Governance Challenges During the COVID-19 Pandemic in Africa 3031112431, 9783031112430

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Governance Challenges During the COVID-19 Pandemic in Africa Edited by Nirmala Dorasamy

Governance Challenges During the COVID-19 Pandemic in Africa

Nirmala Dorasamy Editor

Governance Challenges During the COVID-19 Pandemic in Africa

Editor Nirmala Dorasamy Durban University of Technology Durban, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa

ISBN 978-3-031-11243-0 ISBN 978-3-031-11244-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11244-7 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

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Introduction: Governance Challenges in the Management of the COVID-19 Pandemic in Africa Omololu Fagbadebo and Nirmala Dorasamy Governance Imperative in Public Sector Management in Africa Omololu Fagbadebo and Nirmala Dorasamy

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COVID-19 and Social Alteration Challenges Jirushlan Dorasamy

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Devastating Economic Challenges and Potential Opportunities of COVID-19 Pandemic in the Petroleum Industry Sector of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Eustache Tanzala Kikasu

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Reinvigorating the Okavango Delta Through E-Tourism and Localization Olayemi Bakre, Tsitsi Chipfuva, Memory Mukoroverwa, and Cynthia Chakahwata COVID-19 Ramifications in Lesotho: A Poverty Perspective Wayne Malinga and Bellita Banda Chitsamatanga

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The Syndemic of HIV, Gender Inequality, and Poverty During the COVID-19 Pandemic Among Women in South Africa Lentsu Nchabeleng

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COVID-19, Poverty, and Inequality: Implication on the Egyptian Economy Monisola Omowumi Ajeigbe

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COVID-19 Regulations and the Inequality Gap in Education and Housing in South Africa Simbarashe Tembo and Talkmore Chidede

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Double Tragedy’! Poverty and Inequality as Sources of Community Fragility During COVID-19 Lockdown in Zimbabwe’s Urban Spaces Kwashirai Zvokuomba and Dean Masimba Marunza Livelihoods or Health? The Contradictions and Socio-Economic Impact of COVID-19 Lockdown on Informal Traders in Harare, Zimbabwe Washington Mazorodze Government as the Leviathan: A Comparative Study on Government Policies on the Informal Sector During COVID-19 Pandemic in Zimbabwe and South Africa Happy Mathew Tirivangasi, Louis Nyahunda, Taurai Zingwena, and Thembinkosi E. Mabila Pandemic Within Pandemic: Corruption as an Impediment to Effective Management of COVID-19 in Nigeria and South Africa Omololu Fagbadebo and Nirmala Dorasamy

Index

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Notes on Contributors

Dr. Ajeigbe Monisola Omowumi is a lecturer in the Department of Economics, Faculty of Social Sciences, Redeemer’s University, Ede, Osun State, Nigeria. She holds a B.Sc. (UNAD), M.Sc. (OAU) and Ph.D. (OAU) degrees in Economics and a PGD in Education (NTI). She is the Managing Editor of the Journal of Economics and Social Policy in the same department. She is a reviewer for some journal outlets. She is a fellow of the Gender and Humanitarian Institute (Redeemer’s University Chapter). She is a facilitator and a member of the project management team at the National Open University of Nigeria. She has publications in the field of Applied Econometrics, Financial, Industrial, Trade, Labour Sustainable and Development Economics. Bakre Olayemi is a researcher from the Durban University of Technology, with years of mentorship and supervisory experience. He holds a Ph.D. in Public Management and has more than a dozen of his works published in accredited journals. Dr. Bakre’s area of interest lies in poverty, rural development, policy, and governance, alongside similar themes. His research output has resulted in a few local and international awards. Chakahwata Cynthia is a senior lecturer and programme leader for the B.A. (Hons.) International Finance and Banking Degree at Botswana Accountancy College (BAC). She is also the Patron of the Finance and

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Banking Society at BAC. She is a banker by profession and has vast experience in the banking sector having worked in various departments in an international bank. She has 10 years of lecturing experience in finance and banking modules and has produced excellent results over the years. Cynthia is also a Fellow with the Higher Education Academy (FHEA) in the UK and Accredited Trainer and Assessor with the Botswana Qualification Association. Her research interests lie in Behavioural Finance, Mergers and Acquisition, Regulation of banks and financial Institutions, Credit risk and valuation of corporate debt, Corporate Finance, Financial Intermediation, Investments and Investment Banking. Dr. Chidede Talkmore holds a Doctor of Laws (LL.D.) degree in International Investment Law from the University of the Western Cape. Talkmore also holds a Master of Laws (LL.M.) degree (Cum Laude) in International Trade and Investment Law and a Bachelor of Laws (LL.B.) degree, both from the University of Fort Hare. His research interests are international investment law and commercial arbitration. Dr. Chipfuva Tsitsi is a senior lecturer and portfolio manager for Leisure Programmes at the Botswana Accountancy College in Botswana. Her 18 years of experience as a renowned academic in the hospitality and tourism tertiary landscape spans from the Chinhoyi University of Technology in Zimbabwe, the University of Botswana and presently the Botswana Accountancy College. She is a researcher with a keen research interest in tourism and poverty alleviation, Community-Based Tourism, sustainable tourism and tourism product diversification. She has published in several peer-reviewed journals, book chapters and conference papers. Dr. Chitsamatanga Bellita Banda is a researcher under the South African Research Chairs Initiative (SaRChI) Chair in Sexualities, Genders and Queer Studies at the University of Fort Hare in South Africa. She holds a Ph.D. in Education from the University of Fort Hare in South Africa. Her research interests include human rights, gender and women issues, gender-based violence, rights of children and school-based violence. Mr. Dorasamy Jirushlan is currently studying towards his Ph.D. in the Faculty of Health Sciences at the Durban University of Technology. His areas of research focus include psychology, counselling and wellness. He has published several articles in areas of wellbeing.

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Prof. Dorasamy Nirmala is an NRF-rated professor in the Department of Public Management and Economics at the Durban University of Technology (DUT), Durban, South Africa. She is an award-winning researcher at the university. Her research focuses on ethics and public sector management, with an emphasis on enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of public service delivery. She has established several international linkages, culminating in research projects, engagement in staff mobility programmes and publications. She has widely published in accredited journals, contributed to book chapters and is an editor of books. She has taught in undergraduate and postgraduate programmes, supervised master’s and doctoral students and facilitated programmes with government departments. Dr. Fagbadebo Omololu holds a doctoral degree in Political Science from the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. He is a research associate and a contract lecturer in the Department of Public Management, Law and Economics at the Durban University of Technology. He taught Political Science at the Obafemi Awolowo University, IleIfe, Nigeria and the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. He was a recipient of the Study of the United States Institute (SUSI) on American Politics and Political Thought Fellowship at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, in June/July 2010. He has published academic papers in journals and books. He has presented papers at conferences and workshops. He is a member of the Editorial Board and associate editor of reputable academic journals. His area of specialization includes comparative politics, legislative studies, public governance, public institution, leadership, development studies and African government politics. He is the Coordinator of the African Impact Initiatives for Scholars and the initiator of the Centre for African Governance and Development, Durban Univesity of Technology. Dr. Kikasu Eustache Tanzala has a Ph.D. in Public Administration (DPA). He has conducted research and published several papers in the petroleum industry field. He is the founder and Managing Director at the Research and Capacity Development Programmes Institute for Institutional and Socio-economic Transformation in the DRC. He is the president of the Union of Tshisekedists for the Restoration of the Rule of Law in the DRC.

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Mabila Thembinkosi E. is Director of Research Administration and Development at the University of Limpopo. He has supervised Masters and Doctoral candidates in Humanities. Thembinkosi interests cut across a number of issues related to emerging research capacity development, research methodology, and socio-political topics. He has published papers in language studies, research methodology as well as sustainable development. Dr. Malinga Wayne is an independent development researcher and consultant and lecturer in the Department of Development Studies at Lupane State University in Zimbabwe. He holds a Ph.D. in Development Studies from the University of Fort Hare in South Africa. He has done research and consultancy work on different socio-economic and environmental issues across the Southern African region in countries such as Zimbabwe, South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Eswatini with various international and local NGOs. His research interests include water resources management, natural resources management, climate change, environment, rural development and community development. Marunza Dean Masimba is a Ph.D. candidate of International Relations at Portsmouth University. He is a specialist in development aid and Chinese footprints in Africa. Mazorodze Washington is a Zimbabwean holder of a Ph.D. in Public Administration (Peace Studies) obtained at the Durban University of Technology in South Africa (May 2021). He is a lecturer at the University of Zimbabwe in the Department of Peace, Security and Society. His research interests include domestic, regional and international politics, governance, human security, peace and conflict studies, peacebuilding, conflict resolution and transformation. Mukoroverwa Memory is a programme leader at the International Hospitality Management Programme, School of Business and Leisure at Botswana Accountancy College (BAC). The programme is offered in collaboration with the University of Derby, UK. Ms. Mukoroverwa is also a senior lecturer in Tourism and Hospitality at BAC. Prior her position at BAC, she served as a lecturer at the Chinhoyi University of Technology. She holds a master’s degree in Tourism and Hospitality from the University of Zimbabwe. Ms. Mukoroverwa’s research interests are in Sustainable tourism and Event Tourism. She has collaborated with other

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scholars to publish, whilst some of her findings have also been presented at local and international conferences. Nchabeleng Lentsu, Ph. D. is a research associate at the Nelson Mandela University. She has extensive knowledge in gender development and health communication-related matters. She is currently working on a research project that aims to address gendered challenges in health in three African countries, namely, South Africa, Botswana and Ghana. Nyahunda Louis holds a Ph.D. in Environmental Social work and is currently employed as a Research Associate at the University of Limpopo as well as a post-doctoral researcher at the University of Free State. Dr. Tembo Simbarashe is an ad hoc lecturer at the University of KwaZulu-Natal’s School of Law. He holds a Bachelor of Laws (LL.B.), Master of Law (LL.M.) and a Ph.D. in Law from the University of KwaZulu-Natal. His research interests are Constitutional law, Human Rights Law, and international and regional integration law. Tirivangasi Happy Mathew is a Research Associate at the University of Limpopo and a Ph.D. Researcher at the University of Jyväskylä in Finland. He holds a Master of Arts degree in Sociology from the University of Limpopo, South Africa as well as a Master of Science degree in Governance and Development from the University of Antwerp, Belgium. His interest lies in Environmental and political sociology. Zingwena Taurai holds an MSc degree in Development Evaluation, MSc in Applied Economics. He specializes in the study of Poverty and wellbeing, Food security & Nutrition, Humanitarian aid, and sustainable climate smart agriculture. His current research explored on the humanitarian response strategies in the aftermath of disasters induced by climate change in Zimbabwe. Zvokuomba Kwashirai is a social scientist who deploys sociological lenses to interrogate socio-cultural-economic and political issues. He has a Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Johannesburg where he is also a research associate. He has published in the areas of land and agrarian studies, gender, feminism and development, cultural and social protection studies. He has taught in Zimbabwean universities for more than ten years.

List of Figures

Fig. 4.1

Fig. 4.2

Fig. 5.1

Fig. 5.2 Fig. 8.1 Fig. 8.2

The encouraging effects of SOCIR restructuring and development on the economic environment of the DRC The prospective effects of SOCIR restructuring and development on Congolese people’s lifestyle improvement Map of the Okavango Delta, showing safari camps and Moremi Game Reserve (Source Adapted from Department of Tourism of Botswana [2001]) Revised forecast international tourism 2020 (Source UNWTO [2020]) Impulse response function Variance decomposition

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List of Tables

Table Table Table Table Table Table

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Table 8.7 Table 8.8 Table 13.1

Descriptive statistics Correlation matrix Test of order of integration Results of cointegration test Lag length result Result on normalized cointegrating coefficients (Long run VECM) Short run VECM result Ordinary least square results COVID-19 data in Africa (2021, March 8)

161 162 163 164 164 166 167 168 255

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Governance Challenges in the Management of the COVID-19 Pandemic in Africa Omololu Fagbadebo and Nirmala Dorasamy

Introduction At the center of the ravaging COVID-19 pandemic is the desire of nations to secure the lives of their citizens. Associated with this human security concern is the need to rebound the economy that has succumbed to the lockdown measures to prevent further infection of the virus or flatten the curve of a resurgence. This is not limited to a particular region of the world, COVID-19 is a global pandemic. For more than one year

O. Fagbadebo (B) Department of Public Management, Law and Economics, Durban University of Technology, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] N. Dorasamy Department of Public Management and Economics, Durban University of Technology, Durban, South Africa e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. Dorasamy (ed.), Governance Challenges During the COVID-19 Pandemic in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11244-7_1

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now, since December 2019, the global system has been redefined with a series of measures to combat a virtual enemy with such devastating consequences. It has disrupted socio-economic and political activities and constitutes a threat to lives. Also, it has generated health emergencies and the global economic crisis, which has tremendously impacted “every person in every country, causing illness and death, disrupting livelihoods, and potentially pushing an estimated 150 million more people into extreme poverty around the globe by the end of 2021” (Trotsenburg, 2021). The health emergency environment created by the upsurge in the cases of coronavirus and the attendant crisis “has brought about unprecedented challenges of human suffering, uncertainty and major economic disruption on a global scale” (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2020). Sadly, this unfortunate crisis has created an environment that compromises adherence to governance in the management of the public sector. Even though it is a universal challenge, nevertheless, the approach to managing its consequences is not uniform. While this malaise has remained a global concern, its pervasive consequences are more profound in Africa, even though the number of cases compared to the West has been minimal. Weak institutional and infrastructural facilities in most African states have been unable to cope with the exigencies of a crisis. Thus, the COVID-19 pandemic has presented a challenge that requires effective management of the public sector by the government. Unfortunately, a series of unethical practices, which undermined governance principles and aggravated the existing crisis of governance, characterized the management of this pandemic in most African countries. Consequently, unethical behaviors of government officials have undermined effective public service delivery. The World Bank Group has noted the impact of the severity of the pandemic, showing how it has constituted a challenge to the global health care systems. The “associated lockdowns and travel restrictions have upended normal life for most people – even as lockdowns ease in some countries” (World Bank Group, 2020). With 113 million cases, and 63.5 million recovered, the world has lost 2.5 million of its population to COVID-19 attacks as of February 27, 2021 (Worldometer, 2021). Out of these figures, African countries had recorded 3,736,632 cases, 97, 290 deaths, and 3,265,256 recovered, with the highest from South Africa (1.67 million cases, 1.43 million recovered and 49.667 deaths).

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Globally, the management of the COVID-19 pandemic has caused a significant lockdown of the public space, which has limited the activities of both public and private sector organizations. It also called for emergency procurement of medical equipment and private protective equipment (PPE) to provide adequate health care delivery to infected citizens and protect health workers against infection in the course of their duties. Since the shutting down of the economy would hurt the welfare of citizens, the government also considered provisions of stimulus packages to cushion the effects of economic disruptions. These major policy directions of government created networks of corruption and mismanagement of public resources by leaders in the guise of helping members of the public. The most fundamental challenge is the ability of the state to manage the rules associated with the lockdowns in a manner that would have relieved citizens of the accompanied hardship. Participants at the conference on Developmental Challenges in Africa in the Wake of COVID-19 Pandemic identified a lack of state capacity in Africa for effective public finance management during the pandemic (Songwe, 2021). COVID-19 has meant a loss of jobs to many, with soaring poverty amid mismanagement of public sector finances (Schotte et al., 2021). In their study of the severity of the pandemic in Ghana, for instance, Schotte et al. (2021) found that 64.3% of respondents had experienced a loss of employment and income. In areas with lockdown measures, they discovered that 71.4% lost their jobs because of the closure of their business or workplace. In the informal sector, more than 77.4% of citizens lost their sources of livelihood (Schotte et al., 2021). The loss of jobs is not peculiar to Africa, nevertheless, the severity is more profound because of the pre-existing weak infrastructural inclusive public policy to cope with the demands of good governance during a national emergency. Thus, most African citizens did not subscribe to government lockdown measures because of the loss of trust in public policy. Hence, the series of protests and misgivings by citizens who have lost trust in the ability of the state to provide the necessary safety valves to prevent further carnage. While countries in the West have progressed tremendously in the vaccination of their citizens, African governments are still lagging. A member of the Africa Union Africa Vaccine Delivery Alliance, Dr. Ayoade Olatunbosun-Alakija, has noted the governance problem that would further aggravate inequality in the access to the COVID-19

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vaccines, especially in Africa. According to her, accessing necessary health care facilities would favor the wealthiest nations and citizens. “As the world races against time in a bid to outrun COVID-19, it appears the race is staggered in favor of the wealthy—the wealthy nations and the wealthiest people from the world’s poorest countries” (Olatunbosun-Alakija, 2021). She predicted that even though there were publicity stunts on the vaccination of wealthy citizens, “for many of the world’s poorest people there are no vaccines in the immediate future” (Olatunbosun-Alakija, 2021). Central to the control measures of the COVID-19 pandemic is adherence to governance principles. The World Bank Group (WBG) (2020) has spotted the relevance of good governance and effective institutions of government to a successful recovery of the loss grounds to the pandemic. This would enable stakeholders “to ensure appropriate (re)prioritization of government interventions and actions including enhancing the efficiency of spending through better design and implementation of projects” (World Bank Group, 2020). Bromfield and McConnell (2020) reveal how adherence to good governance practices and principles helped Australia and New Zealand in the initial successful records of its management of the COVID-19 pandemic. According to them, even though the two countries have different governing systems and processes, the stakeholder had a perfect understanding of the contexts of their systems and directed their actions and responses toward the available institutional configurations that support public policy. In Africa, these parameters should be conspicuous in both the short-term and the long-term public sector reforms directed toward mitigating the crisis. Thus, there is the need for exceptional responses, guided by the desire for sustainable recovery.

The Book The focus of this book is the impact of the management of the public sector on the welfare of citizens during his COVID-19 interruption period in the selected African countries. The chapter authors present insights into the governance challenges associated with the management of the lockdown measures concerning the welfare of citizens in selected African states. In the opening chapter, Omololu Fagbadebo and Nirmala Dorasamy present a general theoretical overview of the imperatives of effective management of the public sector. They conceptualize the primacy of adherence to governance principles in the management of

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the public sector, highlighting the major principles of governance such as public participation, accountability, rule of law, effective leadership, and effective state response to societal demands. These principles revolve around the roles of three major components: the state, private citizens, and civil society. Thus, effective governance practices require the functionality of these components. This chapter conceptualizes the roles of these components with the governance principles and the necessity in the management of affairs in the public sector. In Chapter 3, Jirushlan Dorasamy explores the challenges associated with COVID-19 social alteration rules. The chapter discusses the implications of the various lockdown measures on the well-being of citizens across countries, noting the inability of the government to control the manifested crisis associated with compliance with the rules. This presented more challenges in Africa because of insufficient infrastructural support needed for behavioral adaption. It compromised the sense of solidarity that is common among African societies. Thus, adopting behavioral changes like social distancing in the African context is not easy due to overcrowded living conditions, dependence on public transport, crowding at communal water sources, and scarcity of sanitary facilities. For example, social distancing is severely compromised for people living in informal settlements like slums, because of high occupancy rates in restricted spaces. Social distancing is virtually impossible, thereby making compliance a far cry. The implication of this was the manifestation of deepening criminal social activities like rape, femicide, among other societal malaise that increased during the lockdown periods. This governance crisis was compounded by the vulnerability of citizens to attacks because of the prevailing ineffective security and justice system in most African societies. Aside from the social consequences of the COVID-19 lockdown measures on humans, the economy suffered setbacks that further compounded the sufferings of citizens. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the COVID-19 pandemic affected the petroleum industry but provided stakeholders with potential opportunities. Eustache Tantali Kikasu, in his analysis of the consequences of the lockdown measures in Chapter 4, notes that even though the pandemic engendered devastating economic challenges in the petroleum industry sector of the country’s economy, it was a blessing for the stakeholders in the petroleum sector to strengthen its operational strategies. The DRC has an important proved oil potential in three sedimentary basins, including the Coastal

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Basin (located in Kongo Central province extending offshore past the Congo River estuary), the Central Basin, and the Western branch of the East African Rift. Despite such opportunities, the country lacks sufficient capacities to develop its upstream, midstream, and downstream oil and gas industries. Also, due to the lack of an operational oil refinery, the DRC is reliant on the export of all its crude oil and the import of petroleum products from the international market relating to all its fuel needs. The consequences of the COVID-19 lockdown measures became a catalyst to show how the government could explore its potential for domestic economic growth and expansion of the country’s petroleum industry. Using the economic factor of PESTEL variables, the chapter explains the socio-economic role of the petroleum refining industry in the DRC. The results indicated that COVID-19 came as additional socio-economic chock/threats to existing challenges affecting the petroleum industry in the DRC. In contrast, results revealed also that the crisis of COVID19 offered an opportunity to review and improve policies, programs, and strategic plans, which are essential to developing mechanisms that prevent the country from poor management of socio-economic activities. Tourism is another most hit sector by the COVID-19 lockdown measures. Indeed, tourism aficionados, researchers, local community members, environmentalists, and policymakers have continuously fought for the survival of the tourism sector during this pandemic. In Chapter 5, Olayemi Bakre, Tsitsi Chipfuva, Memory Mukoroverwa, and Cynthia Chakahwata explore the use of e-tourism and localization to reinvigorate the Okavango Delta tourist center in Botswana. The tourism sector is susceptible to socio-economic, environmental, and political risks. Despite this inherent threat, the resilience of this sector guarantees its survival from predicaments and pandemics. However, the unprecedented magnitude of COVID-19 has had a multi-dimensional, far-reaching effect on the tourism landscape. In a bid to address this concern, the authors explore sustainable tourism management measures the Okavango Delta could exploit during and beyond the COVID-19 pandemic period. Using interviews as primary data, the authors conducted spoke, telephonically with sixteen safari managers whose operations are within the Okavango Delta. These respondents were chosen through the snowballing approach. Interviewees only comprised operators who had opened for business by June 15, 2020. Insights provided by interviewees were thus analyzed thematically. Among the recurring views expressed by participants was that the closure of international borders has significantly impacted their

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businesses’ viability. Hence, the Botswana government did provide subsidies between April and June 2020, while tourism operators turned to domestic tourism as a means of sustaining the sector. Thus, to complement the measures initiated by the Botswanan tourism industry, the study advocates e-tourism and further localization strategies with attempts to infuse the Financial Portfolio Theory as a basis for the tourism diversification agenda. The authors of Chapters 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 concentrate their analysis on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the aggravated level of inequality and poverty in the African continent. Wayne Malinga and Bellita Banda Chitsamatanga interrogate the ramifications of COVID19 in Lesotho from a poverty perspective in Chapter 6. They argue that the advent of COVID-19 has exposed global society to significant shifts in the socio-economic and political spheres with dire consequences on the poor and the vulnerable groups in developing countries in the Global South. This has seen countries such as Lesotho contending with the corollaries of this virus that has further aggravated its already low human development index, which is influenced by the appalling socio-economic conditions, thereby exacerbating poverty levels. Using desktop research through an in-depth review of the literature and public documents, they discovered that the COVID-19 crisis has exposed the deep underlying health, food insecurity, water, sanitation, housing, and social protection challenges within the country. Part of the findings of the chapter indicates that extreme poverty has increased in Lesotho during the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly among rural communities that are largely dependent on agricultural-related activities and migrant remittances as part of their livelihoods. Moreover, the disparities in terms of socio-economic development have widened between the urban and rural areas in the country, with little focus and attention being given to rural areas that are the hardest hit by this pandemic. The country has witnessed a staggering 1 million people out of its small population of 2.1 million being deeply engulfed in food insecurity due to this health crisis. Furthermore, economic stagnation and downturn, unemployment, poor agricultural performance, lack of access to water, sanitation, and health facilities have exacerbated poverty levels in Lesotho culminating in extreme poverty during the COVID-19 crisis. While the level of poverty has increased in Lesotho, given the prevailing pre-COVID-19 infrastructural challenge, Lentsu Nchabeleng presents, in Chapter 7, an analysis of the challenging plights of South

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African women amid gender inequality, HIV infections, and poverty during the COVID-19 pandemic. The author noted the severity of HIV as a public health problem that disproportionately affects women. Sadly, the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has deepened the preexisting inequalities, exposed social, economic, and political vulnerabilities of women, which in turn amplified the impacts of the pandemic. Using syndemic theory as a framework of analysis, the author considers multiple interrelated epidemics that synergistically interact to undermine health in vulnerable populations. The chapter provides cross-sectional associations between women’s vulnerability to HIV, gender inequality, and poverty during the COVID-19 pandemic. The paper employs a search strategy to review and synthesize global literature that examines the syndemic effects of HIV infection among women during the COVID-19 pandemic in South Africa. The chapter discovered that Vulnerability to HIV among South African women has increased as biological, social, and structural factors interacted in the context of social marginalization. In South Africa, HIV prevalence among women is four times greater than that of men. The low status of women, poverty, and gender-based violence have all been cited as reasons for this disparity in HIV prevalence. Emerging research has identified methodological approaches and interventions that may be integrated into gender analysis tools to address gender inequality and other social factors that make women vulnerable to HIV infection. The findings of this review underpin the need for comprehensive strategies to promote gender equality, HIV prevention, and eradicate poverty during disease outbreaks among women in resource-limited settings. Comparatively, the severity of COVID-19 is more in the advanced countries of the West. Nevertheless, the mild impact on African societies bites harder because of the high level of inequality, as the poor and vulnerable citizens were at the receiving end. In Chapter 8, Monisola Omowumi Ajeigbe discusses this poverty-inequality nexus of the implications of the COVID-19 pandemic in Egypt. The chapter examines the dynamism of COVID-19, poverty, and inequality in Egypt considering the effect of the pandemic on some selected structural issues such as the number of employed persons, price of gasoline, and tourism. A vector error correction mechanism and other diagnostic tests were employed to determine both the short-run and long-run effect of the pandemic on the number of poor people in Egypt and on the income inequality among the Egyptians. Findings revealed that in the short run, a 1% increase in the number of COVID-19 cases gives rise to a 28% increase in the number

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of poor people living in Egypt while on the other hand, it gives rise to a 90% increase in income inequality thereby widening the gap between the rich and the poor. Eventually, findings revealed that a 1% increase in the number of COVID-19 cases gives rise to a 2% increase in the number of poor people living in Egypt with inequality giving rise to a 3% increase in income inequality. This has policy implications as to the findings from the impulse response function and variance decomposition revealed a significant impact on the short run to shocks from COVID-19 and a mild impact on the long run. The study, therefore, recommends that efforts should be made by the government and private individuals to curb and eradicate the virus to reduce and stop the number of daily cases of the virus in the bid toward the achievement of sustainable development goals of zero poverty leaving no one behind. In Chapter 9, Simbarashe Tembo and Talkmore Chidede discuss how the COVID-19 regulations widened the existing inequality gap in education and housing in South Africa. The authors explore the COVID19-related socio-economic complexities within a South African context. Like any other African country, South Africa’s economy and social reality have been fundamentally affected by the COVID-19 control-related measures such as physical distancing, wearing of masks, hand washing, and the lockdown itself. These measures are meant to flatten the curve by reducing the infection rate. However, it is observed that the measures have had a moribund effect on selected rights such as the right to education and the right of access to housing. The pre-existing inequality gap between various races and social classes has not helped matters and it has left others more vulnerable. Learners from poor and less affluent families will find themselves lagging in school and the homeless and those lacking adequate housing are more exposed to the virus than any other social group. Using socio-legal methods, the chapter explores the nexus between the COVID-19-related regulations and the enjoyment of the right to education and the right of access to adequate housing. It is observed that the regulations have exacerbated the pre-existing socioeconomic inequalities in South Africa. It is cautioned that if no drastic measures are put in place to remedy the situation, post-COVID-19 South Africa will be more unequal than before. In Chapter 10, Kwashirai Zvokuomba and Dean Masimba Marunza, in what they describe as a double tragedy, discuss poverty and inequality as the sources of community fragility in the Zimbabwean urban centers during the COVID-19 lockdown era. They examine how urban

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communities, which already had levels of fragility, were affected by and responded to the COVID-19 pandemic. Using an ethnographic survey in the high-density suburbs of Harare, guided by Giddens’s theory of structuration and agency, they argue that the COVID-19 lockdown measures worsened the pre-existing levels of fragility characterized by prevalent poverty levels, overcrowded accommodation, and other fragile systems of the various communities. While residents of the low-density suburbs responded differently to the lockdown measures, the high-density suburbs were characterized by scrambling for water at communal water points and daily queuing for basic food thereby exposing themselves to infections and conflict with law enforcement agents. The paper argues that with the dominance of the informal economy as a source of livelihoods, the lockdown measures compromised not only people’s livelihoods but also the generic socio-political and economic frameworks. Thus, the study concluded that COVID-19 lockdown measures were unbearable and unsustainable such that they forced people to deploy various strategies of survival as ‘agency’; hence, the lockdown pushed the urban poor into the margins. In Chapter 11, Washington Mazorodze discusses the contradictions and socio-economic impacts of COVID-19 lockdown measures on informal traders in Harare, Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean government introduced lockdown measures to curb the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic disease, countries introduced several types of measures as they grappled with containing its spread, one of which was the popular lockdown measures, whereby movements were restricted, and citizens were confined to their homes. Other measures included supporting social distance, the mandatory wearing of masks, quarantine, and self-isolation for those infected with the virus. The economic impact of the disease was enormous and informal traders who constitute most of the working population in Zimbabwe were hard hit by the lockdown as they tried to survive from hand to mouth. Informal traders were faced with a dilemma and two hard choices, whether to continue trading outside the lockdown regulations, risking their health and wrath of the urban authorities on the other hand, and adhering to government lockdown regulations but risking hunger and starvation. This chapter sought to analyze these contradictions and the impact of COVID-19 on informal traders in Harare who survived on vending daily. However, the socioeconomic impact of COVID-19 was not confined to street vendors in Harare alone but across the country and beyond. This chapter chooses

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to focus on informal traders in Harare because most informal traders in the country are located there. The methodology used to collect and analyze data in this study was qualitative which included observation, online journal article reviews, newspaper articles, interviews with vendors, Harare city council, vendor organizations, and analysts. In Chapter 12, Happy Mathew Tirivangasi, Louis Nyahunda, Taurai Zingwena, Thembinkosi E Mabila draw on the concept of the “Leviathan” developed by Thomas Hobbes to examine the influence of COVID-19 on the informal sector and the resulting socio-economic ramifications in South Africa and Zimbabwe, respectively. Government, according to Hobbes, is a leviathan, a state in which the citizens engage in a social contract with the government. For the government to lead and make critical decisions on behalf of the public, the citizens relinquish control of their rights. In the absence of a government, disorder reigns, necessitating the transfer of power to the government to maintain peace and security. The COVID-19 presence is a case in which the fate of millions of employees employed in the informal sector in Zimbabwe and South Africa is determined by government actions. According to World Health Organisation (WHO) data as of the end of April 2020, there were over 2.8 million instances of COVID-19 infections around the world, with a mortality toll that was approaching 195,000 and 210 countries and territories affected. As a result, the government was compelled to take measures to prevent the virus from spreading. Lockdowns and social distancing measures were instituted by the governments of South Africa and Zimbabwe, respectively. People who work in the informal sector faced a difficult situation, with those who were regarded to be part of the critical industry being permitted to continue working while those who worked in the informal sector were denied employment. For example, whereas the South African government allocated R500 billion attained from aid as a social and economic assistance package for those employed in the informal economy, the Zimbabwean government took advantage of an opportunity to reform informal markets by demolishing street stalls of vendors without consulting them. As a result of the epidemic and government initiatives, the social and economic well-being of workers employed in the informal economy has been harmed. Because of this, this chapter is concerned with the following questions: What was the situation of the informal sector in Zimbabwe and South Africa before COVID-19; how did government actions affect the operations of the

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informal sector during the pandemic; and what policy suggestions can be made because of this research. In Chapter 13, Omololu Fagbadebo and Nirmala Dorasmy discuss the impact of the corruption pandemic on the COVID-19 pandemic in Africa, with cases from Nigeria and South Africa. The pervasive crisis of governance in African countries is not new. Rampant abuse of power by the leadership has remained an albatross that defied rational solutions. While citizens suck in their helplessness occasioned by the pandemic corruption, the leaders continue to exploit public resources to the detriment of the public during the COVID-19 era. While citizens were exposed to the hardship generated by the lockdown, leaders took the advantage to steal public resources designated for relief materials. In Nigeria, while citizens were living in hunger, government officials hoard food items and other relief materials earmarked for public consumption. COVID-19 patients were treated poorly, while public officials looted the resources. In South Africa, officials looted the fund established for the welfare of unemployed citizens. The procurement process became a network of corruption. Other African countries experienced the corruption pandemic during the COVID-19 pandemic thereby compounding the bourgeoning governance crisis. Using primary and secondary data from public documents, reports, and extant literature, this paper argues that the entrenched corruption culture would remain a barrier to good governance in South Africa and Nigeria. It would require a resilient public to break the stronghold of the elitist conspiracy through sustained public protests, in the face of the failed democratic process, that has defied the necessary reform for accountability.

References Bromfield, N., & McConnell, A. (2020). Two routes to precarious success: Australia, New Zealand, COVID-19 and the politics of crisis governance. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 1–18 https://doi.org/10. 1177/0020852320972465 OECD. (2020). Anti-Bribery responses to COVID-19. https://www.oecd.org/ daf/anti-bribery/anti-bribery-responses-to-covid-19.htm Olatunbosun-Alakija, A. (2021, February 8). The haves and have-nots: The geopolitical dilemma of COVID vaccine equity. The OECD Forum Network. https://www.oecd-forum.org/posts/the-haves-and-have-nots-thegeopolitical-dilemma-of-covid-vaccine-equity

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Schotte, S., Danquah, M., Osei, R., & Sen, K. (2021, February 11–12). The labour market impact of COVID-19 lockdowns: Evidence from Ghana. A paper presented at the UNU-WIDER Conference on Development challenges in Africa in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. Songwe, V. (2021, February 11–12). Africa’s Pre-COVID growth trajectory and fiscal landscape. A paper presented at the UNU-WIDER Conference on Development challenges in Africa in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. Trotsenburg, A. V. (2021, February 9). COVID-19 response: Where we stand now, and the road ahead. Voices. https://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/covid19-response-where-we-stand-now-and-road-ahead?cid=ECR_E_Newsletter Weekly_EN_EXT&deliveryName=DM93802 World Bank Group. (2020, June). Saving lives, scaling-up impact and getting back on track: World Bank Group COVID-19 crisis response approach paper. Worldometer. (11/02/2021). https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/? utm_campaign=homeAdvegas1?#countries

CHAPTER 2

Governance Imperative in Public Sector Management in Africa Omololu Fagbadebo and Nirmala Dorasamy

Introduction When the COVID-19 pandemic became a global disaster, organizations, especially the World Health Organization (WHO), swung into action to prevent the further spread of the virus. Countries with cases of the virus also rolled out a series of stringent public health and economic measure to forestall the further spread of the virus (Kukharuk, 2020). Lockdown measures affected the public sector management with limited economic activities. Nevertheless, the emergency associated with the pandemic called for the procurement of safety materials such as personal

O. Fagbadebo (B) Department of Public Management, Law and Economics, Durban University of Technology, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] N. Dorasamy Department of Public Management and Economics, Durban University of Technology, Durban, South Africa e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. Dorasamy (ed.), Governance Challenges During the COVID-19 Pandemic in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11244-7_2

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protective equipment (PPE) for health workers. In addition, governments sought relief measures to mitigate the consequences of economic disruption through stimulus relief packages to organizations and vulnerable citizens. This management of the emergency expenditures and procurements has exposed the weak ability of the public sector in Africa to absorb the shocks of emergencies. This reflects the nature of the management of the public sector activities in Africa. Effective management of the public sector depends on the disposition of the stakeholders to public goods and services. The public sector has two major purposes to fulfill: creating societal values and working toward the fulfillment of the expectations of citizens (Bojang, 2022). In other words, public sector management entails the definition of societal values and promotion and provision of services for citizens. This will require the active participation of citizens in identifying and defining these values. Thus, “Citizen participation has the potential to create public value for different service sector organizations. It improves the efficiency and effectiveness of public sector organizations, increases citizens’ satisfaction, and enhances social values” (Bojang, 2022, 49). The effectiveness of public sector management, especially during emergencies, is critical to societal stability. The private sector depends on the enabling environment in the public sector to harness its potential in wealth creation. Indeed, stakeholders in the public sector cannot manage the activities without the active participation of members of the private sector (Mugarura et al., 2020). The importance of the public sector manager is crucial because of the importance of the distribution of public goods. Since the public sector is the custodian of expenditures for major infrastructural developments, given the enormous cost, prudent management of public resources is very pertinent. This chapter interrogates the primacy of effective management of the public sector in Africa. This chapter has six sections, aside from this introduction. Section two discusses the concept of governance while the third section conceptualizes public sector management. The fourth section discusses the nexus between governance and public sector management while section five analyzes public sector management in Africa. Section six concludes.

