Governing Arctic Seas: Regional Lessons from the Bering Strait and Barents Sea: Volume 1 (Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability) 3030256731, 9783030256739

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Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability

Oran R. Young Paul Arthur Berkman Alexander N. Vylegzhanin Editors

Governing Arctic Seas: Regional Lessons from the Bering Strait and Barents Sea Volume 1

Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability Series Editors Paul Arthur Berkman Science Diplomacy Center Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy Tufts University Medford, MA, USA Alexander N. Vylegzhanin Department of International Law MGIMO University Moscow, Russia Oran R. Young Bren School of Environmental Science & Management University of California Santa Barbara, CA, USA

This Springer book series – Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability – offers a roadmap for humankind to address issues, impacts and resources within, across and beyond the boundaries of nations. Informed decisions operate across a ‘continuum of urgencies,’ extending from security time scales (mitigating risks of political, economic or cultural instabilities that are immediate) to sustainability time scales (balancing economic prosperity, societal well-being and environmental protection across generations) for nations, peoples and our world. Moreover, informed decisions involve governance mechanisms (laws, agreements and policies as well as regulatory strategies, including insurance, at diverse jurisdictional levels) and built infrastructure (fixed, mobile and other assets, including communication, research, observing, information and other systems that entail technology plus investment), which further require close coupling to achieve progress with sustainability. International, interdisciplinary and inclusive (holistic) engagement in this book series involves decisionmakers and thought leaders from government, business, academia and society at large to reveal lessons about common-interest building that promote cooperation and prevent conflict. The three initial volumes utilize the high north as a case study, recognizing that we are entering a globally significant period of trillion-dollar investment in the new Arctic Ocean. Additional case studies are welcome and will be included in the book series subsequently. Throughout, to be holistic, science is characterized as ‘the study of change’ to include natural sciences, social sciences and Indigenous knowledge, all of which reveal trends, patterns and processes (albeit with different methods) that become the bases for decisions. The goal of this book series is to apply, train and refine science diplomacy as an holistic process, involving informed decisionmaking to balance national interests and common interests for the benefit of all on Earth across generations. More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/16420

Oran R. Young  •  Paul Arthur Berkman Alexander N. Vylegzhanin Editors

Governing Arctic Seas: Regional Lessons from the Bering Strait and Barents Sea Volume 1

Editors Oran R. Young Bren School of Environmental Science and Management University of California Santa Barbara, CA, USA

Paul Arthur Berkman Science Diplomacy Center Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy Tufts University Medford, MA, USA

Alexander N. Vylegzhanin Department of International Law MGIMO University Moscow, Russia

ISSN 2662-4516     ISSN 2662-4524 (electronic) Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability ISBN 978-3-030-25673-9    ISBN 978-3-030-25674-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25674-6 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover map illustration: Oldest and longest continuous satellite record of ship traffic in the Arctic Ocean from 1 September 2009 through 31 December 2016, produced by the Arctic Options and Pan-Arctic Options projects to facilitate “Holistic Integration for Arctic Coastal-Marine Sustainability” with international, interdisciplinary and inclusive (holistic) collaboration from Canada, China, France, Norway, Russia and the United States. As introduced with the NASA Earth Observatory image of the day on 12 April 2018 (Shipping Responds to Arctic Ice Decline), the centroid of ship traffic north of the Arctic Circle has “moved 300 kilometers north and east—closer to the North Pole—over the 7-year span.” The satellite Automatic Identification System (AIS) data was provided by SpaceQuest Ltd. with big-data analyses and map production by Greg Fiske at the Woods Hole Research Center (for additional details, see Chapter 11: Next-Generation Arctic Marine Shipping Assessments in this book). This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Book Series Preface: Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability

Abstract  This is the opening preface for a new book series  – Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability – published by Springer. Utilizing the Arctic Ocean as an initial case study with its diverse dimensions  – within, across, and beyond national jurisdictions  – this book series will reveal insights, lessons and precedents to apply, train, and refine with science diplomacy, considering local-­ global relevance with synergies of education, research, and leadership. The initial three volumes are: Volume 1 – Governing Arctic Seas: Regional Lessons from the Bering Strait and Barents Sea Volume 2 –  Building Common Interests in the Arctic Ocean with Global Inclusion Volume 3 – Pan-Arctic Implementation of Sustainable Infrastructure The first volume involves the Russian Federation as a common denominator with either Norway (oldest multilateral region in the Arctic) or the United States (sharing with Russia the longest maritime boundary in the world) to interpret changes with connected biophysical and socio-economic systems that underscore decisions across a “continuum of urgencies” from security to sustainability time scales. The second and third volumes will emerge from presentations during the annual Arctic Frontiers Conferences in Tromsø, Norway, starting in January 2020. Volume 2 will consider circumstances associated with areas beyond sovereign jurisdictions from Arctic and non-Arctic perspectives, recognizing the international community has unambiguous rights and responsibilities in the Arctic High Seas under the law of the sea. Volume 3 is intended to synthesize insights on a pan-Arctic scale, analogous to the world ocean across all sea zones, involving decisions to achieve ongoing progress with sustainability, coupling governance mechanisms and built infrastructure. Throughout this book series, which we expect to expand beyond the Arctic, science diplomacy will be applied as an international, interdisciplinary, and inclusive (holistic) process, facilitating informed decisionmaking to balance national interests and common interests for the benefit of all on Earth across generations. With holistic integration, this book series will reveal skills, methods, and theory of informed decisionmaking that will continue to evolve, contributing to balance, resilience, and stability that underlie progress with sustainability across our home planet.

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Introduction to the Book Series This is the opening preface for a new book series – Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability – published by Springer. This book series emerges from fruitful collaborations between the editors, who convened the first formal dialogue between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russian Federation (Berkman and Vylegzhanin 2012), demonstrating the capacity of observers to contribute as participants by convening dialogues with allies and adversaries alike to build common interests. The enduring outcome of that historic dialogue in 2010 at the University of Cambridge, co-convened with MGIMO University (Moscow State University of International Relations), is a precedent of science diplomacy that can be applied to the sustainable, stable, and peaceful development of our world. Utilizing the Arctic Ocean as an initial case study with its diverse dimensions – within, across, and beyond national jurisdictions  – this book series will reveal insights, lessons and precedents to apply, train, and refine with science diplomacy, considering local-global as well as global-local relevance with synergies of education, research, and leadership. The initial three volumes are: Volume 1 – Governing Arctic Seas: Regional Lessons from the Bering Strait and Barents Sea Volume 2 – Building Common Interests in the Arctic Ocean with Global Inclusion Volume 3 – Pan-Arctic Implementation of Sustainable Infrastructure These three volumes will build on each other, addressing shared challenges and solutions that operate across contrasting Arctic marine regions with Pan-Arctic interconnections of associated and dependent biophysical and socioeconomic systems. This volume (Volume 1) involves the Russian Federation in shared marine regions with either Norway or the United States, respectively, in the Barents Sea (oldest regional multilateral governance complex in the Arctic) and Bering Strait (longest maritime boundary between two nations in the world), recognizing Russian coastlines surround nearly half of the Arctic Ocean. Volume 2 will consider circumstances associated with areas beyond sovereign jurisdictions from Arctic and non-Arctic perspectives, recognizing the international community has unambiguous rights and responsibilities in the Arctic High Seas under the law of the sea, to which the eight Arctic states and six Indigenous peoples organizations “remain committed.” Volume 3 is intended to synthesize insights on a pan-Arctic scale, analogous to the world ocean across all sea zones, involving decisionmaking with governance mechanisms and built infrastructure as well as their coupling to achieve ongoing progress with sustainability. Herein with Volume 1, starts this journey to reveal, define, integrate and apply the puzzle pieces (highlighted) of informed decisionmaking as the engine of science diplomacy, helping to achieve sustainability with Arctic and global relevance onward. This three-volume series is inspired by two intertwined projects with scope across Arctic regions in a global context, sharing the subtext of Holistic Integration

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for Arctic Coastal-Marine Sustainability (Table  1). HOLISTIC is the unifying puzzle of science diplomacy with the shape of international, interdisciplinary, and inclusive that facilitates convergence (Roco et  al. 2013), which is further revealed by accelerating knowledge co-production. For example, the Arctic Options and Pan-­Arctic Options projects enabled synergies to produce the Baseline of Russian Arctic Laws (Berkman et al. 2019), introducing transparency to promote cooperation and prevent conflict with the authentic English translation of all Russian laws since the early nineteenth century. Similarly, considering options (without advocacy), holistic engagement was introduced to support implementation of the 2017 Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation (Arctic Science Agreement 2017; Berkman et al. 2017; Arctic Science Agreement Dialogue Panel 2019). An outcome of these two projects also is the Science Diplomacy Center through the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. The central goal of Arctic Options and Pan-Arctic Options involves development of a holistic process, revealing informed decisionmaking as the engine of science diplomacy, characterized as an holistic process, involving informed decisionmaking to balance national interests and common interests for the benefit of all on Earth across generations. Table 1 Intertwined projects involving Holistic Integration for Arctic Coastal-Marine Sustainabilitya Aspects Duration Conceptual scope Geographic scope Options Funding nations Funding program

Funding

Project name Arctic options Pan-Arctic options 2013–2019 2015–2020 Decision-support process to integrate stakeholder perspectives, evidence and governance mechanisms to reveal options that contribute to informed decisionmaking for sustainable infrastructure development in the Arctic Ocean Arctic High Seas, Barents Sea Region Pan-Arctic (defined as north of the (BaSR), Bering Strait Region (BeSR) Arctic Circle + Bering Strait Region) Governance Mechanisms Governance Mechanisms and Built Infrastructure United States, France United States, Russian Federation, Norway, France, China and Canada ArcSEES Belmont Forum (Arctic Science, Engineering, and (Arctic Observing and Research for Education for Sustainability) Sustainability) www.nsf.gov/pubs/2012/nsf12553/ https://www.belmontforum.org/ nsf12553.htm cras/#arctic2014 $2,000,000+ €1,000,000

Goal Design, develop, and demonstrate a holistic process to enhance the effectiveness of governance with built infrastructure for sustainable development in Arctic coastal-marine systems. Objective 1 Aggregate Arctic coastal-marine data from the natural and social sciences in an efficient and flexible manner for diverse decisionmaking purposes. Objective 2 Apply analytical tools and strategic planning concepts to reveal plausible scenarios about Arctic coastal-marine development over diverse spatial and temporal scales. Objective 3 Generate infrastructure and policy options through international, interdisciplinary, and inclusive dialogues responding to Arctic coastal-marine opportunities and risks. Objective 4 Share the options resulting from Objectives 1–3 with members of the policy community in view of current Arctic governance issues

a

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• How does science diplomacy balance national interests and common interests? • What is informed decisionmaking and how does it operate? • How do we facilitate inclusion in a world filled with exclusion? This book series is designed to address these questions with examples and lessons, insights and inspiration, contributing to progress with local-global as well as globallocal sustainability.

Globally-Interconnected Civilization The reality of human civilization is that we are now globally interconnected (Fig. 1). This fact is revealed simply by the concept of “world wars,” which happened for the first time in the history of humankind only in the last century. For perspective, the oldest continuous annual calendars still in use record nearly 6000 years – with the past few centuries like years in a life-span of sixty centuries – demonstrating that we are still in our infancy as a globally-interconnected civilization. Moreover, timing of the past few centuries coincides with ACCELERATING increase in global human population size, which is orders of magnitude larger than at the dawn of the nation-­state with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.

Fig. 1  Globally-Interconnected Civilization, viewed on a planetary scale with our human population (Durand 1977; Worldometer 2019) multiplying by billions (yellow dots) and increasing concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere (USEPA 2019) – across Science, Technology, and Innovation (STI) eras – recognizing “correlation alone does not mean causation”

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At the scale of the Earth, carbon dioxide levels in the global atmosphere also are accelerating (Fig. 1). Without trying to explain this global atmospheric phenomenon or even predict any changes, it is clear that there is a symbiosis between human population and Earth’s climate, which is by definition a planetary process (i.e., Jupiter and other planets in our solar system each have their own unique climates). Underlying all such discussions is the fact that human population size on Earth is increasing exponentially, which is the root cause for considering climate change “as a common concern of humankind” since the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC 1992). The challenge for humankind is to address solutions on a planetary scale, in a dynamic system that changes over decades to millennia (Roberts and Westad 2013), requiring societal processes that operate in a holistic manner. Working from first principles – on Earth, there are areas within the boundaries of nations as well as areas beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ), established under international law as international spaces to promote peace after World War II. These two generalized categories of jurisdiction reveal our fundamental challenge as a globally-interconnected civilization (Figs. 1 and 2) – to balance national interests and common interests for the benefit of all on Earth across generations, recognizing that nations will always first and foremost look after their national interests. With perspective, the law of the sea provides a pedagogical framework to illustrate our fundamental challenge within, across, and beyond national jurisdictions, considering legal zones that apply across the Earth (Fig. 2).

Fig. 2  Law of the Sea Zones, from coastal baselines into areas beyond national jurisdictions (ABNJ), namely, the high seas and area of the deep sea, across a gradient from national interests into common interests (adapted from USGPO 1985). The sea zones are applied under customary international law (as by the United States) and through the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) with nearly 160 signatories. Provisions of UNCLOS are for “strengthening of peace, security, co-operation and friendly relations among all nations” with central applications for Marine Scientific Research (UNCLOS 1982)

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Negotiated over centuries, at least since 1609 when Mare Liberum was crafted by Hugo Grotius (Bull et al. 1992), the zones in the ocean underscore the pull and push (as well as ebb and flow) of nations with TRANSBOUNDARY issues, impacts, and resources. Moreover, these transboundary considerations shift over time due to our changing Earth system, but also involving political cycles with government leaders in office over years, even decades, some in nations and regions that have recorded histories extending across centuries and a few with heritages over millennia.

Science as the “Study of Change” In our transboundary world, applications with science diplomacy originate and operate inside as well as outside of government with connections that exist at all scales on Earth, revealing two cross-cutting questions. How does science enable allies and adversaries alike to build common interests? How can science promote cooperation and prevent conflict? From our industrial and digital revolutions into the future with STI (Fig.  1), these questions underscore the stimulus for science diplomacy as a holistic process to address issues, impacts, and resources across time and space in our globally-interconnected civilization. With international and interdisciplinary inclusion, SCIENCE is the “study of change” (symbolized by the Greek letter delta, ∆, as in mathematics), including the natural sciences and social sciences as well as Indigenous knowledge. Across time and space – all “sciences” involve rigorous training with inquiry skills and strategies to characterize patterns, trends, and processes (albeit with different methodologies) that become the bases for decisionmaking. STI contributes to measurements, assessments, and responses as well as impacts with our civilization across the Earth, as we have seen from the industrial revolution to the digital revolution (Fig. 1). In relation to current decisionmaking, it is easier to understand security issues because urgencies are here and now. Sustainability, on the other hand, involves urgencies across time into the future, which is uncertain. Nonetheless, the starting point and momentum of humankind are known today, without predictions on a planetary scale (Fig. 1). Moreover – underlying diverse decisions – it is understood that human impacts are related to populations, affluence, and technology (Ehrlich and Holdren 1971; Holdren 2008). But, with all kinds of biophysical and socioeconomic “evidence” for decisions from diverse stakeholders, how do we make informed decisions? How can uninformed decisions be detected and corrected? To avoid jargon, as a proposition, informed decisions operate across a “continuum of urgencies” (Fig. 3), introducing a scalable framework that applies across tactical and strategic time scales as well as diverse regional scales to address issues, impacts, and resources.

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As a hypothesis, informed decisionmaking is scalable to the person, institution, system, region, situation, and world, involving the two generalized arenas of decisions that require close coupling to achieve progress with security as well as sustainability (Berkman 2015): • GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS (laws, agreements, and policies as well as regulatory strategies, including insurance, at diverse jurisdictional levels) • BUILT INFRASTRUCTURE (fixed, mobile, and other assets, including communication, research, observing, information, and other systems that require technology plus investment) We are entering a world with 8 billion people this decade. Human generations now are aligned with change on a planetary scale, recognizing human-population size has skyrocketed over 400% just in the lifetimes of our oldest living relatives (Fig. 1). Crossing thresholds unlike any in human history  – considering Our Common Future (UNWCED 1987) – there is great responsibility for decisions that operate in the face of change, considering immediate instabilities as well as balance across generations on Earth (Fig. 1).

 edagogy of the United Nations Sustainable Development P Goals Children and even young adults living today will be alive in the twenty-second century, underscoring the “continuum of urgencies” for humankind (Fig. 3). The context of these urgencies is further revealed in view of human population growth, which began to accelerate on a planetary scale over the past few centuries, introducing the nation-state as the basic administrative unit with sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction across geographies (Fig. 1). The metronome is across generations, central to the concept of sustainability, from Maximum Sustainable Yield in fisheries to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) of our world (Fig. 4).

Fig. 3  Theory of Informed Decisionmaking (Berkman 2019a, b) that an INFORMED DECISION operates across a continuum of urgencies (Vienna Dialogue Team 2017) as a scalable proposition for nations and peoples across the Earth (Fig. 1) from security time scales (mitigating risks of political, economic, cultural, and environmental instabilities that are immediate) to sustainability time scales (balancing economic prosperity, environmental protection, and societal well-being across generations). For each of us as individuals, the continuum of urgencies is like driving on any road, constantly adjusting to the surrounding vehicles and circumstances while being alert to the red lights ahead and traffic behind

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For humankind, the generalization of Thomas Robert Malthus (1798) at end of the eighteenth century still is correct. Human populations are controlled by war, famine, and disease. Fortunately, as a globally-interconnected civilization, our understanding of these risks has matured with increased granularity into an evolving set of development goals for humanity (Fig.  4). Because they are inclusive, the SDGs can be applied with flexibility by governments and businesses as well as civil society more broadly, where all individuals can contribute to decisionmaking. Moreover, for each of the seventeen SDGs, there is integration with generations across a “continuum of urgencies” (Fig. 3) that involves decisions to achieve stability, balance, and resilience as underlying attributes of sustainability (Table 2). The pedagogy of the Sustainable Development Goals to build common interests is further revealed with increased granularity, involving the indicators and targets for each SDG that are elaborated by many nations in their Voluntary National Reviews. Unlike any time in human history – with necessity as the spice of innovation (Fig. 1) – the clarity of common interests with the SDGs is visionary to address issues, impacts, and resources at local-global as well as global-local scales on Earth across generations.

Fig. 4  The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), crafted in a holistic manner for the benefit of all on Earth across generations (UN 2030 Agenda 2015)

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Table 2  Attributes and global-local characteristics of sustainability Attributes Balance Resilience Stability

Global-local characteristics Environmental Protection + Economic Prosperity + Societal Well-Being National Interests + Common Interests Present Generations + Future Generations Governance Mechanisms + Built Infrastructure Promoting Cooperation + Preventing Conflict Peace + Survival

Informed Decisionmaking as the Engine of Science Diplomacy Informed decisions start with questions (Fig. 5). Questions arise in view of systems, defined by their boundaries, providing frameworks to interpret internal and external dynamics. The interpretations of associated and dependent patterns, trends and process begin with questions for any research project, independent of the scientific focus. For human systems, questions also represent the least-complicated stage to build common interests among diverse actors when investments of time, effort, and resources are minimal. Importantly, for diplomacy, questions introduce a framework to reset dialogues when there is minimal progress with conflict resolution in human systems, involving boundaries with biophysical and socioeconomic components.

Fig. 5  Pyramid of Informed Decisionmaking, as the underlying methodology to apply, train, and refine across a “continuum of urgencies” (Fig. 3) that is self-selected, involving stages of research and action with outcomes of common-interest building and enhanced capacities across levels of holistic integration. (Adapted from Berkman et al. 2017)

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Inquiry is a powerful methodology (Berkman 2002) for turning observations into questions that illuminate answers that become new questions in an ever-­ growing cascade of insight. When there are QUESTIONS OF COMMON CONCERN (Fig. 5), progress with common-interest building is revealed by application of appropriate methods to generate answers. With biophysical and socioeconomic systems, the ANSWERS INVOLVE DATA generated in an interdisciplinary manner. “Big data” and “open data” (Kitchin 2014) are continuously emerging, increasingly as public goods (ISC 2018), creating opportunities for service industries to help build an economy based on knowledge (Ackoff 1999). However, to operate across a “continuum of urgencies” with the SDGs (Figs. 3 and 4), there is more than research with questions and data. In addition, actions are required with evidence and options (without advocacy) for decisions, recognizing DATA IS NOT EVIDENCE (Fig. 5). Data are for answering questions whereas evidence is for decisionmaking, reflecting their different purposes and origins. EVIDENCE emerges with integration of data and questions in contexts of the decisionmaking institutions (The Royal Society 2018; Donnelly et al. 2018), involving perspectives and agendas of diverse stakeholders (Fig. 6). Yet, evidence only compels decisionmakers to act, but without specifications of what, when, where, or how to act with governance mechanisms and built infrastructure. In this sense, evidence-based decisionmaking is incomplete as well as redundant, in that all decisions involve some form of evidence. Recognizing that competing agendas engender political dynamics, is evidence being considered selectively by decisionmaking institutions? How can decisionmaking institutions be optimized to consider evidence inclusively?

Fig. 6 Decision-support process to integrate options (without advocacy) that contribute to informed decisions (Figs. 3 and 5). (Adapted from Berkman et al. 2017)

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Ultimately, the diplomacy comes from OPTIONS (without advocacy), which can be used or ignored explicitly, avoiding the political complications that commonly arise when there are different agendas. In this manner, options (without advocacy) are tendered with respect for the roles and responsibilities of the decisionmakers to produce informed decisions as the apex goal (Fig. 5). Informed decisionmaking is the engine of science diplomacy underscoring a holistic process that starts with questions to “connect the dots” in dynamic biophysical and socioeconomic systems with diverse stakeholders and agendas. The key puzzle piece with informed decisionmaking is “holistic” – international, interdisciplinary, and inclusive – at the center of sustainable development, with common-­ interest building and knowledge co-production across research-action stages for the benefit of all at global-local scales (Figs. 3, 4, 5, and 6 and Table 3). Table 3  Categories of questions to apply, train, and refine with science diplomacy and its engine of informed informed decisionmaking (Figs. 3, 5, and 6) to implement the 17 sustainable development goals (Fig. 4) on EARTH across generations (Fig. 1) Question category for decisionmakinga,b Science as an essential gauge of changes over time and space Science as an instrument for Earth system monitoring Science as an early warning system. Science as a determinant of public policy agendas. Science as an element of international legal institutions. Science as a source of invention and commercial enterprise. Science as an element of continuity in our global society. Science as a tool of diplomacy to build common interests.

Holistic dimensions to consider International Interdisciplinary Inclusive X X X X

X

X

X X X

X X X

X X X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Decisions involve governance mechanisms and built infrastructure, coupled for sustainability Elaborated from Berkman et al. (2011)

a

b

Transforming Research and Action Skills are required within and between levels of the Pyramid of Informed Decisionmaking (Fig. 5) to apply, train, and refine with holistic approaches, delivering informed decisions (Fig. 3). Among the levels, enhancing capacities across the DATA-EVIDENCE INTERFACE between research and action with decisionmakers and scientists among other stakeholders (Fig.  6) will be transformative. The primary skill upward and downward across this decisionmaking interface involves

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individuals as both observers and participants, facilitated by curiosity and a sense of responsibility to address key questions (Table 3) with science diplomacy and holistic integration for sustainable development (Table 2) at all scales. Observers are scientists, studying change by recognizing as well as interpreting patterns, trends, and processes of systems at local-global and even galactic and elemental scales. Such observation skills involve curiosity, which is encouraged with the SOCRATIC METHOD, asking and answering questions to stimulate critical thinking with dialogue. In this broader sense, an effective education is revealed when individuals can teach themselves with questions and life-long learning. Observation skills require rigorous training as provided through the natural sciences and social sciences as well as Indigenous knowledge, studying and managing the home (“eco”), as represented by ecology and economics, respectively, as well as ecopolitics (see Volume 1, Chap. 1). Applying insights about trends, patterns, and processes, it is then possible to contribute to informed decisionmaking for sustainable development with actions taken by participants who design and implement governance mechanisms as well as built infrastructure. The opportunity is to train a next generation of informed decisionmakers, serving as observers and participants who also would be contributing to a KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY, where research is transformed with action and vice versa (Fig.  5). Questions provide the foundation for informed decisionmaking and, at its core, science diplomacy stimulates inquiry to identify, answer and refine the questions that apply across all SDGs (Fig. 4 and Table 3). Where do the questions arise for sustainable development at local-global scales? Who is responsible for addressing questions that impact our sustainable development? Thought leadership can come from anywhere, where individuals can be observers and participants with informed decisionmaking (Fig. 3), building from the stage of questions with research and action to informed decisions (Figs. 3 and 5). Beyond symbolism of science as the “study of change” (Δ), the TRIANGULATION OF SCIENCE underlies a skill with holistic integration to accelerate knowledge co-production across the Pyramid of Informed Decisionmaking (Fig.  5). Integration skills also are implied across the learning hierarchy from data and information to knowledge and wisdom, a complementary pyramid that is known widely. In addition, triangulation is involved with diverse pyramids, triads, and trinities, inspiring synergies that are revealed literally by architectural applications with geodesic domes (Fuller and Applewhite 1975). More basically, triangulation reflects indivisible first principles, as with colors and prime numbers to integrate (Fig. 7).

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Fig. 7  Co-production of knowledge – with science as the “study of change” symbolized by Δ – illustrating triangulation with: (left) holistic integration and (right) science-diplomacy features that apply together at each level of the Pyramid of Informed Decisionmaking (Fig. 5)

Triangulation as a skill can come from anywhere, beyond the responsibilities of decisionmakers alone, enabling leadership with research and education (Fig.  7). From research to action with informed decisionmaking (Fig. 5), triangulation comes with the natural sciences and social sciences as well as Indigenous knowledge. The resulting knowledge co-production is reflected literally with the 17 SDGs (Fig. 4), opening doors for a knowledge economy empowered by the capacities of our digital revolution (Fig. 1). Applying SCIENCE AS A PUBLIC GOOD (ISC 2018) synergies are evolving with informed decisionmaking, as revealed in a global context with the International Science Council (ISC 2019) that evolved in 2018 from the International Council of Science (ICSU) and International Social Sciences Council (ISSC). Within the ISC, science diplomacy is championed by the International Network on Government Science Advice (INGSA), closely collaborating with the Foreign Ministry Science and Technology Advice Network (FMSTAN 2019) that originated in 2016. On the Pyramid of Informed Decisionmaking (Fig.  9), INGSA represents the action stages with other ISC bodies, such as the Committee on Data (CODATA) or the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC), representing the stages of research. How can research and action stages of informed decisionmaking (Fig. 5) be triangulated (Fig. 7) to produce synergies for our sustainable development (Fig. 4)? Synergies emerge from holistic dialogues that seek to integrate knowledge. At strategic time scales, syntheses can be integrated to co-produce knowledge with a sense of legacy, as with the 2009 Antarctic Treaty Summit that resulted in the first book on Science Diplomacy (Berkman et al. 2011) as well as the 2009 Wilton Park meeting that resulted in the widely referenced SCIENCE-DIPLOMACY TAXONOMY: Science in diplomacy, diplomacy for science, and science for diplomacy (The Royal Society 2010). Lessons and observations from these meetings translated in 2010 into the first formal dialogue between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russian Federation regarding security in the Arctic (Berkman and Vylegzhanin 2012), operating across the continuum from security to sustainability time scales (Fig. 3).

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At tactical time scales, holistic dialogue also can be the source of knowledge co-­ production to transform observations into actions that contribute to informed decisionmaking (Vienna Dialogue Team 2017; Talloires Dialogue Team 2018). For example, the 2017 Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation mandated a first-year review of its implementation, involving diplomatic as well as scientific communities to make progress, when options (without advocacy) and syntheses would be helpful (Berkman et  al. 2017; Arctic Science Agreement Dialogue Panel 2019). In the context of this book series on Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability, for Volumes 2 and 3 at least, the Arctic Science Agreement will have a central role at the data:evidence interface (Fig. 5) with Pan-Arctic sustainability and associated decisionmaking (Fig. 8). To illustrate holistic integration, the ARCTIC OCEAN SYSTEM offers a case study (Fig. 9) with the inclusive natural boundary of the Arctic Circle, crossing land and sea without being human-imposed, relating to the horizon for sunlight defined by tilt of the Earth’s axis at 66.5° North latitude (Fig. 9a). In this pan-Arctic region, the Arctic Ocean extends within, across, and beyond the jurisdictional boundaries of the surrounding states (Fig. 2) with Indigenous peoples who have lived in the high north for millennia among other residents (Larsen and Fondahl 2014). Fig. 8 Institutional Interplay with the Arctic Science Agreement and other circumpolar Arctic governance mechanisms adopted after 2009 (Berkman et al. 2019), closely coupled with the international framework of the Law of the Sea, to which the eight Arctic States and six Indigenous Peoples Organizations “remain committed” (Arctic Council Secretariat 2013)

Open water and diminished sea ice (Fig. 9b) allow more light to penetrate, stimulating algal production (Arrigo and van Dijken 2015) and available biomass to consume at higher trophic levels throughout the food web (Fig.  9c). Similarly, with warmer waters, southern species are beginning to invade the Arctic marine ecosystem (Vermeij and Roopnarine 2008), illustrating internal and external dynamics with the Arctic Ocean (Fig. 9d), which is undergoing an environmental state-change with its sea surface boundary (Berkman and Vylegzhanin 2012).

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Fig. 9  The Arctic Ocean System with boundaries, inputs and outputs, and internal dynamics. (a) Geographic boundaries north of the Arctic Circle in view of surrounding land boundaries with national jurisdictions and Indigenous peoples among other residents, involving connections to the North Atlantic and North Pacific (Berkman 2015). (b) Changes in the surface boundary from perpetual multiyear sea ice to seasonally open water, as measured by satellites since 1979 (NASA 2012). (c) Illustration of ecosystem interactions among dependent and related species (ACIA 2004) without showing humans and their many connections and (d) Water masses and currents, illustrating internal and external dynamics with the North Atlantic and global ocean (Carmack et al. 2015)

Balancing National Interests and Common Interests In our globally-interconnected civilization (Figs. 1 and 2), international peace and security transcend boundaries beyond the capacities of nation-states alone, recognizing that sustainability on a planetary scale operates across a SPECTRUM OF JURISDICTIONS. The central jurisdictional unit on Earth since 1648 is the nation-state, which will always look after its interests first and foremost. The larger jurisdictional unit is international, which emerged with the League of Nations and United Nations after the “world wars” of the twentieth century, leading into an era of building common interests among nations (Fig. 10). The smaller jurisdictional unit is subnational, recognizing the emergence of “megacities” with more than 10 million people (UNESA 2014) and wealth of associated regions (CBS News 2018),

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even businesses (Office of Denmark’s Tech Ambassador 2019), surpassing the economic capacity of many nations. With establishment of international spaces (Fig. 10), regions on Earth provide opportunities to develop precedents and learn lessons about balancing national interests and common interests. With the Arctic Ocean System as an initial case study, representing common interests – the High Seas surrounding the North Pole in the waters above the sea floor are unambiguously beyond Exclusive Economic Zones and sovereign jurisdictions (Fig. 2). In contrast, representing national interests  – on and in the sea floor  – the Continental Shelf and deep-sea Area in the Central Arctic Ocean are seen as extensions of land areas, where there are recognized sovereign jurisdictions with rights that can be extended under UNCLOS (1982). Balancing between national interests and common interests in the Arctic Ocean will be the focus of Volume 2 of the book series on Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability.

Fig. 10  Balancing national and common interests over time on a planetary scale during the twentieth century, applying international environmental treaties as data (Fig. 5) to address sustainability questions (Table 3) about our globally-interconnected civilization (Fig. 1), with international legal establishment of areas beyond national jurisdictions (ABNJ in yellow) that cover nearly 70% of planet surface (plus outer space) to build common interests and minimize risks of conflicts over jurisdictional boundaries on Earth. (Adapted from Berkman 2002)

The juxtaposition of international legal zones in the Arctic Ocean – on the sea floor and in the superjacent waters (Figs. 2 and 11) – illustrates balancing between national interests and common interests, where questions (Table 3) can be used to stimulate knowledge co-production as the basis for informed decisionmaking (Figs. 3, 4, 5, and 6 and Tables 2 and 3). The questions and progress to build common interests in the Arctic Ocean are reflected by the emergence of binding legal

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agreements (Fig. 8), which further involve decisionmaking for built infrastructure and emerging markets in this “$1 trillion ocean” (Roston 2016). With global relevance, the Arctic Ocean is a special responsibility for humanity with the North Pole as a “pole of peace” and “burning security issues” surrounding the region (Gorbachev 1987). These observations in the 1987 Murmansk speech by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev were accompanied with introduction of the “Arctic Research Council,” becoming the Arctic Council in 1996 as a high-level forum with its six scientific working groups to address “common Arctic issues” (Ottawa Declaration 1996), that evolved with informed decisionmaking into a suite of binding agreements after 2009 (Fig. 8). Considering the pan-Arctic agreements that were signed in 2011 and 2013 as examples, while they are important and forward looking, they also are hollow in the absence of effective built infrastructure for their implementation. Who are the decisionmakers to couple governance mechanisms and built infrastructure? How will the investment mature to achieve progress with Arctic sustainability? Such infrastructure questions (Table 3) are an ongoing focus of the Arctic Economic Council that was established through the Arctic Council in 2015, fostering circumpolar business partnerships. Principles for business development in the Arctic also have emerged through the World Economic Forum (2016): “to promote sustainable and equitable economic growth in the region that furthers community well-being and builds resilient societies in a fair, inclusive and environmentally sound manner.”

Fig. 11  Balancing national interests and common interests over space with the law of the sea (Fig. 2) in view of the Central Arctic Ocean from the: (left) sea floor with sovereign areas and outer Continental Shelf claims into the currently defined Area of the deep sea (different colors) and (right) overlying water column with the High Seas (dark blue) as an unambiguous international space surrounded by Exclusive Economic Zones (light blue). National interests are seaward in contrast to common interests landward with perspective from the North Pole. (Adapted from Berkman and Young 2009)

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With sustainable development as a “common Arctic issue” (Ottawa Declaration 1996), there is an opportunity for decisionmakers to operate across a “continuum of urgencies” (Figs. 3, 4, 5, and 6). The world well knows discussions at security time scales. There also are holistic dialogues that are emerging in view of sustainability time scales with built infrastructure across the twenty-first century (Peoples Republic of China 2015). Developing toward Volume 3 with Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability, what are the investment phases in the Arctic (Fig. 12) as well as elsewhere on Earth to couple infrastructure with governance (e.g., Fig. 8), achieving progress with sustainability across generations?

Fig. 12  Concept of Investment Phases that are operating in parallel today to address a “continuum of urgencies” (Fig. 3) in the Arctic Ocean, as a globally-relevant case study with governance mechanisms (Figs. 2, 8, 10 and 11) and built infrastructure (NORDREGIO 2011) to develop as well as integrate for sustainable development across generations (Figs. 1, 3, 4 and 5; Tables 2 and 3).

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Public-private partnerships (World Bank 2019) with informed decisionmaking at tactical and strategic time scales (Figs.  1, 3, 4, 5, 10 and 11) are necessary to balance economic, environmental, and societal considerations (Tables 2 and 3). In view of trends, patterns and processes revealed with research and addressed with action (Fig. 5), this book series is intended to empower personal capacities with science diplomacy and its engine of informed decisionmaking as a holistic process for the benefit of all on Earth across generations. Tufts University Medford, MA, USA University of California Santa Barbara, CA, USA MGIMO University Moscow, Russia

Paul Arthur Berkman Oran R. Young Alexander N. Vylegzhanin

References ACIA (2004) Arctic climate impact assessment: impacts of a warming Arctic. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Ackoff RL (1999) Ackoff’s best: his classic writings on management. Wiley, New York Arctic Council Secretariat (2013) Vision for the Arctic. Arctic Council Secretariat, Kiruna, Sweden. 15 May 2013 Arctic Science Agreement (2017) Agreement on enhancing international Arctic scientific cooperation. Signed: Fairbanks, 11 May 2017; Entry into Force: 23 May 2018 Arctic Science Agreement Dialogue Panel (2019) Supporting implementation of the Arctic science agreement. Sci Dipl Act 3:1–58 Arrigo KR, van Dijken GL (2015) Continued increases in Arctic Ocean primary production. Prog Oceanogr 136:60–70 Berkman PA (2002) Science into policy: global lessons from Antarctica. Academic, San Diego Berkman PA (2015) Institutional dimensions of Sustaining Arctic Observing Networks (SAON). Arctic 68 (Suppl. 1). https://doi.org/10.14430/arctic4499 Berkman PA (2019a) Evolution of science diplomacy and its local-global applications. Eur Foreign Aff Rev (in press) Berkman PA (2019b) Science diplomacy. Training materials for the frontier diplomacy program. United Nations Institute for Training and Research, Geneva Berkman PA, Vylegzhanin AN (2012) Environmental security in the Arctic Ocean. NATO science for peace and security series. Springer, Dordrecht Berkman PA, Young OR (2009) Governance and environmental change in the Arctic Ocean. Science 324:339–340 Berkman PA, Lang MA, Walton DWH, Young OR (eds) (2011) Science diplomacy: science, Antarctica and the governance of international spaces. Smithsonian Institution Scholarly Press, Washington, DC Berkman PA, Kullerud L, Pope A, Vylegzhanin AN, Young OR (2017) The Arctic science agreement propels science diplomacy. Science 358:596–598 Berkman PA, Vylegzhanin AN, Young OR (2019) Baseline of Russian Arctic Laws. Springer, Dordrecht Berkman PA, Young OR, Vylegzhanin AN, Petrov A (2019) Arctic science diplomacy. In: Nuttall A, Nuttall M (eds) The Routledge handbook of Arctic politics. Routledge, London. (in preparatin)

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Bull H, Kingsbury B, Roberts A (eds) (1992) Hugo Grotius and international relations. Clarendon Press, Oxford Carmack E, Polyakov I, Padman L, Fer I, Hunke E, Hutchings J, Jackson J, Kelley D, Kwok R, Layton C, Melling H, Perovich D, Persson O, Ruddick B, Timmermans M-L, Toole J, Ross T, Vavrus S, Winsor P (2015) Bull Am Meteorol Soc 96(12):2079–2105 CBS News (2018) California now has the world’s 5th largest economy. 4 May 2018. https://www. cbsnews.com/news/california-now-has-the-worlds-5th-largest-economy/ Donnelly CA, Boyd I, Campbell P, Craig C, Vallance P, Walport M, Whitty CJM, Woods E, Wormald C (2018) Four principles for synthesizing evidence. Nature 558:361–364 Durand JD (1977) Historical estimates of world population: an evaluation. Popul Dev 3(3):253–296 Ehrlich PR, Holdren JP (1971) Impact of population growth. Science 171:212–1217 Fuller RB, Applewhite EJ (1975) Synergetics: explorations in the geometry of thinking. Macmillan, London FMSTAN (2019) Foreign Ministry Science and Technology Advice Network. International Network for Government Science Advice and International Science Council. https://www. ingsa.org/divisions/fmstan/; https://council.science/what-we-do Gorbachev M (1987) Speech at the ceremonial meeting on the occasion of the presentation of the order of Lenin and the gold star to the city of Murmansk. 1 October 1987. (English translation prepared by the Press Office of the Embassy of the Soviet Union, Ottawa 1988) Holdren JP (2008) Science and technology for sustainable well-being. Science 319:424–434 ISC (2018) Advancing science as a Global Public Good: High Level Strategy. International Science Council, Paris. https://council.science/cms/2018/06/HLS_EN.pdf ISC (2019) ICSU-ISSC Merger. International Science Council. https://council.science/ about-us/a-brief-history/icsu-issc-merger Kitchin R (2014) The data revolution: big data, open data, data infrastructures and their consequences. Sage, London Larsen JN, Fondahl G (eds) (2014) Arctic human development report. Regional processes and global linkages. Nordic Council of Ministers, Copenhagen Malthus TR (1798) An essay on the principle of population, as it affects the future improvement of society, with remarks on the speculations of Mr. Godwin, M. Condorcet, and other writers. 1st ed. J. Johnson, London NASA (2012) Satellite image of the Arctic Sea-Ice minimum. 16 September 2012. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington, DC. https://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/ features/2012-seaicemin.html NORDREGIO (2011). Megatrends. Nordic Council of Ministers, Copenhagen Office of Denmark’s Tech Ambassador (2019) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Denmark. http://techamb.um.dk/ Ottawa Declaration (1996) Declaration on the establishment of the Arctic Council. 19 September 1996. Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Ottawa Peoples Republic of China (2015) Vision and actions on jointly building silk road economic belt and 21st-century Maritime Silk Road. 28 March 2015. Issued by the National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, with State Council authorization. http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html Roberts JM, Westad OA (2013) The history of the world. 6th ed. Oxford University Press, Oxford Roco MC, Bainbridge WS, Tonn B, Whitesides G (eds) (2013) Convergence of knowledge, technology and society. Beyond convergence of nano-bio-info-cognitive technologies. Springer, Dordrecht Roston E (2016) The World has discovered a $1 Trillion Ocean. Bloomberg 21 January 2016 Talloires Dialogue Team (2018) Science diplomacy – to 2030 and beyond. Science Dipl Action 2:1–9 The Royal Society (2010) New frontiers in science diplomacy: navigating the changing balance of power. The Royal Society, London The Royal Society (2018) Evidence synthesis for policy: a statement of principles. The Royal Society, London

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UN 2030 Agenda (2015) Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development. United Nations General Assembly, New York UNCLOS (1982) United Nations convention on the law of the Sea. Signed: Montego Bay, 10 December 1982; Entry into Force: 16 November 1994 UNESA (2014) World urbanization prospects. The 2014 Revision. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, New  York. https://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/publications/files/ wup2014-highlights.pdf UNFCC (1992) United Nations framework convention on climate change. Signed: Rio de Janeiro, 9 May 1992; Entry into Force: 21 March 1994 UNWCED (1987) Our common future: from one earth to one world. Report transmitted to the general assembly as an annex to resolution A/RES/42/187. United Nations, World Commission on Environment and Development, New York USEPA (2019) Global atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration data. United States environmental protection agency. https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-08/ghg-concentrations_fig-1.csv. Accessed 28 May 2019 USGPO (1985) Third conference on the United Nations convention on the law of the Sea. United States Government Printing Office, Washington, DC Vermeij GJ, Roopnarine PD (2008) The coming Arctic invasion. Science 321:780–781 Vienna Dialogue Team (2017) A global network of science and technology advice in foreign ministries. Science Diplomacy Action 1:1–20 World Bank (2019) Infrastructure and public-private partnerships. http://www.worldbank.org/en/ topic/publicprivatepartnerships. World Economic Forum (2016) Arctic investment protocol. Guidelines for responsible investment in the Arctic. World Economic Forum, Davos Worldometer (2019) Data on the size of the human population on Earth from 1600 to the present. http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/?#table-historical, with compilations by the United Nations since 1950. http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/. Accessed 28 May 2019

Acknowledgments

We are pleased to acknowledge the contributions of numerous individuals, organizations, and funding agencies that allowed us to carry out the work reported in this volume and to develop ideas about informed decision making for sustainability providing the broader context for our thinking about governing ecopolitical regions. We initiated the work that gave rise to this volume in 2013 under the terms of a grant awarded by the US National Science Foundation. This initial grant covering research on “Arctic Options: Holistic Integration for Arctic Coastal-Marine Sustainability (HIACMS)” was awarded under NSF’s Science, Engineering, and Education for Sustainability (SEES) Program (Award No. 1263678 initially at the University of California Santa Barbara and then Award No. 1263819 at Tufts University for the period 1 September 2013–31 August 2019); the French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) provided supplemental funding to support French participation in the project. Known subsequently as Arctic Options, the project’s stated mission was to identify governance strategies and infrastructure options that balance economic, social, and environmental interests in Arctic coastal-marine systems through international, interdisciplinary, and inclusive processes of analysis. A subsequent grant awarded under the auspices of the Belmont Forum and entitled “Pan-Arctic Options: Holistic Integration for Arctic Coastal-Marine Sustainability” allowed us to bring this book effort to a successful conclusion, supported primarily by NSF (Award No. 1660449 for the period 1 November 2015–31 October 2019). The Belmont Forum project involved collaborations supported initially by: Canada (Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council - SSHRC); China (Natural Science Foundation of China -NSFC); France (French National Research Agency ANR); Norway (Research Council of Norway - RCN); Russia (Russian Foundation for Basic Research- RFBR); and United States (NSF). We began this work with the objective of exploring the application of what are widely known as decision support tools to complex policy choices relating to marine systems and associated coastal margins in the Arctic. To provide an empirical focus for our work, we selected the Bering Strait Region and the Barents Sea Region as initial cases for detailed examination. As the overall preface for our book series with Springer, Informed Decision making for Sustainability (included in this volume), makes clear, work on this project has followed a dialectical process in which general

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ideas about informed decision making have proven helpful in analyzing issues arising in the empirical cases, while work on the cases has contributed to the development of our thinking about the practice of informed decision making. What has arisen from this dialectic is an understanding of the importance of an end-to-end relationship between practitioners and analysts marked by cooperation in the identification and framing of questions, the co-production of knowledge, the development of options without advocacy, and the monitoring of results to improve decision making in subsequent iterations of the process. Broadly speaking, we have come to understand that this process works best when it is holistic in the sense of being international, interdisciplinary, and inclusive. More specifically, our work on Governing Arctic Seas has produced the concept of ecopolitical regions and an understanding of the need to balance common interests and national interests in the creation of institutions and construction of associated infrastructure to be successful in meeting the challenges of governance arising in these regions. This effort has proceeded hand-in-hand with the growth of the practice of science diplomacy. Starting with the Antarctic Treaty Summit, an inclusive dialogue held at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, DC, in December 2009 to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959, and continuing with the 2010 NATO Advanced Workshop on Environmental Security in the Arctic Ocean held at Cambridge University, we have worked to identify and clarify the roles that science and scientists can play in the realm of informed decision making for sustainability. Now the focus of a dynamic global enterprise, science diplomacy has played an important role in the evolution of our thinking about Governing Arctic Seas. The result, reflected in this volume, is the development of a process in which practitioners and analysts can work together to address constructively a set of challenges that will determine our ability to govern human-environment interactions in a sustainable manner not only in well-defined regions but also on a planetary scale. A particularly notable feature of our work on Governing Arctic Seas has been the development of a productive ongoing collaboration between Russian and Western team members. There can be no real progress in informed decision making for sustainability in the Bering Strait and Barents Sea Regions without active engagement on the part of individuals from both communities. An element of the production of this volume that we have found deeply satisfying has been the growth of an effective partnership in this realm, reflected not only in the composition of the editorial team but also in the authorship of the individual chapters that make up each of the three main sections of the volume. It is a distinct pleasure to acknowledge the contributions of a sizable collection of individuals and organizations that have played important roles in the development of the work reported in this volume. To carry out some of the work of the NSF-funded project, we organized a research collaborative, including the: Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University; Marine Science Institute at the University of California Santa; University of Alaska Fairbanks; and the National Snow and Ice Data Center at the University of Colorado. The participation of Lawson Brigham, Olivia Lee, and Julie Raymond-Yakoubian was supported by the University of Alaska Fairbanks. The

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University of Colorado supported the participation of Peter Pulsifer. Oran Young’s participation was supported by the University of California Santa Barbara. Tufts University provided support for the contributions of Paul Berkman, Molly Douglas and Greg Fiske. Diwakar Poudel participated in the project as a postdoctoral fellow at the Norwegian Polar Institute funded by the Research Council of Norway. Katia Kontar participated as a postdoctoral fellow at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy funded by the US NSF. Fraser Taylor’s contributions to the project have been supported by the Geomatics and Cartographic Research Centre at Carleton University funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Valeriy Kryukov’s participation was funded by the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences within a project on the evolution of forms of economic activity in the Russian Arctic. Support for Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv’s work came from the NordForsk-funded Nordic Centre of Excellence Project (Award No. 76654) on Arctic Climate Predictions: Pathways to Resilient, Sustainable Societies (ARCPATH), and the Research Council of Norway-funded NORRUSS Project (Award No. 257644) on Challenges in Arctic Governance: Indigenous Territorial Rights in the Russian Federation. The National Center for Ecological Analysis and Synthesis (NCEAS) in Santa Barbara, California, hosted our 20–24 October 2014 Workshop on “Integrated Policy Options for the Bering Strait Region.” This workshop, supported with funding from the US NSF Award No. 1263678, generated the information included in Table 5.1 of this volume. We are grateful to Frank Davis and Ben Halpern of NCEAS for their contributions not only to the success of the workshop but also to the early stages of the Arctic Options project supported under NSF Award No. 1263678. SpaceQuest Ltd. played an important role in our analysis of Arctic ship traffic, providing access to a unique dataset containing the oldest continuous record of satellite observations of ships operating in Arctic waters. The Arctic Options/Pan-Arctic Options Team met for extended working sessions in 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018. The participants in these workshops heard progress reports and provided extensive feedback at every stage in the development of the research reflected in Governing Arctic Seas. The workshops were hosted in chronological order by the Norwegian Polar Institute in Tromsø, Norway, the Université Pierre et Marie Curie in Paris, France, the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) in Moscow, Russia, and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in Medford, Massachusetts, USA. We asked experts in the relevant fields to peer review drafts of the individual chapters included in Governing Arctic Seas. We are grateful to them for agreeing to play this role on a voluntary basis and for providing input leading to significant improvements in the finished products. Those who assisted in this way include: Claudio Aporta, Carolina Behe, Steven Cole, Peter Fox, Jacqueline Grebmeier, Alf Håkon Hoel, Noor Johnson, Paula Kankaanpää, Timo Koivurova, Daniella Liggett, Peter Oppenheimer, Mark Parsons, Alexander Pelyasov, Rebecca Pincus, Karen Pletnikoff, Gunnar Sander, Koji Sekimizu, Alexander Shestakov, Olaf Schram Stokke, Dennis Thurston, and Stein Tronstad.

