9....................................................... 7.17 16..................................................... 7.17 British Nationality Act 1981 s 44..................................................... 10.156 44(2)................................................. 4.233 Broadcasting Act 1990........................... 2.255 s 6....................................................... 4.369 s 201................................................... 11.49 203(1)............................................... 4.95 Sch 20 para 1............................................. 4.95 Broadcasting Act 1996.................... 1.173, 2.255 s 107(1)............................................... 2.216 110(1)............................................... 2.216 Budget Responsibility and National Audit Act 2011.................  12.4, 12.7, 12.8, 12.31 Pt I (ss 1–10)...................................... 12.5 s 1....................................................... 12.6 (6)................................................... 12.6 2, 3................................................... 12.5 4....................................................  12.5, 12.6 s 4(3), (4)............................................ 12.6 s 19..................................................... 12.25 s 29..................................................... 12.7 Sch 1................................................... 12.5 Sch 5 para 13(i)(a)................................... 12.7 Budgetary Reform Act 2011.................. 1.182 Building Societies Act 1986................... 8.31 Care Act 2014................... 2.337, 10.90, 10.113 Care Standards Act 2000....................... 10.130 s 113................................................... 10.81 Charities Act 1993............................  1.154, 8.31 Child Support, Pensions and Social Security Act 2000 ss 13, 42.............................................. 2.262 Childcare Act 2006 ss 12, 13.............................................. 6.50 s 27..................................................... 6.50 Children Act 1989.................  10.92, 11.2, 11.6, 11.8 s 1(1)....................................  1.13, 4.324, 11.7 Pt 3 (ss 16B–30A)...................... 10.93, 10.123

Children Act 1989 – contd s 17.....................................  2.273, 6.50, 6.54, 11.6 s 26(3)(e)...................................... 10.96, 10.97 (3B)(b)................................... 10.96, 10.97 (3C)(c)................................... 10.96, 10.97 26A................................................... 10.95 27..................................................... 2.273 Pt 4 (ss 31–42)........................... 10.93, 11.100 s 42(1)(b)............................................ 11.6 Pt 5 (ss 43–52).................................... 10.93 s 47.....................................................  2.273, 11.6 71(1)................................................. 6.50 83................................................. 6.50, 6.59 84..................................................... 10.81 96(3)................................................. 10.132 97..................................................... 11.6 97(2)................................................. 11.6 97(5)................................................. 11.6 100................................................... 11.6 Sch 2....................................  2.273, 6.50, 6.54 paras 4, 7........................................ 10.102 Children Act 2004.......................... 2.264, 2.271 s 54..................................................... 6.50 58.............................................. 1.180, 1.231 62..................................................... 11.6 63..................................................... 2.271 Childcare Act 2006 ss 37, 56, 64, 69, 90, 92, 104............... 2.262 Children and Families Act 2014............9.46, 10.102 s 36..................................................... 9.46 s 36(7)................................................. 9.46 s 51..................................................... 9.46 s 55..................................................... 9.46 s 76..................................................... 9.47 Children and Social Work Act 2017 ss 12–17.............................................. 10.92 Children and Young People (Scotland) Act 2014......................................... 2.261 Pt 4..................................................... 2.261 Children and Young Persons Act 1933 s 39..................................................... 2.228 47..................................................... 11.6 49..................................................... 11.6 103................................................... 6.59 Children and Young Persons Act 1969 s 9....................................................... 9.35 Children, Schools and Families Act 2010 Pt 2 (ss 11–21).................................... 11.6 Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016......................  6.9, 8.7 Civil Aviation Act 1982 s 23..................................................... 1.230 Civil Evidence Act 1968 s 11..................................................... 11.67 Civil Jurisdiction Act 1997.................... 1.304 Civil Procedure Act 1997...................... 11.118 s 7............................................ 11.116, 11.119 (7)................................................... 11.119 8....................................................... 11.27

Table of statutes   xxi Clean Air Act 1993 s 37..................................................... 1.217 38(5)................................................. 6.50 Commissioner for Older People (Wales) Act 2006 s 20..................................................... 10.1 Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005......................1.228, 12.1 ss 18–20.............................................. 1.230 s 18.............................................. 1.227, 1.228 s 18(1)................................................. 1.228 (2)................................................. 1.228 (h)............................................ 1.228 23.............................................. 1.227, 1.228 Commons Act 2006............................... 6.50 s 20..................................................... 6.50 Commons Registration Act 1965.......... 6.50 s 3(2)................................................... 6.50 Communications Act 2003............ 2.255, 4.102, 6.164, 6.173 s 32..................................................... 2.345 109................................................... 2.343 151................................................... 2.345 319............................................ 4.118, 4.369 (2)............................................... 2.255 320................................................... 4.118 321................................................... 4.118 (2)............................................... 4.369 322................................................... 4.118 324................................................... 2.255 329................................................... 4.369 333................................................... 4.118 336(1)–(4)........................................ 4.369 (5)............................................... 4.369 356(6)............................................... 12.1 402................................................... 2.343 ss 434, 447.......................................... 12.1 Community Health Councils (Access to Information) Act 1988............... 8.81 Companies Acts..................................... 1.14 Companies Act 1985....................... 1.143, 1.304 s 234................................................... 1.304 Pt XA (ss 347A–347K)....................... 4.118 s 356(6)............................................... 12.1 ss 432, 434, 442, 447.......................... 12.1 Sch 7 Pt I.......................................... 1.304, 4.118 Pt III.............................................. 1.304 Companies Act 1989.............................. 1.143 s 68..................................................... 10.83 ss 85, 146–153.................................... 12.1 Companies Act 2006.......... 1.304, 2.342, 4.118, 6.181, 12.1, 12.8 s 2....................................................... 8.31 Pt 22 (ss 791–828).............................. 12.1 Pt 32 (ss 1035–1039).......................... 12.1 Pt 42 (ss 1209–1264).......................... 6.73 Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004 ss 1, 24................................................ 12.1 Competition Act 1998.................  2.340, 11.125, 12.1 s 28..................................................... 11.74

Computer Misuse Act 1990........... 2.168, 2.356, 2.357, 2.358, 2.360 s 1....................................................... 2.357 Constitutional Reform Act 2005........... 10.117 s 40(2)................................................. 10.127 s 47..................................................... 11.15 139................................................... 1.230 Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010.............................. 1.9, 1.140, 4.2, 4.62, 4.64, 4.67, 4.68, 4.70, 4.99, 4.114, 4.147, 4.152, 4.282, 7.17, 12.4 s 9(6)................................................... 4.152 Pt 6 (ss 45, 46).................................... 1.96 s 46..................................................... 1.194 52(2)................................................. 1.194 Sch 7......................................  1.96, 4.67, 4.69 Sch 7(3).............................................. 1.194 Consumer Credit Act 1974................... 2.340 s 158............................................ 2.190, 2.192 159................................................... 2.50 Contempt of Court Act 1981........ 1.157, 1.224, 11.1, 11.4 s 2....................................................... 1.29 2(1)................................................... 11.49 4(2)................................................... 11.4 6(c)................................................... 4.365 9....................................................... 11.15 s 9(1A)................................................ 11.15 10.....................................  7.9, 11.38, 11.39, 11.40, 11.43, 11.44, 11.45, 11.46, 11.47, 11.48 11..................................................... 11.4 Control of Pollution Act 1974 s 64(7)................................................. 6.50 Control of Pollution (Amendment) Act 1989 s 2(4)................................................... 6.50 Copyright Act 1956 s 39..................................................... 4.313 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988........................... 3.38, 4.3, 4.51, 4.55, 4.314 s 30(1), (2).......................................... 4.314 45............................................ 4.313, 11.108 ss 46–50.............................................. 4.313 s 163................................................... 4.313 (2), (3)........................................ 4.313 171(3)........................................ 4.314, 11.45 280................................................... 11.102 Coroners Act 1988 s 11(5)(b)............................................ 10.176 (ii)........................................ 10.175 s 13..................................................... 10.176 Coroners and Justice Act 2009...... 2.150, 2.263, 10.176 s 5....................................................... 10.176 s 5(2)................................................... 10.176 7(2), (3)............................................ 10.176 45..................................................... 10.176 48..................................................... 10.176 Counter-Terrorism Act 2008......... 10.126, 12.1

xxii  Table of statutes Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 – contd Pt 1 (ss 1–21)...................................... 4.370 Pt 4 (ss 40–61).................................... 4.370 Sch 7................................................... 10.126 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015............................ 2.338, 4.370, 10.80, 12.1 s 20(1)................................................. 10.132 s 52(5)................................................. 10.132 Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 s 94..................................................... 6.202 County Courts Act 1984 s 52..................................................... 11.27 53..................................................... 11.28 Crime and Courts Act 2013 s 17(4)................................................. 11.6 s 32..................................................... 11.15 s 32(8)................................................. 11.15 ss 34–36.............................................. 2.246 s 40..................................  2.170, 2.171, 2.251 Crime and Disorder Act 1998........ 2.263, 2.270 s 1....................................................... 4.326 15..................................................... 2.335 37(1)................................................. 1.13 ss 65, 66.............................................. 10.117 s 115............................................ 2.262, 2.271 (2)............................................... 2.271 Crime and Security Act 2010........ 2.331, 2.332, 2.333, 12.1 Crime (International Cooperation) Act 2003............................................2.267, 12.1 s 81.............................................. 2.135, 2.267 83..................................................... 4.208 94..................................................... 2.135 Criminal Appeal Act 1995 ss 17, 18.............................................. 2.272 Criminal Damage Act 1971................... 2.355 Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008..................... 10.120 Criminal Finances Act 2017.................. 12.1 Criminal Justice Act 1925 s 41..................................................... 11.15 Criminal Justice Act 1987 s 1(3)................................................... 12.1 2....................................................... 12.1 3....................................................... 12.1 s 3(5)...............................................2.277, 12.1 Criminal Justice Act 1988 Pt VI (ss 71–103)................................ 4.285 ss 93A–93C, 98.................................. 2.340 ss 158, 159.......................................... 11.10 Criminal Justice Act 1993...................... 2.340 Criminal Justice Act 2003...................... 2.290 Pt 5 (ss 32–40).................................... 11.78 s 32..................................................... 11.78 ss 71, 72.............................................. 11.4 s 327................................................... 2.273 Sch 15.......................................... 2.288, 2.317 Sch 22 para 11(1)...................................... 10.123 Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000......................................... 2.274

Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 Pt 4 (ss 84–92).................................... 10.70 Sch 16................................................. 10.70 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008................................................ 2.145 ss 77, 78.............................................. 2.251 s 140................................................... 2.273 Sch 24................................................. 2.273 Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001... 12.1 ss 50–52.............................................. 11.103 s 59..................................................... 11.74 82..................................................... 2.335 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 s 163................................................... 2.217 Criminal Law Act 1977......................... 4.242 Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996......................................... 11.79 Pt I (ss 1–21)............................... 11.78, 11.79 s 3....................................................... 11.78 Pt II (ss 22–27)............................ 11.78, 11.79 s 29(1)................................................. 4.181 Criminal Procedure (Attendance of Witnesses) Act 1965....................... 11.67 Customs and Excise Management Act 1979...........................................  2.340, 12.1 Data Protection Act 1984................1.267, 2.357, 9.52 ss 5(2)(b), (3), (5)................................ 2.357 Data Protection Act 1998........  1.18, 1.26, 1.35, 1.40, 1.47, 1.74, 1.193, 1.199, 1.200, 1.201, 1.228, 1.235, 1.260, 1.268, 1.305, 1.315, 2.1, 2.3, 2.4, 2.7, 2.10, 2.12, 2.13, 2.17, 2.19, 2.23, 2.24, 2.25, 2.27, 2.34, 2.35, 2.36, 2.43, 2.50, 2.52, 2.62, 2.63, 2.64, 2.81, 2.82, 2.90, 2.92, 2.94, 2.95, 2.96, 2.97, 2.98, 2.99, 2.104, 2.107, 2.109, 2.113, 2.119, 2.126, 2.127, 2.128, 2.130, 2.142, 2.145, 2.150, 2.159, 2.168, 2.172, 2.189, 2.190, 2.191, 2.193, 2.194, 2.197, 2.214, 2.215, 2.250, 2.259, 2.261, 2.269, 2.276, 2.277, 2.278, 2.290, 2.344, 2.358, 4.2, 4.13, 4.18, 4.25, 4.134, 4.319, 8.35, 9.52, 11.18 s 1....................................................... 2.88 (1).....................................  2.16, 2.21, 2.22, 2.27, 2.82 (b).............................................. 2.82 (c)............................................... 2.21 (4)................................................ 2.15, 2.17 3................................................ 1.268, 2.175

Table of statutes   xxiii Data Protection Act 1998 – contd s 6....................................................... 2.350 s 6(6)................................................... 1.247 s 7.......................................  1.264, 2.19, 2.20, 2.28, 2.167 (4)................................................... 11.18 (4)–(6)............................................ 2.72 (9)................................................... 2.22 8(7)................................................... 2.72 10................................................  2.87, 2.167 11................................................  2.69, 2.167 12..................................................... 2.167 (2)................................................. 2.36 13.............................................. 2.168, 2.169, 2.237 (2)................................................. 2.168 14..................................................... 2.167 15(2)................................................. 2.19 28..................................................... 2.133 29.................................................. 1.29, 2.67 29(1)................................................. 2.64 30.................................................. 1.29, 2.76 31.................................................. 1.29, 2.70 32......................................  2.4, 2.177, 2.250 33A(1).............................................. 1.200 34..................................................... 2.69 38..................................................... 1.37 Pt V (ss 40–50)................................... 1.260 s 41..................................................... 2.156 41A................................................... 2.150 42..................................................... 2.165 46..................................................... 2.160 46(1), (2).......................................... 2.155 51(7)................................................. 2.138 52(1)................................................. 2.143 52A................................................... 2.137 52AA................................................ 2.137 54A............................................ 2.135, 2.267 55.............................................. 2.145, 2.172 55A............................................ 2.158, 2.161 56..................................................... 2.181 57..................................................... 2.183 58..................................................... 2.251 59..................................................... 1.230 (1)................................................. 1.228 ss 63, 64.............................................. 1.38 s 68..................................................... 2.190 69..................................................... 2.77 Sch 1 Pt II para 2(1)(b)................................ 2.86 Sch 2................................................... 2.16 para 5............................................. 2.42 6...............................  2.37, 2.81, 2.82, 2.84, 2.86, 2.87, 2.90, 2.91, 2.93 Sch 3................................................... 2.46 Sch 4 para 4............................................. 2.80 Sch 7................................................... 2.73 Sch 9................................................... 2.157 para 12........................................... 1.260 Sch 12................................................. 2.190

Data Protection Act 2018................ 1.17, 1.146, 1.200, 1.235, 1.270, 1.297, 1.300, 2.1, 2.4, 2.5, 2.8, 2.9, 2.10, 2.12, 2.17, 2.36, 2.64, 2.69, 2.81, 2.82, 2.97, 2.127, 2.135, 2.145, 2.157, 2.158, 2.165, 2.177, 2.180, 2.185, 2.186, 2.187, 2.188, 2.189, 2.190, 2.191, 2.193, 2.195, 2.214, 2.218, 2.230, 2.251, 2.259, 2.262, 2.275, 2.276, 2.341, 2.344, 2.355, 2.358, 2.360, 3.17, 3.20, 3.30, 3.52, 4.2, 4.42, 4.173, 4.231, 4.319, 4.326, 7.116, 8.33, 9.27, 9.30, 9.52, 9.64, 11.9 Pt 1 (ss 1–3)........................................ 2.188 s 1(2)................................................... 2.10 s 2....................................................... 2.12 s 3(2)......................................  2.12, 2.18, 2.82 s 3(4)................................................... 9.28 s 3(8)................................................... 2.352 s 3(9)................................................... 1.18 Pt 2 (ss 4–28)........................  2.12, 2.13, 2.14, 2.33, 2.70, 2.117, 2.188, 2.189 ss 4, 5.................................................. 2.14 Pt 2, Chap 2 (ss 6–20)........  2.14, 2.95, 2.105, 2.135, 2.185 s 6....................................................... 2.15 s 7....................................................... 2.16 s 9(3)................................................... 2.50 s 10..................................................... 2.48 s 10(1)................................... 2.44, 2.45, 2.77 s 10(2).............................................  2.44, 2.77 s 10(3)................................................. 2.44 s 10(4), (5)....................................... 2.44, 2.47 s 12..................................................... 2.49 s 12(2), (3).......................................... 2.51 s 12(5)(b)............................................ 2.51 s 13..................................................... 2.50 s 14..................................................... 2.51 s 14(4)(a), (b)...................................... 2.51 s 15...................................  1.200, 2.65, 2.185, 3.53 s 15(5)................................................. 2.65 s 16...................................  1.200, 2.79, 2.185, 3.53 s 17..................................................... 2.103 s 18..................................................... 2.80 s 19........................................  2.45, 2.52, 2.75 s 19(2)............................................  2.52, 2.100 Pt 2, Chap 3 (ss 21–28)........  2.14, 2.65, 2.95, 2.185 s 21(2).................................  2.95, 2.96, 2.100, 2.181 s 22..................................................... 2.95 s 22(1), (2).......................................... 2.95 s 23...............................................  2.95, 2.185

xxiv  Table of statutes Data Protection Act 2018 – contd s 24...................................  1.200, 2.96, 2.101, 2.185 s 24(1)...............................  1.200, 2.96, 2.100, 3.52, 3.53 s 24(2)–(5)....................................  2.96, 2.100 s 24(6)–(9).......................................... 2.100 s 25.............................................. 2.101, 2.185 s 26...................................  1.200, 2.65, 2.102, 2.107, 2.185, 3.53 s 26(2)................................................. 2.102 s 27.............................................. 2.102, 2.139 s 27(3)–(5).......................................... 2.102 s 28..................................................... 2.102 Pt 3 (ss 29–81)......................  2.33, 2.64, 2.65, 2.95, 2.104, 2.105, 2.106, 2.107, 2.117, 2.123, 2.131, 2.133, 2.160, 2.161, 2.165, 2.169, 2.185 s 29..................................................... 2.107 s 30.............................................. 2.108, 2.124 s 31..................................................... 2.108 s 32..................................................... 2.108 s 32(3)................................................. 2.109 s 33..................................................... 2.108 ss 34–42.............................................. 2.109 s 34(1)................................................. 1.200 s 35..................................................... 2.111 s 35(4), (5).......................................... 2.111 s 35(8)................................................. 2.111 s 36..................................................... 2.112 s 37..................................................... 2.113 s 38..................................................... 2.114 s 38(2)................................................. 2.114 s 39..................................................... 2.115 ss 40, 41.............................................. 2.116 s 42.............................................. 2.111, 2.116 Pt 3, Chap 3 (ss 43–54).............. 2.109, 2.117, 2.185 s 43(4)................................................. 1.202 s 44..................................................... 2.118 s 44(2)................................................. 2.118 s 44(4).......................................... 2.118, 2.185 s 45.............................................. 2.119, 2.181 s 45(1)(a)............................................. 3.53 s 45(1)(b)......................................  1.200, 3.53 s 45(4)............................. 1.200, 2.119, 2.185, 3.53 s 46..................................................... 2.120 s 46(3)................................................. 2.120 s 47..................................................... 2.120 s 48..................................................... 2.120 s 48(3)................................................. 2.185 ss 49, 50.............................................. 2.121 ss 51–54.............................................. 2.122 s 59..................................................... 2.123 s 64..................................................... 2.123 s 67..................................................... 2.123 ss 69–71.............................................. 2.123 s 70(2)................................................. 2.124 Pt 3, Chap 5 (ss 72–78)............... 2.109, 2.120 s 73..................................................... 2.124

Data Protection Act 2018 – contd s 73(2)–(4).......................................... 2.124 ss 75–77.............................................. 2.124 s 79..................................................... 2.125 s 79(3)................................................. 2.125 s 81..................................................... 2.123 Pt 4 (ss 82–113)....................  2.33, 2.65, 2.95, 2.102, 2.108, 2.117, 2.126, 2.129, 2.130, 2.131, 2.132, 2.134, 2.160, 2.161, 2.165, 2.167, 2.169, 2.178, 2.184, 2.185 s 82.............................................. 2.126, 2.129 ss 83, 84.............................................. 2.129 s 85..................................................... 2.130 s 86..................................................... 2.130 s 86(1)(a)............................................. 2.134 s 86(2)................................................. 2.134 s 86(3)................................................. 2.130 s 86(7)................................................. 2.130 ss 87–91.............................................. 2.130 Pt 4, Chap 3 (ss 92–100)............. 2.134, 2.185 ss 92–100............................................ 2.131 s 94..................................................... 2.181 s 94(1)(a), (b)...................................... 3.53 s 94(6)–(8).......................................... 2.22 s 94(9)............................................  2.22, 2.131 s 99................................................  2.139, 3.53 Pt 4, Chap 4 (ss 101–108).................. 2.134 ss 102–108.......................................... 2.132 Pt 4, Chap 5 (s 109)........................... 2.133 Pt 4, Chap 6 (ss 110–113)............  2.185, 3.53 s 110................................................... 2.133 s 111............................................ 2.133, 2.139 Pts 5–7 (ss 114–215).......  2.102, 2.104, 2.188 Pt 5 (ss 114–141)................................ 2.136 s 114................................................... 1.18 s 116................................................... 2.136 s 118................................................... 2.136 s 119................................  2.136, 2.187, 2.267 s 120................................................... 2.136 s 121............................................ 2.137, 2.263 s 122................................................... 2.137 s 123(7)............................................... 2.137 s 124................................  2.137, 2.146, 2.177 s 124(5)............................................... 2.137 ss 125–128.......................................... 2.137 s 129................................................... 2.138 s 130............................................ 2.125, 2.139 s 130(4)............................................... 2.139 s 131................................................... 2.140 s 132................................................... 2.140 s 132(2)............................................... 2.140 s 133................................................... 2.140 ss 134–136.......................................... 2.141 s 137................................  2.142, 2.152, 2.162 s 138............................................ 2.142, 2.143 ss 139–141.......................................... 1.258 s 139................................................... 2.143 ss 140, 141.......................................... 2.143 Pt 6 (ss 142–181)......................... 2.145, 2.251 s 142................................................... 2.147

Table of statutes   xxv Data Protection Act 2018 – contd s 142(2)(b).......................................... 2.149 s 142(7)............................................... 2.147 s 143(1)–(4)........................................ 2.148 s 144............................................ 2.148, 2.149 s 145................................................... 2.149 s 146................................................... 2.150 s 147................................................... 2.151 s 147(5)............................................... 2.151 s 148................................................... 2.149 s 149................................................... 2.152 s 149(1)(b).......................................... 2.153 s 149(2)........................... 2.152, 2.153, 2.155, 2.160 s 149(3)–(8)........................................ 2.152 s 150................................................... 2.153 s 150(2)............................................... 2.153 s 151(1)–(7)........................................ 2.154 s 152................................................... 2.155 s 152(3)............................................... 2.155 s 153................................................... 2.156 s 153(3)............................................... 2.156 s 154................................................... 2.157 s 155............................................ 2.149, 2.158 s 155(2), (3)........................................ 2.158 s 156................................................... 2.160 s 156(1), (2)........................................ 2.160 s 157................................................... 2.161 s 157(7)............................................... 2.161 s 158................................................... 2.162 s 158(5)............................................... 2.158 s 159................................................... 2.162 ss 160, 161.......................................... 2.163 s 162............................................ 2.150, 2.164 s 163(1)............................................... 2.164 s 163(3)–(5)........................................ 2.164 s 164............................................ 2.150, 2.164 s 165................................  2.119, 2.120, 2.165 s 165(6)............................................... 2.165 s 166............................... 2.119, 2.120, 2.166, 2.187 s 167................................  2.119, 2.167, 2.187 s 167(5)............................................... 2.167 s 168................................................... 2.168 s 169............................................ 2.169, 2.187 s 169(2)............................................... 2.169 s 170..................................  2.96, 2.172, 2.177 s 171..............................................  2.96, 2.173 s 171(2)–(7)........................................ 2.173 s 172(2), (3)........................................ 2.173 s 173................................................... 2.174 s 173(2)............................................... 2.174 s 174.................................  1.19, 2.155, 2.160, 2.175, 2.176 s 175................................................... 2.176 s 176................................................... 2.177 s 177............................................ 2.146, 2.177 s 178............................................ 2.146, 2.177 s 178(2)–(4)........................................ 2.177 s 179............................................ 2.146, 2.177 s 179(2)............................................... 2.177 s 180................................................... 2.178 s 184................................................... 2.181

Data Protection Act 2018 – contd s 184(1)–(3)........................................ 2.181 s 184(5), (6)........................................ 2.181 s 185(1)–(4)........................................ 2.183 s 186................................................... 2.185 s 186(2), (3)........................................ 2.185 s 187............................................ 2.179, 2.184 s 187(2)............................................... 2.184 ss 188, 189.......................................... 2.184 s 195................................................... 2.262 ss 196–198.......................................... 2.180 s 199...................................................  2.43, 2.180 s 201................................................... 2.179 s 201(1), (2)........................................ 2.179 s 202................................................... 2.179 s 203................................................... 2.179 s 203(2)............................................... 2.179 s 204......................................  2.45, 2.77, 2.77 s 204(1)–(4)........................................ 2.77 s 205................................................... 2.34 s 205(1)............................................... 2.187 s 207(3), (4)........................................ 2.135 s 207(7)............................................... 2.135 s 208................................................... 2.43 s 209................................................... 2.187 s 210................................................... 2.188 Sch 1................................................... 2.44 Pt 1 (paras 1–4).........................  2.44, 2.47 para 1....................................  2.45, 2.48 para 2....................................  2.45, 2.77 para 2(1)–(3).............................. 2.45 para 3.................................... 2.45, 2.77 para 4........................................ 2.45 Pt 2 (paras 5–28)...........  1.201, 2.44, 2.46, 2.47, 2.48, 2.81, 2.177 para 6...................................  1.201, 2.46 paras 7, 8................................... 2.46 paras 10, 11............................... 2.46 para 13.................................  2.46, 2.177 para 14...................................... 2.46 paras 15–27............................... 2.46 para 20...................................... 2.47 Pt 3 (paras 29–37)...................... 2.44, 2.47 paras 29–36............................... 2.47 para 35...................................... 2.48 para 36(1).................................. 2.47 para 37...................................... 2.47 Pt 4 (paras 38–41)............  2.45, 2.46, 2.48 para 39...................................... 2.48 para 40...................................... 2.48 para 40(2).................................. 2.48 para 41...................................... 2.48 Schs 2–4............................................. 1.200 Sch 2....................................  2.65, 2.185, 3.53 Pt 1 (paras 1–5)............................. 2.66 para 2........................................ 2.67 para 2(2), (3).............................. 2.67 para 3........................................ 2.67 para 4........................................ 2.68 para 4(2), (3).............................. 2.68 para 5(1)–(3).............................. 2.69

xxvi  Table of statutes Data Protection Act 2018 – contd Sch 2 – contd Pt 2 (paras 6–15) paras 6–9................................... 2.70 paras 14, 15............................... 2.72 para 15(2).................................. 2.71 Pt 3 (paras 16, 17) para 16...................................... 2.73 Pt 4 (paras 18–25) para 24...................................... 9.32 Pt 5 (para 26).............................2.74, 2.177 Pt 6 (paras 27, 28)......................... 2.75 para 28...................................... 2.75 Sch 3....................................  2.76, 2.185, 3.53 Pt 1 (para 1)................................... 2.76 Pt 2 (paras 2–6)............................. 2.76 Pt 3 (paras 7–12)........................... 2.76 para 8........................................ 2.77 Pt 4 (paras 13–20)......................  2.76, 9.30 Pt 5 (para 21)................................. 2.76 Sch 4....................................  2.78, 2.185, 3.53 Sch 5................................................... 2.103 Sch 6...............................................  2.33, 2.95 Pt 1 (paras 1–72)........................... 2.95 Sch 7................................................... 2.108 Sch 8.......................2.104, 2.109, 2.110, 2.111 Schs 9, 10.................................... 2.130, 2.134 Sch 11.......................................... 2.133, 2.134 paras 2–14..................................... 2.134 Sch 12.............................................1.18, 2.136 Sch 14................................................. 2.136 Sch 15................................................. 2.157 paras 1–5....................................... 2.157 paras 10, 11.................................... 2.157 Sch 16.......................................... 2.158, 2.159 para 1............................................. 2.159 para 5............................................. 2.159 para 9............................................. 2.159 para 15........................................... 2.187 Sch 17................................................. 2.177 Sch 18................................................. 2.181 para 1(2)........................................ 2.96 Sch 19.............................................1.34, 1.261 para 59........................................... 2.143 Sch 20.............................................2.36, 2.189 Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014............................ 4.202 s 1....................................................... 4.236 Defamation Act 1996 s 13............................................. 4.95, 7.2, 7.3 (3)................................................. 7.2 Defamation Act 2013............  2.2, 2.260, 10.174 ss 2–7.................................................. 10.174 s 2, 3................................................... 7.9 s 4..........................................  1.98, 2.260, 7.9 s 4(4)................................................... 2.260 s 4(6)................................................... 7.9 s 5....................................................... 7.9 Defamation Act (Northern Ireland) 1955 s 7....................................................... 4.5 Sch Pt II para 9........................................ 4.5

Deregulation Act 2015.......................... 7.2 s 103(1)............................................... 6.52 Sch 15 para 3............................................. 6.59 Sch 22 para 9............................................. 9.57 Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994................................................ 4.151 s 75..................................................... 1.279 Sch 15................................................. 1.279 Digital Economy Act 2010.................... 4.3, 4.37 Digital Economy Act 2017....  2.262, 2.269, 4.3, 4.33, 4.37, 10.2, 12.1, 12.32 Pt 1..................................................... 4.33 Pt 2..................................................... 4.33 Pt 5 Chap 1........................................... 4.33 Chap 3........................................... 12.1 s 41..................................................... 4.317 ss 108–110.......................................... 2.142 Sch...................................................... 12.1 Disability Discrimination Act 1995............ 1.83, 10.170 s 49A(1).............................................. 10.170 s 49D(2).............................................. 10.170 Domestic and Appellate Proceedings (Restriction of Publicity) Act 1968 s 1....................................................... 11.14 Drug Trafficking Act 1994 s 53(2)(b)............................................ 1.29 Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986..........4.276 s 27............................................ 2.340, 11.103 Education Act 1944 s 77..................................................... 2.192 Sch 1 Pt II, para 7.................................6.50, 8.45 Education Act 1980............................  9.19, 9.49 Sch 2 para 1............................................. 6.153 Education Act 1981............................  9.46, 9.49 Education Act 1993 Pt III (ss 156–191)............................. 9.46 Education Act 1996 Pt IV Chap I (ss 312–336A)............... 9.46 ss 323, 324.......................................... 9.46 333–336.......................................... 9.46 s 408................................................... 6.59 537................................................... 9.38 Sch 33................................................. 6.113 Education Act 2002.................  9.19, 9.20, 9.21, 9.43 s 30..................................................... 9.36 ss 46–53.............................................. 9.20 s 51A................................................... 9.45 52..................................................... 9.45 ss 92–94.............................................. 9.46 191–195.......................................... 9.46 Education Act 2005............................... 9.40 s 5....................................................... 9.40 s 11A................................................... 9.41 (2).............................................. 9.41

Table of statutes   xxvii Education Act 2005 – contd ss 11B, 11C........................................ 9.41 14, 14A, 15, 16, 16A, 17................. 9.40 s 27..................................................... 9.40 29..................................................... 9.40 ss 37, 38.............................................. 9.40 s 39..................................................... 9.40 (7)................................................. 9.40 ss 40, 41.............................................. 9.40 s 42..................................................... 9.40 (5)................................................. 9.40 ss 44A–44F......................................... 9.40 Education Act 2011 s 34..................................................... 9.21 Education and Inspections Act 2006........... 9.20, 9.21, 9.40, 9.41 Pt 8 (ss 112–159)................................ 9.40 ss 113, 114, 115.................................. 9.40 Sch 12................................................. 9.40 Education and Skills Act 2008............... 9.20 Education Reform Act 1988.................. 6.3 s 158................................................... 6.59 162................................................... 6.3 218.............................................  2.190, 9.27 220................................................... 12.2 232.............................................  2.190, 9.27 Electronic Communications Act 2000.. 4.37 Employment Relations Act 1999 s 3.......................................................  2.24, 2.192 Employment Rights Act 1996............... 4.308 Pt IVA (43A–43L).............................. 4.301 s 43C.................................................. 4.302 43D.................................................. 4.303 43F............................................ 4.303, 4.304 43G.................................................. 4.304 (2).............................................. 4.304 (c)(i)............................... 4.304, 4.305 (4).............................................. 4.304 43H.................................................. 4.306 43K.................................................. 4.308 43L(2).............................................. 4.304 ss 47B, 103A....................................... 4.309 s 105(6)............................................... 4.309 s 193................................................... 4.301 Energy Act 2016.................................... 12.1 Enterprise Act 2002........................... 2.340, 12.1 ss 5, 6, 203.......................................... 2.340 s 237............................................ 1.229, 2.340 ss 239–243.......................................... 1.229 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013......................................... 4.301, 10.78 Pts 3, 4................................................ 2.340 ss 17, 18.............................................. 4.301 ss 25–31.............................................. 2.340 ss 61–65.............................................. 2.340 Environment Act 1995 Sch 11................................................. 6.50 Environmental Protection Act 1990 s 20(7)................................................. 6.50 22..................................................... 3.39 64(6)................................................. 6.50 71(4)................................................. 6.50

Equality Act 2010................  1.83, 2.336, 9.150, 10.78, 10.137, 10.148 s 1....................................................... 10.115 ss 39, 40, 49–51.................................. 7.31 Pt 11 (ss 149–159).............................. 9.150 s 149............................ 10.88, 10.115, 10.170 s 155(2)............................................... 9.150 Sch 8................................................... 7.31 Sch 9 para 1............................................. 7.31 Ethical Standards in Public Life etc (Scotland) Act 2000....................4.148, 7.20 European Communities Act 1972......... 5.3 European Union Act 2011.................... 5.2 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018..............................  1.224, 1.289, 2.10, 5.1, 5.2 s 5(4)................................................... 5.1 s 6(2)................................................... 5.2 s 16..................................................... 3.2 s 16(2)................................................. 3.2 Evidence Act 1851 s 16..................................................... 6.77 Exchequer and Audit Departments Act 1866................................................ 12.8 s 6....................................................... 12.7 Exchequer and Audit Departments Act 1921................................................ 12.8 Extradition Act 2003............................. 11.4 Factories Act 1961 s 154................................................... 1.263 Fair Trading Act 1973............................ 2.340 Family Law Act 1986 s 33..................................................... 11.6 Family Law Act 1996 s 36..................................................... 11.15 Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths Act (Scotland) 1976.............................. 1.144 Finance Act 1989 Pt II Ch IV (ss 142–170)................... 12.1 ss 142–148.......................................... 12.1 s 182................................................... 1.228 182(5)............................................... 1.228 Finance Act 1997 s 110............................................ 1.276, 2.262 Finance Act 1998................................... 12.31 Finance Act 2003 ss 197, 198.......................................... 2.262 s 199................................................... 12.1 Finance Act 2004 ss 306–319.......................................... 12.1 Finance Act 2007 Pt 6 (ss 82–97).................................... 12.1 Finance Act 2008 s 58..................................................... 1.179 Pt 7, Chap 1 (s 113–117)................... 12.1 Sch 36............................................  2.340, 12.1 Schs 37, 38......................................... 12.1 Finance Act 2009................................... 2.340 s 92..................................................... 12.1 ss 94–98.............................................. 12.1 Schs 47, 48......................................... 12.1

xxviii  Table of statutes Finance Act 2010 s 56..................................................... 12.1 Sch 17................................................. 12.1 Finance Act 2011 Sch 23................................................. 12.1 Finance Act 2016................................... 12.4 Pts 10, 11 (s 156–183)........................ 12.1 Finance (No 2) Act 2005 s 6....................................................... 12.1 Sch 1................................................... 12.1 Finance (No 2) Act 2017 s 67..................................................... 12.1 Sch 18................................................. 12.1 Financial Services Act 1986 s 180(2)............................................... 4.267 Financial Services Act 1987................... 2.20 ss 82–85.............................................. 2.20 Financial Services Act 2012.............  2.340, 12.1, 12.8 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000............................ 1.181, 1.229, 2.340, 2.342, 12.1 ss 13, 82, 147, 161, 165, 175.............. 2.340 s 230................................................... 2.340 231................................................... 2.340 ss 342–344.......................................... 11.39 s 348................................  1.227, 1.229, 11.37 s 349................................................... 1.229 Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013......................................... 12.1 Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004........ 6.3 s 28..................................................... 6.59 Fiscal Responsibility Act 2010............... 12.4 Food and Environment Protection Act 1985 s 14(2)(b)............................................ 1.217 Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981... 2.355 Freedom of Information Act 2000........  1.0, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 1.10, 1.11, 1.12, 1.14, 1.15, 1.17, 1.18, 1.19, 1.20, 1.21, 1.25, 1.29, 1.40, 1.42, 1.43, 1.44, 1.47, 1.48, 1.49, 1.50, 1.51, 1.56, 1.57, 1.59, 1.62, 1.63, 1.64, 1.66, 1.68, 1.70, 1.72, 1.74, 1.79, 1.80, 1.84, 1.85, 1.87, 1.89, 1.90, 1.91, 1.93, 1.94, 1.98, 1.99, 1.102, 1.106, 1.107, 1.115, 1.116, 1.122, 1.127, 1.140, 1.154, 1.155, 1.162, 1.165, 1.170, 1.174, 1.181, 1.186, 1.195, 1, 198, 1.199, 1.200, 1.203, 1.204, 1.210, 1.215, 1.217, 1.224, 1.225, 1.228, 1.229, 1.230, 1.238, 1.241, 1.245, 1.247, 1.254, 1.257, 1.258, 1.259, 1.260, 1.262, 1.263, 1.265, 1.267, 1.268, 1.270, 1.271, 1.285, 1.286, 1.290, 1.298, 1.299, 1.301, 1.302, 1.303, 1.305,

Freedom of Information Act 2000 – contd 1.306, 1.307, 1.308, 1.311, 1.312, 1.318, 1.320, 2.2, 2.4, 2.12, 2.35, 2.69, 2.81, 2.85, 2.86, 2.87, 2.90, 2.91, 2.92, 2.93, 2.95, 2.96, 2.99, 2.100, 2.107, 2.127, 2.136, 2.145, 2.165, 2.189, 2.190, 2.194, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.12, 3.14, 3.17, 3.18, 3.25, 3.27, 3.29, 3.30, 3.32, 3.35, 3.37, 3.38, 3.42, 3.49, 3.52, 3.55, 3.56, 3.57, 3.58, 3.59, 4.2, 4.5, 4.6, 4.13, 4.18, 4.25, 4.28, 4.31, 4.42, 4.48, 4.57, 4.60, 4.63, 4.64, 4.73, 4.76, 4.77, 4.80, 4.81, 4.88, 4.90, 4.93, 4.98, 4.99, 4.128, 4.129, 4.131, 4.134, 4.144, 4.168, 4.184, 4.269, 4.295, 6.1, 6.6, 6.29, 6.41, 6.46, 6.181, 7.1, 7.10, 7.77, 7.95, 7.112, 7.115, 7.118, 7.122, 8.1, 8.7, 8.31, 8.35, 8.52, 8.75, 9.1, 9.67, 9.139, 10.5, 10.11, 10.45, 10.52, 10.55, 10.79, 10.85, 10.89, 10.115, 10.150, 10.152, 10.163, 11.69, 12.29, 12.32, 12.33 Pt I (ss 1–20)........................  1.17, 1.22, 1.48, 1.89, 1.91, 1.235, 1.237, 1.244, 1.249, 1.255, 1.258, 1.302 s 1................................ 1.48, 1.58, 1.66, 1.71, 1.72, 1.73, 1.91, 1.108, 1.111, 1.173, 1.230, 1.251, 1.263, 1.264, 1.269, 1.311 (1).....................................  1.73, 1.74, 1.75, 1.108, 1.127, 1.236, 1.249, 3.59 (a).................................  1.36, 1.71, 1.77, 1.120, 1.124, 1.127, 1.144, 1.162, 1.183, 1.196, 1.204, 1.211, 1.215, 1.225, 1.239, 1.242, 2.88, 4.67, 4.68, 4.70 (b)............................  1.77, 1.124, 1.162, 1.180, 1.239, 1.242 (3)................................................... 1.120 2.........................................  1.15, 1.35, 1.98, 1.105, 1.106, 1.108, 1.170, 1.234, 1.235, 1.236, 1.249, 1.251, 1.258, 1.263, 1.264, 1.271, 1.290, 1.301, 1.302, 4.64, 4.323 (1)(b)..........................................1.170, 4.65

Table of statutes   xxix Freedom of Information Act 2000 – contd s 2(2)(b)........................................  1.170, 4.65 (3)......................................  1.96, 4.65, 4.72 (3)(f)............................................... 4.72 3.................................................... 1.69, 1.85 (1)................................................... 3.12 (2)................................................... 2.90 (a)............................................  1.68, 1.97 4....................................................  1.15, 1.88 (1)................................................  1.86, 1.88 (2), (3)............................................ 1.88 5................................. 1.85, 1.86, 1.282, 3.12 (1)(a), (b)........................................ 1.89 6....................................................... 1.85 (2)(a), (b)........................................ 1.85 7.....................................................1.89, 1.92 (1)................................................... 1.91 (7)................................................... 1.89 8....................................................  1.48, 1.70 9..........................................  1.73, 1.74, 3.29 10..................................................... 1.231 (1)................................................. 1.180 (2)................................................. 1.75 (3)................................................. 1.308 (6)................................................. 1.75 11.......................................  1.10, 1.78, 1.79, 1.236, 1.249, 3.59 (1)(a)............................................. 1.308 11(1)(b)............................................ 1.64 11(1)(c)............................................. 1.308 (1A).............................................. 1.308 (5)................................................. 1.79 11A................................................... 4.60 12.......................................  1.15, 1.28, 1.65, 1.69, 1.71, 1.72, 1.108, 1.232, 1.233, 3.4, 3.7 (1)................................................. 2.273 (4)................................................. 1.74 (5)................................................. 2.100 13........................................  1.72, 1.74, 2.98 (1)................................................. 1.72 14.....................................  1.28, 1.71, 1.108, 1.232, 3.32 (1)................................................. 1.308 (2)................................................. 1.293 15.......................................  1.96, 3.57, 4.64, 4.65 (5)..............................................  1.96, 4.65 (6)................................................. 4.65 16.............................................. 1.255, 1.292 (1)................................................. 1.83 17................................. 1.192, 1.222, 1.230, 1.231, 1.236, 1.249, 1.290, 2.82, 2.94, 3.59 (1)................................  1.77, 1.108, 4.209 (c)........................ 1.112, 4.209, 10.163 (2)................................................. 1.77 (3)........................................ 1.108, 10.163 (a)............................................. 4.209 (4)................................................. 1.110 (5)................................................. 2.273 19.......................................  1.48, 1.53, 1.79, 4.60, 7.10

Freedom of Information Act 2000 – contd s 19(1)................................................. 1.49 (3)(b)................................... 1.287, 10.163 Pt II (ss 21–44).....................  1.10, 1.15, 1.67, 1.75, 1.77, 1.89, 1.91, 1.104, 1.232, 4.65 s 21.....................................  1.58, 1.95, 1.105, 1.111, 1.112, 1.113, 1.156, 1.294, 3.29, 4.71, 9.1 (1)..............................................  3.29, 8.35 (2)(a), (b)...................................... 1.111 22...................................  1.58, 1.111, 1.114, 1.115, 4.71, 4.295 (1)................................................. 1.202 22A..................................  1.15, 1.116, 1.217 23................................. 1.105, 1.117, 1.121, 1.122, 1.124, 1.125, 1.126, 1.148, 1.234, 1.238, 1.247, 1.310, 4.64, 4.65 (1)................................  1.122, 1.125, 3.60 (2)...............................  1.41, 1.117, 1.125, 1.126, 1.297 (3)................................................. 2.151 (5)............................. 1.121, 1.122, 1.124, 1.126 24................................. 1.121, 1.124, 1.125, 1.126, 1.179, 1.238, 1.247 (1)................................................. 3.60 (2)..............................  1.122, 1.124, 1.126 (3)...............................  1.41, 1.124, 1.125, 1.126, 1.297, 3.60 25..................................................... 1.125 (3)................................................. 3.56 26..................................  1.127, 1.128, 1.131 27................................. 1.122, 1.131, 1.132, 1.210 (1).......................................... 1.130, 1.132 (a)...................................... 1.131, 1.132 (c)............................................. 1.132 (2)................................................. 1.132 (3)................................................. 1.130 (5)................................................. 1.129 28......................................  1.136, 4.67, 4.69 (1).............................................1.134, 4.69 (3)................................................. 4.67 29.............................................. 1.137, 1.138 30................................. 1.140, 1.142, 1.144, 1.146 (1)...............................  1.143, 2.273, 4.67, 4.70 (b)............................................ 1.142 (2)................................  1.142, 2.273, 4.72 (b)............................................ 1.143 (4), (5).......................................... 1.141 31...................................  1.17, 1.144, 1.146, 1.148, 1.149, 1.150, 1.175, 4.67, 4.70 (1)................................................. 1.144 (a)......................... 1.139, 1.148, 1.149, 1.150, 1.151

xxx  Table of statutes Freedom of Information Act 2000 – contd s 31(1)(b)..................................... 1.139, 1.151 (c)–(e)...................................... 1.139 (f)...................................... 1.139, 1.149 (g)..................................... 1.139, 1.148 (h), (i)....................................... 1.139 (2).......................................... 1.140, 1.144 32................................. 1.105, 1.152, 1.153, 1.154, 1.156, 1.157, 4.67, 4.298 (2)...............................  1.80, 1.152, 1.154, 1.155 (4)................................................. 1.154 33....................................  1.158, 1.159, 1.67 (1)(b)............................................ 1.161 (2)................................................. 1.161 (3)................................................. 4.67 34.............................................. 1.105, 1.162 (1)................................................. 1.163 (3)................................................. 1.41 35................................. 1.122, 1.159, 1.160, 1.161, 1.165, 1.169, 1.172, 1.173, 1.174, 1.175, 1.178, 1.180, 1.182, 1.189, 1.190, 1.209, 1.308, 2.261, 3.31, 3.35, 4.67, 6.37, 12.32 (1)..............................  1.173, 1.174, 1.181 (a)......................... 1.164, 1.172, 1.173, 1.174, 1.176, 1.179, 1.180, 1.190, 1.192, 1.231, 1.232, 1.308, 2.261 (b)........................ 1.172, 1.176, 1.179, 1.190, 1.231, 1.308, 2.261 (c)..........................  1.122, 1.181, 1.210 (2).......................................... 1.169, 1.184 (a)–(c)....................................... 1.182 (3).......................................... 1.166, 1.181 (4)................................................. 1.170 (5).......................................... 1.165, 2.261 36...................................  1.41, 1.105, 1.131, 1.165, 1.173, 1.182, 1.189, 1.190, 1.191, 1.193, 1.209, 1.308, 2.86, 3.31, 6.37, 12.32 (2)...............................  1.41, 1.183, 1.184, 1.187, 1.189, 1.190, 1.191, 1.193 (a)............................................. 1.308 2)(a)(ii)..................................... 4.68, 4.69 (b)..................................... 1.191, 1.192 (i)......................  1.179, 1.192, 1.193 (ii)........................................ 1.193 (c)......................... 1.187, 1.191, 1.192, 1.193, 4.68, 4.69 (3)............................. 1.184, 1.190, 1.191, 4.67, 4.68, 4.69 (4)................................................. 1.184 (5).......................................... 1.182, 1.185 (a)–(n)...................................... 1.182

Freedom of Information Act 2000 – contd s 36(5)(o)(i), (ii).................................. 1.189 (7)................................  1.188, 1.191, 2.90 37..................................  1.105, 1.241, 1.194 (1)................................................. 1.194 (1)(a)............................................. 4.67 (1)(a)–(ac)................................. 1.194, 4.69 (1)(ad)........................................... 4.69 (b)............................................ 4.70 38...................................  1.95, 1.131, 1.150, 1.196, 1.197 (1).......................................... 1.196, 2.273 39............................. 1.195, 1.198, 3.30, 3.40 (3)................................................. 3.29 40................................. 1.131, 1.150, 1.163, 1.175, 1.179, 1.191, 1.193, 1.195, 1.197, 1.200, 1.201, 1.202, 1.232, 1.241, 1.313, 2.37, 2.81, 2.82, 2.85, 2.87, 2.89, 2.91, 2.93, 2.94, 2.96, 2.261, 3.35, 4.72 (1)...............................  1.200, 1.202, 2.82, 2.86, 2.88, 4.72 (2)...............................  1.80, 1.200, 1.202, 1.231, 2.31, 2.82, 2.85, 2.86, 2.87, 2.89, 2.90, 2.92, 2.273, 4.72 (3)(a)(i)......................................... 2.91 40(3)(i)(a)......................................... 2.85 (3A), (3B).............................. 1.200, 1.202 s 40(4A)....................................... 1.200, 1.202 (5).............................................. 2.86, 2.88 41................................. 1.105, 1.138, 1.195, 1.203, 1.205, 1.206, 1.207, 1.208, 1.218, 1.222, 1.223, 1.241, 1.270, 1.299, 3.39, 3.50, 4.72, 4.323 (1)(a)............................................. 1.207 (1)(b)............................................ 1.299 42................................. 1.122, 1.148, 1.172, 1.181, 1.195, 1.209, 1.210, 1.212, 1.213, 1.214, 1.231, 1.232, 3.29, 3.42, 4.67 (1)................................................. 1.209 (2)................................................. 4.67 43...................................  1.95, 1.138, 1.207, 1.215, 1.216, 1.219, 1.222, 1.223, 1.227, 1.229, 1.298, 3.39, 3.50, 4.67, 4.69 (1).......................................... 1.215, 1.218 (2)............................. 1.215, 1.218, 1.219, 1.220, 1.221, 1.222, 1.223, 1.229, 2.93, 4.69 (3)................................................. 4.67 44................................. 1.105, 1.227, 1.228, 1.229, 1.230, 2.85, 4.72 (1)..............................  1.224, 1.225, 2.273 (1)(a)............................................. 4.295

Table of statutes   xxxi Freedom of Information Act 2000 – contd Pt III (ss 45–49)..................  1.89, 1.91, 1.255 s 45.......................................  1.22, 1.57, 1.60, 1.66, 1.83, 1.97, 1.108, 1.110, 1.203, 1.235, 1.244, 1.255, 1.271, 1.282, 1.283, 1.286, 1.290, 1.308, 1.315, 3.8, 3.30, 4.33 (2)(c)............................................. 1.270 46.....................................  1.11, 1.22, 1.244, 1.256, 3.3, 4.66 47.................................................1.257, 3.57 (3)................................................. 1.300 (4)................................................. 1.257 48......................................  1.50, 1.260, 3.57 49..................................................... 2.143 Pt IV (ss 50–56).................  1.89, 1.91, 1.124, 1.235, 1.260, 3.59 s 50...................................  1.48, 1.236, 1.238, 1.244, 3.15 (1)............................................  1.270, 3.15 (3)...............................................1.90, 1.91 (3)(b)............................................ 3.15 (4)................................................. 3.59 (5), (6).......................................... 1.244 51...................................  1.91, 1.181, 1.238, 1.244, 1.245, 1.249, 3.15 (1)(a), (b)...................................... 1.181 (3), (4).......................................... 1.244 (5)................................................. 1.245 (8).......................................... 1.244, 1.266 52................................................  1.48, 1.237 (1), (2).......................................... 1.249 (3)................................................. 1.244 (3)(b)............................................ 1.244 (4)................................................. 1.244 53...................................  1.41, 1.175, 1.177, 1.178, 1.195, 1.234, 1.236, 1.238, 1.239, 1.240, 1.241, 1.242, 1.320, 3.4, 3.60 (1)................................................. 1.249 (a)............................................. 3.60 (b)............................................ 1.239 (4)................................................. 1.246 (5)................................................. 1.290 (6)................................................. 1.239 (7)................................................. 1.242 54(3)................................................. 1.249 56..................................................... 1.299 Pt V (ss 57–61)......................  1.89, 1.91, 3.59 s 57....................................  1.52, 1.236, 1.237 58(1)................................................. 1.232 (b)............................................ 1.249 59..................................................... 1.205 59(b)................................................. 1.20 60................................. 1.117, 1.124, 1.125, 1.297, 3.60 (2)................................................. 3.60 (3)................................................. 3.59 s 61..................................................... 1.34

Freedom of Information Act 2000 – contd Pt VI (ss 62–67)................................1.11, 4.64 s 62..................................................... 3.57 63.................................................1.96, 1.140 (2E), (2F)..................................... 4.69 (4)................................................. 1.144 64..................................................... 1.96 (2)................................................. 4.65 65..................................................... 1.96 66..................................................  1.96, 4.65 (3), (4).......................................... 1.96 67..................................................... 1.96 68..................................................... 2.96 69..................................................... 2.97 70................................................  2.99, 2.107 72................................................  1.268, 2.69 73..................................................... 3.3 74..................................................... 1.198 (4)................................................. 1.198 75.............................................. 1.263, 7.116 (2)................................................. 1.266 76..................................................... 1.260 (1)................................................. 1.260 76A................................................... 1.260 s 76B................................................... 1.261 77................................. 1.251, 1.260, 1.264, 1.308, 2.174, 3.59 78..................................  1.106, 1.154, 1.265 79................................................  1.88, 1.269 80..................................................... 3.3 81.............................................. 1.203, 1.276 82(2)(a), (b)...................................... 1.203 84..................................................... 1.266 Sch 1.....................................  1.85, 1.86, 1.88, 1.91, 1.92, 2.107, 3.12 para 6............................................. 3.12 para 52A........................................ 7.122 Pt VI, VII....................................... 1.88 Sch 2................................................... 1.247 Sch 3..............................................  1.246, 3.59 para 1............................................. 3.59 para 12........................................... 3.60 Sch 4................................................... 1.247 Sch 7................................................... 1.260 Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002......................... 1.11, 1.20, 1.64, 1.115, 1.135, 1.252, 1.260, 1.309, 1.310, 1.314, 1.315, 1.316, 2.4, 2.136, 4.42, 4.60 s 3(2)(a)(i)........................................... 1.309 s 3(2)(a)(ii)......................................1.20, 1.309 (4)................................................... 1.309 5(1)................................................... 1.309 6....................................................... 1.309 ss 16, 18.............................................. 1.311 20, 21.............................................. 1.313 s 22(2)–(6).......................................... 1.309 ss 25, 26....................................... 1.310, 1.313 s 27..................................................... 1.312 ss 28–35.............................................. 1.311 s 29..................................................... 1.313 29(3)................................................. 1.312

xxxii  Table of statutes Freedom of Information Act 2000 – contd s 31(1)................................................. 1.313 32(1)(b)............................................ 1.313 34..................................................... 1.313 36(1)................................................. 1.313 (2).......................................... 1.310, 1.313 37.............................................. 1.310, 1.313 38.............................................. 1.310, 1.312 39(1)................................................. 1.311 41..................................................... 1.311 (b)................................................. 1.313 46(2)................................................. 1.313 ss 52, 54.............................................. 1.313 s 58(2)(b)............................................ 1.312 63..................................................... 1.313 Sch 1................................................... 1.309 Sch 3................................................... 1.313 Friendly Societies Act 1974................... 8.31 Friendly Societies Act 1992................... 8.31 Government of Wales Act 1998............ 1.88 s 35..................................................... 10.105 123................................................... 1.135 Government Resources and Accounts Act 2000 ss 8, 25................................................ 12.25 Greater London Act 2007..................... 8.7 s 424(1)............................................... 8.7 Greater London Authority Act 1999............ 6.4, 6.51, 6.99, 6.208 ss 45–48.............................................. 8.7 s 57..................................................... 6.116 58..................................................... 8.7 (3), (4).......................................... 8.7, 8.24 (5)................................................. 8.7 68..................................................... 6.111 72..................................................... 6.101 ss 310, 312.......................................... 6.208 318, 319.......................................... 6.208 Health Act 1999..................................... 8.4 Health Act 2009 s 35..................................................... 10.91 Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 s 28..................................................... 1.263 Health and Social Care Act 2001 s 7................................................... 8.82, 8.84 60..................................................... 2.196 (5)................................................. 2.196 61..................................................... 2.196 Health and Social Care Act 2008.......... 10.90 Health and Social Care Act 2012........  8.4, 8.82, 8.83, 8.84, 10.90, 10.113, 12.32 Pt 3 (ss 61–150).................................. 10.113 s 157................................................... 10.113 Pt 5 (ss 181–201)................................ 8.82 s 181............................................ 8.82, 10.113 ss 182, 183.......................................... 8.82 ss 185, 186.......................................... 8.84 Pt 5 Ch 2 (ss 190–200)................ 8.84, 10.113 ss 194–199.......................................... 10.113 s 201................................................... 10.113

Health and Social Care Act 2012 – contd Pt 9, Ch 2 (ss 252–277)...................... 10.113 Health and Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Act 2003.... 8.4, 10.90, 10.106 Sch 4 para 25........................................... 8.81 Sch 14 Pt I................................................. 8.81 Health Service Commissioner for England (Complaint Handling) Act 2015......................................... 10.113 Higher Education Act 2004.................. 10.40 Higher Education and Research Act 2017................................................ 10.40 Highways Act 1980 s 36(7)................................................. 6.50 37(5)................................................. 6.50 Homelessness Act 2002......................... 10.88 s 3(9)................................................... 6.51 14..................................................... 9.64 15........................................  6.50, 6.51, 9.59 16..................................................... 9.59 17..................................................... 6.51 Homelessness Reduction Act 2017............10.88 Housing Act 1980.................................. 9.53 s 90..................................................... 6.86 Housing Act 1985...............................  9.59, 9.64 Pt IV (ss 79–117)............................... 9.60 s 104................................................... 9.60 105................................................... 9.61 (2), (3)........................................ 9.61 (5)............................................... 6.50 (6)............................................... 6.50 (a)........................................... 9.63 106................................................... 9.64 (2)–(4)........................................ 6.50 (5).............................................6.50, 9.64 114.................................................9.61, 9.64 ss 121AA, 121B.................................. 9.65 s 169................................................... 6.59 Pt VIII (ss 239–263)........................... 6.55 s 246................................................... 6.59 414(3)............................................... 6.50 Housing Act 1988...............................  9.53, 9.54 s 61..................................................... 9.57 61(2)–(4).......................................... 9.57 63..................................................... 9.55 (1)................................................. 9.55 (3).............................................  9.55, 9.56 71..................................................... 9.55 79..................................................... 9.55 90..................................................... 9.58 (3)................................................. 9.58 Housing Act 1996........................... 9.53, 10.137 ss 30–35.............................................. 9.54 s 51.................................................9.54, 10.48 136(1)............................................... 6.50 166(1)(a)........................................... 6.50 168(2)............................................... 6.50 Pt VII (ss 175–218)..................... 9.59, 10.137 s 193................................................... 10.137 ss 202, 204................................. 10.88, 10.134

Table of statutes   xxxiii Housing Act 1996 – contd Sch 2................................................... 9.54 Sch 15 para 2............................................. 9.60 Sch 16 para 1............................................. 9.64 Housing Act 2004.................................. 9.65 s 232(4), (5)........................................ 6.50 Housing and Planning Act 1986........... 9.139 ss 7, 8.................................................. 9.53 Housing and Planning Act 2016 Pt 2, Chap 3....................................... 2.335 ss 143–146.......................................... 10.81 Housing and Regeneration Act 2008.......... 9.53, 9.66 s 2....................................................... 9.66 s 36..................................................... 9.66 ss 38–40.............................................. 9.66 97, 107–109.................................... 9.54 s 228(3)............................................... 9.54 240(3)............................................... 9.54 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990......................................... 2.190 Human Rights Act 1998..........  1.29, 1.85, 1.86, 1.155, 1.181, 2.130, 2.195, 2.215, 2.216, 2.217, 2.218, 2.222, 2.231, 2.236, 2.249, 2.256, 2.290, 2.305, 2.321, 3.14, 4.200, 4.292, 4.293, 4.298, 4.319, 4.320, 4.343, 4.363, 4.369, 5.133, 7.13, 7.117, 9.84, 10.52, 10.61, 10.115, 10.116, 10.118, 10.127, 10.132, 10.135, 10.136, 10.137, 10.142, 10.152, 10.164, 10.175, 11.7, 11.12, 11.16, 11.40, 11.46, 11.53, 11.55, 11.56 s 1....................................................... 10.118 2................................... 2.216, 2.217, 10.52, 10.164 3................................... 2.216, 2.217, 2.225, 2.321, 4.351, 9.11, 10.52 4....................................................... 4.369 6.....................................  1.86, 2.231, 2.321, 4.320 (3)...............................................1.86, 2.228 7....................................................... 4.320 8....................................................... 10.61 10..................................................... 11.40 11..................................................... 10.142 12...................................  1.19, 1.295, 2.222, 2.223, 2.224, 2.228, 2.236, 2.244, 4.5, 4.339, 4.348, 4.349, 4.350, 4.363, 7.13, 7.113 (3)............................. 2.224, 2.225, 2.259, 4.317, 4.350, 4.351 (4)..............................  2.226, 2.253, 4.353

Human Rights Act 1998 – contd s 12(4)(a)(i), (ii)................................... 2.244 (b)........................ 2.227, 2.231, 2.245, 4.354 Sch 1................................................... 2.321 Pt I art 6........................................... 11.4 8.................................... 1.275, 11.12 art 10............................  7.9, 11.4, 11.12 Pt III art 3........................................... 2.268 10.....................................1.80, 1.154 Immigration Act 2014........................... 10.0 Immigration Act 2016............  2.338, 10.0, 12.1 Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 ss 18–21.............................................. 2.338 Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988...........................................  2.342, 12.1 Income Tax Act 2007............................. 12.1 Industrial and Provident Societies Acts 1965–1978...................................... 8.31 Inquiries Act 2005.................  1.7, 2.146, 2.250, 10.104, 10.105, 10.143, 10.149, 10.174, 10.175 s 1....................................................... 10.175 ss 18–20.............................................. 1.152 Insolvency Act 1986 s 236................................................... 12.1 Intellectual Property Act 2014 s 20..................................................... 1.15 s 24(1)................................................. 1.15 Intelligence Services Act 1994....... 1.118, 2.130, 2.133, 4.208, 4.221, 4.222, 4.225, 4.231 s 1....................................................... 4.224 2(3)................................................... 4.226 5................................... 4.195, 4.213, 4.221, 4.228, 4.231 s 5(2)................................................... 4.228 s 6(1)................................................... 4.229 s 6(2), (3)............................................ 4.230 7....................................  4.195, 4.221, 4.231 s 7(3)................................................... 4.221 Interception of Communications Act 1985............................ 1.118, 4.195, 4.196, 4.198, 4.200 s 1(1)................................................... 2.355 s 9....................................................... 4.205 Investigatory Powers Act 2016...... 1.118, 2.130, 2.230, 2.268, 2.335, 4.195, 4.196, 4.197, 4.199, 4.200, 4.202, 4.231, 4.236, 4.237, 4.319, 12.1 Pts 1–7 (ss 1–226)...........  1.261, 2.140, 2.179 s 2....................................................... 4.197 s 2(2)................................................... 4.197 s 4(1)–(5)............................................ 4.208 s 5................................................ 4.197, 4.208 s 6....................................................... 4.197 s 8................................................ 4.196, 4.203 ss 9, 10................................................ 4.204

xxxiv  Table of statutes Investigatory Powers Act 2016 – contd Pt 2, Ch 1 (ss 15–43)................... 4.195, 4.198 ss 26–29.............................................. 4.235 ss 30–40.............................................. 4.204 s 41..................................................... 4.205 s 43(1)................................................. 4.205 s 43(4)................................................. 4.205 s 43(7)................................................. 4.205 Pt 2, Ch 2 (ss 44–52).......................... 4.206 Pt 2, Ch 3 (ss 53–60)................... 4.205, 4.235 s 55..................................................... 4.205 s 56..................................................... 4.205 s 56(1)................................................. 11.84 s 57..................................................... 4.205 s 58..................................................... 4.205 Pt 3 (ss 61–86)............................. 4.207, 4.208 s 61(7)(a)–(j)....................................... 4.202 s 65..................................................... 4.231 ss 76, 77.............................................. 4.235 Pt 4 (ss 87–98)............................. 4.232, 4.236 ss 88–93.............................................. 4.235 s 89..................................................... 4.202 ss 111–114.......................................... 4.235 Pt 6, Ch 1 (ss 136–157)............... 4.195, 4.198 ss 150–156.......................................... 4.235 ss 171–173.......................................... 4.235 ss 191–197.......................................... 4.235 Pt 7 (ss 199–226)................................ 2.126 ss 220–226.......................................... 4.235 Pt 8 (ss 227–247)................................ 4.231 s 231............................................ 2.132, 4.232 s 232................................................... 4.231 s 234................................................... 4.232 s 234(6), (7)........................................ 4.232 s 235................................................... 4.232 s 236................................................... 4.231 s 237............................................ 4.231, 4.301 ss 242, 243................................... 4.196, 4.207 s 244................................................... 4.232 Pt 9, Ch 1 (ss 248–259).............. 1.261, 2.140, 2.179 ss 249, 250.......................................... 4.205 s 260................................................... 4.202 s 261................................................... 4.237 Sch 3................................................... 4.205 Justice and Security Act 2013............  1.7, 4.121, 4.205, 4.221, 4.236, 10.80, 10.127, 11.83, 11.85, 11.86 s 6.....................................  11.4, 11.84, 11.86, 11.87 s 6(7)................................................... 11.87 s 6(11)................................................. 11.86 s 7....................................................... 11.84 s 7(2)–(4)............................................ 11.84 ss 8–12................................................ 11.84 s 14..................................................... 11.88 s 14(2)................................................. 11.84 s 14(2)(c)...................................... 11.84, 11.88 s 17..................................................... 11.36 s 17(3)(a)–(e)...................................... 11.36 s 18..................................................... 11.36

Land Drainage Act 1991....................... 1.113 Land Registration Act 2002 s 66..................................................... 1.4 Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 ss 11–16.............................................. 9.60 Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act 1993 s 123................................................... 9.60 Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment Act 2012......................................... 10.47 Limitation Act 1980.............................. 11.91 Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014..................................  6.70, 6.73, 6.76, 6.79, 6.85, 9.2, 9.3, 9.8, 9.10, 12.2, 12.19 s 1....................................................... 12.2 s 2....................................................... 6.76 s 2(1)................................................... 12.17 s 4....................................................... 6.71 s 4(3)–(6)............................................ 6.71 s 5....................................................... 6.71 s 6....................................................... 6.71 s 6(2)................................................... 6.71 s 7....................................................... 6.73 s 8(1)–(5)............................................ 6.73 s 9....................................................... 6.74 s 10.................................................. 6.52, 6.75 s 10(9)–(11)........................................ 6.75 s 11..................................................... 6.52 s 12..................................................... 6.73 s 12(4), (5).......................................... 6.73 s 14..................................................... 6.75 s 15..................................................... 6.52 s 19.................................................  6.72, 12.8 s 20..................................................... 6.78 s 20(1)(a)–(c)....................................... 6.78 s 22..................................................... 6.76 s 22(1)(a)............................................. 6.77 s 22(1)(b)............................................ 6.78 s 22(3)(b)............................................ 6.76 s 22(5), (6).......................................... 6.76 s 23..................................................... 6.76 s 24..................................................... 6.97 s 25...................................................6.82, 9.10 s 25(1), (2).......................................... 9.11 s 26..................................................... 9.11 s 26(1A).............................................. 9.11 s 26(2)................................................. 9.12 s 26(4)–(6).......................................... 9.12 s 26(9)................................................. 9.12 s 27(1)................................................. 9.13 s 27(1)(b)............................................ 9.15 s 27(2)................................................. 9.14 s 27(3), (4).......................................... 9.15 s 28..................................................  9.13, 9.15 s 29..................................................... 6.79, 9.7 s 31..................................................... 6.79 s 32..................................................... 9.11 s 33..................................................... 12.1 s 35..................................................... 6.85 Sch 2................................................... 6.71 Sch 3................................................... 6.73

Table of statutes   xxxv Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014 – contd Sch 4................................................... 6.74 para 2............................................. 6.74 Sch 5................................................... 6.73 Sch 6................................................  6.72, 12.8 Sch 7....................................  6.97, 7.109, 9.11 para 1............................................. 9.13 para 5(5)........................................ 6.97 para 5(8)........................................ 6.97 Sch 8................................................... 6.79, 9.7 para 3............................................. 6.79 Sch 9................................................... 12.1 Sch 10................................................. 6.52 Sch 11................................................. 6.84 para 5............................................. 6.84 Local Audit (Public Access to Documents) Act 2017.................... 12.2 s 1....................................................... 9.11 Local Authorities (Admission of the Press to Meetings) Act 1908.......... 8.3 Local Authority Social Services Act 1970 s 7................................................ 2.216, 2.270 Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009......................................... 6.9, 9.69 s 30..................................................... 7.28 Pt 5 (ss 70–87).................................... 9.69 s 79(6)................................................. 9.70 Pt 6 (ss 88–120).................................. 6.9 Local Government Act 1972...... 6.2, 6.29, 6.32, 6.49, 7.96, 8.6, 8.18, 8.23, 8.32, 8.37, 8.40, 8.41, 8.61, 8.68, 8.71, 8.72, 8.73, 8.74, 8.75, 8.78, 8.80, 9.67, 10.103 s 60(2)(c)............................................. 6.50 (4)(b)............................................ 6.50 (5)(b)............................................ 6.50 Pt V (ss 79–100)................................. 8.21 s 80(1)(a)............................................. 8.12 ss 94–97.............................................. 7.23 s 95..................................................... 7.46 100................................  7.84, 8.2, 8.3, 8.69, 8.78 Pt VA (ss 100A–100K).........  6.177, 8.2, 8.35, 8.78, 8.80 s 100A............................ 6.46, 6.74, 8.3, 8.41, 8.42, 8.81 (2)...............................  8.21, 8.59, 8.60 (3)..........................................8.22, 8.26 (4)............................................ 8.25 (5).........................................  8.28, 8.59 (5A).......................................... 8.21 (6)...............................  8.37, 8.41, 8.42 (a)........................................ 8.38 (b)........................................ 8.39 (c)......................................8.40, 8.42 (7)...............................  8.41, 8.42, 8.43 (7A).............................  8.41, 8.42, 8.43 (7B)–(7F)..............................  8.41, 8.42 (8)...............................  8.39, 8.41, 8.79

Local Government Act 1972 – contd s 100A(9)...............................  8.40, 8.41, 8.42 100B...................................  6.46, 6.74, 8.59, 8.70, 8.81 (1)..............................  6.50, 8.45, 8.49, 8.54, 8.66 (2)..............................  8.49, 8.54, 8.55, 8.56, 8.57 (3)...............................  6.50, 8.38, 8.45 (a), (b)...............................  6.50, 8.45 (4)........................ 8.38, 8.46, 8.48, 8.69 (b)...........................  6.50, 8.45, 8.47 (5)............................................ 8.54 100C...................................  8.59, 8.60, 8.81 (1)............................................ 8.66 (2)............................................ 8.60 100D............................ 8.36, 8.58, 8.59, 8.81 (1)............................................ 8.66 (5)............................................ 8.58 100E............................ 8.10, 8.11, 8.38, 8.60 (2)............................................ 8.36 (b)........................................ 8.40 100EA...........................................  8.12, 8.62 100F..............................................  6.46, 7.86 100G................................................ 8.65 G(1)............................................ 8.65 G(2)...............................  7.27, 8.65, 9.67 G(3)............................................ 8.65 100H...........................  8.45, 8.66, 8.67, 8.81 (5), (6)..................................... 8.67 100I...............................................  7.94, 8.81 (2), (4) ...................................... 8.29 100J.................................................. 8.7, 8.62 (3)............................................. 8.36 100K(1)...............................  8.40, 8.44, 8.56 Pt VI (ss 101–109).............................. 8.65 s 101.................................  6.94, 6.111, 6.154, 9.67 (1)..................................  7.59, 7.82, 8.13 (9)..........................................  6.153, 7.90 (c), (d), (h).............................. 6.154 (12)............................................. 8.14 102......................................  7.90, 8.14, 8.20 (1)............................................... 6.113 (3)............................................... 6.115 104................................................... 7.82 (1)............................................... 8.12 111....................................  6.177, 8.13, 9.56 (1)........................... 2.217, 2.273, 2.274, 7.82, 8.13, 8.14, 8.15, 8.19 112................................................... 7.31 115................................................... 7.47 115(2)............................................... 7.47 116................................................... 7.27 117................................................  7.46, 7.48 117(1)–(3)........................................ 7.46 137............................... 6.160, 6.163, 6.165, 6.166, 6.168, 6.182, 6.183, 6.184, 6.185 s 137(1)............................................... 6.165 (2C)..................................... 6.165, 6.166 (2D).........................  6.166, 6.167, 6.185 (3)............................................... 6.185

xxxvi  Table of statutes Local Government Act 1972 – contd s 137(4), (4AA)............................ 6.165, 6.185 (4C)............................................ 6.185 (9)........................................ 6.166, 6.168 137A................................................. 6.185 141................................................... 6.177 142............................... 6.160, 6.163, 6.164, 6.166, 6.168 (1B)............................................ 6.164 (2A)............................................ 6.169 145(1)(a)........................................... 6.177 168................................................... 6.59 ss 180–215.......................................... 8.13 Pt XI (ss 222–244A)........................... 8.65 s 228(2)............................................... 9.18 (3)............................................... 7.109 (8)............................................... 9.18 230................................................... 6.59 243................................................... 8.37 250(5)............................................... 9.143 270(3)............................................... 8.26 Pt I..................................................... 8.69 para 4(5)........................................ 8.69 Sch 12..............................................  7.54, 8.77 Pt I................................................. 8.48 para 4(2)(b)................................ 7.53 (5).................................... 8.48 Pts II–IV (paras 7–29)................... 8.77 Sch 12A......................... 1.29, 6.1, 6.29, 6.32, 6.37, 6.38, 6.46, 6.74, 7.94, 8.31, 8.35, 8.54 Pt I..................................  1.227, 7.92, 8.29 para 1........................................ 7.86 (1).................................... 6.31 2........................................ 7.86 3.....................................  7.86, 7.92 paras 4, 5................................... 7.86 para 6..................................... 7.86, 7.92 Pt II............................................... 8.29 9........................................ 7.86 10...................................... 8.31 Pt III.............................................. 8.29 11...................................... 7.86 Pt IV.............................................. 8.29 12...................................... 7.86 14...................................... 7.86 Pts V, VI........................................ 8.29 Local Government Act 1974................. 10.91 s 18(2A).............................................. 6.148 (c)................................... 6.148, 6.149 Pt III (ss 23–34).......................... 6.137, 6.138 s 23..................................................... 6.138 (11), (12)...................................... 6.138 23A................................................... 6.138 (3), (11), (12).............................. 6.138 24A(5).............................................. 10.55 25(1)................................................. 6.143 26B(3).............................................. 10.56 s 26D.................................................. 10.55 28(2), (3).......................................... 6.139 29..................................................... 6.140 s 29(2)................................................. 6.141

Local Government Act 1974 – contd s 29(3).......................................... 6.140, 6.141 s 29(4)................................................. 6.141 (8), (9).......................................... 6.142 30.............................................. 6.149, 6.157 (1), (1B)........................................ 6.145 (4).............................................6.50, 6.145 (4A), (6), (7).................................. 6.145 31.............................................. 6.146, 6.157 (1)................................................. 6.146 (2).......................................... 6.147, 6.149 (2A)....................................... 6.149, 6.155 (2B), (2BA)................................... 6.148 (2C).............................................. 6.149 (2D)....................................... 6.149, 6.152 (2E)...........................  6.149, 6.150, 6.152 (2F)....................................... 6.149, 6.151 (2G).............................................. 6.152 31A................................................... 6.153 (1).............................................. 6.153 (2)....................................... 6.153, 6.156 (3)....................................... 6.154, 6.156 (4).............................................. 6.155 31B............................................ 6.143, 6.157 32(2)..............................  1.230, 6.143, 6.144 33..................................................... 6.144 Pt IIIA (ss 34A–34T)......................... 6.143 Local Government Act 1985................. 6.3 Pt III (ss 18–22).................................  6.3, 8.7 Pt IV (ss 23–42).................................  6.3, 8.7 Pt VII................................................. 6.3 Sch 1 para 13........................................... 10.81 Sch 14 para 24........................................... 7.109 35........................................... 7.54 Sch 17................................................. 7.54 Local Government Act 1986.......... 6.161, 6.177 s 2....................................................... 6.171 (1), (2)............................................ 6.161 (3)................................................... 6.162 2A.............................................. 6.178, 6.179 (1)(a), (b)...................................... 6.178 (2)–(4).......................................... 6.178 3................................................ 6.163, 6.165 (3)................................................... 6.165 4....................................................... 6.170 5....................................................... 6.176 (2), (4)–(7)...................................... 6.176 6(2), (3)............................................ 6.177 Local Government Act 1988.......... 6.137, 6.161 Pt I (ss 1–16)...................................... 9.146 s 12..................................................  6.50, 6.52 Pt II (ss 17–23)................................... 9.149 s 17.............................................. 9.149, 9.152 (1)................................................. 9.151 (5)................................................. 9.149 18..................................................... 9.150 19(7), (9).......................................... 9.151 s 20..................................................... 9.152 20(1)–(3).......................................... 9.152 27..................................................... 6.161 28.............................................. 6.178, 6.179

Table of statutes   xxxvii Local Government Act 1988 – contd Sch 2................................................... 9.149 Sch 3 para 6............................................. 6.145 Local Government Act 1992 Pt II (ss 12–27)................................... 6.5 Local Government Act 1999.............  6.51, 6.59, 9.146 Pt I..................................................... 9.147 ss 1, 2.................................................. 6.52 s 3....................................................... 6.52 3(1)................................................... 6.52 (4)................................................... 9.147 3A..................................................... 6.52 3A(5)................................................ 6.52 11..................................................... 9.148 13(3)(b)............................................ 9.148 15..................................................... 9.148 19..................................................... 9.149 20.................................................6.52, 9.148 Local Government Act 2000...... 6.8, 6.11, 6.12, 6.15, 6.51, 6.59, 6.79, 6.89, 6.112, 6.116, 6.129, 6.179, 6.182, 7.21, 7.58, 7.67, 7.77, 7.97, 8.2, 8.12, 8.76, 9.2, 12.8 Pt I (ss 1–9)................................. 6.168, 6.186 s 2....................................................... 6.23 (1)................................................... 2.273 7....................................................... 6.168 Pt 1A (ss 9B–9P)..................  6.11, 6.13, 6.14, 6.16, 7.92 s 9BA.................................................. 6.14 Pt 1A, Chap 2 (ss 9C–9ID)................ 6.19 s 9C...............................................  7.91, 7.106 s 9D.................................................... 7.91 s 9DA.................................................. 7.91 ss 9F–9FI............................................ 6.22 s 9FA(4), (5)........................................ 6.23 s 9FA(8).............................................. 6.30 s 9G.................................................  6.29, 6.31 s 9GA..............................................  6.29, 6.32 s 9GA(7)............................................. 6.31 Pt 1A, Chap 4 (ss 9K–9OA)............... 6.13 s 9K.................................................... 6.13 s 9KA.................................................. 6.13 s 9KA(3)............................................. 6.13 s 9KB.................................................. 6.13 s 9KC................................................. 6.13 s 9KC(2)............................................. 6.13 s 9P..................................................  6.22, 6.42 Pt II (ss 10–48A)................................ 7.106 s 10..................................................... 7.59 11.................................................  6.12, 7.59 (4)................................................. 7.82 12.................................................  6.12, 7.59 13..................................................... 7.59 (10)(a)........................................... 7.59 14(1)................................................. 7.58 (2)................................................. 7.58 (a)............................................. 7.59 (b)(ii)........................................ 7.59

Local Government Act 1972 – contd s 15(2)................................................. 7.59 (4)(b)............................................ 7.59 (ii)........................................ 7.58 16(2)(a), (b)...................................... 7.59 ss 17–19.............................................. 7.59 s 21..................................................... 7.77 (11)............................................... 7.91 ss 33A–33I.......................................... 6.16 s 50..................................................... 7.23 Pt III, Chap II (ss 57–67)................... 6.129 s 81..................................................... 7.24 82..................................................... 7.25 (8)................................................. 7.25 91..................................................... 6.94 92.............................................. 10.28, 10.61 97..................................................... 8.59 98........................................  6.50, 7.54, 8.45 98(2)...............................................7.54, 7.84 101................................................... 6.124 Sch A1................................................ 6.22 para 4............................................. 7.78 Sch 5 para 15........................................... 6.158 24(3)...................................... 6.104 Local Government Act 2003.............  6.51, 6.53, 6.70, 6.193, 6.201, 9.2, 9.4 ss 1–7.................................................. 6.193 s 8....................................................... 6.193 (3)................................................... 6.193 ss 9–13................................................ 6.193 s 14......................................  6.59, 6.69, 6.193 ss 15–17.............................................. 6.193 s 18..................................  6.189, 6.193, 6.195 ss 19–24.............................................. 6.193 25–30.............................................. 6.99 s 30..................................................... 6.94 Pt 4 (ss 41–59).................................... 6.53 ss 41–59.............................................. 6.186 s 70..................................................... 6.201 Pt 6 (ss 74–86)................................6.60, 6.198 Pt 7..................................................... 6.193 s 95..................................................... 6.187 113................................................... 6.104 115, 116........................................... 6.23 118................................................... 6.165 122................................................... 6.179 127................................................... 6.188 Sch 8 Pt I.......................................... 6.185, 6.188 Local Government (Access to Information) Act 1985................ 6.1, 6.29, 6.36, 6.38, 6.49, 6.96, 6.100, 6.108, 6.110, 6.181, 6.185, 6.197, 7.52, 7.56, 7.64, 7.66, 7.67, 7.84, 7.86, 7.87, 7.91, 7.99, 7.112, 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, 8.5, 8.6, 8.10, 8.19, 8.35, 8.40, 8.41, 8.68, 8.69, 8.75, 8.77, 8.81, 9.3, 9.67, 10.89, 11.58

xxxviii  Table of statutes Local Government (Access to Information) Act 1985 – contd Sch 1................................................ 7.86, 8.29 Local Government and Housing Act 1989............................ 6.100, 6.101, 6.108, 6.116, 6.182, 6.199, 7.21, 7.22, 7.26, 7.31, 7.48, 7.55, 7.65, 7.66, 7.75, 7.102, 9.3 Pt I (ss 1–21)...................................... 7.33 s 1....................................................... 7.27 2....................................................... 6.109 (1)................................................... 7.27 (2)......................................  7.27, 7.28, 7.29 (3)......................................  7.28, 7.29, 7.30 (6)–(8)............................................ 7.27 (10)................................................. 7.30 3....................................................  7.27, 7.30 3A..................................................  7.27, 7.30 4....................................................  7.42, 7.50 (1)(b)....................................... 6.101, 6.104 (3)................................................... 6.102 5....................................................... 7.27 (3)................................................... 6.105 (4)............................................ 6.105, 6.106 (a)–(c)......................................... 6.104 (5)................................................... 6.106 5A..................................................... 6.104 7...................................................6.110, 7.36 (1), (2)............................................ 7.31 8..................................................  6.110, 7.32 (3)(a), (b)........................................ 7.33 (c)................................  6.109, 7.33, 7.34 (d).........................................  6.109, 7.33 (e)............................................  7.33, 7.50 (4)................................................... 7.34 (5)................................................... 7.34 9.......................................  6.39, 6.111, 7.34, 7.36, 7.39 (2)................................................... 6.111 (3)................................................... 7.36 (4)................................................... 6.111 (5)................................................... 7.37 (6)................................................... 7.38 (8)................................................... 7.39 (9), (10).......................................... 6.111 10..................................................... 7.40 11..................................................... 9.11 13..................................................... 6.113 (2)................................................. 6.113 (4)................................................. 6.113 15...................................  6.29, 6.116, 6.118, 6.119, 7.55 (1)(a), (b)...................................... 6.116 (1)(c), (d)............................... 6.116, 6.122 (e)............................................. 6.122 (2)................................................. 6.122 (3)................................................. 6.116 (5)................................................. 6.117 16..................................................... 7.55 (3)................................................. 6.122 17.................................................6.122, 7.55 19..................................................... 7.23

Local Government and Housing Act 1989 – contd s 20.............................................. 6.123, 7.104 (1)................................................. 6.123 (2)................................................. 6.124 (3)................................................. 6.125 Pt II (ss 22–32)................................... 6.153 s 23..................................................... 6.138 25(2)................................................. 6.138 26..................................................... 6.147 32..................................................... 6.158 37..................................................... 6.185 Pt IV (ss 39–66).......................... 6.188, 6.193 Pt V (ss 67–73)................  6.189, 6.194, 6.195 s 68(6)................................................. 6.194 ss 69, 70.............................................. 6.194 s 71(5)–(7).......................................... 6.194 72(2)................................................. 6.194 73..................................................... 6.195 85..................................................... 6.59 Pt VII (ss 89–100)........................... 6.55, 6.59 s 92.................................................. 6.50, 6.55 95(5)................................................. 6.56 113................................................... 7.31 157(9)............................................... 6.59 Sch 1............................................ 6.116, 6.119 para 2............................................. 6.119 Sch 2............................................ 6.165, 6.185 Sch 5................................................... 6.199 para 66........................................... 6.92 Sch 11 para 25........................................... 8.20 26........................................... 8.11 Sch 12................................................. 6.115 Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007...  6.8, 6.14, 6.52, 6.146, 6.153, 7.30, 8.4, 8.82, 8.83, 9.147, 10.56 ss 35, 41, 52........................................ 6.50 Pt 5 (ss 103–128)................................ 10.86 Pt 9 (ss 168–182)................................ 10.56 s 177................................................... 6.157 216................................................... 6.195 Pt 14 (ss 221–234)....................... 8.83, 10.167 s 221................................................... 8.82 s 221(1)............................................... 8.82 s 221(6)............................................... 8.83 s 223(2)(i)........................................... 8.84 s 223A................................................. 8.84 s 223A(2), (3)...................................... 8.84 ss 224, 225, 227.................................. 8.83 ss 236, 237.......................................  8.12, 8.62 Local Government (Contracts) Act 1997............................................6.94, 9.158 s 4....................................................... 9.158 Local Government Finance Act 1982 s 20..................................................... 6.77 23(1)(e)............................................. 6.176 Local Government Finance Act 1988... 6.60, 6.86, 6.88, 6.108, 9.4 s 41..................................................... 6.200

Table of statutes   xxxix Local Government Finance Act 1988 – contd s 41(6B).............................................. 6.199 52..................................................... 6.200 (6B).............................................. 6.199 55..................................................... 6.199 72..................................................... 6.60 95..................................................... 6.92 s 110................................................... 6.67 Pt VIII (ss 111–116).......................  6.86, 6.87 s 111................................................... 6.87, 9.4 112................................................... 6.87 113(3)............................................... 9.5 114..................................  6.89, 9.4, 9.5, 9.6, 9.7 (2)...........................................  6.93, 6.94 (3)..................................... 6.92, 6.93, 9.5 (3A)............................................ 9.5 (4)............................................... 6.92, 9.5 (5)–(7)........................................ 6.93, 9.5 (8), (8A)...................................... 9.5 114A................................................. 6.89 115...................................  6.94, 6.98, 6.106, 9.6, 9.7 (1A)–(1G)................................... 9.6 (2).............................................6.94, 6.95 (3), (7), (8).................................. 6.94 (9)(a), (b).................................... 6.95 116................................................... 9.7 (1)............................................... 6.98, 9.7 (2)............................................... 6.98 Sch 4................................................... 9.7 Sch 9................................................... 6.50 paras 1A, 5..................................... 6.199 para 8(6)–(8).................................. 6.199 9(2)........................................ 6.199 Local Government Finance Act 1992 ss 28, 29, 38, 52.................................. 6.60 s 52 (1).............................................. 6.61 (2)–(8)........................................ 6.62 ss 52Z, 64........................................... 6.60 s 68..................................................... 6.65 68(2)................................................. 6.64 (3)................................................. 6.63 (6)................................................. 6.63 Sch 2................................................... 6.198 para 17........................................... 2.274 Local Government Finance Act 2012... 6.201 Local Government Planning and Land Act 1980......................................... 6.180 s 2....................................................... 9.148 2(1)...............................................6.52, 9.148 3....................................................... 9.148 96(4)................................................. 6.50 135................................................... 6.196 184................................................... 6.143 Sch 32 para 3(5)........................................ 6.50 Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973 s 50..................................................... 8.5 50G(2).............................................. 7.27 ss 83, 88.............................................. 6.163 Local Government (Wales) Act 1994.... 6.2

Local Government (Wales) Measure 2009, 2009 nawm 2....................6.52, 9.147 Local Government (Wales) Measure 2011, 2011 nawm 4........................ 6.14 Pts 3, 4 (ss 34–54).............................. 6.16 Pt 6 (ss 58–87).................................... 6.25 Local Land Charges Act 1975 s 8....................................................... 6.50 Localism Act 2011...............  6.8, 6.9, 6.10, 6.11, 6.13, 6.14, 6.16, 6.19, 6.22, 6.25, 6.129, 6.186, 6.193, 7.21, 7.24, 7.25, 8.12, 9.2, 9.8, 9.67, 9.69, 9.70, 9.71, 10.48 s 1....................................................... 6.168 s 2....................................................... 6.168 s 2(2)................................................... 6.193 s 4....................................................... 6.187 s 4(2)................................................... 6.187 Pt 1, Chap 7 (ss 26–37)...................... 6.130 s 27..................................................... 6.130 s 27(2)................................................. 6.130 s 27(6), (7).......................................... 6.131 s 28(1)................................................. 6.130 s 29..................................................... 6.132 s 29(5), (6).......................................... 6.132 s 30..................................................... 6.133 s 30(1)................................................. 6.135 s 30(3)................................................. 6.133 s 31(2).......................................... 6.134, 6.135 s 31(3), (4)................................... 6.134, 6.135 s 31(6)................................................. 6.134 s 31(7), (8).......................................... 6.135 s 32..................................................... 6.132 s 32(1)(b)............................................ 6.132 s 33..................................................... 6.134 s 34..................................................... 6.135 s 34(2)................................................. 6.135 Pt 1, Chap 8 (ss 38–43)...................... 6.8 s 40..................................................... 6.8 Pt 5, Chap 3 (ss 87–108).................... 6.8 Pt 6 (ss 109–144)................................ 9.69 ss 109, 110.......................................... 9.70 Pt 8, Chap 2 (ss 196–222).................. 6.196 Sch 1................................................... 6.168 Sch 2................................................... 6.8 London Government Act 1963............. 6.2 Malicious Communications Act 1988... 2.195 Medical Act 1983................................... 2.201 Medicines Act 1968 s 118................................................... 1.263 Mental Capacity Act 2005................  2.337, 11.8 Mental Health Act 1983..................... 11.4, 11.8 s 117................................................... 6.159 Metropolitan Police Act 1829........ 6.203, 6.205 Metropolitan Police Act 1839........ 6.203, 6.205 Military Lands Act 1892 s 14(1)................................................. 10.173 Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987.... 6.203 Modern Slavery Act 2015 s 52..................................................... 12.1

xl  Table of statutes National Audit Act 1983..........  6.70, 6.85, 12.3, 12.7 s 1....................................................... 12.7 (3)................................................... 12.7 3....................................................... 12.7 5(1)................................................... 12.7 Pt II (ss 6–9)....................................... 12.7 s 6......................................  12.8, 12.17, 12.19 (1)................................................... 12.16 (2)............................................ 12.16, 12.17 (5)................................................... 12.18 7................................................ 12.17, 12.19 8................................................ 2.272, 12.19 (1)..............................................  6.85, 12.22 (2)................................................... 12.19 s 8(2A)................................................ 6.85 Sch 4................................................... 12.26 National Health Service Act 1977 s 2....................................................... 10.175 84..................................................... 10.175 Sch 11 para 5............................................. 1.263 National Health Service Act 2006......  8.4, 8.82, 8.84 National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990............ 12.2 National Health Service Reform and Health Care Professions Act 2002 ss 15–22.............................................. 8.4 National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006.............................................  8.82, 8.84 s 182................................................... 8.81 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 Pt 6 (ss 118–142)................................ 2.338 s 55..................................................... 10.134 101................................................... 10.117 115................................................... 10.134 NHS (Redress) Act 2006....................... 10.112 s 1(2)................................................... 10.112 (5)................................................... 10.112 Northern Ireland Act 1998 s 19..................................................... 1.166 ss 90, 91.............................................. 1.297 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1987 s 15(1)................................................. 10.52 Office of Communications Act 2002.........4.369 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 s 47..................................................... 2.318 Offices, Shops and Railway Premises Act 1963 s 59..................................................... 1.263 Official Secrets Acts........... 1.265, 1.282, 4.137, 4.146, 4.153, 4.154, 4.302, 6.143, 6.212, 11.65 Official Secrets Act 1889................ 1.206, 4.154 Official Secrets Act 1911.......  4.1, 4.161, 4.163, 4.300 s 1................................... 1.224, 4.155, 4.157, 4.158, 4.160, 4.166, 4.249, 4.295

Official Secrets Act 1911 – contd s 1(1)................................................... 4.155 (2)............................................ 4.155, 4.156 2................................... 4.146, 4.162, 4.163, 4.164, 4.165, 4.168, 4.250, 4.266, 4.270, 4.271, 4.294, 6.212, 7.110 3....................................  4.155, 4.156, 4.158 7....................................................... 4.161 9(1)................................................... 4.263 12..................................................... 4.158 Official Secrets Act 1920....................... 4.300 s 1................................... 4.159, 4.160, 4.161, 11.4 (2)(b).............................................. 4.163 2................................................ 4.165, 6.165 4(3)(b).............................................. 4.198 7................................................ 4.161, 4.163 8....................................................... 11.4 (4)................................................... 4.264 10..................................................... 4.155 11(2)................................................. 4.155 Sch 1................................................... 4.155 Sch 2................................................... 4.155 Official Secrets Act 1939....................... 4.300 Official Secrets Act 1989.......  1.16, 1.29, 1.224, 1.263, 2.185, 2.195, 3.21, 4.1, 4.141, 4.148, 4.153, 4.162, 4.163, 4.164, 4.173, 4.182, 4.183, 4.222, 4.249, 4.250, 4.251, 4.255, 4.261, 4.263, 4.264, 4.267, 4.268, 4.269, 4.271, 4.274, 4.275, 4.276, 4.279, 4.281, 4.284, 4.288, 4.289, 4.293, 4.294, 4.295, 4.300, 4.333, 4.339, 4.346, 4.347, 4.355, 4.360, 4.361, 6.212, 7.1, 7.12, 7.17, 7.110, 8.22 s 1.....................................  1.29, 4.181, 4.183, 4.221, 4.238, 4.240, 4.242, 4.243, 4.248, 4.256, 4.281, 4.283, 4.293, 4.294, 4.300, 4.333, 4.339, 4.347, 4.360, 7.116 (1)............................... 4.176, 4.180, 4.251, 4.257, 4.258, 4.283, 4.285 1(1)(b).............................................. 4.281 (2)................................................... 4.176 (3)............................... 4.177, 4.179, 4.240, 4.243 (4)............................................ 4.177, 4.178 (6)................................................... 4.180 (7)............................................ 4.176, 4.180 2................................... 4.184, 4.185, 4.186, 4.191, 4.238, 4.240, 4.242, 4.243, 4.248, 4.256, 7.116 (1)............................... 4.184, 4.185, 4.240, 4.243 s 2(4)(b)....................................... 4.184, 4.186

Table of statutes   xli Official Secrets Act 1989 – contd s 3................................... 1.133, 4.185, 4.188, 4.191, 4.221, 4.238, 4.240, 4.242, 4.243, 4.248, 4.256, 7.116 (1)............................................ 4.240, 4.243 (b)....................................... 4.188, 4.190 (2)(a), (b)................................. 4.189, 4.190 (3)................................................... 4.190 (5)................................................... 4.187 (6)............................................ 4.188, 4.190 4.....................................  1.29, 4.181, 4.183, 4.194, 4.242, 4.243, 4.248, 4.256, 4.339, 7.116 (1)................................  4.192, 4.220, 4.242 (2)................................  4.220, 4.242, 4.261 (a)(i).................................... 4.192, 4.198 (ii), (iii)................................... 4.192 (b).............................................. 4.192 (3)............................... 4.194, 4.195, 4.208, 4.243, 4.271 (a)........................................ 4.198, 4.220 (b).............................................. 4.221 (4)................................................... 4.193 (6)................................................... 4.192 5................................... 4.221, 4.242, 4.243, 4.256, 4.259, 7.116 (1)............................................ 4.242, 4.246 (a)(i)–(iii).................................... 4.242 (4)................................................... 4.244 (5)................................................... 4.248 6....................................  4.240, 4.256, 4.259 (1)............................................ 4.238, 4.240 (2)................................................... 4.238 (3)................................................... 4.272 (4)................................................... 4.240 s 6(5)................................................... 4.239 7....................................  4.176, 4.177, 4.192 (2)................................................... 4.252 (3)(a), (b)........................................ 4.182 (5)................................................... 4.265 (6)............................................ 4.241, 4.256 8(1)............................... 4.257, 4.262, 4.263, 4.264, 4.265 (a)........................................ 4.257, 4.258 (3)............................................ 4.257, 4.258 (4), (5)........................ 4.259, 4.262, 4.263, 4.264, 4.265 (6)................................................... 4.260 (8)................................................... 4.257 9....................................................... 4.183 (1)................................................... 4.263 10..................................................... 4.262 11(4)................................................. 4.264 12..................................................... 4.177 (2), (3).......................................... 4.177 13(1).......................................... 4.176, 4.188 (2), (3).......................................... 4.188 15..................................................... 4.355 Overseas Development and Cooperation Act 1980 s 1....................................................... 12.23

Parliamentary and Health Service Commissioners Act 1987........ 4.133, 4.144 ss 3, 4.................................................. 4.144 Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967... 1.279, 4.14, 4.133, 4.143 s 5....................................................... 4.134 s 5(1)(a), (b)........................................ 4.133 6(1)(a), (b)........................................ 4.135 7....................................................... 4.136 (1), (2)............................................ 4.136 (4)................................................... 4.139 8(1)–(4)............................................ 4.137 (5)................................................... 4.138 9................................................ 4.139, 4.141 10..................................................... 4.140 (3)–(5).......................................... 4.140 11(2)................................................. 4.141 (c)............................................. 4.141 (3)...................................  4.11, 4.13, 4.22, 4.142 Sch 2................................................... 4.133 Sch 3................................................... 4.134 Parliamentary Papers Act 1840.......  2.256, 4.95, 4.274 s 3....................................................... 4.95 Parliamentary Standards Act 2009.....  2.90, 7.10 s 2....................................................... 7.12 ss 5, 7.................................................. 7.10 s 10..................................................... 7.15 Sch 1................................................... 7.10 Perjury Act 1911 s 5....................................................... 2.148 Planning Act 2008 ss 109–113.......................................... 9.84 Pt 11 (ss 205–225).............................. 9.81 Planning and Compensation Act 1991... 9.67, 9.81 s 16..................................................... 9.77 27..................................................... 9.69 Sch 4................................................... 9.69 Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004...........................  6.51, 9.67, 9.69, 9.70, 9.73 s 11..................................................... 9.72 Pt 2 (ss 13–37)................................  9.72, 9.73 s 13..................................................... 9.72 15.................................................. 9.70, 9.72 15(7)................................................. 9.70 15(9)................................................. 9.70 ss 17, 18.............................................. 9.72 s 19(2)................................................. 9.72 ss 20, 24.............................................. 9.72 s 33A................................................  9.70, 9.71 38..................................................... 9.73 Planning (Consequential Provisions) Act 1990......................................... 9.139 Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990 s 2(4)................................................... 6.50 14(2)................................................. 9.86 ss 67, 73.............................................. 9.79 Police Act 1964.................. 4.222, 6.203, 6.205, 6.210, 6.211

xlii  Table of statutes Police Act 1964 – contd s 4(4)................................................... 6.210 41..................................................... 6.210 49..................................................... 11.66 Police Act 1996.................. 2.276, 6.203, 6.205, 6.207 s 2....................................................... 6.206 10(1)................................................. 6.207 11(2)................................................. 6.207 12(3)................................................. 6.207 22A................................................... 2.123 37A................................................... 6.203 39..................................................... 6.206 39A................................................... 6.206 42..................................................... 6.207 44..................................................... 6.204 44(4)................................................. 6.204 54................................................  6.59, 6.206 55..................................................... 6.206 80.............................................. 1.230, 6.213 80(1)(a)............................................. 6.213 96..................................................... 6.203 Police Act 1997.................. 2.182, 2.289, 2.307, 2.309, 2.311, 4.212, 4.221, 4.326, 6.209, 12.1 Pt II (ss 47–90)................................... 6.209 Pt III (ss 91–108)........... 2.335, 4.198, 4.208, 4.212, 4.276, 11.102, 11.103, 12.1 ss 97, 98.............................................. 11.103 s 101(3)............................................... 4.221 Pt IV (ss 109–111)............................. 6.209 Pt V (ss 112–127)........... 2.181, 2.182, 2.286, 2.290, 2.309, 2.310, 2.311, 2.318, 6.209 s 112............................................ 2.182, 2.286 113............................................ 2.182, 2.286 (2), (5)........................................ 2.286 113A.......................................... 2.309, 2.310 113A(4)............................................ 2.291 113A(6)............................................ 2.286 113A(6)(b)........................................ 2.288 113A(6D)......................................... 2.288 113B(4)..................................... 2.293, 2.325 (4A).......................................... 2.293 (5)..................................... 2.291, 2.292 (6)............................................ 2.291 115............................................ 2.182, 2.335 (7), (8)........................................ 2.290 116A................................................. 2.295 (5)............................................ 2.295 (7)............................................ 2.295 117................................  2.182, 2.290, 2.302 (2)............................................... 2.294 (2A)–(2C)................................... 2.294 A................................................. 2.302 A(4)............................................ 2.302 125................................................... 2.295 Police and Crime Act 2017................... 6.215 Pt 2 (ss 13–37).................................... 6.214 s 13..................................................... 6.214 ss 19, 20.............................................. 6.214

Police and Crime Act 2017 – contd ss 25–27.............................................. 6.215 Sch 5................................................... 6.214 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984............................ 2.333, 2.340, 4.181, 4.242, 4.263, 11.66, 11.102, 11.103, 11.104, 11.109, 12.1 Pt II (ss 8–23)..................................... 11.103 s 8............................................. 11.74, 11.103, 11.104, 12.1 (1)................................................... 11.103 ss 8–16............................................2.335, 12.1 s 9............................................... 4.181, 11.15, 11.103, 12.1 (2)................................................... 4.263 10..................................................... 12.1 (2)........................... 4.276, 11.103, 11.104 11.............................................. 11.103, 12.1 12..................................................... 12.1 ss 13, 14....................................... 11.103, 12.1 15, 16.............................................. 12.1 19, 20.............................................. 12.1 s 22..................................................... 11.79 s 24(2)................................................. 4.263 Pt V (ss 53–65B)................................ 2.115 s 63AA................................................ 2.332 63AB(2)............................................ 2.284 64..................................................... 2.331 (1A).............................................. 2.335 64A................................................... 2.297 67(9)................................................. 2.180 78..................................................... 4.208 Sch 1........................................... 2.335, 11.15, 11.103, 12.1 para 2............................................. 4.181 3(b)........................................ 4.263 Police and Justice Act 2006................... 6.209 s 35..................................................... 2.356 Police Officers (Central Service) Act 1989................................................ 6.203 Police Reform Act 2002.... 6.206, 6.213, 6.214, 10.78 s 4A..................................................... 6.214 s 5....................................................... 6.206 20..................................................... 6.213 21..................................................... 6.213 (3)................................................. 6.213 s 29A................................................... 6.215 s 29A(1).............................................. 6.215 ss 29B, 29C........................................ 6.215 32, 33.............................................. 6.206 s 37..................................................... 4.301 Sch 2................................................... 6.213 Sch 3............................................ 6.213, 6.214 Pt 2 (paras 10–14)......................... 6.213 Pt 3 (paras 15–32)......................... 6.213 para 19ZE................................. 6.214 para 25(2).................................. 6.213 Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011.......................6.203, 6.204, 6.205, 6.206, 6.208, 8.7, 9.6 s 2....................................................... 6.207

Table of statutes   xliii Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 – contd ss 5, 6.................................................. 6.203 ss 11–13.............................................. 6.203 s 11(1), (2).......................................... 8.7 s 14..................................................... 6.203 s 28..................................................  6.203, 8.7 s 29..................................................  6.203, 8.7 s 29(2), (3).......................................... 6.203 s 30..................................................... 6.203 s 36..................................................... 6.204 s 36(1)–(4).......................................... 6.204 Pt 1, Chap 6 (ss 50–76)...................... 6.203 s 77..................................................... 6.203 s 82..................................................... 6.206 ss 83, 84.............................................. 6.206 s 92..................................................... 6.204 Sch 2................................................... 8.7 Sch 6.................................................6.203, 8.7 Policing and Crime Act 2009................ 12.1 Pt 5 (ss 51–66).................................... 12.1 Pt 8 (ss 81–111).................................. 12.1 Policing and Crime Act 2017................ 10.78 s 28..................................................... 4.301 s 70..................................................... 2.332 Political Parties and Elections Act 2009................................................ 4.118 Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000................... 4.118 s 23..................................................... 2.46 Pt VII (ss 101–129)............................ 4.118 ss 139, 140.......................................... 4.118 Prevention of Corruption Act 1906............. 7.17 s 1(1), (2)............................................ 7.17 Prevention of Corruption Act 1916............. 7.17 s 2....................................................... 7.17 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005............2.339, 4.205, 10.80, 10.139, 12.1 s 16..................................................... 10.132 Sch............................................. 10.132, 11.80 Prevention of Terrorism (Additional Powers) Act 1996........................... 12.1 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 s 17..................................................... 12.1 Sch 7...............................................11.51, 12.1 Proceeds of Crime Act 1995................. 4.285 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002................. 12.1 Pt 5, Ch 3B........................................ 2.340 Pt 7 (ss 327–340)....................... 11.89, 11.105 ss 327–329.......................................... 11.105 s 339ZB.............................................. 2.46 Pt 8 (ss 341–412)................................ 11.121 s 345................................................... 11.121 s 345(5)............................................... 11.121 Protection of Children Act 1999........... 2.273 Protection of Freedoms Act 2012............... 1.11, 1.18, 1.79, 1.255, 1.257, 2.284, 2.290, 2.293, 2.295, 2.296, 2.298, 2.300, 2.305, 2.331, 2.332, 2.334, 4.29, 4.31, 4.60, 12.1

Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 – contd Pt 1, Chap 1 (ss 1–25)........................ 2.333 s 23..................................................... 2.332 Pt 2, Chap 2 (ss 37–38)...................... 4.216 s 68..................................................... 2.301 s 69..................................................... 2.302 s 71..................................................... 2.329 s 79..................................................... 2.291 s 82(1)................................................. 2.293 s 82(4)................................................. 2.294 s 82(5)................................................. 2.302 Pt 5, Chap 4 (ss 92–101).................... 2.290 Protection of Vulnerable Groups Act 2006................................................ 2.286 Public Audit (Wales) Act 2004.............. 12.1 Public Audit (Wales) Act 2013..........1.182, 12.9 Public Bodies Act 2011................... 7.120, 10.47 Schs 1, 2............................................. 7.120 Public Bodies (Admission to Meetings) Act 1960......................  7.96, 8.2, 8.3, 8.39, 8.77, 8.78, 8.79, 8.85 s 1(2)...............................................  8.28, 8.80 s 1(3A)................................................ 8.80 Sch 1................................................... 8.77 Public Bodies and Public Appointments etc (Scotland) Act 2003 Sch 2................................................... 7.9 Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889................................................ 7.17 s 1(1)................................................... 7.17 Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998............ 1.98, 4.149, 4.153, 4.282, 4.287, 4.289, 4.301, 4.304, 4.310, 4.317, 4.323, 4.327, 6.136, 7.9, 7.114, 7.117, 11.51 s 2....................................................... 4.301 8....................................................... 4.309 10.............................................. 4.153, 4.301 13..................................................... 4.301 14..................................................... 4.309 Public Involvement and Local Government Act 2012 Pt 5..................................................... 10.86 Public Records Acts..................  1.9, 1.154, 4.74 Public Records Act 1958.........  1.259, 4.2, 4.62, 4.73 s 3(4)................................................... 4.63 Sch 1................................................... 4.63 Public Records Act 1967............. 4.2, 4.62, 4.63 s 5....................................................... 4.64 Public Records (Northern Ireland) Act 1923............................................1.259, 4.73 Public Records (Scotland) Act 2011............. 4.62 Public Services Ombudsman (Wales) Act 2005..................... 4.132, 4.143, 6.138, 10.1 s 13..................................................... 6.139 14..................................................... 6.140 15.............................................. 6.141, 6.142 ss 16, 17.............................................. 6.145 19, 22.............................................. 6.148 s 25..................................................... 6.144

xliv  Table of statutes Public Services Ombudsman (Wales) Act 2005 – contd ss 26, 27, 32........................................ 6.143 Sch 1 para 14........................................... 6.138 Race Relations Act 1976........................ 1.83 s 50..................................................... 10.148 67(4)................................................. 10.134 Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000... 1.83 Rates Act 1984...................................6.66, 6.163 Recall of MPs Act 2015............  7.14, 7.15, 7.16 s 1....................................................... 7.15 s 5....................................................... 7.15 s 5(2)................................................... 7.15 ss 6–12................................................ 7.15 s 14..................................................... 7.15 s 14(3)................................................. 7.15 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000............................ 1.118, 1.197, 2.130, 2.230, 2.268, 2.335, 4.176, 4.182, 4.195, 4.196, 4.198, 4.199, 4.200, 4.202, 4.205, 4.208, 4.216, 4.218, 4.219, 4.231, 4.233, 4.236, 4.286, 4.319, 11.103, 12.1 Pt I (ss 1–25)...................................... 2.179 s 1(1)................................................... 4.200 (1)(a)............................................... 4.209 (3)................................................... 4.196 (6)(a), (b)........................................ 4.201 3(1)................................................... 4.200 5................................................ 4.195, 4.196 8(4)................................................... 4.326 10(1)................................................. 4.209 17..................................................... 4.205 18..................................................... 4.205 s 21..................................................... 4.201 22(a)–(h)........................................... 4.201 23(5)................................................. 4.209 24(2)................................................. 4.209 25(4)................................................. 4.210 Pt II (ss 26–48)............... 4.208, 4.209, 4.213, 4.215, 4.221 s 26..................................................... 4.209 28.............................................. 4.214, 4.221 (3).......................................... 4.214, 4.215 29.............................................. 4.214, 4.221 (3).......................................... 4.214, 4.215 30(1)................................................. 4.214 31(3)................................................. 4.209 ss 32–39.............................................. 4.212 s 33A................................................... 4.212 40..................................................... 4.212 (5)................................................. 4.209 44(2)................................................. 4.209 47(1)(b)............................................ 4.210 48(4).......................................... 4.209, 4.210 Pt III (ss 49–56)................................. 4.217 s 49..................................................... 4.218 53(4)................................................. 4.218

Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 – contd s 54..................................................... 4.218 55..................................................... 4.218 (4), (5), (7).................................... 4.231 59..................................................... 4.231 61..................................................... 4.231 ss 65–70.............................................. 4.196 s 65.............................................. 4.231, 4.233 67..................................................... 4.234 (8)................................................. 4.233 67A................................................... 4.207 68..................................................... 4.234 69..................................................... 4.234 72(2)................................................. 4.234 81(5)................................................. 4.221 Sch 1................................................... 4.214 Pts I, II........................................... 4.214 Sch 2................................................... 4.218 para 1............................................. 4.218 Regulatory Reform Act 2001................ 4.151 Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974... 2.7, 2.286, 2.287, 2.289, 2.290, 2.318, 2.325, 2.335 s 4(4)................................................... 2.287 Representation of the People Act 1983 s 89(1)................................................. 6.50 Representation of the People Act 2000... 2.268 Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006............................ 2.298, 2.301, 2.302, 2.332 s 1....................................................... 2.304 s 4....................................................... 2.329 s 57..................................................... 2.304 Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018......................................... 2.340 School Standards and Framework Act 1998.............................................  9.20, 9.43 s 25..................................................... 9.22 Pt III (ss 84–109)............................... 9.20 s 84..................................................... 9.20 85A................................................... 9.21 (1)(b).......................................... 9.21 86..................................................... 9.20 (1ZA)............................................ 9.20 86A................................................... 9.20 88P................................................... 9.22 88Q.................................................. 9.22 92........................................  9.23, 9.26, 9.44 94..................................................... 9.43 ss 104–109.......................................... 9.50 Scotland Act 1998.................................. 1.88 Scottish Parliamentary Commissions and Commissioners etc Act 2010.. 4.77 Scottish Parliamentary Standards Commissioner Act 2002................ 7.9 Scottish Public Services Ombudsman Act 2002....................................  6.138, 10.1 Security Service Act 1989.............. 1.118, 1.119, 2.130, 2.133, 4.222, 4.231, 4.286

Table of statutes   xlv Security Service Act 1989 – contd s 1(2)................................................... 4.224 (3)................................................... 4.224 (4)............................................ 4.223, 4.225 2(2)................................................... 4.222 (a)........................................ 4.222, 4.228 (b).............................................. 4.222 3................................................ 4.195, 4.221 s 5(4)................................................... 4.233 Sch 1 para 4(1)........................................ 1.297 Security Service Act 1996............... 4.221, 4.225 Senior Courts Act 1981 s 31(6)................................................. 10.172 33..................................................... 11.27 34..................................................... 11.28 37(3)................................................. 11.117 45(4)................................................. 11.4 72..................................................... 11.119 Serious Crime Act 2007........................ 2.46 Serious Crime Act 2015...................  2.356, 12.1 Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005.................................. 2.290, 6.209 Sex Offenders Act 1997.................. 2.268, 2.335 Sexual Offences Act 1956...................... 2.296 Sexual Offences Act 2003 Pt II (ss 80–136)..............  1.275, 2.268, 2.335 s 67..................................................... 2.218 ss 80–92.............................................. 1.275 s 82(1)................................................. 1.275 Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 s 148(2)............................................... 4.311 s 164(1)............................................... 4.311 Social Security Act 1998 s 3....................................................... 2.262 Social Security Administration Act 1992 s 110................................................... 2.262 Social Security Administration (Fraud) Act 1997 s 1....................................................... 2.262 Social Security Fraud Act 2001............. 2.262 ss 5, 6.................................................. 2.262 Special Educational Needs and Disability Act 2001........................ 9.46 Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997.................... 10.80 Statistics and Registration Service Act 2007.................................  1.79, 4.75, 4.295 ss 42–54.............................................. 2.262 Sch 2................................................... 2.262 Street Offences Act 1959 s 1....................................................... 2.321 Supreme Court Act 1981 see Senior Courts Act 1981 Tax Credits Act 2002 Sch 5................................................... 2.271 Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act 2010 s 129................................................... 12.1 Taxes Management Act 1970................ 2.342 s 20..................................  11.89, 11.106, 12.1

Taxes Management Act 1970 – contd s 20(8H)............................................. 1.29 20C.................................................. 11.106 51.............................................. 11.106, 12.1 Television Licences (Disclosure of Information) Act 2000................... 2.340 Telecommunications Act 1984 Sch 20 para 18(2)...................................... 9.78 Terrorism Act 2000................................ 2.339 ss 19, 20.........................................  2.339, 12.1 s 21CA................................................ 2.46 37..................................................... 2.339 38................................................  2.339, 12.1 38B................................................... 2.339 39................................................  2.339, 12.1 57..................................................... 12.1 58.................................................4.370, 12.1 ss 87, 88, 103, 104.............................. 12.1 Sch 5..................................  2.339, 11.52, 12.1 para 6(2)(b).................................... 11.52 Sch 6...............................................2.339, 12.1 Sch 7............................................ 4.217, 4.263 para 17........................................... 2.339 Terrorism Act 2006................................ 12.1 s 2....................................................... 4.370 Terrorism Act 2008 Pt 1..................................................... 2.339 Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011..... 2.339, 4.370, 10.80, 10.132 Terrorist Asset Freezing etc Act 2010... 2.339, 12.1 Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977................................................ 2.195 Town and Country Planning Act 1990. 9.67 Pt II (ss 10–54A)................................ 9.69 s 65..................................................... 9.77 69..................................................  9.74, 9.76 (3)................................................. 9.75 (5)................................................. 6.50 70(2)................................................. 10.162 71A................................................... 9.144 77.............................................. 9.81, 10.126 78..................................................... 9.81 83..................................................... 9.138 106............................................ 9.81, 10.162 ss 106A, 106B..................................... 9.81 s 188................................................... 9.74 (3)............................................... 6.50 198(4)(a)........................................... 6.50 214................................................  6.50, 9.74 288................................................... 10.133 321................................................... 9.120 Sch 1 para 13........................................... 10.81 Sch 7................................................... 9.138 Trade Descriptions Act 1968 s 26(2)................................................. 6.59 Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014.....................4.113 Transport Act 1947................................ 6.203

xlvi  Table of statutes Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1992................ 9.44, 10.161 s 10.......................................... 10.160, 10.162 (3)................................................. 10.160 (6)...................................... 10.153, 10.160 Sch 1................................................... 10.160 Tribunals of Enquiry (Evidence) Act 1921................................................ 10.103 Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007............................  1.32, 10.1, 10.3 s 15..................................................... 10.116 s 29.................................................1.253, 3.62 141................................................... 10.116 United Nations Act 1946...................... 2.339 Utilities Act 2000................................... 7.118 Value Added Tax Act 1983................  2.342, 12.1

Value Added Tax Act 1994..................... 12.1 Water Act 1989 s 33(2), (6).......................................... 10.81 146................................................... 10.81 Water Industry Act 1991 s 202(2)............................................... 6.50 Water Resources Act 1991 s 191B................................................. 1.217 Welfare Reform Act 2012............... 1.182, 10.80 Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999 ss 72, 80.............................................. 2.262 Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 s 57(5)................................................. 6.50 Sch 14................................................. 10.169 Sch 15................................................. 10.169 para 3(8)(a).................................... 6.50

Table of statutory instruments

All references are to paragraph number Abortion Regulations 1991, SI 1991/499.....................................2.85, 2.337 Abortion (Scotland) Regulations 1991, SI 1991/460.................................... 2.337 Accounts and Audit Regulations 2015, SI 2015/234..........................6.80, 9.16, 9.17 reg 8................................................... 6.80 reg 13................................................. 6.80 reg 16................................................. 6.82 reg 20................................................. 6.83 Air Navigation (General) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/601.......................... 1.230 Allocation of Housing and Homelessness (Eligibility) (England) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/1294...................................... 9.64 Allocation of Housing and Homelessness (Eligibility) (Wales) Regulations 2014, SI 2014/2603 (W 257).......................................... 9.64 Allocation of Housing and Homelessness (Review Procedures) Regulations 1999, SI 1999/71 reg 6................................................... 10.123 8................................................... 10.123 Allocation of Housing (England) Regulations 2002, SI 2002/3264... 9.64 Allocation of Housing (Wales) Regulations 2003, SI 2003/239..... 9.64 Asylum Appeals (Procedure) Rules 1993, SI 1993/1661........................ 10.131 Bathing Water Regulations 2013, SI 2013/1675 reg 9................................................... 6.50 reg 11................................................. 6.50 Childcare (Early Years and General Childcare Registers) (Common Provisions) Regulations 2008, SI 2008/976........................................ 2.262 Childcare (Supply and Disclosure of Information) (England) Regulations 2007, SI 2007/722..... 9.78

Childcare (Supply and Disclosure of Information) (England) (Amendment) Regulations 2008, SI 2008/961.................................... 2.262 Children Act 1989 Representations Procedure (England) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/1738........................ 10.92 Pt 2 (regs 3–5).................................... 10.93 regs 3–5.............................................. 10.93 Pt 3 (regs 6–13).................................. 10.94 reg 8................................................... 10.94 8(1)............................................... 10.94 9................................................... 10.94 11................................................. 10.95 12................................................. 10.96 Pt 4 (regs 14–20)................................ 10.97 regs 14, 15.......................................... 10.97 reg 16................................................. 10.98 17................................................. 10.99 17(3)–(5)....................................... 10.99 regs 18–20.......................................... 10.100 Pt 5 (regs 21–23)................................ 10.101 reg 21................................................. 10.101 21(a)–(d)....................................... 10.101 22................................................. 10.101 23................................................. 10.102 Civil Procedure (Amendment No 5) Rules 2013, SI 2013/1571.............. 11.85 Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (Code of Practice) Order 2005, SI 2005/985.......................... 11.79 Civil Procedure Rules 1998, SI 1998/3132......................... 2.29, 2.256, 8.51, 10.67, 10.69, 11.18 r 1.1...................................................1.13, 2.19 1.2.................................................... 11.18 1.4(2)(e)........................................... 10.67 Pt 4..................................................... 10.172 r 5.4.................................................... 1.155 5.4(2)(c)............................................ 1.155 5.4(5)(b)........................................... 1.155 PD 6B................................................ 2.237 PD 8A para 19................................... 10.176 Pt 18............................................11.19, 11.112 r 25.1.................................................. 11.116

xlviii  Table of statutory instruments Civil Procedure Rules 1998 – contd PD 25A.............................................. 11.119 r 26.4(1).............................................. 10.67 26.4(2).............................................. 10.56 Pt 31..............................................11.19, 11.56 r 31.2.............................................11.20, 11.25 31.3(2).............................................. 11.20 31.4.............................................11.18, 11.21 31.6.............................................11.22, 11.58 (b).........................................11.20, 11.22 (c).............................................. 11.22 31.7.................................................. 11.24 (2).............................................. 11.22 rr 31.8, 31.9........................................ 11.23 r 31.10................................................ 11.24 31.12................................................ 11.56 rr 31.14, 31.15.................................... 11.26 r 31.16...........................................11.27, 11.29 (3)(d)....................................... 11.27 (4), (5)................................11.27, 11.28 31.17............................... 11.28, 11.29, 11.35, 11.114 r 31.17(3)(a)........................................ 11.35 31.19(1)........................... 11.30, 11.31, 11.32, 11.58, 11.62 (2)............................................ 11.62 (3)........................... 11.24, 11.30, 11.31, 11.32 (4)............................................ 11.24 (8).......................................11.30, 11.58 31.20.........................................11.33, 11.108 31.21................................................ 11.34 31.22................................................ 11.34 (1)–(3)..................................... 11.37 31.23................................................ 11.34 PD 31.2A........................................... 11.21 PD 31B.............................................. 11.21 r 32.1.............................................4.208, 11.54 32.13................................................ 1.155 Pt 34............................11.113, 11.114, 11.115 r 35.10(4)............................................ 11.26 Pt 39................................................... 11.2 r 39.2.................................................. 1.155 (3).............................................. 11.4 39.3.................................................. 1.155 PD 40F............................................... 11.3 r 48.7(3).............................................. 11.89 Pt 54.................................... 1.250, 1.273, 8.51, 10.47, 10.116, 10.130, 10.164, 11.53, 11.54 r 54.4.................................................. 11.56 54.10(2)............................................ 8.51 54.19................................................ 8.51 62.10................................................ 11.4 Pt 74................................................... 11.130 Pt 76................................................... 1.132 Pt 82................................................... 11.85 Code of Conduct (Qualifying Local Government Employees) (Wales) Order 2001, SI 2001/2280............. 7.25 Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations 2010, SI 2010/948 reg 122, 123....................................... 9.81

Competition Act 1998 (Competition and Markets Authority’s Rules) Order 2014, SI 2014/458............... 11.125 Competition Act 1998 (Directors’ Rules) Order 2000, SI 2000/293 Sch, r 30(1)(c)(i)................................. 1.217 Complaints against Schools (England) Regulations 2010, SI 2010/853..... 10.5 Compulsory Purchase (Inquiries Procedure) Rules 2007, SI 2007/3617 r 7(4)................................................... 6.50 Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 (Commencement No 4 and Saving Provision) Order 2011, SI 2011/46 art 3(b)(i)............................................ 1.194 art 4.................................................... 1.194 Contracting Out (Local Authorities Social Services Functions) (England) Order 2014, SI 2014/829........................................ 10.89 Control of Atmospheric Pollution (Appeals) Regulations 1977, SI 1977/17.......................................... 1.217 Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999, SI 1999/743 Sch 8 para 18........................................... 1.217 Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations 1997, SI 1997/3032... 3.38 Coroners (Inquest) Rules 2013, SI 2013/1616...................................... 10.176 Pt 3..................................................... 10.176 Coroners Rules 1984, SI 1984/552 r 36(1)................................................. 10.176 Council Tax (Administration and Enforcement) Regulations 1992, SI 1992/613.................................... 6.198 Crime and Courts Act 2013 (Commencement No 4) Order 2013, SI 2013/2200........................ 11.6 Crime (International Co-operation) Act 2003 (Commencement No 1) Order 2004, SI 2004/786............... 2.135 Criminal Justice and Data Protection (Protocol No 36) Regulations 2014, SI 2014/3141 Pt 4..................................................... 2.104 Criminal Procedure Rules 2005, SI 2005/384 Pts 22, 23............................................ 11.77 Pts 25, 26............................................ 11.77 Criminal Procedure Rules 2010, SI 2010/60.......................................... 1.155 Criminal Procedure Rules 2011, SI 2011/1709...................................... 1.155 Crown Court (Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996) (Confidentiality) Rules 1997, SI 1997/699........................................ 11.79 Crown Court (Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996) (Disclosure) Rules 1997, SI 1997/698.................. 11.79

Table of statutory instruments   xlix Crown Court (Reports Relating to Adult Witnesses) Rules 2004, SI 2004/2420...................................... 12.1 Data Protection (Charges and Information) Regulations 2018, SI 2018/480........................................ 2.142 Data Protection (Miscellaneous Subject Access Exemptions) Order 2000, SI 2000/419.......................... 2.78 Data Protection (Processing of Sensitive Personal Data) Order 2012, SI 2012/1978........................ 2.36 Data Protection (Subject Access Modification) (Education) Order 2000, SI 2000/414................2.76, 9.32, 9.38 Data Protection (Subject Access Modification) (Health) Order 1987, SI 1987/1903........................ 2.201 Data Protection (Subject Access Modification) (Health) Order 2000, SI 2000/413.........................2.64, 2.76 Data Protection (Subject Access Modification) (Social Work) (Amendment) Order 2005, SI 2005/467........................................ 2.76 Data Protection (Subject Access Modification) (Social Work) (Amendment) Order 2011, SI 2011/1034...................................... 2.76 Data Protection (Subject Access Modification) (Social Work) Order 2000, SI 2000/415............... 2.76 Data Protection Tribunal (Enforcement Appeals) Rules 2000, SI 2000/189.1.247 Data Protection Tribunal (National Security Appeals) Rules 2000, SI 2000/206........................................ 1.247 Data Retention and Acquisition Regulations 2018, SI 2018/1123... 4.237 Defamation (Operators of Websites) Regulations 2013, SI 2013/3028... 7.9 Digital Government (Disclosure of Information) Regulations 2018, SI 2018/912.....................................2.269, 4.33 Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (Amendment) Regulations 2003, SI 2003/1673 reg 31................................................. 6.110 Education (Admissions Appeals Arrangements) (England) Regulations 2002, SI 2002/2899... 9.43 Education (Admission Appeals Arrangements) (Wales) Regulations 2005, SI 2005/1398... 9.43 Education (Admission Forums) (Wales) Regulations 2003, SI 2003/2962 (W 279).......................................... 9.21 Education (Determination of Admission Arrangements) (Wales) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/174..... 9.2

Education (Determining School Admission Arrangements for the Initial Year) Regulations 1998, SI 1998/3165...................................... 9.20 Education (Grammar School Ballots) Regulations 1998, SI 1998/2876... 9.50 Education (Information About Individual Pupils) (England) Regulations 2013, SI 2013/2094....9.27, 9.48 regs 3–5.............................................. 9.27 Sch 1................................................... 9.27 Pts 2, 3........................................... 9.27 Education (Information About Individual Pupils) (Wales) Regulations 2007, SI 2007/3562... 9.27 Education (Investigation of Parents’ Complaints) (England) Regulations 2007, SI 2007/1089......................... 9.41 regs 3, 5, 6.......................................... 9.41 Education (Pupil Exclusions and Appeals) (Maintained Schools) (Wales) Regulations 2003, SI 2003/3227...................................... 9.45 Education (Pupil Information) (England) Regulations 2005, SI 2005/1437.................................. 9.27, 9.28, 9.30, 9.33 reg 3................................................... 9.28 (1)............................................... 9.28 (1)(c)........................................... 9.29 (2)............................................... 9.28 (3)............................................... 9.28 (3)(a)........................................... 9.29 (4), (5)......................................... 9.28 5(2), (3)......................................... 9.30 (4)............................................... 9.32 (5), (6)......................................... 9.31 6(7)(a)........................................... 9.33 9................................................... 9.34 Sch 1................................................... 9.33 Sch 2................................................... 9.34 Education (School Information) (Wales) Regulations 1999, SI 1999/1812...................................... 6.50 Education (School Inspection) (England) Regulations 2005, SI 2005/2038...................................... 9.40 Education (School Inspection) (Wales) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/1714... 9.40 Education (School Records) Regulations 1989, SI 1989/1261... 2.190 Elected Local Policing Bodies (Specified Information) Order 2011, SI 2011/3050........................ 8.7 Elected Local Policing Bodies (Specified Information) (Amendment) Order 2012, SI 2012/2479...................................... 8.7 Electricity Generating Stations and Overhead Lines (Inquiries Procedure) Rules 2007, SI 2007/841........................................ 6.50

l  Table of statutory instruments Electronic Communications Code (Conditions and Restrictions) Amendment Regulations 2017, SI 2017/753........................................ 2.343 Electronic Communications Code (Conditions and Restrictions) Regulations 2003, SI 2003/2553... 2.343 Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions Regulations 2016, SI 2016/696.....................................1.18, 2.354 Employment Relations Act 1999 (Blacklist) Regulations 2010, SI 2010/493.....................................2.24, 2.192 Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2004, SI 2004/1861........1.297, 4.311, 11.4 Sch 1 r 22................................................ 4.311 r 54(2)............................................ 10.132 Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2013, SI 2013/1237... 10.161 Sch 2................................................... 10.161 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 (Abolition of Conservation Area Consent) (Consequential and Saving Provisions) (England) Order 2013, SI 2013/2146............. 9.89 Environmental Information Regulations 1992, SI 1992/3240......................... 3.2 reg 2(2), (3)......................................... 3.2 reg 4................................................... 3.2 Environmental Information Regulations 2004, SI 2004/3391.1.18, 1.21, 1.30, 1.44, 1.85, 1.87, 1.102, 1.124, 1.195, 1.198, 1.199, 1.214, 1.232, 1.238, 1.241, 1.291, 1.304, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.8, 3.9, 3.11, 3.13, 3.14, 3.16, 3.18, 3.19, 3.25, 3.29, 3.35, 3.38, 3.39, 3.40, 3.63, 4.42, 4.67, 4.73, 8.59 reg 2..................................................3.14, 3.52 reg 2(1)............................................... 3.12 (a)........................................... 3.20 (b).........................................3.44, 3.50 reg 2(2)(c)........................................... 3.12 reg 2(2)(d).......................................... 3.16 Pt 2 (regs 4–11).................................. 3.12 reg 4..................................................3.19, 6.50 (2)............................................... 3.43 (2)(b).......................................... 3.43 5..................................................3.20, 3.29 (1)..............................................3.25, 3.59 (2)..............................................3.25, 3.28 (6)............................................... 3.38 6.........................................3.24, 3.25, 3.59 (1)............................................... 3.25 (1)(b).......................................... 3.43

Environmental Information Regulations 2004 – contd reg 6(2)(a)........................................... 3.28 7..................................................3.20, 3.22 8..................................................3.23, 3.33 8(1)..............................................3.23, 3.25 reg 8(2)............................................... 3.25 eg 8(2)(b).......................................... 3.25 8(8)............................................... 3.23 9..................................................3.27, 3.31 9(1)............................................... 3.43 10................................................. 3.28 11.............................. 3.22, 3.58, 3.59, 3.61 12............................. 3.19, 3.30, 3.32, 3.49, 3.54 (1)......................... 3.22, 3.30, 3.32, 3.49, 3.55, 3.56 (b).............................3.22, 3.35, 3.36, 3.42, 3.43, 3.49, 3.56 (2)............................................3.30, 3.35 (3)............................................3.20, 3.54 (4)...........................................3.22, 3.30, 3.31, 3.55 (a)........................................3.31, 3.41 (b)..................................... 3.29, 3.31, 3.32, 3.43 (c)......................................... 3.31 (d)....................................  3.31, 3.34, 3.42, 3.55 (e)...................................... 3.31, 3.35, 3.36, 3.46 (5)........................................ 1.238, 3.22, 3.30, 3.55 (a).............................. 3.37, 3.41, 3.49 (b)..............................3.37, 3.42, 3.50 (c)......................................3.37, 3.38, 3.43, 3.44, (d)..................................... 3.37, 3.38, 3.45, 3.50, (e)......................................3.37, 3.38, 3.39, 3.42, 3.46, 3.50 (f)......................................3.37, 3.40, 3.42, 3.47, 3.50 (g)..............................3.37, 3.40, 3.50 (6)............................................3.41, 3.49 (7)............................................. 3.49 (8)............................................3.31, 3.35 (9)............................................3.43, 3.50 (11)..........................................3.50, 3.51 13.............................. 3.22, 3.30, 3.54, 3.55 (1)...................................3.22, 3.52, 3.55 (2)............................................. 3.52 (2)(a)(ii).................................... 3.22 (2A).......................................... 3.52 (2B).......................................... 3.53 (3)............................................3.22, 3.53 (3A).......................................... 3.53 (4), (5)....................................... 3.53 (5A), (5B).................................. 3.53 (6)............................................. 3.53

Table of statutory instruments   li Environmental Information Regulations 2004 – contd reg 14............................. 3.22, 3.24, 3.29, 3.32, 3.52, 3.59 (2)............................................3.28, 3.43 (3)............................................. 3.43 15................................................. 3.37 15(1)............................................3.56, 3.59 Pt 4 (regs 16, 17)................................ 3.12 reg 16................................................. 3.7, 3.27 reg 16(6)............................................. 3.57 reg 17................................................. 3.57 Pt 5 (regs 18–21)................................ 3.12 reg 18........................... 1.238, 3.22, 3.52, 3.55, 3.59, 3.61 (6)............................................. 3.4 reg 18(7)............................................. 3.37 reg 19................................................. 3.59 reg 20................................................. 3.30 Environmental Information (Amendment) Regulations 1998, SI 1998/1447........ 3.2 Environmental Information (Scotland) Regulations 2004, SSI 2004/520... 3.12 Equality Act 2010 (Gender Pay Gap Information) Regulations 2017, SI 2017/172........................................ 2.336 Equality Act 2010 (Specific Duties and Public Authorities) Regulations 2017, SI 2017/353.......................... 2.336 Sch 2................................................... 2.336 Ethical Standards in Public Life etc (Scotland) Act 2000 (Register of Interests) Regulations 2003, SSI 2003/135........................................ 7.9 Family Proceedings Rules 1991, SI 1991/1247...................................... 11.6 r 4.23.................................................. 11.6 10.20A.............................................. 11.6 Family Procedure Rules 2010, SI 2010/2955...................................... 11.6 r 12.73................................................ 11.6 Food Industry Development Scheme 1997, SI 1997/2673 Sch para 10(2)...................................... 1.217 Freedom of Information (Additional Public Authorities) Order 2011, SI 2011/1041.....................................1.11, 1.87 Freedom of Information and Data Protection (Appropriate Limit and Fees) Regulations 2004, SI 2004/3244............................1.71, 1.72, 1.74 reg 3(1)............................................... 1.74 4(3)..............................................1.71, 1.72 5................................................... 1.74 (3)............................................... 1.74 6................................................... 1.74 7..................................................1.72, 1.74 Freedom of Information (Fees for Disclosure under Section 13) (Scotland) Regulations 2004, SSI 2004/376........................................ 1.314

Freedom of Information (Fees for Required Disclosure) (Scotland) Regulations 2004, SSI 2004/ 467.................................................. 1.314 Freedom of Information (Removal of References to Public Authorities) Order 2011, SI 2011/1042............. 1.11 Freedom of Information (Time for Compliance with Request) Regulations 2004, SI 2004/3364..........1.75, 1.263 Freedom of Information (Time for Compliance with Request) Regulations 2009, SI 2009/1369... 1.75 Freedom of Information (Time for Compliance with Request) Regulations 2010, SI 2010/2768... 1.75 Gender Recognition (Disclosure of Information) (England, Wales and Northern Ireland) Order 2005, SI 2005/635........................................ 2.342 General Medical Council (Fitness to Practise Committees) Rules Order of Council 2000, SI 2000/2051..... 10.110 General Medical Council (the Professional Conduct Committee, the General Health Committee and the Committee on Professional Performance) (Amendment) Rules Order of Council 2000, SI 2000/2034....................................... 10.110 Government Resources and Accounts Act 2000 (Audit of Health Service Bodies) Order 2003, SI 2003/1324...................................... 12.25 Government Resources and Accounts Act 2000 (Audit of Public Bodies) Order 2003, SI 2003/1326............. 12.25 Government Resources and Accounts Act 2000 (Rights of Access of Comptroller and Auditor General) Order 2003, SI 2003/1325............. 12.25 Health Protection (Notification) Regulations 2010, SI 2010/659..... 2.337 Health Service (Control of Patient Information) Regulations 2002, SI 2002/1438...................................... 2.196 reg 3................................................... 2.337 reg 5................................................... 2.337 Highways (Inquiries Procedure) Rules 1994, SI 1994/3263 r 6(7)................................................... 6.50 Homelessness (Review Procedure) Regulations 2018, SI 2018/223..........10.88, 10.123 Housing (Right to Buy)(Information to Secure Tenants)(England) Order 2005, SI 2005/1735........................ 9.65 Housing (Right to Buy) (Information to Secure Tenants) (Wales) Order 2005, SI 2005/2681 (W 187)......... 9.65

lii  Table of statutory instruments Immigration and Asylum Appeals (Procedure) Rules 2000, SI 2000/2333...................................... 10.117 Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 (Data Sharing Code of Practice) (Revocation) Order 2007, SI 2007/3447........................ 2.262 Income Tax (Building Societies) (Dividends and Interest) (Amendment) Regulations 2001, SI 2001/404.................................... 2.342 Independent Educational Provision in England (Provision of Information) and Non-Maintained Special Schools (England) and Independent School Standards (Amendment) Regulations 2018, SI 2018/901.................................... 9.27 Independent Schools (Provision of Information) (Wales) Regulations 2003, SI 2003/3230........................ 9.27 Information Tribunal (Enforcement Appeals) (Amendment) Rules 2002, SI 2002/2722........................ 1.247 Information Tribunal (Enforcement Appeals) Rules 2005, SI 2005/14... 1.247 r 29..................................................1.253, 3.62 Information Tribunal (National Security Appeals) Rules 2005, SI 2005/13.... 1.247 r 24..................................................... 1.247 INSPIRE Regulations 2009, SI 2009/3157............................1.18, 3.63, 4.42 regs 6, 7.............................................. 3.63 Intellectual Property Act 2014 (Commencement No 3 and Transitional Provisions) Order 2014, SI 2014/2330 art 3.................................................... 1.15 Sch...................................................... 1.15 Inquiry Rules 2006, SI 2006/1838........ 10.104 Local Access Forums (England) Regulations 2007, SI 2007/268..... 6.202 Local Authorities (Members’ Allowances) (England) Regulations 2003, SI 2003/1021 reg 15................................................. 9.18 Local Audit (Appointing Person) Regulations 2015, SI 2015/192..... 6.71 Local Audit (Auditor Panel) Regulations 2014, SI 2014/3224... 6.74 reg 7................................................... 6.75 reg 9................................................... 6.74 Local Audit (Auditor Panel Independence) Regulations 2014, SI 2014/2845.................................. 6.74 Local Audit (Liability Limitation Agreements) Regulations 2014, SI 2014/1628...................................... 6.77 Local Audit (Smaller Authorities) Regulations 2015, SI 2015/184 Pts 4, 5................................................ 6.71 reg 9................................................... 6.71

Local Authorities (Access to Meetings and Documents) (Period of Notice) (England) Order 2002, SI 2002/715.......................................7.84, 8.38 Local Authorities (Arrangements for the Discharge of Functions) (England) Regulations 2012, SI 2012/1019...................................... 6.19 Local Authorities (Changing Executive Arrangements and Alternative Arrangements) (Wales) Regulations 2004, SI 2004/3158... 6.16 Local Authorities (Conduct of Referendums) (England) (Amendment) Regulations 2004, SI 2004/226.................................... 6.12 Local Authorities (Executive Arrangements) (Access to Information) (England) Regulations 2000, SI 2000/3272 reg 2................................................... 7.92 6................................................... 7.92 Local Authorities (Executive Arrangements) (Meetings and Access to Information) (England) Regulations 2012, SI 2012/2089.6.31, 6.32, 6.39, 7.92, 7.95, 7.96, 8.35 Pt 2..................................................... 6.31 Pt 4..................................................... 6.31 Pt 5....................................................6.29, 6.30 Pt 6..................................................... 6.31 reg 3................................................... 6.32 reg 4................................................... 6.32 reg 4(1)(c)........................................... 6.32 reg 4(2)............................................... 6.32 reg 4(2)(b).......................................... 6.32 reg 4(3)–(5)......................................... 6.32 reg 4(5A)–(5C)................................... 6.32 reg 4(6)–(9)......................................... 6.32 regs 5, 6.............................................. 8.35 reg 8..................................................6.32, 6.33 reg 9.........................................6.32, 6.34, 8.35 reg 9(1)............................................... 6.34 reg 10................................................. 6.35 reg 10(1)(a)–(c)................................... 6.35 reg 11................................................. 6.35 regs 12, 13.........................................6.37, 7.92 regs 14, 15.......................................... 7.92 reg 16.......................................6.35, 6.38, 7.92 reg 16(1), (2)....................................... 7.92 reg 16(3)............................................6.38, 7.92 reg 16(4)–(8)....................................... 7.92 reg 17................................................6.38, 7.93 regs 18, 19.......................................... 7.93 reg 20.............................. 6.33, 6.34, 6.37, 7.94 reg 20(2)(b)........................................ 6.39 reg 21................................................. 6.40 reg 21(1)............................................. 6.36 reg 22................................................6.35, 6.40 Local Authorities (Functions and Responsibilities) (England) Regulations 2000, SI 2000/2853... 6.10

Table of statutory instruments   liii Local Authorities (Indemnities for Members and Officers) Order 2004, SI 2004/3082........................ 6.124 Local Authorities (Model Code of Conduct) (Wales) Order 2008, SI 2008/788........................................ 7.23 Local Authorities (Public Health Functions and Entry to Premises by Local Healthwatch Representatives) Regulations 2013, SI 2013/351.......................... 8.83 Local Authorities (Standing Orders) Regulations 1993, SI 1993/202..... 6.123 Local Authorities (Standing Orders) (England) Regulations 2001, SI 2001/3384...................................7.32, 7.105 reg 3................................................... 7.107 4................................................... 7.108 Sch 1................................................... 7.107 Pt IV.............................................. 7.108 Sch 2................................................... 7.107 Local Authorities (Standing Orders) (Wales) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/1275...................................... 7.32 Local Authority (Public Health, Health and Wellbeing Boards and Health Scrutiny) Regulations 2013, SI 2013/218........................................ 8.82 Local Authority Social Services and National Health Service (Complaints) Regulations 2009, SI 2009/309.................................10.90, 10.107 regs 7–9.............................................. 10.108 regs 13–18.......................................... 10.90 Local Education Authorities and Children’s Services Authorities (Integration of Functions) Order 210, SI 2010/1158.......................... 9.20 Local Government (Access to Information) (Variation) Order 2006, SI 2006/88 Sch 1................................................... 8.29 Local Government Changes for England (Finance) Regulations 1994, SI 1994/2825 reg 17................................................. 6.59 Local Government etc (Scotland) Act 1994 (Commencement No 7 and Savings) Order 1996, SI 1996/ 323 art 4.................................................... 6.101 Sch 2................................................... 6.101 Local Government (Inspection of Documents) (Sumarry of Rights) Order 1986, SI 1986/854............... 6.50 Local Government Investigations (Functions of Monitoring Officers and Standards Committees) (Wales) Regulations 2001, SI 2001/2281 (W 171)........................ 6.92 Local Government Officers (Political Restrictions) Regulations 1990, SI 1990/851........................................ 7.27

Local Government (Publication of Staffing Information) (Wales) Regulations 1996, SI 1996/1899... 6.50 Local Government (Transparency Requirements) (England) Regulations 2015, SI 2015/480..........9.148, 9.156 Magistrates’ Courts (Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996) (Confidentiality) Rules 1997, SI 1997/704.......................... 11.79 Magistrates’ Courts (Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996) (Disclosure) Rules 1997, SI 1997/703........................................ 11.79 Mental Health Review Tribunal Rules 1983, SI 1983/942.......................... 11.4 r 21(5)................................................. 11.4 Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018, SI 2018/506.... 1.18, 2.361 NHS Redress (Wales) Measure 2008 (Commencement) Order 2011, SI 2011/211 (W 42)............................ 10.112 Noise Insulation Regulations 1975, SI 1975/1763 reg 6(3)............................................... 6.44 Official Secrets Act 1989 (Prescription) Order 1990, SI 1990/200..........4.177, 4.251 Official Secrets (Prohibited Places) Order 1975, SI 1975/182............... 4.158 Openness of Local Government Bodies Regulations 2014, SI 2014/2095.6.32, 6.47, 7.96, 8.2, 8.21, 8.40, 8.41, 8.42, 8.74, 8.78, 8.80, 9.3 Pt 3 (regs 6–10)..........................8.7, 8.62, 8.64 reg 7................................................... 6.48 reg 7(1), (2)......................................... 8.62 reg 7(3), (4)........................................6.47, 8.62 reg 8.........................................6.48, 6.49, 8.63 reg 8(1)............................................... 8.63 reg 8(2)..............................................6.48, 8.63 reg 8(3)–(5)......................................... 8.63 reg 9..................................................6.49, 8.64 reg 9(1), (2)......................................... 8.64 reg 10................................................. 8.64 reg 10(1), (2)....................................... 8.64 Passenger Name Record Data and Miscellaneous Amendments Regulations 2018, SI 2018/598..... 2.269 Patient Information Advisory Group (Establishment) Regulations 2001, SI 2001/2836.................................. 2.196 Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Regulations 1990, SI 1990/1519........................ 9.79 Planning (National Security Directions and Appointed Representatives) (England) Rules 2006, SI 2006/1284...................................... 9.120

liv  Table of statutory instruments Planning (National Security Directions and Appointed Representatives) (Wales) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/1387...................................... 9.120 Police Act 1997 (Criminal Records) (Amendment) Regulations 2011, SI 2011/719.................................... 2.286 Police Act 1997 (Criminal Records Certificates: Relevant Matters) (Amendment) (England and Wales) Order 2013, SI 2013/1200......2.286, 2.288, 2.312, 2.325, 2.327 Police Act 1997 (Criminal Records) Regulations 2002, SI 2002/233 reg 5A................................................. 2.327 Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2012, SI 2012/ 1204................................................ 6.213 Police Super-complaints (Criteria for the Making and Revocation of Designations) Regulations 2018, SI 2018/412.................................... 6.215 Police Super-complaints (Designation and Procedure) Regulations 2018, SI 2018/748.................................... 6.215 Pre-Release Access to Official Statistics Order 2008, SI 2008/2998............. 4.295 Prison Rules 1964, SI 1964/388 r 43..................................................... 10.157 Prison (Amendment) Rules 2002, SI 2002/2116...................................... 10.141 Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) (Amendment) Regulations 2004, SI 2004/1039.................................. 2.343 Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) (Amendment) Regulations 2011, SI 2011/1208.............................2.343, 2.353 Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003, SI 2003/2426..........1.18, 2.137, 2.268, 2.343, 2.345, 2.353 reg 2................................................... 2.344 reg 4................................................... 2.344 reg 5................................................... 2.345 regs 5A–5C........................................ 2.34 regs 6–8.............................................. 2.346 regs 9–11............................................ 2.347 reg 14................................................. 2.348 regs 15, 16.....................................2.347, 2.349 regs 17–23.......................................... 2.349 reg 27................................................. 2.349 reg 28................................................. 2.350 reg 29................................................. 2.351 reg 29A............................................... 2.351 reg 30................................................. 2.351 reg 31................................................. 2.352 regs 31A, 31B..................................... 2.351 reg 32................................................. 2.352 reg 37................................................. 2.352

Public Contracts Regulations 2015, SI 2015/102........................................ 9.153 reg 5................................................... 9.155 Public Interest Disclosure (Prescribed Persons) (Amendment) Order 2004, SI 2004/3265........................ 4.303 Public Interest Disclosure (Prescribed Persons) (Amendment) Order 2018, SI 2018/795.......................... 4.303 Public Interest Disclosure (Prescribed Persons) Order 2014, SI 2014/ 2418 Sch...................................................... 4.303 Public Record Office (Fees) Regulations 2005, SI 2005/471..... 4.62 Pupil Information (Wales) Regulations 2011, SI 2011/1942.......................9.27, 9.48 RAF Greenham Common Byelaws 1985, SI 1985/485.......................... 10.173 Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Covert Human Intelligence Sources: Code of Practice) Order 2014, SI 2014/3119........................ 4.210 Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Covert Human Intelligence Sources – Code of Practice) (Scotland) Order 2018, SSI 2018/53.......................................... 4.210 Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Covert Surveillance and Property Interference: Code of Practice) Order 2010, SI 2010/463............... 4.210 Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Designation of an International Agreement) Order 2004, SI 2004/158........................................ 4.205 Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Directed Surveillance and Covert Human Intelligence Sources) Order 2010, SI 2010/521..........4.209, 4.211 arts 2–8............................................... 4.214 art 10.................................................. 4.214 Sch Pt I Column 1, 2.............................. 4.215 Pt II Column 2.................................. 4.215 Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Extension of Authorisation Provisions: Legal Consultations) Order 2010, SI 2010/461............... 4.210 Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Foreign Surveillance Operations) Order 2004, SI 2004/1128............. 4.208 Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Monetary Penalty Notices and Consents for Interceptions) Regulations 2011, SI 2011/1340... 4.200 Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Prescription of Offices, Ranks and Positions) (Amendment) Order 2002, SI 2002/1298............. 4.221

Table of statutory instruments   lv Regulatory Reform (Collaboration etc. between Ombudsmen) Order 2007, SI 2007/1889...................1.260, 4.133 art 9.................................................... 6.143 Rehabilitation of Offenders Act (Exceptions) Order 1975, SI 1975/1023..................... 2.287, 2.288, 2.307, 2.311, 2.319, 2.325 art 2A(2)............................................. 2.288 art 2A(3)(c)......................................... 2.288 art 3...............................................2.287, 2.327 art 4.................................................... 2.287 Sch 1................................................... 2.287 Rehabilitation of Offenders Act (Exceptions) Order 1975 (Amendment) (England and Wales) Order 2013, SI 2013/1198......2.286, 2.312 Reporting of Savings Income Information Regulations 2003, SI 2003/3297...................................... 12.1 Representation of the People (England and Wales) Regulations 2001, SI 2001/341 reg 114............................................... 2.268 Re-use of Public Sector Information Regulations 2015, SI 2015/1415.1.18, 4.34, 4.40, 4.41, 4.42, 4.55, 4.56, 4.60 reg 2................................................... 4.41 reg 3(1)(aa)......................................... 4.42 reg 8................................................... 4.53 reg 8(4)............................................... 4.53 reg 8(4)(b), (c).................................... 4.54 reg 11................................................. 4.42 reg 12................................................. 4.61 reg 14................................................. 4.61 reg 14(2)............................................. 4.50 reg 15................................................. 4.47 reg 15(11)........................................... 4.47 reg 17................................................. 4.56 regs 18, 19.......................................... 4.48 Road Vehicles (Registration and Licensing) Regulations 2002, SI 2000/2742...................................... 2.271 Rules of the Supreme Court 1965, SI 1965/1776 Order 24 r 1(1).............................................. 2.197 r 3.................................................. 11.54 r 14A.............................................. 11.37 Order 53....................................10.130, 10.164 Order 77 r 12................................................ 11.19 Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 (Controlled Activity and Prescribed Criteria) Regulations 2012................................................ 2.301 School Admissions (Admission Arrangements and Co-ordination of Admission Arrangements) (England) Regulations 2012, SI 2012/8............................................ 9.20

School Admissions (Admission Arrangements and Co-ordination of Admission Arrangements) (England) (Amendment) Regulations 2014, SI 2014/ 2886................................................ 9.20 School Admissions (Appeals Arrangements) (England) Regulations 2012, SI 2012/9.......... 9.43 School Discipline (Pupil Exclusions and Reviews) (England) Regulations 2012, SI 2012/1033........................ 9.45 School Governors’ Annual Reports (Wales) Regulations 2011, SI 2011/1939...................................... 9.36 School Information (England) Regulations 2008, SI 2008/3093... 6.50, 9.20, 9.26 Pt 2..................................................... 9.26 regs 6, 7.............................................. 9.26 regs 8, 9.............................................. 6.50 regs 9, 10............................................ 9.26 Sch 2 para 7, 8......................................... 9.26 Sch 3 paras 9–11..................................... 9.26 para 15........................................... 9.26 School Information (Wales) Regulations 2011, SI 2011/1944) (W 211).......................................... 9.20 School Standards and Framework Act 1998 (Admissions) (Modifications No 2) Regulations 1998, SI 1998/3130...................................... 9.20 Scotland Act 1998 (Cross-Border Public Authorities) (Specification) Order 1999, SI 1999/1319............. 1.20 Scotland Act  1998 (Modifications of Schedules 4 and 5) Order 1999, SI 1999/1749...................................... 1.309 Scottish Parliamentary Standards Commissioner Act 2002 (Power to Call for Witnesses and Documents) (England, Wales and Northern Ireland) Order 2003, SI 2003/2278...................................... 7.9 Sexual Offences Act 2003 (Remedial) Order 2012, SI 2012/1883............. 2.313 Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 (Commencement No 3) Regulations 2015, SI 2015/2029... 4.311 Smaller Authorities (Transparency Requirements) (England) Regulations 2015, SI 2015/494..........9.148, 9.156 Special Educational Needs and Disability Regulations 2014, SI 2014/1530...................................... 9.46 regs 43–45.......................................... 9.46 Special Educational Needs Tribunal for Wales Regulations 2012, SI 2012/322 (W 15)............................ 9.46

lvi  Table of statutory instruments Special Educational Needs (Provision of Information by Local Education Authorities) (England) Regulations 2001, SI 2001/2218... 9.48 Special Immigration Appeals Commission (Procedure) (Amendment) Rules 2007, SI 2007/1285...................................... 10.80 Special Immigration Appeals Commission (Procedure) Rules 2003, SI 2003/1034........................ 10.80 Tax Avoidance Schemes (Prescribed Descriptions of Arrangements) Regulations 2004, SI 2004/1863... 12.1 Tax Avoidance Schemes (Promoters, Prescribed Circumstances and Information) (Amendment) Regulations 2004, SI 2004/2613... 11.105 Town and Country Planning Appeals (Determination by Inspectors) (Inquiries Procedure) (England) Rules 2000, SI 2000/1625.............. 9.138 reg 6(13)............................................. 6.50 Town and Country Planning Appeals (Determination by Inspectors) (Inquiries Procedure) (Wales) Rules 2003, SI 2003/1267 r 6(13)................................................. 6.50 Town and Country Planning (Appeals) (Written Representations Procedure) (England) Regulations 2009, SI 2009/452.........................9.139, 9.1 Pt 1 (regs 4–10).............................9.139, 9.141 reg 6................................................... 9.139 reg 6(2)............................................... 9.139 reg 7................................................... 9.139 reg 7(1), (2)......................................... 9.139 Pt 2 (regs 11–16)........................ 9.139, 9.140, 9.141 reg 13................................................. 9.141 13(2)............................................. 9.139 reg 14................................................. 9.140 reg 14(1)............................................. 9.139 reg 14(2)........................................9.139, 9.140 reg 14(7)............................................. 9.140 reg 15................................................. 9.141 Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisement) Regulations 1992, SI 1992/666 reg 21(6)............................................. 6.50 Town and Country Planning (Development Management Procedure) (England) Order 2015, SI 2015/595...................................9.77, 9.78 art 15(1A)........................................... 9.79 art 15(3)–(5)....................................... 9.79 art 15(7).............................................. 9.79 art 40.................................................. 9.76 Town and Country Planning (Development Management Procedure) (Wales) Order 2012, SI 2012/801 (W 110)....................9.77, 9.78

Town and Country Planning (Enforcement) (Determination by Inspectors) (Inquiries Procedure) (England) Rules 2002, SI 2002/2685...................................... 9.81 Town and Country Planning (Enforcement) (Hearings Procedure) (England) Rules 2002, SI 2002/2684.................................. 9.81 Town and Country Planning (Enforcement) (Inquiries Procedure) Rules 1992, SI 1992/1903 r 8(8)................................................... 6.50 Town and Country Planning (Enforcement) (Inquiries Procedure) (England) Rules 2002, SI 2002/2686.................................. 9.81 Town and Country Planning (Enforcement Notices and Appeals) (England) Regulations 2002, SI 2002/2682........................ 9.81 Town and Country Planning (Enforcement Notices and Appeals) (Wales) Regulations 2017, SI 2017/530 (W 113)........... 9.81 Town and Country Planning (Enforcement) (Written Representations Procedure) (England) Regulations 2002, SI 2002/2683...................................... 9.81 Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2017, SI 2017/571........................................ 9.144 Town and Country Planning (Hearings and Inquiries Procedure) (England) (Amendment and Revocation) Rules 2015, SI 2015/316........................................ 9.89 Town and Country Planning (Hearings Procedure) (England) Rules 2000, SI 2000/1626.................................. 9.142 r 6(6), (6A).......................................... 9.142 9(2)................................................... 9.142 11(3)................................................. 9.142 14(3)................................................. 9.142 Town and Country Planning (Initial Regional Spatial Strategy) (England) Regulations 2004, SI 2004/2206...................................... 9.73 Town and Country Planning (Inquiries Procedure) (Wales) Rules 2003, SI 2003/1266 r 6(13)................................................. 6.50 Town and Country Planning General Regulations 1992, SI 1992/1492 reg 3................................................... 8.31 10................................................. 9.67 Town and Country Planning (Hearings and Inquiries Procedure) (England) (Amendment) Rules 2013, SI 2013/2137...................9.89, 10.162

Table of statutory instruments   lvii Town and Country Planning (Inquiries Procedure) (England) Rules 2000, SI 2000/1624...............................9.83, 9.137 r 2....................................................... 9.85 3(1)................................................... 9.88 3A..................................................... 9.85 4....................................................... 9.85 (2)................................ 9.86, 9.87, 9.92, 9.99 (a), (b)............................9.86, 9.92, 9.113 (c)...................................9.86, 9.90, 9.113 (d).............................................. 9.86 (4)................................................... 9.88 5...........................................9.89, 9.98, 9.110 (1)................................................... 9.97 (2)................................................... 9.113 (a)(ii).......................................... 9.105 (3)................................................... 9.90 (4)................................................... 9.92 (a)(ii).......................................... 9.99 (5)................................................... 9.112 (8)................................................... 9.95 (9)..................................................9.96, 9.97 (10)................................................. 9.97 6(1)................................................9.98, 9.113 (2)................................................... 9.99 (3)................................................... 9.100 (4)................................................... 9.107 (6)...................................9.102, 9.103, 9.112 (8)................................................... 9.103 (12)............................................9.105, 9.113 (13).....................................6.50, 9.99, 9.117 (13A).............................................. 9.99 7(1)................................................... 9.110 8..................................................9.110, 9.116 9....................................................... 9.110 10..................................................... 9.110 (3).................................9.110, 9.131, 9.134 (3A)..............................9.110, 9.131, 9.134 (4)............................................9.131, 9.134 (5).................................9.107, 9.131, 9.134 (6).................................9.110, 9.131, 9.134 (7), (8)..........................9.111, 9.131, 9.134 11(1)(c)............................................. 9.86 12(3)................................................. 9.113 13..................................................... 9.115 (2)................................................. 9.115 (3)................................................. 9.116 (7), (8).......................................... 9.118 14..................................................... 9.119 (3)................................................. 9.119 15(1), (4).......................................... 9.120 (5)................................................. 9.121 (6)............................................9.121, 9.122 (7)................................................. 9.121 (8)................................................. 9.123 (9), (11)........................................ 9.125 (12)............................................... 9.126 16..................................................... 9.127 17(2)................................................. 9.129 (3), (5).......................................... 9.130 (7)................................................. 9.131 18..................................................... 10.162 (1), (1A)........................................ 9.132

Town and Country Planning (Inquiries Procedure) (England) Rules 2000 – contd r 18(3), (3A), (4).................................. 9.133 19..................................................... 9.134 19(1)(a), (b).................................9.134, 9.135 19(1)(c)............................................. 9.134 Town and Country Planning (Local Development) (England) Regulations 2004, SI 2004/2204... 9.73 Town and Country Planning (Permission in Principle) (Amendment) Order 2017, SI 2017/1309...................................... 9.89 Town and Country Planning (Referrals and Appeals) (Written Representations Procedure) (Wales) Regulations 2015, SI 2015/1331...................................... 9.81 Town and Country Planning (Referred Applications and Appeals Procedure) (Wales) Regulations 2017, SI 2017/544 (W 121)..........9.81, 9.85 Town and Country Planning (Regional Planning) (England) Regulations 2004, SI 2004/2203........................ 9.73 Town and Country Planning (Regional Planning Guidance as Revision of Regional Spatial Strategy) (England) Regulations 2004, SI 2004/2208...................................... 9.73 Town and Country Planning (Regional Spatial Strategies) (Examinations in Public) (Remuneration and Allowances) (England) Regulations 2004, SI 2004/2209... 9.73 Town and Country Planning (Regions) (National Parks) (England) Regulations 2004, SI 2004/2207... 9.73 Town and Country Planning (Simplified Planning Zones) Regulations 1992, SI 1992/2414... 9.138 Town and Country Planning (Transitional Arrangements) (England) Regulations 2004, SI 2004/2205...................................... 9.73 Town and Country Planning (Trees) Regulations 1999, SI 1999/1892 reg 3(3)............................................... 6.50 Transfer of Functions (Information and Public Records) Order 2015, SI 2015/1897.................................. 4.62 Transfer of Tribunal Functions Order 2008, SI 2008/2833 reg 3................................................... 9.46 Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/246.......................... 1.209 Tribunal Procedure (Amendment No 2) Rules 2017, SI 2017/1168.......... 10.131 Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009, SI 2009/1976............... 1.232

lviii  Table of statutory instruments Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009 – contd r 10..................................................1.253, 3.62 22(a), (b)........................................... 1.247 Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Health, Education and Social Care Chamber) Rules 2008, SI 2008/2699 r 14(7)................................................. 11.4 Pt 4 (rr 31–42).................................... 11.4

Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, SI 2014/2604.............................10.117, 10.131 Urban Development Corporations in England (Area and Constitution) Order 2014, SI 2014/1181............. 6.196

Table of European legislation

All references are to paragraph number Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000 (as adapted at Strasbourg on 12 December 2007).......................  1.289, 2.64, 4.237, 5.1, 5.2, 5.13, 5.49, 10.166, 11.128 Art 7........................................... 2.0, 2.7, 2.68, 4.207, 4.236 Art 8...................................  2.0, 2.7, 2.9, 2.68, 4.207, 4.236 Art 11..............................................  2.0, 4.236 Art 41....................................5.11, 5.49, 5.115 Art 41(2)............................................. 1.289 Art 42.......................................... 5.7, 5.8, 5.49 Art 47........................................ 1.241, 10.166 Art 48(2)............................................. 11.126 Art 52(1)....................................... 4.207, 4.236 Art 52(3)............................................. 2.0 Code of Practice on Disinformation (2018)............................................. 2.2 Commission Access to the File Notice [2005] OJ C 325/7......................... 11.127 Commission Decision 520/2000/ EC of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the safe harbour privacy principles and related frequently asked questions issued by the US Department of Commerce [2000] OJ L 215/7...... 2.8 Commission Decision 2001/844/EC of 29 November 2001 amending its rules of procedure [2001] OJ L 317/1 ............................................. 5.93 Commission Decision 2001/937/EC of 5 December 2001 amending its rules of procedure [2001] OJ L 345/94............................................ 5.45 Commission Decision (EU) 2016/809 of 20 May 2016 on the notification by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of its

wish to participate in certain acts of the Union in the field of police cooperation adopted before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and which are not part of the Schengen acquis [2016] OJ L 132/105.......................................... 2.266 Council Decision 93/731/EC of 20 December 1993 on public access to Council documents [1993] OJ L 340/43 Art 4(1)............................................... 5.16 Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission [1999] L 184/23............................................ 5.5 Council Decision 2000/23/EC of 6 December 1999 on the improvement of information on the Council’s legislative activities and the public register of Council documents [2000] OJ L 9/22......... 5.16 Council Decision 2001/264/EC of 19 March 2001 adopting the Council’s security regulations [2001] OJ L 101/1.......................... 5.93 Council Decision 2004/194/EC of 10 February 2004 amending Decision 2001/264/EC adopting the Council’s security regulations [2004] OJ L 63/48.......................... 5.93 Council Decision 2004/644/EC of 13 September 2004 adopting implementing rules concerning Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data [2004] OJ L 296/16... 2.8

lx  Table of European legislation Council Decision 2005/571/EC of 12 July 2005 amending Decision 2001/264/EC adopting the Council’s security regulations [2005] OJ L 193/31........................ 5.93 Council Decision 2005/952/EC of 20 December 2005 amending Decision 2001/264/EC adopting the Council’s security regulations [2005] OJ L 346/18........................ 5.93 Council Decision 2007/438/EC of 18 June 2007 amending Decision 2001/264/EC adopting the Council’s security regulations [2007] OJ L 164/24........................ 5.93 Council Decision 2008/633 /JHA of 23  June 2008 concerning access for consultation of the Visa Information System (VIS) by designated authorities of Member States and by Europol for the purposes of the prevention, detection and investigation of terrorist offences and of other serious criminal offences [2008] OJ L 218/129................................. 2.265 Council Decision 2009/937/EU of 1 December 2009 adopting the Council’s Rules of Procedure [2009] OJ L 325/35........................ 5.7 Council Decision 488/2013/EU of 23 September 2013 on the security rules for protecting EU classified information [2013] OJ L 274/1..... 5.46 Council Decision (EU) 2016/2220 of 2 December 2016 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the protection of personal information relating to the prevention, investigation, detection, and prosecution of criminal offences [2016] OJ L 336/1........................... 2.8 Council Framework Decision 2008/977/ JHA 1 of 27  November 2008 on the protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters [2008] OJ L 350/60............ 2.104 Council of Europe Convention 108 for the protection of individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data 1981......................... 2.8 Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents Treaty Series 205 (18 June 2009)... 5.132 Council of Europe modernised Convention 108.......................2.126, 2.128 Art 9................................................... 2.128 Council of Europe Recommendation Rec(2002) 2 of the Committee of Ministers to member states

on access to official documents adopted 21 February 2002............. 5.131 Art IX................................................. 5.131 Council of Europe Recommendation R (2000) 13 on a European policy on access to archives adopted 13 July 2000................................................ 5.131 Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ L 281/31................................  1.132, 1.267, 2.10, 2.16, 2.34, 2.144, 4.18, 4.33 recital (15).......................................... 2.27 recital (27).......................................... 2.27 Art 2(b)............................................... 2.7 Art 2(d)............................................... 2.7 Art 2(2)(c)........................................... 2.27 Art 4(1)(a)........................................... 2.7 Art 12(b)............................................. 2.7 Art 14(1)(a)......................................... 2.7 Art 29................................................. 2.144 Decision ECB/2004/3 of 4 March 2004 of the European Central Bank on public access to European Central Bank documents [2004] OJ L 80/42 Art 5................................................... 5.129 Decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 11 December 2012 concerning public access to documents held by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the exercise of its administrative functions (2013/C 38/02).............. 5.18 Decision of the Secretary-General of the Council/High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of 27 July 2000 on measures for the protection of classified information applicable to the General Secretariat of the Council [2000] OJ C 239/01......... 5.46 Declaration 20....................................... 2.8 Declaration 21....................................... 2.8 d’Estaing Convention............................ 5.48 Directive 77/187/EC of 14 February 1977 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses [1997] OJ L 61/26 (Acquired Rights)........................... 1.209 Directive 77/799/EEC of 19  December  1977 concerning mutual assistance by the competent authorities of the Member States in the field of direct taxation and taxation of insurance premiums [1977] OJ L 366/15........................ 2.262

Table of European legislation   lxi Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment [1985] OJ L 175/40...................................... 9.144, 9.145 Annex III............................................ 9.145 Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts [1989] OJ L 395/33........................ 9.153 Directive 90/313/EEC of 7 June 1990 on the freedom of access to information on the environment [1990] OJ L 158/56..................  3.1, 3.2, 3.3 Directive 92/13/EEC of 25 February 1992 coordinating the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of Community rules on the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors [1992] OJ L 76/14.......................... 9.153 Directive 97/11/EC of 3 March 1997 amending Directive 85/337/EEC on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment [1997] OJ L 73/5................................................ 9.144 Directive 97/66/EC of 15 December 1997 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the telecommunications sector [1997] OJ L 24/1................. 4.195 Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations [1998] OJ L 204/37................................... 5.76 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector [2002] OJ L 201/37.......2.352, 4.195, 4.236 Art 2................................................... 2.343 Art 4................................................... 2.343 Art 5(3)............................................... 2.343 Arts 6–13............................................ 2.343 Arts 15, 16.......................................... 2.343 Directive 2003/4/EC of 28 January 2003 on public access to environmental information [2003] OJ L 41/26............. 1.44, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.11, 3.25, 3.35, 3.61, 5.106

Directive 2003/4/EC of 28 January 2003 on public access to environmental information [2003] OJ L 41/26 – contd recital (10).......................................... 3.9 Art 2(1)............................................... 3.9 Art 2(1)(a)........................................... 3.19 Art 2(2)............................................... 3.12 Art 3................................................... 3.19 Art 3(5)(c)........................................... 3.24 Art 4................................................... 3.30 Art 4(2)............................................... 3.36 Art 6........................................1.241, 3.4, 3.51 Art 6(2), (3)......................................... 3.4 Art 7(2)............................................... 3.19 Directive 2003/35/EC of 26 May 2003 providing for public participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating to the environment and amending with regard to public participation and access to justice Council Directives 85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC [2003] OJ L 156/17.9.144 Directive 2003/42/EC of 13 June 2003 on occurrence reporting in civil aviation [2003] OJ L 167/23.......... 1.230 Directive 2003/48/EC of 3 June 2003 on taxation of savings income in the form of interest payments [2003] OJ L 157/38........................ 12.1 Directive 2003/98/EEC of 17 November 2003 on the re-use of public sector information [2003] OJ L 345/90................................... 5.15 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15  March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/ EC [2006] OJ L 105/54.............4.207, 5.76 Directive 2007/2/EC of 14 March 2007 establishing an Infrastructure for Spatial Information in the European Community (INSPIRE) [2007] OJ L 108/1.......................... 3.4 Directive 2007/66/EC of 11 December 2007 amending Council Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC with regard to improving the effectiveness of review procedures concerning the award of public contracts [2007] OJ L 335/31........ 9.153 Directive 2008/1/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 January 2008 concerning integrated pollution prevention and control (Codified version) [2008] OJ L 24/8............................ 3.50

lxii  Table of European legislation Directive 2009/31/EC of 23 April 2009 on the geological storage of carbon dioxide and amending Council Directive 85/337/EEC, European Parliament and Council Directives 2000/60/EC, 2001/80/EC, 2004/35/EC, 2006/12/EC, 2008/1/ EC and Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 [2009] OJ L140/114..... 9.144 Directive 2009/81/EC of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security, and amending Directives 2004/17/ EC and 2004/18/EC [2009] OJ L 216/76............................................ 9.153 Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 amending Directive 2002/22/ EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws [2009] OJ L 337/11............................................ 2.353 Arts 2, 3.............................................. 2.353 Directive 2011/92/EU of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment [2011] OJ L 26/1............................ 9.144 Directive 2013/37/EU of 26 June 2013 amending Directive 2003/98/ EC on the re-use of public sector information [2013] OJ L 175/1..... 4.34, 4.40, 4.55, 5.15 Directive 2013/40/EU of 12  August 2013 on attacks against information systems and replacing Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA [2013] OJ L 218/8.2.356 Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4  February 2014 on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property and amending Directives 2008/48/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No  1093/2010 [2014] OJ L 60/34 (Mortgage Credit Directive)............................ 5.120

Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC [2014] OJ L 94/65..........................9.150, 9.153, 9.155 Directive 2014/25/EU of 26  February 2014 on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC [2014] OJ L 94/243.. 9.153 Directive 2014/52/EU of 16 April 2014 amending Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment [2014] OJ L 124/1.............................................. 9.144 Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9  September  2015 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical regulations and of rules on Information Society services [2015] OJ L 241/1 Art 1(1)............................................... 2.32 Art 1(1)(b).......................................... 2.39 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA [2016] OJ L 119/89..................  2.8, 2.104, 2.105, 2.106, 2.107, 2.136, 2.165, 2.167, 2.184, 2.275 Chap V............................................... 2.10 Art 1................................................... 2.104 Art 1(1)............................................... 2.104 Art 3(7)............................................... 2.104 Art 10................................................. 2.111 Art 41................................................. 2.165 Art 53(2)............................................. 2.166 Art 54................................................. 2.167 Art 55................................................. 2.184 Directive (EU) 2016/681 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the use of passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime [2016] OJ L 119/132.......................................... 2.266

Table of European legislation   lxiii Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union [2016] OJ L 194/1.............................................. 2.361 Draft Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, as agreed at negotiators’ level on 14 November 2018................................................ 5.128 Pt 3, Title V....................................... 5.128 Pt 3, Title VII..................................... 5.128 Art 8................................................... 5.128 Art 37................................................. 5.128 Art 50................................................. 5.128 Art 53................................................. 5.128 Art 63................................................. 5.128 Art 63(2)............................................. 5.128 Arts 120, 121...................................... 5.128 Art 122............................................... 5.129 Art 163............................................... 5.128 European Convention on Data Protection of 1981......................... 2.8 European Convention on Human Rights...........................  1.29, 1.209, 1.304, 2.64, 2.215, 2.220, 2.224, 2.225, 2.226, 2.229, 2.235, 2.236, 2.253, 2.318, 2.321, 4.289, 4.292, 4.301, 4.319, 4.343, 4.346, 4.350, 4.351, 5.130, 5.133, 10.1, 10.52, 10.61, 10.115, 10.116, 10.118, 10.127, 10.128, 10.132, 10.142, 10.164, 10.176, 11.12, 11.89 Art 2........................ 2.228, 4.5, 4.296, 4.299, 5.133, 10.52, 10.175, 10.176 Art 3................................  2.228, 2.268, 4.320, 5.133, 10.52, 10.127, 10.131, 10.132, 10.134, 10.175 Art 4................................................... 2.321 Art 5.........................................10.127, 10.132 Art 5(4)........................10.117, 10.121, 10.139 Art 5(5)............................................... 10.117 Art 6......................... 2.290, 2.307, 4.4, 4.233, 4.236, 4.293, 5.133, 7.2, 9.84, 10.5, 10.52, 10.61, 10.70, 10.80, 10.88, 10.117, 10.118, 10.119, 10.123, 10.126, 10.127, 10.130, 10.131, 10.132, 10.133, 10.134, 10.135, 10.136, 10.137, 10.139, 10.141, 10.148, 10.152, 10.164, 11.2, 11.4, 11.18, 11.77, 11.80, 11.82, 11.84, 11.86, 11.88, 11.126

European Convention on Human Rights – contd Art 6(1)....................... 10.118, 10.123, 10.132, 10.137, 10.141, 11.77 Art 6(3)(b).......................................... 11.77 Art 6(3)(d).......................................... 11.77 Art 7................................................... 2.274 Art 8.......................1.195, 1.228, 1.267, 1.275, 2.0, 2.84, 2.92, 2.182, 2.195, 2.215, 2.216, 2.217, 2.218, 2.220, 2.222, 2.224, 2.228, 2.229, 2.231, 2.235, 2.255, 2.258, 2.259, 2.261, 2.268, 2.274, 2.275, 2.283, 2.289, 2.290, 2.297, 2.305, 2.307, 2.310, 2.311, 2.314, 2.318, 2.319, 2.321, 2.331, 4.5, 4.196, 4.200, 4.205, 4.208, 4.212, 4.233, 4.236, 4.254, 4.289, 4.291, 4.292, 4.293, 4.296, 4.319, 4.320, 4.324, 4.326, 4.350, 4.361, 5.133, 9.149, 10.52, 10.61, 10.118, 10.123, 10.127, 10.128, 10.131, 10.134, 11.2, 11.6, 11.7, 11.12, 11.18, 11.40, 11.47, 11.89, 11.120, 12.1 Art 8(1)............................  2.245, 2.308, 2.310, 2.335, 11.69 Art 8(2)..................... 2.331, 2.335, 11.69, 12.1 Art 9................................................... 11.55 Art 10.................................1.94, 1.154, 1.155, 1.295, 2.0, 2.215, 2.216, 2.218, 2.220, 2.222, 2.224, 2.225, 2.228, 2.231, 2.235, 2.236, 2.241, 2.253, 2.258, 4.5, 4.181, 4.182, 4.233, 4.236, 4.289, 4.290, 4.292, 4.293, 4.294, 4.296, 4.298, 4.299, 4.301, 4.314, 4.320, 4.324, 4.339, 4.343, 4.345, 4.350, 4.351, 4.354, 4.364, 4.366, 4.369, 5.133, 7.12, 7.30, 7.117, 10.142, 10.157, 10.174, 10.175, 11.2, 11.4, 11.6, 11.7, 11.12, 11.40, 11.43, 11.46, 11.52, 11.55 Art 10(1)........................... 2.227, 4.354, 11.42 Art 10(2)....................................... 11.41, 11.42 Art 11................................. 4.293, 7.30, 11.55 Art 13..............................  4.233, 4.293, 4.320, 10.52, 10.61, 10.175 Art 14...........................................2.321, 4.236 Art 15................................................. 10.127 Art 41................................................. 10.61 Protocol 1, Art 1..........................9.11, 10.126 Protocol 1, Art 3................................ 7.30 EU Constitution (EUC)........................ 5.48 Euratom Treaty...................................... 5.22 European Coal and Steel Community – ECSC Treaty.................................. 5.22

lxiv  Table of European legislation European Parliament – Parliamentary Rules of Procedure Title IV Rule 115 (January 2017).................... 5.8 Rule 115(1), (2).................................. 5.8 Rule 116............................................. 5.8, 5.45 Institutional Agreement Between the EP and Council 20 November 2002 concerning Access by the EP to Sensitive Documents [2002] OJ C 298/1.......................................... 5.93 Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the EC............................ 11.132 Protocol on Subsidiarity and Proportionality Art 5................................................... 5.12 Art 9................................................... 5.12 Prum Convention 2005......................... 2.8 Recommendation No R (81) 19 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the access to information held by public authorities............... 5.130 Art V................................................... 5.130 Regulation 17 – First Regulation implementing Articles 85 [101] and 86 [102] of the Treaty [1962] OJ 13/204....................................... 11.128 Arts 4, 5.............................................. 11.123 Regulation (EEC) 354/83 of 1 February 1983 concerning the opening to the public of the historical archives of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community[1983] OJ L 43/1....................................... 5.100 Regulation (EEC) 880/92 of 23 March 1992 on a Community Eco Label Award Scheme [1992] OJ L 99/1.. 1.304 Regulation (EC) 45/2001 of the European Parliament and Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data [2001] OJ L 8/1..................... 2.8, 2.91, 5.71, 5.72, 5.73, 5.108, 5.117 Art 8(b)...........................................  2.90, 5.73 Regulation 1049/2001 – European Parliament’s proposal recital (4)............................................ 5.115 Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents [2001] OJ L 145/43..........1.98, 1.267, 2.90, 4.187, 4.189, 5.6, 5.7, 5.13, 5.15, 5.16, 5.18, 5.22, 5.23, 5.31, 5.32, 5.36, 5.38, 5.45, 5.46, 5.47, 5.53, 5.55, 5.56, 5.58, 5.61, 5.65, 5.71, 5.72, 5.73, 5.76, 5.79, 5.84, 5.94, 5.95, 5.101, 5.106, 5.107, 5.112, 5.113, 5.115, 5.117, 5.123, 5.124, 11.131

Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents [2001] OJ L 145/43 – contd recital (1)............................................ 5.34 recital (2)..........................................5.18, 5.35 recitals (3)–(6).................................... 5.37 recital (9)............................................ 5.38 recital (11).......................................... 5.39 recital (13).......................................... 5.40 recital (14).......................................... 5.41 recital (15)......................................  5.42, 5.43 recitals (16), (17)................................ 5.44 Art 1.................................................5.20, 5.56 Art 2.................................................5.20, 5.56 Art 2(3).............................................5.57, 5.76 Art 3........................................ 5.27, 5.59, 5.60 Art 3(a), (b)......................................... 5.59 Art 4...................................... 5.28, 5.65, 5.81, 5.83, 5.93, 5.110 Art 4(1).......................... 5.24, 5.66, 5.67, 5.74, 5.75, 5.81, 5.82 Art 4(1)(a)............................... 5.66, 5.68, 5.69, 5.70, 5.82, 5.93 Art 4(1)(a)(i).....................................5.66, 5.68 Art 4(1)(a)(ii)....................................5.66, 5.68 Art 4(1)(a)(iii)......................... 5.66, 5.68, 5.82 Art 4(1)(a)(iv)......................... 5.66, 5.68, 5.82 Art 4(1)(b).............................. 5.71, 5.72, 5.73, 5.108 Art 4(2)................................... 5.20, 5.24, 5.69, 5.70, 5.74, 5.75, 5.76, 5.81, 5.107 Art 4(3)..................................  5.20, 5.68, 5.74, 5.78, 5.79, 5.80, 5.81, 5.82, 5.115 Art 4(3)(i)........................................... 5.79 Art 4(4)............................................... 5.80 Art 4(5)..................................  5.68, 5.80, 5.81, 5.82, 5.110 Art 4(6)............................................... 5.69 Arts 5–8.............................................. 5.29 Art 5...............................................5.87, 5.129 Art 6................................................... 5.88 Art 6(1)............................................... 5.63 Art 6(2)............................................... 5.63 Art 6(3)............................................  5.63, 5.64 Art 6(4)............................................... 5.63 Art 7................................................ 5.63, 5.89 Art 8................................................ 5.86, 5.90 Art 8(2)............................................... 5.90 Arts 9–13............................................ 5.32 Art 9................................................... 5.93 Art 9(5)............................................... 5.129 Art 10................................................. 5.91 Art 10(1)............................................. 5.91 Art 10(2)............................................. 5.92 Art 11................................................. 5.94 Art 12..............................................  5.62, 5.94 Art 13................................................. 5.94 Art 15................................................. 5.94

Table of European legislation   lxv COM(2008) 229 final – proposal to ‘recast’ Regulation 1049/2001 ...... 5.101, 5.109 Art 2(6)............................................... 5.105 Art 3(a)............................................... 5.104 Art 4(1)............................................... 5.106 Art 4(2).........................................5.105, 5.107 Art 4(3)............................................... 5.105 Art 4(5)............................................... 5.108 Regulation (EC) 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities [2002] OJ L 248/1.......................... 5.61 Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 [101] and 82 [102] of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1............ 11.125, 11.126, 11.128 recital (15).......................................... 11.126 Art 5................................................... 11.130 Arts 9, 10............................................ 11.126 Art 11................................................. 5.10 Art 12...................................... 5.10, 11.126 Art 16................................................. 11.126 Chapter V (Arts 17–22)..................... 11.126 Art 18(4)............................................. 11.129 Art 20................................................. 11.130 Art 20(8)............................................. 11.126 Art 27................................................. 11.126 Art 27(2)............................................. 11.126 Art 27(4)...................................11.126, 11.127 Art 28................................................. 11.130 Regulation (EC) 58/2003 of 19 December 2002 laying down the statute for executive agencies to be entrusted with certain tasks in the management of Community programmes [2003] OJ L 11/1...... 5.61 Art 23................................................. 5.61 Regulation (EU) 910/2004 of 23  July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/ EC [2004] OJ L 257/73................. 1.18 Regulation (EC) 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 OJ [2004] L 46/1................................. 1.142 Regulation (EC) 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to  Information, Public

Participation in Decisionmaking and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to  Community institutions and bodies [2006] OJ L 264/13.......... 3.4, 3.50, 5.22, 5.106 Regulation (EC) 213/2008 of 28 November 2007 amending Regulation (EC) No 2195/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Common Procurement Vocabulary (CPV) and Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on public procurement procedures, as regards the revision of the CPV [2013] OJ L 74/1............................ 9.154 Regulation (EU) 182/2011 of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers [2011] OJ L 55/13.............................................. 5.5 Regulation (EU) 536/2014 of 16 April 2014 on clinical trials on medicinal products for human use, and repealing Directive 2001/20/ EC [2014] OJ L 158/1................... 5.120 Regulation (EU) 910/2014 of 23  July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/ EC [2014] OJ L 257/73 (eIDAS Regulation)............................... 2.268, 2.354 Art 19................................................. 2.354 Art 24(2)............................................. 2.354 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/ EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L 119/1.....  2.1, 2.2, 2.8, 2.10, 2.12, 2.13, 2.14, 2.16, 2.17, 2.27, 2.33, 2.34, 2.35, 2.36, 2.37, 2.39, 2.43, 2.48, 2.62, 2.63, 2.65, 2.67, 2.68, 2.69, 2.70, 2.71, 2.73, 2.74, 2.75, 2.76, 2.95, 2.96, 2.100, 2.101, 2.105, 2.109, 2.126, 2.128, 2.131, 2.136, 2.141, 2.142, 2.145, 2.152, 2.158, 2.165, 2.167, 2.168, 2.169, 2.184, 2.187, 2.189, 2.275, 3.52, 5.108, 5.117, 9.30, 10.2

lxvi  Table of European legislation Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/ EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L 119/1 – contd recital (4)............................................ 2.81 recital (6)............................................ 2.9 recital (14).......................................... 2.12 recital (27).......................................... 2.12 recital (39).......................................... 2.1 recital (42).......................................... 2.9 recital (65).......................................... 2.7 recital (71).......................................... 2.51 recital (73).......................................... 2.64 recital (139)........................................ 2.144 recital (140)........................................ 2.144 recital (154).........................  1.19, 1.270, 2.81 recital (171)........................................ 2.8 Art 2................................................... 2.12 Art 2(2)............................................... 2.33 Art 2(2)(d).......................................... 2.104 Art 3................................................... 2.10 Art 4................................................... 2.18 Art 4(1)............................................... 2.18 Art 4(2)............................................  2.25, 2.51 Art 4(3)............................................... 2.26 Art 4(4).............................................2.26, 2.51 Art 4(5)..........................................  2.26, 2.173 Art 4(6)............................................... 2.27 Art 4(7).................................... 2.15, 2.17, 2.30 Art 4(8)–(10)...................................... 2.30 Art 4(11)..................................2.30, 2.37, 2.39 Art 4(12)–(26).................................... 2.32 Chap 2 (Arts 5–11).......................... 2.74, 2.96 Art 5....................................  1.200, 2.48, 2.66, 2.78 Art 5(1)(a)..............................  2.66, 2.74, 2.96, 2.111, 3.53 Art 5(1)(b)..............................  2.66, 2.74, 2.96 Art 5(1)(c)........................................  2.74, 2.96 Art 5(1)(d).......................................... 2.74 Art 5(1)(e)........................................  2.74, 2.96 Art 5(1)(f)........................................... 2.96 Art 5(2)............................................... 2.35 Art 6....................................... 2.39, 2.48, 2.66, 2.74, 2.81, 2.96 Art 6(1)....................................2.16, 2.39, 3.53 Art 6(1)(a)........................................ 2.16, 2.39 Art 6(1)(b)....................................... 2.16, 2.39 Art 6(1)(c)....................... 2.16, 2.39, 2.40, 2.42 Art 6(1)(d)........................................2.16, 2.39 Art 6(1)(e)....................... 2.16, 2.39, 2.40, 2.42 Art 6(1)(f)...................... 2.16, 2.37, 2.38, 2.39, 2.54, 2.81, 3.52 Art 6(2)..................................1.200, 2.39, 2.42 Art 6(3).................................... 2.40, 2.66, 2.79 Art 6(4)............................................... 2.40 Art 7........................................2.41, 2.74, 2.96 Art 8................................................... 2.43 Art 8(1), (2)......................................  2.74, 2.96

Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/ EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L 119/1 – contd Art 9.............................. 2.36, 2.40, 2.43, 2.44, 2.45, 2.74, 2.96, 2.102 Art 9(1).............................................2.43, 2.44 Art 9(2)............................................... 2.44 Art 9(2)(b).......................................  2.44, 2.45 Art 9(2)(g).......................................  2.44, 2.46 Art 9(2)(h)..............................  2.44, 2.45, 2.77 Art 9(2)(i)...............................  2.44, 2.45, 2.77 Art 9(2)(j)........................................ 2.44, 2.45 Art 9(3)............................................ 2.45, 2.77 Art 10..................................... 2.40, 2.44, 2.47, 2.74, 2.96 Art 11(2)...........................................2.74, 2.96 Chap 3 (Arts 12–23).............. 2.35, 2.53, 2.74, 2.96, 2.185 Art 12................................................. 2.53 Art 13....................................  2.53, 2.54, 2.56, 2.63, 2.73 Art 13(1)–(3).................  2.66, 2.74, 2.76, 2.96 Art 14......................................2.53, 2.63, 2.73 Art 14(1)–(4).................. 2.66, 2.74, 2.76, 2.96 Arts 15–20.......................................... 2.62 Arts 15–22.......................................... 2.53 Art 15....................................  2.50, 2.57, 2.72, 2.73, 2.181 Art 15(1)...............................1.200, 2.66, 2.74, 2.75, 2.76, 2.78, 2.100, 3.53 Art 15(2), (3)..........................  2.66, 2.74, 2.75, 2.76, 2.78, 2.100 Art 16..................................... 2.58, 2.66, 2.74, 2.75, 2.154 Art 17.....................................  2.7, 2.58, 2.154 Art 17(1), (2).................................... 2.66, 2.74 Art 18.............................................2.58, 2.154 Art 18(1).......................................... 2.66, 2.75 Art 18(1)(a), (b).................................. 2.74 Art 18(1)(d)........................................ 2.74 Art 19.............................................  2.59, 2.75 Art 20...................................  2.59, 2.96, 2.181 Art 20(1).................................. 2.66, 2.74, 2.75 Art 20(2)..........................................  2.66, 2.74 Art 21.................................1.200, 1.202, 2.60, 3.53 Art 21(1)......................... 2.66, 2.74, 2.75, 2.96 Art 22.............................................  2.51, 2.61 Art 22(1), (4)...................................  2.56, 2.57 Art 23................................................. 2.62 Art 23(1)................................  2.40, 2.66, 2.70, 2.73, 2.79 Art 30................................................. 2.48 Art 32................................................. 2.102 Art 34................................................. 2.53 Art 37................................................. 2.16 Art 41................................................. 2.152

Table of European legislation   lxvii Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/ EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L 119/1 – contd Art 42................................................. 2.103 Art 43................................................. 2.103 Chap 5 (Arts 44–50)................2.10, 2.35, 2.96 Arts 44–49.......................................... 2.96 Art 46................................................. 2.54 Art 47................................................. 2.54 Art 49(1)............................................. 2.54 Art 51................................................. 2.136 Art 57................................................. 2.165 Art 59................................................. 2.143 Chap 7 (Arts 60–76)........................... 2.74 Arts 60–62.......................................... 2.74 Art 63................................................. 2.144 Arts 63–67.....................................  2.74, 2.144 Arts 68–75.......................................... 2.144 Art 76................................................. 2.144 Art 77................................................. 2.165 Art 78(2)............................................. 2.166 Art 79................................................. 2.167 Art 80................................................. 2.184 Art 80(1)............................................. 2.184 Art 82................................................. 2.168 Art 83................................................. 2.161 Chap 9 (Arts 85–91)........................ 2.39, 2.40 Art 85........................................... 2.155, 2.175 Art 85(2).......................................... 2.74, 2.79 Art 86................................................. 1.270 Art 89......................................1.19, 2.75, 2.79 Art 89(1)..................................2.45, 2.52, 2.75 Art 89(2), (3)....................................... 2.64 Rules of Procedure of the Council Annex II (2009).............................. 5.45 Arts 7, 8.............................................. 5.13 Rules of Procedure of the EU Commission 2010/138/EU Art 9................................................... 5.5 Rules of Procedure before the Court of Justice of the European Union...... 11.132 Art 37................................................. 11.136 Arts 55–62.......................................... 11.135 Art 57 et seq....................................... 11.133 Arts 63–75.......................................... 11.133 Arts 96–97.......................................... 11.134 Art 124(1)........................................... 11.133 Art 127............................................... 11.133 Rules of Procedure of the General Court.............................................. 11.132 Art 67(3)............................................. 5.83 Schengen Treaty.................................... 2.8 Statute of the Court of Justice of the EC.................................................. 11.132 Art 18(4)............................................. 11.135 Art 26–30........................................... 11.133 Art 36................................................. 11.136 Art 40................................................. 11.135

Treaty on the European Constitution (TEC)............................................. 5.1, 5.54 Pt 1..................................................... 5.52 Pt 3..................................................... 5.52 Art 1.6................................................ 5.1 Art 28................................................. 5.71 Art 226............................................... 5.71 Art 253............................................... 5.82 Art 255............................................... 5.53 Treaty of Amsterdam 1999.........5.18, 5.19, 5.34 Protocol (No 13)................................ 5.12 Treaty of Brussels 1972......................... 5.3 Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) on the EU (TEU)..............................  2.8, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.13, 5.16, 5.48, 5.49, 5.52, 5.61, 5.79 recital 7.............................................. 5.21 Art 1.......................................... 5.8, 5.14, 5.50 Art 1(2)............................................... 5.7, 5.34 Art 4(2).........................................2.126, 4.237 Art 4(3)............................................... 5.10 Art 5................................................... 5.12 Art 6.................................................5.11, 5.49 Art 6(1)............................................... 5.1 Art 10.............................................5.14, 5.117 Art 10(3)............................................. 5.50 Art 11..............................................  5.14, 5.51 Art 15..............................................  5.7, 5.117 Art 28(1)............................................. 5.21 Art 39 (Lisbon).................................. 2.8 Art 41(1)............................................. 5.21 Declaration No 17............................. 5.1 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)..... 5.1, 5.7, 5.52, 11.122, 11.132 recital (10).......................................... 5.5 Title V (‘Area of freedom, security and justice’)........................................ 5.79 Art 4(3)......................................... 5.82, 11.123 Art 6(1)............................................... 1.289 Art 15...............................  5.7, 5.8, 5.18, 5.21, 5.23, 5.53, 5.115 Art 15(2)............................................. 5.7 Art 15(3)......................... 5.18, 5.20, 5.47, 5.49 Art 16 (Lisbon).................................. 2.8, 5.79 Art 76................................................. 5.12 Art 101, 102............................  11.123, 11.125 Art 108(3)........................................... 11.123 Art 158............................................... 11.124 Art 160............................................... 11.124 Art 192 (175(1) EC)........................... 1.44 Art 228 (195 EC)............................. 5.40, 586 Art 253 (190 EC)............................... 1.289 Art 258............................................... 5.65 Art 263 (230 EC).................... 5.12, 5.40, 5.86 Art 265............................................... 11.137 Art 267 (234 EC)............ 5.10, 11.134, 11.136 Art 278............................................... 11.129 Art 289...............................................  5.3, 5.7 Art 289(2)........................................... 5.4 Art 289(4)........................................... 5.4 Art 290...............................................  5.5, 5.7 Art 291............................................... 5.5

lxviii  Table of European legislation Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) – contd Art 291(2)........................................... 5.5 Art 294............................................... 5.3 Art 296 (253 TEC)............................ 5.68 Art 296(2)..............................5.4, 5.82, 10.159 Art 298(1)........................................... 5.54 Art 337............................................... 11.123 Art 339............................................... 7.19 Art 346(1)(a)....................................... 5.10 TFEU Protocol 21 Article 6a............... 2.106 EC Treaty.............................................. 9.155 Art 10.............................................. 5.95, 5.98 Art 18................................................. 5.100

EC Treaty – contd Art 101, 102............................. 11.126, 11.128 Art 195............................................... 5.86 Art 226............................................... 1.132 Art 230............................................... 5.86 Art 253 EC (previously 190).............. 10.159 Art 255 EC............................. 5.18, 5.19, 5.24, 5.27 Art 255(2)........................................... 5.36 Art 255(3)........................................... 5.44 Art 286 (Amsterdam)......................... 2.8 Declaration No 35 ............................ 5.24 EU Treaty..........................................3.2, 11.132 Art 29................................................. 2.107

Table of international legislation

All references are to paragraph number ‘Aarhus’ Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters. 1.198, 3.2, 3.3, 3.11, 3.14, 3.40, 3.61, 5.106, 5.116 Arts 3, 4.............................................. 1.198 Arts 6–9.............................................. 1.198 Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation [2014] OJ L 134/3.......................... 5.70 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement. 5.70 EU/US Passenger Name Record Agreement...................................... 2.8 EU/US Umbrella Agreement on data exchange and law enforcement...... 2.8 International Bill of Human Rights under UN Assembly Resolution 217.................................................. 1.154 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Art 19................................................. 1.154 Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty............ 4.218 Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Cuba............................................... 5.125 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development No 19...................... 3.3 UK/US Extradition Treaty.................... 2.359 UN Convention on Access to Information.................................... 5.131 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.............................................. 2.137 Art 3(1)............................................... 2.245 UN Framework Convention for Tobacco Control............................ 5.122 UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters... 3.61

AUSTRALIA Australian Freedom of Information Act 1982................................................ 8.4 ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES House of Assembly (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act 1966 s 16..................................................... 7.2 SWEDEN Freedom of Press Act 1766................... 1.2 USA American Convention on Human Rights Art 13........................................... 1.154, 4.298 California Civil Code §1798.82............ 2.3 California Consumer Privacy Act 2018.2.3 California Online Privacy Protection Act. 2.3 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) (15 U.S.C. §§6501–6506).2.3 Civil Service Reform Act 1978.............. 4.153 Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act 2018.............................  2.3, 4.218 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. §1030)................................. 2.3 Electronic Communications Privacy Act (18 U.S.C. §2510).................... 2.3 Electronic Communications Privacy Act 1986......................................... 2.3 Title II: Stored Communications Act 1986............................................. 2.3 Espionage Act........................................ 4.3 Federal Advisory Committee Act 1972.8.4 Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. §§41–58)............................. 2.3 First Amendment............................. 4.284, 11.39 Fourth Amendment............................... 2.3 FOIA 1966........................................  1.51, 1.216 Inspector General and Intelligence Authorization Act 2015, Title VI... 4.287 Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act 1998........................ 4.287 Judicial Protection Act 2016................. 2.1

lxx  Table of International Legislation Judicial Redress Act 2016...................... 2.3 Privacy Act............................................. 2.3 Security Notification Act....................... 2.3 Sunshine Act 1976................................. 8.4

Stored Communications Act 1986........ 2.3 Uniform Code of Military Justice......... 4.3 US Restatement of Torts Sec. 757, comment b (1939).......................... 1.216

Table of cases

All references are to paragraph number. A chronological table of European cases follows the alphabetical table. A A v B [2000] EMLR 1007......................................................................................................... 11.108 A v B (a company) [2002] EWCA Civ 337, [2003] QB 195, [2002] 2 All ER 545, [2002] 3 WLR 542..................................................................................  2.216, 2.230, 4.319, 4.324, 4.340 A v BBC [2014] UKSC 25, [2015] AC 588, [2014] 2 WLR 1243, [2014] 2 All ER 1037, 2014 SC (UKSC) 151, 2014 SLT 613, 2014 SCLR 593, [2014] 5 WLUK 255, [2014] EMLR 25, 37 BHRC 664, 2014 GWD 15-266...................................................................... 1.155, 2.241 A v C [1981] QB 956n, [1980] 2 All ER 347, [1981] 2 WLR 629, [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 200, [1982] RPC 509; affd [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 166............................................................... 11.117 A v Essex County Council [2003] EWCA Civ 1848, [2004] 1 WLR 1881, [2004] LGR 587, [2004] 1 FCR 660, [2004] 1 FLR 749............................................................................... 10.52 A v Independent News & Media Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 343, [2010] 1 WLR 2262, [2010] 3 All ER 32................................................................................................................. 4.298, 10.174 A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 16, 2004 SC (HL) 71, 2004 SLT 383.............................................................................................................................. 10.80 A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 1123, [2005] 1 WLR 414, [2004] HRLR 38........................................................................................................ 10.132 A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 71, [2006] 2 AC 221, [2005] 3 WLR 1249.............................................................................................................  1.124, 10.127 A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 1123, [2005] 1 WLR 414, [2004] NLJR 1291..................................................................................................... 10.132 A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 WLR 87, [2005] NLJR 23............................................................................................ 1.124, 10.127, 10.164 A v Southwark London Borough Council (1987) Guardian, 21 October............................... 10.131 A v Times Newspapers Ltd [2002] EWHC 2444 (Fam), [2003] 1 All ER 587, [2003] 1 FCR 326, [2003] 1 FLR 689....................................................................................................... 11.2 A v United Kingdom [2009] ECRR 301................................................................................... 10.80 A v United Kingdom App 3573/97 (The Times, 28 December 2002).................................... 7.2 A v Ward (No 2) [2010] EWHC 538 (Fam), [2010] 3 WLUK 410, [2010] 2 FLR 159, [2010] Fam Law 59....................................................................................................................... 11.12 A, B etc v Secretary of State for the Home Department ......................................................... 10.80 A & Byrne & Twenty-Twenty Television v United Kingdom (1997) 25 EHRR CD 159, EComHR........................................................................................................................... 11.7 A (a child) v Chief Constable of Dorset [2010] EWHC 1748 (Admin)................................... 4.326 A (minors), Re [1992] 1 All ER 153, [1991] 1 WLR 1026, [1992] 1 FLR 439, [1992] Fam Law 98, 89 LGR 796, 8 BMLR 89, sub nom Re C & L [1991] FCR 351; affd sub nom Re C [1992] 1 FCR 57, CA..................................................................................................... 7.112 AB, Re [1985] FLR 470 see X County Council v A ABC v Telegraph Media Group [2018] EWCA Civ 2329, [2018] 10 WLUK 357, [2019] EMLR 5............................................................................................................................. 2.224 ABNA Ltd v Scottish Ministers [2004] 2 CMLR 967, 2004 SLT 176, OH............................ 1.215 AD v UK (The Times, 6 April 2010)........................................................................................ 2.218

lxxii  Table of cases ADT v United Kingdom [2000] 2 FLR 697, [2000] Fam Law 797, 9 BHRC 112, [2000] Crim LR 1009, ECtHR..................................................................................................... 2.216 A-G v BBC [1981] AC 303, [1980] 3 WLR 109, [1980] 3 All ER 161, [1980] 6 WLUK 137, 78 LGR 529, (1980) 124 SJ 444........................................................................................ 3.18 A-G v Barker [1990] 3 All ER 257, CA..................................................................................... 4.329 A-G v Blake (Jonathan Cape Ltd third party) [2001] 1 AC 268, [2000] 4 All ER 385, [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 487, [2000] 3 WLR 625, [2000] NLJR 1230, [2000] EMLR 949, sub nom A-G v Blake [2001] IRLR 36, [2000] 32 LS Gaz R 37, 144 SJ LB 242, HL........ 1.164, 4.3, 4.271, 4.283, 4.285, 4.294, 4.357, 7.17 A-G v British Broadcasting Corpn [1981] AC 303, [1980] 3 All ER 161, [1980] 3 WLR 109, 78 LGR 529, [1981] RA 27, 124 SJ 444, HL.............................................................  1.154, 4.343 A-G v British Broadcasting Corpn (The Times, 18 December 1987)..................................... 4.280 A-G v Channel 4 Television Co Ltd [1988] Crim LR 237, CA............................................... 4.369 A-G v Guardian Newspapers Ltd [1987] 3 All ER 316, [1987] 1 WLR 1248; revsd [1987] 3 All ER 316, [1987] 1 WLR 1248, [1987] NLJ Rep 713, CA; affd [1987] 3 All ER 316, [1987] 1 WLR 1248, 131 SJ 1122, [1987] LS Gaz R 2689, [1987] NLJ Rep 785, HL.... 4.314, 4.336, 4.360 A-G v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109, [1988] 3 All ER 545, [1988] 2 WLR 805; on appeal [1990] 1 AC 109, [1988] 3 All ER 545, [1988] 2 WLR 805, 132 SJ 566, [1988] NLJR 47, CA; affd [1990] 1 AC 109, [1988] 3 All ER 545, [1988] 3 WLR 776, [1988] NLJR 296, HL.....................................................  1.164, 4.222, 4.231, 4.314, 4.315, 4.318, 4.332, 4.355, 4.358, 4.360 A-G v HM Coroner for S Yorkshire (West) [2012] EWHC 3783 (Admin), [2012] 12 WLUK 603, [2012] Inquest LR 143, [2013] ACD 22.................................................................... 10.175 A-G v Jonathan Cape Ltd [1976] QB 752, [1975] 3 All ER 484, [1975] 3 WLR 606, 119 SJ 696 ..................................................................................................................  1.164, 4.282, 4.329 A-G v Leveller Magazine Ltd [1979] AC 440, [1979] 1 All ER 745, [1979] 2 WLR 247....... 11.2 A-G v Newspaper Publishing plc [1988] Ch 333, [1987] 3 All ER 276, [1987] 3 WLR 942, 131 SJ 1454, [1987] LS Gaz R 3336, [1987] NLJ Rep 686, CA.......................................  1.224, 4.365 A-G v Observer Ltd & Guardian Newspapers Ltd (The Times, 9 May 1989); on appeal sub nom A-G v Newspaper Publishing plc (1990) The Times, 28 February, CA; affd (The Times, 12 April 1991)........................................................................................................ 4.365 A-G v Parry [2004] EWHC 3201 (Ch), [2004] EMLR 223.............................................. 4.317, 4.329 A-G v Punch Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 403, [2001] 2 All ER 655............................. 4.294, 4.366, 4.367 A-G v Times Newspapers Ltd [1992] 1 AC 191, [1991] 2 All ER 398, [1991] 2 WLR 994, HL.............................................................................................................................. 2.228, 4.365 A-G v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 1 WLR 885, [2001] 09 LS Gaz R 38, 145 SJ LB 30, CA....................................................................................................................  4.286, 4.357, 4.367 A-G v Turnaround Distribution Ltd [1989] FSR 169.............................................................. 4.363 A-G for the Northern Territory v Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475, 69 ALR 31........................ 11.107 A-G for the United Kingdom v Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (1987) 8 NSWLR 341; on appeal (1987) 75 ALR 353, 10 NSWLR 86, CA; affd [1988] NLJR 170, HC of A......................................................................................................................................... 4.318 A-G for the United Kingdom v Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) (1988) 165 CLR 30, 78 ALR 449......................................................................................................... 4.318 A-G of Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 AC 629, [1983] 2 All ER 346, [1983] 2 WLR 735, 127 SJ 188, PC.................................................................................................... 9.80, 10.125 A-G of the United States v Irish People 502 F Supp 63 (1980)............................................... 11.79 A-G’s Reference (No 5 of 2002) [2004] UKHL 40, [2005] 1 AC 167, .................................... 4.205 AHRC v Information Comr (EA/2012/0067).......................................................................... 1.193 AKZO Chemie BV v EC Commission (Case 53/85) [1986] ECR 1965, [1987] 1 CMLR 231, ECJ.........................................................................................................................  11.127, 11.130 AKZO Nobel Chemicals Ltd v EC Commission (Case T-125/03R) [2004] 4 CMLR 744, CFI..................................................................................................................................... 11.128 AM & S Europe Ltd v EC Commission (Case 155/79) [1983] QB 878, [1983] 1 All ER 705, [1983] 3 WLR 17, [1982] ECR 1575, [1982] 2 CMLR 264, [1982] FSR 474, 127 SJ 410, ECJ..................................................................................................................................... 11.128 APPGER v ICO & Foreign & Commonwealth Office [2015] UKUT 377 (AAC).......... 1.102, 1.122 APPGER v Information Comr (EA/2011/0049–0051) [2011] UKUT 153 (AAC), [2011] 4 WLUK 478.................................................................................................................. 1.122, 1.124 API v Commission (Case T-36/04) see Association de la Presse Internationale ASBL v Commission

Table of cases   lxxiii Abdalla v Information Comr (EA/2014/0228)......................................................................... 1.224 Abdi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1996] 1 All ER 641, [1996] Imm AR 288, [1996] 09 LS Gaz R 28, [1996] NLJR 245, 140 SJ LB 63, sub nom R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Abdi [1996] 1 WLR 298, HL.............................. 10.131 Abernethy v Hutchinson (1825) 3 LJOS Ch 209, 1 H & Tw 28.............................................. 4.316 Abbott (M) v Information Comr (EA/2015/0081)................................................................... 1.219 Access Info Europe v Council (Case T-233/09) [2011] All ER (EC) 603................................ 5.79 Access Info Europe v Commission (Case T-851/16)................................................................ 5.70 Adoption application, Re an ex parte originating summons in [1990] 1 All ER 639n, [1990] 1 WLR 520, [1990] FCR 538, [1990] 1 FLR 412n, [1990] Fam Law 296....................... 11.75 Advisory Conciliation & Arbitration Service v Grunwick Processing Laboratories Ltd see Grunwick Processing Laboratories Ltd v Advisory Conciliation & Arbitration Service Advocate (Lord) v Scotsman Publications Ltd [1990] 1 AC 812, [1989] 2 All ER 852, [1989] 3 WLR 358, 1989 SLT 705, [1989] NLJR 971, HL.................................................. 4.347, 4.355 Agricultural, Horticultural & Forestry Industry Training Board v Aylesbury Mushrooms Ltd [1972] 1 All ER 280, [1972] 1 WLR 190, 7 ITR 16, 116 SJ 57...................... 10.169, 10.172 Ahilathirunayagam (V) v Information Comr (EA/2006/0070)................................................ 1.82 Ahmed v Governing Body of the University of Oxford [2002] EWCA Civ 1907, [2003] 1 All ER 915, [2003] 1 WLR 995, [2003] ICR 733................................................................... 10.134 Ahmed v United Kingdom [1999] IRLR 188, ECtHR............................................................ 7.30 Akumah v Hackney LBC [2005] 2 All ER 148, HL................................................................. 8.13 Air Canada v Secretary of State for Trade (No 2) [1983] 2 AC 394, [1983] 1 All ER 910, sub nom Air Canada v Secretary of State for Trade [1983] 2 WLR 494, 127 SJ 205, HL...... 1.164, 11.61, 11.70, 11.71 Al Fayed v Advocate General for Scotland (2004) SLT 798 (IH)............................................ 10.124 Al Fayed v Metropolitan Police Comr [2002] EWCA Civ 780.......................................11.89, 11.108 Al Jeddah v UK [2011] ECHR 1092......................................................................................... 10.175 Al Skeini v UK [2011] ECHR 1093.......................................................................................... 10.175 Albert v Belgium (1983) 5 EHRR 533...................................................................................... 10.133 Albert (Prince) v Strange (1849) 18 LJ Ch 120, 1 H & Tw 1, 13 Jur 109, 1 Mac & G 25, 12 LTOS 441.......................................................................................................................... 4.316 Alcock (E) v Information Comr (EA/2006/0022).................................................................... 1.143 Alexander v Simpson (1889) 43 Ch D 139, 59 LJ Ch 137, 1 Meg 457, 38 WR 161, 61 LT 708, 6 TLR 72, CA............................................................................................................ 8.37 Ali v Birmingham City Council [2008] EWCA Civ 1228, [2009] 2 All ER 501, [2009] UKHRR 1.......................................................................................................................... 10.137 Ali v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKSC 60, [2016] 1 WLR 4799, [2017] 3 All ER 20, [2016] 11 WLUK 440, [2017] Imm AR 484, [2017] INLR 109...... 1.131 Ali v United Kingdom (Application 40378/10) [2015] 10 WLUK 500, (2016) 63 EHRR 20, [2015] HLR 46...........................................................................................................10.88, 10.137 Allen v United Kingdom (The Times, 12 November 2002).................................................... 4.200 Allison v Information Comr & HMRC (EA/2007/0089)........................................................ 1.230 All Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition v Information Comr & MoD [2011] UKUT 153............................................................................................  1.121, 1.233, 2.85 ALM Medical Services Ltd v Bladon (The Times, 29 August 2002)....................................... 4.310 Al-Mehdawi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1990] 1 AC876, [1989] 3 All ER 843, [1989] 3 WLR 1294, [1990] Imm AR 140, 134 SJ 50, [1990] 1 LS Gaz R 32, HL...................................................................................................................................... 10.125 Alphasteel Ltd (in liquidation) v Shirkhani [2013] EWCA Civ 1272, [2013] 10 WLUK 692, [2014] CP Rep 1, [2014] CILL 3433................................................................................ 11.37 Al Rawi v Security Service [2011] UKSC 34, [2011] 3 WLR 388, (2011) 108(30) LSG 23... 4.326, 10.80, 10.127, 10.141, 11.4, 11.81, 11.83 Amann v Switzerland (Application no 27798/95), ECtHR...................................................... 1.267 Amarvilis v HM Treasury [2009] EWHC 1666 (TC), [2009] BLR 425, [2010] Eu LR 152.. 11.69 American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396, [1975] 1 All ER 504, [1975] 2 WLR 316, [1975] FSR 101, [1975] RPC 513, 119 SJ 136, HL...................... 2.197, 2.259, 4.348, 4.350 Ames (C) v Information Comr and Cabinet Office (EA/2007/0110)...................................... 1.113 Amin v Director General of the Security Service [2015] EWCA Civ 654, [2015] 6 WLUK 836.... 11.63 Amministrazione Autonoma Dei Monopoli Di Stato, Re: EC Commission v Italy (Case 118/85) [1987] ECR 2599, [1988] 3 CMLR 255.............................................................. 11.123 Amway Corpn v Eurway International Ltd: Case No CO/4553/98........................................ 3.39 Anderson v Bank of British Columbia (1876) 2 Ch D 644, [1874–80] All ER Rep 396, 45 LJ Ch 449, 3 Char Pr Cas 212, 24 WR 624, 35 LT 76, CA................................................... 11.95

lxxiv  Table of cases Anderson v Parades Commission (EA/2007/0103).................................................................. 1.205 Andrews v Reading Borough Council [2004] EWHC 937 (Admin), [2004] EWHC 970 (QB).................................................................................................................................... 10.61 Animal Defenders International v UK [2013] ECHR 491...................................................... 4.369 Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728, [1977] 2 All ER 492, [1977] 2 WLR 1024, 141 JP 526, 75 LGR 555, 121 SJ 377, 5 BLR 1, 243 Estates Gazette 523, 591, [1977] JPL 514, HL................................................................................................... 1.273 Anti-Dumping Documents, Re: Greece v EC Council & Commission: 129/86R [1988] 3 CMLR 728, ECJ...................................................................................................... 11.131, 11.136 Anufrijeva v Southwark London Borough Council [2003] EWCA Civ 1406, [2004] QB 1124, [2004] 1 All ER 833, [2004] 2 WLR 603................................................ 2.231, 10.61, 10.70 Appleby v United Kingdom (Application 44306/98) (The Times, 13 May 2003)............ 2.227, 4.354 Application by JR-38 for Judicial Review, Re [2015] UKSC 42, [2016] AC 1131, [2015] 3 WLR 155, [2015] 4 All ER 90, [2015] NI 190, [2015] 7 WLUK 41, [2015] EMLR 25, [2015] HRLR 13, 39 BHRC 657.....................................................................2.215, 2.297, 4.326 Application of Officer O’s Application for Judicial Review, Re [2008] NI QB 52................... 10.131 Application pursuant to r 2 of the Insolvency Rules 1986, an, Re [1994] BCC 369................ 1.295 Arab Monetary Fund v Hashim (No 5) [1992] 2 All ER 911................................................... 11.36 Arca Capital Bohemia v Commission (Case T-440/17) [2018] EUECJ..............................  5.74, 5.79 Archer v Information Comr & Salisbury DC (EA/2006/0037)............................................... 3.6 Argyll (Duchess of) v Duke of Argyll [1967] Ch 302, [1965] 1 All ER 611, [1965] 2 WLR 790:..................................................................................................................................... 4.316 Armoniene v Lithuania (Application 36919/02) [2008] 11 WLUK 632, [2009] EMLR 7, (2009) 48 EHRR 53, 27 BHRC 389................................................................................. 2.242 Ashbridge Investments Ltd v Minister of Housing & Local Government [1965] 3 All ER 371, 129 JP 580, 63 LGR 400, 109 SJ 595, sub nom Re Stalybridge (Castle Hall No 7) & (Acres Lane & Lawton Street) Compulsory Purchase Order 1963, Ashbridge Investments Ltd v Minister of Housing & Local Government [1965] 1 WLR 1320, CA............................... 10.153 Ashburton (Lord) v Pape [1913] 2 Ch 469, [1911–13] All ER Rep 708, 82 LJ Ch 527, 57 SJ 644, 109 LT 381, 29 TLR 623, CA................................................................4.317, 11.33, 11.108 Ashdown v Telegraph Group Ltd [2001] 2 All ER 370, [2001] 2 WLR 967, [2001] NLJR 58, 145 SJ LB 31...................................................................................................................... 4.314 Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN Ltd [2002] UKHL 29, [2002] 4 All ER 193, [2002] 1 WLR 2033..................................................................................................................  11.36, 11.46 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corpn [1948] 1 KB 223, [1947] 2 All ER 680, 112 JP 55, 45 LGR 635, [1948] LJR 190, 92 SJ 26, 177 LT 641, 63 TLR 623, CA.......................................................................................... 1.125, 1.273, 3.24, 6.108, 7.68, 7.70, 8.47, 10.116, 10.119, 10.124 Association de la Presse Internationale ASBL v Commission (Case T-36/04) [2007] CMLR 51....................................................................................................................................  5.74, 5.77 Aston Cantlow & Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v Wallbank [2003] UKHL 37, [2004] 1 AC 546, [2003] 3 All ER 1213, [2003] 3 WLR 283......................... 1.85 Atlan v United Kingdom (Application No 36533/97).............................................................. 11.77 Atlanta Fruchthandelsgesellschaft mbH v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft (Case C-465/93) [1996] All ER (EC) 31, [1995] ECR I-3761, [1996] 1 CMLR 575, ECJ..................................................................................................................................... 11.136 Aubry v Editions Vice-Versa Inc [1998] 1 SCR 591..........................................................  2.215, 2.234 Austin v Miller Argent (South Wales) Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 1012, [2015] 1 WLR 62, [2015] 2 All ER 524, [2014] 7 WLUK 780, [2015] Env LR 6, [2014] 3 EGLR 1, [2014] LLR 663, (2014) 164(7618) NLJ 20, (2014) 158(30) SJLB 4........................................... 3.11 Australian Broadcasting Corp v Leach Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 185 ALR 1.................... 4.320 Auten v Rayner (No 2) [1960] 1 QB 669, [1960] 1 All ER 692, [1960] 2 WLR 562, 104 SJ 252...................................................................................................................................... 11.67 Axen v Germany (Application No 8273/78) (1983) 6 EHRR 195, ECtHR............................ 11.2 B B (a minor), Re [2003] EWHC 20 (Fam), [2004] 2 FLR 200.................................................. 11.9 B v Auckland District Law Society [2003] UKPC 38, [2003] 2 AC 736, [2004] 4 All ER 269...................................................................................................................................... 11.89 B v M [1990] FCR 581 see Brown v Matthews B v Secretary of State for Defence [2010] ICR 54................................................................... 10.132 B v United Kingdom (Application Nos 36337/97, 35974/97) [2001] 2 FCR 221, [2001] 2 FLR 261, ECtHR...........................................................................................................  11.2, 11.6

Table of cases   lxxv B (children) [2010] EWHC 262 (Fam), [2010] 1 FLR 1708, [2010] 3 FCR 296.................... 11.12 BBC v Harper Collins Publishers Ltd [2010] EWHC 2424 (Ch), [2011] EMLR 6, (2010) 107(4) LSG 23.................................................................................................  2.224, 4.324, 4.350 BBC v Information Comr (EA/2008/0019, 0034, 0051, 0058, 2009/0015)............................. 1.220 BBC v Information Comr [2009] UKHL 9, [2009] 1 WLR 430, [2009] 4 All ER 111, [2009] 2 WLUK 274, (2009) 153(7) SJLB 31.............................................................................. 3.15 BBC v Rochdale MBC [2005] EWHC 2862 (Fam), [2006] EMLR 6..................................... 11.6 BEIS v Information Comr & Henney [2017] EWCA Civ 844, [2017] PTSR 1644, [2017] 6 WLUK 652, [2018] 1 CMLR 8, [2018] Env LR 3........................................................... 3.9, 3.11 BERR v Information Comr & FoE (EA/2007/0072)............................................................... 2.86 Baird v Thurrock BC (2005) App LR 11/07 (The Times, 15 November 2005)...................... 10.159 Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) [1999] 2 SCR 817................1.289, 10.152 Baker (Lord) v Information Comr & DCLG (EA/2006/0043)............................................... 3.36 Baker MP, Norman v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHRR 1275..... 1.125, 1.126 Balabel v Air India [1988] Ch 317, [1988] 2 All ER 246, [1988] 2 WLR 1036, 132 SJ 699, [1988] NLJR 85, CA.................................................................................................... 11.92, 11.94 Ballantine (George) & Son Ltd v F E R Dixon & Son Ltd [1974] 2 All ER 503, [1974] 1 WLR 1125, [1975] RPC 111, 118 SJ 566......................................................................... 11.67 Bank Mellat v HM Treasury [2013] UKSC 38, [2014] AC 700, [2013] 4 All ER 495, [2013] 6 WLUK 526, [2013] Lloyd’s Rep FC 557....................................... 1.39, 10.80, 10.115, 10.126, 10.127, 10.132, 11.4 Bank of Bombay v Suleman Somji (1908) 99 LT 62, [1908–10] All ER Rep 533, 24 TLR 698, PC...................................................................................................................................... 7.67 Bank of Tokyo Ltd v Karoon [1987] AC 45n, [1986] 3 All ER 468, [1986] 3 WLR 414n, CA...................................................................................................................................... 2.340 Banque Keyser Ullmann SA v Skandia (UK) Insurance Co Ltd [1986] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 336, CA...................................................................................................................................... 11.104 Barber v Information Comr (EA/2005/0004).......................................................................... 1.34 Barbulescu v Romania (Application 61496/08) [2017] 9 WLUK 42, [2017] IRLR 1032, 44 BHRC 17........................................................................................................................... 4.196 Barclays Bank plc v Taylor [1989] 3 All ER 563, [1989] 1 WLR 1066, CA............................. 2.340 Barings plc, Re, Secretary of State for Trade & Industry v Baker see Secretary of State for Trade & Industry v Baker Barings plc (in liquidation) v Coopers & Lybrand [2000] 3 All ER 910, [2000] 1 WLR 2353, [2000] NLJR 681, CA........................................................................................................ 11.37 Barking & Dagenham London Borough Council v East London Housing Association (1988) 3 PAD 154.............................................................................................................. 9.143 Barlow Clowes Gilt Managers Ltd v Clowes (The Times, 2 February 1990)......................... 11.4 Barrett v Enfield London Borough Council [1999] 3 All ER 193, [1999] 3 WLR 79, [1999] 2 FCR 434, [1999] 2 FLR 426, [1999] Fam Law 622, 49 BMLR 1, HL.................... 1.273, 10.52 Barrett v Ministry of Defence (The Times, 24 January 1990)................................................. 11.59 Bates v Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone [1972] 3 All ER 1019, [1972] 1 WLR 1373, 116 SJ 584........................................................................................................................... 10.123, 10.169 Bath & NE Somerset Council (EA/2010/0045)....................................................................... 3.46 Bavarian Lager v Commission (Case T-194/04) [2007] ECR II-4523, [2008] 1 CMLR 35... 5.71, 5.72, 5.108 Bavarian Lager v Commission (Case C-28/08 P) [2011] Bus LR 867, [2010] 6 WLUK 672, [2011] 1 CMLR 1, [2011] All ER (EC) 1007.................................................................... 2.9, 2.82 Baxendale v Parliamentary Comr for Standards, ex p Fayed [1998] 1 WLR 669, [1998] 1 All ER 93, (1998) 10 Admin LR 69......................................................................................... 7.9 Beck v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce [2009] EWCA Civ 619, [2009] IRLR 740, (2009) 153(26) SJLB 28..................................................................................................... 11.75 Beck v Ministry of Defence [2004] PIQR 1, [2003] 31 LS Gaz R 31, (The Times, 21 July 2003)................................................................................................................................... 11.26 Belhaj & Boudchar v DPP [2017] EWHC 3056 (Admin), [2017] 12 WLUK 17, [2018] HRLR 4; revs’d [2018] UKSC 33, [2018] 3 WLR 435, [2018] 4 All ER 561, [2018] 7 WLUK 44, [2018] 2 Cr App R 33, [2018] Crim LR 1012............................................... 10.132 Belhaj v Straw [2017] EWHC 1861 (QB), [2017] 7 WLUK 530............................................ 11.87 Bellamy v Information Comr (EA/2005/0023).......................................................1.102, 1.143, 1.209 Benkabouche v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2017] UKSC 62, [2017] 3 WLR 957, [2018] 1 All ER 662, [2017] 10 WLUK 393, [2017] ICR 1327, [2018] IRLR 123, [2017] HRLR 15, 43 BHRC 378......................................................... 10.166

lxxvi  Table of cases Benson (I) v Information Comr (EA/2011/0120)..................................................................... 1.111 Bermingham & others v Government of USA [2006] EWHC 200 (Admin), [2007] QB 727, [2007] 2 WLR 635............................................................................................................. 12.1 Bermuda International Securities Ltd v KPMG (a firm) (The Times, 14 March 2001)......... 11.27 Berkeley v Secretary of State for the Environment [2000] 3 All ER 897, [2000] 3 WLR 420, HL...................................................................................................................................... 9.145 Besselink v Council (Case T-331/11) [2013] 9 WLUK 215, [2014] 1 CMLR 28................... 5.69 Bickford Smith (I) v Information Comr (EA/2010/0032)........................................................ 3.18 Big Brother Watch v UK [2018] ECHR 722.................................................................... 4.233, 4.236 Birmingham City District Council v O see R v City of Birmingham District Council, ex p O Birt (P) v Information Comr (EA/2011/0004)......................................................................... 1.124 Black v Sunitomo Corpn [2001] EWCA Civ 1819, [2003] 3 All ER 643, [2002] 1 WLR 1562.................................................................................................................................... 11.27 Blunkett v Quinn [2004] EWHC 2816 (Fam), [2005] 1 FCR 103, [2005] 05 LS Gaz R 29... 11.2, 11.12 Boddington v British Transport Police [1999] 2 AC 143, [1998] 2 All ER 203, [1998] 2 WLR 639, 162 JP 455, [1998] NLJR 515, HL............................................................................ 10.172 Bolkiah v KPMG (a firm) [1999] 2 AC 222, [1999] 1 All ER 517, [1999] 2 WLR 215, [1999] 1 BCLC 1, [1999] PNLR 220, [1999] NLJR 16, 143 SJ LB 35, HL............................... 11.39 Bolton Metropolitan District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment [1996] 1 All ER 184, [1995] 1 WLR 1176, 160 LG Rev 361, HL........................................................ 10.162 Bonnard v Perryman [1891] 2 Ch 269, [1891–4] All ER Rep 965, 60 LJ Ch 617, 39 WR 435, 65 LT 506, 7 TLR 453, CA...................................................................2.197, 2.224, 2.259, 4.350 Botmeh v United Kingdom (application no 15187/03) (2008) 46 EHRR 31.......................... 11.77 Bousfield (A) v Information Comr (EA/2012/0092)................................................................ 1.193 Bowman v Fels [2005] EWCA Civ 226, [2005] All ER (D) 115 (Mar).............................11.89, 11.105 Bowrick (P) v Information Comr & Nottingham City Council (EA/2005/0006).................. 1.231 Boyer v R (1948) 94 CCC 195.................................................................................................. 4.271 Bradley v Jockey Club [2004] EWHC 2164 (QB)................................................................... 10.130 Brandzburg v Hayes, 408 US 665 (1972), US Supreme Court................................................ 11.39 Brayhead (Ascot) Ltd v Berkshire County Council [1964] 2 QB 303, [1964] 1 All ER 149, [1964] 2 WLR 507, 128 JP 167, 62 LGR 162, 15 P & CR 423, 108 SJ 178.................... 10.162 Breeze v John Stacey & Sons Ltd (The Times, 8 July 1999)................................................... 11.33 Brennan v Sunderland City Council [2009] ICR 479.............................................................. 11.107 Brent LBC v N [2005] EWHC 1676 (Fam), [2006] 1 FLR 310, (2006) 9 CCL Rep 14........ 4.326 Brind v Secretary of State for the Home Department see R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Brind Bristol City Council v Information Comr (EA/2010/0012).................................................... 3.39 British Broadcasting Corpn v Kelly see Kelly v British Broadcasting Corpn British Coal Corpn v Dennis Rye Ltd (No 2) [1988] 3 All ER 816, [1988] 1 WLR 1113, 132 SJ 1430, CA........................................................................................................................ 11.109 British Sky Broadcasting plc v Virgin Media Communications Ltd (formerly NTL Communications Ltd) [2008] EWCA Civ 612, [2008] 1 WLR 2854, [2008] Bus LR 1543.................................................................................................................................... 11.37 British Steel Corpn v Granada Television Ltd [1981] AC 1096, [1981] 1 All ER 417, 452, [1980] 3 WLR 774, 818, 124 SJ 812, HL.......................................................................... 11.39 Broadmoor Special Health Authority v Robinson [2000] QB 775, [2000] 2 All ER 727, [2000] 1 WLR 1590, CA.................................................................................................... 10.142 Bromley London Borough Council v Greater London Council [1983] 1 AC 768, [1982] 1 All ER 153, [1982] 2 WLR 62, 80 LGR 1, [1982] RA 47, 126 SJ 16, HL...................  7.60, 12.24 Brookman v Green (1983) 147 JP 555, 82 LGR 228............................................................... 918 Brooks v Comr of the Metropolitan Police [2005] UKHL 24, [2005] 1 WLR 1495, [2005] 2 All ER 489.......................................................................................................................... 10.52 Brown v Information Comr (EA/2011/0002)........................................................................... 1.194 Brown v Secretary of State for the Environment (1978) 40 P & CR 285............................... 9.130 Brunton v Information Comr & the Duchy of Cornwall (EA 2010/1082)............................. 3.14 Brunyate v ILEA see R v ILEA, ex p Brunyate Bryan v United Kingdom (Application 19178/91) 21 EHRR 342, [1996] 1 PLR 47, ECtHR..................................................................................................................... 10.133, 10.134 Bryce v Information Comr (EA/2009/0083)............................................................................ 2.86 Buchanan v Jennings [2004] UKPC 36, [2005] 1 AC 115, [2004] 3 WLR 1163..................... 7.2 Buck (P) v Information Comr & Epsom etc NHS Trust (EA/2006/0090)........................ 1.206, 1.207 Bucks Free Press v Information Comr (EA/2006/0071).......................................................... 1.150

Table of cases   lxxvii Bugdaycay v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1987] AC 514, [1987] 1 All ER 940, [1987] 2 WLR 606, [1987] Imm AR 250, 131 SJ 297, [1987] LS Gaz R 902, [1987] NLJ Rep 199, HL.............................................................................................................. 10.164 Bugg v DPP [1993] QB 473, [1993] 2 All ER 815, [1993] 2 WLR 628, [1993] Crim LR 374, sub nom Bugg & Greaves v DPP 157 JP 673..................................................................... 10.172 Bullimore v Pothecary Witham Weld [2011] IRLR 18............................................................ 2.195 Bullivant v A-G for Victoria [1901] AC 196, [1900–3] All ER Rep 812, 70 LJKB 645, 50 WR 1, 84 LT 737, 17 TLR 457, HL......................................................................................... 11.104 Bunn v British Broadcasting Corpn [1998] 3 All ER 552, [1998] EMLR 846, [1998] 28 LS Gaz R 31, [1998] NLJR 979.............................................................................................. 4.326 Burchell v Bullard [2005] EWCA Civ 358............................................................................... 10.69 Burgess (R) v Information Comr & Stafford BC (EA/2006/0091).......................................... 3.42 Burgoine v Waltham Forest London Borough Council (1996) 95 LGR 520, [1997] 2 BCLC 612, [1997] BCC 347......................................................................................................... 9.158 Burmah Oil Co Ltd v Bank of England [1980] AC 1090, [1979] 3 All ER 700, [1979] 3 WLR 722, 123 SJ 786, HL.................................................................. 1.164, 11.61, 11.69, 11.70, 11.71 Burns v Royal Mail Group plc (formerly Consignia plc) [2004] ICR 1103, [2004] IRLR 425...................................................................................................................................... 10.152 Burstall v Beyfus (1884) 26 Ch D 35, [1881–5] All ER Rep Ext 1432, 53 LJ Ch 565, 32 WR 418, 50 LT 542, CA........................................................................................................... 11.35 Bushell v Secretary of State for the Environment [1981] AC 75, [1980] 2 All ER 608, [1980] 3 WLR 22, 144 JP 387, 78 LGR 269, 124 SJ 168, HL.................................... 1.168, 3.36, 9.130, 10.139, 10.150 Butler v Board of Trade [1971] Ch 680, [1970] 3 All ER 593, [1970] 3 WLR 822, 114 SJ 604..... 11.104 Buxton v Minister of Housing & Local Government [1961] 1 QB 278, [1960] 3 All ER 408, [1960] 3 WLR 866, 124 JP 489, 59 LGR 45, 12 P & CR 77, 104 SJ 935........................ 9.130 C C v AB [2006] EWHC 3083 (QB), [2007] EMLR 11, [2007] 2 FLR 301............................... 2.235 C v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] UKSC 2, [2016] 1 WLR 444, [2017] 1 All ER 513, [2016] 1 WLUK 489, [2016] EMLR 13, [2016] HRLR 7, (2016) 19 CCL Rep 5, (2016) 149 BMLR 1...................................................................................................................... 11.4 C, Re [1992] 1 FCR 57 see A (minors), Re [1992] 1 All ER 153 C (a minor) (care proceedings: disclosure), Re [1997] Fam 76, [1997] 2 WLR 322, [1996] 3 FCR 556, sub nom Re EC (disclosure of material) [1996] 2 FLR 725, [1997] Fam Law 160, CA........................................................................................................................  2.335, 11.6 C (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) (No 2), Re [1990] Fam 39, [1989] 2 All ER 791, [1989] 3 WLR 252, [1990] FCR 220, [1990] 1 FLR 263, [1990] Fam Law 133, [1989] 28 LS Gaz R 43, [1989] NLJR 613, CA............................................................................ 11.6 CDE v MGN Ltd [2010] EWHC 3308 (QB), [2011] 1 FLR 1524, [2011] Fam Law 360..... 2.259 C & L, Re [1991] FCR 351 see A (minors), Re [1992] 1 All ER 153 CTB v NGN Ltd [2011] EWHC 1344 (QB).................................................................... 2.238, 2.243 Cabinet Office v Ashton [2018] UKUT 2018 (AAC)............................................................... 1.81 Cabinet Office v Information Comr [2018] UKUT 410 (AAC).............................................. 1.102 Cabinet Office v Information Comr (EA/2008/0030)............................................................. 1.174 Cabinet Office v Information Comr (EA/2008/0049)............................................................. 1.173 Cabinet Office v Information Comr (EA/2010/0027)............................................................. 3.34 Cabinet Office v Information Comr (EA/2010/0028)............................................................. 1.248 Cabinet Office v Information Comr (EA/2010/0031)....................................................... 1.175, 1.243 Cabinet Office v Information Comr (EA/2011/0263)............................................................. 1.167 Cabinet Office v Information Comr (EA/2014/0223)............................................................. 1.173 Cabinet Office v Information Comr & C Lamb (EA/2008/0024)........................................... 1.176 Cairns v ICO & DVLA (EA/2009/0119 & EA/2009/0102).................................................... 1.64 Calcraft v Guest [1898] 1 QB 759, [1895–9] All ER Rep 346, 67 LJQB 505, 46 WR 420, 42 SJ 343, 78 LT 283, CA............................................................................................... 11.33, 11.108 Calland (J) v Information Comr (EA/2007/0136).................................................................... 1.229 Callous (Greg) v Information Comr (EA/2013/0159)............................................................. 1.197 Calvin v Carr [1980] AC 574, [1979] 2 All ER 440, [1979] 2 WLR 755, 123 SJ 112, PC....... 10.172 Cambridge Nutrition Ltd v British Broadcasting Corpn [1990] 3 All ER 523, CA......... 2.197, 4.348 Camden (LB) v Information Comr & YV [2012] UKUT 190 (AAC)..................................... 1.150 Camelot Group plc v Centaur Communications Ltd [1999] QB 124, [1998] 1 All ER 251, [1998] 2 WLR 379, [1998] IRLR 80, [1998] EMLR 1, [1997] 43 LS Gaz R 30, [1997] NLJR 1618, 142 SJ LB 19, CA.......................................................................................... 11.43

lxxviii  Table of cases Cameron v Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd [2006] EWHC 1133 (QB), [2007] 1 WLR 163, [2007] 3 All ER 241........................................................................................................... 3.14 Campaign against the Arms Trade v Information Comr & MoD (EA/2006/0040)................ 1.132 Campbell v Frisbee [2002] EWCA Civ 1374, [2003] ICR 141, 146 SJ LB 233, [2003] EMLR 76................................................................................................................................. 2.233, 4.317 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1373, [2003] QB 633, [2003] 2 WLR 80, [2003] 1 All ER 224, [2002] 10 WLUK 336, [2003] EMLR 2, [2003] HRLR 2, (2002) 99(42) LSG 38, (2002) 146 SJLB 234.................................................................................... 2.177, 2.233 Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457, [2004] 2 All ER 995, [2004] 2 WLR 1232, [2004] 21 LS Gaz R 36.............................. 1.206, 2.4, 2.19, 2.216, 2.218, 2.231, 2.233, 2.234, 2.237, 4.318, 4.320, 4.324, 10.138, 11.12 Campbell v Secretary of State [2018] UKUT 372 (AAC)........................................................ 2.12 Campbell v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council [1982] QB 1065, [1982] 2 All ER 791, [1982] 3 WLR 74, 80 LGR 700, 126 SJ 361, CA..................................2.197, 2.216, 11.58, 11.69 Cape Intermediate Holdings Ltd v Dring [2018] EWCA Civ 1795....................................... 1.155 Carey, Smithers v DPP [1989] Crim LR 368, [1989] COD 401............................................. 8.37 Carlton Film Distributors Ltd v VCI plc [2003] EWHC 616 (Ch)........................................ 11.29 Carltona Ltd v Works Comrs [1943] 2 All ER 560, CA.................................................... 4.146, 4.251 Carpenter (Stephen) v Information Comr & Stevenage Borough Council (EA/2008/0046).3.32 Castle v Crown Prosecution Service [2014] EWHC 587 (Admin), [2014] 1 WLR 4279, [2014] 1 WLUK 528, (2014) 178 JP 285, [2014] RTR 19................................................ 4.147 Castle Point BC v Information Comr (EA/2010/0040)........................................................... 3.25 Caswell v Dairy Produce Quota Tribunal for England & Wales see R v Dairy Produce Quota Tribunal for England & Wales, ex p Caswell Cavanagh v Health Service Comr [2005] EWCA Civ 1578, [2006] 1 WLR 1229, [2006] 3 All ER 543.................................................................................................................... 10.15, 10.55 Cavendish Munro Professional Risk Management Ltd v Geduld [2010] ICR 325 , [2010] IRLR 38............................................................................................................................. 4.299 Chahal v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 413, ECtHR..................  10.80, 10.127, 10.134, 10.139 Chan v Alvis Vehicles Ltd [2003] EWHC 1238....................................................................... 1.155 Chandler v DPP [1964] AC 763, [1962] 3 All ER 142, [1962] 3 WLR 694, 46 Cr App Rep 347, 106 SJ 588, HL........................................................................................  4.155, 4.156, 11.65 Chapman v United Kingdom (Application 27238/95) (2001) 10 BHRC 48........................... 10.133 Chappell v United Kingdom [1989] FSR 617.......................................................................... 11.120 Charity Commission of England & Wales v Information Comr (EA/2015/0272)................. 1.83 Chemists (a firm) v R & C Comrs [2009] UKFTT 66 (TC), [2009] STC (SCD) 472........... 11.80 Chesterton Global Ltd v Nurmohamed [2017] EWCA Civ 979, [2018] 1 All ER 947, [2017] 7 WLUK 174, [2018] ICR 731, [2017] IRLR 837............................................................ 4.301 Cheyes v Chiles (Case 14.108 2003)......................................................................................... 4.298 Chichester DC v Information Comr (EA/2010/0153).................................................. 3.36, 3.45, 3.46 Chichester DC v Information Comr [2012] UKUT 491 (AAC)............................................. 3.38 Chief Constable of Humberside v Information Comr [2009] EWCA Civ 1079, [2010] 1 WLR 1136, [2010] 3 All ER 611....................................................................... 1.18, 2.283, 2.284 Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary v Garavelli [1997] EMLR 543, DC............ 11.44 Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v Evans [1982] 3 All ER 141, [1982] 1 WLR 1155, 147 JP 6, 126 SJ 549, [1982] LS Gaz R 1257, HL.................................................. 10.138 Chief Constable of Northern Ireland’s Application for Judicial Review, Re [2010] NI QB 66........................................................................................................................................ 10.175 Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police v Information Comr [2011] EWHC 44 (Admin), [2011] 1 WLR 1387, [2011] ACD 28................................................................................ 1.71 Chief Constable of Surrey Police v Information Comr (EA/2010/0081)................................ 1.191 Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police v Homer [2012] UKSC 15, [2012] 3 All ER 1287, [2012] 4 WLUK 533, [2012] ICR 704, [2012] IRLR 601, [2012] Eq LR 594, (2012) 162 NLJ 652, (2012) 156(17) SJLB 31..................................................................................... 2.84 Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police v S see S v S (Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police intervening) Choudhury v Governors of Bishop Challoner Roman Catholic Comprehensive School see R v Governors of the Bishop Challoner Roman Catholic Comprehensive Girls’ School, ex p Choudhury Christian Institute v Lord Advocate [2016] UKSC 51, 2017 SC (UKSC) 29, 2016 SLT 805, 2016 SCLR 448, [2016] 7 WLUK 790, [2016] HRLR 19, [2016] ELR 474, (2016) 19 CCL Rep 422, 2016 GWD 22-40..................................................................................... 2.261

Table of cases   lxxix Chundawadra v Immigration Appeal Tribunal [1988] Imm AR 161, CA................................ 4.343 City of Moscow v Bankers Trust see Department of Economic Policy & Development of the City of Moscow v Bankers Trust Co Civil Service Unions v United Kingdom (1987) 10 EHRR 269........................................ 4.343, 4.346 Clark v Kelly [2003] 1 All ER 1106, HL................................................................................... 10.134 Clark Homes Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment (1993) 66 P&CR 263............... 10.162 Clibbery v Allan [2002] EWCA Civ 45, [2002] Fam 261, [2002] 1 All ER 865, [2002] 2 WLR 1511.................................................................................................................................... 11.15 Client Earth & PAN Europe v EFSA (Case C-615/13 P)....................................................  5.73, 5.79 Clift v Clarke [2011] EWHC 1164 (QB)................................................................................. 11.47 Coco v AN Clark [1968] FSR 415, [1969] RPC 41............................................................ 1.227, 4.314 Coggins v Information Comr (EA/2007/0130)........................................................................ 1.82 Cole (Chris) v Information Comr (EA/2016/0290)................................................................. 1.131 Coleen Properties Ltd v Minister of Housing & Local Government [1971] 1 All ER 1049, [1971] 1 WLR 433, 135 JP 226, 69 LGR 175, 22 P & CR 417, [1971] RVR 489, 218 Estates Gazette 1163, 115 SJ 112, CA.........................................................10.115, 10.152, 10.162 Colliass (C) v Information Comr (EA/2010/0084).................................................................. 2.86 Columbia Picture Industries Inc v Robinson [1987] Ch 38, [1986] 3 All ER 338, [1986] 3 WLR 542, [1986] FSR 367, 130 SJ 766............................................................................ 11.119 Comfort Hotels Ltd v Wembley Stadium Ltd (Silkin, third party) [1988] 3 All ER 53, [1988] 1 WLR 872, 132 SJ 967, [1988] 26 LS Gaz R 43............................................................. 11.92 Commission v EnBW (Case C-365/12 P) [2014] 2 WLUK 930, [2014] 4 CMLR 30........... 5.79 Commission for Local Administration v Information Comr (EA/2007/0087)....................... 1.230 Common Services Agency v Scottish Information Comr [2008] UKHL 47.............1.64, 1.268, 2.12, 2.24, 2.82, 2.83 Commonwealth of Australia v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1980) 147 CLR 39, 32 ALR 485, 55 ALJR 45...................................................................................................................... 4.330, 4.341 Compagnie Financière et Commerciale du Pacifique v Peruvian Guano Co (1882) 11 QBD 55, 52 LJQB 181, 31 WR 395, 48 LT 22, CA................................................................... 11.18 Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, Inquiry under the, Re [1988] AC 660, [1988] 1 All ER 203, [1988] 2 WLR 33, [1988] BCLC 153, 4 BCC 35, 132 SJ 21, [1988] 4 LS Gaz R 33, [1987] NLJ Rep 1181, HL...................................................................... 11.49 Company’s Application, a, Re [1989] Ch 477, [1989] 2 All ER 248, [1989] 3 WLR 265, [1989] ICR 449, [1989] IRLR 477, [1989] BCLC 462, 133 SJ 917.................................. 4.323 Competition & Markets Authority v Concordia International RX (UK) [2018] EWCA Civ 1881, [2018] Bus LR 2452, [2018] 8 WLUK 65........................................................ 11.68, 11.74 Conerney v Jacklin [1985] Crim LR 234, 129 SJ 285, CA....................................................... 11.66 Connolly v EC Commission (Case C-274/99 P) [2001] ECR I-1611, ECJ............................ 7.19 Connnor (EJ) v Surrey CC [2010] EWCA Civ 286, [2011] QB 429, [2010] 3 WLR 1302.... 10.52 Connor (J) Press Associates Ltd v Information Comr (EA/2005/0005).................................. 1.222 Connors v UK [2005] 40 EHRR 9, 16 BHRC 639, [2004] HLR 52....................................... 10.128 Conway v Rimmer [1967] 2 All ER 1260, [1967] 1 WLR 1031, 111 SJ 479, CA; revsd [1968] AC 910, [1968] 1 All ER 874, [1968] 2 WLR 998, 112 SJ 191, HL...............  1.274, 11.58, 11.61 Cooper v Wandsworth Board of Works (1863) 14 CBNS 180, [1861–73] All ER Rep Ext 1554, 32 LJCP 185, 9 Jur NS 1155, 2 New Rep 31, 11 WR 646, 8 LT 278.................... 10.119 Corderoy & Ahmed v IC, AG & Co [2017] UKUT 495 (AAC)............................  1.122, 1.209, 1.210 Coroner for the Birmingham Inquests (1974) v J Hambleton [2018] EWCA Civ 2081, [2018] 9 WLUK 313......................................................................................................... 10.176 Corporate Officer of House of Commons v Baker (AP) (EA/2006/0015).............................. 2.89 Corporate Officer of House of Commons v Information Comr & Leapman, Brooke & Thomas (EA/2007/0061–63, 0122–23, 0131)...............................................................  7.10, 2.90 Corporate Officer of House of Commons v Information Comr & Leapman, Brooke [2008] EWHC 1084 (Admin), [2009] 3 All ER 403, [2008] ACD 71...................................... 1.163, 2.90 Corporate Officer of House of Commons v Information Comr (EA/2006/0074–0076)........ 2.91 Corporate Officer of House of Commons v Information Comr & Norman Baker (EA/2006/0015–16)...................................................................................................... 2.91, 7.10 Couderc & Hachette Fillipacchi Associes v France (Application 40454/07) [2015] 11 WLUK 215, [2016] EMLR 19, 40 BHRC 436................................................................ 2.242 Coulter (J) v IPSO [2018] EWHC 1017 (Admin), [2018] 4 WLUK 533................................ 2.171 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service see R v Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, ex p Council of Civil Service Unions Coventry Newspapers Ltd, ex p [1993] QB 278, [1993] 1 All ER 86, [1992] 3 WLR 916, sub nom R v Bromell [1992] 35 LS Gaz R 32, [1992] NLJR 1232, 136 SJ LB 254, CA........ 11.66

lxxx  Table of cases Cox v Riley (1986) 83 Cr App R 54.......................................................................................... 2.355 Cox v Sun Alliance Life Ltd [2001] IRLR 448......................................................................... 2.195 Coys Ltd v Autocherish Ltd [2004] EWHC 1334 (QB), [2004] EMLR 482................... 2.224, 4.350 Crake v Supplementary Benefits Commission [1982] 1 All ER 498, [1982] 2 FLR 264......... 10.161 Cranfield University v Information Comr (EA/2011/0146).................................................... 1.222 Craven v Information Comr [2012] UKUT 442 (AAC), [2013] 1 WLUK 549....................3.29, 3.31 Crawford v Information Comr (EA/2011/0145)...................................................................... 1.209 Cream Holdings Ltd v Bannerjee [2004] UKHL 44, [2004] 4 All ER 617, [2004] 3 WLR 918............................................................................................................ 2.224, 2.259, 4.350, 11.4 Creekside Forum v Information Comr & the Department for Culture, Media & Sport (EA/2008/0065)................................................................................................................. 3.42 Crompton (Alfred) Amusement Machines Ltd v Customs & Excise Comrs (No 2) [1974] AC 405, [1973] 2 All ER 1169, [1973] 3 WLR 268, 117 SJ 602, HL........................ 11.59, 11.68, 11.92, 11.100 Crook, Re (The Times, 13 November 1989)........................................................................ 11.4, 11.15 Cross (J) v Information Comr (EA/2010/0101)....................................................................... 1.166 Cross v Information Comr & Cabinet Office [2016] UKUT 153 (AAC)............................... 3.13 Crown Prosecution Service v Information Comr (EA/2009/0077)......................................... 1.180 Crowson Fabrics Ltd v Rider [2007] EWHC 2942 (Ch), [2008] IRLR 288, [2008] FSR 17. 4.315 Cubells (M) v Information Comr (EA/2011/0183).................................................................. 1.230 Cullen v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (Northern Ireland) [2003] UKHL 39, [2004] 2 All ER 237, [2003] 1 WLR 1763...................................................... 10.52 Culkin v Wirral Independent Appeal Panel [2009] EWHC 868 (Admin), [2009] ELR 287.. 10.152 Cumbria County Council v X (The Times, 25 June 1990)...................................................... 11.6 Customs & Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc [2004] 2 All ER 789......................... 11.117 D D (a child) (Care proceedings: professional privilege), Re [2011] EWCA Civ 684, [2011] 2 FCR 585............................................................................................................................. 11.107 D v L [2004] EMLR 1............................................................................................................... 2.216 D v National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children [1978] AC 171, [1977] 1 All ER 589, [1977] 2 WLR 201, 121 SJ 119, HL..................................................11.58, 11.62, 11.68 D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171, [1977] 2 WLR 201, [1977] 1 All ER 589................................... 1.143 DB v General Medical Council [2016] EWHC 2331 (QB), [2016] 9 WLUK 444, (2016) 152 BMLR 106......................................................................................................................... 10.110 DBERR v Information Comr & FoE (EA/2007/0072)...................................................... 1.71, 1.209 DBERR v O’Brien & Information Comr [2009] EWHC 164 (QB)................................. 1.172, 1.209 DCLG v Information Comr [2012] UKUT 102 (AAC).......................................................... 3.37 DEFRA v Information Comr (EA/2009/0011)........................................................................ 3.35 DEFRA v Information Comr (EA/2012/0105)........................................................................ 3.35 DEFRA v Information Comr & Simon Birkett [2011] UKUT 39 (AAC).............................. 1.232 DfEA v Comr & Evening Standard (EA/2006/0006)....................................................... 1.172, 1.173 DIES v Information Comr (EA/2006/0006)............................................................................ 1.166 DMK v News Group Newspapers [2016] EWHC 1646 (QB), [2016] 5 WLUK 337............ 11.3 DP v United Kingdom [2002] 3 FCR 385............................................................................... 10.52 DPP v Channel Four Television Co Ltd [1993] 2 All ER 517, [1993] Crim LR 277, 279, [1992] NLJR 1412, DC.............................................................................................. 4.192, 11.51 DPP v Hutchinson [1989] QB 583, [1989] 1 All ER 1060, [1989] 3 WLR 281, 153 JP 453, 87 LGR 349, [1989] Crim LR 208, 133 SJ 946, [1989] 22 LS Gaz R 33; revsd [1990] 2 AC 783, [1990] 2 All ER 836, [1990] 3 WLR 196, 155 JP 71, 89 LGR 1, 134 SJ 1041, [1990] NLJR 1035, HL..................................................................................................... 10.173 DPP v Lennon [2006] EWHC 1201 (Admin), (2006) 170 JP 532, [2006] Info TLR 311...... 2.356 DTI v Information Comr (EA/2006/0007).............................................................................. 1.143 DWP v Information Comr (EA/2010/0073)............................................................................ 1.215 Dalley (Group Captain) v EC (EA/2011/0180)........................................................................ 3.38 Darnell v United Kingdom (1993) 18 EHRR 205................................................................... 2.218 Davidson v Scottish Ministers [2004] UKHL 34, 2004 SLT 895, HL.................................... 10.117 Davis (M) v Information Comr (EA/2012/0175)..................................................................... 1.113 Dawson-Damer v Taylor-Wessing Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 74, [2017] 1 WLR 3255, [2017] 2 WLUK 461, [2018] WTLR 57...................................................................................... 2.19 De Canitaini v EP (Case T-540/15).......................................................................................... 5.64 De Haes & Gijsels v Belgium (1997) 25 EHRR 1, ECtHR..................................................... 11.40 Dennekamp v European Parliament (Case T-115/13)............................................................. 5.73

Table of cases   lxxxi Department for Business, Enterprise & Regulatory Reform v ICO & Friends of the Earth (EA/2007/0072)................................................................................................................. 1.193 Department for Culture, Media & Sport v Information Comr (EA/2007/0090).................... 1.173 Department for Culture, Media & Sport v Information Comr (EA/2009/0038).................... 1.180 Department for Work & Pensions v Information Comr [2015] EWCA Civ 758................... 1.222 Department of Economic Policy & Development of the City of Moscow v Bankers Trust Co [2004] EWCA Civ 314, [2004] 2 All ER (Comm) 193, [2004] 4 All ER 746, [2004] 3 WLR 533, CA............................................................................................................. 11.4, 11.15 Department for Education v Information Comr [2018] UKUT 348 (AAC).......................... 1.182 Department of Health v Information Comr (EA/2011/0286 & 0287).................................... 1.173 Department of Health v Information Comr (EA/2016/0282)................................................. 1.179 Department of Health v Information Comr & the Pro-Life Alliance (EA/2008/0074)......... 2.85 Department of Health v Information Comr & S Lewis [2017] EWCA Civ 374, [2017] 1 WLR 3330, [2017] 5 WLUK 567..................................................................................... 1.167 Department of Health v Information Comr & Stimson (EA/2008/0018)....................... 1.203, 1.218 Department of the Environment (Northern Ireland) v Information Comr [2016] UKUT 83 (AAC).............................................................................................................................  1.64, 3.18 Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd [1993] AC 534, [1993] 1 All ER 1011, [1993] 2 WLR 449, 91 LGR 179, [1993] 14 LS Gaz R 46, [1993] NLJR 283, 137 SJ LB 52, 81, HL.......................................................................................................................... 10.174 Derry City Council v Information Comr (EA/2006/0014)............................................... 1.138, 1.222 Desmond v Notts Police [2011] EWCA Civ 3, [2011] PTSR 1369, [2011] 1 FLR 1361....... 2.290 Deumeland v Germany (1986) 8 EHRR 448, ECtHR............................................................ 10.164 Devon County Council v Secretary of State for Communities & Local Government [2010] EWHC 1456 (Admin), [2011] BLGR 64, [2010] ACD 83............................................... 10.168 Dey (M) v Information Comr & OFT (EA/2006/0057).......................................................... 1.229 Dian AO v Davis, Frankel & Mead (a firm) [2005] 1 All ER 1074.......................................... 1.155 Digby Cameron v Information Comr (EA/2008/0010)........................................................... 1.68 Digicel (St Lucia) Ltd v Cable & Wireless plc [2008] EWHC 2522 (Ch), [2009] 2 All ER 1094.................................................................................................................................... 11.21 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine & Natural Resources (Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12) [2015] QB 127, [2014] 3 WLR 1607, [2014] 2 All ER (Comm) 1, [2014] 4 WLUK 285, [2014] 3 CMLR 44, [2014] All ER (EC) 775......... 2.9, 2.343, 4.207 Director of the Serious Fraud Office v Eurasian Natural Resources Corpn Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 2006, [2018] 9 WLUK 32, [2018] Lloyd’s Rep FC 635, [2019] Crim LR 44........................................................................................................................................ 11.99 Doherty v Birmingham City Council [2008] UKHL 57, [2009] 1 AC 367, [2008] 3 WLR 636...... 10.128 Doody v Secretary of State for the Home Department see R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Doody Douglas v Hello Ltd [2001] 2 All ER 289, [2001] 2 WLR 992, CA......................2.230, 2.231, 2.232, 4.317, 4.319, 4.350 Douglas v Hello Ltd (No 3) [2003] 3 All ER 996 (Ch)...................................  2.4, 2.231, 4.319, 11.18 Dow Jones & Co Ltd v Jameel [2005] EWCA Civ 75............................................................. 7.9 Dowsett v United Kingdom (Application 39482/98) [2003] Crim LR 890, [2003] All ER (D) 307 (Jun), ECtHR.............................................................................................................. 11.77 Dransfield v Information Comr [2015] EWCA Civ 454, [2015] 1 WLR 5316, [2016] 3 All ER 221, [2015] 5 WLUK 360, [2016] Env LR 9........................................................... 1.81, 1.82 Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Al Alawi [1999] 1 All ER 703, [1999] 1 WLR 1964, [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 478................................................................................................................. 11.104 Dubai Bank Ltd v Galadari [1990] Ch 98, [1989] 3 All ER 769, [1989] 3 WLR 1044, [1990] BCLC 90, [1989] NLJR 1301, CA.................................................................................... 11.110 Dubai Bank Ltd v Galadari (No 7) [1992] 1 All ER 658, [1992] 1 WLR 106......................... 11.110 Dudgeon v United Kingdom (1981) 4 EHRR 149, ECtHR.............................................. 4.345, 4.346 Dun (P) v Information Comr (EA/2010/0060)........................................................................ 2.86 Duncan v Cammell Laird & Co Ltd [1942] AC 624, [1942] 1 All ER 587, 111 LJKB 406, 86 SJ 287, 166 LT 366, 58 TLR 242, HL....................................................................... 11.63, 11.65 Dundass v Information Comr & Bradford MDC (EA/2007/0084)......................................... 2.86 Dunnett v Railtrack plc [2002] 2 All ER 850............................................................................ 10.67 Durant v Financial Services Authority [2003] EWCA Civ 1746............... 1.18, 2.19, 2.21, 2.27, 2.97, 2.107, 2.194, 11.18 Dyason v Secretary of State for the Environment & Chiltern District Council (1998) 75 P & CR 506, [1998] JPL 778, CA......................................................................................... 9.142

lxxxii  Table of cases Dyson v A-G [1912] 1 Ch 158, 81 LJKB 217, 105 LT 753, 28 TLR 72, CA........................... 12.29 E E v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 49, [2004] 2 WLR 135............................................................................................................................ 10.115, 10.153 E v United Kingdom (App No 33218/96) [2002] 3 FCR 700, ECtHR................................... 10.52 EC Commission v Cwik (Case C-340/00 P) ECJ.................................................................... 7.19 EC Commission v Italy (Case 7/61) [1961] ECR 317, [1962] CMLR 39, ECJ...................... 10.159 EC (disclosure of material), Re [1996] 2 FLR 725 see C (a minor) (care proceedings: disclosure), Re [1997] Fam 76 ECGD v Friends of the Earth [2008] EWHC 638 (Admin), [2008] Env LR 40, [2008] JPL 1813. 3.35 ERY v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2016] EWHC 2760 (QB), [2016] 11 WLUK 133, [2017] EMLR 9, [2017] Lloyd’s Rep FC 40...................................................................... 2.247 Earles v Barclays Bank plc [2009] EWHC 2500 (QB), [2010] Bus LR 566, [2009] 6 Costs LR 906............................................................................................................................... 11.21 East Riding of Yorkshire Council v Information Comr & Stanley Davis Group Ltd t/a York Place (EA/2009/0069)........................................................................................................ 3.25 East Sussex County v Information Comr (Case C-71/14) [2016] PTSR 179, [2015] 10 WLUK 129, [2016] 2 CMLR 5, [2016] Env LR 12......................................................... 3.26 Edem v Information Comr & FSA [2014] EWCA Civ 92, [2014] 2 WLUK 236.................. 2.19 Edwards v Bairstow [1956] AC 14, [1955] 3 WLR 410, [1955] 3 All ER 48............................ 10.115 Edwards v United Kingdom 15 BHRC 189............................................................................. 11.77 Edwards v United Kingdom (2002) 12 BHRC 190................................................................. 10.175 Edwards v UK [2005] 40 EHRR 24.......................................................................................... 4.233 Edwards-Tubb v JD Wetherspoon plc [2011] EWCA Civ 136, [2011] 1 WLR 1373, [2011] CP Rep 27.......................................................................................................................... 11.26 Eifert (Hartmut) v Land Hessen (Case C-93/09) [2010] 11 WLUK 251, [2012] All ER (EC) 127..................................................................................................................................  3.54, 5.73 Eli Lilley & Co Ltd v Neopharma Ltd [2008] EWHC 415 (Ch), [2008] FSR 25.................. 11.29 Elliott v London Borough of Southwark [1976] 2 All ER 781, [1976] 1 WLR 499, 74 LGR 265, 32 P & CR 256, 120 SJ 200, 238 Estates Gazette 41, CA............................... 10.161, 10.162 Elmbridge BV v Information Comr (EA/2010/0106).......................................................... 3.39, 3.47 Emerald Supplies Ltd v British Airways plc [2015] EWCA Civ 1024, [2016] Bus LR 145, [2015] 10 WLUK 353, [2016] UKCLR 567..................................................................... 11.130 Enderby Town Football Club Ltd v Football Association Ltd [1971] Ch 591, [1971] 1 All ER 215, [1970] 3 WLR 1021, 114 SJ 827, CA.................................................................. 10.141 Engel v The Netherlands (No 1) (1976) 1 EHRR 647........................................  4.182, 4.293, 10.141 England (C) v LB Bexley & Information Comr (EA/2006/0060 & EA/2006/0066).............. 1.150 English & American Insurance Co Ltd v Herbert Smith & Co [1988] FSR 232, [1987] NLJ Rep 148.............................................................................................................................. 11.108 English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 2409, [2002] 3 All ER 385, CA...... 10.152, 10.159, 10.169 Entick v Carrington 2 Wils 275, 19 State Tr 1029 1065, 95 ER 807, [1558–1774] All ER Rep 41 ...............................................................................................................................2.218, 11.103 Epikhiriseon Metalleftikon Viomitkhanikon Kai Naftiliakon AE v EC Council & Commission (Case 121/86R) [1987] 1 CMLR 57, ECJ................................................... 11.131 Ernst v Belgium (2004) 39 EHRR 35....................................................................................... 11.40 Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman (Minister for Energy & Minerals) (1995) 183 CLR 10, 128 ALR 391, 69 ALJR 404, HC of A......................................................................... 4.332 European Commission v Agrofert Holding [2012] 6 WLUK 722, [2012] 5 CMLR 9........... 11.127 European Commission v Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau GmbH (Case C-550/07 P) [2010] ECR I-5885, [2010] 6 WLUK 713, [2011] 1 CMLR 3, [2011] Bus LR D81.................. 11.128 European Commission v Breyer (Case C-213/15) [2017] 7 WLUK 359, [2018] 1 CMLR 24, [2018] CEC 475................................................................................................................. 5.76 European Commission v Schlyter (Case C-331/15 P) [2018] 1 WLR 1365, [2017] 9 WLUK 90........................................................................................................................................ 5.76 European Commission v Stichting Greenpeace Nederland (Case C-617/13 P)..................... 3.11 Evans v A-G [2015] UKSC 21, [2015] AC 1787, [2015] 2 WLR 813, [2015] 4 All ER 395, [2015] 3 WLUK 802, [2015] 2 CMLR 43, [2015] Env LR 34, [2015] FSR 26...........  1.241, 3.4, 4.5, 10.55 Evans v Chief Constable of Surrey [1988] QB 588, [1988] 3 WLR 127, 132 SJ 898, [1988] 28 LS Gaz R 45, sub nom Evans v Chief Constable of Surrey Constabulary (A-G intervening) [1989] 2 All ER 594................................................................................ 11.67, 11.70

Table of cases   lxxxiii Evans (R) v Information Comr [2012] UKUT 313 (AAC), [2012] 9 WLUK 280.............. 1.208, 3.4 Evans (Rob) v Information Comr & Ministry of Defence (EA/2006/0064)......................  1.195, 2.86 Expandable Ltd v Rubin [2008] EWCA Civ 59, [2008] ECA Civ 59, [2008] 1 WLR 1099... 11.107 Export Credit Guarantees Dept v Information Comr & Campaign against Arms Trade (EA/2009/0021)................................................................................................................. 1.192 Ezeh & Connors v United Kingdom (Applications 39665/98 & 40086/98) 35 EHRR 691, 12 BHRC 589, [2002] All ER (D) 225 (Jul), ECtHR..............................................10.118, 10.141 F FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Godfrey Merrett Robertson Ltd [1999] CLC 566, CA..... 11.37 Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1985] 1 All ER 724, [1984] ICR 589, [1984] IRLR 61, [1985] FSR 105; affd [1987] Ch 117, [1986] 1 All ER 617, [1986] 3 WLR 288, [1986] ICR 297, [1986] IRLR 69, [1986] FSR 291, 130 SJ 573, CA...................................... 4.315, 7.114 Fayed v United Kingdom (1994) 18 EHRR 393, ECtHR....................................................... 10.130 Feeny (P) v Information Comr (EA/2015/0019)...................................................................... 1.224 Feld v Barnet London Borough Council; Pour v Westminster City Council [2004] EWCA Civ 1307, 148 SJ LB 1247................................................................................................. 10.134 Feldbrugge v Netherlands (1986) 8 EHRR 425, ECtHR........................................................ 10.164 Fiddes v Channel 4 Television Corpn [2010] EWCA Civ 730, [2010] 1 WLR 2245, [2011] EMLR 3............................................................................................................................. 11.21 Financial Services Authority v Information Comr [2009] EWHC 1548 (Admin), [2009] Bus LR 1287, [2010] 1 BCLC 53............................................................................................. 1.227 Financial Services Authority v Information Comr (EA/2008/0061)........................................ 1.229 Financial The Times v UK [2010] EMLR 21, (2010) 50 EHRR 46, 28 BHRC 616........ 11.41, 11.42 Findlay, Re [1985] AC 318, [1984] 3 All ER 801, [1984] 3 WLR 1159, 128 SJ 816, HL........ 10.169 Finucane v United Kingdom (2003) 37 EHRR 29................................................................... 10.175 Fisher (A) v Information Comr (EA/2010/0044)..................................................................... 1.209 Fish Legal v IC, United Utilities, Yorkshire water [2015] UKUT 52 (AAC), [2015] 2 WLUK 631...................................................................................................................................... 3.15 Fitt v United Kingdom (2000) 30 EHRR 480, ECtHR........................................................... 11.77 Fitzpatrick v Secretary of State for the Environment (The Times, 29 December 1988)........ 8.12 Flannery v Halifax Estate Agencies Ltd (t/a Colleys Professional Services) [2000] 1 All ER 373, [2000] 1 WLR 377, [1999] BLR 107, [1999] 13 LS Gaz R 32, [1999] NLJR 284, CA......... 10.159 Fletcher v Minister of Town & Country Planning [1947] 2 All ER 496, 111 JP 542, 45 LGR 649, 91 SJ 533, 63 TLR 499.............................................................................................. 10.168 Fletcher’s Application, Re [1970] 2 All ER 527n, CA............................................................... 4.134 Flett v North Tyneside Health Authority [1989] CLY 2968.................................................... 11.69 Flightwise Travel Services Ltd v Gill [2003] EWHC 3082, (The Times, 5 December 2003)... 11.117 Flood v Times Newspapers [2012] UKSC 11, [2012] 2 AC 273, [2012] 2 WLR 760, [2012] 4 All ER 913, [2012] 3 WLUK 668, [2012] EMLR 21, [2012] HRLR 18, (2012) 162 NLJ 463, (2012) 156(12) SJLB 31..........................................................................................  2.259, 7.9 Forbes v Smith [1998] 1 All ER 973, [1998] 2 FCR 342, [1998] 1 FLR 835, [1998] Fam Law 256...................................................................................................................................... 11.4 Foucher v France (1997) 25 EHRR 234, ECtHR.................................................................... 11.77 Fowler (M) v Information Comr & Brighton & Hove City Council (EA/2006/0071).......... 3.62 Franchet v Commission (Case C-237/02) [2006] ECR II-2023, [2007] 1 CMLR 39............. 5.74 Francis v Kensington & Chelsea LBC [2003] 2 All ER 1052.................................................. 10.88 Francis & Francis (a firm) v Central Criminal Court see R v Central Criminal Court, ex p Francis & Francis (a firm) Francome v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [1984] 2 All ER 408, [1984] 1 WLR 892, 128 SJ 484, CA................................................................................................................... 4.323, 4.355 Frankson v Home Office; Johns v Same [2003] EWCA Civ 655, [2003] 1 WLR 1953.......... 2.262, 4.317, 11.75 Fraser v Mudge [1975] 3 All ER 78, [1975] 1 WLR 1132, 139 JP 674, 119 SJ 508, CA......... 10.141 Fraser v Secretary of State for the Environment & the Royal Borough of Kensington & Chelsea (1987) 56 P & CR 386, [1988] JPL 344.............................................................. 7.57 Fraser v State Services Commission [1984] 1 NZLR 116 (NZ CA)........................................ 10.138 Freeze (G) v Information Comr (EA/2010/0112)................................................................. 3.50, 3.55 French Kier Developments Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment [1977] 1 All ER 296, 244 Estates Gazette 967............................................................................................. 10.162 Fressoz & Roire v France (1999) 5 BHRC 654, ECtHR................................................... 4.324, 4.339 Friends of the Earth v Information Comr & Export Credit Guarantee Dept (EA/2006/0073)................................................................................................................. 3.35

lxxxiv  Table of cases Fulham Leisure Holdings Ltd v Nicholson, Graham & Jones [2006] EWHC 158 (Ch), [2006] 2 All ER 599, [2006] PNLR 23.............................................................................. 11.107 Furnell v Whangarei High Schools Board [1973] AC 660, [1973] 1 All ER 400, [1973] 2 WLR 92, 117 SJ 56, PC..................................................................................................... 10.130 G G v Wikimedia Foundation [2001] EWCA Civ 1897, [2002] 1 WLR 1233, [2003] 2 All ER 872... 11.47 G (a minor) (social worker: disclosure), Re [1996] 2 All ER 65, [1996] 1 WLR 1407, [1996] 1 FLR 276, [1996] Fam Law 143, [1995] 44 LS Gaz R 30, [1996] NLJR 85, 140 SJ LB 10, sub nom Re G (a minor) (care proceedings: disclosure) [1996] 3 FCR 77, CA........... 11.6 G (minors) (celebrities: publicity), Re [1999] 3 FCR 181, [1999] 1 FLR 409, CA.................. 11.8 Gain v Gain [1962] 1 All ER 63, [1961] 1 WLR 1469, 105 SJ 970.......................................... 11.65 Gallagher’s Application, Re [2016] NICA 42........................................................................... 2.312 Gallery Cosmetics v Number 1 [1981] FSR 556...................................................................... 11.119 Galloway v Telegraph Group Ltd (The Times, 13 January 2005)........................................... 7.9 Gaming Board for Great Britain v Rogers [1973] AC 388, [1972] 2 All ER 1057, [1972] 3 WLR 279, 136 JP 574, 116 SJ 696, HL............................................................................ 11.68 Gartside v Outram (1856) 26 LJ Ch 113, 3 Jur NS 39, 5 WR 35, 28 LTOS 120.................... 4.323 Garvin v Domus Publishing Ltd [1989] Ch 335, [1989] 2 All ER 344, [1988] 3 WLR 344, 132 SJ 1091, [1988] 33 LS Gaz R 44................................................................................. 11.119 Gaskin v Liverpool City Council [1980] 1 WLR 1549, 79 LGR 21, 124 SJ 498, CA............. 2.197, 2.216, 4.296, 11.58 Gaskin v United Kingdom (1989) 12 EHRR 36, [1990] 1 FLR 167, ECtHR.....................  4.5, 4.295 Gaughran v Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland [2015] UKSC 29, [2016] AC 345, [2015] 2 WLR 1303, [2015] 3 All ER 655, [2015] NI 55, [2015] 5 WLUK 311, 39 BHRC 689, [2015] Crim LR 809........................................................... 2.297 General Medical Council v R (Zia) [2011] EWCA Civ 743, [2012] 1 WLR 504, [2011] 5 WLUK 439, [2012] ICR 146............................................................................................ 10.110 General Mediterranean Holdings SA v Patel [1999] 3 All ER 673, [2000] 1 WLR 272, [1999] NLJR 1145....................................................................................................... 1.304, 11.89 George (Martin) v Information Comr & the House of Lords Appointments Commission (HOLAC) (EA/2008/0035)........................................................................................ 1.209, 1.213 Gillick v West Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112, [1985] 3 All ER 402, [1985] 3 WLR 830, [1986] 1 FLR 224, 2 BMLR 11, 129 SJ 738, [1986] Crim LR 113, [1985] LS Gaz R 3551, [1985] NLJ Rep 1055, HL.................................................. 4.111 Givaudan & Co Ltd v Minister of Housing & Local Government [1966] 3 All ER 696, [1967] 1 WLR 250, 131 JP 79, 64 LGR 352, 18 P & CR 88, 198 Estates Gazette 585, 110 SJ 371.......................................................................................................................... 10.162 Gladman Developments Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities & Local Government [2017] EWHC 2448 (Admin), [2017] 10 WLUK 172, [2018] JPL 345........................... 9.130 Glaser v UK; G v United Kingdom (Children: Right of Contact) (32346/96) [2001] 1 FLR 153, [2000] 3 FCR 193, (2001) 33 EHRR 1, 2001 Fam LR 103, [2000] Fam Law 880.. 2.228 Glasgow City Council v Dundee City Council [2009] CSIH 73, 2010 SC 125, 2010 SLT 9, [2009] 9 WLUK 504, 2009 GWD 40-693....................................................................... 1.64 Glasgow Corpn v Central Land Board 1956 SC 1, HL........................................................... 11.70 Gloucestershire CC v Information Comr (EA/2015/0254–0256)........................................... 3.30 Gnitrow Ltd v Cape plc [2000] 3 All ER 763, [2000] 1 WLR 2327, [2000] NLJR 1109, CA.11.100 Goddard v Nationwide Building Society [1987] QB 670, [1986] 3 All ER 264, [1986] 3 WLR 734, 130 SJ 803, [1986] LS Gaz R 3592, [1986] NLJ Rep 775, CA....................... 11.108 Goldman v Hesper [1988] 3 All ER 97, [1988] 1 WLR 1238, [1989] 1 FLR 195, [1989] Fam Law 152, [1988] NLJR 272, CA........................................................................................ 11.89 Goldsmith v BCD [2011] EWHC 674 (QB), (2011) 108(14) LSG 20.................................... 11.47 Goodridge v Chief Constable of Hampshire Constabulary [1999] 1 All ER 896, [1999] 1 WLR 1558................................................................................................................... 11.67, 11.70 Goodwin v United Kingdom (1996) 22 EHRR 123, ECtHR............................................ 11.40, 11.45 Google Inc v CNIL (Case C-507/17) (10/01/2019)................................................................ 2.7 Google Inc v J Vidal-Hall [2015] EWCA Civ 311, [2016] QB 1003, [2015] 3 WLR 409, [2016] 2 All ER 337, [2015] 3 WLUK 852, [2015] CP Rep 28, [2015] 1 CLC 526, [2015] 3 CMLR 2, [2015] EMLR 15, [2015] Info TLR 373, [2015] FSR 25............ 2.168, 2.237 Google Spain v Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos (AEPD) (Case C-131/12) [2014] QB 1022, [2014] 3 WLR 659, [2014] 2 All ER (Comm) 301, [2014] 5 WLUK 394, [2014] 3 CMLR 50, [2014] All ER (EC) 717, [2014] ECDR 16, [2014] EMLR 27, 36 BHRC 589, (2014) 164(7607) NLJ 20.............................................................................. 2.7

Table of cases   lxxxv Governing Body of Aberdare Girls School v Information Comr (EA/2010/0102)................. 1.245 Governor & Company of the Bank of Scotland v A Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 52, [2001] 1 WLR 751, [2001] 3 All ER 58, [2001] 1 All ER (Comm) 1023, [2001] 1 WLUK 383, [2001] Lloyd’s Rep Bank 73, (2000–01) 3 ITELR 503, (2001) 98(9) LSG 41, (2001) 151 NLJ 102, (2001) 145 SJLB 21........................................................................................... 2.340 Gradwick (SM) v Information Comr (EA/20100030).......................................................  1.121, 1.126 Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, In re: 2005 US App LEXIS 2494 (DC Cir) 15 February 2005.................................................................................................................................... 11.39 Gray v Avadis [2003] EWHC 1830 (QB), [2003] 36 LS Gaz R 43, (The Times, 19 August 2003)................................................................................................................................... 7.9 Gray v News Group Newspapers [2011] EWHC 349 (Ch), [2011] 2 WLR 1401, [2011] 2 All ER 725.......................................................................................................................... 11.111 Greece v EC Council & Commission see Anti-Dumping Documents, Re: Greece v EC Council & Commission Greene v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2005] 1 All ER 30..................................... 2.224, 2.259, 4.350 Grey v UVW [2010] EWHC 2367 (QB)................................................................................. 2.256 Grosvenor Hotel London, Re [1964] Ch 464, [1964] 1 All ER 92, [1964] 2 WLR 184, 107 SJ 1002, CA.................................................................................................................. 11.60, 11.65 Grunwick Processing Laboratories Ltd v Advisory Conciliation & Arbitration Service [1978] AC 655, [1978] 1 All ER 338, [1978] 2 WLR 277, [1978] ICR 231, 122 SJ 46, sub nom Advisory Conciliation & Arbitration Service v Grunwick Processing Laboratories Ltd [1977] IRLR 38, HL................................................................................................... 10.167 Guardian News & Media Ltd v Information Comr (EA/2008/0084)..................................... 2.94 Guardian News & Media Ltd v R & Erol Incedal [2016] EWCA Crim 11, [2016] 1 WLR 1767, [2017] 2 All ER 121, [2016] 2 WLUK 225, [2016] 1 Cr App R 33, (2016) 180 JP 233, [2016] EMLR 14, [2016] HRLR 9, [2016] Crim LR 433......................................... 4.264 Guardian News & Media Ltd, Re sub nom HM Treasury v Ahmed [2010] UKSC 1, [2010] 2 AC 697, [2010] 2 WLR 325...........................................................................  4.339, 4.343, 10.118 Guardian Newspapers v Information Comr & Chief Constable of Avon & Somerset Police (EA/2006/0017)................................................................................................................. 1.143 Guardian Newspapers & H Brooke v Information Comr & BBC (EA/2006/0011)........ 1.174, 1.182 Guardian Newspapers (Court Record: Disclosure), In re (The Times, 18 December 2004). 1.155 Guerra v Italy (1998) 26 EHRR 357, 4 BHRC 63, [1998] HRCD 277, ECtHR.................... 4.296 Guinness Peat Properties Ltd v Fitzroy Robinson Partnership (a firm) [1987] 2 All ER 716, [1987] 1 WLR 1027, 38 BLR 57, 131 SJ 807, [1987] LS Gaz R 1882, [1987] NLJ Rep 452, CA...........................................................................................................11.89, 11.99, 11.100 Guja v Moldova (Application 14277/04) [2008] 2 WLUK 257, (2011) 53 EHRR 16............ 4.293 Gulf Oil (GB) Ltd v Page [1987] Ch 327, [1987] 3 All ER 14, [1987] 3 WLR 166, 131 SJ 695, [1987] LS Gaz R 2276, [1987] NLJ Rep 408, CA..................................................... 2.197 Gulhamhussein & Tariq v UK (Application Nos 46538/11 & 2060/12)................................. 10.132 H H v East Sussex CC [2009] EWCA Civ 249, [2009] ELR 161................................................ 9.46 H v H (minor) [1990] Fam 86, [1989] 3 WLR 933, [1989] FCR 356, 134 SJ 21, [1989] NLJR 864, sub nom H v H & C [1989] 3 All ER 740, sub nom Re H (a minor) [1989] 2 FLR 313, [1989] Fam Law 388, CA........................................................................................... 10.132 H v Kent County Council [2000] ELR 660............................................................................. 9.46 H v Lord Advocate [2012] UKSC 24, [2013] 1 AC 413, [2012] 3 WLR 151, [2012] 4 All ER 600, 2012 SC (UKSC) 308, 2012 SLT 799, 2012 SCL 635, 2012 SCCR 562, [2012] 6 WLUK 422, [2012] HRLR 24, (2012) 109(27) LSG 19, 2012 GWD 21-432................ 2.246 H v News Group Newspapers [2011] EWCA Civ 42, [2011] 1 WLR 1645, [2011] 2 All ER 324........................................................................................................................  4.324, 11.2, 11.3 H (a healthcare worker) v Associated Newspapers Ltd, H (a healthcare worker) v N (a health authority) [2002] EWCA Civ 195, [2002] Lloyd’s Rep Med 210, 65 BMLR 132, , [2002] EMLR 425......................................................................................................................... 4.348 H (children) (care proceedings: disclosure) [2009] EWCA Civ 704, [2009] 2 FLR 1531...... 11.6 H (H) v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic (Genoa) [2012] UKSC 25, [2013] 1 AC 338, [2012] 3 WLR 90, [2012] 4 All ER 539, [2012] 6 WLUK 423, [2012] HRLR 25, (2012) 156(25) SJLB 31..................................................................................................... 2.245 HK (infant), Re [1967] 2 QB 617, [1967] 2 WLR 962, 111 SJ 296, sub nom Re K (H) (infant) [1967] 1 All ER 226........................................................................................................... 10.130 HM Treasury v Ahmed [2010] UKSC 2, [2010] 2 AC 534, [2010] 2 WLR 378...................... 10.142 HM Treasury v Information Comr (EA/2007/0001).......................................................... 1.83, 1.174

lxxxvi  Table of cases HM Treasury v Information Comr (EA/2007/0054)............................................................... 1.209 HM Treasury v Information Comr & Owen [2009] EWHC 1811 (Admin), [2010] QB 563, [2010] 2 WLR 931............................................................................................................. 1.181 HRH Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers [2006] EWCA Civ 1776......................... 1.4, 2.233 HTF v Ministry of Defence [2018] EWHC 1623 (QB), [2018] 6 WLUK 636............... 11.63, 11.87 Hadmor Productions Ltd v Hamilton [1983] 1 AC 191, [1982] 1 All ER 1042, [1982] 2 WLR 322, [1982] ICR 114, [1982] IRLR 102, 126 SJ 134, HL....................................... 4.363 Hague v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison see R v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison, ex p Hague Hales, Re (The Times, 8 May 1990)......................................................................................... 10.157 Halford v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 523, [1997] IRLR 471, [1998] Crim LR 753, 94 LS Gaz R 24, ECtHR.................................................................................  2.218, 4.200, 4.201 Halifax Life Ltd v Eagle Life Assurance Society [2007] EWHC 503 (Comm), [2007] 2 All ER (Comm) 672, [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 528...................................................................... 10.152 Hall v Wandsworth LBC [2004] EWCA Civ 1740, [2005] 2 All ER 192........................10.88, 10.134 Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS Trust [2004] EWCA Civ 576, [2004] 4 All ER 920, [2004] 1 WLR 3002, 81 BMLR 108........................................................................... 10.68, 10.69 Hamilton v Al Fayed [1999] 3 All ER 317, [1999] 1 WLR 1569, [1999] EMLR 501, [1999] 19 LS Gaz R 28, [1999] NLJR 560, 143 SJ LB 134, CA; affd [2000] 2 All ER 224, [2000] 2 WLR 609, [2000] EMLR 531, 144 SJ LB 157, HL................................  1.162, 4.95, 4.274, 7.2 Hamilton v Naviede [1995] 2 AC 75, [1994] 3 All ER 814, [1994] 3 WLR 656, [1994] 2 BCLC 738, [1994] BCC 641, [1994] NLJR 1203, HL..................................................... 1.274 Hammersmith & Fulham London Borough Council v Secretary of State for the Environment see R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p Hammersmith & Fulham London Borough Council Hanlon v Kirklees Metropolitan Council [2004] All ER (D) 154 (Sep), EAT......................... 11.75 Hannon v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2014] EWHC 1580 (Ch), [2014] 5 WLUK 578, [2015] EMLR 1.................................................................................................................. 2.247 Harcup (T) v Information Comr & Yorkshire Forward (YF) (EA/2007/0058)....................... 2.82 Hardy v Pembrokeshire County Council [2006] EWCA Civ 240, [2006] Env LR 28, [2007] JPL 284.............................................................................................................................. 10.172 Hardy’s Application, Re [1988] 12 NIJB 66.............................................................................. 11.69 Hargreaves (Joseph) Ltd, Re [1900] 1 Ch 347, 69 LJ Ch 183, 4 TC 173, 7 Mans 354, 48 WR 241, 44 SJ 210, 82 LT 132, 16 TLR 155, CA.................................................................... 1.274 Harman v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1983] 1 AC 280, [1982] 2 WLR 338, 126 SJ 136, sub nom Home Office v Harman [1982] 1 All ER 532, HL...........  1.155, 11.37, 11.114 Harrington v North London Polytechnic [1984] 3 All ER 666, [1984] 1 WLR 1293, 128 SJ 800, CA.............................................................................................................................. 11.36 Harrow London Borough Council v Qazi [2003] UKHL 43.................................................. 10.128 Hasselblad (GB) Ltd v Orbinson [1985] QB 475, [1985] 1 All ER 173, [1985] 2 WLR 1, [1984] 3 CMLR 679, 129 SJ 32, CA.........................................................................11.68, 11.130 Hatton v United Kingdom (2003) 37 EHRR 28...................................................................... 4.292 Hatungimana v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 231......... 10.115 Hazell v Hammersmith & Fulham London Borough Council [1992] 2 AC 1, [1991] 1 All ER 545, [1991] 2 WLR 372, 89 LGR 271, [1991] RVR 28, HL...................................... 8.13 Health Authority v X [2001] EWCA Civ 2014, [2002] 2 All ER 780, [2002] 2 FCR 357, [2002] 1 FLR 1045............................................................................................................. 1.155 Health Authority v X [2001] 2 FCR 634, [2001] 2 FLR 673, [2001] Fam Law 653, 61 BMLR 22........................................................................................................................................ 2.194 Health Professions Council (HPC) v Information Comr (EA/2007/0116)............................ 1.205 Hector v A-G of Antigua & Barbuda [1990] 2 AC 312, [1990] 2 All ER 103, [1990] 2 WLR 606, 134 SJ 316, [1990] 10 LS Gaz R 34, PC.................................................................... 4.346 Hehir v Metropolitan Police Comr [1982] 2 All ER 335, [1982] 1 WLR 715, 126 SJ 330, CA...................................................................................................................................... 11.66 Heidelberg Cement AG v European Commission (Case C-247/14 P) [2016] 3 WLUK 282, [2016] 4 CMLR 28............................................................................................................ 11.129 Hellewell v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [1995] 4 All ER 473, [1995] 1 WLR 804, [1995] 07 LS Gaz R 35............................................................................................................ 1.274, 4.326 Helmet Integrated Systems Ltd v Tunnard [2006] EWCA Civ 1735, [2007] IRLR 126, [2007] FSR 16.................................................................................................................... 4.315 Helstrip (I) v Information Comr (EA/2012/0201)................................................................... 1.193 Hemsley (P) v Information Comr & Chief Constable of Northants (AP) (EA/2005/0026)... 1.151

Table of cases   lxxxvii Henisch v Germany (Application 28274/08) [2011] 7 WLUK 618, [2011] IRLR 922, (2014) 58 EHRR 31, 32 BHRC 252...................................................................................... 4.293, 4.301 Hewitson v United Kingdom (Application 50015/99) (The Times, 10 June 2003)................ 4.208 Higginson (B) v Information Comr (EA/2005/0008).............................................................. 1.230 Higher Education Funding Council for England v Information Comr & Guardian News & Media Ltd (EA/2009/0036)............................................................................................... 1.205 Hill v Chief Constable of the West Yorkshire Police [1989] AC 53, [1988] 2 WLR 1049, [1988] 2 All ER 238........................................................................................................... 10.52 Hill (William) Organisation Ltd v Gavas [1990] IRLR 488, CA............................................. 10.161 Hillingdon London Borough Council v Paulssen [1977] JPL 518.......................................... 9.11 Hilti v EC Commission (Case T-30/89) [1990] ECR II-163, [1992] 4 CMLR 16, CFI......... 11.127 Hinchy v Secretary of State for Work & Pensions [2005] UKHL 16..................................... 4.4 Hodgson v Imperial Tobacco Ltd [1998] 2 All ER 673, [1998] 1 WLR 1056, [1998] NLJR 241, [1998] 15 LS Gaz R 31, 142 SJ LB 93, CA............................................................... 11.4 HoechstAG v EC Commission (Cases 46/87,227/88) [1989] ECR 2859,[1991] 4 CMLR 410,ECJ ............................................................................................................................................ 11.127 Hogan v Information Comr (EA/2005/0026)..........................................................  1.30, 1.191, 1.197 Holland v Information Comr [2016] UKUT 260 (AAC)........................................................ 3.18 Home Office v Harman see Harman v Secretary of State for the Home Department Home Office v Information Comr (EA/2008/0027)........................................................... 1.65, 1.69 Home Office v Information Comr (EA/2015/0143)................................................................ 1.219 Home Office v Information Comr [2009] EWHC 1611 (Admin)........................  1.102, 1.181, 1.192 Home Office v Tariq [2011] UKSC 35.................................................. 10.80, 10.127, 10.132, 10.141, 11.4, 11.81, 11.82 Home Office & Ministry of Justice v Information Comr (EA/2008/0062).....................  1.191, 1.231 Home Office & Ministry of Justice v Information Comr [2009] EWHC 611 (Admin)......... 1.191 Hone v Maze Prison Board of Visitors see R v Board of Visitors of HM Prison, The Maze, ex p Hone Hood (M) v Information Comr (EA/2010/0167)..................................................................... 1.68 Hopkins Development v Secretary of State for Communities & Local Government [2014] EWCA Civ 470, [2014] PTSR 1145, [2014] 4 WLUK 586, [2014] 2 EGLR 91, [2014] JPL 1000............................................................................................................................ 10.117 Hosking v Runting [2003] 3 NZLR 385, [2004] NZCA 34..................................................... 2.234 Hossack (J) v Information Comr (EA/2007/0024)................................................................... 1.82 Hossain v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWCA Civ 207, [2015] 3 WLUK 368........................................................................................................................ 10.124 Hounslow LBC v Powell [2011] UKSC 8, [2011] 2 WLR 287, [2011] PTSR 512................ 10.128 Howglen Ltd, Re [2001] 1 All ER 376...................................................................................... 11.35 Hoyte (J) v Information Comr & CAA (EA/2007/0101)......................................................... 1.230 Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 105...........10.115, 10.127 Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11, [2007] 2 AC 167, [2007] 2 WLR 581, [2007] 4 All ER 15, [2007] 3 WLUK 535, [2007] 1 FLR 2021, [2007] HRLR 22, [2007] UKHRR 759, 24 BHRC 74, [2007] Imm AR 571, [2007] INLR 314, [2007] Fam Law 587, (2007) 151 SJLB 435................................................... 1.131 Hubbard v Vosper [1972] 2 QB 84, [1972] 1 All ER 1023, [1972] 2 WLR 389, 116 SJ 95, CA:..................................................................................................................................... 4.323 Hyde Park Residence Ltd v Yelland [2001] Ch 143, [2000] 3 WLR 215, [2000] RPC 604, [2000] EMLR 363, [2000] 08 LS Gaz R 35, CA......................................................... 4.314, 11.45 I I v Finland (2009) 48 EHRR 31................................................................................................ 2.218 ICI plc v EC Commission (Case T-36/91) [1995] All ER (EC) 600, [1995] ECR II-1847, CFI..................................................................................................................................... 11.127 IFAW Internationaler Tierschutz-Fonds GmbH (Case T-362/08) [2010] 2 CMLR 41......... 5.82 ILEA v Brunyate see R v ILEA, ex p Brunyate IRC v National Federation of Self Employed & Small Businesses [1982] AC 617, [1981] 2 All ER 93, [1981] 2 WLR 722, [1981] STC 260, 55 TC 133, 125 SJ 325, HL:......... 1.278, 12.29 IRC v Rossminster Ltd [1980] AC 952, [1980] 1 All ER 80, [1980] 2 WLR 1, [1980] STC 42, 52 TC 160, [1979] TR 309, 70 Cr App Rep 157, 124 SJ 18, HL............................... 11.54 ITC Film Distributors v Video Exchange Ltd [1982] Ch 431, [1982] 2 All ER 241, [1982] 3 WLR 125, [1982] Crim LR 237, 125 SJ 863.................................................................... 11.108 Imerman v Tchenguiz [2009] EWHC 2902 (QB), [2010] Lloyd’s Rep PN 221...................... 11.92 Imutran Ltd v Uncaged Campaigns Ltd [2001] 2 All ER 385.......................................... 2.224, 4.350

lxxxviii  Table of cases Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority v Information Comr [2015] AACR 37....... 1.64 Independent Publishing Co Ltd v Att Gen of Trinidad & Tobago [2005] 1 All ER 499........ 11.2 Information Comr v Magherafelt District Council [2012] UKUT 263 (AAC)...................... 2.83 Initial Services Ltd v Putterill [1968] 1 QB 396, [1967] 3 All ER 145, [1967] 3 WLR 1032, 2 KIR 863, 111 SJ 541, CA................................................................................................ 4.323 Independent News & Media Ltd v A [2010] EWCA Civ 343, [2010] 1 WLR 2262, [2010] 3 All ER 32...................................................................................................................... 1.155, 2.256 Innisfil Township v Vespra Township (1981) 123 DLR (3d) 530............................................. 9.130 Inquiry into Mirror Group Newspapers plc, Re an [1999] 2 All ER 641................................ 12.1 Intelsec Systems Ltd v Grech-Cini [1999] 4 All ER 11, [2000] 1 WLR 1190......................... 4.315 Interbrew SA v Competition Commission [2001] EWHC Admin 367................................... 10.130 Interbrew SA v Financial The Times [2002] EWCA Civ 274........................................... 11.40, 11.43 International Transport Roth GmbH v Home Secretary [2002] 3 WLR 345......................... 10.164 Internationaler Tierschutz-Fonds GmbH v EC Commission (Case T-168/02) (The Times, 20 December 2004)........................................................................................................... 5.80 Istel (AT & T) Ltd v Tully [1993] AC 45, [1992] 3 All ER 523, [1992] 3 WLR 344, [1992] 32 LS Gaz R 37, [1992] NLJR 1089, 136 SJ LB 227, HL..................................................... 11.119 Istil Group Inc v Zahoor [2003] EWHC 165 (Ch), [2003] 2 All ER 252, [2003] CP Rep 39.11.33 Ittihadieh v 5–11 Cheyne Gdns RTM Co Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 1212, [2017] 8 WLUK 40, [2018] ICR 1681, [2018] IRLR 4, [2018] Pens LR 1........................................................ 2.19 J JD v East Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust [2005] UKHL 23, [2005] 2 AC 373, [2005] 2 WLR 993............................................................................................................. 10.52 JIH v News Group Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 42......................................................................... 2.222 JS v Worcestershire CC [2012] UKUT 451 (AAC), [2012] 11 WLUK 586, [2013] ELR 138...................................................................................................................................... 9.46 JSC Mezhduparodniy Promyshienniy Bank v Pugachey [2015] EWCA Civ 139, [2016] 1 WLR 160, [2015] 2 All ER (Comm) 816, [2015] 2 WLUK 922, [2015] 1 CLC 238, [2015] WTLR 991, [2015] 2 P & CR DG4...................................................................... 11.116 Jackson v Marley Davenport Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 1225, [2004] 1 WLR 2926, [2004] 38 LS Gaz R 29....................................................................................................................... 11.26 Jackson v Royal Bank of Scotland [2005] UKHL 3................................................................. 2.340 Jacobs (M) v Information Comr (EA/2010/0040).................................................................... 1.82 Jalloh v Germany (2006) 20 BHRC 575................................................................................... 4.218 Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe [2003] EWHC 2945..................................................... 10.103 Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe (No 3) [2005] EWCA Civ 74........................................ 7.9 Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL (No 3) [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 AC 359, [2007] Bus LR 291...................................................................................................... 10.103, 11.3 Jasper v United Kingdom (2000) 30 EHRR 441, ECtHR....................................................... 11.77 Jencks v United States 353 US 657 (1957)............................................................................... 11.79 Jenkins v A-G (1971) 115 SJ 674............................................................................................... 4.4 Jenkins v Information Comr & DEFRA (EA/2006/0067)....................................................... 1.71 Jennings v CPS [2005] EWCA Civ 746, [2006] 1 WLR 182, [2005] 4 All ER 391................ 4.285 Jihoceske v Czech Republic (2006) Application No 19101/03................................................ 4.298 Jindal v University of Glasgow EAT Scotland (2001).............................................................. 11.75 Jockey Club v Buffham [2003] 2 WLR 178............................................................ 2.224, 4.350, 4.365 John v Express Newspapers [2000] 3 All ER 257, [2000] 1 WLR 1931, [2000] EMLR 606, [2000] NLJR 615, 144 SJ LB 217, CA.............................................................................. 11.45 Johnson v Medical Defence Union [2004] EWHC 2509 (Ch), [2005] 1 All ER 87.......... 2.19, 2.30, 11.18 Johnson v Medical Defence Union (No 2) [2007] EWCA Civ 262, [2008] Bus LR 503, [2007] 3 WLUK 734, [2007] 3 CMLR 9, (2007) 96 BMLR 99....................................... 2.25 Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (Case 222/84) [1987] QB 129, [1986] 3 All ER 135, [1986] 3 WLR 1038, [1986] ECR 1651, [1986] 3 CMLR 240, [1987] ICR 83, [1986] IRLR 263, 130 SJ 953, [1987] LS Gaz R 188, ECJ...................... 11.76 Johnston v Information Comr (EA/2006/0085)....................................................................... 1.65 Jones v First Tier Tribunal & CICA [2013] UKSC 19, [2013] 2 AC 48, [2013] 2 WLR 1012, [2013] 2 All ER 625, [2013] 4 WLUK 339, [2013] RTR 28, [2013] PIQR P18.............. 10.114 Jones v Swansea City Council [1989] 3 All ER 162, [1990] 1 WLR 54, 134 SJ 341, CA, revsd [1990] 3 All ER 737, [1990] 1 WLR 1453, 89 LGR 90, 134 SJ 1437, HL................. 7.60, 10.125 Jones v Tsige (2012) ONCA 32 (Canada)................................................................................. 2.215 Jones v University of Warwick [2003] 3 All ER 760................................................................. 4.208

Table of cases   lxxxix Joplin v Chief Constable of City of Vancouver (1985) 20 DLR (4th) 314.............................. 10.141 Jordan v United Kingdom (2001) 11 BHRC 1......................................................................... 10.175 Joy v Secretary of State for Transport etc (12/11/02), QBD.................................................... 9.142 K K v Secretary of State for Defence [2017] EWHC 830 (Admin), [2017] 4 WLUK 453, [2017] ACD 75................................................................................................................... 11.83 K (minors), Re [1994] 3 All ER 230, [1994] 2 FCR 805, [1994] 1 FLR 377, [1994] Fam Law 247, sub nom Kent County Council v K [1994] 1 WLR 912............................................ 11.6 K (a child), Re [2000] NLJR 1538............................................................................................ 11.6 K (H) (infant), Re [1967] 1 All ER 226 see HK (infant) KL (Children) (Preliminary Finding Reversed: Appeal Jurisdiction), Re [2015] EWCA Civ 992, [2016] 4 WLR 123, [2015] 8 WLUK 138, [2016] 2 FLR 863, [2015] Fam Law 1450.......... 10.158 Kanda (B Surinder Singh) v Government of the Federation of Malaya [1962] AC 322, [1962] 2 WLR 1153, sub nom Kanda v Government of Malaya 106 SJ 305, PC............. 10.138 Kaplan v United Kingdom (1980) 4 EHRR 64, 21 DR 5........................................................ 10.164 Kay v LB of Lambeth [2006] UKHL 10, [2006] 2 AC 465, [2006] 2 WLR 570............... 1.29, 10.128 Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62, CA................................................................................ 2.218, 2.230 Keane v Information Comr [2016] UKUT 0461 (AAC).......................................................... 1.126 Keane v Law Society [2009] EWHC 783 (Admin), [2009] 4 WLUK 269.............................. 10.152 Kearns v General Council of the Bar [2003] EWCA Civ 331, [2003] 1 WLR 1357.............. 7.9 Kelly v British Broadcasting Corpn [2001] Fam 59, [2001] 1 All ER 323, [2001] 2 WLR 253, [2000] 3 FCR 509, [2001] 1 FLR 197, [2000] Fam Law 886, 144 SJ LB 250, sub nom British Broadcasting Corpn v Kelly [2000] 39 LS Gaz R 41.............................  4.345, 11.6, 11.9 Kelly v Metropolitan Police Comr [1997] 33 LS Gaz R 28, CA............................................. 11.67 Kennedi v Hungary [2009] ECHR 78...................................................................................... 1.80 Kennedy v Charities Commission [2014] UKSC 20, [2015] AC 455, [2014] 2 WLR 808, [2014] 2 All ER 847, [2014] 3 WLUK 755, [2014] EMLR 19, [2014] HRLR 14, (2014) 158(13) SJLB 37........................................................................  1.105, 1.124, 1.155, 1.265, 4.298, 10.116, 10.142, 11.4 Kennedy v Information Comr [2011] EWCA Civ 367, [2011] EMLR 24............. 1.80, 1.155, 1.155, 4.4, 4.292, 4.298 Kennedy (D) v Information Comr & Charity Commission [2010] EWHC 475 (Admin)..... 1.154 Kennedy v UK [2010] ECHR 26839/05..............................................................  4.293, 4.346, 10.127 Kennedy v UK [2010] ECHR 682............................................................................................ 1.297 Kent County Council v K see K (minors), Re Kerr v Department for Social Development [2004] UKHL 23, [2004] 4 All ER 385, [2004] 1 WLR 1372...................................................................................................................... 4.4 Kessier (J) QC v Information Comr & HMRC (EA/2007/0043)...................................... 1.212, 1.214 Keyu v Secretary of State for Foreign etc Affairs [2015] UKSC 69, [2016] AC 1355, [2015] 3 WLR 1665, [2016] 4 All ER 794, [2015] 11 WLUK 613, [2016] HRLR 2, 40 BHRC 228................................................................................................................ 4.292, 10.116, 10.175 Khan (Sultan) v United Kingdom [2000] Crim LR 684, 8 BHRC 310, ECtHR.................... 4.208 Khanna v Lovell White Durrant (a firm) [1994] 4 All ER 267, [1995] 1 WLR 121, [1994] 45 LS Gaz R 37....................................................................................................................... 11.36 Khuja v Times Newspapers [2017] UKSC 49.......................................................................... 1.155 Kirkaldie v Information Comr & Thanet DC (EA/2006/0001)...............................1.212, 1.214, 3.42 Kirkhone v Information Comr [2016] UKUT 344 (AAC)...................................................... 1.210 Kirklees Council v Information Comr [2011] UKUT 104 (AAC), [2011] 3 WLUK 370...... 3.9 Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349, [1998] 4 All ER 513, [1998] 3 WLR 1095, [1998] RVR 315, [1998] NLJR 1674, 142 SJ LB 279, HL........................ 9.158 Konigsberg (a bankrupt), Re, ex p Trustee v Konigsberg [1989] 3 All ER 289, [1989] 1 WLR 1257, [1990] Fam Law 94, 133 SJ 1337, [1989] NLJR 1302............................................ 11.104 Kopp v Switzerland 4 BHRC 277............................................................................................. 4.196 Kousouros v O’Halloran [2014] EWHC 2294 (Ch), [2015] WTLR 1023............................. 11.33 Kruslin v France (1990) 12 EHRR 547, ECtHR...................................................................... 4.196 Kulkani v Milyon Keynes Hospital Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 789, [2010] ICR 101, [2009] IRLR 829........................................................................................................................... 10.141 Kuschnir (J) v Information Comr (EA/2011/0273).................................................................. 3.47 Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co [2005] EWCA Civ 286.......................................... 11.104 L L, Re [1997] AC 16.................................................................................................................... 11.100

xc  Table of cases L (a minor) (wardship: freedom of publication), Re [1988] 1 All ER 418, [1988] 1 FLR 255, [1987] NLJ Rep 760.......................................................................................................... 11.6 L (minors) (sexual abuse: disclosure), Re [1999] 1 WLR 299.................................................. 2.273 L, Re, Re V (minors: sexual abuse: disclosure) [1999] 1 WLR 299, [1999] 1 FCR 308, [1999] 1 FLR 267, 142 SJ LB 270, CA......................................................................................... 11.6 LM (a child) (reporting restrictions: coroner’s inquest) [2007] EWHC 1902 (Fam), [2007] CP Rep 48, [2008] 1 FLR 1360......................................................................................... 11.12 LPN & Finland v Commission (Case C-514/11 P & C-605/11 P) [2013] 6 WLUK 9, [2013] ETMR 47........................................................................................................................... 5.79 Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 1327, [2017] 9 WLUK 148, [2018] EMLR 2............................................................................................................................. 11.33 Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489....................................................................................... 10.153 Ladha v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1988] Imm AR 284, CA................... 11.54 Lake District Special Planning Board v Secretary of State for the Environment (1975) 236 Estates Gazette 417, [1975] JPL 220, 119 SJ 187............................................................. 9.107 Lamb (C) v Information Comr (EA/2006/0046)...................................................................... 1.83 Lamb (C) v Information Comr (EA/2009/0108)...................................................................... 1.228 Lambeth LBC v Johnston [2008] EWCA Civ 690.................................................................. 10.123 Lancashire Firs v SA Lyons & Co Ltd [1997] IRLR 113, [1996] FSR 629, (1996) 19(8) IPD 19068.................................................................................................................................. 7.114 Lansing Linde Ltd v Kerr [1991] 1 WLR 251, [1991] 1 All ER 418, CA................................ 1.216 Lask v Gloucester Area Health Authority (1985) 2 PN 96, CA............................................... 11.100 Lavelle v Lavelle [2004] EWCA Civ 223, [2004] 2 FCR 418, (The Times, 9 March 2004)... 10.152 Law Debenture Trust Corp (Channel Islands) Ltd v Lexington Insurance Co [2003] EWHC 2297 (Comm), [2003] NLJR 1551...................................................................... 11.37 Lawal v Northern Spirit Ltd [2004] 1 All ER 187, HL............................................................ 10.117 Lawrence v Pembrokeshire CC [2007] EWCA Civ 446, [2007] 1 WLR 2991, [2007] 2 FLR 705...................................................................................................................................... 10.52 Leander v Sweden (1987) 9 EHRR 433, ECtHR.............................................................. 4.293, 4.346 Le Compte, Van Leuven & De Meyere v Belgium (1981) 4 EHRR 1, ECtHR............10.141, 10.164 Leeds City Council v Information Comr (EA/2012/0020 & 0021)........................................ 3.23 Lee-Hirons v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] UKSC 46, [2017] AC 52, [2016] 3 WLR 590, [2017] 3 All ER 97, [2016] 7 WLUK 677, (2016) 19 CCL Rep 383, [2016] Med LR 551, (2016) 151 BMLR 1, [2017] MHLR 57.............................................................. 10.152 Leicester City Council v District Auditor for Leicester [1989] RVR 162, CA........................ 7.82 Lennon v News Group Newspapers Ltd & Twist [1978] FSR 573, CA............................ 4.316, 4.318 Lewis v A-G of Jamaica [2000] 3 WLR 1785, 144 SJ LB 257, PC.......................................... 10.138 Liberty v Security Service, SIS, GCHQ (17 January 2017)..................................................... 2.127 Liberty v UK (application no 58243/00) (The Times, 11 July 2008)................................ 4.200, 4.236 Lillie v Newcastle CC [2002] EWHC 1600 (QB), (2000) 146 SLJB 225.............................8.11, 8.67 Lilly Icos LLC v Pfizer Ltd (No 2) [2002] 1 All ER 842......................................................... 11.37 Lion Laboratories Ltd v Evans [1985] QB 526, [1984] 2 All ER 417, [1984] 3 WLR 539, 128 SJ 533, CA.................................................................................................................... 4.314, 4.323 Little (K), Dr v Information Comr (EA/2010/0072)............................................................... 3.32 Lloyd v McMahon [1987] AC 625, [1987] 1 All ER 1118, [1987] 2 WLR 821, 85 LGR 545, [1986] RVR 188, 130 SJ 696, CA, affd [1987] AC 625, [1987] 1 All ER 1118, [1987] 2 WLR 821, 85 LGR 545, [1987] RVR 58, 131 SJ 409, [1987] LS Gaz R 1240, [1987] NLJ Rep 265, HL...........................................................................................  9.17, 10.117, 12.29 Lloyd (R) v Google LLC [2018] EWHC 2599 (QB), [2018] 10 WLUK 137, [2019] EMLR 4.. 2.168 Lloyds Bank plc v Cassidy (The Times, 11 January 2005)....................................................... 10.138 Local Administration Comr (subpoena issued by), Re [1996] 3 FCR 190, 140 SJ LB 108, sub nom Re a Subpoena (adoption: Comr for Local Administration) [1996] 2 FLR 629, [1996] Fam Law 663.......................................................................................................... 4.12 Local Authority, A v A Health Authority (Inquiry: Restraint on Publication) [2003] EWHC 2746 (Fam), [2004] 1 All ER 480....................................................................................... 2.216 Local Government Board v Arlidge [1915] AC 120, [1914–15] All ER Rep 1, 84 LJKB 72, 79 JP 97, 12 LGR 1109, 111 LT 905, 30 TLR 672, HL................................................... 10.131 Loch (J) v Information Comr & Ministry of Justice (EA/2016/0223)..................................... 1.194 Lock International plc v Beswick [1989] 3 All ER 373, [1989] 1 WLR 1268, [1989] IRLR 481, 133 SJ 1297, [1989] NLJR 644.........................................................................  4.315, 11.119 London & Clydeside Estates Ltd v Aberdeen District Council [1979] 3 All ER 876, [1980] 1 WLR 182, 39 P & CR 549, 253 Estates Gazette 1011, 124 SJ 100, 1980 SC (HL) 1, 1980 SLT 81, HL............................................................................................................... 10.172

Table of cases   xci London & Norwich Investment Services Ltd, Re (The Times, 16 December 1987)............. 11.4 London Regional Transport v The Mayor of London [2003] EMLR 4.................................. 4.317 London Residuary Body v Secretary of State for the Environment (1988) 58 P & CR 256, [1988] 2 PLR 79, [1988] JPL 637, on appeal (1989) 58 P & CR 370, [1989] 3 PLR 105, CA, revsd sub nom London Residuary Body v Lambeth London Borough Council [1990] 2 All ER 309, [1990] 1 WLR 744, 61 P & CR 65, [1990] 23 LS Gaz R 28, HL.. 10.162 Longfield Parish Council v Wright (1918) 88 LJ Ch 119, 16 LGR 865................................. 8.37 Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd (No 2) [1982] AC 173, [1981] 2 All ER 456, [1981] 3 WLR 33, 125 SJ 429, HL.................................................................................................. 11.68 Lonrho plc, Re [1990] 2 AC 154, [1989] 2 All ER 1100, [1989] 3 WLR 535, [1989] NLJR 1073, HL............................................................................................................................ 4.365 Lonrho plc v Fayed (No 4) [1994] QB 775, [1994] 1 All ER 870, [1994] 2 WLR 209, 66 TC 220, CA................................................................................................................... 1.274 Lonrho plc v Secretary of State for Trade & Industry see R v Secretary of State for Trade & Industry, ex p Lonrho plc Lord Chancellor & Lord Chancellor’s Department v Coker & Osamor [2001] IRLR 116, EAT.................................................................................................................................... 4.151 Loutchanksy v The Times (No 2) [2002] 1 All ER 652, CA.................................................... 7.9 Lucas v Barking, Havering & Redbridge Hospitals NHS Trust [2003] EWCA Civ 1102, [2003] 4 All ER 720, [2004] 1 WLR 220, 77 BMLR 13, [2003] 37 LS Gaz R 34............ 11.26 Lucy v Royal Borough of Kensington & Chelsea [1997] ELR 155 [1997] COD 191............ 9.125 Luke (Lord) of Pavenham v Minister of Housing & Local Government [1968] 1 QB 172, [1967] 2 All ER 1066, [1967] 3 WLR 801, 131 JP 425, 65 LGR 393, 18 P & CR 333, 111 SJ 398, 202 Estates Gazette 1121, CA........................................................................ 9.130 M M (a child) (children & family reporter: disclosure) [2002] EWCA Civ 1199, [2003] Fam 26........................................................................................................................................ 11.6 M (minors), Re [1987] 1 FLR 46, [1986] Fam Law 336........................................................... 11.75 M, Re [1994] 1 AC 377, [1993] 3 WLR 433, [1993] 37 LS Gaz R 50, [1993] NLJR 1099, 137 SJ LB 199, sub nom M v Home Office [1993] 3 All ER 537, HL...................................... 1.251 M v France (Application 10078/82) (2500) 41 Decisions & Reports 103................................ 4.346 M v Home Office see M, Re [1994] 1 AC 537........................................................................... 1.251 M v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] 2 All ER 863, CA................. 4.352, 10.127, 10.164 M & N (minors) (wardship: publication of information), Re [1990] Fam 211, [1990] 1 All ER 205, [1989] 3 WLR 1136, [1990] FCR 395, [1990] 1 FLR 149, [1990] Fam Law 22, 134 SJ 165, [1990] 1 LS Gaz R 32, CA.............................................................  7.112, 11.6, 11.58 MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State HD [2010] UKSC 49, [2011] 2 All ER 65, [2011] Imm AR 292............................................................................................................................... 10.115 MGN Ltd’s Application, Re [2011] EWCA Crim 100, [2011] 1 WLUK 398, [2011] 1 Cr App R 31, [2011] EMLR 14.............................................................................................. 11.4 MM v United Kingdom (Application 24029/07) [2012] ECHR 1906, [2012] 11 WLUK 360...............................................................................................................................  2.309, 2.310 MS v Sweden (application 00020837/92)................................................................................. 2.274 McBride v Information Comr (EA/2007/0105)....................................................................... 1.68 McCann v United Kingdom (application no 19009/04).......................................................... 10.128 McCartan Turkington Breen (a firm) v Times Newspapers Ltd [2000] 4 All ER 913, [2000] 3 WLR 1670, 144 SJ LB 287, sub nom Turkington v Times Newspapers Ltd [2000] NLJR 1657, HL........................................................................................................ 4.5, 7.9, 11.37 McCarthy v Information Comr (EA/2006/0053)..................................................................... 1.126 McCarthy & Stone (Developments) Ltd v Richmond upon Thames London Borough Council see R v Richmond upon Thames London Borough Council, ex p McCarthy & Stone (Developments) Ltd McCaughey, Re [2011] UKSC 20, [2011] 2 WLR 1279, [2011] 3 All ER 607........................ 10.175 McClusky v Information Comr & PPS NI (EA/2007/0056)................................................... 1.80 McE v NI Prison Service [2009] UKHL 15, [2009] 1 AC 908, [2009] 2 WLR 782............... 4.212 McFarland, Re [2004] UKHL 17, [2004] 1 WLR 1289, [2004] NI 380.................................. 10.157 McGinley & Egan v United Kingdom (1998) 27 EHRR 1, ECtHR....................................... 4.297 McInerney v Information Comr [2015] UKUT 47 (AAC), [2015] 1 WLUK 680.................. 1.232 McInerney v MacDonald (1992) 93 DLR (4th) 415, 137 NR 35, (Can SC)........................... 2.194 McInnes v Onslow Fane [1978] 3 All ER 211, [1978] 1 WLR 1520, 142 JP 590, 122 SJ 844.... 10.125, 10.127

xcii  Table of cases McIntyre v ICO & MoD (EA/2007/0062)......................................................................... 1.191, 1.193 McKennitt v Ash [2005] EWHC 3003 (QB), [2006] EMLR 10.............................2.234, 2.241, 2.243 Mackenzie (D) v Information Comr (EA/2013/0251)............................................................. 1.127 McKerr, Re [2004] UKHL 12, [2004] 2 All ER 409, HL........................................................ 10.175 MacKinnon v Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corpn [1986] Ch 482, [1986] 1 All ER 653, [1986] 2 WLR 453, 130 SJ 224........................................................................... 11.36 McLaughlin v Lambeth BC [2010] EWHC 2726 (QB), [2011] EMLR 8, [2011] HRLR 2.. 10.174 McMichael v UK (1995) 20 EHRR 205................................................................................... 2.218 McVicar v United Kingdom (App No 4631/99), ECtHR........................................................ 7.2 Maaouia v France (2001) 33 EHRR 42..................................................................................... 10.118 Magee v United Kingdom (The Times, 20 June 2000)............................................................ 10.145 Magharafelt v Information Comr (EA/2009/0047)..............................................................  2.24, 2.82 Magyar Helsinki Bizottszag v Hungary (Application No 18030/11)................................. 1.154, 4.298 Mahon v Air New Zealand Ltd [1984] AC 808, [1984] 3 All ER 201, [1984] 3 WLR 884, [1984] LS Gaz R 3336, 128 SJ 752, PC............................................................................ 10.132 Mahon v Rahn (No 2) [2000] 1 WLR 2150............................................................................. 7.9 Maile v Wigan MBC [2001] Env LR 11................................................................................... 8.59 Malnick (E) v Information Comr (EA/2016/0055).................................................................. 1.192 Mak v UK [2010] 2 FLR 451, (2010) 51 EHRR 14, 28 BHRC 762........................................ 2.218 Makanjuola v Metropolitan Police Comr [1992] 3 All ER 617, [1989] NLJR 468,CA.......... 11.63, 11.63, 11.66 Makin v Information Comr (EA/2010/0080)........................................................................... 1.167 Makisi v Birmingham City Council [2011] EWCA Civ 355......................................... 10.123, 10.137 Makudi v Triesman [2014] EWCA Civ 179, [2014] QB 839, [2014] 2 WLR 1228, [2014] 3 All ER 36, [2014] 2 WLUK 795, [2014] EMLR 17, (2014) 164(7597) NLJ 17.............. 7.4 Malik v Manchester Crown Court [2008] EWHC 1362 (Admin), [2008] 4 All ER 403, [2008] EMLR 19................................................................................................................ 11.52 Malone v Metropolitan Police Comr [1979] Ch 344, sub nom Malone v Metropolitan Police Comr (No 2) [1979] 2 All ER 620, [1979] 2 WLR 700, 69 Cr App Rep 168, 123 SJ 303...................................................................................................................  4.196, 4.318, 4.343 Malone v United Kingdom (1984) 7 EHRR 14, ECtHR........................................................ 4.196 Manchanda v Medical Eye Centre Association (1986) 131 SJ 47, [1986] LS Gaz R 3673, CA...................................................................................................................................... 10.141 Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45, [2010] 3 WLR 1441, [2011] PTSR 61.............................................................................................................................. 10.128, 10.137 Manchester City Council v SSE & Mercury Communications Ltd [1988] 1 WLUK 266, [1988] JPL 774................................................................................................................... 9.143 Mandalia v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 59, [2015] 1 WLR 4546, [2016] 4 All ER 189, [2015] 10 WLUK 352, [2016] Imm AR 180, [2016] INLR 184...................................................................................................................................... 10.123 Mannesmannrohren-Werke (Case T-112/98) [2001] ECR II-729, [2001] 5 CMLR 1........... 11.126 Manton v Brighton Corpn [1951] 2 KB 393, [1951] 2 All ER 101, 115 JP 377, 95 SJ 369, [1951] 1 TLR 1105............................................................................................................ 7.55 Marcel v Metropolitan Police Comr [1992] Ch 225, [1991] 1 All ER 845, [1991] 2 WLR 1118, on appeal [1992] Ch 225, [1992] 1 All ER 72, [1992] 2 WLR 50, CA............ 1.274, 2.261, 11.104, 11.109 Marginson v Tildsley (1903) 67 JP 226.................................................................................... 9.11 Marlow (G) v Information Comr (EA/2005/0031).................................................................. 1.65 Marlwood Commercial Inc v Kozeny [2004] 3 All ER 648, CA.............................................. 11.37 Martin (C) & Oxford City Council v Information Comr (EA/2005/0026 & EA/2005/0030).................................................................................................................. 1.151 Mathieu-Mohin v Belgium (19 (A/113) 88) 10 EHRR 1......................................................... 2.268 Maxwell v Department of Trade & Industry [1974] QB 523, [1974] 2 All ER 122, [1974] 2 WLR 338, 118 SJ 203, CA................................................................................................ 10.139 Maynard v Osmond [1977] QB 240, [1977] 1 All ER 64, [1976] 3 WLR 711, 141 JP 71, 120 SJ 604, 140 JP Jo 430, CA.................................................................................................. 10.141 Medway Council v BBC [2002] 1 FLR 104.............................................................................. 11.6 Meek v City of Birmingham District Council [1987] IRLR 250, CA..................................... 10.161 Melton Medes Ltd v Securities & Investments Board [1995] Ch 137, [1995] 3 All ER 880, [1995] 2 WLR 247............................................................................................................. 1.274 Memory Corpn plc v Sidhu (The Times, 31 May 1999).......................................................... 11.119 Meghesha (S) v Comr of Police of the Metropolis [2013] EWHC 1695 (Admin), [2013] 6 WLUK 451, [2013] ACD 12............................................................................................. 2.235

Table of cases   xciii Merricks v Nott-Bower [1965] 1 QB 57, [1964] 1 All ER 717, [1964] 2 WLR 702, 128 JP 267, 108 SJ 116, CA........................................................................................................... 11.60 Mersey Care NHS Trust v Ackroyd [2003] EMLR 36, CA..................................................... 11.46 Mersey Tunnel Users Assoc v IT & Halton BC (EA/2009/0001).....................................  1.214, 3.42 Mersey Tunnel Users Assoc v IT & Merseytravel (EA/2007/0052)................................. 1.209, 1.214 Metropolitan Police Comr v DSD [2018] UKSC 11, [2018] 2 WLR 895, [2018] 3 All ER 369, [2018] 2 WLUK 453, [2018] 1 Cr App R 31, [2018] HRLR 11............................... 10.52 Metropolitan Police Comr v Information Comr (EA/2010/0008).......................................... 1.121 Metropolitan Police Comr v Information Comr (EA/2008/0078).......................................... 1.126 Metropolitan Police Comr v Locker [1993] 3 All ER 584, [1993] ICR 440, [1993] IRLR 319, [1993] NLJR 543, EAT..................................................................................................... 11.66 Michael v Chief Constable South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732, [2015] 2 WLR 343, [2015] 2 All ER 635, [2015] 1 WLUK 622, [2015] HRLR 8, [2015] Med LR 171, [2015] Inquest LR 78................................................................................................. 10.52 Michael v European Parliament [1981] ECR 2861.................................................................. 10.159 Milford Haven PA v Information Comr & Third Parties (EA/2007/0036)............................ 3.62 Miller v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2003] EWHC 2799...................................................... 7.9 Mills (H) v Information Comr (EA/2013/0263)...................................................................... 1.219 Mills v News Group [2001] EMLR 41..................................................................................... 2.216 Minister of National Revenue v Wrights’ Canadian Ropes Ltd [1947] AC 109, [1947] 1 DLR 721, 1 WWR 214, Can TC 1, PC............................................................................ 10.152 Ministry of Defence v ICO & R Evans (EA/2006/0027)......................................................... 1.193 Ministry of Justice v Information Comr (EA/2007/0016)................................................ 1.181, 1.245 Ministry of Justice v Information Comr [2009] EWHC 1611 (Admin).................................. 1.231 Mionis v Democratic Press SA [2017] EWCA Civ 1194, [2018] QB 662, [2018] 2 WLR 565, [2017] 7 WLUK 776, [2018] EMLR 4............................................................................. 2.224 Mitchell v Information Comr (EA/2005/0002)........................................................................ 1.156 Mitsui & Co Ltd v Nexen Petroleum UK Ltd [2005] EWHC 625 (Ch), [2005] 3 All ER 511...................................................................................................................................... 11.29 Moresfield Ltd v Banners (a firm) [2003] EWHC 1602 (Ch).................................................. 11.27 Morgans v DPP [1999] 1 WLR 968, 163 JP 543, [1999] 2 Cr App Rep 99, [1999] Crim LR 490, revsd [2000] 2 All ER 522, [2000] 2 WLR 386, [2000] 2 Cr App Rep 113, [2000] Crim LR 576, [2000] 09 LS Gaz R 39, HL...................................................................... 4.205 Morison v Moat (1851) 9 Hare 241, 20 LJ Ch 513, 15 Jur 787, 18 LTOS 28, affd (1852) 21 LJ Ch 248, 16 Jur 321........................................................................................................ 4.316 Morris v Director of Serious Fraud Office [1993] Ch 372...................................................... 2.272 Morrow’s Application, Re [2001] NI 261.................................................................................. 4.4 Morton v Information Comr [2018] UKUT 348 (AAC)......................................................... 2.83 Mosley v Ass News [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), [2008] EMLR 20, (2008) 158 NLJ 1112...... 2.235, 2.241, 2.243, 2.246, 2.247 Mosley v United Kingdom (unreported, 10 May 2011)........................................................... 4.361 Mosley v United Kingdom [2015] EWHC 59 (QB), [2015] 1 WLUK 220, [2015] 2 CMLR 22, [2015] EMLR 11, [2015] FSR 24......................................................................... 2.235, 2.242 Mousaka Inc v Golden Seagull Maritime Inc (The Times, 3 October 2001).......................... 10.152 Muniz v Commission (Case T-144/05) (18/12/08).................................................................. 5.78 Murray v Express Newspapers plc [2007] EWHC 1908 (Ch), [2007] ECDR 20, [2007] EMLR 22........................................................................................................................... 2.234 Murray v United Kingdom (1996) 22 EHRR 29, ECtHR..............................................  4.293, 10.145 Murungara v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 1015, [2008] 9 WLUK 231, [2009] INLR 180, (2008) 105(37) LSG 20............................................... 10.80 My Travel v Commission (Case T-403/05) [2008] ECR II-2027, [2008] 3 CMLR 49, [2009] CEC 189............................................................................................................................ 5.78 N N1 & N2 v Google LLC & Information Comr [2018] EWHC 799 (QB), [2018] 3 WLR 1165, [2018] 3 All ER 581, [2018] 4 WLUK 158, [2018] EMLR 18, [2018] HRLR 13, [2018] FSR 22................................................................................................................. 2.7, 2.168 NF v European Council (Case 193/16).................................................................................... 5.70 Nadarajah v Information Comr (EA/2014/0226)..................................................................... 1.224 Nash v Chelsea College [2001] All ER D 133...............................................................  10.138, 10.159 National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd v GTV Corpn Pty [1989] VR 747....... 2.197 Neilson v Laugharne [1981] QB 736, [1981] 1 All ER 829, [1981] 2 WLR 537, 125 SJ 202, CA...................................................................................................................................... 11.66

xciv  Table of cases Network Rail Ltd v Information Comr & NRI Ltd (EA/2006/0061–62)............................... 3.14 New York Times v US 403 US 713 (1971)............................................................................... 4.330 Newcastle upon Tyne NHS Foundation Trust v Information Comr (EA/2011/0236)........... 1.113 Newbery (A) v BBC (EA/2009/0118)....................................................................................... 1.95 News Group Newspapers Ltd v Comr of Police of the Metropolis [2016] 2 All ER 483, [2015] 12 WLUK 602, [2015] Info TLR 179................................................................... 11.52 New York The Times v Sullivan 376 US 254, 11 L Ed 2d 686, 84 S Ct 710 (1964)............... 7.9 New Zealand Fishing Industry Association Ltd v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food [1988] 1 NZLR 544........................................................................................................... 10.155 Nisbet (J) v Information Comr (EA/2007/0031)...................................................................... 1.64 Nold (J) KG v EC Commission (Case 4/73) [1974] ECR 491, [1974] 2 CMLR 338, ECJ.... 11.138 North West etc Fisheries Committee v Information Comr (EA/2007/0133)......................... 3.46 Norwest Holst Ltd v Secretary of State for Trade [1978] Ch 201, [1978] 3 All ER 280, affd [1978] Ch 201, [1978] 3 All ER 280, [1978] 3 WLR 73, 122 SJ 109, CA........................ 10.127 Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs & Excise Comrs [1974] AC 133, [1973] 2 All ER 943, [1973] 3 WLR 164, [1973] FSR 365, [1974] RPC 101, 117 SJ 567, HL................... 11.29, 11.36, 11.69, 11.114 Nutuli v Donald [2010] EWCA Civ 1276, [2011] 1 WLR 294, [2011] CP Rep 13................ 2.256 O OFT v IBA Healthcare [2004] 4 All ER 1103........................................ 10.153, 10.157, 10.159, 11.55 Oakley v S Cambridgeshire DC [2017] EWCA Civ 71, [2017] 1 WLR 3765, [2017] 2 WLUK 375, [2017] 2 P & CR 4, [2017] JPL 703............................................................ 10.156 O’Brien v Komesaroff (1982) 150 CLR 310, 41 ALR 255, 56 ALJR 681................................ 4.322 Observer & Guardian v United Kingdom (1991) 14 EHRR 153, ECtHR....................... 4.364, 11.40 Oceanbulk Shipping & Trading SA v TMT Asia Ltd [2010] UKSC 44, [2011] 1 AC 662, [2010] 3 WLR 1424........................................................................................................... 11.111 Ofcom v Information Comr (Case C-71/10) [2011] PTSR 1676, [2011] 7 WLUK 826, [2012] 1 CMLR 7, [2012] Env LR 7................................................................................. 3.43 Ofcom v Information Comr [2009] EWCA Civ 90, [2009] Info TLR 13, [2009] ACD 48.... 1.102, 1.192 Ofcom v Information Comr [2010] UKSC 3, [2010] Env LR 20, [2010] Info TLR 87......... 3.43 Ofcom v Information Comr & T-Mobile (UK) Ltd (EA/2006/0078)...................................3.41, 3.43, 3.46, 3.50 Ofcom v Morrisey (G) [2011] UKUT 116 (AAC)................................................................... 1.228 Office of Government Commerce v Information Comr [2008] EWHC 737 (Fam), [2008] 2 FLR 936, [2008] Fam Law 608.........................................................................  1.161, 1.174, 4.77 Ofsted v Durand Academy Trust [2018] EWCA Civ 2813, [2018] 12 WLUK 419................ 10.117 Oladehinde v Secretary of State for the Home Department see R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Oladehinde Oliver v Chief Constable of Northumbria [2003] EWHC 2417............................................. 7.9 Oliver v Northampton Borough Council (1986) 151 JP 44..................................................... 9.11 Oneryildiz v Turkey (2004) 39 EHRR 12................................................................................. 4.296 O’Regan v Iambic Productions Ltd [1989] NLJR 1378.......................................................... 11.119 Orkem SA (formerly cdF Chimie SA) v Commission of the European Communities (Case C-374/87) [1989] ECR 3283, [1991] 4 CMLR 502.......................................................... 11.126 Osborn v Parole Board [2013] UKSC 61, [2014] AC 1115, [2013] 3 WLR 1020, [2014] 1 All ER 369, [2014] NI 154, [2013] 10 WLUK 277, [2014] HRLR 1, (2013) 157(39) SJLB 37..................................................................................................................10.117, 10.121, 10.157 Osman v United Kingdom (1998) 29 EHRR 245, [1999] 1 FLR 193, [1999] Fam Law 86, [1999] Crim LR 82, 5 BHRC 293, ECtHR...................................................................... 10.52 Österreichische Vereinigung v Austria [2013] ECHR 1204..................................................... 4.298 Österreichischer Rundfunk (Case C-465/00) [2003] ECR I-4989, [2003] 3 CMLR 10......... 5.71 Ostreicher v Secretary of State for the Environment [1978] 3 All ER 82, [1978] 1 WLR 810, 142 JP 532, 76 LGR 445, 37 P & CR 9, 122 SJ 194, [1978] RVR 131, CA..................... 9.125 Othman v Council & Commission (Case T-318/01) [2009] All ER (EC) 873, [2009] ECR II-1627............................................................................................................................... 5.68 Oxford v Moss (1978) 68 Cr App Rep 183, [1979] Crim LR 119............................................ 4.3 Oxfordshire County Council v L & F [1997] 3 FCR 124, [1997] 1 FLR 235, [1997] Fam Law 249.............................................................................................................................. 11.6 Oxfordshire County Council v Secretary of State for Communities & Local Government [2007] EWHC 769 (Admin), [2007] 2 P & CR 29, [2007] NPC 42................................ 10.152

Table of cases   xcv P P v F Ltd (2001) New LJ 1284.................................................................................................. 12.1 P v Liverpool Daily Post & Echo Newspapers plc see Pickering v Liverpool Daily Post & Echo Newspapers plc P v P (2004) NLJ 1604.............................................................................................................. 11.105 P Commission v TGI (Case C-139/07) [2011] 1 CMLR 3, [2011] Bus LR D81............. 5.79, 11.127 P (disclosure: criminal proceedings) [2003] EWHC 1713 (Fam), [2004] 1 FLR 407............. 11.15 PCR Ltd v Dow Jones Telerate Ltd [1998] FSR 170, [1998] EMLR 407............................... 11.45 PFI & PF2 NAO (2008) HC 718............................................................................................. 1.215 PG & JH v United Kingdom (The Times, 19 October 2001)................................................. 4.208 PGF II SA v OMFS Co Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 1288, [2014] 1 WLR 1386, [2014] 1 All ER 970, [2013] 10 WLUK 734, [2014] CP Rep 6, [2014] BLR 1, 152 Con LR 72, [2013] 6 Costs LR 973, [2013] 3 EGLR 16, [2013] 44 EG 98 (CS), (2013) 157(42) SJLB 37....... 10.69 PJS v NGN Ltd [2016] UKSC 26, [2016] AC 1081, [2016] 2 WLR 1253, [2016] 4 All ER 554, [2016] 5 WLUK 438, [2016] EMLR 21, [2016] 2 FLR 251, [2016] HRLR 13, 42 BHRC 111, [2016] FSR 33, [2016] Fam Law 963............................... 2.224, 2.226, 2.238, 2.243, 2.247, 2.254, 4.318, 4.350 PNM v Times Newspapers Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 1132, [2014] 8 WLUK 31, [2014] CP Rep 48, [2015] 1 Cr App R 1, [2014] EMLR 30............................................................... 2.247 PSC Ltd v Secretary of State for Local Government [2017] EWHC 1502 (Admin), [2017] 1 WLR 4611, [2017] 6 WLUK 476, [2017] Pens LR 17.................................................. 4.110 Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food [1968] AC 997, [1968] 1 All ER 694, [1968] 2 WLR 924, 112 SJ 171, HL.....................................................................4.5, 8.47, 10.154 Pantmaenog Timber Co Ltd, In re [2003] 4 All ER 18, HL.................................................... 12.1 Parker v CS Structured Credit Fund [2003] 1 WLR 1680...................................................... 11.116 Parker v Information Comr & Parliamentary Ombudsman (EA/2007/046).......................... 1.230 Paulic v Slovakia [2007] 1 FLR 1090, [2006] 3 FCR 323 (ECtHR), (2008) 46 EHRR 10..... 2.218 Payne v Lord Harris of Greenwich [1981] 2 All ER 842, [1981] 1 WLR 754, [1981] Crim LR 837, 125 SJ 289, CA..................................................................................................... 11.69 Peach v Metropolitan Police Comr [1986] QB 1064, [1986] 2 All ER 129, [1986] 2 WLR 1080, 130 SJ 448, [1986] LS Gaz R 1725, CA.................................................................. 11.66 Pearlberg v Varty (Inspector of Taxes) [1972] 2 All ER 6, [1972] 1 WLR 534, 48 TC 14, [1972] TR 5, 116 SJ 335, HL............................................................................................ 10.130 Peck v United Kingdom Application no 44647/98 (2003) 13 BHRC 669....................... 2.217, 2.274 Peel Investments (North Ltd) v Bury Metropolitan Borough Council [1999] PLCR 307, CA...................................................................................................................................... 10.156 Pelling v Bruce-Williams [2004] EWCA Civ 845, [2004] 3 All ER 875................................. 11.4 Peninsula Services Ltd v ICO [2014] UKUT 284 (AAC), [2014] 6 WLUK 388.................... 1.152 People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals Europe v Information Comr & University of Oxford (EA/2009/0076).................................................................................................... 1.197 Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart [1993] AC 593, [1993] 1 All ER 42, [1992] 3 WLR 1032, [1993] ICR 291, [1993] IRLR 33, [1992] STC 898, 65 TC 421, [1993] RVR 127, [1993] NLJR 17, HL...................................................................................................................1.29, 4.95 Performance Cars Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment (1977) 34 P & CR 92, 246 Estates Gazette 563, [1977] JPL 585, CA.................................................................. 9.107, 9.108 Pergamon Press Ltd, Re [1971] Ch 388, [1970] 3 All ER 535, [1970] 3 WLR 792, 114 SJ 569, CA.................................................................................................................... 10.130, 10.139 Peter Pan Manufacturing Corpn v Corsets Silhouette Ltd [1963] 3 All ER 402, [1964] 1 WLR 96, [1963] RPC 45, 108 SJ 97................................................................................. 4.315 Pett v Greyhound Racing Association Ltd [1969] 1 QB 125, [1968] 2 All ER 545, [1968] 2 WLR 1471, 112 SJ 463, CA.............................................................................................. 10.141 Pfeiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt (Case C-360/09) [2011] All ER (EC) 979, [2011] 5 CMLR 7.......................................................................................................................................... 11.127 Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 19, [2015] 1 WLR 1591, [2015] 3 All ER 1015, [2015] 3 WLUK 744, [2015] 2 CMLR 49, [2015] Imm AR 950, [2015] INLR 593..............................................................................................  10.88, 10.116 Pharaon v Bank of Credit & Commerce International SA (in liquidation) (Price Waterhouse (a firm) intervening) [1998] 4 All ER 455, 142 SJ LB 251................................................ 4.326 Phelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council [2000] 4 All ER 504, [2000] 3 WLR 776, [2000] 3 FCR 102, [2000] ELR 499, 56 BMLR 1, [2000] NLJR 1198, 144 SJ LB 241, HL...................................................................................................................................... 10.52 Phillip Morris Benelux v Commission (Case T-796/14).......................................................... 5.79 Phillip Morris v Commission (Case T-18/15).......................................................................... 5.79

xcvi  Table of cases Phillip Morris v Commission (Case T-800/14)........................................................................ 5.79 Phillips v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 48, [2012] 2 WLR 848, [2012] 2 All ER 74, [2012] 2 WLUK 4, [2012] EMLR 14, [2012] FSR 29, (2012) 109(7) LSG 17, (2012) 162 NLJ 295..................................................................................................... 11.119 Pickering v Liverpool Daily Post & Echo Newspapers plc [1991] 2 AC 370, [1990] 1 All ER 335, sub nom P v Liverpool Daily Post & Echo Newspapers plc [1990] 2 WLR 494, 134 SJ 786, CA; on appeal sub nom Pickering v Liverpool Daily Post & Echo Newspapers plc [1991] 2 AC 370, [1991] 1 All ER 622, [1991] 2 WLR 513, HL.............................  11.4, 11.8 Piller (Anton) KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd [1976] Ch 55, [1976] 1 All ER 779, [1976] 2 WLR 162, [1976] FSR 129, [1976] RPC 719, 120 SJ 63, CA..................  2.197, 11.116, 11.119 Plumbe (G) v Information Comr (EA/2009/0117).................................................................. 3.42 Plymouth City Council v Quietlynn Ltd see Quietlynn Ltd v Plymouth City Council Police Complaints Authority v Greater Manchester Police Authority 3 Admin LR 757........ 11.67 Poshteh v Kensington & Chelsea RLBC [2017] UKSC 36, [2017] AC 624, [2017] 2 WLR 1417, [2017] 3 All ER 1065, [2017] 5 WLUK 211, [2017] HLR 28........... 10.88, 10.134, 10.137 Port Louis Corpn v A-G of Mauritius [1965] AC 1111, [1965] 3 WLR 67, 109 SJ 413, PC.. 10.168 Port of London Authority (PLA) v Information Comr (EA/2006/0083)................................ 3.14 Porter v Magill [2002] 1 All ER 465, HL........................................................................  6.127, 10.117 Powell v Chief Constable of North Wales Constabulary (The Times, 11 February 2000).... 11.66 Poyser & Mills’ Arbitration, Re [1964] 2 QB 467, [1963] 1 All ER 612, [1963] 2 WLR 1309, 107 SJ 115, 185 Estates Gazette 609................................................................................. 10.161 Practice Direction (Mareva injunctions & Anton Piller orders) [1994] 4 All ER 52, [1994] 1 WLR 1233, [1995] 1 FCR 347, [1994] 2 FLR 704, [1994] RPC 617, [1994] NLJR 1134........................................................................................................................... 1.304, 11.119 Prebble v Television New Zealand Ltd [1995] 1 AC 321, [1994] 3 All ER 407, [1994] 3 WLR 970, [1994] 39 LS Gaz R 38, [1994] NLJR 1131, 138 SJ LB 175, PC......................  4.95, 4.274, 7.2, 7.6 Prestige Group plc, Re, Commission for Racial Equality v Prestige Group plc [1984] 1 WLR 335, [1984] ICR 473, [1984] IRLR 166, 128 SJ 131, HL....................................... 10.148 Preston Borough Council v McGrath (The Times, 18 February 1999); affd (The Times, 19 May 2000).................................................................................................................... 1.274, 4.326 PricewaterhouseCoopers v Information Comr & HMRC (EA/2009/0049)........................... 1.228 Principal Reporter v K (Scotland) [2010] UKSC 56, [2011] 1 WLR 18, 2011 SC (UKSC) 91.... 10.118 Privacy International v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (7 November 2017)................ 2.126 Productores de Musica de Espana (Promusicae) v Telefonica de Espana SAU (Case C-275/06) [2008] All ER (EC) 809, [2008] ECR I-271, [2008] 2 CMLR 17.................. 2.9 Property Alliance Group Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2018] EWCA Civ 1202, [2018] 1 WLUK 78....................................................................................................................... 11.37 Psara v Parliament [2018] EUECJ (Case T-639/15)................................................................ 5.20 Public Citizen Health Research Group v FDA: 704 F 2d 1280 (DC Circuit, 1983)............... 1.216 Public Disclosure Commission v Isaacs [1989] 1 All ER 137, [1988] 1 WLR 1043, 132 SJ 1215, [1988] 28 LS Gaz R 45, [1988] NLJR 185, PC............................................. 10.139, 10.151 Pugh (Dr J) MP v Information Comr & MoD (EA/2007/0055)............................................. 1.209 Q QMU v Information Comr (EA/2012/0229)........................................................................... 1.116 Queen Mary University of London v Information Comr (EA/2012/0229)............................ 1.114 Quietlynn Ltd v Plymouth City Council [1988] QB 114, [1987] 3 WLR 189, 151 JP 810, 131 SJ 940, [1987] LS Gaz R 2119, sub nom Plymouth City Council v Quietlynn Ltd [1987] 2 All ER 1040, 85 LGR 856................................................................................... 10.172 Quinn v Information Comr & Home Office (EA/2006/0010)................................................ 1.69 R R v Absolon (The Times, 14 September 1983)......................................................................... 4.3 R v Advertising Standards Authority Ltd, ex p Insurance Service plc (1989) 133 SJ 1545, [1990] COD 42, 2 Admin LR 77, 9 Tr LR 169................................................................. 10.130 R v Agar [1990] 2 All ER 442, 154 JP 89, 90 Cr App Rep 318, [1990] Crim LR 183, [1989] NLJR 116, CA................................................................................................................... 11.15 R v Agricultural Dwelling-House Advisory Committee for Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire & Northamptonshire, ex p Brough (1986) 19 HLR 367, [1987] 1 EGLR 106, 282 Estates Gazette 1542......................................................................................................... 10.130 R v Ainscough (Zane Roy) [2006] EWCA Crim 694, (2006) 170 JP 517, [2006] Crim LR 635...................................................................................................................................... 2.285

Table of cases   xcvii R v Allgood (1798) 7 Term Rep 746......................................................................................... 7.67 R v Army Board of the Defence Council, ex p Anderson [1992] QB 169, [1991] 3 All ER 375, [1991] 3 WLR 42, [1991] ICR 537, [1991] IRLR 425, [1991] COD 191, [1991] 23 LS Gaz R 35............................................................................................................................ 10.119 R v Assistant Metropolitan Police Comr, ex p Howell [1986] RTR 52, CA............................ 10.138 R v Ataou [1988] QB 798, [1988] 2 All ER 321, [1988] 2 WLR 1147, 152 JP 201, 87 Cr App Rep 210, [1988] Crim LR 461, 132 SJ 537, [1988] 6 LS Gaz R 36, CA.......................... 11.111 R v Austin (Herbert Charles) [2013] EWCA Crim 1028, [2014] 1 WLR 1045, [2013] 6 WLUK 743, [2013] 2 Cr App R 33, [2013] Crim LR 914............................................... 11.80 R v A-G England & Wales [2003] UKPC 22, 147 SJ LB 354, [2003] EMLR 499, [2004] 1 LRC 132............................................................................................................................ 4.285 R v A-G, ex p ICI plc [1987] 1 CMLR 72, 60 TC 1, CA......................................................... 12.29 R v B [2004] EWCA Crim 1368............................................................................................... 11.79 R v Barnes Borough Council, ex p Conlan [1938] 3 All ER 226, 36 LGR 524, 82 SJ 626...... 7.67 R v Beck, ex p Daily Telegraph plc [1993] 2 All ER 177.......................................................... 11.4 R v Bedfordshire Coroner ex p Local Sunday Newspapers Ltd (1999) 164 JP 283, QBD................................................................................................................................... 4.5 R v Bedwellty UDC, ex p Price [1934] 1 KB 333, 31 LGR 430, 98 JP 25, 103 LJKB 152, [1933] All ER Rep 639, 150 LT 180, 50 TLR 91.............................................................. 9.11 R v Bembridge (1783) 3 Doug KB 32....................................................................................... 4.274 R v Bickenhill Parish Council, ex p Secretary of State for the Environment & Solihull Metropolitan Borough Council & the Trustees of Wingfield Digby Estates & Arlington Securities Ltd [1987] JPL 773........................................................................................... 8.39 R v Bignall [1998] 1 Cr App R 1, QBD.............................................................................  2.357, 2.358 R v Birmingham City Council, ex p M (The Times, 13 October 1998).................................. 10.157 R v Birmingham City Council, ex p Sheptonhurst Ltd [1990] 1 All ER 1026, sub nom R v Norwich City Council, ex p Sheptonhurst Ltd 87 LGR 830, CA.........................10.123, 10.125 R v Blackledge [1996] 1 Cr App Rep 326, CA....................................................................... 1.278, 4.2 R v Board of Inland Revenue, ex p MFK Underwriting Agencies Ltd [1990] 1 All ER 91, sub nom R v IRC, ex p MFK Underwriting Agents Ltd [1990] 1 WLR 1545, [1989] STC 873, 62 TC 607.................................................................................................................. 10.124 R v Board of Visitors of HM Prison, The Maze, ex p Hone [1988] AC 379, [1988] 2 WLR 177, 132 SJ 158, [1988] 8 LS Gaz R 35, sub nom Hone v Maze Prison Board of Visitors [1988] 1 All ER 321, HL.................................................................................................... 10.141 R v Board of Visitors of Hull Prison, ex p St Germain [1979] QB 425, [1979] 1 All ER 701, [1979] 2 WLR 42, 68 Cr App Rep 212, 122 SJ 697, CA............................ 10.117, 10.132, 10.148 R v Board of Visitors of Wormwood Scrubs Prison, ex p Anderson [1985] QB 251, [1984] 1 All ER 799, [1984] 2 WLR 613, 128 SJ 223..................................................................... 10.141 R v Botmeh (Jawad) [2001] EWCA Crim 2226....................................................................... 11.77 R v Boundary Commission for England, ex p Foot [1983] QB 600, [1983] 1 All ER 1099, [1983] 2 WLR 458, 127 SJ 155, CA.................................................................................. 10.130 R v Bournemouth Justices, ex p Grey [1987] 1 FLR 36, [1986] Fam Law 337, 150 JP 392... 11.69, 11.115 R v Bow County Court, ex p Pelling (unreported, 31 March 2000)........................................ 11.15 R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex p United States Government [2000] 2 AC 216, [1999] 4 All ER 1, [1999] 3 WLR 620, [2000] 1 Cr App Rep 61, [1999] Crim LR 970, [1999] NLJR 1406, HL............................................................................. 2.358 R v Bradford City Metropolitan Council, ex p Corris [1990] 2 QB 363, [1989] 3 All ER 156, [1990] 2 WLR 247, 87 LGR 821, [1989] NLJR 867, CA................................................. 7.61 R v Bradford City Metropolitan Council, ex p Wilson [1990] 2 QB 375n, [1989] 3 All ER 140, [1990] 2 WLR 255..................................................................................................... 7.61 R v Bradford Metropolitan City Council, ex p Gasson (1988) Guardian, 22 October........... 8.21 R v Braithwaite [1983] 2 All ER 87, [1983] 1 WLR 385, 147 JP 301, 77 Cr App Rep 34, 127 SJ 222, CA.......................................................................................................................... 7.17 R v Brent Health Authority, ex p Francis [1985] QB 869, [1985] 1 All ER 74, [1984] 3 WLR 1317, 128 SJ 815.........................................................................................  7.57, 7.103, 8.25, 8.39 R v Brent London Borough Council, ex p Assegai (The Times, 18 June 1987)...................... 8.39 R v Brent London Borough Council, ex p Gladbaum (1989) 88 LGR 627..........................  7.55, 8.11 R v Brent London Borough Council, ex p Gunning (1985) 84 LGR 168............................... 10.168 R v Bristol City Council, ex p Bailey (The Times, 23 November 1994)................................. 10.157 R v Bristol City Council, ex p DL Barrett & Sons (2001) 3 LGLR 11................................... 9.149 R v British Coal Corpn, ex p Price [1993] ICR 720, sub nom R v British Coal Corpn & Secretary of State for Trade & Industry, ex p Vardy [1993] IRLR 104.................  10.119, 10.123

xcviii  Table of cases R v British Coal Corpn, ex p Vardy [1993] 1 CMLR 721, [1993] ICR 720, sub nom R v British Coal Corpn & Secretary of State for Trade & Industry, ex p Vardy [1993] IRLR 104........................................................................................................................... 10.119, 10.123 R v Broadcasting Complaints Commission, ex p Granada Television Ltd [1995] EMLR 163, CA............................................................................................................................... 2.222, 2.255 R v Broadcasting Standards Commission, ex p British Broadcasting Corpn [1999] EMLR 858, revsd [2000] 3 All ER 989, [2000] 3 WLR 1327, [2000] EMLR 587, [2000] 17 LS Gaz R 32, 144 SJ LB 204, CA........................................................................................... 2.255 R v Broadland District Council, ex p Lashley [2000] LGR 708, 2 LGLR 933, affd (The Times, 20 March 2001)..................................................................................................  7.22, 8.13 R v Bromell see Coventry Newspapers Ltd, ex p R v Brown [1996] AC 543, [1996] 1 All ER 545, [1996] 2 WLR 203, [1996] 2 Cr App Rep 72, [1996] Crim LR 408, [1996] 10 LS Gaz R 21, [1996] NLJR 209, 140 SJ LB 66, HL..... 2.357 R v CICB, ex p A [1999] 2 AC 330............................................................................................ 10.115 R v Caffrey (unreported, 2003)................................................................................................. 2.356 R v Cairns (AL) [2002] EWCA Crim 2838.............................................................................. 11.77 R v Calland [1967] Crim LR 236.............................................................................................. 7.17 R v Central Criminal Court, ex p Bright [2001] 2 All ER 244, [2001] 1 WLR 662, DC........ 4.181, 4.261 R v Central Criminal Court, ex p Francis & Francis (a firm) [1989] AC 346, [1988] 3 WLR 989, 88 Cr App Rep 213, [1989] Crim LR 444, 132 SJ 1592, [1989] 1 LS Gaz R 37, [1988] NLJR 316, sub nom Francis & Francis (a firm) v Central Criminal Court [1988] 3 All ER 775, HL.......................................................................................................4.276, 11.103 R v Central Independent Television plc [1994] Fam 192, [1994] 3 All ER 641, [1994] 3 WLR 20, [1995] 1 FCR 521, [1994] 2 FLR 151, [1994] Fam Law 500, CA..........................4.343, 11.7 R v Chapman (Scott Derek) [2015] EWCA Crim 539, [2015] QB 883, [2015] 3 WLR 726, [2016] 1 All ER 1065, [2015] 3 WLUK 799, [2015] 2 Cr App R 10, [2015] Crim LR 633...................................................................................................................................... 4.274 R v Chaylor (D) etc [2010] EWCA Crim 1910, [2010] UKSC 52.......................................... 1.105 R v Chayter [2010] UKSC 52, [2011] 1 AC 684, [2010] 3 WLR 1707...................... 1.41, 1.162, 2.90, 4.274, 7.16 R v Chelsea College of Art & Design, ex p Nash [2000] Ed CR 571...................................... 10.138 R v Chesterfield Justices, ex p Bramley [2000] QB 576, [2000] 1 All ER 411, [2000] 2 WLR 409, [2000] 1 Cr App Rep 486, [2000] Crim LR 385....................................................... 11.103 R v Chief Constable of North Wales Police, ex p Thorpe [1999] QB 396, [1998] 2 FLR 571, [1998] Fam Law 529, sub nom R v Chief Constable of North Wales Police, ex p AB [1998] 3 All ER 310, [1998] 3 WLR 57, [1998] 3 FCR 371, [1998] 17 LS Gaz R 29, CA.....................................................................................................................1.274, 2.273, 4.326 R v Chief Constable of Sussex, ex p International Trader’s Ferry Ltd [1998] QB 477, [1997] 2 All ER 65, [1997] 3 WLR 132, [1997] 2 CMLR 164, CA, affd [1999] 2 AC 418, [1999] 1 All ER 129, [1998] 3 WLR 1260, [1999] 1 CMLR 1320, [1998] 47 LS Gaz R 29, 142 SJ LB 286, HL................................................................................................................... 11.55 R v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police, ex p Wiley [1995] 1 AC 274, [1994] 3 All ER 420, [1994] 3 WLR 433, [1995] 1 Cr App Rep 342, 159 LG Rev 181, [1994] 40 LS Gaz R 35, [1994] NLJR 1008, 138 SJ LB 156, HL......................................... 1.139, 1.140, 4.4, 11.63, 11.65, 11.66, 11.73 R v Chief Constables of C & D, ex p A [2000] All ER (D) 1524............................................. 1.274 R v City of Birmingham District Council, ex p O [1982] 2 All ER 356, [1982] 1 WLR 679, 80 LGR 680, 126 SJ 329, CA, revsd sub nom Birmingham City District Council v O [1983] 1 AC 578, [1983] 1 All ER 497, [1983] 2 WLR 189, 81 LGR 259, 127 SJ 105, HL........................................................................................................  7.67, 7.68, 7.73, 7.89, 7.97 R v City of London Corpn, ex p Matson [1997] 1 WLR 765, CA........................................... 10.161 R v Civil Service Appeal Board, ex p Cunningham [1991] 4 All ER 310, [1992] ICR 816, [1991] IRLR 297, [1991] NLJR 455, CA.......................................................................... 10.155 R v Clerk to Lancashire Police Committee, ex p Hook see R v Lancashire County Council Police Authority, ex p Hook R v Commission for Racial Equality, ex p Cottrell & Rothon [1980] 3 All ER 265, [1980] 1 WLR 1580, [1980] IRLR 279, 124 SJ 882, 255 Estates Gazette 783............................... 10.148 R v Comr for Local Administration, ex p Croydon London Borough Council [1989] 1 All ER 1033, sub nom R v Local Ombudsman, ex p London Borough of Croydon [1989] Fam Law 187, [1989] COD 226................................................................................. 4.134, 10.53 R v Commissioner for Local Administration ex p Field [2000] COD 58................................ 10.53 R v Cornwall County Council, ex p Nicholls [1989] COD 507.............................................. 8.45

Table of cases   xcix R v Coulson (Andrew) [2013] EWCA Crim 1026, [2014] 1 WLR 1119, [2013] 4 All ER 999, [2013] 6 WLUK 847, [2013] 2 Cr App R 32, (2013) 177 JP 513, [2013] 3 CMLR 51.... 4.208 R v Cox & Railton (1884) 14 QBD 153, [1881–5] All ER Rep 68, 54 LJMC 41, 49 JP 374, 15 Cox CC 611, 33 WR 396, 52 LT 25, 1 TLR 181, CCR...................................... 4.276, 11.104 R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex p Moore [1999] 2 All ER 90, affd (The Times, 14 May 1999)............................................................................................... 10.132, 10.157 R v Crisp & Homewood (1919) 83 JP 121, CCA..................................................................... 4.271 R v Crown Court at Aylesbury, ex p Chahal [1976] RTR 489, [1976] Crim LR 635.............. 10.169 R v Crown Court at Middlesex Guildhall, ex p Tamosius & Partners (a firm) [2000] 1 WLR 453, [2000] Crim LR 390, sub nom R v IRC, ex p Tamosius & Partners (a firm) [1999] STC 1077, [1999] 45 LS Gaz R 34, 143 SJ LB 279.......................................................... 11.106 R v Crozier (1990) 8 BMLR 128, 12 Cr App Rep (S) 206, [1991] Crim LR 138, CA...... 4.323, 11.69 R v Dairy Produce Quota Tribunal for England & Wales, ex p Caswell [1989] 3 All ER 205, [1989] 1 WLR 1089, [1989] NLJR 901, CA, affd sub nom Caswell v Dairy Produce Quota Tribunal for England & Wales [1990] 2 AC 738, [1990] 2 All ER 434, [1990] 2 WLR 1320, [1990] 25 LS Gaz R 36, [1990] NLJR 742, HL........................................... 10.172 R v Davis [1993] 2 All ER 643, [1993] 1 WLR 613, 97 Cr App Rep 110, [1993] 10 LS Gaz R 35, [1993] NLJR 330, 137 SJ LB 19, CA....................................................................... 11.77 R v Davis [2008] UKHL 36...................................................................................................... 10.120 R v Department of Health, ex p Gandhi [1991] 4 All ER 547, [1991] 1 WLR 1053, [1991] ICR 805, [1991] IRLR 431, DC........................................................................................ 10.119 R v Department of Health, ex p Source Informatics Ltd [2000] 1 All ER 786, [2000] 2 WLR 940, 52 BMLR 65, [2000] Lloyd’s Rep Med 76, CA..................................................  2.196, 4.315 R v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison, ex p Hague [1992] 1 AC 58, [1990] 3 WLR 1210, on appeal [1992] 1 AC 58, [1990] 3 All ER 687, [1990] 3 WLR 1210, [1990] NLJR 1036, CA, affd [1992] 1 AC 58, [1991] 3 WLR 340, 135 SJ LB 102, sub nom Hague v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison [1991] 3 All ER 733, HL.................................... 10.157 R v Deputy Industrial Injuries Comr, ex p Moore [1965] 1 QB 456, [1965] 1 All ER 81, [1968] 2 WLR 89, 108 SJ 1030, CA.................................................................................. 10.157 R v Derby Magistrates’ Court, ex p B [1995] 4 All ER 536 (HL)............................................ 1.209 R v Devon County Council, ex p Baker (The Times, 20 October 1992), on appeal [1995] 1 All ER 73, 91 LGR 479, 11 BMLR 141, CA.................................................................... 10.123 R v Director of Government Communications Headquarters, ex p Hodges [1988] COD 123...................................................................................................................................... 10.127 R v DPP, ex p Hallas (1987) 87 Cr App Rep 340, [1988] Crim LR 316, DC.......................... 11.67 R v DPP, ex p Lee [1999] 2 All ER 737, [1999] 1 WLR 1950, [1999] 2 Cr App Rep 304, 163 JP 569................................................................................................................................. 11.79 R v DPP, ex p Manning [2000] 3 WLR 463............................................................................. 10.152 R v Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex p Massingberd-Mundy [1993] 2 All ER 207, [1990] COD 260, [1990] 2 Admin LR 260............................................................... 10.130 R v District Auditor Chelmsford, ex p Judge (The Times, 26 December 1988)...............  9.17, 12.29 R v Dublin Corpn [1911] 2 IR 245........................................................................................... 8.37 R v Durham County Council, ex p Huddleston [2000] 1 WLR 1484, [2000] 2 CMLR 313, [2000] 13 LS Gaz R 43, 144 SJ LB 149, CA.............................................................9.145, 10.155 R v E [2004] EWCA Crim 1243............................................................................................... 4.208 R v Eden District Council, ex p Moffat (unreported, 15 April 1987); on appeal (The Times, 24 November 1988)................................................................................... 7.70, 7.82, 8.13, 10.130 R v Educational Services Committee of Bradford City Metropolitan Council, ex p Professional Association of Teachers (1986) Independent, 16 December........................ 8.37 R v Ethical Committee of St Mary’s Hospital (Manchester), ex p H (or Harriott) [1988] 1 FLR 512, [1988] Fam Law 165, [1987] NLJ Rep 1038.................................................... 10.130 R v F [2016] EWCA Crim 12, [2016] 2 WLUK 323, [2016] 2 Cr App R 13, [2016] Crim LR 775...................................................................................................................................... 11.4 R v Falmouth & Truro Port Health Authority, ex p South West Water Services [2000] 3 All ER 306, [2000] 3 WLR 1464, CA.................................................................  1.265, 10.52, 10.124 R v Field (2002) 2 December, CA............................................................................................. 2.274 R v Financial Intermediaries, Managers & Brokers Regulatory Association, ex p Cochrane [1991] BCLC 106, [1990] COD 33................................................................................... 10.130 R v Flintshire County Council, ex p Armstrong-Braun (The Times, 8 March 2001)............. 8.37 R v Football Association Ltd, ex p Football League Ltd [1993] 2 All ER 833, [1992] COD 52... 10.130 R v Fraternity of Hostmen in Newcastle-upon-Tyne (1745) 2 Stra 1223............................... 7.67 R v G [2004] EWCA Crim 1368, [2004] 1 WLR 2932, [2004] 2 Cr App Rep 630, [2004] 25 LS Gaz R 27....................................................................................................................... 11.79

c  Table of cases R v G (PII: Counsel’s duty) ...................................................................................................... 11.77 R v G [2009] UKHL 13............................................................................................................ 12.1 R v Galvin [1987] QB 862, [1987] 2 All ER 851, [1987] 3 WLR 93, 86 Cr App Rep 85, [1987] Crim LR 700, 131 SJ 657, [1987] LS Gaz R 1651, CA............................................. 4.256, 4.271 R v Gaming Board for Great Britain, ex p Benaim & Khaida [1970] 2 QB 417, [1970] 2 All ER 528, [1970] 2 WLR 1009, 134 JP 513, 114 SJ 266, CA...................................  10.127, 10.139 R v Gateshead Metropolitan Borough Council, ex p Nichol see Nichol v Gateshead Metropolitan Borough Council R v General Council of the Bar, ex p Percival [1991] 1 QB 212, [1990] 3 All ER 137, [1990] 3 WLR 323, [1990] 24 LS Gaz R 44................................................................................. 10.130 R v General Medical Council, ex p Toth [2000] 1 WLR 2209......................................  10.110, 10.130 R v Goulden (unreported, 1992)............................................................................................... 2.356 R v Governor & Co of Bank of England [1891] 1 QB 785, 60 LJQB 497, 55 JP 695, 39 WR 558, 64 LT 468, 7 TLR 421, DC....................................................................................... 7.67 R v Governor of Brixton Prison, ex p Osman [1992] 1 All ER 108, [1991] 1 WLR 281, 93 Cr App Rep 202, [1991] Crim LR 533...................................................................... 11.77, 11.108 R v Governor of Maidstone Prison, ex p Peries [1998] COD 150..................................10.157, 11.55 R v Governor of Pentonville Prison, ex p Osman [1989] 3 All ER 701, [1990] 1 WLR 277, 90 Cr App Rep 281, [1988] Crim LR 611, 134 SJ 458..................................................... 11.108 R v Governor of Swaleside Prison, ex p Wynter (The Times, 2 June 1998)........................... 10.147 R v Gray, Raphael (unreported, 2001)...................................................................................... 2.356 R v Great Yarmouth Borough Council, ex p Botton Bros Arcades Ltd (1987) 56 P & CR 99, [1988] JPL 18..................................................................................................................... 10.125 R v Greenwich London Borough Council, ex p Lovelace [1990] 1 All ER 353, [1990] 1 WLR 18, 88 LGR 604, [1989] NLJR 935, affd [1991] 3 All ER 511, [1991] 1 WLR 506, 89 LGR 549, 135 SJ 184, CA............................................................................................ 7.55 R v Guildhall Magistrates’ Court, ex p Primlaks Holdings Co (Panama) Inc [1990] 1 QB 261, [1989] 2 WLR 841, 89 Cr App Rep 215, [1989] Crim LR 448, 133 SJ 628............. 11.103 R v H [2004] 1 All ER 1269, HL.............................................................................................. 11.80 R v HM Treasury, ex p Smedley [1985] QB 657, [1985] 1 All ER 589, [1985] 2 WLR 576, [1985] 1 CMLR 665, 129 SJ 48, CA............................................................................ 1.39, 12.29 R v Hackney London Borough Council, ex p Gamper [1985] 3 All ER 275, [1985] 1 WLR 1229, 83 LGR 359, 128 SJ 874............................................................  7.68, 7.69, 7.71, 7.72, 7.75 R v Hampshire County Council, ex p H [1999] 3 FCR 129, [1999] 2 FLR 359, [1999] Fam Law 537, [1998] 29 LS Gaz R 27, 142 SJ LB 188, CA..................................................... 2.335 R v Hampshire County Council, ex p K [1990] 2 QB 71, [1990] 2 All ER 129, [1990] 2 WLR 649, [1990] FCR 545, [1990] 1 FLR 330, [1990] Fam Law 253, 88 LGR 618................ 10.138 R v Hampstead Borough Council, ex p Woodward (1917) 81 JP 65, 15 LGR 309, 116 LT 213, 33 TLR 157................................................................................................................ 7.67 R v Hardy, B (31/10/02) CD, CA.............................................................................................. 4.200 R v Harrow London Borough Council, ex p D [1990] Fam 133, [1990] 3 All ER 12, [1989] 3 WLR 1239, [1989] FCR 729, [1990] 1 FLR 79, [1990] Fam Law 18, 88 LGR 41, 133 SJ 1513, [1989] NLJR 1153, CA..............................................................................  2.335, 10.123 R v Head Teacher & Independent Appeal Committee of Dunraven School, ex p B [2000] ELR 156, [2000] 04 LS Gaz R 32, 144 SJ LB 51, CA...................................................... 10.131 R v Hereford Corpn, ex p Harrower [1970] 3 All ER 460, [1970] 1 WLR 1424, 134 JP 665, 69 LGR 28, 114 SJ 705...............................................................................................  7.102, 9.151 R v Herefordshire Justices (1820) 3 B & Ald 581.................................................................. 7.54, 8.37 R v Higher Education Funding Council, ex p Institute of Dental Surgery [1994] 1 All ER 651, [1994] 1 WLR 242..................................................................................................... 10.155 R v Howell [2003] EWCA Crim 486....................................................................................... 1.155 R v Hull Prison Board of Visitors, ex p St Germain (No 2) [1979] 3 All ER 545, [1979] 1 WLR 1401, [1979] Crim LR 726, 123 SJ 768.................................................................. 10.132 R v Hyndburn Borough Council, ex p Strak (unreported, 17 December 1985)...................... 7.80 R v ILEA, ex p Brunyate [1989] 1 Admin LR 22, revsd sub nom Brunyate v ILEA [1989] 2 All ER 417, 87 LGR 725, 133 SJ 749, [1989] 1 Admin LR 65, sub nom ILEA v Brunyate [1989] 1 WLR 542, sub nom R v ILEA, ex p Brunyate [1989] COD 435, HL................. 7.60 R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex p Hussain (The Times, 9 October 1989)..................... 10.117 R v Independent, ex p DPP (1988) Guardian, 1 April.............................................................. 11.15 R v Independent Television Commission, ex p Virgin Television Ltd [1996] EMLR 318...... 11.55 R v Inland Revenue Board, ex p Goldberg [1989] QB 267, [1988] 3 All ER 248, [1988] 3 WLR 522, [1988] STC 524, 132 SJ 1035, [1988] 27 LS Gaz R 40, [1988] NLJR 125, sub nom R v IRC, ex p Goldberg 61 TC 403..................................................................... 11.95

Table of cases   ci R v IRC, ex p Banque Internationale à Luxembourg SA [2000] STC 708.............................. 11.106 R v IRC, ex p Davis Frankel & Mead (a firm) [2000] STC 595............................................... 11.106 R v IRC, ex p Goldberg see R v Inland Revenue Board, ex p Goldberg R v IRC, ex p MFK Underwriting Agents Ltd see R v Board of Inland Revenue, ex p MFK Underwriting Agencies Ltd R v IRC, ex p Tamosius & Partners (a firm) see R v Crown Court at Middlesex Guildhall, ex p Tamosius & Partners (a firm) R v IRC, ex p Taylor [1989] 1 All ER 906, [1988] STC 832, 62 TC 562, CA......................... 11.55 R v IRC, ex p Taylor (No 2) [1989] 3 All ER 353, [1989] STC 600, 62 TC 578, affd [1990] 2 All ER 409, [1990] STC 379, 62 TC 578, CA............................................................... 11.106 R v IRC, ex p Unilever plc [1996] STC 681, 68 TC 205, CA.................................................. 10.123 R v Inner London Education Authority, ex p F [1988] COD 100........................................... 8.45 R v Insurance Ombudsman Bureau, ex p Aegon Life Assurance Ltd [1994] COD 426, [1994] CLC 88.............................................................................................................................. 10.130 R v Islington London Borough Council, ex p Trail [1994] 2 FCR 1261................................. 10.157 R v Jockey Club, ex p RAM Racecourses Ltd [1993] 2 All ER 225, [1990] COD 346, [1991] 5 Admin LR 265................................................................................................................ 10.130 R v Johnson [1989] 1 All ER 121, [1988] 1 WLR 1377, 88 Cr App Rep 131, [1988] Crim LR 831, 132 SJ 1430, CA......................................................................................................... 11.67 R v K [2008] EWCA Crim 185, [2008] QB 827, [2008] 2 WLR 1026.................................... 4.370 R v Keane [1994] 2 All ER 478, [1994] 1 WLR 746, 99 Cr App Rep 1, [1995] Crim LR 225, 138 SJ LB 76, CA............................................................................................................... 11.77 R v Kelly (Lee Paul) [2018] EWCA Crim 1893, [2018] 7 WLUK 47..................................... 11.80 R v Kensington & Chelsea London Borough Council, ex p Stoop [1992] 1 PLR 58............. 10.140 R v Keogh [2007] EWCA Crim 528, [2007] 1 WLR 1500, [2007] 3 All ER 789................... 4.185 R v Khan (Sultan) [1997] AC 558, [1996] 3 All ER 289, [1996] 3 WLR 162, [1996] Crim LR 733, [1996] 28 LS Gaz R 29, [1996] NLJR 1024, 140 SJ LB 166, sub nom R v Khan [1996] 2 Cr App Rep 440, HL.................................................................................... 2.218, 4.208 R v LBC Hillingdon, ex p Puhlhofer [1986] AC 484, [1986] 2 WLR 259, [1986] 1 All ER 467, [1986] 2 WLUK 64, [1986] 1 FLR 22, (1986) 18 HLR 158, [1986] Fam Law 218, (1986) 83 LSG 785, (1986) 136 NLJ 140, (1986) 130 SJ 143................................... 10.88, 10.137 R v Lambeth London Borough Council, ex p Boston (unreported, 25 April 1986)................ 8.48 R v Lancashire County Council, ex p Huddleston [1986] 2 All ER 941, [1986] NLJ Rep 562, CA...............................................................................................................  4.4, 4.5, 10.155, 11.55 R v Lancashire County Council Police Authority, ex p Hook [1980] QB 603, [1980] 3 WLR 70, 78 LGR 397, 124 SJ 310, sub nom R v Clerk to Lancashire Police Committee, ex p Hook [1980] 2 All ER 353, CA....................................................................................... 7.67, 7.68 R v Lewisham London Borough Council, ex p P [1991] 3 All ER 529, [1991] 1 WLR 308, [1991] FCR 684, [1991] 2 FLR 185, [1991] Fam Law 316, 89 LGR 610........................ 2.335 R v Lindley [1957] Crim LR 321.............................................................................................. 7.17 R v Liverpool City Council, ex p Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators’ Association [1975] 1 All ER 379, [1975] 1 WLR 701, 139 JP 171, 73 LGR 143, 119 SJ 166...................... 8.28, 8.47, 8.80 R v Liverpool Corpn, ex p Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators’ Association [1972] 2 QB 299, [1972] 2 WLR 1262, 71 LGR 387, 116 SJ 201, sub nom Re Liverpool Taxi Owners’ Association [1972] 2 All ER 589, CA............................................................  9.80, 10.119, 10.125 R v Local Authority & Police Authority in the Midlands ex p LM [2000] 1 FLR 612....  2.274, 2.291 R v Local Comr for Administration in North & North East England, ex p Liverpool City Council [1999] 3 All ER 85, 79 P & CR 473, [1999] JPL 844, [1999] COD 384, affd [2001] 1 All ER 462, [2000] LGR 571, CA........................................................4.134, 7.22, 10.54 R v Local Ombudsman, ex p London Borough of Croydon see R v Comr for Local Administration, ex p Croydon London Borough Council R v London Borough of Enfield, ex p T F Unwin (Roydon) Ltd (1989) 46 BLR 1, 153 LG Rev 890, [1989] COD 466, 1 Admin LR 50............................................................. 9.149, 10.158 R v London Borough of Islington, ex p Building Employers’ Confederation [1989] IRLR 382, 45 BLR 45.................................................................................................................. 9.149 R v London Regional Passengers Committee, ex p Brent London Borough Council (Financial Times, 29 November 1985).............................................................................. 10.149 R v Lord Saville of Newdigate, ex p A [1999] 4 All ER 860, [2000] 1 WLR 1855, [1999] NLJR 1201, CA...................................................................................................  4.5, 10.120, 11.4 R v McDonald (The Times, 8 November 2004)...................................................................... 11.77 R v Malvern Justices, ex p Evans [1988] QB 540, [1988] 1 All ER 371, [1988] 2 WLR 218, 152 JP 74, 87 Cr App Rep 19, [1988] Crim LR 120, 131 SJ 1698, [1988] 2 LS Gaz R 36, [1987] NLJ Rep 757.......................................................................................................... 11.15

cii  Table of cases R v Manchester Metropolitan University, ex p Nolan [1994] ELR 380, DC.......................... 10.119 R v Mental Health Review Tribunal, ex p Pickering [1986] 1 All ER 99................................. 10.161 R v Merchant Tailors’ Co (1831) 2 B & Ad 115, 9 LJOSKB 146............................................ 7.67 R v Metropolitan Police Comr, ex p Hart-Leverton (The Times, 8 February 1990)............. 11.66 R v Mid Glamorgan Family Health Services Authority, ex p Martin [1995] 1 All ER 356, [1995] 1 WLR 110, [1995] 2 FCR 578, [1995] 1 FLR 283, [1994] 5 Med LR 383, 21 BMLR 1, [1994] 38 LS Gaz R 42, 138 SJ LB 195, CA.................................................. 2.194, 4.5 R v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food, ex p Fisher (t/a T R & P Fisher ) (Case C-369/98) (The Times, 10 October 2000)........................................................................ 1.267 R v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food, ex p Hamble (Offshore) Fisheries Ltd [1995] 2 All ER 714, [1995] 1 CMLR 533................................................................................... 10.124 R v Ministry of Defence, ex p Murray [1998] COD 134..............................................  10.153, 10.154 R v Ministry of Defence, ex p Smith [1996] QB 517, [1996] 1 All ER 257, [1996] 2 WLR 305, [1996] ICR 740, [1996] IRLR 100, [1995] NLJR 1689, CA............................. 1.124, 10.164 R v Monmouthshire County Council, ex p Smith (1935) 99 JP 246, 33 LGR 279, 79 SJ 383, 153 LT 338, 51 TLR 435, DC........................................................................................... 9.11 R v Monopolies & Mergers Commission, ex p Air Europe (1988) 4 BCC 182...................... 10.130 R v Monopolies & Mergers Commission, ex p Elders IXL Ltd [1987] 1 All ER 451, [1987] 1 WLR 1221, 2 BCC 99179, 131 SJ 1120, [1987] LS Gaz R 2764..........................1.274, 10.130 R v Monopolies & Mergers Commission, ex p Matthew Brown plc [1987] 1 All ER 463, [1987] 1 WLR 1235, 4 BCC 171, 131 SJ 1120, [1987] LS Gaz R 2606................... 1.274, 10.130 R v Muhammed (Sultan) [2010] EWCA Crim 227, [2010] 3 All ER 759............................... 12.1 R v Newham London Borough Council, ex p Haggerty (1986) 85 LGR 48.......................... 7.22 R v Norfolk County Council Social Services Department, ex p M [1989] QB 619, [1989] 2 All ER 359, [1989] 3 WLR 502, [1989] FCR 667, [1989] Fam Law 310, 87 LGR 598, [1989] NLJR 293, sub nom R v Norfolk County Council, ex p X [1989] 2 FLR 120...... 2.335 R v North & East Devon Health Authority, ex p Coughlan (Secretary of State for Health intervening) [2000] 3 All ER 850, [2000] 2 WLR 622, 97 LGR 703, 51 BMLR 1, [1999] Lloyd’s Rep Med 306, [1999] 31 LS Gaz R 39, 143 SJ LB 213, 2 CCL Rep 285, CA.... 10.124 R v North Hertfordshire District Council, ex p Cobbold [1985] 3 All ER 486...................... 10.173 R v Northants CC ex p Marshall [1998] COD 457................................................................. 10.161 R v Norwich City Council, ex p Sheptonhurst Ltd see R v Birmingham City Council, ex p Sheptonhurst Ltd R v Nottingham City Council, ex p Costello [1989] Fam Law 469, 21 HLR 301............ 8.32, 10.155 R v P [2001] 2 All ER 58, [2001] 2 WLR 463, 145 SJ LB 28, HL........................................... 4.205 R v P Borough Council, ex p S [1999] Fam 188, [1999] 2 WLR 777...................................... 10.130 R v Panel of the Federation of Communication Services Ltd, ex p Kubis [1998] COD 5..... 10.130 R v Panel on Take-overs & Mergers, ex p Datafin plc [1987] QB 815, [1987] 1 All ER 564, [1987] 2 WLR 699, [1987] BCLC 104, 3 BCC 10, 131 SJ 23, [1987] LS Gaz R 264, [1986] NLJ Rep 1207, CA........................................................................................... 1.86, 10.130 R v Panel on Take-overs & Mergers, ex p Guinness plc [1990] 1 QB 146, [1989] 1 All ER 509, [1989] 2 WLR 863, [1989] BCLC 255, 4 BCC 714, 133 SJ 660, [1988] NLJR 244, CA... 10.130 R v Parliamentary Comr for Administration, ex p Balchin [1996] NPC 147, [1997] COD 146, [1996] EGCS 166, [1997] JPL 917............................................................  4.12, 4.134, 10.53 R v Parliamentary Comr for Administration, ex p Balchin (No 2) (2000) 2 LGLR 87......4.12, 4.134, 10.53 R v Parliamentary Comr for Administration, ex p Dyer [1994] 1 All ER 375, [1994] 1 WLR 621, [1994] 3 LS Gaz R 47, 137 SJ LB 259..........................................  4.12, 4.134, 4.140, 10.140 R v Parliamentary Comr for Standards, ex p Al Fayed [1998] 1 All ER 93, [1998] 1 WLR 669, [1997] 42 LS Gaz R 31, CA....................................................................................... 7.9 R v Parole Board, ex p Bradley [1990] 3 All ER 828, [1991] 1 WLR 134, [1990] COD 375.. 10.157 R v Parrott (1913) 8 Cr App Rep 186, CCA............................................................................. 4.158 R v Pawsey [1989] Crim LR 152............................................................................................... 11.67 R v Pile (unreported, 1995)....................................................................................................... 2.356 R v Ponting [1985] Crim LR 318........................................................................... 4.165, 4.176, 4.251 R v Port Talbot Borough Council, ex p Jones [1988] 2 All ER 207, 20 HLR 265.................. 7.57 R v Portsmouth City Council, ex p Gregory (1990) 89 LGR 478, DC................................... 7.55 R v Preston [1994] 2 AC 130, [1993] 4 All ER 638, [1993] 3 WLR 891, 98 Cr App Rep 405, [1994] Crim LR 676, [1994] 3 LS Gaz R 46, [1993] NLJR 1601, 137 SJ LB 256, HL... 4.205 R v Registrar General, ex p Smith [1990] 2 QB 253, [1990] 2 All ER 170, [1990] 2 WLR 980, [1990] FCR 561, [1990] 2 FLR 79, [1990] Fam Law 218, 134 SJ 933, [1990] 14 LS Gaz R 43, affd [1991] 2 QB 393, [1991] 2 All ER 88, [1991] 2 WLR 782, [1991] FCR 403, [1991] 1 FLR 255, 135 SJ 52, CA................................................................................ 1.295, 4.323