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Governance Governance connotes a process coordinated to engender continuous interaction between the government and the governed in every society or organization (Commission on Global Governance, 1995). It is “the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented or not implemented” (EU, 2011, 24). It is a continuous process of interactions among stakeholders in determining the best form of system for public service delivery. The public sector is the space for this pattern of interactions. And central to this is power and leadership. The caliber and attitudinal disposition of stakeholders in the government would determine the extent to which the outcomes of the interactions benefit citizens (Fagbadebo, 2020). At the state level, there is the need for a leadership structure that can coordinate the activities of the public sector in a manner that would promote the interest of citizens. Thus, such leadership needs the authority of the state to act. Similarly, the governed should be empowered to participate in the public space. This is feasible in a free society where citizens have freedom; hence, the importance of democratic principles in governance (Keping, 2018). This is not limited to the public sector; good corporate governance is also essential to ensure effective interaction between the state and the corporate world. When decisions of the government, in terms of the provision of public services, promote the interests of citizens, then it is known as good governance. Hence, Francis Fukuyama defines governance “as a government’s ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services, regardless of whether that government is democratic or not” (Fukuyama, 2013, 350). The essence of the government, as the coordinator of the public sector and the state, is crucial for direction and survival. This ability of the government encompasses a series of principles that actors must promote and respect. To him, democracy and good governance are not mutually supportive because “the quality of governance is different from the ends that governance is meant to fulfill” (Fukuyama, 2013, 350). In other words, “governance is about the performance of agents in carrying out the wishes of principals, and not about the goals that principals set” (Fukuyama, 2013, 350). It is not enough for the government to propose a policy direction; it is another thing for it to be executed for the intended purpose. This has nothing to do with regime type. As Fukuyama (2013, 351) has noted,

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an “authoritarian regime can be well governed, just as a democracy can be maladministered”. Thus, governance is not limited to or restricted by the type of regime in government. The crucial governance elements in public sector management are legitimacy and public support, operational capacity, and adherence to public values. Yee and Liu (2021) have noted the primacy of capacity in the enforcement of regulations necessary for stability and development in a state. They opine that substantial public sector reforms are necessary to stimulate capacity. Such reforms include appropriation of “functional and geographical demarcation of agency boundaries, functioning political relationships with other administrative units, and an efficient judiciary system and legal provisions that support the exercise of public authority” (Yee & Liu, 2021, 6). Fukuyama (2013) identifies four approaches to evaluate the quality of governance: procedural measures, input or capacity measures, output measures, and measures of bureaucratic autonomy. The procedural approach follows the principles associated with bureaucratic freedom but is subjected to authority only within a defined area, the hierarchical organizational structure of control, discipline, and command, with a definite sphere of competence (Bersch & Botero, 2014; Fukuyama, 2013). Others are the selection of candidates based on technical qualifications, fixed remuneration, career prospects, and separation between ownership and management. Not all society follows these principles, and, in some, it might be complicated depending on the structure of government (Bersch & Botero, 2014; Fukuyama, 2013; Yee & Liu, 2021). The quality of governance in this regard would manifest in the use of merit as the yardstick for recruitment and promotion, level of technical expertise, and formality of bureaucratic procedures (Fukuyama, 2013). The degree of autonomy of the bureaucracy is also crucial in governance. As Fukuyama (2013, 356) has noted, autonomy connotes “how the political principal issues mandate to the bureaucrats who act as its agent”; in other words, the capacity to generate authoritative actions devoid of external constraints (Maggetti & Verhoest, 2014). Such mandates should guarantee the independence of the bureaucracy as experts rather than subordinating it to the whims and caprices of the political executives (Maggetti & Verhoest, 2014). Autonomy defines the relationship, between the political principal, and the bureaucratic agents in terms of the issuance and nature of the mandates (Fukuyama, 2013).

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The fewer and more general the mandates, the greater autonomy the bureaucracy possesses. A completely autonomous bureaucracy gets no mandates at all but sets its own goals independently of the political principal. Conversely, a nonautonomous or subordinated bureaucracy is micromanaged by the principal, which establishes detailed rules that the agent must follow. (Fukuyama, 2013, 357)

Autonomy here relates to the political capacity of the bureaucracy, as a permanent structure of the state, which has evolved continuously through the various outlets and networks of relationship and reputation. As a consequence, the notion of autonomy not only incorporates the implications of a principal-agent relation, but it is also the result of public sector organizations’ embeddedness in complex multi-actor configurations that shape their independence and control. (Maggetti & Verhoest, 2014, 240)

Bureaucratic autonomy is crucial in governance because of its role as an indispensable structure of the government directly involved in the generation and distribution of public goods. The nature of such autonomy determines the policy strength of bureaucrats and the quality of governance. The capacity or input measures approach flows from the deficiency associated with the bureaucratic procedures, which on its own might not be able to induce the expected positive outcomes from the government. Fukuyama notes. it is possible to have an impersonal, merit-based bureaucracy that nonetheless is extremely poor at getting things done. To say that a bureaucrat is selected on the basis of “merit” does not define merit, nor does it explain whether the official’s skills will be renewed in light of changing conditions or technology. (Fukuyama, 2013, 353)

This is important to insulate this crucial governance structure from the political quagmire that often paralyzes effective governance. Bureaucrats would be strong enough to monitor the disbursement of public resources. Fukuyama argues further that the capacity of the state could be measured from the extractive sector, significantly, taxation. To him, the state needs the necessary capacity to extract taxes because “successful tax extraction provides resources that enable the government to operate in other domains” (Fukuyama, 2013, 353). The more resources that are

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available to the state, the stronger the capacity to promote an effective public sector through adequate delivery of the necessary public goods. Tax extraction rates can be measured both by the percentage of taxes to gross domestic product, as well as by the nature of taxation—that is, whether it is based on income or wealth, or indirect taxation (as income and wealth taxes are much more difficult to extract than indirect taxes). (Fukuyama, 2013, 353)

However, this is not a guarantee of the capacity of the state because the potential to extract tax is different from the actual extraction rates. Capacity is measured when the extraction rate correlates with the efficient use of the tax revenues. Tax revenues are based mostly on rents and international transfers rather than taxes from the domestic environment only. Beyond adherence to procedure and state capacity, it is also important to measure governance by the outputs of government such as the provision of basic amenities and infrastructures supporting the promotion of human security: educational infrastructures, healthcare delivery, security, and national defense. Again, these output measures are not the sole responsibility of the government. The private sectors fare well in the provision of school, healthcare facilities, and security. Nevertheless, the state has the responsibility of providing the enabling environment to promote private–public partnership in the promotion of the outputs of the state for the benefit of the general public. This must be protected against corruption that drains state resources and jeopardizes the capacity to provide sufficient public goods.

Corruption in Public Sector Governance Effective management of the public sector is a necessity for good governance. Good governance connotes “exercising authority and power in accordance with fairly stable principles, approved procedures, and recognized authority” (Olsen, 2015, 430). In other words, how stakeholders in the government exercise state powers will determine the quality of governance and the public goods available for citizens. Thus, the nature of the public sector is determined by the actions and inactions of stakeholders,

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including members of the public and civil society. Indeed, the eight principles of good governance establish the necessity for a public sector that is responsive to the needs of citizen. Good governance is governed by the need for public participation in the decision-making process, with public actions and activities governed by an adherent to the rule of law (Fukuyama, 2013; Olsen, 2015). Government should be transparent, responsive, and accountable. In addition, government decisions should be consensus-oriented, equitable, and inclusive. And most importantly, government activities and responses to the needs of the public must be effective and efficient. These principles are directed to the public sector. Thus, good governance is more realizable when the public sector abides by these principles. This signifies the primacy of effective management of the public sector for a transformed society. Conversely, mismanagement of the public sector is antithetical to good governance. When the governance structure becomes corrupt or captured for private benefits, then good governance is in jeopardy and the public sector becomes an appropriated instrument of certain individuals. These are the characteristic features of the African public sector. The economists see corruption as a problem of the principal-agent relationship. The sociologists consider it a problem of social construction, while the psychologists see it as a personal disposition. The democratic theory perspective views corruption as a violation of the fiduciary obligations, entrusted to government officials by the public, with detrimental effects on the legitimacy of the democratic process (Neshkova & Kalesnikaite, 2019). These three perspectives have a common factor: individuals delegated with the responsibility and the power of the state. This has implications for the growth and functionality of the public sector. If citizens view their government as corrupt and dishonest, they become cynical about political life and, as a result, less likely to participate in democratic governance. Such withdrawal patterns especially hold in countries that underwent recent transitions to democracy and market economy, where new political institutions are still underdeveloped and fragile. (Neshkova & Kalesnikaite, 2019, 678)

Corruption occurs when the people that are entrusted with power or responsibility for the promotion of public interests exercise such power for private gains. This is not limited to the public sector, but the private entities as well. In the public sector, there are two distinguished forms

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of corruption: political and bureaucratic. Corruption occurs when elected government officials use the power entrusted to them to procure private gains at the expense of the intended purpose (Fagbadebo, 2007). This includes all forms of unethical conduct such as bribery, nepotism, extortion, cronyism, nepotism, parochialism, patronage, influence peddling, graft, and embezzlement. Again, this is a defining nature of the African public sector, where the political and bureaucratic leadership in collaboration with the elites outside the government are predators that feed on the collective wealth of society (Fagbadebo, 2019; Fagbadebo & Dorasamy, 2021). Bureaucratic corruption occurs when public officials, especially public servants, or politically appointed government officials, explore their positions to extract private gains from the public resources (Neshkova & Kalesnikaite, 2019). Both political and bureaucratic corruption work together. Often, the political office holders use the bureaucrats as fronts to perpetrate abuse of their entrusted power. The bureaucrats, in turn, collect bribes with the knowledge of the political heads. Corruption in government may take many forms, such as conflict of interest, bribery, extortion, embezzlement, and nepotism, and may include one or multiple actors. Single employees can commit embezzlement and theft by illegally appropriating public resources or selling off government property. Often, corruption involves transactions between two parties, but it may also operate through secret networks with multiple participants. (Neshkova & Kalesnikaite, 2019, 679)

Corruption is like cancer in the blood of the public sector. Though lifethreatening, its cure requires a commitment to strict compliance with the prescribed disciplinary measures. In this wise, effective management of the public sector to overcome the burden of public service delivery in society requires strong structure and committed stakeholders, most especially the political and bureaucratic leadership.

Public Sector Management in Africa Institutions and structures define the public sector; not just the physical presence of these structures but the performance of their statutory responsibilities. Thus, the public sector derives its relevance when the institutions and structures of the government are accountable for their

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responsibilities and discharge of their functions (Ayee, 2012). Every society requires development. However, the nature of development depends on the characteristic features of the public sector. In Africa, scholars have noted that the public sector “continues to be beset by inefficiency and remains incapable of performing basic functions” (Owusu & Ohemeng, 2012). The African public sector has been a victim of instability in the governments of the countries in the continent. Shortly after the independence of African countries from their colonial masters in the 1960s, the public sector was plunged into the era of military incursion into the political space. This has had a tremendous implication on the continent’s public sector management. As the ECA (2003) noted, “the continent has found itself in an incessant cycle of political, social and ethnic conflict” (Economic Commission for Africa, 2003, 1). The rationalization for military intervention in the governments of the continent hinged on the rate of mismanagement of the public sector. Nevertheless, the military successors did not demonstrate their mastery of public management. Most of the military regimes adopted new constitutions in order to guarantee freedom and human rights to all citizens. However, history repeats itself and soon after, it was realized that the political and socio-economic conditions of Africa under the reform had not improved. (ECA, 2001, 1)

Even with the return of democratic regimes after long years of praetorian interregnum, Africa’s public sector has remained stagnated and an instrument of state exploitation. Thus, “governance in Africa has been marked by authoritarianism and state privatization for the benefit of the ruling elite, resulting in institutional disintegration rather than development” (ECA, 2003). In recent times, Africa is witnessing a gradual resurgence of military rule, occasioned by the mismanagement of the public sector. Poor service delivery, the bourgeoning crisis of governance, and heightened insecurity characterize the African political space. Public dissent and displeasure against the government pervade the continent’s society with protests against ineffective public service delivery and the crisis of governance. Human security is worsening with astounding data on rising poverty and unemployment amid monumental corruption that has paralyzed the public sector.

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Youth unemployment continues to increase with a corresponding rise in crime (Adekoya, 2020). The International Labour Organisation (ILO) (2020) reported that Africa had the lowest unemployment rate in 2020. Nevertheless, it is that “the majority of Africa’s youth work informally” while a high proportion is “underemployed or remain in poverty despite working due to low wages and the lack of a social safety net, making it difficult to compare African countries to more advanced economies” (Donkor, 2021). According to the African Development Bank (ADB) (2006), 263 million African youth would lack an economic stake by 2025. With approximately 12 million youth entering the workforce annually, the public sector can create 3.1million jobs. One-third of Africa’s 420 million youth “are unemployed and discouraged, another third is vulnerably employed, and only one in six is in wage employment” (ADB, 2006). This development explains the continuous migration of African youth to Europe. Africa has a vibrant growing youth population. The youth population of 226 million living in Africa in 2015 accounted for 19% of the global youth population (POPFACTS, 2015). By 2030, it is projected that the number of youths in Africa will have increased by 42%. Africa’s youth population is expected to continue to grow throughout the remainder of the twenty-first century, more than doubling from current levels by 2055 (POPFACTS, 2015). Unfortunately, most of these youth are lacking in education, as most of the African countries have been struggling to provide the necessary infrastructural facilities that would enable them to have access to education. According to the UN, less than 80% of youths in 32 African countries were literate, and 18 out of these 32 countries would experience a 40% increase in the numbers of youth between 2015 and 2030, and it was expected to increase by 60% in 6 other countries (POPFACTS, 2015). Aside from this, in most of these countries, health and education facilities are inadequate to support the needs of the growing youth population, a development that had limited their capacity to reach their full productive potential and to contribute to economic development (POPFACTS, 2015). The population growth of the youth also has challenging implications on the capacity of the countries to improve the quality of services to be provided within the limit of infrastructural and human capacities. For instance, the South African government expended R25bn on medical malpractice lawsuits, because of medical complications that arose from human errors caused by the dearth of well-equipped medical personnel

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(Makholwa, 2015). There had been an increase in the case of medical malpractices, attested to by the Minister of Health, Dr. Aaron Motsoaledi (Health24, 10/03/2015). Consequently, the health care services both at the public and private health care facility centers have been limited. Provincial health departments are struggling with their obligation to provide healthcare services, while still having to pay out the billions in claims against them. In the private sector, medical specialists are being faced with exorbitant medical protection insurance premiums, causing healthcare costs to rise and impacting practices. (cf. Gifford, 2018)

In Nigeria, healthcare delivery services are poor. This “progressive deterioration” of the healthcare delivery has been attributed “to weakened political will on the part of successive governments to effectively solve some problems that have accumulated in the sector over many years” (Obokoh, 2019). This directly impacts the productivity of citizens and by extension Nigeria’s economic growth. Access to healthcare services has remained a strain on the people as the health expenditure stood at 74.85%. Of the total health expenditure (Obokoh, 2019), The implication of this is that government expenditure for health is only 25.15 percent of all the money spent on health all across the nation. Of the percentage spent on health by the citizens (74.85 percent), about seventy percent is spent as out-of-pocket expenditure to pay for access to health services in government and private facilities. Most of the remaining money spent by citizens on their health is spent on procuring ‘alternative’ remedies of dubious value. (Obokoh, 2019)

While the members of the public suffer greatly thereof, government officials could not insure their life in the hands of the Nigerian medical personnel and the available facilities. They would rather embark upon medical tourism abroad rather than provide adequate facilities that would support the activities of the medical personnel. Every month, almost 6,000 people leave the country for various forms of treatment, including some that can be carried out in Nigeria. And with that, medical tourism is costing the nation huge sums of money, estimated to be over $1.3 billion, according to the Price Waterhouse Coopers (2016) report. Of this amount, about 60 percent is expended on four key specialties, namely: oncology, orthopaedics, nephrology and cardiology.

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This is a significant percentage of the total government spending on public health and if we are serious, these should be areas of priority to our health authorities. (Adeniyi, 2019)

Consequently, Nigerian medical practitioners would prefer to migrate to other countries with better facilities and incentives to practice to their maximum capacities (Adebayo & Akinyemi, 2021). When medical personnel does not have the requisite tools to do their job, as is the case in our country, they will be reduced to mere guesswork. Yet, misdiagnoses can only result in incorrect treatment that could then worsen the condition of patients or even lead to death. Many of such fatalities have been recorded in our country in recent years with all the blame put at the doorsteps of medical doctors. (Adeniyi, 2019)

In their empirical study, Adebayo and Akinyemi (2021) note that the mismanagement of the country’s public sector has created the opportunity for medical personnel to migrate. They found that a combination of factors, such as poor working and living conditions, motivate the medical personnel to migrate to Europe and other countries with better working conditions. According to them, participants in the study expressed the view that “the challenges in the health sector extended to the general population and corruption, with poor political will were some of the challenges pointed out by some of the participants” (Adebayo & Akinyemi, 2021). Poverty and unemployment have made a lot of Nigerian youth victims of trafficking. While a segment went into prostitution abroad, others were into servitude labor, with the harrowing experience of inhuman treatment in foreign lands. One of the victims of such trafficking adventure narrated her story thus: I was linked up by a fellow who facilitated my movement to Lebanon sometime in October last year. The fellow dangled before me a teaching job of English language if I would go, even though my academic qualification is Ordinary National Diploma (OND) in Accountancy… rather than taking me to any school as a teacher as planned, I was subjected into a house help job, fetching water with heavy buckets from a distance location into the storey building apartment I was housed in. I was working like a slave, doing all sorts of menial jobs. (cf. Fagbemi, 2020)

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Income inequality is high in South Africa, while income distribution is skewed toward the mere 20% of the citizens. The top 20 percent of the population holds over 68 percent of income (compared to a median of 47 percent for similar emerging markets). The bottom 40 percent of the population holds 7 percent of income (compared to 16 percent for other emerging markets). Similar trends can be observed across other measures, such as the income share of the top 1 percent. (IMF, 2020)

South Africa’s unemployment rate is significantly higher than other emerging markets, with youth unemployment exceeding close to 50% of the population. “Since early 2020, the total number of employed people in the country has decreased from 16.4 million to 14.2 million” (Naidoo, 2021). The COVID-19 pandemic stifled the country’s business environment thereby contributing to the high unemployment rate in the country. South Africa had more cases of COVID-19 in Africa, with devastating effects on the economy, given the lengthy period of the closure of the economic and social spaces because of the lockdown measures. Creating more low-skilled jobs to improve labor force participation, especially in the poorest provinces, will spur inclusion. Employment prospects could be enhanced by improving the quality of education and facilitating affordable transportation to job centers (IMF, 2020). One of the attributes of good governance is security. Most countries in the African continent are reeling under a siege of insecurity. From the incessant Boko Haram attacks as well as other violent cases of kidnapping, herdsmen attacks, in Nigeria, through the Al Shabab reign of terror in Kenya, and the insurgent attacks in Mali, to the rampant violent killings and gender-based abuses in South Africa, among few others, Africans are suffering from the consequences of an elevated level of insecurity. This is a manifestation of the poor management of the continent’s public sector. Security infrastructures are very weak to combat the rising cases of criminal activities generated by the bourgeoning crisis of governance. In terms of employment, corrupt government officials in their various institutions are exploiting job applicants. Rather than provide jobs, government officials now sell the available job vacancies to desperate job seekers. For instance, in Nigeria, there was a report that officials of an institution of government, the Federal Character Commission (FCC), were in the habit of selling jobs (The Punch, 25/02/2020). A Senator,

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Danjuma La’ ah, who was also the chairman of the Senate Committee on Federal Character Commission, revealed that employment in the country’s government agencies is riddled with corruption. I got reports from different people on sales of jobs going on at the Federal Character Commission. Appointments into government offices are now for sale at the Federal Character Commission. It is real. Someone has forwarded to me a text message which is on my phone that he purchased the Nigeria Ports Authority job from the Federal Character Commission at N3m. (cf. The Punch, 25/02/2020)

Similar complaints are rampant in South Africa, where desperate female unemployed people are being subjected to sexual molestation (Makhubu, 2014; Pijoos, 2019). A job seeker posted the conversation with a potential employer who demanded sex in exchange for employment. “There are no jobs these days, so if you a (sic) woman you have to compromise somehow to get a good lifetime job offer. No one will ever know about our sex deal. Even your husband. It will remain our secret forever and forever” (cf. Pijoos, 2019). Desperate unemployed citizens looking for a job have become victims of a network of job scammers and criminals taking advantage of their vulnerability.

Mismanaging the African Public Sector One major setback in the African public sector is mismanagement. Corruption with impunity has stifled the necessary capacity of African states to stimulate good governance and confront emergencies. The Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) in its 2021 report indicated that for Africa “to have a chance of controlling the COVID-19 pandemic”, the continent would have to “vaccinate 70% of its population by the end of 2022” (MO Ibrahim, 2021, 15). This will require a public sector that is committed to transparency and accountability. These are very rare in the African public sector. In South Africa, the failures of State-Owned Enterprises have had their consequence on governance. For instance, ESKOM, the country’s producer of power, has been spotted as one of the failing SOEs, with its attendant effect on the economy as well as the general welfare of the citizens. The constant load-shedding policy, which rationalizes the supply of electricity, had increased operational costs as well criminal activities.

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One of the victims of these criminal activities is the telecommunication sector where some companies have lost millions of rand in capital expenditure to replace stolen batteries from their various mobile telephone network towers (Njilo, 2020). The use of such batteries was necessitated by the constant power failure while the criminals also exploit the darkness created by the power cut to steal the batteries for their source of power. An officer in one of the telecommunication networks, MTN, stated, “Load-shedding is seeing entire neighborhoods cloaked in darkness at predictable times, which is offering criminals greater cover for their thieving” (cf. Njilo, 2020). In 2018, for instance, MTN claimed it spent R300million on batteries while Vodacom, another telecommunication outfit, records a loss of R120m-R130m annually to the theft of its batteries (Njilo, 2020). In the first instance, these batteries were not necessary if the electricity supply was regular. Now, the load shedding had increased the operational cost, while theft of the batteries and the need to replace them added to the cost. The consequence of these losses is borne by the citizens who are the final consumers, through an increase in the cost of data. Load shedding contributed significantly to the contraction of the South African economy by −0.6%, and the reduction of the GDP by 0.30%, an estimated R8.5billion in 2019 (BusinessTech, 12/12/2019). At the height of the energy crisis last year, President Ramaphosa disclosed that the loss of 2000 MW of power was occasioned by deliberate sabotage in the power generation outfit (Steyn, 2019). The president said: “Someone in the Eskom system disconnected one of the instruments, which finally led to one of the boilers tripping” (cf. Steyn, 2019). Nevertheless, no one has been apprehended for that act, and the load shedding continued into the early part of 2020. This is another challenge of mismanagement of the country’s public sector. The State Capture phenomenon has reduced the South African State to a personalized enclave captured by few individuals to promote their pecuniary interests. Corruption in Nigeria is at another level. In 2007, Daniel Jordan presented a succinct summary of the narratives that described the nature of corruption in Nigeria. By the time I arrived in Nigeria in 1989 as an employee of an international development organization, I was well aware of the country’s reputation for corruption. I had heard the common stories of immigration and customs officers who shakedown arriving passengers at the airport, police looking

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for money who harass motorists, taxi drivers who collude with criminals to rob customers, and government officials who do nothing without a bribe. Further, I had read that the government-controlled oil industry was riddled with graft, and that beginning in the 1980s, Nigeria was believed to be a transit hub in the international narcotics trade, with widespread allegations of official collusion. (cf. Smith, 2007, 1)

At that time, such a narrative was alarming. Nevertheless, contemporary development has made “the scope and complexity of corruption in Nigeria immense” (Page, 2018, 1). Stealing of public resources by public officials is a common feature. For instance, in 2019, crude oil worth $750m was reported to have been stolen. Corruption is rife across the country’s economic sectors: petroleum, trade, industrial, agricultural, infrastructure, power sector, banking, and environmental. Together, these forms of corruption erase billions of dollars from Nigeria’s bottom line and prevent it from realizing its great human and economic potential. (Page, 2018, 2)

The Group Managing Director of Nigeria’s National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), Mallam Mele Kyari, who disclosed this incident attributed it to the insecurity in the country, which also spilled into the oil drilling and processing sector of the economy. The institutional measures and mechanisms to curb corruption are more of networks of corruption rather than anti-corruption bodies. The judiciary, the police, and other public institutions empowered to deal with corrupt activities have been compromised. Page (2018, 2) notes that “corruption in the judiciary and within anti-corruption agencies undermines the country’s already anemic accountability mechanisms, thereby fuelling corruption across the spectrum”. Corruption in Nigeria appears to be ubiquitous and takes many forms: from massive contract fraud to petty bribery; from straight-up embezzlement to complicated money laundering schemes; from pocketing the salaries of nonexistent workers to steering plum jobs to relatives and friends. Some officials enjoy perquisites so excessive that they are widely seen as a form of legalized corruption. (Page, 2018, 3)

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Similarly, Steven pierce (2016) notes the systemic nature of corruption in Nigeria, rooted in the country’s history of patronage. To him, corruption in Nigeria permeates every activity in the private and the public sector because it is complex, multifaceted, and multidirectional. Thus, dealing with corruption in Nigeria should not be a question of preventing criminal diversion of public resources for private use but seeking to accommodate the culture of patronage as a political principle. The public sector of most African countries is similar but in different dimensions and intensities. This warped public sector had implications on the measures to combat the COVID-19 pandemic in the continent. The management of the COVID-19 emergencies, especially in the areas of procurement and distribution of essential services exposed the systemic problem of corruption in the public sector. This is the bedrock of the problems associated with the management of the pandemic in the continent. This was more profound in South Africa, where the Special Investigation Unit (SIU) discovered the violation of the country’s procurement frameworks under the guise of emergency (SIU, 2021). The agency noted that government officials merely rubber-stamped decisions taken by their superior and often “accepted and gave effect to ‘unlawful’ instructions” (SIU, 2021, 39). “Consequently, officials working within support services processed Commitment Letters, Purchase Orders, Invoices and payments without ensuring compliance with normal SCM prescripts and other control measures” (SIU, 2021, 39). The SIU investigated 5467 COVID-19 procurement contracts with a total monetary value of R15 billion. While the Unit was able to recover R34.2million, it was battling to recover another R551 million (SIU, 2021). In Kenya, the Kenya Medical Supplies Agency (KEMSA), charged with the responsibility of procurement of COVID-19 items was embroiled in corruption allegations and scandals to the tune of $400 million (Oduor, 2021). There were reports that “gross misconduct and abuse of funds meant for Covid-19” characterized the procurement activities of the KEMSA (Oduor, 2021). Allocations of tenders were shrouded with irregularities while individuals “who had no history or connection to medical tenders” were awarded contracts for the procurement of medical items (Oduor, 2021). One witness confessed she won the tender when it accidentally happened that she was passing by the KEMSA offices. Malawi also recorded a similar incident of corruption in the procurement of COVID-19 items. In April 2021, the country’s police arrested

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64 people accused of mismanagement of the COVID-19 funds (Oduor, 2021). The audit report indicated government officials in collaboration with the private sector mismanaged a total sum of $1.3 million of the funds through procurement and allowance irregularities (Oduor, 2021). In 2021, President Lazarus Chakwera had to remove the country’s Minister of Labour, Ken Kandodo, who was implicated in the scandal COVID-19 fund (Kateta, 2021). Auditors found that upwards of 720 million kwacha (approximately $915,000) was spent irregularly or unaccounted for in the country’s COVID-19 response. Within the expenditure, 494 million kwacha was involved in inappropriate procurement procedures, 80 million kwacha was spent on allowances, and 83 million kwacha involved problems in accounting, including 12 million kwacha that simply vanished. (Kateta, 2021)

The rampant mismanagement of the COVID-19 funds in the country was responsible for the rate of death of people infected with the virus. This prompted the president to declare, I want all the thieves hiding in the civil service to mark my words: If the finger of evidence points to you as one of the thieves who stole COVID money for saving lives while hundreds of our people were dying of COVID, you are going to prison. (cf. Kateta, 2021)

In Zimbabwe, the government removed Obediah Moyo, the Minister of Health, “after he was accused of illegally awarding a multimillion-dollar contract, which inflated the cost of medical equipment” (Uche et al., 2021). Similarly, security agents in Uganda arrested top government officials for inflating the prices of COVID-19 food relief (Oduor, 2021). The government lost $528,000 to this fraudulent practice.

Conclusion The corruption and mismanagement of COVID-19 in Africa were responsible for the crippling of government responses to the pandemic. The MO Ibrahim Foundation (2021) reported the abysmal response of the African government toward the administration of the COVID-19 vaccination noting that even though the continent was home to 18%

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of the global population, it only accounted for 2.9% of the COVID-19 vaccine doses administered globally. It is evident, therefore, that Africa’s public sector is vulnerable and weak to absorb external shocks, especially during emergencies. Stakeholders in the management of the public sector have the propensity of appropriating state resources for the advancement of their interests at the expense of the welfare of citizens. Thus, African leaders have remained the major obstacle to the growth and development of an effective public sector. Thus, African leaders must be ready to prove to the public that they can manage the public sector in a way that would induce good governance. This is necessary to regain public trust in the government. “Reports of irregularities and corruption in the management of COVID19 funds and relief not only impede the effectiveness of those measures but also undermine trust and legitimacy in government leaders and core institutions” (Foresight Africa, 2021, 79). Africa’s public sector management requires the leaders to demonstrate “true commitment to conserving and deepening domestic political capital, strengthening the social contract with their citizens, and governing accountably” (Foresight Africa, 2021, 79). This is critical to rebuilding the public space.