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Our relationship with Springer has developed from strength to strength during the course of our work on this volume. We are especially grateful to Annelies Kersbergen and Margaret Deignan of Springer for constructive and enjoyable participation in our collaboration. Already, this collaboration has borne fruit in the form of the publication by Springer early in spring 2019 of: Paul Arthur Berkman, Alexander N. Vylegzhanin, and Oran R. Young, Baseline of Russian Arctic Laws, the first compendium of Russian laws relating to the Arctic available in English translation. We are delighted that Governing Arctic Seas will now take its place as Volume 1 in the Springer series Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability. Work is already underway on Volume 2 in this series, and we look forward to continuing our cooperation with colleagues at Springer. During the course of our work on this volume, we have laid the foundation for ongoing cooperation between the Springer book series and Arctic Frontiers, a major conference held annually in Tromsø, Norway. This cooperation, expected to continue as we work on additional volumes in the series, is formalized in a memorandum of understanding dated 25 September 2018 between Akvaplan-Niva on behalf of Arctic Frontiers and the Science Diplomacy Center at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University on behalf of Arctic Options/Pan-Arctic Options. The production of a highly integrated volume like Governing Arctic Seas is a lengthy and complex process. We are grateful to all those who participated in this process for sticking with us to the end to produce an excellent product. Oran R. Young Paul Arthur Berkman Alexander N. Vylegzhanin

Contents

Part I Volume 1: Introduction 1 Governing Arctic Seas: Sustainability in the Bering Strait and Barents Sea Regions ������������������������������������������������������������������������    3 Oran R. Young, Paul Arthur Berkman, and Alexander N. Vylegzhanin Part II The Bering Strait Region 2 Ecosystems of the Bering Strait Region ������������������������������������������������   25 Olivia Lee, Jon L. Fuglestad, and Lyman Thorsteinson 3 Economies of the Bering Strait Region��������������������������������������������������   47 Gunnar Knapp and Valeriy Kryukov 4 Sociocultural Features of the Bering Strait Region������������������������������   75 Julie Raymond-Yakoubian and Eduard Zdor 5 Governing the Bering Strait Region������������������������������������������������������   95 Oran R. Young, Paul Arthur Berkman, and Alexander N. Vylegzhanin Part III The Barents Sea Region 6 Ecosystems of the Barents Sea Region ��������������������������������������������������  119 Jon L. Fuglestad, Rasmus Benestad, Vladimir Ivanov, Lis Lindahl Jørgensen, Kit M. Kovacs, Frode Nilssen, Hein Rune Skjoldal, and Julia Tchernova 7 Economies of the Barents Sea Region����������������������������������������������������  143 Valeriy Kryukov and Diwakar Poudel 8 The Barents Sea Region in a Human Security Perspective������������������  165 Ole Øvretveit, Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv, Maria Goes, Elena Kudryashova, Rauna Kuokkanen, and Maksim Zadorin

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9 Governing the Barents Sea Region��������������������������������������������������������  185 Alexander N. Vylegzhanin, Oran R. Young, and Paul Arthur Berkman Part IV Crosscutting Themes and Analytic Tools 10 Integrated Ocean Management in the Barents Sea������������������������������  207 Ellen Øseth and Oleg Korneev 11 Next-Generation Arctic Marine Shipping Assessments������������������������  241 Paul Arthur Berkman, Greg Fiske, Jon-Arve Røyset, Lawson W. Brigham, and Dino Lorenzini 12 Information Ecology to Map the Arctic Information Ecosystem����������������������������������������������������������������������������  269 Peter L. Pulsifer, Yekaterina Kontar, Paul Arthur Berkman, and D. R. Fraser Taylor 13 Mapping and Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic������������������������������������  293 Julie Raymond-Yakoubian, Peter L. Pulsifer, D. R. Fraser Taylor, Camilla Brattland, and Tero Mustonen 14 Building Capacity: Education Beyond Boundaries������������������������������  321 Molly B. A. Douglas, Yekaterina Kontar, Malgorzata Smieszek, Allen Pope, and Inna P. Zhuravleva Part V Conclusion 15 Informed Decisionmaking for the Sustainability of Ecopolitical Regions����������������������������������������������������������������������������  341 Oran R. Young, Paul Arthur Berkman, and Alexander N. Vylegzhanin Index������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  355

About the Authors

Rasmus  Benestad is Senior Climate Scientist at the Norwegian Meteorological Institute and a coordinating lead author of the chapter on physical and socio-­ economic environment in the AACA perspectives from the Barents area. He has a D.Phil. in physics and long experience with statistical modeling. He has brought these two disciplines together in joint analyses of observations and climate model simulations. He also has led the development of a popular tool for climate analysis and empirical-statistical downscaling and is a member of the team behind www. RealClimate.org.  

Paul Arthur Berkman is Director of the Science Diplomacy Center and Professor of Practice in Science Diplomacy at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. His international and interdisciplinary background has ranged from leading international expeditions to Antarctica to training science diplomacy in national diplomatic academies with informed decisionmaking to balance national interests and common interests for the benefit of all on Earth across generations.  

Camilla Brattland is Associate Professor in the Institute of Social Sciences, UiT – The Arctic University of Norway. She focuses on coastal Sami culture and small-­ scale fisheries, with a particular emphasis on documentation and mapping of traditional marine use and local ecological knowledge.  

Lawson  W.  Brigham is a Polar Institute Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC, and a researcher at the University of Alaska Fairbanks. As a career US Coast Guard officer, he commanded icebreakers on the Great Lakes and in Arctic and Antarctic waters. He served as chair of the Arctic Council’s Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) and as a US delegation member to the IMO during the development of the Polar Code. He is a member of the Polar Research Board of the US National Academy of Sciences.  

Molly B. A. Douglas is an independent researcher and consultant on science, technology, and innovation in sustainable development and international affairs. She holds degrees from the Fletcher School and the Walsh School at Georgetown University. Her background is in international development.  

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Greg Fiske is a Senior Geospatial Analyst at the Woods Hole Research Center in Woods Hole, Massachusetts. He has more than two decades of experience working with large geospatial datasets. Trained as a cartographer, he spends a great deal of time thinking about how best to represent the results of complex geospatial analyses.  

Jon  L.  Fuglestad is Senior Advisor in the Department of Climate and Polar Research at the Research Council of Norway. Formerly, he was the Deputy Executive Secretary of the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme with responsibility for the project on Adaptation Actions for a Changing Arctic (AACA). He has chaired the Oslo-Paris Commission’s group on inputs to the marine environment.  

Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv is Professor of Critical Peace and Conflict Studies at UiT – The Arctic University of Norway. Her areas of research are international relations with a focus on security studies, particularly human security with intersectional approaches to security. She was among the first cohort of Fulbright Arctic Initiative Scholars and has been the Nansen Professor at the University of Akureyri in Iceland.  

Maria  Goes is Research Affiliate at the Barents Institute at UiT  – The Arctic University of Norway. She has an MA in peace and conflict transformation and a PhD in political science. Her current research deals with critical security, Russian politics, and environmental policy.  

Vladimir Ivanov is Leading Research Scientist in the Geography Department of Lomonosov Moscow State University and in the Ocean-Air Interaction Department of the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute. He has participated in 18 marine research expeditions in the Arctic Ocean and is the author or co-author of more than 150 publications relating to physical oceanography and polar and climate studies.  

Lis  Lindahl  Jørgensen is Senior Scientist at the Institute of Marine Research (IMR) in Norway and chair of the Flagship “Climate Change – Fjord and Coast” at the Fram Centre in Tromsø, Norway. She is Co-chair of the Ecosystem Approach Group within the Arctic Council’s PAME Working Group and an engaged scientist in the CBMP marine benthic group of the Arctic Council. Her scientific work focuses on bringing the ecology of the benthos into a wider ecosystem perspective within management and vulnerability assessments.  

Gunnar Knapp is Professor Emeritus of Economics at the Institute of Social and Economic Research at the University of Alaska Anchorage. He has conducted extensive research on the Alaska economy and the Alaska seafood industry. A Russian speaker, he was actively involved in early efforts to develop relationships between Alaska and the Russian Far East.  

About the Authors

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Yekaterina  (Katia)  Kontar is Postdoctoral Fellow at the Science Diplomacy Center, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. She holds a PhD in science communication and policy from the University of Alaska Fairbanks and subsequently was a Belmont Forum Science Diplomacy Postdoctoral Fellow at the Science Diplomacy Center at Tufts University. She conducts interdisciplinary research on physical and socioeconomic drivers and impacts of disasters. Her earlier work involved fostering scientific literacy among K-12 students and promoting Antarctic research and discovery at the Antarctic Geological Drilling Program.  

Oleg Korneev is Deputy Head of the Federal State Budgetary Institutions North-­ West Administration of Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring in St. Petersburg, Russia. He has participated in developing a management plan for the Russian part of the Barents Sea.  

Kit  M.  Kovacs is Leader of the Biodiversity Section at the Norwegian Polar Institute and is Professor II at University Studies on Svalbard. She has worked in the polar regions with marine mammals for several decades. She is the author of over 250 primary journal publications as well as 15 books and many book chapters and scientific reports. Her primary research interests are population ecology and conservation biology.  

Valeriy  Kryukov is Director of the Institute of Economics and Industrial Engineering of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Novosibirsk. He is a Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences and a member of the Norwegian Academy of Polar Research. He has been involved in extensive multidisciplinary research on the natural-resource-based economies of Siberia and the Russian Arctic. He is a professor and founder of the first MA program on natural resource economics and management at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow.  

Elena  Kudryashova is Professor and Rector of the Northern Arctic Federal University named after M.V.  Lomonosov in Archangel. She is a member of the Association of Polar Explorers, the Working Group on Higher Education and Science of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, and the Interagency Working Group on Coordination of the Monitoring and Implementation of the Development Strategy of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation.  

Rauna  Kuokkanen is Research Professor of Arctic Indigenous Studies at the University of Lapland in Rovaniemi, Finland. From 2008 to 2018, she was Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and the Indigenous Studies Program at the University of Toronto. Her newly released book Restructuring Relations: Indigenous Self-Determination, Governance and Gender (Oxford University Press) is an Indigenous feminist investigation of the theory and practice of Indigenous self-­ determination, governance, and gender regimes in Indigenous political institutions.  

About the Authors

xxxvi

Olivia  Lee is Assistant Professor at the International Arctic Research Center, University of Alaska, Fairbanks. Her research includes collaborative partnerships with indigenous coastal community members in the Bering Strait Region focused on tracking changes in sea ice and observed impacts on marine mammals, birds, and other subsistence species. She also co-leads the Sea Ice Collaboration Team of the US Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee and serves on the board of the Arctic Research Consortium of the United States.  

Dino Lorenzini is President and CEO of SpaceQuest, Ltd., a satellite development and manufacturing firm in Fairfax, Virginia. He has more than 45 years experience in the development and management of complex space systems. A graduate of the US Air Force Academy, Lorenzini rose to the rank of colonel and held senior management responsibility for several major space development projects during a 22-year career in the US Air Force. As a DARPA Program Manager, he directed the development of a Precision Pointing and Tracking System for a High-Energy Space-­ Based Laser. As Director of the SDI Pilot Architecture Study, he led the technical efforts of over 75 leading scientists and engineers in the conceptual design and analysis of a National Ballistic Missile Defense System. Lorenzini earned his MS and PhD in aeronautical engineering from MIT. He also holds an MBA from Auburn University.  

Tero  Mustonen is President of Snowchange Co-op, an independent cultural and research organization for the Circumpolar Indigenous and traditional communities. Founded in 2000, Snowchange works in Alaska, Canada, Greenland, Iceland, the Faroe Islands, Sami and Finnish communities, and the Russian Arctic. Mustonen is a winter seiner and head of the Kesälahti fish base. He is currently serving as a lead author for IPCC AR6.  

Frode  Nilssen is Professor at the Nordlund University Business School’s High North Centre for Business and Governance and has experience leading Norwegian-­ Russian scientific collaboration in the food sector over 25  years. He has been a researcher and research director at the Norwegian Institute for Fisheries and is currently head of the Department for Marketing, Strategy and Management at the Bodø Graduate School of Business where he leads a large project on Search and Rescue in the Arctic. Nilssen’s research interests relate to economic behavior, governance, and politics in the exploitation of natural resources.  

Ellen  Øseth is Head of Environmental Management Section at the Norwegian Polar Institute in Tromsø, Norway. Her expertise is advising Norwegian authorities on management in polar areas. She has participated in the management planning process in Norway.  

About the Authors

xxxvii

Ole Øvretveit is Director of Arctic Frontiers, a major annual conference in Tromsø, Norway, that sets the agenda linking policy, business, and science for sustainable development in the Arctic. He received an MSc in political science from the University of Bergen in 2010 and has studied in Berlin, Moscow, and Reykjavik. Before joining Arctic Frontiers, Øvretveit worked with business development commercial productions.  

Allen Pope is Executive Secretary of the International Arctic Science Committee and Research Scientist at the US National Snow and Ice Data Center. He works to bring together Arctic researchers across disciplinary and national boundaries and to advocate for the importance of Arctic science. He also studies Earth’s frozen regions with satellite data, does field work to make sure the satellites have it right, and communicates Arctic science on Twitter @PopePolar.  

Diwakar Poudel is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Norwegian Polar Institute in Tromsø, Norway. His research focuses on developing methods and instruments for managing variable environmental values in the Arctic. Prior to starting work on the Pan-Arctic Options project at the Polar Institute, he participated in several environmental management projects, including, most recently, work on ecosystem-based fisheries management in the Barents Sea.  

Peter L. Pulsifer is Research Scientist at the National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC), University of Colorado at Boulder, where he leads the Exchange for Local Observations and Knowledge of the Arctic project (ELOKA, http://elokaarctic.org). His research addresses questions related to the use of geographic information with a particular focus on supporting interoperability, the ability of information systems to share information or operations. He has focused on theory and practice in the context of polar information management. For more than 10 years, he has worked closely with members of Arctic communities to facilitate the sharing of local observations and Indigenous knowledge.  

Julie Raymond-Yakoubian is an Anthropologist and the Social Science Program Director at Kawerak, Inc., an Alaska Native Tribal Consortium for the 20 Tribes of the Bering Strait Region of Alaska.  

Jon-Arve  Røyset holds an LLM in International Maritime Law from the IMO International Maritime Law Institute and an Executive Master’s Degree in Shipping and Logistics (EMBA) from Copenhagen Business School. Since 2003, he has worked at the Norwegian Coastal Administration where he currently holds the position of Senior Advisor. Røyset heads the extensive shipping-related work in the integrated management plan for the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea. He currently serves as co-lead of the Arctic Shipping Traffic Data (ASTD) project of the Arctic Council.  

About the Authors

xxxviii

Hein  Rune  Skjoldal is a Scientist at the Institute of Marine Research (IMR) in Norway. He has led work on Arctic assessments, including the AMAP Assessment of Oil and Gas Activities in the Arctic and the AMAP/CAFF/SDWG AMSA IIC Report. Skjoldal is a co-lead on the Ecosystem Approach Expert Group in the Arctic Council and the ICES/PICES/PAME Working Group on Integrated Ecosystem Assessment of the Central Arctic Ocean.  

Malgorzata  Smieszek is a Researcher at the Arctic Centre at the University of Lapland in Rovaniemi, Finland. She has co-chaired the IASC Action Group on Communicating Arctic Science to Policymakers and represented IASC at meetings of the Arctic Council. She is a research fellow of the Earth System Governance alliance and a co-founder of the nonprofit association “Women of the Arctic.”  

D.  R.  Fraser  Taylor is Chancellor’s Distinguished Research Professor of International Affairs, Geography and Environmental Studies and Director of the Geomatics and Cartographic Research Centre at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada. He has worked extensively with Northern communities for many years.  

Julia Tchernova is a Biologist contributing to bilateral and multilateral environmental management projects in the Barents Sea Region. She has worked with the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme with a special focus on the AACA project dealing with the Barents area.  

Lyman Thorsteinson formerly a United States Geological Survey Staff Member is known for his research on marine fishes in the northeast Pacific and Arctic Oceans. His studies focused on species-environmental relationships addressing ecological effects of planned offshore oil and gas development, effects of climate change, and restoration of altered aquatic habitats.  

Alexander N. Vylegzhanin is Professor and Head of the Program of International Law at Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). He is VicePresident of the Russian Association of International Law, Vice-President of the Russian Association of the Law of the Sea, and an elected member on the Committee on the Arctic and Antarctic of the Upper House of the Russian Parliament. He is Editor-in-Chief of the Moscow Journal of International Law and has written widely on legal issues, especially relating to the law of the sea.  

Oran R. Young is Professor Emeritus at the Bren School of Environmental Science and Management at the University of California (Santa Barbara). He has devoted his career to analyzing the roles institutions play in meeting needs for governance, with applications to the Arctic going back to the 1970s.  

About the Authors

xxxix

Maksim  Zadorin is Associate Professor in the Department of International Law and Comparative Law of the Northern Arctic Federal University named after M.V. Lomonosov in Archangel. An expert on legal issues of Arctic development, he is also the independent legal expert of the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North.  

Eduard Zdor is a PhD candidate in the Department on Anthropology, University of Alaska, Fairbanks. He studies the sociocultural patterns of the Indigenous peoples of the Bering Strait Region, with a focus on subsistence-oriented activities and traditional ecological knowledge.  

Inna P. Zhuravleva is a Lecturer on Arctic Law in the Department of International Law at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). She holds a PhD in law and has previously worked as head of the Directorate for WTO Affairs at the Analytical Center for the Government of the Russian Federation.  

Acronyms

AACA ABSR ACIA ACW AEWC AIS AMAP AMSA ASOC ASTD BaSR BEAC BeSR CBD CDQ CKE DBO EBM EBSAs EEZ EWC GDP GIS GRP HFOs IHO IMO ICES ICRW IUU IWC KMMC LME

Adaptation Actions for a Changing Arctic Alaska Bering Strait Region Arctic Climate Impact Assessment Arctic Coastal Water Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission Automatic Identification System Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition Arctic Ship Traffic Data Barents Sea Region Barents Euro-Arctic Council Bering Strait Region Convention on Biological Diversity Community Development Quota Central Kola Expedition Distributed Biological Observatory Ecosystem-Based Management Ecologically or Biologically Significant Areas Exclusive Economic Zone Eskimo Walrus Commission Gross Domestic Product Geographic Information Systems Gross Regional Product Heavy Fuel Oils International Hydrographic Organization International Maritime Organization International Council for the Exploration of the Sea International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing International Whaling Commission Kola Mining and Metallurgical Company Large Marine Ecosystem xli

xlii

LNG MARPOL MMSI MPAs MPC NANA NATO NEAFC NMCE NOAA NPI NSEDC NSIDC NSF NSR OSPAR

Acronyms

Liquified Natural Gas International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships Mobile Marine Service Identify Marine Protected Areas Maximum Permissible Concentration Northwest Alaska Native Association North Atlantic Treaty Organization North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission Norwegian Ministry of Climate and Environment National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Norwegian Polar Institute Norton Sound Economic Development Corporation National Snow and Ice Data Center National Science Foundation Northern Sea Route Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic PAG Pacific Arctic Group PAME Working Group on the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment PSSAs Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas RBSR Russian Bering Strait Region RUSALCA Russian-American Long-term Census of the Arctic SAON Sustaining Arctic Observing Networks SOLAS International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea STCW International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch keeping for Seafarers TAC Total Allowable Catch UNCLOS UN Convention on the Law of the Sea UNEP UN Environment Programme WTTC World Travel and Tourism Council WWF World Wildlife Fund

Part I Volume 1: Introduction

1

Governing Arctic Seas: Sustainability in the Bering Strait and Barents Sea Regions Oran R. Young, Paul Arthur Berkman, and Alexander N. Vylegzhanin

Abstract

Some regions defined in biophysical terms are subject to shared authority and responsibility with regard to matters of governance. When such regions lie outside or beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, they constitute international spaces. Where they are subject to the jurisdiction of two or more states, they constitute shared spaces. Together, international spaces and shared spaces make up the domain of ecopolitical regions. Focusing on marine shared spaces, which we describe as regional seas, this book addresses issues of governance broadly defined, with a particular emphasis on the achievement of sustainability regarding human activities occurring in regional seas. We treat the Bering Strait Region and the Barents Sea Region as cases studies for an in-depth examination of this topic. In the process, we seek to contribute to understanding regarding the pursuit of sustainability in regional seas and ecopolitical regions more generally.

This chapter draws on Berkman, Vylegzhanin, and Young 2016 and Vylegzhanin, Young, and Berkman 2018. O. R. Young (*) Bren School of Environmental Science and Management, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, USA e-mail: [email protected] P. A. Berkman

Science Diplomacy Center, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, MA, USA e-mail: [email protected] A. N. Vylegzhanin Department of International Law, MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 O. R. Young et al. (eds.), Governing Arctic Seas: Regional Lessons from the Bering Strait and Barents Sea, Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25674-6_1

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4

1.1

O. R. Young et al.

An Introduction to Marine Ecopolitical Regions

Some regions whose boundaries follow the configuration of physical and biological systems are subject to shared authority and responsibility in dealing with a variety of needs for governance. We treat the universe of cases belonging to this category as ecopolitical regions. Achieving sustainability in such regions requires cooperation on the part of all those who share authority and responsibility to establish governance systems and build supporting infrastructural arrangements that promote cooperation at the regional level, provide mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of conflicts among users of resources located in these areas, address interactions with the outside world, and contribute more generally to the achievement of outcomes that are sustainable over time.1,2 Ecopolitical regions are scalar; they range from the micro-level to the macro-­ level in spatial terms. At the international level, which is our focus in this book, it is helpful to divide ecopolitical regions into two subsets. One subset of these regions, which we call international spaces, includes areas featuring shared authority and responsibility arising from the fact that they lie wholly or largely in areas beyond national jurisdiction (Young 2013a). Prominent examples include the high seas and outer space. The second subset, which we call joint spaces, includes areas that fall within the jurisdiction of two or more states by virtue of the fact that they are bisected by recognized jurisdictional boundaries. Prominent examples include fish stocks and deposits of hydrocarbons that straddle or cross the boundaries of the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of coastal states. This book focuses on joint marine spaces. This class of ecopolitical regions includes what the law of the sea characterizes as “states with opposite or adjacent coasts.”3 Opposite States are those whose coasts face one another in spatial terms. The territorial seas, Exclusive Economic Zones, or continental shelves of these opposite states often overlap forming joint spaces. The case of the Russian Federation and the United States in the Bering Sea exemplifies this situation. Adjacent states are states whose maritime boundaries extend from a fixed point on their common 1  Because the key actors in the ecopolitical regions we analyze in this book are states, governance requires international or intergovernmental cooperation. But analogous issues arise when the relevant actors are subnational units of governance or other units including Indigenous Peoples’ Organizations. 2  For a general discussion of the use of the terms sustainability and sustainable development in the work of the Pan-Arctic Options Project, see the Series Preface included in this volume. 3  The terms “opposite” and “adjacent” were introduced in the final report on the law of the sea prepared by the International Law Commission in 1956. These terms were used in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 1958 (Art. 12) and in the Convention on the Continental Shelf, 1958 (Art. 6). The terms are used in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982) in Arts. 15 (“Delimitation of the territorial sea between States with opposite or adjacent coasts”), 74 (“Delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between States with opposite or adjacent coasts”), and 83 (“Delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts”). Whether coasts are “opposite” or “adjacent” depends on the configuration of the relevant coasts and their geographical position in relation to one another. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea was opened for signature in 1982 and entered into force in 1994.

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coastline through the outer limit of their jurisdiction, as in the case of Norway and the Russian Federation in the Barents Sea. To address needs for governance in such areas effectively, the relevant opposite or adjacent states must agree on the delimitation of their common boundaries or, in the absence of mutually accepted boundaries, on procedures for managing interactive activities in the disputed areas. In this book, we refer to marine ecopolitical regions belonging to the subset of joint spaces as regional seas subject to the jurisdiction of two or more sovereign states. Many regional seas are shared by just two states. But as the cases of the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, the Caribbean Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, and the North Sea make clear, some regional seas include areas under the jurisdiction of a number of states. Cases in which a single coastal state has jurisdiction over all of a marine region (e.g. the White Sea along the Arctic coast of the Russian Federation) do not raise issues of coordination across international boundaries and are not addressed in this analysis of regional seas.4 In some cases, such as the Beaufort Sea shared by Canada and the United States, there are disagreements regarding the location of boundaries or the extent of the jurisdiction of the relevant coastal states (Byers 2013, Ch. 3). Governance in such cases may involve efforts to reach agreement on the resolution of jurisdictional differences (e.g. the Norwegian-Russian Treaty of 2010 delimiting an agreed boundary between the two states in the Barents Sea). But there also are cases in which governance systems are created to manage matters of common concern without resolving existing jurisdictional disputes (e.g. the arrangement for the so-called gray zone in the Barents Sea prior to the 2010 boundary delimitation treaty) (Stokke 2012). Although regional seas are predominantly marine systems, they also encompass the adjacent coastal fringes, including coastal communities and the estuaries of major rivers. They also may include islands (e.g. St. Lawrence Island in the case of the Bering Strait Region; the Svalbard Archipelago in the case of the Barents Sea Region). Accordingly, analysts must consider the near-shore and adjacent coastal areas as well as any significant islands when addressing needs for governance in these regions. While regional seas are predominantly joint spaces, they may include enclaves beyond the reach of the authority of any coastal state in addition to areas under the sovereign control (internal waters, territorial seas) or jurisdiction (EEZs, continental shelves) of coastal states. The Barents Sea, for example, includes areas of high seas (e.g. the “loophole”) as well as areas under the jurisdiction of Norway and the Russian Federation. What is known as the “doughnut hole” in the central Bering Sea lies outside the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the United States as the relevant coastal states. Nevertheless, regional seas lie largely within the jurisdiction of the relevant coastal states.5 4  While developed independently, our use of the term “regional seas” is compatible with the usage of the phrase in UNEP’s Regional Seas Programme to refer to what are described as “shared seas” with an emphasis on transboundary issues relevant to sustainable management and use. 5  UNEP’s Regional Seas Programme includes thirteen marine areas, but none of these is in the Arctic.

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O. R. Young et al.

Governing Regional Seas

The term “ecopolitics” shares with the terms “ecology” and “economics” a common root in the Greek word for home. The three terms refer to the analysis of systems featuring more or less complex forms of interplay among their constituent elements as well as interactions between these elements and the broader settings within which they are situated. Ecological systems or ecosystems are composed of two or more species of organisms (including Homo sapiens) that interact with one another and with the biophysical setting in which they are situated. Economic systems comprise producers and consumers of goods and services who engage in exchanges through market transactions, barter systems, and various forms of sharing that generate more or less well-structured and predictable outcomes of a collective nature measurable in terms of indicators like gross national product or social (in)equality. For their part, ecopolitical systems are composed of various types of actors and the social institutions they develop, either spontaneously or through conscious actions, to foster public order in socioecological systems, to make collective decisions about matters of common interest arising in such systems, and to handle relations with outside actors. When these systems are well-defined in spatial terms, it is appropriate to characterize them as ecopolitical regions. In our analysis of governing regional seas, we draw a clear distinction between the idea of ecopolitics and the older concept of geopolitics. Geopolitics is the study of the spatial determinants of the sources of power that can be brought to bear in dealing with conflicts of interest and of the outcomes of interactions involving the exercise of power (Stavridis 2017). Ecopolitics, by contrast, is the study of needs for governance and the role of common interests in the creation and implementation of governance systems capable of addressing the three main pillars of sustainable development.6 Governance is a social function involving efforts to steer human activities toward collectively desirable outcomes (e.g. sustainable harvests of living resources) and away from collectively undesirable outcomes (e.g. the destruction of stocks of living resources) (Young 2013b). In ecopolitical regions, including both international spaces and joint spaces, the challenge is to find ways to address needs for governance in the absence of any overarching government or, as we generally put it, to provide governance without government (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992). Some needs for governance arising in regional seas involve matters that individual states are in a position to address. Our concern in this book, however, centers on matters that transcend jurisdictional boundaries and require cooperation on the part of two or more states in order to craft effective responses. It is helpful in this connection to differentiate among four subcategories of these needs for governance arising in regional seas. Some needs are intra-sectoral in the sense that they pertain to a single human activity. Needs to manage fisheries to avoid the depletion of 6  Though sustainable development is notoriously difficult to define precisely, there is general agreement on the proposition that it requires balancing the pillars of economic development, sociocultural well-being and environmental protection (Sachs 2015).

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stocks or to introduce vessel traffic schemes to avoid collisions in busy seaways illustrate this subcategory. A second subcategory of needs for governance encompasses inter-sectoral issues that arise from interactions between or among two or more distinct human activities. Efforts to minimize ship strikes on marine mammals or to prevent oil spills harmful to marine life exemplify this category. A third subcategory arises from interactions between local or intra-regional activities and international or extra-regional forces. Clashes between aboriginal subsistence whalers and international environmental groups calling for the termination of all killing of whales constitute a dramatic example of this category. The fourth subcategory includes efforts to address regional impacts of larger and even global developments. Regional issues arising from the recession and thinning of sea ice attributable to global climate change exemplify this category. Although it is helpful to distinguish analytically among these subcategories of needs for government in order to understand their origins and assess options for responding to them, we recognize that two or more of these types of needs for governance can and often do arise at the same time in a given regional sea. Managing the harvest of fish while addressing the effects of marine pollution provides a clear example. A common result is the need to think about interplay between or among responses to individual needs for governance. Collectively, we refer to efforts to meet these needs as governance for sustainability. Governance systems (often called regimes) developed to address needs for governance are institutions in the sense that they are social practices established through formal or informal processes involving key actors in affected areas. Analysts who think about these systems pay attention to (i) regime formation or the processes involved in the creation of governance systems, (ii) implementation or the transition from paper to practice, (iii) effectiveness or issues pertaining to the performance of regimes, and (iv) institutional dynamics or the evolution of social practices over time. Given the nature of regional seas as we have defined them, the leading actors involved in responding to needs for governance are states. But it is important in this connection to take into consideration the dynamics of interactions across levels of governance from the local to the global as well as the roles of nonstate actors including corporations, environmental nongovernmental organizations, and Indigenous Peoples’ Organizations (Delmas and Young 2008).

1.3

Regional Seas in the Arctic

Two of the most prominent shared marine areas located in the Arctic are the Bering Strait Region (BeSR) and the Barents Sea Region (BaSR). These regional seas exhibit similarities that make it interesting to analyze them comparatively in thinking about issues of governance. They are both high latitude marine ecopolitical regions that are dynamic in biophysical terms and subject to growing interest on the part of a variety of current or prospective human actors, including important players located outside the region. Two countries are the dominant players in both regions; in each case, one of these countries is the Russian Federation and the other is a

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western NATO member. In both cases, there are other actors (including Indigenous Peoples’ Organizations like the Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Saami Council and others) that have interests and (sometimes) possess recognized rights that differ from those of the relevant nation states, though it is important to note as well that there are unresolved issues relating to the status of Indigenous peoples and their rights in both regions. This provides a basis for comparing the two regions in thinking about issues of governance and about institutional arrangements and associated infrastructure that have been or could be created to address needs for governance arising in these regional seas. At the same time, the two regions differ substantially (sometimes dramatically) from one another both in terms of important biophysical features and in terms of major characteristics of their human populations and the social, economic, and political circumstances of these populations. Table  1.1 sets forth in tabular form those similarities and differences that we regard as most relevant in considering needs for governance in the two regions and options for addressing these needs. Both the BeSR and the BaSR are subject to the impacts of rapid biophysical changes and of rising levels of human activities. Our challenge in this book is to identify emerging needs for governance in these Arctic regional seas and to explore options available for meeting these needs in such a way as to enhance sustainability. We analyze biophysical, economic, and sociocultural developments relevant to addressing needs for governance in these seas. We then consider options relating both to suitable governance systems and to the infrastructure required to implement these systems effectively under the circumstances prevailing today and likely to arise during the foreseeable future. In the process, we endeavor to generate insights that may be of interest to those concerned with the sustainability of regional seas throughout the world as well as to those with a particular interest in the future of the Arctic.

1.3.1 An Overview of the Bering Strait Region (BeSR) The only gateway between the Arctic and Pacific Oceans is the Bering Strait, an essential migration corridor for marine mammals and sea birds and a place where mixed ocean currents from the Pacific normally stream to the north (if not changed under the influence of winds). The Bering Strait itself, together with the southern Chukchi Sea (to the North) and the northern Bering Sea (to the South) and their associated coastal zones, constitutes the area we treat as the Bering Strait Region or BeSR (Fig. 1.1). Polygon of the Bering Strait Region (BeSR) as defined in this volume showing the maritime boundary between the United States and Russian Federation based on their Exclusive Economic Zones meeting between Little Diomede Island and Big Diomede Island at the middle of the Bering Strait. The northern boundary is adjacent to Point Hope (68°N); the southern boundary is adjacent to Mys Navarin

1  Governing Arctic Seas: Sustainability in the Bering Strait and Barents Sea Regions Table 1.1  Comparing the Bering Strait and Barents Sea Regions Feature Boundary nations Geography Area Northern limit Southern limit Western limit Eastern limit International law Boundary year Multilateral laws Regional laws Bilateral laws Physical system Major Ocean access Adjacent seas Average depth Maximum depthc Sea ice Social system Cities Indigenous Marine subsistence Population size Economic value Commercial fishing Hydrocarbons Vessel traffic Tourism

Bering Strait Region (BeSR)a Russian Federation – United States Fig. 1.1 416,355 km2 68°N 62°N 160°W 176°E Table 1.2

b

Fig. 1.2 2,918,053 km2 84°N 65°N 3.8°W 45.5°E Table 1.3

1990 10

2010 13

8 15

9 9

Pacific Ocean

Atlantic Ocean

Bering Sea (south), Chukchi Sea (north) 41 m (based on Chukchi Sea) 49 m

Greenland Sea/Norwegian Sea (west and south), Kara Sea (east) ~230 m

Seasonal ice-cover

Annual open water (south), seasonal ice-cover and annual ice-cover (north)

Anadyr Inupiat, Siberian Yupik, Yu’pik. Chukchi Hunting, fishing

Murmansk, Tromsø Saami, Nenets

50,000+

1,600,000+

Limited

World class, huge aquaculture

Exploration only On the rise Early stage but on the rise

Initial production Substantial and growing Substantial

Berkman et al. (2016) Vylegzhanin et al. (2018) c Jakobsson (2002) a

Barents Sea Region (BaSR)b Russian Federation – Norway

~3500 m

Limited fishing

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Fig. 1.1  The Bering Strait Region

(62°N), extending from the 160°W to 176°E. The BeSR encompasses the coastal-­ marine systems in between, south of the Chukchi Sea and north of the Bering Sea. So defined, this region is a well-constrained area for analyses of institutions and associated infrastructure needed to manage human uses of this critical gateway to the Arctic on a sustainable basis.7 The area covered by this map corresponds closely to the transboundary region across the Bering Strait proposed by the United States and Russian Federation (National Parks Service 2012). The pivot of the BeSR – the Bering Strait – is a vital marine area between the continents of Eurasia and North America and between the Russian Federation and the United States. The Bering Strait is the only sea waterway connecting Europe – through the Arctic Ocean – with China, Japan, Korea, and other economically strong Far Eastern countries. As the only marine route from the Pacific to the Arctic Ocean, the Bering Strait is increasingly important in economic terms, taking into account that already in the 1980s transpacific trade equaled transatlantic trade and that in recent decades transpacific trade has surged. Although the volume of commercial traffic passing through the Bering Strait is small, it is growing steadily and may rise more rapidly in the future.

7  Sustainable infrastructure development involves the “combination of fixed, mobile, and other built assets (including communications, research, observing and information systems) and regulatory, policy, and other governance mechanisms (including insurance)” (Berkman 2015).

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According to the Sailing Directions, the Bering Strait is 47 nautical miles wide at its narrowest point (Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation 1999, pg. 147). It is in this part of the Strait that Big Diomede Island (also known as Ratmanova Island) belonging to the Russian Federation and Little Diomede Island (also known as Krusenstern Island) and Fairway Rock belonging to the US are located (Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation 1999, pg. 166). Some authors do not mention Fairway Rock in describing the Bering Strait (Molenaar et al. 2013, pg 384; Hartsig et  al. 2014). In legal terms, however, it is appropriate to include Fairway Rock. According to applicable international law (UNCLOS, Art. 121), though rocks do not have exclusive economic zones or continental shelves, they do have the territorial sea adjacent to each side of the rock. The breadth of the territorial sea is established by the relevant coastal state up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles (UNCLOS, Art. 3). This means in legal terms that in the Bering Strait, the Russian Federation has the territorial sea adjacent to its mainland (Chukotka Peninsula) and Big Diomede Island; the United States has the belts of the territorial seas adjacent to Little Diomede Island, Fairway Rock, and the North America continent (Seward Peninsula). The distance between Russian Big Diomede Island and American Little Diomede Island is only about two nautical miles. Here the international boundary between the United States and the Russian Federation is delimited according to two bilateral treaties: the 1867 Convention Ceding Alaska to the United States and the Agreement on the Maritime Boundary of 1990. The distance between Little Diomede Island and Fairway Rock is 7.8 nautical miles (Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation 1999, pg. 149). Due to the configuration of the two islands and one rock lying in the Bering Strait there are, in effect, four geographic channels all covered by the general term Bering Strait: (1) between the Russian mainland and Big Diomede Island, (2) between Big Diomede Island and Little Diomede Island, (3) between Little Diomede Island and Fairway Rock, and (4) between Fairway Rock and the US mainland.8 None of these channels includes an area of high seas. Therefore, the legal regime for the high seas is not applicable to any of the four channels. Though the entire Bering Strait at its narrowest point is the territorial sea of either the Russian Federation or the US, the two states are obliged under applicable international law to respect the right of transit passage of all ships and aircraft through this strait (UNCLOS, Art. 38) as well as the right of innocent passage in the waters of the BeSR more generally (UNCLOS, Art. 17). 8  In this context, the description of the Bering Strait as “three navigational channels” suggested earlier does not seem to be accurate: “At the mid-point of the strait there are two islands – Big Diomede (Russia) and Little Diomede (United States)  – effectively creating three navigational channels: Bering Strait – East, which lies between Russian mainland and Big Diomede Island; Bering Strait  – West, which lies between the US mainland and Little Diomede Island; and the Diomede Channel, which is a channel separating Big Diomede and Little Diomede Islands” (Molenaar et al. 2013, pp. 384–385).

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During the last ice age (until ~10,000 years BP), the Bering Strait Region was above water, forming a great plain often called the Bering Land Bridge and providing the principal pathway for the peopling of the New World.9 This land area, commonly referred to as Beringia, was a great plain hundreds of kilometers wide at its narrowest point. Sea level rise resulting from the melting of glaciers following the last ice age submerged this terrestrial system, transforming it into a relatively shallow marine system. In recent times, the BeSR has been a remote area ice-covered during much of the year. But rapid biophysical changes in the Arctic in recent years, such as changes in sea ice extent and thickness have brought increased attention to the region. The number of ships transiting through the Bering Strait is rising (Fletcher et al. 2016). The growth of shipping along the Northern Sea Route (e.g. LNG tanker traffic to and from the port of Sabetta on the Yamal Peninsula) is already accelerating this trend. The region is also the homeland of several groups of Indigenous peoples, provides important habitat for marine mammals, and is a seasonal home for migratory animals and birds. The Indigenous peoples of the region, especially the Yupik living on both sides of the BeSR, are closely related and have (moral if not legal) rights arising from the facts that they have long regarded the region as their homeland and that they constitute the bulk of the region’s permanent human residents. Addressing emerging needs for governance in the BeSR, therefore, will require not only international cooperation but also careful consideration of the ecological, economic, and sociocultural features of the region (considered in Chaps. 2, 3, and 4). In thinking about these issues (discussed in some detail in Chap. 5) it is important to start with the observation that a network of existing global, regional, and bilateral international legal arrangements already applies to the BeSR (Table 1.2). Efforts to address needs for governance in this ecopolitical region must treat this network of arrangements as a point of departure, adjusting existing arrangements or adding new ones as needed.

1.3.2 An Overview of the Barents Sea Region (BaSR) The Barents Sea Region as defined in this volume includes both the Barents Sea and parts of the Norwegian Sea around the Lofoten Islands. The Barents Sea itself is one of a number of marginal seas that together make up a large portion of the Arctic Ocean. According to the International Hydrographic Organization, the Barents Sea covers the marine region situated to the south of straight lines connecting the northernmost points of the coasts of Greenland, Svalbard, and Franz Josef Land. To the north of these lines lies the Central Arctic Ocean (International Hydrographic Organization 1953). Since the publications of international organizations are not

9  The phrase “land bridge” hides the fact that Beringia was a wide plain (Hopkins 1967; Hoffecker and Elias 2007).

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Table 1.2  Key Environmental and Maritime Agreements/Arrangements with Application (+/−) to the Russian Federation (RF) and/or the United States (US) in the Bering Strait Region (BeSR) Title of agreement Year Key global agreements with application to the BeSR 1946 International convention for the regulation of whaling 1972 Convention for the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter 1973 Convention on International Trade In Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) 1973/ International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, 1978 as modified by the 1978 Protocol Relating Thereto (MARPOL 73/78) and as amended by Polar Code, 2015 1974 International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) as amended by Polar Code, 2015 1979 Convention on the conservation of migratory species of wild animals 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1989 Basel convention on the control of Transboundary movements of hazardous wastes and their disposal 1992 Framework convention on climate change 1992 Convention on biological diversity Key regional agreements/arrangements with application to the BeSR 1973 Agreement on the conservation of polar bears 1996 Declaration on the establishment of the Arctic council 2002 International maritime organization. Guidelines for ships operating in Arctic ice-covered waters 2008 Ilulissat declaration, Arctic Ocean conference 2009 International maritime organization. Guidelines for ships operating in polar waters. Resolution A.1024(26) 2011 Agreement on cooperation on aeronautical and maritime search and Rescue in the Arctic 2013 Agreement on cooperation on marine oil pollution preparedness and response in the Arctic 2017 Agreement on enhancing international Arctic scientific cooperation Bilateral agreements/arrangements with application to the BeSR 1867 Treaty concerning the cession of the Russian possessions in North America by his majesty the emperor of all the Russias to the United States of America 1972 Agreement on cooperation in the field of environmental protection between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 1989 Uniform interpretation of rules of international law governing innocent passage 1989 Agreement between the USSR and the USA concerning cooperation in combating pollution in the Bering and Chukchi seas in emergency situations 1989 Agreement between the government of the United States of America and the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning mutual visits by inhabitants of the Bering Straits region

US

RF

+ +

+ +

+

+

+

+

+

+

+a +a −

− + +

+ −

+ +

+ + +

+ + +

+ +

+ +

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

(continued)

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O. R. Young et al.

Table 1.2 (continued) Year 1989

1990 1991 1993

1994

2000 2005

2011

2012 2013

Title of agreement Agreement between the government of the United States of America and the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the Bering Straits regional commission. The agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the maritime boundary, with annex Shared Beringian heritage agreement Agreement between the government of the Russian Federation and the government of the United States of America on scientific and technical cooperation Agreement between the government of the United States of America and the government of the Russian Federation on cooperation in the field of protection of the environment and natural resources Agreement on the conservation and Management of the Alaska-Chukotka Polar Bears Population Memorandum of understanding for cooperation in the areas of meteorology, hydrology and oceanography between the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration of the Department of Commerce of the United States of America and the Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring of the Russian Federation Joint statement of the president of the United States of America and the president of the Russian Federation on cooperation in the Bering Strait region Joint statement of secretary of state Hillary Clinton and Foreign minister Sergey Lavrov on cooperation in the Bering Strait region Memorandum of understanding between the government of the United States of America and the government of the Russian Federation symbolically linking National Parks in the Bering Strait region

US +

RF +

+

+a

+ +

+ +

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

treated as law, but not necessarily ratified

a

recognized as a source of international law under the terms of Art. 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, however, Norway and the Russian Federation as the coastal states of the Barents Sea are not required to adhere to this definition. Some Russian geographers simply refer to the Barents Sea as part of the Arctic Ocean (Russian Short Encyclopedia 2000, vol. 2, pg. 1404). More importantly for our purposes, however, both Norway and Russia describe the Barents Sea as a shared marine area bounded by: –– the lands of the Eurasian continent, specifically the land territories of Norway and Russia; –– the Svalbard Archipelago under the sovereignty of Norway, subject to stipulations of the 1920 Paris Treaty; –– the islands of Novaya Zemlya under the sovereignty of Russia, and, –– the Franz Josef Land islands also under the sovereignty of Russia.