Table of cases   ciii R v Richmond upon Thames London Borough Council, ex p McCarthy & Stone (Developments) Ltd [1992] 2 AC 48, [1990] 2 All ER 852, [1990] 2 WLR 1294, 60 P & CR 174, [1990] 27 LS Gaz R 41, [1990] NLJR 362, CA, revsd sub nom McCarthy & Stone (Developments) Ltd v Richmond upon Thames London Borough Council [1992] 2 AC 48, [1991] 4 All ER 897, [1991] 3 WLR 941, 90 LGR 1, 63 P & CR 234, [1992] 3 LS Gaz R 33, [1992] JPL 467, 135 SJ LB 206, HL............................................ 9.143 R v Rimmington (Anthony), R v Goldstein [2005] UKHL 63, [2006] 1 AC 459, [2005] 3 WLR 982, [2006] 2 All ER 257, [2005] 10 WLUK 787, [2006] 1 Cr App R 17, [2006] HRLR 3, [2006] UKHRR 1, [2006] LLR 105, [2006] Crim LR 153, (2005) 102(43) LSG 28, (2005) 155 NLJ 1685, [2006] Env LR D3.......................................................... 7.17 R v Robinson (The Times, 13 November 2003)...................................................................... 4.212 R v Rushmoor Borough Council, ex p Crawford (The Times, 28 November 1981).............. 7.55 R v S [2008] EWCA Crim 2177, [2009] 1 WLR 1489, [2009] 1 All ER 716.......................... 4.216 R v St Edmundsbury Borough Council, ex p Investors in Industry Commercial Properties Ltd [1985] 3 All ER 234, [1985] 1 WLR 1157, 51 P & CR 251, 129 SJ 623, [1985] LS Gaz R 2741, [1986] JPL 38................................................................................................ 9.80 R v Sargent [2002] 1 All ER 161, HL....................................................................................... 4.205 R v Sarker (Sudip) [2018] EWCA Crim 1341, [2018] 1 WLR 6023, [2018] 4 All ER 694, [2018] 6 WLUK 230, [2019] 1 Cr App R 3, [2018] EMLR 23, [2018] Crim LR 843..... 11.4 R v Schifreen [1988] AC 1063, [1988] 2 All ER 186, [1988] 2 WLR 984, 152 JP 445, 87 Cr App Rep 257, [1988] Crim LR 437, 132 SJ 624, [1988] NLJR 117, HL......................... 2.355 R v Secretary of State for Defence, ex p Sancto [1993] COD 144, 5 Admin LR 673............. 11.55 R v Secretary of State for Education, ex p J [1993] COD 146................................................. 11.55 R v Secretary of State for Education & Science, ex p G (The Times, 7 July 1989)................ 11.54 R v Secretary of State for Employment, ex p Seymour-Smith (No 2) [2000] 1 WLR 435, [2000] 1 All ER 857, [2000] 2 WLUK 677, [2000] 1 CMLR 770, [2000] HCR 244, [2000] HRLR 263, (2000) 97(9) LSG 40.......................................................................... 2.84 R v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ex p World Development Movement Ltd [1995] 1 All ER 611, [1995] 1 WLR 386, [1995] NLJR 51................................................... 11.55, 12.23 R v Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, ex p Council of Civil Service Unions [1984] IRLR 309, on appeal [1984] IRLR 353, CA, affd sub nom Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, [1984] 3 All ER 935, [1984] 3 WLR 1174, [1985] ICR 14, 128 SJ 837, [1985] LS Gaz R 437, sub nom R v Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, ex p Council of Civil Service Unions [1985] IRLR 28, HL..........................................................  10.117, 10.127, 10.139, 11.60 R v Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, ex p Everett [1989] QB 811, [1989] 1 All ER 655, [1989] 2 WLR 224, [1989] Imm AR 155, 133 SJ 151, [1989] 8 LS Gaz R 43, CA.......................................................................................................... 10.130, 10.157 R v Secretary of State for Health, ex p C [2000] 1 FCR 471, [2000] 1 FLR 627, [2000] Fam Law 311, [2000] 10 LS Gaz R 35, 114 SJ LB 118, CA..................................................... 2.335 R v Secretary of State for Health, ex p Imperial Tobacco Ltd [2001] 1 All ER 850, [2001] 1 WLR 127, HL................................................................................................................... 11.136 R v Secretary of State for Health, ex p US Tobacco International Inc [1992] QB 353, [1991] 3 WLR 529, [1992] 1 All ER 212............................................................................10.119, 10.138 R v Secretary of State for Health, ex p Keen [1990] 1 Med LR 455........................................ 12.29 R v Secretary of State for Health, ex p United States Tobacco International Inc [1992] QB 353, [1992] 1 All ER 212, [1991] 3 WLR 529...................................................... 10.119, 10.138 R (Wagstaff) v Secretary of State for Health [2001] 1 WLR 292, sub nom R v Secretary of State for Health, ex p Wagstaff 56 BMLR 199, [2000] 37 LS Gaz R 39, 144 SJ LB 249, DC....................................................................................................................  4.5, 10.174, 10.175 R v Secretary of State for Social Services, ex p Association of Metropolitan Authorities [1986] 1 All ER 164, [1986] 1 WLR 1, 83 LGR 796, 130 SJ 35............................  10.167, 10.168 R v Secretary of State for Social Services, ex p Connolly [1986] 1 All ER 998, [1986] 1 WLR 421, 130 SJ 205, [1986] LS Gaz R 786, CA...................................................................... 10.157 R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p Brent London Borough Council [1982] QB 593, [1983] 3 All ER 321, [1982] 2 WLR 693, 80 LGR 357, [1981] RVR 279, 126 SJ 118................................................................................................................................. 10.117 R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p Greater London Council [1986] JPL 32... 9.130 R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p Greenwich London Borough Council [1989] COD 530...................................................................................................4.4, 4.111, 12.29 R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p Hackney London Borough Council [1983] 3 All ER 358, [1983] 1 WLR 524, 81 LGR 688, 127 SJ 224, affd [1984] 1 All ER 956, [1984] 1 WLR 592, 128 SJ 280, CA.................................................................................. 10.157

civ  Table of cases R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p Hammersmith & Fulham London Borough Council [1991] 1 AC 521, [1990] 3 WLR 898, 89 LGR 129, [1990] RVR 188, sub nom Hammersmith & Fulham London Borough Council v Secretary of State for the Environment [1990] 3 All ER 589, CA, affd sub nom R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p Hammersmith & Fulham London Borough Council [1991] 1 AC 521, [1990] 3 WLR 898, 89 LGR 129, [1990] NLJR 1422, [1990] RVR 188, sub nom Hammersmith & Fulham London Borough Council v Secretary of State for the Environment [1990] 3 All ER 589, 134 SJ 1226, HL............................  6.65, 8.47, 10.169, 12.24 R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p Hillingdon London Borough Council [1986] 1 All ER 810, [1986] 1 WLR 192, 84 LGR 628, 52 P & CR 409, [1987] RVR 6, [1986] JPL 363, 130 SJ 89, [1986] LS Gaz R 525, [1986] NLJ Rep 16, affd [1986] 2 All ER 273n, [1986] 1 WLR 807n, 84 LGR 628, 55 P & CR 241n, [1987] RVR 6, [1987] JPL 717, 130 SJ 481, [1986] LS Gaz R 2331, CA..................................................7.57, 8.12, 8.39 R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p Islington London Borough Council [1991] NPC 90, [1992] COD 67, CA........................................................................................... 11.55 R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p London Borough of Southwark (1987) 54 P & CR 226, [1987] JPL 587............................................................................................. 10.127 R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p Merton London Borough Council [1990] RVR 116, affd [1991] RVR 78, CA.................................................................................... 11.55 R v Secretary of State for the Environment ex p Rochford DC [2000] 3 All ER 1018........... 9.143 R v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport & the Regions, ex p Alliance against Birmingham Northern Relief Road [1999] JPL 231, [1999] Env LR 447, [1998] EGCS 146.4.315 R v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport & the Regions ex parte Spath Holme Ltd [2001] 2 AC 349.......................................................................................................... 1.29 R v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport & the Regions & Parcelforce, ex p Marson [1999] 1 CMLR 268, 77 P & CR 202, [1998] Env LR 761, CA......................... 10.157 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Abdi see Abdi v Secretary of State for the Home Department R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Al Fayed [1998] 1 WLR 763, [1997] 1 All ER 228, [1997] INLR 137............................................................................... 4.233, 10.156 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Allen (unreported, 12 November 1999,).................................................................................................................................. 10.123 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p BH [1990] COD 445........................ 11.55 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Benson [1989] COD 329................. 11.55 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Briggs, Green & Hargreaves [1997] 1 All ER 397, [1997] 1 WLR 906, [1997] 05 LS Gaz R 33, 141 SJ LB 6, CA.................. 10.124 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Brind [1991] 1 AC 696, [1991] 2 WLR 588, 135 SJ 250, sub nom Brind v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1991] 1 All ER 720, HL......................................................................  4.100, 4.343, 4.346, 4.369 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Chahal [1995] 1 All ER 658, [1995] 1 WLR 526, [1994] Imm AR 107, [1992] COD 214, [1993] 46 LS Gaz R 38, 137 SJ LB 255, CA......................................................................................................... 10.80, 10.127, 10.139 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Cheblak [1991] 2 All ER 319, [1991] 1 WLR 890, CA................................................................................................................. 10.127 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Doody [1994] 1 AC 531, [1993] 3 WLR 154, [1993] NLJR 991, sub nom Doody v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1993] 3 All ER 92, HL......................................................................10.155, 10.157 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Duggan [1994] 3 All ER 277, [1994] COD 258...................................................................................................... 10.139, 10.157, 11.55 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Fayed [1997] 1 All ER 228, [1998] 1 WLR 763, CA............................................................................................................4.233, 10.156 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Fire Brigades Union [1995] 2 AC 513, [1995] 1 All ER 888, [1995] 2 WLR 1, 138 SJ LB 1587, CA, affd [1995] 2 AC 513, [1995] 2 All ER 244, [1995] 2 WLR 464, [1995] NLJR 521, HL.................................... 12.29 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Gaima (1988) Independent, 7 December, CA.................................................................................................................... 10.164 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Gunnell [1984] Crim LR 170, [1983] LS Gaz R 3238, affd [1985] Crim LR 105, [1985] NLJ Rep 357, CA......................10.157, 11.69 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Harrison (1987) Independent, 21 December, CA.................................................................................................................... 11.55 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Harrison [1988] 3 All ER 86............ 10.157 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Harry [1998] 3 All ER 360, [1998] 1 WLR 1737, [1998] 22 LS Gaz R 29.................................................................................. 10.123

Table of cases   cv R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Hickey (No 2) [1995] 1 All ER 490, [1995] 1 WLR 734, [1994] NLJR 1732.................................................................. 10.139, 10.157 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Hindley [2000] 2 All ER 385, [2000] 2 WLR 730, [2000] 15 LS Gaz R 39, 144 SJ LB 180, HL............................................... 10.124 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Javed (The Times, 9 February 2001)................................................................................................................................... 10.127 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Khan [1985] 1 All ER 40, [1984] 1 WLR 1337, [1984] FLR 735, [1984] Fam Law 278, [1984] Imm AR 68, 128 SJ 580, [1984] LS Gaz R 1678, CA......................................................................................... 9.80, 10.125 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Leech [1994] QB 198, [1993] 4 All ER 539, CA............................................................................................................... 2.274, 10.142 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p McAvoy [1998] 1 WLR 790, [1998] 01 LS Gaz R 23, 142 SJ LB 39, CA................................................................................... 10.157 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Northumbria Police Authority [1989] QB 26, [1988] 1 All ER 556, [1988] 2 WLR 590, 132 SJ 125, [1988] 1 LS Gaz R 34, CA......................................................................................................................... 4.222, 4.234 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Oladehinde [1991] 1 AC 254, [1990] 2 All ER 367, [1990] 2 WLR 1195, [1990] NLJR 402, CA, affd [1991] 1 AC 254, [1990] 3 WLR 797, 134 SJ 1264, [1990] 41 LS Gaz R 36, [1990] NLJR 1498, sub nom Oladehinde v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1990] 3 All ER 393, HL.. 4.146, 4.251 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Ruddock [1987] 2 All ER 518, [1987] 1 WLR 1482, 131 SJ 1551, [1987] LS Gaz R 3335...................... 10.119, 10.139, 10.169, 10.170 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, [1999] 3 All ER 400, [1999] 3 WLR 328, [1999] EMLR 689, [1999] 30 LS Gaz R 28, [1999] NLJR 1073, 143 SJ LB 212, HL............................................................... 1.124, 10.142, 10.157, 10.164 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Singh (The Times, 28 March 1988).11.55 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Swati [1986] 1 All ER 717, [1986] 1 WLR 477, [1986] Imm AR 88, 130 SJ 186, [1986] LS Gaz R 780, [1986] NLJ Rep 189, CA...................................................................................................................................... 10.157 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Turgut [2001] 1 All ER 719, [2000] 07 LS Gaz R 40, [2000] NLJR 131, sub nom Turgut v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] Imm AR 306, CA.............................. 10.126, 10.127, 10.131, 10.153, 10.164 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Venables [1998] AC 407, [1997] 3 All ER 97, [1997] 3 WLR 23, [1997] 34 LS Gaz R 27, [1997] NLJR 955, HL........... 10.119, 10.156 R v Secretary of State for Trade & Industry, ex p Lonrho plc (1989) 5 BCC 284, [1989] NLJR 150, CA, affd sub nom Lonrho plc v Secretary of State for Trade & Industry [1989] 2 All ER 609, sub nom R v Secretary of State for Trade & Industry, ex p Lonrho plc [1989] 1 WLR 525, 5 BCC 633, 133 SJ 724, [1989] 26 LS Gaz R 35, [1989] NLJR 717, HL...........................................................................  4.5, 8.47, 10.82, 10.142, 10.154, 10.155 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Cumbria County Council [1983] RTR 129, CA... 10.153 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p de Rothschild [1989] 1 All ER 933, 87 LGR 511, 57 P & CR 330, [1989] 1 EGLR 19, [1988] RVR 200, [1989] 06 EG 123, [1989] JPL 173, CA.............................................................................................................................. 10.162 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame [1990] 2 AC 85, [1989] 2 WLR 997, [1989] 2 All ER 692........................................................................................................... 1.209 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Greater London Council [1986] QB 556, [1985] 3 All ER 300, [1985] 3 WLR 574, [1986] JPL 513, 129 SJ 590 .......................................... 10.173 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Gwent County Council [1986] 2 All ER 18, [1986] 1 WLR 1055, 130 SJ 553, [1986] LS Gaz R 2487, revsd [1988] QB 429, [1987] 1 All ER 161, [1987] 2 WLR 961, [1987] JPL 645, 131 SJ 472, [1987] LS Gaz R 1327, CA......... 9.130, 10.150 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Pegasus Holdings (London) Ltd [1989] 2 All ER 481, [1988] 1 WLR 990, 132 SJ 1182, [1988] 36 LS Gaz R 41, 1 S & B AvR II/1.......... 10.127 R v Secretary of State for Wales, ex p Emery [1996] 4 All ER 1, affd [1998] 4 All ER 367, 96 LGR 83, [1997] LS Gaz R 29, 141 SJ LB 170, CA........................................................... 10.169 R v Secretary of State for Wales, ex p South Glamorgan County Council [1988] COD 104.10.168 R v Security Service Tribunal, ex p Harman & Hewitt (unreported, 14 February 1992), QBD................................................................................................................................... 4.233 R v Sevenoaks District Council, ex p Terry [1985] 3 All ER 226, [1984] JPL 420.................. 9.80 R v Shayler [2002] 2 All ER 477, HL, [2001] 1 WLR 2206, CA........1.29, 4.182, 4.251, 4.254, 4.268, 4.283, 4.284, 4.294, 4.339, 4.346, 4.355 R v Sheffield City Council, ex p Chadwick (1985) 84 LGR 563...................................7.55, 7.75, 7.79

cvi  Table of cases R v Sherwood ex p The Telegraph Group plc [2001] 1 WLR 1983, CA................................. 11.4 R v Shropshire Health Authority, ex p Duffus (The Times, 16 August 1989)......................... 10.171 R v Smith [1960] 2 QB 423, [1960] 1 All ER 256, [1960] 2 WLR 164, 124 JP 137, 44 Cr App Rep 55, 104 SJ 69, CCA.................................................................................................... 7.17 R v Smith [2000] All ER (D) 2135, (2000) The Times, 20 December 2000)........................... 11.77 R v Southampton City Council, ex p Ward [1984] FLR 608, 14 HLR 114............................ 8.32 R v Southwold Corpn, ex p Wrightson (1907) 71 JP 351, 5 LGR 888, 97 LT 431, DC......... 7.67 R v Stockton-on-Tees Borough Council, ex p W [2000] ELR 93, CA.................................... 9.20 R v Strickland & Woods (unreported, 1993)............................................................................ 2.356 R v Swale Borough Council & Medway Ports, ex p Royal Society for the Protection of Birds [1991] 1 PLR 6, [1990] COD 263, [1991] JPL 39............................................................ 10.172 R v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council, ex p Governors of Audenshaw High School (The Times, 27 June 1990)................................................................................................ 10.170 R v Toronto Sun Publishing Ltd (1979) 47 CCC (2d) 535...................................................... 4.271 R v Tower (1815) 4 M & S 162................................................................................................. 7.67 R v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council, ex p Rouf (1989) 21 HLR 294, affd (1991) 23 HLR 460, CA................................................................................................................ 10.155 R v Twomey [2011] EWCA Crim 8, [2011] 1 WLR 1681, [2011] 1 Cr App R 29.................. 11.80 R v United Kingdom [1988] 2 FLR 445, ECtHR.................................................................... 10.123 R v University College London, ex p Idriss [1999] Ed CR 462............................................... 10.157 R v Waltham Forest London Borough Council, ex p Baxter [1988] QB 419, [1987] 3 All ER 671, [1988] 2 WLR 257, 86 LGR 254, [1988] RVR 6, 132 SJ 227, [1988] LS Gaz R 36, [1987] NLJ Rep 947, CA................................................................................................... 7.60 R v Wandsworth London Borough, ex p P [1990] FCR 89, [1989] COD 262.............  10.123, 10.158 R v Wandsworth London Borough Council, ex p Darker Enterprises Ltd (1999) 1 LGLR 601...................................................................................................................................... 8.3 R v Ward [1993] 2 All ER 577, [1993] 1 WLR 619, 96 Cr App Rep 1, [1993] Crim LR 312, [1992] 27 LS Gaz R 34, [1992] NLJR 859, 136 SJ LB 191, CA....................................... 11.77 R v Warwickshire County Council, ex p Dill-Russell (1990) 89 LGR 640, [1991] 3 Admin LR 1, affd (1990) 89 LGR 640, [1991] COD 375, CA..................................................... 7.55 R v Waterfield [1975] 2 All ER 40, [1975] 1 WLR 711, 139 JP 400, 60 Cr App Rep 296, 119 SJ 300, CA.......................................................................................................................... 11.4 R v Westminster City Council, ex p Ermakov [1996] 2 All ER 302, [1996] 2 FCR 208, 28 HLR 819, 140 SJ LB 23, CA............................................................................................. 10.161 R v Westminster City Council, ex p Monahan [1990] 1 QB 87, [1989] 2 All ER 74, [1989] 3 WLR 408, 58 P & CR 92, [1989] JPL 107, 133 SJ 978, [1988] NLJR 311, CA.............. 10.162 R v Wicks [1998] AC 92, [1997] 2 All ER 801, [1997] 2 WLR 876, 161 JP 433, [1997] JPL 1049, [1997] 35 LS Gaz R 34, [1997] NLJR 883, 141 SJ LB 127, HL............................ 10.172 R v Worcester City Juvenile Court, ex p F [1989] 1 All ER 500, [1989] FCR 110, [1989] 1 FLR 230, [1989] Fam Law 143, 132 SJ 1526.................................................................... 10.158 R v Worcester CC & Secretary of State ex p SW (Case CO/4550/99)................................... 2.273 R v Zafar etc [2008] EWCA Crim 184, [2008] QB 810, [2008] 2 WLR 1013........................ 4.370 R & C Comrs Application (Section 20(1) Notice: Subsidiary Co), Re [2008] STC (SCD) 358, [2007] STI 2851;on appeal [2013] UKSC 1, [2013] 2 AC 185................................. 11.89 R (on the application of A) v B [2009] UKSC 12, [2010] 2 AC 1, [2010] 2 WLR 1.......  4.182, 4.231, 4.233, 4.339 R (on the application of A) v Croydon LBC [2009] UKSC 8, [2009] 1 WLR 2557, [2010] 1 All ER 469, [2010] PTSR 106, [2009] 11 WLUK 652, [2010] 1 FLR 959, [2009] 3 FCR 607, [2010] HRLR 9, [2010] UKHRR 63, [2010] BLGR 183, (2009) 12 CCL Rep 552, [2010] Fam Law 137, (2009) 159 NLJ 1701, (2009) 153(46) SJLB 34............................. 10.115 R (on the application of A) v Hertfordshire CC [2001] EWHC Admin 211.......................... 2.273 R (on the application of A) v Hertfordshire CC [2001] EWCA Civ 2113, [2001] BGLR 435...................................................................................................................................... 11.6 R (on the application of A) v Hertfordshire CC [2001] All ER (D) 259, CA.......................... 2.274 R (on the application of A) v Inner South London Coroner (The Times, 17 January 2005).. 4.5 R (on the application of A) v Lord Saville of Newdigate [2001] EWHC Admin 888............. 4.5 R (on the application of A) v Lord Saville of Newdigate, ex p A [1999] 4 All ER 860............ 10.120 R (on the application of A) v National Probation Service [2003] EWHC 2910 (Admin)....... 4.326 R (on the application of A) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] HRLR 12........................................................................................................................................ 10.157 R (on the application of ABCIFER) v Secretary of State for Defence [2003] EWCA Civ 473, [2003] QB 1397, [2003] 3 WLR 80................................................................................... 10.55 R (on the application of ABNA) v Secretary of State for Health [2004] 2 CMLR 39............. 1.215

Table of cases   cvii R (on the application of AKH) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 287, [2009] 1 WLR 2049, [2010] INLR 48.................................................. 10.80 R (on the application of Abassi) v Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs [2002] EWCA Civ 1598.................................................................................................... 10.114 R (on the application of A child) (care proceedings) (disclosure), Re (The Times, 18 July 2000)................................................................................................................................... 11.6 R (on the application of Adam) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, R (on the application of Limbuela) v Secretary of State for the Home Department) [2005] UKHL 66, [2006] 1 AC 396, [2005] 3 WLR 1014, [2007] 1 All ER 951, [2005] 11 WLUK 72, [2006] HRLR 4, [2006] HLR 10, (2006) 9 CCL Rep 30, (2005) 102(46) LSG 25, (2005) 149 SJLB 1354......................................................................................... 10.134 R (on the application of Adlard) v Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government & the Regions [2002] EWCA Civ 735.................................................................................. 10.123 R (on the application of Alconbury) v Secretary of State for the Environment [2001] 2 All ER 963, HL........................................................................................................................ 10.133 R (on the application of Alconbury) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport & the Regions [2001] 2 All ER 929.......................................................9.84, 10.133, 10.134, 10.137 R (on the application of Al-Hasan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 1 All ER 97, HL.................................................................................................................... 10.117 R (on the application of Al Jedah) v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 58, [2008] 1 AC 332, [2008] 2 WLR 31.............................................................................................. 10.175 R (on the application of Allen) v HM Coroner for Inner London (North) [2009] EWCA Civ 623, [2009] LS Law Medical 430, [2009] Inquest LR 187......................................... 10.175 R (on the application of Al-Skeini) v Secretary of State for Defence (The Times, 20 December 2004)................................................................................................................ 10.175 R (on the application of Al-Sweady) v Secretary of State for Defence [2009] EWHC 1687.. 10.147, 11.65 R (on the application of Amin) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] 4 All ER 1264, HL...................................................................................................................... 10.175 R (on the application of Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State fr Culture, Media & Spot [2008] UKHL 15, [2008] 1 AC 1312, [2008] 2 WLR 781........................ 4.369 R (on the application of Anufrijeva) v Secretary of State [2003] 3 All ER 827, HL................  4.4, 4.5 R (on the application of AR) v Greater Manchester Police [2016] EWCA Civ 490, [2016] 1 WLR 4125, [2016] 6 WLUK 252..............................................................................  2.307, 2.321 R (on the application of Argles) v Visitors to the Inns of Court [2008] EWHC 2068 (Admin).............................................................................................................................. 10.118 R (on the application of Asha) v Millennium Commission [2003] EWCA Civ 88................. 10.157 R (on the application of Ashbrook) v Secretary of State etc [2005] 1 All ER 166................... 10.169 R (on the application of Assura Pharmacy Ltd) v NHS Litigation Authority [2008] EWHC 289 (Admin)....................................................................................................................... 10.114 R (on the application of Axon) v Secretary of State for Health [2006] EWHC 37 (Admin).. 2.233 R (on the application of B) v Birmingham City Council Independent Appeal Panel, R (on the application of S) v Birmingham City Council Independent Appeal Panel [2006] EWHC 2369 (Admin), [2006] 8 WLUK 290, [2007] ELR 57, [2007] ACD 7................ 8.12 R (on the application of B) v Merton LBC [2003] 4 All ER 280............................................. 10.123 R (on the application of B) v Stafford Combined Court [2006] EWHC 1645 (Admin), [2007] 1 WLR 1524, [2007] 1 All ER 102......................................................................... 2.235 R (on the application of Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [2008] UKHL 61, [2009] 1 AC 453, [2008] 3 WLR 955................................................................................ 10.170 R (on the application of BAPIO Action Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWCA Civ 1139, [2008] UKHL 27...................................................................... 10.170 R (on the application of BAT Ltd) v Secretary of State for Health [2018] EWHC 3586 (Admin).............................................................................................................................. 1.155 R (on the application of Beer) v Hampshire Farmers Market Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 1056, [2004] 1 WLR 233, [2004] UKHRR 727.......................................................................... 10.130 R (on the application of Beeson) v Dorset CC (The Times, 2 January 2003)......................... 10.134 R (on the application of Begbie) v Secretary of State for Education [2000] 1 WLR 1115, CA..... 10.124 R (on the application of Belhaj) v Director of Public Prosecutions (No 1) [2018] UKSC 33, [2018] 3 WLR 435, [2018] 4 All ER 561, [2018] 7 WLUK 44, [2018] 2 Cr App R 33, [2018] Crim LR 1012........................................................................................................ 11.86 R (on the application of Bernard) v LB Enfield [2002] EWHC 2282 (Admin)...................... 10.61 R (on the application of Bewry) v Norwich City Council [2001] EWHC Admin 657, [2002] HRLR 2............................................................................................................................. 10.136

cviii  Table of cases R (on the application of Bibi) v Newham LBC [2002] 1 WLR 237, CA................................. 10.124 R (on the application of Binyam Mohamed) v Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Office [2010] EWCA Civ 65, [2010] EWCA Civ 158...................  1.130, 11.81 R (on the application of Bloggs 61) v Home Secretary [2003] EWCA Civ 686, [2003] 1 WLR 2724, [2007] Inquest LR 206.................................................................................. 10.124 R (on the application of Bourgass) v Secretary of State for Justice, R (on the application of King) v Secretary of State for Justice [2015] UKSC 54, [2016] AC 384, [2015] 3 WLR 457, [2016] 1 All ER 1033, [2015] 7 WLUK 909............................................................. 10.118 R (on the application of Boyjo) v Barnet LBC [2009] EWHC 3261 (Admin), (2010) 13 CCL Rep 72................................................................................................................................ 10.170 R (on the application of Bradley) v Secretary of State for Work & Pensions [2008] EWCA Civ 36, [2009] QB 114, [2008] 3 WLR 1059............................................................. 4.134, 10.55 R (on the application of Bristol Myers Squibbs Pharmaceuticals Ltd) v NICE [2009] EWCA Civ 2722................................................................................................................... 10.116, 10.168 R (on the application of C) v Secretary of State for the Home Department & Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [2011] EWCA Civ 175, [2011] 1 WLUK 262, [2011] 2 FLR 383, [2011] Fam Law 581, [2011] PTSR D41........................................... 2.290 R (on the application of CPAG) v Secretary of State for Work & Pensions [2010] UKSC 54, [2011] 2 AC 15, [2011] 2 WLR 1...................................................................................... 4.4 R (on the application of Cala Homes South Ltd) v Secretary of State for Communities & Local Government) [2011] EWCA Civ 639, [2011] 34 EG 68, [2011] 22 EG 103 (CS).................................................................................................................................... 9.70 R (on the application of Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) v the Prime Minister [2002] EWHC 2777 (Admin)....................................................................................................... 10.114 R (on the application of Canning) v HM Coroner for Northampton [2005] EWHC 3125 (Admin), (2006) 91 BMLR 32........................................................................................... 10.175 R (on the application of Cannon) v Governor of Full Sutton Prison (30/1/03)...................... 10.141 R (on the application of Cart) v Upper Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28, [2010] EWCA Civ 859, [2011] QB 120, [2011] 2 WLR 36..................................................................................... 10.65 R (on the application of Catt) v Comr of Met Police [2015] UKSC 9, [2015] AC 1065, [2015] 2 WLR 664, [2015] 2 All ER 727, [2015] 3 WLUK 106, [2015] HRLR 4, 41 BHRC 108.................................................................................................................. 2.235, 2.283 R (on the application of Chatwani) v National Crime Agency [2015] EWHC 1284 (Admin), [2015] 5 WLUK 192, [2015] Lloyd’s Rep FC 473, [2015] Crim LR 905........................ 11.121 R (on the application of Citizens UK) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 1812, [2018] 4 WLR 123, [2018] 7 WLUK 730........................................... 10.156 R (on the application of Comninos) v Bedford DC [2003] EWHC 121................................. 10.103 R (on the application of Corner House Research) v DPP [2008] UKHL 60, [2009] 1 AC 756, [2008] 3 WLR 568, [2008] 4 All ER 927, [2008] 7 WLUK 921, [2008] Lloyd’s Rep FC 537, [2009] Crim LR 46, (2008) 158 NLJ 1149, (2008) 152(32) SJLB 29................. 10.159 R (on the application of Cowl) v Plymouth City Council [2002] 1 WLR 803, CA................ 10.67 R (on the application of Cunningham) v Exeter Crown Court [2003] 2 Cr App R (S) 64..... 10.152, 10.155, 10.159 R (on the application of D) v Inner South London Assistant Deputy Coroner [2008] EWHC 3356 (Admin), [2008] Inquest LR 119.............................................................................. 10.175 R (on the application of DSD) v Parole Board for England & Wales [2018] EWHC 694 (Admin), [2018] 3 WLR 829, [2018] 3 All ER 417, [2018] 3 WLUK 689, [2018] HRLR 12, [2018] ACD 57............................................................................................................. 4.5, 4.99 R (on the application of Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26, [2001] 2 AC 532, HL....................................................  4.254, 4.292, 10.116, 10.157, 10.164 R (on the application of Dudson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 52, [2006] 1 AC 245, 2005] 3 WLR 422............................................................... 10.119 R (on the application of EFT Ltd) v Bow Street Magistrates Court [2005] EWHC 1626 (Admin), [2006] 1 WLR 1316, [2005] 4 All ER 285......................................................... 12.1 R (on the application of EMAG) v HM Treasury [2009] EWHC 2495 (Admin), (2009) 159 NLJ 1514.................................................................................................................... 4.134, 10.55 R (on the application of ER) v Comr for Local Administration in England (Local Government Ombudsman) [2014] EWCA Civ 1407, [2014] 10 WLUK 841, [2015] ELR 36, (2015) 18 CCL Rep 290, [2015] PTSR D3........................................................ 10.54 R (on the application of Edwards) v Environmental Agency [2004] 3 All ER 21.................... 10.171 R (on the application of Edwards) v Environmental Agency (No 2) [2006] EWCA Civ 877, [2007] Env LR 9, [2007] JPL 82........................................................................................ 10.171 R (on the application of Edwards) v Environmental Agency [2008] UKHL 22...................... 10.168

Table of cases   cix R (on the application of Elias) v Secretary of State for War [2006] EWCA Civ 1293, [2006] 1 WLR 3213, [2006] IRLR 934................................................................................. 4.140, 10.55 R (on the application of Ellis) v Chief Constable of Essex Police [2003] EWHC 1321 (Admin)........................................................................................................................ 1.275, 4.326 R (on the application of European Roma Rights Centre) v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport [2004] UKHL 55, [2005] 1 All ER 527................................................................ 12.23 R (on the application of Ewing) v Department for Constitutional Affairs [2006] EWHC 504 (Admin), [2006] 2 All ER 993, [2007] ACD 20..................................................... 10.122, 10.141 R (on the application of F) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 17, [2011] 1 AC 331, [2010] 2 WLR 992............................................................... 1.275, 2.290, 2.313 R (on the application of Fitzgerald) v McDonald [1913] 2 IR 55............................................ 8.37 R (on the application of G) v Ealing LBC (The Times, 18 March, 2002)............................... 11.54 R (on the application of G) v Governors of X School [2011] UKSC 30, [2011] 3 WLR 237, [2011] PTSR 1230.....................................................................................  10.118, 10.130, 10.141 R (on the application of G) v IAT etc [2004] 3 All ER 286...................................................... 10.117 R (on the application of GC) v Comr of the Police of the Metropolis [2011] UKSC 21, [2011] 1 WLR 1230, [2011] 3 All ER 859...................................................................  1.29, 2.331 R (on the application of Gulf Centre for Human Rights) v Prime Minister [2018] EWCA Civ 1855, [2018] 7 WLUK 778......................................................................................... 4.99 R (on the application of Gallagher) v Basildon DC [2010] EWHC 2824 (Admin), [2011] PTSR 731, [2011] BLGR 227........................................................................................... 10.55 R (on the application of Gardner) v Parole Board [2006] EWCA Civ 1222, [2007] Prison LR 78, (2006) 103(36) LSG 35.......................................................................................... 10.118 R (on the application of Gentle) v Prime Minister [2008] UKHL 20, [2008] 1 AC 1356, [2008] 2 WLR 879...................................................................................................10.114, 10.175 R (on the application of Greenfield) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 14........................................................................................................................... 10.61 R (on the application of Greenpeace) v Secretary of State for Trade & Industry [2007] EWHC 311 (Admin), [2007] Env LR 29, [2007] JPL 1314..................................  10.119, 10.168 R (on the application of Guardian News & Media Ltd) v City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2010] EWHC 3376 (Admin), [2011] 1 WLR 1173, [2011] 3 All ER 38, [2012] EWCA Civ 420................................................................................................... 1.15, 1.155, 11.4 R (on the application of H) v A City Council [2011] EWCA Civ 403.................................... 1.275 R (on the application of H) v Inland Revenue Commissioners [2002] STC 1354.................. 11.106 R (on the application of HSMP Forum UK Ltd) v Home Secretary [2009] EWHC 711 (Admin)....................................................................................................................10.116, 10.170 R (on the application of Hair) v HM Coroner for Staffordshire (South) [2010] EWHC 2580 (Admin), [2010] Inquest LR 197....................................................................................... 10.175 R (on the application of Hammond) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 69, [2006] 1 AC 603, [2005] 3 WLR 1229........................................................... 10.123 R (on the application of Haralambous) v St Albans Crown Court [2018] UKSC 1, [2018] AC 236, [2018] 2 WLR 357, [2018] 2 All ER 303, [2018] 1 WLUK 344, [2018] 1 Cr App R 26, [2018] Lloyd’s Rep FC 71, [2018] Crim LR 672................................................  10.80, 11.74 R (on the application of Harper) v Aldershot Magistrates Court [2010] EWHC 1319 (Admin).............................................................................................................................. 2.235 R (on the application of Hasan) v Secretary of State for Trade & Industry [2008] EWCA Civ 1312, [2009] 3 All ER 539, (2008) 152(46) SJLB 29......................................................... 10.152 R (on the application of Hirst) v Secretary of State (The Times, 10 April 2002).................... 10.142 R (on the application of Hoareau) v Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs [2018] EWHC 1508 (Admin), [2018] 5 WLUK 312, [2018] ACD 91................. 11.55 R (on the application of Holding & Barnes plc) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport & the Regions [2001] NLJR 135, 145 SJ LB 84, [2000] All ER (D) 2264...... 9.84 R (on the application of Howard) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] QB 830................. 10.175 R (on the application of HTV Ltd) v Bristol City Council [2004] 1 WLR 2717.................... 9.11 R (on the application of Hughes) v First Secretary of State [2006] EWCA Civ 838, [2007] BLGR 320, [2007] ELR 1................................................................................................. 9.130 R (on the application of Hughes) v Local Government Ombudsman [2001] EWHC Admin 349...................................................................................................................................... 10.53 R (on the application of Hurst) v London North District Coroner [2007] UKHL 14, [2007] 2 AC 226, [2007] 2 WLR 754............................................................................................ 10.175 R (on the application of Ingenious Media Holdings plc) v R & C Comrs [2016] UKSC 54, [2016] 1 WLR 4164, [2017] 1 All ER 95, [2016] STC 2306, [2016] 10 WLUK 413, [2017] EMLR 6, [2016] BTC 41, [2016] STH 2746........................................................ 11.109

cx  Table of cases R (on the application of Island Farm Development Ltd) v Bridgend CBC [2006] EWHC 2189 (Admin), [2007] BLGR 60, (2006) 103(36) LSG 36................................................ 7.60 R (on the application of J) v School & College Head Teacher [2003] EWHC 1747.............. 10.147 R (on the application of Jeffrey) v First Secretary of State [2007] EWCA Civ 54, [2007] 1 FLR 819, [2007] 1 FCR 271.............................................................................................. 9.107 R (on the application of Joicey) v Northumberland CC [2014] EWHC 3657 (Admin), [2015] PTSR 622, [2014] 11 WLUK 200, [2015] BLGR 1............................................. 8.59 R (on the application of Jones) v Mansfield DC (The Times, 31 October 2003).................... 9.145 R (on the application of Justice for Health Ltd) v Secretary of State for Health [2016] EWHC 2338 (Admin), [2016] 9 WLUK 496, [2016] Med LR 599, [2016] ACD 119.... 4.4 R (on the application of K) v Secretary of State for Defence [2016] EWCA Civ 1149, [2017] 1 WLR 1671, [2016] 11 WLUK 598................................................................................ 11.83 R (on the application of Kelway) v The Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber) & Northumbria Police [2013] EWHC 2575 (Admin), [2013] 8 WLUK 227................. 2.107 R (on the application of Kent Pharmaceuticals Ltd) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office [2005] 1 All ER 449.....................................................................................................  2.277, 12.1 R (on the application of Khan) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] 4 All ER 1239, CA.... 10.175 R (on the application of Khatun) v Newham LBC [2005] QB 37........................................... 10.125 R (on the application of Khodari) v Kensington & Chelsea RLBC [2017] EWCA Civ 333, [2018] 1 WLR 584, [2017] 5 WLUK 277, [2018] RTR 5, [2017] JPL 1105................... 9.81 R (on the application of L) v Met Police Comr [2007] EWCA Civ 168, [2008] 1 WLR 681, [2007] 4 All ER 128........................................................................................................... 2.182 R (on the application of L) v Comr of Police for the Metropolis [2009] UKHL 3, [2009] 1 AC 739, [2009] 2 WLR 267...........................................................................  2.290, 2.293, 2.305 R (on the application of L) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] 1 All ER 1062.................................................................................................................................... 10.134 R (on the application of Laner) v Cornwall Council [2013] EWCA Civ 1290, [2013] 10 WLUK 862, [2013] 45 EG 75 (CS).................................................................................. 10.152 R (on the application of Law Society) v Lord Chancellor [2018] EWHC 2094 (Admin), [2018] 8 WLUK 16, [2018] 5 Costs LR 937, [2018] ACD 112........................................ 10.168 R (on the application of Letts) v Lord Chancellor [2015] EWHC 402 (Admin), [2015] 1 WLR 4497, [2016] 2 All ER 968, [2015] 2 WLUK 696, [2015] 2 Costs LR 217, [2015] Inquest LR 15, [2015] ACD 94......................................................................................... 10.175 R (on the application of Lewis) v Redcar & Cleveland BC [2008] EWCA Civ 746, [2009] 1 WLR 83, [2008] BLGR 781.............................................................................................. 7.60 R (on the application of Litvinenko) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWHC 194 (Admin), [2014] 2 WLUK 327, [2014] HRLR 6, [2014] Inquest LR 99, [2014] ACD 67).................................................................................................................. 10.175 R (on the application of Lord) v Home Secretary [2003] EWHC 2073................................. 11.18 R (on the application of Lord Carlile of Berriew QC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] UKSC 60, [2015] AC 945, [2014] 3 WLR 1404, [2015] 2 All ER 453, [2014] 11 WLUK 333, [2015] HRLR 1, 38 BHRC 193..................................1.131, 10.115 R (on the application of Love) v Government of the USA, Love v United States [2018] EWHC 172 (Admin), [2018] 1 WLR 2889, [2018] 2 All ER 911, [2018] 2 WLUK 89, [2018] Lloyd’s Rep FC 217, [2018] ACD 33..................................................................... 2.359 R (on the application of Lumba) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 12, [2012] 1 AC 245, [2011] 2 WLR 671, [2011] 4 All ER 1, [2011] 3 WLUK 727, [2011] UKHRR 437, (2011) 108(14) LSG 20, (2011) 155(12) SJLB 30..............4.4, 10.123 R (on the application of Lumsden) v Legal Services Board [2015] UKSC 41, [2016] AC 697, [2015] 3 WLR 121, [2016] 1 All ER 391, [2015] 6 WLUK 762, [2015] 3 CMLR 42, [2015] HRLR 12, [2015] Crim LR 894............................................................................ 10.116 R (on the application of Luton BC) v Secretary of State for Education [2011] EWHC 217 (Admin), [2011] BLGR 553, [2011] ELR 222................................................................... 10.170 R (on the application of MP) v Secretary of State for Health & Social Care [2018] EWHC 3392 (Admin), [2018] 12 WLUK 102............................................................................... 10.170 R (on the application of McClean) v First Secretary of State [2017] EWHC 3174 (Admin), [2017] 10 WLUK 647, [2018] 1 Costs LO 37.................................................................. 7.17 R (on the application of Marchiori) v The Environmental Agency [2001] EWCA Civ 03.... 10.114 R (on the application of Memitt) v Peterborough Magistrates’ Court [2009] EWHC 467 (Admin).............................................................................................................................. 10.116 R (on the application of Mevagissey PC) v Cornwall Council [2013] EWHC 3684 (Admin), [2013] 11 WLUK 72......................................................................................................... 10.152 R (on the application of Middleton) v West Somerset Coroner [2004] 2 All ER 465, HL..... 10.175

Table of cases   cxi R (on the application of Miranda) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 6, [2016] 1 WLR 1505, [2016] 1 WLUK 276, [2016] 1 Cr App R 26, [2016] EMLR 11, [2016] HRLR ........................................................................................... 4.263, 4.370 R (on the application of Mohamed) v Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs [2010] EWCA Civ 65, [2010] EWCA Civ 158, [2011] QB 218, [2010] 3 WLR 554, [2010] 4 All ER 177, [2010] 2 WLUK 776, [2010] CP Rep 28............................ 1.7, 10.139 R (on the application of Mohamed) v Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs (No 2) [2010] EWCA 65, [2010] EWCA Civ 158, [2010] 3 WLR 554......... 11.36, 11.63 R (on the application of Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd) v Special Commissioner of Income Tax [2002] 3 All ER 1, HL.......................................................................................... 2.342, 11.89 R (on the application of Moseley) v Haringey LBC [2014] UKSC 56, [2014] 1 WLR 3947, [2015] 1 All ER 495, [2014] PTSR 1317, [2014] 10 WLUK 872, [2014] BLGR 823, [2015] RVR 93................................................................................................................... 10.168 R (on the application of Moss) v KPMG [2010] EWHC 2923 (Admin)................................. 9.13 R (on the application of Mott) v Environment Agency [2016] EWCA Civ 564, [2016] 1 WLR 4338, [2016] 6 WLUK 447, [2017] Env LR 1, [2016] LLR 649........................... 10.152 R (on the application of Moyse) v Secretary of State for Education [2012] EWHC 2758 (Admin), [2012] 8 WLUK 182, [2012] ELR 551.............................................................. 9.51 R (on the application of Murray) v PCA [2002] EWCA Civ 1472.......................................... 4.134 R (on the application of Nadarajah) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 1363................................................................................................................ 10.170 R (on the application of Nash) v Chelsea College of Art & Design [2001] EWHC Admin 538, , [2001] All ER (D) 133 (Jul)...................................................................................... 10.138 R (on the application of NASHA) v Secretary of State for Health (The Times, 9 March 2005)...............................................................................................................  1.168, 4.146, 4.251 R (on the application of NMA) v PRP [2017] EWHC 2527 (Admin), [2017] 10 WLUK 277...................................................................................................................................... 2.171 R (on the application of National Association of Health Stores) v Department of Health [2005] EWCA Civ 154...................................................................................................... 10.173 R (on the application of Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2013] EWCA Civ 961, [2014] 2 All ER 32, [2013] 7 WLUK 1055, [2014] 1 FCR 316, [2013] HRLR 36, (2013) 16 CCL Rep 413, (2013) 133 BMLR 46......................................................................................... 4.268 R (on the application of Nilson) v Governor of Full Sutton Prison [2004) EWCA Civ 1540.................................................................................................................................... 10.142 R (on the application of Omar) v Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs [2013] EWCA Civ 118, [2014] QB 112, [2013] 3 WLR 439, [2013] 3 All ER 95, [2013] 2 WLUK 750, [2013] ACD 65.......................................................................................... 11.63 R (on the application of P) v Secretary of State for Justice [2009] EWCA Civ 701, [2010] QB 317, [2010] 2 WLR 967.............................................................................................. 10.175 R (on the application of P) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester [2017] EWCA Civ 321, [2018] 1 WLR 3281, [2018] 2 All ER 794, [2017] 5 WLUK 30, [2017] 2 Cr App R 12................................................................................................ 2.276, 2.284, 2.289, 2.312, 2.313, 2.314, 2.315, 2.316, 2.317, 2.318 R (on the application of Perry) v Hackney LBC [2014] EWHC 3499 (Admin), [2014] 10 WLUK 745, [2015] JPL 454, [2014] PTSR D30.........................................................  7.76, 8.59 R (on the application of Persey) v Secretary of State [2003] QB 794...................................... 10.175 R (on the application of Persimmons Homes Ltd) v Secretary of State for Communities & Local Government [2007] EWHC 1985 (Admin)........................................................... 10.152 R (on the application of Pewter) v Comr of Police for the Metropolis [2010] EWHC 3927 (Admin), [2010] 12 WLUK 104........................................................................................ 11.69 R (on the application of Privacy International) v HMRC [2014] EWHC 1475 (Admin), [2015] 1 WLR 397, [2015] STC 948, [2014] 5 WLUK 345, [2014] BTC 25, [2014] ACD 108, (2014) 158(22) SJLB 37.................................................................... 4.4, 4.233, 10.159 R (on the application of Project Management Institute) v Minister for the Cabinet Office [2014] EWHC 2438 (Admin), [2014] 7 WLUK 625....................................................... 10.124 R (on the application of ProLife Alliance) v BBC [2003] 2 All ER 977, HL.................... 4.254, 4.369 R (on the application of Public Law Project) v Lord Chancellor [2016] UKSC 39, [2016] AC 1531, [2016] 3 WLR 387, [2017] 2 All ER 423, [2016] 7 WLUK 266, [2016] HRLR 17........................................................................................................................................ 10.65 R (on the application of Q) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] 2 All ER 905, CA.............................................................................................................................. 10.134 R (on the application of QSA) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWHC 407 (Admin), [2018] 1 WLR 4279, [2018] 3 WLUK 49.................................... 2.321

cxii  Table of cases R (on the application of RJ) v Director of Legal Aid Casework [2016] EWHC 645 (Admin), [2016] 3 WLUK 643, [2016] Inquest LR 91, [2016] ACD 90.......................................... 10.175 R (on the application of Razgar) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 27........................................................................................................................... 10.127 R (on the application of Reading BC) v Admissions Appeal Panel for Reading BC) [2005] EWHC 2378 (Admin), [2006] ELR 186........................................................................... 10.157 R (on the application of Roberts) v Parole Board [2004] EWCA Civ 1031............................ 10.120 R (on the application of Robertson) v City of Wakefield [2002] 2 WLR 889.................. 2.268, 2.274 R (on the application of Robertson) v Wakefield MDC [2001] EWHC Admin 915, [2002] QB 1052............................................................................................................................. 2.69 R (on the application of Robertson) v Secretary of State [2003] EWHC 1760................  2.69, 2.268 R (on the application of S) v Brent LBC [2002] EWCA Civ 693............................................ 10.159 R (on the application of S) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [2004] UKHL 39, [2004] 1 WLR 2196, [2004] 4 All ER 193............................................................................. 2.331, 2.335 R (on the application of S) v Knowsley NHS PCT [2006] EWHC 26 (Admin), [2006] Lloyd’s Rep Med 123, [2006] ACD 60.............................................................................. 10.147 R (on the application of Sacker) v West Yorkshire Coroner [2004] UKHL 11, [2004] 1 WLR 796, [2004] 2 All ER 487.................................................................................................... 10.175 R (on the application of Salih) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWHC 2273...................................................................................................................... 4.4 R (on the application of Sarkandi) v Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs [2015] EWCA Civ 687, [2016] 3 All ER 837, [2015] 7 WLUK 419.............. 10.80, 11.87 R (on the application of Save Britain’s Heritage) v Secretary of State for Communities & Local Government [2018] EWCA Civ 2137, [2018] 10 WLUK 88................................ 10.157 R (on the application of Scholes) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1343, [2006] HRLR 44, [2007] UKHRR 122............................................... 10.175 R (on the application of Secretary of State for the Home Department) v Information Comr [2006] EWHC 2958 (Admin), [2008] 1 WLR 58, [2007] 1 WLR 58.............................. 2.102 R (on the application of Secretary of State for the Home Department) v Southwark Crown Court [2013] EWHC 4366 (Admin), [2014] 1 WLR 2529.............................................. 11.52 R (on the application of Smith) v NE Derbyshire PC Trust [2006] EWCA Civ 1291, [2006] 1 WLR 3315, (2006) 9 CCL Rep 663............................................................................... 10.167 R (on the application of Smith) v Oxfordshire Assistant Deputy Coroner [2009] EWCA Civ 441, [2009] 3 WLR 1099, [2009] 4 All ER 985................................................................. 10.175 R (on the application of Smith) v Parole Board [2003] EWCA Civ 1269, [2005] UKHL 1.. 10.117, 10.121 R (on the application of Smith) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (The Times, 18 February 2004).............................................................................................................. 10.123 R (on the application of Stanley) v Inner North London Coroner [2003] EWHC 1180 (Admin), [2003] Inquest LR 38......................................................................................... 10.175 R (on the application of Stanley, Marshall & Kelly) v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2004] EWHC 2229 (Admin)..................................................................................... 4.326, 11.11 R (on the application of T) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] UKSC 35, [2015] AC 49, [2014] 3 WLR 96, [2014] 4 All ER 159, [2014] 6 WLUK 541, [2014] 2 Cr App R 24, 38 BHRC 505.................................................... 2.283, 2.286, 2.307, 2.309, 2.314 R (on the application of Tesco Stores Ltd) v Forest of Dean DC [2015] EWCA Civ 800, [2015] 7 WLUK 73........................................................................................................... 9.81 R (on the application of Thompson) v Law Society [2004] 2 All ER 113............................... 10.118 R (on the application of Tucker) v DG National Crime Squad [2003] EWCA Civ 2, (2003) 147 SLJB 114, [2003] NPC 14.......................................................................................... 10.139 R (on the application of U) v Commissioner of Metropolitan Police (29/11/02) (QBD)....... 10.117 R (on the application of UMBS) Online Ltd) v SOCA [2007] EWCA Civ 406, [2007] Bus LR 1317, [2008] 1 All ER 465........................................................................................... 12.1 R (on the application of UMO) v Commissioner for Local Administration in England [2003] EWHC 3202.......................................................................................................... 10.53 R (on the application of United Company RUSAL plc) v London Metal Exchange [2014] EWCA Civ 1271, [2015] 1 WLR 1375, [2014] 10 WLUK 215....................................... 10.168 R (on the application of Wall) v Brighton & Hove CC [2004] EWHC 2582 (Admin).....10.152, 10.159 R (on the application of West) v Lloyd’s of London [2004] EWCA Civ 506.......................... 1.86 R (on the application of West) v Parole Board [2002] EWCA Civ 1641................................. 10.117 R (on the application of West) v Parole Board [2005] UKHL 1.............................................. 10.122 R (on the application of Wilkinson) v Broadmoor Special Hospital Authority [2002] 1 WLR 419...................................................................................................................................... 11.54

Table of cases   cxiii R (on the application of Williams) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] 4 All ER 872, CA.................................................................................................................. 10.123 R (on the application of Woods) v Chief Constable of Merseyside [2014] EWHC 2784 (Admin), [2015] 1 WLR 539, [2014] 8 WLUK 95, [2015] HCR 125.............................. 11.63 R (on the application of Wright) v Secretary of State for Health [2009] UKHL 3, [2009] 1 AC 739, [2009] 1 WLR 267......................................................................................  2.290, 10.130 R (on the application of X) v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police [2005] 1 All ER 610, CA......................................................................................................... 1.274, 2.182, 2.290, 4.326 R (on the application of Youssef) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2016] UKSC 3, [2016] AC 1457, [2016] 2 WLR 509, [2016] 3 All ER 261, [2016] 1 WLUK 488................................................................................................  1.124, 10.118 RB (Algeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] UKHL 10, [2010] 2 AC 110, [2009] 2 WLR 512.......................................................................................... 10.118, 10.131 RHM Foods Ltd v Bovril Ltd [1982] 1 All ER 673, [1982] 1 WLR 661, [1983] RPC 275, 126 SJ 158, CA.......................................................................................................................... 2.197 RMC v MP Comr [2012] EWHC 1681 (Admin), [2012] 1 WLR 3007, [2012] 4 All ER 510, [2012] 6 WLUK 483, [2012] HRLR 26, [2012] ACD 103, (2012) 109(28) LSG 2......... 2.297 Radio France v France (App No 53984/00), 30 March 2004................................................... 2.259 Randall v Information Comr & MHPRA (EA/2006/0004)..................................................... 1.71 Rank Film Distributors Ltd v Video Information Centre (a firm) [1982] AC 380, [1980] 2 All ER 273, [1980] 3 WLR 487, [1980] FSR 242, 124 SJ 757, CA, affd [1982] AC 380, [1981] 2 All ER 76, [1981] 2 WLR 668, [1981] FSR 363, 125 SJ 290, HL...................... 11.119 Rasool v General Pharmaceutical Council [2015] EWHC 217 (Admin), [2015] 2 WLUK 185...................................................................................................................................... 10.117 Reading v A-G [1951] AC 507, [1951] 1 All ER 617, [1951] 1 TLR 480, 95 SJ 155, HL..... 7.17, 7.117 Reading Borough Council v Secretary of State for the Environment & Commercial Union Properties (Investments) Ltd (1985) 52 P & CR 385, [1986] JPL 115............................ 9.107 Real Estate Opportunities Ltd v Aberdeen Asset Managers Jersey Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 197, [2007] Bus LR 971..................................................................................................... 11.37 Rees v Crane [1994] 2 AC 173, [1994] 1 All ER 833, [1994] 2 WLR 476, [1994] 13 LS Gaz R 34, 138 SJ LB 71, PC..................................................................................................... 10.130 Regner v Czech Republic (Application 35289/11) [2017] 9 WLUK 277, (2018) 66 EHRR 9.......................................................................................................................................... 10.132 Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [1999] 4 All ER 609, [1999] 3 WLR 1010, [2000] EMLR 1, [1999] 45 LS Gaz R 34, [1999] NLJR 1697, 143 SJ LB 270, HL................................ 7.9 Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127, HL....................................................... 11.3 Rhondda Cynon Taff CBC v Information Comr (EA/2007/0065)..................................... 1.113, 3.29 Ricci v Chow [1987] 3 All ER 534, [1987] 1 WLR 1658, 131 SJ 1156, [1987] LS Gaz R 2274, CA...................................................................................................................................... 11.36 Richard v BBC [2017] EWHC 1291 (Ch), [2017] 5 WLUK 635, [2017] EMLR 22............. 11.46 Richard v BBC [2018] EWHC 1837 (Ch), [2018] 3 WLR 1715, [2018] 7 WLUK 398, [2018] EMLR 26, [2018] HRLR 16........................................................................... 2.247, 2.276 Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40, [1963] 2 All ER 66, [1963] 2 WLR 935, 127 JP 295, 61 LGR 369, 107 SJ 313, HL................................................................................................10.117, 10.119 Rigg v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2004] EMLR 4................................................................ 11.26 Ringeisen v Austria (No 1) (1971) 1 EHRR 455...................................................................... 10.141 Roberts v Parole Board [2004] 4 All ER 1136, CA................................................................... 10.123 Roberts (Alasdair) v Information Comr & the Department for Business, Innovation & Skills (EA/2009/0035)................................................................................................................. 1.193 Roche v UK (application no 32555/96).................................................................................... 4.297 Rogers v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1972] 2 All ER 1057, HL................ 4.4 Rollo v Minister of Town & Country Planning [1948] 1 All ER 13, 112 JP 104, 46 LGR 114, [1948] LJR 817, 92 SJ 40, 64 TLR 25, CA........................................................................ 10.168 Roncarelli v Duplessis [1959] SCR 121, 16 DLR (2d) 689 (Can SC)...................................... 10.125 Rose v Lynx Express Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 447.................................................................... 11.27 Rost v Edwards [1990] 2 QB 460, [1990] 2 All ER 641, [1990] 2 WLR 1280, [1990] 12 LS Gaz R 42.........................................................................................................................  4.274, 7.6 Rotaru v Romania (Application 28341/95) [2000] 5 WLUK 77, 8 BHRC 449...................... 2.309 Roviaro v US 353 US 53 (1957)................................................................................................ 11.79 Rowe & Davis v United Kingdom (2000) 30 EHRR 1, 8 BHRC 325, [2000] Crim LR 584, ECtHR............................................................................................................................... 11.77 Rowland (R) & FSA v Information Comr (EA/2008/0075, 0077)........................................... 1.229 Royal Mail Group Ltd v Information Comr (EA/2010/0005)................................................. 1.253

cxiv  Table of cases Roylance v GMC (The Times, 27 January 1999)..................................................................... 11.75 Rudd v Information Comr & the Verderers of the New Forest (EA/2008/0006)................... 3.42 Rugby Football Union v Consolidated Information Services Ltd [2012] UKSC 55, [2012] 1 WLR 3333, [2013] 1 All ER 928, [2012] 11 WLUK 635, [2013] 1 CMLR 56, [2013] EMLR 25, [2013] HRLR 8, [2012] Info TLR 353, [2013] FSR 23, (2012) 162 NLJ 1504, (2012) 156(45) SJLB 31........................................................................................... 2.9 Runa Begum v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [2003] UKHL 5, [2003] 2 AC 430, [2003] 1 All ER 731, [2003] 2 WLR 388, ............................... 10.88, 10.134, 10.135, 10.137 Rush & Tompkins Ltd v Greater London Council [1989] AC 1280, [1988] 3 All ER 737, [1988] 3 WLR 939, 43 BLR 1, 22 Con LR 114, 132 SJ 1592, [1988] NLJR 315, HL.... 11.111 S S (a child) (identification: restriction on publication), Re [2003] EWCA Civ 963, [2003] 3 WLR 1425 (CA); [2004] UKHL 47, HL...................................  2.241, 4.324, 4.325, 11.7, 11.12 S (a child) [2004] UKHL 47, [2005] 1 AC 593, [2004] 4 All ER 683....................................... 11.12 S v S (Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police intervening) [1999] 1 All ER 281, [1998] 1 WLR 1716, [1999] 1 FCR 244, 142 SJ LB 248, sub nom Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police v S [1998] 2 FLR 973, [1998] Fam Law 726, CA.................................. 11.6 S & Marper v United Kingdom [2008] ECHR 1581........................................................ 2.284, 2.331 SITA UK Group Holdings Ltd v Serruys [2009] EWHC 869 (QB), [2009] STC 1595........ 11.37 Salford City Council v Information Comr (EA/2015/0276).................................................... 3.31 Salmon (R) v King’s College Cambridge (EA/2007/0135)................................................ 1.182, 1.191 Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell Engineering Co Ltd [1963] 3 All ER 413n, 65 RPC 203, CA..................................................................................................................... 4.316 Saunders v Punch Ltd (t/a Liberty Publishing) [1998] 1 All ER 234, [1998] 1 WLR 986, [1998] EMLR 18................................................................................................................ 11.44 Savage v South Essex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust [2008] UKHL 74, [2009] 1 AC 681, 2 WLR 115................................................................................................................ 10.175 Save Britain’s Heritage v Secretary of State for the Environment [1991] 2 All ER 10, 89 LGR 809, 62 P & CR 105, 135 SJ 312, sub nom Save Britain’s Heritage v Number 1 Poultry Ltd [1991] 1 WLR 153, [1991] 3 PLR 17, HL.................................................... 10.162 Savic v Information Comr [2017] AACR 26....................................................................... 1.122, 1.211 Schenk v Switzerland (1988) 13 EHRR 242, ECtHR.............................................................. 4.208 Schering Chemicals Ltd v Falkman Ltd [1982] QB 1, [1981] 2 All ER 321, [1981] 2 WLR 848, 125 SJ 342, CA........................................................................................................... 4.322 Schrems v Data Protection Comr (Case C-362/14) [2016] QB 527, [2016] 2 WLR 873, [2015] 10 WLUK 117, [2016] 2 CMLR 2, [2016] CEC 647........................................... 2.8 Sciacca v Italy (2006) 43 EHRR 20........................................................................................... 2.218 Science Research Council v Nassé [1980] AC 1028, [1979] 3 All ER 673, [1979] 3 WLR 762, [1979] ICR 921, [1979] IRLR 465, 123 SJ 768, HL.....................................  1.304, 11.75, 11.115 Scotland v Information Comr (EA/2007/0128)....................................................................... 1.174 Scott (otherwise Morgan) v Scott [1913] AC 417, [1911–13] All ER Rep 1, 82 LJP 74, 57 SJ 498, 109 LT 1, 29 TLR 520, HL.................................................................................. 11.2, 11.15 Seabrook v British Transport Commission [1959] 2 All ER 15, [1959] 1 WLR 509, 103 SJ 351...................................................................................................................................... 11.98 Seaga v Harper [2008] UKPC 9, [2009] 1 AC 1, [2008] 3 WLR 478...................................... 11.3 Seager v Copydex Ltd [1967] 2 All ER 415, [1967] 1 WLR 923, [1967] RPC 349, 111 SJ 335, CA...................................................................................................................................... 4.316 Secretary of State for Communities & Local Government v Engbers [2016] EWCA Civ 1183, [2016] 11 WLUK 793, [2017] JPL 489................................................................... 10.117 Secretary of State for Communities & Local Government v Venn [2014] EWCA Civ 1539, [2015] 1 WLR 2328, [2014] 11 WLUK 778, [2015] CP Rep 12, [2015] 1 CMLR 52, [2015] Env LR 14, [2015] JPL 573.................................................................................... 3.11 Secretary of State for Defence v Guardian Newspapers Ltd [1985] AC 339, [1984] 3 All ER 601, [1984] 3 WLR 986, 128 SJ 751, [1984] LS Gaz R 3426, HL................................... 1.144 Secretary of State for Education & Science v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council [1977] AC 1014, [1976] 3 All ER 665, [1976] 3 WLR 641, 75 LGR 190, 120 SJ 735, HL................................................................................................... 1.240, 3.24, 7.60, 8.47, 10.115 Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF [2009] UKHL 28, [2010] 2 AC 269, [2009] 3 WLR 74...................................................................... 1.29, 10.80, 10.118, 10.131, 11.83 Secretary of State for the Home Department v AH (Sudan) [2007] UKHL 49, [2008] 1 AC 678, [2007] 3 WLR 832..................................................................................................... 1.94

Table of cases   cxv Secretary of State for the Home Department v Br Union for Abolition of Vivisection & Information Comr [2008] EWHC 892 (Admin), [2008] EWCA Civ 870, [2009] 1 WLR 636........................................................................................................................... 1.227 Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB [2007] UKHL 46, [2008] 1 AC 440, [2007] 3 WLR 681...........................................................................................  1.124, 10.80, 11.81 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman [2002] 1 All ER 122, HL........ 1.124, 1.125, 1.126, 4.352 Secretary of State for the Home Department v T Watson [2018] EWCA Civ 70, [2018] QB 912, [2018] 2 WLR 1735, [2018] 4 All ER 105, [2018] 1 WLUK 477, [2018] 2 CMLR 32, [2018] HRLR 8..............................................................................................  2.9, 4.202, 4.236 Secretary of State for the Home Department v TLU & TLV [2018] EWCA Civ 2217, [2018] 4 WLR 101, [2018] 6 WLUK 287, [2018] EMLR 24........................................... 2.168 Secretary of State for Trade & Industry v Baker [1998] Ch 356, [1998] 2 WLR 667, [1998] BCC 888, sub nom Re Barings plc, Secretary of State for Trade & Industry v Baker [1998] 1 All ER 673, [1998] 1 BCLC 16....................................................................  1.139, 1.278 Secretary of State for Transport v Information Comr (EA/2008/0052).................................. 3.34 Secretary of State for Work & Pensions v Information Comr (EA/2005/0040)..................... 1.169 Segerstendt-Wiberg v Sweden [2007] EHRR 2................................................................ 4.293, 4.346 Sethia v Stern (The Times, 4 November 1987), (The Independent, 30 October 1987)......... 11.65 Shah v HSBC Private Bank (UK) Ltd [2011] EWHC 1713 (QB), [2011] Lloyd’s Rep FC 485...................................................................................................................................... 11.58 Shaheen v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 1294, [2006] Imm AR 57, [2006] INLR 245.......................................................................................... 10.115 Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc v Maclaine Watson & Co Ltd [1989] 1 All ER 1056, [1988] 1 WLR 946, [1989] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 570, 132 SJ 1035, [1988] NLJR 185.......................... 11.101 Sheffield Wednesday Football Club Ltd v Hargreaves [2007] EWHC 2375 (QB)................ 11.47 Shelley Films Ltd v Rex Features Ltd [1994] EMLR 134....................................................... 2.218 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital & the Maudsley Hospital [1985] AC 871, [1985] 1 All ER 643, [1985] 2 WLR 480, 1 BMLR 132, 129 SJ 154, [1985] LS Gaz R 1256, HL............................................................................................... 2.194 Silih v Slovenia [2009] 49 EHRR 37, [2009] Inquest LR 117.................................................. 10.175 Simba-Tola v Elizabeth Fry Hostel Trustees [2001] EWCA Civ 1371................................... 11.75 Simmons v Information Comr (EA/2005/0003)...................................................................... 1.64 Sinclair (Matthew) v Information Comr & Department of Energy & Climate Change (EA/2011/0052)................................................................................................................. 3.41 Sison (P) v Council of the EU (Case C-266/05) [2007] ECR I-1233, [2007] 2 CMLR 17.... 5.68, 5.82, 5.83 Sky Blue Sports & Leisure Ltd v Coventry City Council [2013] EWHC 3366 (Admin), [2013] 11 WLUK 5, [2014] BLGR 34, [2014] ACD 48................................................... 11.55 Slann (N) v Information Comr & FSA (JP) (EA/2005/0019).................................................. 1.229 Smartsource v Information Comr [2010] UKUT 415 (AAC), [2011] JPL 455....................... 3.14 Smith v MoD [2013] UKSC 41, [2014] AC 52, [2013] 3 WLR 69, [2013] 4 All ER 794, [2013] 6 WLUK 529, [2013] HRLR 27, 35 BHRC 711, [2014] PIQR P2, [2013] Inquest LR 135.................................................................................................................. 1.127 Smith v United Kingdom [1999] IRLR 734, ECtHR.............................................................. 10.127 Smith & Grady v United Kingdom (1999) 29 EHRR 493, [1999] IRLR 734, ECtHR.......... 4.292 Smith Kline & French Laboratories Ltd, Re [1990] 1 AC 64, [1989] 2 WLR 397, [1989] 17 LS Gaz R 42, sub nom Smith Kline & French Laboratories Ltd v Licensing Authority (Generics (UK) Ltd intervening) [1989] 1 All ER 578, 133 SJ 263, HL.........1.215, 1.274, 4.323 SmithKline Beecham Biologics SA v Connaught Laboratories Inc [1999] 4 All ER 498, 51 BMLR 91, CA.................................................................................................................... 11.37 SmithKline Beecham plc v Generics United Kingdom Ltd [2003] 4 All ER 1302................. 11.37 Snepp v United States 444 US 507 (1980)............................................................................... 4.284 Sodemare SA v Regione Lombardia (Case C-70/95) [1998] 4 CMLR 667, ECJ.................... 10.159 South Bedfordshire District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment & Boyle [1987] JPL 507................................................................................................................... 9.141 South Buckinghamshire DC v Porter, HL............................................................................... 10.157 South Buckinghamshire DC v Porter (No 2) [2004] UKHL 33 reversing [2003] EWCA Civ 687...................................................................................................................................... 10.162 South Gloucestershire Council v Bovis Homes Ltd (EA/2009/0032).........................  3.35, 3.42, 3.46 South Lanarkshire Council v Scottish Information Comr [2013] UKSC 55, [2013] 1 WLR 2421, [2013] 4 All ER 629, 2014 SC (UKSC) 1, 2013 SLT 799, [2013] 7 WLUK 912, [2014] 1 CMLR 17, [2013] IRLR 899, [2013] Eq LR 1006, 2013 GWD 25-508........... 2.84

cxvi  Table of cases South Oxfordshire DC v Secretary of State for the Environment etc [2000] 2 All ER 667... 9.107 Southwark London Borough Council v Peters (1972) 70 LGR 41......................................... 8.11 Spencer (Earl) v United Kingdom [1998] EHRLR 348, 25 EHRR CD 105.......................... 2.218 Spring v Guardian Assurance plc [1995] 2 AC 296, [1994] 3 All ER 129, [1994] 3 WLR 354, [1994] ICR 596, [1994] IRLR 460, [1994] 40 LS Gaz R 36, [1994[ NLJR 971, 138 SJ LB 183, HL........................................................................................................................ 2.195 Staffordshire CC v Information Comr (EA/2010/0015) [2010] UKFTT 573........................ 3.47 Stalybridge (Castle Hall No 7) & (Acres Lane & Lawton Street) Compulsory Purchase Order 1963, Re, Ashbridge Investments Ltd v Minister of Housing & Local Government see Ashbridge Investments Ltd v Minister of Housing & Local Government State of Norway’s Application, Re [1990] 1 AC 723, [1989] 1 All ER 745, [1989] 2 WLR 458, 133 SJ 290, HL.................................................................................................................. 2.340 Steel & Morris v United Kingdom: Application 68416/01 (15 February 2005), ECtHR....... 7.2 Steeples v Derbyshire County Council [1984] 3 All ER 468, [1985] 1 WLR 256, [1981] JPL 582, 128 SJ 875, [1985] LS Gaz R 358.............................................................................. 9.80 Stefan v General Medical Council [1999] 1 WLR 1293, 49 BMLR 161, [1999] Lloyd’s Rep Med 90, 143 SJ LB 112, PC.................................................................................... 10.152, 10.156 Stephenson (WT) v Information Comr [2013] UKUT 181 (AAC)........................................ 1.144 Stevenson v United Road Transport Union [1976] 3 All ER 29; affd [1977] 2 All ER 941, [1977] ICR 893, CA........................................................................................................... 10.125 Stichting Greenpeace Nederland v Commission (Case T-202/10) [2018] EUECJ................ 3.50 Stirrat v City of Edinburgh (1998) SCLR 973......................................................................... 9.11 Storer v British Gas plc [2000] 2 All ER 440, [2000] 1 WLR 1237, [2000] ICR 603, [2000] IRLR 495, CA.................................................................................................................... 11.15 Street v Derbyshire UWC [2004] 4 All ER 839, CA............................................................... 4.304 Student Loans Co v Information Comr (EA/2008/0092)........................................................ 1.218 Sugar v BBC [2009] UKHL 9, [2009] 1 WLR 430, [2009] 4 All ER 111..................  1.90, 1.94, 1.220 Sumitomo Corpn v Credit Lyonnais Rouse Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1152, [2002] 1 WLR 479, [2002] 4 All ER 68, [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 517, [2001] 7 WLUK 482, [2002] CP Rep 3, [2001] CPLR 462, (2001) 98(34) LSG 41, (2001) 145 SJLB 208..............  11.101, 11.110 Sunday The Times v United Kingdom (1979) 2 EHRR 245, ECtHR.....................4.345, 11.1, 11.40 Sunday The Times Ltd v United Kingdom (No 2) (1991) 14 EHRR 229, ECtHR............... 11.40 Surrey Heath Borough Council v Information Comr (EA/2010/0034).................................. 3.54 Surrey Heath Borough Council v Morley & the Information Comr [2014] UKUT 339 (AAC), [2014] 7 WLUK 785............................................................................................. 2.31 Svenska Journalistförbundet (supported by Sweden) v EU Council (supported by France) (Case T-174/95) [1998] All ER (EC) 545, [1998] ECR II-2289, [1998] 3 CMLR 645, [1998] 34 LS Gaz R 33, CFI........................................................................................ 1.297, 11.76 Swanage TC v Information Comr (EA/2009/0058)................................................................. 1.245 Sweden v Commission (Case C-562/14 P)............................................................................... 6.65 Sweden v Council of the European Union (Case C-39/05) [2009] QB 269, [2009] 2 WLR 867, [2007] ECR I-4723................................................................................................ 5.77, 5.83 Sweden v MyTravel & Commission (Case C-506/08 P) [2011] 7 WLUK 628, [2011] 5 CMLR 18, [2012] All ER (EC) 968..............................................................................  5.69, 5.79 Sweden (IFAW) v Commission (Case C-64/05 P) [2008] B 902, [2008] 3 WLR 756, [2007] ECR I-11389.................................................................................................................  5.81, 5.110 Swinney v Chief Constable of Northumbria Police Force [1997] QB 464, [1996] 3 All ER 449, [1996] 3 WLR 968, [1996] NLJR 878, CA............................................................... 1.272 Szuchs (A) v Information Comr UK Intellectual Property Office (EA/2007/0075)............... 1.157 Szuluk v UK (Application 36936/05)........................................................................................ 10.131 T T v BBC [2007] EWHC 1683.................................................................................................. 2.235 TP v United Kingdom (2000) 2 LGLR 181, ECtHR.............................................................. 10.52 Tangey v Governor of Elmley Prison [2005] EWCA Civ 1009, [2005] HRLR 36, [2005] 2 Prison LR 253.......................................................................................................... 10.118, 10.141 Tarsasag v Hungary (application no 37374/05) [2009] ECHR 618..................................... 1.80, 4.298 Tate Access Floors Inc v Boswell [1991] Ch 512, [1990] 3 All ER 303, [1991] 2 WLR 304, 134 SJ 1227, [1990] 42 LS Gaz R 35, [1990] NLJR 963.................................................. 11.119 Taveta Investments Ltd v Financial Reporting Council [2018] EWHC 1662 (Admin), [2018] 6 WLUK 643................................................................................. 2.224, 2.259, 4.4, 4.350 Taylor v Anderton (Police Complaints Authority intervening) [1995] 2 All ER 420, [1995] 1 WLR 447, [1995] 11 LS Gaz R 37, CA............................................................................ 11.66

Table of cases   cxvii Taylor v Director of the SFO [1998] 3 WLR 1040.................................................................. 11.37 Tchenguiz v Director of the Serious Fraud Office [2014] EWCA Civ 1129, [2015] 1 WLR 797, [2014] 7 WLUK 1173, [2014] CP Rep 45................................................................ 11.33 Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau GmbH v Commission (Case T-237/02) [2006] ECR II5131, [2007] 1 CMLR 39.................................................................................................. 5.74 Telaustria v Telekom Austria (Case C-324/98) [2000] ECR I-10745, ECJ............................. 9.155 Tele2 Sverige AB v Post- och telestyrelsen (Case C-203/15) [2017] QB 771, [2017] 2 WLR 1289, [2016] 12 WLUK 618, [2017] 2 CMLR 30......................................................... 2.9, 4.236 Tenby Corpn v Mason [1908] 1 Ch 457, 77 LJ Ch 230, 72 JP 89, 6 LGR 233, 98 LT 349, 24 TLR 254, CA..................................................................................................................... 8.3 Terrapin Ltd v Builders’ Supply Co (Hayes) Ltd [1967] RPC 375.......................................... 4.315 Terry v Persons Unknown [2010] EWHC 119 (QB), [2010] EMLR 16, [2010] 2 FLR 1306.................................................................................................................................... 2.256 Tesco Stores Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment [1995] 2 All ER 636, HL........... 10.162 Thackeray (William) v Information Comr & the GMC (EA/2009/0063).............................. 2.86 Thackeray (William) v Information Comr (EA/2010/0088)................................................... 1.247 Thermax Ltd v Schott Industrial Glass Ltd [1981] FSR 289................................................... 11.119 Thesing & Bloomberg Finance LP v ECB (Case T-590/10) [2012] 11 WLUK 865, [2013] 2 CMLR 8.......................................................................................................................... 5.49 Thompson v Inner London Education Authority [1977] LS Gaz R 66.................................. 11.58 Thornton (P) v Information Comr (EA/2016/0310)............................................................... 3.32 Thorpe v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [1989] 2 All ER 827, [1989] 1 WLR 665, 87 LGR 537, 133 SJ 750, [1989] NLJR 467, CA........................................... 11.67 Three Rivers DC v Bank of England [2004] UKHL 48................................ 1.210, 1.213, 3.42, 11.92 Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (Disclosure) (No 1) [2002] EWCA Civ 1182, [2003] 1 WLR 210........................................................................................................................... 11.35 Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No 5) [2003] QB 1556 overruling [2002] EWHC 2730.................................................................................................................................... 11.92 Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No 6) [2004] QB 916, CA........................................... 11.92 Tillery Valley Foods v Channel Four Television [2004] EWHC 1075 (Ch)........  2.224, 4.314, 4.350 Tinnelly & Son Ltd & McElduff v United Kingdom (1998) 27 EHRR 249, 4 BHRC 393, ECtHR............................................................................................................................... 1.297 Toland v European Parliament (Case C-471/08) [2011] 1 CMLR 8, [2011] CEC 494, [2011] ICR 99....................................................................................................................  2.90, 5.74, 5.78 Tomlinson v Birmingham City Council [2010] UKSC 8, [2010] 2 AC 39, [2010] 2 WLR 471...................................................................................................  10.88, 10.134, 10.136, 10.137 Top Hit Holzvertrieb GmbH v EC Commission (Case 378/87R) [1988] ECR 161, [1988] 2 CMLR 594, ECJ................................................................................................................ 11.136 Totalise plc v Motley Fool Ltd (The Times, 15 March 2001)..........................................  11.39, 11.47 Tournier v National Provincial & Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461, [1923] All ER Rep 550, 93 LJKB 449, 29 Com Cas 129, 68 SJ 441, 130 LT 682, 40 TLR 214, CA...... 2.340 Toussaint v A-G of St Vincent & the Grenadines [2007] UKPC 48, [2007] 1 WLR 2827, [2008] 1 All ER 1............................................................................................................... 7.2 Town Investments Ltd v Department of the Environment [1977] UKHL 2................... 4.147, 4.329 Trillium (Prime) Property GP Ltd v London Borough of Tower Hamlets [2011] EWHC 146 (Admin)................................................................................................................... 6.33, 7.92 Tripp (E) v Information Comr (EA/2014/0221)...................................................................... 1.65 Tsfayo (application no 60860/00)....................................................................................10.136, 10.137 Tuckley (G) v Information Comr & Birmingham City Council (EA/2006/0077).................. 1.113 Turco v Council see Sweden v Council of the European Union Turcotte v Information Comr & LB Camden (EA/2007/0129).............................................. 2.82 Turgut v Secretary of State for the Home Department see R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Turgut Turkington v Times Newspapers Ltd see McCartan Turkington Breen (a firm) v Times Newspapers Ltd Turner v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [1999] 2 All ER (Comm) 664, [1999] Lloyd’s Rep Bank 231, 143 SJ LB 123, CA..................................................................................................... 4.317 Tweed v Parades Commission for Northern Ireland [2006] UKHL 53, [2007] 1 AC 650, [2007] 2 WLR 1..........................................................................................................  1.205, 11.55 U UCAS v Information Comr [2014] UKUT 557 (AAC), [2014] 12 WLUK 420, [2015] ELR 112...................................................................................................................................... 1.87

cxviii  Table of cases UK v Council of the EU [2011] 1 CMLR 45, [2011] CEC 903.............................................. 2.265 USP Strategies plc v London General Holdings Ltd [2004] EWHC 373.............................. 11.92 Uniplex v NHS BSA (ECJ 28/01/2010)................................................................................... 10.172 Unichem Ltd v OFT [2005] CAT 8, CAT.....................................................................10.130, 10.153 Unilever plc v Procter & Gamble Co [1999] 2 All ER 691, [1999] 1 WLR 1630, [1999] FSR 849, [1999] NLJR 370; affd [2001] 1 All ER 783, [2000] 1 WLR 2436, [2000] FSR 433, [1999] 44 LS Gaz R 40, 143 SJ LB 268, CA..................................................................... 11.111 Union for Abolition of Vivisection v Information Comr & Newcastle University (EA/2010/0064)................................................................................................................. 1.227 Union Nationale des Entraîneurs et Cadres Techniques Professionnels du Football (UNECTEF) v Heylens (Case 222/86) [1987] ECR 4097, [1989] 1 CMLR 901, ECJ.. 1.289, 10.159 United States v Marchetti 466 F 2d 1309 (1972)..................................................................... 4.284 Universal Thermosensors Ltd v Hibben [1992] 3 All ER 257, [1992] 1 WLR 840, [1992] FSR 361, [1992] 26 LS Gaz R 31, [1992] NLJR 195........................................................ 11.119 University of Central Lancashire v Information Comr & David Colquhoun (EA/2009/0034)........................................................................................................... 1.191, 1.219 University of Glasgow v Jindal [2001] All ER (D) 385 (May), EAT (Sc)................................. 11.75 University of Newcastle upon Tyne v Information Comr & BUAV [2011] UKUT 185 (AAC)... 1.227 University of Nottingham v Fishel [2000] ICR 1462, [2000] IRLR 471, [2000] ELR 385.... 4.307 Urmenyi v Information Comr & MB Sutton (EA/2006/0093)............................................... 1.71 Uzukausakas v Lithuania [2010] ECHR 1060.......................................................................... 10.127 V V (minors: sexual abuse: disclosure), Re see L, Re; Re V (minors: sexual abuse: disclosure) VK v Norfolk CC (The Times, 6 January 2005)...................................................................... 10.159 VVT v Switzerland (2001) 10 BHRC 473, ECtHR................................................................. 4.369 Varnava v Turkey [2010] 50 EHRR 21..................................................................................... 10.175 Vassilou v Hajigeorgiou [2005] EWCA Civ 236, [2005] 1 WLR 2195, [2005] 3 All ER 17... 11.26 Vaughn v Rosen 484 F 2d 820 (1973) (CA DC) ...................................................................... 1.108 Vehicle Certification Agency v Information Comr (EA/2016/0190)....................................... 3.37 Veld v Council (Case T-529/09) [2014] 7 WLUK 141, [2015] 1 CMLR 11.......................  5.69, 5.70 Venables v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] 1 All ER 908, [2001] NLJR 57, [2001] 12 LS Gaz R 41, 145 SJ LB 43........................................................................................ 2.228, 2.231 Veolia ES Nottinghamshire Ltd v Nottinghamshire County Council [2010] EWCA Civ 1214.................................................................................................................................... 9.11 Vereniging Weekblad Bluf v The Netherlands (1995) 20 EHRR 189..................................... 4.182 Vestergaard Frandsen A/S v Bestnet Europe Ltd [2009] EWHC 1456 (Ch), [2010] FSR 2.. 4.315 Vilvarajah v United Kingdom (1991) 14 EHRR 248............................................................... 10.134 Visser (W) v Information Comr (EA/2011/0018).................................................................... 1.219 Volker und M Schecke etc v Land Hessen (Case 93/09).......................................................... 5.74 Volvox Establishment v Secretary of State for the Environment [1988] 1 PLR 49, [1988] JPL 400.............................................................................................................................. 10.162 Von Hannover v Germany (Application 59320/00) 24 June 2004, ECtHR..................... 2.218, 2.219, 2.221, 2.234 Vovias (Y) v Information Comr (EA/2011/0007)..................................................................... 1.150 W W, Re [1989] 1 FLR 246 see Cleveland County Council v W (A Minor) (Wardship: Freedom of Publication), Re [1992] 1 All ER 794, CA...............................................................  11.6, 11.7 W (A Minor) (Wardship: Restrictions on Publication), Re [1995] 2 FLR 466, CA................ 11.7 W (children) (identification: restrictions on publication) [2005] EWHC 1564 (Fam), [2006] 1 FLR 1, [2007] 3 FCR 69................................................................................................. 4.325 W (minors) (social worker: disclosure), Re [1998] 2 All ER 801, [1999] 1 WLR 205, [1998] 2 FCR 405, [1998] 2 FLR 135, [1998] Fam Law 387, 142 SJ LB 132, CA...................  11.6, 11.9 W & Others (Children) (Care Proceedings: disclosure), Re [2004] 1 All ER 787.................. 11.6 W v Egdell [1990] Ch 359, [1989] 1 All ER 1089, [1989] 2 WLR 689, 133 SJ 570; affd [1990] Ch 359, [1990] 1 All ER 835, [1990] 2 WLR 471, 4 BMLR 96, 134 SJ 286, [1990] 12 LS Gaz R 41, CA..............................................................................................................  4.323, 11.69 W v Greenwich London Borough Council [1989] FCR 397, [1989] 2 FLR 67, [1989] Fam Law 274, 133 SJ 388.......................................................................................................... 10.158 WM Morrison Supermarkets plc v Various Claimants [2018] EWCA Civ 2339, [2018] 10 WLUK 345, [2019] IRLR 73............................................................................................ 2.168

Table of cases   cxix W, Y v SO, News Group Newspapers Ltd [2003] 2 FCR 686................................................. 11.12 Wade v British Sky Broadcasting [2016] EWCA Civ 1214, [2016] 12 WLUK 2................... 4.315 Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53, [2003] 4 All ER 969, HL......................  4.319, 4.320 Wainwright v United Kingdom (application no 12350/04)..............................................  2.218, 4.319 Waite v United Kingdom (2003) 36 EHRR 54, ECtHR......................................................... 10.117 Wallis (D) v Information Comr (EA/2011/0219)..................................................................... 3.40 Watkins v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] 4 All ER 1158, CA.............. 10.52 Watts (M) v Information Comr (EA/2007/0022)..................................................................... 3.42 Waugh v British Railways Board [1980] AC 521, [1979] 2 All ER 1169, [1979] 3 WLR 150, [1979] IRLR 364, 123 SJ 506, HL.................................................................................... 11.99 Webster v James Chapman & Co (a firm) [1989] 3 All ER 939............................................... 11.108 Weeks v United Kingdom (1987) 10 EHRR 293, ECtHR.............................................. 10.157, 11.69 Weiss v Information Comr (EA/2011/0191)............................................................................ 1.167 West Lancashire DC v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport & the Regions [1998] JPL 1086, [1998] EG 33 (CS), (1998) 95(9) LSG 30............................................ 9.125 Westcott v Westcott [2008] EWCA Civ 818, [2009] QB 407, [2009] 2 WLR 838................. 11.37 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669, [1996] 2 All ER 961, [1996] 2 WLR 802, 95 LGR 1, [1996] NLJR 877, 140 SJ LB 136, HL.............................................................................................................................. 9.158 Wheeler v Le Marchant (1881) 17 Ch D 675, 50 LJ Ch 793, 45 JP 728, 30 WR 235, 44 LT 632, CA.......................................................................................................................  4.276, 11.95 White v Withers LLP [2008] EWHC 2821 (QB)................................................................... 2.235 Whitfield v United Kingdom (The Times, 27 April 2005).................. 10.118, 10.132, 10.133, 10.141 Whitney v California 274 US 357 (1927)................................................................................. 4.5 Wilkes v Spooner [1911] 2 KB 473, 80 LJKB 1107, 55 SJ 479, 104 LT 911, 27 TLR 426, CA...................................................................................................................................... 4.316 Williams v Home Office [1981] 1 All ER 1151......................................................  11.61, 11.69, 11.70 Willow (C) v Information Comr & Ministry of Justice [2017] EWCA Civ 1876; [2017] 11 WLUK 507; application for permission to appeal refused by SCt, 1 May 2018............. 1.149 Wilson v Comr of Police for the Metropolis & National Poilce Chief’s Council [2018] UKIPTrib IPT 11 167....................................................................................................... 11.55 Wilson v Evans [1962] 2 QB 383, [1962] 1 All ER 247, [1962] 2 WLR 532, 126 JP 88, 60 LGR 91, 14 P & CR 13..................................................................................................... 8.61 Wilson (Michael) & Partners Ltd v Emmott [2008] EWCA Civ 184, [2008] Bus LR 1361, [2008] 2 All ER (Comm) 193............................................................................................. 11.37 Wiseman v Borneman [1971] AC 297, [1969] 3 All ER 275, [1969] 3 WLR 706, 45 TC 540, 48 ATC 278, [1969] TR 279, 113 SJ 838, HL................................................................... 10.130 Wood v Comr of Police [2009] EWCA Civ 414, [2010] 1 WLR 123, [2009] 4 All ER 951... 2.235, 4.212 Woodward v Hutchins [1977] 2 All ER 751, [1977] 1 WLR 760, 121 SJ 409, CA.........  2.234, 4.318 Woolgar v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [1999] 3 All ER 604, [2000] 1 WLR 25, 50 BMLR 296, [1999] 23 LS Gaz R 33, [1999] NLJR 857, CA..........................  1.274, 2.273, 4.326 Worcestershire CC v Information Comr (EA/2015/0209)...................................................... 3.38 X X (a Child), Re [2001] FCR 541............................................................................................... 11.6 X (a minor), Re [1984] 1 WLR 1422 see X County Council v A X (a minor) (adoption details: disclosure), Re [1994] Fam 174, [1994] 3 All ER 372, [1994] 3 WLR 327, [1995] 1 FCR 135, [1994] 2 FLR 450, [1994] Fam Law 555, 92 LGR 656, CA...................................................................................................................................... 4.323 X v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633, [1995] 3 All ER 353, [1995] 3 WLR 152, [1995] 3 FCR 337, [1995] 2 FLR 276, [1995] Fam Law 537, [1995] ELR 404, 26 BMLR 15, 160 LG Rev 103, [1995] NLJR 993, HL.................................................................... 10.52 X v Dempster [1999] 3 FCR 757, [1999] 1 FLR 894, [1999] Fam Law 300........................... 11.9 X v Germany (Application 4274/69) 35 Collection Dec 158................................................... 4.343 X v Metropolitan Police Commissioner (2003) New LJ 719................................................... 11.4 X v Norway (Application 9401/81) 27 Decisions & Reports 228............................................ 4.343 X v United Kingdom (1982) 30 DR 239.................................................................................. 2.274 X v Unnamed Persons [2006] EWHC 2783 (QB), [2007] EMLR 10, [2007] 1 FLR 1567.... 2.235 X v Y [1988] 2 All ER 648, [1988] RPC 379, 3 BMLR 1, [1987] NLJ Rep 1062.................... 11.49 X v Y (employment sex offender) [2004] EWCA Civ 662, [2004] 5 WLUK 745, [2004] ICR 1634, [2004] IRLR 625, [2004] UKHRR 1172, (2004) 148 SJLB 697............................. 2.290 X & Y v Netherlands (1985) 8 EHRR 235, ECtHR................................................................ 2.216

cxx  Table of cases X County Council v A [1985] 1 All ER 53, 128 SJ 873, [1984] LS Gaz R 3259, sub nom Re X (a minor) [1984] 1 WLR 1422, sub nom Re AB [1985] FLR 470, [1985] Fam Law 59.... 2.228, 4.365, 11.12 X (formerly M Bell) v O’Brien [2003] EWHC 1101............................................................... 2.228 X Ltd v Morgan-Grampian (Publishers) Ltd [1991] 1 AC 1, [1990] 2 All ER 1, [1990] 2 WLR 1000, 134 SJ 546, [1990] 17 LS Gaz R 28, [1990] NLJR 553, HL................. 1.144, 11.39 Y YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 58, [2008] 1 AC 332, [2008] 2 WLR 31....... 1.85 YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 27, [2008] 1 AC 95, [2007] 3 WLR 112, [2007] 3 All ER 957, [2007] 6 WLUK 427, [2007] HRLR 32, [2008] UKHRR 346, [2007] HLR 44, [2008] BLGR 273, (2007) 10 CCL Rep 505, [2007] LS Law Medical 472, (2007) 96 BMLR 1, (2007) 104(27) LSG 29, (2007) 157 NLJ 938, (2007) 151 SJLB 860, [2007] NPC 75........................................................................................................... 3.14 YS v Minister voor Immigratie Integratie en Asiel [2015] 1 WLR 609, [2014] 7 WLUK 700, [2015] 1 CMLR 18............................................................................................................ 2.19 Yassin Abdullah Kadi & Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union & Commission of the European Communities (Case C-415/05 P) [2009] 1 AC 1225, [2009] 3 WLR 872, [2010] All ER (EC) 1105......................................................... 5.68 Young (W) v Information Comr & DoE NI (EA/2007/0048)................................................. 3.54 Z Z (a minor) (identification: restrictions on publications), Re [1997] Fam 1, [1995] 4 All ER 961, [1996] 2 WLR 88, [1996] 2 FCR 164, [1996] 1 FLR 191, [1996] Fam Law 90, CA...................................................................................................................................  11.6, 11.7 Z v Finland (1998) 25 EHRR 371...........................................................................  2.218, 4.326, 11.69 Z v United Kingdom (Application 29392/95) [2000] 2 FCR 245, E Com HR....................... 10.52 ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 4, [2011] 2 AC 166, [2011] 2 WLR 148, [2011] 2 All ER 783, [2011] 2 WLUK 49, [2011] 1 FLR 2170, [2011] 1 FCR 221, [2011] HRLR 15, [2011] UKHRR 371, [2011] Imm AR 395, [2011] INLR 369, [2011] Fam Law 468, (2011) 108(7) LSG 17, (2011) 155(5) SJLB 3011] 2 AC 166............................................................................................................................... 2.245 ZXC v Bloomberg LP [2017] EWHC 328 (QB), [2017] 2 WLUK 614, [2017] EMLR 21, [2017] Lloyd’s Rep FC 206................................................................................................ 2.247 Zacharides v Information Comr (EA/2010/0162).................................................................... 1.203 Zoumbas v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] UKSC 74, [2013] 1 WLR 3690, [2014] 1 All ER 638, 2014 SC (UKSC) 75, [2013] 11 WLUK 715, [2014] 1 FCR 141, [2014] Imm AR 479, [2014] INLR 262..................................................................... 2.245 Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen AG v Hauptzollamt Itzehoe (Cases C-143/88, C-92/89) [1991] ECR I-415, [1993] 3 CMLR 1, ECJ...................................................................... 11.136 CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF EUROPEAN CASES 7/61: EC Commission v Italy [1961] ECR 317, [1962] CMLR 39, ECJ................................. 10.159 4/73: Nold (J) KG v EC Commission [1974] ECR 491, [1974] 2 CMLR 338, ECJ.............. 11.138 155/79: AM & S Europe Ltd v EC Commission [1983] QB 878, [1983] 1 All ER 705, [1983] 3 WLR 17, [1982] ECR 1575, [1982] 2 CMLR 264, [1982] FSR 474, 127 SJ 410, ECJ.11.128 222/84: Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1987] QB 129, [1986] 3 All ER 135, [1986] 3 WLR 1038, [1986] ECR 1651, [1986] 3 CMLR 240, [1987] ICR 83, [1986] IRLR 263, 130 SJ 953, [1987] LS Gaz R 188, ECJ...................... 11.76 222/86: Union Nationale des Entraîneurs et Cadres Techniques Professionnels du Football (UNECTEF) v Heylens [1987] ECR 4097, [1989] 1 CMLR 901, ECJ..................1.289, 10.159 53/85: AKZO Chemie BV v EC Commission [1986] ECR 1965, [1987] 1 CMLR 231, ECJ..........................................................................................................................  11.127, 11.130 118/85: Amministrazione Autonoma Dei Monopoli Di Stato, Re: EC Commission v Italy [1987] ECR 2599, [1988] 3 CMLR 255............................................................................ 11.123 121/86R: Epikhiriseon Metalleftikon Viomitkhanikon Kai Naftiliakon AE v EC Council & Commission [1987] 1 CMLR 57, ECJ.............................................................................. 11.131 C-374/87: Orkem SA (formerly cdF Chimie SA) v Commission of the European Communities [1989] ECR 3283, [1991] 4 CMLR 502.................................................... 11.126 378/87R:Top Hit Holzvertrieb GmbH v EC Commission [1988] ECR 161,[1988] 2 CMLR 594, ECJ..................................................................................................................................... 11.136 C-143/88 & C-92/89: Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen AG v Hauptzollamt Itzehoe [1991] ECR I-415, [1993] 3 CMLR 1, ECJ................................................................................. 11.136

Table of cases   cxxi T-30/89: Hilti v EC Commission [1990] ECR II-163, [1992] 4 CMLR 16, CFI................... 11.127 T-36/91: ICI plc v EC Commission [1995] All ER (EC) 600, [1995] ECR II-1847, CFI...... 11.127 C-465/93: Atlanta Fruchthandelsgesellschaft mbH v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft [1996] All ER (EC) 31, [1995] ECR I-3761, [1996] 1 CMLR 575, ECJ 11.136 C-70/95: Sodemare SA v Regione Lombardia [1998] 4 CMLR 667, ECJ.............................. 10.159 T-174/95: Svenska Journalistförbundet (supported by Sweden) v EU Council (supported by France) [1998] All ER (EC) 545, [1998] ECR II-2289, [1998] 3 CMLR 645, [1998] 34 LS Gaz R 33, CFI....................................................................................................... 1.297, 11.76 T-112/98: Mannesmannrohren-Werke [2001] ECR II-729, [2001] 5 CMLR 1..................... 11.126 C-324/98: Telaustria v Telekom Austria [2000] ECR I-10745, ECJ........................................ 9.155 C-369/98: R v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food, ex p Fisher (t/a T R & P Fisher) (The Times, 10 October 2000).......................................................................................... 1.267 C-274/99 P: Connolly v EC Commission [2001] ECR I-1611, ECJ...................................... 7.19 C-340/00 P: EC Commission v Cwik ...................................................................................... 7.19 C-465/00: Österreichischer Rundfunk [2003] ECR I-4989, [2003] 3 CMLR 10................... 5.71 T-318/01: Othman v Council & Commission [2009] All ER (EC) 873, [2009] ECR II1627.................................................................................................................................... 5.68 T-168/02: Internationaler Tierschutz-Fonds GmbH v EC Commission (The Times, 20 December 2004)................................................................................................................ 5.80 C-237/02: Franchet v Commission [2006] ECR II-2023, [2007] 1 CMLR 39....................... 5.74 T-125/03R: AKZO Nobel Chemicals Ltd v EC Commission [2004] 4 CMLR 744, CFI..... 11.128 T-233/09: Access Info Europe v Council [2011] All ER (EC) 603.......................................... 5.79 T-36/04: Association de la Presse Internationale ASBL v Commission [2007] CMLR 51..... 5.74, 5.77 T-194/04: Bavarian Lager v Commission [2007] ECR II-4523, [2008] 1 CMLR 35........  5.71, 5.72, 5.108 T-144/05: Muniz v Commission .............................................................................................. 5.78 C-39/05: Sweden v Council of the European Union [2009] QB 269, [2009] 2 WLR 867, [2007] ECR I-4723.....................................................................................  5.76, 5.77, 5.83, 5.107 C-39/05 P & C-52/05 P: Turco v Council [2009] QB 269, [2009] 2 WLR 867, [2008] ECR I-4723...........................................................................................................................  5.76, 5.107 C-64/05 P: Sweden (IFAW) v Commission [2008] B 902, [2008] 3 WLR 756, [2007] ECR I-11389..........................................................................................................  5.81, 5.110 C-266/05 P: Sison v Council of the EU [2007] ECR I-1233, [2007] 2 CMLR 17...... 5.68, 5.82, 5.83 C-275/06: Productores de Musica de Espana (Promusicae) v Telefonica de Espana SAU [2008] All ER (EC) 809, [2008] ECR I-271, [2008] 2 CMLR 17.................................... 2.9 C-139/07 P: Commission v TGI [2011] 1 CMLR 3, [2011] Bus LR D81....................... 5.79, 11.127 C-550/07 P: European Commission v Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau GmbH [2010] ECR I-5885, [2010] 6 WLUK 713, [2011] 1 CMLR 3, [2011] Bus LR D81........................... 11.128 C-28/08 P: Bavarian Lager v Commission [2011] Bus LR 867, [2010] 6 WLUK 672, [2011] 1 CMLR 1, [2011] All ER (EC) 1007............................................................................... 2.9, 2.82 C-471/08: Toland v European Parliament [2011] 1 CMLR 8, [2011] CEC 494, [2011] ICR 99........................................................................................................................... 2.90, 5.74, 5.78 C-506/08 P: Sweden v MyTravel & Commission [2011] 7 WLUK 628, [2011] 5 CMLR 18, [2012] All ER (EC) 968.................................................................................................. 5.69, 5.79 C-93/09: Eifert (Hartmut) v Land Hessen [2010] 11 WLUK 251, [2012] All ER (EC) 127.....  3.54, 5.73 C-360/09: Pfeiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt [2011] All ER (EC) 979, [2011] 5 CMLR 7..... 11.127 T-529/09: Veld v Council [2014] 7 WLUK 141, [2015] 1 CMLR 11................................. 5.69, 5.70 C-71/10: Ofcom v Information Comr [2011] PTSR 1676, [2011] 7 WLUK 826, [2012] 1 CMLR 7, [2012] Env LR 7................................................................................................ 3.43 T-590/10: Thesing & Bloomberg Finance LP v ECB [2012] 11 WLUK 865, [2013] 2 CMLR 8............................................................................................................................. 5.49 T-331/11: Besselink v Council [2013] 9 WLUK 215, [2014] 1 CMLR 28............................. 5.69 C-514/11 P & C-605/11 P: LPN & Finland v Commission [2013] 6 WLUK 9, [2013] ETMR 47........................................................................................................................... 5.79 C-131/12: Google Spain v Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos (AEPD) [2014] QB 1022, [2014] 3 WLR 659, [2014] 2 All ER (Comm) 301, [2014] 5 WLUK 394, [2014] 3 CMLR 50, [2014] All ER (EC) 717, [2014] ECDR 16, [2014] EMLR 27, 36 BHRC 589, (2014) 164(7607) NLJ 20........................................................................................... 2.7 C-293/12 & C-594/12: Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine & Natural Resources [2015] QB 127, [2014] 3 WLR 1607, [2014] 2 All ER (Comm) 1, [2014] 4 WLUK 285, [2014] 3 CMLR 44, [2014] All ER (EC) 775..................  2.9, 2.343, 4.207

cxxii  Table of cases C-365/12 P: Commission v EnBW [2014] 2 WLUK 930, [2014] 4 CMLR 30...................... 5.79 T-115/13: Dennekamp v European Parliament ...................................................................... 5.73 C-615/13 P: Client Earth & PAN Europe v EFSA ..............................................................  5.73, 5.79 C-617/13 P: European Commission v Stichting Greenpeace Nederland .............................. 3.11 C-71/14: East Sussex County v Information Comr [2016] PTSR 179, [2015] 10 WLUK 129, [2016] 2 CMLR 5, [2016] Env LR 12....................................................................... 3.26 C-247/14 P: Heidelberg Cement AG v European Commission [2016] 3 WLUK 282, [2016] 4 CMLR 28........................................................................................................................ 11.129 C-362/14: Schrems v Data Protection Comr [2016] QB 527, [2016] 2 WLR 873, [2015] 10 WLUK 117, [2016] 2 CMLR 2, [2016] CEC 647............................................................ 2.8 C-562/14 P: Sweden v Commission ........................................................................................ 6.65 T-796/14: Phillip Morris Benelux v Commission ................................................................... 5.79 T-800/14: Phillip Morris v Commission ................................................................................. 5.79 T-18/15: Phillip Morris v Commission ................................................................................... 5.79 C-203/15: Tele2 Sverige AB v Post- och telestyrelsen [2017] QB 771, [2017] 2 WLR 1289, [2016] 12 WLUK 618, [2017] 2 CMLR 30................................................................... 2.9, 4.236 C-213/15: European Commission v Breyer [2017] 7 WLUK 359, [2018] 1 CMLR 24, [2018] CEC 475................................................................................................................. 5.76 C-331/15 P: European Commission v Schlyter [2018] 1 WLR 1365, [2017] 9 WLUK 90... 5.76 T-540/15: De Canitaini v EP ................................................................................................... 5.64 C-193/16: NF v European Council ......................................................................................... 5.70 T-851/16: Access Info Europe v Commission ......................................................................... 5.70 C-507/17: Google Inc v CNIL (10/01/2019)........................................................................... 2.7 T-440/17: Arca Capital Bohemia v Commission [2018] EUECJ.........................................  5.74, 5.79

Chapter 1

The freedom of information legislation

‘Truth, like all other good things, may be loved unwisely – may be pursued too keenly – may cost too much.’ Knight Bruce V-C  in Pearse v Pearse (1846) 1 De G & Sm 12 at 28–29 ‘… but at the length truth will out.’ Merchant of Venice II.2 645 ‘Information is the key to sound decision-making, to accountability and development; it underpins democracy and assists in combatting poverty, oppression, corruption, prejudice and inefficiency.’ Lord Mance in Kennedy v Charity Commission [2014] UKSC 20 at para 1 ‘The Freedom of Information Act 2000 was a landmark enactment of great constitutional significance for the United Kingdom. It introduced a new regime governing the disclosure of information held by public authorities.’ Lord Sumption in Kennedy above at para 153

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 1.1  In December 1997, the new Labour government published its proposals for freedom of information (FOI) legislation.1 These were widely acclaimed among the FOI community in the UK, and further afield, for being liberal and for making a bold statement about the future emphasis of openness in the conduct of British government. Prime Minister Blair had been a keen advocate for freedom of information when leader of the opposition although in his memoirs he described the Act as an act of stupidity ‘undermining … serious government’.2 Some observers felt that the White Paper was too bold to become a reality. The White Paper (WP) was hotly contested in government and the Minister responsible for its drafting was subsequently dismissed from the Cabinet.3 In May 1999, a draft Bill was published together with a Consultation Paper.4 Like the White Paper, these were subject to scrutiny by the House of Commons Select Committee on Public Administration in the House of Commons5 and also, and in this case unlike the WP, by a committee of the House of Lords.6

2  Chapter 1 The Commons Committee noted that ‘legislation on the information rights of citizens is a historic moment for our history’. In November 1999, the Bill was published and presented to Parliament. The Bill received Royal Assent on 30 November 2000 after the government imposed a guillotine to force the Bill through the Commons following its return from the Lords, to avoid debate of 118 late amendments. Your Right to Know: Freedom of Information Cm 3818, December 1997. T Blair A Journey (2010) pp 516–517. 3 David Clark, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. 4 Freedom of Information. Consultation on Draft Legislation Cm 4355 (Home Office). 5 In the case of the Bill, pre-legislative scrutiny: see HC  398  I  and II  (1997/98) on the White Paper, HC 1020 (1997/98) for the Government Reply; HC 570 I and II (1998/99) for the Select Committee on Public Administration’s report on the draft Bill. 6 HL 97 (1998/99). 1 2

1.2  The path to freedom of information in the United Kingdom had been a labyrinthine one and the Bill emerged well over thirty years after the Americans introduced the first of various laws on access rights to information and meetings1 and long after various laws on FOI were introduced in the Commonwealth, on the Continent and in Ireland.2 Sweden’s laws on access to information go back to 1766 and were introduced under a Freedom of Press Act. There are over 110 states with FOI statutes and they are becoming features of international organisations such as the European Union (see ch  5).3 However, in Australia there have been inroads into access to information laws.4 While FOI laws are often supported in terms of strengthening democracy since the turn of the 21st century no fewer than 25 ‘democratic’ countries have ceased being democratic.5 FOI laws were introduced initially into an information era that was largely undigitised. Now the world is increasingly in thrall to globalised electronic communications with the ability ‘to make one little space an everywhere’. Devotees not only number film stars and celebrities but heads of state. While we have benefited from the revolution in communications and facilitation of information resources, the downside has been an intrusive and frightening capacity to farm and use our personal data and to access our own information resources. Every second, 2.6 million emails are sent, 64,533 Google searches are made and 7,885 opinions are tweeted.6 The view that the internet is a liberating, decentralised and empowering receptacle of knowledge and information has its flip-side. Intrusion into communications is accompanied by state sponsored, political party and social media manipulation of IT and communications systems that has brought a new dimension to the power of the ‘hidden persuaders’. FOI seemed a vindication of democracy: now democracy itself and its future are threatened by the unbridled power of data and its controllers.7 Freedom of information and openness (ie  open meetings, open fora, open business) have today been embraced by ‘transparency’. Transparency entails not only access to decision-making and ensuring that decision-making processes are made publicly available but making the processes of power and governance easily explicable, traceable and comprehensible – to shine light in hitherto hidden places, spaces and networks. It involves adding perspicuity to the language and operation of power.8

The freedom of information legislation   3 P Birkinshaw Freedom of Information: the Law, the Practice and the Ideal (4th edn, 2010) ch 12. A useful account is contained in: A McDonald and G Terril (eds) Open Government: Freedom of Information and Privacy (1998). Two recent works on FOI are: McDonald and Jones (eds) The Law of Freedom of Information (2009, 2nd edn); and P Coppel Information Rights (2014, 4th edn), both of which cover overseas regimes. See J Wadham et al Blackstone’s Guide to the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (2011, 4th edn). See J Plotnikoff and R Woolfson Management of FOI Requests in Other Jurisdictions (2003) at www.dca.gov.uk/foi/impgroup/07-07c.pdf, and M  McDonagh Freedom of Information Law in Ireland (2006, 2nd edn) for some useful comparative aspects. The impact of the FOIA 2000 on central government has been examined in R Hazell, B Worthy and M Glover The Impact of the FOI Act 2000 on Central Government in the UK. Does FOI Work? (2010); B Worthy The Politics of Freedom of Information: How and Why Governments Pass Laws that Threaten their Power (2017) MUP. 3 http://home.broadpark.no/~wkeim/foi-list.htm. 4 The Office of the Australian Information Commissioner still exists although the government appeared to be on the point of abolishing the office several years ago. 5 Larry Diamond http://nextgenerationdemocracy.org/624/ (14/01/2018). Diamond includes countries such as Russia, Turkey, Hungary. He associates decline in democracy with weakening of good governance, transparency and the rule of law. Clearly his concept is a fluid one. 6 Editorial The Guardian 5 January 2018. 7 N Cheeseman and B Klass How to Rig an Election (2018), D Runciman Is this the End of Democracy? (2016). The Electoral Commission published a report in June 2018 Digital Campaigning: increasing transparency for voters https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_ file/0010/244594/Digital-campaigning-improving-transparency-for-voters.pdf (2/07/2018). Demos has written that in 2017 there were 8.4 billion connected devices to the internet. By 2020 it will be thirty billion The Future of Political Campaigning Demos (2018) p 2. See Democracy Disrupted. Personal Information and Political Influence. ICO (2018) https://ico.org.uk/media/actionweve-taken/2259369/democracy-disrupted-110718.pdf (10/07/2018). 8 These concepts are developed in P  Birkinshaw ‘Freedom of Information and Openness: Fundamental Human Rights?’ (2006) Admin LR 177, pp 188–191. 1 2

1.3  There had been numerous Private Members’ Bills which Labour when previously in power and while in opposition continually supported.1 The excessive secrecy of British government and the hostility of Mrs Thatcher in particular to any interference to the British way of doing things under the banner of representative government and collective and individual responsibility of Ministers to Parliament ensured that no laws would be introduced under a Conservative government which imposed a legal duty on central government to disclose information. Laws relating to public records had been introduced in 1958 allowing publication of public records held in the Public Record Office (now National Archives) after originally 50 years, successively reduced to 30 and now 20 years (see para 4.62 below). Concessions were made by the Major government which produced a Code of Practice on Open Government2 which was in operation until 31 December 2004 (see ch 4). This Code covered bodies within the jurisdiction of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration (PCA) – the Parliamentary ombudsman.3 Local government produced their own guidance on access to information and guidance was provided by the Commission for Local Administration and health authorities and trusts had their own guidance and codes.4 Virtually all UK public authorities are now subject to the Freedom of Information Act 2000 which came into effect, to allow individual access to records held by public authorities, on 1 January 2005. The provisions on publication schemes have been operational since November 2002 (see para 1.48 below).

4  Chapter 1

See P Birkinshaw and A Parkin ‘Freedom of Information’ in Constitutional Reform eds R Blackburn and R Plant (1999). 2 Code of Practice on Access to Government Information: Open Government (2nd edn, 1997) and accompanying Guidance on Interpretation. 3 The Code was tagged on to his governing Act but was non-statutory. See paras 4.18 et seq below. 4 Open Government: A Good Practice Note on Access to Information ACC, AMA, AMA (1995); LGO Issue 6 March 1996, Commission for Local Administration; Code of Practice on Openness in the NHS, NHS Executive (1995). 1

1.4  The 1994 Code, which was revised in 1997, has been praised for helping to introduce greater openness into the operations of government and, in spite of some criticisms, for making officials less defensive about access to information requests. It remained, however, an administrative code, and had serious shortcomings in its design and contents. Many of these deficiencies were highlighted in the government’s 1997 white paper on open government.1 Many individual statutory provisions allowed for access to information in specific circumstances – this book is replete with such examples. One such is s 66 of the Land Registration Act 2002 which allows inspection of the register of title to real estate subject to exemptions. Your Right to Know above.

1

1.5  The Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA 2000), or more accurately its individual access provisions, was delayed from coming into force for over four years from the date of the completion of its passage through Parliament. Although the White Paper was very green at the edges, and did nothing to allay anxieties about the relationship between access to information and privacy protection,1 it was generally very liberal in its content. There were fears that the longer the delay in producing legislation, the more cautious the government would become as it experienced the usual leaks and information disclosures which caused it maximum embarrassment. Particularly affected were the Foreign Secretary, the Trade and Industry Secretary, the Prime Minister and, conspicuously, the Home Secretary who suffered a series of difficulties over the premature disclosure and then wrongful publication of sensitive facts in the Stephen Lawrence inquiry.2 Responsibility for the Bill had in fact been transferred to the Home Office and had been taken away from the Cabinet Office in the summer of 1998 when the Minister who had inspired the liberal contents of the White Paper was dismissed. This was subject to a great deal of criticism in the Select Committee in the Commons. Cm 4262 I and II (revised). Identities and addresses of witnesses had been revealed in the original report. Stephen Lawrence was the victim of a notorious racist gang attack in which he was murdered.

1 2

1.6  As at the time of writing, the FOIA is under the sponsorship of the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport. The 2016–17 annual report refers to a draft memorandum of understanding between the department and the ICO setting out the latter’s independence. The operations and administration of the Act fall within the remit of the Commons Select Committee on Digital, Culture, Media and Sport which is responsible for DPA policy. In 2016, a review of the Act was conducted by an Independent Commission which had been appointed by the Minister for the Cabinet Office (CO). The CO has a

The freedom of information legislation   5 central policy oversight of the FOIA and publishes quarterly statistics on FOIA data with the MoJ.1 There were anxieties that the Act would be savaged by the Commission. In fact, the Commission reported that the Act was working well and had ‘helped to change the culture of the public sector’. FOIA had enhanced openness and transparency.2 https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/government-foi-statistics (30/04/2018). The IC in her annual report for 2016–17 stated that the CO had responsibility for policy on FOI. In April 2018 the CO was still publishing the FOI statistics. The Cabinet Office retains responsibility for FOI policy. 2 https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/independent-commission-on-freedom-ofinformation, p 3. 1

1.7  Since the Act was passed in 2000 the world has become far more security conscious after the events of 11  September 2001. The war in Iraq promoted the Prime Minister into the glare of unremitting publicity in relation to the use of intelligence and information by the government in its case for armed intervention in Iraq, Afghanistan and the use of drones in Syria and elsewhere. Three major inquiries, in addition to Parliamentary and other inquiries, have been conducted: one into the circumstances surrounding the death of the scientific adviser, David Kelly, whose comments on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq to a reporter for the BBC led to internationally sensational events concerning allegations of Prime Ministerial doctoring of intelligence; the second concerned the use of intelligence on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by the government. The first was conducted by a Law Lord, Lord Hutton, the second by the former Cabinet Secretary, Lord Butler.1 The third was chaired by Sir John Chilcot and was commissioned by the Prime Minister Gordon Brown in 2009 to consider the period from the summer of 2001 to the end of July 2009, embracing the run-up to the conflict in Iraq, the military action and its aftermath. The inquiry considered the ‘UK’s involvement in Iraq, including the way decisions were made and actions taken, to establish, as accurately as possible, what happened and to identify the lessons that can be learned’.2 The inquiry reported in July 2016.3 The government’s reply setting out key actions following the Butler inquiry into the use of intelligence is Cm 6492 (March 2005). These inquiries had unparalleled access to the most sensitive of information – much of it unobtainable under the FOIA. The Secretary to the Hutton Inquiry adopted a public interest test like the one under the FOIA to determine which materials should not be published (see para  1.98 below). In the event, he withheld two pages of documents on grounds of national security and personal information. He adopted a ‘bold view’ of the public interest although he embargoed some medical information for 70 years, the Daily Mail reported.4 The Chilcot inquiry took evidence in public and private sessions after protest over the possibility of an exclusively private inquiry. The Inquiry committee intended to include in the report ‘all but the most sensitive information essential to our national security’. The report was debated in Parliament. Witnesses included the former Prime Minister Tony Blair (who was called to give further evidence after the publication of a note from the Attorney General in his government indicating an opinion on the need for a further resolution of UN support for war in Iraq which differed from hitherto published opinions), the then Prime Minister Gordon Brown

6  Chapter 1 and a former head of the secret service. Shortly after coming to office in May 2010, the Prime Minister of the coalition government announced an inquiry into allegations of British security and intelligence services’ involvement in torture of terrorist suspects. This followed litigation in which US intelligence information was handed to a litigant despite protests from the US and UK governments.5 Sensitive intelligence information would not be made public and there were indications that the government would take measures aimed at preventing disclosure of intelligence information in future litigation.6 We return to these points in chapters 10 and 11. The inquiry under Sir Peter Gibson published an interim, but not a final, report.7 In June 2018, the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament published a damning report on the UK’s involvement in mistreatment of detained terrorist suspects overseas.8 HC 247 (2003–04) for Hutton and HC 898 (2003–04) for Butler. See Hutton and Butler: Lifting the Lid on the Workings of Power, ed W Runciman (2004). The whole question of investigatory inquiries has been examined by the Department for Constitutional Affairs in Effective Inquiries (2004) leading to an Inquiries Act 2005 (see para 10.104 below). The method of inquiry into ministerial irregularities – ad hoc, terms of reference from the Prime Minister and usually by a former civil servant – was heavily criticised. The Committee on Standards in Public Life recommended a standing independent panel of two or three persons who would be independent and of ‘senior standing’ and from which one would be chosen to conduct inquiries into alleged breaches of the Ministerial Code. The panel would last for a Parliament, would be publicly known and reports would be published: Ninth Report Cm 5775 (2003) ch 5. See the Public Administration Committee HC 51 (2004–05) on Government by Inquiry (and see para 10.104 below). On inquiries generally, the chair of the Bichard inquiry (paras 2.277 et seq below) was reportedly sceptical about the effects of inquiries in relation to reform: Guardian (2010) 16 September. 2 http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/about.aspx. 3 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20171123123857/http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/theinquiry/. See C Lamb v IC EA/2015/0136 for a successful request for access to the criteria for making appointments to Chilcot inquiry. Appeal dismissed CO v IC [2016] UKUT 0476 (AAC). 4 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1245599/David-Kelly-post-mortem-kept-secret-70years-doctors-accuse-Lord-Hutton-concealing-vital-information.html. 5 R (Mohamed) v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [2010] EWCA Civ 65 and 158. See Information Commissioner decision notice FS50279042. 6 Hansard, HC cols 175–90 (6 July 2010). Justice and Security Act 2013. 7 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/report-of-the-detainee-inquiry. 8 Detainee mistreatment and rendition 2001–2010 HC 1113 (2017–19) and Detainee mistreatment and rendition – current issues HC 1114 (2017–19) both at: http://isc.independent.gov.uk/committeereports/special-reports (2/07/2018). The terms and conditions on witness restrictions on national security grounds were such that ‘we would be unable to conduct an authoritative Inquiry and produce a credible Report’. Access to those primarily involved was denied (p  1). Although no direct involvement of physical mistreatment on detainees by UK personnel was uncovered, threats had been made and there was evidence of involvement in mistreatment administered by others. 1

1.8  The FOIA will rarely operate in such lofty circumstances. It will deal with the hum-drum of government and its daily progress – from the infrequent magnificent to the perpetual mundane. Mundanities may of course topple governments. As we will see, there have been sensational cases involving the Information Commissioner and Information Tribunal (now officially: First Tier Tribunal Information Rights) and the Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber), now enriched by judgments from the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. Those on MPs expenses, Cabinet minutes, ministerial

The freedom of information legislation   7 correspondence, reviews of the identity cards and other IT schemes, export credit guarantees, death rates in hospitals, and Prince Charles’ correspondence with ministers readily spring to mind. Also in constant spotlight in the years following the passage of FOIA was the relationship of the Prime Minister to his press secretary and the use by the Government of publicity and communications. This led to a review of Government Communications and a report in January 2004. The report made recommendations for amendment of FOIA before it had come into effect (para 1.42 below) and other recommendations which can be examined in ch  2 together with a House of Lords committee report on government communications (para 4.114 below). 1.9  Reviews of the FOIA have been conducted by Parliamentary committees and a review of the operation of the Act was conducted by Frontier Economics for the Prime Minister in 2006.1  A  review by Paul Dacre into the ‘Thirty Year Rule’ under the Public Records Acts reported in 2009 and made some interesting observations on the operation of FOIA and public records legislation.2 These can be examined below (see para  4.62). The reforms were brought into effect by the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. There was a review by the Justice Committee of the House of Commons which reported in July 2012 (HC 96) (2012–13).3 The conclusion noted that ‘greater release of data is invariably going to lead to greater criticism of public bodies and individuals, which may sometimes be unfair or partial. In our view, however this, while regrettable, is a price well worth paying for the benefits greater openness brings to our democracy’ (para 38). It noted that public participation in central government decision-making had not increased but a culture of greater openness had been witnessed in the public sector (para  43). The Act worked on the principle of requester blindness, and ‘fees at a level high enough to recoup costs would deter requests with a strong public interest and would defeat the purposes of the Act, while fees introduced for commercial and media organisations could be circumvented’ (para 85). A 20-day time limit for internal reviews was recommended. It recommended increasing penalties for requested records destruction (where there was evidence of such but no enforcement action). On the veto power, ‘We have considered other solutions to this problem but, given that the Act has provided one of the most open regimes in the world for access to information at the top of Government, we believe that the veto is an appropriate mechanism, where necessary, to protect policy development at the highest levels’ (para  179). The committee had not found strong evidence of a ‘chilling effect’ on decision-making but there was anecdotal evidence (para 200). ‘The Act was intended to protect high-level policy discussions. We also recognise that the realities of Government mean that the ministerial veto will have to be used from time to time to protect that space’ (para 201). The Committee believed that access to information about private contractors should be in the terms of contracts made between PAs and such contractors rather than in partial designation under s  5. If contract fails, designation may have to be used (para 240). The chair of the committee, Sir Alan Beith MP, reiterating points made by the Cabinet Office commission (referred to at para 1.7 above), observed:

8  Chapter 1 ‘The Freedom of Information Act has enhanced the UK’s democratic system and made our public bodies more open, accountable and transparent. It has been a success and we do not wish to diminish its intended scope, or its effectiveness. The Act was never intended to prevent, limit, or stop the recording of policy discussions in Cabinet or at the highest levels of Government, and we believe that its existing provisions, properly used, are sufficient to maintain the ‘safe space’ for such discussions. These provisions need to be more widely understood within the public service. They include, where appropriate, the use of the ministerial veto.’4 Review of the Impact of the FOIA (2006). Dacre Review of 30 Year Rule (2009), 14: http://www.30yearrulereview.org.uk/. 3 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmjust/96/96.pdf. 4 http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/justicecommittee/news/foi-report/. 1 2

1.10  Generally the 1999 draft Bill was faithful to many of the government’s statements on its legislative plans for freedom of information, but there were serious deviations. There will be access to information, a term which is broadly defined and includes records. A  person is entitled to be informed in writing whether a ‘public authority’ (PA) holds information of the description specified in the request. If that is the case, the person is entitled to have that information communicated to him/her. The Act makes provision for the automatic disclosure of certain kinds of information by public authorities under publication schemes. A person requesting information has a right to be informed by a public authority whether it holds information of the description specified in the request. If so, the information must be communicated to the requester, subject to various conditions concerning fees, assistance in identifying information requested and other matters (see below). The duty will not cover exempt information under Part II of the Act. Section 11 deals with means of communicating information under the Act (see below). 1.11  Public authorities covered by the FOIA 2000 are scheduled in the Act,1 and this comprises a very wide list along the lines set out by the White Paper but with some modifications. Bodies scheduled in a particular capacity are only subject to access requests in that capacity. The Secretary of State is given wide powers to designate ‘public authorities’ in order to add to the scheduled bodies and this clearly will include a power to bring private bodies within the definition, as stated in the WP, although the designation may be restricted to certain ‘functions’ of such bodies, ie those which fulfil a public as opposed to a private purpose. Those under contract with public bodies to provide a service which is a function of the public authority may also be designated. In such a case the FOIA  2000 provisions only apply to functions covering public service and not coincidental ones. In 2009, the then government published plans to designate bodies as public authorities for the FOIA and the incoming coalition government announced further proposed additions in 2010.1 The coalition government also announced plans to extend FOIA.2 In fact, designation has been minimal. The Act incorporates provisions on public

The freedom of information legislation   9 records which, when the Bill was initially published, remained incomplete.3 Provision is made to repeal or amend statutory prohibitions on disclosing information (see para 1.263). See Annex A below for the list of bodies covered by the Act. http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/about-us/legislation/freedom-bill/extendingfoi-ia?view=Binary. A  consultation also took place in connection with the Scottish FOIA and extension. 2 Contained in the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (see para  1.85). See SI  2011/1041 and SI 2011/1042 on adding and removing bodies. 3 Part VI of the FOIA 2000 refers to ‘Historical Records’ ie those in existence 30 years (reduced to 20 years) after their creation. Certain exemptions are removed after 30 years, 60 and 100 years. Some appear to have no time limit (see paras 4.53 et seq below). See also A McDonald ‘Archives and Open Government’ in Open Government eds A  McDonald and G  Terrill (1998). Under FOIA 2000, s 46 the Secretary of State (previously Lord Chancellor) has to make a code of practice for authorities in relation to the holding of public records: see Lord Chancellor’s Code of Practice on the Management of Records under s  46  FOIA, July 2009, Ministry of Justice: https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/research-and-reports/1432475/foi-section-46-codeof-practice-1.pdf. 1

1.12  Crucially, the Bill dropped several of the exclusions outlined for categories of information in the White Paper and made them exemptions. Critically, this covers information relating to the criminal investigation process. Excluded information is totally outside the operation of the Act – the Act has no relevance to it whatsoever. Exempt information is in most cases subject to a public interest test: although notionally exempt the public interest in being disclosed must be considered by the public authority. Public bodies, including designated bodies, will have to consider the public interest in disclosing information even though the information is exempt. Such exemptions are known as ‘qualified’ exemptions. They are to be distinguished from ‘absolute’ exemptions under which public interest disclosures cannot be made. A new absolute exemption was added after litigation arose in relation to the request for correspondence of Prince Charles with government ministers (paras 1.194 et seq below). A good deal was made of the public interest test in the white paper – the balancing that will have to take place between the public interest in disclosure and the public interest in preventing a harm to an identified interest. Interestingly, the Major Code contained a clear public interest override where a harm test applied in considering whether to disclose information. The provisions under the FOI Bill 2000 were not as fullbloodied as the override test in the Code (1997 edn, p 5, para 2) and disclosures under the public interest provision were referred to as discretionary. However, the Bill as it progressed was amended to impose a duty on authorities to disclose unless ‘in all the circumstances of the case’ the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighed the public interest in disclosure; the case for secrecy had to outweigh that for openness. It should also be recalled that the white paper criticised the Code for its lack of clarity in relation to the concepts of ‘harm’ and ‘public interest’ which were addressed in making the appropriate balance. Furthermore, the Bill published for consultation allowed a public authority to consider the motives of the applicant and the use to which an applicant intends to put the information. These provisions, which met with almost universal condemnation, were removed.

10  Chapter 1

THE COMMONS PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE’S INVESTIGATION 1.13  The Commons Select Committee reported that the Bill as drafted had ‘significant deficiencies which, if not remedied, would undermine the potential’ of the Bill. ‘Key improvements’ were recommended to rebalance the Bill ‘and enable it to fulfil its potential.’ Amendments accepted by the government included: a statement that the right to information was now at the beginning of the Bill in clause/section 1 and the long title had been amended. However, there was no overriding purpose clause emphasising that greater openness was to be an overarching consideration.1 The public interest in discretionary disclosure was given greater emphasis in the later Bill so that the authority shall have regard ‘to the desirability of’ disclosing the information ‘wherever the public interest in disclosure outweighs the public interest in maintaining the exemption in question.’ A more explicit statement that the balance was in favour of disclosure absent a good reason not to disclose was not forthcoming at this stage but it was inserted as the Bill went to the Lords (see below).

1

Purpose clauses in statutes are not uncommon: see Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 37(1), Children Act 1989, s 1(1) and, in statutory instruments, the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, SI 1998/3132, r 1.1.

1.14  Under the original Bill, the Information Commissioner (IC) could only recommend disclosure; the final decision is with Ministers and public authorities. The Select Committee in the Commons (and Lords) wanted the IC to have power to overrule a Minister’s or authority’s decision not to disclose discretionary information. The latter Bill gave the IC a specific power to recommend disclosure ‘specifying information which ought, in his opinion, to be disclosed.’ However, in the first Bill discretionary disclosures applied to all but two of the exempt categories. In the latter Bill, they did not apply to eight (subsequently increased to nine) categories. This was the position in the final Act. ‘It appears that although the Commissioner has been given wider powers, the field on which they can be deployed has been significantly narrowed.’1 On subsequent amendment, Bill No 2 did give the Commissioner power to insist on disclosure but this was subject to a Ministerial veto (see below). Under Bill No 1 the exemption for information relating to civil proceedings, statutory or other investigations including investigations into the causes of accidents or under the Companies Acts (not including criminal investigations for which there was and still is a separate and widely drawn provision) was a class-based exemption. In Bill No  2, information relating to regulatory law enforcement functions, including accident investigation is protected by a contents-based exemption. The very wide protection given to information relating to the formulation of government policy and information whose disclosure ‘would prejudice the commercial interests of any person’ remain in spite of widespread criticism. The government rejected the Select Committee’s recommendation that the contentsbased exemption should be whether ‘substantial’ or ‘significant’ prejudice would result making the test of prejudice or harm ‘weaker than it should be.’2 Some of the information exempted will remain closed long after it has become ‘historical’ under the FOIA 2000. Bill No 2 included a duty on public authorities to give

The freedom of information legislation   11 reasons for refusal to disclose information whereas general provisions covering reasons for decisions would be placed in publication schemes. A Code of Practice will deal with other procedural matters. HC 78 (1999–00), para 4, fourth indent. HC 78 (1999–00), para 4, seventh indent.

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THE EXEMPTIONS 1.15  The exemptions, as detailed below, have increased significantly under the Act from the White Paper. In the latter, exempting interests numbered seven (in John Major’s Code on access it was 15). Those now in the Act number 26 (we include ss 12 and 4 and the new s 22A below) and cover areas such as: where compliance cost exceeds ‘appropriate limit’ of expenditure for complying (ie, as defined in regulations but which will be £600 for central government and Parliament), and vexatious or repeated requests. These are not in the general body of exemptions under Part II of the Bill. Information which is available to the public by other means (see below) and information intended for future publication were brought within the Part II exemptions. Information supplied by or covering the work of the security and intelligence services, GCHQ or the ‘special services’, information required for national security, information prejudicing – or which would be likely to prejudice (a formula which is repeated where ‘prejudice’ (see below) is present) – inter-governmental relationships in the UK, information whose disclosure would prejudice or be likely to prejudice defence, and international relations are exempt. This latter category would cover the EC and EU institutions where their own laws may be more restrictive than our access laws and so could take priority over information coming from or going to such bodies (see para 5.80 below). Further exemptions cover the economy – this is a completely new exemption from the White Paper – information held for criminal investigations and proceedings, and also information held for civil or administrative proceedings under a statutory or prerogative power. This includes investigations ‘with a view to ascertaining the cause of an accident’1 as well as a raft of other investigations concerning safety, breaches of law and other improper conduct. Information otherwise relating to law enforcement – which is drafted in very wide terms – is afforded separate exemption. Information relating to judicial functions and proceedings of courts and tribunals (though not administrative functions) is also exempt and, because it is not covered by the public interest test in what is now s 2, is arguably effectively excluded.2 In fact the amount of information excluded from the public interest test increased as the Bill progressed. A new qualified exemption covering ‘research’ was added by the Intellectual Property Act 2014.3 See paras 1.145 et seq below. On disclosure of documents by the ‘court’ from trial dockets and subject to appropriate safeguards: see CPR 1998, r 5.4 and the accompanying Practice Direction. In criminal cases, any disclosure would be subject to the Criminal Procedure Rules 2010, SI 2010/60 (L2) and Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2010, SI 2010/1921 (L12). See R (Guardian News and Media Ltd) v City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court etc [2010] EWHC 3376 (Admin) (see paras 1.154–1.155 below). Under Major’s Code, courts, tribunals and inquiries were not included, but were subject to ‘present practice’: para 10. 3 FOIA, s 22A inserted (1.10.2014) by Intellectual Property Act 2014, ss 20, 24(1); SI 2014/2330, art 3, Sch. 1 2

12  Chapter 1 1.16  Information concerned with decision-making and policy formulation in central government and for these purposes Northern Ireland Ministers are included, and information whose disclosure would prejudice the effective conduct of public affairs which is not restricted to central government, is exempt as is that information whose disclosure would endanger the health and safety of an individual or concerns deceased persons and would cause distress to living persons. Personal information is exempt, as well as information provided in confidence, that covered by legal professional privilege, trade secrets and commercial interests. Conferral of honours by the Crown is exempt and so is that information whose disclosure is prohibited by any enactment, or a court order. This refers to specific items of information rather than general classes of information as under the Official Secrets Act 1989. The latter legislation is concerned with unauthorised disclosures. The clause includes that which is ‘incompatible with’ any Community ‘obligation’. A Community obligation could be extremely broad, however. As we note below, there was a power to add to the exemptions by retrospective ministerial order. In Bill No  2 this was amended so that only contents based exemptions may be created. Before making such an order – to be approved by positive resolution – the Secretary of State will consult with the IC. This was, however, removed in the Lords.

THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER (IC) 1.17  The IC,1 as outlined in the White Paper, has promotional and investigatory powers in order to assist in the creation of a more open culture in government and to deal with complaints. The IC (currently Elizabeth Denham) may enforce ‘any of the requirements of Part I’ of the Act and not simply those relating to access complaints by individuals. The IC (who has in fact taken over the office of the Data Protection Commissioner (DPC) formerly Registrar) will approve publication schemes produced by public authorities which relate to the mandatory publication of information that they have to select. The IC may approve model schemes for classes of authority such as smaller bodies or schools, universities and not the typical governmental or regulatory bodies. The government, and they should be congratulated for this, responded positively to several of the recommendations of the Select Committee on Public Administration including, as we noted above, the removal of the protection of criminal investigations from the excluded category to an exemption.2 In this latter case, however, there is a sting in the tail. The IC is, it should be noted, a public authority covered by the FOIA 2000 and he investigates complaints against his actions under the FOIA where, eg, he refuses to disclose information to a requester (see, eg, FS50271526 where the IC invoked FOIA 2000, s 31 to deny access to the enforcement referral log). This shortfall has continued. The ICO is given a portfolio of duties in relation to information rights and has had its position enhanced under the Data Protection Act 2018. https://ico.org.uk/ (15/08/2018). HC 398 I (1997–98) pp xxv et seq.

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1.18  There was some unease about the fact that the IC’s headquarters were to be based in Wilmslow, Cheshire and not in London1 and that the advertised

The freedom of information legislation   13 salary was considerably below the very senior civil service remuneration levels. The Bichard inquiry into the Soham murders made some critical remarks about the relationship between ACPO and the IC over police practices in relation to data retention (see paras 2.276 . et seq below). Furthermore, the most important judicial decision on the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA 1998) made no reference to the role of the IC2 although subsequent case law has overruled the IC’s and tribunal’s decisions on alleged police breaches of the DPA 1998.3 The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 makes some changes to the appointment and tenure of the Commissioner amending both FOIA and the DPA 1998. Under the Data Protection Act 2018, s 114 and Sch 12 make further provision for the IC. The IC is a corporation sole and is not a Crown servant. Appointment is made by letters patent and is based on fair and open competition. A  nonrenewable term of office may not exceed seven years. Removal from office may only occur after an address from both houses of Parliament to Her Majesty following a ministerial report to the houses that: (a) the Commissioner is guilty of serious misconduct; and (b) the Commissioner no longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of the Commissioner’s functions. The schedule spells out details on salaries, staff, finance, fees and money received by the IC and keeping of accounts. The Commissioner has functions under the Data Protection Act 2018 (as defined in s  3(9)) and also other functions which have been conferred by domestic legislation. For example, the Commissioner has regulatory functions under Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations, the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (SI  2004/3391), the INSPIRE  Regulations 2009 (SI  2009/3157), the Re-use of Public Sector Information Regulations 2015 (SI  2015/1415), the FOIA  2000, the Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions Regulations 2016 (SI 2016/696), Regulation (EU) 910/2004 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market, and the Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018. The website (www.ico.gov.uk) has details of the HQ and regional offices in Cheshire, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and the press office. A satellite office was opened again in London in 2017. 2 Durant v Financial Services Authority [2003] EWCA Civ 1746. 3 Humberside Chief Constable of Police v Information Commissioner [2009] EWCA Civ 1079. See now paras 2.276 et seq. 1

DATA PROTECTION AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION 1.19  The government also followed the Commons Select Committee’s advice on the division of functions between the data protection and information acts. The White Paper revealed a great deal of confused thinking which, it has to be said, government members before the Select Committee did little to eradicate.1 The White Paper envisaged a dual operation scheme involving both pieces of legislation and the cooperation of the separate Commissioners. The divisions in jurisdiction were far from clear and there was a pressing concern that the

14  Chapter 1 uncertainty might well promote privacy protection as a more important objective than access to information. Certainly in overseas jurisdictions there was evidence of a privacy regime dominating an access to information regime.2 This conflict also featured in the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998) where special safeguards had to be written in to protect freedom of speech3 and also in the data protection legislation to protect journalism, art and literature (and now academic purposes).4 What the FOIA 2000 does is to provide for only one Commissioner thereby eliminating potential and damaging clashes between different Commissioners taking opposing lines on areas within their jurisdiction. Furthermore, claims by data subjects to information about themselves will be made under the DPA 1998 (2018) (it does this by making such data exempt under the FOIA  2000) whereas claims by others to information about someone else will be dealt with by the same Commissioner under the FOIA 2000. Such claims will, however, be subject to the principles and safeguards of the DPA 1998 (now 2018) (see ch 2). These latter points are now much clearer in principle although perhaps unavoidably technical and difficult in application as is evidenced for instance by the extension of ‘data’ covered by the Act to include ‘unstructured personal data’ and the consequential exemptions from the DPA  2018 of such data. In the White Paper, personnel files of employees of public bodies were to be excluded from the FOIA  2000. The Act reduces them to an exemption from the provisions of the DPA 1998 (2018). Making the DPC the IC does raise certain possible problems (see below). The General Data Protection Regulation, in recital 154 and art  89, makes provision for the disclosure of official information held by a PA in a manner that reconciles (respects) data protection. See the evidence of the Lord Chancellor: HC 398 I (1997–98), pp 84 et seq. The IC has offices in Belfast, Cardiff and Edinburgh. 2 See R  Hazell in A  McDonald and G  Terrill, para  1.2, note 2 above. See The Common Services Agency v Scottish IC [2008] UKHL 47 and Lord Hope at [4]. 3 HRA 1998, s 12. See paras 2.222 and 4.349 et seq below. 4 DPA 2018, s 174. See para 2.175 below. 1

COVERAGE 1.20  The FOIA  2000 applies to Northern Ireland – although the Northern Ireland Assembly may make provisions for completely devolved items (this has not occurred) – as well as England and Wales and, although the accompanying Consultation Document stated that the Bill applies to Scotland, its application appears extremely limited. It appears to cover the Scottish Office and those scheduled bodies which have addresses in Scotland, eg  the BBC, so that provision is made for an appeal to the Court of Session against the Tribunal’s (below) decision involving such a body (FOIA 2000, s 59(b)). The FOIA 2000 does not apply to devolved public bodies including the Edinburgh Parliament and Scottish Executive and information held by them unless entrusted ‘in confidence’ by the UK government (Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 (‘SFOIA 2002’), s 3(2)(a)(ii)). (Such information is held under the FOIA (Scotland) Act.) The UK Act applies to ‘cross-border’ authorities even in relation

The freedom of information legislation   15 to devolved matters.1 In fact Scottish plans for legislation on FOI were more liberal than their UK counterparts and although SFOIA  2002 is modelled on the UK legislation, there are some important differences (see paras 1.309 et seq below). There are additional divergences between the two Acts which have emerged as the UK Act has been subject to amendments which have not been incorporated to Scotland (eg an absolute exemption for royal correspondence). Disquiet was expressed during examination of the White Paper that if FOI was a devolved as opposed to a reserved matter for purely Scottish public authorities, unlike human rights which was a reserved matter, there was no guarantee that the new Scottish Parliament would actually legislate for access. This proved unfounded. Eg the Scotland Act 1998 (Cross-Border Public Authorities) (Specification) Order 1999, SI  1999/1319, designated 65 public bodies as cross-border public authorities, including the British Library, the National Heritage Memorial Fund, the Theatres Trust, the Meat and Livestock Commission and their responsibilities extend throughout the United Kingdom.

1

1.21  A Code of Practice (2007) on access to information has been produced by the Welsh Assembly Government1 and replaces an earlier code. It outlines the provisions under which the Assembly will operate. The Code undertakes to operate under a presumption of openness and sets out information it will publish automatically (see www.wales.gov.uk). Originally the Code sets a response rate of 15 working days but it now states that it will be subject to ‘legal limits’ set out in the FOIA 2000 or Environmental Information Regulations. Where ‘harm or prejudice’ are referred to as a ground for not allowing disclosure, these may be outweighed by a greater public interest in disclosure. Now that FOIA is in force, its provisions apply to Welsh public authorities including the Assembly, although some more liberal features of the Code are retained (see para  1.318 below). There is an undertaking to reply in either English or Welsh. The range of ‘public authorities’ covered by the UK legislation is dealt with below (para 1.85). See now http://www.assembly.wales/en/abthome/about_us-commission_assembly_administration/ abt-foi/Pages/abt-foi-cop-pub.aspx (2018).

1

CODES 1.22  Many of the details of administrative practice for English public authorities will be contained in a code under s  45 of the FOIA  2000 (HC  33 2004–05), setting out what the Secretary of State deems ‘desirable practice’ for authorities to follow when discharging their functions under Part I.1 The Commissioner must be consulted on its contents. Codes have been published under s  45 (see eg  para  1.271) and also s  46 (see para  4.73). The s  45 Code was revised (considerably) in 2004 before the access provisions came into effect. Where the code is not followed, the Commissioner may issue a Practice Recommendation. What happens if this is not followed is not clear: is it a matter for the Secretary of State and, if so, under political pressure, or can the Commissioner seek judicial review; or is it a matter for the IC or maladministration for the Parliamentary Ombudsman? A  breach of a Part I  requirement may attract an Enforcement Notice (see below). The code says that such failures may form part of an adverse

16  Chapter 1 comment in a report to Parliament. This code will cover crucial items such as advice to requesters, transfers of requests between authorities, consultation with parties whose interests are likely to be affected by a disclosure, contractual terms relating to the disclosure of information and complaints procedures within authorities for those who are unhappy about the way their complaint is dealt with (see below). Even though the code is not legislation itself, this does not mean the courts will take no cognisance of its terms.2 In November 2017 a consultation was commenced by the MoJ on a revised code following the report by the Commission on FOI (see eg paras 1.57, 1.270, 1.271 and 1.283 below).3 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/235286/0033. pdf (Jan 2018). 2 It could be the basis of a legitimate expectation or it may constitute a relevant factor to consider when exercising discretion. 3 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/659606/FOI_ Code_of_Practice_-_Draft.pdf. 1

1.23  Much of government and public service is today performed under contract with private parties, either under Private Finance Initiatives (PFI) and Public Private Partnerships (PPP) or other contracting in or out arrangements and the provisions of the code on contracts with private sector contractors should be highlighted. The long-term effects of the collapse of the major private sector company Carillion in January 2018, which was not only a leading contractor for major infrastructure projects but also an essential service provider in the public sector, have to be fully gauged. Terms which seek to restrict provision of information beyond those contained in the act should be refused, the original code advised but this was removed on revision. It did not say they were forbidden. Authorities should not agree to hold information in confidence which is not in fact confidential in nature; it does not say not covered by the law of confidence. The following from the original draft while exhorting good practice seems to bow to market reality: ‘Public authorities when entering into contracts with non-public authority contractors may be under pressure to accept confidentiality clauses so that information relating to the terms of the contract, its value and performance will be exempt from disclosure. Public authorities should, wherever commercially viable, endeavour to obtain the agreement of the non-public authority contractor that no such confidentiality can be set up against a request for the disclosure of such information.’ (para 25) 1.24  If it’s a powerful contractor, forget it! Otherwise try and get their consent. What if they refuse? 1.25  Confidentiality clauses must be capable of being justified to the Commissioner. Except where designated as a public authority under the FOIA 2000, it is the authority that will disclose information in accordance with the Act. Where designation occurs, the cost of compliance with the Act should be costed in the terms of the contract. Authorities should not impose secrecy

The freedom of information legislation   17 clauses in excess of the Act! – although this was also removed from the revised code. The question of contracts is of enormous practical importance and will be returned to later in this chapter (paras 1.279 et seq below) where it will be seen that the Code was considerably revised. The 2018 code has added provisions on contracts. The recommendations of the Justice Committee (para 1.9 above) will also be examined. 1.26  Fees may be charged and it was hoped that for ‘most applications’ these will not exceed a maximum of £60 plus copying costs and postage. The question of fees became highly contested and subject to significant revision and the £60 maximum fee did not find its way into the regulations (see below). Under the DPA  1998, the data user may charge £10 for supplying the information from one register entry. Fees may be waived in prescribed cases. Public authorities are given 20 days to comply with the request for information, a reduction from the 40 days originally drafted. 1.27  It was mentioned above that the longer the delay in introducing FOI in the government’s term of office, the greater the risk that the more radical tinges of the White Paper would be diluted. This certainly appears to be the case. In what follows, the author attempts to highlight major differences between the White Paper on Freedom of Information: Your Right to Know and the Bill, as well as specific points which may be of interest.

POINTS OF SIGNIFICANT DEPARTURE FROM THE WHITE PAPER Reduction in the ‘harm’ test for refusing disclosure 1.28  Some exemptions require no test of any damage whatsoever in order to be exempt. This means they are protected as a class because they belong to documents within that class. Out of 26 exemptions, including ss  12 and 14 of the FOIA 2000, 17 are on a class basis. So, information collected as a result of criminal investigations relating to law enforcement requires no test of damage to withhold it. Also, information relating to the formulation and development of governmental policy is subject to no test of damage although information whose disclosure would inhibit, or would be likely to inhibit, the free and frank provision of advice, etc, can be withheld on the ‘reasonable opinion’ of a qualified person that such inhibition would be likely to take place. Where the exemption is not on a class basis, it will be because disclosure of the contents will have, or could have, an undesirable effect causing damage.1 For class and contents claims in Public Interest Immunity, see paras 11.46 et seq below.

1

1.29  Where a damage test is required, the test in the Bill for exempting information is where its disclosure ‘prejudices’ or is likely to prejudice particular interests rather than where its disclosure would cause ‘substantial harm’ to interests as in the White Paper. This is a significant reduction from the White Paper in the test for refusing to disclose information, making withholding information

18  Chapter 1 much easier. The White Paper stated that the test would be substantial harm to a variety of interests although in the case of policy-making simple harm would be the test. ‘Harm’, ‘damage’ and ‘prejudice’ are basically the same it is submitted, and to remove the qualifying ‘substantial’ is deeply significant. The Home Secretary stated in the House of Commons that ‘prejudice’ must be ‘real, actual or of substance’ and references could be made to his statement under Pepper v Hart if necessary.1 Home Office spokespersons correlated ‘prejudices’ with ‘damages’ in the Official Secrets Act 1989 (OSA 1989) and much of the wording in the OSA 1989 is borrowed or very close to that in the FOIA 2000 in several of the exemptions. The Select Committee had drawn attention to the undesirability of comparing access provisions with crimes relating to unauthorised disclosure2 and it might appear unfortunate that the wording of the access provisions is so close to the laws punishing unauthorised disclosures. The fear was that too close an association with official secrecy would weaken the spirit and operation of the access laws. The Bill says nothing about liberalising the Official Secrets Act. The breadth of some of the provisions in the OSA 1989 could, arguably, be found to be in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) (see ch 4). The House of Lords has ruled that the absolute prohibitions on disclosure in ss 1 and 4 of the OSA  1989 do not breach the Human Rights Act 1998 – UK courts are, they have emphasised, bound to put a British gloss on the ECHR under domestic legislation although the ECtHR sets the framework for interpretation.3 332 HC Official Report (6th series), cols 22 and 26 (24 May 1999); Pepper v Hart [1993] 1 All ER  42, HL – the higher courts have been cautious in their use of Pepper. Other statutes to use these terms include: Local Government Act 1972, Sch 12A; Taxes Management Act 1970, s 20(8H); Drug Trafficking Act 1994, s 53(2)(b); DPA 1998, ss 29, 30 and 31; Contempt of Court Act 1981, s 2. Pepper v Hart cannot be used to interpret the extent of a statutory power, only its meaning: R v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions ex parte Spath Holme Ltd [2001] 2 AC 349. 2 HC 398 I (1997–98), paras 77 et seq. 3 R v Shayler [2002] 2 All ER 477 (HL) and [2001] 1 WLR 2206 (CA). Former MI5 officer David Shayler’s lawyers submitted this argument by when they sought to persuade a French court not to extradite Shayler to England for prosecution under the OSA 1989. Extradition was refused by the French court. Shayler eventually made his own way to England and was duly arrested. The ECHR sets the framework for the interpretation of Convention rights under the Human Rights Act 1998 to attempt to ensure consistent interpretation: R (Ullah) v Special Adjudication Officer [2004] UKHL 26 at [20] per Lord Bingham; cf Kay v LB Lambeth [2006] UKHL 10 at [88] per Lord Hope; (AF) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] UKHL 28 at [98] per Lord Rodger. However, the usual rules of precedent apply and are not overridden by contradictory judgments of the ECtHR: Kay and Others v LB of Lambeth [2006] UKHL 10; see further R (GC) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2011] UKSC 21. 1

1.30  The tribunal has ruled on the meanings of the words ‘would or would be likely’ to cause damage or prejudice. The wording changes in exemptions and one has to be alive to that fact. The tribunal has ruled that the chance of prejudice should not be a ‘hypothetical possibility’ – there must have been a real and significant risk’ of the prejudice.1 It should be ‘real, actual or of substance.’ Various decisions have given their own nuanced interpretations to these words but the sense is that ‘would be likely to occur’ the risk should be real and significant – a ‘very significant and weighty chance’;2 in ‘prejudice would

The freedom of information legislation   19 occur’ the chance of prejudice should be greater, meaning ‘more likely than not’ (FS501233488 at 48)3 although one could argue that would denote certainty. The tests are demanding ones. J Connor Press Associates Ltd v IC EA/2005/0005 at 15. Hogan v IC EA/2005/0026. 3 ‘FS’ denotes a decision notice of the Commissioner, ‘FER’ denotes a decision notice under the Environmental Information Regulations (see ch 3). 1 2

A new tribunal 1.31  A tribunal has been added to hear appeals from the Commissioner. This is now the First Tier Tribunal Information Rights. No tribunal featured in the White Paper. And none features in the Scottish FOIA. The Commissioner – resort to whom will involve no ‘additional cost’ – is not the sole independent arbiter of disputes as in the White Paper and in the draft Bill the IC could not enforce disclosure of exempt information. In the White Paper the IC could make binding decisions which were enforceable via contempt proceedings where the authority refused to comply with the Commissioner’s decision. Challenge to the Commissioner’s decisions in the White Paper was via the High Court in a judicial review. 1.32  The new tribunal is empowered to allow an appeal where, inter alia, it would exercise its discretion differently to the Commissioner, ie on the merits. The tribunal can review findings of fact on which a Commissioner’s notice is based as well as take appeal on points of law. These are copious grounds of appeal. These powers have been spelt out by the tribunal on numerous occasions. Members of the tribunal are to be appointed by the Judicial Appointments Commission and two members are lay members. The chair is legally qualified.1 Under the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 as amended. Under the original schemes, lay members broadly represented the interests of public authorities and requesters.

1

1.33  From the tribunal there is to be a right of appeal on a point of law (judicial review – a ‘speedy process’ was present in the White Paper as we saw) originally to the High Court but from 2010 appeal lies to the Upper Tribunal Administrative Appeals Chamber on a point of law. Further appeal to the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court will be possible. 1.34  This could be a drawn-out process and diminishes the importance of speed and effectiveness outlined in the White Paper. An additional stage of appeal has been added and will inevitably assist the public authority whose legal costs are met from the public purse and which has time on its side. Can a private party be guaranteed such support? Legal aid does not apply before the tribunal and costs may be awarded where behaviour is ‘unreasonable’ (see para 1.253). Delay in disclosure can defeat the purpose of seeking information – this is certainly not going to be a ‘hot news item’ provision. Some cases have lasted several years and the IC’s office (ICO) has been criticised for delay in dealing with requests

20  Chapter 1 as well as in other practices.1 Could a Commissioner be empowered to take up a complainant’s case on an appeal by an applicant for access if the Commissioner recommended in favour of disclosure but the authority refused to disclose? This is the situation in Canada, and could be of great assistance to the applicant who is indigent and who might not qualify for legal aid. The government did not think this was appropriate but its reasoning was not clear. It was felt this would compromise the IC’s independence. A new section 61 of the FOIA 2000 was added by Sched 19 to the DPA 2018 under which tribunal rules may make provision for the production of materials used for the processing of personal data and the inspection, examination etc of such materials used in connection with the processing. The FTT is also given power to hand a matter to the Upper Tribunal to deal with as a contempt (see para 2.179 below). See eg E Barber v IC EA/2005/0004.

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Increase in exemptions 1.35  The White Paper identified seven or so exempting interests. The Bill had 25 exemptions (now 26, as referred to above). Part of this may be explained by the fact that unlike the White Paper which specified several exclusions, the exclusions in the Bill only cover the Security Service, Intelligence Service, GCHQ and the special forces – although other exemptions come close to an exclusion. The other exclusions in the White Paper (criminal investigation and public sector employee records as amended under the DPA  1998 which otherwise allows access to ‘unstructured’ personal files) are brought into the exemptions. However, information relating to the judicial functions or legal proceedings of courts and tribunals is not subject to the public interest test in s  2 and nor is that relating to security and intelligence service information as well as other exempted information. In the case of national security information which is properly certified by a Minister, it is hard to imagine the public interest being weighed against a ‘conclusive’ certificate. The ‘gateways’ identified in the White Paper, ie criteria on which access decisions are made, and other provisions which relate to repeated and vexatious requests etc, are now grounds for refusing information. 1.36  However, the exemptions themselves are further qualified in that the duty on public authorities under s  1(1)(a) of the FOIA  2000, to inform applicants of whether the authority holds information of the description specified in the request, is not operable for many of the exemptions where the information requested would itself constitute exempt information and its disclosure would therefore defeat the purpose of the exemption. This is because ‘information’ is given a broad interpretation under the Bill whereas in some FOI provisions elsewhere it only covers ‘documents’ broadly understood. Refusal to confirm or deny the existence of those documents or information is authorised where revealing their existence would undermine the exemption.

The freedom of information legislation   21

Adding to exemptions by ministerial order 1.37  Until the Committee stage of the House of Lords, a clause provided a power to make additional exemptions by order – these may have retrospective effect. This was a provision that was not present in the White Paper. It gave the Minister a considerable discretion which could be a de lege veto, again contrary to the White Paper which stated there would be no ministerial vetoes. The exemption was restricted to a contents-based exemption and does not cover class exemptions: the information is covered by the order and ‘its disclosure under this Act would, or would be likely to, have such effects adverse to the public interest as may be specified in the order’. In the first version of the Bill, the power to add to exemptions covered class based claims to exemption. This introduced a general public interest override against information disclosure in relation to exempted information. Under cl 43(2), where ‘at any time’ it appears to the Secretary of State in relation to particular information already in existence at that time that the public interest in exemption outweighs disclosure, he may by order provide that the information is to be exempt information. Would this in any way bind a particular decision involving access to the exempted information? By cl 13(2) (h), cl 43(2) was included in those provisions where the public authority or its officials or the IC, cannot exercise a discretion to disclose or recommend disclosure respectively. Nothing in the original clause (cl 36) overrode the duties on an official to exercise a specific discretion on the facts under the discretionary disclosure provision. It might be added that s  38 of the DPA  1998 confers a similar ministerial power to add to exemptions under that legislation. 1.38  An order under the clause provided that the duty to confirm or deny did not apply to information exempt by the order. It may also apply any provision of s 63 or 64 which place limits on exemptions for historical records (see paras 4.48 et seq below). 1.39  Delegated orders are judicially reviewable on substantive and procedural grounds.1 While an attack on abuse of power or misleading the House is possible, the courts would require evidence of wildly excessive abuse given Parliament’s role in approving the order. Successful challenge on review is in practice a nonstarter. In rare cases, courts have investigated orders before approval has been given.2 This clause was, however, dropped by the government in the Lords Committee. One of the most criticised features of the Bill was thereby removed. See Woolf and Jowell (eds) De Smith’s Judicial Review (8th edn, 2018) para 3-012 and cases cited; Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No 2) [2013] UKSC 39. 2 R v HM Treasury, ex p Smedley [1985] QB 657. 1

Classes and contents of documents 1.40  The White Paper stated that it would only seek to protect the contents of documents and not classes of documents. This would align FOI policy with the change of position announced by the then Attorney General and Lord Chancellor following the Scott Report into the Iraqi supergun affair.1 The White Paper was

22  Chapter 1 itself ambivalent on this point. However, classes of documents are protected in the following exemptions: information accessible through other means; where information is intended for future publication; information supplied by, or relating to, security and intelligence bodies; national security, although a ministerial certificate stating as much is subject to limited challenge in the Tribunal; investigations and proceedings conducted by public authorities; court records; Parliamentary privilege; formulation of government policy; communications with Her Majesty and conferral of honours; environmental information (though this will be available under other provisions; personal information (available under the DPA 1998 or exempted under FOIA); confidential information; that protected by legal professional privilege; trade secrets; information subject to other legal prohibitions on disclosure. (See para  1.42 below on the Phillis recommendations.) 287 HC Official Report (6th series), col 949 and 576 HL Official Report (5th series), col 1507 (18 Dec 1996) and 297 HC Official Report (6th series), col 616 (11 July 1997).

1

Ministerial vetoes 1.41  The White Paper stated that there would be no ministerial certificates defeating the thrust of openness as there had been in previous Private Member’s Bills. There will be the possibility of certificates under ss  23(2) and 24(3) of the FOIA  2000, concerning security and intelligence services and national security, and ss 34(3) and 36(2). These certificates will be ‘conclusive evidence’ of relevant items. Those under ss  23(2) and 24(3) are subject, however, to an appeal to the tribunal – this is now the Upper Tribunal. Those issued under s 34(3) – Parliamentary privilege – are not challengeable elsewhere in line with Parliamentary privilege.1 More crucially, there is a veto in relation to the IC’s decision and enforcement notices which could cover those issued under s 36. See below (para 1.239) for detail and s 53 of the FOIA 2000. See R  v Chaytor and Others [2010]  UKSC  52 for an illustration of the limits of such privilege into allegations of false accounting by MPs – this case followed on from the notorious FOI investigations into MPs expenses.

1

reviews of the foia

1.42  The most significant review of the Act in operation was the review conducted by the independent commission appointed by the Cabinet Office. This is examined below at para 1.307. Earlier reviews included the Phillis Review of Government Communications (Cabinet Office, January 2004) which recommended that FOIA should be implemented with an ‘overriding presumption of disclosure’ (p 23). His view was that Government should announce that Ministers should not use the veto and that class exemptions should be replaced as far as possible by exemptions based on a harm test. This was especially important in relation to the exemption which restricts analyses on which policy is built. There should be use of the Scottish and Welsh tests of ‘substantial harm or prejudice’. Replies should be met within 20 days under an ‘all purpose limit’ and, in complex cases

The freedom of information legislation   23 involving significant issues of public interest, the limit of £600 as the cost of providing information should be removed. As opposed to the endorsement of Phillis’ recommendations on government communications (para 4.114 below), these proposals were received with appreciable neutrality. 1.43  A  review of the Act was conducted by a private research enterprise Frontier Economics with a view towards review of the Act by the Government in 2006.1 Aspects of the FOIA were examined by Paul Dacre in his review of the Thirty Year Rule in 2009.2 The Act’s operation has been subject to a review by the Justice Committee of the House of Commons which we examined above (see para 1.9). http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.dca.gov.uk/foi/reference/foiindependent-review.pdf. 2 Review of the 30 Year Rule (2009) at www.30yearrulereview.org.uk. 1

PREPARING FOR THE ACT1 1.44  It has to be realised that the preparation for the FOIA has been undertaken with preparations for the introduction of the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (EIR), SI 2004/3391. The implementation of the latter is an EU requirement in order to comply with a Directive (2003/4/EC, OJ L 41/26, 14.2.2003) and EU Treaty obligations under Art 192 TFEU (175(1) EC). The regulations, which came into effect on the same day as the access provisions of FOIA (1 January 2005), are dealt with in ch 3. There has been an Advisory Group on Openness in the Public Sector advising the Lord Chancellor/Secretary of State. An Access to Information Project Board has also advised the Department of Constitutional Affairs (DCA), now the Ministry of Justice (MoJ). The DCA established a monitoring system within the Information Rights Division of the DCA to advise on eg key performance targets and implementation of the access to information monitoring regime across government. A  clearing house (CH) was established within the MoJ to assist departments with difficult or sensitive requests or cross-departmental requests,2 and was moved to the Cabinet Office in 2015. This sets out guidance on when requests should be referred to the central section. In response to a FOI request on 3  May 2018 it was reported that the CH still operates in the Cabinet Office. Detailed work has been carried out on how to establish specifications for IT systems to manage FOI and EIR inquiries. Liaison took place between the MoJ, IC Office and the National Audit Office on a guide for departmental preparations. The MoJ assumed central responsibility for information on FOIA guidance on records processing and management, exemptions (after consultation with the Attorney General). The MoJ had been at the centre of a Government Information Strategy for central government covering the public, the media and Parliament. The Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport took over sponsorship for FOI as outlined above. The Cabinet Office retains responsibility for transparency policy in government including FOI and a series of bodies advise the Cabinet Office on various projects.3 As shall be seen the FOIA  2000 has profound implications

24  Chapter 1 for the Public Records Office, now renamed the National Archives. Central government communications and information responsibilities were within the Office of Public Sector Information (now part of National Archives) having previously been within the Office of e-Envoy and successors (see para 4.34). See FOI Annual Report HC 6 (2002–03) on bringing into force provisions in FOIA not yet fully in force; and HC 5 (2004–05) and Government Reply Cm 6470 (2005). 2 http://www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/foi-procedural-referring.htm. 3 https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/government-transparency-and-accountability. 1

1.45  There has been nothing less than a revolution in government use of IT resources in the last 25 years.1 This point is examined in ch 4 (paras 4.34 et seq). See Protecting Information Across Government (May 2017) and Digital Transformation in Government (March 2017), both NAO.

1

1.46  And yet, despite the flurry of activity, the Commons Select Committee on Constitutional Affairs criticised the state of ill-preparedness of many public authorities for FOI. Health, in particular, followed by local government caused concern although the committee was impressed by the police preparation, as evidenced by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO).1  ACPO have also agreed with members of the judiciary a protocol on disclosure of police information in family proceedings (see www.dca.gov.uk and para 11.16 below), which has been updated.2 This gives guidance on how to apply, and how to challenge, refusals to disclose. Nonetheless, government has been subject to a sea change in information practices and openness and cyber insecurity. In this sea change, a review by Sir Alex Allan for the Cabinet Office in 2015 found management of digital record keeping in government departments ‘poorly organised and indexed’.3 The Cabinet Office took 18 months to respond.4 First Report HC 79 I & II (2004–05). http://www.met.police.uk/scd/specialist_units/Police_Family_Disclosure_Protocol.pdf. 3 Government digital records and archives review by Sir Alex Allan, Cabinet Office, December 2015. 4 Better Information for Better Government, Cabinet Office, January 2017. 1 2

1.47  The ICO has prepared guidance on a very wide range of details under the FOIA 2000 and DPA 1998 covering: personal information; information received in confidence; the public interest; legal professional privilege; commercial interests; information accessible by other means; information intended for future publication; and frequently asked questions in records management as well as on exemptions.1 The MoJ provided detailed guidance on handling requests as well as on exemptions and other items although this was archived in 2015.2 The lists are growing. Much work had been done on other areas such as fees and refusal notices; how to communicate information; identification of vexatious and repetitious requests; development of policy around disability and other access issues; and records held by National Archives. A  central ‘clearing house’ was established in the MoJ to assist departments with difficult or sensitive requests or cross-departmental requests and, although an original aim was transparency enhancement, it keeps a low profile.3

The freedom of information legislation   25 https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guidance-index/freedom-of-information-and-environmentalinformation-regulations/. 2 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20150603171202/https://www.justice.gov.uk/ information-access-rights/foi-guidance-for-practitioners (11/01/18). 3 http://www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/foi-procedural-referring.htm. 1

HOW THE ACT WORKS Publication schemes 1.48  Every public authority is under a duty to adopt and maintain a ‘publication scheme’ which relates to information published proactively by the authority and which will be approved by the Commissioner – approval may be for a specified period. As a result of the Publication Scheme Development and Maintenance Initiative the ICO introduced a model publication scheme that all public sector organisations should have adopted.1 The authority has to publish its scheme but is given discretion to publish its scheme in ‘such manner as it sees fit’ though this may be subject to approval by the Commissioner.2 The scheme in terms of both contents and operation, will be reviewable on ordinary principles of judicial review. The authority will state what it intends to publish and it will be under a duty to publish such information. Failure to publish could be a breach of a ‘legitimate expectation’. Could the IC investigate a complaint concerning a failure to publish information in a scheme? Section 50 refers to a ‘request for information’ which is not dealt with in accordance with Part I, which includes s 19. However, a ‘request for information’ seems to be confined to s 1 requests (see s 8). The power to award an enforcement notice under s 52 is not so confined and may be awarded where an authority has failed to comply with any of the requirements of Part I. The authority will also be under a duty to review the scheme from time to time. The scheme will specify the classes of information which the authority publishes or intends to publish; the manner in which it is or is intended to be published and whether it will be publicly available free of charge. The ICO launched a consultation for revising publication schemes in September 2011. https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-freedom-of-information/publication-scheme/. If, for instance, publication was in a form which prevented effective access by the requester.

1 2

1.49  In adopting or reviewing a scheme, an authority must have regard to the public interest in allowing access to the public to information held by the authority and also in the publication of reasons for decisions made by the authority. This latter will refer to reasons generally for decisions as opposed to reasons for decisions under the FOIA 2000 for refusals etc. It is regrettable that a fully-fledged duty to give reasons was not contained in primary legislation. In relation to publication in the public interest, the IC is given power to approve content but not to compel his view on the authority. Where an authority ignores the IC’s opinion, the Home Office said this would be a breach of what is now s  19(1). The IC can issue an enforcement notice (EN) to indicate the steps required to be taken by the authority to comply with s 19(1), the Home Office believed. Ultimate sanction for non-compliance with an EN is punishment by

26  Chapter 1 the court as contempt. The Act seems to suggest that the ‘remedy’ is a refusal to approve a scheme or its revocation where in some sense it is inadequate. 1.50  Where an authority failed to publish information under the original Bill in accordance with its scheme, this could be remedied by the issue of a Practice Recommendation (PR) by the Commissioner under what is now s 48. This may have been correct under the original Bill, but not under the FOIA 2000 which restricts the matters on which a PR may be issued to those contained in the Code. The first Code did not deal with publication schemes. Arguments could be advanced, however, that a publication scheme could be enforceable through public law process on the basis of legitimate expectation as we saw above. 1.51  Publication schemes were seen as very beneficial from the point of view of greater openness. They could include departmental rules, manuals and guidance as well as the kinds of information that has to be published by agencies in the USA under the US FOIA  1966, as amended. The Department of Health, the Department of Work and Pensions and the Inland Revenue publish internal guidance and summaries of decisions as well as the redress manual in the latter case. Information about mission, objectives and functions and who is responsible for decisions, contacts and board meetings together with agendas and minutes should be published. Regulatory decisions by PAs should be published. It might further include information which has been requested on, say, three previous occasions or all information requested and previously released – through, for instance, a disclosure log which is a web-based list of FOI requests and links to documents linked to those requests. It could cover information on government contracts.1 Since the advent of FOIA 2000, public authorities have developed far more effective search engines for the electronic data they hold. See Evidence of the Select Committee HC 570 I, paras 45–47 (1998–99).

1

1.52  Approval for a scheme may be revoked six months after notice of revocation is given by the IC. Where there is a revocation, or where the IC refuses to approve a scheme, the authority must be given a statement of the reasons for such a decision. This will clearly support a challenge by the authority but it is not subject to appeal to the tribunal1 by the authority. Presumably they may seek judicial review. See FOIA 2000, s 57 which only allows appeals against Enforcement, Information and Decision Notices; see below.

1

1.53  The Commissioner may also approve model publication schemes for different classes of authorities prepared by the IC or others (eg 10,000 parish councils, parish meetings, schools, universities). Where so approved, authorities within a relevant class adopting a scheme without modification will require no further approval. Similar provisions apply to expiration of approval, revocation and refusal to approve as apply to schemes in s 19. 1.54  Publication schemes were introduced on a rolling programme starting with central government, Parliament, the Welsh National Assembly and non-

The freedom of information legislation   27 departmental public bodies (NDPBs) subject to the 1997 Code on Access in November 2002. In February 2003 local government was to be included (excepting police authorities). These latter were to be finalised by June 2003 together with the Crown Prosecution Service, Serious Fraud Office and armed forces. By October 2003, NHS bodies were to be included and schools, universities and remaining NDPBs. By June 2004, all remaining public authorities were to be included. 1.55  There have been some important concerns in the process of producing publication schemes (PSs). The Freedom of Information Campaign believed that the IC and government encouraged PAs to publish only existing information that is already published and not new information.1 This was denied. A  class should represent a continuing commitment to publish all the information falling within a class. Many, the Campaign felt, were not classes at all but oneoff single publications. The IC in the 2002–03 Annual Report stated that PSs tended to publish existing information rather than new information. It was felt that, despite provisions in numerous overseas statutes that internal guidance and advice should be published, not enough was being done to encourage this. The Department of Health had published three online collections of internal guidance covering business planning, finance and personnel matters. The Inland Revenue publishes internal guidance and guidance on customers aimed externally including the purchasing manual and redress manual. The IC’s expectation was that future schemes will set out the intention to publish routinely information which ‘was previously not available at all or only available on request’.2 DEFRA and the Welsh Assembly were singled out for good practices. Interesting features included: See open letter to the IC from the Campaign, 13 September 2002. Campaign for FOI Publication Schemes Good Practice (February 2004). A list of good practice web sites is contained on p 7.

1 2

1.56  Facts and analysis of facts behind decisions – Your Right to Know – Background Material was published, as was Preparation of Draft Legislation – Background Material on the FOIA by the Home Office. purposes of schemes

1.57  The Lord Chancellor’s Department (now MoJ) stated as follows: ‘The purpose of the PS is to ensure that a large amount of information is readily available to members of the public ie without the need for specific consideration under FOIA, and to inform the public of the extent of material that is available. By ‘readily available’ we mean that the information is available: on the LCD website; another website; may be purchased from the Stationery Office; may be obtained from a public library; may be supplied immediately on receipt of a telephone call or letter to the department’. Basically, schemes have to publish information about: • What we spend and how we spend it. • Who we are and what we do. • What our priorities are and how we are doing.

28  Chapter 1 • • • •

How we make decisions. Our policies and procedures. Lists and registers. The services we offer.

A new code under s 45 of the FOIA 2000 (July 2018) suggests: ‘8.5 Public authorities with over 100 Full Time Equivalent (FTE) employees should, as a matter of best practice, publish details of their performance on handling requests for information under the Act. The information should include: • The number of requests received • The timeliness of the response e.g. whether the statutory deadline was met • The number of requests where the information was granted • The number of requests where the information was withheld • The number of internal reviews 8.6 All public authorities should publish their statistics in line with central government, on a quarterly basis. Publication schemes are likely to form the best vehicle for publishing this information. A guide on producing a suitable publication scheme can be found on the ICO’s website.’ Information, the code continues, should also be published on senior executives’ salaries (over £90,000 pa), expenses and benefits in kind.

minutes

1.58  Should these be draft or revised? Many bodies initially opted for the latter. The ICO has stated that ‘There are a number of considerations which might lead authorities to decide to publish unconfirmed minutes if they are aware that a lengthy time delay may ensue prior to the publication of confirmed minutes in the publication scheme. Perhaps the main factor would be the ability, in any event, for individuals to request copies of the unconfirmed minutes via their s 1 access rights, where they are aware that the minutes will not be available via the publication scheme for a period of time. On each such request the authority would need to decide whether s 21 would apply, (could the information be considered to be reasonably accessible to the applicant if it is not scheduled to be published for many months). Whilst in some cases s 22 may apply (see para 1.118 below), the exemption is qualified in so far as its use would only apply in cases where it is reasonable in all the circumstances to withhold the information until the intended date of publication. In each case disclosure was agreed then consideration would also need to be given as to including the information within the publication scheme in any event.’ Excessive delays in the publication of minutes are therefore likely to generate individual requests which will require a full response from the authority within the 20-day limit. In considering the request the authority would need to give full consideration to the available exemptions and their application to the individual request. In many cases therefore, it may prove prudent for the authority to simply include unconfirmed minutes in the publication scheme, together with a warning that they are as yet unconfirmed and may be subject

The freedom of information legislation   29 to change. Minutes and papers of all departmental advisory committees which contain non-governmental representatives should be published and this is done by the Inland Revenue, the Food Standards Agency and DEFRA. disclosure log

1.59  The DCA has disclosed information made available under the 1997 Code on Access (www.dca.gov.uk/foi/publicationsscheme/htm). The Welsh Assembly publishes Cabinet Minutes. A  pervasive feature in FOI practice has been the publication of disclosure logs identifying information released under FOIA by authorities sometimes on a selective basis. The ICO’s disclosure log is online.1 http://search.ico.org.uk/ico/search/disclosurelog.

1

information on contracts

1.60  Paragraph 42 of the Lord Chancellor’s draft s 45 code states that there should be a considerable amount of information in schemes about contracts and the way they are awarded. This was not in the final version of the code but a commitment was given to revise the ‘final version’. In fact, the Campaign for Freedom of Information (CFOI) found that information about contracts was generally small. The Treasury Solicitor’s Department was one of the few to publish details of contract values, and then only on those valued at over £30,000. ‘Commercial sensitivity’ was frequently cited as a reason for not publishing information about values. The Department for International Development and DTI and DCA all developed helpful practices. The Campaign found little evidence of information on contract performance standards, performance reviews as well as results of contract performance although this was urged by government. There was no evidence of publication of the existence of ‘confidentiality clauses’ between contractors and PAs. The Office of Government Commerce (OGC, part of HM  Treasury) was succeeded by the Efficiency and Reform Group, itself closed in 2014. A variety of bodies are responsible for contract oversight in government and include the Crown Commercial Service, the Government Commercial Function which produces Commercial Operating Standards (2016) and the Infrastructure and Projects Authority (CO and HM  Treasury). The OGC published detailed guidance on contracting and FOI1 and the subject of contracts has featured in many complaints and investigations and appeals, as will be seen.2 The ICO has also published guidance on contracting.3 The code under s 45 (para 1.57 above) has additional provisions on contractual arrangements in chapter 9. https://www.gov.uk/guidance/public-sector-procurement-policy#procurement-policies-forpromoting-greater-transparency (12/01/18); http://www.cirruspurchasing.co.uk/FOI_guide.pdf; http://www.ogc.gov.uk/documents/OGC_FOI_and_Civil_Procurement_guidance.pdf. 2 See para 1.279 below. 3 http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/freedom_of_information/detailed_specialist_ guides/awareness_guidance_5 annexe_-_public_sector_contracts.pdf. See https://ico.org.uk/ media/for-organisations/documents/1432163/information-provided-in-confidence-section-41. pdf (20/01/2018) and Transparency in outsourcing: a roadmap ICO (2015). 1

30  Chapter 1 information asset register

1.61  This is published by National Archives (2017).1 It concerns the holdings by departments and bodies of unpublished information. This would be a useful addition to schemes and should include newly created files that are not published (see para 4.35). http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/information-management/info-asset-registerfactsheet.pdf.

1

1.62  Shortly before the access provisions of FOIA came into effect, the Lord Chancellor announced that information requested by a journalist would, if not exempt, be placed on the web. This, the press argued, would mean the FOIA would not be used by investigative journalists because they would be denied a coup. In fact, the FOIA has been widely used by the press and media. 1.63  The idea behind schemes was proactive availability of information by those covered by the FOIA 2000. At the time of the passage of the legislation through Parliament, IT was still in its infancy. Ever increasingly sophisticated search engines and growing familiarity with online information retrieval have caused some to question whether schemes have become anachronistic. In setting a positive duty on proactive publication they provide a valuable service and increasing development of IT by government should enhance schemes’ capability and not diminish it. Information under schemes was also to be available in paper form. We look at the use of IT by government in ch 4 (see para 4.34).

Applying for access1 1.64  Requests for information under FOIA  2000 may be so broad that any government or public activity will be included. The Act covers ‘recorded information’. ‘Any person’ – it is not restricted to a British national or EU citizen – making a request for information to a public authority is entitled to be informed in writing by the authority whether it ‘holds’ information of the description specified in the request. If that is the case, the PA must communicate the information to the requester. The right is a right to ‘information’ but documents may be requested. MoJ guidance states that, ‘It may often be the case that the easiest way to provide the information is to supply a copy of the relevant document, since a document may contain the information that has been requested. However, it may also contain a great deal of other information’.2 Section 11(1)(b) allows inspection of the record (ie  document). Case law has clarified the position. In IPSA  v IC3 the Court of Appeal ruled that access to information can include access to documents where these contain information that only examination of the original document can give. The tribunal has ruled on several occasions that the accuracy of information held is not its concern – the point is whether all the information held and disclosable has been disclosed.4 If a document is requested, the authority should also consider whether relevant information is contained in another document it holds (Cairns v ICO and DVLA EA/2009/0119 & EA/2009/0102). Where an email is requested, any attachment

The freedom of information legislation   31 also falls within the scope of the request and it must be considered along with the email. In Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority v IC the Upper Tribunal ruled ‘information’ did not need to be narrowly construed and, moreover, was not limited to words and figures but extended to visual and aural information. The fact that material was capable of informing an inquiry into the genuineness of a document was relevant to the assessment of whether it constituted information.5 Helpful guidance to the FOIA is provided by the Ministry of Justice and the Information Commissioner’s Office: http://www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/foi-procedural-information. htm#information. The Campaign for Freedom of Information has also produced guides on the Act and the Environmental Information Regulations, eg http://foia.blogspot.com/2009/09/updated-icofreedom-of-information.html. 2 Note 1 above. 3 [2015] EWCA Civ 388. In Common Services Agency v Scottish IC [2008] UKHL 47, Lord Hope at para  4 stated: ‘the release of information … should be construed in as liberal a manner as possible’ in relation to the identical words of the Scottish FOIA. In Glasgow City C  v Dundee City C [2009] CSIH 73, Lord Reed emphasised that the Scottish Act gave a right of access to information not documents, but the point in IPSA was not at issue in Glasgow City, the Court of Appeal emphasised. See DoE v IC [2016] UKUT 83 (AAC). 4 Simmons v IC EA/2005/0003; J Nisbet v IC EA/2007/0031. 5 [2015] AACR 37ws. 1

holds information

1.65  Guidance attempts to clarify what is meant by ‘holds’ and there is now a corpus of case law on this (see para 1.66 below). The authority does not have to create new information to comply with a request. However, compiling a list or schedule of information from existing information is not creating ‘new’ information: FS50070854. Extracting information from existing files by manual manipulation or electronic searching is not creating new information: the information already exists. However, there may well be costs considerations under s 12 where compilation is necessary.1 Information from existing databases is ‘held’.2 However, where access to online data sets is provided under contract the terms of the contract may indicate that data is not held by the authority.3 See FS50318306 in relation to a request to King’s College Cambridge for information about King’s College School.4 The IC has published guidance on ‘holds’ information: • https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1169/determining_ whether_information_is_held_foi_eir.pdf • https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1148/information_ held_by_a_public_authority_for_purposes_of_foia.pdf • https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1147/official_ information_held_in_private_email_accounts.pdf • https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1144/awareness_ guidance_12_info_caught_by_foi_act.pdf Johnston v IC and MoJ EA/2006/0085. Home Office v IC EA/2008/0027. 3 G Marlow v IC EA/2005/0031. 4 See E Tripp v IC EA/2014/0221. 1 2

32  Chapter 1 1.66  The term ‘holds’ does not include information held solely on behalf of another. The expression does cover information held principally or partly for another and the authority exercises control over the information. It will not be held if it is trade union information about employment with the public authority; constituency or ‘party political’ information; or purely personal information from spouses or family. Diaries for official use by Ministers which are kept by officials are likely to be covered, for instance. Private email accounts are included if used for official business (FS50422276 (2 March 2012) – Michael Gove’s private account as Secretary of State was official information held by a PA when it referred to public business) The Act’s headnote makes ‘provision for the disclosure of information “held” by PAs or persons providing services for them’. This is a broad formulation. If the authority does ‘hold’ such information, requesters have a right to have the information communicated to them. The authority may request additional information which it reasonably requires to identify and locate the information requested. Where a requester is informed of this requirement, the authority does not have to comply with the request until the further information is supplied (FOIA 2000, s 1). The revised s 45 code states (at paras 9.3 et seq) that information held by a contractor on behalf of a PA may be requested under FOIA. 1.67  The right to have information ‘held’ communicated above has effect subject to what is known as the situation where the ‘duty to confirm or deny’ that the authority holds information as requested does not arise. This is known as the ‘NCND’ (neither confirm nor deny) provision. Confirmation or denial would itself undermine an exemption. The authority is excused from complying with the above duty of disclosure where the information requested is exempt under any relevant provisions of the FOIA  2000, Part II, although the public interest in disclosure will have to be considered. The duty does not cover bodies that are excluded from the Act. The information covered by the basic duty is information held at the time the request is received although ‘account may be taken of any amendment or deletion made between that time and the time when the information is to be communicated’ where this amendment or deletion would have been made regardless of the request. This could have both positive and negative aspects for the requester. 1.68  Case law shows that where the authority is merely providing storage for information and exercises no control in creating, adding to, removing or editing information it has no control and does not hold the information. In Digby Cameron v IC EA/2008/0010, a council provided funding and administrative support for a coroner held the coroner’s case records solely on behalf of the coroner as the latter had sole statutory control over the information in the records. If the authority can allow access, or remove, add to or delete information and the budget for holding is part of the overall budget of the authority, and enquiries about the information are dealt with by the authority, the information will also be held by the authority.1 In FS50266932 (05/08/10) the complainant made a request to the BBC for a series of statistics relating to annual payments made by its pension scheme and copies of all correspondence between the BBC’s human resources department and BBC  Pension Trust relating to the financial state of the pension fund. The BBC responded that the statistical information was held on behalf of the

The freedom of information legislation   33 BBC Pension Trust and therefore fell outside the definition of information held by a public authority under FOIA 2000, s 3(2)(a). It also responded that it does not hold information falling within the scope of the request for correspondence. The Commissioner decided that the BBC handled the request in accordance with the Act. In FS50314236 (02/08/2010) the complainant requested full details of the income of the Chief Executive of the Isle of Anglesey County Council. The council stated that the individual referred to in the request was its Interim Managing Director and that he was employed by a third-party company to whom the council paid a fee for his services. The council stated that the individual concerned was employed directly by the council in a limited role for which he received a nominal fee. The latter was disclosed. The complainant did not accept that the council did not hold further information about the income of the Interim Managing Director and the council maintained that it had disclosed all the relevant information it held. The Commissioner was satisfied that, on the balance of probabilities, the council did not hold further information although procedural breaches in relation to the council’s handling of the request were found.2 McBride v IC EA/2007/0105. See M Hood v IC EA/2010/0167.

1 2

1.69  Searches may be requested and may involve FOIA  2000, s  3 where information is held by another body on behalf of the authority (FS50180545). Searches may be onerous but s  12 on costs is then likely to come into consideration.1 An authority is not expected to conduct research or create new information to comply with a request.2 However the House of Lords has ruled that ‘barnardising’ information, ie coding it so as not to reveal personal data, is not creating new information and was therefore held.3 However, compiling a list of documents held has been ruled not to create new documents (FS50155552). Quinn v IC and Home Office EA/2006/0010. Home Office v IC EA/2008/0027. 3 Common Services Agency v Scottish IC [2008] UKHL 47 (see para 2.82 below). 1 2

1.70  A  request for information must be in writing, state the name of the applicant and an address for correspondence, and must describe the information requested. A request is to be treated as being in writing where it is transmitted by electronic means, is received in legible form and is capable of being used for subsequent reference. An email address would seem adequate but the Act states that ‘a request for information’ is one ‘which states the name of the applicant’ (s  8). A  non-electronic address would have to be provided for non-electronic documents. The government resisted calls for mandatory indexes of files for bodies covered by the Act. If publication schemes work effectively (above) they should go some way to remedying this. Information Asset Registers should also be consulted (see para 4.44). fees and excessive cost

1.71  The ICO Guidance is available at: • https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1192/calculating_ costs_foia_eir_guidance.pdf

34  Chapter 1 • https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1168/fees_cost_of_ compliance_appropriate_limit.pdf • https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1635/fees_cost_of_ compliance_exceeds_appropriate_limit.pdf • https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1199/costs_of_ compliance_exceeds_appropriate_limit.pdf The authority is not obliged to comply with a request under s 1 of the FOIA 2000 if the cost of so doing exceeds the ‘appropriate limit’. This is by virtue of s 12. The authority is not exempted from its obligation under s  1(1)(a) which entitles the applicant to be informed of whether the authority holds information requested unless the cost of compliance with that obligation exceeds the appropriate limit. This limit, which may be variable ‘in relation to different cases’, will be set in regulations. The basic limit is £600 for central government, the armed forces and Parliament and legislative bodies – £450 for non-central government PAs – according to regulations approved in November 2004 (SI  2004/3244). ICO guidance states that where an authority underestimates a fee it cannot claim an additional amount. Refunds should be made where it overcalculates. Estimates must be reasonable1 and ‘sensible, realistic and supported by cogent evidence’.2 A fees estimate does not have to be served before a search commences.3 Where two or more requests for information are made to a public authority by a single person, or by different persons who appear to the authority to be acting in concert or in pursuance of a campaign, the authority will calculate the estimated cost of compliance with any request as the estimated total cost of compliance with them all. The circumstances in which these criteria are to take effect will be prescribed. It is hoped that they operate in a way that does not defeat requests for information because the information happens to cover a popular issue. The costs and manner of their estimation are provided for by regulations.4 Charges may be made for ‘disbursements’, ie  photocopying and postage. Under reg 4(3) in a case in which this regulation has effect, a public authority may, for the purpose of its estimate, take account only of the costs it reasonably expects to incur in relation to the request in: (a) determining whether it holds the information; (b) locating the information, or a document which may contain the information; (c) retrieving the information, or a document which may contain the information; and (d) extracting the information from a document containing it. Charges may not be made for considering or removing exempt information.5 However, costs involved in use of, eg, equipment to extract such information may be charged as disbursements. Charges may not made for calculating the public interest in disclosure.6 In costing time spent on a request a sum of £25 per hour is used regardless of the level of official. Section 12 is a safeguard against a large number of requests, not against repeat requests, which is covered by s 14.7 Urmenyi v IC and LB Sutton EA/2006/0093. Randall v IC and MHPRA EA/2006/0004. 3 Quinn v IC and Home Office EA/2006/0010. 4 SI 2004/3244. 5 Jenkins v IC and DEFRA EA/2006/0067; DBERR v IC and FoE EA/2007/0072; and Chief Constable of S Yorks Police v IC [2011] EWHC 44 (Admin) (cf however para 51). 1 2

The freedom of information legislation   35 This would seem to follow from ICO  Guidance that ‘the actual or anticipated time spent in considering exemptions’ cannot be included in a fees notice: http://www.ico. gov.uk/upload/documents/library/freedom_of_information/practical_application/ redactingandextractinginformation.pdf. 7 R  Brown v IC and National Archives EA/2006/0088; and see W  Urmeni v IC and LB of Sutton EA/2006/0093. 6

fees for disclosures where costs exceed appropriate limit

1.72  A  clause added in the Lords Committee (and incorporated in the Act) allows a public authority to charge for the communication of any information whose communication is not required by FOIA 2000, s 1, because of the cost of compliance under s  12 and it is not otherwise required by law. The fee charged will be in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of State (s 13(1)). Maximum fees and the manner of prescribing fees may be laid down in regulations. MoJ guidance states: ‘Where section 13 does apply, Regulation 7 states the maximum amount that can be charged, although there is nothing to prevent authorities from charging less than this or charging no fee at all. If the costs exceed the appropriate limit, the maximum charge is the sum of: (a) the costs which the authority was entitled to take into account in calculating that the appropriate limit was exceeded (see explanation of Regulation 4(3) above); and (b) the costs of informing the requester whether the information is held, and of communicating the information to the requester. When the appropriate limit is exceeded, these costs can also include the cost of staff time in carrying out these activities (calculated at a flat £25 per hour). For example, if it would take 30 hours of staff time to locate, sort and edit information in response to a request, costing £750 (based on the standard rate of £25 per hour), and the cost of photocopying and sending out the information is £100, the authority can charge up to a total of £850 for answering the request.1 Surprisingly the £600 waiver does not seem to apply. Or the request may be refused, as explained above. The Regulations described in the following section set out the appropriate limit. This provision does not apply where fees for any disclosure are contained in any other enactment. VAT will not apply where information is provided under FOIA  2000 by a public authority. It will apply to provision of information under a publication scheme where provision for fees is contained in the scheme and fees are charged. Information provided by archives or trading funds which is covered by other legislation may charge fees in accordance with that legislation and are exempt from FOIA fees requirements. https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110204172401/http://www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/ foi-procedural-fees.htm#calculating_the_maximum_fee_section_13. The ICO guidance is https:// ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1168/fees_cost_of_compliance_appropriate_limit. pdf (20/01/2018).

1

36  Chapter 1 fees notices

1.73  An authority may give an applicant for information, and within the time set for compliance with s 1 of the FOIA 2000, a notice in writing (a ‘fees notice’) stating the fee to be charged for compliance with s 1(1).1 Compliance with s 1(1) by the authority does not have to begin until the fee is paid within a period of three months from the day on which the fees notice is given. Unless special statutory fees for information are in effect, fees will be determined in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of State (above). FOIA 2000, s 9.

1

1.74  The details of what may be charged under SI 2004/3244 and contained in a fees notice have been explained. PAs have a discretion to charge a fee if above the statutory levels, answer without charge, or refuse to answer (see para 1.72 above). All PAs will be able to charge the full cost of disbursements including copying or printing and sending out information. Special provision is made under s  12(4) for two or more requests for information either by one person, or persons who appear to the PA to be acting in concert or in pursuance of a campaign. Regulation 5 specifies the circumstances under which the regulation applies: it applies where two or more requests are for information by one person etc which is on the same or a similar subject matter and the requests are received by the PA within a 60-working-day1 consecutive period. The estimated costs of complying with any of the requests is taken to be the total costs which may be taken into account by the PA in complying with all of them. Regulation 6 provides for the maximum fee a PA may specify in a fees notice under s  9 of the FOIA as a charge for complying with a s 1(1) request. Regulation 7 makes provision for s 13 and maximum fees where cost exceeds the appropriate limit. The regulations do not apply if other enactments lay down fees to be charged for disclosure. FOI fees do not apply to ‘Publication Schemes’ (PS) information (Code paras 19 and 20, but subsequently revised). Where bodies are entitled to levy a charge for information, such as Trading Funds, and which are asked to provide information relating to commercial interests, they should be able to charge the full market rate for their work. If a fee is not to be paid, the PA should identify any information that may be of interest and which is free of charge. Fees for unstructured personal data (see paras 2.96 et seq below) under DPA 1998 (as amended by FOIA 2000) will be subject to FOIA 2000 upper ‘appropriate’ limits as above, ie £600 and £450 (SI 2004/3244, reg 3(1)).2 Regulation 5(3) defines working days. The usual subject access fee under DPA 1998 was £10.

1 2

compliance time1

1.75  An authority to which a request has been made must comply with s 1(1) of the FOIA 2000 promptly and not later than the 20th ‘working day’ (s 10(6)) following the date of receipt. It excludes Saturdays, Sundays, Christmas Day, Good Friday and bank holidays as defined. This is subject to s 10(2), which states

The freedom of information legislation   37 that where a fees notice is given and payment duly made the period of working days from the day of notice and ending with the day of receipt of the fee is to be disregarded in calculating the 20 days. The period of 20 days may be extended by regulations to 60 working days. So far, four cases, the guidance states, have been identified for such treatment but these have been added to (and see SI 2004/3364 and SI  2010/2768 bringing academy schools into line with other schools re extensions to 30 days in school vacation): ‘i) to deal with school holidays, since the school will not be staffed at that time; ii) when frontline units of the armed forces are impossible to reach for operational reasons; iii) if a public authority needs to consult posts, governments or companies abroad to obtain information; and iv) when the National Archives need to determine whether requested information in a transferred public record that has not been designated as open information is exempt, or whether the duty to confirm or deny is excluded under Part II.’ And see now, for Northern Ireland, SI 2009/1369. For ICO guidance, see https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1165/time-forcompliance-foia-guidance.pdf.

1

1.76  Regulations may also prescribe different numbers of days in relation to different cases and confer a discretion on the commissioner. 1.77  In cases where a public interest disclosure is being considered, the public authority does not have to comply with s  1(1)(a) or (b) ‘until such time as is reasonable in the circumstances’. This does not affect the time by which a notice under s 17(1) must be given. This means that a public authority that wishes to claim that any provision within Part II of FOIA on exemptions in relation to the duty to confirm or deny is relevant, or that the information is exempt, must give the applicant a notice stating three things: the notice must state that fact; it must specify the exemption in question; and it must state why the exemption applies (if that would not otherwise be apparent). This must be done within the 20-day period. Where the public interest is being considered, under s 17(2) the PA should provide an estimate of the date by which a decision is expected to be reached (see para 1.108 below). This should be realistic (eg taking into account third party consultation). If exceeded, there should be an apology. The applicant should be kept informed and a record of excess times should be maintained. The guidance for officials states: ‘If the information being sought has to be considered under an exemption to which the public interest test applies … then the timescale [twenty days] is extended by a “reasonable period”. Although there is no statutory time limit on how long the “reasonable period” may be, if you are considering the public interest test you must, under section 17(2), give an estimate of the date by which you expect to reach such a decision.’ (Procedural Guidance chapter 6)

38  Chapter 1 The ICO guidance states that an authority should be prepared to justify to the IC time taken beyond 20 days (in addition to the initial 20 days) to consider the public interest.1 http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/freedom_of_information/detailed_specialist_ guides/timeforcompliance.pdf.

1

method of communication1

1.78  Under FOIA 2000, s 11, the authority must supply the information to the applicant in the applicant’s preferred form of communication where this has been expressed by the applicant ‘so far as reasonably practicable’. The means are in ‘permanent form’, ie paper or another form acceptable to the applicant; provision of a reasonable opportunity to inspect the record containing the information; the provision of a digest or summary of the information in permanent form or in another form acceptable to the applicant. Where it cannot reasonably comply with the applicant’s request, the public authority shall notify the applicant of the reasons for its determination. Subject to the applicant’s preference, the public authority may communicate information by any means which are reasonable in the circumstances. In assessing whether it is reasonably practicable to communicate information by a particular means, the public authority may have regard to all the circumstances including the cost. https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1163/means-of-communicatinginformation-foia-guidance.pdf.

1

1.79  The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 added new provisions to s 11. The amendment provides that where information requested is a data set, or which forms part of a data set, and the applicant requests that information held by a PA is communicated in electronic form, then the PA must, as far as reasonably practicable, provide the information to the requester in an electronic form that is capable of re-use, ie a re-usable format (on re-use of public sector information, see para  4.40). The duty is not absolute because there may be IT problems and questions of cost. A  re-usable format is one where the information is available in machine-readable form using open standards enabling its re-use and manipulation. The new duty does not apply to hard-copy data sets but the existing duty to comply with the requester’s preference (above) still applies ‘so far as it is reasonably practicable to do so’. A new sub-s (5) provides a definition of data set: it is a collection of information held in electronic form obtained or recorded by a PA for the purpose of providing the PA with information in the provision of a service by that PA or the carrying out of any other function by the PA. The information should be factual in nature and ‘raw’ or source data, and not an official statistic under the Statistics and Registration Service Act 2007 – statistics are produced and published under the 2007 Act. It should not be the product of interpretation or analysis. The amendment requires that data sets have not been materially altered or have been ‘value-added’ since obtained or recorded. The amendment allows for the data set to be available for re-use on specified conditions (see para  4.40), including: the copyright is only owned by the PA; and the information is disclosed under FOIA 2000. A specified licence for re-use

The freedom of information legislation   39 will be produced. Under FOIA 2000, s 19, PAs must include in their publication schemes any data sets they hold and updated versions of data sets unless the PA is satisfied that it is not appropriate for the data set to be so published. There are further requirements regarding copyright and specified licences. foia 2000 disclosures are to the ‘whole world’

1.80  Disclosures under the Act cannot be selective. If the requester has a malicious motive in making a request, that is not sufficient under FOIA  2000 to refuse a request. An exemption must be relied upon. A variety of exemptions would be relevant if a risk to personal safety were involved. In K McCluskey v IC & PPS NI EA/2007/0056 there was a was a request for information about police officers involved in legal proceedings in which the requester was acquitted. The tribunal noted that there was a ‘fundamental difference between a right to information, as under FOIA, and the voluntary discretionary disclosure of information by a PA, pursuant to agreement, as took place here’ (para 14). The exemption in FOIA 2000, s 40(2) was applied by the IC. There are also dangers of agreements regarding voluntary disclosure where general access is not made – it could foster or lead to favouritism, abuse and a lack of transparency. In Kennedy v IC  [2011]  EWCA  Civ 367 the Court of Appeal remitted a case concerning FOIA 2000, s 32(2) (below) to the tribunal in order to consider the impact of Strasbourg case law and the Human Rights Act 1998, art 10 on rights to freedom of information for a journalist who faced a refusal from a body with a monopoly of state information rights thereby interfering with the journalist’s freedom of speech rights (paras 1.154–1.155 below).1 See Tarsasag v Hungary [2009] ECHR 618 and Kenedi v Hungary [2009] ECHR 78 for the ECtHR rulings.

1

vexatious or repeated requests1

1.81  An authority is not obliged to deal with a request which is vexatious. No statutory definition is provided. Guidance indicates that a person cannot be a vexatious requester: it is the request that is vexatious. Authorities are allowed not to comply with a request from a person which is ‘identical or substantially similar’ to a previous request from that person unless a reasonable interval has elapsed between the two requests. This is left very open and could leave a great deal to judgement which might confound a genuine applicant. It aims to deal with repetitious requests but a slight variation in request could be crucial from an applicant’s point of view but considered of no significance by the authority. Where there are repeated requests, PAs should consider use of their disclosure log or website and indicate this to applicants. Both the IC and MoJ (archived) websites provide guidance on ‘vexatious requests’.2 The basic tests are: would the request be regarded as obsessive, constitute harassment, cause distress, cause a significant burden, is it designed to be disruptive or annoying, or lack any serious purpose or objective (bearing in mind motive is not a factor in FOIA requests)? Advice and assistance (below) do not have to be given to a requester making a vexatious request.

40  Chapter 1 In Dransfield v IC [2015] EWCA Civ 454, upholding the Upper Tribunal, the Court of Appeal ruled that vexatious behaviour could be inferred from previous requests of such a nature in addition to the present request. This might appear hard on a well-motivated request but the judgments were unequivocal. https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1195/dealing-with-repeat-requests.pdf; https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1198/dealing-with-vexatious-requests.pdf. 2 http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/freedom_of_information/detailed_ specialist_guides/22_06_09_foi_advice_and_assistance_v2.pdf. See Cabinet Office v Ashton [2018] UKUT 2018 (AAC). 1

1.82  The case law has shown that, where a person adopted a haranguing tone and made 20 campaigning requests in 90 pieces of correspondence over two years, the request was vexatious.1 Authorities should not be over-quick in making presumptions.2 Guidance is provided in D Young v IC3 and on repeated requests.4  A  vexatious request does not necessarily entail that an appeal is vexatious.5 There has been a spate of case law on these terms. See Dransfield v IC [2015] EWCA Civ 454 at para 1.81 above. Coggins v IC EA/2007/0130. See FS50290108 and FS50288182. V Ahilathirunayagam v IC EA/2006/0070. 3 EA/2010/0004. 4 M Jacobs v IC EA/2010/0040. 5 J Hossack v IC EA/2007/0024. 1 2

duty to provide advice and assistance to requesters1

1.83  An amendment at Report stage in the Lords introduced a duty to provide advice and assistance to requesters ‘so far as it would be reasonable to expect the authority to do so (FOIA 2000, s 16(1)).’ Conforming with the code of practice issued under s 45 (below) is taken to be compliance with this duty. The objective of assistance is to assist the applicant to clarify the information sought: for example, providing access to detailed catalogues and indexes ‘where available’ (Code para  10) and a general response setting out options. It will be very important where requests are unclear. In the ‘Foreword’ the s  45 Code adds that other statutes may be relevant in how a PA discharges its duty. [See draft Code.] The Disability Discrimination Act 1995, the Race Relations Act 1976 as amended by the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 (Equality Act 2010) are referred to. PAs should publish their procedures for dealing with requests for information. Where a request cannot be made in writing, an applicant should be advised to contact a Citizens Advice Bureau (CAB) or ‘in exceptional circumstances’ the PA might offer to take a note of the application over the phone and then send it to the applicant for confirmation and then to use the note as a request. PAs should be flexible in providing the advice most appropriate to the circumstances of the applicant. Advice and assistance may be applicant-specific and MPs could not expect authorities to act as their research assistant.2 Advice may include setting out a request particularising the items required.3

The freedom of information legislation   41 https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1624140/duty-to-provide-advice-andassistance-foia-section-16.pdf. 2 HM Treasury v IC EA/2007/0001. 3 C Lamb v IC EA/2006/0046. See also Charity Commission of England and Wales v IC EA/2015/0272. 1

Clarifying the request1 1.84  The Guidance advises on assistance in clarifying requests. The PA may ask for more detail to identify and locate the information requested. Assistance should, as far as reasonably practicable, be provided by the PA. The aim in seeking clarification is not to establish motive on the part of the requester but to clarify the nature of information required. Motive is irrelevant under FOIA 2000.2 Refusal to disclose has to be based on a FOIA exemption. Explanations should be given as to why further information is sought from a requester. Assistance on such points might include: providing an outline of the different kinds of information which might meet the terms of the request; providing access to detailed catalogues and indexes ‘where these are available’ (para 10); providing a general response setting out options for further information that could be provided on request. The list, it is advised, is not exhaustive and again flexibility is recommended. Requesters will not have access to identifiers or file numbers unless this is provided by the PA. Advice may cover fees (above). https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1624140/duty-to-provide-advice-andassistance-foia-section-16.pdf. 2 https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1043418/consideration-of-the-identityor-motives-of-the-applicant.pdf. 1

public authorities

1.85  ‘Public authorities’ covered by the Act are those contained in s 3 of and Sch 1 to the FOIA 2000 (see Annex A) or which are designated by order under s  5, or which is a publicly owned company as defined by s  6.1 Section 6 has been amended by the Protection of Freedoms Act to include companies owned jointly by PAs (s  6) including the wider public sector (ie  public authorities).1 The definition of ‘owned’ is amended to cover joint public ownership, eg bodies such as waste disposal companies and purchasing organisations will be covered. Companies listed only in relation to certain information are not PAs for FOIA purposes. The approach in FOIA  2000 is indicative and not conceptual. The term covers all government departments and includes any other body exercising statutory functions on behalf of the Crown. It would cover the Cabinet Office and by implication the Cabinet, Cabinet secretariat and Cabinet Committees. These bodies would be covered by numerous exemptions (see below). The term does not cover devolved Scottish bodies which are under the Scottish FOIA. Nor does it cover the security and intelligence services or GCHQ. The Queen and royal family are not covered. The Serious and Organised Crime Authority (SOCA) is excluded from the Act, but that body was brought into the National Crime Agency (September 2010), which is also excluded and will deal with organised cybercrime and cover SOCA’s remit. Banks nationalised after the

42  Chapter 1 2007–08 financial crisis are excluded. The Act’s coverage is truly comprehensive and readers are referred to Annex A  (below) for the relevant bodies. There is none of the confused jurisprudence which we find under the Environment Information Regulations 2004, SI 2004/3391 (EIR 2004) (see para 3.4), judicial review and under the HRA 1998 to determine what is a public body or a public function for the purposes of review or duties under the legislation.2 Information is held by a public authority if: (a) it is held by the authority otherwise than on behalf of another person (eg it is entrusted for safe-keeping to a PA but is not given to the PA as part of its public or regulatory responsibilities; or (b) it is held by another person on behalf of the authority (eg a contractor holds information provided by a PA). In its guidance the ICO states that a body such as Manchester Airports Authority is not a publicly owned company because some of its shares are owned by a private pension company.3 There is also a poorly explained example of a company owned by the BBC. There are many examples of publicly owned companies in local government and universities. It is wholly owned by the Crown or it is wholly owned by a public authority listed in FOIA 2000, Sch 1 other than a government department or any authority listed only in relation to particular information. FOIA  2000, s  6(2)(a) and (b) deal with membership of the companies. On such companies see the ICO’s: http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/freedom_of_ information/detailed_specialist_guides/fep105_publicly_owned_companies_v1.pdf. 2 See eg Aston Cantlow v Wallbank [2004] 1 AC 546 displaying poor reasoning but probably correct on its facts and YL v Birmingham City Council and Others [2007] UKHL 58; see Joint Committee on Human Rights Seventh Report HL 39 and HC 382 (2003–04). The decision in YL was reversed by legislation. 3 https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1152/public_authorities_under_the_foia.pdf. 1

1.86  Under FOIA 2000, s 5, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (CDL) may so designate as a public authority for the purposes of the Act any person who is not listed in Sch 1, nor capable of being added to that Schedule under s 4(1) but who appears to the CDL to exercise functions of a public nature – it does not provide that the ‘function’ has to be statutory; or who is providing under a contract made with a public authority any service whose provision is a function of that authority. This latter formulation is very broad and will cover private bodies providing services of a public authority to the public under contract eg, private prisons. It was felt that simply referring to those bodies exercising statutory functions was too broad because some functions would not be provided to the public. The first part relies upon the CDL’s discretion and will clearly cover bodies such as public utilities even though privately owned. Not all their functions will be of a public nature.1 It compares interestingly with the approach adopted in the HRA 1998 to establish those bodies covered by the HRA 1998,2 as well as the general development of judicial review to cover bodies acting in some sort of quasi-public regulatory or monopoly capacity.3 An order may designate a specified person or office or persons or offices falling within a specified description. Duties of consultation attend the making of orders. Utilities may perform many functions which may be non-statutory but public – or vice versa. HRA 1998, s 6(3). 3 As developed from the decision in R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex p Datafin plc [1987] 1 All 1 2

The freedom of information legislation   43 ER 564, CA. See Woolf and Jowell (eds) De Smith’s Judicial Review (8th edn, 2018) paras 3.046 et seq. See R (West) v Lloyd’s of London [2004] EWCA Civ 506 where Lloyd’s was not acting as a public authority under HRA 1998, s 6 or otherwise in its regulatory functions.

1.87  After a consultation exercise in 2009, it was announced in 2010 that four bodies were to be designated from October 2010. The bodies covered by the designation are: the Association of Chief Police Officers (now the National Police Chiefs Council), the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS), the Universities and Colleges Admissions Service1 (UCAS – for specified functions) and Academy Trusts – the bodies responsible for Academy Schools.2 On coming to power, the coalition government announced possible subjects for designation including nationalised banks and Network Rail – the latter has caused some difficulties of interpretation under EIR  2004 (see para  3.14). The Freedom of Information (Additional Public Authorities) Order 2011, SI  2011/1041, contains a list of additional bodies. See UKAS  v IC  [2015]  AACR  25, [2014]  UKUT  557 (AAC) – the designation order must be interpreted in a broad manner to respect the objectives of FOIA. 2 http://www.justice.gov.uk/news/newsrelease300310a.htm. 1

1.88  Section 4 of the FOIA  2000 allows the list of authorities in Sch  1 to be amended by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (CDL) by adding a reference to any body or the holder of any office which (in either case) is not in the Schedule but for which both of the following are satisfied. First, that the body is established by royal prerogative or primary or secondary legislation, or is established ‘in any other way by a Minister of the Crown in his capacity as Minister or by a government department or the Welsh Ministers, the First Minister for Wales or the Counsel General to the Welsh Assembly Government’.1 Secondly, that in the case of a body it is wholly or partly constituted by appointment made by the Crown, a Minister of the Crown (including a Northern Ireland Minister), a government department or by the Welsh Ministers, the First Minister for Wales or the Counsel General to the Welsh Assembly Government and, in the case of an office, appointments to the office are made by the same parties.2 Before making an order under sub-s  (1), the CDL must consult the Welsh Ministers where the bodies or office holders perform functions which are exercisable only or mainly in relation to Wales. Similar provisions apply to Northern Ireland bodies and office holders. Where either of these conditions fails to be satisfied in relation to any body in Parts VI or VII of Sch 1, that body or office-holder shall cease to be a public authority by virtue of its entry in those parts. This covers non-departmental bodies or colloquially ‘quangos’. Parts VI and VII may be amended where a body or office has ceased to exist or where either of the two conditions has ceased to be satisfied. The provisions do not apply to devolved Scottish institutions.3 FOIA 2000, s 4(2). The present Welsh provisions were as a consequence of the Government of Wales Act 2006. 2 FOIA 2000, s 4(3). 3 See FOIA  2000, s  79 which includes the Scottish Parliament, any part of the Scottish administration, the Scottish Parliamentary Corporate body or any Scottish public authority with mixed functions or no reserved functions within the meaning of the Scotland Act 1998. 1

44  Chapter 1 1.89  Section 7 makes provision for public authorities for which the Act has limited application. Where an authority is listed only in relation to information of a specified description, nothing in Parts I  to V  of the Act applies to other information held by the authority. Limitations to information may be added or removed by order. Where an authority is listed in relation to functions under s 5(1)(a) the designating order must specify the functions with respect to which the designation is to have effect. Information not related to the exercise of those functions is not covered. Similar provisions apply to authorities designated by the Secretary of State because of services under s  5(1)(b). Special provisions on consultation apply in the case of Welsh and Northern Ireland bodies. The Secretary of State may also exclude by order information from the provisions of the Act – which means the Act will have no relevance to the information – in relation to publicly owned companies (s  7(7)). So, in relation to the Bank of England FOIA 2000 does not include information on monetary policy, financial support to maintain financial stability and provision of private banking services. 1.90  The exclusion of the BBC as a public authority in relation to information held for the purposes of ‘journalism, art or literature’ has generated a significant body of litigation. In the most prominent case the Balen report concerned BBC coverage in the Middle East and a FOIA request was made for the report. The House of Lords ruled in Sugar v BBC [2009] UKHL 9 that a decision by the IC that the report was held for the purposes of journalism etc, and was not thereby held in its capacity as a public authority and was therefore a matter over which he did not have jurisdiction, was nonetheless a Decision Notice under FOIA 2000, s 50(3) and was consequentially appealable to the tribunal. The tribunal reversed the IC and maintained it had jurisdiction but it in turn was reversed by the High Court and Court of Appeal.1 The Law Lords ruled by a 3–2 majority that the request could be processed under the appeal provisions of FOIA 2000 and did not have to be challenged under judicial review. [2008] EWCA Civ 191.

1

1.91  FOIA 2000, s 7(1) provides: ‘Where a public authority is listed in Schedule  1 only in relation to information of a specified description, nothing in Parts I to V of this Act applies to any other information held by the authority.’ Under FOIA 2000, s 50(3), a decision notice (DN) could only be issued in cases of a failure to comply with s 1 in relation to a public body. The BBC’s argument was that for journalistic information it was not a public authority; thus s 1 did not apply to it in respect of such information and the IC could not therefore issue a DN. The question of whether the BBC is a public body or not was anterior to the powers of the IC and tribunal under the Act. It amounted to a question of jurisdiction and the IC and tribunal could not make a decision determining their own jurisdiction. Such a jurisdiction was provided by the Act and involved a public authority failing in its s 1 duties. Additionally, if correct, the IC could not exercise powers to obtain the information for his own examination because s 51 depended upon him having jurisdiction. Crucially, the IC agreed with the

The freedom of information legislation   45 BBC as to the status of the information (he subsequently changed his mind!). In such a case the only recourse would appear to be a judicial review of the classification of the information in the High Court. This is what took place and both the High Court and Court of Appeal agreed with the IC’s initial conclusion and overruled the tribunal, which had ruled that an application had been made to a public authority and the IC’s decision letter was in effect a DN and so appealable. This would be a much more convenient and cheaper route for the requester than judicial review. However, had the IC disagreed with the BBC on the classification, he would have proceeded to make a decision under s 50(3) in relation to that information which would have been appealable. The problem arose where the IC agreed with the BBC. 1.92  Lord Phillips believed that the BBC was a hybrid authority holding public and excluded information. The request was made to a public authority but involved excluded information. The IC’s letter to this effect was a DN and appealable. What if excluded material were requested? ‘Section 7 confines the hybrid authority’s obligations to public information. Thus, its obligation under section 1 is to ascertain whether or not it holds information of the description requested as part of its public information, as specified in Schedule 1. If it does not, it is entitled to answer the inquirer “information of the description that you have requested does not form part of the information that I hold in respect of…” followed by the description of public information specified in Schedule 1.’ (Para 33) 1.93  Lord Hoffmann believed that a power of determining the status of the authority was not conferred on the IC by the Act. He lacked jurisdiction, as did the tribunal. Furthermore, the terms ‘hybrid’ and ‘excluded’ were not contained in the Act. The question was, was it holding information as a public authority, although he believed that it would have been better had this power of determination been conferred on the IC. Baroness Hale agreed with Lord Hoffmann on outcome but they were in the minority. Lord Neuberger agreed with Lord Phillips and used the terms ‘hybrid’ and ‘excluded’, and whereas Lord Hope agreed with the their outcome, he disapproved of these terms. Simply, the BBC was a public authority according to the schedule to which a request had been made and refused as illustrated in the decision of the IC which was appealable. 1.94  When the case was heard on appeal from the tribunal on the substantive question – ie was the report in question information concerned with journalism, art or literature? – the High Court adopted a different interpretation to the tribunal. In BBC and IC v Sugar1 the court ruled that the tribunal’s finding – that it was only where a predominant purpose in holding information was for journalism, etc (where there was more than one reason for holding it) that it was excluded material – was not statutorily endorsed and was an unlawful interpretation. The argument that the information originally related to journalism but then became managerial and resource-allocation information, the latter being the predominant purpose, did not stop the information relating to journalism, the

46  Chapter 1 court believed. The Court of Appeal held that the predominant test for holding information relied upon by the tribunal was not supported by the legislation.2 The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the appeal. The majority held that, even if information is held only partly for the purposes of journalism, art or literature, the information is outside the scope of the FOIA. Lord Wilson ruled that, if information is held predominantly for those purposes, it is outside FOIA and the Baden report was so held. Once it is established that the information sought is held by the BBC to any significant degree for the purposes of journalism, it is exempt from production under FOIA, even if the information is also held for other purposes (see paras [67], [75], [104] and [111]). FOIA has an important public interest role in allowing access to information about public bodies. But the BBC, along with commercial broadcasters, has an important public interest in investigation and reporting on news and current affairs without the inhibition of having to publish details of their journalistic etc work. The reason for the protection would fail ‘if the coexistence of other non-journalistic purposes resulted in the loss of immunity’ (para [78]). The protection is given to safeguard the broadcasting functions of the BBC and in those circumstances to protect freedom of speech. Information should be found to be held for the purposes of journalism, art or literature only if an immediate object of holding the information is to use it for one of those purposes (para [67]). Lord Phillips queried whether archived material would be protected, and Lord Walker (at para [84]) cited with approval Lord Neuberger’s obiter (para 55) in the Court of Appeal: ‘In my view, whatever meaning is given to “journalism” I  would not be sympathetic to the notion that information about, for instance, advertising revenue, property ownership or outgoings, financial debt, and the like would normally be “held for purposes … of journalism”. No doubt there can be said to be a link between such information and journalism: the more that is spent on wages, rent or interest payments, the less there is for programmes. However, on that basis, literally every piece of information held by the BBC could be said to be held for the purposes of journalism. In my view, save on particular facts, such information, although it may well affect journalism-related issues and decisions, would not normally be “held for purposes … of journalism”. The question whether information is held for the purposes of journalism should thus be considered in a relatively narrow rather than a relatively wide way.’ The court ruled that Art 10  ECHR did not assist the requester because that article does not confer a right of access to information. It prohibits a government from restricting a person from receiving information which others are willing to impart to that person. This latter ruling must be placed in doubt, given the developments in the European Court of Human Rights which are examined elsewhere (see paras 1.154 and 4.289 et seq).3 [2009] EWHC 2349. [2010] EWCA Civ 715. 3 [2012] UKSC 4. 1 2

1.95  For a subsequent case where FOIA 2000, ss 21, 38 and 43 did not protect BBC contracts with commercial bodies, see FS50296349 (and FS50228493);

The freedom of information legislation   47 where the expenditure of the BBC in coverage of the Pope’s visit to the UK was protected by ‘journalism etc’, see FS50352659; and likewise correspondence with Prince Charles, see FS50318444 and further FS50265745.1 See A Newbery v BBC EA/2009/0118 – successful invocation by BBC.

1

transferred records

1.96  Section 15 of the FOIA 2000 concerns requests for records transferred to, or if they existed would be contained in a transferred record to, the National Archives (formerly Public Record Office), another place of deposit approved by the Lord Chancellor/Secretary of State or the Public Record Office Northern Ireland. Copies of requests will be sent to the ‘responsible authority’ provided the information requested does not fall within an ‘absolute exemption’ set out in s 2(3) (see paras 1.105 and 1.106 below; and see further paras 4.48 et seq below). The responsible authority shall, on receiving a copy and within such time as is reasonable in all the circumstances, inform the appropriate records authority (s 15(5)) of its decisions under s 66(3) and (4) (see ch 4). It should be pointed out that records which are more than 30 years old are referred to as ‘historical records’, and special provision is made for these under ss 63–67 (see para 4.64 below). The period of 30 years has been reduced to 20 years.1 The 20-year period is important because most exemptions end when they become ‘historical records’ at 20 years (see para 4.62 below). Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, Part 6 and Sch 7.

1

1.97  Paragraphs 2.11 et seq of the s  45 Code provide details on transfers between PAs. This might involve contacting the other PA to confirm that it holds the information. This does not include holding a record under s 3(2)(a) of the Act (it is not held on behalf of another person (see above)). The time for measuring a time limit for a request by a transferred authority (TA) runs from the date on which the TA received the request.

Public interest disclosures 1.98  In common with many overseas access to information regimes, the FOIA  2000 allows exempt information to be disclosed where disclosure is in the public interest. This provision was present in the 1997 White Paper.1 The Parliamentary Ombudsman had ruled under the 1994 Code that the public interest may be served where publication might help public understanding of issues of current national debate or which has generated Parliamentary debate (see para  4.10 below). Since the draft Bill of 1999, the provision was more carefully drafted to reflect the central importance of the balancing of public interests. The provision is now s  2 of the Act. However, there were eight exemptions that cannot be the subject of a public interest disclosure (see below). These are called ‘absolute exemptions’. To these has been added a ninth concerning correspondence with the monarch and the first and second in line

48  Chapter 1 to the throne following requests for correspondence to Ministers from Prince Charles (below). Other ‘qualified’ or ‘ordinary’ exemptions are subject to the public interest test. So we have: exclusions (ie information or PAs not covered by FOIA), absolute exemptions and exemptions. In the case of exemptions there may be a public interest disclosure of whether the public authority holds the information requested instead of neither confirming nor denying (NCND) that it holds the information. In the case of exemptions, there may be a public interest disclosure of the exempt information itself. The public interest is determined by the authority concluding that, in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosure (of the fact of holding information or the information itself). This reversed the emphasis so that where the balance was even, the scales would tip down in favour of disclosure although some decisions of the tribunal seem to confuse this.2 It was a late amendment in the Report stage of the Lords. It is an important reversal helping to create a presumption of disclosure. Public interest disclosures feature in other areas of law and information. A public interest may negative a duty of confidentiality and, in the case of information held by public bodies, the courts will require evidence that disclosure is not in the public interest before preventing publication (see paras 4.294 et seq below). The public interest applies in the law of copyright (para 4.314, note 1 below) as well as in the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 where the test is heavily regulated by statutory qualifications (paras 4.272 et seq below). The Defamation Act 2013 (s 4) also sets out a public interest defence under that statute. The courts have for many years applied a public interest test to determine whether information in the possession of a public authority should be disclosed to a litigant, and where the courts weigh the public interests of disclosure in the interests of justice or secrecy in the interests of an overriding aspect of governance or security (see paras 11.46 et seq below for a fuller discussion).

See M Carter and A Bouris Balancing the Public Interest: Applying the Public Interest Test to Exemptions in the FOIA (2nd edn 2006). The IC has produced his own guidance on public interest disclosures. Several overseas laws have a public interest test, including: Ireland – see M McDonagh Freedom of Information Law in Ireland (2nd ed, 2006); Canada – see M Drapeau and M-A Racicot Federal Access to Information 2002 (2001); Australia – see Bayne The Laws of Australia (1995) Part 2.3; and New Zealand – see Eagles, Taggart and Liddell Freedom of Information in New Zealand (1992). In none of these countries does a public interest test apply to all exemptions. See also in ch 5 the EU Regulation on access to documents which also has a public interest test for some exceptions. 2 See P Birkinshaw Freedom of Information: the Law, the Practice and the Ideal (4th edn, 2010) chs 5 and 6. 1

1.99  The DCA Guidance, which is now archived, suggests the following areas where it would not favour the public interest to disclose information:1 • where disclosure would engender some risk to public or personal safety; • where disclosure would be damaging to effective public administration; • where there are contractual obligations in favour of maintaining confidence (in such cases legal advice is likely to be essential). It should be added that agreements cannot evade duties contained in FOIA 2000; • where the duty of confidentiality arises out of a professional relationship; • where disclosure would affect the continued supply of important information (for example, information provided by whistleblowers).

The freedom of information legislation   49 See ICO: https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1183/the_public_interest_test.pdf. The MoJ guidance has been archived: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20150603171202/ https://www.justice.gov.uk/information-access-rights/foi-guidance-for-practitioners

1

1.100  The ICO guidance has now been updated. Many examples are provided by IC and tribunal rulings which are examined in relation to individual exemptions. The ICO stated that in favour of disclosure may be: • general arguments in favour of promoting transparency, accountability and participation; • disclosure might enhance the quality of discussions and decision-making generally; • financial issues – for instance, if the information requested involved a large amount of public money disclosure may be in the public interest; • the specific circumstances of the case and the content of the information requested in relation to those circumstances; • the age of the information might affect the interest in disclosure. Passage of time may well impact upon the strength of the interest in disclosure; • timing of a request in relation to information about an investigation may be relevant. The stage of the investigation and information already released would be important; • the impact, beneficial or otherwise, on individuals and/or the wider public. 1.101  Conversely the public interest may be advanced in disclosing: • information revealing misconduct/mismanagement of public funds; • information that shows that a particular public contract is bad value for money; • information that would correct untrue statements or misleading acts on the part of public authorities or high-profile individuals; • information where a substantial length of time has passed since the information was obtained, and the harm which would have been caused by disclosure at the time the information was obtained has depleted; • specific circumstances of the case and the content of information in relation to those circumstances; • the passage of time – by implication recent information or events may need protecting; • likelihood of any harm and its severity caused by disclosure; • is it ‘live’, ie sensitive or significant; • safe space for government thinking, formulation and debate away from scrutiny; • clear evidence that frankness and candour in debate and decision-making in government will be inhibited. The evidence will need to be clear on this effect; • timing and impact above are repeated. Irrelevant considerations are the identity of the requester; the possibility of misunderstanding information; the status of the information (classified or relating to senior individuals); the number of exemptions being claimed; the accuracy of the information; or that disclosure will lead to poorer record-keeping.

50  Chapter 1 1.102  There is a general public interest in disclosure (see Cabinet Office v IC [2018] UKUT 410 (AAC) and payment to former deputy prime minister Nick Clegg of a public duties cost allowance payable to former prime ministers). Under FOIA 2000, the tribunal has ruled that in applying the test, the considerations in each exemption should be considered individually and not cumulatively1 and that general considerations which might appear relevant should not apply. The focus is on each exemption individually. The sum cannot be greater than its parts. Under EIR 2004, the Court of Appeal has ruled that exemptions may be considered as a whole to assess the overall weight of the public interest. The public interests may be aggregated: Ofcom v IC.2 This was referred to the ECJ by the Supreme Court.3 The ICO believed this approach only applied to the EIR.4 Our view is that the better approach under FOIA  2000 is that adopted under the EIR. In Home Office and MoJ v IC5 the tribunal’s reasoning was upheld on a request for ‘meta’ requests and meta data – information generated by FOI requests themselves. The judgment seems to favour a cumulative test: paras 25 and 38. The Upper Tribunal in APPGER  v ICO and Foreign and Commonwealth Office endorsed the approach that ‘the public interest should be assessed by reference to the circumstances at or around the time when the request was considered by the public authority (including the time of any internal review)’.6 Bellamy v IC EA/2005/0023. [2009] EWCA Civ 90. 3 [2010] UKSC 3. The CJEU confirmed that the grounds for non-disclosure may be cumulatively taken into account: Case C-71/10: Ofcom v IC [2011] CJ (28.07.11). See para 3.43. 4 https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1629/eir_effect_of_exceptions_and_the_ public_interest_test.pdf, para 73. 5 [2009] EWHC 1611 (Admin). 6 [2015] UKUT 377 (AAC). 1 2

1.103  Further guidance has been produced on: Cabinet Committees (the presumption is not to disclose information concerning such committees);1 policy advice; requests for legal advice in relation to the formulation of policy (presumption not to disclose); legal advice (likewise); oral parliamentary questions (PQs); written PQs; press releases and handling strategies; and confidential information obtained from a foreign government or international organisation. http://www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/foi-assumptions-cabinet.htm. See FS50535179 and compare with FS50677400.

1

The exemptions 1.104  It should be recalled that the IC and MoJ have produced guidance on the exemptions available from their websites. The National Archives have also produced a guide.1 Where an authority confirms that it holds information requested and the information is not exempt, or excluded when a public body is not listed in a schedule, it will be available for public inspection subject to the requirements outlined above. Authorities will have to set out in Publication Schemes what information they are going to publish (see above). These are

The freedom of information legislation   51 approved by the Commissioner. The exemptions are pivotal to the operation of the legislation as a code of openness and need the closest scrutiny. We have already observed that some exemptions, eg where the cost of compliance exceeds an appropriate financial limit to meet the request, including the duty to confirm or deny, or where there are vexatious or repeated requests are not within the exemptions contained in Part II of the Act. Official publications refer to 23 exemptions, but in fact there are more than this. http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/information-management/freedom-ofinformation-exemptions.pdf.

1

Absolute exemptions 1.105  Although exempt, the public authority may, as we have seen, make a discretionary disclosure under s  2 of the FOIA  2000 of exempt information which has been requested. However, this does not apply to information which is exempt1 by virtue of ss  21 (accessible by other means); 23 (bodies dealing with security etc); 32 (court records); 34 (information covered by Parliamentary privilege);2 36 (prejudice to effective working of government) in so far as it applies to information held by either House of Parliament; 37, where the information concerns communications with the sovereign, heir to or second in line of succession to the throne, communications with a person who has subsequently acceded to the throne or become heir to or second in line of succession to the throne, and other communications with members of the royal family or household where they are made or received on behalf of a person falling within the previous descriptions; 40(i) and (ii), in relation to the first condition where it is satisfied by virtue of sub-s (3)(a)(i) or (b) of that section (this concerns personal information); 41 (information provided in confidence); and 44 (prohibited by enactment etc). These are absolute exemptions. However, in relation to s 32 the Supreme Court made a significant inroad into the nature of the exemption in Kennedy v Charities Commission (see analysis in para 1.154 below).3 The April 2000 Bill omitted a reference to cl 11 information – the cost of compliance provision. This would be determined by the Bill of Rights 1689, Art 9. See R  v D  Chaylor etc [2010] EWCA Crim 1910; [2010] UKSC 52. 3 [2014] UKSC 20. 1 2

1.106  These exemptions are described as ‘absolute exemptions’ because the authority has no authority to disclose this information. This discretion applies under the section and it does not state that it interferes with, detracts from or otherwise prejudices powers under common law, especially the public interest disclosure provisions under the law of confidentiality.1 To this extent, it is not entirely clear whether the provisions in the statute operate to preclude the common law or whether they act as an alternative. Section 78 does in fact state ‘Nothing in the Act is to be taken to limit the powers of a public authority to disclose information held by it’. This might include powers under common law and so the limitations under s 2 would not apply in such cases. On the contrary, as FOIA 2000 is a comprehensive code, it arguably overrides the common law but not specific provisions in other statutes. Section 2 also prevents the IC

52  Chapter 1 exercising a power of requiring disclosure of exempt information in these areas. The NCND public interest override does not apply where the exemption is absolute. See paras 4.312 et seq below. The terms of the statutory powers of public interest disclosure will be wider than that under the common law. The latter will have regard to the mode of disclosure, the extent of disclosure, the recipient of disclosure, the motive and so on as limiting factors. Conversely, the common law will not be restricted by the eight ‘absolute exemptions’. They only apply to disclosures under the statute.

1

1.107  Where the authority holds information of the description specified in the request and has informed or intends to inform the applicant that it does so, the authority must consider whether to communicate the information in their discretion unless the exemption that applies is absolute. In the case of a qualified exemption such decisions must be made within a time-scale that is reasonable within all the circumstances. They have to regard all the circumstances of the case1 and unless it appears that the public interest in maintaining the exemption in question outweighs the public interest in disclosure, they shall communicate the information to the applicant. There must be a specific balancing and the manner in which they exercise their discretion is investigable by the IC. To what extent may a disclosure be specific to an individual? This is a measure providing for a general right of access and individual factors are not provided for. Disclosure under FOIA 2000 is disclosure to the world. To avoid revealing their identities in the USA, requesters frequently use commercial bodies to make their requests under US FOIA laws. In the original Bill there was included the desirability of ‘informing the applicant whether it holds information’ and ‘communicating information to him’. This was removed from the April 2000 Bill.

1

Refusal of request 1.108  Where the public authority is minded to refuse any request under s 1 of the FOIA 2000 on the basis that the duty to confirm or deny is excluded or that the information is exempt under s 2, it must give the applicant a notice stating that fact, which specifies the exemption in question and which states if not otherwise apparent why the exemption applies (s 17(1)). This has to be done within the 20day period. This is nowhere near the detail of the famous Vaughn index in the USA where exemptions have to be justified line by line.1 The Code of Practice under s 45 stated that good practice might involve preparation of a statement of policies about disclosure which can be provided to applicants ‘without the risk of implying comment upon particular requests’. The draft code has guidance on advice and assistance and communicating with requesters. The notice must specify, where a decision under s  2 is to be taken on the public interest, that no decision has yet been taken. The notice under s 17(1), or a separate notice within such time as is reasonable in the circumstances, must state the reason for claiming why the public interest in maintaining the exclusion of the duty to confirm or deny or in not allowing disclosure outweighs the public interest in disclosing whether it holds the information or in disclosing the information (s  17(3)). Section 17(3) makes a deliberate reference to ‘all the circumstances

The freedom of information legislation   53 of the case’ and this has helped to ensure that reasons are specific and detailed. The authority in making such statements or giving such reasons is not obliged to reveal exempt information. Where the authority claims that s 12 or 14 (cost of compliance and vexatious etc) is to be relied upon by the authority it must give the applicant a notice stating that fact and within the time-scale for compliance with s 1(1). This does not apply where a previous notice relating to s 14 has been given and a further notice would be unreasonable in all the circumstances. Vaughan v Rosen 484 F 2d 820 (CA, DC) (1973).

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1.109  A notice under sub-s (1), (2) or (5) must contain details of any complaints procedures provided by the authority for information complaints or a statement that no such procedure exists (see paras 1.235 and 1.233 below), as well as the applicant’s right to apply to the IC for a decision notice (a formal decision).1 The complete record of decision notices is available at https://icosearch.ico.org.uk/s/search. html?collection=ico-meta&profile=decisions&query (14/08/2018). Tribunal appeals and appeals to the Upper Tribunal are at http://informationrights.decisions.tribunals.gov.uk//Public/search. aspx and http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKUT/AAC/.

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1.110  The s  45 Code stated in a draft that when refusing information, an exemption that is used should not merely be a paraphrase of the wording in the Act (subject to s 17(4)). An authority should also specify any public interest features necessitating reliance upon an exemption. Authorities should keep a record of all applications for monitoring by line managers.

The specific exemptions (i)  information accessible to the applicant1

1.111  This is an absolute exemption. The following is the ICO guidance on the exemption. The ICO guidance is repeated for each exemption below.2 Where information is reasonably accessible to the applicant otherwise than under s 1 of the FOIA 2000, it is exempt. Reasonably accessible includes that which is available only on payment of a fee (s 21(2)(a)). It is reasonably accessible if the authority or any other person is obliged under any enactment to communicate the information to members of the public on request whether on payment of a charge or otherwise but not by simply making information available for inspection (s 21(2)(b)).3 The authority or other person must be under a duty to communicate the information. If it does not fall within s 21(2)(b) then it is not reasonably accessible merely because it may be available on request unless it is available with the authority’s publication scheme and any payments are specified in that scheme.4 The use of ‘applicant’ suggests that the personal circumstances of the applicant eg financial, ability to travel etc, may be considered; requiring payment of a fee for a report of the PA only containing a small amount of requested information may not be reasonable. The publication scheme, including payments, has to be approved by the Commissioner. The authority has to state

54  Chapter 1 why the exemption applies and thereby implies a duty to inform the applicant of its location. If information is not reasonably accessible to the applicant, that may be a ground of complaint to the IC. Section 21 was wrongly relied on where information was in databases and not accessible (FS50146907). Reforms have dealt with data sets and the 2017 code has guidance (see para 1.79). In the numbering that follows, it should be recalled that two exemptions are dealt with above and there is an additional exemption within s 22 for research. 2 https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1203/information-reasonably-accessibleto-the-applicant-by-other-means-sec21.pdf. 3 Eg, birth, marriage and death certificates. 4 I Benson v IC EA/2011/0120 (10 November 2011). 1

1.112  FS50073646 concerned a request for information from the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) about a complaint made by the requester concerning a judge who dealt with the requester’s judicial review application and appeal proceedings. Different exemptions applied to protect different documents. The IC found that the MoJ were wrong in failing to identify information subject to the s 21 exemption and therefore were in breach of s  17(1)(c) and had to provide the requester with an ‘accurate and comprehensive list of all documents it holds’ to which s  21 is applicable. In FS50086060 s  21 was correctly invoked as the information was available via web addresses. 1.113  C  Ames v IC and Cabinet Office EA/2007/0110 was a request for the identity of the person who redrafted the executive summary of the Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction dossier. The tribunal ruled ruled that s 21 was incorrectly invoked by stating the information was available in the Hutton report: it was not. The IC’s DN was substituted. Where bodies are funded by a PA, the tribunal has not inferred that the PA holds information by relying on s 21. In G Tuckley v IC & Birmingham City Council1 the case concerned a request for a list of all neighbourhood forums from 1992 and money paid to each by Birmingham City Council matters that were irrelevant in the case. Rhondda Cynon Taff CBC v IC2 concerned a request for a copy of the Land Drainage Act 1991. The tribunal believed the Act was reasonably accessible and s 21 was rightly claimed by the PA. Information about the workplace email addresses of all university staff were rightly refused under s  21: FS50311065. Section 21 was correctly invoked by the Home Office when a manual on the treatment of police informers was requested, which was publicly available in the British Library: FS50302058. Where information is available through another statutory regime, that regime must not place restrictions on access for s 21 to apply.3 EA/2006/0077. EA/2007/0065. 3 Newcastle upon Tyne NHS Foundation Trust v IC EA/2011/0236. In M Davis v IC EA/2012/0175 a charge of £1,550 for the scheme containing requested information which had been approved by the IC was deemed reasonable! Both the IC and PA should be alert to cost being a deterrent! 1 2

(ii)  information intended for future publication1

1.114  Information is exempt under s 22 of the FOIA 2000 where it is held by the public authority with a view to its publication by the authority or another

The freedom of information legislation   55 person at ‘some future date’ (whether determined or not); it was already held with a view to such publication at the time the request for information was made and it is reasonable in all the circumstances that it be withheld from disclosure until the date referred to above. ‘Reasonable’ connotes an objective standard which may be assessed by the IC. The duty to confirm or deny does not arise for information where compliance would involve the disclosure of any information falling in the above categories. This is a useful device to prevent access to information where a matter is under internal investigation and report, and eventual publication. However, the withholding has to be objectively justified as reasonable in all the circumstances. This will be fact-specific. The exemption has been successfully claimed in relation to a thesis held by Liverpool University (FS50349323) and also FS50349323 and Queen Mary University of London v IC EA/2012/0229 (importance of peer review an important factor in academic publishing in latter case). For inspection to be a valid means of publication, the ICO advises facilities should be: clearly advertised, readily available, accessible and easy to use, eg a cataloguing system (para  18). Failure to identify which information is to be published may well amount to a breach of s 22 (FS50121803). https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1172/information-intended-for-futurepublication-and-research-information-sections-22-and-22a-foi.pdf.

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1.115  The UK Act and the Scottish FOIA differed in their approaches to this exemption. The Scottish FOIA limited the period of publication to 12 weeks. FS50081543 determined that under s 22 there has to be a settled intention to publish the information at the time of the request; in the absence of such an intention, s  22 could not be relied upon (and likewise FS50323585). Section 22 has been wrongly resorted to where it was not responsible to withhold information from the complainant at the time of the request (FS50070741). 1.116  Section 22A came into effect on 1 October 2014 (see para 1.15 above). The section provides that: ‘(1) Information obtained in the course of, or derived from, a programme of research is exempt information if– (a) the programme is continuing with a view to the publication, by a public authority or any other person, of a report of the research (whether or not including a statement of that information), and (b) disclosure of the information under this Act before the date of publication would, or would be likely to, prejudice– (i) the programme, (ii) the interests of any individual participating in the programme, (iii) the interests of the authority which holds the information, or (iv) the interests of the authority mentioned in paragraph (a) (if it is a different authority from that which holds the information). (2) The duty to confirm or deny does not arise in relation to information which is (or if it were held by the public authority would be) exempt information by virtue of subsection (1) if, or to the extent that, compliance

56  Chapter 1 with section 1(1)(a) would, or would be likely to, prejudice any of the matters mentioned in subsection (1)(b).’1 QMU v IC EA/2012/0229.

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(iii)  bodies dealing with security matters1

1.117  This is an absolute exemption. These bodies are not included in the Schedule of public bodies covered by the Act and so they are excluded.2 This exemption in s 23 of the FOIA 2000 deals with information from these bodies, whether supplied directly or indirectly, or relates to them and which is held by scheduled bodies. Where a certificate signed by a Minister of the Crown certifies that information falls within the above category, that will be conclusive evidence of that fact. The certificate signed under s 23(2) is subject to the provisions of s 60 (see below). https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1182/security_bodies_section_23_foi. pdf. 2 The secret services have been subjected to increasing examination in recent years, most notably by the ‘Coroner’s Inquests into the London bombings of 7 July 2005’ by Lady Justice Hallett: http://7julyinquests.independent.gov.uk/docs/orders/rule43-report.pdf and the Intelligence and Security Committee report of June 2018, para 1.7, and other reports in that paragraph. See Birkinshaw Freedom of Information etc (2010) ch 2. 1

1.118  The bodies covered are: • the Security Service; • the Secret Intelligence Service; • the Government Communications HQ (which includes any unit or part of a unit of the armed forces of the Crown which is for the time being required by the Secretary of State to assist GCHQ in carrying out its functions); • the special forces; • tribunals established under the Interception of Communications Act 1985, the Security Service Act 1989, the Intelligence Service Act 1994 (and now under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, as amended by the Investigatory Powers Act 2016); • the Security Vetting Appeals Panel; • the Security Commission; • the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS, which became a part of SOCA and NCA; below); • the Service Authority for the NCIS (as above); • the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA, which has become the National Crime Agency).1 Cm 8097 (2011).

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1.119  The point has been made that the Security Service has extended its remit beyond the traditional territory of MI5 to cover more routine forms of policing as well as computer security in central government, see eg  Security Services Act 1996.1 The Cabinet Office is the nerve centre for cyber security, eg  The Cyber and Government Security Directorate, National Security Cyber Centre

The freedom of information legislation   57 and Cross Government Secure IT which is managed by the National Security Secretariat (see para 2.361). P Birkinshaw Freedom of Information: the Law, the Practice and their Ideal (4th edn, 2010) ch 2.

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1.120  The duty to confirm or deny does not arise if, or to the extent that, compliance with s  1(1)(a) would involve the disclosure of any information, whether or not already recorded which was directly or indirectly supplied to the public authority by, or relates to, any of the bodies specified in sub-s (3). 1.121  Under s 23 a murder inquiry report was rightly refused by the Northern Ireland Office (FS50209828). S M Gradwick v IC1 drew critical comments from the tribunal about the Cabinet Office (CO) when it noted that s  23 protects anodyne information. The request was for the CO’s annual of Protective Security – detailed guidance on controls for government assets and information. Section 23 (and 24) protects information about money paid to police informers – information was provided force-wide but not on a borough basis. The request was rightly rejected reversing the IC’s decision.2 Comr Met Police v IC3 saw the invocation of s 23(5) and a NCND to information about a statement by President Bush about terrorist attacks on London. The IC overruled the MPC and the tribunal overruled the IC, holding the section was correctly invoked. In All Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition v IC and MoD,4 while disclosure of documents relating to the UK’s involvement in extraordinary rendition of terrorist suspects to other countries where they faced torture was ordered, s 23 protected information coming from the special forces. EA/2010/0030. Comr Met Police v IC EA/2010/0006. 3 EA/2010/0008. 4 [2011] UKUT 153 (AAC). 1 2

1.122  The IC has shown a propensity to accept official claims that information is protected under s 23 (see FS50090742 concerning ‘the assessment by the Joint Intelligence Committee of Iraq’s declaration of its weapons of mass destruction in December 2002’). In FS50134744 the IC stated he was satisfied to accept an assurance from the Director of Security and Intelligence in the CO on the protected status of the information. The IC would only accept such an assurance where the official occupies a position in relation to the security bodies which allows them genuinely to validate the origins of the information. In FS50102023 the complainant requested all the documents held by the CO in relation to the bombing of the Rainbow Warrior by French intelligence services. Rainbow Warrior had been Greenpeace’s flagship. The CO refused to confirm or deny if information is held under ss 23(5) and 24(2) of the Act. The IC investigated and upheld the application of ss 23(5) and 24(2) to neither confirm nor deny if information is held. Some very important questions arose in Corderoy & Ahmed v IC, AG & CO [2017] UKUT 495 (AAC).1 A request was made for the legal advice on targeted drone strikes killing members of ISIL/Daesh in Syria, for the defence of UK citizens and whether the legal advice could be disaggregated from information

58  Chapter 1 protected by s 23. The legal advice would form the basis of the policy on targeted strikes. Section 23(1) was cited for refusing the request, together with ss 35(1)(c) and 42 of the FOIA. The issue in this drone case is the ambit of s 23 when other non-security and intelligence (SIS) bodies are involved. Specifically: 1 A request for advice made by a non-section 23 body in circumstances where the advice is sent to a section 23 body. 2 A request for advice made by a section 23 body alone. 3 A request for advice made by a number of section 23 and non-section 23 bodies. 4 In relation to each of these three scenarios, what is the appellants’ submission if the advice was requested: (a) for the purposes of a section 23 body, (b) for non-section 23 body purposes, and (c) for a combination of the above? Can the legal advice be disaggregated from the security information and so fall under ss 35 and 42 as a qualified exemption? The AAT believed that was possible, depending on the context. But public interest factors in this case under ss 35 and 42 (following Savic v IC and Others [2017] AACR 26ws) favoured non-disclosure (see para 1.210, note 2 below). The parties agreed that the issues for consideration were: Application of exemptions 1. What is the scope of section 23(1) of the FOIA and, in particular, how should the concept of ‘in relation to’ be construed and applied? 2. Does section 23(1) apply to the entirety of the contents of the advice or can those contents be disaggregated, such that some of the information within it is not to be treated as covered by section 23(1)? The tribunal answered this question positively. There was also a procedural challenge: was the IC entitled to rely on an assurance on behalf of the Attorney General’s Office and Cabinet Office that the advice was exempt under s 23(1) of the FOIA or ought she to have exercised her statutory powers so as to require the advice to be disclosed to her for her consideration? This referred to a Memo of Understanding between the IC and the Secretary of State for Justice on national security cases (2014).2 The IC did not accept it was necessary to look at documents in this case, despite a disagreement between the AGO and CO on the absolute nature of the s 23 exemption. The AAT expressed surprise at this approach: ‘it fell short of what was required under FOIA’ (para 91); ‘Of itself, that disagreement and absence of explanation should have indicated that the seeking, giving and reliance on an unexplained assurance were inappropriate’ (para 93); and the course adopted by the IC was ‘unfair’ (para 95). The relevant Pas, if they wish for non-consideration of the documents, would have to rely on a certificate under s 23(2) (appealable) and not an assurance. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a4b689a40f0b64cbc261756/GI_0428_2017-00. pdf. See also APPGER v IC EA/2011/0049, 0050, 0051 and [2011] UKUT 153 on extraordinary rendition and requests for information. In APPGER v IC & FCO [2015] UKUT 377 (AAC), the Upper Tribunal discussed s 23 and PI factors under s 27 refusing disclosure. 2 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/memorandum-of-understanding-between-thesecretary-of-state-of-justice-and-the-information-commissioner. 1

The freedom of information legislation   59 1.123  It was most unlikely that this would be other than an absolute exemption. (iv)  national security1

1.124  Information not falling within the previous section is exempt information if exemption from s  1(1)(b) of the FOIA  2000 is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security.2 Sections 23 and 24 are mutually exclusive (ie they cannot both apply to the same information), but they may be cited in the alternative. In Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman, the House of Lords, in a case concerning deportation of a suspected terrorist, held that national security did not simply involve a direct threat to the UK nor action targeted at the UK, its system of government or its people: ‘In contemporary world conditions, actions against a foreign state might be capable of affecting the security of the UK’. In determining whether a deportation was conducive to the public good on grounds of national security, the Secretary of State did not have to show that all the evidence was proved or that his conclusion was justified to a high civil degree of probability. In making such a decision, the Secretary of State was entitled ‘to have regard to all the information in his possession about the actual and potential activities and the connections of the persons concerned. He was entitled to have regard to the precautionary and preventative principles rather than to wait until directly harmful activities had taken place … he was not merely finding facts but forming an executive judgment or assessment.’ Degrees of probability did not seem appropriate although there had to be material on which proportionately and reasonably there were activities harmful to national security.3 The Secretary of State was ‘undoubtedly in the best position to judge what national security required, and the assessment of what was needed in the light of changing circumstances was primarily for him.’ This test (operative post 9/11) has clearly established a very wide margin of appreciation in favour of executive decisions on national security. Nonetheless, ‘there must be a clear basis for arguing that national security must be adversely affected by a disclosure’ (P Kalman v IC EA/2009/0111). The duty to confirm or deny, etc (s 24(2)) does not apply if, or to the extent that, exemption from s 1(1)(a) is required for the purposes of safeguarding national security. Sections 24(2) and 23(5) may be claimed together (APPGER v IC EA/2011/0049, 0050, 0051). A Minister of the Crown may certify that information is, or at any time was, required for purposes of safeguarding national security and again, subject to appeals to the tribunal under s  60, such a certificate is conclusive evidence of that fact (s  24(3)), ie  that the exemption is operable. This would in effect inhibit, but not prevent, the Commissioner determining the public interest or issuing notices under Part IV. A  risk to national security cannot be fanciful or irrelevant, the ICO guidance explains, ‘But once that “reasonably necessary” threshold is met, the potential consequences of disclosure are important factors when considering the public interest’ (para 28). It was noted above how the IC may examine documents that are relevant and she has been criticised by the AAT for being too submissive. It is hard to see what room is left to the public authority or the Commissioner after the award of a certificate unless it is quashed by the tribunal. It should be noted that, under EIR 2004, the issue of a ministerial certificate on the grounds

60  Chapter 1 of national security excludes Part IV of FOIA 2000 (the enforcement provisions) presumably pending a successful appeal (see ch  3). In the absence of such a certificate, the public interest must be considered by the public authority and the Commissioner may investigate a complaint. The certificate may identify information by means of a general description and ‘may be expressed to have prospective effect’. https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1174/safeguarding_national_security_ section_24_foi.pdf; https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1196/how_sections_23_ and_24_interact_foi.pdf. 2 See R v Ministry of Defence, ex p Smith [1996] 1 All ER 257, CA; cf R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Simms [1999] 3  All ER  400, HL  Lord Hoffmann; Kennedy v Charities Commission [2014] UKSC 20 per Lord Mance. 3 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman [2002] 1 All ER 122 (HL). See para 10.127 below and A  etc v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005]  UKHL  71: the Home Secretary may not use intelligence obtained under torture before a judicial body to justify detention of foreign nationals under the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, s  23. The person alleging torture has to prove the allegation to prevent the evidence being admitted which in security cases will be extremely difficult as acknowledged by Baroness Hale in Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB  [2007]  UKHL  46. In A  etc the law lords reversed the Court of Appeal although there was a powerful dissent by Neuberger LJ. See also A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56, Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF [2009] UKHL 28 and Youssef v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [2016] UKSC 3. The effect of exempted information combined with other information that may been available has to be considered: P Birt v IC EA/2011/0004. 1

1.125  Section 60 provides that, where a certificate is issued under s 23(2) or 24(3), the Commissioner or any applicant whose request is affected by the issue of a certificate may appeal to the Tribunal. In the case of security etc information, the Tribunal may quash the certificate if it finds it is not exempt information within s 23(1). The effect of quashing is that the exemption will not apply and other exemptions will have to be invoked. The Tribunal may also quash the certificate if the Minister did not have reasonable grounds for exempting it in relation to national security under s 24(3). In reaching its finding, the Tribunal will apply ‘principles applied by a court on judicial review’. This is a wellworn formula which was devised at a time when courts had not developed the principles of judicial review into the sophisticated body of law that it represents today.1 However, the judgments in Rehman above should be noted. The burden will be on the appellant. Any other party to the proceedings may appeal against a claim that a certificate applying to information of a general description applies to particular information. The Tribunal may determine whether it does so apply. Section 25 concerns various evidentiary points in relation to certificates.2 Changes to procedures now require a mandatory reference to the Upper Tribunal of cases concerned with certificates under ss 23 and 24. Previously they were heard by a specially constituted Information (First Tier) Tribunal. See eg Woolf and Jowell (eds) De Smith’s Judicial Review (8th edn, 2018). The courts have travelled far beyond the territory of Wednesbury unreasonableness. 2 A document purporting to be a certificate under FOIA 2000, s 23(2) or 24(3) shall be received in evidence and deemed to be such a certificate unless the contrary is proved. A  document which purports to be certified by or on behalf a Minister of the Crown as a true copy of a certificate issued by that Minister under the sections shall be evidence of that certificate in any legal proceedings. The Minister must be a member of the Cabinet, the Attorney General, Lord Advocate or Attorney General (Northern Ireland). 1

The freedom of information legislation   61 1.126  Section 24 has been invoked in cases examined above under s 23 (see S  M  Gradwick; FS50209828; FS50090742 and FS50102023). The tribunal has given short shrift to appeals against refusals to disclose intelligence agreements concerning signals between the UK and USA – even from 1948.1 A full discussion of the relationship between s 24 and s 23 took place in N Baker MP v IC and Cabinet Office & NCCL.2 Baker concerned information about the tapping of MPs’ phones and Prime Minister Wilson’s statement of 17 November 1966 that MPs would not be subject to intercepts and any change of policy would be announced in the House ‘at such moments as seemed compatible with the security of the country’. Prime Minister Blair announced on 30 March 2006 that that doctrine was being maintained. An additional request was made as to how many MPs had been subject to intrusive surveillance or tapping since that date. Had there been a change of policy since that time? Sections 24(2) and 23(5) were claimed together. The CO responded with a NCND. After 12 months of investigation, the IC agreed with the Secretary of State (CA) that a ministerial notice under s 23(2) or 24(3) would only be issued after a complaint had been made to the IC. The tribunal noted that it possessed wide powers to review the merits of the IC’s decision and it further observed the wide definition of national security from the Law Lords’ decision in Rehman (above). The case for invoking s 24 is dealt with in paras 30–33. This included evidence from the Director of Security and Intelligence in the Cabinet Office (who was named) who supplied reasons for the NCND response. In essence, a response might blow national security cover (para 34) and so both s 23(5) and s 24(2) were claimed together. Disclosure of the holding of information would negate the ability of the PM to judge at what point it was safe to make any public announcement of change in policy in relation to the tapping of MPs’ phones (para 51(2)). Under s 24, the public interest favoured maintenance of the exemption.3 Section 24 has been successfully invoked to protect the identity of paid informers to the Metropolitan Police in the period 1890–1910 (Keane v IC [2016] UKUT 0461 (AAC) but cf Metropolitan Police v IC EA/2008/0078). M McCarthy v IC EA/2006/0053. EA/2006/0045. 3 See, in the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, Caroline Lucas MP v The Security Service [2017] 1 All ER 283. 1 2

(v)  defence1

1.127  Information is exempt if its disclosure under the Act would, or would be likely to, prejudice the defence of the British Islands or of any colony, or the capability, effectiveness or security of any relevant forces (FOIA 2000, s 26). ‘Any relevant forces’ means armed forces of the Crown and any forces cooperating with those forces or any part of those forces. Would this cover details of contracts relating to inadequate armaments which were tantamount to a fraud on the taxpayer, or which exposed the forces to unnecessary danger?2 The public interest in knowing such would be very high but would disclosure prejudice defence? The public interest test applies to this exemption. The duty to confirm or deny does not arise if, or to the extent that, compliance with

62  Chapter 1 s 1(1)(a) would, or would be likely to, prejudice any of the matters referred to in sub-s (1).3 https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1181/defence-section-26-foia-guidance.pdf. See Smith v MoD etc [2013] UKSC 41. 3 D Mackenzie v IC EA/2013/0251. 1 2

1.128  FS50200146 involved a Ministry of Defence rejection of a request for information on detentions in Iraq, which the IC ruled had been rightly denied. This exemption has featured rarely in the case law1 and a helpful guidance note from the ICO has been published.2 See C Cole v IC EA/2013/0041, 0042. https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1181/defence-section-26-foia-guidance.pdf.

1 2

(vi)  international relations1

1.129  Information is exempt information but subject to the public interest if its disclosure would, or would be likely to, prejudice: (1) Relations between the United Kingdom and any other State; FOIA 2000, s 27(5) defines a ‘State’ as including the government of any state and any organ of its government. (2) Relations between the United Kingdom and any international organisation or international court; s  27(5) defines ‘international organisation’ and ‘international court’. (3) The interests of the United Kingdom abroad or the promotion or protection by the United Kingdom of those interests. Information is also exempt where it is confidential information obtained from a state other than the UK or from an international organisation or international court. https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1184/awareness_guidance_14_-_ international_relations.pdf.

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1.130  This exemption may be relevant to PAs in addition to government departments and agencies (eg police, prisons, health bodies, universities and local authorities). Section 27(3) states that any such information is confidential at any time while the terms on which it was obtained require it to be held in confidence or the circumstances in which it was obtained make it reasonable for the state etc to expect that it will be so held. It may suffice that the information is stamped ‘confidential’ by the donor state or body rather than it is protected by the law of confidentiality.1 The duty to confirm or deny does not arise which would involve disclosure prejudicing any of the matters in sub-s (1) or disclosure of any information (whether or not already recorded) which is confidential information obtained from another state, international organisation or court. Bin Yam Mohamed [2010] EWCA Civ 65 and 158.

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1.131  This covers a very sensitive subject area and the IC has ruled that records of meetings involving King Hussein and British PM were rightly refused

The freedom of information legislation   63 in most cases but some were disclosed (FS50205398; and see FS50260727 where information was correctly refused by the FCO and FS50278116 and FER0081530). In FS50199771 the complainant made a request to the Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD) for information relating to the sale of armoured vehicles to Indonesia and the payment of an agent’s commission on the transaction. ECGD refused to disclose the information relying inter alia on s 27(1)(a). The IC found that ECGD was correct to withhold the information and required no further steps to be taken. FS50292976 concerns information held by the National Archives on arms sales to Saudi Arabia which in some cases, but not all, was rightly withheld on PI grounds. In FS50080115 s 27 was used to block information on recipients of Christmas cards from the Prime Minister in 2003 and 2004. The names of foreign leaders and heads of state should be released (ss 36, 38 and 40 also invoked). (See also FS50178057.) Chris Cole v IC EA/2016/0290 saw an appeal against refusal to disclose information about drone usage and bases in Syria dismissed under s 27 (and s 26). ‘It is the proper function of a professional diplomatic service to assess these matters as best they can. It follows that the only reasonable course which the Home Secretary could have taken was to draw on the expertise of the Foreign Office, as she did … this court is no better and arguably worse off in that respect than she was. We have no experience and no material which could justify us in rejecting the Foreign Office assessment in favour of a more optimistic assessment of our own. To do so would not only usurp the proper function of the Secretary of State. It would be contrary to long established principle which this court has repeatedly and recently affirmed.’1 Lord Carlile v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] UKSC 60 at [46], Hesham Ali v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKSC 60, paras 45 and 46. The Supreme Court re-emphasised the importance of the judgments of the House of Lords in Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] 2 AC 167, notably Lord Bingham at para 16.

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1.132  In FS50134744 the complainant asked the CO for the contents of a file, ‘PREM  8/928’, listed in the National Archive catalogue. The IC decided that the s  27(1)(a) exemption did not apply because the information was historical and was highly unlikely to provoke a reaction from the foreign state involved. In FS50125539 Foreign and Commonwealth Office information was requested from the National Archives about arms sales to Saudi Arabia. Section 27 was properly engaged and the public interest favoured disclosure (much of the information had already been disclosed). FS50070854 concerned information that was requested from the FCO on the UK/US Energy Dialogue. This dealt with a task force set up by Vice President Cheney. The IC believed that most items were properly withheld but some could be disclosed. Those withheld related to continuing confidential discussions. Para  24 states that some information related to corruption and political stability in foreign states, comments upon prominent individuals and the potential for countries to be long-term energy suppliers – information that was not shared with the foreign countries and whose disclosure could prejudice UK/US relationships which would not be in the public interest. This was the kind of information released by

64  Chapter 1 Wikileaks in 2010–2011 when 250,000 US intelligence and diplomatic reports were published without authorisation. Case FS500110720 concerned a copy of the letter from the European Commission to the UK government (Department for Constitutional Affairs) regarding the implementation of the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) by the UK. Section 27 was invoked together with other exemptions. Because the case dealt with policy formulation and the early stages of infraction proceedings by the Commission under then Art 226 EC, s 27(1)(c) was correctly invoked and the public interest was in favour of retention (see pp 11–12). FS50290504 concerned the MoJ and similar requests. Here, s 27(1)(c) and 27(2) were either wrongly invoked or the public interest favoured disclosure in some but not all cases. The IC ‘considers the public interest in disclosure of the specific information in question here to be of particularly significant weight’ (para  54). Campaign against the Arms Trade v IC and MoD1 concerns a request for information relating to a Memorandum of Understanding with the Saudi Arabian government about sale of defence weapons. The use by the tribunal of special counsel to assist the claimants who were excluded from closed sessions was examined and criticism was made of the documentation served by the Ministry of Defence on the tribunal: ‘the documentation provided to us was provided without explanation, piecemeal and in an incoherent manner that made it effectively impossible to understand’ (para  21(d)). The complexity of the documentation required the ‘exceptional’ resort to a special counsel from the Attorney General’s approved list in accordance with CPR  Pt  76. The IT found s  27(1) engaged and the balance of public interest favoured non-disclosure. Shortly before this decision the House of Lords ruled that the SFO’s cessation of a prosecution for fraud involving Saudi Arabian arms contracts was not unlawful.2 Subsequently, employees of the company involved, BAE Systems, were prosecuted and a plea bargaining arrangement was criticised in the High Court.3 EA/2006/0040. R (Corner House Research) v Director of the SFO [2008] UKHL 60. 3 Financial Times 22 December 2010 ‘Plea deal is sorry end to BAE affair’. 1 2

1.133  This provision is inspired by a provision in OSA 1989, s 3.

(vii)  relations within the united kingdom1

1.134  This exemption was felt necessary in the light of devolution. The 1990s legislation has been subject to significant development. Where disclosure would, or would be likely to, prejudice relations between any administration in the United Kingdom and any other such administration, the information is exempt under s 28(1) of the FOIA 2000. This refers to the government of the United Kingdom, the Scottish Administration, the Executive Committee of the Northern Ireland Assembly or the Welsh Assembly Government. It does not apply to relations between local authorities. The duty to confirm or deny does not arise where compliance would, or would be likely to, prejudice information in sub-s (1). https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1171/relationswithintheuk.pdf.

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The freedom of information legislation   65 1.135  The relationship between central government and devolved government is heavily reliant upon non-legally binding ‘Concordats’ covering a wide range of topics, eg EU policy, international relations, government statistics, and financial aid to industry. A Joint Ministerial Committee is established. The arrangements work by sharing of ‘confidential’ information supplementing more formal legal provisions such as s 123 of the Government of Wales Act 1998. These concordats continue the Whitehall tradition of secrecy, it is maintained.1 It should be noted that information given in confidence by the UK government is not disclosable under the Scottish FOIA 2002 (paras 1.309 et seq below). R Rawlings (2000) LQR 257.

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1.136  See FS50121252 involving the Scotland Office. The guidance on s 28 is at https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1171/relationswithintheuk. pdf. (viii)  the economy1

1.137  Information is exempt where its disclosure would, or would be likely to, prejudice the economic interests of the United Kingdom or any part of the United Kingdom or the financial interests of any administration in the United Kingdom as described above (FOIA 2000, s 29). The duty to confirm or deny has a slight variation from the usual formula. https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1177/theeconomy.pdf.

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1.138  This exemption has been rarely invoked although the ICO has produced extensive guidance on the exemption. See FS50105898, where a request was made for information to the Treasury that had been introduced into the macroeconomic model forecasting the performance of the UK economy. The IC was satisfied that s 29 was correctly claimed. In Derry City Council v IC1 (ss 41 and 43 below: see paras 1.207 and 1.215 below), the tribunal ruled that s 29 would have been unsuccessful in that case and it would not have allowed exemption. In FS50519631 the complainant requested information relating to the meetings of the Joint Oversight Board (JOB) about the Funding for Lending Scheme (FLS). The FLS is a scheme intended to help stimulate the UK economy through incentivising banks and building societies to boost lending to the economy by reducing funding costs. Information was rightly withheld. EA/2006/0014.

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(ix)  investigations and proceedings conducted by public authorities1

1.139  Clauses 25 and 26 of the No  1 Bill published in May 1999 had extremely, if not excessively, broad exemptions, indeed wildly so. Clause 25 protected information which has at any time been held for the purpose of criminal investigations for charges, or if charged, for ascertaining guilt. The second part of the section exempts information concerning investigations of a

66  Chapter 1 civil or administrative nature concerning, eg, professional misconduct, breaches of hygiene or environmental regulations such as noise and so on as well as information produced for the purpose of ascertaining the cause of an accident which is a lot more restricted than case law covering privileged documents relating to accidents.2 The second part included investigations relating to wrongdoing in charities, and health and safety investigations. Overall, the breadth of this exemption was breath-taking and fulfilled the Home Secretary’s warning to the Select Committee that if this information were removed from the excluded category, the necessary exemption would be almost as impenetrable. It was much wider than the American equivalent and it has to be questioned why information about major mistakes in criminal investigations cannot be revealed as in the Stephen Lawrence inquiry or why we should not know the facts relating to an accident or a nuisance or a public health danger. The Home Secretary has not accepted the Macpherson Inquiry report’s recommendation that there should be no class exemptions for police information and operational and administrative police information should only be withheld on grounds of ‘substantial harm’.3 Clause 26 related to law enforcement and caught specific items of information not caught by cl 254 as well as any ‘functions’ of a public authority concerned with the civil side of its investigations under cl 25(2). https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1205/investigations-and-proceedingsfoi-section-30.pdf. 2 See eg, Re Barings plc [1998] 1 All ER 673. 3 See Cm 4262, vol I, para 46.32 and Recommendation 9 and Campaign for FOI Press Release 22 May 1999, p 5. See also: R v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police, ex p Wiley [1994] 3 All ER 420, HL. 4 Eg, prevention or detection of crime, the administration of justice, assessment etc of tax, immigration controls, maintenance of security and good order in prisons or other institution where persons are lawfully detained and ‘the exercise by any public authority of its functions for any of the purposes specified in [now] section 31(1)(a) to (i)’. 1

1.140  Section 30 of the FOIA 2000 now covers investigations and proceedings conducted by public authorities and confers a class exemption for such information. It exempts information which has (a) ‘at any time been held by the authority’ for the purposes of any investigation which the public authority (and not another) has a duty to conduct with a view to it being ascertained whether a person should be charged with an offence or whether a person charged is guilty of the offence. This will cover information where it has been decided not to prosecute and where there is no prejudice to any future prosecution. Additionally, it covers (b) any investigation which is conducted by the authority which may lead to the authority instituting criminal proceedings which it has power to conduct (EA/2011/0084) or (c) any criminal proceedings which the authority has power to conduct (eg the Crown Prosecution Service). By s 63, the above information could not be kept exempt for longer than 30 years (see now, on the effect of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, para 4.62).1 Information held by an authority is exempt if it relates to the obtaining of information from confidential sources and was obtained by the authority for the purposes of its functions relating to (a) or (b) above, criminal proceedings which the authority has power to conduct, investigations conducted for purposes under s 31(2) (see below) either under prerogative or statutory powers, or civil proceedings which

The freedom of information legislation   67 are brought by or on behalf of the authority.2 The s 31(2) exemption applies to historical records. The duty to confirm or deny does not apply to information exempt by virtue of the above provisions. This is a broader formulation than the usual proviso. On the public records aspects of the FOIA 2000, see paras 4.48 et seq below. This obviously protects informers on a class basis and maintains the class protection under Public Interest Immunity for this group: see ch 11 below. The statements made by the government (see para 11.60 below) that it would no longer make claims for public interest immunity on a class basis do not cover the police but will cover prosecuting authorities. On police complaints and removal of class immunity from public interest immunity, see R v Chief Constable West Midlands Police ex p Wiley [1994] 3 All ER 420 (HL) and para 11.66 below.

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1.141  Section 30(4) spells out what a public authority means in terms of authorised officers, Ministers of the Crown or Northern Ireland (sic) Ministers. Subsection (5) explains ‘criminal proceedings’ as including courts-martial and naval disciplinary courts and ‘offence’ to include military offences. 1.142  In FS50132101 the complaint concerned information about current investigations conducted by the Civil Aviation Authority concerning air carriers and non-compliance with Council Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 (compensation and assistance to air passengers denied boarding rights). The CAA withheld the information on the basis, inter alia, of the s 30(1)(b) exemption. The IC decided that the information was covered by s 30 and then considered the public interest test. The CAA argued that disclosure could lead to the carriers refusing to engage in informal dispute resolution and consumers’ interests would be prejudiced. The IC decided that there was a significant public interest in disclosing the information so as to hold the CAA to account for its conduct of the investigations. The IC ruled that the information in relation to investigations before the request should be disclosed. However he thought that investigations which were current at the time of the request would not be suitable for disclosure under the public interest test. FS50106800 concerned the Metropolitan police and a request for files on Special Branch investigations from over 100 years previously. Section 30(2) on informers was engaged but the public interest in disclosure was stronger than in retention – on appeal the tribunal ordered the names to be redacted (EA/2008/0078). 1.143  The exemption has been properly claimed for papers concerning an investigation into former leader of the Liberal Party, Jeremy Thorpe, for conspiracy to murder almost 30 years previously.1 Even after almost 30 years the public interest favoured maintenance of the exemption under s 30(1). The overriding public interest in protecting informers’ identities under s  30(2)(b) has been emphasised.2 The tribunal, overruling the IC, has given very strong protection to Companies Act investigations into serious company irregularities including director disqualifications and fraud.3 The IC had required ‘a generalised explanation’ into the investigations but which would not reveal the identities of witnesses. The standard practice of the PA was not to provide any reasons for a Companies Act investigation. The IC showed himself to be an advocate of open government in this case but the tribunal clearly thought it was misplaced

68  Chapter 1 in ruling that the PI favoured maintenance of the exemption. In Bellamy v IC4 the IT sought to confine PI considerations to the specific ones inherent in a particular exemption. Balancing the PI factors is not a discretion – by which presumably it means that it is not an open free choice – it is a mixed question of fact and law for the IT! Guardian Newspapers v IC & Chief Constable of Avon & Somerset Police EA/2006/0017. E Alcock v IC EA/2006/0022; D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171. 3 DTI v IC EA/2006/0007. 4 EA/2005/0023. 1 2

(x)  law enforcement1

1.144  Section 31 of the FOIA  2000 concerns information covering law enforcement and can be claimed by any PA, not only those with law enforcement duties. ‘Law enforcement’ should be construed broadly (WT  Stephenson v IC  [2013]  UKUT  0181 (AAC)). It should be noted that, by virtue of s  63(4), exemption under this section lasts for 100 years (see para  4.70) following the year in which the record was created. Compliance with s 1(1)(a) in relation to any record after a similar period will not be taken to be capable of having any of the effects in s 31(1); it may be judged to have those effects up to 100 years (see para  4.70).2 Section 31 covers information which, although not exempt under s 30, is exempt under this section if its disclosure would, or would be likely to, prejudice: (a) the prevention or detection of crime; (b) the apprehension or prosecution of offenders; (c) the administration of justice, which in case law has been given both wide and narrower meanings. An interference with the system of justice is preferred here because other exemptions exempt more specific information;3 (d) the assessment of any tax or duty or similar imposition; (e) the operation of the immigration controls; (f) the maintenance of good order and security in prisons or in other places where persons are lawfully detained; (g) the exercise by any authority of its functions for any of the purposes specified in sub-s (2); (h) civil proceedings brought for or arising out of an inquiry for any of the purposes listed below or under prerogative or statutory powers; (i) any inquiry under the Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths Act (Scotland) 1976 to the extent that the inquiry arises from an investigation conducted for any of the purposes below by or on behalf of the authority under prerogative or statutory powers. https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1207/law-enforcement-foi-section-31. pdf. 2 In evidence to the Select Committee the Home Secretary stated that some records relating to the secret police in Ireland had been closed since 1874: HC 398 I (1997–98), para 101. 3 See eg  Lord Diplock in Secretary of State for Defence v Guardian Newspapers Ltd [1984] 3  All ER 601, HL and Lord Bridge in X Ltd v Morgan Grampian [1990] 2 All ER 1, HL etc and ch 11 (paras 11.35 et seq) for developing case-law. 1

The freedom of information legislation   69 1.145  The purposes are: (1) Ascertaining whether any person has failed to comply with the law. (2) Ascertaining whether any person is responsible for any conduct which is improper. (3) Ascertaining whether circumstances which would justify regulatory action in pursuance of any enactment exist or may arise. (4) Ascertaining a person’s fitness or competence in relation to the management of bodies corporate or in relation to any profession or other activity which he is or seeks to become authorised to carry on. (5) Ascertaining the cause of an accident. This caused a good deal of controversy in the first version of the published Bill. It is a contents claim and is subject to the public interest test. The IC may make recommendations. It gives far greater protection, however, than would legal professional privilege and is more restrictive than comparable laws elsewhere. (6) Protecting charities against misconduct or mismanagement in their administration and whether by trustees or others. (7) Protecting the property of charities from loss or misapplication. (8) Recovering the property of charities; obviously there was a good deal of special pleading on behalf of charities. (9) Securing the health, safety and welfare of persons at work. (10) Protecting persons other than persons at work against risk to health or safety arising out of or in connection with the actions of persons at work. 1.146  Relevant here would be the secrecy surrounding events such as those leading to the Paddington or Hatfield rail disasters to give appropriate protection to civil litigation brought for such purposes and, on the other hand, giving the public sufficient warning about risk and danger and under-investment (this might also cover commercial exemptions). It is important to see the connection between (g) and (h) above and these purposes, especially (5), (9) and (10). While it is fair and proper that civil proceedings arising from these investigations should not be prejudiced, there is an acute public interest in having responsible reporting about serious accidents and near-accidents of dangerous activities. In assessing the public interest, account may be taken of other information available in the public domain including information available from disclosure decisions (FS50122063) – known in the USA as the ‘mosaic’ principle. Retention of personal data under these provisions (ss 30 and 31) would have to comply with the DPA 2018 if applicable and this has been a subject of great complexity (see ch 2). 1.147  The duty to confirm or deny applies in the normal manner to this information. 1.148  Under s  31(1)(a) and (g) information on bringing prosecutions for speeding in the band 70–75 mph was rightly refused (EA/2010/0071) as was information on the BBC’s requests for search warrants for evasion of licence fee investigations. In FS50197056 concerning the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (PONI), the complainant requested information held by PONI relating to an inspection undertaken by the Office of Surveillance Commissioners (the

70  Chapter 1 OSC). PONI refused to provide this, citing the exemptions at ss  31(1)(a) and 31(1)(g) (law enforcement). Following the IC’s intervention PONI disclosed some of the requested information to the complainant. The IC found that the remaining withheld information was exempt under the provisions claimed, and that the public interest in maintaining the exemptions outweighed the public interest in disclosing the information. Therefore the IC did not require any steps to be taken. In FS50209828 (see above under s 23) a request for a murder inquiry report was rightly refused. The complainant in FS50137475 requested from the BBC information relating to the use and effectiveness of television detector vans. The BBC refused to disclose the majority of the information, relying on ss 31 and 42. The BBC pursued several arguments to the effect that the disclosure would reduce the deterrent effect of vans, enable evaders to find weaknesses in their use and otherwise encourage evasion. On application of the ‘would or would be likely to prejudice’ test the IC decided that disclosure would have adverse consequences. In considering the public interest test, the arguments for disclosure were increased legitimacy and scrutiny of the application of public funds. However, in deciding that the public interest lay with non-disclosure, he believed that the use of the equipment is strictly and independently regulated and that disclosure would have a negative effect on the public interest for legitimate licence fee payers. In FS50138964 similar considerations came to play in upholding the refusal by HM Revenue and Customs of internal guidance on processing self-assessed tax returns. 1.149  Case FS50069091 was a request to the Sussex Police for numbers of people (generic not identifiable individuals) subject to Sex Offences Act orders; a geographical breakdown of where they resided was requested. The IC emphasised that the request was for generic information not specific and s 31 was not engaged. The IC reported that the information was already published. He stated that courts do not usually impose restrictions on the reporting of an adult defendant’s name and address in cases regarding sexual offences in spite of the fact that such information could lead to a violent reaction against the defendant or his family. In FS50309111 information was rightly refused under s  31(1)(a) in relation to individuals who were at risk of recruitment to terrorist activities in the West Midlands. There were numerous similar requests to other police forces. Section 31(1)(f) was involved in a request for an unredacted version of the Minimising and Managing Physical Restraint training manual (‘MMPR’) which sets out the techniques of physical restraint used in Young Offender Institutions (YOIs) and Secure Training Centres (STCs). Refusal to disclose was neither irrational nor improperly reasoned (Willow v IC [2016] UKUT 157 (AAC)). An appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed (C Willow v IC and Ministry of Justice [2017] EWCA Civ 1876). 1.150  C  England v LB  Bexley and IC1 was a request for the addresses and ownership details of empty properties that came to the council’s notice. Section 31(1)(a) was cited as an exemption although the information had not been collected for prevention of crime. It was decided that addresses are personal data for s 40 exemption (para 98). The decision contains a detailed and instructive analysis of the strength of evidence linking s 31 and preventing the commission of crime. The IT found on the evidence that disclosure would be likely to have

The freedom of information legislation   71 a ‘significant negative impact on the prevention of crime’. In Bucks Free Press v IC,2 (referred to above), the tribunal allowed the appeal. The request concerned information of the number of times a notice of intended prosecution has been issued by the Thames Valley Police as a result of alleged speeding offences at two speed cameras. The IC held that ss 31 and 38 were correctly applied and non-disclosure was justified. The tribunal noted that the information sought constituted general information and ‘the connection between disclosure and drivers’ behaviour’ was so ‘tenuous’ that ‘site specific safety factors did not come into effect and the exemptions were not engaged.’ (See FS50357713 for requests to the Big Lottery Fund, which were correctly denied under this section.) EA/2006/0060 and EA/2006/0066. See also Y Voyias v IC EA/2011/0007 and LB Camden v IC and YV [2012] UKUT 190 (AAC) where the approach has been elaborated. 2 EA/2006/0071. 1

1.151  Information on speed cameras has been a popular subject of request. P Hemsley v IC and Chief Constable of Northants (AP)1 was a request for information about speed cameras which are active intermittently at sites. In sunny weather in the early morning a driver in one direction would be looking into the sun, which would impair his vision of speed restriction signs. Section 31(1)(a) and (b) were invoked. The tribunal identified the information that should be available to the general public about speed cameras (para 23). It was concerned about the difficulty in distinguishing between ‘a public spirited request’ and one which was more self-rewarding eg ‘the creation of a commercial website selling forecasts on the operation of safety cameras’. Disclosure was rightly denied on the facts (and see C Martin and Oxford City Council v IC EA/2005/0026 and EA/2005/0030). EA/2005/0026.

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(xi)  court records1

1.152  This is an absolute exemption.2 Section 32 of the FOIA  2000 deals with court records. The ICO guidance above provides illustrations of the kinds of documents caught by this section. Information is exempt information if held by a public authority and if ‘held only by virtue of being contained in’:3 any document filed with, or otherwise placed in the custody of, a court for the purposes of proceedings in a particular cause or matter; any documents served upon or by a public authority for legal proceedings; or any document created by a court or member of the administrative staff of a court for legal proceedings. https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/2014222/section-32-court-inquiryarbitration-records.pdf. 2 See Inquiries Act 2005, s 18 which disapplies s 32(2) in relation to concluded inquiries under the 2005 Act. Section 19 of the 2005 Act deals with restrictions on access and s 20 their duration. In Kennedy v Charities Commission below, the Supreme Court ruled that the extension in s 32 applies after court or inquiry proceedings have ceased and will last until they become historical documents. 3 DBERR  v IC EA/2008/0087: ‘… There is nothing in the section which limits the way in which that information may be used or processed by the public authority provided it is, in effect, only acquired by virtue of being in a “court record”’. Upheld in Peninsular Services Ltd v ICO [2014] UKUT 284 (AAC). See FS50573033. 1

72  Chapter 1 1.153  It is also exempt information if similarly held and contained in any document placed in the custody of a person conducting an inquiry or arbitration for the purposes of such inquiry or arbitration, or if created by such a person for such purposes. The duty to confirm or deny does not arise in relation to information covered by this section. Furthermore, the discretionary disclosure provisions do not apply to this exempt information under s  32 (though see para 1.155 below) and the IC’s recommendatory powers do not apply. 1.154  ‘Court’ includes any tribunal or body exercising the judicial power of the State;1 ‘proceedings in any cause or matter’ includes any inquest or post-mortem examination; ‘inquiry’ means any inquiry or hearing of a statutory nature, but not one conducted under prerogative powers; ‘arbitration’ means, except for Scotland, any arbitration to which Part I  of the Arbitration Act 1996 applies (sub-s (4)). Where an authority has powers of holding an inquiry, information transferred by it to the inquiry receive the protection of s 32(2) and the inquiry maintains that exemption after the conclusion of the inquiry. This was the case even though inquiries have no comparable mechanisms to courts allowing disclosure of documents. Furthermore ‘document’ means an electronic document and not simply one in ‘hard’ form.2 The case was remitted on appeal by the Court of Appeal to the First Tier Tribunal (FTT) to determine whether ECHR, art 10 rights enshrined in the HRA 1998 gave s 32(2) a different interpretation in the light of case law from the ECtHR at Strasbourg.3 Of especial importance were the facts that the requester was a journalist investigating the charitable affairs of George Galloway (a high-profile MP) who was subject to an inquiry under the Charities Act 1993 in an appeal he launched in relation to the Iraq war. The journalist may need access to the documents to realise art 10 freedom of speech rights. The court was otherwise minded to reject the appeal. The Supreme Court on appeal, by a majority of 5–2, was not persuaded of the direction (‘an unsatisfactory state’, para 94) of the ECtHR in its interpretation of art 10 – that art 10 may confer a right of access to documents which the ECtHR has subsequently confirmed4 – but nonetheless ruled that, although s 32(2) conferred an absolute exemption, the PA (Charities Commission) had to consider whether it should disclose documents ‘outside s 32’ under its statutory and common law powers preserved by s  78 of the FOIA (see para  1.265 below). There was no need to read down s  32 in accordance with Art 10 under the Human Rights Act. Lord Mance argued that the statutory powers establishing the Commission included ensuring greater public trust in, and accountability in the oversight of, charities. The common law duties included greater transparency and openness in the operation of public authorities (paras [43]–[56]). Lord Toulson believed that open justice was a ‘fundamental principle of the common law’. In language echoing the words of Jeremy Bentham, ‘Judicial processes should be open to public scrutiny unless there are good grounds for secrecy. Sunlight, if I may, keeps the judge under scrutiny and helps maintain public confidence. These principles apply to quasi-judicial tribunals and hearings such as those in question and the open justice principle should be applied when considering the Commission’s decision’ (paras [109]–[132]). If, having considered these powers, it rejected the request, the requester could seek a judicial review of the refusal.5 The statutory

The freedom of information legislation   73 powers included application of the principles of proportionality, accountability, consistency and transparency (per Lord Mance at para [45]). The common law principle was ‘open justice’. A judicial review could be ‘rigorous’ in a context such as this (paras [43]–[56]). It was noted above that the Supreme Court ruled that s 32 applies after the court or other proceedings have concluded. Two dissenting judges disagreed with the majority on the art 10 issue and Lord Carnwath did not believe judicial review would provide as effective a remedy as under FOIA and art  10. They further reasoned that s  32(2) exemption expired at the end of the relevant inquiry. The court ruled that the language of s 32 provided an absolute exemption, subject to the above reasoning until the information was destroyed or until the Public Records Act provisions came into effect. In Mayagyar Helsinki Bizottság v Hungary6 the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR ruled that, where access to information was necessary for journalists, public interest NGOs and academics to investigate and disseminate matters of obvious public interest, Art 10 on freedom of speech, although not providing a generic free-standing right of access to documents, may nonetheless provide a right of access to information held by public authorities. The scope of the beneficiaries, eg  bloggers, campaigners etc, remains unclear. An applicant would have to establish that he/she/it acts as a ‘social watchdog’, who requires the information in order to contribute to ‘an informed public debate’ on an ‘issue of obvious public importance’. Article  10 could be successfully invoked where a requester could demonstrate that access to the information was ‘instrumental’ to their right to freedom of expression and that denial of access constituted an interference with that right. The requested information would have to be ‘ready and available’. The NGO in question wished to investigate the quality and independence of lawyers appointed by the Hungarian government to represent defendants in criminal proceedings – the implication being this was inadequate. Furthermore, although information on individuals was requested, those individuals were acting in a public and not a private capacity, and protection of their right to private life was not necessary. The Court made several important deliberations. The absence of a specific right to ‘seek information’ in Article  10 – unlike  other human rights instruments, such as Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’) – was not decisive.  Indeed, there was a ‘high degree of consensus’ under international law that access to information is part of the right to freedom of expression. The decisions of the UN  Human Rights Committee regarding Article  19 of the ICCPR, among others, were relevant to the interpretation of Article  10 of the ECHR, despite what may have amounted to a potentially significant difference in the wording of the rights. The Court observed that a consensus on the right of access to information was shared by Council of Europe Member States. At the relevant time, only one member did not have domestic access to information provisions. A  breach of Art 10 could also arise where a national court ordered access to information and this was denied by the national authorities. A-G v BBC [1980] 3 All ER 161. Kennedy v IC and Charity Commission [2010] EWHC 475 (Admin).

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74  Chapter 1 Kennedy v IC [2011] EWCA Civ 367 and Tarsasag (para 1.155, note 1 below, and para 4.298). See also R (Guardian News and Media Ltd) v City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2012] EWCA Civ 420. 4 The grand chamber of the ECtHR had originally ruled that Art 10 did not confer a right of access to documents: Leander v Sweden [1987] 9 EHRR 433. This ruling was gradually eroded by lower sections of the ECtHR: Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v Hungary (2009) Application No 37374/05 and Jihoceske v Czech Republic (2006) Application No  19101/03; Österreichische Vereinigung etc v Austria [2013]  ECHR  1204, 1225, 1270. In Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v Hungary (2016) App 18030/11 the grand chamber confirmed that art 10 can contain a right of access to documents – see text above; and see Reyes v Chile (2006) IACHR 19 Sept 2006 and the judgment interpreting art 13 American Convention on Human Rights; and note the ICCPR art 19 which is a part of the International Bill of Human Rights under UN  Assembly Resolution 217. Under Art 19, the right of everyone to freedom of opinion and expression includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice. This interpretation would make art 10 a European-wide FOIA, said Lord Mance at para 94 of Kennedy. Such an interpretation might extend to other absolute exemptions, such as those covering the security services (para  96 ibid). The Supreme Court’s ruling was confined to s 32. 5 Kennedy v Charities Commission [2014] UKSC 20 reversing [2012] EWCA 317. An application was made to the ECtHR in Times Newspapers and Kennedy v UK App 64367/14 – Communicated Case [2015] ECHR 359 (17 March 2015). On open justice see R (DSD) v Parole Board of England and Wales [2018] EWHC 694 (Admin). See also R (Privacy International) v HMRC [2014] EWHC 1475 (Admin), paras 77 et seq. 6 See note 4 above. 3

1.155  Courts do exercise powers to allow access to documents filed with the court subject to protection for confidential information.1 However, no such provision applies to tribunal documents. This was seen in Kennedy as a lacuna. Rule 39.2 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 states that, as a general rule, hearings are in public, but no special provision has to be made to accommodate members of the public (r 39.2). Under r 39.3, provision is made for hearings in private. See A Health Authority v X [2002] 2 All ER 780 (CA). See The Guardian 9 December 2004 for its headline report on a successful application to obtain case records from an arms bribery case Chan v Alvis Vehicles Ltd [2003] EWHC 1238 (Ch): In re Guardian Newspapers (Court Record: Disclosure) (2004) Times, 18 December and CPR 5.4(5) (b). Rules 5.4B, 5.4C and 5.4D now deal with the supply of documents from court records to parties or other persons. Rule 5.4 concerns publicly available registers. A court’s permission was required before a search could be made of any document other than a claim form, judgment or order: see Dian AO v Davis, Frankel & Mead (a firm) [2005] 1 All ER 1074 on the requirement for permission, the exercise of the court’s discretion and searching classes of documents. Where documents had not been read by the court as part of the decision-making process, such as affidavits or statements, access should only be given where there were ‘strong grounds for thinking that it was necessary in the interests of justice’. See Chan U Seek v Alvis Vehicles Ltd [2005] 1 WLR 2965 on access by non-parties to the court file and now rule 5.4C and Cape Intermediate below. On witness statements see CPR 32.13. There is no comparable provision to CPR 5.4(5)(b) or Part 32.13 in the Criminal Procedure Rules 2010. The Criminal Procedure Rules 2010 (see now SI 2011/1709, as amended, rr 5.7 and 5.8) govern access in criminal proceedings and the Administrative Court has ruled that there is no right of access to skeleton arguments, statements etc under ECHR, Art 10: R (Guardian News and Media Ltd) v City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2010] EWHC 3376 (Admin). This case was reversed in the Court of Appeal ([2012] EWCA Civ 420) which said all courts and tribunals exercising the judicial power of the state had an inherent power to determine how the open justice principle should be applied. Where documents have been placed before a judge and referred to in the course of proceedings, the default position should therefore be that the media should be permitted to have access to those documents on the open justice principle. In the case of dispute the court will have to determine the extent of the duty of open justice. Where a case involves a child or a vulnerable adult, there may be strong reasons for not allowing access. Neither the Freedom of Information Act nor the Criminal

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The freedom of information legislation   75 Procedure Rules precluded the court from permitting a non-party to have access to documents if the court considered such access to be proper under the open justice principle. In the current case, GNM put forward good reasons for obtaining access to the documents, which concerned a subject of considerable public interest. There was no suggestion that this would give rise to any risk of harm to any other party, nor would it place any great burden on the court. GNM’s application should therefore succeed. The case broke new ground in the open justice principle. Where issues of public interest are raised, non-parties should be permitted access to documents referred to in any tribunal exercising the judicial power of the state, unless good reasons can be shown. For limitations, see A v BBC [2014] UKSC 25 and compare with Khuja v Times Newspapers [2017] UKSC 49. See further Cape Intermediate Holdings Ltd v Dring [2018] EWCA Civ 1795, at paras 112–113, and R (BAT Ltd) v Secretary of State for Health [2018] EWHC 3586 (Admin) at para  37 where, although transparency was not an absolute, ‘the power should be exercised presumptively in favour of disclosure’. The impact on open justice of the increasing use of skeleton arguments was commented upon over 35 years ago by Lord Scarman in Harman v Home Office [1983]  AC  280 at 316. See R  v Howell [2003] EWCA Crim 486. See D Kennedy v Charities Commission [2014] UKSC 20 above and reading down s 32(2) by virtue of the HRA 1998 and the influence of Tarsasag v Hungary Application no 37374/05 14 July 2009.

1.156  The case law has decided that written transcripts of court proceedings held in public are not documents created by the court or an administrative member of the court and are not protected by s 32. The documents had been produced by a commercial body. The IC had decided otherwise but was overruled by the tribunal.1 Audio recordings of court hearings and where the proceedings were in public were similarly not covered by s 32. Nor were they protected by s 21 because application to the court does not make them ‘reasonably accessible’ (FS50150314). Mitchell v IC EA/2005/0002.

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1.157  EA/2005/0002 (above) also ruled that s  32 will protect internal notes from the judge to jury or vice versa but not orders under the Contempt of Court Act 1981.1 See A Szuchs v IC & UK Intellectual Property Office EA/2007/0075.

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(xii)  audit functions1

1.158  Where a public authority has audit functions in relation to another authority’s accounts or in relation to the economy, efficiency or effectiveness (the three ‘Es’)2 with which the latter carries out its functions then information held for those purposes is exempt where its disclosure would, or would be likely to, prejudice any of the above audit or three ‘Es’ functions (FOIA 2000, s 33; para 12.8 below). Obvious PAs in this group would include the National Audit Office, Ofsted, HM Inspectorate of Prisons, HM Inspectorate of Police, the Care Quality Commission and the now defunct Office of Government Commerce. The exemption does not apply to internal audits nor to the PA subject to audit, although other exemptions may be relevant. The duty to confirm or deny does not arise under the usual formula but in an amended form. https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1210/public-audit-functions-s33-foi-guidance. pdf. 2 See para 12.8. 1

76  Chapter 1 1.159  There have been several cases involving the ‘gateways reviews’ (GRs) of large-scale government procurement concerning information technology contracts. Many large, complex, and novel civil programmes had missed delivery dates. The Office of Government Commerce (OGC, now no longer in existence)) produced a Gateway Process Review Pack. The ‘Gateway’ process was mandatory across central government including the Ministry of Defence and executive agencies, and local government adopted the reviews on a voluntary basis. They were carried out at five key stages of a programme and were treated as confidential. Reviewers are mainly senior civil servants or outside consultants. GRs saved the Exchequer £1.5bn between 2003 and 2005. Under the reviews, projects are colour-coded periodically at critical stages. These are known as RAG reviews (red, amber, green). Red signifies the necessity of immediate action; amber suggests recommendations and green is an ‘all clear’. A request was made to the OGC for ‘double red warnings reports’. Strategic supplier reviews are now carried out on a similar basis with an additional high-risk category (see para 1.284). The OGC invoked s 33 on the ground of prejudice in relation to the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness achieved by other PAs in their use of resources. Publication, it was argued, would also discourage cooperation by those who supplied information to OGC. The IC was not convinced by such arguments: ’Information was not given purely voluntarily by those persons’ (para 23). IC decided that s 33 was not engaged (FS50095679). FS50070196 also related to a request for GRs of identity cards programmes and contracts run by the Home Office. Sections 33 and 35 were invoked. The information in question was examined by the IC and his officers in the premises of the OGC. The OGC repeated the argument about disclosure reducing cooperation, but it was similarly rejected by the IC. (‘Those persons operate in a professional capacity and cooperation is a part of their professional responsibilities.’) Section 33 was not engaged. In FS50180545 the IC did not consider that auditing documents were of a sufficiently ‘free and frank’ nature to merit protection under s 33. 1.160  EA/2006/0068 and 0080 continue the case law on gateways. ‘Misinterpretation’ of messages was not a good reason for non-disclosure, the tribunal ruled. The Select Committee on Works and Pensions and the Committee of Public Accounts had both recommended publication of GRs and the tribunal had allowed itself to be influenced by this. The government did not agree with the routine publication of GRs but did not invoke a ‘blanket exemption’ for them. Each FOIA request is considered on its merits by the OGC. The point was that Parliamentary reports are often after the event, whereas the tribunal believed major projects should be scrutinised during their actual operation as ongoing concerns. The OGC’s case, also argued under s 35, was rejected. OGC appealed to the High Court. That court allowed the appeal because the tribunal was too influenced in its judgment by a select committee report and this was not something upon which judicial notice could be taken. The tribunal had not exercised its judicial functions correctly in so doing and had made an error of law. But the court did not rule on the merits as it made perfectly clear.1 The case was remitted to the tribunal for a rehearing on the merits.2 The tribunal upheld the publication of two GR reports. The tribunal emphasised that its ruling did not set a precedent for all GRs; each would have to be determined on its particular

The freedom of information legislation   77 facts. Names of those involved in reviews should be redacted, but not the grades of functions of parties. [2008] EWHC 737 (Admin) and 774 (Admin). Office of Government Commerce v IC EA/2006/0068 and 0080 (original cases FS50070196 and FS50132936).

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1.161 In Office of Government Commerce v IC and Anor,1 a request was made for information about the RAG system for overseeing government procurement contracts involving IT. Sections 33(1)(b) and 35 were invoked. Of relevance here was that the tribunal could not examine Parliamentary Questions (PQs) to assess the adequacy of a Minister’s answers to such questions. Ministers should not answer PQs by reference to the exemptions in the FOIA! Parliamentary privilege had been interfered with by judicial reliance on a select committee’s findings and opinions. It denied the full separation of powers. In FS50318502, the NAO rightly refused under ss  33(1)(b) and 33(2) to disclose information needed to audit preparations for the 2012 Olympic games. The OGC has now been disbanded because of a lack of success in its achievements, and oversight of government contracting has become more centralised (see para 1.60). However, the National Audit Office has reported that the Cabinet Office’s transparency policy prevents full publication of contract data by the Infrastructure and Projects Authority2 and only 31 per cent of contracts use open-book (ie  contractor/supplier shared confidential information about costs and profits) accounting practices.3 For contracts not including the MoD, the figure was 23 per cent, although the larger the contract, the higher the rate of use of open-book arrangements – 56 per cent for contracts worth more than 50 million pounds. Despite government claims that competition reduced the need for open-book contracts, the NAO recommended increasing use of the practice. Competition by itself, as the case of Carillion illustrated, is no guarantee of value for money. The Financial Reporting Council has published a highly critical report about the major auditing firms in the UK, accusing them of failing to show ‘appropriate scepticism across their audits’.4 [2008] EWHC 737 (Admin). Delivering Major Projects in Government HC 713 (2015–16) p 7. 3 Open-book Accounting and supply chain assurance HC 91-I (2015–16) 1.11–1.12. 4 Eg https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/c2c92d13-4a5a-4711-9ec5-9d69c60da278/KPMGLLP-Public-Report-2017-18.pdf (3/07/2018). 1 2

(xiii)  parliamentary privilege1

1.162  This is an absolute exemption. The original Bill did not include Parliament within the FOIA 2000’s coverage. It was a recommendation from the Select Committee on Public Administration in its review of the draft Bill which contained no such provision although the White Paper of 1997 referred to ‘continuing discussions’ about Parliament’s inclusion.2 Where disclosure would cause a breach of privilege of either House of Parliament it is exempt information under s 34 of the FOIA 2000. The duty to confirm or deny does not apply if, or to the extent that, exemption from s 1(1)(a)

78  Chapter 1 is required for the purpose of avoiding an infringement of the privileges of either House. A certificate signed by the Speaker of the House of Commons or Clerk of the Parliaments stating that exemption from s 1(1)(b) or (a) and (b) is, or at any time was, required to avoid an infringement of Parliamentary privilege shall be conclusive evidence of that fact. It is unlikely that the IC would have any grounds or capability to question such a certificate.3 Privileges include the freedom of speech and debate within Parliament and that proceedings within each House cannot be questioned in any other place4 and that Parliament exercises exclusive jurisdiction over its own business (FS50116013 and FS50224829). Members’ correspondence to public authorities or to constituents on constituency business, where such information is held by a public authority, is not covered by parliamentary privilege, nor is their general correspondence with ministers or other members, the ICO advises (para  25), although the nature of such information (ie is it related to committee work) must be carefully considered. There has been extensive discussion in the higher courts of the extent of the ancient privilege necessitated by the prosecution of those MPs and peers who had allegedly entered false accounts in making claims for expenses.5 https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1161/section_34_parliamentary_ privilege.pdf. 2 See HC 570 I (1998–99), para 24, and HC 398 I (1997–98), para 37. 3 See eg Hamilton v Al Fayed [2000] 2 All ER 224, HL. 4 Article 9 Bill of Rights 1688–89. 5 R v Chaytor and Others [2010] EWCA Crim 1910 and [2010] UKSC 52. 1

1.163  This has not been a frequently employed exemption. Contrary to some reports, the Speaker did not claim the privilege in relation to the MPs’ expenses fiasco.1 The exemption prayed in aid in that case was s 40 (see para 2.90). The information requested about additional expenses allowances for MPs including addresses did not interfere with their privacy, was not unwarranted, and had to be disclosed in full. The system of expenses (now reformed; see para 2.90, note 1) was ‘deeply flawed’. The arguments that MPs had a reasonable expectation of privacy and the disclosure of addresses was neither proportionate nor necessary were rejected by then court as clear reasons had been given for these findings by the tribunal. The House of Commons could not operate on the basis that legislation did not apply to it or that MPs could dispense with or suspend such legislation. The expenses system was so bad that MPs could not expect anything less than – as necessity required – full disclosure. Only the most pressing of MPs’ privacy requirements could prevent publication, eg security. The tribunal had ‘carefully balanced’ all factors. In FS50327178, the privilege under s 34(1) was claimed successfully in relation to a request for names and numbers of MPs under investigation by the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards. Corporate Officer House of Commons v IC, Brooke etc [2008] EWHC 1084 (Admin) at 2.

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(xiv)  formulation of government policy etc1

1.164  The original cl 28(1)(a) exempted information relating to the formulation or development of government policy, and this is now s 35(1)(a). The totality of

The freedom of information legislation   79 this made it truly an amazing exemption but the subsection then specified various aspects of central government decision-making which are specifically protected, including communications between Ministers of the Crown particularly in Cabinet and Cabinet committee proceedings.2 For safe measure, information of central government (and devolved government) which is not caught by the above and information of other public authorities was protected under cl 28(3) if ‘in the reasonable opinion of a qualified person’ disclosure: ‘(c) would otherwise prejudice, or would be likely otherwise to prejudice, the effective conduct of public affairs.’ https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1200/government-policy-foi-section-35guidance.pdf. NB Committee on Standards in Public Life, Lord Bew, Strengthening Transparency around Lobbying Nov 2013 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ attachment_data/file/407530/2901376_LobbyingStandards_WEB.pdf. 2 This is much stricter than the law relating to confidentiality in Crown or public service or Public Interest Immunity: A-G  v Jonathan Cape Ltd [1976]  QB  752; A-G  v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1988] 3 All ER 545, HL; Burmah Oil v Bank of England [1980] AC 1090, HL; Air Canada v Secretary of State for Trade (No 2) [1983] 2 AC 394, HL. The Ministerial Code formerly stated at ch 2, para 16: ‘The internal process through which a decision has been made, or the level of [Cabinet] Committee by which it was taken, should not be disclosed’ On the current Code, see para 4.99. 1

1.165  The FOIA 2000 now creates two exemptions in ss 35 and 36. Section 35 covers the formulation of government policy and protects four areas of information. This includes the policy of the Executive Committee of Northern Ireland and the Welsh Assembly Government – it covers UK central government and devolved government but not Scotland, although s  35(5) includes the Advocate General for Scotland, the Lord Advocate, the Solicitor General for Scotland as ‘law officers’. It does not cover other PAs. 1.166  Information held by a government department (which includes the Welsh Assembly Government) is exempt where it relates to:1 the formulation of government policy; Ministerial communications including in particular proceedings of the Cabinet or Cabinet Committees,2 the Executive Committee of the Northern Ireland Assembly or the Cabinet or Cabinet Committees of the Welsh Assembly Government; the provision of advice by any of the Law Officers (sub-s  (3), and see para  4.76 on Parliament’s contempt powers where legal advice is not published following a Commons vote ordering this) or any request for the provision of such advice; or the operation of any Ministerial private office. This last office means any part of a government department which provides personal administrative support to a Minister of the Crown, to a Northern Ireland Minister or a Northern Ireland junior Minister (see s 19 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998) and personal administrative support provided by any part of the administration of the Welsh Assembly Government to members of the Welsh Assembly Government. The duty to confirm or deny provision applies in the standard manner. ‘Relates to’ is given a broad interpretation: DfES v IC EA/2006/0006. See J Cross v IC EA/2014/0320 request for Cabinet Precedent Book about collective responsibility, Cabinet, cabinet committees and documents, relations with monarch, appointments, interests etc. Partially successful request on PI grounds.

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80  Chapter 1 1.167  This will cover all advice on policy, from whatever sources, alternatives to policies adopted and any draft policies, draft statements and opinions. The totality of this exemption is breath-taking. ‘Policy’ is a protean concept – the ICO guidance elaborates on this at paras 20–61.1 The dangers in its absoluteness were brought home by the report of Lord Phillips into the BSE inquiry where suppression of the truth of the BSE epidemic was as contagious as the epidemic itself.2 The provision of advice by the Law officers was illustrated dramatically when the Attorney General refused to publish his advice on the legality of commencing armed hostilities against Iraq in 2003.3 Following publication of leaked extracts of the advice by the press, the government published the Attorney General’s advice to the Prime Minister a week before the general election of 2005. The publication of the advice raised more questions than it resolved and contradictory opinions of the Attorney General to the Prime Minister were subsequently published. The Court of Appeal has approved an Upper Tribunal judgment ordering disclosure of a minister’s official diary, adding that the department held the information.4 See FS50083726; FS50451254; Makin v IC EA/2010/0080; Weiss v IC EA/2011/0191; FS50420602 – in the latter case, use of statutory regulations to make calculations was not a part of ‘policy’ but an in-built design; Cabinet Office v IC EA/2011/0263. 2 See HC 887 I-XVI (1999–2000), 16 vols. It is available on: http://62.189.42.105/index.htm. 3 See Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction HC  898 (2003–04), Annex D. See the Ministerial Code (2017) ch 2, on the Law Officers, and note (at para 2.10): ‘By convention, written opinions of the Law Officers, unlike other Ministerial papers, are generally made available to succeeding Administrations’. The advice of Law Officers has been made public on a number of occasions; and see, on s 23, para 1.122 above. 4 Department of Health v IC & S Lewis [2017] EWCA Civ 374. 1

1.168  What of factual, scientific or technical advice? Can this not be revealed even before the decision is finalised? An amendment to the Bill stated that when exercising discretion under cl 13, where information is exempt by virtue of relating to the formulation of policy, the public authority shall have regard in particular to the desirability of communicating to the applicant factual information which has been used, or is intended to be used, to provide an informed background to decision-taking. What if it was factual information that was not used? What is factual?1 Does the reference to applicant personalise the decision in any way? What of the post-decisional stage and release of information? Can information which is not simply ‘factual’ not then be released? The National Assembly for Wales publishes ‘decision reports’ which are summaries of facts and analyses of the facts relating to all formal decisions taken by Ministers under legal powers. These vary from brief statements to very detailed documents. A minute covering advice is not published and constitutes part A of a ‘split report’. See Bushell v Secretary of State for the Environment [1981] AC 75, HL, and cf R (NASHA) v Secretary of State for Health (2005) Times, 9 March – knowledge of civil servant not imputed to Minister.

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1.169  The amendment was itself further amended so that the reference to factual information, either pre- or post-decision, became ‘statistical’ information used to provide any informed background to the taking of the decision. Secretary of State for Work & Pensions v IC1 concerned a request for the feasibility of the government’s ID cards programme and relevant instructions and their full

The freedom of information legislation   81 impact, costs and benefits. Section 35 was invoked. Paragraph  20 deals with ‘statistical information’ test under s 35(2) and also para 75. There is MoJ (formerly Department for Constitutional Affairs) guidance on ‘statistical information’.2 This is not to be treated as relating to the formulation or development of policy or as relating to ministerial communications. This was only to be released, it seemed, post-decision. This was an especially limiting provision. EA/2005/0040. http://www.justice.gov.uk/docs/foi-exemption-s35.pdf at p 9.

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1.170  On Report in the Lords, the original provision concerning factual information was restored and it emerged in the Act as s 35(4) – ‘regard shall be had to the particular public interest in the disclosure of factual information which has been used, or is intended to be used, to provide an informed background to decision-taking’. So that when making a decision on a public interest override of the exclusion of the duty to confirm or deny or a disclosure under s 2(1)(b) or (2)(b) of information which is exempt because it relates to the formulation or development of government policy, regard shall be had to that particular public interest in the disclosure of factual information. EA/2005/0040 (above) discusses factual information and s  35(4) in paras 71 et seq. The onus will be on those justifying secrecy under s  2. The provision does not, however, refer to access to the analysis of facts as did the 1997 Code on Access. Access to such analysis underlying policy decisions and proposals was allowed under the Code after decisions are made. The Code also allowed policy-related material to be withheld only if disclosure would harm ‘the frankness and candour of internal discussion’. A public interest disclosure of such information may be made. The reference to ‘applicant’ has been removed from the Act. The Parliamentary Ombudsman has not allowed factual information to be withheld under the Code.1 Case A 8/00 HC 494 (1999/00); Case A 31/99 HC 21 (1999/00).

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1.171  This exemption is a class exemption and is much wider than say Public Interest Immunity certificates where a class basis of immunity was abandoned by the government in 1996.1 This seems a very sweeping exemption only partially limited by the amendment introduced in the Bill explained above. Protection of timing of release of information is understandable when timing is crucial because of a legitimate sensitivity on eg presentation. The government said it would keep the situation under review.2 See ch 11 and para 1.28 above. See P Birkinshaw (1998) PL 176.

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1.172  DBERR  v D  O’Brien and IC  [2009]  EWHC  164 (Admin) displayed a marked reluctance to interfere with a tribunal’s assessment of PI factors under s  35 (but not under s  42 (below)). FS50126011 contains a useful analysis and discussion of the PI under s 35(1)(a) and (b). The requester wanted information concerning Cabinet Office (CO) papers in relation to an Asylum and Immigration working group. The papers covered the approach to registration of workers from new EU accession states. The CO claimed s 35 was operative and the PI favoured non-disclosure. The IC relied upon the IT’s decision in DfES  v the

82  Chapter 1 Commissioner and the Evening Standard (EA/2006/0006, at 75). The PI factors that were relevant involved a balancing of: ‘In favour of disclosure: (i) Promoting public understanding behind decisions taken. (ii) Public participation and debate in policy issues, especially where the subject matter is of a controversial nature. (iii) Accountability for decisions taken. (iv) Transparency in decision making. (v) Information contained within the paper which is already in the public domain. Against disclosure: (i) The short period of time that had elapsed between the meeting and the complainant’s request, and that the policy in question continues to be kept under review. (ii) Effects on the principle of collective responsibility for decisions by revealing interdepartmental considerations which may reveal disagreements between Ministers and departments. (iii) Revealing the policy options presented to Ministers for collective discussion and decision-making could undermine the process of collective government and inhibit Ministers’ from having a frank and fully-informed discussion in order to reach informed decisions. (iv) Effects on the comprehensiveness of information provided for consideration in policy making.’1 The IC set out his reasons for ordering disclosure: much of the information was already in the public domain; the decision was controversial and that much of the controversy had its origins in a ‘lack of public engagement’ in the process of reaching the decision. It was in the PI for the public to see the reasons behind the decision; release of information would not adversely affect any ongoing reviews of the policy and the information would assist public debate. It was difficult to see how collective responsibility of Ministers could be adversely affected. The IC did not believe there would be any adverse impact on civil service candour by disclosure: names of officials were not included, the discussion was objective and balanced and the IC relied on the tribunal’s decision in DfES v IC and Evening Standard EA/2006/0006. In DfES which is examined directly below. Finally, timing of a request and its relationship to a decision is crucial. Where a decision is announced, as in this case, although aspects may still need to be protected, once a decision was announced less weight may be accorded to the need for protection. The PI favoured disclosure. In Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v IC EA/2005/0040 the information was requested about feasibility studies, instructions and costs and benefits for the New Labour government’s ID cards programme. The tribunal stated that application was at a late stage of policy implementation (an advanced stage of policy formulation) and this ‘second stage’ related to the ‘detailed implementation of the scheme at departmental level’. The ID scheme was unprecedented in its complexity and scale ‘incurring costs of several billion pounds’. It was likely to have a profound effect on access to public services (para  96). The disputed information was introduced at a ‘late

The freedom of information legislation   83 stage in the formulation and development of an ID scheme’ after the decision by government to introduce such a scheme. Both the IC and tribunal believed the PI in these circumstances was in favour of disclosure.2 FS50126011, para 19. The identities of junior civil servants were correctly redacted.

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1.173 In DfES  v IC and Evening Standard EA/2006/0006 – in which, incidentally, it was stated that FOIA  2000, s  1 creates a ‘new fundamental right to information’ (para  61) – s  35(1)(a) was invoked. High-level witnesses on behalf of the PA included the Cabinet Secretary. The request involved information about setting of school budgets in England including the minutes of a policy committee. Arguments on the ‘chilling effect’ on advice and recordkeeping were rejected (and see Department of Health v IC EA/2011/0286 & 0287 and M  Halligan v IC EA/2015/0291). The tribunal ruled crucially that the formulation and development of policy had to be distinguished from implementation of policy and its analysis (para 13). The tribunal acknowledged the dangers of ‘sofa government’ by the use of specialist advisers. The words ‘Relates to formulation and development of policy’ in s 35 should be construed broadly. There was no need to prevent disclosure of officials’ identities. The status of minutes does is not an automatic ground for exemption; this is the case even where they concern the ‘most senior of officials’. ‘To treat such status as automatically conferring exemption would be tantamount to intervening within s.35(1) a class of absolutely exempt information for which the subsection gives no warrant …’ (para 69). In para 75 the guiding principles in cases such as the present are: the content of particular information. As we have seen, no status is automatically exempt. The protection is against compromise or unjust public opprobrium of civil servants not ministers. A paramount feature is the timing of a request. What is highly relevant in June 2007 may carry little weight by January 2011 (earlier years were actually used). A Parliamentary statement announcing the policy ‘will normally mark the end of the process of policy formulation’. But the tribunal emphasised that all specific facts must be viewed carefully, however, and PI in exemption may not necessarily disappear on announcement. One should expect fortitude, impartiality and independence of civil servants. But good reasons may exist to withhold the names of ‘more junior civil servants’. The tribunal assumed that Ministers will ‘behave fairly and responsibly to civil servants who may be associated with unpopular advice’. A blanket policy, however, of refusing to identify civil servants cannot be justified. There must be a specific reason justifying non-disclosure of civil servant’s identity and junior status may qualify for such. There is ‘a general PI in transparency and a better understanding of how the government tackles important policy problems’ the tribunal believed. In the present case the ‘funding crisis’ in schools had caused and was of great public concern. Even though the information may not prove to be significant in any public debate the PI favoured disclosure. In FS50153967 the complainant wrote to the CO to request records of exchanges between Tony Blair and Rupert Murdoch. The documents were more than seven years old and the PI favoured disclosure. Cabinet Office v IC EA/2008/0049 concerned Prime Minister’s meetings. The complainant requested a full list of all those who met

84  Chapter 1 with the Prime Minister at 10 Downing Street in June 2005. Some information was disclosed, but information relating to internal meetings with ministerial colleagues under ss 35 and 36 was withheld. A list of appointments would not come within the definition of policy formulation. Further, it would not be possible to determine the content of any meetings which were held. Therefore the Commissioner decided that details as to the names of officials were not exempt. However, the exemption would apply in respect of references to Cabinet Committees under s 35(1)(a). The commissioner considered the public interest test. The CO argued that disclosure could: (a) disenable ministers from discussing sensitive policy issues without inhibition; (b) cause individuals with whom the Prime Minister met to be targeted by lobbyists; (c) affect the perceived neutrality of particular civil servants; (d) undermine the convention of collective responsibility; (e) link civil servants to particular areas of policy. The tribunal upheld the IC’s decision favouring disclosure under the PI. In Department for Culture, Media and Sport v IC EA/2007/0090 the tribunal reversed the IC’s decision on disclosure on PI grounds under s 35. It concerned advice from civil servants to the Minister on the list of sporting events that were protected under the Broadcasting Act 1996 from being exclusively pay per view. The IC said that encouraging good practice, promoting accountability and understanding, encouraging public debate, and broadening policy input in the age of information were all relevant factors. On examination of the material the tribunal did not consider the first four benefits were advanced by disclosure. The grounds for release have to be supported by good arguments – otherwise s 35 would be used in favour of indiscriminate disclosure. There is no fixed point beyond which a PI in non-disclosure may not be argued. The material here was seven years old. But the tribunal did not consider that release would help public debate. On the facts, and unlike the DfCM&S case above, there was no PI to match the PI in maintaining the ‘private thinking space’ of ministers and civil servants. In terms of the public interest this is a difficult case to understand. The facts constitute a very important public interest question in relation to broadcasting sporting events yet the tribunal felt the evidence for disclosure ‘anodyne’. In Cabinet Office v IC EA/2014/0223 a request for disclosure of the full contents of Getting your bill through the House of Lords, published by the government whips’ office as a guide for bill teams, was partially allowed on PI grounds. Confidential items as identified in an annexe were rightly withheld. 1.174 In Scotland Office v IC EA/2007/0128 the tribunal noted that there was no evidence post-FOIA or the decision in DfS&S EA/2006/0006 of the ‘chilling effect’ of disclosure on civil servants.1 Where outside advisers contributed to ‘blue sky thinking’ in policy development and where they would have expected confidentiality that has been a good reason not to order disclosure: Cabinet Office v IC EA 2008/0030 (concerning Lord Birt). In FS50104994 there was a request to HM  Treasury for information on ‘all relevant documentation covering the decision in principle’ about the reduction of income tax by 1p in the pound announced in 1999. Section 35(1)(a) was invoked. In January 2007, the Treasury

The freedom of information legislation   85 released the greater part of the information but the DN itself was appealed in HM  Treasury v IC EA/2007/0001. The tribunal was not impressed by the warnings from HM  Treasury of ‘dire consequences’ of releasing information much of which had been subsequently released. The undisclosed information was considered sensitive by the Treasury because if disclosed it might confine the range of topics on which Ministers might seek advice from their civil servants. The appeal was allowed in relation to one item of information and a substituted DN was issued. It concerned Budget papers. Section 35(1)(a) was invoked. Section 35 is a class exemption but any ‘damage’ is considered in balancing PI factors. The central question in s 35(1) is ‘the content of specific information in relation to the exemption’. The tribunal believed chilling effect is inherent in the Act (para 57(3)) and was not impressed by the usual arguments trotted out by the Treasury. The PI arguments in favour of disclosure included: ‘the relevant date is 1999 and the effluxion of time; the benefit of participation in government decisions; publication of some information does not remove the desirability of disclosing more; possible contribution and utility so knowing about rejected options for proposals in the future; the general benefits of greater transparency, accountability and public debate. The PI was in favour of disclosure except in relation to one item of information which had to be assessed as at the time of the appraisal in 2005. Interestingly the tribunal believed that information generated before the FOIA had no effect on assessing the PI. An underlying assumption of FOIA 2000 is that ‘disclosure of information held by PAs is in itself of value and in the PI’ citing Guardian Newspapers v IC EA/2006/0011. In FS50196977 the complainant requested minutes of the meetings of the cross-party group on House of Lords reform from the Ministry of Justice. This request was refused under s 35(1)(a). The IC believed the exemption was properly claimed because the group was a ‘part of government’ containing government members and its recommendations would be in a white paper. But the public interest favoured non-disclosure. The information itself ‘related to a matter of constitutional significance which indicates that there is a significant public interest in disclosure, but that very fact also means that it is desirable for the government to be given space to make decisions in order to ensure full and frank discussions’. In OGC v IC [2008] EWHC 737 (Admin), Stanley Burnton J approved the formulation adopted in DfES.

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1.175  Section 35 has been the section where decisions on the public interest involving Cabinet documents were overridden by the veto in s  53 on two occasions by the Labour government in 2009. In both cases, as will be seen, the information involved Cabinet discussions. Cabinet confidentiality and collective responsibility both demanded that the information remained undisclosed. However, in Cabinet Office v IC EA/2010/0031 a request was made in 2005 for information concerning the minutes of the Cabinet discussions of the Westland case in 1986. This decision involving the future of a British helicopter manufacturer with important consequences British and European manufacturers and caused a serious scandal in Mrs Thatcher’s government. The IC had decided that disclosure should be made in the public interest. This was upheld by the tribunal noting that although disclosure of Cabinet minutes will rarely be ordered

86  Chapter 1 within 30 years (the 30-year rule then applicable) Mrs Thatcher had ‘abandoned’ the convention of collective responsibility in her statement in January 1986 about the affair. Crucially, the coalition government decided not to issue a veto. Disclosures involving Cabinet documents under s 35 are rare.1 In FS50350458 the government appealed against a ruling of the IC that information presented to Mrs Thatcher as Prime Minister on the Hillsborough football stadium disaster in 1989 be disclosed by virtue of the public interest under ss 31 and 35, although some was rightfully withheld under s 40. This became the subject of an e-petition to the government (see para 4.92 below) attracting over 100,000 supporters for disclosure. A panel appointed by the government reported in the autumn of 2012 on the disaster, in which 96 fans were killed in April 1989. This found serious fault with management of police records and crucial amendments to police records of events at the disaster. It recommended that all police records of all English and Welsh forces should be transferred to the National Archives, and not simply those of the Metropolitan Police.2 See R  Hazell and D  Busfield-Birch ‘Opening the Cabinet door: Freedom of Information and Policy Making [2011] Public Law 260. 2 Hillsborough: The Report of the Independent Hillsborough Panel September 2012 http://hillsborough. independent.gov.uk/repository/report/HIP_report.pdf. 1

1.176  Cabinet Office v IC and C Lamb EA/2008/0024 and 0029 (F550165372) was the first case that witnessed the application of the Secretary of State’s veto in response to the majority decision of the tribunal upholding the IC’s decision to disclose documents (the minutes subject to specified redactions) of two Cabinet meetings in March 2003. The veto was issued in February 2009, four weeks after the tribunal decision to disclose. In December 2009, the Justice Secretary issued a second veto in relation to the disclosure of minutes of a Cabinet sub-committee on devolution to Scotland, Wales and the English regions dating from 1997. In this case, the Cabinet Office did not even appeal to the tribunal but took action after the IC’s DN.1 The Cabinet at the Iraq meetings discussed and decided to send UK troops to engage in war on Iraq. The request for the minutes was made in April 2007. The tribunal ruled that informal documents accompanying the minutes were protected under s 35(1)(a) and (b) – these were notes taken by civil servants of the meetings. The tribunal described the case as ‘exceptional’ creating very powerful public interest reasons for publication. An important feature of the Cabinet meetings in relation to hostilities were papers from the Attorney General outlining his opinion on the legality of using armed force in Iraq without the necessity of a further UN Security Council resolution authorising armed invasion. The reported view of the Attorney General was that a further resolution was not required. A  memorandum of the Attorney General was subsequently disclosed showing a contrary view from the Attorney General to the Prime Minister from that that had previously been made public and which differed from the Attorney General’s advice that was before the Cabinet. Iraq had been in breach of resolutions concerning inspection and information on its alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMD). No evidence of WMD were actually found and the circumstances leading to warfare and huge loss of life

The freedom of information legislation   87 remain highly controversial. The tribunal recounted how the Butler review of the use of intelligence on the WMD had made critical findings on the nature of Cabinet proceedings and their management in the period in question leading to hostilities. Briefing papers prepared by officials had not been circulated to the Cabinet but had been replaced by ‘unscripted briefings’ by the Prime Minister and Foreign and Defence Secretaries. Discussion took place in detail only between ‘a small circle of individuals’ for which the Cabinet as a whole would bear responsibility. ‘The scope for informed overall political judgement by the Cabinet had been reduced’ (para 28). The Butler inquiry discussion of intelligence and its materials was in closed session. The conclusions alone were published. The IC had previously issued an EN ordering the publication of information supporting the Attorney General’s legal opinion dated 17 March 2003. Confidentiality was maintained for information in ‘uncirculated drafts’ or which were ‘preliminary, provisional or tentative’ or which might ‘reveal legal risks, reservations and counter-arguments’ by those involved in giving advice to the Attorney General. The Government agreed on a Disclosure Statement of materials to be published. The arguments from the Cabinet Office in favour of non-disclosure of the Cabinet Minutes were formulated around collective responsibility of ministers and government – these were general arguments – in relation to the particular information in question, the arguments were more specific. To repeat, additional materials were not ordered to be disclosed. The arguments in favour of collective responsibility revolved around confidentiality and a united public facade. In ch  4 we examine some legal limits to the role of confidentiality in Cabinet discussions (para  4.329 below) as well as the whole context of ministerial confidences and frequent breaches of the convention by ministers themselves in their publications. The tribunal noted several publications where ministers had publicised events at the meetings in question including their differences of opinion and there had been ministerial leaks to the press and media. The IC stated the minutes revealed no dissent in the Cabinet beyond that contained in other published materials; no member of the Cabinet would face a compromise of their public agreement and private dissent. FS501100665 and http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/freedom_of_information/ research_and_reports/ic_report_to_parliament_hc218.pdf.

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1.177  The Cabinet position was that publishing these official minutes would undermine a central feature of the British constitution thereby damaging the public interest. The CO argued that if a pattern emerged of publishing minutes where there was no dissent, but not otherwise, that would lead to the obvious presumption that dissent had occurred at those meetings with a weakening of the convention. While the IC accepted the convention of collective responsibility was deserving of ‘great respect’ being a ‘strong factor’ (para  51), these documents had to be decided upon ‘in their specific context’ and bearing in mind that over four years had passed since the Cabinet meeting. The IC’s case for public interest disclosure included: the gravity and controversial nature of the subject; accountability for government decisions; transparency of decision-making; and public participation

88  Chapter 1 in government decisions (paras 58–59). Some suggested that the probing and testing of the material before the Cabinet was not sufficiently robust to assess the reliability of information used for life and death decisions, quite literally for thousands of individuals. The majority of the IT were persuaded by the ‘compelling’ arguments for disclosure in the PI. The decision was ‘momentous’ and the public had to see and understand the context of that decision ‘and on the effectiveness of the decision-making context’ (para 82). The majority ruled that publication, subject to agreed redactions for reasons of diplomatic sensitivity, was in the public interest. The dissenting member of the tribunal, a former senior civil servant, was that publication of the minutes would drive Cabinet governance towards informality and ‘sofa government’ thereby weakening the public record and undermining good and accountable government. As we have described, on 24  February 2009, four weeks after the tribunal’s decision, the Justice Secretary issued his veto under FOIA 2000, s 53 blocking release of the minutes. His decision was one in which he reported that he had taken the view of the Cabinet. Lord Falconer as Lord Chancellor had variously stated there would be a Cabinet decision and Cabinet consultation. Collective responsibility and Cabinet confidentiality are crucial to the accountability of the executive to Parliament and the people. Free debate in Cabinet would be jeopardised by disclosure and that ‘that damage to the public interest far outweighs any public interest in disclosure’. The ‘integrity of our system of government’ cannot be prejudiced by ‘openness and accountability’. Suggestions for reform also mean a reduction in the 30-year rule. 1.178  One may surmise that the coalition government in the Westland decision where an appeal against the IC’s decision to disclose Cabinet minutes was appealed but where a s 53 veto was not issued reflects a different possible approach to use of s 35 and disclosure of Cabinet minutes on the facts of that case. 1.179  In FS50215878 involving the CO, the complainant requested any documentation emanating from, or sent to, the Office of the Prime Minister between 1997 and 2001 that made reference to the Michael Stone case, in any context. The CO confirmed it held some information falling within the request but refused to disclose the information under the exemption at s 35(1) (b) (ministerial communications). In submissions to the Commissioner, the CO also placed reliance upon s 35(1)(a) (formulation or development of government policy). The Commissioner found that s 35(1)(a) (and to a limited extent, s 35(1) (b)) were engaged and that the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighed the public interest in disclosure of the information. Documents relating to the generation of legislative provisions are also according sensitive treatment. In FS50269514 HM Treasury was asked to disclose all documentation generated by its consideration and formulation of Finance Act 2008, s  58 (retrospective legislation that sought to end a scheme that the government considered to be a ‘highly artificial and aggressive tax avoidance scheme’). The Commissioner concluded that all the withheld information was exempt either under the provisions of s 35(1)(a) or under the provisions of s 36(2)(b)(i) and that the public interest favoured the maintenance of the exemptions.

The freedom of information legislation   89 Department for Health v IC EA/2016/0282 (19/07/2018) concerned ministerial diaries. Disclosure was ordered subject to s 40 and s 24. In relation to s 40, levels at which names should be disclosed were set out as follows: ‘[74] Names which should not be redacted: Members of the Senior Civil Service (Grade 5 and above), persons of equivalent seniority in agencies of the Department of Health (including the NHS), persons holding senior representative positions in stakeholder organisations, journalists, persons in senior positions in commercial organisations with dealings with the NHS, current and former Members of the House of Commons, Members of the House of Lords. [75] Names which should be redacted: Civil servants below the level of the Senior Civil Service (unless in public facing roles), staff of equivalent rank and responsibility in agencies of the Department of Health.’ 1.180  Section 35(1)(a) was involved in Crown Prosecution Service v IC EA/2009/0077. Wells made a request to the CPS asking for information on the CPS’s change of position towards the reasonable punishment defence as amended by the Children Act 2004, s 58; this limited the defence to battery only. He wanted to know why the CPS changed its position from ‘wrong to change the law’ in 2000 to ‘comfortable with the change’ in 2004 and requested copies of any related correspondence and minutes. The CPS refused on the basis of s 35(1) (a). The IC decided that the exemption was engaged, but that the public interest favoured disclosure. The parties agreed various redactions on this basis and the only issue remaining for the tribunal was that of the application of s  35(1)(a). On that issue the tribunal found that the exemption was clearly engaged during the legislative process and therefore up until 2004. The outstanding disputed information related to this period and therefore the exemption remained engaged. However, the fact that the Minister for Children continued to take an interest in the development of policy in the area until 2007 was neither here nor there. There was no sunset clause in the statute and there was no ability to produce secondary legislation. No ongoing review was announced, or conducted, until two years had passed and at the time of the request (2005) there was no ‘policy development’ in any significant sense; the CPS could not rely on this argument. The tribunal found that the public interest favoured disclosure because, whilst all the usual reasons for non-disclosure existed, there was a lack of understanding about the law, the information would inform the wider debate, the public needed to know about the involvement of lobbyists and their influence on the government and it was important for the public to understand how the government negotiates with the opposition. This case also has a discussion on late claims for exemptions which is dealt with below (paras 1.231 et seq). For disclosures under s 35(1)(a) involving other departments where disclosure was allowed, see Department for Culture, Media and Sport v IC EA/2009/0038. In FS50275939 involving the MoJ the complainant requested background information relating to Lord Carter’s report ‘Securing the Future: Proposals for the efficient and sustainable use of custody in England and Wales’. The MoJ indicated some information was in the public domain. Other information falling within s 35(1)(a) was exempt, MoJ argued. The IC decided that this exemption

90  Chapter 1 was engaged, but that the public interest in the maintenance of this exemption did not outweigh the public interest in disclosure and that, in failing to disclose this information within 20 working days of receipt of the request, the public authority failed in its duties under ss 1(1)(b) and 10(1) of the Act. In FS50313758 information on filling Supreme Court vacancies was wrongly refused to some extent under s 35 and a complaint was partly upheld. 1.181  Although the courts and Upper Tribunal on appeal from the tribunal are confined to appeals on questions of law, the high court has been vigilant in reminding the tribunal giving in sufficient weight to relevant factors is an error of law. Section 35(1)(c) was involved in HM  Treasury v IC and Owen [2009]  EWHC  1811 (Admin): insufficient weight had been given by the IC and tribunal to the convention of non-disclosure of law officers’ advice to departments (on the compatibility of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000) with the Human Rights Act 1998). ‘In my judgment, although mere deficiencies in the reasoning process or even isolated errors of law will not suffice to set aside a determination by the Information Tribunal, I  am satisfied that this Tribunal has erred in considering how to approach the strength of the public interest in maintaining the exemption from disclosure of the information whether the Law Officers have advised or not. I  am satisfied that the Tribunal misdirected itself: (i) By failing to conclude that Parliament intended real weight should continue to be afforded to this aspect of the Law Officers’ Convention. (ii) By failing to conclude that the general considerations of good government underlining the history and nature of the convention were capable of affording weight to the interest in maintaining an exemption even in the absence of evidence of particular damage. (iii) By failing to conclude that the evidence of the two witnesses before it, supported with detailed arguments the reasons why the general principles applied in this case, deserved some weight as emanating from senior civil servants with experience of the requirements of government in this field. This does not mean that the Tribunal were bound by these decisions or prevented from reaching their own conclusion upon the issue. Since preparing a draft of this judgment I  have become aware of the decision of Keith J  in Home Office v Information Commissioner QBD  [2009]  EWHC  1611 (Admin) where he rejected any suggestion of deference being required on the facts in that case at [65]. I  see no inconsistency with the conclusion I  have reached on the facts of the present case. (iv) The Tribunal were unduly and wrongly influenced by a misdirection that the FOIA had tended to modify the Law Officer’s Convention, as opposed to preserve it but render it amenable to being out-weighed by greater considerations of the public interest requiring disclosure of information in either limb of the Convention. (v) The Tribunal misdirected itself that the way the Convention worked operated as a trump card in the hands of the Ministerial department

The freedom of information legislation   91 concerned as to whether or not to disclose but could be deployed for its advantage. If this were the case I  would agree with the Tribunal’s comments that this is inconsistent with the principled reasoning and the interests of transparency required by the FOIA. The history of the convention and the evidence of Mr Jones precisely in point demonstrated that it was not. Where Ministers had disclosed without the prior consent of the Law Officers this was considered to be a breach rather than an application of the convention and a matter for reprimand.’1 Ministry of Justice v IC EA/2007/0016 was a refusal to confirm or deny under s 35(3) whether information is held in relation to the s 35(1) exemption. Disclosure was sought on the Attorney General’s advice in relation to the public interest test. Section 35(1)(c) was relied upon. An information notice was served under s 51(a) and (b) by the IC, which provides that no information is required to be given to the IC in relation to advice to a PA by a professional legal adviser, covers general and specific advice from a law officer on advice in response to an FOIA claim. The tribunal accepted the MoJ’s argument that s 51 operated to protect a PA’s legal advice on a FOIA claim. It is wider than s 42 (below) and does not carry a public interest test allowing disclosure. There is a strong convention on not confirming or denying law officers’ advice (paras 15 and 42).

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(xv)  prejudice to conduct of public affairs1

1.182  Information held by a government department as defined in s  35 and not caught by FOIA 2000, s 35, and information held by public authorities apart from government departments is exempt under s 36 if ‘in the reasonable opinion of a qualified person’2 disclosure of information would, or would be likely to, prejudice the maintenance of the convention of the collective responsibility of Ministers of the Crown, the work of the executive committee of the Northern Ireland Assembly or the Cabinet Committee of the Welsh Assembly Government (sub-s (2)(a)). It is also exempt where its disclosure would, or would be likely to, inhibit the ‘free and frank provision of advice’ or the ‘free and frank exchange of views for the purposes of deliberation (sub-s (2)(b)) or ‘would otherwise prejudice, or would be likely to prejudice, the effective conduct of public affairs (sub-s (2)(c)). The focus is on the effects of disclosure. https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1175/section_36_prejudice_to_ effective_conduct_of_public_affairs.pdf. 2 See FOIA  2000, s  36(5). The ‘Qualified Person’ (QP) is likely to be the most senior person in a PA. Additions have been made by the Budgetary Reform Act 2011 and the Public Audit (Wales) Act 2013. See Salmon v IC EA/2007/0135. Power of appointment (authorisation) will be delegated to PAs, and the Ministry of Justice (now Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport) will take responsibility for those bodies not falling within s 36(5)(a)–(n) where a sponsoring department cannot be identified. Advice will be given on QPs. See http://www.justice.gov.uk/ guidance/docs/foi-exemption-s36.pdf at pp 11 and 12 and Guardian Newspapers and H Brooke v IC and BBC EA/2006/0011 and 0013 and FS50269514, and see below. A PA cannot appoint its own QP in the absence of statutory identification and authorisation. In J Slater v IC EA/2013/0145 the opinion of the QP was reasonable but PI favoured disclosure of gateway reviews of universal credit programmes under the Welfare Reform Act 2012. On ss  35 and 36, see Department for Education v IC et al [2018] UKUT 348 (AAC). 1

1.183  The duty to confirm or deny does not apply to information within this section if, or to the extent that, in the reasonable opinion of a qualified person,

92  Chapter 1 compliance with s  1(1)(a) would or would be likely to have any of the effects above (ie in sub-s (2)). 1.184  The disclosure of statistical information under this section is not subject to the ‘reasonable opinion of an authorised person’ to prevent disclosure. It may be withheld where its disclosure would etc have the prejudicial effects under sub-ss (2) and (3). The authority would make the claim. If the information was releasable under s 35(2) it may be withheld under s 36(4). 1.185  Sub-s (5) spells out who are ‘qualified persons’ for the taking of decisions on non-disclosure (see 1.182, note 1 above). Various modifications have been made affecting the Welsh Assembly Government, the Wales Audit Office and the Public Services Ombudsman for Wales. 1.186  Is collective responsibility so important, or indeed so religiously observed, that revealing differences after the decision is made would undermine good government? In the gestation period of the present Act for instance, talk of a rift between the Lord Chancellor and the Home Secretary on the scope of the Bill, and between the Lord Chancellor and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster at the time of the White Paper was commonplace and seemingly well informed. Were ministerial relations or collective responsibility in any way undermined? If not then what is so important about such communications or conventions that they are, absent discretionary disclosures, only appropriate for the Public Records office (National Archives)? Brexit has thrown up its own dramatic illustrations of acute public differences on ministerial opinion and open conflicts. A highly publicised event in January 2018 reported the open plea by then foreign secretary Boris Johnson for an additional injection of £6 billion into the NHS, meeting with the anticipated retort by the Chancellor of the Exchequer that this was not the way Cabinet worked.1 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-42783247.

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1.187  Under s  36(2)(c) of the FOIA  2000, the exemption seems excessively broad. Under s  36(2) the government seems influenced by the New Zealand legislation but without any of the overriding public interest qualifications in that legislation. And furthermore, the exemption in New Zealand only applied to advice etc in the course of performance of a duty – and not where a duty was not being performed – or to protect advisers from improper harassment or pressure. The Select Committee had a good deal to say on these points in its enquiry into the White Paper. In its reply to the Committee’s report, the government stated that factual and background material may be made available under the general disclosure provisions in the publication schemes as well as under the specific access provisions. ‘Wherever possible, however, the aim will be to publish information and analysis before final decisions are taken so that it can inform public discussion and debate of the policy options that are available.’1 The contents of the publication schemes and code on this, and so many other items, will be crucial but the position does not look promising. HC 1020 (1997–98), para 28.

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The freedom of information legislation   93 1.188  Insofar as information is held by either House of Parliament, then by virtue of s 36(7) this is an absolute exemption. 1.189  In the White Paper, the government appeared to indicate that the good and effective policy-making exemption would be likely to apply ‘particularly’ to central government: ‘high level government records’ of Cabinet or Ministerial level and policy advice to ministers was the context in which it was envisaged this exemption operating. The section in the WP is given the heading, ‘Formulation of government policy, etc’. We have examined the operation of s 35 and central government. The government did subsequently develop its thinking to include all public bodies within this exemption which has become s 36 of the FOIA 2000.1 The Minister may authorise public authorities or officials etc in public authorities to take the appropriate decisions (s 36(5)(o)(i) and (ii)). Authorisations may be related to a specified person(s) or persons falling within a specified class, may be general or limited to particular classes of cases and may be granted subject to conditions. Certificates signed by the Speaker of the House of Commons or the Clerk of the Parliaments shall be conclusive evidence of the fact of the effects of disclosure of information referred to in sub-s (2). HC 1020 (1997–98), para 29.

1

1.190  Section 36 exempts disclosure which would, or would be likely to, inhibit the free and frank exchange of advice, or exchange of views for deliberation or would otherwise prejudice, etc, the effective conduct of public affairs. Under the White Paper, this information was protected by a more retentive test than all other exempt information – the test was a ‘harm’ test not a substantial harm test. Sections 35 and 36 aim to protect the policy-making and deliberative processes of government so that advisers will not feel inhibited either by being identified with a particular piece of advice or by being seen to disagree with the views of a Minister. It also seeks to prevent disclosures which could threaten policy initiative. One can appreciate the difficulties of government in a gold-fish bowl but several points will be made about the undesirable breadth of this exemption below. It will be recalled that provision is made for the release of ‘statistical information’ for an informed background in relation to information under s 35(1)(a) and (b) – the formulation of government policy and Ministerial communications. The concession applies also to information which would otherwise be exempt under s 36 and which is purely statistical information. In s 36, it may still be exempt if its disclosure would, or would be likely to, prejudice or inhibit those areas covered by s 36(2) and (3). The coalition government proposals in 2011 stated that s 36 would be subject to a 20-year exemption period. How effectively publication schemes address such matters relating to s 36 will be a true barometer of how productive the publication schemes will be of greater openness in our public life. Attention should also be drawn to the revised code of practice and register on public consultation between government departments and those affected by decisions of government (see para 1.306 below). 1.191  FS50093255: para 37 has a website for list of the then qualified persons for s 36:1 Chief Constable of Surrey Police v IC EA/2010/0081 ruled that a PA must

94  Chapter 1 keep a good record of the ‘opinion’ of a QP. R  Salmon v IC and King’s College Cambridge EA/2007/0135 deals with the situation where there is no ‘qualified person’ for s  36 exemption – s  36 is not thereby engaged. However, the fact that a PA (King’s College Cambridge) is largely dependent on private funding does not diminish the nature of its obligations under FOIA. FS50096973 was a request to DfES for the list of schools suitable for City Academy status. Section 36 was properly invoked to avoid damage to a ‘flagship education programme’. Sponsors would be reluctant to come forward of the information was released. The PI favoured non-disclosure. In relation to a QP’s opinion the IC ruled that ‘If the opinion is reasonable, the IC should not under s 36 substitute his own view for that of the qualified person. Nor should the Tribunal’ (para 13). Hogan v IC EA/2005/0026 saw the IT disagree with the IC’s test for ‘reasonable decision’ of QP under s 36. The tribunal was unhappy that the IC seemed to repeat the test of unreasonableness in judicial review (the Wednesbury test) rather than objective reasonableness which is required by the section. In University of Central Lancashire v IC and David Colquhoun EA/2009/0034, Professor Colquhoun made a request for copies of the course materials for the University’s BSc in homeopathy. The issue of homeopathy training was the subject of significant academic and public debate; Colquhoun thought that the materials might inform that debate. During the course of the IC’s investigations the University’s Vice-Chancellor issued a certificate under FOIA  2000, s  36(2)(c), claiming that disclosure would or would be likely to prejudice the effective conduct of public affairs, namely the administration of the University. The IC found that this exemption did not apply. As regards the public interest on this point, the University’s main argument was that disclosure of course materials in general would hinder innovation in their creation; this was rejected by the tribunal. The tribunal then moved on to consider s 36. The exemption was not made out because there was no evidence that it was a reasonable opinion reasonably arrived at. The University claimed that there would be disruption and consequent expense resulting from a flood of similar claims prompted by disclosure of the information; the tribunal thought that this conclusion was tenuous. The evidence put forward to support a reasonable procedure for gathering the opinion was also inadequate; it consisted of a short email which tacitly acknowledged that the claim was speculative. Disclosure was ordered. FS50108125 concerned a request about animal experiments in which it was alleged mice had been deprived of water for two days. If correct, this would constitute an infringement of experiment licensing conditions. Various exemptions were invoked as well as s 36. Names and addresses were not supplied and this was not challenged. The IC discussed s 36 and inspectors’ inhibitions. Under s 36, the PI favoured an anonymous disclosure. Para 62 et seq discusses ‘reasonable opinion’ of ‘qualified persons’ under s 36 – it must be an objective decision objectively arrived at. Section 36 did not favour non-disclosure but some information was protected under other sections. Some important general points are contained in FS50072316 which concerned Iraq and concerned the unpublished early draft of Iraq’s WMD dossier published on 24  September 2002 which was requested from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). Section 36(2)(b) was invoked. The document had been sent to the Hutton inquiry but had not been subject to discussion or placed in the inquiry report’s annex. The FCO took three months to conduct an internal review of a FOI

The freedom of information legislation   95 appeal (IC’s good practice guide states it should take 20 working days, extendable to 40). Because of oversight in the IC’s office there was a delay of four months before investigation commenced. The FCO wanted the IC (or his official) with ‘suitable vetting’ to examine the dossier in the FCO. This had been a point of contention within government where sensitive documents were concerned: they should not leave the department. Eventually the document was sent to the IC at his office. The IC ruled that s 36 was wrongly invoked and material ordered to be disclosed. This DN was appealed in EA 2007/0047 and the judgment delivered in January 2008 ordering disclosure subject to a minor redaction. The tribunal ruled that there was no presumption in favour of maintaining the exemption under s  36(2) as counsel for FCO had argued. The qualified person’s opinion was not presented to the tribunal and opinions should be so presented, the tribunal believed so their reasonableness may be assessed. Civil servants must expect increased openness post-FOIA and have to come to terms with the socalled ‘chilling effect’ generated by that Act. Factors in favour of maintaining exemption did not, at the date when disclosure was refused, outweigh the PI in disclosure. The information possessed no great intrinsic value but disclosure would enhance the ‘transparency process’ of the drafting process in what was a very sensitive matter (and, one may add, on which a war was based – and see FS50098388 and FS50098388). Section 36(2) and (7) are absolute in relation to requests for the names and salaries of MPs’ staff and salaries (but s 40 could be considered (ch  2) (FS50073128)). Information on an inquiry into leaks at the Home Office was correctly rejected under s  36(3) (FS50226603). Home Office and Ministry of Justice v IC EA/2008/0062 contains a full discussion on the public interest factors in s 36 exemptions. The High Court refused to interfere with the balancing exercise of the tribunal which ruled that the PI favoured disclosure of ‘meta data’ information (that is information generated by a request).2 Whilst the Tribunal found that the s 36 exemption was engaged, they criticised the IC’s approach to this issue; the IC had not seen the submissions to ministers or the ministers’ responses. In McIntyre v ICO and MOD EA/2007/0068, the tribunal made clear that it was ‘unsafe’ for the IC to conclude that s  36 was engaged without seeing those submissions; any other approach would make it difficult to consider whether that ‘opinion was reasonable in substance and reasonably arrived at’. In addition, as there was no evidence as to which limb of prejudice the opinion had related (inhibit/prejudice), the lower threshold of prejudice would be adopted. This is significant because the higher threshold requires greater weight to the inherent public interest in the exemption being claimed. www.foi.gov.uk/guidance/exguide/sec36/annex-d.htm. Home Office and MoJ v IC [2009] EWHC 1611 (Admin).

1 2

1.192  Section 36(2)(b) was considered in Export Credit Guarantees Department v IC and Campaign Against Arms Trade EA/2009/0021 (see also E  Malnick v IC EA/2016/0055 and L  Serewicz v IC EA/2015/0258). The Export Credit Guarantees Department (ECGD) is a department which reports to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills. It provides guarantees and insurance for UK exporters and banks. The request for information related to an export

96  Chapter 1 agreement between Saudi Arabia and the UK government for the export of arms supplied by BAE; the Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) wanted a copy of the ECGD risk committee’s assessment of the Saudi deal. The ECGD refused on the basis of inter alia s 36(2)(b). The information covered under that section was to be disclosed because, whilst s 36(2)(b) was engaged, the public interest favoured disclosure. The central issue before the tribunal was whether the public interest test in respect of the latter exemption had been properly considered. The tribunal was encouraged by the ECGD to accept the evidence of the civil servants without reservation; that they were best placed to determine the likely effect of disclosure. The tribunal rejected this argument outright, particularly considering the case of Home Office and Ministry of Justice v IC  [2009]  EWHC  1611. The ECGD submitted that the tribunal should take into account the Court of Appeal’s ruling in The Office of Communications v IC [2009] EWCA Civ 90, that there should be an aggregation of public interest factors. The ECGD submitted that this principle required the tribunal to consider all relevant public interest factors even where another potentially relevant exemption has not been asserted. The tribunal did not read the case as requiring this; the exemption claimed was s 36(2)(b) and the public interest factors to be considered were only those which were relevant for that specific exemption. The ECGD submitted that the IC had not given sufficient weight to the opinion of the qualified person when balancing the public interest; in fact the IC had not even seen the opinion. The tribunal agreed and found that the IC had failed to acknowledge the relevance of that opinion in balancing the public interest and that in future cases involving the exemption, it would be crucial for the IC to have a copy of the opinion. The public interest factors submitted in favour of maintaining the exemption were as follows: (a) free and frank exchange of views for the purpose of deliberation; (b) free and frank provision of advice to Ministers by public officials so as to fully inform; (c) accurate and efficient recording of meetings about sensitive and significant matters; (d) proper assessment of risk in order to prevent unacceptable financial loss to the taxpayer. The tribunal found that these public interest factors were overstated, particularly the one as to the ‘chilling effect’, which one witness had described in this case as the ‘freezing effect’. In fact, it was thought that disclosure might improve reasoning and recording of meetings; the tribunal appeared to think that the ‘chilling effect’ argument had been overused and overstated since the introduction of FOIA. The factors in favour of disclosure were: (a) the information concerned the sale of military equipment to a county located in an area of conflict and to a regime accused of human rights violation – this was a cause for significant public concern; (b) a substantial sum of public money was at risk – transparency was needed; (c) it is beneficial if the public has a clear understanding of the decision-making process when a policy decision is being promoted or defended; (d) increased transparency may improve future decision-making; (e) there was a continuing public interest in the Saudi–UK agreement. The tribunal decided that the public interest favoured disclosure. In FS50111678 the complainant requested the disclosure of correspondence between the Prime Minister and Lord Birt (his former strategy advisor). The CO refused disclosure initially under s 35 (1)(a), but subsequently under s 36 (2) (b). The Minister for the Cabinet Office as qualified person gave his opinion, which was accepted as reasonable by the Commissioner. The public interest

The freedom of information legislation   97 favoured maintenance of the exemption. The Commissioner recognised that there was a public interest in transparency of governmental affairs, especially considering the debate on the role of special advisors, particularly Lord Birt, but the information withheld was not of such significance that it would contribute to the debate. However the IC considered it appropriate to clarify that Lord Birt did play an informal role in relation to the appointment of senior staff – that fact should have been disclosed. In FS50150598 the IC believed that as far as the advice to a minister was concerned, it was thought that the exemption would apply, because the release of such information would be likely to inhibit such candid and all-encompassing advice being supplied to ministers in the future and would make officials less likely to engage in written discussions of such controversial issues. However, the Commissioner in this case considered that the exemption did not outweigh the public interest in disclosure. FS50086128 was a request to the CO for information on various dates on which Prime Minister Blair met or had formal conversations with Rupert Murdoch. Sections 36(2)(b) (i) and (2)(c) were invoked. The IC believed that dates of official meetings should be disclosed. Disclosure will not put, be further believed, too much pressure on the PM’s diary. The PI favoured disclosure. In this case as in many breaches of FOIA 2000, s 17 were recorded. 1.193  The request in FS50234513 concerned invocation of FOIA  2000, s  36(2)(b)ii and involved the London Borough of Haringey. The complainant requested a copy of the first serious case review (‘SCR’) dated October 2008 into the death of Peter Connelly (formerly known as ‘Baby P’) – a notorious case. The London Borough of Haringey applied the exemptions under s 36(2)(b)(ii) and (2) (c); its conclusions were that the public interest in maintaining both exemptions outweighed the public interest in disclosing the information. The Commissioner investigated and decided that the exemption under s  36(2)(b)(ii) was engaged and that the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighed the public interest in disclosing the information in all the circumstances of the case. Alasdair Roberts v IC and the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills EA/2009/0035 concerned the s  36(2)(c) exemption. Professor Roberts made a request for information to the then Department of Trade and Industry. He sought certain data held on a computer database/document management system called Matrix. He restricted his request to documents and folders created within one specified week in December 2004; he asked for the document reference number and the name of the person who appeared to have written it. He wanted the information in order to carry out some analytical research into the workflows within the department. The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (DBIS) refused disclosure, citing s 40, and the internal review confirmed that disclosure would breach the first data protection principle. The appellant complained to the IC, who was criticised by the tribunal for the inordinate delay in dealing with the complaint. During the IC’s investigation, DBIS sought to rely on s 36 and obtained the relevant statement from the qualified person. The IC decided that s  36(2)(c) applied and that the information was exempt from disclosure. The main ground for appeal was that DBIS had failed to establish that the prejudice to public affairs was more than a hypothetical possibility, or that it was real, actual and of substance. However, the tribunal noticed a discrepancy between

98  Chapter 1 the facts of the case and the claiming of the exemption. Due to the wording of s 36, a public authority cannot rely on the relevant statement if it is not made at the time of initial refusal; an opinion formed later cannot justify refusal because the information was not exempt at the time when the challenged decision not to release it was made. ‘An opinion formed by a qualified person after the public authority had concluded the process of dealing with the request cannot form part of the Information Commissioner’s investigation, or decision’; it was not an issue of late claiming, but of inappropriate claiming. In coming to this conclusion the IT relied on The Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform v ICO and Friends of the Earth EA/2007/0072; McIntyre v ICO and MOD EA/2007/0068; and MOD  v ICO and R  Evans EA/2006/0027. The tribunal nevertheless considered the application of the exemption and found that the evidence for the reasonableness of the opinion was inadequate, but that the IC had rightly decided that the public interest would have favoured maintenance of the exemption. As a general rule the PI in maintaining an exemption diminishes over time (R Evans v IC and MoD EA/2006/0064 concerning ministerial/arms lobbyists meetings). Section 36(2)(b)(i) was invoked with other exemptions. The case examines the question of hearing of fresh evidence by the tribunal in respect of determining the PI under s 36. The timing of grounds for claiming an exemption is that at the time of refusal, not the tribunal hearing (paras 22–23). The PI is that as assessed at the time of request. The tribunal controversially ruled that it cannot hear fresh evidence but this must be seen in the light of subsequent rulings (paras 1.231–1.233 below). The witnesses were not able to show evidence of inhibitory effects of disclosure. ‘Where the information is in a raw unconsidered form the PI in maintaining the exemption is likely to diminish more slowly than where the information is in a finished considered form’ (para 41). The tribunal found that fear of inhibition on lobbyists from disclosure was overstated. In relation to notes of meetings and telephone conversations the exemptions were maintained on PI grounds because these were unfinished and incomplete. In relation to ‘finished’ background notes, there was no such inhibition and the PI favoured disclosure. However, another exemption (s 40) favoured non-disclosure (decided subsequently) (and see MoD v IC & R Evans EA/2006/0027 concerning disclosure of a complete copy of the 2004 edition of the Directory of the Defence Export Services Organisation (DESO). DESO assists in the export of UK military equipment. Information about DESO was limited to the MoD and security-cleared members of the UK defence industry. The IC emphasised the need for transparency in the defence industry/MoD relations. MoD claimed that transparency was satisfied by publication of redacted copy and names of senior MoD officials. This involved disclosure of senior officials’ identities and those who appear in the Diplomatic Service List. It would not cover junior rankings unless their names were published in, eg, the Civil Service Yearbook. The tribunal, which substituted the DN but otherwise upheld disclosure, emphasised that this is a ‘one-off decision and does not set a precedent’. The ‘anonymity of civil servants’ is not an ‘immutable principle’ and civil servants have to be made accountable. The requirements of the DPA 1998 were satisfied (ch 2). ‘The tribunal is not minded, however, to sanction the disclosure of all telephone and email details, save for those in the Civil Service Yearbook’ and otherwise kept details of officials below level B2 anonymous (para 88).

The freedom of information legislation   99 In FS50315973, a request to Kingston University for all staff workplace email addresses was rightly refused under s  36(2)(c) (and likewise Manchester University: FS50318502). Disclosure of information about discussions between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats in May 2010 were rightly refused by the CO under s  36(2): FS50350899. An interesting appeal against refusal was allowed on PI grounds in I Helstrip v IC EA/2012/0201 in relation to compensation payments concerning HS2 (and also A  Bousfield v IC EA/2012/0092 on PI disclosure on children’s bereavement centre at Alder Hey hospital; see AHRC v IC EA/2012/0067).

(xvi)  communications with her majesty, etc1

1.194  This is an absolute exemption in relation to s 37(1)(a) to (ac). Information is exempt information if it relates to communications with Her Majesty, other members of the royal family or royal household or the conferring by the Crown of any honour or dignity (FOIA  2000, s  37) (see FS50441355 on honours and dignity and J  Loch v IC & Ministry of Justice EA/2016/0223 6/08/2018). This exemption featured in the litigation involving Prince Charles’ correspondence with Ministers (below). The judgment of the Supreme Court is the most famous decision on s  37 but this hearing concentrated on the veto issued the Attorney General (para 1.195 below). The duty to confirm or deny is excluded in relation to exempt information under s  37(1). A  NCND response may be made and details differ in its operation in relation to absolute and qualified exemptions. Paragraph  1.105 above describes how the communications with Her Majesty and first and second heirs to the throne are covered by an absolute exemption under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, ss  46, 52(2) and Sch  7(3), and SI  2011/46, art  3(b)(i) (with art  4). The coalition government announced that the life span of the exemption will be reduced from 30 to 20 years, or five years after the death of the relevant member of the royal family, whichever is later. Additional protection for the royal family was announced in January 2011 to protect ‘longstanding conventions surrounding the monarchy and its records’ including the monarch’s right to counsel, encourage and warn her government and the heir to the throne’s right to be instructed in the business of government in preparation for their future role as monarch. The extension of the exemption does not refer to their spouses. Under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2011, the exemptions as reformed will apply to Northern Ireland bodies. Communications outside the absolute exemption are subject to qualified exemption. ‘Communications’ is given a broad interpretation to cover information or documents deriving from communications such as royal wills (Brown v IC EA/2011/0002). The Public Administration Committee of the House of Commons has reported on the honours system.2 https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1194/communications_with_her_ majesty_and_the_awarding_of_honours.pdf. 2 HC  212 (2003–04)  A  Matter of Honour. See: http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/Governmentcitizens andrights/UKgovernment/Honoursawardsandmedals/TheUKHonourssystem/index.htm. 1

100  Chapter 1 1.195  There has been a large number of requests for information about Prince Charles’ correspondence with ministers. These have been refused although disclosures have been made of Prince’s Trust correspondence and also disclosures of the Prince’s correspondence have been ordered in the course of litigation. The refusal to disclose information from correspondence has been the subject of an appeal to the tribunal: FS50119029 House of Lords Appointments Commission; FS50088853 HM Treasury.1 The Guardian ran a series on the hitherto secret de facto veto of the Prince of Wales on legislation affecting his interests; see the Guardian, 31 October 2011. See paras 3.13–3.14. on the application of the EIRs to the Duchy of Cornwall’s estates, ie the Prince of Wales. In Rob Evans v IC2 a journalist requested the correspondence from Prince Charles to government departments and which was made before the absolute exemptions took effect. Requests were made under FOIA and the EIRs. The IC rejected the case for disclosure and, because of the status of the source of the correspondence, the case was transferred on appeal to the Upper Tribunal. The tribunal, chaired by a High Court judge, ruled in favour of disclosure of advocacy correspondence, ie  where the Prince was pressing for a particular official reaction. The appeal was decided after six days of hearing which was notable for the detailed level of analysis of constitutional conventions involving a relationship between a future monarch and officials and the educative (preparatory) role of the latter. The advocacy correspondence had to be disclosed as that was in the PI. It was to be distinguished from official relationships and correspondence which sought to prepare the prince for his future role as monarch and where there was a strong PI in confidentiality. Publication of advocacy correspondence would assist in focusing attention on the educative role. The judgment of the tribunal was effectively halted with the issue by the Attorney General of a veto under s 53 and a veto also under the EIR (para 3.4 below). We shall see how this was challenged by the journalist on a judicial review, leading to the Supreme Court’s majority judgment ruling that the veto was invalid (see para 1.242 below). The tribunal (at para 123) listed the factors involved in assessing the PI: ‘Factors in favour of disclosure IC(1) governmental accountability and transparency; IC(2) the increased understanding of the interaction between government and monarchy; IC(3) a public understanding of the influence, if any, of Prince Charles on matters of public policy; IC(4) a particular significance in the light of media stories focusing on Prince Charles’s alleged inappropriate interference/lobbying; IC(5) furthering the public debate regarding the constitutional role of the monarchy and, in particular, the heir to the throne; and IC(6) informing the broader debate surrounding constitutional reform. Factors against disclosure IC(7) potential to undermine the operation of the education convention;

The freedom of information legislation   101 IC(8) an inherent and weighty public interest in the maintenance of confidences; IC(9) potential to undermine Prince Charles’s perceived political neutrality; IC(10) interference with Prince Charles’s right to respect for private life under Article 8; and IC(11) a resultant chilling effect on the frankness of communication between Prince Charles and government ministers.’ It should be noted that successful requests have been made for disclosure of unpublished guidance on the role of the monarch and the Duchy of Lancaster and consultations with Her Majesty on preparation of Bills affecting her interests (FS50425063 21/08/12). The exemption was unsuccessfully claimed under s 42. The question of members of the royal family as holders of environmental information has also been raised under the Environmental Information Regulations (see paras 3.13–3.14). http://www.justice.gov.uk/docs/foi-exemption-s38.pdf. See FS50088853 under s  40 below and FS50142320 involving the CO and requests about the Princess of Wales. 2 [2012]  UKUT  313 (AAC). Note [2015]  UKUT  303 (AAC) with the Annex of disclosed documents and the reasons for disclosure in June 2015. Exemptions under ss 39, 40 and 41 were also involved. The Supreme Court judgment is [2015] UKSC 21. 1

(xvii)  health and safety1

1.196  Under s  38(1) of the FOIA  2000, information is exempt information if its disclosure would, or would be likely to, endanger2 the physical or mental health of any individual or endanger the safety of any individual. The duty to confirm or deny does not arise if, or to the extent that, compliance with s 1(1) (a) would, or would be likely to, have either of the effects mentioned above (see FS50521978). https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1624339/health-and-safety-section-38foia.pdf. 2 PETA v ICO EA/2009/0076: ‘endanger’ and ‘prejudice’ are interchangeable for the purposes of s 38. 1

1.197 In People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals Europe v IC and University of Oxford EA/2009/0076, PETA requested information from Oxford in August 2007 about scientific experiments carried out on a macaque named Felix which had appeared in a BBC television documentary. The requests related to the licence held by Professor Aziz of Oxford. The information sought was: (a) the intended duration of the Felix project; (b) the scientific background of the work, including references; (c) the anticipated benefits; (d) detailed work plan; (e) how the number of animals would be kept to a minimum; (f) a list of each protocol to be applied to Felix under the licence. Other information was requested as to which of the procedures specified in the licence had been used and when. Further, PETA wanted information as to Felix’s health status throughout and details of veterinary care. Oxford responded by disclosing some information, particularly in relation to (b)–(f) above, but claimed that

102  Chapter 1 the remaining information was exempt under s 38. The IC, in the course of his investigation, identified some further information which could be disclosed, but otherwise found that s 38 was engaged and that the public interest lay in withholding the information. PETA appealed on the grounds that: (a) s 38 was not engaged; and (b) if it was engaged, the public interest lay with disclosure. As regards the scope of the request, the tribunal found that Oxford and the IC were entitled to confine the scope of the request to procedures which had actually been performed on Felix, as opposed to procedures which were permitted under the terms of the licence. When interpreting s  38, the FTT followed the approach in Hogan and Oxford City Council v IC EA/2005/0026 and EA/2005/0030; it looked at: (a) the applicable interest; (b) the nature of the endangerment; (c) the causal relationship; (d) the de minimis threshold of endangerment which is ‘real, actual or of substance’. Oxford relied only upon the ’would be likely to endanger’ limb of s 38 and PETA argued that for it to be engaged, Oxford would have to provide evidence of any possible mental health problems from a psychiatrist. The tribunal rejected this contention; the test was whether the physical threat was sufficient that on the balance of probabilities the effect upon mental health would be more than mere stress or worry. The danger to Professor Aziz and his colleagues was very serious. Many attacks had already been carried out by activists, including death threats and in one instance a letter bomb. The risk of endangerment would be increased by disclosure and therefore s  38 was engaged. The public interest factors in favour of disclosure were: (a) transparency in the way research is conducted; (b) transparency in the way the public were kept informed; (c) transparency in open public debate; (d) transparency in the regulatory system. However, the tribunal found that the public interest in disclosure was limited by the fact that: (a) there was a mismatch between the scope of the request and the contents of the other protocols on the licence; (b) the request related only to a single project licence; (c) information had already been given in the television programme and substantial other information was in the public domain. The risk of escalation of the campaign of the activists from distortion and an increased pool of identifiable targets tipped the balance in favour of nondisclosure (see FS50082472 where s  38 was successfully invoked to protect the names of individuals, companies and academic institutions holding licences to conduct scientific research on animals was refused under s 38. The PI under s  38 favoured non-disclosure. In addition, s  40 also engaged and allowed exemption (ch  2). Section 38 has also been successfully used where information was sought about an anti-fascist organisation held by a local authority (FS50077877) and, unconvincingly, in a case concerning revelation of information on paid informers relating to Irish secret societies at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries (Keane v IC [2016] UKUT 0461 (AAC)). In Greg Callous v IC EA/2013/0159 it was decided that the names of officials holding various roles on behalf of police forces under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 were exempt under s  38. There was a risk of them being approached by criminals intent on corruptly undermining the Act, although there was less evidence that violence was such a risk. Disclosure of police photos of a murder victim may not be appropriate under s  38 ‘to the whole world’ (FS50520884).

The freedom of information legislation   103 (xviii)  environmental information1

1.198  In ch 3 there is a detailed examination of the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (EIR 2004) together with other access to information provisions relating to the environment (see below). Information is exempt if it has to be disclosed to the public under regulations made under s 74 of the FOIA 2000, or it would be so obliged but for any exemption within the regulations (s 39). Section 74 concerns the ‘Aarhus’ Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters which has now been the subject of an EC  Directive which was to be implemented into domestic law of member states by 14  February 2005.2 The information provisions are in Art 4 of the Convention together with arts 3 and 9 which concern access to justice. Articles 6, 7 and 8 deal with public participation. The Secretary of State may implement the information provisions by regulations made under s  74(4) and this has been done. Regulations provide for charges to be made to make information available; provide that the obligation to make information available is to apply notwithstanding any contrary rule of law; and may make provision for the publication by the Secretary of State of a code of guidance. The EIR 2004 are examined in detail in ch 3. The Regulations use the framework of the FOIA 2000 in relation to the IC, tribunals and so on, although it constitutes a separate regime. The ICO guidance states that PAs will need to take a different approach in mixed FOIA/EIR requests in relation to excessive costs, vexatious and unreasonable requests.3 https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1043419/exemption-for-environmentalinformation-section-39.pdf. 2 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters Cm 4736 June 2000. See EP and Council Directive 2003/4/EC OJ L 41/26 (14/2/2003). 3 See https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1615/manifestly-unreasonablerequests.pdf and https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1192/calculating_costs_ foia_eir_guidance.pdf. 1

1.199  It should be noted at this stage that, although a requester for information may specify that information is requested under the EIR 2004, the PA is under an obligation to establish which information regime is relevant: FOIA  2000, DPA 1998 or the EIR 2004. The latter covers any ‘environmental information’ – a term which is very broadly defined (see para 3.9 below). The relevant case law is examined in ch 3.

(xix)  personal information1

1.200  This is an absolute exemption in relation to information covered by s 40(1), and s 40(2) in relation to the first condition in s 40(3A). Section 40 of the FOIA  2000 concerns personal information. The provisions relating to personal data are treated in greater detail in ch  2. Basically, the FOIA 2000 makes all personal information on data subjects exempt under the FOIA 2000 where they are applying to see the information about themselves.

104  Chapter 1 Applications in such cases are to be made under the DPA 2018 the provisions of which will dictate the outcome. Information is also exempt where it constitutes personal data on another person and the applicant is not the data subject of that information and it satisfies one of three conditions. The first condition (s 40(3A)) is that any disclosure of information which falls within the definition of personal data in the DPA 2018 to a member of the public ‘otherwise than under this Act’ would contravene any of the data protection principles (DPP) which govern the holding and processing of personal data, or would do so if the exemption in section 24(1) of the Data Protection Act 2018 (manual unstructured data held by public authorities) were disregarded. The DPP are those set out in art 5 of the GDPR (with the omission of PA legitimate interests gateway in art 6 GDPR second sub-paragraph) and s 34(1) of the DPA 2018. In other words, the effect of s  24(1) of the DPA – which exempts publicly held unstructured data from virtually all the data protection principles – is disregarded for these purposes.2 Information is also exempt (the second condition, s  40(3B)) if the disclosure of the information to a member of the public otherwise than under this Act would contravene art  21 of the GDPR (general processing: right to object to processing). The third condition (s 40(4A)) is (a) on a request under art 15(1) of the GDPR (general processing: right of access by the data subject) for access to personal data, the information would be withheld in reliance on a provision concerning exemptions made by or under section 15, 16 or 26 of, or Schedule 2, 3 or 4 to, the Data Protection Act 2018, or (b) on a request under section 45(1) (b) of that Act (law enforcement processing: right of access by the data subject), the information would be withheld in reliance on subsection (4) of that section. https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1213/personal-information-section40-and-regulation-13-foia-and-eir-guidance.pdf; https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/ documents/1179/access_to_information_held_in_complaint_files.pdf; https://ico.org.uk/media/ for-organisations/documents/1201/information_exempt_from_the_subject_access_right_and_ regulation_foi_eir.pdf; https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1206/neither_ confirm_nor_deny_in_relation_to_personal_data_and_regulation_foi_eir.pdf; https://ico.org. uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1187/section_40_requests_for_personal_data_about_ employees.pdf. 2 Section 33A(1) of the DPA 1998 (precursor of s 24 of the 2018 Act) was added by the FOIA 2000 and basically brings a wider range of non-automated personal information into the DPA 1998 but exempts it from most of the 1998 Act’s data protection principles (see ch 2 below). The effect is that breaches of the data protection principles are relevant for such disclosures by virtue of the FOIA 2000 but, under the DPA 1998, they would not apply to such information. No-one can pretend these provisions and the new additions are easy! 1

1.201  The point has been made that an official’s name is ‘personal data’ under the DPA  1998 which may well result in a reluctance to name officials as the authors of official documents or who were in attendance at meetings if this could breach the DPA 1998. The policy making exemption would also be likely to be applicable in this case and many cases involve a combination of s 40 and other exemptions. The data protection aspects could be of wide application. A similar problem might attend the revelation eg of the identity of individuals acting on behalf of representative bodies or that of sole traders where safety concerns have been in issue and they are identified from documents. A way around this problem will not be possible where the public authority was not willing or able to act accordingly under eg the DPA 2018, Sched 1 Part 2, the public interest

The freedom of information legislation   105 disclosures (such as para  6).1 The balance between data protection and access to information has also caused difficulties in relation to the EU provisions (see ch 5). That disclosure was ‘necessary for the exercise of any functions of the Crown …’. FOI Campaign Briefing 5, 25 October 2000. This point is fully dealt with in ch 2.

1

1.202  The duty to confirm or deny does not arise in relation to exempt information under s  40(1) or disclosures having the effect specified above in relation to breaches of data protection principles etc but for the effect of s 22(1). In other words although the data protection principles do not apply to the data in a general sense, they are relevant if disclosure would involve their breach as expressed in the section. The authority is also free from the duty to confirm or deny where it would breach specified provisions of art 21 of the GDPR or s 43(4) of the DPA 2018.1 Section 40 provides an absolute exemption when it is covered by s 40(1), or s 40(2) so far as relating to cases where the first condition referred to in that subsection (s 40(3A)) is satisfied. Other information under s 40(3B) and (4A) (the DPA  2018 amendments) is only protected by a qualified exemption. The case law on this exemption is more conveniently dealt with in ch 2 (paras 2.81 et seq). This concerns the data subject’s right to be informed of whether personal data about them are being processed and law enforcement data.

1

(xx)  information protected by a legal obligation of confidence1

1.203  This is an absolute exemption. Information is exempt information if it was obtained by a public authority from any other person (including another public authority) (FOIA  2000, s  81 excludes this exemption between government departments) and the disclosure of the information to the public (otherwise than under this Act) by the public authority holding it would constitute a breach of confidence actionable by that other person (s 41). ‘Actionable’ means a case that would be likely to succeed, ie  a strong prima facie case.2 This only covers information protected by the law of confidentiality, not that simply stamped ‘confidential’ which may not be confidential as a matter of law (see paras 4.312 et seq below for a discussion of the law of confidentiality). The information must possess the necessary quality of ‘confidentiality’ and the belief of the donor must be reasonably based, ie its release would be damaging to his or her interests and not trivial – the law of confidentiality does not protect trivia. When a donor or supplier of information simply stamps ‘confidential’ on the information supplied, or indicates in some other fashion that it is confidential, that may be persuasive and advisable, but it is not conclusive.3 If a contract specifies that information is to be treated as confidential this is a matter to be determined under the law of contract as a breach of contract if it is disclosed without authorisation. Where, however, the information apart from the contract would not be treated by the courts as ‘confidential’ then arguably s  41 would not exempt the information which lacks a necessary component of confidentiality. Otherwise parties would be

106  Chapter 1 free to label all forms of information as confidential and could by-pass these statutory provisions on access. The first version of the s 45 code spelt out that confidentiality clauses should only be used ‘exceptionally’ (see the s  45 Code advice: paras 1.282 et seq below). The code now advises parties to be mindful of duties within the Act. If ‘confidential’ under the law of confidentiality, there may still be a public interest defence in disclosure under common law, not under the statute. This removes any action that the party providing the information may have. It also removes the ‘confidentiality’ of the material and therefore this exemption will not apply in such circumstances. The case law shows that the onus of establishing the public interest under the law of confidentiality lies on the person who asserts that interest, ie  the person who has disclosed or wishes to disclose the information if they were sued or, under FOIA  2000, the person applying to see the information. FS50105717 was a request to the Commission for Professional and Public Involvement in Health for an internal report about an investigation into the relationship between some NHS Patient Forum members and support organisations. The IC ordered disclosure. Much of the information including names was publicly available the IC found. The IC made the important point that in the PI of confidentiality at common law, the burden of establishing the PI, unlike the PI test under FOIA, is on the applicant for the information seeking to overcome a claim of confidence properly raised. The IC and tribunal case law also emphasise that the information has to come from another party which sometimes produces complications. For instance, FS50088977 involved a request for a copy of an ACAS agreement leading to reinstatement of a senior police officer, Ali Dizaei. Section 41 was not breached because the information was not provided to the PA by a third party – it was not ‘obtained from a third party’. This follows the wording of the section and is narrower than the common law which will protect information generated by employees of the PA which is confidential – disclosure would be detrimental and there is a reasonable expectation in the confidor that information will be treated as confidential. In similar vein, FS50065053 featured a request for information about a grievance procedure and settlement of legal claims against employees. The amounts received in settlement were not received from a third party and so s 41 did not cover these. (See also Department of Health v IC & Mr Stimson EA/2008/0018 and Zacharides v Information Commissioner EA/2010/0162.) The provision does not protect information which has come to a government department from another government department by virtue of s  81(2)(a), and (2)(b) in relation to NI departments. There is no similar provision in relation to other PAs. Guidance is available on this exemption from the ICO.4 https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1432163/information-provided-inconfidence-section-41.pdf. 2 Hansard vol 619 cols 175–176. 3 R G Toulson and C M Phipps Confidentiality, 2nd ed (2006). 4 https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1432163/information-provided-inconfidence-section-41.pdf; http://www.justice.gov.uk/docs/foi-exemption-s41.pdf, p 2. 1

1.204  The duty to confirm or deny does not arise if, or to the extent that, the confirmation or denial that would have to be given to comply with s 1(1)(a) would (apart from this Act) constitute an actionable breach of confidence.

The freedom of information legislation   107 1.205  FS50111328 involved a request for information about ministerial declarations of interest under the ministerial code. Some information was disclosed but some was protected under s 41.This had been a contentious issue under the 1994 code on access. In Higher Education Funding Council for England v IC and Guardian News and Media Ltd EA/2009/0036 the request was for information relating to the state of buildings at the Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) that contributed to a database of information about the management of land and buildings under their control. The information would be important for potential students and their choice of HEI. The Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) refused disclosure on the basis that the third parties expected information would be treated with confidence and therefore it was exempt under FOIA 2000, s 41. The IC decided that the exemption was not engaged because he did not believe that the HEIs would suffer any detriment if the information were to be disclosed; there would be no cause of action for breach of confidence as required by s 41. On appeal the IC argued that ‘actionable’ meant that a claim for breach of confidence would succeed on the balance of probabilities. HEFCE argued that the threshold was ‘properly arguable’. The tribunal reasoned that: (a) the point was novel and that a consideration of previous tribunal decisions was not helpful; (b) the parliamentary intention, with reference to Hansard, clearly favoured the IC’s position; (c) departmental guidance, issue by the MoJ, stated that a ‘breach of confidence will only be actionable if a person could bring a legal action and be successful’. The tribunal found that it was for HEFCE to demonstrate that disclosure would expose it to the risk of a breach of confidence, which, on the balance of probabilities, would succeed. The tribunal therefore had to determine whether any breach of confidence might be actionable. The information was thought to have the necessary quality of confidence, because there would be a detriment in disclosure. There was potential detriment: (a) disclosure could damage the reputation of the HEIs which had confided the information, with a subsequent effect on their ability to recruit staff and students; (b) HEIs would not submit data, or would submit less extensive data, with the consequence that all HEIs would suffer from a reduction in the value of an important benchmarking tool. However, the tribunal, using the test in HRH Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1776, found that HEFCE would clearly be able to rely on the public interest defence against any HEI minded to bring an action for breach of confidence. It was sceptical as to whether HEIs would withdraw themselves from the data collection system; they had not done so as a result of FOIA coming into force, the alteration of the Code of Conduct or the disclosure of environmental information. Further, HEFCE has powers compulsorily to acquire information. The public interest factors in favour of disclosure were as follows: (a) the need to give information to those choosing a university; (b) disclosure of the proportion of HEIs which are in relatively poor repair; (c) disclosure of the proportion of HEIs not suitable for intended function; (d) the need to inform public debate on the adequacy of HEI funding; (e) concerns about the challenge of maintaining adequate investment in HEI estates. The tribunal ruled that the information should be disclosed (see also FS50123005). Section 41 has protected the identity of informants to Companies House (FS50152888). In Anderson v Parades Commission EA/2007/0103 letters from those complaining about the conduct of marchers in a parade in

108  Chapter 1 Northern Ireland were protected by s  41.1 However, the tribunal supported the IC’s service of information notices to obtain information possessed by a professional body (Health Professions Council) dealing with complaints against medical practitioners. The Council kept a register of practitioners and argued information from practitioners was received in confidence. The PA’s arguments that a new complaints procedure aimed at informal resolution did not carry much weight. FOIA 2000, s 59 also imposes criminal offence on the IC and his office for wrongful disclosure of information (without authorisation) the tribunal reminded the PA in its concerns about breaches through wrongful disclosure.2 See Tweed v NI Parades Commission [2006] UKHL 53. Health Professions Council (HPC) v IC EA/207/0116.

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1.206  FS50155387 (one of 36 such reports into various authorities) was a request for information on the commission payments made by investment managers on behalf of East Riding of Yorkshire Council (‘the Council’). The Council supplied the name of its investment manager. However, it claimed that the remainder of the information was exempt on the basis that the exemptions inter alia in s 41 applied. The IC decided that the exemption in s 41 was partially applicable; however, the confidentiality was overridden by a public interest defence inherent in the common law of confidence. A disclosure of a majority of the information would not be actionable in law. The exemption was not therefore engaged by this information. The IC’s decision was that the information should be disclosed to the complainant, with minor redactions. In FS50146982 the IC ruled that a duty of confidence owed to a patient survived the patient’s death (and see P Bluck v IC & Epsom etc NHS Trust EA/2006/0090). FS50101391 dealt with a request to the National Archives for information from the 1911 census. The IC ruled that a government undertaking that the information would be held in confidence for 100 years was not conclusive in itself. The undertaking would be relevant where information was ‘medical, concerned family relationships that would usually be kept secret, or was about very young children who were born in prison and whose birthplace is not recorded, or which is otherwise sensitive’. The IC did not believe that the information breached the criteria set out by the Law Lords in Campbell v MCN Ltd [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL); that there should be a reasonable expectation of privacy and a breach of that expectation. It was not all confidential, although some was. To be ‘actionable’ a PA did not have to identify a plaintiff. Each 1911 census case must be treated on its merits. The duty of confidence in much of the information had evaporated with the effluxion of time and even though it was protected by the Official Secrets Act 1889. The point here is that the information was imparted in circumstances of confidence (a promise of confidentiality was not enough (para  41)) and was protected by Official Secrets Act 1889, which does reinforce confidentiality, but in most cases the confidence will now have evaporated, the IC believed. The IC arguably made a very brave decision in this case. 1.207  The position on information having to come from a third party to be confidential under s 41 was also analysed in EA/2006/0014 (see also s 43 below). The tribunal maintained the position relating to information having to come

The freedom of information legislation   109 from a third party. At issue in the case was a request for the written agreement between Ryanair and Derry City Council for Ryanair to use Derry airport. As the ‘concluded’ contract was not information received from a third party, it could not be protected by s 41(1)(a). Commercial agreements often contain information received from the other party which they regard as confidential, either in the terms of a schedule specifying the information or information otherwise identified. The same principle applied to a fax between the parties which set out the main points of agreement (para 32(e)). The tribunal accepted that some information on technical details in a schedule may be confidential. Commercial terms would usually be regarded as confidential and confidentiality attached to Ryanair’s negotiations and contracts with airports (para  34(c)). Confidentiality did cover the commercially sensitive information under s  41. The common law test of public interest in confidentiality has already been explained. The PI supported disclosure of ‘key financial information in a contract, a redacted version of which had already been produced’ (para 35(i)). The public interest was also advanced by allowing the public to be informed of ‘serious criticism from a reliable source of a VFM evaluation’. The tribunal indicated further information which may be disclosed in an unpublished schedule if there was no appeal or an unsuccessful appeal. P  Bluck v IC and Epsom etc NHS  Trust EA/2006/0090 information was requested by the parents about their daughter’s death in hospital five years previously. The daughter’s spouse refused consent as he was entitled to. Confidentiality regarding deceased patients is still protected by s 41. Personal representatives can bring breach-of-confidence actions making a claim ‘actionable’. Care must be taken to ascertain that information not apparently coming from another party (eg a psychiatrist working within a PA to which a request has been made) is not actually based on information from a third party. 1.208  It was seen above how some constitutional conventions on royal correspondence may be protected by s  41 where they relate to the educative role in preparing a royal successor for monarchy but not where they related to advocacy for particular causes.1 R Evans v IC [2012] UKUT 313 (AAC).