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CHAPTER 3

COVID-19 and Social Alteration Challenges Jirushlan Dorasamy

Introduction The COVID-19 pandemic is considered highly infectious, unpredictable and disrupting social, economic, environmental and political spheres of life. Worldwide, people have ventured into a “lockdown world”, increasing uncertainty about our future amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result of the pandemic, people are expected to alter their daily social routines. Social alteration has taken the form of social distancing, self-isolation and self-quarantine. Social distancing minimizes physical interaction and requires maintaining at least 2 meters physical distance among people, while self-quarantine is for those who are not infected but maybe in the incubation period but were in contact with infected people. On the other hand, under self-isolation, infected people are separated from those not infected to prevent the transmission of the virus (Suppawittaya et al., 2020). In some fields, work has slowed down or has come to an abrupt halt, while fields like health services continue to serve

J. Dorasamy (B) Faculty of Health Sciences, Durban University of Technology, Durban, South Africa e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. Dorasamy (ed.), Governance Challenges During the COVID-19 Pandemic in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11244-7_3

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us at exponential rates. Many were unprepared for the shift from the “normal”, propelling undue stress under the new normal way of doing things under the current global pandemic crisis. Such a crisis has impacted every sector and every individual. Many countries are experiencing severe drawbacks in healthcare facilities such as ventilators, beds and testing. While governments have developed unprecedented responses to the various scenarios, overall, their capabilities to effectively respond to collective challenges are limited. Brammer et al. (2020) argued that populism, neoliberalism, increased privatization and nationalism are some of the factors impeding substantive responses to global threats. Implications of COVID-19 on Society The COVID-19 pandemic has changed social practices in epic proportions, with new ways of living becoming the norm. Relatedly, the World Health Organisation (2020) asserted that the pandemic has created a social legacy by changing how life is conducted. For example, social isolation has resulted in a massive reduction in interpersonal contact, leading to digital communication becoming the norm. This has been accompanied by emotional and mental effects, as the ongoing and fluid nature of the pandemic has created uncertainty for many people. Society is irretrievably destroyed due to the loss of lives from a pandemic. The enduring demands from the COVID-19 pandemic have invariably exceeded the capacity of many governments to prevent the escalating magnitude of the consequences. As countries with high populations and high densities are more vulnerable to the spread of the virus, such countries need more mechanisms to limit the spread of new cases and death rates (Islam et al., 2020). More so, the pandemic has highlighted the deficiencies and inequities of social advancement. According to Wang et al. (2020), the impact is more severe for families, causing interrupted learning due to closure of educational institutions, childcare problems, compromised nutrition and economic costs to families who have become unemployed. There is now an imperative for the roles and responsibilities of all sectors in society to be impactful, considering that the crisis traverses every aspect of society. Thus, all the phenomena threatening society during this health crisis must be critiqued, so that destructive threats to society can be derailed (Lumpkin & Bacq, 2019). Additionally,

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Yoo (2020) called for solidarity from governments, healthcare personnel and the public, in general, to fight to contain the pandemic. Alexander (2018) opined that the health crisis has caused significant social distress and conflict in society, triggering new forms of sociality. Schmidt (2019) refers to this as a socialization process, whereby stressful events impact various interests in distinctive social spheres. The COVID-19 pandemic has undoubtedly endangered society in every sphere, causing severe strain on endemic problems such as unemployment, poverty, education, business and health. Relatedly, Alexander (2018) argued that escalating health severities have disrupted society, to the extent that “face-to-face contact” is now viewed as “not normal”, thereby requiring regulatory interventions which change social expectations. This has invariably led to individual behaviors changing. However, such regulatory interventions have also provoked backlashes, whereby organizations have attempted to block social change. Related examples include the tobacco and alcohol industries vehemently resisted regulatory interventions associated with the pandemic. The pandemic has triggered the socialization process, with various stages of “lockdown” requiring people to adapt. However, Schmidt (2019) claimed that not all problems lead to full socialization, as opposition and resistance amidst high uncertainty can stall such a process. Moreso, country-specific dynamics can be influential in the socialization process. For example, in the USA despite relief to families, workers, and businesses, and economic crisis was emerging with businesses struggling to survive, millions of employees laid off and the increasing use of food banks (Brammer et al., 2020). However, placing the US economy above the health of the people triggered a backlash that favored freedom of association and movement. The outcome of the socialization process is blurred, as returning to normal while the pandemic is in its second wave is a battle. While many argue that the new normal is here to stay, others find it dehumanizing and posit a total return to normal. Arguments favoring the new normal are premised on the view that the normal had inherent conditions that mitigated effective responses to deal with the threat of the virus and reinforced inequalities that widened the effects of the virus (Lumpkin & Bacq, 2019). Relatedly, Brammer et al. (2020) asserted that COVID-19 has procured significant growth in e-commerce, health protocols and social security, necessitating new institutions and ways of addressing socialization during COVID-19. Additionally, discourses favoring the new normal

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include increased interconnectedness of states; collaborative efforts to increase society’s resilience and community spirit; and heightened appreciation of the crisis impacting inequalities such as employment and medical conditions in the existing normal (Brammer et al., 2020). Conversely, getting back to normal is favored, as in some countries, government interventions have been criticized for interfering with core values like privacy, personal freedoms and independence. COVID-19 has unequivocally disrupted society, providing examples of how it has permeated the existing order. The basic tenets of how we socialize and engage in society serve as a foundation for good health, but COVID-19 has temporarily shifted such tenets. Since good health is influenced by social connections and face-to-face engagement, we need to take responsibility for addressing the threats caused by social isolation. Collaboration from various sectors is crucial. It has called for new roles and responsibilities to manage the pressures caused by the pandemic. This is critical as the pandemic compounds existing global challenges such as climate change, poverty and human capital development (Pereira et al., 2020). Global Impact and Strategies Engagement and Connection Globally, various social measures and health protocols have been implemented to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. Among others, these include social distancing; crowd control at gatherings; wearing of masks; sanitizing; maintaining cough and sneezing etiquette; closure of public spaces and educational institutions; and travel restrictions. Human travel for pleasure and business; and transportation of goods have been affected. This has impacted trade; tourism and travel industries; and economies. All types of social, religious, sport, cultural, scientific and political mass gathering events in various parts of the world have been indefinitely postponed. Restricting mass gatherings is an attempt to restrict the transmission of the virus through direct contact. For example, in countries like Saudi Arabia where religion is a major pillar of society, group prayers five times a day can facilitate the transmission of the virus. Social distancing has impacted the continuation of this practice with large numbers of attendees, resulting in the unprecedented temporary closure of about 80,000 mosques in Saudi Arabia (Yezlia & Khanand, 2020). While social

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distancing and isolation require support from all to prevent the spread of the pandemic, some may see it as an infringement of their human rights. While securing social support for pandemic containment is essential, public health strategies must be socially and culturally competent. This is not easy in multi-cultural populations, who may object to participation in such strategies if in conflict with their culture. As such, while an unprecedented pandemic requires draconic measures, human rights, social cohesion and solidarity must not be compromised. More so, adopting behavioral changes like social distancing in the African context is not easy due to overcrowded living conditions, dependence on public transport, crowding at communal water sources and scarcity of sanitary facilities. For example, social distancing is severely compromised for people living in informal settlements like slums, because of high occupancy rates in restricted spaces. Social distancing is virtually impossible, thereby making compliance a far cry. Another example is the shaking of hands which is a deeply rooted cultural practice in traditional communities and avoiding shaking hands can be considered disrespectful to the culture and person. However, the pandemic has called for such temporary social alteration under COVID-19 conditions, while encouraging other acceptable greeting practices. Thus, the health crisis not only triggered a new reality but has compounded threats to social, economic and political stability. Amid the crisis, governments are facing other challenges such as pollution, ozone layer depletion, soil degradation and urbanization which are causing grave human suffering (Chakraborty & Maity, 2020). Deepening Social Inequality COVID-19 will cause the socio-economic situation of the vulnerable to amplify, further segregating and fragmenting society (OECD Forum Network, 2020). The future of COVID-19 is uncertain but undoubtedly will incorporate increased poverty through higher unemployment and economic downturn. Additionally, according to the Council of Europe (2020), self-protection and exclusionary interests among the advantaged may deepen risks of marginalization of unprivileged groups. Pandemics have been positively associated with increased pre-existing social inequality (Oosterhoff et al., 2020). Especially in developing countries, nutrition deprivation; hunger; loss of informal income; increased homelessness; abuse; and violence may manifest. Additionally, people

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afflicted by social inequality are vulnerable to depression, anxiety and suicide (Solantaus et al., 2004). One aspect of the consequences of the pandemic on increased social inequality is the closure of schools influencing child labor; lack of stimulation for learners who cannot afford to access online study resources; and higher school dropouts. COVID-19 crisis has exposed the deepening of social inequalities. For example, in education, the division between the connected and unconnected during lockdown has shown challenges in accessing resources and a lack of readiness for online learning. Furthermore, Brammer et al. (2020) posited that online engagement cannot fully support the development of consciousness of critical thinking, diversity, inclusivity and social justice. Most low-income communities live in densely populated areas, with limited access to sanitation and hygiene, thereby making them more vulnerable to the spread of the virus (Rezende et al., 2020). More so, social distancing is a challenge as many low-income individuals work in the informal sector, with limited opportunity to work from home. Additionally, Oosterhoff et al. (2020) posited that such effects can be detrimental to the mental health of the socially disadvantaged. Organizations with local knowledge are critical in targeting service needs and combating social isolation, well before more formal schemes are rolled out. This potentially provides opportunities for new collective forms of action to evolve within communities, hopefully sustaining themselves well after the pandemic. Thus, cooperation; shared and collective responses; and an inclusionary vision must be considered when developing and communicating solutions that mitigate deepening social inequality. Employment and Underemployment While social distancing is needed to slow down and prevent further transmissions, it is significantly affecting employment. The closure of several industries like tourism, sport and transport has caused immense difficulty for those employed in such affected industries due to lockdown regulations. The COVID-19 crisis is expected to wipe out 6.7% of working hours globally, affecting employment and earnings (Kumari & Shukla, 2020). For example, the anticipated output decrease as high as 50–70% in the tourism industry has globally threatened increasing unemployment. Globally, working hours are expected to decline by 6.7%, causing people to work involuntarily in low-paid jobs, work part-time or be

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employed in unproductive and inappropriate labor (Kaur et al., 2020). During the pandemic, people are forced to pursue such options, merely to earn a living and sustain a standard of living. Decreasing demand for labor during the pandemic has caused many employees to be underutilized and undervalued (Maynard & Feldman, 2011). Thus, apart from people being unemployed, underemployment has prevented the full potential of individuals from being realized due to inadequate job opportunities during COVID-19. The adverse psychological, health and socio-economic effects require interventions to decrease the negative outcomes. While unemployment and underemployment are visible signs of an unhealthy economy, both manifestations require multi-pronged and robust measures to assist those severely compromised by the pandemic. Mental Wellbeing Issues While the economic and social impact of such measures is increasing, the mental well-being of individuals is also compromised. People with preexisting mental health issues, especially those with severe mental illnesses, may be particularly affected by exacerbation of symptoms, relapse, disruptions to services, isolation and the overload of social media-related information and behaviors associated with the pandemic. The lives of people have been significantly altered, especially during social distancing and self-isolation. Psychological effects such as emotions associated with stress, anxiety, insomnia, boredom, confusion, anger and boredom are fuelled by uncertainties associated with the virus. Relatedly, Sher (2020) posited that prolonged social isolation contributed to stress, anxiety and depression, potentially increasing the risk of suicide. Likewise, Killgore et al. (2020) argued that physical isolation diminishes meaningful social support and may influence suicidal thoughts. This is a serious health challenge during the pandemic and bolstering social support interventions should be considered during prolonged lockdown isolation. One viable way is the use of technology to strengthen mental resilience. Coping with the disruptions and challenges instigated by the pandemic is necessary to mitigate the negative mental health effects. Effect on Youth The daily routines and interactions of youth worldwide have been disrupted by COVID-19. More specifically, Lianhmingthangi et al. (2020) claimed that the youth have also been affected by social isolation, closure of educational institutions, scarce jobs, boredom and disrupted

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economies. Serlachius et al. (2020) identified anxiety regarding reduced psychosocial and physical support; the stress of disrupted routines; and heightened risk of family stress, abuse and domestic violence as some of the challenges facing youth during the pandemic. More so, those with chronic illnesses are likely to experience guilt about an increased dependency on family support; irritability; and distraction (Jiao et al., 2020). Relatedly, a survey in the UK reported that young people with mental health issues reported higher levels of loneliness and psychological distress (Young Minds, 2020). The lack of physical activity affects their quality of life and health, as research points to sedentary behavior affecting those with obesity, diabetes and other health issues (Fiorillo & Gorwood, 2020). Relatedly, inactivity may influence the intake of snacks, substance abuse, frequency of food consumption and laziness. Such effects are harmful especially if it influences coping mechanisms during the pandemic. On the contrary, despite challenges associated with the pandemic, the youth may also benefit from opportunities like reduced social stress, increased time with families; reduced access to substances; and increased use of global digital healthcare. In support, Young Minds (2020) claimed that social isolation has created new opportunities for the youth to learn accountability, responsibility, collaboration, accountability and involvement by engaging in activities like domestic chores, learning first aid and managing financial matters. Additionally, in Ukraine youth from diverse backgrounds have been involved in the production of a video called “Stay at home”, raising awareness about COVID-19 and sharing games that families can play together during the isolation (Council of Europe, 2020). Additionally, while they spend much time on social media to stay connected, Fiorillo and Gorwood (2020) asserted that their exposure to rumors and misinformation on social media can aggravate their fears and anxiety. Too much news and even continuous sad news regarding the pandemic can be overwhelming. Being one of the vulnerable groups, understanding their challenges in adjusting to the new normal is important, with relevant multi-disciplinary interventions needed to reduce their vulnerability. Thus, apart from health professional support, family and social support can help the youth to build their resilience through novel ways of adapting to new routines, leisure activities and managing reduced personal interactions. This is crucial for robust youth development, which is critical for their progress into adulthood.

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Violence and Abuse It is well known that domestic violence among all social classes accelerates during restrictive times when families spend more time together. Reports from various countries have shown shocking figures of the escalation of domestic violence and gender-based discrimination (Bradbury-Jones & Isham, 2020). Shifting work to the home has seen women burdened with extra domestic chores, family feuds, alcoholism and violence. Domestic violence is a devastating and widespread violation of human rights, with COVID-19 aggravating ongoing abuse. For instance, the OECD Forum Network (2020) asserted that isolation means that the confinement of women and children may keep them trapped at home, with no form of a place to escape to and being unable to seek help. More so, despite legislation and awareness regarding gender-based violence, stressful conditions spurred on by crisis such as COVID-19 has shown to be positively correlated with violence. Research points to the increased risk of domestic violence and abuse being associated with financial insecurity and family stress during pandemics (Bradbury-Jones & Isham, 2020). Relatedly, Serlachius et al. (2020) asserted that vulnerable groups are less likely to be identified by child protection service providers during the lockdown. Not being identified to receive timeous and appropriate support can have devastating effects on the lives of those subjected to domestic violence and abuse. Sexual Minorities and Social Disparities Sexual minorities face other vulnerabilities during COVID-19, such as lack of access to HIV treatment, loss of income and unstable accommodation (Torres et al., 2020). Rezende et al. (2020) reported that sexual minorities from low-income groups live in adverse contexts when they are victims of racial disparities. Unfair social systems often force such groups to maintain their informal and unstable income even under social distancing conditions. The study by Torres et al. (2020) showed that sexual minorities in Brazil experienced challenges like access to sanitizers, healthcare and financial support, with the pandemic compounding their burdens and impacting their mental health. Continued high-risk behavior during the pandemic exposes such vulnerable groups to acquire the virus, and further impacts healthcare capacity to manage Covid needs and other pre-existing healthcare needs. Such groups will need social, mental and economic support to prevent them from spreading the virus.

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Social Support Physical and mental health deterioration are profound consequences of lockdown. Restricted movements and interrupted work patterns give rise to feelings of stress, fear and uncertainty. Such social effects can develop into mental health issues. For example, unemployment and underemployment affect the social life, mental health and lifestyle of individuals and their families. Maynard and Feldman (2011) claimed that unattractive job opportunities or unemployment positively correlated with mentally unhealthy individuals showing symptoms of stress, depression and insecurities. In support, Kaur et al. (2020) argued that inadequate or no employment situations may lead to lower standards of living, poor family relationships and negatively affected social networks and interpersonal relations. Thus, multiple new stresses due to the second wave spreading the virus increase physical and mental health risks, especially among vulnerable groups like those with comorbidities, the aged, disabled and socially vulnerable groups such as sex workers (Islam et al., 2020). Relatedly, the negative welfare impact of lockdown measures is accentuated by poverty, coupled with poor social protection support (Husain et al., 2020). Support from various sectors to ensure that the physical and mental wellbeing of people does not degenerate exponentially is not negotiable. For example, in Kenya, government initiatives include cash transfers which provide households with sufficient money to buy necessities and tax reductions for landlords to provide relief from non-payment of rent from tenants. Such measures are not sustainable in the long term for African countries, thereby necessitating support from the international community. The closure of many services and daily activities propelled not only an economic and health crisis but also rising unemployment. The lockdown has created a dilemma between saving livelihoods and lives. Rising poverty has become a consequence, with growing dependence on social support from various sectors. However, various delays in the implementation of social support initiatives have increased poverty. In cases where support programs have rolled out, social distancing has come under challenge in cases where the poor are queuing at social relief banks; buying low-priced food at certain retail outlets; and availing low-cost transport.

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Increasing Healthcare Capacity COVID-19 is presenting as an infectious virus; previously unheard of and requiring novel and advanced public health interventions. More so, infectious viruses are difficult to recognize and manage as they are gradual and require health systems to effect change in human behavior which is difficult. Additionally, pre-existing health problems are compounded when routine health services are disrupted because healthcare systems are prioritizing responses to the pandemic. Likewise, face-to-face health services have been restricted to those most urgent. According to Hamann et al. (2020), weak health systems in Africa prevent them from being fully prepared to contain the virus. As such, global evidence of weaknesses of healthcare systems to respond effectively and efficiently requires immediate and concrete measures to improve healthcare responses to the onslaught of the second wave of the virus. This should be paralleled with stricter control over cross infections, especially in healthcare facilities to prevent the virus from spreading even further. While the focus of healthcare systems should be prevention, promotion and treatment of illnesses, policymakers need to consider contextual factors such as the rate of infection during the pandemic and more inclusive approaches to healthcare which allows various categories of healthcare workers to provide healthcare during the pandemic. The Wellbeing of Healthcare Professionals In many instances, healthcare professionals have struggled to efficiently treat COVID-19 patients due to a lack of appropriate equipment and inadequate healthcare facilities, often resulting in the loss of lives of patients and healthcare professionals. Globally, health professionals are working under extreme pressure, balancing their family, mental and health needs with them amidst constrained resources. Such pressure is tantamount to psychological injury. It is argued that psychological injury is not a mental illness, but a moral injury associated with negative thoughts about themselves and others (Williamson et al., 2018). Under traumatic conditions relating to COVID-19, most health professionals are unprepared for the unprecedented challenges, making them vulnerable to the hurt and pain of seeing so many people die. Health professionals need to be supported and prepared for moral injury, as they are doing their best in the face of limited resources. Issues like emotional challenges associated with caring for COVID-19 patients must be workshopped so that the risk of moral dilemma leading to mental

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health problems among health professionals is mitigated. Willaimson et al. (2018) argued that personally relevant experiences during COVID-19 can be overwhelming for even the most resilient, often leading to moral injury and burnout. Thus, health authorities must realize that monitoring of staff and therapy for health professionals during and post COVID-19 is imperative, to protect their mental wellbeing and prevent long-term damage. Such a critical workforce is needed to help the sick under arduous conditions. Information Screening Various forms of social and educational platforms have provided significant support to society under the “new normal” circumstances. Social media has increasingly made it difficult to keep information from the public. Users are hasty in assimilating social media news, without questioning its validity and reliability. Often, the gullible are fed with fake news, frequently resulting in sharing such news spiraling out of control. Fake news can be detrimental, especially during stressful times when COVID-19 is spreading. According to Anderson et al. (2020), the ongoing pandemic can worsen psychological health and be detrimental to overall wellbeing. While information is freely available, readers need to exercise caution as not all information is based on facts. Further, updated and timely information must be made available from reliable sources. Even mobile apps are being advocated to monitor the virus. However, Ratten (2020) argued for an open policy regarding information dissemination, as expanding the availability of information can significantly contribute to mitigating a severe global concern. For example, various cities across Europe, Australia and Canada have been working in collaborating with local associations to provide immigrant families and ethnic groups facing language barriers with comprehensive information on the evolution of the pandemic, ways to protect their health and several ways to access basic services (Council of Europe, 2020). However, a global competition to find a cure may entice governments to be lured by self-interest over the common good of all. Information Dissemination and Health Research As COVID-19 is accompanied by escalating danger to every sector in society and the emergence of new variants of the virus, continuous information dissemination is critical to ensure ongoing adaptation to

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new health and safety protocols. Poor knowledge about signs, symptoms, transmission and incubation regarding COVID-19 can compromise preventative measures such as personal hygiene and social practices being adhered to. However, the continuous flow of information must be dependable, as misinformation is causing undue anxiety and stress in society (Ratten, 2020). Similarly, Moerschell and Novak (2020) argued that pre-emptive messages are timeously needed so that actions can be taken as the pandemic unfolds with much unpredictability. Additionally, educating the young is crucial to ensure that proper protocols are followed, and unnecessary anxiety is alleviated. Oosterhoff et al. (2020) suggested that viewing of resources from authorized sources like UNICEF websites and news channels will ensure fact-based information is accessed. Information sharing across different sectors in society must be creatively coordinated, with cross-institutional partnerships innovatively managing the complexities arising from COVID-19. Unpacking new knowledge sources can promote the interpretation of information in creative ways and knowledge sharing through collaboration can facilitate learning and the development of new skills to derive innovative solutions for societal wellbeing. On the contrary, while many people rely on social media for various forms of interaction, not everyone has access to it or is comfortable using it. Some may argue that it cannot replace face-toface encounters in casual and spontaneous ways. More so, this has been interrupted by scheduled online conversations, reducing opportunities for informal zooming out contact. This has made many people feel that everyone is not living through the crisis together. Further, developing vaccines and remedies for COVID-19 can have tremendous benefits for society. In the absence of specific anti-viral treatments or vaccines for COVID-19, ongoing clinical trials are imperative for developing stable and safe COVID-19 vaccines. While there are several promising anti-viral alternatives like chloroquine, hydroxychloroquine and redeliver, continued research will be pivotal for the discovery of new vaccines or drugs to prevent and control COVID-19 infections (Verma & Prakash, 2020). Despite various anti-viral drugs having emerged, a stable and safe vaccine is necessary since the virus is emerging with new variants and mutations. The research will play an integral role to discover new vaccines and drugs to prevent and control COVID-19 infections (Chakraborty & Maity, 2020). Additionally, traditional pre-COVID- 19

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policies and models for mental health are redundant during COVID19. Research into mental healthcare during and after lockdown must be pursued to guide an effectively functioning health system that responds to new health needs. Environment and Human Civilization Human manipulation of the environment has caused pollution, global warming, climate change water depletion and changes in the ecosystem. However, the closure of many industries has ironically resulted in decreased waste emissions, pollution and erosion of the ecosystem. As such Verma and Prakash (2020) claimed that environmental pollution impacts the distribution of infectious bacterial and viral diseases, but lockdown due to COVID-19 has reduced air pollutants and improved air quality. While the spread of the virus has triggered negative consequences at an unprecedented rate, it has displayed contrasting benefits to the environment. So, while human lives have been severely compromised by COVID-19, the destruction of the world environment has temporarily slowed down. Thus, it can be claimed that the virus has to an extent been a healing dose for human health, ozone depletion, pollution and climate change (Wang et al., 2020). Likewise, Yoo (2020) argued that massive deforestation for agricultural, industrial and resource extraction purposes has consequently affected human health. It is argued that afforestation will help to contain viruses such as COVID-19 associated with wildlife. According to Pereira et al. (2020), 60% of emerging communicable diseases originate from animals, and 70% of these potentially originate in wild animals. Relatedly, COVID-19 started in a seafood market in China, selling wild animals like bats, pangolins and wolf pups. Restricted wildlife trade may diminish the risks of emerging new viruses, as coronaviruses primarily host animals before being transferred to humans. This will help in protecting human lives, national security, public health and biosafety. Social Value Creation Since the virus is not isolated to certain sectors in society, the unforeseen effects are multiplying and creating much uncertainty on how to manage it. Since this has profound effects on society, there must be a social community of value creation practices. Cankurtaran and Beverland (2020) suggested adjusting how things are done so that effective solutions contribute to social value creation. Social responsibility from businesses

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entails responding to new demands caused by the crisis. By stabilizing market patterns with innovations, beneficial societal effects may accrue (Ratten, 2020). Such social value creation, according to Cankurtaran and Beverland (2020), is needed because of the severe impact the pandemic has had on society. For example, many manufacturing businesses have adapted their processes to make protective equipment and substances. Additionally, Kroeger and Weber (2014) claimed that social value creation requires a focus on societal expectations, driven by altruism and social cohesion. This entails all sectors in society engaging in collaborative social value creation practices such as evangelizing (verbally sharing positive experiences), customizing (modifying products needed during a crisis), documenting (transferring information in easier and user-friendly modes) and governing (specifying codes of conduct during a crisis) (Ratten, 2020). Such social value creation practices result in knowledge sharing which can benefit people in various ways on how to deal with the pandemic effectively. Food Security One of the backlashes of increasing poverty is increasing food insecurity. In most cases, especially in developing countries, any crisis worsens the poverty situation. The production, processing, distribution and consumption of food has been hampered by COVID-19, compounding high food prices and food shortage. The disastrous effects of COVID-19 have severely impacted thousands living below the poverty line, especially in Africa (Kansiime et al., 2021). Additionally, the closure of schools has exacerbated food insecurity, especially in poor communities, where students rely on free school meals. UN-Habitat and WFP (2020) reported that poverty reduction in many African states has stalled because of the virus. Various stringent measures to contain the virus have significantly impacted food security. For example, while healthy daily routines like consuming healthy foods and maintaining a nutritional balance to strengthen immunity against the virus are advocated, food insecurity among the poor makes adherence virtually impossible. Loss of income; disruption of food systems; malnutrition; hunger; and weak health and welfare systems do not provide any shield against mortality. Some of the coping strategies used in distressed households include the use of savings; help from family and friends; sale of assets and changes in dietary patterns (Husain et al., 2020). However, such strategies are not sustainable in the long term to cope with the loss of income due to

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the lockdown measures. Support measures must be enhanced to maintain food consumption and food security coping strategies. Some governments have employed strategies like tax relief, debt relief and social grants for vulnerable groups to cushion the adverse effects of the pandemic. While such measures may mitigate the effects on poverty and food security to some extent, it is not a panacea. More so, in informal economies where daily wages are a survival imperative, the loss of income has yielded disastrous effects. Husain et al., (2020) opined that much more is needed, noting direct cash for utility costs as adding more value to poverty-stricken households. There is a critical need to widen food security coverage, even to those who did not qualify before the COVID-19 but have subsequently been driven into poverty by the pandemic. Moreover, the income-earning potential of the poor is more likely to be affected by the poor during the pandemic, hence the need for social support to offset the adverse risks from the pandemic. For example, in Australia, the Seed Savers Network made seedlings available during the pandemic to help families grow their food and be self-sufficient. This helped to reduce food costs, increase leisurely activities and save money (Ratten, 2020). In South Africa, several community actions networks and mutual aid groups have engaged in pairing partnerships to provide hunger relief (Hamann et al., 2020). However, any relief measures must be rolled out in real-time, which is a common challenge cited in many countries. Additionally, amidst numerous waves of COVID-19 unfolding, there is a serious challenge of hunger in poor communities not diminishing and resources shrinking.

Conclusion Major social challenges propagated by the COVID-19 pandemic have propelled us to think locally and globally. Social isolation has generated tumultuous effects, affecting society with increasing uncertainty due to the ongoing nature of COVID-19. The effect of the COVID-19 pandemic has profusely affected all spheres of life in society, placing strain on society in the trajectory from normal to new normal. Considering the serious nature of the COVID-19, governments and other stakeholders must devise enforcement measures that respond to every sphere of society affected. Without timeous support for vulnerable groups, the poor may become poorer while those who were not poor may become poor. The consequence of rising poverty, hunger and fear can fester into

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non-compliant behavior in pursuit of survival. There must be greater collaboration among policymakers; health care providers; social service providers; and government and non-governmental organizations. Despite the widespread disruption of normal life, the experiences from COVID-19 must be used in planning for the future. Despite diverse responses from governments throughout the world, there is a need for the continuation of such responses as new developments emerge with mutating variants of the virus. More so, it must be reinforced by a drastic move toward initiative-taking measures if the pandemic continues. Aggressive measures like rigorous tracing and testing; community surveillance; and more punitive measures against those who do not comply may have to be considered in addition to currently implemented measures to deal with COVID-19 head-on. Positive change is needed to advance into the new normal. We need to rethink, retool and reinvent how we live meaningfully, advance social justice and meet the needs of society. Empathy, humility, compassion and cooperation are needed from every sector in society so that everyone can emerge from the pandemic and social isolation stronger.

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CHAPTER 4

Devastating Economic Challenges and Potential Opportunities of COVID-19 Pandemic in the Petroleum Industry Sector of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Eustache Tanzala Kikasu

Introduction This chapter discusses the economic challenges and opportunities of the COVID-19 pandemic in the petroleum industry sector of the DRC. The significance of this study consists of alerting political leaders and stakeholders running the oil and gas sector of the DRC about the imperative of designing new perspectives that promote the development of the national petroleum industry and support efforts that can generate economic competitive advantages in the post-COVID-19 pandemic crisis.

E. T. Kikasu (B) Durban University of Technology, Durban, South Africa e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. Dorasamy (ed.), Governance Challenges During the COVID-19 Pandemic in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11244-7_4

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The COVID-19 pandemic came suddenly with its influential and devastating impacts on society, health systems and economies worldwide (World Economic Forum, 2020). COVID-19 pandemic has taken and is still taking not only the life of many world citizens but also continues to hamper the operations of many businesses, with the attendant loss of jobs and incomes. In the petroleum industry sector of the Democratic Republic of Congo, the COVID-19 pandemic has created added challenges and insecurity. Leaders and economic stakeholders came under pressure and affect their responsive and efficient decisions. There is the need for a decision to balance the immediate impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and its effects or consequences on the one hand and the economic incapacity to react to people’s demand for sustainable living in this period of restricted socio-economic activities on the other hand. Requirements to create more awareness and a sense of responsibility from leaders and stakeholders, whether in the petroleum industry or various other sectors of the economy, became an impulse for great decision-making to find new opportunities from the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic. This paper aims to find potential economic opportunities and challenges that have restricted socio-economic activities during the COVID-19 pandemic in the DRC. This paper examines the devastating impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic in the petroleum industry sector of the DRC. It explores the possible effects/opportunities it could generate in terms of reconstructing/recovering the economy, restructuring/upgrading the oil refining industry, reviewing and reframing existing policies, programs and strategic plans, which are governing socio-economic activities in the country. This paper also alerts public and private institutions/organizations of the DRC to consider the devastating impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and starts thinking and planning about the post-COVID-19 pandemic crisis. Nevertheless, in the DRC, the collective reactions and actions from the government and leadership from public–private stakeholders could control a crisis such as that of the COVID-19 pandemic or other socioeconomic challenges, if they are committed together to restructuring and developing the country’s petroleum refining industry. This paper begins with the background of the petroleum industry in the DRC; thereafter it discusses the economic challenges and opportunities of the COVID19 pandemic in the petroleum industry sector of the DRC. The review

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of papers arguing or addressing the economic challenges and opportunities of the COVID-19 pandemic are linked and combined with the research method implemented in studying the socio-economic role of the petroleum refining industry in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Kikasu, 2017).

Background of the Petroleum Industry in the DRC The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is potentially one of the largest affluent African countries in terms of its various natural mineral resources. From cobalt, copper, cassiterite, gold, manganese, diamonds, coltan, timber as well as oil and gas resources, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) keeps on being a country of endless strengths and opportunities (Bustin & Savchenko, 2019). The DRC has proven oil potential in three sedimentary basins, in the Coastal Basin (found in Kongo Central province extending offshore past the Congo River estuary), the Central Basin and the Western branch of the East African Rift. At present, it produces an estimated 25,000 barrels of crude oil per day. However, production could be extended up to 100,000 barrels per day, once the oil new blocks in the east of the DRC enter the production phase (Bustin & Savchenko, 2019). In addition, the DRC oil potential is estimated at 20 billion proven barrels reserves, which places the country as the second country with the largest oil reserve in Africa, after Nigeria, which has an estimated 37 billion barrels proven reserves and far above Angola, which has currently around 9 billion proven barrels reserves (Titeca & Edmond, 2019, 1). However, DRC, a country full of potential natural mineral resources, is facing challenges of business environment instabilities and threats. Much literature has been written about socio-economic challenges affecting the petroleum industry in the DRC (African Development Bank Group, 2014; Kikasu & Dorasamy, 2019; The African Development Bank Report, 2013; The World Bank Report, 2015). Aside from the COVID-19 pandemic crisis, the DRC is experiencing numerous challenges that include unemployment, instability/insecurity, discrimination and inequality, lack of transparency, corruption, lack of financial ability and mismanagement of the oil and gas sector. The consequences thereof have its impacts on the petroleum industry development and engendered

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inadequate sustainable economic development, which has increased the rate of poverty among citizens. Corruption in the country, particularly in the petroleum industry, is stronger than the authority of the rule of law. Unfortunately, the minority corrupted leaders are those that are governing decision-making in terms of natural mineral resources management. They are the most influential people who are attributing contracts, protecting and defending the right of contractors in the country instead of applying the rule of law: existing rules and regulations (Pauw, 2014). The COVID-19 pandemic has suddenly exposed the weakness of political leaders who are unable to create a responsive system to manage effectively socioeconomic calamities. In countries where COVID-19 pandemic infection became so critical, measures and restrictions to control its spread, forced the governments, including the government of the DRC, to lockdown socio-economic activities. Unfortunately, there were no efficient measures to help people who were already victims of inequality, unemployment and poverty in DRC. Consequently, in the global village as well as in DRC, most low-income people become frustrated, as many businesses closed their socio-economic operations due to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic became a dominant and real concern, to support poor people living with low income for their daily subsistence. In the developing countries like the DRC, the cry of paucity about necessary resources or available foods from most unfortunate people became an additional concern, which revealed the poor quality of governance and insufficient capacity or capability of the political leaders to provide deserved and expected assistance to the needed in times of crisis. Therefore, in most advanced countries, people instinctively turned to their government to seek quality actions and reactions as a response to their hopes, unfortunately, in certain developing countries, like the DRC, people’s expectations for help were revealed hopeless and ineffective as the government resources were limited to provide required support (Muggah, 2020). Corruption, unemployment, inequality and poverty are still destroying African economies and killing many African people, Congolese people particularly, and affecting negatively the life of several people at the same way as COVID-19 pandemic is having devastating and disastrous socio-economic impacts in many nations (Titeca & Edmond, 2019, 4). Tragically, no drastic awareness campaign; no strong actions, measures,

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policies, programs and strategic plans, or heavy local or international political interventions have been developed and employed to minimize and halt the spread of corruption, unemployment, inequality and various other socioeconomic challenges. These calamities are harmfully affecting African economies, as well as that of the DRC in the same way as it is done for the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, for many decades, no governments, public or private organizations have put in place a tactical mechanism like that of the COVID-19 pandemic to fight globally or nationally, the political and socio-economic crises, which have been taking the lives of millions of Congolese people particularly, and of African people in general.

Methods and Materials In addressing the economic challenges and opportunities of the COVID19 pandemic in the petroleum industry sector of the DRC, a single factor of the PESTEL model is examined (Smit et al., 2016). The economic variable of the PESTEL model (Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Environment Legal factors) is used in this study to assess the economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic in the petroleum industry, as well as to evaluate its detrimental effects on the socio-economic environment in the DRC. Therefore, the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic are examined concerning the closing down of international borders, given that the DRC’s economy depends totally on the exports of natural mineral resources (crude oil) and the imports of its necessary oil products, including fuel consumptions. As this article relates to the main research study that consisted of exploring the socio-economic role of the petroleum refining industry in the DRC, the PESTEL factors of the macro-economic environment were appropriately used in identifying the socio-economic barriers obstructing oil and gas industry development in the country. In this paper, the discussion involves only the economic factor. The argument in examining particularly the economic variable of the PESTEL model refers to the aim and objective of this paper.

Methodology The main study that relates to the aim and objective of this paper used a mixed-methods design. It focused on exploring the socio-economic role of the petroleum refining industry in the Democratic Republic of

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Congo. The converged parallel design framework was applied in reflecting the process of integration, timing and mixing data (Creswell, 2015). Methodology in this paper comprises the usage of both, the mixedmethods approach and the review of articles discussing the economic challenges and opportunities of the COVID-19 pandemic. The mixedmethods approach is applied as a procedure of collecting, analyzing and mixing both quantitative and qualitative data at a certain level. Creswell (2015) indicated that researchers across the diverse field are expected to be skillful in both quantitative and qualitative techniques. Therefore, the methodology in this paper involves the analysis of economic challenges and opportunities that the COVID-19 pandemic could pose or generate in the DRC’s petroleum industry. The economic variable of the PESTEL environment was used to explore and examine the cost-effective situation of COVID-19 impacting oil and gas industry development in the DRC (Kikasu and Dorasamy, 2019). However, quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis were applied involving descriptions, relationships, comparisons and predictions (Creswell, 2011). The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS version 2.4) software programs for quantitative analysis and Nvivo Pro Software package version 11, descriptive and thematic text analysis for qualitative data analysis, were used in measuring the impacts of economic challenges affecting the petroleum industry development in the DRC. Nevertheless, behind the challenges affecting the socio-economic environment as well as the petroleum industry in the DRC, there are various potential opportunities. The analysis of the economic factor of the PESTEL variables was also applied to examine and determine the potential opportunities that the post-COVID-19 pandemic could generate in the socio-economic situation of the DRC. The next section argues or discusses the economic challenges and potential opportunities of the COVID-19 pandemic in the petroleum industry sector of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Materials In this section, two important sub-sections are examined. Firstly, the economic challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic in the petroleum industry sector of the DRC are explored, and secondly, the potential economic opportunities of the post-COVID-19 pandemic in the petroleum industry sector of the DRC are examined.

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The Economic Challenges of the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Petroleum Industry Sector of the DRC Various socio-economic challenges accompanied the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. According to the OECD (2020a), the COVID19 pandemic has increased the vulnerability of low- and middle-income countries. In African countries, including the DRC, the COVID-19 outbreak has led to a crisis with considerable losses in terms of health but also much of the countries’ economies, with high social costs. In addition, it was witnessed the flowing collapse of the entire production, financial and transportation systems, due to a vicious combination of supply and demand shocks. Therefore, the economic level and trends in local revenue were insufficient to support the finance of public health, social and economic responses to sustainable development (OECD, 2020a). As an example of the devastating impacts of COVID-19 in the economy of the DRC, Okenda (2020) states that the lockdown restrictions and measures imposed on the country have dramatically affected the services and skilled labor required by the mining industry in the country. In addition, due to lockdown measures and restrictions, an organization such as Glencore has suffered a delay in the arrival of inputs to produce its DRC’s acid plant. Consequently, Glencore had to dismiss around 300 expatriate Indian employees, while a significant number of its staff became technically unemployed (Okenda, 2020). This disastrous economic situation caused by the COVID-19 pandemic has added supplementary challenges with the risk of falling global demand for key natural minerals resources, which constitute a great source of income to the country. Globally, the COVID-19 pandemic restrictions forced countries to lockdown their socio-economic activities to limit or contain the spread of this virus. In most countries, governments must redirect budgetary allocations for supporting projects of socio-economic development to combat the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. Therefore, due to the restrictions and measures of lockdown caused by the COVID-19 pandemic globally, economies or businesses were imperatively required to review their plans/expenditures as some economic activities became unproductive. However, the risk to compromise capacity in reaching sustainable development goals became evident that the risk to send back people to unemployment and poverty was inevitable (OECD, 2020b). In the DRC,

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as well as in other low- and middle-income countries, the crisis generated by the COVID-19 pandemic has had impacts on domestic economies, with companies falling short of financing or achieving expected sustainable development goals. Therefore, a reduction in economic activities has reduced the government’s domestic resources mobilization. However, limited resources combined with economic challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic denote that the economy of the DRC is struggling with the financial capacity to support adequate public health, social and economic responses (OECD, 2020b). Considering the situation in the DRC, there is no doubt that challenges affecting the national economy and particularly the petroleum industry could be many. Apart from the uncertain and lack of legal framework best practice governing the petroleum industry, the oil and gas activities in the country are characterized by a critical lack of transparency and strong corruption that are affecting the oil and gas industry development as well as the entire economy of the DRC (Cia World Factbook, 2015; Kikasu & Dorasamy, 2019; Titeca & Edmond, 2019). The crisis of positive human capital capacity, besides the upstream, midstream and downstream oil and gas operations, which are seriously lacking financial and technical capacities to support real projects development has had its impact on the country’s economy. Moreover, according to Kikasu and Dorasamy (2019), there are various economic factors/challenges affecting the development of the oil and gas industry in the DRC. Therefore, discussion about the economic challenges of the COVID19 pandemic revealed more negative effects than opportunities. For example, the World Bank Group prevision in the DRC indicated that the COVID-19 pandemic could generate an economic recession of around −2.2% in 2020 due to low and weak production and export of natural mineral resources, which is caused by the global economic downturn (World Bank Report, 2020). This implies that a decline in government revenues from copper, cobalt as well as the petroleum industry became unavoidable. However, concerning oil and gas production and exportation, oil exporters’ countries, including the DRC have been hardly affected by the fall in oil prices caused in large part by the demand disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. As DRC’s main revenue/income depend mostly on natural mineral resources, including oil and gas export a deficit in the balance of payment in this sector should be expected, given that the fall in oil prices would lead to low-income generation, and makes it impossible to sufficiently

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finance the importation of petroleum products. In this condition, the COVID-19 pandemic has deepened the deficit of financial resources, which already has been a major challenge to the petroleum industry development in the DRC. Unfortunately, the government would not be able to implement policies, programs and strategic plans to invest in shortand medium-term projects in the petroleum industry, as well as in other sectors of the economy. This could lead to a downward review of the expected contribution of the oil and gas sector to the national GDP. Therefore, the COVID-19 pandemic has become an additional barrier to petroleum industry development, and the economy in the DRC. Thus, the recovery of the economy would necessarily require combined efforts from local and international support, in terms of the business environment stability and positive human capital capacity development.