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Fig. 1.2  The Barents Sea Region

These waters – at least those of them adjacent to the mainland – were designated in ancient maps as “Murmanskoie More” (The Murmansk Sea). The name Barents Sea, after the Dutch navigator Willem Barents, originated in the sixteenth century (Academy of Sciences of the USSR 1949, pg. 69 et seq.). For the sake of clarity and for purposes of analysis, we will focus in our discussion of the BaSR on the area enclosed within the solid lines of Fig. 1.2.10 In contrast to the unresolved issue between Canada and Denmark relating to sovereignty over Hans Island located in the Nares Strait between Ellesmere Island and  There is no objective way to assign precise boundaries to marine ecopolitical regions. The area we designate as the BaSR encompasses a portion of the Norwegian Sea in the west and overlaps with two Arctic LMEs identified by the Arctic Council in 2004  in Large Marine Ecosystems (LMEs) of the Arctic Area. https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/61. The BaSR also encompasses some but not all of the areas covered by the OSPAR Convention and the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission. Our analysis pertains explicitly to issues of governance arising in the area delineated in Fig. 1.2.

10

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O. R. Young et al.

Greenland, Norway and Russia have no unresolved claims pertaining to land located in the BaSR.  This circumstance facilitated the success of the 2010 NorwegianRussian Treaty (which entered into force in 2011) delimiting their marine boundary. Due to the effect of the North Atlantic Current, much of the Barents Sea Region is ice-free allowing for year-round shipping to Norwegian and Russian ports along the southern coast of the Barents Sea, including the Norwegian ports of Tromsø and Kirkenes and the Russian port of Murmansk. This feature has differentiated the Barents Sea Region from other parts of the maritime Arctic for centuries (Lenton 2012).11 For this reason Soviet/Russian legislation dealing with the Northern Sea Route (NSR) applies formally only to the area east of the Kara gate; it does not cover those parts of the Northeast Passage located in the Barents Sea. This feature also facilitates economic activities (e.g. oil and gas development) in the BaSR and explains the military and political sensitivity of the Barents Sea not only for Russia and Norway but also for other western states and for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It follows that findings regarding the governance of human activities in the BaSR are not immediately applicable to the rest of the Arctic. Nevertheless, as the recession of sea ice makes other parts of the maritime Arctic increasingly accessible, experience relating to the treatment of shared marine resources in the Barents Sea Region is likely to become a focus of increasing interest to those concerned with other parts of the Arctic (Tedsen et al. 2014; Wadhams 2017). Unlike the BeSR, the Barents Sea Region has sizable cities, with populations up to ~300,000 in the case of Murmansk, and a flourishing regional economy. But at the same time, it is a homeland for the Saami. The BaSR features world-class fisheries and a higher level of shipping than other parts of the Arctic. It is also a dynamic region. Fish stocks are shifting in response to biophysical changes; some oil and gas production is occurring already with more anticipated in the future; rising ship traffic along the NSR is likely to lead to a growth in commercial shipping in the BaSR. It is already clear that future needs for governance will highlight the importance of finding ways to incorporate and accommodate the interests and rights of Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. Ensuring compatibility among arrangements arising to deal with sector-specific issues will be a major concern. A network of existing global, regional, and bilateral legal agreements is applicable to the Barents Sea Region (Table 1.3). Any discussion of initiatives aimed at meeting emerging needs for governance in the BaSR must take this network of agreements as a point of departure, considering ways to make use of existing agreements and exploring how new arrangements would fit into the existing network.

 Some analyses of the impacts of climate change raise the possibility of sharp changes in the thermohaline circulation in the North Atlantic, a development that could produce profound changes in the physical setting of the BaSR.  See Timothy Lenton, “Arctic Tipping Points,” Ambio, 41 (2012): 10–22.

11

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Table 1.3  Key international treaties/instruments applicable to the Barents Sea Region № Title 1. Key multilateral treaties 1. UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 2. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 1958 3. Convention on the High Seas, 1958 4. Convention on the Continental Shelf, 1958 5 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 1946

6.

Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972 7. Convention on International Trade In Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), 1973 8. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the 1978 Protocol Relating Thereto (MARPOL 73/78) and as amended by Polar Code, 2015 9 International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974 as amended by Polar Code, 2015 10. Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, 1979 11 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, 1989 12 UN Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992 13 1992 UN framework convention on climate change 2. Key regional treaties and other arrangements 1 Treaty concerning the archipelago of Spitsbergen, signed at Paris, February 9, 1920 2 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, 1973 3 Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, 1996 4. Agreement between the Government of Iceland, the Government of Norway and the Government of the Russian Federation concerning Certain Aspects of Co-operation in the Area of Fisheries, 1999 5. Ilulissat Declaration, Arctic Ocean Conference, 2008 6. Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic, 2011 7. Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness and Response in the Arctic, 2013 8 Agreement between the Governments in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region on Cooperation in the Field of Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response, 2008 9 Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation, 2017

Norway

Russia

+ −

+ +

− + Conditional adherence since 23 Sep.1960, no ratificationa +

+ + +

+

+b

+

+

+

+

+

−

+

+

+

+ +

+

+

+ +

+ +

+

+

+ +

+ +

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

(continued)

18

O. R. Young et al.

Table 1.3 (continued) № Title 3. Bilateral treaties (Norway-USSR; Norway-Russia) 1 Agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway on Co-operation in the Fishing Industry, 1975 (is in effect on temporary basis) 2 Agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway concerning Mutual Relations in the Field of Fisheries, 1976 3 Soviet–Norwegian Communiqué of 16 March 1978 4 Agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway on joint control of marine fisheries, 1978 (as amended) (superseded by 2010 Treaty) 5 Agreement between Norway and the Soviet Union/Russian Federation establishing a Joint Norwegian-Russian Commission on Environmental Protection, 1988/1992 6 Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Norway and the Government of the Russian Federation concerning cooperation on searchers for missing persons and the rescue of persons in distress in the Barents Sea, 1995 7 Agreement between the Government of Norway and the Government of the Russian Federation on environmental cooperation in connection with the dismantling of Russian nuclear powered submarines withdrawn from the Navy’s service in the northern region, and the enhancement of nuclear and radiation safety, 1998 8 Memorandum of Understanding between the of the Russia and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway Relating to Search and Rescue, as well as Prevention of Incidents, 2000 9 Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean, 2010

Norway

Russia

+

+

+

+

+ +

+ +

+

+

+

+

https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280150135; http://www.state.gov/ documents/organization/191051.pdf b It is provided at the official site: «continuation»; «ratification» is not needed: the CITES Convention was ratified by the USSR and the Russian Federation, according to its National Law, continues to be a party to the Conventions to which the USSR was a party. https://cites.org/eng/ disc/parties/chronolo.php?order=field_country_official_name&sort=asc a

1.4

Plan of the Volume

As we noted at the outset, needs for governance in regional seas involve coordination between or among states to manage human uses of shared natural resources, ensure protection of the environment from unintended side effects of human activities, manage conflicts among different human activities, and promote the overall

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sustainability of human-environment interactions on a regional scale. Although the regional states are the most important actors in these areas, efforts to promote sustainability often require engagement of non-regional states whose actions have consequences for regional sustainability as well as nonstate actors that have (moral and sometimes legal) rights as well as interests likely to be affected by the creation and implementation of governance systems. Like all marine systems, regional seas are three-dimensional, opaque, and dynamic, a combination of features that makes developing the knowledge base required to assess needs for governance arising in these areas and to explore options for meeting these needs especially challenging (Eikeland 1993).12 This is particularly true in the Arctic, a part of the Earth system that is undergoing a state change due most prominently to rapid reductions in the extent and volume of sea ice attributable largely to climate change (Wadhams 2017). This state change is not only triggering a cascade of biophysical shifts (e.g. shifts in the distribution and movement of major fish stocks) but also opening up the area to new or enhanced human activities (e.g. commercial shipping) (National Research Council 2015). This means that the effectiveness of any institutional arrangements created to address issues of sustainability involving Arctic seas will depend on an ability to respond to changing circumstances in an agile or nimble manner, while at the same time maintaining a commitment to basic principles and ensuring that participants pay attention to them. Regional seas like the BeSR and the BaSR are also tightly connected to broader systems, a fact of considerable importance in thinking about issues of governing Arctic seas. The number of ships transiting the Bering Strait is increasing rapidly, for example, but this is a consequence of developments in the outside world rather than developments in the BeSR itself. Similarly, there is growing interest in developing the hydrocarbons located in the BaSR, but this is not driven by the needs of the region’s residents. Depending upon the details of specific situations, such interactions may produce either positive or negative impacts on the sustainability of regional seas. It follows that any consideration of the governance of the BeSR and the BaSR must be alert to interactions between these ecopolitical regions and the outside world. The sections of the book dealing with the BeSR and the BaSR include chapters addressing the three main pillars of sustainability – ecological integrity, economic prosperity, and sociocultural well-being – followed by a chapter focusing specifically on issues of governance and reflecting the analyses provided in the sectoral chapters. In identifying needs for governance, we focus on interactions and linkages among the pillars of sustainability. In the case of the BeSR, for example, we look to biophysical changes (e.g. the recession and thinning of sea ice) that may make economic activities (e.g. commercial shipping) increasingly attractive, producing impacts on subsistence resources important to local residents (e.g. marine mammals) and triggering feedbacks affecting the region’s ecosystems (e.g. the  One approach that some find helpful in this connection is to treat these regions as Large Marine Ecosystems or LMEs. See, for example, Per Ove Eikeland, “Distributional aspects of muiltispecies management: The Barents Sea Large Marine Ecosystem,” Marine Policy, 1993: 256–271.

12

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introduction of invasive species). The sustainability challenge centers on efforts to address a variety of matters arising from these complex interactions. Our purpose is to illustrate the operation of what we treat as informed decisionmaking for sustainability, as described in the Series Preface, rather than to present an exhaustive account of all the needs for governance likely to arise in the BeSR and the BaSR during the foreseeable future. In the first two sections of the book, we highlight several of the most critical issues arising in the two regions at this time and show in each case how the process of informed decisionmaking works, starting with the formulation of questions and progressing through the collection of information and the assemblage of evidence to the identification of options available to relevant decisionmakers. Our goal throughout is to identify and explore options rather than to become advocates for specific options. In the third section of the book, we turn to crosscutting themes and analytic tools. This section contains chapters on integrated ocean management, satellite observations making use of automatic identification systems, new methods for developing and using databases, and Indigenous mapping procedures that may prove helpful in providing a basis for informed decsionmaking in regional seas like the BeSR and the BaSR. This section also includes a discussion based on our study of governing Arctic seas that explores insights pertaining to education and training needed by those desiring to be well-prepared to engage in the development and application of cross-disciplinary decision support tools in the work of the Pan-Arctic Options project and other similar projects. The volume concludes with a brief chapter summarizing our substantive insights relating to governing Arctic seas and discussing insights relating to informed decisionmaking for sustainability arising from this project.

References Academy of Sciences of the USSR (1949) Documents of the Great Novgorod and Pskov (in Russian). Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Moscow-Leningrad Berkman PA (2015) Institutional dimensions of Sustaining Arctic Observing Systems (SAON). Arctic 68(Supplement 1):89–99 Berkman PA, Vylegzhanin AN, Young OR (2016) Governing the Bering Strait Region: current status, emerging issues and future options. Ocean Dev Int Law 47:186–217 Byers M (2013) International law and the arctic. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Delmas M, Young OR (eds) (2008) Governance for the environment: new perspectives. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Eikeland PO (1993) Distributional aspects of multispecies management: the Barents sea large marine ecosystem. Mar Policy X:256–271 Fletcher S et  al (2016) Bering Sea vessel traffic risk analysis. Report prepared by the ocean conservancy Hartsig A et al (2014) Arctic bottleneck: protecting the Bering Strait region from increased vessel traffic. Ocean Coast Law J 18:35–87 Hoffecker JF, Elias SA (2007) Human ecology of Beringia. Columbia University Press, New York Hopkins D (1967) The Bering land bridge. Stanford University Press, Stanford International Hydrographic Organization (1953) Limits of Oceans and Seas, Special Publication No. 23, 3rd ed. IHO, Monte Carlo

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Jakobsson M (2002) Hypsometry and volume of the Arctic Ocean and its constituent seas. Geochem Geophys Geosyst 3(5):1028. https://doi.org/10.1029/2001GC000302 Lenton T (2012) Arctic tipping points. Ambio 41:10–22 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (1999) The sailing directions for the Western part of the Chukchi Sea, Bering Strait and north-western part of the Bering Sea (in Russian), Moscow, Ministry of Defense, p 147 Molenaar EJ et al (2013) The law of the sea and the polar regions. Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden/Boston National Parks Service (2012) Proposed United States/Russia Transboundary area in the Bering Strait region, www.nps.gov/akso/beringia/about/pressroom/ProposedTransbounday_ EnglishTranslation_Version2.pdf National Research Council (2015) Arctic matters: the global connection to changes in the Arctic. National Academies Press, Washington, DC Rosenau JN, Czempiel E-O (eds) (1992) Governance without government: order and change in world politics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Russian Short Encyclopedia (2000) The Arctic Ocean (in Russian), vol 2, Moscow Sachs J (2015) The age of sustainable development. Columbia University Press, New York Stavridis J (2017) Sea power: the history and geopolitics of the world’s oceans. Penguin, New York Stokke OS (2012) Disaggregating international regimes: a new approach to evaluation and comparison. MIT Press, Cambridge Tedsen E et  al (2014) Arctic marine governance: opportunities for transatlantic cooperation. Springer, Berlin UNCLOS (1982) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos_e.pdf Vylegzhanin AN, Young OR, Berkman PA (2018) Governing the Barents Sea region: current status, emerging issues and future options. Ocean Dev Int Law 49:1–27 Wadhams P (2017) A farewell to sea ice: a report from the Arctic. Oxford University Press, Oxford Young OR (2013a) Governing international spaces: Antarctica and beyond. In: Lang PABMA, Walton DWH, Young OR (eds) Science diplomacy: Antarctica, science, and the governance of international spaces. Smithsonian Institution Scholarly Press, Washington, DC, pp 287–294 Young OR (2013b) On environmental governance: sustainability, efficiency, and equity. Paradigm Publishers, Boulder

Part II The Bering Strait Region

2

Ecosystems of the Bering Strait Region Olivia Lee, Jon L. Fuglestad, and Lyman Thorsteinson

Abstract

The Bering Strait Region is an important gateway linking the Pacific Ocean and the Arctic. Changes in this region include impacts from climate change with rapid rates of sea ice loss, coastal erosion and ocean acidification. As a seasonally ice-covered region, the dynamic environment supports areas of rich marine biodiversity including hotspots in species diversity, and important breeding and foraging habitat. Numerous resident and non-resident Arctic species transit through the Bering Strait which is part of an important seasonal migratory route, emphasizing the need for international policies to manage species that cross international borders. Currently, management of natural resources including fisheries, and marine mammal subsistence harvests in U.S. and Russian waters follow guidance from national policies, and it remains challenging to implement an ecosystem-based approach to management. As accessibility through the Bering Strait region increases, there is potential for growing ship traffic, new ecosystem threats from invasive species introductions, noise disturbance, vessels collisions, and potential oil spills and marine pollution from vessels. This chapter provides a brief introduction to our current understanding of the ecosystem with an emphasis on emerging issues that may soon require new policies for natural resource management.

O. Lee (*) University of Alaska Fairbanks, Fairbanks, AK, USA e-mail: [email protected] J. L. Fuglestad Norwegian Research Council, Oslo, Norway L. Thorsteinson Retired, United States Geological Survey, Reston, VA, USA © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 O. R. Young et al. (eds.), Governing Arctic Seas: Regional Lessons from the Bering Strait and Barents Sea, Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25674-6_2

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2.1

O. Lee et al.

Introduction

The Bering Strait region between the United States and Russia bounded by the latitudes 62°N and 69°N is an important gateway linking the Pacific Ocean and the Arctic (reference map in Chap. 1). Changes in this region including impacts from climate change may also provide insight on whether significant ecological changes already observed in the Bering Sea may become more widespread farther north. As a seasonally ice-covered region, the dynamic environment supports areas of rich marine biodiversity including hotspots in species diversity, and important breeding and foraging grounds that are known to persist over decades (Grebmeier et al. 2015). Numerous resident and non-resident Arctic species transit through the Bering Strait which is part of an important seasonal migratory route, emphasizing the need for international policies to manage species that cross international borders. As accessibility through the Bering Strait region increases along with the potential for growing ship traffic, new ecosystem threats from invasive species introductions, disturbance by ships including collisions, additional underwater noise pollution, and potential oil spills and marine pollution from vessels will require cooperative efforts to curb negative ecosystem impacts. This chapter provides a brief introduction to our current understanding of the ecosystem with an emphasis on emerging issues that may soon require new policies for natural resource management, and explores how future change may result in new threats and opportunities for successful ecosystem based management.

2.2

Physical Environment

The Pacific Ocean has a strong influence on the Bering Strait region and it plays an important role in distinguishing this unique Arctic seascape. Characteristic of this region is a seasonal sea ice cover, and a distinct inflow shelf region where there is a bottom-up influence on marine food webs (Carmack and Wassmann 2006). During winter and spring a predictable pattern of polynyas and leads influences the distribution of marine species, and may affect primary productivity. The northern Bering, Chukchi and East Siberian seas are comprised of continental shelves that are relatively shallow. The northern Bering Sea, defined as north of St. Matthew Island to Bering Strait, has an average depth of ~50 m. North of Bering Strait lies the shallow Chukchi sea shelf (average depth ~80 m) and the wide and shallow East Siberian Sea shelf (average depth ~52 m). Distinct shelf regions have been identified which link the physical environment with marine ecosystems that takes into account similarities in sea ice, and advection and stratification of water masses. The northern Bering and Chukchi seas have been described as inflow shelves, whereas the East Siberian and Beaufort Seas consist of interior shelves (Carmack and Wassmann 2006). The Bering and Chukchi Sea shelf waters are a distinct source of deep Arctic Basin waters that also provide a source of heat (Woodgate et al. 2010, 2012), nutrients (Walsh et al. 1989), biogenic material, and freshwater (Aagaard and Carmack 1989) into the Arctic. The water from the Pacific is relatively fresh compared to

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Atlantic waters, and contributes to water stratification, wherein the formation of a cold halocline layer helps to insulate sea ice from warmer Atlantic waters below (Shimada et al. 2001; Steele et al. 2004). Freshwater from Arctic rivers also have a significant influence on the seasonal outflows on interior shelves (Carmack et al. 2015) with substantial freshwater riverine input in the spring associated with snowmelt that may also include terrestrial sediment transportation.

2.2.1 Circulation Pacific water enters the Arctic through the narrow Bering Strait with a mean annual volume of approximately 0.8 Sv (Fig. 2.1) (Woodgate et al. 2015). Flow transport through the strait shows strong seasonal and interannual variability that are not always predictable from changes in the wind (Woodgate et al. 2012). Typically flow

Fig. 2.1  Ocean circulation with major currents and water masses linking the Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea with the Arctic. The approximate ice edge locations in March and September are also shown. (Source: Adapted from AMAP 2017; Moore and Stabeno 2015)

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is along-channel through the strait, with northward flow occurring under north winds or light south winds. The northward flow through the strait is primarily driven by sea level differences between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans (Barber et al. 1994; Weingartner 1997). However, anomalies of ocean water transport in the Bering Strait have been observed and may be related to changes in atmospheric circulation (Danielson et al. 2014). Mechanisms which drive atmospheric circulation such as the Arctic Oscillation, and the Beaufort High and Aleutian Low also influence circulation patterns. During the summer, inflow through the strait is greatest, which facilitates the transfer of low-salinity water, heat, nutrients and plankton towards the Chukchi and Beaufort seas (Moore and Stabeno 2015; Woodgate et al. 2015). The most nutrient-­ rich waters flowing through Bering Strait occur in Anadyr waters that flow northwards along the Russian coast. These waters are typically colder than the Alaska Coastal Water (ACW) in the east that flow along the Alaska coast, but may be warmer than the waters in the middle of the strait. A salinity gradient exists with greater salinity in the west and fresher waters towards the east (Woodgate et  al. 2015). Mid-channel waters include Bering Shelf waters that are less nutrient-rich. These waters may mix with Anadyr water as it flows northward before branching out east and west once it reaches north of Bering Strait. The predominant water mass in eastern Bering Strait is ACW which is relatively warm, and fresh. Typically the ACW is found close to the Alaska coast, but instances of ACW variability can occur due to variable winds which brings warm, fresh water farther west into the strait and away from the coast. This westward movement of ACW may occur in relation to stronger south winds. Waters over the Chukchi shelf are well mixed from fall to spring, but in summer it is stratified with the warmer waters of the ACW. The Eastern Siberian Sea is relatively small in terms of volume, and contains waters of Pacific origin entering from the east, Atlantic origin water from the west, and freshwater from Siberian rivers (Carmack and Wassmann 2006). Water temperatures stay close to freezing during winter and only warm several degrees during summer.

2.2.2 Sea Ice Despite Arctic-wide trends of significant declines in sea ice extent, and longer open water seasons, the Bering Sea region has been a notable exception where sea ice extent has not shown significant declines (Frey et  al. 2015; Laidre et  al. 2015) (Fig. 2.2). At smaller scales, the trends of greater sea ice persistence occurs primarily in the southern Bering Sea. By comparison, areas north of St. Lawrence Island and the narrow Bering Strait show trends of declining sea ice persistence that is between 0 and 3 days shorter per decade (Frey et al. 2015). Sea ice forms during winter and advances southward and usually covers the Chukchi Sea by December reaching a maximum extent over the Bering Sea by late March. In spring, sea ice cover begins to decrease and the Bering Sea becomes ice-free in late May-early June. The Chukchi Sea can become ice free in late July-early August as solar

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Fig. 2.2  Sea ice concentration in March in September in 1985 and 2015. (Source: National Snow and Ice Data Center)

radiation increases, and warm water from Bering Strait is advected north. The spatial patterns of sea ice retreat have been related to atmospheric patterns that influence ocean circulation, freshwater pathways and the movement and melting of sea ice (Moore and Stabeno 2015). Extensive landfast ice along the coast is also a key feature that supports coastal marine species, travel and subsistence hunting activities in coastal communities. The extent of coastal landfast ice can vary a lot by year, with minimal landfast ice noted in some locations even during winter months. The presence of stable landfast ice is important for protection against coastal erosion particularly against winter storms. Loss of Arctic sea ice has been linked to increased storm surge frequencies that can impact coastal ecosystems and enhance erosion (Lesack and Marsh 2007). At shallow depths where grounded ice may occur, sea ice may play an important role in impacting marine benthic ecosystems through the scouring effect of grounded

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ice. Ice scouring effects on benthic communities can act to remove less-mobile epibenthic species, and resuspend sediments and associated nutrients. These newly scoured areas are available for recruitment once sea ice retreats, allowing changes to benthic community composition through recolonization of the newly freed space. This effect may be particularly important in the shallow stamukhi zone, that marks the boundary between the moving pack ice and stable coastal ice, at depths of 10–30 m (Macdonald et al. 2015). An unprecedented lack of winter and spring sea ice was observed in 2017–2018 which was related to persistence of heat in the ocean, and atmospheric circulation patterns that did not promote ice growth (Fig. 2.3). Significant impacts of this lack of winter sea ice include severe winter storms that affected coastal communities with loss of power, impacts to communication lines, and for isolated communities such as Little Diomede, severe disruptions to travel related to the inability to build and maintain the seasonal ice runway to support transportation of people, goods and services. The low sea ice also likely affected the seasonal migration of marine mammals and subsequent timing of subsistence hunting activities. For example, the community of Gambell was able to harvest bowhead whales in winter, and some

Fig. 2.3  Unprecedented low sea ice in winter 2017-spring 2018. (Source: National Snow and Ice Data Center)

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bowhead whales were detected far north, in Utqiagvik in winter when most individuals are typically in more southern waters.

2.2.3 Polynyas and Shoreline Leads During winter the formation of sea ice and the production of cold saline water often occurs within polynyas when there is significantly greater ice cover. In the shallow Bering Sea waters these polynyas can have local circulation patterns where cold, saline waters interact with sediments on the shelf seafloor, which in turn supplies nutrients that support ecosystem productivity (Codispoti et  al. 2005; Hioki et  al. 2014). Polynyas are also important wildlife habitat and sites of subsistence hunting. Several active and large polynyas occur in the Bering and Chukchi seas including: south of St. Lawrence Island, in Norton Sound, in the Anadyr Gulf, and along the coast of northern Alaska. The Anadyr Gulf Polynya is one of the most active polynya areas in the Arctic, and is the source of Anadyr Water, whose transport contributes to the high primary and benthic production in these regions (Stirling 1997; Frey et al. 2015). The coastal leads that first open up the sea ice cover along the Alaska coast in spring affects the migration routes of marine mammals, and provides access to migrating whales and walruses for coastal subsistence hunters.

2.3

Biology of the Bering Strait

2.3.1 Lower Trophic Levels: Plankton Seasonal peaks in productivity are driven by light, stratification, and nutrient availability. One component of productivity in the region involves ice-associated algae which may be responsible for as much as 10% of annual primary productivity in the Bering Sea (McRoy 1974). A diverse assemblage of ice-associated algae and plankton have been identified in the Bering Sea (Szymanski and Gradinger 2016), but few species are endemic to the region. These phytoplankton communities contribute an important source of carbon to benthic and pelagic food webs (Alexander 1992). Currently, tight coupling to benthic ecosystems involves export of organic matter to support benthic organisms and benthic-feeding predators. However, changes in sea ice in the form of thinning sea ice cover, and increasing prevalence of melt ponds on the ice, have been linked to earlier occurrences of phytoplankton blooms. These earlier phytoplankton blooms may support a larger standing stock of zooplankton grazing that cycles through pelagic food webs instead of allowing a net sink of organic matter to support benthic communities (Grebmeier et al. 2006b). Since the Bering Sea is typically seasonally ice-covered, reductions in multiyear ice and increased upwelling that changes dynamics from ice-edge productivity to increased under-ice productivity is less of a contribution in this region compared to farther north in the Arctic. Phytoplankton and sea ice algae represent major food sources for larger zooplankton, but the microzooplankton (microbes and protists) may also

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be important for zooplankton consumption particularly when the population or quality of phytoplankton stocks are low (Cota et al. 1996). Zooplankton community composition has been well studied in the Eastern Bering Sea where the abundance and types of zooplankton observed differs greatly during prolonged warm and cold years (Stabeno et  al. 2012). Although there is strong interannual variation, fewer large copepods and euphausiids occur over the shelf on warm years compared to cold years. Internannual changes in key zooplankton species in turn affects the distribution of predators that forage on this prey base. In contrast, there was no apparent variation in small crustacean zooplankton taxa during warm or cold years (Stabeno et al. 2012).

2.3.2 Lower Trophic Levels: Benthos The productivity of benthic ecosystems in the northern Bering and Chukchi Seas could be significantly altered by changes in the physical environment and the vertical flux of organic carbon to the seafloor. This in turn could affect a transition to a more pelagic ecosystem (Grebmeier et al. 2006b). At present benthic invertebrates form an important base of marine food webs that support fish, birds and marine mammals (Divine et al. 2015; Moore and Stabeno 2015). The terrestrial and freshwater influence on benthic invertebrate communities is greatest along the coast and in lagoon systems (Dunton et al. 2012), and have less influence on offshore benthic communities of the Bering Strait region. In general, benthic abundance patterns across the northern Bering and Chukchi shelf shows the highest benthic biomass occurs in the west, and declines eastward towards the Alaska coast (Grebmeier et al. 2015; Grebmeier et al. 2006a). Throughout the region, important energy-rich prey species such as bivalves show different trends in abundance. Warmer surface waters and earlier sea ice retreat may be responsible for the observed trends of reduced bivalve biomass (Lovvorn et al. 2003; Grebmeier et al. 2006b), but this trend is not apparent throughout the northern Bering Sea. More nutrient-rich regions in the Gulf of Anadyr have shown increasing trends in bivalve biomass (Nadtochiy et al. 2008). Tunicates, echinoderms and crustaceans are relatively abundant in the region, as well as benthic amphipods. Changing amphipod distributions were observed to affect annual differences in the distribution of foraging gray whales (Moore et al. 2003; Nadtochiy et al. 2008). Similarly, changes in the abundance and distribution of other benthic prey species such as bivalves are likely to influence the distribution of benthic-feeding marine mammals, such as bearded seals and walruses. Snow crabs (Chionoecetes opilio) were also found to be abundant in patches in the region, but it is unlikely this region will be able to support a commercial fishery (North Pacific Fisheries Management Council 2009). Observations of increasing ocean acidification associated with continued sea ice loss, particularly in the top 50 m of the Arctic, threatens planktonic and benthic calcifying organisms (Yamamoto-Kawai et al. 2009). In addition, hardshelled invertebrates such as crabs and clams are known to be negatively impacted by increasing acidification in the form of reduced growth rates, or

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death (Mathis et al. 2015). As increasing water temperatures drive temperate species northwards, calcifying species may face increased difficulty with northward range shifts into more acidified waters. The specific effects of ocean acidification can be different for individual species and life history stages, and not all effects are well-known. However, since many calcifying species are also important prey species it is likely that ocean acidification will impact food webs and species beyond those that face direct physiological impacts. Invasive species to the region are currently not significant threats to marine or terrestrial ecosystems in the region with only a few highly invasive species identified (Gotthardt et  al. 2015). Several potential invasive marine species in Alaskan waters such as the European green crab (Carcinus maenas) and tunicates (Didemnum vexillum) may be introduced from ship hulls and vessel ballast water, but establishing populations could be challenging in the colder waters of the northern Bering Sea. However, given the potential ecosystem impacts from increased competition by invasive species, difficulty in first detecting invasive species populations, and the high costs of eradication of invasive species known from other coastal areas (McNeely et al. 2003) it would be wise to focus efforts on the prevention of introducing invasive species.

2.3.3 Fish Over 400 species of fish have been identified in the Bering Sea which acts as large potential source of colonizing species into the Arctic (Thorsteinson and Love 2016). Trawl samples of fish species in the northern Bering Sea and U.S Chukchi Seas show that species abundance can also vary significantly between years, and the effects of a changing climate is likely to influence dominant fish species and distributions. One particular feature known to have a strong effect on fish species distributions is a subsurface cold pool of water (35) and temperatures above 3 °C. Between mainland Norway and Bjørnøya the water temperature varies seasonally and inter-annually between 3  °C and 7  °C (Ingvaldsen and Loeng 2009). Arctic water, in the east and north of the Barents Sea Region, is characterized by lower salinity than Atlantic Waters (34.4–34.7) and temperatures below 0 C. Arctic waters and Atlantic waters are separated by the Polar Front. Water temperature and salinity (basic seawater properties) affect the functioning of ecosystems, directly or indirectly through secondary effects such as density, stratification and light transmission (AMAP 2017a). Therefore, these differences between the water masses are important for the biology in the BaSR, including fish stocks and seasonal sea ice-edge production.

6.2.3 Sea Ice The majority of the BaSR is ice-free all year-round, contrary to other sea areas at the same latitude. Only in the very northern part is there is year-round ice. In winter the

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ice edge normally is located just north of the polar front (Smedsrud et al. 2013). Also, most of the coastal areas, including fjords and bays, in the BaSR are ice free year round allowing for ship transport to major ports in Norway and Russia even in winter. The coastal areas and the west and southern parts of this region have always been ice free throughout the year. The West Spitsbergen Current that brings water masses from southern areas, influences ice cover in the Barents Sea Region (Ivanov et al. 2012); and even in winter there are open water areas at very high latitudes. The interactions between the Atlantic currents and the Arctic currents play a major role in the formation of sea ice in the BaSR (AMAP 2017a). In the geographically defined Barents Sea there is a strong seasonal variability in ice cover. Approximately 50% of the Barents Sea is ice covered during the winter months, but most of it is ice free in summer. The further expected warming of Arctic regions including the Barents Sea Region, will have profound implications for the sea ice cover also in winter in the eastern and northern parts of this region. The decline in sea-ice extent and volume has been widely documented the last couple of decades (e.g. Overland and Wang 2007; AMAP 2017b). Laidre et  al. (2015) provided an ecologically-focused study of seasonal changes in sea ice. The study showed the Barents Sea region to have experienced four times the average rate of change in terms of seasonal sea-ice coverage compared to the Arctic in general, with a reduction of 20+ weeks in just the last few decades. Over the period 1979–2012 first-year sea ice extent decreased by 3.5–4.1% per decade, with the most pronounced reduction occurring during summer at 9.4–13.6% per decade (equivalent to a loss of 0.73–1.07 million km2 per decade), and was 11–16% per decade for multi-year sea ice (Vaughan et al. 2013). The Barents Sea is expected to become the first Arctic region that is ice-free all year round. Using RCP 8,5 projections it is indicated there will be a 94% reduction in September sea-ice extent. Sea ice influences the connection between ocean and the atmosphere, planetary energy flow, weather phenomena, and marine life, and so a decrease in its extent and volume could have profound effects on the future Barents area (AMAP 2017a). Sea ice cover is about the extent as well as the volume of the sea ice. As the warming of the Arctic continues there is less and less multi-year ice in the Barents region. The properties of multi-year ice are very different from annual ice and the physical properties of the ocean-atmosphere are very different between ice-free or ice-covered oceans. For all kinds of marine life associated with sea ice this has huge implications, e.g. for seals and polar bears, but also for microorganisms and thereby the ecosystem. For human activities like shipping or extraction of natural resources the sea ice cover, or lack of it, has of course tremendous implications. There is a strong correlation between the ice conditions and the socio-economy, both locally and globally. The land adjacent to the BaSR is a highly populated and developed region and there are various industrial sectors in the area, both those important internationally as well as those important for local communities. A continued future warming of the Arctic and declining sea ice leads to increased heat release to the atmosphere and reduced vertical stability. Also a shift in the largescale atmospheric circulation pattern over Europe in winter is expected (Christensen

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et al. 2015).The declining sea ice is also important for the possible future increase in shipping trough the North east passage and extraction of natural resources in the region.

6.2.4 Ocean Acidification Another feature of the entire Arctic marine areas, including the BaSR, which has been called the “new kid on the block” is the ocean acidification. Calculations indicate that 25% of the world’s human emissions of CO2 have been dissolved in sea water. This process creates a weak acid and lowers the oceans pH. Ocean acidification is an Arctic issue because CO2 dissolves better in cold waters than in temperate and tropical waters. Therefore Arctic Ocean acidification has a number of potential biological and ecological consequences. The pH of surface waters in the Norwegian Sea has decreased significantly over the past 30 years (Skjelvan et al. 2014). There are so far scarce data concerning responses of ocean acidification on the Barents Sea Region species and ecosystems. However, Arctic marine ecosystems are likely to be at risk from ocean acidification and then it could have huge socio-economic consequences.

6.3

The Biology of the Barents Sea Region

6.3.1 Plankton The primary production, the phytoplankton grow and the following grazing by zooplankton is vital to a well-functioning ecosystem. With very few exceptions all marine life is based upon the biological conversion of light energy to chemical bond energy stored in the form of organic carbon (Rey 2004). In the BaSR the primary production is highly seasonal due to the extreme variation in light levels and temperature across the annual cycle (Sakshaug et  al. 2009). The pronounced spring bloom is based on the nutrients accumulated in the water masses during winter when there is too little light for the phytoplankton to start the primary production. The majority of the primary production in the region is by phytoplankton with some contribution by ice-algae. In the western and southern part of the Barents Sea region the contribution from ice algae is insignificant. With the projected even less sea ice in the east and northern Barents Sea in the coming decades it is anticipated the role of the ice algae will decrease in the future with a concomitant increase in phytoplankton production. Analyses of time series 1998–2011 indicates a moderate increase in net primary production in the Barents Sea due to rising sea temperatures, declining sea ice and prolonged open water seasons (Dalpadado et al. 2014). The zooplankton grazes on the phytoplankton and is the link to the higher trophic levels. There is a diverse number of zooplankton species of various taxonomic and trophic groups in the region (Eiane and Tande 2009). There are boreal groups associated with the warmer Atlantic water in the south and Arctic groups associated with

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cold Arctic water in the north. With the continued expected warming of the region it is expected the boreal species will expand east and north while the Arctic species will retreat. This can have impacts on the geographical distribution of higher trophic levels like fish and whales.

6.3.2 Benthos Animals that live on (epifauna) or in (infauna) the bottom sediments are referred to as benthos. Most infauna animals are bivalves and worms while epifauna is e.g. some fish, brittle stars, sea urchins, shrimps and crabs. In addition benthos can be divided into macro- and microbenthos and therefore there is a huge variety of animals referred to as benthos. The majority of benthic fauna is stationary. The prevailing environmental conditions, including large-scale oceanography, reflect the composition of benthos of the Barents Sea Region (Carroll et  al. 2008; Cochrane et  al. 2009; Jørgensen et  al. 2015). Studies show that infauna (mostly worms and bivalves) density and species richness in the Barents Sea area are 86% and 44% greater at stations near the Polar Front than at stations in either Atlantic- or Arctic-dominated water masses (Carroll et al. 2008). North of the Polar Front, sea ice suppresses water column productivity and infaunal abundances are significantly lower than in open-water areas south of the Polar Front, while the numbers of taxa present are similar (Cochrane et al. 2009) (Fig. 6.3). Bottom trawling operations can have destructive impact on benthic habitats and communities and is of particular concern. In areas of traditional trawl fishing, including the Barents Sea, such operations can cover up to half of the seabed area and can result in the death of 20–40% of benthic organisms. Trawling impacts are greatest on hard bottom habitat dominated by large sessile fauna (Jørgensen et al.

1924-1935

1968-1970

1991-1994

Total biomass, g/m2 500

Fig. 6.3  Distribution of benthic biomass in the Barents Sea for three survey periods (after Brotskaya and Zenkevich 1939; Antipova 1975; Kiyko and Pogrebov 1997) (Institute of Marine Research)

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2015). Direct visual observations in the Barents Sea show vast areas of the seabed exhibit traces of trawling in the form of a trench 2.3 m wide and 0.8 m deep, where the benthic fauna has been virtually eliminated (Aibulatov 2005). The most vulnerable species include corals, sponges and other components of benthic communities. Such species can take tens to hundreds of years to recover from trawling pressure. The long-term impacts of bottom trawling are now the focus of detailed studies in relation to the development of ‘sustainable fisheries’ (Lyubin et  al. 2011; WWF 2013).

6.3.3 Fish There are about 200 species of fish in the Barents Sea region, but far from all of them are commercially exploited. There are three main groups of fish in the Barents Sea seen from a trophic level perspective: Species feeding on plankton, species feeding on benthos, and species feeding on other fish (Dolgov et  al. 2011). The planktivorous species, capelin (Mallotus villosus), polar cod (Boreogadus saida) and juvenile herring (Clupea harengus) are important species for top trophic predators in the Barents Sea marine ecosystem. These three species have broadly divided the sea area among them with capelin in the north, herring in the south, and polar cod mainly in the east (AMAP 2017a). Northeast Arctic cod (Gadus morhua), haddock (Melanogrammus aeglefinus), saithe (Pollachius virens), herring, and capelin are the most commercially important fish species in the Barents Sea Region. The region is one of the most fishery intensive areas in the world. Recruitment of Northeast Arctic cod, haddock and herring is related to the inflows of Atlantic water and the accompanying higher temperatures in the Barents Sea (Ottersen and Loeng 2000). The Northeast Arctic cod distribution area increased from 2004 to 2013 and has the last decade covered most of the Barents Sea shelf in autumn (August–September) and has also expanded northward during winter (Johansen et al. 2013; Prokhorova 2013). The northern expansion of cod is a prime example of the “borealization’ of the Barents Sea ecosystem (Fig. 6.4). The Northeast Arctic  cod stock migrates in late winter/early spring to the Norwegian coast for spawning. Approximately 40% of the stock migrates to the Lofoten islands in the southern part of the Barents Sea Region. This spawning migration is source for huge commercial cod stock fisheries along the Norwegian coast. Haddock is the second most commercially important fish species in this region. Cod feed mostly on other pelagic species while haddock mainly feed on benthic species. Haddock has also recently reached a historic high in abundance and has increased its distribution range since the 1950s (Mehl et al. 2013; McBride et al. 2014). This finding is related to large haddock stocks, an increasing proportion of large individuals in the stocks and higher water temperatures, similar to the situation for Northeast Arctic cod. Mackerel (Scomber scombrus) distribution is primarily south of the Barents Sea Region and prefers water temperatures above 6 °C. The spawning areas are in the

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Fig. 6.4  Distribution of Atlantic cod in the Barents Sea 2004 and 2013. (Prozorkevich and Gjøsæter 2013)

North Sea and west of the British Isles and along the French, Spanish and Portuguese coast. After spawning in February–July mackerel migrates north into the Norwegian Sea and recently even north to Svalbard and into Greenlandic waters. Mackerel is a typical example of a commercial fish stock that lately has migrated further north into the waters off the Norwegian northern coast and even further north. Traditionally the commercial mackerel fisheries have been outside the boundaries of Barents Sea Region (including the Norwegian Sea). In the period 1973–2001 ca 10% of the total mackerel was caught in the Norwegian Sea with the highest catch of 135,000 tons in the mid-1990s (www.imr.no).Most of the catch is landed by Norway and Russia. The last couple of years the catch has been higher than the advice from the International Council for Exploration of the Seas (ICES) because the countries which fish mackerel didn’t reach an agreement. In 2015 Norway, the European Union (EU) and the Faroe Islands agreed, but Iceland and Russia were not part of the agreement. The distribution of mackerel is of today limited to west of the line between Spitsbergen, Bear Island (Bjørnøya) and mainland Norway.

6.3.4 Marine Mammals The BaSR contains one of the most species-rich marine mammal communities in the circumpolar Arctic (Laidre et al. 2015). Key marine mammals include whales, seals, walrus and polar bear. The majority of marine mammals are higher trophic level feeders, with large body sizes and large blubber reserves, which are important for insulation as well as for energy storage. These animals require food resources that are concentrated in time and space at least on a seasonal basis, making them particularly good ecosystem health indicators; they integrate signals of ecosystem change at lower trophic levels and hence are often referred to as ecosystem

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‘sentinels’, thus warranting significant attention in climate change assessments (AMAP 2017a). Most of the marine mammals in the Barents Sea region have experienced high levels of past exploitation and some are still artificially depressed by these earlier excessive harvests, such that they are included on the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Red List of Threatened Species and consequently protected (AMAP 2017a). Today two species of marine mammals are commercially harvested in the region; the harp seal (Pagophilus groenlandicus) and minke whale (Balaenoptera acutorostrata), both species are harvested well within sustainable limits. The circumpolar Arctic endemic marine mammal species include polar bear (Ursus maritimus), the three ice-affiliated cetaceans bowhead whale  (Balaena mysticetus), narwhal (Monodon monoceros), and white whale (Delphinapterus leucas) are permanent residents in the north-eastern part of Barents Sea Region. Polar bears do not inhabit the mainland in the region, only on the islands to the north and east; e.g. Svalbard and Franz Josef Land. Due to the retreat of the sea-ice the polar bear habitat has declined, but polar bears in Svalbard have shown high adult survival and stable body condition (males) and production of yearlings from 1995 to present ( Aars et al. 2017).

6.4

Contaminants

Every ecosystem on earth has its’ share of contaminants that can harm its living organisms, from molecular level to populations. Many contaminants (heavy metals, Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs), emerging contaminants) undergo long-range atmospheric transport (LRT) from far away sources and are deposited in the Arctic (AMAP 2004). Other transport routes to the Arctic are ocean currents, riverine inputs and biotic transport. Prevailing wind directions and ocean currents transport contaminants to the Barents area from distant sources in Europe, Asia and North America. There are relatively few major contaminant sources in the Barents Sea Region. Industrial point sources contribute to local pollution, but also global pollution via CO2 emissions. The local point sources include mining, smelters and petroleum activities. Some of the most widespread pollutants in the Barents Sea Region are heavy metals (mercury, lead, cadmium), oil (oil slicks, PAH and other hydrocarbons), persistent organic compounds (e.g.  PCB, HCH, DDT) and artificial radionuclides (strontium-90, cesium-137, plutonium-239). The coastal ecosystems of the Barents Sea Region are most exposed to anthropogenic activities. However, even in coastal areas, the levels of chemical pollutants are generally lower than officially accepted environmental quality standards and lower than in other parts of Russian or European seas (UNEP 2004; Matishov 2007). The ecological situation is most severe in impact zones (“hot spots”), which are situated in coastal areas with high economic activities. In regards to marine (pelagic) ecosystems, there is no reason to suppose negative effects of contaminants in open waters due to their low background contamination. Impacts of pollutants on seabird populations have been observed and

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studies on dead and dying seabirds on Bear Island indicate contaminants could be the main reason for the mortality (Sagerup et al. 2009). Atmospheric monitoring since the 1990s at the Zeppelin monitoring station, Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard, show declining trends of most legacy POPs (AMAP 2014). The decline seems to have slowed down in recent years as the concentrations have become much lower (AMAP 2014). The declining trends are anticipated to continue. However, continued sea-ice retreat may result in re-emission of previously sea-ice deposited PCBs and other contaminants. The brominated flame retardant polybrominated diphenyl ethers (PBDEs) showed a declining trend 2006–2012 at Zeppelin and Pallas air monitoring stations (AMAP 2014). Both PCBs and PBDEs are listed on the Stockholm Convention and further declining trends are expected on medium and long term. Of the heavy metals mercury is the one which has had the most attention in the Arctic. Monitoring and assessment of mercury in the Arctic was important input for the Minamata Convention on mercury. Over the past 150 years mercury levels in the Arctic have increased roughly ten-fold. Nearly all present day mercury levels in biota are therefore of anthropogenic origin (AMAP 2011). Most of the time series data showing increased trends are for marine species, while no significant recent increases were found for terrestrial animals (AMAP 2011). Many of the contaminants are transferred through nutrition, from the lower levels of the food chain, such as polar cod and capelin, to the higher trophic levels. Thus, species at the top of the marine food chain, such as polar bears and glaucous gulls, accumulate high concentrations of contaminants. Many of the organic substances also bind to fat, and Arctic species typically build up fat reserves to protect them from the cold and give them an energy source when food is scarce. When the animals consume this fat, the pollutants are released into their blood stream, perhaps having harmful effects even though the air and the water are cleaner in the Arctic than further south. Future trends of mercury in Arctic biota on medium and long term are dependent on the implementation of the Minamata Convention and global emissions. The Minamata convention entered into force May 2017 when more than 50 countries had ratified it. Emissions scenarios project that if currently available emission reduction measures are implemented globally, then mercury deposition in the Arctic might be expected to decrease by as much as 20% by 2020 relative to 2005 levels (AMAP 2011).