1

(xxi)  legal professional privilege1

1.209  Information in respect of which a claim to legal professional privilege or, in Scotland, to confidentiality of communications could be maintained in legal proceedings is exempt information (FOIA 2000, s 42).2 ‘Communication’ is a document conveying information in any form. It may be a preparatory act to communication if prepared for litigation or legal advice. Judgments of the courts have supported the view that this privilege has assumed the status of a human right and has to be accorded resolute protection. It is not, however, an absolute exemption. In DBERR v D O’Brien and IC [2009] EWHC 164 QB the High Court ruled that, while the reasoning on PI under ss 35 and 36 was adequate and not challengeable on grounds of legality, insufficient weight had nonetheless been given to the importance of the privilege LPP in assessing the PI – ‘significant

110  Chapter 1 weight’ has to be given to this interest which the tribunal had failed in making the balance. In D O’Brien v IC and DBERR EA/2008/0011(second hearing) a differently constituted tribunal upheld the original ruling that the public interest under s  42 was in favour of disclosure and so ordered. While the decisions show that information may be incorrectly withheld under s  42 (FS50273866 concerning Ofwat) the decisions are well aware of the importance of maintaining this privilege (A Fisher v IC EA/2010/0044: s 42 rightly claimed for advice on compliance with ECHR; and see C Bellamy v IC and DTI (AP) EA/2005/0023 and Crawford v IC EA/2011/0145). An important statement of principle was made in HM Treasury v IC EA/2007/0054. This concerned the convention that opinions of law officers of the Crown are not to be disclosed, and nor is the fact that their advice was sought, without their consent. HM Treasury claimed this convention was an inbuilt immunity against disclosure. The IC disagreed. The information requested concerned an opinion on compatibility of the FSMA 2000 with the ECHR. Section 42(1) inter alia was invoked. There were numerous examples of breach of the convention by governments in the past including the Westland episode, the Scott report, the advice on the decision in Factortame3 and the war on Iraq (see above). The convention involving law officers’ advice is subject to FOIA. Neither the convention nor s 42 provided an absolute immunity although s 42 is a powerful exemption nonetheless (see Corderoy & Ahmed v IC, AG & CO  [2017]  UKUT  495 (AAC) at para  1.122 above). Once again, in Dr J Pugh MP v IC & MoD EA/2007/0055 the request concerned information on the response to two judgments of the ECJ on the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/246, and the Acquired Rights Directive. Section 42 was properly engaged and the tribunal undertook an animated discussion of the nature of the public interest in that section. The PI in preserving the privilege is very strong and is fully supported in the case law.4 However, it is not correct to say that there is an ‘inbuilt weight’ automatically attaching to qualified exemptions. ‘In the legal professional privilege exemption the weight of judicial opinion referred to in [the] cases gives the exemption itself greater weight and to that extent may be described as having an ‘inbuilt weight’ requiring equally weighty PIs in favour of disclosure’ (para  40). This evolves from the jurisprudence on the privilege not the words of the statute. But the exemption is not ‘exceptional’ as IC suggested. It is not thereby converted into an absolute exemption. The PI here was in favour of maintaining the exemption. Again in Martin George v IC and the House of Lords Appointments Commission (HOLAC) EA/2008/0035 there is a strong element of public interest inbuilt into the privilege itself. The tribunal was ‘satisfied that LPP has an inbuilt weight derived from its historical importance, it is a greater weight than that inherent in other exemptions to which the balancing test applies, but it can be countered by equally weighty arguments in favour of disclosure. If the scales are equal disclosure must take place’. In Mersey Tunnel Users Assoc v IT & Merseytravel EA/2007/0052 the tribunal raised a query of whether legal privilege is the same for all areas of law or whether the privilege may be nuanced. Would a criminal, child care or other context colour its application? https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1208/legal_professional_privilege_ exemption_s42.pdf. 2 For legal professional privilege, see para 11.89 below. 1

The freedom of information legislation   111 R v Secretary of State for Transport ex p Factortame [1990] 2 AC 85 concerning breaches of EC law by the UK, leading eventually to legal liability to pay damages to injured victims of the breach. 4 See R v Derby Magistrates’ Court ex p B [1995] 4 All ER 526 (HL). 3

1.210  In a House of Lords judgment on this subject area, Lord Scott believed that communications between Parliamentary draftsmen of legislation and Government lawyers in relation to draft legislation would be protected by ‘legal advice privilege’.1 It might appear a little strange that in relation to the law of the land, as opposed to a government interest under a law, that such a privilege might obtain. It is not absolute and would be subject to the public interest test. This privilege was claimed on behalf of the Attorney General’s advice on the legality of the Iraq war (see HL Debs Vol 646 col WA2, 17 March 2003; HC Debs Vol 402 col 236W, 26 March 2003 and the Butler report HC 898 (2003–04), paras 366 et seq and Annex D).2 Before FOIA took effect a request was made under the Code on Access for the date on which the Attorney General’s advice on legality was first sought. This request was upheld by the parliamentary ombudsman but refused by the government on the grounds that it might inhibit free and frank discussion. Under FOIA many requests for details behind the advice were sought basically to establish whether published statements were consistent with ‘fuller advice that had been given’.3 The IC found that the PA’s reliance on s 27 and a PI in non-disclosure was made out, but under ss 35(1)(c) and 42 some further information did have to be disclosed. An agreed statement on what would be disclosed was settled by the PAs and the IC. Three Rivers DC v Bank of England [2004] UKHL 48. See Kirkhope v IC [2016] UKUT 344 (AAC) where a request was made for ‘copies of any memos, file notes correspondence associated with the drafting of provisions … which exempted the Duchy of Cornwall from criminal liability’. The statutes were drafted by Parliamentary Counsel. No PI could be claimed outweighing the PI in non-disclosure under s 42. 2 See P Sands Lawless World (2005); Corderoy above; Savic v IC and Others [2017] AACR 26ws. 3 http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/freedom_of_information/notices/full_ transcript_of_enforcement_notice_220506.pdf. 1

1.211  The duty to confirm or deny does not arise if, or to the extent that compliance with s  1(1)(a) would involve the disclosure of any information (whether or not already recorded) in respect of which such a claim could be maintained in legal proceedings. 1.212  J Kessler QC v IC & HMRC EA/2007/0043 is a leading discussion of the PI factors involved in s 42 and also on the doctrine of collateral or partial waiver of the privilege. The information requested was for the legal advice concerning removal of the ‘professional trustee residence rule’ given by the DTI to HM  Revenue and Customs. PI favoured maintenance of exemption. The requester claimed privilege had been waived. In Kessler, the legal advice was given by an ‘in-house’ lawyer and not an outside ‘independent’ practitioner. An early ruling of the tribunal in Kirkaldie v IC and Thanet DC EA/2006/0001 was distinguished. The tribunal in Kirkaldie had improperly interpreted the waiver rule – partial disclosure of the privileged information removes the privilege – to extend the rule to disclosures outside litigation. ‘We are satisfied that the rule [namely] that by relying upon part of a privileged document before a court the

112  Chapter 1 party doing so waives privilege in the whole document does not apply to partial disclosure of privileged information outside the context of litigation.’ The tribunal continued: ‘There is an assumption built into FOIA that disclosure of information by PAs on request is in the PI in order to promote transparency and accountability in relation to the activities of PAs. The strength of that interest and the strength of competing interests must be assessed on a case by case basis’ (para 57(d)). The tribunal repeated a point made in relation to other exemptions: ‘The passage of time since the creation of information may have an important bearing on the balancing exercise. As a general rule, the PI in maintaining an exemption diminishes over time’ (para 57(e)). ‘In considering the PI factors in favour of maintaining the exemption, the focus should be upon the public interest expressed explicitly or implicitly in the particular exemption provision at issue’ (para 57(f)). ‘The PI factors in favour of disclosure are not so restricted and can take into account the general PIs in promotion of transparency, accountability, public understanding and involvement in the democratic process’ (para 57(g)). The factors to be balanced are set out at pp 23–24 of the judgment. According to the judgment, the arguments in favour of disclosure were: (a) furthering the understanding of and participation in the public debate of issues of the day, specifically an informed debate into the necessity of the measures; (b) promoting accountability and transparency, obliging public authorities to explain the reasons for decisions taken and allowing the public to understand decisions made by public authorities; (c) allowing individuals and companies to understand how decisions are reached by public authorities; (d) as the decision has now been taken, disclosure would not impair any current decision-making process; (e) obtaining the advice did not involve the provision of confidential information; (f) considerable damage has been and will continue to be caused to the UK professional trustee business; (g) it is impossible to lobby for change to the legislation without being provided with the advice; (h) there is no suggestion that disclosure would disadvantage the government in any legal proceedings; (i) the advice and legislation do not relate to tax avoidance; (j) the advice was not required with any urgency; (k) the Government had made a specific promise to ‘share its findings on the viability of tax simplifications with business’ in the Pre-Budget Report 2007; (l) HMRC relied on the existence and conclusion of the advice as the sole justification of their decision to abolish the residence rule. In favour of maintaining the exemption: (a) there is a strong public interest in maintaining legal professional privilege. That is, to an individual or body seeking access to legal advice being able to communicate freely with legal advisors in confidence and being able to receive advice in confidence;

The freedom of information legislation   113 (b) if legal advice were routinely disclosed, there would be disincentive to such advice being sought and/or as a disincentive to seeking advice on the basis of full and frank instructions; (c) if legal advice were routinely disclosed, caveats, qualifications or professional expressions of opinion might be given in advice which would therefore prevent free and frank correspondence between government and its legal advisers; (d) legal advice in relation to policy matters should be obtained without the risk of that advice being prematurely disclosed; (e) it is important that legal advice includes a full assessment of all aspects of an issue, which may include arguments both for and against a conclusion, publication of this information may undermine public confidence in decision-making and without comprehensive advice the quality of decisionmaking would be reduced because it would not be fully informed and balanced; (f) there is a significant risk that the value placed on legal advice would be diminished if there is a lack of confidence that it had been provided without fear that it might be disclosed. This was not a straightforward process of aggregation and addition. The process requires balancing and judgment: ‘great weight must be attached to the PI in the accountability and transparency of PAs and the decision-making process. ‘A substantial PI would be served by disclosure of fuller reasoning on why the Government reached the conclusions it reached on the State aid’ (in relation to abolition of the rule) (para 69). However, despite all these ruminations, the tribunal ruled that the PI under s 42 was in favour of non-disclosure in this case because the issue was still ‘live’. 1.213 In Martin George v IC and the House of Lords Appointments Commission (HOLAC) EA/2008/0035 the tribunal came to a different conclusion on what the PI required. An executive producer at the BBC, requested information from the HOLAC for the minutes, agendas and papers of meetings. HOLAC provided the information in a redacted form but relied on various exemptions protecting the redactions. The IC subsequently considered that the information was exempt because s 42 was engaged in respect of the information for which legal professional privilege was claimed. The IC found that the public interest favoured non-disclosure. The appellant appealed to the tribunal arguing that: (a) the information contained nothing to which privilege attaches; (b) that the public interest was in favour of disclosure. The tribunal took the following points as determinants. Firstly on the basis of case law (Three Rivers DC v Bank of England above); a broad interpretation has to be afforded to what is covered by the privilege (see ch 11). The ‘general effect’ or ‘broad thrust’ of legal advice is covered by the privilege. Applying that test, and considering the information involved, privilege was correctly claimed. Secondly, the tribunal considered that the amount of information already in the public domain was of relevance (this information was sufficient to inform the public debate). However the tribunal decided that some of the redacted information must be disclosed because the decisions of the House of Lords have an important impact upon the lives of

114  Chapter 1 the population and the members of the Commission through the Commission’s work have ‘a significant influence on the composition of parliament and thus its decisions’. In ruling on this point the tribunal accepted the requester’s submissions. 1.214  There have been several cases involving the Mersey Tunnel Users Association which have raised important points in relation to s  42 (although the second case decided that the Environmental Information Regulations 2004, SI 2004/3391 were in fact the relevant code. The cases are Mersey Tunnel Users Assoc v IT & Merseytravel EA/2007/0052 and Mersey Tunnel Users Association v IT & Halton BC EA/2009/0001 (two hearings were involved). The first of these involved an appeal about a dispute over access to counsel’s opinion concerning the operating costs and financing of the Mersey Tunnel. A complex arrangement had been made to finance loans basically on the collateral of income from users. Users had faced significant increases in charges. The PA argued that the advice was protected under s 42 and the PI was not in favour of disclosure. The disputed information had in fact been seen by the requester. It had been shown to him by the district auditor who had extracted an undertaking that it could not be further divulged to others. The requester wished to use the counsel’s opinion to assist in marshalling his own arguments and this was why the present proceedings were brought. Both the IC and PA opposed the ruling in Kirkaldie and the application of the doctrine of partial disclosure of a privileged document. Such waiver only applies to litigation – not to legal advice more generally as in Kirkaldie where a councillor made a public statement about advice from a lawyer but not in the context of litigation. This point distinguished a ruling of the tribunal in Kirkaldie and followed Kessler above. The tribunal continued with the nature of the exemption under s 42. The often repeated points about the ‘strong in-built PI in s 42’ as a result of case law in the higher courts was examined and accepted. But importantly, the tribunal reported that s 42 is not consequentially promoted into an absolute exemption. When the advice was requested it was ten and a half years old and the request was made over three and a half years earlier. The PA pointed out that any legal action by the appellant was now statute barred, and in fact there had been no litigation (para 46). It has to be said that the tribunal placed a great emphasis on transparency. The tribunal did not doubt the ‘in-built PI in non-disclosure in s 42’ and this carried considerable weight, but in this case and on these facts the PI in disclosure was paramount. A significant allocation of money had been invested into one form of financing a public service instead of alleviating the burden on the fee-paying public users. The countervailing PI arguments in favour of publication were stronger in this case than nondisclosure. In the second case, the governing provision was the EIR 2004 and this is addressed in ch 3 (para 3.4). (xxii)  commercial interests and trade secrets1

1.215  Departments, agencies and other PAs hold a great deal of commercial information: some as regulators eg the DBERR (now, after various mutations, DBIS), regulatory commissions, the Export Credit and Guarantee Department:

The freedom of information legislation   115 some hold such information to help them formulate policy; through PAs being commercial contracting entities themselves and as support services to businesses under industrial development legislation. Public Finance Initiatives (PFI and now PF2) involve public sector/private sector arrangements for the delivery of public projects and services by private sector bodies. Money is borrowed by the private body which is then paid over a period of 25 to 30 years typically ‘unitary charge payments’ from public funds. The 2018 report from the NAO found that increased transparency was not uniform across these arrangements and there was no clear data of the benefits of such arrangements. The critical report from the NAO found that there were 700 such projects with a capital value of £60 billion. Even if no new PF projects were introduced, their costs until 2040 would amount to £199 billion. Public infrastructure investment was still appreciably higher than the PF vehicles.2 Following the Chancellor’s budget statement in 2018 it seems unlikely that any new PF projects will be initiated. Information is exempt if it constitutes a trade secret (FOIA 2000, s 43(1)), designs, drawings or models, processes, product content, recipe or formulae (see DWP v IC EA/2010/0073). It is also exempt if its disclosure under this Act would, or would be likely to, prejudice the commercial interests of any person (including the public authority holding it: s 43(2)): such interests as costs, pricing, profit margins, business plans, supplier and client details. Where compliance with s 1(1)(a) would or would be likely to prejudice the commercial interests as described, the duty to confirm or deny does not apply. Further comment is made about this heading below (see para  1.298). The Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration (PCA) has made several reports on investigation complaints arising under the 1994 and 1997 code on access to information which is claimed by authorities to be commercially confidential.3 A frequent point of some sensitivity concerns tenders and contracts. As discussed below, ‘commercial interests’ potentially has far greater scope to be used as a barrier to openness in the process of government by contract. The local government ombudsman has been very critical of the arrangements made by some authorities to contract out housing benefit administration to private companies. There is no doubt that this information could damage the ‘commercial interests’ of the companies involved. Could they claim the benefit of this exemption? Or would it not apply to such a situation? The Office of Government Commerce literature on contracting OGC (Civil Procurement) Policy and Guidance version 1.1. Section 1 of the archived Guidance says that: ‘Generally speaking, there is a public interest in disclosing information about public procurement to ensure: • that there is transparency in the spending of public money; • that public money is being used effectively, and that public authorities are getting value for money when purchasing goods and services; • that authorities’ procurement processes are conducted in an open and honest way.’ Section 2 discusses what should not be disclosed. FS50085775 contains a powerful statement in relation to s  43 and the new context of transparency. ‘PAs must expect a robust approach to the issue of commercial sensitivity, and be prepared for a greater degree of openness than prior to the advent of the Act’ (para 65). The Local Authority Transparency Guide and ICO both set out

116  Chapter 1 guidance on commercial and financial information that they should publish.4 Financial information would have to possess a commercial quality to fall under this exemption. https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1178/commercial-interests-section43-foia-guidance.pdf. See Commercial Confidentiality NCC  (1998). App 1 has a list of statutes prohibiting disclosure of trade secrets. See R Baxter (1997) JBL 97. See Re Smith Kline & French Laboratories Ltd [1990] 1 AC 64, HL, and commercial confidentiality under EC Directives. See EC Directive 2002/02 and the requirement to publish percentage declarations of ingredients in animal foodstuffs following the BSE and Dioxin episodes. Domestic regulations implementing the Directive were suspended by interim injunction pending a reference to the ECJ on the legality of the Directive because of the ‘serious and irreparable damage’ that would be caused by the disclosure of commercially confidential information and trade secrets, the High Court ruled: R (ABNA) v Secretary of State for Health [2004] 2 CMLR 39. For Scotland, see: ABNA Ltd v Scottish Ministers [2004] 2 CMLR 40. 2 PFI and PF2  NAO  (2018)  HC  718 (2017–18). In the autumn budget statement in 2018 the Chancellor announced there would be no future PFI contracts. 3 National Consumer Council (1998), pp 14 et seq. 4 https://ico.org.uk/media/1262/definition_document_local_authorities.pdf. 1

1.216  ‘Trade secret’ is a legal term of art and has been stated by the Law Commission to cover information which is not generally known, which derives its value from that fact, whose owner has indicated expressly or by implication the wish to maintain it as secret and probably it is information used in trade or business.1 A common point of reference is Lansing Linde Ltd v Kerr:2 ‘Trade secrets are not restricted to secret formulae … but can include highly confidential information of a non-technical or non-scientific nature, such as customers’ names, which if disclosed to a competitor would cause real or significant harm to the owner and which the owner is entitled to have protected’. An amendment in the Lords sought to define a trade secret as: ‘confidential trade information which if disclosed to a competitor would cause harm to its owner’. This was unsuccessful. In the USA, ‘trade secret’ has been defined as ‘a secret, commercially valuable plan, formula, process, or device that is used for the making, preparing, compounding, or processing of trade commodities and that can be said to be the end product of either innovation or substantial effort’: Public Citizen Health Research Group v FDA  704  F  2d 1280 (DC  Circuit 1983). This ‘common law’ definition was adopted because the definition in the US Restatement of Torts Sec. 757, comment b (1939) was rejected as too broad for FOI purposes.3 It should be noted that neither in s  43 nor elsewhere in FOIA is there an exemption for copyright. Copyright does not prevent access; it protects the copyright owner against improper use of copyright material. The exemption for confidentiality or trade secrets would have to be invoked (see para 3.38; on reuse of public sector information, see paras 4.40 et seq). Law Commission Misuse of Trade Secrets (1997) No 150, para 1.29. [1991] 1 WLR 251, [1991] 1 All ER 418 (CA) per Staughton LJ and Butler-Sloss LJ. 3 Freedom of Information Act Guide and Privacy Act Overview (2004) ed US Department of Justice, pp 269 et seq. 1 2

1.217  Disclosures which would, or would be likely to, prejudice the commercial interests of any person is an extremely elastic formulation. It would

The freedom of information legislation   117 apply to information such as research (and note the additional exemption under s  22A of the FOIA, at para  1.116 above, for universities) and development, product testing, performance assessments, strategic business plans. Under EC procurement directives, information has to be made public in relation to contract bids that fall within the directives (see ch 9). The basic test in relation to contractual information is: will its release endanger the commercial interests of any person. Is information still sensitive to further competition or are negotiations relating to which the information is relevant still continuing? The Guidance accompanying the Code on Access stated that the following should be disclosed after a tendering process: identity of successful tenderers, nature of the job, service or goods to be supplied, performance standards, award criteria, winning tender price or range of prices. Costings that have gone into prices have been regarded as confidential.1 Could commercial interests cover numbers of disconnections by utilities? A further amendment in the Lords sought to exempt information whose disclosure ‘would prejudice to an unreasonable degree the commercial interests of any person.2 The MoJ guidance on this exemption is now archived and the current ICO guidance is helpful.3 The Parliamentary Ombudsman received and reported on many cases concerning contracts and exemption 13 of the 1997 Code. He has recommended disclosure in complaints about sale and export of weapons for possible use in torture (A.30/95), disclosure of information about defects in a vehicle (A.25/97) and see (A.16/99) re Committee on Safety of Medicines, (A.2/01) on the early release of information that might be used for further bids re data used in public sector comparator for a London Transport contract, and (A.28/02) where there was no evidence that contract prices would cause prejudice to the commercial position of the contractor or department. 2 See for similar tests which are more demanding than under the FOIA 2000: Control of Atmospheric Pollution (Appeals) Regulations 1977, SI  1977/17; Food and Environmental Protection Act 1985, s 14(2)(b); Water Resources Act 1991, s 191B; Clean Air Act 1993, s 37; Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999, Sch  8, para  18; Competition Act 1998 (Directors’ Rules) Order 2000, r 30(1)(c)(i); Food Industry Development Scheme 1997, SI 1997/2673, para 10(2); see note 1 above for reference. 3 http://www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/docs/foi-exemption-s43.pdf. 1

1.218  Virtually all the case law concerns s 43(2) and not trade secrets. In one of the few cases involving s  43(1) the Student Loans Company’s (SLC) ‘Class Training Manual’ used to train staff was requested. The information was widely disseminated within the organisation and the SLC was in a monopoly position in providing student loans (FS50156040). The IC ordered disclosure but the tribunal subsequently amended another decision of the IC allowing some of the information to be withheld in relation to how to deal with defaulting debtors (Student Loans Company v IC EA/2008/0092). In Department of Health v IC EA/2008/0018, exemptions in ss 41, 43(1) and 43(2) were in question. The case concerned a request for a copy of a contract between the Department of Health (DoH) and Methods Consulting Ltd for the provision of an electronic recruitment service for the NHS. The DoH refused, citing inter alia s 43(1), and the DoH argued that the information requested was exempt under that section. Methods Consulting Ltd had provided the final version of the contract although DoH had negotiated its details and specific terms. The DoH claimed that the information was exempt from disclosure under s  43(1). Whilst the tribunal accepted that the information was clearly used for the purposes of a trade and

118  Chapter 1 the release of the information would cause harm to MC Ltd, it did not have the highest level of secrecy which a trade secret would appear to merit. Competitors would have found it difficult to reproduce the information and use it although this in itself raises important questions. The tribunal considered that any of the information which could constitute a trade secret would more easily be exempt under s 43(2) and it proceeded to discuss that section (below). 1.219  In EA/2008/0018 the DoH argued that disclosure would prejudice its commercial interests in several ways because its future negotiating position would be weakened; disclosure would remove any incentive for tenderers to be innovative and create products different to those specified in the contract; the negotiating position of other departments may be adversely affected; the quality of service provided by Methods Consulting Ltd could have been a reduced; and disclosure could lead to a reduction in the number of qualified tenderers for DoH’s future contracts thereby prejudicing its commercial position and competitors would have an unfair advantage. Addressing itself to the argument of commercial sensitivity, the tribunal found that although some of the information remained secret, a recruitment website and other loci had published some of the information. Although s 43(2) was engaged the tribunal found after a very useful analysis that some information should be disclosed in the public interest and certain other information should not. The tribunal tabulated reasons for disclosure/non-disclosure for each piece of information. There is also discussion on the impact of the Office of Government Commerce Guidance on Civil Procurement (para 1.215 above). The Guidance sets out what should be disclosed in procurement practice and the DoH had apparently failed to consult the guidance. Section 2 of the Guidance covers information that should not usually be disclosed (see para 88 et seq). Dept for Work and Pensions v IC EA/2010/0073 also has an interesting discussion on s 43(2) and its successful and unsuccessful invocation in relation to government contracts. In University of Central Lancashire v IC and David Colquhoun EA/2009/0034 the tribunal ruled that an interest in course materials could be commercial but no prejudice was found under s 43(2). M Abbott v IC EA/2015/0081 and H Mills v IC EA/2013/0263 emphasised the PI in holding a PA accountable and transparency under s 43, but W Visser v IC EA/2011/0018 displayed appreciation of the competitive context in which PAs themselves had to compete in service provision with private contractors (and see Home Office v IC EA/2015/0143 on deducting performance points from a contractor at an immigration detention centre – s 43(2) provided exemption on PI basis). 1.220  In the light of the extensive discussion in the courts in the Sugar case (para 1.90 above) and the wide coverage of the exclusion of information relating to journalism, art or literature and its repetitive incantation by the BBC in FS50259955, it is interesting to witness a case in which a requester was successful. The complainant requested information relating to the BBC’s total taxi spend over the previous financial year and to the BBC’s contract and taxi spend with a particular ground transportation booking and management company. The BBC provided answers to some of the requested information but withheld part of the information under s 43(2). The IC decided that s 43(2) was not engaged. Many

The freedom of information legislation   119 decisions of the IC concerning the BBC found that the exemption in s 43(2) was not engaged but these would now have to take into account the ruling of the Supreme Court in the Sugar case (see FS50086077, FS50102474 and BBC v IC EA/2008/0019, 0034, 0051, 0058 and EA/2009/0015). 1.221  Section 43(2) does not protect information about a private contractor engaging in vehicle recovery work for a police force (FS50124423) nor tendering documents concerning quoted prices (FS50131138). Section 43(2) was engaged in relation to a drug used to prevent dietary-induced laminitis in horses but the PI favoured disclosure (FS50066054). Arguments on prejudice must be carefully presented and ‘well reasoned’ even to engage s  43(2) (FS50168782). In FS50131138 the complainant requested the council to release a copy of the tendering document submitted by the contractor awarded the contract to carry out maintenance work at the council leisure centre. The council responded, informing the complainant that it was willing to disclose a redacted version of the document, with the financial details edited out; it claimed exemption under s 43(2). The IC rejected the arguments that disclosure would be prejudicial to the commercial interests of the contractor and/or the council. He concluded that third parties entering into business with a public authority should be aware of the freedom of information decisions; accountability in the spending of public funds is important. Further, the concerns vis-à-vis disclosure did not appear to be raised by the contractor. The council claimed that disclosure could affect the achievement of best prices for future tenders and that disclosure would likely deter other contractors from working with the council. As the tendering process had been finalised 18 months prior to the request and because no two tenders for work are the same the IC rejected these points. 1.222  FS50101105 reminds us that refusal notices must be properly reasoned to comply with s 17. DEFRA was asked for information about a tendering process for a research contract. DEFRA claimed s 43 was engaged but its reasoning on this and the PI were inadequate and breached s 17. The information requested was not commercially sensitive and s 43 was not engaged, the IC believed. The requested information included a summary of costs and overall cost, a breakdown of those costs giving details of individual tasks, who would conduct those tasks, the number of days involved and daily rates. DEFRA argued that such information would allow competitors to assess how ‘the tenderer scoped and costed projects’. The IC believed that such information would not reveal the profit margins of the company, however, which was the crucial aspect in assessing the commercial interest. The IC has sought evidence of a ‘real and substantial risk of commercial prejudice’ for the s  43(2) exemption to operate (FS50163364). J  Connor Press Associates Ltd v IC EA/2005/0005 also illustrates that this prejudice must be established: the tribunal overruled the IC in holding that it was not established on the facts of the case (see also Cranfield University v IC EA/2011/0146: a contract which is not likely to be re-tendered is not commercially sensitive). Derry City Council v IC EA/2006/0014 has already been encountered under s 41 where it was ruled that s 41 did not exempt the information comprising a copy of the agreement between Ryanair and Derry City Council for the use of Derry airport. Section 43(2) was additionally invoked by the PA. The agreement was

120  Chapter 1 made in 1999 and constituted a ‘special arrangement’. There had been intergovernmental involvement in discussions from the UK and Irish governments. The subject of the arrangement was an agreement between Derry Council and Ryanair concerning charges and fees, building extensions and other commercial spin-offs if Ryanair provided a flight service to Derry. The PA argued that even in 2005 disclosure of the requested information would still have the effect of giving any counterparty in negotiations an indication of the PA’s final negotiating position. The issue was still to that extent ‘live’. On the facts s 43 was properly engaged. However, five years after the agreement in question at the time the request was made the PI test was in favour of disclosure. An audit would not have provided ‘for inspection of the contracts under which particular invoices may have been raised’ and there was a PI in this information being made available. Department for Work & Pensions v IC et al [2016]  EWCA  Civ 758 showed a divided court on the issue of public interest in s 43(2). A request was made for the identities of work placement hosts in a context of reporting on exploitation of workers. The authority and the companies involved claimed there was commercial prejudice to their reputation by the disclosure. The IC and tribunals upheld the request. The Court of Appeal rejected the appeal by a 2–1 majority. The court agreed there was an error of law in the Upper Tribunal’s reasoning but s 43(2) was engaged and the PI in disclosure was not vitiated by error. The case is interesting in the way the appeal judges sifted through the facts and evidence to come to their conclusion ([2016] EWCA Civ 758). 1.223  FS50094891 concerned the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC), a government-owned company and PA, which invests in private equity funds focused on emerging markets in developing parts of the world. The complainant requested the contract between CDC and Actis, one of its fund managers. CDC refused to disclose the contract on the basis that it was exempt under s 43 of the Act (s 41 was also cited). In relation to the s 43 exemption the IC considered CDC’s five arguments that disclosure would harm Actis’ negotiating position when attracting new investors who could use the information to enhance their own bargaining position – s 43(2) applied in this context; disclosure would harm CDC’s negotiating position when looking for new fund managers and the IC accepted this as a reason for s 43(2) applying; disclosure would harm Actis’ negotiating position when acquiring/disposing of investments. Counterparties may have been able to seek a lower price for disposal and would also have a bidding advantage at investment auctions – again s 43(2) applied; public disclosure would prevent CDC from being able to invest in certain funds because disclosure of its dealings would cause it to be treated a ‘second rate investor’. The IC decided that the CDC’s ability to invest in a number of investment funds would be damaged and its commercial interests would thus be harmed; disclosure would enable rivals to use proprietary information at no cost. The IC considered that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the redacted sections constituted proprietary information which could be used by Actis’ rivals to the detriment of Actis’ commercial interests. The majority of the information was covered by s 43(2). In relation to the PI in disclosure, the arguments for disclosure were: transparency in government commercial arrangements (particularly as it was

The freedom of information legislation   121 controversial and had the potential to create environmental, social and economic impacts) and scrutiny of checks and balances and the application of public funds. The arguments against disclosure were: that the industry was already regulated and subject to suitable disclosure, that the investment of public funds would be undermined, that CDC should be in a position to negotiate best price and that confidentiality would enhance CDC’s operating performance. The public interest was deemed to weigh in favour of non-disclosure of the exempted information (and see FS50114967). Section 43(2) protected some information about wine stocks held by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office: FS50347157.

(xxiii)  prohibitions on disclosure

1.224  This is an absolute exemption. Under FOIA 2000, s 44(1), information is exempt information if its disclosure, otherwise than under this Act, is prohibited by or under any enactment; is incompatible with any European Union (Community) obligations – obviously subject to departure from the EU and the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018;1 or would constitute or be punishable as a contempt of court.2 Annex B to this book contains a list of statutory prohibitions on disclosure. The most notorious will be the Official Secrets Acts of 1911 (s  1) and 1989 (see paras 4.154 et seq below). The Official Secrets Acts are concerned with unauthorised disclosure. A formal decision to make a disclosure under FOIA 2000 will provide the necessary authority making the disclosure authorised. The two Acts do not approach the subject of disclosure from the same direction. Official secrets are about discipline; FOIA is about transparency. See ch 5 for a discussion of the regulation on access and proposed amendments in the EU. See P Feeney v IC EA/2015/0019. 2 Under the Contempt of Court Act 1981 and common law: A-G v Newspaper Publishing plc [1987] 3 All ER 276, CA. See Nadarajah v IC EA/2014/0226 and Abdalla v IC EA/2014/0228. 1

1.225  The duty to confirm or deny is excluded if confirmation or denial in compliance with s 1(1)(a) would (apart from this Act) fall within any of the above three provisions under s 44(1). 1.226  This is an absolute exemption and a class-based exemption. 1.227  Section 44 is widely resorted to. The terms of the prohibition must be strictly interpreted.1 Financial Services Authority v IC  [2009]  EWHC  1548 (Admin) contains an important legal point in relation to this section. Section 44 has often been used by regulators, law enforcers, ombudsmen and so on who receive information ‘in confidence’ and who are statutorily prohibited from disclosing this information unless it is to an authorised recipient for an authorised purpose – these are often referred to as ‘gateways’. In this case, although s  43 did not protect the information in question because it was not commercially sensitive or a trade secret as we have seen. However, when that information was pieced together with ‘other information’ held by the FSA,

122  Chapter 1 then taken together it included information given in confidence and therefore was caught by prohibition against disclosure in FSMA 2000, s 348. When the information was combined with other accessible information it would include that from person ‘given in confidence’. Secretary of State for the Home Department v British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection & IC [2008] EWHC 892 (Admin), [2008] EWCA Civ 870 concerned the breeding and supply of animals for scientific procedures which was governed by the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986. Information ‘given in confidence’ in the licensing process was prohibited from disclosure. The tribunal ruled that these words had to satisfy the three-stage test of achieving protection under the law of confidentiality in Coco v AN Clark Ltd (1968) FSR 415 Ch (nature of the information qualifies it as confidential; the information was imparted in circumstances in which confidentiality applies; and there was unauthorised use). The tribunal ruled that the information did not satisfy that test under the law of confidentiality and so the information was not given ‘in confidence’ for the purposes of the statutory prohibition. This was wrong in law ruled the High Court and Court of Appeal and failed to acknowledge the development of the law protecting personal data and information. The words meant given on the understanding that the information was given in confidence and would not be disclosed and did not import the Coco test of the law of confidentiality. The information was therefore protected under the 1986 Act and consequently prohibited from disclosure under s  44 (See British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection v IC and Newcastle University EA/2010/0064 concerning the same provisions where information was ‘held’ by the University and not the researchers and s  44 did not apply. The tribunal’s decision was upheld by the Upper Tribunal: University of Newcastle upon Tyne v Information Commissioner and BUAV [2011] UKUT 185 (AAC). It may only be exempt where disclosure would lead to identification of an individual, eg Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005, ss 18 and 23 – see next paragraph. The statutory wording may not amount to a prohibition: FS50517099 and Local Government Act 1972 (LGA 1972), Sched 12A, Pt 1. Prohibitions on disclosures relating to ‘functions or purposes’ of PAs require special care.

1

1.228 In C  Lamb v IC EA/2009/0108 the tribunal ruled that information in the possession of the IC’s office which had been produced in its examination of a previous request in relation to Cabinet minutes on the decision to invade Iraq were exempt under s 44 by virtue of the prohibition in DPA 1998, s 59(1). PricewaterhouseCoopers v IC and HMRC EA/2009/0049 concerned an appeal involving the construction of the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005 (CRCA  2005), ss  18 and 23 and their relationship with FOIA  2000, s 44. CRCA 2005, s 18(1) imposes a duty of confidentiality which is limited by s 18(2), which allows various gateways to access (above). This includes s 18(2) (h): ’disclosure which is made with the consent of each person to whom the information relates’. Under CRCA  2005, s  23 information is exempt under FOIA 2000, s 44 where disclosure would either specify the identity, or allow the identity to be deduced, of a person to whom the information relates. The request was made by an agent acting for the taxpayer about information provided by the taxpayer, ie the taxpayer wanted access to his records; in effect he was using FOIA 2000 as a DPA 1998 vehicle. Did his consent to disclosure justify a FOIA

The freedom of information legislation   123 disclosure removing s  44? In such a disclosure under FOIA disclosure would potentially be to the whole world. The tribunal ruled that it did justify disclosure. It also noted that such an issue of complicated statutory interpretation was really better suited for the high court or now the Upper Tribunal to where an appeal was made. On a number of occasions PAs have attempted to argue that the general provisions on private and family life under ECHR, Art 8 constitute a prohibition under s 44. This has not been accepted (FS50099223). Information has been refused on abortion statistics where it would constitute a breach of abortion regulations, but the IC did not accept on the facts that it would breach s. 44 because it had been anonymised (FS50122432). FS50074331 was a request to HMRC for correspondence with three tobacco firms which led to a memorandum of understanding between the PA and companies to reduce tobacco smuggling. Section 44 was invoked (Finance Act 1989, s  182 – which prohibits release of information about an identifiable individual by tax authorities, and CCRA 2005, ss 18 and 23 as above). Section 182(5) is a gateway provision. The FOIA was a general duty of disclosure and was not an authorised function under the customs and revenue code. FOIA did not amount to a gateway; disclosure had to take place within the terms of the parent statute. Where an authority has a discretion to disclose under a statutory gateway provision, it is not for the IC to secondguess that discretion (Ofcom v G Morrissey [2011] UKUT 116 (AAC)). 1.229  Many of the cases have involved FMSA 2000, s 348 (see eg FS50082955). In this case the IC accepted that an unauthorised leak of the information in question did not place it in the public domain. Section 349 allows ‘gateways’ for disclosure for various public official functions. Section 348 places restrictions on the disclosure by a primary recipient (here the FSA) of ‘confidential information’ as defined which ‘relates to the business or other affairs of any person’ and which was received by the ‘primary recipient’ for the purposes of the FSA. This would protect information given by one regulator to another if ‘confidential information’. Section 349 allows gateways for disclosure for various public official functions. The request was for copy of a draft report prepared by the FSA’s predecessor and covered events in the 1980s and 1990s involving mismarketing of products by building societies. The IC believed that s  44 would cover background information but not ‘opinion’ information. The opinion of one regulator passed to another represented ‘self-generated information’, he believed. However, s 43(2) would protect the information. The Commissioner investigated the application of these exemptions and found that FSA was correct to apply both of them and that opinion information was protected by s 43 and by the PI in non-disclosure. This decision notice was appealed to the Information Tribunal (see also R  Rowland and FSA  v IC EA/2008/0075 and 0077). In FS50150138 the IC ruled that disclosure of information to carry out a public function of FSA related to functions under the FSMA  2000 and not general duties such as FOIA  2000 (see above). This point of law was upheld in J  Calland v IC EA/2007/0136. (For a difficult FSA case, see FS50075781 upheld on appeal: EA/2007/0093 and 0100; see also Financial Services Authority v IC EA/2008/0061 and N Slann v IC and FSA (JP) EA/2005/0019.) M Dey v IC & OFT EA/2006/0057 made similar points in relation to ‘functions’ under the Enterprise Act 2002, s 237. The requester argued that gateways for access under

124  Chapter 1 that Act (ss 239–243) overcame the absolute exemption in s 4. Sections 239–243 referred to disclosures in accordance with the Enterprise Act 2002 not under FOIA, repeating the point of other cases. 1.230  On a variety of occasions the IC has ruled that the Local Government Act 1974, s  32(2) prevented disclosure by the s  44 exemption although the ombudsman has sometimes been at fault under FOIA  2000, s  1 and the Parliamentary Ombudsman under s  17 (C  Parker v IC and Parliamentary Ombudsman EA/2007/0046). In FS50200163 concerning the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, a request for information was rightly refused. FS50112347 concerned an unsuccessful request for a complaints file of the Local Government Ombudsman; and see FS50094124 where most of the information was protected. Commission for Local Administration v IC EA/2007/0087 also involved the local ombudsman and LGA 1974, s 32(2) and FOIA 2000, s 44. Information obtained in the course of investigating a complaint by the ombudsman was properly exempt under s 44. The tribunal ruled that information which does not refer to the complaint itself can be disclosed. This might include: the name of the authority, the name of the investigator, and the method and process (‘mechanics’) of an investigation. Such information may be accessible under FOIA providing it does not refer to the ‘substance of the complaint’, questions of fact or any evidence collected, is information about processes adopted protected or about ways of proceeding. These matters did not cover the subject of the complaint and did not in effect cover matters of substance. The decision can create problems in definition. For instance in drawing a distinction between information received from a third party (which is protected) and information that has been passed between an ombudsman and an officer employed by the ombudsman (which is not) the tribunal’s decision can present some very difficult questions of distinction. Surely that passing between officials must not have come from a third party and must not be otherwise exempt? The tribunal did not believe that this, ie separating protected and unprotected information in the future, would unduly burden the local ombudsman. In M  Cubells v IC EA/2011/0183 the tribunal ruled that the prohibition involving the health ombudsman did not protect a PA providing information to that ombudsman. FS50073646 was a request for information from the MoJ concerning a complaint the requester had made about a judge in dealing with his judicial review application and appeal proceedings. In relation to FOIA  2000, s  44, the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, s  139 provides for confidentiality of information in relation to judicial appointments. Other exemptions applied to protect other information. The IC has a relevant s  44 exemption by virtue of DPA  1998, s  59 (see FS50126668). The case also highlights a problem of procedural justice – the ICO investigates the IC under the FOIA. In J  Allison v IC and HMRC EA/2007/0089 the tribunal recorded in the strongest of terms that FOIA was not to be utilised to obtain ‘reasons behind a decision’. The Act’s function was to provide access to information. The appellant was seeking interpretations of law under FOIA. Such interpretations are not accessible if not recorded. The case involved CRCA  2005, ss  18–20, which is discussed above. The IC ruled against disclosure and the DN was upheld by the tribunal. On s 44 and Civil Aviation Act 1982, s 23 see J Hoyte v IC and CAA EA/2007/0101 where s  44 was correctly invoked to protect a

The freedom of information legislation   125 Closure Report (CR) after a Mandatory Occurrence Reporting Scheme (MOR) to the Civil Aviation Authority concerning a hazardous or potentially hazardous flight incident or defect. MOR was regulated under EC Directive (EC 2003/42/ EC) and a statutory instrument (Air Navigation (General) Regulations 2006, SI  2006/601) and Air Navigation Order. In B  Higginson v IC EA/2005/0008 there was a request to the Independent Police Complaints Commission for information, denied by s 44 (prohibition by the Police Act 1996, s 80).

Late reliance on an exemption 1.231  The question of whether an additional exemption can be raised after an initial refusal has been raised on numerous occasions. The IC and tribunal (subject to the next paragraph) have dealt with the situation as a matter of discretion (see the early case EA/2005/0006). If there were an element of bad faith in delaying an invocation of an exemption this might have costs implications. There is no duty on the IC to raise an exemption for a PA (P Bowrick v IC and Nottingham City Council EA/2005/0006 at 46) although he may invoke an appropriate exemption not claimed by the PA. In that case, costs were awarded against the authority. In Home Office and Ministry of Justice v IC [2009] EWHC 1611 (Admin) – the point was raised in the High Court but not dealt with in judgment because the IC and tribunal agreed on remission of the case on additional exemptions. Crown Prosecution Service v IC EA/2009/0077 involved a request to the CPS asking for information on the CPS’s change of position towards the reasonable punishment defence as amended by the Children Act 2004, s  58; this limited the defence to battery only. He wanted to know why the CPS changed its position from ‘wrong to change the law’ in 2000 to ‘comfortable with the change’ in 2004 and requested copies of any related correspondence and minutes. The CPS refused on the basis of FOIA 2000, s 35(1)(a). The IC decided that the exemption was engaged, but that the public interest favoured disclosure. The CPS appealed to the FTT out of time, but the appeal was nevertheless accepted. The CPS sought to raise further exemptions at the appeal stage: ss 35(1)(b), s 42 and s 40(2). The FTT followed the decision of the IT in Home Office and Ministry of Justice v IC (EA/2008/0062) that FOIA 2000, ss 10 and 17 do not prohibit the late claiming of exemptions, but the decision as to whether to permit the claim depends on the particular circumstances of the case. Further, the appellant must provide reasonable justification. Whilst there was a public interest in permitting a late claim, there was also a public interest in being required to identify all of the relevant exemptions in the first instance. The tribunal did not accept that the IC was under a duty to identify additional possible exemptions; it applied Bowbrick v Nottingham City Council EA/2005/0006. 1.232 In Home Office v IC EA/2010/0011 the tribunal broke with a consistent pattern and ruled that PAs have a right to make a late claim for exemptions, ie they can raise an exemption at a later stage to any initial exemptions that were raised in response to a request. This was subject to appeal to the Upper Tribunal which upheld the decision of the FTT noting that the right was subject to the tribunal’s case management powers under the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)

126  Chapter 1 (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009, SI 2009/1976) ([2011] UKUT 17 (AAC)). The case concerned the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004, s 12 and the evidence used by the UK Border Authority when the provision was placed before Parliament. The request was rejected under s 35(1)(a) on which the IC ruled against the PA which introduced late invocation of ss 40 and 42. The reasoning of the tribunal did not altogether appear convincing and centred on the appeal provisions in FOIA, specifically s 58(1). The tribunal believed that this was subject to a narrow interpretation namely that in relation to a DN of the IC being ‘not in accordance with the law’ meant the tribunal had a discretion to allow a late invocation of an exemption. A broad interpretation of the words meant looking at the totality of relevant evidence including late and relevant exemptions. We prefer the discretionary approach arguing that it should be allowed where justice demands it. This is fair and consistent with principle but was not the approach of the Upper Tribunal (see also a similar ruling under the EIR 2004: Defra v IC and Simon Birkett [2011] UKUT 39 (AAC)). The Upper Tribunal in McInerney v IC  [2015]  UKUT  47 (AAC) ruled that late reliance was not limited to exemptions under Part II of FOIA, and that late reliance on sections 12 and 14 was permissible, subject to the possible exercise of the tribunal’s case management powers. If a public authority relied on section 12, the tribunal would take the same approach as the Commissioner. As a practical matter, late reliance may effectively be forced on a public authority by the course of events. 1.233 In All Party Parliamentary Group Extraordinary Rendition v IC and MoD [2011] UKUT 153 (AAC) the Upper Tribunal ruled that such a flexible approach will not be accorded to late claims under FOIA 2000, s 12 for excessive cost of compliance. ‘It would be disproportionate and contrary to the UTs overriding objective to allow this point to be taken now’ (para 95).

Enforcement 1.234  To state the position in concise terms, the authority may claim an exemption applies. Originally, the IC could, and still can, challenge this finding on the ground that if it existed, it would not cause ‘prejudice’ if disclosed or the grounds of exemption were simply not established. Now, the authority must consider s  2 and the public interest and although the IC may overrule their decision, the authority may have the protection of a veto under s 53 (see below). In the case of an absolute discretion, there is no reference to the public interest, and the IC may have limited grounds to challenge whether a claim for exemption is correctly made, ie there is no factual basis supporting the claim although the IC could not displace other procedures, such as those under s 23. 1.235  Part IV of the FOIA  2000 is concerned with enforcement. These provisions lean heavily on those under the DPA  1998 and which are now contained in the DPA  2018. Any person viz, the ‘complainant’ may apply to the Commissioner for a decision whether, in any specified respect, a request for information has not been dealt with according to the requirements of

The freedom of information legislation   127 Part I. This includes, inter alia, the general duty under s  1 and discretionary disclosures in the public interest under s 2. Having received the application the Commissioner has to make a decision unless the applicant has not exhausted any internal complaints procedure in accordance with the code of practice under s 45 (see para 1.302 below). Guidance states that these complaints procedures should seek to resolve simple cases within 20 days of receiving the complaint. More complex cases concerning the public interest should be dealt with within six weeks of receiving the complaint.1 Further grounds for not making a decision include undue delay in making the application, that it is frivolous or vexatious or that it has been withdrawn or abandoned. The Commissioner has either to inform the complainant that he is not making a decision under this section and the grounds for not doing so or serve a ‘decision notice’ (literally a notice of his decision) on both the public authority and complainant. http://www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/foi-procedural-unhappy.htm.

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1.236  Where the Commissioner decides that an authority has failed to communicate information or make a confirmation or denial where required by s  1(1) or has failed to comply with any of the requirements of s  11 (form of communication of information), or s 17 (steps that have to be taken on refusing a request) her decision notice must specify the steps that have to be taken for compliance and the period within which they must be taken. The decision notice must contain particulars of the right of appeal under s 57 (see para 1.247). Where a notice requires steps to be taken by the authority, no time can be specified for the taking of such steps until the time for making an appeal has expired. Section 50 is subject to s 53.1 In the Bill, where a decision notice stated that there has been a failure to comply with cl 13(3) or (4) it may not require the public authority to inform the applicant whether it holds particular information or to disclose particular information. It may require the authority to make a decision in accordance with that section and specify matters to which the authority must have regard in making that decision. Elided on third reading. See below on the government’s refusals to accept adverse decisions etc on what was cl 13 (now FOIA 2000, s 2) – the discretionary disclosure. On s 50, see Kirkham v ICO et al [2018] UKUT 303 (AAC).

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1.237  Under s 52 the IC may issue the authority with an enforcement notice (EN) where the IC is satisfied that the authority has failed to comply with ‘any of the requirements of Part I  of the Act’. The authority will be required to take specified steps in order to comply. An EN must contain a statement of the requirement(s) in Part I which are not complied with and the IC’s reasons for his conclusion as well as particulars of the right of appeal under s 57. The EN must not contain any provisions requiring compliance with the notice before appeal rights, including determination or withdrawal of the appeal, have expired. An EN may be cancelled by service of a written notice on the authority.

national security memorandum

1.238  In February 2005, the Secretary of State and the IC signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on the operation of the Act in relation to enforcement

128  Chapter 1 and FOIA 2000, ss 50 and 51 and EIR 2004, reg 18. This could not override any legal requirements or duties. It was replaced by a memorandum focusing solely on national security cases in 2014 (concerning FOIA  2000, ss  23 and 24 and EIR 2004,reg 12(5) where national security is raised) and a separate memorandum exists for DPA cases raising national security matters.1 Nevertheless, it raised some very interesting points. The understanding only applies to government departments. For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in this MoU will operate to restrict or otherwise inhibit the exercise of the powers and duties of the Commissioner or of Departments under the FOIA or the EIRs (see para [4]). It seeks to minimise costs and promote efficiency. However, this is secondary to the proper fulfilment of the Commissioner’s functions under the FOIA and the EIRs (see para [5]). It is also recognised that national security cases will normally be particularly sensitive, often requiring a need for greater dialogue between the Commissioner and Departments before the IC reaches any final conclusions (see para  [7]). The department will supply to the IC a reasoned decision, together with any relevant background information and any further relevant background information requested by the IC within 20 days of the request, unless it provides reasons why this is not possible. In the vast majority of cases it will be possible to resolve the case by dialogue and correspondence between the Commissioner and the relevant Department(s) (see para  [11]). The IC will explain if these actions do not satisfy the IC, it is envisaged they will be exceptional, and the IC may be granted confidential access to the information or its whereabouts, either personally or through an appropriate FOI officer. Information supplied to the IC will be kept according to the conditions of security set out in the Security Policy Framework (Cabinet Office) where it is so protected, and papers which are ‘particularly sensitive’ will only be inspected in situ in the department. Information should not be disclosed by the IC to any third party unless consent has been given or all appeal processes have been finalised. An information notice should only be served where: (a) it has not been possible to resolve the case by agreement; and (b) the Commissioner believes either: (i) that relevant information is being withheld from him, for example, the information which is the subject of the complaint and which, in an exceptional case, he considers he needs to see in order to satisfy himself that the relevant exemptions have been properly relied on; or (ii) that there has been undue delay in providing such information or data to him. Departments will be advised in advance of service of an information notice. If a department intends to issue a national security certificate (see paras 1.124 and 1.125 above) on grounds specified in the memorandum, it will advise the IC in advance. Where the IC believes the information must be disclosed in accordance with any legal duty or proceedings, the IC will inform the department. Where these circumstances arise, the IC acknowledges that he will resist release of the information, where in all the circumstances it is reasonable to do so, and by all reasonable means including the use of any appeals processes. Where such settlement can be achieved (by means, for example, of the provision by the relevant Department of an explanation in general terms of the sensitivity of the information requested), the complainant will be invited to withdraw the complaint.

The freedom of information legislation   129 Where a decision notice raises specific concerns, it should be shown in draft to the department in order to prevent a disclosure that would be damaging to national security. A formal decision notice will be ‘served’ on the department and complainant simultaneously, and a period of time will be given for consideration before publication. The department will consider on a case-by-case basis whether to advise the IC where it is minded to issue a notice under FOIA 2000, s 53 (a veto). https://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/documents/1042533/mou-national-security-cases-foiaeir.pdf (4/04/2018).

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the veto overriding the ic’s decision on the public interest (s 53)

1.239  The above section is subject to a provision inserted at Committee Stage in the Commons. It was further amended in the Lords. This provides that a decision notice or an enforcement notice, which relates to a failure to comply with s 1(1)(a) or (b) of the FOIA 2000, and concerns request(s) for information where the authority believes that the duty to confirm or deny is excluded, or which is exempt (s  53(1)(b)), shall cease to have effect where an ‘accountable person’ in relation to that authority gives the Commissioner a certificate signed by that person. The certificate must be given not later than the twentieth working day following the day on which the notice was given to the public authority. The memorandum referred to above states that advance notice of a s 53 certificate will be given to the IC ‘wherever possible’. The certificate will state that that person has on reasonable grounds formed the opinion that the authority did not fail to comply with any duty within sub-s  1(b) so far as the request(s) are concerned. Where such a certificate is given then crucially, under s  53(6), the accountable person has to provide the complainant (ie requester) with reasons for the decision as soon as it is practicable to do so. But, this only applies in relation to decision notices. It does not cover enforcement notices. In complying with this duty to provide reasons nothing is required which would disclose exempt information. 1.240  It should be noted that this opinion must be supported by ‘reasonable grounds’ implying a degree of objectivity in the decision which although beyond the IC’s bailiwick and not appealable to the Tribunal may be challengeable by judicial review. The reasonable grounds are a jurisdictional fact and on whose existence the proper exercise of the power turns.1 Whether there are reasonable grounds is something that will have to be supportable by evidence – in the case of decisions, this will be facilitated by the duty to supply reasons. In the case of an EN, the absence of reasons will make challenge more difficult and may only be successful where the decision appears perverse on its face. Could the court infer a duty to give reasons in the case of ENs? If the courts do review a certificate under s  53, a quashing order could be accompanied by a mandatory order to exercise discretion properly. Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council [1977] AC 1014, HL.

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130  Chapter 1 the prince of wales correspondence

1.241  Evans v Attorney General1 involved a request by a journalist for correspondence between Prince Charles and ministers. The correspondence was covered both by FOIA and the Environmental Information Regulations (see ch  3). The department refused the request on the grounds of the section 37 exemption as well as ss  40 and 41. At the relevant time, s  37 was subject to the public interest test although subsequently it was made an absolute exemption. For the present proceedings its status was qualified. The journalist complained to the IC who upheld the department’s refusal. There was then an appeal to the Upper Tribunal which upheld the appeal and ruled that it was in the public interest to know about the Prince of Wales’s role as an advocate of causes after a hearing lasting six days in which detailed evidence was taken on the constitutional conventions relating to the role and responsibilities of the Prince of Wales. The Attorney General issued a certificate under s  53 quashing the judicial determination. The tribunal has equal standing to the High Court and was chaired by a High Court judge. The journalist then sought a judicial review of the veto. The Divisional court rejected the application but, on appeal to the Court of Appeal, that judgment was reversed and the veto quashed. On appeal to the Supreme Court a majority of 5–2 ruled that the Attorney General was not empowered to issue the certificate in the manner he did under the FOIA. The grounds of the majority vary with subtle nuances but Lord Neuberger ruled that it was impermissible for the executive to overrule a judicial decision reached in a judicial manner. This offended the rule of law where judicial decisions are binding subject to appeal or statute and also executive decisions are subject to judicial review. The Attorney General’s arguments ‘flout the first principle and stand the second principle on its head’ in so far as it allows executive review of the judiciary and not judicial review of the executive (see para  [52]). To which it may be said that this is what Parliament has said in s 53. But, on tenets of statutory interpretation sanctioned by the House of Lords, Parliament cannot deprive individuals of fundamental rights unless it does so in the clearest and most precise of terms. Ambiguity will not suffice. The Upper Tribunal’s case was clearly reasoned and their judgment should be respected unless the Attorney General had cogent and fully supported reasons for issuing the certificate. Such were not present. Lord Neuberger also discusses grounds (an ‘unusual situation’ at para 130 per Lord Mance) that might justify a certificate (mistake) and whether there may be more opportunity to issue a certificate after a decision notice by the IC rather than a judgment of the tribunal. This was not a part of the ratio but he believed an appeal should be made after a decision notice is issued against a PA rather than issue a certificate (see para [83]). In the present context, Lord Neuberger agreed with the Court of Appeal ‘that it is not reasonable for an accountable person to issue a section 53 certificate simply because, on the same facts and admittedly reasonably, he takes a different view from that adopted by a court of record after a full public oral hearing’ (see para [88]). Lord Mance believed that the Attorney General could not simply disagree, even on rational grounds. He must have reasonable grounds, supported by reasons,

The freedom of information legislation   131 and these must be able to survive judicial scrutiny and stand against the fully reasoned judgment of the tribunal – which could hear evidence in closed session: ‘It follows from all the above that the Attorney General’s certificate proceeded on the basis of findings which differed, radically, from those made by the Upper Tribunal, and in my view it did so without any real or adequate explanation. The Upper Tribunal’s findings and conclusions were very clearly and fully explained. I do not consider that it was open to the Attorney General to issue a certificate under section 53 on the basis of opposite or radically differing conclusions about the factual position and the constitutional conventions without, at the lowest, explaining why the tribunal was wrong to make the findings and proceed on the basis it did. As it is, the certificate asserted the existence of a tripartite convention wide enough to cover the Prince of Wales’s advocacy communications; it asserted in particular that they fell within the preparation for kingship convention, would be of very considerable practical benefit and were an important means of preparation; it further asserted that publication would cause them to cease or would cause misperception, and that the fact that the communications, made in a representational capacity, involved deeply held personal views and belief was a reason for non-disclosure. These assertions were in very direct contradiction with the Upper Tribunal’s findings, without any substantial or sustainable basis being given for the disagreement. In my view and in the light of all that I  have set out, the certificate cannot be regarded as satisfying the test identified in para 129 above. The disagreement with the Upper Tribunal’s detailed findings and conclusions reflected in the certificate has not therefore been justified on reasonable grounds. I therefore consider that the Court of Appeal was right to set aside the certificate, and that the appeal should be dismissed on this ground.’ (para [145]) By 6–1 it was ruled that, in relation to environmental information, the certificate was illegal under the Directive. Here however, unlike the Court of Appeal, there was no resort to Art 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights but a denial of a judicial remedy as set out in art 6 of Directive 2003/04/EC. Since Evans, no certificate has been issued under s 53. It would not be possible to do so under EU law in relation to environmental information. Under FOIA, issue would have to satisfy the demanding and somewhat varying hurdles set by the majority. [2015] UKSC 21.

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1.242  The accountable person who makes a decision under s 53 is set out in sub-s (7). Originally, s 53 applied to all public authorities. They all had the veto. However, the clause was amended so that the veto only applied to government departments, the National Assembly for Wales and ‘designated authorities’ – the designation was made by the Secretary of State and can apply to all authorities. The veto covers notices relating to a failure to comply with either s 1(1)(a) in relation to a duty to confirm or deny the holding of information, or s 1(1)(b) in respect of disclosing exempt information. A veto may only be issued by a Minister

132  Chapter 1 of the Crown who is a member of the Cabinet or the Attorney General, Advocate General for Scotland or the Attorney General (Northern Ireland). Special provisions apply to Welsh and Northern Irish bodies. In relation to these bodies consultation has to take place between the Secretary of State and relevant Welsh and Northern Irish bodies before he may make an order. Designated bodies will not be able to issue their own veto; but what is to stop special pleading between designated bodies and the Minister? The Lord Chancellor has stated that a veto will have to be agreed by the Cabinet and would be ‘very, very exceptional’ (The Guardian (2005) 1 January). 1.243  Until March 2014, seven vetoes have been issued.1 Four concerned access to the minutes of Cabinet meetings, in the first case involving discussion of the invasion of Iraq (see HC 622 (2008–09) and HC 218 (2009–10)), which also involved a further veto by the Attorney General. Two of these involved Cabinet meetings on devolution matters, one concerned NHS risk registers, one on the HS2 development and one on the Prince Charles correspondence (above). It should be noted that when the coalition government came to power, a case had been decided by the IC concerning the minutes from the Cabinet meeting discussing the Westland helicopter saga in the 1980s. A  refusal to disclose the minutes was overruled by the IC and the case was appealed to the tribunal unsuccessfully: Cabinet Office v IC EA/2010/0031. It reveals that the coalition government was initially adopting a similar approach to protection of Cabinet minutes. However, although the CO lost its appeal no veto was issued in this case which showed a new approach by the new government. O  Gay and E  Potton FOI and Ministerial Vetoes House of Commons Library (2014) http:// researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN05007/SN05007.pdf.

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information notices

1.244  Under s  51 of the FOIA  2000, the IC may serve on an authority an information notice. Information includes ‘unrecorded information’ (s  51(8)). This may be served (i) after an application for a decision under s 50, or (ii) where the IC reasonably requires any information in order to establish compliance with the requirements of Part I, or (iii) to determine whether an authority’s practice complies with that laid down in the codes under ss  45 and 46. The former code has been examined in a variety of contexts (and see eg paras 1.271 et seq and 1.282 et seq below). The Code under s 46 is concerned with records management (see para 4.73). The notice requires the authority to furnish the IC within a specified time and in any specified form with information relating to the above three matters. Notices must contain statements relating to an application under s  51 or in relation to (i) or (ii) above a statement of the relevance of the information and the reasons why the IC regards it as relevant. Particulars of rights of appeal and setting time limits which will not undermine appeal rights are also provided for.1 The memorandum on national security cases was discussed above (para 1.238). See FOIA 2000, ss 50(5) and (6), 51(3) and (4), 52(3)(b) and (3) and cf s 52(4).

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The freedom of information legislation   133 1.245  By s 51(5), legal professional privilege is protected from an information notice in so far as it covers communications between a professional legal adviser and his client in connection with giving of legal advice ‘with respect to his obligations, liabilities or rights under this Act’ and with respect to any communications between those parties and any other person ‘made in connection with or in contemplation of proceedings under or arising out of this Act’ and for the purposes of such proceedings. This includes proceedings before the Tribunal. The question of Information Notices and unsuccessful appeals against them is examined in Governing Body Aberdare Girls School v IC EA/2010/0102 and Swanage TC v IC EA/2009/0058. The tribunal has ruled that a PA does not have to comply with a DN served under s 51 where the request was for legal advice from the Attorney General on dealing with the PI factor.1 Ministry of Justice v IC EA/2007/0016.

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failure to comply with a notice and appeals

1.246  Where an authority has failed to comply with any of the above notices, the IC may certify such failure for the court1 which may after due procedures, punish the failure as a contempt. An authority which in purported compliance with an information notice makes a false statement, either intentionally or recklessly, will be taken to have failed to comply with the notice. Under FOIA 2000, Sch 3 the IC is given considerable powers of entry and inspection under warrant issued by a circuit judge. Decision notices end with a reference to these powers and they have only rarely been invoked. This is the High Court or Court of Session: s 53(4).

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1.247  Both complainants and public authorities on whom a decision notice has been served may appeal to the Tribunal against the notice. A public authority may appeal against service upon it of an information or enforcement notice. The Tribunal has extensive powers to allow an appeal on the ground that a notice is not in accordance with the law or where the notice involved an exercise of discretion by the Commissioner, ‘that he ought to have exercised his discretion differently’. This allows the Tribunal to reverse a finding on its merits. It may also on appeal review any finding of fact on which the notice was based. Schedules 2 and 4 contain further provisions relating to the Tribunal.1 From the Tribunal’s decision there is an appeal on a point of law to the Upper Tribunal. Notice of appeal must contain a postal and not just an email address: W  Thackeray v IC EA/2010/0088 – Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009, r 22(a) and (b). One of the lay members of the Tribunal will represent the interests of requesters of information under the FOIA  2000. This amends DPA  1998, s  6(6). Schedule  4 contains details inter alia on the constitution of the Tribunal in national security cases. See SI  2000/189, amended by SI 2002/2722, and SI 2005/13 which, inter alia, revokes SI 2000/206 on national security appeals relating to data protection. SI 2005/13, r 24 states that hearings are to be in private, unless the Tribunal otherwise directs, with the consent of the minister and parties. SI  2005/14 concerns enforcement appeals: proceedings are in public unless the Tribunal otherwise directs under the terms of r 22. Appeals under ss 23 and 24 are made now to the Upper Tribunal.

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134  Chapter 1 1.248  The Cabinet Office v IC EA/2010/0028 was an appeal that concerned the transition of the IT into the FTT and, more particularly, the Practice Note dealing with Confidentiality and Redaction. A new Practice Note was issued for the new regime entitled ‘Protection of Confidential Information in Information Rights Appeals before the First-tier Tribunal in the General Regulatory Tribunal on or after 18 January 2010’. The public authority initially sought to oppose the revelation of a confidential annex appended to its Notice of Appeal. The Practice Note stated that the ‘old system would continue, namely, that there would probably be in most cases an open bundle and a closed bundle’. The primary principal is that the tribunal should have all the relevant information necessary for it to make a just and fair decision. The appellant withdrew its objection to confidential disclosure before the conclusion of the appeal. However the FTT thought it necessary to confirm that the old system would continue. 1.249  The Commissioner can make a decision notice in relation to disclosure under s 1(1) and s 2 and in relation to provisions under ss 11 and 17. Such notices may be issued in relation to other failures to comply with the requirements of Part I of the Act. Decisions are binding subject to appeal or veto. Where information is covered by s 2 – the clause dealing with discretionary decisions by the authority on disclosure of exempt information – the Commissioner can make a decision requiring disclosure – the IC can even enforce such a decision unless a certificate is served under s 53(1). This differs from the situation in the Consultation Bill and the Bills published in November 1999 and February 2000. The IC is not restricted to the correction of the process of decision-making by the authority. The Campaign for FOI believed that the Commissioner’s role under these earlier versions of the Bill was basically that of checking that relevant factors had been considered. There is, in other words, no role for appraisal, balancing or judgement on the merits by the Commissioner. It may be that this original power was not so restricted because the Commissioner will have wide access to the relevant information and records and will be able more easily to fathom how the decision was made and therefore will have ammunition to criticise it. Under s 51 the Commissioner may serve the authority with an information notice. The IC should, in other words, have access to the relevant information as well as the decision record and the reasons for the decision – unlike the applicant under the draft Bill. Will the IC have access to the records generated by the complaint – the internal correspondence? Although the Commissioner acts like a reviewing court in the above enquiry, the IC will have far more material to dig beneath the surface than a reviewing court usually possess. The Act has made it clearer that the onus is on the authority to justify its decision to withhold information in all cases, especially to the ‘discretionary’ information. Authorities are required to give reasons for their decisions; this was added in the second Bill. In looking at the considerations on the public interest, and armed with the information itself, the authorities will of necessity have to explain their decisions. If explained satisfactorily, fine. But if the explanation is not justified by the evidence, or appears disproportionate and suggests a failure not only to consider relevant factors but a failure to give them proper weight, then this could reveal a fault in the decision-making process under s 2 and the Commissioner may, by virtue of s 52(1) and (2) which concerns enforcement notices, require the authority to

The freedom of information legislation   135 take, within a specified time, specified steps in order to comply, and the EN must contain a statement of the requirements of Part I which the IC is satisfied that the public authority has failed to comply with and her reasons for so concluding. The Commissioner, to repeat, will have access to all relevant information and reasoning. Reviewing courts are rarely given this amount of ammunition. This is reinforced by the fact that on an appeal to the Tribunal the Commissioner’s exercise of discretion may be overturned where the IC ‘ought to have exercised his discretion differently’ (s 58(1)(b)). This suggests considerable power in the Commissioner but of course much depends on how the Tribunal exercises its appellate powers. Furthermore, where there is a failure to act upon an EN by the authority, the Commissioner may certify the failure to the court which it can punish as a contempt (s 54(3)). 1.250  Under the later Bill, a power to recommend disclosure of discretionary information was given to the IC. This expresses what would probably have occurred de facto. Under a later version of the Bill, this recommendation was removed because the Commissioner may enforce his decision including disclosure of exempt information subject to a certificate from the accountable person vetoing the IC’s decision. This is yet another example of a veto power in the Minister or other specified person. The Home Secretary expressed his intention that the IC’s decision would prevail over bodies such as local authorities and quangos etc. Details were to be provided. The only method by which a veto may be challenged is via a judicial review. The IC will possess a great deal of evidence if he is permitted to seek review as a person with a ‘sufficient interest’ under Part 54 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (CPR). 1.251  It seems that contempt proceedings are unlikely to have any, or any significant, role in enforcement unless there is no appeal and the authority does not comply with a decision or other notice of the Commissioner. DNs contain notice of the contempt provisions and the IC has had to remind PAs of this power. In a difficult case it might be asked whether it would not have been better to give the Commissioner a power similar to the Northern Ireland Commissioner to seek an injunction to force a recalcitrant authority to comply in particular with decisions relating to ss 1 and 2? More generally, injunctions may be issued against Ministers in their official capacity under judicial review proceedings. Contempt seems to be confined in practice to those cases where, as with the PCA, there is obstruction or wilful interference with the Commissioner’s powers and duties of investigation or, possibly, persistent refusal. Would these not be more appropriately dealt with by an injunction?1 In 1967, it was the case that injunctions would not issue against officers of the Crown in their official capacity. Case law has changed this position. If an injunction is not complied with, then it becomes a matter of contempt. In M v Home Office,2 the Law Lords said that the courts would not enforce a finding of contempt against a Minister – for failing to comply with an injunction – but would leave enforcement to the political arena. Under FOIA  2000, s  77, a criminal offence is created of altering documents etc to prevent disclosure. This is broader than the proposal in the WP. 2 [1993] 3 All ER 537, HL. 1

136  Chapter 1 1.252  It is interesting that the Scottish FOIA does not provide for a tribunal, thereby reviving the importance of the above discussion vis-à-vis the Scottish IC.

Awarding costs 1.253  A discussion on the principles involved in awarding costs is in Royal Mail Group Ltd v IC EA/2010/0005 where an appeal was withdrawn. Should costs be awarded? The governing provisions used to be in the Information Tribunal (Enforcement Appeals) Rules 2005, SI  2005/14, r  29. They are now in the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, s 29 and the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009, r 10 as amended – and may be awarded against a party ‘acting unreasonably’ in bringing, defending or conducting proceedings or where the IC acted unreasonably in making a decision, order or direction. The previous provision in r  29 stated that costs could be awarded where appealing or decisions were ‘manifestly unreasonable’ or where action was frivolous, vexatious, improper or unreasonable.

What matters are within the jurisdiction of the commissioner and tribunal? 1.254  This question became a matter of contention very early in the operational life of FOIA 2000 and led to a decision of the House of Lords which has been examined in detail above (para 1.90).

General functions of Secretary of State, Lord Chancellor and Information Commissioner 1.255  Part III of the FOIA 2000 concerns the general functions of the above Ministers and the IC. Under s  45, the Secretary of State is to issue a code of practice giving guidance to authorities about the practice which it would be desirable, in his opinion, for them to follow in connection with the discharge of their duties under Part I of the Act. This may be revised. A revised model has been referred to (para 1.57, and paras 1.270 and 1.271 below).1 The Commissioner has to be consulted before the issuing or revising of a code and any codes or revisions have to be placed before both Houses of Parliament. The codes will in particular advise on: advice by authorities to those who are making requests for access – compliance with the code is taken as evidence of performing the duty under s 16 (see para 1.83 above); transfer of requests between authorities; consultation with persons to whom the information requested relates or ‘persons who are likely to be affected by the disclosure of information’; the inclusion of contracts entered into between public authorities of terms relating to the disclosure of information; and procedures provided by public authorities for dealing with complaints about requests for information. The code may make different provision for different public authorities. Two codes have been published and approved and a third is in draft (see below). The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 makes provision for

The freedom of information legislation   137 the s 45 code to cover disclosure of data sets and re-use of information (para 1.79 above) and the draft code covers this. https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/revised-freedom-of-information-code-ofpractice.

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1.256  A  code is also to be issued by the Lord Chancellor under s  46 on the public records aspects of the legislation. A  code was updated in 2009 (see para 4.73 below).1 http://www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/foi-procedural-unhappy.htm.

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1.257  Under s  47, the IC is given a wide range of promotional powers to encourage the pursuit of good practice by authorities and to promote the observance by authorities of the Act’s requirements and the provisions of the codes referred to above. The IC may publicise in such manner as she deems appropriate such information for the public as the IC deems expedient about the operation of the Act, good practice – which is not limited to compliance with the Act or the codes – other matters within the scope of the Act and the IC may advise on those matters. The IC may assess whether the authority is following good practice, but, and this is important, only with the consent of the authority and the Commissioner may charge for this service and any others under s 47. The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 removes the requirement under s 47(4) of the IC having to obtain the Secretary of State’s consent before charging for services. Those services for which a charge may be made are listed and may be amended by order. 1.258  Where an authority does not appear to be complying with a code of practice, the IC may give the authority a Practice Recommendation in writing (see para  1.22 above) specifying the steps which in the IC’s opinion ought to be taken for promoting such conformity. We have seen how nothing in the Act makes this enforceable under the Act unless it breaches a requirement under Part I. Interestingly, a power to issue recommendations as to outcome in relation to s 2 information was removed in Committee in the Commons (see above). The IC lays an annual report before both Houses of Parliament on the IC’s work and has power to lay other reports as he thinks fit – see below under conclusion where a ‘veto’ is exercised and the IC has undertaken to issue a report. The publication of reports is now set out in the Data Protection Act 2018 (ss 139– 141, see para 2.143).

Public records aspects of the FOIA 2000 1.259  The FOIA 2000 has made some significant amendments to the Public Records Acts 1958 as amended and the Public Records (Northern Ireland) Act 1923. These are examined in ch 4 (paras 4.62 et seq below).1 See The National Archives (2016), ‘How to manage your information’, http://www. nationalarchives.gov.uk/information-management/manage-information/ (10/1/2018).

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138  Chapter 1

Disclosure of information between Commissioner and Ombudsmen 1.260  Under s  76 of the FOIA  2000, the Commissioner is given a specific power to disclose information obtained by or furnished to the Commissioner to the Ombudsmen. These include: the Parliamentary Ombudsman (PO); the Health Service Ombudsman; and local ombudsmen. Details of the Scottish and Welsh Ombudsmen have moved on (see para 6.138 below). The Northern Ireland Ombudsman is included. A new section 76A includes the Scottish Information Commissioner. The information which may be supplied is that obtained or furnished under the FOIA 2000 or the DPA 1998. It may be disclosed if it appears to the IC that the information relates to a matter which could be the subject of an investigation by that person under their governing enactments. Schedule  7 to the FOIA 2000 amends the governing statutes or Orders of Ombudsmen to allow them to disclose information to the IC where the Ombudsmen believe that the information relates to a matter in which the IC could exercise power by virtue of Part V of the DPA 1998 (enforcement); s 48 of the FOIA 2000 (practice recommendations); Part IV of the FOIA 2000 (enforcement); or commission of an offence under the DPA 1998 except under Sch 9, para 12; or under s 77 of the FOIA  2000 (altering etc records). The Commissioner may disclose to the Scottish Information Commissioner any information obtained or furnished as mentioned in FOIA  2000, s  76(1) if it appears to the Commissioner that the information is of the same type that could be obtained by, or furnished to, the Scottish Information Commissioner under or for the purposes of the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002. Finally, there will be occasions when a complaint received by the PO will be wholly or partly about a breach of the FOIA 2000; or, conversely, a complaint received by the Information Commissioner might include matters of alleged maladministration. The Parliamentary Ombudsman’s website the British and Irish Ombudsman Association prepared a protocol to establish broad principles for the ‘referral and handling of such ‘hybrid’ complaints, which can then be used by all ombudsman and complaint-handling schemes’ (and see SI 2007/1889 which covers ombudsmen only).1 https://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/documents/1042539/mou-phso.pdf (8/05/2018).

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1.261  This suggests a very close working relationship between the IC and Ombudsmen. A  new s  76B added by Sched 19 to the DPA  2018 provides for disclosure on information to the First Tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal. Basically, restrictions do not apply apart from those in Parts 1–7 or Chapter 1 Part 9 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016.

Some general points no statutory rights of action

1.262  The FOIA  2000 confers no right of action in civil proceedings for any failure to comply with any duty imposed by or under this act. This will not prevent actions for negligent exercise of duties or breaches of confidence because these are not imposed by or under the Act.

The freedom of information legislation   139 repeal of existing secrecy provisions

1.263  If it appears that an existing enactment (which does not include a statutory instrument or order) prohibits the disclosure of information (including ‘unrecorded information’) under s 1 or 2 of the FOIA 2000, it may be repealed or amended by order. The list of such statutes as published in 1993 and updated is contained in Annex B. It now numbers in the region of 330–340 legal provisions. This did not include the OSA  1989. It nonetheless represents a considerable corpus of provisions preventing access to information including many which impose criminal penalties for unauthorised disclosures. The Select Committee recommended a procedure not unlike the one used for deregulation orders to review existing legislation with a view to its repeal by order. A  publication from the Lord Chancellor’s Department Interim Report on Statutory Provisions concerning Disclosure of Information (May 2002) did include the OSA  1989. Orders under FOIA, s 75 repealing, or amending, some statutes were laid before Parliament in November 2004 and included: Factories Act 1961, s 154; Offices, Shops and Railway Premises Act 1963, s 59; Medicines Act 1968, s 118; National Health Service Act 1977, Sch 11, para 5; Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, s  28; Audit Commission Act 1998, s  49; Access to Justice Act 1999, s  20 and Biological Standards Act 1975, s 5 (SI 2004/3364). In 2005, the Department for Constitutional Affairs reported that there were in existence over 330 provisions prohibiting the publication of information in addition to the Official Secrecy Acts, but only just over 200 were relevant to FOIA.1 Candidates for repeal, modification, sunset clauses etc were identified. DCA Review of Statutory Prohibitions on Disclosure (2005) http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov. uk/+/http://www.dca.gov.uk/StatutoryBarsReport2005.pdf (8/05/2018).

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offences under the act

1.264  Section 77 creates an offence of altering, defacing, blocking, erasing, destroying or concealing any record which has been requested under the FOIA 2000 or to which an applicant would have been entitled under s 1 or 2 of the FOIA 2000, or under s 7 of the DPA 1998. The offence is committed by any person who does any of the above with the intention of preventing its disclosure by the authority of all, or any part of, the information to a person entitled to receive it. Proceedings may only be instituted by the Commissioner or Director of Public Prosecutions.1 Or NI analogues and level 5 on the standard scale.

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existing powers of disclosure

1.265  Section 78 states that nothing in the FOIA  2000 is to be taken to limit the powers of a public authority to disclose information held by it. This would include both statutory and common law powers. Authorities are free to disclose whatever is not prohibited from disclosure, especially in relation to

140  Chapter 1 central government and police under the Official Secrets Acts, which carry a significant degree of self-authorisation, however vague this is in practice (see para 4.255). If statutory powers are more extensive than the FOIA 2000, then the statutory powers prevail. Could common law powers be more extensive than the FOIA 2000? Could the FOIA 2000 be by-passed by resort to a more relaxed common law power? It would appear strange if the code represented by the FOIA 2000 could be by-passed in such a manner, or indeed what advantage there may be in seeking to do this. However, in the Select Committee’s scrutiny of the Consultation Paper and Bill, the Home Office legal adviser pointed out that refusals to disclose under discretionary powers contained in the Act could be challenged by judicial review. This was because the clause merely dealt with an existing discretion.1 This in spite of the comprehensive provisions contained in the Act via the IC and tribunal. This seems questionable in relation to any common law powers. A specific provision allowing disclosure would have to be invoked. Information holders must be free to disclose information as they wish in the absence of statutory restrictions or where a disclosure would be otherwise unlawful. The existing administrative provisions in the Code on Access ceased to apply on 31 December 2004. The decision in Kennedy and use of common law powers of disclosure circumventing an absolute exemption were explained above (para 1.154). HC 570-xii (1998–99) q 1068. It raises some very difficult points on the relationship between statutory remedies and judicial review: see R v Falmouth etc Health Authority, ex p South West Water Services [2000] 3 All ER 306, CA.

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Some problems with the FOIA 2000 (i)  recorded information

1.266  The first clause of the Draft Bill stated that the duty to disclose will only cover recorded information. This will not apply to unrecorded information. This provision has now been moved to FOIA  2000, s  84, the interpretation clause which states that information means information recorded in any form. Arguably, the WP went further than this in that it covered information even in non-recorded form as did the code, ie opinion and advice may be disclosed (paras 57 and 58 of the Guidance (1997 edn)). Section 84 is now subject to ss 51(8) and 75(2) which both include a reference to unrecorded information, ie for information notices and in relation to existing prohibitions on disclosure.

(ii)  union of data protection and information commissioners and tribunals

1.267  This was perceived as a possible ‘issue’ on the introduction of FOIA in the UK. The IC and the Data Protection Commissioner (DPC) (the former Data Protection Registrar) became one and the same, as indeed did the Data Protection Tribunal and the Information Tribunal. The apprehension was that privacy would predominate over access rights reinforced by the fact that the

The freedom of information legislation   141 DPC has concentrated on privacy protection as provided within the terms of the data protection legislation. A similar point may be made about the tribunal, although it deals with very few DPA cases. Most of the DPC’s work involved regulation, promotion and supervision rather than taking up individuals’ rights of access. The IC’s remit comes from a different angle – access for individuals and openness although the IC has promotional features also. A fear that privacy may predominate over access to information featured in other constitutional reforms such as human rights and the balance between freedom of speech and privacy protection. Where separate access and privacy regimes exist in other jurisdictions, privacy regimes have taken the dominant role, though not always, and much seems to depend upon force of personality.1 See Hazell, para 1.19, note 2 above. Note also R v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex p Fisher: C-369/98 (2000) Times, 10 October, ECJ. In ex p Fisher, the MAFF refused to provide a farmer with data which concerned the set-aside scheme under the EC agricultural policy. The data was supplied by the applicant’s predecessor in title and concerned ‘set aside’ fields. MAFF claimed it was protected by the DPA 1984. The farmer, without the information, was fined when he used fields that were set aside. The ECJ held that the data contained no privacy interests that overrode a legitimate claim for access. Nothing interfered with the data provider’s interests, or fundamental rights or freedoms. The question of the relationship between the Data Protection Directive and the Regulation on access to information in the EU (see ch 5) has been contentious; this has been an issue between the Commission and the EU Ombudsman: see Ian Harden Queen’s Papers on Europeanisation No 9/02 – Openness and Data Protection in The European Union (2002); see Art 8  ECHR and Amann v Switzerland (Application no.27798/95). Stories of unnecessary secrecy on officials’ names are legion. See chs 2 and 5.

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1.268  On the other side, no-one can accuse the Commissioner of actually coming with pre-inclined views against access although, in her evidence to the Select Committee on Public Administration, the previous Commissioner saw herself very much as the champion of privacy in relation to personal information.1 Now her statutory remit will be broadened. And new Commissioners were appointed in 2002, 2009 and 2016. The union of Commissioners has the benefit of addressing and removing the lack of clarity on this point revealed by the White Paper and highlighted by the Committee. Furthermore, the Act has taken up the suggestion made by the Committee on Public Administration2 that access by data subjects to information about themselves is made under the DPA 1998 and access by applicants to personal information concerning others is made under the FOIA 2000 amending the DPA 1998 and subject to data protection principles and exemptions. The new bodies are also given the title of IC and Tribunal, perhaps emphasising a point. The decisions of the IC and tribunal on the FOI/DP interface have not given precedence to one regime over the other. However, under s 72 disclosures under FOIA do not override DPA obligations unlike the case with other statutory regimes on disclosure.3 HC 398-I (1997–98), pp 56 et seq. HC 398-I (1997–98), para 19. 3 Under DPA 1998, s 3, which makes data available under statutes apart from FOIA and regulations exempt from DPA provisions. The fullest judicial explanation of the relationship between FOIA and DPA is from Lord Hope in Common Services Agency v Scottish Information Commissioner [2008]  UKHL  47: ‘It is obvious that not all government can be completely open, and special consideration also had to be given to the release of personal information relating to individuals’. 1 2

142  Chapter 1 (iii)  defamation

1.269  Communication of information under s 1 of the FOIA 2000 to a person and which has been supplied by a third party will attract qualified privilege unless the publication is shown to have been made with malice (s 79). (iv)  third party rights

1.270  The White Paper stated that further thought would have to be given to the question of third party rights, ie  those affected by another’s request for information, very often commercial information but it often includes personal information. This allows a procedure whereby third parties who ‘own’ or are the subjects of the information are notified and may challenge applications or decisions to disclose information. Clearly, in relation to personal data, the DPA  2018 will have to be complied with. The GDPR recital 154 and art  86 basically allow disclosure, subject to the appropriate protection of personal data, eg  on public interest grounds. Section 41 of the FOIA  2000, on information covered by legal rights of confidentiality, may be engaged. Under s  45(2)(c) of the FOIA  2000 such persons are to be consulted under the terms of the code of practice made by the Secretary of State. ‘Any party’ may be joined on appeal to the Tribunal. This all appears a little jejune. A third party is unlikely to be a complainant to the Commissioner under the terms of the Act – they have not requested information (s 50(1)). Presumably they may, however, be a complainant re maladministration to the PCA via an MP but only apropos of those authorities covered by the PCA’s legislation. After the access provisions had been in force for a matter of weeks, there was a considerable generation of interest in the disclosure of papers from the previous Conservative government on the ‘Black Wednesday’ episode concerning the UK’s departure from the Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992. A protocol was drafted allowing former Ministers to seek the support of the Attorney-General to block disclosure of ministerial papers from their period in office. If this involved consultation, this was understandable. If it went further, it would seem to breach the Act. Requests would be handled by civil servants. 1.271  The Code under s 45 offers advice on ‘Consultation with Third Parties’. An earlier version of the Code stated that where the consent of a third party would enable disclosure to be made the third party should be consulted before reaching a decision unless it is clear that their consent would not be forthcoming. Where a third party’s legal rights are not involved, consultation may still be appropriate to establish whether disclosure would not be allowed on some other ground, whether other laws prohibit disclosure or whether the cost would be disproportionate. Where the views of a third party may help in establishing whether an exemption exists or whether discretion should be exercised on public interest grounds under s  2, they should be consulted. The version laid before Parliament is more general. It is ‘highly recommended’ that PAs take appropriate steps to ensure third parties and those who supply information are aware of the PAs duties under the Act and the extent of the exemptions. Consultation may be necessary to establish whether advice on copyright or intellectual property needs

The freedom of information legislation   143 to be given to the requester. Where information is supplied by one government department to another, the latter should not disclose the information without first consulting the supplying department. Representative bodies may be consulted and authorities are reminded that consultation cannot deny applicants’ rights under the Act. Consultation is not necessary where the PA does not intend to disclose information (para 37) or where the third party’s views can have no effect, where no exemption applies so that information should be disclosed. However, it seems some points of complication have been overlooked. The provisions on third parties are in Part 3 of the draft Code. These provisions are weak compared with those which exist elsewhere such as the USA or Canada. 1.272  What if there is a wrongful disclosure that causes damage to the provider of the information – the company? Imagine that the department did not notify the third party about an access request when it should have done. If the failure is an oversight then this would appear to be a pretty straightforward case of negligence and could also justify an action for breach of confidence if the information is confidential in law, especially where provided voluntarily by the company. Even when provided compulsorily, that would not automatically mean that there is no duty of confidentiality (though see para 1.274 below). But negligence would suffice if the necessary elements were established:1 in Swinney a police force negligently allowed confidential information to be entered on documents from which an informer’s identity could be established and then failed to keep the information secure with the result that it was stolen with serious consequences for the plaintiff. The Court of Appeal, upholding Laws J, accepted that a special relationship arguably arose from these confidential circumstances and the plaintiff’s claim was not precluded by any general principle of immunity. An application to strike out the claim was rejected. Swinney v Chief Constable of the Northumbria Police [1996] 3 All ER 449, CA.

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1.273  What if the authority did not think there was any need to refer the matter to the third party? Basically, the situation here covers that where the authority has made an allegedly wrong judgment about the exempt nature of the information and wrongly allows access without warning the third party provider. Or the department considered it was notionally exempt but there was a public interest override in disclosure. Negligence is going to be difficult to establish because of the question of judgement or discretion that is involved. It would, arguably, at least have to be Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational to mount a private law action in negligence on an analogy with Anns v London Borough of Merton1 and that difficult line of cases. Unreasonableness or irrationality are not actionable per se; the only relief may be under Part 54 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 for a declaration after the event or possibly, but extremely unlikely, a quashing order (certiorari). Damages may be awarded under actions for breach of confidentiality. In the latter case especially, the real damage brought about by disclosure may already have been perpetrated and the money remedy will offer little solace. [1978] AC 728, HL, and Barrett v Enfield London Borough Council [1999] 3 All ER 193, HL. See para 10.52.

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144  Chapter 1 1.274  If the information were protected by the law of confidentiality, might there be a remedy for breach of confidentiality? Would there be any difference between information provided under enforcement and that provided voluntarily by the company – it has been seen how distinctions have been drawn by FOI regimes between information supplied voluntarily and otherwise. Case law has not precisely addressed this point but the courts have been reluctant to circumscribe official use of information for causes which are in the public interest:1 ‘In my view, where information has been obtained under statutory powers the duty of confidence owed on the Marcel principle cannot operate so as to prevent the person obtaining the information from disclosing it to those persons to whom the statutory provisions either require or authorise him to make disclosure.’2 See eg Smith Kline & French Laboratories Ltd v Licensing Authority [1989] 1 All ER 578, HL; Hellewell v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [1995] 4 All ER 473; Marcel v Metropolitan Police Comr [1992] Ch 225 esp at 262, CA, and Hamilton v Naviede [1995] 2 AC 75. And note the cases on the Monopolies and Mergers Commission: R v MMC, ex p Elders IXL Ltd [1987] 1 All ER 451 and R v MMC, ex p Matthew Brown plc [1987] 1 All ER 463. And note Melton Medes Ltd v SIB [1995] 3 All ER 880, CA. Also, R v Chief Constable of North Wales Police, ex p AB [1998] 3 All ER 310, CA; Re Joseph Hargreaves Ltd [1900] 1 Ch 347, CA; Lord Reid in Conway v Rimmer [1968] AC 910, HL; Lonrho v Fayed (No 4) [1994] QB 775, CA; Preston Borough Council v McGrath (2000) Times, 19 May, CA; Woolgar v Chief Constable of the Sussex Police [1999] 3 All ER 604, CA; R v Chief Constables of C and D, ex p A (2000) Times, 7 November; R (X) v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police [2005] 1 All ER 610 (CA) and para 2.335. below. See Taveta Insurance v Financial Reporting Council [2018] EWHC 1662 (Admin). 2 Hamilton v Naviede above at 102 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 1

1.275  Furthermore, increased sensitivity to privacy will doubtless be an important factor.1 See paras 2.215 et seq below, and R (Ellis) v Chief Constable of Essex Police [2003] EWHC 1321 (Admin): from the headnote: ‘E applied for a declaration from the court as to the lawfulness of a proposed police initiative whereby posters showing offenders’ names and faces would be displayed in public places. The purpose of the scheme was to reduce the incidence of burglaries and car crimes in the Brentwood area. E, who had a number of previous convictions for dishonesty and car related crime, had been sentenced to three years and six months’ imprisonment and the police considered that he might be a suitable candidate for the scheme. It was thought that, given his record, there was little risk of the scheme affecting E’s future conduct and although his former partner and daughter lived in the Brentwood area, they had taken new names so would not suffer as a result of the publicity. E contended that the notoriety resulting from the poster campaign could reduce his chances of obtaining accommodation or employment in the future, and that his family might suffer adverse consequences. Held, making no order on the application, that the question of whether the scheme was lawful or unlawful would depend on the individual circumstances of the offenders selected for inclusion in the scheme, and on how the scheme would operate in practice. Further information was required before it could be determined whether the possible benefits of the scheme were proportionate to the intrusion into the offender’s rights under the Human Rights Act 1998 Sch 1, Part I, Art. 8. The offender’s family also had rights under Art 8, and the need to safeguard children was particularly important’. See R(H) v A  City Council [2011]  EWCA  Civ 403, where restrictions were placed on blanket notification of sex assault convictions and R (F) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 17 ruling s 82(1) of the 2003 Act was incompatible with Art 8 ECHR because it made no provision for review of notification requirements for individual circumstances and were therefore disproportionate. Sex offender notification to the local police was introduced in 1997 and see Sexual Offences Act 2003, ss 80–92. See Guidance on Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 November 2016 (Home Office) https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/576226/Guidance_on_part_2_of_the_sexual_offences_act_2003_2.pdf (9/05/2018).

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The freedom of information legislation   145 1.276  Almost all these cases deal with the situation where there has been a proper disclosure – the putative argument from the provider of information in our case will be that the disclosure was unlawful because the discretion was not exercised lawfully. An unlawful decision cannot defeat the confidentiality in the information even if it causes the ‘secrecy’ to evaporate. The Law Commission in its 1981 paper on Breach of Confidence (Cmnd 8388 (1981)) did not wish to commit itself to so robust a statement on the position of information given for reward or under compulsion, ie that it would remain confidential. Furthermore, the courts have noted that confidentiality may exist between authorities and information providers even when provided under compulsion.1 There seems no good reason why the recipient of information should not maintain confidentiality even where the information is acquired under compulsory power unless there is a clear statutory authorisation for disclosure. Where information is given to another Crown body by a department it may well be there is no question of breach of confidence because the information is owned by the ‘Crown’.2 Particular attention must be paid to the facts of each case and there may be a judicial willingness to confine such practice.3 IRC v National Federation etc [1981] 2 All ER 93, HL. R v Blackledge (1996) 1 Cr App Rep 326, CA. And see FOIA 2000, s 81. 3 And note recent legislation allowing disclosure of information between government bodies of personal information: Finance Act 1997, s 110. See Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Baker [1998] Ch 356 – no privilege (lawyer/client/litigation) for a statutory report. 1 2

1.277  There might of course be maladministration in such a decision which would attract the PCA, although to what extent would there be an overlap between a legal remedy and a remedy provided by the PCA would be a point to consider (see paras 4.134 et seq below). 1.278  There may well be occasions when although the public interest will not justify disclosure of a trade secret, ‘commercial interests’ is not a sufficient justification not to disclose and although the provider of information should usually be consulted, this may not be practicable where a public health notice or warning ‘must be issued as a matter of urgency’.1 See the 1997 Guidance on the Code of Access, p 76.

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(v)  government contractors

1.279  Will duties exist on such contractors ie, companies, to provide information? Under the 1994 Code as revised they were under such a duty when providing services because they were within the terms of the PCA 1967 which governed the operation of the Code. This would be especially important where information had to be provided under the Citizen’s Charter, the Service First initiative – and presumably any successor. Arrangements will have to be made as between the department and contractor as to who should disclose the information and how. Section 75 of, and Sch 15 to, the Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994 (as amended) allow restricted or confidential information to be handed to contractors on terms that they give it the protection owed by Ministers and civil

146  Chapter 1 servants. This would in any event be implied by the contract as a matter of law. Nothing should require the disclosure of commercially confidential information. 1.280  Where services are provided to government, there may well be considerations of intellectual property, commercial confidentiality or management and negotiating positions requiring confidentiality. The Guidance on the 1994 Code stated that disclosure under the Code will have to be decided on a case by case basis. This is a situation which ought to be covered clearly by contractual provisions relating to property rights in information or reports and confidentiality. 1.281  While the tendency in the law and practice has been to introduce greater openness and transparency into the tendering process, some of these tendencies have been driven by EC requirements implemented into our law, the general position relating to genuine commercial confidences of tenderers and contractors will be maintained. It was noted above how the Guidance on the Code on Access stated that the following should be disclosed: (a) the identity of the successful tenderer; (b) the nature of the job, service or goods to be supplied; (c) the performance standards set (which should be output based); (d) the criteria for award of contract; and (e) the winning tender price or range of prices (maximum/minimum) paid. 1.282  The s 45 code on the FOIA 2000 in the first version stated that public authorities should not agree to hold information ‘in confidence’ which is not confidential in nature (ie protected by the law of confidentiality: see para 1.203 above). Improper pressure to incorporate confidentiality claims in contracts should be resisted, and acceptance will have to be justified. The Code reminded PAs that duties under FOIA are not, to use a phrase, ‘biddable’. If ‘exceptionally’ non-disclosure provisions need to be incorporated in a contract, the schedule to the contract should identify what information should not be disclosed. However, this is subject to duties to disclose under the Act if the information is not exempt. If a PA wishes to prevent a contractor disclosing information, this should be done in accordance with the Act by contractual terms drafted as ‘narrowly as possible’. The public authority will have to disclose any information in compliance with the Act unless the contractor is ‘designated’ under s 5. If a contractor is designated as a PA, cost of compliance will then have to be incorporated within the contractual terms. Needless to say, prohibitions contained in the Official Secrets Acts will have to be maintained. The second version of the Code approved by Parliament provided that ‘Public Authorities should bear clearly in mind their obligations under the FOIA when preparing to enter into contracts which may contain terms relating to the disclosure of information by them’ (para  31). Confidentiality must be consistent with the Act’s exemptions. It has been seen how a duty of confidence can only arise where the law of confidentiality imposes such an obligation. It is not open to parties to reinvent, by contract or otherwise, the law of confidentiality. The later version of the Code also stipulates that reasons for claiming confidentiality should be provided. The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) former adviser Partnership UK,

The freedom of information legislation   147 which is part publicly owned, posted an online database providing details (but not shares), capital values and, in some cases, advisers on PFI arrangements. Much depends on what departments are willing to release, prompted in some cases by FOIA (www.partnershipsuk.org.uk). 1.283  Part 9 of the s 45 Code has guidance on transparency and confidentiality obligations in contracts and outsourced services. Contractors and authorities should be clear what information is held on behalf of a public authority and so covered by FOIA. This should be scheduled in the contract and publicly available. These appropriate arrangements may include: • how and when the contractor should be approached for information, and who the contact points in each organisation are; • how quickly the information should be provided to the public authority, bearing in mind the statutory deadline for responding to the request; • how any disagreement about disclosure between the public authority and contractor will be addressed; • how any request for internal review or subsequent appeal to the Information Commissioner will be handled; • the contractor’s responsibility for maintaining adequate systems for record keeping in relation to information held on behalf of the public authority; and • where the public authority itself holds the requested information, the circumstances under which the public authority must consult the contractor about disclosure, and the process to be adopted in such cases. 1.284  One should not overlook the public interest in disclosure where items of fraud, waste or mismanagement occur. One should also note the legislation to protect employee whistleblowers who disclose evidence of serious wrongdoing in the genuine public interest (see paras 4.301 et seq below). In May 2018, the Work and Pensions and BEIS committees published a joint report into the failed government contractor, Carillion, finding it reported on corporate ‘recklessness, hubris and greed’. ‘Same old story. Same old greed.’ Carillion worked on hospital, education, prison and other contracts. It left £7 billion of liabilities. It failed to provide information that would have been ‘straightforwardly available’ according to the chief executive of the Insolvency Service. Accountancy firms were seriously remiss in their auditing. Practices of the company were aimed at deceiving lenders. The firms assisted an oligopoly ‘but fails the wider economy’.1 It followed other notorious failures by government contractors. The Committee on Public Accounts produced a report in relation to the high risk posed by Carillion, one of the largest government strategic contractors, in which it set out the Strategic Suppliers Risk Management Policy, a successor to the RAG system (identified at para 1.159 above) but with an added ‘black’, meaning very high risk.2 Carillion HC 769 (2017–19). Committee on Public Accounts HC 1045 (2017–19). On the critical comments of the Financial Reporting Council on the ‘big four’ auditing companies auditing Carillion, see para 1.161 above.

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148  Chapter 1 1.285  The former Office of Government Commerce produced guidance on government contracts and FOIA1 and the MoJ produced guidance on ‘gateways reviews’ involving IT contracts.2 http://www.ogc.gov.uk/freedom_of_information_freedom_of_information_act_2000_-_model_ contract_clauses.asp on model contract clauses. 2 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/foiassumptions-gateway-reviews.htm. 1

(vi)  response times

1.286  The response time was 40 days in the Bill. The White Paper did not commit itself to any length so there is no obvious inconsistency but 40 days is longer than any period identified in any comparable FOI regime that is set out in the White Paper. The Code response time is 20 days for ‘simple requests’ and can be extended. The Act states that responses must be made promptly to requests for access ‘and in any event not later than the twentieth working day following the date of receipt’. The response period has been halved. This does not include any period taken to pay for a fee following a fees notice. The period may be modified by regulations which may specify a different period of days in relation to different cases and which confer a discretion on the Commissioner. By December 2004, four circumstances justifying extension had been identified (see para  1.75 above). The s  45 Code recommended that a public interest extension should not go beyond an additional 20 days. Where a longer extension is appropriate, the requester should be notified. Delays beyond the 20-day period for response are common.

(vii)  reasons for decisions

1.287  The White Paper’s promise to create a duty to provide reasons for decisions by bodies covered by the Act appears in s 19(3)(b) of the FOIA 2000, in the section that deals with publication schemes and seems a little diminished. This is a general provision relating to the giving of reasons for decisions by public bodies when adopting or reviewing a publication scheme. The PA has to have regard to the public interest in allowing access to the PA’s information and in publication of reasons for decisions made by the authority. There may be reasons of commercial confidentiality or of a personal nature why access to information may be restricted. The IC’s office has stated that the section requires: evidence of inclusion of information related to processes used to determine decisions and evidence of inclusion of information relating to decision-making processes. 1.288  This is not a universal requirement of reasons for administrative decisions generally: indeed, advice was circulated to PAs by representative bodies that it only applied to reasons for decisions published under schemes. The view of the IC’s Office was that in all cases therefore the response from the office is the same; where decision-making information is not included within schemes the IC will question its absence if the reasons for omitting such information are not clear

The freedom of information legislation   149 from the questionnaire, or if the IC feels that the consideration given towards disclosure has been in some way inadequate. It should perhaps be noted that the Commissioner’s office has openly stated that in the first round of approvals it will not be prescriptive of content within schemes. It is the IC’s belief that in this first round the priority should be to obtain as much sign up to schemes as possible, and that in the second cycle, in light of the four-year running experience plus the introduction of rights, both the IC’s office and the authorities concerned will have a better knowledge and understanding of the sorts of information which are appropriate to include within schemes. The office is in the process of carrying out a review of the effectiveness of schemes as they now stand, with a view to introducing further criteria for approval for the second round (which starts in 2006). This may include, for instance, making comparisons between schemes from organisations which are similar in nature with a view to understanding the differences between the amounts or types of information being made available through the schemes. As an example, if a particular police force makes much more information available than another, on what grounds does the second police force feel it is correct or able to withhold similar information from publication? 1.289  Duties to give reasons in relation to unsuccessful FOI applications were actually strengthened in the Bill as it went through Parliament. This requirement of reasons for decisions is a central feature of an administrative regime operating under legal order1 and many would argue that it requires greater positive emphasis as a primary duty in statute rather than a presence in a publication scheme. It is an increasingly important feature of EC law.2 The duty should be one set out in statute although publication schemes would indicate why reasons were being given for different kinds of decision and could perhaps identify what the purpose of giving reasons was.3 There was no provision in the Bill originally to give reasons to an unsuccessful applicant for information, beyond naming the exemption claimed. Presumably, however, had matters remained unaltered, the Commissioner would expect reasoned and coherent answers to his enquiries when investigating complaints. The Guidance accompanying the 1997 Code certainly felt ‘that an explanation will normally be given’ (para 65).4 English law has seen a significant development of a duty to give reasons for decisions: see note 4 below and Baker v Canada (1999) 2  SCR  817 and a duty to give reasons in Canadian administrative law. 2 Under Art 253 [190] EC and UNECTEF v Heylens: 222/86 [1987] ECR 4097, ECJ. Such a right is contained in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 41(2) which is given the full legal force of the TEU, art  6(1). The Charter will not be included in retained EU law after Brexit under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. 3 See the useful article by A  Le Sueur ‘Legal Duties to Give Reasons’ (1999) 52 Current Legal Problems 150. 4 On giving reasons and legal requirements, see paras 10.125 et seq below. 1

1.290  Duties are now to be contained in ss 17 and 53(5) to provide reasons where there is to be no confirmation or denial or where a discretionary disclosure is not to be made under s 2; in the latter case it covers those situations where the ‘accountable officer’ issues a certificate overriding the Commissioner’s decision re exempt information and discretionary disclosures; reasons for the certificate must be given to the complainant. The s 45 Code in its first version specified that

150  Chapter 1 this must not simply involve a regurgitation of the words of the exemption (see para 1.110 above). The case law examined above has insisted on good reasons being given under relevant provisions of FOIA.

(viii)  requests have to be in writing

1.291  As experience with ombudsmen shows, this can be a prohibiting factor for the poorly educated etc, but it is difficult to see how this requirement can be avoided in FOI requests although the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 do not impose this requirement (paras 3.5 et seq below). The problem will be exacerbated if there are inadequate provisions to provide advice and assistance to requesters. The provisions on advice by authorities to applicants are contained in a code of practice drawn up by the Secretary of State ‘which it will be desirable for them to follow’ and the observance of which the Commissioner will be under a duty to promote. The Commissioner has power to make a practice recommendation but it is not clear how, if at all, it can be enforced (see below). It is all a bit anaemic. The Code advises that where a person is unable to frame their request in writing, appropriate assistance should be given. This could include advising them of a body to assist such as the CAB (sic) or offering to take a note over the telephone and sending that to the applicant for confirmation. When confirmed this would constitute the written confirmation and time would run from receipt of the confirmation (see paras 1.83 et seq above). 1.292  Where a requester provides insufficient information to enable the authority to identify and locate the information requested, or the request is ambiguous, the authority should provide assistance to assist in clarifying the information sought ‘as far as practicable’. The aim of such assistance, the Guidance states, is to clarify the nature of the information sought, not to determine the aims or motivation of the applicant. Appropriate assistance could include provision of an outline of different kinds of information that could meet the request; the provision of detailed catalogues and indexes, where these are available, to help the applicant ascertain the nature and extent of the information held by the authority. The government refused to make provision of indexes a statutory duty. As seen above, however, public authorities are under a duty in FOIA  2000, s  16 to provide assistance which duty is complied with when they follow the code. The code advises on the provision of a general response to the request setting out options for further information which could be provided on request; where cost is a ground for refusal an idea of what can be provided within cost should be given. Even though the information requested has not been identified any relevant information identified and found must be disclosed if within the Act. An explanation should be forthcoming why the authority can proceed no further (see para 1.83 above). Information should not be unreasonably requested and assistance, the code advises, should not be provided to vexatious requesters. Guidance is given by the DCA on what is ‘vexatious’. Being branded such may be a subject of complaint to the IC. The later version of the Code makes some adjustments to the guidance.

The freedom of information legislation   151 (ix)  repeated requests

1.293  Section 14(2) of the FOIA 2000 deals with requests made by any persons – perhaps as part of a campaign but it is not confined to such requests – which have been complied with and which are repeated. These do not have to be processed where they are the same or substantially similar. What happens if the first request was only partially complied with or indeed not complied with? (x)  channelling foi requests to more expensive information access regimes

1.294  Section 21 of the FOIA  2000 allows for the practice criticised by the Canadian Commissioner1 of channelling FOI requests to far more expensive statutory access or charging schemes thereby avoiding FOI provisions which will be reasonably cheap. There appears to be no safeguard to prevent abuse. ‘Reasonably accessible’ includes that which is ‘accessible on payment’. In the discussion on this provision above (at para 1.111) it was observed that it had to be reasonably accessible to the applicant which could allow for personal items such as excessive cost to this applicant to be borne in mind. ‘Reasonable accessibility’ also includes information available through Publication Schemes. AR of the Canadian Information Commissioner 1993–4, p 6.

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(xi)  purpose of seeking information and restricting use of information

1.295  A  clause in the original Bill forced the applicant to state the purpose for which access is claimed and why information is requested. It was not known how, or to what extent, this would have been checked to prevent abuse. The authority could also consider whether disclosure to the applicant would be in the public interest. Also cl 14(6) of the draft Bill empowered the authority to impose restrictions on the use of information provided. Why should information disclosed in the public interest be so restricted? How will this be affected by Art 10 ECHR and the HRA 1998 (see eg s 12 of the latter)? If a newspaper wishes to publish information then surely the provisions of the HRA 1998 come into effect? HRA 1998, s 12 makes court interim injunctions more difficult to obtain than under previous law where freedom of publication is involved and the court must specifically address various points.1 However, use of super-injunctions has not been thwarted (para  2.256 below). In the USA, motive on the part of an applicant is irrelevant although different charging scales are present for different classes of user. However, the English courts have taken motive into consideration in deciding whether to allow access to information under other statutory provisions.2 See paras 2.222 and 4.349 et seq below for discussion of HRA 1998, s 12. R  v Registrar General, ex p Smith [1990] 2  All ER  170; Re Application pursuant to r  7.28 of the Insolvency Rules 1986 [1994] BCC 369.

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1.296  These provisions and restrictions in the Bill were removed in the face of widespread criticism of the Bill that was presented to Parliament. Motive for a

152  Chapter 1 request is irrelevant. Denial would have to fit within an existing exemption and a public interest refusal where applicable.

(xii)  appeals against ministerial certificates under ss 23(2) and 24(3)

1.297  Section 60 of the FOIA  2000 allows appeals to the Tribunal against Ministerial certificates issued under s  23(2) or 24(3) which, in the first case, certify that information covered by the certificate was supplied by or relates to the work of the Security and Intelligence services.1 In the second situation the certificate certifies that exemptions are required for the purpose of safeguarding national security. Subject to appeal, these certificates are ‘conclusive evidence of that fact’. In the first case, the Tribunal may rule that the information was not exempt because it was not supplied etc, as stated. In the second case, if the Tribunal finds that, ‘applying the principles applied by the court on an application for judicial review, the Minister did not have reasonable grounds for issuing the certificate’ it may allow the appeal and quash the certificate. This repeats earlier provisions in statutes2 but originally was not as full a legal challenge as allowed under the ECtHR or EU law to national security or allied grounds3 where relevant rights are being denied. Under the Data Protection Act 2018, similar provisions apply and the tribunal will consider necessity and proportionality (para  2.125 below). The Upper Tribunal now receives these appeals on a mandatory reference. See paras 1.17 et seq above. Eg Security Service Act 1989, Sch 1, para 4(1) and cognate statutes. 3 Tinnelly & Sons v UK (1999) 4 BHRC 393 (ECtHR) and Northern Ireland Act 1998, ss 90 and 91; Johnstone v Chief Constable RUC: 222/84 [1986] 3 All ER 135, ECJ; Svenska Journalistförbundet v EU Council: T-174/95 [1998] All ER (EC) 545, CFI and see Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2004, SI 2004/1861 and procedures where national security is involved and Home Office v Tariq [2011] UKSC 35. See Kennedy v UK [2010] ECHR 682. 1 2

(xiii)  ‘commercial interests’

1.298  Such interests are given a very wide protection under s  43 of the FOIA  2000, wider even than the phrase commercial confidentiality. Will information need to possess the quality of commercial ‘confidentiality’ to be protected? If that is the test then if the onus is on the withholder to establish the ground it might not too easily lead to abuse. But ‘commercial interests’ is a far vaguer phrase and one that could lead to unnecessary over-protection. No attempt is made to define ‘trade secret’ as we have seen although there is considerable discussion of the subject in case law (para  1.215 above). Much government business will now be conducted commercially, as the 2018 code acknowledges. In its reply to the committee’s report the government stated that public authorities will be required to justify their claim for this exemption; the onus is on them.1 The Act leaves this unclear (see below) although the public interest must be considered under this exemption. See para 1.215 above. HC 1020 1997–98, para 27.

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The freedom of information legislation   153 (xiv)  excluding rights of action

1.299  Section 56 of the FOIA 2000 provides that no right of action is conferred by failure to comply with any duty under this Act. Would this protect negligence or malice on the authority’s part? We would suggest not – the immunity is only for breaches of statutory duties directly involved under the Act, ie  wrongfully refusing information. It will not provide an immunity for breaches of common law duties. Actionable breaches of confidence brought about by disclosure would exempt information from disclosure but s  41(1)(b) then adds ‘otherwise than under this Act’. What does this mean? That if information is disclosed under the Act, then even though confidential its release is not actionable? The section is seeking rather to preserve rights to confidentiality in private law. It should also be recalled that s  41 creates an absolute exemption, reinforcing such a right. Negligent disclosures were dealt with above (paras 1.273 and 1.274). (xv)  recommendations as to good practice

1.300  Should the Commissioner not be empowered to carry out an audit of a public authority’s practices in relation to FOI rather than have to seek its consent as under s 47(3) of the FOIA 2000? New audit powers were introduced under the DPA 2018 for personal data processing (paras 2.123, 2.132, 2.138 and 2.145 below). The Commissioner may issue practice recommendations where there are breaches of the codes of practice under the Act. Where recommendations are not complied with, no means of enforcement are mentioned. Could the Commissioner seek a mandatory order (former mandamus)? Is this not an appropriate matter to refer to the Select Committee on Digital, Culture, Media and Sport as recommended by the Committee on Public Administration in its report? More generally, what is to be the role of the Committee in relation to the Commissioner? The Committee made recommendations in its report on the White Paper on this point believing it should become the ‘Parliamentary focus’ for the work of the Commissioner.1 Events moved on. Both committees are re-named. The power of the Commissioner to issue a special report should not be overlooked in the face of serious defiance. Reports were issued where the veto was resorted to. HC 398 I (1997–98), para 90; HC 570 I (1998–99), para 140.

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(xvi)  the onus of proof

1.301  On one vital and practical point, the position under the Act is not entirely clear. Where does the onus of justification or proof fall under the Act – on the public authority in refusing information; on the applicant; on the Commissioner? Where reasons have to be given for decisions then to that extent it places an onus on the party who has to provide reasons. The burden does seem to shift at various stages of the decision. There will be an initial decision that information is or is not covered by an exemption. If an exemption applies, there will be a public interest determination under s 2. What is required is a clear commitment to a right to information subject to exemptions which the authority

154  Chapter 1 has to justify. This could perhaps have been best achieved in a purpose clause which set out clearly the duty of public authorities to advance open government. No such clause presently exists.1 The government was opposed to such a clause as unnecessary. In terms of disclosures under the public interest provisions in s 2, the onus appears was shifted as was seen above (para 1.98) so that in a fine balance between secrecy and disclosure, secrecy has to be justified by the authority. The onus here seems squarely on the authority. On numerous occasions, the IC and tribunal have stated that the Act creates a presumption in favour of disclosure. The inclusion of such a clause was strongly supported by Lord Woolf and Sir Richard Scott HC 570 I (1998–99), paras 56 and 59.

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(xvii)  complaints procedures

1.302  The Code of Practice emphasises the need for procedures for dealing with complaints from people who consider that their request has not been properly handled or are otherwise dissatisfied with the outcome of their request. Such procedures should encourage a prompt determination of the complaint (see para  1.235 above on recommended time-limits). Authorities should publicise their existence including information on how to make a complaint and this should accompany all decisions taken under the Act. The complaints procedure, although it constitutes internal review, should be fair and impartial and should be capable of reviewing all decisions under the Act including those under s 2 of the FOIA 2000. The procedures should come into effect when the publication schemes’ provisions come into effect for the PA. It will therefore also deal with complaints about PSs as well as access complaints post 1  January 2005. They should be easy to understand, prompt and capable or reversing or amending decisions. A  earlier draft of the Code stated: ‘Where practicable, complaints procedures should be handled by a person who was not a party to the original decision’. In small organisations this may not be practicable. If a decision is irreversible, eg  made by a Minister, the PA should consider waiving internal review and the complainant should then be free to go to the IC although MoJ guidance states that a review should be made to the Minister ‘in the light of the complaint’. The guidance now states (para 40) that where a request involves a general access request, a review should be undertaken by someone more senior than the person who took the initial decision ‘where reasonably practicable’. ‘The public authority should in any event undertake a full re-evaluation of the case, taking into account the matters raised by the investigation of the complaint.’ The procedure should be triggered whenever an applicant indicates that he believes the authority has failed to fulfil its obligations under Part I of the Act and the matter cannot be resolved by discussion with the official dealing with the request. Or it may be prompted by a complaint by the requester or another (presumably a third party). As well as setting target times and success rates, records should be kept for all complaints and their outcome. Procedures should be monitored and should be reviewed and amended where regular reversals of initial decisions indicate this as appropriate. If the outcome states that information should be disclosed and not withheld it should be disclosed as soon as practicable and the applicant should be informed how soon this will be. Apologies should be given if

The freedom of information legislation   155 procedures were not followed and steps taken to prevent any repetition. Where a decision upholds the authority, the requester should be informed of his right to complain to the Commissioner. In principle it is right that PAs should be given the opportunity to correct their decisions. But this provision must not be read to allow PAs to cause unnecessary delay and anxiety. (xviii)  companies and the freedom of information act 2000

1.303  The FOIA 2000 was notable amongst such statutes for imposing a duty of disclosure on private bodies ie  companies, that were designated as public authorities. The Act imposes no duties on companies that are not so designated. FOI is correctly associated with accountability of power wielded on behalf of the public interest and provision of opportunities for greater involvement by citizens in the process of rule that governs their lives. It is inevitably an obligation that falls on government and public authorities. As well as government, economic organisation is also a form of power that invariably purports to operate on behalf of the public interest. No company would openly declare that it operates against the public interest although serving a public interest is not a primary reason for its existence – it is an indirect consequence of its existence. Fifty of the world’s largest economies are companies. The 500 biggest corporations control 25 per cent of the world’s economic output.1 These figures are now affected by social media companies. The FOI movement is bound to affect companies both indirectly in so far as the regulatory state collects and stores information gathered under statutory, or other provisions, as well as directly in that companies are under an increasing range of duties to supply information to the public. Transparency, or rather its absence, is becoming a central theme of privacy protection and social media (see para 2.1 below) and is increasingly attracting competition law. D C Korten When Corporations Rule the World (1995), pp 220–1. See A Guide for Business to the FOIA 2000 J Amos and J McDermott, The Constitution Unit and Lovells.

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1.304  Companies have learned to live with FOI regimes elsewhere, where for instance regulators hold information from or about them which is frequently requested. On one point, company secretaries can rest assured; no FOI regime routinely imposes incursions into corporate or personal privacy that would be sanctioned by disclosure processes under English or US litigation, let alone anything like Anton Piller or disclosure orders. Under the former, confidentiality may not be a bar to access where justice demands their disclosure, although safeguards may have to be applied.1 Under the latter, where there is a danger that relevant documents will be destroyed by one party, the court will allow the other party who is usually asserting intellectual property rights to enter relevant premises to copy them. Various safeguards have been built into this process to prevent abuse but it constitutes a remarkable invasion of privacy.2 Furthermore, British companies are used to an ever increasing range of duties to make information publicly available through Companies House or whatever about financial disclosure covering accounts, audit and share-holding. Numerous statutory provisions alongside the Companies Acts allow various bodies to obtain information, even in circumstances which may appear self-incriminating and

156  Chapter 1 which may lead to a clash between English law and the ECHR. Regulators are engaging in ever more open practices of consultation. The Companies Act 1985 had some limited ‘social disclosure’ requirements concerning the company’s policy on employment of disabled persons, arrangements for securing the health and safety of company employees, action taken to inform and consult the workforce on matters relevant to them as employees and promotion of employee share schemes3 and charitable and political donations and these were developed under the Companies Act 2006.4 Additional information is published voluntarily including that on companies’ environmental performance and 79 of the FTSE 100 companies produced an environmental report in 1996 although there are problems concerning reliability where much of the information was not independently audited. There are growing demands for Eco Product labelling (see eg Council Regulation 880/92 23 March 1992 on a Community Eco Label and Award Scheme). Nor should it be overlooked that many major UK companies operate in countries where FOIA regimes exist and will be used to their operation. However, unless designated under FOIA, companies will remain outside FOIA. The question of access to environmental information held by private companies has become a vexed question under the EIR  2004 (paras 3.12 et seq). See Science Research Council v Nassé [1979] 3 All ER 673, HL. See Practice Direction at [1994] 4 All ER 52 and [1997] 1 All ER 288 and Civil Jurisdiction Act 1997 and ch 11. 3 CA 1985, s 234 and Sch 7, Part III. See Parkinson in D Campbell and D Lewis eds Promoting Participation (1999). 4 CA 1985, s 234 and Sch 7, Part I. Parkinson, ibid. 1 2

(xix)  use of foia

1.305  The Cabinet Office and MoJ publish quarterly statistics on FOI requests and an annual report. These contain detailed figures but only cover central government – departments and monitored authorities numbering just over 40. Most of the 100,000 or so PAs are not covered. The report for the last quarter of 2017 stated that in that quarter there had been 11,883 requests to monitored bodies – a 9.1 per cent increase in the same quarter of the previous year. 8,700 were resolvable and 44 per cent were granted in full; 36 per cent (4,137) were withheld in full; and 33 per cent of those withheld were because of cost exceeding the limit. The IC publishes annual statistics on the FOIA and the DPA in the annual report. This has figures on request to it for assistance – 5,433 in 2016–17. Completion times and areas receiving most complaints are recorded. Out of 1,376 decision notices served, 24 per cent upheld the complaint, and 61.8 per cent did not uphold the requester. There is no systematic collection of all requests involving all PAs. (xx)  code of practice on consultation

1.306  Although not part of the FOIA  2000, a new Code of Practice on Consultation was announced by the Cabinet Office in November 2000 and this

The freedom of information legislation   157 was revised in January 2004, 2008, 2012 and updated in 2018.1 The stated aims of the 2004 Code were to increase the involvement of people and groups in public consultations, minimising the burden such consultation places on them while ensuring a proper time to respond – a minimum of 12 weeks. A new register of current consultations will also be launched on www.UKOnline.gov.uk bringing together all the main written public consultations taking place across government. It will be updated to take account of decisions the government takes following consultation. Parties will be able to get e-mail notice of consultations in subject areas in which they are interested. The announcement of these developments followed a meeting between ‘entrepreneurs’ and the Prime Minister in Downing Street. The Code will require proper feedback from government after a consultation including an explanation of why particular options were, or were not, favoured. Departments will have to set up machinery to police compliance. The Register will maintain a listing of all the main consultations in progress or completed. Each department will maintain on its website all its public national consultations. Departments must consider email responses as well as traditional responses. The revised code of 2004 set out six consultation criteria: consult widely allowing a minimum of twelve weeks for written consultations at least once during the development of the policy; be clear in proposals and who may be affected, what questions are being asked and any timescale for responses; ensure consultation is clear, concise and widely accessible; give feed-back regarding the responses received and how consultation process influenced policy; monitor departments’ effectiveness at consultation, including the use of designated consultation coordinator; ensure any consultation follows ‘Better regulation Best Practice’, including the carrying out of a Regional Impact Assessment if necessary. The Code is available on www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/regulation/consultation/ Code.htm. (See also HC 316 I and II (2004–05) on local government.) See also Cabinet Office Effective Consultation and Response (http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/ file44374.pdf). https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/consultation-principles-guidance (26/03/2018). A  leading case on duties to consult is Moseley v LB  Haringey [2014]  UKSC  56 (see para  10.168 below). The 2018 update for the code is: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/ uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/691383/Consultation_Principles_.pdf (1/05/2018).

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THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 1.307  The Commission was appointed in 2015 and reported in March 2016. Its terms of reference were: ‘The Commission will review the Freedom of Information Act 2000 to consider whether there is an appropriate public interest balance between transparency, accountability and the need for sensitive information to have robust protection, and whether the operation of the Act adequately recognises the need for a “safe space” for policy development and implementation and frank advice. The Commission may also consider the balance between the need to maintain public access to information, and the burden of the Act on public authorities, and whether change is needed to moderate that while maintaining public access to information.’

158  Chapter 1 A  call for public evidence asked a number of questions focusing on what protection was required for deliberative processes of government; collective Cabinet discussion; candid assessment of risks; should there be an executive veto and, if so, with what safeguards; what is the appropriate appeal and enforcement system for FOI requests; is the burden placed on PAs justified by the public interest in the right to know? There was some misgiving about the composition of the Commission, but fears that the Act was in for a mauling were misplaced. The Commission reported on matters it felt unable to make recommendations upon, including extension of coverage to private contractors delivering public services and excluding universities, changes to cost limits and extending cost activities. Public bodies under contract for delivery of public services where the contract is in excess of £5 million should be included under FOIA, the Commission stated, but there was no Commission-confirmed recommendation on this. 1.308  The recommendations included: ‘Recommendation 1: That the government legislates to amend section 10(3) to abolish the public interest test extension to the time limit, and replace it instead with a time limit extension for requests where the public authority reasonably believes that it will be impracticable to respond to the request on time because of the complexity or volume of the requested information, or the need to consult third parties who may be affected by the release of the requested information. This time limit extension will be limited to an additional 20 working days only. Recommendation 2: That the government legislates to impose a statutory time limit for internal reviews of 20 working days. Recommendation 3: That the government legislates to make the offence at section 77 of the Act triable either-way. Recommendation 4: That the government legislates to impose a requirement on all public authorities who are subject to the Act and employ 100 or more full time equivalent employees to publish statistics on their compliance under the Act. The publication of these statistics should be coordinated by a central body, such as a department or the IC. Recommendation 5: That the government legislates to impose a requirement on all public authorities who are subject to the Act and employ 100 or more full time equivalent employees to publish all requests and responses where they provide information to a requestor. This should be done as soon as the information is given out wherever practicable. Recommendation 6: Public bodies should be required to publish in their annual statement of accounts a breakdown of the benefits in kind and expenses of senior employees by reference to clear categories. Recommendation 7: The government should give the IC responsibility for monitoring and ensuring public authorities’ compliance with their proactive publication obligations.

The freedom of information legislation   159 Recommendation 8: The government should legislate to replace section 35(1)(a) with an exemption which will protect information which would disclose internal communications that relate to government policy. Recommendation 9: The government should legislate to expand section 35(1)(b) so that, as well as protecting inter-ministerial communications, it protects any information that relates to collective Cabinet decisionmaking, and repeal section 36(2)(a). Recommendation 10: The government should legislate to amend section 35 to make clear that, in making a public interest determination under section 35(1)(a), the public interest in maintaining the exemption is not lessened merely because a decision has been taken in the matter. Recommendation 11: The government should legislate to amend section 35 to make clear that, in making a public interest determination under section 35, regard shall be had to the particular public interest in the maintenance of the convention of the collective responsibility of Ministers of the Crown, and the need for the free and frank exchange of views or advice for the purposes of deliberation. Recommendation 12: The government should legislate to amend section 36 to remove the requirement for the reasonable opinion of a qualified person. Recommendation 13: The government should legislate to put beyond doubt that it has the power to exercise a veto over the release of information under the Act. Recommendation 14: The government should legislate to make clear that the power to veto is to be exercised where the accountable person takes a different view of the public interest in disclosure. This should include the ability of the accountable person to form their own opinions as to as to all the facts and circumstances of the case, including the nature and extent of any potential benefits, damage and risks arising out of the communication of the information, and of the requirements of the public interest. Recommendation 15: The government should legislate so that the executive veto is available only to overturn a decision of the IC where the accountable person takes a different view of the public interest in disclosure. Where a veto is exercised, appeal rights would fall away and a challenge to the exercise of the veto would be by way of judicial review to the High Court. The government should consider whether the amended veto should make clear that the fact that the government could choose to appeal instead of issuing a veto will not be a relevant factor in determining the lawfulness of an exercise of the veto. Until legislation can be enacted, the government should only exercise the veto to overturn a decision of the IC. Recommendation 16: The government should legislate to allow the veto to also be exercised even where the IC upholds a decision of a pubic authority. This would mean that the right of appeal would fall away and challenge would be instead by way of judicial review.

160  Chapter 1 Recommendation 17: That the government legislates to remove the right of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal against decisions of the IC made in respect of the Act. Where someone remained dissatisfied with the IC’s decision, an appeal would still lie to the Upper Tribunal. The Upper Tribunal appeal is not intended to replicate the full-merits appeal that currently exists before the IC and First-tier Tribunal, but is limited to a point of law. Recommendation 18: That the government legislates to clarify section 11(1)(a) and (c) of the Act so that it is clear that requestors can request information, or a digest or summary of information, be provided in a hard copy printed form, an electronic form, or orally. Where a requestor specifies a specific electronic document format, that request should be granted if the public authority already holds the information in that format, or if it can readily convert it into that format. Where the information requested is a dataset, the requirements at section 11(1A) will apply. The legislation should make clear that the obligations on public authorities to provide information in a particular format extend no further than this. Recommendation 19: That the government reviews section 45 of the Act to ensure that the range of issues on which guidance can be offered to public authorities under the Code is adequate. The government should also review and update the Code to take account of the ten years of operation of the Act’s information access scheme. Recommendation 20: That the government provides guidance, in a revised Code of Practice issued under section 45, encouraging public authorities to use section 14(1) in appropriate cases. Recommendation 21: That the government reviews whether the amount of funding provided to the IC for delivering his functions under the Act is adequate, taking into account the recommendations in this report and the wider circumstances.’

THE SCOTTISH FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2002 1.309  In the spring of 2001 the Scottish Executive published a draft consultation paper and FOI  Scotland Bill. In much of its design it revealed the influence of the UK model. The resulting Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 (SFOIA) came into effect on 1 January 2005. FOI is a reserved matter except in so far as FOI applies to purely Scottish public authorities (SPAs). The Act applies to SPAs listed in Schedule 1, those designated under s 5(1), or a publicly owned company under s  6 (see paras 1.85 et seq above). Cross-border public authorities, such as the Forestry Commission, are covered by the UK regime; this is the case even for purely devolved matters. Information covered is that ‘held’ by a SPA other than information held on behalf of another person (s 3(2) (a)(i)). It is not held by a SPA if it is held ‘in confidence having been supplied by a Minister of the Crown or by a department of the Government of the UK’ (s 3(2)(a)(ii), mirroring Scotland Act 1998 (Modifications of Schedules 4 and 5) Order 1999). By this means it is clear that UK Ministers and departments, and

The freedom of information legislation   161 information supplied in confidence, are not within the SFOIA. Special provision is made for records transferred by UK public authorities to the Keeper of the Records of Scotland. These are not held by the Keeper unless it is information to which s  22(2)–(5) of the SFOIA apply by virtue of subsection (6),1 or it is designated as ‘open information’ for the purposes of s 3(4) of the SFOIA. The Scottish Ministers may designate information as ‘open’ which was transferred to the Keeper before 1 July 1999 by the Secretary of State for Scotland. This section contains special provisions relating to records transferred to the Keeper.

1

1.310  The structure of the Act and much of its wording is taken from the UK legislation, although amendments have led to increasing differences. There are publication schemes (paras 1.48 et seq above). The initial time limit is 20 working days. But there are some crucial differences. There are absolute exemptions covering information otherwise accessible (s 25); legal prohibitions on disclosure (s 26); that protected by a duty of confidentiality (s 36(2)); court records (s 37); and most of the personal information in s 38. The Scottish Act has fewer exemptions so that information from the security and intelligence services is not specifically provided for as in UK FOIA, s 23. Such information held by the Scottish Executive will presumably be held in confidence. There is no equivalent of parliamentary privilege for the Scottish Parliament. Some exemptions are coupled in SFOIA such as ‘commercial interests and the economy’ (s  33) and ‘confidentiality’ and equivalent of legal professional privilege although its scope may be wider. The test for withholding information on a contents basis – there were also class exemptions – is ‘substantial prejudice’ in the case of contents exemptions. It is not the simple ‘prejudice’ test, as in the UK. 1.311  There is no reference to the duty to confirm or deny as in UK FOIA, s 1 so there is no reference to the exclusion of that duty in virtually all of the exemptions as in the UK FOIA. SFOIA, s 18 makes provision for non-disclosure of the existence of information in the situation where if information existed and was held by a SPA and the SPA could give a refusal of access notice under SFOIA, s 16 because it is exempt information. Where, in such a case, the SPA considers that to reveal whether the information exists or is held would be contrary to the public interest, it may (whether or not the information does exist and is held by it) give the applicant a refusal notice under s 18. This means the SPA does not have to reveal whether the information exists or is held by it and it does not have to give reasons why the public interest in maintaining the exemptions outweighs the public interest in disclosure. It applies to the following exemptions: • disclosure would prejudice substantially relations within the United Kingdom (s 28); • disclosure would relate to the formulation of Scottish administration policy, Ministerial communications, advice by the Law Officers, or the operation of a Ministerial private office (s 29); • disclosure would prejudice substantially the effect of conduct of public affairs (s 30); • exemption is required to maintain national security or disclosure would prejudice substantially defence (s 31);

162  Chapter 1 • disclosure would prejudice substantially international relations or is confidential information from another state or international organisation or court (s 32); • disclosure would prejudice substantially commercial interests or the economy (s 33); • disclosure would relate to investigations by a SPA or proceedings arising from such investigations (s 34); • disclosure would prejudice substantially law enforcement (s 35); • disclosure would be likely to endanger the physical or mental health or safety of an individual (s 39(1)); • disclosure would relate to communications with the Royal Family or the granting of honours (s 41). 1.312  A limit of not later than 12 weeks after the date on which the information is required is set for the exemption concerning information intended for future publication in the Scottish Act (SFOIA, s 27) and is not left open as in the UK legislation (para 1.115 above). The exemption for personal information (s 38), and most of the information is an absolute exemption, adds personal census information and a deceased person’s health record. In the case of the latter two, the exemption goes after 100 years (s 58(2)(b)). The wording differs in minor ways which may have a significant difference. So in relation to information relating to the formulation of Scottish Administration policy, the Scottish Administration must have regard to the particular public interest in the disclosure of factual information used, or intended to be used, in order to provide an informed background (s 29(3)). There is an exemption where disclosure would, or would be likely to, inhibit substantially the free and frank provision of advice etc and not ‘inhibit’ or ‘prejudice’ as in the UK FOIA (see para 1.182 above). 1.313  Provision is made for internal review by the SPA of its decision (ss 20 and 21). There was to be no tribunal as in the UK model. The SIC may issue decision, enforcement and information notices and has powers of entry and inspection (s 54 and Sch 3). The SIC’s reports are laid before the Scottish Parliament and s 46(2) makes provision for specific facts to be published. The Commissioner’s decision was binding except in the case of five absolute exemptions1 and in six exemptions2 where the First Minister, after consulting other Ministers of the Executive, may issue a veto. The Commissioner’s decision could be enforced through the courts on grounds set out in the 1997 White Paper (see para 1.249 above). Both the complainant and public authority could apply to the courts after a Commissioner’s decision. SFOIA, s 63 allows for the disclosure of information by the SIC to Scottish Public Service Ombudsman and the UK IC. Information otherwise accessible (SFOIA, s 25); prohibitions on disclosure (s 26); information protected by the law of confidentiality (s 36(2)); court records (s 37); and personal information including personal census information and health records (for 100 years) but otherwise in terms similar to the exemption for personal information under s 40 of the UK Act (para 1.200 above). 2 Under SFOIA, s  52 these are: formulation of Scottish Administration policy (SFOIA, s  29); safeguarding national security (s  31(1)); confidential information obtained from a state other than the UK or an international organisation or international court (s 32(1)(b)); investigations by Scottish PAs and proceedings arising out of such investigations (s  34); confidentiality of communications in legal proceedings controversially described as the equivalent of legal 1

The freedom of information legislation   163 professional privilege (s 36(1), and see paras 11.89 et seq below); the exercise by Her Majesty of Her prerogative of honour (s 41(b)).

1.314  Regulations set out fees for information (SSI 2004/467). These use the concept of ‘projected costs’ which means the total costs which a SPA reasonably estimates in accordance with the regulations is likely to be incurred in locating, retrieving and providing such information under the Act. It does not include costs incurred in determining whether the SPA holds the specified information, the entitlement of the requester to receive the information and estimates of staff time involved in locating, retrieving or providing information must not exceed £15 per hour per member of staff. Where projected costs do not exceed £100, no fee is payable. Up to £600, the maximum fee is £50. Over that amount, provision is made in SSI 2004/376 for fees. 1.315  More generally, the Scottish IC established under SFOIA has no responsibility for data protection under the DPA  1998 (a reserved matter). Appointment of the Scottish IC is by the Scottish Parliament on a recommendation to the Queen – not to the Executive and because the Scottish system has no tribunal it has been claimed that the Scottish IC’s decisions constitute precedents. They are subject to judicial challenge. It is estimated there are about 10,000 PAs in Scotland covered by the SFOIA.1 The s  45 Code covers consultation with devolved administration. K Dunion (2003) Government Computing 10.

1

1.316  The Scottish IC has shown a greater degree of imagination than UK counterparts in some subject areas, for instance, exploring the range of private bodies that should be designated under SFOIA.1 The web site for the SIC is http://www.itspublicknowledge.info/home/ScottishInformationCommissioner. asp. See K Dunion in R Chapman and M Hunt (eds) Freedom of Information: Local Government and Accountability (2010) ch  6 and http://www.itspublicknowledge.info/ScottishPublicAuthorities/ ScottishPublicAuthorities.asp.

1

1.317 The SIC  Decision Notices may be viewed at: http://www. itspublicknowledge.info/ApplicationsandDecisions/Decisions/Decisions.php. Guidance is available at: http://www.itspublicknowledge.info/ ScottishPublicAuthorities/ScottishPublicAuthorities.asp. The latest annual report is available at: http://www.itspublicknowledge.info/ home/SICReports/AnnualReports.asp

THE WELSH ASSEMBLY CODE 1.318  The Code of Practice on Access (2007) applies to information held by the Welsh Assembly Government.1 This sets out standards it will apply based on the FOIA, and other information statutes. It does not create legal rights. The code seeks to maximise openness, promises use of clear language, publish on

164  Chapter 1 the internet, respect privacy and confidentiality. It states that it will only make charges in ‘exceptional circumstances’ but it may refuse requests where fees limits under FOIA are reached. The response rate is that under FOIA. http://www.assembly.wales/en/abthome/about_us-commission_assembly_administration/abtfoi/Pages/abt-foi-cop-pub.aspx (13/05/2018).

1

1.319  A disclosure log is available online: www.assembly.wales/en/bus-home/ Pages/OtherBusiness.aspx?category=FOI (13/05/2018).

CONCLUSION 1.320  With specific regard to the FOIA 2000, it was subject to an enormous degree of criticism from the government back-benches, the libertarian right, the consumer lobby and the press and media. This criticism was fomented by the enormous width of the exemptions, and by many provisions which were removed. The IC was, however, left powerless under a s 53 veto or an absolute exemption. By not being able to enforce decisions in relation to absolute exemptions, or by being subject to a veto power in relation to discretionary disclosures in the public interest, the FOI regime is among the weaker of those in existence, certainly weaker than the American, New Zealand or Irish models. However, the IC can report to Parliament where a veto has been exercised and has undertaken to do this whenever a Ministerial veto is used. He will, to that extent, enter the political arena. We have seen how decisions of the UK  Supreme Court have effectively overridden vetoes, and none has been issued since 2014, and qualified an absolute exemption (paras 1.195 and 1.154 above). The courts have been enthusiastic supporters of FOIA and have significantly advanced open justice. By setting the test of damage at the level of ‘prejudice’ or its equivalents and not serious prejudice, the threshold for withholding information has been set at too low a level. However, by enshrining this regime in law the government has built a stronger model than the Code that it replaced and one which will be more easily subject to judicial interpretation. An exacting test may be set for ‘prejudice’ for instance in the courts, making its application in effect little different from ‘substantial prejudice’. The FOIA  2000 will also stand behind every aspect of access that we are about to encounter in the rest of this book. From a weak and highly dubious Bill, a better statute emerged. The coalition government gave strong support to FOIA. So did the Independent Commission in 2016. Its future seems secure. The Act’s coverage is very wide and FOIA has helped to introduce a greater climate of transparency in UK government. FOIA is one major branch of our information rights. The other major branch is data protection.

Chapter 2

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection

Power’s organisational base has moved historically from land to labour, from commerce and technology to data.

Articles  8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and Articles  7 and 8 of the EU  Charter of Fundamental Rights, will feature frequently in this chapter. Article 52(3) of the Charter on the relationship between the two sets of rights is set out also: ‘Article  8 of the Convention – Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’ ‘Article 10 of the Convention – Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless

166  Chapter 2 of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.’ ‘Article 7 of the Charter – Respect for private and family life Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications.’ ‘Article 8 of the Charter – Protection of personal data Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority.’ ‘Article 11 of the Charter – Freedom of expression and information 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. 2. The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected.’ ‘Article 52(3) of the Charter 3. In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.’

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   167

INTRODUCTION – THE CONTEXT OF DATA PROTECTION REFORM 2.1  Just before the reforms to UK data protection laws were finalised a huge scandal broke out concerning social media and privacy. A  British political consulting firm Cambridge Analytica used 50 million (the initial computation rose to 87 million – 70 million in the USA) Facebook data profiles to target voters in key US marginal states in the 2016 US presidential election. Facebook has a world-wide network of around 2.2 billion users. The profiles were employed by Trump’s election campaign. The exposure of the story, through a whistleblower, focused on the mass and cheap exploitation of data in open and networked societies. Social media technology is becoming ever more persuasive as well as pervasive. The data had been gathered from 270,000 Facebook users who had been requested to consent to its use for academic research by an academic at Cambridge University, Alexandr Kogan. In evidence to the House Committee of the US Congress on 11 April 2018, Facebook’s chief executive, Mark Zuckerberg, suggested that a group of researchers at that Psychometrics Centre at that university were developing similar programmes. He was also questioned by the Senate Committees on Judiciary and Commerce on 10 April 2018. Zuckerberg was before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce on 11 April 2018. Kogan devised a personality quiz on an app that required Facebook credentials to participate. The app was designed to harvest data on contacts of those who participated. Kogan gathered data on their friends and contacts and subsequently sold this data on 87 million individuals to Cambridge Analytica (Facebook’s calculation was 72 million – 70.6 million in the USA). CA’s motto was ‘Data drives all we do’. The data comprised public profiles, page likes, birthdays and home addresses as well as political and religious data – sensitive data under the EU  General Data Protection Regulation. The data was used to compile psychographic profiles classifying people by their personality to target them with effective social media messages. Facebook’s chief executive had chosen as a business model one with: a lack of appropriate concern about privacy; opening the data up to commercial developers/exploiters and targeted advertising for huge profit. This amounted to a prioritisation of profit over privacy. Data had become Facebook’s treasure chest. Algorithms, which are protected by commercial secrecy, help create demographic groups for commercial advertisers. Apps could retrieve data without the consent of the data subject (DS). Although promises were made by Mark Zuckerberg when he undertook to ‘fix Facebook’ at the beginning of 2018, this did not address concerns about improperly obtained data already incorporated in its models and how Facebook itself used data. Recital 39 of the GDPR places a premium on transparency in processing and that language and communication associated with processing should be accessible and ‘easy to understand in clear and plain language’. The problem is far more extensive than use of ‘deepfakes’, ie highly realistic fabrication and computational propaganda. It calls into question concerns about transparency – a lack of such by Facebook and a naïve trust or indifference by data subjects – and exposure to unconscionably exploitative political and commercial paymasters. Press and media poured out questions such as: ‘Is a solution banning political advertising and campaigning on the social media?’, ‘In what way had

168  Chapter 2 the data subjects suffered?’, and ‘Would the benefits of their use of social media outweigh any perceived detriment by the use of the data?’. There is also a danger that the threat to national security posed by social media may unleash draconian censorship driven by security agencies. The Privacy Shield which replaced the Safe Harbour agreement between the EU and US only addressed security and law enforcement following the Schrems judgment of the ECJ in October 2015 (para 2.8). The US Judicial Protection Act 2016 provided for an ombudsman in the US to deal with EU citizens’ complaints that the national security agencies had unfairly hoovered up their data. It did not adequately address Silicon Valley corporations. The Privacy Shield is facing a challenge from privacy activists in France. Facebook signed a privacy agreement with the US Federal Trade Commission in 2011. By spring 2018 the FTC was investigating alleged breaches of this agreement which had not been followed by Facebook – one interpretation could argue that Facebook’s transfer for sale of its users’ contacts to developers was covered.1 The EU has been stricter fining Facebook for importing data from WhatsApp and being ordered to track people who did not use Facebook in their browsing. The proposed ePrivacy Directive would restrict Facebook’s tracking of users’ on-line behaviour. But Facebook already breaches EU law – reporting on mental health conditions although arguably there is a public interest aspect here, ie suicide prevention. A change of location of Facebook’s registered office could remove Facebook from EU jurisdiction. Facebook’s registered office in Europe was in Dublin. Facebook’s success was, and is, in micro-targeting and this is the problem. Facebook knows who and what you are. But take away this ability and Facebook’s model would cease.2 $70 billion was wiped off its shares post the CA fracas in March 2018 plus potential huge fines from FTC, although shares then picked up. Cambridge Analytica faced insolvency. As at the time of writing, legislative reforms of social media in the UK are unlikely within the next three years. The priority has been on: controls on 11- to 13-year-olds signing up for accounts; preventing cyber bullying and harassment; and combatting on-line pornography. In July 2018, after a 14-month investigation (confirmed in October 2018 and appealed), the UK’s Information Commissioner (IC) fined Facebook £500,000 for breaches of the Data Protection Act 1998 involving Cambridge Analytica. The events in question occurred before the Data Protection Act 2018, which we examine below, came into effect. The fine is a trifle for Facebook and it had 28 days to respond. More importantly, the investigation by the IC was aimed at the campaign activities of EU leave campaign groups and their use of personal data. These included Arron Banks and his insurance company, Britain Stronger in Europe, Vote Leave and UKIP. The report has serious implications for data use by universities and for the UK’s political parties. Eleven letters were sent to the main parties with Assessment Notices for personal data audits: ‘We have concluded that there are risks in relation to the processing of personal data by many political parties’ (Investigation into the Use of Data and Analytics in Political Campaigns ICO  (2018) p  3).3 The ICO also published Democracy Disrupted? Personal Information and Political Influence (2018).4 This found a ‘significant

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   169 shortfall in transparency and provision of fair transparency information’ (p 3) in political campaigns. The publication has recommendations for fairer and more transparent use of data by political parties and social media in elections. https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2011/11/facebook-settles-ftc-charges-itdeceived-consumers-failing-keep. 2 See, for background, Kate Losse The Boy Kings: A  Journey into the Heart of the Social Network (2012); D  Kirkpatrick The Facebook Effect (2010). For an apocalyptic account of big data, see S Zuboff The Age of Surveillance Capitalism (2018). 3 https://ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-taken/2259371/investigation-into-data-analytics-forpolitical-purposes-update.pdf (10/07/2018). See also The Future of Political Campaigning Demos https://www.demos.co.uk/project/the-future-of-political-campaigning/ (10/07/2018). 4 https://ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-taken/2259369/democracy-disrupted-110718.pdf (10/07/2018). In October 2018, Facebook introduced transparency reforms to political dark ads – visible only to the advertiser and target group – requiring advertisers to prove their identity. Paidfor political content will be kept in a public advertising library for up to seven years. Former Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg was appointed as Facebook’s head of global affairs and communications. 1

2.2  Possible solutions: (i) Ban political and electoral advertising through social media. The ICO has recommended a statutory code of practice for use of data in political campaigns. (ii) Make payments of advertising, and who is paying, completely transparent. (iii) Give full publicity to the objectives and intentions in using media for persuasion or opinion forming. (iv) Rigorously enforce (and improve) standards set in the GDPR by making companies establish their place of business only in countries that abide by strict standards that are consistent with EU standards. (v) Ban social media platforms from acting as vehicles for advertisers. (vi) Charge social media companies a levy to pay for increased regulation by the Information Commissioner. A Commons select committee has published an interim report on ‘Fake News’ and its threat to democracy when wielded through social media platforms used by foreign governments and ‘hidden persuaders’.1 The report recommends reforms to make regulation by Ofcom and the IC more effective. Levies on social media companies were suggested as a way of paying for more effective regulation by the IC. Electoral laws and the powers of the Electoral Commission should be increased and updated to reflect the digital context of political campaigns. There should be a greater and clearer legal liability for social media companies to remove and compensate for unlawful material they allow to be posted. The liability of tech companies under the Defamation Act 2013 should be assessed for effectiveness. Transparency should be ensured through more effective regulation and codes, and the committee calls for an Atlantic Charter with the USA to guarantee rights. In the era of governance by Twitter, this would have little to commend itself to the US executive. This is obviously a long-term agenda. In July 2018 an EU  Code of Practice on Disinformation was produced.2 It applies to signatories for services provided within EEA state contracting parties. The code operates within the framework of existing EU and national law. Disinformation is described as verifiably false or misleading information which

170  Chapter 2 is created/disseminated etc for economic gain or intentionally to deceive the public and which may cause public harm. The term does not include misleading advertising (although false political and ‘issue based’ advertising are among its targets), reporting errors, satire and parody, or clearly identified partisan news and commentary. The aim is to enhance fact finding, fact checking, privacy respect and promotion of key performance indicators through reporting by the European Association of Communications Agencies and the World Federation of Advertisers in co-operation with the EU  Commission. An annex identifies best practices and signatories. It looks like a classic corporatist arrangement. In the USA there is no overarching data privacy law but a collection of federal and state laws and agency best practice guidelines. The GDPR, which we are about to discuss, is the EU’s response to data abuse. A new proposed EU ePrivacy Regulation was published on 5 December 2017.3 The proposed EU Directive on copyright in the digital single market has been highly criticised by social media and IT companies (COM/2016/0593 final – 2016/0280 (COD)) for being censorial, preventing sharing of information, assisting existing platforms and preventing competition and stifling innovation.4 However, the Directive would have forced internet groups to use content filters to avoid and prevent breach of copyright and to ensure publishers and artists/ authors a fairer reward for their work. YouTube, owned by Google, controls 60 per cent of all streaming audio business but pays only 11 per cent of revenues that artists receive. In July 2018, after heavy lobbying by Silicon Valley companies, the European Parliament rejected the draft Directive by 318 to 278 with 31 abstentions. A redraft returned in September 2018 and was voted through with a large majority. As the UK select committee identifies, there are clearly urgently needed reforms in relation to social media tech companies. It would be ironic if it came to pass that the security services (MI5, and GCHQ and its National Cyber Security Centre), who are charged inter alia with cyber security, led the initiative in regulating social media. In what commenced as an attempt to provide an FOI model which was truer to that expression than statutory FOIA, with its exemptions, exclusions, veto and independent determinations on disclosures, it has become a Pandora’s Box. There is no doubt that more effective regulation is required: regulation that has to balance democracy, transparency and responsibility. Digital, Culture etc committee Fake News and Disinformation Interim Report HC 363 (2017–19). The House of Lords select committee on Communications is conducting an enquiry into regulation of the internet: https://www.parliament.uk/internet-regulation (1/05/2018). The Digital etc Committee established a special Parliamentary Commission to inquire into Facebook comprising elected representatives from several jurisdictions to be members. Mark Zuckerberg refused to testify. The committee used ancient Parliamentary powers to seize documents from a US citizen in London which had emerged from US litigation involving Facebook: https:// www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/nov/24/mps-seize-cache-facebook-internal-papers. On subjecting artificial intelligence to the principles of constitutionalism, the rule of law and human rights, see P  Nemitz ‘Constitutionalism, Democracy and Technology in the Age of Artificial Intelligence’ Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 15 Oct 2018: DOI:10.1098/ reta.2018.0089 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3234336 (2/11/2018). 2 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/code-practice-disinformation (26/09/2018). 1

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   171 2017/0003 (COD): http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15333-2017-INIT/en/ pdf. 4 https://www.publicknowledge.org/news-blog/blogs/the-five-worst-things-about-the-proposedeu-copyright-directive (4/07/2018). 3

What is the position regarding data protection in America?1 2.3  There is no federal equivalent to the UK’s Data Protection Act (DPA). Class actions were commenced in the USA after the Cambridge Analytica episode under the US Stored Communications Act 1986 enacted as Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA). This was enacted in part because of the lack of clarity of the fourth amendment’s application to information stored and used online. As the date of the Act suggests, this was not enacted to deal with social media transgressions although it has been invoked against social media operators. Damages were sought in the class actions for an estimated 7 billion dollars. The 1986 Act has been amended by the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act 2018. This Act allows federal law enforcement agencies to compel US-based technology companies to provide requested data under warrant or subpoena regardless of whether the data are stored on US or foreign soil. The Privacy Act, an Act passed long before the cyber age, only applies to government bodies. The Federal Trade Commission Act (15  U.S.C. §§41-58) (FTC Act) is a federal consumer protection law that prohibits unfair or deceptive practices and has been applied to offline and online privacy and data security policies. The FTC has brought many enforcement actions against companies failing to comply with posted privacy policies and for the unauthorised disclosure of personal data. The FTC is also the primary enforcer of the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) (15  U.S.C. §§6501-6506), which applies to the online collection of information from children, and the Self-Regulatory Principles for Behavioural Advertising. Specific legislation covers health and financial data, credit reporting and nonsolicited pornography. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (18 U.S.C. §2510) and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18  U.S.C. §1030) regulate the interception of electronic communications and computer tampering, respectively. Congress enacted the Judicial Redress Act 2016, giving citizens of certain ally nations (notably, EU member states) the right to seek redress in US courts for privacy violations when their personal information is shared with law enforcement agencies without authorisation. Most states have privacy laws and California’s is a leading model and was the first to enact a breach of security notification law. The law requires any person or business that owns or licenses computerised data that includes personal information to disclose any breach of the security of the system to all California residents whose unencrypted personal information was acquired by an unauthorised person (California Civil Code §1798.82). This has been amended several times to give greater protection against government surveillance, to enhance security notifications and to provide more details on ‘personal information’. The

172  Chapter 2 Security Notification Act covers individuals or businesses conducting business in California which owns or licenses computerised data. The California Online Privacy Protection Act only applies to an operator of a commercial website, online service or mobile app that collects personally identifiable information through the internet about individual consumers residing in California who use or visit its commercial website or online service. The most recent addition is the California Consumer Privacy Act 2018. These can overlap and be pre-empted by federal laws. As of 28 March 2018, all 50 states, as well as the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands, have enacted laws requiring notification of security breaches involving personal information. Federal legislation on privacy protection has stalled while state legislation has burgeoned. The following is indebted to ‘Data protection in the United States: overview’ by  Ieuan Jolly: https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/6-502-0467?transitionType=Default&contextData =(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&bhcp=1 (12/05/2018).

1

INTRODUCING DPA 2.4  After the introduction, the first part of this chapter discusses the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA 2018). The 2018 applies to the holding of personal data by both public and private bodies. The 2018 Act repeals and replaces the DPA 1998, which was amended by the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA 2000). The DPA  2018 basically allows the subjects of electronic and ‘structured’ files to access such files (or, more precisely, the personal data within them) which are held on them. The FOIA 2000 covers access to a less-structured range of personal information than did the DPA 1998 but it only applies to public authorities as defined under FOIA and the Scottish FOIA (para 1.85). The DPA 2018 is the governing statute on access to personal information. The DPA’s amendments to the 1998 and 2000 legislation will be explained. The chapter then examines the provisions of the FOIA that deal with exemptions for personal data and interface with the DPA. There will then be an examination of the law concerning privacy protection and some limits to that protection. Like its predecessor, the DPA 2018 is a hugely complex statute.1 The 1998 model was blamed for many ills, largely based on ignorance, including the destruction of the Windrush landing records of West Indian immigrants because of alleged data protection security. On the 1998 Act, especially section 32, see Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers [2002] EWCA Civ 1373, [2003] 1 All ER 224 (CA). See Douglas v Hello! (No 3) [2003] 3 All ER 996 at para 230: ‘Campbell … fortunately ma[de] an understanding of the Act easier than do the unvarnished provisions of the Act itself’.

1

2.5  Data protection involves: restrictions and regulation on the use or ‘processing’ of personal data; access by the person who is the subject of the data to the data; security for the data; transparency in the way in which data is processed; and supervision by an independent authority. There are exemptions from the provisions of the Act. 2.6  In the era of massive data harvesting, sensitivity about use of personal data is a widely and globally shared concern as we have seen. Wrongful loss

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   173 and disclosure of personal data and subliminal invasions of privacy on a massive and frequent scale – facilitated by the unremitting advance of information technology – have been a reiterating feature of public and private commercial enterprises. The details have been collected by the House of Lords Constitution Committee in its review of surveillance.1 Google, Facebook in the private sector engaged in highly criticised practices2 and the introduction has highlighted the most recent and important. The key appears to be to set privacy protection that establishes semi-permeable membranes between the data subjects and data controllers/processors, giving comprehensible and effective privacy protection and setting strict controls on the use of data. In the digitally determined world, privacy – if it means a right to be left alone or to be forgotten – is impossible. HL  18 (2008–09) and GR  Cm 7616; and see HC  702 (2010–11), IC’s report to the House of Commons pursuant to Home Affairs Committee’s report ‘A  surveillance society’ by the Surveillance Studies Network. See Cyber Security: Protection of Personal Data select committee on Culture, Media and Sport HC 148 (2016–17). The IC has stated that the UK was sleepwalking into a ‘surveillance society’ on the report of the surveillance society in 2006. For the 2011 update, see: http://www.surveillance-studies.net/?p=385. The EU Commission fined Facebook 110 million euros for providing misleading information about WhatsApp http://europa.eu/ rapid/press-release_IP-17-1369_en.htm, and Google was fined 2.42 billion euros in June 2017 for abusing its dominant position: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1784_en.htm (30/04/2018). Actions are pending in relation to deliberately by-passing privacy settings and, in July 2018, Google was fined 4.34 billion euros by the EU Commission over Android competition abuse when manufacturers were required to pre-install the Google search and browser app. 2 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39740. 1

Google Spain 2.7  Google Spain is one of the most important DP cases. It involved a Spanish individual who was aggrieved by an archived newspaper article containing public details about his indebtedness. It concerned the ‘right to be forgotten’.1 The ECJ ruled Article 2(b) and (d) of Directive 95/46 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data are to be interpreted as meaning that, first, the activity of a search engine consisting in finding information published or placed on the internet by third parties, indexing it automatically, storing it temporarily and, finally, making it available to internet users according to a particular order of preference must be classified as ‘processing of personal data’ within the meaning of Article 2(b) when that information contains personal data and, second, the operator of the search engine must be regarded as the ‘controller’ in respect of that processing, within the meaning of Article 2(d). Article 4(1)(a) of Directive 95/46 is to be interpreted as meaning that processing of personal data is carried out in the context of the activities of an establishment of the controller on the territory of a Member State, within the meaning of that provision, when the operator of a search engine sets up in a Member State a branch or subsidiary which is intended to promote and sell advertising space offered by that engine and which orientates its activity towards the inhabitants of that Member State. Articles 12(b) and 14(1)(a) of Directive 95/46 are to be interpreted as meaning that, in order to comply with the rights laid down in those provisions and insofar as the

174  Chapter 2 conditions laid down by those provisions are in fact satisfied, the operator of a search engine is obliged to remove from the list of results displayed following a search made on the basis of a person’s name links to web pages, published by third parties and containing information relating to that person, also in a case where that name or information is not erased beforehand or simultaneously from those web pages, and even, as the case may be, when its publication in itself on those pages is lawful. Articles 12(b) and 14(1)(a) of Directive 95/46 are to be interpreted as meaning that, when appraising the conditions for the application of those provisions, it should inter alia be examined whether the data subject has a right that the information in question relating to him personally should, at this point in time, no longer be linked to his name by a list of results displayed following a search made on the basis of his name, without it being necessary in order to find such a right that the inclusion of the information in question in that list causes prejudice to the data subject. As the data subject may, in the light of his fundamental rights under Articles  7 and 8 of the Charter, request that the information in question no longer be made available to the general public on account of its inclusion in such a list of results, those rights override, as a rule, not only the economic interest of the operator of the search engine but also the interest of the general public in having access to that information upon a search relating to the data subject’s name. However, that would not be the case if it appeared, for particular reasons, such as the role played by the data subject in public life, that the interference with his fundamental rights is justified by the preponderant interest of the general public in having, on account of its inclusion in the list of results, access to the information in question. At the end of February 2018, Google reported that about 400,000 requesters had sought the removal of 2.4 million items (URLs) under the so-called right to be forgotten.2 The judgment sets a premium on protection of publicly available information. In Case C-507/17 Google v CNIL (10/01/2019) the Advocate General’s opinion was that EU law did not govern search requests made outside the EU and should not be affected by the de-referencing of the search results. He was not in favour of giving the provisions of EU law such a broad interpretation that they would have effects beyond the borders of the 28 Member States and therefore only applied to sites within the EU. The Advocate General underlined that, ‘even though extraterritorial effects are possible in certain, clearly defined, cases affecting the internal market, by the very nature of the internet, which is worldwide and found everywhere in the same way, that possibility is not comparable’. De-referencing applied only to IP addresses located in a member state irrespective of the domain name used by the internet user who performs the search. In proceedings in England after Google Spain – a case being determined in the twilight of the DP  Directive regime, with the first light of the GDPR already visible on the horizon (para  105) – two business men (N  1 and N  2) who had been convicted of criminal offences long ago sought orders requiring details about their offending and their convictions and sentences to be removed from Google Search results, on the basis that such information is not just old, but out of date, and irrelevant, of no public interest, and/or otherwise an illegitimate interference with their rights. They also sought compensation for Google’s conduct in continuing to return search results disclosing such details, after the claimants’ complaints

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   175 were made. In the case of N1 and N  2 their convictions were spent under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974. N 1’s offences were more serious involving fraudulent conspiracy. After a thorough review of the authorities including Art 17 of the GDPR (para 2.58) the judge ruled that N 2’s claim succeeded: the linked material was inaccurate, delisting would be ordered, and the claim for misuse of private information succeeded, but Google took reasonable care and there was no entitlement to compensation or damages. In N 1’s case, although the delisting claim was not an abuse of process, the material was not inaccurate, there was no misuse of personal information and delisting was not ordered.3 The judge stated: ‘There is a powerful argument that the scheme of the DPA [1998] is incompatible with fundamental rights, as it fails to recognise any possibility of a free speech justification for the processing of sensitive personal data without consent’ (para 105). Case C-131/12 (13  May 2014) Google Spain v AEPD. See GDPR recital 65. See also U  L  für D S-H v W S-H GmbH [2018] EUECJ C-210/16 (5 June 2018) Grand Chamber on including as a DC the administrator of a fan page hosted on a social network and jurisdictional flexibility for the data regulator in different member states in enforcement. 2 http://uk.pcmag.com/news/93578/googles-received-24m-right-to-be-forgotten-requests. 3 N 1 & N 2 v Google LLC and IC [2018] EWHC 799 (QB). 1

DATA PROTECTION ACT 2018 2.8  The DPA  2018 is a tortuous and very important piece of legislation.1 The Act applies the EU  General Data Protection Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2016/679) to most UK data processing. The IC’s 2016–17 annual report stated a 70 per cent increase in the ICO’s budget for DPA work ‘in the long term’. DPA work is paid for from fees received. FOIA work is a grant in aid. According to the Financial Times (19 May 2018), US companies alone who trade in Europe have reportedly spent 7.8 billion dollars in preparing for the GDPR. The GDPR is the EU’s response to privacy and data protection in an age of data harvesting – a further ePrivacy Regulation is proposed which will introduce further conditions for permission for collection and use of data in electronic communications (para  2.343). In addition, the Law Enforcement Directive (LED) on data protection is implemented with modifications under the DPA. The 1995 DP Directive had 72 recitals and 34 Articles. The GDPR alone has 173 recitals and 99 Articles; and the LED is a separate instrument.2 The GDPR came into force on 4 May 2016 and applied from 25 May 2018. Data processing under way at the time of the GDPR coming into force (4 May 2016) had two years to conform with GDPR requirements (see recital 171 of the GDPR). The first such legislation appeared in the UK in 1984, prompted by UK membership of the Council of Europe and the European Convention of Data Protection of 1981.3 A new CoE Convention on Data Protection is in preparation.4 The DPA1998 arose from the necessity of complying with the requirements of Directive 95/46/EC on data protection.5 Data protection falls within the EU competence and is a reserved matter under UK devolution legislation. By virtue of Art 286 EC (Amsterdam) the Directive was binding on the institutions of the EC from 1 January 1999 although this was then effected under Regulation (EC) 45/2001 of the European Parliament and Council, and Council Decision 2004/644/

176  Chapter 2 EC. Separate arrangements were made for the EU pillars and under Freedom, Security and Justice (FSJ) the relevant provisions were made and were based on the Council of Europe Convention. Data sharing was allowed under special treaties agreed by member states such as Schengen (to which the UK did not sign up and did not benefit from) and the Prüm Convention dealing with police transfer between signatories of data on fingerprints, DNA and vehicles (para 2.266). Under the Treaty of Lisbon there is a common legislative model for the former EC and FSJ pillars – now of course collapsed into one EU edifice. Lisbon TFEU, Art 16 provides for data protection and laying down of rules by the ordinary legislative procedure. The special nature of data protection in the area of freedom, security and justice is acknowledged under Declaration 21 and provision is made for special treatment for data affecting national security under Declaration 20. Under Lisbon TEU, Art 39 a derogation from Art 16 is allowed in relation to Common Foreign and Security personal data which will have its own regime. In May 2006, the ECJ ruled that an agreement to transfer personal data on flight passengers between the EU and US authorities was unlawful and relevant decisions of the Council and Commission were annulled.6 A modified agreement operates. Reference was made to this above (para 2.1). This is EU/US Umbrella Agreement on data exchange and law enforcement. On 2  December 2016 the Council adopted the decision authorising the conclusion of the agreement. The agreement entered into force on 1 February 2017, following the completion by US authorities of their internal procedures, including making the necessary designations under the Judicial Redress Act on 17 January 2017. Three EU Member States – the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark – have the possibility to opt-in to the agreement at a later date. There are numerous free publications and Guidelines from the Office of the Information Commissioner: www.informationcommissioner.gov.uk. On the GDPR, see the ICO’s Guide to the Data Protection Regulation: https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-the-general-dataprotection-regulation-gdpr/ (4/05/2018). See H. Grant et al Encyclopaedia of Data Protection and Privacy and quarterly updates; and see https://solutionsreview.com/data-management/top-15-bestbooks-on-gdpr-general-data-protection-regulation/ (1/05/2018); R  Jay Data Protection Law and Practice (4th edn, 2014); P Carey Data Protection – A Practical Guide to EU and UK Law (5th edn, 2018). 2 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016. The UK government has signed the new Convention. 3 Lloyd, I  Information Technology Law (4th edn, 2004) Butterworths. See also M  Chissick and J Harrington (eds) E-government: A Practical Guide to the Legal Issues (2004). 4 https://rm.coe.int/16806a616c. See s 176 of the DPA. 5 [1995] OJ L 281/31; D Bainbridge EC Data Protection Directive (1996) Butterworths. 6 European Parliament et al v Council of the European Union et al Cases-317/04 and 318/04 (30 May 2006). Subsequently, new regimes came into effect: see The EU/US  Passenger Name Record Agreement House of Lords European Union Committee HL 108 (2006–07). See Case C-362/14 Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner where the European Court of Justice held, in ruling the EU-US data transfer agreement Decision 520/2000/EC (26/07/2000) was invalid, that ‘legislation permitting the public authorities to have access on a generalised basis to the content of electronic communications must be regarded as compromising the essence of the fundamental right to respect for private life’. The agreement did not prevent the supervisory authority investigating alleged breaches of data protection: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/documents.jsf?num=C-362/14 Commission Implementing Decision – EU/US Privacy Shield Protection: http://ec.europa.eu/ justice/data-protection/files/privacy-shield-adequacy-decision_en.pdf. Council Decision (EU) 2016/2220 (OJ L 336/1–2), 2 December 2016; Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the protection of personal information relating to the prevention, investigation, detection, and prosecution of criminal offences (OJ L 336/3–13) and Joint EU-US statement, 5 December 2016. 1

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   177 2.9  The 1998 Act required significant updating to attempt to keep abreast of the digital age and developments in electronic communications and data processing. Furthermore, Art 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights had promoted data rights to fundamental rights.1 But: ‘The processing of personal data should be designed to serve mankind. The right to the protection of personal data is not an absolute right; it must be considered in relation to its function in society and be balanced against other fundamental rights, in accordance with the principle of proportionality.’ GDPR recital 422 The somewhat contradictory objectives of opening up trans-border transfers of personal data and protecting personal data were to be achieved in this reform. As the EU General Data Protection Regulation expressed the point: ‘Technology has transformed both the economy and social life, and should further facilitate the free flow of personal data within the Union and the transfer to third countries and international organisations, while ensuring a high level of the protection of personal data.’ GDPR recital 6. The new UK statute comes at a time when the UK is set to leave the EU. While setting a new framework for data protection, the reform seeks both to be compliant with EU law – a commercial necessity and compliance would be a strict legally necessity until the UK left the Union – and to prepare for the UK’s future outside the EU.3 The UK government claimed the Bill would give more control over personal data to data subjects. There are, however, numerous qualifications and exemptions (derogations) to the Act’s regulatory provisions. See Joined cases C-293/12 and 594/12 Digital Rights (Ireland) Ltd and Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15 Tele2 Sverige AB v Post- och telestyrelsen (Case C-203/15) and Secretary of State for the Home Department v Tom Watson (Case C-698/15). 2 Case C-524/06 Huber v Germany discusses the subject of discrimination between member states in data protection. Important points of privacy protection in relation to personal data and investigating breaches of copyright are provided in Case C-275/06 Productores de Musica de Espana (Promusicae) v TDES where the ECJ ruled that, under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, rights to privacy and data protection had to be properly balanced against rights to property and access to justice in breaches of copyright litigation. No right automatically prevailed. Implementation of Directives had to respect that balance and operate proportionately. See also Rugby Football Union v Consolidated Information Services Ltd [2012]  UKSC  55 and Digital Economy Act 2017, ss  105–106. Case C-28/08P Bavarian Lager v Commission discusses the relationship between the EU data protection regime and access to EU documents and is examined in ch 5 (paras 5.71 et seq). Directives may not only determine the interpretation of domestic laws; they may also be directly effective under specified and long-established principles. A list of CJEU case law on data protection is available at https://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/sites/antifraud/files/caselaw_2001_2015_en.pdf. 3 See Department for Exiting the EU: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/technicalnote-on-data-protection (7/06/2018) and, on the framework for UK/EU partnership and data protection (May 2018): https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ uploads/attachment_data/file/710147/DATA_-_FINAL.pdf, and Future Relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union (Cm 9593, July 2018), ch 3. 1

2.10  Section 1(2) of the DPA 2018 proclaims ‘[M]ost processing of personal data is subject to the GDPR’.

178  Chapter 2 The territorial scope is defined in Article  3 of the GDPR. The DPA  2018 provides that the Act applies throughout England, Ireland, Scotland and Wales (para 2.186). The GDPR applies to the processing of personal data in the context of the activities of an establishment of a controller or a processor in the Union, regardless of whether the processing takes place in the Union or not. The Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union, where the processing activities are related to: (a) the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a payment of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in the Union; or (b) the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union. The Regulation applies to the processing of personal data by a controller not established in the Union, but in a place where Member  State law applies by virtue of public international law. There are four main areas provided for in the Act. These are general data processing which has two parts, law enforcement data (LED) processing, data processing for national security purposes including processing by the intelligence services, and regulatory oversight and enforcement. The 1998 Act covered these subjects but made no separate provision for law enforcement and national security processing as the 2018 Act does. The GDPR was published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 4 May 2016 and directly applies, ie it becomes law in member states, on 25 May 2018. That will be the position in the UK until the UK leaves the EU on 29 March 2019. The GDPR replaces the 1995 Directive (Directive 95/46/EC) which was implemented by the 1998 Act. The 2018 statute makes the GDPR UK law with some amendments. It also provides for areas outside EU competence. In August 2017 the UK  Government published The exchange and protection of personal data – a future partnership paper. This explained why the free flow of data is essential to the UK in future trading relationships. Despite Brexit, data protection is one of many areas where our future international relationships require compatibility with EU law. The internet, commerce, law enforcement and security make this unavoidable.1 While the UK remains a member of the EU, all the rights and obligations of EU membership remain in force, including the directly applicable rights and duties under the GDPR. When the UK leaves the EU, the GDPR will be incorporated into the UK’s domestic law as UK law under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. Decisions of the CJEU prior to D Day on EU measures will still be binding on UK courts, but the Supreme Court and Inner House of the Court of Session will be able to establish new precedent and not follow EU judgments. It seems that, in any transitional phase, EU law will apply along with the jurisdiction and sovereignty of the CJEU. After the transitional phase, from 31 December 2020, the supremacy of EU law and the jurisdiction of the CJEU will not apply. However, it is impossible to give a definitive analysis at this stage.

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   179 The need to adjust the Withdrawal Act to allow for a transitional period ensuring EU sovereignty has been acknowledged (Legislating for the Withdrawal Agreement between the UK and EU Cm 9674, 2018, (para 60). The UK government and IC have also provided guidance on data protection in the event of a no-deal Brexit.2 Both the draft Withdrawal Treaty and Political Declaration on Future Relations specify the need for conformity with EU data protection law and the need for high co-operation between regulators.3 The worst outcome of a no deal will be an impasse in data transfer. Chapter 5 of the GDPR and Chapter V of the LED set out the requirements to be met for international transfers. The Future Relationship between the UK and the EU (Cm 9593, 2018), chs 2 and 3.2. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/data-protection-if-theres-no-brexit-deal/dataprotection-if-theres-no-brexit-deal (25/09/2018); https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/dataprotection-and-brexit/data-protection-if-there-s-no-brexit-deal/ (09/01/2019). 3 See Draft Agreement on the Withdrawal of the United Kingdom from The European Union (November 2018), Arts 8, 71–74. The Political Statement outlines criminal law enforcement cooperation. 1 2

Sections 191–194 of the Framework for Government Processing 2.11  Amendments in the House of Lords empowered the Secretary of State to prepare a document, called the Framework for Data Processing by Government, which contains guidance about the processing of personal data in connection with the exercise of functions of (a) the Crown, a Minister of the Crown or a United Kingdom government department, and (b) a person with functions of a public nature who is specified or described in regulations made by the Secretary of State. The Framework may be amended or replaced by the Secretary of State after mandatory consultation with the IC and others considered appropriate. It will not make provision in relation to devolved government. The document must be laid before Parliament and the laying procedures are in section 186 (negative resolution approval). The document must be published and kept under review and, where the Secretary of State is aware that breaches of international obligations could arise from its content, he must takes steps to remedy the situation. Persons carrying out processing which is covered by the Framework must have regard to the document. Under section 194 a failure to act in accordance with the document does not ‘in itself’ make the person liable to legal proceedings in a court or tribunal. The Framework and any amendments or replacements are admissible in legal proceedings. Courts, tribunals and the IC must consider the Framework where relevant to any question before the courts or any function of the IC.

General Data Processing 2.12  The most important part of the Act, in terms of extent of coverage, is Part 2 which is relevant to most processing of personal data in the UK. However, a new s  2 provides for ‘protection of personal data’ under which the IC must have regard, when exercising functions under the data protection laws, to the

180  Chapter 2 importance of securing an appropriate level of protection for personal data, taking into account the interests of the DS, DC and others and matters of general public interest. Personal data does not include corporate or ‘legal’ persons’ data (see GDPR recitals 14 and 27). Section 3(2) refers to ‘living individual’.1 Part 2 both applies the GDPR to the types of processing of personal data covered by Article 2 of the GDPR, and supplements, and must be read with, the GDPR, and it also extends the GDPR provisions to areas outside EU competence (the ‘applied GDPR’ scheme) with modifications. This includes processing under the FOIA Act, processing for activities related to national security and defence, but not processing within Parts three or four (below). It does not apply to processing of personal data by an individual in the course of a purely personal or household activity. The Explanatory (ExN) notes explain that ‘The Bill and the GDPR apply substantively the same standards to the majority of data processing in the UK, in order to create a clear and coherent data protection regime’. There are also derogations providing exemptions from the GDPR. Part three contains provision for law enforcement data processing. Part four provides for data processing by the intelligence services. Part five concerns the Information Commissioner (IC) and Part six deals with enforcement and offences. As the UK Act’s long title makes clear, it is not just an access statute but an Act which provides for the ‘regulation of the processing of information relating to individuals’, but it also makes provision in relation to functions of the Information Commissioner (IC) under information regulations. Matching the two statutes – the DPA 1998 and the FOIA 2000 – was not easy because of the perceived conflict between disclosure under the FOIA 2000 and privacy protection and regulation under the DPA 1998. The House of Lords has spoken of the undoubted importance of FOIA but emphasised that FOIA operates so as not to override privacy and data protection.2 The German Bundesverfassungsgericht has ruled that a parent may inherit the Facebook account of their deceased child. The Federal Constitutional Court found that the daughter’s contract with the media platform was part of her legacy and should be passed on to the mother, giving her full access to the daughter’s account including her posts and private messages (12/07/2018). In Campbell v Secretary of State [2018] UKUT 372 (AAC) under DPA 1998, s 28(4) a DS’s request for access to data and his right of appeal against a ministerial certificate denying access on national security grounds did not survive death. The tribunal assumed (at para 5) that the situation would be the same under the 2018 Act. 2 Common Services Agency v Scottish Information Commissioner [2008] UKHL 47. 1

2.13  The GDPR changes essential terms at the base of data protection law. For Part 2, both before and after 29 March 2019, it is vital to consult the GDPR which contains the details of the data law that has become UK law. Unlike the 1998 Act, it does not transcribe the provisions in detailed drafts of English and Welsh, Scottish and Northern Irish law. The DPA exercises a number of available derogations. To take one example, like the 1998 Act, the GDPR applies to ‘personal data’. ‘But the GDPR’s definition is more detailed and makes it clear that information such as an online identifier, for example a computer’s IP address, can be personal data. The more expansive definition expressly provides for a wide range of personal identifiers to constitute personal data, reflecting changes in technology and the way organisations collect information about people. Also, personal data that has been pseudonymised, for example key-coded data, can fall

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   181 within the scope of the GDPR depending on how difficult it is to attribute the pseudonym to a particular individual’ (Explanatory Notes (ExN) para 12).1 For the ExN, see https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/12/pdfs/ukpgaen_20180012_ en.pdf (27/06/2018).

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2.14  Section 4 specifies the types of data processing (above) that apply under each Chapter within Part 2. Chapter 2 of Part 2 applies to data processing that falls within the scope of EU law. To achieve consistent data protection, Chapter 3 of Part 2 applies to types of processing that are outside the scope of EU law. Section 5 provides that terms used in Chapter 2 of Part 2 have the same meaning as in the GDPR (see above), subject to any modifications in Chapter 2. The terms used in Chapter 3 of Part 2 have the same meaning as in the applied GDPR. 2.15  Section 6 supplements the definition of ‘controller’ found in Article 4(7) of the GDPR. ‘Controller’ means the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data; where the purposes and means of such processing are determined by Union or Member State law, the controller or the specific criteria for its nomination may be provided for by Union or Member State law. This section explains that, when personal data is processed only for the purpose and means for which it is required by legislation to be processed, the person who has the obligation under that legislation to process the data is the data controller. This provision replicates section 1(4) of the 1998 Act.

Meaning of ‘public authority’ and ‘public body’ 2.16  Article 6(1)(a) to (f) of the GDPR sets out a list of conditions which allow for the lawful processing of personal data. Schedule 2 to the 1998 Act contained an equivalent provision to Article 6(1) which was taken from the 1995 Directive. Although Article  6 (1)(e) makes reference to processing carried out by ‘public authorities in the performance of their tasks’ the GDPR does not provide a definition of ‘public authority’ or ‘public body’ for the purpose of Article 6(1)(e) and Article 37. Section 7 defines public authority and public body for the purpose of the GDPR and is consistent with the definition which existed in section 1(1) of the 1998 Act. Basically, the definition is that based on the FOIA Sch 1 and the Scottish FOIA, although the Secretary of State may make regulations removing public status for GDPR (DPA) purposes. These definitions were examined in ch 1 (para 1.85).

Definitions 2.17  There is a similarity in the key terms used in the GDPR and in the 1998 Act. The 2018 Act, however, uses derogations where it is possible to achieve further consistency. Article  4(7) of the GDPR defines what is meant by a ‘controller’ (DC) as the legal or natural person that determines the purposes

182  Chapter 2 and means of the processing of personal data. This is similar to the 1998 Act, but section 1(4) of the 1998 Act goes further by clarifying who is the controller when processing is required under an enactment. The DPA ensures that the clarity in section 1(4) of the DPA 1998 is preserved. A data processor is responsible for processing on behalf of the DC.

Definitions in Article 4 of the GDPR 2.18  The basic definitions in data protection are contained in Article 4 of the GDPR. They are set out in detail. The first requires some discussion of English case law: ‘For the purposes of this Regulation: (1) “personal data” means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (“data subject”); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person;’ Section 3(2) of the DPA adds that the data relate to an identified or identifiable ‘living individual’.

Durant v Financial Services Authority1 2.19  Durant has been the most influential, and controversial, decision from domestic courts on the ambit of the DPA  1998 in relation to ‘personal data’ and ‘structured filing systems’. The claimant applied to the Financial Services Authority (‘FSA’) under DPA 1998, s 7 for disclosure of personal data relating to him held by the FSA. Access to some information was provided but the FSA refused further disclosure. The court was provided with all the information or documents under DPA  1998, s  15(2) that the FSA did not wish to disclose to Durant. The court reiterated the approach adopted by Lord Phillips MR in Campbell v MGN2 who observed that, as the DPA 1998 implements a Directive, it should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Directive. ‘A purposive approach to making sense of the provisions is called for’. It was not ‘appropriate’ to look for the ‘precision in the use of language that is usually to be expected from parliamentary draftsman’ (Campbell, para 96). The Court of Appeal, echoing previous case law, identified the conflict at the heart of data protection laws: the protection of fundamental human rights to privacy and accuracy of personal data held by others under the terms of the DPA 1998 and the facilitation of the free flow of such data between the EU member states. [2003]  EWCA  Civ 1746, [2004]  IP&T  814. See also Johnson v Medical Defence Union [2005] 1  All ER  87 on CPR disclosure re DPA claims. An unsuccessful claim under DPA for access did not prevent a claim under the CPR. See Edem v IC & FSA  [2014]  EWCA  Civ 92 which doubts the breadth of Durant on personal data and ICO Subject Access Code of Practice. Also Joined

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Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   183 Cases 141/12 & 372/12 (14/07/2014)  YS  v Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel [2015] 1 WLR 609. Also, Dawson-Damer v Taylor-Wessing Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 74 and Ittihadieh v 5–11 Cheyne Gdns RTM Co Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 1212. 2 [2003] QB 633.

2.20  The background to the case was litigation between the claimant and Barclays Bank in which the claimant had been unsuccessful. D had attempted to obtain documents from the Bank with a view to further litigation and he wished to know what information the defendant possessed on the Bank in its capacity as a regulator under the Financial Services Act 1987. The FSA declined these requests although it did investigate D’s complaints against the Bank. It did not inform D of its outcome pursuant to confidentiality under ss 82–85 of the 1987 Act. D therefore invoked his rights under DPA 1998, s 7. He sought documents that were both in electronic form and manual documents. 2.21  The FSA disclosed data in computerised form – beyond Durant’s strict DPA entitlements according to the Court of Appeal – having redacted some information to erase the names of others. The FSA refused the request for the unredacted computerised files as well as the paper documents on the grounds that these did not constitute personal information within the terms of the expression ‘personal data’ under DPA 1998, s 1(1). Even if it did, it did not constitute data within the separate definition of that word in s 1(1)(c) in the sense of forming a ‘separate filing system’. It was accepted by the FSA that some of its manual files were basic. These included a file relating to systems controls arranged in date order which contained some information relating to D  in part about his complaint against the Bank. The second manual file was a ‘Complaints file’ about complaints to the FSA by customers of the Bank about the Bank. These had ‘subdividers ordered alphabetically by reference to a complainant’s name, containing behind a divider marked “Mr Durant” a number of documents relating to D, filed in date order’. The third group was the Bank Investigations Group file maintained by the FSA’s Regulatory Enforcement Department. This was related to and organised by reference to issues or cases concerning the Bank ‘but not necessarily identified by reference to an individual complainant.’ (Durant, para 15) The last file was the Company Secretariat papers ‘a sheaf of papers in an unmarked transparent plastic folder held by the FSA’s Company Secretariat’ concerning D’s complaint about the FSA’s refusal to hand to D  details of its investigation into D’s complaints against the Bank and its outcome. These were not organised by date or any other criterion. ‘The FSA has acknowledged in correspondence that each of the files in question contains information in which D  features, that some of them identify him by reference to specific dividers within the file and that they contain such documents as: copies of telephone attendance notes, a report of forensic examination of documents, transcripts of judgments, handwritten notes, internal memoranda, correspondence with the Bank … with other individuals … and between the FSA [and D].’ (Para 17) 2.22  The Court of Appeal concentrated on four questions:1 what makes data in manual or electronic files personal? What is a ‘relevant filing system’ in

184  Chapter 2 the definition of ‘data’ in DPA  1998, s  1(1) that makes personal information in a manual system ‘personal data’ disclosable to the subject under s 1(1)? Was the manual filing system such that the FSA were under a duty to disclose it had it been a computerised system? Further questions concerned when it was reasonable in all the circumstances to comply with the request to disclose even though the personal data contains personal information about another who has not consented to disclosure? Lastly, by what principles should a court be guided in exercising its discretion under s 7(9) to order a data controller, who has wrongly refused to comply with a request under s 1(1), to comply with the request? The two latter questions not dealt with in this section concerned: first, redaction of computerised files that the FSA argued did not contain personal data and files that did contain such data on other individuals. The latter raised the question of the reasonableness of disclosing the data to the applicant (see now eg s 94(6)–(9) and para 2.131 below). The fourth question concerned the court’s powers under DPA 1998, s 7(9) which was, by the time of the Court of Appeal’s hearing, no longer live.

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2.23  The court preferred a narrow interpretation of personal data: the term ‘is not an automatic key to any information, readily accessible or not, of matters in which he may be named or involved’. Nor is it a form of assistance for disclosure of documents for litigation (see ch 11). ‘Ready accessibility’ though important is not a starting point. Not all information obtained from a ‘computer search against a person’s name or unique identifier is personal data within the Act’ (para 27). Two ‘notions’ may be of assistance in determining whether it is personal data: is the information ‘biographical’ in a significant sense? Is it recording information of a putative data subject’s ‘involvement in a matter or an event that has no personal connotations, a life event in respect of which his privacy could not be said to be compromised’ (para 28). Secondly, does the information focus on the subject and not on ‘some other person with whom he may have been involved’ or some event in which he may have had an interest (para 28) eg, as in this case, an investigation into another person’s or body’s conduct that he may have complained of. This narrow interpretation is reinforced, the court felt, by the concentration on the ‘data subject’ in terms of rights under the Act and expressions in the Act. In short, the information which D sought was not personal data whether it was sought from an electronic system or a manual system. In relation to his complaints about the Bank and the FSA’s investigation of his complaints, information generated by such complaints made by D  could not render such information ‘personal data’(para 30). In para 31, Auld LJ believed that what was sought by virtue of the DPA 1998 was ‘third party discovery’ for further litigation an ‘exercise … unrestricted by considerations of relevance’. 2.24  The words ‘or from that data and other information in the possession of the holder of information, or which is likely to come into the possession of the data controller’ were in the former DPA regime and were part of the definition of personal data of an identifiable individual. They were discussed by the House of Lords in Common Services Agency v Scottish Information Commissioner. Although no longer present, they illustrate an important point which is still relevant for recognition and therefore ‘personal data’ purposes.

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   185 In a complex case dealing with barnardised (subject to distortion) data, the Law Lords ruled that the Scottish Information Commissioner would have to establish clearly whether a child’s identity could be established by other data and information in the possession of the authority. If so, it was personal data and the safeguards and protection provided by the Act applied. The Scottish Information Commissioner (SIC) had not established whether it was personal data according to this provision. Surely a crucial question would be whether the requester would have access to the other data or information.1 See Magherafelt v IC EA/2009/0047 (paras 2.82 and 2.83 below). In Common Services Agency v SIC [2008] UKHL 47, para 37 the Law Lords ruled that ‘sensitive personal data’ should be read as a subset of ‘personal data’ so that data qualifying as personal data and subject to the descriptions for sensitive personal data are subject to the personal data definitions and restrictions. Note also Employment Relations Act 1999, s 3 and Employment Relations Act 1999 (Blacklist) Regulations 2010, SI 2010/493.

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2.25  ‘(2) “processing” means any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction;’ Despite the width of the DPA 1998 definition, the Court of Appeal nonetheless ruled by majority that ‘selecting’ data to make a decision in relation to the data subject was not processing.1 The strong dissent of Arden LJ is, we submit, in better accord with the intentions of the DPA  1998. The wording ‘retrieval, consultation, use’ would be broad enough to cover selecting. Johnson v Medical Defence Union (No 2) [2007] EWCA Civ 262.

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2.26  ‘(3) “restriction of processing” means the marking of stored personal data with the aim of limiting their processing in the future; (4) “profiling” means any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning that natural person’s performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or movements; (5) “pseudonymisation” means the processing of personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person;’ 2.27  ‘(6) “filing system” means any structured set of personal data which are accessible according to specific criteria, whether centralised, decentralised or dispersed on a functional or geographical basis;’

186  Chapter 2 In Durant there was also a discussion of the term ‘relevant filing system’ under the DPA 1998. ‘Relevant’ has been dropped in the GDPR. The court believed that the DPA 1998 and Directive contained no material differences on the provisions relating to ‘a relevant filing system’ (Directive 95/46/EC, Art 2(2)(c), recitals 15 and 27; DPA  1998, s  1(1)). The court believed that the intention of these provisions ‘is to provide, as near as possible, the same standard of sophistication of accessibility to personal data in manual filing systems as to computerised records. It is not a question of obtaining information easily: it is a question of ‘structuring’ information in a set or part of a set in such a way that specific information about an individual is ‘readily accessible’. Several factors influenced the court to adopt the narrower interpretation of ‘relevant filing system’ urged on behalf of the FSA so that, firstly, ease of retrieval of information from filing systems ‘with minimal time and cost through clear referencing mechanisms within any filing system potentially containing personal data [which may be] the subject of a request for information (para 45)’ would have to be evident. The Act’s intention cannot have been to impose a ‘disproportionate effect on the property rights of data controllers’ whose administrative section would have to ‘leaf through files to see what [information], and whether information qualifying as personal data of the person who has made the request, is to be found there [and which] would bear no resemblance to a computerised search’ (para  45 – emphasis added). When seen in the context of the narrow meaning identified by the court for ‘personal data’ the required easy access to such data ‘must be on a par with that provided by a computerised system’ and the need for a restrictive meaning to ‘relevant filing system’ is plain (para 47). ‘Parliament intended to apply the Act to manual records only if they are of sufficient sophistication to provide the same or similar ready accessibility as a computerised filing system’ (para 48). ‘That requires a filing system so referenced or indexed that it enables the data controller’s employee responsible to identify at the outset of his search with reasonable certainty and speed the file or files in which specific data relating to the person requesting the information is located and to locate the relevant information about him within the file or files, without having to make a manual search of them.’ (para 48) 2.28  Files are part of a relevant filing system if they are structured in such a way clearly to indicate at the outset of the search whether specific information capable of amounting to personal data of an individual requesting it under DPA  1998, s  7 is ‘held within the system, and, if so, in which file of files it is held’ (para  50). Secondly and conjunctively, the phrase is limited to a system ‘which has, as part of its own structure or referencing mechanism, a sufficiently sophisticated and detailed means of readily indicating whether and where in an individual file or files specific criteria or information about the applicant can be readily located’ (para 50). The FSA files in question did not satisfy these tests. 2.29  When one considers the description of unstructured personal data that UK public authorities will have to disclose under FOIA, it may well reinforce this restrictive interpretation of ‘personal data’ and ‘relevant filing system’ (above). However, it could be argued that the narrow definitions adopted by a

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   187 unanimous Court of Appeal will provide scope for abuse of data holding of such a kind that led to the calls for reform in the 1970s and 1980s to safeguard an individual’s integrity. It should be remembered that the courts have the power of inspection to see whether the statutory definitions are satisfied and it is to be hoped that they will exercise such powers appropriately to protect individuals against abuse.1 See Johnson v Medical Defence Union [2005] 1 All ER 87 (para 2.19 above) and CPR.

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2.30  ‘(7) “controller” means the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data; where the purposes and means of such processing are determined by Union or Member State law, the controller or the specific criteria for its nomination may be provided for by Union or Member State law; (8) “processor” means a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which processes personal data on behalf of the controller; (9) “recipient” means a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or another body, to which the personal data are disclosed, whether a third party or not. However, public authorities which may receive personal data in the framework of a particular inquiry in accordance with Union or Member State law shall not be regarded as recipients; the processing of those data by those public authorities shall be in compliance with the applicable data protection rules according to the purposes of the processing; (10) “third party” means a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or body other than the data subject, controller, processor and persons who, under the direct authority of the controller or processor, are authorised to process personal data; (11) “consent” of the data subject means any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her;’ 2.31  The Upper Tribunal case of Surrey Heath Borough Council v John Morley and the IC [2014] UKUT 0339 (AAC), 21 July 2014, illustrates the point in relation to consent and social media. This point can be dealt with now, although more is said about consent below (para 2.36). The case arose from a request by Mr Morley to Surrey Heath Borough Council for the names of the members of the Surrey Heath Youth Council. The Borough Council withheld the names under section 40(2) of the FOIA, and the Commissioner agreed with this in his decision notice. Mr Morley appealed to the First-tier Tribunal, and provided a link to the Youth Council’s Facebook page. This was a closed group, but there was a front page, accessible to anyone registered with Facebook, with a photograph of the 18 members of the group and some of their names. The First-tier Tribunal, by a majority decision, took this as evidence that these young people had chosen to make their names and membership public, and accordingly found that their names should be disclosed.

188  Chapter 2 The Upper Tribunal however took a different view. Jacobs J said at §18: ‘I  need to deal with one point made by Mr Morley at the hearing. He argued that by putting themselves onto Facebook the members named had consented for the purposes of condition 1. I  reject that argument. For a start, satisfying condition 1 is not sufficient to allow disclosure. It is merely a specific factor that has to be considered in addition to the general requirement of fairness. Aside from that, there were a number of difficulties in the way of showing consent. They were discussed at the hearing. I will take just two. There is no evidence that the persons named were members in late 2010. Nor is there any evidence that those named were responsible for putting their names on the front page.’ 2.32  ‘(12) “personal data breach” means a breach of security leading to the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure of, or access to, personal data transmitted, stored or otherwise processed; (13) “genetic data” means personal data relating to the inherited or acquired genetic characteristics of a natural person which give unique information about the physiology or the health of that natural person and which result, in particular, from an analysis of a biological sample from the natural person in question; (14) “biometric data” means personal data resulting from specific technical processing relating to the physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of a natural person, which allow or confirm the unique identification of that natural person, such as facial images or dactyloscopic data (finger prints); (15) “data concerning health” means personal data related to the physical or mental health of a natural person, including the provision of health care services, which reveal information about his or her health status; (16) “main establishment” means: (a) as regards a controller with establishments in more than one Member State, the place of its central administration in the Union, unless the decisions on the purposes and means of the processing of personal data are taken in another establishment of the controller in the Union and the latter establishment has the power to have such decisions implemented, in which case the establishment having taken such decisions is to be considered to be the main establishment; (b) as regards a processor with establishments in more than one Member State, the place of its central administration in the Union, or, if the processor has no central administration in the Union, the establishment of the processor in the Union where the main processing activities in the context of the activities of an establishment of the processor take place to the extent that the processor is subject to specific obligations under this Regulation; (17) “representative” means a natural or legal person established in the Union who, designated by the controller or processor in writing pursuant to

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   189 Article 27, represents the controller or processor with regard to their respective obligations under this Regulation; (18) “enterprise” means a natural or legal person engaged in an economic activity, irrespective of its legal form, including partnerships or associations regularly engaged in an economic activity; (19) “group of undertakings” means a controlling undertaking and its controlled undertakings; (20) “binding corporate rules” means personal data protection policies which are adhered to by a controller or processor established on the territory of a Member State for transfers or a set of transfers of personal data to a controller or processor in one or more third countries within a group of undertakings, or group of enterprises engaged in a joint economic activity; (21) “supervisory authority” means an independent public authority which is established by a Member State pursuant to Article 51; (22) “supervisory authority concerned” means a supervisory authority which is concerned by the processing of personal data because: (a) the controller or processor is established on the territory of the Member State of that supervisory authority; (b) data subjects residing in the Member State of that supervisory authority are substantially affected or likely to be substantially affected by the processing; or (c) a complaint has been lodged with that supervisory authority; (23) “cross-border processing” means either: (a) processing of personal data which takes place in the context of the activities of establishments in more than one Member State of a controller or processor in the Union where the controller or processor is established in more than one Member State; or (b) processing of personal data which takes place in the context of the activities of a single establishment of a controller or processor in the Union but which substantially affects or is likely to substantially affect data subjects in more than one Member State; (24) “relevant and reasoned objection” means an objection to a draft decision as to whether there is an infringement of this Regulation, or whether envisaged action in relation to the controller or processor complies with this Regulation, which clearly demonstrates the significance of the risks posed by the draft decision as regards the fundamental rights and freedoms of data subjects and, where applicable, the free flow of personal data within the Union; (25) “information society service” means a service as defined in point (b) of Article 1(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council;1 (26) “international organisation” means an organisation and its subordinate bodies governed by public international law, or any other body which is set up by, or on the basis of, an agreement between two or more countries.’ Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical regulations and of rules on Information Society services (OJ L 241, 17.9.2015, p 1).

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190  Chapter 2

Other general processing outside EU law 2.33  Article  2(2) of the GDPR states that the Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data in the course of an activity that falls outside the scope of Union law. Processing for national security is such an area and is not within the scope of the GDPR or the Law Enforcement Directive. The Act contains provisions to extend the GDPR standards to data processing, other than processing caught by Part 3 (law enforcement) or Part 4 (intelligence services), to create a simple framework under which DCs/DPs can apply a single standard. The Act achieves this by applying the relevant Articles of the GDPR to general data outside the scope of Union law, as set out in Schedule 6 (the applied GDPR scheme). There are 72 paragraphs of modifications of a largely technical nature ie ‘domestic law’ instead of ‘Union’ or ‘Community’ law. The Explanatory Notes (ExN para 34 original version) state that: ‘In applying the Articles of the GDPR, the Bill simultaneously makes some modifications to the Articles to make them relevant to a context where Union law does not apply. While it is appropriate to apply the limitations and safeguards on data processing as well as the associated rights, references to Member States and EU institutions after Brexit are not relevant and are removed’. The distinction between general data inside and outside the scope of Union law will cease to have meaning vis-à-vis the UK after Brexit. The UK Government’s expectation is that GDPR standards will continue to apply to data processing within the scope of Part 2 of the Act. ‘When the GDPR is brought within the UK’s domestic law, using the powers in the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill the Government expects to make provision to enable a single domestic legal basis to apply the GDPR data processing standards’ (ExN para 35 original version). UK DP laws will have to be consistent with EU law for the extra-territorial transfer of such data.

Special categories of personal data (formerly ‘sensitive personal data’) 2.34  Following the 1995 Directive the 1998 Act implemented additional safeguards for ‘sensitive personal data’ which includes personal data relating to race, political opinion, trade union membership, health, sex life and criminal records. The GDPR re-terms ‘sensitive personal data’ as ‘special categories of personal data’. It therefore extends the additional safeguards so that genetic data, and biometric data where processed to uniquely identify an individual, are covered. ‘Biometric data’ means personal data resulting from specific technical processing relating to the physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of an individual, which allows or confirms the unique identification of that individual, such as facial images or dactyloscopic (fingerprints) data (s 205). ‘“Genetic data” means personal data relating to the inherited or acquired genetic characteristics of an individual which gives unique information about the physiology or the health of that individual and which results, in particular, from an analysis of a biological sample from the individual in question;’ (s 205)

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   191 ‘Personal data relating to criminal convictions etc. is not included, but processing of this data outside of the control of official authority must be authorised by domestic law, which provides for safeguards.’ (ExN para 12 original version)

The data protection principles 2.35  As under the 1998 Act, processing must take place according to the ‘Principles’ (Data Protection Principles) unless rendered non-applicable or exempt. They (or rather some of them) may, however, be rendered non-applicable in certain processing, eg  in response to FOIA requests and unstructured data (para 2.96). In the 1998 Act there were eight data protection principles (DPPs) and these are largely carried over to the GDPR as set out in the table below from the ExN. The ‘principles’ (DPP) apply to processing of personal data. The GDPR also provides a new principle of accountability. The DC is responsible for, and must be able to demonstrate, compliance with the principles (Art 5(2) of the GDPR). All personal data must be processed according to the GDPR principles (as set out in ExN para 14): Data Protection Act 1998 principles

General Data Protection Regulation principles

Lawfulness

i. Personal data shall be processed fairly and lawfully and according to conditions.

Personal data shall be processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to the data subject.

Purpose

ii. Personal data shall be obtained only for one or more specified and lawful purposes, and shall not be further processed in any manner incompatible with that purpose or those purposes.

Personal data shall be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes.

Data minimisation

iii. Personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purpose or purposes for which they are processed.

Personal data shall be adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed.

192  Chapter 2 Data Protection Act 1998 principles

General Data Protection Regulation principles

Accuracy

iv. Personal data shall be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date.

Personal data shall be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step must be taken to ensure that personal data that are inaccurate, having regard to the purposes for which they are processed, are erased or rectified without delay.

Storage

v. Personal data processed for any purpose or purposes shall not be kept for longer than is necessary for that purpose or those purposes.

Personal data shall be kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the personal data are processed; personal data may be stored for longer periods insofar as the personal data will be processed solely for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes.

Access

vi. Personal data shall be processed in accordance with the rights of data subjects.

The GDPR does not have an equivalent principle. Instead, access rights are found separately in Chapter III of the GDPR.

Security

vii. Appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be taken against unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, personal data.

Personal data shall be processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the personal data, including protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropriate technical or organisational measures.

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   193

Overseas transfer

Accountability

Data Protection Act 1998 principles

General Data Protection Regulation principles

viii. Personal data shall not be transferred to a country or territory outside the European Economic Area unless that country or territory ensures an adequate level of protection for the rights and freedoms of data subjects in relation to the processing of personal data.

The GDPR does not have an equivalent principle. Instead, overseas transfers of personal data are addressed separately in Chapter V  of the GDPR.

The 1998 Act does not have The controller shall be an equivalent principle. responsible for, and be able to demonstrate, compliance with the principles.

Lawfulness of processing Conditions for processing 2.36  The Act seeks to ensure a smooth legal transition in existing processing, subject to the enhanced rights provided by the GDPR. Schedule 20 deals with transitional provisions. The concept of ‘consent’ is central to data processing. Processing of special categories of personal data (in the 1998 Act ‘sensitive personal data’ concerning race, political opinions, health, etc. as described above, and Art 9 of the GDPR below) is generally prohibited unless explicit consent is obtained. The GDPR allows processing to take place in certain circumstances without consent and enables domestic law to stipulate the conditions and safeguards around this processing. This is explained below. The processing of special categories of data and criminal conviction and offences data must be undertaken with adequate and appropriate safeguards to ensure the absolute protection of individuals’ most sensitive personal data. This was allowed under the 1998 Act. Like the 1998 Act, the Bill seeks to allow for continued processing for ‘substantial public interest’ purposes, ‘to ensure that organisations are able to continue lawfully processing data whilst also achieving a balance between individuals’ rights’. ‘It is not possible to predict what future circumstances may arise which justify the processing of these particularly sensitive categories of data without explicit consent of the individual. For example, in 2009 the then Home Secretary established the Hillsborough Independent Panel to investigate the disaster which occurred on 15  April 1989. Some of the information held by public bodies within the scope of the Hillsborough

194  Chapter 2 disclosure exercise included sensitive personal data so the Secretary of State made the Data Protection (Processing of Sensitive Personal Data) Order 2012 (SI 2012/1978) to ensure that there was no room for doubt that it may be possible in an appropriate case for an individual or body to disclose such data. The Bill provides the Secretary of State with the necessary power to manage unforeseeable situations of this sort.’ (ExN para 27) ‘The GDPR gives individuals the right to object to decisions made about them solely on the basis of automated processing, where those decisions have legal or other significant effects. This includes processing where there is no human intervention, for example, when data is collected about an individual’s personal finances, which is then processed to calculate creditworthiness. The GDPR allows additional safeguards to protect consumers from inaccurate processing to be provided for in domestic legislation. The Bill replicates the additional safeguards provided within section 12(2) of the 1998 Act should continue to apply and the Bill makes appropriate provision.’ (ExN para 28) 2.37  To process personal data, a DC/DP must satisfy one of the conditions for processing. Otherwise, processing is unlawful unless a condition is exempted. Although consent is the basic means to enable lawful processing (see Art 4(11) above), it is not the only way to enable processing of data. There may also be a contractual or other legal obligation that allows data to be processed without explicit consent. Data may be processed without consent where necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller (see below). Data may be processed for a vital interest, eg to protect life. Processing must be necessary and, for special purposes data including health, this justification cannot be used where a DS is capable of giving consent and they refuse. Data may also be processed where there is a ‘legitimate interest’, although under the GDPR this can no longer be relied upon by public authorities; however, it is arguable that PAs may be able to invoke this reason where they act in a purely commercial capacity. They have to rely on specific conditions. ‘A  legitimate interest may include processing for direct marketing purposes or preventing fraud; transmission of personal data within a group of undertakings for internal administrative purposes, including client and employee data processing for the purposes of ensuring network and information security and reporting possible criminal acts or threats to public security to a competent authority’ (ExN 18). This list is not exhaustive. The provenance of this justification, which is likely to be widely used, is Art 6(1)(f) of the GDPR. It has similarities to DPA 1998, Sch 2, para 6 which featured widely in IC investigations under s 40 of the FOIA (paras 2.81 et seq below) but it is both wider and more nuanced. Note the emphasis on protecting a child. 2.38  Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR states: ‘processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party except where such interests are

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   195 overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child.’ This can be broken down into a three-part test: • Purpose test: are you pursuing a legitimate interest? • Necessity test: is the processing necessary for that purpose? • Balancing test: do the individual’s interests override the legitimate interest? The IC offers the following advice:1 ‘Legitimate interests is the most flexible lawful basis for processing, but you cannot assume it will always be the most appropriate. It is likely to be most appropriate where you use people’s data in ways they would reasonably expect and which have a minimal privacy impact, or where there is a compelling justification for the processing. If you choose to rely on legitimate interests, you are taking on extra responsibility for considering and protecting people’s rights and interests. Public authorities can only rely on legitimate interests if they are processing for a legitimate reason other than performing their tasks as a public authority. There are three elements to the legitimate interests basis. It helps to think of this as a three-part test. You need to: • identify a legitimate interest; • show that the processing is necessary to achieve it; and • balance it against the individual’s interests, rights and freedoms. The legitimate interests can be your own interests or the interests of third parties. They can include commercial interests, individual interests or broader societal benefits. The processing must be necessary. If you can reasonably achieve the same result in another less intrusive way, legitimate interests will not apply. You must balance your interests against the individual’s. If they would not reasonably expect the processing, or if it would cause unjustified harm, their interests are likely to override your legitimate interests. Keep a record of your legitimate interests assessment (LIA) to help you demonstrate compliance if required. You must include details of your legitimate interests in your privacy information.’ In the absence of ‘explicit consent’ to processing of special categories of personal data and criminal data, there are even more restrictive limitations on when such data can be lawfully processed (below). https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/ lawful-basis-for-processing/legitimate-interests/.

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196  Chapter 2

Conditions for lawful processing 2.39  Article  6 of the GDPR sets out what were called the conditions for processing to be lawful. If one of these is not fully complied with, processing is unlawful in the absence of a derogation. ‘Article 6 Lawfulness of processing [conditions] 1. Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the following applies: (a) the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific purposes; (b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; [‘necessary’ here and below means just that, ie  unavoidable and not simply convenient] (c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; (d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person; (e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Point (f) of the first subparagraph shall not apply to processing carried out by public authorities in the performance of their tasks. 2. Member States may maintain or introduce more specific provisions to adapt the application of the rules of this Regulation with regard to processing for compliance with points (c) and (e) of paragraph 1 by determining more precisely specific requirements for the processing and other measures to ensure lawful and fair processing including for other specific processing situations as provided for in Chapter IX.’ The primary means of acquiring a lawful basis to process personal data under the GDPR is to obtain the consent of the individual to whom the data relates. ‘Consent under the GDPR must be a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the individual’s wishes’ (Art 4(11)). There has to be evidence of some kind of clear affirmative action. Consent cannot be inferred from silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity. Consent must not be condition- or term-dependent. Simple ways for people to withdraw consent must be present. Because a certain level of understanding of what people are being asked is contained in giving ‘consent’, the GDPR specifies that parents or guardians

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   197 must give consent to personal data processing on behalf of young children, using what is termed ‘information society services’. This term will generally include commercial websites. The term is defined as ‘any service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the individual request of a recipient of services’ (see Article 1(1)(b) of EU Directive 2015/1535). 2.40  ‘3. The basis for the processing referred to in point (c) and (e) of paragraph 1 shall be laid down by: (a) Union law; or (b) member state law to which the controller is subject. The purpose of the processing shall be determined in that legal basis or, as regards the processing referred to in point (e) of paragraph 1, shall be necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller. That legal basis may contain specific provisions to adapt the application of rules of this Regulation, inter alia: the general conditions governing the lawfulness of processing by the controller; the types of data which are subject to the processing; the data subjects concerned; the entities to, and the purposes for which, the personal data may be disclosed; the purpose limitation; storage periods; and processing operations and processing procedures, including measures to ensure lawful and fair processing such as those for other specific processing situations as provided for in Chapter IX. The Union or the Member  State law shall meet an objective of public interest and be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. 4. Where the processing for a purpose other than that for which the personal data have been collected is not based on the data subject’s consent or on a Union or Member State law which constitutes a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society to safeguard the objectives referred to in Article 23(1), the controller shall, in order to ascertain whether processing for another purpose is compatible with the purpose for which the personal data are initially collected, take into account, inter alia: (a) any link between the purposes for which the personal data have been collected and the purposes of the intended further processing; (b) the context in which the personal data have been collected, in particular regarding the relationship between data subjects and the controller; (c) the nature of the personal data, in particular whether special categories of personal data are processed, pursuant to Article 9, or whether personal data related to criminal convictions and offences are processed, pursuant to Article 10; (d) the possible consequences of the intended further processing for data subjects; (e) the existence of appropriate safeguards, which may include encryption or pseudonymisation.’

198  Chapter 2

Conditions for consent 2.41  The conditions for consent are set out in Article 7: ‘Article 7 1. Where processing is based on consent, the controller shall be able to demonstrate that the data subject has consented to processing of his or her personal data. 2. If the data subject’s consent is given in the context of a written declaration which also concerns other matters, the request for consent shall be presented in a manner which is clearly distinguishable from the other matters, in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language. Any part of such a declaration which constitutes an infringement of this Regulation shall not be binding. 3. The data subject shall have the right to withdraw his or her consent at any time. The withdrawal of consent shall not affect the lawfulness of processing based on consent before its withdrawal. Prior to giving consent, the data subject shall be informed thereof. It shall be as easy to withdraw as to give consent. 4. When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract.’

Lawfulness of processing: public interest etc 2.42  Article 6(1)(e) of the GDPR provides that processing is lawful where it is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller. Member States may set out more specific provisions in respect of Article 6(1)(c) and (e) (Art 6(2) of the GDPR). Processing may include processing of personal data that is necessary for the administration of justice, the exercise of a function of a Government department, either House of Parliament, the Crown, a Minister of the Crown or a function conferred on a person by enactment. The list is similar to that contained in paragraph 5 of Schedule 2 to the 1998 Act.

Children 2.43  In relation to a child, the age of consent is set out in Article 8. The minimum age set by the GDPR for a child to give consent to data processing is 13–16 years. Member states are given leeway. The IC guidance suggested parental guidance until the age of 12 under the 1998 Act. The Bill as presented allows a child aged 13 years or older to consent to his or her personal data being processed by providers of information society services (see section 9). The position in Scotland differs (s 199). More stringent conditions for ‘special categories of data’ are contained in Article 9. These are defined in Art 9(1).

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   199 Article  8 of the GDPR also sets the age at which a child can consent to the processing of their personal data by information society services. Information society services are defined as ‘any service provided by electronic means, at a distance and at the individual request of a recipient of services and normally provided for remuneration’ (ExN 87), including receipt of revenues from advertising. It is suggested that most online websites would meet this definition, ranging from online banking to search engines and social media. It does not include preventative and counselling services. The minimum age is 13. See section 208 for Scotland. This is in line with the minimum contractual age set by popular information society services which currently offer services to children (eg  Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram). There is no equivalent provision in the 1998 Act.

Special categories of personal data and criminal convictions etc data (section 10 and Sch 1) under Part 2 of the DPA 2.44  The DPA  2018, Sch  1 makes provision for the application of the provisions in Art 9 of the GDPR in UK law and applied GDPR law. Article 9(1) of the GDPR generally prohibits the processing of ‘special categories of data’. These are defined in Article 9(1) of the GDPR as personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purposes of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation. Article 9(2) of the GDPR provides the circumstances in which the prohibition on processing special categories of data in Article 9(1) may not apply. Some of these have direct effect. Others take the form of derogations requiring Union or Member State law and are subject to safeguards. Section 10(1) to (3) makes provision for processing of special categories of data in reliance on derogations contained in Article 9(2)(b), (g), (h), (i) and (j). Subsections (4) and (5) permit the processing of data under Art 10 of the GDPR relating to criminal convictions or related security measures to be carried out under the control of official authority or when the processing is authorised by Union or Member State law providing for appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of others. Processing of personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences or related security measures is only permitted by UK law if it meets a condition in Part 1, 2 or 3 of Sch 1 to the DPA. Section 10(2) and (3) provides for the processing of special categories of personal data for reasons of employment, social security and protection (Art 9(2)(b)); substantial public interest (Article  (2)(g)); health and social care (Art 9(2)(h)), public health (Art 9(2)(i)) and archiving, research and statistics (Art 9(2)(j)). Subsection (2) provides that processing under Article 9(2)(b), (h), (i) or (j) is only permitted by UK law if it meets a condition in Part 1 of Schedule 1. Subsection (3) provides that processing under Article 9(2)(g) is only permitted by UK law if it meets a condition in Part 2 of Schedule 1. These include having an ‘appropriate policy’ document in place (para 2.48 below).

200  Chapter 2 The Secretary of State may by regulation-making powers amend Schedule  1 by adding, varying or omitting processing conditions or safeguards as well as powers to make consequential amendments to this section.

Processing of special categories of personal data 2.45  Processing of special categories of personal data (para  2.44 above) is prohibited (DPA  2018, Sch  1, para  1 – from Art 9 of the GDPR). However, paragraph 1 will not apply if one of the following is present (Sch 1, para 2): ‘(a) the data subject has given explicit consent to the processing of those personal data for one or more specified purposes, except where Union or Member  State law provide that the prohibition referred to in paragraph 1 may not be lifted by the data subject; (b) processing is necessary for the purposes of carrying out the obligations and exercising specific rights of the controller or of the data subject in the field of employment and social security and social protection law in so far as it is authorised by Union or Member State law or a collective agreement pursuant to Member  State law providing for appropriate safeguards for the fundamental rights and the interests of the data subject; (c) processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person where the data subject is physically or legally incapable of giving consent; (d) processing is carried out in the course of its legitimate activities with appropriate safeguards by a foundation, association or any other notfor-profit body with a political, philosophical, religious or trade union aim and on condition that the processing relates solely to the members or to former members of the body or to persons who have regular contact with it in connection with its purposes and that the personal data are not disclosed outside that body without the consent of the data subjects; (e) processing relates to personal data which are manifestly made public by the data subject; (f) processing is necessary for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims or whenever courts are acting in their judicial capacity; (g) processing is necessary for reasons of substantial public interest, on the basis of Union or Member State law which shall be proportionate to the aim pursued, respect the essence of the right to data protection and provide for suitable and specific measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and the interests of the data subject; (h) processing is necessary for the purposes of preventive or occupational medicine, for the assessment of the working capacity of the employee, medical diagnosis, the provision of health or social care or treatment or the management of health or social care systems and services on the basis of Union or Member  State law or pursuant to contract with a health professional and subject to the conditions and safeguards referred to in paragraph 3;

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   201 (i) processing is necessary for reasons of public interest in the area of public health, such as protecting against serious cross-border threats to health or ensuring high standards of quality and safety of health care and of medicinal products or medical devices, on the basis of Union or Member  State law which provides for suitable and specific measures to safeguard the rights and freedoms of the data subject, in particular professional secrecy; (j) processing is necessary for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes in accordance with Article  89(1) based on Union or Member State law which shall be proportionate to the aim pursued, respect the essence of the right to data protection and provide for suitable and specific measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and the interests of the data subject.’ Under paragraph 3, ‘personal data referred to in paragraph 1 may be processed for the purposes referred to in point  (h) of paragraph  2 when those data are processed by or under the responsibility of a professional subject to the obligation of professional secrecy under Union or Member State law or rules established by national competent bodies or by another person also subject to an obligation of secrecy under Union or Member State law or rules established by national competent bodies’. ‘Member States may maintain or introduce further conditions, including limitations, with regard to the processing of genetic data, biometric data or data concerning health’ (para 4). Paragraph 1 of Sch 1 to the DPA 2018 relates to Article 9(2)(b) of the GDPR and allows the processing of special categories of data in the field of employment, social security and social protection law where necessary for the purposes of performing or exercising obligations or rights of the DC/DP or the data subject. There must be an ‘appropriate policy document in place’ to meet this condition (defined in Part 4 of Sch 1). Paragraph 2(1) of Sch 1 to the DPA 2018 concerns Article 9(2)(h) of the GDPR, and enables processing of special categories of data for health or social care purposes. These purposes are defined as ‘health or social care purposes’ in paragraph 2(2) and include all purposes listed in Article 9(2)(h). Paragraph 2(3) indicates the conditions and safeguards in Article 9(3) of the GDPR that apply to processing under Article 9(2)(h), and section 10(1), which defines circumstances that are included in the Article 9(3) requirement. Paragraph 3 of Sch 1 to the DPA 2018 relates to Article 9(2)(i) of the GDPR. That provision enables processing of special categories of data for the purposes of public interest in the area of public health. Processing under this condition must be carried out by, or under the supervision of, a health professional, or by another person who in the circumstances owes a duty of confidentiality under an enactment or rule of law. A health professional is defined in section 204. Article  9(2)(j) of the GDPR allows processing that is necessary for archiving purposes, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes if the processing is carried out in accordance with Article  89(1) of the GDPR (as

202  Chapter 2 supplemented by section 19). Processing has to be in the public interest. This is dealt with in para 4 of Sch 1.

Substantial public interest conditions for processing 2.46  Part 2 of Sch 1 to the DPA 2018 relates to Article 9(2)(g) of the GDPR. It sets out the conditions for processing of special categories of data which are necessary for reasons of substantial public interest. Schedule 3 to the 1998 Act contained a majority of these conditions and the effect of those conditions is retained, with adjustments. It is a condition of processing under this Part for the DC to have appropriate safeguards in place, as set out in Part 4 of Sch 1. Processing of special categories of data (hereafter ‘processing’) that is in the substantial public interest is allowed where necessary for: the administration of justice; the exercise of a function of either House of Parliament; the exercise of a function conferred on a person by an enactment or the exercise of a function of the Crown, a Minister of the Crown or a Government department (DPA 2018, Sch 1, paras 6 and 7). Processing is allowed revealing health or ethnic origin, religious or philosophical beliefs, data concerning health and personal data concerning an individual’s sexual orientation for the monitoring of equality between persons with different racial or ethnic origins, different religious or philosophical beliefs, differing physical or mental health conditions or between persons of different sexual orientation. Processing does not meet this condition if it is carried out for the purposes of measures or decisions with respect to the particular data subject unless the data subject has consented. Processing does not meet this condition if it is likely to cause substantial damage or distress to the data subject. An individual can give notice in writing to the controller requiring the controller to cease processing his or her data, and the processor must cease processing within a reasonable period (DPA 2018, Sch 1, para 8). The Schedule lists groups of people generically (in relation to a category of personal data). Processing is permitted for the purposes of the prevention or detection of any unlawful act where seeking the consent of the data subject to the processing would prejudice those purposes and processing is necessary for reasons of substantial public interest (DPA 2018, Sch 1, para 10). Processing is necessary for the purposes of discharging certain protective functions which are designed to protect members of the public from certain conduct which may not constitute an unlawful act, such as dishonesty, incompetence or mismanagement. Seeking the consent of the data subject would prejudice those purposes and that the processing is necessary for reasons of substantial public interest is an additional requirement (DPA 2018, Sch 1, para 11). Processing is necessary for the disclosure of data for journalism, academic, artistic or literary purposes and the subject matter of the disclosure relates to the matters mentioned in sub-paragraph  (2) which seems restrictive (unlawful acts; dishonesty, malpractice or other seriously improper conduct; unfitness or

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   203 incompetence, mismanagement or a failure in services). The disclosure must be carried out with a view to the publication of the personal data by any person and it must be necessary for reasons of substantial public interest. In addition, the controller must reasonably believe that publication of the personal data would be in the public interest (DPA 2018, Sch 1, para 13). Processing is permitted where the disclosure is necessary for preventing fraud, or a particular type of fraud, and is by a member of an anti-fraud organisation (as defined in the Serious Crime Act 2007) or in accordance with arrangements made by an anti-fraud organisation. The processing of any data so disclosed is permitted (DPA 2018, Sch 1, para 14). Processing is permitted where necessary for the purposes of making a disclosure in good faith under section 21CA of the Terrorism Act 2000 (terrorist financing and identifying terrorist property) or section 339ZB of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (money laundering) (DPA 2018, Sch 1, para 15). Paragraph  16 concerns support for individuals with a particular disability or mental condition covering non-profit bodies providing support. Processing is required to discharge functions involving the provision of services such as confidential counselling and advice in circumstances where the processing is necessary for reasons of substantial public interest and the consent of the data subject is not obtained for one of the specified reasons set out in subparagraph (2) (DPA 2018, Sch 1, para 17). Paragraph 18 permits processing of special categories of data required for the protection of children or of adults at risk and must be necessary. Paragraph 19 permits processing of special categories of data which is necessary to protect the economic well-being of adults. Processing of data concerning health in certain insurance scheme contexts is permitted where (the ExN to the Bill advised) details of a parent, grandparent, great-grandparent or sibling of an insured person are required (eg health details of relatives used to calculate the life expectancy of the insured) and the processing can reasonably be carried out without the consent of those relatives. Processing is permissible where the DC cannot reasonably be expected to obtain the consent of the data subject and the DC is not aware of the relative withholding his or her consent to the processing. The DC/DP must not process these data to make decisions or take actions with respect to those relatives (DPA 2018, Sch 1, para 20). Processing of data is permitted in certain occupational pension scheme contexts and the processing can reasonably be carried out without the consent of the data subject. Third party data processing can be carried out without consent in circumstances similar to paragraph 20 (DPA 2018, Sch 1, para 21). Processing is permitted which reveals political opinions by persons or organisations included in the register under section 23 of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, provided such processing does not cause substantial damage or substantial distress to a person. The processing must be necessary for the purpose of the person’s or organisation’s political activities,

204  Chapter 2 which include political campaigning, fund-raising, political surveys and casework. An individual can give notice in writing to the controller requiring the DC to cease processing his or her data, and this must cease processing within a reasonable period (DPA 2018, Sch 1, para 22). Processing is permitted by elected representatives responding to requests where it is carried out by an elected representative or a person acting with his or her authority. The processing must be in connection with the discharge of the functions of the elected representative and the condition is only met if the processing must be carried out without the data subject’s consent for one of the reasons specified in sub-paragraph (2). ‘Elected representative’ is defined in subparagraph (3) (DPA 2018, Sch 1, para 23). Disclosure is permitted to an elected representative in the discharge of their functions or a person authorised by such a representative and the processing must be carried out without the data subject’s consent for one of the reasons specified in sub-paragraph (2) (DPA 2018, Sch 1, para 24). Processing is permitted about a prisoner, including information relating to the prisoner’s release from prison, for the purpose of informing a member of the House of Commons or a member of the Scottish Parliament about the prisoner and arrangements for the prisoner’s release. The member must be under an obligation not to further disclose the data (DPA 2018, Sch 1, para 25). Paragraph  26 allows the processing of special categories of data where the processing consists of the publication of a judgment or other decision of a court or tribunal, or is necessary for the purposes of publishing such a judgment or decision. Processing is permitted by bodies who are responsible for monitoring or eliminating doping in a sport or sporting event for those purposes (DPA 2018, Sch 1, para 27) and the last paragraph covers processing necessary to protect the integrity of a sport or sporting event.

Conditions for processing relating to criminal convictions etc under Part 2 2.47  Processing is permitted of personal data relating to criminal convictions etc (hereafter ‘as above’) if the data subject has given his or her consent (DPA 2018, Sch 1, para 29). Processing as above is permitted where necessary to protect an individual’s vital interests and where the DS is physically or legally incapable of giving consent (DPA 2018, Sch 1, para 30). Processing as above is permitted for legitimate activities by not-for-profit bodies with a political, philosophical, religious or trade union aim. The processing must relate to members or former members of that body or to persons who have regular contact with it. Personal data must not be disclosed outside that body without consent from the DS (DPA 2018, Sch 1, para 31). Processing as above is permitted where that data that has been made public by the DS (DPA 2018, Sch 1, para 32).

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   205 Processing as above is permitted where necessary for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims and when courts are acting in their judicial capacity. Court may include certain tribunals (DPA 2018, Sch 1, paras 33, 34). Processing of personal data about a conviction or caution is permitted where necessary for the administration of an account (payment cards) used in the commission of indecency offences (photographs or images involving children. The additional safeguards in Part 4 apply to this processing (DPA 2018, Sch 1, para 35). The ExN explains that the final paragraph (DPA 2018, Sch 1, para 36) provides that s  10(4) and (5) have the effect that processing of the above is permitted under relevant conditions in Parts 1, 2 and 3 of the Schedule. Since there is no requirement for processing under Article 10 of the GDPR to be in the substantial public interest, paragraph  36(1) disapplies this express requirement where it exists in Part 2 for the purposes of processing as above. Paragraph 37 extends paragraph  20 of Schedule  1 so that the processing of criminal conviction etc data is permitted for an insurance purpose. Because paragraph 20 only permits the processing of specified special categories of data, this provision is needed to ensure that criminal conviction etc data can be processed.

Additional safeguards 2.48  Section 10 of the DPA  2018 deals with the GDPR requirements that processing as above should only be carried out if safeguards for the fundamental rights of the data subject are in existence. These are in Part 4 of Schedule  1. They apply to processing carried out under paragraph 1 of Schedule 1, Part 2 of Schedule 1, and paragraph 35 of Schedule 1 and are in addition to any express safeguards that are required under any specific processing condition. The DC must have an appropriate policy document in place. The DC must have a document which explains the DC’s procedures for securing compliance with the principles in Article  5 of the GDPR and explains the DC’s policies as regards the retention and erasure of personal data processed in reliance on the condition, with an indication of how long the personal data is likely to be retained (DPA 2018, Sch 1, para 39). The DC must, during the relevant period, keep the policy document under review and updated and must make it available to the Commissioner on request (DPA 2018, Sch 1, para 40). See paragraph 40(2) for ‘relevant period’ – beginning when processing commences and ending six months from the cessation of the processing. A record maintained by the DC or their representative, under Article 30 of the GDPR in respect of processing in reliance on paragraph 1 of Schedule 1, Part 2 of Schedule 1, and paragraph 35 of Schedule 1 must include information on: which condition is relied on; how the processing satisfies Article 6 of the GDPR and whether the personal data is retained and erased in accordance with the appropriate policy document and if not, the reasons for not following those policies (DPA 2018, Sch 1, para 41).

206  Chapter 2

Applications and limits on fees charged by controllers 2.49  The ICO website provides clear basic guidance on rights and duties for both the DC and DS.1 Applications may be made verbally or in writing. The DC has one month to respond, which can be extended by two months if the request is complex or involves several requests. The response must contain (i) confirmation of processing by the DC, (ii) a copy of the personal data, and (iii) other information referred to by the ICO as the ‘privacy notice’ (see below). Section 12 of the DPA 2018 contains details on how the Secretary of State may specify limits on the reasonable fees that a DC may charge for manifestly unfounded or excessive requests for information by a data subject, or for provision of further copies of information already provided. The Secretary of State may use regulations to require controllers to publish guidance about the fees they charge and s/he can specify what the guidance must include. Basically, there is no fee for a DS request for their data unless the request is manifestly unfounded or excessive and then a ‘reasonable fee’ may be charged for administrative costs and compliance. A reasonable fee may be charged where additional copies of data are requested. https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/ whats-new/ for organisations. On individual rights: https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guideto-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/individual-rights/.

1

Obligations of credit reference agencies 2.50  Section 13 of the DPA  2018 concerns the treatment of right of access requests by data subjects under Article 15 of the GDPR when the DC is a credit reference agency. The effect of DPA 1998 is maintained. The DC’s obligations under Article 15 of the GDPR are limited to information concerning the data subject’s financial standing unless contrary intention has been indicated by the DS. Disclosure under Art 15 of the GDPR by the DC must be accompanied by a statement informing the data subject of their rights under section 159 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (see s 9(3) of the DPA).

Automated decision-making authorised by law 2.51  Section 14 of the DPA 2018 addresses Article 22 of the GDPR and contains additional safeguards for some types of automated decision-making (no human involvement), including profiling. Article 4(4) of the GDPR defines ‘profiling’ as ‘any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning that natural person’s performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or movements’. DSs have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on such processing and profiling, where it produces legal effects concerning them or similarly significantly affects them, unless it is: • necessary for the creation and performance of a contract between a DS and DC;

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   207 • •

authorised by law to which the DC is subject and which lays down suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights, freedoms and legitimate interests; or based on the data subject’s explicit consent.

Automated decision-making is not defined in the GDPR, but a reference to it is included in the definition of ‘processing’ in Article 4(2). Recital 71 of the GDPR suggests they should include: • provision of specific information to the data subject; and • right to obtain human intervention, to express his or her point of view, to obtain an explanation of the decision reached after an assessment, and an opportunity to challenge the decision. A  DC must inform the DS in writing when an automated decision has been made, as soon as reasonably practicable (DPA  2018, s  14(4)(a)). The DS may request the DC to reconsider the decision, or take a new decision not based solely on automated processing (DPA 2018, s 14(4)(b)) (see s 12(2) of the DPA 1998). DCs must consider the notice before the end of the period of 21 days beginning with receipt of the request and notify the DS of the steps taken to comply with that notice, as well as the outcome of complying with the notice (s 12(3) of the DPA 1998). The Secretary of State may, by regulations, provide for additional safeguards to meet technological developments etc (s 12(5)(b) of the DPA 1998).

Processing for archiving, research, statistics: safeguards 2.52  Article  89(1) of the GDPR requires appropriate safeguards for the processing of data in support of archiving, scientific or historical research purposes and statistical purposes. Section 19 of the DPA 2018 replicates the safeguards in the 1998 Act. Section 19(2) sets out that processing personal data for scientific or historical research purposes, statistical purposes, or for archiving in the public interest is prohibited where the processing causes substantial damage or distress to the data subject, or where the data has been processed to support a decision being made about the subject.

Rights of data subjects transparency, information etc

2.53  The DS rights are in Chapter III of the GDPR. DPA rights are not confined to UK or EU residents or citizens.1 Article 12 concerns transparency of information, communication and procedures for the exercise of the rights. The standards are strict and detailed. The controller must take appropriate measures to provide any information referred to in Articles 13 and 14 and any communication under Articles 15 to 22 and 34 relating to processing to the data subject in a concise, transparent, intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language, in particular for any information addressed specifically to a child. The information must be provided in writing, or by other means,

208  Chapter 2 including, where appropriate, by electronic means. The DC may not refuse a request for information unless the controller demonstrates that it is not in a position to identify the data subject. A response must be without delay and in any event within a month, which may be extended to two months for complex requests. Information should be provided free under Arts 13, 14, 15–22 and 34. Where requests from a data subject are manifestly unfounded or excessive, in particular because of their repetitive character, the controller may either charge a reasonable fee or refuse the request. Where the controller has reasonable doubts concerning the identity of the natural person making the request referred to in Articles  15 to 21, the controller may request the provision of additional information necessary to confirm the identity of the data subject. https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2019/01/scl-electionsprosecuted-for-failing-to-comply-with-enforcement-notice/.

1

where data are collected from the ds

2.54  Article  13 concerns information to be provided where personal data are collected from the data subject. Where personal data relating to a DS are collected from the DS, the DC must, at the time when personal data are obtained, provide the DS with all of the following information: (a) the identity and the contact details of the DC and, where applicable, of the controller’s representative; (b) the contact details of the data protection officer, where applicable; (c) the purposes of the processing for which the personal data are intended as well as the legal basis for the processing; (d) where the processing is based on point (f) of Article  6(1), the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party; (e) the recipients or categories of recipients of the personal data, if any; (f) where applicable, the fact that the controller intends to transfer personal data to a third country or international organisation and the existence or absence of an adequacy decision by the Commission or, in the case of transfers referred to in Article  46 or 47, or the second subparagraph of Article  49(1), reference to the appropriate or suitable safeguards and the means by which to obtain a copy of them or where they have been made available. 2.55  In addition to the information referred to in the paragraph above, the controller must, at the time when personal data are obtained, provide the data subject with the following further information necessary to ensure fair and transparent processing: (a) the period for which the personal data will be stored or, if that is not possible, the criteria used to determine that period; (b) the existence of the right to request from the controller access to and rectification or erasure of personal data or restriction of processing concerning the data subject or to object to processing as well as the right to data portability; (c) the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority.

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   209 data not obtained from ds

2.56  Article 14 deals with information to be provided where personal data have not been obtained from the data subject. It repeats many of the provisions in Art 13 and adds further rights, inter alia: (a) from which source the personal data originate and, if applicable, whether it came from publicly accessible sources; (b) the existence of automated decision-making, including profiling, referred to in Article 22(1) and (4) and, at least in those cases, meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences of such processing for the data subject.

Access 2.57  Article 15 deals with right of access by the data subject. The data subject has the right to obtain from the controller confirmation as to whether or not personal data concerning him or her are being processed, and, where that is the case, access to the personal data and the following information: (a) the purposes of the processing; (b) the categories of personal data concerned; (c) the recipients or categories of recipient to whom the personal data have been or will be disclosed, in particular recipients in third countries or international organisations; (d) where possible, the envisaged period for which the personal data will be stored, or, if not possible, the criteria used to determine that period; (e) the existence of the right to request from the controller rectification or erasure of personal data or restriction of processing of personal data concerning the data subject or to object to such processing; (f) the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority; (g) where the personal data are not collected from the data subject, any available information as to their source; (h) the existence of automated decision-making, including profiling, referred to in Article 22(1) and (4) and, at least in those cases, meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences of such processing for the data subject.

Rectification and erasure 2.58  Article 16 concerns the right to rectification. Article 17 provides the right to erasure without undue delay – the ‘right to be forgotten’. A variety of grounds are provided, eg no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for which they were collected or otherwise processed; consent is withdrawn, no legitimate grounds for processing or unlawful processing. Rights may not be exercisable for a variety of reasons including freedom of expression and information, listed public interest and to establish legal defences. Article 18 is concerned with the right to restrict processing.

210  Chapter 2 notification by dc: data portability

2.59  Article  19 deals with the notification obligation on the DC regarding rectification or erasure of personal data or restriction of processing to whom data has been disclosed unless this proves impossible or involves disproportionate effort. The DC must inform the DS about those recipients if the DS requests it. Article 20 concerns the right to data portability: the DS has the right to receive the personal data concerning him or her, which he or she has provided to a controller, in a structured, commonly used and machine-readable format and has the right to transmit those data to another DC without hindrance from the controller to whom the personal data have been provided. Basically, it covers data given by consent or under contract and is carried out by automated means.

Objection to processing 2.60  Article  21 concerns the right to object to processing. In such a case, the controller can no longer process the personal data unless the controller demonstrates compelling legitimate grounds for the processing which override the interests, rights and freedoms of the data subject or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims. Such a right must be brought to the DS’s notice at the latest ‘at the time of first communication with the DS’. There is a right to object to direct marketing which is not so qualified in terms of defences.

Automated processing 2.61  Article 22 provides that the data subject has the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her. This does not apply if processing is necessary for the performance of a contract between DC and DS, is authorised by Union or Member State law to which the DC is subject and which also lays down suitable measures to safeguard the DS’s rights and freedoms and legitimate interests, or is based on the data subject’s explicit consent.

The range of DS rights 2.62  These rights may be subject to restrictions (exemptions) in Article  23 which we examine below. The rights that individuals have over their data in the 1998 Act are carried over to the GDPR, but in some cases these are strengthened and have been added to, as set out in the table below. If the purposes for which a controller processes personal data do not, or no longer, require the identification of a data subject by the controller, the controller is not obliged to maintain, acquire or process additional information in order to identify the data subject for the sole purpose of complying with this Regulation. Articles 15–20 do not apply, subject to a proviso.

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   211 table comparing data protection act 1998 and gdpr rights1

2.63  Data Protection Act rights

General Data Protection Regulation rights

The right to be informed

The Act provides the right to ‘fair processing information’, typically given through a privacy notice. The information must include: • the identity of the data controller, • if the controller has nominated a representative, the identity of that representative, • the purpose or purposes for which the data are intended to be processed, and • any further information which is necessary, having regard to the specific circumstances in which the data are or are to be processed, to enable processing in respect of the data subject to be fair.

The GDPR sets out the information that should be supplied and when individuals should be informed. The GDPR specifies information in addition to that under the 1998 Act that should be supplied at Articles 13 and 14.

The right of access

The Act provides that an individual who makes a written request and pays a fee is entitled to be: told within 40 days whether any personal data is being processed; given a description of the personal data, the reasons it is being processed, and whether it will be given to any other organisations or people; given a copy of the information comprising the data; and given details of the source of the data.

The GDPR provides a similar right but the information must be provided for free although a ‘reasonable fee’ may be applied when a request is manifestly unfounded or excessive, particularly if it is repetitive. The time limit to respond is one month, or three months in complex cases.

212  Chapter 2 Data Protection Act rights

General Data Protection Regulation rights

The right to rectification

Where it is inaccurate, the individual concerned has a right to apply to the court for an order to rectify, block, erase or destroy the inaccurate information.

Individuals are entitled to have personal data rectified if it is inaccurate or incomplete. It must be done within one month, or three months in complex cases. Where no action is taken, individuals have the right to be informed of how to seek a judicial remedy.

The right to erasure

The Act does not provide the right to erasure, but an individual can apply to a court for an order for erasure of inaccurate personal data.

Individuals have a right to have personal data erased in specific circumstances: • where the personal data is no longer necessary in relation to the purpose for which it was originally collected/ processed; • when the individual withdraws consent; • when the individual objects to the processing and there is no overriding legitimate interest for continuing the processing; • when the personal data was unlawfully processed; • when the personal data has to be erased in order to comply with a legal obligation; or • when the personal data is processed in relation to the offer of information society services to a child.

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   213 Data Protection Act rights

General Data Protection Regulation rights

The right to restrict processing

The Act allows and individuals to apply to a court for an order to block or suppress processing of personal data where it is inaccurate. When processing is restricted, it is permissible to store the personal data, but not further process it.

Where it is claimed that data is inaccurate or the right to erasure has been exercised individuals can require the controller to restrict processing until verification checks have been completed. Individuals may also require controllers to restrict processing where there is no legal basis it is only needed for legal claims,

The right to data portability

Not applicable

The right to data portability allows individuals to obtain and reuse their personal data for their own purposes across different services. It allows them to move, copy or transfer personal data easily from one IT environment to another in a safe and secure way, without hindrance to usability. The personal data must be provided in a structured, commonly used and machine readable form. The information must be provided free of charge.

The right to object

The Act provides individuals with the right to object to the processing of personal data for direct marketing.

In addition to direct marketing, individuals have the right to object to processing based on legitimate interests or the performance of a task in the public interest/exercise of official authority (including profiling), and processing for purposes of scientific/ historical research and statistics.

214  Chapter 2

Rights in relation to automated decision making and profiling

Data Protection Act rights

General Data Protection Regulation rights

The Act allows an individual access to information about the reasoning behind any decisions taken by automated means. An individual can give written notice requiring that automated decisions are not made using their personal data. Individuals can ask for a decision taken by automated means to be reconsidered.

The GDPR provides similar rights and additionally defines profiling as any form of automated processing intended to evaluate certain personal aspects of an individual.

This is set out in the ExN para 20.

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Exemptions 2.64  As in the 1998 Act there are numerous exemptions from the data rights. Recital 73 of the GDPR states: ‘Those restrictions (exemptions) should be in accordance with the requirements set out in the Charter and in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’. The ExN states there are some ‘limited circumstances’ where it is appropriate to create exemptions to the usual rights that individuals have over personal data about themselves. For instance, information may be recorded about an individual in relation to health, social work and education. It may only be given on the condition that it is not disclosed to the individual. Giving the information is conditional on non-disclosure because disclosure could create safeguarding concerns. Orders were made under the 1998 Act to specify exemptions in the Act to individuals’ rights. For example, the Data Protection (Subject Access Modification) (Health) Order 2000 (SI  2000/413) applies to personal data consisting of information as to the physical or mental health or condition of the individual. It covers court proceedings, essentially preserving the confidentiality of certain reports provided to the court in proceedings concerned with the care of children. Similar exemptions will continue to apply. It is also necessary to disapply individual rights in relation to personal data held by regulatory bodies such as watchdogs performing functions concerned with protecting the public from incompetence, malpractice, dishonesty or seriously improper conduct, or concerning health and safety; charities; or fair competition in business. ‘Without appropriate exemptions a corrupt official might be able to find out how his or her corruption is being exposed’ (ExN para 30). Likewise ‘the Government believes that exemptions should continue to exist to ensure that the judiciary have a ‘safe space’ in which to conduct their work, where they are free to make such records as they see fit whilst reaching their judgment, without fear that such records (such as annotations, recorded discussions) may be investigated or challenged by parties to proceedings’ (ExN para  30). The Act provides for such exemptions.

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   215 On-going investigations into an individual’s conduct may require exemptions. Law enforcement agencies are under Part 3 of the DPA 2018 (below) and are not covered by the GDPR. There are occasions where other investigations would need exemptions from the data rights. The ExN cites as an illustration s 29(1) of the 1998 Act. This allows Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (‘HMRC’) to withhold certain personal data on a case-by-case basis from an individual customer if providing that particular personal data after a request would be likely to prejudice specified crime and taxation purposes. ‘It also means that HMRC is not obliged to send a specific privacy notice to an individual customer when they obtain personal data from a third party if it would tip the customer off about an ongoing investigation into their tax affairs’ (ExN para 31). The 1998 Act provides that personal data processed only for research, historical or statistical purposes is exempt from subject access requests. In relation to personal data processed only for research, historical or statistical purposes, the Bill exercises all of the derogations in Article 89(2) and (3) of the GDPR. This seeks to ensure that research organisations and archiving services do not have to respond to subject access requests when this would seriously impair or prevent them from fulfilling their purposes. Further, the 2018 Act contains provision to exercise derogations so that research organisations do not have to comply with an individual’s rights to rectify, restrict further processing and object to processing where this would seriously impede their ability to complete their work, and providing that appropriate organisational safeguards are in place to keep the data secure. These derogations broadly maintain the status position that obtained under the 1998 Act. To cater for future and unknown contingencies the Act therefore provides the Secretary of State with the power to make further exemptions in the future. 2.65  Exemptions are dealt with in section 15 and in Schedule  2. These are extremely detailed. They restrict the DS rights. Section 15(5) of the DPA 2018 directs DCs, processors etc to the applied GDPR scheme where national security applies. As national security is outside the scope of EU law, the processing of personal data in connection with national security activities, and by agencies or units dealing with national security issues, is not within the scope of the GDPR. So, unless the provisions of Parts 3 (law enforcement processing) and 4 (intelligence services processing) apply, any processing of personal data in connection with safeguarding national security would fall to be governed by Chapter 3 of Part 2, subject to the appropriate application of the exemptions provided for in s 26. Where national security is engaged, section 15(5) signposts data controllers, processors and others to the applied GDPR scheme in Chapter 3 of Part 2.

Listed GDPR provisions 2.66  In Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the DPA 2018: ‘“the listed GDPR provisions” means–

216  Chapter 2 (a) the following provisions of the GDPR (the rights and obligations in which may be restricted (exempted) by virtue of Article  23(1) of the GDPR)– (i) Article  13(1) to (3) (personal data collected from data subject: information to be provided); (ii) Article 14(1) to (4) (personal data collected other than from data subject: information to be provided); (iii) Article 15(1) to (3) (confirmation of processing, access to data and safeguards for third country transfers); (iv) Article 16 (right to rectification); (v) Article 17(1) and (2) (right to erasure); (vi) Article 18(1) (restriction of processing); (vii) Article 20(1) and (2) (right to data portability); (viii) Article 21(1) (objections to processing); (ix) Article 5 (general principles) so far as its provisions correspond to the rights and obligations provided for in the provisions mentioned in sub-paragraphs (i) to (viii); and (b) the following provisions of the GDPR (the application of which may be adapted by virtue of Article 6(3) of the GDPR)– (i) Article 5(1)(a) (lawful, fair and transparent processing), other than the lawfulness requirements set out in Article 6; (ii) Article 5(1)(b) (purpose limitation).’

Crime and taxation 2.67  Paragraph  2 of Sch  2 to the DPA  2018 restricts the application of the listed GDPR provisions above to personal data processed for crime and taxation purposes, to the extent that the processing would be likely to prejudice those purposes. Sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) make provision relating to the further processing of personal data collected for these purposes. Paragraph 3 applies where personal data is processed for the crime and taxation purposes by a DC who is a public body and the restrictions are necessary for the smooth running of a risk assessment system. It restricts a more limited set of GDPR provisions. These restrictions in paragraphs 2 and 3 repeat s 29 of the 1998 Act.

Immigration 2.68  Paragraph  4 of Sch  2 to the DPA  2018 restricts the application of the listed GDPR provisions to personal data processed for the purposes of the maintenance of effective immigration control, or the investigation or detention of activities that would undermine the maintenance of effective immigration control, to the extent that the processing would be likely to prejudice those purposes. Sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) make provision relating to the further processing of personal data for immigration purposes. This was subject to a

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   217 judicial review application in August 2018 on the basis of breaches of the GDPR and Arts 7 and 8 of the CFR.

Disclosures required by law 2.69  Paragraph 5(1) of Sch 2 to the DPA 2018 restricts the application of the listed GDPR provisions to the processing of data protection where the data controller is obliged, under an enactment, to disclose personal data to the public, to the extent that the application of those provisions would prevent compliance with that obligation.1 See s 34 of the 1998 Act. Section 34 was amended by s 72 of the FOIA to the extent that the access right in FOIA did not create an exemption. This was to give DPA higher status than FOIA in relation to personal data. Paragraph 5(2) and (3) restricts the listed GDPR provisions where the disclosure of personal information is required by law or necessary for the purpose of or in connection with legal proceedings. See the discussion in R (Robertson) v Wakefield MDC [2001] EWHC Admin 915, [2002] QB 1052 and R (Robertson) v Secretary of State [2003] EWHC 1760 below on the sale of data on the electoral register to commercial bodies. There was an interesting discussion of s 11 of the 1998 Act. There are now two versions of the register: a full version and an edited version but the provisions are convoluted: see http://www.ico.gov.uk/for_the_public/topic_specific_guides/electoral_register. aspx. A controversy arose in June 2011 concerning the sale of insurance personal data details to intermediaries to sell on to solicitors to encourage personal injury claims.

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Part 2: restrictions based on Article 23(1) of the GDPR 2.70  Paragraph  6 of Sch  2 to the DPA  2018 sets out the ‘listed GDPR provisions’ (same as above) restricted by the exemptions in Part 2 of the Act. Paragraph 7 restricts the application of the listed GDPR provisions to personal data processed for the purposes of discharging the functions concerned with the protection of members of the public, charities and fair competition in business. These functions are listed in the Schedule and cover dishonesty, malpractice or other serious improper conduct. Paragraph 8 restricts the application of the listed GDPR provisions to personal data processed for the purposes of discharging regulatory functions relating to legal services, the health service and children’s services. Paragraph 9 restricts the application of the listed GDPR provisions to personal data processed for the purposes of statutory functions relating to the oversight of public bodies, eg Financial Services Ombudsman, consumer protection officers and monitoring officers in local government. The restrictions in paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 apply to the extent that the processing would be likely to prejudice the proper discharge of those functions and are based on the exemptions provided for under s 31 of the 1998 Act. 2.71  Further paragraphs restricts the application of the listed GDPR provisions to personal data processed: for the purposes of avoiding an infringement of

218  Chapter 2 parliamentary privilege; for the purposes of determining a person’s suitability for judicial office or Queen’s Counsel; and by an individual acting in a judicial capacity or a court or tribunal acting in its judicial capacity. Restrictions also cover all other personal data to the extent that the application of those provisions would be likely to prejudice judicial independence or judicial proceedings. This ensures the administration of justice is not undermined by the application of the GDPR. Crown honours and assessing suitability for offices in para 15(2) of Sch 2 are included.

Restrictions in other circumstances 2.72  Paragraphs 14 and 15 of Sch  2 to the DPA  2018 provide that a DC is not obliged to disclose information under Article 15 of the GDPR if to do so would mean disclosing information relating to another individual who can be identified from the information, except where the other individual has consented, or it is reasonable in all circumstances to comply with the request without that individual’s consent. Special provisions apply to health, social work and education data. In determining whether it is reasonable to disclose the information without consent, the controller must have regard to all the relevant circumstances, including: (a) the type of information that would be disclosed, (b) any duty of confidentiality owed to the other individual, (c) any steps taken by the controller with a view to seeking the consent of the other individual, (d) whether the other individual is capable of giving consent, and (e) any express refusal of consent by the other individual. The ExN states that this retains the effect of sections 7(4), (5), (6) and 8(7) of the 1998 Act.

Restrictions based on Article 23(1): restrictions of rules in Articles 13 to 15 2.73  Paragraph 16 of Sch 2 to the DPA 2018 sets out the listed GDPR provisions restricted by the exemptions in this Part. This covers exemptions listed in Sch 7 to the 1998 Act. It includes the first three above and the last. It covers: material over which legal privilege (or, in Scotland, confidentiality in communications) can be claimed or maintained in legal proceedings; self-incrimination and information disclosed by a person in compliance with Article 15 is not admissible against the person in proceedings for an offence under Part 5 or 6 of the Bill; corporate finance to the extent that one of the conditions set out in that paragraph is met; management forecasting or management planning purposes, to the extent that the application of those provisions would prejudice the conduct of the business or activity concerned; the DC’s record of his or her intentions in relation to any negotiations with the data subject, to the extent that the application of those provisions would be likely to prejudice the negotiation. The last two cover a confidential reference given (or to be given) by the controller (but not to the DC) for education and employment purposes. The last (in para  23) is information

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   219 recorded by candidates during an exam. It also modifies the time limits for complying with disclosure obligations under Article 15, where the personal data to be disclosed consists of examination marks or other information processed for the purposes of determining the results of an exam. This ensures candidates cannot obtain their exam marks before they are first published.

Exemptions etc based on Article 85(2) for reasons of freedom of expression and information 2.74  Part 5 of Sch 2 to the DPA 2018 provides that certain GDPR provisions will not apply when personal data is being processed with a view to publication only for one or more special purpose(s) (as defined in paragraph  24(8)), the controller reasonably believes that the publication would be in the public interest and also that the application of any of the listed GDPR provisions would be incompatible with the special purposes. The list is far more extensive than under previous exemptions: ‘(a) in Chapter II of the GDPR (principles)– (i) Article 5(1)(a) to (e) (principles relating to processing); (ii) Article 6 (lawfulness); (iii) Article 7 (conditions for consent); (iv) Article 8(1) and (2) (child’s consent); (v) Article 9 (processing of special categories of data); (vi) Article 10 (data relating to criminal convictions etc); (vii) Article 11(2) (processing not requiring identification); (b) in Chapter III of the GDPR (rights of the data subject)– (i) Article  13(1) to (3) (personal data collected from data subject: information to be provided); (ii) Article 14(1) to (4) (personal data collected other than from data subject: information to be provided); (iii) Article 15(1) to (3) (confirmation of processing, access to data and safeguards for third country transfers); (iv) Article 16 (right to rectification); (v) Article 17(1) and (2) (right to erasure); (vi) Article 18(1)(a), (b) and (d) (restriction of processing); (vii) Article 20(1) and (2) (right to data portability); (viii) Article 21(1) (objections to processing); (c) in Chapter VII of the GDPR (co-operation and consistency)– (i) Articles 60 to 62 (co-operation); (ii) Articles 63 to 67 (consistency).’ The listed GDPR provisions do not apply to personal data that is being processed only for the special purposes to the extent that: (a) the personal data is being processed with a view to the publication by a person of journalistic, academic, artistic or literary material, (b) the controller reasonably believes that the publication of the material would be in the public interest, and

220  Chapter 2 (c) the controller reasonably believes that the application of any one or more of the listed GDPR provisions would be incompatible with the special purposes. In determining whether publication would be in the public interest, the controller must take into account the special importance of the public interest in the freedom of expression and information and various codes of guidance such as those of the BBC, Ofcom and IPSO. The list may be amended. ‘Publish’ is defined for this Schedule.

Derogations based on Article 89 for research, statistics and archiving 2.75  Part 6 of Sch  2 to the DPA  2018 restricts the application of the listed GDPR provisions to personal data processed for scientific or historical research purposes, statistical purposes or archiving in the public interest from specified provisions in the GDPR relating to data subjects’ rights where this would prevent or seriously impair achievement of those purposes and the relevant safeguards are met. The provisions are: (2) ‘(a) Article 15(1) to (3) (confirmation of processing, access to data and safeguards for third country transfers); (b) Article 16 (right to rectification); (c) Article 18(1) (restriction of processing); (d) Article 21(1) (objections to processing). (3) The exemption in sub-paragraph (1) is available only where– (a) the personal data is processed in accordance with Article 89(1) of the GDPR (as supplemented by section 18), and (b) as regards the disapplication of Article 15(1) to (3), the results of the research or any resulting statistics are not made available in a form which identifies a data subject.’ Paragraph 26 lists derogations which apply where personal data is processed for archiving purposes. The exemptions are: ‘(a) Article 15(1) to (3) (confirmation of processing, access to data and safeguards for third country transfers); (b) Article 16 (right to rectification); (c) Article 18(1) (restriction of processing); (d) Article 19 (notification obligations); (e) Article 20(1) (right to data portability); (f) Article 21(1) (objections to processing).’ The safeguards are that the data is processed in accordance with Article 89(1), as supplemented by section 19.

Exemptions etc from the GDPR: health, social work, education and child abuse 2.76  Schedule  3 to the DPA  2018 restricts certain GDPR provisions where this is necessary for health, education and social work purposes (see the orders made under s 30 of the 1998 Act which is preserved):

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   221 the Data Protection (Subject Access Modification) (Health) Order 2000 (SI 2000/413); • the Data Protection (Subject Access Modification) (Social Work) Order 2000 (SI 2000/415); • the Data Protection (Subject Access Modification) (Education) Order 2000 (SI 2000/414); and • the Data Protection (Subject Access Modification) (Social Work) (Amendment) Order 2011 (SI 2011/1034). •

To these can be added the Data Protection (Subject Access Modification) (Social Work) (Amendment) Order 2005, SI 2005/467, which provides exemptions in relation to children’s guardians, as well as data processed by the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service. Part 1 of Sch 3 sets out the ‘listed GDPR provisions’ (as above) restricted by the exemptions in this Schedule. Part 2 of Sch 3 restricts the application of the listed GDPR provisions in relation to health information. Restrictions apply where: • the application of the listed GDPR (same as above) provisions would be likely to cause serious harm to the physical or mental condition of the data subject, or any other person; • information is processed by a court and consists of information supplied in a report or other evidence given to the court by certain bodies; or • a request is made on behalf of the data subject by the person with parental responsibility for the data subject or by the person appointed by the court to manage his or her affairs would result in disclosure of information contrary to the data subject’s expectations and wishes. It may be restricted where complying with the request would disclose information: (a) which was provided by the data subject in the expectation that it would not be disclosed to the person making the request, (b) which was obtained as a result of any examination or investigation to which the data subject consented in the expectation that the information would not be so disclosed, or (c) which the data subject has expressly indicated should not be so disclosed. Part 3 restricts the application of the listed GDPR provisions in relation to social work information. The restrictions apply to personal data processed by a range of authorities or bodies pursuant to specified social services functions and by the courts in children’s and family proceedings. Restrictions apply where: • the application of the listed GDPR provisions (as above) would be likely to cause serious harm to the physical or mental health of the data subject or any other person; • the information has been provided to a court and it is information that the court may withhold from the data subject; and • a request is made on behalf of the data subject for information that the data subject has expressly indicated should not be disclosed. Part 4 of Sch 3 restricts the application of the listed GDPR provisions in relation to educational information. Restrictions apply where:

222  Chapter 2 • •

the data has been provided to a court in certain proceedings and it is information that the court may withhold from the data subject; exercise of the right would be likely to cause serious harm to the physical or mental health or condition of the data subject or any other person.

Part 5 of Sch 3 restricts the application of Articles 13(1) to (3), 14(1) to (4) and 15(1) to (3) to the processing of personal data consisting of information as to whether the data subject is or has been the subject of or may be at risk of child abuse, to the extent that it would not be in the best interests of the data subject to apply those provisions.

Meaning of ‘health professional’ and ‘social work professional’ 2.77  Article 9(2)(h) and (i) of the GDPR permits processing of personal data which is necessary for health or social care purposes or for processing for public health purposes in the public interest where provided for in Union or Member State law. Section 204 of the DPA 2018 provides definitions of health and social work professional as used in the Act. Section 10(2) and paragraphs 2 and 3 of Schedule 1 to the DPA 2018 permit processing for these purposes. Processing under Article 9(2)(h) is only permitted if the data is processed in accordance with Article  9(3) of the GDPR (professional secrecy obligations etc). Section 10(1) provides that those who are permitted to process personal data under Article 9(2) (h), by virtue of Article 9(3), include anyone processing data who is, or is under the supervision of, a ‘health professional’ or a ‘social work professional’. Under paragraph 3 of Schedule 1 to the DPA 2018, processing in the public interest for public health purposes may only be carried out in certain specified circumstances, including by, or under the supervision of, a ‘health professional’. Paragraph 8 of Schedule 3 to the 1998 Act similarly permitted the processing of sensitive personal data for medical purposes as long as it was undertaken by a health professional or a person under a duty of confidentiality. In line with the approach taken to define health professional in section 69 of the DPA 1998, section 204 of the 2018 Act provides a definition of ‘health professional’, and also now includes a definition of ‘social work professional’. Subsection (1) provides a definition of ‘health professional’ which includes: registered doctors; nurses; dentists; midwives; opticians; pharmacists and child psychotherapists. Subsection (2) provides a definition of ‘social work professional’, which includes registered social workers in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Subsection (3) clarifies the definition of ‘registered medical practitioner’. Subsection (4) defines ‘health service body’; the definition varies in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

Exemptions etc from the GDPR: disclosure prohibited or restricted by an enactment 2.78  Schedule  4 to the DPA  2018 seeks to preserve the substance of the Data Protection (Miscellaneous Subject Access Exemptions) Order 2000,

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   223 SI 2000/419. This is personal data consisting of information which is prohibited to be disclosed under specified enactments for the purposes of safeguarding the interests of the data subject or the rights and freedoms of others. It restricts the application of the listed GDPR provisions (a) Article 15(1) to (3) (confirmation of processing, access to data and safeguards for third country transfers) and (b) Article 5 (general principles) so far as its provisions correspond to the rights and obligations provided for in Article 15(1) to (3). The personal data which are restricted under this Schedule relate to: human fertilisation and embryology information; information contained in adoption and parental order records and reports, and statements and records of the special educational needs of children in England or Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland; and, in Scotland only, information provided by reporters for the purposes of a children’s hearing.

Power to make further exemptions etc by regulations 2.79  Under section 16 of the DPA 2018, the Secretary of State has the power to make regulations altering the application of the GDPR under Articles 6(3), 23(1), 85(2) and 89, including amending or repealing any of the derogations contained in the Act. The affirmative resolution procedure will apply.

Transfers of personal data to third countries 2.80  Section 18 of the DPA 2018 provides regulation-making powers for these circumstances. These are similar to the order-making powers currently provided under paragraph  4 of Schedule  4 to the 1998 Act. Transfers may be made or restricted in the public interest.

The exemption in FOIA 2000, s 40 2.81  The FOIA 2000 exemptions were examined in ch 1. However, the preexistence of a comprehensive legal code on data protection meant that the UK was legally obliged to accommodate FOIA 2000 into the DPA 1998 and now the DPA 2018. The pervasive nature of DPA 1998 and 2018 concepts, principles and technicalities in the discussion of FOIA 2000, s 40 meant that a reader would have to have knowledge of the DPA 2018 to understand how the s 40 exemption works. Moreover, s  40 is the most heavily used of the FOIA exemptions. We shall see below (paras 2.96 et seq) that individuals have a right to a wider range of personal information held on themselves by PAs. Readers are reminded that, where a DS request involves their own data, the DPA  2018 is the governing provision and the exemption in s 40 is absolute. When an FOI request involves data belonging to a third party, the exemption will be absolute where disclosure breaches specified ‘principles’ – that is, data protection principles (DPP). However, this does not mean that protection of data is ‘absolute’. It is only such

224  Chapter 2 in the case of a breach. Recital 4 of the GDPR makes clear that data protection is not an absolute right but has to be balanced with other ‘fundamental’ rights such as freedom of speech and freedom of information. Recital 154 and Art 6 seek to reconcile FOI with data protection, and documents containing personal data ‘may’ be disclosed in a manner consistent with data protection. Recital 154 states: ‘This Regulation allows the principle of public access to official documents to be taken into account when applying this Regulation. Public access to official documents may be considered to be in the public interest. Personal data in documents held by a public authority or a public body should be able to be publicly disclosed by that authority or body if the disclosure is provided for by Union or Member State law to which the public authority or public body is subject. Such laws should reconcile public access to official documents and the reuse of public sector information with the right to the protection of personal data and may therefore provide for the necessary reconciliation with the right to the protection of personal data pursuant to this Regulation.’ The principles invariably require judgement and interpretation and it may, for instance, be ‘fair and just’ and ‘necessary’ to disclose personal data on specific facts. As will be seen, the cases frequently have to make such judgement calls. Central to such judgements was DPA 1998, Sch 2, para 6. This features widely in the cases below. Its analogue now is Art 6(1)(f) of the GDPR which we examined above (para  2.44). Numerous public interest conditions are contained in DPA  2018, Sch 1, Part 2. Article 6 provides that the processing is necessary for the purposes of a legitimate interest of the data controller or the third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights or freedoms of a data subject requiring protection of personal data. This is particularly so in the case of a child. (See FS50088977 on DPA 1998, Sch 2, para 6). The changes in the DPA 2018 to FOIA were set out in ch 1 (para 1.199 and see paras 2.96 et seq below). The case law discussing FOIA, s 40 all deals with the DPA 1998 – now, of course, replaced by the 2018 Act. The IC has provided guidance on Art 6(1)(f)1 but the case law refers to the very similar former schedule. Article 6 clearly requires clear and compelling purposes for processing. Processing must be necessary for a clear purpose. A careful balance (judgement) must be made considering all relevant, reasonable and rational factors and information and which is fully and carefully justified for processing. If Art 6(1)(f) is being relied upon, the DC must document the assessment of how and why it applies to the particular processing in order to assist justification of the decision. This is the accountability requirement. If legitimate requirements are being relied upon, individuals (especially the DS) must be informed what these are. https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/ lawful-basis-for-processing/legitimate-interests/ and https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guideto-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/legitimate-interests/.

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2.82  It is perfectly clear from numerous cases that, where a requester sought to utilise the predecessor to this provision, the burden of proving the legitimate

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   225 interest is on the requester. The DS should be consulted under the terms of the FOI Code of Practice. FS50082768 states that the IC’s Awareness Guidance has advice about requests concerning access to information about third parties: would it cause unnecessary or unjustified distress or damage to the person who the information is about? Would a third party expect such information to be disclosed to others? Has the person been led to believe that the information would be kept secret? Has that third party expressly refused consent? Furthermore, under DPA 1998, Sch 2, para 6 it is up to the claimant to prove that it is in the public interest for the data to be disclosed (reversing the FOIA 2000 PI test). Numerous cases have established that a person’s name is personal data (Turcotte v IC and LB Camden EA/2007/0129; although see the strange decision in T Harcup v IC and Yorkshire Forward (YF) EA/2007/0058). FS50150598 makes it clear that, in relation to the records of a telephone conversation in which names were mentioned, the IC thought that the s 40(1) exemption would apply, and imported the definition of personal data from the DPA 1998. Where names are present on documents held by a PA, and an FOIA request is made for that document or information, the DPA 2018 will come into play. In many cases this may well be incidental; but very often a requester might wish to know who precisely was present at, say, a meeting, eg for commercial reasons. This was the reason for wanting access in the most famous litigation on the relationship between the access to documents regulation and the data protection provisions in EU law. The EU courts and Advocate General all came to different conclusions by different processes on which legal regime took precedence (European Commission v Bavarian Lager Case C-28/08  P  (29/06/2010), paras 5 et seq). There is also the possibility of sinister motives in making a request. Two major themes have emerged in the case law. Firstly, when might it be possible to identify data subjects from information which appears anonymised but which may allow identification from that information and other information in the possession of the DC? This was the central issue in Common Services Agency v Scottish Information Commissioner [2008]  UKHL  47. Here, information relating to childhood incidences of leukaemia in the Dumfries and Galloway area by census ward was requested. The information had been barnardised (distorted) to prevent identification. But the Law Lords ruled that the SIC had erred in law in failing to ask whether this data was personal data under DPA 1998, s 1(1) and, if so, whether its disclosure would breach the DPP. The reason for the error was because the definition of ‘personal data’ comprises both the data requested and whether, from that and any other information in the possession of the DC or which is likely to come into the DC’s possession, a person can be identified. Lord Hope made it clear that it may be possible to do something to both sets of data which make it impossible to identify an individual and in which case it is not personal data protected by the DPA 1998. In Magherafelt DC v IC EA/2009/0047 there was a request for information on the disciplinary record of council employees. Information about numbers disciplined and numbers dismissed was given. The IC had decided that a summarised schedule in which no one was identified but with more details should be disclosed but, on appeal, the tribunal overruled the IC. Even though the information had been barnardised, it would still be possible to identify individuals from the information in the schedule. The data was not anonymous in the context of a small workforce working closely in a ‘family situation’. It would

226  Chapter 2 have been all too easy for a reporter to establish the identities of those involved by seeking information from council employees. The information constituted personal data under DPA 1998, s 1(1)(b) (now DPA 2018, s 3(2)); its disclosure would breach the first DPP; and the data was protected by FOIA 2000, s 40(2). One might ask whether there may not be a good reason under DPA 1998, Sch 2, para  6 for disclosing details of disciplinary breaches if they were serious. The PA had been in breach of FOIA 2000, s 17 by not explaining why it relied on s 40(2) (see FS50133250 in relation to correct non-disclosure at school level of identities of those subject to school exclusions after ‘drug finds’. There was a risk of identifying individuals and the consequences for them could be very serious. The council had correctly invoked s 40). 2.83  On appeal to the Upper Tribunal in Information Commissioner v Magherafelt District Council [2012] UKUT 263 (AAC) the Upper Tribunal sought to clarify a confusion that had arisen out of one interpretation of the House of Lords’ decision in Commons Service Agency v Scottish Information Commissioner [2008] UKHL 47. It had been suggested that the effect of the decision was that even anonymised information remained ‘personal data’ if the data subjects could still be identified by the data controller from information which remained in its possession. The Upper Tribunal disagreed. What matters is whether individuals can be identified by third parties, from the combination of the anonymised material released, and information which is in the possession of, or is reasonably likely to come into the possession of, the intended recipients of the disclosed material.1 See E  Grey: http://www.localgovernmentlawyer.co.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view =article&id=12242%3Arequests-for-personal-data-on-employees&catid=49%3Acomment-aanalysis-articles&Itemid=9 (17/04/2018). See also Morton v IC et al [2018] UKUT 348 (AAC).

1

2.84 In South Lanarkshire Council v Scottish Information Commissioner [2013] UKSC 55, there was a request for information about the basic hourly rate of pay for the council job category at a particular level to assess gender equality at job levels. Identities were not sought. Art 8 of the ECHR was not engaged. In this particular case, however, as the processing requested would not enable Mr Irvine or anyone else to discover the identity of the data subjects, it is quite difficult to see why there is any interference with their right to respect for their private lives. It is enough to apply DPA  1998, Sch  2, para  6 in its own terms (para 26). At para 27, Baroness Hale for the court said: ‘I disagree with Mrs Wolffe, however, about the meaning of “necessary”. It might be thought that, if there is no interference with article 8 rights involved, then all that has to be asked is whether the requester is pursuing a legitimate interest in seeking the information (which is not at issue in this case) and whether he needs that information in order to pursue it. It is well established in community law that, at least in the context of justification rather than derogation, “necessary” means “reasonably” rather than absolutely or strictly necessary (see, for example, R v Secretary of State for Employment, Ex p Seymour-Smith (No 2) [2000] 1 WLR 435; Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police v Homer [2012]  UKSC  15, [2012]  ICR  704). The proposition advanced by Advocate General Poiares Maduro in Huber is

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   227 uncontroversial: necessity is well established in community law as part of the proportionality test. A measure which interferes with a right protected by community law must be the least restrictive for the achievement of a legitimate aim. Indeed, in ordinary language we would understand that a measure would not be necessary if the legitimate aim could be achieved by something less. Thus, for example, if Mr Irvine had asked for the names and addresses of the employees concerned, not only would article 8 have clearly been engaged, but the Commissioner would have had to ask himself whether his legitimate interests could have been served by a lesser degree of disclosure.’ The IC is clearly under a duty to act fairly (and in Scotland there is no appeal from the IC to a tribunal) but it does not follow that every communication passing between the Commissioner and the applicant, or between the Commissioner and third parties such as Members of the Scottish Parliament, has to be copied to the public authority. The Council was aware of the thrust of the communications. 2.85 In Department of Health v IC and the Pro-Life Alliance EA/2008/0074, it was explained that up until 2003 the DoH published comprehensive statistical information relating to abortions. The information was provided by doctors and patients and was entered into frequency tables, each data cell representing the number of respondents that fell into that cell. The provision of the information by the doctors and patients was compulsory. After 2003 the published information was significantly reduced and certain data was excluded. The ProLife Alliance made a request for the missing information under FOIA, but the DoH claimed that: (a) disclosure was prohibited by the Abortion Regulations 1991, SI 1991/499; and (b) FOIA 2000, s 40 applied. The DoH sought to rely additionally on FOIA 2000, s 44. The IC found that ss 40 and 44 did not apply to the information. The main issue for the tribunal to decide was whether either of these two exemptions should apply. In relation to s 40, the tribunal found that the information did constitute personal data, but that the nature of the information did not give rise to a realistic possibility of identifying either the doctor or the patient. Section 44 is discussed in ch 1 (para 1.224). The IT ordered disclosure of the information (and see All Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition v IC and MoD [2011] UKUT 153 (AAC)). In FS50243084 involving the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety the complainant requested information in relation to previously released abortion statistics for hospitals in Northern Ireland for the years 2003–2007. The Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety (DHSSPS) refused to disclose some of this information under s  40(2) and (3)(i)(a) (personal data of third parties) as a basis for non-disclosure. The IC did not find that these exemptions were engaged and the DHSSPS was required to disclose the information in question. 2.86  In relation to DPA  1998, Sch  2, para  6 considerations (to repeat) – processing necessary for purposes of the legitimate interests of the DC or a third party to whom data are disclosed, except where processing is unwarranted in any particular case by reason of prejudice to the rights, freedoms or legitimate interests of the DS – the factors involved in arriving at judgment have been well

228  Chapter 2 rehearsed. In a case involving Cambridge University (FS50110885; at para 2.87 below) the general question is: is disclosure fair? DPA 1998, Sch 2, para 6 was satisfied. The IC did not believe in this case that a specific notification to data subjects that their data may be disclosed under FOIA 2000 is necessary (para 47). There was no high expectation of privacy attached to this data (para 50). But this may not be the case in other circumstances. In William Thackeray v IC and the GMC EA/2009/0063 the tribunal considered the DS’s reasonable expectations as to disclosure and privacy; his seniority in the GMC; whether the information that was already in the public domain would reduce the expectation of privacy; whether disclosure would cause unnecessary or unjustified damage to the DS; and the legitimate interests of the public. It concluded that the processing of the information would be fair. The case concerned a fitness-to-practice hearing of a doctor before the GMC. The IC was overruled (FS50241410). While the IC and tribunal have been vigilant to protect data held by the police under s 40 (C Colliass v IC EA/2010/0084), in J Bryce v IC EA/2009/0083 the tribunal was prepared to distinguish between different classes of information. The case concerned a request for information about a criminal investigation report; the report was requested. The DN was amended by the tribunal. Not all information constituted personal data which would be protected therefore under s  40(1) and (2). The focus of the tribunal’s analysis is on the way the public authority (PA) conducted the inquiry and their actions. It was not about an individual. Information about police practices and procedures was disclosable, but some information about an offendee (therefore personal data) was not disclosable by virtue of DPA  1998, Sch  2, para  6. Information about witnesses was not disclosable, nor was information about an eight-year-old daughter of the offender. In FS50141015 the complainant requested information from the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) as to whether there were any compliments or complaints recorded about a doctor employed by a third party. The DWP eventually (there was a question as to who held the information) responded that, even if it were held by the third party on their behalf, it would be exempt from disclosure by s 40(5). However, in accordance with s 40(5), the DWP was correct to neither confirm nor deny the existence of the requested information; had it confirmed, the DWP would have contravened the first of the DPPs. The IC considered the consequences of disclosure on the doctor and decided that release of information regarding complaints would be unfair. The information requested belonged to a category of information whose nature was such that normally it would remain confidential between an employee, his employer and even possibly a regulatory professional body. Mr Rob Evans v Information Commissioner and Ministry of Defence EA/2006/0064 is a case that was examined under FOIA 2000, s 36 where some disclosure of formal background notes of lobbying meetings had been disclosed – but not informal notes (para 1.164). In this case on somewhat tortuous grounds the tribunal did not consider that there had been a breach of Part II of Sch 1, para 2(1)(b). The IT then considered a possible breach of the first principle on the basis of the conditions contained in DPA 1998, Sch 2. Under para 6 of that provision, ‘[t]he processing must be necessary for the purposes of legitimate interests pursued by … the third party’. It was decided that Mr Evans had a legitimate interest as a reporter, which had to be balanced against the prejudice to the data subject (Mr Wood). It was

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   229 recognised that legitimate interest is not always the same as public interest, but that in the instant case they amounted to the same thing. The public interest in disclosure was minimised as the information would not have been of ‘much interest to anyone’. However, the prejudice which would have been suffered by Mr Wood could have been very damaging both for the company and for him personally. The IT therefore concluded that the public interest weighed in favour of non-disclosure (and see Dundass v IC and Bradford MDC EA/2007/0084 where Sch 2, para 6 militated against disclosure). In BERR v IC and FoE EA/2007/0072, Friends of the Earth wanted information about meetings (lobbying) between CBI and the Department for Trade and Industry on a variety of subjects, with dates, participants, minutes and correspondence. Disclosure was ordered and in some cases material was redacted (see P Dun v IC EA/2010/0060 and disclosure of senior civil servant’s details not breaching the first DPP). 2.87  An important point to bear in mind is that the date of a request may be of vital importance in s 40 requests. FS50088853 concerned a complainant who sought the background papers relating to the 1993 Memorandum of Understanding on Royal Finances (the ‘MOU’) under which the Queen and the Prince of Wales would voluntarily pay income tax. The treasury refused to release the information, citing s  40. The Commissioner made a distinction between private and public finances. Information relating to the former would fall within s 40(2), which is an absolute exemption. The important and decisive point, the IC ruled in denying access because public finances were not involved, was that at the time of the MOU there were no FOI provisions and therefore it was not expected that the information would be disclosed. In another IC case (FS50119963), the complainant requested the names of doctors who had previously worked in a particular hospital department between the years 2000 and 2004. The public authority refused to disclose the information, citing s 40. The IC concluded that the public authority was correct to withhold the information on the basis of s 40. The important point in this case was that the applicant had harassed a registrar with correspondence and this was likely again if names were released. While the motives of an applicant are not relevant under FOI requests, disclosure to the world would include the applicant. Although any ‘harassment’ would be minor – involving correspondence (quaere) – a more significant factor was that registrars in the relevant period had a legitimate expectation of confidentiality and no legitimate purpose of the requester was served under Sch  2, para  6 (on this point, see next paragraph). In FS50099923 the IC also believed that, in ordering disclosure of information concerning film footage of trials at sea on biological warfare agents which had been used to infect animals in the early 1950s, the current climate of openness is very different to 1996 when a similar disclosure caused distress, the MoD alleged. Individuals would be identifiable from the film. In this case the PA also claimed that the second DPP concerning notification for ‘specified and lawful purposes’ prevented disclosure because FOIA was not notified as a ‘purpose’ for processing. The IC did not feel that the second DPP concerning notification was relevant because the drafter of s 40 had in mind that such data could be disclosed and to bar it under the second DPP would effectively bar all claims under FOIA ‘on the basis that data were not originally obtained for that [FOIA] purpose’. This ruling is crucial in facilitating

230  Chapter 2 access to personal data, providing the relevant principles and DPA  1998, s  10 (now under the GDPR) – concerning ‘disclosure likely to cause distress’ – are not breached. FS50110885 was a request for information to Cambridge University for numbers and gender statistics of pupils from the same school who had successfully applied for a course. This had been withheld. The IC stated that the ‘purposes of processing’ for DPA purposes, which have to be stated, are ‘broad’. The request concerned the collation of statistics. Disclosure of personal data under FOIA is not a ‘specific purpose for which such information is processed. In responding to a request made under the Act the PA is not fulfilling one of its business purposes; it is simply complying with a legal obligation [under FOIA]’ (para 44). The IC believed that it would be difficult to argue that compliance with a legal rule would be incompatible with other purposes for which personal data may be processed. 2.88  It must also be noted that the ‘neither confirm nor deny’ (NCND) provision in s  40(5) may come into play where responding to a FOI request would itself reveal personal data. In FS50178633 the complainant made a request for all correspondence between the General Medical Council (GMC), a named doctor and his employers. The GMC went through confirmation or denial. However, the IC found that the GMC was not obliged to respond to the request under s  1(1)(a) by virtue of s  40(5)(b)(i). The IC considered that responding with a confirmation or denial was a disclosure of information which constituted personal data under DPA 1998, s 1 and which would breach the first DPP; the doctor would have a reasonable expectation of privacy. The public interest was in favour of non-disclosure because, whilst there was a legitimate public interest in ensuring the competence of doctors, the existing safeguards were sufficient to ensure such competence. See also FS50298086 concerning a request by Lord Ashcroft’s solicitors to the Cabinet Office for information about Lord Ashcroft and his nomination to a working peerage in 1999. The IC concluded that all of the requested information is Lord Ashcroft’s personal data and therefore the Cabinet Office was correct to refuse to disclose this information under s 40(1). The Commissioner also concluded that, in light of the effect of s  40(5), the Cabinet Office was not in fact obliged to confirm or deny whether it held such information. 2.89  In cases dealing with financial fraud, deception or improper conduct, the IC and tribunal have sought to establish: (a) whether the person about whom information is sought and who will be named is acting in a private or public capacity; and (b) the seniority of the person named and whether this makes a difference. In FS50116822 there was a request to an NHS  Trust for a copy of an internal report into allegations of financial irregularity made against a former director of research governance. Section 40(2) was invoked. ‘Seniority of individual’ should be taken into account in deciding whether to disclose. Information about someone acting in an official or work capacity should normally be disclosed unless there is some risk to the individual concerned (from IC’s Guidance) (para  42). In Corporate Officer of House of Commons v IC EA/2006/0074 to 0076 (below) the tribunal approved the IC guidance: does it apply to the public or private life of data subject (see below)? Would disclosure

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   231 cause unnecessary or unjustified distress or damage to the individual? Would the individual expect information to be disclosed to others? Was the individual led to believe information would be kept secret? Has express refusal to consent been declared? The IC believed disclosure of the internal report would be fair and lawful. Disclosure of third parties named in the report would be unfair and breach the first DPP, but it could be disclosed if anonymised. Disclosure on these terms did not involve a breach of s 40. 2.90  It was under the heading of ‘financial irregularity’ that requests were made for information on MPs’ expenses – the most high-profile investigations and the most important constitutionally conducted under FOIA  2000. There have been many MPs’ expenses cases and, in the most important, the position of the IC and tribunal have been upheld by the High Court. FS50071451 witnessed the IC issuing an information notice (IN) to the House of Commons! The information was examined at the House of Commons. The request was for the receipts, rental agreements or mortgage interest statements of six MPs under the Additional Costs Allowance (ACA – second homes). The House of Commons’ corporate officer claimed that disclosure over and above that in the Publication Scheme would breach the DPA 1998 (para 18). The IC decided that the requested information is personal data and that its fully itemised disclosure would be unfair. However, he ruled that it would not contravene DPA  1998, Sch 2, para 6 to disclose the information showing the totals paid under specified headings within the ACA. This was ordered to be disclosed. The corporate officer appealed the DN, which led to even wider disclosure ordered by the tribunal, and the ruling was upheld by the court (below). There is an irony in that, had the Commons not resisted the original DN, not so much information would have been published. The appeals were heard in Corporate Officer of House of Commons v IC and Leapman, Brooke and Thomas EA/2007/0061 to 0063, 0122 to 0123, 0131. The Corporate Officer’s arguments on the appeal to the IC were rejected but the IC did set limitations on what was disclosable. The IC’s ruling excluded ‘sensitive personal data of MPs, personal data of third parties, but not the name of those in receipt of rents/mortgage interest, and bank statements, loan statements, phone numbers and other matters’. The tribunal in its ruling held that more data should be made public than the IC had determined in its application of Sch 2, para 6 considerations and the public interest. The rules on which ACA operated were secret and unknown to MPs themselves in order not to encourage maximum claims. Self-denial had not been manifest. Lack of transparency did not encourage accountability and honesty in the system which was overseen by the National Audit Office and Commons Committee on Privileges. The tribunal’s ruling was appealed to the High Court which upheld the tribunal’s decision. The questions involved had ‘a wide resonance throughout the body politic bearing on public confidence in our democratic system at its very pinnacle’ (Corporate Officer of the House of Commons v IC, Brooke and Leapman [2008] EWHC 1084 (Admin), para 15). The case led to an overhaul of the MPs’ expenses system, the resignation of the Speaker and two ministers in disgrace and the resignation of numerous MPs as well as criminal convictions and imprisonment of MPs.1 FS50070469 concerned a request for Tony Blair’s ACA details. The IC asked for information from the Commons on 9 September 2005. An IN was issued on

232  Chapter 2 6 June 2006 and information given to the IC on 14 July 2006. The outcome was similar to the previous case. In FS50067986, information requested was on the travel expenses of MPs including an MP’s spouse on official business. By way of defence, the Commons sought to establish motives for the request and use of information. This was irrelevant and not permitted under FOIA 2000, the IC ruled. If it were possible to establish a pattern of travel (ie specific routes), that might constitute a security risk. But this was not a problem here. DPA  1998, Sch 2, para 6 justifies disclosure. However, disclosure of ‘detailed routes, times or dates of those journeys’ would not be justified. FS50073128 involved a request for the names and salaries of MPs’ staff. Section 40(2) could protect relatively junior staff appointments and details of salaries of assistants insofar as disclosure might breach the DPP. The information was ‘held’ by the Commons for the purposes of FOIA 2000, s 3(2), the IC ruled, in rejecting the arguments of the Commons. Section 40(2) did not in itself protect the names of staff (however, FOIA 2000, s 36(7) is absolute in relation to the Commons and names of staff, and its invocation could not be questioned where it was properly claimed). The question of MEP expenses, and a report thereon, was the subject of a request under the EU Access Regulation. Following an initial refusal to publish a detailed report, the General Court ruled that disclosure was ‘an overriding public interest’.2 R v Chaytor [2010] UKSC 52. An independent Parliamentary Standards Authority was established under the Parliamentary Standards Act 2009 ‘to bring independent oversight and control over MPs expenses’. 2 Case C-471/08 Toland v European Parliament. In Psara v Parliament [2018] EUECJ T-639/15 the General Court gave wide protection to documents on MEPs’ expenses and allowances under EC Regulation 1049/2001 and Regulation 45/2001. The applicants had not made out grounds of necessity to obtain the data under Art 8(b) of the latter Regulation and, in any event, the data was not held by the Parliament (para 5.75). 1

2.91  Corporate Officer of House of Commons v IC and N Baker EA/2006/0015 and 0016 concerned one of 167 FOIA requests for travel expenses claimed by MPs. Information was sought on MPs’ travel expenses including the ‘total amount claimed for each MP for modes of travel by rail, road, air and bicycle’. These included: European travel; extended travel and family travel. Section 40 was invoked. Since the autumn of 2004, publication schemes had published general sums on such expenses and, indeed, the Scottish Parliament had led the way in disclosing more information on this subject than Westminster. The IC argued that the DPA’s operation had to be affected by a ‘culture of openness’. Information about someone acting in an official or work capacity should normally be provided on request unless there is some risk to the individual concerned. Family and private life information involves different considerations. For the purposes of fair processing, the IC’s guidance was accepted by the tribunal: does data belong to the public or private life of the individual? The private interests of an MP are not ‘necessarily first and paramount consideration in a case such as this’ where the ‘personal data relates to their public lives’ (para 79). DPA 1998, Sch 2, para 6 involves a balancing of competing interests, namely those of the DS and the requester’s legitimate interests. However, under the PI considerations in the qualified exemptions, the PI in secrecy or non-disclosure has to be greater than that in disclosure to maintain secrecy, as seen in ch 1 above. Under Sch 2, para 6

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   233 the processing must be ‘necessary’ for the legitimate interests of members of the public to apply. It is only where it is established that the requester’s interests outweigh or are greater than the data subject’s interests that the personal data should be disclosed. This emphatic ruling set the benchmark. The appeals in Corporate Officer of the HC  v IC EA/0074 and 0076 concerned information requested about an individual MP’s travel expenses and not collective data: the House of Commons held information collectively on MPs. The request was to try and identify ‘green and environmental’ aspects of travel. The arguments in favour of non-disclosure were that this would involve an ‘invasion of privacy and family life, diverts MPs and the House of Commons from other Parliamentary business, MPs only consent to aggregate disclosure, not individual disclosure, and MPs subject to media scrutiny’ and so on. Section 40 was invoked by the corporate officer although it was agreed that s 40(3)(a)(i) did not apply. This was about ‘public life’, not private life, and so Sch 2, para 6 applied. Disclosure of individuals’ aggregate figures should be disclosed, but not ‘disclosure of travel details which could reveal the times, origins and destinations of journeys and the modes of transport likely to be used at particular times and circumstances’, as such information could be of potential assistance to those with evil intentions, ‘especially where such information was not otherwise available to them’. 2.92  Details of salaries of named individuals are frequently requested.1 The coalition government announced on coming to power that, as well as providing details of ‘new’ contracts, tender documents of central government over £10,000, and new items of central government expenditure over £25,000, salaries of local government senior management staff would be published. In FS50294798 the complainant made a request under FOIA 2000 to the Department for Transport (DfT) for information relating to the latest bonus of the chief executive of an agency of the DfT. The DfT explained that some of the information requested was publicly available; and that the annual reports of the DfT and the relevant agencies contain salary and bonus information relating to the individual concerned within a £5,000 band. The complainant was directed to this information. The specific information about the bonus was refused under the exemption contained at FOIA  2000, s  40(2). The Commissioner considered that the DfT correctly applied the s  40(2) exemption to withhold the information relating to the bonus of the individual concerned and required no further action to be taken. In FS50142539, salaries of senior academics at a university were withheld and were exempt under s 40(2). In FS50267001, information was requested about the head teacher’s salary. This information should have been provided but refusing to supply details of his bonus was correct. Bankers’ bonuses have become a notoriously heated topic, given the astronomical sums of taxpayers’ money that have been spent on bailing out banks after 2007, thereby causing huge public debt and cuts in public financing for public services and financial support. Some UK banks (at the time of writing) are publicly owned but are not within FOIA 2000. The stated aim of government is for banks to publish the names of recipients of bonuses and their amount. There is no legal power to force banks to disclose such information although, if they were publicly owned, it would seem that there could be ways other than via legislation to achieve this. Terms would have to be negotiated. Privately owned banks have argued that publishing

234  Chapter 2 such information would have implications for the law of employment, human rights and data protection, which would prevent such disclosures. We doubt that this information is confidential under the law of confidentiality or that it would be impossible to use the DPA 1998 to require disclosure. For ECHR, Art 8 to come into play, the nature of the ‘private interest’ in receiving huge sums by way of bonus while operating in regulated markets, and by taking risks that could have a profound impact on the public interest, as was seen after 2008, all raise arguments on the nature of the ‘private’ interest in question. Is this ‘private’ or ‘public’ life? The so-called Merlin agreement on remuneration between the Lord Chancellor and senior bankers is available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov. uk/d/bank_agreement_090211.pdf. See, incidentally, PAC HC 472 (2009–10) Top Pay in the Public Sector. The Office for Students has required university vice chancellors to justify their salaries which are published annually: https://www.officeforstudents.org.uk/news-blog-and-events/news-and-blog/vice-chancellorsmust-justify-their-salaries-which-will-be-published-annually/ (29/06/2018).

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2.93  Many of the ‘salary’ requests have involved payments by the BBC either in the form of fees, salaries or expenses. This has become an issue in relation to pay gender differentials. As we saw in ch 1 (para 1.190) the question of what information was covered by the ‘journalism, art or literature’ proviso and which was thereby excluded from FOIA 2000 led to extensive litigation and a ruling from the courts that the IC’s ‘preponderant purpose’ ruling was unlawful. Several decisions may be decided differently today after the Court of Appeal’s ruling (para 1.94). FS50067416 was a request for the highest earner in BBC Northern Ireland. The ‘journalism etc’ exclusion was ruled not to operate. On the basis of s 40 the IC stated that, while it would breach DPA 1998 to disclose the exact salary, this would not be the case in relation to the pay band and individual’s name. Other requested information related to the cost of producing a show and fees for ‘talents’. The question under s 40 was: is this private or public business? Schedule 2, para 6 was satisfied in relation to the highest earner in terms of the pay band. It was reasonable to expect that the BBC would keep information about ‘talent’ fees confidential and s  40 protected this. The ‘talents’ were not in a position to influence policy choices affecting expenditure. FS50102474 was a request to the BBC for the cost of the ‘Children in Need’ programme in 2005. In relation to s 40, the request concerned a one-off fee payment for a presenter, not a salary. The IC found that there was a widespread perception that performers would perform for free. ‘The IC considers that individuals who hold such high-profile and public-facing roles should expect information about them to be available to the public. This is especially so in a climate where the public are constantly alerted by the media to the high earnings of its programme presenters and in a society where the requirement for scrutiny of public spending is increasingly expressed’ (para  42). Applications for information on expenses’ payments (to Alan Yentob) have been rightly refused (FS50068026). Amounts spent by the BBC on taxis have not been exempt under s 43(2). 2.94  The tribunal upheld the IC in Guardian News and Media Ltd v IC EA/2008/0084, which concerned the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and details of the disciplinary action taken against judges including their names, the reasons

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   235 for the action and the dates of action. The MoJ refused to disclose on the basis of s  40. The MoJ had provided inadequately reasoned responses (which were out of time) under s 40, which amounted to a breach of s 17. The IC found that the information came within the definition of personal data in DPA 1998. The legitimate interests of the public were important but the tribunal agreed that the individuals’ reasonable expectations regarding the information were that it would not be disclosed. Important factors also included the data subjects’ seniority and whether disclosure would cause unjustified damage to the individuals. On balance, the information should not be disclosed because the internal disciplinary procedures in place were sufficient to assess suitability and provide scrutiny. The data subjects would not expect these matters to be made public and disclosure would cause ‘unwarranted damage and distress’. The procedures involved in disciplining judges are explained in some detail by the tribunal.

Part 2 of the DPA 2018: other general processing 2.95  Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the DPA  2018 caters for processing that is not covered by Parts 3 and 4 but which is outside the GDPR. Section 21(2) provides that this regime also covers the processing of unstructured, manual data held by an FOI public authority. Such processing was regulated by the 1998 Act as amended, but obviously not the GDPR. Chapter 3 defines ‘automated and structured processing of personal data’ and ‘manual unstructured processing of personal data’ and FOIA authorities. Chapter 3 does not apply to the processing of personal data by an individual in the course of a purely personal or household activity. The aim of section 22 is to ensure consistency between GDPR interpretations and UK law: subsection (1) provides for Articles in the GDPR to be taken as if they were part of an Act forming part of UK domestic law; and subsection (2) provides that the interpretation of key GDPR terms set out in Chapter 2 of the Part should also apply for the purposes of Chapter 3. Section 22 and Schedule 6 specify how the GDPR provisions will apply to areas outside the scope of Union law. The Schedule makes the necessary modifications to the GDPR to effect its application to non-Union law activities. This is referred to as ‘applied GDPR’. The provisions describe how Union law references should be interpreted in the domestic context. There are 72 listed modifications in Part 1 of Sch 6 to the Act. Further modifications may be made by regulations under s 23.

Manual unstructured data held by FOI public authorities 2.96  The government amended the DPA  1998 by FOIA  2000 in a manner which has caused some very difficult provisions. At the suggestion of the Select Committee on Public Administration, requests by individuals for their own personal information will be made under the DPA 1998. Requests for information about other individuals will be made under the FOIA  2000 but subject to

236  Chapter 2 the DPA  1998 requirements where the Act operates. The Data Protection Commissioner (DPC) became the Information Commissioner and is responsible for the administration of both statutes. The IC’s rulings in relation to access under FOIA 2000, s 40 (above) have exposed the DPA 1998 to interpretation on a regular basis. The DPA has been the subject of some controversial rulings from the Court of Appeal. Section 24 of the DPA  2018 repeats the position under the 1998 Act where such records could be disclosed to the subject,  where appropriate, but were exempt from most of the rights and duties created by the 1998 Act. Subsection (1) provides that the GDPR provisions listed in subsection (2) do not apply to manual unstructured personal data held by FOI public authorities. This effectively disapplies the overarching GDPR principles and specified rights of data subjects which are not relevant to the unstructured manual records, such as the right to data portability. But other very important principles are excluded. Subsections (3) and (4) disapply further subject access rights in relation to unstructured manual data where it relates to personnel matters in connection with public sector employment, ie bodies covered by the FOIA. Subsection (5) provides that data controllers are not obliged to comply with a data subject access request if the request omits a description of the personal data, or if the controller estimates that complying with the request would exceed the maximum cost. But this does not remove the controller’s obligation to confirm whether or not personal data concerning the data subject is being processed, unless that in itself would exceed the appropriate maximum cost which may be specified in regulations. While the FOIA  2000 states that all personal information held by public authorities is included within the DPA 1998, it cancelled all the effects of being within the DPA 1998 for this last category of information added by FOIA 2000, s 68 apart from subject access rights and accuracy. Section 24(1) and (2) of the DPA 2018 states: ‘(1) The provisions of the applied GDPR and the DPA  2018 listed in subsection (2) do not apply to personal data to which this Chapter applies by virtue of section 21(2). (2)  Those provisions are– (a) in Chapter II of the applied GDPR (principles)– (i) Articles 5(1)(a) to (c), (e) and (f) (principles relating to processing, other than the accuracy principle), (ii) Article 6 (lawfulness), (iii) Article 7 (conditions for consent), (iv) Article 8(1) and (2) (child’s consent), (v) Article 9 (processing of special categories of personal data), (vi) Article 10 (data relating to criminal convictions etc), and (vii) Article 11(2) (processing not requiring identification); (b) in Chapter III of the applied GDPR (rights of the data subject)– (i) Article  13(1) to (3) (personal data collected from data subject: information to be provided),

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   237 (ii) Article 14(1) to (4) (personal data collected other than from data subject: information to be provided), (iii) Article 20 (right to data portability), and (iv) Article 21(1) (objections to processing); (c) in Chapter V  of the applied GDPR, Articles  44 to 49 (transfers of personal data to third countries or international organisations); (d) sections 170 and 171 of this Act; (see also paragraph 1(2) of Schedule 18).’ 2.97  These provisions will not apply to non-designated functions of public authorities – those basically which are not of a public nature or not an exercise of an official authority vested in the body – and personal information held by those bodies falling under this last group of information. Some PAs such as parish and community councils are not included for these purposes. This means therefore that the DPA  2018 applies to public authorities’ non-automated records even though they are not part of a filing system and as explained by the Court of Appeal in Durant v Financial Services Authority (paras 2.19 et seq above). ‘An example of this might be incidental personal information on a policy file, or in loose papers.’1 Section 69 of the FOIA  2000 adds a further qualification to subject access rights to the group of personal information introduced under the FOIA 2000. Where the information is, although not part of a filing system, nonetheless structured to a certain extent by reference to individuals, eg ‘a case file about an individual which contains correspondence about a number of matters relating to that individual and is indexed by reference only to the dates of the correspondence’,2 it is treated for subject access purposes as any other personal information under the DPA 1998 and now the 2018 Act. FOI Consultation on Draft Legislation (1999) Cm 4355, para 169. Cm 4355, para 170.

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2.98  Where it is not ‘relatively structured’, ie  it is ‘relatively unstructured’, additional rules apply on access requests. Firstly, unstructured personal data will not be given unless the information is expressly described in the request. Requests for information covered by the DPA 1998 will usually be met by giving the subject all of their data without them having to specify any part of it. ‘No part of the residue of relatively unstructured personal information, however, will be included in response to a subject access request unless the data subject has expressly described it.’1 Requests will therefore have to be more specific for this kind of information. Secondly, the authority may refuse an access request in so far as it relates to that information where to allow it would cost more than is provided for in a ‘prescribed cost ceiling’.2 Cm 4355, para 170. See paras 1.72 et seq above. FOIA 2000, s 13 gives a discretion to allow access but subject to a different fees schedule.

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2.99  FOIA  2000, s  70 stripped away all the substantive rights under the DPA 1998 to the group of personal information introduced under the FOIA 2000 apart, as we have seen, from subject access and inaccuracy. It further added

238  Chapter 2 that the extension of access and accuracy rights does not apply to personnel (employee) records within that group of information held by public authorities and this follows the FOI White Paper of 1997. In the White Paper, this group was to be excluded. They are now covered by an exemption. It is basically an absolute exemption (paras 1.199 et seq). 2.100  Section 24(3) to (9) of the DPA 2018 provides as follows: ‘(3)  In addition, the provisions of the applied GDPR listed in subsection (4) do not apply to personal data to which this Chapter applies by virtue of section 21(2) where the personal data relates to appointments, removals, pay, discipline, superannuation or other personnel matters in relation to– (a) service in any of the armed forces of the Crown; (b) service in any office or employment under the Crown or under any public authority; (c) service in any office or employment, or under any contract for services, in respect of which power to take action, or to determine or approve the action taken, in such matters is vested in– (i) Her Majesty, (ii) a Minister of the Crown, (iii) the National Assembly for Wales, (iv) the Welsh Ministers, (v) a Northern Ireland Minister (within the meaning of the Freedom of Information Act 2000), or (vi) an FOI public authority. (4)  Those provisions are– (a) the remaining provisions of Chapters II and III (principles and rights of the data subject); (b) Chapter IV (controller and processor); (c) Chapter IX (specific processing situations). (5)  A controller is not obliged to comply with Article 15(1) to (3) of the applied GDPR (right of access by the data subject) in relation to personal data to which this Chapter applies by virtue of section 19(2) if– (a) the request under that Article does not contain a description of the personal data, or (b) the controller estimates that the cost of complying with the request so far as relating to the personal data would exceed the appropriate maximum. (6) Subsection (5)(b) does not remove the controller’s obligation to confirm whether or not personal data concerning the data subject is being processed unless the estimated cost of complying with that obligation alone in relation to the personal data would exceed the appropriate maximum. (7)  An estimate for the purposes of this section must be made in accordance with regulations under section 12(5) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000.

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   239 (8) In subsections (5) and (6), “the appropriate maximum” means the maximum amount specified by the Secretary of State by regulations. (9)  Regulations under subsection (8) are subject to the negative resolution procedure.’

Manual unstructured data used in long-standing historical research 2.101  The listed GDPR provisions do not apply to manual unstructured data used in long-standing historical research, ie before 24 October 1998 (consistent with DPA) or processed for the purposes of historical research, providing it is not carried out for measures or decisions on an individual, or likely to cause substantial damage or distress to the subject (DPA 2018, s 25). The exemptions in s  24  on manual unstructured data held by FOIA public authorities also apply.

National security and defence 2.102  Sections 26–28 of the DPA  2018 create an exemption from certain provisions in the applied GDPR scheme and in Parts 5, 6 and 7 of the Act if that exemption is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security1 or for defence purposes (see s 26(2)). The exemption includes most of the data protection principles, the rights of data subjects, certain obligations on data controllers and processors, and various enforcement provisions. This exemption is similar to the provision in section 28 of the 1998 Act which provided for exemptions. Provision is made for ministerial certification as under DPA. This exemption is in addition to processing by the intelligence services under Part 4. Any person directly affected by the issuing of any certificate may appeal to the tribunal effectively for a judicial review of the decision to issue the certificate (DPA  2018, s  27(3) and (4)). A  party to proceedings may also challenge the application of a certificate to the processing of particular personal data (s 27(5)). The tribunal may apply the principles applicable on a judicial review (see paras 1.125 and 2.125). Section 28 modifies the application of Articles 9 (prohibition on processing of special categories of personal data) and 32 (security of processing) of the applied GDPR scheme where processing takes place for national security purposes. In both cases, the DC/DP has to have in place appropriate safeguards or security measures. There must be safeguards in relation to processing by wholly or partly automated means. See N Baker MP v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHRR 1275; R (Secretary of State for the Home Department) v IC [2007] 2 All ER 703.

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Certification providers and accreditation 2.103  Article  42 of the GDPR encourages Member States to establish data protection certification mechanisms for the purpose of demonstrating compliance

240  Chapter 2 with the requirements in the Regulation for data processing. Certificates can be issued by the supervisory authority or by certification bodies. Section 17 of the DPA 2018 deals with this matter. Article 43 of the GDPR provides that Member States must ensure that any certification bodies are accredited by the relevant authorities. The Regulation under Article  43 empowers both the supervisory authority and the national accreditation body to accredit certification bodies. The criteria which must be taken into account are set out. The section provides the conditions that the IC must meet to accredit a person as a certification provider and conditions that accrediting bodies must meet to accredit certification providers and other matters including appeals, charging fees and provision of information to the Secretary of State. Appeal and review procedures are contained in Sch 5.

Part 3 of the DPA 2018: law enforcement processing 2.104  Law enforcement processing was covered by DPA  1998, the Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA 1 of 27 November 2008 and 2014 domestic regulations governing EEA transmission.1 The governing EU instrument for processing, by basically the police and other criminal justice agencies ‘for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security’ (see Article 2(2)(d)), is not the GDPR. The governing instrument is the Law Enforcement Directive (EU) 2016/680 (European Parliament and Council) (LED) ‘on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA’. As a Directive it is not directly applicable (although provisions may be directly effective and it has to be implemented into UK law). The Directive is implemented into UK law by Part 3 of the Act, along with provisions in Parts 5–7 of the Act which apply across the GDPR, LED and intelligence services regimes. Article  1 of the LED concerns the processing of personal data by competent authorities for law enforcement purposes. Such processing in effect constitutes the condition for processing under this Part. Sensitive data conditions are covered by Schedule  8 to the DPA  2018 (para  2.110). Under Article  1(1) a ‘competent authority’ is any public authority competent for the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security. Further, a competent authority may also be any other body or entity entrusted by Member State law to exercise public authority and public powers for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security (Art 3(7)). ‘This definition covers not only all police forces, prosecutors and other criminal justice agencies in the UK, but also other organisations with law enforcement

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   241 functions, such as Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, the Health and Safety Executive and the Office of the Information Commissioner’ (ExN para 39).

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Part 4 of the Criminal Justice and Data Protection (Protocol No 36) Regulations 2014 (SI 2014/3141). The EEA are the members of the European Union plus Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein.

2.105  Part 3 of the Act applies to the domestic processing of personal data for law enforcement purposes and is not confined to trans-national processing for such purposes. This will ensure that in the UK there is a single domestic and cross-border regime for the processing of personal data for those purposes covering law enforcement as a whole. ‘The provisions of the GDPR, together with the derogations in Chapter 2 of Part 2 of the Act, will apply to the processing of personal data by law enforcement agencies for purposes other than law enforcement purposes, for example for internal personnel management/ human resources purposes’ (ExN para 40). Member States are required to adopt laws giving effect to the LED by 6 May 2018. The UK is bound by this provision as it pre-dates the Brexit date. 2.106  The UK (and Ireland) opted out of EU provisions concerning judicial co-operation in criminal matters under TFEU  Protocol 21 Article  6a. The application to the UK was limited. As explained above, Part 3 of the Act introduces a common regime for domestic and trans-border processing of law enforcement. Following the Government’s Transposition Guidance on implementing EU  Directives effectively, Part 3 of the Act repeats LED provisions wherever possible, only elaborating ‘where such elaboration is necessary to reflect UKdrafting style, clarify the legal effect of a provision or to take advantage of flexibility afforded by the terms of the LED’ (ExN original bill version). 2.107  The scope of the processing in respect of which the provisions in Part 3 of the Act apply is set out in section 29. The ExN states (para 170) that the provisions of the LED and therefore of this Part are designed to be ‘technology neutral’. Accordingly the Act states that Part 3 provisions cover the processing of personal data by computer systems or paper-based structured filing systems.1 What of FOIA authorities and the police and unstructured personal information? Police forces, prosecutors etc are FOIA public authorities under FOIA, Sch 1. The effect of Part 3 would appear to exclude unstructured data in relation to law enforcement bodies (and see DPA 2018, ss 21(6) and 26) so that Part 3 does not apply to unstructured data. However, s  21(2) in DPA  2018, Part 2 states ‘this Chapter also applies to the manual unstructured processing of personal data held by an FOI public authority’ which suggests s 21(1) applies outside Part 3 in relation to law enforcement bodies covered by the FOIA. If correct, such data will be subject to the restrictions and qualifications below. The High Court has refused permission to apply for judicial review of two Upper Tribunal decisions and provided guidance on the test for determining whether information is personal data in the context of Durant, the DPA 1998, the EU Article 29 Working Party’s opinion and the Information Commissioner’s technical guidance, in circumstances where the meaning of personal data is difficult to assess (R (Kelway) v The Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber) and Northumbria Police and R (Kelway) v Independent Police Complaints Commission [2013] EWHC 2575 (Admin), 20 August 2013).

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242  Chapter 2 2.108  Sections 30–33 of the DPA  2018 concern definitions. Schedule  7 specifies competent authorities. The list includes UK Government departments and ministers, chief officers of police, non-policing law enforcement agencies, prosecutorial agencies, other criminal justice agencies and other office holders or organisations who carry out activities in connection with law enforcement. The entry in respect of UK Government departments only covers those departments which have functions in respect of particular categories of crime (for example, the Department for Work and Pensions in relation to benefit fraud, or the Home Office in relation to immigration offences). Departments with no law enforcement responsibilities are not included. Section 30 provides for a catchall provision to capture other persons (that is, office holders or organisations) exercising statutory functions for a law enforcement purpose, such as local authorities when prosecuting trading standards offences or the Environment Agency when prosecuting environmental offences. It does not, however, apply to a person undertaking a private prosecution. The processing of personal data by the intelligence services is governed by the provisions in Part 4 of the Act. It will not include processing for non-law enforcement purposes, eg  HR or equality. This is general processing. The list may be amended (updated) by regulations. Section 32 of the DPA  2018 provides for definitions of ‘controller’ and ‘processor’. ‘Joint controllers’ is used where two or more persons act together to decide the purpose and manner of any data processing (see s 58). The ExN (para 177) describes how: ‘For example, the Police National Computer is managed on behalf of all police forces in the UK with individual chief constables acting as joint data controllers. The controller and processor can be the same, will be split if a competent authority outsources functions to another person, in that event that other person will be the processor – the competent authority would remain the controller and retain legal responsibility for compliance with the provisions of this Part. Where an employee of a controller is processing data, he or she is not acting as a processor but on behalf of the controller, in effect, as the operational arm of a single legal entity. The definition of an employee in clause 31(2) ensures that, in this context, police officers and special constables (who are officer holders rather than employees) are treated as an extension of their chief officer.’

Law Enforcement Directive Data Protection Principles 2.109  Sections 34–42 of, and Sch  8 to, the DPA  2018 contain the six data protection principles governing the processing of personal data for law enforcement purposes. The principles are analogous to the first, second, third, fourth, fifth and seventh principles as set out in the 1998 Act. The sixth and eighth principles of the 1998 Act are covered in Chapters 3 and 5 of Part 3 of the DPA 2018. The DPP for GDPR data processing have been set out above (para 2.35). DCs are under a general duty to comply with the data protection principles as set out in Part 3 (DPA 2018, s 32(3)).

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   243

Conditions for sensitive processing 2.110  Schedule  8 to the DPA  2018 sets out the conditions for sensitive processing under specific circumstances. These include judicial and statutory purposes, protecting individuals’ vital interests, personal data in the public domain, legal claims and judicial acts, prevention of fraud, archiving and circumstances specified by regulations made by the Secretary of State. 2.111  There is no requirement for data to be processed in a transparent matter (as under the GDPR, Art 5(1)(a)), under the first principle which requires that processing must be lawful and fair (DPA  2018, s  35). This is because of the Neither Confirm Nor Deny (NCND) principle (see para 1.98). Lawful means authorised by either statute or common law.1 Fair and lawful processing under the first DPP does not prevent law enforcement authorities from carrying out activities such as covert investigations or video surveillance. These may be lawful under the terms of surveillance legislation where Parliament is satisfied that they are proportionate and necessary in a democratic society having due regard for the legitimate interests of the natural person concerned. Article 10 of the LED generally prohibits the processing of ‘special categories of personal data’ unless specific circumstances apply. Section 35 uses the term ‘sensitive processing’ (as defined in subsection (8)) to refer to such ‘special categories of personal data’. This is from the definition in the GDPR. Subsections (4) and (5) specify the two circumstances when sensitive processing may take place for law enforcement purposes, namely when the data subject has consented or where the processing is for one or more of the purposes specified in Schedule 8 (see above) and is ‘strictly necessary’. In each case, the controller must have an appropriate policy in place covering consent and what is ‘strictly necessary’ (see DPA 2018, s 42). A controversy has arisen in relation to police seeking access to data from rape victims which it is claimed is intrusive. Victims have been informed that, if the data is not provided, no prosecution of a suspected rapist will follow. Arguably such a data request, given its sensitive and private nature, should be relevant, necessary and proportionate. The IC has launched an investigation into ‘Stafford’ statements which ‘can give wide-ranging, blanket consent for police to access detailed and sensitive information, including copies of a victim’s medical, education, psychiatric, social service and family court proceedings records. These records can date from many years prior to the incident under investigation’.2 The Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme (Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme Guidance Home Office (2016)) utilises the police’s common law powers to disclose information where it is necessary to do so to prevent crime. The public had to be reminded that this scheme applies to both males and females. The Child Sex Offender Disclosure Scheme allows parents, carers and guardians to formally ask the police to tell them if someone has a record for child sexual offences. The scheme is available across all 43 police forces in England and Wales: https://www.gov.uk/ guidance/find-out-if-a-person-has-a-record-for-child-sexual-offences#overview (1/10/2018). 2 https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2018/12/access-to-serioussexual-crime-victims-personal-information-how-much-is-too-much/ (31/12/2018). 1

244  Chapter 2 2.112  The ExN (para 185) states: ‘The second principle (section 36) requires personal data to be processed for specific, explicit and legitimate law enforcement purposes, namely for one or more of the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security. The personal data is permitted to be processed for a different law enforcement purpose than that initially processed for so long as it is a lawful purpose, proportionate and necessary. So, for example, the Crown Prosecution Service could process personal data for the purpose of the prosecution of criminal offences, that had an initial processing purpose of the preventing a criminal offence.’ 2.113  The third principle (DPA  2108, s  37) requires personal data to be ‘adequate and relevant and not excessive for the purposes for which it is processed’. The term ‘adequate, relevant and not excessive’ is found in the 1998 Act. The IC guidance states that DCs should ensure that: • they hold personal data about an individual that is sufficient for the purpose they are holding it for in relation to that individual; and • they do not hold more information than is needed for that purpose. 2.114  The ExN (para 187) states: ‘The fourth principle (section 38) requires personal data held by a controller to be accurate and kept up to date. In the law enforcement context, the principle of accuracy of data must take account of the circumstances in which data is being processed. It is accepted that, for example, statements by victims and witnesses containing personal data will be based on the subjective perceptions of the person making the statement. Such statements are not always verifiable and are subject to challenge during the legal process. In such cases, the requirement for accuracy would not apply to the content of the statement but to the fact that a specific statement has been made. Section 38(2) recognises the distinction between personal data based on facts (for example, the details relating to an individual’s conviction for an offence) and data based on personal assessments, such as a witness statement. The requirement to keep personal data up to date must also be viewed in this context. If an individual’s conviction is overturned on appeal, police records must be amended to reflect that fact. However, this principle would not require the retrospective alteration of a witness statement which the appellate court found to be unreliable.’ 2.115  The fifth principle in DPA  2018, s  39 requires that personal data be kept no longer than is necessary. DCs should establish time limits for erasure, or for periodic review. Minimum or maximum periods are not specified. The ExN recommends (para 188) that DCs should ‘review the length of time they retain personal data; consider the law enforcement purpose or purposes they hold information for in deciding whether, and if so for how long, to retain it; securely delete information that is no longer needed for law enforcement

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   245 purposes; and update, archive or securely delete information that goes out of date’. Other statutory duties govern information retention in specific contexts for law enforcement; eg in England and Wales, Part 5 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 makes provision for the retention of fingerprints and DNA profiles (see para  2.331 below). These points are covered elsewhere in this chapter. The College of Policing’s Management of Police Information contains an overall framework for the review, retention or disposal of the generality of information held by police forces in England and Wales for law enforcement purposes. 2.116  The sixth principle (DPA  2018, s  40) requires personal data to be processed in a secure manner. As with national security (below), the IC’s guidance stipulates that, in practice, this means that DCs must have appropriate security to prevent the accidental or intentional compromising of data they hold. Specifically, DCs must: • design and organise their security to fit the nature of the personal data they hold and the harm that may result from a security breach; • be clear about who has responsibility in their organisation to ensure data security; • ensure there are suitable arrangements for proper levels of physical and technical security, supported by robust policies and procedures and reliable, well-trained staff; and • be in a position to respond in a speedy and effective manner to any security breach. Section 41 of the DPA  2018 makes provision for processing safeguards for archiving, research or statistical reasons. This may include anonymising the data. Section 42 deals with safeguards for sensitive processing.

Rights of the data subject 2.117  Chapter 3 of Part 3 of the DPA  2018 specifies the rights of data subjects under Part 3 and the obligations on DCs to facilitate the exercise of those rights. There is not a separate section on exemptions, as under Parts 2 and 4. Exemptions are a component of the rights within the following sections. Basically, they qualify DS rights on the grounds of law enforcement and NCND provisions. The relevant rights (see para 2.53 above) are: access to information about the processing of personal data relating to the data subject; rectification of inaccurate data; erasure of personal data where the processing of such data would infringe the data protection principles or to restrict the processing of such data. The subject access rights and the rights to rectification, erasure and restriction of processing in relation to the processing of relevant personal data are disapplied in the course of a criminal investigation or criminal proceedings. Access, where possible, will have to be via other processes. Requests may be verbal or written and the ICO website has pro forma models.1 The provisions on charging and response times reflect those under the Part 2 regimes (para 2.49). https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-law-enforcement-processing-part-3-of-the-dp-act-2018/.

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246  Chapter 2 2.118  Section 44 of the DPA 2018 imposes general provision of information duties on DCs. A  ‘minimum generic list’ must be available to data subjects, eg through a controller’s website or supporting literature. This should include the DC’s identity and contact details, legal bases for holding the data, duration of holding, recipients etc. Information on the IC and making a complaint should be available. The ICO has published a code on communicating privacy information to individuals. The information must enable the DS to exercise the subject access rights. The right to the information specified in section 44(2) is a qualified right. Subsection (4) sets out various grounds on which a controller may restrict the provision of information under subsection (2), eg disclosure of such information could compromise an ongoing police investigation or compromise sensitive operational techniques or capabilities. Regard must be had to the fundamental rights and legitimate interests of the DS. Restrictions must be necessary and proportionate.

Right of access by the data subject 2.119  The rights of access accorded to data subjects and the information that should be disclosed on request so that the data subject is aware of, and can verify the lawfulness of, the processing are set out in section 45 of the DPA  2018. Securing such access would then enable a data subject, if necessary, to exercise the other rights provided for in Chapter 3, namely the rights to rectification, erasure or restriction on processing. Controllers must respond to subject access requests in writing without undue delay and, in any event, within one month (it was 40 days under the DPA 1998). Reasons for restrictions must be recorded and made available to the IC if requested by the IC. Section 45(4) provides basically for NCND responses by DCs where the DS is under investigation. Operationally, law enforcement bodies may receive a subject access request from an individual who, unknown to them, is under investigation. An NCND response to investigation data helps to avoid prejudice to the investigation, detection, investigation or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, protects public and national security, and the rights and freedoms of others. The DC must record what they have done and make it available to the Commissioner (if requested). The DS must be advised of the right to complain to the IC, and of the right to go to court under sections 165-167 of the DPA 2018.

Rights to rectification or erasure etc 2.120  Sections 46–48 of the DPA  2018 enable a DS to ask for data to be corrected, erased or for processing of that data to be restricted and includes additions to incomplete data. The data subject is allowed to challenge the processing of the data directly to the controller. The right to rectification applies, in particular, to matters of fact: eg a wrong conviction is recorded on

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   247 the Police National Computer. Rectification would not apply, for example, to the content of a witness statement. ‘In such a case, it would be more appropriate to restrict the processing of the personal data contained in the statement so that it was only used in connection with the relevant criminal proceeding’ (ExN para  199). Furthermore: ‘Restrictions on the processing of data may be given effect by moving the data to another system, for example for archiving purposes, or making it unavailable. The fact that the processing of the personal data is restricted should be indicated on the system, for example, through flagging’ (ExN para 200). ‘Where a data subject’s request for rectification or erasure has been refused, the data subject must be informed of the reasons for the refusal. Again, it is open to a controller not to provide such reasons where, to do so, is necessary and proportionate for the purposes specified in subsection (3) of s 46’ (ExN para 201). A  complaint may be made to the IC if the above exemption is exercised (see DPA 2018, ss 165 and 166). ‘If a controller has rectified, erased or restricted processing for certain data, there is a duty on the controller to inform the competent authority from where the data originated (if different) and to alert any recipients of the data. This is particularly important if data has been transferred internationally (see Chapter 5 of Part 3 for more detail on international transfers).’ (ExN para 203)

Automated individual decision-making 2.121  Individuals have a right not to be subject to ‘significant decisions’ based solely on automated processing and resulting in adverse legal effects or any other significant impacts (DPA  2018, ss  49–50). This refers to automated decisionmaking requiring a final decision to be made without human intervention. Suitable safeguards should be in place, informing the data subject where appropriate what has taken place and the right to request human intervention in the processing or decision, explanations of a decision and challenge, as well as DC consideration of any request for a review of an automated decision. The ExN states that automated processing leading to an adverse outcome is rare in law enforcement ‘and is unlikely to have any operational implications’ (ExN para 206). Automated processing is used to filter down large data sets to manageable proportions to enable a human operator to use them for law enforcement.

Supplementary 2.122  Sections 51–54 of the DPA 2018 provide for the exercise of data subjects’ rights covering the format requested and verification of DS identity. However, a response must be free of charge (the 1998 Act permitted DCs to charge an administration fee of up to £10). Section 53 of the DPA  2018 makes special

248  Chapter 2 provision for subject access requests that are ‘manifestly unfounded or excessive’, eg  malicious and repetitious or misleading. It may include harassment and intentional disruption. In these circumstances the DC may charge a reasonable fee (subject to any prescribed maximum) to respond and may refuse the request entirely. The burden is on the DC to demonstrate that the request is manifestly unfounded or excessive.

Controller and processor: general obligations 2.123  DCs are obliged to take appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure that the requirements of Part 3 of the DPA 2018 are complied with. Internal policies should be proportionate. Measures adopted should be proportionate and should adhere to the data principles and the outcome of any completed data protection impact assessment (see DPA  2018, s  64). Appropriate technical and organisational measures should be used to implement the data principles. Joint DCs, ie  different forces, should provide transparent apportionment of responsibilities under eg  a collaboration agreement, as provided by section 22A of the Police Act 1996. Processors are the subject of section 59 of the DPA  2018 who are under a duty of confidence and whose obligations should be set out in contract. Monitoring of integrity and lawfulness should take place. Records should be kept and available to the IC. There is a new requirement for internal audit. The Independent Police Complaints Commission (Independent Office for Police Conduct) has published guidance because logging is important for complaints. Data protection impact assessments (‘DPIA’) are placed on a statutory basis (DPA 2018, s 64). The IC has published a code. Where there are ‘High risks’ in a PIA, DCs or DPs are required to consult with the IC who may provide written advice. DCs and DPs are under security obligations for both manual and automated processing. Risk is the guiding factor. Where breaches cause significant risks to data rights, the DC is obliged to inform the IC without delay (where feasible, within 72 hours) and to provide details on mitigating steps. A high risk to the rights and freedoms of an individual as a result of a data breach should entail that the data subject(s) should also be notified of the data breach in good time to take the necessary precautions to protect themselves (DPA 2018, s 67). A DC may withhold notice of a data breach in circumstances where notifying a data subject would reveal the existence of the data, ie it would prejudice law enforcement, and the action is necessary and proportionate. There are exceptions where the DC can rectify the situation or steps would involve a ‘disproportionate effort’. Data Protection Officers must be appointed who act independently (DPA 2018, ss 69–71). Whistleblowing for wrongdoing is encouraged (DPA 2018, s 81).

Transfer of data to third countries 2.124  The transfer of personal data to a third country or to an international organisation (DPA  2018, s  70(2)) should only take place if necessary for a law enforcement purpose, and when the controller in the third country or

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   249 international organisation carries out functions comparable to those of a competent authority within the meaning of section 30. Levels of protection apply to onward transmission. Section 73 requires any transfers of data to satisfy the conditions set out in subsections (2) to (4). Condition two relates to the standards of data protection in the recipient third country or international organisation. In order to provide uniformity throughout the EU the European Commission will decide which third countries/international organisations provide an adequate level of protection. Once a decision is made in their favour, data transfer can take place. Another EU state may have to give its authorisation where it provided the data. By September 2017, the Commission had adopted 12 adequacy decisions. The Commission may also withdraw an authorisation, effectively prohibiting transfer unless DPA 2018, s 75 or 76 is satisfied. Specific bilateral agreements or binding instruments may be allowed. Such agreements might involve Eurojust and Europol and third countries. Conditions will include confidentiality and restrictions on processing. A  DC should ‘take into account that the personal data will not be used to request, hand down or execute a death penalty or any form of cruel and inhuman treatment’ (ExN para  230). It is open to a DC to require additional safeguards. Where no such decision or arrangement exists, DPA 2018, s 76 allows transfer for specific reasons of the data subject or public security which must be documented and made available on request to monitor lawfulness. Section 77 of the DPA 2018 concerns transfers to persons other than relevant authorities in urgent cases to save life or prevent a crime or terrorism.

National security: certificates by the Minister 2.125  Section 79 of the DPA 2018 deals with ministerial certificates certifying that a restriction is necessary and proportionate to protect national security. Subsection (3) provides that such a certificate is to be taken as conclusive evidence that the restriction (both specific and general) is required. Provision is made for appeal on the basis we have seen elsewhere (para 1.125). The tribunal may refer to necessity, proportionality and lawfulness in considering human rights and national security. Under DPA 2018, s 130, provision is made for the publication of such certificates.

Intelligence services 2.126  Although the DPA  1998 governed domestic processing of data by the intelligence services, other statutes set out their regulatory structure and powers in relation to data applying to the intelligence services, including data handling. For example, Part 7 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 provides for agency-specific warrants in relation to bulk data sets (see paras 4.200 et seq). The FOIA excludes the security and intelligence services from its provisions, so unstructured files will not be included within accessible information. Part 4 of the DPA 2018 covers personal data processed by the services wholly or partly

250  Chapter 2 by automated means and processing forming part, or intended to form part, of a relevant filing system (DPA 2018, s 82). Arguing through Art 4(2) of the TEU, the ExN states that national security is the sole responsibility of each Member State. National security processing is outside the GDPR. Therefore the processing of personal data in connection with national security activities by agencies or units dealing with national security issues is not covered by the GDPR which is unsuited to ‘the unique nature of intelligence service processing’ (ExN para 43 original version). Such processing is covered by Part 4 and is based on the Council of Europe modernised Convention 108. As of writing, this had not been agreed. This emphatic statement in relation to Art 4(2) of the TEU is made despite the fact that on 30 October the Investigatory Powers Tribunal referred the question of whether collection and retention of bulk communications by the intelligence services is within EU competence.1 Part 4 of the DPA 2018 will develop the existing regime by adopting the standards of the modernised Convention 108 so that such processing is consistent with future international standards. A legal regime is therefore introduced which will not undermine the effective operation of the services to counter existing and new threats to national security. Privacy International v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs etc: http://www.ipt-uk.com/judgments. asp (7 November 2017).

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2.127  The ExN explains that there will be ‘adequate and proportionate exemptions from processing which can only be applied when necessary to safeguard national security’ (ExN para 45). The DPA 2018 utilises the system of ministerial certificate from the 1998 DPA and FOIA (para 1.117) to certify that exemption from a specified requirement is necessary for the purpose of safeguarding national security to be conclusive evidence of that fact. The certificate may be judicially challenged. The ExN states ‘The intelligence services already comply with data handling obligations. These are supported by physical, technical and procedural controls which are overseen by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and which are also aligned to the Cabinet Office Transforming Government Security Review. They include vetting of personnel, handling restrictions based on classification of data, firewalling and air gapping of internal IT and access restrictions’ (ExN para 46 original version). The IP Tribunal has found a variety of breaches by the security and intelligence services in the exercise of their powers.1 Liberty & Others v The Security Service, SIS, GCHQ: http://www.ipt-uk.com/docs/IPT_13_168173_H.pdf [All IPT cases 17/01/2017]. This judgment and related IPT judgments are available at: http://www.ipt-uk.com/judgments.asp.

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Intelligence services processing 2.128  The Council of Europe Convention 108 provides principles for states to transpose into their domestic legislation. Signatories are afforded a degree of discretion in the implementation of the principles in domestic legislation.

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   251 The principles are familiar and include ensuring that data is processed through procedures set out by law for a specific purpose and data is stored no longer than is necessary for the intended purpose. Each party is to establish an independent authority to ensure compliance with data protection principles and lays down rules on trans-border data flows to non-parties to the Convention. The important new principles of Convention 108 include: • proportionality (formerly implicit); • accountability, in particular of data controllers and processors; • renewed focus on data security; • additional obligations to declare data breaches; • enhanced transparency of data processing; and • additional safeguards for the data subject, such as the right not to be subject to a decision solely based on automatic processing without having his or her views taken into consideration, the right to obtain information about the logic underlying the processing, and the right to object as in the GDPR. Under Article  9 of Convention 108, parties will be permitted to exempt DCs from some of these requirements for specified purposes. A specified purpose is national security. Under the DPA 1998, this was the broadest of exemptions.

Processing to which Part 4 applies and definitions 2.129  Section 82 of the DPA 2018 applies the provisions in Part 4 of the Act to personal data controlled by an intelligence service (see paras 4.176 et seq) for their statutory functions.1 It includes processing by, or partly by, automated means or processing of data which forms part of a filing system or is intended to form part of a filing system. The services included are the security service, the intelligence service and GCHQ. Are these the only such services? Section 83 defines ‘processor’ and DC for the purposes of intelligence service in Part 4. Section 84 defines expressions used in Part 4: these include ‘consent’, ‘employee’, ‘personal data breach’ and ‘recipient’. The functions are set out in the governing legislation. See ch 4 (paras 4.222 et seq).

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Part 4 data protection principles 2.130  The six DPPs governing data processing by intelligence services are set out in sections 85 (overview) and 86–91 of, and Schedules 9 and 10 to, the DPA 2018 – the latter deals with sensitive processing. The first principle (DPA 2018, s 86) is that processing must be lawful, fair and transparent. The conditions under which processing is lawful are set out in Schedule 9, and include where the data subject has given their consent, where the processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation, where the processing is necessary for the statutory function of an intelligence service, or where the processing is necessary for the administration of justice. The criteria for sensitive processing (defined in s 86(7)) are stricter and are set out

252  Chapter 2 in Schedule  10. Conditions in Sch  10 may be added to, varied or omitted by regulations made by the Secretary of State (s 86(3)). Fair processing of data does not prevent intelligence services from carrying out activities such as covert surveillance, provided they are carried out within their legal remit. Such activities would be regarded as fair and lawful if they comply with the requirements of legislation such as the Human Rights Act 1998, the purposes and functions and disclosure gateways specified in the Security Service Act 1989 and Intelligence Services Act 1994 (as appropriate) or surveillance powers contained in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 or the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. Transparency demands that DCs are clear and open with data subjects about how information about them will be used. The ExN advises ‘This could be achieved, for example, by providing generic information on a website about the identity of the controller, the purposes of the processing undertaken by the controller, rights available to data subjects and other information as specified’ (para 250). Fair and transparent processing has to have regard to the method by which data were obtained. The second principle, in section 87 of the DPA 2018, requires personal data to be collected for specific, explicit and legitimate purposes. Personal data collected for one purpose may be processed for another. The use for a further purpose, however, must also be lawful, proportionate and necessary. ‘So, for example, personal data collected by the Security Service for the purpose of safeguarding national security could be processed further for the purpose of the prevention or detection of serious criminal offences, for instance by alerting the relevant law enforcement agency to intelligence suggesting a subject of interest is in possession of a firearm’ (ExN para 251). The third principle, in section 88 of the DPA  2018, states that personal data undergoing processing by DCs must be adequate and relevant and not excessive for the purposes for which it is processed. The personal data held on an individual must be ‘sufficient’ for the relevant purpose and the DC does not hold more information than is needed for the purpose. The fourth principle, in section 89 of the DPA  2018, requires personal data undergoing processing to be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date. Given the nature of secret intelligence, accuracy is not a straightforward question of fact. The accuracy of personal data held by a DC under Part 4 might not always be a simple question of fact where underlying information is ‘partial or incomplete’ (ExN para 253). The fifth principle, in section 90 of the DPA 2018, requires that personal data undergoing processing be kept no longer than is necessary. Compliance will involve time limits for erasure or periodic review. Compliance with this principle means DCs should establish time limits for erasure and/or for periodic review. This section does not specify minimum or maximum periods for the retention of data and is similar to the 1998 Act. The ExN advises: ‘In practice, to comply with the fifth principle, data controllers should review the length of time they retain personal data; consider the purpose or purposes they hold information

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   253 for in deciding whether, and if so for how long, to retain it, updating or those purposes’ (ExN para 254). Some data will be governed by additional legislative requirements, eg  warrants and bulk datasets under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. The sixth principle, in section 91 of the DPA 2018, requires personal processing in a secure manner. ICO guidance stipulates that, in practice, this means that DCs must have appropriate security to prevent the accidental or intentional compromising of data they hold. In compliance with this advice, DCs must, the ExN states: • design and organise their security to fit the nature of the personal data they hold and the harm that may result from a security breach; • be clear about who has responsibility in their organisation to ensure data security; • ensure there are suitable arrangements for proper levels of physical and technical security, supported by robust policies and procedures and reliable, well-trained staff; and • be in a position to respond in a speedy and effective manner to any security breach.

Rights of data subjects 2.131  Sections 92–100 of the DPA  2018 specify the rights of data subjects under Part 4 and the obligations on DCs to facilitate the exercise of those rights. These are similar to rights under Part 3 to the LED but with modifications. So, unlike the GDPR and Part 3 of the DPA 2018, in Part 4 a DC may charge a reasonable fee before responding to subject access requests. The rights to information include identity and contact details of the DC, legal bases, categories of data, recipients, complaints to the IC, and any other information needed to secure that data is processed fairly and lawfully. There are detailed provisions on the right of access by the DS. This includes cases where a controller cannot comply with the request without disclosing information relating to another individual who can be identified from that information. The controller is not obliged to comply with the request unless there is consent from that individual, or in all the circumstances it is reasonable to comply without that consent. The factors to consider in assessing reasonableness are in s 94(9), eg confidentiality, steps taken by the controller to seek that person’s consent, whether that person is capable of giving consent, and any express refusal to give consent by the other individual. Automated decision-making is provided for, along with rights to intervene. Rights to information about decision-making and rights to object are included, along with rights to rectification and erasure. Under the right to object to processing where the DC does not comply with the request, the DS may apply to the High Court (or the Court of Session) which, as the court determines, may order the DC to take necessary steps in complying with the request. A request for rectification or erasure may also be enforced via the same courts. A court may consider a restriction on processing rather than correction or deletion. A restriction should be flagged. Such data may only be processed for reason(s) preventing its erasure.

254  Chapter 2

General obligations of controllers and processors 2.132  Sections 102–106 of the DPA 2018 provide for obligations on DCs and DPs to take appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure Part 4 obligations and to ensure minimisation of risks to a DS’s rights and freedoms. Under s 103, where a DC is proposing that a particular type of processing is to be undertaken by the DC, the DC must, prior to the processing, consider the impact of the proposed processing on the rights and freedoms of data subjects. Section 107 concerns security of processing including record and log-keeping for auditing, verification of integrity of data and possible restoration, and levels of security clearance for processing restricted access. Under section 108 of the DPA 2018, notification of a data breach which seriously interferes with the rights and freedoms of the DS is provided. This must be done without delay and, if not within 72 hours, it must be accompanied by reasons for the delay. This may be disapplied where an error under s 231 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 has to be reported.

Transfers of personal data outside the United Kingdom 2.133  Section 109 of the DPA  2018 (which comprises Chapter 5 of Part 4 of the Act) provides that the transfer of personal data to a country outside the United Kingdom or to an international organisation may only take place where the transfer is necessary and proportionate in accordance with the controller’s statutory functions or relevant provisions of the Security Service Act 1989 and the Intelligence Services Act 1994. These allow the widest of powers of transfer to overseas intelligence agencies. An exemption covers national security and includes most of the DPP, the rights of data subjects, certain obligations on DCs and processors, along with various enforcement provisions. This exemption repeats the wide terms of section 28 of the 1998 Act. Provisions similar to ministerial certificates and judicial challenge under Part 3 of the DPA 2018 apply (para  1.125 above). Information may also be exempt on the grounds that it is required for legal proceedings, is legally privileged, to protect information rights of others (DPA 2018, ss 110, 111 and Sch 11). Further exemptions may be made by regulation.

Other exemptions under Part 4 2.134  Schedule 11 to the DPA 2018 provides for exemptions from the listed provisions below. These are: • the data protection principles set out in Part 4 of the Act, but note the condition that processing is lawful and fair and transparent (s 864(1)(a) and (2) and the conditions in Schedules 9 and 10 on conditions for processing and sensitive data are not part of the exemptions)); • the rights of data subjects (Part 4, ch 3); and • the need to communicate a breach of personal data to the IC (Part 4, ch 4).

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   255 The exemptions from the listed provisions, where their application would prejudice or prevent the DC complying with the obligation, are: • in relation to the prevention of crime (para 2); • in relation to disclosures required by law or in connection with legal proceedings or obtaining legal advice (para 3); • in relation to Parliamentary privilege to prevent its infringement (para 4); • in relation to judicial proceedings (para 5); • in relation to Crown honours and dignities (para 6); • in relation to any prejudice to the combat effectiveness of the armed forces (para 7); • in relation to circumstances likely to prejudice the economic well-being of the United Kingdom (para 8); • in relation to legal professional privilege, ie not to breach it (para 9); • in relation to negotiations (para 10); • in relation to confidential references given by the controller (para 11); • in relation to exam scripts and marks (para 12); • in relation to research and statistics; this exemption is only available where there are appropriate safeguards and the results of the research will not be made available in a form that identifies a DS (para 13); and • in relation to archiving in the public interest; this exemption is only available where the processing is subject to appropriate safeguards (para 14).

Data held outside the UK 2.135  The DPA 2018 applies to DCs and DPs established in the UK (s 207(7)). There are specific applications to data processed outside the UK under Part 2, Chapter 2 of the DPA and general processing (s 207(3) and (4)) data controllers established in the UK where the data are processed in the context of that establishment. By virtue of the Crime (International Co-operation) Act 2003, ss 81 and 94 and SI 2004/786, s 54A was added to the DPA 1998, under which the IC may inspect any personal data recorded in: (a) the Schengen information system; (b) the Europol information system; and (c) the Customs information system.

The Information Commissioner 2.136  Part 5 of the DPA 2018 concerns the Information Commissioner who is the UK supervisory authority under Art 51 of the GDPR. Part 5 should be read with Sch 12 to the Act. The ICO has been addressed in ch 1 (para 1.17). The IC is responsible in the UK for data protection supervision. Data protection is a UK subject, unlike FOIA which has a separate Scottish administration. The GDPR makes provision for the continuing existence of the supervisory authority. The DPA contains relevant provisions for continuing and effective transitional functioning.

256  Chapter 2 For GDPR processing, the IC must advise Parliament and other bodies on legislative and other measures and may also issue opinions to those bodies on any issue relating to the protection of personal data. Section 116 of the DPA 2018 makes the IC the supervisory authority for the LED. The IC cannot supervise data processing of courts in their judicial capacity. For GDPR processing the IC is required to co-operate with other LED supervisory authorities and with the Data Protection Board and the European Commission (DPA  2018, s  118 and Sch 14 and also under the Data Protection Convention with ‘foreign designated authorities’). Section 119 of the DPA 2018 allows inspection of data processing under international obligations. Section 120 concerns further international roles of the IC and assistance to encourage co-operation and effective enforcement of data protection.

Codes 2.137  Under section 121 of the DPA 2018 the IC must prepare a code of practice on data sharing agreements between publicly funded DCs and third parties for value for money benefits and development of software. The IC must publish and keep under review a data sharing code of practice containing guidance. This was introduced originally by section 52A of the 1998 Act (paras 2.262 et seq below). In preparing the code the IC must consult as the IC considers appropriate with trade associations, data subjects and persons who represent the interests of data subjects. Section 122 of the DPA 2018 places the IC under a duty to publish and keep under review a direct marketing code of practice promoting good practice that appears to the IC to be desirable including, but not limited to, compliance with the requirements of data protection legislation and the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC  Directive) Regulations 2003 (‘PECR’).1 In preparing the code the IC must consult, as he or she considers appropriate, with trade associations, data subjects and persons who represent the interests of data subject. This preserves the effect of section 52AA of the 1998 Act. The IC must prepare a code of practice which contains such guidance as the Commissioner considers appropriate on standards of age-appropriate design (DPA  2018, s  123(7)) of relevant information society services which are likely to be accessed by children. In preparing the latter code the IC must have regard to the UK’s obligations under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. Duties of consultation and other duties are spelt out. Section 124 of the DPA  2018 was a late inclusion. It covers the publication of a code of practice on journalism and data processing and the promotion of good practice under the DP legislation. The code may be amended or replaced. Consultation must take place with trade associations and data subjects and persons appearing to the IC to represent the interests of DSs. ‘Good practice’ is defined (s 124(5)) and the special interest in freedom of speech and information is highlighted. Codes must be approved by Parliament (DPA 2018, s 125). Special factors apply to age appropriate codes.

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   257 Section 126 concerns the publication and review of data-sharing and direct marketing codes and amendment where the IC becomes aware that the terms of a code could breach international obligations, and section 127 covers the legal effect of data-sharing and direct marketing codes allowing their evidentiary admissibility in legal proceedings. The IC must take a relevant provision of the code into account when determining a question arising in connection with the carrying out of the Commissioner’s functions under the data protection legislation. Codes may be produced as a requirement of regulations for trade associations and good guidance in data processing after consultation (section 128). SI 2003/2426.

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Consensual audits 2.138  Under section 129 of the DPA 2018 (repeating s 51(7) of the 1998 Act) the IC, with the consent of the DP or processor, may carry out an assessment of whether the DC or processor is complying with good practice. The IC is required to inform the DC or processor of the results.

Records of national security certificates 2.139  A provision (DPA 2018, s 130), inserted in the Lords, adds a requirement for the Secretary of State who issues national security certificates under DPA 2018, section 27, 99 or 111, to send a copy to the IC. Where received, the IC must publish a copy. The record must contain the signatory, date and text although the latter is subject to qualifications in section 130(4) on a ministerial determination relating to national security, public safety or which might jeopardise the safety of any person. The record must be kept available for the public while in force.

Disclosure etc of information to the IC 2.140  Section 131 of the DPA 2018 clarifies that a person is not precluded by any other legislation from disclosing to the Commissioner information needed by the Commissioner in relation to the Commissioner’s functions. But this does not authorise disclosures prohibited in Parts 1–7 and Chapter 1 of Part 9 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. Section 132 of the DPA 2018 prevents persons who are currently or have previously been the IC, a member of the IC’s staff or an agent of the IC from disclosing without lawful authority information obtained in connection with their functions and which relates to identifiable individuals or a business and is not available to the public from other sources at the time of the disclosure and has not previously been available to the public from other sources. It is an offence knowingly or recklessly to disclose information without lawful authority. Section 132(2) of the DPA  2018 spells out what constitutes lawful authority. Conditions are specified where information can be legally disclosed. The IC has to publish guidance on how the IC will limit the use of legally privileged communications obtained in carrying out the IC’s functions

258  Chapter 2 (DPA 2018, s 133). The Secretary of State must be consulted and the guidance has to be laid before Parliament.

Fees 2.141  Sections 134–136 of the DPA 2018 state that fees may be charged for services provided to any person other than a DS or data protection officer, although this may be overridden where a request from the latter is unreasonable or unfounded. The IC has to prove it is such a request. The IC may in such a case charge such a fee as is reasonable. ‘Excessive’, in relation to a request, may be one that repeats the substance of previous requests. The IC is to prepare and publish guidance about the fees she proposes to charge in accordance with the Act and GDPR. The Commissioner is required to consult the Secretary of State before publication.

Charges payable to the Commissioner by controllers – no notification 2.142  The Secretary of State has a power to make regulations requiring data controllers to pay a charge to the IC (DPA 2018, s 137) (Data Protection (Charges and Information) Regulations 2018, SI  2018/480).1 Charges may be enforced by an enforcement notice. Those regulations may provide for different charges in different cases and for a discounted charge. Charges may be imposed even though no service is provided. Charges will take into account the desirability of offsetting the amount needed to fund the Commissioner’s data protection and privacy and electronic communications regulatory functions. Regulations may require the provision of information by a DC to the IC to help the Commissioner identify the correct charge. The ICO have advised that the 2018 system will seek to ensure the fees are fair, reflecting ‘the relative risk of the organisation’s processing of personal data’. The size of the data protection fee will still be based on the organisation’s size and turnover and will also take into account the amount of personal data it is processing. A  three-tier system was planned, aiming to keep the regime as simple as possible. Regulations are empowered under DPA 2018, s 137 and supplementary details are in s 138. As the ExN explains: ‘This and the following clause reproduce the substance of the charging powers inserted into the 1998 Act by sections 108 to 110 of the Digital Economy Act 2017. These powers were originally legislated for ahead of this Bill to allow the new charges to be in place in time of the GDPR coming into force in May 2018’ (ExN para 348). Under section 138 of the DPA 2018 there are duties on the Secretary of State of consultation with representative bodies in the making of regulations and reviews on charges under the RPI by the IC and Secretary of State. The Act does not provide for notification by DCs to the IC of processing. The charging provisions effectively replace notification. An unsuccessful amendment in the Lords required the IC to maintain a register of DCs. Under the DPA 1998,

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   259 DCs had to notify the IC of processing. They had to inform the IC what personal data they held and their use of it. Fees were paid, to fund the IC’s work, of either £35 or £500 depending on an organisation’s size. https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/2258205/dp-fee-guide-forcontrollers-20180221.pdf. See also: https://iconewsblog.org.uk/2017/10/05/ico-fee-andregistration-changes-next-year/.

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Reports 2.143  Section 139 of the DPA  2018 largely replicates section 52(1) of the 1998 Act – the IC must include an annual report of its activities as stated in Article 59 of the GDPR. Paragraph 59 of Schedule 19 to the DPA 2018 removes the requirement in section 49 of the 2000 Act for the Information Commissioner to publish reports on the operation of that Act. This is no longer needed in the light of section 138 of the DPA 2018 which introduces a general requirement for the IC to publish annual reports on his/her functions. The IC can also lay other reports before the Houses of Parliament. Sections 140–141 of the DPA 2018 concern publications and notices.

Art 29 Working Group 2.144  Recital 139 of the GDPR provides that, in order to promote the consistent application of this Regulation, the Board should be set up as an independent body of the Union. To fulfil its objectives, the Board should have legal personality. The Board should be represented by its Chair. It should replace the Working Party (29) on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data established by Directive 95/46/EC. It should consist of the head of a supervisory authority of each Member State and the European Data Protection Supervisor or their respective representatives. The Commission should participate in the Board’s activities without voting rights and the European Data Protection Supervisor should have specific voting rights. The Board should contribute to the consistent application of this Regulation throughout the Union, including by advising the Commission, in particular on the level of protection in third countries or international organisations, and promoting co-operation of the supervisory authorities throughout the Union. The Board should act independently when performing its tasks. ‘The Board should be assisted by a secretariat provided by the European Data Protection Supervisor. The staff of the European Data Protection Supervisor involved in carrying out the tasks conferred on the Board by this Regulation should perform its tasks exclusively under the instructions of, and report to, the Chair of the Board.’ GDPR Recital (140) Article  63 of the GDPR refers to the Board as a ‘consistency mechanism’. Its role and powers are set out in Arts 63–67 and include giving opinions, dispute resolution between supervisory authorities, and acting in matters of urgency.

260  Chapter 2 The Commission may adopt by implementing measures provisions on exchange of information electronically between supervisory authorities and the Board. The composition, independence and numerous tasks of the Board and chair are set out in Arts 68–75. The proceedings are confidential (Art 76). We await details on arrangements for the working party’s replacement after UK departure from the EU.

The Information Commissioner, enforcement and offences – Part 6 2.145  The IC could not issue decision notices as under the FOIA. The IC can issue Information, Assessment and Enforcement Notices (IN, AN and EN).1 The Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 enabled the Commissioner to issue a civil monetary penalty notice of up to £500,000 in respect of the most serious breaches of data protection. The GDPR now increases this amount so that the IC can, in the most serious cases, issue a maximum fine of £18 million (€20 million) or 4 per cent of turnover. The Act ensures that the Commissioner’s powers to issue fines are subject to certain safeguards (below). UK data protection law has always been accompanied by certain criminal offences where there are failures to comply with information notices (IN), obtaining, disclosing or selling personal data without the data controller’s consent and general offences relating to compliance with warrants and IC staff misconduct. The usual provision for prosecutions was s 55 of the 1998 Act. The maximum penalty is an unlimited fine. The DPA  2018 reproduces many of the criminal offences in the 1998 Act with modifications due to the GDPR. The DPA 2018 introduces some new offences. For instance, a new offence criminalises the deliberate re-identification of individuals whose personal data is contained in anonymised data. See, on enforcement by ICO, https://ico.org.uk/action-weve-taken/enforcement/ (31/05/2018).

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Media inquiries 2.146  Enforcement was prefaced by clause 142 inserted by the Lords which imposed a duty on the IC to establish an inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005 (paras 10.104 and 10.174) into allegations of data protection breaches by media organisations. Subsection (2) set out what should be included in the terms of reference (these may be added to): ‘(a) to inquire, in respect of personal data processing, into the extent of unlawful or improper conduct within news publishers and, as appropriate, other organisations within the media, and by those responsible for holding personal data; (b) to inquire, in respect of personal data processing, into the extent of corporate governance and management failures at news publishers; (c) in the light of these inquiries, to consider the implications for personal data protection in relation to freedom of speech; and

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   261 (d) to make recommendations on what action, if any, should be taken in the public interest.’ This clause was withdrawn in the Commons. New clauses emerged and these became DPA 2018, ss 124, 177, 178 and 179 (paras 2.137 and 2.177).

Information notices 2.147  In order to obtain required information from a DC/DP the IC may issue, or cancel, an information notice. The IN is in writing. Information may be required with a specified period. Section 142 of the DPA  2018 details the requirements. The IN may be required in order to assist the IC determine whether processing is for a purely personal or household activity. The IN may specify the category of information required, the form in which it should be provided, the time or period of time for provision and the place. The notice must explain why the information is needed and contain details of appeal rights. The DC/DP does not have to comply with the notice during the time in which an appeal may be made and, if made, until the appeal is determined or withdrawn. Section 142(7) of the DPA 2018 states that the time periods do not apply where there is an ‘urgent need for the information’, but seven days should be allowed to provide the information.

Information notices: restrictions 2.148  Section 143(1) of the DPA 2018 provides that an IN cannot be made in respect of personal data being processed for journalistic, academic, artistic or literary purposes, unless the IC has made or is likely to make a written determination under section 174 (the special purposes) explaining why it would be justified. Section 143(2) to (4) provides that a notice cannot compel the provision of details of communications with legal advisers in relation to data protection compliance. The notice cannot compel provision of information that would implicate them in offences under other Acts or other offences, but that does not include offences under the DPA or Perjury Act 1911, s 5. Information cannot be used in criminal proceedings brought under the Act unless for non-compliance with an IN. An IN cannot compel provision of information in breach of Parliamentary privilege. Section 144 provides that it is an offence to make false statements in response to an IN.

Failure to comply with an information notice 2.149  Section 145 provides that an information order may be made by the court where the IC satisfies the court that a person has failed to comply with a requirement of an information notice (IN). The order may require delivery to the IC of the information in the notice or other information having regard to the IC’s statement in DPA 2018, s 142(2)(b). The form, time and place of delivery

262  Chapter 2 may be specified. Failure to comply with an IN, or the following notices, may attract the award of a penalty notice by the IC under s 155 (below). Making a false statement in response to a notice intentionally or recklessly is an offence (DPA 2018, s 144). Under section 148, where an IN or AN has been given to a person, it is an offence to destroy or otherwise dispose of, conceal, block or (where relevant) falsify all or part of the information, document, equipment or material, or to cause or permit the destruction, disposal, concealment, blocking or (where relevant) falsification of all or part of the information, document, equipment or material, with the intention of preventing the Commissioner from viewing, or being provided with or directed to, all or part of the information, document, equipment or material. The burden of proof is on the defendant to prove that the destruction, disposal, concealment, blocking or falsification would have occurred in the absence of the person being given the notice.

Assessment notices 2.150  Section 146 of the DPA  2018 replicates the provisions on assessment notices in section 41A of the 1998 Act (that is, Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and related 2010 SIs). However, in the 1998 Act it was limited to government departments and specified public bodies. The IC and the IC’s staff have a power to issue or cancel an assessment notice for the purpose of carrying out an assessment of whether the DC/DP has complied, or is complying, with the data protection legislation. The IC may require the DC/DP to do certain things, eg  permit the IC to enter specified premises, assist the IC to view certain documents or to observe processing that takes place on the premises or provide copies of documents. The IC has powers of inspection and examination of documents, information or equipment. Compliance times, appeal rights under sections 162 and 164 of the DPA 2018 must be specified. Similar provisions as to INs apply on appeals, and an urgency provision may override these, as with INs.

Assessment notices: restrictions 2.151  Similar provisions apply as under INs for legal communications (DPA 2018, s 147). A DC/DP is exempt from receiving an assessment notice if they are processing personal data for journalistic, academic, artistic or literary purposes, and other exempt bodies are listed in s  147(5). A  notice cannot be given to the bodies listed in section 23(3) of the FOIA – security and intelligence bodies – and for certain education regulatory purposes.

Enforcement notices 2.152  The IC may issue an enforcement notice (EN) under section 149 of the DPA 2018 requiring a person to take steps or refrain from taking steps specified

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   263 in the notice for failings or failures set out in subsections (2), (3), (4) and (5). The circumstances in which a DC/DP can be issued with an enforcement notice for failure to comply with provisions in the GDPR and the DPA  2018 are in s  149(2): failure of compliance with principles of processing, rights of DS, obligations of DC/DPs, communication of data breaches and third country transfer breaches of principles. They may be issued against a monitoring body for non-compliance with Art 41 of the GDPR as well as certification officers for specified circumstances. Issue of ENs for non-compliance with section 137 of the DPA 2018 (charges payable to IC) has been described above. There are limits on ENs (s 149(6) and (7)). Regulations may add to the listed failures to issue an EN (s 149(8)).

Enforcement notices: supplementary 2.153  The EN must state what the person has done or failed to do, giving the IC’s reasons (DPA 2018, s 150). For an EN issued in relation to section 149(2) and (1)(b), the IC may suspend the DC/DP processing data or any specific type of data specified for a particular purpose, time or which has a particular description. Under s 150(2) the Commissioner must consider whether the failure has caused or is likely to cause any person damage or distress. In relation to s  149(2) notices, the IC may impose a ban relating to all processing of personal data, or for a specified description of personal data including its description, purpose or manner of processing or times when processing takes place. Subsections clarify the time for compliance and period restrictions of ENs and restrictions applying in appeal periods and exemptions to issuing specific requirements in that period and non-applicability in cases of urgency. There is a 24-hour respite before requirements must be complied with, where urgency is invoked.

Enforcement notices: rectification and erasure of personal data etc 2.154  Section 151(1) of the DPA  2018 is relevant where an EN applies to failure to comply with accuracy. It may also apply where a DC/DP has failed to comply  with data subjects’ rights on rectification, erasure or restriction of processing under Articles 16 to 18 of the GDPR. Section 151(2) states that, if an EN requires a controller or processor to rectify or erase personal data, a DC/DP may also be required to rectify or erase any expressions of opinion which are based on what appears to the IC to be inaccurate personal data. ‘For example, if a bank holds inaccurate data about an individual’s credit card repayments which leads them to conclude that person is not creditworthy, the Commissioner can require that data and any inaccurate conclusions flowing from it to be rectified or erased’ (ExN para 380). Section 151(3) concerns data which is received from the DS or a third party which is accurately recorded but subsequently found to be inaccurate The EN may require the DC/DP to ensure rectification, or to supplement it with the data subject’s view as to why it is inaccurate, or a statement of the true facts. When the

264  Chapter 2 IC considers the content of an EN for rectification of data, the IC must consider the purpose for obtaining and further processing that data (s 151(4)). An EN may require the DC/DP to notify any third parties to whom the data may have been disclosed. The IC has to consider the number of people who would need to be notified when considering the practicability of such notification (s 151(5)–(7)).

Enforcement notices: restrictions 2.155  Section 152 of the DPA  2018 reflects the provisions of Article  85 of the GDPR. It seeks to balance protection of personal data with the right to freedom of expression for literary, artistic, journalistic or academic purposes. It replicates ss 46(1) and (2) of the 1998 Act. It provides that in such processing an EN cannot be served unless the IC has determined under section 174 of the DPA 2018 that the processing was not wholly for such purposes, or the court has granted permission for the EN to be served. A court cannot grant leave for an EN to be served unless certain conditions are met: it is satisfied that (a) the Commissioner has reason to suspect a failure described in section 149(2) which is of substantial public importance, and (b) the controller or processor has been given notice of the application for leave in accordance with rules of court or the case is urgent (s 152(3)). An EN cannot require anything to be done which would be a breach of Parliamentary privilege of either House.

Enforcement notices: cancellation and variation 2.156  An EN may be cancelled or amended under section 153 of the DPA 2018 (this repeats s 41 of the 1998 Act). A DC/DP can apply to the IC to have the notice varied  or cancelled and the grounds for such are in s  153(3) including on the ground that, by reason of a change of circumstances, one or more of the provisions of that notice need not be complied with in order to remedy the failure identified in the notice.

Powers of entry and inspection 2.157  Section 154 of the DPA  2018 states that these powers are detailed in Schedule 15. It essentially replicates Schedule 9 to the 1998 Act with updating (eg district judges – magistrates’ courts). Paragraph 1 of Schedule 15 sets out the circumstances in which a circuit judge or a District Judge may grant a warrant to the IC other than in connection with assessment notices. Paragraph 2 empowers the court to issue warrants in connection with assessment notices. Paragraph 3 requires the judge to not issue a warrant if the processing is required for special purposes (ie for the purposes of journalism or academic, artistic or literary purposes).

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   265 Paragraph 4 provides restrictions and conditions which a judge must consider and be satisfied have been met before issuing a warrant or where compliance with the conditions would defeat the object of entry. A provision allows warrants in cases of urgency. Paragraph  5 makes provision as to the content of warrants. A  warrant may include the power to enter and search premises and inspect and seize documents, and inspect, examine, operate and test any equipment found on the premises which is used or intended to be used for the processing of personal data. Reasonable force may be used by those empowered to exercise the warrant. A  warrant issued must be executed at a reasonable hour, unless there are grounds to suspect that it would defeat the purpose of the warrant. The warrant must be shown to the occupier and copied or left in a prominent place on the premises. Paragraph 10 requires a person executing a warrant to provide a receipt and give the occupier a copy when seizing a document. It does not require the person executing the warrant to  provide a copy of the document  if providing a copy would result in undue delay. The seized document may be retained for as long as necessary. Certain privileged communications are exempted from seizure under paragraph  11, and the occupier may object to inspection of material exempt under the Act.

Penalty notices 2.158  Powers to serve monetary or civil penalty notices (MPNs) were in section 55A of the 1998 Act. These (‘penalties’) are now in section 155 of the DPA 2018. The penalty notice (PN) requires the DC/DP to pay to the IC an amount determined by the IC. Money so paid is handed to the Treasury unlike fees. A PN may be issued where the IC is satisfied that a person has failed to comply with certain provisions of the GDPR or the DPA 2018 or has failed to comply with an information notice, assessment notice or an enforcement notice. Section 155(2) and (3) deals with the matters which the Commissioner must have regard to when considering whether to award a penalty notice and determining the amount. These are i) whether the matter refers to something in the GDPR, or ii) its nature, gravity, duration; whether intentional or negligent; mitigating action by the DC; degree of DC responsibility; DC’s previous relevant failures; co-operation with the IC; categories of personal data involved; whether the DC notified the IC of breach; DC compliance with previous notices; adherence to codes of conduct etc; other mitigating or aggravating factors; and whether the penalty would be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. Amounts of penalties are set out below (para 2.161). Further provisions are contained in Schedule 16 to the DPA 2018. Regulations may increase the failures for which a PN may be awarded and to provide for the size of penalty (s 158(5)). There are provisions on consultation for regulations which are to be made by the affirmative resolution procedure.

266  Chapter 2

Penalties 2.159  The provisions in Schedule  16 to the DPA  2018 on administrative penalties are broadly equivalent to the provisions on monetary penalties in the 1998 Act (as amended). The meaning of ‘penalty’ is contained in para 1 of Schedule 16. The IC must give notice to the DC/DP that they intend to issue them a penalty notice. A penalty notice cannot be issued after six months has passed from the date the written notice was issued. Paragraph 3 explains what the Commissioner must include in the notice of intent to issue a penalty notice. The IC must consider any oral or written representations by the DC/DP before deciding whether to give a penalty notice. The IC must wait until after the time allocated to the DC/ DP for making oral or written statements has passed before issuing a notice. Paragraph 5 sets out what must be provided in the notice. This may include, for example, reasons why the Commissioner proposes to impose the penalty, reasons for the amount specified and details on rights of appeal. The IC may vary or cancel a notice by written notice. Paragraph 9 concerns enforcement of payments.

Penalty notices: restrictions 2.160  Restrictions are placed on the IC under section 156 of the DPA 2018 in relation to its ability to issue a penalty notice under section 149(2) in relation to processing for special purposes. Section 156(1) and (2) of the DPA  2018 repeats s 46 of the 1998 Act. Section 156(1) provides the circumstances where the Commissioner cannot issue a penalty notice to a DC/DP for processing of personal data for the special purposes. Section 156(2) provides the conditions for which a court must not provide grant of leave for a penalty notice to a DC/DP for processing of personal data for the special purposes. The conditions include the service of a section 174 determination and that the court has given leave for the notice. There has to be a reason on which the IC suspects that the failure is of substantial public importance and notice has been given to the DC or the matter is one of urgency. Prohibitions also involve processing authorised by Parliament, Crown Estates Office, a DC for the Royal Household and certain restrictions in relation to joint DCs under Parts 3 and 4 of the DPA 2018.

Maximum amount of penalty 2.161  Section 157 of the DPA 2018 implements the requirements in Article 83 of the GDPR allowing supervisory authorities to impose administrative fines on a DC/DP who acts in breach of the Act. It also seeks to repeat parts of s 55A of the 1998 Act which gives the IC similar powers, albeit at lower amounts. The GDPR sets the maximum penalty that can be issued as 20 million euros or, in the case of an undertaking, up to 4 per cent of the total worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial year, whichever is higher. Details are contained for ‘maximum penalty amounts’ for breaches of Part 3 of the DPA  2018, ‘high

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   267 maximum amounts’ for breaches of Part 4 of the DPA  2018 and ‘maximum penalty amounts’ for failures to comply with an EN. Where a ‘standard maximum amount’ is the penalty, it is 10 million euros or 2 per cent of the undertaking’s total annual worldwide turnover. For non-undertakings, it is 10 million euros. Section 157(7) outlines how to calculate the conversion of the maximum amount of a penalty in sterling.

Fixed penalties for non-compliance with charges regulations 2.162  The IC must publish a document under section 158 of the DPA 2018 specifying the penalty amounts for failure to comply with regulations under section 137 (charges payable to the Commissioner by DCs). Under section 158, different amounts may be specified for different types of failure and the maximum fines for non-compliance. There are obligations on the IC to consult, inter alia, the Secretary of State before publication of the document. The highest amount is 150 per cent of the maximum charge in respect of a financial year. Guidance will be sent to the Secretary of State and placed before Parliament. It is subject to a negative resolution. Section 159 of the DPA  2018 covers supplementary concerns on ‘undertakings’.

Guidance on regulatory action 2.163  Guidance must also be published about assessment notices, ENs and penalty notices (DPA 2018, s 160). This may be altered or replaced after similar consultation. The guidance will have details on procedural and other matters including examinations and documentation on what will be examined in relation to assessment notices and conducting of any interviews for penalty notices. It will include what factors will be considered when an assessment notice will be issued and documents that will, or will not, be examined. Information will include the nature of inspections, interviews and examinations to be conducted. In relation to penalty notices, information will include when it is appropriate to allow an oral interview for the recipient of a notice. Guidance will be sent to the Secretary of State and placed before Parliament. It is subject to a negative resolution (DPA 2018, s 161). 2.164  There are rights of appeal (DPA 2018, s 162) against an IN, AN, EN, PN, or a penalty variation notice. Decisions on ‘urgency’ may be challenged. Appeals may be against the amount, even if not against a notice. Appeals may be made against the IC’s ruling on ‘special purposes’ data by the DC/DP. The tribunal may review determinations of fact for appeals under section 163(1) or (4), uphold an appeal, issue another notice or alter an IC’s decision depending on the circumstances. If the Tribunal considers (a) that the notice or decision against which the appeal is brought is not in accordance with the law, or (b) to the extent that the notice or decision involved an exercise of discretion by the Commissioner, that the Commissioner ought to have exercised the discretion differently, the Tribunal must allow the appeal or substitute another notice or decision which the Commissioner could have given or made.

268  Chapter 2 Appeals under section 162(3) or (5) may lead to cancellation. Notices may be varied or cancelled. Section 164 allows for the disapplication of urgency statements in notices above or their variation as to time or period. The court has powers of disapplication or variation of the statement. The decision of the court is ‘final’.

Complaints by data subjects 2.165  Section 165 of the DPA  2018 contains a new right for a data subject to make a complaint to the IC about an infringement of the data protection legislation in relation to his or her personal data (see Articles 57 and 77 of the GDPR and Article 41 of the LED). The right includes making complaints under Part 3 and 4 of the DPA 2018. The IC must facilitate complaints by providing a complaint form in either electronic or paper format. The IC must take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, to inform the DS of the outcome of the complaint, and to inform them of their right to apply for an order from the tribunal against the IC. Where requested, the IC is also required to give the data subject further information about how to proceed with the complaint. The ‘appropriate steps’ in response to a complaint include investigating the complaint, to the extent appropriate, as well as informing the complainant about progress with the complaint and whether further investigation or co-ordination with another authority is necessary. Section 165(6) obliges the IC to pass on a complaint to another Member State’s supervisory authority where the complaint relates to an infringement of another Member State’s legislation implementing the LED. The Commissioner must inform the complainant that this has been done and, if requested, must provide further information about how to proceed with the complaint. The other coordinating authorities are listed. The ExN states that the provisions in this section are broadly equivalent to section 42 of the 1998 Act, while taking account of the expanded rights of data subjects under the GDPR, the LED and this Act (ExN para 430). The new right of complaint is far more explicit than the s 42 provision which was a weakness of earlier legislation. It does not, however, confer a DN, as under the FOIA. In the 2016–17 annual report, the ICO reported that 76 per cent of inquiries concern the DPA, 14 per cent the Privacy in Electronic Communications Regulations (PECR) and 6 per cent the FOIA. There were 18,354 DP concerns brought to the ICO. In that year, there were 2,565 self-reported incidents under the DPA.

Orders to progress complaints 2.166  Section 166 of the DPA 2018 also is a new provision. The DS may apply for an order from the tribunal if the IC does not take certain actions in relation to a complaint made by the data subject (see Article  78(2) of the GDPR and Article 53(2) of the LED). This may occur where the IC fails to take appropriate steps to respond to a complaint, or fails to update the data subject on progress

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   269 with the complaint or the outcome of the complaint within three months after the submission of the complaint, or any subsequent three-month period in which the Commissioner is still considering the complaint. The tribunal may order the IC to take the appropriate steps or notify the complainant of progress or outcome within a set period. ‘Specified’ steps may be ordered.

Compliance orders 2.167  A  DS is given the right to apply for a court order against a DC/DP if their rights under the data protection legislation (other than Part 4 of the DPA 2018) have been infringed (see Article 79 of the GDPR and Article 54 of the LED) (DPA 2018, s 167). The ExN states that this is broadly equivalent to the rights to apply for court orders which are set out under sections 7, 10, 11,12 and 14 of the 1998 Act (ExN para  475). This provision covers the new rights given by the GDPR and the LED. It does not apply to infringements of Part 4 of the DPA 2018 where separate provision is made. The powers of the court are set out. The court order can instruct the DC/DP to take certain steps as specified in the court order, or to refrain from taking certain steps and the time limits. Section 167(5) addresses the situation where there are joint DCs.

Compensation for contravention of the GDPR 2.168  The DS is given a right to compensation from a DC/DP (DPA 2018, s  168). The section makes provision in relation to the right to compensation under Article 82 of the GDPR if a person has suffered damage as a result of an infringement of the GDPR. Section 13 of the 1998 Act set out compensation rights, although the GDPR contains broader rights.1 ‘Damage’ includes material and/or non-material damage: financial loss, distress and other adverse effects. Damages may be paid to the representative body (below) or such other person as the court thinks fit on behalf of the DS. Google Inc v J Vidal-Hall [2015] EWCA Civ 311 ruled that the DPA 1998, s 13(2) was incompatible with EU law in not providing a right to damages for non-material (mental distress) injury. See N 1 & N 2 v Google LLC and IC [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) (at para 2.7 above) and Secretary of State for the Home Department v TLU & TLV [2018] EWCA Civ 2217. On representative actions, see R  Lloyd v Google LLC  [2018]  EWHC  2599 (QB). Actions often involve service out of the jurisdiction. An employer, who was not the DC, was held vicariously responsible for the tortious disclosure by a former employee, who was acting to harm the former employer, of 100,000 fellow employees’ data: W M Morrison Supermarkets PLC v Various Claimants [2018] EWCA Civ 2339; 5,518 claimants were involved. The employee had previously been convicted for the action under the Computer Misuse Act 1990 and the Data Protection Act 1998. Actions for breach of confidentiality and misuse of private information are not excluded by the DPA 1998 (para [60]). There was no primary liability under the DPA for the employer.

1

Compensation for contravention of other data protection legislation 2.169  Compensation may also be claimed for breaches of data protection legislation not including the GDPR (DPA  2018, s  169); this involves Parts 3

270  Chapter 2 and 4 of the Act. The definition of ‘damage’ is broader than under s 13 of the DPA 1998. ‘Damage’ includes financial loss, distress and other adverse effects, which may not include financial loss. Section 169(2) sets out the situations in which a controller or processor is liable for damage (‘any damage’ for the DC). A  processor is only liable where they have not complied with data protection provisions specifically aimed at them or they have acted outside or contrary to the DC’s lawful instructions. A defence is available if they are not responsible in any way for the event giving rise to the damage. The position of joint controllers under Parts 3 and 4 of the DPA 2018 is addressed.

Publishers of news-related material 2.170  Clauses dealing with these publishers were introduced in the Lords. They were removed in the Commons. They clearly bear a close similarity to section 40 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 and defamation proceedings. The government announced in March 2018 that it was not seeking to bring s  40 into effect. Clause 168 applied where (a) a relevant claim for breach of the data protection legislation is made against a person (‘the defendant’), (b) the defendant was a relevant publisher at the material time, and (c) the claim is related to the publication of news-related material. If the defendant was a member of an approved regulator at the time the claim was commenced (or there were basically good reasons why not), the court must not award costs against the defendant unless satisfied that (a) the issues raised by the claim could not have been resolved by using an arbitration scheme of the approved regulator, or (b) it is just and equitable in all the circumstances of the case to award costs against the defendant. Where a defendant was not a member of an approved regulator, and where it was able to be a member and there was no reasonable cause not to be, the court must award costs against the defendant unless satisfied that (a) the issues raised by the claim could not have been resolved by using an arbitration scheme of the approved regulator (had the defendant been a member), or (b) it is just and equitable in all the circumstances of the case to make a different award of costs or make no award of costs. The clause did not apply until such time as a body was recognised as an approved regulator. Interpretative terms including ‘approved regulator’, ‘recognition’, ‘relevant claim’, ‘material time’ and ‘relevant publisher’ were in clause 169. ‘News-related material’ means (a) news or information about current affairs, (b) opinion about matters relating to the news or current affairs, or (c) gossip about celebrities, other public figures or other persons in the news (cl 169(6)). A  relevant claim is related to the publication of news-related material if the claim results from (a) the publication of news-related material, or (b) activities carried on in connection with the publication of such material (whether or not the material is in fact published) (cl 169(7)). A reference to the ‘publication’ of material is a reference to publication (a) on a website, (b) in hard copy, or (c) by any other means; and references to a person who ‘publishes’ material are to be read accordingly (cl 169(8)). A  reference to ‘conduct’ includes a reference

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   271 to omissions; and a reference to a person’s conduct includes a reference to a person’s conduct after the events giving rise to the claim concerned (cl 169(9)). The provisions were removed shortly before it was announced that Leveson II would not be commenced (below).

Press Recognition Panel 2.171  The Press Recognition Panel (PRP) has published its second annual report on the recognition system.1 The report explains that there is currently one recognised regulator – IMPRESS (https://impress.press/): ‘IMPRESS has increased its membership in the 13 months since it was recognised as an approved regulator by the Press Recognition Panel, but a number of the larger relevant publishers remain outside the recognition system. Several publishers have joined IPSO, which does not intend to seek recognition from the Press Recognition Panel. Other publishers have chosen not to join IMPRESS or IPSO.’ The report concludes that this situation makes it clear that there is little external incentive for publishers to join or form an approved regulator: ‘As Leveson anticipated, and factored into his recommendations when he produced his independent report, for self-regulation to be effective, there needs to be appropriate incentives to encourage sign up to approved regulators while, at the same time, ensuring low cost access to court in relation to publishers who do not sign up.’ The PRP observed that it was intended that those incentives would be provided by section 40 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013, but the law has not been commenced. Commencement would complete the system and: • protect ordinary people, not just the rich; • protect the press from the chilling effects of large legal costs; and • remove political influence in press regulation. The PRP notes that there continues to be political involvement in press regulation in the UK and that opponents of the new system of regulation have focused on encouraging the Government to repeal section 40: ‘The delay commencing section 40 has paradoxically kept a political presence in place. Politicians should not be involved in press regulation, and full implementation of the recognition system would safeguard against that.’ The Chair of the PRP said: ‘Five years have passed since the Leveson Report was published and it is disappointing that the public is still not being protected in the way that was intended. There has been a concerted campaign to undermine the new system, but the reasons for not commencing section 40 do not bear scrutiny.

272  Chapter 2 The delay supports only the interests of the particular section of the press who oppose it. If the new system was allowed to operate as intended, that would protect the public as well as promote a free and vibrant press. It is clear that incentives are needed for the system to work. The need for action remains urgent.’ Section 40 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 will not be brought into effect (see above). https://pressrecognitionpanel.org.uk/. The decision to recognise IMPRESS was unsuccessfully judicially reviewed: R (NMA) v PRP [2017] EWHC 2527 (Admin). The PRP published its privacy statement in May 2018. See para  2.248 on press regulation. On judicial review of IPSO, see J Coulter v IPSO [2018] EWHC 1017 (Admin).

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Unlawful obtaining etc of personal data 2.172  Under section 170 of the DPA 2018, the deliberate or reckless obtaining, disclosing and retention of personal data without the consent of the DC and procuring the disclosure of personal data to another person without the consent of the DC, is made a criminal offence (see s  55 of the 1998 Act). ‘Unlawful retention’ has been added to cover situations where a person obtains data lawfully but then intentionally or recklessly retains it without the consent of the DC. Defences are available including where the data was obtained for the purposes of preventing or detecting crime, to fulfil a legal obligation, for reasons of public interest or for acting in the reasonable belief that they had a legal right or would have had the consent of the DC. A defence is provided where the person acted (i) for the special purposes, (ii) with a view to the publication by a person of any journalistic, academic, artistic or literary material, and (iii) in the reasonable belief that in the particular circumstances the obtaining, disclosing, procuring or retaining was justified as being in the public interest. A legal burden is placed on the defendant to prove the relevant defences on the balance of probabilities. It is an offence to sell or offer to sell personal data that was obtained, disclosed or retained unlawfully and, in the latter case, whether before or after the data was obtained. The IC had been critical of the lack of effective powers to deal with ‘blagging’, ie obtaining data by deception, and had resorted to other legislation. Leveson was also critical of the DPA 1998 which placed ‘unnecessary and inappropriate barriers’ in the way of effective law enforcement.1 Leveson Executive Summary: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140122144906/ http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/hc1213/hc07/0779/0779.asp at paras 102–107.

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Re-identification of de-identified personal data 2.173  A new offence of knowingly or recklessly re-identifying information that has been de-identified without the consent of the controller who de-identified

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   273 the data is created by section 171 of the DPA 2018. This responds to concerns about the security of de-identified data held in online files. Section 171(2) defines the meaning of ‘de-identification’ and ‘re-identification’ and is informed by the definition of ‘pseudonymisation’ in Article  4(5) of the GDPR. There is a defence if the defendant can prove that re-identification was necessary for the purposes of preventing crime, for complying with a legal obligation or was justified as being in the public interest (DPA 2018, s 171(3)), and there are defences based on a reasonable belief of consent of the DS to whom the information relates or of the DC responsible for de-identifying the information, or would have had such consent if that controller had known about the circumstances of the processing (DPA 2018, s 171(4)). Section 171(5) creates a related offence of knowingly or recklessly processing personal data that has been unlawfully re-identified. Various defences are available (DPA 2018, s 171(6)–(7)), with a legal burden on the defendant to prove the relevant defences on the balance of probabilities. A specific defence is where the person acted (i) for the special purposes, (ii) with a view to the publication by a person of any journalistic, academic, artistic or literary material, and (iii) in the reasonable belief that, in the particular circumstances, the processing was justified as being in the public interest. Section 172(2) provides a defence where a person re-identifies information to test the DC’s de-identification mechanisms. There must be no intent to cause damage or harm and they must act in the reasonable belief that they were acting in the public interest. They must also notify the IC or DC of their activity without undue delay and, at any rate, within 72 hours (s 172(3)).

Alteration etc of personal data to prevent disclosure 2.174  Section 173 of the DPA 2018 criminalises the alteration of personal data to prevent disclosure following the exercise of a subject access right. The relevant subject access rights are set out in section 173(2). The offence is modelled on s 77 of the FOIA (para 1.264). The offence may be committed by any DC, ie public or private. A defence is available where the defendant can prove that the alteration of the data was justified. As worded, the section places a legal burden on the defendant to prove the relevant defences on the balance of probabilities.

The special purposes 2.175  The definition of ‘special purposes’ under section 174 of the DPA 2018 now includes ‘academic purposes’ as well as journalism, artistic purposes and literary purposes (Article 85 of the GDPR, adding to s 3 of the 1998 Act). The IC may make a written determination in relation to the processing of personal data for the defined special purposes where: that data is not being processed solely for the special purposes; that data is not being processed with a view to the publication of new material in relation to the special purposes; or the processing

274  Chapter 2 in question would not be incompatible with the special purposes. The IC must provide written notice of any determination made to the DC/DP concerned. The conditions that must be met before the Commissioner’s determination can take effect are set out and the IC is required to provide information about the relevant rights of appeal.

Provision of assistance in special purposes proceedings 2.176  Section 175 of the DPA 2018 allows for individuals who are a party, or a prospective party, to special purposes related proceedings (as defined in section 174) to apply to the IC for assistance in those proceedings. It requires the IC to decide whether, and to what extent, to grant assistance, but stipulates that the IC must only approve the application if the case, in the IC’s opinion, involves a matter of substantial public importance – the IC must provide reasons where this is not the IC’s opinion. The section also requires the IC to notify the applicant, as soon as reasonably practicable, of any decision in respect of granting assistance. If the opinion favours public interest assistance the IC must notify the applicant and the person against whom the proceedings are to be brought. The applicant must be given details of any assistance to be provided. This may involve paying costs in connection with the proceedings or indemnifying the applicant for costs, expenses or damages. The IC may recover expenses where the applicant is paid sums of money as a result of the proceedings.

Staying special purposes proceedings and guidance on redress 2.177  The court or tribunal under section 176 of the DPA 2018 has to stay the special purposes proceedings if it appears to the court or tribunal, or if the DC/ DP claim, that personal data to which the proceedings relate: is being processed only for special purposes; is being processed with a view to publication by persons of journalistic, literary, or artistic material, and has not been published before by the DC (with publication of the same material 24 hours immediately prior to the relevant time to be ignored). A publication before this timeframe is not to be ignored. Conditions are set out under which the stay can be lifted. This covers part of the territory of the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Campbell ([2002] EWCA Civ 1373, paras 90–131), with regard to the defence in s 32 of the DPA 1998, where it was ruled that the protection applied after a publication. The wording in s 176 of the DPA 2018 is clear and seems to suggest that, where there is a previous publication of the personal data, that does not attract the protection for processing under the 2018 Act. Section 32of the DPA 1998 applied to protect journalists from legal process, such as ‘gagging injunctions’ prior to publication, but the argument that it provided no protection in relation to proceedings for infringement of the Act once publication has taken place had to be rejected, the court believed. However, reference must be made to Part 5 of Schedule  2 to the DPA  2018 and the exemptions for special purposes processing and freedom of expression

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   275 and information exemptions, and one should note defences available under DPA 2018, s 170 and public interest conditions for processing under DPA 2018, Schedule 1, Part 2 (eg para 13) if the DS seeks a remedy. Section 177 of the DPA 2018 was a late addition which requires the IC to publish guidance where a media organisation has failed to comply with DP legislation. ‘Media organisation’ includes any body whose activities consist of or include journalism. Details must include complaints procedures of relevant bodies, the IC’s powers, judicial remedies, ADR, the role of representative bodies, and the powers of the IC to provide assistance. The guidance has to be published within one year of the DPA 2018’s enactment. A new addition in DPA 2018, s 178 saw a duty on the IC to report to the Secretary of State on the extent to which data processing for journalism complied with data protection legislation and good practice. Section 178(2) sets out ‘good practice (see s 124) and the review period. Section 178(3) and (4) sets out the time frame for reports, which must be laid before Parliament and sent to named devolved authorities. Schedule  17 to the DPA  2018 deals with information notices, assessment notices and urgent notices. Under s 179 of the DPA 2018, the Secretary of State or appropriate person must lay before Parliament, before the end of each review period, a report on the use of relevant ADR procedures in that period of cases involving a failure, or alleged failure, by a relevant media organisation (not a broadcaster) to comply with the data protection legislation and the effectiveness of those procedures. Terms are defined in section 179(2). ‘Relevant alternative dispute resolution procedures’ means alternative dispute resolution procedures provided by persons who produce or enforce codes of practice for relevant media organisations.

Jurisdiction 2.178  The courts on whom the jurisdiction conferred by specific provisions in the Act is exercisable are, in England and Wales and Northern Ireland, the county court or the High Court and, in Scotland, the sheriff or the Court of Session (DPA 2018, s 180). For Part 4 cases, the jurisdiction is exercisable only by the High Court (England, Wales and Northern Ireland) or the Court of Session (Scotland).

The Tribunal 2.179  Sections 201–203 of the DPA  2018 concern the tribunal. Section 201 states: ‘(1)  No enactment or rule of law prohibiting or restricting the disclosure of information precludes a person from providing the First-tier Tribunal or the Upper Tribunal with information necessary for the discharge of– (a) its functions under the data protection legislation, or (b) its other functions relating to the Commissioner’s acts and omissions.

276  Chapter 2 (2)  But this section does not authorise the making of a disclosure which is prohibited by any of Parts 1 to 7 or Chapter 1 of Part 9 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016.’ Until the repeal of Part 1 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, provision is made for this prohibition. Section 202 deals with contempt powers of the First-tier Tribunal. A case may be certified (referred) to the Upper Tribunal. Power is conferred to make Tribunal Procedure Rules to regulate the way in which the rights of appeal before the tribunal and the right to apply for an order from the tribunal are exercised. Rules may provide for the DS to authorise a representative body to apply for an order on his or her behalf (DPA 2018, s 187 (para  2.184 below)). Section 203(2) permits Rules to be made to secure the production of material used for the processing of personal data, and inspecting, examining, operating and testing equipment or material used for the processing of personal data. The First-tier Tribunal may refer a matter to the Upper Tribunal for the latter to deal with as a contempt (para 1.34 above).

Offences 2.180  Levels of criminal penalties for offences under the Act are set out in section 196 of the DPA 2018. Proceedings may only be commenced, in England and Wales and Northern Ireland, by the IC or by or with the consent of the DPP or DPP (NI) (DPA 2018, s 197). Section 198 deals with the liability of directors where offences are committed by bodies corporate. The circumstances are set out where the director, manager, secretary, officer or person, as well as the body corporate, is guilty of the offence and liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Further provisions apply to recordable offences (DPA 2018, s 199) and production of IC codes on how the IC intends to deal with section 67(9) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 in exercising powers in connection with offences under the 2018 Act.

Prohibition of requirement to produce relevant records 2.181  Under section 184 of the DPA 2018 it is an offence for an employer to require employees or contractors, or for a person to require another person who provides goods, facilities or services, to provide ‘relevant records’ (DPA  2018, Sch 18, and includes a part or copy of, or part of, such a record) obtained via subject access requests as a condition of their employment or contract. It covers recruitment and continued employment. ‘Employment’ is defined in section 184(6). It is also an offence for a provider of goods, facilities or services to the public to request similar records from another as a condition for providing a service. Such conduct may give the employer or provider access to records to which they would not otherwise have been entitled. For background checks by employees and public service providers, see below.

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   277 The elements of the offence are set out in section 184(1) and (2). Defences for the requester are set out in section 184(3). These may involve fulfilment of a legal obligation under statute or court order or where it is in in the public interest. The section places a legal burden on the defendant to prove the relevant defence on the balance of probabilities. The imposition of the requirement referred to in section 184(1) or (2) is not to be regarded as justified as being in the public interest on the ground that it would assist in the prevention or detection of crime, given Part V of the Police Act 1997 (certificates of criminal records etc). See below. Section 184(5) defines what it means to place a ‘requirement’ on somebody to provide relevant records. It includes any action that the person knows will make the other person feel obliged to comply with the request, or being reckless as to whether the person may feel that they are obliged to comply. The list of relevant records in Schedule 18 to the DPA 2018 is wider than in s 56 of the 1998 Act because it now includes medical records. It also includes a relevant record on convictions or cautions but not manual unstructured data held by FOIA bodies under section 21(2) of the DPA  2018. Such a relevant record (a) has been or is to be obtained by a data subject in the exercise of a data subject access right from a person listed in sub-paragraph (2), and (b) contains information relating to a conviction or caution. The persons are chief constables or commissioners of police forces, the Director General of the National Police Agency and the Secretary of State. A relevant record may also be one relating to statutory functions. It is a record relating to subject access rights under the provisions of Arts 15 and 20 of the GDPR and sections 45 (law enforcement) and 94 (national security) of the DPA 2018, obtained from a person listed in Schedule 18 in relation to statutory functions. The Disclosure and Barring Service is a listed person, along with the Secretary of State. 2.182  In relation to Part V  of the Police Act 1997 (certificates of criminal records etc) the imposition of the requirement to produce records is not to be required as being justified in the public interest where access may be requested on the ground that it would assist in the prevention or detection of crime (and see Police Act 1997, ss 112–113 and 115). Under the 1997 Act, employers (via applications made by employees) can access criminal records in relation to those involved with the care of children, the vulnerable and others. Individuals may have access to their own files which are to be used by others, but the information may be limited. Section 115 of the 1997 Act concerning provision of ‘enhanced criminal records’ (paras 2.286 et seq below) must be exercised fairly and in conformity with natural justice and Art 8 of the ECHR; but the Court of Appeal has ruled that this did not mean that an applicant had to be given a hearing by the chief officer of police where the former disputes evidence of a sexual offence which did not lead to a conviction. The revised scheme and case law is discussed below (para  2.286). Section 117 of the 1997 Act allows the applicant to seek an amended certificate from the Secretary of State (formerly Criminal Records Bureau, now Disclosure and Barring Service).1 R  (X) v Chief Constable West Midlands [2005] 1  All ER  610 and R  (L) v Met Police Com’r [2007] EWCA Civ 168. For the DBS, see para 2.322 below.

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Avoidance of certain contractual terms relating to health records 2.183  Section 185(1) to (3) of the DPA  2018 makes it clear that a term or condition of a contract is void if it requires an individual to supply all or part of a health record which has been obtained through the exercise of subject access rights (s 185(4)). It replaces s 57 of the 1998 Act. The GMC  Guidance (July 2000) concerns patient confidentiality and the Information Commissioner has produced guidance: Guidance and Confidentiality NHS Code of Practice (2009). The NHS Code of Practice Confidentiality was revised in 2006 and see the Department of Health’s website at www.dh.gov.uk. Protecting patient confidentiality is a core value of the NHS and was emphasised in the NHS constitution (2010).

Representation of data subjects 2.184  Under section 187 of the DPA 2018, representative bodies may exercise certain rights on behalf of data subjects. They must be authorised to do this by the data subjects and fulfil the terms of Art 80 of the GDPR. Provision is made where the GDPR does not apply. Representative bodies have to fulfil several conditions: expending the whole of its income, apart from outgoings, for charitable purposes; non-distribution of assets to members; and having objectives in the public interest. The body or organisation has to be active in the field of protection of data subjects’ rights and freedoms with regard to the protection of their personal data. The relevant rights are the right to complain to the Commissioner, the right to bring judicial review proceedings against the Commissioner and to apply for a tribunal order against the Commissioner, the right to apply for a court order against a DC/DP, and the right to receive compensation from a controller or processor (see the rights in Article 80(1) of the GDPR and Article 55 of the LED). The section seems to restrict the right to compensation to processing under the GDPR, but this does not seem to follow the intent of the GDPR and of the LED. Section 187(2) sets out the right for a data subject to authorise a representative body to exercise his or her rights. It includes rights not in the GDPR or Part 4 of the DPA 2018. The rights that a representative organisation can exercise on behalf of the data subject are set out. Section 188 of the DPA 2018 allows for collective representation – ‘relevant claims’ – which are allowed under Art 80 of the GDPR or section 187. Under section 189, the Secretary of State must review provision for representation of data subjects within 20 months of s 187 coming into force.

Data subjects’ rights 2.185  Section 186 of the DPA  2018 gives the data subject rights and data controller obligations special status. This section provides that any other

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   279 enactment or rule of law that seeks to prohibit or restrict the giving of information or withholding of information as specified does not apply. An obvious example is the Official Secrets Act 1989. The only restrictions that can exist are therefore the exemptions contained in the DPA 2018. Under section 186(2), the provisions providing obligations and rights are: ‘(a) Chapter III of the GDPR (rights of the data subject), (b) Chapter 3 of Part 3 of this Act (law enforcement processing: rights of the data subject), and (c) Chapter 3 of Part 4 of this Act (intelligence services processing: rights of the data subject).’ Under section 186(3), the provisions providing exceptions are: ‘(a) in Chapter 2 of Part 2 of this Act, sections 15 and 16 and Schedules 2, 3 and 4, (b) in Chapter 3 of Part 2 of this Act, sections 23, 24, 25 and 26, (c) in Part 3 of this Act, sections 44(4), 45(4) and 48(3), and (d) in Part 4 of this Act, Chapter 6.’

Territorial application of the DPA 2018 2.186  The DPA  2018, with minor exceptions, applies to England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. The overseas application was considered above (paras 2.124 and 2.133 and overseas transfers).

Application to Crown 2.187  The DPA 2018 binds the Crown (s 209). Each government department is to be treated as a separate entity for the purposes of the GDPR and the DPA 2018. Each will have to notify the Commissioner of their processing. Where the GDPR requires contractual undertakings and where this is not possible between departments, a memorandum of understanding will suffice. Neither the DC of the Royal Household, Duchy of Lancaster or Duchy of Cornwall (who are listed) nor any government Department shall be liable to prosecution under the 2018 Act, but Crown servants may be prosecuted for various matters under sections 119, 166, 167, 169 and para  15 of Schedule  16. This is not as broad as under the DPA 1998. ‘Government departments’ includes any part of the Scottish administration, a Northern Ireland department, Welsh Assembly government and any body or authority exercising statutory functions on behalf of the Crown (DPA 2018, s 205(1)). The Department for Constitutional Affairs had expressed the view that, for the law of confidentiality, departments are ‘different legal persons’ but without supporting argument. Secretaries of State are a one and indivisible office.1 Public Sector Data Sharing (Nov 2003) p 11, DCA.

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Application to Parliament 2.188  Parts 1–2 and 5–7 of the DPA 2018 bind Parliament (s 210). DCs are identified. Special provision applies to the Intelligence and Security Committee. DCs are not liable for criminal offences under the Act, but an officer acting on behalf of either House is liable for the same offences as Crown servants (above).

Transitional provisions 2.189  Schedule 20 to the DPA 2018 was a late addition allowing for transitional adjustment. The items included are, for instance, subject rights under the former DPA where rights were requested before the relevant date, ie the repeal of the provision under the DPA 1998. It also provides for the effectiveness of action taken under the DPA 1998 in a wide range of circumstances where action was commenced before repeal. Provision is also made for an extensive range of subjects including the GDPR and Part 2 of the 2018 Act, law enforcement and intelligence services processing, national security certificates, the Information Commissioner, enforcement under the 1998 Act, enforcement under the 2018 Act, and other Acts including the FOIA and EIR and Scottish equivalents.