The Potential Economic Opportunities of COVID-19 Pandemic in the Petroleum Industry Sector of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) According to the OECD (2020a, b), the COVID-19 crisis shows how significant it is to keep resources in reserve for times when unexpected disturbances in the country prevent it from functioning normally, and also, the pandemic highlights the need for strengthening regional or international cooperation, including the building on existing frameworks for emergency preparedness based on evidence to tackle systemic threats and help avert systemic collapse. The opinion of experts from the World Economic Forum (2020) suggests that looking beyond the economic challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic could reveal potential competitive advantages, given that opportunities seen from the post-COVID pandemic challenges could be many. Studies have provided evidence of new perspectives to design proactive economic recovery opportunities post-COVID-19 pandemic (World Economic Forum, 2020). Opportunities may include adapting and improving politics in pursuing technically sound policies, improving more regional cooperation in various economic levels, increasing learning of experiences and practices, resetting national economic approach, defining advanced perspectives for new technology and industrial development/transformation and increasing public–private education programs

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and campaign to upsurge awareness for sustainable economic activities development in preventing socio-economic crisis (World Economic Forum, 2020). In general, this pandemic has led many countries to devise approaches to reverse the curve not only of the COVID-19 pandemic but also to find ways out of the related socio-economic crisis caused by the COVID19 pandemic. According to Goon (2020), Saeza et al. (2020) and many others, the lockdown was a unanimity approach applied by countries globally to stop the rising cases of COVID-19. In addition, a collective, decisive and self-controlled (disciplined) approach regarding the lockdown measures was promoted to reverse the upward trend of COVID-19 cases all over the world, including in the DRC. An awareness campaign for collaborative efforts from the government, the private sector and the scientific community was also significant to control and reverse the curve of the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, several studies showed that it was so difficult to contain the spread of COVID-19 without drastic measures to contain and tackle the virus. Therefore, governments of many countries launched alleviation strategies, trying to slow the spread of the virus and flatten its curve. The government of the DRC, as well as those of other countries, adopted physical distancing, face masks and sanitizing measures after the epidemic outbreak started its exponential growth. The development of these approaches would be significant in generating potential opportunities from governments to increase interventions capacities and awareness for many leaders to think, envisage and plan on how to tackle and control socio-economic calamities such as the spread of this global pandemic virus. Therefore, the greatest practice of the abovementioned approaches led to promoting diverse opportunities, including the capacity to think and plan for the future development of more socioeconomic activities on post-COVID-19 challenges. However, designing socio-economic activities recovery may include building and developing a more prosperous, equitable and sustainable economy. Furthermore, new perspectives are being designed to support efforts to proactively and collectively design or address post-COVID-19 pandemic challenges. Therefore, as countries strive to deal with the economic impacts caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, initiatives for more research to improve policies, programs and strategic plans that would assist countries to respond to the socio-economic crisis are being developed.

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First, Woods (2020) denotes that this global pandemic has revealed situations where some governments find it difficult to increase assistance to the needed people and to support failing small and medium enterprises during the lockdown period occasioned by the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. However, concerning political improvement for the development of economic activities on the post-COVID-19 pandemic, Woods (2020) suggests that countries like the DRC should review their political regimes, which must work together in supporting vulnerable socio-economic activities and they must also pursue technically sound policies. Furthermore, Alter (2020) indicates that opportunities for more regional cooperation and increased learning experiences and practices should be necessary from others in achieving collectively what would not be possible at the individual country level. He also advised that there could be opportunities for a quantum leap in systemic crisis management to be better prepared in any other circumstances of crisis and that governments could gain competitive advantages from exchanging with regional partners as they may confront new and more challenges during the economic reconstruction phase. Alter (2020) in addition emphasizes that opportunities in regional cooperation development should include shared values of regional organizations and institutional structures and capabilities within its member countries and citizens. Among these values, there are factors like building strong trust, solidarity, growing regional economic activities, the opportunities of engaging in collective learning and reducing inequality by contributing to sustainable development. According to Bishop and Roberts (2020), unexpected measures have been approved by governments, the private sector and individuals in response to the COVID-19 pandemic that is expected to be reflective and to have a profound impact on the world geopolitical environment. They also indicated opportunities from the global flow of ideas, which is radically speeding up global research cooperation in various socio-economic areas. Therefore, in the DRC’s petroleum industry sector or various other socio-economic sectors, innovation and structural changes are expected because of global research development. In addition, businesses and regulators will need to consider how best to balance efficiency and resilience. For example, implementing a Just-in-time approach to manufacturing could be economically efficient (but make supply chains vulnerable to disruption). For more efficient and flexible economic activities on the post-COVID pandemic, Bishop and Roberts (2020) suggested openness and nexus (connectivity), which bring incredible advantages to countries, without

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neglecting certain risks that may be created from economic interdependence. Moreover, Bishop and Roberts (2020) stated that the possible prevalent opportunity offered by the COVID-19 pandemic takes account of the possibility to reset some of the economic approaches in a way that maximizes the probabilities of developing more strong and sustainable approaches to globalization. In addition, opportunities aligned to postCOVID-19 may consist of innovating and adaptating existing administrative structures as well as socio-economic environment to technological revolution, which are imperative when dealing with global challenges that affect every person, like the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change. As it has been worldwide observed, dealing with issues like pandemics and climate change are matters of collective actions, even often hard to achieve. The World Economic Forum (2020) indicates that the COVID-19 pandemic came suddenly as a major matter in that no individual and no country should remain invulnerable, even if not all are equally at risk or impacted. Therefore, the lesson to learn from this pandemic crisis is that countries need to rethink how to facilitate international socio-economic cooperation in dealing with global threats in an environment in which the great economies became powerless or fail to lead in suggesting a global solution. Contrary, they have become increasingly fractious in dealing with both, the socio-economic challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic and in providing the ways out in terms of the global solution to stop the outbreak of this virus. Considering the additional opportunities for the COVID-19 pandemic could involve new technological and industrial transformations, which are changing societies around the world (Saran, 2020). Some positive transformations are driven or will be directed by technology companies looking to break new ground and compete for consumers among the millions of social and commercial interactions that will be present or permanently online. For example, during this COVID19 pandemic crisis, video-conferencing platforms have emerged as a way to deal and share ideas, information using technology in response to discussions around measures of prevention and protection. Lamy and Pedrosa (2020) pointed out that multilateral actions were imperative before the COVID-19 pandemic, given that globalization was already in crisis. Thus, multilateral cooperation and action development could constitute a way out in the process of tackling the COVID-19 pandemic. In the present days, with borders shut, the global enemy that came

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with a strong socio-economic shock is a virus that can only be defeated by concerted multilateral actions. Therefore, even some countries can demonstrate successful interventions capacities in dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic at flattening the curve, unless the curve is flattened globally; there will remain a strong risk of people reinfection and socio-economic catastrophe around the world. Therefore, multilateral cooperation and action could stand as an imperative argument in flattening the curve of the COVID-19 pandemic worldwide. However, Lamy and Pedrosa (2020) suggested win-win alternatives in facilitating multinational cooperation in the process of tackling the virus as well as in securing domestic supply from trading partners, who, in turn, are suppliers of other necessary products and services. In this multinational cooperation, no single country should remain self-dependent, but all countries need all countries’ complement support. In other words, in the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, people from developing countries needed the support of people from developed countries and vice versa; given that the COVID-19 pandemic is at the same time a virus that is worsening existing inequalities and an opportunity that makes those inequalities more visible. Considering this, what to say about the DRC and its petroleum industry? All arguments developed further above are relevant to the economic opportunities the petroleum industry in the DRC could gain from the COVID-19 pandemic. Opportunities like improving politics in pursuing technically sound policies, improving more regional cooperation in various economic levels, increasing learning of experiences and practices, resetting national economic approaches and defining advanced perspectives for new technology and industrial development/transformation are imperatively profitable to be considered. Additional opportunities include aspects such as intensification of public–private education programs and campaigns to increase awareness for sustainable economic activities development in preventing a socioeconomic crisis, which are vital key opportunities for the country as a whole and particularly for the petroleum industry development or oil refining industry restructuring process to be reconstructed on the new foundation. Nevertheless, locally, this pandemic crisis can reinforce leadership awareness to promote greater support for businesses development. For example, the petroleum industry development in the DRC can improve social awareness of marginalized communities, promote greater support for small grown businesses and create more jobs. The COVID-19

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pandemic crisis can also present an opportunity for the government of the DRC to encourage the return of skilled national talents through attractive remuneration and close the gap of technical skills shortages whether in areas of the national petroleum industry or various other areas of the national economy. In general, the government of the DRC’s efforts to invest in policies improvement and positive human capital capacity development could foster greater trust and support for future socio-economic and government institutions development. Such as stated earlier, the upstream, midstream and downstream of the national petroleum industry are expected to receive new direction, taking into account reality and experience of measures and restrictions of global lockdown.

Analysis and Interpretation of Results Aligned to the Potential Economic Opportunities of the Post-COVID-19 in the DRC’s Petroleum Industry According to the OECD (2020a, b), in the DRC or any other African country, a full understanding of factors that may contribute to turning challenges into opportunities requires an approach based on integrative sectors of the economy, which calls on the insights and methods of the range of disciplines needed to paint a realistic framework of how the economic system is shaped and helps shape the larger system of systems. This implies that the key drivers, interactions and dynamics of the economic, social and environmental nexus that policy seeks to shape must select points of intervention selectively and adaptively. Critically, this will allow the country like the DRC to emphasize the importance of system resilience to a variety of shocks and stresses, allowing systems to recover from lost functionality and adapt to new realities regarding international economics, societal needs, and human behavior and the risks of a more unpredictable climate (OECD, 2020a, b). Therefore, if leaders, decision-makers and other influential public and private stakeholders or players in the business environment of the DRC can appropriately learn the lesson from the economic challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic, then potential economic opportunities are discussed further below can be expected. If not well learned, then the socio-economic situation in the country will continue to experience unsolved crises; consequently, the condition of many Congolese people

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will not change, and the majority of Congolese people will continue to endure inequality, poverty and unemployment. Nevertheless, a new era of economic aspiration or ambition by all Congolese people could arise, if the lesson from the economic challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic can be accurately learned by all people. The DRC oil potential is estimated at around 20 billion proven barrels reserves. Thus, despite these attractive statistics of proven oil barrels reserves in the DRC, the country lacks a suitable operational oil refining industry. SOCIR became non-operational and inadequate to refine local and international crude oil since 1998 (Kikasu, 2017). However, it was asserted that a developed oil refining industry could be essential to linking the upstream and downstream oil and gas industry integration and development. Therefore, the review of articles aligned to the economic challenges and opportunities of the COVID-19 pandemic revealed that a situation like that of the DRC’s petroleum industry (integration and development) will require policies improvement for the development of economic activities on the post-COVID-19 pandemic. However, policies improvement and best practice could be a sine qua non for reconstructing the economy, as well as for restructuring and upgrading the oil refining industry and integrating the entire oil and gas industry on the postCOVID-19 pandemic. Yet, Woods (2020) suggests that countries like DRC should review their political regimes, which must work together in supporting vulnerable socio-economic activities and they must also pursue technically sound policies. Bishop and Roberts (2020) suggested a flow of new ideas and strategies, which are necessary to radically speed up research cooperation in various socio-economic areas. In other words, innovation and structural changes are expected to appear as new ideas as a result of national research development. In addition, the petroleum industry authority and policymakers/regulators in the DRC will need to consider how best and profitable the refining industry development could contribute to the entire petroleum industry integration and development, to related industries/business expansion and economic growth. Given that the DRC is dependent on the import of its needs in petroleum products, global lockdown measures and restrictions could be an opportunity for the government of the DRC to start thinking and planning on how to develop or restructure the oil refining industry in the country. Therefore, the review of articles related to the economic opportunities on the post-COVID-19 pandemic suggested that countries like the DRC must

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promote new thinking capacities, new technological and industrial development/transformation in the country, which are important factors of changing economies and societies around the world (Saran, 2020). According to Lamy and Pedrosa (2020), additional economic opportunities on the post-COVID-19 pandemic could consist of cultivating and developing accurate multilateral actions that can promote technological and technical skills cooperation and development between countries. Considering the petroleum industry development in the DRC must require improvement and best practice of policies in pursuing technically sound strategies implementation. Nevertheless, improvement of more local and regional cooperation in various economic levels, increasing learning of experiences and practices, resetting national economic approaches, defining advanced perspectives for new technology and industrial development/transformation and increasing public–private education programs and campaigning to increase awareness for sustainable economic activities development are among the significant strategies that need to be taken into consideration on the post-COVID-19 pandemic (World Economic Forum, 2020). For example, encouraging the development of the oil refining industry in the DRC could create opportunities for more flow of petroleum products in the local market, opportunities for the development of new socio-economic infrastructures, and small businesses development in the country. Consequently, the country will be prevented from the excessive cost of importing petroleum products from other world regions. Furthermore, the DRC could also avoid exporting at a low price its produced crude oil by promoting local processing and production at a competitive cost and selling its refined petroleum products at a competitive price whether in the local market or the regional/international market. Accordingly, concerning the probable restructuring and development of the oil refining industry in the DRC, a research study was conducted to point out the encouraging effects of SOCIR upgrade on the economic environment (Kikasu, 2017). Therefore, the following Fig. 4.1 illustrates the opinion of respondents in line with the petroleum refining industry (SOCIR) restructuring and development in the DRC. It also shows the encouraging effects of SOCIR upgrade on the economic environment. The observation from the above statistical findings presented in Fig. 4.1 reveals respondents’ higher positive opinions and expectations of 96% (C2C2) of the petroleum refining industry (SOCIR) upgrade effects on the economic environment of the DRC. Respondents were also

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Fig. 4.1 The encouraging effects of SOCIR restructuring and development on the economic environment of the DRC

highly confident that SOCIR upgrade will ease local crude oil processing in the country, provide the flow of various petroleum products in the country, facilitate the DRC’s oil and gas industry integration, generate much revenue that will contribute to the country’s GDP growth and promote economic diversity of 95% (C2C7). Figure 4.1 shows the great expectation that SOCIR upgrade could reduce the effects of a colonial economic model that consists of exporting the entire crude oil output at a low price and importing oil finished products in the country at a high cost of 93% (C2C1). In addition, respondents agreed that SOCIR upgrade could create the opportunity of reaching the safety of the supply of fossil fuels in the country at 90% (C2C8) and will promote the market of large and small businesses at 87% (C2C3). The strongest respondents’ higher expectations for SOCIR upgrade impacts on the economic environment were also appreciated between the lower level of respondents’ agreement that is above the highest level of neutral 37% (C2C4) and the highest level of disagreement 18% (C2C5). Moreover, the economic effects of SOCIR restructuring and development in the country can also be better seen in Fig. 4.2 which reflects the prospective effects of SOCIR upgrade for Congolese people’s lifestyle improvement. Considering the results, it can be forecasted and shown that the COVID-19 pandemic measures for the lockdown or the restricting of socio-economic activities could be an opportunity for the government of DRC to start planning preventively about local processing industry development of natural mineral

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resources. The prevention approach in developing the petroleum refining industry or agriculture sector industrialization could prepare and prevent the country from unpredictable socio-economic outbreak crises, like that of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has caused unprecedented devastating impacts on most poor Congolese people. The prospective effects of SOCIR restructuring and development on Congolese people’s lifestyle improvement are shown in Fig. 4.2. The imperative of restructuring and developing the petroleum refining industry (SOCIR) in the DRC can be justified from the major respondents’ levels of responses that can be easily perceived by the degree of agreement displayed through Fig. 4.2. The higher levels of agreement (C3C7: 94%, C3C6: 93% or C3C11: 93% and others) prove sufficiently that SOCIR modernization could stimulate progressive socioeconomic change by contributing to the rural environmental development and promoting new investments or projects in the rural areas of the country. Respondents’ perception about the prospective effects of SOCIR restructuring and development for Congolese people’s lifestyle improvement reflects a great expectation of multiplier opportunities that could contribute to jobs creation and reduce unemployment or promote workforce skills development into the petroleum industry, poverty reduction in the country, condense/minimize and replace the use of firewood by the majority of rural people in promoting the usage of oil products as a source of energy in the country. 100.00

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The level of neutral respondents (C3C13: 51%) can be also considered on the fact that the project to upgrade SOCIR could be achieved, but there are issues related to the business environment (PESTEL) instabilities, which must be considered when planning for SOCIR restructuring and development project. Some other respondents were very reserved about the role that SOCIR upgraded could play in promoting CSR values in the oil and gas industry. This situation may be justified in the way that the business environment instability has caused a weak or powerless authority of the rule of law, as well as the lack of best practices of government policies, rules and regulations in the country or the petroleum industry. Therefore, efforts are needed from both shareholders and stakeholders to consider CSR values when dealing with the challenges that are continually affecting the Congolese community, as well as the oil and gas industry. Thus, Figs. 4.1 and 4.2 show also that on the post-COVID19 pandemic, shareholders and stakeholders in the petroleum industry could increase awareness in considering the socio-economic benefits and competitive advantages that the DRC could profitably gain in becoming self-sufficient in terms of petroleum products flow from developing the petroleum refining industry in the country. Yet, the awareness in considering global experiences from COVID-19 pandemic in terms of lockdown measures and restrictions could form a great opportunity for the DRC to learn from other countries about the know-how policies, programs and strategic plans best practice have been efficiently effective; and therefore, attempt to redesign new economic approaches that can promote socio-economic infrastructures development and diversification. Thus, the COVID-19 pandemic has revealed, on one hand, the weaknesses or vulnerability of certain governments’ interventions to help people through their health, social and economic system; and on the other hand, it has increased awareness for the best practice of policies, programs and strategic plans improvement and development to support and promote collective actions for socio-economic infrastructures development in the country.

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Lessons to Be Learned from Economic Challenges and Opportunities on the Post-COVID-19 Pandemic Crisis in the Petroleum Industry Sector of the DRC Many lessons need to be learned. The COVID-19 pandemic shows how subjective factors such as trust in institutions and willingness to follow government advice and instructions, the sentiment of belonging to a community or the type of neighborhood, can influence how a disaster conceals or unfolds (OECD, 2020a, b). The lack of trust; the lack of willingness for the best practice of socio-economic rights, policies, programs and strategic plans; as well as the sentiment of failure or of not expecting good doing from existing institutions in the country, could already stand as a barrier to convert challenges into opportunities. For example, in the DRC, the petroleum industry offers great opportunities for economic growth and development from many oil blocks across several sedimentary basins. At present, the production is estimated at around 25,000 barrels per day. However, the DRC oil potential is estimated at 20 billion proven barrels reserves and the estimation shows that production could be extended up to 100 000 barrels per day, once new blocks in the east of the DRC will enter into the production phase (Bustin & Savchenko., 2019). Therefore, the post-COVID-19 pandemic could be a gold occasion for the country to develop and integrate the petroleum industry, and consequently, an occasion to diversify the economy. Unfortunately, the incapacity and incompetence of political leaders in setting up the rule of law and ensuring the best practice of policies, programs and strategic plans could result in having an adverse socio-economic situation. In addition, there is no doubt that the post-COVID-19 pandemic may look like the current situation of economic and social vulnerability, given that the lack of industrializing in the economy will keep the country implementing repeatedly the colonial economic system, which consists of exporting total output of natural mineral resources and import of all needed substances. Therefore, the post-COVID-19 may not generate expected recovery of the economy in the absence of the business environment stability, and if the DRC still is reliant on the colonial economic system and external financial assistance. The lack of economic diversification, lack of economic industrialization and the powerless situation of the rule of law may continually stand as a strong barrier to the attempt for economic recovery on the

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post-COVID-19 pandemic. The oil and gas industry, which is engrained by corruption and several other local and international malpractices, may not improve its contribution to the national GDP. In addition, without processing the development of natural mineral resources such as oil refining industry development in the country, any attempt for economic recovery, growth and development on the post-COVID-19 pandemic will be impossible. Also, it is impossible to learn a better lesson from the economic challenges and opportunities of the COVID-19 pandemic, if the rule of law, policies, programs and strategic plans encourage the awareness for doing good by doing well are out of best practice in the DRC. In addition, the lack/crisis of positive human capital ability in all spheres of the socio-economic environment will continue to powerlessly affect initiatives for good doing or best practice of existing values. Another lesson is that in all cases, the post-COVID-19 pandemic may not bring change in the DRC, given that the country still is reliant on the export of natural mineral resources (primary industry) and external financial support for its sustainability. Nothing expectant may change effectively and efficiently if the culture of impunity, discrimination, tribalism and violation of socio-economic rights and human rights will not change. No improvement of the economic environment may be expected if the business environment of the DRC will remain sustainably unstable and when the country will continue to be reliant on the colonial economic system. Thus, a fair and credible business environment could help the country to build and develop the economy on a strong foundation, where the DRC can become investors’ point of interest in emerging new industrial infrastructure in the country. It can also be predicted that industrial development and economic diversification based on oil and gas refining industry development, petroleum industry development and integration and other related industries development can cause or create opportunities for new employment and develop abilities to control or minimize inequality and poverty in the country. Nevertheless, an important challenge that strongly remains is to rebuild credible, stable and sustainable democratic institutions that promote the rule of law, including policies, programs and strategic plans that keep on developing the culture of excellence for positive human capital capacity development in the country. Thus, not doing so, many generations to come will find the country progressing on the rail of underdevelopment and learn about the negative history of economic challenges on the post-

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COVID-19 pandemic, instead of learning about the economic opportunities the post-COVID-19 pandemic could provide to the country.

Conclusion This paper reviewed and examined the economic challenges and opportunities of the COVID-19 pandemic in the petroleum industry sector of the DRC. In general, it proves that the improvement of the business environment and particularly of the economic environment, with the petroleum industry development in focus in the DRC, could generate opportunities for socio-economic activities development and diversification. The discussion revealed that the COVID-19 pandemic has put the DRC as well as other African countries, in a situation of socio-economic vulnerability and at risk of government inability to ensure great and expected responses on the need for interventions in the health system, social and economic provision/delivery. In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic has exposed governance inefficiency and the inability of African leaders, including DRC’s leaders to face effectively and in time the emerged socio-economic challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. In most developed countries, people have spontaneously turned to their governments for protection and help in terms of financial provision, health care and food distribution; while most African countries were dependably waiting for external financing, and equipment supports in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic and other socio-economic crisis. Furthermore, in the African continent and particularly in the DRC, most politicians and civil servants did not deliver to their people the expected quality assistance in health and other social services supply. However, the economic challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic in the DRC are many. But the prevalent challenges consist of the government’s inability to financially support adequate public health, social and economic responses to the crisis. In addition, the DRC as well as other countries’ natural mineral resources exporters, including oil and gas resources have been hardly affected by the fall in (oil) prices caused in large part by the demand disruption affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. As the DRC’s main revenue/income depend mostly on natural mineral resources, including oil and gas export for importing all needs in petroleum products, a deficit of the balance of payment in this sector should be expected, given that the fall in oil prices so caused low income and make it impossible to sufficiently finance the high cost of petroleum

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products import. In this condition, the COVID-19 pandemic has deepened the deficit of financial resources, which already has been a major challenge to the petroleum industry development in the DRC. Considering this, the major economic prospects presented by the COVID-19 pandemic in the petroleum industry sector of the DRC is the opportunity to reset some of the economic approaches in a way that takes full advantage of the probabilities of developing local oil refining industry for more resilient and sustainable approaches to national and regional perspectives. On the post-COVID-19 pandemic, considering global lockdown measures and restrictions, expected economic opportunities in the DRC’s socio-economic environment may include new technological and industrial development, which transform or alter societies around the world. Innovation and adaptability to new eventuality are particularly important when dealing with global challenges that threaten all people, like the COVID-19 pandemic. So, the COVID-19 pandemic crisis as well as other socio-economic challenges should be areas in which collective actions should be most importantly required. In the DRC or the entire African continent, the COVID-19 pandemic came as a significant leveler in that no individual and no nation should remain invulnerable. Therefore, more expectations or opportunities on the post-COVID-19 pandemic include the revision of policies, programs and strategic plans that are governing socio-economic activities in the country, particularly in the energy sector (petroleum industry sector) of the DRC. The DRC needs a solid and drastic improvement of its business environment, change and development of its policies, programs and strategic plans and the development of positive human capital abilities to boost a real change of its socio-economic environment. In addition, the DRC government should take advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic crisis to develop new infrastructures in the petroleum industry and create opportunities for local and international investors to invest in oil and gas activities development, with the possibility to restructuring the oil refining industry, which could generate great contributions and diversification of the national economy. Therefore, the policy response in the recovery of the national economy may include the following (OECD, 2020a, b): • Finding vital sectors of interventions, such as the petroleum industry integration and development or processing industry development of natural mineral resources, to improve business recovery on the

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post-Covid-19 pandemic. Resources (funding) should be prioritized based on immediate needs for economic recovery at the system level that includes consideration of local demand and regional/global supply chain and impact of the region to regional, state, and global economy. • Prioritize and invest within critical economic sectors (agriculture and tourism) and businesses based upon value-added to the local community. • Prioritize critical economic sectors and critical industries/businesses that have a socially and economically net-positive contribution to society (education, health, energy, transportation, and rural socioeconomic activities development; etc. So, the lesson from the economic challenges and opportunities of the COVID-19 pandemic in the DRC is simple. In all spheres of life, dealing with any type of socio-economic crisis, the key approach consists of instituting resilient and preventive measures, guaranteeing the best practice of the rule of law and the sovereignty of government omnipotence overall socio-economic activities in terms of developing self-sufficient abilities and of improving win-win partnership or cooperation with other countries (world regions) should always prevail. Developing a systematic monitoring ability could help the country to identify the gaps earlier and develop in time the skills/abilities for interventions. The evaluation of socio-economic challenges and their consequences could help the government of the DRC, public and private stakeholders in determining or analyzing the reasons for their occurrence and develop human capacities/skills/abilities/capabilities/aptitude/talents in taking the necessary helpful actions that may be useful in closing the gaps. Among the essential key approaches that could be useful in trying to manage and solve a socio-economic crisis like that of the COVID-19 pandemic in the DRC, consideration may be given to the following five aspects: • Improving and Developing policies, programs and strategic plans that promote the re-education and development of positive human capital ability, which must lead/manage institutional, organizational and socio-economic operations in the country.

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• Improving and Developing policies, programs and strategic plans that support the best practice of the rule of law, which must guarantee the stability of the business environment and ensure sustainable socio-economic development. • Improving and Developing policies, programs and strategic plans that decolonize or minimize colonial socio-economic system or operations in the country, and that promote win-win partnership or cooperation when signing socio-economic Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) with international partners. • Improving and Developing policies, programs and strategic plans that support and promote the industrialization of the economy (economic diversity): processing industries development of natural mineral resources, socio-economic infrastructure restructuring and development; and • Improving and Developing policies, programs and strategic plans that support and promote essential values like transparency, accountability, integrity, respect, honesty, fairness, commitment, professionalism and excellence at all levels of responsibilities could ensure the effectiveness of socio-economic activities, in the way people deals with a crisis such as that of COVID-19 in the country. Finally, a holistic development of positive human capital ability, taking into consideration human values said further above, must be a forefront key in tackling and turning any socio-economic challenges into opportunities. A holistic human capital ability development must be the vanguard key solution to all types of socio-economic crises in the world. The ability to have any future socio-economic crisis lives on the human capacity to prevent and deal with past and current catastrophic situations of undesirable experiences.

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African Development Bank. 2014. Democratic Republic of Congo Economic Outlook. Available: http://www.afdb.org/en/countries/central-africa/dem ocratic-republic-of-congo/democratic-republic-of-congoeconomic-outlook/. Accessed 8 July 2015. Alter, R. (2020). World Economic Forum 2020: Challenges and opportunities in the post-COVID-19 world. Available: https://www.weforum.org/reports/ post-covid-19-challenges-and-opportunities. Accessed 17 July 2020. Bishop, J., & Roberts, A. (2020). World Economic Forum: Challenges and opportunities in the post-COVID-19 world. Available: https://www.weforum.org/ reports/post-covid-19-challenges-and-opportunities. Accessed 17 July 2020. Bustin, O., & Savchenko, L. (2019). Democratic Republic of Congo: The oil and gas law review. Available: https://thelawreviews.co.uk/edition/the-oiland-gas-law-review-edition-7/1210100/democratic-republic-of-the-congo. Accessed 30 July 2020. CIA World Factbook. (2015). Congo, Democratic Republic of the—CIA. Available: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ cg.html. Accessed 7 July 2015. Creswell, J. W. (2015). A concise introduction to mixed methods research. Sage. Creswell, J. W., & Clark Vicki, L. (2011). Designing and conducting mixed methods research (2nd ed.). Sage. Goon, D. T., & Okafo, U. B. (2020). Curbing the COVID-19 pandemic in South Africa: Taking firmer, aggressive measures and discarding fallacy theories. Available: https://benthamopen.com/FULLTEXT/TOPHJ-13-395. Accessed 21 September 2020. Kikasu, T. E., & Dorasamy, N. (2019). Challenges impacting oil and gas industry development in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Transylvanian Review Journal, XXVII (46), 14433–14445. Kikasu, T. E. (2017). Exploring the socio-economic role of the petroleum refining industry in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A case study of the Congolese Company of Oil refining Industry (SOCIR). Available: http://openscholar. dut.ac.za/handle/10321/2584 Accessed 13 July 2020. Lamy, P., & Pedrosa, E. (2020). World Economic Forum: Challenges and opportunities in the post-COVID-19 world. Available: https://www.weforum.org/ reports/post-covid-19-challenges-and-opportunities. Accessed 17 July 2020. Muggah, R. (2020). World Economic Forum 2020: Challenges and opportunities in the post-COVID-19 world. Available: https://www.weforum.org/reports/ post-covid-19-challenges-and-opportunities. Accessed 17 July 2020. OECD. (2020a). The impact of the coronavirus (COVID-19) crisis on development finance. Available: http://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-respon ses/the-impact-of-the-coronavirus-covid-19-crisis-on-development-finance9de00b3b/. Accessed 21 September 2020a.

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OECD. (2020b). A systemic resilience approach to dealing with Covid-19 and future shocks: OECD policy responses to Coronavirus (COVID-19). Available: http://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/a-systemic-resilienceapproach-to-dealing-with-covid-19-and-future-shocks-36a5bdfb/. Accessed 21 September 2020b. Okenda, J. P. (2020). Natural Resource Governance Institute: How the DRC can defend its mining interests during the pandemic. Available: https://res ourcegovernance.org/blog/drc-defend-mining-pandemic-congo-coronavirus. Accessed 7 August 2020. Pauw, J. (2014). Khulubuse Zuma’s R100bn oil deal—City Press. Available: http://citypress.co.za/news/khulubuse-zuma-r100bn-oil-deal/. Accessed 21 September 2020. Saeza, M., Tobiasc, A., Vargaa, D., Barceló, M. A. (2020). Effectiveness of the measures to flatten the epidemic curve of COVID-19. The case of Spain. Elsevier journal: Science of Total Environment, 727 (2020), 138761. Available: http://www.udg.edu/grecs.htm, [email protected] (M. Saez). Accessed 21 September 2020. Saran, S. (2020). World Economic Forum: Challenges and opportunities in the postCOVID-19 world. Available: https://www.weforum.org/reports/post-covid19-challenges-and-opportunities. Accessed 17 July 2020. Smit, P. J., Botha, T., & Vrba, M. J. (2016). Management principles: A contemporary edition for Africa (6th ed.). Junta and company. Titeca, K., & Edmond, P. (2019). The political economy of oil in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): Corruption and regime control. Elsevier Journal, 6(2), 542–551. The World Bank Report. (2020). The World Bank in DRC. Available: https:// www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview. Accessed 7 August 2020. The World Fact Book Report – CIA. 2015. Crude oil proved reserves–country comparison to the world. Available: https://www.cia.gov/library/publicati ons/the-worldfactbook/fields/2244.html. Accessed 22 April 2015. Woods, N. (2020). World Economic Forum: Challenges and opportunities in the post-COVID-19 world. Available: https://www.weforum.org/reports/postcovid-19-challenges-and-opportunities. Accessed 17 July 2020. World Economic Forum. (2020). Challenges and opportunities in the postCOVID-19 world. Available: https://www.weforum.org/reports/post-covid19-challenges-and-opportunities. Accessed 17 July 2020.

CHAPTER 5

Reinvigorating the Okavango Delta Through E-Tourism and Localization Olayemi Bakre , Tsitsi Chipfuva , Memory Mukoroverwa , and Cynthia Chakahwata

Background The Travel and Tourism industry is heavily impacted by black swan events. Black swan events are rare, unexpected events, which have an extreme impact, are preceded by retrospection and planning for the new

O. Bakre (B) Department of Public Management, Durban University of Technology, Durban, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] T. Chipfuva · M. Mukoroverwa · C. Chakahwata School of Business and Leisure, Botswana Accountancy College, Gaborone, Botswana e-mail: [email protected] M. Mukoroverwa e-mail: [email protected] C. Chakahwata e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. Dorasamy (ed.), Governance Challenges During the COVID-19 Pandemic in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11244-7_5

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normal (Mueller & Stewart, 2016). The COVID-19 pandemic is one such black swan event that has had crippling effects on the Travel and Tourism industry. Travel and Tourism is an important economic activity in most countries around the world and it has direct, indirect, and induced impacts. World Travel and Tourism Council Travel and Tourism Economic Impact report of 2019 revealed that the Travel and Tourism sector accounted for 10.4% of global GDP (gross domestic product) and 319 million jobs or 10% of total employment in 2018. In most developing countries, tourism is increasingly becoming a significant contributor to GDP (OECD, 2020; Roe & Khanya, 2001). Such significance of tourism is also apparent within the Botswanan economy. Nare et al. (2017) note that apart from its diamonds, Botswana’s major competitive advantage is found in its diverse and abundant wildlife and natural resources. The renowned Okavango Delta and Chobe River Plains typify such diversity and abundance of wildlife and natural resources. Tourism has proven to be a potential engine for economic growth in Botswana and has been successfully reported as a source of stimulating investment, revenue generation, employment creation, and sustainable growth (Musora & Mbaiwa, 2018). Tourism, at the community level, has contributed to the improvement of the welfare of those communities that are close to natural resources such as wildlife, and hence its great potential for reducing rural poverty (Magole et al., 2017; Nsukwini & Bob, 2016). The World Travel and Tourism Report (2019) further reveals that the contribution of Travel and Tourism to GDP for Botswana in 2018 was 13.4%. Botswana’s tourism is wildlife-based and concentrated in the northern part of the country. The Botswana government has pursued a lowvolume-high-cost tourism model (Botswana Tourism Master Plan, 2000; Magole & Magole, 2011; Nare et al., 2017; Stevens & Jansen, 2002). Magole et al. (2017) argued that the ‘high value, low-volume tourism strategy appears to have contributed towards enclave tourism, with large foreign ownership of tour operator companies and repatriation of profits from Botswana.’ By implication, most of the revenue is generated amongst foreign tourists (from wealthy Western nations), while such proceeds are repatriated (Morupisi & Mokgalo, 2017). Closure of borders due to the COVID-19 pandemic has led to a significant fall in tourism revenue (UNWTO, 2020). The tourism industry is one of the top sectors of the economy, which has suffered the devastating effects of the coronavirus pandemic.