6.5

Marine Biological Resources

6.5.1 Ocean Fisheries Much of the shipping activity in the Barents Sea Region is fishing vessels. Of a total of approximately 5000 ships in 2009, around 1600 were fishing boats (Arctic Council 2009).The commercially most important fish species in the Barents Sea Region are Northeast Arctic cod, haddock, saithe, herring, and capelin. The North east Arctic cod is the world’s single largest cod stock that represent a Total Allowable

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Catch (TAC) quota of around one million metric tons. Although the agreed TAC quota has been reduced to almost 900.000 metric tons for 2016 and the International Council for Exploration of the Seas (ICES) has recommended the cod quota for 2017 be set to 805.000 metric tonnes (the same as the recommendation for 2016), the economic value and contribution to the countries involved (mainly Norway and Russia) is significant (AMAP 2017a). There are annual quota negotiations between Russia and Norway based on ICES scientific advice. Over several years the spawning stock of Northeast Arctic cod has been at a very high level (Gradinger 2015) and the fish stocks in the regions are in good health. A key question for the future is how the observed and projected increased water temperatures will further influence the biological productivity and the ecosystem. A change in the ocean’s physical/chemical properties can influence the primary and secondary production. Zooplankton species (e.g. Calanus) play a crucial role in the Barents Sea ecosystem and the capelin is a key fish species important for the cod stocks. So far there are no or little evidence that the increased water temperature and other physical/chemical factors have had negative impact on the different trophic levels and therefore not have influenced the cod stock. Besides the questions related to physical/chemical and biological factors influencing the TAC of the commercial important species, a major question is how the fish stocks are managed in the future. In 1976 the Joint Norwegian Russian Fisheries Management Commission was established and it has had positive influence on the stock size. The Commission decides on the TAC and distribution of quotas among the involved parties (Norway, Russia and 3rd countries.). Around 15% of the Northeast Arctic cod quota is allocated to third countries. The commission coordinates cooperative research projects between Norway and Russia, e.g. fish stock surveys, focused on enhancing understanding of the Barents Sea ecosystem and factors driving the dynamics of the most important commercial species (AMAP 2017a). In 2002 the two parties agreed to establish a new tool for sustainable precautionary management principle; a guideline that restricted the changes in TAC to approximately 10% annually. Based on this principle positive impact from the joint management regime became much stronger (Hønneland 2006). It is believed that this co-management regime is one of the main reasons behind the healthy state of the fish stocks in the Barents Sea and adjacent waters. In general, the joint Fisheries Commission has been successful in terms of establishing and maintaining a both biological and economic sound fisheries management regime (Fig. 6.5). There has been a tendency that small-scale coastal fishing is being replaced by high technology, fewer fishermen and larger companies and trawlers (Keskitalo 2008). These trends can be exacerbating with climate change trends. More ocean-­going vessels and the need to possess quotas for other (more expensive) species may limit the extent to which local fishermen can cope with such changes (Keskitalo 2008).

6.5.2 Aquaculture Of the total Arctic fish farming the Norwegian share is currently 98% of total value (Hermansen and Troel 2012). There are some small volumes of freshwater fish

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Catch, thousand tonnes

4500 Saithe Herring Shrimp Greenland halibut Haddock Redfish Polar cod Atlantic cod Capelin

3750

3000

2250

1500

750

0

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

Fig. 6.5  Total catches of the most important fish stocks in the Barents Sea (including catches in all of the ICES areas - along the Norwegian seas and the Norwegian coast south to 62 N) from 1965 to 2013. The herring fishery targets adult fish, which are actually taken outside the Barents Sea, but these fish spawn within the Barents Sea

being produced in Finland and Sweden and some production of Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar) in the Murmansk region. The Norwegian marine aquaculture industry is relatively new, starting in the early 1970s on the Norwegian West coast. After approximately ten years of extensive “trial and error”, combined with a significant research effort, Atlantic salmon took the lead as the main breed of farmed marine salmonoids. The history of the farming of Atlantic salmon has gone through stages of different challenges – both technological, biological and market-challenges. The positive trend in production volumes has, notwithstanding, continued throughout the years as illustrated in the figure below (Fig. 6.6). In the period 1998–2016 Norway’s total fish farming production increased from about 0.4 million tons to more than 1.3 million tons. Fish farming in Norway is nearly entirely marine fish farming of finfish and salmon (Salmo salar) makes up approximately 95% of the total production. In 2016, the three northernmost counties (Nordland, Troms and Finnmark) contributed to almost 40% of Norway’s total marine aquaculture production. This is an increase from ~27% in 1998 (Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries 2016). About 2000 people were employed in the Norwegian aquaculture industry in the three northernmost counties in 2016 (Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries 2016). In 2016 the total value of Norwegian farmed fish was 64 billion NOK, comparable to approximately 8 billion USD (Statistics Norway 2017). In Russia the aquaculture sector is under strong development in the Murmansk region, where the volume of raised commercial fish is now significantly higher; increasing from 440 tons in 2007 to 16,300 tons in 2012 (Strategy for development

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1600000 1400000 1200000 Year

1000000 800000 600000 400000 200000 0 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

Fig. 6.6  Production of farmed salmonids in Norway 1998–2016. Red is total production in Norway, green is the production in the three counties (Nordland, Troms, Finnmark) within the Barents Sea Region. (Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries 2017)

of the Murmansk region 2013).Further development of the aquaculture sector is planned, as it is expected that measures underway will drive an increase in the volume of fish farmed from 16,300 tons in 2012 to 98,900 tons by 2025 (a sixfold increase). This is approximately the same amount as was produced in the northernmost county in Norway, Finnmark, in 2016. There are several reasons for the trend that more fish is produced in the northern regions, including the increase in ocean temperature in the south and central West coast of Norway and vast unexploited sheltered sea areas in northern Norway. Increasing ocean temperature is not favorable for salmon aquaculture for several reasons, including the spread of viral disease outbreaks (pancreas disease, infectious pancreatic necrosis), heart and skeletal muscle inflammation, and cardiomyopathy syndrome (Stene et  al. 2014; Taranger et  al. 2015). The increase in temperature is a significant driver for moving aquaculture activities towards areas with lower ocean temperatures and with sufficient water flow. Northern Norway is an area with both qualities, and with relatively good infrastructure throughout the entire salmon farming value chain. The role and influence of the arctic temperature regime for salmonoid aquaculture need more scientific investigation and documentation. Norwegian fish farming face huge problems with diseases, lice, and farmed salmon escaping from the cages and genetically mix with the wild salmon. A farmed salmon differs quite much from a wild salmon and therefore mixing of genes between them is not wanted. Fish farming is also a major source of nitrogen and phosphorus discharges to Norwegian coastal waters. In 2013, discharges from fish-farming in the three counties within the Barents Sea Region (Nordland, Troms and Finnmark) accounted for about 85% (nitrogen) and 90% (phosphorus) of the total anthrophonic inputs of

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these substances to this coastline (Selvik and Høgåsen 2014). However, the coastline is considered of good or high status according to the EU Water Framework Directive, and as a non-problem area for eutrophication according to the Oslo-Paris Convention (OSPAR) screening procedure (Norderhaug et al. 2016). Another aspect that can play a role in the future development of farming of Atlantic salmon is the new ideas for developing the large high seas structures for salmon farming. These structures are supposed to be located outside of the traditional coastline area and will face other challenges, but also present potential opportunities.

6.5.3 Red King Crab and Snow Crab The red king crab (Paralihoides camtschatica) was deliberately introduced from the North Pacific Ocean to the Kola Peninsula area in the 1960s. The crab has since then migrated into Norwegian waters and east and south of North Cape. The crab is a commercial important species, but it can increase to huge number of individuals within limited geographical area and cause ecological problems. East of North Cape the harvest is controlled with specific quotas, but west of North Cape the crab can be caught without restrictions. In the Russian part of this region, the fjords are open and slope gradually toward the open ocean while in Norway, the coast and fjords are steep and deep. As a result, the crabs are restricted to the coast in Norway where the migration for feeding (deep waters) and mating (shallow waters) take place close to land, while on the Russian side the crabs migrate northward over the shallow banks to reach foraging areas in deeper waters (Jørgensen and Nilssen 2011). The snow crab (Chionoecetes opilio) was first discovered in the Barents Sea in 1996. The crab could have been introduced by ballast water, but this is not totally clear. Genetic studies have shown the snow crab in the Barents Sea and the Bering Sea are related and this supports the hypothesis that it has migrated from east and not from the population in West-Greenland (www.imr.no). The snow crab is a cold a water species which has migrated into the eastern part of the Barents Sea Region. In the Barents Sea commercial snow crab fishing started in 2013. Russian studies have shown the biomass of the snow crab in the Barents Sea, primarily distributed in the eastern Barents Sea, is ten times the biomass of the red king crab in the Barents Sea and half the biomass of shrimps. It is expected the snow crab will migrate north and north-west and inhabit the waters around Franz Josef Land and Svalbard. This can lead to conflicts who has the rights to quotas around Svalbard (Box 6.1).

6.6

Marine Areas of Ecological Importance

Marine Protected Area (MPA) is a generic term that includes a variety of types of protected areas. In 2016, 4.7% of the total Arctic’s marine areas are protected.

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Box 6.1: Ecosystem Services

The term ecosystem services have become more common the last decade with the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) published by the United Nations in 2005 as a milestone. This assessment defined “ecosystem services” as the benefits people obtain from ecosystems and as such link ecosystems with the human society. Ecosystem services thus range e.g. from drinking water supply via clean air to food production. The MEA distinguishes between four categories of ecosystem services, where the so-called supporting services are regarded as the basis for the services of the other three categories; provisioning, regulating and cultural (MEA 2005). Ecosystem services consist of two elements: the ability of ecosystems and biodiversity to provide services (the biophysical and ecological element), and the benefits of these services to humans (the social, cultural and economic elements) (Kettunen et al. 2012). Full benefits of ecosystem services are depended on healthy ecosystems. In the Barents Sea Region one of the main ecosystem services is the well-being and harvesting of the huge commercial fish stocks and the following economic value and health benefits people get from these fish stocks. In a rapid changing Arctic the ecosystems are also changing as has been described with e.g. the “borealization” of Arctic waters. As the ecosystems change in the Arctic so do the ecosystem services and consequently it is a need for adaptation to the new ecosystem services (Forsius et al. 2013). It is often seen that a change in ecosystems and ecosystem services is negative and not so often a positive change. Sometimes it can also be discussed if a change is negative or not. Invasive alien species can have a negative impact on an ecosystem, or change the ecosystem to a new state and on the other hand increase the benefit humans have from that ecosystem. The invasion of the red king crab along the Russian-Norwegian border is an example how this species has increased the income for people in the area. Reduced emissions of greenhouse gases are a top priority for conserving the ecosystems and ecosystem services as they are today. However, societal changes also have huge impacts on ecosystem services. The vulnerability of ecosystem services in the Arctic to the developing bio-economy and to the increasing use of natural resources requires further investigation (AMAP 2017a). In the Barents Sea Region there are several local areas defined as “areas of heightened ecological significance” (AMSA IIc) and Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) as defined by IUCN.  The “areas of heightened ecological significance” have been classified according to its use by birds, fish or marine mammals. The classification can be assigned based on spawning areas for fish, breeding, feeding, molting, migration, staging and wintering areas for the animals. In the Barents Sea Region there are several area of heightened ecological significance (Fig. 6.7) (AMSA IIc)

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Fig. 6.7  Areas of heightened ecological significance in the Barents Sea Large Marine Ecosystem (AMAP/CAFF/SDWG 2013)

In the southern part of the Barents Sea Region (the Norwegian Sea) the Lofoten Islands is defined as an area of heightened ecological significance because of its’ importance as a spawning area for Atlantic cod migrating from the Barents Sea and also as an important breeding area for seabirds and feeding area for marine mammals (AMSA IIc). Table 6.1 gives an overview of these areas and their significance for the fauna. Two distinct geographical areas within the Barents Sea Region have been defined by the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) as Ecologically or Biologically Significant Areas (EBSAs). These are the “North-eastern Barents-Kara Sea” and “Murmansk Coast and Varanger fjord”. The EBSA areas provide important services to one or more species/population of the ecosystem or to the ecosystem as a whole (CBD 2015) The Norwegian Government has produced several white papers to the Storting (parliament) about ecosystem based management plans for the Norwegian Sea and Barents Sea. The purpose of the management plans is “to provide a framework for value creation through the sustainable use of natural resources and ecosystem services in the sea areas and at the same time maintain the structure, functioning, productivity and diversity of the ecosystems.” (Meld. St. 20 (2014–2015)).The first management plan for the Barents Sea and Lofoten islands was presented to the

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Table 6.1  Areas of heightened ecological significance identified within the Barents Sea Region including information on the extent of the area and its use by fish, birds and marine mammals No Area name 1 Pechora Sea

Area (103 km2) 263

2 3

Norwegian and Murmansk coasts Entrance and northern White Sea

130 20

4

White Sea (Kandalaksha, Onega and Dvina bays) Bear Island Svalbard Archipelago Franz Josef Land Western and Central Barents Sea Northern Barents Sea – marginal ice zone Western Novaya Zemlya

32

5 6 7 8 9 10

10 150 117 139 228 101

Fish Sp, F Sp

Sp

Sp W

Birds F, St, Mo B, F, W Mo, W B, F, Mo, St, W B, F, St B, F, Mo B, F, St F, Mi, W

F, B, Mi

Mammals B, F, W

B, Mo, Mi, W F, W

B, F, W B, F, W F F Mi

B breeding, F feeding, Mi migration, Mo molting, Sp spawning; St staging, W wintering Reproduced from AMAP/CAFF/SDWG (2013)

Storting in 2006. An update of the plan was published as a white paper in 2015 (Meld. St. 20 (2014–2015)). The management plans are cross-sectorial and the Norwegian government will in 2020 present an overall revision of the entire Barents Sea-Lofoten area management plan. In the management plans the Norwegian government underline stewardship of the marine areas must be based on knowledge, both about business activities as well as the status and trends of the marine ecosystems. In the geographical area covered by this book the biggest marine protected areas are on the west coast of Svalbard archipelago, classified according to IUCN management category as Ia- Strict Nature Reserve (CAFF and PAME 2017). This category defines and area where use and impacts are strictly controlled and Ia areas can serve as reference areas for research and monitoring. Just outside the Barents Sea Region, the marine areas around Franz Josef Land are classified as Ib- Wilderness area. The framework for pan-Arctic network of marine protected areas sets out a common vision for international cooperation in MPA network development and management. It aims to inform the development of MPAs under national jurisdiction. The framework is not legally binding (PAME 2015). The purpose of the national MPA network in the Arctic is to protect and restore marine biodiversity, ecosystem function and special natural features including preserving cultural heritage and subsistence resources.

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Summary

The Barents Sea Region is a diverse region with cold, Arctic waters in the east and north and warm Atlantic waters to the west and south. Parts of the region have always been open waters with no seasonal sea-ice. The ongoing and predicted future changes physical, chemical and biological conditions in the region that  can have impacts on the governing of the region. Declining sea ice will have an enormous impact on the ecosystem and all species associated with sea-ice. Declining sea ice, but also technological development, opens up the region for oil and gas exploration and the Northern Sea Route which can lead to a conflict between environmental protection and economic development.

Table 6.2 Summary of key observations, drivers of change and conditions affecting sustainability Observation Higher sea temperatures and declining sea ice

Driver Climate change, emissions of greenhouse gases.

Fish stocks migrating north and east

Increased sea temperatures

Introduction of new, commercial species

Increased sea temperatures, human activities.

Condition (current and future manifestation) Most of the Barents Sea Region has always been ice-free all year round including coastal areas, with strong seasonal sea-ice conditions in the east and north part of the region. Retreating sea-ice impacts all marine life associated with sea-ice including primary production and higher trophic levels like seals and polar bears. A key question for the future is how the observed and projected increased water temperatures will further influence the biological productivity and the ecosystem. Decreasing sea ice in the east and north parts of the Barents Sea region also potentially open the Northern Sea Route for more commercial ship traffic between Asia and Europe. Atlantic cod, haddock, saithe, herring, and capelin are the most commercially important fish species in the Barents Sea Region. The region is one of the most fishery intensive areas in the world. The cod distribution area has increased the last decade covers now most of the Barents Sea shelf in autumn. The Atlantic cod stock is the most commercial important fish stock in the region and is co-managed between Norway and Russia. A future healthy fish stock population is both depended on a still healthy ecosystem and a maintaining a biological and economic sound fisheries management regime. With borealization of the Barents Sea region with inflow of Atlantic waters, new species are introduced to the area. These species are deliberated introduced by humans (e.g. the Red King Crab) or they have migrated to the region, e.g. mackerel. The red king crab has caused ecological problems, but is also a commercial important species. The snow crab is relatively new the region and the juridical rights to the fisheries in the Svalbard fishery zone are not solved.

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Northeast Arctic cod populations have expanded north and east due to increased sea temperatures. The cod fisheries in the region are huge and represent great commercial interests. A changed distribution between Norwegian and Russian waters is important for the stewardship of cod and other commercially important fish stocks. New species have been introduced to the region either naturally or they have been introduced by humans and it is expected the commercial value of such species will increase in the coming years. Commercial fisheries of the snow crab started in 2013 and when the crab migrates into the areas around Svalbard it is an example of who has the rights to the snow crab quotas in the Svalbard fishery zone (Table 6.2).

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Laidre KL, Stern H, Kovacs KM, Lowry L, Moore SE, Regehr EV, Ferguson SH, Wiig Ø, Boveng P, Angliss RP, Born EW, Litovka D, Quakenbush L, Lydersen C, Vongraven D, Ugarte F (2015) Arctic marine mammal population status, sea ice habitat loss, and conservation recommendations for the 21st century. Conserv Biol 29:724–737 Lyubin Р, Anisimova N, Manushin I (2011) Long-term effects on benthos of the use of bottom fishing gears. In: Jakobsen T, Ozhigin V (eds) The Barents Sea – ecosystem, resources, management. Half a century of Russian-Norwegian cooperation. Tapir Academic Press, Trondheim, pp 768–775 Matishov GG (ed) (2007) Complex investigations of processes, characteristics and resources of Russian seas of North European Basin. Kola Science Center RAS McBride MM,Filin A,Titov O, Stiansen JE (eds) (2014) IMR/PINRO update of the ‘Joint Norwegian-Russian environmental status report on the Barents Sea Ecosystem’ giving the current situation for climate, phytoplankton, zooplankton, fish, and fisheries during 2012-13. IMR/PINRO Joint Report Series 2014(1) Mehl S, Aglen A, Alexandrov DI, Bogstad B, Dingsør GE, Gjøsæter H, Johannesen E,Korsbrekke K, Murashko PA, Prozorkevich DV, Smirnov OV, Staby A, Wenneck T, de Lange (2013) Fish investigations in the Barents Sea winter 2007-2012. IMR-Pinro Joint Report Series 1-2013 Meld. St. 20 (2014–2015) Report to the Storting (white paper). Update of the integrated management plan for the Barents Sea – Lofoten area including an update of the delimitation of the marginal ice zone Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) (2005) Ecosystems and human well-being: synthesis. Island Press, Washington, 155pp Norderhaug KM, Gundersen H, Høgåsen T, Johnsen TM, Severinsen G, Vedal J, Sørensen K, Walday M (2016) Eutrophication status for Norwegian waters: National report for the third application of OSPAR’s common procedure Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries (2016) Atlantic salmon, rainbow trout and trout. Sale of slaughtered fish. Weight in metric tonnes round weight Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries (2017) Production of farmed salmonids in Norway Ottersen G, Loeng H (2000) Covariability in early growth and year-class strength of Barents Sea cod, haddock and herring: the environmental link. ICES J Mar Sci 57:339–348 Overland JE, Wang M (2007) Future regional Arctic sea ice declines. Geophys Res Lett 34(17) PAME (2013) Large marine ecosystems of the Arctic Area. Revision of the Arctic LME map 15th May 2013, 2nd edn PAME (2015) Framework for a Pan-Arctic Network of marine protected areas Prokhorova T (ed) (2013) Survey report from the joint Norwegian/Russian ecosystem survey in the Barents Sea August-October 2013. IMR/PINRO Joint Report Series no. 4/2013 Prozorkevich D, Gjøsæter H (2013) Fish community. In: Prokhorova T (ed) Survey report from the joint Norwegian/Russian ecosystem survey in the Barents Sea August-October 2013. IMR/ PINRO Joint Report Series no. 4/2013 Rey F (2004) In The Norwegian Sea Ecosystem (ed. Skjoldal HR) Rudels B, Jones EP, Schauer U, Eriksson P (2016) Atlantic sources of the Arctic Ocean surface and halocline waters. Polar Res 23(2):181–208 Sagerup K, Helgason LB, Polder A, Strom H, Josefsen TD, Skare JU, Gabrielsen GW (2009) Persistent organic pollutants and mercury in dead and dying glaucous gulls (Larus hyperboreus) at Bjornoya (Svalbard). Sci Total Environ 407:6009–6016 Sakshaug E, Johnsen G, Kristiansen S, von Quillfeldt C, Rey F, Slagstad D, Thingstad F (2009) Phytoplankton and primary production. In: Sakshaug E, Johnsen G, Kovacs KM (eds) Ecosystem Barents Sea. Tapir Academic Press, Trondheim, pp 167–207 Sandø AB, Nilsen JEØ, Gao Y, Lohmann K (2010) Importance of heat transport and local air-sea heat fluxes for Barents Sea climate variability. J Geophys Res 115(C7) Selvik JR, Høgåsen T (2014) Source apportioned inputs of nutrients to Norwegian Coastal Areas in 2013. Norwegian Institute for Water Research. Report no. 6753–2014 Skagseth Ø (2008) Recirculation of Atlantic water in the western Barents Sea. Geophys Res Lett 35(11)

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Skjelvan I, Jeansson E, Chierici M, Omar A, Olsen A, Lauvset S, Johannessen T (2014) Ocean acidification and uptake of anthropogenic carbon in the Nordic Seas, 1981-2013. Norwegian Environment Agency, Report M244-2014 Smedsrud LH, Esau IN, Ingvaldsen RB, Eldevik T, Haugan PM, Li C, Lien V, Omar A, Otterå OH, Risebrobakken B, Sandø AB, Semenov V, Sorokina SA (2013) The role of the Barents Sea in the Arctic climate system. Rev Geophys 51:415–449 Statistics Norway (2017). www.ssb.no/fiskeoppdrett. Salg av slaktet matfisk, førstehåndsverdi (In Norwegian) Stene A, Bang Jensen B, Knutsen Ø, Olsen A, Viljugrein H (2014) Seasonal increase in sea temperature triggers pancreas disease outbreaks in Norwegian salmon farms. J Fish Dis 37(8):739–751 Taranger GL, Karlsen Ø, Bannister RJ, Glover KA, Husa V, Karlsbakk E, Kvamme BO, Boxaspen KK, Bjørn PA, Finstad B, Madhun AS, Morton HC, Svåsand T (2015) Risk assessment of the environmental impact of Norwegian Atlantic salmon farming. ICES J Mar Sci 72(3):997–1021 UNEP (2004) Matishov, G., N.  Golubeva, G.  Titova, A.  Sydnes and B.  Voegele. Barents Sea: GIWA Regional assessment 11. University of Kalmar, Sweden Vaughan DG, Comiso JC, Allison I, Carrasco J, Kaser G, Kwok R, Mote P, Murray T, Paul F, en J, Rignot E, Solomina O, Steffen K, Zhang T (2013) Observations: cryosphere. In: Stocker TF, Qin D, Plattner G-K, Tignor M, Allen SK, Boschung J, Nauels A, Xia Y, Bex V, Midgley PM (eds) Climate Change 2013: the physical science basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Wassmann P, Slagstad D, Riser CW, Reigstad M (2006) Modelling the ecosystem dynamics of the Barents Sea including the marginal ice zone. J Mar Syst 59(1–2):1–24 WWF (2013) Impact of trawling fisheries on bottom ecosystems of Barents Sea. World Wildlife Fund (WWF)

7

Economies of the Barents Sea Region Valeriy Kryukov and Diwakar Poudel

Abstract

This chapter provides a synopsis of the economic dimensions of the Barents Sea Region. It discusses the economic value of different resources, including fisheries and aquaculture, oil and gas development, mining, and tourism, as well as the economic potential of other resources like wave energy and genetic resources in both the Norwegian and Russian components of the Barents Sea Region. The main features of the economies of the Barents Sea Region include: orientation to the development of natural resources (organic and inorganic) and biological resources (fish and sea animals) together with economic activities molded by the traditional way of life of indigenous peoples of the Arctic region and largely aimed at meeting their needs.

7.1

Introduction

The Barents-Arctic region is Europe’s largest region for inter-regional cooperation that includes the northernmost parts of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Northwest Russia. The region has a unique natural and environmental wealth. The wealth and diversity of resources such as forests, wildlife, fish and birds, minerals, diamonds, oil and gas creates great opportunities and challenges for its management. As defined in this book, the Barents Sea Region (BaSR) covers almost 3 million sqkm V. Kryukov (*) Institute of Economics and Industrial Engineering, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Novosibirsk, Russia e-mail: [email protected] D. Poudel Norwegian Polar Institute, Tromsø, Norway © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 O. R. Young et al. (eds.), Governing Arctic Seas: Regional Lessons from the Bering Strait and Barents Sea, Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25674-6_7

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and has a population of over 1.6 million people. The BaSR extends over the Barents Sea, which has an average depth of ca. 230 m, and a maximum depth of about 500 m at the western end of Bear Island Trough (ICES 2013). The Barents Sea itself is one of the most productive oceanic areas in the world (NMCE 2016b; O’Brien et al. 2004) and is still relatively undamaged by anthropogenic activities. As such, there is potential for protecting its natural values for the future and for maintaining and developing sustainable industries based on its natural resources, along the coast of the Barents Sea and the region (WWF 2003). The Barents Sea ecosystem is rich in diversity, with many species of zooplankton, fish, sea birds and mammals (Flaaten 1988). It is home to at least 20 million seabirds during the summer season. They belong to 40 different species and breed in 1600 colonies [12]. The Barents Sea sustains the highest sea floor biodiversity, including the world’s largest deep-water coral reef, huge mussel banks and large coastal kelp forests (WWF 2003). The Barents Sea is one of the most studied and well-managed seas in the world. The management of the living marine resources in the Barents Sea is carried out through collaboration between Norway and Russia (NMCE 2016b).

7.2

 conomics of the Barents Sea Region E from the Norwegian Perspective

The Barents Sea region and the territories comprises the Nordland, Troms and Finnmark Counties and the Svalbard Archipelago region, with a total population of approximately half million. Fisheries and aquaculture is the main living in the region followed by other mining industries and reindeer herding. The fishing industry from the Barents Sea region as a whole including harvested fish, farmed fish and fish processing contribution during 2012 was reported 5.4% of Gross regional Product (GRP) (Glomsrød et al. 2015). The oil and gas exploration activity has been increasing in the Barents Sea region from the beginning of the century, along with tourism and recreation activities. The economic activities and the contribution of the Barents Sea is discussed below.

7.2.1 Fisheries and Aquaculture The Barents Sea is very important for the Norwegian fishing industry because it is a valuable nursing area for several important species of fish, and also contains a large proportion of the total Norwegian harvest. The major fish species in the Barents Sea include bottom-dwelling fish, such as cod, haddock, Greenland halibut, long rough dab, and redfish, as well as other commercially important species, including capelin, northern shrimp, Minke whales and harp seals. For the past 40 years, the Barents Sea has provided a yield of between one and 3.5 million tons of fish (NPI 2017). The Barents Sea harbors more than 200 different fish species, including some of the important commercial stocks (Michalsen et al. 2013). Among these are some of the world’s largest fish stocks, such as the Norwegian-Arctic cod, capelin, haddock,

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saithe and Norwegian spring-spawning herring. There are also hundreds of cold-­ water coral reefs in the Barents Sea, which are very important spawning and nursing areas for many fish species, including the commercial stocks. The coral reefs are also an important habitat for more than 750 other species in the ecosystem (WWF 2003). The Barents Sea fisheries make a key contribution to the livelihood and maintenance of coastal communities in Northern Norway, in addition to the supply of the seafood to Norway and other parts of the world. The catch of the Barents Sea stock has been increasing overtime. In 2010, the catches of capelin, polar cod, cod, haddock, redfish, Greenland halibut, and shrimp in the Barents Sea were reported to be close to 2.9 million tons. The landed value of Norwegian catches from the Norwegian– Russian joint stocks was about NOK 4.2 billion, and the total export value was about NOK 7 billion (NMCE 2016a). In 2013, the landed value of catches from Norwegian fisheries in Arctic waters was about NOK 13 billion (NMCE 2016b). The total allowable catch (TAC) for 2017 for Barents Sea cod has been set at 890,000 tons by the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission. For haddock, the TAC was set at 233,000 tons. The harvest quota for Greenland halibut was 24,000 tons and for deep-sea redfish, the TAC was 30,000 tons. However, the there is no capelin fishing in the Barents Sea in 2017, as recommended by ICES (ICES 2016). In addition to the fish stocks, commercially important species of marine mammals, such as harp seals and Minke whales, are also harvested in the Barents Sea, although on a smaller scale (Jacobsen and Ozhigin 2011). Aquaculture and fish farming on the other hand, has been one of the most important industries in the Barents Sea region over many years. The Norwegian government has prioritized the aquaculture industry for seafood production in the recent years. The Government’s objective is to be the world’s leading seafood nation. About one-third of aquaculture takes place in North Norway, and production is increasing. Nordland county is one of the country’s largest aquaculture producing counties. Aquaculture production in Troms has also been more than doubled in recent years. In 2010, the fishing and aquaculture industry exported seafood to a total value of NOK 53.8 billion. Aquaculture products accounted for 62% of this figure (i.e. 33.4 billion NOK). The production from aquaculture has been increased to NOK 46.9 billion in 2015 (Statistics Norway 2016). Salmon and trout are the main aquaculture products in Northern Norway. In 2011, the Government decided to permit 5% growth of salmon and trout production in Troms and Finnmark. Farming of other marine species, such as cod and halibut, as well as some mollusks and crustaceans, has also been increasing in northern Norway, and the Government is facilitating further growth in the aquaculture industry within an environmentally sustainable framework (NMCE 2016a).

7.2.2 Oil and Gas Resources The Barents Sea is the largest area of the Norwegian continental shelf, covering 313,000 km2. The Barents Sea South has been opened for petroleum activities and the government has identified several blocks for exploration in the Barents Sea over

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many licensing rounds. In 24 licensing rounds, the government proposes to announce 93 blocks in the Barents. Over the last few years, the exploration effort has started to pay off, and the Barents Sea is becoming an exciting center of activity on the Norwegian continental shelf. To date, a total of 4 billion barrels of oil equivalent (bboe) of oil and gas have been discovered across the province.1 Furthermore, it is estimated that about half of the undiscovered resources on the Norwegian continental shelf are in the Barents Sea (visual diagram is presented in Fig. 7.1). There are five major projects in the Barents Sea, namely Snøhvit, Goliat, Johan Casberg, Wisting and Alta/Gohta. The Snøhvit and Goliat fields are in production, while the other three projects are in the discovery phase (Fig. 7.2).

7.2.2.1 Snøhvit Gas Snøhvit was discovered in the 1980s in the Norwegian Barents Sea, and is a large gas find contained within several reservoirs. Due to its location and the difficulties associated with getting the gas to market, commercial production only started about three decades after its discovery. The Snøhvit started its commercial production in 2007. Although the production was low for several years, the field achieved its

Fig. 7.1  The Barents Sea oil and gas network 2030 (projection). Source: North Energy (2012)

 http://www.offshore-mag.com/articles/print/volume-76/issue-8/northwest-europe/barents-seanorway-s-emerging-oil-province.html

1

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Fig. 7.2  Dynamics of shipments along the Northern Sea Route (composition of cargoes and delivery destinations) in 2010–2015, million tons

highest production in 2015, exporting more than 5 million metric tons (5.5 million tons) of liquefied natural Gas (LNG).2

7.2.2.2 Goliat Oil and Gas Goliat is the first oil field to come on stream in the Barents Sea, located 85 km northwest of Hammerfest in an ice-free area, off the shore of northern Norway. The development plan was approved by the authorities in 2009. The Goliat platform arrived in the Barents Sea in 2015 and started producing oil in 2016. The field will produce 100,000 barrels of oil per day. The Goliat field is estimated to contain about 180 million barrels of oil (28.5 million cubic meters) and 8 billion cubic meters of recoverable gas reserves. 7.2.2.3 Johan Castberg, Wisting Central and Alta/Gohta Field The Johan Castberg field, discovered in 2011, has two primary reservoirs called Skrugard and Havis and is predicted to produce 610 million barrels of oil. In 2013,

 ibid.

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two new fields, Wisting Central and Gohta, were discovered.3 With the anticipated startup of Castberg, Wisting and Alta/Gohta, total Barents production may go beyond 500,000 barrel of oil equivalent/day (boe/d), making the Barents Sea the province with the highest level of discovered resources on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS).4 This is about five times higher than current production from the area. With these new projects, the Barents Sea will become an important production province and could contribute to as much as 15% of total Norwegian production by the end of the next decade.5 Furthermore, the melting of Arctic ice is unlocking new possible gas and oil stocks and new shipping routes.6

7.2.3 Tourism and Recreational Industry 7.2.3.1 Tourism Tourism plays an important part in the economy of the Barents region. The major tourism attractions and activities in northern Norway and the Barents region that play a significant role in the Norwegian economy include the experience of Northern Lights; The Lofoten Islands, for scuba diving, recreational fishing, bird watching and mountain climbing; The North Cape, 71° North; The Arctic-Circle; Svartisen glacier; killer whale safaris in Tysfjord; whale safaris in Andenes, in Lofoten; Setergrotta cave, north of Mo i Rana; etc. The rich and diverse cultural life also offers memorable experiences for tourists (Barentsinfor.org 2017). The direct contribution of travel and tourism to the GDP of Norway was NOK 91.8 billion (2.9% of GDP) in 2014. This mainly reflects the economic activity generated by industries such as hotels, travel agents, airlines and other passenger transportation services (excluding commuter services). Nevertheless, it also includes, for example, the activities of the restaurant and leisure industries (WTTC 2015). The travel and tourism industry contributes to 5% of the employment in Norway, with northern Norway playing a significant role in generating both direct and indirect employment. The tourism sector in North Norway employs about 17,970 people in the three northernmost counties. The industry is, relatively speaking, a more important creator of jobs in Nordland, where 8.6% of employed people work in the industry (WTTC 2015).7 7.2.3.2 Recreation Recreational activities, such as fishing, hunting of sea birds or mammals, bird watching, whale and seal safaris and swimming, play very important role in creating  The Gohta field is estimated to contain between 10 and 21 million standard cubic meters of recoverable oil and between 5 and 8 billion standard cubic meters of recoverable gas. 4  http://www.offshore-mag.com/articles/print/volume-76/issue-8/northwest-europe/barents-seanorway-s-emerging-oil-province.html 5  http://www.offshore-mag.com/articles/print/volume-76/issue-8/northwest-europe/barents-seanorway-s-emerging-oil-province.html 6  http://www.norwaynews.no/meps-reject-ban-on-arctic-oil-drilling/ 7  Data source: World Travel and Tourism Council, 2015. 3

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revenues in the Barents sea and coastal areas. Both national and international tourists visit the area. These are also other key values and benefits associated with cultural ecosystem services. A simple estimate suggests that the value of the recreational activities (as a consumer surplus) ranges from NOK 270–800 million for the people living in the Barents Sea–Lofoten area (Magnussen 2012). The economic effects of marine ecosystems on the recreational tourism sector are estimated, by Borch et al. (2011), to be over 500 million NOK per year in the Barents Sea region of Finnmark, Troms and Nordaland.

7.2.4 Other Economic Activities in the Barents Sea Region 7.2.4.1 Wind and Tidal Energy Production The Barents Sea could contribute to the production of renewable energy, such as wind and tidal energy. There is high potential for both offshore and onshore wind energy production in the Barents region. An example is the Hamnefjell project. The Hamnefjell project can take advantage of rich Arctic winds. The first phase of the project involves 15 wind turbines, with total rated power of approximately 50 MW, which is expected to generate 186 GWh per year. This could cover the energy needs of a town of around 8000 homes, and the wind farm is expected to be completed by the end of 2017. Both offshore and onshore wind energy production are seemingly set to increase in the Barents Sea over the coming years. In addition, there is high potential for tidal energy production. An example is the Floating tidal power plant, Morild II, which was tested over a 2-year trial in Gimsystraumen, in Lofoten, Northern Norway, in 2010. There is ongoing research on different types of models for tidal energy production (Grabbe et al. 2009). 7.2.4.2 Transportation Maritime transport is important for coastal communities in the Barents Sea region because the majority of goods and passengers within the region are transported by ship. There are 150–200 ship-owners in the local transport and cruise traffic sector, most are small businesses but there are also several major companies, such as Torghatten trafikkselskap, Veolia Nord and Hurtigruten. Ship-owners form a larger proportion of the maritime industry in North Norway than in the rest of the country. There are at least three potential factors linked to the maritime industry in the High North, including offshore energy extraction, intra-regional transport and polar transit. Although there is less activity in the Barents Sea than in others, it is predicted to increase in future, due to the Barents Sea oil and gas exploration activities. For example, Tanker activity in the area is likely to increase by more than 100 %, especially for large oil and gas tankers (NMCE 2016a). The Coast Guard and research vessels are other important actors in the region, in addition to the fishing vessels. The domestic and international maritime transport industry accounts for approximately 2% (3700 people) of employment in the three northernmost counties.

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7.2.4.3 Marine Bioprospecting According to Norway’s 2009 strategy for marine bioprospecting, there are estimated to be over 10,000 species in the region that are understudied and unexplored. This wide variety of species indicate that there are prospects for finding marine organisms with unique biochemical traits and substances. The Government has promoted marine bioprospecting through its 2009 strategy. The Government allocated NOK 59 million in 2010 and NOK 54 million in 2011 to activities such as gathering marine organisms from the northern sea areas and further development of infrastructure and research. The Government’s goal is sustainable value creation, and commercialization of products derived from marine bioprospecting (NMCE 2016a) 7.2.4.4 The BaSR Forest The forest in the Barents region of the northern Norway covers an area of about 2.7 million hectares, which is approximately 19% of the country’s total forest area. However, only 1.1 million hectares of the forest is productive. Of the total, half of the productive forests in Northern Norway have been estimated to be economically non-operational due to difficult terrain and long transport distance. The productive forest is divided into more than 18,000 forest holdings of at least 2.5 hectares. However, the forestry and forest industry are much less important sources of livelihood in Northern Norway, with the forest sector only providing employment for about 700 people (Välkky et al. 2008). On the other hand, the forest forms the basis for a rich and diverse array of wildlife, providing various indirect benefits and ecosystem services. The forest is a renewable resource and has potential for producing renewable energy in the region.

7.2.5 Employment and Indirect Benefits The Barents Sea creates employment through different activities in Northern Norway. The fisheries sector (fishing, aquaculture and fish processing) provides employment for almost 5% of the labor force in North Norway, and is very important for maintaining settlement patterns. In addition, it generates a considerable number of jobs, for example, the supply, fish processing and fish transport industries (NMCE 2016a). The travel and tourism industry contributes 5% of the employment in Norway, with Northern Norway playing a significant role in generating both direct and indirect employment (WTTC 2015). The domestic and international maritime transport industry accounts for approximately 2% of employment in the three northernmost counties. According to the Bod Science Park report, there were 2210 people employed in the petroleum sector in the three most northern counties in 2015 (Nordland, Troms and Finmark). However, with increasing petroleum exploration activities, there is highly likely to be an increase in this form of employment. The Barents Sea offers several indirect benefits and services. These include: supporting services, such as maintenance of biodiversity and primary production, are necessary for the production of all other ecosystem services; regulating services, such as climate regulation and water purification; provisioning services, which are

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the products obtained from ecosystems, such as fish, shellfish and energy sources, and genetic resources that provide a basis for the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries; and cultural services, which provide non-material benefits in the form of recreation, aesthetic experience and a sense of place and identity.

7.3

 conomics of the Barents Sea Region from the Russian E Perspective

The Barents Sea Region comprises the Arkhangelsk and Murmansk Oblasts, the Republic of Karelia, and the Nenets Autonomous District. Its population (as of January 1, 2016) is 2.6 million. The economy of all these territories (subjects of the Russian Federation) is based on the development and use of natural resources, as well as the provision of transport services (primarily shipping). For example, the economy of the Murmansk Oblast is largely based on the local rich natural resource, including mainly mineral, hydrocarbon and marine bioresources. The main industries are the extraction of mineral and hydrocarbon resources (oil and gas, polymetals, and apatite and iron ore), and the development of forest resources (wood procurement and processing). Other important industries include fishing, shipping and shipbuilding. Each of the constituent entities in this region has a specialization of its own. Economic activities involving the development and use of marine resources of the Arctic basin prevail in the economy of the Murmansk Oblast. Yet the bulk of this economy includes the mining and metallurgical industries, followed by commercial fishing, fish processing, shipping, shipbuilding and ship repair. The economy of the Arkhangelsk Oblast is dominated by forestry, mining, shipping and, on a much smaller scale, fishing. The economy of the Nenets Autonomous District is characterized by a rapid development of the oil and gas sector (Russia’s only oil and gas platform operates offshore in the area). The major economic activities and the contribution of the Barents Sea is discussed below.

7.3.1 Fisheries Barents Sea fisheries play the greatest role in the Murmansk Oblast: its share in the gross regional product in 2001–2014 ranged from 9% to 15%. In 2015, fishing companies of the region caught 932,000 tons of aquatic bioresources. Of these, 679,400 tons were caught by companies of the Murmansk Oblast. These companies have a wide geography of operation, including not only Russia’s economic zone and continental shelf but also the economic zone of Norway, areas near Greenland, the Faroe Islands and the Svalbard archipelago, convention areas of the North-East and North-West Atlantic, and zones of African countries. Today, the fishing fleet of Russia’s Northern Basin mainly operates in the Barents Sea and other areas of the North-East Atlantic, where 80–90% of aquatic bioresources are caught. Catch volumes in the North-West Atlantic are insignificant compared to the North-East Atlantic (less than 1% in 2014), although recent years have

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seen an increase in catch volumes in central and southern fishing areas of the Atlantic (10–15%) (Jørgensen and Hønneland 2015). The catch of aquatic bioresources in the Barents Sea alone was about 400,000 tons in 1996, and 580,000 tons in 2016. These figures are much lower than those of the 1980s. For example, the average annual catch by companies from the Murmansk Oblast in 2000–2010 was 605,000 tons, which is approximately three times less than the average figure for the 1980s. In 2011–2014, the situation improved somewhat – the average catch reached 614,500 tons. The most important distinctive feature of the situation in the fishing industry in the Barents Sea region (the Northern Basin) is that it is in the process of continuous transformation and change. This refers not only to property rights to the main assets (ships, terminals and fish factories) but also fishing rules and relationship with the state (ranging from financial support measures to fishing quota allocation principles). These factors add to the uncertainty about the functioning and, especially, development of the industry. At the same time, it should be noted that IUU fishing has considerably decreased since the 1990s. One of the key economic factors is that the industry very quickly (during the first half of the 1990s) reoriented itself from supply predominantly to the domestic market to export. Between 2007 and 2014, domestic cod resources increased almost 2.5 times. The fishing is a professional occupation of the coastal population which has no other employment alternatives (Jacobsen and Ozhigin 2011; Vaisman 2002; Zilanov 2013).

7.3.1.1 Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission Norway and Russia are united in the North by common interests and various forms of political cooperation. Of special importance is the management of marine resources, which requires not only constant and consistent implementation of managerial decisions, but also permanent contact between the authorized bodies of the two countries (Jørgensen and Hønneland 2015). The Commission has been functioning for 40 years. Based on joint studies, it annually establishes total allowable catches (TACs) for cod, haddock, halibut, capelin, perch, herring and other fish in the Barents Sea. In addition, the Commission establishes national quotas for the catch of shared stocks for Russia, Norway and other nations. The Commission develops and adopts regulatory measures and gives recommendations to relevant bodies of the two countries for managing and controlling fishing in the Barents Sea. The Treaty between Norway and Russia concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean, which entered into force on July 7, 2011 states that ‘the Norwegian-Russian Joint Fisheries Commission shall continue to consider improved monitoring and control measures with respect to jointly managed fish stocks in accordance with the Agreements’. These are the Soviet-Norwegian agreement on cooperation in the fishing industry of April 11, 1975, and the Soviet-Norwegian Agreement Concerning mutual relations in the Field of Fisheries of October 15, 1976. Undoubtedly, fish stocks of the Barents Sea should be shared by the two delimited national regions. Peculiarities of fish migration in the sea basin (spawning grounds are in the eastern part, while habitats of adult fish are mainly in the western

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part, in the waters of the Spitsbergen Island) requires a joint, coordinated efforts of respective administrative government agencies of the two countries. The introduction and maintenance of a regime under which both countries could fish throughout the Barents Sea. This regime would also presuppose that one part of the TAC would be offered to other countries. In a situation where fish stocks of the Barents Sea were in a poor state and the parties were not able to agree on management issues and technical regulatory measures, Russia and Norway were forced to think in a new way (Jørgensen and Hønneland 2015). The bilateral mechanism for managing stocks is based on Russian-Norwegian cooperation in scientific research (Jacobsen and Ozhigin 2011).

7.3.2 Oil and Gas Resources Several oil and gas deposits have been discovered on the shelf of the Barents and Pechora Seas. The largest of them is the Shtokman gas condensate field, located in the central part of the Barents Sea (600 km from the city of Murmansk, with the depth of sea in the area varying from 320 m to 340 m).

7.3.2.1 Barents Sea Shelf The Gazprom company has repeatedly emphasized that the shelf of the Western Arctic has a high hydrocarbon potential, with non-associated gas prevailing. The discovery of the unique Shtokman gas condensate field (3.9 trillion cubic meters of category C1 gas reserves and 53.3 million tons of categories C1 and C2 condensate reserves) creates prerequisites for the formation of an offshore gas producing region. Other deposits with a high potential are located in the Pechora and Kara Seas (Dolginskoye, Prirazlomnoye, Ludlovskoye and Ledovoye, as well as offshore areas of the Semakovskoye, Krusensternskoye, Tota-Yakhinskoye, Antipayutinskoye and Kharasaveiskoye fields). It is the Gazprom group, namely Gazprom Neft, that now extracts hydrocarbons on the Arctic shelf, the only project of this kind in Russia. The work is conducted at the Prirazlomnoye oil field, located in the Pechora Sea 60 km from the shore. The initial recoverable oil reserves are estimated at over 70 million tons. The extraction is done with the help of the Prirazlomnaya offshore ice-resistant fixed platform, installed in 2011. The first well was drilled in the summer of 2013, and in December 2013 the Prirazlomnaya platform began producing oil. The project for developing the Prirazlomnoye field provides for commissioning 32 wells. By the end of November 2016, the platform had produced three million tons of oil. Oil is transported by two double-hulled ice-class (Arc6) oil tankers, the Kirill Lavrov and the Mikhail Ulyanov. Both were built at the Admiralty Shipyards, St. Petersburg, to ensure the year-round safe transportation of oil from the platform under Arctic conditions. The first oil was shipped from the field in April 2014, and the new sort of crude has been named Arctic Oil (ARCO) (Neftegaz.ru 2016).