Accessible data under the 1998 Act (s 68 and Sch 12) 2.190  ‘Accessible records’ are records that were available under the Access to Health Records Act 1990, personal information held for social work purposes and personal information relating to public sector tenancies under the Access to Personal Files Act 1987. Rights of access to educational records under the Education (School Records) Regulations 1989 (see Education Reform Act 1988, ss 218 and 232) and Scottish and Northern Ireland analogues were also ‘accessible records’ under the DPA 1998. Until the combination of the DPA 1998 and the FOIA 2000, Britain had not, in general terms, gone as far as other common law jurisdictions in allowing access to personal documents by the data subject (the individual concerned). In other respects, Britain had gone further. While there was very comprehensive coverage of automated files by holders who were public bodies or private bodies, access to paper documents was not comprehensive but was covered by statutes for specific subject areas. These invariably made a distinction between private and public bodies – so that, in the case of housing, housing authorities were covered but not housing associations. In health, coverage was more comprehensive. The principal statutes were the Access to Personal Files Act 1987, the Access to Medical Reports Act 1988, Access to Health Records Act 1990 and the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 as well as Consumer Credit Act 1974, s 158. The DPA 2018 now covers manual documents, as defined ie ‘structured filing systems’, held by both public and private bodies within the terms of that Act. Rights to accessible records were incorporated within the DPA 1998. The FOIA 2000 also extends the range of manual documents held by public bodies, and ‘public bodies’ may of course be added to by order of the Secretary of State (see paras 1.85 et seq above).

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   281 2.191  The Access to Personal Files Act 1987 was repealed by the DPA 1998 and the regulations made under that Act, as well as access provisions not under that Act but referred to above, were phased out so that they only covered applications made to the court before the repeal took effect. The DPA 2018 now covers these records. The ICO has advised that ‘manual filing system’ could include manual records containing personal data. Given the wider definition of data introduced for PAs in relation to requesters other than employees, it is difficult to see how data covered by ‘accessible data’ will not be included in the DPA 2018. 2.192  As originally drafted, the Access to Personal Files Bill covered manual files relating to: health records; educational records (including those maintained by ‘any school, college, polytechnic, university, or any other educational establishment as defined in the Education Act 1944, s  77’ and education authorities); housing records; benefit or other records (ejusdem generis); social services and welfare records; employment records held by any employer; bank, building society and credit records (cf Consumer Credit Act 1974, s 158) and immigration records. The debates in Parliament on the Bill and the campaign for freedom of information literature were punctuated by examples of numerous cases where personal information of the above kind had been inaccurate, misleading, erroneous and, potentially or actually, extremely damaging to innocent victims. A  particularly notorious episode has concerned the use of personal records by employment reference agencies which provide information on the alleged political sympathies of individuals.1 And, allegedly, on their relatives; see Hollingsworth and Norton-Taylor Blacklist (1988); Employment Relations Act 1999, s 3; and Employment Relations Act 1999 (Blacklists) Regulations 2010, SI 2010/493.

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2.193  The government pressed its own Bill upon the proponents which was restricted to local authorities which the proponents reluctantly accepted to ensure passage to the statute book. The education bodies covered by the education regulations were not as broad as those contained in the original Bill. Many of these anomalies have now been swept away by the combined effects of the 2000 and 2018 legislation. But, crucial differences will still operate between private and public DCs. So, for access to a housing record held by a non-public sector landlord as defined, the records would have to fall under the ‘electronic’ or ‘manual’ provisions of the DPA.

RECORDS AND THE COMMON LAW 2.194  The common law witnessed some interesting developments in relation to applications for records that were not covered by the DPA 1998. The decision in Durant placed a restricted meaning on ‘structured files’ and ‘personal data’ (para 2.19 et seq above) and FOIA only applies to public authorities. Resort may have to be made to the common law. In ex p Martin1 a person suffering from psychiatric problems applied to two medical authorities for the disclosure of his medical records to establish more information about specific incidents

282  Chapter 2 in the past. Because the records were not on computer and were made before 1991, they were not subject to the existing statutory provisions. The first authority refused to make disclosure stating it had no authority to do so. The second authority made disclosure subject to conditions that an assurance had to be given by the applicant that no litigation was contemplated by him. This assurance the applicant refused to give. The second respondent subsequently refused access after the responsible consultant psychiatrist determined that disclosure to the applicant was not in his best interests and would be detrimental to him. After applying for a judicial review of this decision, the second respondents’ solicitor wrote stating that the applicant’s nominated medical adviser could have access to the documents to decide whether and to what extent disclosure could be made to the applicant without causing him harm. The Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s decision to refuse access stating that access could be denied by the owner of the patient’s records (the authority) if it was in his best interests not to see them, ie where they could cause detriment to his health. The court felt that on the facts, the offer by the Board was a complete answer to the request and it was, one might add, a generous offer. Because the respondent had done all that was necessary to comply with their duty, judicial review was rightly denied. One might suspect that had the offer not been made the approach of the Court of Appeal may have been less generous to the authority. Nourse LJ for instance stated that a health authority no more than a private doctor does not have an absolute right to deal with medical records in any way it chooses and has at all times to act in the best interests of the patient: ‘Those interests would usually require that a patient’s medical records should not be disclosed to third parties; conversely, that they should usually … be handed on by one doctor to the next or made available to the patient’s legal advisers if they are reasonably required for the purposes of legal proceedings in which he is involved.’2 R  v Mid Glamorgan Family Health Services Authority ex p Martin [1995] 1  All ER  356, CA; see Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors [1985] 1 All ER 643, HL and McInerney v MacDonald (1992) 93 DLR (4th) 415, Canada. In A Health Authority v X [2001] 2 FLR 673 it was held that disclosure of a GP’s records relating to children to a health authority was subject to conditions of confidentiality. 2 Ex p Martin at 363j. See the Caldicott Committee on Patient Identifiable Information December 1997. 1

2.195  Where personal information is held by ‘holders’ of a kind not specified by the DPA – cases do not spring readily to mind – and where their possession of information is not otherwise prohibited by the law, eg  Official Secrets Act 1989, it will be well to remember that the possibility of a breach of confidence, misuse of private information, trespass or wrongful interference with personality (documents) under the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977 may have occurred in the manner in which the information was obtained. In the absence of a breach of confidence, or breach of copyright or patent or such protection over intellectual property, British law does not provide for the protection of personal information per se unless an action, eg for defamation, can be maintained. It is of course well to remember the impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 on this area and the application of Art 8 of the ECHR, which have added to privacy

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   283 protection and which we examine below. Further, the dealing with inaccurate information which causes harm – financial or physical/emotional – could on the facts amount to negligence as well as being defamatory. The proximity of the holder to the subject ought to be sufficient to satisfy a duty of care situation1 – in spite of recent attempts to limit the range of victims.2 The comprehensive nature of the DPA will make the residual role of the common law less useful in those areas where the Act protects data. Spring v Guardian Assurance plc [1994] 3 All ER 129, HL, duty between referee and job applicant; see also Cox v Sun Alliance Life Ltd [2001]  IRLR  448 and Bullimore v Pothecary Witham Weld [2011] IRLR 18. 2 See also the Malicious Communications Act 1988. 1

2.196  Health and Social Care Act 2001, s  60 allows ‘patient information’ to be passed on without consent in prescribed circumstances for improving patient care or in the public interest. Provision may be made to disclose prescribed information to the person to whom the information relates by health service bodies. There are limits on the confidential patient information that may be prescribed (s  60(5)). Details are in regulations, and a Patients Information Advisory Group (National Information Governance Board for Health and Social Care) was established under s 61 (see SI 2001/2836).1 See R v Department of Health ex p Source Informatics Ltd [2000] 2 WLR 940 where a company wished to gather information about GPs’ prescribing habits from pharmacists for a fee. They wished to sell this to pharmaceutical companies. Providing the information was not confidential in itself, ie revealing a patient’s identity, there was nothing unlawful in this practice. This section seeks to avoid any complications resulting from that decision but only on the specified grounds. See Health Service (Control of Patient Information) Regulations 2002, SI 2002/1438.

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2.197  Disclosure (discovery) may be applied for to obtain the ‘offending’ or relevant documents, but in the nature of the action such a claim is likely to appear speculative unless the allegations are itemised, and may meet with little sympathy at the interlocutory stage before pleadings, eg  for an interim injunction1 unless the applicant can satisfy the court on application that they are necessary to dispose fairly of the case and not merely to substantiate a suspicion.2 Anton Piller orders (now renamed ‘search orders’) may be invoked where there is a risk of destruction or interference with essential evidence.3 Specificity will be required. However, judges may be less sympathetic to bodies which peddle in personal information for profit than to statutory bodies collecting information in the exercise of their public duties and powers and where confidentiality is often required.4 In terms of personal document it is difficult to see how the DPA 1998 will not govern the situation. RSC Ord 24, r 1(1); cf Gaskin v Liverpool City Council [1980] 1 WLR 1549, CA; for prohibitory injunctions and the balance of convenience: American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396, CA; Cambridge Nutrition Ltd v BBC [1990] 3 All ER 523, CA; National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd v GTV Corpn Pty [1989] VR 747. Cf Bonnard v Perryman [1891] 2 Ch 269, CA; Gulf Oil (GB) Ltd v Page [1987] Ch 327, CA. See para 4.350, note 2 below. 2 RHM Foods Ltd v Bovril Ltd [1982] 1 All ER 673, CA: a case concerning property rights of the plaintiff. 3 See paras 11.118 et seq below, and Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd [1976] Ch 55. 4 Cf Campbell v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council [1982] 2 All ER 791, CA. 1

284  Chapter 2

ACCESS TO MEDICAL REPORTS ACT 1988 2.198  The Access to Medical Reports Act 1988 (ATMRA  1988) confers a right on an individual to have access, in accordance with the provisions of the 1988 Act, to any medical report relating to that individual which is to be, or has been, supplied by a medical practitioner for employment purposes or insurance purposes. 2.199  The ‘applicant’ means the person referred to in ATMRA 1988, s 3(1). This is the person who applies to a medical practitioner for a medical report relating to any individual to be supplied to him for employment or insurance purposes. 2.200  An application must not be made unless the applicant has notified the individual of his or her proposed application and the applicant has the individual’s consent. Such notification must inform the individual of his or her right to withhold consent to the application and of his or her rights under the Act, as well as the effect of s 7 (exemptions). 2.201  Under the 1988 Act (s 2(1)): ‘“care” includes examination, investigation or diagnosis for the purposes of, or in connection with, any form of medical treatment; “employment purposes”, in the case of any individual, means the purposes in relation to the individual of any person by whom he is or has been, or is seeking to be, employed (whether under a contract of service or otherwise); “health professional” has the same meaning as in the Data Protection (Subject Access Modification) (Health) Order 1987; “insurance purposes”, in the case of any individual, means the purposes in relation to the individual of any person carrying on an insurance business with whom the individual has entered into, or is seeking to enter into, a contract of insurance; “medical practitioner” means a person registered under the Medical Act 1983; “medical report”, in the case of an individual, means a report relating to the physical or mental health of the individual prepared by a medical practitioner who is or has been responsible for the clinical care of the individual.’ 2.202  Supply of a medical report for employment or insurance purposes shall be construed as for the purposes of the person who is seeking to be supplied, or who was so supplied for such purposes in the case of a report which has already been supplied (s 2(2)). 2.203  On giving consent to an application under ATMRA  1988, s  3, an individual has the right to express his or her wish to have access to the report

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   285 before it is supplied. The applicant has to notify the practitioner of that fact when the application is made and simultaneously notify the individual of the making of the application (s 4(1)). Each notification must contain a statement on the effect of s 4(2). This basically imposes a duty on the notified practitioner to allow access to the individual before supply. The report must not be supplied before access is allowed and s 5 is complied with, or 21 days have elapsed from the date of the making of the application without a communication from the individual ‘concerning arrangements for the individual to have access to it’. 2.204  Similar provisions apply where the applicant does not notify the practitioner under s 4(1) above, but before supplying the report the individual notifies the practitioner that s/he wishes to have access before supply. 2.205  By ATMRA 1988, s 4(4) references to giving an individual access to a medical report are references to: (a) making the report or a copy of it available for his or her inspection; or (b) supplying the individual with a copy of it. A reasonable fee may be charged by the practitioner to cover the cost of supplying a report. 2.206  Where access is given to an individual, the report shall not be supplied to the applicant without the individual’s consent (s 5(1)). The individual, before s/he consents to supply, may request in writing (s 5(3)) that the practitioner amends any part of the report that the individual considers incorrect or misleading. If agreeable, the practitioner can amend the report ‘to the extent that s/he is prepared to accede to the individual’s request’ (s 5(2)(a)). If not agreeable to an amendment, s/he shall, upon the individual’s request, attach a statement to the report of the individual’s views relating to any part of the report which s/he is declining to amend (s 5(2)(b)). 2.207  The practitioner has to retain reports under the Act for at least six months from the date of supply (s 6(1)) and access has to be given to an individual upon request to relevant reports supplied within the previous six months (s 6(2)). Access can be by way of supplying a copy or making a copy available and reasonable fees to cover the cost of supply may be charged (s 6(3)). 2.208  Section 7 concerns exemptions. Individual access does not have to be given under ss 4(4) or 6(3) to any part of a medical report whose disclosure would in the opinion of the practitioner be likely to cause serious harm to the physical or mental health of the individual or others or would indicate the intentions of the practitioner in respect of the individual. Intentions would cover proposed treatment, recommendations, etc. 2.209  Under s  7(2) a medical practitioner shall not be obliged to give an individual access to any part of a medical report whose disclosure would be likely to reveal information about another person, or to reveal the identity of another person who has supplied information to the practitioner about the individual, unless: (a) that person has consented; or

286  Chapter 2 (b) that person is a health professional who has been involved in the care of the individual and the information relates to or has been provided by the professional in that capacity. 2.210  Where the exemptions are applicable to any part (but not the whole) of a medical report, the individual, who shall be notified of that fact, will be allowed access to the remainder of the report. 2.211  Where the exemptions cover the whole of the report, the individual has to be notified of that fact; but the report shall not be supplied to the applicant unless the individual consents. The individual has no right of access and the restrictions imposed by s 4(2) and (3) on supply do not take effect. 2.212  Relief is via the county court, or, as the Act extends to Scotland, the sheriff’s court, where an individual satisfies that court that a person is not likely to comply or has failed to comply with duties under the Act (s 8). 2.213  All notifications required or authorised to be given under the Act must be in writing and may be given by post (s 9).

ACCESS TO HEALTH RECORDS ACT 1990 2.214  For several years the government expressed its support for a patient’s legal right of access to his/her medical files. In 1990, the above Act was passed after earlier setbacks and significant opposition from the medical profession and medical insurers. The Act has been taken over by the DPA 1998, itself now repealed by the DPA  2018. However, personal representatives or a deceased person’s dependants may apply for records relating to the cause of death where, eg, a negligence action is possible.

PRIVACY PROTECTION 2.215  Until the incorporation of the ECHR under the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998), which took effect from 2 October 2000, there was no doubt that our law fell short of the protection of privacy, or private and family life which is not the same as privacy, envisaged in Art 8 of the ECHR. There was no statutory or common law right to privacy as such.1 There was no right to control the use of information about oneself or one’s image other than through limited legal rights then existing.2 There is, simply, no absolute right to be left alone. We have seen how there is a right to be forgotten in certain circumstances. The DPA 1998, and the law of confidentiality, are the closest we get to such protection (on the latter, see para  4.312 below). Now, however, statutes and regulations must be read wherever possible to be compatible with the Convention and, in particular in relation to our present discussion, Art 8. This states that everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence (and the Article was set out at the beginning of this chapter). Public authorities act

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   287 unlawfully if they breach this Article without a legal justification and victims of such breaches will be entitled to remedies. The court has to establish whether Art 8 applies, is the ‘victim’ engaged in an activity which removes the protection? If not, is the interference justifiable, necessary and proportionate?3 The Article did not establish direct liability for breaches on individuals in their relationships under UK private law. As will be seen, the courts are under a duty to apply existing obligations in common law or statute as modified by Arts 8 and 10, and this can produce legal effects between individuals – horizontality. Article 8 has, however, been given a tortious identity and has significant implications for relations between individuals. A  Canadian case has listed the elements of the tort of invasion of privacy as follows: • the intentional (or reckless) intrusion upon the seclusion of a person’s private affairs; • the intrusion must be without lawful justification; and • a reasonable person would regard the invasion as highly offensive, causing distress, humiliation or anguish.4 It seems to be a path that UK courts are pursuing. See note 4 below. See Aubry v Editions Vice-Versa Inc [1998] 1 SCR 591 for the position in Quebec. 3 See eg the division of opinion on applicability of Art 8 in Re an Application by JR38 for Judicial Review (NI) [2015]  UKSC  42 on its application to a 14-year-old rioter whose pictures were caught by CCTV. 4 Jones v Tsige (2012) ONCA 32 (Canada), Sharpe JA. 1 2

2.216  Some important points were raised in pre-HRA litigation. In R  v Broadcasting Standards Commission, ex p BBC1 it was held by the High Court that a company had no right to privacy as set out in the code under which the BBC operated because, in conformity with Art 8 of the ECHR (see text at the beginning of this chapter), that Article only applied to individuals and not corporate bodies. This decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal which held that corporate bodies are entitled under the code to protection of their privacy.2 This was not a decision on confidentiality but on the code under which the BBC operated and Broadcasting Act 1996, ss  107(1) and 110(1). The question was raised in many quarters whether the HRA 1998 would lead to the development of a law of privacy along the lines of that in the USA. A legal right for privacy means a right to have personal information, and not simply that which would be protected by confidentiality, including film or photographs, protected by court orders or by award of damages where wrongly invaded. There is a considerable body of jurisprudence on Art 8 and the domestic courts will have to have regard to the decisions and opinions of the ECtHR, Commission and Committee of Ministers when interpreting statutes, regulations and developing the common law.3 Caselaw from the ECtHR has ruled that English legislation outlawing consensual homosexual conduct between more than two males in private, group activities which had been video-taped, was a breach of their right to privacy under Art 8.4 It was seen how the ECtHR had gone further in its protection of privacy than had domestic courts.

288  Chapter 2 Campbell introduced a more forthright concentration on ‘private information’ as the central organising concept which deserved judicial protection. In this case the famous model Naomi Campbell was photographed attending an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting which led to publication of the photographs and a front-page news story (see para 2.233 below). The judgment gave a new direction in the protection of personal information. The focus was to be on whether the individual involved had a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’.5 It helped transform the movement from confidentiality and its influence on Art 8 protection to a tort of wrongful use or invasion of personal information and personal life. The ECtHR will continue to be influential. The right of action was originally based in confidentiality as supported by the provisions of the HRA 1998; it was not based on any free-standing tort of privacy.6 It will be shown how a tort of privacy protection has been developing in UK and English courts. There must be no interference with these rights by a public authority except that which is in accordance with the law and is necessary to protect itemised desiderata. This interference must be necessary and must be proportionate in an objective sense. In Gaskin v UK7 the ECtHR ruled that the absence of an independent arbiter to rule on claims for access to personal files (in this case concerning a child in care) was a breach of Art 8. Furthermore, it has been accepted by the same court that the failure by the state to provide protection against Art 8’s infringement by a private party is a breach of Art 8. The state had failed in its duty of protection even though the invasion of private life was by a private citizen.8 We will see in ch 4 (and again in ch 11) how Art 8 has been interpreted to provide a right to information where such access is necessary to protect those rights (see paras 4.296 et seq below). To this extent, it has gone further than the court’s interpretation of Art 10 which was ruled to be of no assistance to Gaskin. However, Art 10 rights are frequently in a balance with Art 8 rights (paras 4.324 et seq and 4.354 below.9 [1999] EMLR 858. [2000] 3 All ER 989, CA; and see Sir S Sedley Freedom, Law and Justice (1999) ch 2. 3 HRA 1998, ss 2 and 3. It refers to the interpretation of a Convention right coming before the courts which would include the common law. 4 ADT v UK [2000] 2 FLR 697, ECtHR. For further discussion on the reach of Art 8, see R (Razgar) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 27. 5 Campbell v MGN  Ltd [2004]  UKHL  22 per Lord Nicholls at [21]. There were differences in opinion on what information was protected in the judgments. 6 Campbell v MGN  Ltd [2004] 2  All ER  995 (HL) and A  v B  [2002] 2  All ER  545 (CA). For confidentiality protection in private relationships, see: D v L [2004] EMLR 1; and for a lovers’ tiff: Lady Archer v Williams [2003] EMLR 38; and Mills v News Group [2001] EMLR 41 where a private address of a property being purchased by a friend of Paul McCartney was not protected. 7 (1989) 12 EHRR 36. 8 X and Y v Netherlands 8 EHRR 235 (ECtHR). Guidance was given in A v B [2003] QB 195 (see below) on balancing of interests, which many believe to be over-generous to the press. A v B has been heavily qualified subsequently (below). 9 See A Local Authority (Inquiry: Restraint on Publication) [2003] EWHC 2746 (Fam), [2004] 1 All ER 480 and the balancing of Art 8 ECHR rights of children and adults and a local authority’s rights to publish under Art 10. The Family Division granted an injunction against the local authority preventing publication of a ‘s 7 Local Authority Social Services Act 1970 inquiry’ into a children’s and vulnerable adults’ home. See now ch 11 below. 1 2

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   289 2.217  The ECtHR has subsequently ruled that breaches of Art 8 may well be committed in circumstances where an English court could not award a remedy under provisions existing at the time of judgment. In Peck v UK1 an individual had been filmed by CCTV attempting suicide in a public place by cutting his wrists. The film and photographs from it were subsequently publicised in a number of ways including national TV coverage. No attempt was made to conceal the applicant’s identity. Peck’s application to English courts for relief was unsuccessful, although it should be noted that the relevant facts took place before the Human Rights Act 1998 came into effect. The ECtHR ruled that there had been a breach of Art 8 and also Art 13 because there had been no remedy in domestic courts for the breach. It should be noted that the defendant in the domestic proceedings was a local authority and the situation would now be covered by the HRA. It may well be very difficult to maintain that not maintaining anonymity in similar circumstances for the claimant was not a breach of Art 8 on the authority’s part. It should not be forgotten that, under HRA  1998, s  2, domestic courts must take into account any judgment of the ECtHR; and s 3 states that, in so far as it is possible to do so, ‘primary and secondary legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with Convention rights’. Peck v United Kingdom Application no 44647/98 (2003) 13 BHRC 669; the events occurred in 1995 and 1996 and the first instance judge noted the future impact of the HRA. The authority had acted under Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s 163 and Local Government Act 1972, s 111(1).

1

2.218  In a further development, Princess Caroline of Monaco was found to have been a victim of a breach of Art 8 when photographs of her in public places were published by the press in Germany, publications which were not actionable under German law.1 Photos of her with her children were subject to injunction but the German court considered that the applicant, who was undeniably a contemporary ‘public figure’, had to tolerate the publication of photographs of herself in a public place, even if they showed her in scenes from her daily life rather than engaged in her official duties. The court referred in that connection to the freedom of the press and to the public’s legitimate interest in knowing how such a person generally behaved in public. The ECtHR ruled that freedom of expression extended to photographs. But these photographs concerned images of personal experiences. The pivotal consideration in balancing Articles  8 and 10 lay in the contribution that the photographs and articles made to a debate of general interest. The general public did not have a legitimate interest in knowing the applicant’s whereabouts or how she behaved generally in her private life, even if she appeared in places that were not private. Everyone, including celebrities, had a ‘legitimate expectation’ that his or her private life would be protected. There had been a violation of Article 8. This case reaffirmed the importance of privacy as a value deserving protection. It has been observed how the English law of confidentiality has had to absorb the Art 8 and Art 10 rights in the development of the case-law. The law of confidentiality has moved from a quasi-proprietorial basis (though this should not be exaggerated) to a more humanistic approach where the protection of private information (including photographs) is becoming the object of judicial

290  Chapter 2 protection, and a tort of misuse of private information has been developed. But the courts in the UK have shied away from the creation of a comprehensive and over-arching tort of privacy itself, as Wainwright shows (para 4.320 below). In Wainwright v Home Office2 the Law Lords ruled that there was no common law tort of invasion of privacy. The case concerned events involving the strip search of prisoners to a prisoner occurring before the HRA came into effect. If their rights to family and private life under HRA 1998 were breached, then this would be actionable although the courts have shown reluctance to award tortious levels of damages for breaches of the HRA (especially when effectively it was maladministration that was causing a breach; see para 10.61 below), but it must be questioned whether it is correct to suggest, as Lord Hoffmann did, that for damages a breach of Art 8 would have to be intentional. Intentionality may go to quantum but not liability. Surely, Lord Hoffmann’s approach is the test for misfeasance of public office? In Wainwright v UK the ECtHR found a breach of Art 8 of the ECHR by the UK on the facts pleaded before the English courts.3 Courts have relied upon the law on confidentiality, defamation or trespass and other torts as modified by Arts 8 and 10 where they wish to apply common law protection. That protection has become ever more apparent. These points are further discussed in relation to Campbell v MGN Ltd (paras 2.216 and 2.231). It is clear that important developments have been made by the English courts in advancing the ‘protection of private information’ by reformulating the law of confidentiality and developing a new tort. Will it be extended to cover personal files that are not protected by the DPA? On what basis and to what extent could protection be given? Von Hannover v Germany Application 59320/00. This concerned Princess Caroline and photographs taken in public places over a sustained period of time by paparazzi; German law had drawn a distinction between public places and a ‘secluded place’ to which the claimant had withdrawn. See Sciacca v Italy (2006) 43 EHRR 20 on publication of an identity photo taken by Italian inland revenue police; and Paulik v Slovakia [2006] 3 FCR 323 (ECtHR) on art 8 rights. In an English case, a female DJ, Sara Cox, was awarded an injunction to prevent publication of photographs of her sun bathing in the nude with her newly married husband: The Guardian, 7 June 2003. See Sexual Offences Act 2003, s  67 and the offence of ‘voyeurism’ with regard to the recording of ‘private acts’ by third parties without their consent for the sexual gratification of others. 2 Wainwright v Home Office [2003] 4 All ER 969 (HL) is discussed below (para 4.320). Concerning intention to breach a right, this has been doubted by Lord Lester QC citing Halford v UK (1997) 24 EHRR 523 at para 76 – improper purpose made breach more serious; Darnell v UK (1993) 18  EHRR  205 at para  24; McMichael v UK  (1995) 20  EHRR  205 at para  103 – claimant not disqualified from compensation because breach unintentional and at common law; Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 State Trials 1029. See also Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62, CA. Cf Shelley Films Ltd v Rex Features Ltd [1994]  EMLR  134; and R  v Khan [1996] 3  All ER  289, HL. See R Wacks Personal Information, Privacy and the Law (1993) and Privacy (1993). In Earl Spencer v UK (1998) 25 EHRR CD 105 the European Commission of Human Rights was not convinced that the English law of confidentiality was an inadequate remedy for breaches of Art 8 ECHR. See also Z v Finland (1998) 25 EHRR 371. 3 [2007] 44 EHRR 40: UK in breach of Art 8. I v Finland (2009) 48 EHRR 31 on duties under Art 8 regarding failures to protect medical records from unnecessary disclosure to hospital staff other than those treating. See Mak v UK [2010] 2 FLR 451 and breach of Art 8 where a minor was subject to medical tests without authorisation; and AD v UK (2010) The Times, April 6 and breach of Art 8 in relation to disproportionate action by authority in care orders. 1

2.219  The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR in Von Hannover v Germany (No 2) (App 40660/08 February 2012) seemed to demur to the German Constitutional

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   291 Court after the first case above. From 2002 to 2004, the German magazines, Frau im Spiegel  and  Frau Aktuell, published a series of photographs showing the applicants, Princess Caroline of Monaco and her husband, on skiing holidays. One was accompanied by an article describing the ill-health of Princess Caroline’s father, Prince Rainier III, the then reigning sovereign of Monaco (‘the first photograph’). On 26 February 2008, the Federal Constitutional Court upheld the Federal Court of Justice’s refusal to grant Princess Caroline an injunction against any further publication of the first photograph by Frau im Spiegel. It did so on the grounds that the information value of the photograph fell to be assessed in the context of the accompanying article. In relation to the second photograph, neither the article nor the photo related to an event of general interest or contemporary society. The information centred exclusively on Princess Caroline’s private life and served merely entertainment purposes. In relation to the third photograph, although the article referred to an event of contemporary society that was a matter of general interest (the Rose Ball in Monaco), there was no connection between the photograph and the event. The photographs could only be published with her consent. Regarding the first photograph, however, whilst it contained no information contributing to a debate of general interest, the same was not true of the accompanying text. The illness affecting Prince Rainier constituted a matter of general interest. The press had accordingly been entitled to report on the manner in which the prince’s children reconciled their obligations of family solidarity with the legitimate needs of their private life, ie vacation. The photograph in question had a sufficiently close link with the event described in the article. The other photos were subject to injunction. 2.220  The Court set out five relevant criteria for domestic courts to consider when balancing rights under Articles 8 and 10: (1) Whether the information contributes to a debate of general interest The first and essential criterion is the contribution by the photographs or articles to a debate of general interest. The definition of what constitutes a matter of general interest will depend on the circumstances of the case and is not limited to political issues or crimes but extends as well to publications concerning sporting issues or performing artists. The German courts’ assessment of the information value of the photographs in light of the accompanying articles could not be criticised under the Convention. A sufficiently close link between the photographs and the event described in the articles had been found. The court noted that the German courts had upheld an injunction forbidding the publication of the two other photographs showing the applicants in similar circumstances, precisely on the grounds that they were being published for entertainment purposes alone. The court accepted that the photographs in question, considered in light of the accompanying articles relating to Prince Rainier’s illness, made some contribution to a debate of general interest. (2) The notoriety of the person concerned Reiterating its case law that public figures could not claim the same protection for their private life as ordinary individuals, the court considered that, irrespective

292  Chapter 2 of the question whether and to what extent the first applicant assumed official functions on behalf of the Principality of Monaco, it could not be claimed that the applicants, who were undeniably well known, were ordinary private individuals. The applicants were clearly public figures. (3) The prior conduct of the person concerned. (4) The content, form and consequences of the publication The court only noted that the photographs of the applicants in the middle of a street in St Moritz in winter were not of themselves offensive to the point of justifying their prohibition. (5) The circumstances in which the photos were taken Whether the person photographed gave their consent to the taking of the photographs and subsequent publication or whether this was done without their knowledge or by subterfuge  will be relevant considerations. The nature or seriousness of the intrusion and the consequences for the persons concerned must be considered. 2.221  The point has been widely made that the categorisation of Princess Caroline as a ‘public figure’, irrespective of the question whether and to what extent she assumed official functions, is hard to reconcile with the court’s earlier Von Hannover judgment of 2004 (Von Hannover (No 1) above). In that case Princes Caroline, despite ‘being known to the public’, was held to be a ‘private’ individual, ‘in whom the interest of the general public and the press was based solely on the membership of the reigning family, whereas she herself did not exercise any official functions’. In Von Hannover (No 2), the court was not willing to accept that the applicants, who were ‘undeniably well-known’, could be claimed to be ‘ordinary private individuals’. It followed that ‘they must, on the contrary, be regarded as public figures’. But the court in Von Hannover (No 1) had never held Princess Caroline to be an ‘ordinary’ private individual. Rather it held that she was a ‘private’ individual but equally known to the public for the reasons set out above. This is not really very helpful: ‘In any event, with a relaxation of the terms “public figure” and “debate of general interest”, the scope of what will constitute a Convention-compliant publication appears to have been widened, but also perhaps rendered less clear.’1 This paragraph and the preceding two paragraphs are based on: www.5rb.com/case/vonhannover-v-germany-2/.

1

Section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998 2.222  As the HRA 1998 proceeded through Parliament, fears were expressed that the incorporation of Art 8 would undermine freedom of the press and media. In R v Broadcasting Complaints Commission, ex p Granada TV, for instance, the Court of Appeal upheld a complaint concerning a broadcast which featured a photograph of a murdered child which was broadcast without the parents’

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   293 consent. This had interfered with the parents’ right to privacy and family life.1 Would politicians, the powerful and famous who are in the public eye, or the corrupt and criminal, use Article  8 to prevent any discussion of events which the public should know about? What was the public entitled to know? Special provisions were therefore introduced in the Act under s 12 to protect freedom of expression. Special regard is to be had to the public interest in publication and any relevant privacy codes such as exist for the press and media. The onus is on the person claiming relief from the court. Clearly, Art 8 has to be balanced with Art 10 rights to freedom of expression. An interesting early example of the benefits of Art 10 was seen in the case of Kelly v BBC2 where the High Court refused to prevent the broadcast of an interview with a 16-year-old who was a ward of court and who had left home to live with a religious cult (see para 11.6 below). These were not proceedings concerned with the upbringing of a child. In such cases, a stricter approach to secrecy of proceedings is usually enforced. [1995] EMLR 163. [2001] 1 All ER 323. See JIH v News Group Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 42.

1 2

2.223  Section 12 of HRA 1998 therefore was enacted to give greater protection to freedom of speech and privacy protection in publications. It is headed by the expression ‘freedom of expression’ and states that the section applies if a court is considering whether to grant any relief1 (including injunctions) which, if granted, might affect the Convention right to freedom of expression. Where the respondent (publisher, broadcaster etc) is not present and is not represented, no such relief (ex parte or without notice injunctions) is to be granted unless the court is satisfied that: (a) the applicant has taken all practicable steps to notify the respondent; or (b) there are compelling reasons why the respondent should not be notified. ‘Relief’ includes any remedy or order other than in criminal proceedings.

1

2.224  Section 12(3) states that no such relief is to be given so as to restrain publication before trial, unless the court is satisfied that the applicant is likely to establish that publication should not be allowed. This clearly puts the onus on the applicant for relief. It is no longer a balance of convenience test pending trial but a likelihood that the applicant will win at the final hearing. In many cases it will make a vital difference – it affords an impetus to publication and freedom of speech.1 There may be a temptation to see the approach as consistent with that adopted by the courts in defamation proceedings.2 Courts have, however, insisted that the test for success by a claimant must not be set too high. A claimant for s 12(3) relief may be advancing his or her fundamental rights, such as a right to life or privacy, which the courts will have to give full effect to in dealing with an application. In Cream Holdings Ltd v Bannerjee, the Court of Appeal held that ‘likely’ does not mean ‘more probable than not’. The threshold test to apply in deciding whether to award an interim injunction preventing publication is that of a ‘real prospect of success, convincingly established’.3 In applying the test, a court is required to consider the merits of the claim for injunctive relief so as to reach a judgment as to the prospects of eventual success. The court should not grant interim relief unless it is satisfied on ‘cogent evidence’ that the

294  Chapter 2 plaintiff does have a real prospect of succeeding at trial ‘notwithstanding the defendant’s ex hypothesi conflicting right to freedom of expression’. The Court of Appeal felt that this was a lower test which was based on a ‘realistic possibility of eventual success in preventing publication’ and not ‘a probabilistic threshold of a better than even prospect of success, below which interim relief, however necessary for a fair trial, cannot be granted’. On such an application, a judge will be given a wide margin of discretion. On the facts, the court was satisfied that this test was established and an interim injunction was rightly awarded by the judge at first instance. Sedley LJ agreed with the interpretation of ‘likely’ but disagreed with the majority on whether an interim order should have been made. On this point the House of Lords agreed with Sedley LJ. The matters which the newspaper wished to publish were matters of serious public interest. The applicant’s prospects of success were not ‘sufficiently likely to justify making an interim order’. Lord Nicholls offered the following guidance: ‘Section 12(3) makes the likelihood of success at the trial an essential element in the court’s consideration of whether to make an interim order. But in order to achieve the necessary flexibility the degree of likelihood of success at the trial needed to satisfy section 12(3) must depend on the circumstances. There can be no single, rigid standard governing all applications for interim restraint orders. Rather, on its proper construction the effect of section 12(3) is that the court is not to make an interim restraint order unless satisfied the applicant’s prospects of success at the trial are sufficiently favourable to justify such an order being made in the particular circumstances of the case. As to what degree of likelihood makes the prospects of success “sufficiently favourable”, the general approach should be that courts will be exceedingly slow to make interim restraint orders where the applicant has not satisfied the court he will probably (“more likely than not”) succeed at the trial. In general, that should be the threshold an applicant must cross before the court embarks on exercising its discretion, duly taking into account the relevant jurisprudence on article  10 and any countervailing Convention rights. But there will be cases where it is necessary for a court to depart from this general approach and a lesser degree of likelihood will suffice as a prerequisite. Circumstances where this may be so include those mentioned above: where the potential adverse consequences of disclosure are particularly grave, or where a short-lived injunction is needed to enable the court to hear and give proper consideration to an application for interim relief pending the trial or any relevant appeal.’4 In PJS, Lord Mance, with whose judgment three justices agreed, emphasised that neither Art 8 nor Art 10 comes with added value in making the balance. On the facts of that case, and even though there had been publication on the internet and overseas, an injunction was justified to prevent unjustified invasion of privacy and family life and was not prevented on an interpretation of s 12.5 See Jockey Club v Buffham [2003] 2  WLR  178, where public interest in disclosure (horse-race scandals) outweighed confidentiality. 2 Bonnard v Perryman [1891] 2 Ch  269; see Greene v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2005] 1  All ER 30, where the rule in Bonnard v Perryman was confirmed by the CA; Coys Ltd v Autocherish Ltd [2004]  EWHC  1334. See also Taveta Investments Ltd v Financial Reporting Council [2018] EWHC 1662 (Admin). 1

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   295 [2003] 2 All ER 318 (CA). See Imutran Ltd v Uncaged Campaigns Ltd [2001] 2 All ER 385, where it was stated that s  12(3) only introduces a ‘marginally higher test’ than American Cyanamid. This seems very restrained and was doubted in Cream Holdings above. See Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2001] 2 All ER 289, CA. See ABC & Others v Telegraph Media Group [2018] EWCA Civ 2329. This case concerned the identity of retail tycoon Sir Philip Green. Two days after the Court of Appeal issued an interim injunction protecting his identity pending a trial of the public interest factors involved (23/10/2018), Lord Peter Hain revealed his name in the House of Lords under Parliamentary privilege. At issue was use of non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) by Green to prevent disclosure by employees of allegations of sex and racial harassment and bullying (see para  4.307 below and public interest disclosures). The Court of Appeal did not consider, in reversing the trial judge, that sufficient weight had been given to the legitimate role of NDAs freely entered into under legal advice for reward to the employees to settle a dispute and an assessment of whether a public interest in breaching such confidentiality was justified: see Mionis v Democratic Press SA [2017] EWCA Civ 1194. In ABC, disclosures to authorities were not barred by the NDA. See Women and Equalities Select Committee Sexual Harassment in the Workplace HC 725 (2017–19). 4 Cream Holdings v Bannerjee [2004] UKHL 44, para 22. On s 12(3), see Tillery Valley Foods v Channel Four News [2004] EWHC 1075 (Ch) and BBC v HarperCollins Publishers Ltd [2010] EWHC 2424. 5 PJS v NGN Ltd [2016] UKSC 26. 3

2.225  It is perfectly clear that, in exercising its powers under s  12(3), the court must balance rights under Art 10 with other Convention rights. So much is required by HRA 1998, s 3 and ‘consistent construction’. Arden LJ pointed out that, in Convention jurisprudence, the Court of Human Rights had ruled that a right to freedom of expression should not be constrained unless the need for restriction is ‘convincingly’ established. We have seen how, in protecting privacy of individuals and personal information, the courts have awarded superinjunctions preventing any interim disclosure of information in its entirety (paras 2.256 et seq below). 2.226  Section 12(4) concerns relief more generally but its subject matter is confined to material as described below. It states that the court must have particular regard to the importance of the Convention right to freedom of expression and, where it is claimed by the respondent or appears to the court to be ‘journalistic, literary or artistic material’, such regard will also be had to the extent to which: (a) the material has, or is about to, become available to the public; or (b) it is, or would be, in the public interest for the material to be published. These provisions were discussed by Lord Mance in PJS (para 2.238 below). 2.227  The court is also to have regard to any relevant privacy code, such as the press code or broadcasting code.1 Quite what weight may be given to codes which are the product of one institution, as opposed to an association, is not clear. There are several codes in existence. In the case of the press code this makes provision for privacy, accuracy, children and harassment amongst other concerns. It is clear that rights under Art 10(1) are essential considerations, but they do not possess automatic overriding power. They have to be balanced with the variety of considerations spelt out in the subsection. This takes us to matters which are discussed below (see paras 2.238 et seq). See HRA 1998, s 12(4)(b) and paras 2.252 and 4.354. On Art 10 rights and traditional property rights, see Appleby v UK App No 44306/98.

1

296  Chapter 2 2.228  The conflict that may emerge where the principles of freedom of speech and privacy clash was graphically illustrated in the case of Jon Venables and Robert Thompson, the notorious murderers of James Bulger, when the two youths sought to continue injunctions protecting them as children1 to prevent the revelation of their identities now that they were adults after their release from prison (they would be given new identities) or their whereabouts. Such an order protecting adults was then unprecedented.2 The courts had to balance their right to privacy, confidentiality, to rehabilitation and to life – in the fear of threats of serious violence to them – and the right of the press to inform the public of their identity and whereabouts. The judgment of the court3 was given by the President of the Family Division and she held that an injunction would be issued in the broadest terms prohibiting the publication of any information leading to the identity of either claimant or their future whereabouts. This would cover their present whereabouts, ‘any information about their present appearance and similar information.’ The injunction would cover any attempts by the media to solicit information from past or present carers , staff or codetainees at their secure units until the claimants were released from prison. The injunction would also seek to prohibit further publication in [England or Wales] of information published on the internet or outside the UK. It remains to be seen how practicable this last feature will be. The injunction was also described as ‘contra mundum’, against the world at large.4 While the rights to freedom of expression and a free press under Art 10 were given especial importance in s 12 of the HRA 1998, that right had to be balanced against other rights, including those under the Convention such as Art 2 (right to life), Art 3 (prohibition of torture) and Art 8 (right to privacy and family life). The court’s task was to apply the Convention to the interpretation and development of the common law and although that did not seem to create a free standing cause of action by one private party against another, it did include a positive obligation on the court as well as a negative one. In other words the court must give positive expression to the rights of the claimants under the influence of the Convention and common law. The court is a public authority under s 6(3) of the HRA 1998 and is under a duty to act in a way which is compatible with the Convention.

The injunctions were issued under Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s 39 in November 1993. As recently as May 2018 there were attempts to reveal the identities of the two men in legal proceedings. 2 See also X County Council v A [1985] 1 All ER 53 where extensive protection was given to an adult (the murderess Mary Bell who had murdered when she was 11) under wardship jurisdiction to protect her child. See also X (formerly M Bell) v O’Brien [2003] EWHC 1101 where an injunction was issued to protect the anonymity of the same person who had now achieved adulthood. On 24 February 2005, an injunction was issued by Eady J in the High Court protecting the anonymity for life of Maxine Carr, former partner of child murderer Ian Huntley. The order was unopposed by the media and was issued because of the serious threat of bodily injury or death to Ms Carr. 3 Venables v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] 1 All ER 908 (Fam D). And see Glaser v UK [2000] 3 FCR 193 where the ECtHR outlined the ‘positive obligations’ under the Convention in relation to Art 8. 4 A-G v Times Newspapers Ltd [1992] 1 AC 191, HL. See also X County Council v A [1985] 1 All ER 53 above. See A-G v Greater Manchester Newspapers Ltd [2001] All ER (D) 32 and contempt proceedings concerning breaches of Butler-Sloss P’s injunction. 1

2.229  The court was satisfied of the requirement of such protection given the ‘uniquely notorious’ circumstances of this ‘exceptional case’, and that there was

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   297 compelling evidence of the risk of death or serious injury possibly in the form of torture if the information were revealed. Indeed, were Art 8 alone in risk of being breached, the judge was doubtful whether injunctions ‘to restrict the Press in this case’ would be issued. It was also clear that the basis of the injunctions was the law of confidentiality as influenced by the duty to act compatibly with Convention rights when interpreting the common law. 2.230  It has been seen that English courts were initially resistant to the development of a law of privacy. The DPA  2018 (above) and the RIPA  2000 and IPA  2016 (see ch  4) all seek to provide, if not protection of privacy, then safeguards in the use of private information. In the latter case, protection as balanced with the intrusive powers of the state, although intrusion by private parties is as big a threat to privacy. But the common law, in the area of privacy as in other areas concerned with fundamental rights, is rapidly developing principles protecting privacy. In Douglas v Hello! Ltd1 the Court of Appeal believed that two famous film stars arguably had a remedy for breach of confidence and privacy when a magazine, Hello!, published photos – which they had obtained from an unauthorised source – of their wedding and which the plaintiffs had already contracted to sell exclusively to a rival journal. In refusing to continue an injunction issued by the High Court to prevent further publication of the defendant journal after publication of 15,750 copies, the judges nevertheless spoke in emphatic terms of the couple’s right to confidentiality and privacy. There was also, it should be noted, the possibility of an unlawful interference with the plaintiffs’ contractual rights. Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2001] 2 All ER 289, CA; Keene LJ thought that Kaye v Robertson would be decided differently today (in 2001). By 2011 this is an absolute certainty. See also A v B [2002] 2 All ER 545 (CA) which now has to be heavily qualified. In the House of Lords for Douglas, see para 2.231 and note 1 below.

1

2.231  The Court of Appeal based its judgment on the principles of confidentiality – in the circumstances a commercial confidentiality seems more appropriate and this is how the judge in the trial of Douglas v Hello! interpreted the relationship1 – although the court spoke of ‘a right of privacy which we will today recognise and protect and which was grounded in equity and the common law’. The case gave ‘the final impetus to the recognition of a right to privacy in English law’, although that more correctly came with Campbell (para 2.216 above). It has been influential in litigation before the Law Lords including in Campbell v MGN Ltd [2005]  UKHL  61 (see MGN  Ltd v UK  Application No  39401/04, 18  January 2011 ECtHR) and subsequent case law. In Campbell, the Law Lords applied the law of confidentiality as modified by the need to protect personal private information under Art 8 ECHR although not all the personal information about the famous model was protected. The court in Douglas was unanimous in lifting the injunction that had been imposed by the High Court because damages or an account of profits would be an adequate remedy at full trial for the plaintiffs (events proved otherwise), whereas an injunction could cause unquantifiable harm to the defendant in the event of their being successful. Were the pictures to be published, that would probably

298  Chapter 2 lead to a breach of the then cl 3 of the Press Complaints Commission Code of Practice protecting privacy to which, under s  12(4)(b) of the HRA  1998, the court was to have particular regard. The court was also to have particular regard to the Convention right of freedom of expression but this was not a trump card which automatically overrode every other consideration. A series of factors had to be balanced. The court felt that, if a breach of cl 3 of the Code of Practice were established at trial, this would probably deprive Hello! of its reliance on Art 10 at the full trial. There was no public interest, one might add, in their publication of the photographs. The photographs had also become available to the public. The case was persuasive for the development of a free-standing Art 8 right of privacy in English law which takes ‘direct horizontal effect’ between private individuals. In Hello! Sedley LJ expressed the point as follows: ‘The law no longer needs an artificial relationship of confidentiality …: it can recognise privacy itself as a legal principle drawn from the fundamental value of personal autonomy’. The HRA 1998 and the Convention do not, as Butler-Sloss P  said in Venables, ‘establish new law. They reinforce and give greater weight to the principles already established in our case law.’ One might add they have become part of the common law. And the courts are under a duty by virtue of HRA  1998, s  6 to apply the Articles to disputes before them, including those disputes between private parties. And the common law’s method is development of principle not ossification. As in Venables, the case reveals the court applying the Convention to the interpretation and development of common law and equity in the form of confidentiality and protection of personal information. It shows that development, however, becoming ever more robust.2 The decision at the trial of Douglas v Hello! (No 3),3 where Lindsay J stated that the Convention comes into play even in cases involving only private parties, and Campbell (paras 2.216 above and 2.233 below) reveal how that process continues. The Court of Appeal in D  v H  (No  3) upheld the claims of the Douglases for breach of confidence and protection of their private information. The fact that they had authorised publication of approved photographs of ‘a private occasion’ did not remove their right to confidentiality in seeking reparation for publication of unapproved photographs. Furthermore, a prior publication of personal information may not remove the necessity of preventing or punishing further publication. Douglas v Hello! [2003] 3  All ER  996: ‘akin’ to a trade secret or a hybrid which was dealt with ‘unconscionably’ by the defendants. The Douglases received £14,600 for distress and incidental costs; OK!, which was wrongfully denied the scoop, was awarded £1,047,756 for lost sales from Hello!. The Court of Appeal [2005] EWCA Civ 595 upheld the claim of the Douglases noting that the award of the amount of damages to them did not represent an ‘adequate and satisfactory’ remedy when considered against the initial refusal by the Court of Appeal in the 2000 proceedings to award an interim injunction because damages would be an adequate remedy. The decision in relation to the claimant OK! was reversed on the grounds that it had no right to commercial confidentiality. In the House of Lords in Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2007] UKHL 21, the issue concerned the claimant OK! only – there was no appeal against the ruling in favour of the Douglases – and, by a majority of 3–2, OK! won its appeal and the original award of damages was reinstated. 2 There has been an interesting debate between those who argue that the HRA 1998 does not create direct horizontal effect between individuals: Sir R Buxton (2000) 116 LQR 48, those who argue that it does precisely that: Sir W Wade (2000) 116 LQR 217, and those who argue that horizontal effect is produced indirectly: M Hunt (1998) Public Law 423. On damages under HRA 1998, see Anufrijeva and Another v Southwark LBC [2004] 1 All ER 833 (CA) and Mosley (para 2.235 below). 3 [2003] 3 All ER 996.

1

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   299 2.232  The protection of private information featured more prominently in the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Douglas. 2.233  The discussion of the emerging principles in Campbell have been developed in a series of English judgments. These display a growing sensitivity to privacy protection. In R (Axon) v Secretary of State for Health [2006] EWHC 37 (Admin) the High Court ruled that a girl under the age of 16 was entitled to communicate confidentially with her doctor about advice on sexual matters and without her mother having a right to be informed. In HRH  Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers [2006] EWCA Civ 1776, confidential journals written by the Prince of Wales regarding the handover of Hong Kong to China, alleged to have been sent to between 50–75 contacts, and which were given to the press by a servant in breach of a contractual term of confidence, were protected by personal privacy and confidentiality.1 These portrayed participants in a less than flattering light. No public interest was present in their disclosure and injunctions preventing publication were rightly awarded by the High Court. ‘What is the nature of ‘private information’? It seems to us that it must include information that is personal to the person who possesses it and that he does not intend shall be imparted to the general public. The nature of the information, or the form in which it is kept, may suffice to make it plain that the information satisfies these criteria’. The Court of Appeal has considered that these observations remain sound. They are in no way ‘discordant’ with the statement of Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead in Campbell v MGN Ltd [2005] UKHL 61 at para 21: ‘Essentially the touchstone of private life is whether in respect of the disclosed facts the person in question had a reasonable expectation of privacy.’ Lord Hope of Craighead at para 85 advanced a similar test: ‘… a duty of confidence will arise whenever the party subject to the duty is in a situation where he knows or ought to know that the other person can reasonably expect his privacy to be protected.’ Lady Hale at para 134 advanced the same test and Lord Carswell at para 165 endorsed this. Lord Hoffmann at para  51 made the following statement in agreement with the principles of protection of personal information, although he disagreed on their application to the facts in question: ‘Instead of the cause of action being based upon the duty of good faith applicable to confidential personal information and trade secrets alike, it focuses upon the protection of human autonomy and dignity – the right to control the dissemination of information about one’s private life and the right to the esteem and respect of other people.’ Campbell v Frisbee [2002] EWCA Civ 1374 on support for contractual duties of confidentiality being more important than simple confidentiality. We doubt this to be the case.

1

2.234 In McKennitt v Ash [2005]  EWHC  3003 (QB) (appeal dismissed in [2007] 3 WLR 194), the High Court protected personal information contained in a publication by the singer Loreena McKennit’s personal assistant and friend

300  Chapter 2 declaring the information to be protected by personal privacy and confidentiality and injuncting it from further publication. The information covered: (i) Ms McKennitt’s personal and sexual relationships; (ii) her personal feelings and, in particular, in relation to her deceased fiancé and the circumstances of his death; (iii) matters relating to her health and diet; (iv) matters relating to her emotional vulnerability; and (v) the details of an unhappy financial dispute between Ms McKennitt and the defendants. The court made an assessment itemising 34 classes of information and identified those that were deserving of protection under personal privacy and confidentiality and therefore needed to be protected by an appropriate injunction and damages for injured feelings. It was clear that the authority of older cases such as Woodward v Hutchins [1977] 2 All ER 751 and the availability of a public interest defence to a defendant based on misdemeanours of the plaintiff were today of limited worth. In Murray v Express Newspapers plc [2007] EWHC 1908 (Ch) the issue concerned a photograph of JK Rowling and her husband and their baby son in a buggy in a public place. The photo was taken covertly with long-range lens. This was published by a newspaper together with some information from JK Rowling previously published in a newspaper. It was an application to strike out the action by Rowling for showing no cause of action. ‘The reality of the case is that the Claimant’s parents seek through their son to establish a right to personal privacy for themselves and their children when engaged in ordinary family activities wherever conducted’ (para 7). From Lord Hope in Campbell (para 122): ‘The taking of photographs in a public street must, as Randerson J said in Hosking v Runting [2003] 3 NZLR 385, 415, para 138, be taken to be one of the ordinary incidents of living in a free community. The real issue is whether publicising the content of the photographs would be offensive: Gault and Blanchard JJ in the Court of Appeal [2004] NZCA 34, para 165. A person who just happens to be in the street when the photograph was taken and appears in it only incidentally cannot as a general rule object to the publication of the photograph, for the reasons given by L’HeureuxDubé and Bastarache JJ in Aubry v Éditions Vice-Versa Inc [1998] 1 SCR 591, para 59. But the situation is different if the public nature of the place where a photograph is taken was simply used as background for one or more persons who constitute the true subject of the photograph.’ In England, people do not have a right to protect their image as such where photos are taken in a public place (see Von Hannover v Germany (No  2) at para  2.219 above). It is the use to which the photographs may be put that interests the law. The use of Naomi Campbell’s photo in a public place was not objectionable; it was the use of her photo at a very private occasion – seeking medical assistance through a narcotics anonymous group – that was an invasion of her privacy. The first instance judgment in Murray rejected the claimant’s claim, holding that he (baby Rowling) had no reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court of Appeal reversed this ruling and held that there was a triable issue which had to go before a trial judge: [2008] EWCA Civ 446. 2.235 In Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008]  EWHC  1777 (QB) the former boss of Formula One racing and son of Sir Oswald Mosley

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   301 brought proceedings against the defendant for publishing, in one of their newspapers and videos on their website, pictures of the claimant participating in sadomasochism, including bondage, beatings and domination, with prostitutes at a party which he had organised. Mosley claimed he had been ruined by this exposure. The defendant claimed publication was in the public interest because, they alleged, of anti-semitic overtones to the behaviour and, failing that, a public interest in knowing that a celebrity was engaging in such immoral conduct. Eady J decided that the claimant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to sexual activities (albeit unconventional) carried on between consenting adults on private property. He found that there was no evidence that the gathering was intended to be a simulation of Nazi behaviour or adoption of any Nazi attitudes. Nor was it in fact, he held: ‘I see no genuine basis at all for the suggestion that the participants mocked the victims of the Holocaust’. There was bondage, beating and domination, which seem to be typical of sadomasochism. But there was no public interest or other justification for the clandestine recording, for the publication of the resulting information and still photographs, or for the placing of the video extracts on the News of the World website – all of this on a massive scale. Of course, the judge accepted ‘that such behaviour is viewed by some people with distaste and moral disapproval, but in the light of modern rights-based jurisprudence that does not provide any justification for the intrusion on the personal privacy of the Claimant’.1 Damages of £60,000 were awarded and the judge refused to award exemplary damages, questioning whether these were available for the action. Mosley then proceeded to the ECtHR, but he was unsuccessful in his attempts to obtain a ruling of a right for a person in his position to be informed by the media or press of a warning before publication. His award of damages was sufficient compensation for the breach of Art 8. Mosley’s case was an important development in privacy protection and the courts have awarded super-injunctions to prevent any disclosure at all by the press of private information or even information about the proceedings themselves (below). No injunction was initially warded to remove the material from the defendant’s website because it was too widely known, but in 2008 a permanent injunction was awarded not to show the video.2 See Wood v Commissioner of Police [2009]  EWCA  Civ 414 which concerned the taking of photographs by police and a majority ruling of breach of Art 8; S Menghesha v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2013] EWHC 1695 (Admin) – individual filmed by police on release from ‘containment’ – breach of Art 8; R (Catt) v Commissioner of Met Police [2015] UKSC 9 – overruling Court of Appeal, intelligence kept by police on individual and retained on a searchable database did not breach Art 8. See also R (B) v Stafford Combined Court [2006] EWHC 1645 (Admin), which was a sex offence case; the medical records of a 14-year-old girl were ordered to be disclosed to the defendant; there was a wrongful interference with the girl’s Art 8 rights because of inadequate protection and she was not represented. A v C [2006] CL Nov 129 concerned the disclosure of a commendation about police officers – they must expect publicity – and see R (Harper) v Aldershot Magistrates’ Court [2010]  EWHC  1319 (Admin); C  v AB  [2006]  EWHC  3083 (QB); and T  v BBC [2007] EWHC 1683 (QB) – balancing Art 8 and Art 10 rights. See X v Unnamed Persons [2006]  EWHC  2783, which concerned John Doe injunctions against ‘persons unknown’ to protect identities. White v Withers LLP [2008] EWHC 2821 (QB) was a case concerning alleged misuse of ‘private information’ – the application was unsuccessful. Problems are likely to emerge over police use of automatic facial recognition techniques. 2 See M Mosley v Google Inc [2015] EWHC 59 (QB). 1

302  Chapter 2 2.236  There is no doubt that the Convention may be invoked to develop the common law and there has been widespread comment about the impact the Act has had on affecting legal relations between private parties by the doctrine of indirect horizontal effect. Only public bodies or those exercising functions of a public nature are directly bound by the Act’s imposition of a duty to act in accordance with the Convention. Because courts are themselves under such a duty, this could well encourage the invocation of Convention rights into private relationships to prevent intrusive contractual terms or secrecy clauses in contracts being enforced. The Act cannot, however, bind private parties directly: it has no direct horizontal effect. But, insofar as the courts are bound and must enforce the law in accordance with Convention rights, the Articles may be indirectly horizontally effective. Section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998 makes special provision for the application of Art 10 in litigation including private or public parties (paras 4.349 et seq below). 2.237  Two cases have helped transform the privacy landscape. The first was Vidal-Hall v Google.1 This judgment made an important ruling on s  13 of the DPA which was examined above (para 2.168). The Court of Appeal determined further that the cause of action for misuse of private information is a tort, specifically for the purposes of the rules providing for service of proceedings out of the jurisdiction under CPR PD 6B. The essence of the complaint was that the defendant collected private information about the claimants’ internet usage via their Apple Safari browser (the browser-generated information, or ‘BGI’) without the claimants’ knowledge and consent, by using a small string of text saved on the user’s device (‘cookies’). It revealed private information about the claimants. On a review of the authorities, especially Lord Nicholls’ judgment in Campbell (above), the court ruled that the wrongful invasion or trespass on private information (privacy) was a tort and differed from a breach of confidence whose origins were in equity: ‘This cause of action has now firmly shaken off the limiting constraint of the need for an initial confidential relationship. In doing so it has changed its nature’; and ‘This does not create a new cause of action. In our view, it simply gives the correct legal label to one that already exists’. It should be recalled that the classification was with respect to service out of the jurisdiction. There were wider implications that the court did not have to address. [2014] EWHC 13 (QB); [2015] EWCA Civ 311.

1

PJS v News Group 2.238  PJS v News Group [2016] UKSC 26 is a seminal case on protection of privacy in the internet age. The case focuses upon the award of interim injunctions in cases involving the tort of misuse of private information. A central point is determining whether ‘injunctions really have no sensible place in an internet age’. This depends on whether the objective is to preserve a secret. In the case, it would have failed in its purpose. ‘But in so far as its purpose is to prevent intrusion or harassment, it has not failed’.1 The invasion of personal privacy would, on present evidence, be clear, serious and injurious (para [44]). There is, on present evidence, no public interest in any legal sense in the story, however

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   303 much the respondents may hope that one may emerge on further investigation and/or in evidence at trial, and it would involve significant additional intrusion into the privacy of the appellant, his partner and their children. Quoting Tugendhat J in CTB v NGN Ltd [2011] EWHC 1344 (QB), para 3.

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2.239  The claimant (P) was married and had two children. Both he and his partner were famous entertainers. He engaged in sexual acts over a period of time with the first individual and on one occasion with that person and another. The editor of the Sun newspaper informed P  that he wished to publish an account by one of the sexual partners (the first individual) of the affair. P sought an injunction to prevent publication. This was initially awarded by the Court of Appeal. In April 2016 the account of the sexual partner was published in print in the United States, and thereafter in Canada and in Scotland, identifying P. As a result of representations by P’s solicitors, publication was restricted to hardcopy editions and online publication was ‘geo-blocked’ so that internet users in England and Wales could not readily access those sites. However, details had been published on a number of other websites and social media, although P’s solicitors had endeavoured to remove offending URLs and web pages. On 12 April 2016, NGN as proprietors applied to the Court of Appeal to set aside the interim injunction on the ground that, as the information was now in the public domain, P was unlikely to obtain a permanent injunction at trial and the interim injunction could therefore no longer be justified. On 18 April 2016, the Court of Appeal held that the injunction should be discharged. The Supreme Court restored it, pending determination of P’s application for permission to appeal, which it ordered to be heard with the appeal, should permission be granted. 2.240  The leading judgment, with whom three justices agreed, is given by Lord Mance. He ruled that the application for permission to appeal should be granted and the interim injunction continued until trial or further order. The reason for so doing were: ‘[1] … The ground on which the Court acts is to preserve the privacy interests of the appellant, his partner and their young children in England and Wales, pending a trial. Without the injunction, there will be further unrestricted and extensive coverage in hard copy as well as other media in England and Wales, and the purpose of any trial will be largely undermined. On the basis of the case law, the fact that there has been significant internet and social media coverage (and limited hard copy publication outside the jurisdiction) which already invades the privacy of the appellant and his family is not decisive. News Group Newspapers Ltd’s (“NGN’s”) purpose in applying to set aside the interim injunction is to add extensively and in a qualitatively different medium to such invasions, without, on present evidence, having any arguably legitimate basis for this and at the risk only of having to pay damages after a trial. [2]  … The Court must [apply the law] in the present case in relation to what, on present evidence, appears to be a clearly unjustified proposed further

304  Chapter 2 invasion of the relevant privacy interests. The invasion is unsupported by any countervailing public interest in a legal sense, however absorbing it might be to members of the public interested in stories about others’ private sexual encounters …’ 2.241  The majority ruled that the Court of Appeal in discharging the injunction had given too much force to Art 10 of the ECHR and freedom of speech. Even at the interlocutory stage, the established methodology determined, (i) neither article has preference over the other, (ii) where their values are in conflict, what is necessary is an intense focus on the comparative importance of the rights being claimed in the individual case, (iii) the justifications for interfering with or restricting each right must be taken into account, and (iv) the proportionality test must be applied.1 Relying upon In re S (A Child) (Identification: Restrictions on Publication) [2004] UKHL 47; [2005] 1 AC 593, para 17, per Lord Steyn, with whom all other members of the House agreed; McKennitt v Ash [2006]  EWCA  Civ 1714; [2008]  QB  73, para  47, per Buxton LJ, with whom the other members of the Court agreed; and Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008]  EWHC  687 (QB), para  28, per Eady J, describing this as a ‘very well established’ methodology. See A  v BBC [2014] UKSC 25 and compare Khuja v Times Newspapers [2017] UKSC 25.

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2.242  The mistake was additionally aggravated in that the Court of Appeal made errors in its use of ‘limited public interest’ in publication in the case and in its introduction of that supposed interest into a balancing exercise. Criticism of conduct ‘cannot be a pretext for invasion of privacy by disclosure of alleged sexual infidelity which is of no real public interest in a legal sense’ (para [21]). Criticism of putative infidelity ‘cannot be the guise under which the media can disclose kiss and tell stories of no public interest in a legal sense is confirmed by a series of European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) judgments’ (para [22]).1 Citing Armonienė v Lithuania [2009] EMLR 7, para 39; Mosley v United Kingdom [2012] EMLR 1, para  114; Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v France (Application No  40454/07) [2015] ECHR 992, paras 100–101.

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2.243 In PJS (at paras 25–37), the argument concentrates on the Court of Appeal’s further error by drawing too close an assimilation of a claim based on the tort of invasion of privacy with breach of confidence and its misguided consequences. Survival of a claim in protection of privacy does not depend, as in confidentiality, on how well known facts are: ‘First, a quantitative approach overlooks the invasiveness and distress involved, even in repetition of private material. Repetition of known facts about an individual may amount to unjustified interference with the private lives not only of that person but also of those who are involved with him’. Second, open hard copy exposure, as well no doubt as further internet exposure, is likely to add significantly to the overall intrusiveness and distress involved. In Mosley, in reality it could be said that there was nothing left for the court to protect by an injunction. This should be compared with the two CTB cases involving a famous soccer player, married with a family, playing away sexually.1 In CTB, an interim injunction had been granted to restrain disclosure of information about an alleged sexual relationship. Lord Mance emphasised that the modern law of privacy is not concerned solely with

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   305 information or ‘secrets’: ‘it is also concerned importantly with intrusion’.2 It is not about horses having bolted or cats out of bags. It is to prevent ‘wall-to-wall excoriation in national newspapers, whether tabloid or “broadsheet”, which is likely to be significantly more intrusive and distressing for those concerned than the availability of information on the Internet or in foreign journals to those, however many, who take the trouble to look it up’.3 CTB v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWHC 1326 (QB) and 1334 (QB). Eady J in CTB v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWHC 1326 (QB) stated at para [23]: ‘It is important always to remember that the modern law of privacy is not concerned solely with information or “secrets”: it is also concerned importantly with intrusion’. See also McKennitt v Ash [2008] QB 73, at 80 and 87. 3 Lord Mance at [29], quoting CTB  v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2011]  EWHC  1326 (QB), paras [23]–[26]. 1 2

The discussion of section 12 of the HRA 2.244  Lord Mance stated (at para [34]) that, in relation to s 12 of the HRA and publication of journalistic material and the factor identified in section 12(4)(a) (ii), the extent to which it is, or would be, in the public interest for the material to be published, the present appeal had to be approached, on the evidence presently available and discussed above: ‘on the basis that there is and would be effectively no public interest in a legal sense in further disclosure or publication. As to the factor in section 12(4)(a)(i), the requirement to have particular regard to the extent to which journalistic material (or conduct connected with such material) “has, or is about to, become available to the public” does not preclude a court, when deciding whether to grant or lift injunctive relief, from having regard to both a) the nature of the journalistic material involved and the medium in which it is, or is to be, expressed, and b) the extent to which it is already available in that medium and the extent to which steps are being or can be taken to remove or limit access to any other publication in that or any other medium. In short, the question whether material has, or is about to, become available to the public should be considered with reference to, inter alia, the medium and form in relation to which injunctive relief is sought.’ The Court of Appeal focused too narrowly on the disclosures already made on the internet, the majority ruled, and did not give sufficient weight to the ‘qualitative difference in intrusiveness and distress likely to be involved in what is now proposed by way of unrestricted publication by the English media in hard copy as well as on their own internet sites’ (para [35]). 2.245  Attention focused (in para [36]) on section 12(4)(b) of the HRA, which had particular relevance in relation to the appellant’s and his partner’s children. The respondents subscribed to the Independent Press Standards Organisation (‘IPSO’) (para 2.252), whose Editors’ Code of Practice of January 2016 provided

306  Chapter 2 that ‘Everyone is entitled to respect for his or her private and family life’ and that editors ‘will be expected to justify intrusions into any individual’s private life without consent’ (clause 3(i) and (ii)). The Code notes that there can be exceptions in the public interest, emphasising, however, that ‘editors must demonstrate an exceptional public interest to over-ride the normally paramount interests of [children under 16])’. The last point echoes the thinking in article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (providing that ‘In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration’) which has in turn informed the ECtHR’s and United Kingdom courts’ understanding of Article 8.1 of the ECHR.1 Citing ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] 2  AC  166, H  v Lord Advocate 2012 SC (UKSC) 308, H (H) v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic (Genoa) [2013] 1 AC 338 and Zoumbas v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] 1 WLR 3690.

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2.246  Lord Mance agrees with Baroness Hale that the rights of the children involved were not adequately protected by the Court of Appeal’s discharge of the injunction. He also holds that discharging the injunction cannot be justified because there is a remedy in damages, which is of very uncertain status. In Mosley v News Group Newspapers [2008]  EMLR  20, it has been held that exemplary or punitive damages are not recoverable at common law for misuse of private information. However: ‘the contrary remains open to argument at higher levels, and whether an account of profits might be claimed is likewise open. In future, there may be a statutory possibility of obtaining an award of exemplary damages against a publisher not a member of an approved regulator; that is under sections 34–36 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013, if a court were to be satisfied that the respondents’ conduct “has shown a deliberate or reckless disregard of an outrageous nature for the claimant’s rights”, that “the conduct is such that the court should punish the defendant for it” and that “other remedies would not be adequate to punish that conduct”. But no approved regulator at present exists, so that the section has no application to the present case.’ (PJS, para [42]) 2.247  Lord Toulson dissented. He approached the case on traditional grounds of confidentiality on which he has produced a leading monograph. He observed (at para [88]), ‘In my view the court needs to be very cautious about granting an injunction preventing publication of what is widely known, if it is not to lose public respect for the law by giving the appearance of being out of touch with reality’. He did not agree with Eady J’s statement in Mosley (namely, that exemplary damages may not be awarded for a breach of privacy) was the final word on that topic although neither had the majority. For Lord Toulson, Lord Mance had worked on the basis that, because damages may be an inadequate remedy, this was a positive reason to grant an otherwise inappropriate injunction (para [92]). In Richard v BBC & South Yorkshire Police1 the High Court awarded Sir Cliff Richard £210,000 general damages against the BBC (the police force had settled

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   307 the claim) after the court ruled that Sir Cliff’s legitimate expectation of privacy had been breached when the BBC broadcast a news story of an investigation into Sir Cliff concerning historical child sex abuse allegations. The context was one of media scoops and sensationalism. There was no public interest in disclosure, it was ruled. The court was careful to rule that privacy in such information was not an invariable rule and was very fact sensitive (see para  2.276). The case nonetheless has important implications for media, press and police investigations and searches and disclosure of information. [2018] EWHC 1837 (Ch). See Hannon v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2015] EMLR 1; PNM v Times Newspapers Ltd [2014] EMLR 30; ERY v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2017] EMLR 9; ZXC v Bloomberg LP [2017] EMLR 21. In PNM v Times Newspapers [2017] UKSC 49 the claimant sought an injunction to prevent reporting of events at a public criminal trial in which he was not a defendant: ‘PNM’s application is to prohibit the reporting, however fair or accurate, of certain matters which were discussed at a public trial. These are not matters in respect of which PNM can have had any reasonable expectation of privacy’: para 34(1), per Lord Sumption.

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THE PRESS AND MEDIA1 2.248  A  Protection of Privacy Bill narrowly failed in the Commons as long ago as 1988–89. This would have given wide protection to individuals against unauthorised disclosure of information about them, basically by the press, even though true. They would have been given a right of action, even though there was nothing defamatory in what was published: it was simply an invasion of privacy. A defence for the press or media would exist where ‘the subject matter was of public concern and that the publication was for the public benefit’. The prime minister has revived the discussion of a need for a privacy law in 2011. M Tugendhat and I Christie The Law of Privacy and the Media (3rd ed, 2016); G Robertson and A Nicol Media Law (5th edn, 2007); R Clayton and H Tomlinson Privacy and Freedom of Expression 2nd ed (2010). According to Reporters without Borders 2018 Press Freedom Index the UK scored 40th out of 180 countries in terms of press freedom. Only Italy as a large European country had a lower ranking than the UK: https://rsf.org/en/ranking (26/04/2018).

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2.249  The Prime Minister’s initiatives included establishing the Leveson inquiry in July 2011 to investigate the ‘culture, ethics and practice’ of the press. Leveson was a Court of Appeal judge. As he drily reported in November 2012, in presenting his recommendations, there had been seven inquiries into the press in since 1947.1 Every major newspaper had operated under a voluntary code since 1989 covering invasion of privacy and complaints. In June 1990, the Calcutt Report on privacy2 recommended the creation of a Press Complaints Commission, initially on a non-statutory basis. After repeated chances for press improvement at the ‘last chance saloon’ the Commission’s Code of Practice and the Commission continued to operate on a non-statutory basis. It remained voluntary and was financed by a levy on the press and magazines. Too often, some newspapers simply ignored its rulings. At the time of the cessation of the News of the World in the phone-hacking scandal in 2011, a scandal which still rumbles on, the Commission’s abolition was widely predicted, predictions encouraged by the then Prime Minister.

308  Chapter 2 Some form of statutory regulation was anticipated. Despite the scandal engendered by the News of the World and other sectors of the press, a free press is a bastion of democracy, a point repeated many times in recent years by senior judges. Regulation must not lead to censorship or political interference with the press. Public-interest journalism must be protected, but so too must individual integrity and dignity. The argument was made that a successor body had to be completely independent of the press, although it will be paid for by levies on the press. Its budget will have to increase significantly to ensure its effectiveness. To be successful, membership by the press will be compulsory. The body will have to be equipped with full powers of investigation and enforcement. A new code would have to cover guidance on its complaints process which would be unlikely to cover legal or contractual matters. The Commission Guidance covered accuracy, opportunity to reply, as well as comment, conjecture and fact, listening devices, hospitals, misrepresentation, harassment, payment for articles, intrusions into grief or shock, innocent relatives or friends, photographs or interviews of children, children in sex cases, victims of crime, financial journalism, confidential sources and the ‘public’s interest’ in exposing wrongdoing. It also contained guidance on privacy. But, the Commission was seen as ‘toothless’. Report into the Culture, Ethics and Practices of the Press (2012) https://www.gov.uk/government/ publications/leveson-inquiry-report-into-the-culture-practices-and-ethics-of-the-press (11/05/2018). House of Commons Paper HC 780 I-IV (2012–13), Executive Summary HC 779 (2012–13) http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/hc1213/hc07/0780/0780.asp. 2 Calcutt Report Cm 1102 (1990). See J Rosenburg Privacy and the Press (2003) and M Fenwick and G Phillipson Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act (2006). 1

2.250  Leveson conducted open televised hearings throughout 2011 and 2012 into a plurality of abuses covering phone hacking, as well as police and press and government relationships.1 The inquiry was set up under the Inquiries Act 2005 by the Prime Minister. A major omission was social media and the internet. Leveson stated in his opening remarks: the focus of the Inquiry is ‘the culture, practices and ethics of the press’ in the context of the latter’s relationship with the public, the police and politicians. ‘All of these matters overlap, and my goal must be to consider what lessons, if any, may be learned from past events and what recommendations, if any, should be made for the future, in particular as regards press regulation, governance and other systems of oversight.’ The fear, and it is understandable, is that too powerful a regulator will stifle independence or, in time, it may seek to foster restraints on speech – it will become a de facto licensor. Leveson was critical of the DPA  1998. He reported that the DPA placed ‘unnecessary and inappropriate barriers in the way of regulatory law enforcement’. He recommended that s  32 which concerned the press essentially and which gave special protection to journalism, art and literature was too broad and should be confined. See para 2.249 above.

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2.251  The government did not accept Leveson’s major recommendation for independent regulation with statutory back-up and opted instead for a

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   309 body under royal charter, the Press Recognition Panel (para  2.171). The Press Complaints Commission was dissolved. The Panel will recognise press regulators. So far, one has been recognised (IMPRESS), which receives funding from Max Mosley, but it has hardly any significant press members within its regime. These are mainly local newspapers and websites. As of May 2018, there are no details of any complaints. Several large newspaper groups joined IPSO which has its own editorial code.1 The Guardian, Observer and Financial Times (which describes its scheme as ‘rigorous’) introduced their own ‘independent’ forms of self-regulation. One recommendation was accepted. Section 40 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 was enacted, but never brought into force, to act as an incentive to newspapers to join a recognised regulator in relation to the award of costs against them even if successful in a breach of confidence, misuse of private information, malicious falsehood, harassment or defamation action. Basically, if they were not members of a recognised regulator, costs could be awarded against them in such litigation. We saw the provisions on data protection above which were introduced (against the government’s wishes) in the Lords which were modelled on s 40. These were removed in the Commons. Paragraph 22 of the ExN to the DP Bill explains that DPA 2018 omits sections 77 to 78 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. Sections 77 to 78 were no longer required because of new offences in clauses 162–176 (Part 6 of the DPA 2018) of the DP Bill. The sections in the 2018 Act introduced an order-making power to increase the maximum penalty for the offence of unlawfully obtaining data under section 55 of the 1998 Act (blagging) and defences for journalistic activity. Custodial sentences were introduced. The provisions were never commenced much to the IC’s criticism.2 On 1  March 2018, the government announced that Leveson Part Two into press governance, the police and illegality would not take place. This was despite publication of a letter from Leveson arguing that the Part Two inquiry was essential. An attempt, supported by the former leader of the Labour party, in May 2018 to revise the Part Two inquiry within the DP  Bill failed.3 The Lords were unsuccessful in their attempts to insert such a clause. The terms would have been wider than the first Leveson inquiry and included DP breaches by the press and broadcasters as well as the role of social media websites and ‘fake news’. A free press is a bastion of democracy, but the power of the press was displayed dramatically in the thwarting of Leveson. https://www.ipso.co.uk/ (16/05/2018). Details on investigations and complaints are at https://www. ipso.co.uk/rulings-and-resolution-statements/ (16/05/2018). It has a journalists’ whistleblowing hotline. 2 See IC DN FS50419834 (9 August 2012). Offences were also contained in the Computer Misuse Act 1990. 3 Hansard 9  May 2018 col 713. It seemed there would be a form of Leveson II for Northern Ireland but not the mainland raising suspicion of a deal to defeat the amendment by support of the Ulster Democratic Unionists. 1

2.252  The IPSO code provides guidance on accuracy, privacy, harassment, intrusion into grief or shock, reporting suicide, children, children in sex cases, hospitals, reporting crime, clandestine devices and subterfuge, victims of

310  Chapter 2 sexual assault, discrimination, financial reporting, confidential sources, witness payments in criminal trials, payments to criminals and the public interest. On privacy, it writes:1 ‘i) Everyone is entitled to respect for his or her private and family life, home, health and correspondence, including digital communications. ii) Editors will be expected to justify intrusions into any individual’s private life without consent. In considering an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy, account will be taken of the complainant’s own public disclosures of information and the extent to which the material complained about is already in the public domain or will become so. iii) It is unacceptable to photograph individuals, without their consent, in public or private places where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.’ IPSO code of practice: https://www.ipso.co.uk/editors-code-of-practice/ (11/05/2018).

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2.253  It has been noted that under HRA 1998, s 12(4) in dealing with cases where the respondent claims or it appears to the court that the material in question concerns journalistic, literary or artistic material and relief is sought which might affect the exercise of the Art 10 right if granted, the court is to have regard to any code on privacy in deciding whether to grant relief affecting the Convention right of freedom of expression as well as having ‘particular’ regard to the Art 10 right. This could be important both in terms of breaches of the code and awards of injunctions and damages. 2.254  Leveson addressed the world of social media in one page of his 2,000page report. Social media regulation has now become a central issue in regulation of communications. In his recommendations he wrote (para 3(4)): ‘There is a qualitative difference between photographs being available online and being displayed, or blazoned, on the front page of a newspaper such as the Sun. The fact of publication in a mass circulation newspaper multiplies and magnifies the intrusion, not simply because more people will be viewing the images, but also because more people will be talking about them. Thus, the fact of publication inflates the apparent newsworthiness of the photographs by placing them more firmly within the public domain and at the top of the news agenda.’ This was quoted with approval by Lord Mance in PJS (paras 2.238 et seq). One can sense the unease among the tabloid press that this may be missing an important target. The Financial Times editorial for 9  May 2018 wrote: ‘[newspaper] publications operate in a more constrained regulatory and economic environment’. 2.255  A statutory Broadcasting Standards Commission existed for broadcasting, having been established under the Broadcasting Act 1996 and which replaced the Broadcasting Standards Council and Broadcasting Complaints Commission of the Broadcasting Act 1990. It has now been replaced by provisions under the Communications Act 2003 which place the Office of Communications under a

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   311 duty to set, review and revise ‘such standards for the content of programmes’ to be included in TV and radio programmes to secure the ‘standards objectives’ set out in s 319(2) of the 2003 Act. Section 324 specifies the procedures, including the publication of a draft code, that OFCOM must go through in setting and publicising standards. As well as these provisions, OFCOM will be bound to comply with the HRA and it is under a statutory obligation to take account of such international obligations as the Secretary of State may notify to them. The courts have ruled that the erstwhile Commission was correct to criticise a programme which broadcast a photograph of a child who had been murdered several years previously after a complaint by the parents whose privacy had been unjustly interfered with.1 The Court of Appeal has also ruled that a company has a right under the code not to have its privacy infringed when concealed cameras took pictures in the company’s shop after various accusations of selling second-hand goods represented as new. This was in spite of the fact that, under Art 8 of the ECHR, companies, it is presumed, cannot enjoy human rights.2 The BBC has its own internal complaints procedures for complaints about accuracy, bias and impartiality and these arrangements have been criticised by the Lords Communications Committee (para  10.3 below). Ofcom deals with complaints against the BBC about privacy breaches and fairness.3 R v Broadcasting Complaints Commission, ex p Granada TV Ltd [1995] EMLR 163, CA. R v Broadcasting Standards Commission, ex p BBC (Liberty Intervening) [2000] 3 All ER 989, CA; Niemietz v Germany (1992) 16 EHRR 97. 3 https://bbcwatch.org/complaints/ (11/08/2018). 1 2

INJUNCTIONS AND SUPER-INJUNCTIONS 2.256  The use of super-injunctions to protect privacy and confidentiality has been widely reported as a serious infringement on freedom of speech. Certainly attempts to prevent reporting of Parliamentary debates raising issues involved in litigation were clearly misguided.1  A  typical form of such an injunction is: ‘The Defendants must not disclose the identity of the Claimant in this action or the nature of the action or the relief sought and granted, save for the purpose of this action.’ Additionally, the fact that proceedings are taking place may be prohibited from disclosure: see Terry v Persons Unknown [2010]  EWHC  119 (QB) for a discussion of principles.2 There are also orders for anonymised injunctions to prevent the reporting of parties’ identities. The use of superinjunctions generated a great deal of controversy: it was revealed in Parliament and on Twitter who had been awarded such injunctions including the failed RBS banker Fred Goodwin and footballer Ryan Giggs. The leaks by Twitter provoked the seeking of orders from the courts requiring the release of the identities of those responsible (paras 11.47 et seq). The Lord Chief Justice highlighted the dangers of outright war between the press and media and the courts. Lord Neuberger was appointed to set up a committee to enquire into the use of superinjunctions and the report (‘Report of the Committee on Super-Injunctions: Super-Injunctions, Anonymised Injunctions and Open Justice’) was published in May 2011.3 A practice direction has been issued under the name of the Master of the Rolls on ‘Super-Injunction and Anonymised Injunction Data Collection

312  Chapter 2 and Practice Guidance for Non-Disclosure Injunctions’.4 The report’s terms of reference covered practice and procedure bearing in mind HRA 1998, s 12, the impact on open justice, a clear definition of ‘super-injunction’ and makes proposals for reform especially to the Civil Procedure Rules and Practice Directions. The report states that open justice is fundamental but not absolute and derogations may be made to the extent ‘strictly necessary’ to secure the proper administration of justice. Injunctions have to be supported by clear and cogent evidence and cannot be awarded to ‘become in practice permanent’ (p v). Practice guidance should be issued setting out principles on ‘interim nondisclosure orders’. The guidance will deal with HRA 1998, s 12 and ‘state that it will be a very rare case where advance notice of such an application to media organisations … can be justifiably withheld’ (p v). Draft model orders are set out in the annex. Use of specialist judges to hear such applications was not justifiable or practicable. The feasibility of a data collection system for all interim nondisclosure orders on an annual basis and its publication should be considered. The MoJ, Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service and the House authorities should consider the feasibility of a streamlined system for answering sub judice queries from the Speakers’ offices (p vi). No court order could interfere with Parliament’s absolute privilege of freedom of debate under Art 9 Bill of Rights 1689; such an attempt would be unconstitutional. On newspaper reports of Parliamentary proceedings, we quote at length: ‘Media reporting of Parliamentary proceedings is protected by the Parliamentary Papers Act 1840, which provides an absolute immunity in respect of civil or criminal proceedings for Hansard and any other publication made by order of Parliament. It also provides an absolute privilege for any individual who publishes a copy of Hansard. The 1840 Act also provides a qualified privilege in civil or criminal proceedings for individuals who publish a summary of material published in Hansard. Qualified privilege arises where such a summary is published in good faith and without malice. There is no judicial decision as to whether a summary of material published in Hansard which intentionally had the effect of frustrating a court order would be in good faith and without malice. Where media reporting of Parliamentary proceedings does not simply reprint copies of Hansard or amount to summaries of Hansard or parliamentary proceedings they may well not attract qualified privilege. Where media reporting of Parliamentary proceedings does not attract qualified privilege, it is unclear whether it would be protected at common law from contempt proceedings if it breached a court order. There is such protection in defamation proceedings for honest, fair and accurate reporting of Parliamentary proceedings. There is no reported case which decides whether the common law protection from contempt applies. There is an argument that the common law should adopt the same position in respect of reports of Parliamentary proceedings as it does in respect of reports of court proceedings.’ (p vii)

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   313 RJW and SJW v The Guardian newspaper and persons unknown (Claim No HQ09). See Lord Neuberger’s lecture on privacy: https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-121128.pdf ; Nutuli v Donald [2010] EWCA Civ 1276; Grey v UVW [2010] EWHC 2367 QB; JIH v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 42; A v Independent News and Media Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 343. 3 https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Reports/super-injunctionreport-20052011.pdf (11/05/2018). 4 http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications-and-reports/guidance/super-injunction-andanonymised-inj-data-collection-and-guidance-non-disclosure-inj. 1 2

2.257  The failure of the injunctions in several cases to ‘hold the ring’ and the apparent inability of the threat of contempt proceedings against the bloggers and others impelled the Prime Minister to set up a joint Parliamentary committee to examine privacy protection, regulation of online social networks and the role of the former Press Complaints Commission (below). 2.258  There is a genuine fear among the press that the use of super-injunctions is reintroducing the draconian ‘gagging writ’ preventing free speech. A careful balance has to be struck between an individual’s right to privacy under Art 8 ECHR, even for those engaging in dubious but lawful practices, and the rights of the press and media to report under Art 10  ECHR on hypocrisy, double standards by the setters of public opinion, politicians, those in positions of trust and special influence or where there is a genuine public interest, as opposed to a salacious or prurient interest, in knowing of ‘private’ activity. It may be that the law can only set general guidelines on the balance that has to be struck between privacy and freedom of speech, even if the principles were in legislation, a move which has been supported by David Cameron. A general rule would be dangerous and case-by-case application of the principles may be the only workable way forward to prevent one right automatically trumping the other. 2.259  It has been observed that both the Human Rights Act 1998 and the DPA 1998 seek to protect freedom of speech in relation to journalism, literature, art and now academic work under the DPA  2018. The Court of Appeal has ruled that the rule in Bonnard v Perryman1 is not changed by HRA 1998, s 12(3). That rule stated that once a defendant in a libel trial had verified that he would justify allegedly defamatory comments which he intended to publish at trial, the court would only exceptionally issue an injunction in prior restraint.2 Privacy protection claims have undermined that robust approach. [1891] 2 Ch 269. Greene v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2005] 1 All ER 30. In Greene, the CA assumed that reputation was protected by Art 8 (Radio France v France Application No 53984/00, 30 March 2004). However, reputation was not as perishable a commodity as personal privacy/confidentiality ‘which once breached is lost for ever’ and applying the test: is the court satisfied that the claimant is likely to establish at full trial that publication should not be allowed (as explained in Cream Holdings [2004] 4 All ER 617 (HL – see para 2.224 above) was too restrictive of freedom of speech in defamation actions. The test in s 12(3) was not suited to the procedures of defamation actions but is appropriate for confidentiality litigation. The s 12(3) test was intended to strengthen the protection for the media in interlocutory proceedings, the inadequacy of which was represented by the decision in American Cyanamid [1975] 1 All ER 504 (HL). See CDE v MGN Ltd [2010] EWHC 3308 (QB). See Taveta Investments Ltd v Financial Reporting Council [2018] EWHC 1662 (Admin) where the court in a judicial review case ruled that the threshold for an interim injunction in a judicial review was higher and more onerous than in private litigation. This concerned publication of a damning FRC report on the failures of auditors in the BHS collapse and Sir Philip Green.

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314  Chapter 2 2.260  While the press are perceived to view privacy with suspicion, it should be noted that section 4 of the Defamation Act 2013 provided a defence to defamation of publication as a matter of public interest among other strengthened defences for defamation claims. Subsection (4) requires the court, in considering whether the defendant’s belief was reasonable, to make such allowance for editorial judgement as it considers appropriate. The Act followed the Supreme Court’s judgment in Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd [2012]  UKSC  11 which gave wider ambit to a public interest defence to defamation under common law.

DATA EXCHANGE, MATCHING AND INFORMATION SHARING AND OTHER PROBLEMS1 2.261  Before examining this issue, one should note FS50177136 which concerned a request to the Cabinet Office for information regarding a Cabinet Committee that was formed in order to consider data sharing within the public sector.2 Some information was provided, but the request for minutes of certain meetings and the name and job titles of the members of the Cabinet Committee were refused under FOIA 2000, ss 35 and 40 respectively. In relation to the request for minutes, the Commissioner found that ss 35(1)(a) and 35(1)(b) were engaged because: (1) Cabinet Committees provide a framework for government to consider major policy decisions; (2) the minutes record suggestions and proposals to improve data sharing and no firm policy decision had been taken at the time of the request; (3) the minutes were recorded for the purpose of providing ministers with an accurate account of the meetings; (4) s 35(5) explicitly makes reference to proceedings of any committee of the Cabinet. The public interest favoured non-disclosure because it was important to protect the convention of collective responsibility. To disclose the information would lead to government time being spent commenting on, and defending, individual views expressed in a Cabinet Committee rather than the position of the government (good analysis on this point: paras 33–42). As regards the request for names, etc, the Commissioner found that s 40 was engaged and the information was protected under the first DPP. https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/data-sharing/. Note the decision in The Christian Institute v The Lord Advocate [2016]  UKSC  51 on proposals to establish the Named Person Service in Scotland to protect the interests of all children in Scotland under the Children and Young People (Scotland) Act 2014. The scheme as established posed real difficulties for the provisions of the 1998 Act as well as Art 8 of the ECHR, despite its good intentions in allowing data sharing of information being likely to protect the interests of children and not a strict necessity test and in failing to specify clear criteria for sharing meant Part 4 of the 2014 Act was not in accordance with the law. 2 Law Commission Data Sharing Between Public Authorities (2014) HC 505 (2013–14) Paper 351. The report was laid before Parliament and awaits a response: https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/ lawcom-prod-storage-11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2015/03/lc351_data-sharing.pdf (14/05/2018). 1

2.262  It must be remembered that such data exchanges must be in accordance with permissible boundaries of the rights, duties, obligations, definitions and principles of the DPA  2018 and the DP legislation. Various statutes and regulations allow for the sharing of information by public authorities: Social Security Administration Act 1992, s  110 gives powers to require information

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   315 about employees from employers. Powers are provided to obtain information, and pass information on, in the Child Support, Pensions and Social Security Act 2000, ss  13 and 42 respectively (and see Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 (Data Sharing Code of Practice) (Revocation) Order 2007, SI 2007/3447). The Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999, ss 72 and 80 allow for sharing of information between governmental bodies, as do the Social Security Administration (Fraud) Act 1997, s  1; Social Security Act 1998, s  3; and Social Security Fraud Act 2001 (SSFA 2001), ss 5 and 6, as well as Finance Act 1997, s 110. The SSFA 2001 provides additional powers for authorities to obtain information and deals with electronic access to information, provides for a code of practice on the use of information powers for exchange of information with overseas authorities and the exchange of information between authorities administering benefit. Finance Act 2003, ss 197 and 198 concern the exchange of information between taw authorities of member states under the Mutual Assistance Directive (Council Directive 77/799/EEC, as amended). Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 115 and the protocol from the Home Office are examined below (paras 2.271 et seq). The Childcare Act 2006 has provisions in ss 37, 56, 64, 69, 90, 92 and 104 (and see Childcare (Supply and Disclosure of Information) (England) (Amendment) Regulations 2008, SI  2008/961 and Childcare (Early Years and General Childcare Registers) (Common Provisions) Regulations 2008, SI 2008/976. The Statistics and Registration Service Act 2007, ss 42 to 46 (with Sch 2) allow existing information flows to continue between the board, as the legal successor body to the Office of National Statistics, and: the General Register Office (s  42); the relevant Secretary of State, and Welsh Ministers, for patient registration data (ss 43 and 44); HMRC (ss 45 and 46, Sch 2); the Bank of England and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (s 46 and Sch 2). Supplementary powers are in ss 47–54. The area of criminal justice and anti-terrorism provides numerous examples.1 This is just a sample (and see DPA 2018, s 195). The Digital Economy Act 2017 provides the most comprehensive source of data exchange (para 2.269 below). With regard to police: Marcel v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis [1992] 1 All ER 72, but cf Frankson and others v Home Office; Johns v Same [2003] EWCA Civ 655 (8 May 2003), CA.

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2.263  The Information Commissioner (IC) has expressed concern that the use of such provisions should protect privacy rights. Joined-up government encourages information sharing as under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and the Children Act 2004. In the White Paper Modernising Government,1 departments and public bodies were urged to work closely with the IC, to carry through the commitment to openness, to use the IC’s powers in relation to assessments and to promote codes of practice, to deploy privacy-enhancing technologies and to provide a proper and lawful basis for information sharing and matching. The DSS, DETR and local authorities have discussed developments concerning ‘high-level guidance on data matching’.2 Following much debate, the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 provided for a code of practice on data sharing now to be contained in the DPA 2018, s 121. The previous statutory provisions were far more extensive. Cm 4310 (1999). DPC Annual Report 2000 ch 5.

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316  Chapter 2 2.264  The IC has produced under the previous legislation, after public consultation, the Statutory Code on Data Sharing, which explains what is meant by data sharing; data sharing and the law; deciding to share data; responsibility, data sharing agreements, privacy impact assessments, data standards and reviewing data sharing arrangements – the latter all under ‘governance’. It continues with the rights of individuals and complaints, things to avoid, the IC’s powers, and penalties and checklists. The code had been approved by the Secretary of State and had been laid before Parliament.1 The IC intends the code to provides practical advice to all organisations, whether public, private or third sector, that share personal data and covers systematic data sharing arrangements as well as ad hoc or one-off requests to share personal data. Adopting the good practice recommendations in the code will help organisations, the IC advises, to collect and share personal data in a way that complies with the law, is fair, transparent and in line with the rights and expectations of the people whose data is being shared. One expects similar considerations will apply to the new code. https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/data-sharing/ (11/05/2018).

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2.265  There is also a European and international dimension to data sharing. The importance of this subject is clearly spelt out in the Future Relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union Cm 9593, chs 2 and 3 (2018) and in the UK–EU Withdrawal Agreement and political statement. At the European level, several law enforcement agencies have been established including Europol, which handles criminal intelligence relating to serious international organised crime. A European Joint Supervisory Body supervises data protection. Provision for data protection is made by the conventions or instruments establishing these bodies. Eurojust is a judicial co-operation organisation aimed at improving co-ordination and co-operation between investigators concerned with serious international crime. The UK opted out of Eurojust membership. A  Eurojust Joint Supervisory Body supervises data protection. A  Customs Information System (CIS) exists, supervised by the CIS Joint Supervisory Authority and the European Data Protection Supervisor; and there is Eurodac which is a database of finger prints of applicants for asylum and aliens illegally present in the EU. There is the Schengen Information System (SIS) linked to the abolition of internal border controls and free movement within the EU, which the UK did not sign up to but which it intended to join, although Brexit has changed the dynamic. UK authorities used the system 539 million times in 2017 for suspects and vehicles. The UK co-operates in information sharing under SIS. The UK wishes to continue co-operating in the European Criminal Record Information System and the Passenger Name Records which at present has barriers to full third country participation (Cm 9593 (2018), paras 21–34). This has increasingly become a source of criminal information for police forces throughout the member states. In Case C-482/08 UK v Council of the EU [2011] 1 CMLR 45 ECJ (Grand Chamber) it was ruled that the UK was rightly denied data on the SIS under Council Decision 2008/633 because the UK had not signed up to the common visa system. The government future partnership (after Brexit) paper Security, Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (2017) sets out the government’s wish for close co-operation

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   317 with the EU on law enforcement and data exchange. The paper called for legal clarity on the rules that apply to data and information that were exchanged between the UK and the EU or its Member States under EU provisions on law enforcement and criminal justice co-operation prior to the UK’s exit or during completion of ‘ongoing procedures’.1 This was developed in the white paper on the future relationship with the EU (Cm 9593 (2018), chs 2 and 3). https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/645416/Security__law_enforcement_and_criminal_justice_-_a_future_partnership_paper. PDF. See also UK Security Co-operation after Brexit HC 635 (2017–19) Home Affairs Committee https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmhaff/635/635.pdf (13/08/2018).

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2.266  The UK opted into 35  EU criminal measures in 2015 and in 2016 notified the Commission of its wish to opt into the Prüm decision covering DNA and fingerprint matches and vehicle registration numbers.1 As well as legislation on the sharing of tax data with EU partners, there are wide-ranging developments affecting transfer of personal data in other subject areas. The EU/ UK arrangements include: the Directive on Passenger Name Records (PNR) (para  2.8); the Schengen Information System (SIS) II; the European Arrest Warrant; and the Europol Internet Referral Unit (IRU) which was set up in July 2015 following the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris and which aims to combat terrorist propaganda online. The UK is a significant contributor to the Europol Analysis Projects and has made over 7,400 intelligence contributions to these projects, focused on tackling serious and organised crime and terrorism in 2016. The UK was a key instigator in the creation of the Joint Cybercrime Action Taskforce (J-CAT) founded at Europol in 2014. J-CAT is part of EC3, Europol’s cybercrime centre, and is a forum for specialist officers from Member States and third countries to work in close proximity to drive co-ordinated action against threats from cybercrime. All these arrangements involve data exchanges. In 2018, the EU  Commission proposed a draft regulation and directive on E-evidence to improve cross-border access to electronic evidence. The measures met with considerable resistance from member states.2 Commission Decision (EU) 2016/809 (20 May 2016). https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/criminal-justice/e-evidencecross-border-access-electronic-evidence_en (5/12/2018).

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2.267  The Crime (International Co-operation) Act 2003 is concerned with international mutual support and assistance between multi-jurisdictional police forces. Section 81 amended the DPA 1998 and, through a new DPA 1998 s 54A, gave the UK IC powers to inspect data in Europol, CIS and SIS, and to test and operate equipment used for the purpose of data processing. It allows the IC to inspect personal data recorded in the UK sections of three European information systems (Europol, CIS and SIS) without a warrant. The Conventions require the supervisory authority to have free access to the national sections of the systems. There are savings for data required for the purposes of safeguarding national security. DPA 2018, s 119 is now the governing provision. 2.268  The IC has also indicated that information from the major registers in use in the UK concerning individuals can all too easily be used for unintended or

318  Chapter 2 undesirable purposes – marketing and commercial exploitation, or watching and besetting to highlight practices that one disagrees with eg animal experimentation, genetically modified crops, or persecution of paedophiles.1 The Representation of the People Act 2000 allows for two versions of the electoral register – a full unabridged version and a partial version with details left out. The latter version may be publicly purchased.2 The Privacy and Telecommunications Regulations are examined below and these concern the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the telecoms sector. Readers are referred to the discussion on the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and IPA 2016 in ch 4 (paras 4.200 et seq below). The IC has also noted the difficulties associated with processing data over the internet and guidance has been produced on this subject. In para 2.354 below, there is a discussion of the eIDAS Regulation. There was a massive demand for publication of the sex offenders’ register following the murder of Sarah Payne in July 2000, along the lines of ‘Megan’s law’ in the USA. In some states, pictures, names and other details can be downloaded from a police website. See, for the UK, the Sex Offenders Act 1997 and Sexual Offences Act 2003, Part 2. 2 See R  (Robertson) v Secretary of State [2003]  EWHC  1760. The Representation of the People (England and Wales) Regulations 2001, reg 114, which allows the sale of the full electoral register to credit reference agencies, is not unlawful and does not breach voters’ human rights. R sought judicial review of reg  114, as amended, which allowed the sale of the full electoral register to credit reference agencies. The Regulations had been amended following the decision in R (on the application of Robertson) v Wakefield MDC  [2001]  EWHC  Admin 915, in which it was held that the sale of the register to commercial concerns was unlawful. R  contended that reg  114 was (1) inconsistent with the decision in Robertson, which made it clear that all sales of the full register to commercial concerns were unlawful, and (2) incompatible with the right to free elections under HRA  1998, Sch  1, Part II, Art 3. Refusing the application, that (1) the judge in Robertson had decided that the individual’s right to respect for private life under Art 8 was infringed disproportionately by the sale of the electoral register to commercial concerns who utilised it for direct marketing purposes. Although credit reference agencies were commercial concerns, they did not use the register for direct marketing purposes and sales to such agencies were therefore lawful, Robertson distinguished. And (2) reg 114 permitted the dissemination of information which was a matter of public record to a narrow group of recipients for a limited purpose, subject to conditions. It represented a balance struck by Parliament following a process of consultation. Selling the register under reg 114 would only cause slight interference with the right to vote under Art 3 whereas the policy pursued a legitimate purpose in the public interest by helping to minimise fraud and the cost of credit, while maximising access to credit. Accordingly, the approach adopted by Parliament fell within the wide margin of appreciation applicable to Art 3, Mathieu-Mohin v Belgium (19 (A/113) 88) 10 EHRR 1 applied. See also I-CD Publishing Ltd v The Secretary of State and the Information Commissioner [2003] EWHC 1761 – I-CD argued that the restrictions on selling copies of the register were unlawfully selective and irrational. I-CD owned 192.com, a website that enables its users, on a fee basis, to search for names on its database, which is mainly compiled on the basis of individual local authorities’ edited registers. If a high proportion of a council’s residents opt out of the edited register, the effectiveness of such a service will clearly be reduced. I-CD thus sought judicial review of the decision that they were not eligible to buy copies of the full register. Mr Justice Kay ruled that the regulations were neutral as to the number of credit reference agencies who could purchase the full register as long as they complied with the conditions imposed by the regulations. If I-CD at any time altered its business so as to comply with the conditions, it would be entitled to purchase the full register. 1

2.269  The topic of data and information sharing had clearly been at the forefront of departments when the DPA  1998 came into effect. It is to be hoped that subsequent initiatives will help to bring some coherence to this vast practice. Codes on data sharing within government are common and the Digital

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   319 Economy Act 2017 spawned frenetic activity. The Act followed the chapter in the Conservative manifesto on reforms to the internet. The legislation provides a gateway to enable specified persons, listed in Schedules, to share information for ‘tightly constrained objectives’ (ExN). The ExN continues, ‘Those objectives must be set out in regulations, must be for the improvement or targeting of the provision of a public service or the provision of a benefit to individuals or households, and must also have as their purpose the improvement of the wellbeing of individuals or households’. Objectives have to support a specified function in the PA’s service delivery including administration, monitoring or enforcement of the delivery of the function. To use the gateway, the proposed sharing of information must be for the purpose of one of the specified objectives, and those involved in sharing must be specified persons in relation to that objective. Their use in fuel and water poverty was highlighted. There are provisions on transferring data for research, from the HMRC in non-identifying data including for purposes that are not related to the specific functions of those revenue authorities in the public interest, for and on transfer of statistics and for sharing civil registration information for verification (birth, death, marriage certificates etc) electronically.1 https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/digital-economy-act-part-5-data-sharing-codesand-regulations (15/05/2018). See Digital Government (Disclosure of Information) Regulations 2018. See the Passenger Name Record Data and Miscellaneous Amendments Regulations 2018, SI 2018/598, and Directive (EU) 2016/681.

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2.270  Early examples included a consultation paper For Your Information: How can the Public Sector Provide People with Information on, and Build Confidence in, the Way it Handles their Personal Details, which was prepared in April 2003 (see www.lcd.gov.uk/consult/datasharing/datashare.htm). See also the Government Data Standards Catalogue (www.govtalk.gov.uk). This followed a Cabinet Office paper Privacy and Data Sharing: the Way Forward (2002). The Home Office has produced a Framework for Data Sharing under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, and guidance exists for those working to safeguard children (Working Together to Safeguard Children under Local Authority Social Services Act 1970, s 7).1 See now https://consult.education.gov.uk/child-protection-safeguarding-and-family-law/ working-together-to-safeguard-children-revisions-t/supporting_documents/Working%20 Together%20to%20Safeguard%20Children.pdf (10/05/2018).

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2.271  The Department for Constitutional Affairs also published Privacy and Data Sharing: the Way Forward for Public Services: Guidance on the Law (November 2003).1 The DCA Guidance explains how data sharing may be made through ‘gateways’. These may be express and permissive, such as the Road Vehicles (Registration and Licensing) Regulations 2002 and under Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 115 which enables any information deemed necessary for the compilation of reports in connection with anti-social behaviour orders, sex offender orders and drug treatment and testing orders to be disclosed to any or all of the authorities mentioned in s  115(2). The Children Act 2004 establishes powers to enable information sharing between those services working with children. Local Safeguarding Children Boards will encourage children’s services to work

320  Chapter 2 together to promote children’s welfare. Section 63 of the 2004 Act allows the Inland Revenue to provide information to local authorities for the purposes of child welfare, and adds to the provisions on disclosure contained in Tax Credits Act 2002, Sch 5. www.dca.gov.uk/foi/sharing/toolkit/lawguide.htm#part1 (11/05/2018). The DCA has suggested a general enabling data sharing power which would be implemented by specific regulations. This is concerned with the vires for swapping and relevant considerations.

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2.272  Express mandatory provisions include the Criminal Appeal Act 1995, s 17 allowing the Criminal Cases Review Commission to require a public authority to allow access to, or to give to the Commission, documents in its possession especially in relation to criminal investigations (see s  18 for limitations), and National Audit Act 1983, s 8 (see para 12.19 below).1 See Morris v Director of Serious Fraud Office [1993] Ch 372, where compulsory powers in a criminal investigation to obtain documents from auditors did not authorise their disclosure to liquidators or others.

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2.273  Gateways, the Guidance continues, may be implied. They may be implied as a matter of construction. Power may be implied in the public interest.1 They may be implied by common law or, the Guidance continues, under prerogative powers. In relation to the Consultancy Service List – a list of those on whom there are doubts as to their suitability to work with children – there was at the relevant time no statutory authorisation to pass information on. Operation of the List was lawful but representations were allowed from those included and were made available to prospective employers in the child-care only after an offer of employment was made.2 In relation to local authorities, wide powers may be implied by Local Government Act 1972, s 111(1) and LGA 2000, s 2(1). A local authority possessed authority to communicate its conclusions resulting from an investigation where it reasonably and genuinely believed that a communication was necessary to protect a child at risk of sexual abuse. A  (a headteacher) was dismissed for gross misconduct following investigations pursuant to Children Act 1989, s 47. Such a power, though not express, arose by implication of ss 17, 27, 47 of, and Sch 2 to, the 1989 Act.3 Woolgar v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [1999] 3 All ER 604 (CA); R v Chief Constable of North Wales Police ex p AB [1998] 3 All ER 310 (CA) (see para 1.274, note 1 and para 4.326, note 1). The cases concern publicity for the whereabouts of convicted paedophiles but with safeguards. See R (A) v Herts CC (note 3 below). See also Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 327 and the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, s 140 and Sch 24 on disclosure of information about convictions for child offenders. See IC case FS50300157 where the complainant requested information concerning the most prolific offender aged ten to 15 within the area covered by the public authority. Initially, the public authority refused the request under the exemptions provided by the following sections of the Freedom of Information Act: s 40(2) (personal information), s 44(1) (statutory prohibitions to disclosure), s 30(1) and (2) (information held for the purposes of investigations) and s 38(1) (endangerment to health and safety). During the Commissioner’s investigation, the stance of the public authority changed and it cited s 12(1) of the Act as it believed that compliance with the requests would exceed the cost limit of £450. The Commissioner found that it was reasonable for the public authority to estimate that the cost of the requests would exceed the limit and so it was not obliged to comply with these requests. However, the Commissioner also found that the public authority failed to comply with s 17(5) of the Act in that it did not cite s 12(1) within 20 working days of receipt of the requests.

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Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   321 In R v Worcester CC and Secretary of State ex p SW Case CO/4550/99, Newman J stated obiter that the list was compatible with Art 8. See now powers under the Protection of Children Act 1999. 3 R  (A) v Hertfordshire CC  [2001]  EWHC  Admin 211; Re L  (Minors) (Sexual Abuse: Disclosure) [1999] 1 WLR 299 distinguished. 2

2.274 In Peck v UK1 the claimant was a person whose attempted suicide in a public place had been filmed by CCTV. This was sold inter alia to a national TV broadcasting company who, without any attempt to conceal his identity relayed the broadcast on national TV. LGA 1972, s 111(1) allowed disclosure to media, but an unanonymised broadcast was ‘disproportionate’ interference with Art 8 rights to privacy, the ECtHR held. Application No 44647/98. In R (A) v Herts CC [2001] All ER (D) 259 (CA), it was accepted that an implied data sharing power existed under the Children Act 1989; no reliance was made on LGA 1972, s 111(1). An authority informed another authority that a headteacher posed a risk to pupils – relying on AB at para 2.273, note 1 above and R v A Local Authority and Police Authority in the Midlands ex p LM [2000] 1 FLR 612, disclosure should only be made where there was a ‘pressing social need’. Local Government Finance Act 1992, Sch 2, para 17 allows for the supply of information (council tax data) but not personal data. See, on electoral registers, R (Robertson) v City of Wakefield [2002] 2 WLR 889 (para 2.268, note 2 above). On disclosure between authorities, see MS v Sweden App No 00020837/92, X v UK 30 DR 239 (1982), X v Belgium 31 DR 231 (1982) – all justified on facts. See Campbell v UK (1993) 15 EHRR 137: blanket opening of prisoners’ letters a breach of Art 8; see also R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Leech [1993] 4 All ER 539 (CA). Under the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000, orders disqualifying adults working with children may be made. These are not ‘penalties’ in relation to Art 7 of the ECHR and so they may be awarded retrospectively to offences committed before the 2000 Act came into effect: R v Field 2 December 2002 (CA).

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2.275  Clearly, the DPA  2018 and the IC codes will have to try and bring some coherence to this jumble. The DPA, predicated by the GDPR and LED, proclaimed modernisation of data protection, and greater protection of data subjects, and its far greater flexibility for processing under numerous conditions should reduce significantly the need to rely on common law bases. In the late stages of the DP Bill in the Commons, the government announced that it would be suspending a memorandum of understanding between NHS Digital, the body which provides national information, data and IT services for patients, clinicians, commissioners and researchers, and the Home Office on exchange of patients’ data to check immigration breaches. These would only be used for ‘serious crime’ and deportations or where there was a risk to the public. Two reports from the Commons Health and Social Care select committee had recommended the cessation of such data exchange. Civil liberties groups were critical of the vague terms under which exchange could continue.1 It was reported at the same time, following FOI requests, how innocent victims of crime had had their data transferred to the immigration authorities although the policy was apparently brought to cessation in December 2018.2 A  growing concern has arisen in relation to automatic facial recognition technology and the invasive use of this technique in completely innocent activities such as peaceful demonstrations. Prima facie, this practice appears difficult to reconcile with test of necessity and proportionality in protection of Art 8 rights and the unreliable nature of the technology. Legal challenges have been launched.

322  Chapter 2 See Select Committee on Health and Social Care HC  677 (2017–19): https://publications. parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmhealth/677/677.pdf (12/05/2018). The report expressed concern about: incompatibility between the disclosure of information about people in contact with health services and the obligations of confidentiality assumed to apply to that information; the risk that sharing of patients’ addresses with other Government departments will become accepted as normal practice; the wider effect on public perception of the confidentiality of data supplied to the NHS; and the knowledge that information may be passed to immigration authorities could deter people from seeking treatment, resulting in detriment to the individuals concerned, hazard to public health, and greater cost to the NHS due to more expensive emergency treatment needing to be administered later. 2 https://www.pressreader.com/uk/the-guardian/20181207/281668256053775. Home Office requests for access to the National Pupil Database and data on nationality have proved controversial: https:// schoolsweek.co.uk/dfe-schools-must-no-longer-request-pupil-nationality-data/ (06/01/2019). 1

DATA HELD BY THE POLICE AND RECORDS 2.276  Holding of data by the police is governed by the DPA 2018 and a mandatory code of practice and guidance issued under the Police Act 1996. The following subjects tie in closely with the prohibition on forced data subject records requests under the DPA (see para  2.181 above). This concerns the balance to be struck between rehabilitation of offenders, to allow them to put the past behind them whereby convictions and cautions are ‘spent’ where appropriate, and the protection of vulnerable members of the public from unjustified risk from those who, through past behaviour (going beyond convictions), might remain a risk. To address the risk where potential employees seek ‘certain types of employment (particularly involving contact with children or other vulnerable people but extending to other sensitive areas), employers are required to obtain a certificate which identifies prior convictions, cautions and reprimands, including those that are spent, and may go further, providing other details which the police consider impacts on risk’.1 Before examining data holding the High Court ruled that Sir Cliff Richard had a legitimate expectation of privacy in a police investigation concerning historical child sex abuse allegations and that the police force and the BBC were in breach of his privacy rights in disclosing and broadcasting details of a search of his home in relation to the investigations including helicopter footage. The legitimate expectation is a starting point, but that is ‘not to say, and I do not find, that there is an invariable right to privacy’.2 On the facts, there was no public interest served by disclosure. General damages of £210,000 against the BBC, including aggravated damages, were awarded. Claims for special damages against both defendants were to be assessed. Given this ruling, the claims under the DPA 1998 were not considered. R (P) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester [2017] EWCA Civ 321 at [1] per Sir Brian Leveson. Richard v BBC & South Yorkshire Police [2018] EWHC 1837 (Ch), paras 248–249. The judge drew support from various sources (paras 240–244).

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2.277  A  good starting point for the modern system of disclosing police records is the report of the Bichard Inquiry which was published in June 2004 (HC  653 (2003–04)). The inquiry followed the conviction of Ian Huntley, a school caretaker, for the murder of two young girls and the discovery that police checks failed to disclose an ‘extensive history of allegations of sexual offences’

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   323 by Huntley where there was no conviction. Information held on Huntley had been deleted. The police force in question blamed the DPA 1998 for a lack of searchable records. This allegation was subsequently retracted. Police may hold such information where this is justified by an ‘ongoing policing need’. Factors to consider include: the nature of the allegation(s), the strength of evidence supporting an allegation(s) and the seriousness of an allegation(s). But detriment to the individual and the possibly harmful effect of disclosure of inaccurate information, possibly founded upon malicious allegations, to third parties have to be considered. The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO, now National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC)) also alleged that two cases subject to action by the IC had undermined the ability of the Criminal Records Bureau to retain records which would assist employers in protecting the interests of children, ie  in cases like Huntley’s. The IC denied this, pointing out that the two cases in question involved very old conviction records held by the Police National Computer for crimes lacking ‘any degree of seriousness’. Huntley’s case concerned non-conviction data held by local police forces.1 The problem arises in relation to rules on the ‘weeding’ of records. ACPO had devised rules on weeding: in then DPP 5 (‘data … shall not be kept for longer than is necessary’) there were eight pages of guidance on this topic. Some records are retained for life: those relating to crimes of violence or a sentence of six months or more. The IC’s point was that while rules on standard retention are unavoidable, there should be a discretion to depart from them where particular circumstances warrant it. ACPO subsequently suggested that all conviction records should now be retained indefinitely. Annual Report 2003–04, pp 30–31. The quotations in this paragraph come from the annual report. See also on CJA 1987, s 3(5): R (Kent Pharmaceuticals Ltd) v Director of the SFO (2004) Times, 18 November.

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2.278  The ACPO guidance then operative on weeding suggested that in the case of acquittals and ‘cases discontinued without caution’ records should not be retained by local police forces normally beyond a 42-day period. Two exceptions were: cases involving acquittal of unlawful sexual intercourse by a male with a female under 16 and acquittal or discontinuance because of a lack of corroboration. More extensive periods of retention were recommended. Guidance is given on the relevant criteria for extended retention in this case (see Bichard, para  3.74.3). These weeding guidelines were re-incorporated within the 2002 ACPO Code on the DPA. Further developments are analysed below.

Police National Computer1 2.279  Central to police records are the Police National Computer (PNC) and Police National Database (PND). The operation of the PNC was described in Bichard.1 The PNC and PND (below) will form part of a new database, the Law Enforcement Data Service, which is being developed.2 The PNC is a national database of information available to all police forces and law enforcement agencies throughout England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, the Isle of

324  Chapter 2 Man, and the Channel Islands, and the British Transport Police. Non-police bodies with access are listed. The following are some of the details held by PNC: • personal descriptions (not given by PNC bureau); • bail conditions (not given by PNC bureau); • convictions; • custodial history; • wanted or missing reports; • warning markers; • pending prosecutions; • disqualified driver records; • cautions; • drink drive related offences; • reprimands; and • formal warnings. Police National Computer 2014, Home Office: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/ system/uploads/attachment_data/file/488515/PNC_v5.0_EXT_clean.pdf (30/4/2018). A  list of those with access to the PNC is at: https://www.inbrief.co.uk/police/police-national-computer/ Nat Police Chiefs Council ACRO Subject Access Online (30/4/2018). https://www.acro.police. uk/Subject_Access_Online.aspx. NPCC ACRO https://www.acro.police.uk/subject_access.aspx PNC User Manual Version 12.01 (March 2012). 2 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/law-enforcement-data-service-privacy-impactassessment (26/09/2018). 1

2.280  Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) had previously audited police forces on their use of the PNC. In 2011, the Government’s Independent Advisor on Criminality Information Management recommended that HMIC’s audit role be extended to cover all PNC users. This is carried out by HMICFRS.1 ACRO  Criminal Records Office (ACRO) is responsible for criminal record information and improving the links between criminal records and biometric information. ACRO’s principal functions are the provision of police certificates, international child protection certificates and responses to subject access requests that require the collection of information from the PNC. ACRO is not currently inspected as part of HMIC’s force inspection regime. Therefore, in early 2016, ACRO’s chief executive officer invited HMIC to inspect ACRO’s use of the PNC. The inspection did not cover all areas of use. https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/our-work/cat/police-ethics-andaccountability/.

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2.281  There is also the Police National Database together with a Code of Practice on the Police National Database.1 The Police National Database (PND) is available to all police forces and wider criminal justice agencies throughout the United Kingdom, allowing the police service to share local information and intelligence on a national basis. The PND supports delivery of three strategic benefits, which are: to safeguard children and vulnerable people; to counter terrorism; and to prevent and disrupt serious and organised crime.2

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   325 Each force and agency under PND standardises its data, using a specially adapted program that automatically converts disparate methods of recording data into the single method to be used by the PND. The same program automatically converted new data into the format used by the PND. Depending on the characteristics of a force’s databases, it automatically updates the PND, either when new data is input or in daily batches. Before the PND, criminals were able to take advantage of slow or absent intelligence-sharing between forces. While police were able to make national checks of proven facts, such as convictions, through the Police National Computer (PNC), it was difficult for them to check intelligence nationally. This was highlighted following the conviction of Huntley, who had come to the attention of the police, using two different names, in relation to eight separate sexual offences over a four-year period. Had his employers known this, he would not have been given a job as a school caretaker. Bichard reported that there was no common IT system for managing criminal intelligence. In March 2005, he reported that such a system was by no means guaranteed although England was on course for a set of protection principles ‘unrivalled anywhere in the world’. Guidance on retention and erasure of files was produced in 2006 although this was not endorsed by the IC and the most recent guidance is dated 2008. Guidelines issued by the Association of Chief Police Officers (‘the ACPO guidelines’) entitled ‘Exceptional Case Procedure for Removal of DNA, Fingerprints and PNC Records’ (16 March 2006) state that, under the guidelines, removal of data was to be ‘exceptional’. The indefinite retention of such data caused a body of adverse decisions in the courts, led to legislative reform (examined below) and the ACPO guidance was ruled unlawful. A fourth progress report on Bichard was published in May 2007, by which time 21 of the 31 recommendations had been realised. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/code-of-practice-on-the-operation-and-use-ofthe-police-national-database. 2 The following paragraph is from https://www.cgi-group.co.uk/case-study/police-nationaldatabase-joins-forces. 1

2.282  In June 2011, the National Police Improvement Agency (now disbanded and responsibilities assigned to the National Crime Agency, Home Office and College of Policing) launched the PND allowing police forces to share and access locally held information and intelligence on a national basis. Bichard found that for local police systems there was no uniform approach. Interfaces between forces were ‘almost non-existent’ (para 3.63). This should now change. ACPO had taken the lead in implementing and promoting the National Intelligence Model (NIM) – a management framework that requires police forces to analyse and address the methods by which intelligence is obtained, created, used and stored. NIM was expected to be implemented by all forces by April 2004 as defined minimum standards in accordance with the Secretary of State’s National Policing Plan. ACPO produced a Code of Practice on the DPA in 2002 and guidance on management of police information in 2010 (see next paragraph). 2.283  The details for collection, recording, incident records, evaluation, retention, review, disposal and sharing police information are on Management of Police

326  Chapter 2 Information.1 The present Home Office guidance on Statutory Disclosure Guidance was published in 2015.2 Responsibility for placing information on the PNC and its quality and timeliness rests with the Chief Officer of Police of the 43 forces in England and Wales, although information is accessible by other forces in the UK and other bodies (above). The Court of Appeal in Chief Constable of Humberside v IC3 overruled the Information Tribunal in ruling that data held on five individuals from as long ago as 1981 and which involved minor offences did not breach the DPP and were therefore disclosable. This must now be read in the light of the Supreme Court decision in R (T) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] UKSC 35 and other developments below. The police position was that conviction data should not be erased except in ‘very rare circumstances’, although it might occasionally be ‘stepped down’ (ie not disclosed but kept ‘for police eyes only’). The ACPO Guidance on the Management of Police Information (2nd edn, 2010) was superseded in October 2014: https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/information-management/ management-of-police-information/). 2 h t t p s : / / w w w. g o v. u k / g o v e r n m e n t / u p l o a d s / s y s t e m / u p l o a d s / a t t a c h m e n t _ d a t a / file/452321/6_1155_HO_LW_Stat_Dis_Guide-v3.pdf. See Deletion of Records from National Police Systems (2018) NPCC. 3 [2009] EWCA Civ 1079. In R (Catt) v Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police [2015] UKSC 9 the Supreme Court ruled that police retention about individuals was within Art 8. The retention of data in police information systems in the United Kingdom is in accordance with the law: there are some discretionary elements in the scheme, but this is inevitable, and the space of discretionary judgement is limited and subject to judicial review; further, future disclosure is limited by comprehensive restrictions (paras [13]–[17]). On the facts, concerning a 91-year-old peaceful demonstrator who demonstrated with a group containing violent protestors, retention of some data was proportionate. The material is regularly reviewed for deletion according to rational and proportionate criteria contained in the publicly available Code of Conduct and accompanying Guidance (paras [26]–[28]). In the case of harassment a period of two and a half years to retain the intelligence was not disproportionate. [See Preface.] 1

2.284  The ‘step down’ process was abandoned following the decision in Humberside above. The guidance has since been replaced by the National Police Chiefs’ Council in a document entitled ‘Deletion of Records from National Police Systems’ (2015), issued pursuant to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s 63AB(2), as amended by the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.1 The result is that a National Record Deletion Unit has been established to co-ordinate requests for record deletion on grounds articulated in Appendix A. This followed S & Marper v United Kingdom (2009) 48 EHRR 50, where biometric information and PNC record had come into being where it was later learnt that there was no crime, and the individual was eliminated from the inquiry, or there had been a judicial recommendation to that effect. Included, however, is ‘incorrect disposal’ or the product of review within the criminal justice process (for example, the withdrawal of a caution) and importantly where there is a wider public interest to do so. In R (P) (below), Leveson P believed this added a degree of flexibility to a previously over-rigid system but the absence of a review system left itself open to judicial review challenges.2 See the Quality Assurance Framework 2014: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ uploads/attachment_data/file/295392/DBS_Applicant_s_introduction_to_QAF_March_2014. pdf (30/04/2018). 2 [2017] EWCA Civ 321 (paras 2.289 and 2.312 et seq below), at para [71]. 1

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   327 2.285  Eight of Bichard’s recommendations fell to the Department for Education for action. Recommendation 16 led to the development of an online training package on safer recruitment for headteachers, school governors and other school staff involved in recruitment, to ensure staff recruitment practices – including interviews – reflect the importance of safeguarding children.1 Safer recruitment training became mandatory for the recruitment of school staff from 1  January 2010. A recruitment panel must have at least one member who has completed the training or, where an individual is in charge of recruitment, that individual must have completed the training. It is the responsibility of schools to comply. HC 653 (2003–04), p 115 et seq. PNC cannot be relied on as authority regarding convictions if contested: R v Ainscough (Zane Roy) [2006] EWCA Crim 694.

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Police Act 1997, Part V 2.286  The Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) came into operation in June 2001. Part V  of the Police Act 1997 (PA  1997 as amended) created the CRB which was part of the legislative framework for the disclosure of criminal records. It has been replaced by the Disclosure and Barring Service (which is explained at paras 2.322 et seq below). In addition to the disclosure provisions under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 as amended, DBS provides for a system of registration of employers and licensing bodies, and disclosure to them of criminal records; controls to protect confidentiality and an offence of improper disclosure. Certificates would be of three kinds: Criminal Conviction Certificates (Basic Disclosure) under PA 1997, s 112; Criminal Records Certificates (‘standard disclosure’ (SD) under s 113 – including cautions and spent convictions under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 and which must be accompanied by a statement from the prospective employer that the certificate is required for an ‘exempted question’ under the 1974 Act, ie it is excluded by order from the relevant provisions of the 1974 Act (PA 1997, ss 113(2), (5) and 113A(6)); and Enhanced Criminal Records Certificates (‘enhanced disclosure’ (ED/ECR) and the most detailed search), where the employment involves ‘regularly caring for, training, supervising or being in sole charge of people under 18’ (and see SI 2011/719 and note the Protection of Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 as amended below). An ED also covers specified activities with adults in receipt of health care or social care services and applicants for gaming and lottery licences. ED includes not only data from the PNC but also local police force data.1 Distinctions between SD and ED (ECR) are ‘subtle and unclear’ (Bichard, para 4.74). Following R (T)2 a revised scheme for the disclosure of criminal records was brought into effect by secondary legislation passed by affirmative resolution of both Houses. It is set out in the Police Act 1997 (Criminal Records Certificates: Relevant Matters) (Amendment) (England and Wales) Order 2013 (SI 2013/1200) (‘the 1997 Act Amendment Order’); and the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act (Exceptions) Order 1975 (Amendment) (England and Wales) Order 2013 (SI  2013/1198) (‘the 1975 Order Amendment Order 2013’). There were allegations that, in order to speed up the process of certification, police were only referring to PNC data, which were denied: The Guardian, 20 August 2018. 2 See R (T) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police and others [2013] EWCA Civ 25. 1

328  Chapter 2 2.287  The 1974 Act, as amended, introduced a scheme whereby convictions and cautions (including reprimands and warnings) for criminal offences do not have to be disclosed in answer to questions insofar as such convictions and cautions are ‘spent’. A  person with a spent conviction is exempted from liability for failing to disclose such matters in circumstances when they would otherwise have been obliged to do so. The protection provided by the 1974 Act, as amended, is subject to a 1975 Order (made pursuant to s 4(4) of the 1974 Act) which removes the protection from non-disclosure in specified circumstances. In particular, by article 3 of the Order, this protection/exemption is removed in relation to questions asked in order to assess suitability for employment in the various positions listed in Schedule 1 and, by article 4, in relation to applications for jobs, among others, working with children and vulnerable adults. ‘Registered persons,’ see below, are those entered on a register maintained by the Secretary of State containing the names of those who demonstrate a potential requirement of a need to ask exempted questions in relation to employment. 2.288  The revised scheme, amended by the 1997 Act Amendment Order and the 1975 Order, no longer requires disclosure of every spent conviction and caution but, from 29  May 2013, requires disclosure only in the following circumstances: i) Any current conviction or caution, depending on whether, at the time of the conviction or caution, the person concerned was under 18 years of age or aged 18 or over. ii) Any spent conviction or caution in respect of certain specified offences (it includes all offences specified in Schedule  15 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 which includes, for example, assault occasioning actual bodily harm). iii) Any spent conviction in respect of which a custodial sentence or sentence of service detention was imposed. iv) Any spent conviction where the person has more than one conviction: see s 113A(6)(b) of the 1997 Act and art 2A(2) and (3)(c) of the 1975 Order (‘the multiple conviction rule’).1 Where there is more than one conviction, all of them are disclosable throughout the subject’s lifetime. Where there are two or more convictions, they are always disclosable on a CRC or an ECRC. Further, where a conviction is of a specified kind or resulted in a custodial sentence, or is ‘current’ (ie for an adult within the last 11 years and for a minor within the last five years and six months), then it will always be disclosable. The offences listed in s 113A(6D) are extensive, and include murder and offences specified under Schedule  15 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003, ie  more serious offences of violence (including assault occasioning actual bodily harm) and all sexual offences (but not, for example, theft or common assault).

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2.289  The purpose of the above amendment was to remove the criticism that the operation of the disclosure scheme (both under the 1994 Act, as amended, and the 1997 Act) was indiscriminate and provided no (or, in relation to the 1997 Act, very little) flexibility of approach, regardless of the circumstances. This was a central feature of the complaint advanced in T v CCGMP (para 2.307 below) and which was successful in the Supreme Court. In R (P) v Secretary of State [2017] EWCA Civ 321 (on appeal to the SC) the revised scheme itself was subject to legal challenge. Challenges were made to the disclosure of cautions in

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   329 relation to affected adults and reprimands or warnings in relation to children. A challenge was also made that the retention of the data which comprises this information itself represents a breach of Article 8 of the ECHR and that a failure to expunge or delete the caution, reprimand or warning on reasonable request is actionable. Thus, in addition to the challenges to the Secretaries of State as to the compatibility of the statutory scheme with Article 8, there were also challenges addressed to the relevant chief constable (as the DC) in relation to its retention under the DPA. 2.290  Basically, EDs/ECRs contain the information in a SD but must contain other information which the chief officer believes ‘relevant’ for the purposes of the certificate. Employers of those involved with the care and education of children and vulnerable adults, those who work in the criminal justice system and those with responsibilities in awarding certain licences and permits may request an individual applying for a position (the applicant) to apply for disclosure of a certificate under the Act. The employers must be registered by the Secretary of State. The 1997 provisions have been amended (by the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and Serious Organised Crime Act 2005 and significantly in the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 below). The information will be provided to the prospective employer. Access is also allowed for national security vetting. The provisions cover data on the PNC, the National Identification Service and the PND. Information provided will not be subject to the provisions on spent convictions under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 and regulations thereunder.1 The Court of Appeal has ruled that the police do not owe a subject of a criminal record a duty of care under common law in formulating records in relation to their completeness and accuracy. Other remedies were available, the court emphasised, ie judicial review, Art 8 ECHR, HRA 1998, DPA 1998. ‘There could also on appropriate facts be possible remedies for misfeasance in public office, for maladministration to an ombudsman, or under the Police Conduct Complaints Procedure.’2 In R  (Wright) the House of Lords, reversing the decision of the Court of Appeal, found breaches of Articles 6 and 8 of the ECHR where four nurses were placed on provisional barred lists and were prevented from working with vulnerable adults where they had not been given a judicial hearing.3 While the Police Act 1997, Part V does not display a parliamentary intention to overrule common law tests of fairness in disclosing information which did not follow a conviction and identity is in issue, fairness did not on the facts in question necessitate that the Chief Constable provide a hearing to the subject of the record: R (X) v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police [2005] 1 All ER 610 (CA) overruling [2004] 2 All ER 1. The applicant can apply to the Secretary of State for a new certificate if the former believes it is inaccurate: the Secretary of State will decide (PA 1997, s 117). The Secretary of State may request the chief officer to provide additional information which may be relevant and which should be included in the interests of preventing crime and which can be shown to the employer but not the applicant (s  115(8)) or which will be in the certificate and therefore seen by the applicant under s 115(7). Some reforms are introduced under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (below). On disclosure at the Chief Officer of Police’s discretion, see R (L) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2009] UKHL 3 (disclosure on the facts did not breach Art 8 ECHR). However, on a breach of Art 8 ECHR where no review of having one’s details entered for life on the sex offenders register, see R (F) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 17. See also R v Local Authority and Police Authority in the Midlands ex p LM [2002] 1 FLR 612 and X v Y (Employment sex offender) [2004] EWCA Civ 662 on disclosure of cautions relating to a consenting homosexual act in a public toilet. Employer should have

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330  Chapter 2 been notified of caution and Art 8 rights were not engaged: see now Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Part 5, chapter 4. In R (C) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [2011] EWCA Civ 175 the court assessed the importance of maintaining a ‘proper balancing exercise’ in disclosures and whether representations are required. See also Criminal Records Bureau – Delivering Safer Employment HC 453 (2003–04). See R (T) below. 2 Desmond v Nottinghamshire Police [2011] EWCA Civ 3. 3 R (Wright) v Secretary of State for Health [2009] UKHL 3.

2.291  Section 79 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (POFA) repeals ss  113A(4) and 113B(5) and (6) of the 1997 Act. The explanatory material accompanying the Act makes the following points. When a person applies for a standard certificate or an enhanced certificate, the DBS simultaneously issues the relevant certificate to the applicant but also, by virtue of ss 113A(4) and 113B(6), sends a copy of the certificate to the registered body which countersigned the application. A  registered body will usually be the applicant’s employer or prospective employer or other organisation acting on behalf of an employer. The applicant does not have the opportunity to review the certificate and, if desired, challenge the information contained within it, before it is released to an employer. The repeal of ss 113A(4) and 113B(6) removes the provisions that require a copy of a certificate to be sent to the registered body so that the certificate is issued to the applicant only, allowing the applicant to make appropriate representations to the CRB regarding the information released without the disputed information first having been seen by the employer. 2.292  Section 113B(5) of the 1997 Act enabled sensitive (non-conviction) information which might be relevant to an employer to be provided to a registered body without being copied to the applicant. Such a procedure is adopted, for example, ‘where the police are engaged in an ongoing criminal investigation and the premature release of the relevant information to an applicant for an enhanced criminal records certificate might compromise that investigation’. The repeal of s 113B(5) removes the statutory obligation to disclose the relevant information to the registered body in such circumstances. However, the explanatory material points out that ‘it would remain open to the police, using their common law powers to prevent crime and protect the public, to pass such information to a potential employer where they considered it justified and proportionate’. The age of requesters for certificates is set at 16 and for those countersigning applications the age is 18. 2.293  Changes are made in relation to enhanced criminal records and the test to be applied by a chief officer when determining whether additional, nonconviction, information should be included in an enhanced criminal records certificate. In place of the then current test of information which, in the opinion of the chief officer ‘might be relevant’ and ought to be included in the certificate, s 82(1) of POFA substitutes a slightly higher test of information which the chief officer ‘reasonably believes to be relevant’ and which in the chief officer’s opinion ought to be included in the certificate.1 A new s 113B(4A) of the 1997 Act enables the Secretary of State to issue guidance to relevant chief officers about the discharge of their functions under s 113B(4) to provide relevant non-conviction information about an applicant for an enhanced criminal records certificate; a

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   331 relevant chief officer is required to have regard to any such guidance. Since the change under POFA the number of ENs/ECRs with non-conviction etc data included amounts to 0.25 per cent of the total (down from 0.4 per cent).2 An independent monitor reviews a sample of such certificates and also resolves disputes concerning locally held police information deciding whether it should be deleted, amended or remain.3 R (L) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2009] UKHL 3. See Post-legislative Scrutiny of the Protection of Freedoms Act Cm 9579 (2018) https://www.gov.uk/ government/publications/post-legislative-scrutiny-of-the-protection-of-freedoms-act-2012. 3 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/annual-report-of-the-independent-monitor-forthe-disclosure-and-barring-service-2012-to-2013 (13/05/2018). 1 2

2.294  Section 82(4) of POFA inserts new sub-ss (2A) to (2C) into s 117 of the 1997 Act. These make further provision about disputes concerning the accuracy of the information contained in a certificate. The explanatory material explains that, under s 117(2), an applicant in receipt of a criminal conviction certificate, criminal record certificate or enhanced criminal record certificate, who disputes the accuracy of the information contained in such a certificate, may make an application to the Secretary of State for a new certificate. New s 117(2A) provides that such an application may, in particular, request a review of the non-conviction information supplied by a relevant chief officer. On receipt of such a request, the Secretary of State must ask an appropriate chief officer of a police force (which will, in practice, be a different chief officer from that who made the original decision to provide non-conviction information to be included in the disputed certificate) to review the relevancy of the disputed non-conviction information. 2.295  The ExN (para 303) to POFA states: ‘New s 116A of the 1997 Act introduces a procedure for updating certificates on a continuous basis. An applicant (or a registered or other person authorised by the applicant) for a criminal conviction certificate, criminal record certificate or enhanced criminal record certificate must subscribe to the updating arrangements at the time an application for a certificate is submitted and thereafter re-subscribe to those arrangements on an annual basis. The update arrangements will only be put in place in respect of an applicant for a certificate and thereafter renewed on payment of an initial fee and subsequently of an annual fee to be prescribed by regulations made under new section 116A(5) (by virtue of section 125 of the 1997 Act such regulations are subject to the negative resolution procedure). The annual fee will be set at a level necessary to recover the costs of the service and will be offset by the removal of the need to make repeat applications for a criminal records certificate. Under the update arrangements the [DBS] will not, as such, provide any new conviction or other relevant information to the subscriber to the updating arrangements. Instead, by virtue of the definition of “up-date information” in new section 116A(7), in response to a request for update information, the [DBS] will advise the person making the request either that there is no new information that would be include on a new certificate or that a new certificate should be applied for (which would imply that a new certificate would contain new information).’

332  Chapter 2 2.296  Provision is also made in the 2012 Act for conditional cautions and for a person to have offences of buggery or gross indecency between men under the Sexual Offences Act 1956 or earlier legislation to have convictions or cautions disregarded by application to the Secretary of State.

Custody images 2.297  New guidance was issued by the Home Office in 2017 on custody images following the judgment in RMC v MP Commissioner [2012] EWHC 1681 (Admin) that retention, under the Metropolitan Police Service’s policy on the retention of custody images of people not convicted of an offence, was a breach of Article 8. Section 64A of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (‘PACE’) provides police with the power to take facial photographs (known as ‘custody images’) of anyone who is detained following arrest. The guidance states ‘The deletion of the custody images of unconvicted individuals should be considered, upon application, on a case-by-case basis. There should be the presumption that the images of those without convictions will be deleted, in line with APP guidance, unless retention is necessary for a policing purpose as set out in the guidance.1 Even in the case of unconvicted persons there should be a discretion not to delete although the presumption is they should be deleted. Review of the Use and Retention of Custody Images Home Office, 2017. The policy will be reviewed in 2020. See also Gaughran v Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland [2015] UKSC 29 and, on police use (handing to the press) of CCTV photographs of a 14-year-old, Re an Application by JR38 for Judicial Review (NI) [2015] UKSC 42.

1

Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 2.298  This 2006 Act (amended by the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, below) followed a number of episodes where persons with convictions for sexual offences were allegedly allowed by civil servants to work with children. The Act provides that there will be two ‘barred’ lists – one for those who are barred from engaging in regulated activity with children (the ‘children’s barred list’), and one for those who are barred from engaging in regulated activity with vulnerable adults (the ‘adults’ barred list’). The Act also establishes an Independent Safeguarding Authority – like the CRB, this was replaced by the Disclosure and Barring Service. The DBS will maintain the children’s barred list and adults’ barred list and will make decisions about whether an individual should be included in one or both barred lists. The Act contains a right of appeal to the Care Standards Tribunal (now Upper Tribunal) , with the permission of the Tribunal, against inclusion in a barred list on a point of law or on a finding of fact made by the DBS. The Act provides for four routes to inclusion on one or both of the barred lists. These are: ‘automatic inclusion as a result of receiving a caution or conviction for specified offences, or other criteria which may be specified (such as orders, foreign orders or directions, and inclusion on a foreign barred list). There will be no right for the individual to make representations nor a right of

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   333 appeal in these cases. There will be automatic inclusion on one or both of the barred lists as a result of receiving a caution or conviction for certain other specified offences or as a result of having met some certain other specified criteria. There will be a right to make representations and a right of appeal following inclusion. Specified behaviour (“relevant conduct”) leads to consideration for inclusion on one or both of the barred lists. This includes, for example, conduct which harms a child in the case of the children’s barred list, or conduct which harms a vulnerable adult in the case of the adults’ barred list, or conduct involving child pornography for both lists. Finally, risk of harm where evidence suggests that an individual may present a risk of harm to children or vulnerable adults, this will lead to consideration for inclusion on the appropriate list.’ 2.299  An individual who is included in the children’s barred list must not engage in regulated activity in relation to children. An individual who is included in the adults’ barred list must not engage in regulated activity in relation to vulnerable adults. Generally speaking, ‘regulated activity will cover a range of specified activities that provide an opportunity for close contact with children or vulnerable adults, other activities in key settings such as schools and care homes which provide an opportunity for contact, and key positions of responsibility such as the Children’s Commissioner and the Director of Adult Social Services’. 2.300  Various criminal offences prevent barred individuals from engaging in regulated activity in relation to children or vulnerable adults; ensure that people permitted to engage in regulated activity in relation to children or vulnerable adults with the permission of a ‘regulated activity provider’ are subject to monitoring (abolished under the 2012 Act); and ensure that relevant employers check an individual’s status in the scheme before permitting an individual to engage in regulated activity in relation to children or vulnerable adults. 2.301  The 2006 Act also confers power on the Secretary of State to make regulations about controlled activity although this has been repealed by s  68 of the 2012 Act (and SI  2012/2160). This covered certain activity other than regulated activity. 2.302  Where the Secretary of State’s enquiries reveal that a person satisfies one of the criteria that lead to automatic inclusion in a barred list, he will refer the matter to the DBS so that the person can be included in the relevant barred list. The Secretary of State will also pass details of relevant cautions and convictions together with all information received from local police forces to the DBS, which the body can then consider in relation to inclusion in a barred list. Under the 2006 Act where a person is included in a barred list, they cease to be subject to monitoring (if they were previously) and are not able to engage in regulated activity. As seen above, monitoring was abolished by s 69 of the 2012 Act. Except in the most serious cases, opportunities to make representations will exist to allow individuals to explain why they should not be barred on the basis of this information. In relation to both standard and enhanced certificates, s 117 of the 1997 Act allows an applicant to apply to the DBS for an amended certificate on

334  Chapter 2 the ground that it is inaccurate. The differences in approach between a CRC and an ECRC are that for the latter, in addition to there being a requirement to include ‘soft intelligence’, pursuant to s 117A of the 1997 Act (added by s 82(5) of the 2012 Act) there is a right of challenge to the independent monitor (who then seeks a review by the relevant chief officer of police) in relation to the inclusion of information on the grounds that it is not relevant for the purpose described, or ought not to be included in the certificate. Guidance to the chief officer can be provided pursuant to s 117A(4). 2.303  The Secretary of State must repeat these searches and enquiries at appropriate intervals. If new information comes to light about a person, the Secretary of State will give the information to the DBS (see above). The DBS may also ‘have cause to consider including a person in a barred list on the basis of referrals from employers, local authorities, professional bodies and supervisory authorities’. 2.304  No claim for damages may be made in relation to action under s 1 of the 2006 Act as amended unless the action is done with malice (2006 Act, s 57).

Case law 2.305 In R (L) v Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police [2009] UKSC 3 there was a challenge on behalf of a woman who had a position as a playground assistant in connection with which the police were required to provide her with an enhanced criminal records certificate (‘ECRC’). They disclosed to the school (pre-2012 Act) that she had been accused of neglecting her child and of non-cooperation with social services, and her employment was terminated. She claimed that the police disclosure violated her right to respect for her private life under the Human Rights Act. The Supreme Court held that, when determining whether to disclose non-criminal related information retained in police records in connection with an application to work with vulnerable persons, the police must give due weight to the applicant’s right to respect for her private life. However, the facts narrated were true, the allegation was directly relevant to her employment and the school was entitled to be apprised of the information. While the consequences for the appellant’s private life were regrettable, disclosure could not in this case be said to be disproportionate to the public interest in protecting vulnerable people (paras [48], [49], [58] and [86]). Her appeal was dismissed. Article 8 was clearly engaged and it concerned private proceedings. Those who apply for positions that require an ECRC cannot be regarded as consenting to their privacy rights being violated. Consent is predicated on the basis that the right to respect for private life will be respected (para [43]). Otherwise, legislation could easily circumvent HRA rights by effectively curtailing access to benefits unless people ‘consent’ to invasions of their rights (para [73]). The police’s historical approach towards balancing the public interest in protecting vulnerable persons and respecting Article 8 rights was flawed, as they applied a general presumption that, in cases of conflict, the public interest should generally prevail (para [44]). Article 8 requires that neither consideration be afforded precedence over the other – each interest should be

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   335 given careful consideration in assessing the proportionality of the proposed disclosure (paras [45], [63] and [85]). 2.306  Factors to be considered in assessing proportionality include: (i) the gravity of the relevant information; (ii) its reliability; (iii) its relevance; (iv) the existence of an opportunity to make representations; (v) the period that has elapsed since the relevant events; and (vi) the adverse effect of the disclosure (para [81]). If disclosure may be: (i) irrelevant; (ii) unreliable; or (iii) out-of-date, the applicant should be given the opportunity to make representations prior to the decision to disclose (paras [46], [63] and [82]). We have seen how this has been effected above. 2.307  R (T) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police1 concerned two cases. The case concerns warnings and cautions. The first claim was brought by a young man (T) who, as an 11-year-old, had been warned (the equivalent for children of being cautioned) in respect of the theft of two bicycles. Eight years later, T needed an ECRC in relation to enrolment on a sports studies course. The warnings were revealed. The second claim was in relation to a 41-yearold cautioned for theft of a packet of false fingernails who, eight years later, was denied employment in the care sector following disclosure of the caution. Both challenged the compatibility of the statutory scheme with Article 8 of the ECHR. Neither had any other criminal record. The Court of Appeal held that the original scheme in relation to the disclosure of convictions and cautions was disproportionate in the way that it balanced, on the one hand, the legitimate aims of protecting the rights of employers, children and vulnerable adults for which they were responsible, and, on the other hand, the need to enable employers to assess an individual’s suitability for a particular type of work. As a result, in this respect, the 1997 Act was declared incompatible with Article  8, and the 1975 Order (to the extent that it provided that an employee was required to answer questions in respect of spent convictions and cautions in the context of prescribed occupations and professions) was declared ultra vires. R (T) v Chief Constable Greater Manchester Police [2014] UKSC 35. In R (AR) v Greater Manchester Police [2016] EWCA Civ 490, an acquittal was revealed. Challenged under Arts 6 and 8. Both unsuccessful. The claimant was not consulted on Art 6 but claimant was consulted under Art 8. On appeal to SC.

1

2.308  Lord Dyson MR in the Court of Appeal ([2013]  EWCA  Civ 25) explained the approach of the court in these terms (at [38]): ‘The fundamental objection to the scheme is that it does not seek to control the disclosure of information by reference to whether it is relevant to the purpose of enabling employers to assess the suitability of an individual for a particular kind of work. Relevance must depend on a number of factors including the seriousness of the offence; the age of the offender at the time of the offence; the sentence imposed or other manner of disposal; the time that has elapsed since the offence was committed; whether the individual has subsequently re-offended; and the nature of the work that the individual wishes to do. These same factors also come into the picture

336  Chapter 2 when the balance is to be struck (as it must be) between the relevance of the information and the severity of any impact on the individual’s article 8(1) right … A  proportionate scheme would not require the individual consideration of each case.’ There might be sub-rules such as (i) ‘a spent conviction for certain specified offences must always be disclosed; (ii) a spent conviction for certain specified offences must never be disclosed irrespective of any other considerations; and (iii) some spent convictions might or might not be disclosed depending on a set of factors such as age when one committed the offence, whether it was a single offence, how long ago it was committed etc’. The fact that the scheme in R (T) had been reviewed in 2013 showed it could be further calibrated. 2.309  On appeal, the Supreme Court in R  (T) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [2014] UKSC 35 went further, although it did not consider the scheme that had been revised. It reviewed the lawfulness of the original scheme from first principles. In particular, Lord Reed analysed the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Rotaru v Romania (App No 28341/95) (2000) 8 BHRC 449, which concerned storage and disclosure of a criminal record in circumstances in which there was no mechanism to correct information held on the database, and MM v United Kingdom (App No 24029/07) [2012] ECHR 1906, which concerned the disclosure by the police of a caution for child abduction to organisations to which MM had applied for employment as a family support worker. In MM, the ECtHR observed (at [204]): ‘No distinction is made based on the seriousness or the circumstances of the offence, the time which has elapsed since the offence was committed and whether the caution is spent. In short, there appears to be no scope for the exercise of any discretion in the disclosure exercise. Nor, as a consequence of the mandatory nature of the disclosure, is there any provision for the making of prior representations by the data subject to prevent the data being disclosed either generally or in a specific case. The applicable legislation does not allow for any assessment at any stage in the disclosure process of the relevance of conviction or caution data held in central records to the employment sought, or of the extent to which the data subject may be perceived as continuing to pose a risk such that the disclosure of the data to the employer is justified.’ In MM, the court highlighted the absence of a clear legislative framework for the collection and storage of data, and the lack of clarity as to the scope, extent and restrictions of the common law powers of the police to retain and disclose caution data. It further referred to the absence of any mechanism for independent review of a decision to retain or disclose data, either under common law police powers or pursuant to Part V of the 1997 Act. Finally, the court noted the limited filtering arrangements in respect of disclosures made under the provisions of the 1997 Act. As regards mandatory disclosure under section 113A, no distinction is made on the basis of the nature of the offence, the disposal in the case, the time which has elapsed since the offence took place or the relevance of the data to the employment sought (MM, para [206]).

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   337 2.310  The Supreme Court was not satisfied that: ‘there were, and are, sufficient safeguards in the system for retention and disclosure of criminal record data to ensure that data relating to the applicant’s private life have not been, and will not be, disclosed in violation of her right to respect for her private life. The retention and disclosure of the applicant’s caution data accordingly cannot be regarded as being in accordance with the law. There has therefore been a violation of article 8 of the Convention in the present case. This conclusion obviates the need for the court to determine whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society” for one of the aims enumerated therein.’ Lord Reed for the majority stated: ‘Put shortly, legislation which requires the indiscriminate disclosure by the state of personal data which it has collected and stored does not contain adequate safeguards against arbitrary interferences with article 8 rights’. Lord Reed recognised that the issue of what was ‘in accordance with the law’ appeared to overlap with the question of whether the interference was ‘necessary in a democratic society’ (within Article  8 of the ECHR), observing that the focus of these questions was different. In the case of the former, there had to be safeguards which had the effect of enabling the proportionality of the interference in general to be adequately examined. Whether the interference in a given case was in fact proportionate was a separate question: see para [114]. Dealing with the case of T, Lord Reed continued (T at para [119]): ‘In the light of the judgment in MM  v United Kingdom, it is plain that the disclosure of the data relating to the respondents’ cautions is an interference with the right protected by article  8(1). The legislation governing the disclosure of the data, in the version with which these appeals are concerned, is indistinguishable from the version of Part V of the 1997 Act which was considered in MM. That judgment establishes, in my opinion persuasively, that the legislation fails to meet the requirements for disclosure to constitute an interference ‘in accordance with the law’. That is so, as the court explained in MM, because of the cumulative effect of the failure to draw any distinction on the basis of the nature of the offence, the disposal in the case, the time which has elapsed since the offence took place or the relevance of the data to the employment sought, and the absence of any mechanism for independent review of a decision to disclose data under section 113A.’ 2.311  Both claimants had suffered breaches of Art 8 under the HRA. The Article 8 interferences under both the 1997 Act and the 1975 Order could not, in any event, be said to meet the requirement of being ‘necessary in a democratic society’ (paras [50], [121] and [158]. While a declaration of incompatibly was issued in relation to Part V of the Police Act, the 1975 Order would not be ruled ultra vires because of amending regulations which would rectify the illegality. 2.312  R (P)1 did address the revised schemes (SI 2013/1200 and SI 2013/1198) [the case is on appeal to the Supreme Court] and a challenge to them by four

338  Chapter 2 claimants. The challenge was to the multiple conviction rule (challenged in P), and the serious offence rule (challenged in the joined cases of G  and W). Basically, the question before the Court of Appeal was: is disclosure relevant and proportionate, ie necessary and in accordance with the law? To what extent should records be filtered (weeded/stepped down) to make them proportionate? R (P) v Secretary of State [2017] EWCA Civ 321 (on appeal to the Supreme Court). See also Re Gallagher’s Application [2016] NICA 42 (on appeal to the Supreme Court). [See Preface.]

1

2.313  The issue involved in P, and joined cases, was that there was no mechanism to review the new rules in question and the absence of discretion and the damage done by the inclusion of a conviction or caution. The challenge concerned the multiple conviction rule and the serious offence rule requiring the disclosure of convictions and cautions in all circumstances. ‘This is irrespective of the triviality of the circumstances, the lapse of time since the events, or the lack of its relevance to the future pursuit of the employment or other activity sought to be undertaken’ (para  [34]). Previous case law suggested this could amount to a failure to accord with the law, although the government was adamant that the absence of a process of review did not entail arbitrariness in itself. Leveson P  observed a review procedure could be comparable to that contained in the system dealing with removal of the requirements to comply with lifetime sex offender registration set out in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (Remedial) Order 2012.1 There is an appeal to the Magistrates’ Court against an adverse decision following application to the relevant chief officer of police. Review schemes also exist for other restrictions or prohibitions which have been imposed on individuals such as football travel orders and sexual offences and harm orders.

1

SI 2012/1883, enacted following R (F) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 17, [2011] 1 AC 331, which severely criticised the absence of any mechanism for review.

2.314  The rationale of R (T) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police would be that indiscriminate disclosure of data stored by the state does not contain adequate safeguards against arbitrary interference with Article 8 rights. Leveson P explains (in para [39] of R (P)): ‘Lord Reed goes on to address the overlap between assessing whether state use of personal data is, firstly, in accordance with the law and, secondly, necessary in a democratic society. He considers the safeguards that are required for an interference to be “in accordance with the law”, and concludes that they must “have the effect of enabling the proportionality of the interference to be adequately examined”. Lord Reed then identifies [in 119] the aspects of the scheme in T  that meant that disclosure was indiscriminate. It was “the cumulative effect” of the lack of discriminators [comparisons] sufficient to draw appropriate distinctions, and ensure that there was a coherent and relevant link between the disclosure and the public interest to be safeguarded, and the absence of any mechanism for independent review, that rendered it arbitrary. Furthermore, it is a mistake to seek to construe Lord Reed’s judgment as if it were an Act of Parliament and, equally, an error to present paras [114] and [119] as being,

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   339 in some way, contradictory. In short, Lord Reed regards a regime requiring disclosure by the state of personal data which it has collected and stored not to contain adequate safeguards to make it “in accordance with the law” if features of the type that he identified in [119] are not present.’ 2.315  Lord Reed assessed when disclosure is in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society. The proportionality of the interference must be ‘adequately examined’. A  scheme would not be in accordance with the law if the cumulative effect would be an absence of ‘discriminators sufficient to draw appropriate distinctions’, as well as ensuring that there was a coherent and relevant link between the disclosure and the public interest to be safeguarded, and the absence of any mechanism for independent review (R (P) at para [39]). Lord Reed, felt Leveson P, did not believe one specific safeguard would convert an arbitrary scheme into a lawful one and a right of individual review is not a pre-requisite in every case. There may be cases, eg murder, which speak for themselves. Statements at first instance in the present case, suggesting that the absence of a review process of fact was required in every case, went too far. It was the absence of discrimination or judgement of itself in a sub rule in a system that allowed such discrimination in other parts which required a review mechanism. ‘Certain rules within a disclosure regime that generally does discriminate by reference to the relevant features may have to make provision for review at some stage if the particular sub rule does not discriminate by reference to those features’ (R (P) at para [42]). The sub rules allowed too much unchallengeable discretion. 2.316  A judgement has to be made as to the calibre of the filter mechanism in the context of the public interest to be protected. An independent review is not an absolute condition, but Leveson P underlined that ‘the less the discrimination in relation to the other features – the nature of the offence, disposal and lapse of time – the greater the need for some filter to ensure that the critical link to the public interest is not lost’ (R (P) at para [41]). 2.317  In short, not every rule requires a review mechanism to prevent arbitrariness. In this case the two rules being challenged, the multiple conviction rule and the serious offence rule, are not, without a mechanism for refinement, ‘in accordance with the law’. The multiple conviction rule is indiscriminate in that it applies without consideration of any of the features identified by Lord Reed. If an individual has been convicted of more than one offence, the rule will apply automatically irrespective of the nature of the offence, the disposal in the case, the time which has elapsed since the offence took place or the relevance of the data to the employment sought. Leveson P  believes Lord Reed would conclude that it is not ‘in accordance with the law’, unless there is a mechanism for independent review. The serious offence rule is not totally indiscriminate as it draws a distinction between offences that are in Schedule 15 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and offences that are not. However, Leveson P ruled (R (P) at para [45]), it is insufficiently calibrated so as to ensure that the proportionality of the interference is adequately examined. The rule draws a bright line by reference to only one of the features identified by Lord Reed at paragraph [119], namely

340  Chapter 2 the seriousness (ie the nature) of the offence. If an individual has been convicted of a serious offence, the rule applies in a blanket way and the conviction will be disclosed automatically. There is no distinction based on the disposal in the case, the time which has elapsed since the offence took place or the relevance of the data to the employment sought. Given that Lord Reed emphasised the cumulative effect of the failure to draw distinctions or provide for a mechanism for independent review, and in the light of the startling consequences for the claimants in G and W, in Leveson P’s judgement there are insufficient safeguards to ensure that the rule does not operate in an arbitrary manner. Without appropriate review mechanisms, which will differ according to subject matter, it is difficult to see how challenges of the type raised in these cases can be avoided. 2.318  The facts and decisions on the four cases were as follows: i) R  (P): in 1999, P  committed two offences of theft by shoplifting while suffering from undiagnosed schizophrenia. She was cautioned for the first offence, and prosecuted for the second. Owing to her condition and homelessness at the time, P failed to appear at court and, in the event, was convicted of the second theft offence and an offence under s. 6(1) of the Bail Act 1976. She was discharged conditionally in respect of each offence, but acquired two convictions. P’s disclosable convictions militate against her getting paid employment as a teaching assistant, and carry with them a requirement to explain her past mental health history. For the reasons outlined above, Leveson P  agreed with the conclusion of the Divisional Court that the revised scheme was not in accordance with the law, albeit for slightly different reasons. Thus, in this case, whatever might be said in different circumstances, the justification simply collapses and the bright line rule has produced an answer which is simply disproportionate (however wide the margin of appreciation) to the interference in P’s private life, because it does not generate interests of public safety so as to make it arguably necessary in a democratic society. In the circumstances, albeit for slightly different reasons, I would dismiss this appeal. ii) R  (G): this case concerned two sexual offences at age 13 with two boys (the two boys were voluntary parties although under the age of consent) aged about 10. The offences were intimate touching and anal intercourse. No prosecutions ensued but out-of-court police reprimands were issued. In 2011, now over the age of 18, G  worked for an employment agency at the library of a local college. He was asked for an ECRC because his work involved contact with children. Leveson P agreed (R (P) at para [93]) that the refusal of the chief of police to remove the cautions was lawful: ‘I accept the proposition that this child’s behaviour with younger children cannot, of itself, rationally demonstrate a risk to the public which required identification in a democratic society. If he sought an ECRC, depending on the nature of the employment, it may be justifiable to include it as “soft intelligence”, so that he could demonstrate to the police (and, if necessary, the court) that his earlier conduct was truly irrelevant. In that way, however, the public is protected, but the necessary flexibility is introduced’.

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   341 Blake J  rejected the challenge to the decision to issue the reprimands in the first place, but held ([2016]  EWHC  295 (Admin); [2016] 4  WLR  94 at para [43]) that, despite the existence of the filtering process, there were insufficient safeguards to ensure that the data retained was relevant to, and necessary for, the purpose for which it was disclosed to the third party. He then set out (at para  [48]) what he described as ‘a compelling case’ that a review mechanism was ‘needed and practicable’, before concluding (at para [50]) that the revised scheme for disclosure could not be said to be in accordance with the law. As a result, he declared that the provisions of Part V of the 1997 Act were incompatible with G’s rights under Article 8 to the extent that they require mandatory disclosure of his reprimands and that the Regulations made under the 1974 Act required amendment. He refused leave to appeal to G in relation to the challenge to the Chief Constable, but granted it to the Secretaries of State as to whether the revised scheme was in accordance with the law. Age here was critical. Had G been slightly older, even maintaining the age gap between him and the boys involved, it may be that reprimands would not have been appropriate and convictions would have followed with different issues as to disclosure. Leveson P believed the issue was more finely balanced, as explained above. iii) R (W): in November 1982, when 16 years of age, W was convicted of ABH contrary to s 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. He received a conditional discharge for two years, and was bound over to keep the peace for 12 months. ABH is a relevant matter under the 1997 Act, and, as a result, must be disclosed on any criminal record certificate. 31 years passed without any further offences, and W has made a success of his life. Leveson P believed it difficult to see how publication of this detail, 31 years on, is relevant to the risk to the public, or proportionate and necessary in a democratic society. The appeal was allowed. iv) R (Krol): on 4 February 2007, police were on patrol and witnessed Ms Krol hitting her three-year-old daughter: she explained that it was because the child was refusing to do her homework. There was evidence of redness to the face and swelling to the arm but it is right to say that the extent of injury is disputed. In the event, Ms Krol was cautioned for ABH. She is seeking employment as a befriender or psychologist. An application to the Metropolitan Police Commissioner to expunge her caution has been refused, most recently in 2013, although the police have expressed a willingness to review its retention five years thereafter on request. These proceedings constitute a challenge to the decision to refuse to expunge the caution: the compatibility with the ECHR of the revised scheme relating to the disclosure of convictions, cautions and other conduct is not in issue. An Early Deletion Unit existed to deal with such removal of cautions. The retention of this caution was lawful, and, in the context of this case, proportionate and necessary for the protection of the rights of others. The willingness to review in five years was neither arbitrary or disproportionate but a vindication of Ms Krol’s Article 8 rights. The judge held disclosure necessary and proportionate. She appealed. Leveson P entirely agreed with William Davis J: the retention of this caution was in accordance with the law; the approach of the Commissioner (prepared to review the matter after a

342  Chapter 2 further five years) was neither arbitrary nor disproportionate. It constituted an affirmation of Ms Krol’s Art 8 rights.

Remedy 2.319  The Crown objected that the effect of a declaration that the relevant orders were ultra vires would be that no disclosure could lawfully be made pursuant to the challenged provision. That would be to provide a remedy beyond that which is required. Leveson P believed the Divisional Court took entirely the right line. That court refused to declare that the 1975 Order was ultra vires, but limited itself to a declaration that the 1975 Order ‘cannot be read or given effect in a way which is compatible with the Claimant’s rights under Article 8 ECHR to the extent it excludes from the definition of a person with a protected conviction, a person with more than one conviction’. The declaration makes clear to Parliament that there is a problem with the operation of the scheme (at the margins), but defers to the legislature as to how to remedy the problem. 2.320  There is nothing in his judgment, Leveson P emphasised, that requires the adoption of a bespoke system providing an individual right of review; devising a filter system which ensures that cases that are at the margin and no longer require disclosure may be entirely feasible. Alternatively, some filter with a mechanism for review of the type that applies to removal from the Sex Offender Register may equally be practicable, and not unduly demanding. Decisions of this nature, however, are not for the court. 2.321 In R (QSA & Ors )1 each of the three claimants has been convicted, many years ago, of multiple offences of loitering or soliciting in a street or public place for the purpose of prostitution, contrary to section 1 of the Street Offences Act 1959. Those convictions, notwithstanding the passage of time, remain on their records; and the claimants are required to disclose them, and to obtain verification of their disclosure, if they apply to work or volunteer within particular occupations. They contend that the recording and retention of information concerning their convictions, and the operation of the statutory provisions which require them to disclose those convictions if seeking particular types of employment, are unlawful. They had been forced into prostitution by grooming and violent gangs. At issue was the multiple conviction rule which applied not only to convictions for the same offence but covered different offences. These never became spent and had to be disclosed on a EN. In challenging the statutory schemes, counsel relies on the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998. Section 3 of that Act requires that, so far as it is possible to do so, primary and secondary legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the rights listed in the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) and set out in Schedule 1 to the Act. By section 6, it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right. The claimants challenged the statutory schemes (the same as in T and P above) on the grounds that the requirement to disclose their spent convictions was arbitrary and unlawful under Article 8. The court found for the plaintiffs on this

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   343 ground and would have done so even if not bound by the decision in P. The rule in question was neither in accordance with the law nor necessary in a democratic society. However, the court did not find the rules gender discriminatory breaching Article 14in conjunction with Article 8, or Article 4.2 In R  (AR) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police3 an enhanced criminal record certificate was issued in relation to the applicant. He had been acquitted of rape at a Crown court trial while engaged as a taxi driver but the ECRC included the acquittal. He was a qualified teacher and previously of good character. The applicant wished to work as a lecturer. He challenged the inclusion of the information. Did the inclusion of this information interfere with his Art 8 rights. The court found guidance on the ECRC system and its impact on those affected neither entirely clear nor consistent. The role of an appellate court in a case such as this was to review whether the trial judge had made an error in assessing proportionality which undermined the cogency of his conclusion. If there was no such error it was not for the appeal court to make its own assessment. The police officers had not been in breach of consultation because they were informed of all relevant evidence. They did not have to act as a trial to establish by detailed analysis if there was actually guilt. Acquittal was in any event a matter of public record. Lord Carnwath notes in his judgment that, although he has reached a clear conclusion on the limited issues raised by this appeal, it gives rise to more general concerns about the ECRC procedure in similar circumstances. There is no clear guidance as to what weight should be given to an acquittal in different circumstances, and there is a lack of information about how an ECRC is likely to be treated by a potential employer in such a case. Careful thought needs to be given to the value in practice of disclosing allegations which have been tested in court and have led to an acquittal (paras [72]–[76]). R (QSA & Ors) v Secretary of State for the Home Department & Anor [2018] EWHC 407 (Admin). Ibid. 3 [2018] UKSC 47. 1 2

The Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS)1 2.322  The above information sets the context for the role of the DBS. Employers can only check the criminal record of someone applying for certain roles, for example in healthcare or childcare. This is known as a DBS check. The DBS is sponsored by the Home Office and the DBS works with the police, who provide information to the DBS that is held locally (Police National Database) or on the Police National Computer. Other close arrangements are with the Department for Education – which owns the safeguarding policy for children – and the Department of Health – which owns the safeguarding policy for vulnerable groups. See https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/disclosure-and-barring-service-framework and https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/disclosure-and-barring-service/about.

1

2.323  Important partners are: • ACRO Criminal Records Office (ACRO) which manages criminal record information nationally and improves the exchange of criminal records and biometric information.

344  Chapter 2 • •

TATA Consultancy Services (TCS) – a private sector partner that operates an administration infrastructure and call centre for the disclosure service. Registered bodies – organisations that have registered with the DBS checking service, and are the primary point of contact for: – checking disclosure applications and validating information provided by the applicant; – establishing the identity of the applicant; – submitting fully completed application forms; and – countersigning application forms to confirm entitlement.

2.324  The objective of the DBS is to help employers make safer recruitment decisions and prevent unsuitable people from working with vulnerable groups, including children. The DBS is responsible for: • processing requests for criminal records checks (DBS checks); • deciding whether it is appropriate for a person to be placed on or removed from a barred list; and • placing or removing people from the DBS children’s barred list and adults’ barred list for England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

DBS checks 2.325  Basic Disclosures (Basic Check) are available for roles that are covered by the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974. Basic Disclosures contain details of only ‘unspent’ cautions or convictions. An individual or the employer (with the individual’s consent) can apply for a Basic Disclosure (https://www.gov.uk/ request-copy-criminal-record). A  Basic Disclosure is not the same as a Standard Disclosure (Standard DBS check), which can only be carried out on roles which are ‘exempt’ from the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (ROA). The DBS, through its criminal record checking service, helps employers with recruitment in more sensitive roles to prevent unsuitable people working with children or vulnerable groups; and also roles which involve a greater deal of trust, such as lawyers and regulated financial roles. These roles are deemed ‘exempt from the ROA’. Employers must first establish whether a role is eligible for a DBS check before applying for a Standard or Enhanced Disclosure. Standard Disclosures (Standard DBS checks) are available from the DBS and contain details of all convictions, cautions, reprimands and final warnings which are not ‘protected’ and are therefore eligible for filtering. Standard Disclosures are available for jobs and activities listed in the Exceptions Order. Enhanced Disclosures (Enhanced DBS checks) are also available from the DBS and contain details of all convictions, cautions, reprimands and final warnings which are not ‘protected’, and may also include ‘other relevant information’ (police intelligence) which a chief police officer of the force that holds the information reasonably believes to be relevant to the role applied for and, therefore, ought to be included. Enhanced Disclosures are only available for

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   345 certain jobs and activities listed in both the ROA Exceptions Order and also the Police Act 1997 (Criminal Records) Regulations (above) as amended. ‘Other’ relevant information may include items such as acquittals and intelligence. The ACRO has produced a quality assurance framework: ‘The objective of QAF is to deliver a standard process and audit trail across all Disclosure Units for individual Chief Officer responsibilities when considering information for disclosure under 113B (4) of the Police Act 1997. QAF is the agreed standard for decision-making, risk assessment, relevance considerations and audit-trail provision.’1 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/353036/ QAF_v9_OV1_Overview_of_QAF_Process_September_2014.pdf and https://www.gov. uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/295392/DBS_Applicant_s_ introduction_to_QAF_March_2014.pdf Quality Assurance Framework 2014. See also the Home Office guidance on statutory disclosure at para 2.322, note 1 above. A list of relevant case law is published (last updated 28/06/2016): https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/qualityassurance-framework-case-law.

1

2.326  Information may be filtered from a certificate.1  A  standard procedure for making representations by applicants has been the objective of the DBS and police bodies but is not yet in operation. Where an employer carries out criminal records checks, they must have a policy on employing ex-offenders and show it to any applicant who asks for it. https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/dbs-filtering-guidance.

1

2.327  Enhanced Disclosures with children’s and/or adults’ barred list check(s) include the same criminal record information as Enhanced Disclosures, but also detail whether the person is barred from working with either children or vulnerable adults or both. To be eligible to request a check of the children’s or adults’ barred lists, the position must be eligible for an Enhanced Disclosure and also specifically listed in the Police Act 1997 (Criminal Records) Regulations as eligible to check against the appropriate barred list(s). Applications for Standard and Enhanced Disclosures have to be made by the employer either directly, if they are a Registered Body,1 or through a Registered Body providing an umbrella service sometimes known as an Umbrella Body. the DBS must supply an ECRC on an application that is countersigned by a registered person, stating that the certificate is required for the purposes of an exempted question, asked for a prescribed purpose. This is prescribed under Regulation 5A of the Police Act 1997 (Criminal Records) Regulations 2002 (SI 2002/233), setting out a list that overlaps significantly with the list in Article 3 of the 1975 Order, itemising situations in which the registered person proposes to consider the applicant’s suitability for a specified position of trust or sensitivity. Employers are entitled by law to ask an individual to reveal their full criminal history (other than protected cautions and convictions), including spent convictions – also known as asking ‘an exempted question’. An exempted question applies when the individual will be working in specific occupations, for certain licences and specified positions. These are covered by the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (Exceptions) Order 1975.

346  Chapter 2 The minimum age at which someone can be asked to apply for a criminal record check is 16 years old. The certificate is sent directly to the individual who must then hand it to the employer. The DBS charges a fee to process applications for these checks; charges will depend on the level of check, and for some volunteers a DBS criminal record check may be free. A  DBS code of practice has been produced for recipients of criminal record information to ensure fair and proper use.2 A  DBS check has no official expiry date. Any information included will be accurate at the time the check was carried out. The applicant must decide when a new check is needed. An update service is available online if the applicant is enrolled.3 https://www.gov.uk/guidance/dbs-check-requests-guidance-for-employers. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/dbs-code-of-practice. 3 https://www.gov.uk/dbs-update-service. 1 2

Referrals 2.328  Referrals are made to the DBS when an employer or organisation, eg a regulatory body, has concerns that a person has caused harm, or poses a future risk of harm to vulnerable groups, including children.1 https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/dbs-referrals-guidance--2.

1

Barring 2.329  There are three main ways in which cases for barring come to the DBS. • Autobars: there are two types of automatic barring cases where a person has been cautioned or convicted for a ‘relevant offence’: i) automatic barring without representations offences will result in the person being placed in a barred list(s) by the DBS irrespective of whether they work in regulated activity; ii) automatic barring with representations offences may, subject to the consideration of representations and whether the DBS believes that the person has worked in regulated activity, involve working in regulated activity or may in future involve work in regulated activity; this may also result in the person being placed in a DBS barred list(s). • Disclosure information is provided where a person has applied for a DBS certificate to work with children or vulnerable adults with a check of one or both barred lists and their certificate reveals they have a criminal history. • Referrals from an organisation that has a legal duty or power to make referrals to DBS: typically there is a duty, in certain circumstances, on employers to make a referral to the DBS when they have dismissed or removed an employee from working in regulated activity, following harm to a child or vulnerable adult or where there is a risk of harm.

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   347 Section 71 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 allows a barring decision to be reviewed by the DBS. An appeal may be made to the Upper Tribunal, and only with the tribunal’s consent, against inclusion or refusal to remove from a barred list. Appeals may be made on a question of law or fact (Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006, s 4).

Test for regulated activity 2.330  A new test for regulated activity has been introduced which means the DBS can only bar a person from working within regulated activity with children or adults if the DBS believes the person is or has been, or might in the future be, engaged in regulated activity. There is an exception where a person is cautioned or convicted for a relevant (automatic barring) offence and is not eligible to submit representations against their inclusion in a barred list. Additionally, where a person is cautioned or convicted of a relevant (automatic barring) offence with the right to make representations, the DBS will ask the person to submit their representations and consider them before making a final barring decision.

Protection of Freedoms Act 2012: DNA and fingerprints 2.331  The Crime and Security Act 2010 contained provisions to give additional powers to the police to take fingerprints and DNA samples from people who have been arrested, charged or convicted in the UK, and from those convicted overseas of serious sexual and violent offences. The Act did not come into force and was repealed by the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (POFA 2012, see below). The 2010 Act was a response to the ECtHR judgment in the case of S  and Marper v United Kingdom [2008]  ECHR  1581, in which it was held that indefinite retention of DNA samples of unconvicted individuals breached their Art 8 ECHR rights. The 2010 Act set out a statutory framework for the retention and destruction of biometric material, including DNA samples, DNA profiles and fingerprints, that have been taken from an individual as part of the investigation of a ‘recordable offence’.1 The ECtHR judgment in Marper effectively overruled the House of Lords judgment in R (S) v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police [2004] 1  WLR  2196 where it was ruled that the retention in question was permitted by Art 8(2)  ECHR. In R  (GC) v Com’r of the Police of the Metropolis [2011]  UKSC  21, the Supreme Court ruled by majority that the ACPO guidance authorising indefinite retention was ultra vires the powers in PACE, s 64 as amended.

1

2.332  The coalition government set out plans to remove ‘unnecessary restrictions’ on essential freedoms and these took shape in the POFA 2012.1 A table comparing the retention rules in respect of fingerprints, DNA samples and profiles and footwear impressions (1) as they were before reform, (2) as they would have been under the provisions of the 2010 Act, (3)

348  Chapter 2 as they currently operate in Scotland, and (4) as they are under the provisions of the Act, is set out below. An independent Biometrics Commissioner is appointed with powers: to keep under review the retention and use of DNA samples and profiles and fingerprints by the police; to decide applications by the police to retain DNA profiles and fingerprints; and to determine national security determinations by the police on such profiles and fingerprints. The Commissioner provides reports for the Home Secretary on these functions. The Secretary of State is given powers to issue a code of guidance. Section 23 inserts a new s 63AA into PACE 1984 which places on a statutory footing the existing National DNA Database. The new section requires DNA profiles taken under PACE or in connection with an investigation to be recorded on the relevant database. The National DNA  Database is maintained and operated initially by the National Police Improvement Agency (see now para 2.282 above) on behalf of the police. Figures on its holdings are in the annual report.2 The National DNA Database Strategy Board was placed on a statutory footing. Additional powers to take profiles were included in sections 144–146 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 and section 70 of the Policing and Crime Act 2017. The POFA 2012 makes provision for parental consent (of both parents but with exceptions) before a child’s (under 18) biometric data can be processed. A child may also object to such processing. There are exceptions and, in the case of objection by a child to processing or continuing processing, suitable alternatives have to be in place. The duty is placed on proprietors of schools or governing bodies of colleges. The Act also provides for a code to be issued by the Secretary of State on CCTV cameras (including automatic number plate recognition) and a Surveillance Camera Commissioner. Amendments are also made to the Safeguarding of Vulnerable Groups Act 2006. The overall effect of the amendments is to reduce the scope of work from which barred individuals are prohibited. Amendments are made to the definition of ‘vulnerable adult’ and ‘regulated activities’. Amendments are also made to the processing of referrals from the Secretary of State to the Independent Safeguarding Authority for barring entries on the barred list. Representations may be made. Provision is made for information on barred persons and duties are placed on regulated activity providers to establish whether persons are barred before allowing them to engage in a regulated activity. See Post-legislative Scrutiny of the Protection of Freedoms Act Cm 9579 (2018): https://www.gov.uk/ government/publications/post-legislative-scrutiny-of-the-protection-of-freedoms-act-2012. 2 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/594185/58714_ Un-Num_Nat_DNA_DB_Accessible.pdf. 1

Comparative DNA tables (from explanatory notes) 2.333  DNA profile retention periods: comparison between (1) current rules under PACE  1984, (2) the rules that would apply under the provisions in the 2010 Act, (3) the rules applicable in Scotland, and (4) the rules in Chapter 1 of Part 1 of POFA 2012.

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   349 Occurrence

Current System (England and Wales)

Crime and Security Act 2010 (England and Wales)

Scottish system Proposed changes under the Act

Adult, conviction, all crimes

Indefinite

Indefinite

Indefinite

Indefinite

Adult, nonconviction, serious crime

Indefinite*

Six years

Three years plus possible two-year extension(s) by court

Three years plus possible single twoyear extension by court

Adult, nonconviction, minor crime

Indefinite*

Six years

None

None† although this is now indefinite if the person has a previous conviction for a recordable offence which is not excluded

Under-18s, conviction, serious crime

Indefinite

Indefinite

Indefinite

Indefinite

Under-18s, conviction, minor crime

Indefinite

First conviction: Indefinite five years; second conviction: indefinite

First conviction: five years (plus length of any custodial sentence); second conviction: indefinite

Under18s, nonconviction, serious crime

Indefinite*

Three years

Three years plus possible two-year extension(s) by court

Three years plus possible single twoyear extension by court

Under18s, nonconviction, minor crime

Indefinite*

Three years

None

None† although this is now indefinite if the person has a previous conviction for a recordable offence which is not excluded

Terrorist suspects

Indefinite*

Not covered Six years plus renewable two- (reserved matters) year period(s) on national security grounds

Biological DNA samples

Indefinite*

Within six months of sample being taken

As per destruction of profiles

Three years plus renewable two-year period(s) on national security grounds Within six months of sample being taken

* Destruction of DNA profiles and biological samples was available under ‘exceptional circumstances’. This required an application to the Chief Constable of the relevant police force; removal from the database is then at his/her discretion in accordance with guidelines issued by the Association of Chief Police Officers. † In all cases, a speculative search of the DNA and fingerprint databases may be conducted before destruction.

350  Chapter 2 2.334  POFA 2012 is accompanied by an overarching impact assessment and further impact assessments on individual provisions. The impact assessments, signed by Ministers, are available online.1 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/protection-of-freedoms-bill.

1

DUTIES TO DISCLOSE INFORMATION 2.335  In a book of this nature it would be impossible to describe the duties which exist in law concerning private bodies or individuals and their disclosure of information to public bodies. The existing provisions cover: convictions;1 those who work with children and the vulnerable as we have seen above;2 and a host of legal duties to provide information to law enforcement agencies or regulatory authorities. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE 1984, as amended), ss 8–16 and Sch 1 impose a duty upon a wide range of individuals holding information to disclose the information to the police, upon production of a warrant, even though the relationship is ‘confidential’. PACE 1984, s 64(1A) (inserted by Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s  82 and further amended as explained above) allows for the retention of fingerprints and DNA samples after an acquittal or decision not to prosecute, a provision which the Law Lords ruled does not engage Art 8(1) ECHR, and retention of fingerprints and DNA samples in such cases ‘save in exceptional circumstances’ was therefore lawful.3 The subsequent developments reversing this position have been described above. Powers of surveillance under Part III of the Police Act 1997 allow surveillance of sensitive confidential and legally privileged information, and the extensive powers of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 will be examined in ch 4. Section 15 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 is another example, as well as the duties of notification under the Sex Offenders Act 1997 and Sexual Offences Act 2003, Part 2. The Police Act 1997, s 115 was referred to above and concerns the scheme to obtain criminal records. The Housing and Planning Act 2016, Part 2, Chapter 3 makes provision for a database of rogue landlords maintained by local housing authorities in England. Recent developments have been outlined above. Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 and orders thereunder. On child protection registers, see R  v Norfolk County Council Social Services Department, ex p M [1989] 2 All ER 359; R v Harrow London Borough Council, ex p D [1990] Fam 133, CA; R v Hampshire County Council, ex p H [1999] 2 FLR 359, CA; R v Devon County Council, ex p L [1991] 2 FLR 541; R v Lewisham London Borough Council, ex p P [1991] 3 All ER 529. On disclosure of information regarding abuse of children: Children Act 1989, ss 47 and 19 do not impose a duty on the local authority, but see Re EC (Disclosure of Material) [1996] 2 FLR 725, CA; Re L; Re V (sexual abuse: disclosure) [1999] 1 FLR 267, CA. See paras 11.16 et seq below. See further R v Secretary of State for Health, ex p C [2000] 1 FCR 471, CA. 3 R  (S) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [2004]  UKHL  39. Lord Steyn stated that ‘it is of paramount importance that law enforcement agencies should take full advantage of the available techniques of modern technology and forensic science’ (para 1). ‘Cultural traditions’ in the UK in the state storing information on individuals was a material factor in considering objective justification under Art 8(2), they were not material in considering whether Art 8(1) was engaged! See above for developments. 1 2

2.336  An example under the Equality Act 2010 covers public and private employers. All UK firms of 250 or more employees are legally bound to report in

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   351 April 2018 on gender pay differentials. Most government departments, the armed forces, local authorities, NHS bodies and many others must follow the Equality Act 2010 (Specific Duties and Public Authorities) Regulations 2017, SI 2017/353. The full list can be found in Schedule 2 to the Regulations and includes non-devolved or cross-border authorities operating across England, Scotland and Wales (such as the NHS). The obligations apply if employers have 250 or more employees on the snapshot date of 31  March of a given year. All other private, voluntary and public sector employers must follow the Equality Act 2010 (Gender Pay Gap Information) Regulations 2017, SI 2017/172. The obligations apply if employers have 250 or more employees on the snapshot date of 5 April of a given year. 2.337  The Health Protection (Notification) Regulations 2010, SI  2010/659, create a scheme for notifying actual and suspected cases of infection and contamination in humans to specified bodies with public health responsibilities. This allows prompt action to be taken by those bodies to protect public health where appropriate. There are Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland equivalents. No sanctions exist in the Regulations themselves – the GMC oversees regulation. The Care Act 2014 requires ‘relevant partners’ to co-operate with local authorities making enquiries about adults at risk unless to do so would be incompatible with their own duties, or would otherwise have an adverse effect on the exercise of their functions. Relevant partners include NHS trusts, foundation trusts and clinical commissioning groups in the local authority’s area. Certain persons or bodies must also give information to a safeguarding adults board, at its request to enable or assist the board to perform its functions. Doctors can be asked to provide information.1 See also Health Service (Control of Patient information) Regulations 2002, SI 2002/1438, regs 3 and 5; the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (England and Wales) and Adults with Incapacity Act (Scotland) 2000; and the Abortion Regulations 1991 (England and Wales) and the Abortion (Scotland) Regulations 1991.

1

2.338  In the field of immigration there is the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, ss 18–21 as amended by the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 and Immigration Act 2016. The provisions under the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, Part 6 concerning the provision of ‘physical data’ by travellers on a voluntary or compulsory basis should be noted, as well as the disclosure provisions relating to public authorities and private persons including employers. The development of these powers led to the ‘harsh environment’ that embroiled many immigrants with a right to be in the UK – the Windrush episode and the application of performance targets on removals. 2.339  The Terrorism Act 2000 has various powers including those imposing duties (as soon as reasonably practicable) and powers to disclose information to the police in relation to financial offences supporting terrorism including money laundering (ss  19 and 20 respectively). Section 20 overrides any countervailing statutory duties not to disclose. Under the Terrorism Act 2000, s 38B, it is a criminal offence for a person to fail to disclose information to the police that they know or believe might be relevant in preventing an act of terrorism or securing the arrest, prosecution or conviction of a person for a terrorist act. Under Sch  7, para  17, powers to request in writing information from the owners of ships or aircraft are

352  Chapter 2 given; and Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, s 17 inserts a new duty on a variety of bodies in listed statutes to disclose information to the security service. Including Northern Ireland there are 66 statutes included as so affected and covering such bodies in Sch 4 to the 2001 Act. The Terrorism Act 2000, ss 37– 39 and Schs 5 and 6 concern powers to obtain information (including financial information) and evidence, and the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 has forfeiture provisions on terrorist cash and property (ss 1–3), and provisions on freezing orders (ss 4–8) and disclosure of information (ss 17–20). Freezing orders in relation to terrorism have been introduced under powers contained in the United Nations Act 1946 and these were ruled unlawful by the Supreme Court but its decision was reversed by temporary legislation and then addressed in the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc Act 2010. The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 concerned control orders and so on (see paras 10.80 and 11.81) which are to be removed under the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011. Part 1 of the Terrorism Act 2008 significantly enhanced powers to gather and share information. 2.340  The Competition Act 1998 and the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, Parts 3 and 4 confer powers of investigation on the Competition and Markets Authority under ss  25–31, 61–65 as amended; and the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and the 2013 Act are replete with duties to provide information to regulators and others.1 The Fair Trading Act 1973 and Competition Act 1998 were amended by the Enterprise Act 2002 and the 2013 Act. These Acts place on the Competition and Markets Authority general duties to acquire information relating to its functions on mergers, market investigations and consumer protection (Enterprise Act 2002, s 5). Under s 6, the CMA is under a duty to provide information to the public. Section 203 of the Enterprise Act 2002 allows IT experts to accompany OFT officials on investigations. Enterprise Act 2002, ss 237 et seq concern restrictions on disclosure of information under the Act. In relation to banks there are over 20 statutes which impose a duty upon, or call upon, a bank to disclose information about a customer in the public interest, eg Criminal Justice Act 1988, s 98 and Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986, s 27.2 The circumstances requiring, or permitting, such disclosures include insider dealing, company fraud and insolvency, breaches of the Consumer Credit Act 1974, tax evasion, inquiries into the affairs of charities, extradition and mental incapacity.3 To these may be added s 17 of the Bank of England Act 1998. The duty between a banker and a customer is one of confidentiality,4 but that duty may be overborne by a public interest defence for the bank under the civil law of confidentiality (see para 4.312 below) or in the legitimate interests of the bank, though the extent of such an immunity for banks, particularly in the latter case, is far from certain.5 Revenue authorities have sought a ‘random search power’ into current accounts via the Finance Act 2008, Sch 36 and Finance Act 2009 and the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 as amended in 2011 which contain their powers of inspection and obtaining information. The Financial Services Act 2012 established the Prudential Regulatory Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority as regulators in the financial sector. The Sanctions and AntiMoney Laundering Act 2018 produced a backbench amendment covering UK overseas dependencies and registers of beneficial ownership of UK registered companies. These had been excluded in earlier registers. The Panama papers

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   353 episode revealed numerous examples of tax evasion by reputable UK citizens and residents and overseas politicians and magnates.6 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, ss 13, 82, 147, 161, 165, 175, 230, 231 as amended; and see Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, s 17. 2 On ss  93A–93C of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (as amended by the Criminal Justice Act 1993) and dilemmas facing banks, see Governor and Company of the Bank of Scotland v A  Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 52, [2001] 1 WLR 751. See Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, Pt 5, Ch 3B. 3 Cm 622 (1989), ch  5 and see App Q  for the list. See the Television Licences (Disclosure of Information) Act 2000. 4 Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461, CA; see R Toulson and C Phipps Confidentiality (2006), ch XIV. See Jackson v Royal Bank of Scotland [2005] UKHL 3 for damages for a breach of confidence by a bank. 5 See Cm 622 (above) and cf Bank of Tokyo Ltd v Karoon [1987] 1 AC 45n, CA; Re State of Norway’s Application [1989] 1  All ER  745, HL; and Barclays Bank plc v Taylor [1989] 3  All ER  563, CA: no breach of confidentiality in bank failing to challenge an application for ‘special procedure material’ under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. 6 See International Consortium of Investigative Journalists: https://www.icij.org/investigations/ panama-papers/ (13/05/2018). 1

2.341  The DPA 2018 will, of course, apply to such holders of data covered by that Act although many of the exemptions and subject access restrictions will operate. 2.342  Duties to allow access, or to disclose information, to regulatory or other authorities would soon take us into the complexities of the regulatory state: eg under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, Banking Act 1987, and the more recent legislation on competition and financial and banking regulatory authorities, Companies Act 2006, the Taxes Management Act 1970 as amended and the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988,1  VAT  Act 1987, Finance Acts and so on, as well as the provisions above. Some of these duties are noted elsewhere in this book, but the treatment constitutes a passing reference only (see para 12.1 below).2 See R (Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd) v Special Commissioner of Income Tax [2002] 3 All ER 1 (HL) and also note SI 2001/404. 2 See Gender Recognition (Disclosure of Information) (England, Wales and Northern Ireland) Order 2005, SI 2005/635. 1

PRIVACY AND ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS (EC DIRECTIVE) REGULATIONS 2003 2.343  The Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003, SI 2003/2426 (as amended by SI 2004/1039 and SI 2011/1208), implement Articles 2, 4, 5(3), 6 to 13, 15 and 16 of Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12  July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (‘the Directive’).1 A  new EU regulation on privacy and electronic communications has been proposed ‘to increase privacy of people’s private lives and increase opportunities for business’.2

354  Chapter 2 See also Electronic Communications Code (Conditions and Restrictions) Regulations 2003, SI  2003/2553, made under Communications Act 2003, ss  109 and 402, on the general duties of providers of networks regarding operations, and the Electronic Communications Code (Conditions and Restrictions) Amendment Regulations 2017, SI  2017/753. On derogations, see Joined cases C-293/12 & C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and Others [2015] 1 QB 127, [2014] 3 WLR 1607. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/proposal-regulation-privacy-andelectronic-communications (13/05/2018). 1

2.344  Regulation 2 of the 2003 Regulations sets out the definitions which apply for the purposes of the Regulations. Regulation 4 provides that nothing in these Regulations relieves a person of any of his obligations under the DPA 1998 (now 2018). 2.345  The explanation accompanying the Regulations states that: ‘Regulation 5 imposes a duty on a provider of a public electronic communications service to take measures, if necessary in conjunction with the provider of the electronic communications network by means of which the service is provided, to safeguard the security of the service, and requires the provider of the electronic communications network to comply with the service provider’s reasonable requests made for the purposes of taking the measures (“public electronic communications service” has the meaning given by section 151 of the Communications Act 2003 and “electronic communications network” has the meaning given by section 32 of that Act). Regulation 5 further requires the service provider, where there remains a significant risk to the security of the service, to provide subscribers to that service with certain information (“subscriber” is defined as “a person who is a party to a contract with a provider of public electronic communications services for the supply of such services”).’ The 2011 amendments: (i) ensure that personal data can be accessed only by authorised personnel for legally authorised purposes; (ii) protect personal data stored or transmitted against accidental or unlawful destruction, accidental loss or alteration, and unauthorised or unlawful storage, processing, access or disclosure; and (iii) ensure the implementation of a security policy with respect to the processing of personal data. New regs 5A, 5B and 5C impose duties to notify the IC of data security breaches, IC audit and enforcement. 2.346  Regulation 6 of the 2003 Regulations provides that an electronic communications network may not be used to store or gain access to information in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user (‘user’ is defined as ‘any individual using a public electronic communications service’) unless the subscriber or user is provided with certain information and is given the opportunity to refuse the storage of or access to the information in his terminal equipment. Consent is modified in the 2011 amending Regulations. Regulations 7 and 8 of the 2003 Regulations set out certain restrictions on the processing of traffic data relating to a subscriber or user by a public communications provider. ‘Traffic data’ is defined as ‘any data processed for the purpose of the conveyance of a communication on an electronic communications network

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   355 or for the billing in respect of that communication’. ‘Public communications provider’ is defined as ‘a provider of a public electronic communications network or a public electronic communications service’. 2.347  Regulation 9 of the 2003 Regulations concerns provision of non-itemised bills by public electronic communications services. Regulations 10 and 11 concern providers of a public electronic communications service and safeguards in relation to the presentation of calling line identification on a call-by-call basis and connected line identification. This regulation is subject to regs 15 and 16. 2.348  Regulation 14 of the 2003 Regulations imposes certain restrictions on the processing of location data, which is defined as ‘any data processed in an electronic communications network indicating the geographical position of the terminal equipment of a user of a public electronic communications service, including data relating to the latitude, longitude or altitude of the terminal equipment; the direction of travel of the user; or the time the location information was recorded’. 2.349  Regulation 15 of the 2003 Regulations makes provision in relation to the tracing of malicious or nuisance calls. Regulation 16 makes provision in relation to emergency calls, ie 999 or European emergency call number 112. Regulation 17 concerns automatic forwarding of calls. Regulation 18 applies to directories of subscribers, and sets out requirements that must be satisfied where data relating to subscribers is included in such directories. It also gives subscribers the right to verify, correct or withdraw their data in directories. Regulations 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 concern direct marketing. Regulation 27 provides that terms in certain contracts which are inconsistent with these Regulations will be void. 2.350  Regulation 28 of the 2003 Regulations exempts communications providers from the requirements of these Regulations where exemption is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security and further provides that a certificate signed by a Minister of the Crown to the effect that exemption from a requirement is necessary for the purpose of safeguarding national security will be conclusive evidence of that fact. It also provides for certain questions relating to such certificates to be determined by the Information Tribunal referred to in s 6 of the DPA 1998. 2.351  Regulation 29 of the 2003 Regulations provides that a communications provider will not be required by these Regulations to do, or refrain from doing, anything if complying with the requirement in question would be inconsistent with a requirement imposed by or under an enactment or by a court order, or if exemption from the requirement is necessary in connection with legal proceedings, for the purposes of obtaining legal advice or is otherwise necessary to establish, exercise or defend legal rights. A new reg 29A requires that communications providers must establish and maintain internal procedures for responding to requests for access to users’ personal data. New regs 31A and 31B concern enforcement and third party information notices and appeals. Regulation 30 allows a claim for damages to be brought in respect of contraventions of the Regulations. 2.352  Regulations 31 and 32 of the 2003 Regulations make provision in connection with the enforcement of the Regulations by the Information

356  Chapter 2 Commissioner (who is the Commissioner appointed under s  3(8) of the DPA 2018). A new reg 37 places a duty on the Secretary of State to carry out a review of the implementation in the United Kingdom of the Directive, to set out the conclusions of the review in a report, and to publish the report. 2.353  The 2003 provisions were amended by the e-Privacy Directive (2009/136/ EC) which was operative from May 2011 (SI  2011/1208). The significant amendments have been set out above. These Regulations implement Arts 2 and 3 of Directive 2009/136/EC amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on co-operation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws by making amendments to ‘the 2003 Regulations. The ICO has provided guidance on ‘cookies technology’ and other matters protecting privacy rights dealt with under the Directives.1 Consent has to be given to the use of cookies – devices to track users’ computer activity (‘spyware’) – on the basis of clear and comprehensive information about the purpose of the processing and use of cookies. Service providers are, from May 2011, given 12 months to install the necessary technology. http://www.ico.gov.uk/for_organisations/privacy_and_electronic_communications/the_guide. aspx (13/05/2018).

1

THE EIDAS REGULATION 2.354  The eIDAS  Regulation (Regulation (EU) 910/2014) sets out rules for electronic identification and ‘trust services’, ie  services that help verification of identity and businesses online or the authenticity of electronic documents. It was implemented in the UK by SI 2016/696.1 The trust services include: electronic signatures, electronic seals, electronic time stamps, electric registered delivery services and website authentication services. The IC is the supervisory authority for trust service providers and has power to carry out audits, grant qualified trust service provider status and take enforcement action including service of an assessment, information or enforcement notice (paras 2.145 et seq) and issue a monetary penalty notice of up to £1,000. This is in addition to any remedies available in contract or tort. The status when awarded allows providers to be listed on a trusted list and to use an EU trust mark. Qualified trust status is the most efficient and reliable form of trust service. Qualified signatures have to meet specific technical requirements. The UK’s national identity scheme is Verify and this aspect is the responsibility of the Government Digital Services. The IC co-operates with other member state supervisors and submits annual reports to the EU Commission and the EU supervisor, the EU Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA). The eIDAS Regulation seeks to provide a common legal framework for cross-border recognition of electronic ID. The ICO’s website has a useful list of definitions. Conformity assessment bodies assess whether a body meets the requirements for qualified status in an assessment report. Such bodies in the UK must be recognised by the UK Accreditation Service.

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   357 In terms of security measures to be provided by service providers, Art 19 of the eIDAS Regulation states: ‘Qualified and non-qualified trust service providers shall take appropriate technical and organisational measures to manage the risks posed to the security of the trust services they provide. Having regard to the latest technological developments, those measures shall ensure that the level of security is commensurate to the degree of risk. In particular, measures shall be taken to prevent and minimise the impact of security incidents and inform stakeholders of the adverse effects of any such incidents.’ Qualified trust providers need to fulfil more demanding security obligations (Art 24(2)). If a security breach has a ‘significant impact’, the ICO must be notified within 24 hours. Service providers must also notify users if they are likely to be affected. In some circumstances, service providers or the ICO may also need to inform the wider public about a breach. Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions Regulations 2016. See also https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-eidas/what-is-the-eidas-regulation/. For the Commission, see https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/trust-services-and-eid. For ENISA, see https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/trust-services/security-measures, https://ico.org.uk/fororganisations/guide-to-eidas/key-definitions/#Trust_service and https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/ guide-to-eidas/breach-reporting/. For obligations on qualified trust service providers, see https://ico. org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-eidas/qualified-trust-service-providers/ (All 14/05/2018).

1

COMPUTER MISUSE AND ‘HACKING’1 2.355  It will be helpful to say a little about the relationship between data protection law and the law relating to computer misuse, although the DPA 2018 is not restricted to computerised, digitised or automated information. Computer-related crimes have increased as the personal computer and electronic communications devices have become ubiquitous. As we observe in ch 4 (paras 4.176 et seq), such ‘hacking’ practices have become a preoccupation of security and intelligence services and have developed the epithet of ‘cyber warfare’. In the case of many computer-related crimes, such as frauds, the computer is often simply a new means of attaining an existing criminal goal, and such crimes can be, and are, largely prosecuted under existing technology-neutral laws. However, there are a range of undesirable activities, primarily involving unauthorised access to computer systems, and the information held on them, where the nature of the technology requires a more focused and specific legislative response. In the UK, after a series of failed2 or unsatisfactory3 prosecutions under existing criminal laws of defendants who had accessed and used computer systems without permission causing financial losses and breaches of privacy, there was a call for specific legislation to deal with such activities. Within two weeks in June 2011, the victims of increasingly sophisticated hacking activities included the IMF, the CIA, Sony, the US Senate, the Turkish government and Citibank. The prominent informal networks perpetrating these crimes were two groups in particular – Anonymous and LulzSec – whose invariably young members are driven by suspicions of state and corporate institutions and attempts to police or

358  Chapter 2 own the web.4 The criminal fraternity and state sponsorship has become more common. The NHS hacking episode in 2017 froze the NHS system and such cyber-attacks often accompany blackmail requests. Cyber-crime damage has been predicted to hit $6 trillion by 2021.5 See HC 907 (2010–12) and Government Reply Cm 8182 (2011) on unauthorised tapping and hacking. 2 For example, R v Gold and Schifreen [1988] 2 All ER 186, HL involving unauthorised access to the Prestel computer system (unsuccessful use of Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981; Interception of Communications Act 1985, s 1(1) was also raised, but not considered by the court). 3 Cox v Riley (1986) 83 Cr App R 54 involving the deletion of programs from a computerised saw; R v Whitely (1991) 93 Cr App Rep 25, (1990) Times, 25 May, 8 June (CA), involving unauthorised access to the JANET academic computer network (both cases involved successful use of the Criminal Damage Act 1971, but this was thought by many commentators to be an unsuitable approach in the long run, due to the difficulty of proving ‘tangible damage’). 4 M Glenny DarkMarket: CyberThieves, CyberCops and You (2011). 5 https://www.csoonline.com/article/3153707/security/top-5-cybersecurity-facts-figures-andstatistics.html (13/05/2018). 1

2.356  In 1988–89, the Law Commission published two papers recommending that certain kinds of computer fraud and computer hacking1 – ie unauthorised entry into a computer – should be criminalised. The Commission did not recommend a ‘comprehensive computer crime statute’ as this was regarded as neither necessary nor appropriate in England or Wales. The new crimes would cover computer use generally, and would not specifically pertain to the holding of personal information. The reports were followed in short order by legislative action in the form of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 (CMA  1990). Under the CMA  1990, three basic offences were created: securing unauthorised access to any programme or data held on a computer; obtaining such access to a computer with a view to committing or facilitating a serious criminal offence; and causing an unauthorised modification (including a temporary one) of the contents of any computer which impairs the operation of the computer, any software or the reliability of any data.2 The Police and Justice Act 2006, s 35 introduced amendments in relation to computer misuse, and consent to mail bombing to interrupt the computer system was discussed in DPP v Lennon [2006] EWHC 1201 (Admin). Following the UK government’s cyber security strategy in 2011 and Directive 2013/40/EU, the Serious Crime Act 2015 created a new offence of unauthorised causing or creating the risk of serious damage by impairing a computer causing damage of a material kind; this is damage to human welfare, the environment, the economy or national security. The maximum sentence is life imprisonment where there is a threat to life, loss of life or damage to national security. The amendments add to the extra-jurisdictional dimension of the offence. Papers in 2015 on national security including cyber security were produced by the Cabinet Office, and the National Security Council will oversee its implementation.3 Computer Misuse Working Paper No 10 (1988); Criminal Law Computer Misuse Law Commission Report No 186, HMSO (1989). 2 Most of the early relevant case-law is unreported: R v Goulden (1992, unreported); R v Strickland and Woods (1993, unreported); R v Pile (1995, unreported); R v Raphael Gray (2001, unreported); R v Caffrey (2003, unreported). 3 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-security-strategy-and-strategic-defenceand-security-review-2015 (13/05/2018). 1

Data protection, access to personal information and privacy protection   359 2.357  In the early 1990s, however, there remained a potential lacuna in the overlapping protection provided to personal data by the DPA  1984, and the protection afforded against unauthorised access to data generally by the CMA 1990. This was demonstrated by two cases involving police officers and the Police National Computer system. In R v Brown,1 a police officer was authorised to use the Police National Computer for the registered purpose of policing as agent of his chief constable, who was a registered user under the DPA 1984. However, he twice caused checks to be made on vehicles owned by debtors from whom the agency had been engaged to recover debts, in order to assist a friend who ran a debt-collection agency. The information was displayed on a computer screen. The first search did not reveal any personal data as the vehicle was corporately owned. The second search revealed personal data but there was no evidence that any subsequent use was made of the information obtained. The defendant was charged with two offences of using personal data held within the memory of the computer for a purpose other than that described in the register, contrary to s 5(2) (b), (3) and (5) of the DPA  1984. As noted above, it was held on appeal that a person who merely retrieved information from the database of a computer in the form of a display on a screen or of a printout did not ‘use’ the data for the purposes of the Act. Shortly afterwards, in R v Bignall,2 two officers serving in the Metropolitan Police had instructed police computer operators to extract details of the registration and ownership of two cars from the Police National Computer for their own personal use. As a result they were charged with offences contrary to CMA 1990, s 1. However, on appeal the court held that the primary purpose of the CMA 1990 was to protect the integrity of computer systems by criminalising the ‘hacking’ of computer systems and not the integrity of the data stored on them. Thus no offence under CMA 1990, s 1 was committed as the officers had caused the computer to perform a function to secure access to information held at a level to which they were entitled to gain access, even if they intended to secure access for an unauthorised purpose. We have addressed the fall-out, but not the final conclusion, from the hacking scandals involving journalists, the police, Leveson and the failure to go forward with Leveson 2 (paras 2.249 et seq). [1996] AC 543, HL. [1998] 1 Cr App R 1, QBD.

1 2

2.358  This lacuna was overcome in the late 1990s by the significant broadening of the definition of ‘processing’ in the DPA  1998, widened further by the DPA 2018, which closed the Brown loophole, and the judgment in the case of R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Another ex parte Government of United States of America,1 where an employee who was authorised to access certain data as part of her job accessed the data for use in a complicated fraud. The House of Lords disapproved the decision in Bignall, stating that it was erroneous to suggest that, just because a person had authority to access data for one purpose, this meant the person also had authority to access it for an unauthorised purpose. The employee’s access was unauthorised, because she had no authority to access the data for the purpose of a fraud. In principle, it currently appears that an individual who processes personal data by means of unauthorised access to a computer system, or with authorised access for an unauthorised purpose, will be in breach of both the DPA 1998 (2018) and the CMA 1990.

360  Chapter 2 Until October 2017, there had been 130 cases recorded which concerned misuse of computer offences.2 [2000] 1 Cr App R 61, HL. www.computerevidence.co.uk/Cases/CMA.htm (13/05/2018) compiled by MJL Turner.

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2.359  It should be noted that the UK-US Extradition Treaty and international arrest warrants have caused concern, especially in relation to hackers. While the Home Secretary’s decision not to extradite Gary MacKinnon, described by the US authorities as ‘the biggest military computer hack of all time’, met with approval from civil liberties groups, especially because of his Asperger’s syndrome, there was criticism from Labour MPs and accusations of inconsistency in treatment.1 Islamic prisoners with the same condition had been extradited. The Home Secretary spoke of introducing a ‘forum bar’ to prevent prosecutions overseas where prosecution was possible in the UK. Courts would make orders where it was not in the interests of justice to allow a prosecution overseas.2 Any such bar would provoke trenchant criticism from US authorities. A forum bar has meanwhile been introduced and was successfully relied on in the Love case involving the Asperger’s syndrome victim, Lauri Love, who was wanted by the US authorities on suspicion of hacking into defence, FBI and other computer systems. Love will not be extradited and it is unknown whether he will face charges before English courts.3 The court stated it would not be ‘oppressive’ to prosecute Love in England. See, with regard to Gary McKinnon suffering from Asperger’s syndrome (16  October 2012), extradition to US blocked by Theresa May: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-19957138. 2 Interpol was accused of failing to scrutinise red notice requests which are used to combat international crime: http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/nov/27/interpol-accused-red-notice-requests. 3 R (Love) v Government of the USA [2018] EWHC 172 (Admin). 1

2.360  While the CMA  1990 provides for criminal penalties for computer misuse, it is important for DCs to remember that the seventh principle of the DPA  2018 requires that ‘Personal data shall be processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the personal data, including protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropriate technical or organisational measures’. Failure to take reasonable precautions against hacking and other forms of misuse may result in a DC facing civil actions from DSs under DPA 2018 which, as we have seen, seeks to give greater security to personal data and/or action by the IC including assessment audit and enforcement action. 2.361  One should also note the Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018 (SI 2018/506) which, following Directive (EU) 2016/1148, seek to establish a legal framework to ensure that essential services and selected digital service providers within the UK put in place adequate measures to improve the security of their network and information systems, with a particular focus on those services which, if disrupted, could potentially cause significant damage to the UK’s economy, society and individuals’ welfare; and to ensure serious incidents are promptly reported to the competent authorities. The networks include digital, health, transport and environmental infrastructures.

Chapter 3

Access to environmental information

INTRODUCTION 3.1  The European Commission in October 1988 recommended a Directive introducing a wide-ranging public right of access to environmental information (9182/88 (Com) 484). This became Council Directive 90/313/EEC  (7  June 1990). Member states would have to implement this within their own law within a specified period. This has now been superseded by Directive 2003/4/EC (OJ L 41/26) on public access to environmental information. 3.2  In 1992, the Houses of Parliament approved the Environmental Information Regulations 1992, SI 1992/3240 (as amended by SI 1998/1447) implementing the 1990 Directive.1 The regulations applied to any information that relates to the environment (reg 2(2)) held by a relevant person (reg 2(3)). There is an obligation to make such information available to any person who requested it and no restriction imposed on disclosure by any other law applies to disclosure under the regulations apart from reg  4. Regulation 4 concerns restrictions on disclosure relating to ‘confidential’ information which is expansively defined including information supplied voluntarily or in confidence and the person supplying does not consent to disclosure. These Regulations are now replaced by 2004 Regulations implementing the 2003 Directive (below). Section 16 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 states that, within six months of the 2018 Act being passed, the Minister must publish a Bill containing environmental principles based on EU law. Section 16(2) states that the set of environmental principles must (however worded) consist of nine specified principles. These include the EU Treaty environmental principles (precautionary principle, prevention principle, polluter pays, sustainable development etc) and those contained in the Aarhus Convention (public access to information, public participation, and access to justice relating to environmental matters). This provision establishes that EU environmental principles will appear explicitly in

362  Chapter 3 UK domestic primary legislation. Their application and role will contain a good deal of flexibility. See Freedom of Access to Information on the Environment HL  9 (1996–97) First Report Select Committee on the European Communities.

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3.3  The Consultation Document on the Freedom of Information (FOI) Bill1 stated that the existing regulations would be repealed and replaced with an FOI access right. The general right will be modified to give effect to Directive 90/313/ EEC and the Aarhus Convention (the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe) on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters signed by the UK in 1998.2 Section 73 of the FOIA  2000 contains a power to make such a provision. The regulations will form a free-standing provision giving access to environmental information. Information available under these provisions will be exempt from access under the FOIA  2000. The regulations may provide for a code of practice3 to apply to bodies covered by the regulations and for the application of the Information Commissioner (IC)’s powers. The IC’s enforcement powers and the use of the Information Tribunal have largely been applied (see ch 1). The Regulations will not apply to Scottish bodies under s 80; they will be covered by Scottish regulations.4 Cm 4355, May 1999, para 54. See Aarhus Convention: Cm 4736, June 2000. See M Pallemaerts (ed) The Aarhus Convention at Ten (2011). See further the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development No 19: http://www. jus.uio.no/lm/environmental.development.rio.declaration.1992/19.html (06/06/2018). 3 Code of Practice Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (2005). https://ico.org.uk/media/fororganisations/documents/1644/environmental_information_regulations_code_of_practice.pdf. The code under s 46 of the FOIA on records management (para 1.22) also applies. 4 SSI 2004/520. 1 2

THE ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION REGULATIONS 2004 3.4 The Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (EIR  2004), SI 2004/3391, came into effect on 1 January 2005 – the same date as the access provisions in FOIA 2000 (see ch 1). They implement Council Directive 2003/4/ EC (OJ  L  41/26).1 Guidance is provided by the IC on the EIR regime.2 Any directly enforceable rights under the Directive will be enforceable through domestic courts if such rights have not been properly implemented into UK laws. The regulations will operate in tandem with FOIA 2000, but information available under the regulations is exempt from FOIA 2000. Crucially, the power of ministerial veto under FOIA  2000, s  53 was retained under the regulations (reg 18(6)) although the decision in Evans v Attorney General ruled that regulation 18(6) was incompatible with Art 6 of the 2003  EU  Directive, and Article  6.3 requires that ‘[f]inal decisions under paragraph 2 shall be binding on the public authority holding the information’. Another executive attempt to prevent disclosure was impermissible.3 Requests for information do not have to be in writing as under FOIA 2000. The range of bodies covered by EIR 2004 is wider than that in FOIA 2000. The regulations apply to all information held by a public authority (PA) covered by the regulations and there is no exemption where the cost of compliance exceeds an ‘appropriate limit’ as under FOIA 2000, s 12 (para 1.71

Access to environmental information   363 above). There are no absolute exemptions. There is a 20-working-day period for responding to all requests including those involving consideration of the public interest, although an extension from 20 to 40 days is allowed for complicated and high-volume requests. Bodies covered by the regulations must have a complaints and reconsideration procedure for allegations of non-compliance. All exemptions are subject to a public interest test and special provisions relate to emissions (below). The ‘exceptions’ (exemptions) differ from FOIA  2000 exemptions although similarities and differences have been discussed in case law.

On the regulation for EU institutions, see Regulation (EC) 1367/2006 EP and Council 6 September 2006 (OJ  L  264/13 (25.9.06)). Also relevant are the INSPIRE  Regulations 2009, SI  2009/3157, which transposed the 2007 EU INSPIRE Directive, which aims to improve environmental policymaking in Europe. Member states are required to make available in a consistent format spatial data sets within the scope of the Directive, and create services for accessing these data sets. Doing so will enable data sets to be more easily shared and facilitate the development and monitoring of environmental policy and practice in member states and across the EU (see para 3.63 below). 2 https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-the-environmental-information-regulations/ what-are-the-eir/ (3/04/2018). 3 [2015]  UKSC  21 (para  1.241 above). See also Evans v IC  [2015]  UKUT  313 (AAC), [2015] AACR 31. 1

3.5  According to guidance prepared by Defra (the sponsoring authority), ‘any request, wherever it comes from, and whatever form it takes, will be a valid request for environmental information so long as the information requested is environmental’.1 If the information is not environmental, another governing regime such as FOIA 2000 will have to be considered. The authority, and not the applicant, has to identify which regime is operable and relevant where a request is made for information. An applicant may specify that the request is under the EIR  2004 but this is not conclusive on the public authority (PA) if it is not correct. The ICO guidance offers advice on the interplay between the regimes.2 Procedures for dealing with requests must be published, and chapter 6 of the code also provides detailed guidance on transferring requests to other PAs and what should be done in the event of a request for records transferred to the National Archives or NI Public Records Office. DEFRA Environmental Information Regulations Detailed Guidance 2004 (2005) now archived but available at: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121204114628/http://archive.defra. gov.uk/corporate/policy/opengov/eir/guidance/full-guidance/index.htm (6/04/2018). 2 ICO guidance: https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1644/environmental_ information_regulations_code_of_practice.pdf. 1

3.6  There are numerous cases where the IC or tribunal has ruled that the PA has dealt with a request for information under the wrong regime: in FS50227038, which concerned the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, the request should have been decided under EIR 2004, not FOIA 2000, s 35. See also FER50092316 and B Archer v IC and Salisbury DC EA/2006/0037. 3.7  The code of practice issued in accordance with EIR  2004, reg  16 gives advice on ‘desirable’ practice. It is not legally binding: failure to follow the code will render it difficult for bodies to comply with their legal obligations, the foreword to the code advises. It may be departed from for good reasons which can be justified to the Information Commissioner. The code offers advice

364  Chapter 3 on training, advice and assistance to requesters, on clarifying the request while indicating that requesters are unlikely to have identifiers such as file reference numbers. Because there is no equivalent of FOIA 2000, s 12 (para 1.71 above), an authority is expected to deal with all requests for environmental information ‘regardless of the cost’. ‘Unreasonable’ requests may be refused under an exception (below). There are no provisions dealing with organised campaigns as under FOIA 2000 (para 1.74 above), although the ICO guidance offers advice on ‘round robin’ requests and what should be done where they are vexatious or repeated.1 The code offers advice on charges, timely responses and has detailed provisions on transfers of requests to other authorities (see para 1.96 above). The foreword to the code spells out the powers of the IC to issue practice directions and information notices (see eg para 1.244 above). The code provides guidance on copyright and licensing under FOIA requests, which is likely to be very important in some environmental information.2 https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1636/foi-guidance-round-robins.pdf and https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1198/dealing-with-vexatious-requests.pdf. 2 http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/information-management/re-using-public-sectorinformation/uk-government-licensing-framework/crown-copyright/ and www.nationalarchives. gov.uk/documents/information-management/information-asset-register-and-freedom-ofinformation.pdf. 1

3.8  The code also advises on requests for information shared with third parties: there is no duty to consult third parties but a commitment to do so may be made. There is also advice on public sector contracts which mirrors that in the earlier FOIA code under FOIA 2000, s 45. Authorities should refuse to enter agreements that purport to restrict rights of access under EIR  2004 (code, para 47). Confidentiality clauses should be rejected where they relate to contractual terms, a contract’s value and performance. The public interest test should be explained to contractors and, as in FOIA 2000, a schedule may be used to identify information which should not be disclosed (paras 1.188 et seq above). But such schedules are not immune from EIR 2004 obligations and rights (code, para 48). ‘In any event, PAs should not agree to hold information ‘in confidence’ which is not confidential in nature’ (code, para  49). This looks like the more robust version of the earlier s 45 code. Commercial confidentiality and voluntarily supplied data (below) are not excepted (exempt) when the information relates to emissions, although the non-exception is not restricted to these categories (below). The PA should not agree to accept and hold information from third parties ‘in confidence’ unless it is confidential in nature (code, para 51).

Scope 3.9  The regulations implement the Directive’s definition of environmental information (EI),1 which is very wide and includes written, electronic, visual, recorded or audio information on: 1. the state of the elements of the environment, such as air, atmosphere, water, soil, land, landscape and natural sites, biological diversity and its components, including genetically modified organisms and the interaction among these elements;

Access to environmental information   365 2. factors affecting or likely to affect the environment referred to in 1 above such as substances, energy, noise, radiation or waste, including radioactive waste, emissions, discharges and other releases; 3. measures (including administrative measures) such as policies, legislation, plans, programmes, environmental agreements, and activities affecting or likely to affect the elements and factors in 1 and 2 above as well as measures or activities designed to protect those elements; 4. reports on the implementation of environmental legislation; 5. cost–benefit and other economic analyses and assumptions used within the framework of environmental measures and activities referred to in 3 above; 6. the state of human health and safety, including the contamination of the food chain, where relevant, conditions of human life, cultural sites and built structures in as much as they are or may be affected by the state of the environment, or factors, measures or activities affecting the environment. Directive 2003/4/EC OJ L 41/26 (14.2.03), recital 10 and Art 2(1). See https://ico.org.uk/media/ for-organisations/documents/1146/eir_what_is_environmental_information.pdf. See Kirklees Council v IC [2011] UKUT 104 (AAC) on access to information on the local land charges register. The information was covered by the EIR and was subject to EIR charging provisions. See BEIS v IC & Henney [2017] EWCA Civ 844 below.

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3.10  The definition does not include ‘non-existent information … which could be created by manipulating existing information’ or information that does not exist until further research is carried out’ (Defra guidance, para 3.7). There is no time limit on historical data. The regulations cover EI ‘no matter when the information was created or gathered’ (para 3.9). 3.11  There appear to be no geographical limitations to these definitions of EI. The code of practice and the IC guidance have helpful advice on the definition and scope. The Court of Appeal has ruled that the regulations, the Directive and Aarhus must be interpreted ‘purposively’. In the ruling of the Court of Appeal the project assessment review of the communications and data component of the smart meter programme was held to be environmental information. The information had to be seen in context although a phrase such as ‘bigger picture’ may not be appropriate.1 BEIS v IC & Henney [2017] EWCA Civ 844 at para [47]. See also Secretary of State for C&LG v Venn [2014]  EWCA  Civ 1539 and Austin v Miller Argent [2014]  EWCA  Civ 1012. See Case C-617/13 P European Commission v Stichting Greenpeace Nederland (23/11/2016).

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Public authorities 3.12  Definitions of public authorities (PA) are those used in FOIA 2000, s 3(1) (para  1.85 above) but Scottish authorities are defined by Scottish measures (SSI  2004/520). The Scottish regulations make modifications for the devolved regime, but the general framework is the same – implementation is an EU requirement. The definition in the UK measures initially included ‘any other body or authority exercising statutory functions on behalf of the Crown’ but this disappeared from the final regulations. The definition of ‘public authorities’ in the

366  Chapter 3 Directive, Art 2.2 is quite broad. A government department is to be treated as a person separate from any other government department for the purposes of EIR 2004, Parts 2, 4 and 5. There are special provisions for those listed in FOIA 2000, Sch 1 as ‘designated bodies’ under s 5 so that such bodies designated and falling within a ‘specified description’, or only covered by FOIA 2000 in relation to ‘information of a specified description’, are not public authorities under these regulations. The exclusions relating to the intelligence and security services under FOIA 2000 seem to apply unless they are caught by the expression: a body carrying out ‘functions of public administration’ (EIR 2004, reg 2(2)(c)). Presumably this will not cover operations and security-sensitive items. The draft DEFRA guidance specified that the services are covered, but in a passage that is rather opaque (para  2.9). This was removed from the final version. An exception may be claimed on grounds of national security. The exclusion in FOIA 2000, Sch 1, para 6 relating to the special services and those units providing assistance to General Communications HQ is specifically removed. The definition includes any other body, office holder or person (except a Scottish public authority which are to be covered by Scottish measures: SSI 2004/520) ‘that carries out functions of public administration’ (reg 2(1)). The definition includes any other body, office holder or person (except Scottish public authority) that is under the control of a body, office holder or person falling within the above definitions and that in relation to the environment: i) has public responsibilities; ii) exercises functions of a public nature; or iii) provides public services. 3.13  Would this latter definition include utilities as providers of public services and which are under licence from the state and which are state regulated? It would appear to cover private companies in which public bodies hold majority or controlling shares and arguably those bodies or individuals under contract with government to perform public duties. There will doubtless be much testing of these points before the Information Commissioner, the tribunal and the courts. The guidance dated July 2010 (which offers ‘guidance’ and not legally binding instructions) says in para  2.22 that the EIR  2004 include private companies and certain PPPs engaged in water, waste, transport and energy sectors. Utility companies are covered. It may also cover environmental consultants. The code of practice also describes ‘control’ as a ‘relationship constituted by statute, regulations, rights, licence, contracts or other means which either separately or jointly confer the possibility of directly or indirectly exercising a decisive influence on a body’ (code, para 2.4). Private companies ‘sufficiently associated’ with the activities of the government so that they owe similar environmental obligations ‘have responsibilities under EIR  2004’ (ibid). A  contractual relationship is not decisive per se: it will depend upon the terms and nature of the contractual relationship: ‘the merits’. On transparency and reporting on sustainability issues, see https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/ Sustainability-reporting-in-central-government-an-update.pdf It has been ruled by the Upper Tribunal that neither the sovereign nor the Royal Household are public authorities or within the terms of the Directive and regulations.1 The sovereign and the household are not within the Schedule

Access to environmental information   367 to the FOIA and the tribunal was not prepared to venture beyond a traditional account of the sovereign (the ‘Crown personal’) in the UK constitution. It is questionable that the head of state is not regarded as a public authority. The Duke of Cornwall is the Harbour authority for the Isles of Scilly and is a PA in that capacity, and therefore under the EIR in that capacity, but not otherwise.2 Cross v IC and Cabinet Office [2016] UKUT 153 (AAC). AG v IC & M Bruton [2016] UKUT 154 (AAC).

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3.14 In Network Rail Ltd v IC and NRI Ltd EA/2006/0061, 0062 the tribunal, overruling the IC (FER0087031) ruled that Network Rail is not a PA under the EIR 2004. Under FOIA 2000 PAs are identified in the Schedule to the Act. This is not the case under EIR 2004 because it is open to the IC or tribunal to use the EIR criteria to argue that a body not covered by FOIA is a PA under the EIR. The case concerned EIR 2004, reg 2. The tribunal was influenced by case law concerning Network Rail under the HRA 1998, which raises different points to the case in question. In its initial statements of FOIA developments, the coalition government stated that Network Rail was a prime candidate for designation as a PA under FOIA. If designated as a PA under FOIA this would also make it a PA under EIR 2004. Since June 2015, Network Rail has been designated as a body that is covered by the FOIA and EIR. In Port of London Authority (PLA) v IC & another EA/2006/0083 the tribunal decided that the Port of London Authority was a PA for EIR purposes even though not scheduled under FOIA 2000. The UN Economic Commission for Europe’s Implementation Guide to the Aarhus Convention and DEFRA’s guide were adverted to for guidance. The cases have distinguishing features on the merits and there was a statutory underpinning to the PLA’s functions and a notable influence by government in appointments and in its loans. The PLA refers to itself in its contracts as a PA. The relevant function was public and was covered by statute. The IC has also decided that a housing association is a public authority under EIR  2004 (FER149772 and FER0735350 (18/08/18) but see FER0700353). The tribunal has ruled that the Duchy of Lancaster is not a PA for the purpose of EIR 2004 (J Cross v IC EA/2010/0101). However, in M  Brunton v The IC and the Duchy of Cornwall EA 2010/0182 the tribunal ruled that the Duchy was a PA for the purposes of the EIR (see, however, AG v IC at para 3.13, note 2 above). In Smartsource v IC etc [2010] UKUT 415 (AAC) the Upper Tribunal (on a case transferred from the First-tier Tribunal to the Upper Tribunal) ruled that privatised water and water and sewerage companies in England and Wales are not PAs under EIR  2004. The Upper Tribunal heard the appeal although technically it was an appeal from a decision letter, not a decision notice. The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide (ECE (UN) (2000)) stated that, ‘The Convention tries to make it clear that such innovations (privatising the provision of public services) cannot take public services out of the realm of public involvement, information and participation’. The tribunal was heavily influenced by case law under HRA  1998.1 The fact that the water companies had to provide a universal continuing service under special conditions, have special public interest powers and were restricted in stopping a service for non-payment of rates did not promote them into a service providing public administrative services. Although highly regulated, they were not subject to control by PAs. They were not subject to the EIR 2004. Given the

368  Chapter 3 objective of transparency in the EIR 2004, we submit that this ruling is deficient and the policy of the Directive and Aarhus would be better served by treating providers of universal public services connected to the environment as covered by EIR 2004 whatever their legal status. The concern should not be on formal definitions of the ‘state’ but on transparency in the provision of essential services. Cameron v Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd [2006] EWHC 1133 (QB) and YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 27.

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3.15  However, in Fish Legal1 on a reference from the Upper Tribunal the CJEU identified two criteria for deciding if a body was a public authority: (1) whether it was vested with special powers beyond private law powers (the ‘special powers test’); and (2) whether it was able to determine in a genuinely autonomous manner the way in which it performed its functions in the environmental field (the ‘control test’) (see Case C-279/12). In relation to the question of functions of public administration, the Tribunal said that the important test was not the nature of the functions but how they were carried out. It ruled that bodies are public authorities if they have been given special legal powers to enable them to carry out their functions. The water companies were public authorities because their powers included i) compulsory purchase, ii) the right to enter property to maintain services, and iii) the power to ask the government directly to create byelaws and criminal offences related to their functions. These were endowments of a public nature. The judgment was specifically addressing water authorities. Any one of the listed powers might suffice to render the body a public authority but more than one power in its possession would strengthen the public status under EU law. The control test was a demanding one that few commercial enterprises would satisfy. The companies’ functions might be fixed by law and by their licences, but the test was concerned with the way in which they exercised those functions. They were subject to stringent regulation and oversight and there was the potential for extensive involvement and influence over the way in which they performed their services. But the evidence fell far short of showing that the Secretary of State, the Water Services Regulation Authority and the Environment Agency influenced their performance, individually or collectively, whether by actual intervention or by more subtle forms of influence, to such an extent that the companies had no genuine autonomy of action (para 155). One may add where the body has a special level of influence or an advisory role in relation to government (and see FER0534921) and where it was susceptible to judicial review. In Fish it was argued by the Secretary of State intervening that the decision on classification as public/private should be challenged on judicial review and not via the statutory appeal (see Sugar v BBC [2009] UKHL 9, paras 1.90–1.94). The IC had jurisdiction both to investigate and to decide whether a body was a public authority. That decision was one made on the application under s 50 of the FOIA, and so the document giving notice of that decision was a decision notice served under s  50(3)(b). Sections 50 and 51 were predicated upon the existence of the three key concepts of request, information and public authority, on which the legislation was based. But that did not deprive the tribunal of jurisdiction to deal with those issues. Section 50(1) merely described the matters that might be the subject of an application under that section and

Access to environmental information   369 so a complaint about the way the specific request had been dealt with; it did not prescribe conditions that must be met before an application could be made and determined by the IC. When sections 50(1) and 51 referred to an application, they referred to a complaint to the IC that any requirement of the legislation had not been met and the IC could address all the reasons advanced as to why this had not occurred, including the assertion that FOIA did not apply because the request was not made to a public authority (para 55). Fish Legal v IC, United Utilities, Yorkshire Water etc [2015] UKUT 52 (AAC), [2015] AACR 33.

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3.16  The IC has given a broad interpretation to ‘relating to’ to include environmental effect. The CJEU gave some examples of ‘control’. These included: the power to issue directions to a body, including by exercising rights as a shareholder; the power to suspend or annul decisions taken by a body; the power to appoint or remove a majority of the management board; and the power to deny a body financing to the extent that it jeopardises its existence. A body might be under the control of a public authority for only part of its wider functions. In these circumstances it is only required to provide environmental information held for the functions that are under the control of a public authority. Control does not have to involve over every aspect of day-to-day management. A  regulatory framework over a body does not by itself indicate control as regulation very often covers private bodies. ‘The test of control under the EIR is not based on what an organisation’s functions are, but on how it goes about performing them.’1 A body is only under the control of a public authority if that control is exercised at all times in respect of its public functions, not just when the business is failing to perform them appropriately. ‘Establishing that a body is controlled by a public author is only the first part of the test under regulation 2(2)(d). It is also necessary to consider whether it has public responsibilities, exercises functions of a public nature or provides a public service. Finally, these responsibilities, functions or services have to relate to the environment. These terms are not defined in the EIR and should be looked at in the context of a body’s activities.’2 ICO guidance: https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1623665/public-authoritiesunder-eir.pdf. 2 Ibid. 1

‘Historical records’ and ‘working day’ 3.17  These terms have the same meaning as in FOIA  2000 (see para  4.64). ‘Data’, ‘data subject’, ‘data protection principles’ and ‘personal data’ have the same meanings as in the DPA  2018 (see ch  2). The Code of Practice and the guidance provide advice on dealing with records transferred to National Archives or the NI Public Records Office.

Holding information 3.18  EIR 2004 apply to a PA that ‘holds’ environmental information. It is not confined to information in its possession but includes that which it may hold

370  Chapter 3 on behalf of another (cf para  1.65 above). It holds information which is in its possession but which it has produced or has received from another or which is held by another person (not simply an authority) on behalf of the authority. The guidance states that the Regulations do not apply to privately owned archives deposited in a public sector archives office for preservation where those archives, if not so deposited, would not be subject to the EIR 2004 (Guidance, para 6.19). Information is in a PA’s possession if held to any extent for the PA’s own purposes. Under the regulations the IC has advised that information merely stored for another would not be considered as being held. This covers ‘information stored on a work computer or email account solely on behalf of a trade union or an MP or councillor. Similarly, we would not consider information a member of the staff produces for their own personal use to be produced or received by you, even if it is on your organisation’s premises or computer systems. For example, if a member of staff uses the public authority’s email system to send a personal, non-work related email, it will not be considered as held for the purposes of the Regulations.’1 Case law has confirmed that information is not held if it is the personal property of an individual collecting it for their own purposes and not the PA’s (Holland v IC  [2016]  UKUT  260 (AAC)). Information held by a public authority may be on a private email account although it may be subject to exceptions.2 The regulations apply to data sets (para  1.79 above). If the data set is covered by the Re-use of Public Sector Information Regulations 2015 (RPSI), then re-use licensing is dealt with under RPSI, and not FOIA (paras 4.40 et seq below).3 The Regulations do not apply to any public authority to the extent that it is acting in a judicial or legislative capacity. This will cover the courts and presumably tribunals, and Parliament. The guidance includes, inter alia, ombudsmen, the Planning Inspectorate, the Council (sic) for Racial Equality (Equality and Human Rights Commission) and Social Services Complaints panels. These bodies are not a part of the ‘judicial arm of the state’.4 Non-application of the EIR should not be taken to exclude administrative functions. The Regulations do not apply to either House of Parliament ‘to the extent required for the purpose of avoiding an infringement of their privileges’. The case law has shown that PAs may have to engage in onerous exercises to establish who holds information under EIR 2004: I Bickford Smith v IC EA/2010/0032. https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1640/information_held_for_the_ purposes_of_eir.pdf. 2 https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1147/official_information_held_in_ private_email_accounts.pdf. On emails, see Department of the Environment (Northern Ireland) v IC [2016] UKUT 83 (AAC). 3 https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1151/datasets-foi-guidance.pdf. 4 A-G v BBC [1981] AC 303. 1

Pro-active availability 3.19  Public authorities shall, in respect of EI that they hold, progressively make the EI available to the public by electronic means which are easily accessible,1 and take reasonable steps to organise the information relevant to its functions with a view to the active and systematic dissemination to the public of such

Access to environmental information   371 information. EIR 2004, reg 4 states this will not apply to excepted information under reg 12 (below). The information will include that referred to in Art 7(2) of the Directive: texts of international treaties, conventions or agreements, and of Community, national, regional or local legislation, on or relating to the environment; policies, plans and programmes relating to the environment ; progress reports on the implementation of the previous two items when held or prepared in electronic form; state of the environment reports from national, regional or local bodies which should be conducted at least every four years and which deal with the quality and pressures on the environment; data or summaries of data derived from the monitoring of activities affecting or likely to affect the environment; authorisations with a significant impact on the environment and environmental agreements or a reference to the place where such information can be requested or found in the framework of Art 3 of the Directive (the access provision); environmental impact studies and risk assessments concerning the environmental elements referred to in Art 2(1)(a) or a reference to where the information may be found. The information has also to include the facts and analyses of facts which the public authority considers relevant and important in framing major environmental policy proposals. IC guidance has been published on the use of publication schemes to make information pro-actively available. This is not a requirement of EIR although the IC recommends that PAs do so to assist compliance with the requirement to publish environmental information pro-actively. The IC advises that information should be published as set out in the ICO ‘model publication scheme’. This will not include information covered by an EIR exception.2 This will not apply to information collected before 1 January 2005 in non-electronic form. https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-the-environmental-information-regulations/ publication-schemes/.

1 2

Requests 3.20  EIR 2004, reg 5 provides that public authorities are under a duty to provide on request environmental information that they hold. This is subject to reg 12(3) which states that, where the applicant is seeking personal data on him or herself, the duty does not apply; an applicant will have to invoke the DPA 2018 (ch 2 above). The duty is in accordance with stipulations laid down in the Regulations as well as exceptions. Information shall be made available as soon as possible and not later than 20 days after the date of receipt of the request. By reg 7 this period may be extended to 40 working days ‘if [the PA] reasonably believes that the complexity or volume of the information requested means that it is impracticable either to comply with the request within the earlier period or to make a decision to refuse to do so’. The applicant must be informed of this as soon as possible and not later than 20 working days after the receipt of the request. Information compiled by the authority shall be up to date, accurate and comparable ‘so far as the public authority reasonably believes’. Where the information made available comprises ‘factors such as substances, energy, noise, radiation or waste, including radioactive waste, emissions, discharges and other releases into the environment, affecting or likely to affect the elements of the environment’ set out in reg 2(1)(a)

372  Chapter 3 then, if the applicant so requests, the public authority must inform the applicant of the place where information can be found on the measurement procedures, including methods of analysis, sampling, and pre-treatment of samples, used in compiling the information, or refer the applicant to the standardised procedures used. This duty is subject to the capability of the authority ‘to do so’. 3.21  As is common elsewhere, any enactment or rule of law that would prevent disclosure of information under these regulations – apart from the exceptions within the regulations – shall not apply. This would include the Official Secrets Act 1989. 3.22  Information shall be made available in the format requested unless it is reasonable to make the information available in another format or form, or the information is already publicly available and easily accessible to the applicant in another form or format. The guidance states that information may be requested in writing, by email, orally over the telephone or during a meeting or by sign language although no advice is offered on the latter (Guidance, chapter 6, introduction). Where information is not made available in the form or format requested, the PA shall explain the reason for its decision as soon as possible and not later than 20 working days after date of the receipt of the request for the information (extendable to 40 days under reg 7 (above)); provide the explanation if the applicant so requests and inform the applicant of the contents of reg 11 to make representations and to engage in a reconsideration (below) and also of the enforcement and appeal provisions in reg 18. Under reg 14, a refusals notice in writing must be issued where information is denied under reg 12(1) or 13(1). These must state the reasons for refusal and any exceptions under regs 12(4), (5) or 13, matters considered in reaching a public interest decision under reg 12(1) (b) or under regs 13(2)(a)(ii) or 13(3) where applicable.

Charges 3.23  Charges may be made for making the information available. Details on charging provisions are contained in the Code of Practice (pp 13–14) and in the IC guidance.1 Charges do not have to be imposed but, where they are, they should be ‘reasonable’. Regulation 8(8) requires PAs to publish and make available a schedule of charges for information and when these may be waived. Regulation 8(1) makes it clear that the ability to charge is subject to all the other parts of reg 8, including reg 8(8). The failure of a PA to publish a schedule of charges results in the loss of its entitlement to levy a charge under reg 8(1) (Leeds City Council v IC EA/2012/0020 and 0021; 22  March 2013)). The IC recommends that the schedule should be published in the publication scheme on a website. It should include standard charges for supply, eg photocopying, or other formats, lists of priced publications, concessions, details of advance payments and how charges for staff time are calculated. https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1627/charging-for-environmentalinformation-reg8.pdf.

1

Access to environmental information   373 3.24  PAs cannot charge for allowing an applicant to access any public registers or lists of environmental information held by the PA such as on the Pollutant Release and Transfers Register. The Sustainable Development Unit maintains a register of Environmental Registers as required under EC Directive 2003/4/EC, Art 3(5) (c). Nor can PAs charge for making information available for examination on their premises. Any charges shall not exceed an amount which the PA is satisfied is a reasonable amount. This would be stricter than the Wednesbury test as developed by the Tameside decision: ‘reasonable amount’ connotes objective criteria.1 An advance payment may be requested and the PA must notify the applicant of the amount required. If such a notification is given, the PA is not required to make the information requested available or to comply with EIR  2004, reg  6 (form or format) or reg  14 (requirements when refusing information and issuing a refusal notice), unless the charge is paid no later than 60 working days after the date on which the PA gave the notification. In computing the 20-day period, the day of giving a notice and the day on which payment is received by the PA are disregarded. PAs must make available a schedule of its charges and information on the circumstances in which a charge may be levied or waived. Associated Provincial Pictures Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223; Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside MBC [1977] AC 1014.

1

3.25  In FER0314876 the complainant submitted a request to Chichester District Council (‘the council’) for information from environmental records held on a property in Chichester. The complainant specified that he wished to view the records in person. The council agreed to provide the information requested but only on the provision of a set fee. The Commissioner’s decision is that the council failed to comply with reg 5(1) as it failed to make information available on request, and reg  5(2) as it failed to make it available within the statutory time for compliance. The council breached reg 6(1) by failing to comply with the complainant’s request to make the requested information available in a particular format. The council has also breached reg  8(2)(b) by attempting to impose a charge for allowing the complainant to inspect some of the requested information. The Commissioner required the council to make the requested information available for the complainant to inspect within 35 days of this notice. In East Riding of Yorkshire Council v Information Commissioner and Stanley Davis Group Limited t/a York Place EA/2009/0069, York Place was a company specialising in the obtainment of information for home buyers/sellers. It, like many other such companies, would often obtain information by making requests about planned activities in the vicinity of a client’s property (eg road changes, planning consents, etc). In this respect the Law Society developed a standard from known as Form CON29R which could be sent to councils to request the relevant information. The request in this instance was to make arrangements in order to inspect the records for highways and traffic schemes within 200 metres of the property. The request was rejected and the appellant argued that it should be treated as a request under either FOIA 2000 or EIR 2004. Later, all parties accepted that the EIR applied. The IC decided that the information did fall within the EIR and that none of the exceptions applied. However, because the information was not in a form which enabled it to be inspected without further collation by the council, it argued that it was entitled to provide the

374  Chapter 3 information in a collated document and impose a reasonable charge for doing so, relying on EIR 2004, regs 6(1), 8(1) and (2). The IC did not agree: the council was required to allow inspection and could make no charge for doing so. The council appealed to the tribunal. It argued that the reasonableness test contained in reg 6 should be applied to a request to inspect, not just the information needed to answer the questions on the form. Further, it was reasonable for it to make the information available in another format. The issues were: (a) whether the request was for inspection of all council records relating schemes in the 200m vicinity; (b) whether York Place had an unqualified right to inspect; (c) whether reg  6 permitted the council to check, collate and redact the information and provide a hard copy if there was no unqualified right to inspect; and (d) whether it was reasonable to charge for a hard copy. On the first issue, considering the factual matrix and the nature of the CON29R form, the tribunal found that the request was for the information which was required to answer the questions. As regards the unqualified right of inspection, on reading the EIR as a whole and notwithstanding the wording of EU  Directive 2003/4 (‘the establishment and maintenance of facilities for the examination of the information required’), there was no such right. Regulation 8(2) allows the requestor to express a preference which may be overridden by the public authority under reg 6. The council made several arguments as to why it was unreasonable for York Place to inspect: (a) personal data would be visible on inspection; (b) the security and integrity of the network would be put at risk; (c) some of the records would be unintelligible to an untrained reader; (d) the software licence was limited to ten users at any particular time, which covered only use by council staff. The tribunal rejected all of these arguments as either not evidenced, or not having been sufficiently investigated for alternatives. The council was not entitled to force York Place to accept the information in a documentary format; it should have allowed inspection free of charge (see also Castle Point BC v IC EA/2010/0040). 3.26 In East Sussex County v IC  Case C-71/14 the CJEU on a reference was asked to rule on ‘reasonable charges’ in relation to CON29R as above. The CJEU distinguished between supplying information and allowing access and examination of information in person. A  PA may only charge for ‘the costs attributable to the time spent by staff of the public authority concerned on answering an individual request for information’. Costs associated with maintaining a database of information are not related to an individual request so cannot be recovered. The CJEU continued that a reasonable charge must not have a deterrent effect or otherwise prevent access to environmental information. The search related to a property search information request that was a part of a commercial property transaction. The cost was a very small part of the overall transaction costs. ‘A  reasonable charge in this commercial context may differ from a reasonable charge when a local residents’ group is seeking information about pollution, for example.’1 Charges must be compatible with encouraging transparency. The ICO guidance suggests that there are two broad types of costs for which a public authority can charge: ‘• The cost of staff time, including overhead costs, incurred when preparing information to be supplied in response to a specific request. This

Access to environmental information   375

•

includes time spent locating, retrieving and extracting the information and putting it into the required format. The costs incurred when printing or copying the requested information and sending it to the applicant.

It is unreasonable for a public authority to include any further costs associated with a request, for example: • The costs associated with maintaining a register of environmental information. • The cost of maintaining a database used by the public authority to answer requests for environmental information.’2 https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1627/charging-for-environmentalinformation-reg8.pdf, para 13. 2 Ibid, paras 14 and 15. 1

Advice and assistance 3.27  As under FOIA 2000, PAs shall provide advice and assistance to applicants and prospective applicants ‘so far as it would be reasonable to expect the PA to do so’ (EIR 2004, reg 9). Where requests are formulated too generally, the PA may request the applicant to provide more particulars in relation to the request, again the PA request should be ‘as soon as possible’ and not later than 20 days after date of receipt of the request and it must assist the applicant. Compliance with a Code of Practice under EIR 2004, reg 16 by a PA shall be taken as compliance with this regulation. 3.28  EIR 2004, reg 10 allows for the transfer of requests between PAs, including Scottish PAs, as well as supply of relevant addresses to the applicant. The date of receipt of a transferred request by a PA for the purposes of regs 5(2), 6(2)(a) and 14(2) is the date on which it receives the request. The code of practice and guidance have advice on these matters.

The relationship between FOIA 2000 and EIR 20041 3.29  The belief was that the EIR 2004 created, as a result of EU obligations, a self-contained code dealing with environmental information (EI). Where EI was involved, the Regulations and not FOIA 2000 would operate. This made good sense. Under FOIA 2000 s 9, EI is not an absolute exemption, but as EIR contains its own PI test for all exceptions there is no room for the operation of the PI test under FOIA. Section 39(3) does not limit the ‘generality of FOIA  2000, s  21(1) – information applicable to applicant by other means (para  1.111 et seq) – so s  21 can apply in EIR cases. The tribunal has had difficulties in understanding the relationship between the two codes (Rhondda Cynon Taff CBC v IC EA/2007/0065) and has argued that FOIA still has a role to play over and above s 21. If this were the case, a form of ping-pong would take place under different regimes involving, very likely, the same officials. The sensible and accurate position here is that the EIR 2004 governs the situation

376  Chapter 3 regarding EI.2 In FER0359156, a local authority claimed FOIA 2000, s 42 in relation to a paper that had been before a planning committee held in public. Any confidentiality and privilege had been lost by the paper becoming public and that the EIRs governed the case. Breaches of regs 5 and 14 were established. In Craven v IC [2012] UKUT 442 (AAC) it was stated: ‘I do not believe that the existence of the of the explicit public interest test in the EIR and the statutory presumption of a restrictive interpretation of regulation 12(4)(b) should mean that, even at the margins, it is in some way “easier” to get a request accepted under the EIR than under FOIA.’ (para 22) https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1643/foi_hints_for_practitioners_ handing_foi_and_eir_requests_2008.pdf. 2 P Birkinshaw Freedom of Information: the Law, the Practice and the Ideal (4th edn, 2010), pp 245–256. 1

Exceptions to duty of disclosure and the public interest 3.30  The exceptions to disclosure are contained in EIR  2004, reg  12.1 The exceptions are to be construed restrictively in accordance with Directive 2003/4/ EC, Art 4 (and see reg 12(2) below). The code of practice also advises that in stating an exception PAs should not simply ‘paraphrase the wording of the exception’ like the earlier version of the s 45 code. Regulation 20 amends FOIA 2000, s 39 to take account of the existence of the Regulations – information available under the Regulations, subject to exceptions, is exempt under FOIA 2000 (para 3.4 above). A PA may refuse to disclose EI requested if an exception identified in reg 12(4) and (5) (below) is present and ‘in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in maintaining the exception outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information’ (reg  12(1)). The PI applies in all exceptions under reg  12(4) and (5) although personal data is dealt with separately and special provisions apply to emissions. As with FOIA, the case for secrecy has to outweigh that for disclosure, so in an even balance, disclosure prevails. Regulation 12(2) states that ‘A PA shall apply a presumption in favour of disclosure’ (see Gloucestershire CC v IC EA/2015/0254 to 0256). The IC guidance provides advice on weighing the public interests2 (and see para 1.198) recommending that information should be redacted wherever possible and permissible. The stimulation of public debate and interest is always a factor to consider (FER0184525). It will also be very important to consider any human rights aspects of access to information under the HRA 1998 (see paras 10.146 et seq below). Personal data referring to the applicant are dealt with under the DPA. Personal data requested which do not refer to the applicant are dealt with in accordance with reg 13 (below). See the ICO’s guidance: https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guidance-index/freedom-ofinformation-and-environmental-information-regulations/. 2 https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1629/eir_effect_of_exceptions_and_the_ public_interest_test.pdf. 1

regulation 12(4)

3.31  A PA may (that is, it possesses a discretion to) refuse to disclose EI under EIR 2004, reg 12(4) where:

Access to environmental information   377 • •

• •

•

it does not hold that information when an applicant’s request is received (reg 12(4)(a)) (para 3.18 above); the request for information is ‘manifestly unreasonable’ – this would suggest a test that is satisfied immediately and unchallengeably. It would have to be a blatant abuse on the part of the applicant and not simply a difficult request (reg 12(4)(b)). The IC guidance refers to vexatious requests and where the compliance cost is too great (see Craven v IC at para 3.29 above); the request is formulated in too broad a manner and reg 9 (above) has been complied with (reg 12(4)(c)); the request refers to documents in the course of completion, that are ‘unfinished’ or are incomplete data. In other words the documents are premature and need to be finalised; there is no requirement that disclosure would be misleading. In short, a policy is still being developed or the statistics or material are not complete. Even where documents are incomplete, it may be possible to disclose information that is finalised but draft documents may still be excepted. This will raise difficult questions (reg  12(4)(d)). The IC advises that data that is being used or relied on at the time of the request is not incomplete even if modified subsequently;1 the request is for disclosure of ‘internal communications’ (reg 12(4)(e));2 the exception does not require the reasonable opinion of a qualified person to be sought but FOIA 2000, s 36 and s 35 reasoning are likely to be relevant to this exception (see paras 1.164 et seq above). For the purposes of this exception, ‘internal communications’ includes communications between government departments (reg 12(8)) but not between different PAs or with third parties such as contractors. In FS50261661 the IC ruled that reg 12(4) (e) does not protect information received from other councils (reg 12(4)(e)). See Salford City Council v IC EA/2015/0276.

https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1637/eir_material_in_the_course_of_ completion.pdf. 2 https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1634/eir_internal_communications.pdf. 1

3.32  Case law (i) In FER0112249 the complainant requested information regarding the distribution of European Union Common Agricultural Policy subsidies by DEFRA. The public authority refused disclosure, arguing that reg 12(4)(b) applied because the request was manifestly unreasonable in that it required extensive and costly extraction. However, the complainant had expressed a willingness to extract the information himself; therefore the Commissioner found that reg 12 was not engaged. Stephen Carpenter v IC and Stevenage Borough Council EA/2008/0046 concerned FOIA and EIR. Mr Carpenter requested information from the council regarding the council’s sale of land to a company which then obtained planning permission and resold the land for a significant profit. The requests were refused on the grounds that they were vexatious for the purposes of FOIA 2000, s 14 or manifestly unreasonable under EIR 2004, regs 12(1) and 12(4)(b). The tribunal decided that the requests were manifestly unreasonable because: (i) they were far too frequent – there were ten requests within 12 days; (ii) the requests were very similar in nature; (iii) the requests were ‘threatening, intemperate and harassing’; (iv) much of the documentation had already been provided and the requests were therefore evidence of an obsessive

378  Chapter 3 and unreasonable attitude. In Dr K Little v IC EA/2010/0072 information was correctly denied under reg 12(4)(b) when the Welsh Assembly refused to disclose information about wind farms; see also J Levy v IC EA/2016/0284 and P Thornton v IC EA/2016/0310 and FS50464000 (26/02/2013). 3.33  Case law (ii) ‘Formulated in too broad a manner’ means too vague and lacking sufficient clarity, not broad in coverage or subject matter although this may raise other problems. In FER0267670 (20/12/2010) the request was for ‘All records and data concerning radiation monitoring, sampling and assaying, including any air filtering assaying devices, deployed on and near the Olympic Park Development Site, including the location of each and every device’. The IC believed the request was clear. The issue seemed to be more about the logistics of collecting the information rather than clarity. Under reg 8 the PA must provide advice and assistance. Where clarification is provided by the requester the time limit is treated as being 20 days after the authority receives the clarification. 3.34  Case law (iii) In FS50156849, reg  12(4)(d) did not apply because the information was not ‘material in the course of completion’; the final version of the study had already been completed. Cabinet Office v IC EA/2010/0027 discussed a request for information relating to the policy on nuclear new-build that was initially raised in a white paper in 2003 and which featured eventually in the High Court decision in the Greenpeace case [2007] EWHC 311 (Admin). The Government was ruled to have acted unlawfully because of inadequate consultation and information. In FER0349127 a request was made for information relating to building affordable housing. The information had been in reports from a district council to the county council in which advice was sought. The documents were finalised, the IC ruled. A document may still be unfinished even though a final version is published (Secretary of State for Transport v IC EA/2008/0052). In FER0321779 the PA refused to disclose ‘estimates’. The IC ruled that on the facts the exception did not apply. Although the IC is not easily persuaded that this exception is involved, because disclosure would create an inaccurate or misleading impression where this is the case and the PA can neither rectify this or only at disproportionate cost, the exception may succeed (FER0210838). 3.35  Case law (iv) Information was refused under FOIA  2000, s  40 and EIR 2004, reg 12(4)(e) – in the latter case to protect ministerial communications and collective responsibility and civil servant advice (internal communications). The tribunal ruled that information had to be released subject to some redactions and removal of written comments on the papers. DEFRA v IC EA/2009/0011 concerned a request for the minutes of meetings between Lord Hunt and Mayor Johnson of London on air quality. Regulation 12(4)(e) was invoked. Information was released but some was withheld. Counsel for an additional party wished to see the redacted material in order to participate effectively in the closed session of the tribunal. This would be subject to a ‘confidentiality ring’, ie he would not pass on the information or its contents to anyone else including his client. This, although permissible under the tribunal’s rules, was denied and the decision is subject to an appeal to the Upper Tribunal. In Friends of the Earth v IC & Export Credit Guarantee Dept EA/2006/0073 (ECGD) information was requested on

Access to environmental information   379 whether EIR 2004 properly implemented Directive 2003/4/EC in relation to ‘internal communications’ in reg  12(4)(e). This provides an exception where ‘the request involves the disclosure of internal communications’. By 12(8) it is provided ‘internal communications includes communications between government departments’. Friends of the Earth requested from ECGD information about the application of credit in respect of the Sakhalin project and specifically correspondence circulating among departments about the ‘sensitive’ project concerning oil and gas development off a Russian island north of Japan and the risk presented thereby to the Western Grey Whale. Evidence to the Information Tribunal spelt out the huge environmental and social concerns in addition to concern about the whales themselves. The request was denied on the basis of reg  12(4)(e) to protect confidentiality and collective decisionmaking in government. The IC in his DN held that internal communications covered communications within a department as well as between departments. He upheld their decision on PI grounds. The IT accepted that the exemption applied to a public authority comprising several departments. The IT believed that the PI in withholding the information did not outweigh that in disclosure. The IT did not want to engage in a comparative discussion of FOIA 2000, s 35 and EIR  2004, reg  12(4)(e): ‘the onus being to specify clearly and precisely the harm or harms that would be caused were disclosure to be ordered. If no such harm can clearly be made out given the effect and terms of Reg 12(2), the balance must fall in favour of disclosure under the test in Reg 12(1)(b)’ (para  53). The PI put forward by ECGD included collective responsibility and candour. The former is not a ‘trump card’. The ‘touchstone is the public interest’ (para 57). ‘Life after FOIA has changed and had to change’ (para 61). The minister is accountable but it is not only his final decision which has to be scrutinised. Timing of a request is a factor to be considered. ‘Arguably EIR may set a higher test in establishing an exception [than FOIA] and a general resort to the “chilling effect” on record keeping. The IT observed “officials in all public authorities as well as Ministers in government should now be fully aware of the risk that in a given case their notes and records, and indeed all exchanges in whatever form, are in principle susceptible to a request or order for disclosure”’ (para  61). The project was not in its infancy or in any way preliminary and there was an undisputed public debate regarding all issues in the project. However, showing disunity in government would be unlikely to add weight to the PI in disclosure. No real prejudice was shown to decision-making and there was a genuine public interest in the discussion and the information would enable the public better to understand an important issue. Two years had passed between the request for comments and the request for information. No evidence was presented of harm arising in 2005 of discussions in 2003. The existence of a large amount of published evidence/information was not relevant in this case – the requested information itself was not in the public domain. An appeal to the High Court from the tribunal was unsuccessful (ECGD v Friends of the Earth [2008] EWHC 638 (Admin)). See South Gloucestershire Council v IC and Bovis Homes Ltd EA/2009/0032 (below) on reg 12(4)(e) and FS50224707. A  communication between a government department and an independent non-departmental body was not an ‘internal communication’ (DEFRA  v IC EA/2012/0105, 13 November 2012).

380  Chapter 3 3.36  Case law (v) Lord Baker v IC and DCLG EA/2006/0043 also involved EIR  2004, reg  12(4)(e). There had been a request for information relating to officials’ submissions made to the Deputy Prime Minister following the report of the inspector in the application to build Vauxhall Tower. The Deputy Prime Minister allowed permission to build and did not accept the inspector’s recommendation. In Bushell v Secretary of State for the Environment [1981] AC 75 the House of Lords ruled that it was not unfair for the minister to take into account new factual evidence from within his department and to refuse to reopen the inquiry where the new evidence was part of the underlying reason for making a decision and there was no disagreement between the inspector’s recommendations and the minister’s decision. The advice in Baker from officials was received before the Deputy Prime Minister overruled the inspector. The IC said submissions as a whole should have been disclosed but officials’ advice should not be. There were familiar arguments from the department about a loss of candour if disclosure were allowed. The tribunal ruled that disclosure of advice and opinions after a decision was made public would not undermine to any significant extent the proper and effective performance of officials’ duties. The PI did not weigh in favour of non-disclosure. Local government has been used to openness and access to information and has worked effectively; why should central government be treated differently queried the tribunal? In FER50092316 the complainant requested information relating to Luton Airport and the South East and East of England Regional Air Services Study (‘SERAS’). Specifically he requested any information provided to ministers as a basis for decisions on which options to take forward for Luton Airport for appraisal in stage two of the SERAS study, together with any records of the ministers’ decisions and the reasons for them. After some correspondence the Department for Transport (DfT) informed the IC that it was relying upon reg  12(4)(e) to withhold the information in question. The IC decided that reg 12(4)(e) was correctly relied upon. He then considered the public interest as required by reg 12(1)(b). The arguments of the DfT were as follows: (a) That reg  12(4)(e) recognised the need for ‘self-contained space’ for consideration of different policy options; that disclosure would be unhelpful and prejudicial because some of the issues were of a highly sensitive and controversial nature; that disclosure could reveal confidential policy and commercial priorities which might limit impartiality and collective responsibility. All of these arguments were rejected by the IC who acknowledged that the timing of a request is an important consideration (the instant case being four years). Once a decision has been made, the risk of disclosure prejudicing the policy process is likely to be reduced. (b) That public consultation and debate were only appropriate before policymaking. However, the IC thought that disclosure would help inform a necessary continued debate. (c) That part of the information may have had a doubtful veracity and disclosure could have undermined other government policy. On the contrary, the IC prioritised transparency and the correction of false assumptions. (d) That the information may have misrepresented more contemporary government thinking. This was rejected because the fact that information may be misleading or inaccurate is not a legitimate basis for withholding it.

Access to environmental information   381 (e) That the commercial interests of both the then current and future airport’s operator would be protected by non-disclosure. The lapse of time was considered to negate this. In para 41, the IC stated: ‘The IC acknowledges that the timing of a request is a very important consideration in this type of situation where different policy options are being examined and debated … once a decision has been made on the policy … the risk of disclosure prejudicing the policy process is likely to be reduced.’ Information relates to meetings occurring in 2001. No detailed evidence was given to the IC of harm from disclosure. Disclosure of information can still be useful after a policy has been announced to inform continuing debate. There is no PI in not revealing information because it may disclose that government assumptions were misplaced. Disclosure would help ‘ensure transparency’ (para  48). The IC was unpersuaded that commercial interests of airport operators would be detrimentally affected or that disclosure would lead to future lack of co-operation. The IC considered that where the government policies ‘could have such wide-ranging and serious implications on people’s lives, the environment and the economy’, that the public interest was clearly in favour of disclosure. Disclosure would allow a ‘more informed debate’ on important issues (para 65). The balancing test came down in favour of non-disclosure in a case involving Nirex – the former adviser on nuclear waste and now brought within the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority: see FER0178729. In FS50156849, reg 12(4)(e) on internal communications did not apply because the adviser was considered to be an external independent advisor. The IC referred to Art 4.2 of Directive 2003/4/EC on this point (‘grounds for refusal … shall be interpreted in a restrictive way’). He did, however, accept that in some circumstances information provided by an independent advisor may be an internal communication if there was a contractual relationship or if the advisor was carrying out a function of the public authority. (See Chichester DC v IC EA/2010/0153.) regulation 12(5)(a)–(e)

3.37  The exceptions in EIR 2004, reg 12(5)(a)–(g) are as follows, and PAs may (again, the discretionary nature of this power should be noted) refuse to disclose EI to the extent that disclosure would adversely affect (not, it should be noted, ‘could’, so a greater degree of certainty and supporting justification is required, and ‘would’ is used throughout FOIA 2000): • international relations, defence, national security or public safety. Regulation 15 makes provision for ministerial certificates stating that an exception is required for national security and the public interest does not favour disclosure (reg 12(5)(a)) (para 1.124 above, and below). The memorandum of understanding in such cases between the IC and government departments was discussed in detail (para 1.238 above). The certificate may be appealed against to the tribunal (reg 18(7)). FER0280033, a case involving a request for a digital version of a weather station data set from the Climatic Research Unit at UEA to Georgia Tech, was part of a notorious episode involving UEA. Reg 12(5)(a), and 12(5)(c) and (f) below did not apply. See also

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FER0282488 on a similar complaint,1 and Vehicle Certification Agency v IC EA/2016/0190. the course of justice (eg law enforcement), the ability of a person to receive a fair trial, or the ability of a PA to conduct an inquiry of a criminal or disciplinary nature (reg 12(5)(b)); on legal professional privilege, see DCLG v IC [2012] UKUT 102 (AAC) where the public interest strongly favoured LPP protection on the facts. It is likely to be relevant where court or tribunal records are requested or where disclosure would prejudice criminal or disciplinary investigations. Genuine ‘without prejudice’ communications aimed at a bona fide settlement may be subject to a successful exception.2

See the Commons Science and Technology Committee HC 444 (2010–12) and HC 496 (2010– 12), also containing the government response. 2 See generally https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1625/course_of_justice_ and_inquiries_exception_eir_guidance.pdf (13/04/2018). 1

3.38  • intellectual property rights (below) (reg 12(5)(c)). These rights have been discussed in relation to FOIA (para 1.216 above, and see paras 4.313 et seq below). Relevant legislation is the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 and regulations include the Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations 1997 (SI  1997/3032). These provisions contain defences on a variety of grounds to what would otherwise be a breach of copyright, eg fair dealing. In some cases, the statute and regulations allow for breach of IP rights where allowed under statutory authority. Additionally, reg  5(6) of the EIR  2004 states, ‘Any enactment or rule of law that would prevent the disclosure of information in accordance with these Regulations shall not apply’. IP protects the right to property so another cannot exploit that property. It is not an immunity against disclosure. Databases must contain an element of necessary originality to benefit from protection (FER0354510). • the confidentiality of the proceedings of that or any other PA where such confidentiality is provided by law (reg  12(5)(d)) (see paras 4.312 et seq below); para 7.5.5.4 of the DEFRA Guidance (para 3.5 above) advises that exemptions imposed by the local government access laws do not override EIR  2004. The case law has emphasised that it is the confidentiality of proceedings that is required (Chichester DC v IC [2012] UKUT 491 (AAC)). A degree of formality would be required. Confidentiality will be supplied within a statutory framework for the proceedings. Where there is no such framework then presumably the exception will have to satisfy ‘confidentiality’ under the common law: see FS50094124, FER0380352 and FER0374428 upheld in Group Captain Dalley v IC (EA/2011/0180, 15 February 2012).1 The views of the courts on the words ‘in confidence’ were noted (para 1.203 et seq). Confidentiality suggests the legal test in the law of confidentiality (see Worcestershire CC v IC EA/2015/0209 and r 12(5)(e) below); https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1626/eir_confidentiality_of_ proceedings.pdf.

1

3.39  • the confidentiality of commercial or industrial information where such confidentiality is provided by law to protect a legitimate economic interest

Access to environmental information   383

•

(reg 12(5)(e)). There has been very little case law on this exception so some additional comments are in order. This is a narrower exception than the commercial interests exemption in FOIA  2000, s  43. The reference is to information protected by commercial confidentiality (paras 1.215 et seq above).The Guidance states that where information has been kept off a register under the Environmental Protection Act 1990, s 22 this may be a relevant factor. In Amway Corpn v Eurway International Ltd: Case No CO/4553/98, [1974] RPC 82 (‘the BNRR case’), legitimate economic interest also implies that the exception may be invoked only if disclosure would significantly damage the interest in question and assist its competitors (Guidance, para 7.5.6.2). Speculative words such as ‘may’ or ‘could’ cause damage are not sufficient: Elmbridge BC v IC EA/2010/0106. From 1 December 2005, the Guidance notes that all central government departments and executive agencies are obliged to have an environmental purchasing policy properly integrated with departmental procurement practices. Mechanisms must be introduced to monitor and report on progress. The environmental implications and impacts of all government contracts must be considered. Once these are known, ‘the PA will be readily able to determine the extent to which information they hold is environmental’ (Guidance, para  7.55). The Procurement Strategy for Local Government lays out the approach to strategic procurement implementation in local government. The guidance on contracts was examined above. There must be a legitimate economic interest to protect. It might involve ‘costs, prices or insight into a company’s operating strategies. Confidentiality per se is not determinative – it must also relate to the protection of legitimate economic interests’ (Guidance, para 7.5.6.5). The guidance from the Ministry of Justice on FOIA 2000, s 41 may be relevant but EIR 2004 is not restricted to information obtained by the PA from the other contracting party and a breach of confidence is not referred to as ‘actionable’. The environmental implications and impacts of all government contracts will have to be considered including mandatory central government environmental purchasing policies and procurement practices. The Environmental Protection Act 1990, s 22 allows information to be kept off a register and this may be a factor to consider. The Procurement Strategy for Local Government covers local government. The terms of the DEFRA Code of Practice should be considered (para 3.5 above). The IC has advised that the following factors have to be established: ‘the information is not on emissions; the information is commercial or industrial in nature; it is confidential under either the common law of confidence, contract, or a statutory bar; the confidentiality is protecting a legitimate economic interest; the confidentiality will be adversely affected by disclosure; and the public interest in maintaining the exception outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information’.1

https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1624/eir_confidentiality_of_commercial_ or_industrial_information.pdf. See Bristol City Council v IC EA/2010/0012 (24 May 2010).

1

3.40  • there are three strands to reg  12(5)(f) and it is subject to the public interest test:

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(i) the interests of the person who provided the information where that person was not under, and could not have been put under, any legal obligation to supply it to that or any other PA – the information was volunteered or possibly returned as a quid pro quo but without compulsion on the part of the PA. It could include: information gathered in consultations and surveys where there was no obligation on people to respond to them; information form whistleblowers; information supplied voluntarily by environmental groups, lobbyists or public interest groups; or commercial bodies suppling information voluntarily before planning decisions (see FS50390500); the IC invokes the Aarhus Implementation guide to encourage the flow of information from private persons or concerns to PAs1 (see D Wallis v IC EA/2011/0219, 31/01/2012); (ii) the person did not supply it in circumstances such that that or any other PA is entitled apart from these Regulations to disclose it – this is not entirely clear. The obvious power of disclosure would be FOIA  2000, but EI is given an exemption under that statute so it would not be disclosable. In spite of that exemption, does the PA still retain a discretion to disclose the information under FOIA (para 1.198 – it is not an absolute exemption under FOIA)? FOIA  2000, s  39 suggests not. EI is dealt with by the EIR  2004 regime. Information protected by the law of confidentiality or by a permissible agreement would not be disclosable by a PA subject to the public interest test and the provision on emissions under EIR 2004 (see D Wallis v IC above); (iii) and the person has not consented to its disclosure, and it appears therefore to be confidentiality that is protected. In the BNRR case, the court found that information contained in a concession agreement following negotiations between the parties is not fairly described as information ‘supplied’ by one party to another (reg 12(5)(f)); the protection of the environment to which the information relates, eg  where disclosure might lead to some exploitation of the environment which is damaging to the environment (reg 12(5)(g)). Case law is sparse in this area. The IC has provided guidance.2

https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1638/eir_voluntary_supply_of_ information_regulation.pdf. 2 https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1630/eir_guidance_protection_of_the_ environment_regulation.pdf. 1

3.41  Case law (i) Under reg 12(5)(a) see Office of Communications v IC and T-Mobile (UK) Ltd EA/2006/0078 below (para 3.43). FER0280033 involved a request for a digital version of a weather station data set sent from the Climatic Research Unit at UEA to Georgia Tech (above). In Matthew Sinclair v IC and Department of Energy and Climate Change EA/2011/0052 (8  November 2011) the exception could be properly applied where the UK’s bargaining position internationally could be adversely affected (para 20). On defence and aircraft procurement, see FS50089556 and FS50117924; the latter concerned the UK  Atomic Energy Authority. As discussed in ch  1, a threat to national

Access to environmental information   385 security does not have to be imminent (see FS50308040). The mosaic principle (ie  piecing together seemingly innocuous fragments of information to form information covered by an exception but which otherwise would not apply to the fragmented parts) will be relevant in this exception. The NCND response under reg 12(6) (para 1.67 above) may be relevant in this exception, especially to avoid inconsistency if a reg 12(4)(a) response had been given earlier and that response is no longer possible because of new facts that are sensitive under this exception. 3.42  Case law (ii) In Mersey Tunnels Users Association v IC and Halton Borough Council EA/2009/0001 the Mersey Tunnels Users Association made a request to the council for information. This was the second stage of appeal and was necessary because the council located further information relevant to the request but was exempt from disclosure under FOIA 2000, s 42 or EIR 2004, regs 12(5)(b), 12(5)(e), 12(4)(d) or 12(5)(f). The IT had already decided that all of the information should be dealt with under the EIR and therefore went on to consider whether any of the exemptions applied to the additional information and, where relevant, whether the public interest favoured disclosure or nondisclosure. The public interest test was to be considered as at the time of the request, not the time of the appeal. The council was permitted to rely on additional exemptions, notwithstanding the late assertion of them, because it could not have previously raised the exemption, as the information had not been located at that time. This served to disadvantage the appellant, but the IT found that it should not penalise the council and should consider the exemptions in deciding whether or not the information should be disclosed. Regulation 12(4) (d) was relied upon in respect of three draft documents. The IT agreed that the exemption was engaged because a draft document is unfinished. The IT found that the public interest favoured non-disclosure because there was little public interest in disclosing a draft document, the final version of which was likely to be made public. The council purported that reg 12(5)(b) covered 21 of the documents. The IC had decided that the documents were covered by legal professional privilege because they referred to legal advice that was given to the council. The IT considered the case of Three Rivers District Council and Others v Governor and Company of the Bank of England [2004] UKHL 48 and followed Rudd v IC and the Verderers of the New Forest EA/2008/0006 and Creekside Forum v IC and the Department for Culture, Media and Sport EA/2008/0065. The IT found that information which was privileged fell within reg  12(5)(b), but only if the document would adversely affect the course of justice (an additional requirement to FOIA 2000). Some of the documents were found to fall within the exemption because disclosure would prejudice the public authority from adopting a more favourable or an alternative position and disclosure of legal advice in general would prejudice public authorities in obtaining advice on their legal rights, obligations and liabilities. However, notwithstanding this finding, it was in the public interest for some of the information to be disclosed. The factors in favour of disclosure were: (a) transparency and accountability; (b) informing the public that advice was sought and that the council acted properly and lawfully; (c) enabling the public to challenge decisions; (d) ensuing debate improve the quality of future decision-making; and (e) significant local public interest. The

386  Chapter 3 factors against disclosure were: (a) strong public interest in maintaining legal professional privilege; (b) public authorities should be able to give and receive full information from its legal advisors; (c) confidentiality is key to the lawyer– client relationship; and (d) the legal advice was ‘live’ at the time of the request and the procurement exercise had not begun. On reg  12(5)(e), relating to 17 documents, the IT followed the decision in South Gloucestershire Council v IC and Bovis Homes Ltd EA/2009/0032 that, ‘wherever, because of the sensitive nature of the information, the law recognises the confidentiality of the information as deserving of legal protection, the confidentiality is provided by law’. The exemption is not limited to circumstances where a duty of confidentiality is owed by or to the council. Some of the documents were held to fall within reg 12(5)(e), and, of those, the public interest favoured non-disclosure. A schedule attached to the DN details the individual findings relating to each document. In G Plumbe v IC EA/2009/0117 the tribunal upheld the claim involving the protection of legal privilege on PI grounds. Mr Christopher Boddy v Information Commissioner and North Norfolk District Council EA/2007/0074 was an appeal to the IT from a decision of the IC. Mr Boddy sought disclosure of counsel’s legal advice obtained by the council concerning the development of certain land. However, he stated that the exception in reg  12(5)(b) would apply; the council was exempt from disclosure by way of legal professional privilege (LPP). The IT considered the matters as follows: • Cessation of legal professional privilege. The IT applied the House of Lords case Three Rivers District Council and Others v Governor and Company of the Bank of England [2004] UKHL48 on LPP. The IT decided that LPP had not ceased. • Application of reg  12(5)(b). In Kirkaldie v The Information Commissioner and Thanet District Council EA/2006/0001, reg  12(5)(b) was applied to information subject to LPP. The test in this respect is whether the course of justice would be adversely affected by disclosure. The IT considered that it would be so affected because the possibility of litigation existed and it would not have been fair for there not to have been a level playing field; disclosure would have revealed the strengths and/or weaknesses of the case to the opposing side and would have adversely affected the course of justice. • The public interest test. Regulation 12(1)(b) provides for consideration of the public interest. It was noted that each case must be considered on its facts and that there is a presumption in favour of disclosure. There were several complaints from Mr Boddy, for example, that the council was breaking restrictive covenants and deceiving the public. However the IT rejected these arguments because they could all be dealt with through private or public legal proceedings. Further, if anybody wished to challenge the council over its actions, they would be able to take their own legal advice. M  Watts v IC EA/2007/0022 involved reg  12(5)(b).The tribunal ruled the prospect of a public enquiry following an outbreak of E. coli was not for criminal or disciplinary matters and so reg  12(5)(b) and its exception did not apply. LPP had not been waived in R Burgess v IC & Stafford BC EA/2006/0091 when a barrister’s report had been given by the council to a councillor. The

Access to environmental information   387 tribunal believed not and repeated points concerning the limits of waiver under FOIA 2000, s 42 (para 1.209 et seq). 3.43  Case law (iii) The most important discussion concerning reg 12(5)(c) is in Office of Communications v IC and T-Mobile (UK) Ltd EA/2006/0078. It was unsuccessfully appealed to the High Court but was partially successful on appeal to the Court of Appeal. The case has been referred to the ECJ by the Supreme Court (Office of Communications v IC  [2010]  UKSC  3). The requester asked Ofcom for information concerning the location, ownership and technical attributes of mobile-phone cellular base stations. There was concern about radio frequency radiation in the form of electromagnetic waves. Information had been provided to Ofcom by each company offering a mobile phone service. The location of the stations could be found using maps on a website, but this did not show the whole database such as address, location and postcode, or whether each station is mounted on a particular kind of building or structure. The IC had ordered disclosure of these details in his DN. The primary concern was the health considerations of operating such base stations. The Stewart Report recommended that a database be set up giving details of all base stations and their emissions. This was issued in 1999. The details were to include: ‘the name of the company, the grid reference, height of antennae, date transmission commenced, frequency range and signal characteristics of transmission, transmitter power and maximum legislative power output’. Stewart recommended a national database that should be ‘readily accessible’ by the public allowing easy identification of all base stations within a defined geographical area. A  voluntary scheme was brought into effect but mobile network operators (MNOs) did not want specific information about various items published. ‘The Sitefinder website was duly set up by the Government and has been operated since the end of 2003 by the respondent, the Office of Communications (“Ofcom”). The site is constructed from information voluntarily provided by mobile network operators from their databases. It has enabled individuals, by inputting a postcode, town or street name, to search a map square for information about the base stations within it’, according to Lord Philips. This agreement represented a ‘modest dilution’ of the Stewart proposals, the tribunal believed. The MNOs wanted protection of commercially sensitive information arguing this was not detrimental to Stewart’s proposals. The information available through the website was also available from local planning authorities. A request was made for information on base stations and Ofcom refused relying on reg 6(1)(b) – information already publicly available. Grid references were not available. Subsequently Ofcom relied upon reg 12(5) (c) – intellectual property rights – arguing under reg  12(1)(b) that the PI favoured non-disclosure. An appeal was made to the IT on basis that under reg 12(5)(c) disclosure would have an adverse effect on Ofcom’s database right or copyright in data on the website. Other exemptions under FOIA 2000 were also said to apply. The MNOs withdrew from the cooperative scheme when the IC found against Ofcom. Recital 10 of the Directive was important for helping to define environmental information. Radio waves are an emission, the tribunal believed, thereby introducing the nullification/disapplication of the exception by virtue of reg 12(9) – as explained, this provides that some exceptions do not

388  Chapter 3 apply to protect information about emissions. The names of the MNOs were within EIR 2004 and so subject to a reg 12(9) disapplication. The tribunal found that the PI favoured disclosure and arguments that disclosure would increase vandalism, etc although substantiated to some extent they was not forceful arguments and did not outweigh the public interest in favour of publication – a position supported by the 1999 report. The PI, in respecting commercial interests of intellectual property rights, preventing the increase of criminal activity and the withdrawal of MNOs from the voluntary arrangements were all factors to consider in balancing the PI (modification of licences may make voluntary arrangements a ‘legal obligation’ although MNOs would challenge this). However, the tribunal ruled that the PI for one exception could not be aggregated and transferred to another exception. They were not cumulatively applicable to assess whether the PI in disclosure was outweighed by nondisclosure – can, in other words, the interests served by different exceptions be combined and then weighed against the public interest in disclosure? The PI in non-disclosure did not outweigh the PI in disclosure. Although there was an unsuccessful appeal to the High Court by Ofcom, the appeal was partially successful in the Court of Appeal ([2009] EWCA Civ 90). The CoA found that the exceptions could be weighed cumulatively in assessing the public interest in disclosure and they did not have to be considered singularly, ie the sum is bigger than its parts. The CoA disagreed with the tribunal and Laws LJ on this and the case was remitted to the tribunal to reconsider this point noting that the tribunal could very well reach the same result. Looking at the exceptions in the aggregate would allow the overall public interest to be assessed. The CoA did rule in favour of the tribunal that public benefit from the disclosure can be weighed against possible breaches of third-party IP rights. Third-party IP rights to databases set out in the 1997 Regulations could not of themselves defeat rights of access. Copyright does not defeat access rights. But using material in breach of copyright is still actionable and may involve criminal offences. The CoA also agreed with the IT and High Court that the names of the MNOs were environmental information and the public interest in disclosure extended to these. In the reference from the Supreme Court the majority believed that the exceptions could be cumulated to assess the strength of the PI in non-disclosure: ‘The majority view is that, since all the facets of the public interest in disclosure go into one side of the scales, it makes sense to put all the aspects of the interests served by refusal to go into the other side. These latter interests may be highly diverse and without any common factor (as in the present case, where the arguments against disclosure under the public safety and intellectual property rights exceptions are separate, one being concerned with public, the other with private protection). But that, in the majority view, can be seen as a positive reason why it is permissible to accumulate them. If, in some future case, it was possible to identify some overlap, then some allowance might perhaps be appropriate to eliminate double counting. The majority further point out that some of the heads of article 4(2), particularly (b), already involve different interests under which different factors could arise which could, they consider, presumably be cumulated.’ (para 13)

Access to environmental information   389 The Advocate General on the reference to the ECJ gave an opinion supporting the majority of the Supreme Court and the CoA’s decision (Case C-71/10, 10  March 2011). The ECJ supported the Advocate General ruling that PAs may ‘evaluate cumulatively the grounds for refusal to disclose’ (para 28) while a number of separate interests may, cumulatively, ‘militate in favour of disclosure’ (Case C-71/10 Ofcom v IC  [2011]  ECJ  (28.07.11), para  25). FER0279668 also concerns reg 12(5)(c). The complainant submitted a request to Walsall Council to inspect building control information. The complainant specified that he wished to view the records in person. The council withheld the information under the exception at reg 12(5)(c), on the grounds that disclosure would be detrimental to the council’s intellectual property rights. The Commissioner’s decision was that reg 12(5)(c) was not engaged. During the course of the investigation, the council decided to rely on the exception at reg 12(4)(b) (manifestly unreasonable). The Commissioner has upheld this exception. The council also breached reg 14(2) by failing to provide a refusal notice within the statutory time for compliance, and reg 14(3) by failing to cite an exception that it later relied upon in its refusal notice. The council also breached reg 9(1) by failing to offer the complainant appropriate advice and assistance. 3.44  Case law (iv) FER0280033 (above) was a case involving a request for a digital version of a weather station data set sent from the Climatic Research Unit at UEA to Georgia Tech. Regulation 12(5)(c) was raised by the UEA. In rejecting the UEA’s invocation of the exception, at para 97, the IC stated, citing the Defra guidance: ‘Copyright does not prevent authorities releasing information they hold. However, where such information is subject to copyright, it should be made clear to applicants that the copyright still exists.’ (para 7.5.4.1 page 12) ‘The Commissioner is of the view that this exception is not intended to protect intellectual property rights in themselves but is intended to protect the interests of the holders of intellectual property rights. Accordingly, in order to engage the exception, it is necessary to demonstrate that the public authority or other interested parties held intellectual property rights in respect of the withheld information and that those rights would have been adversely affected had the information been disclosed. The Commissioner highlights the Information Tribunal decision in Ofcom (EA/2006/0078), paragraph 47: “The Information Commissioner’s case was that he had been right in his Decision Notice to say that infringement of an intellectual property right was not sufficient to trigger the exception. He considered that the expression ‘adverse effect’ required something more in terms of actual harm to commercial or other interests. Ofcom and T-Mobile, on the other hand, argue that the question of loss or harm should be taken into account when carrying out the public interest balance required by EIR regulation 2(1)(b), but not at the stage of determining whether the exception has been engaged… However we believe that, interpreting the exception restrictively requires us to conclude that it was intended that the exception

390  Chapter 3 would only apply if the infringement was more than just a purely technical infringement, (which in other circumstances might have led to a court awarding nominal damages, or even exercising its discretion to refuse to grant the injunction that would normally follow a finding of infringement). It must be one that would result in some degree of loss or harm to the right holder. We do not therefore accept that such harm should only be taken into consideration when carrying out the public interest balance.”’ 3.45  Case law (v) In relation to reg  12(5)(d) FER0086108 was a request for information about two contractors cleaning up after a foot-and-mouth epidemic. Regulation 12(5)(d) – confidentiality of proceedings – was properly invoked for the second contractor. The reg 12(5)(d) exception concerned a settlement at which information had been prepared exclusively for discussion at the meeting. The PI favoured non-disclosure because DEFRA’s trustworthiness would be called into account if it breached undertaking. Disclosure may also have serious implications for DEFRA and their exposure to legal suits (see Chichester DC v IC EA/2010/0153). 3.46  Case law (vi) FS50206320 deals with reg  12(5)(e) – confidentiality of commercial or industrial information. The PA entered into a public finance initiative contract with Veolia Environmental Services (Veolia) to outsource certain waste management functions in order to enable the PA to discharge its statutory waste management obligations. The complainant asked to see the contract and related documents. The PA eventually provided much of the information requested but withheld some citing reg 12(5)(e). The IC decided, following decisions in earlier leading cases, that the reg 12(5)(e) exception had been correctly engaged by Nottinghamshire County Council for some of the information. For some of information withheld under reg 12(5)(e) the balance of the public interest in maintaining the exception did not outweigh that in disclosure. The remaining information was correctly refused as the balance of the public interest in maintaining the exception outweighed that in disclosing the information. In a separate legal process, the complainant asked the PA for some of the relevant information under the provisions of the Audit Commission Act 1998. The High Court granted access. In South Gloucestershire Council v IC and Bovis Homes Ltd EA/2009/0032 Bovis made two planning applications to the council and was informed that the council was to use an independent development appraisal via a consultant. Bovis requested a copy of this information, but the council refused, citing the exceptions for internal communications (reg 12(4)(e)) and confidentiality (reg 12(5)(e)) under the EIR. The IC decided that neither of these exceptions were engaged and ordered disclosure; the council appealed to the IT. The council submitted that the IC took too narrow an approach to the exceptions. The IC maintained that the information was not part of internal communications because it involved third-party consultants, and the duty of confidentiality was not provided by law because it was not to protect a legitimate economic interest. The IT found that the information was not part of an internal communication because of the third-party nature of the consultants. In relation to the confidentiality exception, the IC submitted that the words ‘provided by law’ should be interpreted as ‘imposed on the public authority by law’; the council in this case made a choice to treat the information as confidential, but

Access to environmental information   391 could, if it so chose, have disclosed it at any time. The IC referred the IT to Office of Communication v IC EA/2006/0078. The IT did not accept this interpretation of the wording of the Regulations: ‘[w]herever, because of the sensitive nature of the information, the law recognises the confidentiality of the information as deserving of legal protection, the confidentiality is provided by law’. The IT therefore considered the exception to be engaged. They went on to consider the public interest and found that the factors submitted in favour of disclosure (eg accountability, transparency, public understanding and the role of external consultants) were very limited considering the amount of information already in the public domain. The IT found that the public interest favoured nondisclosure. (See also FER0079969 and North West etc Fisheries Committee v IC EA/2007/0133). See also Bath and NE  Somerset Council EA/2010/0045 for a lengthy discussion where information was disclosed in a redacted form (and see Chichester DC v IC EA/2010/0153). 3.47  Case law (vii) Under reg 12(5)(f), the First-tier Tribunal stated that a fivestep test is involved: Would disclosure adversely affect the interests of the person who provided the information to the public authority? Was the person under, or could they have been put under, any legal obligation to supply the information to the public authority? Did the person supply the information in circumstances where the recipient public authority, or any other public authority, was entitled to disclose it apart from under the EIR? Has the person supplying the information consented to its disclosure? Does the public interest in maintaining the exception outweigh that in disclosure? (J Kuschnir v IC EA/2011/0273, 25/04/2012). Where the first four steps of the test are satisfied, the IC suggests a public authority will owe the person that supplied the information a duty of confidence. There will then be a public interest determination to establish whether or not the information should be disclosed. See Elmbridge BC v IC EA/2010/0106 and Staffordshire CC v IC EA/2010/0015, [2010] UKFTT 573 (GRC) and FER0450536. 3.48  Information that is subject to exceptions should be retained along with copies of information handed to the requester. This information is needed for quality control management and also in case appeals are launched to the IC. regulation 12(6) and ‘neither confirm nor deny’ (ncnd)

3.49  Regulation 12 continues by stating that a PA may respond to a request for the purposes of reg  12(1) by ‘neither confirming nor denying whether such information exists and is held by the PA, whether or not it holds such information, where that confirmation or denial would involve the disclosure of information which would adversely affect any of the interests referred to in [reg  12(5)(a)] above and would not be in the public interest under [reg  12(1) (b)]’. The confirmation or denial may be overridden in the public interest. The NCND provision has a far more restricted application for exemptions than under FOIA 2000, where it applies in most exemptions. For the purposes of the preceding sentence, whether information exists and is held by a PA is itself the disclosure of information (reg 12(7)).

392  Chapter 3

Emissions 3.50  By virtue of EIR 2004, reg 12(9) where the EI to be disclosed relates to emissions, the exceptions above from reg 12(5)(d)–(g) may not be relied upon by a PA. For the purposes of reg 12(5)(b) and (d) and (f) above, references to a PA includes a Scottish PA. Finally, reg 12(11) stipulates that nothing in the regulations allows EI to be withheld where it is held with other EI that is properly withheld under the regulations ‘unless it is not reasonably capable of being separated from the other information’ so as to make the EI available. Parts of documents not covered by an exception should be disclosed where it is reasonably severable. In FER0085500 the complainant requested a report into an application for a grant towards a proposed biomass generation plant. This was initially refused under ss 41 (information provided in confidence) and 43 (commercial interests) of the Act. The information withheld fell within the definition of EI in the EIR and the PA should consider what exceptions from the EIR may apply. The public authority cited regs 12(5)(d) (confidentiality of proceedings of public authorities provided by law), (e) (commercial confidentiality) and (g) (environmental protection). The Commissioner found that the information is on emissions and, therefore, reg 12(9) applied. As reg 12(9) provides that information on emissions cannot be subject to any of the exceptions provided in regs 12(5)(d) to (g), the Commissioner found that the exceptions cited by the public authority were not engaged. The public authority was required to disclose to the complainant the information withheld. The IC has written that, for the purposes of regs 2(1)(b) and 12(9), the word ‘emissions’ ‘should be given its plain and natural meaning and not the artificially narrow one set out in the IPCC Directive 2008/01/EC’.1 In that particular case (Ofcom v IC & T-Mobile EA/2006/0078), the Tribunal accepted that radio wave radiation emanating from a base station was an emission. See also GM Freeze v IC et al EA/2010/0112, FER0445318 and FER0436344. https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1616/information-on-emissions-eirguidance.pdf. See also, under Regulation (EC) 1367/2006 (para 3.4, note 1 above), Case T-202/10 Stichting Greenpeace Nederland v Commission [2018] EUECJ.

1

Severance of non-excepted material 3.51  Regulation 12(11) stipulates that nothing in the Regulations allows EI to be withheld where it is held with other EI that is properly withheld under the Regulations ‘unless it is not reasonably capable of being separated from the other information’ so as to make the EI available. Sections of documents not covered by an exception should be disclosed where it is reasonably severable.

Personal data 3.52  The principles of personal data as affected by the DPA 2018 have been discussed in ch 1 and, in particular, ch 2. Personal data of which the requester is the data subject must be requested under the DPA as is the case for requests

Access to environmental information   393 for such data under the FOIA regime (paras 1.19, 1.200 and 2.81 et seq above). The definitions concerning GDPR, data subject and controller within reg 2 are modified to be in accordance with the GDPR and DPA 2018. Regulations 14 and 18 are likewise modified. Regulation 13(1) is amended to read: ‘(1) To the extent that the information requested includes personal data of which the applicant is not the data subject, a public authority must not disclose the personal data if– (a) the first condition is satisfied, or (b) the second or third condition is satisfied and, in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in not disclosing the information outweighs the public interest in disclosing it.’ Regulation 13(2) is amended to set out the conditions (see paras 1.200 et seq and 2.94 et seq): ‘(2A) The first condition is that the disclosure of the information to a member of the public otherwise than under these Regulations– (a) would contravene any of the data protection principles, or (b) would do so if the exemptions in section 24(1) of the Data Protection Act 2018 (manual unstructured data held by public authorities as set out in FOIA) were disregarded.’ This in effect makes the exemption absolute. As discussed in ch 2 (paras 2.94 et seq) this is absolute where disclosure is a breach of a DPP. However, there may be a lawful justification for processing personal data, and the most common in this context is ‘legitimate interests’ under Art 6(1)(f) of the GDPR. This has been fully explained (para 2.37 above). 3.53  The second and third conditions are qualified by the public interest in reg 13(2B): ‘(2B) The second condition is that the disclosure of the information to a member of the public otherwise than under these Regulations would contravene– (a) Article  21 of the GDPR (general processing: right to object to processing), or (b) section 99 of the Data Protection Act 2018 (intelligence services processing: right to object to processing).’ A new reg 13(3A) replaces 13(3) and reads: ‘(3A)  The third condition is that– (a) on a request under Article  15(1) of the GDPR (general processing: right of access by the data subject) for access to personal data, the information would be withheld in reliance on provision made by or under section 15, 16 or 26 of, or Schedule  2, 3 or 4 to, the Data Protection Act 2018, (b) on a request under section 45(1)(b) of that Act (law enforcement processing: right of access by the data subject), the information would be withheld in reliance on subsection (4) of that section, or

394  Chapter 3 (c) on a request under section 94(1)(b) of that Act (intelligence services processing: rights of access by the data subject), the information would be withheld in reliance on a provision of Chapter 6 of Part 4 of that Act.’ Regulation 13(4) is omitted. A new reg 13(5) reads: ‘(5A)  For the purposes of this regulation a public authority may respond to a request by neither confirming nor denying whether such information exists and is held by the public authority, whether or not it holds such information, to the extent that– (a) the condition in paragraph (5B)(a) is satisfied, or (b) a condition in paragraph  (5B)(b) to (e) is satisfied and in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in not confirming or denying whether the information exists outweighs the public interest in doing so. (5B)  The conditions mentioned in paragraph (5A) are– (a) giving a member of the public the confirmation or denial– (i) would (apart from these Regulations) contravene any of the data protection principles, or (ii) would do so if the exemptions in section 24(1) of the Data Protection Act 2018 (manual unstructured data held by public authorities) were disregarded; (b) giving a member of the public the confirmation or denial would (apart from these Regulations) contravene Article 21 of the GDPR or section 99 of the Data Protection Act 2018 (right to object to processing); (c) on a request under Article 15(1) of the GDPR (general processing: right of access by the data subject) for confirmation of whether personal data is being processed, the information would be withheld in reliance on a provision listed in paragraph (3A)(a); (d) on a request under section 45(1)(a) of the Data Protection Act 2018 (law enforcement processing: right of access by the data subject), the information would be withheld in reliance on subsection (4) of that section; (e) on a request under section 94(1)(a) of that Act (intelligence services processing: rights of access by the data subject), the information would be withheld in reliance on a provision of Chapter 6 of Part 4 of that Act.’ A new reg 13(6) reads: ‘(6) In determining for the purposes of this regulation whether the lawfulness principle in Article 5(1)(a) of the GDPR would be contravened by the disclosure of information, Article  6(1) of the GDPR (lawfulness) is to be read as if the second sub-paragraph (disapplying the legitimate interests gateway in relation to public authorities) were omitted.’ 3.54  The case law only refers to the 1998 Act. In relation to reg  12(3) in FS50282532 it was held that information about a s  106 planning agreement was correctly withheld. In FER0112249 the complainant, DEFRA, requested information regarding the distribution of EU  Common Agricultural Policy

Access to environmental information   395 subsidies. The public authority refused disclosure on the basis of EIR 2004, regs 12 and 13. As regards reg 13, the public authority claimed that the information could not be disclosed under the first DPP. The IC rejected this argument. He accepted that the complainant had a legitimate interest, both as a member of the public and as a member of the press, in knowing how agricultural subsidies were distributed. Further, even though the information related to ‘individuals’ being paid the subsidy, they were not individuals in a personal capacity, but in a business capacity. In this case, communicating the details of the subsidy paid to a person in a business capacity was deemed justified (see W Young v IC and DOE NI EA/2007/0048; see also the Volker Eifert Case C-93/09 (ECJ on this point). A planning officer’s report was wrongly withheld under reg 13 when it was claimed that it constituted personal data. Some personal data were contained and were redacted but it was important that those affected by public decisions should know of the background: Surrey Heath Borough Council v IC EA/2010/0034. See Deborah Clark v IC EA/2012/0160 (29 January 2013) and FS50092069. For personal data available on social media and whether this amounts to consent, see Surrey Heath BC v John Morley and the IC [2014] UKUT 0339 (AAC), 21 July 2014.

Refusals under reg 12(1) or 13(1) 3.55  These refusals shall be in writing and must be explained (specify reasons not to disclose) to the applicant not later than 20 days after date of receipt of the request. Reasons include a refusal under EIR 2004, reg 12(4), (5) or 13 (see G Freeze v IC EA/2010/0112 on reg 13). They must include the matters the PA considered in reaching its decision on the public interest. If EI is refused because of the exception relating to unfinished or incomplete documents (reg 12(4)(d)), the PA must also specify, if known to it, the name of any other PA preparing the information and the estimated time within which the EI will be finished or completed. The refusal shall contain advice to the applicant on their rights to make representations and of the enforcement and appeal provisions under reg 18 (below) which, with modifications, are those under FOIA 2000 (paras 1.234 et seq above).

Ministerial certificates 3.56  A Minister (FOIA 2000, s 25(3)) or his designate may certify (EIR 2004, reg 15(1)) that disclosure under reg 12 would adversely affect national security (paras 1.238 et seq above on the memorandum of understanding) and would not be in the public interest under reg 12(1)(b). Similarly to FOIA 2000, a certificate is conclusive evidence of the matters within reg 12(1) and may identify information in general terms. A document purporting to be such a certificate shall be received in evidence and deemed such a certificate until the contrary is proved. Provision is made for true copies. 3.57  A  code of practice has been issued by the Secretary of State in terms similar to those under FOIA 2000, but with important distinctions as explained

396  Chapter 3 above, and this may make different provision for different PAs. The Information Commissioner has to be consulted before issuing or revising any such code. Powers of the Commissioner under FOIA 2000, ss 47 and 48 (general functions and practice recommendations, paras 1.164 et seq above) apply to the Regulations subject to reg 16(6) which allows for cross-referencing. Regulation 17 concerns requests for historical records (para 1.75 above and paras 4.62 et seq below), which are those over 30 years old (s 62), and for transferred public records by appropriate records authorities and responsible authorities (s 15, and para 1.96 above).

Representations and reconsideration 3.58  EIR 2004, reg 11 allows an applicant to make representations to a PA in relation to the applicant’s request for environmental information if it appears to the applicant that the PA has failed to comply with a requirement of the Regulations in relation to the request. The representations shall be made in writing to the PA no later than 40 working days after the date on which the applicant believes that the public authority has failed to comply with the requirement. The PA must, free of charge, consider any representations together with any supporting evidence. It has to publicise its complaints procedure in the FOIA publication scheme. It will decide whether there has been compliance with any requirement. Internal reviews should be undertaken by parties who were not involved in the original decision (Guidance, ch 8, and code of practice). Any written reply from an applicant expressing dissatisfaction should be treated as a complaint. It should be possible to reverse or otherwise amend decisions previously taken. Where the organisation is small, or the decision is made at a level of seniority that it cannot be reviewed, the organisation should consider waiving the internal review, the guidance advises, although the code is less precise. Paragraph  67 of the code states that, where the outcome of a complaint is that information should be disclosed that was previously withheld, the information in question should be disclosed as soon as possible and within the time limit. Procedural defects should prompt an apology from the PA. Notice of the PA’s decision has to be given to the applicant as soon as possible and no later than 40 days after the date of receiving the representations. Timescales should be set out in the complaints procedure. If these cannot be met, the complainant should be informed. Records should be kept for monitoring and amending procedures. Complainants should be informed of target dates for the determination of complaints. If it decides there has been such a failure by the PA, it shall include in its notification a statement of the failure to comply; the action the authority has proposed to take to comply with the requirement and the period within which such action will be taken. Where the decision refusing information is upheld, the requester must be informed of rights of appeal to the IC.

Enforcement and appeal provisions 3.59  Where an applicant has made representations to a PA under EIR 2004, reg  11 and the applicant believes that the PA has failed to comply fully with

Access to environmental information   397 the requirements of that provision, the enforcement and appeal provisions (involving the Tribunal) of FOIA (FOIA 2000, Parts IV and V and Sch 3) apply with modifications (reg 18). FOIA 2000, Part IV shall not apply in a case where a ministerial certificate concerning national security has been issued under reg 15(1) – this refers to the powers of enforcement and search and seizure residing in the IC under FOIA 2000, ss 50–56 and Sch 3. Presumably these powers would be restored if a certificate were quashed by the tribunal under FOIA 2000, s 60(3) (para 1.281). Necessary cross-referencing in the FOIA enforcement and appeal provisions to the regulations is effected under reg 18 so that a reference to a public authority in FOIA is a reference to a PA under these regulations. Reference to the code of practice, general rights of access to information in s 1(1), means by which communication is to be made (s 11), refusals of request (s 17) and contents of decision notices (s 50(4)) in FOIA are to be treated as references to EIR 2004, regs 5(1), 6 and 14. The reference to the offence of altering records etc under FOIA 2000, s 77 in Sch 3, para 1 shall be treated as an offence under reg 19, and that regulation establishes an offence in relation to EI requests where an official or other person covered by the regulation erases, blocks, defaces, destroys or conceals any record with the intention of preventing its disclosure wholly or partly. Prosecution has to be by the Information Commissioner or Director of Public Prosecutions, or with the latter’s consent. 3.60  FOIA  2000, ss  23(1) and 24(1), which refer to exemptions for bodies dealing with security matters and national security, shall be treated as a reference to information whose disclosure would adversely affect national security. The veto power under s 53 (paras 1.150 et seq above) applies to decision and enforcement notices under the regulations although the Supreme Court judgment and its impact on vetoes in Kennedy has been noted (para  3.4 above). Section 60 on appeals against national security notices applies with modifications so that reg 15(1) replaces s 24(3), and s 60(2) has no application to the regulations in relation to bodies listed under s 53(1)(a) (paras 1.150 et seq above). A government department is not liable to prosecution in relation to an offence under FOIA 2000, Sch 3, para 12 relating to execution of warrants, but the prosecution provisions apply to persons in the public service of the Crown or acting on behalf of either House of Parliament or the Northern Ireland Assembly. 3.61  It will be recalled that the Aarhus Convention was concerned not only with access rights to information but also with access to justice. It was thought at one stage that this would encourage more public participatory mechanisms for decision making on the environment. The government was of the view that existing mechanisms involving inquiries and registers were adequate and Directive 2003/4/EC, Art 6 on access to justice is implemented by EIR 2004, regs 11 and 18. Representations may be made under Art 15 of the UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters via a complaints procedure set up under the Convention where the Convention has not been properly implemented, but all domestic and EU avenues would have to be explored. The Directive may well offer directly effective rights which may be pursued initially through domestic courts.

398  Chapter 3

COSTS UNDER EIR CASES 3.62  Costs orders may be awarded against appellants for manifestly unreasonable, frivolous, vexatious or improper behaviour. In M  Fowler v IC and Brighton and Hove City Council EA/2006/0071 the IT made the point that there would be no costs order against a party reasonably pursuing appeals. Milford Haven PA  v IC and Third Parties EA/2007/0036 contains a discussion of costs orders under IT rules, specifically ‘Manifestly unreasonable, frivolous’ etc behaviour under reg  29 of those. The case also has discussion of earlier authorities. The basis for awarding costs was changed at the beginning of 2010 (para 1.253 above) but the basic test is the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, s 29 and the Tribunal Procedure Rules 2009, SI 2009/1976, r 10 and involves ‘acting unreasonably’.

SPATIAL DATA 3.63  The information covered by the INSPIRE Regulations (SI 2009/3157) is termed ‘spatial data’. Spatial data is any data with a direct or indirect reference to a specific location or geographical area. Spatial data is often referred to as ‘geospatial data’ or ‘geographic information’. The ICO has limited responsibilities under INSPIRE, and DEFRA has the role of providing organisations with information about their responsibilities under the Regulations. More information is available on the DEFRA website.1 The Regulations apply to all public authorities that are covered by the EIR 2004 that hold one or more spatial data sets. They also apply to any organisation or person holding spatial data on behalf of a public authority. From December 2008, separate metadata rules came into force which placed obligations on those covered by INSPIRE to create full metadata for spatial data sets and data services by 24 December 2013. Individuals and other organisations can complain under the INSPIRE Regulations as follows. Under reg  6 (metadata) and reg  7 (network services), a user can complain to a public authority if they believe the required standards have not been met. Complaints may be about refusing access to data or service, charging or re-use. PAs may complain about data sharing arrangements. In each case, organisations other than the ICO are responsible for giving guidance to organisations. The ICO has provided links to the appropriate bodies which depends on the type of complaint. https://data.gov.uk/location.

1

Chapter 4

Central government

INTRODUCTION 4.1  Britain was a late subscriber to freedom of information legislation. While the Freedom of Information Act was a domestic initiative, data protection and access to environmental information were the result of international obligations. An FOI Act of sorts did and does exist for local government as we shall see.1 In 1994, an administrative code on access was published (see below). In Commonwealth countries heavily influenced by the Westminster style of government, FOI legislation has also been adopted.2 A FOI Act operates in the Republic of Ireland and in numerous member states of the European Union and in the Union itself.3 We saw the world-wide movement to FOI regimes in ch  1.4 The most notable feature of central government administration in the United Kingdom and information before the first tentative steps to transparency involved the use of the Official Secrets Acts 1911–1989 to punish by the criminal law the unauthorised dissemination of official information. Section 2 of the 1911 Act was ‘reformed’ in 1989, restricting its ambit but making it less troublesome, the government hoped, to punish and gain convictions for ‘damaging’ disclosures of official secrets (see below). 3 4 1 2

See ch 6. See para 1.2 above. See ch 5. See para 1.2 above.

4.2  The position in law is that unpublished information in the possession of central government,1 however stored, and which has been created, received or used for official business is the ‘property’ of the Crown2 unless property rights are retained by a third party. That being the case, no one has a right of access to Crown property in the absence of a legal right or a statutory entitlement such as exists under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA 2000), Public Records Acts 1958 and 1967 (as amended by the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 (CRGA  2010) (para  4.62)) or the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA  2018). The latter legislation confers rights of access to personal information on individuals, data subjects, held by data users or data controllers as

400  Chapter 4 they are now called and which can be stored and retrieved automatically although rights have been extended to a much wider range of data under the DPA 1998 and 2018 to include certain groups of paper files: ‘structured’, accessible and those added to by the FOIA 2000 amendments to the DPA 1998. These terms were explained in ch 2. Basically in the possession of Crown bodies, official information in the possession of Crown servants, officers or government contractors. 2 See R v Blackledge [1996] 1 Cr App Rep 326, CA. 1

4.3  The Crown may invoke the law of confidence,1 copyright2 or other aspects of intellectual property law to protect the information in its possession although open data policies which we describe (paras 4.28 et seq) are standard practice. The House of Lords has afforded a remedy by way of an account of profits where a former member of the security and intelligence services wrote memoirs about his service without permission and in breach of contract.3 Where physical property is concerned, eg  documents on which information is recorded, it may invoke the law of theft if there is an intention permanently to deprive the owner of that property, but information itself cannot be the object of theft.4 The Crown may, of course, employ the Official Secrets Acts to punish unauthorised leaks.5 The US, as graphically illustrated by the WikiLeaks episode in 2010 and 2011 and the Snowden National Security Agency leaks in 2013, has no Official Secrets Act but has to rely upon the limited Espionage Act, or military offences under the US Uniform Code of Military Justice, to punish wrongful disclosures. The two main protagonists remain outside the US jurisdiction. The Internet, Google, Facebook, Twitter, etc have made the world of intelligence and secrets increasingly porous, and confidentiality and privacy have suffered in a similar manner (paras 4.155 and 2.1). Conversely, greater protection is afforded to intellectual property rights.6 3 4 5 6 1 2

See paras 4.312 et seq below. See para 4.312 below. See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. A-G v Blake [2000] 4 All ER 385, HL. Oxford v Moss (1978) 68 Cr App Rep 183; R v Absolon (1983) Times, 14 September. See paras 4.154 et seq below. See Digital Economy Act 2010 and 2017.

4.4  In the UK government, dissemination of information within government is a matter of prime ministerial and ministerial prerogative and convention.1 Access by Ministers to the papers of a previous administration is governed by conventions and it was noted in ch 1 how the Lord Chancellor had attempted to make special provision for requests for access to former Ministerial papers (para 1.270).2 Previous ministers should be consulted and any decision involving FOI requests should be dealt with by the Attorney General.3 The Ministerial Code provides guidance on publications and speeches by Ministers, on Cabinet circulation, Prime Minister’s clearance and consultation between Ministers where business involves another department.4 Government possesses powers to publish information under common law powers although the courts have sometimes referred to these as prerogative powers. Claiming a prerogative for what any individual is entitled to do as a servant of the Crown seems a little overblown.5 It will be recalled from ch 1 (at para 1.265) that in addition to the

Central government  401 FOIA powers and duties, central government possesses statutory and common law powers to disseminate information although disclosure through FOIA will usually be required where information is requested to achieve consistency. The discussion in Kennedy is important here (para 1.154). Whatever the relationship between these regimes, the government must always act in the public interest and any disclosure, as well as complying with any applicable statutory requirements must not endanger the collective interests or welfare of the nation or individual security or confidence.6 Case law is increasingly imposing duties or limitations on government’s use of information in its dealings with citizens so that it has been held by the House of Lords to be wrong to require an applicant for funeral expenses to prove justification when the department was in possession of all relevant information.7 In R (Salih) v Secretary of State for the Home Department the policy of the Secretary of State not to inform asylum seekers of discretionary schemes for accommodation was unlawful.8 The House of Lords has also ruled that an adverse administrative decision had to be communicated to an applicant before it could have legal effect9 and statutory clauses should be construed to accommodate transparency where possible.10 Since the mid-1980s, the courts in judicial review cases have developed a duty of candour on defendants, claimants and third parties seeking to ensure that the ‘cards face upwards on the table’. The court expects full and accurate explanations of relevant facts.11 For Northern Ireland see Re Morrow’s Application [2001] NI 261. Lord Hunt (1982) Public Law 514.  3 Freedom of Information: Working with the Central Clearing House Toolkit for Practitioners (2008) http://www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/docs/foi-clearing-house.pdf.  4 Ministerial Code (Cabinet Office 2018) https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ attachment_data/file/672633/2018-01-08_MINISTERIAL_CODE_JANUARY_2018__ FINAL___3_.pdf.  5 Jenkins v Att-Gen (1971) Times, 14 August; R v Secretary of State for the Environment ex p Greenwich LBC [1989] COD 530.  6 By analogy with public interest immunity (para 11.58 below), the public interest may be raised by the court and not only by government: see Lord Reid in Rogers v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1972] 2 All ER 1057 at 1060 (HL) and on judicial deference to [bona fide] publications Lord Woolf in R v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police ex p Wiley [1994] 3 All ER 420 at 438c-h (HL).  7 Kerr v Department for Social Security (NI) [2004] UKHL 23.  8 [2003] EWHC 2273, (2003) Times, 13 October, QBD.  9 R (Anufrijeva) v Secretary of State [2003] 3 All ER 827 (HL). See also R (Privacy International) v HMRC  [2014]  EWHC  1475 (Admin) and review of a decision not to give information under Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005, s  18 relying upon R  (Corner House) v DPP  [2008]  UKHL  60 where a refusal to prosecute was explained publicly. On the reverse duty to inform a department of change of facts: Hinchy v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2005] UKHL 16 and incidentally R (CPAG) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2010] UKSC 54. 10 Privacy International, at [142]–[162], and the common law. The case concerned a decision by HMRC not to progress a complaint about arms export controls and was coloured by Art 6 ECHR and EU considerations. See Taveta Investments Ltd v Financial Reporting Council [2018] EWHC 1662 (Admin) and R (Lumba) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] AC 245 at [34]–[38], R (Justice for Health Ltd) v Secretary of State for Health [2016] EWHC 2338 (Admin) at [128]–]162]. 11 R v Lancashire CC ex p Huddlestone [1986] 2 All ER 941; R (I) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007]  EWHC  3103 (Admin). Guidance has been produced by the Government Legal Department, see Woolf and Jowell (eds) De Smith’s Judicial Review (8th ed, 2018), 16.027.  1  2

402  Chapter 4 4.5  Judicial law-making has opened up the possibility of a duty in public law to disclose information by way of reasons and explanations for decisions or actions where in the circumstances such an explanation is demanded in the interests of fairness.1 Numerous statutes provide that reasons shall be given for decisions and under the FOIA 2000, general duties will be set out in publication schemes (see para 1.48 above). Where a discretion to publish is involved, then failures to publish may involve abuses of a discretion which can be the subject of a suitable judicial order possibly even to publish.2 The courts have gradually encroached on the area of discretion involved in withholding information so that the power to refuse disclosure of personal documents or confidential reports is not absolute and may be outweighed by duties of fairness or what is in the best interests of the individual.3 These discretionary powers exist in addition to those under the FOIA 2000. There is evidence of an increasing awareness of the benefits of openness among the judiciary and the Secretary of State was held to be acting irrationally when he ordered the inquiry into the questions raised by the murders of 15 patients by Dr Harold Shipman to be conducted privately. The decision contravened Art 10 of the ECHR guaranteeing freedom of speech and the right to communicate information.4 However, the treatment of such situations by the courts turns on the specific facts of each case. There has been a notable reluctance to spread the ambit of Art 10 too widely in other inquiries, notably that into the foot and mouth disease (see para 10.175 below) although Art 2 of the ECHR has been successfully invoked in other subject areas. A particularly significant intervention came in the case of Alexander Litvinenko (para 10.104 below). The reluctance of the courts to step into the shoes, or the mind, of the Minister should not be overlooked, nor should the readiness of the courts to give full weight and deference to such factors as the element of prematurity of publication which may be present where inquiries, especially of a criminal nature, are continuing and where publication might hinder such inquiries.5 Where government seeks to restrain publication of information on behalf of the public interest the courts have insisted that the public interest must be at risk of being damaged and not simply the reputation of the government.6 Section 12 of HRA 1998 has made the award of interim injunctions to prevent publication more difficult to obtain although this has not prevented the award of so-called ‘super-injunctions’.7 Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968]  AC  997, HL; R  v Lancashire County Council ex p Huddleston [1986] 2  All ER  941, CA; Lonrho plc v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [1989] 2  All ER  609, HL. The most advanced position is in Evans v Attorney General [2015] UKSC 21 (para 1.241) and see R (DSD) etc v The Parole Board for England and Wales etc [2018] EWHC 694 (Admin). 2 By mandatory order (formerly mandamus): R v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, ex p Lonrho (1989) 5 BCC 284, CA, overruled on the merits by Lonrho plc above and see in particular Lord Keith at 615–616j. 3 R  v Mid Glamorgan Family Health Services Authority, ex p Martin [1995] 1  All ER  356, CA. R (Anufrijeva) v Secretary of State [2003] 3 All ER 827 (HL). In proceedings before Simon Brown LJ involving General Pinochet and his notorious extradition the judge ruled that fairness demanded that medical reports on the General should be disclosed to those requesting his extradition under conditions of strict confidentiality: The Guardian, 16 February 2000: ‘If ever a case required the highest standards of transparency and fairness, this was it’. The reports were subsequently leaked to the press: The Guardian, 22 February 2000; note the influence of Art 8 ECHR and Gaskin v UK (1990) 12 EHRR 36. However, complete openness may not be encouraged where life could 1

Central government  403



4

7 5 6

be endangered: R  v Lord Saville of Newdigate, ex p A  [1999] 4  All ER  860, CA – maintaining anonymity of military witnesses giving evidence at the ‘Bloody Sunday’ inquiry. In R (A) v Lord Saville of Newdigate [2001] EWHC Admin 888 compelling former British soldiers to give evidence to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry in Derry breached Art 2 ECHR – the right to life. The decision maker was obliged to ask whether there was a ‘real and serious risk of interference with life. If so, it was incumbent upon Lord Saville to prove compelling evidence for such an interference. The wrong test had been applied: not whether there was a real and immediate risk to life but whether the tribunal was in breach of its obligation not to make a decision which would expose another to the real possibility of a risk to life in the future. See R v Bedfordshire Coroner ex p Local Sunday Newspapers Ltd (2000) 164 JP QBD and R (A and Another) v Inner South London Coroner (2005) Times, 17 January. On the Bloody Sunday inquiry see: http://report.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org/. R v Secretary of State for Health, ex p Wagstaff [2001] 1 WLR 292: Art 10 does not confer a right of access to information but a freedom to impart information (see paras 4.290 et seq and 4.329 et seq below). The House of Lords has also held that a ‘public meeting’ for the purposes of s 7 and para 9 of Part II of the Schedule to the Defamation Act (NI) 1955 was not restricted to a meeting open to all the public, but would cover a press conference with a meeting of invited members of the public who were sympathetic to a particular cause in order to attract qualified privilege for press reports. Lord Steyn believed that ‘freedom of expression is a basic norm of our constitution’ and quoted Justice Brandeis in Whitney v California 274  US  357 at 375–376 (1927): ‘the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies.’ McCartan Turkington Breen (a firm) v Times Newspapers Ltd [2000] 4 All ER 913, HL. As in Lonrho plc, note 2 above. See paras 4.259 et seq below. See para 4.349 below.

THE 1994 CODE ON ACCESS (REVISED IN 1997) 4.6  This Code was replaced by the FOIA 2000 (described in ch 1) on 1 January 2005 in relation to individual rights of access. 4.7  The Code followed the 1993 White Paper on Open Government.1 The Code was policed by the Parliamentary Ombudsman and applied to bodies within his jurisdiction. A  code also applied to requests for NHS information (see Code of Practice on Openness in the NHS, NHS Executive 1995). A code was not produced for local government by their representative association, but authorities were expected to have suitable arrangements and the Commission for Local Administration produced a code of practice for itself in 1995 on access to information. Cm 2290 (1993). See HC 41(ii) (2003–04) for critical evidence on the operation of the code to the Public Administration Committee.

1

4.8  Having resisted a FOI statute from 1979, the government in 1993 published the White Paper as part of the Prime Minister’s – John Major – Citizen’s Charter (CC) initiative (see below).1 The paper proposed, and this was the eventual outcome, to give access to ‘information’ and not to documents. In other words, information would be gleaned from officially held documents and sifted before being handed over to requesters. I do not know of a similar restriction in any other access to information provisions, although Scotland developed its own Code on Access in June 2000 pending the introduction of its legislation on access. See Birkinshaw (1993) Public Law 557.

1

404  Chapter 4 4.9  Of crucial importance were two points. First of all, the government opted for a code on openness not laws. By adopting a code, the government had hoped to keep questions of ‘openness’ away from the courts. Courts have been noticeably critical of high-handed governmental action in the UK in recent years. Such an attitude on the government’s part might reveal an over sanguine comprehension of the state of development of judicial review in England but it was anxious to avoid judicial interference and so the provisions were expressions of administrative practice rather than primary, or even secondary, legislation.

THE USE OF THE OMBUDSMAN 4.10  This desire to evade judicial control was reinforced by the second factor which really constituted a ‘brainwave’ from the government’s perspective. In order to encourage courts not to intervene the government decided to use the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration (PCA) (hereafter Ombudsman) to supervise and deal with complaints under the Code where those requesting information were refused access. This was crucial for a variety of reasons none of which reflect badly on ombudsmen themselves but rather on the terms in which the access scheme was couched. The legal provisions under which the ombudsman operates are still relevant to the later discussion of the ombudsman. 4.11  Although the details of the 1994 Code are behind us, the role of the ombudsman in helping the public to gain access to governmental information is still important. The Ombudsman does not have power to enforce his decisions against reluctant departments. He is not a court in that respect. Rather he has to negotiate a settlement where there is a reluctance to accept his conclusions. He is backed up by the House of Commons Select Committee on the Constitution and Public Administration (formerly on the Parliamentary Commissioner) who will summon reluctant Ministers and their advisers before them to explain their position. The success rate of the Ombudsman is very high indeed but on several occasions departments have opposed his findings. An example of this happened in the 1990s and concerned a complaint relating to the Channel Tunnel and government delay in deciding upon an approach route from the Tunnel to London thereby causing blight to numerous properties on affected sections of the route.1 The indication is that the government will do what it inevitably has in the past, and that is give in after a lengthy protest and as discreetly as possible.2 This, however, has not been the case in some access complaints where the government had refused to accept an Ombudsman’s recommendations to disclose documents in two cases.3 In one case, the Lord Chancellor’s Department and the Cabinet Office issued notices under the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967 (PCA  1967), s  11(3) (see below). These were withdrawn when the complainant sought judicial review of the issue of the certificates and the investigation continued. The Ombudsman has reported on difficulties in obtaining information necessary for Code investigations and a Memorandum of Understanding was published by the Cabinet Office in July 2003 on the Ombudsman’s requirements when investigating Code complaints. Nonetheless difficulties persisted in two areas: responding to statements of complaint and

Central government  405 draft reports issued by the Office for comment. Secondly, in providing the Ombudsman’s Office with information sought by the complainant . This made it ‘impossible for us to carry out our responsibilities under the Code’.4 HC 193 (1994–95). HC 819 (1994–95). See the Public Accounts Committee Work of the Ombudsmen HC 781 (2010– 11). 3 The Parliamentary Ombudsman Annual Report 2003–04 p  28 A7/03 and HC  353 (2001–02) Declarations under the Ministerial Code and A16/03. For investigations see: HC  115 (2002–03), HC 951 (2002–03) and HC 701 (2003–04) and generally HC 41 (2003–04) etc. There has been increasing reluctance to accept recommendations in several high-profile cases since previous editions of this book. See para 10.52. 4 Annual Report 2003–04, p 28. 1 2

4.12  The Ombudsman already operates within a statutory framework dating from 1967 when the office was introduced. This represented a particular philosophy which in several respects is looking very dated. The Ombudsman (as of writing, Rob Behrens who has considerable experience in complaint resolution) is an Officer of the House of Commons and so complainants may only reach him through the intervention of an elected Member of the House of Commons. He may not question the ‘merits’ of a decision taken without ‘maladministration’ and he is then confined to questioning the ‘maladministration’ not the merits. This seemed to pose particular problems from the point of view of access to information complaints because many disputes would potentially lie within the area of the merits and so therefore be outside the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction – and the High Court has ruled that the Ombudsman is judicially reviewable.1 He has to be careful not to exceed or abuse his powers or otherwise act unlawfully or unfairly and indeed, in October 1996, the Parliamentary Ombudsman was successfully judicially reviewed in the High Court in a non-information complaint.2 That said, the courts have in more recent years approached the office of ombudsmen in a more co-operative manner (paras 4.134 and 10.47 et seq). R v Parliamentary Comr for Administration, ex p Dyer [1994] 1 All ER 375. See In Re a Subpoena Issued by the Comr for Local Administration [1996] 3 FCR 190, holding that a local ombudsman was entitled to obtain privileged confidential information from a local authority’s adoption files. 2 R v Parliamentary Comr for Administration, ex p Balchin [1997] JPL 917; and ex p Balchin (No 2) (2000) 2 LGLR 87. 1

4.13  Section 11(3) of the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967 gave the Minister a veto power to prevent the Ombudsman handing information to anyone, other than his officers, which had been gathered from an investigation where its disclosure would be prejudicial to the safety of the state or contrary to the public interest – and it must be emphasised that the Ombudsman has enormous powers to gather information and interview officials as well as powers to hand over to the High Court to punish for contempt in cases where he is obstructed in his investigations. Section 11(3) was a particularly fortuitous provision from the government’s perspective, and one hardly ever used before the Code came into effect. In the event of a disagreement between a department and the Ombudsman over what should be disclosed, the Minister was given the final word and not an independent decision-making body.1 The

406  Chapter 4 Ombudsmen, as we have seen in ch 1 (para 1.260), may disclose information to the Information Commissioner (IC) for the assistance of certain of the IC’s functions under the DPA  1998 and FOI  Acts and the IC may disclose information to them likewise. There has been close liaison between the IC’s office and the Ombudsman’s office and a Memorandum of Understanding was introduced to set out relationships up until and after the Code ceases to exist and the Ombudsman has been a member of the Advisory group advising the Lord Chancellor/Secretary of State. The National Audit Office which is headed by the Comptroller and Auditor General is supposed to have the widest of access to government documents in carrying out his audit responsibilities, but he operates under a ‘Not for the Eyes of the NAO’ convention: see White, Harden and Donnelly (1994) Public Law 526 and see ch 12 below.

1

4.14  Another limitation is that the legislation does not allow the Ombudsman to investigate all complaints. The PCA is limited in that she can only investigate named departments in the Schedule to the PCA 1967 (or agencies or bodies). Many departments are not included although all of those dealing regularly with the public, as do the new executive agencies, are included. These agencies, introduced in the premiership of Mrs Thatcher, have been in existence since 1988 and the government intends to transfer all functions of government that do not require a ministerial departmental status to these in due course to be run on more commercial and managerial lines. Originally seen as a staging post to privatisation or contracting out of government functions, their future within the public sector appears secure for the mid-term future. A large number of nondepartmental bodies has also been added to the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction. The Code does not cover information held by courts, tribunals or ‘inquiries’. 4.15  As well as bodies excluded from his jurisdiction there are functions which are excluded. These are considerable indeed. They include for instance contractual and commercial matters – excepting compulsory purchase of land – and personnel matters – the former at the insistence of the Ministry of Defence which did not want armaments contracts to be the subject of complaint and investigation. Matters affecting international relations, commencement of civil or criminal legal proceedings, military disciplinary or international legal proceedings, exercise of mercy, criminal investigation, or action taken to protect the security of the state, or the grant of honours, privileges or gifts ‘within the gift of the Crown’ are all excluded. 4.16  This represents a considerable corpus of exclusions. More importantly perhaps is the fact that the Ombudsman is not very well known in the UK. He can only be approached by an MP and his decisions are not enforceable as judgments of courts of law.1 He may only make recommendations (see para 10.71 for 2017 proposals). To superimpose a statutory scheme from over 40 years ago when the Ombudsman was first introduced into the UK and when his powers were deliberately confined so as not to interfere too rudely into governing conventions like parliamentary supremacy and ministerial responsibility seems excessively cautious. It is a scheme which all but a few in government, as well as

Central government  407 the staff of the Ombudsman’s Office, understand. Even a large number of MPs are not as well acquainted with the Ombudsman as desirable.2 On to this scheme was placed the operation of the access to information Code. The scheme is modified for local government ombudsmen, the health service commissioner and the Northern Ireland Commissioner for Complaints. 2 HC 33 I (1993–94). See Review of the Public Sector Ombudsman in England Cabinet Office 2000, P Colcutt and M Hourihan, and the Public Administration Committee HC 612 (1999–2000). 1

4.17  On one point, however, the 1993 White Paper outlining the policy on access reported how the Ombudsman was to broaden the opportunity to take complaints from pressure groups and those who had not actually suffered injury as a consequence of maladministration. It was sufficient that they alleged noncompliance with the Code. This was practically of considerable significance. Furthermore, in the face of more privatisation and contracting out, it is worth emphasising that the Ombudsman has access to bodies operating under contract with Ministers to provide public services or with local authorities – the local ombudsman in the case of the latter. Information complaints concerning such bodies are within his jurisdiction as are the regulators of privatised bodies and information complaints concerning the regulators. The industries themselves are not within the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction.

THE CODE 4.18  The Code was outlined in the White Paper on Open Government1 which also provided plans for reforms of practice under Public Records legislation. These would shorten the period of ‘closure’ of many public records to 30 years or less and allow access to those public records. The White Paper further announced the introduction of legislation for access to personal files by the subjects of those files and also access to health and safety information. Provision was made for personal access in the DPA 1998; specific provision for health and safety concerns had to wait until the FOIA 2000.2 Cm 2290 (1993). Annual reports were made on the operation of the Code. EC Council Directive 95/46/EC on Data Protection was implemented into UK legal systems by DPA 1998: see ch 2. This will apply to both paper and electronically stored data. There were indications that the government would exclude subject areas from implementing legislation which it believes are not covered by EC law, eg police and national security, immigration and taxation. This did not occur.

1 2

4.19  The Code on access to information was published only days before it came into effect. It was revised in 1997. It sets out on one page the information it will allow access to and on four and a half pages the information which will be exempt from disclosure. These exemptions in other words operate in addition to the statutory exclusions which were outlined above. The Code has now gone and need not be examined further. However, the ombudsman published a report on the operation of the Code in Access to Official Information: Monitoring of the Codes of Practice 1994–2005 (HC 59 2005–06).

408  Chapter 4

Balancing the public interest in disclosure and confidentiality 4.20  Although the Code has gone, assessing the public interest under the Code may still hold some interesting lessons. Basically, under the Code access is to be allowed except in the case where harm or prejudice, actual or reasonably apprehended, may be caused to the public interest or to individuals. However, there were some very important provisions which have been seized by the Ombudsman to give him a discretion to disclose where ‘any harm or prejudice arising from disclosure is outweighed by the public interest in making information available’. The Ombudsman has stated that this gives him a discretion to disclose where a greater public interest is served by disclosure than by secrecy in those cases where a reason for holding back information is the harm, damage, prejudice etc that may be caused by disclosure: ‘As I see it, the issue of when the public interest in disclosure will override any harm or prejudice which might arise from disclosure is a matter of judgement in the light of the facts of each individual case’ (Case A 12/95, para 8). 4.21  In giving evidence to the Select Committee on Public Administration in July 1999, the Ombudsman indicated that he can disagree with the decision on disclosure on the merits, and that has been accepted. Where harm or prejudice is not referred to, there would seem to be no scope for such a balancing of public interests eg  information received in confidence from foreign governments, foreign courts or international organisations, communications with the Royal Household or proceedings of the Privy Council, information relating to legal proceedings including tribunals and public inquiries and that covered by legal professional privilege and information relating to public employment, appointments and honours, voluminous or vexatious requests, information to be published, information relating to research, statistics and analysis, information supplied in confidence or subject to legal restriction. Some exemptions refer to ‘unwarranted’ or other qualifying epithets and these leave scope for judgment on the part of the Ombudsman. Is the case for ‘unwarranted’ established? The factors that the Ombudsman has relied upon to weigh in favour of disclosure are: the age of documents; the interest of the public as well as the ‘public interest’ (on taxation policy (A 31/02)). 4.22  It was the ombudsman’s decision and in that respect it is not unlike the discretion exercised by the courts where a claim for public interest immunity has been correctly entered by a government Minister or civil servant (see paras 11.58 et seq below). The government have not challenged this interpretation but commentators have been quick to point out that the Minister retains the right to veto publication of information in the Ombudsman’s possession under s 11(3) (para 4.13 above). Both the Prime Minister and Minister for the Duchy of Lancaster have stated that the Ombudsman ‘has it in his hands’ to publish information in such circumstances. This is a significant achievement and the government has not acted contrary to this interpretation. However, in April 2005, the government refused to disclose documents under the Code which related to

Central government  409 meetings between the Prime Minister and business donors to the Labour Party. This was despite the Ombudsman finding that public interest weighed in favour of disclosure. Disclosure, it was claimed, would damage ‘free and frank disclosure of views’ between the government and outside stakeholders (The Guardian (2005) 19 April). This was not the first time that the government had refused to disclose documents in defiance of the Ombudsman’s recommendations (see para 1.209 above). 4.23  The exemptions – which technically were discretionary and may be waived by departments unless a legal obstacle prevents this – cover many of the areas already found in FOI legislation: viz disclosures which would harm defence, security and international relations, law enforcement and legal proceedings, effective management of the economy and collection of tax, effective management and operations of the public service, communications with the Royal Household and information related to public appointments, public employment and conferral of honours. The code writes in safeguards to refuse vexatious or numerous requests requiring ‘unreasonable diversion of resources’ and premature publication of information. Privacy and commercially confidential information are protected. So too is information ‘relating to incomplete analysis, research or statistics, where disclosure could be misleading’: it does not say why it is misleading, eg, because of fault or insufficient research on the part of government. 4.24  Information given in confidence is protected in wide terms especially where the future supply of such information would be threatened by disclosure and so is information where there is a statutory or other national or international provision preventing release or where information cannot be released except by breaching parliamentary privilege. 4.25  Two kinds of information call for particular comment. Information relating to immigration, nationality, consular and entry clearance was given a total exemption – an exemption the ombudsman has described as ‘slightly surprising’. Subsequently, information would be provided ‘though not through access to personal records, where there is no risk that disclosure would prejudice the effective administration of immigration controls or other statutory provisions’.1 Access by the data subjects will be allowed under DPA  1998, as amended by FOIA  2000, to immigration files, subject to exemptions.

1

4.26  Secondly, information concerning the policy making process where disclosure would harm internal discussion and advice. This is a very controversial exemption. What it seeks to prevent is ‘government in a gold-fish bowl’ and the privacy/inviolability of the policy making process and to protect the anonymity of civil servants’ advice. 4.27  The Code became operational on 4 April 1994. Also published were a Code of Guidance on Interpretation and an Annual Report which contained a good deal of otherwise unpublished material. The Annual Report of 1999 was particularly instructive and contains contact points in public authorities for access requests

410  Chapter 4 and departmental websites. The Ombudsman had let it be known that the Code of Guidance is not binding on him, only the Code on Open Government (see below).

THE MOVEMENT TO TRANSPARENCY 4.28  The Conservative Government’s  1994 Code was a last-ditch effort to avoid duties to give the public information they requested in law. Traditionally, the Conservative Party had been hostile to a FOIA in the UK. In the 2010 election, the Conservatives pledged that ‘within weeks of the general election’ they would extend the FOIA to a wider range of bodies. These would include Network Rail, Northern Rock, the Carbon Trust, the Energy Saving Trust, the NHS  Confederation, the Local Government Association and Traffic Penalty Tribunals. The Liberal Democrat manifesto also mentioned Network Rail’s inclusion under FOIA, together with other ‘private companies delivering monopoly public services’. In the event, the extension has been modest (para  1.85). However, the coalition programme1 said nothing on how the Act would be extended. This silence contrasts dramatically with their detailed proposals to effect an increase in state transparency. In the summer of 2011, the Cabinet Office launched a consultation on Making Open Data Real: a Public Consultation in a drive to increase openness and transparency in government.2 http://programmeforgovernment.hmg.gov.uk/files/2010/05/coalition-programme.pdf. http://data.gov.uk/opendataconsultation.

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4.29  The proposals, based on the Conservative party manifesto, included enforcing much greater online disclosure of salaries and expenses of senior officials, job descriptions of all public sector employees, everyone in the centrally funded public sector paid more than the Prime Minister will have to have their salary signed off by the Treasury, a statutory register of lobbyists would be introduced, parliamentary select committees would be given greater powers of scrutiny of public appointments, greater protection for whistleblowers, a level playing field for open source software, ICT contracts, council spending over £500 and central government spending over £25,000; and also creating a ‘right to data’ so that the public can request and use government data sets. Reforms were to be introduced to data sets under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (para 1.79). All data will be published in an easily usable format which is cheap to use. Council minutes would be published – this already occurs under the local government legislation (paras 8.3 et seq). A Public Sector Transparency Board was established in June 2010 and set about establishing public data principles which included free re-use and commercial re-use. Data released under FOIA or the ‘new right to data’ will be automatically released under an open licence. Public bodies should actively encourage reuse of their data and should maintain and publish inventories of their data holdings. 4.30  The Treasury published ‘millions of items’ of spending data from its combined online information system and these were published shortly after the coalition came to power. It was accepted that this was raw data rather than easily usable comparative data. An Independent Office for Budget Responsibility

Central government  411 was established which would report on financial forecasting forming the basis of the budget although its independence was questioned as it comprised many Treasury officials. This was initially set up on a non-statutory basis but its legal basis was established in the Budget Responsibility and National Audit Act 2011 (para  12.5). In health care, information was to be published on outcomes and results of treatment and not on waiting lists.1 In 2013, guidance was published on government departmental spending in excess of £25,000.2 An examination in 2014 found that the following problems were present in transparency data: • inconsistent presentation; • confusion about what needs to be published; and • users unable to find or compare data. Various solutions were identified.3 A selection of current practices is available at: • Government Transparency and Accountability: https://www.gov.uk/ government/policies/government-transparency-and-accountability (13/04/2018) • Publications: Transparency Data: https://www.gov.uk/government/public ations?departments%5B%5D=crown-commercial-service&publication_ type=transparency-data • How to publish central government transparency data: https://www. gov.uk/government/collections/how-to-publish-central-governmenttransparency-datahttps://www.gov.uk/government/collections/how-topublish-central-government-transparency-data • Cabinet Office Gov.data.uk: https://data.gov.uk/publisher/cabinetofficehttps://data.gov.uk/publisher/cabinet-office  • Ministers transparency publications (last 14/12/2017): https://www.gov.uk/ government/collections/ministers-transparency-publicationshttps://www. gov.uk/government/collections/ministers-transparency-publications. Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS Cm 7881 (July 2010). See para 10.106. See eg  the Department for Exiting the EU DEEU spending over £25,000, 31/05/18: https:// www.gov.uk/government/publications/department-for-exiting-the-european-union-spend-over25000-april-2018 (11/06/2018) and generally https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ guidance-for-publishing-spend-over-25000 (updated 24/11/2017). See https://www.gov.uk/ government/collections/how-to-publish-central-government-transparency-data (3/08/2018). 3 https://insidegovuk.blog.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/24/2014/09/transparency-18May-2014.pdf. 1 2

4.31  There was no initial sign of hostility to FOIA. However, many of the developments were non-statutory – a favourite means in the past of introducing open government in the UK. As it is non-statutory it is to a considerable extent discretionary. Amendments to the FOIA in the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 and the Ministry of Justice review of FOIA in 2016 were dealt with in ch 1.

GOVERNMENT AND THE INTERNET1 4.32  Like governments everywhere, the UK government and devolved government have made full use of IT. Tony Blair and David Cameron were devotees of IT in government and for public service.

412  Chapter 4 See Council of Europe edemocracy Rec CM/Rec (2009). Internet Safety Strategy October 2017 Department for Digital, Media, Culture and Sport: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/ government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/650949/Internet_Safety_Strategy_ green_paper.pdf (19/03/2018). See the Oxford Internet Institute: https://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/ research/digital-politics-and-government/ (19/03/2018). A Savin EU Internet Law (2nd edn, 2018).

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4.33  The Cabinet Office has established a transparency initiative and a Transparency Board. A  DirectGov Strategic Review was published in 2010.1 The Chancellor announced proposals for use of the internet by government in a speech at Google Zeitgeist in May 20112 and a Public Data Corporation was established ‘to open up opportunities for innovative developers, businesses and members of the public to generate social and economic growth through the use of data.’3 In the same month the Government’s new Executive Director of Digital (now Director General) was appointed and is responsible for overseeing and improving all of the Government’s online presence and extending the number of public services available online. The Director is head of function for digital, data and technology and is based in the Cabinet Office where he is a member of the Cabinet Office’s executive committee.4 The 2012 Government Digital Strategy aimed at making government services ‘digital by default’ and the provision of digitally enabled transformation in government. This would seek to transform ‘whole citizen facing services’, improve citizen service across departments with added flexibility and aim for digitally enabled change in delivery and government collaboration. The White Paper on Open Data was a policy statement by HM government on egovernment. ‘The UK Government is recognised as being one of the most open in the world’.5 It came top of the 2016 United Nations E-Government and E-Participation surveys and it has co-chaired the Open Government Partnership. ‘There is nothing easy about transparency. The formative years of open government will be tricky. But the prize is effective, personalised, 21st century democracy. It’s a more prosperous United Kingdom where the public services on which we all rely are strengthened and improved.’ … ‘The future will be Open.’(p 6). The future will see: ‘a truly transparent society, with the power where it belongs, in the hands of the people of this country’ (p 45). Data should be publicly provided free or at a fair price where costly or fairer to the tax payer (p 12). The White Paper continues: ‘We are at the start of a global movement towards transparency – and the UK is leading the world in making data more freely available.’ (p  5) ‘Transparency is at the heart of our agenda for government’ (ibid). There is no reference in the paper to the reform of the Official Secrets Act! There will be further publication of spending and almost 9,000 datasets released on www.data.gov.uk covering education, transport, crime and justice. Local crime statistics, sentencing rates, school results whether the cross-bar is raised (or not), hospital infection rates and General Practitioner (family doctor) outcomes will be published (pp 5–6). As well as publication schemes all ‘departments’ have published their first ever Open Data Strategies including commitments to publish more data. The Treasury will produce in machine readable format data relating to management

Central government  413 and use of EU funds in the UK (p 17). Sport England will engage in data sharing with sports facilitators in the private sector. Plans include encouraging ‘IT systems … supported by transparent contracts’ (p 17). The National Audit Office reports on IT procurement have shown abysmal waste. The Cabinet Office has produced Contracts Finder.6 The Open Data Institute will seek to unlock the UK’s economic capabilities (p 16). Rights to privacy will increase in this brave new world and will be in at the beginning of discussions leading to publication of new datasets. A privacy expert will be appointed to the Public Sector Transparency Board. All of this was developing as the EU proposals for review of the Data Protection Directive were taking shape. ‘We don’t want to use legislation too readily’ (p 13) but will consult. The White Paper alerts us to the use of social media by the public sector. There will be widespread co-operation with ‘developers of data’ – third parties (p 18) and Open Business Forum. The latter is a business-led working group which will bring together leading companies and organisations to look at how business can be more transparent and help consumers and investors to differentiate between them, without adding any further burdens. It will promote employment among youth and apprenticeships. This all sounds like corporatism, the networking of private and public powers and off-loading of governmental powers. The state never disappears, it merely reformulates. The problems remain. While governments have protected the sensitivity of Cabinet proceedings and risk registers, the 2012 White Paper states: ‘as part of our drive to make policy making more accessible, we are going to open the development process for the upcoming code of practice on FOIA (under s 45; see para 1.22) up to the public and offer an opportunity to shape the guidance on datasets using a crowdsourced wiki’ (p 12 – outsourcing to unlimited number of people). The code should include details of terms governing disclosure of information in contracts between public and private bodies. An Open Data User Group will advise the Data Strategy Board on prioritisation of data release. The Public Sector Transparency Board will attempt to make data accessible and re-usable. Academic publicly funded research will be more freely available through a Research Transparency Sector Board. A  new array of quangos (non-departmental bodies) and public/private sector compenetration is in the making. The major legislative initiative came with the Digital Economy Act 2017 which seeks to provide greater national access to digital services through ‘superfast broadband’ and other technologies (Part 1), to provide a new electronic communications code for the digital infrastructure (Part 2) and plans for digital government (Part 5, chapter 1) in public service providers, following Better use of data in government (2016) and Government transformation strategy (2017). The Act provides Ofcom with a broader information collection power that the government envisages could be used to obtain address-level data on broadband line speeds, in formats suitable for third party intermediaries to use to present comparisons; and for Ofcom to use for monitoring speed prediction accuracy. It is hoped this will assist consumers with greater clarity. The Act amended Ofcom’s appeal powers and gave additional regulatory powers to Ofcom over the BBC especially in relation to provision of information by the BBC. Ofcom

414  Chapter 4 must have regard to the strategic priorities of government in its regulation of communications.7 The Act also provides bases for data transfer in various areas (paras 2.261 et seq). The Act also makes includes for codes of practice on provision of information on public service delivery and research and these must be consistent with the IC’s data sharing code (paras 2.261 et seq). We pick up on more details in ch 10 but one example of the digital plans from the Conservative manifesto of 2017 involves using digital technology to release massive value from ‘our land that currently is simply not realised, introducing greater specialisation in the property development industry and far greater transparency for buyers. To make this happen, we will combine the relevant parts of HM  Land Registry, Ordnance Survey, the Valuation Office Agency, the Hydrographic Office and Geological Survey to create a comprehensive geospatial data body within government, the largest repository of open land data in the world. This new body will set the standards to digitise the planning process and help create the most comprehensive digital map of Britain to date’. http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/Directgov%20Executive%20Sum%20 FINAL.pdf. 2 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/directgov-2010-and-beyond-revolution-notevolution-a-report-by-martha-lane-fox. 3 http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/news/public-data-corporation-free-public-data-and-driveinnovation. 4 https://www.gov.uk/government/people/kevin-cunnington. 5 Open Data – Unleashing the Potential (Cm 8353, June 2012) p 31. 6 https://www.contractsfinder.service.gov.uk. 7 Similar to other regulators. The Explanatory Notes are at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ ukpga/2017/30/notes/division/3/index.htm (30/04/2018). See Digital Government (Disclosure of Information) Regulations 2018, SI 2018/912. 1

4.34  A particularly important initiative came with the EU laws (now Directive 2013/37/EU) on Re-use of Public Sector information. Following earlier regulations this is implemented in the UK by the Re-use of Public Sector Information Regulations 2015, SI 2015/1415. These aim to allow public sector information to be re-used for commercial purposes. The scheme is quite complicated and detailed. In the UK  Crown and Parliament publications are protected by copyright. The National Archives is responsible for overseeing the operation of re-use although the 2015 regulations now provide for the Information Commissioner to act as a complaint mechanism for grievances. 4.35  A  further development is the Information Asset Register (IAR) which is accessed via inforoute.1 The following leans on official literature. The IAR lists information resources held by the UK  Government, concentrating on unpublished resources. IAR enables users to identify, from one single source, the information held in a wide variety of government departments, agencies and other organisations. ‘inforoute’ is a key part of the Government’s agenda for freeing up access to official information. The UK government cites analogues existing in the US and in Canada. As departments identify information to be published through their FOI  Publication Schemes (above), so unpublished information can also be identified for inclusion in the IAR. IAR will include: central government databases, old sets of files, recent electronic files, collections

Central government  415 of statistics, research, etc. The IAR concentrates on information resources that have not yet been, or will not be formally published. Responsibility for IARs is placed on individual departments. National Archives has overall responsibility for IAR formats and standards and for maintaining the inforoute website. It complements but does not duplicate existing lists of published materials. It has links to other sources of official information and lists of official publications (eg  Directgov). The Government does not wish IAR to become ‘resourceintensive or over centralised’. National Archives is establishing agreed indexing practices across all IAR web sites to build an evolving central service. www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/about/freedom-of-information/information-requests/governmentwide-information-asset-register-and-the-inforoute-service/. And see http://www.nationalarchives. gov.uk/documents/information-management/info-asset-register-factsheet.pdf (13/03/18).

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4.36  An increasingly crucial question concerns computer security. This affects governments, commercial and financial institutions and individuals. Methods of interfering through unauthorised access to computers (‘hacking’) have become ever more complex and sophisticated through the use of ‘worms’, viruses and so on. The detail would take us into the realm of specialised IT, but the capabilities involved concern massive government and commercial investment because of the potential threat to security, public services and intellectual property. The Cabinet Office in the UK has traditionally taken the lead on this subject – currently through the Cyber Security and Information Assurance Operations Centre in conjunction with the Cyber Security Operations Centre based at General Communications HQ. MI5 and special police units work alongside the Home Office (see para 2.361). 4.37  As long ago as 2002, the National Audit Office published a trilogy on Better Public Services through e-government (HC  704  I-III  (2001–02). There are publications reviewing, describing and evaluating each major government department’s website together with appropriate addresses and profiles.1 One specific problem originally related to the use of Crown and Parliamentary copyright in the UK to prevent the placing of statutes and official publications and Hansard – the official reports of Parliamentary proceedings – on the Internet. These reports, together with other Parliamentary publications are available on www.parliament.uk. https://www.gov.uk/. On facilitating electronic commerce, see the Electronic Communications Act 2000; and, on online infringement of copyright, powers in relation to Internet domain registries etc, see the Digital Economy Act 2010 and 2017.

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4.38  The government has informally expressed the view that it will not enforce copyright laws where statutory provisions allowing access to information are placed on a website for access on the Internet. This concession was given to the FOI Campaign which has championed the cause of Open Government in the UK. Since then, there has been a significant relaxation of Crown copyright law.1 It has now become an advocate of open data, subject to qualifications. Cm 4300 (1999). A  new EU copyright law in the digital single market has been proposed: COM/2016/0593 final – 2016/0280 (COD). This has been widely criticised for being censorial, preventing sharing of information and assisting existing platforms: https://www.publicknowledge.org/ news-blog/blogs/the-five-worst-things-about-the-proposed-eu-copyright-directive (4/07/2018).

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416  Chapter 4 4.39  Before turning to the area of official secrecy, there are several areas covering the provision of information by central government which call for specific attention.

RE-USE OF PUBLIC SECTOR INFORMATION 4.40  The following has benefited from official guidance produced by National Archives.1 It deals with how public sector bodies covered by the Regulations should best meet the obligations contained in the European Directive on the Re-use of Public Sector Information (2013/37/EU) implemented across the UK under SI  2015/1415 (‘the Regulations’). The impetus behind the original Directive in 2003 was the recognition that public sector information is a valuable information resource that could be utilised by the private sector to develop value-added products and services. The removal of barriers to re-use would act as a stimulus to the information and publishing industry in Europe so providing significant economic opportunities and enhancing job creation across Europe. An additional benefit would be to improve the flow of information from the public sector to the citizen. The Regulations define terms such as ‘public sector body’, ‘re-use’ and ‘document’. In September 2010, the National Archives introduced a new Open Government Licence for re-use of public sector information.2 http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/information-management/psi-implementationguidance-public-sector-bodies.pdf http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/information-management/ re-using-public-sector-information/psi-directive-transposition-and-re-use-regulations/. 2 http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/news/498.htm. 1

Key principles and objectives 4.41  The main objective of the Regulations is to establish methods facilitating: (a) the ready identification of public sector documents that are available for reuse; ‘document’ means any information recorded in any form, including any part of such information, whether in writing or stored in electronic form or as a sound, visual or audio-visual recording, other than a computer program (reg 2); (b) documents are generally available for re-use at marginal cost; (c) public sector bodies to deal with applications to re-use in a timely, open and transparent manner; (d) the process should be fair, consistent and non-discriminatory; (e) encouraging the sharing of best practice across the public sector.

Scope 4.42  The Open Government Licence (OGL) facilitates re-use of public sector information.1 The OGL grants the recipient a worldwide, royalty-free, perpetual, non-exclusive licence to use the information, subject to conditions. Exemptions are listed and include other intellectual property rights such as

Central government  417 trademarks, patents and design rights. The 2015 Regulations should make re-use easier. In general, any information that is accessible, either because it has been published or because it has been released under access legislation (including the INSPIRE  Regulations), should be available for re-use under an open licence. Under reg 11, public sector bodies should make information and related metadata available through open licences and machine-readable formats and using formal open standards whenever possible. A  machine-readable format is structured so that software applications can easily identify, recognise and extract specific data from it. The format should be standardised through an open process and approved by the Open Standards Board. ‘Formal open standard’ means detailing requirements to ensure software interoperability. ‘Open format’ means a file format that is platform-independent and made available to the public without any restriction that impedes the re-use of documents. The Regulations apply to all documents held by public sector bodies unless specifically excluded. The definition is wide and includes corporations or groups appointed ‘for the specific purposes of meeting needs in the general interest not having an industrial or commercial character’ (reg  3(1)(aa)) and which satisfy other criteria as well as an association formed by one or more public bodies. The cultural sector is included, such as libraries (including university libraries), museums and archives, but performing arts bodies such as orchestras and ballets are excluded. The provisions of data protection legislation are not affected by the Regulations. The 2015 Regulations provide an obligation to allow reuse of information unless restricted or excluded, or from an excluded cultural sector body. Regulations do not apply to a document unless it: (a) has been identified by the public sector body as being available for re-use; (b) has been provided to the applicant; or (c) is accessible by means other than by making a request for it within the meaning of the 2018 Act, the 2000 Act (or where appropriate the 2002 Act) or the 2004 Regulations (EIRs and INSPIRE Regulations). The exclusions fall under the following headings: (a) documents that are exempt or excluded from disclosure under Freedom of Information (FOI) or access legislation including on the grounds of protection of personal data, protection of national security, defence or public security, statistical confidentiality or commercial confidentiality (including business, professional or company secrets); even if available under access legislation, re-use of personal data would be against data processing requirements protecting individuals; the regulations do not apply in any situation in which a person is under a legal obligation to prove an interest in order to gain access to documents; (b) documents in which the copyright and/or other intellectual property rights are owned or controlled by a person or organisation other than the public sector body; (c) documents that fall outside the scope of the public task of the public sector body, provided that the scope of the public task of that body is transparent and subject to review. This covers those situations where a public sector body

418  Chapter 4

(d) (e) (f) (g)

produces documents that are not directly related to the core responsibilities of the public sector body. This may cover documents that are of a valueadded or commercial nature; documents that are held by public service broadcasters and other bodies or their subsidiaries for the fulfilment of a public service broadcasting remit; educational and research establishments including organisations established for the transfer of research results, schools and universities (except university libraries); documents held by cultural establishments such as orchestras, theatre and performing arts establishments (note libraries etc above); parts of documents containing logos, crests or insignia.

http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/information-management/re-using-public-sectorinformation/uk-government-licensing-framework/ and http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ information-management/re-using-public-sector-information/uk-government-licensingframework/open-government-licence/.

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Partnerships 4.43  Previous guidance advised that public sector bodies often develop information products and services with partners in the public and private sectors. The Guidance emphasises the importance of clarifying when any copyright or any other intellectual property rights in such products and services are owned by a private sector partner. The public sector body should also make it clear whom the re-user should contact about re-use. In the case of information that is jointly owned by private and public sector partners and where it is impossible to identify the copyright elements owned by each partner, re-users would need the permission of both parties unless the private sector partner agreed that the public sector should have the responsibility for authorising re-use. Public sector bodies should not authorise private sector partners to authorise re-use of public sector documents. One of the parties in joint enterprise partnerships should be nominated to process requests for re-use to avoid unnecessary bureaucracy. The presumption is that the public sector bodies have the necessary authority to license re-use. Licensing of most copyright material produced at central government level is managed centrally by National Archives. Commercial information may be available on Crown Commercial Service.1 https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/crown-commercial-service (13/04/2018).

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Asset lists 4.44  We saw the existence of such lists above and, under regulation 16, these must be published. This must identify what can be re-used, how it may be obtained and conditions for re-use. It is advised to include information not within a public task to make publicity comprehensive. It should be available in machine-readable format including metadata. It should be electronically searchable. An asset is any information that a public sector body produces that is of interest or value to the organisation itself, and potentially to others. An asset list is simply a register

Central government  419 of these information assets, usually categorised using a standard classification method. The asset list register has been outlined above. The first step to re-using public sector information is to know what documents are available for re-use. 4.45  Some public sector bodies already publish clear and transparent information to help re-users find documents to re-use. Often in practice these information sources have been developed to meet their obligations under FOI legislation. While the obligations under FOI and the production of asset lists under these Regulations are not synonymous, there are, nevertheless, synergies between the two. Public sector bodies should consider ways in which they can meet these obligations in a way that avoids unnecessary duplication of effort and also provides potential re-users with a one-stop shop in terms of finding out what information is available. 4.46  National Archives has the policy lead for the Information Asset Register (IAR) which is used widely across central government as a way of identifying and accessing asset lists. National Archives has been developing a model for the next generation IAR with advanced search capabilities in a way that will enable public sector bodies to easily identify information assets that are available for re-use in a joined-up and effective way. The key message for redeveloping IAR is the need to join up the similarities in existing and emerging information initiatives, polices and legislation to ensure that public sector information assets are easy to manage and easy to find, use and share. To facilitate the transition to the next generation IAR, there is a requirement to rationalise existing documentation relating to IAR and links with other information policy, particularly Freedom of Information Publication Schemes.

Charging 4.47  Charging at marginal cost is the default position. Regulation 15 states that where charges are made the charges should not exceed the marginal cost of reproduction, provision and dissemination. The Guidance acknowledges that ‘much material held by public sector bodies is available in digital format, often by being published on the web, the costs of allowing re-use does not involve any additional cost to the public sector.’ Quite often ‘the cost of raising a charge will in many cases be uneconomic’. There are exceptions for: (a) a public sector body that is required to generate revenue to cover a substantial part of its costs relating to the performance of its public task; (b) documents for which the public sector body making the charge is required to generate sufficient revenue to cover a substantial part of the costs relating to their collection, production, reproduction or dissemination; or (c) libraries (including university libraries), museums and archives. For (a) and (b), the total income for the accounting period must not exceed the cost of collection, production, reproduction and dissemination of the information, together with a reasonable return on investment. In the case of (c), the total income for the accounting period must not exceed the cost of collection,

420  Chapter 4 production, reproduction, dissemination, preservation and rights clearance of the information, together with a reasonable return on investment. Details are provided on ‘total charges’ and ‘total income’. Any charges for re-use must, so far as is reasonably practicable, be calculated in accordance with the accounting principles applicable to the public sector body from time to time. There must be no duplication of direct costs or indirect and overhead costs (for both costs, see reg 15(11)) with those costs under access legislation. The 2015 Regulations do not define a reasonable return on investment (ROI) and the rate of return on capital employed in service provision to be applied will depend on whether that service provision competes with private sector provision of similar services. Normally the standard cost of capital, currently 3.5 per cent in real terms, will apply. However, in cases where provision competes with private sector provision of similar services, the rate should be in line with the rates achieved by comparable businesses facing a similar level of risk. 4.48  Charges may be challenged. Regulations 18 and 19 specifically modify the enforcement and appeals provisions of the FOIA 2000 to apply to charging complaints.

Licensing1 4.49  It is not compulsory to use licences to permit the re-use of documents. Where licences are used the Guidance spells out essential features such as fairness and openness and equality; terms should not be anti-competitive and should be online digital. Licence terms should be standardised. Where the Crown retains copyright a recipient of that information has an automatic right to copy, publish distribute and adapt the information under the Open Government Licence (OGL) for public sector information. They may exploit the information commercially. This is free but subject to conditions. Public authorities that have adopted the OGL are likewise covered. If not covered, copyright retained by them will protect the information. Re-use is subject to the re-use regulations. http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/information-management/re-using-public-sectorinformation/uk-government-licensing-framework/.

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Exclusive arrangements 4.50  A public sector body may not enter into an exclusive arrangement (granting a contractual or other exclusive right to re-use) with any person. A public sector body may, where necessary for the provision of a service in the public interest, enter into an exclusive arrangement. The validity of the reason for granting an exclusive arrangement must be reviewed at least once every three years. Any exclusive arrangement permitted under regulation 14(2) and entered into on or after 31  December 2003 must be published by the public sector body. These provisions do not apply to the digitisation of cultural resources but a public sector body may enter into an exclusive arrangement in relation to the digitisation of

Central government  421 cultural resources. The period of exclusivity for such an arrangement should not normally exceed 10 years and any such arrangement must be published by the public sector body. There are additional provisions on such arrangements.

Transparency, openness and non-discrimination 4.51  All information such as asset lists, standard licence terms and charging information should be published. Complaints procedures should be published. Conditions for the re-use of public sector documents must be non-discriminatory between comparable categories of re-use. Exceptions may be made in the case of libraries, archives and educational establishments, which enjoy special privileges under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, which also includes special provisions for the reproduction of material for visually impaired persons. Principles of non-discrimination apply to the public sector body itself in, eg, developing their own commercial products outside their core public tasks. ‘This is aimed at ensuring a level playing field between the public sector and others when competing in the commercial market place. Private sector applicants may seek evidence that this has been properly applied.’ The Information Fair Trader Scheme (IFTS) was introduced in 2000 to support various UK policy initiatives that sought to encourage the re-use of Crown copyright material and other public sector information. IFTS is ‘highly visible’ seeks to promote an open, fair and transparent system and to ensure fair grievance procedures and a robust audit. It verifies major information traders such as Ordnance Survey and the Met Office. It ranges from significant producers and traders of information to parish councils and doctors surgeries. Verification has involved site visits and detailed audits and verification models reflecting the diversity of bodies. For further information on IFTS, see http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/ information-management/uk-government-licensing-framework.pdf (14/03/18). 4.52  The Guidance states that IFTS verifies: (a) Openness – that the organisation maximises the information available for re-use. (b) Transparency – that the organisation has clear and simple policies and procedures. (c) Fairness – that all customers are treated the same. (d) Compliance – that the organisation’s procedure should comply with the first three principles. (e) Challenge – that the organisation has a robust complaints procedure. IFTS accreditation is usually only given after interviews with key personnel, detailed case file and licence review and a website audit.

Processing applications 4.53  Applications must be in writing, state the applicant’s name and address and state the documents requested and the purpose for which the information

422  Chapter 4 is to be re-used. Permission should be given within a reasonable period of time. The Regulations allow public sector bodies up to 20 working days (as for FOI legislation) following date of receipt of the request for re-use to respond (reg  8(4)). Where the request is extensive or raises complex issues the public sector body may extend the period for responding by such time as is reasonable in the circumstances (reg 8). In such a case the authority must give an estimated date by which it expects to respond to the request for re-use before the end of the twentieth day. The same timelines apply to documents that are not readily available in a published form. Consideration of whether re-use is allowed does not affect the 20 working days’ time limit for access to the information under FOI legislation. If the information can be released under FOI then it must be made available within 20 working days or within a reasonable time if what is known as a public interest exemption applies (para 1.75). If there is a combined release and re-use request then it must be dealt with fully in terms of access to the information (unless exempt under FOI) within 20 working days irrespective of whether the final decision on re-use has been made. A  public sector body may impose conditions on re-use, where appropriate through a licence. Where conditions are imposed they must not unnecessarily restrict either the way in which a document can be re-used or competition.

FORMAT OF DOCUMENTS 4.54  A  public sector body must make a document available to an applicant under regulation 8(4)(b) or (c): (a) in the format and language in which it is held on the date of the request for re-use; and (b) where possible and appropriate, in open format and machine-readable format together with its metadata. Insofar as possible, these comply with formal open standards (see para  4.42 above). Where possible and appropriate, a public sector body must make a document available for re-use by electronic means. However, nothing obliges a public sector body to (a) create or adapt a document or provide an extract from it in order to comply with a request for re-use where to do so would involve disproportionate effort; or (b) continue to produce or store a certain type of document for the purposes of re-use by another person.

Right to refuse the re-use of documents 4.55  The Regulations provide that bodies have the right to refuse the re-use of documents. They must state their reasons. This will usually be because the document falls outside the scope of the EU Directive for the reasons explained above. The notification of refusal must contain details of the means of redress. Where applicable, the notification must contain, where known, (a) who owns the relevant intellectual property rights; or (b) from whom the public sector body obtained the document though not where this would contravene the Copyright,

Central government  423 Designs and Patents Act 1988. This obligation does not apply to libraries, museums or archives. Where possible and appropriate, processing of requests should be carried out by electronic means.

Complaints, means of redress and dispute resolution 4.56  A  public sector body must establish an internal complaints procedure for determining complaints relating to its compliance with these Regulations (reg 17). A person who believes that a public sector body has failed to comply with any requirement of these Regulations may complain in writing to the public sector body in accordance with its internal complaints procedure. A public sector body must determine any complaint so made within a reasonable time and thereafter notify the person of its determination without delay. Such notification must be in writing and give reasons for the determination.

The dispute resolution process 4.57  The regulations have recast the complaints and appeals process. If the requester is not satisfied with a decision (or non-decision) on re-use or conditions, including charging, a complaint may be made to the Information Commissioner. The details are as under the FOIA in ch 1 although, in the case of a charging complaint, the IC does not issue a decision notice but makes a recommendation. If the IC decides that a public sector body (PSB) has failed to comply with the requirements of RPSI, the decision notice will specify the steps that must be taken to comply and the time period for doing so. The decision notice is binding on the PSB. This may be appealed to the First Tier Information Rights Tribunal. The requester may also appeal likewise where the complaint is not upheld. The IC may also award an enforcement and information notice as appropriate, with rights of appeal. 4.58  If the complainant is not satisfied with a PSB’s response to an IC recommendation, they can appeal to the First-tier Tribunal. In this situation their case would be against the PSB and not the IC. A requester may also appeal to the Tribunal against the IC’s recommendation. The IC does not have to issue a decision notice or a recommendation if: • the complainant has not exhausted its internal complaints procedure; • there has been an undue delay in making the complaint; • it is frivolous or vexatious; or • the complainant has withdrawn or abandoned it.

Advisory Panel on Public Sector Information (APPSI) 4.59  APPSI acted both as adviser to Ministers on re-use of PSI and licensing matters and in an executive capacity determining disputes. It was abolished in 2015.

424  Chapter 4

Freedom of information and re-use 4.60  In the UK, access to public sector information rights are given by the FOIA 2000 and the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 (SFOIA). FOI legislation specifies categories of exempt information that cannot be supplied. Exemptions may be absolute or qualified. The latter are subject to public interest disclosures. It follows that if access is denied, then re-use is not permitted either. The supply of information under FOI does not automatically give the recipient of the information the right to re-use it; for example, the right to publish it unless covered by open use. In most cases, separate permission, often in the form of a licence, needs to be obtained from the public sector body that owns the copyright. The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 makes some important amendments on access to data sets held by PAs and rights of re-use (para 1.79). The 2015 Regulations amend sections 11A and 19 of the FOIA regarding release of datasets or portions of datasets for re-use. These changes mean that, where a dataset is covered by the 2015 Regulations, it is the 2015 Regulations and not FOIA which will govern the re-use of such dataset information and their entry on a publication scheme. This is an important change for the large number of public authorities which are also public sector bodies. Re-use of their datasets that are relevant copyright works will be dealt with under the 2015 Regulations, not FOIA. However, if the body is covered by the FOIA but the dataset is not covered by the 2015 Regulations, the 2000 Act will apply.

Non-discrimination 4.61  Any condition imposed under reg  12 must not discriminate between applicants who make a request for re-use for comparable purposes. If a public sector body which holds a document wishes to re-use the document for activities which fall outside the scope of its public task, the same conditions must apply to that re-use as would apply to re-use by any other applicant for comparable purposes. Exclusive arrangements, subject to exceptions in reg 14, must not be entered into by the PA.

PUBLIC RECORDS ACTS AS AMENDED BY THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 20001 4.62  Before 1959 there was no legal right of access to public records in the Public Record Office (PRO), now renamed National Archives, which since 2003 has incorporated the Historical Manuscripts Commission which dated from the nineteenth century. In what follows, for PRO read National Archives; the title of Lord Chancellor has been retained for the time being although today it is a title shared with that of the Secretary of State for Justice and the latter is the official usually named by SI 2015/1897. Certain discretionary practices on disclosure existed but it was not until the Public Records Act was passed in 1958 that a legal right, subject to exceptions, conferred access to public records. The Act does not apply to Scottish2 and Northern Ireland records. These are covered by other

Central government  425 provisions. The Act required courts, government departments and specified nondepartmental bodies to transfer records selected for permanent preservation to the PRO, or another approved place. This was to occur before they were 30 years old; they would be available for public inspection when 50 years old. The Public Records Act 1967 (PRA 1967) reduced the period of closure to 30 years in the ‘30 year rule’. Documents may be retained in departments for more than 30 years. The CRGA 2010 has reduced the period to 20 years. See A  McDonald ‘Archives and Open Government’ in A  McDonald and G  Terrill Open Government: Freedom of Information and Privacy (1998). On PRO fees, see SI 2005/471. 2 See Public Records (Scotland) Act 2011. 1

4.63  A statement of practice was made in 1993 when John Major’s government published the White Paper on Open Government which stated that more information would be released following administrative changes to the criteria used for withholding information for longer than 30 years – noting that 30 years was becoming a norm adopted by EC member states. Its revised arrangements would apply to Scotland and Northern Ireland. All records which were not retained in departments (under s 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958) should be released after 30 years (see above) unless it was possible to prove actual damage by release falling within criteria set out in the guidance.1 Section 3(4) allows retention within departments for special reason which the Lord Chancellor has approved. Public records of other bodies not covered by the PRA 1967, eg local authorities, are covered by different practices and the FOIA 2000 has significantly amended the law for bodies covered by the FOIA 2000. The variations on the basic practice are as follows. See HC 570 I (1998–99), Annex 5. See the heavily amended Sch 1 to the 1958 Act for ‘public authorities’.

1

4.64  The FOIA 2000 has now sought to put this regime which was discretionary of both a statutory and non-statutory nature on a par with the FOIA 2000, an intention which was set out in the 1997 White Paper. Most of the provisions of s 5 of the PRA 1967 which set out the previous regime are repealed. Public records become ‘historical records’ after 30 (20 when the CRGA 2010 takes effect) years and are governed by the provisions of Part VI of the FOIA 2000. The provisions of the FOIA 2000 apply to these, presumably even those retained in departments for purposes of administrative convenience because they were in constant use or subject to review, though quaere where they related to civil servants or because they related to security or intelligence. So, while the security and intelligence services and records they hold are excluded from the Act, information within s 23 of the FOIA 2000, ie from such bodies or relating to them which is contained in a historical record in the PRO and PRO (NI) are exempt and in the case of such records the provisions of s 2 are not overridden by absolute exemption as they are with FOIA applications. In other words there is a discretion to disclose in the public interest once they are 30 (20) years old but only where they are in the PRO. Where a request is made for historical records in the public authority which are exempt, the Lord Chancellor/Secretary of State has to be consulted and, under s 15, the PRO is obliged to consult the originating department before releasing an exempt record.

426  Chapter 4 4.65  Section 66 concerns transferred public records (see para 1.96 above on s  15 of the FOIA  2000). These relate to information which is, or if it existed would be, contained in records transferred from responsible authorities (public authorities basically) to the National Archives (NA), another place of deposit appointed by the Lord Chancellor or the PRO (NI). It does not apply to that designated as ‘open information’ for the purposes of s  66. The ‘appropriate records’ authorities’ are the NA and PRO (NI) and the Lord Chancellor. Before making a decision on whether information covered by the section falls within any of the exemptions under Part II concerning confirmation and denial or exemptions from disclosure, the ‘responsible authority’ (s  15(5)) has to be consulted. These are basically, the Ministers of the Crown, ‘other persons’, Northern Ireland Ministers of the Crown and Ministers and other persons (in Northern Ireland) appearing to the Lord Chancellor or Northern Ireland Minister to be ‘primarily concerned’. Decisions under s 2(1)(b) (confirmation or denial) are determined by the responsible authority, not the appropriate records authority. This is the same for decisions on exemption and disclosure under s  2(2)(b). This provision will not allow disclosure etc of absolute exemptions under s  2(3) (though see s  64(2) above in relation to s  23 information). The Lord Chancellor and the appropriate NI Minister must be consulted before the responsible authority makes any determination that s  2(1)(b) or (2)(b) do not apply. Special provisions apply to responsible authorities which are not, apart from s 15(6), public authorities. 4.66  The Lord Chancellor has to publish under s  46 a code of practice on records management. This was published in November 2002 and revised in 2009 (see below). The IC will deal with complaints relating to refusal of historical records as he does with ordinary requests. 4.67  Some of the exemptions disapply after 30 years (20 when CRGA  2010 applies) and so the historical records are not exempt, they are only exempt as records before that date. This covers: relations within the UK (s 28 – although this will be removed under CRGA 2010, Sch 7 in relation to 20 years and will therefore remain at 30); investigations which an authority has a duty to conduct in relation to criminal charges, ascertainment of guilt, institution of criminal proceedings and any criminal proceedings (s 30(1) (though see below on s 31); court records (s  32); audit functions (s  33); the formulation of government policy-making (s  35); prejudice to the effective conduct of public affairs (s  36 although this will be removed under CRGA  2010 in relation to 20 years and remain at 30 for cases involving Northern Ireland (see para  4.68 below, but note the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012); communications with Her Majesty, members of the Royal Family or Royal Household (s 37(1)(a) although this will be removed under CRGA 2010; see below); legal professional privilege (s 42); and commercial interests (s 43 although this will be removed under CRGA 2010 in relation to 20 years and remain at 30). The duty to inform in writing a requester for information whether it holds information of the description specified under s 1(1)(a) in relation to an historical record shall not be taken to be capable of having any of the effects referred to in s 28(3) (removed as above), 33(3), 36(3) (removed as above), 42(2) or 43(3) removed as above), ie it is not to be taken as

Central government  427 revealing the interest which the exemption seeks to protect (see ch 1) (para 4.69 below). 4.68  The CRGA 2010 specifies that information in a historical record cannot be exempt information by virtue of s 36 except in a case falling within s 36(2) (a)(ii) (see para 1.182) or in a case falling within s 36(2)(c) where the prejudice or likely prejudice relates to the effective conduct of public affairs in Northern Ireland. The duty to inform in writing a requester for information whether it holds information of the description specified under s 1(1)(a) in relation to an historical record shall not be taken to be capable of having any of the effects referred to in s 36(3) unless it falls within the two previous provisions. 4.69  Information in CRGA 2010, ss 28, 43 and 36(2)(a)(ii) and (2)(c) will lose their exemption after 30 years under CRGA 2010 and provision is made for the ‘neither confirm nor deny’ provision in relation to ss 28(1) 43(2) and 36(3) for 30 years likewise. New sub-sections 63(2E) and (2F) create time limits after which the exemptions in the new ss 37(1)(a) to (ad) of the FOIA 2000 no longer apply (see para 1.194). The exemption ceases to apply 20 years after the creation of the record in which the information is contained, or five years after the death of the relevant member of the royal family, whichever is longer. In the case of communications with the royal household falling within the fifth category, the relevant member of the royal family for these purposes is the sovereign reigning when the record in question was created. The amendments made by Sch 7 will not apply to information held by the Northern Ireland Assembly, any Northern Ireland department and any Northern Ireland public authority. The FOIA 2000 will apply to these bodies as if the amendments had not been made. However, under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, the relevant period for NI bodies is 20 years except in the case of s 36(2) (a)(ii) and (2)(c) where the period is 30 years. The period remains at 30 years for ss 28 and 43 and Northern Ireland historical records. 4.70  Historical records within s 37(1)(b) (the conferring of honours) lose their exemption after 60 years. Information within s 31 (law enforcement) is given a 100-year exemption. Information exempt under s 30(1) loses its exemption after 30 years (see above and CRGA 2010 and reduction to 20 years); it is therefore no longer exempt under that section but could be exempt under s 31. A similar provision as above covers compliance with s 1(1)(a) and s 31 although it refers to any record, not historical records. It means that authorities must inform requesters whether they hold information 100 years from the year after which it was created. 4.71  Information contained in a historical record in the PRO or PRO (NI) is not exempt by virtue of s 21 (information accessible by other means)1 or s 22 (information intended for future publication). Public Keeper under a duty to supply.

1

4.72  Historical records apart from the above are given indefinite exemption. In the case of parliamentary privilege, personal information within s 40(1) or (2) in relation to the first condition (see paras 4.62 et seq above), information given in

428  Chapter 4 confidence under s 41 or where there is a prohibition on disclosure under s 44, this is not information subject to FOI public interest disclosure or decisions as to disclosure by the IC.1 Information given an indefinite period of exemption therefore covers: information supplied by or relating to bodies dealing with security matters (although the provisions of s 2(3) do not apply to this information so after 30 (above) years it may be subject to public interest disclosure where it is in the PRO. The following are given indefinite exemption but are subject to public interest disclosure: national security; defence; international relations; the economy; information falling within s  30(2) ie, information obtained or recorded for the purposes of its functions relating to investigations into criminal charges, ascertaining guilt, into criminal proceedings, or civil proceedings arising from any of the above investigations and the information relates to the obtaining of information from confidential sources. Health and safety and environmental information are given indefinite exemption. Information covered by Parliamentary privilege is given indefinite exemption and the public interest disclosure provisions do not apply. Personal information as identified in s  40 (s 2(3)(f)) is given an indefinite exemption and is not subject to public interest disclosure, so too is information provided in confidence; information whose disclosure is prohibited by statute, or is incompatible with Community law or would constitute etc a contempt is similarly treated. Historical information given an expansive protection is that which is given an indefinite period of closure and to which the absolute exemptions under s 2(3) apply. To recall, the IC had no authority over these ‘absolute exemptions’ and the public authorities may not make discretionary disclosures of such information.

1

4.73  The Lord Chancellor shall issue and may revise a code of practice for relevant authorities on the practice which it would, in his opinion, be desirable for them to follow in connection with the keeping, management and destruction of their records. Guidance may also be provided on transfer of documents. In exercising these functions the Lord Chancellor shall have regard to the public interest in allowing access to documents. A  draft Code was published in June 2000 and a final version in November 2002 which was itself revised in 2009.1 This states that failure to comply with the Code may lead to breach of one of several statutory provisions under the Public Records Acts and local government legislation. ‘Access rights are of limited value if information cannot be found when requested, or, when found, cannot be relied upon as authoritative’ (Introduction (iv)) and how poor records create serious risks for an authority. It reminds PAs of the IC’s powers under the FOIA. Part One of the Code deals with the practices which PAs subject to the Public Records Act 1958 and Public Records (NI) Act 1923 should follow in relation to the creation, keeping, management and destruction of these records. Part Two concerns arrangements to be followed in reviewing records and in transferring them to the NA, place of deposit or PRO (NI). A policy statement on records management should exist which should be reviewed every three to five years and which would cover electronic records. The 2002 Code also provided that: ‘records created by the authority should be arranged in a record keeping system that will enable the authority to obtain the maximum benefit from the quick and easy retrieval of information’ (para 8.3). The 2009 Code states that ‘Authorities should keep their records in systems that

Central government  429 enable records to be stored and retrieved as necessary’ (para  9). Guidance is given on storage, security and disposal as well as ‘collaborative working’ and outsourcing, ie  contracting out. Records may be transferred to the NA or to ‘places of deposit appointed by the Lord Chancellor’ (para 17.2). In reviewing records for public release, authorities should ensure that public records become available to the public at the earliest possible time in accordance with the FOIA and EIR. Guidance is given on exemptions for PAs, the NA and the Advisory Council. Electronic and paper records’ keeping systems shall contain descriptive and technical documentation to enable the system and records to be understood and to be operated efficiently and to allow for effective management of records. https://www.nidirect.gov.uk/publications/lord-chancellors-code-practice-management-recordsissued-under-s46-freedom-information (14/03/18).

1

4.74  The Public Records Acts are concerned with the maintenance of records which are of historical importance and significance. Most of the records in the NA are open. Of those records in the NA closed for 30 (above) years or more, ‘no more than about 1 per cent of its total holdings of 447,000 shelf feet (85 miles)’ is unavailable for public inspection.1 Papers within departments are examined twice to see whether they need to be kept for NA purposes or destroyed. An Advisory Council under the Master of the Rolls advises on public records (Advisory Council on National Records and Archives). This has representatives of historians, readers, IT experts and lawyers as well as representatives from the three major political parties. Most documents are delivered to readers within 30 minutes at the NA at Kew. The NA catalogue became available over the Internet in 1999 containing over eight million individual descriptions. In 2011 the figure was 11 million. The NA had taken the lead in records management within government departments. Roper, in Open Government eds R Chapman and M Hunt (1987), p 88. See S Healy ‘Freedom of Information and its Impact on Archives’ in R Chapman and M Hunt (eds) Open Government in a Theoretical and Practical Context eds (2006).

1

4.75  The Statistics and Registration Service Act 2007 makes provision for the creation of a new body, the UK Statistics Authority, with a statutory responsibility to promote and safeguard the production and publication of official statistics that serve the public good: informing the public about social and environmental matters; assisting in the development and evaluation of public policy; regulating quality and publicly challenging the misuse of statistics. The Authority is a Non-Ministerial Department, acting at arm’s length from Ministers, composed of a majority of non-executive members. The Authority’s responsibilities will cover the whole UK statistical system, including England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The Act requires the Authority to adopt a Code of Practice for Official Statistics. Compliance with the Code is a statutory requirement for bodies that produce statistics that are designated as National Statistics through the Office for Statistics Regulation’s assessment process. The 2007 Act maintained the decentralised nature of the UK official statistics system. Each government department that produces official statistics has a Head of Profession who is accountable to their departmental management for day-to-day delivery, but also has a professional accountability to the National Statistician.

430  Chapter 4 The Authority’s remit covers three principal elements of the UK statistical system. These comprise: • The Government Statistical Service (GSS), which is the cross-government community of all those involved in the production of official statistics in the UK. The Head of GSS is the National Statistician. • The Office for National Statistics (ONS), which is the executive office of the UK Statistics Authority and the largest producer of official statistics in the UK. • The Office for Statistics Regulation (OSR), which is the regulatory arm of the UK Statistics Authority. It assesses official statistics for compliance with the Code of Practice for Official Statistics, reports on system-wide issues and on how statistics are used, celebrating when the standards are upheld and challenging publicly when they are not.

PROVISION OF INFORMATION TO PARLIAMENT1 4.76  One cannot overestimate the importance in our constitutional history and practice of the present topic. The Major government’s failure to keep Parliament informed of changes in export licensing arrangements for dual use equipment was one of the central issues in the inquiry by Sir Richard Scott into Matrix Churchill. Parliament voted for an invasion of Iraq on the basis of incomplete and inadequate information leading ultimately to the Chilcot inquiry. On assuming the office of Speaker in October 2000, Michael Martin MP criticised the government for publishing policy statements on the Web and for leaking statements to the press before announcing them to Parliament.2 In the run-up to the Parliamentary vote on the UK/EU withdrawal agreement in December 2018, the Commons voted unanimously (Conservative MPs abstained) a humble address requiring the government to publish the legal advice from the Attorney General to the government on the agreement and the Northern Ireland backstop arrangements. The advice was not published but a summary of 45 pages was published. The Attorney General was required to make a statement to the Commons – a very rare event. Following a Commons motion for contempt for not following the humble address, the Commons voted by 311 to 293 to find the responsible ministers in contempt of Parliament (on law officers’ advice and legal privilege under FOIA, see paras 1.164 et seq and 1.209 et seq). Such a vote against a government minister, and therefore the government, was unprecedented. The government undertook to publish the advice in full – it was six pages long. The scope of the motion leaves no guidance on its future limits and how such a motion may be legitimately refused on grounds of national security, matters sub judice or personal privacy and confidentiality, for instance.3 Annual reports are made to Parliament on departmental performance. To do this whole subject anything like justice would take us far away from our current remit in describing access, or the lack of it, to government information. The legislative process is one that can provide, or ought to provide, detailed information behind government Bills. The committee stages, now before renamed legislative committees, in particular, can be the place for detailed probing and examination,

Central government  431 and for Private Bills4 and Hybrid Bills5 there is opportunity after Second Reading for petitioners against the Bill to present their case in an oral hearing with legal representation in Opposed or Unopposed Bill committees. Earlier publication of Bills, pre-presentation and post-legislative scrutiny have increased opportunities for informed debate as has the special examination of Bills by select committees as in the case of the Constitutional Reform Bill (2003–04) by the Lords Select Committee on Constitutional Reform. The on-line possibilities of pre-legislative scrutiny were debated at HC Debs Vol 416 col 1 (6 January 2004). As early as 1979, the Electricity Bill was published in draft form. Explanatory information on both legislation and statutory instruments has improved enormously over the last two decades.6 https://www.parliament.uk/mps-lords-and-offices/offices/commons/hcio/about-our-service/. The standing order governing public business is SO 122B (2013) https://publications.parliament. uk/pa/cm201314/cmstords/900/body.htm#122B (13/03/2018). 2 (2000) Guardian, 31 October. 3 Hansard HC  Debs 4  December 2018 cols 667–732. Commentators were quick to assert that there was no precedent; in former eras, ministers were subject to impeachment and attainder, such as Strafford in 1641, although these actions have long fallen into desuetude in the UK. A minister has been found guilty of contempt for not obeying an order of the High Court: M v Home Office [1994] 1 AC 377, but the court would not enforce the finding against the Minister. That was Parliament’s function. 4 Bills relating to a special, and not a public, matter. 5 A Public Bill which affects a particular private interest in a manner differently from the private interests of other persons or bodies of the same category or class. 6 See Parliament, Politics and Law-Making: Issues and Developments in the Legislative Process Hansard Society (2004). HC Debs Vol 567 Q. 6 (12 September 2013). 1

Question Time 4.77  The system of Westminster government has developed the idea of ministerial responsibility to the House of Commons as the primary means for ensuring the accountability of government and its administration. Parliamentary Questions (PQs) are central to this process although select committee interest in PQs seems to have diminished since the introduction of FOIA in 2005.1 The abuse by MPs of the process of asking questions in return for cash payments led to the establishment of the Committee on Public Standards originally under Lord Nolan, a Law Lord. Lord Nolan produced the seven principles of ethical conduct in public life: selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and leadership. The present chair is Lord Evans.2 The weaknesses of PQs as a means of extracting responsibility and accountability have been well noted elsewhere,3 but it is a central feature of our constitutional practice. The High Court has ruled that the undesirability of answering a PQ with reference to a specific application and suggested answer to the operation of the FOIA risks conflict between the judiciary and Parliament. The minister risks ‘creat[ing] the potential for a judicial ruling to the contrary effect, as indeed happened in this case: implicitly, and obviously, the effect of the Tribunal’s decision is that the Parliamentary answer given by Mr Boateng, that the gateway reviews were exempt from disclosure under the Act, was wrong. It is, I think, undesirable for the potentiality for such conflicts to be created.’4

432  Chapter 4 See the Public Administration Committee HC  622 (2001–02), HC  1086 (2001–02), HC  136 (2002–03) and HC  Debs Vol 416 col 151 8  January 2004 on Parliamentary Questions. From the same committee HC  355 (2003–04) Taming the Prerogative: Ministerial Responsibility and Parliamentary Questions and Government Reply HC 1262 (2003–04) and HC 449 I and II (2004– 05); and Strengthening Ministerial Accountability to Parliament HC 422 (2003–04) and Government Reply Cm 6187. PQs cost in the region of £6 million per session. Also Government Response to Treasury Committee report Accountability of Departments to Parliament HC 149 (2002–03). The average costs incurred by the Government when answering parliamentary questions have been estimated to be £164 for a written answer and £450 for an oral answer: Sandford (para 4.78, note 2 below), p 11. See PAC HC 122 (2006–07) Politics and Administration: Ministers and Civil Servants and HC 1063 (2010–12) Improving Effectiveness of Parliamentary Scrutiny and Government Reply to HC 800 (2010–11). 2 Lord Evans was a former head of MI5. In Scotland, the Scottish Commissions and Commissioners etc Act 2010 establishes the Commission for Ethical Standards in Public Life in Scotland. 3 Most dramatically in Scott’s Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions HC 115 (1996–97), vols I–V. 4 Office of Government Commerce v IC [2008] EWHC 737 (Admin). 1

4.78  MPs can ask questions – lots of them – although the number of written questions fell back in the coalition government. These PQs may require an oral answer in the House from the responsible minister, notice of which must be given to the clerks at the Table1 or in the Table office. The details of the procedure are contained in Erskine May.2 1924 questions were made for oral answer and 25,467 tabled for written answer according to the Order papers in 2009–10. In the past the total for questions asked has been as high as 80,000 or so PQs asked and answered each year. The House of Commons Factsheet of 2010 states that over 57,000 questions were asked for written answer in 2007–08. Procedures were altered after reports from the Select Committee on Procedure and the Select Committee on Modernisation were debated and approved in the Commons on 29  October 2002. Further reforms have been made. Since 2003, ‘cross-cutting’ questions have been allowed involving several departments. Reforms include a split question time with the second part, comprising about a quarter of the time, devoted to topical questions following a recommendation from the Modernisation Committee in 2007. The list specifying when ministers are to answer questions – the question rota – is decided by the government and prepared by the Table office. Questions are subject to a computer shuffle relating to the department to which questions are put and the successful questions are listed in order in the Notice of Questions section of the vote bundle – the blue pages. Notice of questions must be given no later than three days before questions for that department but they may be tabled at any time after the previous session involving that department – the precise timing depends upon the day it was given. Fridays and weekends are not included. Question Time takes place for an hour, Monday to Thursday, after preliminary proceedings and private business. Supplementary questions may be asked, first by the MP asking the original question, then, at the Speaker’s invitation, by other MPs, usually alternating between government and opposition MPs. When the first question is concluded, the MP with the second question is called, and so on. Those left unanswered at the end of the Question Time proceed to a written answer printed in a subsequent issue of Hansard. The Speaker controls the process and about 15–20 questions are answered each session. The Prime Minister’s Question Time now takes place on a Wednesday at 12.00 noon lasting for about 30 minutes.