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According to UNWTO’s Report on COVID-19 Related Travel Restrictions, as of April 6, 2020, approximately 96% of all worldwide destinations have introduced travel restrictions in response to the pandemic. Almost 43% (90 destinations) have closed their borders, partially or completely, and an estimated 21% (44 destinations) have introduced travel bans to inbound travelers affected by COVID-19. Furthermore, approximately 27% (56 destinations) have suspended partially or all inbound international flights. On March 30, 2020, the first three COVID-19 cases in Botswana were confirmed. This instantaneously compelled President Mokgweetsi Masisi to declare a state of emergency, and a 28-day lockdown as a response to slow the spread of the coronavirus (Government of Botswana, 2020). The government extended the 28-day lockdown and ended after 48 days. This 48-day lockdown meant the total shutdown of the Okavango Delta and other tourist destinations in Botswana. In the post-48-day lockdown measure, the Botswana Tourism Organization (BTO) publicized COVID-19 guidelines for the tourism sector (BTO, 2020) to transit from a lockdown to full operations. In another media publication, Mbaiwa (2018) noted, ‘while COVID-19 has crippled global tourism, Botswana’s Tourism strategy is a perfect fit for this era. If the high-end tourists were to visit Botswana, they will not have many challenges with extreme social distancing since tourists come in small groups.’ Nicola et al. (2020) have noted that the tourism sector was one of the hardest hits by the outbreak of COVID-19, with impacts on both travel supply and travel demand. Botswana’s tourism sector felt the impact of COVID-19 as the pandemic struck during the resumption of the tourism peak season and what followed was a reduction of scheduled routes as well as load factors by international airlines. The industry was bound to be negatively affected as tourism in Botswana depends entirely on inbound tourists who were beginning to cancel their reservations due to risks posed by the coronavirus pandemic. In the same vein, Bakar and Rosbi (2020) note that demand for tourism products would fall due to factors such as foreign tourists delaying or withdrawing orders. In addition, travel agents and tour operators were negatively affected when airlines grounded operations because they failed to obtain refunds from airlines for canceled and pre-paid flights (Khan & Yasmine-Khan, 2020). On the supply side, there were disruptions in developing countries, as there were shortages of imported raw materials. The Daily News of June 1, 2020, suggested that the negative impacts of the coronavirus

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had also cascaded to hotels, lodges, camps, guesthouses, bed and breakfast facilities, mobile safaris, transfers, mokoro cruise, and motor boating. A protracted discourse on the direct and indirect economic implications of the COVID-19 pandemic is further elaborated within the later section of this study. Study Area This study focuses on the Okavango Delta, a large pristine wetland in northwestern Botswana. The Okavango Delta is situated at the northern edge of the Kalahari sandveld in northwestern Botswana, below the Caprivi Strip in Namibia and it is the largest designated inland wetland in the world containing 95% of Botswana’s surface water (Turpie et al., 2006). The Okavango Delta is formed by the inflow of the Okavango River that originates from the Angolan Highlands, flowing through Namibia and draining into the northwestern part of Botswana. In 1997, the Okavango Delta was listed as the largest Ramsar Wetland of International importance (Mladenov et al., 2007) and in 2014, the Okavango Delta was listed as the 1,000th World Heritage site and opined to be one of the most iconic natural areas on the planet (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The Okavango Delta is characterized by large amounts of open water and grasslands that sustain a variety of plant and animal species. In addition, the Okavango Delta sustains the livelihoods of local communities, and these livelihood activities include a collection of various plant and animal products for different uses, fishing, and flood recession farming (Kgathi et al., 2004; Kolawole et al., 2017). Tourism in the area was almost non-existent in the 1970s but it has since grown dramatically with the establishment of large numbers of tourism lodges in the area and further use by numerous mobile safari operators (Campbell & von Richer, 1976; Mbaiwa et al., 2018). Due to its rich wildlife diversity, permanent water resources, rich grasslands, forests, and scenic landscapes, the Okavango Delta has become one of the key international tourism destinations in Botswana. Mmopelwa et al. (2007) noted that tourists to the delta come from South Africa and other African countries, North America, and Australasia. Magole et al. (2017) however states that locals are not meaningfully benefiting from tourism in the Delta. Rather, foreigners dominate the industry, thereby leading to revenue leakages. Figure 5.1 shows the map of the Okavango Delta.

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Fig. 5.1 Map of the Okavango Delta, showing safari camps and Moremi Game Reserve (Source Adapted from Department of Tourism of Botswana [2001])

The global tourism industry has been severely impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic (Nicola et al., 2020; UNWTO, 2020). Before the outbreak of COVID-19, in Botswana, the number of domestic trips trailed that of international arrivals (Morupisi & Mokgalo, 2017). The tourism industry has been plunged into a loss-making abyss because of slumped tourism bookings and cancellations in Botswana’s Okavango delta. The continuous COVID-19 pandemic in the Okavango delta impacted the growth of the tourism industry and economy at large. On a national scale, fiscal earnings for the government will be wiped out

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and tourism’s contribution to national coffers will decrease, affecting the nation’s GDP, BOP, and tourism growth in general. The pandemic is envisaged to impact tourism revenues, compel tourism establishments to lay off human capital, and may force businesses to shut down. Responses to the COVID-19 pandemic which include efforts to stimulate domestic tourism, tabling of motions to lure American and European tourists, and the establishment of the COVID-19 relief fund have not borne any fruits yet as financial losses continue to rear their ugly head on tourism in the Okavango delta. Against this background, the study explores sustainable measures the management of Okavango Delta operations may employ ‘during and beyond’ the COVID-19 pandemic. In achieving this aim, a situational assessment of the Botswanan tourism sector was conducted, while a similar assessment of the Okavango Delta was conducted. Furthermore, the study identified current tourism responses employed by the Botswanan tourism industry. The subsequent subsections of this study revolve around a discussion on the consequences of COVID-19 on the Tourism sector, which is further narrowed to the impact of COVID-19 on the Okavango Delta. This is followed by a discourse on portfolio management theory, which serves as a lens to diversification stratagem within the Okavango Delta. To gain further insight into an inquiry of interest, a qualitative evaluation of operations in the Okavango Delta is harnessed, while discussions and results from this evaluation are used in drawing pragmatic and futuristic recommendations.

The Consequences of COVID-19 on the Tourism Sector The tourism industry has been on the path of growth from the 1950s to the 2000s with arrival totals of 25 million and US$ 1.4 billion revenue generated cumulatively over the same period (Raidió Teilifís Éireann [RTE], 2020). In 2018, the tourism industry generated US$ 8.8 trillion and 319 million jobs globally (World Travel and Tourism Council [WTTC], 2019). The industry witnessed further growth in 2019 wherein the tourism industry accounted for 10.3% (US$ 8.9 trillion) of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 1 in 10 jobs worldwide (330 million), and US$ 948 billion of capital investment (World Travel and Tourism Council [WTTC], 2020). Before the COVID-19 pandemic, 1.8 billion

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(global) tourist arrivals were forecasted by 2030 (UN News, 2017), which would translate to increased tourism receipts as well. Favorable tourism growth trends and forecasts revolve around the industry’s digitization; proliferation of budget airlines, and the emergence of a wealthy global middle class that has higher travel propensity. Consequently, the tourism industry under its increased multiplier effects, its associated yields; direct and indirect; as well as induced benefits have continuously sustained the global tourism development. However, certain developments had in the past, interrupted the growth trends. For instance, the September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in the USA, an outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in Asia in 2003, and the global economic recession of 2008, as shown in Fig. 5.2, have had their effects on the growth of tourism. The outbreak of the COVID-19 in Wuhan in December 2019 (UNWTO, 2020), was the recent global development that impinges on the growth of tourism. Over the first half of 2020, the coronavirus had spread to all tourism regions of the world, because of increased human interconnectedness and globalization. Since tourism is a resilient industry, as evidenced by its swift recovery from past pandemics and unfavorable economic conditions, it is projected that the recovery from COVID-19 may follow the same pattern. However, the UNWTO (2020) adopted a cynical view where the global tourism industry recovery was forecast to take 10 months once all the travel restrictions have been lifted (see Fig. 5.2). The devastating impacts of COVID-19 on the tourism and hospitality industry may extend over the long term given the expected recession (UNWTO, 2020). Destinations around the globe introduced lockdowns and restrictive measures to curb the spread of the virus. This resulted in the closure of hotels, travel intermediaries, restaurants, attractions, and cancellations of various tourism events. All these measures have dented the once-prosperous tourism industry (Lai, 2020; UNWTO, 2020; World Travel and Tourism Council [WTTC], 2020). Initially, growth in tourism arrivals for 2020 was pegged at 3–4%; however, a review necessitated by the outbreak of the virus points to a contraction of international tourism demand by about 20–30% and revenue losses between US$ 300 and US$ 450 trillion (UNWTO, 2020). Similar detrimental effects were evident in the airline industry which generated US$ 830 Billion in 2019 and was forecasted to yield US$ 872 billion (African Union, 2020) but lost US$ 113 Billion and 121 million jobs in the first six months of 2020.

Fig. 5.2 Revised forecast international tourism 2020 (Source UNWTO [2020])

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Asia and the Pacific are the most affected regions as the virus originated from this region, and it may take quite some time for tourists to regain confidence in traveling to this region post the pandemic. In Europe, destinations such as Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom bore the brunt of the coronavirus with high rates of deaths and infections while Africa and the Middle East are less affected. The Italian tourism sector for instance suffered a revenue loss of US$ 200 million in the first quarter of 2020, with destinations such as Lombardy and Veneto being affected (Federazione Italiana del Turismo, 2020). Given the fact that tourism is a major player in global economies, the pandemic’s negative impacts have taken center stage in industry discussions to find mitigation measures and solutions to revive the industry. To circumvent the disastrous effects of the pandemic, hotels such as Thailand’s A-One Hotel, Parklane Hongkong, and Fairmont Singapore introduced quarantine packages for returning residents and citizens who can afford luxury mandatory quarantine instituted by governments (Skift, 2020; The Real Deal, 2020; Wall Street Journal, 2020). However, the situation remains dire given the fact that as of June 15, 2020, only 22% of destinations were open to regional and international travel whereas 65% of the destinations remained closed (UNWTO, 2020) since a vaccine is yet to be found. The slow easing of COVID-19 restrictions and delayed reopening of borders will continue to have ripple effects on the economies and livelihoods of global citizens. Africa registered a 7% growth in arrivals and receipts of US$ 38 billion in 2019 (UNWTO, 2020). The tourism sector’s contribution cannot be underestimated since it contributes an estimated 8.5% to GDP and 6.7% to total employment (WTTC, 2019). Tourism is key to the Island Nations of Seychelles, the Republic of Cabo Verde, and Mauritius where it contributes more than 25% of GDP. Increased physical and market accessibility, relaxed visa regimes, and prioritization of tourist safety are factors credited for the success of the tourism sector in Africa. Notwithstanding, the African tourism industry has not been spared from the scourge of the COVID-19 pandemic. Tourist arrivals are set to plummet by 1–3% leading to a loss of revenue between US$30 and US$50 billion (UNWTO, 2020; WTTC, 2019). Top destinations such as Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda have equally suffered a fall in tourism demand and receipts. Airlines have been the hardest hit with Kenya Airways and Rwanda Air projected to lose US$ 0.54 billion and US$20.4 million, respectively, and suffer total job losses of 140 965 (East African Business

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Council, 2020). The hospitality industry operations across the African continent were ground to zero as most commercial accommodation establishments and foodservice facilities closed shop in compliance with lockdown measures. To manage and mitigate the impacts of the pandemic in Africa, authors such as Adam and Kimbu (2020) have proposed incentives such as tax holidays, financial support schemes for businesses, as well as promotions of domestic and intra-regional African travel, as part of the recovery process to normalcy. Botswana’s tourism industry witnessed a growth of 3.4%, contributing 8.9% of employment, and US$ 2.52 Billion to the country’s economy in 2017 (World Travel and Tourism Council [WTTC], 2020). The tourism industry has contributed toward economic diversification as Botswana relied on mining for the past decades that ensued after independence in 1966. Tourism has opened opportunities for socio-economic development in both urban and rural environments. Due to the current global pandemic, all tourism sectors have been negatively affected including but not limited to hotels, lodges, bed and breakfasts, camps, safaris, transfers, tour operators, and especially freelance safari operators who depend on fees paid by clients for their working capital (Sibanda, 2020). What further compounds the current scenario is that the COVID-19 pandemic coincides with the peak tourism season in Botswana (Sibanda, 2020), which yields high revenues that cushion tourism businesses during low seasons. Hambira (2020) mentions that small to medium enterprises (SMMES) in the tourism sector have been hard hit with a majority losing 72% of revenue earnings as all tourism operations have been ground to a halt. Therefore, the small-scale tourism operators due to the prevailing impacts of the pandemic are in arrears of rental costs, salaries, and wages as bank loan repayments. To turn the fortunes of the industry and ensure the survival of SMMEs and other key players, the government has stepped in to provide a stimulus package through the COVID-19 fund relief to support businesses financially post-COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, three-month salaries, and wage subsidies of 50% were available to all taxcompliant tourism operators (Hambira, 2020) to prevent any looming retrenchments that could escalate the country’s unemployment rate. The nature of Botswana’s tourism demand also worsens the impacts of the pandemic on the local industry. More so, 84% of tourists who visit the country originate from within Africa while the rest is ‘non-African international’ high-paying tourists from Europe and the Americas.

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Even though the latter tourists make up a small share of the tourism market, their revenue contribution exceeds that of African tourists. As a result, travel restrictions and lockdowns that were introduced in international source markets to reduce the impacts of the pandemic understandably led to a drastic fall in tourism revenue thus threatening the economic sustainability of the sector. Since international tourism may only resume in 2021 (Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 2020), the local tourism industry will continue to experience unprecedented negative ramifications of COVID-19. Tourism facilities in wildlife tourism hotspots of Maun and Kasane will continue to run below capacity, which may threaten the socio-economic development gains realized since the start of the tourism industry in the country in 1966. This has its impacts on rural communities that are dependent on international tourists for consumptive and non-consumptive wildlife tourism because community tourism ventures are not operational (Hambira, 2020). Considering this scenario, poverty increase is becoming commonplace.

Okavango Delta During the COVID-19 Era The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has brought operations at the Okavango Delta to a grinding halt (Jamal & Budke, 2020). Due to the interactive nature of the tourism sector, businesses in the sector were shut down in the early period of the pandemic and will likely be amongst the last set of sectors (businesses) to fully reopen (OECD, 2020). The full reopening of the Okavango Delta is a more problematic task than shutting it, as the movement of tourists is a potential vector to the spread of the COVID-19. A quick-and-rush reopening might also dampen earlier efforts of governments in slowing the spread of this novel virus. The prolonged reopening of the tourism sector has posed a challenge to its resurfacing. More so, while reopening the tourist sector, tourist operators alongside prominent stakeholders may need to adopt persuasive measures in convincing speculative tourists to build assurances and confidence. Besides the current COVID-19 pandemic, the Botswanan tourism sector has been facing threats such as humanitarian crises and challenges attributed to climate change (Mbaiwa, 2012; Cassidy et al., 2017). Before the COVID-19 outbreak, the Maun International Airport would welcome a multitude of foreign tourists to the iconic Okavango Delta. However, the lockdown led to the hibernation of this international airport since March 2020 (Tjinyeka, 2020). However, the bulk of

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tourists, who visit the Okavango Delta, are local citizens or from African countries. Nevertheless, the importance of non-African tourists cannot be overemphasized as they generate above 70% of the revenue (Hambira, 2020). Amongst the 1.8 million tourists who visited Botswana in 2017, 16% were from the United Kingdom, Germany, and the USA, while the remaining 84% were from the African continent (Hambira, 2020; Stone & Nyaupane, 2019). Worrisome also is the fact that the pandemic broke out during the peak season wherein most operators within the Okavango Delta make their highest revenue during the year. Rather, the booking cancellations meant the loss of millions of Pula. Exemplifying with a tour operator such as the African Big 5 Tours and Safaris’, the loss incurred due to this outbreak were estimated at P2 million (Tjinyeka, 2020). Such incidence is not an isolated scenario but a typified case amongst several tour operators in Botswana (OECD, 2020). Although it may be premature to estimate the effect of COVID-19 on the Okavango Delta and the entire Botswanan tourism sector, however, some economic fatalities have been recorded since the inception of the pandemic. As reported by the Local Enterprise Authority, the Botswana tourism sector lost over 72% of its revenue in March of 2020 (Tjinyeka, 2020). This industry is also reported to have failed to service bank loans, laid-off workers, and was unable to meet its other financial obligations (e.g., rental payments). Unlike other sectors, whose employees were given the leeway to work remotely, this is an uncommon practice within the tourism industry due to the simultaneous nature of tourism services. Furthermore, recent studies have shown that a decline in revenue within the tourist industry has resulted in increased poaching of wildlife (Buckley, 2020). A tourism-related opportunity missed this year was Safari hunting, which is part of consumptive tourism. Before the COVID-19, the international Safari hunting operators alongside community members have joint safari hunting agreements, which allowed Safari hunters a specific hunting quota in 2020 in return for hunting fees. Unfortunately, the travel restrictions did not allow it to eventuate (Hambira, 2020). The tour operators and employees who are directly or indirectly involved with the Okavango Delta operations were severely affected also during this crisis. Thus, this was a loss to the community and neighboring communities, as an estimated 95% of residents are dependent on tourism (Mbaiwa, 2018).

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Given the above development, the Botswanan government has introduced some fiscal and economic relief measures. One of such is the ‘do not cancel but postpone strategy,’ where clients who pre-booked were persuaded to postpone and not cancel their trips (Hambira, 2020). Furthermore, as an agenda to accelerate recovery within the tourism sector, the Botswanan government initiated ‘a loan guarantee scheme for 24 months, up to a maximum of BWP 25 million (USD 2 million) per business’. In addition, through the COVID-19 Relief Fund, subsidies were offered to companies to cover 50% of employees’ salaries between April and June of 2020. Despite these measures, the desired result is far from the anticipated target of the initiators. Notwithstanding, it may be too early and challenging or complex to quantify the impact of COVID-19 on the sustainability/viability of the Okavango Delta. However, the latter sections of this book chapter do attempt in proposing alternative approaches to sustaining this tourist destination ‘during and beyond’ the COVID-19.

Financial Portfolio Theory Harry M. Markowitz put portfolio theory forward in the early 1950s. This theory is premised upon two main concepts. The advocacy of the first concept is that investors seek to maximize their expected return from an investment given some level of risk they are willing to accept (Fabozzi & Grant, 2001). It focuses on the trade-off between expected return and risk (Maier-Paape & Zhu, 2018). The theory analyzes the relationship between risk and return and enables investors to construct an efficient portfolio that suits their risk appetite. Risk is defined as the variance between the actual return and expected return (Ivanovic et al., 2018). On the contrary, the second concept advocates that risk can be mitigated through portfolio diversification (Fabozzi & Grant, 2001). Portfolio diversification is when investors spread their investments across various asset classes such that losses in one asset class are offset by gains from other asset classes. This was supported by Rodrigues (2009, 3) who mentioned that an investment portfolio should have assets that are uncorrelated because they provide more diversification. Therefore, the theory emphasizes ‘do not put all your eggs in one basket.’ Ivanovic et al. (2018, 153) argue that, though portfolio theory originates from finance, its relevance can be found within the tourism sector. Such assertion is based on the high volatility within the tourism services

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which is likened to shares listed on the stock exchange. This concept is further buttressed by Jang and Chen (2008) who allege that some principles inherent in the portfolio theory can be applied to the tourism market. One of such is the ‘efficient frontier’ (Fabozzi & Grant, 2001).

Qualitative Evaluation of Operations at Okavango Delta The Okavango Delta is the largest inland Delta in Africa. It is in the Ngamiland region in Northern Botswana. The natural wonder is a haven to a diversity of fauna and flora that has made Botswana a pristine wildlife tourism destination. The sampling frame of companies in the Okavango Delta is unknown and it was not immediately clear which operators in the Delta had resumed business operations by the time of doing this research (Sharma, 2017). Therefore, the absence of an accurate register of safari operations that had opened shop by June 15, 2020, made snowball sampling a suitable sampling technique. Snowball sampling is defined as a sampling method in which an interviewee gives the names of other suitable potential respondents that could be approached by the researcher to seek their consent to participate in the research (Bhattacherjee, 2012; Cohen & Arieli, 2011; Patton, 1990; Phillips, 2014). Unfortunately, the sampling procedure in question does not give room for accurate determination of the sampling error and generalization of the research findings is also compromised by adopting this method (Etikan et al., 2016; Sharma, 2017). Morgan (2008) criticized the above notion by emphasizing that generalization is not a priority for qualitative research since the main aim of such research is to gather in-depth and detailed data. To ensure a variation of the study sample, three researchers established their own independent ‘seed’ (Etikan et al., 2016) to avoid similar responses being generated from respondents who may share similar traits. The study was conducted with sixteen (16) snowballed safari managers from safari companies that operate in the Okavango Delta. All the respondents were working for safari companies that opened for business on June 15, 2020. Semi-structured interviews were used to collect data from the 16 respondents via telephone since the researchers believed non-essential travel could put them at risk of contracting COVID-19. Virtual interviews could have been conducted to give the interviewer a chance to observe body language but the internet network in the Delta is too

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weak to support Zoom, Teams, or Skype Calls. The interviewers either transcribed the responses or recorded the interviews for future reference during data analysis in a bid to ensure data trustworthiness. The interviews provided a platform for the sixteen (16) research respondents to freely express their views on the status of tourism in the Okavango Delta pre-and post-COVID-19 outbreak as well as recommending long and short-term strategies for the recovery of the local tourism industry. Data were analyzed using thematic analysis to identify themes and patterns from the data collected (Braun & Clarke, 2006). All interview respondents were coded from A to P. The three researchers read and listened to recorded interview scripts to establish key themes from the interviews, which were then reviewed by the senior researcher. Most reoccurring, as well as most pertinent remarks made by interviewees, are presented within this subsection. These responses were classified into two broad themes; these include: – Situation Assessment of the Okavango Delta and Botswana tourism sector; and – Tourism responses by the Botswana tourism industry. Through these themes, the study juxtaposes the aim of the study—‘to explore sustainable measures the management of Okavango Delta may employ “during and beyond” the COVID-19 pandemic,’ while being used to proffer realistic recommendations in the concluding section of this study.

Situation Assessment of the Okavango Delta and Botswana Tourism Sector In providing a situation assessment of the Okavango Delta, and that of the Botswanan tourism sector at large, the narrative encompassed discusses tourism products and services offered at the Okavango Delta, as well as the direct and indirect economic impact of the pandemic. Some of the excerpts provided by the interviewees are presented within the subsections.

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Luxurious Tourism Experiences as the Dominant Product According to interviewees, tourist activities within the Okavango Delta included nature walks, game drives, boating, fishing, aerial safaris, and land safaris. Due to the current closure of national borders, camps, and mobile safaris are not receiving their ‘normal’ customers and therefore are forced to rely on an undeveloped domestic tourism market. Interviewees foresee the reopening of the international leisure market by 2021. Zero Occupancies and Absence of International Tourists All respondents indicated that the Okavango Delta operations performed poorly during this COVID-19 pandemic as travel restrictions were imposed on international travel that constituted the dominant demand. Tourism is one of the hardest hits by COVID-19 outbreak in Botswana. It is experiencing a rapid and sharp drop in demand and a surge in job losses.—Respondent M …. currently, there is no activity at all. We are not operating, and employees are home.—Respondent N

All respondents indicated that their companies have written off the whole of 2020 due to huge financial losses incurred so far because of travel restrictions and lockdowns worldwide. Company revenues declined by 95% based on the performance of the 2019 financial year and expectations are that only 2% of last year’s revenue will be made this current year. The current and projected 2020 revenue is forecasted to be non-viable. Invariably, in staying afloat, capital and non-capital expenditures were cut off. ………. We have cut off all capital and non-essential expenditure to allow our business to stay afloat.—Respondent C

One amongst the respondents did claim that a 100% occupancy was achieved in the Safari camp in 2019. However, the narrative is quite dissimilar in 2020 with the opening to domestic tourism. Before 2020, BWP 6,000 was charged, however, local tourists are presently being charged R1,750 which respondents claim does not cover their operational

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costs, let alone contribute to the achievement of break-even by companies operating in the Delta. The respondents lamented over the absence of international tourists who they said paid not less than BWP 8,000 per person per night (sharing), excluding land and air transfers. Nevertheless, local tourism consumption remains constrained by the absence of a domestic tourism policy, perceived high prices of tourism services, and a general lack of interest in tourism (Hambira, 2020; Mpoeng, 2020; Nicola et al., 2020). It is therefore reasonable for operators to continue to wish for an end to the COVID-19 pandemic that will signal the return of international travel to rejuvenate the tourism sector, which has taken a downward spiral.

Salary Cuts and Retrenchments Responses to the management of staffing costs by operators in the Okavango Delta have been characterized by a mix of strategies all geared toward managing company cash flows. As cash flow reserves began to dwindle, tourism operators in the Delta saw it appropriate to either cut salaries, retrench employees, or suspend employee contracts. ………the company cut the employees’ salaries soon after the travel restrictions were imposed, and the business closed shop. Employees were given the option to either take voluntary retrenchment packages or remain employed and receive no wages.—Respondent A

He further alluded that. ……. At the moment there is the operations manager, 2 or 3 staff and one mechanic at each camp instead of 50 employees per camp that we were accustomed to.—Respondent A

According to the respondents, 90% of the employees that were on the payroll were receiving not more than 40% of their salaries while at home. A respondent mentioned that employees’ contracts were suspended and depending on the length of service, employees were given 2–3 months’ salary packages and monthly food hampers till operations return to normalcy. The COVID-19 outbreak has therefore led to job cuts, suspension of employee contracts and salary cuts as companies are finding it difficult to cover staff costs against a background of no cash inflows

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precipitated by restricted international travel. Given this scenario, many employees working at the Okavango Delta have been further entrenched into poverty. Cash Flow Reductions Due to the Absence of International Tourism Inflows The absence of international travel has led to minimal revenues inflows into tourism operations, thus threatening the survival of companies during the pandemic. To ensure the company’s survival, Respondent C claimed they had to negotiate with their creditors for longer terms of payments for services already rendered. …We have negotiated with our service providers to extend the 30, 60- and 90-day payment terms to 60, 120 and 180 days respectively to protect our cash flows until we resume business. In the case of fixed costs for service level agreements we have with some suppliers, we negotiated for lower rates given the COVID-19 circumstances.—Respondent C

All these strategies have been adopted to protect the remaining company cash flows. Respondent C and E mentioned that in the past, the exceptional performance of the company led to the payment of employee bonuses to the tune of 100–200%, but this did not materialize this year due to low cash flows that are threatening business viability. Respondent C also revealed that bank loans have been availed to tourism operators to cover their operational costs, but the company opted to use savings accumulated over the past five good years to avoid sinking into deeper debt as it is unclear when the business will return to normal. Staff Training During the COVID-19 Some of the participants did allege that they had capitalized on the low tourist turnout to upskill their employees. The competency exercises are also geared toward a post-COVID-19 era. These training sessions were imperative, to ensuring staff does not lose their skills due to prolonged redundancy.

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Tourism Responses by the Botswana Tourism Industry In line with the study’s objectives, further inquiry was made as regards responses made to alleviate the COVID-19 situation. Thus, this subsection provides a condensed narrative of responses given by the interviewees. Negotiation with the Botswana Tourism Organization In mitigating the effect of the pandemic on the tourism sector, some respondents interviewed within this study claimed to have addressed a letter to the Botswana Tourism Organisation (BTO)—the country’s national tourism entity. The said letter was a request to pay the mandatory 2% tourism levy in installments to the BTO. This request is still under consideration at BTO, but in the meantime, operators are compelled to pay the 2% tourism levy despite their constricted cash flow. Another concern is that due to bureaucracies in government, their calls may not heed expeditiously. Thus, some operators obtained bank loans to pay the 2% tourism levy. Temporary Salary Subsidy The Botswanan government introduced a three-month salary subsidy to employees across all sectors of the economy. Thus, employees within the tourism sector were also included amongst the beneficiaries. However, concerns were raised about the discontinuation of the subsidy at the end of June 2020. The study participants claimed this subsidy termination has left many tourism employees in a predicament. Respondent C stated that the received wage subsidy from the government was plowed back into employees’ savings, as these employees were previously paid full salaries during the three months of the lockdown (April–June 2020). The subsidy would then be paid once the company is unable to meet its overhead cost, which may occur due to a foreseeable cash flow constraint. Further Findings and Discussion Further exigent highlights from the interviews are further summarized while delving into discourses pertinent to the theme of the paper.

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High tourism prospects in 2020—a recurring theme amongst the interviewees was the high prospects for tourism demand in 2020. Operators were optimistic that the positive financial trend of the last five years would proceed on a continuum projectile in 2020, as previous years had shown impressive results with occupancy ranging from 80 to 100%. Given the good financial performance, the company set aside a capital expenditure of 35 million to rebuild one of its safari camps in line with contemporary tourism market needs. Coupled with that development was the opening of two new camps in the Okavango Delta that was earmarked to create 100–120 employment opportunities. Prior COVID19 bookings further gave the operators heightened optimism; however, the outbreak of the pandemic spun the optimism into a dystopian state. ….. many operators in the delta were sitting at 98% occupancy and some operators had even built or renovated their properties only to find that they ran a loss due to COVID-19 outbreak.—Respondent M

Promotion of domestic tourism—the pandemic exposed the need to develop and promote domestic tourism in Botswana. An enticing and persuading citizen, operators discounted prices by 75%. Nonetheless, domestic tourists still considered the prices high. Rather, locals and residents prefer to engage in outbound tourism, to destinations such as Swakopmund in Namibia, Victoria Falls in Zimbabwe, and Suncity in South Africa. Apart from perceived high prices, locals and tourism operators are in perceptual conflict. ………Tourism operators have reduced the prices by 75% but the prices are now being charged at BWP 4000 per night per person sharing… but this is still too high.—Respondent A …If a local person owns 500 heads of cattle, they are unwilling to sell some of the cattle and go on holiday with their family?—Respondent C

Respondents however argued that citizens did not fully appreciate tourism benefits. Therefore, educating the locals about tourism and its benefits is key to transforming the mindsets of the local people. Operators must make a deliberate attempt to tailor-make marketing strategies for the local market in the absence of international tourism demand.

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Local tourists want cheap services, so they pay peanuts. For example, for a game drive, they want to pay P150, but International Tourists are willing to pay P500. I will close than open to domestic tourists. The amount they pay is not enough to cover the wear and tear of the cars and pay staff. Also, they complain too much.—Respondent M

The operators placed priority on the high-paying international market that contributes significantly to Gross Domestic Product (GDP), a point not appreciated by the citizens and residents. However, such an international market may not materialize until international travel restrictions are lifted. Constraint to the adoption of e-Tourism—when operators at the Okavango Delta were asked about the feasibility of exploring e-tourism during the pandemic and beyond, they cited constraints such as lack of ICT infrastructure and human ability. Most of the study participants claimed not to have explored the use of ICT for tourism purposes. Only 25% of the respondents claimed that they do have photographers and videographers at their companies who can develop e-tourism through real-time virtual tours. An operator did mention during the interview that the amateur photo/videographers are unable to produce real-time virtual tours of substance. Realistically, in as much as e-tourism is a choice to resuscitate the Okavango Delta operations, it is ‘currently’ constrained by a lack of appropriate hardware and software as well as the relevant expertise for successful implementation. A further challenge is the poor internet connectivity in most parts of the delta, which would make it impossible to conduct real-time virtual tours. The adverse effect of lockdown—further concerns raised during the interview were the difficulty in supporting the safari camps, some of which have begun to dilapidate due to non-usage. More so, the isolation of the camps has given leeway to wild animals to roam, which poses a threat to staff members within the camps. Furthermore, poaching of the ‘Big-Five’ has been on the rise during the lockdown. Thus, some safari camps have risen to the challenge by using their guides to patrol within the delta and working collaboratively with organizations such as ‘Rhinos without borders ’ to track the movement of Rhinos, which are the endangered species.

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Future of Okavango Delta The operators interviewed put some valuable propositions forward. One of the most reoccurring views was the need to promote local entrepreneurship within the safari sector. This sector has been dominated by ‘foreign white ownership’. As a result, the locals view safari holidays as a preserve of the white man. According to the Operators, the pandemic has exposed the need to increase the use of travel intermediaries for local bookings. Such domestic bookings have not been exploited fully; thus, a 20% commission is currently being offered to local travel agencies per successful booking. Operators also wanted insurance companies in Botswana to extend their package to cover business losses attributed to public health crises or pandemics. Furthermore, Operators saw the need to have resident healthcare professionals in the Okavango Delta. More so, they felt the need to undergo basic and continuous training to take precautionary measures against the COVID-19.

Reinvigorating the Okavango Delta Tourism aficionados, researchers, local community members, environmentalists, and policymakers have continuously fought for the survival of this highly vulnerable industry—tourism. The tourism sector is known to be highly susceptible to socio-economic, environmental, and political risks. Despite this inherent threat, the resilience of this sector has continuously sprung it back from predicaments and pandemics such as acts of terrorism, natural disasters (Tsunami), and viral outbreaks—ZIKA, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), and Ebola (Novelli et al., 2018). However, the unprecedented size of COVID-19 is forecasted to have a multi-dimensional, far-reaching effect on the tourism landscape (Sigala, 2020). Thus, this calls for the swift adoption of a ‘new normal’ premised upon sound scientific evidence and innovativeness. In adopting the new normal, the Botswanan tourism fraternity has begun to make concerted efforts to lure tourists with strategies such as providing discounted fees to local tourists and sustainability approaches through governmental subsidies. To keep the tourist height before the pandemic, it is obvious several reinvigoration measures still need to be put in place. Thus, to contribute further toward these measures started by the Botswanan tourism industry, the study makes advocacy of e-tourism and

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further localization strategies while attempts are made to infuse the Financial Portfolio Theory as a basis for the tourism diversification agenda. During the COVID-19 pandemic, tourist destinations/operators have often been faced with the dilemma to close or pursue e-tourism (Gretzel et al., 2020). E-tourism is also known as e-travel is the digitalization of all the tourism processes and value chains in the tourism, travel, hospitality, and catering industries (Buhalis, 2003). Kenya, Namibia, and South Africa have recently launched their virtual tour live stream to showcase their respective game safaris and other tourist attractions. Similarly, lessons can be drawn from Egypt which prior and during the pandemic have provided tourists with a virtual tour of a thousand years of Arab history and the famous legacy of the Pharaohs. Through these virtual tours, tourists are shown mysterious temples, the famous Pyramids of Giza, Abu Simbel temples, the Philae Island with its temple of Isis, and the temple of Horus, amongst other, eye-catching tourist attractions. Likewise, operators within the Okavango Delta could follow a similar trend. This would have been an idle time to build brand trust within the digital world, explore innovative online tools, with the intent of creating a more personalized connection with targeted tourists. More so, the Okavango Delta operators should create enticing content on their websites, while also luring tourists with attention-grabbing sceneries through the adoption of social media platforms such as Instagram. Upon gaining huge followership through online platforms, virtual tours of the Okavango Delta may equally be provided to tourists via bookings. Adoption of e-Tourism by safari operators in the Okavango Delta will enhance personalization, interoperability, and continuous engagement with tourists from across the globe. This feat may only be realized through the upgrade of ICT infrastructure within the Okavango Delta; providing capacitation exercises for operators, as well as the involvement of online content experts who are well engrained in tourism. Toward the realism of a reinvigorated Okavango Delta, the development of a local tourist market is equally imperative. A plethora of sources has advocated the need to promote domestic tourism. According to the OECD (2020), domestic tourism accounts for 75% of the tourism economy amongst OECD nations. While some of these OECD countries are beginning to revive their tourism market through the ‘staycation’ drive (OECD, 2020), Botswana’s tourism market, sustained through overseas tourists, is facing difficulty due to its poorly developed local tourist market.