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7.3.2.2 Pechora Sea Shelf The expansion of oil production in the northern part of the Timan-Pechora oil and gas province in the 1990-2000s was the result of Soviet-era achievements in geological prospecting, the booking of reserves, and aggressive corporate strategies, especially that of Lukoil (oil production in the Nenets Autonomous District in the 1990s was only 1.2 million tons, or 7.6% of the production in the Timan-Pechora oil and gas province, whereas in 2007 production reached 13.6 million tons, or 52.9%). [...] The low infrastructure level of the northern part of the Timan-Pechora oil and gas province ultimately led to the domination of large vertically integrated corporations, primarily Lukoil (as of 2007, the company accounted for 49.7% of all production, and when the Yuzhno-Khylchuyuskoye field reaches the design capacity, it will ensure up to 70% of oil production in the district; the company has the most developed pipeline system in the region, its own export marine terminal, Varandey, and a major control center in Naryan-Mar) and Rosneft (in 2007 it accounted for 39.5% of all oil production in the Nenets Autonomous District) (Anonymous 2010). Lukoil has completed the construction of a unique ice-resistance marine terminal in the Pechora Sea (the Varandey oil export terminal) with a capacity of up to 12 million tons per year, capable of accommodating ships with a displacement of up to 70,000 tons and ensuring direct shipments of oil from the Nenets Autonomous District to world markets. The company has also formed a fleet of ice-class tankers for the transportation of oil from the Timan-Pechora oil and gas province, and is much closer than other players to the creation of an integrated system of inter-field pipelines. Rosneft in 2003 acquired 100% of the Severnaya Neft company. In the 1990–2000s, several joint ventures operated simultaneously in the northern part of the Timan-Pechora oil and gas province (in close proximity to the Pechora Sea coast). These ventures involved the United States’ ConocoPhillips, France’s Total and Norway’s Statoil (this refers, above all, to the development of the Kharyaga oil field under production sharing agreements). As a result, there are now four oil production centers in the Nenets Autonomous District, which use three main non-overlapping routes for transporting oil  – the northern route (Varandey) and two southern routes (Kharyaga-Usinsk and Val Gamburtseva field-Salyukinskaya booster pipeline pumping station). The Timan-Pechora oil and gas province is one of the fastest-developing oil production centers. Rosneft and Lukoil are jointly implementing a project to develop the Trebs and Titov oil fields, the largest in the region. Their peak oil production, expected to be achieved by 2020, is estimated at 4.8 million tons per year (Bashneft.ru 2017). The extraction of hydrocarbons in the Nenets Autonomous District is gradually shifting farther and farther to the north – to the Arctic coast of the Pechora Sea. This factor assigns a greater role to the maritime transport infrastructure in delivering oil to markets outside the region (the Varandey port). Much effort is also made to intensify hydrocarbon production at previously commissioned fields. 7.3.2.3 Prospects Companies developing oil and gas fields on the Pechora Sea shelf and the Yamal peninsula transport hydrocarbons from the fields to marine terminals on the coast or on the shelf and then to terminals in Kola Peninsula bays (in Murmansk, the Kola

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Bay, and the Pechenga Bay). Terminals in Kola Peninsula bays are export terminals. There hydrocarbons are loaded on to large tankers or gas carriers for export. According to reports (Bambulyak 2005), these terminals pose the risk of polluting the Barents Sea with oil products during transshipment. The terminals include the Varandey terminal, the Prirazlomnoye field, the Kolguyev terminal, the Indiga port, Teriberka, and terminals in Murmansk, the Kola Bay and the Pechenga Bay. Not all oil and gas projects are implemented equally intensively, as priority is given to projects for extracting oil and producing liquefied gas (above all, in offshore areas of the Barents and Pechora seas). The implementation of large offshore gas projects, such as the development of the Shtokman field, has been postponed. Earlier, three major companies – Gazprom (51% of shares), Total S.A. (25%) and Statoil ASA (24%)  – established Shtokman Development AG to develop the Shtokman gas condensate field on the shelf, whose reserves, estimated at 3.9 trillion cubic meters, would be enough to meet the world’s demand for gas for a year. The consortium was named the owner and operator of the infrastructure of the first phase of the Shtokman project for a period of 25 years from the time of the field’s commissioning. However, in 2010 it was announced that the development would be postponed due to a decrease in the demand for gas and the reduction of Gazprom’s investment program. Earlier, the decreased demand for gas had caused Gazprom to postpone the commissioning of its first major project on the Yamal Peninsula – the Bovanenkovskoye field with a potential yield of 115 billion cubic meters of gas per year  – until 2012. On July 1, 2012, the Shtokman Development AG agreement expired. Statoil returned its shares to Gazprom and wrote off about U.S. $335 million of investment in the project. Much hope for the implementation of this project was pinned on the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Oblasts. If implemented, the project would have not only created prerequisites for more sustainable energy supply to the economies of these regions but also fundamentally changed the structure of their economies and revenues. Currently, there is no certainty as to when the project will be implemented. The reasons for that include high costs, an impeded access to subsea production technologies, and a relative overcapacity of gas production in the country. It should be noted that many oil and gas production projects have been considered and implemented with the active participation of foreign companies. For example, Statoil has shares in several oil and gas projects in Russia, both onshore and offshore. Most of them are implemented jointly with Rosneft (vedomosti.ru 2017).

7.3.3 Transportation The Barents Sea Basin is one of the largest sea transport regions in Russia. It hosts the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk commercial ports. The directions of sea transport flows depend on the following two factors: (a) export of mineral, hydrocarbon and forest resources from Russia to various countries of the world; (b) transportation of cargoes along the Northern Sea Route  – both eastward (from Murmansk and Arkhangelsk to the mouths of Siberian rivers and the sites of major projects in the

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mineral and hydrocarbon sector) and westward (export of oil, gas condensate, LNG, and polymetallic ore from Norilsk to Pechenga and Zapolyarny). The transformation of the Northern Sea Route into an international transport artery between Western Europe and Asia-Pacific countries has been discussed for a long time. However, the number of transit voyages has not been great so far. The reasons for that include not only the undeveloped infrastructure along the route (from the point of view of navigation and emergency prevention and response) but also other requirements (for example, mandatory icebreaker support). The Murmansk Commercial Seaport is the largest port in the region. The current situation is characterized by a significant change in the structure of cargoes and delivery destinations. In 2016, for example, coastal shipping placed second after export in the structure of the port’s freight turnover. One of the factors behind this was a significant increase in the transshipment of crushed stone in the direction of the port of Sabetta8 (transshipment from the Norwegian port of Kirkenes), where the construction of infrastructure for the oil and gas industry continued.9 Another kind of “unusual” cargo was brought by the ship Wilson Nice in 2016. It delivered about 8000 tons of iron ore mined at one of the largest deposits in the north of Sweden and loaded onto the ship in the Norwegian port of Narvik. If this logistics chain proves effective, voyages from Narvik to Murmansk may become regular.10 The freight turnover of the Murmansk Commercial Seaport in 2015 exceeded 14.5 million tons. The main type of cargo handled by the port is still coal. The volume of coal transshipment for export in 2015 was 13.6 million tons.11 The Arkhangelsk Commercial Seaport placed second in the volume of cargo handled: its turnover in 2016 stood at 1.6 million tons (including 0.5 million tons of timber exports, one million tons of coastal cargo, and 0.06 million tons of imports).12 In total, operators of sea terminals in the Arctic Basin in 2016 transshipped 49.7 million tons of cargo, which is 40.6% more than in 2015. The volume of dry cargo transshipment increased to 26.6 million tons (+6.6%), and liquid cargo to 23.1 million tons (by 2.2 times). The total freight turnover of ports (including commercial ports and terminals of individual companies) increased to: 33.4 million tons (by 1.5 times) in Murmansk, 8 million tons (+21.6%) in Varandey, and 1.2 million tons (+1.6%) in Dudinka. Cargo transshipment decreased in the port of Arkhangelsk to 2.6 million tons (−31.0%) and Kandalaksha to 0.8 million tons (−3.4%) (Livejournal 2016). The growth in freight turnover is due to the increase in the shipment of ore, building materials and hydrocarbons. This factors affect the environment of ports. 8  The Arctic port of Sabetta and the Yamal LNG plant are priority projects for creating an LNG production center in Russia with a capacity of 16.5 million tons per year, based on the YuzhnoTambeyskoye gas field on the Yamal Peninsula. Leading enterprises of the Murmansk Oblast actively participate in the project, taking advantage of the port infrastructure (http://www.portmurmansk.ru/ru/press/news/?section=full&id=3102). 9  http://www.portmurmansk.ru/ru/press/news/?section=full&id=3116 10  http://www.portmurmansk.ru/ru/press/news/?section=full&id=3115 11  http://www.portmurmansk.ru/ru/press/news/?section=full&id=3052 12  http://www.ascp.ru/htm/2.htm

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According to the Survey of the state of the Environment and Environmental Pollution in the Russian Federation for 2015, prepared by Russia’s Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring (Roshydromet), “the content of petroleum hydrocarbons in the area of the Murmansk Commercial Seaport during the year changed essentially. In January, the maximum permissible concentration (MPC) of petroleum hydrocarbons was exceeded by 3.4 times, and in March by 11 times. During the rest of the year, the concentration of petroleum hydrocarbons decreased sharply (Roshydromet 2016, p. 137). Other major pollutants are iron and copper, and there are high concentrations of pesticides, ammonium nitrogen, and manganese in water. The most polluted is the Kola Bay near Murmansk. On the other hand, the greatest interest is the development of the Northern Sea Route as a transit international sea artery. As noted above, its future depends not only on the development of infrastructure and emergency prevention and response services along the route (Marchenko 2012), but also on a navigation regime that Russia is ready to establish for foreign ships. The Federation Council (the upper house of the Russian Parliament) pointed out in June 2016 that “at the turn of the 1980s/1990s, up to eight million tons of various cargoes were transported annually along the Northern Sea Route. To date, more than half of the 50-plus ports and berths have stopped operating.13 In August 2016, the Russian government approved “the Action Plan for Implementing the Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and Ensuring National Security for the Period to 2020.” The plan attaches special importance to the safety of navigation and the development of the necessary infrastructure.

7.3.4 Mining Industry The mining sector – the extraction of minerals - has been developing the fastest in the Murmansk Oblast, the Arkhangelsk Oblast (diamond mining) and the Nenets Autonomous District (extraction of hydrocarbons, coal and iron ore).

7.3.4.1 Kola Peninsula The Murmansk Oblast is one of the leading regions in Russia and, possibly, the world for the extraction and smelting of nickel and polymetallic ores and the extraction of apatite ores (raw material for obtaining phosphate fertilizers). The largest ore mining and smelting centers are located near Russia’s borders with Finland and Norway and not far from Barents Sea bays. The Kola Mining and Metallurgical Company (KMMC) is the leading enterprise in the Murmansk Oblast. It is a division of Norilsk Nickel, which produces sulphide copper-nickel ores and non-ferrous metals. Copper and nickel production on the Kola Peninsula was launched in the 1930s. The Kola Mining and Metallurgical Company was established on November 16, 1998. It was founded by two local subsidiaries of Norilsk Nickel: Pechenganickel and Severonickel mining and 13

 http://www/vedomosti/ru/politics/news/2015/06/26 [Rus. Ed.].

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metallurgical combines. The KMMC is the main employer for residents of the towns of Zapolyarny, Monchegorsk and Nikel, where the company’s production facilities (town-forming enterprises) are located. Every third resident of working age in the area works for the company. KMMC plants produce electrolytic nickel and copper, carbonyl nickel powders, cobalt concentrate and precious metal concentrates.14 As of December 31, 2012, the number of personnel employed at KMMC enterprises stood at 12,462.15 In 2010, KMMC enterprises produced 111,318 tons of commercial nickel, 56,378 tons of copper, and 2548 tons of cobalt. Metallurgical workshops in Nikel and Zapolyarny started production in the 1930s. For decades, they annually emitted more than 100,000 tons of sulfur dioxide (SO2). Until the 1970s, the plants used local ore with a sulfur content of about 6.5%, but in 1971 the plant started receiving Siberian ore from Norilsk, which had a sulfur content of almost 30%. This led to a sharp increase in sulfur dioxide emissions. In 1979, annual emissions reached about 400,000 tons [30]. To date, the level of emissions by Pechenganickel is lower than in the 1980s, yet the concentration of sulfur dioxide is still above the critical level. Since 1998 (the year of the company’s foundation), KMMC specialists have implemented several projects at Zapolyarny and Nikel, which allowed reducing sulfur dioxide emissions from 188,000 to 119,700 tons in 2016. The scale of the company’s impact on the regional environment can be seen from the fact that “in 2008, for example, sulfur dioxide emissions by Pechenganickel alone were 20% higher than sulfur dioxide emissions in the whole of Finland and approximately five to six times higher than gross emissions of sulfur dioxide in Norway” (Bronder et al. 2010). The main problem is outdated ore dressing and smelting technologies, which lead to the significant emissions of sulfur dioxide into the atmosphere and the contamination of the ground and water resources with heavy metals. Measures to fundamentally improve the environment require much time and investment. A closure or even temporary shutdown of these industries would be a difficult decision as they are the main employers for people living in nearby monotowns.

7.4

Concluding Remarks

7.4.1 C  ontribution of the Barents Sea Region to the Coastal Communities The Barents Sea Region has been important for people’s livelihoods in Norwegian and Russian coastal communities for centuries and this has largely been based on the use of natural resources (both renewable and nonrenewable). In addition, the Barents Sea has also provided different socioeconomic and ecosystem services to the communities. Traditionally, hunting, fishing and reindeer herding were the main  http://www.kolagmk.ru/about/info  http://www.kolagmk.ru/news/2013-01-24/obespechennost-personalom-na-kolskoy-gmk-v2012-godu-sostavila-98.html [Rus. Ed.]. 14

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activities (Hoel 2009), but now the Barents Sea has become the ’sea of Norwegian economy’ due to its commercialization and industrialization. In addition to the contribution to coastal communities, the share of Barents Sea contribution in the Norwegian economy is increasing, due to fishing and aquaculture, mining of oil and gas and maritime and tourism industries. These industries have created both direct and indirect employment in the region.

7.4.2 Sustainable Management of Renewable Resources The Barents Sea and the region is rich in natural renewable resources, including the fisheries and forest resources, coral reefs and marine animals and their diversity. In particular, the fisheries have been the key resource in the Barents Sea, and are one of the best-managed examples in the world. Some of the important commercial stocks, such as haddock, Northeast Atlantic cod and capelin, are shared by the Norway and Russia and other neighboring nations. Despite disputes over several issues, the Barents Sea stock is jointly managed by the two countries. The quota is set jointly through the Joint Norwegian–Russian Fisheries Commission every year. Furthermore, the commercial stocks are regulated through quotas and licensing. Despite this, there has been increasing conflict between different actors in the fishing industry, oil and gas industry and tourism industry. For example, the majority of the coastal fisheries on the north are more vulnerable due to oil pollution and the loss of traditional fishing areas due to the discoveries and production of oil and gas. This requires that conservation and utilization of the natural resources, in collaboration with the coastal communities in the region, should be emphasized. Local communities’ participation in the natural resource management should be increased for sustainable management.

7.4.3 Associated Costs and Externalities All or most of the economic activities have consequences and externalities. The oil and gas industries could have a serious impact in the fisheries and aquaculture, by impacting the Barents Sea ecosystem and biodiversity. An oil spill from a shipping accident could be disastrous for the marine ecosystem and the natural resources. Similarly, fishing activities can damage the coral reefs, habitats, species and biodiversity. The fishing vessels leave physical litter. The plastic litter from the fishing and aquaculture industries is the litter most frequently found on the beaches and ocean beds. Plastic litter could be a threat to birds and marine mammals. Maritime industries, such as shipping, could increase air pollution in the region, for example, through releases of nitrogen and Sulphur oxides, and could disturb the delicate ecological balance in the arctic by transporting and spreading alien species. Tourism and recreational activities could also increase pollution, for example, through transport and emissions, noise, solid waste, littering and disturbances to the birds and mammals in the coastal areas. These activities could increase the associated cost of management of the Barents region.

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7.4.4 M  ining and Maritime Industries and Consequences for Environment There is increasing anthropogenic encroachment in the Barents Sea Region due to the increased discoveries of the oil and gas resources and expansion of maritime industries. In terms of production, the Barents Sea will grow considerably and could contribute to as much as 15% of total Norwegian production by the end of the next decade. The exploration activities not only affect the marine environment but also the coastal communities. The potential consequences will be large for any accidents that happens in the areas of special importance such as the marginal ice zone and coastal waters (NMCE 2016b). On the other hand, the changing climate is becoming favorable to the mining and maritime industries due to the melting ice. This further damages the environment. A good planning and precautionary policy is important for minimizing environmental damage in the Barents Sea and the region.

7.4.5 Search for Ways to Solve Environmental Problems The search for approaches solving environmental problems posed by the mining industry has continued for more than 40 years. Possible solutions have been discussed at various levels, ranging from intergovernmental to interregional level. For example, the project ‘joint Ecogeochemical Mapping and Monitoring in Scale of 1.1 Million in the West Murmansk Oblast and Contiguous Areas of Finland and Norway,’ abbreviated to “Kola Ecogeochemistry,” was initiated in 1991 as cooperation between the Central Kola Expedition (CKE) and Geological Surveys of Finland (GTK) and Norway (NGU) (Reimann et al. 1997). Prime Ministers Nikolai Ryzhkov and Gro Harlem Bruntland signed Soviet-­ Norwegian Environmental Agreement, which established a joint Soviet-Norwegian Environmental Commission, in Oslo in January 1988. At the intergovernmental level, there is a unanimous understanding of the need to solve pressing problems. Moreover, the Russian government has repeatedly reiterated its readiness to offer the corporation privileges and preferences that would facilitate the implementation of necessary decisions. At the same time, the solution of the problems was impeded by the corporation’s formation based on previously established enterprises in the new (market) economic conditions. International law distinguishes the following sources of marine pollution: land-­ based sources and activities; sea transportation and other activities, such as fishing and aquaculture; dumping; seabed activities; and atmospheric sources. Ecologists name the economic and industrial development of the Arctic as the main cause of all environmental problems in the region. The Arctic suffers not only from oil but also from contamination with heavy metals, persistent organic pollutants and radioactive substances (Tables 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5).

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Table 7.1  Contributions of Individual Industries to GRP of the Barents Sea Region in 2014 (%) Territory Murmansk Oblast Arkhangelsk Oblast Republic of Karelia Nenets Autonomous District

Fishing 8.2 1.0 0.7 0.6

Extraction of mineral and hydrocarbon resources 10.8 20.6 19.3 74.3

Transport and communication 13.6 14.3 15.4 2.9

Note: The Gross Regional Product contribution is higher from the Nenets Autonomous District and the contribution from the fishing industry is higher in the Murmansk Oblast. The transport industry contribution is Murmansk Oblast, Arkhangelsk Oblast and Republic of Karelia Source: Rosstat (2015)

Table 7.2  Total catch of aquatic bioresources in the Barents and Norwegian Seas (ICES Areas I and II) in 1992–2011 Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Russia 000’ tons 813.2 676.6 542.7 578.6 618.8 667.0 578.2 645.5 737.9 823.0 867.2 741.0 631.9 670.0 647.3 601.0 610.1 745.9 828.7

% 34.8 32.4 27.6 24.6 23.5 23.8 23.0 21.4 23.5 28.5 28.9 25.6 24.7 28.7 28.9 26.1 24.3 25.7 25.9

Norway 000’ tons 1381.1 1292.9 1228.3 1338.0 1476.1 1615.7 1463.5 1414.1 1533.5 1511.5 1526.1 1363.8 1362.9 1175.9 1190.8 1357.3 1523.4 1795.4 1855.9

% 59.2 61.9 62.4 56.8 56.1 57.6 58.1 47.0 48.8 52.3 50.8 47.2 53.3 50.4 53.2 58.9 60.7 61.9 58.0

Other countries 000’ tons % 139.6 6.0 118.6 5.7 198.7 10.1 438.2 18.6 536.7 20.4 520.7 18.6 475.1 18.9 950.8 31.6 871.1 27.7 554.0 19.2 608.5 20.3 787.3 27.2 562.6 22.0 488.7 20.9 401.0 17.9 346.1 15.0 375.2 15.0 357.2 12.3 515.1 16.1

Total 000’ tons 2,333.9 2,088.2 1,969.7 2,354.8 2,631.7 2,803.4 2,516.7 3,010.4 3,142.5 2,888.4 3,001.8 2,892.1 2,557.5 2,334.5 2,239.1 2,508.8 2,508.8 2,898.5 3,199.7

Source: Zilanov (2013) Table 7.3  Catch of aquatic bioresources by territories of the Northern Basin in 2015

Territory Murmansk Oblast Arkhangelsk Oblast Republic of Karelia Nenets Autonomous District Source: Zilanov (2016)

Thousand tons 679.4 157.9 80.5 14.2

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Table 7.4  Pollutant Emissions by Industrial Enterprises of Murmansk Oblast in 2000-2015 Air pollutants (000 tons) Emitted by stationary sources Including manufacturing plants Extraction of minerals and hydrocarbons

Years 2000 373.3

2011 263.1 161.2 24.4

2012 258.9 163.2 23.1

2013 269.8 176.3 23.8

2014 276.4 178.8 24.8

2015 275.8 182.1 24.4

Source: Murmanskstat (2016) Table 7.5  Summary of main points The BaSR has a long history of industrial scale resource development World class fisheries have long been the dominant industry, but other industries are of increasing importance Norway and Russia have a history of effective cooperation in the region Rapid biophysical changes are raising new challenges for economic cooperation in the BaSR

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Livejournal (2016) Cargo turnover at Russian seaports in the 12 months of 2016. http://nortwolfsam.livejournal.com/1843559.html. Retrieved 21.06.2017 Magnussen K (2012) Marine ecosystem services in the Barents Sea and Lofoten Islands, a scoping assessment Socio-economic importance of ecosystem services in the Nordic countries. In: Synthesis in the context of The Economics Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB), Nordic Council of Ministers, Copenhagen TemaNord, vol. 559, pp 262–267 Marchenko N (2012) Russian Arctic seas: navigational conditions and accidents. Springer, Berlin Michalsen K, Dalpadado P, Eriksen E, Gjøsæter H, Ingvaldsen RB, Johannesen E et  al (2013) Marine living resources of the Barents Sea–ecosystem understanding and monitoring in a climate change perspective. Mar Biol Res 9(9):932–947 Murmanskstat (2016) Statistical yearbook 2015/Federal State Statistics Service. Murmansk Oblast Office of the Federal State Statistics Service (Murmanskstat), Murmansk [Rus. Ed.] Neftegaz.ru (2016) Gazprom Neft produced on Prirazlomnoye three millionth ton of oil. http://neftegaz.ru/news/view/155797-Gazprom-neft-dobyla-na-Prirazlomnom-mestorozhdenii-3-millionnuyu-tonnu-nefti. Retrieved 21 June 2017, 2016 [Rus. Ed.] NMCE (2016a) Meld. St. 7 (2011-2012) Report to the Storting (white paper), The High North: visions and strategies. Norwegian Ministry of Climate and Environment NMCE (2016b) Meld. St. 20 (2014–2015) Report to the Storting (white paper). Update of the integrated management plan for the Barents Sea Lofoten area including an update of the delimitation of the marginal ice zone. Norwegian Ministry of Climate and Environment North Energy (2012) Slik kan Barentshavet se ut i 2030 (This is how the Barents Sea can be seen in 2030). https://www.tu.no/artikler/slik-kan-barentshavet-se-ut-i-2030/235068. Retrieved 7 August 2017 NPI (2017) Barents Sea. http://www.npolar.no/en/the-arctic/the-barents-sea/. Retrieved 2017-05-04 O’Brien K, Tompkins H, Eriksen S, Prestrud P (2004) Climate vulnerability in the Barents Sea Ecoregion: a multi-stressor approach. Report Center for International Climate and Environmental Research-Oslo (CICERO), Oslo, p 35 Reimann C, Ayras M, Chekushin VA, Bogatyrev I, Boyd R, Caritat PD, et al (1997) Environmental geochemical atlas of the central Barents region Roshydromet (2016) Survey of the state of the environment and environmental pollution in the Russian Federation for 2015. Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring (Roshydromet), Moscow, p 204 [Rus. ed.] Rosstat (2015) Regions of Russia. Rosstat (Russian Federal State Statistics Service), Moscow (Rus. Ed.). Russian Federal State Statistics Service, Moscow, p 482 Statistics Norway (2016) Akvakultur, 2015, endelige tall. http://www.ssb.no/jord-skog-jaktog-%20fiskeri/statistikker/fiskeoppdrett/aar/2016-10-28. Retrieved 5 May 2017 Vaisman AL (2002) Fishing in the Fog. Fishing and trade in fish products in the Russian part of the Bering Sea. – Traffic-WWF, p 69 [Rus. Ed.] Välkky E, Nousiainen H, Karjalainen T (2008) Facts and figures of the Barents forest sector. Technical report, Working papers of the Finnish Forest Research Institute, Helsinki. vedomosti.ru (2017) Statoil has recognized the impact of anti-Russian sanctions on its business in Russia. http://www.vedomosti.ru/business/news/2017/03/17/681692-statoil-vliyanie-sanktsii. Retrieved 21.06.2017 [Rus. Ed.] WTTC (2015) Travel and tourism economic impact 2015. WTTC, Harlequin Building 65 Southwark Street London, SE1 0HR United Kingdom WWF (2003) Barents Sea – a sea of opportunities and threats. WWF, Norway Zilanov VK (2013) Is Russia losing the Arctic? Algoritm, Moscow, pp 37–38 [Rus. Ed.] Zilanov VK (2016) Prospects for the development of fisheries of the Northern Basin in changing conditions. Publishing House of the Murmansk State University for the Humanities, Murmansk [Rus. Ed.]

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The Barents Sea Region in a Human Security Perspective Ole Øvretveit, Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv, Maria Goes, Elena Kudryashova, Rauna Kuokkanen, and Maksim Zadorin

Abstract

The Barents Sea Region (BaSR) is a dynamic and complex region that acts as a meeting place for both states and peoples. Using a human security lens, this chapter reveals some of the stories of the people of the BaSR as a home to multiple ethnicities and nationalities, to large cities and small communities. The region’s relevance to current geopolitics is significant, where Norway, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), borders the Russian Federation. This geopolitical relevance, though important, does not define the region or relations among peoples. Indeed, the region is also well known for very good relations between Russian and Norwegian peoples from the times of the Pomor trade to the present. Overlapping these dynamics are the continuous struggles of Indigenous peoples to maintain and develop their own societies and political institutions. The Sámi people have experienced various forms of colonization on both the Norwegian and Russian sides of the borders. Over time, Sámi O. Øvretveit (*) Arctic Frontiers, Tromsø, Norway e-mail: [email protected] G. H. Gjørv Critical Peace and Conflict Studies, UiT – The Arctic University of Norway, Harstad, Norway M. Goes Barents Institute, UiT – The Arctic University of Norway, Harstad, Norway E. Kudryashova Northern Arctic Federal University, Arkhangelsk, Russia R. Kuokkanen Arctic Indigenous Studies, University of Lapland, Rovaniemi, Finland M. Zadorin Department of International Law and Comparative Law, Northern Arctic Federal University, Arkhangelsk, Russia © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 O. R. Young et al. (eds.), Governing Arctic Seas: Regional Lessons from the Bering Strait and Barents Sea, Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25674-6_8

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rights have increased, as has access to governance structures, though to different degrees depending on Russian or Norwegian state policies. Intertwined within these relations of power between states, and between states and peoples, is the extensive natural resource wealth of the region from fisheries to oil and gas. The combination of all of these dynamics make the region unique to the Arctic setting.

8.1

An Introduction to the Barents Sea Region

As defined in this book, the Barents Sea Region or BaSR (see Fig. 1.2) is a marine area lying largely to the north of the northernmost coast of Norway and the north coast of the northwestern part of Russia.1 This region’s coastal fringe is populated by both Indigenous peoples and other local populations including Norwegians, Russians, and Kvens (Finnish origin) among others.2 The name “Barents” was assigned to this area in the nineteenth century in honour of the Dutch explorer and navigator Willem Barentsz. It was known previously as the “Murman” (Norwegian) Sea by the Russians. The Barents Sea Region, including the coastal zone, has additionally been characterized as Fennoscandia – representing the region’s unique geological traits as well as cultural linkages between the northern sectors of Sweden, Norway and Finland, and neighbouring parts of Russia (the Republic of Karelia, Murmansk Oblast and parts of Leningrad Oblast). For the region’s Indigenous peoples and especially the Sámi, however, these permutations of regional identity as “Barents” may have far less meaning than a vision of the region as Sámiland or Sápmi. It is important to draw a clear distinction between the BaSR and the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR). Established under the terms of the 1993 Kirkenes Declaration on Cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, the BEAR encompasses the northernmost counties and oblasts of Norway, Sweden, Finland, and the northwestern part of the Russian Federation (Kirkenes Declaration 1993). With a human population of ~5.5, the BEAR has become a focus of attention among both national and regional policymakers in the four countries led by the efforts of the Regional Council including representatives of regional governments and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council including representatives of the national governments. The Barents Sea Region, the main focus of this chapter, is a subset of the BEAR. All the human communities of the BaSR are included within the Barents Euro-Arctic Region. But the BEAR covers areas and human communities that lie outset the boundaries of the BaSR. All these regional monikers, including Sápmi/Samiland, reflect the dynamism of this place and its peoples: lived experiences and the meaning of this region differ significantly. As such, what is included in the Barents Sea Region requires  We refer to “Russian Federation” and “Russia” interchangeably.  By “local population” we refer to the many other ethnic but non-Indigenous communities in the region. 1 2

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additional specification. The total human population of the BaSR is ~1.6 million living both to the west and to the east of the international boundary between Norway and Russia. Unlike the Bering Strait Region, the BaSR contains sizable cities, including Tromsø in Norway with a population of ~75,000 and Murmansk in Russia with a population of ~300,000. Archangel (Arkangelsk), an even larger city with a population of ~350,000, is located at the southeastern corner of the region. Although the region includes a sizable number of Indigenous residents, a large majority of the people living in the BaSR are non-Indigenous local populations. Overall, the BaSR stands out, especially in contrast to the Bering Strait Region (see Chap. 4), as a developed area that encompasses large communities and modern industries and that is an area of intense concern to national governments in Oslo and Moscow. As such the Barents Sea Region has innumerable stories to tell. To capture a comprehensive picture of the BaSR requires multiple voices, multiple chapters. Here, we are able to examine a few of these stories in light of human security perspectives in the region. We use human security as a lens into the region to illustrate the ways in which the apparently “smallest” (individual-based) relationships can have meaning for the survival of everyday life and further impact the “bigger picture” of the region and beyond.

8.2

The Barents Sea Region in Context

Some analysts think of the BaSR as part of the “Old North,” a description meant to differentiate the area from other parts of the Arctic and to signal the longstanding integration of the region into the national economic and social systems of Norway and Russia. In this regard, the contrast between the BaSR and the BeSR is striking. The BaSR is geopolitically sensitive. Four North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) member states border the Russian Federation (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Norway). Norway’s border with Russia is located in the Arctic in the Barents Sea Region region. This border has played a significant role in the history of the BaSR, where for over 40 years the border extending into the Barents Sea was contested until Norway and Russian negotiated the 2010 boundary delimitation treaty (Hoel 2012; see also Chap. 9). The region is home to the Russian Northern Fleet and nuclear installations on the Kola Peninsula (Baev 2009; Sergunin and Konyshev 2014). On the opposite side of the border are NATO cooperative radar stations in the otherwise small, unassuming towns of Vardø and Vadsø (Higgins 2017). If this sounds like the perfect recipe for Cold War posturing, it is not. The Norwegian city of Kirkenes is approximately 11 km from the Russian border. Around 10% of its population is Russian, and street signs in the city center are in both Norwegian (Latin alphabet) and Russian (Cyrillic alphabet). This is also the region where many people continue to have a strong sense of collaboration and support based on a powerful history dating from WWII, when Russian troops supported Norwegian citizens who were devastated by the German occupation, and where Norwegians supported partisan efforts in Russia (Myklebost and Nielsen 2014).

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The BaSR is a region where people for all intents and purposes boast about “people to people” cooperation. Since 2008 there has existed an open border area between Russia and Norway ensuring that local people with special visas can cross with relative ease (Novikova 2015). The relationship between Russia and Norway is often framed in positive terms. People’s relationships provide a counterpoint to geopolitical concerns. Overlapping the traditional “state-based” security concerns are also the interests of peoples who view the region on a different map, where Sámiland has greater meaning than the nationalities of dominant ethnicities and states.

8.3

 he Barents Sea Region Through the Lens of Human T Security

The complexity of populations and nations in the BaSR is reflected in differing “security” perspectives, ranging from national and regional to local and individual, from the geopolitical to the human. Security is the perception and/or feeling of no worries, to put it most simply. It is not a concept relegated to only the state, and indeed, the BaSR demonstrates the importance of the concept at the human level. The nuances and variation of locally lived experiences justify a focus on the human security perspective in the BaSR. Already when comparing different parts of the region, the differences in security become apparent. The Norwegian-Russian border in the BaSR has the distinction of having one of the largest differences in standard of living depending on which side of the border one lives. In and of itself, this is an indication of the relevance and importance of human security perspectives in the region. Arctic security ranges from state-protection, military-based security perceptions, to economic, energy, and environmental security including consequences of climate change (Berkman and Vylegzhanin 2012; Hoogensen Gjørv et al. 2014; Hoogensen Gjørv et al. forthcoming). The security of communities, human security, adds an additional layer of security concerns emanating from different Arctic communities and populations that intersect with economy, energy, and the environment, as well as traditional state security concerns. Arctic security cannot be understood as separate from broader global politics, trends, and claims to security. Human security perspectives make visible differing individual and community perspectives around economic, food, health, personal, political, environmental and group identity/community security (UNDP 1994). These perspectives can complement each other across communities, or embody competing perspectives as different communities may see their survival in different priorities. Likewise between individuals/communities and states – at times the perspectives may complement one another, but not always. As such, human security helps illuminate who the different actors/ peoples/states are, and the power dynamics among actors in the region and expose who decides whose security perspective dominates (Hoogensen Gjørv 2017). Human security therefore makes visible the intersections of security in the Arctic as a lens through which to understand current and future trends in governance and security from the state to individual levels. It can provide interesting insights into the challenges that BaSR communities, industries, and governance structures experience.

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Our focus in this chapter is what we call “bottom-up,” focusing on the different peoples that make up the BaSR. Human security has been increasingly reflective of bottom-up approaches with a sensitivity to multiple identities that exist and interact within a particular space or geography. As such, an “intersectional” approach is useful in further understanding of human security, recognizing the relevance of diverse identities and perspectives of security, and the power dynamics between them. An intersectional approach with a focus on gender is particularly relevant in a region where the power dynamics and access to tools of security differ greatly between peoples (Kuokkanen and Sweet forthcoming). Intersectionality makes visible the practices or experiences of people of color, Indigenous people, non-white-centric ethnicities and cultures, or those with differing experiences based on age, class, sexuality, and ability (Kuokkanen and Sweet forthcoming; Marfelt 2016) who are otherwise often excluded in debates about security. Coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw in the late 1980s (Crenshaw 1991), the term intersectionality was designed to critically assess the intersection between race and gender. While a human security lens is most often applied to contexts of the global south, dynamics in the Arctic region also serve to illustrate the purchase and utility of a human security perspective. The BaSR is a unique space populated with peoples claiming and representing various if not multiple identities, interacting with a rich, dynamic natural environment around them. As such, it is important to consider the relationships people have to the environment, to economies, and to energy – all three of which play an important role in security perspectives both locally and regionally. Environmental perspectives of security, ranging from state level perceptions to human security, play an important part in the Arctic security picture, combining extensive natural resources with an increasingly fragile environment due to the impacts of climate change. The meaning of environmental security ranges from the importance of protecting natural resources for the security of the state to protecting the environment for human security (human well-being), to protecting ecosystems for their own sake (Dalby 2014). Environmental security focuses on communities identifying threats to their existence and lifestyles, and their capacities to mitigate or adapt to these threats as needed, in concert with other actors from the state, to industry, NGOs, and civilian populations (Hoogensen Gjørv et al. 2014). The human security literature has enhanced our understanding of environmental security by taking a “bottom-up” perspective that prioritizes individuals and communities over the state. Environmental security thus has gravitated toward a better understanding of the relationships between human communities and their natural surroundings, and the ways in which human beings are dependent upon a thriving and diverse environment (O’Brien et al. 2010). Energy security is equally relevant in Arctic settings, not least in the BaSR. It reflects some of the earlier iterations of environmental security, insofar as it embodies the important role of natural resources to the security of the state. Cherp and Jewell (2014: 415) refer to the practice of understanding energy security through the “four As”: availability, accessibility, affordability, and acceptability. The production of, and necessity for, energy affects state security and policy, including the economic viability of the state. Energy security definitions and debates are also

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increasingly affected by the demands of electorates/populations, both in regions used to constant and consistent energy availability as well as those that have not enjoyed regular access and require more reliable access to resources in order to ensure increased development, employment, and living standards. Experiences in the BaSR reflect both sides of the energy security equation. Environmental and energy security concerns combine with economic security, where for many northern communities, economic security emanates from opportunities arising from energy industries, binding the survival (and thus security) of the individual, community and state together through a reliance on one dominant industry. Economic security pertains to potential threats against finances or resources needed to function and thrive in society, for individuals and states alike (Carlarne 2009). Energy security depends on affordable prices, but these cannot be so low as to burden the industry and make it unprofitable for either states or local communities that may benefit. Thus interacting with economic, environmental and energy security concerns are experiences of human security – how people themselves experience security and insecurity.

8.4

 he Place of Indigenous Peoples in the Barents Sea T Region

The history of the Sámi people, as with many Indigenous peoples, is characterised by colonialism, persisting inequalities, resistance, and resilience. Indigenous peoples have had to endure much to fight for their survival and human security, not just physically but also their identities as Indigenous societies that were threatened by state policies designed to eradicate them (Greaves 2016; Kuokkanen and Sweet forthcoming). Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, southern governments in Norway and Russia sought to integrate “frontier zones” and to assimilate Indigenous inhabitants of northern areas into dominant cultures. Norwegian governments adopted a policy to assimilate the Sámi into Norwegian culture (Hansen 2012). As modern Russian historians point out (Goldin et al. 2015): The relatively tolerant attitude of the state to the Indigenous population did not exist for long and changed in the first half of the 19th century. At the beginning of the century, the geopolitical map of Scandinavia changed. The Norwegian-Finnish section of the border became the border between Norway and Russia. At the same time, the ideological polarization of European politics intensified. …. By analogy with continental Europe, … the state began to take enforced measures to tighten border regimes and to apply techniques of social and ethnic engineering. Technological progress played an essential role in this, contributing to the reappraisal of the values of different types of economic systems.

The Sámi of the frontier zone of Norway and Russia were traditionally perceived as constituting a “dual-population,” a situation that accounts for both the development of the policy of Norwegianization and the active role of the Orthodox Church of Russia. In both cases, the goal was cultural and religious assimilation of the

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Sámi. According to archival data (Archangel Oblast) during the colonization of the Murmansk coast by Russian fishers in the nineteenth century, colonists complained about the privileged position of the Sámi, who had priority regarding fishing and grazing of reindeer. Household and interpersonal conflicts occurred frequently. Thus, it is essential to note that the policies of states varied, and the assimilation of Indigenous peoples depended on both local conditions and factors relating to foreign policy. The overall effect on Sámi culture and societies was negative, frequently producing devastating consequences. As the result of the Alta River conflict, there was a radical change in Norwegian Sámi policy by the end of the 1980s. A main component of this was a clear admission of the wrongdoings in governmental Norwegianization policy and the final abandonment of this policy. In 1989, the Sámi Parliament was established. Originally, the Sámi Parliament was an advisory body, but its authority has somewhat expanded throughout the 1990s. A major question in the 1990s was the Sámi right to land and natural resources. This resulted in the Finnmark Act of 2005, a co-management arrangement in parts of Finnmark county.3 There are Sámi Parliaments also in Sweden and Finland. The Constitutions of Norway and Finland have recognized a form of Sámi cultural, non-territorial autonomy exercised through elected, representative bodies of the Sámi Parliaments. The three Sámi Parliaments are also government agencies in charge of administering Sámi-related affairs, specifically Sámi cultural policy. All three Sámi Parliaments have somewhat ambivalent mandates but all been established as mainly consultative or advisory bodies rather than self-governing institutions (Kuokkanen 2019). In Sápmi, resource development (economic security) has generally enjoyed strong state support, though the Sámi have had limited possibilities to influence decisions, legislation and policy. In their Arctic strategies, Nordic states are increasingly committed to the promotion of extractive industry investments in Sápmi, but the role, duties and modus operandi of the state are changing. Tensions between environmental, energy, and economic security and whose security interests prevail, are influential to Sámi experiences. In Sweden, studies have examined the role of resource extraction in the colonization of Sámi territories and erosion of Sámi land rights, the ways in which ongoing colonialism and dispossession manifests as conflicts between Sámi reindeer herding communities and industry proponents backed by the state and the industry’s negligence regarding the international norm of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) (Lawrence 2014; Lawrence and Åhrén 2016; Sehlin MacNeil 2017). In Norway, there are some studies on land use conflicts between reindeer herding and extractive activities and Sámi-industry relations (Johnsen 2016; Nygaard 2016; Wilson 2017; Dannevig 2018; Magnussen 2018). There are also studies on extractive industries such as forestry and hydro development in the Sámi region (Mustonen et al. 2011; Össbo and Lantto 2011; Horstkotte 2013; Carson et al. 2016).

 Please see: Fakta om Finnmarkloven (Facts on the Finnmark Law) https://www.regjeringen.no/ no/dokumenter/fakta-om-finnmarksloven/id88240/ (only available in Norwegian)

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The Sámi people of the Murmansk Oblast are the only Indigenous people of the Russian sector of the Barents Sea Region. The overarching BEAR also includes Nenets and Karelian Veps, but along the sea coast, the Sámi remain the only Indigenous community of the Kola Peninsula. The Kola Sámi number just over 1500 people. In 2018, however, 39 Sámi communities4 were registered in this area, not counting the three Sámi public organizations (e.g. the Kola Sámi Association, a member of the international Sámi Union). Nine communities have leased forest areas for reindeer grazing. All sites include areas for traditional fishing. Two communities have access to fishing grounds on the White Sea. The Sámi communities are located in four districts of Murman: the Kovdorsky urban district, the Kola municipal district, the Lovozersky municipal district, and the Tersky municipal district. The Lovozersky district is home to 66% of the Kola Sámi. The village of Lovozero (or Luujäuˊrr in Skolt Sámi) is the cradle of the Sámi culture of the Kola Peninsula; it is sometimes called “the capital of Russian Lapland.” The Russian Sámi are somewhat isolated from the Scandinavian Sámi. Several factors account for this separation. The Kola Peninsula is a military outpost of Russia including the home base of Russia Northern Fleet. Russian Sámi also experience language isolation, since their textbooks are published mainly in Cyrillic rather than Latin script. Moreover, the Kola Sámi traditionally practiced a dual faith, blending Indigenous traditions and Orthodoxy. This autonomy persists to this day, reinforced by present geopolitical realities. The Kola Sámi do not have a body similar to the Sámi Parliament in Fennoscandia although its establishment has been discussed for some time. The Kola Sámi are involved in the transnational Sámi cooperation through the Sámi Council, which is an NGO with an ECOSOC status at the United Nations and Permanent Participant status at the Arctic Council. Specific features of the federal structure of Russia (e.g. a strong central authority) and the presence of 47 Indigenous minorities have produced different results.5 Nevertheless, a Council of Representatives of Small Indigenous Peoples of the North under the Government of the Murmansk Oblast (the so-called “Aboriginal Board”) has the right to develop recommendations for public authorities on conditions of Sámi life and to control land relations and the protection of the environment. Key issues for the life and security of the Sámi are the preservation of their native language (Kildin dialect) and support of fisheries and reindeer herding. The special feature of the Sámi reindeer husbandry on the Kola Peninsula is that reindeer are “assigned” to the former collective farms converted into the agricultural cooperatives “Tundra” and “Olenevod”. This helps the Sámi with employment and sustains the traditional way of life connected with reindeer herding. But it does not consider the most important thing, measures to protect reindeer pastures and prevent degradation of vegetation cover. 4  Non-governmental organisations, Ministry of Justice (Russia). URL: http://unro.minjust.ru/ NKOs.aspx. Accessed 03.05.19. 5  O Edinom perechne korennykh malochislennykh narodov Rossiyskoy Federatsii [On Unified List on Indigenous Small-Numbered Peoples of the Russian Federation], Governmental resolution of March 22, 2000 No. 255. URL: http://docs.cntd.ru/document/901757631. Accessed 03.05.19.

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The goal of this system is primarily economic growth, while Sámi families have traditionally adjusted their herds to the sustainability of the biological/environmental system. Because more than 66% of the Kola Sámi live in rural areas, there are problems with language proficiency. According to the 28 June 2013 Law of the Murmansk Oblast (No. 1649-ZMO) “On Education in the Murmansk Oblast,” meeting the needs of the Indigenous minorities of the North in learning their native languages and reading Indigenous literature falls under the authority of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Murmansk Oblast. The Kola Sámi Association President Elena Goy notes that the study of Sámi language at schools of the Lovozersky District depends on the wishes of parents who can request extra classes. Sámi language classes are open to everyone, including the Komi-Izhemtsy and Russians (Goj 2018). On 26 October 2018, the President of Russia signed a decree establishing a Fund for the Preservation and Study of the Native Languages of the Peoples of Russia.6 Despite Russia’s non-participation in ILO Convention 169 and the Sámi Convention, this gives hope that mechanisms will be created to protect the linguistic rights of the Sámi as part of the Sámi cultural heritage in Scandinavia and the Kola Peninsula.

8.5

Barents Sea Region Livelihoods

Since the early 2000s, issues relating to extractive industries have become increasingly central to the Barents development discourse. At the core is a balance between petroleum development, fisheries interests and ocean environment in the north (Hønneland and Jensen 2008; see also Chap. 7). During the last decade, another component has become increasingly prominent, the effects of carbon emissions from the extraction and consumption of fossil fuels on the global climate.

8.5.1 Norwegian Experiences Economic, energy, and environmental security intertwine at the local and regional levels, impacting local peoples as well as Norway as a nation, simultaneously. With its long coast, Northern Norway’s marine resources have laid the foundation for local economies and to some extent national economic growth. Increased capacity, new technology and natural fluctuations in fish stocks resulted in collapses in some fish stocks from the late 1960s to the 1980s. Governmental resource management based on close collaboration with industry and the scientific community has secured sustainable and profitable fish stocks since the 1990s (see also Chap. 10). Since 2008, Norwegian seafood exports have grown some 122% reaching a net worth of 6  O sozdanii Fonda sokhraneniya i izucheniya rodnykh yazykov narodov Rossii [On the creation of the Fund for the preservation and study of the native languages of the peoples of Russia]. URL: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58914. Accessed: 03.05.2019.