Central government  433 From the 2014–15 session onwards, all written questions waiting to be answered, and the answers given, in both the Commons and the Lords, can be searched for via the Written Questions and Answers service. Questions are published on the service the day after they have been tabled. Answers are usually published within 90 minutes from being given.3 Electronic tabling was introduced following a Procedure Report in 2002. In the 2014–15 session, 553 of 650 Members are registered on the system; and in the 2013–14 session, 84.9% of questions were e-tabled.4 The Table of the House directly in front of the Speaker. M  Hutton, S  Patrick et al Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament (24th edn, 2011), 352–365. See M Sandford Parliamentary Questions – recent issues (2015) http:// researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN04148/SN04148.pdf; also House of Commons Factsheet Parliamentary Questions Revised August 2010 (archived). See generally: J Griffith et al Parliament: Functions, Practice and Procedure (2nd edn, 2003) ch 6. 3 http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/business/written-answers/ (13/03/2018). 4 Sandford (note 2 above), p 10. 1 2

4.79  Ministers apart from the Prime Minister on average face questions about once every three to four weeks. A  question should either seek information or press for action; it should not deal with opinion, ‘though it may be based on facts for the accuracy of which the Member is himself responsible’. It must relate to a matter for which the minister to whom it is addressed is responsible as a minister. Legal opinions must not be sought. A list of questions or topics that will not be answered is available.1 Matters within the responsibility of devolved bodies are not subject to PQs at Westminster. See the Report of the Select Committee on Public Administration: Ministerial Accountability and Parliamentary Questions HC 820 (1997–98) and Fourth Report (1998–99) and HC 61 (2000–01) and para 4.77, note 1 above.

1

4.80  A PQ which has already been asked and fully answered cannot normally be asked again. Where a Minister has refused to take some action or to provide information, the same question may be asked again after three months. There are a number of subjects such as the security services or matters of commercial confidence on which Ministers have consistently refused to answer. A  refusal prevents a question being admitted on such a subject, though Ministers may be asked once each Session if they will now answer questions on a subject previously blocked. The introduction of FOIA in 2005 led to the termination of the Government’s previous practice of citing reasons for refusal to answer a PQ. 4.81  The rules on blocking PQs were amended in 1993. Blocking still prevents a PQ being tabled if a Minister has previously refused to answer it but only if the refusal has been made in the current session. The practice of refusing to answer PQs ‘of their nature secret’ or where there was a persistent refusal was amended but Ministers still persisted in pre-1993 practice. The government also undertook to answer PQs on the same basis as requests for information under 1994 Code on Access to information as revised by the FOIA, ie where it would be provided under the Act, it would be provided in answer to PQs.1 The judicial response (negative) to answering PQs in line with the FOIA anticipated

434  Chapter 4 responses was set out above (para 4.77). There should be no inconsistencies. It is the duty of the Clerks to ensure that the questions comply with these and other rules of the House. Their method is to advise a Member, if his question appears to breach a rule, how by amendment he can bring it into order. If a Member is not satisfied with the advice given to him, he may have his question submitted to the Speaker. The Speaker’s responses have referred to the standard routes open to MPs: tabling further questions; complaining to the Procedure Committee; or seeking an adjournment debate; and writing to Ministers. Only with very few questions in each Session is it necessary to go to this length.2 Ministers may refuse to answer a question if the cost of doing so would exceed the advisory cost limit. This currently stands at £850 although it was originally aligned with central government FOIA fees. There is no cost limit for oral questions. Reversing original plan; see HC 820 1997–98 and Fourth Report above. House of Commons Factsheet above 2010, p 3.

1 2

4.82  The order of questions is dealt with by a ballot – the ‘five o’clock [now 12.30 pm] shuffle’. Questions are put in a ballot and selected electronically. The number of PQs that may be put to a department was reduced to a new quota – and MPs are limited in the number of questions they may ask (eight in every ten sitting days, two in any one day, and only one question may be put to the same minister on any day). 4.83  The department concerned first receives warning of a question on the morning after the question has been tabled. The officials responsible for the department’s parliamentary business extract their own questions from the Notice Paper and send them, in specially marked folders, to the officials within their departments who deal with the subject matter of the questions. Drafts of answers for the minister’s consideration are then made. If approved, it goes forward for inclusion in the answer file to be used on the day the question is answered in the House. Oral questions are far more onerous than written answers as civil servants have to give full background briefing on which a minister can base his answers to supplementary questions, and every ramification must be anticipated from the factual to the highly political. Questions may well be inspired by a minister or put down by colleagues to give full publicity to successes and to announce popular decisions. If the question is directed to the wrong minister, it will be re-routed to the appropriate one. The content of the reply is a matter for the minister. 4.84  Ministerial Accountability and PQs has been the subject of several Select Committee reports although no recent reports.1 These contain details of PQs that have been blocked in the respective sessions. ‘Will write’ answers – usually published in Hansard but longer replies are in the deposited papers collection (http://deposits.parliament.uk/). The Ministerial Code on Conduct and Guidance (below) spells out that Ministers have a duty to account to Parliament by giving accurate and truthful information correcting any error at the earliest opportunity. Ministers who knowingly mislead will be expected to offer their resignation to the Prime Minister. Ministers should be as open as possible with Parliament only refusing to disclose information when this would be against the public interest

Central government  435 and resolutions have been made in the House on the nature of a Minister’s duty.2 It was a matter of some consternation that before the summer recess in 2004, the government announced that from the end of the 2003–04 session, those PQs that were unanswered would not survive the session and would have to be asked again. Select Committee on Public Administration HC 820 (1997–98), Fourth Report (1998–99) and HC 61 (2000–01) and see para 4.77, note 1 above and HC 449 I & II (2004–05) and GR HC 853 (2005–06). 2 Resolution of the House of Commons, Official Report (6th series) 292 Vol 292, cols 1046–7, 19 March 1997. 1

Urgent questions (private notice questions) 4.85  In the case of an emergency, a procedure allows an expedited form of questioning. An MP must apply to the Speaker before noon on the day on which an answer is required. The department concerned is informed immediately. The rules above apply to private notice questions (PNQs) with two additional criteria: it must be urgent, and it must be of public importance. One example would be an immediate threat to the liberty of the subject; another airport security. They are dealt with after Question Time and only about four or five PNQs a month have averaged in recent sessions.1 This does not include routine PQs from the Leader of the Opposition to the Prime Minister.

1

Written answer questions (WAQs) 4.86  There is no limit to the number of questions hich may be tabled for written answers. As many as 250 may be tabled in a single day. The questions, governed by the same rules as oral questions, amount to about 94 per cent of all questions (the total being around 35,000–52,000 in each session prior to 2000; now about 77,000). A WAQ is usually dated for two days after it is tabled; the question is usually answered within seven days of that date. Where an answer on a specified day is required, it must be signified as a ‘Named Day’ or ‘Priority’ question, with an ‘N’ in the Order Book. It receives priority, but to obtain this the MP has to give two days’ notice – the answer may be that an answer will be given as soon as possible! 4.87  When Next Steps agencies were established ministers devolved to the appropriate Chief Executive responsibility for answering PQs. They can only supply written answers. Until 1992, these replies were placed in the Library and House of Commons Information Office, although after that date they are published in Hansard. 4.88  In 2003–04, it was estimated that the total annual cost for answering all questions was £6 million. ‘Inordinate expense’ is a frequent excuse for not providing a written answer to a question, eg  over £750. This is the limit (disproportionate cost threshold) for dealing with a PQ. FOIA requests under

436  Chapter 4 the fees arrangements in relation to central departments and Parliament have a fees limit of £600. The average cost at December 2008 was £149 for a written answer £410 for an oral question.

Parliamentary Papers 4.89  Many research papers into PQs are Deposited Papers and, together with other unpublished papers, are placed in the House of Commons library. Papers deposited after 1987 may be available on https://www.parliament.uk/ depositedpapers Those before 1987 are covered by https://www.parliament. uk/business/publications/parliamentary-archives/visiting-and-services/enquiryservices/. Digital versions date from 2007. Documents received before this date are only available in hard copy. Hard copy documents can be viewed in the Reading Room in the Parliamentary Archives or made available from the Archive Reprographic Services. Many papers are placed on www.parliament.uk under ‘Publications and Records’. Papers may be accessed through the House of Commons Library Service. They are available to all MPs and may be restricted to MPs. Ministers ‘will write’ replies to MPs after a question is available to MPs. Recent responses may be obtained from the Commons Information Office or the Lords Information Office. Some of the work produced in papers by the Library research staff is publicly available. Older papers, over 30 years old, are available to the public via the Parliamentary Archives (formerly House of Lords Record Office). Requests to the House of Commons library for Deposited Papers from a member of the public are referred to the parliamentary clerk of the depositing department who may well arrange for the policy division concerned to send it to the requester or to allow access.1 Many such documents are published by National Archives as non-parliamentary or departmentally circulated papers. On public access, see https://www.parliament.uk/about/how/publications/deposited/#jumplink-3.

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4.90  Papers laid before the House which are not ordered to be printed and unprinted Command Papers are available to the public through Parliamentary Archives. Readers are reminded that the FOIA 2000 now covers documents of both Houses of Parliament, subject to parliamentary privilege. 4.91  Since an experimental period in 2006, arrangements have been in place to answer written questions in the recess in September and three days are presently set aside to table questions and three to give replies.

Debates 4.92  Time for debates is arranged through the Whips of the government and opposition parties. Government controls most of this time. Opposition days allow for 20 days to be allotted for opposition business. A third block, for

Central government  437 private members, is allocated by a ballot for private members’ motions and not by Whips. At the end of each day, the government moves the adjournment of the House and an MP’s particular subject may be debated. This is the Adjournment Debate and it lasts for up to 30 minutes. MPs are selected by a private ballot conducted by the Speaker except for the Thursday Adjournment Debate when a member is chosen by the Speaker. An Early Day Motion (EDM) may be put down by an MP although no date is fixed for debate. In the vast majority of cases there is no prospect of these motions being debated. Any number of MPs may sign the motion.1 The full text of EDMs since 1989–90 is available at http:// www.parliament.uk/business/publications/business-papers/commons/early-daymotions/. Since 2000, adjournment debates may take place in Westminster Hall lasting between three and four and a half hours. Subjects are chosen by ballot through application to the Speaker’s Office. The select committee on reform of the House of Commons reported it was time to give members in a committee of the House of Commons greater powers over debates.2 In 2010, a Back-bench Business Committee was established with responsibility for arranging debates on 35 days. The chair is appointed after a secret ballot of MPs not by patronage. The other seven members are also elected by secret ballots but using a system to ensure overall party and gender balance. Elections take place every parliamentary year. The House of Commons Backbench Business Committee3 has a limited allocation of time outside Government control in which it can schedule subjects for debate suggested by backbench Members of Parliament. The Committee can consider any subject for debate. This includes subjects raised in national or local campaigns, reports by select committees and other groups and issues suggested by constituents, including by people who have signed an e-petition or a traditional paper petition (there is no restriction on the number of signatures required). Plans to move to a House Business Committee which would decide weekly agendas in the Commons including government business moved slowly. The coalition government committed itself to establish this by the end of the third year of Parliament (2013). In July 2015 the plans for such a committee came to an end. A development supported by the Speaker was the use of e-petitions whereby if 100,000 petitions were received on a government e-petition web site this would trigger a debate in Parliament. 10,000 signatures will receive a response from government. The Petitions Committee is the body charged with overseeing the new e-petitions system and recommending petitions for debate in Westminster Hall on a Monday. For more information see the e-petitions page or the Petitions Committee’s homepage.4 Factsheet P3 June 2010 Early Day Motions. See generally Revitalising the Chamber: the Role of the Backbencher Modernisation Committee HC 337 (2006-07). 2 HC 1117 (2008–09) and HC 372 (2009–10). 3 http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/backbenchbusiness-committee/how-the-backbench-business-committee-works/. 4 https://petition.parliament.uk/ and https://www.parliament.uk/petitions-committee. 1

Publications1 4.93  Government publishes Green Papers and White Papers on policy proposals or as the basis for an annual parliamentary debate. It publishes

438  Chapter 4 consultative documents on important issues, planned policy decisions, to stimulate debate or to test the water. It publishes statistical data2 and background papers – an example was the Croham Directive exhorting greater publication of background information. Under the FOIA 2000 and under the Code on Access it published various background papers to policy making. Public bodies have to publish publication schemes under the FOIA 2000. The Government publishes its responses, memoranda and oral evidence of government departments to select committees of the Commons which examine the policy, administration and expenditure of government departments. Since 1991, departments have published annual reports as part of the annual expenditure process (see ch 12). These are published as Command Papers. Such papers have their provenance from ministers of the Crown and ‘are laid before Parliament as conveying information or decisions which the government think should be drawn to the attention of one or both Houses’.3 The main types of such papers are: (a) treaties; (b) White Papers (ie government proposals for legislation), policy statements, and some annual reviews (eg defence); (c) most government replies to select committee reports (see below); (d) reports of royal commissions (but not normally the evidence thereof); (e) reports of some major committees of inquiry, and other commissions and non-parliamentary bodies; (f) state papers (including communiques, etc); (g) annual reports, statistics, etc of certain bodies; and (h) some, but not the majority of consultative documents (sometimes called Green Papers).4 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications?official_document_status=command_and_act_ papers (17/03/2018) and http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/publications/government/. 2 D  Englefield Whitehall and Westminster: Government Informs Parliament (1985); Institute for Government Whitehall Monitor https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/our-work/whitehallmonitor?gclid=EAIaIQobChMI9d2HnbXz2QIVbr7tCh1aVQMIEAAYASAAEgKdkPD_BwE (19/03/2018). 3 House of Commons Papers Factsheet revised August 2010 (www.parliament.uk/factsheets, now archived – see note 1 above). On privilege, see para 4.95, note 1 below. 4 House of Commons Factsheet Commons Papers (August 2010). 1

4.94  House of Commons papers include, as a basic principle, papers arising out of the deliberation of the House and its committees or those required for its work. The actual corpus is wider than this, however, the main categories being: (a) select committee papers: (i) reports of select committees, (ii) evidence taken by select committees, (iii) minutes of proceedings of select committees (government replies to their reports may appear as special reports of the committee concerned); (b) minutes of proceedings of public legislation and general committees; public Bill Committees, unlike the Standing Committees they replace, have the power to take written and oral evidence from officials and experts outside Parliament to enhance the information base; (c) returns to addresses by the House; (d) estimates and appropriation, etc, accounts;

Central government  439 (e) certain annual and other reports;1 and/or accounts; and (f) House returns. Those that are not Command papers.

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4.95  ‘Proceedings in Parliament’ are covered by absolute privilege in defamation proceedings, or indeed any other legal proceedings.1 Privilege for publication of Parliamentary papers published under the authority of Parliament is governed by the Parliamentary Papers Act 1840 which confers absolute privilege on Parliamentary papers and reports. Command papers may be brought within this protection if produced to Parliament. Fair and accurate extracts of such papers in press or media reports are protected by qualified privilege under s 3 and the Broadcasting Act 1990, s  203(1) and Sch  20(1). On the question of privilege concerning Parliamentary proceedings, s 13 of the Defamation Act 1996, allows an MP to waive privilege in order to enable the MP to bring proceedings in defamation. The Court of Appeal has ruled that the report of the Commissioner for Standards finding that an MP had received cash for asking questions and which had been adopted by the Committee on Standards and Privileges did not prevent the MP waiving his privilege by virtue of s 1, Art 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689 under s 13. The court added that the plaintiff’s action did not seek to impugn the procedures in Parliament. The court was not challenging Parliament’s authority and was not seeking to judge the procedural quality of an earlier decision of Parliament or one of its officers. The court therefore refused to strike out the plaintiff’s action which the plaintiff – Neil Hamilton – subsequently lost. On appeal to the House of Lords, the reasoning of the Court of Appeal, and Lord Woolf’s views in particular were criticised by the Law Lords. Section 13 was the determining factor and allowed an MP to waive his rights to privilege. The wider statements of Lord Woolf would have meant that the court would have questioned material which was placed before a Commons Committee which is precisely what the courts are jealous to prevent to avoid any conflict.2 These are not self-explanatory terms: On privilege, see A Bradley and K Ewing Constitutional and Administrative Law (16th edn, 2015) ch 9 and Leopold (1990) Public Law 183. The privilege could allow an MP to obtain an unfair advantage in litigation if the adversary was unable to rely upon crucial evidence for the case thereby causing the court to stay the action. 2 Hamilton v Al Fayed [2000] 2 All ER 224, HL. Section 13 was a response to the Privy Council decision in: Prebble v Television New Zealand Ltd [1994] 3  All ER  407; for criticism of s  13 see HL  43-I, HC  214-I  (1998–99). Where the extent of a privilege is disputed is for judicial determination but infringements are determined by the House (Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 595, 645). There have been attempts by injunction to prevent the press reporting on what has been said in Parliament which is likely to be a breach of privilege. Statements by members which breach the sub judice rule are within the jurisdiction of the Standards and Privileges Committee. 1

4.96  Hansard is an independent record of the proceedings of the House of Commons in the Chamber and its general committees and of proceedings in the Lords. The report of one day’s Commons sitting (up to about 10.00 pm) is on MPs’ breakfast tables the next day. It is also available on the Parliament website: www.parliament.uk. 4.97  The press were first allocated seats in the public gallery in 1803, although their presence in the Commons goes back to an earlier period. Prior to this in

440  Chapter 4 1762, the House had resolved that publication in the press of members’ speeches in the House was a breach of privilege. Sound broadcasting began in 1978. In December 1987, the House of Commons took the decision to broadcast its proceedings on television.1 Broadcasting commenced in November 1989. First Report: Commons Select Committee on TV. Procedure, 17 May 1989. TV broadcasting on an experimental basis has taken place in the Lords since 1968. See the Modernisation Committee’s Connecting Parliament with the Public HC 69 (2004–05) for a discussion on the eponymous theme. See also: Hansard Commission on the Communication of Parliamentary Democracy – Members Only? Parliament in the Public Eye. Hansard Society (2005).

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House of Commons publication scheme 4.98  Under FOIA, both Houses are separate public authorities and each has its own publication scheme. A number of classes of information are published under the Commons scheme.1 The Commons lists information under all of the following classes, sub-divided with links: • Who we are and what we do • What we spend and how we spend it • What are our priorities and how we are doing • How we make decisions • Our policies and procedures • Lists and registers • The services we offer • Other information which has an entry on ‘transparency data’.2 https://www.parliament.uk/site-information/foi/accessing-information/commons-publicationscheme/ and, for the Lords, http://www.parliament.uk/mps-lords-and-offices/offices/lords/ freedom-of-information-in-the-house-of-lords/foi-lords-scheme/. 2 https://www.parliament.uk/site-information/foi/transparency-publications/hoc-transparencypublications/. 1

Ministers 4.99 The Ministerial Code, which was revised in 2018,1 is a detailed statement of ministerial practice which Ministers are expected to follow in the letter as well as the spirit. It constitutes guidance on good practice and is not a legal code. The 2018 code emphasised in its foreword fair treatment and opportunity for all and a reflection of these standards by Ministers and Parliament. Harassment and bullying will not be tolerated (Code, para 1.2). This followed various episodes of allegations of harassment, sexual harassment and bullying by Ministers. Detailed guidance is contained in section 9 (formerly Part 3) of the Code on ‘Ministers and Parliament’. Section 3 contains advice on use of special advisers – a subject which has generated reports from the Committee on Standards in Public Life (Ninth Report Cm 5775) and other bodies (see para 4.113). Ministers are reminded that it is Parliament where the ‘most important’ announcements are to be made. Section 8 is concerned with ‘Ministers and the Presentation of Policy’. The Number 10 press office should where possible be consulted and clear in draft

Central government  441 ‘all major announcements, speeches, press releases and new policy initiatives 24 hours in advance’. The reference to the Prime Minister has gone. Prime Minister Blair’s Code was examined by the Commons Committee on Public Administration at the same time as Peter Mandelson was forced to resign over his alleged role in obtaining passports for the Hinduja brothers (HC 821 (1999– 2000)) and was subsequently revised. In ch 1 (para 1.7) reference was made to the recommendations of the Committee on Standards in Public Life concerning inquiries into allegations of breaches of the code by Ministers. The Committee also recommended an Independent Adviser on Ministerial Interests to advise on political conflicts of interests. The Adviser would be able to ask questions about the organisation of business within departments and would keep a record of Ministerial interests. Information on the facts of interests would be published as well as guidance for Ministers (Cm 5775, ch 5). Subsequently, the remit of the appointed adviser was widened (HC  381 (2007–08) and GR HC  1056 (2007– 08)). The following are set out as guiding principles for Ministers (Code, ch 1): ‘a) The principle of collective responsibility applies to all Government Ministers [some seem more bound than others]; b) Ministers have a duty to Parliament to account, and be held to account, for the policies, decisions and actions of their departments and agencies;2 c) It is of paramount importance that Ministers give accurate and truthful information to Parliament, correcting any inadvertent error at the earliest opportunity. Ministers who knowingly mislead Parliament will be expected to offer their resignation to the Prime Minister [The resignation of Amber Rudd as Home Secretary in 2018, when she gave misleading answers to a select committee on key targets for deportations at the height of the Windrush episode, exemplifies this tenet];3 d) Ministers should be as open as possible with Parliament and the public, refusing to provide information only when disclosure would not be in the public interest which should be decided in accordance with the relevant statutes and the Freedom of Information Act 2000;4 e) Ministers should similarly require civil servants who give evidence before Parliamentary Committees on their behalf and under their direction to be as helpful as possible in providing accurate, truthful and full information in accordance with the duties and responsibilities of civil servants as set out in the Civil Service Code; f) Ministers must ensure that no conflict arises, or appears to arise, between their public duties and their private interests; g) Ministers should not accept any gift or hospitality which might, or might reasonably appear to, compromise their judgement or place them under an improper obligation; h) Ministers in the House of Commons must keep separate their roles as Minister and constituency Member; i) Ministers must not use government resources for Party political purposes; j) Ministers must uphold the political impartiality of the Civil Service and not ask civil servants to act in any way which would conflict with the Civil Service Code as set out in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010.’

442  Chapter 4 Allegations of a breach of the code will be referred to the ‘independent adviser on ministers’ interests’ by the Prime Minister after consulting the Cabinet Secretary where further investigation is warranted. The adviser additionally acts as an independent check and source of advice to government ministers on the handling of their private interests, in order to avoid conflict between those interests and their ministerial responsibilities. The latest report states that, until 2016, only one enquiry had been conducted.5 This procedure was not followed when the Defence Secretary, Liam Fox, was investigated in 2011 because of his relationship with an unofficial ‘adviser’, Adam Werritty, who had not been given security clearance to attend official meetings with defence staff. The Cabinet Secretary investigated the affair. Subsequently, permanent secretaries would have direct access to the Prime Minister and Cabinet Secretary to report misgivings about ministers’ conduct. The posts of Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Home Civil Service were also to be split. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/672633/201801-08_MINISTERIAL_CODE_JANUARY_2018__FINAL___3_.pdf. Every PM introduces their own code after election. The omission in the 2015 code of respecting ‘international law and treaty obligations’ was not considered ‘a matter of substance’: R (GCHR) v Prime Minister [2018] EWCA Civ 1855 and HL Deb col 1170 (28/10/2015). 2 The position of agencies can be a complicating factor in establishing who is responsible for what, as the Home Secretary’s experience illustrated when the UK Borders Agency relaxed passport entry controls in 2011. The division of responsibility between the Minister for Justice and the chief executive of the Parole Board brought to light in the Worboys episode was not clear: John Worboys, a serial rapist, was released after ten years in jail. The decision was overturned by the High Court: R (DSD & NBV et al) v The Parole Board et al [2018] EWHC 694 (Admin) and the chair of the Board was forced to resign by the Justice Secretary.. 3 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/homeaffairs-committee/windrush-children/oral/82003.html Q  61 et seq (3/05/2018). In July 2018 Esther McVey had to apologise to the House after the head of the National Audit Office wrote a public letter criticising her for inaccurate statements about the NAO’s report on universal credit (see para 12.28), Hansard Vol 644 col 321 (4/07/2018). Amber Rudd replaced Esther McVey as Work and Pensions Secretary in November 2018. 4 See HC Deb (19 March 1997) col 1046 and HL Deb (20 March 1997) col 1055. According to PAC, Ministers are under a duty to give an account and to be held to account HC 313 (1995–96). 5 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/579780/ Independent-Adviser-on-Ministers-Interests-2016.pdf. 1

GOVERNMENT PUBLICITY AND THE MEDIA AND PRESS 4.100  The use by the government of the media, social media, the operation of the press lobby and press and information officers takes us beyond our present brief, although it is a subject causing increasing concern. Like the former Conservative governments in the 1980s and 1990s the New Labour government was also accused of abusing the position of its use of press officers.1 The relationship between government and the media has also caused numerous controversies including the use by the government in 1988 of its powers to ban the broadcasting of certain subjects and information2 and the explosive relationship between the Director General of the BBC and the PM Press Secretary over the role of the BBC in the Gilligan Radio 4 report about ‘sexing up’ the broadcast of

Central government  443 intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD). These events centred on the death of David Kelly, a specialist on WMD in notorious circumstances, events that were investigated by Lord Hutton at the PM’s behest although the request was formally made by the Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs, aka the Lord Chancellor.3 ‘Spin’, it was claimed, had become a pre-occupation of government.4 Central to the promotion of spin it was alleged was the Prime Minister’s communications director, Alastair Campbell.5 Under the coalition government, the Prime Minister’s communications director Andy Coulson had to resign because of his former position as editor of the News of the World during a period when there had been extensive use of private investigators by the newspaper to obtain personal information that had been illegally hacked. Coulson claimed to know nothing about such usage. He was subsequently arrested in relation to these events. Coulson’s deputy editor at the paper had also taken up a position as a consultant for Scotland Yard at a time when the police vigorously refused to conduct inquiries into the hacking allegations. The Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Sir Paul Stephenson, subsequently resigned. This background led to the establishment of the Leveson inquiry which was examined in ch 2 (paras 2.249 et seq). See HC 770 (1997–98) and Government Reply HC 162 (1998–99). See Brind v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1991] 1 All ER 720, HL. 3 HC 247 (2003–04). See the Public Administration Committee HC 274 (2003–04). 4 T.Daintith ‘Spin: a Constitutional and Legal Analysis’ (2001) 7 European Public Law 593. 5 A Campbell The Alastair Campbell Diaries Vols 1, 2 and 3. 1 2

4.101  The BBC is not a spokesperson for the government. The BBC’s independence is guaranteed by the Charter (Cm 9365, 2017). Hutton’s report into the death of David Kelly was critical of editorial control at the BBC and led to the resignation of the Chair of the Board of Governors and the Chief Executive and to the reorganisation of the BBC. Following a government review leading to its most recent Charter, new governance and regulatory arrangements were put in place which established a single BBC Board and gave sole regulatory responsibility for the BBC to Ofcom. The new, unitary, BBC Board is led by a non-executive Chairman and consists of a majority of non-executive directors alongside executive directors including the BBC’s Director-General. The Board is responsible for ensuring the BBC fulfils its mission and public purposes as set out in the Charter and is accountable for all the BBC’s domestic and international activities.1 It does this by: • setting the strategic direction for the BBC; • establishing the creative remit; • setting the BBC’s Budget; and • determining the framework for assessing performance. The Director General chairs the Executive Committee which is responsible for the day-to-day running of the BBC and consists of the senior directors managing large operational areas of the BBC. The Executive Committee is responsible for delivering the BBC’s services in accordance with the strategy and delegation framework agreed by the Board, and for all aspects of operational management.2 Complaints should be made to the BBC first, although complaints about fairness

444  Chapter 4 and breaches of privacy may be made to Ofcom. The corporation may enter into framework agreements with the Secretary of State which are binding upon the BBC but which are subject to the terms of the Charter. In the event of conflict, the Charter prevails. The BBC exists to serve the public interest and to promote its five public purposes.3 Its licence fee is subject to periodical negotiation with the government and was last set in 2017. http://www.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/insidethebbc/managementstructure/bbcboard. http://www.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/insidethebbc/managementstructure/seniormanagement. 3 http://www.bbc.co.uk/corporate2/insidethebbc/whoweare/publicpurposes. 1 2

4.102  Cabinet Office Guidance on communications – Propriety Guidance – has been issued on a regular basis since 1989 and the present guidance dates from 2014.1 The revisions have been made in the light of the growth in the volume of government publicity, and are concerned with the conventions governing publicity and that the mechanisms for ensuring propriety should be observed, as well as value for money. Specific guidance is published before national, local or EU elections. In all cases Ministers should follow the advice on publicity in the Ministerial Code. Civil servants should follow the Civil Service Code remaining impartial and objective. The code sets out advice on ‘dos and don’ts’. Political advertising is governed by the Communications Act 2003 regulated by Ofcom and this sets out limits on information campaigns – they should not be partial or promote a government policy or directed towards a political end.2 Guidance is provided on seeking sponsorship. The conventions on government communications are set out in chapter 10 of the code. https://gcs.civilservice.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Government-CommunicationPropriety-Guidance-Feb-16-1.pdf. 2 https://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv-radio-and-on-demand/broadcast-codes/broadcast-code and https://www.asa.org.uk/codes-and-rulings/advertising-codes.html (12/02/2018). 1

4.103  Under ‘propriety’, the main conventions require that government publicity: (a) should be relevant to government responsibilities; (b) should be objective and explanatory, not tendentious or polemical; (c) should not be, or not be liable to misrepresentation as being, party political; and (d) should be conducted in an economic and relevant way, having regard to the need to be able to justify the costs as expenditure of public funds. Officials should speak on the record wherever possible and act professionally, avoiding party political content. Impartial and objective presentation should be aimed for. Advice is given on dealing with Ministers and announcing new policies. The guidance covers both paid and unpaid publicity. The former includes: advertising, software and filmed presentations, leaflets, use of the internet, and exhibitions in particular. New guidance on social media was published in 2014.1 Guidance is given on direct marketing, use of PR consultancies and legal and commercial sensitivity. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/social-media-guidance-for-civil-servants/socialmedia-guidance-for-civil-servants.

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Central government  445 4.104  The reviews have been undertaken during a period when government had become ‘one of the largest purchasers of paid publicity, and, as well as providing general information for the public, uses publicity to influence the social behaviour of individuals and the economic behaviour of individuals and businessmen’. Government publicity should be aimed at ‘informing the public’ even when seeking to influence behaviour and should not ‘image build’ the government or ministers. There is nothing new in government ‘spin’. 4.105  In cases of paid publicity those responsible for the proposal need to be able to respond persuasively to the following: (i) make sure that the topic is relevant to the government’s responsibilities; (ii) make sure that the resources used are proportional to the objectives, affordable and represent good value for money; (iii) make sure that the channels and media are targeted effectively to make best use of resources; (iv) ensure there are precise goals and precise targets; (v) set out clear success measures and ways in which they will be evaluated, especially where publicity aims to change the behaviour of individuals; (vi) check whether the publicity required can be achieved through existing channels (eg  Parliamentary announcement, ministerial speech, regular publication), or through partnerships with other departments or public and private bodies; (vii) encourage creativity to make the most of limited budgets; (viii) stick to facts and avoid political bias; (ix) make sure the communication is not used for party political purposes; (x) keep a record of the options considered for the campaign and the rationale for a decision taken; (xi) observe Parliamentary privilege, particularly when arranging publicity for White Papers or similar documents; (xii) remember that not all legislative proposals obtain Parliamentary approval. 4.106  In departmental arrangements involving heads of department, heads of information and departmental finance divisions there should be little need to refer to central departments, ie Cabinet Office and the Treasury. This must occur where central reference is mandatory (paid publicity in advance of legislative approval); where it is novel or contentious; where a minister, head of department or head of information wants a second opinion. 4.107  In the future, responsibility for provision of central advice on the conventions will be provided through the Cabinet Secretary’s Office for propriety questions, and in the relevant Treasury expenditure division for value for money issues. The division of subjects will be as follows:1

446  Chapter 4 Cabinet Office: relevance objectivity propriety non-polemical

Treasury: production/distribution in an economic way and a value for money justified use of public funds

non-party political Efficiency and Reform Group (ERG) advertising, marketing and communications expenditure controls (delegated by Treasury) The Chief Secretary of the Treasury acts as a point of reference at ministerial level and adjudicates on conflicting departmental approaches.

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4.108  In relation to public relations or similar consultancies, ‘could the work be carried out by the Government’s own employees? If not, can the appointment of a consultancy be justified as a cost-effective way of reaching the target audience and provide the best value for money? Does the use of a consultancy in this case comply with the rules of propriety? Is the task discrete and closely defined? Are the supervisory arrangements adequate to keep the consultancy to its brief?’. The list of criteria to be considered before considering the appointment of such consultancies, include thorough and clear arrangements for appointment.1 Government Propriety Guidance (para 4.102, note 1 above), ch 6.

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4.109  The Guidance covers use of direct marketing, which was being used increasingly to communicate with particular businesses and audiences, including use by the former Data Protection Commissioner (DPC), to reach small firms and for the AIDS campaign. Unsolicited distribution of material requiring, but which has not obtained, parliamentary approval will be considered improper. It must be appropriate, not over-intrusive, there should be suitable address lists available within guidelines laid down by the Information Commissioner and it should not coincide with another department approaching the same audience over that period. The Guidance offers advice on public relations and consultancies and it should be asked whether the in-house expertise could suffice. A substantial amount of public funds are spent on publicity campaigns every year. It is essential that the cost of this paid publicity can be justified (p 13). Special care should be taken on subjects concerning commercial and legal sensitivity, market sensitivity, criminal matters, court reporting restrictions, contempt of court, civil litigation and judicial review proceedings. The legislative context including freedom of information, data protection, disability, copyright and the use of the Welsh language. 4.110  Government publicity over the former community charge was challenged as unlawful in May 1989 because of allegedly serious inaccuracies. The Divisional Court ruled that it only had limited powers of intervention, viz

Central government  447 where publicity or guidance mistook the law or was manifestly inaccurate or misleading. Such an ‘exceptional power’ of review should not be exercised in a grey area between what was, and was not, acceptable.1 R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p Greenwich London Borough Council (1989) Times, 17 May. See also Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1985] 3 All ER 402, HL. NB HL  105 (2010–11) Merits Committee On The Local Authority Code Of Practice On Publicity and HC  834 (2010–11) Proposed Code Of Recommended Practice On Local Authority Publicity, A Government Reply. See PSC Ltd v Secretary of State for Local Government etc [2017] EWHC 1502 (Admin).

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4.111  It should be noted that the use of publicity here is controlled by conventions and guidelines, whereas for the case of local government it has been regulated by legislation (see ch  6). The sixth Report from the Committee on Standards in Public Life, chaired originally by Lord Nolan and subsequently by Lord Neill QC, reported on the use by government of political advisers and the subject has featured extensively in more recent reports (para 4.113 below).1 Cm 4557, vols I and II (2000).

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4.112  Although the methods of communication continually develop and change, including use of all forms of information communications, and government disseminates increasing amounts of information, the basic conventions remain. Civil Service Information Officers are at all times bound by the provisions of the Civil Service Code. Paragraph  1 requires civil servants ‘with integrity, honesty, impartiality and objectivity, to assist the duly constituted government of whatever political complexion …’. The Code and servants’ activities under the Code, are to be seen in the context of the duties and responsibilities of Ministers as set out in the Ministerial Code so they must not be asked to act contrary to the Code or in a way which would compromise their political objectivity. ‘Heads of Information must be able to ensure Heads of Departments that working arrangements preserve proper professional distance between Information Officers and Ministers. Civil servants must conduct themselves with integrity, impartiality and honesty … they should not knowingly mislead Ministers, Parliament or the public and they must endeavour to ensure the proper, effective and efficient use of public money. They should conduct themselves to ensure that confidence in their work can be given by Ministers and future Ministers.’ Particular advice is spelt out for Departmental Press Officers on avoidance of abuse of publicity for party political or ‘image building’ objectives. 4.113  The use of specialist advisers by government has been investigated by the Commons Public Administration Committee.1 A code of conduct exists for special advisers and was revised in 2016.2 The Ministerial Code at paragraph 3.2 lays down broad limits on the number of special advisers that a minister may appoint. There is advice on the ‘Model Contract for Special Advisers’ (2016). The conventions basically state that such consultants should not be used where employees are able to do the work which it would not be improper for a civil servant to perform. The last annex covers ‘Government Use of Direct Marketing’. Guidance is also provided to civil servants on ‘Contacts with Lobbyists’. The Neill Committee on Standards in Public Life reported on lobbying in January

448  Chapter 4 2000 (Cm 4557, vol 1, ch 7). The public administration has reported on lobbying PASC lobbying and influence in Whitehall (HC  36  I  (2008–09)). The same committee was to launch an inquiry into vetting procedures for special advisers to avoid conflicts of interest after it was disclosed that David Cameron’s press secretary, Andy Coulson (para 4.100 above) was paid by News International while employed by the Conservative Party. The Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014 established a register and a Registrar of consultant lobbyists and made consultant lobbying an offence without prior registration. http://www.civilservant.org.uk/spadscode2009.pdf. B  Yong and R  Hazell Special Advisers: Who They Are, What They Do, and Why They Matter (2014). 2 HC  727 (1999–00) and HC  610 (2010–11) on Central Government Use of Advisers. See Special Advisers in the thick of it HC 655 (2012–13). 1

4.114  Government communications formed the subject of an investigation by the Commons Public Administration Committee (HC 303 (2002–03); HC 274 (2003–04)) and the response of the government was the establishment of an enquiry into Government Communications by the Phillis Review (Cabinet Office, 2004); there was an interim review in August 2003. Phillis recommended a ‘sustained commitment to a long-term programme of radical change in the conduct, process and style of government communications’ (p  2). The review believed that government communications should be based on the following principles: openness not secrecy; more direct, unmediated communications to the public; genuine engagement with the public as part of policy formulation and delivery, not communication as an afterthought; positive presentation of government policies, not misleading spin; use of all relevant channels of communication, not excessive use of national press and broadcasters; coordinated communication of issues that cut across departments, not conflicting or duplicated departmental messages; reinforcement of the civil services political neutrality, rather than a blurring of government and party communications. The CRGA 2010 places the civil service on a statutory basis as well as establishing a statutory Civil Service Commission and Code. 4.115  Phillis recommended a new Permanent Secretary for Government Communications who would provide a strategic leadership for communications across government, building a ‘new and authoritative communications service within government’. There has been a permanent secretary for government communication since 2004 and the position was reappointed in 2009. The Prime Minister’s Official Spokesperson will report to and will work alongside the Prime Minister’s Director of Communications. There should be a strong and integrated departmental communications structure. The Government Information and Communications Service should be disbanded, with greater emphasis on regional communications. There would be new rules on special advisers and new rules would also spell out the boundaries between civil servants and special advisers. There should be clearer rules on releasing statistical information. All major government briefings should be on the record, live on TV and radio with full transcripts available promptly online. Ministers should deliver departmental statements at the daily lobby. The existing lobby was no longer

Central government  449 working effectively. There should be customer-driven online communications. The relationship between politicians and the media needed to be reappraised. The government gave fairly enthusiastic support to these recommendations. In ch 2 (paras 2.249 et seq) we noted the Leveson inquiry into the press and how the second inquiry was cancelled in early 2018. 4.116  Government information policy is led by the National Archives. National Archives is responsible for making public sector information available through print and online services. Gov.uk is the government website (para  4.33 above) and the use of the Number 10 website was outlined above. The Government Communications Service is a network of communications specialists working across government in the UK and it provides best practice framework for communicators. The Service supports central government and regional offices communications to the public through the press and publicity.1 The Government Knowledge and Information Management Profession is the team that supports the delivery of the knowledge and information management strategy for government.2 https://www.gov.uk/government/announcements (3/05/2018). https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/civil-service-government-knowledgeinformation-management-profession/about (3/05/2018).

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4.117  The House of Lords Communications Committee reported on government communications in 2009 and recommended that special advisers should follow guidance set out on their practice in the Model Contract for Special Advisers and the Code of Conduct for Special Advisers, more open press conferences and tours of duty by ‘high flying civil servants in government press and communications’ offices. This report, Government Communications (HL 7 (2008–09)), sets out a number of recommendations: • When there is sensitive information, the Government should commit to return to Parliament at the earliest opportunity to give an account of developments. • The Prime Minister should draw all Ministers’ attention to the guidance in the Ministerial Code that the most important announcements of Government policy should be made in the first instance to Parliament. • Further, new information should always be provided on a fair and equal basis to all interested journalists. • The morning briefing to journalists should appear live on the Number 10 website. • The Leader of the House of Commons should reinstate a weekly briefing on parliamentary business. • All major press conferences should be live on the internet. • It is important that Ministers make clear that special advisers must follow the guidance available and stay within set limits. • That where possible, high-flying civil servants should spend a period of service in the departmental press office. • The Chief Executive of the Central Office of Information should take the lead in improving standards, with training and guidance to regional press officers, tailoring regional press releases, having greater contact with the

450  Chapter 4 regional media and making more senior officials and Ministers available for interview on the local impact of policies. • The Committee states that Government information should always be available and accessible to as many people as possible and that the Cabinet Office should collate annual statistics on the costs of Government communications across departments. The government response is available online.1 https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-archive/communications/ (14/05/2018).

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ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS 4.118  Although referendums are the direct voice of the people, that voice will be influenced by government as well as others. The Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 as well as establishing the Electoral Commission to oversee wide-ranging regulation of the party political and electioneering process places restrictions on government, and local government, influence on referendums (see Part VII) and places limits on expenses. In addition, ss 139–140 provide for the disclosure of political donations by companies and for shareholder approval. These provisions amended the Companies Act 1985, Part XA and Sch 7, Part I (now Companies Act 2006). Further reforms were made under the Political Parties and Elections Act 2009. Free time is made available for political parties for party political broadcasts and election broadcasts covering both the BBC (under charter) and the independent sector (Communications Act 2003, s  333). ‘Time’ emerges after consultations between the parties and the broadcasters. Communications Act 2003, s 319 imposes a duty on OFCOM to ensure the accuracy and impartiality of news programmes and the impartiality of political programmes. The BBC is bound by its Charter in relation to fairness and impartiality. Political advertising is otherwise banned for commercial broadcasters (Communications Act 2003, ss 319–322). The OFCOM code deals with participation of candidates in Parliamentary or local elections and the BBC Trust agrees a new code before each election. The Electoral Commission has made recommendations for increasing transparency in elections in the digital age.1 See para 1.2, note 7 above.

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SELECT COMMITTEES 4.119  Once again, a comprehensive survey of this topic is not possible,1 but the use and publication by parliamentary select committees of otherwise unpublished information, and their role as siphons in informing Parliament and the public, must be addressed. A report of the Liaison Committee in 2000 recommended changes in the manner of appointment to Select Committees (then chiefly by Whips) and a change to the title of the Committee to the Select Committee Panel. It also listed examples of best practice where Select Committees

Central government  451 had engaged in innovative techniques.2 Select Committees were advised to concentrate on a limited number of topics for inquiry or core tasks.3 A Select Committee on Selection was established and it allocates chairs and members to committees based on the proportion of party membership of the House. The Liaison Committee noted the patchy quality of many government responses to Select Committee reports. In addition to select committees there are committees for bills and grand committees. In the First Report of the House of Commons Select Committee on Reform of the House of Commons (HC 1117 (2008–09) the committee recommended that select committee chairs should be appointed by secret ballot among MPs and not by patronage. Chairs are elected by Parliament. The committee also recommended that a failure by a committee member to attend 60 per cent or more of meetings would lead to their removal. The Commons agreed to accept these recommendations and to change its standing orders. Liaison committee reports have identified the positive contribution of select committees to accountability and scrutiny of the executive.4

See Liaison Committee: Select Committees and the Executive HC 300 (1999/2000) and Government Response (Cm 4737) and HC  321 (2000–01). See also The Challenge for Parliament: Making Scrutiny Work Hansard Society (2001) and Modernisation Committee Select Committees HC 224 (2001–02) and House of Commons Factsheet P2 Departmental Select Committees August 2010 www.parliament.uk. See also Select Committees House of Commons (2011) http://www.parliament. uk/documents/commons-information-office/brief-guides/select-committees.pdf (12/03/2018). 2 See Liaison Committee: Select Committees and the Executive HC 300 (1999/2000), para 24. 3 HC 692 (2001–02). 4 HC 697 (2012–13) Vols I & II Select Committee Effectiveness, Resources and Powers. 1

4.120  The most visible of the select committees, apart from the Public Accounts Committee, are the departmentally-related committees (there are usually 19–20 and currently include the select committee on exiting the EU), which were reformed in 1979, but all together there are over 30 select committees (including ‘domestic’ committees and various joint (with House of Lords) committees including the human rights and equality committee and statutory instruments committee). It would be a serious mistake to overlook the importance of other committees such as the Commons Select Committee on Public Administration and the Constitution which emerged from the Select Committee on the Parliamentary Commissioner and then from the Select Committee on Public Service or the Select Committee on the European Union in the House of Lords which has six sub-committees. Other Lords committees include the Constitution Committee, the Economic Affairs Committee, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee and the Science and Technology Committee – there is also a Science and Technology Committee in the Commons. Special legislative committees may be established to deal with specific bills in both Houses. 4.121  The Intelligence and Security Committee operates under specific statutory provisions and reports to the PM. Suggestions for changes to enhance the oversight role of the ISC are set out in Justice and Security Cm 8194 (2010); see para 11.81 below. The Justice and Security Act 2013 enacted these reforms naming the committee ‘Independent’ and establishing it as a committee of Parliament. Its remit over operational activities has been increased.

452  Chapter 4 Departmental select committees investigate and overview the policy, administration and expenditure of government departments and their related or ‘associated’ bodies, ie for which a minister must ultimately answer. A resolution is usually passed under Standing Order to allow the public and press to attend their meetings and hear its evidence. When deliberating, however, the invariable practice is for the press and public (‘strangers’) to be excluded, but this does not cover appropriate officers of the House or specialist advisers who may assist committees. MPs who are not members of the committee can only be excluded from any stage of a committee’s proceedings by resolution of the House. Such an MP cannot, however, take a part in the proceedings, eg address the committee or put questions to witnesses.1 Secret committees have, however, existed in the past on the order of the House.2 An MP who is being examined has no right to be present during the deliberations upon his answers by the committee. 2 Erskine May (21st edn) at 701. See now Erskine May (24th edn, 2011), Part 6 on ‘Select Committees’. 1

4.122  Select committees are given power by the House to send for persons, papers and records. However, there have been refusals to attend from several Ministers1 and an MP2 although the latter relented. The Joint Committee on Human Rights has reported on repeated refusals by Ministers to give oral evidence on British government complicity in torture of terrorist suspects.3 Where an MP refuses to attend, only a motion of the House can ultimately compel his/ her attendance. For a non-MP the committee can issue a summons: it has done so with a trade union member;4 a permanent secretary of the former DES5 before the Public Accounts Committee; and the Trade and Industry Committee has ‘pressurised’ heads of big oil companies to attend and give evidence. The Maxwell brothers famously stonewalled the committee in their questioning by the committee on the Mirror Group pension scandal and in 2011 Rupert Murdoch, Rebekah Brooks and others agreed to appear before the Culture, Media and Sports Committee to answer questions in relation to the ‘phone hacking’ scandal. The Culture, Media and Sport Committee was on the point of issuing a summons to appear to Mark Zuckerberg following the Cambridge Analytica scandal in 2018. In November 2018, the Committee invoked ancient subpoena powers of Parliament to seize documents in the possession of an American citizen in London. These documents were obtained in US litigation using US discovery powers. The litigation involved an action against Facebook in the USA.6 The most difficult of cases in practical terms concern civil servants. Ministers have insisted that they have the right to embargo such appearances. 3 4

Including Mrs Thatcher as Prime Minister. Edwina Currie in the ‘salmonella in eggs’ saga. HL 152 and HC 230 (2008–09). Arthur Scargill, former NUM president. There has been some fairly contumacious treatment of Select Committees by ‘lay’ witnesses and even by civil servants. On a refusal by a witness (a journalist, Andrew Gilligan) to reveal a source, see HC 1044 (2002–03). 5 Sir David Andrew (1989) Guardian, 5  January. Former Ministers are making increasing appearances before committees. 6 See https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/nov/24/mps-seize-cache-facebookinternal-papers (28/11/2018). 1 2

Central government  453 4.123  A  memorandum of guidance for officials appearing before select committees was produced by the Civil Service Department in 1980, and it was revised most recently in 2014 by the Cabinet Office.1 It is described as a ‘government document’ without any formal parliamentary standing or approval. This provides guidance to officials giving evidence before, or preparing memoranda for submission to, select committees. This is ‘generally applicable’ to House of Lords select committees. Because the Public Accounts Committee has the power to question the Accounting Officer2 of departments and bodies subject to its inquiries, and because of the investigatory powers of the Comptroller and Auditor-General, the guidelines are not ‘literally applicable’ to the Public Accounts Committee. Guidance for civil servants when dealing with the joint and select committees on statutory instruments is provided in Statutory Instrument Practice. The Cabinet Office has issued separate guidance for the appearance before the then Commons Select Committee on European Legislation (now European Scrutiny) and on the handling of EC documents.3 The House of Lords also has select committees including, notably, that on the European Union and its sub committees, the Constitution and Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform. Osmotherly rules: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/364600/Osmotherly_Rules_October_2014.pdf (3/05/2018). Giving Evidence to Select Committees – Guidance for Civil Servants (Cabinet Office, 2005 and 2009 and 2014). 2016 Guide for witnesses to select committees: http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/ witnessguide.pdf (3/05/2018). 2 Usually the Permanent Secretary. It rarely questions a minister (see ch 12 below). 3 See C Kerse (2000) European Public Law 81. See also: House of Lords Select Committee on the EU, Fourth Report (2000–01). 1

4.124  Of appreciable constitutional significance was the innovation of the Liaison Committee in 2002 to take evidence from the Prime Minister. This is usually done three times a year, increasing from twice a year. This was the first appearance of the Prime Minister qua head of government to answer questions qua head of government although in 1927 a prime Minister had appeared before a select committee.1 See HC 1095 (2002–03) and Cm 5628 and HC 318 (2004–05). See https://www.parliament.uk/ business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/liaison-committee/prime-minister-evsessions/ (3/05/2018).

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Committees and civil servants 4.125  Committees should not usually enforce their rights for information from the executive at a level below that of ministerial head of the department concerned. Although earlier guidance on appearances of witnesses before select committee stated that ‘Select Committees are free to seek evidence from whomsoever they please, and are entitled to require the production of papers by private bodies or individuals so long as they are relevant to the Committee’s work’, civil servants in fact operate under ministerial instructions.1 They may be called upon to give a full account of government policies, but their purpose in

454  Chapter 4 doing so is to assist the process of ministerial accountability ‘not to offer personal views or judgements on matters of government policy’ thereby undermining impartiality.2 Gen Notice 80/38. Osmotherly Guidance (para 4.123, note 1 above), para 5.

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4.126  For civil servants, ministers decide which officials should appear to give evidence. S/he may suggest an alternative official or her/himself,1 but if a committee insists on the presence of a named official, s/he must attend, subject to the ‘ministerial instructions’ as to how s/he should answer questions. Select Committees should not act as disciplinary tribunals so a Minister is likely to consider ‘carefully’ a request to take evidence from a named official which is likely to expose the official to questioning about personal responsibility or allocation of blame between them and others. The questioning of David Kelly, the expert on weapons of mass destruction, by the Foreign Affairs Committee in July 2003 was widely criticised for appearing to act in contravention of this convention(HC 247 (2003–04), ch 4).2 Especially sensitive are situations where disciplinary proceedings or internal departmental inquiries have been pursued or may be pursued. A  Cabinet Secretary, Sir Robert Armstrong, has appeared instead of specific civil servants requested initially by a Select Committee: HC 519 (1985–86) lxv–lxviii. 2 See Osmotherly Guidance (para 4.123, note 1 above), para 38 on support for witnesses. 1

4.127  Agency Chief Executives give evidence on behalf of the Minister on matters within their Framework Documents setting out their managerial authority. Members of non-departmental bodies that are free of ministerial control are unlikely to be under such constraint.1 It is not usually appropriate to call retired officials who lack up to date information and who cannot be said to represent the Minister and ‘hence cannot contribute directly to his accountability to the House’.2 Sir Richard Scott was critical of the refusal to allow former officials to testify to the Treasury and Industry Committee in its inquiries related to the Iraqi supergun affair: ‘[The civil servants] were primary witnesses to the facts … Far from being unproductive, their evidence would have been highly pertinent and helpful. A  Minister’s duty to account to Parliament for what his department has done ought … to be recognised as extending … to an obligation to assist an investigating Select Committee to obtain the best first hand evidence available on the matters being investigated. The refusal to facilitate the giving of evidence … may be regarded as a failure to comply fully with the obligations of accountability owed to Parliament.’3 HC 210, 447 and 1055 (2003-04). Osmotherly Guidance (para 4.123, note 1 above), para 15. 3 Scott (above), para F4.66. 1 2

4.128  Officials should be as helpful as possible to committees in providing information within the terms of the FOIA 2000 (para 9). Holding information back should only be on grounds that are necessary in the public interest as

Central government  455 set out in law. They should ensure the accuracy of their evidence and not be drawn into the discussion of merits of alternative policies sticking to facts and explanations of policies. Specialist officials should be very cautious in discussing technical or professional matters underlying government policy. Memoranda or appearances should be adequate. Evidence may be given in confidence and is then protected by Parliamentary privilege. Agreement has been reached with the Liaison Committee on how to treat classified information. Special provision is made about Parliamentary Ombudsman and Comptroller and Auditor General investigations and evidence seen. Views of Ministers should be sought if there is a question of withholding information. Inter-departmental liaison may have to take place where more than one department is involved and a ‘lead’ department established to co-ordinate responses – usually the department which is ‘shadowed’ by the Committee in question. If necessary, the Cabinet Office may on rare occasions provide this role. If additional research is required, the department may wish to remind committees of their power to contract specialist advisers or researchers. Suitable advance notice of ministerial statements should be given to committees on matters within their remit. 4.129  Reasons for not providing information as well as those spelt out in the FOIA 2000 include matters sub judice, information covering the behaviour of individual officers ‘with the implication of allocating individual criticism or blame’ (paras 35–37). The Minister should conduct an internal enquiry into such events and report to the Committee on the outcome, either personally or through a senior official, not the officials involved. Where committees need such information to discharge their duties they should take evidence in closed session. This will be on a clear understanding of confidentiality along with other safeguards, ie  waiting until disciplinary proceedings are completed and in a manner which protects identity where not publicly known. After any proceedings, the Committee will be informed what has been done to correct any shortcomings. Well established conventions cover the use of policy papers of a previous administration of a different political complexion.1 Officials cannot show documents to Committees that they could not show to their Ministers. Guidance is issued on the handling of evidence so that where oral evidence is given in closed session, departments should not disclose the evidence before it has been published, after appropriate ‘sidelining’ or redaction.2 Special provisions apply for the receipt of ‘confidential’ information. Publication without authorisation before report to Parliament is a contempt of Parliament. In more recent years the Committee of Privileges has decided not to punish journalists for publishing leaked documents;3 witnesses and departments are asked to identify which parts of evidence given in closed session should be sidelined and as this may face challenge before the committee. Officials should be prepared to defend requests by reference to statutory exemptions but not giving detailed citations or ‘protective marking systems’ (see below). Instructions also exist in relation to classified information. Guidance is also given in relation to non-departmental public bodies and evidence from commercial parties particularly government contractors. Steps should be taken to achieve transparency but also to protect commercial confidentiality and sensitive third party and private information handled by contractors. Government contracts very often specify the contractor’s

456  Chapter 4 obligation to provide information to the public and to protect confidential and sensitive information. Contractors, like non-departmental public bodies may need advice on answering questions. In advice given to businesses some years ago, business was more or less told to treat all information as if it were classified.4 Advice is also given on Government Responses to Select Committee Reports. HC Official Report (6th series) 24 January 1980, cols 305–7. A committee may only release ‘top security’ information on ministerial authorisation alone. On Official Secrets and Parliamentary Privilege, see paras 4.273 et seq below. 3 HC 476 (1989–90). See HC 1055 (2003–04) on protection of witnesses before select committees. 4 Protecting Business Information: Keeping it Confidential and Understanding the Risks (DTI, 1996). 1 2

4.130  In October 2004, the Liaison Committee of the House of Commons questioned the Minister about a proposed revised draft of the Guidance on Departmental Evidence and Response to Select Committees. In his evidence, the Minister stated:1 ‘In fact Select Committee activity has increased vastly since we came into office in 1997, with 350 substantive reports from the Departmental Select Committees alone last session. Ministerial appearances before Select Committees are running at over 200 a year and appearances by civil servants are many more than that. … We have made a number of positive and very significant changes in response: namely, making clear the presumption that Committees’ requests on attendance of civil servant witnesses, including Special Advisers, will be agreed to; making clear the presumption that the provision of information will be agreed to, including the presumption of cooperation on joined-up inquiries, including a new paragraph on parliamentary privilege in relation to evidence from civil servants and non-departmental public body staff, and encouraging departments to be proactive in providing relevant information and documents to Committees. So I see this as an opportunity for reform, but if you have any further issues or suggest amendments to the initial stab at this, then we would be very pleased to look at them in a constructive way.’ Liaison Committee HC 1180(i) (2003–04) and see Committee on Privileges Sixth Report (2003–04).

1

4.131  Reference has been made elsewhere to the reports on inquiries conducted by Lord Hutton and Lord Butler into events surrounding the use of intelligence on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq to persuade Parliament of the need for invasion, and the Chilcot inquiry into the war against Iraq. These inquiries were notable for the access to intelligence material and in the case of Hutton for the application of the public interest test under FOIA to determine what evidence should be made public (see para  1.7 above) although some medical and other evidence was embargoed (para 1.7).

PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSIONER FOR ADMINISTRATION – PARLIAMENTARY OMBUDSMAN 4.132  The above guidelines apply to the select committee on the Parliamentary Ombudsman (PO) and officials’ appearances before that committee – now the

Central government  457 select committee on the Constitution and Public Administration. However, the powers that the PO has to inquire and receive information must be explained.1 A  Cabinet Office report has made a series of outline recommendations to modernise the ombudsman regime by establishing an Ombudsmen Commission comprising public sector ombudsmen.2 We revisit these recommendations and draft legislation in ch  10 (para  10.71). In Scotland, a Scottish Public Services Ombudsman has been established since 2002 (when the Parliamentary Ombudsman ceased acting as Scottish Parliamentary Commissioner). This is an integrated organisation examining complaints against Scottish government departments, local councils, housing associations, the NHS in Scotland and other public bodies. The Public Services Ombudsman (Wales) Act 2005 effected a similar development for public sector ombudsmen in Wales. In Northern Ireland there is a unified NI ombudsman service. The Public Administration Committee has conducted several investigations into the work of the Ombudsman3 and this role is now undertaken by the Constitution and Public Administration committee. On the PCA and a ‘right’ to official advice/information, see Mowbray in (1990) Public Law 68. P  Collcutt and M  Hourihan Review of the Public Sector Ombudsman in England Cabinet Office April 2000; Select Committee on Public Administration HC 612 (1999–00). T Buck, R Kirkham and B Thompson The Ombudsman Enterprise and Administrative Justice (2011). 3 HC 448 (2002–03), HC 506 (2002–03) Government Reply Cm 5890, and HC 41 (2003–04), and reports on Equitable Life Justice Denied HC 41 I & II (2008–09) and HC 219 Parliament and the Ombudsmen HC 107 (2009–10) and Work of the Ombudsmen HC (2010–12). 1 2

4.133  The PO was appointed by the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967 (PCA  1967), as amended (especially by the Parliamentary and Health Service Commissioners Act 1987 (PHSCA  1987)).1 The Regulatory Reform (Collaboration etc. between Ombudsmen) Order 2007, SI 2007/1889 facilitated collaboration in investigations by the Parliamentary, Health Services and local ombudsmen and the transfer of information between them. The PO investigates complaints handed to him by an MP, with the consent of the person who made it, requesting the PO to conduct an investigation thereon. The complaint has to be made in writing to an MP by a ‘member of the public claiming to have sustained injustice in consequence of maladministration in connection with the actions so taken’.2 The PO may investigate the action of any, or on behalf of any, body listed in Sch 2 to the PCA 1967, being action taken in the exercise of administrative functions of the body. The scheduled bodies were significantly extended in 1987 and the schedule is subject to continuing amendment so that in 1998/99, for instance, a further 150 bodies were added to his jurisdiction. Executive agencies have been included since their inception.3 A full list of amendments is available at https://www.ombudsman.org.uk/about-us/who-we-are/ legislation/legislation-parliamentary-ombudsman. 2 PCA  1967, s  5(1)(a) and (b). On ‘maladministration’ see M.Seneviratne Ombudsmen: Public Services and Administrative Justice (2002). The Parliamentary Ombudsman has added items to the list: HC 112 (1993–94), para 7. 3 A  list of bodies subject to investigation is available at https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ ukpga/1967/13/schedule/2 (2/3/2018). 1

4.134  PCA  1967, Sch  3 lists the items not subject to complaint1 and s  5 also stipulates that the Commissioner shall not conduct an investigation

458  Chapter 4 where the person aggrieved has a right of appeal, reference or review to or before a tribunal constituted by or under any enactment or HM prerogative, or a remedy before a court of law. The PCA has a discretion to investigate notwithstanding such a right ‘if satisfied that in the particular circumstances it is not reasonable to expect the complainant to resort to it’.2 Nevertheless, the courts have ruled that a statutory ombudsman is subject to judicial review, and the PCA has himself been successfully reviewed in the courts.3 The spectre of judicial review is taking an increasing profile in the work of the Ombudsmen generally (see para 10.47) and the courts have seen the benefits of ombudsmen investigations. There were eight applications for judicial review of the Parliamentary and Health Service ombudsman in 2016–17. The ombudsman has also received 691 FOIA and DPA requests (Annual Report 2016–17, p 17). Courts have also been very critical of government responses to PO reports. In relation to the Parliamentary Ombudsman the Equitable Life saga led to a re-investigation of the complaint by the Ombudsman after a judicial review of her initial decision not to investigate the case. The PCA is given complete discretion, subject to the above, to determine whether to initiate, continue or discontinue an investigation.4 Foreign affairs, action taken outside the UK (except by consular officers), action relating to territory overseas, extradition and fugitive offenders, investigation of crime, state security (incl passports), legal proceedings, certain prerogative powers, personnel matters in the civil service, and contractual and commercial transactions. 2 The local government ombudsman who operated under many similar features to the PO has been given strict guidance by the courts as to when he should not investigate when a court is more appropriate: R v Comr for Local Administration, ex p Croydon London Borough Council [1989] 1 All ER 1033. In R v Local Comr for Administration, ex p Liverpool City Council [1999] 3 All ER 85 the High Court interpreted the powers of the local ombudsman benevolently. The defendants claimed there was a remedy by judicial review but that process would not have uncovered the information that the complainants to the Commissioner required to sustain a successful challenge. The Commissioner’s decision to proceed and also her decision to apply a more relaxed test of ‘bias’ in a planning decision were lawful, a decision upheld by the Court of Appeal: [2001] 1 All ER 462. See also the discussion in para 10.7 below, but note R (Bradley) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2008] EWCA Civ 36. See R Kirkham et al (2008) Public Law 510. R (EMAG) v HM Treasury [2009] EWHC 2495 (Admin). 3 R v PCA, ex p Balchin [1997] JPL 917 and R v PCA ex p Balchin (No 2) (2000) 2 LGLR 87. 4 Re Fletcher’s Application [1970] 2 All ER 527, CA (refusal to investigate). His selection of matters to investigate is unlikely to be reviewed by the courts and he has no power to re-open an investigation once his report had been sent to the MP without a new referral: R v PCA, ex p Dyer [1994] 1 All ER 375. See R (Murray) v PCA [2002] EWCA Civ 1472 on an MP’s refusal to refer a case – not challengeable by judicial review. 1

4.135  Any individual, natural or corporate, may make a complaint except local authorities or public authorities or nationalised industries and ‘any other authority or body whose members are appointed by Her Majesty or any minister of the Crown or government department, or whose revenues consist wholly or mainly of moneys provided by Parliament’.1 Other formalities include the fact that the complaint must be made to the MP (any MP)2 not later than 12 months from the day on which the person aggrieved first had notice of the matters alleged in the complaint although the PO has a discretion to waive such a requirement as to time ‘if he considers that there are special circumstances which make it proper to do so’.3

Central government  459 PCA 1967, s 6(1)(a) and (b). Not a member of the House of Lords. The Committee on Public Administration has recommended for more than a decade that this ‘filter’ should be removed: HC 612 (1999–00), para 12. 3 Eg residence or death. 1 2

4.136  The PO will attempt resolution through intervention without the need for a full investigation. Under PCA 1967, s 7, where the PO proposes to conduct an investigation, s/he must provide an opportunity, to the Principal Officer of the department concerned and any other person alleged in the complaint to have taken or authorised the action complained of, to comment on any allegations contained in the complaint.1 Investigations are conducted in private according to what the PCA thinks appropriate in the specific circumstances; s/he ‘may obtain information from such persons and in such manner, and make such inquiries, as s/he thinks fit’. S/he may determine whether any person may be represented, by counsel or solicitor or otherwise, in the investigation.2 Expenses and compensation for lost time may be made. The PO has sought to resolve an increasing number of disputes informally rather than conduct a formal investigation. There are three stages in the complaints process: stage 1 involves an initial check; stage 2 is an assessment; and stage 3 is an investigation. For government departments there were 6,909 complaints in 2016–17 and 1,451 went to assessment. Overall for central government and NHS bodies, 36 per cent of complaints were upheld. Complaints have increased 31 per cent overall since 2011. Four departments dominate the number of complaints received: Work and Pensions, HMRC, Home Office and Ministry of Justice. In 1997–98 it was 376. 1208 complaints were made about the ombudsman – both the PO and Health ombudsman. The largest proportion of upheld complaints against investigated bodies related to delays. In 2009–10, 65 per cent of complaints were dealt with within 12 months. The number of complaints taking more than 12 months to complete fell from 136 in 2015–16 to 104 in 2016–17. In 2016, the ombudsman launched their Service Charter. The 2016–17 annual report has details on performance targets and customer feedback. There are details on the demographic profile of those who use the service. A  five-year strategy was launched in 2013 on improving performance and a new corporate strategy was introduced in 2017–18.3 PCA 1967, s 7(1). Ibid, s 7(2). 3 The Ombudsman’s Annual Report and Accounts HC 207 (2016–17). 1 2

4.137  The PO may require, for the purposes of an investigation, any minister, officer or members of the department or authority concerned or any other person who in the PCA’s opinion is able to furnish information or produce documents relevant to the investigation to furnish any such information or produce any such document.1 The PO is given the same power as the High Court, Court of Session and High Court NI to demand attendance and examine witnesses and for production of documents.2 Evidence may be taken on oath although this practice, if it happened at all, occurred with the Health Service Commissioner (HSC)

460  Chapter 4 rather than the PO. The Official Secrets Acts do not apply to prevent access to information by the PO and the Crown cannot rely upon public interest immunity (see ch 11 below) to prevent disclosure of documents.3 The list of subject areas that the PO cannot investigate should be kept in mind. However, no person may be required or authorised to furnish any information or answer any question relating to proceedings of the Cabinet or of any committee of the Cabinet or to produce so much of any document as relates to such proceedings. A certificate issued by the Cabinet Secretary with the Prime Minister’s approval certifying that any information, question, document or part of a document so related shall be conclusive.4 In the past the drafts of papers to be submitted to a meeting of a Cabinet committee were not certified as excluded. The certificate was limited to documents covering the actual transactions of the Cabinet Committee.5 3 4 5 1 2

PCA 1967, s 8(1). PCA 1967, s 8(2). PCA 1967, s 8(3). PCA 1967, s 8(4). HC 498 (1974–75).

4.138  Whereas the Crown cannot rely upon public interest immunity, an individual shall not be compelled to give any evidence or produce any document which he could not be compelled to give or produce in proceedings before the Court, ie  where documents in their possession are privileged, eg  they contain legal advice, they remain immune.1 PCA 1967, s 8(5).

1

4.139  Obstruction of the PO or his officers in their functions without lawful excuse, or being guilty of any act or omission which before a court would constitute a contempt, may lead the PO to certify the offence for the court to deal with and punish as if committed before the court.1 It would appear that the file generated by the PO investigation is not covered by these provisions.2 PCA 1967, s 9, although s 7(4) above concerning Cabinet documents is not overridden. By analogy with the position of the Comptroller and Auditor General: see ch 12.

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4.140  Section 10 concerns reports. The PO sends the report of an investigation, or the reasons for not investigating, to the sponsoring MP.1 A  copy is not sent to the complainant by the PO. The PO also sends a copy of the report of results of an investigation to the Principal Officer (PrO) of the department or authority concerned, and to any other person who is alleged in the relevant complaint to have taken or authorised the action complained of. In fact, reports are sent in draft to the PO for comments. There may be significant differences between the draft versions and the final version. The complainant has no right to see a copy of the draft report which is sent to the PrO.2 Where the PO finds maladministration which remains unremedied, the PO may, if s/he thinks fit, lay before each House of Parliament a special report upon the case (s 10(3)).3 The PO lays before Parliament, and publishes, an annual report by the PO, and four quarterly select investigations’ reports are published. The PO has published several detailed investigation reports, a practice which has increased and he has also published detailed reports of investigations into the Child Support Agency

Central government  461 (s 10(4)).4 Reports from recent years include A Breach of Confidence concerning a variety of departments (HC 709 (2010–11)) and an Assessment of the Loss of Personal Data by a Home Office Contractor (HC 448 (2009–10)), Equitable Life: A Decade of Regulatory Failure (HC 815 (2007–08 Parts 1–5)), Trusting in the Pensions Promise (HC 984 (2005–06)) and a Debt of Honour the ex gratia scheme for British Groups Interned by the Japanese in the Second World War (HC 324 (2005–06)).5 All reports are protected by absolute privilege by virtue of s 10(5). Or, if no longer an MP, to an appropriate one. When Parliament is dissolved no MPs are in existence to take a complaint. 2 R v PCA, ex p Dyer [1994] 1 All ER 375. 3 Eg HC 666 (1977–78); and, for the report into the failure by the Department of Transport to remedy findings of maladministration in relation to delays in choosing a route for the Channel tunnel, see: HC  193 (1994–95); PCA  1967, s  10(3). The department eventually accepted the recommendations. 4 Eg into Barlow-Clowes: HC 76 (1988–89); HC 20 (1995–96) for the Child Support Agency; and HC 809 I & II (2002–03) on The Prudential Regulation of Equitable Life. The refusal by the Home Secretary to provide information on the number of times Ministers had made declarations of interest under the Code on Access was dealt with by a report under s 10(4) and not section 10(3): HC 353 (2001–02). 5 On the latter see: R (Elias) v Secretary of State for War [2006] EWCA Civ 1293. 1

4.141  Information collected by officers of the PO and the PO might itself be covered by the Official Secrets Act 1989, although it may be disclosed in reports and for the purposes of investigation as above and in legal proceedings for offences under that Act or inquiries into possible proceedings, ie where the information is disseminated without authority, or for offences under s 9 of the 1967 Act.1 Apart from such proceedings, the PO and the PO’s officers will have an immunity from disclosing information in any other proceedings.2 PCA 1967, s 11(2). PCA 1967, s 11(2)(c).

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4.142  By s 11(3) a minister of the Crown may give notice in writing to the PO, the effect of which is that the disclosure of any document, information or class of documents or information as specified would be prejudicial to the interests of the state or otherwise contrary to the public interest. The result is that the PO and his or her officers must keep such information etc as specified secret to themselves.1 Minister includes Commissioners of Customs and Excise and Inland Revenue.

1

4.143  There has been a Parliamentary Commissioner for Northern Ireland government departments, a role now taken by the NI  Ombudsman. The PO above, however, dealt with complaints against scheduled bodies in the PCA 1967, even though they came from Northern Ireland. Under the legislative schemes for devolution, in Northern Ireland the PO is responsible for reserved matters and the NI ombudsman deals with devolved matters. The NI ombudsman also deals with health and local government. Both offices are held by the one person known as the Northern Ireland Ombudsman. Scotland was addressed above. Reserved matters are the responsibility of the PO. The Welsh system was reformed by the Public Services Ombudsman (Wales) Act 2005 (see para 6.138 below).

462  Chapter 4 4.144  The PHSCA  1987 allows greater delegation of responsibilities by the PCA to officials of the Health Service Commissioner (they work in the same office in fact)1 and s 4 enables consultation and exchange of information between the Parliamentary and the Health Service Ombudsmen. As of May 2018, the office of the ombudsmen is held by the same person. Annual reports have witnessed a greater degree of integration in the way their work is reported.2 The section allows information received in one capacity to be used in another and it also allows such exchange where the posts are held by different people. If a complaint is received by an ombudsman, which appears to involve the bailiwick of another, s/he should consult that other and perhaps advise the complainant of the proper steps to recommence a complaint. The provisions in the FOIA 2000 allowing the public sector ombudsmen to exchange information with the IC were noted above (at para 1.260). PHSCA 1987, s 3. https://www.ombudsman.org.uk/sites/default/files/Information_sharing_policy_ version_2_2014.pdf (3/05/2018).

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4.145  In 2003 the Parliamentary Ombudsman together with the Commission for Local Administration (the body responsible for local ombudsmen) commissioned a MORI public awareness survey on the ombudsmen’s offices. More than half of those questioned had never heard of ombudsmen – very often unskilled individuals, black and minority groups – and the level of unresolved grievance among those who had not contacted the ombudsmen was alarmingly high. A Customer Service Unit was fully operational in 2003 and is a first port of call for those making telephone, email or fax contacts. Customer awareness surveys in the 2016–17 annual report were adverted to above.

CIVIL SERVANTS AND THEIR DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES TO MINISTERS 4.146  Before we examine the Official Secrets Acts, it has to be established precisely what is the constitutional relationship between civil servants and their ministers. Is it one of undivided loyalty? Is it protected by the law of confidentiality?1 Are duties owed purely to the Minister, or are there duties of a superior nature owed to the nation, the public, or the Crown as representative of the public weal, or the state? The reform of s  2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911 was partially due to certain ambiguities surrounding the nature of a civil servant’s duty to his or her Minister which the government wished to be resolved (see below). Ambiguities have remained. The law has long recognised that the relationship between Ministers and civil servants is symbiotic with the widest of powers of delegation.2 See HC 92 I and II (1985–86), and paras 4.312 et seq below for a locus classicus of orthodoxy. From the famous case of Carltona v Commissioners of Works [1943] 2 All ER 560 (CA) and and cf R (NASHA) v Secretary of State for Health [2005] EWCA Civ 154; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Oladehinde [1990] 2 All ER 367, CA. See Castle v Crown Prosecution Service [2014] EWHC 587 (Admin) for agencies.

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Central government  463 4.147  The orthodoxy was set out in guidelines by the Cabinet Secretary in 1985 and which were amended in 1987 and again to take account of changes to the Civil Service Code in 1996 and 1999.1 The Code is now issued under CRGA  2010 which has placed the civil service on a statutory basis removing it from being an organisation under the royal prerogative. An updated version from 2015 is on-line.2 Although employed under the prerogative, civil servants were and are given legal and judicial protection in the enjoyment of their employment rights. The Code operating under CRGA  2010 – and which is supplemented by departmental or agency guidance – states that it forms part of the contractual relationship between the civil servant and their employer and creates an expectation of ‘high standards of behaviour’. Under the same Act, the civil service is defined as ‘the civil service of the State’. The ‘State’ is not legally defined in English or UK law although the term is widely used in governance and government and to some extent in legislation (see para 4.157 below). Executive power is organised around the Crown which can mean both the sovereign and monarch, and the formal organised basis of central government.3 The Crown in the latter sense is represented by the government of the day: in general, the executive powers of the Crown (monarch) are exercised by and on the advice of HM  Ministers, who are answerable to Parliament. The Civil Service has no constitutional personality or responsibility separate from the duly elected government of the day – it is there to advise and assist the government, or its administration, in policy-making putting decisions into effect, to manage and deliver services, and to present government policies and decisions. While civil servants serve the government of the day as a whole, a servant’s primary duty is to the Minister in charge of the department in which he or she is serving and to junior Ministers. The Minister is answerable to Parliament and civil servants must serve their Minister with complete integrity, honesty, impartiality and objectivity and to the best of their ability. Under devolution, civil servants remain members of the Home Civil Service, but in Wales and Scotland and Northern Ireland, their primary loyalty is to the ‘administration in which they serve.’ There are appropriate modifications to take account of regional Parliaments/Assemblies, Assembly Secretaries etc. Those working in executive agencies are civil servants. HC  Official Report (6th series) cols 130–132, 26  February 1985 subject to amendments as specified in the text. See also Treasury and Civil Service Committee HC 27-II (1993–94) p 188. The May 1999 revisions to the Code took account of certain items concerning devolution: see Civil Service Code (May, 1999) para 2 now updated. The Code is available with the Civil Service Management Code which from 1 April 2000 is only available through the website: http://www. civilservice.gov.uk/about/resources/csmc/index.aspx. 2 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/civil-service-code/the-civil-service-code (3/05/2018). 3 Town Investments Ltd v Department for the Environment [1977] UKHL 2. 1

4.148  The Civil Service, unlike the government of the day, must be politically neutral1 and ready to serve masters of differing political persuasions in a way which deserves and retains the confidence of Ministers, thereby building up a relationship of total confidence ‘and that the Civil Service will at all times conscientiously fulfil its duties and obligations to, and impartially assist, advise and carry out the policies of, the duly constituted government of the day, Assembly Secretaries’ etc. Under the Code, civil servants are expected to perform their

464  Chapter 4 role ‘with dedication and a commitment to the Civil Service and its core values: integrity, honesty, objectivity and impartiality’. Integrity requires that public money is spent properly and efficiently and they must deal with the public fairly and promptly, upholding the law and administration of justice. They must set out facts and issues honestly and fairly and use resources only for specified purposes. They should refrain from deceiving Ministers, Parliament and the public. They should provide accurate and evidence based advice to Ministers, take proper account of expert and other advice and must not frustrate the implementation of policies. They must carry out their duties in a fair, just and equitable manner without discrimination or unjustifiable favour. The determination of policy is the minister’s etc responsibility. The civil servant has no distinct role or constitutional responsibility separate from the Minister. It is a civil servant’s duty ‘to make available to a Minister all the information and experience at his or her disposal’ which is relevant, and to provide ‘honest and impartial advice’ without fear or favour. Withholding information is a breach of duty, as is obstructing or delaying a decision ‘because they do not agree with it’. Theirs is not to agree or disagree, but to perform a minister’s lawful instructions: ‘Civil servants are under an obligation to keep the confidences to which they become privy in the course of their official duties; not only the maintenance of trust between Ministers and civil servants but also the efficiency of government depend on their doing so. There is and must be a general duty upon every civil servant, serving or retired, not to make disclosures which breach that obligation. This duty applies to any document or information or knowledge of the course of business which has come to a civil servant in confidence in the course of duty. Any such unauthorised disclosures, whether for political or personal motives, or for pecuniary gain, and quite apart from liability to prosecution under the Official Secrets Act 1989 or other statutes restricting disclosure of government information, may result in the civil servant concerned forfeiting the trust that is put in him or her as an employee and making him or her liable to disciplinary action … or to civil proceedings. He or she also undermines the confidence that ought to subsist between Ministers and civil servants and thus damages colleagues and the Service as well as him or herself.’2 For local government see ch  6 below and in Scotland: Ethical Standards in Public Life etc (Scotland) Act 2000 covering local and devolved government in Scotland. 2 For the most recent guidance on civil servants’ confidentiality see Civil Service Management Code section 4.2: http://www.civilservice.gov.uk/about/resources/csmc/index.aspx. 1

4.149  The Civil Service Management Code (2016) sets out standards of behaviour in relation to civil servants financial interests, political activities, business appointments after service and guidance is provided on lobbying and lobbyists. Advice sets out instructions for appearances before Select Committees (see above). Civil servants should not be requested to do anything unlawful, unethical, in breach of a constitutional convention or professional code, or which constitutes maladministration. Civil servants who are being asked to act in a way which would breach the Civil Service Management Code, or in a way which raises a fundamental issue of conscience for them, should proceed in accordance

Central government  465 with procedures laid down in departmental guidance or rules of conduct. These provide for assistance after a suggestion by Lord Nolan’s Committee on Standards in Public Life1 and appeal to the Civil Service Commissioners instead of reporting to the Head of Department and through that person to the Head of the Home Civil Service and Prime Minister. Breaches should be reported to appropriate authorities. ‘It is not acceptable for a serving or former civil servant to seek to frustrate policies or decisions of Ministers by the disclosure outside the government, in breach of confidence, of information to which he or she has had access as a civil servant.’ Detailed provisions for appeals are included in the Civil Service Management Code.2 Specific departments may possess their own supplements on disclosure by civil servants (eg Vol 7 MoD Personnel Manual). The public interest defence under the law of confidentiality and the provisions of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 are dealt with below. This ‘whistleblower’ Act is given a prominent profile. Cm 2850 I, pp 59 et seq. http://www.civilservice.gov.uk/about/resources/csmc/index.aspx. And see further, HC 94 (2000–01).

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4.150  Ministers’ duties include integrity; the duty to give Parliament and the public ‘as full information as possible’ about policies, decisions and actions of government ‘and not to deceive or mislead Parliament or the public’. Civil servants’ advice must be considered fairly and properly, they must not be asked to do what ministers should not do; nor should appointments be made by abusing partisan purposes.1 Cmnd 9841. The Civil Service Commissioners are responsible for maintaining the principle of recruitment after fair and open competition and producing a recruitment code and auditing recruitment practices. Since 1995, none of the Commissioners has been a civil servant.

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4.151  However, for almost 40 years, governments have engaged in the process of ‘hiving off’ responsibilities to executive and independent agencies; devolving more responsibility to line managers and executives and also devolving far greater responsibility for reaching targets of performance under agreements – most recently public service agreements – which will make the traditional model of the civil servant and ministerial responsibility something of an anachronism if fully developed, or at least much more restricted to a core of senior civil servants. Even at this level, short-term contracts and dismissal are becoming more common. The size of the Civil Service has been reduced and non-civil servant ‘special advisers’ are more frequently resorted to which has caused increasing friction as we saw above. In 2001, the government produced a Code of Conduct for Special Advisers and more recent developments were outlined above (para  4.117). Changes in organisation have included contracting out public services to the private sector under the provisions of the Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994 (amended by the Regulatory Reform Act 2001), the movement towards the Private Finance Initiative and now Public Private Partnerships in the provision of public services and the creation of Task Forces to advise on special areas of policy and activity. These have been identified with tensions which have been addressed in the reports of the Committee on Public Standards.1 The coalition government pursued these arrangements with enthusiasm and has accelerated their utilisation although enthusiasm was to some extent diminishing by 2018.

466  Chapter 4 See the Sixth Report Cm 4557 I and II (2000). The appointment of special advisers is not subject to the usual Civil Service rules for appointments: Lord Chancellor v Coker [2001]  IRLR  116, EAT. See also the Public Administration Committee: HC 293 (2000–01) on Special Advisers the Committee on Standards in Public Life Defining the Boundaries within the Executive: Ministers, Special Advisers and the permanent Civil Service Cm 5775 and the Government Response Cm 5964. See the Ministerial Code (2017).

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4.152  A  Civil Service Bill 2003–04 contained provisions for a statutory Civil Service Commission, a renamed Civil Service of the State; provided a Ministerial power for the issue a code under the statute on civil service conduct. The Civil Service No 2 Bill 2003–04 provided for the impartial appointment of civil servants, makes provision for the duties of Ministers and special advisers to uphold impartiality and their respective duties and restrictions. Provision is made in relation to information relating to special advisers and codes of conduct for civil servants and special advisers and on procedure. Neither Bill survived the 2003–04 session although the Cabinet Office produced a draft Civil Service Bill in November 2004 (Cm 6373). The CRGA  2010 now provides the legal framework for the civil service. Section 9(6) of the CRGA 2010 states that, where a complaint is made to the Civil Service Commission by a civil servant, the civil service management authorities, the complainant and any civil servant whose conduct is covered by the complaint must provide the Commission with any information it reasonably requires. The procedures have been set out in its 2015 annual report.1 There is no appeal although judicial review would not be barred. If its recommendation was not accepted it could make the matter available for public and Parliamentary attention, raise it with the Permanent secretary involved and the Cabinet Secretary. Report of the Civil Service Commissioners HC 251 (2014–15) p 44.

1

4.153  Until the passage of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 the UK afforded the civil servant who ‘went public’ without authority little if any legal protection against reprisal where he or she believes that they have acted in the public interest. This was in marked contrast to the position in overseas common law countries, particularly the USA and to a lesser extent Canada.1 The general framework concerning disclosures was covered by the Official Secrets Acts. The breadth of the British official secrecy laws have been widely commented upon. The notorious events surrounding WikiLeaks in 2010 when the first group of 250,000 US diplomatic and intelligence reports were published without authorisation were not susceptible to prosecution under the OSA 1989 because the alleged perpetrators were not UK citizens and the information did not belong to the UK Crown. WikiLeaks was followed by the Edward Snowden disclosures from the US National Security Agency. The episodes brought home the impossibility of controlling the dissemination of official information in the digitalised and networked globe.2 Under s  10, Crown servants are brought within the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 but not members of the armed services or those working in ‘national security’. See The US  Civil Service Reform Act 1978 and paras 4.284 et seq below. In disciplinary proceedings, Canadian civil servants may invoke the ‘public interest’ defence only available in civil proceedings in the UK or under PIDA 1998.

1

Central government  467 D Leigh and L Harding WikiLeaks (2011); M L Sifry WikiLeaks and the Age of Transparency (2011). Followed by the Panama papers leak identifying leading politicians and celebrities who placed resources in overseas tax havens.

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OFFICIAL SECRETS ACTS 1911–1989 (OSAS 1911–1989) 4.154  The first Official Secrets Act dates from 1889 and survived until 1911. The Law Commission has published a detailed consultation document on reforming the legislation from 1911 to 1989.1 Law Commission Protection of Official Data. A  Consultation Paper Consultation Paper No  230 (2017). We examine this below (para 4.300).

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Section 1 of the Official Secrets Act 19111 4.155  Section 1 concerns, according to its marginal heading, ‘penalties for spying’.2 The section can be quoted: ‘(1) If any person for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State – (a) approaches [inspects, passes over]3 or is in the neighbourhood of, or enters any prohibited place4 within the meaning of this Act; or (b) makes any sketch, plan, model, or note which is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy; or (c) obtains, [collects, records, or publishes,] or communicates to any other person [any secret official code word, pass word, or] any sketch, plan, model, article, or note, or other document or information which is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy; he shall be guilty of [an offence]. (2) On a prosecution under this section, it shall not be necessary to show that the accused person was guilty of any particular act tending to show a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State, and, notwithstanding that no such act is proved against him, he may be convicted if from the circumstances of the case, or his conduct, or his known character as proved, it appears that his purpose was a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State; and if any sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, or information relating to or used in any prohibited place within the meaning of this Act, or anything in such a place [or any secret official code word or pass word], is made, obtained, [collected, recorded, published], or communicated by any person other than a person acting under lawful authority, it shall be deemed to have been made, obtained [collected, recorded, published] or communicated for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State unless the contrary is proved.’ For the background, see Birkinshaw Freedom of Information: The Law, The Practice and The Ideal (4th edn, 2010) ch 3 and DGT Williams Not In The Public Interest (1965).

1

468  Chapter 4 See, however, Chandler v DPP [1964] AC 763, HL. The words in square brackets were added by the Official Secrets Act 1920 (OSA 1920, ss 10, 11(2) and Schs 1 and 2). 4 See OSA 1911, s 3. 2 3

4.156 In Chandler v DPP1 the House of Lords held that the section was not limited to spying but also extended to the saboteur, viz those who had entered a US air base – a prohibited place under section 3 – to cause disruption by way of demonstration against nuclear weapons. ‘Purpose’ was to be distinguished from the motive for doing an act and ‘any purpose’ included direct or immediate purpose as distinguished from an ‘ultimate aim’. Where there were several purposes, including an ultimate purpose of alerting the nation to the folly of nuclear weapons, an immediate purpose nonetheless remained one of them and was therefore within the words ‘any purpose’.2 [1964] AC 763, HL. It was held that the ‘immediate purpose’ was to obstruct the operational activity of the air base: this was prejudicial to the interests of the state, on incontrovertible Crown evidence, and contrary evidence was inadmissible; cf however, Lord Devlin. Section 1(2) allows guilt to be inferred in very wide circumstances and reverses the onus of proof.

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4.157  The court will accept the government’s evidence on what is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the state. The House of Lords also held, variably, that the word ‘State’ in the phrase ‘interests of the State’ meant the ‘organised community’ (Lords Reid and Hodson) or the organs of government of a national community (Lords Devlin and Pearce). In matters of national security which is what s 1 is concerned with, the interests of the state are the same as the interests of the government of the day because it falls to the government of the day to advise the Crown on national security and the disposition of the armed forces for the protection of the nation. On such matters, there cannot be two competing interpretations of the interests of the state. It is not settled law, however, that the interests of the state are always synonymous with the interests of the government of the day where national security is not involved, as the ‘State’ may signify an entity which is larger than the government of the day.1 As we saw above, the government did not accept this possibility. What, for instance, is meant by the Crown? M Sunkin and S Payne (eds) The Nature of the Crown: a Legal and Political Analysis (1999).

1

4.158  ‘Enemy’ in s 1 includes a potential enemy with whom there might be war.1 ‘Prohibited place’ is defined in s  3 and is given an exhaustive definition which can be added to by order (SI 1975/182). Under s 12: ‘Expressions referring to communicating or receiving include any communicating or receiving, whether in whole or in part, and whether the sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, or information itself or the substance, effect, or description thereof only be communicated or received; expressions referring to obtaining or retaining any sketch, plan, model, article, note, or document, include the copying or causing to be copied the whole or any part of any sketch, plan, model, article, note, or document; and expressions referring to the communication of any sketch,

Central government  469 plan, model, article, note or document include the transfer or transmission of the sketch, plan, model, article, note or document; The expression “document” includes part of a document; The expression “model” includes design, pattern, and specimen; The expression “sketch” includes any photograph or other mode of representing any place or thing; [The expression “munitions of war” includes the whole or any part of any ship, submarine, aircraft, tank or similar engine, arms and ammunition, torpedo, or mine, intended or adapted for use in war, and any other article, material, or device, whether actual or proposed, intended for such use;]’ R v Parrott (1913) 8 Cr App Rep 186, CCA.

1

4.159  Section 1 of the OSA 1920 prohibits the unauthorised use of uniforms; the falsification of reports, forgery, personation and the use of false documents to gain admission to a prohibited place or for any other purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the state within the Act. 4.160  Section 2 of the OSA 1920 allows communications with foreign agents to be used as evidence of the commission of certain offences under s 1 relating to the obtaining or attempting to obtain information. Under OSA 1911, s 1 no prosecution may proceed except with the consent of the Attorney-General.1 And Scottish and Northern Ireland equivalents.

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4.161  Section 7 of the OSA  1911 imposes penalties for harbouring spies. Section 7 of the OSA 1920 makes it an offence to attempt to commit any offence under the principal Act or the OSA  1920 or to solicit, incite or endeavour to persuade another person to commit an offence or to aid and abet or do any act preparatory to the commission of an offence under the principal Act or the OSA 1920 (para 4.163). 4.162  Section 2 of the 1911 Act has been repealed and replaced by the OSA 1989. This Act came into force on 1 March 1990.

Official Secrets Act 1989 ‘We are legislating for a generation; we are not legislating for the next five years.’1 N  Bugden MP, HC  Official Report (6th series) col 1005, 22  February 1989. The Act has outdistanced the generation.

1

4.163  The breadth of the British official secrecy laws have been widely commented upon. The headnote to the 1989 Act states that it replaces s 2 of the OSA 1911. One section is replaced by an Act of 16 sections and two schedules!

470  Chapter 4 The 1989 Act is not cited as being a part of the principal Act (1911); it therefore presumably stands as a substantive measure in its own right. Therefore, the provisions under s  7 of the OSA  1920 on attempting, inciting or aiding and abetting offences under the 1911 Act do not apply, if this is correct, to offences under the 1989 Act.1 Cf the common law of attempt, incitement and conspiracy. NB, OSA 1920, s 1(2)(b). See Law Commission (para 4.154 above and para 4.300 below), pp 27–28.

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4.164  More has probably been written about OSA 1911, s 2 than any other legal provision in British, and British-inspired, legal system(s).1 One could say very little with any certainty about s 2; however, this much is certain: it has been repealed and its much criticised replacement is still on the statute book.2 Birkinshaw, para 4.155, note 1, above. It is a substantive Act in its own right and not simply a replacement of s 2.

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4.165  In 1972, a committee under the chairmanship of Lord Franks reported that s 2 should be replaced. It was a wide catch-all provision, the very breadth of which had brought it into disrepute. However, Franks’ recommendations were not acted upon and a series of events1 led the government to publish its own reforms in 1988 after an abortive Bill in 1979. These came in the White Paper Reform of s 2 of the OSA 1911.2 The Franks Report on Reform of the OSA 1920, s 2; Cmnd 5104 (1972); the Ponting trial R v Ponting [1985] Crim LR 318; the Shepherd Bill reforming s 2, 1988 inter alia. 2 Cm 408 (1988). 1

White Paper of 1988 4.166  The White Paper followed Franks in believing that s 1 of the OSA 1911 left important areas of information unprotected. ‘Effective protection requires that the law should cover leakage of information, as well as espionage’, concluded Franks. 4.167  The government believed that unauthorised leaks of information causing ‘damage to the public interest’ should be punishable by the criminal law. Separate tests of likely harm for the different categories of information to be covered were proposed for the legislation and these would be ‘concrete and specific’, not general such as the Franks test of ‘likely to cause serious injury to the interests of the nation or endanger the safety of a citizen of the UK and Colonies’. However, the government scrapped the idea of ministerial certificates conclusively establishing before a court that leaking of the specified information would cause serious injury. Such a certificate could not be challenged by a defendant. Instead, the government proposed ‘where it is necessary for the courts to consider the harm likely to arise from the disclosure of particular information, the prosecution should be required to adduce evidence as to that harm and the defence should be free to produce its own evidence in rebuttal. The burden of proof would be on the prosecution …’.1 Cm 408, para 18.

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Central government  471 4.168  The legislation would confine the operation of criminal law to six areas of information. It would not be suitable to cover breaches causing ‘local damage to individuals or groups, or result in political embarrassment’ or which would ‘obstruct sensible and equitable administration’.1 The criminal law would not cover Cabinet documents as a class or advice to ministers as a class although specific items of such classes may be protected if they are within the six categories of protected information. Nor will economic or financial information2 be protected as a class. Nor will blanket protection be given to information entrusted in confidence to government – it will have to fall within a protected category. In these cases the government and third parties would have to rely upon civil remedies, such as the law of confidentiality (see paras 4.312 et seq below) and the government could invoke disciplinary measures contained in Civil Service codes (see paras 4.281 et seq below). However, specific statutes protect the secrecy of information in the possession of civil servants. The government will keep under review whether the reform of s  2 will ‘leave without a criminal safeguard any private information provided to the government in confidence which merits such protection’ and ‘separate specific offences of disclosure’ may be created.3 The FOIA 2000 exempts information from disclosure on a class basis especially in the field of the formulation of government policy and the security services, it should be noted. Cm 408, para 24. On the budget, lending rate etc. 3 Cm 408, para 35. 1 2

4.169  The Home Secretary on behalf of the government affirmed, however, that ‘there could not conceivably be a prosecution under the Bill on the ground of embarrassment to a British Minister’.1 HC Official Report (6th series) col 428, 15 February 1989. See further the Select Committee on Public Administration HC 94 (2000–01).

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4.170  As the reform meant that only a ‘very small proportion of the information in the hands of Crown servants would be protected by the criminal law’ this does not mean that there will be freedom of information. ‘Ministers will continue to determine what information should be disclosed and to account to Parliament for those decisions’ (Cm 408, para 71). The government did not ‘address such matters as the question of public access to official information not covered by the Government’s proposals’ (Cm 408, para 5). Further, the Civil Service Discipline Code will continue to operate against unauthorised disclosure of information and conduct rules for Crown servants on disclosure of official information will be amended, as will departmental rules and guidance to ensure that Crown servants are clear on ‘what types of information they cannot disclose without authority without rendering themselves liable to criminal or … disciplinary action’ (Cm 408, para 73).

SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS 4.171  Security classifications will remain and continue to play ‘an essential administrative role in handling information’ (Cm 408, para 76). These were last

472  Chapter 4 formulated and came into effect in 2014. All information that the Government needs to collect, store, process, generate or share to deliver services and conduct government business has intrinsic value and requires an appropriate degree of protection, the guidance advises.1 The guidance offers detailed instructions on appropriate methods of handling, security, transmission and protection. TOP SECRET

The Government’s most sensitive information requiring the highest levels of protection from the most serious threats. For example, where compromise could cause widespread loss of life or else threaten the security or economic well-being of the country or friendly nations.

SECRET

Very sensitive information that justifies heightened protective measures to defend against determined and highly capable threat actors. For example, where compromise could seriously damage military capabilities, international relations or the investigation of serious organised crime.2

OFFICIAL

The majority of information that is held or processed by the public sector. This includes routine business operations and services, some of which could have damaging consequences if lost, stolen or published in the media but are not subject to the heightened profile. This may be qualified where there is a clear and justifiable requirement to reinforce the ‘need to know’ for eg procedural or personnel purposes, in which case assets should be conspicuously marked: ‘OFFICIAL–SENSITIVE’

Government Security Classifications Cabinet Office, April 2014 https://www.gov.uk/government/ uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/251480/Government-Security-ClassificationsApril-2014.pdf and https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/government-securityclassifications (3/03/2018) for other relevant documentation. 2 This is more specific than ‘Interests of the nation are interpreted broadly and are not confined to questions of national security in the military sense’, under the previous secret classification, Franks, above, para 62. 1

4.172  All officials and those working with government must respect the confidentiality and integrity of information and data they deal with. The classification scheme applies to information (or other specific assets). Major ICT infrastructure (eg large aggregated data sets, payments systems, etc) may require enhanced controls to effectively manage associated confidentiality, integrity and availability risks – determined on a case-by-case basis following a robust risk assessment. Some particularly sensitive information will attract a Caveat (eg  OFFICIAL– SENSITIVE) or Special Handling Instructions (eg CODEWORDS or National Caveats) to denote the need for further controls, particularly in respect of sharing. The impact of compromise of this information may be higher, but this

Central government  473 does not imply that it will necessarily be subject to the threat model applicable to higher tiers. Such information can be managed at the same classification level, but with a more prescriptive information handling model, potentially supported by extra procedural or technical controls to reinforce the need to know. The aim of additional technical controls is to manage the information characteristics that attract the additional marking (for example, enforcing access control, or technically limiting the number of records a user can view). These controls will be data and system dependent. 4.173  All relevant legal requirements will have to be respected, eg  OSA and DPA. 4.174  Classifications of documents will have no evidential relevance for a jury or for the degree of harm or injury caused by the leak; ‘it is only evidence of the view of the persons who awarded the classification’ and only evidence of the view at the time of classification. However, the: ‘grade of classification may be relevant in a prosecution as evidence tending to show that the defendant had reason to believe that the disclosure of the information was likely to harm the public interest, but the prosecution will have to adduce separate evidence to prove that the disclosure was indeed likely to cause such harm’.1 Cm 408, para 75.

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4.175  In short the legislation will not ‘apply criminal sanctions to disclosures which are not likely to harm the public interest, nor to anyone who could not reasonably have been expected to foresee the effect of his disclosure’.1 The government also believed that ‘responsible media reporting would not be affected by the government’s proposals’.2 The government was happy to entrust the safeguarding of the public interest in this area to the juries and the courts. Cm 408, para 77. Cm 408, para 78.

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THE CATEGORIES OF PROTECTED INFORMATION Security and intelligence1 4.176  Under s 1(1) of the Official Secrets Act 1989 (OSA 1989) a person who is or has been a member of the security and intelligence services2 or a person ‘notified’ that s/he is subject to the provisions of this subsection is guilty of an offence if, without lawful authority,3 s/he discloses4 any information, document or other article relating to security or intelligence which is or has been in his or her possession by virtue of his or her position as a member of any of those services or in the course of his or her work while the notification is or was in force. The government refused to publish the list of such related officials or to

474  Chapter 4 define in regulations what kinds of service would be covered. Members of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament are notified under s 1(1).5 By s 1(2), the offence is committed when statements by the above which ‘purport’ to be such disclosures are made or where it is ‘intended to be taken by those to whom it is addressed as being such a disclosure’. In other words empty rhetoric pretending to be such information will be covered. The offences in sub-ss (1) and (2) are, almost, absolute (see below). No damage has to be proved beyond the unauthorised disclosure6 which, absent a perverse jury decision, would be sufficient to ground a conviction. OSA  1989, s  1(7) describes this as the work of, or in support of, the security and intelligence services or any part of them, and references to information relating to security and intelligence include references to information held or transmitted by those services or by persons in support of, or any part of, them. 2 MI5, MI6, GCHQ being the more obvious – and now referred to as the Intelligence services (SIS) – Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA 2000). Notified persons, presumably, will be civil servants on sensitive committees, and those whose work is related to security and intelligence. After equivocation, the government accepted that notification decisions are judicially reviewable. 3 See OSA 1989, s 7 for ‘authorised disclosures’, paras 4.250 et seq below. 4 This includes parting with possession of a document or other article, OSA 1989, s 13(1). 5 http://isc.independent.gov.uk/home. 6 See Cm 408, para 41. The Ponting, Tisdall, Massiter, etc leaks would be covered by the criminal law. The Wright episode would still be problematical because he was outside the jurisdiction a difficulty the government discovered in the Shayler episode until he voluntarily returned to England. See Law Commission (para 4.300 below). 1

4.177  For persons who are or who have been Crown servants1 or government contractors,2 they will be guilty of an offence under sub-s (3) if, without lawful authority,3 they make a damaging disclosure of any information, document or other article relating to security or intelligence which is or has been in their possession.4 A disclosure for these purposes is damaging if: (a) it causes damage – this is not defined so presumably any ‘damage’ would suffice for a prosecution, ie ridicules botched amateurism or wastage of funds? – to the work of, or any part of, the security and intelligence services; or (b) it is information or a document or other article which is such that its unauthorised disclosure5 would be likely to cause such damage or which falls within a class or description of information, documents or articles the unauthorised disclosure of which would be likely to have that effect.6 By OSA 1989, s 12 this includes Ministers, civil servants, members of the armed forces and police officers, as well as prescribed persons and office holders. The Secretary of State may prescribe as Crown servants office holders and some or all of their staff by statutory instrument (affirmative resolution). The Comptroller and Auditor General and the National Audit Office have been included: SI 1990/200. 2 OSA 1989, s 12(2). Section 12(3) excludes certain parties from being government contractors for the purposes of the Act. 3 OSA 1989, s 7. See paras 4.250 et seq below for ‘lawful authority’. 4 OSA 1989, s 1(3). 5 See paras 4.250 et seq below. 6 OSA 1989, s 1(4). 1

4.178  It is up to the prosecution to prove the damage, but the ‘class or description’ provision in s  1(4) seems to re-introduce to some extent the

Central government  475 concept of ministerial certificate. How will documents be classed or described and by whom? This classification is evidence of its damaging quality, unlike the classification system described above which only reflects the opinion of the classifier. This would allow arguments before the court to be less specific. The prosecution would be tasked with satisfying the court that a particular disclosure was of a certain class or description and that disclosure of that class or description was likely to damage the operation of the services.1 Cm 408, para 40.

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4.179  A defence is available for a person charged with an offence under this section where s/he can prove that at the time of the alleged offence s/he did not know, and had no reasonable cause to believe1 that the information, document or article in question related to security or intelligence or, in the case of an offence under sub-s (3), that the disclosure would be damaging as set out. In other words there is no presence of mens rea and they had not shut their eyes to the reality of the situation. The onus is on the defendant. A virtual impossibility for security and intelligence personnel.

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4.180  The persons under sub-s  (1) who will be subject to ‘notification’ that they are bound by an absolute duty will be notified in writing of such by a Minister. The Minister may serve such a notice if, in the Minister’s opinion, the work undertaken by the person in question is or includes work connected with the security and intelligence services and its nature is such that the interests of national security require that s/he should be subject to the provisions of that subsection.1 A notification may at any time be revoked and will be subject to a duration of five years, and renewable at five-year periods. The Minister is under a duty to serve a notice of revocation as soon as, in his/her opinion, the work undertaken by that person ceases to be such as mentioned in s 1(6).2 Information obtained etc within period of notification will still be covered after the period has ended. The most obvious persons notified under this section are members of the Parliamentary Security and Intelligence Committee. OSA 1989, s 1(6). OSA 1989, s 1(7).

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4.181  For several years at the end of the 1990s and early in 2000, a former MI5 officer, David Shayler, was the object of the attention of the AttorneyGeneral and prosecuting authorities on this side of the Channel. Shayler, who lived in Paris, had sent a letter to The Guardian which the latter published in edited portions. The Observer also published an article about the allegations made by Shayler which included allegations and knowledge of the identities (these were not disclosed) of those British agents who had set about plotting the assassination of Colonel Gadaffi of Libya. The attempt to gain access to the letter under Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s 9 and Sch 1, para 2 failed in the case of The Guardian and orders of the Crown Court judge were quashed. The access conditions had not been established in relation to the letter to The Guardian. Furthermore, Judge LJ believed, the privilege against selfincrimination had to be given sufficient weight. The other two judges were not as

476  Chapter 4 protective of the privilege against self-incrimination. In relation to The Observer’s reporter his letter from Shayler had not been the subject of a wrongful order of access under the Act.1 Shayler returned to the jurisdiction in August 2000, was arrested, charged with offences under s 1 and also s 4 (which covers information obtained by interception and by the security and intelligence services – below) and bailed. He was not charged in relation to the disclosure of any plot to kill Colonel Gadaffi. In the spring of 2001, the trial judge in Shayler’s case ordered a preparatory hearing under s 29(1) of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996. The trial judge ruled that no public interest defence was available to Shayler under those sections and that ss  1 and 4 were compatible with Art 10 ECHR guaranteeing freedom of speech. If Shayler had been successful, the government was not duty bound to repeal s  1, but its future utility would be called seriously into question. If the government were successful, as it was, there would have to be careful judgment exercised in relation to bringing any future prosecution. R v Central Criminal Court, ex p Bright [2001] 2 All ER 244, DC.

1

4.182  An appeal was made to the Court of Appeal which upheld the first instance judgment.1 The further appeal to the House of Lords was unsuccessful.2 The provisions in question gave the defendant no opportunity to show that the disclosure was in the public interest and imposed on the prosecution no obligation to prove that the disclosure was not in the public interest. Giving the sections their natural meaning and interpreting them in the context of the Act as a whole, it was clear that a defendant was not entitled to be acquitted if he showed it was, or believed it was, in the public or national interest to make the disclosure in question. Nor was he entitled to acquittal if the jury believed it was in the public interest to make the disclosure. The sections in question were furthermore not in breach of Article  10. The need to preserve the secrecy of the information in question had been recognised by the European Court and Commission on Human Rights.3 The test to be applied was whether in all the circumstances the interference with the individual’s right to freedom of expression prescribed by national law was greater than was required to meet the legitimate object that the state was seeking to achieve. In addition, the ban the Law Lords held was not absolute because disclosure could be made lawfully. A former or acting member of those services could make a disclosure internally under s 7(3)(a) to the staff counsellor, the Attorney-General, the DPP, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police or the Prime Minister or other Ministers if s/he had concerns about the lawfulness of conduct, or concerns about misbehaviour, irregularity, maladministration, waste of resources or incompetence. If no appropriate action followed, the officer could under s 7(3)(b) seek official authorisation to a ‘wider audience’. Such a request would have to be dealt with in accordance with the importance attached to freedom of speech, and the need for any restriction to be necessary, responsive to a pressing social need and proportionate. A refusal could be subjected to a judicial review.4 These procedures properly applied ‘provided sufficient and effective safeguards’ to ensure unlawfulness and wrongdoing were reported. It was not open to a defendant to argue that in effect these procedures would have provided no safeguard or would have been of no avail.

Central government  477 R v Shayler [2001] 1 WLR 2206 (CA). [2002] 2 All ER 477 (HL). 3 See the case-law cited by Lord Bingham at para 26 commencing with Engel v The Netherlands (No 1) (1976) 1 EHRR 647 at 684–686 and ending with Vereniging Weekblad Bluf! v The Netherlands (1995) 20 EHRR 189 at 201–202. 4 R (A) v B [2009] UKSC 12 establishes that the only body to hear complaints is the tribunal now established under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and not a judicial review. 1 2

4.183  One can only say that is a very sanguine view of the procedures and their efficacy. In early 2004, a civil servant at GCHQ and a former Minister both made disclosures which seemed prima facie a breach of ss 1 and 4. These related to interception of communications of Kofi Annan in the United Nations in New York by MI6 and GCHQ. The prospect of raising the illegality of the Iraq war in 2003 – the opinion on the legality of which the Attorney-General had refused to publish – as a defence and the calling of the Prime Minister and even AttorneyGeneral as witnesses inevitably caused the trial against the civil servant to collapse and ensured that no prosecution was brought against the former Minister, Claire Short. There was some irony in the Law Lords’ reminder that under OSA 1989, s 9 the Attorney-General must give his consent to a prosecution under the OSA (see para 4.261 below).

defence

4.184  Section 2 of the OSA  1989 covers defence information. Those who have been or who are Crown servants or government contractors are guilty of an offence if, without lawful authority, they make a damaging disclosure of any information, document or other article relating to defence which is or has been in their possession by virtue of their position.1 ‘Damaging’ under this section means where: (1) The disclosure damages2 the capability of, or any part of, the armed forces of the Crown to carry out their tasks or leads to loss of life or injury to members of those forces or serious damage to the equipment or installations of those forces. (2) Otherwise than as mentioned in para (1), it endangers the interests of the United Kingdom abroad, seriously obstructs the promotion or protection by the United Kingdom of those interests or endangers the safety of British citizens abroad. It is not clear from the first part whether this might include commercial interests relating to defence, although s 2(4)(b), below, might make such an interpretation untenable. (3) It is of information or of a document or article which is such that its unauthorised disclosure would be likely to have any of those effects. OSA 1989, s 2(1). The original clause had ‘prejudices’ – note the discussion in ch 1 on the FOIA 2000.

1 2

4.185  It is a defence to charges under s 2 for a defendant to prove that at the time of the alleged offence s/he did not know, and had no reasonable cause to believe, that the information, document or article in question related to defence, or that a disclosure would be damaging within the meaning of s  2(1). In R  v

478  Chapter 4 Keogh Lord Phillips ruled that it would suffice for the prosecution to prove that the defendant had reasonable cause to believe that the information fell within a protected category and that its disclosure would be damaging. No invitation to the jury to ‘engage in a subjective assessment of the defendant’s state of mind’ is necessary.1 ‘Damaging’ means it damages the capability of, or any part of, the armed forces of the Crown to carry out their tasks or leads to loss of life or injury to members of those forces or serious damage to the equipment or installations of those forces. It covers endangering the interests of the UK abroad seriously obstructing the promotion or protection by the UK of those interests or endangers the safety of British citizens abroad. A disclosure is also damaging which is of information or a document or article which is such that its unauthorised disclosure would be likely to have any of the above effects. R v Keogh [2007] EWCA Crim 528 at paras 29–30. OSA 1989, ss 2 and 3 (below) do not reverse the burden of proof by placing it onto the defendant; there is, however, an evidentiary burden to make out the defence.

1

4.186  ‘Defence’ means for s 2: ‘(a) the size, shape, organisation, logistics, order of battle, deployment, operations, state of readiness and training of the armed forces of the Crown; (b) the weapons, stores or other equipment of those forces and the invention, development, production and operation of such equipment and research relating to it; (c) defence policy and strategy and military planning and intelligence; (d) plans and measures for the maintenance of essential supplies and services that are or would be needed in time of war.’1 OSA 1989, s 2(4)(b).

1

international relations

4.187  By OSA 1989, s 3(5) these are defined as: ‘the relations between States, between international organisations or between one or more States and one or more such organisations and includes any matter relating to a State other than the UK or to an international organisation which is capable of affecting the relations of the UK with another State or with an international organisation’.1 Note the discussion of the EU Regulation on access in ch 5 below.

1

4.188  Section 3 concerns offences relating to international relations and covers Crown servants and government contractors, present or past, and damaging disclosures without authority of any information, document or other article relating to international relations or ‘any confidential information, document or other article which was obtained from a State1 other than the United Kingdom or an international organisation’.2 It applies to information etc which is or has been in a person’s possession by virtue of that person’s position as a Crown servant or government contractor. ‘Confidential’ for the purposes of this section

Central government  479 covers situations where the terms on which information etc received from a State or organisation require it to be held in confidence, or ‘while the circumstances in which it was obtained make it reasonable’ for the latter to expect as much.3 In other words stamping it ‘confidential’, no matter how innocuous the contents, will make it confidential, as will those occasions where the custom and practice of diplomacy etc require confidentiality. It is not ‘confidential’ according to principles developed by the courts (see below). ‘State’: s 13(1). OSA 1989, s 3(1)(b). Eg the European Commission, and see s 13(1), (2) and (3). 3 OSA 1989, s 3(6). 1 2

4.189  A disclosure is damaging if: it endangers1 the interests of the UK abroad (for example if commercial interests would be concerned, or if there would be a lowering of esteem because of revelations of environmental contamination); it seriously obstructs the promotion or protection by the UK of those interests;2 or, it endangers the safety of British citizens abroad;3 or, it is of information or of a document or article which is such that its unauthorised disclosure would be likely to have any of those effects.4 Arguably, this could apply to information exempted under the 2001 EC Regulation on Access discussed in ch 5. 3 4 1 2

Originally ‘prejudices’. Would this include commercial interests? OSA 1989, s 3(2)(a). OSA 1989, s 3(2)(b).

4.190  When information is ‘confidential’ under s 3(1)(b), and sub-s (6), it may1 be regarded for the purposes of s 3(2)(b) as such that its unauthorised disclosure would be likely to have any of the effects there mentioned, ie  those in s  3(2) (a) above, either by reason of the fact that it is confidential or by reason of its contents or nature.2 In other words, damaging effects may be presumed to follow where it is confidential without actual proof. This provision3 was highly criticised. Not ‘must’, but a discretionary test depending upon the seriousness of the damage. OSA 1989, s 3(3). 3 Because it is simply stamped ‘Confidential’. The government emphasised the discretionary nature of the test; see para 4.188. 1 2

4.191  Again, a defence can be made out by the defendant in terms almost identical to those in s 2: basically that at the time of the alleged offence the defendant did not know etc that the information was protected under s 3 and s/he had no knowledge etc that its disclosure would be damaging.

crime

4.192  A former, or present, Crown servant or government contractor is guilty of an offence if without lawful authority1 s/he discloses any information etc which is or has been in his or her possession by virtue of his or her position as such2 and the disclosure of which: (a) results in the commission of an offence (any offence);3

480  Chapter 4 (b) facilitates an escape from legal custody4 or the doing of any other act prejudicial to the safekeeping of persons in legal custody;5 or (c) impedes the prevention or detection of offences or the apprehension or prosecution of suspected offenders,6 or which is such that its unauthorised disclosure would be likely to have any of these effects.7 OSA 1989, s 7 and paras 4.250 et seq below. OSA 1989, s 4(1). 3 OSA 1989, s 4(2)(a)(i), eg publicising a faulty burglar alarm, or security system. Cf disclosures by members of the armed services in Northern Ireland which led to attacks on putative Republicans: see DPP v Channel Four Television Co Ltd [1992] 2 All ER 517, DC, ch 11 below. 4 OSA 1989, s 4(6). 5 OSA 1989, s 4(2)(a)(ii). 6 OSA 1989, s 4(2)(a)(iii). 7 OSA 1989, s 4(2)(b). 1 2

4.193  A defence can be made out by the defendant to a charge under (a)–(c) that at the time of the alleged offence s/he did not know and had no reasonable cause to believe that the disclosure would have any of the effects listed above.1 OSA 1989, s 4(4). See para 4.185 and Keogh above.

1

information obtained by interception and by the security services and intelligence services (s 4(3))

4.194  Although within OSA 1989, s 4, this category in fact constitutes a clearly separable class of information. No damage has to be proved for unauthorised disclosure of the information within this category, although the defence can prove (on a balance of probabilities) that the defendant did not know at the time of the alleged offence and had no reasonable cause to know that the information etc was that to which s 4(3) applies. 4.195  Section 4(3) applies to any information obtained by reason of the interception of any communication in obedience to a warrant issued under s 5 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, any information relating to the obtaining of information by reason of any such interception and any document or other article which is or has been used or held for use in, or has been obtained by reason of, any such interception. The 2000 Act has been amended by the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 which adds ‘any information obtained under a warrant under Chapter 1 of Part 2 (interceptions) or Chapter 1 of Part 6 (bulk interceptions) of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, any information relating to the obtaining of information under such a warrant and any document or other article which is or has been used or held for use in, or has been obtained by reason of, the obtaining of information under such a warrant’. The 2000 Act repealed the Interception of Communications Act 1985 and also implemented Article  5 of the EC  Council Directive 97/66 ‘Telecommunications Data Protection Directive’, now replaced by the 2002 Directive (paras 2.343 et seq). The section also applies to information obtained under the issue of warrants to

Central government  481 the security and intelligence services under the Security Service Act 1989, s 3, Intelligence Services Act 1994, s 5 and s 7 (para 4.221 below). Basically, s 4(3) prohibits the unauthorised disclosure of intercept and security and intelligence services’ special investigation powers information. 4.196  The ICA 1985 followed litigation in the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in which the UK was ultimately found to be in breach of Art 8 of the Convention because interceptions did not take place under any appropriate legal framework.1 The legislation sought to produce a legal framework that would comply with the provisions of the Convention. The Act was widely criticised for providing only an absolute minimum safeguard and for leaving the power to grant warrants within the executive and not handing it to the courts. Basically all interceptions of communications covered by the 1985 Act2 (and now under s 5 of RIPA 2000 and under the 2016 Act as above) have to be authorised by warrant of the Secretary of State.3 Those not so authorised are a criminal offence.4 Warrants may only be issued to nine (ten are listed) responsible intercepting bodies. A warrant may only be issued for any one of three grounds: protection of national security, prevention of serious crime or disorder, and economic well-being in relation to national security. The 2016 Act introduces the requirement for ‘double-lock’ approval by a minister and a judge (Judicial Commissioners who may be retired judges) for certain warrants, ie  interception, equipment and bulk equipment interference, bulk data and bulk data sets’ powers. There is to be oversight by an Investigatory Powers Commissioner, a senior judge. There are to be special safeguards in the case of ‘particularly sensitive material’, eg involving lawyers, MPs and journalists. Other forms of surveillance are dealt with by RIPA.5 Malone v UK (1984) 7 EHRR 14. See Kruslin v France (1990) 12 EHRR 547 and Kopp v Switzerland 4 BHRC 277. On surveillance on employees by employers and the six factors national authorities should consider in setting appropriate safeguards at the workplace see Barbulesco v Romania App 61496/08 (5/09/2017) ECtHR Grand Chamber. 2 The Act was effective from 10 April 1986. The Act covered postal and telephone interceptions. 3 Or those warranted by an authorised delegate. 4 Outside the Act, civil redress is unlikely; see RIPA 2000, s 1(3) and IPA 2016, s 8 and, for the powers of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, RIPA 2000, ss 65–70 and IPA 2016, ss 242, 243. 5 See paras 4.200 et seq below on RIPA 2000 as amended by the 2016 Act. 1

4.197  For interceptions, as explained above, the 2016 Act is the governing legislation. Conduct that is not interception and lawful authority are defined (ss 5 and 6). This legislation also amended the law on collection and retention of communications data and equipment interference for obtaining communications and other data. This data is the ‘who’, ‘when’, ‘how’ and ‘where’ of a communication but not the content. The Bill was subject to further amendments in Parliament including overarching provisions on privacy protection in s  2, safeguards in the warrant process, protection of trade unions, and enhanced protections for sensitive professions and parliamentarians, including the requirement that a Judicial Commissioner must consider that there is ‘an overriding public interest’ before any request to identify a journalist’s source can be approved. In relation to warrants the authority must have regard to:

482  Chapter 4 (a) whether what is sought to be achieved by the warrant, authorisation or notice could reasonably be achieved by other less intrusive means, (b) whether the level of protection to be applied in relation to any obtaining of information by virtue of the warrant, authorisation or notice is higher because of the particular sensitivity of that information, (c) the public interest in the integrity and security of telecommunication systems and postal services, and (d) any other aspects of the public interest in the protection of privacy (s 2(2)). However, these factors may be nuanced by the context including national security. 4.198  Section 4(3)(a) of the OSA  1989 makes it an offence to disclose any information obtained under a relevant warrant under Chapter 1 of Part 2 and Chapter 1 of Part 6 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA). It does not apply to the disclosure of unauthorised obtaining of such information, it should be noted, although it might fall within s 4(2)(a)(i) of the OSA 1989 above, ie it results in the commission of an offence. Nor does it apply to information obtained by other eavesdropping devices, although this may have been covered by s 4(3)(b) of the OSA 1920 until repealed by the 1985 Act. Covert operations by police were, however, placed on a statutory basis by the Police Act 1997, Part III and by the RIPA 2000. 4.199  It is necessary to say a little more about the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and sibling Investigatory Powers Act 2016.

THE REGULATION OF INVESTIGATORY POWERS ACT 2000 AND THE INVESTIGATORY POWERS ACT 2016 4.200  As already described, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA  2000) established a new framework for the regulation of investigatory powers.1 The ICA 1985 was therefore repealed to the extent necessary. RIPA 2000 sought to address various problems identified by statutory shortcomings, case law, especially in the Halford decision before the ECtHR which involved an unregulated intercept on a private network by an employer,2 the impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the fact that the ICA 1985 was introduced when there were basically only two telecommunications companies offering fixed line services; by 2011 there were about 757 telecommunications providers (the telecoms ombudsman lists 300 members).3 There is a mass ownership in mobile phones; totally new services have been introduced such as international simple resale; there has been a rapid evolution of the satellite telephone market; a dramatic increase in communications via the internet; use of radio pagers; smart phones; there has also been a rapid development in the number and type of postal services.4 The government saw the extension of the powers of interception to cover these communications as vital for the fight against crime. See Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Monetary Penalty Notices and Consents for Interceptions) Order 2011, SI 2011/1340 which allows the Interception Commissioner to issue monetary penalty notices where there are unlawful intercepts and where an offence under s 1(1) has not been committed (see the schedule) and which amends s  3(1) to remove the words ‘or which that person has reasonable grounds for believing’.

1

Central government  483 Halford v UK (1997) 24 EHRR 523; see also Allen v UK (2002) Times, 12 November (ECtHR). No ‘tapping’ is involved when tapping one’s own phone calls: R v Hardy, B. 31/10/02 (CA CD). Liberty v UK No 58243/00 Times 11/7/08 on art 8 breach and 1985 ICA ‘virtually uncontrollable discretion and guidelines cy Commissioner but not in law or published. 3 http://www.freeindex.co.uk/categories/business_services/business_communications/ telecommunication (21/03/11). By 2017, the top five companies had a market share of 91 per cent: https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/Exiting-the-EuropeanUnion/17-19/Sectoral%20Analyses/37-Telecommunications-Report.pdf (23/03/2018). 4 Cm 4368 Interception of Communications in the UK (1999). 2

4.201  The government therefore sought to update the legislation to take account of communications services introduced since 1985, to extend the law to cover interception on private telephone networks which were linked to public networks – the problem posed by the ECtHR decision in Halford’s case (though see s  1(6)(a) and (b)); to provide a ‘clear, statutory framework for authorising the disclosure of data held by communications service providers’; as well as providing a legislative framework for the police and security services etc to obtain communications data (information about the use of a communications service but not the contents of those communications)1 and such data may be obtained on grounds that are wider than obtaining an intercept.2 See RIPA 2000, s 21. RIPA 2000, s 22(a)–(h).

1 2

4.202  The Investigatory Powers Bill followed a review by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorist Legislation of existing laws of investigatory powers, a review by the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament and by the Panel of the Independent Surveillance Review convened by the Royal United Services Institute. All three agreed that current powers remained essential for the UK’s security. A  joint Parliamentary committee engaged in pre-legislative scrutiny. There were also widespread critical reactions in the media. The Bill was enacted at the end of 2016. Under s 260 the Secretary of State must prepare a report on the operation of the Act within six years of it coming into effect. This must be published and presented to Parliament. As stated, the Act brings together powers for interception of communications (targeted), obtaining and retention of communications and communications data, bulk data and bulk data sets, and it covers collection of data in bulk by interception, communications data acquisition and equipment interference – computer hacking; ‘bulk’ means powers and collection of personal information about large numbers of individuals most of whom will be of no interest to the SIS and bulk personal data sets (only SIS have the ‘bulk’ capabilities basically for national security and serious crime objectives and these are subject to warrants, judicial approval and other controls), and internet connection records in real time. Communications service providers will be under a duty to assist interceptions and to provide and retain communications data. Warrants are not required for targeted communications data (journalism has safeguards – para  4.235 and, for authorisations, see now paras 4.236–4.237 below). Retention notices by a Secretary of State have to be judicially approved (s 89). Access to targeted data will be by authorisations granted by designated

484  Chapter 4 senior officers in ‘relevant’ public authorities with stricter requirements for local authorities. In all cases, and they extend far beyond serious crime (s 61(7)(a)–(j)), action must be ‘necessary and proportionate’. The wide range of powers has caused difficulties for the UK authorities before the CJEU which we examine below and a 2014 temporary Act amending RIPA was ruled contrary to EU law by domestic courts.1 Powers of the Secretary of State to require retention of communications data, which may be for up to 12 months, need the approval of a Judicial Commissioner. Warrants are required for bulk data communications and these have to be approved by a Judicial Commissioner. Secretary of State for the Home Department v T Watson et al [2018] EWCA Civ 70.

1

4.203  There will continue to be an offence of unlawful interception. Monetary penalties may be awarded by the IC where relevant conditions are met. Civil actions for unlawful interceptions are provided for by s 8 providing the necessary conditions are met – this basically applies to transmissions in the UK by private telecoms systems, or in the course of its transmission, by means of a public telecommunication system, to or from apparatus that is part of a private telecommunication system. 4.204  Sections 9 and 10 of the IPA  2016 contain restrictions on requesting interception by overseas authorities and restrictions on requesting assistance under mutual assistance agreements. Sections 30 to 40 deal with the details of procedure for warrants before judicial approval, such as issue by Secretary of State, necessary requirements, duration, renewal, modification and by whom, notification of major modifications and approval of these in urgent cases and cancellation and mutual assistance warrants. 4.205  There will continue to be ‘strict controls’ over the extent to which intercepted material is disclosed or copied, restricting this to the minimum necessary. These are contained in Part 1 chapter 3 of the IPA  2016. This is especially true in relation to use of intercept evidence and related communications data in court, although such restrictions of court use do not apply to information obtained under other Parts of the 2000 Act. Such use of intercepts in court is prohibited under s  56.1 Schedule  3 allows for numerous exemptions to s 56, including use of intercept material in criminal proceedings for breaches of the Act. The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 added ‘control orders’, so controversially introduced under that Act, to exceptions and their successors, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures, are scheduled. The Proscribed Organisations Tribunal, closed material proceedings under the Justice and Security Act 2013 and financial restriction or terrorist asset freezing procedures are also scheduled. The Special Immigration Appeals Commission was already within the former s 18 of RIPA 2000 and remains scheduled. Section 57 of the IPA 2016 imposes a duty not to make unauthorised disclosures, and s 58 provides for exceptions. There has been, it should be noted, increasing pressure on the government to introduce measures allowing use of intercept evidence in trials, especially those involving suspected terrorists, but their use in trials involving organised criminals

Central government  485 is also supported. Section 55 of the IPA 2016 sets out the safeguards which apply when an item subject to legal privilege is retained for purposes other than its destruction. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner must be informed as soon as is reasonably practicable. The Commissioner has the power to order that the item subject to legal privilege is destroyed, or to impose conditions as to the use or retention of the material. It has been ruled by the House of Lords that s 17 of RIPA 2000 (the predecessor to s 56 of the IPA 2016) did not prevent questions being asked, evidence adduced or disclosure made in a criminal trial to establish whether a telecommunications system is a public or private system and whether, if a private system, it has been carried out with the consent of the person who controls the operation or use of that system.2 A relevant operator that has been served with a copy of a warrant to which s 41 of the IPA 2016 applies by (or on behalf of) the intercepting authority must take all steps for giving effect to the warrant that are notified to the relevant operator by (or on behalf of) the intercepting authority although a relevant operator that has been served with a copy of a warrant to which s 41 applies by (or on behalf of) the intercepting authority must take all steps for giving effect to the warrant that are notified to the relevant operator by (or on behalf of) the intercepting authority (IPA 2016, s 43(1) and (4)). Knowingly failing to comply is a criminal offence (IPA 2016, s 43(7)). Communications service providers (CSPs) may be obliged by the Secretary of State to maintain a reasonable intercept capability (IPA 2016, ss 249–250). The Secretary of State may contribute towards the costs incurred by CSPs of providing an intercept capability. See R v Preston [1994] 2 AC 130, HL; Morgans v DPP [1999] 1 WLR 968. See R v P [2001] 2 All ER 58, HL which held that evidence under foreign intercepts was not subject to the s 9 (1985 Act) restrictions and was admissible and this was not a breach of Art 8 ECHR (see SI 2004/158 on lawful interception of persons outside UK). Also R  v Sargent [2002] 1  All ER  161 (HL) – interception by employee for personal use. See R v E [2004] EWCA Crim 124. 2 A-G’s Reference No 5 of 2002 [2004] UKHL 40. 1

4.206  Part 2 chapter 2 of the IPA 2016 authorises interception of communications for the purposes of monitoring or keeping a record of communications for a range of purposes. These include: • interception with the consent of the sender or recipient; • interception by providers of postal or telecommunications services; • interception by businesses etc for monitoring and record-keeping purposes; • postal services: interception for enforcement purposes; • interception by OFCOM in connection with wireless telegraphy; • interception in prisons; • interception in psychiatric hospitals etc; • interception in immigration detention facilities; and • interception in accordance with overseas requests. 4.207  An Investigatory Powers Tribunal continues to operate under the legislation.1 A major development is that appeals on points of law may be made from the IPT to the Court of Appeal (IPA 2016, s 242 adding s 67A to RIPA). The Tribunal or relevant appellate court must not grant leave to appeal unless it considers that (a) the appeal would raise an important point of principle

486  Chapter 4 or practice, or (b) there is another compelling reason for granting leave. The IPT must notify all parties to proceedings when they have reached a decision or determination, including decisions on permission to appeal. There is an exception for circumstances where the Tribunal is prevented from doing so by its procedural rules (for example, where the decision relates to closed proceedings). Section 243 of the IPA  2016 sets out the functions of the IPT in relation to the Act. The Tribunal’s powers are fuller than under the 1985 legislation in terms of its ability to challenge the substantive merits of an authorisation. The creation of the Investigatory Powers (IP) Commissioner was noted above, together with the Judicial Commissioners (retired judges). The IP Commissioner appoints a Technical Advisory Panel to advise ministers and the IP Commissioner on developments in technology and the Technical Advisory Board will continue. Part 3 of the IPA  2016 also authorises the obtaining and disclosure of ‘communications data’ as opposed to interceptions.2 See www.ipt-uk.com/. The Data Retention (EC  Directive) Regulations 2009, SI  2009/859 – data as specified in the Schedule may be retained for 12 months. In Joined Cases C-293/2012 & C-594/12 Digital Rights (8/04/2014) the ECJ  Grand Chamber ruled that the Communications Retention Directive 2006/24/EC was unlawful for breaching the Charter of Fundamental Rights, arts 7, 8, 52(1).

1 2

4.208  The first part of OSA  1989, s  4(3) only applies to interceptions as explained above.1 It does not cover communications data in Part 3 of the IPA 2016. But, for completeness, it should be added that Part II of RIPA 2000 puts the use of covert surveillance which is not already covered by Part III of the Police Act 1997 and the Intelligence Services Act 1994 as well as covert human resources, ie informants, agents and undercover officers under statutory regulation.2 Foreign surveillance concerning foreign police and customs officers in the UK was authorised under the Crime (International Co-operation) Act 2003, s  83; and cessation of authorisations by the Serious Organised Crime Agency was covered by regulations (SI 2004/1128). Evidence had been given to the Home Affairs Committee by a senior metropolitan police officer (Assistant Commissioner John Yates) that ‘hacking’ into mobile phones may not be an ‘interception’ for RIPA purposes where the voice box or email box message has been read. It may be an interception where the message in the box has not been read.3 Section 4(1)–(5) of the IPA  2016 set out what constitutes intercepting a communication in the course of its transmission by a telecommunications system. The Explanatory Notes identify three elements. Firstly the person must perform a ‘relevant act’, which is defined in s 4(2) and includes modifying or interfering with the system. Secondly, the consequence of the relevant act must be to make the content of the communication available to a person who is not the sender or intended recipient. Thirdly, the content must be made available at a ‘relevant time’, which means a time while the communication is being transmitted or any time when the communication is stored in or by the system. The definition of a relevant time makes it clear that interception includes obtaining stored communications, such as messages stored on phones, tablets and other individual devices whether before or after they are sent. The Police

Central government  487 Commissioner and assistant commissioner both resigned following a welter of bad publicity. Watching television (a general broadcast) is not interception (IPA 2016, s 5). On ‘interceptions’, see R v E [2004] EWCA Crim 1243. The ECtHR ruled that the legally unregulated use of surreptitious devices to obtain information was a breach of ECHR Art 8: Khan v UK (2000) 8 BHRC 310, following the House of Lords decision that whether a breach or not it was not unlawful under English law and evidence was admissible in a trial under the provisions of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s 78: R v Khan [1996] 3 All ER 289, HL and see Schenk v Switzerland (1988) 13 EHRR 242. For preRIPA: Hewitson v UK (2003) Times, 10 June (ECtHR); PG and JH v UK (2001) Times, 19 October (ECtHR). For the civil law position on the use of improperly obtained evidence and CPR 1998, r 32.1, see Jones v University of Warwick [2003] 3 All ER 760. 3 HAC  Specialist Operations HC  441 (2010–11)  Q  5. See http://www.parliament.uk/documents/ commons-committees/home-affairs/Memoranda.pdf. In R v Coulson [2013] EWCA Crim 1026 an appeal against conviction relying on the police officer’s interpretation was rejected. See HC 907 (2010–12) and Government Reply Cm 8182 on unauthorised tapping or hacking. The police officer was asked to return to give further evidence. In a civil action for disclosure of hacking material, the high court ordered the police to disclose information held by them on hacking by private companies largely for the press, in particular the News of the World, Financial Times 19 March 2011. Select Committee on Media, Culture and Sport 24 March 2011. On private investigators and supply of personal data through illegal means, see IC What Price Privacy? HC 1056 (2005–06) and What Price Privacy Now? HC 36 (2006–07). See paras 2.249 et seq on Leveson. 1 2

4.209  Section 26 of RIPA  2000 concerns three types of activity covered by Part II of the Act. ‘Directed surveillance’ is covert surveillance that is undertaken in relation to a specific investigation in order to obtain information about, or identify of, a particular person or to determine who is involved in a matter under investigation.1 It may also include an intercept without warrant where a necessary consent has been given (RIPA 2000, s 48(4)). The Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Directed Surveillance and Covert Human Intelligence Sources) Order 2010, SI 2010/521 lists the ranks of individuals who may give authorisations and limits on authorisations. A code of guidance covers such intelligence.2 The Information Commissioner has dealt with requests for information about surveillance. In FS50289146 a request was made to the MoJ for a list of prisoners who had been subject to covert surveillance in either Belgium, HMP Belmarsh or the Old Bailey during a specified period. The public authority refused to confirm or deny if it held information falling within the scope of this request, citing the exemptions provided by ss 23(5) (information relating to, or supplied by, security bodies), 24(2) (national security), 31(3) (prejudice to law enforcement), 40(5) (personal information) and 44(2) (statutory prohibitions to disclosure) of the Act in relation to HMP Belmarsh. In relation to Belgium and the Old Bailey, the complainant was advised to redirect his requests elsewhere. In relation to the HMP Belmarsh request, the Commissioner found that the public authority applied the exemptions provided by ss 23(5) and 24(2) correctly. However, in relation to the Belgium and Old Bailey requests, the Commissioner ruled that the public authority failed to confirm or deny whether it held information falling within the scope of these requests and, in so doing, did not comply with ss 1(1)(a) and 10(1). The Commissioner also found that the public authority breached FOIA 2000, s 17(1), (1)(c) and (3)(a). See T Pitt-Payne and A Proops Employee Surveillance (2011). The report of the chief surveillance commissioner for 2016 is at https://www.gov.uk/government/ publications/office-of-surveillance-commissioners-annual-report-2016. 2 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/covert-surveillance-and-covert-humanintelligence-sources-codes-of-practice (21/03/2018). 1

4.210  ‘Intrusive surveillance’ is covert surveillance carried out in relation to anything taking place on residential premises or in any private vehicle. This

488  Chapter 4 surveillance may be by a person or device inside such premises or a private vehicle or by means of a device placed outside ‘which consistently provides a product of equivalent quality and detail as a product which would be obtained from a device located outside.’ The use of a tracking device eg to locate a vehicle is not intrusive surveillance (s  25(4)) and nor is that obtained under s  48(4) above. Codes of practice cover covert surveillance and property interference: the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Covert Surveillance and Property Interference: Code of Practice) Order 2010, SI 2010/463 and 2014 code;1 the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Covert Human Intelligence Sources: Code of Practice) Order 2014, SI  2014/3119.2 The Scottish equivalent is the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Covert Human Intelligence Sources – Code of Practice) (Scotland) Order 2018, SSI 2018/53. Directed surveillance may be treated as intrusive by order of the Secretary of State such as, for instance, where property is used for legal consultations (RIPA 2000, s 47(1)(b) and SI 2010/461). https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/384975/Covert_ Surveillance_Property_Interrefernce_web__2_.pdf. 2 See also the Revised Code of Practice (August 2018) at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/ system/uploads/attachment_data/file/384976/Covert_Human_Intelligence_web.pdf. 1

4.211  A  ‘covert human intelligence source’ is someone who establishes relationships with another to facilitate: covert use of the relationship to obtain information or to provide access to any information to another person or (b) covertly discloses information obtained by the use of such a relationship or as a consequence of its existence. These may be added to by order. The Secretary of State may prescribe by order who within public authorities may authorise directed surveillance and covert human intelligence sources – details are contained in a code. These authorities have been extended by order (see SI 2010/521 below). Authorisations will only be given where necessary and proportionate. These areas have proved very controversial in cases where police undercover officers have formed intimate sexual relationships with targets when investigating political campaigners. It led to an inquiry being set up in 2014 but which will not hear evidence until 2019 because of numerous applications by officers to keep their identities secret.1 The chair was Mr Justice Mitting: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/jul/uk-undercoverpolicing-inquiry-change-of-chairman-pr-26-7-17.pdf.

1

4.212  Section 32 of RIPA 2000 allows intrusive surveillance to be authorised (ISA) by respective parties and ss  33–40 set out the procedure for obtaining ISAs for investigations carried out by the police, the National Crime Agency (NCA) and HMRC. NCA collaborative agreements between two or more forces are covered by s 33A. ISA can only be given for one of three grounds (unlike directed or covert sources where there are seven): protection of national security; prevention of serious crime or disorder; or protection of the economic well-being of the country. Where surveillance is necessary and proportionate, an ISA will be given by the Chief Constable etc, or where necessary by the Secretary of State, except where this is not practicable because of urgency. Approval will be given by

Central government  489 a Surveillance Commissioner (established under Part III of the Police Act 1997 now replaced by the IP Commissioner and Judicial Commissioners under the IPA) before an ISA can take effect. Under the 1997 Act, approval was required for sensitive information covered eg by legal privilege or confidentiality. Even where authorisations take effect without approval because of urgency, the chief constable etc will have to notify the Commissioner as soon as reasonably practicable giving reasons for proceeding without approval. Approval has to satisfy the dual tests of proportionality and necessity. A  Commissioner may quash an authorisation for the grounds stated in s 37 and an appeal lies to the IP Commissioner by a Chief Constable, etc where an authorisation is not approved or renewed. Special provisions apply to ISAs carried out by the intelligence services, the Ministry of Defence, HM forces or persons designated for the purposes of the section. These are authorised by the Secretary of State and do not involve the Commissioner. From the Secretary of State’s decision there is no appeal. Codes of Practice exist for Covert Human Intelligence Sources and Covert Surveillance (see above). Guidance is provided on precautions necessary for confidential (including confidential journalistic) and legally privileged information. In R  v Robinson the Court of Appeal Criminal Division examined the Code on Covert Human Intelligence Sources and held that use of solicitors or their clerks as informers would breach their duties to their clients and would also amount to breaches by police of duties owed to citizens.1 In McE v NI Prison Service2 the House of Lords ruled that intrusive surveillance may be used to eavesdrop on conversations between lawyers and their clients. Some forms of police surveillance such as keeping someone under observation, taking photographs, using informants or infiltration into organisations do not require prior approval of the surveillance commissioner. In Wood v Commissioner of Metropolitan Police the Court of Appeal ruled that on the facts taking and retaining photographs of Wood who was engaging in political protests at a meeting breached his ECHR, Art 8 rights.3 (2003) Times, 13 November. [2009] UKHL 15 3 [2009] EWCA Civ 414. More recent case law is discussed in para 2.235. 1 2

4.213  Intelligence services authorisations under Part II are made by warrant in accordance with s 5 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994 (see below). 4.214  Schedule  1 to RIPA  2000 lists those who are entitled to authorise directed surveillance and the use and conduct of covert intelligence sources under RIPA 2000, ss 28 and 29. As explained above, these authorities have been extended by SI  2010/521; arts 2 and 3 amend Schedule  1 to RIPA  2000 by adding to it a number of new public authorities (there are further and numerous amendments.1 Additional offices, ranks and persons for ‘urgent cases’ are listed in Art 4. Articles 5–8 list restrictions on authorisations. Designated individuals in the public authorities listed in Part I of Schedule 1 are entitled to authorise directed surveillance and the use and conduct of covert human intelligence sources under ss  28(3) and 29(3) of the 2000 Act, respectively. Designated individuals in the public authorities listed in Part II of Schedule 1 are only entitled to authorise directed surveillance under s  28(3) of the 2000 Act. Article  4 of this Order prescribes offices, ranks and positions for the purposes of s  30(1) of the 2000

490  Chapter 4 Act for both the public authorities already in Schedule 1 and those added to it by this Order. Individuals holding these prescribed offices, ranks or positions are designated under ss 28 and 29 of the 2000 Act as being able to authorise directed surveillance and the use and conduct of covert human intelligence sources. Earlier Orders are revoked by Art 10 of this Order. See https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/schedule/1.

1

4.215  Column 1 of the Schedule to the Order lists the public authorities. Column 2 specifies the individuals within each public authority that can authorise directed surveillance and the use and conduct of covert human intelligence sources. An individual holding an office, rank or position listed in column 2 of Part I of the Schedule may grant an authorisation under either s 28(3) or s 29(3) of the 2000 Act, other than where the Schedule indicates to the contrary. An individual holding an office, rank or position listed in column 2 of Part II of the Schedule may only grant an authorisation under s  28(3) of the 2000 Act. Individuals holding more senior offices, ranks or positions to those listed in column 2 may also authorise in the same circumstances as those to whom they are senior. Column 3 sets out certain less senior officials who can authorise in urgent cases. Column 4 sets out the grounds on which an authorisation can be given by reference to the grounds set out in the different paragraphs of ss 28(3) and 29(3) of the 2000 Act. For example, ground (b) is for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime or of preventing disorder. These are baffling regimes and the chief surveillance commissioner has the duty of keeping the operation of RIPA part two under review. 4.216  The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Part 2, chapter 2 amended RIPA 2000 so as to require local authorities to obtain judicial approval for the use of any one of the three covert investigatory techniques available to them under the Act, namely the acquisition and disclosure of communications data, and the use of directed surveillance and covert human intelligence sources (‘CHIS’). 4.217  Finally, Part III of RIPA  2000 deals with ‘Encryption’.1 Encryption protects information stored on mobile and static devices and in transmission. It is a way of safeguarding against unauthorised or unlawful processing of data. Encryption is a mathematical function using a secret value — the key — which encodes data so that only users with access to that key can read the information. The key is generated by an algorithm. In many cases encryption can provide an appropriate safeguard against the unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data, especially in cases where it is not possible to implement alternative measures. Information is encrypted and decrypted using a secret key (some algorithms use a different key for encryption and decryption). Without the key the information cannot be accessed in an intelligible form and is therefore protected from unauthorised or unlawful processing. It is a means of authenticating electronic messages to guarantee authenticity and confidentiality. See https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/encryption/; Building Confidence in Electronic Commerce HC  187 (1998–99) (Trade & Industry Committee); Building Confidence in Electronic Commerce, DTI  5  March 1999 and http://www.itgsnews.com/ encryption-ethical-issues/ (13/03/2018); https://wiki.openrightsgroup.org/wiki/Regulation_of_

1

Central government  491 Investigatory_Powers_Act_2000/Part_III (13/03/2018); R v S [2009] 1 All ER 716. On the 2007 Code of Practice https://wiki.openrightsgroup.org/wiki/Regulation_of_Investigatory_Powers_ Act_2000/Part_III, The Terrorism Act 2000, Sch  7 has been used to obtain secret passwords: Miranda v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 6.

4.218  The legislation allows a person who has come into possession of protected information – basically that lawfully obtained after seizure, interception etc and which is protected by keys – to serve a notice under s 49 on any person possessing a key to that information requiring the disclosure of the key. The requirement must be necessary and proportionate in the interests of national security, for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime or in the interests of the economic well-being of the UK. Disclosure of the information in an intelligible form instead of the key is permissible. Failure to comply with a notice is a criminal offence. A variety of statutory defences apply under s 53(4). A specific offence of ‘tipping off’ is created. This is where a person on whom a s 49 notice is served discloses anything required by the notice to be kept secret.1 Section 55 provides for safeguards in the exercise of powers under this part of the Act which must be read together with Sch  2. Schedule  2 provides that only a person with the appropriate authorisation can issue a notice and in paragraph 1 this means an authorisation obtained by a judge. However, it then goes on to cover a warrant issued by the Secretary of State! In R v S the Court of Appeal ruled that although requesting a key leading to a criminal charge may be self-incriminatory, it was not unfair or a breach of proportionality.2 A problem arises where access is requested to a social media account but the data are held in a foreign jurisdiction, such as Facebook which is based in the USA. Furthermore, the US authorities do not have powers of compulsion over data stored in another jurisdiction. A UK/USA communications exchange agreement is being considered to replace existing diplomatic procedures under the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT).3 These procedures were criticised by the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Cressida Dick, when a suspected child murderer was convicted under RIPA  2000 for refusing to allow access to his Facebook account, but Facebook would not allow access invoking the procedure. RIPA 2000, s 54. [2009] 1 All ER 716. See also Jalloh v Germany (2006) 20 BHRC 575, ECtHR. 3 See the US  Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act 2018 which will replace MLAT procedures (para 2.3 above). 1 2

4.219  This aspect of the Act on authorisations was heavily criticised by software groups, technology groups and pressure groups as well as civil liberties groups. Central to their concerns was a desire for judicial authorisation via a court and a technical evaluation by a board of industry experts. Nonetheless, successive Home Secretaries have sought to force a ‘backdoor’ into encrypted material enforcing access. This would, of course, deny its existence as encrypted material. 4.220  Unless any of the above information falls within s 4(3)(a) of the OSA 1989 (ie  intercepts), it would have to fall within s  4(1) or (2) of the OSA  1989 to be punishable under that Act. Special provision is made for the security and intelligence services.

492  Chapter 4 the security service acts 1989 and 1996, the intelligence services act 1994 (as amended) and disclosures under osa 1989, s 4(3)(b)

4.221  Section 4(3)(b) of OSA  1989 makes it a criminal offence to disclose without authority any information obtained by reason of action authorised by a warrant issued under s  3 of the Security Service Act 1989 (SSA  1989), any information relating to the obtaining of information by reason of any such action and any document or other article which is or has been used or held for use in, or has been obtained by reason of, any such action. Similar protection was afforded to information obtained by MI6 and General Communications Headquarters (the government’s intelligence gathering centre: see above) and warrants issued under s  5 and authorisations for overseas activities under s  7 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994 (ISA  1994). Section 7 was amended by the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, s 116 which added GCHQ to the list of agencies entitled to seek authorisation under s  7 for overseas activities. Section 7 basically authorises acts outside the UK which would be criminal or subject to civil liability within the UK and provides an immunity.1 Section 7(3) sets out strict conditions including necessity and reasonableness. The provision has understandably aroused criticism. The 2001 amendment also allows GCHQ and SIS to engage in authorised acts within the UK but only where the intention is to affect apparatus which is located abroad. Section 116 also aligns the definitions of prevention and detection of crime under which the security and intelligence services operate to that in RIPA  2000, s  81(5). The ISA 1994 further provided for a Parliamentary Committee to oversee the services. The committee structure and powers were reformed by the Justice and Security Act 2013. The Security Service Act 1996 attempted to define what amounts to serious criminal conduct for the purposes of invoking powers to issue warrants to intercept communications or enter or interfere with property or with wireless telegraphy within the UK or British islands by the Security Service.2 Where activities are carried out by the security and intelligence services under Part II of the RIPA 2000, concerning the use of covert, directed and intrusive surveillance techniques, are these covered by OSA 1989, s 4(3)(b)? They have to fall within the terms of the security and intelligence legislation, ie  they concern interference with private property, wireless telegraphy or unlawful acts (contrary to criminal or civil law) committed outside the UK. Those matters not so covered may well be offences under OSA 1989, s 1 and possibly s  3 (and also s  5 below). The Police Act 1997 regulated the use by police of electronic surveillance devices or ‘bugs’ on private property. Initial authorisation is by a Chief police or HMRC officer subject to prior approval by a Surveillance Commissioner (now IP Commissioner) where the intrusion was into people’s homes, offices or hotel bedrooms or on other grounds except in a case of urgency. A  code was issued under s  101(3) of the Police Act 1997.3 Codes have been drawn up by the Home Office on interception of communications, surveillance, use of informants, undercover operations and recording and dissemination of information.4 As explained, RIPA 2000 provided additional safeguards for intrusive surveillance.5 The activities of the police and others under Part II of RIPA 2000 who are not members of the intelligence and security services are not covered by OSA 1989, s 4(3)(b).

Central government  493 See Intelligence and Security Committee Report Detainee Mistreatment and Rendition 2001– 2010 HC 1113 and HC 1114 (2017–19). 2 On oversight of MI5 illegal activity, see http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/uk-unveilsoversight-directive-criminal-activities-intelligence-agencies-2055320832 (14/03/2018). 3 Intrusive Surveillance Code of Practice (2014) and see Commons Research Paper 00/25. 4 See para 4.209 above. 5 See para 4.201, note 1 above, and SI 2002/1298 under RIPA 2000, ss 28 and 29. 1

4.222  The Security Service Act 1989 placed the UK security services (MI5) on a statutory footing.1 ISA 1994 does likewise with the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and General Communications HQ – now known as the ‘Intelligence Services’. The Secretary of State appoints a Director-General (DG) who is responsible for the efficiency of the secret service and who is under a duty, under s 2(2), to ensure: ‘(a) that there are arrangements for securing that no information is obtained by the service except so far as necessary for the proper discharge of its functions, or disclosed by it except so far as necessary for that purpose or for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime or for the purpose of any criminal proceedings;2 and also (b) that the service does not take any action to further the interests of any political party.’3 Similar provisions apply to the Chief of MI6 and the Director of GCHQ. MI6 is secret intelligence. Until the 1989 Act MI5 operated under the Maxwell-Fyfe Directive of 24  September 1952 issued to its Director-General by the then Home Secretary. See Lord Denning’s inquiry into the Profumo scandal, Cmnd 2152 (1963). See also Lord Donaldson MR in A-G v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1988] 3 All ER 545 at 605 on MI5 and breaches of the law. It is not clear what prerogative powers survive the Act: R  v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Northumbria Police Authority [1988] 1 All ER 556, CA – a chief officer of police’s powers were not exhausted by the Police Act 1964. See generally, Birkinshaw Freedom of Information: the Law, the Practice and the Ideal (4th edn, 2010) ch 2. 2 Security Service Act 1989, s 2(2)(a) as amended. 3 ISA 1994, s 2(2)(b). 1

4.223  The DG is also under a duty in relation to arrangements to coordinate activities with police forces and law enforcement agencies under s 1(4) below. 4.224  By s 1(2) and (3) of the SSA 1989, the functions of the service are: ‘the protection of national security and, in particular, its protection against threats from espionage, terrorism and sabotage, from the activities of agents of foreign powers and from actions intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means; and to safeguard the economic well-being of the United Kingdom against threats posed by the actions or intentions of persons outside the British Islands.’1 The functions of the intelligence service in s 1 of the ISA 1994 are: ‘(a) to obtain and provide information relating to the actions or intentions of persons outside the British Islands; and (b) to perform other tasks relating to the actions or intentions of such persons.

494  Chapter 4 (2)  The functions of the Intelligence Service shall be exercisable only– (a) in the interests of national security, with particular reference to the defence and foreign policies of Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom; or (b) in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom; or (c) in support of the prevention or detection of serious crime.’ The Australian and Canadian security services have a much narrower remit: Birkinshaw Freedom of Information: The Law, The Practice and The Ideal (2010) ch 2, and Leigh and Lustgarten (1989) Mod LR 801 and In from the Cold (1994, OUP). See the Hutton Inquiry HC 247 (2003–04) and the Butler Inquiry HC 898 (2003–04) and the Chilcot Inquiry report on its website: http://www. iraqinquiry.org.uk/.

1

4.225  A  new s  1(4) of the SSA  1989 was added by the Security Service Act 1996 and gives the service the function of supporting police forces and the National Crime Agency and other law enforcement agencies in the prevention and detection of serious crime. The 1996 Act also amended the ISA  1994 by enabling the Home Secretary to issue warrants to the security service entitling it to enter upon or interfere with property or to interfere with wireless telegraphy in the UK in relation to their new powers in circumstances where such entry or interference would otherwise be unlawful. 4.226  Information obtained by the service shall not be disclosed for use in determining whether a person should be employed, or continue to be employed, by any person, or in any office or capacity, except in accordance with provisions on that behalf approved by the Secretary of State.1 ISA 1994, s 2(3).

1

4.227  Annual reports must be made by the Director on the work of the service to the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State, and the Director may make reports to either of them on any matter relating to its work. 4.228  Under s 3(1) of the SSA 1989 (superseded by s 5 of the ISA 1994 and applicable to MI6 and GCHQ), entry or interference with property shall not be unlawful (ie neither a crime nor a tort) if authorised by the Secretary of State’s warrant. By s 5(2) of the 1994 Act: ‘The Secretary of State may on an application made by the Service[s] [MI5 and MI6] and GCHQ issue a warrant under this section authorising the taking of such action as is specified in the warrant in respect of any property so specified if the Secretary of State enables the SIS to perform their functions as defined; that the action to be taken is proportionate to what the action seeks to achieve (a) thinks it necessary for the action to be taken in order to obtain information which: (i) it is likely to be of substantial value in assisting the SIS to discharge any of its functions; and (ii) cannot reasonably be obtained by other means; and (b) is satisfied that satisfactory arrangements are in force under section 2(2) (a) [of the 1989 Act …] with respect to the disclosure of information

Central government  495 obtained by virtue of this section and that the information obtained under the warrant will be subject to those arrangements.’ 4.229  Under s 6(1) of the ISA 1994, a warrant must not be issued under this section except: ‘(a) under the hand of the Secretary of State; or (b) in an urgent case where the Secretary of State has expressly authorised its issue and a statement of that fact is endorsed on it, under the hand of a senior official.’ 4.230  By s 6(2), a warrant will, unless renewed under sub-s (3), cease to have effect: ‘(a) if the warrant was under the hand of the Secretary of State, at the end of the period of six months beginning with the day on which it was issued; (b) in any other case, at the end of the period ending with the fifth working day following that day. (3) If at any time before the day on which a warrant would cease to have effect the Secretary of State considers it necessary for the warrant to continue to have effect for the purpose for which it was issued, he may by an instrument under his hand renew it for a period of six months beginning with that day. (4) The Secretary of State shall cancel a warrant if he is satisfied that the action authorised by it is no longer necessary.’ 4.231  The appointment of a Commissioner1 to keep under review the exercise of SIS powers was the responsibility of the Intelligence Services (MI5, MI6 and GCHQ) Commissioner appointed under RIPA 2000, s 59. The position is now governed by Part 8 of the IPA 2016 and the IP Commissioner has this responsibility added to his remit. The provisions concerning the Commissioner and his investigation of complaints under the SSA 1989, and similar provisions relating to the Commissioner and complaints under the ISA 1994, were therefore repealed and taken over by RIPA 2000 and now by the 2016 Act. The IP Commissioner will deal with investigatory matters and undertake, with the assistance of the Judicial Commissioners and staff, the functions currently undertaken by the Intelligence Services Commissioner, the Interception of Communications Commissioner and the Surveillance Commissioners. Additional functions relating to SIS may be added by the Secretary of State (IPA 2016, s 232). The Commissioner, who is or was a senior judge, keeps under review the exercise of the powers by the Secretary of State, inter alia, to issue warrants under ss 5 and 7 of the ISA 1994 (which now covers the Security Service); powers and duties conferred or imposed upon the Secretary of State by the IPA 2016 in connection with the activities of the Intelligence services as well as similar powers exercised in stated circumstances by Ministry of Defence officials and Her Majesty’s forces. The Commissioner must also assist the Tribunal (which succeeds the Tribunal established under the earlier legislation) in, significantly, the investigation of complaints within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The jurisdiction is spelt out in s  65 and crucially covers ‘proceedings against the intelligence services’ or others acting on their

496  Chapter 4 behalf. It involves a complaint by a ‘person who is aggrieved by any conduct’ falling within the section.2 It would include a complaint by a member or former member of the Intelligence services. Section 236 of the IPA 2016 provides that, if the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament refers an issue to the IP  Commissioner with the intention that the Commissioner should carry out an investigation, inspection or audit, then the IP  Commissioner must inform the Committee of their decision as to whether to do so. Section 237 allows individuals to give information to the Judicial Commissioners regardless of any legal restrictions, ie to express concerns. This does not protect a breach of the DPA where a provision is not exempt. An Investigatory Powers Commissioner for Northern Ireland is established under s 61 of RIPA 2000. By the PM. The Commissioner is a person holding, or who has held, high judicial office. For the 2016 annual report, see https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ uploads/attachment_data/file/669932/ISCom_Open_annual_report_2016.pdf (5/03/2018). The first IP Commissioner is Sir Adrian Fulford. 2 RIPA  2000, s  65 states that the Tribunal will be the only body dealing with alleged actions incompatible with the Convention rights which are actions of the intelligence services or persons acting on their behalf; proceedings under s  55(4) concerning loss or damage involving a key; and proceedings taking place in challengeable circumstances (see sub-s  (7)) of conduct falling within sub-s (5). Such circumstances are established where there is no warrant or authority but ‘the circumstances are such that (whether or not there is such authority) it would not have been appropriate for the conduct to take place without it, or at least without proper consideration having been given to whether such authority should be sought.’ Where Intelligence services’ action is not authorised by warrant or authorisation, the service is subject to the ordinary law of the land: cf Lord Donaldson MR in A-G v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1988] 3 All ER 545 at 605. However, the Tribunal will be the only, or the ‘appropriate’ Tribunal for matters within this section. See R (A) v B [2010] UKSC 12 at para 4.233, note 3 below. 1

4.232  The Commissioner has to inform the Tribunal of his or her opinion on any complaint referred if the Tribunal so requires. Section 235 of the IPA 2016 ensures that the Judicial Commissioners have access to the information necessary to carry out the Commissioners’ oversight role effectively. The section does this by requiring people to provide a Judicial Commissioner with all the information and documents that the Commissioner may need. People must also provide the Commissioner with any assistance they may need when carrying out investigations, inspections or audits. This section does not limit what such assistance may include, but makes clear that it includes providing access to technical systems. The duties to provide information and assistance apply very widely. The persons to whom these obligations apply include anyone working for a public authority, telecommunications and postal operators who are subject to obligations under this Act and anyone who is or may be required to provide assistance under the Act. Every member of the services, and every official of the department of the Secretary of State, and every member of the armed forces shall disclose or give to the Commissioner such documents or information as s/he may require for the purpose of enabling the Commissioner to discharge his or her functions. The Commissioner makes an annual report to the Prime Minister and may make additional reports (IPA 2016, s 234). Annual reports are laid before Parliament, but

Central government  497 under s 234(7) the Prime Minister may exclude material from the parliamentary report, after consulting the Commissioner, the publication of which would be ‘contrary to the public interest or prejudicial to: national security; the prevention or detection of serious crime; the economic well-being of the UK …’. Where this appears to the Prime Minister to be necessary, a statement signifying that material is excluded will also be presented under s 234(6). Section 231 of the IPA 2016 provides for a process through which people can be informed of any serious relevant error in the use of investigatory powers that relates to them. A relevant error means an error made by a public authority in complying with any requirement over which the IP Commissioner has oversight. The IP Commissioner must inform the person affected by a relevant error if the error is serious and if it is in the public interest for the person to be informed. An error can only be considered serious if it has caused significant prejudice or harm to the person concerned. In deciding whether informing the person is in the public interest, the Commissioner must balance on one hand the seriousness of the error and the impact on the person concerned, and on the other hand the extent to which disclosing the error would be contrary to the public interest or would be prejudicial to national security, the prevention and detection of serious crime, the economic well-being of the UK, or the ability of the intelligence agencies to carry out their functions. If the IP Commissioner decides that the person should be informed, that person must also be informed of any right they have to bring a claim in the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. The person must also be provided with the details necessary to bring such a claim, to the extent that disclosing information is in the public interest. The IP Commissioner’s annual report (see IPA 2016, s 234) must include details regarding errors, including the number of errors the Commissioner becomes aware of, and the number of times a person has been informed of an error. The Information Commissioner must audit requirements or restrictions concerning data retained subject to a retention notice under Part 4 of the Act, ie retention of data communications and their security (IPA 2016, s 244).

the tribunal

4.233  Section 65 of RIPA 2000 establishes a Tribunal to deal with complaints as specified in the section or in relation to any actions of the Intelligence services incompatible with Convention rights ‘or people acting on their behalf’;1 complaints concerning the use of investigatory powers under the 2000 Act; ‘or any other entry on or interference with property or any interference with wireless telegraphy’ and various other matters including the disclosure of encryption keys (see below). We saw above how an appeal on a point of law may be made to the relevant court of appeal in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.2 Additionally, the Supreme Court has ruled that complaints about breaches of ECHR, Art 10 when a former member of MI5 was refused authorisation to

498  Chapter 4 publish his memoirs had to be dealt with before the RIPA tribunal and not by judicial review. This would protect the secrecy and closed nature of the tribunal’s procedures where necesary.3 Furthermore, the ECtHR has found no breaches of arts 8 and 13 in the use of the tribunal and its use of secretive processes. The 2000 Act and relevant codes contained necessary safeguards and were proportionate.4 This will cover employment vetting. In R  v Security Service Tribunal, ex p Harman and Hewitt (14  February 1992, unreported) QB Kennedy J questioned the efficacy of s 5(4) of the Security Service Act 1989 which sought to prevent legal challenge of decisions of the forerunner to the present Tribunal; see also R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Al Fayed [1997] 1 All ER 228, CA, where Lord Woolf ruled that the British Nationality Act 1981, s 44(2) which stated that nothing in the Act required reasons for decisions on nationality did not prevent the giving of an outline explanation for a refusal and any decision made unfairly was made outside jurisdiction. In R  (Privacy International) v Secretary of State [2017]  EWHC  114 (Admin) the Divisional Court ruled that RIPA 2000, s 67(8) did successfully prevent judicial review although one judge had misgivings. The appeal was dismissed in R (Privacy International) v IPT [2017] EWCA Civ 1868. There is now an appeal provided on a point of law to the Court of Appeal (para 4.207). 3 R (A) v B [2010] UKSC 12. 4 Kennedy v UK (2011) 52 EHRR 4 and see Edwards v UK [2005) 40 EHRR 24. In Big Brother Watch et al v UK [2018] ECHR 722 the First Section CHR ruled that the tribunal’s procedures under RIPA did not breach Art 6 ECHR. 1 2

4.234  Sections 67–68 of RIPA  2000 concern the jurisdiction and procedure of the Tribunal and s 69 makes extensive provision for rules regulating tribunal jurisdiction including its treatment of evidence. The Secretary of State may make codes for the exercise of powers under the Act and other matters, and failure to comply with the codes shall not of itself make any person liable to any criminal or civil proceedings (RIPA 2000, s 72(2)).

additional safeguards

4.235  Sections 26–29 of the IPA 2016 contain additional safeguards in relation to targeted intercept warrants. This covers legal privilege, MPs and confidential journalistic material and journalistic sources. Sections 150–156 provide restrictions in the case of bulk interception warrants. Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the IPA 2016 contains restrictions on the use of, or disclosure of, material obtained on warrants, eg  safeguards on retention and disclosure of material, disclosure overseas, additional safeguards for legally privileged material, and the exclusion and exceptions for not using material in legal proceedings (which have been noted at para 4.205 above).1 Sections 76 and 77 contain additional protections on the obtaining of communications data including use of single point of contact and judicial approval for identifying or confirming journalistic sources. Sections 88–93 provide additional safeguards for retention of communications data. Sections 171–173 deal with bulk acquisition restrictions. Sections 111–114 provide additional safeguards in relation to equipment interference similar to interception safeguards. Sections 191–197 concern on bulk equipment interference warrants. Sections 220–226 are on bulk datasets. This is a complex statutory edifice but it is well to recall judgments from the not so distant past on

Central government  499 the relationship between the statutory and prerogative powers of public order and, by implication, national security.2 See Privy Council Review of Intercept as Evidence Cm 7324 (2008). R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Northumbria Police Authority [1989] 1 QB 26.

1 2

the ipa 2016 and future amendments

4.236  The IPA  2016 faces difficulties and amendment is unavoidable. The future of the Act in relation to communications data and bulk data sets and bulk data have been thrown into doubt by a judgment of the Grand Chamber of the ECJ.1 The English Court of Appeal2 had referred a case to that court seeking clarification on the question of the effect of the decision in Digital Rights (Joined cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, 8  April 2014) on the temporary legislative replacement to provisions in RIPA  2000 which are now themselves replaced by the IPA  2016. Basically, did the Digital Rights judgment lay down mandatory requirements for domestic legislation governing access to such data by authorities? In particular, the ECJ ruled that the relevant Directive (2002/58/ EC, as amended) read in the light of Arts 7, 8, 11 and 52(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) precludes national legislation, for the purpose of fighting crime, providing for general and indiscriminate retention of all traffic and location data of all subscribers and registered users to all means of electronic communications. Secondly, there was a breach where the access to the data was not restricted to fighting serious crime and where access is not subject to prior review by a court or an independent administrative authority. The Court of Appeal declared that the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014, s 1, which had been enacted to place communications on a domestic footing, was inconsistent with EU law on the second point but decided not to make a ruling in relation to blanket retention powers.3 References from the Investigatory Powers Tribunal to the ECJ have raised wider points that the Court of Appeal did not rule upon in relation to bulk powers and the SIS.4 The Home Secretary also commenced a consultation on necessary reforms to the IPA 2016 to comply with the ECJ judgments.5 In Liberty the Divisional court declared Part 4 of the IPA 2016 unlawful under the CFR because, in the area of criminal justice: (1) access to retained data is not limited to the purpose of combating ‘serious crime’; and (2) access to retained data is not subject to prior review by a court or an independent administrative body.6 The government was given six months from the date of the judgment to enact the changes. Furthermore, in Big Brother Watch v UK,7 the ECtHR ruled that the bulk interception regime under Chapters I  and II of RIPA  2000 breached Article 8 ECHR and, in both cases in relation to journalists and public interest NGOs, Art 10. This refers to the pre-2016 regime. There was a lack of adequate oversight of the entire selection process for bulk interception and an absence of safeguards for the selection of related communications data (para  387). There was no evidence that SIS were abusing their powers under s  8(4) of RIPA 2000. The intelligence-sharing facilities under PRISM and Upload with the US National Security Agency were ruled Art 8 compliant. The case arose

500  Chapter 4 from the Snowden revelations. The IPT was given a clean bill of health by the CHR and its procedures did not constitute a breach of Art 6. Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15 Tele2 Sverige AB  v Post- och telestyrelsen (Case C-203/15  ECJ  [2016]) and Secretary of State for the Home Department v Tom Watson (Case C-698/15 ECJ [2016]). 2 [2015] EWCA Civ 1185 which was after the High Court ruled certain features of the temporary legislation to breach Arts 7 and 8 of the CFR. 3 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Watson [2018] EWCA Civ 70. 4 Privacy International v Secretary of State https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/ investigatory-powers-act-2016 and http://www.ipt-uk.com/judgments.asp?id=40. The IPT has also ruled that there were breaches of Arts 8 and 10 ECHR in relation to surveillance prior to 2016. In July 2018 it ruled that bulk data powers had been wrongfully delegated to GCHQ by the Secretary of State until October 2016: Privacy International v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs et al [2018] UKIPTrib IPT/15/110/CH. Arrangements for data sharing were Art 8 compliant. 5 https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/investigatory-powers-act-2016. The ECJ judgments being those in notes 1 and 4 above. 6 R (Liberty) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWHC 975 (Admin). 7 Court of Human Rights, First section [2018] ECHR 722. There were no breaches of Articles 6 and 14 ECHR. 1

4.237  From January to December 2015, 761,702 items of data were acquired by public authorities, 85.8 per cent of which was for the statutory purpose of preventing or detecting crime or of preventing disorder; and 53 per cent of the data acquired for that purpose was in relation to four types of crime: drugs offences, sexual offences, theft offences, and fraud and deception offences.1 The consultation did not include the SIS and their powers because the government believed that Art 4(2)  TEU made national security a domestic matter and the CFR only had competence within EU law. The ECJ judgment did not apply to ‘entity data’ (IPA 2016, s 261), the government believed but, in future, requests for such data would be authorised in the same manner as ‘events data’ (s 261) (see Liberty judgment, above, at para 154, and paras 2.34 et seq of the Data Communication Code of Practice 2018). The ECJ case covered ‘events data’, ie trafficking and location and views were sought. Changes to the IPA 2016 would be effected by regulations and additions to the code of practice.2 Codes will have statutory force and authorities must have regard to them in exercising powers under the legislation. The code is admissible as evidence in criminal and civil proceedings, and may be taken into account by any court, tribunal or supervisory authority when determining a question arising in connection with those functions.3 The ECJ judgment does not apply to the retention or acquisition of data for national security purposes, the consultation asserted. The three UK security and intelligence agencies (MI5, MI6 and GCHQ) primarily exist to manage national security threats to the UK. The Government considers that their activities, including requests for communications data for the statutory purpose of crime, ‘fall outside the scope of EU law and the CJEU’s judgment’.4 The government did not consider that the existing domestic data retention regime is ‘general and indiscriminate’. It currently provides that data retention is based on objective criteria (p  14). Access to such data must be necessary, proportionate and in accordance with the law. However, amendments would: require that a notice

Central government  501 must specify the services to which it relates and require that the Secretary of State must specifically consider which of the operator’s services the notice should relate to; require consideration of whether it would be appropriate to restrict a notice by geography or exclude groups of customers; and more closely link the benefits of the notice to the statutory purpose by ensuring that the Secretary of State takes into account the statutory purpose(s) for which the notice is being given when considering the potential benefits of the notice, ie the Secretary of State will need to consider how the retention of data would, for instance, be beneficial in the prevention and detection of serious crime, rather than how the retention of the data would be beneficial more generally, ie greater specificity. The government would define more carefully the ‘serious crime’ permitting retention and access to data and to remove three, but not all, of the current justifications: public health, taxation and financial matters. ‘Serious crime’ is a crime carrying a minimum sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment as specified; there are several other reasons to order retention and access to data, but only serious crime allows access to traffic and location data. These other reasons are, for instance, public safety, miscarriages of justice or for identification of individuals and preventing death or injury to health. The draft Regulations create a new power for the IP Commissioner to authorise communications data access requests. The IP Commissioner will delegate these functions to a newly appointed body of staff, to be known as the Office for Communications Data Authorisations (OCDA). OCDA will report directly to the IP  Commissioner, and will be responsible for considering the vast majority of requests to access communications data made by public authorities. Senior officers, as set out, will be able to give authorisations in urgent cases. Because of the government’s views on national security above, the designated senior officers will continue to authorise these requests for retention and access. SIS will continue to authorise the ‘vast majority’ of their applications internally (p  19). The government believed that existing safeguards removed any need to notify individuals affected. The ECJ had ruled that notification should be given to data subjects when such notification would not jeopardise the investigation being undertaken. If still being undertaken, it is difficult to see how it will not be prejudiced. Consultation (para 4.236, note 5 above), p 6. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/663677/ November_2017_IPA_Consultation_-_Draft_regulations_amending_the_IP_Act.pdf. See Data Retention and Acquisition Regulations 2018, SI 2018/1123. 3 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/663675/ November_2017_IPA_Consultation_-_Draft_Communications_Data_Code_of_Pract….pdf. 4 Ibid, p 11. 1 2

INFORMATION ENTRUSTED ‘IN CONFIDENCE’ TO OTHER STATES OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 4.238  This area is covered by s  6(1) of the OSA  1989. It applies where any information, document or other article, which relates to security or intelligence, defence or international relations – as defined in ss  1, 2 and 3 respectively – and which has been communicated in confidence by or on behalf of the UK to another state or to an international organisation, has come into a person’s1

502  Chapter 4 possession as a result of having been disclosed (whether to that person or another) without the authority of the state or organisation or, in the case of an organisation, of a state which is a member of it. The offence relates to ‘damaging’ (infra) disclosures made without lawful authority which are not offences under ss 1–3 above (s 6(2)). In other words, the offence is aimed at persons who receive, and make a damaging disclosure of, such information without authority, even when leaked and published, without authority, overseas.2 ‘Person’ is not defined; Crown servants’ and government contractors’ offences will be catered for by ss 1–3. 2 See note 1. 1

4.239  Information etc is communicated ‘in confidence’ if it is communicated on terms requiring it to be held in confidence or in circumstances in which the person communicating it could reasonably expect that it would be so held (s 6(5)). There is no requirement that the information is protected by the law of confidentiality. 4.240  ‘Damaging’ vis-à-vis a disclosure shall be determined in the same way as it would for a Crown servant acting in contravention of s 1(3), 2(1) or 3(1) above.1 It is an essential requirement that the defendant knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, that the information etc is of the kind mentioned in s 6(1), that it came into his or her possession as there mentioned and that its disclosure would be damaging. In other words, these are ingredients of the substantive offence under s  6 and indicate that the prosecution must prove to the criminal standard the presence of mens rea in relation to the category of information, the method of acquisition (without authority), and that its disclosure would be damaging. OSA 1989, s 6(4). For the purposes of s 6 ‘security or intelligence’, ‘defence’ and ‘international relations’ have the same meaning as in OSA 1989, ss 1, 2 and 3.

1

4.241  An offence is not committed if the information etc is disclosed by that person with the lawful authority, or it has previously been made publicly available with the authority, of the state or organisations concerned or, in the case of an organisation, of a member of it. Authority would have to be from an appropriate level.1 ‘Duly given’ on behalf of: OSA 1989, s 7(6).

1

RECEIPT OF UNAUTHORISED INFORMATION OR THAT ENTRUSTED IN CONFIDENCE 4.242  Sections 1–4 of the OSA 1989 constitute the six categories of information to be protected by the OSA 1989: security and intelligence; defence; international relations; information obtained in confidence from other states or from international organisations; crime; and special investigation powers. Section 5 is concerned with the recipient of information etc protected by ss 1–4. The section applies when ‘protected’ information comes into a person’s possession after:1

Central government  503 (a) disclosure (whether to that person or another) by a Crown servant or government contractor without lawful authority;2 or (b) it is entrusted by a Crown servant or government contractor on terms requiring it to be held in confidence or in circumstances in which the Crown servant or government contractor could reasonably expect that it would be so held (so disclosing is not authorised); or (c) it was disclosed (whether to that person or another) without lawful authority by a person to whom it was entrusted as specified in (b), supra; and the disclosure as above is not an offence under ss 1–4 by the recipient (he is not a Crown servant, notified person or government contractor). OSA 1989, s 5(1)(a)(i), (ii) and (iii). Much has been made of the fact that OSA 1989, s 5(1) appears to contain a serious (from the government’s perspective) omission. It does not refer to former Crown servants or government contractors. As the situation was meant to deal with the ‘Wright’ situation, infra, where the press published information from a former security official, there appears to be substance in the observation. OSA  1989, s  5(1)(a)(iii) only deals with intermediaries who have received ‘in confidence’. What are the possibilities of conspiracy charges under the Criminal Law Act 1977 involving members of the press and media and offences involving attempts, aiding and abetting or encouraging crime under the common law or other statutory provisions? See Birkinshaw Freedom of Information: The Law, The Practice and The Ideal (4th edn, 2010) pp 103–105. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 was used by the police to attempt to obtain information from journalists about those police officers who had leaked information in breach of OSA 1989, s 4(1) and (2) in the hacking scandal in 2011. The application to the court was dropped after much public criticism. On notified persons and s 5, see Law Commission (para 4.300 below), para 3.59.

1 2

4.243  The person into whose possession the information etc has come will be guilty of an offence if s/he discloses it without lawful authority, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that it is protected against disclosure by the foregoing provisions, and that it came into that person’s possession as above. No offence is committed by a person under this section (s 5) where the disclosure is an offence by that person (‘that person’ is a Crown servant, government contractor or a ‘notified person’) under ss  1–4. The prosecution must prove these matters on the criminal standard of proof to gain a conviction and it must also prove that the disclosure of information protected by ss  1–3 above was damaging – as described in s 1(3), 2(1) or 3(1) – and that the defendant made it knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe, that it would be damaging. This requirement does not apply to disclosures under s 4(3) concerning intercept or special investigation powers and unauthorised disclosure of information about or from these. Damage is assumed in the disclosure itself of such information. 4.244  A  limitation on the chain is effected by s  5(4) which stipulates that, where it was disclosed without lawful authority by a government contractor or it was disclosed without lawful authority to a person to whom it was entrusted in confidence by a Crown servant or government contractor, an offence is not committed unless the disclosure was by a British citizen or took place in the United Kingdom, in any of the Channel Islands, or in the Isle of Man or colony. 4.245  The further along a chain of recipients information goes, the more difficult it will be for the prosecution to establish the essential conditions for the

504  Chapter 4 offence. The provisions certainly contemplate and embrace a journalist receiving information in contravention of the provisions and an editor publishing that disclosure. 4.246  Crown servant or government contractor

recipient ‘in confidence etc’

third party

fourth party? Caught by ‘whether to him or another’?

Figure 4.1  Who is caught by s 5(1)?

4.247  This interpretation seems to create a chain ad infinitum potentially (see above). 4.248  Under s 5(5) information is protected against disclosure by the foregoing provisions of this Act if: (a) it relates to security or intelligence, defence or international relations within the meaning of s 1, 2 or 3 or is confidential information etc obtained from a foreign state or international organisation; or (b) it is information etc to which s  4 applies (crime and special investigation powers). 4.249  A  person is guilty of an offence if without lawful authority s/he discloses any information, document or other article which s/he knows or has reasonable cause to believe, to have come into his or her possession as a result of a contravention of s 1 of the OSA 1911 (see para 4.155 above on OSA 1911, s 1). A defence of prior publication (above) was rejected by the government in relation to this section of the 1989 Act.

WHAT CONSTITUTES LAWFUL AUTHORITY? 4.250 Lawful authority is central to the scheme of the OSA 1989. The 1989 legislation avoids problematic phrases such as ‘interest’ or ‘interests’ of the state when describing those occasions when a person is justified in disclosing information, although s 2 of the OSA 1911 spoke of being ‘authorised’. 4.251 For the purposes of the OSA 1989 a disclosure by a Crown servant or a person notified under OSA 1989, s 1(1) is made with lawful authority, ‘if, and only if, it is made in accordance with his official duty’ (and see SI 1990/200). There is judicial support for the view that official duty means within the ordinary chain of command, presumably going up to and including the Permanent Secretary and minister as adviser to the Crown.1 Although a civil servant is a servant of the Crown in constitutional and legal doctrine, s/he is a servant to his or her minister who is head of the department or institution, and ultimately the government collectively in a functional sense. His or her terms and conditions of employment

Central government  505 are laid out in great detail in codes, regulations and circulars. The view of the Head of the Home Civil Service on the relationship between, and duties owed by, civil servants to ministers have been described above, and in July 1989 a draft revision of the code insisted upon a lifelong duty of confidentiality by all existing and former civil servants to government and the duty covers all information not sanctioned to be made public, whether or not it is covered by the OSA 1989. The Civil Service Code and Management Code (2016) now set out the range of duties (para  4.147 above).2 As we saw above, the present position is not as strict as this as it refers to ‘civil servants’, not former civil servants and does not speak of a life-long duty. The strict approach is the judicially accepted version of official duty for security and intelligence staff,3 though whether the courts will protect confidentiality by interim injunction will depend upon the circumstances (see para 4.347 below). A distinction has been drawn between members of the security and intelligence services and possibly designated officials who work with them and other civil servants. Both the common law and the OSA 1989 impose stricter duties of confidentiality on the former. See: McGowan J in R v Ponting [1985] Crim LR 318. See, incidentally, Carltona Ltd v Comrs of Works [1943] 2 All ER 560, CA and cf R (NASHA) v Secretary of State for Health (2005) Times, 9 March; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Oladehinde [1990] 2 All ER 367, CA. 2 In 1989, it was reported that about ten civil servants a year were disciplined for breaches of confidentiality and ‘political offences’ Hansard Official Report (6th series), 30  October 1989 (R  Luce MP). Civil Service unions have argued that duties are owed to, eg  the Crown in Parliament, ie  MPs. The ‘Crown in Parliament’ is a legislative device and might refer to the presence of Ministers in Parliament. It does not cover MPs individually. On leaks from the Home Office to MPs, see HC 157 (2008-09) Home Affairs Committee and the Public Administration Committee’s Leaks and Whistleblowing in Whitehall HC 83 (2008–09). See para 4.274 below. 3 See paras 4.332 et seq and R v Shayler below. 1

4.252 A disclosure by a government contractor is made with lawful authority if, and only if, it is made in accordance with an official authorisation1 or for the purposes of the functions by virtue of which s/he is a government contractor and without contravening an official restriction.2 One which is duly given or imposed by a Crown servant or government contractor, or by or on behalf of a prescribed body or a body of a prescribed class. 2 OSA 1989, s 7(2). 1

4.253 A disclosure made by ‘any other person’ is made with lawful authority if, and only if, it is made: (a) to a Crown servant for the purposes of his or her functions as such (above); or (b) in accordance with an official authorisation. 4.254 If authorisation ‘by any other person’ is sought and refused, the refusal must comply with the House of Lords decision in R v Shayler.1 Shayler was a former Crown servant and not one still in service. A prohibition must be prescribed by law. There must be a pressing social need for which a prohibition is sought by the authorities and prohibition must be necessary in accordance with the discussion in Shayler and as exemplified in decisions such as ex p Daly which concerned rights under Article  8 and reading prisoners’

506  Chapter 4 privileged correspondence in their forcible absence from their cells in routine cell searches: by analogy with Daly the reasons for a prohibition on freedom of speech must be subjected to rigorous and intrusive review by the court to establish that the ban is ‘proportionate’.2 However, in other contexts courts have not insisted on such an invasive review and have been content to allow the body entrusted with the discretion to make an order on the merits banning a political broadcast on grounds of taste and decency with which the courts would be slow to interfere.3 Even in these sensitive fields, however, courts have developed a more exacting scrutiny where human rights are involved (paras 2.215 et seq, and below). See [2002] 2 All ER 477 (HL) and para 4.369, note 4. R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 2 AC 532 (HL). 3 R (ProLife Alliance) v BBC [2003] 2 All ER 977. See Animal Defenders (para 4.369 below). 1 2

4.255 Self-authorisation will presumably apply until such time as a disclosure by a Crown servant or minister is damaging and thereby outside official duties unless the latter is justified in making a damaging disclosure or permitting a servant to do likewise. Here, as ever, self-authorisation will be a mystery1 and doubtless widely practised where ‘damage’ as set out in the Act will not follow. See Franks, op cit, para 18.

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4.256 A party1 charged with an offence under ss 1–6 may prove, with the onus on that party, that at the time of the alleged offence s/he believed that s/he had lawful authority to make the disclosure in question and had no reasonable cause to believe otherwise. His or her simple belief is not enough, even if mistaken. S/he must not close his or her eyes to those things that would give that person reasonable cause to believe otherwise.2 Section 7(5) and (6) give further circuitous explanation on ‘official authorisation’ and ‘official restriction’ including that duly given under s 6 in relation to foreign states or international organisations. A Crown servant, government contractor, a person notified under s 1 or ‘any other person’. A jury should be told to consider whether prior publicity for information or acquiescence by the authorities may be taken as an implicit authorisation: R v Galvin [1987] 2 All ER 851, CA.

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SAFEGUARDING INFORMATION 4.257 Unlawful retention by a Crown servant,1 ie  contrary to his or her official duty, of documents2 etc which it would be an offence under the previous sections to disclose without lawful authority, is an offence (OSA 1989, s 8(1)(a)), as is failure to comply with an official direction (s 8(8)) to return or dispose of a document or article by a government contractor. For both parties it is an offence to fail to take such care to prevent the unauthorised disclosure of the document or article as a person in his or her position may reasonably be expected to take (s 8(1)). OSA 1989, s 8(3) includes as such those notified under s 1(1) even though not Crown servants or contractors. 2 Discs, tapes etc. 1

Central government  507 4.258 It is a defence under s 8(1)(a) for a defendant who is a Crown servant1 to prove that at the time of the alleged offence s/he believed that s/he was acting in accordance with his or her official duty and had no reasonable cause to believe otherwise. This includes those under a ‘notification’ in OSA 1989, s 1(1): s 8(3).

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4.259 Section 8(4) covers those who are not Crown servants and government contractors and makes it an offence for them not to comply with an official direction for the return or disposal of information etc, or, when entrusted in confidence under s  5, s/he fails to take such care to prevent its unauthorised disclosure as a person in their position may reasonably be expected to take (s 8(4)). Failure by a person to comply with an official direction to return documents or articles as described in s 6 is an offence (s 8(5)). 4.260 It is an offence to disclose any official information etc which a Crown servant or government contractor has had or has in their possession by their position as such, or which the discloser knows or has reasonable cause to believe was or is so possessed, and which can be used for the purpose of obtaining access to any information etc protected against disclosure by the foregoing provisions of this Act, and the circumstances of disclosure are such that it would be reasonable to expect that it might be used for that purpose without authority (s 8(6)).

ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL1 AND PENALTIES 4.261 Prosecution may only be brought with the consent of the AttorneyGeneral or A-G  (Northern Ireland), except for offences under s  4(2) of the OSA  1989 (relating to crime) where the respective Directors of Public Prosecutions have to consent. In Scotland, the Lord Advocate is responsible for prosecutions. In the Spycatcher episode, a decision not to seek an injunction against publishers and other authors was wrongly attributed to Sir Michael Havers, the Attorney General, by Sir Robert Armstrong, the Cabinet Secretary. In fact, Havers had not been consulted on the decision! Very often the role of the Attorney-General has raised questions. He is a member of the government and Cabinet as well as the government’s (Crown) legal officer. The suspicion in some quarters is he is already a parti pris or, worse, a cover for decisions taken elsewhere. When plans were developing for the Constitutional Governance and Reform Bill it was envisaged that the Attorney General’s consent for prosecution would be removed from many offences; the OSA 1989 was not included. See now A  Protocol between the Attorney General and Prosecuting Authorities (July 2009) which retains the requirement for the Attorney General’s consent for prosecution under the OSA 1989 or where national security is concerned. The Franks report on Section 2 Cmnd 5104 (1972) supported the role of the Attorney General (p 95) as did the 1988 paper Cm 408 para 69 and Lord Bingham in Shayler [2002] UKHL 11 para 35.

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4.262 Section 10 stipulates that for offences other than under s 8(1), (4) or (5) the penalty on conviction on indictment should be imprisonment for up to two years, or a fine, or both; on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or both.

508  Chapter 4

POLICE POWERS 4.263 Offences under the OSA 1989 are made arrestable under PACE 1984, s  24(2) except those under OSA  1989, s  8(1), (4) or (5). Section 9(1) of the OSA  1911 concerning search warrants shall include references to offences under the OSA 1989 except for s 8(1), (4) or (5) offences. Section 9(2) and Sch 1, para 3(b) of PACE 1984 shall apply to s 9(1) of the OSA 1989 as extended by this subsection; the former provisions in the PACE 1984 contain restrictions on obtaining evidence.1 Section 9(2) of PACE 1984 excludes items subject to legal privilege and certain other material from powers of search conferred by previous enactments; Sch 1, para 3(b) prescribes the access provisions for the special procedure laid down in the schedule. See para 4.181 above. See also R v Central Criminal Court, ex p Bright [2001] 2 All ER 244, DC. See Terrorism Act 2000, Sch 7 and R (Miranda) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 9 on journalistic sources’ protection.

1

EXCLUSION OF PUBLIC FROM PROCEEDINGS 4.264 Section 8(4) of the OSA 1920 which allows the public to be excluded from committals or trials shall have effect as if references to offences under that Act included references under the OSA 1989 apart from those in s 8(1), (4) or (5).1 OSA  1989, s  11(4). On common law powers to exclude the public from a criminal trial, see Guardian News & Media Ltd v R & Erol Incedal [2016] EWCA Crim 11.

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4.265 An act done abroad by British citizens or Crown servants, if an offence under the Act if performed in the UK, apart from s 8(1), (4) or (5), shall be an offence.

PUBLIC INTEREST DEFENCE 4.266 Previous attempts to reform s 2 of the OSA 1911 had included a public interest defence, viz that no offence was committed where an unauthorised disclosure was in the public interest. An amendment in the Commons allowed disclosure etc in the public interest ‘in so far as the [discloser] has reasonable cause to believe that it indicated the existence of crime, fraud, abuse of authority, neglect in the performance of official duty or other serious misconduct … or a serious threat to the health or safety of the public’. 4.267 The government rejected such a defence, arguing that the ‘public interest’ was present in deciding whether to prosecute and the prosecution assessing the degree of harm and public benefit. Further, a jury would have to be persuaded of damage and would be invited to consider the benefit in disclosure by the defence which would necessarily, in such a case, reject the allegation that the defendant’s act caused ‘harm’. ‘The Bill does not allow the defendant to argue that although the disclosure has caused the specific harm, and he knew that it

Central government  509 would, the court should weigh that against some other consideration.’1 The government also believed that the presence of such a defence would not help to clarify the law.2 We shall see how the public interest defence operates in the civil law of confidence in a later section (para 4.323 below). D Hurd MP HC Official Report (6th series) col 469, 21 December 1988. Cm 408 (1988) para 60. NB Financial Services Act 1986, s 180(2) and the original OSA 1889 had a public interest defence.

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4.268 The extent to which there is a defence available under the law of ‘necessity’ has been adverted to but not authoritatively determined.1 However, as was seen above, the prospect of damaging revelations of illegal or highly embarrassing high-handed actions by British officials and Ministers will doubtless have a constraining impact on decisions by the Attorney-General to prosecute. In R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice (not an OSA case) the Court of Appeal ruled there is no general defence of necessity.2 Where (or if) available, the defence was heavily qualified by context and must not be disproportionate and should not undermine a clear legislative policy.3 See R v Shayler in both the Court of Appeal and House of Lords (para 4.181 above). [2013] EWCA Civ 961. 3 Law Commission (para 4.300 below), paras 3.123 et seq. 1 2

4.269 The FOIA 2000 has, as we saw in ch 1, a pronounced public interest element in allowing disclosures. However, that Act, unlike previous unsuccessful FOI Bills, made no provision for reform of the OSA 1989.

DEFENCE OF PRIOR PUBLICATION 4.270 Such a defence was present for certain categories of information within the Protection of Information Bill 1979 which sought to reform OSA  1911, s  2. Basically, the defence would be available where the information had been published before. In the Lords an amendment was moved allowing a defence where ‘before the time of the alleged offence the information in question had become widely disseminated to the public whether in the UK or elsewhere’ adding ‘there was no reasonable likelihood that its further disclosure would damage the work of, or any part of, the security and intelligence services’. This latter part was to meet the government’s objection to such a defence, viz1 additional or more serious damage would be perpetrated by a second or further disclosure. In the USA under the FOI, this is described partially as an aspect of the ‘mosaic’ principle ie superficially innocuous information can be pieced together to make a damaging disclosure. The mosaic or ‘jigsaw’ was introduced into the draft 1999 FOI Bill but was removed in Parliament.

1

4.271 Prior publication was the government’s downfall in the Spycatcher litigation – the confidentiality of the information had evaporated by the time the final court order was sought. However, information can still be officially secret even though published,1 it was previously decided under the former s 2.2 Official secrecy and confidentiality may overlap but they are not the same thing,

510  Chapter 4 and the government insisted that no such defence would be available under the statute. If information is published prior to the disclosure, this will be an issue for the jury to consider in assessing the ‘damage’. This will not be available to breaches by security, intelligence and ‘notified’ officials under s 1 as that section creates an absolute offence for unauthorised disclosures when disclosed by such persons, whether or not theirs is an initial or subsequent disclosure,3 nor for offences under s  4(3). In case law concerning confidentiality, the courts have accepted a life-long or ‘absolute’ duty of confidentiality is owed by members of the intelligence services. Disclosures by them of information already in the public domain may cause additional damage; a disclosure of this information by such officials would certainly be a breach of contract the House of Lords has held.4 The Law Commission provisionally recommended that a defence of prior publication should be available where the defendant proves that the information is already in the public domain and widely disseminated.5 R v Crisp and Homewood (1919) 83 JP 121, CCA; R v Galvin [1987] 2 All ER 851, CA. See also Boyer v R (1948) 94 CCC 195 and R v Toronto Sun Publishing Ltd (1979) 47 CCC (2d) 535. 2 Acquiescence in publication by the authorities might amount to authorisation. 3 Financial Services Act 1986, s 180(1)(r) allows a defence of prior publication. 4 A-G v Blake [2000] 4 All ER 385, HL. 5 Law Commission (para 4.300 below), para 3.204. 1

4.272 A  defence is available under s  6(3) for disclosure by a person where information has been published by the proper authorities in foreign states or by the authority of an international organisation or member of it.

MPS AND PRIVILEGE 4.273 Disclosures to MPs are not protected under the statute as such; they are not ipso facto authorised recipients. An amendment (defeated) would have allowed non-Crown servants and non-government contractors to have disclosed information to MPs (147 HC Official Report (6th series), cols 505–543). 4.274 OSA  1989 does not interfere with parliamentary privilege, and statements by MPs in the House or anything said in committee proceedings are protected by absolute privilege. But this immunity does not protect a third party communicator of privileged information.1 The question of an MP’s privilege remains unaffected by this Act, but the other party will not be protected unless, eg, information was given in a parliamentary proceeding reported within the protection of the Parliamentary Publications Act. In 2008, an opposition frontbench spokesperson, Damian Green MP, was arrested after information was leaked to him by a civil servant. No charges were brought under OSA  1989, but the police were given permission, controversially, to search the MP’s office in Parliament by the serjeant-at-arms. A  special committee on privilege was established to investigate and report on the affair: Police Searches on the Parliamentary Estate HC  62 (2009–10). A  Cabinet Office guidance document exists on dealing with leaks: Official Information: Standards of Conduct and

Central government  511 Procedures (2009). Previous versions were not made public but the 2009 version is in the library of the House of Commons. The civil servant leaker was dismissed but no prosecutions were brought under the OSA 1989 or a common law offence of misconduct in public office: R v Bembridge (1783) 3 Doug KB 32.2 Conviction carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment and prosecutions under the common law offence have risen steadily in recent years to 21 in 2007 (para 49) mainly involving police officers and including offences of wrongful disclosure. Some of Green’s papers were covered by Parliamentary privilege and were returned to him. The committee recommended that the common law offence should not be used to subvert the intention of Parliament in the OSA 1989 to use the criminal law for specific and serious disclosures (para 54). HM  Inspectorate of Constabulary investigated the wider implications of the case and concluded that police should not be involved in investigation of unauthorised leaks where there is no evidence of an offence under the OSA or another serious criminal offence.3 A protocol was attached to the report which set out a seven-stage process for investigation of such leaks in the future which involved all relevant parties. MPs’ privilege, where engaged, must be addressed and constantly assessed in the investigation.4 The Committee on Privileges discussed the relationship between the OSA and an MP’s privilege in the Duncan Sandys MP case: HC 173 (1937–38) and HC 101 (1938–39); official secrecy and privilege were raised again in the ‘Zircon’ episode in 1987: HC 365 (1986–87). See Rost v Edwards [1990] 2 All ER 641; Prebble v NZTV Ltd [1994] 3 All ER 407; Hamilton v Al Fayed [2000] 2 All ER 224, HL and R v Chaytor [2010] UKSC 52. 2 R v Chapman [2015] EWCA Crim 539 – there has to be a specific guidance on ‘damage to the public interest’ for conviction; this case involved Operation Elveden (bribery involving £20 million). 3 Law Commission (2017), paras 5.3–5.17. 4 Lessons Learned from Metropolitan Police Service’s Investigation of Home Office Leaks (2009) HMIC. 1

LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE 4.275 Legal professional privilege (LPP) basically covers two situations: (a) communications between a lawyer and his client; and (b) communications with third parties concerning pending or contemplated litigation. Legal professional privilege is examined in ch  11. It has been a topic of considerable litigation in recent years. The point was raised that a communication under the OSA  1989 would not attract such privilege since the communication constituted the crime itself, an interpretation loosely supported by the Law Society. 4.276 The government believed that ‘the common law relating to LPP communications between a client and his solicitor’ was not affected by the Act:1 ‘LPP acts to prevent the production in evidence of [a communication between a client and a legal adviser] and hence to deprive of its foundation any prosecution that might ever be sought to be founded on such a

512  Chapter 4 communication … But of course it is well established that anyone who, when communicating with his solicitor, seeks the latter’s help in the furtherance of some criminal purpose, is disqualified in respect of that communication from the benefit of privilege.’ Wheeler v Le Marchant (1881) 17 Ch D 675; R v Cox and Railton (1884) 14 QBD 153; cf PACE 1984, s 10(2) and the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986 and R v Central Criminal Court, ex p Francis & Francis (a firm) [1989] AC 346, HL. See Part III of the Police Act 1997, s 98.

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4.277 The function of LPP is to aid the administration of justice and not to aid crime. But a wrongdoer’s position is ‘quite different from that of someone who discloses information to his solicitor in the process of seeking advice in good faith about his own legal position in relation to it’.1 HC Official Report (6th series) (Committee) cols 503–504, 16 February 1989.

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4.278 The distinction lies in the use of a solicitor by a person to advance a crime and the seeking of advice by a party without criminal design, to be guided on where s/he stands in relation to the law. A disclosure for the latter is privileged. However, a lawyer may need information from the opponents to advance his client’s case or undermine the adversary’s. This may necessitate abandoning a prosecution or it might involve use of ‘special counsel’ where information could not be entrusted to lawyers advising their clients (para 11.80 below).

DEFENCE AND SECURITY MEDIA ADVISORY SYSTEM1 (D NOTICE SYSTEM) 4.279 The D notice system (now DSMA notice) of the DSMA Committee2 and its usefulness will, the government stated,3 remain unaffected by the Act. This exists as a voluntary public/private body advising the press and media on the limits of responsible and permissible publication of sensitive defence and security information. Like the lobby system,4 the benefits are that membership will keep one informed by official sources; exclusion or non-involvement in the system may mean a greater preparedness on the authorities’ part to prosecute those who go outside the terms of a D notice. They advise editors and media personnel, usually in general terms, on what may not be published. D notices have no legal authority – it is a voluntary system. www.dsma.gov.uk. Basically comprised of members of the armed services and relevant departments concerned with defence and national security and representatives of the press and media. D Notices, as of writing, are still regularly resorted to: see P Sadler National Security and the D Notice System (2001) and Nicholas Wilkinson Secrecy and the Media – the Official History of the D Notice System (2009). 3 HC Official Report (6th series) col 1131, 25 January 1989. 4 An informal arrangement whereby members of the press and media were briefed by government officials and ministers on a ‘no names’ basis. The power and influence of the PM’s Chief Press Officer and the PM’s Press Office have been the subject of mounting criticism: see HC Official Report (6th series), 30 October 1989 (Richard Luce MP) and HC 770 (1997–98) and HC 162 (1998–99). On the Central Office of Information see: the National Audit Office Publicity Services for Government Departments HC 46 (1989–90); and HC 81 (1989–90). The lobby system was amended in 2000 when sources’ identities were revealed; see also paras 4.114 et seq above on the Phillis Review of 2004. The PM makes monthly televised press briefings. 1 2

Central government  513 4.280 Staying within a D  notice is no guarantee that a prosecution will not follow, although given the high quality of official representation on the committee, it is unlikely that a jury would be easily persuaded that where a D  notice allowing certain publications was given, a disclosure was without lawful authority. However, in late 1987 and early 1988, the government sought an injunction (a civil remedy) to stop broadcasting, allegedly in breach of confidentiality, of a series of programmes about the views and activities of security personnel.1 This was in spite of the fact that a D notice allowing publication had been issued by the Defence Press and Broadcasting Advisory Committee.2 The D  notice system was modified slightly in 1992 and from 1993 they were called DA notices. DA notices were revised in 2000 and 2015. They presently cover: military operations, plans and capabilities; nuclear and non-nuclear weapons and equipment; military counter-terrorist forces, special forces and intelligence agency operations, activities and communication methods and techniques, physical property and assets; and personnel and their families who work in sensitive positions. A-G v BBC (1987) Times, 18 December. See HC Official Report (6th series) vol 126 col 483.

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FORMALITIES, DISCIPLINE, AUTHORS AND THE OSA 1989 4.281 Franks reported that every civil servant signs the ‘Official Secrets Act Declaration’ at least twice in his or her career, on entering and leaving the Civil Service; and it may be signed on other occasions. According to Franks in 1972: ‘Declarations are also signed by numbers of non-civil servants, eg employees of Government contractors working on classified contracts, officers of public authorities involved in planning for war and emergency and members of official committees, consultants and research workers who are given access to official information in confidence.’1 Franks, above, paras 34–36. Appendix VI for copies. The 1989 Act states that persons can be notified under s 1(1)(b) that they are bound by s 1 of the Act (para 4.176 above) and the Act binds members of the public in its relevant provisions.

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4.282 These serve to draw their attention to the terms of the legislation and to point out that where a civil servant wishes to use and publish information for his personal use, eg as memoirs, s/he must obtain ‘prior official sanction’. This is achieved, if at all, through an application to the Permanent Under-Secretary in the department in which s/he worked. Ministerial memoirs are cleared via the Secretary to the Cabinet and Prime Minister, and outsiders have to approach the Secretary to the DSMA committee.1 Civil servants who wish to report wrongdoing must follow internal procedures in accordance with the Civil Service Code. A code on whistleblowing was introduced in 2011 and this advises that it goes further than the Public Interest Disclosure Act.2 There are many things that could be raised under the Code that would not be protected by the PIDA (p 2). After exhausting such procedures, civil servants may appeal if necessary to the

514  Chapter 4 Civil Service Commissioners (Appeal OCSC). The procedures will now be based on the CRGA 2010 and codes thereunder (para 4.147 et seq above). See A-G v Jonathan Cape Ltd [1976] QB 752. http://civilservicecommission.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/ Whistleblowing-and-the-Civil-Service-Code.pdf (26/03/2018).

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4.283 For members of the security and intelligence services, the OSA  1989 prohibits, forever, their unauthorised disclosure of such information. OSA 1989, s 1(1) serves as legal notice of the absolute nature of offences under that provision for members and former members of the security and intelligence services and those notified under the terms of s 1 (para 4.176 above). However, a system of vetting has existed ‘informally’ to approve publication, although there was no contractual undertaking on either side that the procedure would be exercised,1 let alone that works would be vetted and approved. Publication without approval will therefore be a breach of s 1 of the OSA 1989, and if the author and publisher are outside the jurisdiction, publication may be restrained in the UK by use of the law of confidentiality where the information is not already sufficiently in the public domain or if a public interest may still be served by prohibiting publication.2 Any public interest defence is dealt with below. Shayler set out the avenues available to SIS personnel and would finally involve the IP  Tribunal (para 4.181). Both Spycatcher and Inside Intelligence were refused examination for approval. See Blake below, however. Stella Rimington published her memoirs and Elizabeth Manningham Buller delivered the BBC Reith lectures. NB J Comey A Higher Loyalty (2018) by the former director of the FBI and his criticism of the US President Trump. 2 See paras 4.312 et seq below. 1

4.284 The government did not wish to introduce a formal vetting (approval) procedure in the OSA 1989 especially for security and intelligence as this might encourage applications.1 It is in complete contrast to the USA, for instance, where vetting agreements cover the work of the CIA agents,2 breach of which may lead to the employer seeking to seize all the proceeds of the sale of memoirs on the basis of breach of constructive trust3 where they were published without vetting approval. This would not rule out the possibility of criminal proceedings under the US espionage laws, as well, for such breaches. HL Official Report (5th series) col 754, 18 April 1989. There is extensive resort to secrecy agreements in the USA among federal employees. 3 Snepp v United States 444 US 507 (1980); and see United States v Marchetti 466 F 2d 1309 (1972). Much case law has intervened on First amendment considerations: but note Lane v Franks (2014) 573 US. See Law Commission (2017) pp 198–228. In the Spycatcher litigation, Scott J believed that had Peter Wright sought permission to publish, and were this refused, that decision would have been amenable to judicial review: and see R v Shayler (para 4.254, note 1 above) where this was confirmed by the Law Lords. This was not approved in R (A) v B [2009] UKSC 12. The IP Tribunal is the only avenue for judicial redress. 1 2

4.285 After prolonged legal proceedings involving the spy George Blake, who was seeking the profits from the sale of his book No Other Choice published in 1990, the House of Lords held, in July 2000, that the Attorney-General was entitled to receive on behalf of the Crown the profits payable by the publisher to Blake

Central government  515 from agreed advances. Blake had been in breach of a contractual undertaking signed in 1944 ‘not to divulge any official information gained by me as a result of my employment, either in the press or in book form’.1 The High Court had found that Blake was not a fiduciary in relation to the information because it was no longer confidential. The Court of Appeal held that the Attorney-General was possessed of public law powers entitling him to a court injunction freezing the royalties in question until a court determined who was entitled to the assets. In the House of Lords, this claim on behalf of the public interest in public law was found to be without support. There was no prospect of Blake’s return to the jurisdiction and so no likelihood of confiscation orders under appropriate legislation.2 The order looked to all intents and purposes as confiscatory and without any statutory underpinning. It appeared pro tanto contrary to all principles of common law. In the House of Lords it was established that the Attorney-General had a private law right to an account of profits representing the result of Blake’s breach of promise not to do precisely what he had done and where no other remedy was available. This broke new ground in the law of contract and realising its adverse impact in more conventional commercial arrangements Lord Nicholls described it as ‘exceptional’ a remedy only available in ‘exceptional circumstances’ such as the present case which concerned secret intelligence information, ‘the life-blood’ of security and intelligence officers. A-G v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268, HL. The Law Lords accepted this as a contractual claim in spite of the usually held view – a view subject now to significant qualification – that civil servants do not have contracts of employment. No reference was made in the contract to film or TV rights! SAS members also have to sign contracts of confidentiality introduced because of increasing publications of memoirs: R v A-G for England and Wales [2003] UKPC 22. Lord Scott dissented, believing such contracts were vitiated by undue influence. 2 Part VI of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and the Proceeds of Crime Act 1995 following conviction under OSA 1989, s 1(1); see Jennings v CPS [2005] 4 All ER 391 (CA). 1

4.286 If individuals assign copyright for the Crown in published work based on information gleaned from official duties, this could lead to actions on behalf of the Crown for breach of copyright.1 Civil Service Management codes of practice2 set out the duties of secrecy, and details of disciplinary procedures and appeals. Prevention is better than cure so, for sensitive and security-sensitive posts, positive vetting procedures may be invoked to assess suitability for positions. UK Security Vetting (UKSV)3 provides security vetting. An appeal procedure, with procedural limitations,4 exists for those who fail such tests. Where the internal appeal process does not satisfy the vetted person, they can be referred to the independent Cabinet Office Security Vetting Appeals Panel. Applicants for employment have no formal right of appeal. There are counter-terrorism checks, security checks, developed vetting and enhanced developed vetting checks. Outside the UKSV there are also less probing tests known as negative vetting tests.5  A  staff counsellor exists for members of the security and intelligence services who feel they cannot in conscience comply with their instructions and duties. The procedures available for civil servants in government departments who wish to publish information or who are disconcerted are examined above.6 See A-G v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 09 LS Gaz R 38, CA and the events surrounding former MI6 officer Richard Tomlinson’s The Big Breach: From Top Secret to Maximum Security (2001). 2 See paras 4.147 et seq above. 1

516  Chapter 4 https://www.gov.uk/guidance/security-vetting-and-clearance (26/03/2018). And note the terms of the Security Service Act 1989 (paras 4.221 et seq above). 5 On earlier vetting, see: 563  HC  Official Report (6th series) cols 152–156, 29  January 1957; HC 242 (1983–84) and Cmnd 8540; HC 59 (1982–83); Cmnd 8876. See I Linn Application Refused: Employment Vetting By the State (1990). On new tests under negative vetting, 177  HC  Official Report (6th series), cols 159–61, 24 July 1990 Written Answers. See L Lustgarten and I Leigh In from the Cold: National Security and Parliamentary Democracy (1994) ch 6. For vetting appeals, see HC cols 764–766 (15 December 1994) and the RIPA 2000. 6 See para 4.282 above. 3 4

4.287 However, until 1998, there was no equivalent of the ‘Whistleblower’s Charter’ as it exists in the United States, which seeks to protect from administrative reprisals officials who ‘go public’ on wrongdoing within their departments or agencies. For certain kinds of information1 only a designated official may be informed and not the press. The whistleblower has to establish that there is a link between the disclosure of information and the alleged reprisals, and the investigation of the wrongdoing itself – not the reprisal – is conducted by agency heads and not by the Office of Inspector-General. However, this is not a public interest defence against criminal prosecution and the UK government successfully resisted attempts to introduce such a defence in the Official Secrets Bill 1989. The CIA and National Security Agency in the USA have suffered numerous and notorious leaks highlighted in the Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden leaks given to WikiLeaks.2 Reference must now be made to the PIDA 1998 for the UK (see paras 4.301 et seq below). The position of a staff counsellor for SIS in the UK has been raised and the Law Commission reported on an ‘Ethical counsellor’ in each of the agencies as an avenue for ethical concerns. The staff counsellor (a different body) stated that 149 cases had been referred to the office since 1987 and his giving of evidence to the Law Commission.3 Intelligence and counter-intelligence. Following the 1986 Irangate episode, a version of the procedure was recommended for the CIA. See Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act 1998 and use of Inspector General and Intelligence Authorization Act 2015, Title VI. 2 Manning’s sentence of imprisonment (35 years, seven of which were served) was commuted by clemency in January 2017 in one of President Obama’s last acts as President. Edward Snowden’s fate if he returned to the USA is obvious. 3 Law Commission (2017), paras 7.87–7.96. 1

4.288 In the UK, a civil servant’s pension rights can only be automatically forfeited where there is a conviction for treason, although the Treasury has the power to withhold pensions in whole or in part for conviction of offences under the OSA  1989 which attracted prison sentences of ten years, singly or consecutively. Forfeiture is not used to punish a disciplinary offence although a civil servant may face dismissal.

THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT 1989 AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 4.289 Before we turn to the PIDA 1998, the question has to be put whether the OSA 1989 is in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights in

Central government  517 seeking to prevent any disclosure by security and intelligence officers past and present. Particularly relevant will be Art 10, and also increasingly pertinent to access to information rights has been Art 8. These were set out at the beginning of ch 2 but they are repeated here for ease of reference.

Articles 10 and 8 ECHR 4.290 Article 10 gives everyone a right to freedom of expression. It includes a freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. Nothing, however, in Art 10 prevents states licensing broadcasting, television and cinemas. This right which ‘carries with it duties and responsibilities’ may be subject to formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties ‘as are prescribed by law1 and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure on information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary’. Ie statute or delegated legislation or a published code regarded as binding.

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4.291 Article  8 provides a right to respect for one’s private and family life, one’s home and correspondence. Public authorities are prohibited from interfering with the exercise of this right except where it is in accordance with the law and where again ‘it is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’ 4.292 The rights under Arts 8 and 10 are not absolute but they can only be subjected to limitation where necessary to safeguard the interests listed and in a manner which is proportionate. There can be no doubt that the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA  1998) has introduced proportionality into domestic law whatever its status may have been before that Act was brought into effect. The courts may engage in ‘anxious scrutiny’ and a high level of intensity of review where Convention rights under the HRA are concerned. Exceptionally this does allow for a ‘merits review’.1 Furthermore, even in Convention cases, the intensity of review may vary according to the subject matter.2 How widely beyond the area of human rights ‘proportionality’ may be applied we shall have to wait and see.3 R  (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001]  UKHL  26, [2001] 3  All ER  433 per Lord Steyn; see Smith and Grady v UK (1999) 29 EHRR 493 (ECtHR) criticising the high threshold required before English courts would allow judicial review, and Hatton v UK (2003) 37 EHRR 28. 2 And UK courts have been anxious not to allow the ECtHR to claim exclusive space in human rights protection: Osborn v Parole Board [2013] UKSC 61 per Lord Reed at [56] and [57]. 3 See Keyu v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2015] UKSC 69; see Kennedy (para 4.298 below). 1

518  Chapter 4 4.293 In the extradition proceedings brought by the English prosecuting authorities in a Paris court, it was argued on behalf of David Shayler (para 4.181 above), a former MI5 officer, that the OSA 1989 was in breach of the Convention. In particular there was a breach of Art 10. The success of such an argument would depend on a court – and now an English court by virtue of the HRA  1998 – accepting that such restraints as the Act contains are not necessary in a democratic society to protect those ‘pressing social needs’ referred to in the Convention including national security. The absence in the Act of a public interest defence and the prohibition of all information being disclosed, even trivia, could prove embarrassing – no balance is allowed. The prohibition in s 1 is absolute whereas for other officials there must be damaging disclosures. However, the ECtHR has deferred to national security arguments advanced by states when seeking to defend various practices such as refusing access to security registers.1 In Segerstedt-Wiberg v Sweden the ECtHR ruled that there had been a denial of art 8 rights on the facts by keeping certain security files on individuals (but not in relation to the named claimant). Retention was neither necessary nor in accordance with the law. However, not allowing disclosure of the full extent of grounds for maintaining national security files on a secret register did not breach art  8. It was within the margin of appreciation. There had in addition been breaches of art 10 and freedom of speech, and arts 11 (concerning political freedom and in so far as art 8 had been breached) and 13.2 Leander v Sweden (1987) 9  EHRR  433. See also: Engel v The Netherlands (No  1) (1979–80) 1 EHRR 647 and Murray v UK (1995) 19 EHRR 193. See Kennedy v UK [2010] ECHR 26839/05 where the ECtHR ruled that there had been no breach by the UK of ECHR, arts 6, 8 and 13 when the Investigatory Powers Tribunal examined his complaints (about MI5 and GCHQ processing hid personal data) in private and simply stated no findings had been made in his favour. 2 [2007] EHRR 2. See further Guja v Moldova (2011) 53 EHRR 16 and Heinisch v Germany (2014) 58 EHRR 31.and Bucur and Toma v Romania 40238/02 (8/01/2013) Third Chamber on justified defences where internal safeguards are not viable. 1

4.294 But there are many who believe the Act – like s 2 before it – is ready for pensioning off. In the Court of Appeal litigation involving publication of Shayler’s letters by The Guardian and The Observer judicial dicta seemed vigilant to protect the rights of the press to freedom of speech and to defend the privilege against self-incrimination (see below). Could a new era encouraged by the ‘common law of human rights’ see judicial inroads into the Act? These judgments must be seen in the light of Attorney-General v Punch Ltd1 (para 4.366 below). The decision in R v Shayler dealt with at length above (paras 4.181 et seq) held virtually unequivocally that s 1 was not incompatible with Art 10 providing the proper approach was adopted in balancing the respective rights and interests involved. In the Blake case, the leading judgment emphasised the special position of trust occupied by security and intelligence officers who commit a crime by divulging non-harmful information whereas civil servants must make a ‘damaging’ disclosure evidenced by some independent harm. Blake had agreed to secrecy and ‘An absolute rule against disclosure, visible to all, makes good sense.’2 See para 4.182 for the Shayler decision. [2003] 1 All ER 289 (HL) reversing the Court of Appeal. Per Lord Nicholls in A-G v Blake [2000] 4 All ER 385, HL.

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Central government  519 4.295 Under OSA  1989, prosecutions have been brought regularly.1 The Parliamentary study reported a PQ from 2004 stating that figures were less than one a year. In 2012, there was one prosecution under s 1 of the 1911 Act leading to a conviction and one conviction under the 1989 Act leading to an acquittal. There were no prosecutions in 2012–16 and figures for 2017–18 could not be supplied because of a date for official publication and s 22 of the FOIA (para 1.114). The information for 2017 and 2018 was also exempted by virtue of s 44(1)(a) of the FOIA in accordance with prohibitions in the Statistics and Registration Service Act 2007 and the Pre-Release Access to Official Statistics Order 2008. Figures supplied by the Ministry of Justice after FOI request on 11/04/2018. Older figures are available at HC  Debs 22  January 2002 col 830W. There were no prosecutions in 2009 – information from MoJ under FOIA  2000. See also HC  Debs (6 Feb 2004) 1120W and The Official Secrets Act and Official Secrecy House of Commons Library Briefing Paper (CBP-7422, May 2017) G Bartlett and M Everett.

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article 10 echr

4.296 As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the ECtHR had not been over-anxious to create a right to freedom of information from Art 10 and indeed the erstwhile Commission on Human Rights had shown a greater propensity to create such a right. More recent case law from the ECtHR reveals a different picture (para 1.194). The earlier case law illustrated that people kept in ignorance of the state of toxicity of a chemical plant had not been victims of a breach of Art 10, the court ruled; the government had not sought actively to suppress any information, the court held. They were under no duty actively to provide it. By a slender majority the Commission ruled there was an active right to such information: ‘the current state of European law … confirms that public information is now an essential tool for protecting public well-being and health in situations of danger to the environment’. The Commission cited a 1996 resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe which stated that where nuclear energy and related matters are concerned ‘public access to clear and full information … must be viewed as a basic human right’. States were under a positive duty to publish it. The court did hold, however, that Art 8 could provide a duty to publish information where, in protecting family and private life, knowledge of such information was essential for such enjoyment. The applicants were denied ‘essential information that would have enabled them to assess the risk they and their families might run if they continued to live in Manfredonia, a town particularly exposed to danger in the event of an accident at the factory’.1 Guerra v Italy (1998) 4 BHRC 63. See also Oneryildiz v Turkey (2004) 39 EHRR 12 and failure to inform of public danger by an authority leading to a breach of Art 2 ECHR and Gaskin v UK etc and below.

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4.297 In McGinley and Egan v UK servicemen were exposed to nuclear testing by way of explosions. Although the claim failed on its facts the following was conceded:

520  Chapter 4 ‘Where a government engages in hazardous activities such as those in issue in the present case, which might have hidden adverse consequences on the health of those involved in such activities, respect for family life under article  8 requires that an effective and accessible procedure be established which enables such persons to seek all relevant and appropriate information.’1 These cases have significant implications for the law relating to privacy protection (see para 2.215 above). (1998) 27 EHRR 1. See also Roche v UK Application No 32555/96.

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4.298 Recent ECtHR judgments have journeyed even further so that while not asserting that art 10 creates a free-standing right of access to information, where access to state-held information, otherwise unavailable, was necessary in order for a journalist or public interest body to exercise freedom-of-speech rights, a fundamental right of access to documents was thereby established.1 This approach has been confirmed (para  1.194). The impact of these cases is influencing English judgments2 and led the Court of Appeal to re-submit a case to the First Tier Tribunal for a reconsideration of FOIA 2000, s 32 under the duties of interpretation in the HRA  1998 and ECHR, Art 10.3 The Supreme Court’s judgment in Kennedy was analysed at para 1.154. Although the Supreme Court did not follow the recent direction of the ECtHR it provided a majority approach that both vigorously reinforced the integrity, legislative intent and accountability of public authorities and public confidence and reminded the government of the growing protection of openness and transparency in the common law.4 We have already seen the development of more recent judgments of the ECtHR where Art 10 has been interpreted to give a right of access to information and readers are referred to this discussion. The most recent is Magyar Helsinki Bizottszág v Hungary5 where the Grand Chamber held that a right of access to information was not a free-standing right under Article 10 of the ECHR. It arose in two circumstances: if a domestic court ordered access to the information; or if an applicant could demonstrate that access to the information was ‘instrumental’ to their right to freedom of expression and that denial of access constituted an interference with that right because they acted in the public interest as a social commentator. This is not without difficulty. As we have pointed out elsewhere, the ECtHR has also given a wider berth to security and surveillance and national security operations than has the ECJ.6 Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v Hungary (2009) Application No  37374/05 and Jihoceske v Czech Republic (2006) Application No  19101/03; Österreichische Vereinigung etc v Austria [2013]  ECHR  1204, 1225, 1270. For the successful use of a freedom of speech right to gain access to documents in the American Human Rights Court under the AHRC, art 13, see Cheyes v Chile case 12.108 (2003). See paras 1.154–1.155 above. See generally P Birkinshaw ‘Freedom of Information and Openness: Fundamental Human Rights?’ (2006) 58 Administrative LR 177. 2 A v Independent News and Media Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 343. 3 Kennedy v IC [2011] EWCA Civ 367. 4 Kennedy v Charity Commission [2014] UKSC 20. 5 App No 18030/11 (8 November 2016) Grand Chamber. 6 See para 4.233, note 4 above. 1

Central government  521 4.299 As will be seen (paras 4.343 et seq below), Art 10 has had some effect in English courts in allowing access to information by way of opening up inquiries into serious wrongdoing to the public but the position is mixed; and, more recently, Art 2 ECHR, a right to protecting life, has met with more appreciable success (see paras 10.174 et seq).

LAW COMMISSION CONSULTATION ON PROTECTION OF OFFICIAL DATA 4.300 The Law Commission’s consultation on Protection of Official Data examined the operation of the OSA legislation. In relation to the remnants of the 1911–1939 Acts the Commission recommended a new Espionage Act. It also recommended a new Act to replace the 1989 legislation. The paper is a detailed analysis of the operation of the legislation but some of its provisional conclusions for greater clarity and effectiveness fomented criticism from liberal elements of the press. In a series of provisional recommendations and questions the paper sought suggestions on: defendants should not avoid prosecution because proving damage in court might cause further damage; should there be a shift to non-results-based offences; should sentences be increased to reflect the degree of harm caused by some disclosures; and strict liability offences should remain for SIS and notified persons. Calls for greater clarification on internal procedures generally and in relation to notified persons under s  1 of the OSA 1989 are welcome, as are the suggestions for prior publication (above). Should the categories of protected information be more narrowly drawn but should economic information which is national security sensitive be included? One may add cyber espionage is a well-known concept. Should the territorial ambit of the OSA be extended? The Commission was not in favour of a public interest defence under the OSA but Crown servants and SIS members should have a statutory right to seek permission to make a disclosure. Furthermore, a new role was recommended for the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to receive a concern ‘about employment’ and who may investigate and report to the Prime Minister. There is, in addition, a very helpful description of overseas analogous legislation in common law and Commonwealth countries.

PUBLIC INTEREST DISCLOSURE ACT 1998 AS AMENDED 4.301 Employers should provide whistleblowing procedures although this is not a legal requirement. It is good practice as set out in the DBIS code Whistleblowing (2015). In relation to the law, the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (PIDA 1998) ‘creates a framework for whistleblowing across the private, public and voluntary sectors’.1 The Act amends the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA 1996), adding a new Part IVA (ss 43A–43L). The Act applies to those in service of the Crown (PIDA  1998, s  10), and workers generally, but not to those involved in national security and intelligence work (Employment Rights Act 1996, s  193 as amended – see also Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s  237). To much criticism, including that from the then Police Complaints Authority

522  Chapter 4 and ACPO, the Act did not protect police officers (s  13) but the provisions were extended to police officers by Police Reform Act 2002, s 37. The Policing and Crime Act 2017, s  28 amends the 2002 Act and empowers the successor to the police complaints body, the Independent Office for Police Conduct, to investigate concerns raised by whistleblowers who are or have been under the direction and control of a chief officer of police. PIDA  1998 does not apply to genuinely self-employed professionals (other than in the NHS) and voluntary workers (including charity trustees and charity volunteers). The Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, s 17 emphasised the public interest test in qualifying disclosures. The 2013 Act removed the good faith requirement in making a protected disclosure. However, a disclosure not made in good faith may lead to a reduction in compensation (ERRA 2013, s 18) and the tribunal may, if it believes the protected disclosure was not made in good faith, and it considers it just and equitable in all the circumstances to do so, reduce any award it makes to the worker by no more than 25 per cent. The Court of Appeal has given a wide interpretation to the public interest so that a personal interest does not necessarily negate a public interest.2 Workers are protected against any detriment or failure to act by their employer where they have made a ‘qualifying disclosure’ (PIDA 1998, s 2). Where the reason for a dismissal or redundancy, or principal reason, was a qualifying disclosure, the dismissal is automatically unfair (see para 4.309 below). A protected disclosure is a qualifying disclosure (QD) where it is made by a worker in accordance with the Act’s provisions. A QD is one where information3 is disclosed in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure that it tends to show one or more of the following: (1) That a criminal offence has been committed, is being committed or is likely to be committed (the latter two – ‘present and future’ – denoted as ‘etc’ in what follows). (2) That a person has failed etc to comply with any legal obligation to which he is subject. (3) That a miscarriage of justice has occurred etc. (4) That the health or safety of any individual has been endangered etc. (5) That the environment has been damaged etc. (6) That information tending to show any matter falling within any one of the preceding paragraphs has been deliberately concealed etc. G Dehn Annotation CL Statutes (1998) ch 23, p 1. See also Cm 6394 I, II, II Shipman Inquiry Fifth Report and Tenth Report Committee of Standards in Public Life, Cm 6407, ch 4. A Savage Leaks, Whistleblowing and the Public Interest (2016) and National Audit Office Government’s Whistleblowing Policies (January 2014). On the European Convention on Human Rights and whistleblowing protection and Art 10 ECHR, see Heinisch v Germany (2011) ECHR 1755. 2 Chesterton Global Ltd v Nurmohamed [2017] EWCA Civ 979, para [37]. 3 A QD covers information not an allegation: Cavendish Munro Professional Risk Management Ltd v Geduld [2010] IRLR 38. 1

4.302 It is immaterial where the failure/event occurred etc and also what the governing law is. However, a disclosure of information is not a QD if the person making the disclosure commits an offence by making it – this would include

Central government  523 the Official Secrets Acts although internal channels may properly be pursued under the 1989 Act. Information covered by legal professional privilege cannot be the subject of a QD. A QD is made in accordance with ERA 1996, s 43C if the worker makes the disclosure to his employer, or to another person where the worker reasonably believes that the relevant failure relates mainly or solely to the conduct of another person other than his employer or concerns any matter for which a person other than his employer has responsibility. It is then made to that other person. If the worker has made a disclosure to another under a procedure whose use is authorised by the employer, it is to be treated as making the QD to the employer. 4.303 A QD is made if made in the course of obtaining legal advice (ERA 1996, s 43D). A QD is made if made to a Minister of the Crown where the worker’s employer is appointed by a Minister of the Crown under any enactment or is a body any of whose members are so appointed. This covers governmentappointed bodies. A QD is made if the worker makes the disclosure to a person prescribed by an order made by the Secretary of State for the purposes of this section and the worker reasonably believes that the relevant failure falls within any description of matters in respect of which the person is so prescribed. The ‘prescribed person’ is set out in the Schedule to the Public Interest Disclosure (Prescribed Persons) Order 2014, SI 2014/2418 and SI 2018/795 for relevant amendments, to which the Independent Police Complaints Commission and its successor, the IOPC, have been added by SI 2004/3265.1 The information disclosed and any allegation contained in it must be ‘substantially true’ (ERA 1996, s 43F). The responsibilities of the prescribed person are set out in https://assets.publishing.service. gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/604935/whistleblowingprescribed-persons-guidance.pdf (31/08/2018).

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4.304 In other cases (ERA 1996, s 43G), a QD is made otherwise than via an employer etc where the worker makes the disclosure and s/he reasonably believes that the information disclosed and any allegation contained in it are substantially true; the disclosure is not made for personal gain;1 any of the conditions in sub-s  (2) is met; and in all the circumstances of the case it is reasonable for him to make the disclosure. The conditions in sub-s (2) are that at the time he makes the disclosure the worker reasonably believes that he will be subjected to detriment by his employer if he makes a disclosure to his employer or as under s 43F; that where no person is prescribed for the purposes of s 43F, the worker reasonably believes that it is likely that evidence relating to the relevant failure will be concealed or destroyed if the disclosure is made to the employer; or, that the worker has previously made a disclosure of substantially the same information2 either to the employer (s 43G(2)(c)(i)) or in accordance with s 43F. See ERA  1996, s  43L(2) whereby any statutory reward is disregarded. See Street v Derbyshire UWC [2004] 4 All ER 839 (CA): a belief in the veracity of the material was not sufficient to meet the good faith requirement. It was possible to believe the truth of the material but to promote it for reasons of personal antagonism and such conduct did not equal good faith under ERA 1996, s 43G. The purpose of the amendment by the 1998 Act was to protect those who made disclosures in the public interest ‘not to allow persons to advance personal grudges’.

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ERA 1996, s 43G(4) states ‘a subsequent disclosure may be regarded as a disclosure of substantially the same information as that disclosed by a previous disclosure as mentioned in sub-s (2)(c) even though the subsequent disclosure extends to information about action taken or not taken by any person as a result of the previous disclosure’.

4.305 Various factors are considered in determining whether it is reasonable to make the disclosure including the identity of the person to whom disclosure is made; the seriousness of the relevant failure; whether that failure is continuing or is likely to recur; whether the disclosure is made in breach of a duty of confidentiality owed by the employer to any other person; any action taken by the employer or person to whom the disclosure is made, or which might reasonably be expected to be taken as a consequence of previous disclosures. In making a disclosure under s 43G(2)(c)(i) above, regard is to be had to whether in making the disclosure to the employer the worker complied with any procedure whose use by the worker was authorised by the employer. 4.306 Under ERA 1996, s 43H, disclosures of exceptionally serious matters may be protected even though they do not fall within the conditions in the previous sections. There has to be a reasonable belief by the worker that the information etc is substantially true and that it is not made for personal gain. The relevant failure must be exceptionally serious and in all the circumstances it is reasonable for the worker to make the disclosure. In determining ‘reasonableness’ regard shall be had to the identity of the person to whom the disclosure is made. 4.307 Any term of a contract seeking to prevent a worker from making a protected disclosure is void. This covers employment contracts, or other contracts including settlement agreements. These are commonly referred to as ‘gagging clauses’ and non-disclosure agreements.1 See para 2.224 above; ABC & Others v Telegraph Media Group [2018] EWCA Civ 2329. Note that an employee is not under a duty to inform his employer of a breach of contract by that employee on the facts of the following case: University of Nottingham v Fishel [2000] IRLR 471.

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4.308 The scope of the phrase ‘worker’ is defined in s  43K and extends far beyond the scope of employment law. It covers employees and those independent contractors who themselves provide services but not in a professional/client relationship. ‘In addition to these, this Act protects certain agency workers, homeworkers, NHS doctors, dentists, ophthalmologists and pharmacists, and trainees on vocational or work experience schemes.’1  A  worker does not lose the protection of the Act where the person receiving the information is already aware of it, ie that there is strictly no ‘disclosure’. Dehn above at p 23–17.

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4.309 By ERA 1996, s 47B, a worker has the right not to be subjected to any detriment by any act, or any deliberate failure to act by the employer which has been done on the ground that the worker made a protected disclosure. An employee who is dismissed cannot claim under s 47B but, with one exception, must claim under ERA  1996, ss  103A and 105(6). Complaints may be made to an employment tribunal by a worker – in fact this is the only avenue open

Central government  525 (s 14).1 A declaration of victimisation may be made and compensation awarded. There are limits on awards of compensation to prevent disparities between highly paid workers, and employees, where contracts are terminated. Dismissal because of, or mainly because of, a protected disclosure is automatically deemed an unfair dismissal. Employees are also given new protection against selection for redundancy where they have made a protected disclosure. Claims under this Act are not subject to the minimum qualifying period for unfair dismissal nor to the upper age limit. Regulations may be made covering compensation levels for dismissal under s 8 of PIDA 1998. Interim relief may be claimed by employees but not workers. On time limits, see note to s 3 in Dehn above.

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4.310 In July 2000, an employment tribunal awarded £293,441 to an employee who had been dismissed for justifiable whistleblowing in one of the first cases brought under the Act setting out an early indication of the seriousness of this provision.1 While compensation levels appear generous, re-employment orders cannot be enforced but employer refusal to comply will lead to additional compensation. However, there are many examples of whistleblowers who have suffered in their employment prospects particularly in relation to health and safety disclosures and those relating to financial irregularity. In April 2018, the Financial Conduct Authority and Prudential Regulation Authority decided not to ban the chief executive of Barclays Bank under the Senior Managers Regime who had attempted to uncover the identity of a whistleblower. His fine of £642,000 was considered inappropriate punishment for the message it sent out in a sector with a heavily tarnished reputation for abuse of power and corruption.2 Whistleblowers are expected to put their reputations and careers on the line and yet in reality receive precious little for their disclosures for the greater public good. A ‘beastly sneak’ syndrome still attends their work. Numbers are declining. Should there be a financial reward for public interest disclosures? (2000) Guardian, 11 July revealed how the government had taken action to reverse a court ruling which allowed detailed facts about employment tribunals to be published. The order significantly reduced the amount of information that could be published. On the procedures to be adopted re evidence by Employment Tribunals, see ALM  Medical Services Ltd v Bladon (2002) Times, 29 August (CA). 2 Financial Times 21 April 2018, p 14. He also had to repay a bonus of £500,000. 1

4.311 On 1 October 2004, new rules came into effect which enforce secrecy of employment settlements which do not go to an open tribunal. The Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2004/1861, it has been claimed, attempt to assist conciliation by avoiding publicity (Sch  1, rule 22). Critics claim that valuable information on whistleblowing will not be made public. An addition to the governing act was made which imposed a duty on the prescribed person to report annually on disclosures of information by workers to that person. This must not reveal detail allowing workers or employers or other persons against whom the disclosure has been made to be identified.1 Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, ss 148(2), 164(1); SI 2015/2029.

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THE LAW RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY 4.312 More than 40 years ago, the law of confidence was unsuccessfully invoked by the Crown to protect information about Cabinet proceedings (see below). Since then, case law and discussion about the scope of confidentiality have developed considerably. The extent of the obligation makes it a relevant consideration for the whole of the public and private sectors, personal and corporate. It is advantageous to introduce the subject at this stage. 4.313 Under s 163 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, a work made by an officer or servant of the Crown in the course of his or her duties qualifies for copyright protection under the Act and Her Majesty is the first owner of any copyright. This is referred to as ‘Crown copyright’1 and confers a maximum copyright term of 125 years.2 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s 163(2); see Copyright Act 1956, s 39. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s 163(3); see ss 45–50 of the 1988 Act.

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4.314 Copyright is not the same thing as confidentiality.1 Copyright is a property right, a right ad rem although in case law reference has been made to equitable rights to copyright:2 confidentiality is in essence a right in personam, a right against an individual or individuals to prevent them from perpetrating, or to make them account for, a breach of confidence. ‘[E]quity intervenes to preserve the confidentiality of information not because information is susceptible of a proprietary claim but because its use in the hands of the defendant is unconscionable.’3 In its simplest sense it is a duty imposed by the civil law to keep a secret. Unlike the law of official secrets the courts, applying the law of confidentiality, cannot treat as secret that which is no longer in fact secret and which has become a matter of public knowledge. It follows that an injunction will not issue to prevent dissemination of information which is already placed in the public domain by others apart from the confidee and where no further damage can be done by publication.4 What the law can do in such an event is to punish the confidee in breach of his or her duty by way of an award of damages or for an account of profits where s/he has put the information to profitable use. In a classic analysis of the nature of legal protection of confidentiality, Megarry J stated that there has to be information which must be of a confidential nature; the information must have been communicated in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence (and deserving of the protection of confidentiality); and it must be disclosed in breach of that duty to the confidor through unauthorised use.5 Although the ‘public interest’ defence in the case of a publication applies to a breach of copyright as well as to a breach of confidence: Lion Laboratories Ltd v Evans [1985] QB 526, CA. However, in Hyde Park Residence Ltd v Yelland [2001] Ch 143, the Court of Appeal ruled that the two tests were not identical, the copyright test being narrower and therefore less easily invoked. In Ashdown v Telegraph Group Ltd [2001] 2 All ER 370, the Vice Chancellor was unwilling to allow a defence to a breach of copyright and confidentiality based on Art 10 ECHR where statutory defences under the 1988 Act were unsuccessful. The Court of Appeal upheld the decision but held that Art 10 rights should be given effect in ‘rare’ cases where those rights trumped the statutory proprietary rights [2001] 4 All ER 666 (CA). See also Tillery Valley Foods Ltd v Channel Four News Corp and Another (2004) 11 May; P Torremans Copyright and Human Rights: Freedom of Expression,

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2 3



4



5

Intellectual Property, Privacy (2004); Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria The Modern Law of Copyright (5th ed, 2018). In HRH  Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers [2006]  EWHC  522 (Ch), there is a discussion of various defences against a breach of copyright claim under the ‘fair dealing’ provisions of the Copyright , Designs and Patents Act 1988, s 30(1) and (2) and the public interest provision in s 171(3). This discussion is hinged upon the usual context of a breach of copyright claim where a newspaper is seeking to justify a breach of copyright under a duty owed by the original author. See in particular Scott J in A-G v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1988] 3 All ER 545. Lord Oliver (1989) 23 Israel Law Review 407 at 413; A-G v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109. See generally, R G Toulson and C M Phipps Confidentiality (2nd ed, 2006). Unless, possibly in a case concerning a confidence owed to the Crown further damage to the public interest may be caused, infra. Coco v AN Clark [1969] RPC 41.

4.315 The most common use of the law of confidentiality today (although not the most notorious) is in the field of employer/employee relations to protect, in a wide sense, the trade secrets of the employer or to restrict the use of information gleaned by an employee from the course of employment.1 In such cases the nature of the duty arises from the contractual relationship involving either the interpretation of express provisions2 or those arising as a matter of necessary implication.3 Recent litigation has displayed an awareness of the need not to spread too widely the protection given to an employer4 and also the necessity of enjoining a former employee in breach of the obligation from using information which is in the public domain where his or her prior knowledge or familiarity affords that person an additional advantage over other competitors – the socalled ‘springboard’ doctrine.5 But confidentiality may arise in the widest range of circumstances and courts are anxious not to allow its ambit to be too widely drawn. Some contractual relationships are built upon a fiduciary relationship of special trust and terms may be interpreted as protected by confidentiality: principal and agent is often cited. In ch 1 (paras 1.279 et seq above) it was seen how the stipulations of commercial contracting parties as to what is confidential and where no special relationship exists will not be binding on the courts in terms of the law of confidentiality; in the absence of a duty of confidence, any remedies such as they are will be under the law of contract and these may be negligible. In litigation involving a concessions agreement to build a road, it has been held that claims to commercial confidentiality must not be made in an over-extensive fashion and in any event a discretion was retained to disclose a compensation clause. Information was sought by a public interest group.6 Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1985] 1  All ER  724, affirmed [1986] 1  All ER  617, CA; Lock International plc v Beswick [1989] 3 All ER 373; Intelsec Systems Ltd v Grech-Cini [1999] 4 All ER 11. See commercial confidentiality: Helmet Integrated Systems Ltd v Tunnard [2006] EWCA Civ 1735 and Crowson Fabrics Ltd v Rider [2007] EWHC 2942 Ch (on Faccenda, etc) and Wade v British Sky Broadcasting [2016] EWCA Civ 1214. 2 See J Heydon et al (eds) Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines and Remedies (5th edn, 2014) Part 8.3 for a lucid account. 3 Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, above. 4 Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1985] 1 All ER 724; affirmed [1986] 1 All ER 617, CA. 5 Terrapin Ltd v Builders’ Supply Co (Hayes) Ltd (1959) [1967] RPC 375. See, however, Lord Goff in A-G v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1988] 3 All ER 545 at 661–662. The doctrine has been held not to apply where a defendant is not involved in any wrongdoing: Peter Pan Manufacturing Corpn v Corsets Silhouette Ltd [1963] 3 All ER 402 at 408. See Vestergaard Frandsen A/S v Bestnet Europe Ltd [2009] EWHC 1456 (Ch). 1

528  Chapter 4 R v Secretary of State for the Environment etc, ex p Alliance Against the Birmingham Northern Relief Road [1999] Env LR 447. See R v Department of Health, ex p Source Informatics Ltd [2000] 1 All ER 786, CA: information required from prescriptions excluding the identity of patients was not confidential.

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4.316 An obligation to maintain a confidence may arise independently of contract and had long been the object of appropriate relief in the former Court of Chancery.1 In 1807, for instance, Lord Eldon, in camera, enjoined the editor of The Phoenix from publishing depositions before a Cabinet committee conducting a ‘delicate investigation’ into allegations that the Princess of Wales had given birth to a child conceived in an adulterous relationship.2 Subsequent cases display an equitable protection of confidential information which relates to family3 and intimate relationships.4 The importance of the equitable jurisdiction is, of course, that it will bind third parties who are not in a contractual nexus with the confidor where they know, or ought to realise, that it is confidential information, or where they have received information without giving valuable consideration,5 and where there is no possibility of suing for any tortious act such as inducing breach of contract or being a party to a conspiracy. The extent to which relief may be awarded against an innocent third party (ie  one without notice actual or constructive) who has provided valuable consideration6 is a moot point, though such a party ought to be protected from an injunction or action for an account if their conscience is clear; the situation may be different if, initially innocent, s/he subsequently acquires knowledge of the wrong.7 Abernethy v Hutchinson (1825) 3  LJOS  Ch  209; Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 18  LJ  Ch  120; Morison v Moat (1851) 20 LJ Ch 513. 2 Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines and Remedies (5th edn, 2014), Part 8. 3 Argyll v Argyll [1967] Ch 302. 4 Supra. Cf Lennon v News Group Newspapers Ltd and Twist [1978] FSR 573, CA. 5 Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell Engineering Co Ltd (1948) 65  RPC  203, CA; Seager v Copydex Ltd [1967] 2 All ER 415. 6 See Jones (1970) 86 LQR 463; Meagher, Gummow and Lehane (para 4.315, note 2 above), Part 8.3. 7 Then there may well be an account of profits accruing post the existence of the knowledge of the confidence; cf, however, the usual position in equity: viz a good title passes even to a subsequent purchaser with notice from a bona fide purchaser: Wilkes v Spooner [1911] 2 KB 473 may place too much emphasis on proprietorial rather than conscionable aspects of the situation. 1

4.317 Alongside contractual duties, the law will protect, or rather restrain ‘the publication of confidential information improperly or surreptitiously obtained or of information imparted in confidence which ought not to be divulged’.1 The quotation emphasises the trust and confidence relied upon by the plaintiff: ‘or that the defendant obtained surreptitiously or improperly that which he could otherwise have obtained either not at all or only on a limited basis’.2 The quotation also emphasises the importance of the circumstances in which the defendant obtained information so that relief is not dependent upon the intrinsic value or importance of the information itself or upon ‘any apprehended damage to the plaintiff by misuse thereof’.3 But the latter may be significant. For example, confidentiality attaches to information which is given to the police during the course of a criminal investigation, whether it is given by a suspect under caution or by a potential witness. The weight to be attached to the confidentiality will

Central government  529 depend very much on the particular circumstances in which the material was obtained.4 The statement also indicates that the law will protect confidences that ought not to be divulged: it will not protect every confidence nor, importantly, will it protect everything marked ‘confidential’. Indeed, some confidences ought, in the public interest, to be disclosed (see below). Swinfen Eady LJ Ashburton v Pape [1913] 2 Ch 469 at 475, CA. See: Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2001] 2 All ER 289, CA. See for breach of an implied contractual duty: Turner v Royal Bank of Scotland [1999] 2 All ER (Comm) 664, CA. It has been suggested obiter that under Human Rights Act 1998, s 12(3) (para 4.350 below) it is arguable that a contractual duty of confidence is stronger than an equitable one and the Queen was entitled to an injunction restraining an employee of the Daily Mirror employed as a royal footman from divulging confidential information: Attorney General v Parry [2004] EMLR 13. Cf Robert Walker LJ in London Regional Transport v The Mayor of London [2003] EMLR 4 and Lord Phillips MR in Campbell v Frisbee [2003] EMLR 3. Surely a claim in contract cannot affect the strength of a confidentiality. Contract may help to clarify the extent of what is protected. But if information is confidential why should contract make the claim ‘stronger’? However, a contractual claim will subsist within a breach of confidence, so that the confidor may terminate the agreement after a confidee has made a disclosure, even one supported by a public interest. This was a problem which the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 sought to address. See Digital Economy Act 2017, s 41. 2 Meagher, Gummow and Lehane Equity: Doctrines and Remedies (3rd edn, 1992), para 41.045. 3 Supra, providing the information is worthy of protection. 4 Frankson and others v Home Office [2003] 1 WLR 1953, in particular per Scott Baker LJ at para 35. 1

4.318 As emphasised in the Spycatcher litigation, confidentiality will not protect trivial or useless information. Further, it is not only information which is obtained consensually that is protected, ie  by a willing confider upon a willing confidee. Confidential information, even though not ‘obtained consensually’ nonetheless ‘cannot be purloined and freely used’.1 Information will be protected where it ‘would be just in all the circumstances that [a person] should be precluded from disclosing the information to others.’2 The past behaviour of plaintiffs is important to ascertain whether they are volens or implicitly consenting to the publication. Their past behaviour towards seeking publicity or selling private information about themselves may restrict the ambit of confidentiality via ‘breaches’ by his or her family or coterie;3 or their behaviour may establish that they do not come to court with ‘clean hands’.4 We saw in ch 2 (para 2.224) that, while the protection of private information and privacy may not be so judgmental as the law of confidentiality, it requires delicate balancing.5 Meagher, Gummow and Lehane Equity: Doctrines and Remedies, para 41.045 and cases cited. The authors are very critical of Megarry VC’s observations in Malone v Metropolitan Police Comr [1979] Ch 344 at 376 to the contrary. 2 A-G v Guardian Newspapers (No 2) [1990] AC 109 at 281 per Lord Goff. 3 Lennon v News Group Newspapers Ltd and Twist [1978] FSR 573, CA; or deliberately projecting a public image that was false: Woodward v Hutchins [1977] 2 All ER 751, CA. These questions are central to Campbell v MGN Ltd and the different approaches taken by the Court of Appeal and House of Lords: [2003] 1 All ER 224 and [2004] 2 All ER 995 respectively. 4 At first instance in the proceedings involving Spycatcher in Australia, the judge did not think the ‘clean hands’ doctrine operated against the government: A-G for the UK v Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (1987) 8  NSWLR  341, Powell J. On appeal, A-G  for the UK  v Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 86 and A-G (UK) v Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) (1988) 78 ALR 449. 5 See PJS v NGN Ltd [2016] UKSC 26.

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530  Chapter 4 4.319 Since the previous edition of this work the courts have been forced to address several issues in relation to confidentiality. The most pressing concern has been the impact of Art 8 ECHR and its protection of privacy (para 4.291 above) and the impact the Article will have over the development of the English law of confidentiality. Will it create via the Human Rights Act 1998 a right to privacy in English (and British and Northern Irish) law? Privacy is a theme that was addressed in ch 2 (see paras 2.215 et seq). As was seen in ch 2, while there are differences in the details of confidentiality and protection of private information, the English courts have developed a tort of misuse of private information. It is probably still correct to say that a free-standing or ‘over-arching, all-embracing’ right to privacy has not arisen in English law. Various statutes make provision for aspects of privacy such as the Data Protection Acts 1998 and 2018 – which regulate the use of personal information (ch 2) – the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and its 2016 addition (para  4.200 above) and, especially, the Human Rights Act 1998.1 But the right to protection of private information and therefore privacy have been witnessed. In several cases, the courts have confronted the issue and have given relief where the law of confidentiality would not have provided a remedy. We examined the cases where English and UK courts have given a remedy for a breach of privacy as a tort.2 Article 8 is directly enforceable by the courts against public bodies and courts are duty bound to uphold that Article and all other Convention rights contained in HRA  1998. Through the use of Art 8, the courts have fashioned a legal right to privacy and protection of personal information and the use of super-injunctions making secret the fact that a claimant has used the courts to obtain an injunction, breach of which may amount to a contempt of court, have fomented heated discussion of the re-emergence of prior restraint on freedom of speech (para 2.256). Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53 and for a breach of art 8 in the ECtHR: Wainwright v UK App No 12350/04. 2 The older cases of Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2001] 2 All ER 289 (CA); A v B [2002] 2 All ER 545 (CA); Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2003] 3 All ER 996 (Ch) have now to be seen in the light of the case law at paras 2.215 et seq. 1

4.320 There has also been a recognition that ‘aspects of privacy’ will be protected because privacy ‘lies at the heart of liberty in the modern state. A  proper degree of privacy is essential for the well-being and development of an individual’.1 Although the House of Lords ruled in Wainwright v Home Office2 (a pre-HRA  1998 case) that there is no all-encompassing action for ‘breach of privacy’, it has been suggested that following the incorporation of Art 8 into UK laws, the essence of the tort of breach of confidentiality is ‘better encapsulated now as misuse of private information’.3 Autonomy and dignity are central features of this development. The values inherent in Arts 8 and 10 are now a part of the law of confidence and the protection of private information. Neither article takes pre-eminence over the other which is very important in relation to the ‘public interest’ – there is no automatic overriding interest in publicity of information or in privacy. If the emphasis is to be placed on the distinction between ‘private’ and ‘public’ information, this begs analysis of the method used to distinguish between the two. The test of Gleeson CJ in Australian Broadcasting Corp v Leach Game Meats Pty Ltd4 met with some approval in the case of the supermodel Naomi Campbell,

Central government  531 when it was reported that she was seeking therapy for drugs-related addiction together with the nature of the therapy and accompanying photographs: ‘The requirement that disclosure or observation of information or conduct would be highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities is in many circumstances a useful practical test of what is private.’ In Campbell, the majority in the House of Lords ruled that the above information was protected by confidentiality and Art 8 (see para 4.324 below). The courts in England and the UK have developed this line of thinking (paras 2.215 et seq) to fashion remedies for misuse of private information and wrongful intrusion into private and family life. Per Lord Nicholls in Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL) at para [12]. [2003] UKHL 53, [2003] 4 All ER 969 (HL). This involved strip searches of visitors to a prisoner by prison officials. The events in question took place before the HRA came into effect. PostHRA, the claimants in Wainwright could have made their claim on the basis of Art 8 by virtue of HRA 1998, ss 6 and 7. Lord Hoffmann believed that it was far from clear that a breach of Art 8 would provide relief for distress where a breach was unintentional; it is unclear why such a limit should be imposed. In Wainwright v UK (para 4.319, note 2 above) the ECtHR found that there had been a breach of art 8 and also art 13 – but not art 3. 3 Lord Nicholls in Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 All ER 995 at paras [13]–[17]. See Lord Hoffmann at paras [50]–[52], ibid that a right to protection of private information is ‘the right to control the dissemination of information about one’s private life and the right to the esteem and respect of other people’ at para [51]. Lord Hope spoke of Ms Campbell’s right to privacy being infringed at para [125] although the action was framed in confidentiality. 4 (2001) 185  ALR  1. Lord Nicholls, however, opined that a concentration on ‘highly offensive’ rather than ‘a reasonable expectation of privacy’ focused more on a test of proportionality in relation to an interference rather than on the existence of a confidentiality itself. 1 2

4.321 Private information may be protected even though it concerns matters that take place in public; and acts in private places may not warrant protection as private information. Context is everything. It is crucial in explaining the way in which confidentiality has been fashioned to protect public sector secrets (below). 4.322 Information to be protected must be capable of being described or defined with sufficient clarity to be the subject of an injunction.1 Minor breaches of confidence by limited publication will not necessarily defeat the request for an injunction; it is very much a matter of fact and degree and the possibility of extended or additional harm by publication, even reviving public recollection2 of damaging public controversy, may suffice. Clearly, there comes a point at which even adventitious publicity will defeat an injunction, as the necessary quality of confidentiality or secrecy will have evaporated. Prior publication will not necessarily remove the protection of privacy (paras 2.215 et seq). As we shall see, there is a difference between the position of the confidant and third parties where confidences relating to state secrets are involved (paras 4.329 et seq below). O’Brien v Komesaroff (1982) 56 ALJR 681 (Australia). Schering Chemicals Ltd v Falkman Ltd [1981] 2 All ER 321.

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The public interest defence 4.323 Where there is a public interest in revealing confidential information to the public, ie  where it is genuinely in the interest of the public that the

532  Chapter 4 information be revealed, and not merely interesting to the public, then the duty of confidentiality will not extend to that information.1 Originally conceived in the phrase ‘there can be no confidence in an iniquity’ it has been extended to cover wrongdoing of various degrees,2 unconscionable behaviour, and now covers that which ought to be made public because of public safety and health and to prevent individuals being misled.3 This is so even where the disclosure is activated by malice.4 However, disclosing for personal profit, or making any unnecessarily wide disclosure via the media or internet and not to authorities may remove the public interest protection. The facts have to be carefully assessed. In not automatically negativing malice the common law test is considerably wider than the public interest test contained in the PIDA 1998 (see above). It may not, however, contain the same breadth as the public interest discretionary disclosure test under s 2 of the FOIA 2000 (see paras 1.98 et seq above). It should be recalled that under FOIA 2000, s 41 information may not be disclosed if the disclosure would constitute an actionable breach of confidence. It was observed that the public interest test under the law of confidentiality would be available but the onus of establishing such an interest lay on the requester for information (paras 1.206–1.207). Gartside v Outram (1856) 3 Jur NS 39. See paras 2.215 et seq above for the public interest test in protection of private information against wrongful intrusion. 2 Initial Services Ltd v Putterill [1968] 1 QB 396, CA; Hubbard v Vosper [1972] 2 QB 84, CA. 3 Lion Laboratories v Evans [1985]  QB  526, CA. However, a disclosure may not be justified by publication in the media, but by reporting to the authorities: Francome v Mirror Group Newspaper Ltd [1984] 2 All ER 408, CA. See also W v Egdell [1989] 1 All ER 1089; affd [1990] 1 All ER 835, CA; R v Crozier (1990) 8 BMLR 128, CA; compare R v Registrar-General, ex p Smith [1991] 2 All ER 88, CA; and Re X [1994] 3 All ER 372, CA. 4 Re a Company’s Application [1989] 2 All ER 248. See also: Re Smith Kline & French Laboratories Ltd [1990] 1 AC 64, HL. 1

4.324 The question of a public interest defence has become increasingly embroiled with the right of freedom of speech under Art 10 ECHR and the right to privacy under Art 8 ECHR, both now parts of UK law. One must be balanced against the other in the context of specific facts and merits. Too much emphasis of one will unjustifiably jeopardise rights under the other.1 The balancing has taken place in several high profile cases where the courts have ruled that the details of a sexual relationship between a married professional footballer and two casual partners did not merit protection by a court order prohibiting a newspaper from publishing details of the relationships. The footballer was a role model and his ‘clay feet’ were justifiably exposed. Preventing the press from reporting these facts would interfere with freedom of speech rights under Art 10. Casual sexual relationships did not merit the same degree of protection as marital relationships. Furthermore, while the press will of course publish for profit as a commercial concern, the two females involved wanted to exercise their Art 10 rights in order to make a financial profit.2 Although the identities of footballers playing sexual ‘away games’, or those of rock stars and celebrities, have subsequently not always been protected by the courts from disclosure, the growing use of super-injunctions has caused the media to complain about the apparently increasing use of gagging orders to prevent any information at all about sexual or other peccadillos from being published. Orders have been

Central government  533 awarded contra mundum. Judicial restraints on publication include the fact that the claimant has gone to court to seek an injunction. The courts have not adopted the robust attitude of Lord Woolf in A v B (see note 2 below) especially where there may be some underhand activity by a sexual partner of the person seeking the injunction. Nonetheless, the award in some cases is difficult to understand, especially, for instance, in the case of the disgraced banker Fred Goodwin who was having an affair with a senior colleague at the time of the collapse of RBS bank. Identities have been revealed through Parliament and via social sites such as Twitter, making the court orders practically useless in terms of privacy but raising the possibility of contempt proceedings. This area is the subject of a report by Lord Neuberger MR and we addressed this in ch 2 (para 2.256).3 Conversely, where Naomi Campbell had publicly declared that she was not a drug addict the press were entitled to publicise the fact that she was and that she was receiving treatment but not the fact that she was attending Narcotics Anonymous, details of the treatment and a ‘visual portrayal’ (photograph) of the model leaving the NA meetings. These were features of private information which did not warrant publication.4 They were not publishable simply because they attended items of information which in the public interest could be published. As noted in ch 2, the courts have adopted a more robust approach in protecting private information even though there has been publication on the internet and overseas. It is not so much a question of secrecy protection but appropriate personal privacy protection. However, see paras 11.6–11.7 below where, in relation to cases concerning the upbringing of children, the paramountcy principle in Children Act 1989, s 1(1) invariably necessitates secrecy: see for other situations Re S (a child) (identification: restriction on publication), Re [2003] 3 WLR 1425. See H.Fenwick (2004) 67 Mod L.R. 889. 2 A v B [2002] 2 All ER 545 (CA). 3 For publication of the existence of an affair but not details see Ntuli v Donald [2010] EWCA Civ 1276. For complete anonymity, see JIH v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 42. On the refusal to issue an injunction where a person’s identity had entered the public domain: BBC v HarperCollins Publishers Ltd [2010] EWHC 2424 (Ch). 4 See para 4.320, note 3 above. Cf Fressoz and Roire v France (1999) 5 BHRC 654 (CHR) where journalists published details of the Managing Director of Peugeot’s salary (publicly available information) as well as his tax return (prohibited under French penal law from publication). The ECtHR set ruled that the conviction under French law for publishing the tax return was a denial of Art 10 rights: ‘If … the information about M.Calvert’s annual income was lawful and its disclosure permitted, the applicants’ conviction for merely having published the documents in which that information was contained, namely tax assessments, cannot be justified under Article 10. In essence, that Article leaves it to journalists to decide whether or not it is necessary to reproduce such documents to ensure credibility’ (para 54). Surely they are not free to publish unless there is wrong-doing in the return ie evasion (and avoidance) of tax? 1

4.325 Lord Steyn in Re S  (a child) (see para  11.12 below) stated that four propositions emerge from the Campbell case: ‘First, neither article has as such precedence over the other. Secondly, where the values under the two articles are in conflict, an intense focus on the comparative importance of the specific rights being claimed in the individual case is necessary. Thirdly, the justifications for interfering with or restricting each right must be taken into account. Finally, the proportionality test must be applied to each. For convenience I  will call

534  Chapter 4 this the ultimate balancing test. This is how I  will approach the present case.’ (para 17)1 This approach met with the approval of Lord Mance in PJS (para 4.318, note 5 above). See Re S  (A  Child) (Identification: Restrictions on Publication) [2004]  UKHL  47; W  (Children) (Identification: Restrictions on Publication) [2005] EWHC 1564 (Fam) and http://www.familylawhub. co.uk/default.aspx?i=ch1164 for recent case law.

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4.326 There has been extensive litigation on the rights of the police to disclose information about known paedophiles to those likely to be affected by their presence in a local area. Although the paedophiles should have been allowed to see the information before it was disclosed, on the facts of the case this had not been a fatal omission and the general policy of disclosure was not unlawful or irrational.1 The courts will be vigilant to ensure fair procedures in the manner in which such information may be disclosed.2 Furthermore, naming and shaming members of a teenage gang who terrorised a housing estate when they were the recipients of Anti-Social Behaviour Orders under Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 1 was justified as an invasion of their privacy on the facts.3 R  v Chief Constable of the North Wales Police, ex p AB  [1998] 3  All ER  310, CA. See also Bunn v BBC [1998] 3 All ER 552; Woolgar v Chief Constable of the Sussex Police [1999] 3 All ER 604, CA – disclosure of confidential information to a regulatory authority; Preston Borough Council v McGrath (2000) Times, 19  May, CA – police entitled to disclose information on corruption to a council; S v S [1999] 1 All ER 281, CA; Pharaon v BCCI SA [1998] 4 All ER 455; Hellewell v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [1995] 4 All ER 473 – confidentiality protected ‘mugshots’ taken in police custody; see R (Ellis) v Chief Constable of Essex Police [2003] EWHC 1321 (Admin), at para 1.275, note 1 above and R (A) v National Probation Service [2003] EWHC 2910 (Admin) and disclosure of murder conviction to manager of accommodation. On Art 8 ECHR, see Z v Finland (1998) 25 EHRR 371. In another context, note Brent LBC v N [2005] EWHC 1676 and refusal to allow disclosure to a foster child’s parents that the fosterer was HIV positive. See further Re an Application by JR38 for Judicial Review (NI) [2015] UKSC 42. Although taking and using a photo of an individual falls within the ambit of Art 8 ECHR there is a question as to whether that was the case when CCTV pictures were used by the police to publicise a 14-year-old youth’s participation in a riot. Two justices ruled Art 8 was engaged but publication was justified, and two ruled Art 8 was not engaged, but if it were, publication would be proportionate. Chapter 2 discusses DPA limits on holding and processing personal data. See also R (Catt) v ACPO [2015] UKSC 9 and retention of police intelligence. 2 See note 1 above. See R (X) v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [2005] 1 All ER 610 (CA). While safeguards and procedures must be followed in R (X) – which concerned the Police Act 1997 – this did not require a hearing for the claimant. See para 2.290, note 1 above. 3 R (Stanley, Marshall and Kelly) v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2004] EWHC 2229 (Admin). On protection of art 8 rights and non-disclosure of police information see A (A child) v Chief Constable of Dorset [2010] EWHC 1748 (Admin) citing Al Rawi v The Security Service [2010] EWCA Civ 482 on refusing closed procedures and special advocates for a civil trial. The decision in Al Rawi was appealed to the Supreme Court which ruled that under the common law, the special advocate procedure was not extendible to civil actions (para 10.127): see, however, Al Rawi v The Security Service and Others [2011] UKSC 34 where the special advocate procedure could be used in employment vetting cases. See the Cabinet Office/Ministry of Justice Green Paper Justice and Security Cm 8194 (2011); see para 11.81 below and the Justice and Security Act 2013. 1

4.327 It is important to realise, however, that the public interest defence is only a defence against an action in breach of confidence; it will not provide the basis of an action for wrongful dismissal, or for a claim of unfair dismissal, against an

Central government  535 employer by an employee who is subsequently dismissed after his public interest disclosure. The employee will have to turn, in such a situation, to the PIDA 1998 (paras 4.301 et seq above). 4.328 The above can serve as little more than an introduction to a fast developing area of law. We must now examine these basic principles as they have been applied to protect the public secrets of the state and not the private rights of individuals.

Public secrets and confidentiality 4.329 The Crown, meaning the Monarch, may avail itself of the law of confidentiality to protect its own personal secrets, as can anyone else.1 There would appear to be no reason why the Monarch could not invoke the developing law of protection of private and family life. In fact in the nineteenth century there were several cases concerning confidentiality which involved the royal family.2 However, since 1975, the Attorney-General on behalf of the Crown, meaning government,3 has invoked the law of confidentiality to restrain publication of information about the processes of government – that side of Crown activity that affects the public sphere. It is clear that although the Crown prayed in aid the law of confidentiality in these cases, the courts have modified that law to the particular purposes of government activities. This modification will become more apparent now that the laws of confidentiality focuses more upon private information and human autonomy and dignity. For an injunction protecting the personal information of the Queen in her private capacity, see: A-G v Barker [1990] 3 All ER 257, CA and A-G v Parry (para 4.317, note 1 above). 2 See para 4.316, note 1 above. These did not involve the Crown, ie monarch or sovereign. Actions were brought in a personal, not governmental, capacity. 3 Town Investments Ltd v Department of the Environment [1977] UKHL 2. 1

4.330 In A-G v Jonathan Cape Ltd,1 the Attorney-General sought to restrain (unsuccessfully)2 the publication of the memoirs of the former Secretary of State, Richard Crossman, which contained numerous details of his work as a Cabinet Minister. Lord Widgery at first instance held that not only would the plaintiff have to establish a breach of confidence by publication, but also that the public interest required that publication be restrained and that there was no other competing public interest of greater moment than that relied upon by the Crown which would allow publication. This reasoning was developed by Mason J in Commonwealth of Australia v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd: ‘The equitable principle has been fashioned to protect the personal, private and proprietary interests of the citizen, not to protect the very different interests of the executive government. It acts, or is supposed to act, not according to standards of private interest, but in the public interest. This is not to say that Equity will not protect information in the hands of the government, but it is to say that when Equity protects government information it will look at the matter through different spectacles.

536  Chapter 4 It may be a sufficient detriment to the citizen that disclosure of information relating to his affairs will expose his actions to public discussion and criticism. But it can scarcely be a relevant detriment to the government that publication of material concerning its actions will merely expose it to public discussion and criticism. It is unacceptable in our democratic society that there should be a restraint on the publication of information relating to government when the only vice of that information is that it enables the public to discuss, review and criticise government action. Accordingly, the court will determine the government’s claim to confidentiality by reference to the public interest. Unless disclosure is likely to injure the public interest, it will not be protected. The court will not prevent the publication of information which merely throws light on the past workings of government, even if it be not public property, so long as it does not prejudice the community in other respects. Then disclosure will itself serve the public interest in keeping the community informed and in promoting discussion of public affairs. If, however, it appears that disclosure will be inimical to the public interest because national security, relations with foreign countries or the ordinary business of government will be prejudiced, disclosure will be restrained. There will be cases in which the conflicting considerations will be finely balanced, where it is difficult to decide whether the public’s interest in knowing and expressing its opinion, outweighs the need to protect confidentiality.’3 This statement has met with general approval in subsequent litigation to which we now turn pausing only to make some points about publications by Ministers and civil servants – the subject of the proceedings in Jonathan Cape. One only needs to add that the equitable principles have been developed into a tort to protect private life and information, not public secrets. [1976] QB 752. Too lengthy a period existed between the events in question and the time of application for the injunction. 3 (1980) 147 CLR 39 at 51. The qualifying nature of the italicised words (not italicised in original) should be noted. On the case and copyright – see Cripps The Legal Implications of Disclosure in the Public Interest (2nd edn, 1994), ch 4. On First amendment protection against US government attempts to prevent publication of sensitive classified information which the President wished to keep secret, see New York Times v US 403 US 713 (1971). 1 2

4.331 The whole area of ministerial publications, and those by civil servants, diplomats and special advisers was investigated by the Public Administration Committee in 2006–09 following the publication of memoirs by former diplomats and special advisers. The government believed that existing procedures based on the Radcliffe report were adequate for ministers. Under these, ministers were informed of duties of confidentiality and official secrecy on taking office; that they should sign an undertaking; and that they had to obtain permission from the Cabinet secretary for publication. The secretary had no powers of enforcement, merely persuasion in those situations where no breach of law occurs.1 The committee wanted a system whereby diplomats and civil servants and advisers were placed under contractual duties of confidentiality and would assign copyright to the Crown with an independent form of arbitration to determine

Central government  537 the rights of the Crown and the public interest in publication in the event of a dispute. Formal independent arbitration was rejected by the government and the Radcliffe principles continue to apply to ministers.2 Report of the Committee of Privy Counsellors on Ministerial Memoirs Cmnd 6386 (1976). Whitehall Confidential? The Publication of Political Memoirs (HC 689 I & II (2005–06); GR HC 91 (2007–08); Mandarins Unpeeled HC 664 (2007–08) and GR HC 428 (2008–09).

1 2

The Spycatcher litigation 4.332 Peter Wright was a former member of the security service MI5, who wished to publish his memoirs in Australia. These contained a great deal of information acquired while in that service, although much of it was already published, and some of it was subsequently shown to be unreliable. The publication of Wright’s memoirs in Australia could not be restrained by an English court.1 A-G v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1988] 3 All ER 545. See also Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman (1995) 183 CLR 10 cited in Toulson and Phipps op cit para 5–05 for a very interesting public interest test.

1

4.333 It is now established that under the civil law, members or former members of security and intelligence services owe a lifelong duty of confidentiality to the Crown which can be protected by injunction against the member, or former member, to restrain publication, as well as any third party who receives such information.1 Such a duty of confidentiality ‘may also apply to other Servants of the Crown’ where presumably they dealt with intelligence information.2 In all other cases, civil servants owe a duty of confidentiality to the Crown: the precise scope, extent and nature of the duty, and the degree of judicial protection afforded to it, will depend upon the circumstances. They would also be covered by the relevant provisions of OSA 1989 (above). Per Scott J [1988] 3 All ER 545 at 551. How relevant ‘notification’ under OSA  1989, s  1 is in this regard is an interesting question (para  4.176 above). For the unsuccessful attempts to restrain publication in Australia, see para 4.318, note 4 above. Litigation also took place in New Zealand and Hong Kong. See M Fysh (ed) The Spycatcher Cases [1989] European Law Centre for the reports of cases.

1 2

4.334 Injunctions, ex parte and inter partes, were issued by the English High Court to prevent publication by newspapers of the contents of the memoirs, in so far as these could be contained in an outline of allegations to be made in Australian proceedings, of Wright’s book, Spycatcher. The Australian proceedings commenced in 1985. The Millett injunction of 11 July 1986 restrained: ‘newspapers from publishing or disclosing any information obtained by Mr Wright in his capacity as a member of MI5 or from attributing any information about MI5 to him. There were, however, three important provisos. First, the order permitted the direct quotation of attributions to Mr Wright already made by [another author] in published books … or already made by Mr Wright in a TV programme broadcast in 1984.

538  Chapter 4 Second, the order permitted the disclosure or publication of material disclosed in open court in the course of the New South Wales action; and, third, the fair and accurate reporting of proceedings in either House of Parliament in this country or of any public court proceedings in this country was excepted from the scope of the injunctions.’1 [1988] 3 All ER 545 per Scott J at 553.

1

4.335 On 25  July 1986 the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from the judgment of Millett J but slightly modified the injunctions.1 Per Scott J at 553.

1

4.336 There were publications in other newspapers of enjoined material which formed the basis of contempt proceedings (see below). There were also subsequent attempts by the papers enjoined to have the injunctions lifted because of widespread publication of the book in the United States, the lack of an import ban on the book covering travellers coming from the United States, as well as the fact that extracts had been published in The Sunday Times in July 1987. The Vice-Chancellor subsequently lifted the injunctions on the basis that the ‘secrecy’ of the information had gone.1 This judgment was overruled by the Court of Appeal2 which held that, although the contents were no longer secret, there was the possibility of further damage being done to the security service and international relations by publication in newspapers of such information. The injunction was modified to allow publication in very general terms of the allegations made by Mr Wright.3 ‘There was then an appeal to the House of Lords (see [1987] 3 All ER 316 at 343–376, [1987] 1 WLR 1248 at 1282–1321). A minority, Lord Bridge and Lord Oliver, would have allowed the appeal and taken the same course as was taken by Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V-C. Their reasons were, like his, that the interlocutory injunctions, although rightly granted in the first place, had been overtaken by supervening events and could no longer serve any legitimate purpose. Lord Brandon, Lord Templeman and Lord Ackner, on the other hand, took the view, expressed with variations in emphasis, that the Attorney-General had an arguable case for a permanent injunction in that the defendant newspapers had been and would be in breach of duty in publishing extracts from or commenting on information contained in Spycatcher, a work published by an ex-officer of MI5 in apparently flagrant breach of the duty of confidence he owed to the Crown. They concluded, therefore, that a temporary injunction, pending trial, should remain.’4 A-G v Guardian Newspapers Ltd [1987] 3 All ER 316. [1987] 3 All ER 316. 3 At 339. 4 Per Scott J [1988] 3 All ER 545 at 556. 1 2

4.337 However, the modifications introduced into the injunction by the court of appeal were considered unworkable and the reporting of what had taken place in open court in Australia was prohibited.

Central government  539

Permanent injunctions 4.338 The hearings for permanent injunctions against the newspapers1 restraining them from publishing information obtained directly or indirectly from Peter Wright as well as a general injunction restraining future publication of material derived from Wright or other members of the security service, came before Scott J.2 It will be useful to look at the decisions on the application for permanent injunctions and then to assess how future interim applications for injunctions restraining publications in breach of confidence, and which concern public secrets, may be dealt with. The Observer, The Guardian and The Sunday Times. See para 4.336, note 4 above.

1 2

4.339 The court at first instance, and the Court of Appeal and House of Lords, held that: (1) Wright was under a lifelong duty of confidentiality. That lifelong duty was not relieved by worldwide publication of the material. The injunction on Wright, his agents and servants, would remain. The lifelong duty on security and intelligence officers has been confirmed by subsequent case law. The House of Lords’ discussion of the duty under ss 1 and 4 of OSA 1989, Art 10 ECHR and Shayler (paras 4.181 et seq above) should be recalled. However, Scott J added obiter ‘the duty of confidence would not extend to information of which it could be said that, notwithstanding the needs of national security, the public interest required disclosure.’ Reference must be made at this point to Shayler, where Lord Bingham stated that if the internal channels refused to take effective action, a ‘former officer’ could seek permission to disclose to the press from his superior and then ultimately to the Minister and a refusal would be subject to judicial review (para 4.182 above). However, in R (A) v B [2009] UKSC 12, the Supreme Court ruled that the RIPA tribunal was the appropriate body to determine disputes between former members of MI5 and the authorities in relation to ECHR, Art 10 rights. The court has noted the tendency for cases involving security matters to read like ‘alphabet soup’ and principles for anonymising litigants were discussed in Guardian News and Media Ltd Re HM Treasury v Ahmed [2010] UKSC 1. Any information compromising safety of agents would be unlikely to be given such an authorisation. But, if the information revealed matters which ‘however scandalous or embarrassing’ would not damage any security or intelligence interest or impede the services’ public functions, ‘another decision might be appropriate.’1 If an authorisation were not forthcoming, that decision could be subject to judicial review (subject to R (A) v B above). The response of the court will very much depend on the nature of information which it is sought to disclose. A review of case involving Art 10 ECHR will be rigorous and intrusive. Special counsel may have to be appointed to deal with very sensitive security information. Scott added, ‘Nor … would the duty extend to information which was trivial or useless or which had already been disclosed under the authority of the government.’2 (2) The articles in The Observer and The Guardian were fair reporting of the nature of the case in Australia. No ‘pressing social need’ (ie national security) was damaged by their publication.3

540  Chapter 4 (3) With regard to the routine criminal activities (burglary), references to this in reporting the Australian litigation were permissible, but there ‘was no legitimate public interest to be served by disclosure’ in any other, or greater detail. (4) The allegations of iniquity and the plot to assassinate President Nasser were such that ‘a duty of confidence cannot … be used to prevent the press from informing the public that the allegations have been made’.4 The allegation of attempts to destabilise the Wilson government could not be protected by a duty of confidentiality,5 nor could the allegations of Soviet attempts to penetrate MI5: ‘The press has a legitimate role in disclosing scandals in government. An open democratic society requires that that be so. If an allegation be made by an insider that, if true, would be a scandalous abuse by officers of the Crown of their powers and functions, and the allegation comes to the attention of the press, the duty of confidence cannot, in my opinion, be used to prevent the press from reporting the allegation. I  do not think it is an answer to say that the allegation has been investigated and been found to be groundless. Where that is the case, public belief in the allegation will, no doubt, be reduced. Nor is it, in my opinion, necessarily an answer to say that the allegation should not have been made public but should have been reported to some proper investigating authority. In relation to some, perhaps many, allegations made by insiders, that may be the only proper course open to the press. But the importance to the public of this country of the allegation that members of MI5 endeavoured to undermine and destroy public confidence in a democratically elected government makes the public the proper recipient of the information.’6 However, ‘just excuse’ for publication of allegations by an official7 or their servant or agent cannot be by way of mere assertion.8 (5) The Sunday Times, in serialising Spycatcher, was in breach of a duty of confidence as it was indiscriminate publication, and an account of profits would be made.9 (6) The newspapers, including The Sunday Times, are not under any duty now to refrain from disclosing (by serialisation) or reporting on the information contained in Spycatcher. Scott J was not impressed by arguments of further damage to the national interest by harm caused by a third party publishing information from an insider.10 (7) None of the newspapers could be enjoined at the time of Scott J’s judgment from publishing future information from Wright or any other security official.11 The court could not respond to a mere possibility or speculation. R v Shayler [2002] 2 All ER 477 at para 30. Per Scott J, at p  585j. Lord Donaldson MR and Lord Griffiths did not concur on the trivia exception, pp 597–598 and 650 respectively. Lord Goff did. In R v Shayler [2002] 2 All ER 477 (HL) Lord Scott obviously felt unease about too wide a protection for the security service: see para 120.  3 Lord Donaldson disagreed, p  601. The importance of his remarks for interim applications in future should be noted. Cf HRA 1998, s 12.  4 P 588. See, however, Lord Griffiths [1988] 3 All ER at 657 e–j, Lord Goff at p 660 and Bingham LJ’s test at p 630. See Lord Donaldson’s test at pp 604–605.  1  2

Central government  541  7  8  9 10 11  5  6

Such acts, if true, would have breached the Maxwell-Fyfe Directive (para 4.221, note 1 above). At pp 588–589 per Scott J. And see Fressoz v France 5 BHRC 654 (ECtHR). This includes a former official, see OSA 1989, and para 4.176, note 2 above. See comments of Lord Keith at pp 641–642. Bingham LJ disagreed. Lords Donaldson MR and Griffiths dissented vis-à-vis The Sunday Times. Such an application would be merely speculative.

4.340 In the House of Lords, Lord Keith believed – it was ‘common ground’ – that neither the defence of prior publication nor the so-called ‘iniquity’ rule/ defence would have availed Wright if he had sought to publish his book in England. Sporadic and ‘low key’ prior publication could not conceivably justify detailed publication of his book. The damage, vis-à-vis the press, had already been done by worldwide publication.1 At 642. See Lord Woolf in A v B [2002] 2 All ER 545 (CA) above, where it was held that reporting to the press (for a profit) was justified on the facts although the judge at first instance had ruled this impermissible, but reporting the facts to friends and the footballer’s wife was permissible!

1

4.341 Lord Goff doubted whether Wright was still bound by a duty of confidence which could be enjoined by injunction when the information was in the public domain. ‘The subject matter is gone; the obligation is therefore gone.’ All that is left is the remedy or remedies for breach of the obligation. Lord Goff believed Mason J in Fairfax supported this although the Law Lord was alone on this point. 4.342 The book itself, it was held, could be published, but not via Wright or his agents or servants. It was in the public domain.

Article 10 ECHR 4.343 In the High Court,1 Court of Appeal,2 and House of Lords,3 there was the clearest of support for the view that the ECHR could be invoked to support freedom of expression in aiding the interpretation of English common law, and the Convention was not restricted to the interpretation of statutory law.4 In fact, the strength of feeling among the judges in support of this utilisation of the ECHR was appreciable.5 Since that time, the Convention has been brought into domestic law by the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998) and the common law has developed through judicial interpretation its own protection of fundamental human rights.6 Whether with an ‘English gloss’ or not, the courts will have the highest concern to protect Art 10 rights. But as seen above (para 4.324) and below (paras 4.345 et seq) such rights have to be balanced with other rights and considerations. 3 4 1 2

Per Scott J at pp 580–582. Per Bingham LJ at pp 627–628. Lord Goff at p 660e–h. See Megarry VC in Malone (para 4.196, note 1 above) at p 13. See also Brind (para 4.369, note 2 below), where it was held that the ECHR has no relevance to a statutory instrument where the Act is clear. NB  Chundawadra v Immigration Appeal Tribunal [1988] Imm AR  161, CA and R  v Central Independent Television plc [1994] 3 All ER 641, CA. The HRA 1998 has revolutionised this area; but see para 4.369, note 4.

542  Chapter 4 See Lord Bridge in the interlocutory proceedings: [1987] 3  All ER  316. NB  A-G  v BBC [1981] AC 303 at 352 and 362. The European Commission of Human Rights has upheld sanctions on civil servants, in disciplinary proceedings, for unauthorised disclosures to the press: 4274/69, X v Germany 35 Collection Dec 158; 9401/81, X v Norway 27 Decisions & Reports 228. And see Civil Service Unions v United Kingdom (1987) 10 EHRR 269. 6 See in particular HM Treasury v Ahmed [2010] UKSC 2 and 5. 5

4.344 Article 10 has already been cited at para 4.290 above. 4.345 The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has said that in applying Art 10: ‘it is faced not with the choice between two conflicting principles but with a principle of freedom of expression which is subject to a number of exceptions which must be narrowly interpreted … It is not sufficient that the interference involved belongs to that class of exceptions listed in Article 10 which has been invoked; neither is it sufficient that the interference was imposed because its subject-matter fell within a particular category or was caught by a legal rule formulated in general or absolute terms; the Court has to be satisfied that the interference was necessary having regard to the facts and circumstances prevailing in the specific case before it.’1 Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979) 2  EHRR  245; Dudgeon v United Kingdom (1981) 4 EHRR 149. See Kelly v BBC [2001] 1 All ER 323.

1

4.346 The court has ruled that restraint must be proportionate to the need for restraint.1 Further, it is unlikely that the court would accept as a blanket justification for restraint reasons of national security on a bare assertion by the government2 But the ECtHR has shown itself to be tolerant of claims to national security where cause can be shown.3 A pressing social need would have to be made out on the facts. This would be true not only in relation to the law of confidentiality, but also official secrecy and deciding whether the OSA 1989 complies with obligations under the Convention. Readers are reminded of the discussion of R v Shayler (paras 4.181 et seq above) where these questions were examined and of the Law Lords’ recognition of the need for probing and invasive reviews where human rights questions are involved. Dudgeon v UK, above. See Hector v A-G of Antigua and Barbuda [1990] 2 All ER 103, PC. See, however, 10078/82 M v France 41 Decisions & Reports 103 (Commission) and Civil Service Unions v United Kingdom (1987) 10 EHRR 269. 3 Leander v Sweden [1987] 9 EHRR 433 and see Brind v UK (1994) 18 EHRR 342. See SegerstedtWiberg v Sweden at para 4.293 above, and further Kennedy v UK [2010] ECHR 26839/05. 1 2

Interim injunctions 4.347 The important factors relating to confidentiality and its protection in the operation of governmental bodies by permanent injunction must be seen in the context of a ‘confidence’ still being confidential, ie a secret or information that still requires protection. If information is no longer a secret, then a permanent injunction cannot be awarded unless, in the case of State secrets, further damage may be caused by repetition. This seems to be the basis of government arguments

Central government  543 vis-à-vis security and intelligence personnel and their revelations regarding their work, even when the information is in the public domain. This argument was accepted by the House of Lords in a case in which an interim interdict1 was sought in Scotland to stop publication of information from a book by a former MI6 member in a Scottish newspaper, even though the contents were accepted by the Crown as ‘innocuous’. For that latter reason, and not for the reason that limited publication had taken place,2 the House of Lords declined to upset the refusal of the lower courts to award the interdict against a third party who was not an agent, servant or ‘anyone in the “direct chain from the confidant”’.3 If the paper had received the book directly from the author, this, it seems, may well have implicated them in the duty of confidence. They could, therefore, have been the subject of a court order. Both Lords Templeman and Jauncey believed that, if not entirely co-extensive, where no prosecution could be brought under the OSA 19894 no injunction could be awarded at common law.5 3 4 5 1 2

Lord Advocate v Scotsman Publications Ltd [1989] 2 All ER 852. 279 copies of Inside Intelligence had been distributed by the author. Per Lord Jauncey in Lord Advocate v Scotsman Publications Ltd [1989] 2 All ER 852at 863b. Under OSA 1989, s 1 or where a disclosure is ‘damaging’: paras 4.163 et seq above. NB the injunction may not be awarded, but a prosecution may follow as there is no ‘public interest’ defence (para 4.266 above). See also Lord Templeman at 861g.

4.348 In the interlocutory proceedings involving Spycatcher,1 the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords, by majority, did not accept that publication of the book in the USA and elsewhere, and its importation without official restriction, had brought the contents of the book into the public domain. The potential for damage was still present and restraint prior to publication, or ‘prior restraint’, was ordered by injunction in the widest of terms.2 It is tempting to look at the case at the stage of litigation involving the permanent injunction and to say the majority of Law Lords and Court of Appeal were wrong in the interlocutory proceedings. But such a view is facile. While it was true to suggest, as in the first edition of this book that a court at an interlocutory application is asked to decide the balance of convenience and whether or not there is a serious issue in dispute the position has now to be interpreted in the light of HRA 1998, s  12.3 Any doubt about a plaintiff’s rights, especially in an area as delicate as confidentiality involving state secrets and national security, will be protected pending full hearing for a permanent injunction when the overall position may be assessed. See para 4.332. Ie preventing publication. See H  v N  (A  Health Authority) (2002) Times, 19  March where a newspaper was enjoined from publicising the name of a health authority where disclosure might lead to the identity of an HIV positive dentist employed by the authority. 3 American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396, HL; Cambridge Nutrition Ltd v BBC [1990] 3 All ER 523, CA. 1 2

Section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998 4.349 There was a discussion of s 12 in ch 2 (para 2.256). To recap, the section is headed by the expression ‘freedom of expression’ and states that it applies if a

544  Chapter 4 court is considering whether to grant any relief1 (including injunctions) which, if granted, might affect the Convention right to freedom of expression. Where the respondent (publisher, broadcaster etc) is not present and not represented, no such relief (ex parte or without notice injunctions) is to be granted unless the court is satisfied: (a) that the applicant has taken all practicable steps to notify the respondent; or (b) that there are compelling reasons why the respondent should not be notified. ‘Relief’ includes any remedy or order other than in criminal proceedings.

1

4.350 The section continues (s 12(3)) that no such relief is to be given so as to restrain publication before trial unless the court is satisfied that the applicant is likely to establish that publication should not be allowed. This clearly puts the onus on the applicant for relief. It is no longer a balance of convenience test pending trial but a likelihood that the applicant will win at the final hearing. In many cases it will make a vital difference – it affords an impetus to publication and freedom of speech.1 There may be a temptation to see the approach as consistent with the that adopted by the courts in defamation proceedings.2 Courts have, however, insisted that the test for success by a claimant must not be set too high. A  claimant for s  12(3) relief may be advancing his or her fundamental rights such as a right to life which the courts will have to give full effect to in dealing with an application. The decision in Cream Holdings Ltd v Bannerjee of the Court of Appeal was discussed in ch  2 (paras 2.224 et seq).3 The matters which the newspaper wished to publish were matters of serious public interest. The applicant’s prospects of success were not ‘sufficiently likely to justify making an interim order’. The House of Lords agreed with Sedley LJ’s analysis and Lord Nicholls offered the following guidance: ‘Section 12(3) makes the likelihood of success at the trial an essential element in the court’s consideration of whether to make an interim order. But in order to achieve the necessary flexibility the degree of likelihood of success at the trial needed to satisfy section 12(3) must depend on the circumstances. There can be no single, rigid standard governing all applications for interim restraint orders. Rather, on its proper construction the effect of section 12(3) is that the court is not to make an interim restraint order unless satisfied the applicant’s prospects of success at the trial are sufficiently favourable to justify such an order being made in the particular circumstances of the case. As to what degree of likelihood makes the prospects of success ‘sufficiently favourable’, the general approach should be that courts will be exceedingly slow to make interim restraint orders where the applicant has not satisfied the court he will probably (‘more likely than not’) succeed at the trial. In general, that should be the threshold an applicant must cross before the court embarks on exercising its discretion, duly taking into account the relevant jurisprudence on article 10 and any countervailing Convention rights. But there will be cases where it is necessary for a court to depart from this general approach and a lesser degree of likelihood will suffice as a prerequisite. Circumstances where this may be so include those mentioned above: where the potential adverse consequences of disclosure are particularly grave, or where a short-

Central government  545 lived injunction is needed to enable the court to hear and give proper consideration to an application for interim relief pending the trial or any relevant appeal.’4 In PJS, Lord Mance, with whose judgment three justices agreed, emphasised that neither Art 8 nor Art 10 comes with added value in making the balance. On the facts of that case, and even though there had been publication on the internet and overseas, an injunction was justified to prevent unjustified invasion of privacy and family life and was not prevented on an interpretation of s  12 (paras 2.222 et seq).5 See Jockey Club v Buffham [2003] 2 WLR 178 public interest in disclosure (horse-race scandals) outweighed confidentiality. 2 Bonnard v Perryman [1891] 2 Ch  269; see Greene v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2005] 1  All ER 30 where the rule in Bonnard v Perryman was confirmed by the CA; Coys Ltd v Autocherish Ltd [2004]  EWHC  1334. For publication of reports in the public interest despite possible adverse consequences for individuals, see Taveta Investments Ltd v Financial Reporting Council [2018] EWHC 1662 (Admin). 3 [2003] 2 All ER 318 (CA). See Imutran Ltd v Uncaged Campaigns Ltd [2001] 2 All ER 385; s 12(3) where it was stated that s 12(3) only introduces a ‘marginally higher test’ than American Cyanamid. This seems very restrained and was doubted in Cream Holdings above. See Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2001] 2 All ER 289, CA. 4 Cream Holdings v Bannerjee [2004] UKHL 44, para 22. On s 12(3) see: Tillery Valley Foods v Channel Four News [2004] EWHC 1075 (Ch) and BBC v HarperCollins Publishers Ltd [2010] EWHC 2424. 5 PJS v NGN Ltd [2016] UKSC 26. 1

4.351 It is perfectly clear that in exercising its powers under s 12(3) the court must balance rights under Art 10 with other Convention rights. So much is required by HRA 1998, s 3 and ‘consistent construction’. No article is pre-eminent. 4.352 In national security cases, however, it is likely that courts will tread cautiously and any doubt of danger will be resolved in the applicant’s favour. This opinion is reinforced by the wider formulation of ‘national security’ that has been given by the courts.1 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman [2002] 1 All ER 122 (HL) (see para 1.124 above). See, however, M v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] 2 All ER 863 (CA).

1

4.353 To recall, s 12(4) of the HRA 1998 concerns relief more generally but its subject matter is confined to material as described below. It states that the court must have particular regard to the importance of the Convention right to freedom of expression and where it is claimed by the respondent or appears to the court to be ‘journalistic, literary or artistic material’ such regard will also be had to the extent to which: (a) the material has, or is about to, become available to the public; or (b) it is, or would be, in the public interest for the material to be published. 4.354 The court is also to have regard to any relevant privacy code, such as the press code or broadcasting code.1 Quite what weight may be given to codes which are the product of one institution as opposed to an association is not clear. In the case of the press code this makes provision for privacy, accuracy, children and harassment amongst other concerns (see paras 2.170 et seq, 2.245, 2.248 and

546  Chapter 4 2.252 above). It is clear that rights under Art 10(1) are essential considerations, but they do not possess automatic overriding power. They have to be balanced with the variety of considerations spelt out in the subsection. This takes us to matters which are discussed in ch 2 (see paras 2.215 et seq) and ch 11 (see para 11.12). See HRA 1998, s 12(4)(b) and para 4.353. On Art 10 rights and traditional property rights, see: Appleby v UK App No 44306/98.

1

Iniquity and ‘just excuse’ in publishing 4.355 As regards publication of an iniquity, the House of Lords judgments in the Spycatcher permanent proceedings, and in the Inside Intelligence case,1 would offer little2 scope for publication by a security or intelligence officer of such iniquities. Their duty is lifelong and, even outside the jurisdiction,3 is prohibited in the widest form without exception by the OSA  1989 (see above). Scott J thought (supra) that it was up to the authorities to decide what information in the hands of security officials should be protected – if they refused ‘to draw any line at all, they mistake, in my view, the nature of the duty of confidence they seek to enforce’.4 Further, in his belief, a duty of confidentiality did not apply to iniquities: ‘If the information was trivial or useless, or if it was public knowledge anyway, or if it was of serious iniquity, the conclusion may follow that the defendant was never under a duty not to disclose the information.’5 However, disclosure to the press would only be justified as a last resort – for the most serious of misdeeds and where official avenues had been pursued without response or where it would be justified to ignore them.6 Lord Griffiths gave support to this dictum (at 650d). Once again, the decision in Shayler (paras 4.181 et seq above) must be recalled. All internal channels will have to be pursued and the position is not as robust as Lord Griffiths believed. Lord Advocate v Scotsman Publications Ltd [1989] 2 All ER 852. See also Lord Donaldson MR in A-G v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1988] 3 All ER 545 at 598b, and Lord Griffiths at 650c–f. 3 See OSA 1989, s 15. Their absence may prevent a prosecution. 4 A-G v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1988] 3 All ER 545 at 574g. 5 The All ER report at p 583c omits the ‘not’ from this quotation. The correct version is reported at [1990] 1 AC 109 at 159H. 6 See Francome v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [1984] 2 All ER 408, CA. 1 2

4.356 Lord Keith, however, in speaking of the publication of the book but not in making a revelation to, eg, the press, believed: ‘The work of a member of MI5 and the information which he acquires in the course of that work must necessarily be secret and confidential and be kept secret and confidential by him. There is no room for discrimination between secrets of greater or lesser importance, nor any room for close examination of the precise manner in which revelation of any particular matter may prejudice the national interest. Any attempt to do so would lead to further damage.’ (at 642 c–d)

Central government  547 4.357 Scott’s view, which was supported, would accord better with legal principle. There must, theoretically, be items of information over which the duty does not extend. However, the decision in A-G v Blake would seem to support Lord Keith’s views. But Blake was concerned with preventing a wrongdoer profiting from his wrongdoing, not preventing publication of information. As recent court cases have shown, in today’s world global village, preventing publication is often idle.1 See the case of Richard Tomlinson (para 4.286, note 1 above) where the Court of Appeal refused to prevent publication of his book on MI6 because it was in the public domain. Attention was then directed towards seizing his profits. A-G v Times Newspapers [2001] 09 LS Gaz R 38, CA.

1

4.358 Lord Keith gave his opinion on the position of the press and then on Wright and his agent/licensee: ‘As to just cause or excuse, it is not sufficient to set up the defence merely to show that allegations of wrongdoing have been made. There must be at least a prima facie case that the allegations have substance. The mere fact that it was Mr Wright, a former member of MI5 who, with the assistance of a collaborator, had made the allegations, was not in itself enough to establish such a prima facie case. In any event the publication [by The Sunday Times] went far beyond the mere reporting of allegations, in so far as it set out substantial parts of the text of Spycatcher. For example, the alleged plot to assassinate Colonel Nasser occupies but one page of a book, in paperback, of 387 pages, and the alleged plot to destabilise Mr Wilson’s government about five pages. In this connection it is to be noted that counsel for The Sunday Times accepted that neither of the two defences would have availed Mr Wright had he sought to publish the text1 of Spycatcher in England. There is no reason of logic or principle why The Sunday Times should have been in any better position acting as it was under his licence.’2 Text of the book, not allegations per se. A-G v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1988] 3 All ER 545 at 644e–g.

1 2

4.359 On the issues determined at the interlocutory stage, Scott J  believed in the permanent injunction proceedings that the report of proceedings in an Australian court, published by the two newspapers, was permissible,1 but that the disclosure and report of routine security service activities (bugging of diplomatic missions and meetings) would have to be justified by ‘a strong countervailing public interest’. Cf Lord Donaldson MR at 600–601. Scott J actually allowed more by way of publication than was actually reported in the case in Australia at the relevant time. However, a majority of the Court of Appeal and House of Lords approved Scott J on this point.

1

4.360 On the serious allegations, viz the plot to destabilise the Wilson government, the plot to assassinate President Nasser, and Russian infiltration of MI5, publication by the press (although not disclosure by the security official or former official who had not gone through the procedures outlined by Lord Bingham) did not constitute a breach of duty:1

548  Chapter 4 ‘I hope the allegation [to kill President Nasser] is untrue. But whether the allegation is true or untrue the duty of confidence cannot, in my opinion, be used to prevent the press from informing the public that the allegation has been made. None the less the editors contend that if the allegations [re the Wilson Government] are repeated by an insider the press ought to be entitled to report that fact. I  agree. The press has a legitimate role in disclosing scandals in government. An open democratic society requires that that be so.2 The legitimate purpose of the duty of confidence imposed on members and ex-members of MI5 is to preserve the secrecy of MI5’s affairs and thereby to enable it to operate efficiently. The purpose is not to save the government of the day from pressure or embarrassment. Second, and more important, the ability of the press freely to report allegations of scandals in government is one of the bulwarks of our democratic society. It could not happen in totalitarian countries. If the price that has to be paid is the exposure of the government of the day to pressure or embarrassment when mischievous and false allegations are made, then, in my opinion, that price must be paid. In my judgment, a newspaper which comes into the possession of confidential information known to emanate from a member or ex-member of the security services must ask itself whether and to what extent public disclosure of the information can be justified. Prima facie, the information should not be disclosed. A strong case is, in my view, needed to outweigh the national security interest in the material remaining confidential. The Editors gave me to understand that they did ask themselves this question. I think they came to the right answer. In my view the articles represented the legitimate and fair reporting of a matter that the newspapers were entitled to place before the public, namely the court action in Australia. Further, and for different reasons, disclosure of two of the allegations was, in my view, justified.3 There was no justification for indiscriminate4 reporting, however. To sum up: newspapers may report what is in the public domain; they may report what is “innocuous”; they may report the proceedings of foreign courts and legislatures;5 they may report what, in the genuine public interest, the public ought to know, which will be determined by the circumstances of particular cases. To emphasise, at the interlocutory stage, once the plaintiff has established the existence of a duty of confidentiality, it is then up to the defendant to prove that the confidential nature of information has been destroyed; that it is “innocuous” if not admitted as such, or that there is an iniquity or item of information which should be published. As Lord Donaldson MR said at the interlocutory stage: “The second part of their [the newspapers] case is and always has been that Mr Wright has revealed unlawful conduct on the part of the service or some of its officers and that the public interest in the

Central government  549 exposure of what is quaintly known as ‘iniquity’ overrides the public interest in confidentiality, even when the need for confidentiality is so overwhelmingly and obviously necessary in the national interest. Here again I have to remind myself that, whilst I must assume that this might prove to be the case, it might not, and, in any event, mere allegations of iniquity can never override confidentiality. They must be proved and the burden of proof will lie on the newspapers.”6 In the light of criticism, he amplified this in the later permanent proceedings: “What I  should have said, and what I  hope that I  meant to say, was that the publication of bare allegations which clearly involve a breach of confidence cannot be justified simply because, if true, they would support a defence based on the public interest in the exposure of ‘iniquity’. The greater the degree and importance of the confidentiality which the newspapers would be breaching, and prima facie it can hardly be greater than in the context of revealing matters concerning the security service, the more sure they must be that the allegations are likely to be true before they can justify publication. This involves looking for independent corroboration and, in a national security context, considering what opportunity the government has had of investigating the allegations, what investigations have taken place and the result (if known), the extent to which the opposition is aware of the allegations, the extent to which the opposition accepts the government’s conclusions and the extent to which the ordinary process of parliamentary control of the executive is operating and may be relied on to safeguard the public interest. Just as it is not for the media to usurp the constitutional function of the courts, so it is not their right, duty or role to usurp that of Parliament.”’7 Cf OSA 1989, s 1. Per Scott J in A-G v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1988] 3 All ER 545 at 588. 3 Scott J [1988] 3 All ER 545 at 558–59. 4 As The Sunday Times had reported. Cf Lord Donaldson at 606b–j. 5 Cf no defence of prior publication under the OSA 1989. 6 A-G v Guardian Newspapers Ltd [1987] 3 All ER 316 at 337d. 7 [1988] 3 All ER 545 at 604–05. 1 2

4.361 Dillon LJ did not believe that an editor had to submit copy to the authorities for clearance. He must act responsibly where he knows the Crown believes national security is involved, ‘asking himself the right questions and giving the right answers’. This approach was followed in the case of the former MI6 officer Richard Tomlinson (para 4.286, note 1 above).1 However, where an editor publishes without warning the authorities, charges under the OSA 1989 may be relevant and applicable (para 4.339 et seq above). In May 2011, Max Mosley lost his case seeking to guarantee a right for an individual to be warned in advance when the press was about to run a critical story allegedly breaching their privacy rights under Art 8: Mosley v UK (unreported, 10 May 2011) ECHR.

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4.362 Where the government asserts national security as a reason for nonpublication by prior restraint, the court will not act on the mere assertion of the government, ‘but it does mean that where national security is in issue the

550  Chapter 4 court will readily acknowledge the obvious limitations of its own knowledge and expertise’.1 Bingham LJ would also give ‘iniquity’ a ‘less restricted meaning than [Scott J] did’. For Lord Griffiths, the Treasury Solicitor should be informed.2 A financial motive in informing would always be suspect. [1988] 3 All ER 545 at 628 per Bingham J. [1988] 3 All ER 545 at 657f–j.

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4.363 It is essential, then, to realise that proceedings for interlocutory and permanent injunctions were very different processes. A  decision at the interlocutory stage to hold the ring had no binding quality on a later decision for a permanent injunction.1 Now, the prospect of success is a factor to consider before awarding interim relief under the HRA. On appeal from the first instance decision, a decision which involves an exercise of discretion, appeal courts are only prepared to overturn the decision on very limited grounds.2 Section 12 of HRA  1998 places the onus squarely on those seeking an injunction to satisfy the court of the requirements in the section before publication will be halted. If there is any genuine risk to national security put forward by the AttorneyGeneral a judge will be reluctant to allow publication to proceed. Pace Lord Bridge in the interlocutory proceedings [1987] 3  All ER at 345 obiter. For a successful interim application against a former MI5 official: A-G v Turnaround Distribution Ltd [1989] FSR 169. 2 See Lord Diplock in Hadmor Productions Ltd v Hamilton [1982] 1 All ER 1042 at 1046, HL. 1

4.364 The Court of Human Rights ruled when the Spycatcher proceedings progressed to Strasbourg that the original injunctions were not in breach of Art 10. However, when the book was published in the USA, the injunction was no longer supportable.1 Observer and Guardian v UK (1991) 14 EHRR 153. The first ruling concerned events up until 30 July 1987; the court ruled 14-10 that no breach of Art 10 ECHR had taken place because such prohibition was within the margin of appreciation of domestic bodies. The court was unanimous that after 30 July 1987 the injunction was in breach of Art 10 ECHR. The book was published in the USA on 13 July 1987.

1

Publication by those not named in the original order 4.365 In the Spycatcher proceedings, the publication of information from the book by newspapers that were not enjoined by the Millett injunctions led to the Court of Appeal establishing the possibility of the newspapers being in contempt of court. In overruling the High Court, the Court of Appeal held that an interference with the administration of justice was capable of amounting to a contempt of court. Section 6(c) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 preserved the power of the court to commit for contempt conduct that was intended to impede or prejudice the administration of justice. Where, as in this case, an order was made to preserve the subject matter of an action, viz confidential information, pending trial, a non-named party who knew of those orders but who destroyed or seriously damaged that subject matter would be guilty of criminal contempt if in doing so s/he intended to impede or prejudice the administration of justice.1

Central government  551 The intention would need to be a ‘specific intention’ and not a reckless action and ‘such an intent need not be expressly avowed or admitted, but can be inferred from all the circumstances, including the foreseeability of the consequences of the conduct’.2 Subsequent proceedings established that several of the papers were in fact guilty of contempt and the general thrust of the Court of Appeal judgment was maintained by the House of Lords.3 A-G v Newspaper Publishing [1987] 3 All ER 276. And see X County Council v A [1985] 1 All ER 53; cf Re Lonrho plc [1989] 2 All ER 1100, HL. 2 See Lord Donaldson at 304c. 3 For the committal hearing: A-G v Observer Ltd and Guardian Newspapers Ltd (1989) Times, 9 May; on appeal (1990) Times, CA, 28 February. A-G v Times Newspapers Ltd [1991] 2 All ER 398, HL. Jockey Club v Buffham [2003] 2 WLR 178 where the court ruled that injunctions binding third parties only applied to interim and not permanent injunctions. 1

4.366 The decision in A-G  v Punch Ltd1 should be noted carefully for the wide protection the Court of Appeal (a decision subsequently reversed by the Law Lords) gave to a publisher who was not named in the original order of the court. The Court of Appeal held that an intention to defeat the purpose of the original order of the court had to be established to amount to a contempt. The wider the original order, the more difficult it may be to establish a contempt. Furthermore, in the case of national security, the case concerned the publication of the Shayler allegations, the evidence required to establish intent on the part of the publisher was that there was knowledge that information had not previously been published. The court was very concerned that to require less than this would run the risk of introducing censorship by the Attorney-General and this would amount to a clear breach of Art 10 of the ECHR. [2001] 2 All ER 655, CA. See Simon Brown LJ dissenting, however.

1

4.367 The House of Lords ruled that even where orders were drawn in ‘over wide terms’ a contempt would be committed where a third party (newspaper editor) wilfully interfered with the administration of justice by thwarting the purpose of an interlocutory order issued by the court. The purpose of the order was to protect the confidentiality of information specified in the order pending trial so that at trial the court could adjudicate on those questions of confidentiality meaningfully, ie not after a disclosure destroyed the confidential nature of the information. The editor knew that the order sought to protect the confidentiality of information relating to national security. By publishing the order, he was doing precisely what the order sought to prevent – pre-empting a fair trial on those issues. This constituted a ‘knowing’ interference with the administration of justice. Any discussion of whether there was an intent to harm national security was beside the point.1 Where an order was set in broad terms there was nothing objectionable in providing in an order that it does not cover information which the Attorney-General has confirmed in writing is not information that the Crown is seeking to restrain. The court remains the arbiter of what can be published and the order (drafted by the Attorney-General) should set out this safeguard of application to the courts for clarification. The order would have to be a ‘justified and proportionate restraint’ on freedom of speech. The Law Lords hoped that the Attorney-General and future judges would draft

552  Chapter 4 such orders as carefully as possible to provide necessary protection but not to include unnecessary information.2 A-G v Punch Ltd [2002] UKHL 50 [2002] 1 All ER 289 (HL). And see A-G v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 1 WLR 885: it was not just to impose on a newspaper publishing information from a former security service officer’s memoirs published in the USA, Europe and on the internet the need to obtain confirmation from the Attorney-General or the court that information it wanted to republish was in the public domain so that the cloak of confidentiality had been lifted. It was for the newspaper’s editor to judge whether the information should be republished and the existing variation imposed a duty to comply with the law of confidentiality. Anything beyond that was a fetter on the newspaper’s freedom of expression.

1 2

PRIVACY PROTECTION 4.368 Privacy is an important component of individual integrity, not only in relation to invasive government, central or otherwise, but also in relation to entities such as the press and media. In ch 2 there was a discussion about the development of privacy protection in our law.

BANNING BROADCASTING 4.369 The Secretary of State has power under s 336(5) of the Communications Act 2003 to require the Office of Communications1 via notice to direct licensed broadcasters to refrain from including in their licensed services any matter, or description of matter. The previous formulation of this power was exercised in relation to prescribed organisations in Northern Ireland in 1988. In the past, the veto may cover any matter or classes of matter and a direction may include a specific broadcast.2 The exercise of this power previously had not attracted the protection of Art 10.3 Once more, however, the presence of the Human Rights Act will change the nature of future debate (above). Under s 336(1)–(4) the Secretary of State has broad powers to require the Office to direct holders of licences as specified to publish in their licensed services specified announcements. Powers under the section are in addition to any other powers conferred on the Secretary of State. Section 329 allows the Secretary of State to proscribe foreign ‘unacceptable foreign television and radio services’. Section 319 sets out in considerable detail OFCOM’s code on standards for the content of TV and radios services. Section 320 provides for special impartiality requirements in relation to service providers in matters of political or industrial controversy or matters relating to current public policy. On Broadcasting Act 1990, s 6 and banning programmes on the grounds of offending taste and decency, the House of Lords decision in R  (ProLife Alliance) v BBC indicates clearly that Art 10 may not always be a trump card.4 The case concerned videos for a TV political broadcast of what was involved in abortion processes featuring mutilated foetuses. The ban was not unreasonable. The approach should be compared with the far more rigorous (anxious) scrutiny of the Court of Appeal which was based on proportionality and which ruled the ban a breach of HRA  1998.5 In R  (on application of Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State for Culture, Media

Central government  553 and Sport [2008] UKHL 15 the appellant, an animal protection society, sought a declaration under HRA 1998, s 4 that the Communications Act 2003, s 321(2) banning broadcasting of political advertising (animal rights) was incompatible with ECHR, art 10 as given effect in this country by HRA 1998. The section is said to be incompatible as imposing an unjustified restraint on the right to freedom of political expression. The law lords refused to award a declaration despite the strong authority to the contrary of the ECHR’s judgment in VgT.6 In Animal Defenders International v UK the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR ruled that the reasons justifying the ban were relevant and sufficient and were not a disproportionate interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression.7 Established by the Office of Communications Act 2002. R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Brind [1991] 1 AC 696, HL. And the courts’ power – ‘to protect its own process’ – to ban broadcasting during the hearing of an appeal in which a retrial was being canvassed: A-G v Channel 4 Television Co Ltd [1988] Crim LR 237, CA. 3 Brind, op cit. 4 [2003] 2 All ER 977 (HL). 5 [2002] 2 All ER 756. See VVT v Switzerland (2001) 10 BHRC 473, ECtHR: the VgT decision. 6 Note 5 above. 7 [2013] ECHR 491. 1 2

The Government’s War on Terror 4.370 Anti-terrorism legislation since 2000 has placed numerous powers on the authorities to obtain, transfer, swap and use information in the ‘war on terror’.1 There are numerous offences involving use or possession of information.2 The anti-terrorism efforts have involved secret procedures to hear cases against terrorist ‘suspects’ in a variety of procedures. We examine these procedures in ch 10 (paras 10.127 and 10.131–10.132) and ch 11 (paras 11.83 et seq). See C Walker Blackstone’s Guide to the Anti-terrorism Legislation (3rd ed, 2014) for a full treatment. Eg R  v Zafar etc [2008]  EWCA  Crim 184 – Terrorism Act 2006, s  2 possession of terrorist literature; R v K [2008] EWCA Crim 185: Terrorism Act 2000, s 58 and terrorist information; Miranda v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 6; Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, Parts 1 (on powers to acquire and share information) and 4 (on notification orders); Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011; Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015.

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Chapter 5

The European perspective1

5.1  In this chapter, we examine the European perspective to our contemporary government and the use of legal provisions, and legal duties, relating to information. The chapter is written with the prospect of Brexit in 2019 and UK departure from the EU and a transition period where the UK will remain bound by EU laws and the EU courts until the end of 2020. The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 seeks to define legal relationships thereafter. It seems that EU data protection law will continue to have a central importance in shaping our law and in EU criminal law under freedom, security and justice provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and predecessors to which the UK agrees the ECJ is likely to retain jurisdiction.1 The failure of the Treaty on the European Constitution (TEC) after the rejection of the French and Dutch voters in their national referenda paved the way for the Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) on the EU (TEU) and the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). The latter treaties were formally ratified by all member states and subsequently took effect in December 2009. ToL played down some of the more obvious moves towards greater federal tendencies: any reference to ‘constitution’ had gone; the original constitutional treaty provision on the primacy of Union law over national laws (TEC, Art 1.6) has given way to Declaration No 17 in the ToL. The EU  Charter of Fundamental Rights is not an integral part of the treaties as it was in the Constitution but it is a legally binding instrument which ‘is to have the same legal value as the treaties’ according to TEU, Art 6(1). The UK government does not want the CFR to be part of the EU legal edifice that survives in domestic law after Brexit and it was removed by s  5(4) of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has given way to a High Representative although a President of the EU for a term of two years has been provided for and appointed. However, nobody should be deceived: the TEU is the TEC in an envelope and many of the major features of the constitution were incorporated in the TEU. The EC and EU are now simply the EU and the three-pillar structure of the EU has been collapsed into a singletier structure comprising the former EC, the common foreign and security area and the freedom, security and justice area. The first and third are now covered by a common legislative method with binding effect in national laws but foreign and security policy are dealt with exclusively in the TEU and will have its own

The European perspective1   555 modi operandi maintaining its intergovernmental character. The UK had elected to be outside much of the freedom, security and justice area unless it opts in, which it did in core areas. The UK and Gibraltar referendum in June 2016, on leaving or remaining within the EU, determined by a small majority that the UK would leave. It is impossible to make predictions on what the eventual outcome and consequences will be.2 H  Kranenbourg ‘Access to documents and data protection in the EU’ (2008) CMLRev 1079; D.Adamski (2009) 46  CMLR  521; D  Curtin et al (2016): www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/ etudes/IDAN/2016/556973/IPOL_IDA(2016)556973_EN.pdf; L  Rossi and P  Vinagre e Silva Public Access to Documents in the EU (2017). On a comparative study on European countries, see D Dragos, P Kovac´ & B Marseille (eds) The Laws of Transparency in Action (2018). 2 See A Biondi, P Birkinshaw and M Kendrick Brexit: The Legal Implications (2018, Wolters Kluwer). 1

5.2  The impact of the EU on our domestic affairs assumed greater and greater significance not only under the EC pillar but also the former second and third pillars (see para 5.11 below). This impact will remain under ToL. The Conservative opposition leading up to the 2010 election was hostile to the increased role of the EU and when it formed the coalition government in May 2010 with the Liberal Democrats a European Union Act 2011 was enacted introducing UK national referendum locks before any further transfers of power to the EU. The role of EU law after Brexit was set out in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. This basically provides that, on Brexit, EU law will remain in place in domestic law unless removed or amended by domestic law. The decisions of the CJEU, the EU or EU entities until the date of departure from the EU will be binding and thereafter will be of persuasive force ‘so far as it is relevant to any matter before the court or tribunal’ (2018, Act, s 6(2)). However, the UK has agreed to be bound by EU law and the CJEU judgments until the end of the transitional period. This included the Charter of Fundamental Rights.1 See P Birkinshaw in A Biondi et al above.

1

5.3  While much of the business of UK government in the EU takes place between the UK and devolved governments/executives and the EU Commission, the EU has impinged increasingly on the lives of individuals who might wish to know what lies behind decisions or non-decisions of the EU institutions. Constitutional demands have been placed on the EU by its citizenry so that it operates in a more open and responsive manner. Since our accession to the European Community under the Treaty of Brussels in 1972, implemented in our domestic law by the European Communities Act 1972 and taking effect on 1 January 1973,1 law-making and decision-making binding upon the UK may be carried out in the institutions of the EU. Treaty provisions and Directives may be directly effective and Regulations are directly applicable within the legal system of a member state. Decisions providing for access to Council and Commission documents, which were supplemented by a joint code on access, were issued in 1993 and 1994, and these have now been replaced by a Regulation following a Treaty amendment at Amsterdam (see paras 5.18 et seq below). The ToL adds to these provisions. The Council of Ministers is the legislative body of the Community although co-decision on legislation with the European Parliament (EP) had become increasingly common and, under ToL, it will become the

556  Chapter 5 normal (‘ordinary’: TFEU, Art 289) method of making legislation along with qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council, although some items will not be subject to QMV. Complex procedures exist to deal with disagreements between the Council and Parliament under existing arrangements in TFEU, Art 294. The Commission formulates proposals for new Community policies and laws, mediates between member states to secure the adoption of these proposals, coordinates national policies and oversees the execution of existing Community policies, and also makes regulations. See P Craig The Treaty of Lisbon (2010).

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5.4  As well as the ordinary legislative procedure, there is a ‘special legislative procedure’ under TFEU, Art 289(2) allowing for adoption of a measure by either the Council or Parliament with the participation of the other body. Acts adopted by both ordinary and special procedures are ‘legislative acts’ or legal acts. Legislative acts, in specific areas provided for by the treaties, may also be adopted on the initiative of a group of member states, the Parliament, on the recommendation of the European Central bank or at the request of the Court of Justice or European Investment Bank (Art 289(4)). Under Art 296(2) legal acts shall state the reasons on which they are based and shall refer to any proposals, initiatives, recommendations, requests or opinions required by the Treaties. 5.5  The Commission is a politically independent body which meets in private.1 It has delegated legislative powers and implementing powers. Under TFEU, Art 290 the Parliament and Council may delegate to the Commission the power to adopt ‘non-legislative acts of general application’ subject to conditions laid down in the article. These delegated regulations supplement or amend non-essential elements of the legislative acts of the Parliament and Council. The conditions in Art 290 are strict. Such regulations are not subject to the comitology procedures (below) but the Commission has undertaken to consult national experts in their making. Many of its proposals on implementing measures (regulations) are formulated through complex committee structures comprising national civil servants and commission officials.2 The governing article here is TFEU, Art 291. Committees created by the Council which are of both a managerial and regulatory nature may prevent the Commission proceeding with a measure unless the Committees approve. There are also advisory committees. New provisions in 2006 established regulatory committees with scrutiny and allowed the EP to block the measures approved by these committees where they were quasi-legislative in nature and emerged from the co-decision law-making procedure of the EP and Council. Committees other than those established in 2006 were established under Council Decision 1999/468/EC. The 1999 decision has now been replaced by a regulation introduced in March 2011 establishing two procedures for the committees (comitology): an examination procedure and an advisory procedure (Regulation (EU) 182/2011 under TFEU, Art 291(2)). The former deals with implementing measures of a general nature and those dealing with a potentially specific impact in important areas such as agriculture, fisheries, environment, health, taxation and trade. Decisions approving the Commission measure are

The European perspective1   557 by qualified majority and in the case of rejection the Commission may redraft the measure or appeal to an appeal committee. Advisory committees operate in ‘other fields’ and the Commission must take the ‘utmost account’ of its opinion which is reached by simple majority. The new regulation also confers on the EP and the Council a right of scrutiny. Where the basic legislative act has been adopted under the co-decision procedure, the EP or the Council may at any time inform the Commission that it considers the draft implementing act to exceed the powers which they conferred on it. In such a case, the Commission must review the draft act and decide whether to maintain, amend or withdraw it. ‘In order to achieve greater consistency, the procedural requirements should be proportionate to the nature and impact of the implementing acts to be adopted (Recital No 10).’ In 2017, a proposal was made for a new regulation for comitology which proposed changing the voting rules to remove abstentions, greater involvement of ministers, making public the votes of member state representatives, and ensuring political input from the Council if the appeal committee is unable to adopt a position.3 See Rules of Procedure of the EU Commission 2010/138/EU, Art 9, 24 February 2010. G  Brandsma et al ‘How transparent are EU  Comitology Committees in practice?’ (2008) 14 ELJ 819. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/news/more-transparency-and-accountability-implementingeu-law-2017-feb-14_en (27/04/2018). 1 2

5.6  A  register of committees exists and the list of committees is published with the annual reports of committees.1 The register contains agendas, draft implementing measures, summaries of papers and voting results. Their deliberations as contained in documents are subject to the Regulation on access (see below). Case law had decided that the committees were covered by the former Code on access (see below) and they are covered by the access Regulation (see below). Commission decisions themselves are taken by simple majority vote. Under a ‘written procedure’ draft decisions are frequently circulated among the Commissioners. They are considered adopted if no objections are made within a specified period. Representations from individuals are not encouraged; far more common are representations from collective groups such as trade associations, business lobbies, public interest groups as well as domestic governments. A White Paper and a follow-up paper have made numerous suggestions in relation to lawand rule-making and consultation, openness and other safeguards.2 http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm?do=HowTo.howto#committee (28/04/2018). A new register for delegated acts was introduced in 2017: http://www.consilium. europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/12/13/more-transparency-on-eu-decision-makingnew-register-of-delegated-acts/ (27/04/2018). Generally, registers are not user-friendly. 2 European Governance COM (2001) 428 final, European Commission and COM (2002) 704, 705, 709, 719 European Commission. 1

5.7  The Council of Ministers of the EU (the ‘Council’, comprising ministers from each member state, and not to be confused with the European Council, which is the gathering of heads of state or government, the President of the European Council and the president of the Commission (TEU, Art 15)) is

558  Chapter 5 a joint legislator with the European Parliament of EU primary legislation (legislative measures), subject to the co-decision procedure within the TFEU. The Council concludes agreements with foreign countries and decides on the Community budget together with the EP. Most Council meetings were held in private although some meetings have been open to the public since 1993 and became more transparent in 2006. Council meetings are regulated by the Council’s rules of procedure.1 The Council is served by a permanent committee of senior national officials known as COREPER which has two operating levels. In relation to legislative committees the Council meets in public when considering and voting on a draft legislative act. The same provision (TFEU, Art 15(2)) states that the Parliament shall meet in public. The Parliament’s rules of procedure from 2017 state that Parliament shall conduct its activities in ‘utmost transparency’ in accordance with TEU, Art 1, para  2, TFEU, Art 15 and Charter of Fundamental Rights, Art 42 (para  5.8 below).2 Positions adopted by ministers were not originally revealed by the Council save to the extent that they are covered by the Regulation on access, although ministers may make public their own position. Successive treaties from Maastricht have considerably enhanced the role of Parliament as a legislator as explained above in the ordinary legislative procedure. The Council of Ministers and the Parliament may, where provided for by the Treaties, adopt regulations, directives and decisions by a special legislative procedure under TFEU, Art 289. A legislative act may delegate to the Commission powers to make regulations (non-legislative acts or regulatory acts often described as quasi-legislative) to supplement or amend non-essential elements of a legislative act (TFEU, Art 290) subject to the procedures outlined above in relation to delegated and implementing acts and relevant committees. Council Decision 1 Dec 2009, 2009/937/EU [2009] OJ L 325/35 https://europa.eu/europeanunion/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/rules_of_procedure_of_the_council_en.pdf (28/04/2018). 2 Title III, arts 103 and 104 on the application of TFEU, Art 15 and EC Regulation 1049/2001. 1

5.8  The Parliament possesses certain opportunities to amend and modify the budget. As a general rule, committees of Parliament will normally sit in public unless, at the time of the presentation of the agenda, business is divided into public and private sessions (Parliamentary Rules of Procedure, Rule 115 (January 2017)). The rules continue: ‘However, if a meeting is held in camera, the committee may decide to make documents from the meeting available for public access’. Minutes are not specifically referred to as in the previous rule. The rule provides: ‘(1)  Parliament shall ensure that its activities are conducted with the utmost transparency, in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 1 of the Treaty on European Union, Article 15 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 42 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. (2)  Debates in Parliament shall be public.’ Rule 116 covers public access to documents (under the access regulation below) and transparency of business.

The European perspective1   559 5.9  At the end of meetings, coordinators will sit in private to discuss future agendas and ‘household business’. The Committee which deals with members’ immunities sits in private session. 5.10  Relationships between member states, and between those states and the institutions of the Union, are governed by a provision in the Treaty on ‘good faith’ and ‘sincere cooperation’ (TEU, Art 4(3)), although the phrase ‘good faith’ is not in the Treaty itself. It was held by the ECJ in an old case Zwartveld that this necessitates the sharing of information in the Commission’s possession with national authorities to help those authorities carry out inquiries into the operation of markets and alleged malpractices in relation to EC law.1 Furthermore, Commission officials had to consent to an examination before the domestic judges. Both were subject to imperative reasons for non-disclosure that the Commission might advance. The case did not concern a preliminary reference under then EC, Art 234 (TFEU, Art 267) or a point of interpretation of a Treaty or secondary provision of law and the procedure was regarded as innovative. Provisions exist in the Treaty for exchange of information between member states subject to a right of non-compliance where a member state considers supply contrary to the ‘essential interests of its security’ (TFEU, Art 346(1)(a)). Exchange of information and data exchanges are a crucial dimension in freedom security and justice (see below) in relation to combating crime at the EU level. Case C-2/88 [1990]  ECR  I-3365 followed by S  and S  Services Ltd v Customs and Excise Commissioners [2004] Eu LR  1. On cooperation in competition investigations, see Council Regulation OJ L [04/01/03] Arts 11 and 12 and chapter V on investigations.

1

5.11  One of the most controversial aspects of the operation of the EC, and now the EU, in recent years has been the ‘democratic deficit’ in the Union. New styles of governance, the growth of comitology, the advent of numerous agencies and new methods of governance have all taken place to advance cooperative international governance but have not been accompanied by developed and appropriate accountability and transparency mechanisms or an administrative procedure code. There are codes on good administrative practice produced by the EU  Ombudsman and Commission, and regulations exist for agencies and comitology. The Charter of Fundamental Rights, which is recognised by member states and which has the same legal effect as the treaties (TEU, Art 6), includes principles on good administration (Art 41). The ‘Reneual’ group of experts has been working on an administrative code for several years.1 http://www.reneual.eu/ (5/03/2018).

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5.12  A subject of particular concern has been the residual role that National Parliaments (NPs) play in the implementing of EC legislative provisions and the EU policy-making process, while the role of the European Parliament (EP) in the legislative process has increased. Whatever the EP’s democratic legitimacy, the fact that it is not seen as superior to NPs is widely held and accepted. NPs have been poorly provided with information about legislative proposals before the Council and did not have sufficient time to question

560  Chapter 5 relevant Ministers.1 The Amsterdam Treaty provided a Protocol (No 13) on the role of national Parliaments within the EU. The committees of the Westminster Parliament with responsibility for EU affairs were subject to amendments to their remit and titles after the 1998 memorandum of the President of the Council to the select committee on Modernisation of the House of Commons.2 This identified three main objectives of any changes: strengthening the role of the Westminster Parliament; increasing democratic oversight of new EU legislation; and increasing the transparency and parliamentary awareness of the conduct of EU business.3 Changes have been made in domestic regimes vis-àvis Parliamentary oversight of draft legislative measures.4 Crucially, the ToL has important protocols on both the role of NPs in the EU and on subsidiarity and proportionality.5 The Commission consults widely before proposing legislative acts. These protocols have strengthened the role of NPs in the legislative process, have increased the information they receive from the Commission in relation to consultation documents and draft measures and their timeliness so that eight weeks must elapse between a draft measure being available to a NP and its being placed on a provisional agenda for the Council for its adoption or for the adoption of a position under a legislative procedure. Exceptions are possible in cases of ‘emergency’. A ten-day period, again subject to emergency, shall elapse between the placing of a draft legislative act on the provisional agenda of the Council and the adoption of a position. Each EU institution has to ensure constant respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality under TEU, Art 5. Draft legislative acts as defined have to be justified according to these principles and have to contain a detailed statement making it possible to appraise compliance with the principles. Further requirements including financial impact are in Art 5 of the Protocol on Subsidiarity and Proportionality. The Protocol allows for a reasoned opinion on non-compliance with subsidiarity from a NP of a draft legislative proposal within eight weeks of the transmission of the proposal to NPs. Where a threshold (30 per cent for legislative proposals and 25 per cent for a legislative act under TFEU, Art 76) of votes from NPs (each NP has two votes, one for each chamber in bicameral parliaments) determines that subsidiarity is not conformed with, the proposal must be reviewed by the Commission or proposer of the draft measure. Under the ordinary legislative procedure a vote of a simple majority of NP votes allocated prompts such a review by the Commission. The review may maintain, amend or withdraw the draft or proposal. Reasons have to be given for the decision. The Commission has to give reasons for its decision in the case of a proposal under the ordinary legislative procedure. The reasoned opinions and those of NPs must be submitted to the Union legislator, and the EP and Council must consider before the conclusion of first reading whether the legislative proposal is compatible with subsidiarity. A majority of 55 per cent in the Council or a majority of votes cast in the EP can kill off the proposal. The Protocol provides for judicial review under TFEU, Art 263 of legislative acts because of alleged infringement of subsidiarity. The application may be made by member states ‘or notified by them in accordance with their legal order on behalf of their NPs or a chamber thereof’. The Committee of the Regions may also bring such actions on specified grounds. Under the Protocol on Subsidiarity and Proportionality, Art 9 the Commission must submit each year a report to the Council, EP and

The European perspective1   561 NPs on the application of TEU, Art 5. It will be forwarded to the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. See P Birkinshaw and D Ashiagbor ‘National Participation in Community Affairs: Democracy, the UK Parliament and the EU’ (1996) Common Market Law Rev 499 and the Select Committee on European Legislation The Scrutiny of European Business HC 51 xxvii (1995–96); Jacob Öberg (2019) European Public Law Issue 1 (forthcoming). 2 Cm 4095. The Commons Committee is called the European Scrutiny Committee. The House of Lords committee is the Select Committee on the European Union. 3 See C Kerse (2000) European Public Law 81. 4 P Birkinshaw European Public Law (2nd edn, 2014) ch 7. 5 Ibid. 1

5.13  Two further developments are crucial: the move towards qualified majority voting allowed legislation to be passed in the Council without the specific approval of national Ministers and therefore, it was argued, without the consent or authorisation of the duly elected government of the member state; and, secondly, the secrecy of the conduct of the two inter-governmental pillars covering foreign and security policy, and police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters both of which are part of the post-TEU edifice, as explained above. We shall see that the CJEU has been protective of secrecy in treaty negotiations where access to documents has been sought under EC Regulation 1049/2001. The business of these two pillars was also conducted through committees and sub-committees that operated in secrecy although reforms as set out above have modified procedures. Openness is very much a key issue in the future development and legitimation of the EU. Significant reforms are contained in the ToL. Important in the present discussion are further provisions on access and transparency that will be examined below, the collapsing of the pillar structure into one legal edifice with one legal personality, the formal institutional recognition of the European Council (Heads of State) of the EU as an institution of the EU and one which will be within the access regimes for the first time; that the Council as legislator will sit in public under Art 7 of its rules of procedure (para  5.7, note 1), and under Art 8 in other cases where legally binding but non-legislative measures are to be adopted but only for the ‘first deliberation’;1 the protocols on the role of national parliaments (above); and crucially, the elevation of the previously intergovernmental Charter of Fundamental Rights as a legally binding part of the ToL. This promotes openness, transparency, access to information, data protection and good administrative process to fundamental constitutional measures along with the more usual subjects of human rights protection.2 This covers ‘important new measures’ as determined by the Presidency. The Council or COREPER may determine otherwise. The Council or COREPER may determine by QMV which important issues affecting the interests of the EU and its citizens shall be the subject of public debates in the Council. It shall be for the Presidency, any member of the Council, or the Commission to propose issues or specific subjects for such debates, taking into account the importance of the matter and its interest to citizens. 2 See P  Birkinshaw (2004) 10 European Public Law 57 and ‘Supranationalism, the Rule of Law and Constitutionalism’ in P Eeckhout and T Tridimas Yearbook of European Law 2004 (2005, OUP), p 199. 1

5.14  Under Article  10  TEU every citizen has the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union. Decisions shall be taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen (and see Article 1). EU institutions should consult widely

562  Chapter 5 before taking legislative initiatives. TEU, Art 11 contains three underlying principles: dialogue, transparency and pluralism, the latter as represented by representative associations, citizens and ‘parties concerned’.1 Consultations should be widely published via ‘European Commission Consultations’.2 Guidance on consultation was published in 2014.3 Eight weeks are allowed for responses to written consultations and 20 days’ notice of meetings should be given. A 2002 communication states that lobbyists must abide by standards such as explaining the interests they represent and how inclusive these are. Failure to abide by these standards means their submission will not be treated as a representative one and will be afforded less weight. Having observed the rather anodyne qualities of these measures, the Commission established a voluntary register for lobbyists. Membership is only allowed for those who observe a code of conduct in the register.4 The Commission and EP established a joint Transparency Register (TR) following an Inter-Institutional Agreement (IIA) between the Commission and Parliament in 2011. It remains a voluntary system of registration for interest representatives seeking to directly or indirectly influence the EU decisionmaking process. The TR has grown at an average rate of 1,000 registrants per year, and now includes over 7,000 organisations. It covers all organisations and self-employed individuals, irrespective of their legal status, engaged in activities falling within the scope of the Register, including in-house lobbyists, trade and professional associations, professional consultancies, law firms, self-employed consultants, think-tanks, research and academic institutes. The most recent review of the IIA entered into force on 1 January 2015, and will be followed by an update of the system.5 ‘Inclusiveness’ is explained in the 2002 Communication (COM(2002)704, 11–12). European Commission General Principles and Minimum Standards for Consultation of Interested Parties by the Commission (2002) for the earlier version. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/info/consultations_en (27/04/2018). 3 http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/docs/scgl_pc_questionnaire_en.pdf (27/04/2018). 4 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-Briefing-542170-European-TransparencyRegister-FINAL.pdf (27/04/2018). 5 For developments towards a mandatory register, see http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislativetrain/theme-union-of-democratic-change/file-inter-institutional-agreement-on-a-mandatorytransparency-register-for-lobbyists (20/11/2018). For annual and other reports, see http:// ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/homePage.do (7/12/2018). 1

5.15  These measures have sought to enhance transparency in the EU. Finally, before examining the regulation on access to information it should be noted that the European Parliament and Council of Ministers agreed a Directive on the re-use of public sector information, which is to be implemented by 1 July 2005 (Directive 2003/98/EEC (17/11/03) OJ L 345/90). This was updated by Directive 2013/37/EU. The UK has implemented this provision, as explained in ch 4 (paras 4.40 et seq).

THE DECISIONS AND THE CODE ON ACCESS 5.16  The Decisions and the Code on Access have now been superseded by the Regulation on access which is discussed below. The provisions of the Code need

The European perspective1   563 no longer delay us but some very important case-law was decided under the Code showing the secrecy (and somewhat duplicitous negotiations) that went on in the making of legislation by the Council. This showed that the Council had not balanced all relevant considerations in deciding whether to apply an exemption correctly after a request was made for documents used in the legislative process and crucial evidence came from member states who were not happy with the way the decision was taken.1 Subsequently, on 2 October 1995, the Council adopted a Code of Practice on Public Access to the Minutes and Statements in the Minutes of the Council Acting as Legislator.2 In the case of a statement by one or more members of the Council, the Council will seek the agreement of the author(s) before deciding to make it available to the public. Decisions will be taken on whether public access should be allowed to references to documents before the Council and decisions taken or conclusions reached by the Council which are contained in the minutes relating to the final adoption of its legislative acts. The aim is to ensure the widest possible public availability of its minutes save in exceptional cases covered by Art 4(1) of the 1993 Decision. The permission of author(s) of statements in minutes will be sought before taking a decision on publication. It does not say what will happen if the agreement is not forthcoming. Its decision will be taken on advice from COREPER – the permanent committee of the Council of Ministers – and the Code only takes effect after its adoption. A Council Decision (2000/23/EC (13/1/2000) 2000 OJ L 9/22) made additional provision on access. The 2001 regulation now makes provision for access to documents in the legislative process as does the ToL (below). Carvel v EU Council Case T-194/94 [1996] All ER (EC) 53. PRES/95/271, 2 Oct 1995.

1 2

5.17  Further litigation produced a series of embarrassing set-backs for the Commission usually on technical points under the Code. It must be said the reputation of the Commission and Council’s support of transparency often suffered a set-back in the case law. These cases have covered a failure to give proper reasons and to follow correct procedures for refusing access.1 This was followed in the Svenska decision where the Court of First Instance (CFI) also ruled that it had jurisdiction over third pillar documents in the possession of the Council – subject to exemptions. Again the CFI ruled that clear reasons had to be given for refusing access.2 Access to second pillar documents was also maintained in Heidi Hautala v EU Council where a decision by the Council to refuse consideration of handing over redacted documents to an applicant was annulled by the Court of First Instance and upheld by the ECJ because it was ‘disproportionate’.3 In the Rothmans case, the CFI held that ‘comitology’ (the committees of the Commission above) documents are accessible under the Code on access.4 Limits have been placed on requests for information so the CFI has said the Commission does not have to comply with every request for information.5 The CFI has nonetheless insisted that proper procedures are complied with.6 Partial disclosure could not be evaded by the Council and Commission by finding that ‘partial disclosure would be of no use to the applicant’.7 However, on one major point, the ECJ refused to accept the argument that a right of access to information constituted a constitutional right under the Community framework which was built on openness and the rule of law.8 Such an approach

564  Chapter 5 had been argued for by the Advocate General. The judgment did express the point, however, that there was a trend towards a ‘progressive affirmation of individuals’ rights of access to documents held by public authorities’. In the Hautala decision above, the ECJ declined the invitation to decide whether EC law recognises a general right to information. The CFI described access rights as a ‘wide general principle’ and any exceptions should be construed ‘strictly’ ie, in favour of openness. The EU  Ombudsman was also very active in pursuing the principles of openness and access to documents and he conducted an owninitiative investigation into the practices of Community institutions.9 This led to all bodies adopting their procedures to follow the Decisions and the Code, even though they were not covered by the Code. The Council also adopted a register of documents allowing Council documents drawn up after 1  January 1999 to be identified. The EU  Ombudsman has also produced a model Code of Good Administrative Behaviour which states that institutions should produce information on request subject to permissible exemptions. Case T-105/95 WWF UK v Commission [1997] ECR II-313; Kuijer v EU Council: Case T-188/98 [2000] 2  CMLR  400 – the Council was in error in failing to carry out an assessment of each document requested in relation to conditions in countries from which the majority of asylum seekers originated. A  blanket reason for refusing access where the conditions differed was unlawful and failed to show each document had been individually assessed. See also, Bavarian Lager Co Ltd v EC Commission: Case T-309/97 [1999] ECR II-3217. 2 Svenska Journalistförbundet v EU Council: T-174/95 [1998] ECRII-2289. 3 Case T-14/98 [1999] 3 CMLR 528; Case C-353/99 P 6 December 2001, ECJ. 4 Case T-188/97 Rothmans International BV v EC Commission [1999] ECR-II 2463. 5 Case T-106/99 Meyer v Commission [1999] ECR II-3273. 6 Case T-105/95 WWF UK v EC Commission [1997] ECR II-313. 7 Case C-353/01 P Mattila v Council of EC and Commission [2004] 1 CMLR 32. 8 See Case C-58/94 Kingdom of the Netherlands v The Council [1996] ECR I-2169. 9 OJ 1998 C 292/170; Annual Report of the European Ombudsman (1999), p 245. 1

THE EC REGULATION ON ACCESS (ARTICLE 255 EC) Background 5.18  We will see how TFEU, Art 15 provided for a new regulation on access to documents. Nine years later, there has been no regulation, meaning that the 2001 Regulation is still the governing measure. In the Commission’s explanatory memorandum on the 2001 draft Regulation on access, the Commission explained how the Amsterdam Treaty introduced a new Art 255 into the EC  Treaty, which grants the citizens and residents of the Union the right of access to the documents of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission. The governing provision is now TFEU, Art 15, which we address below. We should note, however, that Art 15(3) confers a right of access to documents of the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. This is a much wider formulation of coverage than the regulation. The Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Central Bank and the European Investment Bank are subject to this paragraph only when exercising their administrative tasks. The Decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 11 December 2012 concerning public

The European perspective1   565 access to documents held by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the exercise of its administrative functions (2013/C 38/02) sets out the regime for applying for administrative documents from the CJEU. The Treaty also included among the general principles of the Union the idea that decisions must be taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizens. The Preamble to the Regulation proclaims: ‘Openness enables citizens to participate more closely in the decision-making process and guarantees that the administration enjoys greater legitimacy and is more effective and more accountable to the citizen in a democratic system’. Has the interpretation of the regulation by the CJEU advanced the spirit of this statement? 5.19  Under the terms of the EC, Art 255 (Amsterdam 1999), the Commission had to prepare draft legislation on the general principles and limits governing the right of access to documents of the three institutions (note three institutions – not the coverage that the EU Ombudsman has ensured in his own-initiative inquiries investigating access among EU institutions and which sought to persuade institutions to adopt practices on access based on the Code), which must be adopted under the co-decision procedure within two years of the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, ie before 1 May 2001. Each institution must also lay down specific provisions regarding access to its documents in its rules of procedure (see below).

Scope of the Regulation (Arts 1 and 2) institutions covered by the regulation

5.20  It was seen above (para 5.18) that the range of bodies covered by Art 15(3) and now by the regulation has been significantly extended. It now covers the European Council.

subjects covered by the regulation

5.21  Articles 28(1) and 41(1) of the Treaty on European Union expressly provide that the right of access also applies to documents relating to the common foreign and security policy and police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters (the second and third pillars). This is confirmed by recital 7 (above). The terms of TFEU, Art 15 are set out below. 5.22  In accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice, the Regulation must also apply to documents relating to activities under the ECSC (now disbanded) and Euratom Treaties.1 Case: 382/85: Deutsche Babcock Handel GmbH  v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost [1987]  ECR  5119 (Judgment given on 15.12.1987). On access to environmental information held by EU institutions, see Regulation (EC) 1367/2006 (para 3.4, note 1).

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566  Chapter 5 documents covered by the regulation

5.23  The legislation will cover all documents held by the three institutions, ie  documents drawn up by them or emanating from third parties and in the possession of the institutions. This widening in the scope of the access system was seen by the Commission as a major step forward compared to the current system which only covers documents produced by the institutions. The wider dimension of TFEU, Art 15 will be examined below. 5.24  Both the EP and the European Ombudsman keenly advocated this approach which was in line with existing legislation in most member states. The formulation of Declaration No 35 in the EC Treaty – which allows a member state to request the Commission or Council not to communicate to third parties documents from that state without its prior agreement – also supports a broader interpretation of Art 255 EC. However, it is understood that access to a document received from a third party will not be granted if the document is covered by one of the exceptions provided for in Art 4(1) and (2). Where there is some doubt on this, the institution will consult the author of the document first, although it reserves the right, if no reply is forthcoming, to take the final decision on whether to hand over the document or not (for the legal effect of a ‘request’ by a member state, see para 5.80 below). Access to documents from third parties will be limited to those sent to the institution after the date of entry into application of this Regulation so as to enable European citizens to be properly informed of this wider access to documents. We examine the case law below. definition of the term ‘document’

5.25  The term ‘document’ is defined as any content whatever its medium: paper, electronic, sound, visual or audio-visual recording. It will cover only administrative documents, ie  any document on a topic which falls within the institution’s remit concerning policies, activities and decisions. The EU Ombudsman has ruled that data sets are documents for the purposes of the regulation.1 Excluded are documents expressing individual opinions or reflecting free and frank discussions or provision of advice as part of internal consultations and deliberations as well as informal messages such as e-mail messages ‘which can be considered the equivalent of telephone conversations’. As the Committee of Independent Experts emphasised in its Second Report ‘like all political institutions, the Commission needs the “space to think” to formulate policy before it enters the public domain, on the grounds that policy made in the glare of publicity and therefore “on the hoof” is often poor policy’.2 Case 2493/2008/(BB)(TS)FOR  (23/03/2012) https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/ en/11360, paras 77–84 (6/06/2018). 2 Second report by the Committee of Independent Experts, ch 7, para 7.6.6. 1

compatibility between the general principle of access to documents and existing specific rules

5.26  Specific rules relating to the access to documents or files already exist in connection with certain procedures. It is therefore important to stipulate clearly

The European perspective1   567 that the future rules governing the right of access to documents will not apply where specific rules already exist for certain persons who have a particular interest in information or rules governing the confidentiality of certain documents. However, these rules should be revised as soon as possible in the light of the general principles on transparency.

Beneficiaries of the right of access (Art 3) 5.27  In accordance with Art 255 of the EC Treaty, any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a member state, enjoys the right of access to documents. The applicant is not required to cite a special reason or interest.

Exceptions to the right of access (Art 4) 5.28  The legislation includes a number of exceptions to the right of access to documents. As under the present system, all the exceptions are based on a ‘harm test’ although the expression used in ‘undermine’. This means that access to documents will be granted unless disclosure would undermine certain specific interests, which are spelled out in Art 4 (with reference to specific examples). Compared with the rules laid down in the present Council and Commission code of conduct, the wording of the exceptions has been spelled out more clearly. It is also worthy of note that the harm must be ‘seriously undermine’ in the case of internal documents or those received from outside the institution or concerning opinions for internal use in deliberations (cf the test of ‘prejudice’ under the FOIA 2000). In some cases as shall be seen there is an overriding ‘public interest in disclosure’ test allowing disclosure even though an exception might apply.

Processing of initial and confirmatory applications, remedies, exercise of the right of access and rules on reproduction for commercial purposes or other forms of economic exploitation (Arts 5–8) 5.29  The proposal contains provisions similar to those in force under the former Code – which operated satisfactorily the Commission believed – with a number of adjustments. 5.30  For example, the time-limit for replies may now be extended by one month, provided that the applicant is notified in advance and detailed reasons are given. In accordance with the judgment given by the CFI on 19 July 1999 in Case T-14/98 (Hautala v EU Council and upheld in the ECJ Case C-353/99 P), the proposal also introduces a requirement that, where a document contains passages covered by one of the exceptions to the right of access, partial access must be granted after the passages covered by the exception have been concealed.1 See also: Mattila, para 5.17, note 7 above.

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568  Chapter 5 5.31  The Regulation introduces the principle that no reply to a confirmatory request equals a positive response which strengthens citizen’s rights.

Final provisions (Arts 9–13) 5.32  A number of final provisions are proposed, which are designed to: • commit the institutions covered by the Regulation to take the necessary steps to inform citizens of their rights and to set up public registers of documents; and • remind the institutions that they must lay down in their rules of procedure specific provisions for the implementation of the general principles and limits laid down in this Regulation. 5.33  The Commission spelt out that the three institutions should undertake to adopt a number of additional measures in order to ensure a consistent approach in the implementation of the new rules governing public right of access to their documents: ‘Such measures include training and informing their staff and reviewing existing procedures for registering, filing, archiving and classifying documents’. 5.34  From the Preamble to the Regulation on access, it is important to note the following recitals which add to points already made. ‘Article 1(2) of the Treaty on European Union, as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam, enshrines the concept of openness, stating that “This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen”.’ (recital 1) 5.35  The statement below, which has been introduced above, is, it could be argued, a constitutional clarion call for openness which must include access to documents: ‘Openness enables citizens to participate more closely in the decisionmaking process and guarantees that the administration enjoys greater legitimacy and is more effective and more accountable to the citizen in a democratic system.’ (recital 2) 5.36  This seems self-declaratory: ‘The purpose of this Regulation is to give the fullest possible effect to the right of public access to documents and to lay down the general principles and limits on such access in accordance with Article 255(2) of the EC Treaty.’ 5.37  The next three recitals from the Preamble state that the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and Euratom treaties are within this Regulation (ECSC no longer exists), the Regulation applies to common foreign and security

The European perspective1   569 policy and police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters (freedom, security and justice); and that access to documents should be extended to include all documents held by the three institutions. Recital 6 calls for wider access to documents in cases where the institutions are acting in a legislative capacity including the exercise of delegated powers (see para 5.5 above). 5.38  Where other rights of access exist, these rules will not undermine those; such rights as under the Directive on data protection or procurement. Certain documents ‘on account of their highly sensitive content’ are to be given special treatment. These concern defence and security (recital 9) (see below). The Regulation will include documents received by the institutions. 5.39  Recital 11 states that, although all documents ‘in principle’ should be available, ‘certain public and private interests should be protected’. 5.40  This sets out the requirement for exceptions or exemptions from access. These are criticised below: ‘In order to ensure that the right of access is fully respected, a two-stage administrative procedure should apply, with the additional possibility of court proceedings or complaints to the Ombudsman.’ (recital 13) The right of challenge against an adverse decision is available to the courts (TFEU, Art 263) and via the ombudsman (TFEU, Art 228). 5.41  This refers to an initial request, a refusal and then a request for a further consideration – the ‘confirmatory’ stage: ‘Each institution should take the measures necessary to inform the public about the new provisions in force; and to train its staff to assist citizens exercising their rights under this Regulation. In order to make it easier for citizens to exercise their rights, each institution should provide access to a register of documents.’ (recital 14) 5.42  This is an important provision. An up-to-date register is invaluable in helping to gain access: ‘Even though it is neither the object nor the effect of this Regulation is to amend national legislation on access to documents, it is nevertheless clear that, by virtue of the principle of loyal cooperation which governs relations between the institutions and the Member States, Member States should take care not to hamper the proper application of this Regulation and should respect the security rules of the institutions.’ (recital 15) 5.43  As we shall see, this provision was heavily criticised by the European Parliament although it was toned down to its present form from a far stronger version which more or less stated that member states had to be ‘loyal’. 5.44  Recital 16 states that the Regulation is without prejudice to existing rights of access to documents for member states, judicial authorities or investigative bodies.

570  Chapter 5 ‘In accordance with Article 255(3) of the EC Treaty, each institution lays down specific provisions regarding access to its documents in its rules of procedure.’ (recital 17) 5.45  Each institution covered by the Regulation will have to make rules of procedure containing specific provisions on access. These are very important because the Regulation is not effective until they are made and they will deal with items such as the confidentiality of their own proceedings.1 In spite of all its protestations advocating greater openness, it was the EP’s rules which could lend themselves to greater protection of secrecy. The EP rules are: European Parliament Rules of Procedure (2017) Title IV rule 116; Council Rules of Procedure Annex II (2009); and 5 December 2001 OJ L 345/94 for the Commission.

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5.46  Council Decision 488/2013/EU1 allows for the classification of documents (EU Classified Information) as ‘top secret’, ‘secret’, ‘confidential’, ‘restricted’ and various internal references for information which is not to be publicly available: • EU TOP SECRET: unauthorised disclosure could cause exceptionally grave prejudice to essential EU or member state interests. • EU SECRET: unauthorised disclosure could seriously harm essential EU or member state interests. • EU CONFIDENTIAL: unauthorised disclosure could harm essential EU or member state interests. • EU RESTRICTED: unauthorised disclosure could be disadvantageous to EU or member state interests. Where documents are in the first three classifications and they concern ‘military and non-military crisis management within the framework of a strengthened European security and defence policy’ they are excluded from the provisions allowing access under the Regulation. The public register will contain no reference to the information classified in the manner stated above as top secret, secret and confidential, ie  documents from the institutions or the agencies established by them, from Member States, third countries or international organisations. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013D0488&from= EN (28/04/2018).

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5.47  Note that the ECJ and CFI are not included in the Regulation but they are within Art 15(3) (as explained at para 5.18). The ECJ began drawing up a code on access after the EU Ombudsman’s own initiative inquiry even though the ECJ and CFI are not within the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction when acting in their judicial role.

The Treaty of Lisbon 5.48  One of the motivating desires behind the drafting of the EU Constitution (EUC) by the d’Estaing Convention was a simplification of the existing framework

The European perspective1   571 of Union institutions and laws. The creation of a single legal personality into which the three separate pillars would collapse, the formal establishment of the European Council as an institution of the Union and not a nebulous supranational and all-governing quingo (quasi-autonomous international governmental organisation), the allocation of competencies and the principles of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality in the exercise of powers by the EU institutions were all realised in the ToL, but not the simplification of the legislative procedure as set out in the EUC. 5.49  As explained, the ToL provides a new legal base for an access regulation in TFEU, Art 15(3). ToL states that, under TEU, Art 6 the Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000 (as adapted at Strasbourg on 12  December 2007), which has the same legal value as the Treaties. The provisions of the Charter do not extend in any way the competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties. Under Art 42 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights there is a right of access to the documents of the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union. This was a fundamental right in international law, and much broader in its effect than existing rights, and on the coming into force of the ToL it became a legally binding part of the Treaties and not simply a matter of intergovernmental agreement. Art 41 of the Charter gives a right to good administration. So, the rights in the Charter to good administration and a right of access to documents are legally binding ‘fundamental rights’.1 Case T-3/00 & 337/04 Pitsiorla v Council (27/11/07) concerning the European Central Bank, and Case T-590/10 Gabi Thesing and Bloomberg Finance LP v ECB (application unsuccessful; see paras 65–84 on the CFR).

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5.50  Under TEU, Art 10(3) every citizen has the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union. Decisions shall be taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen (and see Art 1). This is also present in TEU, Art 1. 5.51  TEU, Art 11 provides that the institutions shall, by appropriate means, give citizens and representative associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas of Union action. The institutions shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society. The European Commission shall carry out broad consultations with parties concerned in order to ensure that the Union’s actions are coherent and transparent. Citizens (not less than a million) may invite the Commission to submit proposals for laws for the purpose of implementing the Treaties. 5.52  The provision on access to documents was in the first part of the TEC which dealt with constitutional basics (TEC, Art I.50) as well as under Part Three of the TEC. It is now (apart from its presence in the Charter above) in the second part of ToL: the TFEU. 5.53  Under TFEU, Art 15 (replacing TEC, Art 255) it states that in order to promote good governance and ensure the participation of civil society, the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies shall conduct their work as openly as

572  Chapter 5 possible. After provisions about Parliament and the Council meetings being in public, the latter when considering and voting on a legislative act, it states: ‘3. Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State, shall have a right of access to documents of the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, whatever their medium, subject to the principles and the conditions to be defined in accordance with this paragraph. General principles and limits on grounds of public or private interest governing this right of access to documents shall be determined by the European Parliament and the Council, by means of regulations, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure. Each institution, body, office or agency shall ensure that its proceedings are transparent and shall elaborate in its own Rules of Procedure specific provisions regarding access to its documents, in accordance with the regulations referred to in the second subparagraph. The Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Central Bank and the European Investment Bank shall be subject to this paragraph only when exercising their administrative tasks.’ It should be emphasised that this measure does not confer rights on those who are not ‘citizens or resident in the EU’. The position at present is that noncitizens and residents are covered by EC  Regulation 1049/2001, as explained above. Secondly, all institutions of the EU are covered. This will include the European Council, which is made an ‘institution’ under ToL. Because of the collapse of the pillars into one EU edifice there is no formal distinction between what were EC and EU concerns. The coverage of this measure would appear to be much wider that the existing regulation. We still await the final detail. 5.54  TFEU, Art 298(1) provides that ‘in carrying out their missions, the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union shall have the support of an open, efficient and independent European administration’ and the EP and Council shall establish provisions to that end. Under the TEC it stated that such provisions are subject to staff regulations and conditions of employment on confidentiality, discipline and non-publication of materials acquired from employment.1 Case C-274/99 P Connolly v EC Commission [2001] ECR I-1611; Case C-340/00 P EC Commission v Cwik; see A Biondi (2003) European Public Law 39.

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5.55  Finally, the Commission has conducted a review of EC  Regulation 1049/2001 on access and its recommendations for amendment and comments are dealt with below (paras 5.101 et seq). The House of Lords EU Committee has examined the subject of access to EU documents (HL 108 (2008–09)).

Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 5.56  The Commission has been reviewing Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 (OJ  L  145/43)1 on access, a process which preceded ToL and which is still

The European perspective1   573 continuing. However, the existing Regulation is likely to be the basis of any future regulation and its details must be addressed along with proposals for its reform. Article 1 of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 states that the purpose of the Regulation is to establish rules ensuring the easiest possible exercise of the right of access. Article 2 states that any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a member state, has right of access to the documents of the institutions subject to the principles, conditions and limits defined in the Regulation. The institutions may grant access to such documents subject to the same conditions, principles and limits. See the ‘Report from the Commission on the application in 2008 of Regulation EC No 1049/2001’ (COM(2009)331). Details on applications for access are contained in the annual reports on access to documents: 2016 Annual Report of the Council on Regulation 1049/2001: http://data. consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7903-2017-INIT/en/pdf; Council 2015 report: http:// www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/06/24/council-access-documents/; 2014 Report: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/publications/council-annualreport-access-documents-2014/; 2013 Report: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documentspublications/publications/council-annual-report-access-to-documents-2013/; 2012 Report: https:// www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/publications/council-annual-report-accessdocuments-2012/; Commission 2016 Report (Dec 2017): http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52017DC0738; 2015 Report: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52016DC0533; 2014 Report: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52015DC0391; 2013 Report: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0619; 2012 Report: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52013DC0515; European Parliament Annual Reports 2012–2016: http:// www.europarl.europa.eu/RegistreWeb/home/annualReport.htm?language=EN.

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5.57  Under Art 2(3) on ‘scope’: ‘(3) This Regulation shall apply to all documents held by an institution, that is to say, documents drawn up or received by it and in its possession, in all areas of Union activity.’ This would include documents from individuals and corporations, other EU institutions and national governments. 5.58  Access to documents from third parties shall be limited to those sent to the institution after the date of entry into force of the Regulation. 5.59  Article 3 sets out the definitions: ‘For the purposes of this Regulation: (a) “document” shall mean any content whatever its medium (written on paper or stored in electronic form or as a sound, visual or audiovisual recording); concerning a matter relating to the policies, activities and decisions falling within the institution’s sphere of responsibility; (b) “third party” shall mean any natural or legal person, or any entity outside the institution concerned, including the Member States, other Community or non-Community institutions and bodies and third countries;’ 5.60  An earlier draft of the article spelt out the bodies covered by the institutions and various committees.

574  Chapter 5 5.61  These provisions disappeared from the final version after prolonged disputes between the EP and the Council and Commission. The recitals include Comitology committees, agencies, and COREPER is a Council body. Clearly missing is the European Council for which the ToL now makes provision (see below). It should be added that executive agencies are covered by Council Regulation (EC) 58/2003, Art 23 of which concerns access to documents under Regulation 1049/2001.1 Council Regulation (EC) 58/2003, OJ  L  11/1, laying down the statute for executive agencies to be entrusted with certain tasks in the management of Community programmes; on financial regulation, see Council Regulation (EC) 1605/2002, OJ L 248/1.

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5.62  Documents will be accessible to the public following a written application or application in electronic form or through a register. Documents drawn up in a legislative procedure shall be made directly accessible in accordance with Art 12. The register has not been seen as user-friendly and many preparatory legal documents were not registered. If a document is not on the register there should be an indication of where it may be located. 5.63  A  written request for access must be sufficiently precise to enable an institution to identify the relevant documents (Art 6(1)). Clarification may be sought where the request is not precise. Assistance should be provided to enable the requester to clarify a request (Art 6(2)), There is a general duty to assist and provide information on how and where to make applications (Art 6(4)). Applications received must be acknowledged and a response made in 15 days of either allowing or refusing access with reasons for the latter (Art 7)). Where the request is for a ‘very long document’ or a large number of documents, informal discussion may take place to settle a fair solution on what should be provided (Art 6(3)). This latter aspect has featured in litigation (below). The applicant is not obliged to state reasons for the application or his interest. 5.64  In Case T-2/03 Verein fur Konsumenteninformation v Commission [2005]  ECR II-1121 a request was made for documents which would involve an allegedly ‘unreasonable amount of work’ by officials in reading voluminous documents. The case concerned determining where the balance of interest lay in either granting public access or allowing public disclosure and the institution’s right to protect the interest in good administration. However, this latter possibility justifying refusal was ‘applicable only in exceptional cases’ and the institution had to justify this stance. In Case T-42/05 Williams v Commission [2008] ECR II-156 the court emphasised that the possibility of denial in such cases was applicable only in exceptional circumstances. The institution relying on the unreasonableness of the task entailed by the request bears the burden of proof of the scale of that task (para 86). The requester in Williams asked for internal communications within the Commission on six pieces of legislation which were the core of its legal regime on genetically modified organisms. The Commission availed itself of the possibility under Art 6(3) of the Regulation of dividing the applicant’s initial request into six. The Commission replied only to the first request on preparatory documents relating to a Directive – the request was not ‘wide-ranging’. Nothing in the other requests suggested an

The European perspective1   575 ‘unreasonable amount of work’ likely to be detrimental to good administration. The Commission could not rely on the unreasonable work test to justify nonconsideration of the disclosure of each and every document held by it relevant to the request. The principle of transparency had to be observed. If files are identifiable, they should be considered. The test is an onerous one.1 See also Case T-540/15 De Capitani v EP (22/03/2018).

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Exceptions 5.65  Article 4 establishes exceptions and exemptions. Settled case law of the courts states that the exceptions must be interpreted and applied ‘restrictively’ so as not to defeat the right of access1 although a wide discretion will apply in some exceptions (below). The Regulation deals with access to ‘third party documents’ held by an institution. ‘Third party’ means any natural or legal person other than one of the three institutions covered by the Regulation. Unless it is clear that the document shall or shall not be disclosed, there has to be consultation by the institution with the third party with a view to assessing whether one of the exceptions is applicable. Curtin and colleagues have identified the following areas as much litigated subjects vis-à-vis exceptions: the legislative process; the administrative process which they claim has introduced ‘a strand of case law that permits the institutions to rely in relation to certain categories of administrative and court documents on a general presumption that their disclosure would undermine the purpose of the protection of an interest protected by the Regulation – as a result, the institutions are freed from examining the requested documents individually’; court proceedings; infringement proceedings and EU pilot schemes privacy protection; and finally international relations.2 Pilot schemes are the main tool used by the Commission to communicate with the participating member state where an issue concerning the correct application of EU law arises before infringement procedures is launched under TFEU, Art 258. It is the first step and replaced Commission administrative letters.3 Case T-211/00 Kuijer v Council [2002]  ECR II-485, para  55; Case T-194/04 Bavarian Lager v Commission [2007]  ECR II-4523, para  94. See D  Adamski (2009) 46  CMLR  521 and P  Leino (2011) 48(4)  CML  Rev 1215; D  Curtin et al Openness, Transparency and the Right of Access to Documents in the EU DG for Internal Policies (2016) www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ IDAN/2016/556973/IPOL_IDA(2016)556973_EN.pdf. We are grateful to Curtin and colleagues for their insights in this area. See D Curtin and P Leino ‘In search of transparency for EU lawmaking: Trilogues on the cusp of dawn’ (2017) 54 CML Rev 1673. 2 Curtin et al above. 3 Case C-562/14 P Sweden v Commission (11/05/2017) para 37. 1

5.66  Article 4 states: ‘1. The institutions shall refuse access to documents where disclosure could undermine the protection of: (a) the public interest as regards: (i) public security, (ii) defence and military matters,

576  Chapter 5 (iii) international relations; (iv) the financial, monetary or economic policy of the Community or a Member State.’ 5.67  Article  4(1) does not contain an overriding public interest allowing disclosure as regards the relevant exceptions. It provides a mandatory exception where protection of a public interest in one of the stated areas would be undermined by disclosure. 5.68  Under Art 4(1)(a) (specifically sub-paras (i) and (iii)) the ECJ ruled in Sison that the Council must be recognised as enjoying a ‘wide discretion’ for the purpose of determining whether the disclosure of documents would undermine the public interest.1 The review of the legality of such a decision was limited to verifying whether the procedural rules and duty to state reasons had been complied with, whether the facts had been accurately stated, and whether there had been a manifest error of assessment or misuse of powers. In assessing the exceptions the Council was not obliged to take account of the applicant’s particular interests in seeing the documents. Even though the reasons were brief for the decision in question they were ‘adequate’ [81]. A  statement of reasons under TFEU, Art 296 (formerly TEC, Art 253) must be appropriate to the act in issue. Case T-264/04  WWF  European Policy Programme v Council [2007] ECR II-911 concerned a request for documents related to international trade negotiations taking place within the WTO. These covered WTO and states’ positions and minutes of meetings. It was reasonably foreseeable that disclosure would undermine the proceedings thereby undermining the public interest regarding international interests and the Community’s financial, monetary and economic policy. One should note, however, Case T-211/00 Kuijer v Council [2002] ECR II-485 where access to human rights reports prepared by the Centre for Information, Reflection and Exchange on Asylum was refused. They covered asylum and reports on other countries. The court overruled the Council in Kuijer. Each report had to be considered and they contained general statements that had already been published and were not politically sensitive. Where a Member state invokes Art 4(5) (below) it too must be given a ‘broad discretion in assessing exceptions under Art 4(1)(a). In Case T-362/08 IFAW Internationaler TierschutzFonds gGmbH (which concerned Art 4(1)(iii)–(iv), 4(3) and 4(5); below) in which it was claimed that disclosure of the documents in question would undermine Germany’s international relations and economic policies. The risk of undermining a protected interest must be reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical and the reasoning must not be based on ‘manifestly erroneous’ grounds (IFAW, para 124). The test for non-disclosure was satisfied in IFAW (below).

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Case C-266/05 P Sison v Council of the EU (1 February 2007). The case concerned specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities to combat terrorism in Decision 2002/848/ EC. In Cases C-402/05  P  and C-415/05  P  Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities and Case T-85/09 Kadi v Commission the ECJ and General Court ruled unlawful EU regulations which breached the human rights protection of EU law – an ‘autonomous legal order’ – and which had implemented UN Security Council resolutions. The General Court found that the review by the UN Security Council committee of inclusion of individuals on a list of suspected terrorists was inadequate to allow for a ‘searching review’ by the EU courts. See also Case T-318/01 Othman v Council and Commission.

The European perspective1   577 5.69  S in ’t Veld v Council (Case T-529/09 (04/05/2012) (’t Veld 1)) concerned secrecy in negotiating international agreements. ’t Veld 1 involved a request for access to an opinion of the Council’s Legal Service, issued in the context of the adoption of the Council decision authorising the opening of negotiations, on behalf of the European Union, for an international agreement between the European Union and the United States of America in order to make available to the United States Treasury Department financial messaging data to prevent and combat terrorism and terrorist financing. Moreover, it was not in dispute that that opinion is, in essence, concerned with the legal basis of that decision and with the respective competences of the European Union and the European Community. The Council objected that strategic objectives pursued by the EU would be disclosed. Exemption was claimed under the third indent of Art 4(1) (a) (above) and that the EU’s negotiating position could be undermined. The Council also argued that disclosure would reveal differences of legal opinion on the correct legal basis to adopt. The General Court was prepared to protect confidentiality of strategic objectives in negotiations but not a difference over legal opinions. To that extent the decision was annulled. The Council relied on the second indent of Art 4(2) concerning legal advice. To advance its claim, the Council argued, firstly, that the requested disclosure would have the result of making known to the public ‘an internal opinion of the Legal Service, intended only for the members of the Council within the context of [that institution]’s preliminary discussions on the envisaged Agreement’, which might ‘lead the Council to decide not to request written opinions from its Legal Service’ (paragraph 10 of the contested decision). Secondly, the Council highlighted the risk that its Legal Service might itself ‘refrain from putting in writing views which might expose the Council to risk in the future [, which] would impact on [their] content’ (paragraph  11 of the contested decision). Thirdly, the Council claims that ‘disclosure to the public of [its] internal legal advice … would seriously undermine [that] Service’s capacity in the future to present and defend … the Council’s position in court proceedings, a position which may differ from the one previously recommended by the Legal Service’. The General Court found the arguments of the Council (and Commission) unconvincing in terms of legal advice (para 97): ‘it is precisely openness concerning legal advice that contributes to conferring greater legitimacy on the institutions in the eyes of European citizens and increasing their confidence in them by allowing divergent points of view to be openly debated. It is in fact rather a lack of information and debate which is capable of giving rise to doubts in the minds of citizens, not only as regards the lawfulness of an isolated act, but also as regards the legitimacy of the decision-making process as a whole (Sweden v MyTravel and Commission, paragraph 18 above, paragraph 113).’ Further ‘the public interest in the transparency of the decision-making process would become meaningless if, as the Commission proposes, it were to be taken into account only in those cases where the decision-making process has come to an end’ (para 101). The Council decision was also annulled insofar as access was denied to parts of the document not covered by operative exceptions

578  Chapter 5 concerning strategic objectives. Its reasoning on refusal for strategic objectives in negotiations was justified. The Council lost its appeal in the ECJ.1 Many points in the General Court’s judgment were confirmed although courts stressed the importance of protecting those elements that could reveal the strategic objectives pursued by the EU in the negotiations. However, outside those areas, the Council had not demonstrated how, ‘specifically and actually’, harm to the public interest in the field of international relations existed. Case C-350/12  P  Council of the EU  v Sophie in  ’t Veld [Third indent of Article  4(1)(a), second indent of Article 4(2), and Article 4(6)]. See also Case T-331/11 Leonard Besselink v Council which concerned negotiations for the EU access to the ECHR.

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5.70 In S in ’t Veld v Commission (Case T-301/10 (19/03/2013) (’t Veld 2)) there was a request, largely rejected and partly upheld by the court, to documents relating to the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement which the European Parliament later refused to give its consent to and criticised for a lack of transparency in the negotiation process. The documents more clearly concerned the international stage of negotiations rather than internal Commission work. The court was more kindly disposed to the Commission arguments which the parties had agreed would be conducted in confidence and ‘particularly sensitive and essential nature of the interests’ relating to international relations, which gives the decisions on access ‘a complex and delicate nature which calls for the exercise of particular care’ and presumes ‘some discretion’ (para 108). Curtin and colleagues argue that: ‘A  key element in the recent jurisprudence is the General Court’s recognition that even if international relations do not fall under legislative matters, transparency still has a function and its requirements must be taken into account. These cases have also demonstrated that international relations should not as a policy field be treated as a categorical exception, and that there are matters where – despite the fact that they formally fall under international relations – it should be possible to take into account the public interest relating to transparency, especially if the possible harm of disclosure seems limited or rather hypothetical.’1 In Access Info a request was made for access to ‘all documents generated or received by the Commission containing the legal advice and/or analysis of the legality under EU and international law of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation (OJ [2014] L 134, p. 3])’ – the Syrian refugee crisis. There was also a request for access to ‘all documents generated or received by the Commission containing legal advice and/or analysis of the legality of the actions to be carried out by the [European Union] and its Member States in implementing the actions set out in the statement on the agreement reached with Turkey at the summit held on 7 March 2016 … this covered documents drawn up both before and since the meeting was held, to date’. Exceptions in Arts 4(1)(a) and 4(2) second indent were invoked. The application was unsuccessful as all documents were covered by the court proceedings and legal advice exception. In relation to the former

The European perspective1   579 it is not confined to pleadings and various other internal documents exchanged with respect to pending proceedings (para 68). The important point is that the heart of the exception is protected, namely the principle of equality of arms and the sound administration of justice (paras 70–72). On legal advice, this was not a legislative process: ‘the disclosure of such legal advice, which was preparatory and internal and drawn up for the purpose of political dialogue between the institution and representatives of a Member State and a third state would have actually undermined, in a foreseeable manner, the Commission’s interest in seeking and receiving frank, objective and comprehensive advice from its various department in order to prepare its final position as an institution, in an area of certain high political sensitivity, and in a context of urgency in order to address a delicate migration situation’ (para 93).2 On both grounds the public interest favoured non-disclosure. See Curtin et al above. Case T-851/16 Access Info Europe v Commission (07/02/2018) [Art 4(1)(a) and (2)]. See also Case T-192/16 NF v European Council; Case 193/16 NG v European Council and Case T-257/16 NF v European Council (all 28/02/2018) where the treaty in question was not subject to judicial review in the CJEU: https://europeanlawblog.eu/tag/regulation-10492001/.

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5.71  Article  4(1)(b) states: [the public interest as regards] ‘privacy and the integrity of the individual, in particular in accordance with Community legislation regarding the protection of personal data’ (see ch 2, and para 1.267). Article 4(1)(b) has been widely discussed and much litigated. The leading case of Bavarian Lager saw the Court of First Instance (CFI) rule that the Data Protection Regulation (EC 45/2001) does not trump the access Regulation to prevent disclosure of personal data.1 The case concerned a meeting between EU officials, British civil servants and representatives of a beer-brewing trade organisation which discussed matters relevant to the applicant who was not allowed to attend the meeting. Proceedings commenced against the UK under then TEC, Art 226 for alleged breaches of TEC, Art 28 before the meeting took place. The applicant requested the names of those from the organisation who had attended the meeting as well as names of companies making submissions to the Commission. In determining whether Art 4(1)(b) applies, ‘it is necessary to examine whether public access to the names of the participants at the meeting … is capable of actually and specifically undermining the protection of the privacy and the integrity of the persons concerned’ (para 120). The participation of the names as ‘representatives’ of organisations did not affect their private lives the CFI determined (para 125). Case T-194/04 Bavarian Lager v Commission [2007]  ECR II-4523; see Case C-465/00 Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others [2003] ECR I-4989.

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5.72  In her opinion for the ECJ in the appeal by the Commission against the CFI decision in Bavarian Lager, the Advocate General accepted that the case concerned two ‘fundamental rights of equal value’: access and privacy. The Advocate General agreed with the destination of the CFI but not with its method of travel. The CFI had given insufficient weight to the Community legislation on protection of personal data. However, the Commission’s decision was correctly annulled because the governing provision was Regulation 1049/2001. The claim

580  Chapter 5 was for access to an official document which incidentally contained personal data; it was not a request for data involving processing of personal data. The latter would be governed by the provisions of EC Regulation 45/2001. That was not the case here. Although the Advocate General believed the decision should be upheld there is clearly a very grey area in the Opinion between requests for documents incidentally containing personal data (governed by EC  Regulation 1049/2001 including Art 4(1)(b)) and those containing a large quantity of personal data and ‘processing’ (governed by the provisions of EC Regulation 45/2001).1 Case C-28/08 P, 15 October 2009.

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5.73  The ECJ on appeal, however,1 ruled that names of individuals was personal data and therefore protected under EC Regulation 45/2001. The ECJ ruled that the Commission was within its rights to restrict disclosure in this way. In its judgment the ECJ sidestepped the ‘big questions’ that many were hoping to have resolved in this case. The ECJ confined its ruling to the point that Bavarian Lager had failed to show why it needed to know the names and that, in the absence of any credible claim of a need to know, the data protection/privacy rights in EC  Regulation 45/2001 took precedence as of right over the access provisions in EC Regulation 1049/2001. However, the fact that this point had not been raised in argument means that it is open in the future for a requester to show good reasons why disclosure is justified. EC Regulation 45/2001 is not an automatic trump card. The court’s judgment contrasts sharply with that of the CFI and with the Opinion of the Advocate General, who wrestled with the wider issues of principle. Bavarian Lager was adopted in Schecke where provisions requiring the publication of names of those natural persons receiving agricultural aid were declared void. The court ruled they were in conflict with privacy rights and protection of personal data in the CFR.2 An absence of an analysis of harm caused was absent from the judgment and the data was already in the public domain. The General Court gave the fullest protection to documents concerning all MEPs’ flat rate expenses and allowances under Art 4(1)(b) of Regulation 1049/2001 and Art 8(b) of Regulation 45/2001. The claimants could not establish a necessity test under Art 8(b). The court accepted in addition that there was no evidence to rebut the claim by Parliament that there were no documents held on such matters.3 This raises serious questions of accountability and integrity in public expenditure amid numerous scandals (see para 2.90, note 2). Case C-28/08 P, 2 July 2009. Joined cases Volker und Markus Schecke GbR (C-92/09) and Hartmut Eifert (C-93/09) v Land Hessen. Although a public interest has been accepted, the threshold has been set at a high level: Case T-115/13 Dennekamp v European Parliament and in particular Case C-615/13 P ClientEarth and PAN Europe v EFSA. 3 Psara v Parliament Case T-639/15 and see BAT (Investments) v Commission Case T-311/00 para 35. 1 2

5.74  Article 4(2) states: ‘The institutions shall refuse access to a document where disclosure would undermine the protection of:

The European perspective1   581 – – –

commercial interests of a natural or legal person including intellectual property, court proceedings and legal advice, the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits,

unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.’ For the exceptions in para 2, but not for those in para 1 above, there is a public interest override (para 5.75 below).1 The Court or Ombudsman will be able to make a decision on the balance of the merits. ‘Commercial interests’ is a very broad formulation (see para  1.215 above).2 The CJEU has had difficulty in establishing a public interest override in Art 4(2) in relation to inspections and also under Art 4(3) the safe deliberation exception. Case T-36/04 API v Commission (12/9/07). Case T-237/02 Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau Gmbh v Commission [2007] 1  CMLR  39 where a strict test in favour of disclosure was applied by the CFI. Case T-308/04 Terezakis v Commission (30/1/08); and Case T-237/02 Franchet v Commission [2006]  ECR II-2023. On audits into MEPs’ expenses and disclosure of the report, see Case T-471/08 Toland v European Parliament (judgment of second chamber General Court, 7/06/11) and Case T-440/17 Arca Capital Bohemia v Commission [2018] EUECJ.

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5.75  Some criticisms are made of these provisions below. It should be observed that under Art 4(2) there is now a public interest override allowing the courts or the Ombudsman to allow access where a greater public interest is served by disclosure than by secrecy. The institutions will have to prove that disclosure would undermine the protection of: the public interest and the specified subject areas under Art 4(1); disclosure would undermine the privacy and personal integrity of the individual under Art 4(1); or disclosure would undermine the interests under para 2 of Art 4 but with a public interest override in the latter case only. 5.76  Under Art 4(2) an overriding public interest in disclosure may also be applied although a harm test is made out. In Turco (concerning the legal advice exception, see below) the ECJ ruled that an overriding public interest in disclosure need not be distinct from the general principles of openness and transparency that underlie the Regulation.1 The onus is on the applicant for documents. The Court has constructed a three-stage test requiring the institution to first identify and verify the parts of the document that contain information covered by an exception; then examine whether disclosure of the parts of the document would undermine an interest; and thirdly, when a public interest test applies to the exception if there is an overriding public interest justifying the disclosure (Turco, para 43). However, the ECJ Turco judgment has assisted requesters by requiring an institution to ascertain, if it takes the view that disclosure would undermine the protection of legal advice in the legislative process, as in Turco, whether there is any overriding public interest justifying disclosure despite the fact that its ability to seek legal advice and receive frank, objective and comprehensive advice would thereby be undermined. The institution has to balance the particular interest to be protected by non-disclosure of the document concerned against, inter alia, the public interest in the document being made accessible in the light of the advantages stemming from increased openness. This ‘enables citizens to

582  Chapter 5 participate more closely in the decision-making process and guarantees that the administration enjoys greater legitimacy and is more effective and more accountable to the citizen in a democratic system.’ The institution must explain the basis of the exception and its reasoning on the public interest (paras 45 and 49). As things stand, nothing constrains the institutions to make the balance in favour of the public interest in disclosure where a harm test is established. In Turco the harm test was not established, the court believed. Where a harm test is made out by an institution, applicants have to argue for the public interest, but their arguments unavoidably face the considerable difficulty of not having seen the relevant document. In 2009, the EU Ombudsman’s office did not know of a case where officials had identified a public interest in disclosure where a harm test has been established.2 The EU institution has to establish a harm test and determine and reason on the public interest. Although Turco assists requesters under the EU Regulation the requester still faces considerable difficulties. Schlyter (art  4(2) third indent) ruled that the Commission’s detailed opinion delivered under the Directive 98/34 procedure ’is a factor which will be taken into consideration by the national legislature when adopting the draft technical regulation’ and thus ‘the possibility for citizens to find out the considerations underpinning legislative action is a precondition for the effective exercise of their democratic rights’. Therefore, ‘the necessity of ensuring that a Member State is willing to cooperate with the Commission in a spirit of mutual trust does not constitute a legitimate reason for limiting transparency in the process for the adoption of a technical rule’ (para 72). The decision was upheld by the ECJ.3 In Breyer the requested documents related to infringement proceedings brought in 2007 by the Commission against the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Austria concerning the transposition of Directive [2006/24]. More precisely, [Mr Breyer] applied for access to all documents relating to the administrative procedures conducted by the Commission and to all documents relating to the court proceedings in Case C-189/09 Commission v Austria (EU:C:2010:455). The General Court found that the written submissions at issue fell within the scope of Article 2(3) of the Regulation and the ECJ upheld this decision.4 3 4 1 2

Joined Cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P Turco v Council, judgment of 1 July 2008, paras 67 and 74. See I Harden (2009) EPL 239. Case C-331/15 P (07/09/2017). Case C-213/15 European Commission v Patrick Breyer (18/07/2017).

5.77  A general and abstract argument from an institution that disclosure would lead to doubts as to the lawfulness of a legislative act did not suffice to establish that the protection of legal advice would be undermined where the legal advice and opinion exception involved the institution’s own legal service and advice they had provided. There would be no compromise of independence by disclosure of legal opinions where there were no reasonably foreseeable, as opposed to purely hypothetical, risks of frank and reliable advice being undermined. An assessment of where the public interest lay had to be made by the institution. Disclosure of an institution’s legal advice documents from its legal service on legal questions arising when legislative initiatives were being debated increased transparency

The European perspective1   583 and strengthened the democratic right of European citizens to scrutinise the information on which a legislative act is based. Non-disclosure may be justified in cases of particular sensitivity or where it went beyond the legislative process. In this case, a ‘detailed statement of the institution’s reasons’ had to be given.1 Case C-39/05 Sweden v Council of the European Union [2007]  I-11389. See also Case T-36/04 Association de la Presse Internationale ASBL v Commission [2007] CMLR 51.

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5.78  Article  4, para  3 continues that firstly, access to a document, drawn up by an institution for internal use or received by an institution, which concerns a matter where the decision has not been taken by the institution, shall be refused if disclosure of the document would seriously undermine the institution’s decision-making process, unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure. Secondly, access to documents containing opinions for internal use as part of deliberations and preliminary consultations within the institution concerned shall be refused even after the decision has been taken if disclosure would seriously undermine the decision-making process unless, once again, there is a public interest override. ‘Shall’ connotes a mandatory refusal, but the institution would have to give cogent reasons why it ‘would’ ‘seriously’ undermine the decision-making process. ‘Seriously’ connotes a higher degree of harm than in the previous tests. The deliberative stage of decision-making is not excluded. Access may be had to documents containing internal discussions. In a request for such documents, access must be allowed unless the institution can show that serious harm to its decision-making process is reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical1 and the requester cannot establish that there is an overriding public interest in disclosure. Case T-403/05 MyTravel v Commission, judgment of the CFI of 9  September 2008. See paras 51–54. See Case T-144/05 Muniz v Commission (18/12/08) and Case T-471/08 Toland v European Parliament above.