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Wen et al. (2020) argue that tourists in the post-COVID-19 era will be unwilling to partake in mass tourism, rather they will opt for wellplanned trips with an ‘emphasis on extended experiences and holidays.’ In the same line of reasoning, Losada and Mota (2019) claim the gradual adoption of the concept of ‘slow tourism.’ The adoption of ‘slow tourism’ or ‘localization,’ as used in this study centers on the domestic populace, which promotes longer lengths of stay with more fulfilling tourist experiences. Countries that have adopted this approach are fast regaining lost grounds caused by the pandemic. More so, as suggested during the interview, operators felt the need to provide financial and technical support to locals, as a means to entice them to be a part of the tourism industry. This may also possibly influence perceptions regarding taking safari holidays as the current skepticism is premised on the notion that tourism is for foreigners. Local tourists may then be motivated to visit black citizen-owned safari companies. Further to this, a continuous sensitization campaign in promoting domestic tourism will be integral in purporting this agenda.

Conclusion As tourist destinations across the globe begin to adapt to the new normal, academicians are anticipating the COVID-19 crisis will be a wake-up call to rethink tourism in a more innovative, inclusive, and sustainable fashion. One that can absorb shocks and crises. Significant amounts of tourist destinations are beginning to adopt e-tourism; it is no doubt in its infancy and could create a multitude of untapped opportunities for the development, management, and marketing of tourist destinations, services, and products. Such adoption may further be used to diversify products or services offered by tourism operations in the Okavango Delta. More so, operators have failed to realize the opportunity realizable through the development of a credible interface with other affiliates within and beyond the tourism industry. This has invariably constrained the advancement of their ‘virtuality.’ Further, while adjusting to the new normal in a post-COVID-19 era, ICT is an indispensable condition-sine-qua-non (Gretzel et al., 2020). Hence, operators who may not swiftly adapt to this trend will struggle to stay competitive. Thus, a tourism recovery plan will necessitate robust indices to calibrate tourism products through e-Tourism. While this study advocates the reinvigoration of the Okavango Delta through e-tourism

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and localization strategies, it is advised similar tourist destinations drive similar agendas or those that aptly suit and sustain their viability.

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CHAPTER 6

COVID-19 Ramifications in Lesotho: A Poverty Perspective Wayne Malinga and Bellita Banda Chitsamatanga

Introduction The outbreak of COVID-19 has brought unprecedented socio-economic and political changes on a global scale, with predictions of exacerbated poverty levels amongst low-income countries in the Global South. However, the situation has extended beyond low-income countries as poor, vulnerable, and marginalized people from middle and high-income

W. Malinga (B) Department of Development Studies, Lupane State University, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] Institute for the Future of Knowledge, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa B. B. Chitsamatanga SARChI Chair in Sexualities, Gender and Queer Studies, University of Fort Hare, Alice, South Africa e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. Dorasamy (ed.), Governance Challenges During the COVID-19 Pandemic in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11244-7_6

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countries have also been hit hard because of the economic fallout and health impact imposed by the pandemic (Woodhill, 2020). The most affected are the rural people who are already deeply engulfed in development challenges instigated by overpopulation, poverty, lack of income, depreciated remittances, and state abandonment in addressing their plight (Woodhill, 2020). Zooming in on the African continent, the underlying socio-economic conditions like weak public healthcare systems, poverty, unemployment, and inequality have been further aggravated by the pandemic, posing serious challenges in addressing the impact of the virus. In tracing the pandemic in the continent, Egypt was the first country to report the first case of the virus on February 14, 2020, while Lesotho was the last country (54th nation) to record COVID-19 on May 13, 2020 (United Nations, 2020a). However, it is imperative to show that before the outbreak of the pandemic, the continent was already confronted by persistent and endemic poverty. This is clear in the prioritization of addressing poverty as an international concern through the initiation of former Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the current Sustainable Development Goals. Since the advent of COVID-19 in the Wuhan Province in China in November 2019, the virus has spread rapidly across the entire globe with devastating consequences on the health and lives of people (SIDA, 2020). International organizations, such as the World Health Organization, have been instrumental in leading the fight against this pandemic from a health perspective but have left a void that seeks answers, particularly concerns related to the socio-economic implications imposed by this virus such as the pertinent question of ‘poverty’. Development as a discourse has experienced a change in basic assumptions due to the influence of this pandemic on a myriad of topics related to the economic, financial, political, social, and cultural sectors that are prudent spheres of driving the development agenda forward. Agbe (2020) argues that the impact of COVID-19 extends beyond the health consequences. The introduced regulation measures to curb the spread of the virus have put a huge strain on the socio-economic development trajectory resulting in rising unequal levels across the entire globe. This raised questions on how poor people from poor countries would adapt to and survive the imminent threat imposed by COVID-19 on their lives, livelihoods, way of living, standard of living, survival tactics, and general wellbeing. A halt in economic activities through lockdown regulations

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is a popular approach that has been used by most governments across the entire globe to address and restrain the rapid widespread of this pandemic. However, this hard stance initiative has spelled doom on the poor who survive and thrive on the full functioning of the economy. In the context of Africa, governments implemented severe and strict measures as part of the efforts to contain the spread of this virus with adverse socio-economic consequences. This involved lockdown regulations travel bans, prohibition of large gatherings, social distancing, closure of schools and institutions of higher learning, shutting down of businesses, and closure of borders (UNESCO, 2020). Recent statistics show that the continent has experienced a relatively low number of infections and deaths as initially predicted (United Nations, 2020a), with 1,918,932 confirmed cases of COVID-19, 1,620,746 recoveries, and 46,283 death cases reported as of November 12, 2020 (African Arguments, 2020). However, the severity of this pandemic on the socio-economic susceptibilities and complexities of the continent cannot be underestimated (United Nations, 2020a). The Sustainable Development Goals Center for Africa (2020) projected that over 20.4 million people could be pushed into extreme poverty and if the situation worsened this could result in an additional 82 million propelled to the brink of the worst kind of poverty. Furthermore, 63.7 million people would experience food insecurity and 34 out of the 54 countries in the continent were already in dire and urgent need of food help to feed their populations, particularly the poor who do not have any access to food as a result of the impact of this pandemic (The Sustainable Development Goals Center for Africa, 2020). The general outlook and picture provided by this pandemic are that poor people are experiencing poverty in all its forms and sides. This includes an extension of the manifestation of the COVID-19 crisis in socio-economic development deficiencies such as poor health, lack of access to water and sanitation, food insecurity, unemployment, and inequality (United Nations, 2020b). Lesotho has experienced severe economic consequences of the pandemic resulting in the reduction of migrant remittances and exports (IMF, 2020). The small mountainous kingdom has a small population that lives in rural areas where poverty is rife. Therefore, the spread of this pandemic poses a serious looming catastrophe on the poor communities and households in the country who depend on different economic activities such as agriculture, manufacturing, mining, and remittances for their survival.

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The main motivation for this chapter is to provide a snapshot of the ramifications of COVID-19 in Lesotho from a poverty perspective. Furthermore, it provides an overview of the tentative arguments on the co-relation between COVID-19 and poverty in the context of poor countries such as Lesotho. The central argument advanced by the chapter is that the phenomenon of COVID-19 has exposed the frailties that exist within governments in low-income countries in the Global South in providing basic needs such as food, water, shelter, sanitation, health, infrastructure, important prerequisites that can be used in the fight against the pandemic. Therefore, the vulnerabilities of the poor to the pandemic pose a serious threat to their lives and survival. The rest of the chapter is divided into five sections. The first part is a discussion of the problem statement and method adopted for the study. The second section deals with the conceptualization of poverty while the third part focused on the phenomenon of poverty in Lesotho. The fourth section provides a snapshot of the COVID-19 pandemic in Lesotho. The last section of the chapter deals with findings and discussion.

Problem Statement The mountainous kingdom of Lesotho has a long-protracted history of deprivation and decelerated economic growth with devastating consequences on the poor and vulnerable groups. Moreover, the country has experienced its fair share of development challenges that have ranked it low in terms of the Human Development Index (HDI). Much of the population (57.1%) is afflicted by poverty (Callander, 2017). From multidimensional poverty and poverty mapping perspective (UNDP, 2020), poverty is a persistent challenge in Lesotho combined with inequality (AfDB, 2013). According to the World Bank (2019), poverty in the country was highly concentrated in the rural areas as compared to the urban areas, bringing to the fore, the issue of socio-economic disparities between these two areas. Therefore, the deteriorating socio-economic conditions prevailing in the country have exposed the repeated failures of the state, economy, and politics to address the prevalence of chronic and extreme poverty. Furthermore, the outbreak of COVID-19 posed a greater risk to the survival and lives of poor and vulnerable groups in the country. On a global scale, the impact of the virus has shown that it extends beyond the health effect by exposing and worsening socio-economic development challenges culminating in increased poverty

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levels. Therefore, the main impetus of the chapter is to interrogate the ramifications of COVID-19 in Lesotho from a poverty perspective.

A Note on Method The widespread COVID-19 pandemic presents a multiplicity of health and socio-economic development challenges for vulnerable and poor groups. Within the African continent where extreme poverty is rife, this crisis is likely to aggravate poverty levels amongst most countries due to the negative economic downturn imposed by the pandemic. In low-income countries such as Lesotho, the risk of the virus on the lives, health, and survival of poor groups is high accompanied by catastrophic consequences. Therefore, the chapter adopted a desktop research approach using secondary analysis in examining the impact of COVID19 in Lesotho from a poverty perspective. This involved an in-depth review of existing literature in the form of reliable internet websites, newspaper articles, blogs, peer-reviewed journals, books, regional and national reports, records, and any published data on COVID-19 in Lesotho. There is vast information on COVID-19 given its impact on a global scale and thus the chapter had to use authentic information sources to collect data.

Conceptualization of Poverty There is a flood of information and literature on the term ‘poverty’ but there is no universally agreed definition of what it entails and constitutes, making it a contentious and debatable terminology. The term poverty is multifaceted and therefore, needs to be defined depending on the political and socio-economic context. According to Misturelli and Heffernan (2010), poverty is intrinsically linked to the evolving development paradigms influenced by different financial, political, economic, social, and political changes that take precedence in the world. Meanwhile, Alcock (2006, 4) argues that “poverty is inherently a contested concept because poverty is not just a state of affairs, it is an unacceptable state of affairs; it implicitly contains the question, what are we going to do about it?”. Such assertions make it difficult to have a common definition of poverty that captures the experiences and lived realities of poor people. The contextualization and understanding of poverty have changed over time due to the ramifications of global political and socio-economic landscape changes (OECD, 2015). Moreover, there are so many indices that

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have been formulated globally in defining and measuring poverty such as the headcount index, poverty gap index, squared poverty gap (poverty severity) index, Gini coefficient, growth incidence curve, Sen index, the Sen-Shorrocks-Thon index and the Watts index, income-based measure of poverty, wealth index, human poverty index, gender development index, and multidimensional poverty index (Nussbaum et al., 1993; SESRIC, 2015; Shaukat et al., 2020). These have been widely accepted on a global scale as part of the efforts to measure poverty despite their varied strengths and weaknesses. So many definitions scanned in the literature survey collected by the authors, have come out of scholars and organizations from the Global North (Alcock, 1997; Lister, 2004; Oppenheim, 1993; Ravallion, 1992; UNDP, 2010; United Nations, 2009; World Bank, 2000) who provide a westernized and Eurocentric definition and understanding of the features and characteristics of poverty. However, their power to influence their perceptions within the development discourse has popularized these ideas. Thus, definitions, characteristics, and measurements of poverty have been deeply immersed in controversy, particularly in countries in the Global South that are deeply engulfed in poverty that manifests itself in different forms and types. Earlier definitions have focused on understanding poverty from an income point of view without taking into consideration that this concept is not static and changes with time depending on the political and socio-economic events and vicissitudes that would have taken place. In turn, this has influenced the development discourse and in part our understanding of the development trajectory that has shaped our ideas and understanding of the concept of poverty. International literature has conceptualized and defined poverty in two forms: absolute and relative poverty. Sarlo (2019, 3) contends, Poverty, it turns out, is defined differently depending on who you talk to. Traditionally, people thought of the poor as those who were suffering an unhealthy level of deprivation. Terms like “insufficiency” and “a lack of basic necessities” crop up frequently in dictionary definitions and in descriptions of the condition of folks living in poverty. This understanding of poverty is often referred to as “absolute” poverty. However, in recent decades, an alternate definition has gained currency, particularly within the broader “social justice” community. This newer approach to understanding poverty defines it as a condition of “relative” privation. In other words, you are poor if you are significantly less well off than most others in your society, regardless of your actual standard of living.

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The above assertion provides the foundational analysis and operational definitions that have influenced the understanding and meaning of poverty in terms of deprivation and relativity. However, these definitions have failed to take into consideration terminologies such as vulnerability and social exclusion (Development Initiatives, 2016). Consequently, in understanding poverty, this chapter has adopted the view by Jerneck (2015), which contends that poverty, apart from the basic assumptions of deprivation and relativity, also hovers around lack of opportunities and prospects, cultural marginalization, and social exclusion. This means that poverty must be understood not only in economic terms but also in social terms (Misturelli & Heffernan, 2008; World Bank, 2015a) to get a deeper understanding of the realities and lived experiences of poor people (Vinaya, 2020). The chapter suggests that there is a fundamental relationship between poverty and inequality where the latter is created as a ripple effect of the former. Consequently, the distribution of structural injustices and prevalence of unequal societies continue to prevail between the ‘haves’ (those who have means to afford) and ‘have nots’ (those who cannot afford) due to political and economic paradigm shifts that advantage others and leave others vulnerable and marginalized. It is difficult to discuss poverty without mentioning the phenomenon of inequality that has widened the gap and created disparities in satisfying access to basic needs for poor and vulnerable groups.

A Snapshot of the Phenomenon of Poverty in Lesotho According to the World Bank (2017), Lesotho has a small population of 2.2 million and it is classified and regarded as a low middle-income country. Furthermore, in terms of the Human Development Index (HDI), the country is ranked low with an average of 0.505 (Office of the Prime Minister: The Kingdom of Lesotho, 2018). Concerning the economy, the country is dependent on a myriad of sectors such as manufacturing in textiles, mining, natural resources such as water and agriculture to mention a few (Ardigó, 2014). In addition, the country is well known for its vast endowment of water resources due to its mountainous terrain that has resulted in the generation of revenue, royalties, and hydroelectricity through the multi-billion-dollar project termed the

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Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) in partnership with neighboring South Africa (Malinga, 2018). However, despite the existence of different economic sectors and a thriving water project; the country is faced with chronic poverty due to persistent development challenges such as unemployment, lack of economic opportunities, dilapidated infrastructure, food insecurity, and lack of access to health and education because of the negative political and socio-economic development landscapes. The population profoundly submerged in poverty is estimated at 57.3% (Ardigó, 2014; Office of the Prime Minister: Kingdom of Lesotho, 2018; World Bank, 2013). Households in the country are vulnerable to poverty due to some reasons such as the devastatingly high rate of HIV/AIDS, which stands at 23.6% (KPMG, 2014), unemployment, lack of income, persistent droughts due to climate change that has adversely affected the growth and prosperity of agriculture which is the main source of livelihood for a majority of households (IFAD, 2008), environmental shocks leading to the depletion of the natural resource base (World Bank, 2015a, b). However, there seem to exist disparities in terms of poverty levels and experiences between urban and rural areas, with rural areas being the hardest hit by this phenomenon (Monaheng, 2003). According to Callander (2017), 75% of the population of the country lives in rural areas with an estimated 30% living in extreme poverty. A recent report by World Bank (2019) contends that the gap in terms of poverty between urban and rural areas has widened over the years. This has seen high poverty levels amongst children, large families, unemployed, less educated, femaleheaded households, and elderly people in the rural areas (Rocchi & Del Sette, 2016; World Bank, 2019).

COVID-19 in Lesotho: A Brief Overview Lesotho was the last country to record its first case of COVID-19 on May 13, 2020, however, by March 2020, the government had already made several inroads in preparation for the advent of the virus by declaring a state of emergency (United Nations, 2020b). Just like the norm in most countries worldwide, Lesotho introduced a nationwide lockdown to regulate the spread of the pandemic within its borders and this was instituted on March 29, 2020. The lockdown was characterized by the limited movement of people and halting of non-essential services as prescribed by the 2020 COVID-19 Regulations on Public Health. Furthermore,

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the government established the Ministry of Health and Cabinet subcommittee led National Emergency Command and Emergency Operation Center (UNDP, 2020). Since recording its first case of the virus in May 2020, the country has experienced a surge in the number of cases. By September 2020, Lesotho has recorded 2026 cases with 44 fatalities and 1029 recoveries (Worldometer, 2020). In terms of finances and investment toward combating the pandemic, Lesotho has managed to secure funding from global financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Recent reports have seen the Kingdom of Lesotho receiving emergency support from IMF under the Rapid Credit Facility and the Rapid Financing Instrument totaling an amount of US$49.1 million as part of the stimulus package to fight the looming threats and catastrophe imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic (IMF, 2020). Furthermore, other global leading financial institutions such as the World Bank through its arm of International Development Assistance (IDA) have also played a pivotal role by providing credit to Lesotho worth US$7.5 million to support and boost the country’s financial base to combat and fight the spread of the virus (World Bank, 2020a). Meanwhile, the government announced measures to cushion businesses and people adversely affected by the pandemic through the establishment of financial help worth M500 million (Mpaki, 2020). The overall budget of the government toward the Disaster Relief Fund due to the pandemic was estimated at M698 million (Mpaki, 2020). The lockdown measures introduced by the government to curb the spread of the pandemic have engendered socio-economic development deficiencies. This has negatively affected the livelihoods of most of the poor in the country plunging them into extreme and chronic poverty. The United Nations (2020b) reported that the marginalized, underresourced, and vulnerable groups would bear the biggest brunt of the impact of this pandemic. This will lead to astronomical and negative economic growth resulting in increased poverty levels, unemployment, food insecurity, and vulnerability (UNDP, 2020). Before the outbreak of the pandemic, the country already faced development challenges that heightened economic downturn, political instability, and shocks related to the environment particularly the management of natural resources (UNDP, 2020). Consequently, the chapter argues that Lesotho was already under siege due to a plethora and myriad of socio-economic and political challenges that were negatively affecting the economic growth

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of the country and the advent of COVID-19 has worsened the situation, particularly those of poor and vulnerable groups.

Ramifications of COVID-19 from a Poverty Perspective in Lesotho: Findings and Discussion The whole world is currently grappling with the COVID-19 pandemic. The impact of the virus is multidimensional and unparalleled across a myriad of sectors ranging from health, social, economic, financial, political, cultural, and environmental. This means that the virus has extended beyond its impact on health by negatively affecting people’s lives, particularly the poor from a socio-economic perspective. According to SIDA (2020), poverty has been worsened by the crisis and low-income countries like Lesotho are the hardest hit by the pandemic. Therefore, this section provides an overview of the impact of COVID-19 in the country from a poverty perspective. The consensus is that poverty manifests itself in different socio-economic forms and hence the chapter presented the discussion of poverty in Lesotho guided by the following socioeconomic characteristics, unemployment, remittances, social protection, health, water, sanitation, and food insecurity.

Poverty Poverty in Lesotho is intense amidst limited resources (Southall, 2020). Since the attainment of independence in 1966, the country is still faced with an unending and persistent scourge of poverty. According to Mills and Nwokolo (2020), most of the populace living in rural areas (60%) live below the national poverty line of $1.25 per day. Even though there are several reports purporting a substantial decrease in poverty in the last 15 years in Lesotho, extreme and chronic poverty is still rife (World Bank, 2020c) with most of the population (51%) living in poverty (Lakrichi, 2020). Estimations by the World Bank (2020b) on the impact of COVID19 on poverty point out that it will increase by 0.5 percentage points. Meanwhile, estimates by the UNDP (2020) point out that poverty in Lesotho will increase between 0.2 and 0.9 percentage points. Rural areas such as the Senqu region and mountainous regions are likely to be the hardest hit by poverty which is expected to increase by 2.6 and 2.9 percentage points (UNDP, 2020). A report by the IMF (2020) contends that GDP growth in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic is expected to

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fall by −5.2%, spelling doom to the already crippled and ailing economy while worsening poverty levels in the country.

Unemployment The unemployment level is high in Lesotho and the United Nations in 2019 purported that it remained high above 20% and this has had a huge bearing on extreme poverty and income inequality in the country (United Nations, 2019). The poverty rate figure is likely to increase in 2020 due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. A substantial number of people have resorted to informal employment due to lack of opportunities within the formal sector due to some reasons such as lack of education, skills, and a declining economic sector. The advent of COVID-19 has dealt a heavy blow to job prospects for poor and vulnerable groups due to lockdown regulations that have ceased economic activities resulting in the closure of businesses and industries. COVID-19 is likely to cause job losses overburdening the already scanty job market resulting in high unemployment opportunities (SADC, 2020). Youth unemployment is high in the country.

Remittances Remittances contribute significantly to the economy of Lesotho due to the massive migrant labor force that is employed in various sectors like the mining industry in neighboring South Africa. According to Corley (2020), the contribution of remittances to the country’s GDP stands at 23%. However, in recent times the outbreak of COVID-19 has threatened the flow of remittances in the country where a majority are dependent on as a major source of livelihood. Sayeh and Chami (2020) contend that the drop of remittances is likely to affect and aggravate the social, fiscal, and economic pressures on governments like Lesotho that were already struggling before this crisis. As a source of income, remittances are used for the survival of poor and vulnerable households in the country where the income is used to buy food, ensure access to health, and the general wellbeing of families. The introduction of lockdown as part of the measures to regulate and curb the spread of the pandemic has dealt a heavy blow to income generation for migrant workers due to the closure of businesses and industries particularly in neighboring South Africa which is the hardest hit by the pandemic in the continent. Both skilled and unskilled

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Basotho have migrated to South Africa to seek greener pastures and the shutting down of borders has limited the sending of remittances coupled with the physical sending of goods across the borders (Stats SA, 2020). It is estimated that 17% of households in Lesotho are highly dependent on remittances (FAO, 2020) and in 2018 remittances received by the country from migrant workers in South Africa totaled US$440 million which forms 15.5% of the GDP (UNDP, 2020) while in 2019 there was a slight increase to 21.3% of the GDP (FAO, 2020). Therefore, the outbreak of COVID-19 has affected household income negatively thereby exacerbating poverty levels amongst vulnerable groups. The shutdown of South Africa, which is the largest source of remittances, to curb the spread of the virus resulted in 60,000 Basotho workers returning to Lesotho before the close of the borders (IMF, 2020). Several families that rely on remittances as a source of income and livelihood were negatively affected by this turn of events. According to the World Bank (2020d), remittances in Sub-Saharan Africa are expected to decline by 9% and this is inclusive of Lesotho. The importance of remittances for most economies in the Southern African region cannot be overemphasized both for household consumption and the monetary system (WFP, 2020). Consequently, increased unemployment because of COVID-19 is likely to decrease household income in terms of the amount usually received from remittance flows negatively changing the capacity of households to buy the necessary goods and essential commodities in Lesotho (WFP, 2020). A situational report conducted by IOM (UN Migration) (2020) between May and June 2020 in Southern African countries, including Lesotho, on the impact of this pandemic on migration and migrants, contends that many migrants have lost their jobs in the region and are particularly vulnerable to the socio-economic impacts imposed by this virus. Job losses have far-reaching consequences on remittance flows in the region (including Lesotho) and this has extended to deteriorating socio-economic conditions (IOM, 2020) highly characterized by alarming poverty levels. A study by Orozco (2020) purports that the outbreak of the pandemic would result in migrants sending less than 5% of the usual money sent, an undesirable situation for households who receive higher volumes and flow of income from remittances. The ripple effect imposed by this virus is that most of the households that are dependent on migrant remittances will be pushed back into extreme poverty (Ataguba, 2020; Damak & Bahtia, 2020).

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Social Protection Social protection is now being developed as a strategy to mitigate the impacts of COVID-19 in African countries (FAO & AU, 2020). Present and past epidemics such as Ebola and HIV/AIDS have drawn lessons for countries to prioritize health needs through the implementation of social protection programs geared toward addressing the anomalies such as income degeneration, loss of livelihoods, and food insecurity created by such health crises such as the current COVID-19 pandemic (FAO & AU, 2020). In the context of Lesotho, social protection is contained in the country’s constitution where vulnerable groups such as the elderly and children have been beneficiaries of cash transfer programs such as social grants to augment their income and support their livelihoods. The notion of social protection is to financially support vulnerable groups while at the same reducing poverty. In Lesotho, the government spends about 4.6% of its GDP on social support (UNDP, 2020). However, the COVID-19 pandemic is threatening social protection programs for the poor due to the halting of economic activities where the revenue for the government (through tax) is collected. Most of the funding for the government has gone to the Disaster Relief Fund which aims to address the socio-economic consequences created by the pandemic leaving poor and vulnerable groups in a grim situation highly characterized by poverty and food insecurity.

Health Access to quality healthcare before the COVID-19 pandemic has been a constant challenge in Lesotho particularly on the poor and vulnerable groups. Public healthcare is appalling leaving private healthcare that is not affordable for most poor rural communities (World Bank, 2020e). Consequently, poor households are vulnerable to the imminent health threats imposed by the pandemic due to the poverty status that does not afford them properly and quality healthcare access in case of contraction of the virus. Even though the healthcare system is delivered by the government, there are also other health actors within the health fraternity such as the Christian Health Association of Lesotho (World Bank, 2020f) and privately owned healthcare facilities. The country’s public health system is weak and therefore, a substantial increase in the number of cases can spell doom for poor and vulnerable groups (United Nations, 2020a).

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The country’s public health system is confronted with a lot of challenges such as inadequate medical staff and personnel, medicines, medical supplies, infection control facilities, and intensive care units across the country (United Nations, 2020b). Furthermore, other communicable and non-communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS and Tuberculosis (TB) are highly prevalent as well, posing a threat to the health system. Lesotho has the second-highest prevalence of HIV in the world which stands at a staggering 25% amongst the adult population between the ages of 15–49 years (World Bank, 2020d). This disproportionately large prevalence of HIV, child mortality, high maternal mortality, and malnutrition have put the public health system in ruins in the country, making it unable to cope with the size and threat imposed by the outbreak of an infectious disease such as COVID-19. In addition, inequality and poverty have been intensified by these diseases which have exerted more pressure on health costs in the country. This assertion is supported by the high widespread of such diseases on vulnerable communities deleteriously distressing their livelihoods and economic activities. Therefore, the outbreak of COVID-19 is an encumbrance of the already overburdened public health system in Lesotho. People living with chronic ailments in poor households means that their immune systems are compromised, leaving them highly susceptible to COVID-19 infection.

Water and Sanitation Lesotho is one of the few countries in the world that is richly endowed with natural resources such as water which contributes significantly to the country’s economy and GDP (Malinga, 2018). However, access to this precious resource remains a persistent problem amongst poor and vulnerable groups, particularly at a crucial time that demands constant washing of hands using water and soap to curb the spread of the virus. Water access is one of the most prudent prerequisites in combating the spread of the virus, yet most of the world’s poorest including Lesotho are experiencing the devastating effects and risks of COVID-19 on top of water and sanitation shortfalls (IFC, 2020). The World Bank (2020e) contends that the lack of essential basic public services such as water and sanitation in Lesotho poses a high risk to the transmission of COVID19. In addition, erratic rainfall patterns that have been experienced in the country in the past three farming seasons have eventually led to dwindling

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water supplies, with ominous costs on the poor to prevent the public health crisis imposed by the pandemic (UNDP, 2020).

Food Insecurity The food security and economic situation of the country have been directly affected by the pandemic (United Nations, 2020a). The closure of borders between South Africa and Lesotho has created a shortage of basic essential commodities increasing prices (FAO, 2020). Lesotho has close links with South Africa which is its biggest trading partner where its neighbor supplies around 80% of its goods and services (FAO, 2020). Even though agriculture is the mainstay of the economy, particularly in the rural areas where small-scale farming is common (Malinga, 2018), the sector has failed to live up to expectations due to erratic rainfall patterns, droughts, and lack of investment in the sector. This has hampered prospects of income generation and livelihoods amongst rural households resulting in food insecurity amongst most households. A recent report on Lesotho Vulnerable Assessment Committee (LVAC) highlighted that the country is going to face a third successive poor harvest in 2020 raising concerns about food insecurity in the country, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic era (FAO, 2020). The report further estimates that there would be an increase in people (899,287) vulnerable to food insecurity where 720,000 are in the rural areas and 179,287 living in the urban areas (United Nations, 2020b). The food situation is in a dire state threatening the survival of poor groups while catapulting poverty to unimaginable levels. The rapid number of food-insecure people is a result of a lack of agricultural opportunities, a decline in migrant remittances, and the high number of returning migrants from South Africa due to lockdown regulations that have closed businesses, industries, and jobs opportunities (United Nations, 2020b). A recent report by the Southern Africa Development Committee (SADC) highlights the dire food situation that is likely to occur in the region due to increased commodity prices, depreciation in livestock prices and sales, loss of employment, and dwindling livelihood prospects like remittances (SADC, 2020). Moreover, poorer households are going to be the hardest hit by the pandemic concerning food security due to food commodity price increases which will deplete their sources of livelihood assets (SADC, 2020). Coupled with this, households will struggle to access food due to increased food prices and loss of major income

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bases (SADC, 2020). Therefore, poorer households will fail to adapt and cope with the rapid increase of food prices due to the pandemic with children running the risk of being adversely affected by malnutrition. This is coupled with a failing and ailing agricultural sector in Lesotho.

Conclusion The main impetus of the chapter interrogated the ramifications of COVID-19 in Lesotho from a poverty perspective. It proved that the current COVID-19 crisis is a human tragedy that has extended beyond the health calamity as exhibited in the dire consequences imposed by the virus on socio-economic conditions. Low-income countries in the Global South like Lesotho are bearing the biggest brunt of the pandemic on their economies thereby worsening poverty and inequality levels. The conceptualization of poverty in the chapter deviated from the traditional definitions of deprivation and relativity to include social issues such as understanding the reality and lived experiences of poor people. Moreover, this also extended to include other socio-economic issues such as social exclusion and inequality. The chapter argued that lockdown restrictions have presented a multiplicity of challenges to the survival of poor and vulnerable households in Lesotho. Furthermore, the impact of the pandemic has manifested itself in various socio-economic development challenges such as poverty, unemployment, declining migrant remittances, food insecurity, social protection, poor access to water, sanitation, and illhealth. It was proved in the chapter that there are disparities in terms of poverty between rural and urban areas in Lesotho, with a significant proportion of rural areas being deeply engulfed in extreme poverty. Therefore, the outbreak of the pandemic is a looming catastrophe on the lives, livelihoods, and survival of rural people who are dependent on a myriad of social and economic activities for income generation that have been halted during the outbreak of COVID-19.

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World Bank. (2000). World Development Report (WDR) 2000/2001: Attacking poverty (Vol. 2000/2001). World Bank. World Bank. (2013). Lesotho: A safety net to end extreme poverty. World Bank. World Bank. (2015a). Project appraisal document on a proposed IDA credit to the Kingdom of Lesotho for a social assistance project. World Bank. (2015b). World development report: Mind, society and behaviour. World Bank. http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/773141482349928900/ Spotlight-3.pdf (Accessed 15 September 2020). World Bank. (2017). World Bank Development Indicators. World Bank. World Bank. (2019). Lesotho poverty assessment: Progress and challenges in reducing poverty. https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/doc uments-reports/documentdetail/387071576240590486/lesotho-poverty-ass essment-progress-and-challenges-in-reducing-poverty (Accessed 10 September 2020). World Bank. (2020a, April 22). World Bank predicts sharpest decline of remittances in recent history. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/ 2020a/04/22/world-bank-predicts-sharpest-decline-of-remittances-in-rec ent-history World Bank. (2020b). Lesotho COVID-19 Emergency Preparedness and Response Project (P173939). http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/240741 588234502363/pdf/Project-Information-Document-Lesotho-COVID-19Emergency-Preparedness-and-Response-Project-P173939.pdf (Accessed 15 September 2020). World Bank. (2020c). Lesotho. http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/360011492 188162534/mpo-lso.pdf (Accessed 15 September 2020). World Bank. (2020d). Overview-Lesotho. https://www.worldbank.org/en/cou ntry/lesotho/overview (Accessed 15 September 2020). World Bank. (2020e). World Bank approves $7.5 million to support Lesotho’s efforts to address COVID-19 pandemic. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/ press-release/2020/05/14/world-bank-approves-7-5-million-to-supportlesotho-efforts-to-address-COVID-19-pandemic (Accessed 16 September 2020). World Bank. (2020f). COVID-19: Remittance flows to shrink 14% by 2021. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020f/10/29/ COVID-19-remittance-flows-to-shrink-14-by-2021 (Accessed 12 November 2020). World Food Programme (WFP). (2020). COVID 19: Economic and health impacts on regional food and nutrition security. https://docs.wfp.org/api/ documents/WFP-0000115667/ (Accessed 15 September 2020). Worldometer. (2020). Lesotho. http://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/cou ntry/lesotho/ (Accessed 12 November 14 September 2020).

CHAPTER 7

The Syndemic of HIV, Gender Inequality, and Poverty During the COVID-19 Pandemic Among Women in South Africa Lentsu Nchabeleng

Introduction Multiple pathways link HIV to gender inequality and poverty. Driven by socio-economic inequalities, and deepened by poverty and the normalization of gender-based violence, HIV continues to be a long-term development challenge in sub-Saharan Africa (Gibbs et al., 2020). It has become clear that the outbreak of COVID-19 is not only a global health crisis, but the measures to contain it have plunged the global economy into a severe contraction. To understand the impact of the COVID19 pandemic, syndemic theory, which takes into account multiple interrelated epidemics, will be used to understand women’s vulnerability to HIV, gender inequality, and poverty during the COVID-19

L. Nchabeleng (B) Nelson Mandela University, Port Elizabeth, South Africa e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. Dorasamy (ed.), Governance Challenges During the COVID-19 Pandemic in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11244-7_7

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pandemic. A syndemic is “two or more afflictions, interacting synergistically, contributing to excess burden of disease in a population” (Wilson et al., 2014). Syndemic theory posits that it is the synergistic clustering of conditions, rather than the summation of additional symptoms, that influence the health burden of a specific population (Tsai & Burns, 2015). In other words, syndemic theory involves the correlation between social and diseases. This paper provides a cross-sectional analysis of how gender inequality and poverty synergistically interact to undermine women’s vulnerability to HIV during the COVID-19 pandemic. The paper employs a search strategy to review and synthesize global literature that examines the syndemic effects of HIV infection among women during the COVID-19 pandemic in South Africa. The complex nature of these factors highlights the need to develop novel research approaches to better understand how multiple epidemics interact within the key affected population.