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99 billion kroner (~11.4 billion USD). A number of fish stocks have been of special importance, among them Northeast Arctic cod and Norwegian spring spawning herring. Much of the explanation behind the increasingly prosperous fisheries industry lies in fisheries management within the Norwegian Exclusive Economic Zone and across maritime borders. In this context, it is worth paying a closer look at the Russian-Norwegian fisheries collaboration (see Chap. 9). This collaboration has been a successful case of cross-border collaboration, very stable across different periods. Though it has roots all the way back in the first decade of the 1900s when Russian and Norwegian ocean research pioneers started collaborating in the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), the collaboration found its present platform with the establishment of the Norwegian-Russian Joint Fisheries Commission in 1975 (Rowe 2008). The collaboration in the fisheries commission has been pivotal in the management of the plentiful fish stocks in the Barents Sea. It has served as a platform for extended science cooperation, especially between the Norwegian Institute of Marine Research (IMR) and Knipovich Polar Research Institute of Marine Fisheries and Oceanography (PINRO) (Dolgov et al. 2007). The research collaboration, which is the basis for the scientific advice provided by the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) is the backbone of the management system. The commission sets total quotas for cod, haddock, capelin, Greenland halibut and redfishfish and allocates the TACs according to set formulas including quotas for third countries fisheries in the region. As there always is a degree of uncertainty in the scientific estimates, the commission has based its decisions on recommendations on scientific advice from ICES based on a precautionary approach (Hønneland and Jørgensen 2018). Although the fisheries collaboration has to a large extent kept the peace on the fishing grounds, different disagreements have arisen between the Norwegian and Russian members from the 1980s up to around 2005 when, for example, Russia wanted higher quotas. During recent years, aquaculture has outgrown fisheries in export value (see Chap. 7). After some challenging decades, the aquaculture industry has grown to become larger in export value than capture fisheries.7 The industry has focused mainly on Atlantic salmon. In the formative years in the 1970–90s, the owners of the fish farms were mainly small local entrepreneurs. As prices have risen and technology and competence have turned aquaculture into a more mature industry, ownership has been consolidated into fewer hands. Aquaculture is controversial, from its business models to environmental impacts among other things, and tension is growing as the industry moves further north along the Norwegian coast. The Barents Sea, the Norwegian Sea and the Lofoten Basin are the areas with the largest prospects for major reservoirs of hydrocarbons on the Norwegian continental shelf. There have been expectations for findings in the Barents Sea, especially in the former disputed area with Russia (Rottem et al. 2008: 70). After the agreement on the delimitation line in 2010, optimism was further raised about the prospects for 7  See Norwegian Seafood Council “Sjømateksport for 99 milliarder i 2018 (Seafood exports at 99 billion in 2018)”: https://seafood.no/aktuelt/nyheter/sjomateksport-for-99-milliarder-i-2018-/

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extraction opportunities. Though activity has risen in the area, major breakthroughs in the Barents Sea have yet to occur. Exploratory activities and drilling in the north are controversial, particularly in the Lofoten/Vesterålen area, and cause tension and disputes between environmentalists and industry and between and within political parties. Experience in the BaSR is not limited to natural resources. Northern Norway is increasingly urbanised, and the closest relationship many people have with fish is that which they buy in the stores, or to petroleum as that which they pump into their cars (electric cars are increasing in popularity, though more so in the south of Norway). Research, service, and tourist industries are also a growing part of north Norwegian life. The third largest university in Norway is located in Tromsø – UiT The Arctic University of Norway. Bodø is home to Nord University, also located in northern Norway.8 Both foster national and international research cooperation. The Fram Centre (High North Research Centre for Climate and the Environment) plays a central role in regional, national and international research on climate and environmental issues. North Norway is experiencing increasing tourist visits which are putting increasing demands on tourist-based industries and general service industries including restaurants and hotels.9 The developments in both research institutions and tourist and service industries are by no means divorced from their location as part of the BaSR, as the region is a focal point for increasing knowledge and understanding on issues ranging from marine and terrestrial life in the north to international law, geopolitics, and peace and conflict in the Arctic.

8.5.2 Russian Experiences Despite a lack of studies related to human security, the security concept has been present in the Russian experience, ranging from the level of individuals and their communities to geopolitical considerations (Goes 2018). Human security in northwest Russia can be exemplified by the experiences of individuals who, not unlike their neighbours to the west, find their lives impacted by economic, environmental and energy security considerations. Perhaps even more so than their western neighbours, local residents in the Russian part of the BaSR find their human security experiences also tightly intertwined with national security issues and geopolitics. People born and raised on the shore of the White Sea in the town of Severodvinsk10 (the Archangel region, Northwest Russia), during the last years of the Soviet era, had to go through a border control: the bus was stopped at the checkpoint and the 8  University student numbers, in Norwegian: https://www.ssb.no/utdanning/artikler-og-publikasjoner/her-er-de-storste-studiestedene-i-norge. List of universities and colleges in Norway, in English: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/kd/organisation/kunnskapsdepartementets-etater-ogvirksomheter/Subordinate-agencies-2/state-run-universities-and-university-co/id434505/) 9  Statistics on tourism, in Norwegian: https://www.statistikknett.no 10  In the Soviet time, Severodvinsk had status of closed town or ZATO.  ZATO status restricted uncontrolled movement out of and in the town.

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documents of every passenger were inspected. It was better not to reveal the name of one’s town of origin: “Say that you are from Archangel, if somebody asks you.” Children knew that there were “secret enterprises” that were very important to the state. The word security was never pronounced, but the words ‘state,’ ‘defence’ (in spoken Russian oboronka) and ‘secret’ were always there (Goes 2018). An order (zakaz)11 was very important for such a northern town: enterprises needed orders from the state since only the state could use the facilities of these huge enterprises.12 Because these towns were so important to the state, life there was much better than outside the checkpoint. There was a better supply of food, people were better educated, and they had better salaries than in the neighbouring towns, having a significant impact on their experienced human security. The Soviet Union ceased to exist in 1991. The words ‘secret’ and ‘state’ quickly disappeared from daily vocabulary.13 Inhabitants used various strategies of survival to cope with economic difficulties. The huge military enterprise was in the process of conversion from military-oriented products into building civilian vessels and oil platforms and supplying consumer goods. Since it was hard to find customers for an enterprise which for years had been subsidised by the state, the number of inhabitants in this town declined from nearly 259,000 in 1991 to 188,000 18 years later.14 Despite the decline in the 1990s, an increase in energy prices and the new energy policy of Russia have brought about a change in the city’s fortunes. Notable in this regard is the adoption of the “Integrated Investment Plan for the Development of the Severodvinsk Single-Industry Town for 2010–2020,” approved by the government of the Archangel Oblast.15 The total amount of financing of the Integrated Investment Plan is about 40  billion rubles. The key investment projects are the technical re-­ equipment of the United Shipbuilding Corporation OJSC, and the development of a new shipyard as a joint construction project of “Sevmash” and “Zvyozdochka” partly supported by the state to build large vessels, including civilian ships. The investment projects for the development of the single-industry town of Severodvinsk for 2010–2020 include reconstruction of the bridge across the Nikolskoye Mouth of the Northern Dvina, restoration of the Archangel highway, construction of a road to connect Okruzhnaya and Yubileinaya streets, and the repair of engineering infrastructure for wastewater and sewage. Recently, Severodvinsk received significant federal funds to support this development. The town was  The system of orders was developed in the Soviet time. It was connected to an economics based on the principle of distribution. The state provided money to the plants to build a submarine or to repair a ship. The plants did not participate in any open competition, and just had to wait for the contact from above. This became especially crucial in the ‘90s. For such a town the absence of orders from the state meant, literary, economic death, because the majority of the inhabitants were employed by the state through four major enterprises. 12  Life in Severodvinsk is built around four major enterprises working for the state defence. 13  The volume of defence orders to the Naval Yard in Severodvinsk from the state fell by 95% in 1990 (Åtland 2009: 114). 14  Trofimova “Zigzagi demografii.” [Zigzags of demography]. Newspaper Severnyi rabochii, Severodvinsk, 2010, January 21: 9. 15  Please see: http://www.dvinaland.ru/prcenter/release/17278/ 11

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founded and still exists due to its importance as a shipbuilding and ship repair complex. But today it is necessary to overcome the single-industry structure of the town’s economy. A comprehensive investment plan has been developed to meet this need. The above story is just one of many from Russia of the 1990s. Another case is Murmansk. The Murmansk region is located in northwest Russia, mainly on the Kola Peninsula and borders Norway and Finland. The administrative centre of the Murmansk region is the city of Murmansk. It was established in 1916, and the region was actively developed during the Soviet era. Murmansk is the only ice-free port in the European North of Russia, and connects Russia to Europe and North America. That is why Murmansk is often called “a gate to the Arctic”. Nevertheless, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the region faced various problems, including a severe decline of population and a high rate of unemployment. The development of the Shtokman gas field, located in the offshore zone of the Murmansk region, was connected to hopes for future prosperity of the region and the country. The regional administration and Gazprom16 claimed that the expected development of the Shtokman field would attract not only energy companies, but also building and transport companies and various related services, and that it would boost the development of the region.17 All this had to occur in an area subjected to an active military presence and deemed to be of high national importance. It is difficult to find anything about Shtokman in media today. Of those headlines that do appear, the tone of those publications is different than before. For example, “Shtokman: long jump to nowhere,” (Bi-port 2013), “Shtokman moves further out of sight” (Staalesen 2013), or “Goodbye, Shtokman” (Staalesen 2012). The intensity of the publications is not comparable with the period from 2007 to 2012. The capacity of the communities in the region to adapt themselves to these kinds of changes remained unclear as well as whether or not oil and gas development had an impact on the region. By the same token, some positive trends might be noted with regard to the Year of Ecology projects in 2017. According to the Analytical Gazette of the Council of Federation of the Federal Assembly of Russia, in 2017, a plan to clean up Kola Bay from the flooded sunken property was started and supported by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology of Russia. Russian industrialists also have assumed a certain amount of environmental responsibility. For example, Norilsk Nickel reduced emissions and opened a modern visitor center in the Pasvik Nature Reserve. The international status of this reserve provides opportunities for the visitor center to become a platform for the development of cooperation in border areas. Also, with the participation of the Government of the Murmansk Oblast, an international

 Gazprom is a large Russian company working with extraction, production and sale of natural gas. The Russian Government holds a majority stake in the company. 17  “Shtokmanovskyi proekt  – kluch k promyshlennomu razvitiju Evropeiskogo Severa Rossii.” [Shtokman project – a key to industrial development of the European North of Russia]. Alexey Miller’s report on the Murmansk International Economic Forum: http://www.gazprom.ru/press/ news/2009/october/article69343/ published online October 15, 2009. Accessed November 22, 2016. 16

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project to rehabilitate the former coastal base in Andreeva Bay, an area of severe radiation hazards, has been completed. This project is an example of international cooperation, involving the collaboration of hundreds of specialists from seven states.18 The change in the geopolitical situation with the end of the Cold War reshaped the international security configuration. At the same time, this change also brought uncertainty in ways that were not known before in Russia. The first Russian economic crisis (1992–1995) caused by the transition from a planned to a market economy heavily affected those regions which were related to the military-industrial complex.19 Changes in the political and economic structure altered the configuration of state – individual relations: they were no longer ‘the one whole.’ State control through the planned economy was connected to security for the people: stable incomes, social guarantees and a predictable future. New political and economic structures brought prospects of development as well as displayed the difference in interests between the state and individuals and the inability of the state to be a sole provider of security. Thus, challenges are related to the ability of the state and individuals to articulate their concerns, to balance their interests and to mitigate insecurities. Changes regarding the role and place of energy security in relation to national security also took place. Heininen (2016) points out that the increasing role of energy security is a global trend. Moreover, energy security becomes increasingly important in oil and gas dependent countries like Norway and Russia, since access to energy resources is related to power and geopolitical influence (Heininen 2016: 19, 22). Therefore, it is important to examine how this global trend affects the oil and gas regions and perceptions of security in these places. The first economic crisis of the years 1992–1995  in Russia demonstrated the power of economic security. The threat of economic insecurity forced the state to search for new sources of economic sustainability. The oil and gas sector was one of the few sectors of Russia’s economy that was lightly affected during the first crisis and demonstrated fast recovery compared to other Russian industries like machine building or metallurgy (Zubarevich 2016). The price for oil and gas was relatively stable in the 1990s, and the export of petroleum provided a stable income, in particular for regions where the oil and gas were produced. That is why it is not surprising that the oil and gas sector was viewed by the state as a cure for economic insecurity. Kryukov (2009) points out that the decision to develop the Russian Arctic shelf was mainly based on the reason of economic security rather than energy needs. The Shtokman project20 was

 Please see (in Russian): http://council.gov.ru/activity/analytics/analytical_bulletins/92403/)  Zubarevich (2016) extracts four crises in Russia. The first one took place in 1992–1995. The second one from 1998 is partly related to the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and partly to the difficult economic situation in Russia, which resulted in devaluation of the ruble and default. The third crisis took place in 2008–2009 and was related to the global financial crisis of 2007–2008. The fourth one started in 2013 and is still ongoing. This crisis is related to the decrease in oil prices in 2014. 20  The Shtokman gas and condensate field is located on the territory of the Murmansk region. 18 19

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initiated to support the military-industrial complex of the Murmansk and Archangel regions in a critical economic situation in the 1990s (Kryukov 2009: 37). Thus, the oil and gas sector represents an important trend in economic development related to new sources of economic stability.

8.6

Cross-Border Relations

The Barents Sea Region has historically been an area of extensive contact across national borders. This also goes for scientific cooperation and resource management. Different ethnic groups and nationalities have moved across the regional and national borders. People-to-people interaction, culturally and commercially, has a long history in the region, not least in the form of the Pomor trade (Myklebost/ Nielsen 2014). The Pomor trade featured commerce and barter of fish and grain between northern Norwegian and Russian coastal communities. The Pomor trade lasted some 200 years until the Russian revolution in 1917 made all cross border activities more difficult.21 With the end of the Cold War however, cross-border cooperation was again on the agenda. The smaller countries in the region sought to multilateralize collaboration with Russia, and the Barents region gained a new meaning. With a vision to encourage sustainable economic and social development, improve living conditions, contribute to stability, environmental development and peaceful development of northern Europe, the Barents cooperation was formalised by the foreign ministers of Russia, Norway, Finland and Sweden in addition to representatives from Denmark, Iceland and the European Commission in 1993 with the signing of the Kirkenes Declaration. The Barents Euro-Arctic Council became a forum to enhance interregional contact in the northernmost parts of Norway, Russia, Finland and Sweden. Along with the Barents Euro-Arctic Region where representatives of the Indigenous peoples and regions also signed and the Barents Secretariat provides administrative support, a bilateral collaboration between Norway and Russia arose on the regional level. These institutions enhance interregional contact and activities across the borders.22 The Barents collaboration has had varying levels of success. However, though the parties seem to a large extent to be pursuing national interests within the framework of the Barents collaboration, and commercial activities across the borders have stagnated, the structures and institutions of the Barents collaboration still stand strong.

21 22

 See «The Pomor Trade»: https://www.ub.uit.no/northernlights/eng/pomor.htm  See «The Barents Region»: https://barents.no/nb/om-oss/barentsregionen

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The Barents Sea Region in a Global Context

An important theme running through this account of the societies and cultures of the BaSR is the extent to which the region is affected by the global forces of geopolitics and geoeconomics (see Chap. 9). Although these forces do not negate the regional concerns discussed in the preceding sections, they do impact efforts to address issues of security at the regional level, sensitizing national governments to regional developments and creating conditions in which considerations of high politics intrude to complicate initiatives intended to respond to regional concerns. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the sensitivity of the Arctic with regard to matters of military security declined dramatically. The emphasis during the 1990s and 2000s fell on matters of environmental protection and sustainable development. More recently, however, there has been a revival of interest in the role of the Arctic as a theater of military operations. While the significance of this development is widely debated, nowhere are the signs of renewed military activities more visible than in the Barents Sea Region. As it rebounds from the collapse of the 1990s, Russia has sought to reclaim its role as a great power, strengthening the Northern Fleet based on the Kola Peninsula and resuming active military patrols in the Barents Sea Region. At the same time, China has emerged as a great power with growing interests in the Arctic. The development of the idea of the Polar Silk Road as a component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative provides a rationale for China’s newfound interest in the Arctic (Lanteigne 2019). In concrete terms, this is reflected in expressions of Chinese interest in specific projects such as the proposed KirkenesRovaniemi rail link. The BaSR is also affected by global geoeconomic developments. Not only is the prospect of offshore oil and gas development in the region attractive to some major players (Kristoffersen and Dale 2014); the growth of commercial shipping using the Northern Sea Route will lead to a substantial increase in the number of ships passing through the BaSR (Humpert 2018). While the use of the Northern Sea Route by container ships moving goods between Europe and Asia is not likely to become a major factor in the near term, the shipment of raw materials extracted in the Arctic to southern markets is already increasing rapidly. A particularly prominent example is the growth in maritime traffic involving the use of state-of-the-art LNG tankers to move liquified natural gas from the port of Sabetta on the Yamal Peninsula to European consumers. One controversial issue in this realm concerns the transhipment of natural gas from ice-strengthened vessels to regular tankers for onward shipment to international destinations. A particularly interesting feature of this development is the emerging competition between LNG tankers and pipelines as preferred means of moving natural gas across international borders. Like the Bering Strait Region, therefore, some of the issues giving rise to needs for governance in the BaSR are attributable in large measure to the impact of outside forces, including the growth of pressure simultaneously to take advantage of the increasing accessibility of Arctic resources and to address a suite of problems associated with the impacts of climate change in the Far North. Yet, it would be a

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mistake to exaggerate the importance of these global forces in thinking about the issues of concern to the societies and cultures of the Barents Sea Region. As the previous sections make clear, the BaSR is a distinctive region with a set of concerns that revolve around relations between Indigenous peoples and local communities and the links between human communities of the coastal fringe and the priorities of national governments located in Oslo and Moscow.

8.8

Concluding Observations

The Barents Sea region is dynamic, contested, and a window into a multilevel security politics picture. The border area between Norway and Russia has played an enormous practical as well as symbolic role. There is a long history of cooperative relations in this region, dating back to early Indigenous-local population interactions and the Pomor trade and moving forward through the cooperative efforts associated with the fight against Germany during World War II and the development of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission in the 1970s to the experience of recent decades with the Barents Euro-Artic Region. In practical terms, this has resulted in day-to-day interaction through the landing of fish harvested by Russian vessels in Norwegian ports and the cross-border interaction focused on the city of Kirkenes. Yet, this history of cooperative relations goes hand-in-hand with tensions relating to the survival of Indigenous livelihoods in the face of escalating extractive activities, the redevelopment of Russian military installations in northwestern Russia and extensive NATO exercises in the Arctic (e.g. the Trident Juncture exercise in 2018). Other important developments include the flow of refugees from the Middle East across the relatively open border between Russia and Norway; the growth of commercial shipping in the region, and the uncertain impacts of dramatic changes in the biophysical environment of the BaSR associated with climate change (see Chap. 6). Making use of the lens of human security, we have sought to dissect this complex picture, showing how the BaSR raises complex concerns relating to economic, energy, environmental, and human security as well as the more traditional concerns relating to military security. In short, monochrome, one-dimensional perspectives are not helpful in thinking about the societies and cultures of the Barents Sea Region. The human relations in the region demonstrate that small and largescale politics are far more dynamic and complex than that. The lens of human security attempts to make visible those actors who either have never been “heard” or have been “silenced” (Indigenous peoples, women, minorities, etc.) due to dominant discourses concerning what security should be about. Given that the employment of the notion of security is highly political, giving top priority to issues deemed most valuable in the eyes of powerful actors (usually the state but not always exclusively), we wish to make visible the priorities and values of individuals and communities to see how they can and should inform these political discourses and future plans (Table 8.1).

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Table 8.1  Summary of major findings The BaSR is integrated into national policies and priorities The BaSR features the presence of modernized communities and complex relations between regional authorities and national governments The Barents Sea fringe is geopolitically sensitive The lens of human security provides a basis for thinking about the BaSR coherently Cross border or people to people relationships provide a counterpoint to geopolitical concerns The Norwegian-Russian border in the BaSR has the distinction of having one of the largest differences in standard of living Environmental perspectives of security, ranging from state level perceptions to human security, play an important part in the Arctic security picture Arctic security ranges from state-protection, military-based security perceptions, to economic, energy, and environmental security including consequences of climate change Cross border science and management collaboration of ocean resources have resulted in healthier and productive marine ecosystems Energy security becomes increasingly important in oil and gas dependent countries like Norway and Russia, since access to energy resources is related to power and geopolitical influence While the use of the Northern Sea Route by container ships moving goods between Europe and Asia is not likely to become a major factor in the near term, the shipment of raw materials extracted in the Arctic to southern markets is already increasing rapidly

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Governing the Barents Sea Region Alexander N. Vylegzhanin, Oran R. Young, and Paul Arthur Berkman

Abstract

Drawing on the chapters dealing with the ecological, economic, and sociocultural systems of the Barents Sea Region, this chapter identifies key issues of governance arising in the region and makes use of our approach to informed decisionmaking for sustainability to guide thinking about options for addressing these issues. We identify two issues as priority concerns: (i) will the suite of biophysical changes that are altering the character of the Barents Sea Region generate new needs for governance and (ii) how can we address a number of socioeconomic developments in the region that are making it harder to respond to needs for governance on a sectoral basis? We then identify options (without advocacy) that decisionmakers may consider in selecting responses to the priority issues in such a way as to maximize the achievement of sustainability.

A. N. Vylegzhanin (*) Department of International Law, MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected] O. R. Young Bren School of Environmental Science and Management, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, USA P. A. Berkman

Science Diplomacy Center, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, MA, USA e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 O. R. Young et al. (eds.), Governing Arctic Seas: Regional Lessons from the Bering Strait and Barents Sea, Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25674-6_9

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Introduction

What do the analyses presented in Chaps. 6, 7 and 8 have to tell us about needs for governance now coming into focus in the Barents Sea Region and about ways to think about these needs in a manner that can contribute to the achievement of sustainability? As in Chap. 5, we proceed in this chapter to address the following questions. Are some needs for governance in the BaSR more urgent than others? Are there alternative ways to frame the key issues relating to governance in the Barents Sea Region (BaSR) that will be of interest to policymakers responsible for matters of governance in this region? What are the relative merits of strategies targeting different venues that may be suitable for addressing these issues? Can we generate a range of options that policymakers may want to consider as they think about issues of governance in the region? Are there linkages between or among these issues that ought to be taken into account in constructing institutions and associated infrastructure to respond to needs for governance in the region? Are there critical uncertainties that make it difficult to answer questions of this sort, and can analysts play constructive roles in identifying key uncertainties and marshaling evidence that can help to reduce them? Drawing on the contributions of the preceding chapters, we apply our general approach to informed decisionmaking for sustainability as described in the preface to this book series to provide some preliminary responses to these questions. Section 9.2 deals with needs for governance. In keeping with our general approach, we start in this section by identifying key questions. We then proceed in Sect. 9.3 to consider data and evidence relevant to responding to these questions. In doing so, we treat the BaSR as a distinct region linked in various ways to the outside world and concentrate on identifying emerging needs for governance that will require responses extending beyond the limits of measures that either Norway or the Russian Federation can develop and implement on its own. A major theme is the challenge of achieving sustainability at the regional level, given the growing impact of external forces shaping the future of the BaSR. Section 9.4 deals with options for addressing those needs for governance likely to require intentional responses in the near term. Central to this discussion is the distinction between institutional arrangements (frequently called regimes) and infrastructure along with an emphasis on the importance of combining institutions and infrastructure to create effective governance systems. Focusing on the interplay among arrangements created to deal with needs for governance in the BaSR, we describe the Barents Sea regime complex in Sect. 9.5 and pose the question of whether there are now or soon will be sufficient benefits to be reaped from deliberate efforts to increase the integration of the principal elements of the complex to justify the effort required to pursue this option. We offer a preliminary account of opportunities in this area and discuss options that Norway and Russia (and potentially other interested parties) may want to consider in the coming years. The concluding section ties together the messages of the chapter, commenting on the roles that analysts can play in reducing uncertainties that make such questions hard to address in a rigorous fashion, contributing to informed decisionmaking for sustainability in the process. Throughout the chapter, we focus on exploring issues and options. Our goal is to make a constructive contribution to informed decisionmaking about needs for

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governance in the BaSR rather than to become advocates for particular courses of action in this realm. We recognize that policymakers must respond to a variety of pressures in making choices, that governance systems that may look attractive on paper often prove disappointing or fail outright in practice, and that high levels of uncertainty often plague efforts to make informed choices regarding constructive responses to specific needs for governance. Nevertheless, we are convinced that informed decisionmaking is a worthwhile goal and that analysts can make a variety of contributions toward the fulfillment of this goal.

9.2

Governance Questions in the Barents Sea Region

There are both similarities and differences between the Barents Sea Region and the Bering Strait Region that are important to take into account in thinking about needs for governance. Perhaps the most significant similarity arises from the fact that needs for governance in the Barents Sea Region, as in the Bering Strait Region (BeSR), reflect the impact of external drivers. These drivers include both biophysical forces (e.g. the impacts of climate change on sea ice, salinity, water temperatures, the distribution of fish stocks) and socioeconomic forces (e.g. rising interest in commercial shipping, the effects of world market prices for hydrocarbons, incentives to construct a rail line from Finland to the Barents Sea, increasing tension between Norway and Russia associated with deployments of military forces). In some cases, these external drivers give rise to new needs for governance as in the case of pressures to allow fishing on the part of third parties arising as a consequence of shifts in the distribution of fish stocks. In others, external pressures intensify concerns regarding developments occurring within the region (e.g. the intentional or unintentional introduction of species such as red king crabs and snow crabs that are not native to the BaSR). As a consequence, any consideration of needs for governance in the BaSR as well as options for addressing them must take into account the linkages between this ­ecopolitical region and the broader setting in which it is situated. That said, differences between the BaSR and the BeSR are also significant, making it clear that we need to think carefully about the distinctive features of the Barents Sea Region in exploring needs for governance. First and foremost, the BaSR is a relatively developed region with a sizable human population, major urban hubs, modern economies, and strong links to the southern metropoles in both Norway and Russia. An estimated 1.6 million people live in the BaSR compared with an estimated 50,000  in the BeSR.  The BaSR has sizable cities, including Murmansk on the Kola Peninsula with a population of more than 300,000 and Tromsø in northern Norway with a population of ~76,000. The southern portion of the BaSR has long been ice-free year around, a condition arising from the effects of the extension of the Gulf Stream known as the North Atlantic Drift. This has permitted the development of world class fisheries (e.g. the Barents Sea cod fishery); it makes the region’s coastal areas suitable for the development of aquaculture, and it means that projects aimed at the development of hydrocarbons in the area are less complex than similar efforts in other parts of the Arctic where sea ice and exceptionally severe weather are frequent problems. Both Norway and Russia have

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highly developed national interests in maintaining robust human societies in their sectors of the Barents Sea Region. Norway, for example, has adopted an array of policies designed to strengthen its northern counties, including creating a major university and building up a collection of research institutions (e.g. the Norwegian Polar Institute) in Tromsø. Tromsø has emerged also as the administrative hub of the Arctic Council, hosting the council’s secretariat and the secretariat of the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme along with several related administrative units. In addition, the existing governance system for the shared resources of the Barents Sea Region is more highly developed than the parallel system in the Bering Strait Region. Norway and Russia are the principal actors in this ecopolitical region, occupying the roles of adjacent states in the terminology of UNCLOS Article 74. The two countries have an extensive track record of cooperation regarding the management of shared marine resources going back to the establishment of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission under the terms of agreements dating to 1975/1976 (Stokke 2012). The commission has played an important role in promoting bilateral cooperation ever since. More recently, the two countries have established cooperative arrangements to deal with matters of environmental protection of common concern. Prominent in this regard are the activities of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Commission on Environmental Cooperation, launched initially in 1988 and restructured in 1992 following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 2010 boundary delimitation treaty resolved outstanding jurisdictional issues regarding the maritime boundary between Norway and Russia, eliminating the problem of overlapping claims in what was known as the gray zone and reinforcing and extending the mechanisms through which the two states deal with issues of common concern regarding natural resources and ecosystem protection in the area. Yet, it would be a mistake to conclude that governing the BaSR will be a matter of clear sailing with no major challenges during the foreseeable future. The region is characterized by both biophysical and geopolitical features that pose significant challenges for those concerned with promoting peaceful and sustainable uses of the Barents Sea’s natural resources and ecosystem services. Unlike the BeSR, the Barents Sea Region features jurisdictional complexities whose significance is likely to grow as a consequence of shifts in the location or distribution of living resources. The most prominent cases in point concern the waters of the loophole, an area that is acknowledged to be high seas (though surrounded by areas under the jurisdiction of Norway and Russia) and therefore open to access on the part of nationals of any (party to UNCLOS) State, and the status of the Svalbard Fishery Protection Zone, an area whose status is subject to significant disagreements among the signatories to the 1920 Paris Treaty (Pedersen 2008; Østhagen 2018). As a result, governance arrangements for the Barents Sea Region must take into account the interests of outsiders who are entitled to engage in a range of activities under the terms of the prevailing law of the sea and who may have specific claims under the provisions of the 1920 Paris Treaty (Vylegzhanin et al. 2018). Movements of important fish stocks in the region, as described in Chaps. 6 and 7, are increasing the importance of these jurisdictional complexities of the BaSR. More generally, uncertainties regarding the

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trajectories of biophysical and economic developments in the region make it essential to develop and maintain a capacity to adjust the provisions of existing governance systems agilely to be responsive to changing needs for governance that are often hard to anticipate. As in Chap. 5, we concentrate here on particularly prominent emerging needs for governance in order to demonstrate the use of our methodology for achieving informed decisionmaking in some detail. Specifically, we ask (i) will a suite of biophysical changes that are altering the character of the BaSR as an ecopolitical region generate new needs for governance? and (ii) how can we address interactions among a number of socioeconomic developments that are making it increasingly difficult to deal with needs for governance in the region on a sectoral basis?

9.3

Data and Evidence

Following the same logic we adopted in Chap. 5, we turn now to assembling data and evidence needed to engage in informed decisionmaking about questions of governance in the Barents Sea Region. Though it is by no means exhaustive, the following account directs attention to key issues in this realm.

9.3.1 The Consequences of Biophysical Changes Chapter 6 documents the fact that most of the Barents Sea Region has been ice-free year around during modern times. A key difference between this region and other parts of the Arctic, this condition has played an important role in the development of human activities in the BaSR in modern times. Among other things, it has enabled the rise of sizable settler communities in the region, facilitated largescale commercial fishing operations, and made coastal shipping comparatively easy. It also explains the fact that Russia’s Northern Fleet, the country’s most powerful naval force  – including late model nuclear-powered submarines equipped with sea-launched ballistic missiles and nuclear-powered attack submarines – is based in the region (along the north coast of the Kola Peninsula). Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to assume that the physical features of this region are stable conditions that can be expected to remain unchanged during the foreseeable future. We have known for some time that the impacts of climate change are developing more rapidly throughout the Arctic than in other parts of the world. But recent scientific research indicates that the northern part of the Barents Sea has emerged as a particularly prominent climate “hotspot” featuring a sharp increase in ocean temperature, a decline in sea-ice, and a rising level of salinity. The result is what researchers have taken to describing as the Atlantification (or borealization) of the Barents Sea Region (see Chap. 6 and Lind et al. 2018). How these developments will unfold during the coming years remains highly conjectural at this stage. It is possible, though by no means certain, that nonlinear changes will occur leading to major surprises regarding oceanic conditions in the region. But in any case, physical

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changes are already producing documented biological effects that raise important questions regarding governance in the BaSR. Perhaps the most significant biological effect in terms of governance involves shifts in the distribution and abundance of northeast Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua), the single most important fish species in the region and the focus of a world-class fishery. Cod stocks have been robust in recent years, a condition many attribute to good fisheries management under the leadership of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission. Nevertheless, there are good reasons to expect that these stocks will be affected by the Atlantification of the BaSR. Already, there is evidence indicating that the distribution of cod stocks is shifting to the north and east (see Figure 6.4 in Chap. 6) and that fluctuations in the abundance of cod are increasing. The Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission set the cod quota for 2018 at 775,000 tons, down from the 2017 quota of 890,000 tons, following a recommendation from the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) that the 2018 quota should not exceed 712,000 tons (Nilsen 2017). Despite the operation of a sophisticated management system, it is difficult to anticipate future developments regarding the status of the BaSR’s cod stocks as well as other species (e.g. red king crabs and snow crabs) that have presented complex management challenges in recent years (Østhagen and Raspotnik 2019). Aside from the obvious importance of setting annual quotas in such a way as to maintain the robustness of key stocks while at the same time satisfying the most urgent demands of the fishing industry, these developments raise important governance questions linked to the jurisdictional arrangements in place in the Barents Sea Region. Issues associated with shifts in the distribution and abundance of cod stocks constitute a prominent example in this regard. In part, this is attributable to the fact that increasing quantities of cod are showing up in the loophole, an area of high seas that is open to access on the part of fishers from third countries. The critical question here is whether the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission can find ways to accommodate the activities of such fishers that allow the commission to continue to operate as the main instrument for fisheries management in the region or, alternatively, some major modifications or even a significantly restructured regime will become necessary to address the consequences of shifting stocks in the BaSR in the coming years. At the same time, stock shifts are reawakening somewhat dormant concerns relating to the status of the waters surrounding the Svalbard Archipelago. The central question here is whether these waters should be treated as part of Norway’s Exclusive Economic Zone and arguably subject to the provisions of Article 2 of the 1920 Paris Treaty on equal rights of fishing, despite that fact that the concept of EEZs did not exist at the time the treaty entered into force. Norway, which has created a Fishery Protection Zone in the area, asserts that the Svalbard Archipelago does not have an Exclusive Economic Zone of its own, so that the waters in question are not subject to the provisions of the 1920 treaty. Others (e.g. Iceland, Russia, Spain), interested in gaining access to potentially growing fish stocks located in an area often called the Svalbard box, have taken the position that they should be allowed to enjoy the treaty’s equal access provisions with regard to resources located

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in the waters surrounding the archipelago. In recent years, representatives of the European Union’s Commission have expressed interest in the area’s living resources, further complicating Norway’s position. There is no way to forecast with any precision at this time how the key biophysical and legal processes will develop during the coming years. We do know that the impacts of climate change are particularly strong in this region and that we should be prepared for surprising developments in the future. But this observation does not have straightforward implications with regard to the development and operation of governance systems. What is clear is that it is important to avoid lock-in with regard to decisions made in response to specific needs for governance in the BaSR.  In practice, this raises a critical question that is likely to arise in one form or another in many ecopolitical regions during the coming years. Are we best off for now making ad hoc adjustments to the existing arrangement featuring the operation of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission in the main part of the Barents Sea and Norwegian control in what is known as the Fishery Protection Zone around Svalbard? Or would it make sense to launch a more general effort to consider a restructured regime for this dynamic region? We will come back to this question in the next section.

9.3.2 Interactions among Sectoral Developments As is the case in other parts of the world, most governance systems in the BaSR are sector specific. The Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission manages the region’s commercial fisheries subject to the terms of the longstanding bilateral Norwegian-Russian agreement on procedures for setting quotas and promoting compliance on the part of harvesters. Current tensions regarding the effectiveness of this arrangement are being treated largely as a matter of adjusting the fisheries regime. Offshore energy developments in the BaSR (e.g. the Snøhvit gas field and the Goliat oil field located in the Norwegian sector of the region) are subject to national regimes operated by Norway and Russia. In the case of reservoirs that straddle the maritime boundary between the two countries (e.g. the Fedynsky High depicted in Fig. 9.1), Norway and Russia have established general procedures (with details to be addressed case-by-case) under the terms of the boundary delimitation treaty to deal with the development of shared energy resources on a unitized basis. Norway is now opening up additional tracts for potential development in its part of the BaSR, a process that has triggered sensitivities in cases where tracts are located in waters surrounding the Svalbard Archipelago. But there are no provisions to address potential interactions between commercial fisheries and offshore oil and gas development in place at this stage. Similar observations are in order regarding commercial activities in other sectors. Most important (as documented in Chaps. 7 and 11) is the prospect of enhanced shipping arising from commercial activities taking place in the BaSR itself, the transport of Arctic commodities (e.g. liquid natural gas originating on the Yamal Peninsula) to European markets, and (potentially) the use of the Northern Sea Route

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Fig. 9.1  Barents Sea hydrocarbon reservoirs (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate). (Source: Norwegian Petroleum Directorate)

to move goods between Europe and East Asia. Ship-based tourism, especially in the form of tours to the North Pole aboard Russian icebreakers in the summer months, has added to ship traffic in the eastern portion of the BaSR.1 Strictly speaking, the provisions of the Polar Code, adopted by the International Maritime Organization and codified largely in the form of amendments to the 1974 Safety of Life At Sea Convention and the 1973/1978 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, do not apply to areas that are ice-free year around, a fact that puts much of the BaSR formally beyond the scope of this regulatory regime. But overall, the number of ships operating in the region is rising rapidly, leading not only to a growing interest in the regulation of ship traffic but also to the prospect of 1  A recent article claims that “More than 80 percent of tourists on Russian icebreaker tours to the North Pole are Chinese” (Pincus 2018).

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rising tension between shipping on the one hand and fishing and oil and gas development on the other. For the most part, issues of environmental protection in the region are subject to separate governance arrangements. Both Norway and Russia have created sizable protected areas in the Arctic (e.g. large parts of the Svalbard Archipelago on the part of Norway and of Franz Josef Land on the part of Russia). The two countries established the Joint Norwegian-Russian Environmental Commission in 1988 to address environmental concerns of common interest in the BaSR. For the most part, this commission has focused on matters of environmental protection regarding terrestrial areas and the coastal zones along the southern margins of the BaSR. Nongovernmental organizations (e.g. WWF) have assessed the need for the creation of marine protected areas in the BaSR and published maps showing the location of areas regarded as priorities from this perspective. But the governments have not acted to adopt the recommendations emanating from these sources. With regard to needs for governance, the obvious question arising in this context concerns the prospect of interactions among these activities that none of the sectoral regimes has a clearcut mandate to address. How might oil and gas development in the BaSR affect fishing and shipping? Will oil spill preparedness and response plans become an important mechanism to protect other activities from harm? Will there be a need to create sea lanes for shipping to avoid negative interactions between the operation of commercial ships and other activities in the region or to avoid or mitigate environmental impacts (e.g. ship strikes on marine mammals, noise pollution) arising from commercial shipping? Can marine protected areas be established in a manner that provides adequate protection for particularly sensitive ecosystems without imposing excessive costs of industrial activities? As Chap. 10 documents, significant developments involving the methodology of integrated ocean management may provide a means to address some of these questions. Norway has taken a leading role in this area and now makes use of integrated ocean management in its sector of the BaSR. Russia has taken significant steps to follow suit, and there is evidence of a growing effort to bring these techniques of integrated ocean management to bear in the BaSR in a coordinated fashion. Of course, all these matters are subject not only to the biophysical uncertainties referred to in the preceding subsection but also to a range of uncertainties arising from socioeconomic considerations. It is difficult to say whether world market conditions will make hydrocarbons located in the BaSR (e.g. the huge proven Shtokman gas field whose development is now on indefinite hold) economically attractive during the foreseeable future. There are fundamental uncertainties regarding both the types of volumes of future shipping along the Northern Sea Route that will affect interactions between shipping and other activities in the BaSR. Such considerations highlight, once again, the importance of avoiding lock-­ ins in efforts to address needs for governance in the Barents Sea Region during the coming years.

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Options: Institutions and Infrastructure

For the most part, existing governance arrangements have performed well in maintaining peace and contributing to the achievement of sustainability in the BaSR.  All interested parties accept the prevailing law of the sea centered on UNCLOS as the constitutive base on which to build regimes dealing with more specific needs for governance arising in the region. The 2010 bilateral treaty between Norway and Russia not only settled the principal jurisdictional dispute between the two countries; it also contains annexes extending and formalizing longstanding arrangements dealing with fisheries and providing for similar cooperative measures relating to energy development. So far, the arrangements established under the terms of this treaty have proven effective, though it is fair to observe that they have not yet been subjected to severe tests (Stokke et al. 1999; Stokke 2012). For the most part, the region’s fish stocks are robust; ICES plays an acknowledged and significant role in determining total allowable catches, even though the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission is not required to accept its advice and sometimes adopts quotas that differ from those ICES recommends. The joint commission on environmental protection is engaged actively in a broad effort to capitalize on Norway’s role as a leader in the development of advanced tools in the area of integrated ocean management. A working group operating under the auspices of the commission released a plan in November 2016 for Norwegian-Russian cooperation to protect polar bears and other key species in the BaSR (Joint Russian-­Norwegian Commission on Environmental Protection 2016). Overall, as Table 9.1 indicates, there is a sizable collection of organizations (i.e. material entities with administrative capacity and resources) that are regional in

Table 9.1 Regional organizations active in administration of governance systems for the Barents Sea Region

International Council for the Exploration of the Sea Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission, Committees, Working Groups Joint Norwegian-Russian Commission on Environmental Protection, BarentsPortal OSPAR Commission, Working Groups, Secretariat North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission, Committees, Secretariat Barents Euro-Arctic Council and Barents Regional Council Arctic Council Working Groups, Task Forces, Expert Groups, Secretariats

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scope and that play roles in addressing functional issues arising in connection with the day-to-day operation of governance systems applicable to the BaSR.2 The fact that these arrangements have worked well in the past, however, does not mean that there are no important challenges on the horizon regarding needs for governance in this dynamic region. For purposes of this discussion, we focus on four broad categories of governance concerns: practices needed to avoid problems arising from unresolved and contentious jurisdictional issues; procedures needed to strengthen ecosystem protection at the regional level; measures designed to handle interplay among sectorally-defined regimes, and arrangements established to allow for agile responses to major (often nonlinear and surprising) changes in biophysical and socioeconomic conditions. In each case, appropriate types of infrastructure will be required to ensure that regimes created to address the relevant needs are implemented dependably, monitored on an ongoing basis, and adjusted in a timely manner to respond to changing circumstances (Berkman 2015).

9.4.1 Institutions The most prominent unresolved jurisdictional issue in the Barents Sea Region focuses on the status of the waters surrounding the Svalbard Archipelago (Pedersen 2008; Østhagen 2018). In essence, the issue turns on the applicability to the archipelago of provisions of the contemporary law of the sea  – especially those dealing with Exclusive Economic Zones as set forth in UNCLOS Part V – that did not exist in 1920 when the Paris Treaty was negotiated. Norway takes the view that it is entitled to exercise authority not subject to the provisions of the treaty in areas lying beyond a narrow band of territorial waters surrounding the archipelago. Based on this rationale, it has established a 200-mile Fishery Protection Zone in these areas. A number of Parties to the treaty, including Great Britain, Iceland, Spain, and Russia, prefer an interpretation under which an Exclusive Economic Zone and continental shelf associated with the archipelago should be subject by extension to the equal access provisions of the regime established under the terms of the Paris Treaty. Like many disagreements regarding matters of jurisdiction, this one has no straightforward or easy to implement solution. It is likely to prove difficult to resolve the differences to everyone’s satisfaction during the foreseeable future. For now, the way forward may well be to make use of practical mechanisms that allow for cooperation without prejudice to the legal positions of the parties, following precedents like the treatment of the gray zone in the Barents Sea prior to the negotiation of the 2010 boundary delimitation treaty between Norway and Russia (Oude Elferink 1994) and the handling of the disagreement between Canada and the US regarding transit passage in the Northwest Passage (Kirkey 1994–1995). So long as interest in the area’s resources (e.g. fish stocks or hydrocarbons) remains 2  Organizations differ from institutions in that they are material entities with offices, personnel, and budgets. Typically, organizations play important roles in administering institutions (Young 1989, Ch. 2).

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Fig. 9.2  OSPAR regions. (Source: open access at: www.ospar.org/convention/the-north-east-atlantic)

limited, such an arrangement may be adequate. Should human activities become more intense and diversified in the future, however, pressure may rise to make a conscious effort to sort out these differences. Most of the BaSR lies within OSPAR’s Region 1 labeled Arctic Waters (see Fig. 9.2).3 Many observers regard this regime established under the 1992 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic as an effective arrangement created initially to address problems of ship-based and land-­ based pollution but now dealing increasingly with European standards on matters of marine biodiversity, eutrophication, hazardous and radioactive wastes, and offshore oil and gas development as well (Molenaar and Oude Elferink 2009). It seems accurate to say, however, that Region 1 has received much less attention under the terms of this regime than other regions, including Region II encompassing the North Sea. This condition is unlikely to change during the foreseeable future, especially given the fact that the Russian Federation is not formally a contracting party to the OSPAR Convention. At the national level, Norway has proceeded vigorously to develop a system of coastal and ocean management applicable to areas under its jurisdiction (see Chap. 3 and Hoel and Olsen 2012). A particularly notable feature

3  The Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission has regulatory areas encompassing those parts of the BaSR that are beyond coastal state jurisdiction.