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5.79  In Case T-233/09 Access Info Europe v Council, the General Court ruled that the Council had acted unlawfully in refusing to disclose documents revealing the identities of the member states and their proposals and positions on redrafting Regulation 1049/2001 on access. The Council objected to the identities being revealed because of the grounds stated in Art 4(3)(i). The court emphasised the importance of transparency in the legislative process in ruling against the Council. The Council’s arguments, basically protecting the identities of those member states in favour of restricting the scope of Regulation 1049/2001, did not accord with full accountability in ‘a system based on the principle of democratic accountability’ (para 69).1 The content of the Commission’s proposed reforms of Regulation 1049/2001 is addressed below. The ECJ upheld the decision of the General Court and dismissed the Council’s appeal (Case C-280/11  P). The ECJ ruled that full access can be limited only if there is a genuine risk that the protected interests might be undermined: ‘…the various proposals for amendment or re-drafting made by the four Member State delegations which are described in the requested document are part of the normal legislative process, from which it follows that the requested documents could not be regarded as sensitive’ (para 63). The ombudsman in a separate investigation made a finding of maladministration in the Council’s failure to make the identity of member

584  Chapter 5 states public: ‘Making the position of member states known in a timely and accessible manner can help reduce citizen alienation from EU institutions’ (Case 01/2/2017/TE). In De Capitani2 the General Court granted access to requested documents in the legislative process concerning trilogues (Council, EP and Commission informal discussions) relating to the ordinary legislative procedures and which are used in 70–80 per cent of such procedures. They are conducted in camera. The case concerned provisions which have as their legal basis Title V of the TFEU (‘Area of freedom, security and justice’) and TFEU, Art 16 relating to the protection of personal data (‘the confirmatory application’). The applicant argued that after the Lisbon Treaty, legislative preparatory documents are subject to the principle of widest possible access. The Parliament objected on the basis of Art 4(3) first paragraph. The General Court in ClientEarth3 addressed the question of whether documents relating to impact assessments produced before the adoption of a Commission legislative proposal should be public documents. The court ruled that the Commission, despite the power of legislative initiative, was not acting in a legislative capacity. The court accepted a general presumption of secrecy was necessary to protect the independence and rigour of its analysis of policy proposals and to prevent unofficial lobbying outside organised consultations. This judgment was reversed by the ECJ  Grand Chamber which ruled impact assessment documents were a part of the legislative process and the presumption of transparency applied. The decision of the Commission was annulled by the court as an infringement of Art 4(3).4 The first appearance of a distinction between legislative and administrative procedures came in the case of TGI5 although in My Travel the court observed: ‘it is true that, as the Court has already stated, the administrative activity of the Commission does not require as extensive an access to documents as that concerning the legislative activity of a Union institution. However, that does not in any way mean […] that such an activity falls outside the scope of Regulation No 1049/2001.’6 The more recent approach of the court is to permit the institutions ‘to rely in relation to certain categories of administrative and court documents on a general presumption that their disclosure would undermine the purpose of the protection of an interest protected by the Regulation’.7 As a result, documents are not covered by a general presumption and the institutions do not have to examine the documents requested individually. This has the effect of placing the burden of proof on individual requesters who have to establish there will be no harm to the protected interest. This is the not unfamiliar problem of seeking to establish an access right to documents one has not seen. A general presumption of secrecy has now been confirmed in case law, at the request of the Commission, for documents relating to state aid, mergers, court proceedings, cartels and infringement proceedings.8 The CJEU has shown an increasing tendency to adopt a ‘presumption of secrecy’ in court proceedings and administrative proceedings. The API case9 ruled there should be ‘a general presumption that disclosure of the pleadings lodged by one

The European perspective1   585 of the institutions (Commission) in court proceedings would undermine the protection of those proceedings … while those proceedings remain pending’ (para  94). In the Court’s view, ‘disclosure would flout the special nature of that category of documents and would be tantamount to making a significant part of the court proceedings subject to the principle of transparency’. In the case of pleadings that had been lodged in closed cases, the Court opined once proceedings have been closed by a decision of the Court, there are no longer grounds for presuming that disclosure of the pleadings would undermine the judicial activities of the Court and the ‘general presumption’ of secrecy no longer applied. In LPN, for instance, an infringement procedure concerning environmental conservation, the court observed:10 ‘the requirement to ascertain whether the general presumption (of secrecy) in question actually applies cannot be interpreted as meaning that the Commission must examine individually each document requested in the case. Such a requirement would deprive that general presumption of its proper effect, which is to permit the Commission to reply to a global request for access in a manner equally global.’ Infringement proceedings are considered as ‘a type of procedure which, as such, has characteristics precluding full transparency being granted in that field and which therefore has a special position within the system of access to documents’ (para  55). State aid procedures were similar in character. Confidentiality was required in order to allow an opportunity for negotiation and settlement under EU law and avoid litigation and for the parties to defend or promote their legal interests in the proceedings. As Spirlea confirmed, there is little room for transparency here in the pre-litigation and pilot (para 5.65) stages: ‘access is wholly incompatible with the proper conduct of those procedures and is likely to jeopardise their outcome … That unifying element is equally applicable to EU Pilot procedures, in which a general presumption is, essentially, dictated by the need to ensure the proper conduct of such procedures and to ensure that their purpose is not undermined.’11 http://www.access-info.org/documents/Access_Docs/Advancing/EU/Secret_State_of_EU_ Transparency.pdf.  2 Case T-540/15 (22/03/2018).  3 Case T-424/14 and T-425/14 ClientEarth v Commission. The Advocate General’s opinion is at Case C-57/15 P (28/11/2017) where he wrote that the judgment of the general court should be set aside despite there being no need to hear the appeal. See also See Cases T-18/15 Philip Morris v Commission; Case T-520/13 Philip Morris Benelux v Commission; Case T-796/14 Philip Morris v Commission; Case T-800/14 Philip Morris v Commission and the Order of the Court in Case C-520/13 Philip Morris Benelux v Commission.  4 Case C-57/16 P (04/09/18).  5 Case C-139/07 P Commission v Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau  6 Case C-506/08 P Sweden v Commission and My Travel Group paras 87–88.  7 Curtin et al, para 5.65, note 1 above.  8 See Case C-404/10 P Commission v Éditions Odile Jacob EU:C:2012:393; Case C-514/07 P Sweden and Others v API and Commission EU:C:2010:541; Case C-365/12  P  Commission v EnBW EU:C:2014:112; Joined Cases C514/11  P  and C-605/11  P  LPN and Finland v Commission EU:C:2013:738 and Case T-440/17 Arca Capital Bohemia v Commission [2018] EUECJ.  1

586  Chapter 5 Joined Cases C-514/07 P, C-528/07 P and C-532/07 P Association de la presse internationale ASBL (API). Joined Cases C-514/11 P and C-605/11 P LPN and Finland v Commission EU:C:2013:738. 11 Case T-306/12 Spirlea v Commission para 57.  9 10

5.80  Third parties shall be consulted to assess whether a para 1 or 2 exception applies ‘unless it is clear that the document should or should not be disclosed’ (Art 4(4)). It should be noted that this does not cover the exceptions in para 3 of Art 4, although in the case of a member state the following is highly relevant. A member state may request the institution not to disclose a document originating from that member state without its prior agreement under Art 4(5). The effect of such a request when it is made by a member state was not originally entirely clear: is it binding on the institutions or merely persuasive? Clearly it would be diplomatically insensitive not to follow the wish of a member state, and in the spirit of EU cooperation the article would imply a duty to comply with the member state’s wish. It was not initially clear whether the reasonableness of that wish would be important. In a controversial and much criticised decision in December 2004, the CFI made it clear that Art 4(5) placed the member state in a different position to a third party under Art 4(4). A ‘request’ from a member state to the Commission not to disclose constituted an instruction not to disclose, the CFI held and was therefore mandatory. The member state was under no obligation to state the reasons for its refusal and the institution had no power to question whether disclosure could be made on eg public interest grounds. Where no request was made by the member state after it had been consulted, the institution remained obliged to see whether the document should be disclosed under Art 4(4). It would then be for national authorities to determine any application for access under any relevant national measures. Other third parties have a right to be consulted by the institution involved. But their wish is not binding on the institution.1 See Case T-168/02 Internationaler Tierschutz-Fonds GmbH  v The Commission (2004) Times, 20 December. The Commission was supported by the UK, the applicant by Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands.

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5.81  This judgment was not followed by the ECJ on appeal.1 The ECJ ruled that a ‘document originating from a Member State’ covers any document that a member state transmits to an institution regardless of the author. Article 4(5) does not give the member state a ‘general and unconditional right of veto to access’. Furthermore, the Article gives a member state an opportunity to participate in a decision by the institution. The ECJ ruled that decisions should involve a ‘genuine dialogue’ discussing the possibility of invoking exceptions in Art 4 above. Dialogue should be commenced without delay and time limits (below) should be observed. Following the dialogue, where the member state objects to disclosure, it has to state reasons for the objection with reference to the exceptions set out above in Art 4(1) to (3). If the member state does not provide reasons for its refusal upon request the institution should allow access where it believes none of the exceptions above applies. Where a reasoned refusal is forthcoming, the institution should deny access. The institution has to explain the reasons for the member state refusing access under one or other of the exceptions above. The validity of reasons provided by a member state may be reviewed by EU courts. Case C-64/05 P Sweden (IFAW) v Commission [2007] ECR I-11389.

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The European perspective1   587 5.82  In Case T-362/08  IFAW  Internationaler Tierschutz-Fonds GmbH, which concerned Art 4(1)(iii)–(iv) and 4(3) second paragraph, the Commission relied upon reg  4(5) to deny access. This was a decision in the case discussed above (para 5.68) after it had been remitted to the General Court by the ECJ after that court heard appeal on the preliminary points (above). The facts involved a request for a letter from the German Chancellor to the Commission President involving a proposed development of an environmentally protected site concerning natural habitats and wild fauna. Many documents given to the Commission by German authorities had been disclosed. In relation to the contested letter, the court accepted that the examination of the applicability of the exceptions must be clear from the institution’s reasons and these must be based on clear reasons from the member state as to why the exceptions are applicable. The reasoning of a member state adopted by the institution must disclose in a clear unequivocal manner the reasoning followed by the institution adopting the measure.1 The member state’s reasons must comply with the duty to provide reasons in TEC, Art 253 (now TFEU, Art 296(2)). The relationship between the member state and institution must respect the duty of loyal cooperation now set out in TFEU, Art 4(3). The requester must be allowed to understand the origin and grounds of the refusal and the court must be allowed to exercise its review. Although the court did not want to make a specific ruling on the nature of the Commission’s review of the member state decision (para 84) – such a distinction would have been relevant had the Commission disagreed with the member state (para 86) – it is clear that the review by the court is not limited to a prima facie or ‘cursory’ review as suggested by the Commission (para 87). But nor could the court second guess the decision of the Commission and member state by engaging in a review of the merits and a de novo decision. The refusal must be based on the duty to give reasons and on a substantive assessment made by the member state of the applicability of the exceptions which has been accepted and properly explained by the Commission. On this basis, the reasoning of the Commission revealed no errors in the member state’s reasons and the decision was lawful. Three levels of review seem to be possible: cursory or prima facie review; complete or detailed review, and merits review, the latter of which is not invoked. The court noted the institution enjoys a broad discretion to determine whether the public interest in Art 4(1)(a) exceptions ‘could’ (para 104) be undermined. The word used in Art 4(1) is ‘would’. The discretion relates to a ‘complex and delicate nature which calls for the exercise of particular care and that the criteria in Art 4(1)(a) … are very general’ (para 104) (Sison, paras 34–36). A member state making a political assessment must also be afforded a broad discretion. The documents in question were ‘confidential’ and the letter concerned a confidential matter regarding the economic policy of Germany and other member states. Although the statement of reasons was brief it was still ‘adequate’ in the light of the context of the case and it was sufficient to enable the requester to ascertain the reasons for refusal and for the court to review those reasons. There had been a prolonged history of communications with the requester over the proposed development in Germany which the Commission had approved on grounds of public interest within the relevant environmental legislation (para 113). Case C-266/05 P Sison v Council [2007] ECR I-1233.

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588  Chapter 5 5.83  On appeal,1 it was held that IFAW was not correct in submitting that the General Court erred in law by not acknowledging that the Commission was required, with respect to the document whose disclosure was refused, to carry out an exhaustive assessment of the reasons for objecting put forward by the Member State on the basis of the exceptions in Article 4 of Regulation No 1049/2001. The first ground relied on by IFAW in support of its appeal had to be rejected. If the Member State gives a reasoned refusal to allow access to the document in question and the institution concerned is consequently obliged to refuse the request for access, the person who has made the request enjoys judicial protection. It is within the jurisdiction of the European Union judicature to review, on application by a person to whom the institution has refused to grant access, whether that refusal could have been validly based on those exceptions, regardless of whether the refusal results from an assessment of those exceptions by the institution itself or by the Member State concerned (see, to that effect, Sweden v Commission, paras 90 and 94). Ensuring such judicial protection for the person who has made the request and to whom the institution has refused to grant access to one or more documents originating from a Member State following an objection by that State means that the European Union judicature must assess the lawfulness of the decision to refuse access in the specific case (see, in that respect, Sison, above, paras 33–39), in the light of all relevant factors, among the most important of which are the documents whose disclosure has been refused. To comply with the prohibition of disclosure of the documents in question without the prior agreement of the Member State concerned, the General Court must consult the documents in camera, so that the parties themselves do not have access to them, as provided for by the third indent of Article 67(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. The second ground of appeal was therefore upheld, and the judgment under appeal was set aside in its entirety. Case C-135/11 P (21/06/2012) para [65].

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5.84  Serious problems could be produced were it not for the Council’s practice of treating the written positions of delegations and documents summarising the oral statements by member states of the Council, or those held by one of its preparatory bodies, as Council documents. They are then within the Regulation.1 See B Driessen, ‘The Council of the European Union and access to documents’ (2005) European Law Review 675 at p 687.

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5.85  Documents may be redacted to allow access to parts not covered by exceptions. Usually exceptions apply for 30 years but in the case of privacy, commercial interests or sensitive documents, the period of exception may be extended for longer. Separate provisions exist to deal with archives of the Union.1 These are documents that are more than 30 years old: see para 5.100, note 1 below.

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5.86  The courts and the Ombudsman will require reasons for refusals which make plain the basis on which refusal is being maintained. If these are

The European perspective1   589 inadequate, it has been explained how the courts and Ombudsman will adopt a strict approach and, if adequate reasons cannot be provided, order disclosure. The Regulation (Art 8) states that an applicant has to be informed of rights to challenge under Arts 230 and 195 of the EC Treaty (TFEU, Arts 263 and 228) to the courts and ombudsman. The ombudsman has been a champion on openness. 5.87  For documents in the possession of a member state, originating from an institution, the member state shall consult with the institution concerned to ensure that no decision is made jeopardising the objectives of the Regulation ‘unless it is clear a document shall, or shall not, be disclosed’ (Art 5). 5.88  The provisions under Art 6 concerning applications for access are dealt with above (paras 5.29–5.30). 5.89  Art 7 has been dealt with above. In the institution’s written statement of the reasons for the total or partial refusal the institution must inform the applicant of their right to seek a ‘confirmatory application’, ie an internal review. It has been seen how the period may be extended beyond 15 days. Failure to reply within the prescribed time limit entitles the applicant to make a confirmatory application. This is a higher level of internal review of the initial decision. Such an application must be made within 15 working days of the initial refusal. 5.90  Article 8 concerns confirmatory applications. This again has to be handled promptly. The same time limits of 15 days are repeated to grant access or to deny access with a written statement of reasons for total or partial denial. The applicant must be advised of remedies. ‘2. In exceptional cases (eg large documents etc) , the time-limit provided for in paragraph 1 may be extended by 15 working days, provided that the applicant is notified in advance and detailed reasons are given. Failure to reply within the prescribed time-limit shall be equivalent to a negative reply entitling the applicant to proceed to the court or EU Ombudsman.’ 5.91  Article 10 concerns the exercise of the right to access: ‘1. The applicant shall have access to documents either by consulting them on the spot or by receiving a copy, including, where available, an electronic copy, according to the applicant’s preference.’ 5.92  The cost of producing and sending the copies may be charged to the applicant inferring a discretion. The cost shall not exceed the ‘real charge’. On the spot consultation, copies of less than 20 A4 pages and direct access in electronic form or through the register shall be free. Article  10(2) allows the institution to inform the applicant on obtaining documents already released and which easily accessible to the applicant. The format of documents shall include electronic, Braille, large print or tape.

590  Chapter 5 5.93  Article  9 deals with the treatment of sensitive documents. These are documents originating from the member states, institutions, third countries or international organisations classified as ‘Très secret/Top secret, secret or confidentiel/confidential’ in accordance with the rules of the institution concerned protecting essential interests under Art 4(1)(a), especially public security, defence and military matters. Information does not have to fall within Art 9 to be treated as confidential or sensitive. Reasons do not have to be given justifying non-disclosure of information which would themselves reveal sensitive or confidential information that is not within Art 9 (see para 111 of the IFAW decision at para 5.82 above). Applications for these documents may only be dealt with by those who are vetted and cleared to deal with them. These persons may also assess which references to sensitive documents could be made in the public register. It is clear that sensitive documents shall only be released or recorded in the register ‘only with the consent of the originator’. This is an exclusion and not an exception. Reasons should be given for refusal in a manner which does not compromise the interests protected in Art 4. Member states shall take appropriate measures to ensure that, in handling applications for sensitive documents, the principles in Arts 9 and 4 are complied with in relation to sensitive documents. The rules of the institutions concerning sensitive documents shall be made public. The most recent rules on classification have been published (para 5.46 above). They are voluminous documents and have been amended on a variety of occasions.1 Also published are rules on handling sensitive documents between the Council, Commission and EP.2 Council Decision 19 March 2001 [2001] OJ L 101/1; Commission Decision 29 November 2001 [2001]  OJ  L  317/1 and on access by the EP to sensitive documents: (2002)  OJ  C  298/1. See Council Decisions 2004/194/EC, 10 February 2004; 2005/571/EC, 12 July 2005; 2005/952/EC, 20 December 2005; and 2007/438/EC, 18 June 2007. 2 20 November 2002, [2002] OJ C 298/1. 1

5.94  Article  11 deals with registers of documents which institutions have to provide including in electronic form. Documents shall be recorded without delay. The register had to be operational by 3  June 2002 and must provide details on referencing but not so as to undermine the exceptions. Documents should, as far as possible, be directly available through electronic form especially legislative documents and ‘where possible’ documents relating to policy or strategy development (Art 12). The register should indicate where the document is located if direct access is not available. Article 13 specifies the documents that shall be published in the Official Journal of the EU. Institutions must take the requisite measures to inform the public of their rights under this measure, and member states shall cooperate in providing information to citizens. Article  15 deals with good administrative practice within the institutions to facilitate access rights under the Regulation and an inter-institutional committee shall be established to examine best practice and discuss future developments. Existing copyright laws limiting rights of reproduction or exploitation are not affected. Annual reports shall be published by each institution with details on refusals to grant access, reasons for such, and the number of sensitive documents not recorded in the register. The Commission was to report on implementation by 31 January 2004 (see para 5.101, note 3 below on recent reports). The Regulation

The European perspective1   591 was implemented by rules of procedure by each institution and was applicable from 3 December 2001.1 See para 5.45, note 1 above.

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5.95  The EU Ombudsman has been very critical of an earlier version of the access Regulation.1 In a valuable report, the House of Lords Committee on the EU reported on a draft of the Regulation.2 It was critical of the Commission’s failure to consult before the adoption of the draft Regulation. The Lords committee noted: ‘Extensive external consultation would have demonstrated a commitment to openness’ (para 46). It criticised an original recital which stated that ‘Member States shall take care not to hamper the proper application of this Regulation’. It was seen as going far beyond the requirements of co-operation in then Art 10 of the EC Treaty and seemed to impose a requirement on member states’ FOI laws not to be more liberal than the EC regime. Sweden and Scandinavian countries pride themselves on their openness and many member states are seeing the benefits from greater transparency. The ‘Community system should not create any unnecessary restrictions, especially where national FOI regimes are more liberal’ (para  53). The final version removed many of these objectionable provisions. See Wall Street Journal (2004) 24 February, p 11 and reply from Romano Prodi Wall Street Journal (2000) 9 March. 2 HL  109 (1999–2000) Sixteenth Report. See also HL  221 (2006–07) Behind Closed Doors – G6 Meeting. 1

5.96  Thirdly, in principle, all documents should be accessible and exceptions to the right should be limited as far as possible. The harm test should be applied on a case by case basis. Where third party documents are sent to the institutions with a request for confidentiality there should, where necessary, be an arbitration procedure between the third party and institution concerned. This might involve the ECJ, the EU Ombudsman or the Data Control Authorities in the institutions. Documents on security from eg  NATO cannot be treated in the same way as company documents. However, the EP was critical of the security reviews on classification made by the Council in the summer of 2000. Detailed rules now govern these matters. 5.97  Fourthly, the term ‘document’ should be interpreted broadly. This will include internal documents of the institutions although ‘informal documents’ ie purely personal documents involving personal opinions and ‘brain-storming’ will not be included. This provision if enacted will be difficult to operate but it has not caused overwhelming problems in eg the USA where the distinction is made. The Commission proposal actually reduces access to internal documents. 5.98  Fifthly, modes of access should be made as easy as possible, especially in the case of legislative documents. The register should contain ‘mostly the documents relating to the legislative procedures and including all proposals, opinions, working documents, agendas, documents for discussion at formal meetings, minutes, declarations and positions of Member States’.1 Classified documents should also be listed so that a challenge may be made to their classification as

592  Chapter 5 non-public. Information officers should replace Secretary-Generals as the arbiter on access for confirmatory decisions. Electronic versions of the Official Journal and of internal registries should be available in reading rooms everywhere in the Union. Under Art 10 of the EC Treaty (co-operation) local authorities could be asked to arrange this facility. Access should be user friendly. European Parliament Final A5-0318.2000, 27  October 2000 and Final A5-0318/2000 Part 2, 3 November 2000, the Cashman Report.

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5.99  Sixthly, where a member state is asked for documents of an EU institution, national rules should prevail subject to a spirit of loyal co-operation entailing that member states should inform institutions of the request and fully take into account their views. It is important not to prejudice the development of Union policy. 5.100  Finally, Art 18 refers to the Regulation on archives.1 Regulation (EEC) 354/83; and see Council of Europe 2002/0203 (CNS) COM  (2002) 462 final (4 September 2002) on a proposal to amend Regulation354/83. See https://ec.europa.eu/ info/about-european-commission/service-standards-and-principles/transparency/freedominformation/access-documents/information-and-document-management/archival-policy/ document-management-and-archival-policy_en (15/03/2018).

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COMMISSION PROPOSALS FOR ‘RECASTING’ REGULATION 1049/2001 5.101  In 2007, the Commission commenced1 a public consultation on access to documents2 followed by a Commission proposal to ‘recast’ the Regulation.3 The Commission proposed that the existing distinction between citizens and residents (who enjoy the right of access) and other natural and legal persons (who ‘may’ be granted access – see above) should be removed. All natural and legal persons should have the right of access. This section relies heavily on Ian Harden’s article in (2009) EPL 239. The EU Committee of the House of Lords reported on the Commission’s recommendations in HL 108 (2008–09). 2 Public Access to Documents held by institutions of the European Community: a Review, COM(2007) 185 final. 3 COM(2008) 229 final. Recasting is a special legislative technique which is not best suited to the Regulation in that it placed constraints on Parliament’s manoeuvrability. The most recent Commission report on the application of the Regulation in 2008 is COM(2009) 331 Final (2 July 2009). 1

5.102  The Commission proposed amendments to assist applicants requesting documents that are not clearly stated or that cannot be identified. The period for responding would only commence from the time clarification is received. Some of the difficulties here may relate to an institution’s incomplete indexing. 5.103  The Commission also proposes extending the normal deadline for handling a confirmatory application to 30 working days. This may be extended for a further 15 working days. The 15-working-day deadline, the Commission has argued, is far too short and creates insuperable burdens.

The European perspective1   593 5.104  The definition of ‘document’ would be amended to include only those ‘formally transmitted to one or more recipients or otherwise registered.’ The Commission proposal would mean that no application for access to a document drawn up by an institution could be made unless so transmitted or registered.1 If not formally transmitted it would have to be registered. This would give the Commission wide powers of inclusion and exclusion. Article 3(a).

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5.105  The Commission further proposed excluding access to investigation files or proceedings of an ‘individual scope’ until they were ‘closed’ or an act had become ‘definitive’, ie completed. Where documents were obtained or taken from natural or legal persons in such investigations these would be permanently excluded even if any harmful effect had been removed by the passage of time.1 This amendment would remove the consideration of an overriding public interest consideration.2 According to Harden a literal reading of the proposed new text would allow a ‘whole document’ to be ‘permanently excluded’ ‘even if the relevant information were contained only in a footnote.3 There are also implications for the use of databases and data search engines and how the expression ‘documents’ is defined. Search engines and electronic databases might have been designed with internal management needs only in mind and may need to be redesigned with regard to the needs of transparency. Article 2(6). In particular, Art 4(2), first indent, and Art 4(3). 3 Harden (2009) EPL 239. 1 2

Proposals for exceptions protection of the environment

5.106  Protection of ‘the environment, such as breeding sites of rare species’ would be added. There would be no possibility of an overriding public interest in disclosure.1 This is consistent with the Aarhus Convention. Further alignment of the Access Regulation and the Environmental Information Regulation would include emissions into the environment. As under Article  4(1). See Regulation 1367/2006 European Parliament and Council of 6 September 2006 and application of Åarhus Community institutions and bodies 2006 OJ L 264, p 13.

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court proceedings and legal advice

5.107  To the existing exception covering court proceedings and legal advice in Art 4(2) would be added ‘arbitration and dispute settlement proceedings’. The Commission propose this as a ‘clarification’. Given that the European Ombudsman has ruled that the WTO dispute resolution1 is not covered by this exception, this has the appearance of a considerable extension, not clarification. In Turco, which preceded the Commission’s proposals,2 the ECJ reversed the

594  Chapter 5 ruling of the CFI. The Regulation imposes an obligation to disclose the opinions of the Council’s legal service in connection with a law-making process, the ECJ ruled. This would include cases where the service had expressed doubts about a draft legislative instrument. The Commission argued if the service had subsequently to advise on the measure’s legality this would place the service in an invidious position. The ECJ ruled unequivocally that such sensitivity could not justify an exception to openness within the Regulation. The Council should attend to any improper pressure on the service to influence its published advice. Sensitivity should not be an excuse for non-transparency. See Case 582/2005/PB: http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/decision/en/050582.htm Joined Cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P Turco v Council, judgment of 1 July 2008.

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individual privacy

5.108  The Commission proposed a change to the exception concerning privacy and integrity of the individual presently in Art 4(1)(b). This reform has been drafted very much with the ruling by the CFI in the Bavarian Lager case in mind, although we saw above how the ECJ quashed the CFI’s ruling.1 The proposal (a new Art 4(5)) seeks to allow the names, title and functions of publicoffice-holders, officials and private-interest representatives in relation to their professional activities to be disclosed. An exception would apply where, ‘in the particular circumstances, disclosure would adversely affect those persons’. In addition: ‘Other personal data shall be disclosed in accordance with the conditions regarding lawful processing of such data laid down in EC legislation on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data.’ This suggests that for ‘other personal data’ the Regulation on access would not be the governing provision; it should be Regulation 45/2001 on the regulation of personal data. The CFI in Bavarian Lager in fact decided the opposite: the access Regulation should be the governing provision.2 The ECJ made no finding on priority; simply that Regulation 45/2001 had not been complied with as it should, and it may allow disclosure. In its judgment, the CFI emphasised that the Art 4(1)(b) exception only applies to data ‘capable of actually and specifically undermining the protection of privacy and the integrity of the individual’. It does not apply to all personal data. The ECJ did not accept this. The GDPR now seeks to strike a balance between access to information and privacy (paras 2.37 et seq). Case T-194/04, Bavarian Lager v Commission [2007] ECR II-4523. See especially paragraphs 98–100 of the judgment.

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decision-making

5.109  The Commission proposed that the exception for the decision-making process should be widened by extending the range of papers protected to include ‘all documents in that process’. This should be seen in the context of the

The European perspective1   595 narrowing of ‘documents’ that are covered by the amended Regulation (above) and the exclusion of documents forming part of the administrative file of an investigation or of proceedings concerning an act of individual scope. Taken together there would be a considerable extension of this exception. member state documents

5.110  For multi-level governance, the Commission proposes that a member state may give reasons to an institution for withholding documents based on exceptions in Reg 4(5) ‘or on specific provisions in its own legislation preventing disclosure of the document concerned.’ The ‘adequacy of these reasons … shall be appreciated by the institution … insofar as they are based on exceptions laid down in this regulation’. The ECJ ruled in IFAW that while national laws may identify an interest deserving protection an exception cited by the institution had to be consistent with Reg 4.1 Case C-64/05 P Sweden (IFAW) v Commission [2007] ECR I-11389. See paras 83–84, 86 and 88.

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miscellaneous

5.111  Proposals from the Commission on contract selection procedures seem to make it easier to refuse documents opening up decisions involved with awarding contracts. Amendments are proposed for staff selection procedures. Suggested amendments to copyright seem to confuse copyright and access protecting papers covered by copyright from access. The proposal requires clarification. It appears to treat copyright as a means of defeating access and not simply the unauthorised re-use of information. Re-use is covered by its own Directive. overall impact

5.112  While some of the Commission’s suggested reforms seek to reduce the overall administrative burden of access regimes and should be seen against a background of claims to inadequate resourcing for transparency and access, the Commission nonetheless emerges as very defensive. The European Parliament has rightly argued that if a right to access and transparency are given, their realisation should be adequately resourced. Many of the proposals possess a spirit of secrecy and ‘Big Brother knows best’. This sits most uneasily with the plaudits for transparency accompanying the EU Constitution and ToL fanfares of recent memory. The approach is in marked contradiction to the Commission’s ‘European Transparency Initiative’ and its ‘drive towards more transparency’ which was launched in November 2005 and which included a review of the Regulation.1 Minutes of the Commission’s meeting No 1721 of 9 November 2005.

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5.113  The sum result of the proposals is a risk of enhancing the opportunities for networked favouritism and the thwarting of a wider public involvement in administration. The Commission has consistently taken a less than positive

596  Chapter 5 approach to genuine transparency and access. The EP proposals for amendment to the Regulation are below. One proposal is that a statement that an interinstitutional register of lobbyists and interested parties is a ‘natural tool for the promotion of openness and transparency’ should be placed in the recitals to the Regulation. How has the EP sought to promote its view of openness and transparency and the public interest? the european parliament’s proposals1

5.114  The EP debated the proposals for reform on 11 March 2009 following a report by a committee under Michael Cashman MEP.2 The concern of the EP is far more consistent with the principles of transparency and openness than the Commission proposals. Information officers should be appointed to ensure compliance within each Directorate General See P Birkinshaw ‘Transparency and Access to Documents’ in P Birkinshaw and M Varney (eds) The European Union Legal Order after Lisbon (2010). 2 The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs 2008/0090(COD) (5  January 2009): http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP// NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-415.164+02+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN. 1

5.115  A new recital 4 states: ‘Transparency should also strengthen the principles of good administration in the EU institutions as provided for by Article  41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’). Internal procedures should be defined accordingly and adequate financial and human resources should be made available to put the principle of openness into practice.’ The detailed proposals frequently diverge from the position of the Commission. In March 2011, the Commission put forward more limited proposals to amend reg  1049 basically seeking to introduce the amendments introduced under TFEU, Art 15.1 http://www.statewatch.org/news/2011/mar/eu-com-access-reg-1049-proposal.pdf (30/04/2018). This is the website of Statewatch which is very critical of the Commission’s proposals, arguing that they do not address the question of transparency of the legislative process and Art 4(3) of the Regulation (above).

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5.116  However, an impasse to reform has become an institutional deadlock and, in June 2013, the Parliament resolved overwhelmingly to call on the institutions to end the deadlock. It maintained the ‘red-lines’ on its own position:1 • explicitly extend the scope to all EU institutions, offices and agencies; • enhance legislative transparency, including access to legislative legal opinions, whereby any use of exceptions in the legislative procedure should constitute an exemption from the general rule of legislative transparency; • clarify the relationship between transparency and data protection; • include the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information; • consider the current broad definition of a document as a minimum basis for further development;

The European perspective1   597 • • •

ensure appropriate access to documents and transparency in relation to international negotiations and agreements; provide for financial transparency of EU funds; and not introduce any block exemptions.

http://www.statewatch.org/news/2013/jun/ep-access-docs-prel.pdf. See www.europarl.europa. eu/legislative-train/theme-union-of-democratic-change/file-revision-of-the-access-todocuments-regulation (30/04/2018).

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5.117  EU legislation on access to documents has become anachronistic. It has not been redrafted in accordance with the Treaty of Lisbon and the spirit of TEU, Arts 10 and 15 has not been reflected in institutional practices. The right of access as a fundamental right under the Charter is a heavily qualified one. The present framework gives neither the CJEU nor ombudsman an opportunity to inform the institutions with appropriate levels of openness and transparency. In fact, the CJEU has introduced presumptions of secrecy which the UK system would not entertain. A new proposal for legislation on access to assist in greater openness and transparency is long overdue at a time when the Commission is seeking to extend secrecy to new agencies. The balance between access and privacy seems to be tilted too consistently towards the latter in the case law and does not reveal the balance that has been achieved in the UK. The GDPR will lead to a new version of Regulation No 45/2001. One hopes the contribution of the EU Ombudsman and the DP Supervisor will be valued and seen as essential in the reformulation of Regulation 1049/2001 in the discussions between the Parliament and the Commission.1 See the conclusions of Curtin et al, para 5.65, note 1 above.

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THE EUROPEAN OMBUDSMAN 5.118  Much of what follows examines the broader strategically oriented work of the European Ombudsman (EUO) and is taken from EUO reports. But she is a complaints investigator. In 2003, the EUO received 1,768 complaints; in 2011, the number was 1,846; and, in 2016, it was 1,169. In 2016, 86 of the closed complaints (29.6 per cent of closed complaints) concerned transparency and access to documents. Recommendations were accepted in 56 per cent of cases overall. In 17 per cent of cases there was non-compliance by EU institutions – a worrying statistic for an organisation that desperately needs to improve its public image. 5.119  The EUO has had an increasingly important role in promoting transparency by bringing specific secretive practices to light and addressing them in individual complaints, as well as through an increasing number of own-initiative inquiries operating at a more systemic level.1 The EUO seeks to advance ethics, transparency and probity in the work of the EU institutions. The broader political context drives the work of the present ombudsman. Complaints of a lack of transparency in negotiations led to an own-initiative inquiry into the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership – the EU/US

598  Chapter 5 trade agreement which now seems moribund. The EUO launched a call in 2016 for nominations for ‘Award for Good Administration’ for EU staff who promote good administration. The Commission revised the EU  Transparency Register in 2016 at the EUO’s request and the EUO called for full funding transparency for lobbying groups. The EUO noted with pride that media references to the Ombudsman’s work have increased each year since 2012 and particularly in 2015 and 2016. She has promoted the Open Government Partnership. Two reports in 2018 highlighted the lack of transparency in the Council and the Commission. The first concerned the Council of the EU in the legislative process and procedures adopted which hindered the accountability of elected representatives to their citizens and which constituted maladministration.2 The EUO found four instances of maladministration in the manner in which the European Commission’s secretary general was appointed in February 2018. The correct procedures were followed neither in the spirit nor the letter of the rules. The Commission’s communications were described as ‘defensive, evasive and at times combative’. The college of commissioners as a whole were guilty of maladministration.3 The Commission did not share all the views of the EUO. https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/activities/annualreports.faces for EUO annual reports from 1996 to 2016. The following concentrates on the 2016 report. See also N Vogiatzis The European Ombudsman and Good Administration in the European Union (2018, Palgrave Macmillan). 2 https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/recommendation/en/89518 (6/09/2018). 3 https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/recommendation/en/102651 (6/09/2018). 1

5.120  By the end of 2016, the Ombudsman had received five complaints involving administrative issues related to Brexit, three of which concerned access to information in that year. In 2016, transparency-related inquiries again accounted for the greatest proportion of cases. The Ombudsman in July 2016 published proposals to make trilogues – informal negotiations on EU legislative proposals between the European Parliament and Council of the EU in the presence of the Commission – more transparent. These included making available: the dates of trilogue meetings and summary agendas; the positions of both co-legislators on the Commission’s proposal; and the names of the decisionmakers present in trilogue meetings. She recommended that documents that track the main stages of the process should be published as soon as possible after the negotiations end. The Ombudsman inspected the trilogue files of two EU laws (Credit Mortgage Directive and Clinical Trials Regulation) and held a public consultation, receiving 51 replies including five from national parliaments. The European Parliament, Council and Commission responded to the Ombudsman’s proposals in December, generally agreeing with the Ombudsman’s arguments in favour of more transparency. In the responses, the institutions outline their initial follow-up, which includes discussions with each other on the implementation of the proposals. 5.121  The EUO opened a strategic inquiry into how the European Commission carries out conflict of interest assessments for its special advisers. The advisers provide on-demand expert input directly to Commissioners. The aim of the inquiry, following individual complaints, is to ensure that rules are robust enough to avoid inappropriate influence on policy-making. In a letter to

The European perspective1   599 the President of the European Commission, the EUO suggested that both the mandate of the adviser and their outside activities be clear before the adviser is appointed and that the conflict of interest assessment be updated if their outside activity changes. The EUO also inquired into the transparency of EU lobbying and related matters. The balance of interests represented in the hundreds of expert groups that advise the Commission on policy and legislation became a major strategic inquiry. In early 2016, the Ombudsman asked the Commission to take a series of expert group transparency steps, including the publication of comprehensive minutes of their meetings. The Parliament was also very active on this issue. In May 2016, the Commission replied that it intended to make several changes to the system, including: publishing agendas and meaningful minutes; improving conflict of interest management in relation to individuals appointed in a personal capacity; and linking expert group membership to the obligation to be on the EU Transparency Register. The Ombudsman reported that she will inspect the minutes of meetings and other relevant documents in following years, ie 2017 et seq, before drawing her final conclusions on the Commission’s response to her recommendations. 5.122  In a decision at the end of 2016, the EUO noted her strong disapproval of the Commission’s stance regarding the transparency of its meetings with tobacco lobbyists.1 In autumn 2015, the Ombudsman had asked the Commission to proactively publish online all meetings with tobacco lobbyists, or their legal representatives, as well as the minutes of those meetings, to bring the institution in line with its obligations under the UN Framework Convention for Tobacco Control (FCTC). The practice recommended by the Ombudsman was already being followed by the Commission’s Directorate-General (DG) for Health. The Commission responded in early 2016 that it believed it was already complying with the FCTC and did not need to adopt the DG for Health’s practice. The Ombudsman closed the case with a finding of maladministration, noting that the Commission had not provided any good reasons for refusing to take the steps proposed by her office. Decision-making in economic and financial matters is of significant public interest. The Ombudsman’s office has dealt with individual complaints in this area and the Ombudsman also sometimes considers it more helpful to point out issues of concern or ask for more information as part of a ‘strategic initiative’. Decision 852/2014/LP https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/73774 (15/05/2018).

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5.123  Representatives of the Ombudsman’s office met the chair of the Supervisory Board of the European Central Bank (ECB), to discuss the transparency of the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) – by which Eurozone banks are assessed on their financial good health. The Ombudsman followed up with a letter to the chair noting that the ECB was likely to be anticipating – if not already experiencing – an increasing number of requests for public access to documents in the area of banking supervision. The Ombudsman suggested that the ECB could examine its scope to make public parts of the supervisory manual of the Single Supervisory Mechanism.

600  Chapter 5 In February 2016, the Ombudsman suggested to the European Investment Bank (EIB) President that the minutes of Board of Directors meetings for both the EIB and the European Investment Fund (EIF) be proactively published. In a response welcomed by the Ombudsman, President Hoyer noted that the bank had agreed to take these transparency measures. In addition, the EIB is progressively updating its public register – an electronic database linked to the projects the bank finances – by publishing more information related to environmental and social issues. The Ombudsman also asked about the regime for publishing documents related to the work of the European Fiscal Board, a new body set up to advise the Commission on fiscal matters. The Commission replied that the Board’s documents would be subject to EU rules on public access to documents (Regulation 1049/2001). 5.124  Every year, the EUO receives many complaints from individuals or organisations about the EU administration’s failure to provide public access to documents. In these cases, the Ombudsman looks to see if the institution is justified in not releasing the document. If the Ombudsman finds it not justified, she seeks release of the requested document. One such case concerned a request for public access to opinions assessing candidates’ suitability to be Judges and Advocates-General at the Court of Justice and the General Court of the EU. The Council refused access to the opinions – drawn up by a panel of experts – arguing that EU rules concerning access to documents (Regulation 1049/2001) did not apply in that instance. Following the Ombudsman’s intervention, the Council announced that it had decided to apply Regulation 1049/2001. The Ombudsman welcomed the Council’s policy change, noting that this case raised the important issue of how to strike the correct balance between the need to protect the personal data of those being assessed for high public office with the need to ensure maximum transparency in the appointment process. She noted that in such cases the balance should generally be in favour of greater openness. The Ombudsman encouraged the Council to deal with any future requests for public access to such documents with this approach in mind. A further complaint concerned the Commission’s refusal to grant public access to documents related to its investigation of an allegedly illegal shipment of live Bluefin tuna to Malta. The Commission accepted the Ombudsman’s recommendation to grant access to the documents the Commission had drafted. While it refused, during the inquiry, to disclose those documents that Malta had sent to the Commission, it later took a decision to follow the Ombudsman’s recommendation to release the documents from Malta. Malta then took the Commission to the EU courts in an attempt to block the Commission from releasing the documents. 5.125  In a case concerning the European External Action Service (EEAS), the complainant, a Swedish NGO, wanted access to the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Cuba. The EEAS refused, arguing that the Agreement was still provisional at that stage. The complainant turned to the Ombudsman, noting that the Agreement had already been initialled. In the

The European perspective1   601 course of the inquiry, the EEAS released the document after the Commission had adopted the Agreement. Sometimes the institutions change their approach to a particular request for document access. This was the case in a complaint about the Commission’s refusal to grant public access to documents concerning the surveillance of the internet by UK intelligence services. Following the Ombudsman’s intervention, the Commission disclosed one document, a letter from the UK  Foreign Secretary, but not two letters from the Commission Vice-President. This led the Ombudsman to find maladministration. However, the Commission in October 2016, a year after the Ombudsman’s decision, released the documents in question.

Agencies 5.126  One major case concerning an EU agency opened in 2014. This concerned the decision of the European Medicines Agency (EMA) to give only partial public access to clinical trial studies related to the approval of Humira, a drug used to treat Crohn’s Disease. In June, the Ombudsman closed the inquiry, welcoming increased transparency in this area. However, she expressed concern about four specific pieces of information that the EMA had withheld. The Ombudsman noted that any clinical information of value to doctors, patients and researchers should be disclosed in the public interest.

Contracts and grants 5.127  Complaints in this area accounted for 14.5 per cent of the total.

BREXIT AND FUTURE RELATIONSHIPS CONCERNING ACCESS 5.128  The draft agreement on the UK withdrawal from the EU and Euratom1 sets out several issues relevant to this chapter. As well as numerous documentation requirements needed for the administrative back-up for duties and obligations in the treaty, the following are germane. ‘The Member States and the United Kingdom shall disseminate information concerning the rights and obligations of persons covered by [Part Three on citizens’ rights], in particular, by means of awareness-raising campaigns conducted, as appropriate, through national and local media and other means of communication’ (Art 37, November 2018). The UK will lose access to networks, information systems and databases established by EU law (Art 8, November 2018). There are derogations to this to ensure compliance with the treaty (eg Arts 50, 53 and 63(2)). Part Three, Title V, Article 63 concerns exchange of information in police matters. Title VII of Part Three concerns data and information processed or obtained before the end of the transition period or on the basis of this agreement. Obligations of professional secrecy will apply during and after the transition period (Art 120), as will professional discretion (Art 121). There will be a regular dialogue and exchange

602  Chapter 5 of information between the CJEU and the highest courts in the UK (Art 163). The UK government will also seek a framework agreement on the exchange and protection of classified information in foreign, security and defence areas, especially in the Common Security and Defence Policy, the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre and the Cyber Threat Repository.2 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/draft-agreement-withdrawal-unitedkingdom-great-britain-and-northern-ireland-european-union-and-european-atomic-energycommunity-0_en (March 2018) and https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/ draft_withdrawal_agreement_0.pdf (November 2018). 2 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/technical-note-on-the-exchange-and-protectionof-classified-information (25/05/2018). See Future Relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union Cm 9593 ch 3 and also ch 2 on data exchange in security matters. 1

Article 122 Access to documents 5.129  Article 122 of the November 2018 draft agreement provides as follows: ‘1. For the purposes of the relevant provisions of Union law on access to documents of the institutions, agencies, offices and bodies of the Union, all references to Member States and their authorities shall be read as including the United Kingdom and its authorities in respect of documents drawn up by or obtained by the institutions, agencies, offices and bodies of the Union a) before the end of the transition period, or b) after the end of the transition period in connection with activities of the Union pursuant to this Agreement. 2. Article  5 and Article  9(5) of Regulation (EC) No  1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Article  5 of Decision ECB/2004/3 of the European Central Bank shall apply in the United Kingdom in respect of all documents falling within the scope of those provisions obtained by the United Kingdom a) before the end of the transition period, or b) after the end of the transition period in connection with activities of the Union pursuant to this Agreement.’ The accompanying Political Declaration of 22 November 2018 has provisions on commitments to agreements on security classifications and security and intelligence exchanges. The provisions on personal data were addressed in ch 2 (para 2.8).1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/37059/20181121-cover-political-declaration.pdf.

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THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE 5.130  The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted a Recommendation of 25 November 1981 on access to information held by public authorities.1 This reflects a degree of international agreement on the desirability of access to information, but it does not form part of our domestic law because it is not a part of the Convention incorporated into domestic law in October 2000. Furthermore, ‘one or more of its principles’ may be modified or excluded

The European perspective1   603 in the interests of ‘good and efficient administration’. They are also subject to ‘such limitations and restrictions as are necessary in a democratic society for the protection of legitimate public interests’ (such as national security, public safety, public order, the economic well-being of the country, the prevention of crime, or for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence) and for the protection of privacy and other legitimate private interests, having, however, ‘due regard to the specific interest of an individual in information held by public authorities which concerns him personally’.2 R(81)19. A further instrument is currently being drafted. R(81)19, Art V.

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5.131  A new Recommendation (Rec(2002)2) on access to official documents was adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 21  February 2002, referring amongst other matters to the UN  Convention of Access to Information and Recommendation No. R (2000) 13 on a European policy on access to archives. Article IX speaks of public authorities ‘as far as possible’ making information available by drawing up lists or registers of documents they hold. 5.132  In June 2009 a convention from the Council of Europe on access to official information was opened to signature.1 Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents Treaty Series 205 (18  June 2009).

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5.133  The ECHR, which the UK has incorporated into domestic law, though not completely, by the HRA  1998 and which remains an international as well as a domestic legal obligation, also has relevant Articles: these are Art 2 on the right to life, Art 3 on the prohibition on torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, Art 6 (fair and public hearings), Art 8 (respect for private and family life) and Art 10 (freedom of expression), and are examined elsewhere (chs 1, 2 and 10). The future of the UK membership of the ECHR, the Council of Europe and the continuation of the Human Rights Act appear reasonably secure despite the dislike of these ‘European’ human rights instruments by elements in the Conservative party. Mrs May stated in the Conservative Manifesto in 2017 that there would be no development until Brexit was resolved and after the next election (2022). This assumes a five-year term. It takes a brave person to guess how and when the Brexit episode may end and when clarification will allow time to be devoted to the ECHR and HRA, or even how long Mrs May’s government can last. The government’s hope is that, between 29 March 2019 (formal date of Brexit) and late December 2020, there will be a transitional period in which we continue to abide by EU law and CJEU decisions without formally being a member of the EU, ie  not participating in law-making and having no UK members of the CJEU. In the white paper on The Future Relationship Between the United Kingdom and the European Union the Prime Minister stated that the UK would remain a member of the ECHR and paragraph  7 of the political declaration confirmed this (para 5.129, note 1 above).1 Cm 9593 (July 2018) paras 2.5e and 2.3.19.

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Chapter 6

Local government as providers and keepers of information

INTRODUCTION 6.1  We saw in ch  4 that, until the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA 2000), many of the duties on central government to provide information to Parliament or the public were non-legal duties. For local government there has been an Access to Information Act since 19851 so the legal position is, ostensibly, significantly different. First, however, we have to indicate what is meant by local government. The following offers a brief outline. Local Government (Access to Information) Act 1985, effective from 1  April 1986. It is an amendment to the Local Government Act 1972 (LGA 1972), Sch 12A. See Access to Information in Local Government Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (September 2002).

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6.2  In England the expression covers the county authorities, unitary authorities, district authorities and parish councils existing within some districts. Under the Local Government (Wales) Act 1994, Wales is divided into unitary authorities. London comprises the unitary boroughs both inner and outer.1 The City of London is administered by a non-statutory corporation.2 London Government Act 1963. The provisions of the 1963 Act were incorporated with slight modification in the LGA 1972. 2 SH Bailey Cross on Principles of Local Government Law (3rd edn, 2004). 1

6.3  From 1 April 1986, the Greater London Council and metropolitan county authorities (there were six) were abolished by virtue of the Local Government Act 1985 (LGA 1985). The Act provided for the transfer of their functions to other authorities. Most of such functions went to London borough councils and metropolitan district councils. Part IV of the LGA 1985 provided for separate ‘joint authorities’ to be established to act as police, fire, civil defence and passenger transport authorities in the former metropolitan counties and as the fire and civil defence authority for London. Changes to the regime for fire services has been brought about by the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004. A ‘residuary body’ was

Local government as providers and keepers of information   605 established by Part VII for each area to deal with residual affairs concerning abolished authorities. An Inner London Education Authority established under Part III of the LGA 1985 was abolished by the Education Reform Act 1988.1 Education Reform Act 1988, s 162. It had a non-statutory existence from 1965.

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6.4  An authority for Greater London was re-established by the Greater London Authority Act 1999, and provision was made for the election of a mayor. As a result of this, a number of functions previously possessed by the local authorities in London and a number of new delegated powers have been granted to the Mayor of London. 6.5  The areas of counties, districts, unitary authorities1 and London boroughs are designated as ‘principal areas’ and their councils are known as ‘principal councils’ (PCs). Parishes and communities have parish and community meetings and they may have parish and community councils. Local Government Act 1992, Part II.

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6.6  Authorities have duties and powers assigned to them by public and private Acts of Parliament and by statutory instruments. They are also exhorted, cajoled, advised, etc by ministerial circulars, departmental rules and administrative communications. The relevant duties and powers will be dealt with on a subjectby-subject basis throughout the book. There is also an extensive network of quasi local authorities and private contractors who carry out functions on behalf of authorities. These functions are likely to be designated functions for the purposes of the FOIA 2000 bringing such contractors within the terms of the Act but the FOIA 2000 will only apply to such functions as are designated.1 See paras 1.86 et seq above.

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6.7  Plans for the creation of regional assemblies or authorities in England were ultimately not carried through as they failed to be supported in the referendums in which they were put forward. The regional development agencies, which offered a degree of regional government focused in particular on economic development in the regions, were phased out in the period 2010–2015 as part of the cuts to NDPBs. These bodies have been replaced by Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs), which do not receive direct funding from the government but may be supported to some extent by the local authorities that are members of the relevant LEPs. The local government legislation provides for attendance at meetings of principal authorities, committees and sub-committees, as will be seen. 6.8  The Localism Act 2011 delivers some significant changes to local government in England. Schedule  2 to the Act makes some changes to the governance arrangements presently provided for in the Local Government Act 2000 (addressed in greater detail below where the changes are material). Significant changes are also made to the regime on standards, involving the abolition of much of the previous regime. This is addressed in greater detail in ch 7. Chapter 9 of the Act contains measures which aim to deliver pay accountability

606  Chapter 6 in local government, allowing the Secretary of State to offer guidance to local authorities on appropriate levels of remuneration and requiring each local authority to produce a senior pay policy statement.1 The Act also creates the ability (already included to an extent in the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007 (LGPIHA 2007)) for local people to petition for a local referendum on a particular issue, though this has been very seldom used. There is further provision for local referendums where councils are seeking to secure an increase in council tax, which has also been used very infrequently. The Act is most notable for its removal of the ultra vires rule for local authorities, allowing far greater freedom of action than is presently permitted by the law. Chapter 3 of Part 5 of the Act deals with assets of community value and requires a list of such assets to be produced and published. Changes are also proposed in relation to certain aspects of social housing provision, which are noted, insofar as they are relevant to this work, in ch 9. The changes brought about by the Act are significant and will make changes to many areas of the law that are examined by this book. See also the government guidance produced on this issue: Openness and Accountability in Local Pay: Guidance Under Section 40 of the Localism Act (2012, DCLG); and Openness and Accountability in Local Pay: Guidance Under Section 40 of the Localism Act (Supplementary Guidance) (2013, DCLG).

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6.9  In addition to the changes brought about by the Localism Act 2011, there has also been movement towards the creation of a number of combined authorities, which arise where local authorities come together and delegate some of their functions to a combined authority. The potential to create a combined authority was originally created in Part 6 of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009, although the functions of such combined authorities were limited to specific policy fields (particularly transport) as the Act was originally enacted. A few combined authorities were created under the provisions of the 2009 Act and the creation of such authorities has been encouraged by central government, as they are seen as a way of devolving functions closer to local people and also of a potential means of delivering cost reductions in local government. The government’s powers to grant additional powers to combined authorities (termed ‘devolution deals’) has been significantly expanded by the amendments to the provisions of the Cities and Local Government Act 2016. Up to now, 12 combined authorities have been created using these powers, a number of which have been granted additional powers by central government under a ‘devolution deal’ and others that are in the process of negotiating such deals. The combined authorities, where created, are subject to many of the same obligations in relation to the keeping and providing of information as other local authorities, as discussed below.

NEW MODEL EXECUTIVES FOR AUTHORITIES 6.10 In Modern Local Government: In Touch With the People,1 the government set out its plans for modern local government and appropriate forms of councils for such authorities which were responsible for spending about a quarter of all public expenditure. Such councils were to be built on a ‘culture of openness

Local government as providers and keepers of information   607 and ready accountability’ (para 1.2). Pointing out the pathetically low turnout at local elections the paper believed that councillors did not sufficiently reflect their communities (only a quarter of councillors were women) and that the structures within which local authorities operated were the result of nineteenth-century legal philosophy. The committee structure was ‘inefficient and opaque’ with councillors spending ‘too many hours on often fruitless meetings’ (para  1.15). ‘Above all, the committee system leads to the real decisions being taken elsewhere, behind closed doors, with little open, democratic scrutiny and where many councillors feel unable to influence events’ (para 1.15). It set forth an agenda for change involving new organisational frameworks to run councils, the creation of opportunities for giving local people a greater say in the running of the council and its service provision – by establishing ‘beacon councils’, improving local services, reforming business rates, improving local financial accountability, capital finance and providing a new ethical framework. The subject of standards and organisation had been heavily influenced by the Nolan Committee on Standards report on local government, although the Localism Act 2011 might be argued to have reduced some of the rigour in the previous standards regime.2 Cm 4014 (1998). Cm 3702 (1997).

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6.11  The question of organisation was taken forward in Local Leadership: Local Choice (‘Local Leadership’)1 and was given effect by the Local Government Act 2000 (LGA 2000). The Localism Act 2011 has further revisited the question of governance arrangements for local authorities in England, by inserting a new Part 1A into the LGA  2000, although the fundamental governance structures available in the Localism Act 2011 do not differ substantially from the regime previously in place. Cm 4298 (1999).

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6.12  With the introduction of the Local Government Act 2000, government sought to produce a regime of governance that would promote efficiency, transparency, accountability and high standards of conduct, enhance decisionmaking and be appropriate to local circumstances.1 It was hoped the legal changes will provide strong leadership, powerful roles for all councillors and high standards of conduct. The way forward was for councils – which under new arrangements will remain single legal entities – to consult the local community on how they wish to be governed with referendums on whether there should be a directly elected mayor as in London. Detailed guidance on local consultation has been provided.2 This referendum could be initiated by a petition of 5 per cent of the electorate or a proposal from the Council. Statutory guidance would provide details on content and timing of referenda and regulations would contain the rules of conduct for a referendum paying regard to the Neill report (Nolan’s successor) on party political funding.3 A majority decision in favour of change would be binding on the council. The government would be able to say what detailed proposal for a new form of local governance must be drawn up following a petition; how the proposal must reflect any intention or preferences of the petitioners; when the referendum should be held; and must ensure fair conduct.

608  Chapter 6 The detailed proposal when implemented will become the council’s constitution. If the proposal is not supported, it cannot be implemented. The council could, after further consultation, move to another form of operating which does not involve a mayor. After a five-year moratorium a further referendum for a mayor would be possible. The government want the issue to be raised locally and it does not want councils to continue with traditional patterns of administration. If no referendum is put to the people, and no new form of organisation is put into effect (see below), the Secretary of State may direct a referendum within a specified period on a question determined by the Secretary of State. The coalition government expressed disappointment with the limited uptake of new governance arrangements and particularly the small number of authorities that had moved to have an elected mayor, as only 12 elected mayors were in place in 2011.1 LGA 2000, ss 11 and 12, and with reference to additional forms of executive. Modern Local Government: Guidance on Enhancing Public Participation DETR (1998). The Local Government Act 2000 New Council Constitutions – Guidance Pack DETR  (2000) has further guidance on Consultation Guidelines for English Local Authorities. See Local Authorities (Conduct of Referendums) (England) Regulations 2004, SI 2004/226. 3 Cm 4057 (1998). 1 2

6.13  The Localism Act 2011 introduced a new Part 1A to the Local Government Act 2000, as noted above. One element of the Act was to provide new machinery for the potential transfer between governance arrangements. Chapter 4 of the new Part 1A deals with these issues. Section 9K of the Act provides for the possibility of a local authority to change from one means of governance to another. Sections 9KA and 9KB provide that local authorities that operate executive arrangements may make changes to these as they see fit, but any such changes must be supported by a resolution of the local authority as provided for in s 9KC. It is important to note that s 9KC(2) requires the local authorities to publicise any such changes by ensuring that details of the changes are made available at its principal offices and also by advertising the changes in one or more local newspapers. The notice must set out the detail of its resolution, the date upon which the change will have effect, the main features of the change and must also state that the full details of the changes are available for inspection at the authority’s principal offices and specify the address of the principal office. Section 9KA(3) of the Act prevents authorities from making a further change in governance arrangements for five years after a change is made. 6.14  Following the Localism Act 2011, there are four models of management presently in place: (1) A directly elected mayor with a cabinet. (2) A cabinet with a leader. (3) The committee system. (4) Prescribed arrangements specified by the Secretary of State. In the past, a fifth model was available, viz: (5) A  directly elected mayor and a council manager (restricted to Wales by LGPIHA  2007 and then repealed for Wales by the Local Government (Wales) Measure 2011).

Local government as providers and keepers of information   609 The Localism Act 2011 modifies the structures of some of these arrangements by introducing a new Part 1A of the Local Government Act 2000. The vast majority of local authorities in England now operate either arrangement (1) or (2). As things stand, the Secretary of State has not yet made use of the powers contained in s 9BA of the Local Government Act 2000 (as inserted by the Localism Act 2011) to prescribe other governance arrangements. 6.15  The executive models first introduced by the Local Government Act 2000 seek to provide a ‘clearly identified and separate executive to give leadership and clarity to decision-taking’ and ‘powerful roles for all councillors to ensure transparency and local accountability’.1 Such forms of governance will provide for a separation of the executive and will be efficient, transparent, and accountable: ‘All councillors will have powerful roles, acting together in the council, or as members of the executive or powerful overview and scrutiny committees. People will know who is responsible for decisions, and communities will have a clear focus for leadership. Decisions will be scrutinised in public, and those who take them and implement them will be called publicly to account for their performance.’ (para 3.3) Local Leadership etc, para 3.1.

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6.16  Consultative Drafts of proposed Guidance and Regulations on New Constitutions for Councils were published in May 2000.1 In England, the regime for changing executive arrangements was altered by the LGPIHA  2007, which introduced the new ss 33A–33I to the LGA 2000. The regime for making changes is now contained in the new Part 1A of the LGA 2000, inserted by the Localism Act 2011 (and described in para  6.13 above). The arrangements in Wales were provided for by the Local Authorities (Changing Executive Arrangements and Alternative Arrangements) (Wales) Regulations 2004, SI  2004/3158. These Regulations were repealed for Wales with some transitional provisions by the Local Government (Wales) Measure 2011, Parts 3 and 4. DETR, May 2000.

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610  Chapter 6 6.17  Directly Elected Mayor – Provides political leadership – Proposes policy framework – Proposes budget – Takes executive decisions within policy framework

Council – Decides new constitution – Agrees policy framework – Agrees budget – Appoints Chief Executive and Chief Officers

Cabinet – Appointed by the Mayor from the council – Implements policies under the political guidance of the Mayor – Takes delegated executive decisions as group or individuals

Councillors outside the executive – Propose amendments to budget to Mayor and Cabinet – Propose new or changed policies to Mayor and Cabinet – Represent electorate – Scrutinise executive

Chief Executive and Chief Officers – Executive and full council to concur on appointment – Provide require support, including dedicated staff, to councillors outside the executie, Mayor and Cabinet – Implement policy and secure service delivery for executive – Account for executive actions to councillors outside the executive Figure 6.1 Directly elected mayor with cabinet

Local government as providers and keepers of information   611 6.18  Council – Decides new constitution – Decides policy framework – Decides budget – Appoints Council Manager and possibly Chief Officers

Directly Elected Mayor – Provides political leadership – Proposes board policy framework

Council Manager (Chief Executive) – Appointed by full Council – Possibly appoints Chief Officers – Under political guidance of Mayor: – develops and proposes details of policy framework; and – implements policy and secures service delivery

Councillors outside the executive – Propose amendments to budget – Propose changes to Council policies – Represent electorate – Scrutinise executive

Chief Executive and Chief Officers – Executive and full council to concur on appointment – Provide require support, including dedicated staff, to councillors outside the executie, Mayor and Cabinet – Implement policy and secure service delivery for executive – Account for executive actions to councillors outside the executive Figure 6.2 Cabinet with a leader

612  Chapter 6 6.19  The details on these points are contained in Chapter 2 of the new Part 1A of the LGA 2000, inserted by the Localism Act 2011, including the minutiae of executive functions and their discharge. They are supplemented by Regulations and guidance.1 See SI 2000/2583 and SI 2012/1019.

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6.20  Before adopting a new constitution, a council should address: (1) The model for its new constitution. (2) The functions of the executive and whether they should be subject to conditions and limits. (3) How the executive should be structured and which groups or individuals should have which responsibilities. (4) How the overview and scrutiny role should be structured. (5) What committees there should be for functions not discharged by the executive. (6) What standing orders there should be to define the relationship between executive and the rest of the council. (7) How changes to the new constitutional arrangements will be developed and agreed. (8) What should be the relationship between councillors and officers. (9) Who should appoint the chief executive and other officers. (10) How appointments to other bodies should be determined. (11) Direct support for mayoral or scrutiny functions from small groups of officers. (12) Transitional arrangements and timetabling. 6.21  All councillors will agree or approve key plans and decisions. Regulatory responsibilities such as licensing and planning will not be functions of the executive but will be carried out by the full council or delegated to committees and other matters may be taken by the full council or delegated in accordance with a council’s constitution. A  chair is elected from the councillors and by the full council and that person may not be a member of the executive, or the overview and scrutiny committee (see paras 6.116 et seq below). It is hoped that these arrangements will allow councillors more time to give direction to the council and local services such as local performance plans, fundamental reviews of best value or community safety. 6.22  All forms of local governance must have one or more overview and scrutiny committees (OSCs): see LGA  2000, ss  9F–9FI (as added by the Localism Act 2011) and Sch A1. They are to have the same political balance as the full council and will meet in public with the current rules on public access applying. Details on size, number etc are a matter for local choice. The OSCs are required to cover all aspects of the executive’s responsibilities. The constitution should provide for details such as co-opted members (non-voting) and chairs, and requesting a full debate in council before a decision is taken or implemented. Local authorities are required to keep their constitutions up to date (LGA 2000, s 9P). Constitutions will be required to provide that OSCs would be:

Local government as providers and keepers of information   613 (a) able to require members of the executive and officers to attend their meetings and to invite others to attend; (b) required to meet and examine these people in public (current rules on access to apply); (c) able to have all necessary support and information and training to discover what their local community wants and to represent them effectively; and (d) required to ensure the Standing Orders protect minority interests on the committee to get their concerns onto the agenda. Guidance on the functions and best practice in relation to OSCs was most recently published in 2006, with new guidance planned for late 2018. 6.23  Section 9FA(4) of the Local Government Act 2000 permits the co-opting of members to OSCs even where these individuals are not members of the authority concerned. Similarly to the previous s 115 of the LGA 2003, voting rights may be provided for such co-opted members if the Secretary of State deems it appropriate through delegated legislation, although such voting rights are not ordinarily provided, as made clear by s 9FA(5). Under LGA 2003, s 116 local polls may be conducted to ascertain the views of those polled about any matter relating to services provided in pursuance of an authority’s functions or expertise on such services including powers under LGA  2000, s  2. Details on polls are left to authorities subject to possible guidance. 6.24  The constitution must provide for the existence of other committees and sub-committees, membership, chair appointments, and role and responsibility. They are required to have the same political balance as the council and current rules on public access and conduct of business will apply. Social services committees are to be abolished. Councils will also be able to decide on area committees and neighbourhood forums. 6.25  The Localism Act 2011 retains OSCs and their functions in their present form with no radical changes. The functions and composition of OSCs in Wales were altered by the provisions of Part 6 of the Local Government (Wales) Measure 2011, although these do not bring about significant changes to the operation of the present system.

614  Chapter 6 6.26  Overview and scrutiny committee(s) review policy in public taking views from all stakeholders. Policy platform on which executive was elected.

Results of consultation with public and other stakeholders.

Overview and scrutiny committee(s) review policy in public taking views from all stakeholders.

Executive* decides its policy taking further advice from overview and scrutiny committee(s), interest groups, the local community and others as appropriate.

Executive* makes proposals to the full council.

Executive* makes proposals to the full council.

Executive* implements policy consulting overview and scrutiny committees, interest groups, the local community and others as appropriate.

Executive* publishes: – its decisions and the reasons for them; – all relevant factual background papers including officer advice.

Overview and scrutiny committees review effectiveness of policy implementation and outcomes in public and make recommendations. *Mayor, another member of the executive or the executive collectively, as the case may be. Figure 6.3 Policy formulation and implementation in a new constitution1 From the Local Government Bill Consultative Document, May 2000, p 11.

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6.27  The executive should take the lead on all policy and strategy issues, including the budget, searching for best value and decisions on resources and priorities. It is the focus for forging links and partnerships outside the council. The expected size of executives is 15 per cent of the council or ten councillors, whichever is the smaller. They may be smaller but where there is a cabinet with a leader or elected mayor there should be at least three members. The constitution should set out membership but the executive does not usually reflect the political balance on the council. It will comprise majority or coalition members. Specific

Local government as providers and keepers of information   615 members would be given portfolios – this was the preferred option with the government because it ‘speeds up decisions and clarifies responsibilities, improving accountability’ (para  3.47). Decisions would either be taken by the whole cabinet, in sub-groups, as individuals or as combinations of these. In a cabinet with a leader, appointments would be made by either the leader or the council and in the latter case it would by majority vote decide the make-up of the cabinet under its constitution. 6.28  Formal co-option is not allowed, but a mayor could benefit from a political adviser paid for by the council in addition to those advisers serving the three largest groups. S/he could attend but not vote at executive meetings.

EXECUTIVE MEETINGS AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION 6.29  It is no doubt the case that ‘at a minimum’ any provisions on access to information will need to comply with the FOIA 2000 (ch 1). Sections 9G and 9GA of the Local Government Act 2000 require the executive to ensure that a written record of all decisions taken, and the reasons for those decisions, is produced. Regulations made under s 9GA require the record, along with factual and background papers (excluding that information which is currently exempt under Sch 12A to the LGA 1972 (see ch 7) relating to those decisions, to be made available to the public, both at the registered office of the authority and on its website, as practicable. Once a decision is taken by an individual, the record of that decision and the reasons for the decision and additional items must be made available to the public. The LGA 1972 (as amended by the Local Government (Access to Information) Act 1985 (LG(ATI)A 1985)) will continue to apply to meetings of the full council, committees and sub-committees including the overview and scrutiny committee (OSC). The same provisions on openness that apply to committees apply to cases where the executive consults with an OSC. Under Part 5 of SI 2012/2089, the OSC has the right to see, but not make public, any information relating to their responsibilities which would be exempt to the public by virtue of Sch 12A to the LGA 1972. Regulations spell out qualifications (see below). The OSC is under the provisions on access set out in the amended 1972 legislation and is also within the provisions of s 15 of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 (LGHA 1989) (duty to allocate seats to political groups (see paras 6.116 et seq below). Political advice to the executive remains private. Meetings of the executive may be open to the public [or press] or private (see below and LGA 2000, s 9G). 6.30  The OSC would have the right to demand the attendance of the mayor or leader, along with members of the executive or council officers to answer questions or to contribute to a debate on policy under LGA 2000, s 9FA(8). Part 5 of SI 2012/2089 gives members of the OSC the power to demand access to papers from any parties called before it. The government was minded to make advice from officers public along with factual material. It realised that officers might be placed in a sensitive position when it was seen that their advice was not being followed and the regulations excluded access to their advice. Reports

616  Chapter 6 and background papers will be provided as explained below. The duty to create a record of decision and the reasons lies on an officer when it is the decision of all or some of the executive. If made by an individual member of the executive, it is their responsibility to create the record and to make it available to the proper officer. The OSC can ask for any additional factual information it requires to support its work. Effective discharge of its role requires ‘regular and open dialogue’ with the executive. No further provision on access may be required.1 The full discussion and approval by the council of policy proposals and the budget will ensure openness! All officers will be accountable to the council in its overview and scrutiny role and may be called to give evidence to the OSC. All officers will have to adapt to the new situation where consultation directly with local people and stake-holders will replace servicing and attending committees. The government believed that a veto power in the mayor over council or committee decisions ‘could be appropriate’.2 Local Leadership, para 3.65. Ibid, para 3.66.

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6.31  In LGA  2000, s  9G meetings of the executive or its committees, joint committees and sub-committees of the latter may be held in public or private. The decision on openness is taken by the executive, although constrained by Part 2 of SI  2012/2089. This seems at first to cut across the thrust of the 1985 legislation on access but that legislation has been used as a basis for the regulations on openness and access. A written record must be kept of prescribed decisions made by executives and their committees held in private and by individual members which must include reasons for decisions, as set out by Part 4 of SI 2012/2089. These records, together with ‘such reports, background papers or other documents ‘as may be prescribed’ must be made available to the public in accordance with the requirements of SI 2012/2089. The whole or any part of a document may be held back on specified grounds, contained in Part 6 of SI 2012/2089. The Regulations make provision as to the circumstances in which meetings are to be held in private in whole or in part; the information to be included in written records; on the reasons to be included; those responsible for the records; on the requirement that such records may be made available to members of authorities and to OSC; their availability by electronic means; to confer rights on members of the public, members of local authorities or OSC in relation to records or documents; and to create offences in respect of rights or ‘requirements’ under the section. Further Regulations may be made concerning access to joint committees or written records where held in private etc (see s 9GA(7)). 6.32  SI 2012/2089, made under LGA 2000, s 9GA,1 requires that the public must be able to see papers relating to forthcoming decisions (see reg 9) where these decisions are identified as ‘key decisions’ under reg  8. These decisions are ones that have significant budgetary impact, or have a significant impact on communities in two or more wards in a local authority area. Regulation 3 begins with the presumption that meetings of the executive of the authority are to be held in public, unless any of the circumstances in reg 4 apply, in which case it may be justified for all or part of the meeting to be held in private. It is only permissible

Local government as providers and keepers of information   617 to hold meetings in private where the failure to do so would be likely to lead to the disclosure of confidential information or information that is exempt under LGA 1972, Sch 12A. Wherever the executive wishes to hold part of a meeting in private due to reliance on the exemptions in the LGA  1972, then it must resolve to do so and insofar as the reason for holding that part of the meeting in private is because this would lead to the disclosure of exempt information, the resolution must state the exemption upon which it relies (reg  4(2)(b)). In such circumstances, the resolution must identify the proceedings or part of the proceedings to which the exemption applies and state the class of information under LGA 1972, Sch 12A that the information falls under (reg 4(3)). Where the authority relies upon this exception to hold the meeting in private, it can exclude the public only from those parts of the meeting where the exempt material is to be discussed (reg 4(4)). A further potential reason for exclusion of the public is contained in reg 4(1)(c) – the potential to exclude the public in order to preserve public order. However, should an executive seek to use this provision, reg 4(5) makes it clear that it is not permissible to use this power only to exclude specific members of the public. It is an ‘all or nothing’ provision. Where the public are excluded under reg 4(2), a new reg 4(5A) makes it clear that the meeting may also exclude recording devices that can operate without the presence of an operator in order to allow for appropriate exclusions where the openness provisions inserted by SI 2014/2095 are relied upon. SI 2012/2089 has been amended, with additional requirements as to openness, by SI 2014/2095. These provisions seek to extend the access to meetings to the public in order to facilitate the recording or reporting of proceedings. Regulation 4(5B) permits any member of the public present at the meeting to make a report on proceedings, although reg  4(5C) does not permit oral reporting or commentary from the room of the meeting while it takes place, in order to avoid disruption. Regulation 4(6) also makes it clear that, where reporters attend for the purpose of reporting the meeting, the council must, insofar as is practicable, support them with adequate facilities to do so. The new reg 4(7)–(9), inserted by SI 2014/2095,2 provides that persons present may use any method of communication including the internet to report proceedings, permits dissemination during or after the meeting, and defines ‘reporting’ broadly, to include photography and audio and video recording. Local Authorities (Executive Arrangements) (Access to Information) (England) Regulations 2012, SI 2012/2089. 2 Openness of Local Government Bodies Regulations 2014, SI 2014/2095. 1

6.33  The definition of a ‘key decision’ is outlined in the previous paragraph. One challenge in this area is the definition of what is ‘significant’ impact. In determining ‘significant’, regard shall be had to guidance issued by the Secretary of State (which does not seem to have been created since the coming into force of the Regulations). The intention may be good, but reg 8 bristles with subjective judgements. This does not prevent discussion of key decisions by executives in secret (a ‘private meeting’) where the officer is not in attendance or is offering advice. Executives will decide what is a key decision. Where it is not a key decision, papers will not have to be available in advance. Key decisions may be delegated to individuals and only discussed at meetings and this will produce less publicity although reports on decisions taken by individual executive members

618  Chapter 6 must be publicly available in advance for at least three clear days before making a key decision. The member or officer shall ensure it is publicly available as soon as possible after the member or officer receives it. This is subject to confidential and other items in reg 20 (see para 6.37 below). Background papers for reports or part of reports must also be available for inspection by the public, or on the authority’s website.1 In Standing Committee, the Minister stated that ‘an executive may meet as a group of executive members, each of whom will have personal responsibility for an area of decision taking’.2 If a decision is based on a draft report are these excluded from the publicity provisions? One would expect that a decision based on a draft report converts the report into a final report. The regulation states that ‘report’ does not include a draft report and ‘document’ does not include a draft document. Reports submitted to an individual executive member or officer with a view to it being considered when he makes a key decision must be sent by the person submitting the report to the Chair, or every member in the absence of the former, of a relevant OSC. Note that the definition of ‘background papers’ in the Regulations excludes ‘published works’. For a case which turned at least to some extent on what was a ‘published work’, see Trillium (Prime) Property GP Ltd v London Borough of Tower Hamlets [2011] EWHC 146 (Admin), discussed in more detail in para 7.92, note 1. 2 Standing Committee A, 23 May 2000, col 269. 1

6.34  The taking of a key decision must be preceded by the publication of a reg  9 document. Regulation 9 provides for an instruction to be given to the proper officer (monitoring officer – para 6.104 below) to the authority that the authority must publish a notice of a proposed key decision. The notice must contain, according to reg  9(1), that a key decision is to be made, the matter to which the decision relates, the identity of the individual decision-maker (or, where that is a body, the identities of the members of the body to make the decision), the date or period of time in which the decision is to be made, a list of documents submitted to the decision-maker to inform the decision, an address from which these documents can be requested (subject to the exemptions and requirements of confidentiality), and details of any background documents and the details of the address from which these documents might be requested as they become available. The expectation is that this document is available for inspection at the offices of the relevant local authority and on its website for 28 clear days in advance of the decision being taken (reg 9(2)). Should the council seek to exclude the public from a meeting discussing a key decision, or rely on the general exemptions on disclosure of documents in reg 20, then the document must contain particulars of this, but not any information that the authority is not required to disclose by virtue of reg 20. 6.35  There is a general exception to this requirement in reg 10 – publication is ‘impracticable’ – but, subject to reg  11, no decision shall be taken until the decision-taker, either an individual or a chairman of a body, has informed the chair of a relevant OSC or each member thereof of the matter to which the decision is to be taken (reg 10(1)(a)). This must be by notice in writing. Furthermore, s/he must instruct the proper officer to make available at the offices of the authority for public inspection a copy of such notice (reg 10(1)(b)) which has been publicly

Local government as providers and keepers of information   619 available for five clear days (reg 10(1)(c), as amended). Regulation 11 concerns exceptions from reg 10 on grounds of urgency. In such cases the decision maker obtains the agreement of the chair of the OSC, the chair or vice-chair of the local authority in descending order of availability. Where a key decision has been taken and it was not treated by the decision maker as a key decision, the OSC may require a report to be submitted by the executive to the local authority within such time as specified. This must include details of the decision and reasons for it, the body or individual who made the decision, and reasons for the executive’s opinion that it was not a key decision, provisions of regulation. The executive leader or appropriate person must submit a quarterly report on decisions taken under reg 16 in the preceding three months, the number of such decisions and a summary of their subject matter. Obstruction of rights of public access and failure to provide copies of documents are both offences (reg 22). 6.36  In the final stages of the LGA Bill (24 July 2000) the government made it clear that executives would be open to the public when discussing ‘key decisions’ made by authorised individuals and not simply when making a collective decision. They will be open unless the public are excluded under reg 21(1), ie whenever it is likely that, if the public were present, confidential items would be disclosed to them in breach of the obligation of confidence. The definition of confidentiality is that available under the LG(ATI)A  1985. The public may be excluded by resolution from an executive meeting whenever it is likely, in view of the nature of the business to be transacted or the nature of the proceedings, that if members of the public were present during that item there would be disclosure to them of exempt information. This means information exempt under the 1985 Act (see paras 8.29 et seq below). The public may be excluded where advice is given by a political adviser/assistant. The public may also be excluded to maintain public order. Further provisions on resolutions, public notice (‘five clear days’, and see para  8.36 below) and public attendance and facilities for ‘duly accredited members of the press’ echo those in the 1985 legislation. These provisions also cover meetings of committees of executives. 6.37  Under SI 2012/2089, reg 12, the proper officer must, as soon as reasonably practicable after a private meeting or a public meeting, produce a record of every decision taken at that meeting and, as respects each decision, a statement of (a) the record of the reasons for the decision; (b) any alternative options considered and rejected; (c) any conflict of interest declared by any member of the decision-making body; and (d) any note of dispensation granted in respect of such a declaration. This should be compared with ss 35 and 36 of FOIA 2000 (paras 1.164 et seq above). Regulation 13 provides for similar rights to records of executive decisions of individuals. Regulations make provision for the inspection of documents after executive meetings of authorities and executives’ committees, as well as inspection of background papers, additional rights of access to documents for members of local authorities which are similar to some of the provisions contained in the LG(ATI)A 1985 (see paras 7.84 and 8.3 et seq below). Nothing in the Regulations confers a right of access to confidential or exempt information or to ‘advice provided by a political adviser’ (reg 20). Where a copy of a report or part of a report accompanying agenda items at a meeting

620  Chapter 6 is withheld, the report shall be marked ‘nor for publication’ and a statement to that effect specifying that it contains confidential information, by reference to the descriptions in Sch 12A to the LGA 1972 (see paras 8.29 et seq below) the description of exempt information applicable to that report; or that the report contains advice of a political adviser or assistant. The public may be excluded from meetings on similar grounds as above by resolution which has to identify the part or parts of meetings from which the public are excluded. The public may be excluded to maintain public order. Records and reports must be publicly available for six years beginning on the date on which the decision relating to the record or report was made. Background documents are available for four years from the date of the meeting; any longer period is discretionary. 6.38  The additional rights of members to access covers ‘any document, which is in the possession, or under the control of the executive of a local authority and contains material relating to any business to be transacted at a public meeting’ (see SI 2012/2089, reg 16).1 Certain exemptions under Sch 12A to the 1972 Act are grounds for refusing access to documents and parts of documents; these are the same as under the rights of members for access to committee documents under the LG(ATI)A 1985, which amends the 1972 legislation (see ch 7). Rights to documents are also subject to this proviso and, in addition, where access by a member would involve disclosure of advice provided by a political adviser. The above rights are in addition to any other rights, eg common law, or under the LG(ATI)A 1985. Regulation 16(3) deals with decisions of individual members of executives, business in private meetings and decisions of officers in accordance with executive arrangements and provides access on the same terms. The OSC and its sub-committees are given extensive powers of access to documents. This access does not include exempt or confidential information ‘unless that information is relevant to an action or decision that they are reviewing or scrutinising or to any review contained in its programme of work’. There will be interesting arguments as to ‘relevance’ as well as who has the final decision. No such qualification attaches to advice of political advisers, so this is effectively excluded from OSC oversight (SI 2012/2089, reg 17). For more detail, see paras 7.92 et seq.

1

6.39  The Regulations contain an exemption for ‘advice from political advisers’.1 Although such advisers may participate in discussions of political groups, they can take no role in formal meetings. As the Campaign for Freedom of Information (FOI) states the point, ‘by formally encouraging the involvement of political advisers – but allowing all traces of their advice to be deleted from the published record – the government may be undermining its own claim that the new arrangements will provide greater transparency and accountability than at present.’2 DETR 3 July 2000; SI 2012/2089, reg 20(2)(b) and see LGHA 1989, s 9. Local Government Bill: Briefing for Report Stage, Campaign for FOI.

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6.40  Regulations dealing with duties to publish information in a register of the name and address of every member of the executive and the ward or division

Local government as providers and keepers of information   621 they represent, as well as information about committee members and details of executive functions exercisable by individual members, were not included in the final regulations. SI 2012/2089, reg 21 covers details of publicity and provision for copying information. Details of offences of obstruction and failure to comply with these duties are contained in reg 22.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE ON ACCESS 6.41  In its White Paper of 1993, the government stated that local government would be covered by a code on access like central government. It is with local government that most people have regular contact in the UK, not central or even devolved government. In 1995 the government resiled from this position and left it to authorities to devise their own guidance on access. This was produced in June 1995 and basically advises authorities to have in place a policy on access to documents.1 This is a weakening of the original concept of a central government code which in turn is a weakening of a statutory code. The FOI  Campaign has been very critical of this development, arguing that such guidance produces only the weakest of frameworks to guide local authorities’ actions on openness. The position of the local ombudsman may not be quite so limp. Where guidance exists as a recommended practice, failure to follow the guidance depends upon whether the guidance has been adopted. Where adopted and not followed this may amount to maladministration where no justifications are given for the departure. Even if not adopted the authority may still be asked to justify why they have not adopted such guidance in refusing a request for information and the manner in which they have refused access may well amount to maladministration. It should be added that legislation does exist on access to local authority committee and sub-committee documents, background papers and the law allows access to meetings by the public – a ‘Government in the Sunshine’ provision.2 The Commission for Local Administration has produced its own guidance on ‘Access to Information’ (1997, revised March 2000) which deals with requests to the Commission for information. It is based on the government’s revised code (ch 4). After 1 January 2005, the FOIA applies to all public authorities covered by the Act to allow individual access within its terms (ch 1). AMA, ACC, ADC Open Government – a Guidance Note (June 1995). LG(ATI)A 1985, an amendment to the LGA 1972.

1 2

6.42  Central government produced a local government transparency code in 2014, which was then replaced by the latest code in 2015. This code imposes a number of requirements on local authorities (unitary authorities, counties and districts, fire authorities, waste authorities and parish councils with an annual turnover above £200,000, and a range of other authorities defined in para 14 of the code) to publish information and make datasets available. Part 2.1 of the code sets out information that must be published quarterly by local government, including details of all expenditure over £500 in a wide range of categories, all spending on a Government Procurement card and the details

622  Chapter 6 of all tenders published and contracts awarded (broadly defined) above the value of £5,000. In addition to this information, Part 2.2 of the code requires the publication of details of local authority land, social housing assets, grants to voluntary, community and social enterprise organisations, an organisation chart, including details of all of those at the top three levels in the organisation, including details of salary in increments of £5,000, trade union facility time, details of income and expenditure on the provision of parking, including income from penalty charge notices, details of staff salaries consistent with the requirements in the relevant statutory instrument on these issues, and further information about the bonuses that these staff may have received (which is not required by the Regulations), an additional requirement to publish the Council’s constitution on the website (which is not required by LGA  2000, s  9P), details of the ‘pay multiple’ (which is the multiple of the highest paid member of staff at an authority and the media earnings of all employees in the authority) and details of the counter-fraud work undertaken by the authority. This material must be published annually, with the general expectation that it is to be published each April. Part 2.3 of the code covers information to be published once only and requires authorities to publish details of their existing waste collection contracts. 6.43  There is an additional Part 3 of the code, which sets out information that is recommended to be published. Rather than introducing additional categories of information to be published, this Part recommends that information is published with greater depth and detail than that which is essential in Part 2, or is published with increased frequency. For example, it is recommended that local government publishes all expenditure above £250 and aims for publication either on a monthly or ‘real time’ basis, rather than publishing quarterly. Similarly, authorities are encouraged to publish an organisational chart containing details of all of those earning more than £50,000. 6.44  The avowed aim of the code is to ‘meet the Government’s desire to place more power into citizens’ hands to increase democratic accountability and make it easier for local people to contribute to the local decision making process and help shape public services. Transparency is the foundation of local accountability and the key that gives people the tools and information they need to enable them to play a bigger role in society’ (para 1). The question over the extent to which the code has been successful in this is open to question. At a time of austerity and significant reduction in local authority resources, authorities have been required to engage in additional expenditure to meet the requirements of the transparency code. Whether or not such publication has truly increased the financial accountability of local government is questionable, as the data published may not be particularly accessible to the public and may also be difficult to contextualise and compare to the data produced by other authorities. 6.45  In publishing information under paragraphs 69 and 70 of the code, the government wishes all authorities to move towards fully open data formats. The

Local government as providers and keepers of information   623 process is graded from one star to five stars. A one-star process of transparency would be fulfilled by publication of the required data on the internet in whatever format, whereas a five-star publication in terms of its transparency would require the publication of the data in open and machine readable formats with contextualisation of the data through links to that published by other authorities. The different stages on that path are then encompassed by two-star, three-star and four-star data publication standards. 6.46  The transparency code explicitly seeks to ensure that any publication by local authorities does not contravene sections 100A, 100B and 100F of the Local Government Act 1972. These provisions relate to exemptions from public access to meetings if disclosure of exempt or confidential information may occur, provision of documents for the same reason and access to additional information relating to business transacted at meetings. Where information may be exempt from disclosure under eg FOIA 2000 or Sch 12A to the LGA 1972, then para 22 of the code states that authorities can decide whether or not to publish or withhold the information as they think necessary. 6.47  Local authorities are required by SI 2014/2095 to keep records of decisions that would ordinarily be taken by a local government body, or a committee, subcommittee of that body or a joint committee in which that body participates, but has been delegated to an officer under an express delegation, or a general authorisation to take decisions where such a decision grants a permission or a licence, affects the rights of an individual or ‘award a contract or incur expenditure which, in either case, materially affects that relevant local government body’s financial position’. Regulation 7(3) requires details to be recorded of the date of the decision, the details of the decision taken and the reasons for it, the alternatives that were considered and rejected and, in circumstances where there is express delegation of a decision-making power, the details of any member of the relevant committee who has declared a conflict of interest. Regulation 7(4) notes that the duty is fulfilled where the information is recorded as a result of the requirements of any other statutory provision. 6.48  Regulation 8 of SI 2014/2095 requires the authority to make copies of the written record and any background documents available at its principal offices and on its website as soon as reasonably practicable. The written record must be kept for a minimum of six years and the background documents for a minimum of four years. In addition to the right to inspect the documents noted here, reg 8(2) requires, on payment of a postage charge and any charge for copying or transmission, that the documents covered by reg 7 must be supplied to a member of the public by the authority. 6.49  Regulation 9 of SI  2014/2095 provides that the authority must not disclose information under reg 8 insofar as it contains confidential information the disclosure of which would breach an obligation of confidence, or it otherwise appears to the proper officer that the information is confidential or exempt.

624  Chapter 6

Publication of information 6.50  There are duties upon principal councils in numerous statutes to publish information for the public. The Local Government (Inspection of Documents) (Summary of Rights) Order 1986 lists those enactments until May 1986 which conferred rights to attend meetings and to inspect, copy and be furnished with documents. The most important of these is the LGA 1972, as amended by the LG(ATI)A 1985, and which is described in detail in chs 7 and 8. The duties as updated are as follows, and must be available in written summary form at the offices of every council: Enactment

Subject matter

Authorities outside London, in London, each borough

Commons Registration Act 1965, s 3(2) (NB Commons Act 2006 in force for some areas)

Register of common land

Counties and unitaries

Local Government Act 1972, s 60(2)(c), (4)(b), (5) (b) (Wales only)

Copies to Local Government Boundary Commission proposals, recommendations and amendments

Counties, metropolitan districts and unitaries

Local Government Act 1974, s 30(4)

Copies of reports of ombudsman

All authorities

Control of Pollution Act 1974, s 64(7)

Register of recorded noise levels in noise abatement zones (copies and fee)

Districts and unitaries

Local Land Charges Act 1975, s 8

Register of local land charges (prescribed fee)

Districts and unitaries

Noise Insulation Regulations 1975, SI 1975/1763, reg 6(3)

Map or list of buildings eligible for insulation works

Highway authorities

Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980, s 96(4)

Register of land held not currently in use (copies and fee)

All authorities

Sch 32, para 3(5)

Enterprise Zone Planning scheme (copies)

Districts and unitaries

Highways Act 1980, s 36(7) List of highways maintainable at public expense s 37(5)

Counties, metropolitan districts and unitaries

Counties, metropolitan Certificates of highways dedicated to public use and districts and unitaries magistrates’ courts order to similar effect

Local government as providers and keepers of information   625 Enactment

Subject matter

Authorities outside London, in London, each borough

Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, s 57(5)

Definitive map of public rights of way

Counties, metropolitan districts and unitaries

Sch 15, para 3(8)(a)

Documents which are taken into account in modification of definitive map (within notice period) (copies)

Counties, metropolitan districts and unitaries

Representation of the People Act 1983, s 89(1)

Returns of election expenses in local government elections (copies and fee)

Returning officers

Housing Act 1985, s 105(5) Scheme of housing and (6) management including housing association schemes lodged with housing authorities

Districts and unitaries

s 106(2)–(5)

Allocation of rules and (for the applicant only) records of information supplied by the applicant

Districts and unitaries

s 414(3)

Copies of entries in register of common lodging houses

Districts and unitaries

Local Government Act 1988, s 12

Information as to external bids competing for functional work in competition with authorities direct labour

‘defined authorities’

Local Government Finance Act 1988, Sch 9

Property Rating Valuation List (Business Rates)

Children Act 1989, s 17 and Sch 2

Information about services and assistance etc, under the Act

Counties, metropolitan districts and unitaries

s 71(1)

Register of child minders and premises

Counties, metropolitan districts and unitaries

s 83, as amended by Children Act 2004, s 54

research and returns on children

Control of Pollution (Amendment) Act 1989, s 2(4)

Register of Waste Disposal Licences (copies and fees)

Counties and unitaries

Local Government and Housing Act 1989, s 92

Information regarding proposals, actions taken and available assistance for declared renewal areas

Counties, metropolitan districts and unitaries

626  Chapter 6 Enactment

Subject matter

Authorities outside London, in London, each borough

Town and Country Planning Act 1990, s 69(5)

Register of planning applications and decisions

Districts and unitaries (or counties where national park)

s 188(3)

Registration of enforcement and stop notices

Districts and unitaries (or counties where national park)

s 198(4)(a)

Register of applications for consent to works under TPOs and decisions

Districts and unitaries (or counties where national park)

s 214

Register of notices of intention to carry out works to trees in conservation areas

Districts and unitaries (or counties where national park)

Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990, s 2(4)

List of buildings of special architectural or historic interest

Counties, metropolitan districts and unitaries

Environmental Protection Act 1990, s 20(7)

Register of information on integrated pollution and air pollution control

Counties, metropolitan districts and unitaries

s 64(6)

Register of information on waste recycling and disposal (copies and fee)

Counties, metropolitan districts and unitaries

s 71(4)

Reports on action taken in relation to unlawfully deposited waste

Counties, metropolitan districts and unitaries

Water Industry Act 1991, s 200(2)

Map of public sewers and drains

Districts and unitaries

Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisement) Regulations 1992, SI 1992/666, reg 21(6)

Register of application for and decisions on, consent to display advertisements

Districts and unitaries

Town and Country Planning (Enforcement) (Inquiries Procedure) Rules 1992, SI 1992/1903, r 8(8)

Statements and documents prior to appeal against enforcement notice (copies where ‘practicable’)

All authorities

Clean Air Act 1993, s 38(5)

Registration of information on atmospheric pollution (copies and fee)

Districts and unitaries

Local government as providers and keepers of information   627 Enactment

Subject matter

Authorities outside London, in London, each borough

Highways (Inquiries Procedure) Rules 1994, SI 1994/3263, r 6(7)

Statements of highway authority and documents prior to public enquiry (copies where practicable)

Highway authorities

Environment Act 1995, Sch 11

Exchange of information between authorities

Counties, unitaries and districts

Public access to information about air quality Housing Act 1996, s 136(1) Information regarding introductory tenancies and arrangements as to their management, etc

Districts and unitaries (and Housing Action Trusts)

Local Government (Publication of Staffing Information) (Wales) Regulations 1996, SI 1996/1899

Quarter staffing statistics

All Welsh authorities

Housing Act 1996, s 166(1)(a) (substituted by Homelessness Act 2002, s 15)

Copies of entries on housing register (relating to applicant only)

Districts and unitaries (and Housing Action Trusts)

s 168(2)

Information as to local housing authority’s allocation scheme (copies and fee)

Districts and unitaries (and Housing Action Trusts)

Education (School Information) (England) Regulations 2008, SI 2008/3093, regs 8 and 9 (for Wales see SI 1999/1812)

Information as to maintained schools and admission arrangements (copies to parents of affected children)

Counties, metropolitan districts and unitaries

Town and Country Planning (Trees) Regulations 1999, SI 1999/1892, reg 3(3)

Register of TPOs and any modifications

Districts and unitaries

Town and Country Planning (Inquiries Procedure) (England) Rules 2000, SI 2000/1624, r 6(13)

Statements and documents referred to prior to public inquiry on planning appeal (copies available where practicable)

All authorities

628  Chapter 6 Enactment

Subject matter

Authorities outside London, in London, each borough

Town and Country Planning Appeals (Determination by Inspectors) (Inquiries Procedure) (England) Rules 2000, SI 2000/1625, r 6(13)

Written submissions and documents (copies available where practicable)

All authorities

Housing Act 2004, s 232(4) Register of licences and (5) for houses in multiple occupation and other properties subject to registration (copies and fee)

Local housing authorities

Town and Country Planning (Inquiries Procedure) (Wales) Rules 2003, SI 2003/1623, r 6(13)

Statements and documents referred to prior to public inquiry on planning appeal (copies available where practicable)

All authorities

Town and Country Planning Appeals (Determination by Inspectors) (Inquiries Procedure) (Wales) Rules 2000, SI 2003/1267, r 6(13)

Written submissions and documents (copies available where practicable)

All authorities

Environmental Information Regulations 2004, SI 2004/3391, reg 4

Counties, districts and Progressive publication unitaries and classification of environmental information held by the authority by electronic means

Childcare Act 2006, s 12 (s 27 in Wales)

Information to parents on the provision of childcare and other services relevant to parents

All authorities

s 13 (England only)

Information and advice to childcare providers

All authorities

Commons Act 2006, s 20 (NB the Commons Registration Act 1965 (above) is still in force for some areas)

Register of common land

Counties and districts

Local government as providers and keepers of information   629 Enactment

Subject matter

Authorities outside London, in London, each borough

Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007, ss 35, 41 and 52

Explanatory document if change from partial council elections to full council elections or vice versa is proposed

Districts

Compulsory Purchase (Inquiries Procedure) Rules 2007, SI 2007/3617, r 7(4)

Acquiring authority’s statement and documents prior to public enquiry

All authorities

Electricity Generating Stations and Overhead Lines (Inquiries Procedure) Rules 2007, SI 2007/841

Statements and documents of authority prior to enquiry into authority’s objections to siting of generating stations, overhead cables and pipelines

All authorities

Bathing Water Regulations Details of bathing water 2013, SI 2013/1675, reg 9 quality as described in reg 11 and details of and reasons for any advice not to bathe; a general description of water quality

All authorities in areas where bathing waters are accessible

6.51  To the above duties must be added duties under the Local Government Acts 1999 and 2000, the Greater London Authority Act 1999, the Homelessness Act 2002, ss 3(9), 15 and 17, the Local Government Act 2003 and the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004. A government review of the duties placed on local government which took place in 2011 includes open data on the duties imposed by the DCLG and duties imposed by other departments. This data can be searched and contains information on duties imposed on local government not only in respect of information to be made available at principal offices, but also other information obligations. It is perhaps notable that government initially intended to update this review on a regular basis, but has not done so up to yet! 6.52  The provisions relating to compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) in s  12 of the Local Government Act 1988 (LGA  1988) have been replaced by ‘best value’ duties and provisions under the Local Government Act 1999 (LGA 1999). Under LGA 1999, s 3 a best value authority (see ss 1 and 2) must make arrangements to secure improvement in the way in which its functions are exercised, having regard to a combination of economy, efficiency and effectiveness. Authorities have to consult various representative bodies to decide how to fulfil the duty arising under sub-s  (1) and they must have regard to guidance issued by the Secretary of State on whom to consult and the form, content and timing of consultations. LGPIHA  2007 inserted a new s  3A into

630  Chapter 6 the LGA 1999, offering the potential for best value authorities to facilitate the involvement of representatives of local persons (or classes thereof) in the exercise of best value functions. This might be done via the provision of information, consultation or the taking of other steps, offering a broad discretion over the steps to be taken to the authorities concerned. Police authorities are excluded from s  3A, and the Secretary of State can exempt other authorities by Order. Section 3A(5) provides that where guidance is issued by the Secretary of State, the authority must have regard to it. Guidance was issued in 2008.1 These provisions were not widely used and have been repealed by the Deregulation Act 2015, s 103(1). The provisions in the Act which required authorities to draw up a best value plan and carry out best value reviews were repealed in England by LGPIHA 2007 and in Wales by the Local Government Measure 2009, removing what was a considerable obligation on authorities to publish information in this area. Best value activities remain subject to audit (described as a ‘best value inspection’ (BVI)), and the powers of inspection previously granted to the Audit Commission are now available to an inspector appointed by the Secretary of State under the regime brought about by the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014, Sch 10. A copy of the auditor’s report sent to the authority (it is also sent to other parties) may also be published by the auditor. The inspector must also send a copy to the Secretary of State if there is a recommendation of a direction by the latter under s  15. Where an inspector carries out an inspection under s 10 into an authority’s compliance with the relevant duties, the inspector has a right of access at all reasonable times to any premises of the BVI concerned and to any document relating to the BVI which appears to him to be necessary for the purposes of inspection (s 11). He may require those holding or accountable for such documents to give him such information and explanation as he thinks necessary and he may require the person to attend before him in person to give the information or explanation or to produce the document. Failure to comply without reasonable excuse is a criminal offence. The inspector must give three days’ notice of any requirement under this section and, if required, produce documents identifying himself. An inspection report may be published by the inspector or Secretary of State. Section 20 of the LGA  1999 adds best value authorities to those listed under s 2(1) of the Local Government Planning and Land Act 1980, which lists authorities subject to duties in codes to produce information. DCLG (2008) Creating Strong, Safe and Prosperous Communities: Statutory Guidance, paras 2.12–2.27.

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6.53  To encourage Public Private Partnerships, the LGA  2003 provides for business improvement districts (BIDs), which have to be approved after a ballot of non-domestic rate-payers in the proposed district (LGA 2003, Part 4). 6.54  Section 17 of and Sch 2 to the Children Act 1989 impose a duty upon authorities to publish information about services and assistance etc for children under that Act. 6.55  Under LGHA 1989, s 92 where local housing authorities have declared an area to be a ‘renewal area’1 under Part VII of the Act, they must publish

Local government as providers and keepers of information   631 information, from time to time, in such manner as appears to them best designed to ensure that residents or owners of property in the area are informed: (a) of the action the authority is proposing to take; (b) of the action they have taken; and (c) what assistance is available for carrying out works in the area. These replaced housing action areas and general improvement areas under Housing Act 1985, Part VIII. It covers an area of a local housing authority consisting primarily of housing accommodation where the living conditions are unsatisfactory.

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6.56  By s  95(5), local authorities should take the steps that appear to them to be best placed to bring to the attention of residents and property owners, residing in the area that the authority has resolved to be a ‘renewal area’, that the area is subject to the resolution. 6.57  The duties contained in statutes and regulations concerning access to personal information have not been included at this stage (see ch 2). 6.58  As well as duties to the public, there are duties to the following bodies.

Central government 6.59  Again, there are numerous duties to provide central government, usually a Secretary of State, with information, or in some instances duties to provide information to government inspectorates.1 To some extent, one might argue that the amount of provisions requiring such information to be provided have reduced in recent years, partly due to a desire on the part of central government to reduce the burden on local authorities (an example here is the revocation of the requirement to maintain details of undeveloped land or information relating to education)2 or in some cases because functions traditionally exercised by local authorities have been transferred to central government agencies. Duties under LGA 1999 in relation to best value were described above, as were duties under LGA  2000. Duties to provide information to the Secretary of State include: financial returns to the Secretary of State;3 council-house sales;4 slum clearance and redevelopment, housing conditions, housing action areas5 as superseded by renewal areas;6 housing revenue account subsidies;7 trade descriptions;8 or child care.9  A  more general duty is contained in s  230 of LGA  1972 (and see LGHA 1989, s 157(9)). Under LGA 1972, s 230: ‘Every local authority, every joint board and every joint committee of local authorities shall send the Secretary of State such reports and returns, and give him such information with respect to their functions, as he may require or as may be required by either House of Parliament.’ Eg Police Act 1996, s 54; Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, s 28; Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s 103. 2 This was previously required by the Education Reform Act 1988, s  158, repealed in part; Education Act 1996, s 408 and then ultimately repealed in total by the Deregulation Act 2015, Sch 15, para 3. 3 LGA 1972, s 168; see SI 1994/2825, reg 17. See LGA 2003, s 14. 1

632  Chapter 6 6 7 8 9 4 5

Housing Act 1985, s 169. Housing Act 1985, s 246. LGHA 1989, Part VII. LGHA 1989, s 85. Trade Descriptions Act 1968, s 26(2). Children Act 1989, s 83.

6.60  In spite of the ostensibly copious nature of this provision, local government legislation since 1980 is replete with duties to provide information which became more attuned to hedging in potential defaulters under statutory duties. An example was the Local Government Finance Act 1988 which concerned the long-departed community charge/poll tax.1 This was replaced by s 64 of the Local Government Finance Act 1992 (LGFA 1992) (and see also LGFA 1992, ss 28, 29 and LGA 2003, Part 6) and the LGA 1999 which sought to improve relations between central and local government in relation to capping powers over local government, powers which produced various causes célèbres in litigation in the early 1990s. It is worth quoting in full. This concerns the amount calculated by the authority for its budget requirement (see also LGFA  1992, ss  38 and 52). Under the relevant provisions, authorities have to calculate budget requirements for a financial year. Where this is believed by the Secretary of State (or National Assembly in Wales – s 52Z) to be excessive he may designate (cap) or nominate (warn) the authority for producing an excessive budget requirement. This involves copious procedures which may lead to the authority being capped and having financial targets set. Local Government Finance Act 1988, s 72.

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6.61  LGFA 1992, s 52Y(1): ‘An authority shall notify the Secretary of State in writing of any amount calculated by it as its budget requirement for a financial year, whether originally or by way of substitute.’ 6.62  LGFA 1992, s 52Y(2) and (3) deal with notification of aggregate amounts for any financial year of any precepts and time-limits for making notifications, and s 52Y(4)–(8) provide as follows: ‘(4) The Secretary of State may serve on a charging authority or precepting authority a notice requiring it to supply to him such information as is specified in the notice and required by him for the purpose of deciding whether to exercise his powers, and how to perform his functions, under this Chapter ie to limit council taxes and precepts. (5)  The authority shall supply the information required if it is in its possession or control, and shall do so in such form and manner, and at such time, as the Secretary of State specifies in the notice. … (7) If an authority fails to comply with subsection (2) above the Secretary of State may assume the information required to be such as he sees fit if he informs the authority concerned of his intention to make the assumption; and in such a case he may decide in accordance with the assumption

Local government as providers and keepers of information   633 whether to exercise his powers, and how to perform his functions, under this Part. (8)  In deciding whether to exercise his powers, and how to perform his functions, under this Part the Secretary of State may also take into account any other information available to him, whatever its source and whether or not obtained under a provision contained in or made under this or any other Act.’ 6.63  Where information – not being personal information (see sub-s  (6)) – is requested in a notice on an authority or relevant officer and is required by the Secretary of State to decide whether to exercise relevant powers under this Part of the Act and not just designating, then,where the information is not supplied, the Secretary of State may by s 68(3) simply make assumptions about the information required and the authority and, on those assumptions, decide how to act. 6.64  Under LGFA  1992, s  68(2) the authority must supply the information required, and must do so in such form and manner, and at such time, as the Secretary of State specifies in the notice. 6.65  Under s  68, the Secretary of State may act on any assumptions and estimates s/he deems fit where the authority fails or refuses to supply information. The rate-capping ‘saga’ in 1985 offers interesting analogies,1 and the provisions were tested in the House of Lords.2 See M Grant Rate Capping and the Law (1986). R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council [1990] 3 All ER 589, CA.

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6.66  Authorities designated for capping under the Rates Act 1984 wanted the Secretary of State to disclose the assumptions which formed the basis of his determination of their proposed maximum rate or precept. The High Court refused to award discovery against him for the production of documents relating to his assessment of the proposed maximum for ILEA, as the ‘relevant’ material was before the court.1 Were that not so, the court ‘would not necessarily have upheld the Secretary of State’s alternative defence on grounds of public interest’. The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, adding that there was no valid ground for arguing that the production of the documents would advance the applicant’s case ‘which had to be directed to the objective reasonableness of what the Secretary of State had done, not to a subjective examination of why he had done it’.2 R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p Greater London Council and Inner London Education Authority (26 February 1985, unreported). 2 1 March 1985, unreported. 1

6.67  When leave to apply for judicial review was awarded in April 1990 to the Labour-controlled authorities which had been charge-capped, discovery of documents relating to the Secretary of State’s decision was not allowed.

634  Chapter 6 However, an undertaking was given by the Secretary of State that he would volunteer relevant information. The authorities argued that they had a right to have disclosed to them ‘any information which he intends to take into account received from a source other than the authority in question and of which the authority might not be aware’: ‘Finally, it was submitted for the appellant authorities that the Secretary of State is under a legal obligation before submitting a draft order for approval by the House of Commons under s  110 to disclose to the authority affected any information which he intends to take into account received from a source other than the authority in question and of which the authority might not be aware. Both courts below accepted the view that the requirements of fair procedure imposed such an obligation, but the court of appeal rejected the complaint … that there had been any breach of obligation. The position taken on behalf of the Secretary of State in relation to this submission was that it was the practice to inform an authority of any factual information on which the Secretary of State proposed to act which contradicted the case put forward by the authority, but that the reason for this practice was simply to ensure so far as possible that the information on which the Secretary of State proposed to act was accurate. It was not accepted that there was any legal obligation in the matter … To read into the statute a legal obligation on the Secretary of State to disclose to an authority challenging his proposed cap all relevant information before him and then to give the authority the opportunity to comment on or counter that information … would introduce such delays into a procedure which is meant to operate with the greatest expedition and I cannot believe that this is what Parliament intended.’ 6.68  The matter should be resolved by ‘sound administrative practice’ and not ‘nice legal definitions’ in this non-adversarial process.1 Lord Bridge at [1990] 3 All ER 589, 639f.

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6.69  These are some of the major provisions concerning the duties to provide information to central government. Other duties fall under legislation on eg capital finance (borrowing) under LGA 2003, s 14. Further areas which relate to complaint, appeal etc to the Secretary of State – and in which provision of information is ancillary – are examined in ch 10.

Local audits 6.70  Local audit and best value audits have been the subject of considerable change. The Audit Commission Act 1998 has been repealed and the Audit Commission has been abolished. As such, there have been substantial changes to both the regime for local audit, which is now governed by the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014 (LAAA 2014) and the regime for best value audits, for which the scheme in the LGA  2003 is retained, but such audits are now undertaken by inspectors appointed by the Secretary of State which are, in

Local government as providers and keepers of information   635 practice, drawn from the National Audit Office. The accounts of local authorities are not audited by the Comptroller and Auditor-General under the National Audit Act 1983 (see ch 12). 6.71  The accounts subject to audit are specified in LAAA 2014, s 4. These are the accounting records and statement of accounts of a local authority (s  4(3)) and then the accounts for the relevant health bodies covered in s 4(4)–(6) and listed in Schedule 2. There are exceptions for ‘smaller authorities’ described in general in ss 5 and 6 of the LAAA 2014 and elaborated in Regulations. A ‘smaller authority’ is defined by s 6(2) of the LAAA 2014 as an authority where the higher of its gross income or gross expenditure does not exceed £6.5 million. Where an authority is designated as a smaller authority, the Secretary of State can specify a person to provide audit services and smaller authorities can opt in to this audit regime.1 Any authority with income or expenditure above £25,000 can, if it wishes to do so, opt out of the smaller authorities regime and choose to produce fully audited accounts, compliant with the full rigours of the regime outlined below.2 Authorities with gross income or expenditure below £25,000 can declare themselves exempt from the regime. Local Audit (Smaller Authorities) Regulations 2015, SI 2015/184, Parts 4 and 5, and Local Audit (Appointing Person) Regulations 2015, SI 2015/192. 2 SI 2015/184, reg 9 and Parts 4 and 5. 1

6.72  The new regime under LAAA  2014, s  19 provides for the creation of Codes of Practice on audit. Schedule 6 to the Act requires the Comptroller and Auditor General to produce a Code of Practice or Codes of Practice in order to offer guidance on best practice in relation to audit of the authorities covered by the Act. This was published in April 2015 and it is perhaps worth noting the statement in chapter 1.11 of the Code, which provides that ‘In carrying out their work, the auditor should exercise professional scepticism. They should obtain and document such information and explanations as they consider necessary to provide sufficient, appropriate evidence in support of their judgements’. The Code also emphasises the need for auditors to be familiar with the requirements of the law on data handling and confidentiality (para 1.18). Further requirements as to audit are laid down in Regulations. 6.73  Unlike the procedure under the Audit Commission Act 1998, where the Commission appointed local auditors, the LAAA 2014 requires each authority to appoint its own local audit panel and local auditor. The process for appointment is regulated by both the LAAA 2014 and Regulations. Under s 7 of the LAAA 2014 there is an obligation upon an authority to appoint an auditor for the relevant financial year no later than 31 December in the preceding year. In making an appointment, the authority must consult its local audit panel (s 8(1)) and then publish a notice stating that the auditor has been appointed. Such notices must comply with all of the conditions in s 8(2) and must be made available to the public both on the website of the relevant authority (if it has one) (s 8(3)) and in a manner which is likely to bring the appointment to the attention of the residents of the area of the authority or, in the case of health bodies, to the users or recipients of its services. This requirement can be found in s 8(4). Any notice published by

636  Chapter 6 virtue of s 8(2) must exclude any information that would prejudice commercial confidentiality, unless the authority believes that there is an overriding public interest in disclosure (s 8(5)). Schedule 3 to the Act requires that, in cases where local authorities are operating executive arrangements, the duty to appoint the auditor does not rest with the executive, but with the full council. Section 12 of the LAAA 2014 requires any authority that has failed to appoint an auditor to inform the Secretary of State to do so with immediate effect. Upon receipt of such notification, the Secretary of State might direct the authority to appoint a specified person, or appoint an auditor for the authority. In circumstances where the Secretary of State proposes to make such direction or appointment, he or she must make the intention to do so known to the local authority 28 days in advance of the adoption of any such decision and consider any representations made by the authority (s 12(4)). It is possible for the Secretary of State to circumvent this provision if the Secretary of State thinks it likely that the auditor will have to exercise any functions under the Act within 60 days of the appointment being made under s  12(5). Schedule  5 to the Act requires that persons appointed as auditors should be qualified in accordance with the requirements of Part 42 of the Companies Act 2006. 6.74  The appointment of auditors and the audit process is now to be overseen by an audit panel, appointed by the authority. The audit panel is required by s  9 of the LAAA  2014 and details of the requirements as to appointment are contained in Schedule 4 to the Act. In essence, it is necessary for every authority subject to the Act to appoint a local audit panel, to appoint an audit panel jointly with another authority, to appoint a committee of the authority to serve as an audit panel, or to subject itself to the audit panel of another authority. In order to be appointed as a member of an audit panel, the requirements of SI 2014/3224 and SI 2014/2845 must be observed. The former sets out the requirements for a minimum number of members of the audit panel (three), provides that terms of office and allowances to be paid are to be determined by the authority, and also provides (in reg 9) that the audit panel is subject to the duties in LGA 1972, ss 100A and 100B and the exceptions in LGA 1972, Sch 12A. LAAA 2014, Sch 4, para  2, as amended by SI  2014/2845, deals with the constitution of the audit panels, which should have a majority of independent members and must also be chaired by an independent member. Independence is defined in the context of Schedule 4 to the Act as persons who do not have links to the relevant authorities, have not been members or employees for five years preceding appointment, and who do not have relatives who are members or employees of the authority concerned. 6.75  The functions of the audit panel are set out in s 10 of the LAAA 2014 and include advising the authority on the need to retain an independent relationship with its auditor, on the selection and appointment of an auditor, and on any potential liability limitation agreement that the authority proposes to enter into.1 An additional role for the audit panel has been inserted by reg 7 of SI 2014/3224, which requires advice to be offered on whether the authority should adopt a policy on the purchasing of non-audit services from the appointed local auditor (ie services offered by the local auditor other than those for local audit). Section

Local government as providers and keepers of information   637 10(9)–(11) requires such information to be published by the authority in a manner likely to be accessible to those who live within the area covered by the authority, or who use the services of the authority unless such publication would prejudice commercial confidentiality. If publication of such information could be justified as there is an overriding public interest, then it may be published. This issue is further regulated by LAAA 2014, s 14 and SI 2014/1628.

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6.76  Under LAAA 2014, s 22, an auditor has the right of access at all reasonable times to all such documents relating to a body whose accounts are required to be audited under the Act and which appear to the auditor to be necessary for the purposes of his functions under the Act. S/he shall be entitled to require from any person holding or accountable for any such document such information and explanation as s/he thinks necessary for those purposes. If s/he thinks it necessary, s/he may require any such person to attend before the auditor in person to give the information or explanation or to produce any such document. S/he may require any officer or member of a body whose accounts are to be audited to give such information or explanation as s/he thinks necessary for the purposes of the audit and, again if s/he thinks necessary to require any such officer or member to attend before the auditor in person to give the information or explanation (s 22(3)(b)). The body audited must provide the auditor with every facility and all information which s/he may reasonably require for the purposes of the audit. Failure to comply without reasonable excuse is a punishable offence (s  23)). Section 2 of the LAAA  2014 makes it clear that that auditors’ right of access to a document includes the right to inspect, take away or copy the document concerned. Section 22(5) and (6) concern rights to receive and inspect copies of electronic documents and the computer equipment on which such documents are stored and to secure the assistance of those who are in charge of said computers in order to gain such access. In general terms, these provisions are little different to those in place in s 6 of the Audit Commission Act 1998 prior to its repeal. 6.77  Under earlier similar provisions, it was clearly settled that the auditor’s powers were not restricted to officers or documents of the authority; contractors and their documents were included.1 This is now seemingly made clear by s 22(1)(a) which talks of access to documents that ‘[relate] to a relevant authority or an entity connected with a relevant authority’. Oaths are rarely considered necessary and decisions on the auditor’s inability to take evidence upon oath under previous legislation would no longer appear to be conclusive as earlier legislation did not confer a power to ‘hear, receive and examine evidence’.2 Re Hurle-Hobbs Decision [1944] 2 All ER 261, CA; R v Hurle-Hobbs, ex p Simmons [1945] KB 165. On the former LGFA 1982, s 20, see Porter v Magill [2002] 1 All ER 465 (HL). 2 Evidence Act 1851, s  16; R  v Roberts [1908] 1  KB  407 at 419, 439, CA. See Lords Keith and Templeman in Lloyd v McMahon [1987] AC 625 at 697E and 716G–H, HL. 1

6.78  It is apparent that the auditor’s powers are not limited too closely to the accounts of the authority. Section 22(1)(b) gives a right of access to documents that ‘the auditor thinks is necessary for the purposes of the auditor’s functions under this Act’. The purposes of the audit are defined in s  20 of the Act and s  20(1)(c) requires the audit to consider ‘that the authority has made proper

638  Chapter 6 arrangements for securing economy, efficiency and effectiveness in its use of resources’. This is in addition to the requirements in s 20(1)(a) and (b), which relate more explicitly to the accounts. 6.79  Under s 20 of ACA 1998 (as enacted), an auditor had the power to issue a prohibition order if s/he believes the body or an officer is about to make or has made a decision which involves unlawful expenditure, unlawful action likely to cause loss or deficiency, or is about to enter an unlawful item of account. Sections 21–23 of ACA 1998 qualified and set out additional features in relation to the power to issue a prohibition order. The power to issue a prohibition order was removed by LGA 2000 and replaced with an advisory notice allowing the auditor to ventilate his concerns on the grounds that an item of account is contrary to law. This model is continued by the LAAA 2014, which permits an auditor to issue an advisory notice under the terms initially in ACA 1998, s 20. The advisory notice has the effect of rendering it unlawful for an authority to enter into such a transaction until the process in LAAA 2014, Sch 8, para 3 has been completed.1 Section 31 of the LAAA 2014 grants a power to bring a claim for judicial review to the local auditor, where ‘a decision of that authority, or of a failure by that authority to act, which it is reasonable to believe would have an effect on the accounts of that body’ is at issue. The regime for the imposition of such advisory notices is provided for in LAAA 2014, s 29 which applies Sch 8 to the Act, where the detailed provisions are to be found.

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6.80  SI 2015/234 requires that, once an audit has been completed, authorities should publish as soon as possible the information required of them in relation to the audit. For authorities that are not ‘smaller authorities’ (as described above), this includes the statement of accounts along with any certificate or opinion entered by the local auditor, a governance statement (outlining the methods of securing internal control of expenditure) and a narrative statement, including ‘comment by the authority on its financial performance and economy, efficiency and effectiveness in its use of resources over the financial year’.1 For smaller authorities, the obligations extend only to the publication of the accounts and governance statement, but not a narrative statement.2 In both cases, the authorities are required to publish the information, including on their website, and must also keep copies of the statement of accounts available for purchase by any person on the payment of a reasonable sum and retain copies of the relevant materials for a period of at least five years after the expiry of the period for public objection to the accounts. SI 2015/234, reg 8. SI 2015/234, reg 13.

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6.81  Rights for electors etc to inspect the auditor’s report, and other rights such as the right of objection, are dealt with elsewhere (see paras 9.17 et seq below). 6.82  Regulation 16 of SI 2015/234 requires that a notice of the completion of an audit is published by an authority once the audit is completed. This must state that the audit is completed and the accounts are published and must provide

Local government as providers and keepers of information   639 details of the public’s right to inspection in s 25 of the LAAA 2014 and the hours in which such inspection may take place. Publication of the notice must take place on the authority’s website. 6.83  Regulation 20 of SI  2015/234 requires that any letter received from the auditor on completion of the audit must be published (including on the authority’s website) and must also be made available to any member of the public on payment of a reasonable fee. 6.84  Schedule  11 to the LAAA  2014 contains limits on the disclosure of information received by the auditor in the exercise of his or her functions. The Schedule prohibits disclosure other than in the circumstances specified, and Sch 11, para 5 creates an offence of wrongful disclosure, punishable by a fine. 6.85  In addition to the provisions discussed above, section 35 of the LAAA 2014 amends the National Audit Act 1983 (NAA 1983) in order to permit the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) to carry out ‘examinations into the economy, efficiency and effectiveness with which relevant authorities have used their resources in discharging their functions’. In so doing, the CAG has, under s 8(1) of the NAA 1983 (as amended by the LAAA 2014), ‘a right of access at all reasonable times to all such documents as he may reasonably require for carrying out any examination’ and ‘shall be entitled to require from any person holding or accountable for any such document such information and explanation as are reasonably necessary for that purpose’. This right extends only to documents under the custody and control of the authority concerned (NAA 1983, s 8(2A)).

Part VIII of the Local Government Finance Act 1988 6.86  We have seen above how individual officers1 have been placed under greater and more specific duties to provide information to central government. It is worth highlighting the Local Government Finance Act 1988 (LGFA 1988). Eg under Housing Act 1988, s 90.

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6.87  Part VIII of this Act makes provision for financial administration of local authorities1 and combined police authorities and combined fire and rescue authorities.2 The most salient feature is the strengthening (or underlining) of the functions of the chief finance officer – the ‘responsible officer’. For which see LGFA 1988, s 111. LGFA 1988, s 112.

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6.88  The responsible officer must, after the coming into effect of the relevant Part of the Act (29  September 1988), hold certain professional qualification requirements (unless in office immediately before that date). 6.89  Under LGFA  1988, s  114, the responsible officer must make a public report in specified cases of actual or anticipated financial misconduct. In relation

640  Chapter 6 to local authorities operating executive arrangements, the provisions of s 114A are also relevant. This duty should be read in conjunction with the power of the auditor to issue advisory notices under LGA  2000 (see above). This provision grew out of the notorious cases of the audit, surcharge and disqualification involving councillors of rate-capped authorities, and the ‘creative accounting’1 techniques of other authorities as well as capped ones to ‘minimise the shortterm effect of’ income limitation.2 The government was convinced such devices were storing up long-term problems for such authorities’ finances.3 In Lloyd v McMahon,4 the Court of Appeal criticised members of two authorities who had acted ‘with blatant recklessness in disregarding the principal officer’s advice’.5 However, were that officer simply to toe a council line, or that of a ruling party, that would probably involve a breach of duty to the council and ratepayers.6 Involving new methods of budgeting, transferring money between funds and across financial years, etc. 2 Grant Current Law Statutes Annotated (1988) vol 3, ch 41, p 151. 3 Cmnd 9714 (1986) paras 7.15–25. 4 [1987] 1 All ER 1118 (CA and HL). 5 Per Dillon and Woolf LJJ. 6 For a brief history of the treasurer in local government, see Grant Current Law Statutes Annotated (1988) vol 3. 1

6.90  The responsible officer shall make a report if it appears to him/her that the authority etc: (a) has made or is about to make a decision which involves or would involve the authority incurring expenditure which is unlawful; (b) has taken or is about to take a course of action which, if pursued to its conclusion, would be unlawful and likely to cause a loss or deficiency on the part of the authority; or (c) is about to enter an item of account, the entry of which is unlawful. 6.91  The government believed this formula ‘requires the chief finance officer only to concern himself with the lawfulness of a course of action and the likelihood that it will cause the authority to incur a loss, and not with the intentions or state of mind of those responsible’.1 Lord Hesketh 498 Official Report (5th Series) HL col 196 (14 June 1988).

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6.92  Under LGFA 1988, s 114(3) the responsible officer shall make a report under this section if it appears to him that the expenditure of the authority incurred (including expenditure it proposes to incur) in a financial year is likely to exceed the resources (including sums borrowed) available to it to meet that expenditure. This is especially relevant given the authority’s duty to budget under s 95. Where such a report is made it shall be sent to the person who has the duty at the time to audit the authority’s accounts; and to every member of the authority (s 114(4)). The authority’s head of service and monitoring officer shall be consulted as far as reasonably practicable in preparing the report (LGHA 1989, Sch 5, para 66; for Wales, see SI 2001/2281 (W 171)). 6.93  Section 114(5) provides that the duties under sub-ss (2) and (3) are to be performed by the responsible officer personally. Where unable to act because

Local government as providers and keepers of information   641 of absence or illness, the duties under sub-ss  (2) and (3) shall be performed in accordance with sub-s  (6) by properly qualified subordinates. By sub-s  (7) a relevant authority shall provide its chief finance officer with such staff, accommodation and other resources as are, in the officer’s opinion, sufficient to allow his or her duties under this section to be performed. 6.94  Where copies of a report are sent as above, the authority shall consider the report at a meeting where it shall decide whether it agrees or disagrees with the views contained in the report and what action (if any) it proposes to take in consequence of it (s 115(2)). This meeting must be held not later than the end of the period of 21 days, beginning with the day on which copies of the report are sent, and the meeting must be of the council, not a committee or sub-committee or officers.1 During the ‘prohibition period’ the course of conduct which led to a report under s 114(2), or any agreements leading to a report under s 114(3), shall not be pursued or entered into respectively. If these sections are not complied with, any payment or contract will be considered ultra vires,2 although the consequences for third parties are not spelt out. LGA  2003, s  30 introduced some flexibility into s 115 by allowing the chief finance officer to authorise the entering into an agreement to improve the situation or prevent it deteriorating or recurring. His authorisation must be in writing and be accompanied by the CFO’s explanations. Cf LGA 1972, s 101; LGFA 1988, s 115(3). LGFA  1988, s  115(7) and (8). The authority is taken not to have had the power to make the payment or enter into the agreement. This, it is submitted, relates to the vires of a public body rather than to private law capacity. Presumably, the contract etc will be unenforceable. See the Local Government (Contracts) Act 1997 and LGA 2000, s 91 adding new ss 19A, 19B and 19C to the ACA 1998 (above).

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6.95  The ‘prohibition period’ means the period beginning with the day on which copies of the report are sent (LGFA 1988, s 115(9)(a)) and ending with the first business day (s 115(2)) to fall after the day (if any) on which the authority’s consideration of the report under sub-s (2) above is concluded (s 115(9)(b)). Noncompliance with the 21-day period is immaterial for the purposes of s 115(9)(b), as are the nature of the decisions made at the meeting. 6.96  The report does not have to be made public, nor does it have to be kept confidential, but the provisions of the LG(ATI)A 1985 apply to such meetings.1 Excepting ‘confidential’ and exempt information.

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6.97  It should be noted that the authority does not have to desist from its action; the report and accompanying procedure constitute a locus poenitentiae. But the auditor, who has to receive a report, may act under s 24 of and Sch 7 to the LAAA 2014 (above). S/he has a duty to consider whether, in the public interest, s/he should issue a special report in the course of audit for the consideration of the body under audit or to inform the public, and further to consider whether an immediate report is required in the public interest. Auditors have a statutory right of access to current accounts ‘and both they and the Audit Commission have taken the view that the s 8 power is exercisable at any time and is not confined

642  Chapter 6 to the statutory audit process which commences when the authority’s accounts are completed and submitted for audit’.1 Given that s 24 of the LAAA 2014 is expressed in similar terms to s 8 of the ACA 1998, one might anticipate that this is still the case. Schedule 7, para 5(5) of the LAAA 2014 requires the authority to consider such a report within one month and the auditor may extend this under LAAA 2014, Sch 7, para 5(8) for a further month. Grant Current Law Statutes Annotated (1988) vol 3.

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6.98  Where it is proposed to hold a meeting under s 115 above, the authority’s proper officer shall as soon as is reasonably practicable notify its auditors of the date, time and place of the proposed meeting (s 116(1)). S/he has to inform the auditor as soon as reasonably practicable after a s 115 meeting of any decision taken (s 116(2)). 6.99  It should be added that LGA  2003, ss  25–30 contain provisions on reports from chief finance officers to authorities (including the Greater London Authority) on the ‘robustness of estimates’ for calculations under LGFA 1992 or the Greater London Authority Act 1999 and on the adequacy of proposed financial reserves.

Members1 6.100  Chapter 8 contains a detailed discussion of the duties of an authority to provide information to members under common law and the LG(ATI)A 1985. The LGHA 1989 significantly affects the position of the member, and groups of members, and their powers in relation to certain matters. These can be dealt with now, although the discussion does not directly concern the giving of information to members. See Birkinshaw Open Government, Freedom of Information and Local Government (1986) Local Government Legal Society Trust.

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THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND HOUSING ACT 1989 Designated and monitoring officers 6.101  Under the LGHA 19891 every relevant authority has to ‘designate’ one of its officers as the head of their paid service ‘and must provide that officer with such staff accommodation and other resources as are, in that officer’s opinion, sufficient to allow the officer’s duties under this section to be performed’ (s 4(1) (b)). See Greater London Authority Act 1999, s 72 and SI 1996/323, Sch 2, Art 4.

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6.102  The ‘designated officer’ (DO) shall, where s/he considers it appropriate, prepare a report to the authority in respect of any proposals of the DO, as specified, on:

Local government as providers and keepers of information   643 (a) the manner in which the discharge by the authority of their different functions is co-ordinated; (b) the number and grades of staff required by the authority for the discharge of their functions; (c) the organisation of the authority’s staff; and (d) the appointment and proper management of the authority’s staff (s 4(3)). 6.103  As soon as practicable after s/he has prepared a report under this section, s/he shall arrange for a copy of it to be sent to each member of the authority. This report must be considered by the council (non-delegable) not more than three months after copies of the report are first sent to members. 6.104  Under s 5 of the LGHA 19891, authorities must designate an officer as a ‘monitoring officer’ (MO), with the same provisions as under s 4(1)(b) above as regards the DO. Section 5A deals with the role of the MO in authorities operating executive arrangements – the role and powers are in all material aspects the same as under s 5 as described below, except that the executive rather than the authority or relevant committee is under the obligation to consider the MO’s reports. The MO may not be the head of the paid service. The MO has to prepare a report for the authority on any proposal, decision or omission by the authority, committee, sub-committee or officer of the authority, or any joint committee on which the authority is represented (s 5(4)(a)–(c)), which appears to the MO to constitute, to have given rise to, or which is likely to, or would give rise to a contravention by the authority etc of any enactment, or rule of law [or of any code of practice made or approved by or under any enactment,] or any maladministration or injustice under Part III of the Local Government Act 1974 (the ombudsman provisions). Amended by LGA 2000, Sch 5, para 24(3) and LGA 2003, s 113.

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6.105  The MO is under a duty as soon as practicable after preparing a report to arrange for a copy of it to be sent to each member of the authority.1 In preparing such a report the MO has to consult, so far as practicable, with the head of the authority’s paid service and the chief finance officer (s 5(3)). Or each member of the committee under s 5(4).

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6.106  The authority, or committee under s 5(4), must consider the report at a meeting held not more than 21 days after copies of the report are first sent to the authority or committee. In the case of the authority the duty is non-delegable to one of its committees (s 5(5)). The authority is under a duty to ensure that no step is taken, before the report is considered, for giving effect to any proposal or decision to which it relates.1 And without prejudice to any duty imposed by virtue of LGFA 1988, s 115: see para 6.94 above.

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6.107  The MO must perform these duties personally, or, in the event of absence or illness, through deputies nominated by the MO. 6.108  It should be noted that the authority is not bound by the report; it only has to consider it. Clearly, the reports under the LGHA 1989 and LGFA 1988

644  Chapter 6 have as their objectives the provision of a ‘cooling off period’ before any potentially unlawful or maladministrative practice is perpetrated. The reports may strain relationships between the respective officers and their authorities, and are clearly aimed at preventing some of the ‘excesses’ caused by authorities trying to circumvent previous government legislation. The relevant meeting will fall within the terms of the LG(ATI)A 1985 (see chs 7 and 8). 6.109  Further, Regulations made by the Secretary of State may require a relevant authority’s standing orders to require the MO to prepare a report to the authority in respect of every proposed appointment of a person to a ‘politically restricted post’1 stating whether in the MO’s opinion the proposed appointment can be made without contravening the Act and without considering any matter which could not properly be taken into account. The MO may, in accordance with regulations, have to state reasons if the appointment cannot be so made.2 LGHA 1989, s 2 for definition. LGHA 1989, s 8(3)(c) and (d). These will be incorporated in the standing orders.

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Staff appointments 6.110  These measures are in s 8 of the LGHA 1989 (and see s 7, as amended by SI 2003/1673, reg 31, at para 7.31 below) and impose a duty upon an authority to adopt prescribed provisions in standing orders in relation to the appointment of staff so as to restrict the freedom of authorities in the manner of appointment and in the directions which authorities can give to persons making appointments. The report by the MO on every proposed appointment to a politically restricted post is not sent to all members as above, but to the authority. In addition, the regulations may prohibit the authority or committee or sub-committee or other person acting on their behalf from acting towards an employee, ie dismissing or disciplining, except in accordance with recommendations contained in a report made to the authority by an independent person of such a description as is prescribed by the regulations. As this report concerns an employee, the LG(ATI) A 1985 and its exemptions vis-à-vis public access and members’ access come into play, although a member may be able to establish a ‘need to know’ at common law (paras 7.67 et seq below).

Appointment of political assistants 6.111  Two further provisions which are of relevance concern the appointment of assistants to members of a political group to which members of the authority belong. Such an appointment is permissible providing it is within the terms of the statute.1 No appointment can be made until the authority have allocated a post to each of the groups qualifying for one; appointments which do not qualify are prohibited as is more than one allocation to any one political group. To qualify as a group under LGHA 1989, s 9, membership of the group must comprise at least one-tenth of the authority’s membership; the number of other groups, if any, which are larger than that group does not exceed two; or, if there are more than

Local government as providers and keepers of information   645 two other qualifying groups, the authority has determined the group in question (of which in total there must be no more or less than three) to be the group to receive an allocation, the only safeguard presumably being judicial review on the Wednesbury principles.2 Special provision is made where only one group has onetenth or more membership. The maximum number is then two groups (s 9(7)). Powers cannot be delegated to advisers under this section by use of LGA 1972, s  101 or the Scottish equivalent. Regulations provide for a variety of details3 including whether a person is or is not a member of a political group and the manner in which such a determination is to be made. LGHA 1989, s 9(2): one of not more than three posts; each falls to be filled by the wishes of a political group to which the post has been allocated under standing orders; the salary is within the relevant amount (see s 9(4)). See Greater London Authority Act 1999, s 68. 2 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corpn [1948] 1 KB 223, CA. 3 See LGHA 1989, s 9(10). By s 9(9) an authority’s employees cannot be directed by such an adviser except to provide secretarial or clerical services. 1

6.112  The LGA  2000 has important implications for the use of political advisers (see para 6.39 above).

Voting rights of members 6.113  The other relevant provision affects the voting rights of members of certain committees. Members of committees etc who are not members of the authority are to be treated as non-voting members for the purposes of designated powers under s 13 of the LGHA 1989.1 However, if the committee is one enumerated within s 13(4) or its sub-committee, s/he shall not be treated as a non-voting member unless not also a member of the parent committee in the case of a sub-committee. By LGHA 1989, s 13(2) the section applies to powers conferred by LGA 1972, s 102(1); those exercisable under Education Act 1996, Sch 33, Pt I.

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6.114  The Secretary of State may prescribe by Regulations members of subcommittees as voting members even when not members of the appointing committee. 6.115  Section 102(3) of the LGA  1972 has been amended,1 omitting the necessity that two-thirds of the members of certain committees are to be members of an appointing authority or authorities. See LGHA 1989, Sch 12.

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Political balance of bodies 6.116  The LGHA 1989 makes provision for the political balance of bodies of a relevant authority, the latter of which are under a duty to review the representation of different political groups on that body after divisions occur on party lines within that body,1 and the committees2 of which are under a similar duty where

646  Chapter 6 they have power to make appointments from time to time to a body covered by the section.3 The authority or committee must determine4 the allocation to the different political groups, into which the members of the authority are divided, of all the seats which are to be filled by appointments5 made by the authority or committee.6 Membership of committees and sub-committees is thereby regulated. These provisions do not apply to executive arrangements under the LGA 2000 and accompanying Regulations (paras 6.29 et seq above). LGHA  1989, s  15(1)(a)–(d) sets out the ‘relevant times’ of reviews, and such other times as prescribed. See Greater London Authority Act 1999, s 57. 2 Except as prescribed by regulations made by the Secretary of State. 3 LGHA 1989, s 15. And see LGHA 1989, Sch 1 on the bodies covered. 4 At the ‘relevant times’. 5 The duty arises as soon as practicable after the review. 6 LGHA 1989, s 15(3). 1

6.117  In making appointments, effect must be given, so far as reasonably practicable, to the following principles: (a) that not all the seats on the body are allocated to the same political group; (b) that the majority of the seats on the body is allocated to a particular political group if the number of persons belonging to that group is a majority of the authority’s membership; (c) subject to the above, that seats on ordinary committees are allocated to each political group in proportion to the total number of seats on the ordinary committees of the authority as is borne by the number of members of that group to the membership of the authority; and (d) subject to paras (a) to (c) above, that the number of the seats on the body which are allocated to each political group bears the same proportion to the number of all the seats on that body as is borne by the number of members of that group to the membership of the authority (s 15(5)). 6.118  Basically, s  15 amends the common law which is described in ch  7 (para 7.55). 6.119  Under Sch  1, there are further provisions concerning the political balance on local authority committees. Subject to exceptions as may be made by regulations, s 15 applies to counties, districts, boroughs, their committees and: (a) ordinary committees and sub-committees of the authority; (b) advisory committees and sub-committees appointed by such advisory committees; and (c) any body falling within para 2 of the Schedule which is a body at least three seats on which fall from time to time to be filled by appointments made by the authority or committee. 6.120  Regulations may be made providing for the circumstances in which members of a relevant authority are to be treated as divided into different political groups; who is to be treated as a member of such a group and when membership ceases, and setting down a procedure to determine disputes on membership; and specifying the manner in which, and the times at which, the wishes of such

Local government as providers and keepers of information   647 a group are to be expressed and the consequences of a failure by such a group to express its wish. 6.121  On appointments and vacancies, the wishes of the political group allocating seats must be followed. 6.122  Section 17 concerns exemptions to and extensions of political balance requirements.1 Breach of s 15 does not invalidate proceedings (s 16(3)). In a manner prescribed by regulations and subject to no dissenting vote of the authority or committee. This does not defeat a duty under LGHA 1989, s 15(1)(c), (d) or (e) or (2).

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6.123  By s 20, the Secretary of State may require, by regulations, authorities to incorporate into standing orders provisions regulating their proceedings and business and to make, or refrain from making, such other modifications of any such orders as may be prescribed (s 20(1)). 6.124  Section 20(2) empowers regulations to require standing orders to contain, notwithstanding any enactments or relevant decisions of the authority or its committees or sub-committees, an authorisation for members to requisition meetings of the authority, its committees or sub-committees, to require the review of decisions by the authority or a committee, and to require that a vote of the authority etc is taken in a particular manner. 6.125  Section 20(3) provides: ‘Regulations under this section may contain such incidental provision and such supplemental, consequential and transitional provision in connection with their other provisions as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.’ 6.126  Many of the details of this Part have been supplemented by Regulations.1 The impetus for change came from the Widdicombe Report2 and the government reply to that Report. Opinion was divided on whether the abuse of a small minority of authorities justified such wholesale legislative regulation of committee proceedings. By the late 1990s, the question of standards had become inseparable from new styles of management in local government. Eg Local Authorities (Standing Orders) Regulations 1993, SI 1993/202. The Conduct of Local Authority Business Cmnd 9797 (1986); Cm 433 (1988) (reply).

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STANDARDS OF CONDUCT 6.127  Standards of conduct in local government formed the subject of Lord Nolan’s third report. It was also a concern of the Widdicombe Report in 1986 on Conduct in Local Government which led to developments such as the introduction of the Monitoring Officer and Reporting Officer (see above). The subject was also a central feature of events in several authorities including Westminster.1 The government set out its plans for a new ethical framework in Modern Local Government: In Touch with the People.2 Following this report, many councils started

648  Chapter 6 to develop systems such as standards committees, panels or benches to address matters of conduct relating to members to ensure openness and honesty in their activities. These vary in detail between size, independent membership, political balance and arrangements for chairs. Involving Dame Shirley Porter: see Porter v Magill [2002] 1 All ER 465 (HL). For indemnities relating to local government members (including mayors) and officers, see LGA  2000, s  101 and SI 2004/3082: special provisions apply to breaches of the code. The SI makes provision for repayment of indemnities to authorities: it does not cover criminal or wilfully wrongful acts, fraud or recklessness; nor does it apply to bringing defamation actions but it does apply to their defence. 2 (1998) ch 6, Cm 4014. 1

6.128  The above White Paper had three basic components: (1) A  requirement upon every council to adopt a code of conduct that all members would have to sign up to. (2) A  requirement for most authorities to set up standards committees to oversee ethical issues and provide advice and guidance on the code and its implementation. (3) The establishment of an independent body, the Standards Board, which would investigate alleged breaches of a council’s code. 6.129  In response to the above, the Local Government Act 2000, Part III, Chapter II, contained a wide-ranging set of provisions creating a Standards Board and the associated machinery for the support of the work of the Standards Board. This was ultimately decided to have become too burdensome and was considered to be a disproportionate use of resources, so this regime was ultimately repealed by the Localism Act 2011. In place of the provisions in the LGA 2000 is a muchsimplified regime to be operated by each local authority in England. 6.130  The standards regime is now dealt with by Chapter 7 of the Localism Act 2011, which through s 27 places every authority under a duty to promote and maintain high standards of conduct by members of the authority and coopted members of the authority. Section 27(2) requires that every council should publish a code of conduct or parish councils may adopt the code of conduct of their principal authority. According to s  28(1) the code should have reference to the Nolan principles of selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and leadership. A brief draft text has been produced by the DCLG as guidance.1 Section 27(2) of the Localism Act 2011 imposes a further obligation on local authorities to include provisions in the code in order to ensure appropriate arrangements for the registration of pecuniary and nonpecuniary interests. Illustrative Text for Local Code of Conduct (2012, DCLG) available at: https://assets.publishing. service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/240161/120906_ Illustrative_Code_of_Conduct__2_.pdf.

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6.131  Under s 27(6) of the Localism Act 2011, all authorities other than parish councils must have mechanisms in place to investigate allegations of breaches of the code and to determine whether a breach has taken place. In so doing, s 27(7)

Local government as providers and keepers of information   649 requires the appointment of an independent person to whom the authority can turn and seek views on the allegation before making a decision in respect of it. The sanctions are then in the hands of the authority concerned. 6.132  The monitoring officer of the authority concerned is under a duty to keep a register of interests under s  29 of the Localism Act 2011. What must be registered is to be determined by the authority in its code of conduct. The register of interests must be available to the public at all reasonable hours at a place in the authority’s area and is also published on the authority’s website under s 29(5). Similar rules apply to parish councils in s 29(6), though the obligation is fulfilled by making the register available through the principal authority. Section 32 contains an exception to the requirement incumbent on a member of an authority or a co-opted member to register an interest where the interest is considered to be a ‘sensitive interest’. A  ‘sensitive interest’ under s  32(1)(b) arises where ‘the nature of the interest is such that the member or co-opted member, and the authority’s monitoring officer, consider that disclosure of the details of the interest could lead to the member or co-opted member, or a person connected with the member or co-opted member, being subject to violence or intimidation’. In such circumstances, it is permissible for the details of the interest to be omitted from the published versions of the register, although a statement that such an interest exists but has been withheld under s 32 should be included. 6.133  Section 30 of the Localism Act 2011 requires that, within 28 days of being appointed as a member or co-opted member of an authority, such individuals declare all disclosable pecuniary interests. Section 30(3) extends this obligation not only to pecuniary interests of the member, but also relevant interests of spouses and civil partners. 6.134  Where a member has not disclosed a pecuniary interest under the code and it is not published on the authority’s register, if the member has a disclosable pecuniary interest in a matter to be considered at a meeting of the council or a relevant executive or committee, the member concerned must disclose the interest to the meeting (s 31(2)) and must also notify the authority’s monitoring officer within 28 days of the disclosure so that the interest can be recorded (s 31(3)). In such circumstances, s 31(4) requires that members in such circumstances should not participate, or participate further, in any discussions on the issue concerned or vote on the issue should a vote be taken at the meeting. Similar provisions apply in s 31(6) et seq for situations where members acting alone are taking decisions in which they have an undisclosed pecuniary interest. In appropriate circumstances, s 33 of the Act permits an authority to waive the requirements of s 31(4) of the Act. 6.135  Section 34 of the Localism Act 2011 provides for criminal offences in relation to failures to comply with ss 30(1), 31(2), (3) and (7) or where a member participates in discussions or votes contrary to the requirements in s  31(4) or takes a decision as a single member under s 31(8). Furthermore, provision of false or misleading information in relation to the same provisions is also an offence

650  Chapter 6 if the person knows the statement is false or misleading or is reckless to the fact (s 34(2)).

‘WHISTLEBLOWER’ ARRANGEMENTS – PUBLIC INTEREST DISCLOSURE ACT 1998 6.136  We have dealt with these provisions in ch 4 (paras 4.301 et seq above).

COMMISSION FOR LOCAL ADMINISTRATION 6.137  The last major source of request for information from authorities, apart from the public, is made by the commission for local administration – the local ombudsman – now known as the local government and social care ombudsman. There were originally a number of local government commissions and these were subject to Cabinet Office discussion involving the establishment of a new commission to cover all the major public sector ombudsmen (see para  4.132 above). They were also subject to two-stage investigations and reports about the Commission’s future conducted by the Department of the Environment in 1996. More recent developments were outlined in ch 4. Established by Part III of the Local Government Act 1974 (LGA  1974), the commissions were the subject of considerable statutory amendment. The contents of ‘maladministration’ can be deferred until a later chapter (see ch 10). It is pertinent to point out at this stage that the LGA  1988 allows a complainant to complain directly to a local ombudsman. The complaint must be in writing. A substantial increase in complaints followed this reform. 6.138  There is one local ombudsman with three local offices in England (in Coventry, London and York)1 and one for Wales. Northern Ireland has a commissioner for complaints. The Scotland Act and Wales Act provide for ombudsmen for devolved matters and, under the Scottish Public Services Ombudsman Act 2002, a combined Ombudsman service for Scottish public authorities was established. In the past, a Welsh Administration Ombudsman existed for the Welsh National Assembly and for bodies dealing with devolved administration in Wales. The Public Services Ombudsman (Wales) Act 2005 (PSO(W)A  2005) unifies ombudsmen in Wales. The Commission for Local Administration in Wales and the Welsh Administration Ombudsman have been abolished and a new Public Services Ombudsman for Wales has been created. Each commission in England under LGA 1974, Part III has to publish information about the procedures for making complaints. Every commissioner must submit an annual report to his commission.2 In Wales, PSO(W)A 2005, Sch 1, para 14 contains similar requirement, with the report to be laid before the Welsh Assembly. The commission shall prepare a general report on the discharge of their functions and must formally submit it to the appropriate representative persons and authorities3 despite the commission having arranged for its publication. These are persons representing authorities, or authorities not so represented. LGPIHA  2007 has amended s 23A by inserting LGA 1974, s 23A(3) in order to require the laying of the annual report before Parliament. After consulting the representative persons

Local government as providers and keepers of information   651 and authorities, each Commission for Local Administration (CLA) may provide to authorities ‘such advice and guidance’ about good administrative practice as appears to the CLA to be appropriate. The CLA may arrange for the information to be published (LGHA  1989, s  23). The commissions are now funded by central government exchequer grant but are independent of central government. Additional non-investigatory advisory commissioners may be appointed. For information see: www.lgo.org.uk. The three areas have become less distinct geographically so that all three Ombudsmen cover parts of London, in the case of one ombudsman only one borough. See HC 458 (2004–05) on The Role and Effectiveness of the Local Government Ombudsmen. 2 LGA 1974, s 23(11). The commissioners also conduct a triennial review of the investigation of complaints, s 23(12): see Commission for Local Administration (2009) Review of the Operation of Part III of the Local Government Act 1974. The requirement for a triennial report is not in place in PSO(W)A 2005. 3 The representative persons must be given a reasonable time to make their comments: LGHA 1989, s 25(2) (LGA 1974, s 23A). 1

6.139  The commissioner’s investigations shall be conducted in private, the procedure being determined by the commissioner as appropriate in the circumstances. The local commissioner (LC) may obtain information from such persons and in such manner, and make such enquiries, as s/he thinks fit, and determine whether any person should be represented.1 Those furnishing information may be paid expenses2 and allowances for loss of time. Similar provisions can be found in PSO(W)A 2005, s 13. LGA 1974, s 28(2). LGA 1974, s 28(3).

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6.140  By s 29 of the LGA 1974, upon investigation a commissioner may require any members or officer of the authority concerned, or any other person who in his or her opinion is able to furnish information or produce relevant documents, to furnish any information or produce any such relevant documents.1  S/he is given, for such investigation, the powers of a High Court judge in respect of the attendance and examination of witnesses and in respect of the production of documents. S/he may require, under s 29(3), any person to furnish information concerning communications between the authority concerned and any government department, or to produce any correspondence or other documents forming part of any such written communication. Similar provisions can be found in PSO(W)A 2005, s 14. Reports eg in 1989, have highlighted difficulties in obtaining information.

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6.141  The Official Secrets Acts and other provisions enjoining secrecy on HM officials do not apply to requests from the ombudsman for information – no breach of the law is perpetrated by complying.1 Nor, where LGA  1974, s 29(3) applies, may the Crown rely upon any such secrecy provision or privilege such as ‘public interest immunity’ to withhold information2 although subject to that subsection, viz s  29(4), no person shall be compelled for the purposes of an investigation under the Act to give any evidence or produce any document which s/he could not be compelled to give or produce in civil proceedings before

652  Chapter 6 the High Court. In other words, an individual can plead a personal privilege providing s  29(4) does not override that claim. Similar, though less detailed provisions can be found in PSO(W)A 2005, s 15. LGA 1974, s 29(2). Information disclosed by a government department under the LGA 1974, s 29(3) shall not be made public in a commissioner’s report unless the department is given not less than one month’s written notice.

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6.142  Where without lawful excuse a local commissioner, or his or her officer, is obstructed in his or her functions, or a person acts or obstructs his or her investigation so that if it were a proceeding in the High Court that would constitute a contempt, the commissioner may certify the offence for the High Court which can deal with the matter.1 Similar obligations and powers are contained in PSO(W)A 2005, s 15. LGA 1974, s 29(8) and (9).

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6.143  Under LGA 1974, s 32, as amended by LGPLA 1980, s 184, notice may be given to the commission by the minister of the Crown or any of the authorities mentioned in s 25(1) which has the effect of instructing the commissioner not to disseminate information or documents as specified beyond the commissioner or the staff assisting the commissioner. All publications as specified in s 32 are absolutely privileged.1 Information obtained by local commissioners or their officers, during or for investigations, shall not be disclosed except for reports under ss 30, 31 and 31B, or for the purposes of an investigation being carried out by the PCA or Health Service Commissioner for England, for the purposes of an investigation under the new LGA  1974, Part 3A (investigations into privately arranged or funded adult social care – inserted by the Health Act 2009), proceedings under the Official Secrets Acts 1911–1989, for perjury or for inquiries conducted with a view to taking such proceedings or for proceedings under s 29(9).2 Otherwise, the information is privileged in legal proceedings.3 The courts have upheld the local ombudsman where there have been challenges to his their powers to obtain information and early in their career, their powers had to be amended to prevent authorities resisting requests for information.4 The High Court has ruled that where an ombudsman decided not to investigate a complaint formally – and where the reasons were flawed, the ombudsman should have shown his interview notes to the complainant in the absence of any good reasons preventing this. These covered meetings with an official and the chair of the planning committee.5 Section 32(2) of the Act did not prohibit disclosure of the notes which in the circumstances were required in the interests of fairness. The local ombudsman should respect any request for confidentiality but he must not adopt a blanket test of non-disclosure. This decision does seem to be desirable on the grounds of fair procedure but it does seem to disregard the strict wording of s  32(2). Similar provisions can be found in PSO(W)A 2005, ss 26–27 and 32. There are four kinds of publication that are protected involving communications between the commission and members, complainants, etc. The LGPIHA 2007 adds publication under s 31B (power of the Commissioners to publish reports). SI 2007/1889, Art 9 adds a further protection of publication where this results from collaboration between the Local Commissioners and the PCA or Health Service Commissioner for England.

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Local government as providers and keepers of information   653 Contempt proceedings. LGA 1974, s 32(2). 4 Re a Subpoena (Adoption: Comr for Local Administration) [1996] 2  FLR  629 and access by the ombudsman to adoption files. 5 R (Turpin) v Commissioner for Local Administration [2001] EWHC Admin 503. 2 3

6.144  Section 33 concerns consultation between local commissioners, the parliamentary commissioner (who is an ex officio member of the Commission for Local Administration) and the health service commissioner where a complaint involves more than one ombudsman.1 Section 32(2) above does not apply to inhibit such consultation.2 It was noted in ch 1 how ombudsmen may exchange information with the Information Commissioner and vice versa. Similar provisions can be found in PSO(W)A 2005, s 25. He may, if necessary, inform the person initiating the complaint of appropriate steps. Which otherwise restricts disclosure of information.

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Reports of the commissioners into investigations 6.145  The provisions relating to reports have been amended by legislation in 1988, 1989, 2000, 2007 and 2009. The authority concerned, inter alia, in a complaint receives a copy of the report.1 Such authority shall make copies of the report available, for a period of three weeks, for inspection by the public without charge, at all reasonable hours at one or more of their offices. Any person is entitled to take copies of, or extracts from, the report when so made available (LGA 1974, s 30(4)). Not later than two weeks after the report is received by the authority the ‘proper officer’ (s 30(7)) shall give public notice, by advertisement and such other ways as appear to him or her appropriate, that copies of the report will be available as under s 30(4). S/he shall specify the date, being a date not more than one week after the public notice is first given, from which the period of three weeks (above) will begin. The authority shall supply a copy of the report to any person on request, if s/he pays such charge as the authority may ‘reasonably require’.2 The publicity etc provisions may be waived at the commissioner’s discretion on the grounds of the public interest and those of the complainant and third persons (s 30(7)). Obstruction of these rights by a person with custody of the reports is a criminal offence punishable summarily (s 30(6)). The Court of Appeal has ruled that under LGA 1974, s 30(1), the LGO is only required to report after an investigation is completed; anything else, such as a decision not to continue, only requires a statement of reasons.3 These provisions are mirrored in PSO(W)A 2005, ss 16 and 17. As do the complainant, referring member and others alleged to have taken or authorised action complained against: see ch 8. NB the introduction of a new s 30(1B) by LGPIHA 2007. This section permits the Commissioner to refuse to provide copies of the report if he is satisfied with the action that the authority under investigation has taken or proposes to take and he believes that it is not appropriate to prepare and send a copy of the report. If the Commissioner decides to do this he must prepare a statement of reasons for his decision and copy it to the persons concerned. 2 LGA 1974, s 30(4A); LGA 1988, Sch 3, para 6. 3 R  (Maxhuni) v Commissioner for Local Administration [2002]  EWCA  Civ 973, (2002)  NLJ  1172 (CA). 1

654  Chapter 6 6.146  Section 31 of the LGA 1974 has been the subject of recent amendment by LGPIHA  2007. In particular, s  31(1) is modified to apply whenever there has been maladministration in connection with the exercise of the authority’s administrative functions, a failure in a service which it was the function of an authority to provide or when there is a failure to provide such a service. This application is clearly broader than the old wording of s 31, which applied the section only where a commissioner reports a case of injustice caused to a person aggrieved in consequence of maladministration. 6.147  In addition to the publicity outlined above, the report has to be laid before the authority; it has to be considered by the authority; and the authority must notify the commissioner of its actions thereon or proposals within three months of receiving the report or such longer period with the written agreement of the commissioner.1 LGA 1974, s 31(2) as added by LGHA 1989, s 26.

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6.148  If this notification is not received within the requisite period; or the commissioner is not satisfied with the authority’s actions or proposals; or s/he does not receive confirmation from the authority that they have taken action, as proposed, to his or her satisfaction – this has to be within a three-month period after the end of the period allowed – s/he may issue a ‘further report’.1 This will set out the facts above and will make recommendations.2 These, by virtue of LGA 1974, s 31(2B), are such as the local commissioner thinks fit to make with respect to action which, in his or her opinion, the authority concerned should take to remedy the injustice to the person aggrieved and to prevent similar injustice being caused in the future, ie it is a prophylactic device. A new s 31(2BA) is added, creating a similar regime should there be a report in relation to a failure in a service or a failure to provide a service in order to support the modifications made by the LGPIHA  2007 noted above. Similar provisions can be found in PSO(W)A 2005, ss 19 and 22, although with the ‘old’ ‘persons aggrieved’ wording. LGA 1974, s 18(2A)(c), as amended. LGA 1974, s 18(2A).

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6.149  The section makes clear that s  30 supra and s  31(2) apply to further reports under s  31(2A) as they do to a report under s  30 – with necessary modifications.1 This repeats the requirement of a notification for a further report, which if not received within the requisite period (three months), or if the commissioner is satisfied before the expiry of that time that the authority concerned has decided to take no action, or s/he is dissatisfied with the action or proposals of the authority, or no confirmation is forthcoming as under s 18(2A)(c)2 or for an extended period in writing, then s/he may, by notice to the authority, require them to arrange for a statement to be published in accordance with s 31(2E) and (2F).3 LGA 1974, s 31(2C), as amended. Confirmation of action to the commissioner’s satisfaction. 3 LGA 1974, s 31(2D). 1 2

Local government as providers and keepers of information   655 6.150  This statement, in a form agreed by the authority and the commissioner, consists of: (a) details of any action recommended by the local commissioner (LC) in his or her further report which the authority have not taken; (b) such supporting material as the LC may require; and (c) if the authority so requires, a statement of the reasons for their having taken no action on, or not the action recommended in, the report.1 LGA 1974, s 31(2E).

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6.151  ‘Publication’ of a statement is satisfied where it is in any two editions within a fortnight of a newspaper circulating in the area of the authority agreed with the LC, or, in default of agreement, nominated by the commission and publication in the first such newspaper arranged for the earliest practicable date.1 LGA 1974, s 31(2F).

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6.152  Failure on the authority’s part to arrange for publication or to agree within a specified period1 shall lead to the LC arranging for such a statement under LGA 1974, s 31(2E) to be published in any two editions within a fortnight of a newspaper circulating within the authority’s area (s 31(2G)). The authority will have to reimburse on demand any reasonable expenditure incurred by the LC under s 31(2G). The section only applies to reports made after the section comes into force. One month beginning with the date on which they receive the notice under s 31(2D), or such longer period as the commissioner agrees in writing.

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6.153  A new s 31A is added to the LGA 1974 by LGHA 1989, Part II. This provision has been significantly amended by the LGPIHA 2007, although the thrust of the provisions remains the same. This specifies that the authority itself must have referred to it consideration of a further report under s 31(2A) if it is proposed that the authority should take no action on, or not the recommended action in, a report.1 Consideration of such reports by committees specified in LGA  1972, s  101(9)2 or by an appeal committee constituted under Education Act 1980, Sch 2, para 1 ‘shall be subject to a corresponding restriction’, ie the authority itself must have the report referred to it.3 LGA 1974, s 31A(1). Including education, police and social services committees. The latter will not operate where authorities have adopted executive arrangements: LGA 2000, s 102. 3 LGA 1974, s 31A(2). 1 2

6.154  These restrictions do not apply where the report recommends that action be taken by a joint committee established under LGA 1972, s 101 or any committee referred to in an enactment specified in s 101(9)(c), (d) or (h).1 LGA 1974, s 31A(3).

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6.155  Where the authority, in considering a LGA 1974, s 31(2A) report, takes into account a report by a person or body with an interest in the LC’s report,

656  Chapter 6 it must also consider a report by a person or body with no interest in the LC’s report, ie an independent assessment must be made.1 LGA 1974, s 31A(4).

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6.156  Any member of an authority or of a committee as specified in s 31A(2) and (3), and who is named and criticised in a report or further report of an LC, shall not vote on any question relating to such report. 6.157  LGPIHA  2007, s  177 inserts a new LGA  1974, s  31B giving the Local Commissioner express powers to publish reports and statements under LGA 1974, ss 30 and 31 and summaries thereof if he believes that it is in the public interest to do so after taking account of the interests of the complainant and other persons. The Commissioner may also provide a report or part of it to anyone who requests it and charge a reasonable fee for doing so. 6.158  A  provision added by LGHA  1989, s  32 allowing a member to be identified in a report where there was action amounting to maladministration by the member which breached the national code of conduct was repealed by LGA 2000, Sch 5, para 15. 6.159  Finally on reports, the LGOs have initiated the practice of issuing special reports which bring together the experience and information of several investigations into one subject area. These have covered funding of aftercare under Mental Health Act 1983, s 117, delays in referring housing benefit appeals to the Appeals Service, school admissions and appeals and administrative pitfalls, and parking enforcement by local authorities.

RESTRICTING PUBLICITY BY AUTHORITIES 6.160  In ch  4 (paras 4.100 et seq above) it was observed how the provision of information by central government for publicity purposes was restricted by conventions. A series of confrontations between central government and local government in the 1980s ended in legislation restricting the use of information by authorities for publicity purposes. This followed a report from a committee of inquiry under David Widdicombe QC published in July 1985.1 The specific terms of reference were to clarify: ‘the limits and conditions governing discretionary spending, including the use of ss 137 and 142 of the LGA 1972 and Scottish equivalents for political purposes in local government, or in relation to bodies set up, and largely financed by, local authorities.’ Local Authority Publicity (1985) HMSO.

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6.161  Under the Local Government Act 1986 (LGA  1986), as amended by LGA 1988, a local authority shall not publish any material which, in whole or in part, appears to be designed to affect public support for a political party.1 In determining whether material falls within the prohibition, regard shall be had

Local government as providers and keepers of information   657 to the content and style of the material, the time and other circumstances of publication and the likely effect on those to whom it is directed and, in particular, to the following matters: (a) whether the material refers to a political party or to persons identified with a political party or promotes or opposes a point of view on a question of political controversy which is identified as the view of one political party and not of another; and (b) where the material is part of a campaign, the effect that the campaign appears to be designed to achieve.2 LGA 1986, s 2(1). LGA 1986, s 2(2) as amended by LGA 1988, s 27; effective from May 1988.

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6.162  Under LGA 1986, s 2(3), an authority shall not give financial or other assistance to a person for the publication of material which the authority are prohibited by this section from publishing themselves, ie it prohibits publication through an agent or indirectly. 6.163  Section 3 of the LGA  1986 is a voluminous section amending LGA 1972, ss 137 and 142 and Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973, ss 88 and 83. LGA 1972, s 142 concerns the provision of information relating to local government within authorities’ respective areas as well as films, lectures, seminars and displays to the same effect. The sections had featured in various celebrated episodes, including the abolition of the Greater London Council (GLC), and regularly in litigation causing the auditor to opine that s 142 should be concerned more with ‘information rather than persuasion’.1 The Scottish and English case-law established that: the provision did not confine a council to publishing purely factual information. It allowed explanation and justification. Nor was the authority prevented from selecting information projecting the controlling party in a favourable light2 but attempting to persuade the local inhabitants to adopt a course of action advocated by an authority, against the effects of ratecapping, and employing an advertising agency to effect such persuasion, were unlawful. The authority was adopting an unlawful objective viz, persuasion or proselytisation which had materially influenced its decision. Permitted objectives within ‘information relating to local government’ would be an explanation of legislation such as the Rates Act 1984 as well as a description of how far the authority’s activities and facilities would be contracted if the Secretary of State’s directions on maximum expenditure were adhered to.3 The GLC was restrained by injunction from engaging advertisers to help its campaign against abolition. It was not a case of information dissemination but persuasion.4 R v Inner London Education Authority, ex p Westminster City Council [1986] 1 All ER 19; R v Greater London Council, ex p Westminster City Council (1985) Times, 22 January. 2 Meek v Lothian Regional Council 1983 SLT 494. 3 R v Inner London Education Authority, ex p Westminster City Council [1986] 1 All ER 19. 4 R v Greater London Council, ex p Westminster City Council (1985) Times, 22 January.

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6.164  LGA 1972, s 142 is now amended and concerns publicity ‘relating to the functions of an authority’ and not ‘as to local government matters affecting the area’ – ie it is drawn more tightly and relates to functions which must be statutorily

658  Chapter 6 based – and to services available in the area provided by other authorities as mentioned in sub-s (1B). The Communications Act 2003 amends s 142 to allow for an electronic communications network or electronic communications service to broadcast or distribute information falling within the amended section, but not to do anything which would be a contravention of the 2003 Act or a number of other Acts which concern licensing of broadcasting and electronic communications networks. An arrangement may be made with the provider of such a network. Information concerns information relating to services within an authority’s area provided by the authority or by other authorities mentioned in sub-s (1B) or information relating to the functions of an authority. 6.165  LGA 1972, s 137 confers a power upon authorities to spend up to the product of various charges1 which in their opinion is in the interests of the area or any part of it or some or all of its inhabitants, provided that the object of expenditure is not the subject of other statutory provision. Widdicombe in 1985 found that some authorities had used this section to finance publicity campaigns. Section 3 of the LGA 1986 amends the section to limit its scope. A local authority may incur expenditure under s 137(1) on publicity only: (a) for the purpose of promoting the economic development of the authority’s area where the publicity is incidental to other activities undertaken or to be undertaken by the authority for that purpose; or (b) by way of assistance to a public body or voluntary organisation where the publicity is incidental to the main purpose for which assistance is given.2 See now LGHA 1989, Sch 2 and the replacement of the 2p rate: s 137(4) and (4AA). LGA 2003, s 118 provides for differences to formulae calculating sums. 2 LGA 1972, s 137(2C); LGA 1986, s 3(3). 1

6.166  LGA  1972, s  137(2C) also provides that expenditure under s  142 on information as to services provided by local authorities shall be subject to s 137(2D)–(9) so that expenditure under s 142 will be included in the financial limit under s 137. 6.167  Finally, LGA 1972, s 137(2D) defines ‘publicity’ as ‘any communication, in whatever form, addressed to the public at large or to a section of the public’, and ‘voluntary organisation’ as ‘a body which is not a public body but whose activities are carried on otherwise than for profit’. 6.168  Part I of the LGA 2000 contains powers for local authorities as defined to promote the economic, social or environmental well-being etc of their areas (s 2). Limits are set in s 3 which prevent an authority doing anything prohibited etc in any enactment although these may be repealed by an order of the Secretary of State under s 5. LGA 2000, s 7 makes further provision for the definition of local authorities by a slight amendment to LGA 1972, s 137. Section 1 of the Localism Act 2011 introduced a new ‘general power of competence’, giving local authorities the same power to act that an individual generally has. This general power of competence is subject to the boundaries contained in section 2, one of which is that: ‘If the exercise of a pre-commencement power of a local authority is subject to restrictions, those restrictions apply also to exercise of the general

Local government as providers and keepers of information   659 power insofar as it is overlapped by the pre-commencement power’. The precise result of this interplay between sections 1 and 2 is not entirely clear and has still not been thoroughly explored in the case law. The explanatory notes to the Bill state that: ‘…if an existing power requires a particular procedure to be followed, the same procedure will apply to the use of the general power to do the same thing’. It also applies any express prohibitions, restrictions and limitations within primary or secondary legislation, to the use of the general power. Schedule  1 to the Act also amends LGA 1972, s 137(9) to provide for a definition of local authorities in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It is clear that these changes have expanded the powers of local authorities to a considerable degree beyond those described above in LGA 2000. At the same time, limitations and prohibitions such as those contained in LGA 1972, ss 137 and 142 continue to apply. 6.169  LGA 1972, s 142(2A) allows authorities to assist voluntary organisations to provide advice and information to individuals about their rights and duties as well as providing assistance by making communications or providing representation. 6.170  Section 4 of the LGA  1986, as amended, empowers the Secretary of State to issue one or more codes of recommended practice on the content, style, distribution and cost of local authority publicity and such other related matters as s/he thinks appropriate, and local authorities ‘shall have regard to the provisions of any such code in coming to any decision on publicity’.1 This does not mean follow, even less slavishly adhere to, but the authority, to be safe, must provide evidence, eg a minute, that they regarded the code. ‘Shall have regard to’: De Falco v Crawley Borough Council [1980] QB 460, CA. See also R (Beale) v Camden LBC [2004] EWHC 6 (Admin), [2004] HLR 48.

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6.171  Codes may deal with different kinds of publicity or different kinds of local authority or the same kind of local authority in different circumstances or different areas and the code may be revised or withdrawn. A code, which shall be subject to consultation1 before issue or revision or withdrawal, shall be laid in draft and approved by both Houses. Revisions of a code are subject to more prolix procedures. The Code was revised and republished in 2011, partly in order to address certain issues, particularly local authority publication of local newspapers, which the incoming government felt were a problem. The major provisions of the Code are as follows. It states2 that nothing in the Code overrides the prohibition found in LGA  1986, s  2 (see para  6.161) but that some guidance is offered on publications which may contain or have links to party political material. The major focus of the Code is ‘paid advertising and leaflet campaigns, publication of free newspapers and newssheets and maintenance of websites – including the hosting of material which is created by third parties.3 With local authority associations appearing to be concerned and with any authorities as appear to the Secretary of State to be desirable. 2 DCLG Circular 01/2011, para 3. 3 DCLG Circular 01/2011, para 2. 1

660  Chapter 6 6.172  There are some key principles for all local government publications in the code. All publications should be lawful, cost-effective, objective, evenhanded, appropriate, have regard to equality and diversity and should be issued with care during periods of heightened sensitivity.1 The Code further notes that ‘local authorities should not use public funds to mount publicity campaigns whose primary purpose is to persuade the public to hold a particular view on a question of policy.’ It is permissible, however, for an authority to publish material that corrects erroneous material that has been published by other parties.2 DCLG Circular 01/2011, para 4. DCLG Circular 01/2011, para 16.

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6.173  The Code is clear that all local authority publicity that is paid for must abide by the ASA’s Code, and any broadcast material must be sure to avoid contravening the prohibition on political advertising in the Communications Act 2003 and also legislation on elections and referendums.1 All publicity relating to policies should be balanced and factually accurate and all paid-for advertising by LAs should be clearly marked as such.2 The Code further prohibits the paying of lobbyists in order to publish material designed to change the views of public officials, MPs, etc and provides that LAs should not spend money on having stands at the conferences of political parties which seek to influence members of that party to take a particular view on a certain issues or issues.3 One particular feature of the new Code, as noted above, is that it aims to prevent any publication of communications which ‘seek to emulate commercial newspapers in style or content’.4 Furthermore, where LAs seek to publish newspapers or similar publications, these should not be published more frequently than on a quarterly basis, or a monthly basis in the case of parish councils.5 The content of such publications should be limited to information about the ‘business, services and amenities of the council or other local service providers’. All information that is produced should be freely available to anyone who requests it, and should be ‘in a format readily accessible and understandable by the person making the request or by any particular group for which services are provide’.6  All local authority publications should seek, insofar as is possible, to further the authority’s obligations in terms of combating discrimination and promoting equality and diversity. 3 4 5 6 1 2

DCLG Circular 01/2011, paras 5–9. DCLG Circular 01/2011, paras 15–18. DCLG Circular 01/2011, paras 26 and 27. DCLG Circular 01/2011, para 28. DCLG Circular 01/2011, para 28. DCLG Circular 01/2011, para 29.

6.174  The Code has guidance on advertising, which should not be used as a means of subsidising a voluntary, commercial or industrial organisation, and which should be cost-effective. Local authorities should generally avoid publications which do nothing more than seek to echo central government publicity. Where there is a question of value for money, LAs ought to seek advice from appropriately qualified analysts.1 DCLG Circular 01/2011, paras 10–14.

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Local government as providers and keepers of information   661 6.175  The code contains a section on the use of publicity at times of heightened sensitivity, and addresses publications at the time of elections and referendums. The basic thrust is that publications on politically controversial issues should be avoided at this time and no publication should seek to influence voters.1 The Code was the subject of a report by the Communities and Local Government Select Committee.2 The Committee expressed some dissatisfaction with the Code’s limitations on the ability of LAs to produce newspapers as it was felt that the complaints of the local and regional press that these publications were unfair competition were not generally supported by evidence. Furthermore, the report notes that although there is need for regulation of the use of lobbyists by local government, the Code on publicity, particularly given its lack of direct enforceability, is perhaps not the best place for this to be done. DCLG Circular 01/2011, paras 33–35. HC 666 (2010-2011)

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6.176  Under s  5 of the LGA  1986, local authorities are required to keep a separate account of expenditure for publicity. This applies to publicity expressly or impliedly authorised by any statutory provision. Any interested person may at any reasonable time and without payment inspect the account and make copies of it.1 Intentional obstruction of this right is a criminal offence triable summarily. Power to make regulations governing rights of inspection of accounts under LGFA  1982, s  23(1)(e) applies to the right of inspection under s  5(2).2 The Secretary of State may exclude by order prescribed descriptions of publicity or expenditure.3 LGA 1986, s 5(2). LGA 1986, s 5(4). 3 LGA 1986, s 5(5); see also sub-ss (6) and (7). 1 2

6.177  The provisions of LGA  1986 do not apply to information provided under LGA  1972, Part VA (LG(ATI)A  1985) and its Scottish analogue. Local authorities are defined in s 6(2) to include those in s 6(3). The LGA 1986 also covers any such publicity expressly or impliedly authorised by any statutory provision including: • s 111 of the LGA 1972 – general subsidiary powers;1 • s 141 of the LGA 1972 – research and collection of information; and • s 145(1)(a) of the LGA 1972 – provision of entertainment etc. R v Greater London Council, ex p Westminster City Council (1985) Times, 22 January.

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6.178  A new s 2A was added to LGA 1986 by LGA 1988, s 28. This prohibited the intentional promotion of homosexuality or the publication of material with the intention of promoting homosexuality by a local authority.1 The section continued that a local authority shall not promote the teaching in any maintained school (s  2A(4)) of the ‘acceptability of homosexuality as a pretended family relationship’.2 In any proceedings connected with the application of this section a court shall draw such inferences as to the intention of the local authority as may reasonably be drawn from the evidence before it. The evidence before the court, and inferences from that evidence alone, must be viewed objectively

662  Chapter 6 (s  2A(2)). However, ‘nothing in sub-s  (1) above shall be taken to prohibit the doing of anything for the purpose of treating or preventing the spread of disease’ providing there is not, presumably, an ulterior motive as inferred under s 2A(3). LGA 1986, s 2A(1)(a). LGA 1986, s 2A(1)(b).

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6.179  The provisions in LGA 1988, s 28 sparked off further controversy when attempts were made in Scotland to repeal this provision and hostile reaction ensued from church leaders and businessmen. The government also sought, initially unsuccessfully, to repeal the provisions in England and Wales. Under LGA 2000, a provision was added stating that the above ban did not prevent the headteacher or governing body of a maintained school, or a teacher employed by a maintained school, from taking steps to prevent any form of bullying. LGA 1986, s 2A was repealed by LGA 2003, s 122.

QUASI LOCAL GOVERNMENT 6.180  A  member of that family of beasts known as ‘quangos’ is a ‘qualgo’ – a quasi-autonomous local government organisation. In general terms these are bodies which are not local authorities according to statutory definitions, but which are either government agencies – the urban development corporations under the Local Government Planning and Land Act 1980 is an example – or else they are created by local authorities – such as local authority companies – or they may form partnerships between central and local government, eg, local enterprise agencies. To these may be added a wide variety of programmes and agencies initiated by central government but operating locally. Lord Nolan’s committee on standards also investigated local spending bodies such as higher education institutions, further education institutions, grant maintained schools, Training and Enterprise Councils, local enterprise councils in Scotland and housing associations.1 Local Public Spending Bodies Cm 3270 I and II (1996).

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6.181  To what extent are these bodies bound to provide information to the public about their activities? The bodies in question are not formally within the terms of the LG(ATI)A 1985 and so are not covered by that legislation unless items of their business are present on the agenda of authority meetings.1 Even here, they would be subject to exclusion on grounds of confidentiality or exemption. Apart from this eventuality, the information and meetings of such bodies do not have to be available to the public or open to the public, though they may be available to other bodies such as the Comptroller and Auditor-General, the parliamentary or local commissioner, or they may have to report to the Secretary of State or to Parliament. With companies, the provisions of company law apply, although the information available under the Companies Acts will be limited largely to details of directors, etc and accounting information.2 If the bodies or their functions are identified or designated for purposes of FOIA 2000, then they will be under that legislation (see ch 1).

Local government as providers and keepers of information   663 See chs 7 and 8. See the Companies Act 2006.

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6.182  Government legislation has given local authorities a specific power to carry out economic development; they will not use LGA 1972, s 137. ‘The power introduced under the LGHA 1989 will be a general, but circumscribed, power to engage in economic development initiatives at the discretion of the authority’.1 These provisions were repealed by LGA  2000 (see para  6.186 below). Other powers for such expenditure, including that under s 137, were to be removed but survived the 2000 Act. The Conservative government also believed that some activities were not appropriate to local government, eg some commercial trading activities and equity participation in commercial companies. Legislation (infra) would attend to the consideration of priorities across the whole field of economic development; co-ordination with other activities by the authority and with the agencies in the public and private sectors; and proper scrutiny, and special provision for consultation with the business community. On local authority interests in companies a consultation paper was issued by the DoE in June 1988. Cm 433 (1988), para 7.14.

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SECTION 137 EXPENDITURE 6.183  New limits for expenditure under LGA  1972, s  137 were proposed even after the removal of economic development expenditure from the section. Section 137 is widely used for funding voluntary organisations, charities and bodies providing a public service otherwise than for gain and for contributions to special appeals. Section 137 need only be used: (a) where an authority is contributing to the general running costs of a charity working in the UK – eg Marriage Guidance Council; (b) for some activities in certain types of advice-giving organisations, eg  law centres; (c) for an appeal by another local authority; and (d) to fund other organisations, where specific powers or s 137 do not apply, but where they consider such expenditure to be in the interests of the area or some of its inhabitants. 6.184  While accepting the desirability of funding of voluntary bodies, the government agreed with Widdicombe that there should be clear arrangements for assuring the accountability and monitoring of bodies that benefit from grants. A  list of grants to bodies and their purpose should be made available – these would be those in excess of £2,000. Voluntary bodies should send an annual report to the authority saying how the grant has been used; this should be publicly available. The code of practice on annual reports is to be amended to give the public more detailed information about s  137 spending ‘which by definition is spending on matters not approved by Parliament’. 6.185  Section 137 is further amended1 and a new s  137A is added by LGHA 1989, s 37. This provides that where in any financial year a local authority

664  Chapter 6 provides financial assistance to a voluntary organisation (s 137(2D)) or a body or fund falling within s 137(3), and the amount provided equals or exceeds the relevant minimum (£2,000 or such sum as specified by order (s 137(3)), the body has to furnish to the authority a statement in writing of the use to which the amount has been put.2 Such a statement has to be furnished within the period of 12 months beginning on the date when the assistance is provided (ie, the date on which the grant or loan is made, or on which a guarantee was entered into). Under s 137(4) it is sufficient to furnish to the local authority an annual report or accounts containing the required information which shall be deposited with the ‘proper officer’.3 ‘Local authority’ includes the common council of the City of London. LGA 2003, Sch 8, Part I repealed s 137(4AA) and (4C). And see LGA 1972, s 137 as amended by LGHA 1989, Sch 2, and Audit Commission Act 1998, Sch 3, para 3(4). 2 LGA 1972, s 137A, added by LGHA 1989, s 37. 3 Available as accounts and under the LG(ATI)A 1985 but cf exemptions, infra. 1

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 6.186  The powers associated with the promotion of economic development were contained in Part I  of LGA  2000, but are now confined only to Wales. The Localism Act 2011 and the general power of competence it provides has expanded the powers of local authorities of England to engage in activities relating to economic development. In addition, LGA  2003, ss  41–59 make provision for business improvement districts (BIDs). Reference has already been made to BIDs (para 6.53 above) and how they are subject to approval by nondomestic rate-payers.

Companies as ‘alter egos’ of local authorities 6.187  Section 4 of the Localism Act 2011 makes it clear that local authorities may use the general power of competence in s 1 to take actions for a commercial purpose, but only if the authority also has the power to take such action for a non-commercial purpose. Where an authority takes action for a commercial purpose, it must do so through a company (s 4(2)). The provisions here largely reflect the previous provisions on local authority trading in LGA 2003, s 95. 6.188  LGA 2003, s 127 and Sch 8, Part I repealed LGHA 1989, Part IV (ss 39– 66) which concerned revenue accounts and capital finance of local authorities, which were enumerated within s 39. 6.189  LGA  2003, s  18 makes provision for the bodies described and seeks to ensure that local authorities do not evade capital controls. This applies to Passenger Transport Executives, companies under LGHA 1989, Part V subject to local authority influence or control, and trusts subject to local authority influence.

Local government as providers and keepers of information   665

LOCAL ENTERPRISE PARTNERSHIPS 6.190  It was noted above (para  6.7) that the regional development agencies were abolished and phased out in the period 2010–2015. In order to replace some of the functions of the RDAs and to encourage economic development, the government encouraged local authorities to create local enterprise partnerships (LEPs). These bodies are non-statutory and are comprised of members of the local authorities that have created the LEP for their area and individuals from the private sector. 24 LEPs were approved by government in its White Paper in 2010. Further LEPs have been created since then and, in 2017, there were 39 such bodies. LEPs do not receive direct government grants (although some money has been made available by central government to offer support for startup). LEPs have also been able to obtain financial support from the Regional Growth Fund created by government, EU structural funds and a number of other sources. 6.191  The accountability and transparency of LEPs has been a source for concern, as they do receive and use public money, some of which is provided by central government and some of which may be provided by local government. In order to facilitate transparency and accountability of LEPs, the government has produced best practice guidance on the governance and transparency of LEPs following a review that it undertook. The Comptroller and Auditor General has also investigated the effectiveness of the use of growth funds provided by central government by LEPs,1 demonstrating some concern over the ability of the LEPs to deliver on their objectives. National Audit Office (2016) Local Enterprise Partnerships HC 887 (2015–2016). MHCLG (2017) Review of Local Enterprise Partnership governance and transparency Available at: https://www. gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/655188/Review_of_local_ enterprise_partnership_governance_and_transparency.pdf. MHCLG  (2018) Local Enterprise Partnership governance and transparency: best practice guidance Available at: https://www.gov.uk/ government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/679430/LEP_Governance_and_ Transparency_Best_Practice_Guidance.pdf.

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6.192  The best practice guidance on transparency and accountability of LEPs, alongside the national assurance framework for LEPs, sets out the requirements for the publication of information incumbent on LEPs. The essential requirement in the national assurance framework is that LEPs should abide by the relevant legislation (outlined above and in ch 8) on making and recording decisions and providing access to agendas and papers etc applicable to local authorities when they make decisions, they should retain a website where they publish information about the activities and progress of the LEP, and they should retain a register of interests and a register of interests policy.

LOCAL AUTHORITY LOANS 6.193  A new regime for capital finance, credit and accounts was introduced by LGA 2003, ss 1–24.1 These provisions replace the controls in LGHA 1989, Part IV and seek to introduce a national framework of standards and accountability,

666  Chapter 6 devolution, diversity, flexibility and greater choice of ‘customers’. Credit arrangements (loans) must not exceed the affordable borrowing limit set by an authority under s 3 and any limits under s 4 concerning national limits or limits set by direction in relation to a particular authority. The Secretary of State has certain reserved powers under s 8(3). Under s 14, a local authority shall supply the Secretary of State with such information relating to any of the matters dealt with in this Chapter, and at such time, as he may request. Although the Localism Act expands the powers of authorities, as noted in para 6.168 above, existing limitations on powers and processes are maintained through s 2(2) of the Localism Act 2011, so the provisions in the LGA 2003 on borrowing will retain relevance. See Modernising Local Government Finance (September 2000) and Strong Leadership: Quality Public Services Cm 5237 (2001). LGA 2003, Part 7 seeks to simplify the housing revenue account and subsidy system. It contains powers on borrowing and freedom to establish ‘high-performing’ arm’s length management organisations (ALMOs). The Local Government Ombudsman Annual Report 2003–04 stated that ALMOs are within the LGO jurisdiction but detailed advice would be provided in guidance on ‘Partnerships’.

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LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND CONTROLLED COMPANIES 6.194  LGHA  1989, Part V  (ss  67–73) concerns companies in which local authorities have interests. Section 68 concerns companies under the control of a local authority and how control is constituted. Section 68(6) stipulates that notwithstanding that a company is a controlled company, it will be deemed an ‘arm’s length’ company if all of eight conditions apply at the time it is controlled. Section 69 concerns companies subject to local authority influence – this will include ‘almost all housing associations’ – the provisions of which may be extended to non-charitable trusts subject to local authority influence. Different provisions may be made for trusts and companies under s  70 (the substantive provision governing the actions of authorities over controlled and influenced companies) (s 72(2)). Where a company is an ‘authorised’ company, ie specified as such by regulations, then by s 71(5) in any case where a member or officer is an authority’s representative at an annual general meeting of an authorised company or is a member of an authorised company mentioned in s 71(7), the authority has to make arrangements (by SO or otherwise) allowing members to put questions to the representative about the company’s activities. ‘(6) Nothing in subsection (5) above shall require the representative (as defined in that subsection) to disclose any information about the company which has been communicated to him in confidence.’ 6.195  Section 73 makes special provisions for the situation where authorities are acting jointly in controlling companies, or do so by committees. The effect of LGA 2003, s 18 was outlined above. Part V is the subject of repeal by the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007, s 216, but the repeal has not yet been brought into force. Part V would be replaced by the provisions of Part 12 of the 2007 Act and relevant secondary legislation which has not yet been made. Given that minor amendments have been made to LGHA 1989, Part

Local government as providers and keepers of information   667 V as recently as 2014, it may be that the provisions will now stand and will not be repealed.

URBAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS 6.196  Urban development corporations (UDCs) were public corporations established by statutory order under LGPLA 1980, s 135 for designated areas of land by the Secretary of State if s/he is of the opinion that it is expedient in the national interest to do so. In 1990, UDCs existed in the following areas: London Docklands, Merseyside, Trafford Park, Teesside, Tyne and Wear, Cardiff, Bristol, Leeds, Central Manchester and Sheffield. These UDCs have now lapsed. New UDCs were created in Thurrock in 2003, London Thames Gateway in 2004 and Northamptonshire West in 2006, although all of these have now lapsed.1 At the present time, though the powers to create UDCs are still in force, there are no active UDCs. Details of their operations may be found in the first edition of this book.2 The Localism Act 2011, Part 8, Chapter 2, grants powers to the Mayor of London to create Mayoral Development Corporations in a manner broadly similar to the powers in relation to UDCs. See SI 2014/1181. Government and Information: The Law Relating to Access, Disclosure and Regulation (1st edn, 1990), ch 2.

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HOUSING ACTION TRUSTS 6.197  Housing action trusts (HATs) were intended to take over local authority housing powers and duties. They are public corporations. They are not subject to the LG(ATI)A 1985. Their impact on housing is dealt with later in this book (paras 9.55 et seq below).

COUNCIL TAX 6.198  Schedule  2 to the LGFA  1992 and Regulations thereunder set out details on administration of the collection of council tax, which replaced the notorious poll tax provisions, and include: supply of information to authorities; supply of information by authorities; and use of information by authorities.1 Schedule  3 lists penalties for failing to supply information to either billing or levying authorities.2 Numerous regulations have been made under this schedule, see eg SI 1992/613 as amended. See LGA 2003, Part 6. 2 See SI 1992/613, as amended. 1

NON-DOMESTIC RATING 6.199  Under LGFA 1988, Sch 9, para 5 valuation officers (VOs) may serve a notice on an owner or occupiers of an hereditament requesting information as

668  Chapter 6 specified and which the officer reasonably believes will assist him/her in carrying out his/her statutory functions. The LGHA  1989 has added a new para  1A requiring the officer to state why s/he believes the information requested will assist him/her in carrying out his/her functions. Further provisions added by that Act relate to the supply to the VO of information as prescribed by regulations, and to access to valuation lists by ‘a person’ whether as against the VO (if the VO maintains it), the charging authority,1 or the Secretary of State.2 Compliance must be within a reasonable time and place without payment; information may be in documentary or other form as the person or authority requested thinks fit.3 Copies of information in documentary form may be made by the person given access and photocopies may be requested; where not in documentary form transcripts may be made of or from the information, or a person having control of access to the information may be required to supply him/her with a copy in documentary form of, or extracts from, the information.4 A reasonable charge may be requested, compliance depending upon payment. Intentional obstruction is an offence. Under LGFA 1988, Sch 9, para 9,5 a person may, at a reasonable time and without making payment, inspect any proposal made or notice of appeal given under regulations made under s  55 of the LGFA  1988, if made or given as regards a list which is in force when inspection is sought or which has been in force at any time in the preceding five years. Copies of, or extracts from, documents may be made, or photographic copies requested from a person with custody (para  9(2)). A  reasonable charge may be requested, compliance depending upon payment. Intentional obstruction is an offence. 3 4 5 1 2

Where the authority has deposited a copy of the list under LGFA 1988, s 41(6B). Where the Secretary of State has deposited it under LGFA 1988, s 52(6B). LGFA 1988, Sch 9, para 8(6) as amended by LGHA 1989, Sch 5. And see revised paras 5 and 6. LGFA 1988, Sch 9, para 8(7), (8). As amended by LGHA 1989, Sch 5.

6.200  National non-domestic rating is based upon two rating lists: the local list compiled under LGFA 1988, s 41 by the VO; and the central list, compiled by the central VO under LGFA 1988, s 52. The latter concerns centrally owned property, eg  nationalised industries, privatised utilities. Both lists were to be compiled on 1 April 1990, and on 1 April of every fifth year thereafter. 6.201  The LGA  2003 makes some significant developments in relation to non-domestic rates. Briefly these affect rate relief and crucially, a power for the Secretary of State to prescribe a system for the local retention of non-domestic rates (s 70). This is part of the move to greater flexibility in local provision of services and should be seen alongside the provisions on BIDs (para 6.186 above). The Local Government Finance Act 2012 further changes some provisions to allow authorities to retain a proportion of the non-domestic rates from their area.

LOCAL ACCESS FORUMS 6.202  The Local Access Forums (England) Regulations 2007, SI  2007/268, made under Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000, s 94, require Highway

Local government as providers and keepers of information   669 Authorities and National Park Authorities to establish advisory bodies – local access forums – to advise on improved access to land for open-air recreational purposes. These Regulations include consultation requirements and public access to meetings of forums.

POLICE 6.203  Outside the Metropolitan Police District and City of London Police Area, police were traditionally organised on a local basis. The movement towards a national legal framework for policing has been a dramatic development in the last ten years as will be seen. There are also specific forces covering British Rail and the Ministry of Defence.1 Earlier legislation was consolidated in the Police Act 1996 which established police areas, all of which had a police authority. Very significant reforms were made in this area by the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 (PRSRA 2011). Outside of London, police authorities have been replaced by police and crime commissions, led by an elected police and crime commissioner, with the remainder of the elected members constituting a police and crime panel. Police and crime commissioners (PCCs) are elected through the procedure outlined in Chapter 6 of the Act. In the Metropolitan Police district, the Mayor of London will serve the function of commissioners elsewhere in the country. The PCC will issue a police and crime plan in the financial year in which each ordinary election of commissioners takes place, though the plan may be varied (PRSRA  2011, s  5, or s  6 in London). Any strategic priorities set down by the Secretary of State must be had regard to. Once the plan is issued, the commissioner must have regard to it in the exercise of his functions, as must the Chief Constable of each force. Sections 11–13 of the PRSRA 2011 set out provisions for the elected body to publish information specified in regulations, produce annual reports and provide information to police and crime panels, which are constituted of members of the local authorities in the relevant policing area and independent members in accordance with s  28 of and Sch 6 to the Act. Section 14 makes some changes to the route through which public views on policing can be sought, amending the relevant provisions in Police Act 1996, s 96. The purpose of the police and crime panels is to hold the PCC to account. Sections 29 and 30 of the PRSRA 2011 deal with accountability of the PCC. Section 29 grants the panel the power to require the PCC or a member of the PCC’s staff to attend the panel at reasonable notice and answer any question that it appears necessary to the panel to ask in order to carry out its functions, although s 29(2) makes it clear that this obligation does not extend to a requirement on members of staff to answer questions or disclose documents that would disclose advice given to the PCC. Section 29(3) permits the panel to require a written response to any report or recommendation made by the panel to the Commissioner. Section 77 of the PRSRA 2011 delivers significant amendment of s  37A of the Police Act 1996, which previously allowed the Secretary of State to set strategic priorities for police authorities. The Secretary of State is now empowered to issue a document known as the ‘strategic policing requirement’, which sets out the Secretary of State’s view of national threats at the time of issue and the appropriate national policing capabilities to counter

670  Chapter 6 the threats identified. Chief officers are required to have regard to this in the exercise of their functions. It is perhaps strange that there is no requirement, other than perhaps indirectly, for commissioners or panels to have regard to these when setting priorities. Metropolitan Police Acts 1829 et seq; Police Act 1964; Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987; Transport Act 1947; cf Police Officers (Central Service) Act 1989.

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6.204  The PRSRA 2011 contains a number of requirements on the provision of information beyond those noted in the previous paragraph. By virtue of s 36, the elected policing body (ie the PCC) may require the chief constable of police in the area to provide information on policing matters in the form specified by the PCC (s 36(1) and (2)). The PCC may publish this information, or may require the chief constable to publish it under s 36(3), with the decision over what must be published and the manner of publication lying with the PCC (s 36(4)). Section 92 of the PRSRA 2011 also amends s 44 of the Police Act 1996, which permits the Secretary of State to require chief constables to provide information on policing activities and also may require this information to be published by the chief constable under Police Act 1996, s 44(4) as amended. 6.205  The legal relationship between the authority and chief officer of police – in the Metropolitan force the commissioner,1 in the counties and combined forces the chief constable,2 and in the City the commissioner3 – is contained in the Metropolitan Police Acts 1829–1839, and for county forces in the Police Act 1964 (which also has some provisions relating to the Metropolitan force) as consolidated in the Police Act 1996. The basic informing idea behind the police in England and Wales is that they should operate free from executive or political control. In the Metropolitan force it has usually been said that the Home Secretary assumes a wide responsibility to Parliament for the general policies of the Metropolitan Police, while denying himself any opportunity to direct the detailed operations of the force which is the preserve of the commissioner,4 a position accepted by the Parliamentary Commissioner and a Lord Justice of Appeal,5 although ‘this forthright view is not in full accord with the history of the Metropolitan Police’.6 The coming into force of the PRSRA 2011 is an example of this relationship becoming more politicised, given that many PCCs are affiliated to a particular party. 3 4

Appointed by the Crown on the advice of the Home Secretary. Appointed by the police authority subject to the Home Secretary’s approval. As above. The Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration has accepted that the Home Secretary has no power to give instructions to the Metropolitan Police on the manner in which they should carry out their duties: HC 6 (1967–68) p 25, HC 350 (1967–68) pp XIII, 56–58 cited in Bradley and Ewing (formerly Wade and Bradley) Constitutional and Administrative Law (1997) pp 528 et seq. 5 Per Salmon LJ R v Metropolitan Police Comr, ex p Blackburn [1968] 2 QB 118 at 138, CA. 6 Bradley and Ewing, above, p 529. 1 2

6.206  The traditional balance has now been formally influenced by the Police Reform Act 2002 and has subsequently been changed by the PRSRA  2011. The Police Reform Act 2002 places a duty on the Home Secretary to prepare a

Local government as providers and keepers of information   671 National Policing Plan each year setting out strategic priorities for the next three years. The Home Secretary could previously issue codes of practice to police authorities and chief officers of police. The PRSRA 2011 repeals the power of the Secretary of State to provide codes of practice to the now abolished police authorities (previously s  39 of the Police Act 1996) and does not permit such codes to be provided to PCCs. However, the power to issue codes of practice to chief officers is retained by the insertion of a new s  39A of the Police Act 1996. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) is responsible for reports on various inspections into police forces including those on the National Criminal Intelligence Service, National Crime Squad and the Police National Computer. The Police Act 1996, ss 54–55 gives the police and crime panel the power to request inspections by HMIC, and empowers HMIC, rather than the Secretary of State, to publish the reports that are produced (this is amended by ss 83–84 of the PRSRA 2011). Adverse reports on efficiency and effectiveness of forces maintained under s 2 of the Police Act 1996 (local police forces and the Metropolitan police) may lead to a Home Secretary’s direction under the 2002 Act, s 5 directing a police authority to take specified remedial measures. The authority may be required to submit an ‘action plan’ setting out the action proposed to be taken in relation to the remedial measures. The 2002 Act extended the powers of police authorities to require senior officers to resign on the grounds of efficiency and effectiveness and it gives new powers to the Home Secretary to require police authorities to request the resignation or retirement of senior police officers on those grounds (Police Reform Act 2002, s 33). Section 32 provided new powers to authorities to suspend senior police officers (with the Home Secretary’s approval).1 The provisions of the PRSRA 2011 transfer these powers to the relevant local PCC, though the Secretary of State will retain a power to instruct the PCC to remove chief constables or the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police (PRSRA 2011, s 82). R (Secretary of State for the Home Department) v Humberside PA [2004] EWHC 1642.

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6.207  Outside the metropolis, the Police Act 1996 (PA 1996) places each police force under the chief constable’s direction and control, or, in their absence, that of their deputy.1 The force is not under the control of the police authority (PCC) for operational purposes. The PCC provides the requisite premises and equipment (PRSRA 2011, s 2). It, subject to Home Secretary approval, has power of appointment over chief constables or deputy or assistant chief constables, and may require, subject to similar approval, the same officers to retire in the interests of efficiency or effectiveness.2 The PCC may institute disciplinary proceedings against the chief constable and the Home Secretary may require the PCC to retire the chief constable (PA 1996, s 42). PA 1996, s 10(1). PA 1996, ss 11(2) and 12(3) in relation to Assistant Chief Constables.

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6.208  The Greater London Authority Act 1999 established a police authority for the Metropolitan Police (s  310). This will replace the Home Secretary as the PA in London (s  312). The Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner are appointed by the Crown. Assistant Commissioners are appointed by the

672  Chapter 6 authority, subject to the Secretary of State’s approval (s 319). The authority may call upon the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner or Assistant Commissioners to retire on the grounds of economy and efficiency, acting with the Secretary of State’s approval (ss  318 and 319). Note the changes outlined above under the PRSRA 2011. 6.209  The Police Act 1997 created a national policing service: the National Criminal Intelligence Service whose role is the provision of intelligence to other police forces and national law enforcement agencies including the National Crime Squad set up under Part II of the Police Act 1997 and which brings together the regional crime squads. These bodies were disbanded by the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005. The Police Information Technology Organisation set up under Part IV of the Act was responsible for advising the police on information technology, but was disbanded by the Police and Justice Act 2006. Part V of the Act creates a new legislative framework for the disclosure of criminal records for employment purposes (see paras 2.286 et seq). 6.210  Ex p Northumbria Police Authority1 emphasised the special relationship between the Home Secretary and chief constables. The Court of Appeal held that a chief constable could provide plastic baton rounds and CS gas to the force under either s  41 of the Police Act 1964 or under a prerogative power to maintain the peace as an officer of the Crown.2 The issue of a Home Office circular advising that the chief constable did not have to consult the PA on their provision was ruled not to be ultra vires as it did not replace an exclusive power of the PA under s 4(4), but expressed rather a surviving prerogative power relating to public security.3 R  v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Northumbria Police Authority [1988] 1  All ER 556, CA. 2 To provide equipment to maintain efficiency and public order. 3 The Police Act 1964 had not filled all the space occupied by the former prerogative under the principle of A-G v De Keyser’s Royal Hotel [1920] AC 508, HL. See also R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Fire Brigades Union [1995] 2 All ER 244 HL. 1

6.211  The case is, it is submitted, unsatisfactory, as many basic constitutional points are not given sufficient analysis. What, for instance, is the extent of this prerogative? When will it come into play to remove the safeguard provided by the PA? 6.212  Police information is covered by the Official Secrets Acts, whereas local authority information is not per se so covered.1 Employees of a police authority, ie therefore employed by a county council where a committee of the council, are covered by the OSA 1989.2 One of the most frequent uses of Official Secrets Act 1911, s 2 concerned unauthorised use and sale of information from the police national computer, or police files.3 Unless it otherwise falls under the OSA 1989 as ‘Crown information’ (paras 4.163 et seq above). This would cover solicitors employed by forces. 3 As occurred with regularity in Northern Ireland. 1 2

Local government as providers and keepers of information   673

Police complaints 6.213  Provisions concerning the supervision of police complaints by the Police Complaints Authority and access to investigations generated a great deal of controversy. Many of the complaints which had sought access to information fell under the law concerning public interest immunity (ch 11 below) but not all did. Investigating officers’ reports were not available but the position relating to information generated by the investigation and held by the police was altered by the House of Lords when it ruled that such information could only be protected on a contents basis.1 Under Police Act 1996, s 80 the Police Complaints Authority was prevented from disclosing information received by it in connection with its functions.2 The position is now governed by the Police Reform Act 2002 (PRA 2002). Part 2 of, and Schs 2 and 3 to, this Act established the Independent Police Complaints Commission. Since January 2018 this body is known as the Independent Office of Police Conduct (IOPC). This body will be able to conduct independent investigations into the most serious complaints against the police as well as supervise or manage police investigation of complaints and hear various appeals from local resolution of disputes (a complainant has to consent to a local resolution) and investigations by chief officers or police authorities including where it is alleged inadequate information has been provided (PRA 2002, Sch 3, para 25(2) in the latter case). Complaints relating to death or serious injury must be referred to the IOPC, other complaints may be referred under regulations and the IOPC can direct a reference to it of a complaint. The system does not deal with complaints relating to direction and control of a police force. There is a duty on the IOPC to keep the complainant informed of the progress of an investigation, provisional findings of the person conducting an investigation, information about relevant reports and action thereunder and the outcome of such action. Regulations may provide for the detail3 and for exceptions to disclosure where information may be used for actual or prospective criminal proceedings, where disclosure may be premature or inappropriate and amongst other grounds for the protection of national security, to prevent crime or apprehend offenders, to prevent a disproportionate adverse effect in relation to any benefits or which is otherwise necessary on public interest grounds (PRA  2002, s  20). Section 21 imposes a duty on a chief officer, a police authority or the IOPC to keep ‘interested’ parties (apart from a complainant) informed of matters under the section. This will cover relatives and those suffering serious injury as an alleged result of conduct investigated and those who satisfy s 21(3). It might cover those who withhold their consent for the matter to be dealt with as a complaint leading to the circumstances being dealt with as a ‘conduct matter’. The latter may lead to an investigation even though there has been no complaint. It is restricted to matters which are potentially a breach of discipline or a criminal offence (PRA  2002, Sch  3, Part 2). Investigations may lead to disciplinary or criminal action (PRA 2002, Sch 3, Part 3). R v Chief Constable of the West Midlands ex p Wiley [1994] 3 All ER 420 (HL). R  (Green) v Police Complaints Authority [2004] 2  All ER  209 (HL). Section 80(1)(a) did not, in the circumstances, require disclosure of witness statements and other materials sought by the claimant. 3 Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2012, SI 2012/1204. 1 2

674  Chapter 6 6.214  Part 2 of and Sch 5 to the Policing and Crime Act 2017 (PCA 2017) put into place some changes to the regime set out above, although these provisions have not yet been brought into force. The main change is that the elements of the complaints system that were previously in the hands of the chief police officer can now be taken over by the local policing body (PCA 2017, s 13), a new s 4A will be inserted into the PRA 2002, permitting the IOPC to investigate a complaint on its own initiative (ie without referral), and s 19 of the PCA 2017 modifies Sch 3 to the PRA 2002 to place greater restrictions on the disclosure of sensitive information received from relevant government bodies and authorities during the investigatory process. Section 20 of the PCA  2017 modifies the PRA  2002 to grant enhanced powers of seizure, particularly of information stored in electronic form, by adding a new para 19ZE to Sch 3 to the PRA 2002. 6.215  The PCA  2017 also creates a regime for the submission of ‘super complaints’. Sections 25–27 of the PCA  2017 insert new ss  29A–29C of the PRA 2002. These provisions permit bodies designated by the Secretary of State to make a ‘super complaint’ about a police force or a number of police forces. Section 29A(1) of the PRA 2002 defines such a complaint as ‘A designated body may make a complaint to Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary that a feature, or combination of features, of policing in England and Wales by one or more than one police force is, or appears to be, significantly harming the interests of the public’. Section 29B gives the Secretary of State the power to designate bodies to make super complaints through secondary legislation, and s 29C gives the Secretary of State to regulate the procedure for making such complaints and investigating such complaints through secondary legislation. Two pieces of secondary legislation have been made under ss 29A and 29B.1 Police Super-complaints (Criteria for the Making and Revocation of Designations) Regulations 2018, SI 2018/412, and Police Super-complaints (Designation and Procedure) Regulations 2018, SI 2018/748.

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Chapter 7

Restrictions on the use of, and access to, information by public officials and representatives

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 7.1  The subject of the restriction on information within central government has been examined in ch 4. Such restrictions may also be placed expressly, or by the operation of law, on Crown information covered by the Official Secrets Act 1989 (OSA 1989) which is communicated to officials in other tiers of government, ie local government, public corporations, non-departmental bodies and so on, as well as members of the public, regardless of the fact that the recipients have not signed the OSA. Given the existence of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA 2000), it would be possible to plead a defence to charges under the latter Act where a recipient of information had no reason to believe that it had been handed over in contravention of the OSA 1989. Indeed, a proper consideration of an FOIA request may well constitute authorisation under the OSA  1989. Readers are referred to chs 1 and 4.

MPs, Lords and ministers 7.2  The ability of MPs to extract information from departments has been examined above in ch 4. When not protected by parliamentary privilege1 in the course of parliamentary proceedings, MPs are subject to the same rules of law on the use of information as any other citizen. Under s 13 of the Defamation Act 1996 a Member of Parliament or a peer may waive any protection ‘so far as concerns him’ of any enactment or rule of law which prevents proceedings in Parliament being impeached or questioned in any court or place outside Parliament and where his conduct in or relating to proceedings in Parliament is in question in defamation proceedings. This was introduced in the Lords to circumvent the decision in Prebble v Television New Zealand2 whereby defamation

676  Chapter 7 actions could be staid by a court if the invocation of parliamentary privilege by an MP or peer would cause an injustice to the other party whose ability to defend an action would thereby be seriously undermined by his inability to examine and cross-examine on the basis of privileged material. In Hamilton v Al Fayed3 which concerned the notorious episode in which Neil Hamilton MP was accused by Mohamed Al Fayed of taking bribes for asking parliamentary questions and who subsequently sued Al Fayed for defamation, the House of Lords ruled that s 13 was a ‘complete answer’ to the application to stay proceedings because it allowed the plaintiff MP to waive the privilege of the whole House, although he could not waive the privilege for another MP in legal proceedings; he could only waive the privilege for himself.4 It is important to note that s 13 of the Defamation Act 1996 was repealed by the Deregulation Act 2015 and its provisions no longer apply. It is, however, important to leave the discussion of this material in place to provide context to the discussion of the defamation cases involving MPs here. Wade and Ewing Constitutional and Administrative Law (2010, 15th edn) ch 11. Article 9 of the Bill of Rights is part of a wider manifestation of privilege in which ‘the courts and Parliament are both astute to recognise their respective constitutional roles’: Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Prebble v Television NZ [1995] 1 AC 321, PC. See also Toussaint v Attorney General of St. Vincent and the Grenadines [2007] UKPC 48, [2007] 1 WLR 2825, where the Privy Council found that s 16 of the House of Assembly (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act 1966 (of St. Vincent and the Grenadines), which sought to prevent the use of Parliamentary statements as evidence in legal proceedings without the permission of the Speaker of the House did not prevent T from using a statement by the Prime Minister in judicial review proceedings relating to expropriation of his property. This was the case because there was an established practice that ministerial statements in Parliament could be used in judicial review proceedings and also because in a case such as that of T (which concerned appropriation of his property) s 16 had to be read down in light of the constitutional right of protection for private property, thus requiring the statement to be admitted as evidence in order to facilitate such judicial review. In A v UK App 3573/97 (2002) Times, 28 December, the ECtHR ruled that absolute privilege from defamation for a legislature was not beyond the ‘margin of appreciation’ and was proportionate; and in McVicar v UK App No 4631/99, the ECtHR ruled that unavailability of legal aid for defamation actions was not a breach of Art 6 ECHR. However, the unavailability of legal aid in this case was a breach of Art 6 in Steel and Morris v UK (the McDonalds libel case) Application 68416/01 (15 February 2005), ECtHR. 2 [1995] 1 AC 321, PC. 3 [2000] 2 All ER 224, HL. 4 Defamation Act 1996, s 13(3) (now repealed). See Buchanan v Jennings [2004] 3 WLR 1163 (PC) on repetition of parliamentary statement on non-privileged occasion; record of parliamentary proceedings could be relied upon to confirm the making of a statement and subsequent confirmation of it, even if not repeated, and could lead to a liability in defamation. 1

7.3  In this case, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards (PCS) – appointed as a consequence of Lord Nolan’s first report – had investigated complaints against Neil Hamilton and had made an adverse report against him to the Select Committee on Standards and Privileges. The House of Lords doubted the correctness of the Court of Appeal’s decision in this case. The Court of Appeal had held that the questioning of the evidence before the Committee on Standards and Privileges, which had upheld the critical report on Neil Hamilton by the PCS, was not interfering with Parliamentary privilege because it was not questioning their conclusion but merely allowing the evidence to be questioned by a different process to the committee’s in a court of law.1 The Court of Appeal had come to the same conclusion as the Law Lords on s 13.

Restrictions on use of information by public officials and representatives   677 Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s criticism seems well directed.2 The route taken by the Court of Appeal would have allowed that very questioning of parliamentary proceedings which the privilege denies. In 2002, the incumbent Commissioner’s appointment ceased in circumstances suggesting retribution from MPs who disliked the investigatory thoroughness of the then Commissioner. The episode seriously undermined public credibility in the ability of Parliament to regulate itself.3 [1999] 3 All ER 317, CA. It was Jonathan Aitken’s ability to waive his privilege which led to his famous trial against The Guardian, his loss of that action and his subsequent trial and conviction for perjury. 3 See Standards of Conduct in the House of Commons Cm 5663 (Nov 2002) Committee on Standards in Public Life. This made numerous recommendations in relation to the Commissioner, including a fixed-term appointment of between 5 and 7 years, and that there should be an investigatory panel chaired by an independent lawyer to handle serious contested cases. There are numerous recommendations on procedure. See HC  Debs 26  June 2003 for the Parliamentary Debate. See also HC 1055 (2003–04) on protection of witnesses who have given evidence before select committees. 1 2

7.4  It is possible for statements made under parliamentary privilege to lead to liability in defamation if these are then repeated or confirmed outside Parliament. It is clear that the general principle is Article 9 of the Bill of Rights extends only to statements made in Parliament, and statements repeating or confirming the statements outside Parliament do not enjoy the absolute protection offered by Article 9. The decision of the Court of Appeal in Makudi v Triesman1 illustrates a situation where the Court of Appeal was willing to extend the protection offered by Article 9 of the Bill of Rights to statements made to an inquiry held by the Football Association that had subsequently been made to an inquiry by the Culture, Media and Sports Committee of the House of Commons related to alleged misconduct of bidders during the selection process for the country to hold the Football World Cup in 2018. The Court of Appeal held that the privilege provided by Article  9 of the Bill of Rights to statements made in Parliament could be extended to statements made outside Parliament if there was a public interest in the repetition of the statement that the speaker sought to serve and it might have been reasonably expected at the time the speaker made the statement in Parliament that he or she might be obliged to repeat it outside Parliament and the purpose of making both statements was the same or very closely related. [2014] EWCA Civ 179.

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7.5  Unlike elected councillors, MPs are under no statutory regulation to declare their financial interests, although they should not ask questions in the House where they have such an interest; nor are there rules of law preventing them voting on matters in the House in which they have an interest. Serious impropriety may be a matter for the Committee on Standards and Privileges which applies various resolutions of the House of Commons. 7.6 A  ‘compulsory’1 register of MPs’ interests has existed since a Resolution of the House on 22 May 1974 (and see the Resolution of 12 June 1975). In July 1996, a Code of Conduct and a Guide to the Rules Relating to the Conduct

678  Chapter 7 of Members was approved by the House of Commons and was most recently significantly revised in 2009, with further updates including one in 2018.2 This applies to ministers who are MPs and they are additionally under a code of practice qua Ministers (see para  4.99 above). It does not apply to the House of Lords which, since 1995, has had its own register of Lords’ interests which contains two mandatory entries and one discretionary entry. Lord Neill began an enquiry in June 2000 into the Lords’ register of business interests and to establish whether peers should operate under an ethical code of conduct; and the House of Lords agreed to a Code of Conduct and mandatory register of interests on 2 July 2001 (HL Debs 2 July 2001 col 630; and see HL 69 (2003–04) on the Code of Conduct and Members Interests, paras 46–47). The Code was subject of a major revision and strengthening in 2009 and has undergone more limited updates since. Since the 2009 reforms, the Code operates on a basis which is broadly equivalent to that which applies to the House of Commons.3 Enoch Powell persistently refused to register his interests. See Rost v Edwards [1990] 2 All ER 641 which has subsequently been doubted in Prebble above; and HC 115 (1989–90). 2 The Code of Conduct August 2018  HC  1474 (2017/2018), available at https://publications. parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmcode/1474/147402.htm. The latest version of the Code with the accompanying Guide for Members can be found as HC 1076, published on 14 April 2015. This is available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmcode/1076/1076.pdf. 3 Code of Conduct for Members of the House of Lords May 2015 HL 3 (2014/2015), available at http:// www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld/ldcond/code.pdf. 1

7.7  There are 10 categories of registrable interests1 for MPs covering: employment and earnings; donations and other support for activities as an MP;2 gifts, benefits and hospitality in the UK; overseas visits; gifts, benefits and hospitality from outside the UK; land and property; shareholding; family members employed; family members engaged in lobbying; and a final category, miscellaneous, ie any relevant interests not falling within the above. Registration is required for ‘financial interests or any other material benefit’. Unremunerated interests which might be thought by others to influence his actions in a manner similar to remunerated interests may be registered, although the decision to do this rests with the MP concerned. There are ten categories in the Code applicable to the House of Lords, including all those which must be declared by MPs except the controlled transactions and declaration of employment of family members. 2 The controlled transactions are loans or other credit agreements over £500 offered to members which relate to political activities. 1

7.8  An employment agreement which involves the provision of his services in his capacity as an MP must conform to the Resolution of the House of 6 November 1995 and subsequently amended, most recently on 1 August 2018. A copy of any agreement for the provision of such services must be placed with the PCS. The Nolan Committee recommended that paid advocacy should be prohibited, ie acting as a representative for another as an MP for pay or reward.1 Resolutions against paid advocacy go back as far as May 1695. Paid advocacy was prohibited by the Resolution of 15  July 1995. The rules on this issue are now contained in Chapter 3 of the Code. When adopted in 1995, the Code drew a distinction between initiation of Parliamentary proceedings on the one

Restrictions on use of information by public officials and representatives   679 hand and speaking in support of a subject after declaration of interest on the other, with the former strictly prohibited. Since 2002, the Code has not drawn this distinction, but prohibits a Member from doing anything in Parliament with the objective of conferring a benefit exclusively on an individual or body from whom the member has received or expects to receive a financial benefit. Members are free to speak or initiate proceedings which relate to interests of such individuals or bodies provided that the relationship between them and the Member is properly registered and declared. Guidance is given on the parameters of the advocacy rule (Chapter 3) and in difficult cases the advice of the PCS should be sought. The rules do not prohibit sponsorship, or acting as a director, adviser or consultant, and the line is difficult to draw in some cases. Further guidance is contained in Chapter 3 of the Code for Members who hold such positions. The rules on lobbying for reward or consideration cover advocacy or initiation of any cause or matter on behalf of any outside body or individual or urging any other Member of either House including Ministers to do so in any speech, PQ, Motion, or introduction of a Bill or Amendment. Chapter 2 of the Code of Conduct concerns Declaration of Members’ Interests and dates from the Resolution of 22 May 1974. For Divisions in the House or its committees, registration of an interest in the Register is sufficient. The Code has detailed provisions on declarations at other procedures: debates, written notices, select committees etc. And see recommendations 9 and 10 of the Neill Committee’s report: Reinforcing Standards Cm 4557 (2000).

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7.9  As already explained, a PCS exists who compiles the register on MPs, and also investigates complaints, from the public or other MPs, of breaches of the code. The office is non-statutory.1 The PCS reports to the Select Committee on Standards and Privileges. Communications between a member of the public and the PCS are not covered by Parliamentary privilege and are not legally privileged until the Commissioner decides the case ‘has some substance to merit further enquiry.’2 Such communications may, however, be given a qualified privilege especially in the light of the House of Lords judgment in Reynolds v Times Newspapers3 where the Law Lords, in a case concerning the press it should be noted, although not prepared to accept ‘political information’ as a generic category of information attracting qualified privilege, nonetheless adverted to the common law of misstatements of fact and the elasticity of the common law of qualified privilege to give protection to the press where necessary to protect freedom of expression and the genuine public interest. Reynolds, the former Irish Prime Minister, claimed to have been defamed by The Sunday Times. Disclosures made by the press would be covered by the Reynolds decision in appropriate circumstances.4 That decision has no direct relevance to those mentioned in the code who are not members of the press, or MPs, the latter of whom would be covered by parliamentary privilege if engaged in ‘proceedings in Parliament’. But it would appear anomalous if the more liberal framework of Reynolds were not extended to public spirited individuals where parliamentary privilege did not protect them. Presumably the PCS would treat the communications as confidential and the office would not be subject to orders of the court enjoining disclosure.5 The PCS is not susceptible to attack by way of judicial review, the

680  Chapter 7 Court of Appeal has held, because his work is inherently involved with the internal work of Parliament unlike the ombudsman, whose work is citizen-directed.6

For Scotland, see the Scottish Parliamentary Standards Commissioner Act 2002, and SI 2003/2278 extending powers of investigation to witnesses and documents in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, and SSI 2003/135 on the manner in which devolved and local authorities in Scotland perform their duties. The Public Bodies and Public Appointments etc Scotland Act 2003 provides for an office of Commissioner for Public Appointments to prepare and publish and keep under review a code of practice in respect of Scottish Ministers appointing to offices named in Sch 2. 2 Code of Conduct, para 107. 3 [1999] 4 All ER 609, HL. See also McCartan Turkington Breen (a firm) v Times Newspapers Ltd [2000] 4 All ER 913, HL and Mahon and Another v Rahn and Others (No 2) [2000] 1 WLR 2150. 4 If a statement about an individual is false it is defamatory because the law implies malice. Qualified privilege provides a defence. Where qualified privilege applies to cover a statement or more correctly an occasion when the statement was made, malice in fact has to be proved by the plaintiff. This can be proved where the statement was made with knowledge of its falsity, with recklessness as to its truth or where the respondent was negligent as to its truth. This is in contradistinction to the USA where a false statement about a politician attracts a qualified privilege unless made knowing it was false, or with reckless disregard as to its truth (the ‘public figure’ defence: New York Times Co v Sullivan 376  US  254 (1964). The Law Lords emphasised the elasticity of the common law on qualified privilege allowed an appropriate weight to be given to the importance of free speech by the media on all matters of public concern and confined interference with that freedom to what was necessary in the circumstances of the case. These circumstances were not to be considered separately from the duty-interest test – was there a duty to inform and a public interest in knowing – but were to be taken into account in determining whether the test was satisfied or whether the public was entitled to know the allegation. The following were offered as ‘illustrative’ examples of circumstances to consider in taking into account whether qualified privilege protects a statement: The seriousness of the allegation. The more serious the charge the public is misinformed and the individual damaged if the charge is untrue. The nature of the information and its concern to the public. The reliability of the source. Steps taken to verify the information. The status of the information – does it command respect? The urgency of the situation – news is a perishable commodity. Was comment sought from the plaintiff although this may not always be necessary? Did the article cover the ‘gist’ of the plaintiff’s version? The tone of the article – a newspaper may invite questions or investigations rather than make assertions. The circumstances of publication including timing. ‘This list is not exhaustive’ per Lord Nicholls at 626 b–e. Freedom of speech is the basis of true democracy, but should newspapers be compelled to publish a declaration of falsehood if a statement was false but privileged? See Lord Hutton’s strictures in formulating the duties of investigative media reporters prior to publication in his investigation into the death of David Kelly: HC 247 (2003–04) pp 212–214. See Loutchanksy v The Times (No 2) [2002] 1 All ER 652 (CA) on the public interest in publishing an article ‘true or false’. See further: Galloway v Telegraph Group Ltd (2005) Times, 13 January; Miller v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2003] EWHC 2799; Oliver v Chief Constable of Northumbria [2003] EWHC 2417; and for a strict application of the ‘responsible journalism’ by the Court of Appeal: Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe No 3 [2005] EWCA Civ 74. The House of Lords overturned the decision of the Court of Appeal on the issue of ‘responsible journalism’ in Jameel, finding that the Court of Appeal’s finding that the qualified privilege defence did not apply as the newspaper had not delayed publication frustrated the intent of the House in Reynolds to liberalise the requirements of qualified privilege. See [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 AC 359. The courts have not been generous to journalists. See Dow Jones and Co Ltd v Jameel [2005] EWCA Civ 75 on ‘the legal presumption that publication of a defamatory article about an identifiable individual caused that individual to suffer damage, without the need to prove that the publication had in fact damaged that individual’s reputation, was not incompatible with the right to freedom of expression under the Human Rights Act 1998, Sch 1, Part 1, Art 10’ from the headnote. This issue was not appealed to the House of Lords in Jameel, but the Law Lords, in their opinions, appear to approve of the Court of Appeal’s approach to this issue. The Supreme Court returned to the question of the ‘responsible journalism’ test in Flood v Times Newspapers [2012] UKSC 11, [2012] 2 AC 273, and upheld an appeal from the Court of Appeal, in a case where the newspaper published allegations against a police officer in relation to corruption and the disclosure of confidential police information. 1

Restrictions on use of information by public officials and representatives   681 The police officer was ultimately exonerated by a police investigation, as no evidence could be found against him. Regardless of this, the Supreme Court found that qualified privilege could exist where there was an overriding public interest in publication, even if this left a claimant without a remedy. The overriding test for whether the privilege should be available is whether the publication exhibits the features of responsible journalism. In this case, the Court held that there was a strong circumstantial case against the claimant and there were reasonable grounds, having tried to verify the allegations against the claimant, for the publication. As such, qualified privilege applied in a case such as this. The Supreme Court held that the privilege covered publication in the newspaper and on its website up until 5 September 2007, when the police completed their investigation, but not to subsequent publication on the newspaper’s website until 2009, when the story was updated to reflect the status of the investigation by the police. Damages of £60,000 were ultimately awarded for the period where the defence did not apply: Times Newspapers Ltd v Flood [2013] EWHC 4075 (QB); and the subsequent litigation on costs (in which the newspapers were unsuccessful in avoiding liability for the costs of claims) was determined by the Supreme Court in 2017: Times Newspapers v Flood [2017] UKSC 33, [2017] 1 WLR 1415. The Defamation Act 2013 changes the position in future by abolishing the defence in Reynolds in s 4(6), although the statutory defence that is created in s 4 still requires the court to consider all of the circumstances of the case, and the factors considered in the ‘responsible journalism’ test are still relevant. The statute also sets out a defence for operators of websites in s  5, further elaborated by the Defamation (Operators of Websites) Regulations 2013, SI  2013/3028. The Act also creates statutory defences of ‘truth’ and ‘honest opinion’ in ss 2 and 3 and abolishes the common law defences of justification and fair comment accordingly. 5 See eg Contempt of Court Act 1981, s 10 (ch 11) and the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (ch  4). On cases of absolute privilege regarding evidence to the Office for the Supervision of Solicitors, see Gray v Avadis [2003]  EWHC  1830 (QB) and Baxendale-Walker v Middleton [2011] EWHC 998. For a case on qualified privilege between the Bar Council and members of the Bar, see Kearns v General Council of the Bar [2003] EWCA Civ 331, [2003] 1 WLR 1357. 6 R v Parliamentary Comr for Standards, ex p Al Fayed [1998] 1 All ER 93.

7.10  The expenses scandal which has affected both the Commons and the Lords led to substantial reform of the system for the claiming of Parliamentary expenses, including considerable enhancements to the openness of the process. Expenses claims were governed by the Green Book1 in the House of Commons. A  guide is in place on allowances in the House of Lords. The scheme for allowances in the House of Lords was revised considerably in 2010 and has been updated on a number of occasions since then, most recently in May 2018.2 Both Houses have now published details of expense claims made by members, with the House of Commons publishing detailed information about claims made from 2004/2005 until the third quarter of 2010. Following the expenses scandal, partly brought about by a number of successful FOIA requests and appeals,3 significant changes in the expenses scheme in the House of Commons were brought about. The Parliamentary Standards Act 2009 sets out a new regime for dealing with MPs’ expenses and creates the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority (IPSA). The Act requires the IPSA to create a scheme for the payment of MPs’ allowances (s 5) along with appropriate guidance (s 7). By virtue of Sch 1 of the Act, IPSA is required to produce an annual report and is subject to FOIA 2000. IPSA adopted a publication scheme under FOIA  2000, s  19 in 2010, which has been updated on a number of occasions, most recently in 2018;4 and IPSA consults each year on the adoption of the publication scheme and the nature of the information that will be published or withheld.5 The guidance outlines a broadly proactive approach to the publication of MPs’ expense claims, broken down into categories and also in terms of total expenses claimed. There is an

682  Chapter 7 increasingly sophisticated searchable database, which allows the public to make searches by individual MP, category of expense, etc, and to see a map of expense claims. The guidance makes it clear that digitised copies of receipts and other documentation supporting expense claims will not ordinarily be made available, primarily on grounds of the expense of doing so. The guidance also sets out what information will not be published routinely – generally MPs’ personal information and that of their staff, such as addresses, bank account details, etc. The details of individual receipts are not published, but they are acknowledged to be available under FOIA. No details of security or disability budgets are published, but the details of the total claims for both each year are included. House of Commons (2009) Green Book. House of Lords (2018) Guide to Financial Support for Members. 3 See eg  FS50074144 and EA/2006/0015–0016 Corporate Officer of the House of Commons v Information Commissioner and Norman Baker and Corporate Officer of the House of Commons v Information Commissioner (Leapman, Brooke and Thomas) EA/2007/0061–0063, 0122–0123 and 0131. 4 IPSA  (2018)  IPSA  Publication Scheme available at: http://www.theipsa.org.uk/media/184882/ ccs0718117668-001_ipsa-publication-scheme_web-accessible-3.pdf. 5 IPSA (2018) Consultation on IPSA’s publication policy for MPs’ business costs and expenses available at: http://www.theipsa.org.uk/media/184807/consultation-on-ipsa-publication-policy.pdf. 1 2

7.11  IPSA took over the publication of MPs’ expense claims from 7 May 2010. IPSA has maintained the database outlined above from that date and the database is available to be searched via IPSA’s website. In addition to the data that IPSA makes available in line with the guidance outlined in the previous paragraph, it has also received a considerable number of FOIA claims. These, along with any responses, are available on IPSA’s website.1 See http://www.theipsa.org.uk/publications/freedom-of-information.

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7.12  The regime for the House of Lords is comparatively less stringent, with the Parliamentary Standards Act 2009, s 2 specifically excluding the House of Lords from the regime. There have, however, been substantial reforms to the system of allowances in the Lords and the transparency of claims. Rule 10(c) of the recently adopted Code of Conduct1 states that failure to comply with the rules in respect of the financial support to members is a breach of the Code and is subject to investigation by the newly created House of Lords Commissioner for Standards, which has taken over the investigation of such complaints from the Clerk of the Parliaments. Details of members’ claims for allowances and expenses are published on Parliament’s website,2 and the House of Lords Committee for Privileges and Conduct has considered a number of recent cases of improper claims and has made reports accordingly. Code of Conduct for Members of the House of Lords and Guide to the Code of Conduct. See http://www.parliament.uk/mps-lords-and-offices/members-allowances/house-of-lords/ holallowances/hol-expenses04/.

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7.13  In addition, conventions govern the use by present and past Ministers of former ministerial documents and Cabinet documents which formed part of their duties while in office or which cover their current field of responsibility.1 These are now codified in the Ministerial Code,2 which provides that former

Restrictions on use of information by public officials and representatives   683 Ministers should have reasonable access to their papers from the period when they were in office, including having access to the Cabinet Office or Cabinet Committee papers which were issued to them when in office or which they were known to have handled (r 2.9). Ministers are supplied with guidelines on avoiding a conflict of interest between personal and public duties while in office (see para 4.99). The Code prohibits any Minister from writing a book on their experience as a Minister while in office, or entering into a contract to do so (r 8.9). Former Ministers must submit a copy of the manuscript of any book written about their experiences after their time in office to the Cabinet Secretary ‘in good time before publication’ and must also abide by the guidance contained in the Radcliffe report (r 8.10). The law of confidentiality, which was examined in ch 4, applies to the use by Ministers or former Ministers of official information, although except in the most blatant and serious of breaches it may prove difficult to invoke. An injury to the public interest would have to be established to award an injunction preventing publication, and the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1988 would have to be brought into consideration, especially s 12 and Art 10 ECHR (see para 4.349). The situation where this is most likely to arise relates to publication of memoirs. Certainly, there has been no successful case brought by or on behalf of the government which has prevented publication by a Minister of his or her memoirs. In the spring of 2000, when it became publicly known that Stella Rimington, the former Head of the Security Service MI5, was planning to publish her memoirs, no steps were taken to prevent publication. David Shayler, it will be recalled, was prosecuted under the OSA 1989.3 For a discussion of the Parliamentary Affairs Select Committee investigation into political memoirs and possible unauthorised disclosure, see para 4.331 above. Hunt (1982) Public Law 514. Cabinet Office (2018) Ministerial Code. 3 From 1983, it is suggested that seven books have been published by former security and intelligence officials about their work: Norton Taylor (2000) The Guardian, 27 July. 1 2

7.14  It is surprising, perhaps, that public opinion has not forced a more detailed regulation by law on the abuse by MPs and ministers of their official position and information derived therefrom until recently, with the enactment of the Recall of MPs Act 2015. In this respect, the Nolan Reports and those of his successors (including Sir Christopher Kelly), in spite of their significant advances, have largely continued the traditions of self-regulation and internal control over standards in public life in central government, in contradistinction to legal regulation. Those traditions came under further strain when the Committee investigated a report by the PSC into Keith Vaz MP and a junior Minister. There had been significant obstruction of the PSC in her investigation of alleged breaches of the Code (HC 314 (2000–01), paras 65–72). It is evident that the public opprobrium driven by the expenses scandal led to increased legal regulation and intervention into the system of Parliamentary expenses, including some criminal prosecutions and a clarification of the position in relation to Parliamentary privilege where criminal offences may have been committed in relation to expense claims.1 Expenses are now undoubtedly dealt with in a more transparent way and the rules for both Houses have been modified significantly. More broadly, however, other than the introduction of the House of Lords Commissioner for Standards,

684  Chapter 7 relatively few changes have been introduced to prevent abuses other than in relation to expenses. In fact, it is arguable that the rules in relation to initiation of Parliamentary proceedings as a result of an employment relationship are more permissive now than they have been in the past. R v Chaytor [2010] UKSC 52, [2010] 3 WLR 1707.

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7.15  The Recall of MPs Act 2015 was passed by Parliament following pressure that arose from the expenses scandal. The Act provides, in s 1, three reasons why an MP may be recalled: an MP may be convicted of a criminal offence leading to imprisonment or detention and has not appealed within the requisite appeal period, or if on appeal the conviction is not overturned; an MP may be censured by the Commons Standards Committee resulting in a suspension from the House of 10 sitting days or more, or 14 days outside the period when the House sits; or an MP may be convicted under s 10 of the Parliamentary Standards Act 2009 for providing false and misleading statements in relation to expenses and then the MP either does not appeal within the requisite period, or the conviction is not overturned on appeal. Section 5 of the Act requires that, as soon as the Speaker of the House becomes aware that one of the recall conditions in the Act has been met, he must notify the petitions officer for the MP’s constituency, unless any of the exceptions in s 5(2) apply. Once notice has been given, the recall officer must run a petition in the constituency concerned in accordance with ss 6–12 of the Act. Under s 14, the petition is successful if more at least 10% of the eligible registered electors in the constituency sign the recall petition (s  14(3)). If the recall petition reaches the level required in the Act, the seat is declared vacant and a by-election must be held. It is perhaps important to note that the MP who has been removed is not prohibited from standing in that election, provided that no other statutory prohibitions affect the MP’s ability to stand. 7.16  So far, only one petition has been held following the censure of Ian Paisley MP, the MP for North Antrim. The House of Commons voted in favour of the motion supporting the critical report and suspended him from the Commons for 30 sitting days. Ultimately, Mr Paisley was not recalled, because after the running of the recall petition only 9.4% of electors voted in favour. This demonstrates the weakness of the approach in the Act, as the need for individuals to vote either in person, by post or by proxy over a period of six weeks perhaps means that the process loses its immediacy (unlike in the case of voting over a shorter period) and also has the potential to discourage those who would prefer to vote online.

Civil servants 7.17  As well as the OSA  1989 and other specific statutes prohibiting the disclosure of information, the civil service code sets out a series of prohibitions aimed at preventing conflicts of interest. There was no statute governing the civil service although a Bill was before the House of Lords in 2003–04 (see below). They were governed under a prerogative power and orders, although Lord Neill and others suggested that the time was ripe for a Civil Service Bill which amongst other things would prevent them being dragged into the political arena

Restrictions on use of information by public officials and representatives   685 (see para  4.152 above). The governance of the Civil Service was put on to a statutory footing by the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, noted above in chs 1 and 4. Breaches of confidentiality and conflicts of interest are largely a matter of internal discipline and domestic hearings with the occasional cause célèbre such as the Ponting trial elevating matters to the criminal courts.1 The provisions governing confidentiality have been examined in ch 4. Further provisions cover Crown copyright. Specific prohibitions covering corruption – which might involve the sale on one’s own behalf of information or advantages or opportunities while on official business2 – in the public sector, and the public and private sector, are contained in the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889 and the Prevention of Corruption Acts 1906 and 1916.3 These are not restricted to Crown servants, and the 1889 Act does not cover an agent of the Crown. Nolan in his first report recommended clarification by Parliament of the law relating to bribery, or receipt of bribes by MPs and furthermore that the statute law on bribery should be consolidated. The Bribery Act 2010 is now in force and has repealed the legislation outlined above. The Act creates new offences of bribing another person and a number of new offences in relation to receipt of bribes which results in improper performance of a function or activity. It is clear that the Act also envisages circumstances in which the receipt of a bribe may constitute improper performance of a relevant activity in and of itself without the need for further action or inaction on the part of the recipient. Section 3 of the Act defines the functions or activities that are subject to the Act’s provisions. All public functions are covered by the Act, provided that the person performing the function or activity is expected to do so in good faith, with impartially, or is in a position of trust. Section 16 of the Act extends its application to ‘individuals in the public service of the Crown’. In order for an offence to be committed, s  4 requires that the function or activity is performed ‘in breach of a relevant expectation’, or that the failure to perform a particular function or activity is itself a breach of a ‘relevant expectation’. The test of what is expected is outlined in s 5(1) as ‘what a reasonable person in the United Kingdom would expect in relation to the performance of the type of function or activity concerned’. In the case of MPs and civil servants it seems likely that this test would at least in part be informed by the standards codes outlined above.4 So far, there have been no prosecutions of public servants under the Bribery Act 2010 that have led to reported cases, and the only case that has so far arisen in this context was a claim that the ‘confidence and supply’ agreement supporting the current government was in contravention of the Act.5 Despite considerable discussion and a number of proponents, the Bribery Act did not create a new statutory offence of misconduct in public office and it seems unlikely that such an offence will be created in the near future, depending on the outcome of the Law Commission’s work in this area.6 See paras 4.281 et seq above, and the codes referred to. Rules exist requiring under-secretaries and above (and their equivalent) to seek government assent before accepting employment in business and other bodies within two years of resignation or retirement. Government departments apply similar rules where officials below that rank have had contact with the prospective employer. See Treasury and Civil Service Committee: Acceptance of Outside Appointments by Crown Servants HC 216 (1980–81). See also: HC 44 (1988–89) on Parliamentary Lobbying Committee on Privileges. See Nolan First Report Cm 2850, recommendations 15, 17, 29, 30 and 31, and Neill Cm 4557, ch 11. Revised rules came into effect on 1 April 1996. The rules were extended

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686  Chapter 7



2 3



4



5 6

to Ministers and special advisers only after the Committee’s first report in 1995. An Advisory Committee on Business Appointments provides advice on appointments and the First report’s recommendation that its reasons should be published ‘was not fully implemented’ Neill (above), para 11.8. Reading v A-G [1951] AC 507, HL; A-G v Blake [2000] 4 All ER 385, HL. The essence of the offence is the receipt, or agreement to receive a reward etc or ‘advantage whatever’ (Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889, s  1(1)) or ‘any gift or consideration’ (Prevention of Corruption Act 1906, s 1(1), and see s 1(2)) in return for doing or forbearing to do anything … in which the public body (1889 Act) or principal (1906 Act) is engaged or concerned. Section 2 of the 1916 Act allows corruption to be presumed where any money, gift or other consideration has been paid, given to or received by a public sector employee. See R v Braithwaite [1983] 1 WLR 385, CA, on ‘consideration’; and R v Calland [1967] Crim LR 236 on dishonesty and corruption and cf R v Smith [1960] 1 All ER 256, and CCA, R v Lindley [1957] Crim LR 321. See Salmon Commission Standards of Conduct in Public Life Cmnd 6524 (1976) on a proposed offence of corruption at p 102. Can a leak in the public interest, albeit for reward, be corruption? The guidance on the application of the Act produced by the MoJ can be found at http://www. justice.gov.uk/downloads/guidance/making-reviewing-law/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf. It is important to note that this guidance applies to commercial organisations, as required by s 9 of the Act, but is likely to have relevance to public authorities due to the effects of s 16 of the Bribery Act 2010. R (on the application of McClean) v First Secretary of State [2017] EWHC 3174 (Admin). It is important to note that there is a common law offence of misconduct in public office, although the House of Lords has held that prosecutions under this common law offence should not be brought where there is a suitable statutory offence to pursue: R v Rimmington, R v Goldstein [2005] UKHL 63. The Law Commission is presently considering possible reform of this offence, with recommendations due in 2019. For the range of documents so far, see https://www.lawcom. gov.uk/project/misconduct-in-public-office/.

7.18  In ch  4 there was a discussion of the ninth report of the Committee on Standards on Ministers, Special Advisers and the Permanent Civil Service and the Government Response and the Code for Special Advisers (see paras 4.99 and 4.151).

EUROPEAN UNION 7.19  Article  339 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides that members of the institutions of the EC and officials and servants shall be required, even after their duties have ceased, not to disclose information covered by professional secrecy about undertakings, business relations and cost components. Staff regulations (interpretation of which is now dealt with by the General Court) specify restrictions on the use of information, and the case law of the General Court and ECJ has examined cases involving publication of works by officials in alleged contravention of the regulations.1 Case C-274/99P Connolly v EC Commission [2001] ECR I-1611; Case C-340/00P EC Commission v Cwik; see A Biondi (2003) European Public Law 39.

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LOCAL GOVERNMENT1 7.20  The most important restrictions will be those operating to restrict disclosure on the use of information by members of authorities and by officers. For Scotland, see the Ethical Standards in Public Life etc (Scotland) Act 2000 which covers councils and devolved bodies.

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Restrictions on use of information by public officials and representatives   687 7.21  Legislation aimed at preventing corruption seeks to restrict the use of official, or other, positions for personal gain or profit and these will apply to officials in local government. See paragraph  7.17 above for a discussion of the impact of the Bribery Act 2010 in this area. Members who have extensive rights to information (see below) are bound by legal restrictions and there was a Department of the Environment code of guidance which was provided for under the LGHA 1989 and was replaced by a code of conduct under the LGA 2000, which has now been repealed by the Localism Act 2011. Standards are now left in the hands of each local authority. Such restrictions have been the subject of extensive investigation by government-appointed bodies and by government replies since the late 1960s. 7.22  The former national code of local government conduct constituted guidance and was not thought to be legally binding upon members. However, the local ombudsman has regard to the code when considering whether action, and specifically a failure to comply with the code, constitutes maladministration. In R v Local Comr for Administration, ex p Liverpool City Council the ombudsman was ruled to have acted lawfully when she applied the code’s test of ‘interest’ to establish bias on the part of councillors in making a planning decision. The councillors argued that the more relaxed test of bias in administrative law should have been the determinant of bias and in this case the maladministration of which the ombudsman found them guilty.1 The code provided that a member’s overriding duty was to the whole local community with a special duty to constituents. Councillors should not be influenced by private or personal factors in any decision which they had to make. They should avoid any occasion for suspicion or the appearance of improper conduct. It is a councillor’s duty alone to decide what view to take on a council matter. The code emphasised that non-pecuniary interests such as kinship, friendship, membership of or association with a society, trade union, freemasons,2 or voluntary bodies can be as important as pecuniary interests. Unless insignificant, such an interest should be disclosed and the member should decide whether it is clear and substantial. If s/he so decides, s/he should withdraw, pending consideration by the meeting, unless one of four circumstances or other dispensation obtains (para 12). [1999] 3 All ER 85; affirmed [2001] 1 All ER 462. See R v Broadland District Council, ex p Lashley (2000) 2 LGLR 933, CA. 2 See R v Newham London Borough Council, ex p Haggerty (1986) 85 LGR 48, in which it was ruled a mandatory requirement that councillors declare whether they were inter alia freemasons before being allocated to committees was intra vires. The decision was reversed by the LGHA 1989. 1

7.23  This code was replaced by a new model code of conduct for members and co-opted members of relevant authorities in England made by the Secretary of State by order under LGA 2000, s 50. The National Assembly for Wales also developed a model code (which still applies in Wales) (SI 2008/788, as amended). The following provisions replaced those under Local Government and Housing Act 1989 (LGHA  1989), s  19 and Local Government Act 1972 (LGA  1972), ss 94–97. The whole standards regime for England has now been repealed by the

688  Chapter 7 Localism Act 2011 and each authority is now required to create its own code of standards and relevant monitoring and enforcement machinery. This material is covered in some detail in ch 6 (paras 6.129–6.135). 7.24  Under LGA  2000, s  81 every relevant authority must establish and maintain a register of interests of the members etc of the authority. This duty is discharged by the Monitoring Officer. This will be available for public inspection. Each member etc must be required by virtue of the mandatory provisions of the code to register such financial and other interests as specified in the mandatory provisions of the code. The mandatory provisions must also require any member etc to disclose such interests before taking part in the business of the authority relating to that interest and also prevent or restrict the participation of a member in any business to which such an interest relates. This section remains in force in England, although there is no longer a model code in England, but the illustrative text for the code of conduct under the Localism Act 2011 published by the DCLG includes provisions on registration of interests (see para  6.130 above). In Wales, a dispensation from a prohibition from participation by the authority’s standards committee will not constitute a breach of the code by the member. The circumstances in which a dispensation may be given may be set out in regulations (though none seem to have been created yet). Where information relating to personal interests could be considered to be ‘sensitive’ (defined as creating, or being likely to create, a serious risk that the member or a person who lives with the member will be subject to violence or intimidation) then, subject to the agreement of the authority’s monitoring officer, such an interest need not be included on the register. Note that the Localism Act 2011 has created criminal offences of failure to register interests by members of local authorities (see para 6.135 above).

The law on officers’ duties 7.25  Like members, officers are subject to the civil law of confidentiality, although the latter qua an employment relationship, the former qua membership (see paras 7.46 et seq below). Councillors and officers should show ‘mutual respect’ to each other. For Wales, section 82 of the LGA  2000 allows the Secretary of State, and the Welsh National Assembly, to issue a code on the conduct which is expected of qualifying employees of relevant authorities. Consultation must take place with local authority representative bodies, trade unions, the Audit Commission and the Commission for Local Administration. The Welsh Government introduced a code of conduct for employees in the Code of Conduct (Qualifying Local Government Employees) (Wales) Order 2001, SI  2001/2280. This order applies to all local government employees in Wales with the exception of teachers and firefighters. In England, this section has been repealed by the Localism Act 2011, which is unsurprising given the broader changes to the standards regime in England.1 LGA 2000, s 82(8) for qualifying employees.

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Restrictions on use of information by public officials and representatives   689 7.26  The LGHA 1989 deals with perceived abuse on the appointment and use of officers and advisers in local government. This is known as ‘twin-tracking’. 7.27  Sections 115–117 of the LGA 1972 deal with a variety of relevant themes on officers’ duties. Section 116 – which has been applied and referred to in numerous regulations – prohibits an officer of an authority being a member of the employing authority. Section 1 of the LGHA 19891 has extended the prohibition to those holding politically restricted posts under any other local authority in Great Britain. These sections were augmented by the Local Government Officers (Political Restrictions) Regulations 1990.2 LGHA 1989, s 2(1) defines holders of politically restricted posts as: (a) the person designated under s 4 below as the head of the authority’s paid service; (b) the statutory chief officers; see s 2(6); (c) a non-statutory chief officer; see s 2(7). This does not include those whose duties are solely secretarial or clerical or are ‘support services’; (d) a deputy chief officer; see s 2(8); again secretarial etc duties are excluded; (e) the monitoring officer designated under s 5; (f) any person holding a post to which s/he was appointed in pursuance of s 9;3 (g) any person not falling within paras (a) to (f) above whose post is for the time being specified by the authority in a list maintained in accordance with s  2(2) and according to directions under LGHA  1989, s  3 or 3A or with LGA 1972, s 100G(2) or Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973, s 50G(2) (list of officers to whom powers are delegated). See Cm 433 (1988) ch 5 for the reasons behind the government’s reform. See SI 1990/851. 3 This concerns assistance for political groups. 1 2

7.28  Under s  2(2) an authority has to prepare and maintain a list of posts, duties of which fall within s  2(3) (below) and are not exempted. They will be listed and deposited with the ‘proper officer’.1 The list in s 2(2) will be deposited within two months of the section coming into force and any modifications to the list will also be notified. Previously, all officers in full-time posts (or parttime posts where the remuneration, if the officer worked full-time, would have exceeded the prescribed amount) whose remuneration exceeded an amount prescribed in Regulations were included on the list of those who were subject to political restrictions. This requirement was removed by the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009, s 30. The result of this is that posts are no longer included on the list of politically restricted posts only by virtue of the level of remuneration, but remain to be listed by local authorities if it is determined that LGHA 1989, s 2(3) applies. See LGA 1972, s 270(3).

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7.29  Under LGHA 1989, s 2(3), the duties of the post under a local authority fall within s 2(2) if they consist of or involve any one or more of the following tasks:

690  Chapter 7 ‘(a) giving advice on a regular basis to the authority themselves, to any committee or sub-committee of the authority or to any joint committee on which the authority are represented; (b) speaking on behalf of the authority on a regular basis to journalists or broadcasters.’ 7.30  Head teachers, principals of schools, colleges etc maintained or assisted by LEAs are excluded, as are teachers or lecturers in such establishments.1 In England, the recently introduced LGHA 1989, s 3A (inserted by the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007) allows the holder of a post listed under s 2(3) to apply to the standards committee of a local authority to have that post exempted from the list and for any person to apply to the standards committee to have a post which is not presently listed to be included on the list. Under the Localism Bill 2010–2011, the head of paid service in a local authority will take over this role from the standards committee. In Wales, persons shall be appointed by the Secretary of State to consider, inter alia, applications for exemption from political restriction and to advise on the determination of questions arising under s 2(3), supra (s 3). A local authority must give such a person all information as is reasonably required for the statutory functions, and must comply with that person’s directions. The post-holder must be informed where that post is included in a list by the person. In the case of Ahmed v UK2 the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the regulations made under the statute were not in breach of Arts 10 (freedom of expression), 11 (freedom of association), and Art 3 of Protocol 1 (right to participate fully in the electoral process). LGHA 1989, s 2(10). [1999] IRLR 188.

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Staff appointments on merit 7.31  The LGHA  1989 also makes provision in relation to the appointment of staff (and assistants for political groups). All staff appointments of local authorities, or parish or community councils in England and Wales, shall be made on merit (s  7(1)), whether appointed by the authority etc or a committee and whether made under s 112 of the LGA 1972 (s 7(2)). This provision is subject to legislation on employment for the disabled;1 genuine occupational requirements relating to sex, pregnancy and maternity, marriage and civil partnership, gender reassignment and race;2 and the necessary qualifications of those responsible for the administration of the financial affairs of certain authorities (LGHA  1989, s 113). The section came into force at the expiry of the period of two months beginning on the day of enactment (16 November 1989). Equality Act 2010, ss 39, 40 and 49– 51, and Sch 8. Equality Act 2010, Sch 9, para 1.

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Staff and standing orders 7.32  Under LGHA 1989, s 8, regulations may require relevant authorities to incorporate in Standing Orders (SOs) prescribed provisions relating to staff,

Restrictions on use of information by public officials and representatives   691 subject to modification or non-modification as specified. SOs relate to staff if they make provision for appointments to paid office or employment by the authority or the dismissal or disciplining of such persons.1 SI 2001/3384 (England) and SI 2006/1275 (Wales).

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7.33  The SOs restrict the manner of exercising the power of selection for, or of, appointment so as to make it exercisable only by the authority itself, or a committee or sub-committee, or by particular officers of the authority and to restrict an authority and its committees/sub-committees giving directions on whom to appoint or ‘otherwise to interfere with the making of appointments by such persons’.1 Further, regulations may require the monitoring officer (MO) to prepare a report to the authority in respect of every proposed appointment of a person to a politically restricted post2 stating whether in his or her opinion the proposed appointment can be made without contravening any statutory provision in Part I of the LGHA 1989 and without considering matters ‘which could not properly be taken into account’. If it cannot be so made, s/he must state the reasons.3 The regulations may provide that SOs: ‘prohibit the authority or any committee, sub-committee or other person acting on their behalf from dismissing or taking other disciplinary action against a person holding office or employment under the authority except in accordance with recommendations contained in a report made to the authority by an independent person of such a description as is prescribed by the regulations.’4 3 4 1 2

LGHA 1989, s 8(3)(a)–(b). LGHA 1989, s 8(3)(c). LGHA 1989, s 8(3)(d). LGHA 1989, s 8(3)(e).

7.34  LGHA 1989, s 8(4) empowers these regulations to contain a wide variety of incidental provisions. These concern delegations; reports of MOs on sub-s (3) (c) above; the consequences of any contraventions of SOs under the regulations: ‘(i) in relation to any appointment or contract of employment; (ii) in relation to any proceedings on a complaint to an industrial tribunal; and (iii) in relation to any expenditure incurred by the authority,’ and in relation to the appointment of persons under s  9 of the LGHA  1989; and the appointment of persons for the purposes of joint committees on which ‘relevant authorities’ (s 8(5)) are represented. 7.35  The White Paper stated that councillors should be excluded from participating in the appointment of officers who are not within the proposed politically restricted category.1 Cm 433, para 5.40.

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Political advisers and exemptions 7.36  LGHA 1989, s 9 says that appointments under that section, viz assistants for political groups, may be made regardless of s  7 or any SO or rule of law

692  Chapter 7 rendering it unlawful to have regard to any person’s political activities or affiliations in determining whether s/he should be appointed. Such appointments are those: ‘… made for the purpose of providing assistance, in the discharge of any of their functions as members of a relevant authority, to the members of any political group to which members of the authority belong; (b) the terms of the appointment comply with subsection (3); (c) the appointment is to one of not more than three posts which a relevant authority have decided to create for the purposes of this section; and (d) each of those posts falls, under the standing orders of the authority, to be filled from time to time in accordance with the wishes of a political group to which the post has been allocated under those standing orders.’1 See para 6.111 above, on political advisers.

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7.37  SOs of relevant authorities whose members are in different political groups shall, by virtue of s 9(5): (a) prohibit the making of an appointment to any post allocated to a political group until the authority have allocated a post to each of the groups which qualify for one; (b) prohibit the allocation of a post to a political group which does not qualify for one; and (c) prohibit the allocation of more than one post to any one political group. 7.38  LGHA 1989, s 9(6) caters for the situation where members of a relevant authority are split into different political groups. A  group shall qualify for a post if: ‘(a) the membership of that group comprises at least one-tenth of the membership of the authority; (b) the number of the other groups (if any) which are larger than that group does not exceed two; and (c) where the number of the other groups which are the same size as or larger than that group exceeds two, the authority have determined that that group should be a group to which a post is allocated; and it shall be the duty of a relevant authority, before making any allocation for the purposes of this section in a case in which there are groups which would qualify for posts if paragraph (c) above were disregarded, to make such determinations under that paragraph as secure that there are no more nor less than three groups which do qualify for a post.’ 7.39  Powers cannot be delegated for the discharge of the authority’s functions to a s  9 appointment (LGHA  1989, s  9(8)). Further provisions stipulate that officers or employees shall not act under the direction of a s  9 appointment (except secretarial or clerical services). Further, SOs may specify, under regulations which may be made: ‘(a) the circumstances in which the members of a relevant authority are to be treated as divided into different political groups;

Restrictions on use of information by public officials and representatives   693 (b) as to the persons who are to be treated as members of such a group and as to when a person is to be treated as having ceased to be a member of such a group; (c) requiring the question whether a person is or is not a member of a political group to be determined in such manner as may be provided for by or under the regulations; (d) requiring a relevant authority from time to time to review allocations made for the purposes of this section; (e) specifying the manner in which, and times at which, the wishes of a political group are to be expressed and the consequences of a failure by such a group to express its wishes; and regulations under this section may contain such incidental provision and such supplemental, consequential and transitional provision in connection with their other provisions as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.’ 7.40  LGHA 1989, s 10 limits the amount of paid leave which may be given by the latter authority to an officer who is a member of another authority. 7.41  It is necessary to spell out the above provisions to comprehend the far greater degree of regulation of officers and political advisers and, inter alia, their use of local authority information, or political group information. The 1990 Code stated that officers are responsible to the council and are appointed according to legal rules and SOs. An officer’s job is to advise councillors and the council, and to carry out the council’s work under the direction and control of the council and its committees. The government made such copious provision in law, to be amplified by regulations and SOs, because they felt, contrary to the 1986 Widdicombe report, that a statutory chief executive would be an inappropriate person to arbitrate on the detailed application of rules for party balance on committees, or deciding whether a councillor needs to see a document or attend a meeting. It would impose a uniform pattern of organisation at the highest level on all authorities and it required a detailed definition of the role of the chief executive in relation both to members and other chief officers. This the then government found ill-advised. 7.42  At the time of the first edition of this work, that approach seemed hard to square with the role of the MO and the officer designated under s 4 as the head of the paid service, with access to all necessary resources and with a duty to report to the council and all members, as well as the changes relating to the chief financial officer. It now seems unavoidable. 7.43  A draft consultation paper from the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister in August 2004 queried whether a separate code of practice from that for employees, dealing specifically with conduct of political advisers, should be produced, though none has yet been developed.

694  Chapter 7

Attendance of officers at party groups 7.44  In relation to the attendance of officers at party groups and meetings, the government stated: ‘The Government agree broadly with the Committee’s proposals which, they consider, give necessary recognition to the forum in which many major issues of council policy are now formulated in many local authorities, and the need for officers to act effectively in giving advice to councillors. The Government propose therefore to recommend the Local Authorities’ Conditions of Service Advisory Board to amend the terms and conditions of service to local government officers to make clear that no special inhibition is placed on officers’ attendance at party groups. In addition, the Government will encourage local authorities to set out in local conventions details of their arrangements for officer attendance at party group meetings, together with safeguards to ensure that all requests for officer attendance are addressed to the chief executive or appropriate chief officer, who would have responsibility for deciding which officers should attend, and that all substantial party groups on the council are notified and offered this facility. Subject to satisfactory arrangements being made by local authorities, the Government do not propose to legislate on this matter.’1 Cm 433, para 5.30.

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7.45  The position of officers being present at new style executive meetings was discussed in ch 6 (paras 6.27 et seq above).

Legal restrictions on officers’ use of information 7.46  Section 117 of the LGA 1972 restricts an officer’s use of information: ‘(1) If it comes to the knowledge of an officer employed, whether under this Act or any other enactment, by a local authority that a contract in which he has any pecuniary interest, whether direct or indirect (not being a contract to which he is himself a party), has been, or is proposed to be, entered into by the authority or any committee thereof, he shall as soon as practicable give notice in writing to the authority of the fact that he is interested therein. For the purposes of this section an officer shall be treated as having indirectly a pecuniary interest in a contract or proposed contract if he would have been so treated by virtue of section 95 above had he been a member of the authority (see above). (2) An officer of a local authority shall not, under colour of his office or employment, accept any fee or reward whatsoever other than his proper remuneration.1 (3) Any person who contravenes the provisions of subsection (1) or (2) above shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine.’ See, on corruption, para 7.17 above.

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Restrictions on use of information by public officials and representatives   695 7.47  Section 115 is relevant as it places a duty on local authority employees: ‘… at such times during the continuance of his office or within three months after ceasing to hold it, and in such manner as the local authority direct, [to] make out and deliver to the authority, or in accordance with their directions, a true account in writing of all money and property committed to his charge, and of his receipts and payments, with vouchers and other documents and records supporting the entries therein, and a list of persons from whom or to whom money is due in connection with his office, showing the amount due from or to each. (2) Every such officer shall pay all money due from him to the proper officer of the local authority or in accordance with their directions.’

Officers’ access to information 7.48  It would be presumed that an officer has access to all necessary and relevant information to perform his or her duties in advising the council and its relevant members. Such questions would fall under the rubric of employment law. Unlike the position with members (see paras 7.52 et seq below), officers’ grievances have not caused a litany of litigation on this point. Section 117 of the LGA 1972 above deals with an officer’s duty to provide notice of an interest. Consultations took place on a code of conduct for employees (above). The provisions of the LGHA  1989 seek to ensure the political neutrality of appointments and aim to reduce the scope for improper interference by members in appointments, dismissals and discipline, thereby seeking to reduce occasions for refusing, on irrelevant grounds, access to information. 7.49  Legally, improper refusal to give access could justify a finding of constructive dismissal in appropriate circumstances. If relief were sought to obtain the document or information per se, would an officer proceed by judicial review or under private law process? Judicial review would probably be the better option but would an officer be interpreted as enforcing contractual rights? In reality such a problem is unlikely to remain unresolved to the extent that it would require the intervention of a court or tribunal. 7.50  Where a claim for access was made by an officer below the level of a chief officer of a department, the matter would be resolved by an internal ‘appeal’ to the head of department. Further recourse in the case of a dispute involving the head of a department would have to be made as a matter of practice to the chief executive,1 usually in conclave with the leader of the council. In the event of nonresolution, it would be a matter for the full council – an unlikely and undesirable scenario. Where a disciplinary aspect is present, the provisions in LGHA 1989, s 8(3)(e) would have to be complied with. Not as a matter of law – there is no statutory office of chief executive: see LGHA 1989, s 4, and Head of Paid Service.

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7.51  We look at the effects of the law of confidentiality below.

696  Chapter 7

Access by members to information and meetings council meetings

7.52  In ch  6, we saw how provisions for the new executive arrangements for authorities had brought with them their own provisions on access. This passage should be read in conjunction with the relevant section of ch 6 (paras 6.27 et seq above). The point was noted that these were built on the model of the Local Government (Access to Information) Act 1985 (LG(ATI)A  1985). There is also an abundance of common law principles on access which will remain relevant as well as statutory provisions for access outside executive arrangements. 7.53  Every councillor has a common law right to attend every part of all meetings of the full council by virtue of being elected and under LGA  1972, Sch  12, para  4(2)(b), and ‘a summons to attend the meeting, specifying the business proposed to be transacted thereat … shall … be left or sent by post’ to the home of every councillor. 7.54  Councillors must be summoned to the meeting and be given the agenda three clear days in advance of it taking place;1 only business specified in the summons may be transacted at the meeting, with the sole exception of the AGM, at which statutory business or urgent matters under SOs may also be conducted. ‘Any other business’ is unlawful where notice of the business is not specified. By LGA 2000, s 98(2) this period of three clear days may be extended by order to ‘such greater number of days as may be specified’. The day on which the notice is given and the day of the meeting are to be excluded: R  v Herefordshire Justices (1820) 3  B  & Ald 581. On council meetings see LGA  1972, Sch  12 as amended by Local Government Act 1985, Sch 14, para 35 and Sch 17. See LGA 2000, s 98.

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membership of committees and sub-committees

7.55  The provisions in the LGHA  1989 relating to the party balance of committees and sub-committees will substantially affect this topic. Within the provisions of ss 15–17, there has to be a proportional representation of political parties in relation to the parties’ membership of the council on committees and sub-committees. This is novel and amends the common law position.1 We looked at the provisions in ch  6 (paras 6.114 et seq above).2 Membership of the full council and their finance committee must comprise elected members alone. We also looked at the limits placed on co-option on to committees of non-elected members, of which in 1988 there were 6,000 compared with 24,000 elected councillors. The provisions seek to ensure that co-opted members have relevant experience and expertise, that they do not vote on decision-making committees, though this prohibition would not apply to advisory committees. Certain committees, eg police, are exempted. R v Rushmoor Borough Council, ex p Crawford (1981) Times, 28 November – council may exclude opposition members from committee membership; R  v Greenwich London Borough Council, ex

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Restrictions on use of information by public officials and representatives   697 p Lovelace [1990] 1 All ER 353; cf R v Sheffield City Council, ex p Chadwick (1985) 84 LGR 563 and ultra vires action vis-à-vis sub-committees; Manton v Brighton Corpn [1951] 2 KB 393. The council cannot delegate the power to remove from committees: R v Brent London Borough Council, ex p Gladbaum (1989) 88 LGR 627. See R v Warwickshire County Council, ex p Dill-Russell (1990) 89 LGR 640. 2 See R v Portsmouth City Council, ex p Gregory (1990) 89 LGR 478, DC.

7.56  The government did not accept that one-party policy groups should be exempted from the provisions of the LG(ATI)A 1985 or pro rata representation as Widdicombe suggested, making them special status ‘deliberative committees’. If committees, they are committees: ‘Instead the Government considered that such groups should retain an informal status and that the provision of officer advice (in so far as there is any doubt on the question) should be secured through appropriate amendments to officers’ terms and conditions of service and through published conventions adopted by individual councils to suit their own requirements. Officers would also be enabled to give advice to minority party groups. These proposals are subject to the reservation that officers should not be required to attend and advise such groups where party members other than councillors are present.’1 Cm 433, para 2.17.

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delegation to a single member

7.57  The government White Paper has a helpful passage: ‘Under the present law a council can delegate decisions to a committee, sub-committee or an officer. Decisions cannot be delegated to a single member,1 although the rule appears to be broken in some cases.2 The Committee recommended that this practice, often known as ‘chairman’s action’, should be made lawful. The Government do not agree since this would breach the principle of corporate decision making and the principle of pro rata representation on decision making committees which is proposed above. An urgency committee of, say, three members ought to be able to deal with the limited number of circumstances in which major urgent decisions are necessary while less important urgent decisions can be delegated to officers. The government will consider whether guidance to local authorities would be helpful.’3 R  v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p Hillingdon London Borough Council [1986] 1  All ER 810 affirmed, [1986] 2 All ER 273n CA; and cf R v Brent Health Authority, ex p Francis [1985] 1 All ER 74; R v Port Talbot Borough Council, ex p Jones [1988] 2 All ER 207. 2 Ex p Francis, above; and Fraser v Secretary of State for the Environment and the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (1987) 56 P & CR 386. 3 Cm 433, para 2.18. 1

7.58  This must now be seen in the light of the LGA 2000 where single-person decisions may be made. See, for example, LGA 2000, s 14(1), (2) and s 15(4)(b)(ii).

698  Chapter 7 executives

7.59  Powers are conferred upon executives by virtue of LGA 2000, ss 10–13 and functions so allocated may ‘not be discharged by the authority’ (s 13(10)(a)) and are not covered by LGA  1972, s  101(1) which concerns the arrangement for the discharge of functions by the authority. Functions may be discharged by the elected mayor or by arrangement of the mayor ‘by another member of the executive’ (s 14(2)(a), (b)(ii)). This facility is also afforded to executive leaders in non-mayoral executives where executive arrangements do not allocate functions under s 15(2) and s 15(4)(b). Where an executive consists of an elected mayor and an officer – ‘a mayor and council manager executive’ – functions may be discharged by the council manager who is an officer of the authority either alone or with the mayor but not by the mayor alone (s 16(2)(a) and (b)). The Secretary of State may by regulations arrange for the discharge of functions which may include their discharge by area committees (ss  17 and 18) or another local authority (s 19).

motives for voting

7.60  The Court of Appeal has held that where a member votes simply on the grounds of ‘blind party allegiance’ s/he is abandoning a duty to make up his or her own mind on how to vote on a particular issue. The issue in question involved setting a rate.1 The councillor was entitled to give weight to the views of colleagues in his party and to the party ‘whip’. However, the person challenging the resolution of the meeting on the grounds of ‘blind allegiance’ would have to establish as much, and this would not be established where councillors, albeit following a party line, nevertheless retained an unfettered discretion2 on the issue and a free choice. Even this case shows the difficulty involved in getting a court to look behind the record.3 R v Waltham Forest London Borough Council, ex p Baxter [1987] 3 All ER 671, CA; on misfeasance of office present in the votes of some members of a committee, see Jones v Swansea City Council [1989] 3 All ER 162, CA. In the Waltham Forest case, SOs made a distinction between committees dealing with general business and those dealing with quasi-judicial business: in the latter category an independence of judgment was required. 2 On the independence of a school governor: ILEA v Brunyate [1989] 1 WLR 542, HL. On fixed policies and manifesto promises, see Bromley London Borough Council v Greater London Council [1983] 1 AC 768, HL; cf Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council [1977]  AC  1014, HL and more recently, R  (Island Farm Development Ltd) v Bridgend CBC [2006] EWHC 2189 (Admin), [2007] BLGR 60. The Court of Appeal recently overturned a decision of the High Court which found that the making of a planning decision in a pre-election period (contrary to the council’s own guidelines) was unlawful due to the appearance of bias in some of the councillors. See R (Lewis) v Redcar and Cleveland BC [2008] EWCA Civ 746, [2009] 1 WLR 83. 3 This was not the case, however, in Bromley London Borough Council, supra. 1

7.61  In the case of a casting vote by a mayor, there was no duty on the mayor to use the casting vote to maintain a status quo, as that would continue a deadlock. A  casting vote, where exercised, had to be exercised ‘honestly and according to [a] perception of what was in the public interest’.1 The Court of Appeal has

Restrictions on use of information by public officials and representatives   699 added that a casting vote may be used as the voter thinks fit and in favour of the political party to which s/he belongs. Impartiality is not required.2 R v Bradford City Metropolitan Council, ex p Wilson [1989] 3 All ER 140. R v Bradford City Metropolitan Council, ex p Corris [1989] 3 All ER 156, CA.

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inspection of documents and attendance at meetings

7.62  The government rejected Widdicombe’s proposals making the chief executive the arbiter of contested cases involving members, usually of minority parties, and decisions to refuse them access to documents or to allow them to attend a meeting. The government did not intend to remove from the courts the ultimate resolution of such disputes. 7.63  Two further points are relevant before we look at the law on access. 7.64  First, a problem arises from the LG(ATI)A 1985. Widdicombe observed that it enables councillors to have access to documents not available to the public and in which they have a pecuniary interest. The government proposed to amend the law to correct the anomaly.1 Cm 433, para 2.19.

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7.65  Second, however, a proposal that councillors’ rights of access and attendance should be codified in statute and the common law provisions subsumed within such a codification did not eventuate in the LGHA 1989. The problem was identified with exclusion of minority parties which the provisions in the LGHA 1989 sought to redress.

Common law 7.66  The following discussion on the common law must be seen in conjunction with the LG(ATI)A  1985 rights and the changes on party political balance introduced by the LGHA 1989. The common law will also have to be assessed in the light of arrangements made for access to executive committees which were discussed in ch 6. 7.67  What is the law? A  corpus of precedents going back to the eighteenth century establishes the rights of members of corporations to see the books or documents of the corporation of which they are members, providing they have no ulterior or improper motive in wishing to see them. A similar right existed for copy-holders to examine the muniments held by the lord to establish the terms of their tenancies – sometimes expressed in forceful language.1 Mandamus (mandatory order) would issue to enforce the duty on the body at the discretion of the court. A series of judgments of less appreciable antiquity has established the following propositions. A member has a prima facie right to inspect documents which are addressed to the council of which s/he is a member. S/he has this right because s/he is under a duty to keep himself or herself informed of council business

700  Chapter 7 which touches upon his or her role as an elected representative. But this right is not absolute. If s/he has an indirect motive, then the council may raise this as a bar to inspection. As a corollary of this limitation, a member is not afforded a roving commission through council documents. The most important manifestation of this last restriction is present in the fact that council administration is conducted through committees and post-LGA 2000 coming into effect, through new-style executives. If a member is also a member of a committee, then a fortiori, s/he has a prima facie right to inspect documents coming before that committee.2 If s/he is not a member of the committee then s/he has to show cause why sight of them is necessary to perform his or her duties adequately: in common parlance s/ he must establish a ‘need to know’. This would appear to be the case at common law as regards documents before the executive. If a member of a committee, the right is not absolute, but can be qualified on the ground that there is some other good cause to refuse access established by the committee.3 Dicta suggest that good cause can be established by the committee if inspection might lose the benefit of qualified privilege attaching to documents in relation to defamation proceedings: where there might be a risk of unnecessary replication of ‘gossip and hearsay’; or where documentation or reports relate to matters before the committee prior to the appointment of the member to the committee and it is not necessary for the new member to be apprised of the information to perform his or her duties.4 R v Fraternity of Hostmen in Newcastle-upon-Tyne (1745) 2 Stra 1223; R v Allgood (1798) 7 Term Rep 746; R v Tower (1815) 4 M & S 162; R v Merchant Tailors’ Co (1831) 2 B & Ad 115; R v Governor & Co of Bank of England [1891] 1 QB 785. 2 Birmingham City District Council v O [1983] 1 All ER 497, HL. 3 Bank of Bombay v Suleman Somji (1908) 99 LT 62, PC; R v Southwold Corpn, ex p Wrightson (1907) 97 LT 431; R v Hampstead Borough Council, ex p Woodward (1917) 116 LT 213; R v Barnes Borough Council, ex p Conlan [1938] 3 All ER 226. But not to defeat rights under the LG(ATI)A 1985. 4 R v Lancashire County Council Police Authority, ex p Hook [1980] QB 603, CA. 1

7.68  The member’s right to inspect is a strong one, but it is not absolute even when s/he is a member of a committee, and Lord Brightman’s emphatic words in Birmingham City District Council v O1 about no secrecy existing between a member of a social service committee and the social workers of the department have to be seen in the context of the member’s position or the request being above-board and not for any ulterior or improper motive. The basic point is that if the committee, or if necessary the council, show cause, the onus transfers to the member to establish that that cause and the decision which represents it are unreasonable, on the test established by Lord Greene MR in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corpn.2 If the council establishes a good cause, the onus on the member then becomes a difficult one to shift as in favour of the council or committee omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta.3 A reasonable decision of a committee or council which has considered all relevant matters and not considered irrelevant ones will stand. Where the arguments are of equal weight, the bias may, be in favour of disclosure. These basic propositions were illustrated by R v Hackney London Borough Council, ex p Gamper.4 In ‘O’s case, Lord Brightman said where a councillor had a bona fide and reasonably based concern … not a mere busybody … the bias should be in favour of access, not concealment. 2 [1948] 1 KB 223, CA. 1

Restrictions on use of information by public officials and representatives   701 Hook’s case above. [1985] 3 All ER 275.

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7.69 In Gamper, Lloyd LJ held that in a Labour-controlled authority, a member of the minority Liberal party who was a member of the public services and housing committees was entitled to see documents going before a Direct Labour Organisation (DLO) sub-committee of the first committee and he was entitled to attend meetings of the sub-committee by virtue of his membership of the parent committee: ‘The committee of which the applicant was a member had a residual responsibility for the matters delegated to the sub-committee, and was answerable in its turn to the Council by virtue of its terms of reference. On that, if no other ground, he had demonstrated a “need to know”.’ 7.70  Lloyd LJ further stated that the applicant councillor could not perform his duties as a member of the council, nor as a chairman of an unrelated, ie to the Public Services’ Committee, housing services sub-committee without sight of the agenda and working papers of the DLO sub-committee. These latter grounds turned very much on the individual facts, but the former ground is a strong authority to suggest that a member of a committee has a prima facie right of access to its sub-committees. The authority had not considered the councillor’s legitimate need to know in refusing to let him inspect the documents or attend the sub-committee and had therefore failed to consider a relevant factor. Had they considered this and still maintained that the councillor could not have sight of documents and access, their decision, Lloyd LJ believed, would be unreasonable and ultra vires on the basis of the residuary test in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corpn (above). Attempts to evade the impact of this decision by the committee creating a working party rather than a sub-committee would be looked at with scepticism and there would be a strong tendency for courts to look at the substance of what was established and not the mere appellation.1 See Moffat’s case below.

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7.71  The following are important indications of the ambit of the right: ‘Counsel for the council argued that the Birmingham case was concerned only with a single document, or file of documents, whereas here Mr Gamper is asking for access to committee documents generally. I can see no difference in principle, provided the documents come within the scope of Mr Gamper’s “need to know”. Mr Gamper cannot perform his duties properly or effectively as a member of the council, or the public services committee, or as chairman of the Shoreditch district housing committee, without having access to the agenda, minutes and other documents of the DLO sub-committees. There may be, I know not, documents which are so confidential that they cannot be disclosed without passages in those documents being covered up or deleted.’1 [1985] 3 All ER 275 at 281.

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702  Chapter 7 7.72  On attendance at meetings, as distinct from access to documents: ‘Counsel rightly drew my attention to the fact that neither the Birmingham case, nor any of the previous reported cases, were directly concerned with attendance at a meeting as distinct from access to documents. Nor was anything said in any of the cases, which anyone has been able to find, about the right to attend committee or sub-committee meetings. But there is no logical distinction between access to documents and attendance at meetings. As in the case of access to documents, the answer must depend on whether the councillor needs to attend the meeting in order to perform his duties properly as a member of the council. In the end this point was conceded by counsel for the council. It may be, as counsel submitted, that the councillor must show a more urgent need to know in the case of attendance than in the case of access to documents. But it is unnecessary to decide that point now. As in the case of access to DLO sub-committee documents, the council’s decision to exclude Mr Gamper from sub-committee meetings must, in my view, be quashed on two grounds: that the council asked itself the wrong question, and that it reached a conclusion which no reasonable council could have reached if properly directed in law. Obviously, the right to attend DLO sub-committee meetings does not carry with it the right to take part in the discussions, unless invited to do so, or to vote.’1 [1985] 3 All ER 275 at 283.

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7.73  Where information was ‘confidential’, that would not ipso facto destroy the right, but: ‘Members of the council are, by virtue of Standing Order 24(6) and other references in the standing orders, under an obligation not to disclose confidential information. I  will assume in favour of the council, though I find it difficult to imagine, that there are some matters which come before the sub-committee, such, perhaps, as prices at which it is proposed to tender or at which rival contractors have tendered, that are so highly confidential that they cannot be disclosed even to members of council. That cannot, in my view, justify blanket denial of access to all sub-committee documents. If there are indeed such highly confidential matters, then they can be dealt with in the usual way, as I have already mentioned, by covering up what needs to be kept confidential. The very width of the prohibition in the present case shows to my mind conclusively that no reasonable council directing itself in accordance with the principles stated in the Birmingham case, could have reached the decision to exclude access to all sub-committee documents.’1 [1985] 3 All ER 275 at 283. See Donaldson LJ in ex p O [1982] 1 WLR 679, CA, on the need to apply a ‘screening’ process with great strictness in child care cases and adoption.

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7.74  Further, councillors seeking access are well advised to be as specific and clear as possible as to why they have a need to know. Reasons must be spelt out in most cases.1 See, eg [1985] 3 All ER 275 at 281 b–c.

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Restrictions on use of information by public officials and representatives   703 7.75  The theme of Gamper’s case was developed in R v Sheffield City Council, ex p Chadwick.1 The applicant was a leader of a minority party on the city council and a member of the policy committee, the principal committee of the authority. A subcommittee of that committee was the budget sub-committee, a recommendatory committee all the members of which were members of the ruling party alone.2 Chadwick sought a declaration that the council acted unlawfully by refusing to allow him to attend meetings of the budget sub-committee and by refusing to supply him with copies of reports made to that sub-committee. He considered it necessary to attend and receive information because of the Secretary of State’s decision to rate-cap Sheffield City Council’s expenditure and his need ‘to reach a reasonable judgment on those [budget] decisions’ made at a future policy committee and city council meeting called for that purpose. His attendance was denied, although certain amounts of financial information were to be provided by the Treasurer ‘according to conventions’, but agenda papers were excluded. The council’s case was that exclusion of opposition members was necessary because of the sensitive proposals for a budget examined and worked out in such a sub-committee, and attendance of opposition members would make it difficult for members to seek the advice of officers without inhibition. The aim was to protect the secrecy of the party’s deliberative process. (1985) 84 LGR 563. NB the LGHA 1989 and pro rata membership according to political strength: see paras 6.114 et seq above.

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7.76  Woolf LJ held that it was not permissible for the council, by allowing the sub-committee to be used for party political purposes, to justify a need for confidentiality and secrecy which would not otherwise arise, ie it was unlawful to use a sub-committee for party political purposes in this way. It was possible for them to establish an ad hoc group outside the council structure, and even to consult officers of the council. But the confidential nature of the party political deliberations taking place was an unlawful consideration for the council to adopt in denying access and the council could ‘not reasonably take the view that he did not have a need to know’ to understand the recommendation behind resolutions on which he was to vote. There was no justifiable reason for confidentiality. If attendance was a convenient way for a councillor to obtain information, then absent special circumstances of confidentiality ‘there would in the ordinary way be no rational basis for refusing attendance’. Nor would a councillor with a need to know be expected to exhaust all other channels to get information, providing he did not act unreasonably. He had a need to know and the committee had no good reason to exclude him.1 For a more recent treatment, which was not a direct application at common law by a councillor for access, but which applies Gamper’s case, see R (Perry) v Hackney LBC [2014] EWHC 3499 (Admin), [2015] JPL 454.

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The case-law and executives 7.77  Nothing in principle precludes the operation of the common law principles in relation to executives under the LGA 2000, but the fact that most members

704  Chapter 7 will not be on such executives, that they have no roving commission through council documents and that in terms of accountability an overview and scrutiny committee (OSC) will be appointed militate against a wide interpretation of their right to access. Where meetings are held in private, a need to know will have to be established to gain access to documents and members may find it more useful to rely upon the FOIA 2000 or regulations under the LGA 2000, whichever are more favourable. Special provision is made in LGA 2000, s 21 for access by the public to executive information (see below) and these are drafted in order to be consistent with the FOIA 2000. The case-law had actually adopted a more subtle and flexible approach when dealing with the rights of members of a corporate body represented through the council and committees. The LGA 2000 emphasises the division more along Whitehall lines where MPs have no right to know executive information apart from that under the FOIA 2000 and SOs of the House and other legal provisions (see ch 4). Local authorities are still corporate bodies but the executive arrangements could easily facilitate an enhanced secrecy in deliberations and decision-making. It will be interesting to see how courts will respond to the challenge. 7.78  In terms of presence at meetings, LGA 2000, Sch A1, para 4 provides that a member of a local authority who is not a member of the authority’s executive is entitled to attend, and speak at, a meeting of the executive, or of a committee of the executive, which is held in private only if invited to do so. This seems fairly conclusive in terms of attendance. Could it be argued that, because statute has removed any right of attendance, it has also removed any claim to a right to know?

When is it council information? 7.79  A question often raised is whether or not documentation or reports are addressed to the council or whether they are or are not committee papers. If not, then it was reasoned that they are not documents prima facie within the scope of the case-law, so that there is no basic presumption of a right to inspect. This is important where there are one party working groups, or budgeting ‘groups’ of leading members of the ruling party planning the council budget. Are such documents or is such information council information? A budgeting sub-committee in Chadwick’s case was dealing with council information to which he had a need to know. Further, meetings outside the formal council structure may still be within the realm of what a councillor ‘needs to know’ to perform his duties. It is a question of fact and degree. The more informal, extraneous or the less directly related to council business, the less likely are documents to be relevant, or council information. 7.80 In R  v Hyndburn Borough Council, ex p Strak1 for instance, there were informal meetings of political leaders of the two leading groups, in collaboration with senior officers, where, councillor Strak complained, decisions were effectively taken on behalf of the council, de facto if not de lege. It was accepted that it was in order for senior officers to consult members of particular political groups, and

Restrictions on use of information by public officials and representatives   705 where the initiative came from officers it should be exercised reasonably. Where officers had delegated powers, there was nothing improper in their exercising those powers after consulting members or groups of members. In respect of decisions taken by officers, the rights of members to be informed was the same as that which operated as against committees. It was also accepted that, normally, there was no right to obtain information or be present in consultations between officers and members when they were consulted as members of a political group. There would not normally be a need to know, although it is submitted one may be established on the facts of a case. CO/918/85 (17 December 1985, unreported).

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7.81  Minutes of the meetings, Strak suggested, showed that the meetings were not part of an informal administrative consultation process before official organs of the council made decisions. They were decision-making meetings on behalf of the council, a claim with which Woolf LJ was not inclined to disagree, and therefore Strak was justified in seeking access. It would seem, however, too unguarded to offer this as authority for the proposition that a member cannot establish a need to know and be present in the consultation process between a political group and officials. It is an arguable proposition depending upon the facts of each case, unlikely though it may be to achieve success in a large majority of consultative processes. The extent of the legitimate official interest and responsibility of the councillor will need to be assessed.

Working parties1 7.82  It has been decided that local authorities have power to establish working parties (White Papers) to proffer advice to committees.2 In R  v Eden District Council, ex p Moffat,3 councillor Moffat was excluded from the meetings of a working party which he claimed in fact was a sub-committee, and under SOs and common law he had a right to attend. On the facts, which included membership of the committee of chief officers,4 it was held that the body was a working party, with consequently no right for Moffat to attend under the SOs. On funding officers’ time to serve political parties see: Leicester City Council v District Auditor for Leicester [1989] RVR 162, CA. 2 Pursuant to the power in LGA 1972, s 111(1) and not under the exercise of functions through the council, committee, sub-committee or officers under s 101(1). The case concerned ‘confidential’ items about appointments and restructuring. 3 R  v Eden District Council, ex p Moffat (15  April 1987, unreported) CO/803 86; on appeal 8 November 1988 667/87 and (1988) Times, 24 November, CA. 4 Officers cannot be members of committees: LGA 1972, s 104. They can be a member of a ‘mayor and council manager’ executive: LGA 2000, s 11(4). 1

7.83  At first instance, Webster J believed that there was no reason in principle why a common law ‘need to know’ argument on behalf of a councillor could not be made out in relation to information before a working party of which s/ he was not a member.1 This, respectfully, must be correct, although in Moffat’s case no need to know was established. The fact that Moffat was a member of the council establishing the WP would have been influential, although membership

706  Chapter 7 of the parent will not confer automatic right of admission to its progeny. His presence might inhibit frank discussion in a forum discussing tentatively provisional and sensitive matters, and he had no right to attend,2 even though he may have benefited from being present in later council meetings discussing the report. Nourse LJ on appeal believed this benefit constituted a ‘need to know’ and argued that a right to attend is not a right to participate, ‘nor may it generally be objected that his presence there will inhibit others from speaking out as they would otherwise do’ where he has a need to know. His right can only be defeated where his presence would cause injury to the public interest by eg breaching a confidence. ‘It is not to be defeated by vague generalisations and the sensitivities of those who might feel more comfortable if he was excluded from their discussions’. The two other judges did not believe there was a need to know, or a need to attend.3 On appeal, Nourse LJ agreed, Croom-Johnson LJ and Sir Denis Buckley seemed not to, but Croom-Johnson LJ appeared to be arguing to the particular facts, not making a general principle. 2 However, Webster J at first instance believed the authority had acted unfairly and unlawfully in not allowing Moffat to explain why he had a bona fide right or need to attend. This refusal was unlawful, he held. The Court of Appeal, however, did not agree. There was no right to attend, and therefore no right to explain why a right to attend might be established! 3 Croom-Johnson LJ and Sir Denis Buckley. 1

Access for members under the Local Government (Access to Information) Act 1985 7.84  This Act, which adds to LGA 1972, s 100, is dealt with exhaustively in ch 8. It confers rights on the public, including the press, and members to attend local authority meetings, committee and sub-committee meetings and the right to receive notice of meetings, to inspect and copy the agenda of any council, committee or sub-committee meeting three clear days before the meeting takes place – the three clear days period has been extended to such longer period as the Secretary of State may prescribe by order (LGA 2000, s 98(2)) and the period has been extended to five days;1 to inspect and copy any reports being considered during the public part of such a meeting; to inspect the minutes of any such meeting except where the minutes of the private part of a meeting themselves reveal the information which led to the meeting being closed in the first place. In the latter case only a summary giving a ‘reasonably fair and coherent record’ of the proceedings needs to be provided. Also conferred is a right to inspect background papers used in the preparation of the reports to be discussed in public at any council, committee or sub-committee meetings. This was done by SI 2002/715.

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7.85  There are exemptions and exclusions from these rights (see para 8.29). 7.86  Under the Act, councillors are in a stronger position than members of the public. LGA 1972, s 100F (as inserted) states that a councillor may see any documents ‘in the possession or under the control’ of the council which contain material relating to any business to be transacted at a meeting of the

Restrictions on use of information by public officials and representatives   707 council, committee or sub-committee, unless those documents contain exempt information as defined in LGA 1972, Sch 12A, Part I, paras 1–6, 9, 11, 12 and 14 (as inserted by LG(ATI)A 1985, Sch 1). These rights are wider than the public’s rights in four ways:1 (i) the public’s rights only apply to the public parts of meetings, whereas the member’s rights are not so restricted, although certain exemptions apply; (ii) not all the exemptions which apply to the public apply to members;2 (iii) the member has access to background documents that relate to the business conducted at the meeting, ie they are not restricted to those that disclose facts or matters on which the report of an officer is based and which have been relied on to a material extent in the report, as is the case with the public; (iv) documentation available to the public, it has been argued, need only relate to ‘the business’ being transacted, not to a report about the business which is being discussed, ie  ‘facts, reports, counter evidence to that used by an officer, contrary opinions of other officers etc which may have been ignored, forgotten … or simply not known by the officer writing the report will not be available to the public but will be available to members’. Other documents which relate to the business being transacted, apart from those available to the public, should be asked for. These points were made by Ron Bailey Guide to Councillor’s Rights To Information; see paras 8.29 et seq below for the provisions. 2 Quaere the position of members of the authority who are not members of the committee which is dealing with ‘confidential’ information according to the LG(ATI)A 1985? Are they members of the public and thereby automatically excluded? Presumably not if they have a need to know. 1

7.87  Further, only the public are excluded, under the statute, from meetings where ‘confidential’ items are to be discussed. This means they will not have access to related documents. The statute does not exclude members, though as a matter of practice they probably will be. 7.88  The rights under this section are in addition to the common law rights above. The statutory rights cannot be defeated by common law restrictions. 7.89  If a member who is not on a committee establishes a need to know, then s/he will be entitled to obtain the document, even if it falls within one of the exempt categories.1 Birmingham City District Council v O [1983] 1 All ER 497, HL.

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7.90  That is the common law position. Once such a need is established, it overrides third party rights to confidentiality, or immunities of local authorities unless ulterior motives be established. The Act will be important for routine information; the common law will be important for exempt information, or information not covered by the Act where there is a need to know. Controversial questions likely to arise under the Act are: (1) when is a document in the possession or under the control of a principal council? and (2) what is a meeting of the council, or committee or sub-committee of the council, or a committee or sub-committee, under LGA 1972, ss 101(9) and 102?

708  Chapter 7 7.91  As regards possession or control, information collected by officers for their official duties would seem to be covered; with members there must be an opportunity to acquire information which could concern council business but which is their private property. Once again, in difficult cases it is a question of fact and degree. Useful questions may be: by whom was it collected or acquired? In what capacity? for what purpose? How closely related is it to council business? The discussion above on committees etc is relevant here (paras 7.55 et seq above). Executive bodies of a council are now provided for under LGA 2000, s 9C and their executive functions under ss  9D and 9DA. The LG(ATI)A  1985 has no relevance to them as shown above. The Act will have relevance to functions effected by the council, committees, sub-committees and officers and by OSCs (LGA 2000, s 21(11) for the latter). Officers cannot be members of the council, committees or sub-committees. A  council can establish deliberative/advisory committees – these will be covered by the Act. A council can establish a working party (see above) – these will be purely tentative or advisory and will not be covered. However, the information or documentation before these working parties will eventually often come before the official organs of the council; it will then be covered by the Act unless, crucially that body is the executive. FOIA 2000 will clearly apply to information from the executive body. 7.92  The Local Authorities (Executive Arrangements) (Meetings and Access to Information) (England) Regulations 2012, SI 2012/2089, provide for access to documents and proceedings of executive bodies as set out in Part IA of the LGA 2000. The Regulations provide that records must be kept of all decisions made at private or public executive meetings and decisions of individuals. Under reg  12 the records should include inter alia a record of the decision, reasons for the decision, details of any alternative options considered and rejected, and details of any conflicts of interest that were declared. Similar provisions apply in reg  13 to decisions taken by individual members. Regulations 14 and 151 generally require these records and any background documents to be accessible to the public at the offices of the authority ‘as soon as is reasonably practicable’. Newspapers may request the records of decisions made (but not background documents), which must be provided on payment of postage, the cost of copying or any necessary charge for transmission. The Regulations give the public access to executive meetings and certain documents (primarily the agenda and related documents and ‘forward plans’) for these meetings which relate to ‘key decisions’ (ie those which involve expenditure or cost savings which are significant in regard to the authority’s budget, or those which are significant in terms of their impact in an area comprising two or more electoral wards of the authority).2 Members of the local authority enjoy a broader right of access. It is useful to set out the full details of reg 16 (as amended): ‘(1)  Subject to paragraphs (5) to (6), any document which– (a) is in the possession or under the control of the executive of a local authority; and (b) contains material relating to any business to be transacted at a public meeting, must be available for inspection by any member of the relevant local authority.

Restrictions on use of information by public officials and representatives   709 (2)  Any document which is required by paragraph (1) to be available for inspection by any member of the relevant local authority must be available for such inspection for at least five clear days before the meeting except that– (a) where the meeting is convened at shorter notice, such a document must be available for Inspection when the meeting is convened; and (b) where an item is added to the agenda at shorter notice, a document that would be required to be available under paragraph (1) in relation to that item, must be available for inspection when the item is added to the agenda. (3)  Subject to paragraphs (5) to (6), any document which– (a) is in the possession or under the control of the executive of the local authority; and (b) contains material relating to– (i) any business transacted at a private meeting; (ii) any decision made by an individual member in accordance with executive arrangements; or (iii) any decision made by an officer in accordance with executive arrangements, must be available for inspection by any member of the relevant local authority when the meeting concludes or where an executive decision is made by an individual member or an officer immediately after the decision has been made. (4)  Any document which is required by paragraph (3) to be available for inspection by any member of the relevant local authority must be available for such inspection, in any event, within 24 hours of the conclusion of the meeting or the decision being made, as the case may be. (5) Paragraphs (1) and (3) do not require a document to be available for inspection if it appears to the proper officer that it discloses exempt information of a description falling within Part 1 of Schedule 12A to the 1972 Act (descriptions of exempt information: England). (6)  Notwithstanding paragraph (5), paragraphs (1) and (3) do require the document to be available for inspection if the information is information of a description for the time being falling within– (a) paragraph 3 of Schedule 12A to the 1972 Act (except to the extent that the information relates to any terms proposed or to be proposed by or to the authority in the course of negotiations for a contract); or (b) paragraph 6 of Schedule 12A to the 1972 Act. (7) Where it appears to the proper officer that compliance with paragraph (1) or (3) in relation to a document or part of a document would involve the disclosure of advice provided by a political adviser or assistant that paragraph will not apply to that document or part. (8)  The rights conferred by paragraphs (1) and (3) are in addition to any other rights that a member of a local authority may have.’

710  Chapter 7 In reg 6 of the previous SI (substantially reproduced in reg 15 of the current Regulations), there is a requirement that background papers to a report or part of a report before the executive should be made available to the public for public inspection. In reg 2 of the previous SI, ‘background papers’ were (and still are) defined as in relation to a report or part of a report, those documents other than published works, that: (a) relate to the subject matter of the report or, as the case may be the part of the report; and (b) in the opinion of the proper officer (i) disclose any facts or matters on which the report or an important part of the report is based; and (ii) were relied on to a material extent in preparing the report. In Trillium (Prime) Property GP  Ltd v London Borough of Tower Hamlets [2011]  EWHC  146 (Admin), Ouseley J found that there had been a breach of the regulations when the council had failed to include certain documents, including a report from English Heritage and a list of groups who supported a particular position in relation to a planning application. The council had argued that these documents were ‘published’ (and thus not within the scope of reg  6) as they were publicly available. Ouseley J rejected the idea that all documents which were publicly available were ‘published’. He said at [167]: ‘Although the documents which should have been listed as background papers were to some degree public, and Trillium certainly knew of some of them, they were not in my view published documents within the statutory definition. They were not the sort of documents deliberately made available to the general public, or to the informed but relevant public. They are not such that it can be assumed that the public or would-be participants would know of them or have ready access to them. Listing should alert members to them, and the public is entitled to see them.’ In Trillium, this omission was not sufficient to invalidate the decision at issue in the case as a whole, but the decision was found to be unlawful due to various other inadequacies in the report which led to the decision. 2 It was recently decided that a decision to grant a licence for a festival was not a ‘key decision’ simply because the income from that festival would offer support to the local authority’s park budget. See R (Friends of Finsbury Park) v Haringey LBC [2016] EWHC 1454 (Admin), [2016] PTSR 1299. 1

7.93  Regulation 17 provides that members of the OSC of a local authority is entitled to copies of any document in the possession or under the control of the local authority that contains material relating to a public or private meeting of a decision-making body, or which relates to any decision that has been made by a member of the executive or an officer of the local authority under executive arrangements. The only exceptions to this are where the document contains confidential or exempt information (see below), although the member of the OSC can still require access to such document where the information relates to a decision or action s/he is scrutinising, or which is contained in the programme of work of the OSC. Members of the OSC may not have access to any document or part of a document which contains advice provided by a political adviser or assistant. The Regulations further provide that the OSC may require the executive to submit a report on any decision that was not treated as a ‘key decision’ if the OSC is of the opinion that it should have been treated as being such. The report should contain details of the reasons for the decision, the body or individual who made the decision and the reasons why the decision was felt not to be a key decision (reg 18). Regulation 19 requires the executive leader to submit a quarterly report of executive decisions taken including the particulars of the decision and a summary of the matters to which the decision relates. 7.94  SI  2012/2089 contains, in reg  20, a number of exceptions to the requirements set out above. The public can be excluded from meetings where their presence would lead to the disclosure of confidential information, exempt information (under LGA  1972, s  100I and Sch  12A), where attendance at the

Restrictions on use of information by public officials and representatives   711 meeting would reveal the advice of a political adviser or assistant or where lawful power is used to maintain orderly conduct at a meeting. The exclusion must apply only to the parts of the meeting where such information is likely to be discussed or revealed. Similar provisions apply to documents, which may not be made available for inspection by the public if such availability would lead to the disclosure of confidential or exempt information, or would lead to the revealing of the advice of a political adviser or assistant. 7.95  The provisions of SI  2012/2089 appear to be broadly in line with the approach taken in FOIA 2000, although it seems possible that members of the public would need to have recourse to FOIA  2000 to obtain documents, etc relating to those decisions that are not ‘key decisions’ in the majority of cases. The applicable exemptions appear to be similar. 7.96  In addition to the rights in SI  2012/2089, there has been the further introduction of the Openness of Local Government Bodies Regulations 2014, SI 2014/2095. These Regulations build on the rights contained in, and amend relevant provisions of, the Public Bodies (Admission to Meetings) Act 1960, LGA 1972 and SI 2012/2089 to permit recording of meetings in order to make the proceedings available to the public at some later date.

Working practice 7.97  Under the common law, the decision not to allow inspection of committee, etc documents will invariably be made by the committee, though in constitutional theory the council has a right to make a final decision.1 Many authorities have devised procedures, either de lege in standing orders or de facto to resolve such disputes. Executives under the LGA 2000 will make decisions on access relating to their activity and deliberations vis-à-vis members. They will be subject to judicial review.2

See Lord Brightman in Birmingham v O above. There were subtle differences between committees with referred, as opposed to delegated, powers. 2 For members of the public, there will be judicial review and possible resort to the ombudsman. What will the role of the OSC be in such cases? 1

7.98  The examples in existence often followed the standard model of standing orders, viz inspection of any document which has been considered by a committee, sub-committee or by the council and supply of a copy if available. ‘Provided that a Member shall not knowingly inspect and shall not call for a copy of any document relating to a matter in which he is professionally interested or in which he has directly or indirectly any pecuniary interest within the meaning of the Local Government Acts for the time being in force and provided that this Standing Order shall not preclude the Director of Administration from declining to allow inspection of any document which is or in the event of legal proceedings would be legally protected by privilege or other claim confidentiality.’

712  Chapter 7 7.99  SOs will invariably refer to rights under the LG(ATI)A 1985. 7.100  Some authorities spell out in guidelines for chief officers of departments how to react if a request is made to them for access to files or documentation. Basically in the case of any difficulty the matter should be referred to the appropriate committee chairman and/or the director of administration or his equivalent. If the director of administration is seised of the issue, a regular pattern is for the director to contact the chair and for them to make an informal ruling. A significant number of authorities believe that is adequate. In some cases provision is made for further ‘appeal’ to the chief executive, possibly in conclave with the leader of the council, with a final appeal to the full council or in some cases the policy and resources committee. Although these possibilities exist, resort to them in practice is extremely rare. The government refused to give the Chief Executive a statutory role to resolve such disputes. Executives will make their own decisions. 7.101  On attendance at committee meetings, a common SO provides: ‘Any member of the Council shall be permitted to attend a meeting of any Committee of which s/he is not a member and will only be permitted to speak with the prior consent of the Chair but in no circumstances will such member be enabled to move, second or vote upon any motion before the meeting. Any such member shall be bound by any decision of the Committee as to the confidentiality of any information whether written or oral discussed at that meeting.’ 7.102  The same provision often applies to sub-committees. SOs cannot reduce statutory or common law rights and those in the LGHA 1989 should be recalled. If they attempt this they are ultra vires.1 Where they provide rights in excess of the law, but not contrary to it, they must be complied with.2 See Woolf and Jowell (eds) De Smith’s Judicial Review (8th edn, 2018). R v Hereford Corpn, ex p Harrower [1970] 1 WLR 1424.

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Revised standing orders 7.103  The Widdicombe Committee and the government believed that SOs need clarifying and amending to safeguard the rights of minority parties. Unlike Widdicombe, the government preferred voluntary guidance,1 reserving powers to enable a statutory core of SOs to be prescribed should that be judged desirable. The following were to be included in the guidance: ‘(a) the right of a minority party to put a matter on the agenda of the council or one of its committees or sub-committees; (b) the circulation of agendas and papers to members and officers; (c) the suspension of the council’s standing orders; (d) the right of a minority party to require a committee or sub-committee with delegated powers to take decisions to refer matters to full council or a parent committee;

Restrictions on use of information by public officials and representatives   713 (e) the delegation of decisions to officers; (f) provision to give the chief executive or chief officer the right to advise either orally or in writing on any matter coming before the council or a committee for decision; (g) the requirements for calling special meetings of the council; (h) the duty2 of the chairman of a council, committee or sub-committee meeting to clear the public gallery in the case of disorder. They do not think that councils should be expected to provide for a compulsory “question time”, which would be inappropriate in many councils, for example, where there is no controlling group seeking to answer for council policy. Any standing orders governing the membership of committees would need to reflect the proposed statutory requirements which are set out. The government agree with the Committee’s conclusion that authorities should draw up, and make available publicly, conventions about the working relationships between political groups and between councillors and officers. They commend such conventions to authorities. They do not consider that such conventions should be required by statute.’3 Prepared by local authority associations and government departments. R v Brent Health Authority, ex p Francis [1985] 1 All ER 74. 3 Cm 433, paras 2.27–2.28. 1 2

7.104  Section 20 of the LGHA 1989 empowers regulations to require SOs to allow members to requisition meetings of an authority and its committees, etc. In the case of new executive meetings, the government has placed its faith in access regulations and the Overview and Scrutiny Committees. 7.105  Provision on SOs is now made by the Local Authorities (Standing Orders) (England) Regulations 2001, SI 2001/3384. These Regulations require certain local authorities in England to make or modify SOs so that they include the provisions set out in the Regulations, or provisions to the like effect. 7.106  Part II of the LGA  2000 provides for local authorities to draw up proposals for the operation of executive arrangements (under which certain functions of the authority are the responsibility of an executive) or, in the case of certain authorities, for the operation of alternative arrangements (see ch 6). In the case of executive arrangements, the local authority’s executive must take one of the forms specified in LGA 2000, s 9C. 7.107  Under the Regulations, a county council, district council or London borough council which is operating executive arrangements must have SOs relating to its staff which include the provisions set out in Sch 1 (on staff), and must have SOs for regulating its proceedings and business which include the provisions set out in Sch 2 (regulating business and proceedings), or provisions to the like effect. The SOs must be the appropriate ones for the particular form that the executive takes (as set out in different Parts of Schs 1 and 2) and, if that form changes, the SOs must be varied accordingly (reg 3).

714  Chapter 7 7.108  A  county council, district council or London borough council which is operating alternative arrangements must have SOs relating to its staff which include the provisions set out in Sch 1, Part IV, or provisions to the like effect (reg 4).

Inspection of the accounts 7.109  Under LGA  1972, s  228(3) as amended,1 a member has the right to inspect the accounts of the authority or any proper officer of the authority. S/he has the right to copy them or take an extract from them.2 By LGA 1985, Sch 14, para 24. See also LAAA 2014, Sch 7.

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Confidentiality 7.110  The law of confidentiality has been examined in ch  4. It may be invoked to restrain members, officials, or third party recipients of confidential information from breaking the confidence on the principles already discussed. There is no law of official secrecy protecting local authority information in the way that Crown information is protected by the OSA 1989. Indeed, in evidence to the Franks Committee on the former OSA 1911, s 2 it was claimed that such legislation in local government was unnecessary.1 The law of confidentiality has been successfully invoked to protect confidential council reports, as well as papers on the accounts of controversial works.2 Association of Metropolitan Authorities’ submission to the Franks Report on OSA 1911, s 2. See eg, The Guardian 12 December 1998.

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7.111  However, several points need to be addressed in relation to local government. 7.112  First, it is likely that authorities will find it difficult to justify the award of an interim injunction restraining breach of confidence where it concerns the secrets of a public body such as a local authority. It is unlikely that such a body will be able to invoke national security1 or other reason why a ‘public secret’ should be maintained. It is more likely that a court will look to see if the information concerns an individual, eg a child2 or, of increasing importance, an item of commercial confidentiality which is given very wide protection under the FOIA 2000. Although Margaret Thatcher’s government discussed the possibility of amending the LG(ATI) A 1985 to cover national security. The Attorney-General would be the appropriate plaintiff for civil law applications. 2 See Re M and N (minors) [1990] 1 All ER 205; Re A (Minors) (Child Abuse: Guidelines), Practice Note [1991] 1 WLR 1026. For developments (of which there have been many) regarding litigation, see paras 11.6 et seq below. 1

7.113  Secondly, the confidential nature of much of a member’s business is emphasised in official publications, circulars and SOs. These, however, will not

Restrictions on use of information by public officials and representatives   715 necessarily be conclusive in persuading a court to award an interim injunction and the considerations in the preceding paragraph are relevant. Section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998 and applications to the courts for interim orders imposing ‘prior restraint’ will also be of crucial significance here (para  4.349 above). It is a problem which is likely to be resolved by peer group and administrative pressure/redress from within the authority. 7.114  Thirdly, officials are employees of the authorities and the nature of their contracts of employment, implicitly if not expressly,1 will contain terms of confidentiality. These will be of especial importance in relation to commercial and trade ‘secrets’2 though the ambit of the law will not be restricted to such areas. It must also be recalled that we are dealing with principles under confidentiality and the courts will wish to see damage to the public interest before restraining publication by third parties. The terms of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 should be recalled (para 4.301 above). ‘No officer shall communicate to the public proceedings of any committee ie  meeting etc, or the contents of any documents relating to the authority unless required by law or expressly authorised to do so.’ National Joint Council Conditions of Service, section 7, para 72. 2 See Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1986] 1 All ER 617, CA. The courts have shown reluctance to protect confidential information after a contract is terminated unless it constitutes a trade secret or is so highly confidential it amounts to such. The Court of Appeal examined this issue further in Lancashire Fires v SA Lyons & Co Ltd [1997] IRLR 113. 1

OTHER PUBLIC BODIES 7.115  The FOIA  2000 has now affected every public authority and those private bodies which are designated for the purposes of the Act. This was covered in ch 1 (and see Annex A below). 7.116  All public bodies and private Data Controllers are covered by the Data Protection Act 2018 and their personal records will have to be available in accordance with the terms of that Act (ch 2). Where the employees of such bodies are not Crown servants as defined in the OSA 1989, they will not be under the ‘direct’ duties within ss 1–4 of that Act, but they may become liable under s 5 and they may be notified of liability for unauthorised disclosure where they are contractors dealing with relevant information or are researchers covered by the terms of the Act. As we saw in ch 1, a wide range of statutes imposes specific criminal offences upon individuals not to release information without authority, usually received in confidence by government or its agencies (see Annex B for a list of such statutory provisions). Under the FOIA 2000 these are subject to ministerial review under s 75. 7.117  For most employees, the most significant inhibition to maintain effective secrecy will be that of dismissal, the withdrawal of benefits and the blighting of career prospects should they betray their employers’ confidences, not to mention the risk of black-listing by private agencies as a troublemaker. It is common practice to restrict any public comments, media interviews, etc among former

716  Chapter 7 nationalised industries’ employees and other public bodies by a code of conduct with contractual force.1 Guidelines on conduct, basically to avoid a conflict of interest are common for chairmen of public corporations but unless incorporated into contracts of employment they are not likely to be legally binding.2 Readers are also referred to the discussion on confidentiality in ch 4 and above and also to the discussion on the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 in that chapter. The British Medical Journal has published allegations of a strictly enforced ‘tight-lipped policy by management in the NHS’ (New Statesman, 10 June 1988). It has been claimed that city analysts’ research was controlled and ‘disciplined’ prior to the electricity flotation by a ‘centralised committee of government experts’: The Guardian, 29 September 1989. This was to help create a good impression for investors. It remains a widespread practice. What will the impact of Art 10 and the Human Rights Act 1998 be? Article 10 can take horizontal effect, ie between private actors. 2 They may articulate duties of confidentiality and duties to account which will be incorporated into the contractual nexus expressly or implicitly although it is true that such duties will operate independently of contract where there is a fiduciary or trust relationship: see Reading v A-G [1951] AC 507, HL, and Goff and Jones The Law of Restitution (6th edn, 2002). 1

PUBLICATION OF INFORMATION 7.118  Where publication is not practised voluntarily or is not of a type covered by the FOIA 2000, one has to look at the statute, if it is a body created by statute, to see what the duties and powers are in relation to publicity and information. There is a frequent duty to publish annual reports which are laid before Parliament, accounts which may be examined by the Comptroller and AuditorGeneral (see ch 12) and other information as required. Guidance has been given on the establishment of non-departmental bodies, formerly by the Treasury, now the Cabinet Office.1 This contains guidelines on, inter alia, accountability and information flows for managerial efficiency.2 More recent versions have offered guidance on provision of information and guidance on annual reports and audits.3 Advice is given on public meetings, and departments and public bodies should hold such meetings at least annually. Publication of minutes should be considered, stakeholders and ‘interested parties’ should be invited and wide publicity for such meetings should be made, although due regard must be had to sensitive, commercial and political information. Members of Non-Departmental Public Bodies (NDPBs) must abide by a Code of Practice.4 The internal flow of information within the executive, rather than the public provision of information, has characterised the world of public corporations such as those that ran nationalised industries.5 Today, notwithstanding the FOIA 2000, it is common to have a regulatory commission (formerly a non-ministerial department) with responsibility for collecting information about performance and standards from a range of private, public and privatised concerns. The bodies in question, eg the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority under the Utilities Act 2000, will be under a duty to provide information to the public. Behind such agencies will be select committees of Parliament conducting examinations and the ombudsman may be allowed to investigate the commissions. Public Bodies: A Guide for Departments (2006). Available at: http://www.civilservice.gov.uk/about/ resources/public-bodies.aspx.

1

Restrictions on use of information by public officials and representatives   717 Public Bodies: A Guide for Departments (2006), chapter 8, which is concerned with openness and accountability. 3 Public Bodies: A Guide for Departments (2006), chapter 8, para 3.1. 4 Available at: http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/psr_governance_gia_guidance.htm. 5 A  Prosser (1986) Nationalised Industries and Public Control. See Sir R  Reid (1990) The Times, 9 January. 2

REGULATORY AGENCIES 7.119  The agencies which have been established to regulate telecommunications, gas, electricity and water markets are dealt with elsewhere (ch 9). As is common with many investigatory, regulatory or supervisory public bodies, there are criminal restrictions on the disclosure of information by officials within those bodies.

EXECUTIVE AGENCIES 7.120  The government announced in February 1988 a plan to allocate the executive functions of government to units designated as agencies headed by a chief executive.1 By December 1998, 138 agencies had been established and four departments were operating on Next Steps Lines (employing in all 383,290 staff).2 By 2002, there were 127 agencies, 92 reporting to Whitehall departments3 – these figures do not include Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish bodies. The major thrust of the initiative is for greater accountability and efficiency. The parent department and the Treasury must be satisfied ‘that the proposed Agency will have a robust management structure with appropriate financial, accounting and management information systems’. In 2009 the number of agencies had grown to 192. The newly elected coalition Government pledged to reduce the number of such bodies and undertook a review process that has led to recommendations to merge a number of executive agencies and to abolish a number of others, returning their functions to government departments.4 Some other bodies are to be privatised or converted to charitable status. The Public Bodies Act 2012 gives Ministers the power to abolish the bodies listed in Sch 1 to the Act and to order the merger of those listed in Sch 2. The Government has argued that the reduction in the number of agencies will deliver greater accountability as a larger proportion of government functions will be exercised by government departments and thus will be subject to greater democratic accountability. The Public Administration Select Committee cast a degree of doubt on the efficacy of these changes in delivering greater accountability, as much depends on the detail of the way in which functions are taken back into Departments of State.5 Furthermore, many of the accountability measures described below will no longer apply, yet these arguably provide a reasonably clear set of goals and principles upon which to judge the performance of agencies. Under The Next Steps Initiative: announced in February 1988. The agencies employed 331,010 staff, of whom 304,645 were civil servants: Next Steps Report 1997 Cabinet Office (1998). The departments made up the difference. The latest reports include only staffing of ‘executive’ NDPBs, which numbered 111,129 in 2009. For a more recent statistical

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718  Chapter 7 account, see Cabinet Office (2009) Public Bodies 2009. The most recent statistics do not contain detail on staffing in NDPBs, but contain some useful statistical information. See Cabinet Office (2017) Public Bodies 2017. 3 Better Government Services – Executive Agencies in the 21st Century. 4 For the latest information on which bodies are to be retained, merged or abolished, see Cabinet Office (16 March 2011) Public Bodies Reform – Proposals for Change. 5 HC 537 Smaller Government: Shrinking the Quango State (5th Report of 2010–2011), pp 27–32.

7.121  Each agency will be required to produce every year on a rolling basis a medium-term corporate plan and an annual operating plan with detailed performance targets for the year ahead. As these will be a part of the annual public expenditure survey they will not be published as a part of that process, although annual reports of the agencies will normally be published. Agencies will generally remain Crown bodies and staff will be civil servants. Ministers will be responsible for overall policy, objectives, targets and resourcing of agencies. The chief executive will normally be better placed to deal with operational matters. The chief executive’s responsibilities and authority will be set out in a ‘framework document’ which will normally be published. These will contain whatever details exist in relation to ‘reporting arrangements’ for the public. The Comptroller and AuditorGeneral will audit their accounts (see ch 12). The Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration will have jurisdiction over them. There have been some notorious episodes involving Ministers and Agency Chief Executives where the public picture of their relationship was not a true reflection of private reality.1 D Lewis Hidden Agendas: Politics, Law and Disorder (1997).

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7.122  After so many years, the excitement generated by the appearance of the agencies has evaporated. The discussion moved on to focus on ‘joinedup government and joined-up services’ – a joining of public-sector providers together with voluntary and private-sector bodies in which information sharing and greater use of information technology is the key to effective public service for the future.1 Debate now appears to have moved further on to look at the potential for the ‘Big Society’, in terms of shifting certain aspects of service delivery to charities and community groups. A  White Paper on Open Public Services1 has been published which outlines proposals for delivering greater competition and diversity in public service delivery, with greater potential for service provision by private and community or voluntary sector organisations. From the perspective of this volume, the most important proposals are those which suggest that there will be an endeavour to provide greater access to open data on public services (para 3.17) and also to deliver increased transparency via publication of business plans and spending data (para  5.23). Some of these policies are already in the process of being implemented, whereas the broader plans on open data are still in an early stage. As noted above, some agencies will be dissolved and their tasks returned to government departments or they will be merged. Exemptions in FOIA for issues such as policy-making may lead to some concerns about this process. There may also be challenges for the FOIA regime if delivery of public services is shifted to the private, charitable or voluntary sectors as these bodies are not currently subject to the FOIA regime. The White Paper notes that FOIA has been extended to academy schools2 and certain private providers of healthcare services, but does not set out further plans to extend the Act’s horizons.

Restrictions on use of information by public officials and representatives   719 Cm 8145, July 2011. This was done by the Academies Act 2010, Sch 2, para 10 as FOIA 2000, Sch 1, para 52A.

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APPOINTMENTS TO PUBLIC BODIES AND TERMS OF CONDUCT 7.123  We saw earlier how heavily regulated by the law appointments to local government have become. The civil service code contains prohibitions on the political activities of civil servants. 7.124  Public appointments, and the associated power of ministerial patronage, was investigated by the Nolan Committee and his recommendations led to the establishment of the Public Appointments Commissioner in December 1995. The operation of this body was reviewed by the Neill Committee on Public Standards in its report of January 2000. This reported that there were concerns with the use of procedures for making appointments which did not reflect the different levels of importance, status, responsibility and remuneration for the posts. There was a lack of proportionality in approaches adopted. The remit of the Commissioner was extended in October 1998 to cover nationalised industries, public corporations, utility regulators and advisory non-departmental public bodies. A concern in NHS bodies was with delays in making appointments and insensitivity in treatment of, for instance, volunteers.1 Government departments are required to follow the Commissioner’s principles and code of practice in making over 11,000 ministerial appointments in ‘England, Scotland and Wales’. Cm 4557 (2000), ch 9.

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7.125  The work of the Commissioner was again investigated by the Committee on Standards in its Tenth Report. While a culture of appointment on merit had been introduced, there were still examples of ‘unregulated ministerial interventions’ which differed from practices in devolved regimes. The Commissioner should be given a power, like the Scottish Commissioner, of halting appointments in breach of the code, and recruitment and training of independent assessors should be further standardised.1 There was still public disquiet about ‘cronyism’. See ch 4.

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Chapter 8

Public access to information and access to meetings

GENERAL ACCESS UNDER THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT (ACCESS TO INFORMATION) ACT 1985 8.1  This chapter examines the major legal provisions which open up the meetings of public authorities to the public and which allow inspection of a public authority’s documents alongside the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA 2000). 8.2  The major legislation involves local government, viz the Local Government (Access to Information) Act 1985 (LG(ATI)A 1985) which in fact is an amendment to the Local Government Act 1972 (LGA 1972).1 The 1985 Act has been extended to other public bodies, as we shall see. It will also be necessary to examine the Public Bodies (Admission to Meetings) Act 1960, as that Act applies to public bodies as listed in the Act, including health authorities. To these provisions there has been added the Openness of Local Government Bodies Regulations 2014, SI 2014/2095 (para 8.41). Central government has already been examined in ch 1, and general duties requiring information and openness in local government were looked at in detail in ch  6 and duties to provide access to meetings or otherwise under the Local Government Act 2000 (LGA  2000) were also examined. Chapter 9 contains a survey of the access provisions relating to particular areas of administration. The present chapter will not repeat such discussion, but will concentrate on public access to information and meetings under the two pieces of legislation identified above. Agencies of central government have shown increasing tendencies towards open meetings; this is true of the Food Standards Agency and the Office of Communications (and, for non-departmental bodies, see paras 7.115 et seq above). LGA 1972, s 100. The new provisions are known as Part VA.

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Public access to information and access to meetings   721

LOCAL AUTHORITY MEETINGS 8.3  The LG(ATI)A 1985 amended and added to s 100 of the LGA 1972. Section 100 itself extended the provisions of the Public Bodies (Admission to Meetings) Act 1960, which opened up council meetings to the public and press, to cover committee meetings of local authorities. Until the 1960 Act only the press had access to local authority meetings following legislation in 1908.1 However, the High Court has held that LGA 1972, s 100A (inserted by LG(ATI)A 1985) did not require the public to be admitted to the ‘pre-decision deliberations’ of a council’s sub-committee dealing with the grant or renewal of licences for sex establishments. The proceedings were ‘quasi judicial’ in nature and it accorded with neither experience nor expectation that pre-decision deliberations would take place, or could reasonably take place, in public.2 This is an unhelpful decision. The public should only be excluded if grounds for exclusion are made out under the Act, eg confidentiality, and not for additional reasons. Local Authorities (Admission of the Press to Meetings) Act 1908; and see Tenby Corpn v Mason [1908] 1 Ch 457, CA. 2 R v Wandsworth London Borough Council, ex p Darker Enterprises Ltd (1999) 1 LGLR 601. 1

8.4  The LG(ATI)A 1985, which was extended to health service joint consultative committees (the Act’s effect in relation to these was repealed by the Health Act 1999) and to community health councils (these were removed in England in 2003, but are retained in Wales) is important not only in allowing access to documents, but also in being an open meetings law.1 Since 2002, the NHS in England has seen what is an astonishing number of different methods for public involvement. The National Health Service Reform and Health Care Professions Act 2002, ss 15–22 introduced patients’ forums and the Commission for Patient and Public Involvement in Health, which had the function of advising NHS bodies on public involvement. This structure was extended to NHS Foundation Trusts by the Health and Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Act 2003. This regime was then substantially modified to create a system of patients’ forums, supported by the Commission for Patient and Public Involvement in Health (which also appointed members of patients’ forums) by the National Health Service Act 2006. Patients’ forums and the Commission for Patient and Public Involvement in Health were then abolished by the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007 and have been replaced by local involvement networks under the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007. The Health and Social Care Act 2012 delivers further changes, including the renaming of local involvement networks as ‘Local Healthwatch organisations’. There was also a proposal to create a new committee of the Care Quality Commission known as the Healthwatch England Committee. The regime is considered in more detail below (paras 8.82 et seq below). Note the US Government in the Sunshine Act 1976 and the Federal Advisory Committee Act 1972 and the Australian Freedom of Information Act 1982 which have open meetings’ dimensions.

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8.5  The LG(ATI)A  1985 opens up the meetings of a principal council, its committees and sub-committees to the public. It also allows public access to

722  Chapter 8 the agenda and connected officers’ reports of meetings in advance of meetings, inspection of minutes and other documents after meetings, the inspection of background papers before and after meetings, and the Act places duties upon councils to publish additional information. The Act, as we saw in ch 6, confers additional rights on the members of principal councils. It also sets out material which is excluded from access and that which is exempt. The Act extends to Scotland.1 Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973, s 50 with differences, not all of which were intended.

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8.6  In what follows, the provisions are referred to as sections of the LGA 1972, as inserted by LG(ATI)A 1985.

Principal councils 8.7  As well as county, unitary and district councils and London boroughs, s  100J of the LGA  1972 includes (amongst others) the following bodies as principal councils: (1) The Assembly of the Greater London Authority.1 (2) A joint authority.2 (3) A combined authority. (4) The Common Council of the City of London when acting as a local authority or police authority. (5) A joint board or joint committee constituted as a body corporate under any enactment, and it discharges functions of two or more principal councils which includes bodies under (1)–(3) above. (6) A fire and rescue authority. (7) An economic prosperity board. Police authorities were listed bodies under section 100J but the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 (PRSRA 2011) abolished police authorities in England and Wales, outside London and Manchester where mayors have responsibility for police oversight, in November 2012, replacing them with directly elected police and crime commissioners (PCCs). They are subject to the FOIA and specific duties on publishing information under PRSRA 2011, s 11(1) and (2) and orders thereunder.3 Police and Crime panels are to be appointed (PRSRA 2011, ss 28 and 29 and Sch 6). Under the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016, the Secretary of State may provide by order for a mayor additionally to undertake the functions of a PCC for the combined authority area (in place of the PCC) (see PRSRA 2011, Sch 2). In London, from January 2012 the Mayor of London acted as the PCC for the Metropolitan Police through the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime. The Common Council for the City of London continues to perform the role of police authority and therefore does not have a PCC. There are several strange omissions, such as Transport for London (TfL). TfL is, however, a body covered by Part 3 of the Local Government Openness Regulations which we examine below (at para 8.62).4

Public access to information and access to meetings   723 Greater London Authority Act 1999, s 58. This makes some amendments to LG(ATI)A 1985: see s 58(3), (4) and (5). And see ss 45–48 (as amended by the Greater London Act 2007) – the latter providing for an annual report from the Mayor, a public meeting once in every financial year (s 424(1)) to engage in the State of London debate, and a People’s Question Time twice a year in public with the Mayor and Assembly. 2 See LGA 1985, Parts III and IV. 3 Elected Local Policing Bodies (Specified Information) Orders, SI 2011/3050 and SI 2012/2479. See https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_ data/file/143836/publishing-information.pdf (28/10/2018). The information includes information about contracts over a threshold of £10,000 and contracts and expenditure of chief officers of police. 4 https://tfl.gov.uk/corporate/transparency/ (30/10/2018). 1

8.8  In relation to the above bodies, special provisions apply for the posting of notices of meetings where they are not held at the offices of a local authority but at other premises and on the authorities’ website where available. Notice will be posted at those other premises. Special provisions also apply to take account of the fact that the membership of some of the above bodies is not directly elected. 8.9  Where bodies are not specified as principal councils, eg urban development corporations, local authority companies, trading partners or bodies such as the former London Residuary Body, they are not covered by the statute.

Committees, sub-committees and working parties 8.10  The LG(ATI)A 1985 applies to all the committees and sub-committees of principal councils (s  100E). Section 100E makes detailed provision on the committees included, but it does not deal with the question of what is excluded. The major problem has concerned bodies referred to as working parties, advisory groups, one party groups, etc. Widespread evasion of the Act could take place by frequent resort to such bodies as we saw in ch 7. 8.11  Although the courts will look at what has been created, and, it is submitted, look to the essence rather than the mere form or appellation,1 there are limits on what they can do. Readers will recall the discussion in chs 6 and 7 of reforms of committee membership and powers which touch upon the present subject. Southwark London Borough Council v Peters (1972) 70 LGR 41; R v Brent London Borough Council, ex p Gladbaum (1989) 88 LGR 627. See Local Government and Housing Act 1989 (LGHA 1989), Sch 11, para 26. See also Lillie v Newcastle CC [2002] EWHC 1600 (QB), (2002) 146 SJLB 225 where it appears to be accepted that an independent review body created by a council may not fall within s 100E.

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8.12  First, officers cannot in law be members of committees or sub-committees.1 They are frequently made members of such working parties. Further, it is not possible to have a committee of one person;2 and members cannot act in an executive capacity alone outside the provisions concerning executives under the LGA 2000 as amended by the Localism Act 2011 (see paras 6.29 et seq above) or where functions of an authority have been allocated to a member under the

724  Chapter 8 terms of s 236 of the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007.3 They may advise an officer to whom powers are delegated. LGA 1972, ss 80(1)(a) and 104(1). They may be members of an executive, as specified. R  v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p Hillingdon London Borough Council [1986] 1  All ER 810; see Fitzpatrick v Secretary of State for the Environment (1988) Times, 29 December, CA, and sub-delegation to officers under the Chief Officer. See R  (B) v Birmingham City Council Independent Appeal Panel [2006] EWHC 2369 (Admin); [2007] ELR 57 on the impermissibility of the delegation of the functions of an appeal panel to an executive officer. 3 See s 100EA of the LGA 1972 and s 237 of the 2007 Act and para 8.62. 1 2

8.13  It has also been held, as we saw in ch  7, by the High Court and by a unanimous Court of Appeal, that a local authority has power to establish working parties which are not committees or sub-committees. It was accepted that a local authority’s members, outside the executive, can only exercise the functions of a local authority via a committee or sub-committee (LGA  1972, s  101(1)). However, a distinction was drawn between the functions of a local authority and its powers. Its functions are set out in ss 180–215 of the LGA 1972: ‘Section 111 of the LGA gives it power to do anything which is calculated to facilitate or is conducive or incidental to the discharge of its functions. The exercise of a power can therefore be distinct from the discharge of a function … the setting-up of the working party and the working party’s activities constituted things done pursuant to the power conferred by s 111(1), not the discharge by the authority of any of its functions.’1 Webster J R v Eden District Council, ex p Moffat (15 April 1987, unreported) CO/803/86 (QBD). On s 111(1) generally, see: Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council [1991] 1 All ER 545, HL, and Akumah v Hackney LBC [2005] 2 All ER 148, HL. See R v Broadland District Council, ex p Lashley (2001) Times, 20 March, CA.

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8.14  Power to establish such bodies was possessed by the council, its committees or sub-committees under LGA 1972, s 111(1). However, a point not dealt with by the judge but raised on appeal1 concerned s 101(12), which provides: ‘References in this section and section 102 below (which concerns the appointment of committees), to any of the functions of a local authority, include references to the doing of anything which is calculated to facilitate or is conducive, or incidental to, the discharge of any of those functions.’ See CO/803/86 (QB), Croom-Johnson LJ; affirmed No 667/87 and (1988) Times, 24 November.

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8.15  In other words, the ‘doing’ of anything under s 111(1) is a ‘function’. 8.16  On appeal, it was not accepted that this provision meant that such bodies would be involved with the functions of an authority, and ipso facto had to be a sub-committee etc. It would seem that, where a working party is closely involved with the performance of a function, it is really a committee in another guise with officers in attendance advising. However, this merely begs the question. 8.17  Where, however, it is a genuine advisory body, proffering tentative advice – not recommendations – to the sub-committee etc, then it will not be a body falling within the 1985 amendments. No power will be delegated to it.

Public access to information and access to meetings   725 8.18  Nourse LJ believed that: ‘The functions of a local authority are not confined to the acts which they are expressly or impliedly required or empowered to perform by [the LGA] … The setting up of the working party was calculated to facilitate the discharge of the Council’s function of improving their structure and efficiency.’ 8.19  They therefore had power to set it up under s 111(1), and the LG(ATI) A 1985 does not cover such bodies. 8.20  The power of the authority to appoint sub-committees and advisory committees under LGA 1972, s 102 has been provided by LGHA 1989, Sch 11, para 25.

Excluding the public1 (i)  mandatory

8.21  Under LGA 1972, s 100A(2) the public must be excluded from a meeting during an item of business whenever it is likely, in view of the nature of the business to be transacted or the nature of the proceedings, that, if members of the public were present during that item, confidential information would be disclosed to them in breach of the obligation of confidence. Nothing in that Part of the Act (LGA 1972, Part V) authorises or requires disclosure of confidential information. A  new section 100A(5A), inserted by SI  2014/2095 permits the council to prohibit recording devices that can capture proceedings without a person being present at a meeting from being used wherever the public are excluded. This is an important addition to allow for a restriction of the additional rights granted to the public by SI 2014/2095. An injunction has been issued to prevent an admission by ticket only to a meeting pending a judicial review: R v Bradford Metropolitan City Council, ex p Gasson (1988) Guardian, 22 October, Farquharson J.

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8.22  LGA 1972, s 100A(3) defines confidential information as: (a) information furnished to the council by a government department upon terms (however expressed) which forbid the disclosure of the information to the public. This might also involve a breach of the OSA 1989 (see ch 1) if one of the relevant categories of information is involved and the disclosure is damaging (and unauthorised); and (b) information the disclosure of which to the public is prohibited by or under any enactment (eg, OSA 1989) or by the order of a court (see paras 11.2 et seq below). 8.23  It should be noted that confidential under the statute is not the same as that under the judicially developed doctrine under common law. As the former Department of Environment pointed out, those writing to local authorities ‘in confidence’ are not protected by this section. Where such correspondence is

726  Chapter 8 received, authors should be advised that their written representations cannot be considered unless they are prepared to allow them to be disclosed.1 DoE Circular 6/86, para 14.

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8.24  The Greater London Authority Act 1999 has expanded the definition of ‘confidentiality’ for the purposes of that Act (s  58(3) and (4)). It includes disclosure ‘in breach of the obligation of confidence’ without the consent of the relevant body and includes financial or business affairs of any particular person acquired in the course of a relationship between that person and a relevant body (Transport for London and the London Development Agency); amounts of expenditure proposed to be incurred by a relevant body under a particular contract where this would confer an advantage on a body seeking to enter a contract with that relevant body whether against the relevant body or another; any terms proposed or to be proposed by or to a relevant body in the course of negotiations for any particular contract if it would prejudice that body in those or other negotiations; identities of tenderers to the relevant body for contracts for goods or services. (ii)  discretionary

8.25  Under LGA  1972, s  100A(4) a council may by resolution1 exclude the public from a meeting during an item of business whenever it is likely, in view of the nature of the business to be transacted or the nature of the proceedings, that if members of the public were present during that item there would be disclosure to them of exempt information as defined (see below). Which would have to be in public; cf R v Brent Health Authority, ex p Francis [1985] 1 All ER 74.

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8.26  As with confidential documents under sub-s (3), the documents ought to be marked before the meeting by the committee clerk that they are exempt. He is usually the ‘proper officer’ for the purposes of this Part of the Act.1 LGA 1972, s 270(3).

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8.27  The resolution may be upset if unreasonable, or otherwise unlawful, but the onus would be on the applicant.1 The public, it should be noted, do not have to be excluded: it is at the council/committee/sub-committee’s discretion. For attempts to impugn the proper officer’s classification, see para 8.51 below.

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8.28  The resolution must identify the proceedings, or the part of the proceedings to which it applies, and state under what category of exempt information the resolution is being made. Where a resolution is passed, the section does not require the meeting to be open to the public during proceedings to which the resolution applies.1 LGA 1972, s 100A(5): ‘resolution … shall’. Given the importance of a resolution to exclude the public, it is expected that there will be strict compliance with the provisions of this subsection and that the courts will, if called upon, interpret ‘shall’ as imposing a mandatory duty. In R v Liverpool City Council, ex p Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators’ Association [1975] 1 All ER 379 Lord Widgery CJ,

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Public access to information and access to meetings   727 in a case concerning the interpretation of Public Bodies (Admission to Meetings) Act 1960, s 1(2), interpreted the instruction to give reasons in the minute of the resolution excluding the public as directory only, so non-compliance would not necessarily vitiate the meeting in law. Here, the direction is written in mandatory language, however, and should be interpreted accordingly.

The categories of exempt information 8.29  The categories of ‘exempt information’ are provided in LGA  1972, Sch  12A, Part I  (inserted by LG(ATI)A  1985, Sch  1) which has to be read in conjunction with Sch 12A, Part II (the qualifications). It will be convenient to spell out the categories at this juncture. Schedule  12A provides that exempt information, which the Secretary of State can add to or delete by statutory instrument (negative resolution procedure: s  100I(2) and (4)). Schedule  12A was replaced in its entirety by The Local Government (Access to Information) (Variation) Order 2006, SI  2006/88, Sch  1. It is notable that there is now a considerable difference in the provisions between England and Wales. In England, Parts I, II and III of Sch 12A apply, whereas in Wales Parts IV, V and VI apply. 8.30  In England, exempt information is that: (1) relating to any individual; (2) which is likely to reveal the identity of an individual; (3) relating to the financial or business affairs of any particular person (including the authority holding that information); (4) relating to any consultations or negotiations, or contemplated consultations or negotiations, in connection with any labour relations matter arising between the authority or a Minister of the Crown and employees of, or office holders under, the authority; (5) in respect of which a claim to legal professional privilege could be maintained in legal proceedings; (6) which reveals that the authority proposes: (a) to give under any enactment a notice under or by virtue of which requirements are imposed on a person; or (b) to make an order or direction under any enactment; or (7) relating to any action taken or to be taken in connection with the prevention, investigation or prosecution of crime. 8.31  The exemptions for England do not cover information that is required to be registered under certain enactments (the Companies Acts (as defined in Companies Act 2006, s  2); the Friendly Societies Act 1974; the Friendly Societies Act 1992; the Industrial and Provident Societies Acts 1965 to 1978; the Building Societies Act 1986; or the Charities Act 1993. There is also a non-inclusion as an exemption for information where ‘it relates to proposed development for which the local planning authority may grant itself planning permission pursuant to regulation 3 of the Town and Country Planning General Regulations 1992’. Schedule  12A, Part II, para  10 provides that the exemptions listed above are qualified exemptions in a similar sense to

728  Chapter 8 FOIA 2000, ie information ‘is exempt information if and so long, as in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information’. It is interesting to note that the English approach is a significant change to the previous approach under LGA 1972, Sch 12A, offering a much shorter list of exemptions that are qualified, although it is evident that the exemption relating to ‘information relating to any individual’ along with ‘information which is likely to reveal the identity of any individual’ is potentially broader than the more detailed list of exemptions in place prior to the amendments in 2006. The exemptions are now the same for Wales. 8.32  This is a considerable corpus of exemptions.1 One point to note is that the exemptions as drafted will exclude a member of the public being in attendance, even where s/he has been the provider of exempt information. It is common practice for authorities to deal with ‘appeals’ from officers’ decisions by referring ‘appellants’ to committees and sub-committees of the authority. Some allow the appellants to be present; others do not.2 Where such cases fall within one of the categories, the appellant’s presence will still be discretionary. This was one of the issues which the DoE undertook to deal with in guidance on the Act – it was not. No guidance appears to have been issued more recently by the relevant departments. This is an important point as the presence of an ‘appellant’ could be vital, especially given the High Court’s sanction for the receipt of hearsay evidence in housing homeless cases by authorities which may be dealt with at committees or by officers.3 See the comments of R Squire MP, Standing Committee C, col 86, 20 March 1985. Birkinshaw Grievances, Remedies and the State (2nd edn, 1995) ch 3. 3 R v Southampton City Council, ex p Ward [1984] FLR 608; R v Nottingham City Council, ex p Costello [1989] Fam Law 469. See para 10.88 and the current homelessness code. 1 2

8.33  We shall deal with the requirements allowing access to documents in a moment, and readers are referred to the details of the regulations concerning ‘manual’ (paper) education, social services and housing files in ch 2 (paras 2.96 et seq above), now under the provisions of the Data Protection Act 2018. 8.34  It was expected that authorities would establish their own methods to deal with disputes concerning access and classification. The possibility of an ‘appeals committee’ was suggested (R Squire MP, Standing Committee, col 17, 13 March 1985). Specific provision in the Bill for an appeal procedure within authorities was dropped.

Access under LG(ATI)A 1985 and FOIA 2000 8.35  While the FOI  Bill was going through Parliament, the government believed that an applicant for information, if defeated under one Act (either the FOIA  2000 or LG(ATI)A  1985), should be able to apply under the other – in other words, s/he would get the benefit of the more generous provision. There are many situations where the local government legislation applied

Public access to information and access to meetings   729 but where FOIA does not (meetings, for instance). The right of the public to be present at meetings of principal authorities is determined by the 1985 legislation. Furthermore, under FOIA 2000, s 21(1), information required to be communicated upon request under another statute will be exempt under FOIA. The following sets out a diagram from the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister on the relationship between the two schemes, as well as the Local Authorities (Executive Arrangements) (Meeting s and Access to Information) (England) Regulations 2012, SI 2012/2089.

CURRENT REGIME COVERED BY PART VA OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT 1972 AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION REGULATIONS

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000

Right of access to information Public has right of access to meetings and documents connected with decisions a local authority makes.

General right of access to all recorded information held by public authorities.

• Full council, its committees and sub-committees, background papers, agendas and reports for those meetings (Part VA of LGA 1972)

• Information which is already required to be made available must continue to be made available

• Executives and their committees (paras 6.10 et seq above) where a key decision is to be taken, documents relating to executive and key decisions (SI 2012/2089). There must be 28 clear days’ notice of a document about key decisions containing specified matters under reg 9. Regulation 5 concerns key decisions and any intention to discuss an item in private with reasons. Regulation 5 specifies there must be five clear days’ notice of a meeting. Available from council’s principal office or on its website. For public meetings there must be five clear days’ notice of the time and place of a meeting displayed as in reg 5. Shorter notice periods may apply as specified (reg 6). Agendas and documents must be publicly available for the notice period.

• Duty of a public authority to provide advice and assistance to those seeking information

• Right of access applies to any written request for information whether it mentions FOI or not. General right of access to all recorded information held by public authorities

730  Chapter 8 How information is released Local authorities are required to make information available to the public, even in the absence of specific requests.

The public makes a request for information.

• Papers must be made available five clear days before meetings take place

• Authorities have 20 days to respond to the request

• Designated officers decide whether information is exempt and if it should be released

• Authorities may charge a fee for dealing with requests

• Local authorities take a proactive stance

• Any officer/member who receives a request for information will have to decide whether to disclose • Local authorities take a responsive stance

Forward plans and publication schemes Authorities operating executive arrangements must set out a forward plan showing what key decisions they plan to take although the requirement of a rolling four-month period was removed. This practice is still common. Regulation 9 (above) contains the detail.

All authorities must produce a publication scheme – a guide to information the authority publishes or intends to publish.

Exemptions Seven exemptions in Schedule 12A to LGA 1972 (England) and 15 exemptions (Wales) tailored to local government including:

Twenty-three exemptions listed in FOIA 2000 applying to all public bodies. Eight of these are absolute exemptions, meaning information in these categories is automatically exempt, including:

• Information relating to individuals

• Information dealing with national security matters

• Details of financial and business affairs

• Personal information (dealt with under DPA 1998)

• Instructions to counsel and legal privilege protection

• Court records

• Information relating to the investigation or prosecution of crime

Information accessible through the publication scheme is exempt, since it is already publicly available.

A council may by resolution exclude the public from a meeting during an item of business, if in its view exempt information is likely to be disclosed

A public interest test must be applied to the remainder of the exemptions – information must be released unless the public interest in not disclosing is greater than the public interest in disclosing. The exemptions this test applies to include:

Public access to information and access to meetings   731 An officer may choose not to disclose exempt information contained in background papers/ agendas/ reports/ minutes.

• Commercial interests

• Legal professional privilege If, after the exclusion of exempt information, minutes do not provide a fair and reasonable view of proceedings the proper officer must provide a summary of proceedings. • Health and safety Individual local authorities will have established their own procedure for dealing with complaints regarding the classification of exempt information. The Monitoring Officer often plays a key role. A dissatisfied applicant may appeal to the Information Commissioner about an authority’s decision on where the public interest lies or if they think information has been wrongly withheld. The Commissioner may require disclosure. Figure 8.1 Comparison between current regime and FOIA 2000

Public notice and other provisions 8.36  Public notice of the time and place of the meeting shall be given by posting it at the offices of the council (Assembly in London)1 or on its website at least five clear days before the meeting (three clear days in Wales), or, if the meeting is convened at shorter notice,2 at the time it is convened. As we shall see below, background documents are also available under LGA 1972, s 100D. See LGA 1972, ss 100E(2) and 100J(3). See para 8.37.

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8.37  It has been held that five ‘clear days’ excludes the day on which notice is given and the day of the meeting.1 It is submitted that to keep within the spirit of the legislation, and indeed the letter, viz ‘public notice’ (LGA 1972, s 100A(6)), these days would not include days on which council offices were closed to the public.2 Such an interpretation would also accord with LGA 1972, s 243.3 R v Herefordshire Justices (1820) 3 B & Ald 581; Alexander v Simpson (1889) 43 Ch D 139: notice must be clear and unconditional. On specifying the business, see: Longfield Parish Council v Wright (1918) 16 LGR 865; R (Fitzgerald) v McDonald [1913] 2 IR 55; R v Dublin Corpn [1911] 2 IR 245. Rules on voting for principal councils are usually governed by SOs. For parish and community councils there are express provisions in the LGA 1972 where SOs do not apply. A resolution will be void if there is non-compliance with SOs: R v Educational Services Committee of Bradford City Metropolitan Council, ex p Professional Association of Teachers (1986) Independent, 16 December; but contract awards will not be void. SOs are usually in public libraries and every member possesses a copy. See also R v Flintshire CC, ex p Armstrong-Braun [2001] LGLR 1. 2 Sundays and public holidays; see also Carey, Smithers v DPP [1989] Crim LR 368, DC. 3 Which concerns, inter alia, computation of time. 1

732  Chapter 8 8.38  The LGA 2000 amended LGA 1972, ss 100A(6)(a) and 100B(3) and (4), by allowing the Secretary of State to substitute a longer period of days for notice of meetings of councils and the Assembly in London and access to their agenda and connected reports. This applies to council and Assembly meetings as well as committees and sub-committees (LGA 1972, s 100E). This power has been exercised for England, extending the period from three to five days (SI 2002/715). 8.39  While the meeting is open to the public, the council shall not have power to exclude members of the public from the meeting (LGA 1972, s 100A(6)(b)). However, this has to be read in conjunction with sub-s (8). The latter preserves the common law power of the chairperson of a statutory body to exclude the public if it was clear that members of the public were intent on causing such disruption that the transaction of business was being, or would be, prevented.1 As the chairperson may take preventive action before the meeting, it was held that the resolution excluding the public did not have to be made in public.2 However, doubts about the correctness of this decision have been expressed in so far as the chairperson was acting alone – and there cannot be a committee of one.3 The actual wording of sub-s (8) says that the section ‘is without prejudice to any power of exclusion to suppress or prevent disorderly conduct or other misbehaviour at a meeting’, which is broad enough in scope to cover anticipated disturbance. It has been held, however, that the exercise of the power of exclusion must be reasonably conducted and that excluded persons should be provided with an opportunity to put their case.4 If the level of (anticipated) disturbance is such that this is impossible, the chairperson should formally resolve, with other members of the committee (possibly acting as a sub-committee), to exclude the public in advance. A recent decision of the High Court has confirmed that the common law power to exclude the public on grounds of disruption or disorder does not extend only to the meeting room, but also to the building in which the meeting is taking place in appropriate cases.5 R v Brent Health Authority, ex p Francis [1985] 1 All ER 74 and the Public Bodies (Admission to Meetings) Act 1960. See R v Bickenhill Parish Council, ex p Secretary of State for the Environment [1987] JPL 773. 2 ‘A decision relating to the internal affairs of the authority’ per Woolf J in R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p Hillingdon London Borough Council [1986] 1 All ER 810. 3 Cf the Court of Appeal in Hillingdon [1986] 2 All ER 273n. 4 R v Brent London Borough Council, ex p Assegai (1987) Times, 18 June. 5 Laporte v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2014] EWHC 3574 (QB), [2015] 3 All ER 438. 1

The press 8.40  Prior to the amendments made by SI 2014/2095 (discussed in the next paragraph), the LG(ATI)A  1985 permitted accredited representatives of the newspapers1 attending the meeting for the purposes of reporting proceedings for their newspapers while the meeting is in progress shall, so far as practicable, be afforded reasonable facilities for making their report and, unless the meeting is held in premises not belonging to the council or not on the telephone, for telephoning the report at their own expense (LGA  1972, s  100A(6)(c)). Bob Neill (Parliamentary Undersecretary of State in the DCLG) wrote to all council

Public access to information and access to meetings   733 leaders and monitoring officers in February 2011 reminding them of their duties under the LGA 1972 and also encouraging councillors to permit ‘bloggers’ to enjoy the same facilities as newspapers, to permit blogging and ‘tweeting’ from council meetings and also to permit filming.2 Despite the DCLG’s wish to ensure that such opportunities were offered in 2011, it is clear that, until the changes brought about by SI  2014/2095, such access was not on a legislative footing. One question, to which the answer was not entirely clear prior to the changes brought about by the 2014 Regulations, is whether journalists from accredited newspapers could be prevented from blogging and ‘tweeting’ from council meetings, or whether this would be considered to be part of the activities of modern news-gathering and dissemination. It is now clear, from the provisions of the new s 100A(9), that such measures are permissible. LGA 1972, s 100K(1) and see s 100E(2)(b). Note that the definition of newspaper is limited to newspapers, news agencies and broadcasters. 2 See http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/localgovernment/pdf/1850773.pdf. 1

8.41  The provisions of the Openness of Local Government Bodies Regulations 2014, SI  2014/2095, introduce some notable amendments to s  100A of the LGA  1972 (as introduced by the LG(ATI)A  1985) in terms of access for the purposes of reporting. In essence, the objective of these Regulations is to place the guidance (discussed in para  8.40 above) on a clear statutory footing. The primary purpose of the changes is to allow for recording of proceedings of principal councils covered by the Act for dissemination to the public. The new s 100A(6)–(9), modified or introduced by the Regulations, is as follows: ‘(6) The following provisions shall apply in relation to a meeting of a principal council, that is to say– (a) public notice of the time and place of the meeting shall be given by posting it at the offices of the council five clear days at least before the meeting or, if the meeting is convened at shorter notice, then at the time it is convened; (b) while the meeting is open to the public, the council shall not have power to exclude members of the public from the meeting; and (c) subject to subsection (7D), while the meeting is open to the public, duly accredited representatives of newspapers attending the meeting for the purpose of reporting the proceedings for those newspapers shall, so far as practicable, be afforded reasonable facilities for taking their report and, unless the meeting is held in premises not belonging to the council or not on the telephone, for telephoning the report at their own expense. (7) Subject to subsection (7A), nothing in this section shall require a principal council to permit the taking of photographs of any proceedings, or the use of any means to enable persons not present to see or hear any proceedings (whether at the time or later), or the making of any oral report on any proceedings as they take place. (7A) While a meeting of a principal council in England is open to the public, any person attending is to be permitted to report on the meeting.

734  Chapter 8 (7B) Subsection (7A) does not require a principal council in England to permit oral reporting or oral commentary on a meeting as it takes place if the person reporting or providing the commentary is present at the meeting. (7C) A person attending a meeting of a principal council in England for the purpose of reporting on the meeting must, so far as practicable, be afforded reasonable facilities for doing so. (7D) Subsection (7C) applies in place of subsection (6)(c) in the case of a principal council in England. (7E) Any person who attends a meeting of a principal council in England for the purpose of reporting on the meeting may use any communication method, including the internet, to publish, post or otherwise share the results of the person’s reporting activities. (7F) Publication and dissemination may take place at the time of the meeting or occur after the meeting. (8) This section is without prejudice to any power of exclusion to suppress or prevent disorderly conduct or other misbehaviour at a meeting. (9)  In this section “reporting” means– (a) filming, photographing or making an audio recording of proceedings at a meeting, (b) using any other means for enabling persons not present to see or hear proceedings at a meeting as it takes place or later, or (c) reporting or providing commentary on proceedings at a meeting, orally or in writing, so that the report or commentary is available as the meeting takes place or later to persons not present.’ 8.42  As the provisions outlined in the previous paragraph illustrate, the changes brought about by SI 2014/2095 are designed to facilitate the recording and dissemination of the proceedings of principal councils in England. This is achieved primarily by the modification of s 100A(6) and (7) and the introduction of new s 100A(7A)–(7F) and (9). The key requirement is found in the new s 100(7A), which requires all principal councils in England to permit those present at the meeting to report on the meeting. Section 100A(7B) does not require a council to permit anyone present to provide an oral report or commentary on that meeting while the meeting is taking place, presumably to avoid disturbance. However, it is plain from s  100A(7C) that, outside of the limitations on providing oral commentary or report during the meeting, the council is to provide reasonable facilities to allow the reporting of its proceedings. Another important purpose of the Regulations is illustrated by s  100A(7D) – this applies s  100A(7C) in place of s 100A(6)(c) in England and is designed to facilitate ‘citizen journalism’, extending reporting rights to all present, rather than just for accredited representatives of newspapers. Sub-sections (7E) and (7F) of s 100A make it clear that the material recorded or reported from the meeting may be disseminated by any communication method and may also be disseminated during or after the meeting. Section 100A(9) adopts a very wide definition of ‘reporting’ including

Public access to information and access to meetings   735 filming, audio recording and photographing, including broad wording to permit dissemination by social media and being sufficiently broad in scope to allow for future developments in technology.1 See M Sandiford Local Government Transparency in England HC Library, Briefing Paper No 06046 (2015).

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8.43  The Act does not require authorities to permit the taking of photographs, or the televising or broadcasting of proceedings (LGA 1972, s 100A(7)), other than to the extent required by the new s 100A(7A).

Access to documents 8.44  The LGA 1972 defines information to include ‘an expression of opinion, any recommendations and any decisions taken’ (s 100K(1)). 8.45  Copies of agendas and copies of officers’ reports relating to items on the agenda (reports for the meeting) shall be1 open to inspection by members of the public at the offices of the council (not libraries) at least five clear days (as amended by LGA 2000, s 98, see above) before the meeting.2 Where, however, the meeting is convened at shorter notice, eg because of emergency, copies of both agenda and reports shall be open from the time the meeting is convened. Where an item is added to an agenda (see LGA 1972, s 100B(4)(b) below), copies of which are open to inspection by the public, then copies of that item and any related report shall be open to inspection from the time the item is added.3 Section 100B(3) adds, tantalisingly, that nothing in the subsection requires that items, agendas or reports should be publicly available on inspection before copies are available to members of the council. This must be read subject to the three-day requirement (as amended) or the convening of a meeting if shorter notice, or the adding of an item to the agenda where such apply; otherwise the provision appears nonsensical.4 Copies may be made available to the public before members of the council. The principal council and its committees etc are not free to abandon the five-day or longer period required under LGA 2000, s 98 but must only convene meetings at shorter notice5 or add items to the agenda where permitted.6 Section 100H states that committee reports and committee agendas must be open to inspection at all reasonable hours. This is mandatory. The subsection refers to any reports but this will not preclude speaking to the item; but a full oral report could not be used to defeat the section. 2 LGA 1972, s 100B(1) and (3), see supra. What of a meeting in the evening? The provisions apply to committees and sub-committees. 3 LGA 1972, s 100B(3)(a) and (b). Under different legislation viz Education Act 1944, Sch 1, Part II, para  7, it has been held that a bare recommendation cannot constitute a report: R  v Inner London Education Authority, ex p F [1988] COD 100; and R v Cornwall County Council, ex p Nicholls [1989] COD 507. 4 And, on a matter of construction, the primary duty is to inform the public by statutory notice; this would be defeated if authorities deliberately delayed notice so as to inform members first, ie it was a ploy. 5 As in an emergency. 6 See LGA 1972, s 100B(4)(b) below. 1

736  Chapter 8 8.46  This view is reinforced by s 100B(4) which states that an item of business may not be considered at a meeting of a principal council unless either a copy of the agenda including the item (or a copy of the item) is open to public inspection for five clear days before the meeting or, where the meeting is convened at shorter notice, from the time the meeting is convened. This refers to items, not reports. However, it would not be lawful to publicise an agenda and items with the expression ‘report to follow’ alongside any item, and then to provide the reports to the public in breach of the five clear days rule. The report must comply with the above provisions, subject, it is submitted, to reasonable and limited additions such as necessary updating. 8.47  Under s 100B(4)(b) the chairperson of the meeting, where s/he is of the opinion that an item should be considered at the meeting as a matter of urgency, may allow the item to be considered even though the notice provisions have not been complied with. This must be because of ‘special circumstances’ which shall be ‘specified in the minutes’. Because of the importance of this incursion into the principles of the Act, courts will look carefully at this mandatory requirement and will expect more than cursory references to vague circumstances,1 even though the judgment is that of the chairperson.2 The word ‘specify’ would suggest reasons which would support a reasoned justification in an affidavit, although the minute would not itself be a reasoned justification. For an example of directory wording see: R  v Liverpool City Council, ex p Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators’ Association at para 8.28, note 1 above. 2 On reviewing a subjective discretionary opinion see: Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corpn [1948] 1 KB 223, CA. Padfield v Minister of State for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997, HL; Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council [1977]  AC  1014, HL; Lonhro plc v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [1989] 2  All ER  609, HL; R  v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council [1990] 3 All ER 589, HL. 1

8.48  There is an incompatibility – there are several – between LGA  1972, s 100B(4) and Sch 12, Part I. Schedule 12, para 4(5) restricts the business of a council meeting itself (but not the annual meeting) to those items specified1 in the summons. Additional items can be taken at the annual meeting and include, inter alia, matters of urgency in accordance with the council’s standing orders, but it does not allow matters to be taken because of urgency as under s 100B(4). Paragraph 4(5) would appear, on the face of it, to prevail. A compromise would be to incorporate the chairperson’s powers under s  100B(4) into the standing orders. See para 8.35, note 1 above, and R v Lambeth London Borough Council, ex p Boston (25 April 1986, unreported) CO/610/186.

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Exempt documents 8.49  The public inspection provisions of LGA  1972, s  100B(1) may be disapplied by the proper officer, if s/he thinks fit, to the whole of any report, or any part, which relates only to items during which, in his or her opinion, the meeting is likely not to be open to the public (s 100B(2)).

Public access to information and access to meetings   737 8.50  The provision can only refer to exempt documents and not the excluded confidential category, as these must be dealt with in a closed meeting. 8.51  The phrases ‘if … fit’ and ‘in his opinion’ both relate to a subjective discretion on the part of the proper officer. Case-law shows that such phrases as these and their analogues do not create an inviolable power. It would be open to a party with sufficient interest to seek judicial review of the proper officer’s decision, but the applicant would have to be expeditious to have a decision altered before a meeting. Under the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, Part 54 new procedures for judicial review have been operative since October 2000. The court is given power to ‘take the decision itself’ if no purpose is served by remitting the matter to the body against which a ‘quashing order’ (certiorari) is sought. This may not be possible where the power is reposed by statute in a specific person or body (r 54.19). Where permission to proceed is given to an applicant, a stay of proceedings may also be ordered by the court (r 54.10(2)). 8.52  Disclosure (discovery) of documents can be applied for, but usually disclosure is used as an aid to proving one’s case; here, obtaining the documents constitutes the very reason for making the application. The court, presumably, could not order disclosure to the applicant if the documents fell within one of the exempt descriptions, as the decision on disclosure is for the relevant meeting of a principal council in such a case. The applicant would be using the court to stand in judgment upon the ‘proper officer’s’ classification. If access is applied for under the FOIA 2000, the Information Commissioner will be the appropriate authority to deal with complaints once the local authority has been through its internal procedures (para 1.233 above). 8.53  The judge, if doubt existed, could examine the documents to be satisfied that the discretion was wrongly or correctly exercised: the burden on the applicant would be a heavy one. 8.54  Where under LGA  1972, s  100B(2) the whole, or any part, of a report is not open to public inspection under sub-s  (1), every copy of the report, or relevant part, shall be marked ‘Not for publication’. On every such report, or relevant part, there must be stated the category of exempt information according to Sch 12A under which the council is likely to exclude the public during the item to which the report relates (sub-s (5)).

At the meeting 8.55  Where a meeting, or part of a meeting, of a council etc is required to be open to the public,1 a ‘reasonable number of copies of the agenda and of reports for the meeting must be available for the public who are present. LGA  1972, s 100B(2) applies to such reports. Or if at the authority’s discretion, the exemptions do not apply.

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738  Chapter 8

The press 8.56  Representatives of a newspaper (LGA 1972, s 100K(1)) may make a request for and, on payment of postage or other necessary charge for transmission,1 be supplied with: (a) a copy of the agenda for a meeting of a principal council and its committees and sub-committees and a copy of its reports, subject to the s  100B(2) qualification above; (b) such further statements or particulars, if any, as are necessary to indicate the nature of the items included in the agenda; and (c) if the proper officer thinks fit in the case of any item, s/he shall supply2 copies of any other documents supplied to members of the council in connection with the item. This does not appear to contain a discretion not to charge. Mandatory where the proper officer thinks fit.

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8.57  The s  100B(2) qualification can only apply to reports, and not to the statements, documents etc under items (b) and (c) above.

Background papers 8.58  Under LGA 1972, s 100D background papers1 may be inspected. See LGA  1972, s  100D(5). The inclusion of sub-s  (5) was conceded by the proponent of this Private Member’s Bill to ensure the Bill’s passage.

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8.59  This is an important provision in the Act. Section 100D concerns the right of the public to inspect ‘background papers’ to reports which are to be made available under ss 100B and 100C. The papers are to be available if and so long as copies of the whole or part of a report for a principal council are required by the sections to be open to inspection by members of the public, though after the meeting the relevant period for public inspection of background papers is four years, not six. Those copies of reports will have to include a copy of a list of background papers of the report, or part of the report, compiled by the proper officer. These will have to be available for inspection at the offices of the council or London Assembly.1  A  copy of the list and documents required to be made available shall be taken … to be so open if arrangements exist for its production to members of the public as soon as is reasonably practicable after the making of a request to inspect the copy. Nothing in the section requires the inclusion of ‘exempt information’ and nothing requires or authorises the inclusion of a document containing confidential information within the meaning of s 100A(2). Basically sub-s (5) leaves the definition of ‘background papers’ up to the opinion of the proper officer on whether they disclose any facts or matters on which the report or an important part of the report is based, and, again in his or her opinion, have been relied on to a material extent in the definition. The courts have given a wide discretion2 to what officers include either in reports or in background documents in drafting reports for committee.3 If disclosure were

Public access to information and access to meetings   739 applied for, it would be with a view to obtaining documents, and not simply to have a classification changed as under s  100B(2) (see discussion above). Such disclosure will seldom be granted in judicial review cases.4 This Part was amended by LGA 2000, s 97. Maile v Wigan MBC [2001] Env LR 11: a database dealing with potentially contaminated sites in the council area. See now the application of the Environmental Information Regulations 2004, SI 2004/3391 (ch 3 above). In recent cases, this discretion has sometimes been controlled. See R (on the application of Joicey) v Northumberland CC [2014] EWHC 3657 (Admin), [2015] PTSR 622 (a noise assessment report in relation to a planning application for a wind farm). 3 It was held that the decision not to include details of a financial viability statement for affordable housing and an independent review of the appraisal in the list of background documents was justified by the exemption on commercial confidentiality in R (on the application of Perry) v Hackney LBC [2014] EWHC 3499 (Admin), [2015] JPL 454. 4 See, in general, Tweed v Parades Commission for Northern Ireland [2006] UKHL 53, [2007] 1 AC 650 and, more specifically, R (on the application of Perry) v Hackney LBC [2014] EWHC 1721 (Admin), [2014] JPL 1329. 1 2

Inspection after the meeting 8.60  Under LGA  1972, s  100C the minutes, or copy of the minutes, of the meeting of a principal council and committees and sub-committees (s 100E) shall be open to inspection by members of the public for six years after the meeting at the offices of the council. Time runs from the date of the meeting. Minutes disclosing ‘exempt information’ where the public were excluded are excluded (and see s 100A(2)). A copy of the agenda for the meeting and copies of reports for the meeting relating to items during which the public were allowed to be present shall be open to inspection likewise. Also available will be a summary under sub-s (2). Where parts of the minutes are excluded because of the ‘exempt information’ provision and the minutes available do not provide a reasonably fair and coherent record of the whole or part of the proceedings, ‘the proper officer shall make a written summary of the proceedings or the part … which provides such a record without disclosing the exempt information’ (s 100C(2)). This will require some skill. Background papers, it should be recalled, are available for four years after the meeting, not six (above). 8.61  Prior to this Act coming into effect only the minutes of councils and committees exercising referred powers were open to inspection by law; those of committees exercising delegated powers were not open to inspection.1 The minutes of sub-committees likewise were not open to inspection; the authority had discretion. Wilson v Evans [1962] 1 All ER 247.

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Recording delegated officer decisions and access to documents 8.62  Part 3 of the Openness of Local Government Bodies Regulations 2014, SI  2014/2095 (OLGBR  2014), (in reg  7(1)) introduces a duty on a decisionmaking officer to produce a written record of any decision which falls within

740  Chapter 8 paragraph (2). This part of the regulation largely uses definitions from the existing legislation, ie  background papers, opinion of the proper officer, confidential information etc, and relevant local authority (above). It covers a wider range of bodies than LGA 1972, s 100J and includes, for instance, Transport for London. Regulation 7(2)–(4) states: ‘(2)  A decision falls within this paragraph if it would otherwise have been taken by the relevant local government body, or a committee, sub-committee of that body or a joint committee in which that body participates, but it has been delegated to an officer of that body either– (a) under a specific express authorisation; or (b) under a general authorisation to officers to take such decisions and, the effect of the decision is to– (i) grant a permission or licence; (ii) affect the rights of an individual; or (iii) award a contract or incur expenditure which, in either case, materially affects that relevant local government body’s financial position. (3) The written record must be produced as soon as reasonably practicable after the decision-making officer has made the decision and must contain the following information– (a) the date the decision was taken; (b) a record of the decision taken along with reasons for the decision; (c) details of alternative options, if any, considered and rejected; and (d) where the decision falls under paragraph (2)(a), the names of any member of the relevant local government body who has declared a conflict of interest in relation to the decision. (4) The duty imposed by paragraph (1) is satisfied where, in respect of a decision, a written record containing the information referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph (3) is already required to be produced in accordance with any other statutory requirement.’ Section 100EA of the LGA  1972 makes provision for decisions by single members and access to records concerning s 236 of the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007 (see s 237 and para 8.12).

Decisions and background papers to be made available to the public 8.63  Regulation 8 of the OLGBR 2014 provides: ‘(1) The written record, together with any background papers, must as soon as reasonably practicable after the record is made, be made available for inspection by members of the public– (a) at all reasonable hours, at the offices of the relevant local government body; (b) on the website of the relevant local government body, if it has one; and, (c) by such other means that the relevant local government body considers appropriate.

Public access to information and access to meetings   741 (2)  On request and on receipt of payment of postage, copying or other necessary charge for transmission, the relevant local government body must provide to the person who has made the request and paid the appropriate charges– (a) a copy of the written record; (b) a copy of any background papers. (3) The written record must be retained by the relevant local government body and made available for inspection by the public for a period of six years beginning with the date on which the decision, to which the record relates, was made. (4)  Any background papers must be retained by the relevant local government body and made available for inspection by the public for a period of four years beginning with the date on which the decision, to which the background papers relate, was made. (5)  In this regulation “written record” means the record required to be made by regulation 7(1) or the record referred to in regulation 7(4), as the case may be.’

Confidential and exempt information 8.64  Regulation 9 of the OLGBR 2014 provides: ‘(1) Nothing in this Part is to be taken to authorise or require the disclosure of confidential information [as in paras 8.29 et seq] in breach of the obligation of confidence. (2) Nothing in this Part– (a) authorises or requires a relevant local government body to disclose to the public or make available for public inspection any document or part of a document if, in the opinion of the proper officer, that document or part of a document contains or may contain confidential information; or (b) requires a relevant local government body to disclose to the public or make available for public inspection any document or part of a document if, in the opinion of the proper officer, that document or part of a document contains or is likely to contain exempt information.’ Regulation 10 states: ‘(1) A  person who has custody of a document which is required by regulation 8 to be available for inspection by members of the public commits an offence if, without reasonable excuse, that person– (a) intentionally obstructs any person exercising a right conferred under this Part in relation to inspecting written records and background papers; or (b) refuses any request under this Part to provide written records or background papers.

742  Chapter 8 (2)  A  person who commits an offence under paragraph  (1) is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 1 on the standard scale.’

Additional information 8.65  Under LGA 1972, s 100G a principal council has to maintain a register containing: (1) The name and address of every member of the council for the time being and the ward or division which s/he represents; as well as the name and address of every member of each committee or sub-committee of the council for the time being. (2) A list of powers delegated to officers under statute stating the officers’ title. It does not require a power to be listed ‘if the arrangements for its discharge by the officer are made for a period not exceeding six months’.1 (3) At the office of every principal council there shall be kept a written summary of the rights to attend the meetings as specified in the Act and to inspect, copy and be furnished with documents as specified in the Act, and under LGA  1972, Part XI and such other enactments as the Secretary of State specifies by order. The respective ‘register’, ‘list’ and ‘written summary’ shall all be open to inspection at the offices of the council. See LGA 1972, Part VI.

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A miscellany 8.66  Section 100H of the LGA  1972 contains supplemental provisions and establishes the offences which relate to the intentional obstruction, or refusal to comply with the rights created by this Act, by those having the custody of documents which are required to be open to inspection by virtue of s 100B(1) or 100C(1). Offences are triable summarily by fine. Documents shall be open to inspection for all reasonable hours, and for documents under s  100D(1) upon payment of such reasonable fee as may be required for the facility. Copies or photocopying facilities may be required upon payment of reasonable fees.1 This led to abuse: Birkinshaw ‘Open Government – Local Government Style’ in (1988) Public Policy and Administration p 46.

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8.67  Section 100H(5) provides for qualified privilege for any ‘accessible’ documents (s  100H(6)) available for inspection or supplied to the public, or which is supplied to a newspaper.1 The case of Lillie v Newcastle CC [2002] EWHC 1600 (QB) held that the publication of a report by an independent review body set up to investigate allegations of child abuse by certain council employees was covered by s 100H as the report was made available at a council meeting and that the independent review body, as it was acting in accordance with its contractual arrangement with the council in making the report available to the council, enjoyed the protection of qualified privilege at common law. Ultimately, however, the independent review body was found to be liable for defamation in its production of the report as there was evidence of malice.

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Public access to information and access to meetings   743

General comments 8.68  The above is an account of the legal provisions introduced into LGA 1972 by the LG(ATI)A 1985. Various points call for comment. 8.69  First, there are various anomalies and inconsistencies arising from the fact that the 1985 Act amends LGA 1972, s 100 and Sch 2, Part I but without all the necessary dovetailing taking place. We examined, in particular, the relationship between para 4(5) of the Schedule and s 100B(4)(b). 8.70  Secondly, a variety of items, such as ‘any other business’ or discussion of the minutes of a previous meeting, will have to be avoided unless they are brought within the notice provision of s 100B. 8.71  Thirdly, the Act provided for no internal enforcement mechanism with rights of appeal to designated officers. It was hoped that authorities would provide grievance procedures for such disputes, but a requirement in the Bill that they be provided was dropped (see above). Those disgruntled by refusals will have to rely upon the local ombudsman, judicial review or political support via a councillor, although there is a far greater consciousness of the necessity for effective grievance procedures now than there was in past decades. 8.72  Fourthly, too many provisions in the Act are either vague or unclear, eg ‘reasonable charges’ is a term which has been abused and is ambiguous, and the notice provisions relating to councillors being informed before the public need clarification. 8.73  Fifthly, the Act’s operation was the subject of extensive discussion between the local authority representative bodies and the then DoE, and certain matters were a cause of concern for the respective interests.1 The former DoE considered the inclusion of a national security exclusion. Local authorities have encountered difficulties with the ‘three clear days’ formulation, now extended by powers of the Secretary of State (above), and the application of the law to quasi-judicial committees.

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8.74  Sixthly, the practices of a number of authorities, before the Act was passed and since, have been exemplary in responding to or surpassing the Act’s requirements.1 Given all these points, the additional emphasis afforded to transparency by the 2014 Regulations should assist in making local government bodies more open. See eg Charter for Open Government Association of London Boroughs (1986).

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8.75  Finally, where the FOIA 2000 gives greater rights of access than LG(ATI) A 1985, or where amendments to the LGA 1972 prove more liberal, the applicant may use whichever is the more generous. The 1985 Act is an open meetings law, whereas FOIA is not. These points were examined above.

744  Chapter 8

Access to information etc of executives under the Local Government Act 2000 8.76  This was dealt with in detail in ch 6.

PUBLIC BODIES (ADMISSION TO MEETINGS) ACT 1960 8.77  The LG(ATI)A 1985 did not, as described above, apply to the meetings or documents of parish councils, or community councils. These are covered by LGA 1972, Sch 12 as regards meetings (Parts II–IV) and by the Public Bodies (Admission to Meetings) Act 1960 (PB(ATM)A 1960) since 1 April 1986. The PB(ATM)A 1960 applies to all bodies included in Schedule 1 to the Act, including the Care Quality Commission, Local Healthwatch organisations, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, and Local Health Boards. 8.78  In straightforward terms, public access is allowed to the meetings of the bodies as scheduled in the 1960 Act. Public notice had to be given on similar terms as under LGA 1972, Part VA but the period of notice for bodies covered by the 1960 Act is three clear days. In England, SI 2014/2095 amends the PB(ATM) A 1960 to give similar rights to the public as under the LGA 1972 (for details, see paras 8.41 and 8.42 above). Similar provisions are made for press agents and broadcasters as under the LGA 1972, with a qualification as under LGA 1972, s 100, and for qualified privilege. 8.79  The 1960 Act contains the prototype of LGA 1972, s 100A(8) (para 8.39 above) and need not be revisited here. 8.80  Under s 1(2) of the 1960 Act, power is given to exclude the public whenever publicity would be prejudicial to the public interest because of the confidential1 nature of the business or for other special reasons stated in the resolution excluding the public and arising from the nature of the business. Much like in the LGA  1972 as modified by SI  2014/2095, a new s  1(3A) of the PB(ATM) A 1960 grants the power to exclude recording devices and other methods that permit recording of proceedings in the absence of the operator’s presence at the meeting. In particular, and without prejudice to the foregoing, the section covers the power to treat the need to receive or consider recommendations or advice from sources other than members, committees or sub-committees of the body as a special reason why publicity would be prejudicial to the public interest. This is regardless of the subject or nature of the recommendations or advice. Advice from officers would, therefore, be protected by this exemption. This provision has been the subject of judicial interpretation. In R v Liverpool City Council, ex p Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators’ Association,2 40 members of the public wished to attend a committee meeting, at which only 14 seats were available for the public, the press and those attending to make representations. The chair decided to exclude the public because of the limited seating and because of the need to hear those making representations privately. Those were the reasons, but they were not minuted adequately. Lord Widgery held that the reason for exclusion amounted to ‘special reasons’ within the Act but that the legal requirement that

Public access to information and access to meetings   745 the reasons be stated in the resolution was directory, not mandatory and would only be set aside if a party suffered injury! The vagueness of the reason3 did not therefore invalidate the resolution. In fact, the court supplied the reasons which the public authority had omitted. Not as per LGA 1972, Part VA but as is ordinarily understood. [1975] 1 All ER 379. 3 ‘So that the business of the committee may be carried out satisfactorily’; ‘limitations of space’ was also mentioned. 1 2

EXTENSION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT (ACCESS TO INFORMATION) ACT 1985 8.81  The relevant provisions of the LG(ATI)A  19851 apply to community health councils in Wales2 and their committees, with necessary modifications to account for differences in their organisation and administration. This extension was effected by the Community Health Councils (Access to Information) Act 1988. Access has to be allowed to registers of members of the bodies covered at all reasonable hours free of charge. Copies may be made, or requested,3 on payment of a reasonable fee.4 LGA 1972, ss 100A–100D, 100H and 100I. Amended by Health and Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Act 2003, Sch 4, para 25 and Sch 14, Part I. 3 National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006, s 182. 4 And must be received within three days, including the day of request, under the Community Health Councils (Access to Information) Act 1988. 1 2

8.82  NHS bodies will make representations to local authority ‘overview and scrutiny committees’ (OSCs) concerning the views of members of the public about healthcare. OSCs were extended to health care matters by the Health and Social Care Act 2001, s 7, amended by the National Health Service Act 2006 and the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006. The role of the OSC is further set out by the Local Authority (Public Health, Health and Wellbeing Boards and Health Scrutiny) Regulations 2013, SI 2013/218. The Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007 (LGPIHA 2007) was amended by the Health and Social Care Act 2012 (HSCA 2012), Part 5 of which establishes Healthwatch England as a statutory committee of the Care Quality Commission.1 Healthwatch England is a national body representing the views of users of health and social care services, other members of the public and Local Healthwatch organisations (LHOs – as to which see HSCA 2012, s 181). Healthwatch England is under a duty to provide LHOs with advice and assistance of a general nature in relation to the making of arrangements with local authorities under s 221(1) of the LGPIHA 2007. Sections 182 and 183 of the HSCA 2012 amend the local authority arrangements under s 221 of the LGPIHA 2007. Local authorities will enter into contractual arrangements with LHOs. Planning, Assuring and Delivering Service Change for Patients NHS  England (2018) https:// www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/planning-assuring-delivering-servicechange-v6-1.pdf (28/10/2018).

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746  Chapter 8 8.83  As noted above, the regime for public involvement with NHS bodies in England has been and continues to be the subject of enormous reform. The present provisions which apply are found in the LGPIHA 2007, as amended by the HSCA 2012, although it was noted above that the public also enjoys access to meetings of many NHS bodies via the PB(ATM)A 1960, and this includes LHOs. LGPIHA 2007, Part 14 requires each local authority to enter into contractual arrangements to allow local people to participate in the commissioning, provision and scrutiny of local care services – to be known as a local involvement network. ‘Local care services’ and ‘care services’ are defined in LGPIHA 2007, s 221(6) and include health services provided by the NHS and social services provided by local authorities. Under s 227, each local authority must, when reaching contractual arrangements, require the Local Healthwatch organisations to deliver an annual report detailing its activities throughout the year and its expenditure. Section 224 requires that service providers should respond to the reports and actions of Local Healthwatch organisations. Section 225 provides that service providers should allow authorised persons from Local Healthwatch organisations to have access to this report in order to view and observe the carrying on of service provision in their local authority facilities. Further details on rights of access and other matters in relation to Local Healthwatch organisations can be found in the Local Authorities (Public Health Functions and Entry to Premises by Local Healthwatch Representatives) Regulations 2013, SI 2013/351. 8.84  Section 185 of the HSCA 2012 inserts a new s 223A of the LGPIHA 2007 which requires local authorities to make arrangements for the provision of independent advocacy services in relation to their area for complaints relating to the provision of health services and, as set out in new s 223A(2), removing this duty from the Secretary of State. ‘Independent advocacy services’ are services providing assistance (whether by way of representation or otherwise) to persons making various types of complaints in relation to the provision of health services, or to persons intending to make such complaints.  Section 223A(3)  enables a local authority to make other arrangements for the provision of services to assist individuals in connection with complaints relating to services provided as part of the health service. Section 186 of the HSCA 2012 empowers the Secretary of State to make regulations to impose a duty on certain persons such as certain providers or commissioners of health or social care services to respond to requests for information, or reports or recommendations made by LHOs or Local Healthwatch contractors when those organisations or contractors are carrying on Local Healthwatch activities or when Local Healthwatch organisations are discharging the duty under regulations under section 223(2) (i) of the LGPIHA 2007 to act with a view to securing that Local Healthwatch contractors are representative of the local area. LHOs are given inspection and scrutiny powers in relation to health care providers and must produce an annual report. Chapter 2 of Pt 5 of the 2012 Act amends the scrutiny role of local authorities concerning the views of members of the public about healthcare. As noted above, OSCs were extended to health care matters by the Health and Social Care Act 2001, s 7, amended by the National Health Service Act 2006 and the National

Public access to information and access to meetings   747 Health Service (Wales) Act 2006. The role of the OSC is further set out in regulations (para 8.82). Under the HSCA 2012 the scrutiny role may, but does not have to, be performed by an OSC. The authority may arrange for scrutiny itself involving oversight of commissioning and health provision. If there is certain information being discussed in relation to health scrutiny functions at meetings – for example, commercially confidential material – the public can be excluded from meetings as they can from OSC meetings.

CONCLUSION 8.85  The PB(ATM)A 1960 is an interesting example of open government in a wider sense than simply providing access to documents. Its spread is, however, very limited.

Chapter 9

Information and open government – specific areas

9.1  This chapter examines specific areas where there are existing duties or powers to publish information. It will be recalled that the FOIA  2000 does not prevent public authorities from exercising existing powers to disclose information. Under FOIA 2000, s 21 information which an authority is obliged by or under any enactment (apart from FOIA) to communicate is an absolute exemption under FOIA. One has to obtain it from an authority under that other enactment, whether free of charge or on payment of a fee (para 1.111 above).

POLICY AND FINANCE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 9.2  The general provisions of law applicable to meetings, documents and the public, as well as the rights of members to information apply in this area as elsewhere. Because of the sensitivity of this area, political groups in authorities where party politics are active may wish to keep proposals in the policy-making process confidential for as long as possible. However, as we have seen, there are limits imposed on secrecy by the law affecting authorities’ meetings, documentation, composition of membership of meetings and members’ access.1 This area is also significantly affected by the Local Government Acts 2000 (LGA 2000) and 2003 (LGA 2003), the Localism Act 2011 and the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014. See chs 6 and 7. See chs 6, 7 and 8 above.

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9.3  In policy formulation, a frequent ploy is to create a one-party group, working group or advisory group which is outside the formal committee structure of an authority,1 and so not covered by the Local Government (Access to Information) Act 1985, but which nevertheless the authority has power to create as we described above. These will be within the common law duties of authorities to allow access to documents and if necessary to allow a member to be present where the member can establish a right to know based upon a ‘need to know’.2 Such a need would have to relate not only to the subject-matter but

Information and open government – specific areas   749 also the timing of access. The effects of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 (LGHA 1989) have been discussed.3 The reforms which we outlined in ch 6 concerning new-style executives seek to address some of these points (paras 6.29 et seq above). There are dangers that we could end up with executive processes that are more resistant to openness than the present structures. The government hoped that removal of the antagonism that surrounded tax capping and the development through legislation of best value in the provision of local services emphasising participation of service recipients would help open up financial decisions. This has subsequently been added to by the increased transparency requirements in the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014 and the Openness of Local Government Bodies Regulations 2014, SI 2014/2095. See chs 6 and 7 above. See paras 7.66 et seq above. 3 See ch 6 above. 1 2

9.4  As regards financial planning or budgeting, the position is largely governed by the Local Government Finance Act 1988 (LGFA 1988). As we saw in ch 6, this Act recast the law relating to local authority financial planning. Authorities impose a council tax, as well as a national business rate set by central government, a change which necessitated a reformulation of the system for re-allocating central government grants to local authorities. It will be recalled from ch  6 that reforms to the business rate were introduced by the LGA  2003. Further reforms were proposed in the Local Government Finance Bill 2017 to enable local government to retain 100% of the business rates for their area (up from 50% in the present regime) but this Bill did not pass the legislative stages in advance of the 2017 general election. The Bill has not yet been reintroduced by the government in the new Parliamentary session. The LGFA 1988 imposes a requirement on the chief finance officer to make a report1 if it appears to him that the authority,2 a committee of the authority, a person holding any office or employment under the authority, a member of the relevant police force or a joint committee on which the authority is represented: (a) has made or is about to make a decision which involves or would involve the authority incurring expenditure which is unlawful; (b) has taken or is about to take a course of action which, if pursued to its conclusion, would be unlawful and likely to cause a loss or deficiency on the part of the authority; or (c) is about to enter an item of account the entry of which is unlawful. LGFA  1988, s  114. See paras 6.86 et seq above. See also LGFA  1988, s  114 which contains provisions of an identical nature applicable to authorities operating executive arrangements. 2 LGFA 1988, s 111 for the authorities. 1

9.5  Section 114 of LGFA 1988 continues: ‘(3)  The chief finance officer of a relevant authority shall make a report under this section if it appears to him that the expenditure of the authority incurred (including expenditure it proposes to incur) in a financial year is likely to exceed the resources (including sums borrowed) available to it to meet that expenditure. [The head of the authority’s paid service and

750  Chapter 9 monitoring officer shall be consulted as far as reasonably practicable (see subsection (3A)).] (4)  Where a chief finance officer of a relevant authority has made a report under this section he shall send a copy of it to– (a) the person who at the time the report is made has the duty to audit the authority’s accounts, and (b) in the case of– (i) a police and crime commissioner, the commissioner and each member of the police and crime panel for the commissioner’s police area; (ii) the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, that Office and each member of the police and crime panel of the London Assembly; (iii) a chief officer of police, the chief officer and the elected local policing body; and (iv) any other relevant authority, each person who is at that time a member of the authority. (5)  Subject to subsection (6) below, the duties of a chief finance officer of a relevant authority under subsections (2) and (3) above shall be performed by him personally. (6)  If the chief finance officer is unable to act owing to absence or illness his duties under subsections (2) and (3) above shall be performed– (a) by such member of his staff as is a member of one or more of the bodies mentioned in section 113(3) above and is for the time being nominated by the chief finance officer for the purposes of this section, or (b) if no member of his staff is a member of one or more of those bodies, by such member of his staff as is for the time being nominated by the chief finance officer for the purposes of this section. (7) A  relevant authority shall provide its chief finance officer with such staff, accommodation and other resources as are in his opinion sufficient to allow his duties under this section to be performed. (8)  In this section– (a) references to a joint committee are to a committee on which two or more relevant authorities are represented, and (b) references to a committee (joint or otherwise) include references to a sub-committee. (8A)  In this section “relevant police force”, in relation to the chief finance officer of a relevant authority, means— (a) in the case where the relevant authority is a chief officer of police, the police force of which that person is chief officer; (b) in any other case, the police force maintained by the relevant authority.’ 9.6  The authority must consider the report made under s  114 at a meeting of the whole authority, which must be held within 21 days of the sending out of copies of the report. Temporary prohibitions exist regarding the proposed course of conduct which is the subject of the report and new agreements which

Information and open government – specific areas   751 may involve the incurring of expenditure.1 The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 includes a similar regime for the police under the new arrangements introduced by the Act. These are found in s 115(1A)–(1G) of the LGFA 1988. LGFA 1988, s 115; and see paras 6.94 et seq above.

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9.7  Under LGFA 1988, s 116(1), where it is proposed to hold a s 115 meeting, the authority’s proper officer shall as soon as is reasonably practicable notify its auditor of: the date, time and place of the proposed meeting; and, after the meeting, what decisions were made. The power of the auditor to issue prohibition orders under LGA 1988, Sch 4 have now been replaced by powers to issue advisory notices, now under s 29 of and Sch 8 to the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014. Clearly LGFA 1988, ss 114–116 are aimed more at the final stages of decision-making than the early deliberative stages. 9.8  We have seen how the provisions on standards seek to build on these safeguards (paras 6.127 et seq above), although the rigours of these standards have been substantially changed and perhaps reduced by the Localism Act 2011. 9.9  The powers of the Secretary of State to obtain local authority financial information are described elsewhere (paras 6.60 et seq above).

Inspecting the accounts 9.10  The previous regime on the inspection of local authority accounts was provided by ss 14–15 of the Audit Commission Act 1998 (ACA 1998), which has been repealed by the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014 (LAAA  2014). The rights of inspection granted to the public are not significantly changed by the 2014 Act and it is likely that much of the case law that considered provisions in the 1998 Act is still relevant. Section 25 of the LAAA 2014 governs the law relating to inspection of the accounts. It applies to all bodies audited under that section but not to health service bodies. 9.11  Under LAAA 2014, s 25(1), at each audit ‘a local government elector’ may inspect and make copies of any statement of accounts; local auditor’s certificate; local auditor’s opinion on the statement of accounts; any public interest report relating to the body or an entity connected with it under Sch 7 to the Act and any recommendation relating to the body or an entity connected with it issued under Sch 7 to the Act prepared by the body or auditor pursuant to regulations under s 32. The elector may require copies of any such statement or report to be delivered to him on payment of a reasonable sum for each copy (s 25(2)). Section 26 allows the accounts of a body to be audited, again excluding health service bodies, to be inspected by any person interested1 and any journalist – defined in s 26(1A), introduced by Local Audit (Public Access to Documents) Act 2017, s 1 as ‘any person who produces for publication journalistic material (whether paid to do so or otherwise)’ – as well as all books, deeds, contracts, bills, vouchers and receipts relating to them, and copies of all or any part of the accounts and those

752  Chapter 9 other documents to be made. ‘Interest’ has been taken to mean a financial or legal interest rather than an idle curiosity and a person so interested has been held to be entitled to employ a skilled agent. Application forms for bursaries have been held not to be vouchers.2 The Court of Appeal considered the scope of s 15 of the ACA 1998, which is worded in the same terms as s 26 of the LAAA 2014, in Veolia ES Nottinghamshire Ltd v Nottinghamshire County Council3 and determined that it should be construed widely. In this case, Veolia sought to prevent the council from disclosing certain elements of a contract, including details of the formulae for calculating payments to be made as part of the council’s contract with Veolia, details of deductions to be made in case of Veolia’s default and a performance scorecard. The council also proposed to disclose the key performance indicators that were used to determine if deductions could be made. Counsel for Veolia sought to argue that the documents should not be disclosed to the individual who had made the request under s 15 (the fact that the individual was a local government elector for the purpose of s 15 was not in dispute) as the contract concerned was not expressly included in the council’s audited accounts. This argument was rejected by the Court of Appeal where it was held that the reference in s 15(1)(a) to ‘… the accounts to be audited and all books, deeds, contracts, bills, vouchers and receipts relating to them’ should be construed widely as referring to all materials pertinent to the council’s annual accounts, regardless of whether they were referred to explicitly in the final summary accounts published by the council. The case then considered whether the requirements in s 15 ought to be ‘read down’ in light of either the duty of interpretation in s 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 insofar as the contract could be said to be covered by Veolia’s right to private property contained in Art 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR. The court held that the information did constitute property under the Convention, and therefore the statute ought to be read accordingly in order to deny access to the information in this case.4 A final issue considered by the case was whether, if the information was disclosed under s  15, Veolia could seek to restrain the party to whom the information was disclosed to use it only for the purpose of audit. Rix LJ felt that it could, whereas the other two judges in the case declined to determine this point as it was not at issue in the appeal given that the case at hand was not one where Veolia had brought private law proceedings in order to claim an injunction.5 On person interested, see R (HTV Ltd) v Bristol City Council [2004] 1 WLR 2717: broadcasting company was a ‘person interested’ by virtue of its position as a non-domestic rate-payer but not as a media operator, and ‘person interested’ did not mean someone who found the issue interesting: see Marginson v Tildsley (1903) 67 JP 226; R v Bedwelty UDC [1934] 1 KB 333; Stirrat v City of Edinburgh (1998) SCLR 973 at 978. 2 R v Monmouthshire County Council, ex p Smith (1935) 51 TLR 435. On contracts see: Hillingdon London Borough v Paulssen [1977]  JPL  518. See Oliver v Northampton Borough Council (1986) 151 JP 44 and LGHA 1989, s 11. 3 [2010] EWCA Civ 1214. 4 Ibid at [143] (Rix LJ) and [162] (Etherton LJ). 5 Ibid at [160] (Rix LJ) and [164] and [166] (Etherton LJ and Jackson LJ respectively). 1

9.12  By LAAA 2014, s 26(2) a local government elector for any area to which the accounts relate may request, and the auditor shall give the elector or any representative of his or hers, an opportunity to question the auditor about the

Information and open government – specific areas   753 accounts. By virtue of s 26(4) and (5), there is no entitlement to inspect documents covered by commercial confidentiality or to require such disclosure in the answer to any question. Under s 26(6) nothing in the section entitles a person to inspect accounts or other documents containing personal information about a member of staff or to require the disclosure of such information in response to questions. Information is personal information as described when it relates specifically to a particular individual and is available to the body audited because the individual held or holds an office or employment under that body; or that payments or other benefits in respect of an office or employment have been or are being made to that individual by the body. Under this latter provision is included so-called ‘severance payments’ which have caused considerable notoriety (s 26(9)). 9.13  The elector, as above, is given the right under LAAA 2014, s 27(1) to make objections. The auditor is required to consider objections where these concern: (a) a matter in respect of which the auditor could make a public interest report (under LAAA 2014, Sch 7, para 1);1 (b) a matter in respect of which the auditor could apply for a declaration under LAAA 2014, s 28. For a case on interpretation of a similar provision under the similar s 17 of the ACA 1998 see R (Moss) v KPMG [2010] EWHC 2923 (Admin) at [11]–[12] (Ouseley J).