Methods This paper employs a selective strategy literature search rather than exhaustive, prioritizing the use of cross-sectional studies and meta-analytic studies. The search strategy focused on socio-behavioral factors and interventions addressing different aspects of the syndemic of HIV among women from 2011 to 2020 using NCBI, PubMed, Google Scholar, and MEDLINE. A search strategy was conducted using the following key search terms in English: HIV, gender inequality, women, poverty, COVID-19, violence, gender-based violence, health, gender dynamics, sexually transmitted infections (STIs), interventions, and HIV prevention. Eligible articles addressed at least three terms representing key aspects of the syndemic of HIV, gender inequality, and poverty. The study also included additional references from annual reports and progress reports searched on databases of WHO, UNAIDS, USAID, and CDC for literature relating to the study. The search focused on structural factors that exacerbate HIV infection among women during the COVID-19 pandemic, not risky sexual behavior that contributes to HIV infection among women. This search strategy yielded 31 articles that were included in this review.

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Women and HIV Since the start of the global HIV epidemic, women have been disproportionately affected (Bain et al., 2017). According to UNAIDS, women constitute more than half of all people living with HIV, and HIV remains the leading cause of death for women aged between 15 and 49 (UNAIDS, 2019b). In sub-Saharan Africa, one out of every ten new HIV infections happens among adolescent girls and young women. In countries hardest hit by HIV, adolescent girls are up to eight times more likely to be living with HIV than adolescent boys (UNAIDS, 2019b). This shows that gender disparities in HIV persist, and HIV risk remains higher among women than men. It is estimated that around 50 adolescent girls die every day from AIDS-related opportunistic diseases (UNAIDS, 2019b). The Lancet Global Health presented a systematic review and metaanalysis of available data for HIV incidence in adolescent girls and young women from HIV-burdened countries in Africa between 2005 and 2015 (Karim & Baxter, 2019). The collated data revealed a decline in the absolute levels of HIV incidence among adolescent girls and young women in Rakai (Uganda), Manicaland (Zimbabwe), and among female sex workers in Kenya (Birdthistle et al., 2019). Birdthistle et al. (2019) postulate that HIV incidence has remained largely unchanged in the highestburdened communities in South Africa. HIV incidence rates have also remained high in certain high-risk groups such as fishing communities in Uganda, where HIV incidence of up to 12•4% are observed among teenage girls aged 15–19 years, and among female sex workers aged 18–24 years in South Africa (HIV incidence of 13•2%) and Zimbabwe (10•8%) (Birdthistle et al., 2019). Despite the global progress made in HIV prevention, these efforts are in danger of being reversed by the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. The COVID-19 pandemic has overstretched health systems around the world, and many are unable to operate effectively. In line with the latter view, the COVID-19 could lead to a disruption to the provision of services for people living with HIV and those at risk of acquiring HIV. Cognizance needs to be taken of the fact that disruption to the delivery of HIV services could lead to adverse consequences for people at risk of HIV infection and those living with HIV. Disruption to the provision of HIV services could affect new HIV infections and HIV-related mortality. In sub-Saharan Africa, women’s probabilities of HIV exposure, acquisition, and transmission are influenced by numerous factors such as

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infectiousness of male partner according to the stage of the disease, or presence of ulcers in the male partner in the event of unprotected sexual intercourse (Ramjee & Daniels, 2013). In some countries, women face significant barriers to accessing healthcare services. These barriers take many forms including discrimination from healthcare providers that stems from perspectives on female sexuality and poor-quality services. These barriers occur at the individual, interpersonal, community, and societal levels (World Health Organization, 2017). Existing research on health care access and use suggest that lesbian and bisexual women face multiple barriers to health care due to the limited number of culturally competent health providers trained in lesbian and bisexual health needs (Dahlhamer et al., 2016). This has resulted in negative experiences with the health care system in the form of enacted, perceived, or internalized stigma (e.g., refusal of treatment because of sexual orientation or anticipation of disrespectful provider behavior) (Dahlhamer et al., 2016). In light of the COVID-19 pandemic, women and girls continue to be disproportionately affected by the outbreak. Across the globe, women earn less, save less, hold fewer jobs, and are more likely to be employed in the informal sector. They have less access to social protection and are the majority of single-parent households. Their capacity to absorb economic shock is therefore less than that of men (Burki, 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic has prevented 1.52 pupils from attending school. Out of education, girls face a heightened risk of female genital mutilation and early marriage. Schools are a safe environment for vulnerable girls and protect them from certain abuses. Furthermore, the COVID-19 pandemic could prevent 9.5 million women and girls from accessing contraception and safe abortions (Burki, 2020). As health facilities try to contain the spread of the COVID19 pandemic, healthcare providers tend to prioritize COVID-19 cases over other health services including HIV prevention services. The lack of access to comprehensive HIV and sexual and reproductive health services means that women are less able to look after their sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) and to reduce their risk of HIV infection. This paper acknowledges that healthcare providers are faced with daunting challenges in providing health services such as a lack of healthcare infrastructure and resources. However, arguing from a human rights perspective, and taking into account socio-political considerations (Section 27 of the South African Constitution provides that everyone has the right to access healthcare) it is necessary that healthcare providers remain steadfast in their HIV prevention efforts and to ensure that

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people continue to access services they require to remain HIV-free, discrimination-free, and violence-free during any pandemic. The key question is to maintain and prioritize HIV prevention services in the context of COVID-19. This paper, therefore, posits that innovative ways of getting HIV prevention services to the people who need them must be found. This means allowing distribution centers to remain open during lockdowns, dispensing longer-term quantities of prevention supplies, and protecting community distribution points are but a few possibilities. In line with the above, critical measures needed to keep the most vulnerable alive and healthy, including measures required to prevent and address gender-based violence and mechanisms to keep a supply of critical HIV prevention commodities must be prioritized. Summarily, access to quality integrated sexual and reproductive health information, counseling, and services that include prevention of HIV, unwanted and early pregnancy, and sexually transmitted infections are critical for the empowerment of women and achieving the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 3—good health and wellbeing and SDG 5—gender equality.

Gender Inequality, Poverty, and HIV During the COVID-19 Pandemic Twenty-five years after the adoption of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, the achievement of gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls remains an insurmountable task (UNAIDS, 2020). The 2020 review of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action by the United Nations Secretary-General demonstrates critical gains that have been achieved since 1995 (UNAIDS, 2020). For example, more countries have reached gender parity in enrolling girls in schools; there has been a significant decrease in the global maternal mortality ratio and the proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel has increased over the past decade (UNAIDS, 2020). This progress review takes place in the context of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including SDG 5 on achieving gender equality and empowering all women and girls. Although the question of gender has been at the forefront of analysis and intervention in the HIV epidemic in Southern Africa (Heidari et al., 2013), women continue to bear the brunt of HIV, both in terms of prevalence as well as caring and labor obligations within families. It is also documented and widely accepted that gender inequities have

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exacerbated, and continue to drive the HIV epidemic, with gender-based violence, toxic social norms, inability to negotiate sexual practices, and other sexual risk behaviors as key drivers of the HIV epidemic (Dunkle et al., 2004; Jewkes & Sikweyiya, 2013). The gender-focused response to HIV in Southern Africa is embedded in advocacy by gay and lesbian movements around HIV in the global North as well as a feminist movement in South Africa (Matebeni et al., 2013). These movements have put gender-related aspects of HIV front and center on the national agenda. However, in recent years, the progress on gender equality has not been fast and effective enough, with some areas reporting no progress at all (UNAIDS, 2020). It has become evident that no country has fully achieved gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls (UNAIDS, 2020). This lack of progress in gender equality can be attributed to multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination, vulnerability, and marginalization that women and girls experience throughout their lives. Key concerns that need continuous reflection in terms of gender equality include the gender gap in labor, chronic poverty among women, women’s empowerment and health, and access to education. The challenge concerning gender equality is that the many obstacles that women and girls experience are systemic. This view is supported by Vyas and Jansen (2018) that although gender inequality is experienced by and between individuals, it is also a result of power relations that structure how societies are organized, laws are set, economies function, and ideologies are shaped. According to UNAIDS (2020), women still hold only a quarter of the seats in single or lower houses of parliament around the world, and reports of violence against women in political and public life are on the rise. Violence against women in public and private spheres remains pervasive. Undoubtedly, there seems to be an agreement that advancing gender equality is fundamental to ensuring the health, freedom, dignity, and liberty of all people. The situation further calls for a multisector approach to examine the epidemics of HIV, poverty, and gender inequality among women. Findings show that factors individually related to HIV risk may also have complex relations with other variables. For example, research studies suggest that gender discrimination and gender-based violence fuel the HIV epidemic. Gender norms in many cultures combined with taboos about sexuality have a huge impact on the ability of women to protect their health and prevent HIV, seek health services, and make their own

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informed decisions about their sexual and reproductive health and lives (World Health Organization, 2013). Although the HIV pandemic has been a global pandemic for more than 38 years, the recent outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has set both pandemics on a collision course (The Lancet, 2020). The COVID19 pandemic exacerbates pre-existing inequalities and threatens to halt or reverse the gains of decades of collective effort (UNAIDS, 2020). Understanding the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on poor women is crucial, particularly in South Africa. This is because South Africa’s COVID-19 lockdown regulations are likely to have a devastating impact on the incomes of women and their dependents, as many are low-income earners performing jobs in precarious, informal sector of the economy without unemployment insurance and no savings (Schotte, 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic has unearthed South Africa’s stark social and economic differences between the rich and the poor. Poverty is an overarching factor that increases vulnerability to HIV and is further complicated by gender inequalities. Poor women are often economically dependent on men. The need for economic support makes women vulnerable to domestic violence and existing gender inequalities may make it difficult for young women to insist on safer sexual practices. This view is supported by Pascoe et al. (2015) that the poorest women may have little choice but to adopt behaviors that place them at risk of acquiring HIV, including transactional and intergenerational sex, earlier marriage, and relationships that expose them to violence and abuse. A socio-economic assessment by the United Nations Development Programme in South Africa revealed that the COVID-19 pandemic has affected female-headed households the worst. Furthermore, the study revealed that female households that were more likely to fall into poverty were black South Africans (South Africa, 2020). This suggests that it is now more important than ever to accelerate action for the realization of gender equality and the empowerment of women. Across every sphere, from health to economy, security to social protection, women should be acknowledged and supported for their contributions. In the absence of a vaccine or even an effective treatment, COVID-19 has also become a social phenomenon defining almost every aspect of humanity.

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Syndemic Theory and Its Application to Understanding HIV Among Women Syndemic theory was employed as the theoretical framework that can better explain the vulnerability of women to HIV infection in South Africa because it takes into account multiple interrelated systems that contribute to the high rates of HIV infection among key affected populations. A syndemic is described as “two or more afflictions, interacting synergistically, contributing to excess burden of disease in a population” (Milstein, 2001). This term refers to the tendency for multiple epidemics to cooccur and, in the process of affecting some of the same people, for the various maladies to interact with one another, with each one worsening the effects of the others (Singer, 2009). The adoption of the concept of syndemics gives cognizance to the fact that many disease outbreaks and social issues do not exist in isolation from one another and the fact that many disease outbreaks and social issues exacerbate the effects of others already being experienced by their host. According to (Walkup et al., 2008), health problems may be construed as syndemic when two or more conditions/afflictions are linked in such a manner that they interact synergistically, with each contributing to an excess burden of disease in a particular population. Thus, syndemics include epidemics both disease outbreaks and the social conditions that influence the proliferation of the disease. Therefore, epidemic must be understood in both physiological (i.e., disease) and psycho-sociological (i.e., behavioral, social, and structural) terms (Wilson et al., 2014). In recent years, the concept of syndemic has been expanded to constitute syndemics theory, which is the overarching conceptualization that disease and social conditions not only co-occur but also interact with one another such that the sum of the effects of experiencing each of the cooccurring conditions is greater than merely experiencing its constituent maladies alone would be (Klein, 2011). This view is supported by previous research conducted by Gielen et al. (2007), Arbeit et al. (2016), and Corliss et al. (2014) on syndemics and syndemic theory as they apply to HIV. It is noteworthy that syndemics theory may be applied to understanding not only the underlying factors leading to disease outbreaks but also the socio-behavioral outcomes, such as high HIV prevalence among a certain population group. Accumulating research worldwide has documented a robust linkage between experiencing different types of gender-based violence and HIV, which is magnified among women

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and girls (Browne & Wechsberg, 2010). Although physical intimate partner violence is not a direct mechanism for HIV transmission, a recent meta-analysis of global data documents that physical intimate partner violence alone contributes to HIV infection by 28–52% among different populations of women (World Health Organization, 2013). More recently, syndemic theory has been utilized by Gilbert, Raj et al. (2015) to identify a continuum of multi-level integrated interventions that target key SAVA (substance abuse, violence, and HIV/AIDS) syndemic mechanisms. Evidence from the study suggests that genderbased violence significantly increases the risk of HIV and other sexually transmitted infections among women and girls who inject drugs. Furthermore, the study revealed that multiple structural, biological, and behavioral mechanisms link gender-based violence and HIV among women and girls (Gilbert et al., 2015). Taken together, these studies have highlighted that to address HIV effectively among women, interventions need to address the multitude of syndemic factors that affect different populations of women. With limited research having been conducted to examine the applicability of syndemics theory on high HIV infection among women during the COVID-19 pandemic, the present study represents an effort to examine this very issue in a comprehensive review of syndemic factors that exacerbate high HIV infection among women during the COVID19 pandemic. The HIV epidemic affects women and men differently, at a broader societal level, various factors influence the scale and rate of the epidemic spread such as overall HIV and STI prevalence, sexual practices, marriage, and other cultural norms including structural factors not in control of the individual (Ramjee & Daniels, 2013). The COVID19 pandemic has revealed how existing inequalities among women make them more vulnerable to disease outbreaks. Due to existing inequalities, women can be less likely than their male counterparts to have power in decision-making around the outbreak, consequently having their general needs and health, including sexual and reproductive health and rights unmet. The study acknowledges that the dominant patriarchal culture and society in South Africa exacerbates women’s inferiority and their disparate health status. Furthermore, cognizance needs to be taken of the fact that gender is often neglected in health systems, yet health systems are not gender neutral. Gender is a key social stratify, affecting health system needs, experiences, and outcomes at all levels (Percival et al., 2014).

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A gender lens is needed to highlight the specific risks and challenges women face because of deep-rooted inequalities and traditional gender roles. Using a gender lens can uncover new facts and perspectives that create stronger, more effective policies and programs. This highlights the need for the centrality of gender equality to progress women’s empowerment and health, particularly within healthcare systems. Supporting the health and rights of all women creates a positive ripple effect for everyone—lifting families, societies, and economies.

Limitations The limitations of this review stem from the limitations of the systemic reviews the study relied on for HIV syndemic mechanisms. The study only focused on gender inequality and poverty as contributing factors to HIV infection among women. It is well documented that other cooccurring epidemics synergistically interact to exacerbate HIV infection among women. These epidemics include substance abuse, depression, intimate partner violence, and childhood sexual violence. Nor did this review include other outbreaks such as the Ebola epidemic and the Zika virus epidemic, which significantly limits the scope of studies reviewed for this paper. Thus, the paper’s conclusions about the syndemic of HIV among women during the COVD-19 pandemic should be preliminary.

Recommendations and Directions for Further Research Although accumulating research has employed the syndemic theory to understand the vulnerability to HIV infection among key affected populations, there remain significant geographical and methodological gaps in research. Some research on colliding epidemics among women in subSaharan Africa, including South Africa is largely underrepresented in the literature. This highlights an urgent need for research to understand how the syndemic affects women during two or more pandemics coupled with pre-existing inequalities in society. The poor systematic surveillance of multiple interrelated epidemics continues to deter the mapping of biological, social/structural, and behavioral factors contributing to HIV infection among women. Most studies tend to focus on biological factors of HIV and behavioral factors and not focus on social or structural factors that exacerbate HIV infection

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among women during an outbreak. As most women are disproportionately affected by disease outbreaks, more focus is needed on this population, particularly women in resource-limited settings. Research is also needed on lesbians and transgender women, who remain susceptible to HIV infection, gender inequality, discrimination, poverty, and violence. To effectively study how a syndemic operates requires taking methodological approaches that allow the simultaneous exploration of disease outbreaks and the social conditions out of which they emerge (Wilson et al., 2014). Some researchers spend years focusing on a specific disease outcome, adding over variables they believe they understand the etiology of the pathology. However, categorizing research endeavors will hinder the scientific community from adequately measuring the role that context plays in research participants’ lives. Thus, there is an urgent need for research to focus on how individual-level motivation to adopt healthprotective behaviors is connected to structural inequalities, poverty, violence, and a variety of other extra individual-level factors. Further research is needed to identify the structural and behavioral intervention strategies that may best address the syndemic mechanisms linking different types of structural inequalities and HIV risks. This research should include a focus on how biomedical prevention options of PREP and PEP may be promoted for women who are unable to negotiate condom use or safer sex with violent partners. Integrated sexual reproductive health and HIV services should employ a multi-dimensional syndemic screening protocol that can promote adherence to antiretroviral treatment and access to HIV services during any disease outbreak. Such protocols should prioritize the health needs of women and promote prevention and response to gender inequalities, gender-based violence, and other structural determinants of HIV that affect women. To date, there have been numerous policies adopted by many countries around the world to advance and promote gender equality in healthcare systems, however, the implementation of these policies is yet to be seen. Stakeholder engagement and economic empowerment interventions also hold promise for preventing key HIV syndemic mechanisms but have yet to be upscaled for women in resource-limited settings during disease outbreaks. Structural interventions, including legislative, policy, and advocacy initiatives, are needed to redress the high rates of police abuse against lesbians and transgender women worldwide. Targeted efforts are also

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needed to ensure that police, prosecutors, and judges can respond effectively to gender-based violence cases among women who do not have the financial needs to afford private attorneys. Decriminalization of sex work is also critical to reducing stigma and widening access to gender-based violence services, substance abuse treatment, harm reduction programs, and HIV testing, treatment, and care. Summarily, the findings of this review underpin the need for comprehensive strategies to promote gender equality, HIV prevention, and eradicate poverty during disease outbreaks among women in resource-limited settings.

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Schotte, S. (2020). COVID-19 in South Afriva: Temporary shock or lasting poverty trap?, http://www.chronicpovertynetwork.org/blog/2020/4/23/ covid-19-in-south-africa-temporary-shock-or-lasting-poverty-trap Singer, M. (2009). Introduction to syndemics: A critical systems approach to public and community health. John Wiley & Sons. South Africa. (2020). COVID-19 in South Africa. Department of Cooperate Governance and Traditional Affairs. Lancet, T. (2020). When pandemics collide. The Lancet. HIV, 7 (5), e301. Tsai, A. C., & Burns, B. F. (2015). Syndemics of psychosocial problems and HIV risk: A systematic review of empirical tests of the disease interaction concept. Social Science & Medicine, 139, 26–35. UNAIDS. (2019a). 2018 Fact Sheet. UNAIDS. (2019b). Women and HIV: A spotlight on adolescent girls and young women. UNAIDS. (2020). Accelerating the Realization oF Gender Equality and the Empowerment of all women and girls. Retrieved 30 September 2020 from, https://www.un.org/pga/75/event/high-level-meeting-on-thetwenty-fifth-anniversary-of-the-fourth-world-conference-on-women/ Vyas, S., & Jansen, H. A. (2018). Unequal power relations and partner violence against women in Tanzania: A cross-sectional analysis. BMC Women’s Health, 18(1), 185. Walkup, J., Blank, M. B., Gonzalez, J. S., Safren, S., Schwartz, R., Brown, L., Wilson, I., Knowlton, A., Lombard, F., & Grossman, C. (2008). The impact of mental health and substance abuse factors on HIV prevention and treatment. JAIDS Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes, 47 , S15–S19. Knowlton, A., Lombard, F., & Grossman, C. (2008). The impact of mental health and substance abuse factors on HIV prevention and treatment. JAIDS Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes, 47 , S15–S19. Wilson, P. A., Nanin, J., Amesty, S., Wallace, S., Cherenack, E. M., & Fullilove, R. (2014). Using syndemic theory to understand vulnerability to HIV infection among Black and Latino men in New York City. Journal of Urban Health, 91(5), 983–998. World Health Organization. (2013). Responding to intimate partner violence and sexual violence against women: WHO clinical and policy guidelines. World Health Organization. World Health Organization. (2017). Policy brief: Consolidated guidelines on HIV prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care for key populations. World Health Organization.

CHAPTER 8

COVID-19, Poverty, and Inequality: Implication on the Egyptian Economy Monisola Omowumi Ajeigbe

Introduction Globally, records have shown that infectious diseases lead to the death of approximately 50, 000 people daily, with more than 17 million lives being claimed by death yearly (Bukari et al., 2020). In recent times, one of the infectious diseases that has troubled the world and the world leaders is the COVID-19. The disease started in China in December 2019 and by April 2020, more than 1.5 million people have been infected all over the world (John Hopkins University, 2020; Suryahadi et al., 2020). With the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic globally, several measures, such as the use of face masks, washing of hands, shelter-in-place, and social distancing, were put in place in the absence of vaccine (Morsy et al., 2020; Nicola et al, 2020).

M. O. Ajeigbe (B) Department of Economics, Faculty of Social Sciences, Redeemer’s University, Ede, Osun State, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. Dorasamy (ed.), Governance Challenges During the COVID-19 Pandemic in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11244-7_8

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In Africa, the COVID-19 pandemic appeared later than in other parts of the world when the first confirmed case was found in Egypt, North of Africa on February 14, 2020 and this triggered the spread of the disease to other parts of the continents (Morsy et al., 2020). Recently, records have shown that 54 out of 55 countries in Africa have at least one reported case of COVID-19 with the impact gradually having a devastating socio-economic crisis on the continent. Based on the increasing number of cases daily in most countries in Africa, it can be asserted, according to International Monetary Fund (2020), that there is the need for the continent to brace up for a shock of extraordinary harshness and complication that is anticipated to prompt the worst recession ever since the Great Depression (Baldwin & Weder di Mauro, 2020a; Baldwin & Weder di Mauro, 2020b). In the bid to curb the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in Egypt, the government implemented several measures, which include travel bans on international commercial passenger flights, curfew during nighttime, and restrictions on gathering, school and religious institutions closure (Breisinger et al, 2020). These measures and the partial lockdown of the Egyptian economy has been identified to be modest by the international standard as it was able to strike a balance between public health and economic consideration as the economy was able to cope under the slower pace of economic activity (Mohammed & Mohammed, 2020). Aside from the partial lockdown, the Central Bank of Egypt on March 29, 2020 gave out instructions to all banks in the country on the application of a temporary limit on daily withdrawals and deposits. This is done with the knowledge that economic shocks affected the impoverished the most, thereby creating a place for inequality. The temporary limit was also put in place based on the foresight that the country’s two main sources of income to the economy which are tourism and remittances from citizens working abroad are most likely to be affected by the pandemic concerning what happened during the global recession. The impact of the pandemic in the country was moderated to assist the poor and vulnerable. This is done by making available subsidized provisions for hundreds of thousands of struggling families across the capital. The country’s workforce informally employed and vulnerable whose livelihoods were destroyed during the pandemic were also put into consideration (Kurancid, 2020). Based on a recent forecast by the International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook (2020), Egypt has been projected to be the only country in the Middle East and North Africa region to have witnessed

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positive economic growth in 2020 which was estimated at 1.95% with the expectation on all other economies contracting (Sandefur & Subramanian, 2020). Egypt has also been identified as a budding economy among emerging economies as the country moves toward the completion of several reforms launched in 2016 (Mirette et al., 2020). Recent estimates revealed that Egypt’s economic growth has been growing over 5% in the last two years with the tourism sector recorded to have the highest revenues in 2018–19 which is a sign of stability increase for the country (Breisinger et al, 2020). However, with the outbreak of the COVID19 pandemic, assessments from Egyptian Center for Economic Studies revealed that the impact of COVID-19 on the country would likely be felt until around June 2021 because of lower domestic consumption, reduced remittances, declining travel and tourism, and outflow of capital projected to be nearly 16 million (IMF, 2020). More so, the COVID-19 pandemic is also expected to interrupt the stability progress recorded based on the IFPRI’s Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) multiplier model for Egypt as GDP is expected to fall between 0.7% and 0.8% (EGP 36–41 billion or $ 2.3–$2.6 billion) while household incomes are likely to fall particularly among the poor (Breisinger et al., 2020; Thurlow, 2020).

Problem Statement The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in recent times has made scholars and researchers address the various impact of the pandemic on the social and economic activities of regions and countries. Studies have documented several ways in which the pandemic has triggered poverty and inequality effect (Brown & Ravallion, 2020; Furceri et al., 2020; Lakner et al., 2020; Palomino et al., 2020; Patel et al., 2020) with evidence showing a significant impact of poverty felt before and during the pandemic. Estimated growth projections from June 2020 Global Economic Prospect report showed that 71 million people will be pushed into extreme poverty in 2020 with the baseline scenario and 100 million under the scenario at the downside (World Bank, 2020). The estimate implies that global extreme poverty is likely to increase from 8.23% in 2019 to 8.6% in 2020. This stands as the first extreme poverty since 1998, overruling the progress experienced ever since 2017 (World Bank, 2020). Specifically, it has been projected that COVID-19 might generate 176 million additional poor people at $3.20 and 177 million additional poor at $5.50 (Mahler et al., 2020). Regions expected to have at least 10

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million more people living on less than $5.50 per day are Latin America & Caribbean, East Asia & Pacific, and the Middle East & North Africa (World Bank, 2020). This stands as a major concern for a country like Egypt that has been rated as a rising star in North Africa, as estimates from the World Bank revealed that 60% of the Egyptian population are poor and vulnerable. This is based on the official poverty rates estimated by the national poverty levels to be 32.5% and the existence of sharp inequality across regions with poverty levels in Egypt’s poorest villages rated as high as 81.7%. (World Bank, 2020). Evidence also revealed a rising inequality triggered by the effect of COVID-19 with the gap between the rich and the poor getting widened day by day (Fathalla, 2020). One of the major consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic has been documented concerning the achievement of the UN Sustainable Development Goal (SDGs) toward ending poverty by 2030 (Buheji, et al., 2020; Sumner et al., 2020). This was supported by World Bank projections which suggested that COVID-19 will push into extreme poverty 50 million people (Mahler et al., 2020; Bukari et al., 2020). A study by Sumner (2020) showed a dismal poverty relapse scenario which has been estimated to make 420 to 580 million people poorer in 2020 due to COVID-19 pandemic impact. Given these facts and based on the objective of leaving no one behind which is within the policy framework of SDGs gives the implication that there is the need to understand and report through deeper knowledge of the drives that cause people to plunge into and persist in poverty. Based on the stated SDG objective, inequality has been documented in the literature as a potential long-term consequence of the current coronavirus pandemic (Maffioli, 2020). Inequality can reduce the poverty intensity of growth (Olinto et al., 2014) which implies that there will be less impact on the poor and other marginalized groups if eventually there will be economic recovery after the pandemic as this can leave them worse off, thus experiencing inequality than before. Therefore, there is the need to address the issue of inequality as eventual economic recovery might have less impact on poverty brought on by COVID-19 (United Nations, 2020). Hence, this study addresses the dynamic interaction of COVID-19, poverty and inequality in Egypt during and after the pandemic, in addition to estimating the nature and degree of economic outcome linked to structural issues originating from the supply and demand-side shock. This is adopted based on the interplay of one of the three context-specific factors which can be used to measure the impact of COVID-19 on any

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economy (Valensisi, 2020). This has been identified in the literature to deserve particular attention in many developing countries as it was argued to have greater significance than health emergencies (Aung et al., 2020; Baldwin & Weder di Mauro, 2020; UNECA, 2020; UNCTAD, 2020a, 2020b).

Methodology Data Sources and Measurement In the bid to examine the dynamic interaction between COVID-19, poverty, and inequality in Egypt, a vector error correction mechanism was employed with daily time-series data from when the first case was discovered in Egypt on February 14 to September 10, 2020. Data were sourced on each of the variables used from the different data banks. COVID19 data were sourced from STATISTA data bank on some daily cases starting from when the first case was first discovered on September 10, 2020, and this was what prompted the choice of time frame for other variables. Data on Poverty were sourced from the POVCALNET (2020) data bank proxied by the number of populations in millions classified to be poor. Data on Inequality were sourced from the World Bank Population review (2020), and this was proxied by the Gini Index which measures the degree to which the distribution of income among persons or households within an economy differs from a perfectly equal distribution. Structural issues as suggested by Valensisi (2020) as a means of measuring the impact of COVID-19 were used as control variables. For this study, the structural issues adopted were commodity price as proxied by gasoline price in Egypt, labor force participation as proxied by some employed persons in Egypt, value chain as proxied by one of the most important revenue-generating sectors which is tourism. Data used for the structural issues were sourced from Trading Economics Forecast for Egypt based on the 2020–2022 outlook. Tourism is proxied by the number of tourists that travel to a country other than the country in which they have their normal residence. The labor force is measured by the number of employed persons in the country who is economically active. Gasoline price is measured by the price of crude oil, the rate of refining the crude oil, the selling, supply costs, taxes, and of course, profits all along the way from production to the final consumption.

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Model Specification The study made use of the vector error correction model which has been identified as a restricted vector autoregression designed for use with nonstationary series known to be cointegrated. The usefulness of VECM is embedded in its cointegration relations built into the specification such that eventually, it restricts the behavior of the endogenous variables to converge to their cointegrating relationship giving space for shortrun adjustment dynamics. The cointegration term can be known as the error correction term based on the deviation from long-run equilibrium which will be corrected gradually through a series of partial short-run adjustments. In estimating the vector error correction models and cointegration, the following steps are required to be followed: test for order of integration, the cointegration tests, and the error correction estimation (Johansen, 1992; Juselius, 2006). Test of Order of Integration The test of the order of integration, which is also known as the unit root test, estimates the individual series under consideration. The test of the order of integration was developed to follow several procedures which include the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test of Dickey and Fuller (1979, 1981) and the Phillip-Perron (PP) of Phillip (1987) and Phillips and Perron (1988). The main function of the ADF test is to reject the Null hypothesis of unit root (non-stationary series) in the bid to accept the alternative hypothesis of stationarity. The tests are thus conducted based on with and without a deterministic trend (t) for individual series. The main equation of the ADF test can be estimated using the following regression below: yt = β0 + β1 yt−1 +

n 

βyt + εt

(8.1)

β1 yi + γt + εt

(8.2)

i=1

yt = β0 + β1 yt−1 +

n  n=1

where y represents times series, t represents a linear time trend,  represent the first difference operator, β0 represent a constant, n stands as the

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optimum number of lags in the dependent variable, and εt represents the random error term which is the difference between Eq. (8.1) and (8.2) with Eq. (8.1) including a drift while Eq. (8.2) includes both drift and linear time trend PP. The result of the difference between Eqs. (8.1) and (8.2) is written below: yt = β0 + β1 yt−1 + ∈t

(8.3)

Cointegration Test Testing the presence of cointegration between series which are of the same order of integration is the next procedure and this is done by forming a cointegration equation. Cointegration allows that if overall, two or more series move closely together notwithstanding the series are trended, the difference between them will remain constant. It is assumed that the series has a long-run equilibrium relationship due to the stationarity between them (Hall et al., 1989). If the series is not cointegrating, then it suggests that the variables have no long-run relationship which implies that the variables are randomly broadening from one another (Engle & Granger, 1987). For this study, the Johansen (1991), Johansen and Juselius (1990) maximum likelihood test procedure was employed. This can be expressed if Yt is a vector of n stochastic variable with the existence of a p-lag vector autoregression with Gaussian errors. Therefore, Johansen’s methodology can take a point in the vector autoregression based on the order p which is given by the equation below: Yt = π + i Yt−1 + . . . ρ Yt− p + ∈t

(8.4)

where Yt represents nx1 vector of variables that are integrated of order and can be denoted by Eq. (8.1), t represent nx1 vector of innovations. Thus, the VAR equation can be expressed as Yt = π + δYt−1

p−1 

τi Yt−1 + ∈t

(8.5)

i=1

where =

p  i−1

Mi−1 andτi = −

p  j=i+1

Mj

(8.6)

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To examine the number of cointegration vectors, two statistical tests were recommended by Johansen and Juselius (1990) and Johansen (1988, 1989). Firstly, the study tests the Null hypothesis that the number of distinct cointegration vector is less than or equal to q which stand against the general unrestricted alternatives q = r. The test was estimated using the equation stated below:  (8.7) λtrace(r ) = − ln[1 − λt ] 

i=r +1

where stands as the number of usable observations and the λs stands as the estimated Eigenvalue from the matrix. Secondly, the study tests the maximum Eigenvalue test (λmax) which is calculated based on the formula below: λ max(r, r + 1) = − ln(1 − λr + 1)

(8.8)

The main concern of the test of the Null hypothesis is to show that there is r of cointegrating vectors as against the alternative that r + 1 cointegrating vector. The Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) The appropriate estimation technique that can be used if a set of variables are discovered to have one or more cointegrating vectors is the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM). This technique is applied to determine the reaction of a set of independent variables to the shock from the dependent variable (Lütkepohl, 2015). The VECM adjusts to both short-run changes in the variable given the deviations from equilibrium. In estimating VECM, the lag length criteria suggest the lag to be chosen. The general form of the VECM is specified below: Yt = α1 + α2 ECt−1 + α3 Yt−1 + α4 X t−1 + εt

(8.9)

The coefficient of the error term (EC t−1 ) which is used to measure the speed of adjustment is an important parameter in the estimation of the VECM dynamic model. Therefore, for this study, a positive sign is expected for COVID-19, poverty, inequality, and number of employed persons, gasoline price, and tourism. In the bid to establish the joint effect of variables using the VECM technique, all the variables are taken

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as endogenous(Y ) and exogenous (X ) to establish the long and short-run interaction among them. The VECM is applied based on one cointegrating equation and using the Econometric Views (E-VIEWS) environment, the study estimated the OLS of six equations which are ordered by individual variables. Through the individual coefficient of the differentiated terms, the short-run effect was captured which implies that the impact of the variables was captured such that the coefficients of the VECM variables are embedded with the information on whether the past values of variables affect the current values of the variables used for the study. In measuring the tendency of each variable returning to equilibrium, the size and statistical significance of the coefficient of the error correction term were employed. By implication, the significant coefficient explains that the past equilibrium errors played a role in determining the current outcomes which capture the impact in the long run.