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of Norway’s approach has been a proactive effort to apply the tools of integrated ocean management, sometimes referred to as marine spatial planning in other regions of the world (see Chap. 10 and Young et  al. 2007). The development of bilateral cooperation between Norway and Russia on marine issues within the framework of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Commission on Environmental Protection suggests that there is room for an intermediate arrangement that transcends national boundaries but is more focused than Region I of OSPAR (see Fig. 9.2). One mechanism that may provide helpful insights in this connection is the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) with its various subsidiary bodies and with a secretariat located in Kirkenes, Norway.4 The Barents Regional Council, which operates under the auspices of BEAC, is composed of subnational units of government including the northern counties of Norway and the northwestern oblasts of the Russian Federation as well as the northern counties of Finland and Sweden and representatives of Indigenous peoples’ organizations and is designed to engage regional authorities in efforts to stimulate and implement cooperative measures on matters of particular concern to local or regional constituencies (Stokke and Hønneland 2007). Although the spatial domain of the BEAC does not coincide with what we treat as the BaSR and the council has focused more on terrestrial than marine matters, this body’s experience in stimulating functional cooperation on issues that cut across jurisdictional boundaries may suggest constructive approaches to the governance of a marine ecopolitical region like the BaSR. One interesting strategy for achieving coordination regarding matters of regional concern in the BaSR may be to start by establishing a coordinated network of marine protected areas (MPAs) in the region through some procedure featuring mutual consent (Figure 6.7 in Chap. 6 provides a map of areas of heightened ecological significance in the region). It is worth noting in this connection that the waters around the Svalbard Archipelago and around Franz Josef Land are accorded particularly high priority in these terms. As it happens, these are areas in which Norway and Russia already have taken significant steps, going back in some cases to the 1970s, to protect coastal and marine ecosystems (Sazhenova 2016). Beyond this, it will be essential to proceed with care, assessing the relationship between high priority areas from the perspective of ecosystem protection and areas of particular interest to fishing, energy, and shipping interests. Experience in other regions makes it clear that it is typically difficult to delineate specific areas for various forms or levels of protection that all parties concerned can accept comfortably. Nevertheless, there is growing momentum in other parts of the world to establish larger and larger MPAs (McLeod and Leslie 2009). Naturally, it is more difficult to make progress in areas located beyond the jurisdiction of coastal states. But the decision announced in October 2016 to create a large MPA in the Ross Sea adjacent to Antarctica indicates that international cooperation even in parts of the high seas is feasible (ASOC current). It may well be that Norway and Russia can build on their success in governing shared marine resources to design a coordinated network of MPAs in the BaSR.  For background on the structure and operations of the BEAC, consult: www.beac.st/en

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As these observations suggest, there are limitations inherent in any system of governance founded on the principle of dealing with needs for governance in a sectoral manner (Crowder et  al. 2006). In the BaSR, there are currently in place distinct arrangements dealing with fishing, energy development, shipping, and ecosystem protection. So long as human activities in these separate sectors are limited, such a system can produce satisfactory results. But as human activities in a marine ecopolitical region like the BaSR increase, problems of institutional interplay arise. This is an issue that is destined to become more prominent in the BaSR and other regions involving shared resources in the coming years (Young 2016). In the Barents Sea, the main areas of overlap involve fishing grounds, gas fields, shipping lanes, and marine protected areas. Undoubtedly, some of the resultant issues can be handled on an ad hoc basis. Shipping lanes can be adjusted on a seasonal basis to avoid major fishing grounds or the annual migratory routes of marine mammals. It is possible to impose regulations on offshore oil and gas development (e.g. the requirement to drill relief wells) that are effective in minimizing the likelihood of accidents or the destructive impacts of oil spills or gas leaks that get out of control. Sophisticated tools may make it possible to design marine protected areas in ways that minimize interference with conventional economic activities like fishing and shipping (Airame et al. 2003). At some stage, however, the challenge of finding ways to integrate the elements of this regime complex will become a major concern (Oberthür and Stokke 2011). Regime complexes are sets of nonhierarchical arrangements that arise to deal with needs for governance in an identifiable issue domain or spatially defined area (Raustiala and Victor 2004; Keohane and Victor 2011; Alter and Raustiala 2018). Although the initial emergence of a regime complex reflects unplanned or de facto rather than intentional developments, it becomes important as human activities increase in scope and intensity to think about rationalizing constituent elements in order to avoid conflicts between or among individual regime elements and to take advantage of potential synergies among them (Oberthür and Gehring 2006). There is no simple criterion for determining when this threshold is reached. But the growth of a range of human activities in the BaSR indicates that we are likely to reach a threshold of this sort in addressing needs for governance in the Barents Sea Region during the foreseeable future. An additional need for governance centers on the importance of devising arrangements that can facilitate efforts to respond agilely to nonlinear, sometimes abrupt, and often surprising changes in marine ecopolitical regions. Although their main impact lies to the west of the area we treat as the BaSR, recent shifts in the mackerel (Scomber scombrus) stocks in the North Atlantic offer a striking illustration of this sort of dynamism (Nøttestad et al. forthcoming). Stocks of Atlantic mackerel have expanded rapidly in a westerly direction, starting in the Norwegian Sea and extending into waters under the jurisdiction of the Faroe Islands, Iceland, and even Greenland (Ministry of Industries and Innovation current). By some measures, mackerel now constitute the largest single-species biomass in the North Atlantic. This expansion has occurred rapidly; it is not known whether the stocks will crash or recede equally rapidly in the coming years, making it challenging to provide for

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effective governance. Already, ICES is calling for reductions in allowable catches of this species (ICES 2015-2016). But achieving the consensus needed to act on such recommendations is difficult. The BaSR may experience similar dynamism, driven by a range of factors including shifting weather patterns, ocean acidification, the growth of aquaculture, fluctuations in world market prices for oil and gas, and the growth of commercial shipping, among others. The arrangement covering fisheries established initially under the bilateral agreements of the 1970s and reconfirmed and extended to energy development under the terms of the 2010 Norwegian-­ Russian Treaty may be part of the answer to this challenge. But they are not likely to be sufficient. Pressure from the fishing industry may lead the Joint Norwegian-­ Russian Fisheries Commission to set allowable harvest levels in excess of the recommendations of ICES, especially if the cod stocks enter a period of decline relative to their current robust condition. As fish stocks move into the international waters of the loophole, fishers from other countries are becoming increasingly resistant to the decisions of the Joint Commission regarding quotas. In any event, these arrangements cannot deal with the establishment of new or expanded MPAs, a response recommended by many as a means of cushioning the impacts of largescale but unpredictable shifts in the composition of marine systems (McLeod and Leslie 2009). As a result, dealing effectively with the dynamics of the BaSR may require the development of institutional arrangements that are better positioned to address systemic shifts than those in place today.

9.4.2 Infrastructure Governance systems are seldom self-executing. They require the development of administrative capacity to handle implementation on a day-to-day basis as well as the creation of monitoring systems, compliance mechanisms, and dispute settlement procedures. Relative to other sectors of the Arctic, the BaSR has some distinct advantages with regard to such matters. Because much of the region, including those areas of greatest interest from the perspectives of fishing and energy development, are ice free year around, there is little need to contend with problems (e.g. shipping in ice-covered or ice-infested waters, search and rescue under unusually difficult conditions, or responses to pollution in ice-infested waters) that loom large in moving governance systems from paper to practice in other parts of the Arctic. Similarly, the Arctic coasts of Norway and northwestern Russia are better endowed with ports and other relevant forms of built infrastructure than other parts of the Arctic. As Table  9.1 indicates, a number of intergovernmental organizations and related bodies encompass the BaSR within their scope of authority and contribute to the administration of governance systems currently operative in the region. These are distinct advantages; they set the BaSR apart from other parts of the Arctic with regard to the availability of built infrastructure capable of taking on a variety of functional tasks. Still, it would be a mistake to conclude from these observations that upgrading infrastructure is not an important consideration in governing the BaSR effectively.

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Some requirements are largely matters of extending or adapting existing capabilities to address the evolving character of the Barents Sea regime complex. This applies to the role of ICES in providing science-based advice on the condition of fish stocks in the BaSR, the capacity of advanced technologies to monitor ship traffic in the region, and the activities of Norwegian Coast Guard and Russian Federal Border Service units in addressing the challenges of law enforcement regarding fisheries and other matters of joint concern. But other requirements are likely to call for the development of new organizational capacity and built infrastructure. The most obvious example centers on the introduction of organizational arrangements designed to sort out tensions and take advantage of synergies in the evolving Barents Sea governance complex. One worthwhile avenue to explore for early action in this connection is the strengthening of capacity in the areas of monitoring, reporting, and verification. The region is already served by well-developed ship tracking systems and by sophisticated tools used to support integrated ocean management (see Chaps. 10 and 11). But rapid advances in technology are opening up new opportunities to combine Earth observations from satellites with a variety of surface observations to provide advance warning of emerging problems, support emergency services, and conduct real-time monitoring to verify compliance with regulations and facilitate the apprehension of those who violate applicable regulations.5 In this regard, there may be a role for mechanisms operating within the framework of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) or, more modestly, for assessing the experience of the BEAC in promoting transnational cooperation on a regional basis as a source of lessons of interest to those with a mandate to implement the various elements of the emerging governance system applicable to human activities occurring in the BaSR and the probable growth of these activities during the foreseeable future (Stokke and Hønneland 2007). The critical challenge in this regard is to mesh regional arrangements that provide prominent roles for local actors possessing in-depth knowledge of the region (see Chap. 8) with broader international arrangements that apply equally to the BaSR and a range of other regions.

9.5

The Future of the Barents Sea Region Regime Complex

The discussion in the preceding section suggests that it would be worthwhile for decisionmakers to consider options for increasing the integration of the Barents Sea Region regime complex and enhancing its agility in responding to changes that are difficult to foresee in advance (Oberthür and Gehring 2006; Oberthür and Stokke 2011). Certainly, Norway and Russia will be the lead actors in any activity of this sort. But it may make sense to develop explicit procedures to allow for enhanced participation on the part of other governments (e.g. the Faroe Islands, Iceland), 5  For a general account of the uses of satellite observations in addressing environmental problems, see Stokke and Young 2017.

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intergovernmental organizations (e.g. ICES, NEAFC, OSPAR), and Indigenous peoples’ organizations (e.g. the Saami Council). The creation of an integrated arrangement of this sort is apt to be a slow process involving negotiations and the evolution of informal practices over a period of time among a variety of stakeholders with distinct but overlapping interests. A consideration of the rising need for integration among the elements of the Barents Sea regime complex suggests that it may make sense to start the process of working out the terms of what could evolve over time into a Barents Sea Regional Authority sooner rather than later to alleviate the problem of having to make decisions under severe time pressure at a later stage (see also Chap. 5). One way to initiate this process would be to focus at the outset on the articulation of a set of common principles governing human activities in the BaSR rather than on the development of more formal or legally binding rules or procedures (Young 2017, Chap. 6). To some extent, this would be a matter of adapting generic principles set forth in global international agreements like UNCLOS to the specific circumstances of this region. Among the most relevant of these are the precautionary principle, the polluter pays principle, and the principle of environmental equity. The principle of stewardship may offer a particularly attractive point of departure for thinking about the future of governance in the BaSR in a coherent manner (Chapin et al. 2015). Principles of this sort are codes of conduct that are expected to operate as guides to normatively prescribed or ethical behavior rather than legally binding rules that actors are obligated to comply with under applicable international law. They are intended to provide a basis for building up a set of normatively grounded social practices that serve to structure the behavior of public and private actors in an issue domain or spatially defined region. Principles are not substitutes for more formal rules setting forth requirements and prohibitions that are legally obligatory. Nevertheless, there is much to be said for encouraging the growth of principled governance as a basis for addressing more specific needs for governance in an effective manner in an area like the BaSR (Young 2017, Chap. 6). Whether or not this process would evolve over time toward the creation of a Barents Sea Regional Authority would depend more on incremental developments than on a constitutive decision taken at a particular point in time.

9.6

Conclusion

In one sense, the Barents Sea Region is a comparatively simple case with regard to governance in which two adjacent states – Norway and Russia – have a substantial history of cooperation, have resolved their longstanding disagreement regarding the delimitation of their maritime boundary in the area, and have put in place cooperative arrangements to address needs for governance relating to fisheries, energy development, and environmental protection. From the perspective of governance, these are noteworthy achievements. Going forward, however, we can expect the emergence of new needs for governance in this region. Many of these needs arise from the complex biophysical dynamics of the region or reflect the growth of human

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activities in distinct sectors that generate challenges involving the integration of the Barents Sea regime complex to match shifting conditions in the region. Norway and Russia will remain the dominant players in the BaSR.  But both biophysical and socioeconomic changes have given rise to conditions that will require a consideration of the interests of additional players. The dominant players will need to acknowledge the validity of the interests of others; they should take the lead in proposing institutional adjustments that allow others to have a voice in governing the BaSR, while at the same time protecting the legitimacy of the practice of treating the coastal states as the primary actors in this region. Rationalizing the Barents Sea regime complex is a matter of devising procedures to manage institutional interplay, a classic challenge for governance in complex settings (Oberthür and Stokke 2011). It will also require the development of suitably augmented or new forms of infrastructure to administer the resultant arrangements on a day-to-day basis. In one sense, these governance challenges constitute a case of what we can treat properly as “good trouble.” There is no need to start from scratch in addressing needs for governance in the BaSR or to treat the current situation as approaching a condition of crisis. The arrangements already in place in this region provide an excellent point of departure for addressing new needs for governance as they arise over time. Yet it is important not to adopt a complacent attitude regarding the governance of this ecopolitical region. There is much to be done in enhancing the existing governance system of the BaSR not only to meet needs coming into focus today but also to anticipate needs already visible on the horizon for the future.

References Airame S et al (2003) Applying ecological criteria to marine reserve design: a case study from the California Channel Islands. Ecol Appl 13:S170–S184 Alter KJ, Raustiala K (2018) The rise of international regime complexity. Ann Rev Law Soc Sci 18:1–18 ASOC current Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition, “Ross Sea Preservation,” www.asoc.org/ advocacy/marine-protected-areas/ross-sea-preservation Berkman PA (2015) Institutional dimensions of sustaining Arctic observing networks. Arctic 68(Suppl 1):89–99 Chapin F, Stuart III et al (2015) Ecosystem stewardship: a resilience framework for Arctic conservation. Glob Environ Chang 34:207–2017 Crowder LB et al (2006) Resolving mismatches in U.S. Ocean Governance. Science 313:617–618 Hoel AH, Olsen E (2012) Integrated Ocean management as a strategy to meet rapid climate change. Ambio 41:85–95 ICES (2016) Mackerel (Scomber scombrus) in Subareas 1–7 and 14 and Divisions 8.a-c and 9.a Northeast Atlantic. Published 30 September 2015, revised 20 September 2016 Joint Russian-Norwegian Commission on Environmental Protection (2016) Russia and Norway work out a draft plan for polar bear conservation. http://arctic.ru/environmental/20161109/488230.html Keohane RO, Victor DG (2011) The regime complex for climate change. Perspect Polit 9:7–23 Kirkey C (1994–1995) Smotthing troubled waters: the 1988 Canada-United States Arctic co-operation agreement. Int J 50:401–426

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Lind S, Ingvaldsen RB, Furevik T (2018) Arctic warming hotspot in the northern Barents Sea linked to declining sea-ice import. Nat Clim Chang 8:634–639 McLeod K, Leslie H (eds) (2009) Ecosystem-based Management for the Oceans. Island Press, Washington, DC Ministry of Industries and Innovation of Iceland. Mackerel fishing dispute questions and answers. http://eng.atvinnuvegaraduneyti.is/mackerel-fishingidispute/news/nr/6903 Molenaar EJ, Oude Elferink AG (2009) Marine protected areas in areas beyond National Jurisdiction – the pioneering efforts under the OSPAR convention. Utrecht Law Rev 5:5–20 Nilsen (2017) Russia, Norway agree to reduce Barents Sea cod quota. The Barents Observer, 13 October Nøttestad L et al (forthcoming) Quantifying changes in abundance, biomass, and spatial distribution of Northeast Atlantic mackerel (Scomber scombrus) in the Nordic Seas from 2007 to 2014. ICES J Mar Sci 73(2):359–373 Oberthür S, Gehring T (eds) (2006) Institutional interaction in global environmental governance: synergy and conflict among international and EU policies. MIT Press, Cambridge Oberthür S, Stokke OS (eds) (2011) Institutional interaction and global environmental change. MIT Press, Cambridge Østhagen A (2018) Managing conflict at Sea: the case of Norway and Russia in the Svalbard Zone. Arctic Rev Law Politics 9:100–123 Østhagen A, Raspotnik A (2019) Why is the European Union challenging Norway over snow crab? Svalbard, special interests, and Arctic governance. Ocean Dev Int Law. https://doi.org/10.108 0/00908320.2019.1582606 Oude Elferink AG (1994) The law of maritime boundary delimitation: a case study of the Russian Federation. Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht Pedersen T (2008) The dynamics of Svalbard diplomacy. Ocean Dev Int Law 32:236–262 Pincus R (2018) China’s polar strategy: an emerging gray zone. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat. com/2018/07/chinas-polar-strategy-an-emerging-gray-zone/ Raustiala K, Victor DG (2004) The regime complex for plant genetic resources. Int Organ 55:277–309 Sazhenova A (2016) Russia ready to boost Arctic tourism. The Barents Observer, 29 June Stokke OS (2012) Disaggregating international regimes: a new approach to evaluation and comparison. MIT Press, Cambridge Stokke OS, Hønneland G (eds) (2007) International cooperation and Arctic governance: regime effectiveness and northern region building. Routledge, London Stokke OS, Young OR (2017) Chapter: 6: Integrating earth-observation systems and international environmental regimes. In: Onoda M, Young OR (eds) Satellite earth observations and their impact on society and policy. Springer, Tokyo Stokke OS, Anderson LG, Mirovitskaya N (1999) The Barents Sea fisheries. In: Young OR (ed) The effectiveness of international regimes. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 91–154 Vylegzhanin AN, Young OR, Berkman PA (2018) Governing the Barents Sea Region: current status, emerging issues, and future options. Ocean Dev Int Law 49:1–27 Young OR (1989) International cooperation: building regimes for natural resources and the environment. Cornell University Press, Ithaca Young OR (2016) Governing the Arctic Ocean. Mar Policy 72:271–277 Young OR (2017) Governing complex systems: social Capital for the Anthropocene. MIT Press, Cambridge Young OR et al (2007) Solving the crisis in ocean governance: place-based Management of Marine Ecosystems. Environment 49:20–32

Part IV Crosscutting Themes and Analytic Tools

Integrated Ocean Management in the Barents Sea

10

Ellen Øseth and Oleg Korneev

Abstract

The Barents Sea is a high-latitude large marine ecosystem shared uniquely by Norway and Russia, located off the northern coasts of both countries. In the South and West it is influenced by Atlantic water (warmer and more saline water), and in the North and East by Arctic or mixed (Atlantic and Arctic) water (colder and less saline). The Barents Sea is characterized by large seasonal and annual variations in ocean climate and moderately high productivity. On the Norwegian side, a management plan was established in 2006, updated in 2011, and are now planned for a full revision in 2020. In Norway, the foundation of the management plans is not in the legal system, meaning there are no laws regulating the existence of management plans as a tool for management. However, the management plans are sanctioned at the highest political level in Norway, as they are presented as White papers from the Government to Parliament, and endorsed by Parliament. On the Russian side, a number of strategic documents of the Russian Federation are devoted to the issues of environmental management. Thus, in accordance with the Environmental Doctrine of the Russian Federation, the main direction of the state’s environmental policy is the implementation of comprehensive environmental management, and its orientation towards sustainable development of the Russian Federation. There is no management plan in place for the Russian side of the Barents Sea, but Norway and Russia are cooperating,

E. Øseth (*) Environmental Management Section, Norwegian Polar Institute, Tromsø, Norway e-mail: [email protected] O. Korneev Federal State Budgetary Institution North-West Administration of Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring, St. Petersburg, Russia © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 O. R. Young et al. (eds.), Governing Arctic Seas: Regional Lessons from the Bering Strait and Barents Sea, Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25674-6_10

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aiming at harmonisation of the management of the shared ocean area. Russia is working towards a management plan.

10.1 The Barents Sea: A Rich, Common Ocean Area Norway and Russia share a common ocean space, and have a long history of collaboration in this area. The Barents Sea (Norwegian: Barentshavet; Russian: Баренцево море) is a high-latitude large marine ecosystem shared uniquely by Norway and Russia, located off the northern coasts of both countries. In the South and West it is influenced by Atlantic water (warmer and more saline water), and in the North and East by Arctic or mixed (Atlantic and Arctic) water (colder and less saline). The Barents Sea is characterized by large seasonal and annual variations in ocean climate and moderately high productivity (McBride et al. 2016). With an average depth of 230 m and a maximum depth of approximately 500 m at the western entrance, it is a shallow shelf sea (Stiansen et al. 2009). The southern half of the Barents Sea is not ice covered, but in the northern part sea ice is present parts of the year. The Barents Sea sea ice cover is characterized by large variation from year to year. The main development in the ice extent since 1979 has been a clearly negative trend (MOSJ 2019) (Fig. 10.1). The Barents Sea is an important feeding area for cod, capelin, haddock, herring, sea perch, catfish, plaice, halibut, Atlantic salmon, and redfish. Major international fisheries take place in the area, and the main sources of pollution are industrial activities linked to marine transport, the extraction of petroleum products (oil and gas) and fresh-water runoff (McBride et al. 2016). In recent years, a continuous increase in temperature and a decrease in sea ice have caused a ‘borealisation’ of the Barents Sea. Temperature increases have caused Atlantic and thermophilic species to migrate from the South-West parts of the Barents Sea to migrate North and East, while the distribution of Arctic species to a large degree is limited to the nothernmost and easternmost areas. Loss of sea ice has increased primary production, which together with solid fisheries management created the foundation for a large stock of Northeast Arctic cod (Arneberg and Jelmert 2017). Other important trends in the ecosystem are not as positive as for the stock of Northeast arctic cod. Most seabird populations are declining, probably due to failure in food availability, and populations of the ice-dependent seal species and certain fish stocks are showing negative trends. The increased distribution of snow crab, a new species in the ecosystem, might have changed the biomass of benthos in some areas (Arneberg and Jelmert 2017). The sustainable management of such a resource rich area needs to be done in a holistic manner, including all anthropogenic impacts and the natural variations to foresee the possible trajectories for the ocean, but also to insure the necessary limitations and precautions for industrial activity to maintain the productivity and diversity of the area’s ecosystems. Both Norway and Russia have decided ecosystem-­ based management plans are helpful frameworks for achieving this.

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Fig. 10.1  Map of the Barents Sea

10.2 W  hy Develop Integrated Ocean Management in the Barents Sea? As both Norway and Russia are aiming at managing the Barents Sea within the framework of ecosystem-based management (EBM), a short description of the theoretical framework for this is needed. However, this chapter is a description of the approach of the two states, and a comparison as far as it is possible, given the different stages the two processes are at, and given the differences between the organization of the two states. The aim is not to evaluate the effectiveness or success of the two processes, but to give insight on the status and development. EBM is widely recognized as a strategy for sustainable management of the oceans (Sander 2018). Over the last decades, the use of it has grown consistently, due to the recognition of management failing the sustainable exploitation of marine

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resources. Fish stock collapses in the decades before the millennium are presented as the reason behind the need for a different management regime (Curtin and Prellezo 2010). In the Arctic Council report on EBM in 2013, a definition is given: EBM is the comprehensive, integrated management of human activities based on best available scientific and traditional knowledge about the ecosystem and its dynamics, in order to identify and take action on influences that are critical to the health of ecosystems, thereby achieving sustainable use of ecosystem goods and services and maintenance of ecosystem integrity (Arctic Council 2013).

The main difference from more single-sector management regimes, is the holistic approach where the ecosystem as such is the entity for management, not single species, habitats or concerns (Sander 2018). Another main point in EBM is the recognition of ecosystems as complex adaptive systems where changes in lower trophic levels can due to actions and processes occurring at lower levels. Humans are part of the complex adaptive systems and can change the functioning of them. This recognition is also important in order to show how society can exploit these resources in a sustainable manner. To achieve legitimacy, the inclusion of stakeholders is important (Curtin and Prellezo 2010). Given these basic theoretically descriptions of EBM, Norway an Russia are continuously working on finding the best way of implementing, adopting and developing their management plan regimes.

10.3 D  evelopment of the Management Plan Systems in the Barents Sea 10.3.1 Russian–Norwegian Cooperation in the Barents Sea 10.3.1.1 Joint Norwegian–Russian Fisheries Commission Major stocks of commercial important fish species in the Barents Sea are shared between Russia and Norway. During the late 1970s, cooperation on management of shared fish stocks was instituted through the Joint Norwegian–Russian Fisheries Commission (JNRFC), formally established in 1975. The bilateral cooperation is of critical importance to ensure sustainable fisheries in the Barents Sea. Stocks are currently assessed through the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), which provides scientific advice and contributes to sustainable management. JNRFC uses this advice to decide safe fishing quotas for Russia, Norway, and third-party countries. Joint agreements are also established on effective regulatory measures. Quotas for joint stocks of Northeast Arctic cod, haddock, and capelin are determined based on sustainable management strategies. The Polar Research Institute of Marine Fisheries (PINRO) in Russia and the Institute of Marine Research (IMR) in Norway have a close collaboration on monitoring, research and advice on quota in the Barents Sea.

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10.3.1.2 T  he Joint Norwegian–Russian Commission on Environmental Protection A well-functioning cooperation between Norway and Russia is important to protect the environment and manage the resources in the Barents Sea. Sharing borders both on land and in the Barents Sea, the two countries also share the responsibility for the environment in these areas. The Barents Sea ecosystem is common, with shared populations of birds, fish and mammals. Cooperation within the field of protection of the environment is coordinated by the Joint Russian–Norwegian Commission for the Protection of the Environment. The Ministry of Natural Resources of Russia and the Ministry of Climate and Environment in Norway signed the first agreement on cooperation in 1992. About 12  years ago, the Ministry of Natural Resources of Russia started dealing with issues of preparation for the environmentally safe development of the resources of the Russian part of the Barents Sea. For example, in January 2005, within the work of the Joint Russian–Norwegian Commission for the Protection of the Environment of the Barents Sea, a Marine Group was established, which included representatives of the main organizations involved in science and management of the Russian and the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea. Within the work of the Marine Group under the Joint Russian–Norwegian Commission, in the years 2005–2007, Norway’s experience with development of a management plan was studied. During the years 2007–2008 large joint work was carried out to determine the situation in the Barents Sea ecosystem and the level of economic activity. In 2009, for the first time in the history of international environmental relations of Russia, the Joint Russian–Norwegian Report on the State of the Barents Sea Ecosystem was published. In the years 2010–2018, the work of the Marine Group was focused on the following projects: Ocean-1 Development of the concept of the Barents Sea resource management plan Ocean-2 Web portal with status evaluation and environmental data for the Barents Sea Ocean-3 Ecosystem monitoring of the Barents Sea Ocean-4 Oil and gas activity in the Barents Sea Ocean-5 Mapping of the biotopes in the Barents Sea Within the Ocean-1 project in 2015, the joint report on the status of the Barents Sea ecosystem, was published. In 2018, a decision to involve ICES into the project was made, to help establishing a joint approach on mapping vulnerable and valuable areas in the Barents Sea. Ocean-2 runs an updated web portal presenting status and data for the entire Barents Sea, which facilitates regular updates on status. The next update will happen in 2020 at the latest. The project Ocean-3 project published the joint report “On Ecological Indicators for Ecosystem Monitoring of the Barents Sea” in 2015. After this, the focus has

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been on increasing knowledge on several species included in the selected indicators, in cooperation between Russian and Norwegian scientists. Within the project Ocean-4 from 2008 to 2014 joint visits to the oil production platforms in Norway and Russia were carried out to share experience in the field of environmental control in the activities. Within the Ocean-5 project in 2013, for the first time in international practice in the Arctic, a joint geological (lithological) map of the Barents Sea was designed («Sevmorgeo» from Russia, the Geological Survey from Norway), presented at the Barents Portal (http://www.barentsportal.com). This all means that steps taken within the joint marine working group have brought the Norwegian and Russian management of the shared ocean and the resources therein closer. The cooperation within environmental protection is regarded as a success story by both sides.

10.3.2 Management Plan Systems in the Two Countries 10.3.2.1 Norway In Norway, the foundation of the management plans is not in the legal system, meaning there are no laws regulating the existence of management plans as a tool for management. However, the management plans are sanctioned at the highest political level in Norway, as they are presented as White papers from the Government to Parliament, and endorsed by Parliament. In 2002, the Norwegian Government presented a White paper called Protecting the Riches of the Seas, where a management plan system for the Norwegian ocean areas was proposed, and consequently endorsed by Parliament. In the White paper, the Government states: The overall goal is to provide the prerequisites for a clean and rich sea, inter alia, through the establishment of external conditions that allow us to strike a balance between the commercial interests connected with fisheries, aquaculture and the petroleum industry within the framework of a sustainable development.

Based on this, Norway now has management plans for all three defined ocean areas, the North Sea and Skagerak, the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea. The first Norwegian management plan for the Barents Sea–Lofoten Area was presented for Parliament in 2006, and the plan was updated in 2011. A new update and revision is planned for 2020. From the very beginning, the management plan system has been ecosystem and knowledge based, see Fig. 10.2. The management plans are sanctioned at the highest possible political level, as the management plans are presented by the Government as White Papers to Parliament. To develop the plans, there is an organizational body with a steering committee of representatives from nine ministries, and two scientific entities delivering the scientific basis for the plans (Fig. 10.3). The Management forum consists of representatives from 12 directorates from all sectors, cooperating across sectors. In the Monitoring group, there are 13 directorates and public research institutes

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based on best available ecological

serve as key environmental and socio-economic indicators

Develop knowledge base: Ecosystem impact assessments

Set goals

Develop conceptual models

Collect physical, biological & socioeconomic data

Monitor & assess

Project management & stakeholder

Make and implement EBM decisions

Visualize data & scenarios

Process & manage data Analyze data & develop models & scenarios

Possible Methodology for Applying EBM

Fig. 10.2  The ideal for the management plan system for the Norwegian ocean areas. Arctic Marine Strategic Plan 2015–2025

cooperating to make reports on the status of the ecosystems and identifying important monitoring gaps. The scientific process produces a scientific base for the political process of developing the plan (Fig. 10.3). The monitoring part of the system is indicator based. This means that the Monitoring group reports on a set of indicators, providing the needed knowledge base for the environmental status in the three different ocean areas, including the Barents Sea. The selected indicators, most of them updated with data yearly, form the basis for the regular status reports from the Monitoring Group, and the data and interpretations of the indicators are published in Norwegian on the website www. environment.no. Other knowledge from monitoring and research publications compliments the indicators as a scientific foundation.

10.3.2.2 Russia A number of strategic documents of the Russian Federation are devoted to the issues of environmental management. Thus, in accordance with the Environmental

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Fig. 10.3  The organization of the Norwegian management plan system consists of all the nine relevant Ministries and directorates and public research institutes from all relevant sectors

Doctrine of the Russian Federation,1 the main direction of the state’s environmental policy is the implementation of comprehensive environmental management, and its orientation towards sustainable development of the Russian Federation. Work on the draft for the comprehensive marine management plan in the Russian part of the Barents Sea began during the work of the “ocean group” of the Joint Russian–Norwegian Commission for Environmental Protection in 2005 under the auspices of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology of Russia and the Ministry of Environment of Norway. On June 52,014, in St. Petersburg, a meeting under the leadership of the President of the Russian Federation dedicated to the issues of safe development of the Arctic was held. Following on June 292,014, the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation issued a document “List of orders of the President of the Russian Federation to the Government”. In point 3b it states: “to develop a pilot plan for the comprehensive environmental management in the Arctic seas and implement it in the Russian part of the Barents Sea”. In Russia, the following declarations and resolutions of the United Nations are the base of the ecosystem-based management (EBM) for sustainable development of the human activity in the Barents Sea: –– –– –– ––

For Human Environment (Stockholm, 1972); For Environment and Development (Rio-de-Janeiro, 1992); For Sustainable Development (Johannesburg, 2002); Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Geneva, 2015)

 dated August 31, 2002 No. 1225-r

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In addition, the Norwegian experience of creating the integrated management plan, UNESCO Guidelines for Marine Spatial Planning (2009 and 2014) and Protocol of the Strategic Environmental Assessment for UN Espoo Convention, have been used. The strategic plan for maritime development of the Russian Federation for the period until 20302 for the purposes of marine environmental management sets a goal of development and use of marine spatial planning. The strategic plan for development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation and ensuring national security for the period until 2020, approved by the President of the Russian Federation in 2013 is at its second stage (until 2020). According to paragraph 31, it provides for a “set of measures to ensure sustainable use of aquatic resources of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation”. The President of the Russian Federation ordered in 2014–2015 research on the topic “Concept of Ecosystem-based Management in the Russian part of the Barents Sea”. The work was conducted under the management of JSC «Sevmorgeo» (part of the state holding company «Rosgeo»), and a pilot project was conducted. In their work they used the Norwegian expertise in developing a resource management plan, taking into account the guidelines for marine spatial planning of the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of the United Nations.3 The Murmansk Biological Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Polar Research Institute of Marine Fisheries and Oceanography (Federal Agency for Fishery), Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute (Roshydromet), All-Russian Research Institute of Ecology (Ministry of Natural Resources) and World Wildlife Fund (Russian branch), participated in the work of developing the draft plan for comprehensive marine management for the Russian part of the Barents Sea. When setting goals and objectives for the pilot project for the management plan in the Russian part of the Barents Sea, the following documents were used: –– Guidance of the UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission for marine spatial planning (A Step-by-Step Approach to Ecosystem-based Management, 2009); –– The management plans for the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea from 2006 and 2011; –– a report on the research and development of the Ministry of Natural Resources “Proposals and recommendations for the draft plan for resource management in the Russian part of the Barents Sea based on the ecosystem approach”, 2015. Thus, taking into account international documents on ecosystem management and marine spatial planning, the main objective for the pilot project on comprehensive marine management in the Russian part of the Barents Sea is to ensure an optimal level of economic development in the marine area without interrupting the sustainability of the biodiversity in the ecosystem.  Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of December 8, 2010 No. 2205-r  UNESCO, No. 342009 and No. 702014. IOC Manuals And Guides

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Based on the research work on the development of the pilot project, the Ministry of Natural Resources developed a report to the Government of the Russian Federation on the implementation of the Presidential Order of June 29, 2014, within which a roadmap for its implementation was developed.

10.3.3 Purpose of the Plans 10.3.3.1 Norway The purpose of the management plan for the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea remained unchanged in the update: The purpose of this management plan is to provide a framework for the sustainable use of natural resources and goods derived from the Barents Sea–Lofoten area and at the same time maintain the structure, functioning, productivity and diversity of the area’s ­ecosystems. The management plan is thus a tool for both facilitating value creation and maintaining the high environmental value of the area.

The area defined in the Barents Sea and Lofoten management plan is presented in Fig. 10.4.

10.3.3.2 Russia During the pilot project on comprehensive marine management in the Russian part of the Barents Sea, the following results have been obtained: –– –– –– –– ––

spatial and time limits of the marine environmental management plan; mapping and analysis of existing and planned human activities; spatial conflicts between branches of the national economy; mapping and analysis of the current state of the ecosystems; identification of spatial conflicts between sectors of the national economy and the state of the ecosystems; –– the development of a list of measures and proposals to minimize the negative impact of the industrial development on the state of the ecosystems; –– a monitoring system for both implementation of the comprehensive marine management plan and the state of the ecosystem; –– suggestions on adaptation of the developed plan during the actual implementation process based on the monitoring results. In the latest version of the draft Federal Law “On the State Management of Maritime Activities”4 (adoption is planned in 2019), the expediency of using the marine spatial planning is indicated, but without detail.

 Article 10 para. 3

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Fig. 10.4  Map over the area of the Norwegian management plan for the Barents Sea. ((C) Norwegian Polar Institute, 2017)

10.3.4 Updates and Evolvements When a management plan is in place, regular updates and revisions are needed to keep track of developments both in the environment and in activities in the area.

10.3.4.1 Norway On the Norwegian side, all three ocean areas now have management plans and undergo scheduled revisions and updates. The newly decided frequency of updates for all management plans in Norwegian waters is an update every 4th year and a complete revision every 12th year. For the Barents Sea, the first management plan was presented in 2006, updated in 2011 and is now undergoing a complete revision due to be finished in 2020. Updates are done to make sure the plans are based on the most updated knowledge on status in the environment and the situation for the

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activities. The latter can for example be due to changes in the politics for activities in the area. This means, in an update, only new knowledge is added as basis for adjustments to the plan. A revision is a more comprehensive process. In the mandate for revisions, it is stated that the scientific basis must provide a thorough review of status and development, assessment of changes and a review of areas with new knowledge or changed activities. The current revision of the scientific basis started in 2016 and is due spring 2019. Based on this scientific basis and the government’s policies and politics, a new management plan will be presented in 2020. The following topics will be included in the scientific basis for the revision: –– –– –– –– –– –– –– ––

Evaluation of environmental goals; Environmental status and cumulative environmental effects; Particularly vulnerable and valuable areas; Industrial activities, present-day and future area usage and needs, and effects on the environment and other industries; The foundation for ocean-based industries (ecosystem services); Risks and preparedness for acute pollution; Knowledge gaps; Status for implementation of measures in previous management plans, and the effect of them

10.3.4.2 Russia Taking into account the fact that only a pilot project of the comprehensive marine management plan has been developed in Russia, its update is not planned, but the development of this approach continues at present within a project of the “ocean group” of the Joint Russian-Norwegian Environmеntal Commission. Nevertheless, after the development of the actual plan after 2020, the pilot project suggested to regularly update it, presumably once every 5–7 years. In accordance with the UNESCO Guidelines for marine spatial planning, determining the spatial and time limits of the comprehensive marine management plan for the Russian part of the Barents Sea is to be carried out in two stages. Firstly, the definition of the spatial boundaries are set, followed by a definition of the time limits. The stage of determining the spatial boundaries was divided into two sub-stages: firstly the defining of boundaries between the branches of the national industry in the water area; secondly defining the limits of the analysis of natural conditions in the given ocean area. Taking into account the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation in the Barents Sea, the area of implementation of the comprehensive marine management plan is contained within national waters including waters of the sea itself and waters of the exclusive economic zone, as well as the main physical infrastructure objects on the coast, such as ports and settlements (Fig. 10.5). Defining the time limits was also divided into two sub-stages; the definition of the base year or the period for assessing current conditions; followed by a definition of the planning perspective (year or period).

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Fig. 10.5  Map of the area of the management plan area in the Russian part of the Barents Sea (highlighted in blue). (Korneev et al. 2015)

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The years from 2012 to 2014 are defined as the base period for this project, since there is up-to-date information on both the state of the ecosystem and physical infrastructure in the Russian part of the Barents Sea available. The planning perspective extends for the period 2020–2030, which is determined by the strategic plans of development of the national industry, set out in relevant documents.

10.4 Development of a Management Plan 10.4.1 Norway All the Norwegian management plans are based on knowledge from science. The Management Forum (see Fig. 10.3) coordinates and collects the necessary data and information as basis for the political decisions in the management plan. Throughout the years of the management plan system, more than 100 single reports on different aspects of the management plan have been produced. The reports vary in theme, from more typically environmental status reports, to analysis of maritime traffic, to fisheries, to cumulative effects from activities, to prospects for oil and gas to tourism, to scenarios for future developments for the northern part of Norway, to effects on indigenous people and much more. Between every update of the management plan, new knowledge is produced, both from monitoring and science in general, but also as assessments and studies ordered by the Management Forum. Before every update, all new knowledge is combined in an assessment from the management forum to the Ministries as scientific basis for the management plan. Each update process has a specific mandate from the Ministries, giving guidance on areas to cover in the scientific foundation. For the complete revision of the management plan for the Barents Sea in 2020, the scientific basis is presented as several reports within defined topics, and a summary report of them all.

10.4.2 Russia To implement the comprehensive marine management plan for the Russian part of the Barents Sea, two main things must be made. Firstly, an evaluation of the current and future state of the marine ecosystem, taking into account spatial characteristics of geo- and biodiversity; and secondly an evaluation of the current and future human impact on the marine ecosystems. As is known, the ecosystem consists of two main parts: the environment – non-­ living nature (abiotic components or geodiversity) – and living nature (biotic components or biodiversity). For assessing geodiversity the «Sevmorgeo» JSC (geological environment), the Polar Institute of Fisheries and Oceanography and the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute (AARI) (atmosphere, ice, water masses) were involved.

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For assessing biodiversity, the Murmansk Marine Biological Institute, the Polar Institute of Fisheries and Oceanography and the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute, the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute for Environmental Protection (VNII Ecology) and the Marine Mammals Council were involved. Based on these results, the state of the marine ecosystem of the Russian part of the Barents Sea was assessed through the abiotic components atmosphere, hydrosphere, sea ice, lithosphere and an assessment of current and expected climate change. The biotic components in the assessment were plankton (phytoplankton and zooplankton), benthos (phytobenthos and zoobenthos), fish (benthic, pelagic and transitional), marine mammals (pinnipeds, cetaceans, polar bear), seabirds, invasive species and human population, including indigenous peoples. An assessment of the impact of current and predictive climate changes on the state of the biotic components of the ecosystem were included too. In accordance with the data of the World Meteorological Organization, the climate changes expected over the Barents Sea by 2031 are increasing air temperature, decreasing salinity of surface waters, increasing ocean acidification and decreasing sea ice. These climate changes can lead to changes in the biotic components.

10.4.3 Valuable and Vulnerable Areas 10.4.3.1 V  aluable and Vulnerable Areas in the Norwegian Part of the Barents Sea From the very beginning of the Norwegian management plan, the identification of valuable and vulnerable areas has been of large importance. In 2003, the first report on methodology and suggestions for areas in need of a special protection was presented. The goal was to identify the areas from a pre-defined set of criteria. An expert panel with representatives from all relevant sectors defined the valuable areas for all different components of the ecosystem, and based on an over-all evaluation, it was suggested to define some areas as the valuable areas of the management plan. The criteria were defined as main criteria (importance for biodiversity and importance for biological production) and supplementary criteria (importance for representation of all biological zones, biotopes, habitats, species and cultural heritage in the area, connections between marine and terrestrial environment, extent of human influence, uniqueness, economic importance, scientific value and availability). Under all of these criteria, more specific, detailed and explanatory criteria were defined. For practical reasons, the identification of valuable areas was mainly based on the two main criteria listed above. In the marine environment, areas important to biodiversity and areas important for biological production, are often found where there are special oceanographic or topographic conditions. Therefore, by identifying such areas, areas of an especially rich or unique flora and fauna are identified too. I addition, marine organisms occupy different habitats through the different life stages. Such areas, for example spawning areas and nursery areas, are not always connected to a specific topography or oceanography. Hence, areas important at different life stages were identified separately.

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Under oceanographic and topographic unique areas, front systems (the marginal sea ice zone, the polar front, the edge of the continental slope) were defined as valuable. In these areas nutrition is available in the upper, productive layer of the water column, creating the foundation for high primary production and hence organisms higher in the food web. In addition, areas of strong currents, fjords and polls, retention areas and the littoral zone were defined as valuable. Areas important for the life history of organisms were defined as spawning, feeding and nesting areas, nursing areas and areas were early life stages of many organisms are transported in the water masses, feeding areas, overwintering areas and moulting areas. Already established or suggested protected marine areas and cultural heritage sites and areas under water were also taken into consideration. In the first management plan (Report No 8 to the Storting (2005–2006)) the particularly valuable and vulnerable areas were defined, and then again in the updated plan (Meld. St. 10 (2010–2011)) in 2011 (Fig. 10.6), but no changes were made. An update of the scientific foundation for the definition of the particularly valuable and vulnerable areas will be presented in 2019, and decided in the revision of the management plan in 2020.

10.4.3.2 V  aluable and Vulnerable Areas in the Russian Part of the Barents Sea Based on the assessment of some specific marine species of the Barents Sea, integrated spatial distribution of biodiversity charts were prepared for the main four seasons: winter (November–February), spring (March–May), summer (June– August) and autumn (September–October). In the following, we describe how these charts were made. The main biotic components of the ecosystem of the Russian part of the Barents Sea are plankton (phytoplankton and zooplankton), benthos (phytobenthos and zoobenthos), fish (bottom fish, pelagic and migratory fish), marine mammals (pinnipeds, cetaceans and polar bears) and seabirds. For a more correct spatial assessment of biodiversity in the Russian part of the Barents Sea, the trophic chain was conditionally divided into two main subclasses: –– lower trophic (phytoplankton, ichthyoplankton, zooplankton and zoobenthos) (Fig. 10.7); –– higher trophic (fish, birds, marine mammals). The fish are represented by the following main classes and species: bottomfish (North Atlantic cod, haddock), pelagic fish (capelin, saika), migratory fish (Atlantic salmon, pink salmon, trout, Arctic char, nelma, omul). MMBI scientists developed seasonal maps of the total distribution of these species (Fig. 10.8). As can be seen from this figure, the main distribution maxima are located in the southern part of the Barents Sea. In the Russian part of the Barents Sea, with different probability, 19 species of mammals (MMBI, Marine Mammal Council) can be encountered.

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Fig. 10.6  Particularly valuable and vulnerable areas in the Barents Sea–Lofoten area (the coastal zone shown in green, the marginal ice zone shown in dotted green and the polar front shown in striped green). (Source: Norwegian Polar Institute, 2011)

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Fig. 10.7  Distribution of phytoplankton and hydrobionts of the lower trophic level (zooplankton, ichthyoplankton, zoobenthos) by quarters (Upper left panel: winter; upper right panel: spring; lower left panel: summer; lower right panel: autumn). (Korneev et al. 2015)

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Fig. 10.8  Total ranked distribution of the main fish species of the Barents Sea by season: Upper left panel: winter; upper right panel: spring; lower left panel: summer; lower right panel: autumn; 1–5: rankings. (Korneev et al. 2015)

Based on data on the distribution of major mammal species, MMBI scientists developed seasonal charts of the ranking of the distribution of the main mammal species (Fig. 10.9). Analysis of Fig. 10.9 also shows that the main distribution maxima are concentrated in the southern part of the sea, and on the seasonal distribution plan the maxima are observed in winter, when the pinnipeds use ice for hunting and breeding. In the open sea, birds are represented by typically colonial species, among which mule and thick-cheeked guillemots predominate. The largest colonial concentrations of birds (bird bazaars) are observed on the western coast of Novaya

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Fig. 10.9  The total ranked distribution of Barents Sea marine mammals by seasons: Upper left panel: winter; upper right panel: spring; lower left panel: summer; lower right panel: autumn; 1–5: rankings. (Korneev et al. 2015)

Zemlya. The MMBI scientists compiled seasonal seabird distribution charts in the Barents Sea (Fig. 10.10). As a result of juxtaposition of charts of fish, marine mammals and seabirds distribution by means of ArcGIS software complex maps of distribution of these higher trophic species were compiled (Fig. 10.11). As can be seen from the presented figures, the main maximum of biodiversity is observed in the coastal part of the Kola Peninsula. During the year, highs are observed in the third and fourth quarters, which is especially evident in the Pechora Sea and off the coast of the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago.

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Fig. 10.10  Ranked distribution of Barents Sea colonial and water birds (16 species) by seasons: Upper left panel: winter; upper right panel: spring; lower left panel: summer (September); lower right panel: autumn; 1–3: rankings. Arrows show the direction of the seasonal bird migrations. (Korneev et al. 2015)

10.4.4 Involvement of Stakeholders Throughout the history of the Norwegian management plans, several public meetings, meetings with stakeholders, and public hearings have been organized in the process of developing the joint scientific foundation for the management plans. There are a lot of different stakeholders with both different and sometimes opposite interests when discussing the ocean areas. From local fishermen to international oil companies, from environmental organizations to mining industries, and of course

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Fig. 10.11  Seasonal distribution of Barents Sea higher trophics (fish, birds, marine mammals): Upper left panel: winter; upper right panel: spring; lower left panel: summer; lower right panel: autumn. (Korneev et al. 2015)

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the general public as such – they all have views on the management of the oceans. In the scientific report from the Management Forum, no suggestions for specific measures or actions are made, but the definitions of valuable and vulnerable areas are important for all groups as it is expected the areas will get extra attention and protection in the management plans. During the work on development of the pilot project on comprehensive marine management in the Russian area, the existing economic activities in the Russian part of the Barents Sea and its cost for their subsequent optimization were assessed: –– Port activities (ports, offshore stationary oil terminals, oil transshipment complexes); –– Shipping (cargo and passenger transport, fishing vessels, research vessels, auxiliary vessels); –– Industrial fishing (bottom and pelagic fish, Kamchatka crab, snow crab, Iceland scallop and northern shrimp); –– Exploration and production of hydrocarbon resources (seismic survey, prospecting, explorative and mining drilling, offshore gas pipelines); –– Navy; –– Operation of coastal municipal treatment facilities; –– Aquaculture; –– Sea-hunting industry; –– Anthropogenic objects on the bottom (cables and communication lines, sunken vessels and structures, underwater pipelines); –– Regional and transboundary pollution (chemical, mechanical, acoustic, radioactive, biological); –– Specially protected natural areas; –– Recreational resources; –– Objects of cultural heritage in the sea, on the islands and on the coast. Thus, the main stakeholders in Russia are either private companies that carry out economic activities in the Barents Sea, or government bodies responsible for developing economic activities at sea (Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Defense, Academy of Sciences, Rosrybolovstvo, Rosnedra, Rosmorport) or government bodies responsible for the environmentally safe use of this water area (Rosprirodnadzor, Rostekhnadzor, MNRE).

10.4.5 Identifying Knowledge Gaps For both the Norwegian and Russian sides of the ocean, the main knowledge gaps and hence the challenge for planning economic activities are caused by three factors. Firstly, there is an uncertainty in assessing the future development of the ecosystems because of future climate change. Species respond very differently to the changing conditions, and while some species are categorized as winners in the future, others are expected to be losers.