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9.14  Under s 27(2) of the LAAA 2014, the auditor is obliged to consider an objection only if the objection is made in writing and a copy of the objection is sent to the authority whose accounts are being audited. Such objections may be ignored by the auditor where the auditor thinks that the objection is frivolous or vexatious, the cost of investigation would be disproportionate or the objection repeats an objection that has already been considered. 9.15  By s 28(3), any person who has made an objection under s 27(1)(b) above and is aggrieved by a decision of an auditor not to apply for a declaration under s 28 (that an item of account is unlawful) has the right to require the auditor to state the reasons in writing for that decision. It must be required within six weeks of the decision. The person may also appeal against that decision to the court within 21 days of the decision. The court hearing the appeal has the same powers as if the auditor had applied for a declaration, powers which are contained in s 28 (s 27(3) and (4)). Lord Nolan recommended in his third report that powers of surcharge of members and officials should be abolished and replaced by orders of the court on the application of the auditor allowing compensation and imposing disqualification from office (Cm 3702–I, Rec 27). He also recommended a new statutory offence of misuse of public office applying to all holders of public office. Furthermore, the right of a local elector to challenge an authority’s accounts should be recast to avoid abuse of the process. In June 2000, details of new offences concerning corruption across the public and private sector spectrum were published by the Home Office. Anti-terrorism legislation addressed certain of these issues (see para 7.17 above).1 Section 2 of the Bribery Act 2010 extends the potential for holders of public office and public sector employees to be prosecuted should they engage in improper conduct and receive a benefit for so doing. The opportunity to create a statutory offence of misuse of public office

754  Chapter 9 was not taken in the Bribery Act 2010. The Law Commission, in its report which led to the Bribery Act,2 noted that the new offence in the Bribery Act would complement, but not replace, the present common law on misconduct in public office.3 Raising Standards and Upholding Integrity: The Prevention of Corruption Cm 4579, 20 June 2000. See Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, ss 108–110. 2 HC 928 (2008-2009) Reforming Bribery Law Commission No 313. 3 The Law Commission is presently undertaking a more detailed consultation on the potential creation of a new offence of misconduct in public office. See the documents available at https:// www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/misconduct-in-public-office/. 1

9.16  The Accounts and Audit Regulations 2015, SI 2015/234, and the Code of Audit Practice1 provide further details on the auditor’s role. National Audit Office (2005) and see Statement of Responsibilities of Auditors and Audited Bodies (2010).

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9.17  The above regulations specify the degree of public notice that the authority must give by advertisement before the beginning of the period for public inspection – this must be at least 14 days. Statements of accounts, with an auditor’s opinion wherever possible, should be published within the publication period provided for in reg 15(1). The code says that where appropriate the person inspecting the accounts should be reminded of his or her right to make objection. There is no statutory duty to hold nor any right to insist on, an oral hearing with all the parties to determine an objection, although the auditor must consider1 whether oral hearings ought to be conducted and, if so, whether the public should be given the right to attend. The public should be excluded ‘if it becomes apparent that injustice may be caused by allegations made without due notice’ (code, chapter 5). Lloyd v McMahon [1987] 1 All ER 1118, CA and HL; R v District Auditor Chelmsford, ex p Judge (1988) Times, 26 December.

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9.18  Section 228(2) of the Local Government Act 1972 (LGA 1972) allows a local government elector for the area of a local authority to inspect and make a copy of, or extract from, an order for the payment of money made by the local authority. Photographic copies may be produced. Failure to comply with the section is a criminal offence.1 See Brookman v Green (1983) 82 LGR 228: did not cover allowances under now SI 2003/1021, reg 15, although the scope of this regulation, unlike that before the court in Brookman, now covers the right to make copies. See s 228(8) for parish councils.

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EDUCATION 9.19  From the Education Act 1980, the area of education has seen an immense growth in the duties on schools, local education authorities (LEAs) and governors to inform parents in particular of a variety of factors. There have been ten major statutes in that period. The Education Act 2002 is the basis for the new legal

Information and open government – specific areas   755 frameworks to maintain schools, regulation of independent schools, the national curriculum in England and other matters.

School Standards and Framework Act 1998, as amended 9.20  Part III of the School Standards and Framework Act 1998 (SSFA 1998, as amended by the Education Act 2002 and the Education and Inspections Act 2006) concerns admission arrangements for maintained schools and, under s  84, the Secretary of State shall issue and, from time to time, revise a code containing such practical guidance as he thinks fit on the discharge by local authorities,1 governors of maintained schools, appeals panels and adjudicators of their duties in relation to admissions.2  A  School Admission Appeals Code (2009) came into effect on 10 February 2010 and includes provisions on who must have regard to the Code, disability discrimination, recruitment to appeals panels, venues for hearings, bias, evidence and the conduct of hearings. The Code may include guidelines setting out aims, objectives and other matters in relation to these functions.3 The persons mentioned above and any other person when exercising relevant functions are under a duty to have regard to any relevant provisions of the Code. The Secretary of State is under a duty to publish the code. There are familiar provisions relating to consultation in the making of the Code and it is subject to negative resolution approval before both Houses. Sections 46–53 of the 2002 Act make provision for admissions, exclusions and attendance and amend various of the provisions contained in the SSFA  1998. There are provisions dealing with the number of pupils to be admitted to maintained schools in any one year and on the coordination of admissions arrangements. SSFA  1998, s  86 provides for the making of arrangements by LEAs to provide for the parents of a child in the area of the authority to express their preference for a school for their child and to state their reasons, though not in relation to sixth-form education or education for children beyond compulsory school age by virtue of s 86(1ZA), inserted by the Education and Skills Act 2008. Section 86A of the SSFA 1998 deals with choices in relation to sixth-form and other non-compulsory education. Authorities are under a duty to comply with the preference unless their preference would interfere with a variety of factors. See the amendments made by SI 2010/1158 on the integration of functions between LEAs and Children’s Services departments. 2 See Department for Education (2014) School Admissions Code (available at: https://assets. publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/389388/ School_Admissions_Code_2014_-_19_Dec.pdf) and Welsh Assembly Government (2013) School Admissions Code (available at: https://beta.gov.wales/sites/default/files/publications/2018-03/ school-admissions-code.pdf). 3 Department for Education (2012) School Admission Appeal Code (available at: https://assets. publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/275897/ school_admission_appeals_code_1_february_2012.pdf) and Welsh Government 2013 (available at: https://beta.gov.wales/sites/default/files/publications/2018-03/school-admission-appealscode.pdf). See, for England, SI 2012/8 as amended by SI 2014/2886. For Wales, see SI 1998/3130, SI  1998/3165 and SI  2006/174. See SI  2008/3093 (as amended) on the publication by local authorities of a composite prospectus of admissions information for schools in England in their areas. Similar provisions for Wales can be found in SI 2011/1944. See R v Stockton-on Tees Borough Council, ex p W [2000] ELR 93, CA. 1

756  Chapter 9 9.21  In Wales only, section 85A of the SSFA  1998 (originally introduced by the Education Act 2002 and heavily modified by the Education and Inspections Act 2006) requires each local authority to create an admissions forum for the purpose of advising the authority on such matters as are prescribed in Regulations and, in particular, under SSFA  1998, s  85A(1)(b) advising on matters relating to admissions. The admissions forum may make reports on prescribed matters and may require the local authority for which it was created, adjoining local authorities and the governors of maintained schools in the area for which the forum is established to provide it with information prescribed in Regulations for that purpose. The constitution of the admissions forum, its functions and the reports that it is expected to produce are all set out in secondary legislation.1 The admissions forum should report on whether the admissions arrangements within its area ensure fair access to educational opportunity and also make recommendations for any improvements that might be made. The forum should be provided with any information that it requires in order to exercise its functions. Education Act 2011, s 34 repealed these requirements for schools in England. See SI 2003/2962.

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9.22  Under SSFA  1998, s  88P, local authorities are required to produce a report on school admissions giving details of all maintained schools, academies, City Technology Colleges and City Technology Colleges of the Arts. The report should contain, as required by para  3.23 of the Code referred to in para  9.20 above, an assessment of the effectiveness of fair access protocols, including details of the number of children admitted to each relevant school in its area under the Protocols. Details must also be provided of the number of appeals made. The local authority must also make a statement that the maintained schools in its area will conform to the Schools Admission Code. Section 88Q of the SSFA 1998 requires information to be provided to the local authority by the schools, governing bodies, and owners of Academies in order that the report under s  88P might be produced. This report must be sent to the adjudicator provided for in SSFA 1998, s 25. 9.23  Under SSFA 1998, s 92, Regulations may: ‘(a) require the publication by a local authority of such information relating to admissions as may be prescribed, (b) require the publication by the governing body of a foundation or voluntary aided school of such information relating to admissions as may be prescribed, (c) require or allow the publication by the governing body of any school maintained by a local authority, or by the local authority on behalf of the governing body, of such information relating to the school as may be prescribed, and (d) make provision as to the time by which, and the manner in which, information required to be published by virtue of this section is to be published.’ 9.24  Foundation and voluntary aided schools are under similar duties, but only in relation to their own schools.

Information and open government – specific areas   757 9.25  The governing body of a school maintained by a local authority have to publish information respecting their school as required by regulations and such other information as they think fit in relation to the school. Information about the school includes that relating to employment or training by pupils on leaving school, and about continuing education. 9.26  The School Information (England) Regulations 2008, SI  2008/3093, specify the information to be published by local authorities and governing bodies under SSFA  1998, s  92 including that on special education provision. Under Part 2 of the 2008 Regulations, local authorities are only required to publish details about admission arrangements in a composite prospectus. A  school prospectus must be made available for distribution free of charge to parents. This information must contain an explanation of the local authority’s fair access protocol and should include particulars of arrangements for co-ordinated admissions (SI  2008/3093, Sch  2, paras 7 and 8) and details of the school’s admissions number or numbers and the number of preferences expressed for that school in the previous admissions year (Sch 2, para 13). It is notable that the information that is now mandated to be included in school prospectuses is much reduced in the 2008 Regulations when contrasted with the 2002 Regulations. The school prospectus must now contain only information relating to special needs provision and any other general information that the governing body sees fit (SI 2008/3093, reg 10). Governing bodies have to provide authorities with specified information to assist with publication of a composite prospectus (SI  2008/3093, reg  7). Information to be published by local authorities in respect of transport to and from schools and further education institutions must be published (SI 2008/3093, Sch 3, paras 9–11). There is a further duty, applicable only to children of compulsory school age, to publish information on the arrangements and policies in place on the transport of children with special educational needs to maintained, non-maintained and independent special schools (Sch 3, para 15). The local authority must make available the composite prospectus by displaying it on its website and also making copies available on request at local authority offices and at each maintained school in the local authority’s area (SI 2008/3093, reg 6). The information that local authorities are required to publish under Sch 3 must be published in a similar manner, but there are additional requirements that a copy is provided to parents of children in maintained schools in the area and at every academy, City Technology College and City Technology College of the Arts and for reference in public libraries (SI 2008/3093, reg 9).

Reports on pupils and information about pupils 9.27  Teachers are under an obligation to provide assessments, reports and records relating to pupils.1 The latter concerns curricular and educational records and the duties of head teachers of maintained schools. Records of pupils must be transferred to educational institutions which they subsequently attend by the school governing body if requested. Under the Education Reform Act 1988, ss 218 and 232, the Secretary of State had the power to make

758  Chapter 9 regulations concerning the retention and disclosure of records. Regulations were issued in July 1989 but these duties now fall under the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA 2018) (see ch 2). The Education (Information About Individual Pupils) (England) Regulations 2013, SI  2013/2094, also provide details of the information about pupils that governing bodies of schools are required to supply to local authorities. The Regulations apply to all schools maintained by a local authority, including schools with sixth forms providing education to pupils over compulsory school age, but only if these schools also provide education to pupils of compulsory school age (SI 2013/2094, regs 3 and 4). City Technology Colleges, City Colleges for the Technology of the Arts and academies are also included in the requirements (reg  5). Information must ordinarily be provided within 14 days of the local authority’s request. The principal requirements (contained in Sch  1) provide that, in relation to all pupils (other than sixth-form pupils), the information which schools are required to provide includes: the student’s personal details, including date of birth, gender, surname and preferred surname; the derivation of information about ethnicity; whether the pupil is or has been looked after by a local authority; whether the pupil has special educational needs; whether the pupil is eligible for free school meals; whether the student has been identified as gifted and talented; and information relating to absences. In relation to excluded pupils, schools must provide alongside the personal details outlined above, details of whether the pupil had special educational needs or was looked after by a local authority and the details of the exclusion and reasons for it (Sch 1, Part 2). For sixth-form students at institutions covered by the Regulations, Sch 1, Part 3 provides that the information to be provided includes the personal details outlined above for pupils covered by Sch 1 and details of the qualifications that are being pursued. See, most recently, SI  2005/1437 and SI  2013/2094. For Wales, see SI  2011/1942 and SI 2007/3562. For information to be provided by independent schools, see SI 2018/901 (England) and SI 2003/3230, as amended (Wales).

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Access to records 9.28  Regulations on individual pupils’ achievements are to be found in the Education (Pupil Information) (England) Regulations 2005, SI  2005/1437. These Regulations do not apply to independent schools and there are no requirements at present for similar disclosure. The governing body of every school is under an obligation to ensure that a ‘curricular record’, defined as ‘a formal record of a pupil’s academic achievements, his other skills and abilities and his progress in school’, is kept. Schools are not required to keep records on behaviour and personality, although they remain free to keep such records if they wish. Regulation 3 also defines the concept of an ‘educational record’: ‘(1) Subject to paragraph  (4), in these Regulations ‘educational record’ means any record of information which— (a) is processed by or on behalf of the governing body of, or a teacher at, any school specified in paragraph (2);. (b) relates to any person who is or has been a pupil at any such school; and

Information and open government – specific areas   759 (c) originated from or was supplied by or on behalf of any of the persons specified in paragraph (3), other than information which is processed by a teacher solely for the teacher’s own use. (2) The schools referred to in paragraph (1)(a) are— (a) any school maintained by a local authority; and (b) any special school which is not so maintained. (3) The persons referred to in paragraph (1)(c) are— (a) any employee of the local authority which maintains the school or former school attended by the pupil to whom the record relates; (b) in the case of— (i) a voluntary aided, foundation or foundation special school; or (ii) a special school which is not maintained by a local authority, any teacher or other employee at the school or at the pupil’s former school (including any educational psychologist engaged by the governing body under a contract for services); (c) the pupil to whom the record relates; and. (d) a parent of that pupil. (4) In addition to the information referred to in paragraph  (1), an educational record includes— (a) any EHC plan (para 9.46 below); and (b) any personal education plan, relating to the pupil concerned. (5) For the purposes of this regulation, ‘processed’ shall be construed in accordance with the definition of ‘processing’ in section 3(4) of the DPA 2018.’ The Regulations cover the keeping, disclosure and transfer of school records and cover all key stages of education. 9.29  The provisions cover educational progress reports; and behaviour records either held separately or which were passed on from year to year. Regulation 3(1) (c) draws a distinction between formal records and a teacher’s note for ‘personal use’ which would be regarded as the teacher’s property and therefore excluded, but not if they were passed on to other teachers, orally or otherwise. Regulation 3(3)(a) covers material provided by education welfare officers and other local authority employees. Information provided to or from outside bodies, eg social services departments, local authorities, medical practitioners, etc on suspected child abuse is not to be disclosed to parents or children (see below). 9.30  Under reg  5(2), parents have the right to inspect a pupil’s educational record free of charge within 15 school days of the parent’s written request. The parent may also request a copy of the educational record, for which a fee no greater than the cost of production may be charged (reg 5(3)). The Regulations include, for the first time, any statement of special educational needs in the definition of ‘educational record’, along with the personal learning plan for any pupil in

760  Chapter 9 local authority care. The governing body must not supply any information that it could not lawfully disclose to the pupil under the GDPR, which the pupil would have no right to access under the GDPR. The primary exemptions relate to information which would seriously harm the pupil physically, mentally or emotionally, or where the information disclosed would reveal that the pupil is or has been the subject of child abuse or is considered to be at risk of child abuse and this disclosure would not be in the pupil’s best interests.1 The pupil him or herself may request access under the DPA 2018 and has no right to request the information set out above under the Regulations, which apply only to parents. The position under the DPA 2018 is discussed in ch 2. It is notable that academies are not covered by the Regulations. See Data Protection Act 2018, Sch 3, Part 4.

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9.31  Regulation 5(5) of SI  2005/1437 provides that where a pupil is under consideration to another school (including independent schools), further education institution or higher education institution, the governors should transfer the curricular record upon request. Note that this obligation extends to the curricular record only and excludes details of any assessment of the pupil’s achievement (reg 5(6)). 9.32  The governing body is responsible for making arrangements for the keeping and disclosure of records. Day-to-day responsibility rests with the staff and teachers. Disclosure of references remains voluntary as confidential references are exempted by DPA 2018, Sch 2, para 24 and thus by reg 5(4) of the Regulations. Many authorities allow for disclosure of references to parents. 9.33  The Regulations also require the headteacher of every school covered by SI 2005/1437 to produce an annual report, supplied either to the parent or to the pupil in cases where the pupil is an ‘adult pupil’.1 The information which must be provided is set out in Sch 1, which primarily relates to educational progress and attainment. There is a further requirement that a similar report be provided to each school-leaver. As defined in SI 2005/1437, reg 6(7)(a).

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9.34  SI 2005/1437 also creates the concept of a ‘common transfer file’ which must ordinarily be transferred to the new school at which a pupil becomes registered if the pupil changes school (reg  9). The contents of the ‘common transfer file’ are set out in Sch 2. 9.35  Section 9 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 obliges local authorities in care proceedings to provide such information about the school record of any child or young person as appears to the authority likely to assist the court.

Governors’ reports 9.36  In Wales, governors must still produce an annual report as required by the Education Act 2002, s 30. The detail of the report that must be produced

Information and open government – specific areas   761 is set out in the School Governors’ Annual Reports (Wales) Regulations 2011, SI 2011/1939. 9.37  The report required of governors in Wales which may be produced in languages other than English, must give the names of all the governors, their terms of office, details of how they were appointed and whom they represent, the school’s examination results, financial statements, and information about steps to improve community links. The governors also have to prepare a statement containing a financial statement, National Curriculum assessments, security for pupils and staff, numbers of registrations, pupils’ attendance, pupils’ achievements, and so on. They also have to prepare a separate written statement setting out their views on whether sex education should be part of the curriculum, and if it is taught, how it should be taught. Information has to be provided about school syllabuses and other educational subjects.

Reports on academies 9.38  The Secretary of State is required by the Academies Act 2010, s  11 to produce an annual report on academy arrangements entered into during the year and the performance of academies over the year. The report must include information that the Secretary of State might require by creating Regulations under the Education Act 1996 (EA  1996), s  537 or through the Academy Agreement. Academy agreements contain a clause1 allowing the Secretary of State to request information on a wide range of matters including, inter alia, the curriculum, assessment of students, teaching staff, class sizes and numbers of pupils excluded. The Academies Act 2010, s 11(4) requires the Secretary of State to lay the report produced before Parliament. The numbering of the clauses in academy agreements is not consistent throughout all of those that are published and has varied over the years, though in the current model funding agreement, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/694364/Mainsteam_Single_V7._March2018.odt, the requirements are in paras 8.1 and 8.2.

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Inspectors’ reports 9.39  The Secretary of State had, as a practice, published HM  Inspectors’ (of schools) reports, involving local authorities and schools and the effects of expenditure policies on the education service in England and Wales. Inspections are also carried out in the private independent sector, and for further education and other colleges. In the independent sector, the inspection bodies (ISI, the Bridge Schools Inspectorate and the Schools Inspection Service) are all required to publish the reports that they produce by virtue of the agreement letters that they have in place with the Department for Education.1 The agreements can be found in Department for Education (2016) Registration of Independent Schools available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ uploads/attachment_data/file/492259/Registration_of_independent_schools.pdf.

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762  Chapter 9 9.40  The Education and Inspections Act 2006 (amended for England by the Education and Inspections Act 2006, Part 8 in particular)1 sets out the statutory framework including the functions of the Chief Inspector for England and another for Wales, as well as HM Inspectorates – again, one for England and Wales. The schools that are subject to inspection are set out in the Education Act 2005, s 5. In England, schools may be inspected by a Chief Inspector, one of the appointed HM  Inspectors or ‘additional inspectors’ as provided for in ss 113–115 of and Sch 12 to the Education and Inspections Act 2006. In Wales, schools may be inspected by registered inspectors (who enjoy various rights of appeal to a tribunal against adverse decisions concerning their registration under s 27) although a school may be inspected by a member of the Inspectorate. In England, the Education Act 2005, ss 14, 14A and 15 (maintained schools) and 16, 16A and 17 (non-maintained schools) deal with destination of reports. Copies of reports are to be made available to the public, and parents of registered pupils at the school must be sent a copy of the report. If special measures are proposed the local authority (maintained schools) or proprietor (non-maintained schools) must prepare a written statement of the action they propose to take, which must be sent to the Secretary of State, the Chief Inspector and any other person that the Secretary of State may specify. Further details on the procedure in relation to provision of reports and statements can be found in SI  2005/2038. Similar provisions apply to Wales, as set out in the Education Act 2005, ss 37–42 and SI 2006/1714. In Wales, ss 39(7) and 42(5) of the 2005 Act set out the requirements for local authorities or proprietors to make copies of their statements available to the public and parents. In Wales, with regard to schools with sixth forms that are found to require significant improvement, a process of reporting and production of an action plan, which must be provided to the Welsh Ministers and the school inspected, is found in ss 44A–44F of the 2005 Act. In England, the Act does not set out requirements for the statement itself to be provided to members of the public or parents, but each statement that is produced must set out the way in which the school will inform parents of the action that is proposed and how the views of parents will be sought.2 Section 29 of the Education Act 2005 provides a broad power to the Chief Inspector to arrange for publication of inspection reports, including by electronic means. The main purpose of the amendments in Part 8 of the Education and Inspections Act 2006 is to create the Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills in England, offering an integrated approach to inspection of local authority childcare and school and further education in England. The bulk of the framework for school inspections remains unchanged and is found in the Education Act 2005. 2 For further information, see Department for Education (2014) Statutory Guidance on Schools Causing Concern available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ attachment_data/file/680559/Schools_causing_concern_guidance_-_February_2018.pdf, ch 4. 1

9.41  The Education and Inspections Act 2006 introduced a power, contained in ss 11A–11C of the Education Act 2005, for the Chief Inspector to investigate complaints made about schools by parents. Section 11A provides that the Chief Inspector may investigate a ‘qualifying complaint’ if he thinks it appropriate to do so. Section 11A(2) defines a ‘qualifying complaint’ as one which falls within a prescribed definition, is made in writing and is made by a person who satisfies the prescribed conditions. The Regulations which elaborate on this are to be found

Information and open government – specific areas   763 in The Education (Investigation of Parents’ Complaints) (England) Regulations 2007, SI 2007/1089. Regulation 3 sets out the matters which might be subject to complaint and include the quality of education provided at a school, the standard of educational attainment and the quality of leadership. Regulation 5 provides that before a complaint can be considered, the complainant should have followed any complaints process that this is in place, although reg  6 permits the Chief Inspector to waive this requirement if it is deemed appropriate. Section 11B of the Education Act 2005 requires that schools and local authorities (where relevant) should provide all necessary information to allow a complaint to be investigated and, if necessary, arrange for a meeting of parents in order to facilitate the investigation. Section 11C allows the Chief Inspector to publish a report on the outcome of the investigation if this is deemed to be appropriate. The Chief Inspector must provide a copy of any such report to the school, to the local authority in case of a maintained school, and the Chief Inspector may also direct that the report is provided to parents. 9.42  Also published is a list of spending totals in league form of each local authority.

Admissions and exclusion appeal procedures under the SSFA 1998 9.43  We have seen how under the SSFA  1998 and the Education Act 2002 the local authority has to ‘make arrangements’ allowing the parents to express a preference of school for their child, with specified exceptions. By SSFA 1998, s 94 every local authority has to make arrangements allowing the parents of a child to appeal against the allocation of a particular school to their child. Governing bodies of a foundation or voluntary aided school shall make arrangements allowing for appeal against refusing to allow admission to the school. Joint arrangements may be made by the governing bodies of two or more such schools. An appeal panel is established under regulations under the SSFA 1998 as amended which does not allow for members of the authority to be appointed as members of the panel (see SI 2012/9). The same provision allows membership from those who have ‘experience in education, are acquainted with the educational conditions in the area of the authority or are parents of registered pupils at a school’ along with lay members. Panels are to consist of a minimum of three members. The previous Regulations (SI  2002/2899) set out in some detail the procedure for hearing an appeal. SI  2012/9 does not do this, but the statutory guidance on appeals contains detail of the procedure to be followed.1 For the Regulations in Wales (which are largely identical on composition of panels and retain the detailed requirements as to the procedure of the hearing), see SI 2005/1398. Department for Education (2012) School Admission Appeal Code available at: https://assets. publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/275897/ school_admission_appeals_code_1_february_2012.pdf.

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9.44  Panels fall under the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1992. Local authorities have to publish information about admissions under s 92 (see above).

764  Chapter 9 9.45  Pupils excluded from maintained schools have a right of appeal against exclusion or reinstatement to the above appeal panels which are to operate with some modifications (see Education Act 2002, ss 51A (England) and 52 (Wales) and SI 2012/1033 (England) or SI 2003/3227 (Wales)).

Special educational needs and the Education Act 1996 9.46  The Education Act 1981 introduced distinct legal provisions concerning a local authority’s assessment of the ‘special educational needs’ (SEN) of a child. The Children and Families Act 2014 (CFA 2014) introduces significant changes to the regime in England, introducing the concept of an ‘Education, Health and Care plan’ (EHC plan) in place of the previous regime of SEN statements. The EHC plan may be drawn up following a request made to a local authority for an assessment by the child’s parent, a young person or a school or post-16 educational institution under s  36 of the CFA  2014. Under s  36(7), there is a requirement that the local authority should notify the parent or young person that it is considering securing an EHC and must allow the parent or young person to make representations, whether orally or in writing, and submit evidence to the authority. Additional provisions on the EHC assessment, including material on the permitted disclosure of the EHC report, can be found in SI 2014/1530.For Wales, the relevant provisions are to be found in EA 1996, Part IV, Chapter 1, re-enacting Part III of the Education Act 1993 (and, for Wales, see Education Act 2002, ss 191–195). The Secretary of State is under a duty to issue and revise a code of practice to which LEAs are under a duty to have regard.1 Briefly, a local authority is under a duty to provide special needs children with placements in mainstream schools providing this is not incompatible with the parents’ wishes or with a variety of other factors. The local authority has to notify a parent that they propose to make an assessment of the SEN of a child where it is of opinion that a child has SEN and it is necessary to determine the SEN; of the procedure; of an officer from whom information may be obtained and of the parents’ right to make representations and submit written evidence within a time-limit of not less than 29 days beginning with the date of the service of notice. If an assessment is then made, the decision with reasons (in writing) must be notified to the parent. The local authority must keep a statement of the SEN of a child if it determines SEN after an assessment under EA 1996, s 323. The statement under s 324 may include provision excluding the application of the national curriculum (Education Act 2002, s 92).2 In England, appeal lies to the First-tier Tribunal3 by the child’s parent against refusal by the local authority’s determinations under s 51 of the CFA 2014, although a mediation process is imposed by s 55 of the Act. In Wales, the appeal lies to the SEN Tribunal (Wales).4 The parent may also appeal against the contents of a statement. Parents may request an LEA to make an assessment and appeal lies to the Tribunal against refusal to do so.5 Department for Education (2001) Special Education Needs: Code of Practice DFES 0581/2001. See also: Education Act 2002, s 93 on temporary exceptions for individual pupils in relation to the national curriculum; s 94 on the provision of information about s 93 exceptions to the parent. 3 SI 2008/2833, reg 3. The appeal previously lay to the Special Educational Needs Tribunal. See H v Kent County Council [2000] ELR 660, H v East Sussex CC [2009] EWCA Civ 249 [2009] ELR 161 1 2

Information and open government – specific areas   765 and JS v Worcestershire CC [2012] UKUT 451 (AAC) on giving adequate reasons. See also the Special Educational Needs and Disability Act 2001. 4 See EA 1996, ss 333–336 and SI 2012/322. 5 See also SI 2014/1530, regs 43–45.

9.47  Section 76 of the CFA  2014 requires the Secretary of State to publish information obtained under powers in CFA  2014, s  76 ‘where the Secretary of State thinks the publication of the information would be likely to assist the Secretary of State or others in improving the well-being of … children in England with special educational needs’. The information must not include the names of the children concerned and can be published in whatever manner the Secretary of State thinks fit. The Secretary of State may levy a charge, not exceeding the cost of supply for any document published. 9.48  The Special Educational Needs (Provision of Information by Local Authorities) Regulations 2001, SI  2001/2218, deal with details on publication of information about SEN.1 These Regulations place a duty on local authorities to publish information about matters relating to the provision of education for children with special educational needs. In particular they are required to publish an explanation of that part of special educational provision that they expect maintained schools to fund from their budget shares, and that element that the authority expect to fund themselves. They must also publish information about the broad aims of their policy on special educational needs, as well as specific action the authority is taking on SEN issues. See SI 2013/2094 (England) and SI 2011/1942 (Wales) on information about individual pupils.

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9.49  The provisions on appeals from the Education Act 1980 onwards, and the meetings, representations, and appeals of the 1981 Act as developed may well have the quality of overkill about them. Parental power, local pluralism and popular support all helped to dictate the necessity of more apparent and regular procedures to deal with school allocation disputes etc though it is of interest to point out that prior to the Education Act 1980 local authorities had often provided detailed informal procedures for education disputes.

Designation of grammar schools and subsequent issues 9.50  The SSFA  1998, ss  104–109 allows the Secretary of State to designate any school which had selective admissions arrangements as a grammar school. In order to be so designated, a school had to have admissions arrangements that had the objective of selecting students only on the basis of high academic ability. Provisions are in place (ss 105–109) to allow parents to petition so that a ballot might be held for the school to cease to have selective admissions arrangements. The Education (Grammar School Ballots) Regulations 1998, SI 1998/2876 set out the requirements for the petition that parents must submit and the process for a ballot if a valid petition is submitted. Section 107 of the SSFA 1998 places restrictions on the ability of local authorities and governing bodies of schools to engage in expenditure to provide information in relation to petitions or ballots.

766  Chapter 9

Conversion to academies 9.51  The Academies Act 2010 creates a framework through which governors of maintained schools can apply to the Secretary of State for an order transferring the school to academy status. Section 5 of the Act requires that the governors consult with ‘…such persons as they think appropriate.’ Section 5(2) provides that the consultation ‘must be on the question of whether the school should be converted into an Academy.’ Section 5(3) allows the consultation to take place at any time before the academy arrangements are entered into, ie either before or after the application for an academy order has been made. There has been litigation over this process of consultation, clarifying that the Secretary of State is not required to accept a majority view of parents that it should not be converted to an academy.1 R  (on the application of Moyse) v Secretary of State for Education [2012]  EWHC  2758 (Admin), [2012] ELR 551.

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HOUSING Housing records 9.52  Until the DPA 1998 came into effect in March 2000, the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1984 applied to computerised personal records. For paper records, regulations covering housing were made under the Access to Personal Files Act 1987. These regulations came into force on 1  April 1989 (and see DoE Circular 13/89). The 1987 Act was repealed by the DPA 1998 and the regulations were therefore rescinded also. The DPA 2018 now governs the situation and readers are directed to the discussion in ch 2.

Housing administration 9.53  Since 1980, the efforts of the government to off-load public housing on to the private sector have been obvious and widely reported. The first step was the ‘right to buy’ policy under the Housing Act 1980. Housing and Planning Act 1986, ss 7 and 8 encouraged and facilitated the disposal to private sector landlords of tenanted properties held by local authorities, with consultation provisions for tenants where tenants were to lose their security of tenure. The Secretary of State was not to give his or her consent if it appeared to him or her that a majority of the tenants to which the application relates do not wish the proposal to proceed. S/he may have regard to any information available to him/her ‘and the local authority shall give him such information as to the representations made to them by tenants and others … as he may require’. However, the ‘Secretary of State’s consent to a disposal was not invalidated by a failure on his/her part or that of the local authority to comply with the requirements of this Schedule’. These provisions must now be read in the light of the Housing Act 1996 (HA 1996) which repealed many relevant provisions of the Housing Act 1988 (HA 1988).

Information and open government – specific areas   767 For England, a number of provisions of the Housing Act 1996 have been repealed or amended by the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 (HRA 2008). 9.54  There has been increasing reliance on the provision of housing via housing associations registered under the Regulator of Social Housing (RSH) and the Welsh Assembly Ministers, particularly after the HA 1988. In England, this area is now governed by HRA  2008, Parts 2 and 3, which deal with the social rented sector where social landlords, ie housing associations, have to be registered with the RSH (operating as Homes England) on a register which is made available to the public.1 The RSH has a general power to obtain information, which it can enforce, and it also has powers to receive and disclose information under HRA 2008, ss 107–109. The RSH may publish information, advice and guidance as part of its role by virtue of HRA 2008, s 97. The RSH must publish an annual report on the performance of registered providers, with particular focus on information that would be useful to local authorities, tenants and potential tenants. If the RSH issues a penalty notice to a registered provider or requires a registered provider to pay compensation then, under ss  228(3) and 240(3) of the 2008 Act respectively, the RSH may require the registered provider to publish information about the penalty or compensation award in a specified manner. In Wales, the Welsh ministers enjoy similar powers to seek and disclose information, granted by ss 30–33 of the HA 1996. Information about levels of performance is collected by the Welsh ministers from ‘registered social landlords’ and this is to be publicised as the ministers consider appropriate: at least once a year for tenants and prospective tenants (HA 1996, ss 34 and 35). The Welsh ministers may issue guidance for registered social landlords. In both England and Wales, registered social landlords must belong to a scheme for the investigation of complaints which can be enforced via the High Court (HA 1996, s 51 and Sch 2 (as amended)). The scheme involves an independent ombudsman, the Housing Ombudsman, and various other matters set out in the Schedule. The register is available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ uploads/attachment_data/file/754079/List_of_registered_providers_6.11.18.xlsx.

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9.55  The HA  1988 introduced housing action trusts (HATs)1 to which local authority housing stock may be transferred together with housing and a variety of other powers including planning powers. Their basic objectives are found in s  63. These include repair and improvement and ‘proper and effective management and use’ of property, and to encourage diversity in the identity of landlords, which can be achieved either by disposal2 and/or by use of their grantaid/financial assistance powers in s 71. A public corporation. HA  1988, s  63(1); see ss  63(3) and 79: Arden Current Law Annotated Statutes Vol 4 (1988), pp 50–124.

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9.56  HATs’ principal powers are to provide and maintain housing, and to facilitate the provision of shops, advice centres and other such facilities for the benefit of the community or communities in their areas, not merely those living in their accommodation. They possess power to acquire, hold, manage, reclaim and dispose of land and other property, carry out building and other operations,

768  Chapter 9 seek to ensure the provision of utilities and similar services and carry on ‘any’ business or undertaking, together with a general ancillary power1 to do anything ‘necessary or expedient’ for the purposes of the objects and powers or purposes incidental thereto.2 LGA 1972, s 111. HA 1988, s 63(3).

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Consultation and publicity 9.57  In Wales, the Secretary of State shall, under HA  1988, s  61, consult every local housing authority any part of whose district is to be included in the proposed designated area before making a designation order for a HAT: ‘(2) Where the Secretary of State is considering a proposal to make a designation order, he shall use his best endeavours to secure that notice of the proposal is given to all tenants of houses in the area proposed to be designated who are either secure tenants or introductory tenants or tenants of such description as may be prescribed by regulations. (3) After having taken the action required by subsection (2) above, the Secretary of State shall either– (a) make arrangements for such independent persons as appear to him to be appropriate to conduct, in such manner as seems best to them, a ballot or poll of the tenants who have been given notice of the proposal as mentioned in that subsection with a view to establishing their opinions about the proposal to make a designation order; or (b) if it seems appropriate to him to do so, arrange for the conduct of a ballot or poll of those tenants in such manner as appears to him best-suited to establish their opinions about the proposal. (4) If it appears from a ballot or poll conducted as mentioned in subsection (3) above that a majority of the tenants who, on that ballot or poll, express an opinion about the proposal to make the designation order are opposed to it, the Secretary of State shall not make the order proposed.’ This requirement was removed for England by Deregulation Act 2015, Sch 22, para 9. 9.58  HA 1988, s 90 provides that an authority shall provide ‘any document’ or information to the Secretary of State to carry out his tasks under s 90(3). 9.59  A variety of duties upon housing authorities exist under the Housing Act 1985 (HA  1985) concerning information on improvement grants, assistance for owners of defective premises; repair notice; improvement notices and slum clearance; duties to report to the Secretary of State on overcrowding in their area and to report on particular houses or areas. HA  1996, Part VII concerns duties to the homeless. This is further amended by the Homelessness Act 2002, which imposes new duties on local housing authorities. These include rights for information and guidance, as well as allocation schemes (ss 15, 16).

Information and open government – specific areas   769 9.60  HA  1985, s  104 concerns provision of information about tenancies. It imposes a duty on every body which lets dwelling-houses under secure tenancies1 to publish information ‘about its secure tenancies in such form as it considers best-suited to explain in simple terms and so far as it considers appropriate, the effect of’ express terms of secure tenancies; Parts IV of the HA 1985; and ss  11–16 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985.2 The information ‘so far as is reasonably practicable’ shall be kept up to date and the secure tenant shall be supplied with a copy of information published by the authority under the section and terms of the tenancy in so far as not expressed in the lease or written tenancy agreement … nor implied by law. The written statement shall be supplied on the grant of the tenancy or as soon as practicable afterwards. See Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act 1993, s 123. See HA 1996, Sch 15, para 2 – landlord’s repairing obligation.

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9.61  Section 105 of the HA 1985 (as amended) provides that every landlord authority covered by the section shall make and maintain ‘such arrangements as it considers appropriate to enable those of its secure tenants who are likely to be substantially affected by a matter of housing management’ to inform the tenants of its proposals and to make their views known to the authority within a ‘specified period’. The authority is under a duty to consider representations so made and to publish its arrangements which are to be available for inspection, free of charge, at all reasonable hours at the authority’s principal office, or which can be furnished, on payment of a reasonable fee, to any member of the public asking for a copy etc. Section 114 defines landlord ‘authority’ and s 105(2) and (3) defines ‘housing management’. It is the latter if, in the opinion of the landlord authority, the matters represent: ‘(a) a new programme of maintenance, improvement or demolition, or (b) a change in the practice or policy of the authority, and are likely substantially to affect either its secure tenants as a whole or a group of them who form a distinct social group or occupy dwellinghouses which constitute a distinct class (whether by reference to the kind of dwelling-house, or the housing estate or other larger area in which they are situated).’ 9.62  Rent payable under secure tenancies or charges for services etc are not matters of housing management. The section also defines ‘group’. 9.63  A landlord authority which is a registered housing association shall, instead of making the documents available at its principal office under HA 1985, s 105(6) (a), send copies to the RSH or Welsh ministers and to the council of any district or London borough in which there are dwelling-houses let by the association as secure tenancies. The council shall make them available for inspection as under sub-s (6)(a) but there is no duty to provide copies for a charge. 9.64  HA  1985, s  106 states that every landlord authority (see s  114) shall publish a summary of its rules on determining priority on application, exchanges and transfers, and it is under a duty to maintain a set of those rules and allocation

770  Chapter 9 procedure rules and make them available at its principal office for inspection at all reasonable hours without charge by members of the public.1  A  copy of the summary of the rules is available without charge, and a copy of a set of the rules ‘shall be furnished on payment of a reasonable fee, to any member of the public who asks for one’. The requirement to keep a housing register has gone (Homelessness Act 2002, s  14). Rights for access to personal documents under the HA 1985 are subsumed within the access rights under the DPA 2018, although s 106(5) gives the right for applicants for social housing to require that the housing authority provide ‘details of the particulars which he has given to the authority about himself and his family and which the authority has recorded as being relevant to his application for accommodation’.2 See HA 1996, Sch 16, para 1. And see SI  2002/3264 and SI  2006/1294 on allocation of housing in England. In Wales, see SI 2003/239 and SI 2014/2603.

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9.65  Sections 121AA and 121B of the HA 1985 (added by the Housing Act 2004) require information to be provided to secure tenants by the relevant body on their right to buy. The information should assist tenants in making a decision over whether they wish to exercise the right to buy or not. The information that is to be provided to tenants is found in an Order,1 and includes the circumstances in which the right can and cannot be exercised, the exceptions to the right, the procedure for exercising the right and the cost of so doing. Information must also be provided on the initial costs that might be faced, the risk of repossession and advice on the other costs that a homeowner might face. The risk of repossession must also be publicised. The information must be kept up to date insofar as is reasonably practicable. Section 121B provides that the document must be published and copies of it must be supplied to secure tenants of the body concerned. The Order promulgated under s 121AA provides that the document must have been published within two months of the Order coming into force and, whenever it is revised, within one month of that revision. In addition to providing a copy to each of its tenants, s 121B also requires that the document must be supplied free of charge to anyone requesting it, and that it must make copies available at its principal offices and other places it considers appropriate at reasonable hours. The fact that the document is available from these locations must be publicised to the secure tenants of the body. SI 2005/1735 (England) and SI 2005/2681 (Wales).

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9.66  The Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 creates, for England, the Homes and Communities Agency (HCA). The objectives of the Agency are set out in s 2 of the Act and include improving the supply and quality of housing and securing the redevelopment of land or infrastructure and encouraging sustainable development. Section 36 provides that the Secretary of State might require the HCA to provide information about the homes supplied by it as social housing. Sections 38–40 give the HCA power to publish ideas and information, etc, provide education and training and also to publish guidance. If the HCA wishes to provide guidance, it must consult before doing so.

Information and open government – specific areas   771

PLANNING AND THE ENVIRONMENT 9.67  The governing provisions relating to planning are in the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, as amended by the Planning and Compensation Act 1991. The Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 has made some important innovations that will be described where relevant. Once again, the reader must be directed to the provisions of the Local Government (Access to Information) Act 1985 (LG(ATI)A  1985) (amending the LGA  1972), and the provisions of the LGA  2000 for those duties dealing with access to executive meetings, committee meetings, reports and background papers and the more general provisions of the FOIA 2000 (see chs 1 and 6–8). Notwithstanding the developments to local authority administration ushered in by the LGA  2000 and the Localism Act 2011 (see ch  6), it was intended that authorities would retain planning committees. In planning, certain decisions can be delegated to officers.1 These decisions, and the information relating to them, will be covered by the LG(ATI)A 1985 unless exempt, insofar as the decisions have to go back to a committee for report and notification or for formal approval, and details of delegation have to be published under the Act.2 The intention behind the FOIA 2000 was that the more liberal regime between the LG(ATI)A 1985 and the FOIA 2000 would prevail (paras 8.32 et seq above). LGA 1972, s 101 and eg SI 1992/1492, reg 10. LG(ATI)A 1985: LGA 1972, s 100G(2).

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9.68  However, planning permission has to be consistent with guidelines laid down by central government for development plans and development control issued through circulars and, from 1988, by way of policy guidance notes. Circulars are to be used for administrative details, not for guidance on policy. Regional guidance is also published by the Secretary of State in planning policy guidance notes. Development plans as produced by local planning authorities (LPAs) below constitute the basic background for decisions on planning and land use.

Statements of planning policy 9.69  In the past, county planning policy was formulated through structure plans1 which involved publicity and public participation exercises. These plans were then replaced by the provisions of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 (PCPA 2004). The provisions of the PCPA 2004 were then replaced by the provision in Part V  of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009. The regional spatial strategies (RSS) and regional strategies under the 2009 Act were relatively short-lived and the Localism Act 2011 revoked these and also imposed further changes under Part 6 of the Act. TCPA 1990, Pt II, and Planning and Compensation Act 1991, s 27 and Sch 4.

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9.70  Section 109 of the Localism Act 2011 revoked the requirement to adopt a regional strategy for planning. The Court of Appeal held that the revocation of

772  Chapter 9 regional strategies in advance of the coming into force of s 109 by the Secretary of State using powers under s 79(6) of the 2009 Act was lawful, and that local planning authorities were thus entitled to take account of the revocation in the making of decisions on planning applications.1 The new structure for planning under the Localism Act 2011 is ‘bottom up’ and modifies the PCPA  2004 in respect of local development schemes. The newly modified s 15 of the PCPA 2004 requires each local authority to specify the local development documents that form part of its scheme, including the subject matter and geographical area to which they relate and details of any joint preparation with other local authorities. The scheme will come into effect when the authority resolves this (s 15(7)) and the authority must make the up-to-date text of the scheme, any amendments and details of compliance with any published timetable in relation to planning available to the public (s  15(9)). Section 110 of the Localism Act 2011 inserts a new s  33A of the PCPA  2004 requiring authorities to co-operate with one another in respect of planning for sustainable development. R (Cala Homes South Ltd) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2011] EWCA Civ 639 (27 May 2011).

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9.71  At the time when the Localism Act 2011 was going through the legislative process, concern was expressed about the removal of regional planning from the planning process. The Communities and Local Government Select Committee published a report1 which notes that the immediate revocation of regional plans leaves a significant lack of regional input into the planning process, with particular problems in relation to certain strategic issues such a traveller sites and mining. This does not appear to have been addressed to any significant extent since that time. Similarly, the report cast doubt on the ability of arrangements under the new s 33A of the PCPA 2004 to deliver on its objectives, as there is no sanction for a failure to co-operate. More broadly, the witnesses to the committee are generally sceptical that ad hoc arrangements for co-operation between local planning authorities are likely to deliver the coherence of the regional strategies that were previously in place. HC  517 (2010–2011) Abolition of Regional Spatial Strategies: A  Planning Vacuum (2nd report of 2010–2011).

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9.72  Under Part II of the PCPA  2004, local planning authorities (LPAs) must conduct surveys of their area in relation to development or the planning of its development: s 13 of the 2004 Act provides details. County councils are to conduct surveys where development affects a ‘county matter’. LPAs are to produce local development schemes (s 15) specifying local planning documents, development plan documents, jointly prepared documents, and timetables for the preparation and revision of documents. Procedural matters may be made by regulations and will deal with publicity, public inspection of schemes and other items. Section 17 provides details on local development documents and, under s  18, an LPA must prepare a statement of community involvement. Local development documents must be prepared in accordance with the local development scheme, and s  19(2) lists the matters to which an LPA must have regard in preparing a local development document. Every development

Information and open government – specific areas   773 plan document must be submitted to the Secretary of State for independent examination. Persons making representations seeking to change a development plan document must be given the opportunity to appear before and be heard by the conducting the examination who is appointed by the Secretary of State. That person makes recommendations to the Secretary of State giving reasons (s 20). Local development documents must be in ‘general conformity’ with RSSs or spatial development strategy in relation to a London borough. The opinion of the RPB will be sought by the LPA (s 24). The part of the Act has details on revocation and revision of local development documents and default powers by the Secretary of State, joint local development documents and joint committees, annual monitoring reports and regulations covering similar items in relation to RSSs under s 11 (above). 9.73  Under s 38 of the 2004 Act, development plans are in relation to Greater London the spatial development strategy and development plan documents; in relation to other authorities in England the RSS and development plan documents.1 Note that the RSS is no longer a relevant part of a development plan due to the revocation outlined above, but all other plan documents created under Part II of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 remain in force, as do all published planning policy statements, other than the regional strategy.2 The government recently published a revised national planning framework, which sets out the central objectives of the planning system.3 See SIs 2004/2203 to 2004/2209 on the new arrangements under the 2004 Act. See the letter from the Chief Planning Officer to local authorities of 6  July 2010, found on the DCLG website at http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/planningandbuilding/ pdf/1631904.pdf. 3 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (2018) National Planning Policy Framework available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ uploads/attachment_data/file/740441/National_Planning_Policy_Framework_web_accessible_ version.pdf. 1 2

Register of planning applications 9.74  Every planning authority must keep a register of planning applications and decisions, containing information as prescribed including information as to the manner in which such applications have been dealt with.1 TCPA 1990, s 69. See also ss 188, 214.

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9.75  Section 69(3) of the TCPA  1990 states that a development order may make provision for the register to be kept in two or more parts, each part containing such information relating to applications for planning permission as may be prescribed by the order, and may also make provision: (a) for a specified part of the register to contain copies of applications or requests and of any other documents or material submitted with them; and (b) for the entry relating to an application or request (and everything relating to it) to be removed from that part of the register when the application (including any appeal arising out of it) or the request (as the case may be) has been finally disposed of.

774  Chapter 9 9.76  Every register kept under s  69 shall be available for inspection by the public at all reasonable hours.1 See also SI 2015/595, art 40.

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9.77  Under s 65 of the TCPA 1990, as amended by Planning and Compensation Act 1991, s 16 there has to be compulsory publicity for all planning applications. There are statutory requirements for different classes of development. Publicity may require ‘consultation’, ie inviting the views of specialist bodies for particular types of development. ‘Notification’ requires developers to notify owners and agricultural tenants of a planning application they intend to submit in relation to the owner’s or tenant’s land. There are details on notification forms and certificates which have to be filled and the identities of those who must be notified. Responsibility falls primarily on LPAs (parish or community councils (Wales) may assist). The statutory requirements can be found in the relevant statutory instruments – SI 2015/595 for England and SI 2012/801 for Wales. 9.78  The types of publicity involve: publishing a notice in a local newspaper; posting a site notice, visible to the general public; neighbour notification to occupiers and owners of adjoining properties. It is courteous to advise third parties of decisions and to exercise ‘judgment’ on how best to do this. The table below sets out the statutory publicity requirements.1 And see SI  2015/595 and SI  2012/801. For a requirement of legibility of a notice under the Telecommunications Act 1984, Sch  20, para  18(2), Lloyd Jones and Others v T  Mobile (UK) Ltd [2003]  EWCA  Civ 1162 – a notice on private land did not have to be ‘accessible’ from neighbouring land!

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9.79  ‘TABLE – STATUTORY PUBLICITY Nature of Development

Publicity Required

GDO or other statutory provisions

Development where application accompanied by environmental statement

Advertisement in newspaper Art 15(1A) of the GDO and site notice (at least 30 days)

Departure from development plan

Advertisement in newspaper Article 15(3) of the GDO and site notice (at least 21 days)

Affecting public right of way Major development

Advertisement in newspaper Article 15(4) of the GDO and site notice (at least 21 days) or neighbour notification

Minor development

Site notice or neighbour notification

Development affecting the setting of a listed building

Advertisement in newspaper and Section 67 of the Planning site notice and use of website (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990 and SI 1990/1519

Article 15(5) of the GDO

Information and open government – specific areas   775 Development affecting the character or appearance of conservation area

Advertisement in newspaper and Section 73 of the Planning site notice and use of website (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990 and SI 1990/1519

All applications

Art 15(7) of the GDO Details to be published on website of local planning authority: (a) the address or location of the proposed development; (b) a description of the proposed development; (ba) in the case of EIA application accompanied by an environmental statement, that statement; (c) the date by which any representations about the application must be made, which must not be before the last day of the period of 14 days or, in the case of an EIA application accompanied by an environmental statement, 30 days beginning with the date on which the information is published; (d) where and when the application may be inspected; (e) how representations may be made about the application; and (f) that, in the case of a householder or minor commercial application, in the event of an appeal that proceeds by way of the expedited procedure, any representations made about the application will be passed to the Secretary of State and there will be no opportunity to make further representations.

9.80  Prior to these changes, the ombudsman had spent a great deal of time investigating ‘neighbourhood notification’ schemes. Outside the statutory requirements, notification or consultation is a matter of local discretion. The Association of District Councils (ADC) had advised its members to avoid making formal resolutions committing the authority to undertaking specified nonstatutory neighbour or general public consultation in connection with planning applications. It advised that officers should be formally authorised to undertake ‘such informal consultation entirely at their discretion, having due regard to

776  Chapter 9 prior circulars and that planning staff should never give firm commitments to consult over future planning applications’. There is authority to suggest that breach of an undertaking could be remedied through the courts1 and could on the facts amount to a breach of a legitimate expectation; be that as it may, the ADC felt that if no formal undertaking were given, maladministration was unlikely to arise in a refusal to consult. Failure to consult, to inform, to meet or to advise have all been held to constitute maladministration, even in the absence of a formal undertaking. What upset the Commission for Local Administration (CLA) was that the advice from the ADC was given without consulting the CLA. The statutory changes are therefore desirable. R v Liverpool Corpn, ex p Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators’ Association [1972] 2 QB 299, CA; A-G of Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 All ER 346, PC; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Khan [1985] 1 All ER 40, CA. For publication of planning applications where the authority has an interest see: Steeples v Derbyshire County Council [1984] 3 All ER 468; R v Sevenoaks District Council, ex p Terry [1985] 3  All ER  226; R  v St Edmundsbury Borough Council, ex p Investors in Industry Commercial Properties Ltd [1985] 3 All ER 234.

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Appeals 9.81  Where permission is not given, either after a planning agreement1 or otherwise, or the application is not called in by the Secretary of State,2 or is subject to conditions which the applicant does not accept, the applicant may appeal.3 The rules governing town and country planning inquiries have been reformulated and developed. In addition, detailed guidance is provided on these procedures by the Planning Inspectorate in the relevant procedural guide.4 This emphasises consistency, fairness, openness and cooperation between the various parties. It hopes for the speeding up of decisions while ensuring public participation. TCPA  1990, s  106; the authority allows development in return for an undertaking from the developer to comply with specifications or make provision for the authority’s wishes in the development. See also ss 106A and 106B (added by the Planning and Compensation Act 1991). NB the rather complex interaction between s 106 agreements and the ‘Community Infrastructure Levy’ found in Part 11 of the Planning Act 2008 and SI  2010/948, regs 122 and 123, which place limits on the extent to which s 106 agreements can be used. See also R (on the application of Khodari) v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC [2017] EWCA Civ 333, [2018] 1 WLR 584 and R (on the application of Tesco Stores Ltd) v Forest of Dean DC [2015] EWCA Civ 800. 2 Under TCPA 1990, s 77. 3 On appeal under TCPA 1990, s 78 or referral under s 77. See https://www.gov.uk/topic/planningdevelopment/planning-permission-appeals. See also, for enforcement procedures, SI 2002/2682, SI 2002/2683, SI 2002/2684, SI 2002/2685 and SI 2002/2686; and SI 2015/1331, SI 2017/530 and SI 2017/544 for Wales. 4 See The Planning Inspectorate (2018) Procedural Guide: Planning Appeals – England available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/743495/Procedural_Guide_Planning_appeals_version_3.pdf. 1

9.82  A  variety of hearings is possible for the appeal, including: an informal hearing now accompanied by regulations (para 9.142 below); an appeal by way of written representation, decided by the Secretary of State or an appointed person; or a public inquiry with the final decision made by the Secretary of State or the appointed person.

Information and open government – specific areas   777 9.83  For public inquiries where the Secretary of State determines the appeal, SI 2000/1624 (as amended) applies. We will concentrate on these Regulations, although there are significantly more written proceedings than hearings or inquiries.1 Planning Inspectorate (2018) Planning Appeals Received by Type of Procedure available at https:// www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/733705/2.1_s78_ received.ods.

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9.84  The position of the Secretary of State was thrown into some confusion by the declaration of the Divisional Court that his role as an appellate authority is inconsistent with Art 6 ECHR insofar as he is an ‘interested party’.1 This judgment was reversed by the House of Lords which held that, although the Secretary of State was not an impartial tribunal for the purposes of the HRA 1998 and Art 6, the totality of the procedures, including a judicial challenge under statute, had to be examined in their entirety and the possibility of a statutory review in the courts did provide the necessary independence and impartiality to comply with Art 6.2 The Planning Act 2008 introduced a new Infrastructure Planning Commission (IPC) to determine planning applications for large infrastructure projects, guided by national policy statements on the development of infrastructure concerned. The Secretary of State had only limited powers to intervene or give directions in the process, which were found in ss 109–113. This process arguably removed the concerns which led to the judicial review claims above in many cases where the Secretary of State might be said to be an interested party. The Localism Bill abolished the IPC and transferred its functions back to the Secretary of State; the IPC was ultimately very short-lived and up to April 2011 had not made any decisions to grant development consent for a project. See R (on the application of Holding & Barnes plc) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2001] NLJR 135. 2 R (Alconbury) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2001] 2 All ER 929. 1

Preliminary information to be supplied by local planning authority 9.85  Rule 4 of the Town and Country Planning (Inquiries Procedure) (England) Rules 2000, SI 2000/1624, provides that an LPA shall, on receipt of a notice from the Secretary of State under rule 3A of his intention to cause an inquiry to be held (‘the relevant notice’), forthwith inform him and the applicant in writing of the name and address of any statutory party1 who has made representations to them; and the Secretary of State shall as soon as practicable thereafter inform the applicant and the local planning authority in writing of the name and address of any statutory party who has made representations to him. See SI 2000/1624, r 2 for definition of a ‘statutory party’. For the Welsh rules, see SI 2017/544.

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9.86  Rule 4(2) applies where: ‘(a) the Secretary of State or any local authority has given to the local planning authority a direction restricting the grant of planning permission for which application was made; or

778  Chapter 9 (b) in a case relating to listed building consent, the Commission has given a direction to the local planning authority pursuant to s  14(2) of the Listed Buildings Act as to how the application is to be determined; or (c) the Secretary of State or any other Minister of the Crown or any government department or any body falling within rule 11(1)(c) has expressed in writing to the local planning authority the view that the application should not be granted either wholly or in part, or should be granted only subject to conditions; or (d) any person consulted in pursuance of a development order has made representations to the local planning authority about the application.’ 9.87  Where r 4(2) above applies, the LPA shall forthwith after the date of the relevant notice (‘the relevant date’) inform the person of the inquiry and, unless they have already done so, that person or body shall thereupon give the local planning authority a written statement of the reasons for making the direction, expressing the view or making the representations, as the case may be. 9.88  A new r 4(4) under the 2000 Rules states that the LPA shall ensure that, within two weeks of the starting date, the Secretary of State and the applicant have received a completed questionnaire together with a copy of the documents referred to in it, as well as ensuring that any statutory party and ‘other person’ who made representations to the local planning about the application occasioning the appeal has been notified that an appeal has been made, along with the address to which and period within which they may make representations to the Secretary of State. These do not apply to referred applications under r 3(1).

Pre-inquiry hearings 9.89  Rule 5 of SI  2000/1624 (as amended by SI  2013/2137, SI  2013/2146, SI 2015/316 and SI 2017/1309) allows for a pre-inquiry meeting to be held unless the Secretary of State believes it unnecessary in the case of an inquiry lasting for more than eight days or if he believes it necessary in the case of shorter inquiries. A statement of matters about which he particularly wishes to be informed for the purposes of his consideration of the application or appeal in question will be served where a pre-inquiry meeting is to be held. 9.90  The LPA shall cause to be published in a newspaper circulating in the locality in which the land is situated a notice of the Secretary of State’s intention to cause a meeting to be held and of the statement served as above in such form as the Secretary of State may specify (r 5(3)). Statements under r 4(2)(c) will also be served (above) and will be copied to the Minister or department concerned. The LPA has to publish in a local newspaper in relation to the land in question a notice of the Secretary of State’s intention for a meeting to be held. 9.91  The LPA and the applicant shall ensure that, within eight weeks of the starting date, two copies of their outline statement have been received by the Secretary of State. The latter then forwards a copy of the relevant report to the other party.

Information and open government – specific areas   779 9.92  Where r 4(2) above applies, the LPA shall: ‘(a) include in their outline statement the terms of– (i) any directions given together with a statement of the reasons therefor; and (ii) any view expressed or representation made on which they intend to rely in their submissions at the inquiry; and (b) within the period mentioned in para (2), supply a copy of their outline statement to the person or body concerned.’ (r 5(4)) 9.93  The Secretary of State may in writing require any other person who has notified him or her of an intention or a wish to appear at the inquiry to serve, within four weeks of being so required, an outline statement on the Secretary of State, the applicant and the LPA. 9.94  The meeting (or, where there is more than one, the first meeting) shall be held no later than 16 weeks after the relevant date. 9.95  The Secretary of State shall give not less than three weeks’ written notice of the meeting to the LPA, the applicant, any person known at the date of the notice to be entitled to appear at the inquiry and any other person whose presence at the meeting seems to be desirable; and s/he may require the local planning authority to take, in relation to notification of the meeting, one or more of the steps which s/he may under r 10(6) require them to take in relation to notification of the inquiry (r 5(8)). 9.96  The inspector shall preside at the meeting and shall determine the matters to be discussed and the procedure to be followed, and s/he may require any person present at the meeting who, in his or her opinion, is behaving in a disruptive manner to leave and may refuse to permit that person to return or to attend any further meeting, or may permit him or her to return or attend only on such conditions as s/he may specify (r 5(9)). 9.97  Where a pre-inquiry meeting has been held pursuant to para  (1), the inspector may hold a further meeting. Paragraph (9) applies to such a meeting which is designed to obtain any additional information required (r 5(10)). Rule 5(10) makes provision for further information. Guidance on the latest approach to the operation of planning appeals can be found in the procedural guide on planning appeals.1 The Planning Inspectorate (2018) Procedural Guide: Planning Appeals – England available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/743495/Procedural_Guide_Planning_appeals_version_3.pdf.

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Service of statements of case etc1 9.98  SI 2000/1624, r 6(1) states that the LPA shall ensure that, not later than: (a) six weeks after the starting date; or (b) where a pre-inquiry meeting is held pursuant to r 5, four weeks after the conclusion of that meeting,

780  Chapter 9 two copies of their statement of case have been received by the Secretary of State, and a copy by any statutory party. In the past, inspectors have complained that pre-inquiry submissions were unhelpful and not sufficiently related to the inquiry.

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9.99  Rule 6(2) concerns the duty on a LPA to include in their statement of case details of the time and place where the opportunity to inspect and take copies described in rule 6(13) shall be afforded and where r 4(2) applies the matters mentioned in r 5(4)(a)(ii) unless already notified in an outline statement. A new r 6(13A) provides that the opportunity referred to in r 6(13) will be satisfied if a person is notified of publication of the documents on a website, the address of that website and details of how to access the documents concerned on that website. 9.100  Under r 6(3), the applicant has to ensure that two copies of their statement of case have been received by the Secretary of State within various time schedules depending upon whether a per-inquiry hearing was held or not. A copy of the LPAs statement is sent by the Secretary of State to the applicant and a copy of the applicant’s to the LPA. 9.101  The applicant and LPA may in writing each require the other to send a copy of any document or the relevant part of any document referred to in the list of documents comprised in that party’s statement of case. This shall be sent as soon as practicable. 9.102  The Secretary of State may in writing require any other person who has notified the former of an intention or a wish to appear at an inquiry to serve three copies of their statement of case, within four weeks of being so required, on the Secretary of State and a (or any other) statutory party (SI  2000/1624, r 6(6)). The Secretary of State shall send these as soon as practicable to the LPA and applicant. 9.103  The Secretary of State shall supply any person from whom s/he requires a statement of case in accordance with para  (6) with a copy of the LPA’s and the applicant’s statement of case and shall inform that person of the name and address of every person on whom his or her statement of case is required to be served. The Secretary of State or an inspector may require in writing any person who has served a statement of case in accordance with this rule to provide such further information about the matter contained in the statement as s/he may specify and within specified times (r 6(8)). The LPA or applicant so required must supply the relevant number of copies of information in writing to the Secretary of State or inspector as well as to any statutory party. The rule carries on to deal with ‘any other persons’ and their provision of information as well as statements by ‘any persons’. 9.104  Any person serving a statement of case on the LPA shall serve with it a copy of any document, or of the relevant part of any document, referred to in the list comprised in the statement.

Information and open government – specific areas   781 9.105  Unless s/he has already done so, the Secretary of State shall not later than 12 weeks from the starting date, serve a written statement of the matters referred to in r 5(2)(a)(ii) on the applicant, the LPA, any statutory party and any person from whom s/he has required a statement of case (r 6(12)). 9.106  The LPA shall afford to any person who so requests a reasonable opportunity to inspect and, where practicable, take copies of any statement of case, written comments, information or other document which, or a copy of which, has been sent to them in accordance with this rule, and the LPAs completed questionnaire and statement of case together with a copy of any document, or of the relevant part of any document, referred to in the list comprised in that statement and any written comments, information or other documents sent by the LPA pursuant to this rule. Safeguards exist where any person who sends a statement to the Secretary of State wishes to comment upon the case of another party. Copies of such comments must be passed to the Secretary of State and any statutory party the former passing them on to the applicant and LPA. 9.107  Under former rules, if a LPA failed to comply with the relevant requirement and presented uninspected documentation at the inquiry, the inspector had a discretion to allow new documents to be introduced, so long as s/he gives the relevant parties an adequate opportunity to consider such new documents. In Performance Cars Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment1 a LPA had circulated details of proposed development to neighbours, who then lodged a series of objections which the applicant wished to see. The LPA refused to hand them over to him. They were finally given to the applicant at the beginning of the inquiry itself. The inspector allowed the applicant one hour and forty minutes adjournment to peruse the documents, and the applicant was successful in having the Secretary of State’s decision, upholding the LPA and the inspector, quashed on the grounds of breach of former rr 6(4) and 10(5). A nice test was spelt out in a case decided by Kerr J:2 ‘The court must consider the nature of evidence or information received, its importance to the issues as they stood at the time of its receipt, the extent to which it had already been the subject of cross-examination or comment by the other side, its relationship to the ultimate decision and in effect whether in all the circumstances a reasonable person would consider that there was any risk of injustice or unfairness having resulted.’ Performance Cars Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment [1977]  JPL  585, CA. See South Oxfordshire DC v Secretary of State for the Environment etc [2000] 2 All ER 667 and R (Jeffery) v First Secretary of State [2007] EWCA Civ 584 on introducing new evidence at the appeal. In Jeffery, the Court of Appeal was clear that and challenge to the validity of a decision of the Secretary of State on grounds that not all relevant evidence had been considered with an endeavour to raise new points of evidence at the judicial review stage would not be permitted otherwise than in circumstances when there was a good reason for failure to raise the evidence at the inquiry stage. 2 Lake District Special Planning Board v Secretary of State for the Environment [1975]  JPL  220; Reading Borough Council v Secretary of State for the Environment and Commercial Union Properties (Investments) Ltd [1986] JPL 115. 1

9.108 In Performance Cars the adjournment was not adequate opportunity to examine the documents fairly.

782  Chapter 9 9.109  Parties should provide in their statements the data, methodology and assumptions used to support their submissions. 9.110  If no pre-inquiry hearing is held under r 5, the inspector may hold one if s/he considers it necessary (r 7(1)). Parties are given two weeks’ written notice of a pre-inquiry meeting and, as well as obvious parties, this includes ‘any person whose presence at the meeting appears to him to be desirable’. Further rules deal with inquiry timetable; notification of the appointment of an assessor; and date and notification of an inquiry (rr 8, 9 and 10). Under r 10(3), the period of notice for an inquiry is reduced from not less than 42 days to not less than four weeks. In 2009, r 10(3A) was added to permit written notice to be provided via publication on a website. Under r 10(6) the Secretary of State may require the LPA to take one or more of the following steps: ‘(a) not less than two weeks before the date fixed for the holding of an inquiry to publish a notice of the inquiry in one or more newspapers circulating in the locality in which the land is situated; (b) to serve a notice of an inquiry on such persons or classes of persons as he may specify within such period as he may specify; (c) to post a notice of an inquiry in a conspicuous place near to the land, within such period as he may specify.’ 9.111  Where the land is under the control of the applicant s/he shall, if so required by the Secretary of State, affix firmly to the land or to some object on or near the land, in such manner as to be readily visible to and legible by members of the public, such notice of the inquiry as the Secretary of State may specify; and s/he shall not remove the notice, or cause or permit it to be removed, for such period before the inquiry as the Secretary of State may specify (r 10(7)). Rule 10(8) contains details of what has to be specified in such notices. 9.112  As well as the applicant and the LPA, a variety of public authorities and statutory parties, ‘any other person who has served a statement of case in accordance with r 6(6) or an outline statement under r 5(5)’ is entitled to appear. Any other person may appear at the inspector’s discretion. Legal representation is allowed. 9.113  Representatives of government departments and other specified public bodies may, by written application to the Secretary of State not later than two weeks before the date of an inquiry, be requested to attend and be made available. This concerns cases where the Secretary of State, or the New Towns Commission, has given a direction under r 4(2)(a) or (b); or the Secretary of State or any other Minister of the Crown or other government department has expressed a view under r 4(2)(c) which the LPA have included in a statement served under rr 5(2) or 6(1); or another Minister or any government department has expressed such a view under r 4(2)(c) and the Secretary of State has included its terms in a statement served under r 5(2) or 6(12). The representative shall give the reasons for the direction or expression, shall give evidence and be subject to cross-examination to the same extent as any other witness (r 12(3)) but nothing shall require a representative to answer any question which in the opinion of the inspector is directed to the merits of government policy.

Information and open government – specific areas   783 9.114  The procedural rules have become more obviously legalistic, which doubtless reflects the development of inquiry procedures in practice over the last 20 or so years.

Statements or proofs of evidence 9.115  By SI  2000/1624, r 13, a person entitled to appear at an inquiry who proposes to give, or to call another person to give, evidence at the inquiry by reading a proof of evidence shall send the required number of copies of the proof to the Secretary of State – who passes them on to the LPA and applicant – together with a written summary of that evidence although no summary is required where the proof contains no more than 1,500 words (r 13(2)). A copy is sent to any statutory party. Where a written summary is provided only that summary shall be read at the inquiry, unless otherwise permitted or directed by the inspector. 9.116  The proof and summary shall be received by the Secretary of State no later than four weeks before the date fixed for the inquiry, or by the date of any timetable agreed under r 8 (r 13(3)). The Secretary of State shall send to the inspector as soon as practicable after receipt any proof of evidence together with any summary sent to him in accordance with this rule and received within the specified period if any. 9.117  Any person required by this rule to send copies of a proof of evidence to Secretary of State shall send with them the same number of copies of the whole, or the relevant part, of any documents referred to in the proof, unless copies of the documents or parts of documents in question have already been made available by the local authority pursuant to r 6(13). 9.118  Local authorities must allow any person a reasonable opportunity to inspect and copy documents sent to or by them under r 13(7). Rule 13(8) provides that this requirement is complied with if the documents are published on a website and the address and location of the documents on the website are publicised. 9.119  Rule 14 states that LPAs and applicants shall together prepare an agreed statement of common ground and ensure that the Secretary of State and any statutory party receive a copy. The LPA must make this available for public inspection and copying. Rule 14(3) provides that this opportunity will be given where the material is made available on a website.

Procedure at inquiry 9.120  Procedure at an inquiry is under the control of the inspector unless otherwise provided by the rules (SI  2000/1624, r 15(1)). The inspector has to identify at the start of the inquiry the main issues as they appear to the inspector

784  Chapter 9 and any matters on which the inspector requires further elucidation by parties entitled or permitted to appear. This does not preclude reference by the parties to other matters which they regard as relevant and which are not identified by the inspector. Usually, the applicant shall begin and shall have the right of final reply; and the other persons entitled or permitted to appear shall be heard in such order as the inspector may determine (r 15(4)). Section 321 of the TCPA 1990 provides that all inquiries must be held in public and the public should have access to the inquiry documents, other than where disclosure of the information would compromise national security or reveal the measures to be taken in order to secure any premises or property and this disclosure would be contrary to the national interest.1 See also SI 2006/1284 (England) or SI 2006/1387 (Wales).

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9.121  A person entitled to appear at an inquiry shall be entitled to call evidence and the applicant, the LPA and a statutory party shall be entitled to cross-examine persons giving evidence. However, subject to the foregoing and r 15(6) and (7), the calling of evidence and the cross-examination of persons giving evidence shall otherwise be at the inspector’s discretion (r 15(5)). 9.122  Rule 15(6) provides that the inspector may refuse to permit: ‘(a) the giving or production of evidence, (b) the cross-examination of persons giving evidence, or (c) the presentation of any other matter,’ which s/he considers to be irrelevant or repetitious; but where s/he refuses to permit the giving of oral evidence, the person wishing to give the evidence may submit to the inspector any evidence or other matter in writing before the close of the inquiry. Evidence given in summary may still be subject to crossexamination on the proof. 9.123  The inspector may direct that facilities shall be afforded to any person appearing at an inquiry to take or obtain copies of documentary evidence open to public inspection (r 15(8)). 9.124  The inspector may require any person appearing or present at an inquiry who, in the inspector’s opinion, is behaving in a disruptive manner to leave and may refuse to permit that person to return, or may permit that person to return only on such conditions as s/he may specify; but any such person may submit to the inspector any evidence or other matter in writing before the close of the inquiry. 9.125  The inspector may allow any person to alter or add to a statement of case served under r 6 so far as may be necessary for the purposes of the inquiry; but s/he shall (if necessary by adjourning the inquiry) give every other person entitled to appear who is appearing at the inquiry an adequate opportunity of considering any fresh matter or document (r 15(9)). The inspector may proceed with an inquiry in the absence of any person entitled to appear at it (r 15(11)).1 See Ostreicher v Secretary of State for the Environment [1978] 1 WLR 810, CA. Though see eg Lucy

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Information and open government – specific areas   785 v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea [1997] COD 191 or, more specifically in the planning context, West Lancashire DC  v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [1998] JPL 1086.

9.126  The inspector may take into account any written representation or evidence or any other document received by him from any person before an inquiry opens or during the inquiry provided that s/he discloses it at the inquiry (r 15(12)). Inquiries may be adjourned subject to safeguards and where an inquiry lasts for eight or more days any closing submissions must be shown to the inspector by the close of the inquiry. 9.127  Rule 16 concerns site inspections.

Procedure after inquiry 9.128  After the close of an inquiry, the inspector shall make a report in writing to the Secretary of State which shall include conclusions and recommendations or the reasons for not making any recommendations. The inspector does not have to make specific ‘findings of fact’ any longer. 9.129  Where an assessor has been appointed s/he may, after the close of the inquiry, make a report in writing to the inspector in respect of the matters on which s/he was appointed to advise (SI 2000/1624, r 17(2)). 9.130  Where an assessor makes a report in accordance with the above the inspector shall append it to his or her own report and shall state in that report how far s/he agrees or disagrees with the assessor’s report and, where s/he disagrees with the assessor, the reasons for that disagreement (r 17(3)). When making his decision the Secretary of State may disregard any written representations, evidence or other document received after the close of the inquiry. The Secretary of State does not have to disregard it. But where he regards it, the following provision is crucial. If, after the close of an inquiry, the Secretary of State: ‘(a) differs from the inspector on any matter of fact1 mentioned in, or appearing to him to be material to, a conclusion reached by the inspector, or (b) takes into consideration any new evidence or new matter of fact2 (not being a matter of government policy)’3 and is for that reason disposed to disagree with a recommendation made by the inspector,4 the Secretary of State shall not come to a decision which is at variance with that recommendation without first notifying the persons entitled to appear at the inquiry who appeared at it of the disagreement and the reasons for it; and affording to them an opportunity of making written representations to the Secretary of State within three weeks of the date of the notification, or (if the Secretary of State has taken into consideration any new evidence or any matter of fact, not being a matter of government policy) of asking within that period for the re-opening of the inquiry (r 17(5)).

786  Chapter 9 Lord Luke of Pavenham v Minister of Housing and Local Government [1968] 1 QB 172, CA; Brown v Secretary of State for the Environment (1978) 40 P & CR 285 on fact/value distinction, ie opinion on the merits. 2 Buxton v Minister of Housing and Local Government [1961] 1 QB 278. See also R (Hughes) v First Secretary of State [2006] EWCA Civ 838, where it was held that acknowledgement of a legal obligation incumbent on a local authority which was not mentioned in the inspector’s report was not a fresh finding of fact to engage the procedure in r 17(5). See also Gladman Developments Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2017] EWHC 2448 (Admin), [2018] JPL 345. 3 Bushell v Secretary of State for the Environment [1981] AC 75, HL; R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Gwent County Council [1986] 2  All ER  18; reversed [1987] 1  All ER  161, CA; see Innisfil Township v Vespra Township (1981) 123 DLR (3d) 530. 4 R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p Greater London Council [1986] JPL 32: conditions imposed on inspector’s recommendations after subsequent consultation with another department: not a disagreement. 1

9.131  The Secretary of State may, as s/he thinks fit, cause an inquiry to be reopened to afford an opportunity for persons to be heard on such matters relating to an application or appeal as s/he may specify, and s/he shall do so if asked by the applicant or the LPA in the circumstances and within the period mentioned in the preceding paragraph; and where an inquiry is re-opened (whether by the same or a different inspector): ‘(a) the Secretary of State shall send to the persons entitled to appear at the inquiry who appeared at it a written statement of the specified matters; and (b) paragraphs (3) to (8) of rule 10 shall apply as if the references to an inquiry were references to a re-opened inquiry’. (r 17(7))

Notification of decision 9.132  The Secretary of State shall notify his decision on an application or appeal, and the reasons for it, in writing to all persons entitled to appear at the inquiry who did appear, and to any other person who, having appeared at the inquiry, has asked to be notified of the decision (SI 2000/1624, r 18(1)). There has been extensive litigation of the requirement to provide ‘reasons’ which is examined in ch 10 (paras 10.152 et seq below). Rule 18(1A) permits notification by website if the persons entitled to notice agree to this as a method of communication. 9.133  Where a copy of the inspector’s report1 is not sent with the notification of the decision, the notification shall be accompanied by a statement of the conclusions and of any recommendations made by the inspector, and if a person entitled to be notified of the decision has not received a copy of that report, s/he shall be supplied with a copy of it on written application made to the Secretary of State within four weeks of the date of the determination (r 18(4)). ‘Report’ includes an assessor’s report; other documents not included may be inspected by any person receiving a copy of the report on a written application within six weeks of the date of the Secretary of State’s decision. Rule 18(3A) allows this requirement to be met by publishing the documents concerned in a website and providing details to the persons concerned. ‘Report’ includes any assessor’s report appended to the inspector’s report but not any other documents so appended, see below and SI 2000/1624, r 18(3).

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Information and open government – specific areas   787

Procedure following quashing of decision 9.134  SI 2000/1624, r 19 stipulates that where a decision of the Secretary of State on an application or appeal in respect of which an inquiry has been held is quashed in proceedings before any court, the Secretary of State: ‘(a) shall send to the persons entitled to appear at the inquiry who appeared at it a written statement of the matters with respect to which further representations are invited for the purposes of his further consideration of the application or appeal; and (b) shall afford to those persons the opportunity of making, within three weeks of the date of the written statement, written representations to him in respect of those matters or of asking for the re-opening of the inquiry; and (c) may, as s/he thinks fit, cause the inquiry to be re-opened (whether by the same or a different inspector) and if he does so paragraphs (3) to (8) of r 10 shall apply as if the references to an inquiry were references to a re-opened inquiry.’ 9.135  Representations and requests under para (b) must be received within three weeks of the date of the written statement under para (a). 9.136  The Secretary of State may allow further time for the taking of any steps required or enabled under these rules. 9.137  The main objective of the rules is ‘to make an inquiry process at all stages as efficient and effective as possible, while impairing neither the fairness and impartiality of the proceedings, nor the ability of participants to make representations which are relevant to the decision’.1 The rules are aimed at speeding up the inquiry, allowing ‘no place for surprise tactics’. The latest guidance in the procedural guide on planning appeals builds on PINS 01/2009 and is the result of a consultation which took place in 2007. The objectives of the 2007 consultation were primarily to enhance proportionality, customer focus and efficiency within the system.2 The changes introduced included the reduction of some time limits and the ability of the Planning Inspectorate (on behalf of the Secretary of State) to choose an appeal procedure.3 See DoE Circular 10/88, para 6. DCLG  (2007) Improving the Appeal Process in the Planning System – Making it Proportionate, Customer Focused, Efficient and Well Resourced. 3 On which, see the guidance in the Planning Inspectorate (2018) Procedural Guide: Planning Appeals – England available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/ system/uploads/attachment_data/file/743495/Procedural_Guide_Planning_appeals_version_3. pdf, Annex A. 1 2

9.138  The above rules, with modifications, are virtually identical in all procedural respects to inquiries where inspectors make the decisions.1 SI  2000/1625. Procedures for simplified planning zones are contained in SI  1992/2414: see TCPA 1990, s 83 and Sch 7.

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788  Chapter 9

Written representation procedures1 9.139  These procedures were made statutory in 1986 under the Housing and Planning Act 1986 (now in the Planning (Consequential Provisions) Act 1990 and the details are in the Town and Country Planning (Appeals) (Written Representations Procedure) (England) Regulations 2009).2 Appellants are invited by the department to waive the right to a hearing and to have the appeal decided on written representations only, saving time and expense. The 2009 Regulations have two distinct parts: Part One relating to householder, advertisement consent and minor commercial appeals and Part Two which relates to appeals in all other cases. Written notice of the hearing shall be given to ‘interested parties’, ie any person notified or consulted in accordance with the Act or a development order about the application which has given rise to the appeal or any other person who made representations to the LPA about the application. The notice must specify the matters in SI 2009/452, reg 6(2) (householder appeals) or 13(2) (other appeals). A questionnaire relating to the proceedings must be completed by the LPA who submit this to the Secretary of State and the appellant. The LPA must also include all documents referred to in the questionnaire when it is sent to the Secretary of State and the appellant. The questionnaire requests a range of information from the LPA and requires the inclusion of the reasons for the refusal of planning permission, any policies that are replied upon in order to refuse the application, reports prepared during review of the application and relevant minutes from the LPA’s Planning Committee.3 The questionnaire provides the basis of the LPA’s representations in householder appeals (reg 7(2)) and may constitute its sole input into a Part Two procedure (reg 14(2)). If the LPA is to treat the questionnaire as being its sole representation, it should inform the Secretary of State and the appellant accordingly (reg  14(2)).4 If the LPA wishes to make additional representations it may do so within six weeks of the starting date of the appeal. The appellant’s notice of appeal and accompanying documents will constitute the basis of his appeal in householder appeals cases (reg 7(1)), and also in a Part Two procedure (reg 14(1)), though in a Part Two procedure the appellant may make further written representations within six weeks of the start of the appeal. The householder appeal in Part One is designed to be rapid and offers no potential to offer further representations on the part of the appellant and the LPA beyond those submitted under reg 7, though the Secretary of State may request further information from the parties if this is considered necessary. The Secretary of State serves the representations made under reg  7, though under the Part One householder procedure there is no opportunity to comment on these unless further information is sought. Third parties notified under reg 6 will have their written representations served on the appellant and LPA. They will receive information setting out the application and other matters but no provision is made to receive the appeal notice of the applicant and the questionnaire of the LPA. An application may be made under the FOIA 2000 if they are not otherwise forthcoming. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/planning-appeals-dealt-with-by-writtenrepresentations-taking-part. 2 SI 2009/452, amended by SI 2013/2114. And see The Planning Inspectorate (2018) Procedural Guide: Planning Appeals – England available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/ 1

Information and open government – specific areas   789 government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/743495/Procedural_Guide_ Planning_appeals_version_3.pdf, Annexe C. 3 See also the Procedural Guide on the approach for each kind of appeal. 4 See also the Procedural Guide on the approach for each kind of appeal.

9.140  The Part Two procedure in SI  2009/452 offers a greater potential for responses to be made to submissions by the parties. Regulation 14 of the Regulations requires, as noted in the previous paragraph, the appellant to provide a notice of appeal and the LPA to provide its questionnaire and allows a six-week period after the start of the appeal for either party to make additional representations (though note that the LPA may not do so if it has indicated under reg 14(2)) that the questionnaire will be its sole representation in the appeal). If the parties make further representations, the Secretary of State must send these to the other party and each party has the opportunity to make further comments upon any representations that are made, though the Secretary of State has the right to ignore these unless they are made within seven weeks of the start of the appeal (reg 14(7)). 9.141  Site visits are not catered for in either Part One or Part Two procedures, but it is clear they may be conducted by the inspector.1 It is made clear that no discussions can take place in relation to the case with any party during the site visit.2 The decision notice is made public and sent to the parties in the appeal and a request can be made for a reasoned decision.3 The process may have serious disadvantages for third parties such as neighbours and interest groups. Under the Part One procedure, no provision is made for their views, let alone participation – even if they fall within those persons who made representations at the application stage. In the Part Two procedure, reg 15 allows for third parties to make representations within five weeks of the start of the appeal, but only if they fall within the class of persons required to be notified in reg 13 (those persons required to be notified under the provisions of an Act or Order, or those who made representations at the initial stage). Third parties should where possible have access to documents submitted by the principal parties, facilitated by the LPA and not the Planning Inspectorate.4 A majority of appeals are now conducted by the written representation procedure. The Planning Inspectorate (2018) Procedural Guide: Planning Appeals – England available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/743495/Procedural_Guide_Planning_appeals_version_3.pdf. Site visits may be carried out wherever it is deemed to be necessary. 2 See also the Procedural Guide on the approach for each kind of appeal. 3 South Bedfordshire District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment and Boyle [1987] JPL 507. See also the Procedural Guide, para  4.1. The decision will be published on the Planning Inspectorate’s website. 4 PINS 01/2009, C.5.3. 1

Hearings1 9.142  The Town and Country Planning (Hearings Procedure) (England) Rules 2000, SI 2000/1626 (as amended), provide for what is an intermediate procedure, somewhere between the full inquiry and a system of written representations.

790  Chapter 9 Guidance has been produced for hearings (the Procedural Guide, Annexe E). In Annex C  of the now superseded PINS  01/2009 there was a table of guidance on the suitability of the procedures, which emphasised that hearings would be suitable if: the proceedings were unlikely to take more than one day; little or no third party interest was involved; no technical, legal or policy questions were involved; and formal cross-examination would not be required. The Procedural Guide does not repeat this material, but it still appears to be apposite. If crossexamination is deemed necessary, the inspector must consider whether a formal inquiry is more suitable (r 11(3)). Publicity for a hearing will be given as the LPA thinks advisable, and those with an interest in the land and any person who wrote to the LPA at the application stage will be notified of the time of a hearing. Five weeks before the hearing, the LPA and appellant will provide a written statement of their case containing full particulars and a list of any documents to which they wish to refer. Representation is not essential. The provisions in relation to third party access to information and attendance are relatively liberal (rr 6(6), (6A) and 9(2)). See Dyason v Secretary of State for the Environment (1998) 75 P & CR 506, CA, on judicial criticisms of informal proceedings hearings becoming too ‘informal’ and which may lead to unfairness. Joy v Secretary of State for Transport etc (12/11/02 QBD), draft planning conditions sent to developer and planning authority but not to all parties who had participated: a fatal breach of fairness and SI 2000/1626, r 14(3).

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Costs 9.143  Planning Inspectorate guidance1 outlines the opportunities for costs to be awarded against parties at inquiries where ‘unreasonable behaviour’ on one side has incurred unnecessary expense on the other.2 The potential to make an award of costs arises from LGA  1972, s  250(5) as applied in various pieces of planning legislation. See https://www.gov.uk/guidance/appeals#the-award-of-costs--general. Barking and Dagenham London Borough Council v East London Housing Association (1988) 3 PAD 154 and Manchester City Council v SSE & Mercury Communications Limited [1988] JPL 774. R v Secretary of State for the Environment ex p Rochford DC [2000] 3 All ER 1018. NB charges for information and advice before a formal planning application: McCarthy & Stone (Developments) Ltd v London Borough of Richmond upon Thames [1992] 2  AC  48, HL, reversing R  v Richmond-upon-Thames London Borough Council, ex p McCarthy & Stone (Developments) Ltd [1992] 2 AC 48, CA.

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Environmental impact assessments 9.144  Planning authorities shall not grant planning permission where an environmental impact assessment (EIA) application has been made by a developer until they have considered the environmental information relating to such application. They have to state in their decision that they have done so.1 The relevant regulations are now SI 2017/571 and the guidance provided by the Planning Inspectorate.2 These regulations extend the projects covered by EIAs and make a small number of procedural changes. These regulations have details on procedure and publicity requirements for EIAs.

Information and open government – specific areas   791 TCPA  1990, s  71A; Council Directive 85/337/EEC, as amended by Directive 97/11/EC, 2003/35/EC and 2009/31/EC. Amendments have then been codified in Directive 2011/92/EU and this has subsequently been amended by Directive 2014/52/EU. 2 See https://www.gov.uk/guidance/environmental-impact-assessment. 1

9.145  The House of Lords has treated compliance with the Directive as a strict requirement so there had been no EIA where a ‘disparate collection of documents, produced by parties other than the developer and traceable by a process with a good deal of energy and persistence as satisfying the requirement to make available to the public the Annex III [of the Directive] information’ had been made available. The EIA was an accessible compilation of the relevant environmental information and a summary in non-technical language, produced by the developer at the very start of the application process.1 Berkeley v Secretary of State for the Environment [2000] 3 All ER 897, HL. And see R v Durham City Council, ex p Huddleston [2000] 1  WLR  1484, CA, and the impact of the Directive on domestic law possessing indirect horizontal effect. A planning authority’s decision that an EIA was not required was challengeable only on grounds of unreasonableness: R (Jones) v Mansfield DC [2003] EWCA Civ 1408, [2004] Env LR 21.

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COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISE AND CONTRACTING 9.146  The provisions of the LGHA  1989 were examined in ch  6. These followed the Widdicombe Report and White Paper1 on local authority commercial undertakings. Local authorities were under duties to engage in compulsory competitive tendering under Part I of the Local Government Act 1988 (LGA  1988). These duties have since been overtaken by the ‘best value’ regime introduced under the Local Government Act 1999 (LGA 1999). Cmnd 9797 (1986); Cm 433 (1988).

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9.147  Part I of the LGA 1999 lists ‘best value authorities’ (BVA), a list which may be and has been amended. A  BVA must make arrangements to secure continuous improvement in the way in which its functions are exercised, having regard to a combination of economy, efficiency and effectiveness. It has to engage in widespread consultation in deciding how to fulfil its duty. The Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007 abolished the requirement for authorities to draw up best-value plans and carry out bestvalue reviews and also the ability of the Secretary of State to set performance indicators and performance standards for best-value objectives in England. These requirements remained in place for Wales, but have now been repealed by the Local Government (Wales) Measure 2009. The Secretary of State has copious powers to issue specifications and ‘guidance’, which must be taken into account by local authorities in the performance of their activities by virtue of the modified LGA 1999, s 3(4). 9.148  The Secretary of State can appoint a person to inspect BVAs to ensure compliance, and LGA  1999, s  11 (this provision was modified by the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014 to permit the appointment of a person,

792  Chapter 9 rather than the now abolished Audit Commission, to carry out this function) gives the inspector wide powers of access to premises and documents. Fees may be charged for such inspections, and reports must be issued by the inspector after inspection. The reports may be published by the inspector under s  13(3)(b) of the LGA  1999. The Secretary of State has considerable sanction powers under s 15, including power to issue directions. The duty to publish information under Local Government Planning and Land Act 1980, s 2(1) applies to BVAs.1 LGA 1999, s 20. NB the statutory guidance under s 2 is now given the force of law by SIs made under s 3 of the Act. See Local Government (Transparency Requirements) (England) Regulations 2015, SI 2015/480, and similar provisions applicable to smaller authorities in SI 2015/494. See also Department of Communities and Local Government (2015) Local Government Transparency Code 2015 available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ uploads/attachment_data/file/408386/150227_PUBLICATION_Final_LGTC_2015.pdf.

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9.149  Under Part II of the LGA 1988, duties are placed upon local authorities and other public bodies as defined in Sch 2 to the Act in relation to contracts for the supply of goods, materials or services or the execution of works. Under s 17 a duty is imposed on such bodies to exclude from relevant supply or works contracts any consideration of matters which come within the definition of non-commercial matters within the section. Authorities under Sch  2 must not discriminate against a contractor by invoking political or ‘irrelevant’ considerations.1 It covers decisions to include or exclude, from approved lists of contractors or from ‘invitation to tender’ lists, a selection of contractors and subcontractors. Section 17(5) specifies the non-commercial matters.2 Section 19 of the LGA 1999 empowers the Secretary of State to remove certain of the matters specified in LGA 1988, s 17(5) as ‘non-commercial matters’ by order. No such orders have yet been made. Much more specific than the common law test of relevance: R v London Borough of Enfield, ex p F Unwin (Roydon) Ltd (1989) 46 BLR 1; R v Islington London Borough Council, ex p Building Employers Confederation [1989] IRLR 382. See also, more recently, R (A) v B Council [2007] EWHC 1529 (Admin), [2007] BLGR 813 (a case which also discusses the application of Art 8 ECHR to s 17 in light of the circumstances involved in the case) and R v Bristol CC, ex p D L Barrett and Sons (2001) 3 LGLR 11. 2 Terms and conditions of employment of employees; self-employment; involvement in irrelevant fields of central government policy; conduct in industrial disputes; restricting the territorial activities of contractors; affiliation or interests of a political, industrial or sectarian nature, contribution to a political party. 1

9.150  Section 155(2) of the Equality Act 2010 gives a Minister of the Crown power to make regulations which ‘may impose duties on a public authority that is a contracting authority within the meaning of the Public Sector Directive in connection with its public procurement functions.’ The Equality Act 2010 repealed LGA 1988, s 18, which permitted local authorities to take account of certain issues pertaining to race relations in their procurement process. Section 155(2) of the Equality Act 2010 must be viewed in the context of the public sector equality duty contained in Part 11 of the 2010 Act. As of yet, no regulations have been produced, but official guidance is available on the impact of the 2010 Act on procurement activities.1

Information and open government – specific areas   793 For more information, see Wadham et al Blackstone’s Guide to the Equality Act 2010 (3rd edn, 2016) chs 7 and 8. Equality and Human Rights Commission (2018) Guidance on Public Sector Procurement available at: https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/advice-and-guidance/ guidance-public-sector-procurement and Cabinet Office (2013) Procurement Policy Note 01/13: Public Sector Equality Duty available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ attachment_data/file/80185/PPN_Procurement_Equality_Jan-13_0.pdf.

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9.151  Interestingly, duties under LGA 1988, s 17(1) create a sufficient interest for judicial review for a potential or, where made, former potential contractor,1 and a failure to comply with the provisions in the section is actionable (s 19(7)) by any person who, in consequence, suffers loss or damage.2 R v Hereford Corpn, ex p Harrower [1970] 1 WLR 1424. See LGA  1988, s  19(9) allowing judicial review proceedings on grounds other than noncommercial matters.

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9.152  Section 20 of the LGA 1988 concerns the giving of reasons. It provides: ‘(1) Where a public authority exercises a function regulated by section 17 above by making, in relation to any person, a decision to which this section applies, it shall be the duty of the authority forthwith to notify that person of the decision and, if that person so requests in writing within the period of 15 days beginning with the date of the notice, to furnish him with a written statement of the reasons for the decision.1 (2) This section applies to the following decisions in relation to any person, namely: (a) in relation to an approved list, a decision to exclude him from the list, (b) in relation to a proposed public supply or works contract– (i) where he asked to be invited to tender for the contract, a decision not to invite him to tender, (ii) a decision not to accept the submission by him of a tender for the contract, (iii) where he has submitted a tender for the contract, a decision not to enter into the contract with him, or (iv) a decision to withhold approval for, or to select or nominate, persons to be sub-contractors for the purposes of the contract, or (c) in relation to a subsisting public supply or works contract with him– (i) a decision to withhold approval for, or to select or nominate, persons to the sub-contractors for the purposes of the contract, or (ii) a decision to terminate the contract. (3) A statement of reasons under subsection (1) above shall be sent to the person requesting it within the period of 15 days beginning with the date of the request.’ The period may be amended by order.

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European directives 9.153  European directives seek to ensure open competition in public procurement, and in 1989 a Directive was adopted on enforcement procedures

794  Chapter 9 for the directives. The present rules can be found in Directive 2014/25/EU1 (as amended), which covers contracts for works, supplies and services in the utilities sector (ie  post, water, energy and transport) and Directive 2014/24/EU2 (as amended) which applies to public contracts for works, supply and services. The new regime endeavours to further simplify the procurement regime and also seeks to codify and place some issues, such as the use of electronic means, on a clearer footing. The two new directives require the use of electronic means. Electronic means are mandated for the notification and advertisement of contracts, with a broader objective of having ‘straight through’ electronic procurement (ie the advertisement, tendering or bidding process and the conclusion of the procedure by electronic means) by 2020. In addition to the two directives noted above, there is also a Remedies Directive3 and a directive which modifies the regime in the two directives above in cases of defence procurement4 and a specific directive regulating the award of concession contracts. The bulk of the provisions in the directives are implemented in the UK by the Public Contracts Regulations 2015, SI 2015/102. [2014] OJ L 94/243. [2014] OJ L 94/65. 3 Directive 89/665/EEC for the public sector and Directive 92/13/EEC for the utilities sector. Both of these directives were substantially amended by Directive 2007/66/EC, [2007] OJ L 335/31. 4 Directive 2009/81/EC, [2009] OJ L 216/76. 1 2

9.154  It should be added that Regulation (EC) 213/2008 of the European Parliament and Council concerns the Common Procurement Vocabulary (CPV). The CPV is an important tool in the publicity process for public contracts, as it permits each contract to be classified according to its subject matter. Potential bidders may then search for public contracts in fields that are of interest to them as defined by the CPV. 9.155  These measures set out the procedures that are to be followed in awarding contracts by bodies covered by the Regulations. Directive 2014/24/ EU applies to contracts above a specific threshold as defined in the various Directives. Regulation 5 of SI 2015/102 requires that the thresholds listed in the Directives and amended from time to time should be converted to UK currency using the prevailing conversion rate approved by the Commission at the time of the contracting process. Contracting authorities are encouraged to issue prior information notices listing the contracts to be awarded in the coming year. The Directives require EU-wide publication of contracts, use of non-discriminatory technical specifications and use of objective criteria for selection of participants in tendering and contract award. In Telaustria v Telekom Austria (Case C-324/98 [2000] ECR I-10745) the ECJ ruled that, even where the Directives do not apply, fundamental rules of the EC Treaty such as non-discrimination, which includes an obligation of transparency, do apply. This will cover ‘a degree of advertising’ by the contracting authority to enable both competition in tendering and a review of ‘impartiality of procurement procedures’ (paras 60–62). Some guidance on contracts that fall outside of the thresholds required by the Directives or are otherwise excluded from the regime is now available.1 [2006] OJ C 179/2.

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Information and open government – specific areas   795 9.156  In the case of the vast majority of contracts, the contracting authority is required to publicise its intention to seek tenders in the Official Journal of the European Communities (OJEC) except in certain specified circumstances. Specifications cover the form of advertisement and information which it must contain, which must be submitted via the electronic tools discussed below. Regulations provide for response times by contractors and their access to documents and other information. Regulations applicable to each kind of procurement process require a contracting authority to submit information in respect of each contract awarded by it, including a record containing information on the awardee and the reasons why the contract was awarded. Furthermore, regulations and the Local Government Transparency Code require information about the public contracts entered into by local authorities to be published.1 The Commission may request these records and reports if it so wishes. Where technical specifications are to be applied, these must be contained in the contract documents and are subject to strict controls to avoid discrimination. Local Government (Transparency Requirements) (England) Regulations 2015, SI  2015/480, and similar provisions applicable to smaller authorities in SI 2015/494. See also Department of Communities and Local Government (2015) Local Government Transparency Code 2015 available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_ data/file/408386/150227_PUBLICATION_Final_LGTC_2015.pdf.

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9.157  Electronic systems have superseded paper-based publications for the notification of public contracts. The SIMAP system provides the necessary forms for contracting authorities to notify the publications office of a contract that is to be advertised. There are two possible routes that might be used – either the e-Notices system, where individual contracting authorities provide the information to the publications office by entering data online, or the e-Senders system, where approved third parties prepare the necessary information and send it to the publications office directly. Once notification is received by the publications office, the contract is publicised online on the Tenders Electronic Daily (TED) system, which has replaced the S series of the Official Journal.

Local Government (Contracts) Act 1997 9.158  This Act was passed following litigation which ruled that local authorities could not enter – or at least not with legal effect – and could not have enforced against them ultra vires contracts.1 In order to encourage various initiatives, not least the PFI and PPPs, the Act sought to remove uncertainties arising from the litigation by allowing self-certification under the Act which produces a strong presumption that the contract is lawful and the contract can therefore be performed. Any challenge may only be made by a public law or audit review process, not by private law. If the courts by such public law process determine that a contract is unlawful, in spite of a presumption and explicit discretion to allow an unlawful contract to be performed then there are special discharge terms which may be agreed or imposed allowing payment to the contractor, or those financing the contractor, of compensation.2 Under s 4, a copy of the certificate has to be open for inspection by members of the public during the period for

796  Chapter 9 which the contract operates. It is to be available for all reasonable times without payment and the public are to be provided with facilities for obtaining copies on payment of a reasonable fee. The Local Government (Contracts) Act 1997 is silent about rights in restitution: Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] 2  All ER  961, HL; Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council [1998] 4 All ER 513, HL. 2 See Burgoine v Waltham Forest London Borough Council (1996) 95 LGR 520 for personal liability of officers. 1

Chapter 10

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review

There is a microcosm of this chapter in the following passage. This refers to the Windrush episode in which the destruction of personal files by the authorities (for data security reasons) left children of West Indians, who emigrated to the UK with rights of residence and citizenship, without means to identify their right of abode in the UK. They endured conditions which can only be described as severe harassment by the authorities as a consequence leading, in some cases, to deportation. ‘I  am concerned that the Home Office has become too concerned with policy and strategy and sometimes loses sight of the individual. This is about individuals, and we have heard the individual stories, some of which have been terrible to hear. That is why I  have acted. That is why I  have put a clear limit on the amount of time it will take to correct the situation. That is why I am so committed to ensuring that there is no cost involved’ (Amber Rudd, Home Secretary, HC Debs Vol 639 col 28, 16/04/2018). But wasn’t the policy driven by the Immigration Acts 2014 and 2016, a hostile antiimmigrant climate (with Brexit and government fear of a surge in UKIP’s support in the run-up to the 2016 referendum), aggressive checks and performance targets, building on earlier statutes, on employers, landlords and universities among others forcing them to establish people’s right to be here and the individuals’ duty to prove such a right? Amber Rudd promised special measures, including customer centres to provide assistance to help the Windrush generation enable their position to be rectified (ie citizenship), waiving of the usual fees, hot lines, 50 senior case workers to assist firsttier case workers get the discretion exercised appropriately, the burden of proof will no longer be on the claimant and an audit of the work to ensure transparency, and compensation in appropriate cases (HC Debs 23/04/2018 cols 619–620). Amber Rudd subsequently resigned as Home Secretary in April 2018 when it became apparent she had misled a select committee on the existence of performance targets. The ordeal for the Windrush victims

798  Chapter 10 was far from over. In November 2018, Amber Rudd was appointed Secretary of State for Work and Pensions. For figures on compensation payments to those subject to wrongful immigration detention between 2015 and 2016, see https://www. parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/home-affairs/ Correspondence-17-19/180625_Permanent_Secretary_Immigration%20 Enforcement.pdf (3/07/2018).

INTRODUCTION 10.1  The purpose of this chapter is to provide a practical overview of the way that internal and more formal grievance procedures, ombudsmen and judicial review help to open up the decision-making process of public institutions and to make them more responsive to the public. Interest in informal resolution of grievances has grown substantially over many decades. So too has interest in, and the number of offices of, ombudsmen – a recent addition being the armed forces services complaints ombudsman (personnel matters are usually excluded from the ombudsman’s remit). The Collcutt report of 2000 recommended the creation of a single ombudsman commission, which should be ‘the key objective of any reform process’ (PAC HC  448 (2002–03), para  6). In 2014, the Public Administration Select Committee published their report Time for a People’s Ombudsman. Robert Gordon CB subsequently carried out a review, followed by a public consultation in the spring of 2015, followed by the government’s response. The Queen’s Speech in 2015 proposed to reform and modernise the Public Service Ombudsman sector to provide ‘a more effective and accessible final tier of complaints redress within the public sector’. In December 2016 a draft Bill was published by the Cabinet Office which proposed abolition of the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman and the Commission for Local Administration (the local government ombudsman). The local government ombudsman is now called the local government and social care ombudsman. The Bill made no appearance in the May 2017 Queen’s Speech, however, suggesting that there will be a delay in implementing any reforms to the landscape. We will examine the Bill’s proposals below (para 10.71). The Scottish have created such a commission in Scotland under the Scottish Public Services Ombudsman Act 2002 (para 4.132 above). The Public Services Ombudsman (Wales) Act 2005 has established a unified ombudsman scheme in Wales although the Commissioner for Older People (Wales) Act 2006, s 20 introduced a complaints procedure for older people. It may be that linked-up justice is an equally pressing need in the era of joined-up government1 and offloaded and downsized government.2 This has been addressed to some extent by the Department for Constitutional Affairs in a White Paper response to the Leggatt review on tribunals (see below) which laid the foundation for the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (TCEA  2007). The abolition of the Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council in August 2013, which had as its brief the overview of administrative justice as a whole, has not inspired

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   799 confidence in government’s intentions. The Law Commission has reported on Public Sector Ombudsmen and we examine this report in this chapter.3 In the area of fair procedure the courts have made significant contributions in the area of judicial review since the early 1960s in the terrain covered by jurisdictional review, review for irrationality and procedural impropriety and human rights. In more recent years the growing European influence on our public law has added to the judicial armoury especially in human rights protection. The UK withdrawal of the UK from the European Union will alter, but not remove, the shape of that influence, although the UK will remain a member of the ECHR for the foreseeable future. Modernising Government Cm 4310 (1999). The Coalition: Our Programme for Government: Freedom, Fairness, Responsibility (May 2010) HM Government. 3 Law Commission Paper No 329 HC 1136 (2010–12). See para 10.57 below. 1 2

10.2  What follows will extract the practical implications for openness and the obtaining of information from these developments. Understandably, networked government and public services have brought information technology to the fore. From the Conservative Manifesto 20171 there was a promise of a Digital Charter (in the context of GDPR), the legislative embodiment of which became the Digital Economy Act 2017 (see para 4.33): ‘We will publish operational performance data of all public-facing services for open comparison as a matter of course – helping the public to hold their local services to account, or choose other better services if they prefer.2 In doing so, central and local government will be required to release information regularly and in an open format, and data will be aggregated and anonymised where it is important to do so. We will incubate more digital services within government and introduce digital transformation fellowships, so that hundreds of leaders from the world of tech can come into government to help deliver better public services. We will continue the drive for open data, maintaining our position as the world leader. We must use common platforms across government and the wider public sector. That must start with the way we identify ourselves online, so that people have one single, common and safe way of verifying themselves to all parts of government. That is why we shall roll out Verify, so that people can identify themselves on all government online services by 2020, using their own secure data that is not held by government.’ Government may be increasingly digital, but that only reinforces the need for effective and efficient complaints procedures. And not everyone is online. https://www.conservatives.com/manifesto (18/04/2018). On open public services, see https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/open-public-services (18/04/2018).

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INTERNAL COMPLAINTS AND GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES 10.3  The movement towards widespread provision of internal complaints grievance procedures in public bodies, and more latterly in privatised industries

800  Chapter 10 and bodies under contract with public bodies to provide publicly financed services, has its origins in the mid-1970s in the UK. Over 30 years ago, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) noted that ‘equal access by all citizens to the public administration and to the established complaints system – a basic right in the constitutional principles of OECD Member countries – is not always, nor necessarily, ensured by the structures of representative democracy’.1 The OECD referred to the need to establish mechanisms to deal with complaints before ombudsmen or courts are invoked, ie  internal mechanisms. We shall see that these may take very different forms. This message from the late 1980s was reinforced by a detailed report from the National Audit Office in March 2005 which found that government complaints’ processes were slow, complex and expensive. The 1.4 million complaints that were known cost £510 million to process and involved 9,300 staff. (National Audit Office: Citizen Redress HC 21 (2004–05); Appendix 1 of the report has details of scales and costs of redress systems in agencies and departments, and Appendix 2 has examples of case studies in agencies.) The Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council (AJTC) established under the TCEA 2007 has referred to internal complaints procedures in its newsletters.2  A  publication in June 2011, ‘Right First Time’, addresses a core concern for all involved in the delivery of public services: how to get more decisions right first time. The AJTC reports on how over a million appeals and other challenges to governmental decisions are now made each year to tribunals, ombudsmen and other dispute-resolution bodies: ‘These result in surprisingly high success rates and each appeal involves significant processing costs as well as strain on the individual whose rights are affected.’ The report identifies the scope to make ‘substantial savings through a concerted effort to improve original decision-making within government departments, agencies and other public bodies’. Despite the obvious advantages for citizens and public authorities in getting things right first time currently there are ‘few incentives or policies directed at such an outcome’, the AJTC reported.3 The AJTC also published ‘Principles of Administrative Justice’ (2010). In Securing Fairness and Redress: Administrative Justice at Risk (2011) the AJTC examined mistakes, complaints and independence in administrative justice, asking, ‘What is happening in the era of austerity and cutback?’. Austerity and cutback have continued. The AJTC was abolished in a quango austerity cull, as noted above. In June 2011, the House of Lords Communications Committee reported on BBC internal complaints mechanisms covering complaints about impartiality and accuracy with the Corporation’s programmes. Media regulator Ofcom, rather than the BBC, should have the final say over such complaints, the Committee recommended (HL 166 (2010–12). In ch 4 it was observed how this has occurred along with other reforms at the BBC although the BBC still deals with some complaints internally (para  4.101). The Lords Communications Committee’s inquiry into BBC governance and regulation also said ‘the convoluted and overly complicated complaints process at the BBC’ must be improved. Although effective internal complaints procedures are essential, we argue, in the case of the BBC leaving complaints on impartiality and accuracy in journalistic judgement to the Corporation made the BBC ‘judge and jury in these matters’.4 OECD Administration as Service: The Public as Client (Paris, 1987).

1

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   801 Adjust Newsletter (2008) at: www.ajtc.gov.uk/adjust/adjust_ latest.htm. The Council was earmarked as a ‘quango’ to be chopped in the 2010 review of quangos. Its responsibilities included oversight of the administrative justice system and state accountability. The concerns of the Justice committee on AJTC’s abolition are reported in HC 965 (2012–13) Eighth report. 3 Right First Time June 2011. 4 House of Lords Communications Committee HL 166 (2010–12). 2

10.4  Many commentators noted in former years how unresponsive public bodies were to citizens or recipients of such bodies’ services when there was a perceived shortcoming or failure in service. This was when there was an unquestioned assumption that public bodies alone provided public services. It was commonplace, indeed almost universal, not to have identified personnel or procedures to deal with complaints and to provide no information about how complaints that were made were processed. This was in marked contradiction to employee/personnel complaints where procedures were far more apparent in public bodies. Answers to queries were in the most perfunctory of forms and redress of any kind rarely forthcoming. Any success in registering a complaint invariably owed more to persistence, stamina and sheer cussedness on the part of a complainant which may have resulted in the ‘noisy wheel getting the grease’ outcome rather than one based upon just desert, strength of case and merits. Most bodies were content to rely upon ombudsmen, tribunals – of which there are many in the UK1 – and courts to remedy wrongs. Any internal mechanisms were superfluous.

1

A review of tribunals was conducted by Sir Andrew Leggatt and a White Paper has been produced: see para 10.7, note 1 below.

10.5  Some authorities on the contrary developed highly effective complaints procedures during the 1980s and 1990s and many of the examples from these local authorities were used as suggestions for good procedures by central government. The Alternative Dispute Resolution movement had its influence encouraging means of redress other than through courts or formal adjudicatory bodies. In 1991 there was the Citizen’s Charter (CC) initiative from Prime Minister John Major. The principles that the Charter sought to advance were: explicit standards; openness; information; choice; non-discrimination; accessibility; and finally, when things went wrong, a ‘good explanation’, an ‘apology’ and ‘well publicised and readily available complaints procedures’.1 The Commons select committee on public administration re-emphasised the Charter’s message of ‘putting the user first’ and using complaints procedures as learning devices. The report, which concentrated on central government delivery of services to the public, also identified that difficulties were present in identifying ‘complaints’, distinguishing between complaints and appeals and the assistance required in using complaints procedures when available.2 The Cabinet Office was seen as the place to champion good complaints practice. The Parliamentary and Health Services Ombudsmen were seen as a source of information on problems with public services and the number of complaints upheld should reflect a level of quality control. The Cross-Government Complaints Handlers Network was established in 2006, the report noted, and this self-organised body could be developed into a more formal body. The committee recommended a single

802  Chapter 10 access point for all public services in central government providing information and advice on complaining. Government departments should publicise their complaints procedures in their publication schemes under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA  2000) (para  1.48).3 These are not confined to FOIA complaints. More recently the Cabinet Office has published guidance on establishing internal ombudsman-like schemes within departments which builds on the work of the British and Irish Ombudsman Organisation guidance (below). It recommends avoidance of the word ‘ombudsman’, consultation with the Ministry of Justice where a tribunal may be more appropriate and special regard to the need to safeguard Art 6 ECHR rights where an individual’s civil or political rights are in issue.4 The Parliamentary Ombudsman in the overview of casework for 2016–17 wrote, ‘There is work underway across Whitehall to encourage organisations and their staff to engage with complaints and to harness the learning from complaints to improve the services they deliver to the public’.5 In November 2018, the local government ombudsman, noting the increasing number of complaints about care and social services, wrote: ‘It’s no longer just one-off mistakes; we’re seeing problems with systems, policies and the way procedures are being applied …’.6 Citizens Charter p 5. These were established under statutory regulations in schools, utilities and elsewhere; see now eg Complaints against Schools (England) Regulations 2010, SI 2010/853. 2 Select Committee on Public Administration When Citizens Complain 5th report HC 409 (2007– 08) and GR HC  997 (2008–09). See PAC and HC  1147 (2007–08) From Citizen’s Charter to Public Service Guarantees. See the National Audit Office Handling Customer Complaints HC 995 (2007–08) and HC 853 (2007–08) Feeding Back: Learning from Complaint Handling in Health and Social Care. There are some very useful chapters in M Adler ed Administrative Justice in Context (2010). See H Genn Judging Civil Justice (2009) ch 3. 3 See, for an example from local government, http://www.communities.gov.uk/corporate/foi/ complaintsprocedure/. 4 Cabinet Office Ombudsman schemes – guidance for departments (2009). 5 Complaints about Government Departments and Agencies and Other UK Public Organisations P&HSO (2016– 17). On complaints studies, see Sheffield study: https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/ourplan/guidingprinciples/case-studies-archive/transforming-uk-ombudsmen-law-richard-kirkham-1.426452 and Le Sueur http://repository.essex.ac.uk/7416/1/SSRN-id2154195.pdf (1/05/2018). 6 https://www.lgo.org.uk/information-centre/news/2018/nov/social-care-pressures-reflected-inombudsman-s-annual-review-of-complaints (29/11/2018). 1

10.6  Specific areas in local government have been the subject of developments in terms of grievance redress such as social services and education (below) and in health there have been statutory initiatives put in place which were modified in 2009.1 In Scotland, the Crerar report in 20072 reviewed complaints procedures covering all authorities under the Scottish administration including Scottish local authorities. This report led to a government report recommending standardisation of procedures for Scottish local authorities and a greater role for the Scottish Public Services Ombudsman acting as an independent complaints handler.3 This only covered Scottish bodies and not UK bodies dealing with tax or social security complaints. The Commission for Local Administration and the Welsh ombudsman have provided guidance on complaints handling by local authorities, discussed below, and the local ombudsman can hear complaints about the work of the local standards committees that were examined in paras 7.24 et seq.

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   803 http://www.nhs.uk/choiceintheNHS/Rightsandpledges/complaints/Pages/NHScomplaints.aspx. L Crerar ‘Report of the Independent Review of Regulation, Audit Inspection and Complaints Handling in Scotland’ (2007) Scottish Government. For responses, see https://www.cne-siar. gov.uk/committees/audit/agendas/February2008/Report%20to%20AAS%20re%20Crerar%20 for%2021%20feb%202008%20final.pdf (16/04/2018). 3 Fit-For-Purpose Complaints System Action Group ‘Report to Ministers’ Scottish Government (2008). There is a Commissioner for Ethical Standards in Public Life in Scotland dealing with complaints about MSPs, councillors and members of public bodies. A report may be made to the Standards Commission for Scotland. 1 2

10.7  Prime Minister Blair stated in Leading from the Front Line (2003, Office of Public Service Reform) that he wished to see services that were not only universal but which treated people as individuals and, in response to the Leggatt review on tribunals, which recommended a unified system of tribunals provided by central government,1 the Department for Constitutional Affairs published ‘Transforming Public Services: Complaints, Redress and Tribunals’ (Cm 6243, 2004). This included as one of its key elements in a five year plan: ‘moving out of courts and tribunals disputes that could be resolved elsewhere through better use of education, information, advice and proportionate dispute resolution. ‘Transforming Public Services’ concentrated on a range of policies and services that, so far as possible, will help people avoid problems and legal disputes and where they cannot a system that ‘provides tailored solutions to resolve the dispute as quickly and cost-effectively as possible’ (para  2.2). These may use the full spectrum of well-known devices such as adjudication, arbitration, conciliation, early neutral evaluation, mediation, negotiation and ombudsmen. As noted above, the body that would oversee linked-up administrative justice was abolished under the coalition government. Tribunals for Users – One System, One Service (2001) www.tribunals-review.org.uk; and see M  Partington (ed) The Leggatt Review of Tribunals: Academic Seminar Papers Faculty of Law, University of Bristol (2001). M Adler (ed) Administrative Justice in Context (2010).

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COMPLAINTS 10.8  A complaint (whether written or oral) is a statement that something has gone wrong regardless in fact of whether anything has gone wrong. It is the complainant’s perception that is important though that does not mean that anyone who complains will get what they seeking. It is also distinguished from a simple request for information or clarification. A grievance is an unresolved complaint or one that is not resolved to the satisfaction of the complainant. There can be complaints about maladministration: delay, inaccuracy, oversight, rudeness, bias, inappropriate behaviour. The Parliamentary Ombudsman has provided a list that has been added to over the years (see para 4.133, note 1 above). Complaints may have serious and widespread implications where a change in decision may affect not simply one complainant but potentially thousands. Complaints may also be directed not at the rights or wrongs of an individual decision but at the policy lying behind a decision. There is usually a reluctance for complaints procedures being allowed to address policy complaints, but feeding information about such complaints back to policy makers is increasingly regarded as a vital component of the complaints’ industry.

804  Chapter 10

Government and other initiatives 10.9  Gov uk websites provide details on complaining about public and some private bodies.1 Many complaints arise from poor communication or/and inadequate information and publicity. Very often the quality of service or what is provided is not clearly set out so recent years have seen increasing attempts to set out service and performance criteria, sometimes in the form of a ‘contract’ between authorities and citizens. Complaints about a reduction in service are likely to increase in a period of austerity. Public authorities place details for complaining on the internet.2 The former http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/Governmentcitizensandrights/Yourrightsand responsibilities/Makingcomplaints-yourrights/index.htm, which was a useful portal, is no longer available. See https://www.gov.uk/search?q=Complaints (18/04/2018). A user has to type in Gov UK followed by the public body and ‘complaints’. A  list of departments, agencies and public corporations is at: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations (18/04/2018). The ombudsman has produced advice (tips) on complaining: https://www.ombudsman.org.uk/publications/tipsmaking-complaint-about-uk-government-services (18/04/2018). 2 See eg  for the Cabinet Office: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/cabinet-office/ about/complaints-procedure (18/04/2018); and for the BBC: http://www.bbc.co.uk/complaints/ where-to-complain/ (5/07/2018). 1

10.10  Complaints systems have a wealth of experience to draw upon – a cause for reflection. The Major government set up, within the Citizen’s Charter (CC) Unit, a CC Complaints Task Force in 1993 which has been superseded by the Better Government initiative and Service First of the Labour Government. This published advice for public-sector bodies on: access to complaints systems; simplicity and speed in the operation of a complaints system; achieving fairness covering items such as monitoring fairness in responses and investigations and treatment of complainants, getting second opinions where necessary, independence in complaints procedures and use of outside individuals, use of mediation and conciliation services, treatment of difficult and vexatious complainants, protection of confidentiality. Further papers dealt with staff training and motivation so as to engender a constructive approach to complaints and to integrate complaints resolution into an overall service/consumer programme. Much depended upon ethos and positive culture. This meant giving high visibility to complaints processes and ensuring that those working in such processes were not regarded as ‘also rans’ in terms of career development. 10.11  Advice was offered on learning the lessons from complaints which included guidance on recording complaints including informal complaints eg oral expressions of dissatisfaction and the best ways of extracting information from complaints to feed it into the management and policy-making processes. It also had advice on complaints about policies themselves for although there was no, or at best limited scope, to change policy on taxation, excise, competition it may be that the complaint was really about explanation of policy or an exercise of discretion within a given policy on eg social security payments. The last paper covered remedies. Today, government departments and public authorities will be expected to possess well-publicised complaints procedures via publication schemes under the FOIA, through websites and otherwise. Public authorities

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   805 will also have to possess internal complaints avenues to deal with challenges under FOIA 2000 (para 1.302 above). 10.12  The Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman has produced ‘Principles of Good Complaint Handling’ (2009).1 This counsels on: getting it right, including acting in accordance with the law and relevant guidance and the rights of others including their human rights; being customer-focused; being open and accountable; acting fairly and proportionately; and putting things right and seeking continuous improvement. All of those have specific points of supporting detail. Like the Commission for Local Administration (below), the ombudsman has produced ‘Principles of Good Administration’ (2009) and ‘Remedy’ (2009).2 All operate under the same basic principles as those proposed for complaint handling. https://www.ombudsman.org.uk/about-us/our-principles/principles-good-complaint-handling (16/04/2018). 2 http://www.ombudsman.org.uk/improving-public-service/ombudsmansprinciples. The Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council has also published Principles for Administrative Justice: the AJTC’s Approach (November 2010). 1

10.13  The Commission for Local Administration (CLA) produced guidance on good practice for authorities within the local ombudsmen’s jurisdiction. One of these was entitled ‘Running a Complaints System’, which was revised by the CLA in 2009.1 This has a wealth of good advice to give local authorities – who are likely to be the tier of government that most citizens come into contact with. The guidance states that from April 2009, local ombudsmen will expect complainants to use the internal procedures before they will take up a complaint, although there may be exceptions. It defines a complaint as an ‘expression of dissatisfaction’ whether provided by the council, a contractor or a partner that requires a response. Distinctions between formal and informal complaints should not be made. ‘Local Partnerships and Citizen Redress’ provides guidance on complaints procedure operated by partners.2 Guidance exists on ‘Unreasonably Persistent Complainants and Unreasonable Complainant Behaviour’ (2010).3 ‘Listening, Responding, Improving: a Guide to Better Customer Care’4 from the Department of Health contains guidance on statutory procedures for adult social care. Separate procedures exist for child care. The main reasons for having a complaints system are: (a) individuals are now more aware of their right to voice critical comments and suggestions for improvement; (b) increasing emphasis is being given by public bodies to providing services of the highest affordable standard; (c) greater emphasis is being given to the importance of promoting and developing customer care; (d) as an integral part of customer care policy and quality assurance programme a complaints system can show that an authority cares about their constituents; (e) complaints systems need not be defensive but can be positive ways of improving customer satisfaction and enhancing services; and (f) well-publicised complaints procedures are part of government and opposition philosophy on the rights of citizens.

806  Chapter 10 http://www.lgo.org.uk/publications/guidance-notes/ (16/04/2018). www.lgo.org.uk/publications/special-reports. 3 Ibid. 4 Department of Health 2009: www.dh.gov.uk. 1 2

10.14  ‘Running a Complaints System’ gives detailed guidance on what are complaints, a checklist of questions for officials setting up procedures to ensure efficacy and a checklist of their responsibilities. The guidance gives added emphasis to the development of information technology. It does not advocate one procedure but offers advice on best principles for complaint handling. The principles are: accessibility, communication, timeliness, fairness, credibility and accountability. The variety of channels other than internal procedures through which it might be better to pursue complaints of a criminal, financial or disciplinary matter. There are checklists on good investigative practices and on awarding compensation. An effective complaints procedure will help to resolve the dissatisfaction of citizens about the service they should have, or believe they should have, received. To be effective it will provide: a straightforward means for customers or their representatives to make a complaint – it will be accessible and conspicuous, simple to use; a procedure for investigating a complaint objectively which will be as speedy as possible working according to pre-determined time limits though these may, and with explanation, have to be waived but a target of 12 weeks should be aimed for; keep the complainant informed about progress and eventual outcome; offer redress where required; ensure that action is taken to avoid recurrence; feedback necessary information to officials, managers and politicians to ensure relevant information is taken into account when decisions are taken on resource allocation, benefit conferral, prioritisation, quality assurance and forward planning. A National Audit Office report in 2008 found feedback in social care and health complaints to be undeveloped.1 The guidance recommends that a member of senior management should ‘own’ the procedure and reports should be made to that person on complaints and outcomes and who should disseminate best practice lessons. Responses should be proportionate. National Audit Office ‘Feeding Back? Learning from complaints handling in health and social care’ HC 583 (2007–08).

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10.15  The CLA guidance no longer recommends procedures involving three distinct stages. Two stages should be adequate and kept within the timescale. The CLA document speaks of complaint resolution by frontline staff. If that fails, there should be reference to a specific person who displays independence and authority within the council. This is not clear. Liaison with partners and contractors should be effectively and timeously pursued. A  third stage might involve a person outside the section becoming involved, perhaps as part of a review panel, but this may cause delay and is not encouraged. The review panel has been removed from adult-care complaints. In the field of complaints about medical treatment in the NHS, services complaints are made to service staff and employing organisations/trusts will appoint a complaints officer. A second stage for more resistant complaints, which was dealt with by an independent panel comprising independent members, has been removed under changes introduced in 2009. The second stage now involves the Health Service Ombudsman whose

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   807 statutory powers have been considerably extended and who can question the clinical judgement of doctors and other specialists; however, the courts have been quick to remind the ombudsman that he cannot investigate matters at large – the subject of investigation must be in the complaint.1 Patient Advice and Liaison Services are available in all hospitals. Police complaints and complaints against privatised utilities involve a three-tier structure; these begin with complaints being resolved by the utilities themselves who provide their own procedures and which progress through ever-increasing degrees of formality. Cavanagh v Health Service Commissioner [2005] EWCA Civ 1578.

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10.16  The 1997 Labour Government developed thinking on complaints procedures which was initially contained in a 1998 publication from the Cabinet Office.1 The PM’s Office of Public Service Reform and the Department for Constitutional Affairs carried on a variety of initiatives after 2003. This built on the recommendations of the Complaints Task Force whose work was given support by the Parliamentary Public Service Committee in its report on the CC in 19972 and replaces the Task Force’s Guidance and the Charter Unit’s Complaints Review Arrangements in Public Services (May 1997). In particular, it emphasises the desirability of internal complaints procedures, which would apply equally to social housing providers,3 a further review procedure where the first stage is not successful and which should be separate ‘from line management’, and then advising complainants of where to go should they remain dissatisfied viz, ombudsmen or other statutory procedures. Additional items included publishing information at least once a year on: (a) the number and type of complaints; (b) how quickly they were dealt with; (c) users’ satisfaction; and (d) actions taken as a result. How to deal with complaints (June 1998, Service First – the New Charter Programme). HC 78-I (1996–97), pp xxvii–xxx. 3 Present government advice on housing is at https://www.gov.uk/council-housing/complaints (5/07/2018). There is a housing ombudsman (below). 1 2

10.17  Further points included putting details of complaints procedures on the internet (now de rigueur). Freephone numbers should be used although the bane of pre-recorded messages is ubiquitous. ‘Hot-lines’ are commonly resorted to. Advice emphasises necessary precautions to avoid discrimination against complainants: make clear they will not suffer any adverse consequences, allow access to necessary documents and personnel but allow complaints to be made confidentially where this is required – although confidentiality should not be used to prevent important information for service improvement being disclosed – monitoring services provided to those who have complained and allowing complaints to be made to others who are not dealing directly with complainants and carrying out surveys of those who have made a complaint. Citizens Advice provides details of complaints about the public sector equality duty.1 https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/law-and-courts/discrimination/public-sector-equality-duty/ complaining-about-the-public-sector-equality-duty/ (18/04/2018). Citizens Advice is a network of charities currently numbering 316.

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808  Chapter 10 10.18  The second-stage ‘review arrangements’ which it urges upon public authorities concern complaints about maladministration and failures to meet service aims and targets. It does not cover formal appeals about decisions based on statutory requirements or complaints about policy (p 3). However, for internal complaints staff should be trained to deal with complaints about policy even if ‘they cannot change things’ (p  37). I  will say more about the relationship of different redress mechanisms below. There is certainly a greater emphasis on all staff knowing about effective complaint redress mechanisms. 10.19  Building on existing work and procedures, it gives examples of best practice. One city housing authority uses a complaints form with a tear-off slip for the complainant to send in. The rest of the form the complainant keeps and explains in simple language how the complaint will be dealt with and includes deadlines and a section on the reverse which allows them to record all relevant dates. Some authorities include a stamped addressed envelope for complaints. Other authorities use business cards for their employees to give to those who wish to complain while they are travelling locally. 10.20  Another city authority had the following procedure which was fairly typical: ‘STAGE 1 You will receive an acknowledgement within 7 working days of receipt of your complaint, telling you who is dealing with it. A full reply will follow within 14 working days of receipt, or you will be advised of any delay. STAGE 2 If you are not happy with the outcome, please write back within one month (there’s no need to send a new form). A Departmental Complaints Manager will acknowledge your letter within 7 working days of its receipt and arrange a review of your complaint. You will be sent a reply within 14 working days of receiving your letter, or be advised of any delay. STAGE 3 If you are still unhappy with the situation, please write back to the Departmental Complaints Manager within one month. Your complaint will then be referred to the Director of Legal and Administrative Services for a final review. You will be sent an acknowledgement within 7 working days of receiving your letter and a full reply will be sent within 14 working days of its receipt or you will be advised of any delay.’ 10.21  One other public authority provides the following service to those who have complained: ‘A 20 per cent check of the service provided to those who have complained is carried out. A questionnaire asks: Did you find it easy to complain? Were you given an apology?

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   809 Were you satisfied with any explanation given? Was you complaint dealt with quickly enough? Would you like further contact with the Customer Service Manager?’ 10.22  The checklist to follow in setting up a complaints system is: set out service standards; inform the user about complaints systems; remove barriers to complaining; explain the stages of the procedures; meet any special needs; provide support and assistance to those who need it; obtain the views of those who use the procedures. 10.23  The document sets out a series of ‘dos’ and ‘don’ts’ in terms of good practice. To help monitor complaints there might be sense in a departmental complaints manager who will prepare a departmental procedure for monitoring and dealing with complaints received by the department – increasingly these are spoken of as being ‘owned’ by employees and users who will contribute towards their design. S/he will make sure all staff are familiar with the procedures and that procedures are properly publicised. One authority has spelt out guidance for its employees. This explains why the authority needs a complaints procedure; what a complaint is; who can complain; how the separate stages of the procedure work; other assistance that should be available for consumers; the authority’s comments and suggestions scheme; how to deal with complaints against the authority’s employees; a detailed list of good and bad practice in relation to complaints. 10.24  The principles for good procedures follow much of what has been discussed already, but they should be written in clear simple language and in all relevant languages and cover complaints about operations and policy and should be subject to regular review. They should spell out clearly when a complaint should go to the next stage. These stages are: on the spot reply (informal); referral, investigation and reply; internal review; external review. It might be advisable to use an easily identifiable colour for complaints forms to ensure they are not misplaced. 10.25  Replies should: aim to answer all the points of concern appropriately; be factually correct; avoid jargon; be signed by the officer responsible; contain a contact number; and inform the person what to do next if still not satisfied. In difficult cases, visits at the home of the complainant may be made. A willingness to meet with complainants may be useful and is certainly good practice. 10.26  The guidance was written in a period that was not subject to recession and huge reduction in public expenditure. These factors will clearly have an extensive impact on levels and quality of service. There is also pressure to remove services from local government control, as with schools under the school academy programmes. Nonetheless, there are important lessons which it would be fatal to ignore. In 2007–08, the Public Administration Select Committee expressed its support for the enduring influence of the 1991 Citizens Charter on the provision of public services in England and Wales.1 ‘Charter’ is still a

810  Chapter 10 common designation of a complaints and service document in the public and private sectors. The government are prioritising a ‘Digital Charter’ as we write.2 From Citizen’s Charter to Public Service Guarantees: Entitlements to Public Services HC 411 (2007–08). See https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/digital-charter/digital-charter (12/01/2019).

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REMEDIES 10.27  The local ombudsman has published Guidance on Good Practice: Remedies (2018).1 This is a very detailed document and sets out guidance in subject areas. The ombudsman investigates complaints and attempts effective dispute resolution by recommending redress which is proportionate, appropriate and reasonable, based on all the relevant facts. Financial remedies receive a good deal of coverage, as well as distress. Advice is offered on harm and risk, time and trouble, personal outrage. Usually a ‘modest sum’ of £100–£300 is recommended but exceptionally in excess of £1,000 may be recommended. The ombudsman will not seek to dissuade a body in jurisdiction from proposing a settlement which exceeds what the ombudsman would seek and should not limit the redress offered to a person (one adds there may be an issue with legality). Final decisions are set out in writing and, in nearly all cases, posted on the LGSCO site. The guidance states that solicitors or professional advisers are not usually required to make a complaint. Guidance and examples are offered on a wide range of local authority and social care responsibilities including adult social care, benefits and debt recovery, children and care and education, environment and public protection, housing, planning, including anti-social behaviour, and ‘other’. The guidance focuses on the pathological and no advice is offered on clear explanations. Compensation has been a vexed issue in the UK. In a report into ‘Maladministration and Redress’,2 the Parliamentary Ombudsman investigated the total confusion of practice and procedures for making compensatory payments. The situation verged on anarchy. In central government, the position is discretionary and governed by Treasury Guidance, known as ‘Dear Accounting Officer’ letters. Those issued prior to 2008 have largely been disbanded.3 ‘Managing public money’4 is the present Treasury account of good financial practice. Sections 4.11, 4.12 and 4.13 and Annex 4.14 deal with standards of service, complaints, remedy and transparency. Annex 6.2 advises on when charges may be made for information.5 The available guidance states that staff should provide information which will allow complainants to identify whether a service is below par. Suitable remedies should be offered and ensure that staff are aware of the options; try to give remedies that complainants wish for though within reason and obvious constraints; survey complainants to see whether they received the remedy they wanted. Remedies (nowhere near as detailed as the local ombudsman guidance) might include: (a) an apology; (b) an explanation; (c) correction of the error or other remedial action; (d) an undertaking to improve procedures or systems; and (e) financial compensation, ie one-off or structured settlement.

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   811 https://www.lgo.org.uk/information-centre/reports/advice-and-guidance/guidance-notes/ guidance-on-remedies (16/05/2018). 2 HC 112 (1994–95); Government Reply HC 316 (1994–95). 3 http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/psr_governance_dao_letters.htm. See https://www.gov.uk/ government/collections/dao-letters (18/04/2018). 4 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/686462/MPM_2018.pdf (2013, revised 2018) (18/04/2018). 5 Ibid. 1

10.28  Great care should be taken in devising financial compensation, especially if a precedent is being set. Novel, unusual, or complex cases require consultation with the Treasury as do those where limits of delegation are in issue as well as implications for other service deliverers. Guidance is provided on these matters including interest awards. Financial awards should have estimates cover and be approved by a Parliamentary vote. They score as special payments in departments’ resource accounts. Annual reports should indicate through ‘summary information’ what payments have been made for maladministration. In local government, the CLA has produced detailed guidance on remedies and financial compensation (above). There are also greater legal restrictions on making compensatory payments because of the statutory basis of local government administration, but the Local Government Act 2000, s  92 makes provision to pay compensation (or provide some other benefit) where a person has been adversely affected by maladministration.

Encouraging good practice 10.29  To encourage the right attitude among staff, and in addition to what has been said already, managers should send notices to all staff stressing the importance of complaints and the benefits of handling them well. ‘Chief executives or equivalents in all public services should be held personally responsible for effective complaints handling. And this would be reflected in job descriptions and performance appraisals, including decisions on performance related pay.’ It would, as the Select Committee said, be a contractual undertaking by senior officers. In turn, managers should recognise and reward staff who handle complaints well. Some authorities have made handling complaints a part of formal appraisal of staff: ‘For staff who deal direct with the public, the assessment of their ability to handle customers well is a major determinant of their appraisal. More importantly, the appraisal itself reaffirms the authority’s commitment to customer care and provides these staff with the opportunity to say what they feel is going well or badly in this area and what help they need to do the job better.’ (How to deal with complaints, p 43) 10.30  Complaints procedures should be separated from disciplinary procedures. Greater publicity, provision of information, consultation with representatives of user groups and staff and delegation for complaints handling to ‘the lowest possible level’ (ie most accessible) will help reduce the cost of administering such schemes and any consequential demand for more resources.

812  Chapter 10 10.31  Recording complaints should be done in a consistent and detailed fashion. It should be simple, practical and not onerous and should be useful for monitoring complaints. There are details on the minima that should be recorded and these include: name, address and telephone number of complainant; date of receipt; details of the complaint, putting it into a category depending upon the subject; remedy requested; immediate action to be taken. Advice on complaint analysis is provided and an example from a police headquarters is given: ‘the HQ produce a six monthly management report on complaints. This shows: the number and type of complaint broken down into departments and districts; complaints that have been sorted out into type and result; and management issues arising from complaint investigations. The report is reviewed each year with feed-back from those who receive it.’ (Ibid, p 51) 10.32  The following information about complaints should be published: the numbers and types or categories of complaints received; the speed with which they were dealt with compared with target times; levels of customer satisfaction with your replies; action taken to improve services as a result of complaints. 10.33  It might also be useful to consider setting up networks of authorities who provide complaints procedures to compare best practice etc. 10.34  London Councils complaints is available on the internet and it advises on complaints and what is outside its subject areas – FOI, DPA, and environment, traffic and road user charging adjudicators, for example.1 The former London Wide Complaints Network membership involved 20 London Boroughs. Its aims were to: (a) exchange ideas and information on all areas of local authority complaints procedures with maximum encouragement for the sharing of information; (b) agree on features of good practice where possible; (c) act as a support group for officials engaged in complaints procedures; (d) identify any network-wide training/conference needs and develop common approaches where appropriate to meet them; and (e) provide effective liaison and representation of the views of the network and institutions/directorates it represents to relevant bodies such as ombudsmen. https://www.londoncouncils.gov.uk/who-we-are/about-us/governance/complaints (16/04/2018).

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10.35  London Councils represents 32 London boroughs and the City of London. London Councils (LC) acts as a catalyst for effective sharing among boroughs of ideas, good practice, people, resources, or policies and new approaches. The strategic direction of London Councils is set by the Leaders’ Committee. Meeting eight times a year, the Leaders’ Committee comprises the Leaders of all of London’s local authorities. There is also a cross-party Executive Committee which guides the organisation’s day-to-day work and LC is a crossparty group with no political affiliation.1 https://www.londoncouncils.gov.uk/who-we-are/about-us (18/04/2018).

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Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   813 10.36  There has also been increasing contact between public and private sector bodies such as retailers and IT experts to gain relevant experience and cross-fertilisation of ideas. The review of complaints procedures themselves to see how fairly etc they are working may well benefit from having an outside element on it to help bring impartial and fresh ideas. The review process should have access to all staff and relevant papers. 10.37  As well as the internal review with a possible independent element, authorities should consider the creation of formal external arrangements for reviewing complaints after internal processes have been exhausted. For some, this is the role of the ombudsman and courts. Complaints review means an arrangement for reviewing individual complaints or complaints systems that is separate from line management. Details will obviously relate very closely to the needs of the authority and its users, and the impact of almost a decade of austerity hitting the public sector. It might be completely external – as is increasingly common in UK central government (see below) and some services in local government, eg social services. In other cases it might utilise the office of a senior manager who has not been involved with the service area or complaint. These reviews might review difficult complaints, systems of complaints’ handling or both. There may be some confusion with internal monitoring mechanisms if not careful. The existence of external review mechanisms may well help to persuade the public that complaints are being taken seriously and the authority aims to deal with them fairly. ‘In 1995 … the Citizen’s Charter Complaints Task Force reported that people felt there was a gap between internal investigations by line management and an external ombudsman.’ (Ibid, p 68) 10.38  The term ‘ombudsman’ should not be used for this body to avoid confusion with statutory models (see below). 10.39  Reviewers must respect confidentiality but they should also report on their work publicly after an investigation is concluded and be free to contact the press in a responsible manner. Their independence should be guaranteed and they should be properly resourced. Complaints that reviewers will deal with should be clearly defined eg does it include relatives of users/service recipients or advisers/representatives? Those entitled to complain should be able to reach the reviewer directly without having to obtain approval from the service or authority. Review arrangements should be fully advertised and explained. 10.40  Adjudicators have been appointed for investigation of complaints by many departments and public bodies. Some are statutory like the Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education1 under the Higher Education Act 2004. This exists alongside a new regulatory regime for universities centred on the Office for Students under the Higher Education and Research Act 2017. Others are non-statutory such as the Independent Complaints Adjudication Service for Ofsted2 and the Adult Learning Inspectorate, the Independent Complaints Reviewer dealing with the Land Registry, the National Archives,

814  Chapter 10 the Charity Commission, and the Homes and Community Agency and Waterways ombudsman. An interesting example of an external review is that of the Adjudicator’s Office in the areas of Inland Revenue (including national insurance) and Customs and Excise and the Valuation Office Agency (council tax and business rate valuations).3 If customers are unhappy with the service they have received, they may ask for a formal review of their complaint. If the complaint is still not resolved, the customer may ask for a second review, which is a fresh look at their complaint and gives them the department’s final response. If the customer remains unhappy, then they may approach the Adjudicator’s Office. The complaint is investigated to draw together a full and impartial summary of details from the customer and the department. The Adjudicator provides an independent review of the details and makes her recommendation. Those who remain unhappy can ask an MP to refer their complaint to the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman. The Ombudsman decides whether to investigate the complaint and, if he decides to do so, his investigation may also look at the way in which the Adjudicator’s Office has reviewed the complaint. Mediation is the process where both parties reach an agreement on how a case may be settled. An investigator reviews the complaint and, if there is scope to propose a mediated settlement, they work with the customer and the relevant department to achieve this on behalf of the Adjudicator. Resolution by recommendation will be proffered where there is little scope for mediation. The investigated case is presented to the Adjudicator. The Adjudicator reviews the case in detail. She then writes to the customer and the relevant department outlining her views together with any recommendations.4 http://www.oiahe.org.uk/. www.ofstedadjudicationservice.co.uk/?p=process. 3 http://www.adjudicatorsoffice.gov.uk/publications.htm. 4 http://www.adjudicatorsoffice.gov.uk/pdf/report2017.pdf pp 10–11. Earlier guidance was more user-friendly. 1 2

10.41  Reviewers should offer the opportunity for conciliation if necessary and the procedure should separate out these two functions. The Independent Case Examiner of the Department for Work and Pensions and its agencies, including the Child Support Agency and Child Maintenance Agency, provides a conciliation function as well as a complaints review service.1 Reviewers will be expected to follow the points of good practice recommended for complaints procedures and should have their own complaints procedures for those dissatisfied with their service. Even ombudsmen may be guilty of maladministration. Reviewers should have access to the staff and papers they require – in the case of the Prisons Ombudsman, information has been refused. In 2016, the Social Security Advisory Committee conducted a review of the Department for Work and Pensions policy which required a mandatory internal review of benefit decisions (DWP made about 12 million of these per annum) before appealing to the First Tier Tribunal. SSAC found that mandatory

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   815 reconsideration could be an ‘efficient process to improve dispute resolution’. However, much of the evidence revealed the process was not working as well as it should and the recommendations focused on how improvements could be made.2  A  potential conflict of interest was revealed in the use of a private contractor to conduct compliance tests and which was paid on a result basis. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/how-to-take-a-complaint-to-the-independentcase-examiner/how-to-bring-a-complaint-to-the-independent-case-examiner (23/04/2018). 2 Decision Making and Mandatory Reconsideration (SSAC, 2016) and Appeals Reform: An Introduction (DWP, 2013). The examination looked at fitness for work, tax credits and employment and support allowance. 1

10.42  The reviewer should be able to monitor responses to complaint recommendations to ensure compliance and bodies covered by such reviews should enforce their decisions unless they have very good reasons for not doing so which they should explain in public. Reviewers should identify trends in complaints referred; repeated failures of service or standards; weaknesses in institutions’ complaints procedures or organisation. They should have a fast track to senior managers and chief executives. While they cannot overrule policy or law, they should be able to comment on the impact of policy and law – not unlike the UK ombudsmen. They are expected to advise on further recourse to statutory ombudsmen. They will publish individual reports and annual reports and other reports as required. These reports should be widely circulated publicly. 10.43  For central government and its agencies, reviewers, adjudicators, commissioners, case examiners cover (as well as those bodies listed in para  10.40): the Public Guardianship Office and the Insolvency Service, both within the Adjudicator’s Office; the Vehicle Licensing Authority, the Driving Standards Agency, the Highways Agency, the Vehicle Inspectorate, the Child Support Agency (an agency which was the subject of a deeply critical report of the Parliamentary Ombudsman)1 together with the Northern Ireland Social Security Agency, prisons and probation (both private and public prisons through the prisons’ ombudsman), the Immigration Services Commissioner, War Pensions; and they exist in various local authorities, probation services and educational institutions as we have seen. There are usually limits on such bodies, such as the Adjudicator’s Office, dealing with matters that can be brought before an independent tribunal or which might have already been investigated by the ombudsman. HC 20 (1995–96).

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Attitudes towards complaints procedures 10.44  To some, additional grievance procedures are not self-evidently justified. There may be other more effective routes through which to make complaint (see below). They may be specifically suited to an Anglo-Saxon culture, a mix of individualism and anti-state sentiment and where the absence of a defined sphere of public law and, until recently, a public law tradition have encouraged the burgeoning of grass-roots legal systems and domestic avenues for maintaining

816  Chapter 10 social order. Other legal/political traditions within Europe have no need for such mechanisms, it may be argued. Germany is a leading example. 10.45  To others they appear as anti-public sector; a means of encouraging captious anti-public service sentiments and supporting advocates of a minimal state. The Labour Government (1997–2010) nevertheless gave full support to complaints mechanisms supporting the existence of at least one internal complaints procedure within public bodies serving the public as one of the ‘six Whitehall standards’ of public service. Such a complaints procedure is also included as one of the nine principles of public service delivery. The Better Government programme embarked upon a wide-ranging and continuing process of consultation and participation by all relevant parties to enhance public service and to shape the service that people want. People’s Panels (which it claims to be the first national initiative of its kind in the world, although local initiatives have occurred in Germany and the USA), Quality Networks involving managers at national level, charters (200 national, 10,000 local), and a commitment to place the key public service principles in legal provisions and an interactive use of the internet to discuss best practices in public service were early initiatives.1 FOIA 2000 requires bodies covered by the Act to make publicly available information on how services are run; the service they provide; standards of service and performance against them; and complaints procedures2 – all part of an attempt to make the programme more bottom-up and less top-down. We saw in ch 9 how ‘best value’ was seen as relying upon full consultation with local citizens and how detailed guidance on consultation had been published by the DETR.3 The most recent updated code on consultation was published by the Cabinet Office in 2018.4 There is nothing to indicate a change in philosophy in succeeding governments. When a record number of complaints (over 100,000) was recorded against the NHS in 2009–10, the minister responsible stated: ‘The Coalition Government is determined to put patients at the centre of everything the NHS does. Quality and outcomes will be the measures by which the service is judged.’5 The Government was forced in June 2011 by the strength of professional and public opinion to modify its plans for greater competition and private delivery of health care by making procedures more participatory and transparent (para 10.106 below). The preoccupation has become a continuing funding crisis. The number of complaints has continued to rise.6 As the local government ombudsman observed, complaints are increasingly about policies, systems and application of procedures which are deemed unfair and even oppressive.7 The Citizen’s Charter: A consultation exercise: the Government’s response. Service First: the new charter programme. 3 Guidance on Enhancing Participation in Local Government (October 1998); Strong Local Leadership – Quality Public Services Cm 5327 (2001) and Code of Practice on Consultation Cabinet Office 2004: www. cabinet-office.gov.uk/regulation/consultation/code.htm on consultation by central government, and Public Participation in Local Government: a Survey of Local Authorities ODPM  (2002). The latter found that take-up of traditional methods of engaging the public had slowed significantly in recent years whereas take-up of innovative and deliberative approaches such as interactive websites, citizens’ panels and focus groups have increased since 1997. 4 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/691383/Consultation_Principles__1_.pdf (18/04/2018). 5 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-11083236. And see HC 482 (2010–11) Listening and Learning: Ombudsman Review of NHS Complaints Handling. 1 2

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   817 https://digital.nhs.uk/article/7676/Number-of-written-complaints-about-NHS-increases-4-9per-cent (18/04/2018). 7 See para 10.5, note 6 above. 6

Preparation 10.46  Before establishing a complaints procedure, officials and management should be committed to its introduction. Staff will have to be properly motivated and receive adequate training. This has been repeated in the guidance noted above from the Parliamentary ombudsman and CLA. A  senior official should be identified as the person having overall responsibility for introducing the procedure. S/he may well head a working group. Consider any resource implications and how they can be met. Will additional staff be required with obvious limits in straitened times? Employee whistleblower provisions are now mandatory. Consult all relevant bodies: the ombudsman, user groups and trade associations, employees’ associations, trade unions, legal officers, financial controllers, national bodies as appropriate and groups with special problems. Define a complaint and what is not included. Who can complain? Details of how to complain: all addresses including e-mail, phone and fax numbers. Stages of any procedure. Recording of complaints, any form that they should be in – whether informal at first but thereafter in writing but without pedantic obstacles. Who takes action? Political involvement and how to respond. Time limits. How to deal with special cases: eg very senior officials as subjects of complaint, financial impropriety. What to do about anonymous complaints? Remedies available. Advice on other remedies and next steps. Establish a senior officer to co-ordinate and manage complaints arrangements to ensure consistency, promote efficiency and facilitate monitoring. Don’t call this person an ombudsman. How will the complaints procedures tie in with any existing procedures required by law or currently in operation, eg disciplinary procedures? How can procedures be best publicised and most widely disseminated? Make maximum use of the internet and up-to-date software.

INTERNAL COMPLAINTS PROCEDURES, OMBUDSMEN, TRIBUNALS AND COURTS 10.47  There have been three significant reviews in the area of administrative justice in the UK within the last 20 years. These were the review of the public sector ombudsmen schemes undertaken by the Cabinet Office, the most recent in 2015,1 the review of tribunals undertaken by Sir Andrew Leggatt, and the review of judicial review procedure by Sir Jeffery Bowman which led to the new Part 54 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998. To a great extent, all three reviews have been conducted discretely with no attempt to interrelate their investigations and findings and the relationship between different approaches to justice in the joined-up state.2 The joined-up state has lost its currency but downsizing should not be an excuse for unco-ordinated anarchy. The removal of the Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council in 2013 under the Public

818  Chapter 10 Bodies Act 2013 did not inspire confidence in maintaining overall coherence in administrative justice. For the first time since the late 1950s, the UK had no statutory body to oversee the delivery of administrative justice and to issue detailed guidance and recommendations on reforms.3 In 2017, Justice took over the role of the Administrative Justice Forum in the Administrative Justice Council.4 At several places in this chapter the effect of cuts on legal aid is referred to. Since the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment Act 2012 the number of those receiving legal aid to challenge benefit decisions, whether by review or appeal, has fallen by 99 per cent. More than two-thirds of appeals affecting vulnerable people in poverty with illnesses and disabilities are affected.5 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/486797/PSO_-_Consultation_Response_-_Final.pdf (18/04/2018). 2 See N  Lewis and P  Birkinshaw When Citizens Complain: Reforming Justice and Administration (1993). 3 Its last annual report for 2011–12 is at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/ uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/243433/9789999120975.pdf (2013). An advisory committee was set up in Scotland. The Administrative Justice Forum acted as a non-statutory advisory body to the Ministry of Justice but it ceased in 2017. 4 https://justice.org.uk/justice-host-successor-administrative-justice-forum/ (18/04/2018). See the Press Notice in December 2017: https://2bquk8cdew6192tsu41lay8t-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/ wp-content/uploads/2017/12/JUSTICE-Press-Release-Launch-of-the-Administrative-JusticeCouncil.pdf. 5 http://www.apg-legalaid.org/meetings (4/12/2018). 1

10.48  How do complaints procedures relate to other bodies or procedures that may be resorted to? Complaints procedures have proliferated. But there may be formal processes of internal review which concentrate on the correctness of the initial decision. The object is not to see whether discretion may be exercised differently. In a UK context and commonly elsewhere, if internal processes exist, the ombudsman will expect them to be resorted to unless there is a compelling reason why not. The complaints procedures will, as already stated, cover basically the same ground as the ombudsmen – maladministration – and UK ombudsmen supply copious guidance for authorities within their jurisdiction on what good and bad practice are.1 Ombudsmen are increasingly the last or very often third stage in a complaints process after the internal procedures are finalised. Ombudsmen are also subject to changes in the areas that they cover; the Localism Act 2011 transferred complaints in 2013 about registered social housing providers and local authorities arm’s length arrangements from the local government ombudsmen to the housing ombudsman. The LGO deals with homelessness complaints and joint investigations may be conducted under a memorandum of understanding. The housing ombudsman is approved under Housing Act 1996, s 51 by the Secretary of State and social landlords are under a contractual duty to implement the housing ombudsman’s recommendations.2 See para 10.12 above and PCA The Ombudsman in Your Files. See, for a general text, M Hertogh and R Kirkham (eds) Research Handbook on the Ombudsman (2018). 2 See http://www.housing-ombudsman.org.uk/ (18/04/2018). See the discussion at para  10.71 below on housing complaints and the Public Service Ombudsman proposals. 1

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   819 10.49  One point that has arisen in the UK, and this arose from the very early days of the Citizen’s Charter, concerns the overlap between such procedures and established ombudsmen. The concerns relating to confusion have continued. Indeed, ombudsmen felt threatened by their existence for a variety of reasons: they might be a deliberate attempt to undermine ombudsmen by taking work away from them and giving it not to independent persons but to bodies that were inherently a part of the body that was complained against. They could confuse the public into believing that they were the ombudsmen and deprive the real ombudsmen of the benefit of their service.1 In tune with the appeal to the market driven philosophy of the then government in the UK, it was suggested that ombudsmen should enter the market of dispute resolution mechanisms and compete with other bodies for the custom of citizens. This did not come to fruition and ombudsmen very clearly are hierarchically superior to internal mechanisms. See the Select Committee on the Parliamentary Commissioner’s report at: HC 158 (1991–92).

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10.50  However, the British and Irish Ombudsmen Association (BIOA) – a representative body now called the Ombudsman Association – did seek to control the use of the name ‘ombudsmen’ and established criteria which had to be satisfied before the appellation could be used and refused to admit to the Association anyone who did not satisfy the criteria of independence. There have been difficulties with the Prisons Ombudsman and the Revenue etc Adjudicator and their perceived lack of independence. The Parliamentary Ombudsman also advised that the expression ‘ombudsman’ should not be used by internal bodies. This has not been respected in some cases. Furthermore, ombudsmen have stated that not possessing an internal procedure may indicate evidence of maladministration. The BIOA has produced guidance to assist in setting up internal complaints regimes and the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish ombudsmen have assisted in devising good complaints mechanisms in the bodies within their jurisdiction, as have the Parliamentary and local ombudsmen. Additionally, authorities should be under a duty to signpost the existence of the relevant ombudsman if individuals do not receive a remedy. This is the case under the Scottish and Welsh ombudsmen and their statutes. 10.51  A  difficulty that has arisen in the UK is the question of what the promises under the Citizen’s Charter and its successors amount to. Are they legally binding under private or public law or are they merely exhortatory? In the case of the utility regulators, standards and compensation schemes are written in formal published documents, sometimes in the form of regulations as occurred originally in the case of electricity. Elsewhere, they do not take the form of legal rules. The Parliamentary Ombudsman (PO) has written that where they are firm promises, a claim for compensation where they are not met is very strong. If they are ‘indicators of performance’ they are persuasive but not guarantees entitling one to compensation as a right. Meeting targets does not rule out maladministration; failure to meet them does not automatically mean maladministration.1 PCA Annual Report 1993.

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820  Chapter 10 10.52  In relation to courts, an important development has been the use of the existence of internal procedures to reduce opportunities for legal remedies. First of all where they exist, courts will expect parties seeking judicial review to use them before they can come to court unless the remedies internal procedures offered were inadequate or there were other serious shortcomings.1 Limitation periods would run from the date of the final decision of a complaints body. More importantly, under English law, where a statute lays down a remedy for an aggrieved party, and where a duty is not owed to a restricted group of individuals, this has been taken by the courts as a good reason for not creating a duty owed to the individual from a breach of the statute and a right for compensation to a party allegedly injured by the breach. This has been illustrated in some dramatic caselaw where the courts relied upon the existence of internal complaints procedures as one reason to deny a right to compensation for breaches of statutory duties.2 Furthermore, statutory rights in public law eg  for access to a solicitor for those in custody are remediable by judicial review and did not carry a right to damages where there was a breach of a statutory provision.3 That having been said, this area has been subject to considerable European influence, both via the EU and the ECHR.4 It is also feeling the considerable impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the duty to take into account the relevant jurisprudence of the Convention on Human Rights under HRA  1998, s  2 and the duty of compatible construction of statutes and regulations under s 3. As the FOIA 2000 places a duty upon authorities to publicise complaints procedures in publication schemes, this could be seized upon by the courts as a reason for not creating a compensatable right in private law for a breach of statutory duty. Article 13, which concerns an effective remedy for breaches of convention rights, was not implemented by the HRA but it remains an obligation under the Convention in international law. To avoid further criticism the ombudsmen and the courts will have to provide robust investigations and remedies. The fact that the ombudsmen could not enforce their decisions undermined their efficacy in relation to Art 13, the ECtHR believed. This comes close to short-changing ombudsmen regimes because they are not based on adjudicatory procedures. That would still leave any actions in negligence to be addressed by the courts. Complaints procedures under FOIA to deal with FOI complaints are dealt with by the code issued under the FOIA 2000 (para 1.22). R  v Falmouth and Truro Port Health Authority, ex p South West Water Services Ltd [2000] 3  All ER 306, CA. 2 See X v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633, HL and note Barrett v Enfield London Borough Council [1999] 3  All ER  193, HL, and Phelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council [2000] 4  All ER 504, HL – in the latter two cases there is strong evidence that the courts are more relaxed about allowing actions to proceed. In Lawrence v Pembrokeshire CC [2007] EWCA Civ 446 the court noted comments that Art 8 ECHR may well have changed the position of a duty of care to children in relation to decisions affecting children. See, however, Osman v United Kingdom (1998) 5  BHRC  293 where the ECtHR ruled that denying a right of action in negligence on policy grounds (action against the police investigating crime) was a breach of Art 6 ECHR; the English case law followed Hill v Chief Constable of the West Yorkshire Police [1989]  AC  53, itself followed in Brooks v Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police [2005] UKHL 24 and Van Colle and Smith [2008] UKHL 50. See Michael v Chief Constable South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2 and Met Police Commissioner v DSD [2018] UKSC 11 for liability under the Human Rights Act and Arts 2 and 3 ECHR respectively. The case of one of the litigants in X above successfully challenged the ruling of the House of Lords: in TP v United Kingdom (2000) 2 LGLR 181 the EComHR ruled 1

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   821 that there had been a breach of Art 6 when the English courts held that an action in negligence could not be maintained against a decision by social services to take a child into care. A failure to provide video evidence in good time was also ruled to be a breach of Art 8. The ECtHR did not believe a breach of Art 6 had occurred but there had been a breach of Art 8: [2001] 2 FCR 289. See Z v UK [2000] 2 FCR 245, EComHR upheld on this aspect by the ECtHR in relation to Art 3 but not Art 6: [2001] 2  FCR  246. In E  v UK  App No  33218/96 [2002] 3  FCR  700 the ECtHR held that a local authority’s failure to protect step-children from being sexually abused by a step-father amounted to a breach of Arts 3 and 13 ECHR – no further issue concerning a breach of Art 8 arose. In DP v UK [2002] 3 FCR 385 there were breaches of Art 13 ECHR because of an absence of ‘effective domestic procedure of enquiry’ for allegations of abuse via the local ombudsman and the courts. See A v Essex CC [2003] EWCA Civ 1848 where it was held that local authorities owe prospective adopting couples who are also parents a duty of care to take reasonable steps to provide all relevant information about children being considered for adoption including information about problematic behaviour. See also JD  v East Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust [2005] 2 AC 373 – no duty of care owed by health care officials to parents accused of abuse of their children; Lawrence v Pembrokeshire above had not advanced the position re a duty to parents by virtue of Art 8 ECHR. This would be ‘a step too far’ in relation to removing or registering children. Note also EJ Connor v Surrey CC [2010] EWCA Civ 286. 3 Cullen v Chief Constable of the RUC  [2004] 2  All ER  237 (HL) concerning Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1987, s 15(1). There were very strong dissenting judgments from Lords Bingham and Steyn who felt that a breach of s  15 was actionable per se but following EU law, proof of a ‘sufficiently serious breach’ is required for a damages action, at para 21. See incidentally: Watkins v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] 4  All ER  1158 (CA) and general damages for interference with fundamental rights by misfeasance of public office. The Law Commission in its 2008 paper ‘Administrative Redress: Public Bodies and the Citizen’ recommended a public law of tortious liability but this was widely criticised and not pursued in its 2010 paper No 322. 4 See P Birkinshaw European Public Law: the Achievement and the Challenge (2014), ch 10.

10.53  A problem that has arisen between courts and ombudsmen in the UK ought not to interfere with relationships between complaints procedures and courts, viz a cross-over of jurisdiction. Public sector ombudsmen in the UK are prevented from investigating and recommending in cases where there is a legal or statutory administrative remedy unless this route is unreasonable in the circumstances for the complainant. The wording differs between schemes but that is the end result – a statutory bar. They have a discretion to investigate but the courts have reminded ombudsmen that this must be exercised carefully. The same is not true for private sector ombudsmen many of whom may investigate legal disputes but a conflict in jurisdiction has arisen.1 Most ombudsmen in other jurisdictions are not so confined. Some unfortunate decisions from the courts have reminded the ombudsmen of their limitations and that they are subject to judicial review, which is understandable, although a very exacting standard of review has been imposed.2 Furthermore, one judicial decision has stated that where there is a legal remedy before the courts, the ombudsman should hand the case over to the courts where the courts have suitable forms of relief and the fact that the complainant is unlikely to obtain a legal remedy ought not to constrain the ombudsman’s decision even though a remedy may be available on the grounds of maladministration.3 However, if the ombudsman exercised his discretion and investigated, the judgment stated that the court would not give a remedy on that basis, suggesting judicial deference. It has been repeated that difficulty in obtaining judicial review may not be enough to give the ombudsman solid grounds to launch an investigation.4 In cases of doubt, the High Court has advised complainants that where there is overlap, the ombudsman should

822  Chapter 10 be approached first so as to avoid the operation of the statutory mechanism depriving the ombudsman of jurisdiction after judicial review proceedings have been initiated.5 Dr Julian Farrand was particularly disgruntled at the approach of some judges towards his office when he was the Pensions Ombudsman. Some judges, he said in a press release in July 1997, were ‘inimical to the idea of the ombudsman’. 2 R v Parliamentary Comr for Administration, ex p Balchin [1997] JPL 917 and ex p Balchin (No 2) (2000) 2 LGLR 87; R v Comr for Local Administration, ex p Croydon London Borough Council [1989] 1 All ER 1033. See R (Hughes) v Local Government Ombudsman [2001] EWHC Admin 349 where the High Court did not believe it was open to the ombudsman to find ‘no injustice’ on the evidence, but where it was inappropriate for the court to rule on a finding that should be made when the ombudsman reconsidered the matter. 3 R v Comr for Local Administration, ex p Croydon London Borough Council [1989] 1 All ER 1033. 4 R (on the Application of UMO) v Commissioner for Local Administration in England [2003] EWHC 3202 and R v Commissioner for Local Administration ex p Field [2000] COD 58. 5 UMO, ibid. 1

10.54  The ombudsmen have said that these decisions have not had an inhibiting effect. Indeed, in a Court of Appeal decision in March 2000, a more relaxed attitude was taken by the court to an ombudsman investigation where there was a legal remedy available. Part of the complaint was about the fact that the ombudsman had used a less demanding test for a finding of bias than that required by the courts. This, it was held, was not impermissible. Maladministration and unlawful activity are not synonymous, although there may be overlap. Indeed, the fact that the ombudsman had full investigatory powers and in a judicial review the applicants may not have obtained necessary evidence to get their case started was a serious factor swaying the case the ombudsman’s way.1 However, there are illustrations of how the provision has prevented the ombudsmen investigating because of a legal remedy.2 Nonetheless, when ombudsmen were introduced into the UK, the law of judicial review was nowhere near as developed and as sophisticated as it is today. Maladministration, which to repeat is what internal complaints procedures basically deal with, was a much wider and more nebulous concept covering mistakes, errors, oversights, delay, rudeness, incompetence, inaccuracy, failing to explain or give adequate information or advice, bias, bad procedures and inadequate monitoring of existing procedures, disproportionate redress and failing to advise on rights of appeal or other remedies. The list is endless. Maladministration allows the ombudsman to examine the full range of information on which the decision-maker acted, or failed to act, and their practice of sending the draft report to the department or authority investigated allows the ombudsman to discover additional information. Only very rarely has the local ombudsman felt that the body investigated has not been forthcoming with all the relevant information,3 although in the case in question it was the default of an individual officer, not the authority’s policy. R v Local Comr for Administration, ex p Liverpool City Council [1999] 3 All ER 85 and on appeal [2001] 1 All ER 462, CA. 2 See R (ER) v LGO etc [2014] EWCA Civ 1407. 3 Inv87/A/203. 1

10.55  In the case of the PO a developing relationship of constructive cooperation has been witnessed since earlier editions of this work. This has

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   823 been seen in some prolonged and difficult cases involving persons interned by the Japanese in the Second World War and the claims to a compensation fund (R (Elias) v Secretary of State for Defence [2006] EWCA Civ 1293), the complaints concerning occupational retirement pensions (R (Bradley) v Secrtary of State for Work and Pensions [2008] EWCA Civ 36) and on the investigation and reports involving Equitable Life and the loss suffered by those holding policies with the assurance company (R  (EMAG) v HM  Treasury [2009]  EWHC  2495). The claims of the internees in Elias were originally rejected by the court (R (ABCIFER) v Secretary of State for Defence [2003] EWCA Civ 473) but the PO found maladministration in the way the claims were dealt with and the manner in which the scheme was administered. The PO was concerned not only with the complainant’s case and those in a similar position but sought to draw attention to the way compensation schemes were introduced by the Government. All relevant questions should be considered before an announcement by government and any changes to a scheme should be publicised and explained (HC 324 2005–06). In Bradley, the Government had rejected the findings and recommendations of the PO. The court, while making no ruling on the recommendations, held that the Government had acted with irrationality because in rejecting the PO’s findings it had failed to provide cogent reasons for the rejection. It could not simply reject them out of hand (Bradley v Secretary of State). In EMAG the divisional court again held that the Government had failed to produce cogent reasons for rejecting a number of the Ombudsman’s findings of maladministration and injustice, and quashed its decision to reject the findings. The Government’s application for permission to appeal was refused. The court has also required the Government to provide a written response to the judgment within 21 days (R  (EMAG) v HM Treasury).1 In both cases, this judicial criticism and increasing Parliamentary scrutiny led to a government reconsideration and implementation (though not complete) of the PO recommendations. This reasoning was highly influential in the case of Evans v Attorney General [2015] UKSC 21 (para 1.241) where the UK government (Attorney General) issued a veto under the FOIA 2000 overruling an Information Tribunal’s judgment to disclose correspondence between Prince Charles and government departments. However, in Cavanagh v HS Commissioner [2005] EWCA Civ 1578 the Court of Appeal reminded the ombudsman (health) that he is not free to examine complaints at large; there is no roving commission and the ombudsman can only investigate matters raised in a complaint. The Local Government Ombudsman’s (LGO) powers were amended to allow investigation of a matter that comes ‘to his attention during the course of an investigation’ where it appears an injustice may have been caused (LGA 1974, ss 24A(5) and 26D). Bradley and EMAG have helped establish the constitutional position of redress through the ombudsmen.2 See R (Gallagher) v Basildon DC [2010] EWHC 2824 (Admin) for the test involved when a local ombudsman’s recommendations are not followed. 2 T Buck et al The Ombudsman Enterprise and Administrative Justice (2011). See PAC HC 781 Work of the Ombudsman (2010–12). 1

10.56  The whole question of the relationship between the courts and ombudsmen has been the subject of Law Commission investigations and reports.1 The LGO rejected 352 complaints in 2008–09 because of the statutory bar, the

824  Chapter 10 Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman (PHSO) 39, and the Public Services Ombudsman for Wales eight. It is not an idle matter. The Commission in its consultation paper found the ‘default position in favour of judicial review was no longer sustainable’.2 The Commission provisionally proposed relaxing the bar where the interests of justice required this. This entailed questions of whether a court seized of a case should stay proceedings to allow the ombudsman to investigate beyond those currently available in civil procedure rules to allow recourse to alternative dispute resolution (ADR).3 The Commission proposed such a power. It also proposed specific powers in ombudsmen to rely upon methods of resolving complaints other than by investigation, ie via negotiation. The PHSO should be able to dispense with the requirement that a complaint be in writing it was proposed. The local ombudsman has this power (LGA 1974, s 26B(3); Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007, Part 9). The 2007 Act made a variety of changes to the local ombudsman scheme in relation to matters subject to examination, including some contractual matters, and methods of complaining. The filter should be amended it was proposed to allow a dual track access to the PO via an MP or directly by a complainant similar to practices involving the local ombudsmen.4 Further proposals for consultation include allowing the public sector ombudsmen to dispense with the requirement to investigate in private where this seems appropriate. A power to refer a legal point for the determination of the administrative court was proposed and it was asked whether there should be a requirement for a legal opinion before referral. Administrative Redress: Public Bodies and the Citizen (2008) Consultation Paper No  187. Ditto Paper No 322 (2010) and on judicial review and public liability and Public Services Ombudsmen Law Commission Consultation Paper No 196 (2010). 2 No 196 para 4.24. 3 CPR 26.4(2). 4 Select Committee on Public Administration Parliament and the Ombudsman HC 107 (2009–10) para 6 and Further Report HC 471 (2009–10) para 3. 1

10.57  In July 2011, the Law Commission published its report ‘Public Service Ombudsmen’.1 Among its recommendations are: (a) the creation of a specific power to stay an application for judicial review, so that suitable matters are handled by ombudsmen rather than the courts; (b) improved access to the ombudsmen by modifying the ‘statutory bar’ – the rule that recourse may not be had to the ombudsmen if the complaint has or could be pursued in a court of law; (c) a power for the ombudsmen to refer a question on a point of law to the courts; and (d) the removal of the MP filter in relation to the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration. Law Commission Paper No 329 (July 2011) HC 1136 (2010–12).

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10.58  Where ombudsmen deal with legal disputes, as is common on the continent and in UK private law regimes as well as the EU ombudsman (para 5.118), the courts in the UK have been assertive in holding their decisions to be legally incorrect when the ombudsman has attempted to mitigate the rigors of the law to do what they believe was just in the circumstances. The Pensions

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   825 Ombudsman was particularly outspoken in his criticism of judges whom he believed had not understood the purpose of ombudsmen, part of whose job was to mitigate the rigours of the law.1 It is hard to avoid the conclusion that there have been jurisdictional jealousies driving this debate. It is also interesting to note that in its guidance to local authorities on good administrative practice, many of the points raised are clearly statements of proper legal practice arising from judicial decisions. See para 10.53, note 1 above.

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10.59  The presence of the ombudsman has had a beneficial impact on bureaucratic decision-making. Their practice of commenting on aspects of good administration, and deploring those which, while not maladministration, are in need of criticism is encouraging of improved performance. 10.60  It is now accepted that courts will not treat complaints procedures with suspicion. They are more likely to be seen by judges as a sensible and welcome attempt by public authorities to settle disputes before the necessity of resorting to expensive and over-worked courts, with an obvious declaration of interest, or the ombudsman. If complaints procedures are driven by an ideology or are invested with too much power, then in a UK context this may well attract an exacting standard of review. 10.61  Furthermore, although ombudsmen are not duty bound like courts to have regard to the principles of the Convention on Human Rights’ institutions in its interpretations, it has nonetheless been confirmed by the Court of Appeal that complainants should usually turn to the ombudsman and not the courts where they are claiming damages for a breach of human rights caused by maladministration. The case concerned the breach of a positive duty to act under Art 8 ECHR. The compensation was comparable to ombudsman awards and ombudsmen are a free service. In the same case, the court ruled that where damages were sought under the HRA for maladministration then the local ombudsman’s recommendations can be looked at for guidance.1 A suggestion by Lord Woolf that damages under the HRA should be on the low side has been disapproved and not followed; but the approach adopted when calculating damages for breaches of duty under the civil law was not to be followed. In the judgment in Anufrijeva, there was support for the award of modest damages where maladministration was complained of. The House of Lords has since ruled that decisions of the ECtHR on damages under Art 41  ECHR in relation to breaches of Art 6 should not be followed ‘inflexibly’ but neither should they be ‘significantly more or less generous’ than those judgments in awards under HRA  1998, s  8. The HRA was not a ‘tort statute’ said Lord Bingham (R (Greenfield) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 14). The finding of a breach in the case of Art 6 and a rehearing were usually adequate. Claims involving maladministration should be brought in the Administrative Court, Lord Woolf believed, and before giving any permission to apply for judicial review the Administrative Court judge should require the claimant to explain ‘why it would not be more appropriate to use any available internal complaints procedure’ or proceed to the Police Complaints

826  Chapter 10 Authority or Local Government Ombudsman where relevant. Damages claims may be best dealt with by such a process and the court would restrict itself to any other relief required. The court wanted to encourage alternative forms of relief without wishing to be prescriptive (see para 81). The use of prolix and highly expensive judicial procedures for such claims was not encouraged.2 Anufrijeva and Another v LB of Southwark [2004] 1 All ER 833 following R (Bernard) v LB Enfield [2002]  EWHC  2282 (Admin). In the light of Anufrijeva and LGA  2000, s  92 allowing local authorities to give compensation for maladministration, the Commission has rewritten its guidance on remedies (paras 10.13–10.14 above). See Andrews v Reading BC [2004] EWHC 970 (QB) where some dicta of Lord Woolf are clarified. Max Mosley was awarded £60,000 damages in his successful suit under Art 8  ECHR and confidentiality (para  2.235). He proceeded to the ECHR initially arguing that such an award breached his rights under Art 13  ECHR but subsequently sought to establish that he had a right to be forewarned by the press of a publication breaching his privacy in order to allow him to seek an injunction before publication. He was unsuccessful. 2 See eg  the complaints procedures available for qualifying schools under the Apprenticeships, Skills, Children and Learning Act 2009, Part 10, ch 2. 1

THE RESPONSE TO LEGGATT1 10.62  The White Paper Transforming Public Services: Complaints, Redress and Tribunals (Cm 6243, July 2004) from the Department for Constitutional Affairs (DCA) sets out a wholly revised agenda for administrative justice in modern Britain and Northern Ireland. The WP recognises the advantages to government and management of effective grievance and complaints mechanisms in terms of information for reform and enhanced delivery of service and to complainants of having greater transparency and access to decision-making channels and an enhanced sense of justice and equity when they are working effectively. See para 10.7, note 1 above.

1

10.63  The WP, it will be recalled, aimed to promote policies that empower the citizen to enhance their lives in both a communal and individual sense, to reduce the need for courts and tribunals through proportionate dispute resolution, ensuring that remedial devices, and constitutional arrangements are ‘fit for their purpose and cost effective’, and finally to re-shape the DCA to meet the needs of the public. The aim, as we saw above, is for problem avoidance in the first place and where disputes arise, to provide ‘tailored solutions’ to remedies. The White Paper notes that the existence of departmental schemes for resolution of complaints is ‘patchy’ and there is ‘scope for greater government involvement in establishing a consistent and co-ordinated policy on the role and benefit of independent complaint handling schemes’ (para 3.17). 10.64  Within a unified tribunal system a new type of organisation should be created which ‘will not only provide formal hearings and authoritative rulings where these are needed but will have as well a mission to resolve disputes fairly and informally either by itself or in partnership with the decision-making department, other institutions and the advice sector (para  4.21). The WP

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   827 recommends a commitment across government to better handling of complaints and ‘faster, friendlier and cheaper solutions’; a unified tribunal service aimed at promoting proportionate dispute resolution in central government and an Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council to replace the Council on Tribunals but ‘with an expanded remit’ (para 6.1). This was established and abolished as we have noted. This is nothing other than regrettable. It is, as the WP says, aiming at linked-up justice at the central government level. The objectives are: improvements in the original decisions on service affecting an individual; better explanation of decisions; enhanced resolution of disputes ‘without external intervention’; and better availability of information to the public about how to seek redress (para 6.33). There will be a two-tier structure of tribunal hearings, the proposed ‘judges’ for which will be subject to recommendation by the Judicial Appointments Commission. There is a Senior President of Tribunals of Lord Justice of Appeal level. The administrative support for the new structure of tribunals will be provided by an executive agency of the DCA (now Ministry of Justice) known as the Tribunals Service. In 2011 HM Courts and Tribunals Service was established. This is an integrated executive agency providing support for the administration of courts and tribunals in criminal, civil and family jurisdictions in England and Wales and non-devolved tribunals in Scotland and Northern Ireland. It uniquely operates as a partnership between the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals as set out in a Framework Document. It published a business plan (2011–15 is the latest) and annual reports)1 and it publishes an annual report with published accounts. The Tribunals Service has published annual performance targets against key performance indicators. Powers to make procedural rules will be transferred to the Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs/Lord Chancellor and these will aim for accessibility, fairness and efficiency both for tribunals and for less formal processes. For reports, see https://www.gov.uk/government/publications?departments%5B%5D=hmcourts-and-tribunals-service&publication_type=corporate-reports (20/04/2018).

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10.65  With some exceptions there is a two-tier structure for tribunals including an appellate level within the new structure. The exceptions will include the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) and the Proscribed Organisations Appeals Commission. There are six ‘first tier’ chambers of tribunals comprising: general regulatory, which includes information rights and immigration and numerous other subjects; health, education and social care; immigration and asylum; social entitlement; tax; and war pensions and armed forces compensation. From the new appeals tribunals, appeal will lie to a newly created Administrative Appeals Tribunal – now the Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber), together with other specialist divisions. From here any supervisory/appellate jurisdiction would be exercised by the Court of Appeal on a point of law. Judicial review in the High Court would therefore seem to have little place where these new structures are operative, although unappealable decisions of the Upper Tribunal may be subject to limited review in the Administrative Court.1 Anxious to minimise cost, the WP did not want to recommend funding for full-scale representation in every administrative dispute or tribunal case. Clearer initial procedures, greater transparency and

828  Chapter 10 fuller explanations and advice should reduce the need for legal representation. In cases where representation would assist, the WP spoke of ‘enhanced advice project’ for fact finding assistance and advice on presentation and the merits of a case. The hope was that most tribunal cases would be free of legal representation so that, as Leggatt suggested, with improved procedures and clearer channels and advice from tribunal staff, ‘the vast majority of appellants’ will be able to put their cases properly themselves (Leggatt, para 4.21). The Law Society was not so sanguine arguing that representation was increasingly necessary. Funding already exists for representation before some tribunals but legal aid is subject to severe and highly criticised cuts.2 R (Cart) v Upper Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28, on appeal from [2010] EWCA Civ 859. The Supreme Court likened review to existing statutory grounds of appeal from the Upper Tribunal to the Court of Appeal. 2 Eg the EAT, Mental Health Review Tribunal, the Lands Tribunal, Special Immigration Appeals Commission, the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission, the Immigration Appeal Tribunal or proceedings before an adjudicator in immigration. See Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004 and the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal. So also are proceedings before the Protection of Children Act Tribunal, and some proceedings before the VAT and Duties Tribunal and General and Special Commissioners of Income Tax are supportable through the Community Legal Service. The Legal Services Commission runs the legal aid scheme in England and Wales through the Community Legal Services (civil) and the Criminal Defence Service. See R (Public Law Project) v Lord Chancellor [2016] UKSC 39. 1

10.66  Finally, and crucially, the WP recommended that the Council on Tribunals be replaced by an Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council. It would cover the whole of the administrative justice sector reporting to the Secretary of State/Lord Chancellor and the Administrative Justice Council might make suggestions for departmental review of decisions, for proportionate dispute resolution, for balance between different parts of administrative justice, and would ensure that ‘the relationships between the courts, tribunals, ombudsmen and other ADR routes satisfactorily reflect the needs of users’ (para 11.12). Some of its reports have been identified above. The AJTC was one of the bodies to be abolished in the coalition government quango cull announced in 2010. This has been commented upon (para 10.47 above).

ADR AND THE COURTS 10.67  There has been some confusion over the relationship between alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and the role of the courts. Active case management should encourage the use of ADR within Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (CPR 1998), rr 1.4(2)(e) and 26.4(1).1 In R (Cowl) v Plymouth City Council the Court of Appeal ruled that a council’s willingness to follow a statutory complaints procedure rightfully deprived the applicant of an opportunity for judicial review. The court stated that it was of paramount importance that litigation should be avoided between public authorities and members of the public, and courts were under a duty to use their powers under the CPR 1998 so that such disputes were resolved, or issues of conflict reduced, with the minimum of judicial intervention.2

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   829 Dunnett v Railtrack plc [2002] 2 All ER 850. Rule 1.4(2)(e) defines ‘active case management’ as including ‘encouraging the parties to use an alternative dispute resolution procedure if the court considers that appropriate and facilitating the use of such procedure’. Rule 26.4(1) provides that ‘a party may, when filing the completed allocation questionnaire, make a written request for the proceedings to be stayed while the parties try to settle the case by alternative dispute resolution or other means’. 2 [2002] 1 WLR 803 (CA). 1

10.68 In Halsey the Court of Appeal was prepared to accept that there are many disputes that are suitable for mediation. This was consistent with the Woolf reforms on civil procedure. The view of the court, however, was that when the government had given a pledge that ADR would be used in litigation involving public authorities, it was no more than an undertaking that ADR would be considered in appropriate cases. The court offered helpful advice on when mediation should be considered. The court believed that a party could not be compelled into ADR: the court’s role was one of encouragement. The court believed it: ‘would not be right to stigmatise as unreasonable a refusal by the successful party to agree to a mediation unless he showed that a mediation had no reasonable prospect of success. That would be to tip the scales too heavily against the right of a successful party to refuse a mediation and insist on an adjudication of the dispute by the court. It seems to us that a fairer balance is struck if the burden is placed on the unsuccessful party to show that there was a reasonable prospect that mediation would have been successful. This is not an unduly onerous burden to discharge: he does not have to prove that a mediation would in fact have succeeded. It is significantly easier for the unsuccessful party to prove that there was a reasonable prospect that a mediation would have succeeded than for the successful party to prove the contrary’. (para 28) 10.69  H, quoting from the headnote in Halsey, ‘appealed against an award of costs in favour of M’. H  had brought a claim against M  arising from the allegedly negligent treatment of her husband while in hospital. Her husband had subsequently died. M disputed liability and refused H’s invitation to take part in alternative dispute resolution. Following the dismissal of the claim at trial, the judge awarded M its costs on the grounds that it had successfully defended the claim and that the CPR 1998 were not designed to compel parties who had a good defence to settle claims that they ultimately went on to win. In dismissing the appeal, that the judge had been right to conclude that M should not be deprived of any of its costs by reason of the fact that it had refused to accept H’s invitations to mediate, since M had not acted unreasonably by refusing. The judge had also been justified in finding that H’s approaches to M on the subject of mediation had been ‘somewhat tactical’. M had been reasonable in taking the view that the costs of a mediation would have been disproportionately high compared with the actual value of the claim and M’s costs of a trial. In the circumstances, H had not discharged the burden of proving that mediation had a reasonable prospect of success.’1 Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS Trust [2004] EWCA Civ 576 (CA). See Burchell v Bullard [2005] EWCA Civ 358; PGF II SA v OMFS Co Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 1288.

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830  Chapter 10 10.70  To hold parties bound to use ADR may breach Art 6  ECHR. On the other hand, where a satisfactory internal procedure exists and this has not been resorted to, this may be a ground for refusing judicial review. The Court of Appeal could see no good ground for discriminating against public bodies which had been successful in litigation by way of adverse cost orders. Readers are referred to the discussion of Anufrijeva in the Court of Appeal (para  10.61 above). There have also been significant reforms making judicial review less accessible introduced under the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, Part 4. Schedule 16 concerns changes to planning procedures and challenges.

THE DRAFT PUBLIC SERVICE OMBUDSMAN BILL 10.71  In December 2016, following several reviews (para  10.47 above), the Cabinet Office published a draft Public Service Ombudsman Bill,1 although ‘ombud’ has become popular in usage. This followed a promise in the Queen’s Speech in 2015 to introduce such an ombudsman. The Bill has not been enacted and the 2017 Queen’s Speech was silent on the subject. The Bill would abolish the parliamentary, health and local ombudsmen and establish a Public Service Ombudsman (PSO) and a Public Service Ombudsman Board.2 The Board provides the administrative support to the ombudsman ensuring that s/he acts independently and advises on discretion in taking complaints and conducting investigations! A code of practice will set out the relationship. As well as complaints against designated bodies, a list of which must be published, the ombudsman had to engage in the promotion of best practice in complaint handling. Complaints shall be in writing ‘or in any other way approved by the PSO’. A complainant may complain directly to the PSO – the filter would go although an elected representative may refer a complaint. The statutory bar involving judicial remedies exists with the same proviso and there is added flexibility. Usually, the complaint should be made to the body but a discretionary override exists. Schedule 4 sets out subjects which the PSO cannot investigate. The merits of a decision taken without maladministration in the exercise of a discretion as at present cannot be investigated but clinical judgment is investigable. The PSO can, on conditions, expand an investigation. As to be expected, there are copious details on investigations, evidence, contempt, reports, statements, and special statements where a finding of maladministration is not remedied. Provision is made for social housing complaints to be brought within the PSO’s bailiwick although Sch 4 excludes local authority as a registered provider of social housing. ‘Commercial transactions’ are excluded from investigation but, surprisingly, procurement activities are investigable. Schedule  5 concerns information provisions. The bill has lain fallow for almost two years. Its enactment would be beneficial, but it appears to have lost favour. Cm 7374 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ attachment_data/file/575921/draft_public_service_ombudsman_bill_web_version_ december_2016.pdf (18/04/2018). 2 See House of Commons Library: http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/ Summary/CBP-7864. 1

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   831

REDRESS OF GRIEVANCE WITHIN AUTHORITIES AND OPENNESS AND INFORMATION Central government 10.72  The most successful route in pressing a grievance was traditionally seen to be by invoking an MP’s assistance. Approximately three million letters a year are sent to MPs from constituents.1 Departments invariably have a hotline to the minister’s office and ‘fast reply’ services in response to MP’s letters. Indeed the level of ministerial reply can itself be dictated by the status of the MP, eg  Secretary of State response to Privy Councillor and so on. There are frequently internal hierarchical appeals through a department which can end up with the Cabinet. This is so in the field of procurement, for instance. Many formalised internal procedures have been established since the beginning of the 1990s as we have seen, especially in executive agencies, and these will doubtless have a very marked impact on redress of grievance. It was noted above how the DCA’s WP highlighted the ‘patchy’ nature of internal mechanisms. C Harlow and R Rawlings Law and Administration (3rd edn, 2009) p 445.

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10.73  What is of interest is that the end response is rarely more than a routine reply. However, the internal inquiries may well generate a voluminous file of documentation and correspondence, none of which will usually be shown to the MP or the complainant s/he is sponsoring. 10.74  A  few basic points must be made. First, it would be otiose to expect departments to have uniform procedures although these are now available online and are relatively easy to negotiate (and see Gov UK at paras 4.32 and 10.9 above). Departments differ enormously, not only between themselves and their size and organisation, the topics they deal with and the level of contact they will have with the public, but also the internal organisation within a department will vary between divisions of a department. A good starting place will be the website of a department or agency or non-departmental body or the manual, Civil Service Yearbook (53rd edn),1 to identify divisions and organisations within departments and government agencies in order to make personal contact. http://www.civilserviceyearbook.com/csyb/default.aspx (5/7/2018).

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10.75  Secondly, the sort of response one is likely to receive will vary according to its perceived importance. The MP connection outlined above is an obvious factor, but so too will be civil service perceptions of whether the grievance has political implications, whether it is a potential lawsuit or whether it will find its way to the ombudsman. In many cases, all three avenues may potentially be involved. 10.76  Grievances with obvious political implications will see the involvement of politicians at the highest of levels. So much is unremarkable. Action will be coloured by the potential public reaction and making of ministerial statements. Where a lawsuit is expected, the involvement of the legal division will mean that

832  Chapter 10 a wary eye will be kept on the privilege attaching to documents and the guarded nature of statements. The investigatory powers of the ombudsman will, indeed, have inculcated a defensive attitude to make sure that all responses, internal procedures and time taken for action are up to scratch – not necessarily open and helpful to the complainant, but up to scratch internally. 10.77  Delivery of services through local, area or regional offices has attracted much parliamentary attention from select committees and the Public Accounts Committee in particular. Some agencies have been severely criticised for shortcomings in service. Deficiencies in service have been highlighted in a variety of reports.1 At the same time, the drive towards cash limits, greater efficiency, effectiveness and economy in administrative operations is itself generating many of the grievances among the recipients or non-recipients of such programmes.

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Eg HC 319 (1986–87); HC 736 (1987–88); HC 451 (1987–88); HC 498 (1987–88) the Child Support Agency HC 20 (1995–96), the Individual Learning Accounts HC 633 (2002–03) and more generally Treasury Committee HC 340 I (2001–02) and HC 149 (2002–03) Parliamentary Accountability of Departments. The UK Borders Agency was disbanded after a report, and numerous ombudsman complaints, by the Home Affairs Committee fourteenth report HC 792 (2012–13). See PAC Who’s accountable? Relationship between government and arm’s length bodies HC 110 (2014–15).

10.78  In many areas of governmental and private activity there are special agencies which are government appointed and which deal specifically with the promotion of rights in particular areas, eg  the Equality and Human Rights Commission for the promotion of equality and human rights,1 the Independent Police Complaints Commission under the Police Reform Act 2002 (now renamed as the Independent Office of Police Conduct under the Policing and Crime Act 2017) and regulations thereunder or bodies whose regulatory activities will involve some degree of grievance redress, eg the Competition and Markets Authority established under the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 replacing the Office of Fair Trading, or the agencies appointed to regulate privatised industries and consumer bodies. The move towards executive agencies in central government has been accompanied by a greater awareness of the need for effective grievance procedures. These agencies are subject to the Parliamentary Ombudsman (see ch 4 and para 4.132 above). HL 78 (2003–04) HC 536 (2003–04); HL 156 and HC 998 ditto Joint Committee on Human Rights on the Commission and Cm 6185 (2004) Fairness for All: a New Commission for Equality and Human Rights on the government proposals and the Equality Act 2010.

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10.79  Where a complaint concerns the activities of these bodies, in the first instance it may well be more advantageous to address the matter to the chief executive of the agency concerned. A complaint to a sponsoring department may well be deflected with the answer that it does not fall within the department’s responsibilities. Further complaint may well be made to the Parliamentary Ombudsman or the local ombudsman: the amended Schedules to the Acts establishing these bodies will have to be examined to establish that they are within their respective jurisdictions. Publication schemes under the FOIA 2000 should have details of internal processes.

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   833 10.80  There are literally thousands of rights of appeal to an ‘independent’ body under statute in addition to informal methods of grievance redress, or informal requests for information. These may be dealt with by way of a tribunal hearing, some other kind of administrative hearing as in the case of disappointed applicants under the Social Fund which was abolished under the Welfare Reform Act 2012 leading to decisions by local authorities, or by an inquiry. The proposals for reform of the ‘administrative justice system’ were outlined above. A Special Immigration Appeals Commission was established to conduct appeals where the Secretary of State has directed that a person be deported on the grounds of national security or for the public good. This replaced the ‘three wise men’ procedure – an opaque committee of grandees. A ‘special advocate’ may be appointed by the Attorney General to represent the appellant who may well be absent from proceedings.1 Hearing evidence in closed session under closed material procedures is now governed by the terms of the Justice and Security Act 2013 as added to by decisions of the Supreme Court (Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No 1) [2013] UKSC 38 and see R (Haralambous) v Crown Court at St Albans [2018] UKSC 1). The procedures involving possible deportation and then those on control orders involving house arrest of suspected terrorists under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, which have been replaced by the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 as well as the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, have spawned an impressive catalogue of case law.2 Statutes, statutory instruments and circulars and codes of practice should all be consulted as they invariably have important provisions on the supply of information or the giving of reasons for decisions.3 Further, case-law may well set the parameters of fair procedure (paras 10.114 et seq below) and dictate what the interpretation of crucial provisions actually means, what factors or information should be considered by a decision-maker and what weight should be given to them. This followed criticism by the ECtHR of the decision in R  v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Chahal [1995] 1 WLR 526, CA: Chahal v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 413. Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 and SI  2003/1034 and SI  2007/1285. As Blake describes it in his essay, the SIAC was introduced under the SIAC Act 1997 to ‘resolve the dichotomy between a fair hearing for the suspect and the preservation of secrecy for informer material and other intelligence data that could not be disclosed to suspects without compromising future operations’ based, it appears on Canadian procedures. In the UK a special advocate (SA) or counsel is appointed where the Home Secretary intends to use sensitive material. The deportee will have his own lawyers and the SA operates on behalf of his interests but he does not represent the deportee. The SA can discuss the case personally with the deportee and obtain information from that person. But the SA cannot usually communicate with the proposed deportee after the sensitive or ‘closed’ material has been served on the SA. ‘Thereafter the SA cannot communicate with the appellant of his lawyers about the case, for fear that questions may inadvertently disclose the nature of the closed material. Submissions are then made that some closed material should be disclosed in whole or in gist to achieve as fair a hearing as possible and commensurate with the public interest. The substantive appeal then proceeds to an open and closed part with the state’s case for exclusion tested by the SA in the absence of the appellant.’ From R Dyzenhaus (ed) The Unity of Public Law (2004) at 240–241. In A etc v Secretary of State for the Home Department (para 10.132, note 4 below) the SIAC heard evidence that was not given to the Court of Appeal or House of Lords. It needs only to be added that the same SA has, allegedly, acted for both the government and the appellant: R. Norton-Taylor Guardian, 22  December 2004. See, further, Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee Seventh Report HC 323 I and II (2004–05) on special advocates and suggested reforms; and Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF [2009] UKHL 28 following A v UK [2009] ECRR 301 where it was ruled by the law lords, following the ECHR, that denying sufficient information to the defendant to make an effective

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834  Chapter 10 challenge to an allegation against him was a denial of Art 6 ECHR rights. The procedure was allowed in hearings by the Parole Board: Roberts v Parole Board [2005] UKHL 45. See Al Rawi v The Security Service [2011] UKSC 34 and the refusal of the Supreme Court to allow an appeal by the government against the Court of Appeal’s ruling that the closed material/special advocate procedure could not be extended to ordinary civil actions at common law; see, however, Tariq v Home Office [2011] UKSC 35 decided the same day as Al Rawi where there was no breach of Art 6 ECHR or EU law in allowing the closed procedure/SA procedure before the employment tribunal in a security vetting employment case. See the Justice and Security Act 2013 which now governs the use of closed material procedures and which made them available in all civil proceedings (paras 11.88 et seq). On fairness and national security see also R (AKH) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] 1 WLR 2049. On the role of the special advocate, see Sedley LJ in Murungara v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 1015 para 17; R (Sarkandi) v Secretary of State for Foreign etc Affairs [2015] EWCA Civ 687. See the Kadi etc cases in the EU (para 5.68). 2 See A v Secretary of State [2004] UKHL 16; Secretary of State v MB [2007] UKHL 46; Secretary of State v AF (FC) and another [2009] UKHL 28. 3 See, eg on inquiries, paras 9.81 et seq above.

10.81  Again there are numerous rights of appeal, opportunity to make objection or complaint to the Secretary of State or Minister or some other body. In the course of this book we have dealt with examples and those on education spring readily to mind (paras 9.43 et seq above). In form, such opportunities are often contained in default powers residing in central government to issue orders or take action when a local or other authority is failing to perform its statutory responsibilities. The duties may be enforceable by a mandatory order. The flow of information from the exercise of such statutory powers in relation to local government was examined in ch 6.1 A party representing a complainant should make full inquiries to establish what opportunities there are to meet or deal with officials/Ministers at an appropriate level; what details of any existing processes are available; and what can be provided in the way of background material and information to effect an acceptable resolution. In April 1984, a list of default powers residing in Secretaries of State and ministers was given in Hansard: 58 HC Official Report (6th series), col 249 (11 April 1984). More recent examples include: LGA 1985, Sch 1, para 13; Children Act 1989, s 84; see also Water Act 1989, ss 33(2), (6) and 146: power to give directions to the National Rivers Authority under the latter; TCPA 1990, Sch 1, para 13 and Care Standards Act 2000, s 113; up to Housing and Planning Act 2016, ss 143– 146.

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10.82  The more aggressive a complainant becomes, the greater the risk that the officials will become more cautious and retentive. Although departments can be very accommodating in their pursuit of openness and fairness, where this operates to their detriment they will draw obvious conclusions. Further, the courts may well prompt them to draw such conclusions. This was graphically illustrated in the litigation involving Lonrho plc and the attempts of its managing director to get publication of a report by inspectors into the take-over of Harrods by an opposing interest group. The Secretary of State’s reluctance arose from the possibility of criminal proceedings, which were still under consideration, in which the report might be crucial. The Lonrho group was attempting to pressurise the Secretary of State to refer the bid to the then Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC). There were extensive internal negotiations between the Department of Trade and Industry, the Director General of Fair

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   835 Trading and Lonrho’s representatives. Lord Keith describes in vivid terms one of the meetings at the Department of Trade and Industry at which there was the fullest opportunity for points and counter-points to be made and for all the views on publication that were made by Lonrho to be considered seriously, which he was satisfied they were. Lonrho was represented by three counsel, two solicitors and three directors at the meeting. A representative of the Serious Fraud Office was cross-examined by counsel for Lonrho.1 Lonrho plc v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [1989] 2 All ER 609 and 613e–h.

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10.83  Lord Keith’s warning is worth quoting in full: ‘The only effect of Lonrho’s conduct is to discourage decision-makers from affording oral interviews. In some cases an oral interview will remove misunderstandings and provide clarification and new information. In the present case there never was excuse or justification for a meeting, let alone four meetings, although the DTI was understandably anxious to demonstrate its fairness. It was clear from beginning to end that the Secretary of State intended to publish the report as soon as possible and took the view that the public interest in early publication of the report was outweighed by the risk that early publication might hamper or prevent the institution, or prejudice the outcome, of a criminal prosecution. Lonrho’s arguments that early publication would have no adverse effect and that there were overwhelming public interest reasons in favour of early publication could be and were fully set forth and explained in written submissions of inordinate length to which oral representations added nothing.’1 [1989] 2 All ER 609 at 617a–c. Cf Companies Act 1989, s 68.

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10.84  This is far removed from the usual processes of internal grievance redress, but it offers useful illustrations of what can take place before formal statutory or legal processes begin. 10.85  The presence of the Parliamentary Ombudsman has doubtless assisted in enhancing an appreciation of procedural fairness, as have judicial decisions. The FOIA 2000 should give greater emphasis to effective means for resolving disputes and assuaging anxieties.

Local government 10.86  A  substantial volume of research has been conducted on the area of redress of grievance within local authorities. More recent work has located such procedures within participatory mechanisms.1 The role of members here is not as immediately effective in general terms as the role of the MP, and indeed MPs are often resorted to on problems concerning local government.2 This is not to say that authorities do not treat members’ complaints with care, and often internal procedures will be triggered only after the intervention of a member. See para 10.45, note 3 above. See Public Involvement and Local Government Act 2012, Part 5.

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836  Chapter 10 An important early publication is Lewis, Seneviratne and Cracknell Complaints Procedures in Local Government (1987), pp 4 et seq. See https://www.gov.uk/understand-how-your-council-works/ make-a-complaint (21/04/2018).

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10.87  The position of the member and his/her ability to obtain information has been examined in paras 7.56 et seq. It must be pointed out that if a member is seeking information to assist a person with a grievance against the authority, this may cause the authority to interpret the request as being for an ulterior, improper or unreasonable motive. On the other hand, it falls within the duties of a member to represent the interests of his constituents including those with a grievance about the authority’s administration. 10.88  As far back as 1974, the Redcliff–Maud report1 recommended the adoption by all authorities of ‘clearly established and well publicised machinery for the reception and investigation of complaints’ from the public. In 1978, a code of practice on such complaints was issued by the Commission for Local Administration. A fully revised code came into existence in 1992 and has itself been revised.2 The general impression gained from the first detailed research programme into complaints procedures in local government found that, in spite of very good practice in some authorities, much was still wanting from the perspective of good and open procedures, accessibility and responsiveness. Complaints were very often dealt with in an ‘unpatterned and uneven’ way. The existence of good procedures was often deceptive as they were really little more than defensive mechanisms to the existence of the ombudsman and the possibility of a complaint ending up in that office. The task of locating appropriate officers can be very difficult. Only one authority had full-time complaints’ officers, and even then their existence was not publicised.3 In other authorities, most complaints’ officers, typically in the chief executive’s office, were there essentially to respond to ombudsmen complaints that had been referred back to the authority. Now authorities must have published complaints mechanisms and a complaints officer.4 In some areas, statute has taken the lead as in s 202 of the Housing Act 1996, which provides for an internal review procedure within the authority for an applicant under the homeless persons provisions. Section 204, as amended by the Homelessness Act 2002, provides a right of appeal to the county court on a point of law.5 The Homelessness Reduction Act 2017 is now the governing statute and it is accompanied by its own code of almost 200 pages.6 Regulations set out the procedures to be followed (Homelessness (Review Procedure) Regulations 2018, SI 2018/223). Conduct in Local Government Cmnd 5636 (1974), vol 1. https://www.lgo.org.uk/information-centre/reports/advice-and-guidance/guidance-notes (14/05/2018). 3 Paragraph 10.86, note 2 above. 4 https://www.gov.uk/understand-how-your-council-works/make-a-complaint (23/04/2018). 5 Francis v Kensington and Chelsea LBC [2003] 2 All ER 1052. On review of these procedures, see Hall v Wandsworth LBC [2004] EWCA Civ 1740; Runa Begum v London Borough of Tower Hamlets [2003] UKHL 5; Tomlinson and Ali v Birmingham City Council [2010] UKSC 8 where the Supreme Court ruled that Art 6 ECHR did not apply to homelessness decision-making. The same court refused to depart from this approach in Poshteh v Kensington & Chelsea RLBC [2017] UKSC 36 after the decision by the ECtHR in Ali v United Kingdom (2016) 63  EHRR  20 which ruled that Art 6 did apply to homelessness cases because they dealt with ‘civil rights and obligations’. 1 2

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   837 The ECtHR had not sufficiently addressed the reasoning of the judgment in Ali and it was better to await a judgment of the Grand Chamber on the issue. The decision of the chamber (4th section) had failed to ‘address in any detail either the reasoning of the Supreme Court, or indeed its concerns over judicialisation of the welfare services, and the implications for local authority resources’. The Supreme Court ruled that the light touch judicial review of such cases, as explained in R v LBC Hillingdon ex p Puhlhofer [1986] AC 484, was no longer appropriate. See Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 19. The court took the view that, taking into account the ‘sharp focus’ required by Equality Act 2010, s 149 in cases of disability, the review decision contained adequate reasons. See para 10.123, note 1 below on the right of an applicant to demand an oral hearing. 6 Homelessness Code of Guidance for Local Authorities Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (2018) https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a969da940f0b67aa5087b93/ Homelessness_code_of_guidance.pdf.

10.89  Authorities have made efforts to publicise their procedures and services – in part a response to consumer awareness and the necessity of selling themselves; in larger part as a result of online governance and central government direction. And expenditure on such items is lawful providing it relates to publicity and information, not political proselytism. But austerity has bitten hard into local procedures. Publication schemes under the FOIA 2000 were seen as providing considerable potential for opening up authorities but the growing sophistication of search engines has been a bigger factor. . Before FOIA, there was the Local Government (Access to Information) Act 1985. The 1985 legislation does seem to have some impact on local authority administration.1 The inclusion in the original Bill of a procedure to deal with disputes over entitlement to documents was dropped. The government and local authorities preferred voluntary procedures. They are available under the FOIA  2000. Where, as increasingly is the case, service provision is outsourced to private providers, the specifications should identify clear complaints processes within the provider. Those not resolvable by such a process will have to be made to the local authority outsourcer (see eg  Contracting Out (Local Authorities Social Services Functions) (England) Order 2014, SI 2014/829). The action of the local authority will be subject to the ombudsman procedure. J Steele Public Access to Information: An evaluation of the Local Government (Access to Information) Act 1985, Policy Studies Institute and DoE 1995, and Access to Information in Local Government, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (2002): see para 8.35 above.

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10.90  The Health and Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Act 2003 made provision for the Secretary of State to make regulations about the handling and consideration of complaints in relation to the functions of English NHS bodies, the provision of health care by or for such bodies, and also about the discharge of social services functions by English local authorities and the provision of services in the discharge of those functions. The Act provides regulation-making powers covering the procedures that are to be followed. Under the Health and Social Care Act 2008, the Care Quality Commission is an independent regulator of health and social care providers in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland whether in the NHS, local government, private bodies or voluntary arrangements. It published Complaints Matter in 2014.1 The Health and Social Care Act 2012 and the Care Act 2014 made wide-ranging

838  Chapter 10 changes to the organisation and provision of health and care services (paras 10.106 et seq below). Complaints procedures are contained in the Local Authority Social Services and National Health Service Complaints (England) Regulations 2009, SI 2009/309, as amended, for adult social care complaints. The Regulations ‘align’ complaints procedures for adult social and health care into a single set of arrangements.2 Bodies covered by the Regulations must have arrangements in place to deal with complaints. A  ‘responsible person’ must ensure compliance with the arrangements. Those who may make complaints are identified. The Regulations apply to complaints made after 1  April 2009. Complaints must be dealt with efficiently and properly investigated. Complainants must be treated with courtesy and respect; receive assistance on understanding relevant procedures and where such assistance is available; receive a timely and appropriate response; and be informed of the outcome of any investigation. Arrangements have to ensure any action is taken if necessary in the light of the outcome of the complaint. There are two stages for the making of complaints. For social care complaints the second stage involves the local ombudsman. Regulations 13 and 14 deal with procedures for making a complaint about social services or care; reg 15 deals with communications; reg 16 with publicity arrangements, reg 17 with monitoring; and reg 18 with annual reports by bodies covered. http://www.cqc.org.uk/sites/default/files/20141208_complaints_matter_report.pdf (21/04/2018). 2 NHS  Complaints https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/nhse-complaintspolicy-june-2017.pdf (21/04/2018). 1

10.91  Powers have come into force for the LGO to investigate complaints from people who arrange their own care. ‘Self-funders’ have the same access to the independent complaints service as those people who have had their care arranged and funded by local authorities. The Health Act 2009, s 35 amended the Local Government Act 1974 to give the LGO service these powers from 1 October 2010. 10.92  Children’s social services complaints procedures involve a three-stage procedure under the Children Act 1989 Representations Procedure (England) Regulations 2006, SI  2006/1738. These regulate the procedure which local authorities are to follow in the consideration of representations made to them about the discharge of certain functions under the Children Act 1989 (CA 1989) and under the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (ACA 2002).1 The Regulations specify some of the matters about which a person may make representations using this procedure. They also apply the procedure, with modifications, to representations made to voluntary organisations providing accommodation for children and about fostering limits. The explanation to the Regulations sets out procedures as follows. See also Children and Social Work Act 2017, ss 12–17 on safeguarding of children.

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10.93  Part 2 of SI  2006/1738 is concerned with the subject matter of representations. As well as providing a procedure for making representations

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   839 about the discharge by a local authority of its functions under CA  1989, Part 3, the Regulations provide a procedure for considering representations about specified local authority functions under CA 1989, Parts 4 and 5 (reg 3), functions under ACA 2002 (reg 4), and functions related to special guardianship support services (reg 5). 10.94  Part 3 of SI 2006/1738 makes general provision about representations. Regulation 8 allows a local authority not to consider representations, in whole or in part, if the local authority decide that to do so might prejudice any of the proceedings falling within para  1. By reg  9 a complainant may make his representations to the local authority no later than one year after the grounds to make the representations arose. However, if the representations are made outside that time limit the local authority may still consider them if they think that it would not be reasonable to expect the complainant to have made the representations within a year, and that it is still possible to consider the representations effectively and fairly. 10.95  Local authorities have to give complainants information about the representations procedure when they first make representations and they must also give information about advocacy services (reg 11) where relevant, ie where the complainant is a looked-after child or a child in need and so is entitled to an advocate under CA 1989, s 26A. 10.96  Regulation 12 of SI  2006/1738 sets out how local authorities are to deal with representations which are made by persons falling within CA  1989, s 26(3)(e), (3B)(b) or (3C)(c). Each section requires local authorities to consider representations from persons whom the local authority considers to have sufficient interest in the child concerned to warrant their representations being so considered. Local authorities must decide whether to consider the representations and are required to take into account the views of the child if they think it appropriate to do so. 10.97  Part 4 of SI  2006/1738 sets out the procedure for considering representations. Unless the complainant and the local authority agree otherwise, the first stage involves an informal attempt to resolve the problem (regs 14 and 15). This stage usually begins when the local authority receive the representations, when they decide to consider representations from someone falling within CA 1989, s 26(3)(e), (3B)(b) or (3C)(c), or when, in appropriate cases, an advocate has been appointed for a child. The complainant may ask for the start date to be a later date as agreed with the local authority. This stage should be concluded within ten working days of the start date, but that period can be extended where the local authority consider that the representations are complex. 10.98  Before progressing to the second stage, whether the representations have been considered under stage one or not, they must be written down where they have only been made orally (reg 16).

840  Chapter 10 10.99  The second stage of the procedure is governed by reg 17 and involves consideration of the representations by an independent person. The local authority must consider the representations and send a notice of response within time limits set out in paras (3) to (5). 10.100  The third stage of the procedure involves consideration of the representations by a panel of three (reg  19), which can be requested by the complainant or his advocate in accordance with reg  18. All three members of the panel must be independent. The panel has to make recommendations within five working days of considering the representations and the local authority has 15 working days to consider the recommendations and make a decision (reg 20). 10.101  Part 5 of SI 2006/1738 is concerned with representations to voluntary organisations and about fostering limits. Regulation 21 requires voluntary organisations who are providing accommodation for a child to have a procedure (set out in reg 22) for considering representations made to them by the persons specified in paras (a) to (d). 10.102  Under CA  1989, Sch  6, para  7, every local authority is required to establish a procedure for considering any representations made to them about the discharge of their functions under Sch 6, para 4 which allows a local authority to exempt people from the limit on the number of children they may foster. Regulation 23 sets out the procedure local authorities must follow in carrying out consideration of such representations. The Children and Families Act 2014 has provisions relating to the Children’s Commissioner and the promotion and protection of children’s rights as well as special educational needs (see para 9.46) and other rights.

Ad hoc inquiries 10.103  One point that should be referred to is the position of local authority ad hoc inquiries – those that are not provided for under any specific statutory provision. The Law Commission has investigated the subject of ad hoc local inquiry reports. The Law Commission investigation followed an inquiry report into abuse of children in care in North Wales in 2000.1 The inquiry chairman was concerned that local authorities might not act in the wider public interest after such reports for fear of defamation actions2 or loss of insurance cover. Such fears may cause authorities not to publish reports, others could not learn from mistakes and improve procedures and facts would not become known. The Commission’s investigation was not limited to abuse of children but covered ‘any serious failure in the delivery of local authority services’. Among the Law Commission’s recommendations were that the guidance issued by the Society of Local Authority Chief Executives on ad hoc inquiries and the code of practice issued jointly by the ABI and LGA should be refined to ensure that local authorities can act in the public interest without putting their insurance cover at risk; the law relating to qualified privilege should be amended to protect fair and

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   841 accurate inquiry procedures and reports in the absence of malice. ‘Fair’ means conclusions are based on findings of fact from evidence as presented and any parties criticized are given notice of any criticisms, an opportunity to respond and their response is fairly represented in the report. Joint local authority reports would also be likewise protected but where reports are made by a local authority and another public authority the statutory defence recommended by the Commission would protect the local authority but the other body would rely on any common law defence of qualified privilege. Where there is a serious failure to deliver a service, there should be a statutory power to establish a new form of special inquiry. These may be required where parties are or may be reluctant to produce information or evidence. Powers to require information or evidence may be enforceable through a High Court order.3 Lost in Care HC 201 (1999–2000). This was established under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921. 2 In R  (Comninos) v Bedford DC  [2003]  EWHC  121 a council had powers under the Local Government Act 1972 to fund its legal officers’ legal costs or to indemnify them in libel actions: see also Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe [2003] EWHC 2945 and [2006] UKHL 44. 3 In the Public Interest: Publication of Local Authority Inquiry Reports Law Commission No 289 Cm 6274 (2004). On overview and scrutiny committees, see paras 6.29 et seq above and Communities etc Select Committee HC 369 (2017–19). 1

Inquiries Act 2005 10.104  The Department for Constitutional Affairs published a consultation paper Effective Inquiries (May 2004) in response to the Select Committee on Public Administration’s report.1 The report was not confined to local government. Nonstatutory inquiries have been resorted to on numerous and notorious occasions by central government or other authorities, including the Scott Inquiry, the Hutton Inquiry and the Butler Inquiry. The Inquiries Act 2005 (and the Inquiry Rules 2006, SI  2006/1838) seek to provide a statutory framework for formal, independent inquiries into events causing, or which could cause, public concern, or ‘where there is public concern that particular events may have occurred’, according to the Act’s explanatory text. Inquiries are instigated by a minister. The inquiry into the death of Alexander Litvinenko who was poisoned allegedly by Russian agents in London was conducted under the 2005 Act (para 10.175).2 So too is the inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse which was set up in March 2015 and which initially experienced a troubled history. It issued an interim report in April 2018. It reported it had learned from the Truth Project which was set up to assist victims and survivors of abuse.3 The Grenfell Tower inquiry was also set up under the 2005 Act.4 The Act makes provision on how inquiries held under its remit are to be conducted. An inquiry chairman will have powers to require the production of evidence and for either or both the establishing minister and the chairman to be able to place restrictions on both public access to the inquiry, and publication of evidence, where appropriate. These provisions were seen as controversial. The chairman may sit with a panel. The inquiry will not determine either civil or criminal liability, but this should not inhibit its ability to draw inferences from facts it investigates or recommendations it makes. The Act also makes provision for expenses and legal fees. One of the reasons for introducing

842  Chapter 10 the Bill was the huge cost of the Saville Inquiry into ‘Bloody Sunday’, estimated at £150 million but finally alleged to have cost in the region of £400 million.5 HC 606 (2003–04). See by the same committee: HC 51 (2004–05) Government by Inquiry. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160613090324/https://www.litvinenkoinquiry.org/ report (23/04/2018). 3 https://www.iicsa.org.uk/interim-report/foreword (16/05/2018). 4 https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/ (16/05/2018). 5 http://report.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org/. 1 2

10.105  Under devolution arrangements, devolved authorities have their own powers to conduct inquiries into subjects relevant to the exercise of their powers: see eg Government of Wales Act 1998, s 35. The 2005 Act will have a UK-wide remit although matters within devolved administration will be the responsibility of ministers from those administrations.

NHS complaints and the NHS Constitution1 10.106  The right to complain about NHS treatment is contained within the NHS constitution along with a catalogue of principles, rights and responsibilities.2 Prior to the Health and Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Act 2003, the NHS complaints procedure was set out in various directions and guidance. It could sometimes take 18 months or more to exhaust all existing elements of the complaints procedure and therefore the purpose of legislation was to ensure that complaints were investigated rigorously and resolved as quickly as possible. The health ombudsman’s report ‘Making things better? a report on reform of the NHS complaints procedure in England’ highlighted weaknesses in the current approach to complaints handling in health and social care, some of which were: complaints systems being fragmented within the NHS, between the NHS and private health care systems, and between health and social care; and the complaints system not being centred on the patient’s needs. The ombudsman’s findings were supported by the Healthcare Commission in ‘Spotlight on Complaints’ (2006). The LGO also identified problems in complaints handling and redress within health and social care partnerships. ‘When the procedural frameworks are different, it is much more difficult to provide a seamless service.’ The Department of Health believed that retaining the current arrangements was simply not on the agenda. It would not meet government commitments and it would not improve local handling of complaints. Furthermore, changes to the current legislation were needed in any event with the dissolution of the Healthcare Commission and its replacement by the Care Quality Commission. http://www.nhs.uk/choiceintheNHS/Rightsandpledges/NHSConstitution/Pages/Overview.aspx. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-nhs-constitution-for-england/the-nhsconstitution-for-england (23/04/2018).

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10.107  Following consultation the Department of Health published ‘Making experiences count. The proposed new arrangements for handling health and social care complaints. response to consultation’ (February 2008). As explained above, the Local Authority and National Health Service Complaints Regulations

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   843 2009 cover adult social care and health complaints. NHS Complaints Policy was published most recently in June 2017.1 The explanatory note to the Regulations states: ‘The Department considered whether to make prescriptive regulations that set out in detail what organisations must and must not do. This option would require organisations to operate within narrow and restrictive procedures, which would limit the flexibility needed for a more personalised approach to delivery of complaints arrangements at local level. These regulations align adult social care and health complaints processes into a single set of arrangements. They require the complainant to be involved in the way in which the complaint is handled, by requiring the body dealing with the complaint to offer to discuss this with the complainant. They also remove prescription around the timescale to be followed in terms of investigating a complaint. Less prescription around timescales allows organisations to assess and deal appropriately with all complaints, allowing these arrangements to meet the needs of the individual case and for proper consideration of learning and service development issues. Specifically in relation to complaints about NHS care, the regulations remove the second tier (the [former] Healthcare Commission reviewing individual complaints cases) from the arrangements, with the Health Service Ombudsman providing independent review of cases unresolved at local level.’ A two-tier complaints model has been introduced. https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/nhse-complaints-policy-june-2017. pdf (23/04/2018).

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10.108  Regulation 7 of SI 2009/309 (as amended) provides: ‘(1)  This regulation applies to a complaint which is– (a) made to a clinical commissioning group or the National Health Service Commissioning Board in accordance with these Regulations on or after 1 April 2013;1 (b) about the services provided by a provider under arrangements with the group or Board; and (c) not specified in regulation 8(1). (2) In this regulation, “provider” means an NHS body, primary care provider or independent provider. (3)  Where a clinical commissioning group or the National Health Service Commissioning Board receives a complaint to which this regulation applies– (a) the group or Board must ask the complainant whether the complainant consents to details of the complaint being sent to the provider; and (b) if the complainant so consents, the group or Board must as soon as reasonably practicable send details of the complaint to the provider. (4)  If the clinical commissioning group or the National Health Service Commissioning Board considers that it is appropriate for the group or Board to deal with the complaint–

844  Chapter 10 (a) it must so notify the complainant and the provider; and (b) it must continue to handle the complaint in accordance with these Regulations. (5)  If the clinical commissioning group or the National Health Service Commissioning Board considers that it is more appropriate for the complaint to be dealt with by the provider, and the complainant consents– (a) the group or Board must so notify the complainant and the provider; (b) when the provider receives the notification given to it under subparagraph (a)— (i) the provider must handle the complaint in accordance with these Regulations; and (ii) the complainant is deemed to have made the complaint to the provider under these Regulations.’ Regulation 8 covers complaints not to be dealt with under the procedure, and includes where the complaint is made orally, and is resolved to the complainant’s satisfaction not later than the next working day after the day on which the complaint was made; and reg  9 deals with cooperation between responsible bodies where more than one is involved. Clinical commissioning groups (CCGs) are clinically led (by general practitioners) statutory NHS bodies responsible for the planning and commissioning of health care services for their local area. There are now 195 CCGs in England. For complaints, see https://www.citizensadvice. org.uk/health/nhs-and-social-care-complaints/complaining-about-the-nhs/who-you-can-goto-when-you-have-a-problem-with-the-nhs/complaining-to-a-clinical-commissioning-groupabout-services-they-commissioned/ (23/04/2018).

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10.109  The former PHSO, Ann Abraham, published the report ‘Listening and Learning’ (HC 482 (2010–2011)) which assesses the NHS’s performance over the previous year in responding to and learning from complaints from patients and their families. The overall conclusion is that the NHS needs to listen more attentively and learn more from complaints. The report is the first of what will be an annual series of reports examining NHS complaint handling.1 See NAO  853 (2007–08) Feeding Back: Learning from Complaints’ Handling in Health and Social Care. See also Commons Health Committee Complaints and Litigation HC 786 (2010– 12) and Government Reply Cm 8181 (2011); How to Complain about a Health or Social Care Service Care Quality Commission (2014).

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10.110  Where complaints result in disciplinary proceedings before the General Medical Council, the High Court has requested a greater degree of openness and the desirability of conducting proceedings in public.1 In the screening process complainants should receive confidential documents unless there were strong grounds against this and an undertaking of confidentiality could be extracted. This introduces us to the role of the courts in securing greater openness through the doctrine of natural justice or fair procedure. R v General Medical Council, ex p Toth [2000] 1 WLR 2209. See General Medical Council v R (Zia) [2011]  EWCA  Civ 743  and DB  v General Medical Council [2016]  EWHC  2331 (QB). See SIs 2000/2051 and 2000/2034.

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Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   845 10.111  Nevertheless, there are significant drawbacks, not least the low public awareness of the procedures. More still needs to be done in this area. And public uncertainty over the role of the ombudsmen is not assisted by the constant changing of bodies over whom they have jurisdiction and frequent change of nomenclature. An executive preoccupation for attention-grabbing efficiency often leaves the consumer baffled by changing terminology. 10.112  The NHS (Redress) Act 2006 provided for schemes for redress of grievances through non-judicial processes under civil justice arising from medical negligence claims. It sets out the cases to which a scheme may apply. A scheme may only apply to cases involving liabilities in tort arising out of qualifying services provided as part of the NHS in England, whether provided in England, in another part of the UK or abroad (s 1(2) and (5)). This means that a scheme may cover people with claims in tort arising out of hospital treatment as part of the NHS wherever that hospital treatment might be provided. Redress could include an offer of compensation, apologies, explanations and reports stating how action would not be repeated. The scheme was to be implemented by regulations which would contain the details of schemes which could involve the provision of free legal advice and representation and an emphasis on resolution to avoid litigation. Provision was to be made for the making and dealing with complaints of maladministration in the operation of schemes, who may make complaints and about what. The ombudsman could investigate complaints that were not resolved. The NHS Redress (Wales) Measure 2008 Commencement Order 2011 covers schemes operating in Wales. 10.113  The Health and Social Care Act 2012 sets in place a dramatic reorganisation of health and social care in England. Strategic Health Trusts and Primary Care Trusts are abolished. The Care Act 2014 has made additional changes. Part 3 of the 2012 Act establishes an independent regulator of the NHS known as the monitor, and services from licensed providers are commissioned through an NHS Commissioning Board authorising commissioning consortia to commission services. The monitor’s duties include ensuring that competition and patient choice operate effectively. Complaints may be made about designation of services and representations may be made about licensing decisions. Information standards are the duty of the Health and Social Care Information Centre (Part 9, ch 2) and a body called Healthwatch England (s 181), described as a consumer champion for health and social care, oversees public involvement, and there are Local Healthwatch organisations (ss 194–199). Part 5, ch 2 deals with the health scrutiny functions of local authorities and makes provision for the establishment of health and well-being boards in each upper-tier local authority area. It sets out their role in preparing the joint strategic needs assessment, the joint health and well-being strategy and in promoting integrated working between NHS, public health and social care commissioners. This chapter also contains provisions to make it possible for foundation trusts and commissioning consortia to be designated as Care Trusts. Annual public meetings of the NHS Foundation Trusts and Trusts will have to take place (s 157) and there are further provisions on Health Service Commissioner reports and to whom they may be sent (s 201). The NHS  Commissioner for England (Complaint Handling) Act 2015 also

846  Chapter 10 provides for reports to complainants on delays of more than 12 months in dealing with complaints and for reports of such to Parliament containing (a) how long investigations that were concluded in the year to which the report relates took to be concluded, (b) how many of those investigations took more than 12 months to be concluded, and (c) the action being taken with a view to all investigations being concluded within 12 months. Certain provisions of the 2012 Act extend to Scotland and Northern Ireland as well as Wales. The Bill was subjected to widespread professional and public criticism and in June 2011 the NHS  Future Forum, a body appointed by the Government to make recommendations for modifications, reported.1 The major recommendations included: (a) the pace of the proposed changes should be varied so that the NHS implements them only where it is ready to do so; (b) the Secretary of State for Health should remain ultimately accountable for the NHS; (c) nurses, specialist doctors and other clinicians must be involved in making local decisions about the commissioning of care – not just GPs – but in doing this the NHS should avoid tokenism, or the creation of a new bureaucracy; (d) competition should be used to secure greater choice and better value for patients – it should be used not as an end in itself, but to improve quality, promote integration and increase citizens’ rights; (e) the drive for change in the NHS should not be based on monitor’s duty to ‘promote’ competition, which should be removed, but on citizens’ power to challenge the local health service when they feel it does not offer meaningful choices or good quality; (f) all organisations involved in NHS care and spending NHS money should be subject to the same high standards of public openness and accountability. The government response promised a ‘drive for transparency’ and acceptance of many of the recommendations2 (Cm 8113, 2011).3 http://healthandcare.dh.gov.uk/future-forum-report/. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/government-response-to-the-nhs-future-forumreport. 3 See the Care Act 2014 on Health Education England and the Health Research Authority. 1 2

FAIR PROCEDURE, INFORMATION, OPENNESS AND THE COURTS 10.114  It must be emphasised that what follows is directed towards extracting what case-law has contributed towards the task of obtaining information, reasons and openness in the administrative process. What follows is not an exposition, detailed or otherwise, of the law of judicial review, fair procedure and natural justice.1 Nor can the chapter offer an analysis of those matters that are properly susceptible to judicial review.2 A few preliminary words are necessary to explain the information basis on which judicial review takes place and which are relevant to our discussion. Judicial review generally has increased phenomenally (15,594 applications in 2013 – see www.judiciary.gov.uk – up from 160 in 1974 and 5,439 in 1998).3 At the end of 2013, immigration cases were transferred to the Upper

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   847 Tribunal (Immigration & Asylum Chamber) so that, by 2016, the number was 4,300 with 2,483 immigration cases (48 transferred to UTIAC) and 1,600 ‘civilother’ applications. There were 217 criminal cases.4 See Woolf and Jowell (eds) De Smith’s Judicial Review (8th edn, 2018); Wade and Forsyth Administrative Law (11th edn, 2014); P Craig Administrative Law (8th edn, 2016). 2 R  (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) v the Prime Minister [2002]  EWHC  2777 – legality of war in Iraq non-justiciable; R  (Abassi) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2002]  EWCA  Civ 1598 – failure to exercise diplomatic powers in respect of British national subject to alleged breaches of human rights in a foreign state was susceptible to judicial review because judicial review could supervise prerogative powers and a legitimate expectation that the government would not ignore the matter had been established by government statements but A had received all the assistance he could legitimately expect; R (Marchiori) v The Environment Agency [2002] EWCA Civ 3: merits of defence policy were for the government and not the courts to decide, and a court could not question a statutory discharge of radioactive waste authorisation in the production of nuclear weapons. See also R (Gentle) v Prime Minister [2008] UKHL 20. On the scope of review of fact, as distinct from law, see E v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] 2 WLR 1351 and R (Assura Pharmacy Ltd) v NHS Litigation Authority [2008] EWHC 289 (Admin); Jones v First Tier Tribunal and CICA [2013] UKSC 19. 3 See The Judge over your Shoulder (2016) Government Legal Department. 4 https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/civil-justice-statistics-quarterly-january-tomarch-2017 (23/04/2018). 1

10.115  Traditionally, judicial review is a review on a point of law or legality. It is not concerned with the facts or the merits of a decision. The latter means that a court on judicial review cannot second-guess the judgment of an official or tribunal which is concerned solely with a judgment on the merits or inherent quality of the subject on which that official or tribunal has to make judgment. The court cannot swap its opinion or judgment for that of the official. The reluctance to question mistakes of fact was also coloured by the very limited fact-finding capabilities of the reviewing court. Evidence was filed on affidavit (written sworn statement) and cross-examination and disclosure of documents were rarely used. In addition, the applicant had the burden of establishing any allegations. Against this backdrop, the courts have developed a duty of ‘candour’ in judicial review applications which is a duty on public authority defendants and claimants as well as third parties. It is aimed at promoting the highest standards of public administration and requires full and accurate explanations and provision of documents and information (para 4.4). Parliament has also imposed overarching duties in relation to public authorities in the protection of human rights by the Human Rights Act 1998 and the promotion of equality under ss 1 and 149 of the Equality Act 2010. Questions of fact seem initially straightforward: A is 6 ft 2 ins tall. B is a juvenile. C  is a British national. But a ‘straightforward’ question of fact can present intricate legal complications. D is female, for instance. When a question of fact is involved, the courts set out the limits of their review powers many years ago.1 However, a question of fact is not always straightforward. If a judgment requires an inference from fact, this could be treated as a question of mixed fact and law and to some extent reviewable if, for instance, the inference drawn is not justified or if there is simply inadequate evidence for the inference. An absence of evidence supporting a finding of fact could become a question of law.2 Where a condition precedent has to be established before a power can be exercised the

848  Chapter 10 courts regard this as a question of jurisdictional fact and a question of law which they are empowered to correct or establish.3 A clear mistake in fact is reviewable: S is a safe country to deport D when clearly this is wrong and can be shown to be so. A striking development in recent years has been the extension of the scope of review for mistakes of fact. In E v Secretary of State for the Home Department, the Court of Appeal ruled that a mistake of fact ‘giving rise to unfairness’ was a ground for review providing that a mistake of fact could be proved by available evidence and that the mistake can be objectively established, must not have been induced by the applicant or his advisers, and played a material part in the decision, even if it was not a decisive factor.4 Crucially, a poor process of reasoning to a decision may lead to a quashing of a decision and a remit to the decision maker where a factual basis is not adequately explained.5 Greater powers of disclosure of documents allowed by the courts in judicial review applications (para 11.53), and the possibility of obtaining documents under FOIA 2000, may well provide more factual material to challenge the reliability of a decision. Much depends upon how far the courts will, on the limited judicial review procedures, excavate the evidential basis of a decision. In human rights cases, the courts are themselves under a duty to abide by the Convention rights entailing an assessment of the proportionality of a decision-maker’s exercise of power where a human right is engaged. Proportionality entails a range of review powers based on necessity, full and proper assessment and weighing and balancing of all factors; a full appraisal of all considerations. In such cases, something like a merits review may seem unavoidable.6 ‘These provisions, read purposively and in context, make it plain that the task of the appellate immigration authority, on an appeal on a Convention ground against a decision of the primary official decision-maker refusing leave to enter or remain in this country, is to decide whether the challenged decision is unlawful as incompatible with a Convention right or compatible and so lawful. It is not a secondary, reviewing, function dependent on establishing that the primary decision-maker misdirected himself or acted irrationally or was guilty of procedural impropriety. The appellate immigration authority must decide for itself whether the impugned decision is lawful and, if not, but only if not, reverse it.’7 The courts have emphasised that, while interpretation of statutory provisions may entail de novo review, proportionality does not allow a merits review. The constitutionally allotted role of a minister and the minister’s expertise in areas such as international affairs and security have to be respected.8 Only a legal error would justify review. Such an error was established in Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No 2) on both procedural and substantive grounds (para 10.126 below) in highly sensitive security circumstances. Edwards v Bairstow [1956]  AC  14. See incidentally MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State HD [2010] UKSC 49 on ‘safe country guidance’ for deportation. 2 Coleen Properties Ltd v MHLG [1971] 1 WLR 433 now has wide acceptance. 3 Secretary of State for Education v Tameside MBC [1977] AC 1014. 4 E v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 49 and R v CICB ex p A [1999] 2  AC  330; R  (A) v Croydon LBC  [2009]  UKSC  8; cf Shaheen v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 1294. 5 Hatungimana v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 231. 1

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   849 Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 105; upheld on this point in [2007] UKHL 11 para 11. 7 [2007] UKHL 11 para 11. 8 Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No 2) [2013] UKSC 39 at [21] per Lord Sumption; R (Lord Carlile) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] UKSC 60 at [20]. 6

10.116  A general overview of the development of judicial review ineluctably raises the question of proportionality review which has been addressed elsewhere (para  4.292).1 Furthermore, the courts on judicial review now have powers to make new decisions, as opposed to simply reviewing a decision and asking for a reconsideration, within the terms of s 15 and s 141 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 as well as to issue interim declarations under CPR r 54 as amended. The courts have extended the ambit of irrationality review in cases that do not involve a human rights aspect2 and review on legitimate expectation3 and equality have all made significant strides in providing judicial protection.4 The courts have accepted that questions of weight and balance can be present in reasonableness review as well as in proportionality review.5 In Keyu, Lord Neuberger stated that it would not be appropriate for a five-member panel of the Supreme Court to reach a final conclusion on the question whether proportionality should supplant rationality as a ground of judicial review challenge at common law, questions ‘which are profound in constitutional terms and very wide in applicable scope’.6 R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26; see Craig (para 10.114, note 1 above), ch 21. See, generally, Woolf and Jowell (eds) De Smith’s Judicial Review (8th edn, 2018) ch 11. 2 Development of judicial review outside human rights: Eisai Ltd v NICE [2008] EWCA Civ 438; R (Bristol Myers Squibbs Pharmaceuticals Ltd v NICE) [2009] EWHC Civ 2722. Where EU law applies, proportionality may apply but this raises different issues to proportionality under the HRA and ECHR: see R (Lumsden) v Legal Services Board [2015] UKSC 41 for proportionality in EU-derived domestic law. 3 Recent cases on legitimate expectation: R  (Merritt) v Peterborough Magistrates’ Court [2009] EWHC 467 (Admin) and R (HSMP Forum UK Ltd) v Home Secretary [2009] EWHC 711 (Admin). 4 See para 10.168 below. 5 Kennedy v Charities Commission [2014] UKSC 20 at [54]. See also Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 19 at [60], [95], [109]–[110]; Keyu v Secretary of State for Foreign etc Affairs [2015] UKSC 69 at [129], [132]–[139], [143], [283]. In Keyu, Lady Hale, who dissented on the majority’s decision concerning the setting up of an inquiry into the killing of 24 unarmed civilians in Kenya by British forces in 1948, believed that Wednesbury contained the forensic capability to reach a different conclusion to the majority and in ‘establishing the value of the truth’ at [313]. 6 Keyu, at [132]. 1

10.117  Such is the flexibility of the development of the concept of natural justice into fair procedure since the decision of Ridge v Baldwin1 in 1963 that it would today be idle to attempt to draw out with particularity the distinction between the two concepts. The influence of Art 6  ECHR has also been profound, as discussed below, although it may carry some technical limitations and UK courts have been anxious not to extend its appropriate boundaries in the protection of ‘civil rights and obligations’ because of the procedural impositions of Art 6.

850  Chapter 10 Fair procedure represents the extension of the concept of natural justice into a looser, more discretionary framework in the governmental sphere. It is what fairness demands in a particular context. It is a continuum of natural justice. The fact that an administrative decision has procedural rules to structure its progress does not rule out the application of the principles of fair procedure, viz a fair hearing and an absence of bias,2 to supplement those rules if need be. Similarly, the labelling of a decision as political, non-legal or administrative does not automatically dictate the attitude of the courts and whether they should or should not intervene on the basis of a breach of fair procedure. Whenever a person’s rights, liberty, privileges,3 interests, livelihood, good name, occupation or integrity are at risk of being lost, taken away or otherwise destroyed, or indeed where they stand to suffer a detriment,4 the strongest presumption will exist that such an occurrence ought not to take place without that person being given the opportunity to know why a course of action is being proposed and to address their comments, orally or in writing, to the decision-maker. An oral hearing may be dispensed with where the party has already been heard orally and the deciding body is in possession of all the facts.5 The common law doctrine is wider in scope and less formalistic than Art 6. [1964] AC 40, HL. Audi alteram partem and nemo iudex in sua causa. For detailed statutory codes, see the TCP rules (paras 9.81 et seq above) (see Hopkins Development v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2014]  EWCA  Civ 470; Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government v Engbers [2016] EWCA Civ 1183); and the Immigration and Asylum Appeals (Procedure) Rules, now the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, SI  2014/2604 (L  31). On judicial supplementation of a statutory procedure, see Lloyd v McMahon [1987] 1 All ER 1118, CA and HL. On bias, see Porter v Magill [2002] 1 All ER 456 (HL) and Lawal v Northern Spirit Ltd [2004] 1  All ER  187 (HL); Davidson v Scottish Ministers [2005] UKHL 74 – judicial involvement in legislative proceedings by a judge; and Rasool v General Pharmaceutical Council [2015] EWHC 217 (Admin). For the ever more demanding application of the bias test: R (Al-Hasan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 1 All ER 97 (HL) and prison discipline. For the question of whether judicial review survives a statutory review under Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, s  101, see R  (G) v IAT etc [2004] 3  All ER  286 – per Collins J. Only ‘exceptionally’ would it survive; upheld on appeal [2005] 2  All ER 165 (CA). Art 6 ECHR lay behind the reforms leading to the creation of the United Kingdom Supreme Court in 2010 in order to separate the legislative and judicial functions of the UK’s top court: Constitutional Reform Act 2005. On the fairness of Ofsted’s complaints procedure after a school inspection report, see Ofsted v Durand Academy Trust [2018] EWCA Civ 2813. 3 Privileges have been ‘transmuted’ into public law rights: R v Board of Visitors of Hull Prison, ex p St Germain [1979] QB 425, CA, was a watershed. 4 See Lord Roskill in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3  All ER  935, HL; and R  v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p Brent London Borough Council [1982] QB 593. See R (U) v Commissioner of Metropolitan Police (29/11/02) (QBD); it was a breach of the fair trial provisions guaranteed by Art 6 for a young person accused of an offence of indecent assault to be given a formal warning without being told that his admission of guilt and consequent warning would cause his name to be recorded on the sex offenders’ register: Crime and Disorder Act 1998, ss 65–66. 5 R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex p Hussain (1989) Times, 9 October, CA: a case which should be treated with caution. Likewise R (Smith) v Parole Board [2003] EWCA Civ 1269: recall to prison of a life prisoner; no right to an oral hearing on the facts was reversed by the House of Lords [2005] UKHL 1 (para 10.121 below). An oral hearing should be ordered where there was a disputed issue of fact which was central to the Board’s assessment and which could not fairly be resolved without hearing oral evidence, R (on the application of West) v Parole Board [2002] EWCA Civ 1641 applied. Cf Waite v UK (2003) 36 EHRR 54 (ECtHR): recall from licence for a life prisoner after 1 2

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   851 expiry of the tariff was a breach of Art 5(4) where an oral hearing allowing legal representation and calling of witnesses was not given. Unavailability of compensation was a breach of Art 5(5). Oral hearings before parole boards are now governed by the decision in Osborn v Parole Board [2013] UKSC 61 (para 10.121 below).

10.118  Where a person’s ‘civil rights and obligations’ are determined (or where criminal charges are brought) the protection offered by Art 6  ECHR and the HRA 1998 which guarantees a ‘fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent tribunal established by law’ and the requirement for a reasoned judgment will come into play. What constitutes civil rights and obligations is not always patently clear but they include rights under the Convention1 but not where deportation is in question and no other convention rights are involved.2 Article 6 will be crucial in its impact upon administrative decision-making for those decisions falling within its remit; many do not. In prison disciplinary cases involving hearings by the governor or controller, and who had not allowed legal representation, the adjudicators were not sufficiently independent of the Home Office, and the proceedings were a breach of Art 6, the ECtHR has ruled (Whitfield v United Kingdom (2005) Times, 27 April – Application 46387/99 CHR).3 Because of the involvement of ECHR rights in control order cases, which use closed material procedures in suspected terrorist proceedings – neither the suspect nor their lawyer see the closed evidence – the House of Lords has ruled unreservedly that those subject to orders must have access themselves to information which is crucial for their case (Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF and another [2009] UKHL 28 applying A v UK [2009] ECHR 301). ‘Gisting’ ie giving an outline of the evidence, may in certain contexts be sufficient. Even where the HRA did not apply, the denial of access to an open court and a right to judicial protection was a denial of the principle of legality in relation to the property rights of an individual (HM Treasury v Ahmed & Ors [2010] UKSC 2 & 5). This should be read with Youssef.4 The English courts are also accommodating Art 6 to a common law culture which gives a high priority to informality and avoidance of excessive legalism where possible. The basic common law test is: what does fairness demand? Regardless of Art 6 there has been a considerably enhanced perception of the requirements of justice in a wide range of administrative contexts. In disciplinary proceedings involving a solicitor the Court of Appeal held that civil rights and obligations were not engaged unless the proceedings were ‘directly decisive of those rights’ in that they could lead to the discontinuation of a solicitor’s right to practice. Where as in this case, the proceedings could lead to the award of a ‘reprimand’ which could lead to an increase in the cost of a solicitor’s indemnity insurance, that did not determine the solicitor’s legal rights. From that decision there was an appeal with a right to a public hearing. Basically a right did not come into question until a binding decision with legal effect was to be made. In the process of deciding whether such a decision should be made, eg by the Solicitors’ Disciplinary Tribunal, the claimant solicitor’s rights under Art 6 would be engaged.5 Where the rights protected by Art 6 are involved, the court may have to look at the totality of the procedures in operation in an administrative context to see whether adequate protection is present (see paras 10.132 et seq below).

852  Chapter 10 See HRA 1998, s 1 for ‘Convention rights’. RB (Algeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] UKHL 10. Reliance was placed on Maaouia v France (2001) 33 EHRR 42. 3 See Tangey v Gov of Elmley Prison [2005] EWCA Civ 1009 on Art 6 and prison discipline; R (Gardner) v Parole Board [2006] EWCA Civ 1222 on exclusion of prisoner from a hearing and fair process; Ezeh v UK (2003); R (Napier) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWHC 936 (Admin) and prison discipline; and R (King) v Secretary of State for Justice [2010] EWHC 2522 (Admin) and disciplinary proceedings in a young offender institution before a governor adjudicator. No breach of Art 6 ECHR and judicial review would oversee legality and fairness. In R (Bourgass) v Secretary of State for Justice [2015] UKSC 54 the Supreme Court held that a prisoner does not possess any private law right to association, or any precisely defined entitlement as a matter of public law. Article 6(1) therefore does not apply. In any event, judicial review could meet the requirements of Article 6(1) in this context (at [122]–[126]). Common law fairness requires that a prisoner should normally have a reasonable opportunity to make representations before a decision is taken to authorise continued segregation. He must therefore normally be informed of the substance of the matters on the basis of which the authority of the Secretary of State is sought. In the present cases, more could and should have been said (at [98], [100]). 4 R (Youssef) v Secretary of State for Foreign etc Affairs [2016] UKSC 3 which was at pains to distinguish the legal and factual context of Ahmed & others. 5 R  (Thompson) v Law Society [2004] 2  All ER  113. The Bar Council’s disciplinary process has been ruled a breach of Art 6 ECHR by the Visitors to the Inns of Court because of insufficient independence. See R (Argles) v Visitors to the Inns of Court [2008] EWHC 2068 and reluctance to invalidate proceedings on the basis of the de facto appointment to an adjudicating office. See R (G) v Governors of X School [2011] UKSC 30 (para 10.130 below). On Art 8 ECHR rights and the judicial process, see Principal Reporter v K (Scotland) [2010] UKSC 56. 1 2

10.119  In decisions of an administrative character, where a body is empowered to proceed by way of a written procedure and not an oral one, the manner in which it exercises discretion should not be inflexible and it should be prepared to hear evidence orally where fairness requires this; where for instance there are substantial disputes of fact.1 The broader the discretionary framework in which a decision is being taken, and the more it involves a matter of policy affecting a wide range of interests, the less scope there is to structure formally a decision-making process with the principles of fair procedure, although the requirement of fairness, like reasonableness,2 is implicit in the exercise of public power and will have to be applied.3 In some contexts, however, the judges have found it difficult or unnecessary to construe fairness as requiring a right to be heard or consulted, or to know, in other than general terms, why a course of action is being pursued. However, where the circumstances and context require the principles of a fair procedure, or where a ‘legitimate expectation’ has been created in the mind of a person affected by a decision or non-decision that his or her view will be canvassed, or that a warning will be given before a state of affairs is altered, then in such circumstances procedural restraints and safeguards have been applied.4 A notable decision involved a decision by the Minister to change his policy in relation to the production and sale of oral snuff where although the applicant manufacturers who had been induced by government grants to manufacture in the UK could not claim a substantive legitimate expectation that the Minister would not change policy in relation to the manufacture of the product. However, he was in breach of his statutory duty to consult when he refused to divulge independent medical reports on the substances. The ‘high degree of fairness and candour owed to the applicants was due in part to the catastrophic effect that the ban would have on their financial interests’.5

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   853 R v Army Board of the Defence Council, ex p Anderson [1992] QB 169; and see R v Department of Health, ex p Gandhi [1991] 1 WLR 1053: ‘administrative convenience must not override exigencies of a particular case’ at 1063; see also R v Manchester Metropolitan University, ex p Nolan [1994] LR 380; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Venables [1997] 3 All ER 97, HL. 2 Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corpn [1948] 1 KB 223, CA. 3 Byles J in Cooper v Wandsworth Board of Works (1863) 14 CBNS 180; Lord Reid in Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40, HL; Lord Denning in R v Liverpool Corporation, ex p Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators’ Association [1972] 2 QB 299. And see R v British Coal Corpn, ex p Price [1993] ICR 720. 4 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Ruddock [1987] 2 All ER 518 and R (Greenpeace) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2007] EWHC 311. For an absence of an oral hearing see: R (Dudson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 52 – no breach of Art 6 ECHR when the Lord Chief Justice reviewed minimum terms of a sentence imposed on a child or ‘young person’ murderer. The process was more akin to an appeal and not a primary review of fact. 5 R v Secretary of State for Health, ex p US Tobacco International Inc [1992] 1 All ER 212. On legitimate expectation interests, see ex p Coughlan etc at para 10.124 below. 1

10.120  Generally the courts are increasingly concerned to ensure that justice and administration are conducted under sufficient levels of openness. However, anonymity of witnesses at an inquiry may be ordered in order to protect a fundamental right to life.1 Where a source of evidence may be put at risk if revealed to a prisoner whose case was being heard by the Parole Board, the evidence may be withheld from the prisoner and his legal representatives. The Parole Board has power, through the specially appointed advocate procedure, to mitigate any unfairness.2 The case caused a notable division of opinion between the majority and the dissenting judges. R v Lord Saville of Newdigate, ex p A [1999] 4 All ER 860, HL, the inquiry into ‘Bloody Sunday’. On anonymity of witnesses in criminal trials see Criminal Evidence (Witness Arrangements) Act 2008 reversing R v Davis [2008] UKHL 36 which prohibited anonymous witnesses in criminal trials. 2 R (Roberts) v Parole Board [2005] UKHL 45. See T Bingham The Rule of Law (2010), pp 104–106, on subsequent developments.

1

10.121  The House of Lords has ruled that the Parole Board is under a duty, by virtue of Art 5(4)  ECHR, when considering the case of a prisoner serving a determinate sentence whose release on licence has been revoked, to afford the prisoner an oral hearing. Furthermore, the common law may require an oral hearing in the particular context of a case (R  (Smith) v Parole Board [2005]  UKHL  1). In Osborn1 the Supreme Court ruled that the common law duty to act fairly is influenced by the requirements of Article 5(4); compliance with the former should ensure compliance with the latter (at [101]–[113]). The parole board acted unlawfully in not offering an oral hearing to the prisoners in the case. The kind of circumstances requiring an oral hearing included: (a) where important facts are in dispute, or where a significant explanation or mitigation is advanced which needs to be heard orally in order fairly to determine its credibility (at [73]–[78], [85]); (b) where the board cannot otherwise properly or fairly make an independent assessment of risk, or of how it should be managed and addressed (at [79], [81], [86]); (c) where it is tenably maintained that a faceto-face encounter, or questioning of those who have dealt with the prisoner, is necessary to enable his case to be put effectively or to test the views of those who have dealt with him (at [82]); and (d) where, in the light of the prisoner’s

854  Chapter 10 representations, it would be unfair for a ‘paper’ decision taken by a singlemember panel to become final without an oral hearing (at [96]). The purpose of the oral hearing is not only to assist in the board’s decisionmaking, but also to reflect the prisoner’s legitimate interest in being able to participate in a procedure with important implications for him, where he has something useful to contribute (at [82]). The court re-iterated that damages were not appropriate for a breach where no deprivation of liberty occurred (at [115]). R (Osborn) v Parole Board [2013] UKSC 61. The National Audit Office report Investigations into the Parole Board HC 1013 (2016–17) has figures on the substantial increase in applications for oral hearings following Osborn and the adverse effect the increase had on older and more difficult cases.

1

Opportunities to be heard 10.122  The basic principle is a right to be heard before a decision adverse to one’s rights or important interests is taken. As well as a hearing, opportunities can be built to obtain information, allow examination and obtain reasons. A right to a hearing does not always imply a right to an oral hearing: a person is ‘entitled to an oral hearing where fairness requires that there should be such a hearing but fairness does not require that there should be such a hearing in every case’.1 Where facts are in issue which could affect the decision or where an oral hearing would otherwise make a contribution to a just result.2 Osborn (above) has provided helpful guidance. R (Ewing) v Department for Constitutional Affairs [2006] EWHC 504; and see R (West) v Parole Board [2005] UKHL 1. 2 R (West) v Parole Board [2005] UKHL 1. 1

10.123  Whenever a decision is going to adversely affect an individual in a significant manner, the presumption will be that that individual, absent special reasons, will be entitled to a hearing.1 The same ought to apply to an identifiable or ascertainable group which stands to be adversely affected unless, the courts have maintained, the change is going to be effected by the making of legislative provisions or rules.2 However, where the adverse effect is serious,3 or where the decision-maker has informed the person affected that they will be heard before a decision is taken, and even though it does not affect their ‘rights’ but their ‘privileges’ such as welfare payments, licences, grants or state concessions, then a legitimate expectation to be heard may be implied on the facts.4 Therefore a representation that a group of affected parties would be heard before new licences were allocated; or that an opportunity to make a special case out even with regard to the exercise of a discretion; an undertaking to confer a right of audience before the exercise of legal duty,5 or a regular practice of consultation before decision-taking in the past,6 have all been said to have created a right to be heard because of legitimate expectation in the minds of the recipients.7 See R v Harrow London Borough Council, ex p D [1990] Fam 133, CA: placing children on child abuse register [now replaced by entering into a child protection plan]; see R v United Kingdom [1988] 2 FLR 445 on termination of parental rights [now parental responsibility] and Arts 6 and 8 of the ECHR; R v Wandsworth London Borough, ex p P [1989] COD 262: right to a hearing before

1

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   855 removal from list of ‘approved foster parents’. In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Allen (12 November 1999, unreported), the Court of Appeal held that a prisoner had not been unfairly treated when he had not been given a hearing and had not seen relevant information relating to his early release assessment. A  hearing, and any access rights, would arise on an appeal to the Governor. Cf R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Harry [1995] 3 All ER 360. For dispensing with an oral hearing in reviewing a young offender’s tariff: R (Smith) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (2004) Times, 18 February. See R (Williams) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] 4  All ER  872 (CA): documents disclosed to a review team reviewing a post tariff sentence for a discretionary life prisoner should, subject to public interest immunity (paras 11.58 et seq below) be available to the prisoner and an oral hearing should be provided in ‘exceptional circumstances’. R (Hammond) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 69 – Criminal Justice Act 2003, Sch 22, para 11(1) is incompatible with Art 6(1) ECHR and should be read with an implied condition for an oral hearing if necessary in a decision concerning sentencing and tariff setting. See Roberts v Parole Board [2005] UKHL 45 on use of ‘special advocates’ in prison above and note paras 10.127 and 10.141 below. For assessing an applicant’s age for entitlement to support under Children Act 1989, Part III (whether asylum seeker under 18 years old): R  (B) v Merton LBC  [2003] 4  All ER  280 – question did not require a trial and full judicialisation of proceedings. See Makisi v Birmingham City Council [2011] EWCA Civ 355 and a right for a homeless housing applicant to demand an oral hearing under SI 1999/71, regs 6 and 8 (see now Homelessness (Review Procedure) Regulations 2018, SI  2018/223; see Lambeth LBC v Johnston [2008] EWCA Civ 690 and para 10.89 above. 2 See, however, R v British Coal Corporation and Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, ex p Vardy [1993] ICR 720. 3 Depriving individuals of eg trade unions’ rights: see para 10.127, note 1 below; cf Bates v Lord Hailsham [1972] 3 All ER 1019. 4 In R (Adlard) v Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions [2002] EWCA Civ 735 the Court of Appeal ruled that a refusal to call in a planning application by the Secretary of State did not require an opportunity for oral hearings and refusal of such did not engage Art 6 rights. 5 See cases at para 10.125, note 4 below and R v Birmingham City Council, ex p Sheptonhurst Ltd [1990] 1 All ER 1026, CA. 6 CCSU case (para 10.127, note 1 below), Lord Roskill; R v IRC, ex p Unilever plc [1996] STC 681, CA. 7 And see R v Devon County Council, ex p Baker [1995] 1 All ER 73, CA, where there was insufficient notice given to residents of an old people’s home to allow proper representations or complaints. See R  (Lumba) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011]  UKSC  12 and Mandalia v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 59.

10.124 In ex p Coughlan1 the Court of Appeal, developing earlier and much criticised (in certain quarters) decisions,2 established that a substantive legitimate expectation – that is, an expectation to a thing, a position or something of substance – could be established where a representation to do or not do a certain thing, and then to go back on that representation, would be so unfair that it amounted to an abuse of power. In such a situation, the court could itself having established the legitimacy of the representation balance the requirements of fairness against any competing interest relied upon by the authorities for the change of policy and could make appropriate orders. This was the strongest of three positions discussed by the court. The first was where the authority’s representation was merely a factor to consider and which it gave the weight which it felt appropriate and no more. Its decision here could only be overturned on grounds of Wednesbury unreasonableness.3 The second case was where the authority promised or represented that it would consult parties before making a decision. The representation may be express or implied from prior conduct but the representee must, it appears, have knowledge of it4 although not necessarily have acted in reliance of it,5 and must not behave in a manner

856  Chapter 10 which is less than even-handed; they must put all their ‘cards face up on the table’.6 A representation should be ‘clear, unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualification’.7 Consultation must take place unless the court is convinced there is a countervailing reason why it should not. What is represented must be within the authority of the representor (R (Bloggs 61) v Home Secretary [2003] 1 WLR 2724) and for representations by one ministry binding on another (see R (BAPIO Action Ltd) v Home Secretary [2008] UKHL 27). R v North and East Devon Health Authority, ex p Coughlan [2000] 3 All ER 850, CA. R  v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex p Hamble (Offshore) Fisheries Ltd [1995] 2  All ER 714. 3 R  v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Briggs, Green and Hargreaves [1997] 1  All ER 397, CA. 4 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Hindley [2000] 2 All ER 385, HL. 5 R  (Bibi) v Newham LBC  [2002] 1  WLR  237 (CA) although reliance is a relevant factor. In R  (Begbie) v Secretary of State for Education [2000] 1  WLR  1115 (CA), absence of reliance was ‘an exception rather than the rule’. The representation must be intra vires: Al Fayed v Adv Gen Scotland (2004) SLT 798 (IH). The courts have emphasised that legitimate expectation is not to be supported lightly: see, Wade and Forsyth Administrative Law (10th edn, 2009) pp 455–456. 6 Bingham LJ in R v IRC, ex p MFK Underwriting Agencies Ltd [1990] 1 WLR 1545. 7 Per Bingham LJ, ibid. See R v Falmouth and Truro Port Health Authority, ex p South West Water Services Ltd [2000] 3  All ER  306, CA; and R  (Project Management Institute) v Minister for the Cabinet Office [2014] EWHC 2438 (Admin); Hussain v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWCA Civ 207. 1 2

10.125  Forty years ago, Megarry V-C helpfully analysed1 a typical decision in an administrative framework as: (1) Removal of a benefit conferred. Here, a right to be heard would usually obtain, and may still be insisted upon, though where a solicitor acting for the applicant has negligently prevented the applicant being present at an earlier hearing that may not constitute a breach of natural justice.2 (2) Non-renewal of a benefit conferred. Here, a legitimate expectation is often created that non-renewal will only be for a cause; and where there is such a cause it ought, in fairness, to be communicated to the individual where benefit is not being renewed.3 (3) Allocation of a benefit. Here, Megarry V-C held that no right to be heard existed. This was for a number of reasons. First, the numbers involved may well make hearings impossible. Second, a reason for non-conferral of a benefit may not be because of a detriment attaching to an applicant such as a blemish on a record; it may not be awarded simply because the strength of the application is not sufficient. Also, by implication, in this case no legitimate expectation of a hearing has been created – unless the conferring body has indicated otherwise.4 And conferral of benefits may involve an exercise of wide discretion and subjective judgment which courts traditionally have been reluctant to expose to detailed scrutiny in the absence of an obvious vitiating factor.5 McInnes v Onslow Fane [1978] 3 All ER 211. Al Mehdawi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1989] 3 All ER 843, HL. 3 See R v Birmingham City Council, ex p Sheptonhurst Ltd [1990] 1 All ER 1026, CA; cf Stevenson v United Road Transport Union [1976] 3 All ER 29. 4 R v Liverpool Corpn, ex p Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators’ Association [1972] 2 QB 299, CA; A-G of Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 All ER 346, PC; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 1 2

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   857 ex p Khan [1985] 1 All ER 40, CA; R v Great Yarmouth Borough Council, ex p Botton Bros Arcades Ltd (1987) 56 P & CR 99. 5 Roncarelli v Duplessis (1959) 16  DLR  (2d) 689 at 705; see Jones v Swansea City Council [1989] 3 All ER 162, CA. The Court of Appeal has re-affirmed this reluctance in R (Khatun) v Newham LBC [2005] QB 37.

10.126  Nevertheless, statute frequently supplements the omission of the common law to allow hearings before conferral of a benefit, as in planning where a decision is ‘called in’ by the minister,1 and appeals or reviews after an adverse decision.2 Bank Mellat v HM  Treasury (No  2) is a striking illustration of common law protection.3 The case concerned measures taken by the Treasury to restrict access to the UK’s financial markets by a major Iranian commercial bank on account of its alleged connection with Iran’s nuclear programme. On 9 October 2009, the Treasury made a direction under Schedule 7 to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (‘the Act’) requiring all persons operating in the financial sector not to have any commercial dealings with Bank Mellat. The Act lays down three safeguards: (1) the direction must be laid before Parliament after being made and, unless approved by affirmative resolution within 28 days, will cease to have effect thereafter; (2) the direction must be proportionate having regard to the risk to the national interest presented by, in this case, nuclear proliferation; and (3) any person affected by the direction may apply to the High Court to set it aside. The directions were challenged by Bank Mellat on substantive and procedural grounds. Bank Mellat’s procedural case was that the Treasury failed to give it the opportunity to make representations before making the direction. Although it had no express statutory right to such an opportunity, it contended that such an opportunity was required at common law or by Article 6 (right to a fair trial) and Article 1, Protocol 1 (right to peaceful enjoyment of property) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The majority (6–3) held that Bank Mellat was entitled to succeed on the procedural ground that it received no notice of the Treasury’s intention to make the direction, and therefore had no opportunity to make representations before it was made (at [28]). The common law duty of prior consultation depended on the particular circumstances in which each direction is made (at [31]). Unless a statute expressly or impliedly excludes a duty of consultation, or in the particular case consultation would be impractical or frustrate the object of the direction, fairness required that a person specifically targeted by it should have an opportunity to make representations. The direction had serious effects on Bank Mellat’s business, came into force immediately and took effect for up to 28 days pending Parliamentary approval (at [32]). There were no significant practical difficulties about consultation: the Bank could as easily re-arrange its affairs after the direction as before it, and the Treasury could have disclosed before making the direction the material which they were properly required by Mitting J to disclose in the subsequent proceedings (at [31]). The duty of fairness was not excluded by (1) the statutory right under the Act of recourse to the courts after the direction; or (2) the fact that the order was subordinate legislation (at [33]). As to (1), the statutory right substantially

858  Chapter 10 reproduces the rights which a person affected would have anyway on judicial review. It should not limit other procedural rights. It is also inadequate where the effects of an order are immediate (at [37]). As to (2), the statutory instrument is the instrument of the minister who is empowered by the enabling Act to make it. The fact that it requires Parliamentary approval does not alter that (at [44]). The direction, although made by statutory instrument, involves the application of a discretionary legislative power against identifiable individuals. The statutory instrument is simply the form which the specific application of the particular legislation is required to take (at [46]). The Bank also won on substantive grounds by a majority of 5–4. The orders were disproportionate and irrational in singling out one Iranian bank. Town and Country Planning Act 1990, s  77. NB  Structure and Development Plans and their replacement: see paras 9.69 et seq above. 2 https://www.gov.uk/social-security-child-support-tribunal/appeal-tribunal (24/04/2018) and, for universal credit appeals, https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/benefits/universal-credit/onuniversal-credit/appealing-a-universal-credit-decision-at-a-tribunal/ (24/04/2018). 3 [2013] UKSC 39. 1

10.127  Reasons of national security,1 emergency action2 or the greater public good3 in the past have defeated a right to a hearing, but not to fair treatment.4 Even in cases of national security, special procedures may have to be devised using ‘special counsel’, as under the Special Immigration and Asylum Commission appeals, to ensure that procedures are not unlawful. However, the requirements of the ECHR must not be overlooked, in particular the requirements of judicial control of detention under Art 5 and a fair hearing before an independent tribunal under Art 6.5 These requirements are reinforced in the UK by the Human Rights Act 1998 which came into effect on 2 October 2000. In ex p Turgut, the Court of Appeal emphasised that where a decision to deport an applicant for political asylum was challenged for breaching Art 3  ECHR prohibiting torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, and there were allegedly no grounds to award exceptional leave to stay, the court’s role was not that of primary fact finder. But the court had to subject the decision to ‘rigorous examination’ and examine the underlying factual material. No special deference to the Secretary of State’s view of the facts would be given. The right under Art 3 was ‘absolute and fundamental’. The area of judgment to which deference was to be shown to the Secretary of State was a ‘decidedly narrow one’ in such a case. The case was decided before the HRA 1998 took effect. The decision was not overturned.6 But it now looks dated and rather threadbare. The decisions of the courts have extended this concept of anxious scrutiny so that it may be very difficult to discern any real difference between a primary decision-maker and the courts in cases concerning rights under Art 3  ECHR. The most difficult of cases have involved national security detentions and prevention measures and deportations and although the courts have given a wide berth to statutory definitions of national security and the information the Secretary of State may use to satisfy statutory definitions (para 1.124) a justification for detention will have to be made out.7 In December 2004, the House of Lords, in a court of nine Law Lords, ruled that detention under Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, s 23 for an indefinite period without trial was a breach of the HRA 1998 and Art 5 ECHR. The rule of law

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   859 demanded limits to executive detention.8 The law lords followed this judgment with a further decision involving the same claimants who argued that it was not permissible for a judicial tribunal (SIAC was the tribunal in question) to hear evidence that was extracted under torture overseas by foreign parties. The law lords ruled such a practice was repugnant to the common law, although the party alleging torture had to prove the case (A  etc v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005]  UKHL  71). The further development involving disclosure of relevant evidence to a person subject to judicial proceedings involving special counsel was outlined above (para 10.80). The Supreme Court has ruled that the special advocate procedure is not extendible to civil litigation under the common law9 although its use in security vetting procedures and employment did not involve a breach of Art 6 ECHR.10 The same court did rule by majority that it could conduct closed material procedures on appeals to that court where they had been used in lower proceedings despite the absence of a specific statutory authority.11 As we point out (in para 11.81 below), the government has legislated to attempt to strike a balance between ‘justice’ and ‘security’ in the handling of sensitive evidence.12 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935, HL; R v Director Government Communications Headquarters, ex p Hodges [1988] COD 123.  2 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Pegasus Holdings (London) Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 990.  3 R v Gaming Board for Great Britain, ex p Benaim and Khaida [1970] 2 QB 417, CA; Norwest Holst Ltd v Secretary of State for Trade [1978] Ch 201, CA; R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p London Borough of Southwark (1987) 54 P & CR 226.  4 See Megarry V-C in McInnes (at para 10.125, note 1 above). See R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Cheblak [1991] 1 WLR 890, CA.  5 Note in particular the decision in Chahal, para 10.80, note 1 above and the criticism from the ECtHR in Chahal v UK (1996) 23 EHRR 413. And under Art 8, see Smith v UK [1999] IRLR 734, ECtHR.  6 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Turgut [2001] 1 All ER 719, CA. See also R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Javed [2001] 3 WLR 323 (CA). Post-HRA, see re Art 8 ECHR, Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 105 – deference to Secretary of State’s view on proportionality not permissible in non-policy questions. See also R (Razgar) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 27.  7 M v Home Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] 2 All ER 863 (CA).  8 A  and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004]  UKHL  56. The derogation was a disproportionate and discriminatory measure. However, eight Law Lords ruled that the declaration of a state of emergency by the government under Art 15  ECHR – ‘an essentially political decision’ – was not unlawful.  9 Al Rawi v The Security Service and Others [2011] UKSC 34 at common law. 10 Tariq v Home Office [2011] UKSC 35 and see Kennedy v UK [2010] ECHR 26839/05 and compare Uzukauskas v Lithuania [2010] ECHR 1060. See Bank Mellat v HM Treasury [2015] EWCA Civ 1052. A  successor to the Bank Mellat litigation in the Supreme Court (at para  10.126 above), analysing the disclosure requirements of a closed material procedure. 11 Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No 1) [2013] UKSC 38. A general reliance by the majority was placed on the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, s 40(2) providing for appeals from the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court on any judgment. 12 Justice and Security Cm 8194 (2011) and Justice and Security Act 2013.  1

10.128  The ECtHR had ruled that not providing a tenant with a procedural opportunity to challenge a factual ground for serving a notice to quit was a breach of Article 8 ECHR (Connors v UK [2005] 40 EHRR 9). In Harrow London Borough Council v Qazi [2003] UKHL 43, it was held by the majority that the

860  Chapter 10 contractual and proprietary rights to possession of a public authority landowner could not be defeated by a defence based on Art 8 ECHR. In Kay and others v Lambeth London Borough Council [2006] UKHL 10, it was held by the majority, affirming Qazi, that the county courts, when faced with a defence to a claim to possession by a public authority landlord which is based on Art 8, should proceed on the assumption that domestic law strikes a fair balance and is compatible with the occupier’s Convention rights. But it was recognised that there might be cases of a special and unusual kind, of which Connors was an example, where it would be incompatible with Art 8 for the occupier not to be permitted to challenge the factual allegations that were made against him which were the basis for the claim for a possession order. If the legal framework denied him that opportunity it would fall to be regarded as incompatible with the Convention right. There are several ways in which such a procedural challenge may be made. The House of Lords had to revisit the decision in Kay1 and held in Doherty that a decision by an authority to terminate a right to possession of land by travellers should be challengeable on judicial review which would be more exacting than the usual form of review. It would include assessment of fact, and reasons for possession and whether the decision was ‘disproportionate’.2 In Kay v UK [2011] HLR 2 the ECtHR ruled there had been a breach of Art 8 by the UK in Kay because the proportionality of the authority’s action had not been assessed. And also had to consider the effect of the ECtHR judgment in McCann v United Kingdom, application no 19009/04; see now Kay v UK App No 37341/06 21 Sept 2010 (ECtHR). 2 Doherty v Birmingham City Council [2008]  UKHL  57 at paras 52, 53–55, 68, 70 and more emphatically Lord Mance at 161–164 who argued Convention principles should apply. See also Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45 where it was held that the proportionality of a possession order must be judicially assessed and Hounslow LBC v Powell etc [2011] UKSC 8. 1

Preliminary hearings 10.129  A difficult issue concerns a preliminary hearing before a more formal determination at which the individual will be heard. 10.130  As a general rule of thumb, a hearing will not be necessary at the preliminary1 (investigatory) stage, but one should be held where serious consequences follow immediately to the detriment of the individual, ie stoppage of earnings,2 and the purpose of the investigation will not be defeated or unduly frustrated by a hearing. The House of Lords has ruled that Art 6  ECHR was breached where a provisional listing under the Care Standards Act 2000 did not afford a right to a hearing so depriving a worker of employment in care pending a full hearing. The consequences were very serious and a full hearing could take months to hear (R (Wright and others) v Secretary of State for Health [2009] UKHL 3).3 A fair procedure will not require that the person investigated be given the earliest opportunity to be fully informed of all relevant information and it will not require a hearing at the preliminary stage, especially where that may well hinder the investigation or run the risk of intimidating witnesses or destroying evidence. However, an outline of adverse information should be provided, orally if need be.4 It is now clear that a mere advisory body is subject to judicial review5 where it abuses its powers or acts unfairly, although fair procedure

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   861 would be unlikely to involve a hearing as a legal requirement before such a body. This might be otherwise, perhaps, where the nature of the recommendations require hearings because they are damning and are de facto binding. Even then, the hearing would be investigatory rather than adversarial.6 It is also clear that a non-public body exercising powers on behalf of the state or acting in the public interest as a surrogate for the state may also be subject to public law review under CPR 1998, Part 547 and the principles of fair procedure apply likewise to such bodies. The courts have been careful not to extend this jurisdiction too widely.8 They have nonetheless been prepared to advance the boundaries of review or to dovetail the tests for review of private bodies and public bodies exercising disciplinary procedures.9 Wiseman v Borneman [1971]  AC  297, HL; Pearlberg v Varty [1972] 1  WLR  534, HL; Furnell v Whangarei High Schools Board [1973]  AC  660, PC. See R  v General Medical Council, ex p Toth (para 10.110, note 1 above). 2 Though a hearing was not necessary in Furnell above. See Re HK [1967] 2 QB 617; Re Pergamon Press Ltd [1971] Ch  388, CA; R  v Agricultural Dwelling-House Advisory Committee, ex p Brough [1987] 1 EGLR 106. R v P Borough Council, ex p S [1999] Fam 188: suspension from child minder’s register without providing an opportunity to make representations during investigation was unfair. See also Wright and others in the following text. 3 See R (G) v Governors of X School [2011] UKSC 30; para 10.141 below. 4 See Fayed v UK (1994) 18 EHRR 393; and see Lord Slynn in Rees v Crane [1994] 1 All ER 833, PC. 5 See R v ADHAC, ex p Brough [1987] 1 EGLR 106; R v Eden District Council, ex p Moffat (15 April 1987, unreported) CO/803/86; on appeal 667/87 (1988) Times, 24 November, CA. R v Boundary Commission, ex p Foot [1983]  QB  600, CA; see R  v Ethical Committee of St Mary’s Hospital, ex p Harriott [1988] 1 FLR 512. 6 On the provision of information in an investigation of the former Monopolies and Mergers Commission, see: R v MMC, ex p Elders IXL Ltd [1987] 1 All ER 451; R v MMC, ex p Matthew Brown plc [1987] 1 All ER 463; and on not allowing further comment: R v MMC, ex p Air Europe (1988) 4 BCC 182. See Interbrew SA v Competition Commission [2001] EWHC Admin 367. See also: Unichem Ltd v Office of Fair Trading [2005] CAT 8. 7 R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex p Datafin [1987] 1 All ER 564, CA; R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex p Guinness plc [1989] 1 All ER 509, CA; R v Advertising Standards Authority, ex p Insurance Service plc (1989) 133 Sol Jo 1545; R v General Council of the Bar, ex p Percival [1991] 1  QB  212; cf R  v FIMBRA, ex p Cochrane [1991]  BCLC  106; R  v Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex p Massingberd-Mundy [1993] 2 All ER 207: Jockey Club not judicially reviewable under Ord 53. Cf R v Jockey Club, ex p Ram Racecourses [1993] 2 All ER 225. For a private law employment case R  (K) v Middlesbrough BC  [2010]  EWHC  1035 (Admin) and for public law process in an employment case: R (Shoesmith) v Ofsted [2011] EWCA Civ 642. 8 R v Football Association Ltd, ex p Football League Ltd [1993] 2 All ER 833; R v Insurance Ombudsman Bureau, ex p Aegon Life Assurance Ltd [1994] COD 426; R v Panel of the Federation of Communication Services Ltd, ex p Kubis [1998] COD 5. 9 See R  (Beer) v Hampshire Farmers Market Ltd [2004] 1  WLR  233; Bradley v Jockey Club [2004] EWHC 2164. 1

The content of a fair hearing 10.131  Generally, the person entitled to a fair hearing has the right to know the case against him or her; to be given fair and timely warning; to know the impression of the decision-maker; to examine the evidence; to cross-examine witnesses and to know the identity of those making accusations,1 although clearly the law of defamation and other qualifications will be important in this respect.2 However, the courts have acknowledged that procedures aimed at achieving

862  Chapter 10 speedy resolution of disputes may not be required to make such a full disclosure of evidence; this was so in a case which concerned a Special Adjudicator established under the Asylum Appeals (Procedure) Rules 1993, SI  1993/1661 where the Home Secretary was not obliged to hand to the adjudicator the material on which the former had based a ‘safe country certificate’.3 Given the importance of the certificate to the outcome the decision appeared regrettable. In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Turgut, in another asylum case where ill-treatment if returned to country of origin under Art 3 of the ECHR was alleged, the court stated it was under an obligation to subject the Secretary of State’s decision to a rigorous examination by considering the underlying factual material.4 The attitude of the courts, shaped by decisions of the ECtHR, has become more demanding in relation to the human rights’ aspects of such cases so that information crucial to the case against the suspect cannot be denied in a manner inconsistent with Art 6 ECHR rights (Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF and another [2009]  UKHL  28 at para  10.118 above). The ECtHR has shown itself in more recent case law to be more accommodating to the use of closed material procedures (para 10.132, note 5 below) indicating the importance of context, the seriousness of consequences and overall safeguards and the absence of an absolute right to security-sensitive evidence. Cf Local Government Board v Arlidge [1915] AC 120, HL. It was unfair not to disclose evidence of one pupil against another in a decision to exclude a child from a grant maintained school: R v Head Teacher and Independent Appeal Committee of Dunraven School, ex p B [2000] ELR 156, CA. 2 And the absence of absolute privilege. Decisions on procedure, within the bounds of reasonableness, are for the tribunal alone: see A v Southwark London Borough Council (1987) Guardian, 21 October. 3 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Abdi [1996] 1 All ER 641, HL. See RB (Algeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009]  UKHL  10. See now SI  2014/2604 and SI 2017/1168. 4 See para  10.127, note 6 above. See Re Application of Officer O’s Application for Judicial Review [2008] NIQB 52 – a request for a police officer’s medical file – Art 8 ECHR in issue – notice to be given and representations allowed. Szuluk v UK App 36936/05 CHR – reading of prisoner’s medical correspondence – Art 8 breached. 1

10.132  The courts would now have to be additionally vigilant that such an approach is consistent with Art 6  ECHR as applied by the HRA  1998. The individual must be given the opportunity to present his or her own case, to present evidence and not to face improper or constant interruption. These are decisions made by administrative bodies and are not decisions made by courts of law,1 so hearsay evidence is usually admissible subject to the evidence being of reliable ‘probative’ value2 and an opportunity is provided to comment on it by the party concerned who should be allowed to argue on the whole case. However, where serious disciplinary consequences may follow, hearsay evidence ought not to be taken.3 If such cases involve civil rights and obligations as outlined above, Art 6 ECHR will apply (see Whitfield v UK, para 10.118 above). Where the government had exercised a power to derogate from the HRA  1998 (Art 5 ECHR) in order to detain persons suspected of being terrorists without charge on evidence which, it was claimed, had been extracted under torture, a majority of the Court of Appeal refused to vitiate either the decision of the Secretary of State to detain or proceedings before the Special Immigration Appeal Tribunal upholding the decision. Guilt was not in question, but suspicion. The Home Secretary had to act on a wide range of materials which he could not verify as

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   863 conforming with Art 3 ECHR. To require him to do so would be inconsistent with his power to act on a suspicion and a belief. The dissenting judge believed any party bringing an appeal before the commission could not be said to have had a fair trial, within Art 6(1) ECHR, if evidence obtained by torture had been used against him. The court accepted that, in the context of Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, s 21, a reasonable belief justifying detention could be held on the basis of the receipt of information which had not been proved and suspicion could reasonably arise from unproved facts.4 This decision was unanimously reversed by the House of Lords (para 10.118 above). This was not a matter concerning technical rules of evidence; it was a matter of constitutional principle. Receipt of evidence before a judicial body in the UK that had been obtained by torture was prohibited. However, the person making the allegation of torture had to prove that fact. In the circumstances of SIAC procedures this could invariably prove to be impossible. Sections 21 to 32 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act were repealed by s 16 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (itself given a 12-month life). The 2005 Act introduced the highly controversial ‘control order’ regimes approved by, or taken under, judicial authority. The Schedule to the 2005 Act provides that the details of procedures in control orders are to be in rules of court. These will include: dispensing with hearings, conducting hearings in the absence of ‘relevant persons’, nondisclosure of full details of reasons for decisions relating to the proceedings to the relevant person, for modes of proof, for legal representation, for non-disclosure provisions, for disclosure of summaries of material by the Secretary of State, non-use of material, for anonymity, use of advisers and special representation. It has already been explained how the procedures have led to a corpus of case law.5 Control orders were repealed under the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 and replaced by Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs). These, according to the explanatory note, would be a ‘civil preventative measure intended to protect the public from the risk posed by suspected terrorists who can be neither prosecuted nor, in the case of foreign nationals, deported, by imposing restrictions intended to prevent or disrupt their engagement in terrorism-related activity. The regime would be capable of imposing less intrusive restrictions than those available under control orders, and there would be increased safeguards for the civil liberties of those subject to the measures. There would be no provision in the replacement system for derogation from the ECHR’ as under control orders. The Government’s difficulties with control orders involved non-derogating measures. TPIMs rely upon the Secretary of State being satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the suspect is or has been involved in terrorism-related activities. This formulation was added by the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, ss 20(1), 52(5) and replaced a ‘reasonable belief’ test. Closed material procedures (CMPs) are used in civil proceedings.6 In Bank Mellat v HM  Treasury (No  1) [2013]  UKSC  38, Lord Neuberger at [68]–[74] set out guidance on use of CMPs. The Court of Appeal ruled that hearsay evidence could be taken in wardship cases, but not in custody or access cases: Re W [1990] FCR 286 and H v H [1990] Fam 86, CA, on access. The Children Act 1989 allows for the reversal of decisions on the exclusion of evidence: s 96(3). 2 See R v Deputy Industrial Injuries Comr, ex p Moore [1965] 1 QB 456, CA; Mahon v Air New Zealand [1984] AC 808, CA. 1

864  Chapter 10 See R v Board of Visitors of Hull Prison, ex p St Germain (No 2) [1979] 3 All ER 545; NB Mahon’s case (above) where the proceedings became a trial of fact and the strict test applied. 4 A  etc v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004]  EWCA  Civ 1123, reversed by [2005] UKHL 71. 5 On secret hearings under Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2004, SI  2004/1861, Sch  1 para  54(2), B  v Secretary of State for Defence [2010] ICR 54 adverted to the limits of a tribunal’s expertise in national security. Coles v Barracks [2006]  EWCA  Civ 1041 provided a different emphasis in security vetting cases. See Tariq v Home Office [2010]  ICR  223 and para  54, compliance with the ECHR. In Tariq v Home Office [2011] UKSC 35, the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the Home Office that the closed material/ special counsel procedure was permissible before employment tribunals deciding security vetting cases; see para 10.127 above. Tariq’s appeal to the ECtHR was, after six years, ruled as ‘manifestly ill-founded’ and his application was dismissed by the ECtHR first division: Gulhamhussein & Tariq v UK App Nos 46538/11 and 2060/12, 3 April 2018. See also Regner v Czech Republic App No 35289/05, 19 September 2017. 6 Not criminal proceedings, but see Belhaj & Boudchar v DPP [2017] EWHC 3056 (Admin) which was overruled by Belhaj v DPP  [2018]  UKSC  33 ruling by 3–2 majority holding that judicial review proceedings in question were not a civil matter – a decision not to prosecute for a criminal offence was in issue. This seems a very broad interpretation. 3

10.133  The tendency in British public administration to informalise administrative procedures could face serious consequences if Art 6 was readily invokable in informal resolution processes (see Whitfield v UK, para  10.118 above). The field of land use and planning regulation was thrown into panic some years ago when the Divisional Court ruled that the system for dealing with planning and compulsory purchase, railway and highway appeals where a Secretary of State called in an application or otherwise made a decision in a case in which he notionally had a governmental interest in applying policy breached Art 6 because he was not an independent and impartial tribunal. The House of Lords ruled in Alconbury that the whole decision-making process had to be seen in its entirety. There were usually public inquiries before inspectors. The Secretary of State’s decision was controllable in the courts by an application by a ‘person interested’ under eg Town and Country Planning Act 1990, s 288 on a point of law rather like judicial review. There was no review of facts or merits. The House of Lords held that although the Secretary of State was not an independent tribunal, the fact that his decision was reviewable in a court of law provided the necessary compliance with Art 6. Indeed, it was not appropriate for courts to become involved in the merits of government policy in land use regulation or related matters, and ECtHR jurisprudence did not require an appeal on the merits.1 R  (Alconbury) v Secretary of State for the Environment [2001] 2  All ER  963 (HL) reversing the Divisional Court at ditto 934. The Law Lords did not decide on the extent to which proportionality might be available in English law in such a case, though see Lord Slynn at para [51]. For the ECtHR: Albert v Belgium (1983) 5 EHRR 533; Bryan v UK (1995) 21 EHRR 342; and Chapman v UK (2001) 10 BHRC 48. See, further, P Craig (2003) Public Law 753.

1

10.134 In Runa Begum v Tower Hamlets the question was whether an internal local authority review dealing with homeless cases under Housing Act 1996, s  202 complied with Art 6. The review was conducted by an officer of the authority. The procedure left by itself did not comply because the officer was not an ‘independent and impartial tribunal’ for Art 6 purposes, but the Law Lords ruled that an appeal to the county court (on a judicial review basis) under

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   865 s  204 of that Act did bring the overall procedure within Art 6. The absence of full fact-finding powers by the appeal court did not deprive that procedure of Art 6 qualities assuming, without deciding, that the right in question was a civil right.1 In Tomlinson (below) the Supreme Court decided that determining ‘homelessness decisions’ under the relevant procedures does not involve Art 6 rights, a view confirmed in Poshteh (para 10.88, note 4 above). Although judicial review in the past has not offered a sufficient review of facts to satisfy cases where Art 3 was engaged,2 the UK courts have been more persuaded by the heightened levels of scrutiny that may apply when human rights are engaged, or situations which impose a serious detriment on claimants. The courts are prepared to see whether the process of decision-making as a whole, including judicial review, offers adequate opportunity for challenge.3 Where a decision-making process is tainted by unfairness and clearly cannot be remedied by judicial review because the court cannot establish the basis on which a decision-maker made a decision affecting civil rights, judicial review did not offer adequate safeguards for Art 6.4 The case concerned refusal of assistance to an asylum seeker under Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, s 55 which the Secretary of State refused after inadequate enquiries as to why claims for assistance by the claimants had not been made ‘as soon as reasonably practicable’. The process had not been adequately explained to the claimants, what the purpose of interviews (eligibility for support) was for, inadequate information had been given to them, insufficient thought had been given to statutory formulations such as ‘reasonably practicable’, relevant factors such as the claimant’s state of mind and could asylum reasonably have been claimed earlier had been overlooked? The questions put to claimants at the time did not allow ‘a sufficiently full picture for a fair decision to be made’ (para 90). More than a standard form questionnaire was required. Nor were there sufficient inquiries by the authorities to satisfy themselves adequately in law of whether they are complying with the claimant’s rights under eg Arts 3 and 8 ECHR. The interviewer, furthermore, was not the person who made the decision. Nor had the claimant been given the ‘gist of the case against him’. All will depend on specific circumstances. On the facts, a request for further review by the Secretary of State would not have satisfied fairness. Where these standards as suggested but the court were satisfied, judicial review would provide a procedure compliant with Art 6 because an proper scrutiny could be had by the court of the decision. [2003] 1 All ER 731 (HL) considering Bryan v UK (1996) 21 EHRR 342, ECtHR. See Feld v Barnet LBC (CA) 18/10/04 and Hall v Wandsworth LBC [2004] EWCA Civ 1741 on the tests and procedure to be applied by the reviewing officer: a ‘housing authority is not a court’; ‘its primary task is that of investigation’. It must act fairly, but does not have to engage in indefinite exchange and counter-exchange of evidence and comment. 2 Vilvarajah v UK (1991) 14 EHRR 248; Chahal v UK (1996) 1 BHRC 405. 3 See Alconbury below. See also: R  (Beeson) v Dorset CC  (2003) Times, 2  January: no reason to question the integrity of a decision on the facts and judicial review could rectify any errors; R (L) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] 1 All ER 1062 – judicial review could rectify any shortcomings under Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, s 115; see, on the role of clerks in Scottish District courts (analogue of magistrates’ courts), Clark v Kelly [2003] 1 All ER  1106 (HL); and, on assessors sitting with a judge under Race Relations Act 1976, s  67(4), Ahmed v Governing Body of Oxford University [2003] 1 All ER 915. 4 R (Q) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] 2 All ER 905 (CA) – on the proviso that a ‘fair’ system was in place to question asylum seekers about welfare payments. See R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Adam etc [2005] UKHL 66. 1

866  Chapter 10 10.135 The Runa Begum decision has raised important questions. The impact of the HRA 1998 may have led to an increasing judicialisation of our public services but the courts have shown that they will not require public service providers or state agents to set up procedures satisfying the strict tests of Art 6 ECHR for internal review of rights protected by Art 6 where somewhere in the process there is an opportunity for appropriate judicial challenge of primary facts and the decision is made by parties who are independent – this is not strictly interpreted – of the initial authority. The House of Lords in Runa Begum stressed that although the housing officer in a homeless case had been called upon to resolve some disputed factual issues, these findings of fact were, per Lord Bingham, ‘only staging posts on the way to the much broader judgments’ concerning local conditions and the availability of alternative accommodation, which the housing officer had the specialist knowledge and experience to make. Although the housing officer could not be regarded as independent, since she was employed by the local authority which had made the offer of accommodation which Runa Begum had rejected, statutory regulations provided substantial safeguards to ensure that the review would be independently and fairly conducted, free from improper external influences. Any significant departure from the procedural rules would have afforded a ground of appeal. 10.136  Where a decision complained against ultimately rests on broad discretionary determinations of policy or expediency a full review on the merits is not necessary or appropriate. Where internal review procedures do exist and where they establish questions of primary fact and determine civil rights protected by Art 6, there would have to be an appeal capable of reviewing facts to an independent body acting judicially. The principles have been developed in the following case law. In Tsfayo ((2007) ECHR 656 App No  60860/00) the ECtHR had before it a case from England involving a Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit Review Board (HBRB) comprising five councillors from the council. Housing benefit is a means-tested assistance for rented accommodation. It was an Art 6 protected human right (unlike a decision on homelessness per Tomlinson below). Not only did the HBRB lack any independence from the council executive, it was directly connected to one of the parties to the dispute. Any procedural safeguards were not adequate to ‘overcome this fundamental lack of objective impartiality’ (para 47). The High Court had previously ruled in another case involving a HBRB that it ‘did not have jurisdiction to rehear the evidence or substitute its own views as to the applicant’s credibility. Thus, in this case, there was never the possibility that the central issue would be determined by a tribunal that was independent of one of the parties to the dispute’ (para  48). The procedure constituted a breach of Art 6. Tsfayo was decided in England before the HRA 1989 came into effect. The limited nature of judicial review over the procedures in question at the relevant date had already been established (R  (Bewry) v Norwich City Council [2001] EWHC Admin 657, Moses J). Review cannot upset findings on the weight of evidence as opposed to an absence of evidence or a clear error. The lack of independence and its effect may not be sufficiently scrutinised by the court. Would bias in the composition of a board itself not be subject to review?

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   867 10.137  The ECtHR held that the decision-making process in Tsfayo was significantly different. In contrast to Alconbury and Runa Begum,1 in Tsfayo the HBRB was deciding a simple question of fact: was there ‘good cause’ for the applicant’s delay in making a claim? The HBRB found the applicant’s explanation to be ‘unconvincing’ and rejected her claim for back-payment of benefit. No specialist expertise was required to determine this issue. The factual findings in Tsfayo cannot ‘be said to be merely incidental to the reaching of broader judgments of policy or expediency which it was for the democratically accountable authority to take’ (para  45), as in Alconbury. In Tomlinson v Birmingham City Council [2010] UKSC 8, in ruling that when determining cases of homelessness under statutory provisions, the governing procedures for such a determination do not attract Art 6 protection (and the strict application of impartiality), the justices stated (para 49): ‘That being the present state of the authorities, I would be prepared now to hold that cases where the award of services or benefits in kind is not an individual right of which the applicant can consider himself the holder, but is dependent upon a series of evaluative judgments by the provider as to whether the statutory criteria are satisfied and how the need for it ought to be met, do not engage article  6(1). In my opinion they do not give rise to “civil rights” within the autonomous meaning that is given to that expression for the purposes of that article. The appellants’ right to accommodation under section 193 of the 1996 Act falls into that category. I  would hold that article  6 was not engaged by the decisions that were taken in the appellants’ cases by the reviewing officer.’ See also Makisi (at para 10.23, note 1 above). In Poshteh2 the Supreme Court re-visited the points raised in Ali (joined with Tomlinson) in the light of a fourth chamber judgment of the ECtHR in Ali v United Kingdom ((2016) 63 EHRR 20) where it ruled that Art 6 did apply to the homelessness procedures although the procedures under Housing Act 1996, Part VII are now replaced (see para 10.88, note 5 above). The unanimous judgment of the Supreme Court in Ali v Birmingham City Council was intended to settle the issue at domestic level after a full review of the Strasbourg authorities, the Supreme Court in Poshteh noted (at [32]). It found the judgment surprising in that it failed to address in any detail either the Supreme Court’s reasoning or its concerns over ‘judicialisation’ of the welfare services. The Supreme Court was critical of the manner in which the 4th chamber reasoned to its conclusion. As for comparators used by the ECtHR, ‘It is hard to see any fair comparison with the range of factors to which authorities are entitled to have regard in fulfilling their obligations under the housing legislation’ (at [35]) reinforced by duties under the Equality Act 2010.The UK court’s duty was to have regard to the Strasbourg court under the HRA (citing Manchester City C v Pinnock [2011] 2 AC 104) (at [36]). The Supreme Court should not depart from its prior judgment in Ali but should await a ‘full consideration’ in a decision of the Grand Chamber to decide how, if at all, to depart from its own decision (at [37]). A ‘light review’ of homelessness cases in the courts as established over 30 years ago was no longer in order.3

868  Chapter 10 As to the substance of the appellant’s claim in Poshteh, which involved an Iranian asylum refugee, who claimed the property offered induced ‘panic attacks’ because it reminded her of a former prison in Iran, ‘the appeal on this issue well illustrates the relevance of [the] warning … against over-zealous linguistic analysis. This is not to diminish the importance of the responsibility given to housing authorities and their officers by the 1996 Act, reinforced in the case of disability by the Equality Act 2010. … [T]he decision-letter … viewed as a whole reads as a conscientious attempt by a hard-pressed housing officer to cover every conceivable issue raised in the case … he clearly understood the potential importance of considering her mental state against the background of her imprisonment in Iran’ (at [39]). In Ali v Birmingham City Council [2008] EWCA Civ 1228, which was a joined case in Tomlinson before the Supreme Court, it was stated that Runa Begum (para  10.88, note 5 above) covered questions of primary fact as well as decisions resting on the special expertise of the decisionmaker. 2 Poshteh v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC [2017] UKSC 36. 3 R v London Borough of Hillingdon ex p Puhlhofer [1986] AC 484. 1

10.138  Requests for all relevant documents and information should be made. If they are denied and relied upon by the decision-maker, the denial will have to be justified.1 In a wide range of circumstances, such a practice may well be questioned successfully in the courts.2 The Divisional Court has held that in cases concerning allegations of child abuse parents are entitled to information held by social services departments on their children. The information concerned official police medical reports. The authority should also have helped to arrange for the parents to make their own independent medical inspection (see para 11.16 below).3 Unreasonable and speculative demands would not have to be met. A judgment of a majority of the House of Lords was prepared to accept the ex parte (to one party only) notification of information which was not revealed to the other side in environmental regulation despite the misgivings of some of the law lords.4 Such communications, as a matter of interest, are generally prohibited under American law. Chief Constable of North Wales Police v Evans [1982] 1 WLR 1155, HL; R v Assistant Metropolitan Police Comr, ex p Howell [1986]  RTR  52, CA; Kanda v Government of the Federation of Malaya [1962]  AC  322, PC; Fraser v State Services Commission [1984] 1  NZLR  116: R  (Bentley) v HM  Coroner for Avon [2001]  EWHC  170 Admin. See Lloyds Bank plc v Cassidy (2005) Times, 11 January. 2 R v Secretary of State for Health ex p United States Tobacco International Inc [1992] 1 All ER 212. In Lewis v A-G of Jamaica [2000] 3 WLR 1785 the Privy Council overturned death sentences where there had been a failure to disclose materials to petitioners for mercy. See also, R v Chelsea College of Art and Design, ex p Nash [2000] Ed CR 571. 3 R v Hampshire County Council, ex p K [1990] 2 All ER 129 – juvenile care proceedings. 4 R  ( Edwards and another) v Environment Agency and others [2008]  UKHL  22 and EIAs: Lords Mance and Brown disagreed with the majority on this point. 1

10.139  Nor will the following: (1) Where there are security reasons for withholding information, especially on the grounds of national security.1 However, where English courts refused to balance national security considerations and the security of the individual (C) involved by refusing to review the evidence on which the Secretary of

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   869 State based a decision to deport an Indian national ‘for reasons of a political nature’ that would run foul of Art 5(4)  ECHR. C’s liberty had not been subject to any effective judicial control. While respecting the legitimate requirements of national security and evidence from informers, the courts must provide the individual with an appropriate level of procedural justice.2 The SIAC procedures and their power to rely on closed material were introduced to deal with this problem in respect of those facing deportation on national security grounds.3 One should also refer to the procedures involved in ‘control orders’ under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (para 10.132 above). We have seen how the courts have insisted, largely by ECtHR prompting, that these procedures, and their replacements TPIMs, must comply with the open and fair justice requirements of Arts 5(4) and 6 ECHR (above). (2) Where the identity of informers (and consequential risk of harm to them) may be established by giving detailed information.4 Even here, although there is no need to quote ‘chapter and verse’, an outline of the allegations will be required.5 (3) Where there is an apprehension that the party involved requires detailed information to invoke the law of defamation where qualified privilege may not apply or to intimidate witnesses or to present others giving evidence.6 (4) Where the request is really part of a frustrating exercise or is unnecessary in the circumstances.7 See Council for Civil Service Unions (para  10.117, note 4 above). NB  R  v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Ruddock [1987] 2  All ER  518. Note the important judgments in R (B Mohamed) v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [2010] EWCA Civ 65 and [2010] EWCA Civ 158 on publication of information in and required for litigation which the US intelligence authorities wished to remain secret. 2 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Chahal [1995] 1 All ER 658 and Chahal v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 413. See R (Tucker) v DG National Crime Squad [2003] EWCA Civ 2 and seeking disclosure of sensitive intelligence reports. 3 It was reported by Justice in 2009 that 14 statutes had been passed since 1997 authorising use of secret evidence in tribunals as diverse as employment and land use planning: Justice Secret Evidence (2009). 4 See R v Gaming Board for Great Britain, ex p Benaim and Khaida [1970] 2 QB 417, CA; Re Pergamon Press Ltd [1971] Ch 388, CA. 5 As above. And see: R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Duggan [1994] 3 All ER 277; and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Hickey (No 2) [1995] 1 All ER 490. 6 Ibid and Maxwell v Department of Trade and Industry [1974] QB 523, CA. 7 Public Disclosure Commission v Isaacs [1989] 1  All ER  137, PC; cf Bushell v Secretary of State for the Environment [1981]  AC  75, HL and refusal to allow cross examination of departmental representatives on what was alleged to be ‘policy’. 1

10.140  A committee entitled to sit in closed session does not have to disclose legal advice from its officers to persons with a right to be heard or to disclose its advice.1 The High Court has ruled that the PCA has not acted unfairly in sending a draft report of his investigation to the department complained against but not to the complainant, because it was the department that was being investigated and not the complainant.2 R v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, ex p Stoop [1992] PLR 58, HL. R v Parliamentary Comr for Administration, ex p Dyer [1994] 1 All ER 375.

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870  Chapter 10 the right to legal representation

10.141  A fair procedure may necessitate legal representation. In cases where a disciplined organisation is concerned, eg  the police or a prison, the courts have denied the automatic right to legal representation for parties involved in disciplinary hearings.1 The parties have therefore been denied the presumed benefits that representation will bring for forensic examination of evidence and eliciting of information as well as interpretation of possibly complex rules. But the courts have insisted that legal representation should be allowed if reasonably required in the circumstances because of the seriousness of a charge and potential penalties; whether any points of law are likely to arise; the capacity of the party to conduct his or her own case; whether procedural difficulties are likely to arise; the need for a reasonably speedy dispatch of a disciplinary matter in an institution such as a prison; and the need for fairness between all the parties involved.2 In other cases the courts have held that although legal representation before a domestic body was discretionary, it may well be mandatory where serious consequences follow.3 The Court of Human Rights has ruled that whether offences in prison were criminal or disciplinary was only a starting point in an inquiry; disciplinary proceedings before the governor attended by forfeiture of remission was a criminal matter and proceeding after refusing legal representation for a prisoner was a violation of Art 6 ECHR.4 This decision must put under question a previous ruling of the House of Lords that the mere fact that a disciplinary charge may also be the grounds for bringing a criminal charge will not, ipso facto, be a sufficient ground for insisting upon legal representation.5 The Prison Rules have been amended (SI 2002/2116) by providing an adjudicator approved by the Secretary of State to inquire into charges of serious offences against of discipline. A governor who determines that a charge is sufficiently serious must refer the charge to the adjudicator. At an inquiry by the adjudicator, a prisoner is given the opportunity of legal representation. Elsewhere, in Kulkani v Milton Keynes Hospital Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 789 a doctor at a disciplinary hearing was entitled to representation by a Medical Protection Society lawyer. Art 6 ECHR required legal representation in disciplinary cases with serious implications if a ruling was adverse. In R (G) v X School Governors [2009] EWHC 504 refusal of legal representation before school governors dealing with a serious disciplinary subject and serious consequences if a finding was adverse necessitated legal representation even though it was not a criminal matter according to Convention law as in Engel.6 This ruling was upheld by the Court of Appeal but reversed by majority in the Supreme Court, which reasoned that Art 6(1) rights were not in play in this case because this was an internal disciplinary matter and the decision on barring the teacher from working with children would be determined on appeal by the Independent Standards Authority where legal representation would be allowed. It has to be said that this case reveals a limited approach to the fairness in issue under Art 6(1) and how the common law may have provided fuller protection.7 Lord Kerr dissenting stated: ‘The overall process involving the determination of the claimant’s civil right must be fair. In light of this, it is mistaken to concentrate substantially or exclusively on an individual stage in that process. In this case, the disciplinary proceedings were critical in testing the evidence against the claimant. To recognise his right to be legally represented at

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   871 that stage is consonant with the proper safeguarding of his article 6 rights.’8 We respectfully agree. See Fraser v Mudge [1975] 1 WLR 1132, CA; Maynard v Osmond [1977] QB 240, CA, per contra Joplin v Chief Constable of Vancouver (1985) 20  DLR  (4th) 314. Police regulations in England and Wales were amended to allow legal representation. In prison disciplinary proceedings, see Whitfield v UK (para 10.117 above). 2 R v Board of Visitors of Wormwood Scrubs Prison, ex p Anderson [1984] 1 All ER 799. 3 Manchanda v Medical Eye Centre Association [1986] LS Gaz R 3673, CA; see Pett v Greyhound Racing Association Ltd [1969] 1 QB 125, CA; Enderby Town Football Club Ltd v Football Association Ltd [1971] Ch 591. 4 Ezeh and Connors v UK  [2004] 39  EHER  1. See Tangney v Governor of HMP  Elmley and Home Secretary [2005] EWCA Civ 1009. See R (Cannon) v Governor of Full Sutton Prison (30/1/03): the permission of the governor was required before a prisoner could exchange legal documents with a legal adviser – requirement was held proportional. 5 Hone v Maze Prison Board of Visitors [1988] 1 All ER 321, HL. 6 Engel v Netherlands (1979–80) 1 EHRR 647, ECtHR. 7 Cf Al Rawi v The Security Services [2011] UKSC 34 and Tariq v Home Office [2011] UKSC 35, para 9. And para 10.127 above. 8 R (G) v Governors of X School [2011] UKSC 30 citing Ringeisen v Austria (No 1) (1971) 1 EHRR 455 and Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v Belgium (1981) 4 EHRR 1. 1

10.142  In disciplinary, and non-disciplinary, administrative decision-making, although legal representation is not uncommon,1 in the absence of the above considerations there would appear to be no legal duty to allow representation.2 Statements do exist that in the absence of specific statutory or other prohibitions an individual who has a right of appearance before a statutory tribunal is entitled to be represented by a legal adviser or other appropriate spokesperson.3 To interfere with a prisoner’s right of access to legal advice by reading his correspondence to lawyers has been interpreted as a denial of a prisoner’s right of unimpeded access to the courts.4 The House of Lords has ruled that preventing a journalist conducting an interview with a prisoner may amount to an interference with a prisoner’s right to freedom of expression and the right to have his case investigated to establish the safety of his conviction.5 These are further examples of recently discovered fundamental human rights under the common law and which exist independently of the HRA 1998.6 We have seen how the Supreme Court has often stated that common law protection is no less effective than the ECHR.7 See Lonrho plc v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [1989] 2 All ER 609, HL. Legal aid for representation is extremely limited and covers those bodies referred to at para 10.65, note 2 above. 3 Woolf and Jowell (eds) De Smith’s Judicial Review (8th edn, 2018), at para  7.076 and seq (see para 10.114, note 1 above) and ibid for interpreters and litigation friends at 7.082-3. See Lord Hutton HC 247 (2003–04), ch 13. 4 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Leech (No 2) [1994] QB 198, CA. 5 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Simms [1999] 3 All ER 400, HL. In R (Hirst) v Secretary of State (2002) Times, 10  April, a policy (based on regulations) which prohibited a prisoner the right to contact media whenever his purpose was comment on matters of legitimate public interest was lawful. See also Broadmoor Hospital Authority v R [2000] 2 All ER 727 (CA): unsuccessful attempts to stop publication of a book by an inmate of a special hospital of his book about his crime; R (Nilson) v Governor of Full Sutton Prison [2004) EWCA Civ 1540, 2 February: refusal to hand back to a prisoner autobiographical writings under Prison Standing Order 5 was not a breach of Art 10 ECHR and (2004) Times, 23 November. 1 2

872  Chapter 10 Note HRA 1998, s 11 which states that rights under the Convention do not restrict any other rights conferred on an individual by any other laws including common law and EC law. NB HM Treasury v Ahmed and ors [2010] UKSC 2 and 5. 7 See eg Lord Toulson in Kennedy v Charities Commission [2014] UKSC 20 and Poshteh (para 10.137 above). 6

10.143 Wider-ranging inquiries such as those conducted into the Hillsborough football disaster by Sir Peter Taylor and into prison riots by Lord Woolf have adopted more restricted approaches to the conduct of the inquiry than might be usual in eg planning inquiries. The editors of de Smith put the matter as follows: ‘only those persons whose actions were at risk of being criticised were allowed to be represented, witnesses were normally only called by counsel to the inquiry, who exercised his discretion as to who should be called, and cross-examination was strictly limited. Different techniques were used for different classes of evidence, only part was given orally (not all in public) …. And in the case of the Prison Inquiry even seminars were employed to canvass issues of a wide-ranging nature.’1 This compares with the much wider-ranging enquiry conducted by the independent panel into the Hillsborough disaster which reported in 2012 and which resulted in publication and disclosure of ‘information [which] will add significantly to public understanding’.2 At the Grenfell inquiry in 2018, lawyers representing core participants were only able to question witnesses with the chair’s permission. In most cases, they had to give five days’ notice of questions. A Protocol on Legal Representation at Public Expense (August 2017) was produced by the chair. De Smith’s Judicial Review (2018), above, para 7.118. See Effective Inquiries (DCA, May 2004) and Inquiries Act 2005. See Lord Hutton’s inquiry into the death of the WMD expert David Kelly HC 247 (2003–04). 2 Hillsborough – The Report of the Hillsborough Independent Panel HC 581 (2012). The Home Office was faced with a bill of £63.6 million for the legal costs of families of the 96 victims. 1

10.144  The approaches were adopted by Taylor and Woolf to save time and resources and to prevent the inquiry being overwhelmed by material. This allowed for the expeditious production of reports without complaint of unfairness say the editors. Sir Richard Scott adopted a more restrictive approach to the representation of witnesses before his famous Matrix Churchill inquiry.1 HC 115 (1995/96) and Blom-Cooper (1994) PL 1. On the child abuse inquiry, see para 10.104 above; and, on the Grenfell Tower inquiry, see https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/ where additional assessors were appointed to help examine wider social factors in the disaster. There were three counsel to the inquiry and one solicitor.

1

10.145  Where a person in police custody was refused access to a lawyer for the first 48 hours in detention there was a breach of a right to a fair trial, the ECtHR has held.1 Murray v UK (1996) 22 EHRR 29. See also Magee v UK (2000) Times, 20 June.

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Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   873

Cross-examination 10.146  Like legal representation, cross-examination may well in the circumstances be necessary for the realisation of a fair procedure. It may also serve to intimidate those taking part in the proceedings so as to prevent a fair procedure. 10.147  The general principle would seem to be that if a witness is called, especially in a disciplinary hearing, then s/he should be cross-examined, perhaps with the questions being put through the chairperson. When a witness is not called, and hence cannot be cross-examined, then whether this amounts to a denial of fair procedure depends on the circumstances which were discussed above in relation to hearsay evidence. Where for instance, in school exclusion appeals a witness is fully aware of the case against him, an absence of witnesses at an oral hearing did not undermine the adequacy of the procedure.1 A prisoner appearing before a prison disciplinary tribunal following a positive mandatory drug test was not allowed to cross-examine the relevant laboratory scientist provided that he had been informed about the tests that had been used and the safeguards to ensure accuracy. This is an important proviso.2 Where a witness has given oral evidence and a request to cross-examine the witness is made by a party, especially where there is a dispute of fact with important consequences, crossexamination should, it is submitted, be allowed.3 In R (Al-Sweady) v Secretary of State for Defence [2009] EWHC 2387 (Admin) on cross-examination and judicial review proceedings the court commented on the lamentable level of disclosure in a case of killings by the UK military in Iraq. The use of cross-examination in judicial review applications is considered below (para 11.54). R (J) v School and College Head Teacher [2003] EWHC 1747. See R (S) v Knowsley NHS PCT etc [2006] EWHC 26 where serious disputes of fact will require cross-examination. 2 R v Governor of Swaleside Prison, ex p Wynter (1998) Times, 2 June. 3 Knowsley above and R (Sim) v Parole Board [2003] EWCA Civ 1845. 1

10.148  Where there are opportunities for full written and oral representations before the taking of adverse decisions, and where these may be put through a legal representative, then the absence of the opportunity to cross-examine a witness making accusations may not be fatal to a fair procedure.1 Where serious consequences flow from a decision, then the right to cross-examine should be presumed. In one case, the classification of a non-discrimination notice served by the Commission for Racial Equality as an administrative matter, and not as a penalty, justified the conclusion that there was no implied right to crossexamination.2 The crucial finding of such an issue turning on a mere appellation is unfortunate: what is of significance is the seriousness of the consequences. The same case also held that as the Commission, with powers of subpoena,3 has power to delegate its function of formal investigation to its officers, then its officers’ reports are necessarily hearsay if no direct evidence is taken at a hearing. As it is proper to delegate its functions in such a way, it is proper to act on such reports.4 For the purpose of administrative convenience, one would not expect every hearing in the administrative process to be fully confrontational, adversarial and judicialised. On the other hand, the seriousness of the consequences may dictate

874  Chapter 10 that a party making a serious allegation should be cross-examined, and where no improper motive on the part of the requester can be discerned or suspected such examination should be permitted.5 All that the rules of natural justice mean are that the proceedings must be conducted in a way which is fair in all the circumstances. The presence of matters covered by Art 6 will involve degrees of procedural fairness consistent with that provision. Disputes of fact would have to be subjected to cross examination where there would be serious consequences for an individual’s civil rights and obligations. R v Commission for Racial Equality, ex p Cottrell and Rothon [1980] 3 All ER 265: the proceedings were classified as more investigative than judicial: sed quaere? 2 R v Commission for Racial Equality, ex p Cottrell and Rothon [1980] 3 All ER 265. 3 For a ‘named’ investigation, ie into ‘persons’ as identified; for a general investigation, the subpoena powers are those of the Secretary of State: Race Relations Act 1976, s 50 (now Equality Act 2010) and Re Prestige Group plc, Commission for Racial Equality v Prestige Group plc [1984] 1 WLR 335. 4 R v Commission for Racial Equality, ex p Cottrell and Rothon [1980] 3 All ER 265, and NB R v Hull Prison Board of Visitors ex parte St Germain (No 2) [1979] 3 All ER 545. 5 See, however, Benaim and Khaida etc, para 10.139, note 4 above. 1

10.149  The courts have given wide leeway to bodies carrying out administrative inquiries to conduct their procedures in a way which the bodies deem appropriate. The matter is within their discretion unless Parliament determines otherwise. They have shown reluctance to interfere with situations where cross-examination, and also final submissions, were not allowed on the grounds that the hearing, by a regional passenger committee, was not ‘justiciable’1 but purely fact-finding and recommendatory. Again the test should be, what does fairness require in the circumstances? If there is any possibility that ‘facts’ are being proffered which are not facts, then one could argue that cross-examination should be allowed. But there is a reluctance to over-legalise procedures which are designed for informality. R  v London Regional Passengers Committee, ex p Brent London Borough Council (1985) Financial Times, 29 November, CA. See Effective Inquiries (DCA, May 2004) and the Inquiries Act 2005; para 10.104 above.

1

10.150  Where the facts are concerned with the formulation of government policy, and where the ‘facts’ can be ascertained by the Minister and his advisers, then cross-examination at an inquiry into objections will not be required as a matter of fairness.1 Nor indeed might discussion of complex facts justifying a policy. If such has taken place at an inquiry, then it need not as a matter of law form part of the report to the Minister by the person holding the hearing.2 There are more appropriate fora for the examination of government policy.3 The FOIA 2000 allows for the release of factual information related to the policy formulation process (para 1.170 above). We discussed the impact of this measure in ch 1. Bushell v Secretary of State for the Environment [1981] AC 75. R  v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Gwent County Council [1987] 1  All ER  161, CA; reversing QBD. 3 Eg, Parliament. 1 2

10.151  Where as a result of a complaint an investigation into alleged malpractices by a high-ranking official is instigated, the complainant has no right

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   875 to question or rebut the case of the investigating commission where it decides, after investigation, that the complaint has not been made out.1 It is submitted that this is not so much a question of fairness as an attempted and improper assumption by an individual of an official body’s responsibilities and duties. Public Disclosure Commission v Isaacs [1989] 1 All ER 137, PC.

1

Reasons for decisions 10.152  It remains true as a statement of general principle, though for how much longer remains debatable, that there is no obligation for administrators to give reasons for their decisions, whether adverse or favourable, in English or Scottish law.1 Numerous decisions have formerly emphasised the fact that it is neither a rule of law nor, therefore, a component of natural justice.2 Without reasons for decisions, a right of challenge or a right of appeal may well be little more than illusory.3 The Privy Council has acknowledged the growing trend in the law to require reasons for decisions a ‘trend that was consistent with current developments towards an increased openness in matters of government and administration.’ It was also a position that has been affected by the HRA 1998 and Art 6 of the ECHR where an individual’s civil rights and obligations are concerned. Stefan v General Medical Council [1999] 1  WLR  1293, PC. See R  v DPP, ex p Manning [2000] 3 WLR 463: it is good administrative practice to give reasons for not prosecuting. Mousaka Inc v Golden Seagull Maritime Inc (2001) Times, 3  October: refusing permission to appeal under Arbitration Act 1979, s 69 did not breach Art 6 if no reasons were given! For a contrary approach in Canada: a common law presumption that reasons will be given for adverse decisions: Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1999] 2 SCR 817 and D Dyzenhaus (ed) The Unity of Public Law (2004). R (Hasan) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2008] EWCA Civ 1312: FOIA 2000 has not changed the general rule that there is no duty to provide reasons for decisions. Culkin v Wirral Independent Appeal Panel [2009]  EWHC  868 (Admin) – an adequate explanation of school exclusion had been given. In Lee-Hirons v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] UKSC 46 an inadequately performed process in which a written justification was required for recalling a mental health patient under mental health legislation did not, on the facts, vitiate a recall despite a loss of liberty. In other contexts the courts have not allowed additional evidence to make good deficiencies in reasons required by a statute: Keane v Law Society [2009] EWHC 783 (Admin); R  (Lanner PC) v Cornwall Council [2013]  EWCA  Civ 1290; R  (Mott) v Environment Agency [2016] EWCA Civ 564 at [55]–[58]. 2 Wade & Forsyth Administrative Law (11th edn, 2014) ch 14; Justice/All Souls Administrative Law: Some Necessary Reforms (1988). See M Elliott ‘Has the Common Law Duty to give Reasons Come of Age Yet?’ (2011) Public Law 56. 3 See Minister of National Revenue v Wright’s Canadian Ropes [1947] AC 109, PC; see also: English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 2409 (CA) judges must give adequate reasons: so too must tribunals: Burns v Royal Mail Group plc and Another (2004) Times, 24 June. See further R  (Cunningham) v Exeter Crown Court [2003] 2 Cr App R  (S) 64: reasons must be given for costs order refusing defendant’s costs and also Lavelle v Lavelle (9/3/04) (CA). NB statutory provision and Coleen Properties Ltd v Minister of Housing and Local Government [1971] 1 WLR 433, CA. On reasons in planning decisions, Oxford City Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2007]  EWHC  769 (Admin); R  (Wall) v Brighton and Hove City Council [2004] EWHC 2582 (Admin); R (Persimmons Homes Ltd) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2007]  EWHC  1985 (Admin); Halifax Life Ltd v Eagle Life Assurance Society [2007] EWHC 503 (Comm): reasons under Arbitration Act 1996 regarding expert determination; R (Mevagissey PC) v Cornwall Council [2013] EWHC 3684 (Admin). 1

876  Chapter 10 10.153  To this opening bold statement of general principle, however, may be added several caveats. First, the courts will insist that a decision is made on the basis of relevant evidence before a decision-maker, and they are prepared to strike down a decision which is not justified by the factual evidence.1 Such an approach was initially facilitated by the extension of the concept of the record in judicial decisions providing more material for a court’s scrutiny.2 More recent years have seen the courts accepting the general benefits of greater transparency in decision-making.3 However, in the absence of information before the court, it is up to the party alleging illegality to substantiate his or her case. In judicial review procedure courts are empowered to make orders for disclosure and crossexamination but are usually cautious in invoking this power (see para  11.53 below). The trend to greater transparency in public law litigation has been noted (paras 10.115 and 4.4 above). See R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Cumbria County Council [1983] RTR 129, CA; Ashbridge Investments Ltd v Minister of Housing and Local Government [1965] 3 All ER 371, CA; and see ex p Turgut (para 10.127, note 6 above). See also OFT v IBA Healthcare [2004] 4 All ER 1103. See also the Competition Appeal Tribunal in Unichem Ltd v OFT [2005] CAT 8. On submission of new evidence by a claimant, see E v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 49 acknowledging, but not slavishly following, Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489. 2 Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1992, s 10(6). See Admin Decisions (Jud Rev) Act 1977 (Australia) https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2017C00031 (27/04/2018) with amendments. 3 R v Ministry of Defence ex p Murray [1998] COD 134, DC. 1

10.154  Secondly, the courts will not allow the statutory purpose of legislation to be defeated or overborne by an improper motive on the part of the minister or other official.1 In the cases illustrating this proposition, there has been evidence of improper motive on the part of the Minister.2 However, the case would have to be a flagrant one for the courts to intervene, and a decision of the Law Lords in 1989 shows that they are sympathetically disposed to ministerial pleas of the complexity of regulatory regimes in legislation and that they will usually be slow to find bad faith in a failure to give reasons.3 However, the circumstances should be carefully noted. The case concerned a report by DTI inspectors into a takeover and the failure of the Secretary of State to publish that report; to refuse to make a reference to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission; and a refusal to give reasons for his decision. Of constraining influence in the judges’ minds was the fact that a criminal investigation into the contents of the report was still being conducted with a possibility of prosecutions. Also, the Secretary of State had been advised by, not constrained by, a report from the Director-General of Fair Trading which recommended that a reference should not be made. Padfield v Minister of Agriculture Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997, HL. See R v Ministry of Defence, ex p Murray [1998] COD 134, for a general statement. 2 As above. 3 Lonrho case (para 10.82, note 1 above). 1

10.155  Thirdly, the judiciary have shown a preparedness to accept that where a situation calls out for, or begs, a reasoned justification, they may well insist that such justification should be given even though no statute requires one, or they may draw inferences which are adverse to the decision-maker.1 The common law will supplement the omission of the legislature. Several important decisions have

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   877 put a gloss on this developing duty. In Cunningham2 the Court of Appeal held that where a judicialised tribunal (acting analogously with industrial and employment tribunals) was making decisions affecting an individual’s rights and even though under a prerogative power relating to civil servants, it must nonetheless give reasons for decisions which revealed how it directed its mind giving an indication of whether its decisions are lawful. Failure to provide such reasons was a breach of natural justice on the facts. The absence of reasons hindered opportunities to challenge the decision. In a dramatic development in Doody,3 the House of Lords held that facilitating a right of challenge or appeal was but one feature behind a right to reasons. Another would be where serious adverse consequences followed a decision and where to leave it without a reasoned explanation is an affront to justice and fairness. Doody concerned the setting of the tariff period of imprisonment of a life prisoner. The courts have made it clear that a finding that a body is acting ‘judicially as in Cunningham’ is not essential to establish a duty to give reasons. What is crucial is the impact of the decision on individuals’ lives. However, this point was made in a case where the courts refused to impose a duty to give reasons in a situation where it was felt they lacked expertise to interfere with the subject matter in question, ie ‘pure academic judgements’ relating to the quality of research upon which decisions were made vis-à-vis state funding. It might be different if evidence were present of discrimination or unfairness or a decision is ‘inexplicable’ or ‘aberrant’.4 R v Lancashire County Council, ex p Huddleston [1986] 2 All ER 941, CA; Lonrho at 620c; New Zealand Fishing Industry Association Ltd v Minister of Agriculture Fisheries and Food [1988] 1 NZLR 544, NZ CA. See also: R v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council, ex p Rouf (1989) 21 HLR 294 and R v Nottingham City Council, ex p Costello (1989) 21 HLR 301 for fairness in homelessness inquiries. See para 10.137 above. 2 R v Civil Service Appeal Board, ex p Cunningham [1991] 4 All ER 310, CA. 3 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Doody [1994] 1 AC 531, HL. 4 R v Higher Education Funding Council, ex p Institute of Dental Surgery [1994] 1 All ER 651. 1

10.156  As dramatic was the Court of Appeal decision which heard Mohamed Al Fayed’s appeal from the High Court against the refusal of the Home Secretary to allow him British nationality. Although under s 44 of the British Nationality Act 1981 nothing required the relevant authorities to give reasons for decisions, nevertheless fairness may require that the applicant was provided with sufficient information relating to any concerns or misgivings the Home Secretary may have about the application and which it was not contrary to the public interest to divulge.1 The Home Secretary subsequently undertook to provide reasons in nationality cases. Where disagreement arose between a local authority and an inspector of an inquiry into a development plan, the authority was under a duty to give reasons for its insistence that a site’s green belt merits outweighed the worst case analysis of a housing shortage. Such a balancing exercise was not a matter of purely subjective planning opinion but its absence was a failure to identify overriding objective considerations leading to a decision. Its decision could not therefore stand.2 The Court of Appeal has set a high benchmark for the duty of candour and cooperation and reasons in assessing the eligibility of unaccompanied asylum-seeking children to be transferred to the United Kingdom.3 A decision of the Court of Appeal in 2017 stated that, while there is no universal obligation to give reasons in all circumstances, reasons should be

878  Chapter 10 given unless there was a proper justification for not doing so. This is a broad and bold statement.4 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Fayed [1997] 1 All ER 228, CA, and see R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Venables [1997] 3 All ER 97, HL. And in Stefan v GMC above, the absence of a statutory requirement to give reasons nonetheless did not rule out the necessity of brief reasons. 2 Peel Investments (North) Ltd v Bury Metropolitan Borough Council [1999] PLCR 307, CA. 3 R (Citizens UK) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 1812. 4 Oakley v S Cambridgeshire DC [2017] EWCA Civ 71 at [70] per Elias LJ. 1

10.157  In spite of these advances, the basic principle holds again and again and a substantial body of case-law exemplifies the proposition that where there is no duty to give reasons imposed by statute, the courts will not, and should not, require them.1 Decisions appear inconsistent.2 Nor will the courts require ‘reasons for the reasons’ where it is argued that the reasons as provided (under statutory regulations) are no more than standardised responses.3 However, in refusing to allocate a child to a school of his parents’ first choice, a standard letter was not sufficient and had to contain some more precise reasons.4 Contrariwise, reasons for not giving a capital grant may be ‘brief even though an explanation of a rejection had been promised.5 In prison administration a denial of reasons when refusing to accept the Parole Board’s recommendation to release a prisoner6 and a failure either to hear a prisoner before, or to give him adequate reasons within a reasonable time, for his removal from association under r 43 of the Prison Rules 1964 have not constituted a denial of fair procedure.7 The former decision must now be read in the light of Doody and Smith and other decisions where the courts have upgraded the fairness of proceedings even in a custodial context. These earlier decisions are unlikely to be followed today and the impact of ECtHR decisions and common law development should be noted.8 Such cases from the past can be explained by the overall desire to maintain security and safety in prison administration but more recent decisions have shown that such arguments must not be too readily accepted where fundamental rights are in issue.9 Osborn (para 10.121 above) is illustrative of the new approach. Good order and safety may be decisive in cases where those suspected by the Secretary of State of being terrorists are detained under Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, s 21 (upheld by the Special Immigration Appeal Commission and who were allowed access to reporters from the BBC and Guardian but only within earshot of officials). The detainees claimed a breach of their rights under Art 10 but the court was satisfied that the safeguard, which had been agreed to by the reporters, was necessary for the maintenance of prison order.10 Where an individual is affected by the exercise of the royal prerogative, viz refusal of a passport, s/he is entitled to be informed of reasons for the refusal11 but not where ex gratia payments were refused under the royal prerogative although in a recent case the decision was explained.12 See eg R v Secretary of State for Social Services, ex p Connolly [1986] 1 WLR 421, CA; R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex p Moore [1999] 2 All ER 90; R v Secretary of State for the Environment etc, ex p Marson (1999) 7 P & CR 202, CA; R v University College London, ex p Idriss [1999] Ed CR  462 – refusal to admit to a course. See R  (Save Britain’s Heritage) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2018] EWCA Civ 2137 although note effect of legitimate expectation here.

 1

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   879 See eg R v Islington London Borough Council, ex p Trail [1994] 2 FCR 1261 and R v Bristol City Council, ex p Bailey (1994) Times, 23 November.  3 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Swati [1986] 1 All ER 717, CA; see R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p Hackney London Borough Council (1983) 81 LGR 688.  4 R v Birmingham City Council, ex p M (1998) Times, 13 October. In R (Reading BC) v Admissions Appeal Panel for Reading BC [2005] EWHC 2378 an admissions’ appeal panel had to give reasons in an appeal where it branded the authority’s decision as unreasonable.  5 R (Asha) v Millennium Commission [2003] EWCA Civ 88. In S Bucks DC & Another v Porter the House of Lords held that planning reasons (by an inspector) may be brief – substantial prejudice must be shown in failing to provide an adequately reasoned decision. See OFT v IBA Healthcare [2004] 4 All ER 1103 at 1134–35 per Carnwath LJ: requirement for reasons does not mean the detail of a legal judgment or an inquiry report.  6 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Gunnell [1984] Crim LR 170; Weeks v UK (1987) 10 EHRR 293; R v Parole Board, ex p Bradley [1990] 3 All ER 828.  7 R v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison, ex p Hague [1992] 1 AC 58; on appeal [1992] 1 AC 58, CA; Re Hales (1990) Times, 8 May.  8 Doody above. See also: R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Hickey (No 2) [1995] 1  WLR  734; R  v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p McAvoy [1998] 1  WLR  790; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Duggan [1994] 3 All ER 277 – an outline of reasons for security categorisation may be sufficient; and R v Governor of Maidstone Prison, ex p Peries [1998] COD 150 – standards of Duggan not applicable in all categorisation decisions – reasons should be given for decision but no entitlement to prior notification of materials. On the ECtHR, see Ezeh (para  10.141, note 4 above). See also R  (Ali) v Director of High Security Prisons [2009] EWHC 1732 (Admin): classification of prisoner as high-risk meant provision of reasons and an opportunity of a hearing to review decision, but not a prior disclosure of material considered.  9 See eg  R  v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Simms [1999] 3  All ER  400, HL. R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 2 AC 532. 10 R (A) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] HRLR 12. 11 R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex p Everett [1989] QB 811, CA, reasons actually known to applicant. 12 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Harrison [1988] 3 All ER 86; see Re McFarland [2004] UKHL 17 where an explanation was given.  2

10.158  In cases where an authority has removed a contractor from a list of approved contractors1 and removed peoples’ names from a local authority’s list of potential foster parents2 the courts have ruled that the parties have the right to know why and to rebut any ‘allegations’. Similarly, a juvenile court must state its reasons for refusing an application to discharge a care order in respect of a child.3 Where there is a duty to provide reasons, but the information has been communicated to the individual via another source, a failure to give reasons may well not be fatal.4 R v Enfield London Borough Council, ex p T F Unwin (Roydon) Ltd (1989) 46 BLR 1. R v Wandsworth London Borough Council, ex p P [1990] FCR 89. 3 R v Worcester City Juvenile Court, ex p F [1989] 1 All ER 500; and see W v Greenwich London Borough Council [1989] 2 FLR 67: reasons for refusing parental access. See Re KL [2015] EWCA Civ 992. 4 See ex p Everett above. 1 2

10.159  Since the 1989 judgment of the Court of Appeal in Cunningham there has been a growing judicial awareness of the content of fairness, and the courts have spelt out more and more clearly the duty of judges themselves to give adequate reasons for decisions.1 But the position is still blemished by inconsistency. The inconsistency is not purely domestic. Under EU law, for instance, a general duty to give reasons for decisions has been developed by the

880  Chapter 10 courts (CJEU) and has followed from the duty to give reasons for their legislative decisions under Art 253  EC (previously Art 190, now Art 296(2)  TFEU) and from general principles of law.2 However, in Sodemare the ECJ ruled3 that the requirement to give reasons for a legislative decision in Art 253 did not apply to the laws of a member state which fell within the purview of Community law. The Community courts have ruled that, where reasons should be given, they should be provided at the time of decision and not subsequently.4 Important guidance on the timing or reasons is contained in Nash v Chelsea College.5 Flannery v Halifax Estate Agencies Ltd [2000] 1 All ER 373, CA; English v Emery Reinbold & Strick Ltd [2002] 3  All ER  385 (CA). In Baird v Thurrock BC  (2005) App LR  11/07, (2005) Times (15 November): county court judges should give judgments with sufficient reasons on conflicts of evidence. 2 UNECTEF v Heylens: 222/86 [1987] ECR 4097; EC Commission v Italy: 7/61 [1961] ECR 317. 3 Case C-70/95: [1998] 4 CMLR 667. 4 Case 195/80 Michael v European Parliament [1981] ECR 2861; see also, in a domestic setting, R (S) v Brent LBC [2002] EWCA Civ 693. 5 [2001] All ER D 133. See the interesting R (Privacy International) v HMRC [2014] EWHC 1475 (Admin) para  67 and reliance upon giving information in R  (Corner House Research) v DPP  [2008]  UKHL  60. See also VK  v Norfolk CC  (2005) Times, 6  January – inadequate SEN reasons cannot be substantially supplemented. See also, R (Wall) v Brighton and Hove City Council [2004] EWHC 2582. See, however, OFT v IBA Healthcare (para 10.157, note 5 above). 1

Section 10 of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1992 10.160  This section, which was first enacted in 1958 following the wake of the Franks Report, imposes a duty on tribunals listed in Sch 1 to the Act to furnish a statement (written or oral) of the reasons for a decision. The duty only arises if a request for reasons is made1 on or before the giving or notification of the decision. Reasons may be refused or curtailed on grounds of national security. Reasons may be refused to persons not primarily concerned with the decision if the tribunal is of the opinion that to furnish them would be contrary to the interests of any person primarily concerned.2 A statement of reasons is part of the decision and will be incorporated into the record.3 The section is silent about providing a statement of established facts. Specific rules usually impose an unqualified duty. Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1992, s 10(3). 3 Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1992, s 10(6). 1 2

Failure to provide reasons 10.161  It is probably correct to say that a failure to provide adequate reasons is not, under the above provisions of the 1992 Act, an automatic error of law justifying judicial intervention.1 However, if inadequate reasoning reveals erroneous or irrational decision-making, or such can be inferred from the reasoning, then the courts will intervene.2 Perfunctory reasons per se may not be a ground for invalidating a decision but may be the grounds for awarding a mandatory order (mandamus) to supply adequate reasons.3 The courts have

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   881 shown more recent signs of a readiness to strike down decisions in breach of statutory duties to provide reasons or to treat failures to provide reasons as breaches of fair treatment.4 Industrial (now employment) tribunals may give reasons in summary form only (Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2013, SI 2013/1237) except in four cases.5 Crake v Supplementary Benefits Commission [1982] 1 All ER 498; see R v Northants CC ex p Marshall [1998]  COD  457. Cf Re Poyser and Mills’ Arbitration [1964] 2  QB  467 and R  v Mental Health Review Tribunal, ex p Pickering [1986] 1 All ER 99. 2 Crake supra and Meek v City of Birmingham District Council [1987] IRLR 250, CA. 3 Elliott v London Borough of Southwark [1976] 2 All ER 781, CA. 4 R v Westminster City Council, ex p Ermakov [1996] 2 All ER 302, CA; R v City of London Corpn, ex p Matson [1997] 1 WLR 765, CA; R (Wall) v Brighton and Hove CC [2004] EWHC 2582 (Admin). 5 Two of the cases allow a party to request full reasons. The Court of Appeal has also allowed exiguous reasons, though cf Meek’s case, note 2 above. William Hill Organisation Ltd v Gavas [1990] IRLR 488, CA. See SI 2013/1237, Sch 2 for procedures in national security cases. 1

10.162  Secretaries of State are under the duty, in s  10 of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1992, to give reasons for their decisions after an inquiry into planning or compulsory purchase appeals and after the inspector has reported to him. Such a duty is now contained in procedural rules.1 Although judicial decisions have treated benevolently a planning authority’s failure to comply with statutory duties to provide reasons,2 the duties under the procedural regulations have on occasions been very strictly interpreted to the detriment of the authorities.3 Reasons must be clear and intelligible and must reflect the substance of relevant arguments that were adumbrated. The House of Lords has refused to hold in a planning case that a court must first decide whether reasons were adequate and then assess whether any inadequacy could reveal a shortcoming in the decisionmaking process.4 Does a decision leave ‘genuine as opposed to forensic doubt’ as to what was decided and why?5 In planning also, reasons by a Secretary of State which seem sparse may be given a helpful gloss by matters raised at an inquiry and the inspector’s reasons in the recommendations.6 On application to the courts to quash compulsory purchase orders, there is some reason to believe that the courts will examine the factual basis of a decision with more than their customary degree of scrutiny to establish a ‘sufficient justification’ for a ministerial decision on the merits.7 See paras 9.81 et seq above and eg TCP (Inquiries Procedure) Rules 2000, SI 2000/1624, r 18, amended by SI 2013/2137. 2 Brayhead (Ascot) Ltd v Berkshire County Council [1964] 2 QB 303, and see: Save Britain’s Heritage v Secretary of State for the Environment [1991] 2 All ER 10, HL; Bolton MDC v Secretary of State for the Environment (1995) 71 P&CR 309 (HL) and S. Bucks DC v Porter (No 2) [2004] UKHL 33 reversing [2003] EWCA Civ 687. 3 See Volvox Establishment v Secretary of State for the Environment [1988] 1 PLR 49; the leading case is French Kier Developments v Secretary of State for the Environment [1977] 1 All ER 296; London Residuary Body v Secretary of State for the Environment [1988] JPL 637. See the House of Lords in Save Britain’s Heritage above and Givaudan & Co Ltd v Minister of Housing and Local Government [1967] 1 WLR 250. 4 Save Britain’s Heritage v Secretary of State for the Environment (note 2 above). 5 Clark Homes Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment [1993] 66 P&CR 263 per Bingham MR. 6 Save Britain’s Heritage v Number 1 Poultry Ltd [1991] 1 WLR 153, HL; Elliott v Southwark London Borough Council [1976] 1 WLR 499, CA; see Woolf and Jowell (eds) de Smith’s Judicial Review (8th edn, 2018), para 7.106. 1

882  Chapter 10 See: R  v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p de Rothschild [1989] 1  All ER  933, CA; see Coleen, para  10.152, note 3 above. See the wide berth given to ‘material considerations’ in granting planning permission and TCPA 1990, s 70(2) and agreements under s 106: R v Westminster City Council, ex p Monahan [1989] 2  All ER  74, CA and Tesco Stores Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment [1995] 2 All ER 636 (HL).

7

Reasons for decisions under the FOIA 2000 10.163  FOIA 2000 contains provisions concerning the giving for reasons for decisions. The provision is in s 19(3)(b) and will be incorporated in publication schemes, although duties to provide reasons for decisions under FOIA  2000 are present in the Act and were strengthened as the Bill progressed through Parliament. Such duties occur in s  17(1)(c) to state why an exemption applies and s 17(3) on claiming public interest grounds for maintaining an exemption. In fact, there are numerous duties to provide reasons for decisions in statutes and regulations which in some cases require detailed reasons to be given as a legal requirement.1 It is a matter of regret that such a general duty was not contained in the primary FOIA 2000 itself rather than to be left in publication schemes, and that the view of the government was that it only applied to reasons for decisions published in a publication scheme (see paras 1.287 et seq above). It is also to be hoped that a general duty to provide reasons will not act to undermine those duties in statutes and regulations where they provide for the giving of more specific duties in statutes and regulations. We saw in chapters 1 and 3 how the Information Commissioner and tribunal had insisted on full and proper reasons being given for refusals to provide information under the Act and EIRs (see eg FER0313870). A LeSueur (1999) Current Legal Problems 150.

1

General points 10.164  Under the court’s powers of judicial review in Part 54 of the CPR 1998 (formerly RSC Ord 53), the more draconian a decision affecting an individual, the more likely the court will be to conduct a probing inquiry to establish an adequate evidentiary basis and that a decision was not irrational or otherwise oppressive.1 Examples include ex p Turgut.2 Under the HRA  1998, however, the courts will impose demanding standards in reviewing decisions interfering with rights protected under that Act; the standard of review may vary according to the importance of the right or where interference has to be ‘necessary’ to protect other legitimate interests or rights.3 The courts have refused to set rigid formulae for the test to be applied, but numerous cases have set out quite clearly the more intrusive into a person’s liberties and rights a decision is, the more careful will the courts be in scrutinising the legal and factual basis for a decision, even in cases of detention of suspected terrorists under Anti-terrorist, Crime and Security Act 2001, s 21 and in the case of control orders and whatever may replace such orders.4 Reference should be made to the obligation under Art 6 of the ECHR which guarantees to everyone an entitlement to a fair and public hearing before an independent tribunal within a reasonable time in the

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   883 determination of one’s civil rights and obligations as well as any criminal charges laid against an individual. The interpretation of the Article has in the past been somewhat limited, thereby reducing the range of administrative decision-making against which the Article will provide protection5 (see above). UK courts must take into account the decisions of the ECtHR, some of which have been listed above, in determining questions concerning convention rights ‘whenever made or given, so far as, in the opinion of the court or tribunal, it is relevant to the proceedings in which that question has arisen’ (s 2). Further, UK courts must, ‘so far as is possible’, read and give effect to domestic measures in a manner consistent with Convention rights. This legislative mandate has transformed the domestic judicial approach to questions of administrative fairness generally, if not invariably, for the good. R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Gaima (1988) Guardian, 6 December: political asylum; cf Bugdaycay v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1987] AC 514, HL; R v Ministry of Defence, ex p Smith [1996] 1 All ER 257, CA. 2 See para 10.127 above. 3 R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26; International Transport Roth GmbH v Home Secretary [2002] 3 WLR 345. 4 M v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] 2 All ER 863: refusing to overrule SIAC’s decision that the Secretary of State did not have reasonable suspicion that the claimant was linked to named terrorist organisations. Ex p Smith, above; Simms, para 10.157, note 9 above. See A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56. 5 Le Compte v Belgium (1981) 4  EHRR  1; Kaplan v UK  (1980) 4  EHRR  64 and Feldbrugge v Netherlands (1986) 8 EHRR 425; Deumeland v Germany (1986) 8 EHRR 448; Bradley Public Law (1987) p 3. See further Bradley (1995) European Public Law 347. 1

10.165  The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, to which the UK is a party, has passed a resolution – Resolution (77)31 – recommending that governments of member states should be guided in their law and administrative practice by five principles: the fourth principle concerns a statement of reasons where an administrative act adversely affects the rights, liberties or interests of the person concerned. 10.166  The other principles cover: a right to be heard; access to information on which an administrative act is based; assistance and representation; and the nature of remedies available for the persons concerned, ie  both natural and artificial persons. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (now incorporated within the draft EU Constitution) and the code of good administrative practice of the EU  Ombudsman contain a duty to provide reasons for decisions. The Charter is one of the provisions of EU law that will not be made a part of domestic law after Brexit, despite the efforts of the House of Lords to keep it in the withdrawal Bill.1 For the effect of the Charter going beyond domestic and ECHR law, see Benkabouche [2017] UKSC 62 and Art 47.

1

Consultation 10.167  Numerous statutes impose duties to consult and the duty generally has been the subject of extensive interpretation.1 The presence of a duty to consult can

884  Chapter 10 give third parties a locus to come to court who otherwise would not have standing to challenge a decision on allocation of contracts of medical service.2 Guidance has been issued by the government on consultation (para  1.238). The latest version is from 2018.3 The Department for Business Innovation and Skills (BIS) code on written consultation names the bodies that have signed up to its principles (2008) in which formal consultations on Green Papers but not White Papers or independent reviews or impact assessments may be supplemented by public hearings.4 Usually, but not exclusively, before the making of statutory regulations and orders: for a strict interpretation in another context, see Grunwick Processing Laboratories v ACAS  [1978]  AC  655, HL. For a general and useful test of the criteria of consultation, see Webster J in R v Secretary of State for Social Services, ex p Association of Metropolitan Authorities [1986] 1 All ER 164. 2 R (Smith) v NE Derbyshire PC Trust [2006] EWCA Civ 1291; see also Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007, Part 14 ss 221–234 on local involvement networks. See the discussion on NHS reforms at para 10.106 above. 3 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/691383/Consultation_Principles__1_.pdf (26/04/2018). 4 http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/better-regulation/consultation-guidance. 1

10.168  The courts have established under common law principles (the Gunning principles)1 that the person engaging in the consultation must, with a receptive mind, seek and welcome the aid and advice which those with local or specialised knowledge may be in a position to proffer in regard to a plan or proposals which the decision-maker has tentatively evolved.2 The decision-maker must supply sufficient information to those consulted to enable them to tender advice, and, on the other hand, a sufficient opportunity must be given to those consulted to tender that advice.3 In meeting requests for information, however, the decision-maker is not required or expected to formulate detailed plans for the future administration of a large scheme or point the way to the solution of all new problems.4 Sufficient time must be given by the consulting body to those consulted to enable them to offer helpful advice to be considered by the consulting party.5 ‘Sufficient’ means sufficient to allow the purpose to be fulfilled. Even where urgency is present, this will not allow the consulting party to offer so little time and such little information that those consulted were not sufficiently informed, and their views insufficiently considered. However, in the specific statutory context, the question of whether there was sufficient consultation may have to be decided by looking at the facts as they appeared to the Secretary of State or other decision-maker. The form and substance of regulations and the time for consultation may well depend on matters of a political nature, of which the Secretary of State etc was the best judge. But this would not absolve the minister of the duty to consult.6 Further, where a decision-maker is adequately informed of all relevant aspects of a decision, s/he may be excused in law the necessity of consulting every interest.7 A very powerful statement on the legal requirements of a duty to consult was provided in the Greenpeace case where the Government had promised the fullest consultation before progressing on any changes in relation to a policy not to build new nuclear power generators. The policy was changed. The consultation was seriously flawed: it lacked vital information on disposal of nuclear waste and economic costs, and this amounted to a breach of a legitimate expectation by the Government. The announcement of a change of policy was unlawful.8 In Eisai Ltd v NICE the courts insisted on

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   885 disclosure in a consultation process of the ‘fully executable version of data’ relied upon by NICE in issuing guidance on drug use despite NICE’s claims to confidentiality. The claimant stood to be disadvantaged in a commercial capacity by the guidance and would be placed at a disadvantage if it could not subject the data to its own testing.9 The limits on what the House of Lords by majority was prepared to allow access to in relation to ex parte notifications by a party in planning regulation was noted above.10 The cases emphasise that fairness must be seen in context. Where a stated basis of consultation was altered by a minister who adopted new approaches without warning and without opportunities for consultees to address those approaches, he acted unfairly and unlawfully even though the changed criteria were not irrelevant.11 R (Moseley) v Haringey LBC12 is an important addition to case law on consultation. The case confirmed the Gunning principles (above). But the Supreme Court made a further progression. It decided that a consultation concerning a Council Tax reduction scheme required Haringey to consult not only on its own proposals, but to provide a brief outline of the alternative options the Council had considered and the reasons for their rejection. The principle that a public body must consult residents on proposals which it has rejected has profound implications. Moseley has, on one view, changed the legal landscape of consultation although the majority believed that it was based in common law notions of fairness and different considerations came into play where someone was losing a benefit as a consequence of cuts as opposed to a future benefit. Lord Reed based his judgment, concurring with the outcome, on duties to consult. The courts will have to see how this case unpacks in future developments and are now wrestling with what this all means. Failure to provide relevant information made a consultation unfair and a flawed methodology produced an irrational policy and regulations on seeking reductions in criminal legal aid fees, ‘Consultees are entitled to expect that a government ministry undertaking a consultation exercise will conduct it in a way which is open and transparent’.13 A nice discussion is in R v Brent LBC ex p Gunning [1986] 84 LGR 168. Rollo v Minister of Town and Country Planning [1948] 1 All ER 13, CA, per Morris J. On the continuing nature of consultation: Fletcher v Minister of Town and Country Planning [1947] 2 All ER 496.  3 Rollo per Bucknill LJ.  4 Port Louis Corpn v A-G of Mauritius [1965] AC 1111, PC, per Lord Morris.  5 R  v Secretary of State for Social Services, ex p Association of Metropolitan Authorities [1986] 1  All ER 164.  6 Above. However, although the resulting regulations were made in breach of a mandatory requirement and theoretically ultra vires, they had become law and would not be invalidated because of widespread reliance upon them.  7 R  v Secretary of State for Wales, ex p Glamorgan County Council (1988) Times, 25  June – school closure. See, however, R (Goldsmith) v Wandsworth LBC [2004] EWCA Civ 1170 – all evidence must be considered in local; authority welfare decision.  8 R (Greenpeace) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2007] EWHC 311 (Admin).  9 [2008] EWCA Civ 438 and see para 66 and reversing the High Court. See R (Bristol Myers Squibbs Pharmaceuticals Ltd) v NICE [2009] EWHC 2722 (Admin). 10 R (Edwards and another) v Environment Agency [2008] UKHL 22 concerning EIAs. 11 Devon County Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2010] EWHC 1456 (Admin). 12 [2014] UKSC 56; See R (UCR PLC) v London Metal Exchange [2014] EWCA Civ 1271. 13 R (Law Society) v Lord Chancellor [2018] EWHC 2094 (Admin) at [93] per Leggatt LJ.  1  2

886  Chapter 10 10.169  Unless a hearing is required by statute, consultation is usually satisfied by written communications, representations or comments. The High Court has interpreted a statute as conferring a right to a public hearing in the form of an inquiry where there was a conflict of testimony, although none was expressly provided for under the relevant sections. The decision was doubted on this point by the Court of Appeal.1 The usual form of a duty to consult is to consult such interests as the Secretary of State, or named official or body, believes relevant. It is a mandatory duty to consult followed by a discretion as to those whom s/he deems appropriate. It is the decision-maker’s discretion on who is appropriate and could usually only be upset on the grounds of unreasonableness or irrationality. Where a body is deemed appropriate for consultation by the decision-maker, but through no fault of the consulting person is not presented with the information, consultation has not taken place and that body may be excluded from the scope of a subsequent decision or regulations.2 Where, as a matter of discretion, a body is not consulted, the courts have been reluctant to make good the omission of the person consulting; and they have gone so far as to say that no right to consultation exists before a policy is changed by rule-making or delegated legislation,3 or where a policy or principle is being evolved, even for those who stand to be significantly affected. The scope of the protection has widened, it is true, and courts are more sensitive to procedural fairness even of a collective nature. But courts still tread most surely where the rights of individuals are involved. R  v Secretary of State for Wales, ex p Emery [1996] 4  All ER  1; affd [1998] 4  All ER  367, CA. Provisions for hearings were provided for in other parts of the statute: Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, Schs 14 and 15. See R (Ashbrook) v Secretary of State etc [2005] 1 All ER 166. 2 Agricultural, Horticultural and Forestry Industry Training Board v Aylesbury Mushrooms Ltd [1972] 1 WLR 190. 3 Bates v Lord Hailsham [1972] 3 All ER 1019 is the clearest statement; Re Findlay [1985] AC 318, HL; R v Crown Court at Aylesbury, ex p Chahal [1976] RTR 489. Cf ex p Ruddock, para 10.139, note 1 above; R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council [1990] 3 All ER 589, HL. See Bank Mellat (para 10.126 above). 1

10.170  The decisions suggest that, where a party stands to lose an important right or privilege, the courts will infer a right to consultation.1 Indeed the language of consultation is being used interchangeably with the language of fair procedure, and a right to a hearing where there is a ‘legitimate expectation’ of consultation taking place. A right to consultation is frequently observed by an opportunity to make written representations: ‘As the two cases show, the principle [of legitimate expectation] is closely connected with “right to be heard”. Such an expectation may take many forms. One may be an expectation of prior consultation. Another may be an expectation of being allowed time to make representations, especially where the aggrieved party is seeking to persuade an authority to depart from a lawfully established policy adopted in connection with the exercise of a particular power because of some suggested exceptional reasons justifying such a departure.’2 The courts have developed the law of legitimation expectation – both substantive and procedural (see para  10.119 above).3 The High Court has ruled that disabled persons had a legitimate expectation in being consulted in decisions

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   887 affecting them under the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 as amended.4 The decision in Bancoult set limits to the scope of legitimate expectation in the special circumstances of not allowing the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) islanders to return to their native home which had become a US naval base. The majority was not persuaded that a legitimate substantive expectation was established on the facts. The dissent of two law lords has more legal conviction in its reasoning.5 However, where the representations are clear and precise, they have been upheld by the courts.6 But if a court finds there is not a settled and uniform practice of public consultation before exercising the power to make regulations in a particular subject area, it may not be inclined to infer such a duty.7 See the CCSU case, para 10.117, note 4 above and at first instance [1984] IRLR 309 and Ruddock, para 10.139, note 1 above; the courts will look for a particular detriment to an identifiable and restricted group but this test does not satisfy all the cases. 2 Lord Roskill in the CCSU case [1984] 3 All ER 135 at 954, HL. See R v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council, ex p Governors of Audenshaw High School (1990) Times, 27 June. 3 R (Nadarajah) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 1363, Laws LJ. 4 R (Boyjo) v Barnet LBC [2009] EWHC 3261 (Admin), DDA 1995, ss 49A(1) and 49D(2). 5 R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [2008] UKHL 61. 6 R (HSMP Forum UK Ltd) v Home Secretary [2009] EWHC 711 (Admin) and R (BAPIO Action Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWCA Civ 1139; [2008] UKHL 27; R (Luton BC and others) v Secretary of State for Education [2011] EWHC 217 (Admin), paras 94–96 on duty to consult via a legitimate expectation. 7 R (MP) v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care [2018] EWHC 3392 (Admin) at [73] which also raised questions of interpretation of the public sector equality duty under Equality Act 2010, s 149. 1

10.171  However, where consultation has taken place on proposals for changes in a health authority area, and such proposals are subsequently revised in the light of the consultation, there is no duty to repeat the consultation process unless the revised proposals are so different that they constitute fresh proposals. Whether the revised proposals constitute fresh proposals is a question of fact and degree in each case.1 It has also been ruled that persons who had not participated in a consultation should not be denied locus standi to challenge a decision after the consultation.2 R v Shropshire Health Authority, ex p Duffus (1989) Times, 16 August. R  (Edwards) v Environment Agency and Another [2004] 3  All ER  21, R  (Edwards) v Environment Agency and Another (No 2) [2006] EWCA Civ 877: no point in quashing decision on which data is out of date.

1

2

The remedy 10.172  Where a duty to consult is mandatory the resulting instrument, order, decision ought to be ultra vires and challengeable in direct or collateral proceedings. However, the courts have frequently resiled from such straightforward procrustean logic and where the duty has not been complied with, have either excluded the affected party from the operation of the order,1 or have let the subsequent regulations stand, declaring merely that consultation did not take place.2 Some judgments have suggested that administrative decisions

888  Chapter 10 ought not to be impeached collaterally, but only in direct proceedings.3 This would appear to have been thwarted by subsequent case-law, and the House of Lords established that although there is no rule confining the range of collateral challenge, there may be limitations to collateral challenge making it unsuitable where a detailed statutory code for appeal is set out.4 In their desire to promote expedience at the expense of strict logic, the courts are turning their backs on the full consequences of a decision or action being ultra vires and have held, for instance, that a decision in breach of natural justice is not void in a complete sense5 but may be rectified by a later internal hearing or may be acted on until declared void by a court. However, in this latter respect it must be remembered that relief under CPR 1998, Part 4 is discretionary, not as of right, and relief may be refused when because of undue delay it would cause substantial hardship to, or substantially prejudice the rights of, any person or would be detrimental to good administration.6 See Aylesbury Mushrooms, para 10.169 above. Ex p AMA, para 10.167 above. 3 Quietlynn Ltd v Plymouth City Council [1988] QB 114; Bugg v DPP [1993] QB 473. 4 R  v Wicks [1997] 2  All ER  801, HL and Boddington v British Transport Police [1998] 2  All ER 203, HL. 5 Calvin v Carr [1980]  AC  574, PC; London and Clydeside Estates Ltd v Aberdeen District Council [1980] 1 WLR 182, HL. 6 Supreme Court Act 1981, s 31(6); see: R v Dairy Produce Quota Tribunal, ex p Caswell [1989] 3 All ER 205, CA, affd, [1990] 2 All ER 434, HL; R v Swale Borough Council, ex p Royal Society for the Protection of Birds [1991] 1 PLR 6; Hardy v Pembrokeshire County Council [2006] EWCA Civ 240. Note under EU procurement directives and implementing regulations: Case C-406/08 Uniplex v NHS BSA (ECJ 28/01/10). 1 2

10.173  A  court has held that a byelaw made by the Defence Secretary may be both bad and good simultaneously, even though in breach of a statutory provision in the enabling statute.1  A  court has a discretion whether to strike down the whole of the subordinate instrument or to enforce only the valid parts of it.2 The decision represented part of a growing trend favouring administrative convenience rather than strict individual entitlement. Such discretion will not attend decisions where human rights are involved. However, the House of Lords allowed an appeal holding that where a vitiating factor in subordinate legislation was of a nature that it could not successfully be severed from the regulations without substantially altering the subject matter of the remaining regulations, the regulations were ultra vires.3 DPP v Hutchinson [1989] QB 583; Military Lands Act 1892, s 14(1) and SI 1985/485. See R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Greater London Council [1986] QB 556 and R v North Hertfordshire District Council, ex p Cobbold [1985] 3 All ER 486. 3 DPP v Hutchinson [1990] 2 AC 783, HL. Note R (National Association of Health Stores & Anor) v Department of Health [2005] EWCA Civ 154 and the filling in of omissions by the courts. 1 2

Fact-finding inquiries 10.174  Readers are reminded of the discussion of the Inquiries Act 2005 (para  10.104 above). In the next chapter we shall see the extent to which the courts may facilitate access to information. A right to freedom of information

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   889 had not been established at common law. However, in a remarkable decision in Shipman, the Divisional Court upheld a challenge by families of the victims of Dr Shipman, who murdered numerous female victims in Manchester, against the decision of the Secretary of State to hold the inquest in private. Kennedy LJ held that the decision to sit in private was irrational and contravened the principle of freedom of speech in Art 10 ECHR. It constituted an unjustified government interference with the free communication of information. The exceptions to free expression must be narrowly interpreted and the necessity for any restrictions must be convincingly established. It is, he continued, incumbent on the press to impart information and ideas on matters of public interest. Free expression was a fundamental right of common law as well as being enshrined in the ECHR. In this point he reiterated the House of Lords decision in Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd in which it was held that a public authority has no capacity to sue in defamation because of the inhibiting effect this would have on freedom of speech under common law.1 A public inquiry must proceed in public ‘unless there are persuasive reasons for taking some other course’. The Minister had failed to give persuasive reasons for excluding the press and public and, for this reason, he had exceeded his powers.2 [1993]  AC  534, HL. See McLaughlin v Lambeth LBC  [2010]  EWHC  2726 (QB). See also A  v Independent News Media Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 343. See Defamation Act 2013 and defences in ss 2–7. 2 R v Secretary of State for Health, ex p Wagstaff [2000] 1 WLR 292, DC. 1

10.175  The decision in Wagstaff has subsequently not been followed where Art 10 has been invoked to attempt to insist that an inquiry held to establish facts should be held in public. The courts have reminded litigants that Art 10 confers a right to pass on information, not a right of access to information.1 Inquiries into deaths under Art 2  ECHR (the ‘right to life’ provision) where there has been a state involvement have met with a more positive response from the courts that such inquiries should be in public. The cases have concerned inquiries into racist murders in prisons in disturbing circumstances where an investigation must be ‘independent, effective, reasonably prompt, have a sufficient element of public scrutiny, and involve the next of kin to an appropriate extent’.2 In Khan, a young child of three had died in hospital after being the victim of gross negligence and after suspicions of a cover-up. Internal inquiries by the police and the hospital trust had not been in public and had not involved the parents. In these circumstances, a public inquiry involving the effective participation of the parents through legal representation was called for. A  statutory inquest might satisfy this test but not if the father was unfit to participate because of his grief at the child’s death and its circumstances, and if legal representation was not provided.3 Readers are reminded of the discussion on Effective Inquiries and the Inquiries Act 2005 above (para 10.104).The judgment placed doubts on the suitability of inquests to conduct investigations consistent with the requirements of Art 2  ECHR. This view was heavily influenced by case-law of the ECtHR on Art 2 and deaths suffered under the responsibility of state organs – whether deliberately or through other culpable or questionable behaviour.4 The House of Lords has ruled that, to satisfy the requirements of Art 2, inquests should allow a jury to express its factual conclusion on the events leading up to a death

890  Chapter 10 in custody so that the word ‘how’ [the deceased came by death] should mean ‘by what means and in what circumstances’.5 A further House of Lords decision confirmed that there has to be a proper examination and analysis of disputed facts, the events leading to a prisoner’s suicide, steps taken or not taken to prevent it, and precautions necessary to avoid or reduce the risk to other prisoners.6 Case law has added profusely to the application of relevant principles.7 None was more dramatic than the inquiry relating to the murder of former KGB agent Alexander Litvinenko although it did not concern Art 10 ECHR but Art 2. The death of Litvinenko led to an inquest by a coroner but the coroner realised that the full investigation of the death raised issues (including Russian state liability) which would not be examinable in an inquest. The High Court had ruled that crucial evidence was protected by public interest immunity certificates (paras 11.58 et seq), Based on his recommendation that an inquiry under the Inquiries Act should be conducted so that sensitive evidence could be heard in camera, the widow of the victim sought a judicial review of the Home Secretary’s refusal to hold such an inquiry. The Home Secretary’s decision was successfully reviewed, ‘I am satisfied that the reasons given by the Secretary of State do not provide a rational basis for the decision not to set up a statutory inquiry at this time but to adopt a “wait and see” approach. The deficiencies in the reasons are so substantial that the decision cannot stand’.8 R (Persey) v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2003] QB 794 – foot and mouth disease inquiry; R (Howard) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] QB 830 – National Health Service Act 1977, s 2 – a general provision. Specific powers exist under s 84 of the 1977 Act and some inquiries have been held partially in private, with relatives and participants admitted but not the general public. 2 R (Amin) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] 4 All ER 1264 (HL). 3 R (Khan) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] 4 All ER 1239 (CA). 4 Edwards v UK  (2002) 12  BHRC  190; Jordan v UK  (2001) 11  BHRC  1; Finucane v UK  (2003) 37 EHRR 29. 5 R (Middleton) v West Somerset Coroner [2004] 2 All ER 465 (HL) and Coroners Act 1988, s 11(5) (b)(ii) and regulations under the Act. 6 R (Sacker) v West Yorkshire Coroner [2004] UKHL 11. Also R (Stanley) v Inner North London Coroner [2003] EWHC 1180 – failure to provide adequate reasons in relation to the achievement of the aims of an inquest amounted to a breach of Art 2. See, however, Re McKerr [2004] 2 All ER 409 (HL) and G. Anthony (2005) European Public Law cf Re McCaughey [2011] UKSC 20 – the obligation to inquire into death resulting from ‘shoot to kill’ policy in Northern Ireland could pre-date the incorporation of the ECHR under the HRA 1989: Silih v Slovenia [2009] 49 EHRR 37and Varnava v Turkey [2010] 50  EHRR  21. For inquiries and litigation into deaths of prisoners in British military custody in Iraq under Arts 2 and 3 after hostilities had ceased: R (Al-Skeini) v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 6. The HRA 1998 applied to actions of forces in those circumstances where an individual was under British military detention but not otherwise and R (Al Jeddah) v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 58 on displacement of the HRA 1998 by Security Council resolutions and which is on appeal to the ECtHR. The ECtHR allowed the appeals in Al Skeini v UK [2011] ECHR 1093 and in Al Jeddah v UK [2011] ECHR 1092 holding in the first that the ECtHR (and therefore HRA 1998) was breached in relation to those killed by UK forces in Iraq, even when not detained, where there had been no independent inquiry into their deaths. The second case decided that the UN Security Council resolutions did not implicitly authorise displacement of the ECHR in Iraq. Any displacement would have to be explicit. How would explicit displacement square with Kadi Nos 1 and 2 (para 5.68)? 7 R (on the application of P) v Secretary of State for Justice [2009] EWCA Civ 701: death in custody and compliance with Art 2  ECHR. R  (on the application of D) v Inner South London Assistant Deputy Coroner [2008] EWHC 3356 (Admin) and Art 2. R (Smith v Oxfordshire Assistant Deputy 1

Information, redress of grievance and judicial review   891 Coroner [2009]  EWCA  Civ 441 and Savage v South Essex Partnership NHS  Foundation Trust [2008]  UKHL  74; R  (Platts) v HM  Coroner for South Yorkshire [2008]  EWHC  2502 on Art 2. R (Scholes) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1343 – no right to a public inquiry into young offender’s suicide. R (Gentle) v The Prime Minister [2008] UKHL 20 – no duty under Art 2 not to commence unlawful war and therefore no public inquiry into the war. R (Canning) v HM Coroner for Northampton [2005] EWHC 3125 (Admin) – no reasonable cause to suspect culpable failing re death. R (L) v Secretary of State for Justice [2009] EWCA Civ 2416. Brecknall v UK (2008) 46 EHRR 42 and a death in Northern Ireland involving breaches of Arts 2 and 13. R (JL) v Secretary of State for Justice [2008] UKHL 68 – independent investigation into near suicide in prison. R (Hurst) v London North District Coroner [2007] UKHL 14: death prior to HRA  1998 coming into effect (HRA  1998 only affects inquests after 2  October 2000); McKerr correct (but see Re McCaughey above, note 6). Bubbins v UK (App 50196/99): breaches of Arts 2 and 13 in lack of remedy over police killing. R (Lawrence) v HM Coroner for West Somerset [2008] EWHC 1293 (Admin) on test for judicial review. R (Allen) v HM Coroner for Inner London (North) [2009] EWCA Civ 623. Also: R (Mcleish) v HM Coroner for the North District of Greater London [2010] EWHC 3624 (Admin); R (Hair) v HM Coroner for Staffordshire (South) [2010] EWHC 2580 (Admin) and Re Chief Constable of NI’s Application for Judicial Review [2010]  NIQB  66; Attorney General v HM  Coroner for S  Yorkshire (West) [2012]  EWHC  3783 (Admin) on the Hillsborough inquest. On legal aid: R (Letts) v Lord Chancellor [2015] EWHC 402 (Admin) and R (RJ) v Director of Legal Aid Casework [2016] EWHC 645 (Admin). 8 R (Litvinenko) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWHC 194 (Admin) at [74]. Compare Keyu v Secretary of State for Foreign etc Affairs [2015] UKSC 69 where, because of the passage of time, refusal to hold an inquiry under Inquiries Act 2005, s 1 into killing of unarmed civilians in Malaya in 1948 by British forces was not unreasonable or irrational.

10.176  The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 introduced major reforms into investigations (inquests) into deaths.1 The explanatory memorandum accompanying the Act states that the purpose of the Act ‘is to establish more effective, transparent and responsive justice and coroner services for victims, witnesses, bereaved families and the wider public. It seeks to achieve this by: (a) updating parts of the criminal law to improve its clarity, fairness and effectiveness; (b) giving vulnerable and intimidated witnesses, including those in respect of gun and gang-related violence, improved protection, from the early stages of the criminal justice process; (c) introducing a more consistent and transparent sentencing framework; (d) improving the service bereaved families receive from a reformed coroner system; (e) giving those who are suddenly or unexpectedly bereaved opportunities to participate in coroners’ investigations, including rights to information and access to a straightforward appeals system; and (f) putting in place a unified system of death certification that includes independent scrutiny and confirmation of the causes of death given on death certificates. Section 5 establishes the matters to be ascertained and the purpose of a senior coroner’s investigation. The two purposes of an investigation are: (i) to establish who the deceased was and how, when and where the deceased came by his or her death; and (ii) to establish the details needed to register the death (such as the cause of death). These purposes were previously contained in r 36(1) of the Coroners Rules 1984, and in section 11(5)(b) of the Coroners Act 1988. Section 5(2) requires the scope of the investigation to be widened to include an

892  Chapter 10 investigation of the broad circumstances of the death, including events leading up to the death in question, where this wider investigation is necessary to ensure compliance with the ECHR), in particular Article 2. Article 2 relates to the State’s responsibility to ensure that its actions do not cause the death of its citizens. The Act does not define the precise circumstances under which a coroner should conduct an Art 2 investigation. This will allow for flexibility in the future should case law determine that Art 2 inquests should extend to cover additional matters. Such information could, however, be contained in guidance issued by the Chief Coroner. The Act deals with juries and in general an inquest must be held without a jury. Section 7(2) and (3) of the 2009 Act set out the exceptions to this rule. A jury must be summoned where the deceased died while in custody or otherwise in state detention, and the death was violent or unnatural, or of unknown cause; where the death was as a result of an act or omission of a police officer or member of a service police force (defined in s  48) in the purported execution of their duties; or where the death was caused by an accident, poisoning or disease which must be reported to a government department or inspector. This includes, for example, certain deaths at work. Although a jury is not required in any other case the coroner will be able to summon one in any case where he or she believes there is sufficient reason for doing so. The Government will in secondary legislation make further, more detailed provision about the conduct of inquests (in the Coroners Rules to be made under s 45).2 The Court of Appeal has ruled that a coroner does not have to conduct an inquiry into the identities of those responsible for murders where this has not been established at criminal trial, ie the inquest is not a surrogate criminal trial.3 J Cooper Inquests (2011). NB powers in relation to criminals’ publications is covered in the last part of the Act. 2 Coroners (Inquest) Rules 2013, SI 2013/1616 – see Part 3 on disclosure of documents. Provisions on appeal to the Chief Coroner in the 2009 Act were repealed and CPR (PD 8A para 19) governs the procedure to challenge a coroner’s decision in the High Court under s 13 of the 1988 Act. 3 Coroner for the Birmingham Inquests (1974) v J Hambleton and Ors [2018] EWCA Civ 2081. This involved the notorious bombings at two pubs in Birmingham in 1974 by the IRA. 1

10.177  The next chapter investigates the role of the courts in extracting information from parties in litigation and other relevant matters.

Chapter 11

Litigation and information

11.1  In this chapter there will be an examination of the opportunities that may be provided to obtain information through the process of litigation and the obstacles that may be placed in the path of a litigant wishing to obtain information. There will not be an exhaustive treatment of the practice and procedure of litigation and rules of evidence, nor will there be any discussion of the law of contempt1 and how orders and penalties for contempt may be used to pre-empt discussion of matters that are sub judice.2 The major preoccupation will concern the process of discovery, or disclosure of documents as it is known following the Woolf reforms, and especially the legal immunities which may prevent disclosure or inspection. Contempt of Court Act 1981; see Arlidge, Eady and Smith Law of Contempt (5th edn, 2017); Borrie and Lowe The Law of Contempt (4th edn, 2010); Miller and D Perry QC, Contempt of Court (4th edn, 2017); the Salmon Report on Tribunals of Inquiry Cmnd 4078 (1969); the Phillimore Report Cmnd 5794 (1974); Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979) 2 EHRR 245; In the Public Interest: Publication of Local Authority Inquiry Reports Law Commission No 289 Cm 6274 (2004). See further: J Jaconelli Open Justice: Reappraising the Public Trial (2002) and J Jacob Civil Justice in the Age of Human Rights (2007). We are grateful to our colleague, Martin Parry, for assistance on the family law aspects of this chapter and to Joe Jacob for advice on openness of judicial proceedings. 2 See Birkinshaw Freedom of Information: The Law, The Practice and The Ideal (4th edn, 2010), ch 11. 1

IN CAMERA OR PRIVATE HEARINGS 11.2  Under Part 39 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (CPR 1998), the general rule is that a ‘hearing’ is to be in public subject to a number of provisos. That principle of the common law was stated in constitutional terms in Scott v Scott.1 Hearings may be in private if publicity would defeat the object of the hearing, it involves national security, confidential information or where publicity might damage the interests of a child or patient, and other matters as identified or ‘the court considers this necessary, in the interests of justice’.2 Article 6 ECHR provides an entitlement to a ‘fair and public hearing’ in the determination of civil rights and obligations, or any criminal charge against an individual.3 This Convention right is subject to exceptions similar to CPR 1998, Part 39.

894  Chapter 11 [1913] AC 417 (HL). The Privy Council has ruled that at common law the trial judge has no power to make orders preventing publication of proceedings in open court, but a warning may be given that publication could lead to contempt proceedings: Independent Publishing Co Ltd v Att Gen of Trinidad and Tobago [2005] 1 All ER 499. See Att Gen v Leveller Magazine Ltd [1979] AC 440. The Court of Appeal has recently considered the scope of openness of hearings in relation to proceedings brought to restrain publication of private information in H v News Group Newspapers [2011] EWCA Civ 42, [2011] 1 WLR 1645, with a discussion of the need to balance ECHR, Arts 8 and 10 alongside the requirements of Art 6. For the general principles set out, which begin with the premise that the names of the parties should be included in all orders and judgments of the court and that any departure from that principle is a derogation from the principle of open justice; see para [21] of the judgment. 2 A v Times Newspapers Ltd [2003] 1 All ER 587 and principles relevant to open or private hearings involving children under the Children Act 1989. See B  and P  v UK (App Nos 36337/97 and 35974/97): ‘upbringing’ (custody) proceedings in private and unpublished judgments did not breach Art 6 ECHR, ECtHR. In October 2004, the case of Charlotte Wyatt (11 months old and seriously ill and debilitated) was heard in public so that ‘informed debate’ could help discussion of controversial matters concerning life support. See Blunkett v Quinn (2004) Times, 7 December where judgment was given in public in a case concerning parental responsibility and contact orders in order to overcome widespread misinformation in the media. The case involved the then Home Secretary. 3 Axen v Germany (1983) 6 EHRR 195, para 25. 1

11.3  The presumption in favour of publicity is, amongst other things, there to assist free reporting and freedom of speech. In Reynolds v Times Newspapers Limited1 Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead expressed the view: ‘It is through the mass media that most people today obtain their information on political matters. Without freedom of expression by the media, freedom of expression would be a hollow concept. The interest of a democratic society in ensuring a free press weighs heavily in the balance in deciding whether any curtailment of this freedom bears a reasonable relationship to the purpose of the curtailment.’ [2001] 2  AC  127 at 200G–H. See also Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL (No  3) [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 AC 359, where the House of Lords overturned the Court of Appeal’s finding that the Wall Street Journal had lost its right to claim qualified privilege as it did not delay and give the claimant the opportunity to comment on a story prior to publication. The Privy Council case of Seaga v Harper [2008] UKPC 9, [2009] 1 AC 1 then extended this to expression beyond the newspaper medium. In the context of super-injunctions, see H  v News Group Newspapers [2011] EWCA Civ 42, [2011] 1 WLR 1645, especially [19]–[25], and DMK v News Group Newspapers [2016] EWHC 1646 (QB) at [12]–[17]. CPR PD 40F concerns the collection and publication (in anonymised form) of information about non-disclosure injunctions. The Ministry of Justice has published statistics on applications for privacy injunctions such as these in the Civil Justice Statistics Quarterly (available at https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/ civil-justice-statistics-quarterly) for a number of years. The number of such applications varies, but has never exceeded 25 in any six-month period and is frequently in low single figures.

1

11.4  One point to note immediately, however, is the power of a court to sit in camera when it is deemed appropriate; an obvious example would be a trial under s 1 of the Official Secrets Act 1920 (OSA 1920) where sensitive information is to be examined.1 Another may be where confidential industrial or commercial information is involved. Even when proceedings are in chambers or are in camera, that does not mean that judgments in those proceedings are secret. ‘The concept of a secret judgment is one which I believe to be inherently abhorrent’2. Secrecy

Litigation and information   895 would depend upon the subject matter. It has been held that a judge may decide to keep a judgment secret in cases where the court is hearing an arbitration claim pursuant to s 68 of the Arbitration Act 1996 in private under CPR r 62.10, although there should be no automatic presumption of such secrecy.3 Under the Contempt of Court Act 1981 (COCA 1981), and a wide variety of other statutes, courts have a range of powers to restrict or defer publication of information4 and to exclude the press or public or to restrict reporting.5 The principle of a public hearing does not apply to cases in family proceedings involving children or mentally disordered persons. Administration of Justice Act 1960, s 12 concerns the publication of information in proceedings held in private. This is not in itself a contempt of court except in five areas specified below (para 11.8). OSA 1920, s 8: sentence must be passed in open court. Per Jacob J in Forbes v Smith [1998] 1 All ER 973. See also Hodgson v Imperial Tobacco Ltd [1998] 1  WLR  1056 at 1071C–1072C, CA. I  am grateful to Joe Jacob for reference to these cases. Even in cases of ‘closed material’ procedures, the Supreme Court has indicated that the idea of a closed or secret judgment should only be adopted in the most exceptional of circumstances. See, in particular, the judgment of Lord Hope (dissenting) in Bank Mellat v HM  Treasury [2013] UKSC 38, [2014] AC 700 at [98]–[100]. See also the comments of Lord Dyson in Al Rawi v Security Service [2011] UKSC 34, [2012] 1 AC 531 at [14]–[18]. See further on confidentiality: Cream Holdings v Bannerjee [2004] 4  All ER  617 (HL) below. Pronouncement of judgment in public after an in camera hearing is in conformity with Art 6 ECHR: Pelling v Bruce-Williams [2004] 3 All ER 875. 3 Department of Economics, Policy and Development of the City of Moscow v Bankers Trust Co [2004] EWCA Civ 314, [2005] QB 207. 4 Contempt of Court Act 1981, ss 4(2), 11. On ‘secret witnesses’ see R v Lord Saville of Newdigate, ex p A [1999] 4 All ER 860, CA, and Marcus (1990) Public Law p 207. See CPR 1998, r 39.2(3); on the three-stage test to follow, see: R v Sherwood ex p The Telegraph Group plc [2001] 1 WLR 1983 (CA): ‘The questions to be posed were firstly whether any press reporting would give rise to a substantial risk of prejudice in the relevant proceedings, secondly, in the event that such a risk was found to exist, whether an order under s  4(2) of the 1981 Act would dispose of that risk, and thirdly, if an order would dispose of that risk, whether it was the best method by which to eliminate it having regard to the competing public interest considerations exemplified by Human Rights Act 1998, Sch 1, Part I, Arts 6 and 10. A judge might conclude that the risk of prejudice identified should nevertheless be regarded as bearable on the basis that it constituted the lesser of two evils. On the facts of the instant case, severance of the trials had been necessary in the public interest and any media reports would have undermined the aim of such an order, R v Beck Ex p Daily Telegraph Plc [1993] 2 All ER 177 distinguished’. The later case of Re MGN Ltd’s Application [2011] EWCA Crim 100, [2011] 1 Cr App R 31 illustrates that the court will decline to make a s 4(2) order where alternative routes might exist to protect the interests of those who the order is being sought to protect (so in this case the Court of Appeal overturned an order made under s 4(2) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 as, insofar as there may have been relevant interests to protect, the statutory provisions on the protection of witnesses were more appropriate grounds for the seeking of such orders. See also R v Sarker (Sudip) [2018] EWCA Crim 1341, [2018] EMLR 23 where the Court of Appeal overturned a s 4(2) order requiring the BBC to postpone publication of a report on a trial until the end of proceedings, rather than contemporaneously. The trial court issued the order holding that a contemporaneous report of proceedings ran the risk of prejudicing the jury. The BBC argued that any such contemporaneous report would only offer an account of the evidence put before the jury and that any links from that story on its website would link to material already in the public domain and could thus be retrieved simply by undertaking an internet search. As such, given that the jury had been directed by the court not to undertake such research, an order under s 4(2) was not necessary. The Court of Appeal found in favour of the BBC, with Lord Burnett CJ arguing that the trial court had not struck an appropriate balance between the rights of freedom of expression protected by Art 10 ECHR and the right to a fair trial contained in Art 6 ECHR. The Court of Appeal also noted that in some circumstances it may be more appropriate for a court to use its powers under s 45(4) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 1 2

896  Chapter 11 to make targeted orders, restricting the publication of particular information on certain social media accounts etc rather than making a general order under s 45(2) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981. On s 45(4) orders, see R v F [2016] EWCA Crim 12, [2016] 2 Cr App R 13. 5 See eg, Criminal Justice Act 2003, ss 71 and 72. See R v Waterfield [1975] 2 All ER 40, CA, and discretion to allow reporters to remain. In R (on the application of Guardian News and Media Ltd) v City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2010] EWHC 3376 (Admin), [2011] 1 WLR 1173 the Divisional Court found that the Guardian could not invoke ECHR, Art 10 to give it a right to inspect documents referred to by the parties in extradition proceedings as the documents concerned had been subject to detailed oral representations in open court. ‘We do not consider that there is any basis or any justification for extending the Article  10 rights of the Guardian so as to entitle it to inspect additional documents merely because its journalists have a genuine concern to see them. In addition, if the Guardian’s case was correct and its journalists had a genuine desire to inspect documents which had been made available for the purpose of criminal proceedings (including unused material), such documents would then automatically become open for inspection even if they had not been relied on and even though they had been produced solely for the purpose of the criminal proceedings. This extension of Art 10 sought by the Guardian cannot be justified.’ at [33], per Sullivan LJ. This decision was overturned by the Court of Appeal [2012] EWCA Civ 420, [2013] QB 618, where Toulson LJ argued that ‘Unless some strong contrary argument can be made out, the courts should assist rather than impede such an exercise. The reasons are not difficult to state. The way in which the justice system addresses international corruption and the operation of the Extradition Act 2003 are matters of public interest about which it is right that the public should be informed. The public is more likely to be engaged by an article which focuses on the facts of a particular case than by a more general or abstract discussion’ at [77]. The decision of the Supreme Court in Kennedy v Information Commissioner [2014] UKSC 20, [2015] AC 455 demonstrated an unwillingness on the part of the Supreme Court to require disclosure of documents obtained by the Charity Commission in the course of an investigation conducted in private, as Art 10 did not require such disclosure in the instant case. See also Re Crook (1989) Times, 13 November, CA: information received privately in chambers in criminal matters – when the public are excluded, the press should be excluded; and Re London and Norwich Investment Services Ltd (1987) Times, 16 December. On the now repealed SI  1983/942, see Pickering v Liverpool Daily Post and Echo Newspapers plc [1990] 1  All ER  335, CA (mental health review tribunals) and reversing in part [1991] 1 All ER 622 (HL): name of patient making application to Mental Health Review Tribunal and directions as to discharge not a part of ‘proceedings’ and latter like formal order of court excluded from protection under Administration of Justice Act 1960, s 12(2). Mental health cases have now been transferred to the Health, Education and Social Care Chamber of the First Tier Tribunal and the rules for mental health cases can be found in Part 4 of SI 2008/2699. The principle in the case does not appear to have been affected by the revised rules as r 14(7) of the 2008 Rules is very similar to r 21(5) of the 1983 rules. On civil proceedings such as judicial review applications brought by patients subject to restrictions under the Mental Health Act 1983, see C  v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] UKSC 2, [2016] 1 WLR 444, where the Supreme Court held that where an anonymity order had been granted in unsuccessful judicial review proceedings it should be continued in this case, as disclosure of the claimant’s identity could place the claimant at significant risk of failing to integrate with the community should his identity and past criminal conduct be widely known. The Court held that in each case a balance should be struck between the public’s right to know what decisions were being made in court and the risk of a patient’s rehabilitation being jeopardised by identification. In the instant case, the balance was struck in the interests of the patient. On press reports of proceedings in public: Barlow Clowes Gilt Managers Ltd v Clowes (1990) Times, 2  February. The EAT has ruled that both it and Employment Tribunals have power to order restricted reporting orders: X v Metropolitan Police Commissioner (2003) New LJ 719. Note also that the Supreme Court has recently held that the ‘closed material procedure’, where a special advocate might represent the claimant where the claimant and his representatives is compatible both with EU Law and the ECHR when used in Employment Tribunals. See Home Office v Tariq [2011] UKSC 35. The Supreme Court declined to adopt ‘closed material’ proceedings in civil cases where such a regime is not created or demanded by statute, holding that closed material proceedings are an exception to the general common law principle of openness in justice. See Al-Rawi v. Security Service [2011]  UKSC  34, [2012] 1  AC  531, although the power to launch

Litigation and information   897 closed material proceedings in civil matters is now available to the court under s 6 of the Justice and Security Act 2013. See also Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Proceedings) Regulations 2004 and criticism of government attempts to keep ‘whistleblower’ proceedings secret until the tribunal hearing: HL Debs, 27 October 2004 (para 4.311 above).

11.5  The following offers a brief description of some of the more important examples. 11.6  The public are excluded from the youth court or family court, although the press are admitted and may publish certain particulars. They must not publish names and addresses which might identify the family involved.1 Publication of information identifying children is prohibited.2 Children Act 2004, s 62 makes provision for a wide range of proceedings in which publication may be allowed. Privacy may be dispensed with by order of the court or Secretary of State in the child’s welfare. A defence to a prosecution is available where the defendant did not know and had no reason to suspect that publication was intended, or likely, to identify the child. The section defines ‘publish’ (s 97(5)). The Court of Appeal has ruled that there is no duty under s 17 or 47 of the Children Act 1989 on local authorities to inform other authorities of the addresses of those found guilty of sexual abuse in care or other family proceedings. Information may be disclosed to the police or a defendant in a criminal trial but not to authorities to pass on.3 Children Act 1989 proceedings in the family court and High Court and wardship hearings are in private, with both the press and public excluded. It has been held that, in the absence of a specific injunction, facts in the public domain and not covered in the wardship proceedings may be published.4 It is important to note that the significant amendments to s 97 of the Children Act 1989 in Part 2 of the Children, Schools and Families Act 2010 were never brought into force and have now been repealed by the Crime and Courts Act 2013, s  17(4) and SI 2013/2200. No further legislation to amend this area of the law has yet been proposed, so s 97 (as amended) is the relevant legal provision. Children and Young Persons Act 1933, ss  47 and 49; and Re M  and N  (Minors) [1990] 1  All ER 205, CA a balancing of the right of the media and the need to protect the welfare of the child in cases of genuine public interest involving children where information is not statutorily barred under the Administration of Justice Act 1960, s 12. See Children Act 1989, s 97 (as amended by the Access to Justice Act 1999). 2 See Kent County Council v K [1994] 1 WLR 912; Re G (Social Worker: Disclosure) [1996] 1 FLR 276; Re EC (Disclosure of Material) [1996] 2 FLR 725, CA; Oxfordshire County Council v L and F [1997] 1  FLR  235. For more recent cases see Re X  (Children) (Disclosure for Purposes of Criminal Proceedings) [2008] EWHC 242 (Fam), [2008] 3 All ER 958 and M (A Child) (Children and Family Reporter: Disclosure) [2002]  EWCA  Civ 1199, [2003] Fam 26. See Re Z  (A  Minor) (Freedom of Publication) [1997] Fam 1; Re C (a minor) (Care Proceedings: Disclosure) [1997] Fam 76, CA; and Re W (minors) (social worker: disclosure) [1998] 2 All ER 801, CA; Re M (A Child) (Children and Family Reporter: Disclosure) [2002] EWCA Civ 1199. [2003] Fam 26; and Re H (Children) (Care Proceedings: Disclosure) [2009] EWCA Civ 704, [2009] 2 FLR 1531 for a discussion of balancing confidentiality and disclosure. In the Re H  case the Court of Appeal held that changes to the Family Proceedings Rules 1991 (since repealed and replaced by the Family Procedure Rules 2010 (above)) and in particular the repeal of r 4.23 and its replacement by r 10.20A in 2005 may tip the balance in favour of disclosure in a larger number of cases than in the past. Rule 12.73 of the Family Proceedings Rules 2010 contains a similar list of parties to whom information might be disclosed as that which was contained in r 10.20A of the old rules. The courts have treated requests by police for documents arising in child proceedings more generously and have emphasised the cooperation that must exist between the various agencies involved in child welfare: see ‘Working 1

898  Chapter 11 Together to Safeguard Children’ Dept of Health (1999). In another context, the courts have also discouraged applications to them for orders under Family Law Act 1986, s 33 directing the police to disclose the whereabouts of a child who was in the custody of one parent in a refuge: S v S [1999] 1 All ER 281, CA. Also: Re K (A Child) [2000] NLJR 1538 and Re X (above). 3 Re L and Re V (Minors: sexual abuse: disclosure) [1999] 1 FLR 267, although cf R (on the application of A) v Hertfordshire CC  [2001]  EWCA  Civ 2113, [2001]  BLGR  435. See R  (A  Child) (Care Proceedings) (Disclosure), Re (2000) Times, 18 July, CA and disclosure under Children Act 1989, s 42(1)(b). In Re W and Others (Children)(Care Proceedings: disclosure) [2004] 1 All ER 787 the court ordered the police to disclose information about a suspected drugs dealer to a solicitor of the mother of a child in care proceedings, but not to pass on to the clients without permission. 4 Re W (Publication of Information) [1989] 1 FLR 246: the order, enforceable against newspapers and editors but not, on facts, journalists; see Re C (No 2) [1989] 2 All ER 791; Re L [1988] 1 All ER 418. For wardship proceedings and local authorities, see Children Act 1989, s 100. Stephen Brown P has included, for a ward of court, the name and address and indication of the identity of a ward as publishable where such publication is not specifically enjoined and does not form part of the proceedings: Re W. See Cumbria County Council v X (1990) Times, 25 June. In Kelly v BBC [2001] 1 All ER 323, the High Court refused to prevent the broadcast of a programme, with an interview, about a 16-year-old ward of court who had left his family home to live with a religious sect. Article 10 of the ECHR was crucial in allowing the broadcast. There was no breach of Administration of Justice Act 1960, s 12 nor of Children Act 1989, s 97(2) nor any question of the custodial jurisdiction of the court. See also X (a Child) [2001] FCR 541; Medway Council v BBC [2002] 1 FLR 104; and BBC v Rochdale MBC [2005] EWHC 2862 (Fam), [2006] EMLR 6 where the court held that two social workers in a particular case could be identified, finding that the Art 10 right to freedom of expression held greater weight than the Art 8 rights either of the social workers concerned or the children who might have been identified from the disclosure of the social workers’ identities. It should be noted, however, that the disclosure was to take place some time after the original intervention by social services.

11.7  Where the ‘upbringing’ of a child is concerned, the principle that the welfare of the child is paramount deriving from Children Act 1989, s 1(1) has been used to impose secrecy for the proceedings.1 In cases where the care and upbringing of the child were not, or were not directly, in question the courts had been prepared to allow press reporting of facts which might reveal the identity of children involved in proceedings because of the public interest of free speech and a free press.2 Or reports may be allowed, but not identifying the children.3 The subject is now dominated by the decision in Re S which held that the position was governed by the rights, and Convention methodologies, under Arts 8 and 10 of the Convention by virtue of the Human Rights Act 1998 (below). In re Z  (A  Minor) (Identification: Restrictions on Publication) [1995] 4  All ER  961 (CA) – a TV programme about the daughter of Cecil Parkinson and Sarah Keays and her special educational needs: injunction prohibiting commentary identifying child maintained. See: A  and Byrne and Twenty-Twenty TV v UK (1998) 25 EHRR CD 159 before the EComHR. See Lord Steyn in Re S (a child) [2004] UKHL 47 at para 37 where this view is maintained obiter. 2 Re W (A Minor) (Wardship: Freedom of Publication) [1992] 1 All ER 794 (CA); R v Central Independent Television [1994] 3 All ER 641, CA. 3 Re W (A Minor) (Wardship: Restrictions on Publication) [1995] 2 FLR 466 (CA). 1

11.8  The secrecy of proceedings involving the upbringing of children has brought increasing criticism that parties involved in the litigation may find it impossible to be treated fairly.1 Furthermore the courts have been prepared to allow proceedings to be heard in public, for identities to be released or for judgment to be published where this is clearly in the public interest because of the important questions raised.2 Section 12(1) of the Administration of Justice

Litigation and information   899 Act 1960 and formerly the common law prohibited publication of details of the proceedings3 held in private; however, publication of the name of a sex offender who had made an application to the Mental Health Review Tribunal did not concern proceedings before the tribunal. Section 12 states that the publication of information relating to proceedings before any court sitting in private (including in camera or in chambers) shall not of itself be contempt of court. There are five exceptions to this, including proceedings involving the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court with respect to minors; or under the Children Act 1989 or the Adoption and Children Act 2002; or which otherwise relate wholly or mainly to the maintenance or upbringing of a minor. The second category concerns proceedings under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, or the Mental Health Act 1983 authorising an application or reference to be made to either the Firsttier Tribunal in England, the Mental Health Review Tribunal for Wales or the county court. The last three deal with national security, secret processes and inventions, and last of all where the court has the power and expressly prohibits publication of all information relating to the proceedings or of information of the description which is published. Section 12(2) allows the publication of the text or a summary of the whole or part of an order made by a court except where the court with power to do so expressly prohibits publication.4 Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee HC 1247(i) (2003–04). See Cm 6507 Family Justice. Where questions relating to the continuing life of a child in serious physical distress on a life support machine or where a ‘miracle baby’ born to an infertile mother was in fact the product of child trafficking: in the latter case, identities were not released. 3 See Pickering v Liverpool Daily Post and Echo Newspapers plc [1991] 1  All ER  622 (HL) on ‘proceedings’ before First-tier Tribunals (Mental Health), more commonly known as the Mental Health Tribunals. 4 Re G (Minors) (celebrities: publicity) [1999] 3 FCR 181, CA. 1 2

11.9  In relation to a child, the section is not concerned with protecting information about the child or that s/he is a ward of court and is the subject of wardship proceedings.1 Nor does the section apply to documents held by social services which have not been filed with or used in the proceedings.2 The Family Division has ruled that there is a publication whenever the law of defamation would treat there as having a publication: subject to exceptions of communication of information to a professional where both the communicator and the recipient were acting in furtherance of protection of the children. In essence, a distinction is drawn between ‘the nature of the dispute’ and the publication of evidence, even in summary form. The former may be permissible; the latter will not.3 X v Dempster [1999] 1 FLR 894 at 898. See Kelly above. Re W [1998] 2 All ER 801, CA. Such documents will be covered by the Data Protection Act 2018 and by the law of confidentiality. 3 Re B (a child) (disclosure) [2004] 2 FLR 200. Munby J provided examples of what cannot be published. 1 2

11.10  Section 159 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 allows the appeal judge to give directions ordering the transfer to that judge of any transcript or note of proceedings or other document and to stay proceedings in any other court until the appeal is dispensed of, and related matters.1 Criminal Justice Act 1988, s 158 concerns anonymity in rape cases.

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900  Chapter 11 11.11  Rules allow for the above appeals to be heard in private. Readers are reminded of the powers of publicising anti-social behaviour orders but in a manner which is reasonable and proportionate (para 4.326, note 3).1 R (Stanley etc) v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2004] EWHC 2229 (Admin); and see Crook v Chief Constable of Essex [2015] EWHC 988 (QB) for potential issues relating to data protection.

1

11.12  Article 8 of the ECHR and the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998) may also be invoked by those who have protective orders preventing reporting or publication of information about them as children to continue after they achieve adulthood. Convention rights will now dominate the situation and the former wardship case-law will have to be re-examined in the light of the Convention and the framework provided by those rights. The former case-law may be of some use in exercising a balance between rights under Arts 8 and 10. Such injunctions preventing reporting were requested by the murderers of the young child, James Bulger, after their release from prison and after they had achieved adulthood. Orders prohibiting such publication were granted by the High Court (see paras 2.228 et seq above). Such orders are ‘exceptional’, but have been used in the case of Mary Bell until she achieved the age of 18, and injunctions were issued on her reaching that age on the grounds of protecting confidentiality (para 2.228, note 2 above).1 However, in Re S under inherent powers, the court refused to prohibit publication of the identities of a child’s mother and her alleged murder victim (the child’s brother) in criminal proceedings to protect the identity of her son who was involved in care proceedings, but a balance will have to be struck between Arts 8 and 10 ECHR.2 These criminal proceedings were not concerned directly with the upbringing of the child. Both Articles must be considered in their own right and balanced proportionately. The majority held, agreeing with the judge at first instance, that the injunction should be discharged and reporting allowed. This decision, but not the reasoning, was upheld by the House of Lords. In giving the judgment for the appeal committee, Lord Steyn stated: ‘The House unanimously takes the view that since the 1998 Act came into force in October 2000, the earlier case law about the existence and scope of inherent jurisdiction need not be considered in this case or in similar cases. The foundation of the jurisdiction to restrain publicity in a case such as the present is now derived from convention rights under the ECHR. This is the simple and direct way to approach such cases. In this case the jurisdiction is not in doubt. This is not to say that the case law on the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court is wholly irrelevant. On the contrary, it may remain of some interest in regard to the ultimate balancing exercise to be carried out under the ECHR provisions. My noble and learned friend Lord Bingham of Cornhill invited the response of counsel to this approach. Both expressed agreement with it. I would affirm this approach. Before passing on I would observe on a historical note that a study of the case law revealed that the approach adopted in the past under the inherent jurisdiction was remarkably similar to that to be adopted under the ECHR. Indeed the ECHR provisions were often cited even before it became part of our law in October 2000. Nevertheless, it will in future be necessary, if earlier case law is cited, to bear in mind the new methodology required by the ECHR as explained in Campbell.’3

Litigation and information   901 Re X (A Minor) [1984] 1 WLR 1422 and W, Y v SO, News Group Newspapers Ltd [2003] 2 FCR 686. Re S (a child) (identification: restriction on publication) [2003] EWCA Civ 963, [2003] 3 WLR 1425 (CA). 3 Re S (a child) etc [2004] 4 All ER 683, HL, at para 23; for Campbell, see paras 2.216 and 4.295 above. See Blunkett v Quinn (2004) Times, 7 December, para 11.2, note 2 above. More recently, the court has granted injunctions to prevent the publication of any material that might identify birth parents of children who had been adopted. The parents wished to give interviews to the media in order to highlight what they believed were miscarriages of justice which ultimately led to the adoption of their children. The court found that although the birth parents were pursuing a legitimate objective, there was an overriding interest in the protection of the adopted children and thus granted injunctions in broad terms, prohibiting publication of any information that could lead to the identification of the children or the interference in their family life. See Re B  (Children) [2010]  EWHC  262 (Fam), [2010] 1  FLR  1708 and A  v Ward (No  2) [2010] EWHC 538 (Fam). Conversely, injunctions have been refused where the guardian of a child sought to restrict publication of proceedings in coroner’s inquest investigating the death of the child’s sister. It was argued that reports of proceedings could lead to identification of the surviving sibling, but the court held that the public interest in the free reporting of legal proceedings outweighed the child’s Art 8 rights – Re LM (A Child) (Reporting Restrictions: Coroner’s Inquest) [2007] EWHC 1902 (Fam), [2007] CP Rep. 48. 1 2

11.13  A  factor that weighed heavily with openness was the large number of exceptions to openness provided by Parliament (above) and that further judicial inroads would pile ‘exception upon exception to the principle of open justice’. The child was not a participant in a criminal trial for which specific provision is made. 11.14  In appeals otherwise from decisions of courts which sat in private, the appeal court has the same power to sit in private for all or part of the appeal, though the decision, and reasons for the decision, must generally be in public.1 Domestic and Appellate Proceedings (Restriction of Publicity) Act 1968, s 1.

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11.15  Nevertheless, the general presumption is that justice will be done in public.1 However, proceedings in chambers are in private but judgments will usually be public documents unless the nature of the proceedings requires secrecy2 and the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) has laid down guidelines on when information should be received privately in chambers by the judge in criminal matters. Where the public were excluded, the press should usually be excluded.3 It should be observed that interim proceedings in the Queen’s Bench Division for injunctions are in chambers, in contradistinction to the Chancery Division where proceedings are in open court. Court proceedings in England and Wales may not be broadcast or recorded publicly but discussions are taking place with a view of allowing limited broadcasts. In November 2004, filming of proceedings in the Court of Appeal was allowed but for internal consumption only. The Department for Constitutional Affairs launched a consultation exercise on broadcasting court proceedings, which did not immediately lead to change in the law, as court proceedings still cannot be broadcast.4 There are two notable exceptions to the prohibition on photography or broadcasting of court proceedings (primarily to be found in s 41 of the Criminal Justice Act 1925 and s 9 of the COCA 1981) relates to proceedings in the Supreme Court. Section 47 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 expressly excludes the Supreme

902  Chapter 11 Court from the ordinary prohibition on photography, etc of court proceedings contained in s 41 of the 1925 Act, though not s 9 of the 1981 Act. Section 32(8) of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 modifies s 9 by inserting a new s 9(1A), which permits the publication or disposal of recordings of the Supreme Court with the leave of the Court. It should be noted that the court might grant leave for the use of tape-recording equipment and give permission for the recordings to be released to the public under the provisions of s  9 in any case, whereas the provisions of s 41 of the 1925 Act are absolute. The president or presiding judge in a Supreme Court case may grant permission to broadcast proceedings5 and the judge concerned may impose such conditions on recording and broadcasting as he thinks fit, including the potential to require agreement of all the parties. The Supreme Court and broadcasters have agreed a protocol on the recording and use of material, including exclusions for private discussions between parties and counsel and restrictions on the use of excerpts. The protocol also contains prohibitions on the use of footage for marketing or party political purposes. The protocol is referred to in Practice Direction 8 of the Supreme Court, but does not appear to be publicly available. The Supreme Court generally publishes video recordings of its hearings (subject to restrictions in appropriate cases) and publishes them on its website. Broadcasting has taken place in Scotland. The debate over the broadcasting of certain proceedings in lower courts was a topic addressed by Lord Neuberger, then the Master of the Rolls, in a Judicial Studies Board lecture in 2011.6 A second exception to the general prohibition contained in s 41 of the 1925 Act and the restrictions in s 9 of the 1981 Act was added by s 32 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013. This section permits the Lord Chancellor to disapply the provisions of these sections in order to permit the making of recordings of proceedings. So far, two Orders have been made. One of these concerns the recording of proceedings in the Court of Appeal and the other concerns recordings of sentencing reports in the Crown Court. In the case of the provisions in respect of the Court of Appeal, broadcasting is permitted provided that the provisions of the Order are met, whereas the recordings in the Crown Court may not presently be broadcast and are recorded on a trial basis only. Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417, HL. R v Malvern Justices, ex p Evans [1988] 1 All ER 371. For a recent graphic illustration, see Storer v British Gas plc [2000] 2 All ER 440, CA and R v Bow County Court, ex p Pelling [2001] UKHRR 165 (CA). See Clibbery v Allan [2002] Fam 261: publication allowed of information arising from Family Law Act 1996, s 36 proceedings in chambers; and P (Disclosure: Criminal Proceedings) [2004] 1 FLR 407. For arbitration and requirements of privacy, see City of Moscow v Bankers Trust [2004] EWCA Civ 314, discussed above. Rules allow tribunals to sit in private in certain circumstances. For ADR and negotiated justice and cognate matters, see J Jacob Civil Justice in the Age of Human Rights Act (2007), pp 65–66. We are grateful to Joe Jacob for discussion on a variety of points. 2 See para 11.4 above. 3 Re Crook (1989) Times, 13  November. See R  v Independent, ex p DPP  (1988) Guardian, 1  April and PACE 1984, s 9 and Sch 1 applications concerning sensitive information. On broadcasting, Dockray (1988) MLR 593. See, incidentally, R v Agar [1990] 2 All ER 442, CA. 4 Department for Constitutional Affairs (2004) CP 28/04 Broadcasting Courts. Available at: http:// webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/courts/broadcastingcp28-04.pdf. See also Ministry of Justice (2012) Proposals to allow the broadcasting, filming, and recording of selected court proceedings. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/ government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/217307/broadcasting-filmingrecording-courts.pdf. 1

Litigation and information   903 UK Supreme Court Practice Direction 8, para 8.17.1. Lord Neuberger ‘Open Justice Unbound?’ Judicial Studies Board Annual Lecture 2011. Available at: http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Speeches/mr-speech-jsb-lecturemarch-2011.pdf.

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PROTOCOLS ON POLICE INFORMATION 11.16  In the past, there was a protocol on the means by which police information or evidence was to be disclosed by the police to local authorities and others involved in litigation concerning family proceedings, which was agreed by ACPO and members of the judiciary in the Autumn of 2004. It was implemented on a pilot basis in London and the North-West from 1 December 2004 and evaluations undertaken demonstrated that the protocol was successful in reducing the amount of time taken to obtain disclosure and were deemed to improve communication and co-operation between the various parties. This was adopted by most police forces.1 This protocol is no longer used and all information sharing by the police in England and local authorities or other bodies must be undertaken in accordance with the College of Policing’s Authorised Professional Practice (APP) on Information Management.2 The purpose of the APP is to ensure that all such information is compliant with the law on data protection and the Human Rights Act 1998. Any information sharing must be done through an information sharing agreement. It is for each force to agree information sharing agreements with bodies with whom information should be shared and there are examples online of the agreements that have been reached between the police and local authorities. W O’Connor and J Dickson Disclosure of Police Information in Family Proceedings (2006). London: National Centre for Social Research. 2 College of Policing (2013 and modified 2018) Authorised Professional Practice on Information Sharing available at: https://www.app.college.police.uk/information-management-index/ and the particular guidance on sharing at https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/informationmanagement/sharing-police-information/. 1

11.17  The Crown Prosecution Service also publishes a model protocol on the sharing of information between local authorities and prosecutors in child abuse cases.1 The protocol provides guidance on information sharing, offers some detail on the relevant legal frameworks and issues under data protection law and also provides a model form which the police might use to request information from local authorities. Available at https://www.cps.gov.uk/publication/investigation-and-prosecution-child-abuse-cases.

1

DISCLOSURE (DISCOVERY)1 What is disclosure? 11.18  The origins of disclosure, or what for centuries was known as discovery, lie in the equitable jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, and the Court of Exchequer. It must be explained briefly that the change in name outlined

904  Chapter 11 above came with the CPR 1998 which emerged from the Woolf reforms of the civil justice system. The Rules contain a statement of the overriding objective of dealing with cases justly – which is spelt out in r 1.2 – and give to judges significant powers of case management.2 Disclosure is the process by which parties to an action may identify and inspect the documents (CPR 1998, r 31.4) which are, or have been, in each other’s control, which means they are or were in the party’s physical possession, where there is or was a right to possession, or the party had a right to inspect or take copies of the documents. See Compagnie Financière Commerciale du Pacifique v Peruvian Guano Co (1882) 11  QBD  55 for the common law principles. Disclosure P  Matthews and H  Malek (2001) and Documentary Evidence C  Hollander (2003). For disclosure and the Data Protection Act 1998 see: Durant v FSA [2003] EWCA Civ 1746, Johnson v Medical Defence Union Ltd [2005] 1 All ER 87 and R (Lord) v Home Secretary [2003]  EWHC  2073 (Admin) at para 2.19. In the latter, a blanket policy of refusing annual security reports on category A prisoners to those prisoners was in place. Section 7(4) of the DPA 1998 necessitated a proper balance to be struck between the rights of a prisoner and the rights of the authors of security reports to remain anonymous. Therefore, a blanket policy of non-disclosure could not be justified; a more selective and targeted approach was required. See also Durham County Council v D  [2012]  EWCA  Civ 1654, [2013] 1  WLR  2305 where it was held that the appropriate balance to be struck in disclosure cases where the claimants were seeking access to personal data (in this case, unredacted personnel files) was a balance informed by the competing interests of the right to a fair trial under Art 6  ECHR and the right to a private family life under Art 8 ECHR. In this case, the Court of Appeal upheld an order that the unredacted files be disclosed as this was necessary for the claimant’s case. For a recent case applying similar principles in the Court of Protection, see RC v CC [2014] EWHC 131 (COP), [2014] 1 WLR 2731. 2 Pre-action Protocols seek to encourage the exchange of early and full information about the prospective legal claims. On the duty to retain documents when litigation is in prospect, see: R. Harrison (2004) New LJ 1716. See also the discussion of authorities of pre-action destruction of documents by Morritt V-C in Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2003] EWHC 55 (Ch), [2003] EMLR 29. 1

11.19  Most of what follows concerns litigation against private as well as public bodies. The main provision covering disclosure in the High Court and county courts is CPR 1998, Part 31 – the rules apply to both High Court and county court proceedings. The basic provision is now for ‘standard disclosure’ (see below). However, other provisions are also important: Part 18 concerns the power of the court to order a party to provide additional information on any matter which is in dispute in the proceedings. RSC Ord 77, r 12 was important in litigation involving the Crown. Disclosure against the Crown was not automatic and did not have to be made except under order of the court. Order 77, r 12 has been repealed and the Crown, like other parties, may object to disclosure. Further, the Crown may keep secret ‘the existence of any document the existence of which it would, in the opinion of a Minister of the Crown, be injurious to the public interest to disclose’. These may now be kept secret under the provisions applying on disclosure. 11.20  A party discloses a document by stating that the document exists or has existed (CPR  1998, r 31.2). A  party to whom a document has been disclosed has a right to inspect that document except: where the document is no longer in the control of the party who disclosed it; the party disclosing the document has a right or a duty to withhold inspection of it (see below); or where under r 31.3(2) a party considers that it would be disproportionate to the issues in the

Litigation and information   905 case to permit inspection of documents within a category or class of documents disclosed under r 31.6(b) (see below). As previously, disclosure must simply be shown to be ‘necessary in order to dispose fairly of the case or to save costs.’ Where these proportionality provisos apply, a party is not required to permit inspection of documents within that category or class; but he must state in his disclosure statement that inspection of those documents will not be permitted on the grounds that to do so would be disproportionate. An order to give disclosure is an order to give ‘standard disclosure’ (see below) unless the court directs otherwise. Standard disclosure may be dispensed with or limited by the court and dispensation or limitation may also be agreed to by the parties. 11.21  It is perhaps important to note that the disclosure of electronic documents and information has become a more pressing issue in light of the considerable expansion of such material in recent years. Practice Direction 31B offers detailed guidance on the disclosure of electronic documents. Rule 31.4 and corresponding PD  31.2A require the parties to seek to reach agreement on an appropriate strategy for the search for relevant electronic documents.1 In some circumstances it will be important for such data to be disclosed in accordance with the early disclosure regime in relevant pre-action protocols. Failure to conduct an adequate search for electronic material may lead to adverse inferences being drawn against those failing to carry out an adequate search, even if the material concerned is material that was created prior to the contemplation or commencement of proceedings.2 Where a computer-assisted review process is used to search for documents, it may be appropriate to seek to exclude some material using such processes, but the way in which this is done must be transparent. One particular problem in the case of electronic documents is that there is a potential for them to be deleted but still in the hands of a party because they still exist on back-ups. The courts have occasionally required detailed searches of back-ups in order for the requirements of disclosure to be met,3 although the Court of Appeal recently upheld a decision of the High Court that this was not necessary if it added unduly to expense.4 It is clear that all bodies, both public and private, must seek to have a system in place that enables the effective searching and retrieval of electronic material in case it is required for the purposes of litigation. See Blaxell (2010) NLJ 544. Earles v Barclays Bank Plc [2009] EWHC 2500 (QB), [2010] Bus LR 566. 3 Digicel (St Lucia) Ltd and Ors v Cable & Wireless Plc & Ors [2008] EWHC 2522 (Ch), [2009] 2 All ER 1094. 4 Fiddes v Channel 4 Television Corporation [2010] EWCA Civ 730, [2010] 1 WLR 2245. 1 2

11.22  Under r 31.6, standard disclosure requires a party to disclose the documents on which he relies, all documents which could (i) adversely affect his or her own case or (ii) adversely affect another party’s case, or (iii) support another party’s case (r 31.6(b)); and documents which must be disclosed by any relevant practice direction (r 31.6(c)). When giving standard disclosure, a party is required to make a reasonable search for documents falling within r 31.6(b) or (c). Relevant factors in deciding upon the reasonableness of a search include: (a) the number of documents involved;

906  Chapter 11 (b) the nature and complexity of the proceedings; (c) the ease and expense of retrieval of any particular document; and (d) the significance of any document which is likely to be located during the search (r 31.7(2)). 11.23  A party who has not searched for a category or class of document on the grounds that to do so would be unreasonable, must state this in their disclosure statement and identify the category or class of document. CPR 1998, r 31.8 deals with the duty of disclosure, and r 31.9 concerns disclosure of copies. 11.24  The basic form of disclosure, standard disclosure, is under CPR 1998, r 31.10. Under standard disclosure, each party must make and serve on every other party a list of documents in the relevant practice form. The list must identify the documents in a convenient order and manner and as concisely as possible. The list must indicate: those documents for which a party is claiming a privilege or an immunity; and those documents no longer in the party’s control and what has happened to them. Where a privilege etc is claimed, r 31.19(3) and (4) require a statement in the list of documents relating to any documents inspection of which a person claims he has a right or duty to withhold. The list must include a disclosure statement. This is a statement made by the party disclosing the documents setting out the extent of the search that has been made to locate the documents which he is required to disclose; certifying that he understands the duty to disclose documents; and certifying that to the best of his knowledge he has carried out that duty. Additional provisions apply to statements made by companies, firms, associations or ‘other organisation’ (r 31.7). The parties may agree in writing to disclose documents without making a list; and to disclose documents without the disclosing party making a disclosure statement. A disclosure statement may be made by a person who is not a party where this is permitted by a relevant practice direction. Any duty of disclosure continues until the proceedings are concluded. If documents to which that duty extends come to a party’s notice at any time during the proceedings, he must immediately notify every other party. 11.25  As well as standard disclosure there is also specific disclosure as well as specific inspection. Disclosure is also required by pre-action protocols. The party who receives an order for specific disclosure must do one of the following things: disclose documents or classes of documents specified in the order; carry out a search to the extent stated in the order; disclose any documents located as a result of that search. An order for specific inspection is an order that a party permit inspection of a document referred to in r 31.2. This allows a party to state in their disclosure statement that they will not permit inspection of a document on the grounds that it would be disproportionate to do so. 11.26  Disclosure or inspection may take place in stages either by written agreement between the parties or by court order. A party may inspect a document mentioned in: a statement of case; a witness statement; a witness summary; an affidavit; or, subject to r 35.10(4), an expert’s report.1 Where a party has a right to inspect a document, written notice of his wish to inspect the document must

Litigation and information   907 be given by that party to the party who disclosed the document. The latter must permit inspection not more than seven days after the date on which he received notice; and a copy may be requested on undertaking to pay reasonable costs (r 31.15).2 This concerns the question of privilege. See Lucas v Barking, Havering and Redbridge NHS Trust [2003] EWCA 1102; Jackson v Marley Davenport Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 1255 and Beck v Ministry of Defence [2004] PIQR 1 re references to earlier reports in expert evidence reports. In Vasiliou v Hajigeorgiou [2005]  EWCA  Civ 236, [2005] 1  WLR  2195 the Court of Appeal held that a judge did not have the power to prevent the claimant from seeking the opinion of more than one expert in relation to the assessment of damages, although if the second expert’s report was relied upon, the first expert’s report was required to be disclosed as a part of the proceedings. The recent case of Edwards-Tubb v JD Wetherspoon Plc [2011] EWCA Civ 136, [2011] 1 WLR 1373 finds that the court has the power to require the disclosure of an expert report even where the claimant has changed expert prior to the issue of proceedings. See also J Payne and C Urquhart (2011) NLJ 461. It has been held that it is necessary for a previous expert’s report to be disclosed where that expert has chosen to retire during the course of long-running proceedings (10 years): BMG (Mansfield) Ltd v Galliford Try Construction Ltd [2013] EWHC 3183 (TCC); [2014] CP Rep 3. However, the decision in Vilca v Xstrata Ltd [2017]  EWHC  1582 (QB), [2017]  BLR  460 illustrates that, where there is no evidence of a process of ‘expert shopping’ or other abuse of process by a claimant who is changing expert witnesses, the court is not obliged to and will not order disclosure of the previous expert report. 2 For documents referred to in statements of case (r 31.14), see Rigg v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2004] EMLR 4, Expandable Ltd v Rubin [2008] EWCA Civ 59, [2008] 1 WLR 1099 and National Crime Agency v Abacha [2016] EWCA Civ 760, [2016] 1 WLR 4375. 1

11.27  CPR  1998, r 31.16 applies where an application is made to the court under any act for disclosure before proceedings have started.1 The application must be supported by evidence. Among other factors, the court may make such an order where disclosure before proceedings have started is desirable in order to dispose fairly of the anticipated proceedings; assist the dispute to be resolved without proceedings; or to save costs (r 31.16(3)(d)). Further provision is made concerning specification of documents or classes of documents which must be disclosed and other matters including specifying any of those documents which are no longer under his control or in respect of which he claims a right or duty to withhold inspection. The respondent may be asked what has happened to documents no longer under his control and specify the time and place for disclosure and inspection (r 31.16(4) and (5)). Senior Courts Act 1981, s 33; County Courts Act 1984, s 52. See Bermuda International Securities Ltd v KPMG (a firm) (2001) Times, 14 March, CA. Lord Woolf proposed that such disclosure be extended to all cases (see Civil Procedure Act 1997, s 8). See Black and Others v Sumitomo Corp [2003] 3 All ER 643 (CA); Moresfield Ltd v Banners [2003] EWHC 1602 and Rose v Lynx Express Ltd and Another [2004] EWCA Civ 447. In Smith v Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change [2013]  EWCA  Civ 1585, [2014] 1  WLR  2283 the Court of Appeal rejected the idea that the claimant needed to be able to demonstrate a prima facie or arguable case before such disclosure could be sought, although emphasised the need for some appropriate evidence to be adduced of the relevance of the material sought before the court would order disclosure.

1

11.28  Rule 31.17 applies where an application is made under any Act for disclosure by a person who is not a party to the proceedings.1 Once again the application must be supported by evidence. The court may only make an order where the documents of which disclosure is sought are likely to support the case of the applicant or adversely affect the case of one of the other parties to the

908  Chapter 11 proceedings; and disclosure is necessary in order to dispose fairly of the claim or to save costs. Further provisions then apply as under r 31.16 (4) and (5). Senior Courts Act 1981, s 34; County Courts Act 1984, s 53.

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11.29  Neither r 31.16 nor r 31.17 limits any other powers a court may possess to order disclosure before proceedings have started and disclosure against a person who is not a party to proceedings.1

1

Under the principles discussed in Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Comrs [1974] AC 133, below. See Carlton Film Distributors Ltd v VCI PLC [2003] EWHC 616. See also Mitsui & Co Ltd v Nexen Petroleum UK Ltd [2005] EWHC 625 (Ch), [2005] 3 All ER 511, Eli Lilly & Co Ltd v Neopharma Ltd [2008] EWHC 415 (Ch), [2008] FSR 25 and Wobben Properties GmbH v Siemens Plc [2014] EWHC 3173 (Pat), [2014] Info TLR 405.

11.30  Under r 31.19(1), a person may apply without notice for an order permitting him to withhold disclosure of a document on the ground that disclosure would damage the public interest. This is against disclosure itself it should be noted. Unless the court orders otherwise, an order of the court under para (1) must not be served on any other person and must not be open to inspection by any other person. Where a person wishes to claim that he has a right or a duty to withhold inspection of a document, or part of a document, he must state in writing that he has such a right or duty and the grounds on which he claims that right or duty (r 31.19(3)). By r 31.19(8) this Part does not affect any rule of law which permits or requires a document to be withheld from disclosure or inspection on the ground that its disclosure or inspection would damage the public interest. This is the subject matter known as public interest immunity (see below). This rule sets out the procedure but the substance of the law is as developed by numerous judicial decisions. 11.31  The statement in r 31.19(3) must be made in the list in which the document is disclosed or if there is no list, to the person wishing to inspect the document. A party may apply to the court to decide whether a claim made under para (3) should be upheld. For applications under both paras (1) and (3) above, the court may: (a) require the person seeking to withhold disclosure or inspection of a document to produce that document to the court; and (b) invite any person, whether or not a party, to make representations. 11.32  An application under para  (1) (withholding disclosure) or para  (2) (withholding inspection) must be supported by evidence. 11.33  Where a party inadvertently allows a privileged document to be inspected, the party who has inspected the document may use it or its contents only with permission of the court.1 CPR 1998, r 31.20. At common law this has generated a great litany of litigation: see Calcraft v Guest [1898] 1 QB 759, CA; Lord Ashburton v Pape [1913] 2 Ch 469, CA; Breeze v J Stacey & Sons Ltd (1999) Times, 6 July, CA; Istil Group Inc v Zahoor [2003] EWHC 165 (Ch), [2003] 2 All ER 252; Kousouros v O’Halloran [2014] EWHC 2294 (Ch), [2015] WTLR 1023 and the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd [2017]  EWCA  Civ 1327, [2018] EMLR 2 that demonstrates the application of this principle in the context of the desire

1

Litigation and information   909 of the media to publish privileged information inadvertently disclosed. See para 11.108 below. For a case on the interaction of the law on inadvertent disclosure and public interest immunity (a principle discussed in more detail below), see Tchenguiz v Director of the Serious Fraud Office [2014] EWCA Civ 1129, [2015] 1 WLR 797.

11.34  A party may not rely on any document which he fails to disclose or in respect of which he fails to permit inspection unless the court gives permission (r 31.21). This places an enormous emphasis on careful pre-litigation preparation. Rule 31.22 concerns subsequent use of disclosed documents and is examined below. Rule 31.23 allows proceedings for contempt to be brought against a person if he makes, or causes to be made, a false disclosure statement, without an honest belief in its truth. Proceedings may only be brought by the AttorneyGeneral or with the permission of the court.

Strangers to the action 11.35  Vis-à-vis a stranger to the action, disclosure cannot usually be obtained apart from under CPR 1998, r 31.17. If documents or information are required from a stranger, it will usually be necessary to issue a witness summons (subpoena) on that person.1 There is one important exception apart from the above rule. Burstall v Beyfus (1884) 26 Ch D  35, CA, and paras 11.113 et seq below. On r 31.17, see Re Howglen Ltd [2001] 1  All ER  376 and Three Rivers DC  v Bank of England (Disclosure) (No.1) [2002] EWCA Civ 1182, [2003] 1 WLR 210 where the Court of Appeal found that the meaning of ‘likely’ r 31.17(3)(a) meant ‘may well’ and furthermore held that this test must be applied to each individual document, or where documents belonged to a class of documents to each individual class. More recently, the High Court has held that those seeking disclosure under r 31.17 must be able to demonstrate that the documents sought contain ‘material which is of direct relevance and of central importance for the just determination of the proceedings’. See Global Energy Horizons Corp v Gray [2014] EWHC 2925 (Ch) at [56]. Where the documents sought may be covered by a privilege, it is not necessary for the party seeking disclosure to demonstrate that the documents could be deployed as part of its case, it is sufficient to show that the documents could support its case even if they cannot be deployed. See Twin Benefits Ltd v Barker [2017] EWHC 177 (Ch), [2017] 4 WLR 42.

1

11.36  A  stranger who, although not personally liable, has either provided facilities for the commission of, or has otherwise become implicated in, a tort, albeit perfectly innocently, may be made a party to an action for disclosure/ discovery only. The defendant’s facilitation of the wrong, however, where innocent, will not lead to damages being awarded against the defendant by a successful plaintiff: these s/he will have to recover from the wrongdoer in the subsequent tort action.1 The House of Lords has confirmed that an intermediary who handed information from a source employed by the claimant but who himself was not a tortfeasor or in breach of legal duties to the claimant is an appropriate person to be subjected to a court order for disclosure and it was not necessary for such an order to be awarded that the claimant wished to dismiss the source. An action in damages against the source was not necessary.2 Disclosure may also be allowed where required to prevent the dissipation of assets in an action brought to establish ownership of the assets.3 It is important to note that ss 17 and 18 of the Justice and Security Act 2013 prevent the court from making an order for

910  Chapter 11 disclosure under its jurisdiction in Norwich Pharmacal where such information would be sensitive information. Sensitive information is defined in s 17(3)(a)–(d) as material held by, obtained from or relating to an intelligence service. Section 17(3)(e) permits the Secretary of State to certify other information as unsuitable for disclosure under s 17, but any such certification is then open to review under s  18. As far as we are aware, there has not been any litigation in relation to reviews under s 18.4 Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Comrs [1974] AC 133, HL; Harrington v North London Polytechnic [1984] 3 All ER 666, CA; on jurisdictional limits MacKinnon v Donaldson Lufkin and Jenrette Securities Corpn [1986] Ch 482; cf Ricci v Chow [1987] 3 All ER 534, CA. See Ashworth Hospital Authority, para  11.46, note 1 below for an application of Norwich Pharmacal to a wrongdoer. 2 See Ashworth Hospital Authority, para 11.46, note 1 below. 3 Arab Monetary Fund v Hashim (No 5) [1992] 2 All ER 911; see also Khanna v Lovell, White, Durant [1995] 1 WLR 121. 4 Pre-Act, see R (Mohamed) v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [2010] EWCA 65 and 158, which brought about s 17. 1

Restrictions on the subsequent use of disclosed documents 11.37  Once documents are disclosed, the party obtaining disclosure may use them only for the purpose of the proceedings in which they are disclosed. There are three exceptions: where the document has been read to or by the court, or referred to, at a hearing which has been held in public; when the court gives permission; or, the party who disclosed the document and the person to whom the document belongs agree (CPR  1998, r 31.22(1)). The court may make an order restricting or prohibiting the use of a document which has been disclosed, even where the document has been read to or by the court, or referred to, at a hearing which has been held in public (r 31.22(2)). An application for an order may be made by a party, or by any person to whom the document belongs.1 Rule 31.22(3): British Sky Broadcasting Plc v Virgin Media Communications Ltd (formerly NTL Communications Ltd) [2008] EWCA Civ 612, [2008] 1 W.L.R. 2854; SmithKline Beecham plc v Generics UK Ltd [2003] 4 All ER 1302; Lilly Icos LLC v Pfizer Ltd No 2 [2002] 1 All ER 842. See previous Ord 24, r 14A and Harman v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1983] 1 AC 280, HL and the decision in Smith Kline Beecham Biologicals SA v Connaught Laboratories Inc [1999] 4 All ER 498, CA for a liberal test of when documents had entered the public domain; and the Law Debenture Trust Corp v Lexington Ins Co (2003) New LJ 1551: and note McCartan Turkington Breen v Times Newspapers Ltd [2000] 4 All ER 913, HL. See also Baring plc v Coopers & Lybrand [2000] 3 All ER 910, CA, and Banking Act 1987, s 82(1) and (2) and FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Godfrey Merrett Robertson Ltd [1999]  CLC  566, CA. There have been a number of recent cases which have considered the role of s 348 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 on disclosure. See Real Estate Opportunities Ltd v Aberdeen Asset Managers Jersey Ltd [2007]  EWCA  Civ 197, [2007] Bus LR 971 and, for a broader consideration of the scope of s 348 see Financial Services Authority v Information Commissioner [2009]  EWHC  1548 (Admin), [2009] Bus LR  1287 and Property Alliance Group Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland Plc [2018] EWCA Civ 1202. For disclosure of unused documents by the prosecution created in the course of a criminal investigation, see: Taylor v Director of the SFO [1998] 3 WLR 1040 and Westcott v Westcott [2008] EWCA Civ 818, [2009] QB 407. See also Marlwood Commercial Inc v Kozeny and Others [2004] EWCA Civ 798, [2005] 1 WLR 104; Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Emmott [2008] EWCA Civ 184, [2008] Bus LR 1361; SITA UK Group Holdings Ltd v Serruys [2009] EWHC 869 (QB), [2009] STC 1595; and Alphasteel Ltd (In Liquidation) v Shirkhani [2013] EWCA Civ 1272, [2014] CP Rep 1.

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Litigation and information   911

Contempt of Court Act 1981, s 10 11.38  As the procedure outlined above to obtain disclosure from third parties will be used invariably, though not exclusively, to discover the identity of putative wrongdoers, s 10 of the COCA 1981 should be borne in mind: ‘No court may require a person to disclose, nor is any person guilty of contempt of court for refusing to disclose, the source of information contained in a publication for which he is responsible, unless it be established to the satisfaction of the court that disclosure is necessary in the interests of justice or national security or for the prevention of disorder or crime.’ 11.39  This provision replaced an uncertain position catered for by the common law on a case-by-case basis.1 The immunity is of wide and general applicability and is subject only to the four exceptions, each of which must be established as being ‘necessary’ – not convenient or expedient. The onus of proof establishing that disclosure is necessary for one of the four exemptions falls on the party making the application and is on the balance of probabilities. Where national security is involved, the court may infer from additional material to the affidavit on application that disclosure is necessary. It did seem that the proprietary claims of the applicant will not, ipso facto, defeat the immunities of a publisher. However, s 10 may be invoked by a publisher where a court order might, not necessarily would, force the disclosure of a source of information to eg a journalist. It was, said the House of Lords, in the interests of justice that persons should be enabled to exercise important legal rights (viz to protect their own confidential information) and to protect themselves from serious wrongs regardless of whether or not resort to legal proceedings in a court of law was necessary to attain those objectives.2 The serious threat to the claimant’s business of publication of confidential information at a time of financial restructuring and the fact that any public interest in protecting the source’s identity had been diminished by the source’s complicity in a ‘gross breach of confidentiality’ was not counterbalanced by any public interest in publication of the information. The identity of the leaker was not revealed and Goodwin, the journalist, was fined for contempt. Lord Bridge offered some useful advice on the sorts of considerations that might come into play in deciding whether disclosure was necessary in the interests of justice: ‘In estimating the importance to be given to the case in favour of disclosure there will be a wide spectrum within which the particular case must be located. If the party seeking disclosure shows, for example, that his very livelihood depends upon it, this will put the case near to one end of the spectrum. If he shows no more than that what he seeks to protect is a minor interest in property, this will put the case at or near the other end. On the other side the importance of protecting a source from disclosure in pursuance of the policy underlying the statute will also vary within a wide spectrum. One important factor will be the nature of information obtained from the source. The greater the legitimate public interest in the information which the source has given to the publisher or intended

912  Chapter 11 publisher, the greater will be the importance of protecting the source. But another and perhaps more significant factor which will very much affect the importance of protecting the source will be the manner in which the information was itself obtained by the source. If it appears to the court that the information was obtained legitimately this will enhance the importance of protecting the source. Conversely, if it appears that the information was obtained illegally, this will diminish the importance of protecting the source unless, of course, this factor is counterbalanced by a clear public interest in publication of the information, as in the classic case where the source has acted for the purpose of exposing iniquity.’ (at pp 9–10) British Steel Corpn v Granada TV [1981] AC 1096, HL, and see Lord Wilberforce at 1168. Section 10 is primarily concerned with journalists and broadcasters and to a lesser extent authors. Guidance for doctors is given by the GMC in Good Medical Practice (2013) and in a booklet on ‘Confidentiality’ (2017). Accountants have guidelines on breaches of confidence in the Code of Ethics Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (2011); and see Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, ss  342–344. The Institute also publishes specific guidance on information requirements at http://www.icaew.com/en/technical/legal-and-regulatory/ information-law-and-guidance. Following Bolkiah v KPMG [1999] 2 AC 222, HL, Tech 4/00 was published advising accountants on ‘Conflicts of interest and confidentiality’. In the USA, the Supreme Court has ruled that the First Amendment does not protect reporters from disclosing sources of publications made by them in Brandzburg v Hayes 408 U.S. 665 (1972). This was relied upon in the cases involving two reporters who published stories about CIA leaks of operatives’ identities and who refused to disclose their sources: the Court of Appeals DC could not ‘seriously entertain the notion that the First Amendment protects the newsman’s (sic) agreement to conceal the criminal conduct of his source … on the theory that it is better to write about a crime than to do something about it’: In re: Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 2494 (D.C. Cir.) Feb. 15, 2005). 2 X Ltd v Morgan Grampian Ltd [1990] 2 All ER 1, HL. On the application of the principles to website providers, see Totalise plc v Motley Fool Ltd (2001) Times, 15  March and Clift v Clarke [2011] EWHC 1164 (QB), [2011] Info TLR 13. 1

11.40  The decision in this case was subsequently criticised by the European Court of Human Rights in Goodwin v UK1 which recognised the ‘potentially chilling effect’ of an order holding that it could not be compatible with Art 10 of the ECHR unless justified by an overriding requirement in the public interest. By 11 votes to 7 the majority held no such overriding interest to be present in this case. This case must now be considered under the HRA 1998 when the courts are reaching decisions on s 10. The case of Interbrew SA v Financial Times2 was considered by the Court of Appeal in 2002. In this case, the Financial Times was sent documents by an anonymous source which contained information prepared for Interbrew on a possible takeover bid for a South African brewing company. Interbrew argued that some of this information had been doctored and incorrect information had been inserted. The Financial Times then published information from the report, leading to trading in both Interbrew’s shares and those of the alleged target of the bid. Interbrew obtained an order from the High Court requiring the Financial Times to retain the document and deliver it up to Interbrew. The Financial Times appealed against this order, but the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that in this case, even when the art 10 interest in preserving the confidentiality of journalists’ sources was considered, the interests of justice and the public interest demanded that the document should be disclosed. In giving the judgment of the court, Sedley LJ said, ‘What in my judgment matters critically, at

Litigation and information   913 least in the present situation, is the source’s evident purpose. It was on any view a maleficent one, calculated to do harm whether for profit or for spite, and whether to the investing public or Interbrew or both. It is legitimate in reaching this view to have regard not only to what Interbrew assert is the genuine document but also to the interpolated pages; for whether they are forged or authentic, integral or added, they were calculated to maximise the mischief.’3 (1996) 22 EHRR 123; see under Art 10 more broadly: De Haes v Belgium (1998) 25 EHRR 1, and Ernst v Belgium (2004) 39 EHRR 35 on disproportionate searches of journalistic material and also breaches of Art 8 ECHR. The court has emphasised the importance of the free press as a ‘public watch-dog’: Observer and Guardian v UK (1991) 14 EHRR 153 at 191 and Sunday Times v UK (No 2) (1991) 14 EHRR 229 at 241. See also Sunday Times v UK (1979) 2 EHRR 245 – the thalidomide case. 2 Interbrew SA v Financial Times Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 274, [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 229. 3 Interbrew SA v Financial Times Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 274, [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 229 at [55]. 1

11.41 The Financial Times took this case to the ECtHR, which found in favour of the newspaper. In its judgment, the court found that ,‘…the aim of preventing further leaks will only justify an order for disclosure of a source in exceptional circumstances where no reasonable and less invasive alternative means of averting the risk posed are available and where the risk threatened is sufficiently serious and defined to render such an order necessary within the meaning of Art 10(2). It is true that in the present case the Court of Appeal found that there were no less invasive alternative means of discovering the source, since Kroll, the security and risk consultants instructed by Interbrew to assist in identifying X, had failed to do so. However, as is apparent from the judgments of the domestic courts, full details of the inquiries made were not given in Interbrew’s evidence and the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that as much as could at that time be done to trace the source had been done by Kroll was based on inferences from the evidence before the court.’1 In the eyes of the ECtHR, this approach was clearly unsatisfactory – it appears that the Court of Appeal would have needed to see Kroll’s reports in order to determine whether or not all alternative methods of discovering who had leaked the document had been exhausted. Financial Times v UK [2010] EMLR 21 at 69.

1

11.42  Furthermore, the ECtHR stated that, ‘the Court emphasises that a chilling effect will arise wherever journalists are seen to assist in the identification of anonymous sources. In the present case, it was sufficient that information or assistance was required under the disclosure order for the purpose of identifying X.’1 This approach appears to set an extremely high threshold for the disclosure of journalists sources. It is necessary in cases such as the one before the court for it to be demonstrated that there is no other alternative method for the claimant to discover the identity of the informant and also that the need to avoid a chilling effect on journalism bears significant weight in any balancing process between Art 10(1) and 10(2). Financial Times v UK [2010] EMLR 21 at 70.

1

11.43  In the Camelot case the operator of the national lottery wished to gain orders leading to the identity of an employee who had disclosed confidential

914  Chapter 11 documents (draft accounts) to a journalist. Their concern was that an employee with access to high level information might leak information in the future, including, speculatively, a lottery winner wishing to remain anonymous.1 The Court of Appeal felt that the tests applied by the domestic courts in relation to COCA 1981, s 10 and the ECtHR regarding Art 10 ECHR were essentially the same. This may now be in question following the decision of the ECtHR in Interbrew, discussed above. The difference was one of conclusion in applying essentially similar principles to facts. There was no iniquity involved which required exposure, no whistleblower’s rights, merely the diminution of an opportunity to put a ‘spin’ on accounts. Preventing a distortion was not sufficiently important to protect the source’s identity and defeat the claimant’s rights. The public, Schiemann LJ, believed would be denied no valuable public interest on the facts of the case. ‘The well informed source is always going to have to take a view as to what is going to be the court’s reaction to his disclosure in the circumstances of the case.’2 Subsequently, the Court of Appeal has ruled that where there was a breach of confidence by a source and an intention to harm a claimant, the award of a s 10 order was justified.3 Camelot Group plc v Centaur Communications Ltd [1998] 1 All ER 251, CA. [1998] 1 All ER 251 at 261j. 3 Interbrew SA v Financial Times [2002] EWCA Civ 274. 1 2

11.44 In Saunders,1 the High Court refused to order the disclosure of a source’s identity after the publication of an article in Punch which contained details about delays of an investigation into the claimant by the DTI and meetings between the claimant and his lawyers. An injunction restraining further publication had dealt with the risk of further publication of the information in question. Suffering substantial further damage by the claimant was unlikely if the order was not made and there was a public interest in the subject matter of the article. The application was dismissed.2 The court was not persuaded by arguments that s  10 was automatically overridden by legal professional privilege (LPP). While important, LPP must enter into the scales of competing interests and not override them. A  further factor to consider in deciding whether to order a disclosure is whether the plaintiff has sought by other legitimate means to identify the source. If not this could be pivotal. Saunders v Punch Ltd [1998] 1 All ER 234. See Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary v Garavelli [1997] EMLR 543.

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11.45  In a Court of Appeal judgment1 following after Goodwin, the spirit of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR’s) judgment in Goodwin was clearly supported. Here, a draft advice from a barrister left overnight in chambers and which concerned a well known entertainer was handed to a newspaper which destroyed the advice and notified the plaintiff’s solicitors. The claimant sought an order for disclosure of the source. The High Court made such an order under s 10. The Court of Appeal was persuaded by the fact that no internal enquiry had been conducted by the chambers into the likely identity of the source, that any threat to LPP could not automatically overrule the privilege, that ordering the disclosure of the identity by a journalist might not be successful and therefore the damage to the public interest in not maintaining the source’s confidentiality

Litigation and information   915 would not bring any compensating benefit to LPP. In giving too much weight to LPP, and in giving insufficient consideration to the failure to conduct an internal enquiry the judge failed to establish that disclosure was necessary in the interests of justice and ‘even if it had been, the judge should have exercised his discretion to refuse disclosure. ‘When orders were made requiring journalists to depart from their normal professional standards, the merits of their doing so in the public interest had to be clearly demonstrated. In the instant case there would be a real danger that that would not be the position if the judge’s order were allowed to stand. His decision would wrongly be interpreted as an example of lawyers attaching a disproportionate significance to the danger to their professional privilege while undervaluing the interests of journalists and the public.’2 John v Express Newspapers plc [2000] 3 All ER 257, CA. At 265g–p, 266c, f. For the public interest defence under Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s 171(3), see PCR Ltd v Dow Jones Telerate Ltd [1998] FSR 170; in Hyde Park Residence Ltd v Yelland [2001] Ch 143, CA, it was held that the defence is not the same as that applied in breach of confidence; see paras 4.294 et seq above.

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11.46  The House of Lords has confirmed that both s 10 and Art 10 ECHR required the domestic court stringently to scrutinise any request for relief that would result in the court interfering with freedom of expression, including the ordering of a journalist’s sources. Before disclosure would be ordered, a ‘sufficiently strong case’ had to be made for disclosure and the order had to meet a pressing social need and be proportionate to legitimate ends being sought. The situation had to be ‘exceptional’ for disclosure to be allowed. The facts of the case were exceptional because an employee at an NHS special security hospital was disclosing confidential information from a patient’s medical records to an intermediary who handed them to the defendant newspaper for publication. Action was necessary to prevent a repetition. The newspaper was ordered to reveal the identity of the intermediary who handed it the information.1 The recent decision in Richard v BBC demonstrates a further exceptional case, where the BBC was required to disclose whether the source of information about a police raid was a member of the investigating team, or someone connected to it.2 Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN Ltd [2002] 4 All ER 193 (HL). The patient was Ian Brady and concerned his hunger strike. See Mersey Care NHS Trust v Ackroyd [2003] EMLR 36 (CA) – disclosure of the source by the intermediary in Ashworth should not be ordered on a summary order but should go for a full trial to test any public interest defence. See further Mersey Care NHS Trust v Ackroyd [2006] EWHC 107 (QB) where the High Court refused to order disclosure giving great effect to the HRA 1998 and Art 10 rights and the lapse of seven years. Upheld on appeal at [2007] EWCA Civ 101. 2 [2017] EWHC 1291 (Ch), [2017] EMLR 22. 1

11.47  It is notable that recent celebrity scandals, in relation to super-injunctions (on which, see paras 2.256 et seq) have led to some debate over whether s 10 of COCA 1981 may be used in order to protect those who disclose otherwise confidential information using social networking sites or who have provided information resulting from the interception of communications. There does not yet appear to be any litigation on this precise point. There has, however, been litigation on the broader issue of the obligations of website operators to disclose the identities of their users in circumstances where such users have

916  Chapter 11 posted defamatory statements. The case of Totalise Plc v Motley Fool1 considered the circumstances in which such an identity could be revealed. Later cases have also examined the circumstances in which the disclosure of identities of users could be released, finding that orders might only be granted in circumstances where the parties concerned have clearly committed actionable wrongs.2 In the later case of G v Wikimedia Foundation,3 the court was willing to grant an order requiring the operator of a website to disclose the IP address of an individual who had revealed sensitive and personal information about G and her children in order that an appropriate remedy might be sought against the individual concerned. The circumstances surrounding Ryan Giggs’ recent endeavours to ensure that elements of his personal life were not revealed were ultimately fatally undermined by users of Twitter and other social networking sites. Some blogs also published details of his identity during the time in which the injunction that was granted to him was in force. It seems likely that the individuals who posted these messages could be pursued by Mr Giggs and actions could be brought against the operators of the networks and websites concerned in order that the identities of wrongdoers might be revealed, although this is heavily complicated by the fact that Twitter is a company based in the US and there would be issues in relation to the conflict of laws. We are not aware of any litigation to that effect at the present time. [2001] EWCA Civ 1897, [2002] 1 WLR 1233. Sheffield Wednesday Football Club Ltd v Hargreaves [2007] EWHC 2375 (QB). See also Clift v Clarke [2011] EWHC 1164 (QB), where the court refused to order the disclosure of information about two users of a website who had posted comments that were arguably defamatory of the claimant as a year had passed before the claimant had discovered the comments and the comments concerned were perhaps unlikely to be found to be defamatory if any proceedings were brought. As such, the court found that the users’ ECHR Art 8 rights and the website’s privacy policy outweighed the arguments in favour of disclosure. 3 [2009]  EWHC  3148 (QB), [2010]  EMLR  14. See also Goldsmith v BCD  [2011]  EWHC  674 (QB) where a third-party disclosure order was awarded in order to require the disclosure of information about the hacker of email accounts in a breach of confidence case. 1 2

11.48  As far as we are aware, there has not yet been any reported litigation on the application of COCA 1981, s 10 to comments posted on Twitter or blogs. This issue is complicated in the sense that it is possible that the operator of a particular website (eg Twitter) may wish to have recourse to s 10 in order to avoid disclosing the identities of its users. It is also possible that authors of blogs may wish to have recourse to s 10 in order to protect their sources. As we observed above, the protection in s 10 is not reserved exclusively for journalists, so bloggers could have recourse to the section. The test for public interest contained in s 10 will need to be considered carefully in any such cases – it is clear that the courts have now adopted a position where they are more willing to protect the private lives of celebrities and others in the public eye, but this will need to be balanced against the public interest in freedom of expression. It is possible to argue that the courts might be willing to place significant weight on the need to ensure the viability of the injunction as a means to restrain publication in these cases and might therefore be relatively willing to find that there is a public interest in disclosure. It seems likely that in due course there will be litigation on this issue, which may ultimately find its way to Strasbourg.

Litigation and information   917 11.49  For the ‘prevention of crime’, the prevention of crime in general rather than a specific crime would satisfy the making of an order defeating the immunity.1 ‘In the interests of justice’ would not be satisfied by a speculative legal claim or right; a court would have to identify and define the issue for which disclosure was required and then to decide whether, having regard to the nature of the issue and the circumstances of the case, it was in fact necessary to order disclosure.2 Under s 2(1) of the COCA 1981, ‘publication’ includes any speech, writing, broadcast or other communication in whatever form, which is addressed to the public, and has been interpreted to include an act of publication preparatory to ‘publication’.3 Re an Inquiry under the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 [1988] 1 All ER 203, HL; however, a plaintiff would have to establish that they were actually seeking identification for the prevention of crime: X v Y [1988] 2 All ER 648. 2 In X Ltd, Lord Bridge disagreed with the view adopted by Lord Diplock in Guardian Newspapers above that in the interests of justice meant the administration of justice. This was ‘too narrow’. 3 And see Broadcasting Act 1990, s 201. 1

11.50  Relevant provisions also apply under the Prevention of Terrorism legislation. In the Channel Four Television litigation, the TV company broadcast a programme made by a production company which alleged there was widespread and systematic collusion between Loyalist terrorists and members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary. This it was alleged had led to at least 20 sectarian murders in Northern Ireland. A source ‘A’ had revealed crucial information to a researcher for the programme and both the TV company and the production company had given a specific undertaking not to reveal their identity. The researcher sent sensitive information out of the jurisdiction and also left the jurisdiction. 11.51  After the programme was broadcast, a special branch officer in the Metropolitan Police applied to the Crown Court for an order under Sch 7 to the (subsequently repealed) Prevention of Terrorism Act 1989 to produce documents relating to the programme. The order was made along with a subsequent order to produce to the police the material sent out of the jurisdiction. The companies refused to follow the order because of their undertaking and because they feared for the lives of the source and the researcher. The companies were the subject of a contempt order sought by the DPP. The Divisional Court was very critical of the companies for refusing to produce the information although it accepted that the companies were acting under what they believed were genuine motives. They were not in a position to give a totally unqualified undertaking which would have to give way to a court order. They were fined £75,000 and could have faced imprisonment.1 Readers should recall the discussion of the PIDA  1998 (paras 4.301 et seq above). DPP v Channel Four Television Co Ltd [1993] 2 All ER 517. See the Saville inquiry in Northern Ireland: para 4.5, note 3 above.

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11.52  The later case of Malik v Manchester Crown Court1 concerned a journalist who was writing a book about a man who had admitted that he was involved with a proscribed organisation in the past and who also admitted to Malik that he had been involved in terrorism-related offences. The police sought disclosure of Malik’s sources and materials related to his book under the Terrorism Act

918  Chapter 11 2000, Sch  5. An order was granted by a judge in broad terms, requiring the disclosure of Malik’s sources and other information that the police sought. The divisional court found that in order for disclosure to be ordered, the test in Sch 5, para 6(2)(b) must be given its plain meaning. The paragraph requires the police to demonstrate that such disclosure would have substantial value to a terrorist investigation. It was held that the value must be more than a minimal value in order to qualify for an order to be made. The divisional court ultimately found that on the facts, the judge was entitled to make an order for disclosure and that this was not a disproportionate interference with Malik’s Art 10 rights given the public interest in the successful investigation of terrorism. The order was, however, varied. The reason for this is that the wording of the crown court judge’s order was such that it could be construed in a manner which would require Malik to produce information beyond that which related to the individual at the centre of his book. The court found that this order was too wide and moved to limit the order to information about the book’s subject and one of his friends, but not information about others. [2008]  EWHC  1362 (Admin), [2008] 4  All ER  403. See the subsequent decisions in R  (on the application of Secretary of State for the Home Department) v Southwark Crown Court [2013] EWHC 4366 (Admin), [2014] 1 WLR 2529 and News Group Newspapers Ltd v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2016] 2 All ER 483, [2015] Info TLR 179.

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DISCLOSURE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 11.53  In judicial review proceedings, disclosure, along with interrogatories (requests for information) and other interim relief, may be obtained, but this is not automatic. Part 54 of the CPR 1998 has the effect that disclosure is not required unless the court orders otherwise. Part 54 establishes the Administrative Court in London and Cardiff. The Practice Direction of 27 July 2000 stated that the new procedures were to come into effect on 2 October 2000 – the same day as the HRA 1998 came into effect. The Administrative Court produces an annual Guide on judicial review, containing information about its work and procedures.1 The Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide 2018 available at: https://assets.publishing.service. gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/727626/Admin_Court_ JRG_2018_content_v3_web.pdf.

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11.54  Discovery – and cross-examination – was obtainable on judicial review under the former Ord 24, r 3, although the courts intimated that it should be used ‘sparingly’ if judicial review procedure is to be a success.1 Part 54 is silent as to cross-examination. Nothing in the CPR 1998 prevents the court on a judicial review application under either r.32.1 or the court’s inherent jurisdiction from hearing oral evidence or allowing cross-examination.2 In some cases it has been ruled that cross-examination may be essential.3 See eg IRC v Rossminster Ltd [1980] 1 All ER 80 at 105g per Lord Scarman; Ladha v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1988] Imm AR 284, CA; and R v Secretary of State for Education and Science, ex p G (1989) Times, 7 July. 2 R  (G) v Ealing LBC  (2002) Times, 18  March. For further guidance, see R  (on the application of Jedwell) v Denbighshire CC [2015] EWCA Civ 1232, [2016] PTSR 715, considering when crossexamination should be ordered. 1

Litigation and information   919 R (Wilkinson) v Broadmoor Special Hospital Authority [2002] 1 WLR 419 with emphatic statements on the court’s ability to examine the merits of a medical decision to administer medical treatment without a patient’s consent and whether this breached a claimant’s human rights.

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11.55  The courts have held that, upon judicial review, disclosure will be appropriate in fewer cases and is likely to be more circumscribed.1 In judicial review the onus of proof falls on the applicant for review to make out a case for review. The court will therefore refuse discovery to fill gaps in the evidence of the applicant simply to make good the applicant’s case.2 They will not assist an applicant who lacks evidence and the courts have gone so far as to say that disclosure will only be allowed where something is revealed on the record or in an affidavit (sworn statement of truth) which suggests inaccuracy or evokes suspicion. For some years courts have encouraged parties to file affidavits which disclose what is necessary.3 The Court of Appeal has been reluctant to allow discovery of reports referred to in affidavits because under the supervisory nature of judicial review ‘what was under consideration was the decision making process, not the contents of documents considered by the decision maker or his or her state of mind’.4 Further, where no fault or flaw can be shown in the respondent’s decision-making process so that it does not appear unreasonable or defective, the court is unlikely to allow discovery and inspection of the respondent’s documents to see whether a vitiating factor can be ascertained.5 An applicant must show that reports are central and relevant to the applicant’s application. The case of Tweed6 demonstrates some of the challenges that might be posed in cases concerning alleged infringements of the HRA  1998 or infringements of the proportionality principle in human rights cases. In this case, the organiser of an Orange Order parade claimed that the restriction of the parade was a disproportionate interference with rights under ECHR arts 9, 10 and 11. Tweed sought disclosure of a number of documents from the Parades Commission, arguing that these were required in order to construct a case on the issue of proportionality, as without the documents it was difficult to demonstrate the lack of proportionality in the case. The House of Lords held that the court may need to be more willing to order disclosure in proportionality cases, although in ordering such disclosure the judge must be cautious to examine the full text of each document to determine whether the need for disclosure outweighed the usual presumption against it. Where disclosure was being considered, the issue of redaction should also be considered. Lord Carswell said, ‘The proportionality issue forms part of the context in which the court has to consider whether it is necessary for fairly disposing of the case to order disclosure of such documents. It does not give rise automatically to the need for disclosure of all the documents. Whether disclosure should be ordered will depend on a balancing of the several factors, of which proportionality is only one, albeit one of some significance.’7 Medical reports may not be withheld from a prisoner, whose recommendation for release on parole had been refused by the Secretary of State, on grounds of privilege alone, but they may be withheld on medical grounds.8 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Harrison (1987) Independent, 21 December, CA. See also the comments of Lord Bingham in Tweed v Parades Commission for Northern Ireland [2006]  UKHL  53, [2007] 1  AC  650, at [3] – disclosure in judicial review cases is the exception rather than the norm as the facts should generally be agreed between the parties. For applications of the principle in Tweed, see eg Sky Blue Sports & Leisure Ltd v Coventry City Council

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[2013] EWHC 3366 (Admin), [2014] BLGR 34 and R (on the application of Hoareau) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2018] EWHC 1508 (Admin). See also the decision of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal in Wilson v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and National Police Chief’s Council [2018] UKIPTrib IPT_11_167_H. R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Singh (1988) Times, 28 March, CA. See R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p Merton London Borough Council (1990) Times, 22 March. R v Lancashire County Council, ex p Huddleston [1986] 2 All ER 941 at 945, CA, and the discussion of the duty of candour and co-operation in R (on the application of Hoareau) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2018] EWHC 1508 (Admin). See Carnwath LJ in OFT v IBA Healthcare [2004] 4 All ER 1103 at 1134 et seq on the adequacy of reasons. The Treasury Solicitor’s Department has produced Guidance on Discharging the Duty of Candour and Disclosure in Judicial Review Proceedings available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/ uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/285368/Tsol_discharging_1_.pdf. Woolf and Jowell (eds) De Smith’s Judicial Review (8th edn, 2018) paras 16.072 et seq; R  v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p BH [1990] COD 445; R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p Islington London Borough Council [1992]  COD  67, CA; R  v Secretary of State for Education, ex p J [1993] COD 146; and see R v Secretary of State for Defence, ex p Sancto (1992) Times, 9 September; R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex p World Development Movement Ltd [1995] 1 WLR 386; R v Independent Television Commission, ex p Virgin TV [1996] EMLR 318 – the ‘pick out a plum’ school of advocacy is particularly dangerous (as well as being futile) in judicial review cases where, as here, there is neither full discovery nor crossexamination, nor the full rigour of pleadings …’ per Henry LJ; for new evidence to be viewed by a court which was not before the court below, see: R v Chief Constable of Sussex, ex p International Trader’s Ferry Ltd [1998] QB 477, CA. R v IRC, ex p Taylor [1989] 1 All ER 906, CA; R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p Merton London Borough Council (1990) Times, 22 March. Tweed v Parades Commission for Northern Ireland [2006] UKHL 53, [2007] 1 AC 650. Tweed v Parades Commission for Northern Ireland [2006] UKHL 53, [2007] 1 AC 650 at [38]. R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Benson (1988) Times, 8 November. See however, R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Duggan [1994] 3 All ER 277 and R v Governor of Maidstone Prison, ex p Peries [1998] COD 150.

11.56  In his Review of the Crown Office List in March 2000, Sir Jeffery Bowman recommended that neither the new procedure ‘A’ requiring permission to proceed nor procedure ‘B’ which does not require permission should attract the general power of discovery.1 Disclosure should only take place under the direction of the judge and should only be ordered where and to the extent that it is necessary to dispose fairly of the case. ‘This means that application of CPR 1998, Part 31 should be expressly limited to r 31.12 (specific disclosure or inspection).’ His review accepted that such orders for discovery (sic) may well be required more frequently under HRA  1998 litigation’.2 Claimants would serve a detailed statement in support of their case. The claim form would contain all the information currently contained on Form 86A which accompanies judicial review.3 If the defendant intends to defend the case he must set out an outline of the grounds for defence. Rule 54.4 states that permission is required for judicial review whether under this Part or transferred to the Administrative Court. 2 Bowman Review of the Crown Office List March 2000 (LCD), para 69. 3 See p 69 of Bowman for details of what this must contain. 1

11.57  The details on the latter are now contained in the Pre-action Protocol for Judicial Review.1 The protocol requires a letter before claim to be sent prior to commencement of proceedings, usually in accordance with and containing the details required in Annex A to the Protocol. This does not affect the time

Litigation and information   921 limits for judicial review (three months and extendable).2 The letter must set out important items of information. These include any relevant information that the claimant is seeking, subject to any immunities and privileges. The public authority has fourteen days to respond which may be extended. The response may contain a ‘fuller explanation’ and any relevant documents. The response will also state whether interim relief is being opposed and other matters. Letters are not appropriate in cases of urgency or where the defendant lacks the power to alter a decision, such as in the case of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal. Available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/courts-and-tribunals/courts/procedure-rules/ civil/contents/protocols/prot_jrv.htm. 2 See Wade and Forsyth Administrative Law (11th edn, 2014), pp 561–562 or Fordham Judicial Review Handbook (5th edn, 2008), p 26. 1

PUBLIC INTEREST IMMUNITY 11.58  CPR 1998, r 31.19(1) allows a claim to withhold disclosure or inspection on grounds of the public interest. Rule 31.19(8) does not affect any rule of law which permits or requires a document to be withheld from disclosure or inspection on the ground that its disclosure or inspection would damage the public interest. This is otherwise known as public interest immunity (PII).1 It is not confined to cases involving Crown or public bodies, though it almost invariably will involve such bodies. A  voluntary body, and therefore in law a private body, has successfully entered the plea.2 A local authority may enter the plea, but the ‘confidential’ nature of local authority records per se3 as a ground of non-disclosure is unlikely to be successful where they are required so that justice may be done.4 There must be an additional public interest in non-disclosure.5 Previously called Crown Privilege; see: Conway v Rimmer [1968] AC 910. D  v NSPCC  [1977] 1  All ER  589, HL. For a recent example of a successful claim at first instance involving PII in relation to a private body, see Shah v HSBC  Private Bank (UK) Ltd [2011] EWHC 1713 (QB). The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal against the findings of the High Court in relation to PII, holding that the issue did not properly arise in the case, given the Court of Appeal’s conclusions on the application of CPR r 31.6 in the case before it. See [2011] EWCA Civ 1154. 3 Gaskin v Liverpool City Council [1980] 1 WLR 1549. 4 Thompson v ILEA [1977] LS Gaz R 66. Cf the LGATIA 1985. 5 To protect the vulnerability of the young etc, cf Campbell v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council [1982] 1 QB 1065; see Re M and N (Minors), para 11.6, note 1 above. 1 2

11.59  The rationale for the rule is the overriding need to protect certain kinds of information from dissemination in the process of litigation. The plea will be successful where serious injury would be perpetrated to the processes of government and public service were discovery to be allowed. Confidentiality alone is not a sufficient basis for allowing the plea but it may be ‘a very material consideration to bear in mind’ when the immunity is claimed;1 a public interest would have to be involved over and above the requirements of keeping a confidence, eg the confidentiality is necessary to make sure that the information or similar information is forthcoming from the public or informers and is reliable. Alfred Crompton Amusement Machines v Customs and Excise Comrs (No 2) [1974] AC 405 per Lord Cross; see Barrett v Ministry of Defence (1990) Times, 24 January.

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922  Chapter 11 11.60  Until the aftermath of the notorious events surrounding the Matrix Churchill episode, which were enquired into and reported upon by Sir Richard Scott, and which arose partly because of the use of public interest immunity certificates in a criminal trial arising from the export of dual use equipment to Iraq,1 objection may have been made to disclosure in relation to the specific contents of the documents – a contents basis – or on what is known as a class basis, ie that the documents belong to a class of documents which ought not, in the public interest, to be disclosed. The class to which the documents belonged had to be specified.2 In December 1996, the government announced that as far as it was concerned, claims based on a class basis would no longer be made. Claims to immunity would be restricted to their contents alone.3 These statements would not cover the police or local authorities and decisions of the courts have protected police information on a class basis (see below). While local authorities are unlikely to require protection on the basis of national security4 and neither is likely to seek protection on the grounds of foreign affairs or to protect the inner workings of government, the police may well seek to protect information on a class basis. Surely the time has arrived when claims can only be made on a contents basis. The statement would be binding on prosecuting authorities who are Crown bodies. HC 115 (1995–96). Re Grosvenor Hotel London [1964] 1 All ER 92, CA; Merricks v Nott-Bower [1965] 1 QB 57, CA. 3 287  HC  Official Report (6th series), col 949; 576  HL  Official Report (5th series), col 1507 (18 December 1996) and 297 HC Official Report (6th series), col 616 (11 July 1997) by incoming Labour government. 4 The police may well wish to resort to national security although national security is the responsibility of the national executive: Lord Diplock in CCSU  v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 at 412. Security officials giving evidence to the Scott inquiry stated they did not need a class basis of protection and had been adequately served by a contents protection: Scott Report op cit, G18-39, G18-102. The Attorney General would act for the intelligence services and would be bound by the statement made in Parliament: he made it! 1 2

11.61  Where the plea for public interest immunity is made, and it should only be made if the public interest in preserving the immunity of the documents outweighs the public interest in securing justice, the court has to balance the public interest in non-disclosure against the countervailing public interest of doing justice in litigation. The burden is on the applicant for disclosure once there are justifiable grounds for raising the immunity.1 The courts have held as protected by the immunity documents in the policy-making process of government.2 These clearly would no longer be protected on a class basis (see above). Even before the change of practice announced in Parliament, decisions of the courts had found the relevance and the necessity of the documents to advance the cause of justice to be more persuasive factors, even though the documents are within the policy-making3 process of central government, providing they were not requested for ‘fishing’ or ulterior purposes or to mount an attack on the policy-making process itself. This proviso applies where such an attack is unrelated, or only tangentially related to the action or application for review.4 Judges have spoken at the highest level of the availability of even Cabinet documents where necessary and appropriate.5 Air Canada v Secretary of State for Trade (No 2) [1983] 2 AC 394, HL; Lord Wilberforce in Burmah Oil Co Ltd v Bank of England [1980] AC 1090, HL.

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Litigation and information   923 Conway v Rimmer [1968] AC 910, HL, esp Lord Reid. Especially advice from civil servants: cf Williams v Home Office [1981] 1 All ER 1151. 4 See Air Canada above. 5 See Lord Fraser in Air Canada at 915 (Cabinet minutes and documents) citing US, Australian and New Zealand authorities; Lord Scarman in Burmah Oil (note 1 above). 2 3

11.62  The rule allows for an immunity of documents from disclosure or inspection. Objection may be made on the grounds of public interest immunity either when disclosure or inspection of documents is made or requested, or possibly at the judicial proceedings (trial or application for review) when production is called for. These matters should be resolved before the hearing. An application not to disclose is made to the court without notice to the other side and any such order awarded is not shown to the other side or otherwise made publicly available.1 An objection to inspection must be made in writing stating the grounds on which the claim is made. Before trial the decision to object should normally2 be taken by the political head of the department in question. The Minister shall examine the documents and decide whether production would be against the public interest on a contents basis. However, even if no claim is entered, the judge may nevertheless rule the documents immune on public interest grounds on the judge’s own motion. It is a public interest, and not a Crown or governmental interest, which is at stake.3 Viz, CPR r 31.19(1) and (2). Or permanent heads where appropriate, eg  where the papers requested belong to a previous administration. 3 See D v NSPCC, para 11.58, note 2 above. 1 2

11.63  Quite what the duty of the Minister is was a central feature of the Matrix Churchill and Sir Richard Scott’s Report and about which there was a notable division of opinion among senior judges speaking extra-judicially. Where documents require protection because of their contents, it is the duty of the Minister to make out a certificate. However, as was made clear in the decision in Duncan v Cammell Laird & Co1 the duty is upon the Minister which he must exercise with all due discretion and judgement. In Matrix Churchill, Ministers took advice from the Attorney-General that they were under a duty to enter certificates, most of which the court overrode, as leaving them with no choice in the matter. They were merely a rubber stamp for the Attorney-General. The Minister must apply his mind to the contents of documents and whether disclosure and inspection will or could undermine the public interest. He is under a duty to assist the court in making its judgment on where the public interest resides and he can only do this properly by exercising his own judgement having considered advice. He must not allow another to make judgement for him. Some dicta of Bingham LJ were taken out of context and invoked by supporters of the Attorney-General’s advice that a Minister had no discretion in entering the plea.2 Where a Minister genuinely believes that the plea should be entered on cogent grounds then he is under a duty to do so. But his decision must be properly made after careful consideration: ‘A rubber stamp approach to public interest immunity by the holder of a document is neither necessary nor appropriate’.3 This was the view of Sir Richard Scott in his report and is, with respect, to be preferred. The case of Mohamed4 concerned the question of whether seven paragraphs from a judgment of the Divisional

924  Chapter 11 Court should be redacted from the open judgment. These paragraphs concerned summaries of reports made by the US Government and passed to the security services in the United Kingdom concerning Mohamed’s treatment while he was prisoner in Pakistan. The Foreign Secretary had claimed PII in the reports and also in the paragraphs from the final judgment. Lord Judge CJ emphasised the importance of open justice and its link to freedom of expression, noting that the principle of open judgments should only be subject to limitation in extremely limited circumstances. However, it was accepted that in a case such as this, where the Foreign Secretary was concerned that any disclosure of the material in the US reports may impinge on the supply of future information from the US, there should generally be deference to the view of the Secretary of State. Lord Judge CJ said: ‘If for any reason the court is required to address the question whether the control principle, as understood by the intelligence services, should be disapplied, the decision depends on well understood PII principles. As the executive, not the judiciary, is responsible for national security and public protection and safety from terrorist activity, the judiciary defers to it on these issues, unless it is acting unlawfully, or in the context of litigation the court concludes that the claim by the executive for public interest immunity is not justified. Self-evidently that is not a decision to be taken lightly … It is nevertheless accepted by and on behalf of the Foreign Secretary in this litigation that in our country, which is governed by the rule of law, upheld by an independent judiciary, the confidentiality principle is indeed subject to the clear limitation that the Government and the intelligence services can never provide the country which provides intelligence with an unconditional guarantee that the confidentiality principle will never be set aside if the courts conclude that the interests of justice make it necessary and appropriate to do so … However, although in the context of public safety it is axiomatic that his views are entitled to the utmost respect, they cannot command the unquestioning acquiescence of the court.’5 [1942] AC 624, HL. Makanjuola v of Metropolitan Police Comr [1992] 3 All ER 617, CA. 3 Lord Templeman in R v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police, ex p Wiley [1995] 1 AC 274 at 281, HL. 4 R (Mohamed) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No 2) [2010] EWCA Civ 65, [2010] EWCA Civ 158, [2010] 3 WLR 554. 5 Ibid at [44] and [46]. For subsequent acknowledgement of the need for PII to recognise the importance of the UK’s relationship with foreign governments or international organisations, see HTF  v Ministry of Defence [2018]  EWHC  1623 (QB) (material from the International Committee of the Red Cross could be withheld on PII principles); Amin v Director General of the Security Service [2015]  EWCA  Civ 654 (material on the work of the Intelligence Services in Pakistan); R  (on the application of Woods) v Chief Constable of Merseyside [2014]  EWHC  2784 (Admin), [2015] 1 WLR 539 (intelligence leading to police disciplinary action in judicial review proceedings); and R (on the application of Omar) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2013] EWCA Civ 118, [2014] QB 112 (material relating to criminal proceedings brought by the Ugandan government in Uganda). 1 2

11.64  Ultimately, the Court of Appeal held that the paragraphs ought not to be redacted from the judgment and it should be published in full. Primarily, this is because the Secretary of State’s claim that the material that PII should be

Litigation and information   925 retained in the material as it was confidential no longer held good. A court in the US had found Mr Mohamed’s claim that he had been mistreated in custody to be true and the court had divulged at least some of the information contained in the redacted paragraphs in its judgment. This, in the opinion of the court, resulted in the Foreign Secretary’s claim no longer being justified and the public interest in publication outweighed the arguments in favour of PII in the circumstances. It is clear in cases such as this that the court is willing to place the arguments in favour of retaining PII under considerable scrutiny. 11.65  Where a judge entertains doubts about the bona fides, plausibility or clarity of the reasons behind an objection in a ministerial certificate, s/he may inspect the documents and ought invariably to do so before allowing disclosure or inspection overriding a ministerial certificate. Judicial inspection will therefore precede inspection by the party making the application for inspection; in the event of an appeal by the Minister the inspection by the applicant will be deferred until the outcome of the appeal. To clarify an objection a Minister may be called to court,1 and the same principles discussed above apply to the exclusion of oral or of documentary evidence.2 If a court decides that public interest immunity obtains in relation to documents, the immunity still applies even though they have passed into the possession of another person.3 There must be limits to this immunity where the documents are in the public domain.4 It has been held that even though documents are not disclosed, parties may still deny the nature of the contents or their accuracy where these are known to the other party5 but this would seem to run counter to the advice of Lord Woolf in ex p Wiley (see below). Re Grosvenor Hotel London [1964] Ch 464, CA on whether the minister can be cross-examined; cf Chandler v DPP [1964] AC 763, HL. 2 Duncan v Cammell Laird [1942] AC 624, HL; and see Gain v Gain [1961] 1 WLR 1469. 3 Cf OSAs and prosecution: paras 4.242 et seq above. 4 On this issue see R  (Al-Sweady) v Secretary of State for Defence [2009]  EWHC  1687. See also Mohamed, discussed at paras 11.63 and 11.64 above. 5 Sethia v Stern (1987) Times, 4 November, CA. 1

11.66  That this is an area of law subject to extensive development is well illustrated by the case-law covering police investigations. When the police carried out an investigation into a complaint under s 49 of the Police Act 1964 (and the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and successor legislation),1 statements made in the course of such an investigation to the investigators were protected by public interest immunity on a class basis,2 even as against the person making the statement.3 The recipient of such a statement, eg the chief police officer of the force whose officer(s) is being investigated, could not waive the immunity as it was a public interest immunity, not a police immunity.4 Although the immunity covered all oral and written statements in the course of the investigation, and those handed to the Police Complaints Authority, it did not cover the original complaint made to the police5 which may therefore be actionable for defamation. Where the major or dominant reason for conducting an investigation was not a private inquiry into police conduct but to ascertain the facts behind an episode, viz an unlawful death, and such statements would be available to the coroner, public interest immunity would not protect the documents on a class basis, but it may

926  Chapter 11 on a specific contents basis.6 The immunity did not apply to documents relating to police officers’ internal grievance procedures.7 In R v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police, ex p Wiley8 the House of Lords overruled the Court of Appeal decisions which had protected statements made in complaints investigations on a class basis. Arguments that this would inhibit witnesses were not selfevident. They could attract protection on a contents basis. Lord Slynn agreed that a general class protection was too sweeping and the cases providing such should be overruled but he felt that a class claim could sometimes be required. Subsequently, the Court of Appeal held that there was a class protection for an immunity in relation to an investigating officer’s report and working papers. This class protection could only be outweighed by a countervailing public interest in disclosure determined by the trial judge.9 Where an immunity is claimed successfully, the parties and the court should try to give what information is necessary in a manner that would not compromise any immunity.10 However, if inspection is not allowed, the evidence itself must be excluded.11  3  4  1  2



 5

 8  9 10 11  6  7

In response eg to a complaint from a member of the public. Neilson v Laugharne [1981] QB 736, CA. Makanjuola v Metropolitan Police Comr [1992] 3 All ER 617, CA. Above and Hehir v Metropolitan Police Comr [1982] 2 All ER 335, CA. See ex p Coventry Newspapers Ltd [1993] QB 278, CA. Conerney v Jacklin (1985) 129 Sol Jo 285, CA. NB R v Metropolitan Police Comr, ex p Hart-Leverton (1990) Guardian, 6 February. Peach v Metropolitan Police Comr [1986] 2 All ER 129, CA; inspection allowed. Metropolitan Police Comr v Locker [1993] 3 All ER 584, EAT. [1995] 1 AC 274, HL. Taylor v Anderton (Police Complaints Authority intervening) [1995] 2 All ER 420, CA. Lord Woolf in Wiley. Powell v Chief Constable of North Wales Constabulary (2000) Times, 11 February, CA.

11.67  Communications between a chief constable and the DPP concerning written statements and officers’ reports and a request for advice on prosecution relating to an accused have been held to be within public interest immunity.1 Initial reports into an investigation which were sent to the Crown Prosecution Service were within the class immunity and subject to the balancing test.2 Further, certificates of previous findings of guilt on adjudications before police disciplinary proceedings arising out of the arrest of an applicant for discovery have not been disclosed.3 Discovery (disclosure) would be ‘oppressive’ as material obtained would be used solely for cross-examination of a witness to attack the witness’s credibility and similar fact evidence from the prior proceedings4 and their determinations would only reveal ‘a disposition to commit the conduct alleged’ (assault, unlawful arrest, malicious prosecution) and was not required to rebut a defence of accident or coincidence or to prove a system of conduct. Records of disciplinary proceedings were outside s 11 of the Civil Evidence Act 1968 and would therefore be probative of nothing.5 Public interest immunity was not prayed in aid. However, a private prosecutor in a murder case has been held to be entitled to disclosure by the Crown Prosecution Service of ‘all statements and exhibits thereto obtained by the police in connection with the death’. A summons had been issued under the Criminal Procedure (Attendance of Witnesses) Act 1965 but objection had been made by the Service to the statements of witnesses

Litigation and information   927 who refused to consent to disclosure. The matter had been committed to trial and the prosecution was on behalf of the Crown, it was held.6 Evans v Chief Constable of Surrey Constabulary [1989] 2  All ER  594; see Auten v Rayner (No  2) [1960] 1 All ER 692 and Police Complaints Authority v Greater Manchester Police Authority (1991) 3 Admin LR 757. In Goodridge v Chief Constable of Hampshire [1999] 1 All ER 896, if the police are seeking legal advice from the DPP, this will be covered by legal professional privilege (LPP) as well as PII if within the latter immunity. Legal professional privilege did not apply on the facts. 2 Kelly v Metropolitan Police Comr [1997] 33 LS Gaz R 28, CA. 3 Unlike criminal conviction certificates which would be allowed: Civil Evidence Act 1968, s 11. The applicant was suing for assault and related matters. 4 George Ballantine & Sons Ltd v FER Dixon & Son Ltd [1974] 2 All ER 503. 5 Thorpe v Chief Constable of the Greater Manchester Police [1989] 2 All ER 827, CA. See R v DPP, ex p Hallas (1987) 87 Cr App Rep 340, and R v Johnson [1989] 1 All ER 121, CA. 6 R v Pawsey [1989] Crim LR 152 distinguishing Hallas, supra. 1

11.68  Public interest immunity has been successfully raised to protect information collected by the Crown to value goods for tax purposes where confidentiality and presumably the necessity to obtain accurate information were crucial;1 to protect information given to the Gaming Board by the police on applicants for certificates of consent;2 to protect the identity of an informant to the NSPCC, even when making a false accusation;3 to protect material provided in confidence to an inspector inquiring into the breaches of sanctions involving the former Southern Rhodesia;4 to protect communications made by an individual to the European Commission in its investigations of anti-competition practices.5 3 4 5 1 2

Alfred Crompton, para 11.59, note 1 above. Gaming Board for Great Britain v Rogers [1973] AC 388, HL. D v NSPCC, para 11.58, note 2 above; also [1978] AC 171, HL. Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd (No 2) [1982] AC 173, HL. Hasselblad (GB) Ltd v Orbinson [1985] 1  All ER  173, CA. See, more recently, Competition and Markets Authority v Concordia International RX (UK) [2018]  EWCA  Civ 1881, holding that information covered by PII did not have to be disclosed into a confidentiality ring set up for the purposes of an investigation into anti-competitive practices.

11.69  The plea has been unsuccessfully raised inter alia to protect the identity of the names of persons likely to have violated the claimant’s patent rights;1 to protect the records of an adoption agency which contained an admission of paternity by a putative father;2 to protect the record of discussions between a minister and senior civil servants on the merits of a control unit regime in a prison;3 to protect ‘confidential’ medical records.4 In Burmah Oil5 the judges inspected but did not allow the applicant to inspect on the grounds of irrelevance; the case concerned high level meetings involving ministers and senior civil servants and Bank of England officials. It was unsuccessfully raised by the Home Secretary to prevent access to Special Branch reports.6 The court has recently been asked to consider whether the Treasury might claim PII in a number of classes of document in which a claimant sought disclosure in litigation over compliance with public procurement processes. The court ordered disclosure of the documents it felt were relevant to the litigation, including internal Treasury documents over which PII had been claimed, finding that the Treasury’s own published commitment to transparency was incompatible with a PII claim over documents relating to the operation of a procurement process.7 It has been held

928  Chapter 11 that mistaken disclosure of part of a document over which PII had been granted did not affect the document’s PII status.8 Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Comrs [1974]  AC  133, HL: no confidentiality in routine information. 2 R v Bournemouth Justices, ex p Grey (1986) 150 JP 392. 3 Williams v Home Office para 11.61, note 3 above. However, records on prisoners have been protected: Re Hardy’s Application [1988] 12 NIJB 66; NB Payne v Lord Harris [1981] 2 All ER 842, CA; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Gunnell [1985] Crim LR 105, CA; cf Weeks v UK (1987) 10 EHRR 293. The discussion re fair procedure and prisoners in ch 10 should be recalled. 4 Flett v North Tyneside Health Authority [1989] CLY 2968; cf Campbell v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council, para 11.58, note 5 above; NB W v Egdell [1989] 1 All ER 1089: duty of doctor to patient overborne by duty to inform the public; R v Crozier (1990) 8 BMLR 128, CA. To what extent would FOIA 2000 and the data protection legislation avail would-be litigants? See also Z v Finland (1998) 25 EHRR 371 on justified and unjustified use of medical information under Art 8(1) and (2) ECHR. 5 Burmah Oil v Bank of England [1980] AC 1090, HL. 6 (1990) Guardian, 20 July, p 8. 7 Amaryllis v HM Treasury [2009] EWHC 1666 (TCC), [2009] BLR 425. 8 R (Pewter) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2010] EWHC 3927 (Admin). 1

Public interest immunity and judicial inspection 11.70  Where public interest immunity is properly raised, the onus is on the plaintiff to make out cause why the judge should inspect documents covered by a certificate. There is a judicial reluctance to look behind a certificate where it is prima facie in order. The more so where it is a ‘contents claim’ than where claims for classes of documents are made. To repeat, class claims are now likely to be very rare and will not cover central government. The burden on the claimant to persuade the judge to inspect has been described by judges as ‘fairly strict’1 and ‘not light’.2 In Air Canada, where there were requests to see documents relating to the policy-making process and allegedly unlawful decision-making by the government and a public corporation, a majority of the Law Lords decided that the test a judge should apply in deciding whether to inspect was that: ‘the party seeking disclosure ought at least to satisfy the court that the documents are very likely3 to contain material which would give substantial support to his contention on an issue which arises in the case, and that without them he might be “deprived of the means of … proper presentation” of his case: see Glasgow Corpn v Central Land Board 1956  SC(HL) 1 at 18 per Lord Radcliffe. It will be plain that formulation has been mainly derived from the speech of Lord Edmund-Davis in the Burmah Oil case, [1980] AC 1090 at 1129 [1979] 3 All ER 700 at 721 and from the opinion of McNeill J in Williams v Home Office [1981] 1 All ER 1151 at 1154. It assumes, of course, that the party seeking disclosure has already shown in his pleadings that he has a cause of action, and that he has some material to support it. Otherwise he would merely be “fishing”.’4 Lord Fraser in Air Canada Secretary of State for Trade (No 2) [1983] 1 All ER 910 at 916–917, HL. Wood J in Evans, para 11.67, note 1. See also Goodridge v Chief Constable of Hampshire Constabulary [1999] 1 All ER 896. 3 Emphasis added. 4 [1983] 1 All ER 910 at 917. 1 2

Litigation and information   929 11.71  The documents must be ‘very likely’ to advance an applicant’s case, or very likely to weaken the adversary’s. It is not for the judge to use disclosure to attain facts to assist the court to do justice. The party seeking disclosure must persuade the judge by demonstrating the way in which documents which s/he has not seen will assist his or her case. This demonstration must be specific, and not a mere hunch. In practice this is a very difficult burden. If it is not made out, the judge ought not to inspect privately. However, the more cogent a claimant’s case under this demanding test, the more it will make an inroad into a certificate covering documents which have been identified, even on a contents basis where necessary.1 As Lord Fraser said in Air Canada, the circumstances vary greatly according to the importance of the documents and the weight of public interest in favour of disclosure.2 Where a judge decides to inspect privately, inspection will be deferred where an appeal is made and will await the outcome of such appeal. See Lord Scarman in Burmah Oil above. In the past, however, the latter claim has often been conclusive: Lord Fraser in Air Canada. 2 In Air Canada at 917. 1

11.72  On inspection, the judge has to weigh the competing public interests of doing justice to the individual or maintaining a secret to prevent damage to the public or the state. In another context, it has been stated that the state means the official collective entity protecting public welfare, not simply the government of the day.1 See para 4.157 above.

1

11.73 In ex p Wiley, Lord Woolf believed that a claim for immunity should usually be made at the hearing of the substantive issue and it should not be dealt with as a preliminary or ancillary item. 11.74  There has recently been litigation involving public interest immunity and the inspection of documents in which PII is claimed where the cases involve the seeking of warrants to search premises under s 8 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, or the retention of such material under s 59 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001. In Haralambous, the Supreme Court held that, in determining whether to issue warrants under the legislation noted, magistrates or other judges dealing with such proceedings are entitled to rely upon and must consider information that is subject to PII and has not been disclosed to the claimant.1 The Court of Appeal has subsequently held that, in a case involving the variation of a warrant sought by the Competition and Markets Authority in relation to an investigation into anti-competitive practices under s 28 of the Competition Act 1998, the judge must have regard to material subject to PII and which has not been disclosed to the party subject to the warrant.2 R (on the application of Haralambous) v St Albans Crown Court [2018] UKSC 1, [2018] AC 236. Competition and Markets Authority v Concordia International RX (UK) [2018] EWCA Civ 1881.

1 2

Public interest immunity and confidentiality 11.75  Confidentiality is not, per se, a ground of public interest immunity, as we saw above. However, in cases involving employment tribunals it has been held

930  Chapter 11 that it lies within the discretion of the tribunal to refuse access to confidential assessments and records of other parties not directly involved in proceedings. This is not a public interest immunity, merely a device to prevent unnecessary access to confidential material involving third parties. Inspection should not be ordered unless it was necessary either for disposing fairly of the case or for saving costs.1 A tribunal may inspect, and, if necessary, irrelevant but confidential parts may be erased or covered. If necessary the hearing may be held in camera. The confidentiality of probation service records held by a local authority may entitle them to be withheld unless the ‘public interest’ requires that they be adduced.2 Science Research Council v Nassé [1979] 3 All ER 673, HL. It was decided by a court that where a whistleblower’s case went to an employment tribunal the facts should be made public knowledge. See more recently Simba-Tola v Elizabeth Fry Hostel Trustees [2001] EWCA Civ 1371 and Beck v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce [2009] EWCA Civ 619, [2009] IRLR 740. The government was opposed to this and amended the effect of the decision by regulations only allowing for an outline to be published. See para 4.282 above. See Hanlon v Kirklees Council EAT (2004) New LJ, 17 September: claim of applicant struck out when he refused consent for access to his medical file by other party under Access to Medical Reports Act 1988 – the court cannot order disclosure under the Act to another. Jindal v University of Glasgow EAT Scotland (2001): allegation of racial discrimination in failure by employer to promote. Disclosure of names of academics from whom references were sought by the employing university were to be disclosed! This appears to flout duties of confidence. Deliberations of the professional conduct committee of the GMC in camera are protected by public interest immunity: Roylance v GMC (1999) Times, 27 January. See Frankson v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 655. 2 Re M  [1987] 1  FLR  46. On adoption files and Adoption Rules, see Re an ex parte originating summons in an adoption application [1990] 1 All ER 639 at 640. 1

11.76  Traditionally, an immunity based upon national security has met with unqualified respect from the judiciary. While there may be evidence that domestic courts are not so willing to accept the invocation of this plea in the unqualified manner of former years, if a question of Community law is involved the ECJ has certainly not shown itself to be over-receptive to claims based on national security where legitimate rights could be undermined on unpersuasive grounds.1 Johnstone v Chief Constable RUC: 222/84 [1986] 3 All ER 135, ECJ; Svenska Journalistförbundet v EU Council: T-174/95 [1998] All ER (EC) 545, CFI.

1

Public interest immunity in criminal trials1 11.77  At the Matrix Churchill trial, public interest immunity certificates were entered into criminal trials. This was far from the first time such certificates were entered to prevent certain evidence going to the defence.2 Such certificates have become very common in criminal trials and their uncontrolled use was seen as endangering the fairness of the trial from a defendant’s point of view if he were prevented from defending himself effectively because of the non-production of crucial evidence. Various judicial guidelines were laid down to help regulate the use of the plea in criminal trials;3 after all, one tradition suggested that where vital evidence was withheld from the defence, either the case collapsed or evidence had to be handed over. This was the position favoured by Sir Richard Scott. It became apparent that in too many cases vital evidence was not handed over or indeed the defence were not advised of its existence and yet the prosecution

Litigation and information   931 continued. The Court of Appeal gave guidance on cases where the immunity is claimed for ‘highly sensitive’ material in a criminal trial. Where an ex parte application is made to the trial judge by the prosecution the latter should present ‘material’ documents to the judge which they wish to withhold from the defence. The judge has to balance the importance of the evidence for the defence and the importance of their non-disclosure. ‘If the disputed evidence may prove the defendant’s innocence or avoid a miscarriage of justice, then the balance comes down resoundingly in favour of disclosing it.’4 The ECtHR has ruled that where the prosecution withheld information from the defence without informing the trial judge, a review of the evidence by the Court of Appeal but in the absence of the defence lawyers but in the presence of the prosecution lawyers did not remedy a breach of Art 6(1), 6(3)(b) and (d) of the ECHR.5 In Edwards v UK the question at issue concerned ‘equality of arms’ in criminal trials. The state’s interests must be considered but a defendant’s rights were only to be interfered with when strictly necessary; failures to allow adequate defence and using evidence obtained through entrapment which was not shown to the defence would breach Art 6.6 See HL Debs Vol 646 col 1396 (2 April 2003). Criminal Procedure Rules 2005, SI 2005/384, Part 25 now provides for the procedures in making PII applications in criminal trials; and Part 26 concerns use of confidential material or information. Parts 22 and 23, on disclosure by the prosecution and defence respectively, merely refer to existing provisions. 2 R v Governor of Brixton Prison, ex p Osman [1992] 1 All ER 108. 3 See R v Ward (1992) 96 Cr App Rep 1, CA; R v Davis [1993] 2 All ER 643, CA. 4 Per Lord Taylor CJ in R v Keane [1994] 2 All ER 478, CA. 5 Rowe and Davis v UK (2000) 30 EHRR 1. Dowsett v UK (2003) Times, 12 July: requirement to disclose evidence not absolute but where a decision is made by the prosecution without reference to the judge, there was a breach of Article  6  ECHR. However, see R  v Smith (2000) Times, 20 December; Fitt v UK (2000) 30 EHRR 480 and Jasper v UK (2000) 30 EHRR 441. See also Foucher v France (1997) 25  EHRR  234. For the dangers of the English approach: R  v Botmeh (Jawad) [2001] EWCA Crim 2226. See also: R v G and Another (PII: Counsel’s duty) and R v Cairns (A.L.) [2002] EWCA Crim 2838 and R v McDonald etc (2004) Times, 8 November. 6 15  BHRC  189; confirmed by the Grand Chamber, ECtHR (2004) New LJ  1726. See Atlan v UK App No 36533/97. See also Botmeh v United Kingdom App No 15187/03 (2008) 46 EHRR 31 which followed the Court of Appeal’s decision in R v Botmeh (Jawad) [2001] EWCA Crim 2226, [2002] 1 WLR 531. This case concerned B’s claim that his Art 6 rights had been infringed as the Crown disclosed the existence of a document that was not used as part of the evidence in the trial was not put before the judge when PII was claimed in it. The ECHR dismissed the application, given that the Court of Appeal had ordered disclosure of a summary of the material to B and there was clear potential, in light of the summary received, for B’s legal team to reach a decision on the safety of the conviction. 1

11.78  Under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, Parts I and II and the accompanying code of practice under the latter Part, a new framework of rules governs the release of information to the defence by prosecutors. This has been amended by Criminal Justice Act 2003, Part V. The prosecution should disclose information which ‘might reasonably be considered capable of undermining’ the prosecution case or which is capable of ‘assisting the case for the accused’ (CJA 2003, s 32 amending CPIA 1996, s 3). This is a continuing duty. Many of the provisions in Part V concern defence statements. 11.79  The 1996 Act and code apply in respect of criminal investigations conducted by police officers beginning after 1 April 1997. A disclosure officer

932  Chapter 11 (a police officer) is the person responsible for: examining material retained by the police during an investigation, revealing material to the prosecutor during the investigation and any criminal proceedings resulting from it, certifying that this has been done and disclosing material to the accused at the request of the prosecutor. Material is material of any kind including information and objects obtained in the course of an investigation and which may be relevant to an investigation. The code gives an enormous discretion to the police as to what is ‘relevant material’ and ‘sensitive material’ which ought not to be disclosed in the public interest and they may consult with the prosecutor about what is ‘relevant information’. The code sets out general responsibilities, as well as duties to record information, retention of material obtained in criminal investigations (subject to Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE  1984), s  22 where material is seized under that provision). Sensitive material – examples of such are provided – must be listed in a schedule together with the reasons why it is so regarded unless in exceptional circumstances it is so sensitive, as considered by the investigator, that it should not be scheduled. Its existence will be revealed to the prosecutor separately. This is likely to apply where ‘compromising the material’ would be likely to lead directly to loss of life or directly threaten national security. Great discretion is given to the investigator but he must ensure that the prosecutor is able to inspect the material so that ‘he can assess whether it needs to be brought before a court for a ruling on disclosure.’ If it has been referred to the court for such a ruling, and one should note ‘If’ because so much seems to rely on the integrity of investigators and prosecutors, a court may conclude that it is in the public interest that such sensitive material should be disclosed if the trial is to proceed. Disclosure is then necessary. What, however, if the matter is not referred to the court or the court does not believe such sensitive material should be disclosed? Will the prosecution be terminated if the evidence is crucial for the defence?1 Various statutory rules have been passed in relation to Parts I and II.2 In the USA, release of defendants where crucial defence information is withheld has met with the approval of the Supreme Court Roviaro v US 353 US 53 (1957); Jencks v US 353 US 657 (1957); A-G of the US v Irish People 502 F Supp 63 (1980) and see Tomkins (1993) Public Law 650. 2 SI 2005/985, SI 1997/698, SI 1997/699, SI 1997/703 and SI 1997/704; see also R v DPP, ex p Lee [1999] 2 All ER 737. There are also Attorney General Guidelines. See, on inadvertent disclosure and restraining orders, R v B [2004] EWCA Crim 1368. 1

11.80  The House of Lords, moved by the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, has ruled that in a criminal trial, the ‘golden rule’ was full disclosure should be made to the defence of any material held by the prosecution which weakened its case or strengthened that of the defendants.1 Where this golden rule could not be adhered to fully or at all because of an overriding public interest and risk of serious injury to that interest, some derogation may be justified. But this was always to be the minimum necessary to protect the public interest and ‘had never to imperil the overall fairness of the trial’. Provided that procedures for dealing with claims for public interest immunity made by the prosecution in criminal proceedings were operated with ‘scrupulous attention to those governing principles’ and with continuing regard to the proper interests of the accused, there should be no breach of Art 6 ECHR. Furthermore, the Law Lords ruled that there was no absolute rule requiring the appointment of special counsel in

Litigation and information   933 any particular case. The court should appoint special counsel where the interest of justice required it on a case by case basis – it was envisaged that such an appointment would be exceptional. The judge should consider in detail the material that the prosecution sought to withhold. If the material did not weaken the prosecution case or strengthen the defence there would be no requirement to disclose it. Only in truly borderline cases should the prosecution seek a judicial ruling on whether the material in its hands should be disclosed – in other words, disclosure should be the norm.2 The defence ought to be involved to the maximum extent possible without disclosing that which the general interest required to be protected but taking full account of the specific defence relied on. The Schedule to the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 makes provision for rules of court to deal with ‘control order’ procedures and non-disclosure of material and other matters, use of advisers and appointment of special counsel (see para 10.108 above). R v H [2004] 1 All ER 1269 (HL) and R v Austin (Herbert Charles) [2013] EWCA Crim 1028, [2014] 1 WLR 1045. For a recent example of the court finding that there was an overriding need for non-disclosure in relation to methods of frustrating encryption in mobile communications devices, see R v Kelly (Lee Paul) [2018] EWCA Crim 1893. 2 On this issue, see Chemists (A Firm) v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2009] UKFTT (TC) [2009] STC (SCD) 472. See also R v Twomey [2011] EWCA Crim 8, [2011] 1 WLR 1681. 1

11.81  The Supreme Court further considered the use of the closed material procedure and special advocates in two notable cases. In the case of Al Rawi,1 which concerned a civil claim against the security services for mistreatment which occurred at Guantanamo Bay, the Supreme Court held that no power existed at common law to order the use of a closed material procedure in a civil trial. The decision was a 6:3 majority, with the majority arguing that the use of the closed material procedure was an infringement of the principle of open justice enshrined in the common law and that the PII system generally worked satisfactorily in civil cases.2 There was, however, no objection to special advocates assisting a judge in the determination of PII claims in such cases. For the minority, led by Lord Clarke, there was some attraction in the use of a closed material procedure once a PII process had been completed if it was evident that PII existed in so much of the evidence that a trial could not proceed unless the closed material procedure was used.3 It is important to emphasise that all of the Justices did not exclude circumstances in the future where it might be necessary for the closed material procedure to be used in civil proceedings and for the common law to develop to permit this, but the majority did not feel that this was appropriate when the facts in the case before the court were considered. The difficulties presented to government by the decisions in Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB,4 Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF,5 Al Rawi and Tariq (below), prompted a consultation Green Paper, Justice and Security (Cm 8194 October 2011) from the Ministry of Justice and Cabinet Office. This Green Paper examines the balance to be struck between secrecy of proceedings where sensitive information involving national security is at issue and the Government’s duty to safeguard national security and the requirements of justice under the rule of law. This is referred to as the twin imperatives of ‘justice and security’. The Green Paper was published at a time when the Secret Intelligence Services have

934  Chapter 11 featured in 14 cases coming to the House of Lords and Supreme Court since 2001 and many more cases in the lower courts. Before that and for 90 years, no case impacting directly on Secret Intelligence Services existence reached the House of Lords (cf Spycatcher). It has information on ‘recent secret intelligence successes’ where intelligence has assisted in saving lives and foiling outrages. It does not deal with criminal proceedings or with intercept evidence. It will cover civil actions and cases involving measures against terrorist suspects. The Green Paper states that rights to justice and fairness must be protected and that the Government is committed to transparency. The use of sensitive evidence before inquests is also examined. Ways to ensure that an investigation into a death can take account of all relevant information and also support the involvement of jurors, family members and other persons are sought. Al Rawi and Ors v The Security Service and Ors [2011] UKSC 34, [2011] 3 WLR 388. See, in particular, the judgment of Lord Dyson, but also Lord Kerr. 3 See, in particular [159]–[187]. 4 [2007] UKHL 46. 5 [2009] UKHL 28. 1 2

11.82  The decision of the Supreme Court in Tariq1 found that the use of the closed material procedure and special advocates in proceedings before the Employment Tribunal was not in contravention of ECHR Art 6 or the relevant provisions of EU law. In this case, Tariq had brought a claim for unlawful discrimination after his security clearance as an immigration officer had been rescinded following the arrest of his brother and cousin on suspicion of terrorism offences. Tariq’s brother was released, but his cousin was convicted. Tariq argued that the use of the closed material procedure and special advocates was contrary to Art 6 and EU law in the sense that he was unable to know in sufficient detail what the allegations against him were or what the detail of the Secretary of State’s defence were for him to instruct his legal representatives effectively. The Supreme Court rejected these claims, finding that national security was an important concern and that neither the relevant provisions of EU law nor Art 6 gave rise to an absolute right to have access to all elements of the Secretary of State’s case. See para 11.4, note 5 above.

1

11.83  It is clear that other than insofar as the use of the closed material procedure and special advocates is permitted by statute, the courts were not willing to extend the use of the process, other than in certain very limited circumstances.1 Parliament acted to address the issue in the Justice and Security Act 2013 (JSA 2013) and extend the scope of the closed material procedure to civil proceedings. This Act opens up the potential for the adoption of the closed material process in all civil proceedings. It is notable that this element of the Act has generated a great deal of litigation since its coming into force, including much on the balance to be struck between the use of the closed material process and the withholding of disclosure under PII.2 Below, we aim to summarise the major points that have arisen from the litigation so far. In Al Rawi at [63] and [64], Lord Dyson offers wardship and cases of commercial confidentiality as possible examples.

1

Litigation and information   935 K v Secretary of State for Defence [2017] EWHC 830 (Admin), with the ‘effective instruction’ test drawn from the decision of the House of Lords in AF [2009] UKHL 28, [2010] 2 AC 269; R (on the application of K) v Secretary of State for Defence [2016] EWCA Civ 1149, [2017] 1 WLR 1671.

2

11.84  Section 6 of the JSA 2013 provides (insofar as is relevant) as follows: ‘(1)  The court seised of relevant civil proceedings may make a declaration that the proceedings are proceedings in which a closed material application may be made to the court. (2)  The court may make such a declaration– (a) on the application of– (i) the Secretary of State (whether or not the Secretary of State is a party to the proceedings), or (ii) any party to the proceedings, or (b) of its own motion. (3)  The court may make such a declaration if it considers that the following two conditions are met. (4)  The first condition is that– (a) a party to the proceedings would be required to disclose sensitive material in the course of the proceedings to another person (whether or not another party to the proceedings), or (b) a party to the proceedings would be required to make such a disclosure were it not for one or more of the following— (i) the possibility of a claim for public interest immunity in relation to the material, (ii) the fact that there would be no requirement to disclose if the party chose not to rely on the material, (iii) section 56(1) of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (exclusion for intercept material), (iv) any other enactment that would prevent the party from disclosing the material but would not do so if the proceedings were proceedings in relation to which there was a declaration under this section. (5)  The second condition is that it is in the interests of the fair and effective administration of justice in the proceedings to make a declaration. (6)  The two conditions are met if the court considers that they are met in relation to any material that would be required to be disclosed in the course of the proceedings (and an application under subsection (2)(a) need not be based on all of the material that might meet the conditions or on material that the applicant would be required to disclose). (7)  The court must not consider an application by the Secretary of State under subsection (2)(a) unless it is satisfied that the Secretary of State has, before making the application, considered whether to make, or advise another person to make, a claim for public interest immunity in relation to the material on which the application is based.

936  Chapter 11 (8)  A declaration under this section must identify the party or parties to the proceedings who would be required to disclose the sensitive material (“a relevant person”). … (11)  In this section– “closed material application” means an application of the kind mentioned in section 8(1)(a), “relevant civil proceedings” means any proceedings (other than proceedings in a criminal cause or matter) before– (a) the High Court, (b) the Court of Appeal, (c) the Court of Session, or (d) the Supreme Court, “sensitive material” means material the disclosure of which would be damaging to the interests of national security.’ Section 7 of the Act requires a court making such a declaration to review the declaration once it is made and s 7(2) requires revocation of the declaration if it is no longer in the interests of fair and efficient administration of justice. In addition, s 7(3) requires that the court must review every declaration made in relation to closed material after the pre-trial disclosure exercise is completed and revoke it if it is no longer in the interests of fair and efficient administration of justice. Section 7(4) also allows the Secretary of State, a party to the proceedings or the court on its own volition to revoke the declaration. In making any determination under s 7(2) and (3), the court is required to consider all of the material that has been put before it and not only the material upon which it based its initial declaration under s 6. Section 8 then provides the jurisdiction of the court to determine whether specific information or documents should be treated as closed material and made available only as permitted by the Act. This is achieved by requiring that the relevant rules of the court achieve these objectives. Section 9 provides that special advocates might be appointed to represent the interests of parties whose own representatives have been excluded by the declaration under s  6. Section 10 emphasises that the normal rules of disclosure must apply, other than to the extent that these are constrained by the need to meet the requirements of ss 8, 9 and 11 of the Act. Section 11 of the Act then provides that the rules of court must ensure that, under the closed material procedure, there is a need to secure disclosures of evidence where they would be damaging to national security. Section 12 of the Act came about as a result of an amendment to the legislation during the Parliamentary process and requires the Secretary of State to report on the number of applications made and the number of declarations made by the court under s 6 in each 12-month period.1 The report must also contain detail of the number of closed judgments resulting from the process. Section 12 further requires that every five years a review of the operation of the closed material procedure is undertaken and the report is laid before Parliament. Section 14(2) of the Act contains some important points of interpretation. In particular, s  14(2)(c) makes it clear that nothing in the provisions of the Act should be taken as requiring a court or tribunal to act in a manner inconsistent with Art 6 ECHR.

Litigation and information   937 The reports can be found at https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/use-of-closed-materialprocedure-reports.

1

11.85  A new Part 82 of the Civil Procedure Rules was introduced in order to give effect to the provisions of the JSA 2013 in court procedure. The new Part 82 was added by SI 2013/1571 and deals with all aspects of hearings under the closed material procedure. 11.86  A  number of issues have been litigated in respect of the provisions of the JSA 2013. The Supreme Court has recently addressed the question of the meaning of ‘criminal cause or matter’ in relation to the definition of ‘relevant civil proceedings’ in s  6(11) of the 2013 Act in Belhaj. The Divisional Court held in this case that a claim for judicial review of a decision not to prosecute a senior MI6 officer, for alleged involvement in the unlawful rendition of the claimant and his partner from Thailand to Libya, fell outside of the definition of a ‘criminal cause or matter’ and thus the closed material procedure could be invoked. In a 3–2 majority decision (Lords Sumption and Mance JJSC and Baroness Hale PSC in the majority) the Supreme Court held that the judicial review proceedings did constitute proceedings relating to a ‘criminal cause or matter’ and thus the court had no jurisdiction to invoke the closed material procedure under s 6 of the JSA 2013 in the proceedings. Lord Sumption sought to explain the rationale for the introduction of the exception for proceedings in relation to a criminal cause or matter and to explain the reasons for treating the instant case as falling within that exception: ‘The explanation of the distinction given in the Green Paper appears in a section at p 7 headed “Criminal vs civil: Why criminal proceedings are out of the scope of this Paper”. This is relevant not as guide to the meaning of the words of a Bill which had not yet been published, but as evidence of the mischief behind the distinction between civil and criminal causes or matters. The difference between them lay in the degree of control exercisable by the executive in criminal cases. The Green Paper pointed out that the right to a fair trial under article  6 of the Human Rights Convention imports more onerous requirements in criminal cases, and “the rules concerning the use and protection of sensitive evidence are different to those in civil cases.” These words are a reference, as the text goes on to explain, to the rule that although the prosecution may choose to rely only on material whose disclosure would be consistent with the national interest, it must disclose any potentially exculpatory unused material. The prosecution may seek to limit the disclosure of unused material by the issue of a public interest immunity certificate, followed by an application for permission not to disclose it. But if that application fails, the state can as a last resort avoid disclosure by withdrawing the prosecution and allowing the defendant to be discharged. By comparison, in civil claims, where the Government is a defendant, there is no possibility of withdrawal, so that the ability to protect sensitive material is entirely dependent on PII claims. There is no reason to doubt that this was indeed the rationale for the distinction between civil and criminal proceedings in section 6 of the Act. But it is not a rationale which requires closed material procedure to be available in an ancillary

938  Chapter 11 judicial review of a decision made as an integral part of the criminal justice process, when it would not be available for an actual trial. The executive can dispose of proceedings of either kind by withdrawing the prosecution.’1 R (Belhaj and another) v Director of Public Prosecutions and another (No 1) [2018] UKSC 33, [2018] 3 WLR 435 at [22].

1

11.87  In the case of Belhaj v Straw, which is a civil claim brought by the same claimants as in the judicial review proceedings discussed in the previous paragraph, the court considered some important aspects of the jurisdiction to make a declaration under s 6 of the JSA 2013. The claimants in this case had submitted that in order for the court to make such a declaration it was necessary to demonstrate that the sensitive material before it was of central relevance to the case, or at least highly relevant to it. The court rejected this approach and held that, even if the material went to only one issue raised in the case, the court might make a declaration under s  6.1 It was also argued that the Secretary of State had not given adequate weight to the need to consider a claim for PII under s 6(7) of the Act. It was held that the Secretary of State had a reasonable basis for concluding that a PII claim would not be as suitable as an application for a declaration under s 6 of the JSA 2013 and that a hearing in relation to whether a declaration should be made under s 6 was not an appropriate forum to engage in judicial review of the Secretary of State’s decision.2 On the consideration of the approach of the judge when considering whether a s 6 declaration or a grant of PII may be more appropriate see R (on the application of Sarkandi) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2015] EWCA Civ 687, [2016] 3 All ER 837. 2 Ibid at [37]. See also HTF v Ministry of Defence [2018] EWHC 1623 (QB) and [2017] EWHC 1861 (QB). 1

11.88  A  further issue that has arisen in litigation is the extent to which the rights of claimants under Art 6  ECHR (which are specifically preserved by s 14(2)(c) of the JSA 2013) require a certain minimum level of disclosure even under the closed material procedure. The Court of Appeal held that alleged failure of Secretaries of State to relocate or compensate Afghan nationals who had provided covert intelligence to the UK in accordance with published and unpublished policies was a determination of their civil rights and obligations for the purposes of Art 6 ECHR. In such circumstances, the High Court held that the impact of Art 6 and s 14 on disclosure in closed material cases would vary depending on the facts of the case. There may be some cases where all that is required is sufficient disclosure of the closed material to allow the claimant to get the essence of the case, whereas in cases involving individual liberty or significant restrictions on property such as asset freezing, it is necessary for sufficient disclosure to allow the subject of any such control to offer effective instructions to his or her counsel or special advocate.

LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE 11.89  Unlike public interest immunity, legal professional privilege (LPP) is a privilege and may be waived only by the party possessing the privilege –

Litigation and information   939 the client1 – and it can only be raised by the party possessing the privilege.2 This topic is dealt with exhaustively elsewhere.3 There has been a considerable amount of litigation and statutory intervention on the subject of LPP under Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, Part VII.4 The Privy Council has defended the immunity in powerful terms. It was not subject to competing public interests at common law. It was a fundamental condition on which the administration of justice as a whole rested. For a statute to make inroads into the immunity, the statutory language would have to be specific and allow such inroads by necessary implication. Limited disclosure of privileged documents did not waive a privilege generally. There was no balancing exercise to be conducted by a judge because the policy considerations giving rise to the privilege precluded such a balance. There might be a limited use of documents by agreement but that did not waive privilege in the documents save to the extent of the agreement.5 And not eg a solicitor representing the client: see, however, Goldman v Hesper [1988] 3 All ER 97, CA; Comfort Hotels Ltd v Wembley Stadium Ltd [1988] 3 All ER 53. 2 Cf Guinness Peat Properties Ltd v Fitzroy Robinson Partnership [1987] 2 All ER 716, CA concerning an insurance document. It has been held that CPR 1998, r 48.7(3), which allows a court to direct that legally privileged documents could be disclosed to the court and the other party, was ultra vires: General Mediterranean Holdings SA v Patel [1999] 3 All ER 673. See Al Fayed v Commissioner of Police (2002) Times, 17  June where documents were mistakenly disclosed to the other side where solicitor was not aware of the mistake and a reasonable solicitor would not be so aware; no injunction would be issued to prevent use of the documents by the other side. 3 See eg, Cross and Tapper on Evidence (12th edn, 2010). 4 On which, see Bowman v Fels [2005] EWCA Civ 226, [2005] 1 WLR 3083. 5 B v Auckland District Law Society [2004] 4 All ER 269 (PC) and the Three Rivers litigation in the House of Lords (para 11.92, note 7 below). See R (Morgan Grenfell and Co Ltd) v Special Commissioner of Income Tax [2002] 3 All ER 1 (HL): Taxes Management Act 1970, s 20 did not override LPP; Court of Appeal overruled. Note that this privilege under s 20 applies only to legal advice given by legal advisors. In Re Revenue and Customs Commissioners Application (Section 20(1) Notice: Subsidiary Co) [2008]  STC (SCD) 358 the Commissioners noted that similar privilege did not apply to advice about the law received from accountants and required the company at the centre of the application to deliver the correspondence between the company and its accountants for inspection by the Inland Revenue. This issue remains contentious. Prudential is presently pursuing a judicial review case arguing that legal advice provided on tax matters by accountancy firms should be subject to the privilege. The High Court [2009] EWHC 2494 (Admin), [2010] 1 All ER 1113 and more recently the Court of Appeal [2010] EWCA Civ 1094, [2011] QB 669 have both refused to extend the privilege. The Court of Appeal noted that s 20 of the Act refers specifically to what an accountant might be required to disclose and Parliament did not at that time choose to extend the privilege. Furthermore, the weight of precedent supported the principle that the privilege extends only to advice received from lawyers. The Court of Appeal rejected the claim that ECHR, Art 8 extended beyond the principle that advice received from lawyers was subject to protection under the Convention. The decision of the Court of Appeal has subsequently been affirmed by the Supreme Court [2013] UKSC 1, [2013] 2 AC 185. 1

11.90  Suffice it to say for present purposes that there are two classes of privilege: (a) documents and communications that are privileged whether or not litigation was contemplated or pending; and (b) documents and communications that are privileged only if litigation was contemplated or pending when they were made or came into existence.

940  Chapter 11 11.91  Where the seeking of advice is itself a material fact in proceedings, eg a relevant date for the purpose of the Limitation Act 1980, LPP does not apply to that fact.1 Ie to establish the effluxion of the relevant period.

1

11.92  Under (a), ‘legal advice privilege’, correspondence and communications passing between a solicitor and client, or the client’s predecessors in title, are privileged from production. They must be made confidentially ‘and written to, or by, the solicitor in his or her professional capacity, and for the purpose of getting legal advice or assistance for the client’.1 Those purposes must be construed broadly.2 The same privilege attaches to communications by an employer with a solicitor in the full-time employment of the former, eg a government department or local authority,3 as are instructions and briefs to counsel, cases for counsel’s opinion and the opinion itself, as well as counsel’s drafts and notes.4 The Court of Appeal has sought to confine the scope of this privilege in the Three Rivers litigation.5 The Bank of England appealed against a further decision of the Court of Appeal6 that communications between itself (specifically a specific unit of Bank officials whose task was to deal with communications between the Bank and the Bingham Inquiry) and its solicitors concerning preparations for the Bingham Inquiry (HC 198 (1992–93)) into the Bank’s regulation of the BCCI were not covered by legal advice privilege where those communications pertained solely to the manner in which B should present its evidence. In dismissing the appeal, the Court of Appeal ruled that whilst solicitor and client communications were often what could be expected in the normal course of business, legal advice privilege only arose when such communications pertained to advice on liabilities and rights. Legal advice meant advice on law. However, where the initial relationship between the client and solicitor consisted of advising on rights and liabilities, legal advice privilege ‘would cover a broad spectrum of communication and ancillary matters’. In circumstances of the present appeal, however, the purpose of the communications was not to obtain advice on rights and liabilities, but to obtain advice on presentation of evidence and accordingly legal privilege did not arise, regardless of the fact that the Bank wished to urge upon the Inquiry a conclusion as favourable to its own position as possible. This somewhat surprising decision was overturned by the House of Lords.7 See the Supreme Court Practice Part 31 and the authorities there cited. Balabel v Air India [1988] 2 All ER 246, CA. See USP Strategies plc and Another v London General Holdings Ltd [2004] EWHC 373 on privilege attaching to summaries and copies of legal advice. Notes taken by a solicitor of evidence given by witnesses in an Employment Tribunal case (but not any annotations or observations on the evidence made by the solicitor) have been found not to be subject to privilege by the EAT: Comfort v Department of Constitutional Affairs (2005) 102(35) LSG 42. 3 Alfred Crompton Amusement Machines Ltd Customs and Excise Comrs (No 2) [1974] AC 405, HL. EU law is stricter: para 11.128 below. 4 Pre-existing documents that are submitted to counsel as part of instructions and then returned to the client are not necessarily subject of privilege. In Imerman v Tchenguiz [2009] EWHC 2902 (QB), [2010] Lloyd’s Rep PN  221 the court found that a document which had been sent to counsel as part of instructions and which had been annotated by counsel was not subject to legal professional privilege. Insofar as the document was annotated, the annotations could be redacted. 5 Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No 5) [2003] QB 1556, overruling [2002] EWHC 2730. See the obiter remarks casting doubt on this decision (though acknowledging that this issue should 1 2

Litigation and information   941 be determined by the Supreme Court) in Director of the Serious Fraud Office v Eurasian Natural Resources Corp Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 2006 at [123]–[130]. 6 Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No 6) [2004] QB 916 (CA). 7 Three Rivers DC v Bank of England [2004] UKHL 48.

11.93  The privilege referred to as legal advice privilege, said Baroness Hale, ‘is too well established in the common law for its existence to be doubted now’ (para  61). The thrust of the judgments was that the advice privilege was not restricted to the provision of advice on legal rights and obligations as identified by the Court of Appeal, and that per Lord Scott: ‘None of these judicial dicta tie the justification for legal advice privilege to the conduct of litigation. They recognise that in the complex world in which we live there are a multitude of reasons why individuals, whether humble or powerful, or corporations, whether large or small, may need to seek the advice or assistance of lawyers in connection with their affairs; they recognise that the seeking and giving of this advice so that the clients may achieve an orderly arrangement of their affairs is strongly in the public interest; they recognise that in order for the advice to bring about that desirable result it is essential that the full and complete facts are placed before the lawyers who are to give it; and they recognise that unless the clients can be assured that what they tell their lawyers will not be disclosed by the lawyers without their (the clients’) consent, there will be cases in which the requisite candour will be absent. It is obviously true that in very many cases clients would have no inhibitions in providing their lawyers with all the facts and information the lawyers might need whether or not there were the absolute assurance of non-disclosure that the present law of privilege provides. But the dicta to which I  have referred all have in common the idea that it is necessary in our society, a society in which the restraining and controlling framework is built upon a belief in the rule of law, that communications between clients and lawyers, whereby the clients are hoping for the assistance of the lawyers’ legal skills in the management of their (the clients’) affairs, should be secure against the possibility of any scrutiny from others, whether the police, the executive, business competitors, inquisitive busy-bodies or anyone else …. I, for my part, subscribe to this idea. It justifies, in my opinion, the retention of legal advice privilege in our law, notwithstanding that as a result cases may sometimes have to be decided in ignorance of relevant probative material.’ (para 34) 11.94  Inquiries such as the Bingham Inquiry which was ad hoc under the Banking Acts, but whose findings nevertheless could have important implications for the Bank’s position in law, and which itself could be subject to judicial review and ‘presentational advice’ or assistance given by lawyers to parties whose conduct may be the subject of criticism by the inquiry, is advice or assistance that may serve to avoid the need to invoke public law remedies. The words of Taylor LJ in Balabel v Air India1 were used in several of the judgments: ‘legal advice is not confined to telling the client the law; it must include advice as to what should prudently and sensibly be done in the relevant legal context’ (at p 330). Were the

942  Chapter 11 lawyers, qua lawyers, being asked to provide legal advice to the client, asked Lord Rodger (para 58). This might include advice given by Parliamentary counsel to the government in relation to the drafting and preparation of public bills. It is not clear why this should be so (para 1.138 above). Advising on presentation and selecting material for relevance is per Lord Carswell ‘the classic exercise of one of the lawyer’s skills’ (para 113). On the question of whether other employees apart from the members of the BIU were also covered by the advice privilege, which the Court of Appeal ruled in (No 5) was not the case and on which the Bar Council and Law Society intervened, the Law Lords declined to express their opinions.2 [1988] Ch 317. An appeals committee of the House of Lords had refused permission for the Bank to appeal against this aspect of the earlier ruling.

1 2

11.95  The privilege under category (b), ‘litigation privilege’, covers: ‘Communications between a solicitor and a non-professional agent or third party, directly, or through an agent, which come into existence after litigation is contemplated or commenced and made with a view to such litigation, either for the purpose of obtaining or giving advice in regard to it, or of obtaining or collecting evidence to be used in it, or obtaining information which may lead to the obtaining of such information.’1 Supreme Court Practice 24/5/8: Anderson v Bank of British Columbia (1876) 2 Ch D 644, CA; Wheeler v Le Marchant (1881) 17 Ch D 675. On copies of documents, see R v Inland Revenue Board, ex p Goldberg [1988] 3 All ER 248.

1

11.96  The scope of the privilege covering client/third party communications is less clear cut. 11.97  Information from a non-professional agent is not protected unless obtained with a view to contemplated or existing litigation except where the agent is merely the medium of the message that is confidential between a client and his or her solicitor or vice versa. 11.98  Where the client receives reports from communications with a nonprofessional servant, agent or third party, the courts have limited the nature of the privilege.1 Seabrook v British Transport Commission [1959] 2 All ER 15.

1

11.99  If documents came into existence only for the purpose of obtaining legal advice in existing or anticipated proceedings, the privilege will obtain. Where there are two purposes, eg  to establish the facts behind an accident as well as preparing legal advice for contemplated litigation, only when the predominant purpose for which the document was prepared was to submit it to a legal adviser will the privilege under the second head apply.1 Waugh v British Railways Board [1980] AC 521, HL; see Guinness Peat Properties, para 11.89, note 2 above: the dominant purpose is not necessarily ascertained by reference to the intention of the composer, but reference should be made to the employer’s or insurer’s intention. Where the

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Litigation and information   943 insurer’s intention was to bring a document into existence to be advised on whether a claim should be paid or resisted, LPP will obtain especially in complicated cases. This will not be the case where the issue is simple and is really about assessing quantum. For a more recent case considering the scope of the privilege to contemplated litigation (in this case it was held that advice produced for the purposes of responding to a Serious Fraud Office investigation where the SFO had indicated the potential for prosecution was subject to litigation privilege), see Director of the Serious Fraud Office v Eurasian Natural Resources Corp Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 2006 at [91]–[101].

11.100  Case-law has also insisted that a strict test should apply to determine when the privilege applies to eg accident reports and reports for valuation (for tax purposes)1 ie  distinguishing between anticipated litigation and a report on an occurrence which may lead to litigation. The Court of Appeal has held that, if litigation is reasonably in prospect, documents brought into existence for the purpose of enabling solicitors to advise whether a claim should be met or rejected are protected by the privilege; this is whether or not a decision to instruct solicitors has been made at the time the documents were created. However, such a motive/decision, viz advising on the claim, must be the dominant one.2 When the privilege applies to a client’s communication to his solicitor, it also covers copies of such documents.3 The House of Lords has ruled by majority that investigations under Children Act 1989, Part IV (care and supervision) are not adversarial but are inquisitorial in nature and litigation privilege could not be relied upon.4 3 4 1 2

Alfred Crompton above; Lask v Gloucester Area Health Authority 2 PN 96, CA. Guinness Peat Properties above. See Gnitrow Ltd v Cape plc [2000] 3 All ER 763, CA. See para 11.108, note 1 below. Re L [1997] AC 16.

11.101  Once a document is privileged it is always privileged in the hands of the litigant or his successor in title unless the holder chooses to waive the privilege.1 Translations of unprivileged documents will not attract privilege and nor will a selection of unprivileged documents attract privilege on the ground that their selection reveals legal advice.2 See Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc v Maclaine, Watson & Co Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 946. Sumitomo Corp v Credit Lyonnais Ltd [2002] 4 All ER 68 (CA).

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11.102  Communications other than the above are not privileged1 no matter how confidential, a point recently illustrated in the criminal law by PACE 1984 and Police Act 1997, Part III. See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s 280 and patents and relevant communications. On confidentiality and public interest immunity, see para 11.75 above.

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PACE 1984 and privilege 11.103  This Act allows searches for, and seizure of, evidence which prior to the Act coming into force was privileged, but which may now be obtained by a warrant or order from a circuit judge.1 The Act allows seizures of what otherwise is defined under the statute as ‘excluded’2 and ‘special procedure’3 material and which may be obtained by following the procedure laid down in

944  Chapter 11 s 9 and Sch 1.4 Access to legally privileged documents (see below) may not be granted at all unless they are held with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose: s  10(2).5  A  court must not grant a warrant under s  8 for seizure of legally privileged material unless it is satisfied, properly directing itself, that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the material did not consist of, or include, legally privileged material.6 When the police seized documents covered by LPP under a search warrant under s 8(1), there was no rule against this provided the officer had no reasonable grounds to believe the documents were privileged. Police officers were not allowed to remove documents to sift through them to establish what was in the scope of the warrant. Documents unlawfully seized had to be returned and a liability for trespass to goods might arise. A procedure before a circuit judge to deal with such matters was required, the court believed.7 Under Part III of the Police Act 1997, sensitive, confidential and legally privileged information may be obtained by surveillance-powers (see ss 97–98) added to by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (see ch 4). The 2016 Code of Practice on interceptions has guidance on the safeguards involving intercepted information. Paragraphs 4.7 et seq of the code state that, where a lawyer is the subject of an interception, it is possible that a substantial proportion of the communications which will be intercepted will be between the lawyer and his client(s) and will be subject to legal privilege. Any case where a lawyer is the subject of an investigation should be notified to the Interception of Communications Commissioner during his inspections and any material which has been retained should be made available to him if requested. 3 4 5

PACE 1984, Part II (ss 8 et seq) and Sch 1. PACE 1984, s 11; it includes journalistic material: s 13. PACE 1984, s 14; includes ‘journalistic material’ other than excluded material. To a circuit judge who has to be satisfied of either one of two sets of conditions. On PACE 1984, s 10(2), which expressly preserves the exclusion of privilege from communications made ‘with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose’ see: R v Central Criminal Court, ex p Francis & Francis (a firm) [1989] AC 346, HL and Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986, s 27. 6 R v Guildhall Magistrates’ Court, ex p Primlaks Holdings Co (Panama) Inc [1990] 1 QB 261. If in doubt, a magistrates’ court should dismiss an application under PACE  1984, s  8, leaving the applicant to proceed under s 9 before a circuit judge. 7 R v Chesterfield Justices, ex p Bramley [2000] QB 576 – the spirit of Entick v Carrington survives! See, however, Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, ss 50–52 to deal with this situation. 1 2

Legal professional privilege and criminal purpose 11.104  Public interest immunity, it has been held, does not protect as a class documents seized under the PACE 1984. On presentation of a subpoena duces tecum (witness summons) the police will have to disclose them in civil proceedings if the owner would have been so required.1 A major exception to LPP concerns those cases where a document came into existence ‘as a step in a criminal or illegal proceeding’, ie where the solicitor is asked to advise on the perpetration of a crime or illegal act, or is implicated in it. The privilege will not cover such communications.2 However, LPP will cover cases where the solicitor is asked to advise on the legality or criminality of proposed actions, or how to stay within the law or within a statute.3

Litigation and information   945 Marcel v Metropolitan Police Comr [1992] Ch  225, CA. The court provided instructions on appropriate safeguards, cf a contents claim. 2 Bullivant v A-G  for Victoria [1901]  AC  196, HL; R  v Cox (1884) 14  QBD  153, CCR; Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Al Alawi [1999] 1 All ER 703; and Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co [2005] EWCA Civ 286. And see PACE 1984, ss 8 and 10(2). 3 Butler v Board of Trade [1971] Ch 680; Banque Keyser Ullman SA v Skandia (UK) Insurance Co Ltd [1986] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 336, CA; see also Re Konigsberg, ex p the Trustee v Konigsberg [1989] 3 All ER 289. 1

11.105  The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, Part VII increases the risk of criminal sanctions for solicitors in relation to laundering offences (ss  327–329), failure to report such offences (s  329) and facilitating laundering offences. Privilege only covers legal advice and does not cover ‘litigation’ privilege concerning third parties. The Court of Appeal has ruled that Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, s 328 was not intended to cover or affect the ‘ordinary conduct of litigation’ by legal professionals since that ordinary conduct did not fall within the concept of ‘becoming concerned in an arrangement which facilitates the acquisition, retention, use or control of criminal property’.1 Bowman v Fels [2005] EWCA Civ 226; and see P v P (2004 NLJ 1604) and SI 2004/2613.

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Miscellaneous points 11.106  The Board of Inland Revenue possesses wide powers under ss 20 and 51 of the Taxes Management Act 1970 (as amended) to serve notices requiring documentation relating to tax liabilities. In the case of a solicitor, documents requested might be covered by the privilege. A solicitor would have to comply, but inspectors could only use the documents in relation to the solicitor’s tax liabilities and not for any other purpose.1 In R v IRC, ex p Tamosius & Partners2 the police were allowed to take a lawyer on a search of premises under a warrant under s 20C of the Taxes Management Act 1970 to help in determining whether documents were covered by LPP. Notices issued for good reasons under s 20 did not involve a breach of the right to privacy.3 Under s 20C, revenue officers may seize a computer to copy the contents of the hard drive if this is not possible on the tax payer’s premises.4 R v IRC, ex p Taylor (No 2) [1989] 3 All ER 353; affirmed [1990] 2 All ER 409, CA. [1999] STC 1077. On the delegation of the Board’s powers to one of its own officers, see: R v IRC ex p Davis, Frankel and Mead [2000] STC 595. 3 R v IRC, ex p Banque International à Luxembourg SA [2000] STC 708. 4 R (H) v Inland Revenue Commissioners [2002] STC 1354. 1 2

11.107  Privilege will be waived where documents are put in evidence, or read out in court. It will be waived for the whole document in such a case unless the ‘remaining part deals with an entirely different subject-matter’1 Considerable litigation has taken place over the circumstances in which privilege can be said to be waived. The Court of Appeal recently found that the mention of the existence of correspondence with a lawyer in a witness statement was not sufficient to waive privilege in the document.2 A-G for the Northern Territory v Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475.

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946  Chapter 11 Expandable Ltd v Rubin [2008] EWCA Civ 59, [2008] EWCA Civ 59, [2008] 1 WLR 1099; Fulham Leisure Holdings Ltd v Nicholson Graham & Jones [2006] EWHC 158 (Ch), [2006] 2 All ER 599; Brennan v Sunderland City Council [2009] ICR 479 and Re D (A Child) (Care proceedings: professional privilege) [2011] EWCA Civ 684, [2011] 2 FCR 585.

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11.108  Although it has been held that a party may use secondary evidence about the contents of a privileged document in proceedings,1 eg  a photocopy, if s/he has not yet used it and merely intends to do so it has been held that s/he must hand it to the person in whom LPP is vested if that person makes a claim for delivery up of the copy; s/he may also be restrained from using it.2 However, a court has a discretion to allow a party to use ‘privileged’ documents which have come into that party’s hands where they are confidential, where possession came about completely innocently3 and where a reasonable solicitor would not realise that a mistake had been made.4 Under CPR  1998, r 31.20 a discretion would appear to continue because the permission of the court must be given to use documents inadvertently disclosed. It is not permissible for a litigant to use documents covered by LPP where s/he has obtained them by stealth, deceit or improper conduct.5 There is some judicial concern about the use of documents which through inadvertence have lost their privilege and which cannot be protected by confidentiality – a disclosure by oversight for instance.6 On the other hand, it might be asked why clients should be protected from the negligence or oversight of their lawyers when the opponents’ solicitors have not acted unconscionably. There is always the possibility of an action for professional negligence for such oversight. To which one may argue, only the client may waive the privilege; but the client has to operate through the mediation of his lawyers. Calcraft v Guest [1898] 1 QB 759, CA; R v Governor of Pentonville Prison, ex p Osman [1989] 3 All ER 701 at 729–731. Calcraft v Guest has been severely criticised since it was decided. Ashburton v Pape [1913] 2 Ch 469 seems to provide the possibility of protecting ‘privileged’ documents by confidentiality even where LPP has evaporated where they have come into the possession of the other party by breach of confidence or accident. See R  Toulson and C  Phipps Confidentiality, ch 20 (1996). See, however, A v B [2000] EMLR 1007 and Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s 45. 2 Goddard v Nationwide Building Society [1986] 3 All ER 264; English and American Insurance Co Ltd v Herbert Smith & Co [1988] FSR 232. 3 Webster v James Chapman & Co [1989] 3  All ER  939, Scott J  doubting Nourse LJ in Goddard, above. 4 See Al Fayed v Commissioner of Police (2002) Times, 17 June (para 11.89, note 2 above). 5 ITC Film Distributors Ltd v Video Exchange Ltd [1982] Ch 431. 6 See English and American Insurance above and Browne Wilkinson V-C at 239. 1

11.109  Documents which are disclosed to the police out of a sense of public duty to assist in their investigations for the purpose of a subsequent criminal trial will not lose an obvious privilege for civil proceedings, and no waiver of privilege for civil proceedings is made or implied. Such a loss would be contrary to public policy.1 British Coal Corpn v Dennis Rye Ltd (No 2) [1988] 3 All ER 816. Cf documents obtained under the PACE 1984 and Marcel v Metropolitan Police Comr [1992] Ch 225, CA. The principle in Marcel was approved by the Supreme Court in R (Ingenious Media Holdings plc and another) v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2016] UKSC 54, [2016] 1 WLR 4164.

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Litigation and information   947 11.110  On the other hand, where there is no privilege attaching to a copy of an affidavit served on a defendant and handed by him to his legal adviser to advise on a civil claim, then it would not be privileged in subsequent unrelated civil proceedings against the defendant.1 Dubai Bank v Galadari [1989] 3 All ER 769; and Dubai Bank v Galadari (No 7) [1992] 1 All ER 658 where a selection of copies of documents reveals the ‘trend of advice’ given by a solicitor. The ‘trend of advice’ reasoning has been disapproved of by the Court of Appeal in Sumitomo Corp v Credit Lyonnais Rouse Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1152, [2002] 1 WLR 479.

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OTHER FORMS OF PRIVILEGE 11.111  We leave to other sources1 the privilege relating to self-incrimination or exposure to a penalty,2 and ‘without prejudice’ communications3 as well as other forms of privilege. Cross and Tapper on Evidence (11th edn, 2010). R v Ataou [1988] 2 All ER 321, CA. This privilege was the subject of some high-profile litigation in Gray v News Group Newspapers [2011] EWHC 349 (Ch), [2011] 2 WLR 1401, where the High Court ordered Glen Mulcaire to reveal the names of the journalists who asked him to access voicemail messages in the phone hacking scandal. The Court of Appeal refused permission to appeal in the case. 3 Rush & Tompkins Ltd v Greater London Council [1989] AC 1280, HL. See Unilever plc v Procter & Gamble Co [1999] 1 WLR 1630; affirmed [2000] 1 WLR 2436, CA. More recently, see Oceanbulk Shipping & Trading SA v TMT Asia Ltd [2010] UKSC 44, [2011] 1 AC 662. 1 2

Requests for information (interrogatories) 11.112  The procedure relating to requests for information, formerly known as interrogatories, which are in form detailed questions relating to any matter in issue between the applicant and the other party in the cause or matter requiring that other party to answer the request on a statement of truth (affidavit) within a specified period, is contained in CPR  1998, Part 18. The immunities and privileges enumerated above apply to requests as well as for disclosure.

Witness summonses (subpoenas) 11.113  The governing provision is now CPR  1998, Part 34. Witness summonses replaced the process of issuing subpoenas. 11.114  It should be noted that, apart from the limited circumstances set out in CPR 1998, r 31.17 and in the Norwich Pharmacal case,1 disclosure cannot be ordered against a third party, a mere witness. As Lord Diplock said,2 discovery is an inroad, in the interest of achieving justice, into the right of individuals to keep their documents to themselves; it is an inroad which calls for safeguards against abuse. These sentiments should be borne in mind when applications for witness statements (subpoenas) are made for documents, especially if there is a suspicion that they are being used to obtain disclosure. However, a witness can be ordered

948  Chapter 11 to attend and/or to produce documents under Part 34, and the details of practice and procedure are contained in that Part. See para 11.36, note 1 above. Harman v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1983] 1 AC 280, CA.

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11.115  A  party to proceedings is not obliged to produce any documents under Part 34 for which privilege may be claimed. Readers are directed to the discussion above. In R v Bournemouth Justices, ex p Grey1 the High Court refused to set aside on the grounds of public interest immunity a witness summons in affiliation proceedings against a social worker who was in possession of vital evidence which, per Hodgson J, was known to everyone. The public interest did not necessitate the acceptance of the immunity in that case, which on its facts was a weak one from the perspective of public interest immunity. Where documents are protected by the law of ‘confidentiality’, especially for instance where they relate to children,2 even though they may not be protected by public interest immunity, the court will be prepared to weigh that confidentiality against the interests of doing justice in the particular case and will have regard to the possible harm that may be done to third parties if a disclosure is made. Protection of an individual’s safety is a matter of public interest. It can, if it thinks that disclosure should be made having inspected the documents, consider whether any evidence should be heard in camera, should be elided if irrelevant to the cause, or if names should be erased.3 These points were made in a case concerning an application for discovery inter partes in a discrimination case before an industrial tribunal but the principles seem to be applicable here. This will of course be subject to any relevant statutory or other powers of the courts that are relevant. [1987] 1 FLR 36. See paras 11.7 et seq above which concern statutory restrictions on publicity. 3 Science Research Council v Nassé [1979] 3 All ER 673, HL. 1 2

FREEZING ORDERS AND SEARCH ORDERS1 11.116  A brief reference to these important provisions will be helpful although the terminology has now been altered by CPR 1998, r 25.1 which gives courts powers to make interim remedies.2 The Mareva injunction is referred to as a ‘freezing order’ and an Anton Piller order is now referred to as a ‘search order’ under s 7 of the Civil Procedure Act 1997. See: S Gee Commercial Injunctions (6th edn). See Parker v CS Structured Credit Fund [2003] 1 WLR 1680 and JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank v Pugachev [2015] EWCA Civ 139, [2016] 1 WLR 160.

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Freezing orders (Mareva injunctions) 11.117  A Mareva injunction originally restrained defendants from removing or disposing out of the jurisdiction moneys standing to the credit of defendants in a London bank until trial of the action or further order. The principle of the

Litigation and information   949 case was extended so that an interim injunction may be awarded to a plaintiff with a proper claim in any case where there is a basis for fearing that assets may be transferred abroad or concealed in this country thereby defeating justice. Parliament upheld this extension in s 37(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981. The jurisdiction of the court must be ‘swift and secret’, ie ex parte (without notice).1 Disclosure orders may be made in support of a freezing order in requiring, eg, a bank to disclose information on its customers.2 See Flightwise Travel Services Ltd v Gill [2003] EWHC 3082 on safeguards for respondents in the ex parte process. 2 A  v C  [1981]  QB  956n. See Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc [2004] 2  All ER 789: extent, if any, of duty of care owed by bank to party who served a freezing order re a customer’s account; the Court of Appeal held that a duty of care does exist between the bank and the claimant for the freezing order: [2004] EWCA Civ 1555, a decision that was subsequently overturned by the House of Lords [2006] UKHL 28, [2007] 1 AC 181. 1

Search orders (Anton Piller orders) 11.118  Anton Piller orders (APOs) were put onto a statutory basis by the Civil Procedure Act 1997. The High Court has an inherent power to make an order for the detention or preservation of the subject-matter of a cause and of documents and articles relating thereto. This is in addition to any other powers. 11.119  Very often what was authorised was entry, search and seizure but it operated by way of a court order against the defendant requiring him to allow entry and search.1 Authority is now based in Civil Procedure Act 1997, s 7 which in no way reduces or restricts the jurisdiction formerly exercised under APOs.2 The application may be made ex parte (without notice) where there is a danger that notice to the other party will bring about the destruction of incriminating materials – usually in breach of copyright or patent or where they have been used to ‘pass off’ the plaintiff’s goods. The court, in such a case, will sit in camera. An application for an APO requires full disclosure by the applicant. Omission of material matter in the application is usually fatal.3 The courts have introduced strict controls.4 The court should not make an APO where it will force the defendant to allow access to, or answer questions on, incriminating matter where the rule against self-incrimination has not been abolished by statute.5 Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd [1976] 1 All ER 779, CA. The award is a serious matter, and in employment breach of confidence cases it may be more appropriate to order delivery up or preservation of documents, or that the former employer be allowed to make copies rather than an APO: Lock International plc v Beswick [1989] 3 All ER 373. 2 See Practice Direction 25A on search orders and freezing injunctions, available at: https://www. justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part25/pd_part25a. 3 Thermax Ltd v Schott Industrial Glass Ltd [1981]  FSR  289; Gallery Cosmetics Ltd v Number 1 [1981] FSR 556; O’Regan v Iambic Productions Ltd [1989] NLJR 1378. 4 Columbia Picture Industries Inc v Robinson [1987] Ch  38; Universal Thermosensors Ltd v Hibben [1992] FSR 361 though see Memory Corpn plc v Sidhu (1999) Times, 31 May. 5 Rank Film Distributors Ltd v Video Information Centre [1980] 2  All ER  273; Garvin v Domus Publishing Ltd [1989] 2  All ER  344; Tate Access Floors Inc v Boswell [1991] Ch  512; AT&T  Istel v Tully [1993] AC 45, HL, and Civil Procedure Act 1997, s 7(7). On the potential abolition by statute (in this case Senior Courts Act 1981, s  72), see Phillips v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 48, [2012] 2 WLR 848. 1

950  Chapter 11 11.120  There are safeguards which may be employed in the award of an APO, and in particular their use at a time when search warrants are being exercised in relation to the same property.1 See Chappell v United Kingdom [1989] FSR 617 and Art 8 ECHR. Chappell ruled that APOs were not in appropriate cases in breach of Art 8 ECHR.

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PROCEEDS OF CRIME ACT 2002 11.121  Under Part 8 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, which concerns the tracing of proceeds of crime and investigation of money laundering, a production order may be served on individuals as set out in s 345,1 together with search and seizure warrants, orders relating to computer information, disclosure orders, customer (of banks) information orders and account monitoring orders are all made to the appropriate court: the High Court in civil recovery matters and Crown Court judges for confiscation or money laundering investigations. These provisions build on powers relating to drugs trafficking and terrorist offences (see para 11.105 above). Though it is not possible for such an order to require immediate production of such documents other than in exceptional circumstances. Ordinarily the ‘7-day rule’ in s 345(5) should be adhered to. See R (on the application of Chatwani) v National Crime Agency [2015] EWHC 1284 (Admin), [2015] Lloyd’s Rep FC 473.

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EUROPEAN LAW 11.122  First of all, it is relevant to note that the European Commission has extensive powers to gather information and institute proceedings in cases of failure to fulfil an obligation under the Treaty. 11.123  Power to gather information is provided in a general form in Art 337 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), as well as in more specific provisions of the Treaty and Community Acts.1 The Commission has to be able to collect all necessary information and ‘carry out any checks required for the performance of the tasks entrusted to it’. Although no general implementing provisions have been laid down by the Council, the obligation imposed upon the member states to ‘facilitate the achievement of the community’s tasks’ (TFEU, Art 4(3)) should provide the necessary legal means for the Commission to obtain all the required data.2 The Commission also adopts its own rules of practice in relation to complaints about its investigations which have featured frequently before the EU Ombudsman. Eg TFEU, Arts 108(3) and 337. And see reg 17, Arts 4 and 5: reg 17 was the first Regulation to implement Arts 101 and 102 on competition. 2 See Case 118/85 Re AAMS: EC Commission v Italy [1988] 3 CMLR 255. 1

11.124  Where the Commission believes a member state has not fulfilled Community obligations the Commission has to remind the government in question of its legal duties,1 invite the state to take the necessary measures or

Litigation and information   951 to submit its own observations, all within a two-month period unless the matter is one of urgency. A  reasoned opinion will follow from the Commission if no comments are forthcoming, or those that are unconvincing. Non-compliance by the member state may result in the Commission bringing proceedings before the Court of Justice. The court may require the member state ‘to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment’ when it finds that the member state has failed to fulfil its obligations. Additional powers were added by the Maastricht Treaty and are retained by the Treaty of Lisbon.2 The Commission may bring the matter back before the court if it feels there has been non-compliance with the judgment of the court and after it has afforded the state the opportunity to submit its observations and has issued a reasoned opinion specifying the points on which the member state has not complied with the judgment. The Commission may specify an amount of a lump-sum or penalty payment which it considers appropriate. Where the court finds non-compliance with its judgment, it may impose a lump sum or penalty payment on the MS. TFEU, Art 158. TFEU, Art 160.

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Competition investigations 11.125  The Commission has important powers relating to informationgathering and investigation of infringements of TFEU, Arts 101 and 102 concerning competition. Of particular relevance are the provisions of Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 (OJ  L  1/1) on the implementation of the rules of competition laid down in Arts 101 and 102.1 NB the powers of the Competition and Markets Authority under English law: and Competition Act 1998 and under EU provisions: SI 2014/458. See N Khan EU Antitrust Procedure (6th edn, 2012).

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11.126  This Regulation empowers the Commission to undertake all necessary investigations into alleged breaches of Arts 101 and 102  EC by undertakings and associations of undertakings. Of crucial significance is the new emphasis on cooperation between the Commission and national competition authorities and national courts forming a ‘network of public authorities’ applying Community competition rules in close cooperation (recital 15). Emphasis is placed on sharing of information, including confidential information by national authorities (Art 12) and while the regime will have to be a decentralised one relying on national bodies, Art 16 makes provision for the uniform application of Community law. Powers of investigation are contained in Part V  of the Regulation. The investigation powers of the Commission are considerable and include power to enter private premises subject to judicial authorisation and the Commission may request national authorities to carry out investigations in accordance with national law. Every investigative act has to obey the principle of proportionality (Art 20(8)). But Regulation 1/2003 does not contain the right to remain silent.1 If the information is not supplied within the requisite period, or is incorrect or misleading, the Commission must require that it is supplied by decision. There are penalties where there is non-compliance and a decision may be reviewed in

952  Chapter 11 the CFI. Article 27 covers hearings for interested parties into matters on which the Commission has taken objection. Commission decisions must be based on matters on which parties have been allowed to comment. Rights of defence and a right of access to the Commission file shall be respected. This will not cover ‘confidential files’ of member states or the Commission, nor correspondence passing between the Commission and member states, or between member states. Access is not allowed to information relating to the legitimate interest of other undertakings in protecting their business secrets. ‘Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the Commission from disclosing and using information necessary to prove an infringement (Art 27(2)).’ Other persons may be heard and those with a ‘sufficient interest’ will be heard. Article  27(4) concerns summaries of cases where the Commission decides where it adopts a decision pursuant to Art 9 or 10, and interested parties may submit comments. See Case C-374/87 Orkem SA  v EC  Commission [1989]  ECR  3283 and Case T-112/98 Mannesmannrohren-Werke AG  v EC  Commission [2001]  ECR II-729. The first case maintained a right to refuse self-incriminating questions. The second case partially upheld such a right of ‘defence’ but refused to hold that Art 6 ECHR was breached, Cf under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Art 48(2), although this does not specifically aver to the right to remain silent.

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11.127  Where an undertaking has insisted that the Commission obtain a national warrant before gaining entry, they were subsequently fined by the Commission, which obtained the warrant, for non-compliance with the original order allowing a ‘dawn entry’. The ECJ ruled that the Commission had not exceeded their powers.1 The new regulation makes more specific provision for cooperative investigations (above). Trade secrets obtained should not be divulged as has been seen above, but note Art 27(4).2 Access to the file should be allowed, subject to protection of commercial secrets and confidential items as outlined above, to enable the person to whom objections are addressed to express their views on the Commission’s conclusions.3 Hoechst v Commission [1989] ECR 2859. AKZO Chemie BV v Commission [1986] ECR 1965; see also Hilti AG v Commission [1990] ECR II-163. 3 ICI v Commission [1995] ECR II-1487; and see Commission’s Access to the File Notice [2005] OJ C325/7. Access to the file has proved to be a problematic issue and the ECJ has found that access may be refused where disclosure could have a negative impact on competition investigations. See eg Case C-139/07 P Commission v TGI [2010] ECR I-5885 and C-477/10 P European Commission v Agrofert Holding [2012] 5 CMLR 9. See Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt [2011] 5  CMLR  7, which perhaps takes a more permissive approach to the release of the file and particularly details of leniency proceedings to the public in order for civil proceedings to be considered, though release is ultimately left to the discretion of national courts. 1 2

11.128  The Regulation respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles established in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and now contained in the draft EU constitution. One difficult issue has concerned legal privilege. In A  M  & S  Ltd v EC  Commission1 the European Court held that the former Regulation 17 (the precursor to Regulation 1/2003) protects the confidentiality of written communications between lawyer and client provided they are for the client’s defence and emanate from independent rather than ‘in-house’ employed lawyers; the member state in which the lawyer resides is immaterial provided the

Litigation and information   953 lawyer is entitled to practise in any one of the member states. The protection covers all written communications exchanged after the initiation of the administrative procedure under Regulation 17 which might lead to a decision on the application of Arts 101 and 102 of the EC Treaty or to a decision imposing a financial penalty on the undertaking. The protection extends to earlier written communications which were related to the subject-matter of that procedure. The crucial distinction between ‘independent’ lawyers and ‘in-house’ lawyers who are employees of the undertaking under investigation is not a distinction drawn in English law (see paras 11.89 et seq above). The CFI issued an injunction to prevent use by the Commission of documents seized by the Commission and which dealt with in-house legal communications. The president of the CFI accepted at the time the injunction was issued that it may be time to extend LPP to written communications between a company and its in-house lawyers and that internal documents prepared for the purpose of seeking external advice may be privileged. Ultimately, the CFI decided that privilege did not extend to in-house lawyers and this decision was upheld by the ECJ.2 It was seen above how the English courts had sought to confine the parameters of LPP where legal advice was given but how these attempts were overruled by the House of Lords (paras 11.89 et seq above). Case 155/79 [1983] 1 All ER 705. Case T-125/03 Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Akcros Chemicals Ltd v Commission [2007] ECR II3523, affirmed by the ECJ in Case C-550/07 P [2010] ECR I-5885.

1 2

11.129  Where such a privilege is claimed, the undertaking is nevertheless required to provide the Commission’s authorised agents with relevant material demonstrating that the communications fulfilled the conditions for being granted legal protection, although it is not bound to reveal the contents of the communications in question. If dissatisfied, the Commission could order production under Art 18(4) of Regulation 1/2003 and could order financial penalties for non-compliance. The undertaking would then have to bring an action in the Court of Justice to see whether the documents were protected. The operation of the Commission’s decision could be suspended.1 TFEU, Art 278. See the recent decision of the CJEU in Case C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement AG v European Commission [2016] 4 CMLR 28 for consideration of the necessity for reasoning on the part of the Commission to support a demand for production of documents.

1

11.130  The English Court of Appeal has decided that communications to the European Commission are not protected by absolute privilege in English law1 as the Commission does not operate as a court of law but as an administrative body, even though its decisions are enforceable by the High Court under CPR Part 74.2 Nor is the communication protected by Art 28 of Regulation 1/2003. This protects the secrecy of information that the Commission has received by the application, or at least the threat of the application, of its compulsory powers to obtain information and conduct inquiries. Article 20 could not cover information obtained under Art 5 which concerns information volunteered by way, inter alia, of making complaint. Under Art 28, total secrecy cannot be maintained. However, a majority of the Court of Appeal held that, on the facts, the communication in question – a letter – was protected by public interest immunity.3

954  Chapter 11 They may attract qualified privilege. On the protection of documents communicated by the Commission to national courts, see Emerald Supplies Ltd v British Airways Plc [2015] EWCA Civ 1024, [2016] Bus LR 145. 2 Hasselblad (GB) Ltd v Orbinson [1985] 1  All ER  173. See AKZO case (53/85) [1987] 1 CMLR 231 ECJ on the care in communicating information to a complainant. An independent hearing officer is appointed by the Commission. 3 Hasselblad above. 1

11.131  Elsewhere the European Court has ruled that there is very limited scope for obtaining interim discovery of documents in the possession of the Commission. Circumstances would have to be ‘exceptional’ to allow such discovery. An argument that the documents – concerning an investigation into non-EEC imports – were required urgently was based upon ‘the risk of alteration or concealment of relevant documents’ by the Commission. The court would not permit such arguments to be sustained, which cast doubt on the good faith of the Commission, without supporting evidence.1 The discussion in ch  5 on the Regulation on Access to Council, Commission and Parliament’s Documents should be recalled.2 Epikhiriseon MVKN AE v EC Council and Commission [1987] 1 CMLR 57; Greece v EC Council and Commission [1988] 3 CMLR 728. 2 See paras 5.18 et seq above and Regulation (EC) 1049/2001. 1

Proceedings before the Court of Justice of the European Union1 11.132  The rules of procedure before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) for direct actions are contained in a Protocol on the statute of the Court of Justice of the EC annexed to the EU and TFEU Treaties, as well as the rules of procedure which the court adopts after the unanimous approval of the Council. The procedure of the General Court, which commenced activities in 1989 as the Court of First Instance and was renamed the General Court in 2009, is very close to that of the CJEU although it has some special features. Lenaerts et al EU Procedural Law (2014).

1

11.133  Procedure in direct actions is commenced by a submission to the court of a written application to the Registrar – the Registrar serves the application on the defendant. The standards and rules contain a variety of requirements on form, content and accompanying documents.1 The application must state the grounds on which it is based, both facts and legal arguments in detail, as fresh issues in the course of the proceedings may not be raised unless they relate to matters of law or fact emerging in the written procedure.2 An address for service in Luxembourg must be provided and the applicant’s lawyer must file a certificate of his entitlement to practise before the courts of a member state. The application is notified to the defendant by the Registrar and the defendant must file a defence within two months.3 The President of the Court assigns the case to one of the Chambers. A judge-rapporteur is chosen along with an advocate-general. Time-limits for pleadings are fixed by the president of the court. Before these written proceedings are closed the court may4 decide to prescribe ‘measures of inquiry’5 for the case which could involve interrogation

Litigation and information   955 of the parties, the hearing of witnesses6 or requests for information. This is known as the investigation or preparatory inquiry. These rarely occur. The CJEU may decide at its administrative meeting at the prompting of the judgerapporteur to seek answers to questions from the parties or the Commission either in writing or at the oral hearings or to produce documents or evidence for the court. Information added to the court file in the course of the preparatory inquiry or after the questions described above must be made freely available to the parties who have the right to respond to its contents. The date for the oral procedure is fixed by the President of the court although this may in certain cases be dispensed with. 3 4 5 6 1 2

See the statute, and rules: Art 57 et seq. Rules: Art 127. Rules: Art 124(1). At the prompting of the judge-rapporteur or advocate-general. See Rules: Arts 63–75. Statute, Arts 26–30 and the rules on measures of inquiry noted above. Witnesses may be heard on oath.

11.134  Where a preliminary ruling is made under TFEU, Art 267, the parties, the member states, the Commission and the Council and European Parliament (where measure jointly adopted by Council and the EP) – who all have a copy of the notice of reference sent to them1 – may submit to the court statements of case or written observations. The procedure is designed not to settle disputes but to provide consistent and uniform interpretation of EU law. Council only when a Council measure involved; European Central Bank likewise. See generally Rules, Arts 96–97 .

1

11.135  Member states and Community institutions, as well as other parties who can establish an interest in the decision of a case, may intervene in cases before the ECJ.1 They have to provide contentions tending to sustain or deny the contentions of one of the parties to the principal dispute, the supporting evidence and an election of domicile.2 Statute, Art 40. Statute, Art 18(4), Rules: Arts 55–62.

1 2

11.136  After the written procedure there is an oral procedure consisting of reports by the judge-rapporteur, the opinion of the advocate-general and legal submissions at the hearing, if any, of witnesses and experts. Cross-examination as practised in English courts is not allowed. Judgment follows later. Hearings are in public but may be in camera where the Court decides otherwise for ‘serious reasons’.1 Deliberations are, and shall remain, secret. The judgment is that of the Court without dissenting judgments. Judgments must state the reasons on which they are based.2 The language of the case is that of the national court making the reference under Art 267 TFEU although a member state’s submissions and the opinion of the advocate-general are in their own language.3 In direct actions the applicant has choice of language but where a defendant is a member state or an individual or corporation with the nationality of that state, the official language of that state is chosen. However, questions may be put in any language by a

956  Chapter 11 member of the court and there is simultaneous translation. The deliberations in secret are in French. Applications for interim relief may be made in writing to the President, who may refer the matter, exceptionally, to the whole court: see Top Hit Holzvertrieb GmbH  v EC  Commission: 378/87R [1988] 2  CMLR  594; see Greece v EC  Council and Commission para  110.131, note 1 above. On interim relief, see Zuckerfabrik Case C-143/88 [1991] ECR I–415, Atlanta Bananas Case C-465/93 [1995] ECR I–3761, and R v Secretary of State for Health, ex p Imperial Tobacco Ltd [2001] 1 All ER 850, HL. 2 Statute, Art 36. 3 Rules, Art 37. 1

11.137  On judicial review applications involving EC institutions an application shall be accompanied, where appropriate, by the measure for which annulment is sought or, if under Art 265 TFEU, with documentary evidence of the date on which the relevant institution was requested to act. 11.138  Generally, the court is liberal in construing the grounds of an application1 and the Registrar will ask parties to put documents into proper order. J Nold KG v EC Commission: 4/73 [1974] 2 CMLR 338.

1

Chapter 12

The National Audit Office and the Comptroller and Auditor General

Follow the money. 12.1  Society has, from time immemorial, had to rely upon the state and its officials, or those acting under the authority of, or in co-operation with the state, to investigate aspects of behaviour affecting the public weal. Powers of informationgathering accompany, obviously enough, investigatory powers. Examples include those relating to the police investigation of crime under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, the Police Act 1997, the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001,1 the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (as amended by the Serious Crime Act 2015 and the Criminal Finances Act 2017), the Policing and Crime Act 2009 on proceeds of crime (Part 5) and safeguarding vulnerable groups (Part 8 – see paras 2.332 et seq), the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 and the Crime and Security Act 2010, which was heavily amended by the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, prevention of terrorism,2 collection of income tax,3  VAT,4 customs and excise,5 financial regulation,6 investigation of serious fraud,7 or activities or practices damaging competition8 and hundreds of other regulatory responsibilities of the modern state. These powers include investigation into companies under the Companies Act 1985, ss  432 and 442 and the Companies Act 2006, Part 32 and Part 22 on disclosure of information about shareholdings.9 The international dimension is witnessed by the Crime (International Co-operation) Act 2003. Contemporary instances include modern slavery under the Modern Slavery Act 2015, s 52, and duties to supply information to state authorities under the Energy Act 2016 and the Immigration Act 2016. This book has in reality provided a catalogue of such activities. Under the Digital Economy Act 2017, Part 5, Chapter 3, the government is seeking to help manage debts owed to the public sector more effectively. The

958  Chapter 12 Act creates a new gateway enabling information to be shared between specified persons, listed in a Schedule to the Act, in relation to debt owed to public authorities or the Crown. This attempts to improve efficiency in dealing with debt owed to the public sector. The objective is to use effective data-sharing to obtain a more informed view of a customer’s individual circumstances as well as their ability to pay. Each proposed data-sharing arrangement under this power will be subject to a pilot process which will be set out in a statutory code of practice to measure the effectiveness of the information-sharing. Various government agencies investigate to detect and prevent fraudulent activity against the public sector. The 2017 Act (in Part 5, Chapter 3) enables bodies listed in a Schedule to the Act to share information (data sharing) with a view to taking action in respect of fraud against a public authority. They will also be subject to a pilot process, which the government hopes will allow new methods of information-sharing to be trialled and measured for effectiveness. ‘It is intended that more effective data-sharing in this area will make it easier, for example, to spot conflicting information across different public services that could suggest patterns of fraud for further investigation by officials’ (taken from the ExN for the 2017 Act).10 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, ss 8–16 and Sch 1, Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001; Police Act 1997, Part III; Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (as amended) – see R (UMBS Online Ltd) v SOCA [2007] EWCA Civ 406.  2 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, s  17 and Sch  7; Prevention of Terrorism (Additional Powers) Act 1996; Terrorism Act 2000, ss  19, 20, 38, 39, 57, 58, 87, 88, 103 and 104, Schs 5, 6; and Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (see para  2.339 above), Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, Terrorism Act 2006, Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, Terrorist Asset Freezing etc Act 2010 and Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. See R v G  [2009]  UKHL  13 and R  v Muhammed (Sultan) [2010]  EWCA  Crim 227 on Terrorism Act 2000, ss  57, 58. The Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill 2017–19 has various online offences including viewing terrorist material on more than three occasions which have drawn journalistic and academic criticism: Human Rights Joint Committee Ninth Report HC 1208 and HL 167 (2017–19).  3 Eg Taxes Management Act 1970, ss 20 and 51; Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988; Finance Act 1989, ss 142–148 and Pt II, ch IV generally; and see paras 2.337 et seq above. NB savings from another EU member state: SI 2003/3297 (Finance Act 2003, s 199 and Council Directive 2003/48/EC (OJ L 157/38)). On disclosure by advisers relating to tax avoidance schemes, see Finance Act 2004, ss  306–319; and SI  2004/1863, as amended and relaxed, after consultation, by SI 2004/2420 and Finance (No 2) Act 2005, s 6 and Sch 1, Income Taxes Act 2007, Finance Act 2007, Part 6, Finance Act 2008, Part 7, ch  1 and Schs 36, 37 and 38, Finance Act 2009, s 92 on the HMRC charter, s 94–98 and Schs 47 and 48, Finance Act 2010, s 56 and Sch 17, Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act 2010, s 129, Finance Act 2011, Sch 23 and powers to obtain bulk data, Finance Act 2016, Parts 10 and 11 on tax evasion and avoidance and administration and data-gathering powers; Finance (No  2) Act 2017, s  67 and Sch  18 on requirement to correct income from overseas involving multi-national co-operation. On a consultation to increase powers to obtain information from third parties on taxable payments, see https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_ data/file/724048/Amending_HMRC_s_Civil_Information_Powers_consultation_document.pdf (13/07/2018); see House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee The Powers of HMRC: Treating Taxpayers Fairly HL 242 (2017–19).  4 Value Added Tax Act 1983 and 1994.  5 Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 and Commissioners for Customs and Revenue Act 2005.  6 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, heavily amended by the Financial Services Act 2012. The Financial Services Authority was prepared to use statutory powers to compel production of  1

The National Audit Office and the Comptroller and Auditor General   959



 7



 8



 9



10

information as a matter of course instead of relying upon voluntary arrangements: (2003) New LJ 1856. It has been replaced by the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority under the 2012 Act and see Bank of England and Financial Services Act 2016. The Treasury may issue recommendations to the FCA under Part 2 of the 2016 Act. Criminal Justice Act 1987, ss 2 and 3: see R (EFT Ltd) v Bow Street Magistrates’ Court [2005] 4 All ER 285 (CA). See R (Kent Pharmaceuticals Ltd) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office [2005] 1 All ER 449 (CA) on Art 8 ECHR and CJA 1987, s 3(5) disclosure by the SFO of documents seized under search warrants to other government departments (to pursue legal proceedings against the owners of documents). Disclosure was in accordance with the law for the purposes of Art 8(2) ECHR but required fairness and absent good reasons informing the owner of the goods. No prejudice had been caused by not informing the owner. See on CJA 1987, s 1(3) and HRA compliance: Bermingham and Others v Government of USA [2006] EWHC 200. See PACE 1984, ss 19, 20. Competition Act 1998, Enterprise Act 2002 and Financial Services Act 2012; Companies Act 1989, ss 85, 146–153; Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013. Inspectors have no power to require those investigated to sign confidentiality undertakings under Companies Act 1985, s 434: Re an Inquiry into Mirror Group Newspapers plc [1999] 2 All ER 641. Under s 356(6) of the 1985 Act the court may compel an immediate inspection of the register and index of company members: the court has a discretion: P v F Ltd (2001) New LJ 1284. See also Insolvency Act 1986, s 236 and a power of the official receiver to obtain information from any person relating to the officers of a company: In re Pantmaenog Timber Co Ltd [2003] 4 All ER 18 (HL). See Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004 on auditing of accounts and investigations. Companies Act 1985, s 447 is replaced by s 1 of the 2004 Act; and see s 24 of the 2004 Act and the Companies Act 2006 in the text. On data matching to prevent fraud, see Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014, s 33 and Sch 9.

12.2  In ch 6 there was an examination of the audit regime introduced by the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014. The Act (in s 1) abolished the Audit Commission (AC) and its powers and duties in relation to local government. The Commission’s powers had been extended to cover a wider range of educational bodies.1 Under the National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990 the AC’s work had been extended to include national health service bodies.2 The Local Audit (Public Access to Documents) Act 2017 extended access rights to journalists and ‘citizen journalists’ (paras 9.11 et seq above on inspection of the accounts). The Public Audit (Wales) Act 2004 makes provision for the Welsh Assembly, bodies supervised by the Assembly and local government in Wales. By Education Reform Act 1988, s 220; see now Audit Commission Act 1998, s 36. The legislation is now consolidated in the Audit Commission Act 1998 as amended.

1 2

12.3  It will be instructive to describe the provisions of the National Audit Act 1983 (NAA 1983). It provides one of the most successful instruments to inform Parliament – through the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) – and the public of the delivery, impact and expenditure of government programmes. A  brief description of fiscal transparency will be given. 12.4  The state of the economy and government fiscal and monetary and spending plans are announced in the Budget. In 2016, the Chancellor announced that the Budget would be announced in the autumn. These follow budgetary preparations in departments that began in the previous year and which are developed on a three-year forward planning schedule. From Spring 2018, an annual Spring Statement will accompany an updated economic and fiscal forecast from the Office for Budget Responsibility (below). The Chancellor will

960  Chapter 12 not make significant tax or spending announcements at the Spring Statement, unless the economic circumstances require it. Reforms have taken place since the 1980s so that plans for spending and taxation are now aligned. A single autumn Budget will mean tax changes are announced well in advance of the start of the tax year in which they will take effect. The government expected this would give more time for scrutiny and consultation on proposals at the time of the Spring Statement.1 The government believed the new timetable would introduce ‘a more open, considered and professional approach’ to expenditure and taxation. Events may prevent full consultation on all items. More information is published through Tax Information and Impact Notes to explain policy objectives. Most policies will be announced at least 16 months before the tax year in which they are introduced. The government intends to use the Spring Statement to examine issues and options before measures are confirmed in the autumn Budget. The cycle is set out below.

2017

Finance Bill 2018–19 Autumn

Summer Budget 2018

Winter Spring 2019

Initial consultation

Spring Statement 2018 Publish draft clauses

Autumn

Spring Statement 2019

Budget 2019

Winter Spring

Final announcement

Announce measures

Introduce FB 2018–19

Policy consultation

Royal Assent FB 2018–19 Publish draft clauses

Summer Autumn

2020

Announce measures Policy consultation

Winter Spring

2018

Budget 2017

Finance Bill 2019–20

Final announcement Introduce FB 2019–20

Spring Statement 2020

Royal Assent FB 2019–20

The Budget does not cover all public spending. Parliament does not vote on all expenditure although the publication of ‘Whole of government accounts’ has given a more comprehensive picture.2 Parliament has no formal control over borrowing. There have been over a dozen fiscal rules since 1997, only two of which have definitively been met.3 The Office for Budget Responsibility (below) reports on the overall financial picture. The Fiscal Responsibility Act 2010 imposed a variety of duties on the Treasury to secure sound public finances. The Act also introduced Commons votes for some aspects of borrowing by government. The Act was repealed by the Budget Responsibility and National Audit Act 2011, which repealed many reforms of the Labour government. For

The National Audit Office and the Comptroller and Auditor General   961 their part, departments must prepare their estimates (money required), publish their accounts and publish further details in annual reports. Estimates and government publications in the financial cycle have improved the clarity, quality and accessibility of information about expenditure plans. The public expenditure statistical analyses provide information on departmental expenditure and are published annually.4 The Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 also introduced a requirement for greater amounts of information on departmental bodies as well as departments themselves in the estimates. The New Budget Timetable HM  Treasury (2017) https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ the-new-budget-timetable-and-the-tax-policy-making-process/the-new-budget-timetable-andthe-tax-policy-making-process (18/05/2018). A  Tax Consultation Framework was published in 2011. An independent Office of Tax Simplification was placed on a statutory basis in the Finance Act 2016. 2 https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/whole-of-government-accounts#publications (21/05/2018). See Committee of Public Accounts HC 463 (2017–19). 3 The rules have been summarised at Treasury Committee HC 600 (2017–19), para 48. 4 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/630570/60243_PESA_Accessible.pdf (31/05/2018). 1

12.5  The incoming government in 2010 focused much of its criticism of the preceding government on its failure to manage the economy and monetary and fiscal policy in a transparent and effective manner. To this end, the Budget Responsibility and National Audit Act 2011, Part I  established an independent Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) (see s 3 and Sch 1). Under s 2 the Treasury has to produce budget documents. The OBR was established initially on a nonstatutory basis in 2010. It will be led by a three-person committee appointed by the Chancellor with at least two non-executive members. It is the duty of the OBR under s 4 to examine and report on the sustainability of the public finances. The OBR must, on at least two occasions for each financial year, prepare: ‘(3) (a) fiscal and economic forecasts, and (b) an assessment of the extent to which the fiscal mandate has been, or is likely to be, achieved. (4) It must also, on at least one occasion for each financial year, prepare– (a) an assessment of the accuracy of fiscal and economic forecasts previously prepared by it, and (b) an analysis of the sustainability of the public finances. (5) Any forecast, assessment or analysis prepared by the Office under subsection (3) or (4) must be included in a report. (6) Any report which the Office makes in pursuance of its duty under this section must include an explanation of the factors which the Office took into account when preparing the report, including (in particular)– (a) the main assumptions made by the Office, and (b) the main risks which the Office considered to be relevant.’ 12.6  The OBR has complete discretion on how it exercises its duty under s 4, but it is subject to the requirements of objectivity, transparency and impartiality.

962  Chapter 12 It must have regard to relevant government policies but must not consider alternatives. The Treasury is to produce a charter on budget responsibility under s  1 and this may contain guidance for the OBR.1 The Charter may include guidance to the OBR about how it should perform its duty under s 4, including (in particular) guidance about the time at which it is to prepare any forecast, assessment or analysis required to be prepared under s 4(3) or (4). But the Charter must not make provision about the methods by which the OBR is to make any such forecast, assessment or analysis. The OBR must, in the performance of its duty under s 4, act consistently with any guidance included in the Charter by virtue of s 4. If the Treasury proposes to modify the guidance included in the Charter, a draft of the modified guidance must be published at least 28 days before the modified Charter is laid before Parliament under s 1(6). OBR reports must be published, laid before Parliament and sent to the Treasury. The OBR has a right of access (at any reasonable time) to all government information which it may reasonably require for the purpose of the performance of its duty under s 4. The OBR is entitled to require from any person holding or accountable for any government information any assistance or explanation which the OBR reasonably thinks necessary for that purpose. ‘Government information’ means information held by any Minister of the Crown or government department. The section is subject to any enactment or rule of law which operates to prohibit or restrict the disclosure of information or the giving of any assistance or explanation. Charter for Budget Responsibility HM  Treasury (April 2011). The OBR’s publications are found at: http://obr.uk/publications/ (21/05/2018) including the Charter, framework document and memorandum of understanding. On the growth of analogues to OBR and encouragement of fiscal responsibility, see C  Viney & T  Poole ‘Independent Fiscal Institutions in Comparative Constitutional Perspective’ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 12/2018.

1

THE NATIONAL AUDIT ACT 1983 12.7  The NAA  1983 established the manner in which the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) will be appointed.1 The CAG is an officer of the House of Commons. The CAG is given, subject to statutory duties, ‘complete discretion in the discharge of his functions and, in particular, in determining whether to carry out any examination under Part II of the Act.2 Section 3 established the National Audit Office (NAO) with the CAG at the head of a staff of approximately 800 persons (2011: 900) working in London and Newcastle. Spending oversight in the UK is performed by Audit Scotland, Wales Audit Office and Northern Ireland Audit Office. The CAG is given the power to charge audit fees (s 5(1), heavily amended by the 2011 Act, s 29 and Sch 5, para 13(i)(a)) which will be paid to the NAO and into the Consolidated Fund.3 There are limitations on his ability to charge fees.4 The Budget Responsibility and National Audit Act 2011 makes further provision in relation to the Comptroller and Auditor General, who is to be appointed for one term of ten years, and the NAO, which is to be a body corporate distinct from the CAG. NAA 1983, s 1, and see Exchequer and Audit Departments Act 1866, s 6. This is by the Crown on the advice of the Prime Minister whose recommendation must be supported by the Chair of the PAC who, by convention, is a member of the opposition. 2 NAA 1983, s 1(3). 1

The National Audit Office and the Comptroller and Auditor General   963 https://www.nao.org.uk/freedom-of-information/wp-content/uploads/sites/13/2013/03/Code_ of_Practice_Spring_2012.pdf (18/05/2018). 4 Ibid, paras 9 and 10. 3

12.8  NAA  1983, s  6 empowers the CAG to carry out examinations into the economy, efficiency and effectiveness1 with which any department, authority or other body to which the section applies has used its resources in discharging its functions. These are ‘value for money’ (VFM) audits2 and are considerably wider than a traditional commercial audit in the private sector and exchequer or certification audits carried out by the CAG under the Exchequer and Audit Departments Acts 1866 and 1921. There are over 60 VFM audits per annum (68 in 2017). In deciding whether to carry out VFM audits the CAG must have regard to any proposals of the Public Accounts Committee. The CAG also conducts investigations (18 in 2017) in response to concerns raised by representations made to the NAO. It also undertakes international work and work for the EU. The 2011 Act requires the CAG to carry out his functions efficiently and cost-effectively. In 2010–11, there were three reports on government support to UK banks making ‘the level of government exposure transparent to the public and helping to focus parliamentary attention on the value for money delivered by government intervention. As steps are taken to make the banking system safer for the future,3 the NAO will continue to scrutinise and support value for money and transparency. In 2011–12 it plans to concentrate on accountability arrangements as government reforms take effect more generally. Exchequer reports on the audits of relevant bodies are made after the end of the financial year as part of the appropriation accounts. The CAG must be satisfied that expenditure is restricted to the purposes approved by Parliament and conforms to its governing authority. The CAG is not, however, empowered to chase public money wherever it is spent. Many nondepartmental public bodies and some local spending bodies are not audited by the CAG and private contractors performing tasks for public bodies within jurisdiction of the CAG are only subject to investigation if the parent authority agrees to incorporation of a term in the contract allowing access for the NAO. There is a good practice contract management framework.4 Since 2008, he has been the auditor to 48 public sector companies incorporated under the Companies Act. The CAG cannot disallow expenditure or formally stand in judgment on questions of legality. The auditor in local government lost powers of surcharge under the Local Government Act 2000 (LGA 2000) (see paras 9.11 et seq above). With the abolition of the Audit Commission the CAG has to prepare a code of practice under the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014, s 19 and Sch 6. The NAO can examine the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of central government expenditure for local government bodies (‘relevant bodies’ which does not include health service or chiefs of police) including provision of local services. A  new power allows the office to evaluate, comment upon and offer guidance to local bodies. The NAO has produced The NAO’s Role in Local Audit (2016). The CAG does supervise Treasury rules on expenditure, and Treasury consent for expenditure is frequently required. The Bank of England and Financial Services Act 2016, Part 1 mandates the CAG to conduct VFM examinations into Bank of England resources and prudential regulation.

964  Chapter 12 See Audit Commission Act 1998, s 5. See NAO Progress with VFM Savings and Lessons for Cost Reduction Programmes (2010). 3 Including the creation of the Financial Policy Committee of the Bank of England to act as an early warning system on banking activities and which will meet at least four times a year and whose proceedings will be published. There will also be a Prudential Regulatory Authority under the Bank to oversee insurers and deposit takers: see now Financial Services Act 2012. Andrew Tyrie, then chair of the Treasury Committee, criticised the governance procedures involving oversight by the nine-member Court of the Bank of England: Financial Times 22 June 2011.The Court’s directors, some witnesses said, did not have sufficient expertise to conduct appropriate inquiries for the purposes of accountability and did not order inquiries into banking failures in the past as at Northern Rock. See HM Treasury Cm 8083 (2011) A New Approach to Financial Regulation. The retail and investment businesses of banks are also to be ring-fenced and split. 4 https://www.nao.org.uk/report/good-practice-contract-management-framework-2-2/ (18/05/2018). 1 2

12.9  The NAO is the principal state audit body in the United Kingdom.1 The work of the NAO is scrutinised by the Public Accounts Commission, a committee of Parliament, which also appoints external auditors and approves its supply estimate (budget). The NAO has a management board with executive and non-executive members, committees and six clusters supported by networks of experts. The management structure and its objectives are set out in annual reports. There is the Auditor General for Scotland (AGS), supported by Audit Scotland. The AGS is responsible for auditing the expenditure of the Scottish Parliament and Executive and reporting to that Parliament. Audit Scotland is also responsible for local authority audit in Scotland. The existence of Public Audit (Wales) Act 2004 was dealt with in ch  6. The Comptroller and Auditor General for Northern Ireland and the Northern Ireland Audit Office operate in respect of the Northern Ireland Assembly (reporting to the Westminster Parliament when the Assembly was not in operation).

1

See IC DN FS50324495 where information was requested on changes to complaints investigations by the NAO.

12.10  In order to share good practice, the public audit bodies work as closely as possible together. A Public Audit Forum has been established ‘to act as a focus for developmental thinking on public audit’.1 http://www.public-audit-forum.org.uk/.

1

12.11  European Union expenditure in all EU member states is audited by the European Court of Auditors (ECA). The NAO describes itself acting ‘as a liaison point between the ECA and UK departments’. The Office also reports ‘regularly to Parliament on issues relating to the expenditure of EU funds in the UK, and on occasion, on wider issues of financial management within the European Union’ (www.nao.org.uk).

ECONOMY, EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS – THE ‘THREE ES’ 12.12  The Expenditure Committee in 1976–77 published the CAG’s own words on the ‘three Es’:1

The National Audit Office and the Comptroller and Auditor General   965 ‘Taking Government policy as given, a value for money audit covers the examination of the management of projects or programmes to bring to light any weaknesses in judgement, execution or control leading to wasteful, extravagant or unrewarding expenditure, or failure to maximise receipts … An efficiency audit thus takes a programme or project as given and examines whether it has been well or ill executed. An effectiveness audit [by contrast] attempts to assess how successful particular activities have been in meeting the Government’s objectives. This requires not only a clear statement of those objectives, but some means of measuring the degree of success in attaining them. It is also likely to involve questions of policy, an area which the CAG and his Department have over the years studiously avoided. But few boundary lines in public administration are completely clear cut, and to report as part of a value for money examination on the outcome of certain policies may carry a pretty clear implication that modifications might provide better financial results. Financial or economic criteria, though important, are not of course the only ones which the Government may wish to apply.’ HC 535 (1976–77) at p 584.

1

12.13  The former Treasury and Civil Service Committee (TCSC) (now the Treasury Committee) has produced a more developed account as follows:1 ‘The intention of a programme may be defined as its ultimate aim and it is likely to be stated in broad terms such as full employment, stable prices, the health or security of the nation. For the purpose of managing a particular programme such broad intentions must be translated into operational objectives. The steps towards such objectives should, where feasible, be quantified as targets. An efficient programme is one where the target is being achieved with the least possible use of resources and instruments. Similarly, on the way to achieving the target, the actual output of a programme should be secured with the least use of resources. An effective programme is one where the intention of the programme is being achieved. That implies that the intention, the operational objectives and the targets have been defined; that the targets adequately represent the objectives and the objectives the intention and that the outputs of the programme are equal to the target.’ HC 236 (1981–82), vol i, paras 51–52.

1

12.14  The TCSC’s model defines ‘efficiency’ to mean productive efficiency, ie securing the same output for a lesser use of resources. The evidence to the Expenditure Committee by the former CAG tends to obscure the distinction between productive efficiency and economy: the former refers to the same output for less use of resources, the latter the same output for less expenditure. 12.15  The NAO (www.nao.org.uk) describes the ‘three Es’ in the following terms: ‘– Economy: minimising the cost of resources used or required – spending less;

966  Chapter 12 – –

Efficiency: the relationship between the output from goods or services and the resources to produce them – spending well; and Effectiveness: the relationship between the intended and actual results of public spending – spending wisely.’

THE EXCLUSION OF POLICY 12.16  Section 6(2) of the NAA 1983 provides that nothing in s 6(1) shall entitle the CAG to question the merits of the policy objectives of any department, authority or body in respect of which an examination is carried out! It is a truism to suggest that the dividing line between policy and administration is a difficult one to locate. The implications of CAG reports may be devastating for government policies; but there must not be questioning of their merits in a VFM inquiry. The implementation of policy ‘and the assessment of the adequacy of the information on which both policy and implementation decisions are based, do fall within the NAO’s value for money remit’.1 Openly to criticise advice and appraisal may come too close to criticism of policy although VFM reports raise obvious questions about the merits of policy decisions. It is for others to pick up the cudgels such as departmental select committees (see para  4.119 above). White, Harden and Donnelly Public Law (1994) 526 at p 531.

1

12.17  NAA 1983, s 6 goes on to define the bodies within the CAG’s jurisdiction.1 Under s 7 the CAG, where the CAG has reasonable cause to believe that any authority or body to which the section applies has in any of its financial years received more than half its income from public funds, may carry out a VFM audit for the year in question. The s  6(2) provision concerning the merits of policy objectives, above, applies. This now includes ‘three Es’ examinations into ‘relevant bodies’ under the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014, s 2(1) with exceptions (above). Basically government departments, health authorities, those covered by statute and those subject to agreement between the body and a Minister. The Welsh ministers and National Assembly for Wales Commission are included.

1

12.18  The body concerned and the Treasury must be consulted. Section 6(5) defines what ‘money received from public funds’ means. 12.19  Under NAA 1983, s 8 the CAG has a right of access at all reasonable times to all such documents reasonably required for carrying out s  6 or s  7 examinations, together with such information and explanation from the holder of the document as are reasonably necessary. Special provisions have been inserted by virtue of the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014 and in relation to Welsh ministers and the Assembly. It does not apply to those documents not under the control of the department etc (NAA  1983, s  8(2)). However, if the CAG has no statutory right of access, then access has to be negotiated with the body.

The National Audit Office and the Comptroller and Auditor General   967

Pergau Dam 12.20  In the Pergau Dam affair, which concerned UK government expenditure for overseas development in Malaysia in order to assist British companies bid for overseas aid projects, the powers of the CAG to obtain information and the role of the departmental accounting officer – in large departments usually the Permanent Secretary – came under crucial scrutiny. A  consortium of British firms found that the cost of the Pergau Dam project would be about £316 million. The relevant department advising on such projects, the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) (which administers schemes jointly with the Department of Trade and Industry), advised that the project was ‘just about acceptable’. However, the cost was revised upwards to £417 million described by the ODA as ‘unequivocally bad … In economic terms’.1 The Accounting Officer reported his misgivings, stating the project should not be supported. He stated that he would require a ministerial direction before any expenditure could be incurred. This was forthcoming from the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs in consultation with the Prime Minister. The issue of such a direction was regarded as a matter of government policy which the CAG could not criticise on a VFM audit.2 Based on a NAO VFM report the PAC of the House of Commons made a critical report which attracted an enormous amount of attention and eventually litigation (see below). The duties of an Accounting Officer are contained in Accounting Officer Memorandum which is included in Government Accounting. Basically an Accounting Officer is under a duty to advise Ministers on all matters of financial propriety and regularity as well as ‘prudent and economical administration, efficiency and effectiveness’. As practice then existed at the time of the relevant events and overruling, the Accounting Officer was under a duty to inform the CAG where in his opinion he had formed the view that a Minister planned a course of action that contravened the requirements of propriety or regularity. Having duly informed the Minister in writing of his views, the Accounting Officer could then be formally overruled. Where the Minister decided to proceed with expenditure, the Accounting Officer should receive written instructions from the Minister and then inform the Treasury and send the papers to the CAG ‘without delay’. Where a matter fell within the wider remit of the ‘prudent and economical administration, efficiency and effectiveness’ provision, at the time in question the Accounting Officer had to advise the Minister and if overruled he should ensure that his advice and its overruling are clear from the papers. There is no duty to communicate this to the CAG or Treasury. Only where the CAG conducts a VFM inquiry was there a requirement to inform the CAG of the overruling. I draw on the article by White, Harden and Donnelly, para 12.16, note 1 above, for help on detail. HC 908 (1993–94), p 11.

1 2

12.21  The Accounting Officer in the Pergau affair informed the PAC that the expenditure fell under the heading of ‘prudent and economical administration, efficiency and effectiveness’. The duty to inform the Treasury and CAG did not arise and only occurred when the CAG decided to conduct a VFM inquiry. The PAC recommended that in all cases concerning a ministerial direction where a question of economical administration, efficiency and effectiveness are concerned,

968  Chapter 12 the Accounting Officer should be under a duty to inform the CAG and provide the relevant papers. The government accepted this recommendation.1 It would then be open to the CAG to report such matters to the PAC. Cm 2602.

1

12.22  In the Pergau Dam episode, a practice of marking documents as ‘Not for NAO Eyes’ emerged and in response to Parliamentary Questions it transpired that 1,500 documents had been so designated by departments investigated by the CAG. It has been stated that far from representing a ‘covert game plan to undermine the workings of the CAG’ the practice represents a working relationship between the CAG and government on access to documents.1 The formal legal provision allowing access is NAA  1983, s  8(1). This provides for access at ‘all reasonable times’ to all documents ‘as he may reasonably require’. For VFM inquiries, he may require persons holding or accountable for such documents to ‘give such information and explanation as are reasonably necessary’ for the inquiry. ‘Reasonable’ is a word of wide interpretation so the legal provision has been circumscribed as a practice, not a matter of law, by internal concordats and practice. The CAG has accepted limitations on his access to include: (1) Ministerial Private Office files, containing Cabinet or Cabinet Committee papers or minutes. (2) Files dealing with the conduct of business with the NAO or PAC ‘often classified “Not for NAO Eyes”’. These might otherwise be referred to as active files generated by an inquiry.2 White, Harden and Donnelly article, para 12.16, note 1 above. See, on internal audit, https://www.nao.org.uk/report/the-effectiveness-of-internal-audit-incentral-government/ (18/05/2018).

1 2

12.23  In the investigation into Pergau, the CAG obtained all necessary files. And in fact it was this information, together with other investigations before select committees, which produced so much evidence for the judicial review which sought, successfully, to establish that the expenditure was ultra vires. The ‘Not for NAO Eyes’ warning was dropped by the incoming Labour government in July 1997 with retrospective effect.1 The decision to provide overseas aid was ruled by the High Court to be ultra vires the Overseas Development and Cooperation Act 1980, s 1 which provided that the Secretary of State had ‘power, for the purpose of promoting the development or maintaining the economy of [an overseas] country or territory … or the welfare of its people, to furnish any person or body with assistance, whether financial, technical or of any other nature’.2 The applicants were a public interest organisation with national and international expertise and interest in promoting and protecting aid to underdeveloped nations. In a generous interpretation the court allowed the applicant locus standi but refused disclosure of minutes that were sought by the applicants even though the Secretary of State’s statements in affidavit were incomplete. These were amplified by a subsequent letter from the Secretary of State.3 The court ruled that the grant of aid was not for the purposes of economically sound development even though the Secretary of State was entitled to take into account broader political, economic, commercial and human rights aspects in his decision. He was not, however, entitled to take into consideration the political impossibility

The National Audit Office and the Comptroller and Auditor General   969 of withdrawing from a promise of aid to the Malaysian government in 1989. Without an express inclusion of a ‘developmental promotion purpose’ within s 1 the grant was ultra vires. It should be noted it was unlawful even though the Accounting Officer in requesting a ministerial direction had not ruled that the expenditure was in contravention of propriety or regularity. In his evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Accounting Officer, however, described the project as ‘an abuse of the aid programme’, ‘not … a sound development project’ and lacking any counter arguments to support the economic case.4 In the judicial review hearing, the judge observed: ‘[W]here … the contemplated development is, on the evidence, so economically unsound that there is no economic argument in favour of the case, it is not, in my judgment, possible to draw any material distinction between questions of propriety and regularity on the one hand and questions of economy and efficiency of public expenditure on the other. It may be surprising that no suggestion of illegality was made by any official, or that the Secretary of State was not advised that there would, or might be, any illegality. No legal advice was ever sought.’5 Cm 3714 and White and Hollingsworth Audit, Accountability and Government (1999) OUP, p 114. R v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ex p World Development Movement Ltd [1995] 1 All ER 611. 3 See para 11.53 above and the restricted opportunities for disclosure in judicial review litigation. See the crucial disclosures made in European Roma Rights Centre v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport [2005] 1 All ER 527 (HL) at paras 88 et seq. 4 HC 271 (1993–94) at p 271; see White, Harden and Donnelly, above. 5 Per Rose LJ at pp 626–27, note 2 above. 1 2

12.24  As commentators have pointed out, this brings the question of legality very close to questions of propriety and regularity. In this respect, the law is a far more direct and abrupt form of control than the techniques hitherto applied in supervising government expenditure.1 Local government expenditure has always been subject to far greater legal control because its powers are exclusively statutory and less deference has been shown to local government by the courts. See Bromley London Borough Council v Greater London Council [1983] 1 AC 768, HL; and compare with the approach to the government in R v Secretary of State ex p London Borough of Hammersmith & Fulham [1991] 1 AC 521.

1

12.25  The Government Resources and Accounts Act 2000, s 8, allows the CAG access at all reasonable times to any documents relating to a department’s accounts. Assistance must be provided by the departments. Under s 25, the powers in s 8 are extended to bodies audited by the CAG by statute or agreement.1 Auditing of companies performing public functions under the 2000 Act is amended under the Budget Responsibility and National Audit Act 2011, s 19. See SI 2003/1326, SI 2003/1325 and SI 2003/1324 (audit of health services bodies).

1

THE CAG REPORTS 12.26  The reports of the CAG1 may be made to the House of Commons. The reports form the basis of inquiries by the Public Accounts Committee. This

970  Chapter 12 is a separate body to the Public Accounts Commission although there may be some shared membership. The committee investigates 40–50 VFM and financial reports each year and can issue up to about 50 reports. This committee of the Commons has a peculiar privilege in being able to insist on the appearance before it of the accounting officer of the department or body investigated. Appearance of civil servants before select committees is in every other case subject to ministerial control (see paras 4.125 et seq above). It also has members of the Treasury in attendance. Once again, the PAC is privileged in having such wellresearched and factual reports on which to base its own investigations. The NAO has expanded the assistance it gives to other select committees as well as the PAC. Schedule 4 to the NAA 1983 lists those bodies over which the CAG has no power of investigation. It includes remaining nationalised industries (although it reported on the nationalisation of Northern Rock in 2009), but not the BBC, and Welsh Fourth Channel Authority.2 It has reported on Regulating Network Rail’s Efficiency (2011). The last three decades have seen a heightened awareness of the importance of, and support for, internal audits by bodies within the jurisdiction of the CAG.3 http://www.nao.org.uk/publications.aspx?psl=10. This is a much narrower range of bodies than that originally in the Bill which became the National Audit Act. 3 Starting with the Financial Management Initiatives, MINIS, Rayner Scrutinies etc through to Public Service Agreements which ceased in 2010. The Government Internal Audit Agency seeks to ensure that central government and the wider public sector provide services effectively: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/government-internal-audit-agency (5/7/2018). 1 2

12.27  Reports on accounts of bodies audited are contained in the reports of those bodies which are presented annually to Parliament – there were 475 accounts audited in 2009–10 (over 550 separate accounts audited in 2003–04) with a total revenue and expenditure of over £950 billion (£700 billion in 2003– 04).1 In 2016–17, 372 accounts were certified; 94 per cent of recommendations made to departments since 2014 have been accepted. The 2016–17 annual report stated that, since 2010, the work of the office has saved the taxpayer £7.5 billion. The VFM reports of the CAG – which form the basis of PAC investigations and reports, and government replies – are published as separate reports of the National Audit Office with a House of Commons sessional number. There are approximately 60  VFM reports each year (63 in 2009–10, 68 in 2016–17) and reports are published at the CAG’s complete discretion which is also true of their timing. Reports have, in more recent years, concentrated on financial management in departments,2 quality of public service, private finance initiatives and audit of international bodies to which the UK contributes. The NAO has also assisted in the smooth introduction of international financial reporting standards for the bodies it audits. Annual Report 2004 NAO Helping the Nation Spend Wisely; NAO Annual Report 2010. https://www.nao.org.uk/report/the-effectiveness-of-internal-audit-in-central-government/ (18/05/2018).

1 2

12.28  CAG reports have been criticised in the past for being a little colourless. Presentation is much improved from previous eras. There is much in the way of critical self-analysis. The reports are mines of useful information. This is

The National Audit Office and the Comptroller and Auditor General   971 no less true of areas of customer service by departments, agencies and other bodies where the standard of service is far from suitable,1 to programmes for privatisation,2 urban development corporations,3 public housing programmes of the Department of the Environment,4 government contracting,5 safety of regulation of medicines,6 regulating charities7 and improving the speed and quality of asylum decisions (HC  535 (2003–04) and HC  238 (2004–05) from the PAC).The CAG has investigated the subject of expenditure on government publicity.8 In 2016, it reported on how transparency and accountability in projects were often afterthoughts. The report sought to strengthen transparency and accountability of accounting officers’ decisions within departments. A report in May 2016 looked at HMRC and the need for faster resolution of disputes and environmental impact.9 The NAO has given wider evidence to government on eg the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) which, according to the 1997 Annual Report of the NAO, was accepted by the government in full. It published its approach to the audit of PFI projects to assist public officials embarking on such projects. It also produced by 1998 four separate VFM reports on PFI projects.10 Further reports on PFI and the Public Private Partnerships have been produced, including Financing PFI  Projects in the Credit Crisis (2010).11  PFI reports are common throughout the years 2006–18 and, in January 2018, reports on PF 1 and 2 were produced (HC 718, 2017–19). In March 2005, there was a wide-ranging investigation and report into Citizen Redress and internal complaints procedures (HC 21 (2004–05); see para 10.3 above for more recent reports). Reports have been issued on data security and information assurances and cyber security. The reports cover the criminal justice landscape, reforming the courts, data systems for public service agreements, regulatory reform and financial sustainability for higher education, exiting the EU, modern slavery, funding reductions in local government and whether central government understands the implications (March 2018), and an investigation into the Disclosure and Barring Service (February 2018). Whistleblowing has been reported on (2014). The NAO conducted an investigation into the Parole Board highlighting consequences of the Osborn judgment (examined in para 10.121 above).12 Its report on the failed private contractor of public services, Carillion – which had around 420 contracts with the public sector – painted a bleak picture of the public-private commercial interface.13 So too did its report on universal credit which replaced six meanstested benefits for working age households in an attempt to reduce the costs of administration and fraud and reduce unemployment. It reported evidence of hardship and difficulties for claimants, which government denied. Government objectives in the system which had been planned from 2010 were difficult to quantify. NAO concluded that the project is not ‘value for money now, and that its future value for money is unproven’.14 The responsible minister was openly criticised by the CAG when the latter published a letter to the minister specifying her misrepresentations in an initial response to the report. Let us hope this stops any budding tendency to ‘fake news’ by Her Majesty’s ministers.15 In a September 2018 report on sustainability of police funding, the Home Office’s light touch approach to overseeing police forces meant that it did not know if the police system was financially sustainable, the NAO observed. The Home Office lacked a long-term plan for policing and significant gaps remain

972  Chapter 12 in its understanding of demand for police services and their costs. The way the Department chooses to distribute funding has been ineffective and detached from the changing nature of policing for too long, and it cannot be sure overall funding is being directed to the right places. With plans to reform the funding formula on hold, and no systematic approach to ensuring forces are financially sustainable, the NAO could not conclude that the Home Office’s oversight of the police system represents value for money.16 Lawyers representing parties challenging decisions of government bodies should check to establish whether there are in existence any reports of the CAG or PAC on the particular responsibility of the body in question. The reports are not merely of a wider academic or political significance. The CAG and PAC are vital conduits for the provision of information to the public which could be essential armoury for a lawyer. HC  451 (1987–88); HC  736 (1987–88); See BSE – the Cost of the Crisis HC  583 (1997–98); Government on the Web HC 87 (1999–2000). The reports are at https://www.nao.org.uk/reports/ (18/05/2018).  2 See eg Privatisation of the Rolling Stock Leasing Companies HC 576 (1997–98) and, controversially, on the Sale of the Rover Group, HC 9 (1989–90).  3 HC 492 (1987–88).  4 CAG, 21 September 1989 HMSO.  5 NB the Zircon affair: HC 365 (1986–87) and Modernising Procurement HC 808 (1998–99).  6 Safety, Efficacy, Quality: Regulating Medicines in the UK (2003).  7 Giving Confidently: the role of the Charity Commission in Regulating Charities HC 234 (2001–02).  8 HC 46 (1989–90).  9 Accountability to Parliament for Taxpayers’ Money (February 2016). 10 White and Hollingsworth (above), at pp 78 et seq. 11 Eg HC  530 (2003–04) on PFI and the PAC HC  460 (2001–02) on PFI arrangements and HC 700 (2002–03) on Operational Performance of PFI Prisons and HC 955 (2002–03) on the new accommodation programme at GCHQ; on PPPs, HC 644 and 645 (2003–04) both on London Underground and PPPs. The NAO has run an electronic database of the recommendations made by the NAO and PAC on PPPs since 2003. See HC 920 (2010–12) Lessons from PFI and Other Projects. 12 HC 1013 (2016–17). 13 HC 1002 (2017–19). Carillion was the first private sector public liability company continuing to trade while being wound up. Criticised practices included late payments to sub-contractors and short selling of its shares. 14 HC 1123 (2017–19). 15 See para 4.99, note 3 above. 16 Financial Sustainability of Police Forces in England and Wales HC 1501 (2017–19).  1

12.29  However, unlike the audit provisions of local government (paras 9.11 et seq above), there is no public dimension to the CAG’s investigations until the report is published although the Office is subject to the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA  2000). No provision is made, unlike local government, for electors or taxpayers to become involved in the process of audit and to make objection that may well become a matter for challenge before a court of law.1 These were amended in 2014. The litigation resulting from Pergau Dam was a remarkable development but it arose from a judicial review brought by a public interest group. Until recently, it was assumed that individuals had no locus standi to challenge central government decisions on expenditure.2 Raising allegations about the illegality of central government expenditure would, in most

The National Audit Office and the Comptroller and Auditor General   973 cases, raise insuperable difficulties in relation to parliamentary estimates, votes and appropriations3 as well as locus standi4 for disgruntled citizens. A generous approach was taken by the court to locus standi in the case, one that was more in line with a developing approach. The Pergau Dam episode also concerned specific statutory authority for specific expenditure rather than expenditure under general appropriations under the annual Appropriation Act. R v District Auditor Chelmsford, ex p Judge (1988) Times, 26 December; cf Lloyd v McMahon [1987] 1 All ER 1118. The surcharge provisions have gone but the auditor may still apply to the court for a declaration that an item of expenditure is contrary to law and under Audit Commission Act 1998, s 16 a local elector may make objection to the auditor and under s 17 may appeal against the auditor’s decision to the courts. 2 Unlike taxation: Dyson v A-G [1912] 1 Ch 158, CA. 3 See eg R v Secretary of State for Health, ex p Keen [1990] 1 Med LR 455; R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p Greenwich London Borough Council (1989) Times, 17 May. In the Court of Appeal judgment in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Fire Brigades Union [1995] 1 All ER 888, Hobhouse LJ believed that once money was voted by Parliament for expenditure – in this case on compensation for criminal injuries – it cannot be said to be ‘unlawful, unauthorised or unconstitutional’ expenditure: at p 905j. On government audit generally, see Cm 5456 Audit and Accountability in Central Government and HC 701 (2001–02) for the government response. 4 IRC  v National Federation of Self Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982]  AC  617, HL; R  v HM Treasury, ex p Smedley [1985] QB 657, CA; R v A-G, ex p ICI plc [1987] 1 CMLR 72, CA. 1

12.30  The NAO has also reported on the forecasts of the Office for Budget Reform in 2010 following earlier work on government budget ‘assumptions’. The earlier work was to assist the government in preparing its forecasts of the public finances by reviewing the assumptions adopted for economic growth, unemployment, interest rates and other conventions for projecting income. This could be viewed as yet a further development in opening up budgetary and monetary policy to greater public scrutiny, a process started by Kenneth Clark under John Major’s premiership when he published the minutes of the monthly meetings between himself and the Governor of the Bank of England after six weeks. This was subsequently reduced to two weeks. The authority is now in the Bank of England Act 1998. It has also been extended to the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England,1 although it now publishes these documents eight times per annum. Publication of inflation reports and correspondence between the Chancellor and Governor takes place if inflation moves away from its target by more than 1 per cent in either direction. Cm 3693.

1

12.31  As a concluding comment, it should be noted that, while the budgetary and expenditure processes of local government have been brought under evertightening legal regulation and reduction, those of central government remain remarkably free of such legal regulation. Apart from the existence of the Supply and Appropriation Acts, there were no other formal legal requirements. Reforms have aimed to provide greater transparency and scrutiny, with the Office for Budget Responsibility. Taxation requires legislation. Although the budgetary process has traditionally been characterised by its secrecy,1 since 1990 there have been several important developments in the provision of information to Parliament about the expenditure cycle and the budget and taxation decisions.

974  Chapter 12 The most recent changes have been highlighted above. The publication of annual reports from departments and agencies since 1991 has helped the flow of information and replaced the obscurity of erstwhile budgetary and expenditure publications. New accounting techniques in central government have assisted parliamentary oversight.2 The reforms starting with the Finance Act 1998 and most recently the Budget Responsibility and National Audit Act 2011 were outlined above (para 12.4).3 From 1998, National Accounts have been drawn up in accordance with the Community’s European System of Accounts. This was interesting, given our decision not to join the European Monetary Union. Brexit will presumably bring an end to this practice. The Treasury and Bank of England were heavily criticised for their forecasts on the pessimistic financial implications of Brexit. See generally Likierman Public Expenditure (1988). For an analysis which looks at reforms aimed at opening up the expenditure process, see T Daintith and A Page The Executive in the Constitution (1999). 2 See HC 365 (2003–04) Financial Reporting and Auditing. 3 T Daintith and A Page The Executive in the Constitution (1999), pp 106–107. 1

12.32  For over 20 years, the NAO has been alive to the various developments from joined-up public services, e-government, to the policies on digitisation government in the Digital Economy Act 2017. As long ago as 2001–02 the NAO produced reports on Better Public Services through E-government.1 Much of the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) has been cloaked by commercial secrecy, and serious mismanagement. But PFI has the propensity to re-emerge, as in the case of the plans for the East Coast railway in May 2018, although the Chancellor announced their demise in November 2018 (para 1.215). Similar fears attended the coalition government plans for the NHS reforms in the Health and Social Care Act 2011. The policy-making process will remain protected from critical gaze by virtue of FOIA  2000, ss  35 and 36. To make a point, and without repeating what was said in ch 1, the FOIA 2000 that was given Royal Assent in November 2000 is not a statute that supplies the necessary degree of openness and transparency and the means to allow citizens to comprehend fundamental changes affecting us all. But the Act does not start from the premise of exclusion. This is where a body such as the NAO provides a crucial service in informing Parliament and the public of the implications and limitations of major social change – much of it technically driven and with huge financial consequences. The growing resort to IT in government is a case in point.2 Often seen as a panacea, costs have spiralled out of control and programmes have been totally inadequate or insufficiently updated, making them prone to cyber attacks as with the NHS.3 The NAO has produced telling criticism. In 2017 it commented upon Digital Transformation in Government and, while noting positive points, it reported the Government Digital Service ‘was trying to cover too broad a remit with unclear accountabilities’.4 The future may be digital but it may not be inclusive, or only superficially so, or perspicuous. The power of digital networks is subliminal. FOIA  2000 is a considerable improvement and it has surprised the government in its operation and commentators in its positive impression on government commissions (para 1.307 above). It has done so despite some glaring weaknesses in its design.

The National Audit Office and the Comptroller and Auditor General   975 HC 364 (2001–02). See The National Programme for IT in the NHS: an update on the delivery of detailed care records systems HC 888 (2010–12). 3 See Protecting Information Across Government HC 625 (2016–17). 4 HC 1059 (2016–17). 1 2

12.33  In the previous edition of this work, we wrote: ‘Given the dramatic changes planned for public service and services in the UK as a whole, and given the coalition government’s support for FOIA 2000 and greater transparency (see paras 1.251 and 2.32 et seq), it should surely be asked whether the former responsibilities of the Audit Commission should be transferred to the NAO and whether the brief of the NAO should be extended to follow public money wherever, and however, it is spent. This would be a monumental service to transparency. A key theme in recent years has been the attempts by the NAO to ensure that government uses the best information available in the optimal way to enhance delivery, service and productivity.1 This is an aspiration that should apply whenever public money is spent and our lives affected. “We want to help central government make better use of information to … achieve improved performance and productivity’ is the stated aim of the NAO”.’ The task is as pressing now as it was then, although the NAO has been given VFM oversight of local bodies. NAO Annual Report 2011, p 6.

1

Annex A

Freedom of Information Act 2000, Schedule 1

SCHEDULE 1 PUBLIC AUTHORITIES part i  general

1  Any government department other than: (a) the Competition and Markets Authority, (b) the Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills. 1ZA  The Competition and Markets Authority, in respect of information held otherwise than as a tribunal. 1A The Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills, in respect of information held for purposes other than those of the functions exercisable by Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Education, Children’s Services and Skills by virtue of section 5(1)(a)(iii) of the Care Standards Act 2000. 2  The House of Commons, in respect of information other than— (a) information relating to any residential address of a member of either House of Parliament, (b) information relating to travel arrangements of a member of either House of Parliament, where the arrangements relate to travel that has not yet been undertaken or is regular in nature, (c) information relating to the identity of any person who delivers or has delivered goods, or provides or has provided services, to a member of either House of Parliament at any residence of the member, (d) information relating to expenditure by a member of either House of Parliament on security arrangements, (e) information held by the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament. Paragraph (b) does not except information relating to the total amount of expenditure incurred on regular travel during any month. 3  The House of Lords, in respect of information other than— (a) information relating to any residential address of a member of either House of Parliament,

978   Annex A (b) information relating to travel arrangements of a member of either House of Parliament, where the arrangements relate to travel that has not yet been undertaken or is regular in nature, (c) information relating to the identity of any person who delivers or has delivered goods, or provides or has provided services, to a member of either House of Parliament at any residence of the member, (d) information relating to expenditure by a member of either House of Parliament on security arrangements, (e) information held by the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament. Paragraph (b) does not except information relating to the total amount of expenditure incurred on regular travel during any month. 4  The Northern Ireland Assembly. 5  The National Assembly for Wales, in respect of information other than— (a) information relating to any residential address of a member of the Assembly, (b) information relating to travel arrangements of a member of the Assembly, where the arrangements relate to travel that has not yet been undertaken or is regular in nature, (c) information relating to the identity of any person who delivers or has delivered goods, or provides or has provided services, to a member of the Assembly at any residence of the member, (d) information relating to expenditure by a member of the Assembly on security arrangements. Paragraph (b) does not except information relating to the total amount of expenditure incurred on regular travel during any month. 5A  The Welsh Assembly Government. 6  The armed forces of the Crown, except— (a) the special forces, and (b) any unit or part of a unit which is for the time being required by the Secretary of State to assist the Government Communications Headquarters in the exercise of its functions. part ii  local government

England and Wales 7 A  local authority within the meaning of the Local Government Act 1972, namely— (a) in England, a county council, a London borough council, a district council or a parish council, (b) in Wales, a county council, a county borough council or a community council. 8  The Greater London Authority. 9  The Common Council of the City of London, in respect of information held in its capacity as a local authority, police authority or port health authority.

Freedom of Information Act 2000, Schedule 1   979 10 The Sub-Treasurer of the Inner Temple or the Under-Treasurer of the Middle Temple, in respect of information held in his capacity as a local authority. 11  The Council of the Isles of Scilly. 12 A  parish meeting constituted under section 13 of the Local Government Act 1972. 13  Any charter trustees constituted under section 246 of the Local Government Act 1972. 14  A fire and rescue authority constituted by a scheme under section 2 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 or a scheme to which section 4 of that Act applies. 14A  A fire and rescue authority created by an order under section 4A of that Act. 15 A  waste disposal authority established by virtue of an order under section 10(1) of the Local Government Act 1985. 15A […] 16  A port health authority constituted by an order under section 2 of the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984. 17 […] 18  An internal drainage board which is continued in being by virtue of section 1 of the Land Drainage Act 1991. 19 A  joint authority established under Part IV of the Local Government Act 1985 (fire and rescue services and transport). 19A  An economic prosperity board established under section 88 of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009. 19B  A combined authority established under section 103 of that Act. 20  The London Fire Commissioner. 21  A joint fire authority established by virtue of an order under section 42(2) of the Local Government Act 1985 (reorganisation of functions). 22  A body corporate established pursuant to an order under section 67 of the Local Government Act 1985 (transfer of functions to successors of residuary bodies, etc). 23  A body corporate established pursuant to an order under section 17 of the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007 (residuary bodies). 24  The Broads Authority established by section 1 of the Norfolk and Suffolk Broads Act 1988. 25 A  joint committee constituted in accordance with section 102(1)(b) of the Local Government Act 1972. 26  A joint board which is continued in being by virtue of section 263(1) of the Local Government Act 1972.

980   Annex A 27 A  joint authority established under section 21 of the Local Government Act 1992. 28 A  Passenger Transport Executive for a passenger transport area for the purposes of Part 2 of the Transport Act 1968. 28A  A sub-national transport body established under section 102E of the Local Transport Act 2008. 29  Transport for London. 30  The London Transport Users Committee. 31  A joint board the constituent members of which consist of any of the public authorities described in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 12, 15, 16, 20 to 31, 57 and 58. 32  A National Park authority established by an order under section 63 of the Environment Act 1995. 33  A joint planning board constituted for an area in Wales outside a National Park by an order under section 2(1B) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. 33A  A strategic planning panel established under section 60D of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004. 34 […] 35 […] 35A […] 35B An inshore fisheries and conservation authority for a district established under section 149 of the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009. 35C  An urban development corporation established under section 135 of the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980. 35D  A Mayoral development corporation established under section 198 of the Localism Act 2011. 35E A  Local Healthwatch organisation, in respect of information held in connection with— (a) arrangements made under section 221(1) of the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007, or (b) arrangements made in pursuance of arrangements made under section 221(1) of that Act. Northern Ireland 36  A district council within the meaning of the Local Government Act (Northern Ireland) 1972. part iii  the national health service

England and Wales 36A […]

Freedom of Information Act 2000, Schedule 1   981 37 […] 37A  The National Health Service Commissioning Board. 37B A  clinical commissioning group established under section 14D of the National Health Service Act 2006. 38  A special health authority established under section 28 of the National Health Service Act 2006 or section 22 of the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006. 39 […] 39A  A Local Health Board established under section 11 of the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006. 40  A National Health Service trust established under section 25 of the National Health Service Act 2006 or section 18 of the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006. 40A  An NHS foundation trust. 41  A Community Health Council established under section 182 of the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006. 41A […] 42 […] 43 […] 43A  Any person providing primary medical services, primary dental services or primary ophthalmic services— (a) in accordance with arrangements made under section 92 or 107 of the National Health Service Act 2006, or section 50 or 64 of the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006; or (b) under a contract under section 84 or 100 of the National Health Service Act 2006 or section 42 or 57 of the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006; in respect of information relating to the provision of those services. 44 Any person providing general medical services, general dental services, general ophthalmic services or pharmaceutical services under the National Health Service Act 2006 or the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006], in respect of information relating to the provision of those services. 45 […] 45A  Any person providing local pharmaceutical services under— (a) a pilot scheme established under section 134 of the National Health Service Act 2006 or section 92 of the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006; or (b) an LPS scheme established under Schedule  12 to the National Health Service Act 2006 or Schedule  7 to the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006. 45B […]

982   Annex A Northern Ireland 46 A  Health and Social Services Board established under Article  16 of the Health and Personal Social Services (Northern Ireland) Order 1972. 47 A  Health and Social Services Council established under Article  4 of the Health and Personal Social Services (Northern Ireland) Order 1991. 48  A Health and Social Services Trust established under Article 10 of the Health and Personal Social Services (Northern Ireland) Order 1991. 49 A  special agency established under Article  3 of the Health and Personal Social Services (Special Agencies) (Northern Ireland) Order 1990. 50 The Northern Ireland Central Services Agency for the Health and Social Services established under Article 26 of the Health and Personal Social Services (Northern Ireland) Order 1972. 51 Any person providing primary medical services, general dental services, general ophthalmic services or pharmaceutical services under Part VI of the Health and Personal Social Services (Northern Ireland) Order 1972, in respect of information relating to the provision of those services. 51A  The Regional Business Services Organisation established under section 14 of the Health and Social Services (Reform) Act (Northern Ireland) 2009. 51B  The Patient and Client Council established under section 16 of the Health and Social Care (Reform) Act (Northern Ireland) 2009. 51C  The Regional Health and Social Care Board established under section 7 of the Health and Social Care (Reform) Act (Northern Ireland) 2009. 51D  The Regional Agency for Public Health and Social Well-being established under section 12 of the Health and Social Care (Reform) Act (Northern Ireland) 2009. part iv  maintained schools and other educational institutions

England and Wales 52  The governing body of— (a) a maintained school, as defined by section 20(7) of the School Standards and Framework Act 1998, or (b) a maintained nursery school, as defined by section 22(9) of that Act. 52A  (1) The proprietor of an Academy, in respect of information held for the purposes of the proprietor’s functions under Academy arrangements. (2) In sub-paragraph (1)— ‘Academy arrangements’ has the meaning given by section 1 of the Academies Act 2010; ‘proprietor’ has the meaning given by section 579(1) of the Education Act 1996. 53  (1) The governing body of— (a) an institution within the further education sector,

Freedom of Information Act 2000, Schedule 1   983 (b) a university receiving financial support under section 65 of the Further and Higher Education Act 1992, (c) an institution conducted by a higher education corporation, (d) a designated institution for the purposes of Part II of the Further and Higher Education Act 1992 as defined by section 72(3) of that Act, or (e) any college, school, hall or other institution of a university which falls within paragraph (b). (2) In sub-paragraph (1)— (a) ‘governing body’ is to be interpreted in accordance with subsection (1) of section 90 of the Further and Higher Education Act 1992 but without regard to subsection (2) of that section, (b) in paragraph (a), the reference to an institution within the further education sector is to be construed in accordance with section 91(3) of the Further and Higher Education Act 1992, (c) in paragraph (c), ‘higher education corporation’ has the meaning given by section 90(1) of that Act, and (d) in paragraph (e) ‘college’ includes any institution in the nature of a college. Northern Ireland 54  (1) The managers of— (a) a controlled school, voluntary school or grant-maintained integrated school within the meaning of Article 2(2) of the Education and Libraries (Northern Ireland) Order 1986, or (b) a pupil referral unit as defined by Article 87(1) of the Education (Northern Ireland) Order 1998. (2) In sub-paragraph (1) ‘managers’ has the meaning given by Article 2(2) of the Education and Libraries (Northern Ireland) Order 1986. 55  (1) The governing body of— (a) a university receiving financial support under Article 30 of the Education and Libraries (Northern Ireland) Order 1993, (b) a college of education … or in respect of which grants are paid under Article  66(2) or (3) of the Education and Libraries (Northern Ireland) Order 1986, or (c) an institution of further education within the meaning of the Further Education (Northern Ireland) Order 1997. (2) In sub-paragraph (1) ‘governing body’ has the meaning given by Article 30(3) of the Education and Libraries (Northern Ireland) Order 1993. 56 Any person providing further education to whom grants, loans or other payments are made under Article  5(1)(b) of the Further Education (Northern Ireland) Order 1997. part v  police

England and Wales 57  A police and crime commissioner.

984   Annex A 58  The Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime. 59  A chief officer of police of a police force in England or Wales. Northern Ireland 60  The Northern Ireland Policing Board. 61  The Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland. Miscellaneous 62  The British Transport Police. 63  The Ministry of Defence Police established by section 1 of the Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987. 63A  The Civil Nuclear Police Authority. 63B  The chief constable of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary. 64  Any person who— (a) by virtue of any enactment has the function of nominating individuals who may be appointed as special constables by justices of the peace, and (b) is not a public authority by virtue of any other provision of this Act, in respect of information relating to the exercise by any person appointed on his nomination of the functions of a special constable. part vi  other public bodies and offices: general

The Adjudication Panel for Wales. The adjudicators appointed under section 25 of the School Standards and Framework Act 1998. The Administration of Radioactive Substances Advisory Committee. The Advisory Board on Restricted Patients. The Advisory Board on the Registration of Homoeopathic Products. The Advisory Committee on Clinical Excellence Awards. The Advisory Committee for Disabled People in Employment and Training. The Advisory Committee for the Public Lending Right. The Advisory Committee on Animal Feedingstuffs. The Advisory Committee on Borderline Substances. The Advisory Committee on Business and the Environment. The Advisory Committee on Business Appointments. The Advisory Committee on Conscientious Objectors. The Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens. The Advisory Committee on the Government Art Collection. The Advisory Committee on Historic Wreck Sites.

Freedom of Information Act 2000, Schedule 1   985 An Advisory Committee on Justices of the Peace in England and Wales. The Advisory Committee on the Microbiological Safety of Food. The Advisory Committee on Novel Foods and Processes. The Advisory Committee on Organic Standards. The Advisory Committee on Overseas Economic and Social Research. The Advisory Committee on Packaging. The Advisory Committee on Releases to the Environment. The Advisory Committee on Statute Law. The Advisory Committee on Telecommunications for the Disabled and Elderly. The Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs. The Advisory Council on Public Records. The Advisory Group on Hepatitis. The Advisory Council on Historical Manuscripts. The Advisory Council on National Records and Archives. The Advisory Group on Medical Countermeasures. The Advisory Panel on Public Sector Information. The Advisory Panel on Substance Misuse. The Aerospace Committee. An Agricultural Dwelling House Advisory Committee. An Agricultural Wages Committee. The Agriculture and Environment Biotechnology Commission. The Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board. The Airborne Particles Expert Group. The Air Quality Expert Group. The All-Wales Medicines Strategy Group. The Animal Welfare Advisory Committee. The Architects Registration Board. The Armed Forces Pay Review Body. The Arts Council of England. The Arts Council of Wales. An assessor appointed for the purposes of section 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 in its application to England and Wales. The Audit Commission for Local Authorities and the National Health Service in England and Wales. The Auditor General for Wales. The Bank of England (including the Bank in its capacity as the Prudential Regulation Authority), in respect of information held for purposes other than those of its functions with respect to— (a) monetary policy,

986   Annex A (b) financial operations intended to support financial institutions for the purposes of maintaining stability, and (c) the provision of private banking services and related services. The Better Regulation Task Force. The Big Lottery Fund. The Board of the Pension Protection Fund. The Britain-Russia Centre and East-West Centre. The British Association for Central and Eastern Europe. The British Broadcasting Corporation, in respect of information held for purposes other than those of journalism, art or literature. The British Coal Corporation. The British Council. The British Film Institute. The British Hallmarking Council. The British Library. The British Museum. The British Pharmacopoeia Commission. The British Tourist Authority. The British Transport Police Authority. The British Wool Marketing Board. The Broadcasting Standards Commission. The Building Regulations Advisory Committee for England. The Building Regulations Advisory Committee for Wales. Canal & River Trust, in respect of information held by it relating to functions exercisable by it by virtue of the British Waterways Board (Transfer of Functions) Order 2012 (SI 2012/1659). The Care Council for Wales. The Care Quality Commission. The Central Advisory Committee on War Pensions. The Central Rail Users’ Consultative Committee. The Certification Officer. The Channel Four Television Corporation, in respect of information held for purposes other than those of journalism, art or literature. The chief inspector of constabulary appointed under section 54(1) of the Police Act 1996. The Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service. The Children’s Commissioner. The Children’s Commissioner for Wales. The Civil Aviation Authority. The Civil Justice Council.

Freedom of Information Act 2000, Schedule 1   987 The Civil Procedure Rule Committee. The Civil Service Appeal Board. The Civil Service Commission. The Coal Authority. The College of Policing. Comisiynydd y Gymraeg (The Welsh Language Commissioner). The Commission for Equality and Human Rights. The Commission on Human Medicines. The Commission for Local Administration in England. The Commissioner for Older People in Wales. The Commissioner for Public Appointments. The Commissioner for Victims and Witnesses. The Commissioners of Northern Lighthouses. The Committee on Carcinogenicity of Chemicals in Food, Consumer Products and the Environment. The Committee on Climate Change. The Committee on Fuel Poverty. The Committee on Medical Aspects of Radiation in the Environment. The Committee on Mutagenicity of Chemicals in Food, Consumer Products and the Environment. The Committee for the Protection of Animals Used for Scientific Purposes. The Committee on Radioactive Waste Management. The Committee on Safety of Devices. The Committee on Standards in Public Life. The Committee on Toxicity of Chemicals in Food, Consumer Products and the Environment. The Committee on the Medical Effects of Air Pollutants. The Commonwealth Scholarship Commission in the United Kingdom. Communications for Business. The Competition Service. Compliance Officer for the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority. The Comptroller and Auditor General. A conservation board established under section 86 of the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000. The Construction Industry Training Board. Consumer Communications for England. The Consumer Council for Water. The Consumer Panel established under section 16 of the Communications Act 2003. The Council for Science and Technology.

988   Annex A The Covent Garden Market Authority. The Criminal Cases Review Commission. The Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority. The Criminal Justice Consultative Council. The Criminal Procedure Rule Committee. The Dartmoor Steering Group and Working Party. The Darwin Advisory Committee. The Defence Nuclear Safety Committee. The Defence Scientific Advisory Council. The Diplomatic Service Appeal Board. The Director General of the Independent Office for Police Conduct. Director of Labour Market Enforcement. The Disabled Persons Transport Advisory Committee. The Disclosure and Barring Service. The Distributed Generation Co-Ordinating Group. The East of England Industrial Development Board. The Ebbsfleet Development Corporation. The Electoral Commission. The Engineering Construction Industry Training Board. The English Sports Council. The English Tourist Board. The Environment Agency. The Ethnic Minority Business Forum. The Expert Advisory Group on AIDS. An Expert Panel on Air Quality Standards. The Export Guarantees Advisory Council. The Family Justice Council. The Family Procedure Rule Committee. The Family Proceedings Rules Committee. The Film Industry Training Board for England and Wales. The Financial Services Authority. The Financial Reporting Advisory Board. The Fire Services Examination Board. The Firearms Consultative Committee. Flood and Coastal Erosion Committee or Pwyllgor Llifogydd ac Erydu Arfordirol. The Fuel Cell Advisory Panel. The Future Generations Commissioner for Wales. The Gaelic Media Service, in respect of information held for purposes other than those of journalism, art or literature.

Freedom of Information Act 2000, Schedule 1   989 Gambling Commission. Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority. The Gas and Electricity Consumer Council. The Gene Therapy Advisory Committee. The General Chiropractic Council. The General Dental Council. The General Medical Council. The General Optical Council. The General Osteopathic Council. The General Pharmaceutical Council. The General Teaching Council for Wales. The Government Hospitality Advisory Committee for the Purchase of Wine. The Government Chemist. The Government-Industry Forum on Non-Food Use of Crops. The Great Britain-China Centre. Groceries Code Adjudicator. The Health and Safety Executive. The Health and Care Professions Council. The Health and Social Care Information Centre. The Health Research Authority. The Health Service Commissioner for England. Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Education and Training in Wales or Prif Arolygydd Ei Mawrhydi dros Addysg a Hyfforddiant yng Nghymru. Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons. Her Majesty’s Commissioners for Judicial Appointments. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation for England and Wales. The Higher Education Funding Council for Wales. The Historic Buildings and Monuments Commission for England. The Historic Royal Palaces Trust. The Homes and Communities Agency. The Horserace Betting Levy Board. The Horserace Totalisator Board. Horticulture Research International. The House of Lords Appointments Commission. Any Housing action trust established under Part III of the Housing Act 1988. The Housing Ombudsman. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority. The Human Genetics Commission. The Human Tissue Authority.

990   Annex A The Immigration Services Commissioner. The Imperial War Museum. The Independent Advisory Committee on Development Impact. The Independent Advisory Group on Teenage Pregnancy. The Independent Anti-slavery Commissioner. The Independent Case Examiner for the Child Support Agency. The Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration. The Independent Commission for Aid Impact. The Independent Groundwater Complaints Administrator. The Independent Living Funds. Any Independent Monitoring Board established under section 6(2) of the Prison Act 1952. The Independent Monitoring Board for the Military Corrective Training Centre. The Independent Office for Police Conduct. The Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority. The Independent Remuneration Panel for Wales. The Independent Review Panel for Advertising. The Independent Review Panel for Borderline Products. The Independent Scientific Group on Cattle Tuberculosis. The Independent Television Commission. The Industrial Development Advisory Board. The Industrial Injuries Advisory Council. The Information Commissioner. The Insolvency Rules Committee. The Institute for Apprenticeships. The Insurance Brokers Registration Council. The Integrated Administration and Controls System Appeals Panel. The Intellectual Property Advisory Committee. Investors in People UK. The Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation. The Joint Nature Conservation Committee. The Joint Prison/Probation Accreditation Panel. The Judicial Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman. The Judicial Appointments Commission. The Judicial Studies Board. The Land Registration Rule Committee. The Law Commission. The Legal Deposit Advisory Panel. The Legal Services Board.

Freedom of Information Act 2000, Schedule 1   991 The Local Democracy and Boundary Commission for Wales. The Local Government Boundary Commission for England. A local probation board established under section 4 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000. The London and South East Industrial Development Board. The London Pensions Fund Authority. The Low Pay Commission. The Marine Management Organisation. The Marshall Aid Commemoration Commission. The Measurement Advisory Committee. The Migration Advisory Committee. Monitor. The Museum of London. The National Army Museum. The National Assembly for Wales Remuneration Board. The National Association of Citizens Advice Bureaux— (a) in respect of information relating to the function exercisable by virtue of article  2 of the Public Bodies (The Office of Fair Trading Transfer of Consumer Advice Scheme Function and Modification of Enforcement Functions) Order 2013 (SI 2013/783); (b) in respect of information relating to the functions transferred to it by Article  3(1)(a), (b) or (c) of the Public Bodies (Abolition of the National Consumer Council and Transfer of the Office of Fair Trading’s Functions in relation to Estate Agents etc) Order 2014 (SI 2014/631). The National Audit Office. The National Citizen Service Trust. The National DNA Database Ethics Group. The National Employers’ Liaison Committee. The National Employment Panel. The National Employment Savings Trust Corporation. The National Forest Company. The National Gallery. The National Heritage Memorial Fund. The National Independent Safeguarding Board. The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence. The National Library of Wales. The National Maritime Museum. The National Museum of Science and Industry. The National Museums and Galleries of Wales. The National Museums and Galleries on Merseyside.

992   Annex A The National Non-Food Crops Centre. The National Portrait Gallery. Natural England. The Natural History Museum. The Natural Resources Body for Wales. The New Deal Task Force. The NHS Pay Review Body. The North East Industrial Development Board. The Northern Ireland Judicial Appointments Ombudsman. The North West Industrial Development Board. The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority. The Nuclear Research Advisory Council. The Nursing and Midwifery Council. The Office for Budget Responsibility. The Office of Communications. The Office for Legal Complaints. The Office of Manpower Economics. The Office for Nuclear Regulation. The Office for Students. The Office of Tax Simplification. The Oil and Pipelines Agency. The Olympic Lottery Distributor. The Olympic Park Legacy Company. The Ombudsman for the Board of the Pension Protection Fund. The OSO Board. The Panel on Standards for the Planning Inspectorate. The Parliamentary Boundary Commission for England. The Parliamentary Boundary Commission for Scotland. The Parliamentary Boundary Commission for Wales. The Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration. The Parole Board. The Passengers’ Council. The Payment Systems Regulator established under section 40 of the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013. The Pensions Ombudsman. The Pensions Regulator. The Pesticide Residues Committee. The Pesticides Forum. The Police Advisory Board for England and Wales.

Freedom of Information Act 2000, Schedule 1   993 The Police Negotiating Board. The Police Remuneration Review Body. The Political Honours Scrutiny Committee. The Prison Service Pay Review Body. The Prisons and Probation Ombudsman for England and Wales. A probation trust. The Professional Standards Authority for Health and Social Care. The Public Private Partnership Agreement Arbiter. The Public Services Ombudsman for Wales. Pubs Code Adjudicator. Qualifications Wales. The Race Education and Employment Forum. The Race Relations Forum. The Radio Authority. The Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee. A Regional Cultural Consortium. Any Regional Flood and Coastal Committee. The Registrar of Consultant Lobbyists. The Registrar General for England and Wales. The Regulator of Community Interest Companies. The Regulator of Social Housing. The Regulatory Policy Committee. The Renewable Energy Advisory Committee. Resource: The Council for Museums, Archives and Libraries. The Review Body on Doctors and Dentists Remuneration. The Reviewing Committee on the Export of Works of Art. The Royal Air Force Museum. The Royal Armouries. The Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew. The Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons, in respect of information held by it otherwise than as a tribunal. The Royal Commission on Ancient and Historical Monuments of Wales. The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution. The Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts. The Royal Hospital at Chelsea. The Royal Mint Advisory Committee on the Design of Coins, Medals, Seals and Decorations. The School Teachers’ Review Body. The Science Advisory Council.

994   Annex A The Scientific Advisory Committee on Nutrition. The Scientific Committee on Tobacco and Health. The Sea Fish Industry Authority. The Security Industry Authority. The Senior Salaries Review Body. The Sentencing Council for England and Wales. The Service Complaints Ombudsman. Sianel Pedwar Cymru, in respect of information held for purposes other than those of journalism, art or literature. The single financial guidance body. The Single Source Regulations Office. Sir John Soane’s Museum. Small Business Commissioner. The Small Business Council. The Small Business Investment Task Force. The Social Care Institute for Excellence. The Social Mobility and Child Poverty Commission. The Social Security Advisory Committee. Social Work England. The South West Industrial Development Board. The Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee. The Sports Council for Wales. The Sports Grounds Safety Authority. The Standing Advisory Committee on Industrial Property. The Standing Advisory Committee on Trunk Road Assessment. The Standing Dental Advisory Committee. The Statistics Commission. The Steering Committee on Pharmacy Postgraduate Education. The Strategic Investment Board. The subsidence adviser appointed under section 46 of the Coal Industry Act 1994. The Substance Misuse Advisory Panel. The Surveillance Camera Commissioner. The Sustainable Development Commission. The Sustainable Energy Policy Advisory Board. The Tate Gallery. The TB Advisory Group. The Technical Advisory Board. The Theatres Trust. A  traffic commissioner, in respect of information held by the commissioner otherwise than as a tribunal.

Freedom of Information Act 2000, Schedule 1   995 The Treasure Valuation Committee. The Tribunal Procedure Committee. The trustee corporation established by section 75 of the Pensions Act 2008. The UK  Advisory Panel for Health Care Workers Infected with Bloodborne Viruses. The UK Chemicals Stakeholder Forum. The UK Commission for Employment and Skills. The UK Sports Council. The United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority. United Kingdom Research and Innovation. The University for Industry. The Unlinked Anonymous Serosurveys Steering Group. The Unrelated Live Transplant Regulatory Authority. The Valuation Tribunal Service. The verderers of the New Forest, in respect of information held by them otherwise than as a tribunal. The Veterinary Products Committee. The Veterinary Residues Committee. The Victoria and Albert Museum. The Wales Audit Office. The Wales Centre for Health. The Wallace Collection. The War Pensions Committees. The Welsh Committee for Professional Development of Pharmacy. The Welsh Dental Committee. The Welsh Industrial Development Advisory Board. The Welsh Medical Committee. The Welsh Nursing and Midwifery Committee. The Welsh Optometric Committee. The Welsh Pharmaceutical Committee. The Welsh Revenue Authority. The Welsh Scientific Advisory Committee. The Westminster Foundation for Democracy. The West Midlands Industrial Development Board. The Wilton Park Academic Council. The Women’s National Commission. The Yorkshire and the Humber and the East Midlands Industrial Development Board. The Youth Justice Board for England and Wales. The Zoos Forum.

996   Annex A part vii  other public bodies and offices: northern ireland

An advisory committee established under paragraph  25 of the Health and Personal Social Services (Northern Ireland) Order 1972. The Advisory Committee on Justices of the Peace in Northern Ireland. The Agricultural Wages Board for Northern Ireland. The Agri-food and Biosciences Institute. The Arts Council of Northern Ireland. The Assembly Ombudsman for Northern Ireland. The Attorney General for Northern Ireland. The Belfast Harbour Commissioners. The Board of Trustees of National Museums and Galleries of Northern Ireland. The Boundary Commission for Northern Ireland. A central advisory committee established under paragraph 24 of the Health and Personal Social Services (Northern Ireland) Order 1972. The Certification Officer for Northern Ireland. The Charities Advisory Committee. The Charity Commission for Northern Ireland. The Chief Electoral Officer for Northern Ireland. The Chief Inspector of Criminal Justice in Northern Ireland. The Civil Service Commissioners for Northern Ireland. Comhairle na Gaelscolaíochta. The Commission for Victims and Survivors for Northern Ireland. The Commissioner for Children and Young People for Northern Ireland. The Commissioner for Older People for Northern Ireland. The Commissioner for Public Appointments for Northern Ireland. The Construction Industry Training Board. The consultative Civic Forum referred to in section 56(4) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998. The Council for Catholic Maintained Schools. The Council for Nature Conservation and the Countryside. The County Court Rules Committee (Northern Ireland). The Criminal Injuries Compensation Appeals Panel for Northern Ireland, in relation to information held by it otherwise than as a tribunal. A development corporation established under Part III of the Strategic Investment and Regeneration of Sites (Northern Ireland) Order 2003. The Distinction and Meritorious Service Awards Committee. The Drainage Council for Northern Ireland. The Education Authority. The Equality Commission for Northern Ireland. The Family Proceedings Rules Committee (Northern Ireland).

Freedom of Information Act 2000, Schedule 1   997 The General Consumer Council for Northern Ireland. The General Teaching Council for Northern Ireland. The Governors of the Armargh Observatory and Planetarium. The Harbour of Donaghadee Commissioners. The Health and Safety Agency for Northern Ireland. The Historic Buildings Council. The Historic Monuments Council. The Independent Assessor of Military Complaints Procedures in Northern Ireland. The Independent Commissioner for Holding Centres. The Independent Financial Review Panel. An independent monitoring board appointed under section 10 of the Prison Act (Northern Ireland) 1953. The Independent Reviewer of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act. Invest Northern Ireland. The Industrial Research and Technology Unit. The Labour Relations Agency. The Lay Observer for Northern Ireland. The Livestock & Meat Commission for Northern Ireland. The Local Government Staff Commission. The Londonderry Port and Harbour Commissioners. The Magistrates’ Courts Rules Committee (Northern Ireland). The Northern Ireland Audit Office. The Northern Ireland Authority for Utility Regulation. The Northern Ireland Building Regulations Advisory Committee. The Northern Ireland Civil Service Appeal Board. The Northern Ireland Commissioner for Complaints. The Northern Ireland Community Relations Council. The Northern Ireland Council for the Curriculum, Examinations and Assessment. The Northern Ireland Court of Judicature Rules Committee. The Northern Ireland Crown Court Rules Committee. The Northern Ireland Events Company. The Northern Ireland Fire and Rescue Service Board. The Northern Ireland Fishery Harbour Authority. The Northern Ireland Health and Personal Social Services Regulation and Improvement Authority. The Northern Ireland Housing Executive. The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission.

998   Annex A The Northern Ireland Insolvency Rules Committee. The Northern Ireland Judicial Appointments Commission. The Northern Ireland Law Commission. The Northern Ireland Library Authority. The Northern Ireland Local Government Officers’ Superannuation Committee. The Northern Ireland Museums Council. The Northern Ireland Practice and Education Council for Nursing and Midwifery. The Northern Ireland Social Care Council. The Northern Ireland Tourist Board. The Northern Ireland Transport Holding Company. The Parades Commission. Parole Commissioners for Northern Ireland. The Pharmaceutical Society of Northern Ireland, in respect of information held by it otherwise than as a tribunal. The Poisons Board (Northern Ireland). The Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland. A  policing and community safety partnership or a district policing and community safety partnership established under Part 3 of the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2011. The Prisoner Ombudsman for Northern Ireland. The Probation Board for Northern Ireland. The Royal Ulster Constabulary George Cross Foundation. The Rural Development Council for Northern Ireland. The Safeguarding Board for Northern Ireland. The Sentence Review Commissioners appointed under section 1 of the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998. The discretionary support Commissioner appointed under Article  136 of the Welfare Reform (Northern Ireland) Order 2015. The Sports Council for Northern Ireland. The Statistics Advisory Committee. The Statute Law Committee for Northern Ireland. The Training and Employment Agency. Ulster Supported Employment Ltd. The Warrenpoint Harbour Authority. The Waste Management Advisory Board. The Youth Council for Northern Ireland.

Annex B

List of statutory provisions concerning prohibitions on disclosure of information

This Annex lists primary and secondary legislation identified as prohibiting the disclosure of information held by public authorities. Some provisions have doubtless been repealed. At para 1.263 of the text we wrote that orders under FOIA, s 75 repealing, or amending, some statutes were laid before Parliament in November 2004 and included: Factories Act 1961, s  154; Offices, Shops and Railway Premises Act 1963, s  59; Medicines Act 1968, s  118; National Health Service Act 1977, Sch 11, para 5; Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, s  28; Audit Commission Act 1998, s  49; Access to Justice Act 1999, s  20 and Biological Standards Act 1975, s  5 (SI  2004/3364). In 2005, the Department for Constitutional Affairs reported that there were in existence 336 provisions prohibiting the publication of information in addition to the Official Secrecy Acts (see para 1.263).

PRIMARY LEGISLATION Abortion Act 1967, s 2 Adoption Act 1976, ss 50 and 51A Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978, s 45 Adoption (NI) Order 1987, arts 50 and 61 Agricultural Marketing Act 1968, s 47 (as amended) Agricultural Marketing (NI) Order 1982, art 29 Agricultural Produce (Meat Regulation and Pig Industry) (NI) Act 1962, s 15 Agricultural Returns Act (NI) 1939, s 1 Agricultural Statistics Act 1979, s 3 Agriculture Act 1967, s 24 Agriculture Act 1970, ss 83 and 108 Agriculture and Horticulture Act 1964, s 13

1000   Annex B Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Act 1977, s 52 Air Force Act 1955, s 60 Airports Act 1986, s 74 Anatomy Act 1984, s 10 Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986, s 24 Army Act 1955, s 60 Atomic Energy Act 1946, ss 11 and 13 Banking Act 1987, ss 82 and 86 Betting, Gaming and Lotteries Act 1963, s 28 Biological Standards Act 1975, s 5 Births and Deaths Registration (NI) Order 1976, art 17 Broadcasting Act 1990, ss 196 and 197 Building Act 1984, s 96 Building Regulations (NI) Order 1979, art 11 Building (Scotland) Act 1959, s 18 Building Societies Act 1986, s 53 Census Act 1920, s 8 (as amended) Census Act (NI) 1969, ss 6 and 7 Census (Confidentiality) (NI) Order 1991, art 3 Cereals Marketing Act 1965, s 17 Child Support Act 1991, s 50 Child Support (NI) Order 1991, art 46 Civil Aviation Act 1982, s 23 Civil Defence Act 1948, s 4 Clean Air Act 1993, s 49 Coal Act 1938, s 53 (as amended) Coal Industry Nationalisation Act 1946, s 56 Coastal Protection Act 1949, s 25 Commissioner for Complaints Act (NI) 1969, s 12 Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005, ss 18(1) and 19 Companies Act 1985, s 449 Companies Act 1989, s 86 Companies (NI) Order 1986, art 442 Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, ss 1, 2, 4 and 5 Company Securities (Insider Dealing) (NI) Order 1986, arts 11 and 16B Competition Act 1980, s 19 Consumer Credit Act 1974, s 174 Consumer Protection (NI) Order 1987, art 29 Consumer Protection Act 1987, s 38

List of statutory provisions concerning prohibitions on disclosure   1001 Control of Pollution Act 1974, ss 79 and 94 (as amended) Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, s 49 Covent Garden Market Act 1961, s 32 Deep Sea Mining (Temporary Provisions) Act 1981, s 13 Diseases of Fish Act 1983, s 9 Education (Student Loans) Act 1990, Sch 2, para 4 Electricity Act 1989, ss 57 and 98 Electricity (NI) Order 1992, arts 59 and 61 Employment Agencies Act 1973, s 9 Employment and Training Act 1973, s 4 (as amended) Energy Act 1976, Sch 2, para 7 Energy Conservation Act 1981, s 20 Enterprise and New Towns (Scotland) Act 1990, ss 9 and 11 Environmental Protection Act 1990, Sch 3, para 3 Estate Agents Act 1979, s 10 European Communities Act 1972, s 11 Factories Act 1961, s 154 Factories Act (NI) 1965, s 154 Fair Employment (NI) Act 1989, ss 5, 19 and 30 Fair Trading Act 1973, ss 30 and 133 Film Levy Finance Act 1981, s 8 Finance Act 1989, s 182 Financial Services Act 1986, s 179 Fire Precautions Act 1971, s 21 Fire Services (NI) Order 1984, art 41 Fisheries Act 1981, s 12 Fisheries Act (NI) 1966, s 18 Flood Prevention (Scotland) Act 1961, s 10 Food (NI) Order 1989, s 47 Food Safety Act 1990, ss 25 and 32 Food Safety (NI) Order 1991, art 33 Friendly Societies Act 1992, s 63 Gas Act 1965, Sch 6, para 9 Gas Act 1986, s 42 Hallmarking Act 1973, s 9 Harbours Act 1964, s 46 Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974, ss 27 and 28 Health and Safety at Work (NI) Order 1978, arts 29 and 30 Highways Act 1980, s 292

1002   Annex B Horticulture Act (NI) 1966, s 29 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, s 33 (as amended) Industrial Organisation and Development Act 1947, s 5 Industrial Training Act 1982, s 6 Industrial Training (NI) Order 1984, s 28 Industry Act 1975, s 33 Insurance Companies Act 1982, s 47A Interception of Communications Act 1985, Sch 1, para 4 Iron and Steel Act 1982, s 33 Land Development Values (Compensations) Act (NI) 1965, s 40 Land Drainage Act 1991, s 70 Legal Aid Act 1988, s 38 Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986, s 34 Legal Aid, Advice and Assistance (NI) Order 1981, art 24 Livestock Marketing Commission Act (NI) 1967, s 4 Local Government Act 1974, ss 30 and 32 Local Government Finance Act 1982, s 30 (as amended) Local Government Finance Act 1992, ss 21 and 86 Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976, s 15 Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980, s 167 and Sch 20, para 16 Local Government (Scotland) Act 1975, ss 27 and 30 London Building Acts (Amendment) Act 1939, s 142 London County Council (General Powers) Act 1949, s 35 London County Council (General Powers) Act 1957, s 58 Magistrates Courts (NI) Order 1981, art 90 Marketing of Eggs Act (NI) 1957, s 16 Marketing of Potatoes Act (NI) 1964, ss 10 and 13 Medicines Act 1968, s 118 Mental Health Act 1983, s 103 Merchant Shipping Act 1974, ss 3 and 14 Merchant Shipping (Liner Conferences) Act 1982, s 10 National Health Service Act 1977, Schs 11 and 13 National Health Service (Scotland) Act 1978, Sch 10 National Savings Bank Act 1971, s 12 Naval Discipline Act 1957, s 34 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1991, Sch 5 Nuclear Installations Act 1965, s 24 Office and Shop Premises Act (NI) 1966, s 56 Offices, Shops and Railway Premises Act 1963, s 59

List of statutory provisions concerning prohibitions on disclosure   1003 Official Secrets Act 1911, ss 1 and 2 (as amended by Official Secrets Act 1989) Offshore Safety Act 1992, s 5 Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967, ss 8 and 11 Parliamentary Commissioner Act (NI) 1969, s 11 Planning (Hazardous Substances) Act 1990, s 36B Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990, s 88B Planning (NI) Order 1991, art 122 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s 98 Police (NI) Order 1987, art 18 Population (Statistics) Act 1938, s 4 (as amended) Post Office Act 1969, s 65 Post Office (Data Processing Services) Act 1967, s 2 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, s 17 Prices Act 1974, Sch, para 12 Property Misdescriptions Act 1991, Sch, para 7 Public Health (Control of Diseases) Act 1984, s 62 Race Relations Act 1976, s 52 Radioactive Substances Act 1993, ss 34 and 39 Radioactive Materials (Road Transport) Act 1991, s 5 Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, s 9 Rehabilitation of Offenders (NI) Order 1978, art 10 Rent (Agriculture) Act 1976, s 30 Representation of the People Act 1983, s 66 (and Sch 1) Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976, s 41 Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act 1961, s 12 Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) (Scotland) Act 1965, s 11 Road Traffic Regulations Act 1984, s 43 Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries (Protection) (Scotland) Act 1951, s 15 Sea Fish Industry Act 1970, s 14 Sewerage (Scotland) Act 1968, s 50 Sex Discrimination Act 1975, s 61 Sex Discrimination (NI) Order 1976, art 61 Slaughterhouses Act (NI) 1953, s 5 Social Security Administration Act 1992, s 123 Social Security Administration (NI) Act 1992, s 116 Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992, s 16 Social Security (NI) Order 1989, art 21 and Sch 2 (as amended) Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968, s 58 Statistics of Trade Act 1947, s 9

1004   Annex B Statistics of Trade and Employment Order (NI) 1988, arts 7 and 8 (as amended) Statutory Water Companies Act 1991, s 16 Supply Powers Act 1975, s 5 Taxes Management Act 1970, s 6 (and Sch 1) Telecommunications Act 1984, ss 45 and 101 Timeshare Act 1992, Sch, para 5 Town and Country Planning Act 1990, ss 196, 325 and Sch 15, para 14 Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1972, ss 91C, 97B and 97C and 266 Trade Descriptions Act 1968, s 28 Trade Marks Act 1938, ss 28 and 58D Transport Act 1968, s 87 Transport Act (NI) 1967, s 36 Video Recordings 1984, s 16A Water Act 1989, s 174 (as amended) Water Act (NI) 1972, s 24 Water and Sewerage Services (NI) Order 1973, art 52 Water Industry Act 1991, s 206 and Sch 6, para 5 Water Resources Act 1991, ss 204 and 205 Water (Scotland) Act 1980, s 38 Weights and Measures Act 1985, ss 64 and 79 Weights and Measures (NI) Order 1981, arts 36 and 41 Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949, ss 5 and 15

EXAMPLES OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS ON DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION PUNISHABLE BY CRIMINAL SANCTIONS SINCE 1993: 1993: Clean Air Act 1993, s 49(1) Radioactive Substances Act 1993, s 34(1) Railways Act 1993, s 145 1994: Coal Industry Act 1994, s 59(1) Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, ss 14(1) and (2) Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994, s  75 and Sch  15 modifies prohibitions etc Drug Trafficking Act 1994, s 58 – extension to Crown Servants in s 61(1) Value Added Tax Act 1994, s 91(4) 1995: Criminal Appeal Act 1995, s 23

List of statutory provisions concerning prohibitions on disclosure   1005 Criminal Law (Consolidation) Act (Scotland) 1995, s  36 and possibility of extension to Crown Servants through Order of Secretary of State in s 42 Environment Act 1995, s 113 – not clear on sanction London Local Authorities Act 1995, s 41 1996: Chemical Weapons Act 1996, s 32(1) and (4) Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, ss 17 and 18 Employment Rights Act 1996, s 202 has a national security provision Housing Act 1996, s 33(3), (4) and (5) Nursery Education and Grant Maintained Schools Act 1996, Sch 2, paras 3–5 Police Act 1996, s 80 1997: Police Act 1997, s 124 Sexual Offences (Protected Material) Act 1997, s 8, but only in relation to the defendant Social Security Administration (Fraud) Act 1997, s  4 – adds to the list of individuals who face criminal sanction for disclosure under the Social Security Administration Act 1992, s 123 1998: Audit Commission Act 1998, s 49 Bank of England Act 1998, s 37 and Sch 7, esp para 1 Competition Act 1998, s 55 Data Protection Act 1998, s 59 Landmines Act 1998, s 19 Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998, s 63 1999: Access to Justice Act 1999, ss 20 and 125(4) Disability Rights Commission Act 1999, Sch 3, Part IV, para 22 Greater London Authority Act 1999, s 235 – creation of specific CIVIL liability for breach of PPP provisions Health Act 1999, s 24 Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, ss 93 and 158 Local Government Act 1999, s 22(5) extends the sanction in s 49 of the Audit Commission Act 1998 to certain parts Northern Ireland (Location of Victim’s Remains) Act 1999, s 5 – not clear on sanction 2000: City of Newcastle Upon Tyne Act 2000, s 17 Electronic Communications Act 2000, s 4

1006   Annex B Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, ss 351–352 Local Government Act 2000, ss 63 and 95 Postal Services Act 2000, Sch 7 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s 19 Representation of the People Act 2000, s 9 – adds to previous restrictions in the Representation of the People Act 1983 Television Licences (Disclosure of Information) Act 2000, s 3 Terrorism Act 2000, s 39 Utilities Act 2000, s 105 2001: Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, ss 79 and 80 Adoption and Children Act 2001, s 59 2002: Enterprise Act 2002, ss 237 and 245 2003: Communications Act 2003, s 393 Health and Social Care Act 2003, s 136 2004: Child Trust Funds Act 2004, s 18 Pensions Act 2004, s 82 Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004, s 15C 2005: Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005, s 19 Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, ss 35 and 86 Public Services Ombudsman (Wales) Act 2005, s 26 2006: Armed Forces Act 2006, ss 1 and 17 Charities Act 2006, s 72(6) National Health Service Act 2006, ss 201 and 205 and Schs 10 and 11 Health Act 2006, ss 50 and 53 National Lottery Act 2006, s 2 Identity Cards Act 2006, s 27 Childcare Act 2006, s 13B Companies Act 2006, ss 458, 460 and 1224B Equality Act 2006, s 6 Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006, s 111 2007: Serious Crime Act 2007, s 69

List of statutory provisions concerning prohibitions on disclosure   1007 Consumers, Estate Agents and Redress Act 2007, s 29 Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, s 102 Digital Switchover (Disclosure of Information) Act 2007, s 3 Welfare Reform Act 2007, s 43 Statistics and Registration Service Act 2007, s 39 2008: Energy Act 2008, ss 59 and 101 Pensions Act 2008, ss 64 and 142(5) Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, s 76 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, s 25 Housing and Regeneration Act 2008, s 109(6) Health and Social Care Act 2008, ss 76–80 Sale of Student Loans Act 2008, s 7(6) Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, Sch 9B 2009: Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, ss 15–18 2010: Children, Schools and Families Act 2010, ss 11 and 16(2) and (3) Cluster Munitions (Prohibition) Act 2010, s 23 2011: Parliamentary Voting and Constituencies Act 2011, Sch 2, para 19 Postal Services Act 2011, s 56 2012: Civil Aviation Act 2012, Sch 6 Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, ss 33 and 34 Welfare Reform Act 2012, s 129 2013: Crime and Courts Act 2013, Sch 7, para 10(1) and (2) Energy Act 2013, Sch 9 2014: Defence Reform Act 2014, Sch 5 Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014, Sch 11 Mesothelioma Act 2014, s 8 2015: Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, s 74 and Sch 10, paras 15 and 25 2016: Investigatory Powers Act 2016, ss 57, 58, 82, 134, 173, 196 and 224

1008   Annex B 2018: Data Protection Act 2018, s 132

SECONDARY LEGISLATION (UNTIL 1992) Abortion Regulations 1991 (SI 1991/499), reg 5 Abortion (Scotland) Regulations 1991 (SI 1991/460), reg 5 Act of Sederunt (Adoption of Children) 1984 (SI 1984/1013), paras 9 and 24 Adoption Agencies Regulations 1983 (SI 1983/1964), reg 14 Adoption Agencies Regulations (NI) 1989 (SR 1989/253), reg 14 Adoption Agencies (Scotland) Regulations 1982 (SI 1982/34), reg 17 Adoption Agencies (Scotland) Regulations 1984 (SI 1982/988), reg 24 Adoption Rules 1984 (SI 1984/265), r 53 Alcoholometers and Alcohol Hydrometers (EEC  Requirements) Regulations 1977 (SI 1977/1753), reg 13 Arrangements for Placement of Children (General) Regulations 1991 (SI 1991/890), regs 9 and 10 Calibration of Tanks of Vessels (EEC  Requirements) Regulations 1975 (SI 1975/2125), reg 9 Child Support Commissioners (Procedure) Regulations (NI) 1993 (SR 1993/42), reg 22 Community Health Councils Regulations 1985 (SI 1985/304), reg 20 Construction Products Regulations 1991 (SI 1991/1620), reg 25 Construction Plant and Equipment (Harmonisation of Noise Emission Standards) Regulations 1985 (SI 1985/1968), reg 4 Construction Plant and Equipment (Harmonisation of Noise Emission Standards) Regulations 1988 (SI 1988/361), reg 4 Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1984 (SI 1984/1902), reg 13 Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards Regulations (NI)1985 (SR 1985/175), reg 13 Control of Misleading Advertisements Regulations 1988 (SI 1988/915), reg 7 County Courts Rules (NI) 1981 (SR 1981/225) (as amended), r 32 Criminal Appeal (Reference of Points of Law) (NI) Rules 1973 (SR 1973/428), r6 Education (Special Educational Needs) Regulations (SI 1983/29), reg 11 Electromagnetic Compatibility Regulations 1992 (SI 1992/2372), reg 97 Electrically, Hydraulically and Oil-Electrically Operated Lifts (Components) (EEC Requirements) Regulations 1991 (SI 1991/2748), reg 3 Falling-object Protective Structures for Construction Plant (EEC Requirements) Regulations 1988 (SI 1988/363), reg 4 Fossil Fuel Levy Regulations 1990 (SI 1990/266), reg 36

List of statutory provisions concerning prohibitions on disclosure   1009 Foster Placement (Children) Regulations 1991 (SI 1991/910), reg 14 Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained Use) Regulations (SI 1992/3217), reg 15 Magistrates’ Courts (Adoption) Rules 1984 (SI 1984/611), rr 5 and 32 Measuring Container (SI 1977/932), reg 8

Bottles

(EEC  Requirements)

Regulations

1992

1977

Measuring Instruments (EEC Requirements) Regulations 1988 (SI 1988/186), reg 26 Milk Marketing Boards (Special Conditions) Regulations 1981 (SI  1981/322), reg 7 National Savings Stock Register Regulations 1976 (SI 1976/2012), reg 57 National Health Service (General Medical Services) Regulations 1992, Sch  2, para 50 National Health Service (Venereal Diseases) Regulations 1974 (SI  1974/29), reg 2 Natural Mineral Waters Regulations 1985 (SI 1985/71), reg 17 Non-automatic Weighing Instruments (EEC Requirements) Regulations 1992 (SI 1992/1579), reg 38 Notification of New Substances Regulations 1982 (SI 1982/1946), reg 10 Offshore Installations (Inspectors (SI 1973/1842), regs 6 and 7

and

Casualties)

Regulations

1973

Package Travel, Package Holidays and Package Tour Regulations 1992 (SI 1992/3288), Sch 3, para 7 Personal Protective Equipment (EC Directive) Regulations 1992 (SI 1992/3139), reg 3 Petroleum Production (Landward Areas) Regulations 1984 (SI  1984/1832), Sch 4, para 26 and Sch 5, para 28 Petroleum Production (Seaward Areas) Regulations 1988 (SI 1988/1213), Sch 4, para 34 and Sch 5, para 15 Placement of Children with Parents etc Regulations 1991 (SI 1991/893), Sch 2 Police (Discipline) Regulations 1985 (SI 1985/518), Sch 1, para 6 Premium Savings Bonds Regulations 1972 (SI 1972/765), reg 30 Prison (Scotland) Rules 1952 (SI 1952/585), r 184 Public Health (Infectious Diseases) Regulations 1988 (SI 1988/1546), reg 12 Public Supply Contract Regulations 1991 (SI 1991/2679), reg 18 Roll-over Protective Structures for Construction Plant (EEC  Requirement) Regulations 1988 (SI 1988/363), reg 4 Savings Contracts Regulations 1969 (SI 1969/1342), reg 26 Savings Certificates (Yearly Plan) Regulations 1984 (SI 1984/779), reg 31 Savings Certificates (Children’s Bonus Bonds) Regulations 1991 (SI 1991/1407), reg 28

1010   Annex B Savings Certificates Regulations 1991 (SI 1991/1031), reg 31 Self-Propelled Industrial Trucks (EEC  Requirements) Regulations 1988 (SI 1988/1736), reg 4 Supply of Machinery (Safety) Regulations 1992 (SI 1992/3073), Sch 6, paras 1–3 Simple Pressure Vessels (Safety) Regulations 1991 (SI  1991/2749), Sch  5, paras 1–3 Taximeters (EEC Requirements) Regulations 1979 (SI 1979/1379), reg 15 Telecommunications Terminal Equipment Regulations 1992 (SI  1992/2423), reg 85 Uncertificated Securities Regulations 1992 (SI 1992/225), reg 113

A SELECTION OF MORE RECENT OFFENCES CREATED BY SIs 1997: Airports (Groundhandling) Regulations 1997 (SI 1997/2389), reg 23 2003: Nuclear Industries Security Regulations 2003 (SI 2003/403), reg 25 2005: Access to Information (Post-Commencement Adoptions) (Wales) Regulations 2005 (SI 2005/2689), reg 19 Disclosure of Adoption Information (Post-Commencement Adoptions) Regulations 2005 (SI 2005/888), reg 21 Road Transport (Working Time) Regulations 2005 (SI 2005/639), reg 17 2008: Cross-border Railway Services (Working Time) Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/1660), reg 11 2011: Trade in Animals and Related Products Regulations 2011 (SI 2011/1197), reg 39 Trade in Animals and Related Products (Wales) Regulations 2011 (SI 2011/2379), reg 39 2012: Customs Disclosure of Information and Miscellaneous Amendments Regulations 2012 (SI 2012/1848), reg 3 Human Medicines Regulations 2012 (SI 2012/1916), reg 334 2013: Construction Products Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/1387), reg 22

Index

All references are to paragraph number A

Absolute exemptions court records, 1.152–1.157 information accessible to applicant, 1.111– 1.113 introduction, 1.105–1.107 late reliance on an exemption, 1.231–1.233 legal obligation of confidence, 1.203–1.208 Parliamentary privilege, 1.162–1.163 prejudice to conduct of public affairs, 1.182–1.188 prohibition by enactment, 1.224–1.230 security bodies, 1.117–1.123 Abuse of position MPs and ministers, and, 7.16 Academic attainment records education authorities, and, 9.28–9.35 Academies education, and conversion, 9.51 reports, 9.38 Access to documents of local authorities additional information, 8.65 availability at meeting, 8.55 background papers, 8.58–8.59, 8.63 community councils, 8.77–8.80 community health councils, 8.81 conclusion, 8.85 confidential information, 8.64 decisions to be made available to public, 8.63 delegated officer decisions, 8.62 exempt documents, 8.49–8.54 exempt information, 8.64 fees, 8.66 general comments, 8.68–8.75 inspection after meetings, 8.60–8.61 introduction, 8.44–8.48 Local Government (Access to Information) Act 1985, under extended provision, 8.81–8.84 general, 8.44–8.75 Local Government Act 2000, under, 8.76 NHS trusts, 8.77 offences, 8.66 parish councils, 8.77–8.80

Access to documents of local authorities – contd press, 8.56–8.57 Public Bodies (Admission to Meetings) Act 1960, under, 8.77–8.80 qualified privilege, 8.67 recording delegated officer decisions, 8.62 water authorities, 8.77 Access to information and see under individual headings central government banning broadcasts, 4.369 civil servants’ duties, 4.146–4.153 Code on Access, 4.6–4.27 confidentiality, 4.312–4.367 elections, 4.118 information provided to Parliament, 4.76–4.99 Internet use, 4.32–4.39 introduction, 4.1–4.5 official secrets, 4.155–4.300 Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, 4.132–4.145 privacy, 4.368 public interest disclosures, 4.301–4.311 public records, 4.62–4.75 publicity for the public, 4.100–4.117 referendums, 4.118 re-use of public sector information, 4.40–4.61 Select Committees, 4.119–4.131 ‘transparency’, 4.28–4.31 ‘war on terror’, and, 4.370 data protection and see Data protection accessible data, 2.190–2.193 common law, at, 2.194–2.197 computer misuse, and, 2.355–2.360 context of reform, 2.1–2.3 Crown, and, 2.187 data exchange, matching and sharing, 2.261–2.275 data held by police, 2.276–2.334 data protection principles, 2.34–2.35 data subjects’ rights, 2.53–2.94

1012  Index Access to information – contd data protection – contd definitions, 2.16–2.32 duties to disclose information, 2.335– 2.342 eIDAS Regulation, 2.354 enforcement, 2.145–2.185 framework for government processing, 2.11 general data processing, 2.12–2.33 human rights, and, 2.215–2.247 Information Commissioner, 2.136–2.185 injunctions, and, 2.256–2.260 intelligence services processing, 2.126– 2.135 introduction, 2.4–2.7 law enforcement processing, 2.104–2.125 lawfulness of processing, 2.36–2.52 media, and, 2.249–2.255 medical/health records, and, 2.198–2.214 offences, 2.180 other general processing, 2.95–2.103 overview, 1.19 Parliament, and, 2.188 police data, 2.276–2.334 Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive, and, 2.343–2.353 protection of privacy, and, 2.215–2.260 special categories of personal data, 2.34 statutory basis, 2.8–2.198 territorial scope, 2.186 transitional provisions, 2.189 documents of local authorities and see Access to documents conclusion, 8.85 Local Government (Access to Information) Act 1985, under, 8.44–8.75 Local Government Act 2000, under, 8.76 Public Bodies (Admission to Meetings) Act 1960, under, 8.77–8.84 European perspective Brexit, and, 5.128–5.129 Council of Europe, 5.132–5.133 European Ombudsman, 5.118–5.127 generally, 5.1–5.17 Regulation on Access, 5.18–5.47 Regulation (EC) 1049/2001, 5.56–5.117 Treaty of Lisbon, 5.48–5.55 freedom of information legislation conclusion, 1.320 differences from White Paper, 1.28–1.43 Independent Commission on Freedom of Information, 1.307–1.308 introduction, 1.1–1.27 operation, 1.48–1.265 preparation, 1.44–1.47 problem areas, 1.266–1.306 Scotland, 1.309–1.317 Wales, 1.318–1.319 local government administrative practice, 6.41–6.69 audit provisions, 6.70–6.85

Access to information – contd local government – contd Commissions for local administration, 6.137–6.159 economic development, 6.186–6.197 executive arrangements, 6.10–6.40 financial administration, 6.86–6.100 introduction, 6.1–6.9 LGHA 1989, 6.101–6.126 local audit, 6.70–6.85 police authorities, 6.203–6.215 public interest disclosure, 6.136 quasi-local government organisations, 6.180–6.182 restrictions on publicity, 6.160–6.179 standards of conduct, 6.127–6.135 voluntary organisations, 6.183–6.185 meetings of local authorities and see Access to meetings conclusion, 8.85 introduction, 8.1–8.3 Local Government (Access to Information) Act 1985, under, 8.3–8.43 Public Bodies (Admission to Meetings) Act 1960, under, 8.77–8.84 public officials and representatives appointments to public bodies, 7.123– 7.125 central government, 7.1–7.18 EU, 7.19 executive agencies, 7.120–7.122 local government, 7.20–7.114 other public bodies, 7.115–7.117 publication of information, 7.118 regulator agencies, 7.119 Access to meetings of local authorities attendance by members, 7.52–7.54 committees, 8.10–8.20 community councils, 8.77–8.80 community health councils, 8.81 conclusion, 8.85 exclusion of the public discretionary, 8.25–8.28 mandatory, 8.21–8.24 exempt information, 8.29–8.34 fire authorities, 8.7–8.9 introduction, 8.1–8.2 Freedom of Information Act 2000, under, 8.35 Greater London Authority, 8.7–8.9 Local Government (Access to Information) Act 1985, under extended provision, 8.81–8.84 general, 8.3–8.43 NHS trusts, 8.77 parish councils, 8.77–8.80 police authorities, 8.7–8.9 pre-decision deliberations, 8.3 press, 8.40–8.43 principal councils, 8.7–8.9 Public Bodies (Admission to Meetings) Act 1960, under, 8.77–8.80

Index  1013 Access to meetings of local authorities – contd public notice, 8.36–8.39 sub-committees, 8.10–8.20 water authorities, 8.77 working parties, 8.10–8.20 Accessibility to applicant generally, 1.111–1.113 guidance, 1.47 Account monitoring order litigation, and, 11.121 Accounts inspection, 9.10–9.18 Ad hoc inquiries redress of complaints, and, 10.103–10.105 Administration of justice freedom of information, and, 1.144 Administration Ombudsman (Wales) disclosure to and from IC, and, 1.260 Admission arrangements appeal procedures, 9.43–9.45 generally, 9.20–9.24 ADR redress of complaints, and, 10.67–10.70 Advice and assistance freedom of information, and, 1.83 Alcohol licensing disclosure powers, and, 9.260–9.264 Altering records freedom of information, and, 1.264 Alternative dispute resolution redress of complaints, and, 10.67–10.70 Annual reports publication, and, 4.93 Anonymity of witness redress of complaints, and, 10.120 Anti-terrorism legislation fair hearing, and, 10.132 generally, 4.370 opportunity to be heard, and, 10.127 reasons for decisions, and, 10.157 redress of grievance with authorities, and, 10.80 Anton Piller orders generally, 11.118–11.120 Apologies redress of complaints, and, 10.27 Appeal tribunal and see Information Tribunal background, 1.31–1.34 costs awards, 1.253 generally, 1.246–1.252 jurisdiction, 1.254 Ministerial certificates, and, 1.297 union with DPT, 1.267–1.268 Appeals data protection, and, 2.164 education, and, 9.43–9.45 environmental information, and, 9.231 planning, and, 9.81–9.84 Application for access under FOIA advice and assistance, 1.83 appeals costs awards, 1.253

Application for access under FOIA – contd appeals – contd generally, 1.246–1.252 jurisdiction, 1.254 clarification, 1.84 compliance time generally, 1.75–1.77 problem areas, 1.285–1.286 decision notices failure to comply, 1.246 generally, 1.236 disclosures to the ‘whole world’, 1.80 enforcement appeals, 1.246–1.254 decision notices, 1.236 enforcement notices, 1.238 failure to comply with notices, 1.246 generally, 1.234–1.238 information notices, 1.244–1.245 national security memorandum, 1.238 overriding decision on public interest, 1.239–1.240 Prince of Wales correspondence, 1.241– 1.243 enforcement notices failure to comply, 1.246 generally, 1.236 excessive cost, 1.71 exemptions audit functions, 1.158–1.161 background, 1.15–1.16 commercial interests, 1.215–1.223 Communications with Her Majesty etc, 1.194–1.195 confidential information, 1.203–1.208 court records, 1.152–1.157 defence, 1.127–1.128 departures from the White Paper, 1.35–1.39 devolution, and, 1.134–1.136 economic interests, 1.137–1.138 environmental information, 1.198–1.199 generally, 1.104–1.107 government policy, 1.164–1.181 health and safety, 1.196–1.197 incompatible with Community obligations, 1.224–1.230 information accessible to applicant, 1.111–1.113 information intended for future publication, 1.114–1.116 international relations, 1.129–1.133 intra-UK relations, 1.134–1.136 investigations conducted by public authorities, 1.139–1.143 late reliance on an exemption, 1.231– 1.233 law enforcement, 1.144–1.151 legal obligation of confidence, 1.203– 1.208 legal professional privilege, 1.209–1.214 national security, 1.124–1.126 official secrets, 1.224–1.230

1014  Index Application for access under FOIA – contd exemptions – contd Parliamentary privilege, 1.162–1.163 personal information, 1.200–1.202 policy formulation, 1.164–1.181 policy-making exemption, 1.189–1.193 prejudice to conduct of public affairs, 1.182–1.193 proceedings conducted by public authorities, 1.139–1.143 prohibition by enactment, 1.224–1.230 refusal of request, 1.108–1.110 security bodies, 1.117–1.123 trade secrets, 1.215–1.223 fees excessive cost, 1.71 generally, 1.72 notices, 1.73–1.74 form generally, 1.70 problem areas, 1.291–1.292 functions of Ministers and the IC, 1.255– 1.258 generally, 1.64 ‘holds information’, 1.65–1.70 information notices failure to comply, 1.246 generally, 1.244–1.245 method of communication, 1.78–1.79 ‘public authorities’ designated private bodies, 1.303–1.304 generally, 1.85–1.95 public interest disclosures, 1.98–1.103 refusal of request, 1.108–1.110 repeated requests, 1.81–1.82 transferred records, 1.96–1.97 vexatious requests, 1.81–1.82 Appointments to public bodies public officials and representatives, and, 7.123–7.125 Article 255 EC Treaty access to EU documents, and, 5.18–5.19 Assembly Ombudsman (NI) disclosure to and from IC, and, 1.260 Assessment notices appeals, 2.164 generally, 2.150 guidance, 2.163 restrictions, 2.151 Assessment of tax freedom of information, and, 1.144 Attorney General consent to prosecution, and, 4.261 Audit Commission generally, 6.70–6.85 Audit functions freedom of information, and, 1.158–1.161 local government, and, 6.70–6.85 public records, and, 4.67 Authorisation surveillance, and, 4.212–4.216 Automated decision-making authorised by law, 2.51

Automated decision-making – contd comparison between DPA 1998 and GDPR, 2.63 generally, 2.61 intelligence services processing, 2.131 law enforcement processing, 2.121 Automatic forwarding of calls electronic communications, and, 2.349

B

Background papers access to public authority documents, and, 8.58–8.59 , 8.63 Balance of interests Code on Access 1994, and, 4.20–4.27 BBC communication with the public, and, 4.101 Behaviour records education, and, 9.29 Bell case reporting restrictions, and, 11.12 Blocking records freedom of information, and, 1.264 Bowman Review redress of complaints, and, 10.47 Breach of confidence generally, 1.203–1.208 third party rights, 1.276 Brexit access to documents, 5.129 generally, 5.128 Bribery civil servants, and, 7.19 Broadcasts banning orders, 4.369 BSE inquiry freedom of information, and, 1.167 Budget Day Internet, and, 4.32 Budgeting disclosure powers, and, 9.4 Bulger case reporting restrictions, and, 11.12 Butler Inquiry freedom of information, and, 1.7

C

Cabinet Committees freedom of information, and, 1.103 Call tracing electronic communications, and, 2.349 Calling line identification electronic communications, and, 2.347 Care Quality Commission dispute resolution, and, 10.90 Central government anti-terror legislation, and, 4.370 available options, 4.1–4.5 banning broadcasts, 4.369 Citizen’s Charter, 4.8 civil servants duties and responsibilities, 4.146–4.153 Select Committees, and, 4.125–4.131

Index  1015 Central government – contd Code on Access background, 4.7–4.8 balance of interests, 4.20–4.27 generally, 4.18–4.19 introduction, 4.6–4.9 replacement, 4.6 revision, 4.19 supervision, 4.10–4.17 confidentiality contempt of court, 4.365–4.367 copyright, 4.313–4.314 ECHR, and, 4.343–4.346 employment relationships, 4.315 iniquities, and, 4.355–4.364 interim injunctions, 4.347–4.354 introduction, 4.312 just excuse, and, 4.355–4.364 protectable information, 4.320–4.322 public interest defence, 4.323–4.328 public secrets, and, 4.329–4.331 remedies for breach, 4.316 restraint of publication, 4.317 Spycatcher litigation, 4.332–4.342 trivial information, 4.318 Crown copyright, 4.313–4.314 elections, 4.118 information provided to Parliament debates, 4.92 introduction, 4.76 Ministerial Code, 4.99 Parliamentary papers, 4.89–4.91 private notice questions, 4.85 publications, 4.93–4.97 Question Time, 4.77–4.84 urgent questions, 4.85 written answer questions, 4.86–4.88 Internet use, 4.32–4.39 introduction, 4.1–4.5 Ministerial Code, 4.99 Official Secrets Act 1911 consent to prosecution, 4.160 introduction, 4.154 penalties for harbouring spies, 4.161 penalties for spying, 4.155–4.158 repealed provision, 4.162 Official Secrets Act 1920, 4.159–4.160 Official Secrets Act 1989 Attorney General’s role, 4.261 background, 4.166–4.170 categories of protected information, 4.176–4.249 consent to prosecution, 4.261 crime, 4.192–4.193 D notices, 4.279–4.280 defence, 4.184–4.186 defences, 4.266–4.272 disclosure to MPs, 4.273–4.274 ECHR, and, 4.289–4.299 exclusion of public from proceedings, 4.264–4.265 information entrusted in confidence by or to other states etc, 4.238–4.249

Central government – contd Official Secrets Act 1989 – contd information obtained by interception, 4.194–4.237 international relations, 4.187–4.191 introduction, 4.163–4.165 Law Commission consultation, 4.300 ‘lawful authority’, 4.250–4.256 legal professional privilege, 4.275–4.278 memoirs, and, 4.281–4.288 penalties, 4.262 police powers, 4.263 prior publication, 4.270–4.272 public interest defence, 4.266–4.269 safeguarding information, 4.257–4.260 security classifications, 4.171–4.175 papers, 4.89–4.91 Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration Code on Access, and, 4.10–4.17 generally, 4.132–4.145 Parliamentary debates, 4.92 privacy, 4.368 private notice questions, 4.85 provision of information Parliament debates, 4.92 introduction, 4.76 Ministerial Code, 4.99 Parliamentary papers, 4.89–4.91 private notice questions, 4.85 publications, 4.93–4.97 Question Time, 4.77–4.84 urgent questions, 4.85 written answer questions, 4.86–4.88 public interest disclosures, 4.301–4.311 public officials and representatives, and civil servants, 7.17–7.18 introduction, 7.1 ministers, 7.2–7.16 MPs, 7.2–7.16 public records, 4.62–4.75 publications House of Commons scheme, 4.98 generally, 4.93–4.97 publicity for the public, 4.100–4.117 Question Time, 4.77–4.84 redress of complaints, and, 10.72–10.85 re-use of public sector information Advisory Panel on Public Sector Information, 4.59 asset lists, 4.44–4.46 availability of documents, 4.54 charging, 4.47–4.48 complaints, 4.56 dispute resolution, 4.56–4.58 exclusive arrangements, 4.50 format of documents, 4.54 freedom of information, 4.60 introduction, 4.40 licensing, 4.49 non-discrimination, 4.61 objectives, 4.41 openness, 4.51–4.52

1016  Index Central government – contd re-use of public sector information – contd partnerships, 4.43 principles, 4.41 processing applications, 4.53 redress, 4.56 right to refuse, 4.55 scope, 4.42 transparency, 4.51–4.52 referendums, 4.118 Select Committees civil servants, and, 4.125–4.131 generally, 4.119–4.124 terrorism, and, 4.370 ‘transparency’, 4.28–4.31 urgent questions, 4.85 ‘war on terror’, and, 4.370 whistleblowers, 4.301–4.311 written answer questions, 4.86–4.88 Chief finance officers generally, 6.87–6.99 reports, 9.4–9.6 Children civil hearings, 11.6–11.9 criminal proceedings, 11.10–11.11 data protection, and, 2.43 protective orders into adulthood, 11.12 Children’s social services dispute resolution, and, 10.90–10.102 Civil defence disclosure powers, and, 9.282 Citizen’s Charter generally, 4.8 redress of complaints, and generally, 10.10 introduction, 10.5 City of London local government, and, 6.2 Civil action freedom of information, and generally, 1.262 problem areas, 1.299 Civil servants duties and responsibilities, 4.146–4.153 EC institutions, in, 7.19 generally, 7.17–7.18 political activity prohibitions, 7.123 Select Committees, and, 4.125–4.131 Clarification freedom of information, and, 1.84 Classes of documents generally, 1.40 ‘harm’ test, and, 1.28–1.30 Code of Practice on Consultation freedom of information, and, 1.306 Code on Access (EU) generally, 5.16–5.17 Code on Access 1994 (revised) background, 4.7–4.8 balance of interests, 4.20–4.27 generally, 4.18–4.19 introduction, 4.6–4.9 replacement, 4.6

Code on Access 1994 (revised) – contd revision, 4.19 supervision, 4.10–4.17 Codes freedom of information, and, 1.22–1.27 Codes of Practice consultation under FOIA, 1.306 records management, 4.66 Commercial enterprise EU Directives, 9.153–9.157 generally, 9.146–9.152 Local Government (Contracts) Act 1997, 9.158 Commercial interests freedom of information, and generally, 1.215–1.223 government contractors, 1.279–1.285 guidance, 1.47 problem areas, 1.298 third party rights, 1.278 public records, and, 4.67 Commissioner for Complaints (NI) disclosure to and from IC, and, 1.260 Commissions for Local Administration generally, 6.137–6.144 guidance on access, 1.3 investigation reports, 6.145–6.159 public awareness, 4.145 redress of complaints, and, 10.13 Committee of Inquiry reports publication, and, 4.93 Committees access to meetings, and, 8.10–8.20 membership, 7.55–7.56 Common law data protection, and, 2.194–2.197 public officials and members, and, 7.66–7.76 Communication methods freedom of information, and generally, 1.78–1.79 introduction, 1.10 Communications with Her Majesty etc freedom of information, and, 1.194–1.195 public records, and, 4.67 Communiques publication, and, 4.93 Community councils access to public authority documents and meetings, and, 8.77–8.80 local government, and, 6.5 Community health councils access to public authority documents and meetings, and, 8.81 Compensation data protection, and GDPR, of, 2.168 other DP legislation, of, 2.169 electronic communications, and, 2.351 redress of complaints, and, 10.27 Competition investigations Commission’s powers, 11.125–11.131 Complaints resolution ad hoc inquiries, 10.103–10.105

Index  1017 Complaints resolution – contd ADR, and, 10.67–10.70 anonymity of witness, 10.120 apologies, 10.27 attitudes, 10.44–10.45 best practice, 10.19–10.26 Bowman Review, 10.47 Care Quality Commission, 10.90 central government, in, 10.72–10.85 children’s social services, 10.92–10.102 Citizen’s Charter generally, 10.10 introduction, 10.5 Commission for Local Administration, 10.13 compensation, 10.27 consultation generally, 10.167–10.171 remedy, 10.172–10.173 courts, and, 10.52–10.61 cross-examination, 10.146–10.151 encouraging good practice, 10.29–10.43 explanations, 10.27 fact-finding inquiries, 10.174–10.176 fair hearings anonymity of witness, 10.120 consultation, 10.167–10.173 content, 10.131–10.140 cross-examination, 10.146–10.151 ECHR, 10.118 fact-finding inquiries, 10.174–10.176 generally, 10.114–10.121 legal representation, 10.141–10.145 method of procedure, 10.119 natural justice, 10.117 opportunity to be heard, 10.122–10.128 Parole Board, 10.120–10.121 preliminary hearings, 10.129–10.130 reasons for decisions, 10.152–10.163 standards demanded by courts, 10.164– 10.166 freedom of information, and, 1.302 freephone numbers, 10.17 internal complaints, 10.3–10.7 introduction, 10.1–10.2 legal representation, 10.141–10.145 Leggatt Review generally, 10.47 response, 10.62–10.66 local government, in, 10.86–10.102 maladministration, and, 10.50–10.51 National Health Service, 10.106–10.113 natural justice, 10.117 nature of complaints, 10.8–10.14 Ombudsman Commission, 10.1 Ombudsmen, and, 10.48–10.51 opportunity to be heard, 10.122–10.128 preparation, 10.46 procedure best practice, 10.19–10.26 freephone numbers, 10.17 generally, 10.15–10.17 review arrangements, 10.18 Public Service Ombudsman, 10.71

Complaints resolution – contd reasons for decisions failure to provide reasons, 10.161–10.162 FOIA, under, 10.63 generally, 10.152–10.159 statement, 10.160 remedies, 10.27–10.28 review arrangements, 10.18 self-funders, 10.91 social services functions, 10.90–10.102 Compliance time freedom of information, and generally, 1.75–1.77 problem areas, 1.285–1.286 Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) appointment, 12.7 functions, 12.8 reports, 12.26–12.33 Computer information, orders relating to litigation, and, 11.121 Computer misuse privacy, and, 2.355–2.360 Concealing records freedom of information, and, 1.264 Conduct of public affairs, prejudice to freedom of information, and, 1.182–1.188 public records, and, 4.67 Confidential information freedom of information, and foreign governments and organisations, from, 1.103 generally, 1.203–1.208 guidance, 1.47 official secrets, and, 4.188 Confidentiality civil servants, and, 7.17 contempt of court, 4.365–4.367 copyright, 4.313–4.314 ECHR, and, 4.343–4.346 employment relationships, 4.315 iniquities, and, 4.355–4.364 interim injunctions, 4.347–4.354 introduction, 4.312 just excuse, and, 4.355–4.364 MPs and ministers, and, 7.13 protectable information, 4.320–4.322 public interest defence, 4.323–4.328 public interest immunity, and, 11.75–11.76 public officials and members, and, 7.110– 7.114 public secrets, and, 4.329–4.331 remedies for breach, 4.316 restraint of publication, 4.317 Spycatcher litigation, 4.332–4.342 trivial information, 4.318 Confidentiality clauses freedom of information, and, 1.25 Conflicts of interest civil servants, and, 7.17 Connected line identification electronic communications, and, 2.347 Consent to prosecution official secrets, and, 4.261

1018  Index Consultation generally, 10.167–10.171 housing, and, 9.57–9.66 remedy, 10.172–10.173 Consumer protection disclosure powers, and, 9.265–9.267 Contempt of court confidentiality, and, 4.365–4.367 disclosure, and, 11.38–11.52 litigation, and, 11.7 Contents of documents freedom of information, and, 1.40 Contracting EU Directives, 9.153–9.157 generally, 9.146–9.152 Local Government (Contracts) Act 1997, 9.158 Contractors freedom of information, and, 1.279–1.285 official secrets, and, 4.177 Control orders fair hearing, and, 10.132 redress of grievance with authorities, and, 10.80 Controlled companies local government, and, 6.194–6.195 Copying of intercepted material RIPA 2000, and, 4.205 Copyright confidentiality, and, 4.313–4.314 Corruption civil servants, and, 7.17 Costs environmental information, and, 9.234 planning, and, 9.143 Council of Europe access to EU documents, and, 5.132–5.133 Council of Ministers access to EU documents, and, 5.7 Council tax local government, and, 6.198 Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) generally, 11.132–11.138 Court records freedom of information, and, 1.152–1.157 Courts martial freedom of information, and, 1.143 Covert human intelligence source RIPA 2000, and, 4.211 CPAC investigation freedom of information, and, 1.13–1.14 Credit reference agencies privacy, and, 2.50 Crime data protection, and, 2.67 official secrets, and, 4.192–4.193 Criminal convictions data protection, and conditions for processing, 2.47 generally, 2.34 Criminal investigations freedom of information, and, 1.144 public records, and, 4.67

Criminal purpose legal professional privilege, and, 11.104– 11.105 Criminal Records Bureau duties to disclose information, and, 2.335 Criminal trials public interest immunity, and closed material procedure, 11.81–11.88 code of practice, 11.78–11.79 generally, 11.77–11.82 ‘golden rule’, 11.80 human rights, and, 11.88 Croham Directive publication of background information, and, 4.93 Cross-examination redress of complaints, and, 10.146–10.151 Crown data protection, and, 2.187 Crown copyright civil servants, and, 7.17 confidentiality, and, 4.313–4.314 Customer information orders litigation, and, 11.121

D

D notices official secrets, and, 4.279–4.280 ‘Damage’ test freedom of information, and, 1.28–1.30 Damage to the public interest defence information, 4.184 international relations, 4.189 introduction, 4.167–4.168 security and intelligence information, 4.177 Damages and see Compensation electronic communications, and, 2.351 Data protection access to data comparison between DPA 1998 and GDPR, 2.63 exemptions from data rights, 2.66 generally, 2.57 intelligence services processing, 2.131 law enforcement processing, 2.119 principle, 2.35 accessible data, 2.190–2.193 accountability, and, 2.35 accreditation, 2.103 accuracy of data, 2.35 alteration of personal data to prevent disclosure, 2.174 archiving exemptions from data rights, 2.75 generally, 2.52 Article 29 Working Party, 2.144 assessment notices appeals, 2.164 generally, 2.150 guidance, 2.163 restrictions, 2.151 audits, 2.138

Index  1019 Data protection – contd automated decision-making authorised by law, 2.51 comparison between DPA 1998 and GDPR, 2.63 generally, 2.61 intelligence services processing, 2.131 law enforcement processing, 2.121 ‘binding corporate rules’, 2.32 ‘biometric breach’, 2.32 certification providers, 2.103 charges payable by controllers, 2.142 child abuse, 2.76 children, 2.43 civil penalty notices, 2.158 codes of practice, 2.137–2.185 common law, at, 2.194–2.197 compensation for contravention GDPR, of, 2.168 other DP legislation, of, 2.169 complaints by data subjects generally, 2.165 order to progress, 2.166 computer misuse, and, 2.355–2.360 conditions for processing consent, 2.41 GDPR, and, 2.39–2.40 generally, 2.28–2.36 law enforcement processing, 2.110–2.116 consent generally, 2.30–2.31 lawfulness of processing, and, 2.36–2.37 context of reform, 2.1–2.3 controller charges payable to IC, 2.142 generally, 2.15, 2.30 intelligence services processing, 2.132 law enforcement processing, 2.123 credit reference agencies, 2.50 crime, and, 2.67 criminal convictions conditions for processing, 2.47 generally, 2.34 ‘cross border processing’, 2.32 Crown, and, 2.187 Crown processing, 2.11 data collected from subject comparison between DPA 1998 and GDPR, 2.63 exemptions from data rights, 2.66 generally, 2.54–2.55 ‘data concerning health’, 2.32 data exchange, matching and sharing, 2.261–2.275 data held by police case law, 2.305–2.321 custody images, 2.297 Disclosure and Barring Service, 2.322– 2.330 DNA, 2.331–2.334 fingerprints, 2.331 generally, 2.276–2.278 Police Act 1997, Part V, 2.286–2.296

Data protection – contd data held by police – contd Police National Computer, 2.279–2.285 safeguarding vulnerable groups, 2.298– 2.304 data held outside the UK, 2.135 data minimisation, 2.35 data not obtained from subject comparison between DPA 1998 and GDPR, 2.63 exemptions from data rights, 2.66 generally, 2.56 data portability comparison between DPA 1998 and GDPR, 2.63 exemptions from data rights, 2.66 generally, 2.59 Data Protection Act 2018 background, 2.4 introduction, 2.8–2.10 data protection principles generally, 2.34–2.35 intelligence services processing, 2.130 lawfulness of processing, 2.36–2.52 law enforcement processing, 2.109 data subjects’ rights access to personal data, 2.57 automated processing, 2.61 comparison between DPA 1998 and GDPR, 2.63 data collected from subject, 2.54–2.55 data not obtained from subject, 2.56 data portability, 2.59 erasure, 2.58–2.59 exemptions, 2.64–2.94 information, 2.54–2.56 intelligence services processing, 2.131 introduction, 2.53 invalidity of restrictions or prohibitions, 2.185 law enforcement processing, 2.117–2.122 objection to processing, 2.60 range of, 2.62 rectification, 2.58–2.59 restriction on processing, 2.63–2.94 transparency, 2.53 defence, 2.102 definitions ‘binding corporate rules’, 2.32 ‘biometric breach’, 2.32 ‘consent’, 2.30–2.31 ‘controller’, 2.15, 2.30 ‘cross border processing’, 2.32 ‘data concerning health’, 2.32 definitions, 2.17–2.32 ‘enterprise’, 2.32 ‘filing system’, 2.27–2.29 general data processing, 2.12–2.14 generally, 2.12–2.14 ‘genetic breach’, 2.32 ‘group of undertakings’, 2.32 health data, 2.32 ‘information society service’, 2.32

1020  Index Data protection – contd definitions – contd ‘international organisation’, 2.32 introduction, 2.17 ‘main establishment’, 2.32 outside EU law, 2.33 ‘personal data’, 2.18–2.24 ‘personal data breach’, 2.32 ‘processing’, 2.25 ‘processor’, 2.30 ‘profiling’, 2.26 ‘pseudonymisation’, 2.26 ‘public authority’, 2.16 ‘public body’, 2.16 ‘recipient’, 2.30 ‘relevant and reasoned objection’, 2.32 ‘representative’, 2.32 ‘restriction of processing’, 2.26 ‘supervisory authority’, 2.32 ‘third party’, 2.30 Disclosure and Barring Service barring, 2.329 checks, 2.325–2.327 generally, 2.322–2.324 referrals, 2.328 regulated activity test, 2.330 disclosure of information to Information Commissioner, 2.140 disclosure prohibited or restricted by an enactment, 2.78 disclosures required by law, 2.69 Durant v FSA decision, 2.19–2.24 duties to disclose information, 2.335–2.342 education, 2.76 eIDAS Regulation, 2.354 enforcement appeals, 2.164 assessment notices, 2.150–2.151 compensation for contraventions, 2.168 complaints by data subjects, 2.165–2.166 compliance orders, 2.167 enforcement notices, 2.152–2.156 entry power, 2.157 guidance, 2.163 information notices, 2.147–2.149 inspection power, 2.157 introduction, 2.145 media inquiries, 2.146 news-related material, and, 2.170–2.171 penalty notices, 2.158–2.162 powers, 2.157 enforcement notices appeals, 2.164 cancellation, 2.156 erasure of data, and, 2.154 generally, 2.152 guidance, 2.163 rectification of data, and, 2.154 restrictions, 2.155 supplementary, 2.153 variation, 2.156 ‘enterprise’, 2.32 entry power, 2.157

Data protection – contd erasure of data comparison between DPA 1998 and GDPR, 2.63 exemptions from data rights, 2.66 generally, 2.58–2.59 intelligence services processing, 2.131 law enforcement processing, 2.120 exemptions from and restrictions on data rights archiving, 2.75 based on Art 23(1) GDPR, 2.70–2.71 child abuse, 2.76 comparison between DPA 1998 and GDPR, 2.63 crime, 2.67 disclosure prohibited or restricted by an enactment, 2.78 disclosures required by law, 2.69 education, 2.76 freedom of expression, 2.74 freedom of information, and, 2.81–2.94 generally, 2.64–2.66 health, 2.76–2.77 immigration, 2.68 introduction, 2.63 ‘listed GDPR provisions’, 2.66 other circumstances, in, 2.72 overview, 2.26 power to make by regulations, 2.79 research, 2.75 rules in Articles 13 to 15, 2.73 social work, 2.76–2.77 statistics, 2.75 taxation, 2.67 transfers of personal data to third countries, 2.80 Facebook – Cambridge Analytica, and, 2.1 ‘fake news’, and, 2.2 fees controllers, by, 2.49 Information Commissioner, by, 2.141 ‘filing system’, 2.27–2.29 framework for government processing, 2.11 freedom of access, and, 2.4 freedom of expression, 2.74 freedom of information, and, 2.81–2.94 GDPR 2016 application, 2.10 data subjects’ rights, 2.63 effect on UK law, 2.12–2.13 generally, 2.8–2.9 lawfulness of processing, 2.39–2.40 general data processing definitions, 2.15–2.32 generally, 2.12–2.14 outside EU law, 2.33 ‘genetic data’, 2.34 Google Spain case, and, 2.7 ‘group of undertakings’, 2.32 health data and records avoidance of certain contractual terms, and, 2.183

Index  1021 Data protection – contd health data and records – contd exemptions from data rights, 2.76–2.77 generally, 2.32 ‘health professional’, 2.77 human rights, and, 2.215–2.247 immigration exemptions from data rights, 2.68 generally, 2.68 information about data comparison between DPA 1998 and GDPR, 2.63 generally, 2.54–2.56 intelligence services processing, 2.131 Information Commissioner Article 29 Working Party, 2.144 audits, 2.138 charges payable by controllers, 2.142 codes of practice, 2.137–2.185 disclosure of information to, 2.140 enforcement, and, 2.145–2.185 fees, 2.141 introduction, 2.136 records of national security certificates, 2.139 reports, 2.143 information notices appeals, 2.164 failure to comply, 2.149 generally, 2.147 restrictions, 2.148 ‘information society service’, 2.32 injunctions, and, 2.256–2.260 inspection power, 2.157 intelligence services processing controller obligations, 2.132 data protection principles, 2.130 data subjects’ rights, 2.131 definitions, 2.129 generally, 2.128 introduction, 2.126–2.127 other exemptions, 2.134 processor obligations, 2.132 relevant processing, 2.129 transfer of data to third countries, 2.133 ‘international organisation’, 2.32 introduction, 2.4–2.7 jurisdiction of courts, and, 2.178 knowingly re-identifying de-identified personal data, 2.173 law enforcement processing access by subject, 2.119 automated individual decision-making, 2.121 conditions for sensitive processing, 2.110–2.116 controller obligations, 2.123 data protection principles, 2.109 data subjects’ rights, 2.117–2.122 erasure of data, 2.120 introduction, 2.104–2.108 national security certificates by Minister, 2.125

Data protection – contd law enforcement processing – contd processor obligations, 2.123 rectification of data, 2.120 transfer of data to third countries, 2.124 verification of subjects identity, 2.122 lawfulness of processing additional safeguards, 2.48 archiving, 2.52 automated decision-making authorised by law, 2.51 children, 2.43 consent, 2.41 credit reference agencies, 2.50 criminal convictions, 2.47 fees charged by controllers, and, 2.49 GDPR, and, 2.39–2.40 generally, 2.28–2.36 public interest, 2.42 research, 2.52 special categories of personal data, 2.44–2.45 statistics, 2.52 substantial public interest conditions, 2.46 legitimate interest, 2.37–2.38 ‘listed GDPR provisions’, 2.66 long-standing historical research, 2.101 ‘main establishment’, 2.32 manual unstructured data held by FOI authorities, 2.96–2.100 used in long-standing historical research, 2.101 meaning, 2.5 media, and, 2.249–2.255 medical/health records, and, 2.198–2.214 monetary penalty notices, 2.158 national security generally, 2.102 law enforcement processing, 2.125 records of certificates, 2.139 news-related material, and generally, 2.170 Press Recognition Panel, 2.171 objection to processing of data comparison between DPA 1998 and GDPR, 2.63 exemptions from data rights, 2.66 generally, 2.60 intelligence services processing, 2.131 offences alteration of personal data to prevent disclosure, 2.174 penalties, 2.180 re-identification of personal data, 2.173 requiring employee etc to provide relevant records, 2.181–2.182 unlawfully obtaining personal data, 2.172 other general processing accreditation, 2.103 certification providers, 2.103 defence, 2.102 generally, 2.95 manual unstructured data held by FOI authorities, 2.96–2.100

1022  Index Data protection – contd other general processing – contd manual unstructured data used in longstanding historical research, 2.101 national security, 2.102 outside EU law, 2.33 overseas transfer of data, 2.35 overview, 1.19 Parliament, and, 2.188 penalty notices appeals, 2.164 fixed sums, 2.162 generally, 2.158 guidance, 2.163 maximum amount, 2.161 non-compliance with charges regulations, 2.162 penalties, 2.159 restrictions, 2.160 ‘personal data’ Durant v FSA, 2.19–2.24 introduction, 2.18 special categories, 2.34 ‘personal data breach’, 2.32 police data case law, 2.305–2.321 custody images, 2.297 Disclosure and Barring Service, 2.322– 2.330 DNA, 2.331–2.334 fingerprints, 2.331 generally, 2.276–2.278 Police Act 1997, Part V, 2.286–2.296 Police National Computer, 2.279–2.285 safeguarding vulnerable groups, 2.298– 2.304 Press Recognition Panel, 2.171 Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive, and, 2.343–2.353 privacy protection, and, 2.215–2.260 Privacy Shield, and, 2.1 processing conditions, 2.36–2.40 consent, 2.41 GDPR, and, 2.39–2.40 generally, 2.25 lawfulness, 2.36–2.52 processor generally, 2.30 intelligence services processing, 2.132 law enforcement processing, 2.123 ‘profiling’, 2.26 protection of privacy, and, 2.215–2.260 ‘pseudonymisation’, 2.26 ‘public authority’, 2.16 ‘public body’, 2.16 public interest, 2.42 purpose of data, 2.35 ‘recipient’, 2.30 records of national security certificates, 2.139 rectification of data comparison between DPA 1998 and GDPR, 2.63

Data protection – contd rectification of data – contd exemptions from data rights, 2.66 generally, 2.58–2.59 intelligence services processing, 2.131 law enforcement processing, 2.120 reform context, 2.1–2.3 re-identification of de-identified personal data, 2.173 ‘relevant and reasoned objection’, 2.32 representation of data subjects, 2.184 ‘representative’, 2.32 requiring employee etc to provide relevant records, 2.181–2.182 research exemptions from data rights, 2.75 generally, 2.52 restriction of processing archiving, 2.75 based on Art 23(1) GDPR, 2.70–2.71 child abuse, 2.76 comparison between DPA 1998 and GDPR, 2.63 crime, 2.67 disclosure prohibited or restricted by an enactment, 2.78 disclosures required by law, 2.69 education, 2.76 freedom of expression, 2.74 freedom of information, and, 2.81–2.94 generally, 2.64–2.66 health, 2.76–2.77 immigration, 2.68 introduction, 2.63 ‘listed GDPR provisions’, 2.66 other circumstances, in, 2.72 overview, 2.26 power to make by regulations, 2.79 research, 2.75 rules in Articles 13 to 15, 2.73 social work, 2.76–2.77 statistics, 2.75 taxation, 2.67 transfers of personal data to third countries, 2.80 security of data, 2.35 social media, and, 2.1 social work generally, 2.76–2.77 ‘social work professional’, 2.77 special categories of personal data generally, 2.34 lawfulness of, and, 2.36 processing, 2.44–2.45 special purposes definition, 2.175 introduction, 2.175 proceedings, 2.176–2.177 special purposes data appeals, 2.164 conditions for processing, 2.37 exemptions from data rights, 2.74 information notices, 2.148

Index  1023 Data protection – contd special purposes data – contd penalty notices, 2.160 powers of entry and inspection, 2.157 re-identification of personal data, 2.173 unlawful obtaining of personal data, 2.172 special purposes proceedings provision of assistance, 2.176 stay, 2.177 statistics exemptions from data rights, 2.75 generally, 2.52 statutory basis, 2.8–2.198 storage of data, 2.35 substantial public interest conditions, 2.46 super-injunctions, and, 2.256–2.260 ‘supervisory authority’, 2.32 taxation, and, 2.67 territorial scope generally, 2.186 introduction, 2.10 ‘third party’, 2.30 transfers of data to third countries generally, 2.80 intelligence services processing, 2.133 law enforcement processing, 2.124 transitional provisions, 2.189 transparency, 2.53 Tribunal, 2.179 unlawfully obtaining personal data, 2.172 US, in, 2.3 verification of data subjects’ identity, 2.122 Data Protection Commissioner (DPC) and see Information Commissioner generally, 1.7 union of functions, 1.267 Decision notices failure to comply, 1.246 generally, 1.236 Decisions on Access generally, 5.16 Defacing records freedom of information, and, 1.264 Defamation freedom of information, and, 1.269 MPs and Ministers, and, 7.4 Parliamentary proceedings, and, 4.95 Defence freedom of information, and, 1.127–1.128 official secrets, and, 4.184–4.186 Defence and Security Media Advisory System official secrets, and, 4.279–4.280 Defences prior publication, 4.270–4.272 public interest, 4.266–4.269 Delegation local government members, and, 7.57–7.58 Designated bodies freedom of information, and, 1.11–1.12 Designated officers local government, and, 6.101–6.103

Destroying records freedom of information, and, 1.264 Detection of crime freedom of information, and, 1.144 Devolution freedom of information, and, 1.134–1.136 Direct marketing electronic communications, and, 2.349 Directed surveillance RIPA 2000, and, 4.209 Directive on Re-use of Public Sector Information access to EU documents, and, 5.15 Directories of subscribers electronic communications, and, 2.349 Disability discrimination education, and, 9.20 Disclosure application to withhold, 11.30–11.32 background, 11.18 contempt, and, 11.38–11.52 effect of failure to disclose, 11.34 generally, 11.18–11.34 identity of wrongdoers, 11.38–11.52 judicial review, and, 11.53–11.57 methods, 11.26 non-party generally, 11.28–11.29 strangers to the action, 11.35–11.36 pre-action, 11.27 pre-action protocols, under, 11.25 specific, 11.25 standard, 11.22–11.24 statement of, 11.31 use of disclosed document, 11.37 use of inadvertently disclosed document, 11.33 Disclosure and Barring Service barring, 2.329 checks, 2.325–2.327 generally, 2.322–2.324 referrals, 2.328 regulated activity test, 2.330 Disclosure of information privacy, and, 2.335–2.342 Disclosure of intercepted material RIPA 2000, and, 4.205 Disclosure powers and see under individual headings accounts, inspection of, 9.10–9.18 budgeting, 9.4 chief finance officer’s report, 9.4–9.6 civil defence, 9.282 commercial enterprise EU Directives, 9.153–9.157 generally, 9.146–9.152 Local Government (Contracts) Act 1997, 9.158 contracting EU Directives, 9.153–9.157 generally, 9.146–9.152 Local Government (Contracts) Act 1997, 9.158

1024  Index Disclosure powers – contd education academic attainment records, 9.28–9.35 admission, 9.20–9.24 appeal procedures, 9.43–9.45 behaviour records, 9.29 conversion to academies, 9.51 designation of grammar schools, 9.50 Education Act 1996, 9.46–9.50 Education Act 2002, 9.20–9.45 educational progress reports, 9.29 exclusion appeals, 9.43–9.45 governor’s reports, 9.36–9.37 Inspectors’ reports, 9.39–9.42 introduction, 9.19 parental choice, 9.43–9.45 pupil information, 9.27 pupil records, 9.28–9.35 pupil reports, 9.27 reports on academies, 9.38 school information, 9.23–9.26 School Standards and Framework Act 1998, 9.20–9.45 special educational needs, 9.46–9.49 environmental information advice and assistance, 3.27–3.28 appeals, 3.59 charges, 3.23–3.26 costs, 3.62 emissions, 3.50 enforcement, 3.59–3.61 EU Directive, 3.1–3.3 exceptions, 3.30–3.49 generally, 3.4–3.8 historical records, 3.17 holding information, 3.18 introduction, 3.1–3.3 Ministerial certificates, 3.56–3.57 ‘neither confirm or deny’ provision, 3.49 personal data, 3.52–3.54 pro-active availability, 3.19 refusals, 3.55 Regulations, 3.4–3.63 relationship with FOIA 2000, 3.29 relevant public authorities, 3.12–3.16 representations, 3.58 requests, 3.20–3.22 scope, 3.9–3.11 severance of non-excepted material, 3.51 spatial data, 3.63 working day, 3.17 financial planning, 9.4 formulation of policy, 9.3 generally, 9.1 housing administration, 9.53–9.56 consultation and publicity, 9.57–9.66 disposal of tenancies to PSL, 9.53 housing action trusts, 9.55–9.56 housing associations, 9.54 records, 9.52 right to buy, 9.53 inspection of public accounts, 9.10–9.18

Disclosure powers – contd introduction, 1.265 planning and environment appeals, 9.81–9.84 costs, 9.143 environmental impact assessments, 9.144–9.145 hearings, 9.142 inquiry procedure, 9.120–9.127 introduction, 9.67–9.68 notification of inquiry decision, 9.132– 9.133 post-inquiry procedure, 9.128–9.131 pre-inquiry information, 9.85–9.88 pre-inquiry meetings, 9.89–9.97 publicity for applications, 9.77–9.80 quashing of decision, 9.134–9.138 register of applications, 9.74–9.76 service of proofs of evidence, 9.115–9.119 service of statements of case, 9.98–9.114 statements of policy, 9.69–9.73 written representation procedures, 9.139–9.141 policy and finance budgeting, 9.4 chief finance officer’s report, 9.4–9.6 financial planning, 9.4 formulation of policy, 9.3 generally, 9.2–9.9 inspection of accounts, 9.10–9.18 Disclosure to MPs official secrets, and, 4.273–4.274 Disposal of tenancies to PSL housing, and, 9.53 DNA samples data protection, and, 2.331–2.334 Documents of public authorities additional information, 8.65 availability at meeting, 8.55 background papers, 8.58–8.59 , 8.63 community councils, 8.77–8.80 community health councils, 8.81 conclusion, 8.85 confidential information, 8.64 decisions to be made available to public, 8.63 delegated officer decisions, 8.62 exempt documents, 8.49–8.54 exempt information, 8.64 fees, 8.66 general comments, 8.68–8.75 inspection after meetings, 8.60–8.61 introduction, 8.44–8.48 Local Government (Access to Information) Act 1985, under extended provision, 8.81–8.84 general, 8.44–8.75 Local Government Act 2000, under, 8.76 NHS trusts, 8.77 offences, 8.66 parish councils, 8.77–8.80 press, 8.56–8.57 Public Bodies (Admission to Meetings) Act 1960, under, 8.77–8.80

Index  1025 Documents of public authorities – contd qualified privilege, 8.67 recording delegated officer decisions, 8.62 water authorities, 8.77

E

Economic development local government, and, 6.186 Economic interests freedom of information, and, 1.137–1.138 ‘Economy, efficiency and effectiveness’ NAO functions, and, 12.12–12.15 Education academic attainment records, 9.28–9.35 academies conversion, 9.51 reports, 9.38 admission, 9.20–9.24 appeal procedures, 9.43–9.45 behaviour records, 9.29 conversion to academies, 9.51 data protection, and, 2.76 designation of grammar schools, 9.50 Education Act 1996, 9.46–9.50 Education Act 2002, 9.20–9.45 educational progress reports, 9.29 exclusion appeals, 9.43–9.45 governor’s reports, 9.36–9.37 Inspectors’ reports, 9.39–9.42 introduction, 9.19 parental choice, 9.43–9.45 pupil information, 9.27 pupil records, 9.28–9.35 pupil reports, 9.27 reports on academies, 9.38 school information, 9.23–9.26 School Standards and Framework Act 1998, 9.20–9.45 special educational needs, 9.46–9.49 Electoral Commission referendums, and, 4.118 Electronic Communications Regulations privacy, and, 2.343–2.353 Emergencies disclosure powers, and, 9.282 Employment confidentiality, and, 4.315 medical records, and, 2.181–2.182 MPs and ministers, and, 7.8 public interest disclosure, and, 4.301–4.311 Emergency calls electronic communications, and, 2.349 Encryption RIPA 2000, and, 4.217–4.219 Enforcement environmental information, and, 9.231–9.233 Enforcement notices appeals, 2.164 cancellation, 2.156 erasure of data, and, 2.154 generally, 2.152 guidance, 2.163 rectification of data, and, 2.154

Enforcement notices – contd restrictions, 2.155 supplementary, 2.153 variation, 2.156 Enforcement under DPA appeals, 2.164 assessment notices appeals, 2.164 generally, 2.150 guidance, 2.163 restrictions, 2.151 compensation for contravention GDPR, of, 2.168 other DP legislation, of, 2.169 complaints by data subjects generally, 2.165 order to progress, 2.166 compliance orders, 2.167 enforcement notices appeals, 2.164 cancellation, 2.156 erasure of data, and, 2.154 generally, 2.152 guidance, 2.163 rectification of data, and, 2.154 restrictions, 2.155 supplementary, 2.153 variation, 2.156 entry power, 2.157 guidance, 2.163 information notices appeals, 2.164 failure to comply, 2.149 generally, 2.147 restrictions, 2.148 inspection power, 2.157 introduction, 2.145 media inquiries, 2.146 news-related material, and, 2.170–2.171 penalty notices appeals, 2.164 fixed sums, 2.162 generally, 2.158 guidance, 2.163 maximum amount, 2.161 non-compliance with charges regulations, 2.162 penalties, 2.159 restrictions, 2.160 powers, 2.157 Enforcement under FOIA appeals costs awards, 1.253 generally, 1.246–1.252 jurisdiction, 1.254 decision notices failure to comply, 1.246 generally, 1.236 enforcement notices failure to comply, 1.246 generally, 1.236 failure to comply with notices, 1.246 generally, 1.234–1.238

1026  Index Enforcement under FOIA – contd information notices failure to comply, 1.246 generally, 1.244–1.245 national security memorandum, 1.238 overriding decision on public interest, 1.239–1.240 Prince of Wales correspondence, 1.241– 1.243 Entertainment licensing disclosure powers, and, 9.260–9.264 Environment planning, and, 9.67 Environmental impact assessments planning, and, 9.144–9.145 Environmental information advice and assistance, 3.27–3.28 appeals, 3.59 Brexit, and, 3.2 charges, 3.23–3.26 costs, 3.62 emissions, 3.50 enforcement, 3.59–3.61 EU Directive, 3.1–3.3 exceptions to duty of disclosure introduction, 3.30 ‘neither confirm or deny’ provision, 3.49 Reg 12(4), under, 3.31–3.36 Reg 12(5), under, 3.37–3.48 freedom of information, and generally, 1.198–1.199 introduction, 1.139 generally, 3.4–3.8 historical records, 3.17 holding information, 3.18 introduction, 3.1–3.3 Ministerial certificates, 3.56–3.57 ‘neither confirm or deny’ provision, 3.49 personal data, 3.52–3.54 pro-active availability, 3.19 refusals, 3.55 Regulations, 3.4–3.63 relationship with FOIA 2000, 3.29 relevant public authorities, 3.12–3.16 representations, 3.58 requests, 3.20–3.22 scope, 3.9–3.11 severance of non-excepted material, 3.51 spatial data, 3.63 working day, 3.17 Erasing records freedom of information, and, 1.264 EU officials access to information, and, 7.19 European Commission access to EU documents, and, 5.5 competition investigations, 11.125–11.131 information-gathering powers, 11.122– 11.124 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) confidentiality, and, 4.343–4.346 data protection, and, 2.215–2.247

European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) – contd hearings, and, 11.2 generally, 5.133 identity of child, and, 11.12–11.13 interception of communications, and, 4.233 official secrets, and freedom of expression, 4.290, 4.296–4.299 introduction, 4.289 nature of rights, 4.292–4.295 right to respect for private and family life, 4.291 privacy, and, 2.215–2.247 redress of complaints, and, 10.118 reporting restrictions, and, 11.12–11.13 European Court of Auditors generally, 12.11 European Court of Justice see Court of Justice of the European Union European Ombudsman agencies, and, 5.126 contracts complaints, 5.127 generally, 5.118–5.125 grants complaints, 5.127 European Parliament access to EU documents, and, 5.5 European perspective Article 255 EC Treaty, 5.18–5.19 Brexit, and, 5.128–5.129 Code on Access, 5.16–5.17 Commission, 5.5 Council of Europe, 5.132–5.133 Council of Ministers, 5.7 Decisions for Access, 5.16 Directive on Re-use of Public Sector Information, 5.15 European Convention on Human Rights, 5.133 European Ombudsman agencies, and, 5.126 contracts complaints, 5.127 generally, 5.118–5.125 grants complaints, 5.127 European Parliament, 5.5 introduction, 5.1–5.15 qualified majority voting, and, 5.3, 5.15 Regulation on Access background, 5.18–5.19 beneficiaries of right of access, 5.27 compatibility between general principle and existing rules, 5.26 ‘document’, 5.25 documents covered, 5.23–5.25 exceptions to right of access, 5.28 final provisions, 5.32–5.47 institutions covered, 5.20 processing applications, 5.29–5.31 scope, 5.20–5.26 subjects covered, 5.21–5.22 Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 applications for access to documents, 5.62–5.64

Index  1027 European perspective – contd Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 – contd archives, 5.100 commercial interests, 5.74–5.77 Commission proposals for ‘recasting’, 5.101–5.114 confirmatory applications, 5.90 court proceedings and legal advice, 5.74–5.77 defence and military matters, 5.67–5.73 definitions, 5.59–5.61 European Parliament’s proposals, 5.114– 5.117 exceptions and exemptions, 5.65–5.100 exercise of right to access, 5.91–5.92 financial, monetary or economic policy, 5.67–5.73 generally, 5.56–5.100 international relations, 5.67–5.73 introduction, 5.56 public interest, 5.67–5.73 registers of documents, 5.94 scope, 5.57 sensitive documents, 5.93 relationship between member states, 5.10 three ‘pillars’, and, 5.2 Treaty of Lisbon, 5.48–5.55 Excessive cost freedom of information, and, 1.71 Excluded information under FOIA generally, 1.35 introduction, 1.12 Exclusion appeals education, and, 9.43–9.45 Exclusion of public official secrets proceedings, and, 4.264–4.265 Executive agencies public officials and representatives, and, 7.120–7.122 Executive authorities access to information, 6.29–6.40 advice from political advisers, 6.39 generally, 6.10–6.28 key decisions, 6.32–6.33 key executive decisions, 6.34 membership information, 6.40 publication impracticable, 6.35 Exempt information under FOIA audit functions, 1.158–1.161 background, 1.15–1.16 commercial interests, 1.215–1.223 Communications with Her Majesty etc, 1.194–1.195 confidential information, 1.203–1.208 court records, 1.152–1.157 defence, 1.127–1.128 devolution, and, 1.134–1.136 economic interests, 1.137–1.138 environmental information, 1.198–1.199 generally, 1.104–1.107 government policy, 1.164–1.181 health and safety, 1.196–1.197

Exempt information under FOIA – contd incompatible with Community obligations, 1.224–1.230 information accessible to applicant, 1.111– 1.113 information intended for future publication, 1.114–1.116 international relations, 1.129–1.133 intra-UK governmental relations, 1.134– 1.136 introduction, 1.12 investigations conducted by public authorities, 1.139–1.143 late reliance on an exemption, 1.231–1.233 law enforcement, 1.144–1.151 legal obligation of confidence, 1.203–1.208 legal professional privilege, 1.209–1.214 legislative background, 1.15–1.16 national security, 1.124–1.126 official secrets, 1.224–1.230 Parliamentary privilege, 1.162–1.163 personal information, 1.200–1.202 policy formulation, 1.164–1.181 policy-making, 1.189–1.193 prejudice to conduct of public affairs, 1.182–1.193 proceedings conducted by public authorities, 1.139–1.143 prohibition by enactment, 1.224–1.230 refusal of request, 1.108–1.110 security bodies, 1.117–1.123 trade secrets, 1.215–1.223 White Paper, and, 1.35–1.39 Expenses elections, and, 4.118 Explanations redress of complaints, and, 10.27

F

Fact-finding inquiries redress of complaints, and, 10.174–10.176 Fair hearings anonymity of witness, 10.120 consultation, 10.167–10.173 content, 10.131–10.140 cross-examination, 10.146–10.151 ECHR, 10.118 fact-finding inquiries, 10.174–10.176 generally, 10.114–10.121 legal representation, 10.141–10.145 method of procedure, 10.119 natural justice, 10.117 opportunity to be heard, 10.122–10.128 Parole Board, 10.120–10.121 preliminary hearings, 10.129–10.130 reasons for decisions, 10.152–10.163 standards demanded by courts, 10.164–10.166 Fairness government information, and, 4.5 Family proceedings CPS protocol, 11.17 generally, 11.4 police information protocol, 11.16

1028  Index Fees access to public authority documents, and, 8.66 data protection, and controllers, by, 2.49 Information Commissioner, by, 2.141 freedom of information, and background, 1.26 excessive cost, 1.71 generally, 1.72 guidance, 1.47 notices, 1.73–1.74 public authority documents, and, 8.66 Financial administration local government, and, 6.86–6.99 Financial interests MPs and ministers, and, 7.5 Financial planning disclosure powers, and, 9.4 Fingerprints and samples data protection, and, 2.331–2.334 Fire authorities access to public authority meetings, and, 8.7–8.9 Foreign surveillance RIPA 2000, and, 4.210 Former Ministerial papers generally, 4.4 MPs and ministers, and, 7.13 Formulation of policy disclosure powers, and, 9.3 freedom of information, and, 1.164–1.181 National Audit Office functions, and, 12.16–12.19 public records, and, 4.67 Franks Committee report official secrets, and, 4.165 Fraud computer misuse, and, 2.355–2.360 Freedom of expression data protection, and, 2.74 official secrets, and generally, 4.296–4.299 introduction, 4.290 privacy, and, 2.74 public interest defence, and, 4.324 Spycatcher litigation, and generally, 4.343–4.346 statutory provision, 4.349–4.354 Freedom of information legislation absolute exemptions court records, 1.152–1.157 information accessible to applicant, 1.111–1.113 late reliance on an exemption, 1.231– 1.233 legal obligation of confidence, 1.203– 1.208 Parliamentary privilege, 1.162–1.163 prejudice to conduct of public affairs, 1.182–1.188 prohibition by enactment, 1.224–1.230 security bodies, 1.117–1.123

Freedom of information legislation – contd advice and assistance, 1.83 appeal tribunal background, 1.31–1.34 costs awards, 1.253 generally, 1.246–1.252 jurisdiction, 1.254 union with DPT, 1.267–1.268 application for access advice and assistance, 1.83 clarification, 1.84 compliance time, 1.75–1.77 enforcement, 1.234–1.254 excessive cost, 1.71 exemptions, 1.104–1.233 fees, 1.72–1.74 functions of Ministers and the IC, 1.255– 1.258 generally, 1.64 ‘holds information’, 1.65–1.70 method of communication, 1.78–1.79 ‘public authorities’, 1.85–1.95 public interest disclosures, 1.98–1.103 refusal of request, 1.108–1.110 repeated requests, 1.81–1.82 transferred records, 1.96–1.97 vexatious requests, 1.81–1.82 audit functions, 1.158–1.161 background CPAC investigation, 1.13–1.14 data protection, 1.19 exemptions, 1.15–1.16 Information Commissioner, 1.17–1.18 overview, 1.1–1.12 breach of confidence, 1.203–1.208 Cabinet Committees, 1.103 civil action, and generally, 1.262 problem areas, 1.299 clarification, 1.84 classes of documents, 1.40 Code of Practice on Consultation, 1.306 Codes, 1.22–1.27 commercial interests generally, 1.215–1.223 problem areas, 1.298 communication method, 1.78–1.79 Communications with Her Majesty etc, 1.194–1.195 companies designated as public authorities, 1.303–1.304 complaints procedure, 1.302 compliance time generally, 1.75–1.77 problem areas, 1.285–1.286 conclusion, 1.320 confidential information generally, 1.203–1.208 foreign governments and organisations, from, 1.103 court records, 1.152–1.157 coverage, 1.20–1.21 CPAC investigation, 1.13–1.14

Index  1029 Freedom of information legislation – contd data protection, and generally, 2.81–2.94 introduction, 1.19 defamation, 1.269 defence, 1.127–1.128 departures from the White Paper appeal tribunal, 1.31–1.34 classes of documents, 1.40 exemptions, 1.35–1.39 ‘harm’ test, 1.28–1.30 Ministerial vetoes, 1.41 devolution, and, 1.134–1.136 disclosure log, 1.59 disclosure powers, and and see under individual headings commercial enterprise, 9.146–9.158 contracting, 9.146–9.158 education, 9.19–9.51 generally, 9.1 housing, 9.52–9.66 introduction, 1.265 planning and environment, 9.67–9.145 policy and finance, 9.2–9.18 disclosures to the ‘whole world’, 1.80 economic interests, 1.137–1.138 enforcement appeals, 1.246–1.254 decision notices, 1.236 enforcement notices, 1.238 failure to comply with notices, 1.246 generally, 1.234–1.238 information notices, 1.244–1.245 national security memorandum, 1.238 overriding decision on public interest, 1.239–1.240 Prince of Wales correspondence, 1.241– 1.243 environmental information generally, 1.198–1.199 introduction, 1.139 excessive cost, 1.71 exclusions, 1.12 exemptions audit functions, 1.158–1.161 background, 1.15–1.16 commercial interests, 1.215–1.223 Communications with Her Majesty etc, 1.194–1.195 confidential information, 1.203–1.208 court records, 1.152–1.157 defence, 1.127–1.128 devolution, and, 1.134–1.136 economic interests, 1.137–1.138 environmental information, 1.198– 1.199 generally, 1.104–1.107 government policy, 1.164–1.181 health and safety, 1.196–1.197 incompatible with Community obligations, 1.224–1.230 information accessible to applicant, 1.111–1.113

Freedom of information legislation – contd exemptions – contd information intended for future publication, 1.114–1.116 international relations, 1.129–1.133 intra-UK relations, 1.134–1.136 introduction, 1.12 investigations conducted by public authorities, 1.139–1.143 late reliance on an exemption, 1.231– 1.233 law enforcement, 1.144–1.151 legal obligation of confidence, 1.203– 1.208 legal professional privilege, 1.209–1.214 national security, 1.124–1.126 official secrets, 1.224–1.230 Parliamentary privilege, 1.162–1.163 personal information, 1.200–1.202 policy formulation, 1.164–1.181 policy-making, 1.189–1.193 prejudice to conduct of public affairs, 1.182–1.193 proceedings conducted by public authorities, 1.139–1.143 prohibition by enactment, 1.224–1.230 refusal of request, 1.108–1.110 security bodies, 1.117–1.123 trade secrets, 1.215–1.223 White Paper, and, 1.35–1.39 fees excessive cost, 1.71 generally, 1.72 notices, 1.73–1.74 functions of Ministers and the IC, 1.255– 1.258 good practice, 1.300 government contractors, 1.279–1.285 government policy, 1.164–1.181 ‘harm’ test, 1.28–1.30 health and safety generally, 1.196–1.197 investigations, 1.139 historical background, 1.1–1.4 hygiene breaches, 1.139 incompatible with Community obligations, 1.224–1.230 Independent Commission on Freedom of Information, 1.307–1.308 information accessible to applicant, 1.111– 1.113 information asset register, 1.61–1.63 Information Commissioner (IC) background, 1.17–1.18 disclosure with Ombudsmen, 1.260–1.261 general functions, 1.255–1.259 union with DPC, 1.267–1.268 information intended for future publication, 1.114–1.116 information on contracts, 1.60 Information Tribunal background, 1.31–1.34 costs awards, 1.253

1030  Index Freedom of information legislation – contd Information Tribunal – contd generally, 1.246–1.252 jurisdiction, 1.254 union with DPT, 1.267–1.268 international relations, 1.129–1.133 intra-UK relations, 1.134–1.136 investigations conducted by public authorities, 1.139–1.143 late reliance on an exemption, 1.231–1.233 law enforcement, 1.144–1.151 legal advice, 1.103 legal obligation of confidence, 1.203–1.208 legal professional privilege, 1.209–1.214 Ministerial certificates appeals, 1.297 generally, 1.41 national security, 1.124–1.126 offences, 1.264 official secrets, 1.224–1.230 Ombudsmen, and, 1.260–1.261 onus of proof, 1.301 operation application for access, 1.64–1.97 enforcement, 1.234–1.254 exemptions, 1.104–1.230 functions of Ministers and the IC, 1.255– 1.258 general points, 1.262–1.265 public interest disclosures, 1.98–1.103 public records, 1.259–1.261 publication schemes, 1.48–1.56 refusal of request, 1.108–1.110 overview, 1.1–1.12 Parliamentary privilege, 1.162–1.163 Parliamentary questions, 1.103 personal information, 1.200–1.202 Phillis Review, 1.42 policy advice, 1.103 policy formulation, 1.164–1.181 prejudice to conduct of public affairs, 1.182–1.193 preparations, 1.44–1.47 press releases, 1.103 private bodies designated as public authorities, 1.303–1.304 problem areas civil actions, 1.299 Code of Practice on Consultation, 1.306 commercial interests, 1.298 companies designated as public authorities, 1.303–1.304 complaints, 1.302 defamation, 1.269 good practice, 1.300 government contractors, 1.279–1.285 Ministerial certificates, 1.297 onus of proof, 1.301 private bodies designated as public authorities, 1.303–1.304 purpose of access, 1.295–1.296 reasonable accessibility, 1.294 reasons for decisions, 1.287–1.290

Freedom of information legislation – contd problem areas – contd repeated requests, 1.293 response times, 1.285–1.286 third party rights, 1.270–1.278 union of IC and DPC, 1.267–1.268 unrecorded information, 1.266 use of FOIA, 1.305 use of information, 1.295–1.296 written requests, 1.291–1.292 proceedings conducted by public authorities, 1.139–1.143 professional misconduct, 1.139 prohibition by enactment, 1.224–1.230 ‘public authorities’ designated private bodies, 1.303–1.304 generally, 1.85–1.95 public interest disclosures, 1.98–1.103 public interest test, 1.12 public records disclosure between IC and Ombudsmen, 1.260–1.261 introduction, 1.259 publication schemes disclosure log, 1.59 generally, 1.48–1.56 information asset register, 1.61–1.63 information on contracts, 1.60 minutes, 1.58 purposes, 1.57 purpose of access, 1.295–1.296 reasonable accessibility, 1.294 reasons for decisions, 1.287–1.290 recorded information, 1.266 refusal of request, 1.108–1.110 relevant information, 1.266 repeal of existing provisions, 1.263 repeated requests generally, 1.81–1.82 problem areas, 1.293 requests for information advice and assistance, 1.83 clarification, 1.84 compliance time, 1.75–1.77 enforcement, 1.234–1.254 excessive cost, 1.71 exemptions, 1.104–1.233 fees, 1.72–1.74 functions of Ministers and the IC, 1.255– 1.258 generally, 1.64 ‘holds information’, 1.65–1.70 method of communication, 1.78–1.79 ‘public authorities’, 1.85–1.95 public interest disclosures, 1.98–1.103 refusal of request, 1.108–1.110 repeated requests, 1.81–1.82 transferred records, 1.96–1.97 vexatious requests, 1.81–1.82 requests for legal advice, 1.103 response time generally, 1.75–1.77 problem areas, 1.285–1.286

Index  1031 Freedom of information legislation – contd Scotland, in, 1.309–1.317 security bodies, 1.117–1.123 third party rights, 1.270–1.278 trade secrets, 1.215–1.223 transferred records, 1.96–1.97 unrecorded information, 1.266 use, 1.305 use of information, 1.295–1.296 vexatious requests, 1.81–1.82 Wales, in, 1.318–1.319 written requests, 1.291–1.292 Freedom of speech data protection, and, 2.74 official secrets, and generally, 4.296–4.299 introduction, 4.290 privacy, and, 2.74 public interest defence, and, 4.324 Spycatcher litigation, and generally, 4.343–4.346 statutory provision, 4.349–4.354 Freephone numbers redress of complaints, and, 10.17 Freezing orders litigation, and, 11.116–11.117 Funding voluntary organisations local government, and, 6.183–6.185

G

Gagging clauses public interest disclosure, and, 4.307 Good practice freedom of information, and, 1.300 Government Communications HQ freedom of information, and, 1.118 interception of communications, and, 4.222 Government contractors freedom of information, and, 1.279–1.285 official secrets, and, 4.177 Government policy freedom of information, and, 1.164–1.181 Government replies publication, and, 4.93 Governor’s reports education, and, 9.36–9.37 Grammar schools education, and, 9.50 Greater London Authority access to public authority meetings, and, 8.7–8.9 local government, and, 6.3–6.4 Green Papers publication, 4.93 Grievances and complaints resolution ad hoc inquiries, 10.103–10.105 ADR, and, 10.67–10.70 anonymity of witness, 10.120 apologies, 10.27 attitudes, 10.44–10.45 best practice, 10.19–10.26 Bowman Review, 10.47 central government, in, 10.72–10.85

Grievances and complaints resolution – contd Citizen’s Charter generally, 10.10 introduction, 10.5 Commission for Local Administration, 10.13 compensation, 10.27 consultation generally, 10.167–10.171 remedy, 10.172–10.173 courts, and, 10.52–10.61 cross-examination, 10.146–10.151 encouraging good practice, 10.29–10.43 explanations, 10.27 fact-finding inquiries, 10.174–10.176 fair hearings anonymity of witness, 10.120 consultation, 10.167–10.173 content, 10.131–10.140 cross-examination, 10.146–10.151 ECHR, 10.118 fact-finding inquiries, 10.174–10.176 generally, 10.114–10.121 legal representation, 10.141–10.145 method of procedure, 10.119 natural justice, 10.117 opportunity to be heard, 10.122–10.128 Parole Board, 10.120–10.121 preliminary hearings, 10.129–10.130 reasons for decisions, 10.152–10.163 standards demanded by courts, 10.164– 10.166 freephone numbers, 10.17 internal complaints, 10.3–10.7 introduction, 10.1–10.2 legal representation, 10.141–10.145 Leggatt Review generally, 10.47 response, 10.62–10.66 local government, in, 10.86–10.102 maladministration, and, 10.50–10.51 National Health Service, 10.106–10.113 natural justice, 10.117 nature of complaints, 10.8–10.14 Ombudsman Commission, 10.1 Ombudsmen, and, 10.48–10.51 opportunity to be heard, 10.122–10.128 preparation, 10.46 procedure best practice, 10.19–10.26 freephone numbers, 10.17 generally, 10.15–10.17 review arrangements, 10.18 Public Service Ombudsman, 10.71 reasons for decisions failure to provide reasons, 10.161–10.162 FOIA, under, 10.63 generally, 10.152–10.159 statement, 10.160 remedies, 10.27–10.28 review arrangements, 10.18 Scotland, and, 10.6 Guidance freedom of information, and, 1.47

1032  Index H

Hacking computer misuse, and, 2.355–2.360 Hansard Parliamentary proceedings, and, 4.96 ‘Harm’ test Code on Access 1994, and, 4.20–4.27 freedom of information, and generally, 1.28–1.30 introduction, 1.12 Health data protection, and avoidance of certain contractual terms, and, 2.183 exemptions from data rights, 2.76–2.77 generally, 2.32 Health and safety freedom of information, and generally, 1.196–1.197 investigations, 1.139 Health records data protection, and avoidance of certain contractual terms, and, 2.183 exemptions from data rights, 2.76–2.77 generally, 2.32 Health Service Commissioner disclosure to and from IC, and, 1.260 Hearings ECHR, and, 11.2 generally, 11.2–11.15 planning, and, 9.142 Her Majesty etc, communications with freedom of information, and, 1.194–1.195 public records, and, 4.67 Historical Manuscripts Commission generally, 4.62 Historical records public records, and, 4.70–4.75 Honours system freedom of information, and, 1.194– 1.195 public records, and, 4.70 Housing administration, 9.53–9.56 consultation and publicity, 9.57–9.66 disposal of tenancies to PSL, 9.53 housing action trusts, 9.55–9.56 housing associations, 9.54 records, 9.52 right to buy, 9.53 Housing action trusts disclosure powers, and, 9.55–9.56 generally, 6.197 Housing associations disclosure powers, and, 9.54 Human rights and see European Convention on Human Rights data protection, and, 2.215–2.247 public interest immunity, and, 11.88 Hutton Inquiry freedom of information, and, 1.7

Hygiene breaches freedom of information, and, 1.139

I

Identity of wrongdoers disclosure, and, 11.38–11.52 Immigration controls duties to disclose information, and, 2.68 freedom of information, and, 1.144 In camera hearings litigation, and, 11.2–11.15 Incompatibility with Community obligations freedom of information, and, 1.224–1.230 Informal hearings planning, and, 9.142 Information accessible to applicant freedom of information, and generally, 1.111–1.113 guidance, 1.47 public records, and, 4.71 Information Commissioner (IC) Article 29 Working Party, 2.144 audits, 2.138 background, 1.17–1.18 charges payable by controllers, 2.142 codes of practice, 2.137–2.185 disclosure of information to, 2.140 disclosure to and from Ombudsmen, 1.260– 1.261 enforcement, and and see Enforcement under FOIA generally, 1.234–1.254, 2.145–2.185 fees, 2.141 general functions, 1.255–1.259 introduction, 2.136 records of national security certificates, 2.139 reports, 2.143 union with DPC, 1.267–1.268 Information entrusted in confidence to other states etc official secrets, and, 4.238–4.241 Information intended for future publication freedom of information, and generally, 1.114–1.116 guidance, 1.47 public records, and, 4.71 Information notices data protection, and appeals, 2.164 failure to comply, 2.149 generally, 2.147 restrictions, 2.148 freedom of information, and failure to comply, 1.246 generally, 1.244–1.245 Information obtained by interception additional safeguards, 4.235 authorisation of surveillance, 4.212–4.216 Commissioner, 4.231–4.232 covert human intelligence source, 4.211 directed surveillance, 4.209

Index  1033 Information obtained by interception – contd disclosure and copying of intercepted material, 4.205 encryption, 4.217–4.219 foreign surveillance, 4.208 generally, 4.194–4.199 grievances, 4.207 interceptions authorisation of surveillance, 4.212–4.216 covert human intelligence source, 4.211 directed surveillance, 4.209 foreign surveillance, 4.208 introduction, 4.208 intrusive surveillance, 4.210 tracking devices, 4.210 introduction, 4.200–4.207 intrusive surveillance, 4.210 postal packets, 4.201 tracking devices, 4.210 Tribunal, 4.233–4.234 unlawful interception, 4.203 warrants, 4.205 Information provided to Parliament debates, 4.92 introduction, 4.76 Ministerial Code, 4.99 Parliamentary papers, 4.89–4.91 private notice questions, 4.85 publications, 4.93–4.97 Question Time, 4.77–4.84 urgent questions, 4.85 written answer questions, 4.86–4.91 Information Tribunal background, 1.31–1.34 costs awards, 1.253 generally, 1.246–1.252 jurisdiction, 1.254 union with DPT, 1.267–1.268 Iniquities confidentiality, and, 4.355–4.364 Injunctions privacy, and, 2.256–2.260 restraint of identification into adulthood, and, 11.12 Spycatcher litigation, and freedom of expression, 4.343–4.346 interim relief, 4.347–4.348 permanent relief, 4.338–4.342 statutory restriction, 4.349–4.354 Inquiries (planning) notification of decision, 9.132–9.133 post-inquiry procedure, 9.128–9.131 pre-inquiry information, 9.85–9.88 pre-inquiry meetings, 9.89–9.97 procedure, 9.120–9.127 quashing of decision, 9.134–9.138 service of statements of case, 9.98–9.114 written representation procedures, 9.139– 9.141 Inspection access to public authority documents, and, 8.60–8.61 public authorities’ accounts, and, 9.10–9.18

Inspectors’ reports education, and, 9.39–9.42 Intellectual property rights copyright, 4.313–4.314 introduction, 4.2 Intelligence information official secrets, and, 4.176–4.183 Intelligence Services Act 1994 interception of communications, and, 4.221–4.237 Intelligence Services Commissioner and see Official secrets generally, 4.231–4.232 Intelligence services processing controller obligations, 2.132 data protection principles, 2.130 data subjects’ rights, 2.131 definitions, 2.129 generally, 2.128 introduction, 2.126–2.127 other exemptions, 2.134 processor obligations, 2.132 relevant processing, 2.129 transfer of data to third countries, 2.133 Intelligence Services Tribunal and see Official secrets generally, 4.233–4.234 Interception of communications authorisation of surveillance, 4.212–4.216 Commissioner, 4.231–4.232 covert human intelligence source, 4.211 directed surveillance, 4.209 disclosure and copying of intercepted material, 4.205 encryption, 4.217–4.219 foreign surveillance, 4.208 generally, 4.194–4.199 grievances, 4.207 interceptions authorisation of surveillance, 4.212–4.216 covert human intelligence source, 4.211 directed surveillance, 4.209 foreign surveillance, 4.208 introduction, 4.208 intrusive surveillance, 4.210 tracking devices, 4.210 introduction, 4.200–4.207 intrusive surveillance, 4.210 postal packets, 4.201 tracking devices, 4.210 Tribunal, 4.233–4.234 unlawful interception, 4.203 warrants, 4.205 Interim injunctions confidentiality, and, 4.347 Internal complaints redress of complaints, and, 10.3–10.7 International courts freedom of information, and, 1.129 International organisations freedom of information, and, 1.129 International relations freedom of information, and, 1.129–1.133

1034  Index International relations – contd official secrets, and, 4.187–4.191 Internet government websites, 4.32–4.39 Interrogatories litigation, and, 11.112 Intrusive surveillance RIPA 2000, and, 4.210 Investigation of crime freedom of information, and, 1.144 public records, and, 4.67 Investigations conducted by public authorities freedom of information, and, 1.139–1.143 Investigatory Powers Act 2016 additional safeguards, 4.235 background, 4.202 future amendments, and, 4.236–4.237 introduction, 4.203–4.207 Iraq war freedom of information, and, 1.167

J

Judicial inspection public interest immunity, and, 11.70–11.74 Judicial review disclosure, and, 11.53–11.57 freedom of information, and, 1.31–1.33 Just excuse confidentiality, and, 4.355–4.364

L

Law enforcement freedom of information, and, 1.144–1.151 Lawful authority official secrets, and, 4.250–4.256 Legal advice freedom of information, and, 1.103 Legal advice privilege and see Legal professional privilege generally, 11.92–11.94 Legal aid applications privilege, and, 11.111 Legal obligation of confidence freedom of information, and, 1.203–1.208 Legal professional privilege classes, 11.90 complaints to PCA, and, 4.138 criminal purpose, and, 11.104–11.105 freedom of information, and generally, 1.209–1.214 guidance, 1.47 generally, 11.89–11.102 legal advice privilege, 11.92–11.94 litigation privilege, 11.95–11.100 miscellaneous points, 11.106–11.110 official secrets, and, 4.275–4.278 PACE 1984, and, 11.103 public records, and, 4.67 secondary evidence of privileged document, 11.108 tax liabilities, 11.106 use of documents in court, 11.107

Legal professional privilege – contd waiver, 11.101 Legal representation redress of complaints, and, 10.141–10.145 Leggatt Review generally, 10.47 response, 10.62–10.66 Licensing disclosure powers, and, 9.260–9.264 List of documents disclosure, and, 11.31 Litigation account monitoring orders, 11.121 Anton Piller orders, 11.118–11.120 children civil proceedings, 11.6–11.9 criminal proceedings, 11.10–11.11 protective orders into adulthood, 12.16 CJEU proceedings, 11.132–11.138 computer information, orders relating to, 11.121 contempt, 11.7 CPS protocol, 11.17 customer information orders, 11.121 disclosure application to withhold, 11.30–11.32 background, 11.18 contempt, and, 11.38–11.52 effect of failure to disclose, 11.34 generally, 11.18–11.34 identity of wrongdoers, 11.38–11.52 judicial review, and, 11.53–11.57 methods, 11.26 non-party, 11.28–11.29, 11.35–11.36 pre-action, 11.27 pre-action protocols, under, 11.25 specific, 11.25 standard, 11.22–11.24 statement of, 11.31 strangers to the action, 11.35–11.36 use of disclosed document, 11.37 use of inadvertently disclosed document, 11.33 European law CJEU proceedings, 11.132–11.138 Commission’s powers, 11.122–11.124 competition investigations, 11.125–11.131 family proceedings CPS protocol, 11.17 generally, 11.4 police information protocol, 11.16 freezing orders, 11.116–11.117 hearings ECHR, and, 11.2 generally, 11.2–11.15 in camera hearings, 11.2–11.15 interrogatories, 11.112 introduction, 11.7 legal professional privilege classes, 11.90 criminal purpose, and, 11.104–11.105 generally, 11.89–11.102 legal advice privilege, 11.92–11.94

Index  1035 Litigation – contd legal professional privilege – contd litigation privilege, 11.95–11.100 miscellaneous points, 11.106–11.110 PACE 1984, and, 11.103 secondary evidence of privileged document, 11.108 tax liabilities, 11.106 use of documents in court, 11.107 waiver, 11.101 Mareva injunctions, 11.116–11.117 money laundering, and, 11.121 private hearings, 11.2–11.15 privilege legal aid applications, 11.111 legal professional, 11.89–11.110 self-incrimination, 11.111 without prejudice communications, 11.111 production orders, 11.121 protocol on police information, 11.16 public interest immunity closed material procedure, 11.81–11.88 confidentiality, and, 11.75–11.76 criminal trials, in, 11.77–11.88 generally, 11.58–11.69 human rights, and, 11.88 judicial inspection, and, 11.70–11.74 rationale, 11.59 withholding disclosure, and, 11.30–11.32 requests for information, 11.112 search and seizure warrants, 11.121 search orders, 11.118–11.120 subpoenas, 11.113–11.115 wardship proceedings, 11.6 withholding disclosure, 11.30–11.32 witness statements, 11.113–11.115 Woolf reforms, 11.7 youth courts, 11.6 Litigation privilege and see Legal professional privilege generally, 11.95–11.100 Loans local government, and, 6.193 Local access forums local government, and, 6.202 Local enterprise partnerships generally, 6.190–6.192 introduction, 6.7 Local government administrative practice on access duties of provision to central government, 6.59–6.69 duties of publication to public, 6.50–6.58 introduction, 6.41–6.49 audit provisions, 6.70–6.85 chief finance officer, 6.87–6.99 City of London, 6.2 Commissions for local administration generally, 6.137–6.144 investigation reports, 6.145–6.159 community councils, 6.5 companies as ‘alter egos’, 6.187–6.189 controlled companies, and, 6.194–6.195

Local government – contd Council tax, 6.198 designated officers, 6.101–6.103 duties and powers, 6.6 economic development, 6.186 financial administration, 6.86–6.99 funding voluntary organisations, 6.183–6.185 Greater London, 6.3–6.4 housing action trusts, 6.197 introduction, 6.1–6.9 LGHA 1989 designated officers, 6.101–6.103 monitoring officers, 6.104–6.109 political assistants, 6.111–6.112 political balance of bodies, 6.116–6.126 staff appointments, 6.110 voting rights of members, 6.113–6.115 loans, 6.193 local access forums, 6.202 local audit, 6.70–6.85 local enterprise partnerships, 6.190–6.192 meetings and documents of conclusion, 8.85 Local Government (Access to Information) Act 1985, under, 8.1–8.76 Public Bodies (Admission to Meetings) Act 1960, under, 8.77–8.84 members rights, 6.100 monitoring officers, 6.104–6.109 new model executives access to information, 6.29–6.40 advice from political advisers, 6.39 generally, 6.10–6.28 key decisions, 6.32–6.33 key executive decisions, 6.34 membership information, 6.40 publication impracticable, 6.35 non-domestic rating, 6.199–6.201 overview and scrutiny committee access to information, 6.29–6.40 generally, 6.22–6.23 parish councils, 6.5 police authorities complaints, 6.213–6.215 generally, 6.203–6.211 national computer, 6.212 power to obtain information, 6.212 political assistants, 6.111–6.112 political balance of bodies, 6.116–6.126 public officials and representatives, and confidentiality, 7.110–7.114 inspection of accounts, 7.109 introduction, 7.20–7.21 Local Government (Access to Information) Act 1985, 7.84–7.96 members, 7.52–7.78 Model Code of Conduct, 7.22–7.23 officers, 7.25–7.51 political advisers, 7.36–7.43 register of members’ interests, 7.24 standing orders, 7.103–7.108 working parties, 7.82–7.83

1036  Index Local government – contd public officials and representatives, and – contd working practice, 7.97–7.102 principal areas, 6.5 public interest disclosure, and, 6.136 quasi-local government organisations, 6.180–6.182 redress of complaints, and, 10.86–10.102 restrictions on publicity, 6.160–6.179 s 137 expenditure, 6.183–6.185 standards of conduct, 6.127–6.135 urban development corporations, 6.196 voting rights of members, 6.113–6.115 Wales, 6.2 whistleblowing, and, 6.136 Local government members attendance at council meetings, 7.52–7.54 common law rights, 7.66–7.78 council information, 7.79–7.81 delegation of decisions, 7.57–7.58 executives, 7.59 inspection of documents, 7.62–7.65 introduction, 7.20–7.21 membership of committees, 7.55–7.56 Model Code of Conduct, 7.22–7.23 political advisers, 7.36–7.43 register of interests, 7.24 voting motives, 7.60–7.61 Local government officers access to information, 7.48–7.51 attendance at party meetings, 7.44–7.45 duties, 7.25–7.30 introduction, 7.20–7.21 merit-based appointments, 7.31 standing orders, 7.32–7.35 use of information, 7.46–7.47 Localism Act 2011 local government, and, 6.8–6.9 Location data electronic communications, and, 2.348 Lords, MPs and ministers abuse of position, 7.16 confidentiality, 7.13 defamatory statements, 7.4 employment agreement, 7.8 expenses, 7.10–7.12 financial interests, 7.5 generally, 7.2 parliamentary privilege, 7.3–7.9 register of interests, 7.6–7.9 standards, 7.3 use of former ministerial documents, 7.13

M

Maladministration freedom of information, and, 1.279 redress of complaints, and, 10.50–10.51 Malicious call tracing electronic communications, and, 2.349 Manual records data protection, and held by FOI authorities, 2.96–2.100

Manual records – contd data protection, and – contd used in long-standing historical research, 2.101 Mareva injunctions litigation, and, 11.116–11.117 Marginal cost freedom of information, and, 1.74 Mary Bell case reporting restrictions, and, 11.12 Media privacy, and, 2.249–2.255 Medical reports privacy, and, 2.198–2.214 Meetings of public authorities attendance by members, 7.52–7.54 committees, 8.10–8.20 community councils, 8.77–8.80 community health councils, 8.81 conclusion, 8.85 exclusion of the public discretionary, 8.25–8.28 mandatory, 8.21–8.24 exempt information, 8.29–8.34 fire authorities, 8.7–8.9 introduction, 8.1–8.2 Freedom of Information Act 2000, under, 8.35 Greater London Authority, 8.7–8.9 Local Government (Access to Information) Act 1985, under extended provision, 8.81–8.84 general, 8.3–8.43 NHS trusts, 8.77 parish councils, 8.77–8.80 police authorities, 8.7–8.9 pre-decision deliberations, 8.3 press, 8.40–8.43 principal councils, 8.7–8.9 Public Bodies (Admission to Meetings) Act 1960, under, 8.77–8.80 public notice, 8.36–8.39 sub-committees, 8.10–8.20 water authorities, 8.77 working parties, 8.10–8.20 Members of Parliament abuse of position, 7.16 confidentiality, 7.13 defamatory statements, 7.4 employment agreement, 7.8 expenses, 7.10–7.12 financial interests, 7.5 generally, 7.2 parliamentary privilege, 7.3–7.9 register of interests, 7.6–7.9 standards, 7.3 use of former ministerial documents, 7.13 Memoirs official secrets, and, 4.281–4.288 Ministerial certificates appeals, 1.297 generally, 1.41 official secrets, and, 4.178 public interest immunity, and, 11.65

Index  1037 Ministerial Code generally, 4.99 introduction, 4.4 Ministers abuse of position, 7.16 confidentiality, 7.13 defamatory statements, 7.4 employment agreement, 7.8 expenses, 7.10–7.12 financial interests, 7.5 generally, 7.2 parliamentary privilege, 7.3–7.9 register of interests, 7.6–7.9 standards, 7.3 use of former ministerial documents, 7.13 Misuse of computers electronic communications, and, 2.355–2.360 Model Code of Conduct public officials and representatives, and, 7.22–7.23 Money laundering litigation, and, 11.121 Monitoring officers local government, and, 6.104–6.109 register of interests, and, 7.24 standing orders, and, 7.36 MPs abuse of position, 7.16 confidentiality, 7.13 defamatory statements, 7.4 employment agreement, 7.8 expenses, 7.10–7.12 financial interests, 7.5 generally, 7.2 parliamentary privilege, 7.3–7.9 register of interests, 7.6–7.9 standards, 7.3 use of former ministerial documents, 7.13

N

National Archives freedom of information, and, 1.47 generally, 4.62–4.75 National Audit Office (NAO) Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) appointment, 12.7 functions, 12.8 reports, 12.26–12.33 ‘economy, efficiency and effectiveness’, 12.12–12.15 establishment, 12.7 functions, 12.9–12.11 introduction, 12.1–12.6 Office for Budget Responsibility, and, 12.5–12.6 Pergau Dam affair, 12.20–12.25 policy, and, 12.16–12.19 National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) freedom of information, and, 1.118 interception of communications, and, 4.221 National Health Service redress of complaints, and, 10.106–10.113

National security data protection, and generally, 2.102 law enforcement processing, 2.125 records of certificates, 2.139 electronic communications, and, 2.350 freedom of information, and, 1.124–1.126 Natural justice redress of complaints, and, 10.117 Naval disciplinary courts freedom of information, and, 1.143 Neill Committee public officials and representatives, and, 7.124 NHS trusts access to public authority documents and meetings, and, 8.77 Nolan Committee appointment to public bodies, and, 7.124 civil servants, and, 7.17 Non-domestic rating local government, and, 6.199–6.201 Non-itemised bills electronic communications, and, 2.347 Non-parties disclosure, and generally, 11.28–11.29 strangers to the action, 11.35–11.36 Northern Ireland audit functions, and, 12.9 freedom of information legislation, and, 1.20 Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, and, 4.143 Nuisance calls electronic communications, and, 2.349

O

Obstruction of officers Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, and, 4.139 Offences access to public authority documents, and, 8.66 data protection, and alteration of personal data to prevent disclosure, 2.174 penalties, 2.180 re-identification of personal data, 2.173 requiring employee etc to provide relevant records, 2.181–2.182 unlawfully obtaining personal data, 2.172 freedom of information, and, 1.264 public authority documents, and, 8.66 Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) generally, 12.5–12.6 Official secrets consent to prosecution, 4.160 freedom of information, and generally, 1.224–1.230 exemptions, 1.16 introduction, 4.154 Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, and, 4.141–4.142

1038  Index Official secrets – contd penalties harbouring spies, 4.161 spying, 4.155–4.158 unauthorised disclosures and see Official Secrets Act 1989 generally, 4.163–4.300 Official Secrets Act 1989 Attorney General’s role, 4.261 background, 4.166–4.170 categories of protected information crime, 4.192–4.193 defence, 4.184–4.186 information entrusted in confidence by or to other states etc, 4.238–4.249 information obtained by interception, 4.194–4.237 intelligence, 4.176–4.183 international relations, 4.187–4.191 security, 4.176–4.183 confidential information, 4.188 consent to prosecution, 4.261 crime information, 4.192–4.193 D notices, 4.279–4.280 damage to the public interest defence information, 4.184 international relations, 4.189 introduction, 4.167–4.168 security and intelligence information, 4.177 Defence and Security Media Advisory System, 4.279–4.280 defence information, 4.184–4.186 defences prior publication, 4.270–4.272 public interest, 4.266–4.269 disclosure to MPs, 4.273–4.274 ECHR, and freedom of expression, 4.290, 4.296–4.299 introduction, 4.289 nature of rights, 4.292–4.295 right to respect for private and family life, 4.291 exclusion of public from proceedings, 4.264–4.265 Franks Committee Report, 4.165 freedom of expression, and, 4.290 government contractors, 4.177 in camera hearings, and, 11.4 information entrusted in confidence to other states etc, 4.238–4.241 information obtained by interception Investigatory Powers Act 2016, 4.202– 4.220 introduction, 4.194–4.199 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, 4.200–4.220 intelligence information, 4.176–4.183 Intelligence Services Act 1994, and, 4.221– 4.237 interceptions authorisation of surveillance, 4.212–4.216 covert human intelligence source, 4.211

Official Secrets Act 1989 – contd interceptions – contd directed surveillance, 4.209 foreign surveillance, 4.208 introduction, 4.208 intrusive surveillance, 4.210 tracking devices, 4.210 international relations, 4.187–4.191 introduction, 4.163–4.165 Investigatory Powers Act 2016 additional safeguards, 4.235 background, 4.202 future amendments, and, 4.236–4.237 introduction, 4.203–4.207 Investigatory Powers Commissioner, 4.207 Investigatory Powers Tribunal, 4.207 Law Commission consultation, 4.300 ‘lawful authority’, 4.250–4.256 legal professional privilege, 4.275–4.278 memoirs, and, 4.281–4.288 ministerial certificates, 4.178 overview, 4.1 penalties, 4.262 police powers, 4.263 prior publication, 4.270–4.272 proof of damage, 4.178 protected information crime, 4.192–4.193 defence, 4.184–4.186 information entrusted in confidence by or to other states etc, 4.238–4.249 information obtained by interception, 4.194–4.237 intelligence, 4.176–4.183 international relations, 4.187–4.191 security, 4.176–4.183 public interest defence, 4.266–4.269 receipt of unauthorised information, 4.242– 4.249 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 authorisation of surveillance, 4.212–4.216 Commissioner, 4.231–4.232 covert human intelligence source, 4.211 directed surveillance, 4.209 disclosure and copying of intercepted material, 4.205 encryption, 4.217–4.219 foreign surveillance, 4.208 grievances, 4.207 interceptions, 4.208–4.217 introduction, 4.200–4.207 intrusive surveillance, 4.210 postal packets, 4.201 tracking devices, 4.210 Tribunal, 4.233–4.234 unlawful interception, 4.203 warrants, 4.205 right to respect for private and family life, and, 4.291 safeguarding information, 4.257–4.260 security classifications, 4.171–4.175 security information, 4.176–4.183

Index  1039 Official Secrets Act 1989 – contd Security Services Acts 1989 and 1996, and, 4.221–4.237 Shayler case, and, 4.181–4.182 unlawful interception, 4.203 unlawful retention, 4.257 White Paper, 4.166–4.170 Ombudsman Commission redress of complaints, and, 10.1 Ombudsmen and see Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration disclosure to and from IC, and, 1.260–1.261 redress of complaints, and, 10.48–10.51 One-party groups access to public authority meetings, and, 8.10–8.20 disclosure powers, and, 9.3 public officials and members, and, 7.82–7.83 Onus of proof freedom of information, and, 1.301 Open Government (White Paper 1993) Code on Access 1994, and, 4.7 Opportunity to be heard redress of complaints, and, 10.122–10.128 Oral Parliamentary questions freedom of information, and, 1.103 Overview and scrutiny committees access to information, 6.29–6.40 generally, 6.22–6.23

P

Parental choice education, and, 9.43–9.45 Parish councils access to public authority documents and meetings, and, 8.77–8.80 generally, 6.5 Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration (PCA) Code on Access, and balancing interests, 4.20–4.27 generally, 4.10–4.17 complaints, 4.133–4.135 delegation, 4.144 disclosure to and from IC, and, 1.260 exchange of information, 4.144 exclusions from complaint, 4.134 generally, 4.132–4.145 investigations, 4.136–4.137 legal professional privilege, 4.138 Northern Ireland, and, 4.143 obstruction of officers, 4.139 official secrets, and, 4.141–4.142 public awareness, 4.145 public interest immunity, 4.138 reports, 4.140 Scotland, and, 4.132 Wales, and, 4.143 Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards (PCS) public officials and representatives, and, 7.3–7.9

Parliamentary debates information given to Parliament, and, 4.92 Parliamentary expenses MPs and ministers, and, 7.10–7.12 Parliamentary privilege freedom of information, and, 1.162–1.163 MPs and ministers, and, 7.3–7.9 Parliamentary proceedings privilege, and, 4.95 Parliamentary questions freedom of information, and, 1.103 generally, 4.77–4.84 private notice, 4.85 written answer, 4.86–4.91 Party groups and meetings attendance of officers, and, 7.44–7.45 Pergau Dam affair National Audit Office functions, and, 12.20–12.25 Personal data data protection, and Durant v FSA, 2.19–2.24 introduction, 2.18 special categories, 2.34 freedom of information, and, 1.200–1.201 Personal information generally, 1.200–1.202 guidance, 1.47 Pesticides disclosure powers, and, 9.235–9.236 Phillis Review freedom of information, and, 1.42 Planning and environment appeals, 9.81–9.84 costs, 9.143 environmental impact assessments, 9.144– 9.145 hearings, 9.142 inquiry procedure, 9.120–9.127 introduction, 9.67–9.68 notification of inquiry decision, 9.132–9.133 post-inquiry procedure, 9.128–9.131 pre-inquiry information, 9.85–9.88 pre-inquiry meetings, 9.89–9.97 publicity for applications, 9.77–9.80 quashing of decision, 9.134–9.138 register of applications, 9.74–9.76 service of proofs of evidence, 9.115–9.119 service of statements of case, 9.98–9.114 statements of policy, 9.69–9.73 written representation procedures, 9.139– 9.141 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 legal professional privilege, and, 11.103 Police authorities access to public authority meetings, and, 8.7–8.9 complaints, 6.213–6.215 generally, 6.203–6.211 national computer, 6.212 power to obtain information, 6.212 Police data case law, 2.305–2.321

1040  Index Police data – contd custody images, 2.297 Disclosure and Barring Service barring, 2.329 checks, 2.325–2.327 generally, 2.322–2.324 referrals, 2.328 regulated activity test, 2.330 DNA, 2.331–2.334 fingerprints, 2.331 generally, 2.276–2.278 Police Act 1997, Part V, 2.286–2.296 Police National Computer, 2.279–2.285 safeguarding vulnerable groups, 2.298–2.304 Police information litigation protocol, and, 11.16 Police investigations public interest immunity, and, 11.66 Police National Computer computer misuse, and, 2.357 data protection, and, 2.279–2.285 Police powers official secrets, and, 4.263 Police records See also Criminal Records Bureau case law, 2.305–2.321 custody images, 2.297 Disclosure and Barring Service, 2.322–2.330 DNA, 2.331–2.334 fingerprints, 2.331 generally, 2.276–2.278 Police Act 1997, Part V, 2.286–2.296 Police National Computer, 2.279–2.285 safeguarding vulnerable groups, 2.298– 2.304 Policy advice freedom of information, and, 1.103 Policy and finance budgeting, 9.4 chief finance officer’s report, 9.4–9.6 financial planning, 9.4 formulation of policy, 9.3 generally, 9.2–9.9 inspection of accounts, 9.10–9.18 Policy formulation freedom of information, and, 1.164–1.181 disclosure powers, and, 9.3 National Audit Office functions, and, 12.16–12.19 public records, and, 4.67 Political advisers generally, 7.36–7.43 local government, and, 6.111–6.112 Political balance local government, and, 6.116–6.126 Political donations regulation, 4.118 Postal packets interception of communications, and, 4.201 Practice Recommendations freedom of information, and, 1.22 Pre-action disclosure litigation, and, 11.27

Pre-action protocols disclosure, and, 11.25 Pre-decision deliberations access to public authority meetings, and, 8.3 Pre-inquiry meetings planning, and, 9.89–9.97 ‘Prejudice’ Code on Access 1994, and, 4.20–4.27 freedom of information, and, 1.28–1.30 Prejudice to conduct of public affairs freedom of information, and, 1.182–1.188 public records, and, 4.67 Prerogative information within government, and, 4.4 Press access to public authority documents, and, 8.56–8.57 access to public authority meetings, and, 8.40–8.43 data protection, and, 2.249–2.255 Press Recognition Panel privacy, and, 2.171 Press releases freedom of information, and, 1.103 Prevention of crime freedom of information, and, 1.144 Principal areas local government, and, 6.5 Principal councils access to public authority meetings, and, 8.7–8.9 Prior publication official secrets, and, 4.270–4.272 Prison discipline freedom of information, and, 1.144 Privacy data protection, and and see Data protection accessible data, 2.190–2.193 common law, at, 2.194–2.197 computer misuse, and, 2.355–2.360 context of reform, 2.1–2.3 Crown, and, 2.187 data exchange, matching and sharing, 2.261–2.275 data held by police, 2.276–2.334 data protection principles, 2.34–2.35 data subjects’ rights, 2.53–2.94 definitions, 2.16–2.32 duties to disclose information, 2.335–2.342 eIDAS Regulation, 2.354 enforcement, 2.145–2.185 framework for government processing, 2.11 general data processing, 2.12–2.33 human rights, and, 2.215–2.247 Information Commissioner, 2.136–2.185 injunctions, and, 2.256–2.260 intelligence services processing, 2.126– 2.135 introduction, 2.4–2.7 law enforcement processing, 2.104–2.125 lawfulness of processing, 2.36–2.52

Index  1041 Privacy – contd data protection, and – contd media, and, 2.249–2.255 medical/health records, and, 2.198–2.214 offences, 2.180 other general processing, 2.95–2.103 overview, 1.19 Parliament, and, 2.188 police data, 2.276–2.334 Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive, and, 2.343–2.353 protection of privacy, and, 2.215–2.260 special categories of personal data, 2.34 statutory basis, 2.8–2.198 territorial scope, 2.186 transitional provisions, 2.189 computer misuse, 2.355–2.360 duties to disclose information, 2.335–2.342 eIDAS Regulation, 2.354 Electronic Communications Regulations, 2.343–2.353 hacking, 2.355–2.360 introduction, 4.368 protective orders into adulthood, 11.12 Private and family life, right to respect for official secrets, and, 4.291 public interest defence, and, 4.324 Private bodies designation as public authorities, 1.303–1.304 Private Finance Initiative (PFI) freedom of information, and, 1.23 Internet, and, 4.32 Private hearings litigation, and, 11.2–11.15 Private notice questions (PNQs) information given to Parliament, and, 4.85 Privilege legal aid applications, 11.111 legal professional classes, 11.90 criminal purpose, and, 11.104–11.105 generally, 11.89–11.102 legal advice privilege, 11.92–11.94 litigation privilege, 11.95–11.100 miscellaneous points, 11.106–11.110 PACE 1984, and, 11.103 secondary evidence of privileged document, 11.108 tax liabilities, 11.106 use of documents in court, 11.107 waiver, 11.101 Parliamentary proceedings, and, 4.95 self-incrimination, 11.111 without prejudice communications, 11.111 Proceedings conducted by public authorities freedom of information, and, 1.139–1.143 Proceedings in Parliament privilege, and, 4.95 Production orders litigation, and, 11.121 Professional misconduct freedom of information, and, 1.139

Progress reports education, and, 9.29 Prohibition by enactment freedom of information, and, 1.224–1.230 Proof of damage official secrets, and, 4.178 Proofs of evidence planning, and, 9.115–9.119 Protective orders into adulthood introduction, 11.128 Protocol on police information litigation, and, 11.16 Provision of information to Parliament debates, 4.92 introduction, 4.76 Ministerial Code, 4.99 Parliamentary papers, 4.89–4.91 private notice questions, 4.85 publications, 4.93–4.97 Question Time, 4.77–4.84 urgent questions, 4.85 written answer questions, 4.86–4.91 Public Accounts Committee and see National Audit Office freedom of information, and, 1.13–1.14 generally, 12.6 Public Audit Forum generally, 12.10 ‘Public authorities’ designated private bodies, 1.303–1.304 generally, 1.85–1.95 introduction, 1.11 Public interest defence confidentiality, and, 4.323–4.328 official secrets, and, 4.266–4.269 Public interest disclosures generally, 4.301–4.311 local government, and, 6.136 Public interest immunity confidentiality, and, 11.75–11.76 criminal trials, in closed material procedure, 11.81–11.88 code of practice, 11.78–11.79 generally, 11.77–11.82 ‘golden rule’, 11.80 human rights, and, 11.88 generally, 11.58–11.69 judicial inspection, and, 11.70–11.74 Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, and, 4.138 rationale, 11.59 rights of claimants under Art 6 ECHR, 11.88 withholding disclosure, and, 11.30–11.32 Public interest test generally, 1.98–1.103 guidance, 1.47 introduction, 1.12 Public notice access to public authority meetings, and, 8.36–8.39 Public officials and representatives appointments to public bodies, 7.123–7.125

1042  Index Public officials and representatives – contd central government civil servants, 7.17–7.18 introduction, 7.1 ministers, 7.2–7.16 MPs, 7.2–7.16 civil servants EC institutions, in, 7.19 generally, 7.17–7.18 political activity prohibitions, 7.123 EU, 7.19 executive agencies, 7.120–7.122 local government confidentiality, 7.110–7.114 inspection of accounts, 7.109 introduction, 7.20–7.21 Local Government (Access to Information) Act 1985, 7.84–7.96 members, 7.52–7.78 Model Code of Conduct, 7.22–7.23 officers, 7.25–7.51 political advisers, 7.36–7.43 register of members’ interests, 7.24 standing orders, 7.103–7.108 working parties, 7.82–7.83 working practice, 7.97–7.102 local government members attendance at council meetings, 7.52–7.54 common law rights, 7.66–7.78 council information, 7.79–7.81 delegation of decisions, 7.57–7.58 executives, 7.59 inspection of documents, 7.62–7.65 introduction, 7.20–7.21 membership of committees, 7.55–7.56 Model Code of Conduct, 7.22–7.23 political advisers, 7.36–7.43 register of interests, 7.24 voting motives, 7.60–7.61 local government officers access to information, 7.48–7.51 attendance at party meetings, 7.44–7.45 duties, 7.25–7.30 introduction, 7.20–7.21 merit-based appointments, 7.31 standing orders, 7.32–7.35 use of information, 7.46–7.47 ministers, 7.2–7.16 Model Code of Local Government Conduct, 7.22–7.23 MPs, 7.2–7.16 Neill Committee, 7.124 Nolan Committee, 7.124 other public bodies, 7.115–7.117 publication of information, 7.118 register of MPs interests, 7.6–7.9 regulatory agencies, 7.119 Public Private Partnerships (PPP) freedom of information, and, 1.23 Public records freedom of information, and disclosure between IC and Ombudsmen, 1.260–1.261

Public records – contd freedom of information, and – contd introduction, 1.259 generally, 4.62–4.75 Public relations communication with the public, and, 4.100– 4.117 Public secrets confidentiality, and, 4.329–4.331 Public Service Ombudsman redress of complaints, and, 10.71 Publication of information public officials and representatives, and, 7.118 Publication schemes freedom of information, and disclosure log, 1.59 generally, 1.48–1.56 information asset register, 1.61–1.63 information on contracts, 1.60 introduction, 1.10 minutes, 1.58 purposes, 1.57 generally, 4.93–4.97 House of Commons scheme, 4.98 Publicity for the public generally, 4.100–4.117 housing, and, 9.57–9.66 Pupil information education, and, 9.27 Pupil records education, and, 9.28–9.35 Pupil reports education, and, 9.27

Q

Qualified majority voting access to EU documents, and, 5.3, 5.15 Qualified privilege access to public authority documents, and, 8.67 Qualifying disclosures public interest disclosure, and, 4.301–4.304 Quashing of decision planning, and, 9.134–9.138 Quasi-autonomous local government organisations local government, and, 6.180–6.182 Question Time information given to Parliament, and, 4.77–4.84

R

Reasonable accessibility freedom of information, and, 1.294 ‘Reasonable opinion’ ‘harm’ test, and, 1.28–1.30 Reasons for decisions failure to provide reasons, 10.161–10.162 freedom of information, and, 1.287–1.290 FOIA, under, 10.63 generally, 10.152–10.159 statement, 10.160

Index  1043 Receipt of unauthorised information official secrets, and, 4.242–4.249 Recorded information freedom of information, and, 1.266 Records management Code of Practice, 4.66 Redress of grievances and complaints ad hoc inquiries, 10.103–10.105 ADR, and, 10.67–10.70 anonymity of witness, 10.120 apologies, 10.27 attitudes, 10.44–10.45 best practice, 10.19–10.26 Bowman Review, 10.47 central government, in, 10.72–10.85 Citizen’s Charter generally, 10.10 introduction, 10.5 Commission for Local Administration, 10.13 compensation, 10.27 consultation generally, 10.167–10.171 remedy, 10.172–10.173 courts, and, 10.52–10.61 cross-examination, 10.146–10.151 encouraging good practice, 10.29–10.43 explanations, 10.27 fact-finding inquiries, 10.174–10.176 fair hearings anonymity of witness, 10.120 consultation, 10.167–10.173 content, 10.131–10.140 cross-examination, 10.146–10.151 ECHR, 10.118 fact-finding inquiries, 10.174–10.176 generally, 10.114–10.121 legal representation, 10.141–10.145 method of procedure, 10.119 natural justice, 10.117 opportunity to be heard, 10.122–10.128 Parole Board, 10.120–10.121 preliminary hearings, 10.129–10.130 reasons for decisions, 10.152–10.163 standards demanded by courts, 10.164– 10.166 freephone numbers, 10.17 internal complaints, 10.3–10.7 introduction, 10.1–10.2 legal representation, 10.141–10.145 Leggatt Review generally, 10.47 response, 10.62–10.66 local government, in, 10.86–10.102 maladministration, and, 10.50–10.51 National Health Service, 10.106–10.113 natural justice, 10.117 nature of complaints, 10.8–10.14 Ombudsman Commission, 10.1 Ombudsmen, and, 10.48–10.51 opportunity to be heard, 10.122–10.128 preparation, 10.46 procedure best practice, 10.19–10.26

Redress of grievances and complaints – contd procedure – contd freephone numbers, 10.17 generally, 10.15–10.17 review arrangements, 10.18 Public Service Ombudsman, 10.71 reasons for decisions failure to provide reasons, 10.161–10.162 FOIA, under, 10.63 generally, 10.152–10.159 statement, 10.160 remedies, 10.27–10.28 review arrangements, 10.18 Referendums generally, 4.118 Refusal of request under FOIA generally, 1.108–1.110 guidance, 1.47 Regional authorities local government, and, 6.7 Regional development agencies local government, and, 6.7 Register of applications planning, and, 9.74–9.76 Register of interests MPs and ministers, and, 7.6–7.9 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 authorisation of surveillance, 4.212–4.216 Commissioner, 4.231–4.232 covert human intelligence source, 4.211 directed surveillance, 4.209 disclosure and copying of intercepted material, 4.205 encryption, 4.217–4.219 foreign surveillance, 4.208 grievances, 4.207 interceptions authorisation of surveillance, 4.212–4.216 covert human intelligence source, 4.211 directed surveillance, 4.209 foreign surveillance, 4.208 introduction, 4.208 intrusive surveillance, 4.210 tracking devices, 4.210 introduction, 4.200–4.207 intrusive surveillance, 4.210 postal packets, 4.201 tracking devices, 4.210 Tribunal, 4.233–4.234 unlawful interception, 4.203 warrants, 4.205 Regulation on Access (EC) background, 5.18–5.19 beneficiaries of right of access, 5.27 compatibility between general principle and existing rules, 5.26 ‘document’, 5.25 documents covered, 5.23–5.25 exceptions to right of access, 5.28 final provisions, 5.32–5.47 institutions covered, 5.20 processing applications, 5.29–5.31 scope, 5.20–5.26

1044  Index Regulation on Access (EC) – contd subjects covered, 5.21–5.22 Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 applications for access to documents, 5.62–5.64 archives, 5.100 commercial interests, 5.74–5.77 Commission proposals for ‘recasting’ court proceedings, 5.107 decision-making, 5.109 environmental protection, 5.106 generally, 5.101–5.105 impact, 5.112–5.114 legal advice, 5.107 member state documents, 5.110 miscellaneous, 5.111 privacy, 5.108 confirmatory applications, 5.90 court proceedings and legal advice, 5.74–5.77 defence and military matters, 5.67–5.73 definitions, 5.59–5.61 European Parliament’s proposals, 5.114– 5.117 exceptions and exemptions archives, 5.100 commercial interests, 5.74–5.77 confirmatory applications, 5.90 court proceedings and legal advice, 5.74–5.77 defence and military matters, 5.67–5.73 exercise of right to access, 5.91–5.92 financial, monetary or economic policy, 5.67–5.73 generally, 5.65–5.66 international relations, 5.67–5.73 public interest, 5.67–5.73 registers of documents, 5.94 sensitive documents, 5.93 exercise of right to access, 5.91–5.92 financial, monetary or economic policy, 5.67–5.73 generally, 5.56–5.100 international relations, 5.67–5.73 introduction, 5.56 public interest, 5.67–5.73 registers of documents, 5.94 scope, 5.57 sensitive documents, 5.93 Regulatory agencies public officials and representatives, and, 7.119 Regulatory authorities duties to disclose information, and, 2.342 Relations within the UK freedom of information, and, 1.134–1.136 public records, and, 4.67 Remedies complaints, and, 10.27–10.28 consultation, and, 10.172–10.173 Repeated requests generally, 1.81–1.82 guidance, 1.47 problem areas, 1.293

Reporting restrictions litigation, and, 11.4–11.6 Representations environmental information, and, 9.230 Requests for information litigation, and, 11.112 Requests for information under FOIA advice and assistance, 1.83 appeals costs awards, 1.253 generally, 1.246–1.252 jurisdiction, 1.254 clarification, 1.84 compliance time generally, 1.75–1.77 problem areas, 1.285–1.286 decision notices failure to comply, 1.246 generally, 1.236 enforcement appeals, 1.246–1.254 decision notices, 1.236 enforcement notices, 1.238 failure to comply with notices, 1.246 generally, 1.234–1.238 information notices, 1.244–1.245 national security memorandum, 1.238 overriding decision on public interest, 1.239–1.240 Prince of Wales correspondence, 1.241– 1.243 enforcement notices failure to comply, 1.246 generally, 1.236 excessive cost, 1.71 exemptions audit functions, 1.158–1.161 background, 1.15–1.16 commercial interests, 1.215–1.223 Communications with Her Majesty etc, 1.194–1.195 confidential information, 1.203–1.208 court records, 1.152–1.157 defence, 1.127–1.128 departures from the White Paper, 1.35–1.39 devolution, and, 1.134–1.136 economic interests, 1.137–1.138 environmental information, 1.198–1.199 generally, 1.104–1.107 government policy, 1.164–1.181 health and safety, 1.196–1.197 incompatible with Community obligations, 1.224–1.230 information accessible to applicant, 1.111–1.113 information intended for future publication, 1.114–1.116 international relations, 1.129–1.133 intra-UK relations, 1.134–1.136 investigations conducted by public authorities, 1.139–1.143 late reliance on an exemption, 1.231–1.233

Index  1045 Requests for information under FOIA – contd exemptions – contd law enforcement, 1.144–1.151 legal obligation of confidence, 1.203– 1.208 legal professional privilege, 1.209–1.214 national security, 1.124–1.126 official secrets, 1.224–1.230 Parliamentary privilege, 1.162–1.163 personal information, 1.200–1.202 policy formulation, 1.164–1.181 policy-making, 1.189–1.193 prejudice to conduct of public affairs, 1.182–1.188 proceedings conducted by public authorities, 1.139–1.143 prohibition by enactment, 1.224–1.230 refusal of request, 1.108–1.110 security bodies, 1.117–1.123 trade secrets, 1.215–1.223 fees excessive cost, 1.71 generally, 1.72 notices, 1.73–1.74 form generally, 1.70 problem areas, 1.291–1.292 functions of Ministers and the IC, 1.255– 1.258 generally, 1.64 ‘holds information’, 1.65–1.70 information notices failure to comply, 1.246 generally, 1.244–1.245 method of communication, 1.78–1.79 ‘public authorities’ designated private bodies, 1.303–1.304 generally, 1.85–1.95 public interest disclosures, 1.98–1.103 refusal of request, 1.108–1.110 repeated requests, 1.81–1.82 transferred records, 1.96–1.97 vexatious requests, 1.81–1.82 Requests for legal advice freedom of information, and, 1.103 Research data protection, and exemptions from data rights, 2.75 generally, 2.52 Response time freedom of information, and generally, 1.75–1.77 problem areas, 1.285–1.286 Restraint of publication confidentiality, and, 4.317 Re-use of public sector information Advisory Panel on Public Sector Information, 4.59 asset lists, 4.44–4.46 availability of documents, 4.54 charging, 4.47–4.48 complaints, 4.56

Re-use of public sector information – contd dispute resolution, 4.56–4.58 exclusive arrangements, 4.50 format of documents, 4.54 freedom of information, 4.60 introduction, 4.40 licensing, 4.49 non-discrimination, 4.61 objectives, 4.41 openness, 4.51–4.52 partnerships, 4.43 principles, 4.41 processing applications, 4.53 redress, 4.56 right to refuse, 4.55 scope, 4.42 transparency, 4.51–4.52 Review arrangements redress of complaints, and, 10.18 Right to buy housing, and, 9.53 Right to respect for private and family life official secrets, and, 4.291 public interest defence, and, 4.324 Royal Commission reports publication, and, 4.93 Royal Family, communications with freedom of information, and, 1.194–1.195 public records, and, 4.67

S

Safeguarding information official secrets, and, 4.257–4.260 School information education, and, 9.23–9.26 Scotland audit functions, and, 12.9 freedom of information, and application of FOIA, 1.20 generally, 1.309–1.317 Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, and, 4.132 Search and seizure litigation, and, 11.121 Search orders generally, 11.118–11.120 Secret Intelligence Service freedom of information, and, 1.118 interception of communications, and, 4.222 Section 137 expenditure local government, and, 6.183–6.185 Security bodies freedom of information, and, 1.117–1.123 Security classifications official secrets, and, 4.171–4.175 Security Commission freedom of information, and, 1.118 Security information official secrets, and, 4.176–4.183 Security Service freedom of information, and, 1.118 Security Vetting Appeals Panel freedom of information, and, 1.118

1046  Index Select Committees civil servants, and, 4.125–4.131 generally, 4.119–4.124 publication of documentation, and, 4.93 Self-funders dispute resolution, and, 10.91 Self-incrimination privilege, and, 11.111 Service proofs of evidence, 9.115–9.119 statements of case, 9.98–9.114 ‘Sexing up’ communication with the public, and, 4.100 Shayler case official secrets, and, 4.181–4.182 Social services data protection, and generally, 2.76–2.77 ‘social work professional’, 2.77 dispute resolution, and, 10.90–10.102 Special educational needs education, and, 9.46–9.49 Special forces freedom of information, and, 1.118 Special purposes data appeals, 2.164 conditions for processing, 2.37 exemptions from data rights, 2.74 information notices, 2.148 penalty notices, 2.160 powers of entry and inspection, 2.157 re-identification of personal data, 2.173 unlawful obtaining of personal data, 2.172 definition, 2.175 introduction, 2.175 proceedings, 2.176–2.177 provision of assistance, 2.176 stay, 2.177 Specific disclosure litigation, and, 11.25 Spycatcher litigation confidentiality, and, 4.332–4.342 Spying official secrets, and, 4.155–4.162 Standard disclosure litigation, and, 11.22–11.24 Standards in public life communication with the public, and, 4.111 local government, and, 6.127–6.135 Ministerial Code, and, 4.99 MPs and ministers, and, 7.3 Standing orders generally, 7.32–7.35 revision, 7.103–7.108 State papers publication, and, 4.93 Statements of case planning, and, 9.98–9.114 Statements of policy planning, and, 9.69–9.73 Statistics publication, and, 4.93

Statutory provisions repeal of secrecy provisions, and, 1.263 Sub-committees access to meetings, and, 8.10–8.20 membership, 7.55–7.56 Subpoenas litigation, and, 11.113–11.115 Subscriber directories electronic communications, and, 2.349 Super-injunctions privacy, and, 2.256–2.260 Surveillance and see Interception of communications authorisation, 4.212–4.216 duties to disclose information, and, 2.335 covert human intelligence source, 4.211 directed, 4.209 foreign, 4.208 introduction, 4.200–4.207 intrusive, 4.210 tracking devices, 4.210

T

Tax data protection, and, 2.67 Tax assessment freedom of information, and, 1.144 Tax liabilities legal professional privilege, and, 11.106 Terrorism fair hearing, and, 10.132 generally, 4.370 opportunity to be heard, and, 10.127 reasons for decisions, and, 10.157 redress of grievance with authorities, and, 10.80 Third party rights freedom of information, and, 1.270–1.278 Three ‘pillars’ access to EU documents, and, 5.2 Tracing calls electronic communications, and, 2.349 Tracking devices RIPA 2000, and, 4.18 Trade secrets freedom of information, and generally, 1.215–1.223 government contractors, 1.279–1.285 guidance, 1.47 problem areas, 1.298 third party rights, 1.278 protection of confidentiality, and, 4.315 Trading standards disclosure powers, and, 9.265–9.267 Transferred records freedom of information, and, 1.96–1.97 generally, 4.65 ‘Transparency’ coalition government plans, and, 4.28–4.31 Treasury Committee audit functions, and, 12.13–12.14 Treasury Press Releases Internet, and, 4.32

Index  1047 Treaties publication, and, 4.93 Trivial information confidentiality, and, 4.318 Twin-tracking officers’ duties, and, 7.26

U

Unlawful interception official secrets, and, 4.203 Unlawful retention official secrets, and, 4.257 Unrecorded information freedom of information, and, 1.266 Urban development corporations local government, and, 6.196 Urgent questions information given to Parliament, and, 4.85 Use of information freedom of information, and, 1.295–1.296

V

Value for money (VFM) audits National Audit Office functions, and, 12.8 Vetoes freedom of information, and, 1.41 Vexatious requests generally, 1.81–1.82 guidance, 1.47 Voting members’ rights, 6.113–6.115 motives of members, 7.60–7.61

W

Waiver legal professional privilege, and, 11.101 Wales freedom of information, and application of FOIA, 1.20–1.21 generally, 1.318–1.319 local government, and, 6.2 Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, and, 4.143 Wardship proceedings public hearings, and, 11.6 Warrants interception of communications, and, 4.205 Water authorities access to public authority documents and meetings, and, 8.77

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) communication with the public, and, 4.100 Whistleblowing generally, 4.301–4.311 local government, and, 6.136 White Papers Code on Access, and, 4.7 freedom of information, and appeal tribunal, 1.31–1.34 classes of documents, 1.40 exemptions, 1.35–1.39 ‘harm’ test, 1.28–1.30 introduction, 1.1 Ministerial vetoes, 1.41 Phillis Review, 1.42 official secrets, and, 4.166–4.170 publication, 4.93 Widdicombe Committee standing orders, and, 7.103–7.108 ‘Wise Men’ Reports Internet, and, 4.32 Withholding disclosure public interest immunity, and, 11.30–11.32 Without prejudice communications privilege, and, 11.111 Witness statements litigation, and, 11.113–11.115 Woolf reforms litigation, and, 11.7 Working parties access to public authority meetings, and, 8.10–8.20 disclosure powers, and, 9.3 public officials and members, and, 7.82–7.83 Written answer questions information given to Parliament, and, 4.86–4.91 Written Parliamentary questions freedom of information, and, 1.103 Written requests freedom of information, and generally, 1.70 problem areas, 1.291–1.292 Wrongful disclosure freedom of information, and third party rights, 1.274

Y

Youth courts public hearings, and, 11.6