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Secondly, there is an uncertainty in forecasting the human-caused impacts on the ocean areas, due to various possible scenarios of economic development in the region and throughout the world. Thirdly, modeling the total effects on the ecosystems is not straightforward, not even if we had the perfect knowledge of future industrial activities in the Barents Sea. The cumulative effects are challenging to foresee. In the Norwegian management plan system, attention to knowledge gaps has been important from the beginning. Systematic reports on identified knowledge gaps were produced in 2003, and in the Management Forum report in 2010, an evaluation of the development of knowledge status was made. Both management plans review the knowledge gaps, and most importantly – some of the gaps from the first management plan had been filled by the time the plan was updated in 2011. In the ongoing process of updating the management plan in 2020, there is also attention on knowledge gaps.

10.4.6 Species Management 10.4.6.1 S  pecies Management in the Norwegian Part of the Barents Sea It is a goal to manage the marine resources in an ecosystem perspective, meaning the earlier one-species-targeted management should be replaced by a management of the ecosystem. This trend started before the management plan system was in place, but has gathered momentum during the years of a management plan. Species management, as all management through concrete actions, is still a responsibility of the different sectors. However, the ecosystem perspective on management helps when establishing fishing quotas for commercial species or when limitations or allowances for industrial activity are decided. The Government used the following targets for evaluating species management in the Barents Sea–Lofoten area in the management plan from 2011: –– Naturally occurring species will exist in viable populations and genetic diversity will be maintained; –– Harvested species will be managed within safe biological limits so that their spawning stocks have good reproductive capacity; –– Species that are essential to the structure, functioning, productivity and dynamics of ecosystems will be managed in such a way that they are able to maintain their role as key species in the ecosystem concerned; –– Populations of endangered and vulnerable species and species for which Norway has a special responsibility will be maintained or restored to viable levels as soon as possible. Unintentional negative pressures on such species as a result of activity in the Barents Sea–Lofoten area will be reduced as much as possible by 2010; –– The introduction of alien organisms through human activity will be avoided.

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The evaluation of the management of the different species is performed by comparing status to the targets listed above when updating or revising the plan.

10.4.6.2 S  pecies Management on the Russian Side of the Barents Sea Based on the results of marine spatial planning in Russia in 2014–2015 with the planning perspective to 2030, relevant proposals were made on the management of the main resources of the Russian part of the Barents Sea, especially the management of the fishery industry. As a basis for improving all fishery industry practices, it seems appropriate to consider the implementation of the principles of sustainable fisheries as specified in the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (adopted by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) on October 31, 1995 in Rome, Italy) and applied in environmental certification of fisheries according to the standards of the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC). Regarding measures for reducing the impact of bottom trawling on benthic communities and their protection, it should be recommended for the Russian trawling fleet to use reporting in case of megabenthos catches with the subsequent mandatory change of the location of the fishing area. With respect to traditional trawl fishing areas, where limitations are difficult and impractical to implement, it is necessary to change the trawl fishery itself to improve its ecological character. This means, to reduce the impact on benthic communities in the following ways: 1. switching to trawls with pelagic boards and (or) flexible spacers not touching the ground; 2. modernization of ground ropes for exclusion or minimal touching of soil and introduction of appropriate elaborations into practice; 3. improvement of the technology of the trawling process for more accurate, targeted towing of the trawl in the places of commercial accumulations (for example, the Autotral system). Regarding measures for reducing non-target by-catches and illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, it is recommended to consider the possibility of: 1. revision of approaches to fishery regulation in terms of rationing of by-catch and accounting of caught products; 2. restoration of the short-term forecasting system and operational coordination of the fleet; 3. equipping the production ships with modern search equipment, which makes it possible to determine the size and species composition of the clusters and to select areas for the overfishing with a minimum proportion of non-target objects and young fish.

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It is quite obvious that it is impossible to completely eliminate the negative impact of fishing on the ecosystem of the Barents Sea. Therefore, the following general approaches are suggested to be implemented: 1. providing the most objective information about the actual catch of marine species, both commercial and non-commercial; 2. systematic, comprehensive collection of data on environmental conditions, the status of populations of both commercial and non-productive inhabitants of the Barents Sea and adjacent waters; 3. improvement of mathematical models for calculating the fishery industry and its impact on reserves in order to improve the accuracy of the forecast; 4. calculation of interdependent values of the general catch of several ecologically related commercial species. Based on such general catch catches, out of economic and social expediency, complex quotas consisting of several commercial objects can be determined; 5. to reduce the impact of fishing gear, primarily bottom trawl, it is necessary: –– to develop Russian longline fishing and increase its segment in the total admissible catch of cod, haddock, black halibut, etc.; –– to use streamers and light and sound emitters to repel birds when setting up a line.

10.4.7 Sector-Based Actions 10.4.7.1 Norway The Norwegian management plan can draw some overarching limitations and concerns, but the specific actions are still made by the sectorial authorities. Species management, fisheries, shipping, petroleum and other industries are regulated in detail by the different sector authorities. A concrete example of sector regulations because of the management plan is the framework for petroleum activities in the Barents Sea. The definition of particularly valuable and vulnerable areas in the management plan resulted in a framework where most of the defined vulnerable and valuable areas were defined as areas where no petroleum activities were allowed. The map of areal regulations are presented in Fig. 10.12. When comparing this map to the map in Fig.  10.6, it is evident that the planning has taken the results of environmental mapping well into account. 10.4.7.2 Russia The main negative impact on the situation of the ecosystem of the Russian part of the Barents Sea is provided by industrial fishing, shipping traffic and oil and gas activity. It should be noted that industrial fishing is currently well-managed by taking into account the limitations of the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea and the Russian-Norwegian Fishery Commission in establishing the values of the total allowable catches for each type of commercial fish.

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Fig. 10.12  Framework for petroleum activities in the Barents Sea–Lofoten area. (Source: Ministry of the Environment 2006)

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Great prospects for the development of sea freight are specified in the strategic planning documents of the Ministry of Transport of Russia. By 2030, the total cargo turnover is expected to increase by almost seven times, and traffic along the Northern Sea Route by 53 times (Shcherbanin 2013). In oil and gas activities, real oil production in the sea is carried out only at the Prirazlomnoye field, and within the remaining 33 licensed areas seismic exploration and prospecting drilling are carried out. As a result of overlapping of the main activities, maps were obtained showing their spatial ratio for each season. For the mapping of fishing, the main commercial species of fish are selected, these are cod and haddock. The greatest conflicts are observed in the period of maximum biodiversity, in summer and in autumn (third and the beginning of the fourth quarter) (Korneev et al. 2015). In summer, the zone of cod and haddock distribution in the northeastern direction increases substantially towards the Russian part of the Barents Sea. During this season the following main conflict zones are observed: Between fishing and oil and gas activities: In the zones of maximum distribution of cod and haddock in the southern part, conflict zones remain, as in I-II quarters, but the cod fishing area already covers not only the areas of license areas of OJSC Severneftegaz: Kolsky-1, Kolsky-2, Kolsky-­3 (No. 2, 3 and 4) and Rosneft Fedynsky OJSC (No. 12), but also license areas No. 7 (Shtokman GCF), No. 11 (NK Rosneft OJSC), No. 21 and 22 (Gazprom PJSC); In the zone of the maximum distribution of polar cod is the central part of the license area Fedynsky. In the areas of maximum distribution of capelin and polar cod, located in the central and northern part of the sea, there are almost all licensed areas of this area of the sea. In the Pechora Sea, there are conflict zones between the polar cod fishery and licensed areas of Gazprom PJSC (No. 27) and NK Rosneft OJSC (No. 13, 14, 15 and 19). Between shipping traffic and fishing: Shipping routes to the West and the East stretch along the zones of maximum distribution of cod and haddock off the coast of the Kola Peninsula and in the central part of the sea, including navigation routes of the northern version of the Northern Sea Route. In the zones of maximum distribution of capelin and polar cod in the central and northern (near the coast of the Novaya Zemlya archipelago), the northern version of the Northern Sea Route stretches throughout the sea; in the Pechora Sea, navigation routes cross the zone of maximum spread of the polar cod to the northeast of the Kolguev island. Between shipping traffic and oil and gas activities: Along the coast of the Kola Peninsula, possible routes according to Unified Information System on the World Ocean cross license areas No. 2, 3 and 4;

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In the Pechora Sea, there is a large number of both licensed areas and options for navigable waterways, which implies the emergence of conflicts in the event of the start of oil and gas production in these licensed areas. When assessing the impact of the offshore oil and gas activities on the Barents Sea ecosystem, most vulnerable areas under the risk of stress/negative impact from this type of economic activity were identified. Such division was based on the recommendations of the 9th Conference of the Convention on Biological Diversity (2008). At present, the most intensive infrastructure impact in the Russian part of the Barents Sea is on the Pechora Sea. In this sea, the first in the Russian Arctic production oil platform Prirazlomnaya already operates, and for several years the year-round shipment of oil at the PJSC Lukoil’s remote oil export terminal has taken place. The transportation of oil is carried out by tankers from the port of Varandey and Naryan-Mar, as well as by transit from the Kara Sea. The above allocation of areas with limited anthropogenic activities should be taken into account when granting hydrocarbon exploration and production licenses, as well as issuing permits for exploratory and production drilling in the Pechora Sea by introducing special measures to prevent negative anthropogenic impacts of oil and gas facilities. In addition, in development of oil and gas facilities using the ecosystem approach the following circumstances should be taken into account: 1. In regions where the maxima of biodiversity are located, seismic prospecting should be performed only in the first and second quarters and at the end of the fourth quarter of the year; 2. Explorative and production drilling should be carried out only according to the “zero discharge” scheme; 3. Shipment of oil at the terminals should be carried out with indispensable recuperation of output hydrocarbon gases from tanks (“large and small breathing”); 4. Transportation of hydrocarbons by sea should be under constant control of the rescue centers located along the transportation route. The following has been proposed for regulation of maritime traffic: 1. It is advisable: –– to recommend that the Ministry of Natural Resources applies to the Ministry of Transport with a proposal to declare the restricted areas of navigation in the water zones of marine protected areas (MPAs) with the appropriate publication of these restrictions in the “Notice to the Mariners”: –– to establish MPAs located in the territorial sea and inland waters, on the basis of Federal Law of July 31, 1998, No. 155-FL “On Inland Sea Waters, Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of the Russian Federation”; –– to establish MPAs located in the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Russian Federation, that is the marine area of the SPNRs around the Franz Josef Land

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archipelago, on the basis of the Article 32 of the Federal Law “On the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Russian Federation”, No. 191-FL of December 17, 1998; 2. that, on the basis of the Article 33 of the Federal Law “On the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Russian Federation”, the Ministry of Natural Resources recommends that the Ministry of Transport applies to determine the recommended navigation routes; –– that, the main cargo traffic according to the Northern Sea Route is carried out according to the northern variant (above Novaya Zemlya archipelago), while the recommended route in the area of Cape Zhelaniya in the third quarter is shifted to the north by 5  miles to avoid its intersection with the maximum biodiversity in the area; –– when sailing in the Pechora Sea it is recommended to choose the sea routes above Kolguev island for 70 degrees N; 3. To recommend that the Ministry of Natural Resources applies for the introduction of a permanent (in the Ministry of Transport) or temporary (second and third quarters) restrictions (Defense Ministry) for navigation during cargo transportation in the Pechora Sea through the Yugorskiy Shar (the territorial sea); 4. To recommend that the Ministry of Natural Resources applies to the Ministry of Transport with a proposal on the priority use for navigation of ships along the coast of the Kola Peninsula of the possible navigation routes offered by the Unified Information System on the World Ocean, which are farther from the coast.

10.4.8 Risk Evaluations In Norway, the risk of acute pollution, and preparedness and response to acute pollution, have been central in the management plan from the first and throughout the updated management plan. The management plan analyses risks and trends in risk within maritime traffic, petroleum activities and radioactivity. Risks of oil spills, including oil drift models, in particularly valuable and vulnerable areas are also a part of the management plan. In addition, an analysis of the preparedness and response to acute pollution is an important part of the foundation for deciding the framework for activities that can lead to oil spills with large negative effects. From the first management plan in 2006 to the updated plan in 2011, several new measures were implemented to strengthen the preparedness and response to acute pollution. Within governmental and municipal measures, emergency response equipment has been renewed and reallocated, and a new Coast Guard vessel carrying oil spill recovery equipment has been gradually implemented. The competence of personnel in the governmental system has been strengthened by increasing the frequency of exercises. The knowledge base for environmental risk and preparedness analyses has been strengthened, and new tools for decision-making for the use of dispersants have been developed. Licenses awarded for the oil industry now contain more

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specific requirements for dealing with oil spills close to the source and in the drift trajectory towards the coast. In the private sector, the number of high seas oil recovery systems has increased. New technology needs are identified, and a technology programme in cooperation with the Norwegian authorities is implemented. In order to comply with the requirements for preparedness and response to acute pollution during planned operations over a limited period (exploration drilling), the operators have strengthened preparedness for coastal waters and the shoreline for certain segments of coast in the management plan area (Ministry of the Environment, 2011). In Russia, there are currently no officially approved guidelines for risk assessment of the impact of the implementation of various economic plans on the state of ecosystems. Within the framework of Russian–Norwegian cooperation in 2012, a seminar was held on analysing existing approaches in both countries to the environment risk assessment, but this line of research is still officially absent in Russia.

10.4.9 Ratifications of the Plans There are no laws in Norway regulating the development of the management plans, but as a now over 10-years-old system, it seems to be stable. The system has survived different Governments, and is still regarded to be the best way of managing the ocean areas. Evolvements and improvements have been implemented throughout the years. It is the highest possible political level, The Parliament, who sanctions the Managements plans. The different activity sectors have, maybe due to the broad participation in the process, operated within the limitations set by the management plans. In Russia there are no any laws regulating the development of Plans on Integrated Management of Marine Environmental Management. However, taking into account the experience in the development and implementation of the existing Federal Target Programs (FTP) in Russia, for example, the FTP “World Ocean”, the implementation of the project developed by Plans on Integrated Management of Marine Environmental Management will require the publication of a special Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation. This Resolution will define the responsibilities of both private companies and government agencies to clearly implement the provisions of the Plans on Integrated Management of Marine Environmental Management and monitor their implementation.

10.5 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Systems 10.5.1 Strengths and Weaknesses in the Norwegian Management Plan System The ecosystem approach is definitely a strength of the system. The inclusion of all sector authorities in creating the scientific basis for the plans makes it robust. All groups with interests are invited to give their feedback to the reports from the

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Management Forum, meaning the scientific foundation for the white papers in general are consensus based, with few disagreements between sectors. The system has proven resilient to political changes, as different Governments of Norway have further developed the system. Every comprehensive management system has potential for improvements. In 2015, the 10-years anniversary of the management plan system was celebrated with a conference where lessons learned were presented, and summed up in a report. The report points out several aspects where improvements are both needed and possible. There is a need for a better coordination between different national and international projects relevant for the system. Some of the political decided environmental goals are strategical, but not tractable, meaning it is very difficult to design a management plan with a monitoring system to detect achievement of objectives. Even though the monitoring and management systems are meant to be ecosystem-based, there is still quite a potential to move the system away from a single-species and single-impact focus to a focus on the processes of the ecosystems and the cumulative effects of activities and other anthropogenic influences.

10.5.2 Strengths and Weaknesses in the Russian Management Plan System The Russian management plan system is not yet adopted. The strengths of having a management plan for the Russian part of the Barents Sea will be to have precise data for existing climate conditions and the opportunity to visualise and compare the location of areas with intensive development of economic activities and foci with a maximum biodiversity. The weaknesses can be uncertainties of future climate changes and, accordingly, uncertainty about the future state of ecosystems, which is extremely important for management planning. The process of plan development is long and new information on the initial statement of the ecosystem is needed, and for this, new real observations of geo- and biodiversity are needed. Obtaining strategic development plans in Russia from Gazprom, Rosneft, Sovcomflot and other private companies is a complex challenge, and there is uncertainty of business plans in the context of uncertainty in the development of various scenarios for the development of the post-­ crisis economy in the region and in the world.

10.6 Plans for the Future On the Norwegian side, there are expectations for a regular and relatively frequent update of the management plan in the future. Norway has divided the Norwegian waters into three management plan areas, the North Sea and Skagerak, the Norwegian Sea, and the Barents Sea, and all areas now have management plans. In the future, updates of the management plans will be performed every fourth year, and a total revision will be performed for each of the areas every 12th year.

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Table 10.1  Summary of major points The Barents Sea is a high-latitude large marine ecosystem shared uniquely by Norway and Russia, located off the northern coasts of both countries. On the Norwegian side, a management plan was established in 2006, updated in 2011, and are now planned for a full revision in 2020 In Norway, the foundation of the management plans is not in the legal system, meaning there are no laws regulating the existence of management plans as a tool for management. However, the management plans are sanctioned at the highest political level in Norway, as they are presented as white papers from the government to parliament, and endorsed by parliament On the Russian side, a number of strategic documents of the Russian Federation are devoted to the issues of environmental management. Thus, in accordance with the environmental doctrine of the Russian Federation, the main direction of the state’s environmental policy is the implementation of comprehensive environmental management, and its orientation towards sustainable development of the Russian Federation There is no management plan in place for the Russian side of the Barents Sea, but Norway and Russia are cooperating, aiming at harmonisation of the management of the shared ocean area. Russia is working towards a management plan

A new mapping tool for compilation and analysis of different area-based data is under development by the Management Forum, and will hopefully both improve and rationalize the updates and revisions of management plans in the future, and enable a better evaluation of areal conflicts. For the Russian management plan process, the development of the roadmap for implementation of a management plan system is described earlier in this chapter. One of the points of the road map is the development of the draft Federal Law “On Maritime (Aquatorial) Planning in the Russian Federation” in 2020 After the adoption of this law by the State Duma, its ratification by the Federation Council and approval by the President of the Russian Federation, it is planned to issue a Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation on its implementation based on the developed national Guidelines on marine spacial planning. A common framework, close cooperation and exchange of data, shared knowledge and information between the two states will contribute to an even better management of the Barents Sea in the future. While already in place for fishery management, the cooperation and agreement on methodology for common management of other shared resources will be developed within the framework of the Joint Norwegian–Russian Commission on Environmental Protection and by the two states separately. Cooperation on different levels, e.g. scientific, within the bureaucracies and at the political level, is crucial to insure a joint management of the common Barents Sea (Table 10.1).

References Arctic Council (2013) Ecosystem-based management in the Arctic. Report submitted to senior Arctic officials by the expert group on ecosystem-based management. Tromsø Arneberg P, Jelmert A (eds) (2017) Status for miljøet i Barentshavet og ytre påvirkning – rapport fra Overvåkingsgruppen 2017. Fisken og Havet, særnummer 1b-2017 (In Norwegian)

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Curtin R, Prellezo R (2010) Understanding marine ecosystem based management: a literature review. Mar Policy 34(2010):821–830 Korneev OY, Rybalko AE, Korneyva EV, Pavlov AP, Ivanova TY, Ermark EO, Tomilin AM, Shavykin AA (2015) Development of information analysis materials as part of the work program of Russian-Norwegian environmental cooperation in 2013–2015. Sevmorgeo, St. Petersburg McBride MM, Hansen JR, Korneev O, Titov O (eds) Stiansen JE, Tchernova J, Filin A, Ovsyannikov A (co-eds) (2016) Joint Norwegian – Russian environmental status 2013. Report on the Barents Sea ecosystem. Part II – complete report. IMR/PINRO Joint Report Series, 2016 (2), 359pp. ISSN:1502–8828 Ministry of the Environment (2006) Report no. 8 to the storting (2005–2006) Integrated management of the marine environment of the barents sea and the sea areas off the Lofoten Islands Ministry of the Environment (2011) Meld. St. 10 (2010–2011) Report to the Storting (white paper) First update of the Integrated Management Plan for the Marine environment of the Barents sea–Lofoten Area MOSJ (2019) Sea ice extent in the Barents Sea. http://www.mosj.no/en/climate/ocean/sea-iceextent-barents-sea-fram-strait.html. Downloaded 06.01.19 Sander G (2018) Against all odds? Implementing a policy for ecosystem-based management of the Barents Sea. Ocean Coast Manag 157(2018):111–123 Shcherbanin YA (2013) Transport and transport infrastructure in 2030: some predictive estimates. Stud Russ Econ Dev 24(3):259–264 Stiansen JE, Korneev O, Titov O, Arneberg P (eds) Filin A, Hansen JR, Høines Å, Marasaev S (co-eds) (2009) Joint Norwegian-Russian environmental status 2008. Report on the barents sea ecosystem. Part II – Complete report. IMR/PINRO Joint Report Series, 2009(3), 375 pp. ISSN 1502–8828

Next-Generation Arctic Marine Shipping Assessments

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Paul Arthur Berkman, Greg Fiske, Jon-Arve Røyset, Lawson W. Brigham, and Dino Lorenzini

Abstract

The Arctic is prominent in the history of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), following the RMS Titanic disaster in 1912 and soon signing in London of the Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea in 1914. Eighty years later, the IMO initiated a process to manage shipping in ice-covered oceans. In concert with the IMO Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-Covered Waters in 2002 and their 2004 release of the Arctic 2004 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, the Arctic Council initiated the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA), which issued its final report in 2009. The goal of this chapter is to build on AMSA as a case study of informed decisionmaking through the steps of questions to generate data, which are then integrated into evidence to reveal options (without advocacy), informing decisions by relevant institutions to address a ‘continuum of urgencies’ that involve shipping in the new Arctic Ocean with its transformed sea-ice cap, assessing whether shipping is increasing as sea ice is decreasing (‘ship-ice hypothesis’). Primary sources of data for AMSA involved ship tracking from ground-station Automatic Identification System (AIS), shore-­based radar systems and details of fishing vesP. A. Berkman (*) Science Diplomacy Center, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, MA, USA e-mail: [email protected] G. Fiske Woods Hole Research Center, Woods Hole, MA, USA J.-A. Røyset IMO International Maritime Law Institute, Msida, Malta L. W. Brigham Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC, USA D. Lorenzini SpaceQuest, Ltd., Fairfax, VA, USA © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 O. R. Young et al. (eds.), Governing Arctic Seas: Regional Lessons from the Bering Strait and Barents Sea, Informed Decisionmaking for Sustainability, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25674-6_11

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sels as well as other smaller ships provided by the Arctic nations. However, Arctic ship traffic fundamentally changed the year of the AMSA report, when satellite AIS records began providing continuous, synoptic, pan-Arctic coverage of individual ships with data pulsed over seconds to minutes. This chapter reveals the oldest and longest continuous satellite AIS record (from 1 September 2009 through 31 December 2016), applying the ‘spacetime cube’ (which also was unavailable during AMSA) with more than 120,000,000 satellite AIS messages from SpaceQuest Ltd. to begin addressing synoptic questions with any level of granularity from points to regions to pan-Arctic over time. Future questions can be considered to assess ship attributes (including vessel flag state, size and type) in view of biophysical and socio-economic variables, recognizing that shipping and sea ice are recognized as primary drivers of change in the Arctic Ocean. Contributions to these assessments come from all areas of science (inclusively defined as the study of change), across the natural and social sciences with Indigenous knowledge in an holistic (international, interdisciplinary and inclusive) manner to achieve Arctic sustainability across generations. As a practical outcome in a user-defined manner, this chapter reveals characteristics of next-generation Arctic marine shipping assessments, revealing patterns and trends that can be applied to informed decisionmaking about the governance mechanisms and built infrastructure as well as operations for multilateral stability and sustainable development in the new Arctic Ocean.

11.1 Science Diplomacy and Arctic Shipping This book is about regional lessons from the Bering Strait and Barents Sea (AMAP 2017a, b; Berkman et  al. 2016; Vylegzhanin et  al. 2018; Raymond-Yakoubian 2018)  in the Arctic Ocean to help address issues, impacts and resources within, across and beyond jurisdictional boundaries generally. As a premise for each region, however defined, there are stakeholder perspectives, geospatial evidence and governance mechanisms that influence all manner of decisions for sustainable development (Preface Figs. 4 and 6). Simply defined as the study of change, the science behind these decisions can be international, interdisciplinary and inclusive (holistic), characterized by patterns, trends and processes with methodologies from the natural sciences and social sciences as well as Indigenous knowledge. At user-­ defined levels of granularity (across time and space) – goal of this chapter is to contribute to informed decisionmaking about a fundamental socio-economic driver of Arctic change, namely ship traffic in the Arctic Ocean. Human activities in the world ocean operate under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982) and customary international law of the sea more generally, applying to maritime governance and enforcement within, across and beyond national jurisdictions in the Arctic Ocean (Berkman and Young 2009). The International Maritime Organization (IMO 2017a) is the specialized agency of the United Nations in London, established in 1948, with “global standard-setting authority for the safety, security and environmental performance of international shipping.” The Arctic is prominent in the history of the IMO, following the RMS

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Titanic disaster in 1912 and subsequent signing in London of the Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS 1914). With the Arctic Ocean at the center – literally and figuratively – IMO has provided leadership since 1993 to manage shipping in ice-covered oceans (Brigham 2017). Notable steps include adoption of the voluntary or recommendatory IMO Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-Covered Waters (IMO 2002) and Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (IMO 2009), en route to the legally binding International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code) that came into force on 1 January 2017 (IMO 2017b). The Polar Code is implemented by amendments to SOLAS (1974) as well as the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 1973) and International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW 1978). During the 2004–2009 period – when the IMO shipping guidelines were expanding to both polar regions – the Arctic Council conducted the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) through its Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) working group. With broadly relevant lessons for Arctic sustainability, AMSA (2009a) integrated perspectives from diverse stakeholders into questions, generating data, evidence and options that contributed to informed decisions (Preface Fig. 5). These lessons from AMSA (Brigham 2011; Box 11.1) illustrate practical applications of science diplomacy as a holistic process, involving informed decisionmaking to balance national interests and common interests for the lasting benefit of all on Earth across generations (Berkman et al. 2017). Box 11.1: Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) On 29 April 2009 the Arctic Council Ministers in Tromsø, Norway approved the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA), involving nearly 200 experts under the Arctic Council’s Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) working group led by Canada, Finland, and the United States during 2004–2009. AMSA was a broad, interdisciplinary assessment including diverse topics: marine geography and regional climate; governance and law of the sea; Arctic marine transportation history; the human dimension and Indigenous marine use; scenarios or plausible futures of Arctic marine navigation; environmental impacts; marine infrastructure; and a database of vessels in the Arctic marine environment derived from a survey of the Arctic states (prior to era of comprehensive AIS-derived ship information). A key objective of AMSA was to obtain the official (national) ship data within Arctic regions defined by the individual states. The AMSA team took a holistic approach to Arctic marine use and included nearly all surface vessels over 100 tons (less naval ships), including: tankers; container ships; icebreakers; cruise ships; fishing vessels; offshore support vessels; survey vessels; research ships; coast guard vessels; ferries; salvage vessels; and, tug-­ barge combinations. The data survey revealed an estimated 6000 individual ships operating in or near the Arctic marine environment during calendar year 2004. The outcome was the first pan-Arctic snapshot of shipping and operations in the Arctic marine environment, within regions defined by each of the (continued)

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Box 11.1: (continued) Arctic states (who identify themselves collectively as having territories north of the Arctic Circle, which is an objective Earth system boundary). The AMSA effort can be viewed as a: • Baseline assessment of Arctic marine activity early in the twenty-first century using the 2004 database as an historic snapshot of Arctic marine use; • Strategic guide for a host of Arctic and non-Arctic actors and stakeholders; and • Policy document of the Arctic Council since the AMSA 2009 Report was negotiated and approval was reached by consensus of the eight, Arctic state Ministers within the Arctic Council. Ninety-six findings are identified throughout the AMSA (2009a) report and seventeen recommendations are listed under three inter-related themes: (1) Enhancing Arctic Marine Safety; (2) Protecting Arctic People and the Environment; and, (3) Building the Arctic Marine Infrastructure. A significant challenge for AMSA was to address the future of Arctic marine shipping. Using scenario planning exercises to create plausible futures, AMSA identified nearly 120 factors and forces that could shape the future of Arctic marine operations and shipping. The scenarios effort identified two primary drivers and uncertainties: resources and trade (the level of demand); and governance (the degree of relative stability of rules for use) within the Arctic and globally. AMSA emphasizes that the vastness and harshness of the Arctic environment make the conduct of marine emergency response more difficult than other marine regions. Missing or lacking marine infrastructure in most Arctic areas include: hydrographic data and marine charts; communications coverage; environmental monitoring (sea ice, weather and icebergs); search and rescue, and environmental response capacities; salvage; aids to navigation; ship monitoring and tracking; icebreaking; ports; and more. The Arctic human dimension is addressed throughout the AMSA report and the final recommendations include the critical need for surveys of Arctic Indigenous marine use to assess local impacts of Arctic marine operations. Moreover, AMSA identified the release of oil from ships through accidental and or illegal discharge as the most significant environmental threat in the Arctic. AMSA further considered potential impacts on Arctic marine ecosystems from lengthening the navigation season, potentially year-round. A major success from AMSA was its contribution to development of the mandatory ‘Polar Code’ to manage ship operations in the Arctic Ocean into the future. As fertile ground for informed decisionmaking en route to the Polar Code in 2017, AMSA along with other scientific assessments (e.g., ACIA 2004; AMSP 2004; OGA 2007) soon began to bear fruit through the “high level forum” of the Arctic Council with binding legal agreements signed by the Foreign Ministers of the eight

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Arctic States regarding search-and-rescue (SAR 2011) as well as marine-oil-­pollution prevention, preparedness and response (MOPP 2013). Progress in this arena of informed decisionmaking is further complemented by the Arctic Science Agreement (2017), which “is a strong signal reaffirming the global relevance of science as a tool of diplomacy, reflecting a common interest to promote scientific cooperation even when diplomatic channels among nations are unstable” (Berkman et al. 2017). AMSA provides a benchmark and, as such, it is the organizing feature of this chapter (Box 11.1) to consider characteristics of next generation Arctic marine shipping assessments. The starting point for informed decisionmaking involves questions (Preface Fig. 5), which the Arctic States and Indigenous peoples along with others framed in terms of their common interests about marine shipping to generate the data for the assessments (AMSA 2009b): • What are the environmental and geographic features that should be assessed (e.g., bathymetry, large marine ecosystems, climate and monthly sea-ice coverage) north of the Arctic Circle and in areas defined by each Arctic state? • What marine activities based on vessel routes (especially the Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage) and vessel categories (e.g., general cargo, bulk carriers, tankers, tugs, barges and icebreakers) should be measured and how, but without elaboration of individual ships and with fishing activities treated separately? • How should origin and destination ports be characterized? Value of such questions is they initiate holistic integration, contributing to sustainable development in the Arctic Ocean across a ‘continuum of urgencies’ from security to sustainability time scales (Preface Fig. 3). The pan-Arctic context for AMSA (2009a) also includes estimates of Northern Hemisphere sea-ice extent from 1978–2007, building on the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA 2004) with its data embedded at different time and space scales to address local-regional-global questions (Preface Table 2). Ancillary data on maritime accidents north of the Arctic Circle, involving vessel damage or failures from 1995–2004, along with adjacent human population demographics were represented in the Geographic Information Systems (GIS) analyses with raster data. There also were derived products from the AMSA data (AMSA 2009b), including the “the world’s first activity-based estimate of Arctic marine shipping emissions.” Importantly, the AMSA data and analyses demonstrate that nations can balance national interests and common interests through shared methods to answer questions. However, data to answer questions is different than evidence for decisions. The evidence is framed by integrating data from the natural and social sciences along with Indigenous knowledge in view of the decisionmaking institutions that produce governance mechanisms and built infrastructure, which require close coupling to achieve sustainability. As a process, AMSA (2009a, b) took into consideration holistic evidence along with stakeholder perspectives and prevailing governance mechanisms to produce seventeen recommendations across three major themes: Enhancing Arctic Marine Safety; Protecting Arctic People and the Environment; and Building the Arctic Marine Infrastructure. PAME (2017) now is working “to develop and adopt updated

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shipping priorities and recommendations under the three themes of the 2009 Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment.” Introducing options (without advocacy), which can be used or ignored explicitly, this chapter will focus on development of an Arctic Marine Traffic System recommended under the AMSA (2009a) theme of Building the Arctic Marine Infrastructure: comprehensive Arctic marine traffic awareness system to improve monitoring and tracking of marine activity, to enhance data sharing in near real-time, and to augment vessel management service in order to reduce the risk of incidents, facilitate response and provide awareness of potential user conflict. The Arctic states should encourage shipping companies to cooperate in the improvement and development of national monitoring systems.

Recognizing that “marine use of the Arctic Ocean is expanding in unforeseen ways early in the 21st century” (AMSA 2009a), this chapter will highlight fundamental contributions of satellite Automatic Identification System (AIS) data and vector-­ based GIS methodologies that also were unavailable for AMSA to consider. To operationalize an Arctic Marine Traffic System, it will be necessary to simultaneously assess sea ice and shipping as linked biophysical and socio-economic drivers of human activities in the Arctic Ocean. Informed decisions also will consider an Arctic Marine Traffic System as central for “sustainable infrastructure development” (Berkman 2015) to balance economic prosperity, environmental protection and societal well-being in a pan-Arctic context with global relevance across generations.

11.2 Arctic Shipping Traffic from Satellites 11.2.1 Arctic Satellite AIS Data Satellite AIS analyses of Arctic ship traffic still are in their infancy (Eucker 2011. Østreng et al. 2013; Eguíluz et al. 2016; Melia et al. 2017; Serkez et al. 2018). The oldest and longest continuous satellite AIS database for the Arctic Ocean is analyzed herein with SpaceQuest (2017) data from its polar-orbiting constellation from 1 September 2009 through 31 December 2016 (Table 11.1). Table 11.1  Satellite Automatic Identification System (AIS) Data Provided by SpaceQuest Ltd. for Pan-Arctic Options: Holistic Integration for Arctic Coastal-Marine Sustainabilitya with Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI) of Unique Ships in the Arctic Ocean (Fig. 11.1) from 1 September 2009 through 31 December 2016 Satellite AIS messages characteristics Total AIS messages received Total AIS messages with validated MMSIb in the study area (Fig. 11.1)

Satellite AIS data Messages received 122,771,418 85,664,811

A Belmont-Forum project (Preface Table 1) with support of national science agencies in Canada, China, France, Norway, Russian Federation and United States (http://panarcticoptions.org/) b MMSI validated by 9-character strings and correct formatting ITU (2019) and USCG (2019) a

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The satellite AIS data from SpaceQuest (Table 11.1) are from the region north of the Arctic Circle (see Book Cover Figure), focusing on the Barents Sea Region (BaSR) and Bering Strait Region (BeSR), as introduced in Chap. 1. GIS spatial-data files defined by longitude-latitude coordinates were established to enable spatially-­ consistent comparisons in future assessments of these regions (Fig. 11.1).

Fig. 11.1  Arctic Ocean regions north of the Arctic Circle (blue), including the Barents Sea Region (BaSR – red) as well as Bering Strait Region extending slightly southward (BeSR – orange), with color coding that is consistent in subsequent figures (green is satellite ship traffic data minus BeSR and BaSR). Rationale for the regional boundaries have been elaborated previously for BeSR (Berkman et al. 2016), BaSR (Vylegzhanin et al. 2018), with the actual data provided for the three colored regions as mapped. Boundaries also are shown for the Polar Code north of 60° North latitude (IMO 2017a, b, c) and associated marine boundaries (including dark grey areas) of the Arctic Science Agreement (2017), as mapped by Berkman et al. (2017). These boundaries are complemented by additional overlapping boundaries compiled from previous years (Berkman 2015), with the Arctic Circle as a consistent natural system boundary based on the tilt of the Earth’s axis. All of these regions can be defined by spatial data for Geographic Information System (GIS) analyses to generate accurate assessments of socio-economic and biophysical patterns, trends and relationships in the Arctic Ocean into the future with synoptic pan-Arctic satellite measurements, available for both shipping (e.g., Table 11.1) and sea-ice (e.g., NSIDC 2017)

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Table 11.2  Ship and movement details encoded on Automatic Identification System (AIS) messages from Class A Transponders Versus Class B Transponders with movement details only (see NAVCEN 2017)a Maritime Mobile Service Identify (MMSI) – Unique identification for each transponder; International Maritime Organization (IMO) number – Unique identification for each ship; Vessel name; Type of ship/cargo (e.g., tanker, bulk carrier or enforcement); Navigation status (at anchor, under way using engines or not under command); Rate of turn – Right or left, 0 to 720 degrees per minute; Speed over ground; Position accuracy; Longitude and latitude; Course over ground; True heading; Time stamp (UTC, time accurate to nearest second when data was generated); International radio call sign, assigned to the vessel by its country of registry; Dimensions of ship; Type of positioning system (e.g., Global Position System or LORAN-C); Location of positioning system’s antenna on board the vessel; Draught of ship (0.1–25.5 m); Destination; and Estimated time of arrival at destination. Flag state designation is transmitted as three Maritime Identify Digits (MID) in the MMSI Code ITU (2019) and USCG (2019)

a

As anticipated in earlier papers, within consistent boundaries, regional governance lessons associated with the Bering Strait (Berkman et  al. 2016) and Barents Sea (Vylegzhanin et al. 2018) can be integrated with quantitative assessments from a satellite AIS baseline for the Arctic Ocean. The AIS signals contain information about ship attributes, transmitted on different message channels by Class A transponders linked to the unique IMO number of each ship and by Class B transponders without IMO ship references and details (Table 11.2). The common feature for both classes of AIS transponders is they generate messages with time-position information linked to the Mobile Maritime Service Identify (MMSI) for each ship. In addition to the MMSI data from all of the ships (Table 11.1), SpaceQuest provided the attribute metadata from ships with Class A transponders (Table 11.2). The contributions of Class A and Class B transponder data among the validated MMSI data (Table 11.1) will be evaluated further with the satellite AIS time series extended to 31 December 2018.

11.2.2 Vector-Based AIS Analyses To assess movements and behavior of individual ships as well as pattern and trends of ship traffic in the Arctic Ocean – the SpaceQuest data have been compiled within an ArcGIS architecture, applying the ‘space-time cube’ (ESRI 2017). These

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Fig. 11.2  (Left) Three-dimensional system to analyze change in issues, impacts or resources that are measured over space (x-y, latitude-longitude) and time (past to future). (Right) The ‘space-­ time cube’ from ESRI (2017) is a geospatial approach that can be applied to ‘big data’ questions with vector-based analyses (points, lines and polygons) within and between ‘bins’

vector-­based analyses (Fig. 11.2) of the satellite AIS data were further enhanced by SQL queries of tables through the Google Compute Engine with BigQuery (Google 2017; Leetaru 2018), enabling questions with user-defined space and time resolution to interrogate the nearly 86 million satellite MMSI data points (Table  11.1) within seconds. Ship latitude and longitude coordinates were mapped with the North Pole Lambert Azimuthal Equal Area (Alaska) projection using the WGS84 ellipsoid (WGS 1984). Analyses of the SpaceQuest data in this chapter relate to total numbers of unique ships, which are represented by the validated MMSI data (Table 11.1) over time and space. Additionally, the attribute of flag state was included in these initial analyses because it can be extracted directly from the MMSI code of every ship (ITU 2019; USCG 2019). Other ship attributes (Table 11.2) and synoptic biophysical or socio-economic data can be introduced into these vector-based analyses with cloud processing in seconds to reveal trends, patterns and processes that underlie informed decisions, depending on the questions.

11.2.3 Arctic Ship Traffic and Sea-Ice Ship traffic in the Arctic Ocean is of increasing interest because the sea-ice is diminishing dramatically in the Arctic Ocean (e.g., NSIDC 2017; PIOMAS 2017). Importantly, these two parameters have the advantage that they can be measured objectively by satellites (Mjelde et  al. 2014; Onoda and Young 2018) with high levels of granularity across space (meters to thousands of kilometers) and time (minutes to decades). At first pass with the satellite AIS data analyses, it appears that Arctic shipping is increasing as sea ice decreasing (Fig. 11.3), which can be treated as a hypothesis (‘ship-ice hypothesis’) that can be experimentally tested in terms of cause and effect. Recognizing that BaSR is open water throughout the year, unlike the seasonally ice-covered BeSR, provides an experimental control area to test this

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Fig. 11.3  Illustration of the ‘Ship-Ice Hypothesis’ that diminishing sea ice is driving the increase in Arctic shipping, which is itself becoming a socio-economic driver in the Arctic Ocean, providing the basis for experimental analyses with available data to test the relationship between these biophysical and socio-economic drivers of change, respectively, recognizing that ‘correlation alone does not mean causation.’ Based on satellite observations of the Arctic Ocean: (Left) Arctic sea-ice extent decreasing 9.7% per decade from 1979–2017 (NSIDC 2017). (Right) Arctic ship traffic increasing 6.6% per year, based on unique ship counts (Table  11.1) annually within the study area (Fig. 11.1), during full-observation years of 2010–2016

hypothesis and assess drivers of Arctic ship traffic that may be external to the icecovered Arctic Ocean (Fig. 11.1), as considered with the AMSA (2009a) scenarios about trade. Such biophysical and socio-economic analyses together have societal importance, particularly with sea ice and shipping as primary drivers of change in the Arctic Ocean, as considered at the Arctic Options (2014)  workshop at the University of California Santa Barbara (Table 5.1), involving diverse stakeholders: • • • • • •

Indigenous peoples with subsistence livelihoods in the Arctic; National agencies managing Arctic resources, impacts and activities; Commercial enterprises utilizing Arctic resources; Non-governmental organizations protecting Arctic ecosystems and cultures; Natural and social scientists researching Arctic sustainability; and International organizations responding to human activities in the Arctic.

Figure 11.3 reveals the number of unique ships operating annually in the Arctic Ocean, involving satellite AIS records from all class of transponders on the ships (NAVCEN 2017). AIS records from Class A and Class B transponders separately require further investigation across regions and time, especially to frame evidence that can be considered for informed decisionmaking about governance mechanisms and built infrastructure in the Arctic Ocean. Additional consideration of big-data processing strategies and intercalibration with ground-based as well as satellite receivers is necessary to apply AIS data for operational decisionmaking in the Arctic Ocean.

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11.2.4 Historic Arctic Satellite AIS Baseline The oldest and longest continuous recording of satellite AIS data from the Arctic Ocean (Table 11.1) is shown on a daily basis from 1 September 2009 to 31 December 2016 (Fig.  11.4). The synoptic data in Fig.  11.4 have been integrated with the ‘space-time cube’ (Fig. 11.2), revealing the relative number of unique ships

Fig. 11.4  Baseline record of the total validated number of unique ships daily in the Arctic Ocean, derived from satellite automatic Identification System (AIS) data in relation to the Mobile Maritime Service Identity (MMSI) of each ship from 1 September 2009 through 31 December 2016 (Table 11.1). (Upper) Number of unique ships each day north of the Arctic Circle, including the Bering Strait Region and Barents Sea Region, as shown in Fig.  11.1 (see legend for regions). (Middle) Number of daily MMSI counts from the SpaceQuest satellites during the observation period. (Bottom) Number of unique ships each day, normalized in relation to the total number of daily counts collected by the SpaceQuest satellites throughout the observation period

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over time within and between BeSR, BaSR and the overall Arctic Ocean region (as represented in the Book Cover Figure). This historic baseline is being updated with 2017–2018 satellite AIS data. Simply comparing their relative trends (Fig. 11.4), ship traffic is increasing across the entire Arctic Ocean (most of which is ice-covered seasonally) at a faster rate than in BaSR, which is ice-free throughout the year. Moreover, for the entire Arctic Ocean, the rate of ship-traffic increase on an annual basis is similar to the rate of sea-ice decrease on a decadal basis (Fig. 11.3). There also is clear ship traffic seasonality in all regions of the Arctic Ocean, following the growth and decay of the sea ice. All of these conclusions support (i.e., without falsifying) the ship-ice hypothesis that sea ice is the primary driver of increased shipping in the Arctic Ocean. Interestingly, the seasonality of ship traffic in the Barents Sea is opposite to the trend in ice-covered areas of the Arctic Ocean, as revealed by the ‘diamond’ pattern in their cycles (Fig.  11.4). Analyses based on MMSI numbers just in BaSR (Fig. 11.1) in 2016 indicate that the mean centers of the ship traffic during the winter (November-May) and summer (June-October) moved 400 kilometers northeastward with the seasonal retreat of the sea ice, raising question of year-round traffic (Bourbonnais and Lasserre 2015; Darby 2018). Consequently, while BaSR is largely beyond the defined region of the Polar Code (IMO 2017b), as shown in Fig. 11.1, this open-water region is coupled closely with summer ship traffic in the seasonally ice-covered Arctic Ocean. Fortunately, with regard to governance, there is an existing complex of jurisdictions in the Barents Sea to complement implementation of the Polar Code (Vylegzhanin et al. 2018). In addition, the normalized numbers of unique ships in the Arctic Ocean (Fig. 11.4) indicate the highest ship traffic was in 2012, during the lowest summer ‘sea-ice minimum’ recorded by satellites (NSIDC 2017). Together, these analyses all strengthen the hypothesis that sea-ice changes are a primary driver of Arctic ship traffic over diverse time and space scales (Fig. 11.3), reflecting the importance of their being analyzed together from satellite data for the purposes of maritime operations and real-time decisionmaking to implement all binding agreements that involve ship-borne activities in the Arctic Ocean.

11.2.5 Arctic Ship Traffic Patterns Ship traffic involves the movements of individual vessels and the flow of all vessels over time and space. Individual vessels have different classifications, dimensions, cargos, crew characteristics, fuels and other features (e.g., Table 11.2) that relate to their “safe, secure and reliable” operations in the Arctic Ocean (Deggim 2013). Ultimately, it is the individual vessels that need to be monitored at the time scales of operational decisionmaking. However, it is the aggregations of vessels that need to be characterized for long-term infrastructure investment and development, as is being suggested across the twenty-first century by the ‘belt and road initiative’ (China 2017) with its ‘polar silk road’ (China 2018). At a macro-level, ship interactions with sea ice can be analyzed to reveal both patterns and trends (such as hypothesized by Smith and Stephenson 2013) that can

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contribute to informed decisionmaking for sustainable infrastructure development in the Arctic Ocean. Sea-ice coverage can be interpreted from satellites with 4 km2 grid-spacing on a daily basis across the Arctic Ocean (NSIDC 2017). These sea-ice data were used to model ship-ice interactions during the period of satellite AIS observations (Table 11.1, Figs. 11.3 and 11.4) by: joining the AIS and sea-ice points in the space-time cube (Fig. 11.2); and counting the number of unique ships daily in each 4 km2 cell with sea ice. Duplicate MMSI points in each 4 km2 cell with sea ice were deleted. The total number of ship-ice interactions daily then were aggregated on an annual basis in relation to their latitudes (Fig. 11.5). Figure 11.5 reveals a pattern of Arctic ship-ice interactions with the highest numbers in 2015–2016  in the latitude band from 70°-75° North. Progressively lower numbers surround this zone of highest ship-ice interactions, revealing a trend of increasing ship-ice interactions annually at higher latitudes. Characteristics of the ship traffic across the Arctic Ocean can be further analyzed over time and space, in relation to ship attributes (Table 11.2) at user-defined levels of granularity, to address diverse questions. As an illustration, what nations have the most ships in the Arctic Ocean and where are those ships from 2009–2016? The answer (Fig. 11.6) is derived from the attribute of flag state.

Fig. 11.5  ‘Heatmap’ of ship-ice interactions by joining sea-ice data (NSIDC 2017) and satellite AIS data (Figs.  11.3 and 11.4) across latitudes on an annual basis throughout the observation period (Table 11.1), as described above. There were no ship-ice interactions with latitudes >86° or