Result and Discussion Descriptive Statistics To examine the dynamic interaction among COVID-19, Poverty, and Inequality in Egypt, the study started with descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix of the variables used for the study. The descriptive statistics made available the facts surrounding the sample statistics such as the mean, median, maximum, and minimum value and revealed the measurement of the distribution of the sample such as the kurtosis, skewness, and the Jarque–Bera statistic. The first case of COVID-19 from 14th February was observed after two hundred and ten days of this study. During this time, the maximum value for poverty, inequality, number of employed persons, price of gasoline, and tourism was at 2, 1, 24, −0.3, and 13% while the minimum value was at 2, 0, 24, 0.3, and 13%. The data series displayed a high level of consistency as the mean and median values lie within the range of minimum and maximum values of the series. The standard deviation (SD) which measures the extent of the variation of degrees of dispersion of each series from its mean is exceptionally low, implying little deviations of the actual data from their mean. However, the standard deviation of COVID-19 was 41% indicating inconsistency when compared with other variables and by implication, it can be related to the daily increase of no of cases of infected persons. The result from the descriptive statistics also revealed 50% (3 of 6) negative and positive

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skewness of the series distribution which by implication show that the variables are skewed leftward and rightward. For a perfectly symmetrical distribution such as normal distribution, the coefficient of skewness which measures the degree of asymmetry or departure from the symmetry of distribution is expected to be zero. From the result, all the variables have their coefficient of skewness approaching zero, suggesting that most of the series used for the study are normally distributed. Like skewness is the kurtosis which provides information about the degree of peakedness of distributions and the result from the descriptive statistics showed that 83% (5 of 6) of the variables have platykurtic distribution (relatively flat-topped distribution) while the remaining have leptokurtic distribution series (relatively high peaked distribution). However, each skewness and kurtosis statistic is not the end tool for testing the statistics on the normality of a probability distribution of a series. One of the statistics used to test normality or the asymptotic property of a series is the Jaeque-Bera statistic which is computed using the skewness and kurtosis coefficient of the series is examined. The essence of testing for normality or asymptotic property of a series is formed by the assumption of series normality distribution by other test statistics like χ, t, and F, among others, which are popularly used in the estimation of the econometric model. The result from the descriptive statistics revealed that the probability value of Jarque–Bera statistics normal distribution assumption is accepted at 1% or 5% for all the series. The result of the descriptive statistics is presented in Table 8.1. Correlation Matrix The next analysis conducted is to determine the possible degree of association among the variable. The study made use of the correlation matrix and results revealed the correlation coefficients and the degree of the relationship among the variables. The results showed that Poverty, Inequality, Number of employed persons, Price of Gasoline, and Tourism showed a positive association with the COVID-19 pandemic which implies that the more the number of cases discovered, the more the variables are adversely affected. The result of the correlation matrix is presented in Table 8.2.

2.013565 2.013568 2.015941 2.011181 0.001384 −0.003814 1.799966 12.60123 0.001835** 422.8487 0.000400 210

LPOV 1.002855 1.006333 1.018728 0.000000 0.069632 −14.32639 206.8394 370,750.4 0.000000*** 210.5996 1.013374 210

INEQID 24,115.41 24,115.41 24,115.69 24,115.12 0.166027 3.05E-08 1.799945 12.60115 0.001835** 5,064,235 5.761089 210

EMPP

Note ***, ** indicate 1% and 5% levels of significance. Figures in parenthesis are probability values. Source Author’s Computation

40,505.85 21,437.50 100,557.0 1.000000 40,534.37 0.363127 1.374965 27.72162 0.000001** 8,506,229 3.43E + 11 210

COVID

Descriptive statistics

Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev Skewness Kurtosis Jarque–Bera Probability Sum Sum Sq. Dev Observations

Table 8.1

TOU 12.57406 12.57406 12.57691 12.57120 0.001660 2.18E-07 1.799945 12.60115 0.001835** 2640.552 0.000576 210

GAS −0.324172 −0.324169 −0.321561 −0.326793 0.001521 −0.004193 1.799970 12.60125 0.001835** −68.07607 0.000484 210

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Table 8.2 Correlation matrix Correlation Probability COVID LPOV INEQID EMPP GAS TOU

COVID

LPOV

INEQID

EMPP

1.000000 – 0.948032 1.000000 0.0000*** – −0.143558 −0.167248 1.000000 0.0376** 0.0153** – 0.948308 0.999999 −0.167438 1.000000 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0151** – 0.948005 1.000000 −0.167230 0.999999 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0153** 0.0000*** 0.948308 0.999999 −0.167436 1.000000 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0151** 0.0000***

GAS

TOU

1.000000 – 0.999999 1.000000 0.0000*** –

Note ***, ** indicate 1% and 5% levels of significance. Figures in parenthesis are probability values. Source Author’s Computation

Stationarity Test The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root tests are the test adopted to the stationary test of COVID-19, poverty, inequality, number of employed persons, price of gasoline, and tourism series. Through the application of Eq. 8.3, the ADF and PP unit root tests were carried out in sequential order such that estimation is done with and without intercept and/or deterministic trend. Akaike and Schwarz’s information criteria were used in the determination of the lag length of the augmenting term. The result showed that the variables are stationary at levels and in first differences suggesting that the variable selected for the study are integrated of order I (0) and I (1). The result is presented in Table 8.3. Cointegration Test The Johansen cointegration test was conducted on COVID-19, poverty, inequality, some employed persons, price of gasoline, and tourism. The result revealed that both the Trace and Maximum Eigenvalue test suggest the acceptance of the Null hypothesis under the 5% level with a positive

8

Table 8.3 Test of order of integration

COVID-19, POVERTY, AND INEQUALITY …

Variable

ADF

PP

COVID

−3.68 (0.03) ** −10.8 (0.00)*** −3.12 (0.08)* −17.6 (0.00)*** −13.9 (0.00)*** −19.1 (0.00)***

–

POV INEQ EMPP GAS TOU

163

−30.0 (0.00)*** – −56.6 (0.00)*** −3.31 (0.02)** −56.6 (0.00)***

Note ***, **,* indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance. Figures in parenthesis are probability values. Source Author’s Computation

relationship. This implies that there is the existence of a stable and longterm equilibrium relationship among the variables. Based on the presence of cointegration, the Vector Error Correction Mechanism (VECM) was conducted. The result of the cointegration test is present in Table 8.4. Lag Length Criteria The VAR lag length is used to select some model selection criteria. It is approached by fitting VAR models with orders p = 0, 1, 2…. pmax and then selecting the value of p which minimizes the model selection criteria (Lebari, 2018; Lütkepohl, 2005). The main issue about the selection of Lag is that choosing too few lags might lead to systematic variation in the residuals and in another scenario, too many lags have the product of fewer degrees of freedom. This study made use of a fit at Lag 1 according to Schwarz’s information criteria. The result is presented in Table 8.5. Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients The result from the normalized cointegrating coefficient shows a negative relationship between the number of daily cases of COVID-19 and Poverty. This implies that a 1% decrease in the number of cases will lead to a 2.09% decrease in poverty ceteris paribus. This finding supports the

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Table 8.4 Results of cointegration test Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) Hypothesize No of CE(s)

Eigen Value

Trace Statistics

None* 0.44 177.3 At Most 1 0.09 56.6 At Most 2 0.08 37.7 At Most 3 0.07 21.6 At Most 4 0.03 6.9 At Most 5 0.00 0.2 Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level. *Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level. **Mackinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values. Source Author’s Computation

Critical Value (0.05)

Prob**

95.8 69.8 47.9 29.8 15.5 3.8

0.00 0.35 0.32 0.32 0.60 0.67

Critical Value (0.05)

Prob**

40.1 33.9 27.6 21.1 14.3 3.84

0.00 0.83 0.66 0.31 0.53 0.67

Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigen Value) Hypothesize No of CE(s)

Eigen Value

Max-Eigen Statistics

None* 0.44 120.7 At Most 1 0.09 18.9 At Most 2 0.08 16.1 At Most 3 0.07 14.8 At Most 4 0.03 6.67 At Most 5 0.00 0.18 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn (s). *Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level. **Mackinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values. Source Author’s Computation

Table 8.5 Lag length result Lag

LogL

LR

FPE

AIC

SC

HQ

0 1

−928.3241 2926.982

NA 2563.041*

1.489681 1.54e-16*

8.912193 −27.89456

8.960169 −2,770,266*

8.931590 −27.81698

*Indicates lag order selected by the criterion. LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level). FPE: Final prediction error. AIC: Akaike information criterion. SC: Schwarz information criterion. HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion. Source Author’s Computation

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works of (Breisinger, et al., 2020; Kurancid, 2020; Mahler, 2020) that the more the number of cases of COVID-19, the more Egyptians will be plunged into poverty overall. On the other hand, there exists a positive relationship between COVID-19 and inequality. By implication, a 1% increase in the number of COVID-19 cases will lead to a 3.14% increase in inequality, ceteris paribus. This finding supports the estimates done by the World Bank (2020) on the impact of COVID-19 on inequality (Fathalla, 2020; Maffiolii, 2020) and how the pandemic has widened the gap between the rich and the poor. More so, with regard to structural issues in Egypt, the result on the three selected variables revealed a positive relationship between the number of COVID-19 cases and the number of employed persons, ceteris paribus. A 1% increase in the number of COVID-19 cases in Egypt will lead to a 1.58% decrease in the number of persons employed as many people lost their jobs due to the lockdown experienced during the pandemic. By implication, more people are likely to join the bracket of unemployed thereby increasing the unemployment rate in the country. The price of gasoline revealed a positive relationship between the number of COVID-19 cases, ceteris paribus. A 1% increase in the number of cases of COVID-19 is expected to lead to a 1.73% decrease in the production of gasoline. This implies that the price of gasoline is likely to increase to meet up with the shortfall in production as most revenue generated will be diverted to reducing the number of infected persons. Also, consumer spending will be affected as gasoline stands as an essential commodity to the household, industry, and the economy. The tourism sector which stands as a major revenue-generating sector of the Egyptian economy showed a positive relationship with the number of cases of COVID-19. A 1% increase in the number of cases will lead to a 1.42% decrease in the number of tourists. By implication, there will be a drop in the revenue being generated from the sector. The findings on structural issues support the findings of Valensisi (2020). The result is presented in Table 8.6. VECM and Short-Run Relationship The result of the short-run VECM revealed the error correction model used in the study. The ECM was developed by Engle and Granger in a bid to reconcile the short-run behavior of an economic variable with its long-run behavior (Gujarati, 2004). It is expected that the ECM be

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Table 8.6 Result on normalized cointegrating coefficients (Long run VECM) COVID

POV

INEQ

EMPP

GAS

TOU

1.00000

2.09 (2,5)

−3.14 (7.7)

−1.58 (4.1)

−1.73 (2.1)

−1.42 (1.8)

Note Standard Errors in Parenthesis. Source Author’s Computation

negative and must lie between 0 and 1. The negative sign implies a movement back toward equilibrium. The ECM is also known to be the speed of adjustment factor which reveals how fast the system adjusts or a shock in the economy is restored. In this study, the error correction coefficient revealed the speed at which poverty, inequality, and other control variables converge to equilibrium after an exogenous shock of the COVID-19 pandemic. By implication, the error correction term is expected to be negatively signed to indicate a move toward long-run equilibrium. The error correction term in this study revealed a negative sign, which implies that based on adjustment speed of 1069 and given the initial shock with a speed of adjustment of 11%, the error term converges. Taking the first difference of the lagged of a dependent variable, the error correction estimate for poverty, inequality, number of employed persons, price of gasoline, and tourism, that is, D(POV(-1)), D(INEQ(-1)), D(EMPP(1)), D(GAS(-1)), and D(TOU(-1)), respectively, as explanatory variables indicates that the model converges in the long run given an initial shock with a speed of adjustment of 3.7, 65, 19, 1.7, and 3.1%, respectively. The result is presented in Table 8.7. Estimation of Ordinary Least Square As a robustness check, the study made use of OLS specifically to test for the short-run dynamics of the main three variables for this study which are COVID-19, Poverty, and Inequality. The results of the OLS estimates were used to establish the behavior of the variables in the absence of cointegration or error correction mechanism. Poverty showed a positive and meaningful relationship with the daily number of cases in Egypt while Inequality revealed a positive but not committed relationship with the daily number of cases of COVID-19. By implication of the statistical evidence, a 1% increase in the number of cases of COVID-19 gives

8

Table 8.7 Short run VECM result

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167

Error Correction

D (COVID 19)

Coint Eq. 8.1

−3.71 (5.6) 0.94 (0.07) 3.67 (1.7) 6557 (3.9) −1879 (1553) −1.67 (1.8) −2.95 (1.5) 6355 (1069) 0.97 0.97 551.22

D (COVID (-1)) D (POV (-1)) D (INEQ (-1)) D (EMPP (-1)) D (GAS (-1)) D (TOU (-1)) C R2 Adjusted R2 F-statistics Note Standard Errors in Parenthesis. Source Author’s Computation

rise to a 28% increase in the number of poor people in Egypt, ceteris paribus. These findings support the work of Nonvide (2020) and Vos and et al., (2020), on the other hand, a 1% increase in the number of cases of COVID-19 also give rise to a 90% increase in inequality thereby widening the gap between the rich and the poor in the country. This supports the findings in the Vector error correction estimate, despite the magnitude of change are not the same, it reveals the same direction. The OLS result is presented in Table 8.8. Impulse Response Function and Variance Decomposition As part of the robustness check, the study examines the dynamic effects of the model response to shocks as well as the extent of the effect among the variables. Further analysis was employed using Impulse Response Function and Variance Decomposition based on VECM. The result was presented for 10 periods. The impulse response function was presented in a diagram showing the generalized impulses one SD innovations which

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Table 8.8 Ordinary least square results

Variables

OLS coefficients

POV

2785 (0.00)*** 8982 (0.49) −5604 (0.00)*** 0.899 0.898 921.2167 (0.00)***

INEQ C R2 Adjusted R2 F-statistics

Note ***, ** indicate 1% and 5% levels of significance. Figures in parenthesis are probability values. Source Author’s Computation

draw more meaningful interpretations for the short-run and long-run responses to shocks. Therefore, based on the impulse estimations, it is assumed that the first variable to appear explains the other variables but not vice versa. COVID-19, poverty, inequality, and price of gasoline indicate a negative short-run correlation from the first to the eighth period and a positive long-run correlation from the ninth to the tenth period while on the other hand, the number of employed persons and tourism sector revealed a positive correlation in the first to the eighth period and a negative correlation in the ninth to the tenth period. In the broad sense, COVID-19 pandemic shock has a large effect on Poverty and Inequality in the short term but overall, a mild effect will be experienced as the country move toward looking for an immediate solution to curb the spread of the virus. The result is presented in Fig. 8.1. Variance Decomposition The impulse response function has revealed the effect of shock of a system on an internal variable while the variance decomposition was conducted to influence individual variable’s update on the other variables showing the relative effect. The estimated result predicted high variance contribution of COVID-19 shocks in the first and second period for poverty, number of employed persons, price of gasoline, and tourism with the variance contribution gradually slowing down from the third to the tenth period. This was not the case for inequality as the predicted variance contribution

8

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Response to Cholesky One S.D. (d.f. adjusted) Innovations Res pons e of LPOV to COVID Innovation

Respons e of COVID to COVID Innovation 1.2E+28

5E+39

1.0E+28 4E+39 8.0E+27 3E+39

6.0E+27

2E+39

4.0E+27 2.0E+27

1E+39 0.0E+00 -2.0E+27

0E+00 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1

10

Res ponse of INEQID to COVID Innovation

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Res pons e of EMPP to COVID Innovation 6E+31

2.5E+36

5E+31 2.0E+36 4E+31 1.5E+36

3E+31

1.0E+36

2E+31 1E+31

5.0E+35 0E+00 -1E+31

0.0E+00 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1

10

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Respons e of TOU to COVID Innovation

Res pons e of GAS to COVID Innovation 2.0E+28

0E+00

1.5E+28

-1E+28

1.0E+28 -2E+28 5.0E+27 -3E+28

0.0E+00

-5.0E+27

-4E+28 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Fig. 8.1 Impulse response function

of COVID-19 shocks is expected to affect inequality from the first to the tenth period. The result is presented in Fig. 8.2.

Conclusion The study examined the nexus between COVID-19, poverty, and inequality in Egypt to determine the dynamic interaction among the variables. The study made use of structural issues such as the number of

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M. O. AJEIGBE Variance Decomposition using Cholesky (d.f. adjusted) Factors V ar ianc e Dec ompos ition of COV ID

V arianc e Dec ompos ition of LPOV

100

100

80

80

60

60

40

40

20

20

0

0 1

2

3

4

5

COVID EM PP

6

7

LPOV GAS

8

9

1

10

2

INEQID T OU

3

4

5

COVID EM P P

6

7

LPOV GAS

8

9

10

INEQID T OU

V ar ianc e Dec ompos ition of EMPP

V ar ianc e Dec ompos ition of INEQID 100

100

80

80

60

60

40

40

20

20

0

0 1

2

3

4

5

COVID EM PP

6

7

LPOV GAS

8

9

1

10

2

3

4

5

COVID EM P P

INEQID T OU

6

7

LPOV GAS

8

9

10

INEQID T OU

V ar ianc e Dec ompos ition of TOU

V ariance Dec omposition of GA S 100

100

80

80

60

60

40

40

20

20

0

0 1

2

3

4

COVID EM PP

5

6 LPOV GAS

7

8

9

INEQID T OU

10

1

2

3

4

COVID EM P P

5

6 LPOV GAS

7

8

9

10

INEQID T OU

Fig. 8.2 Variance decomposition

employed persons, price of gasoline, and tourism as identified in the literature. The study made use of a vector error correction model in the bid to detect the long-run relationships among the variables. As part of the robustness check, the study made use of the ordinary least square technique to assess the short-run dynamics among the variables. The impulse response function and variance decomposition techniques were employed to explain the interaction of the shocks of the COVID-19 pandemic with the explanatory variables. The study concluded that in the short run, a 1% increase in the number of COVID-19 cases gives rise to a 28% increase in the number of poor people living in Egypt while on the other hand, it gives rise to a 90% increase in income inequality thereby widening the

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gap between the rich and the poor. Eventually, findings revealed that a 1% increase in the number of COVID-19 cases gives rise to a 2% increase in the number of poor people living in Egypt with inequality giving rise to a 3% increase in income inequality. This has policy implications as to the findings from the impulse response function and variance decomposition revealed an enormous impact on the short run to shocks from COVID-19 and a mild impact on the long run. The study, therefore, recommends that efforts should be made by the government and private individuals to curb and eradicate the virus to reduce and stop the number of daily cases of the virus in the bid toward the achievement of sustainable development goals of zero poverty and leaving no one behind. The Egyptian government should put in place institutions that will work on the structural issues affected by the pandemic such as the provision of employable ventures and investments that will accommodate people that have been driven to the unemployed bracket due to the occurrence of the pandemic. Also, specific sectors such as tourism should be revamped as soon as the pandemic effect has dropped down so as increase its revenue base. Finally, the commodity prices should be revisited and another economic activity that has been affected by the pandemic as the no of cases is expected to drop drastically in the long run.

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Nonvide, G. M. A. (2020). Short-term impact of COVID-19 on poverty in Africa. Covid Economics, 15, 184–195. Olinto, P., Lara Ibarra, G., & Saavedra-Chanduvi, J. (2014). Accelerating poverty reduction in a less poor world: The roles of growth and inequality. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, (6855). Palomino, J., Gabriel R., & Raquel, S. (2020). Inequality and poverty effects of the lockdown in Europe, VoxEU.org, 16 June. Patel, J. A., Nielsen, F. B. H., Badiani, A. A., Assi, S., Unadkat, V. A., Patel, B., Ravindrane, R., & Wardle, H. (2020). Poverty, inequality, and COVID-19: The forgotten vulnerable. Public Health, 183, 110–111. Sandefur, J., & Subramanian, A. (2020). The IMF’s growth forecasts for poor countries don’t match its COVID narrative’. Working Paper 533. Center for Global Development (CGD). https://www.cgdev.org/publication/imfs-gro wthforecasts-poor-countries-dont-match-its-covid-narrative (accessed 28 May 2020). Sumner, A., Hoy, C., & Ortiz-Juarez, E. (2020). Estimates of the impact of COVID-19 on global poverty. UNU-WIDER Working Paper 43/2020. https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/estimates-impactcovid-19-global-poverty Suryahadi, A., Al Izzati, R., & Suryadarma, D. (2020). The impact of COVID19 outbreak on poverty: An estimation for Indonesia. Jakarta: The SMERU Research Institute, 12, 3–4. Thurlow J. (2020). COVID-19 lockdowns are imposing substantial economic costs on countries in Africa [Internet]. International Food Policy Research Institute [cited May 20, 2020]. https://www.ifpri.org/blog/covid-19-lockdo wns-are-imposing-substantial-economic-costs-countries-africa United Nations. (2020). Ending Poverty. https://www.un.org/en/sections/iss ues-depth/poverty/ (accessed 12 April 2020). UNECA. (2020). COVID-19: Lockdown exit strategies for Africa. Addis Ababa: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). https://www. uneca.org/publications/covid-19-lockdown-exit-strategies-africa (accessed 28 May 2020). UNCTAD. (2020a). From the great lockdown to the great meltdown: Developing country debt in the time of COVID-19. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ gdsinf2020d3_en.pdf (accessed 28 May 2020a). UNCTAD. (2020b). The COVID-19 shock to developing countries: Towards a “Whatever it takes” programme for the two-thirds of the world’s population being left behind. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/gds_tdr 2019_covid2_en.pdf (accessed 28 May 2020b).

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Valensisi, G. (2020). COVID-19 and global poverty: Are LDCs being left behind? WIDER Working Paper Series wp-73, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER). Vos, R., Martin, W., & Larbode, D. (2020). How much will global poverty increase because of COVID-19?’ 20 March. https://www.ifpri.org/blog/ how-much-will-globalpoverty-increase-because-covid-19 (accessed 28 May 2020). World Bank. (2020). Monitoring global poverty.

CHAPTER 9

COVID-19 Regulations and the Inequality Gap in Education and Housing in South Africa Simbarashe Tembo and Talkmore Chidede

Introduction On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) a global pandemic (Cucinotta & Vanelli, 2020). Many governments across the world subsequently adopted emergency policy and regulatory measures to curb the rapid transmission of the pandemic within their jurisdictions. Some of the policy and regulatory measures limited certain constitutionally recognized rights including freedom of commerce, movement, and assembly, among others, necessary to prevent the spread of COVID-19. The government of South Africa, in terms of Section 27 (2) of the Disaster Management Act 67

S. Tembo (B) University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] T. Chidede University of the Western Cape, Cape Town, South Africa

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. Dorasamy (ed.), Governance Challenges During the COVID-19 Pandemic in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11244-7_9

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of 2002 declared the state of national disaster on March 15, 2020. On March 27, 2020, the government of South Africa then declared a national lockdown and issued regulations to that effect. The lockdown regulations restricted the freedom of movement, assembly, and trade (except for essential businesses), access to justice and education as courts and schools were closed. The COVID-19 pandemic equally exposed and exacerbated fundamental socio-economic inequalities in South Africa between different races, genders, and social classes. The lockdown fundamentally disrupted the lives of the people, especially those involved in the labor market as the economy came near to a grinding halt. The challenges faced by people are intrinsically related to loss of employment for those in the formal sector and loss of income for those in the informal sector. Some policies were adopted to buffer the socio-economic impact of COVID-19 on the livelihoods of people in South Africa. However, there has not been a uniform impact as the poor and the marginalized were the most affected. The measures or policies adopted by the government of South Africa include the use of preventative social distancing, restriction of movement of people, and temporary closures of certain economic sectors (Staunton et al., 2020). It should be noted that with the introduction of the various measures, employees in permanent contracts or salaried jobs were less likely to lose their income, whereas those in the informal sector and fixed-term employment contracts were more likely to lose their jobs thereby worsening the inequality gap. This chapter provides key considerations concerning the impact of COVID-19 on South Africa focusing primarily on poverty and inequality in respect of the right to education and right of access to adequate housing.

Research Problem South Africans were restricted to their homes from 27th March as the country entered a COVID-19 lockdown. According to Carlitz and Makhura (2020: 2) “[e]very person was to be confined to a place of residence unless performing essential services, obtaining essential goods or services, collecting social grants, emergency care or chronic medication attention.” School children have also been confined to their homes for a large part of the lockdown. The government introduced various catchup plans for learners, however, these measures could not be implemented uniformly across the social divide, as a result, most poor learners find

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themselves lagging. This itself is a violation of Section 27 of the Constitution which guarantees the right to education. Equally so, it has been observed that South Africans have spent an average of 70% to 80% of each day indoors (Akinnusi, 2020). During the pandemic, the home has essentially become the shelter, the office, the classroom, and the playground for kids. This means that people are confined to those spaces. However, given the dire housing situation in South Africa, the pandemic is likely to expose the vulnerable, especially the poor and the homeless. It has also been observed that 44.5% of the population has been fortunate enough to live reasonably comfortable and secure. The other 55.5% live in poverty. (Francis & Webster, 2019). This segment of the population has not been fortunate enough to live comfortable like their counterparts. The COVID-19 pandemic will therefore have the effect of widening the inequalities that exist in the right of access to adequate housing in South Africa.

Methodology Through socio-legal lenses, the chapter examines how the COVID-19 pandemic and its related control measures have impacted the constitutionally protected rights to housing and education. The idea here is to examine the lines along which the law, which is legislation, and COVID19 Regulations intersect the society. This leaves room for an examination of the poverty and inequality phenomenon from a multi-disciplinary theoretical and methodological perspective. According to O’Donovan (2016; Ch 7), “Socio-legal studies embraces disciplines and subjects concerned with law as a social institution, with the social effects of the law, legal processes, institutions and services and with the influence of social, political and economic factors on the law and legal institutions.” This chapter, therefore, seeks to expose the social impact of the COVID-19 regulations on the right to education and the right of access to adequate housing.

Discussion of Findings a. COVID-19 and the Constitutional Right to Education The COVID-19 has affected every sphere of human life. Schoolgoing children are not spared either. Estimations indicate that at the height of lockdowns worldwide, about a 1.5 billion were out of school worldwide (UNICEF, 2020). The affected population makes

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up 80% of the world’s total enrolled learners (WEF 2020). To curb the spread of the pandemic, South Africa announced the closure of schools on 18th March (HEDCOM, 2020b). The country has since begun implementing measures for the recovery of the economy including the opening of schools. Due to the pre-existing inequalities, the impact of the lockdown has not been uniform across the education sector. It is our submission that the impact that COVID19 has had on the enjoyment of the rights to education in South Africa has exacerbated the disparities found in the general historical inequalities in the country. In post-COVID-19 South Africa, the government will be faced with an insurmountable task of addressing the inequalities that exist in the schooling system to afford learners an equal opportunity to enjoy the right to education as provided for in the Constitution of 1996.

The Historical Inequalities in the Education System in South Africa The inequalities in the education system of South Africa are rooted in the system of Apartheid (van der Berg, 2007). During the Apartheid era, there was institutionalized marginalization of the township and rural schools which were designated for black students. This created the stark realities of a divide between black schools and white schools that persist. According to Moses, va der Berg, and Rich (2017: 8), “[t]he concentration of poverty in the former homelands has its roots in the systematic exclusion of black South Africans from full economic and political participation during the apartheid era.” The quality of education offered in these communities also followed these economic and political exclusion trends. Even after Apartheid, the trends are still quite visible. Spaull (2013) argues that “while there was a sharp break in political ideology between the pre- and post-apartheid governments, many of the country’s social institutions, such as schools, continued to function as they did under apartheid.” According to Churr (2015), the pre-existing inequalities in the school environment, include the lack of quality education, insufficient funds for the provision of basic education, inadequate buildings, a shortage of qualified and skilled educators, and the inability of the school system to adapt to various learning needs. The former white communities or schools continue to benefit from a more affluent type of education and

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the formerly black schools are still fraught with poor infrastructure, lack of resources, and generally poor-quality education. According to Spaull (2013), In South Africa we have two public schooling systems: one which is functional, wealthy, and able to educate students (about 25% of public schools); with the other being poor, dysfunctional, and unable to equip students with the necessary knowledge and skills they should be acquiring in their schooling career. (roughly 75% of public schools)

In Governing Body of the Juma Masjid Primary School and Others v Essay NO and Others (Centre for Child Law and Another as Amici Curiae) para 42, the Constitutional Court observed that “today, the lasting effects of the educational segregation of apartheid are discernable in the systemic problems of inadequate facilities and the discrepancy in the level of basic education for the majority of learners.” We suppose that by the time the COVID-19-related measures are lifted, the inequality gap in the quality of education will have widened. This inequality gap will transcend into future generations and will create further inequalities in access to employment and competitiveness in the job market.

Equal Education Legal Framework The Constitution of South Africa places a duty on the state to ensure that the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights are promoted and protected. Section 29(1) of South Africa’s Constitution provides that “[e]veryone has the right to a basic education.” This right, unlike other socioeconomic rights, is framed in a manner that makes it immediately realizable. This places an obligation on the state to ensure that in its quest to control the spread of the coronavirus, the right to education remains protected. According to Churr (2015: 2405–2406), “the right to education is justiciable and the state can therefore be confronted and challenged in court if it does not succeed with its constitutional obligations regarding education.” According to Seleoane (2003; 140) “…the right to basic and adult basic education is not articulated in any conditional terms.” The courts have also had the opportunity to give meaning to the obligations imposed on the state under Section 29(1) (a) of the Constitution. In Governing Body of the Juma Masjid Primary School and Others, v Essay

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NO and Others (Centre for Child Law and Another as Amici Curiae) para 57 the Court held that breach of this obligation “occurs directly when there is a failure to respect the right, or indirectly, when there is a failure to prevent the direct infringement of the right by another or a failure to respect the existing protection of the right by taking measures that diminish that protection.” It is also elaborated that “education furnishes people with dignity, self-respect and self-assurance, and is an important basic human right on which the realization and fulfillment of other rights depend” (Churr, 2015: 2406). The right to education is also protected by various international legal instruments. As a fundamental right, education is enshrined in Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Articles 13 and 14 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). It is important to note that these instruments alongside other human rights instruments and treaties place an obligation on the state to ensure free primary school education and to make secondary education generally “available and accessible to all by every appropriate means.” This right, just like other economic, social, and cultural rights is not immediately fulfilled but is subject to progressive realization within the availability of state resources. General Comment No. 13 of 1999 of the Committee on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights outlined the normative provision of Article 13 of the ICESCR and the state parties’ obligations on the right to education. It was outlined that the state must ensure that education is available, accessible, acceptable, and adaptable. According to Normandin (2020), given the context of COVID-19 and related measures, accessibility and adaptability are of particular interest. Accessibility can be further divided into three overlapping dimensions: non-discrimination, physical accessibility and economic accessibility. Hence, education should be available to all without discrimination, affordable (primary education shall be free) and if necessary accessible via ‘modern technology’ such as ‘distance learning programs’. In addition, adaptability entails that States’ education systems should be flexible in order to adapt to changing societal needs as well as the needs of students (Normandin, 2020).

The state, therefore, bears the obligation to take positive steps to ensure the realization of the right to education considering the issues of acceptability, adaptability, accessibility, and availability.

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It should be noted that the ICESCR does not contain a derogation clause on the right to education, however, Article 4 provides that states parties “may subject such rights only to such limitations as are determined by the law and only in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of these rights and solely to promote the general welfare in a democratic society”(ICESCR). It will be shown that during the COVID-19 pandemic in South Africa the government has not done enough to ensure that education is both accessible and adaptable for all. Accessibility and adaptability issues have widened the inequality gap between the poor and the more affluent students thereby unreasonably limiting the enjoyment of the right to education for the poor.

Poverty, Inequality, and the Right to Education During the COVID-19 Pandemic With South Africa gradually easing the lockdown restrictions in various stages, school children have since returned to school. According to Mahaye (2020), the Department of Education suggested a gradual reopening of schools which it described as “Phasing in Approach.” However, the phased-in return to school exposed the glaring inequalities in the education system and has severely impacted the realization of the right to basic education for the poor. Rural and township pupils are the most affected. The schools themselves as well as teacher unions and student activists raised awareness that most schools were not ready to receive students as the hygiene and water situation did not meet the basic requirements to keep the learners and teachers safe. It was reported that “teachers’ unions had urged staff to defy the government’s orders to go back to work, claiming that the majority of schools lacked sufficient health and hygiene measures to keep educators and pupils safe” (Muvunyi, 2020). The phased return to school was announced, in a public statement, on May 19, 2020 by the Minister of Basic Education, Angeline Motshekga. It was announced that all public-school teachers were to return to work on 25th May followed by grade 7 and grade 12 learners on June 1, 2020 (HEDCOM, 2020). Schools were implored to adhere to health and safety protocols. However, this announcement caused a public outcry with various sects of the education community as well as parents raising concerns around the preparedness of schools to receive learners and comply with the COVID-19 control measures such as hygiene and social

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distancing. The National Association of Parents in School Governance rejected the government’s decision as “irrational and arbitrary” on the basis that the announcement failed to take into account “those pupils that are taught under trees, in tents, dilapidated buildings or overcrowded schools” (News24: 23 May 2020). Before the children returned to school under the staggered approach, academic work could only be advanced through homeschooling, online learning, community radios, and educational TV programs (Department of Basic Education, 2020). According to Burgess and Sievertsen (2020), “[f]amilies are central to education and are widely agreed to provide major inputs into a child’s learning.” This means that only affluent, uppermiddle-class, or educated families could afford to either homeschool their children or provide internet access required for online learning. Homeschooling requires either a tutor or parents who can deliver lessons with a decent understanding of the material. Burgess and Sievertsen (2020) explain, […] while global homeschooling will surely produce some inspirational moments, some angry moments, some fun moments and some frustrating moments, it seems very unlikely that it will on average replace the learning lost from school. But the bigger point is this: there will likely be substantial disparities between families in the extent to which they can help their children learn. Key differences include… the amount of time available to devote to teaching, the non-cognitive skills of the parents, resources (for example, not everyone will have the kit to access the best online material), and also the amount of knowledge—it is hard to help your child learn something that you may not understand yourself.

Therefore, children from poor families could not have access to materials required for homeschooling, tutors, or even internet access and smart devices to advance their studies during the lockdown. Blundell et al. (2020; 309) share similar sentiments noting, “[t]he environment for learning that parents can provide may make a long-lasting difference in the education outcomes of children, and better-off families tend to provide more of the resources that children need to develop and learn.” This has the detrimental effect of perpetuating the inequality gap across the education system in South Africa. These gaps mean that pupils from affluent families and affluent schools are doing or did more learning time

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of potentially excellent quality as compared to their less affluent counterparts. Blundell et al. (2020; 310) cite a study by Andrew et al. (2020) which shows that. private schools and the state schools that children from better-off families attend are providing more activities that involve active engagement between teachers and students. These include online classes, video chats and online chats, and are likely to be more productive than more passive online resources and home learning packs.

To date, the government has not announced any remedial action or catch-up programs for the learners who found themselves lagging. b) COVID-19 and the right of access to adequate housing The dawn of COVID-19 and regulations imposed by the government of South Africa to contain the spread of the virus perpetuated the inequalities within the realm of housing in South Africa. The South African lockdown regulations, for instance, required every person to be confined to their place of residence, unless strictly to perform an essential service, obtain an essential good or service, collect a social grant, or seek emergency, life-saving, or chronic medical attention (Section 11B (1) (a) (i) of the Disaster Management Act, 2002). These regulations were adopted based on the supposition that every South African has a house or home, which is not necessarily the truth. South Africa is home to many homeless people and crowded informal settlements. According to Naidoo (2010: 130), “…homeless population in South Africa can be roughly divided into three groups: informal settlement dwellers, temporary overnight sleepers and detached homeless people.” Homeless people and those living in informal settlements are particularly vulnerable to contract COVID-19, and thus risking the spread of the virus in their communities. The state further provided temporary accommodation for homeless people or evacuated people. According to Section 11D of the Disaster Management Act:

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1. “For the period of the declaration of a lockdown, a person refusing to be evacuated from any place subject to lockdown may be evacuated by an enforcement officer to a temporary shelter, if such action is necessary for the preservation of life. 2. The state shall identify— a. Temporary shelters that meet the necessary hygiene standards for homeless people; and b. Temporary sites for quarantine and self-isolation that meet the necessary hygiene standards for people who cannot isolate or quarantine in their home. 3. The provision of state’s resources listen herein shall be for the duration of the lockdown, and the use thereof will be subject to conditions determined by the Cabinet member responsible for such resources.” The state should provide temporary accommodation for people who have been evicted. The South African Constitutional Court confirmed this in the case Joe Slovo Community v Thubelisha Home. In Joe Slovo Community v Thubisela Home, the Constitutional Court ruled that the state was obliged to provide temporary shelter for people who have been evicted or face imminent eviction and were unable to find shelter, as the absolute priority must be the principle of upholding human dignity. The duration of the pandemic is not yet known. The state should ensure that there is permanent housing so that such affected people do not return to their informal settlements or homelessness once the pandemic is over.

Historical Inequalities in the Right to Housing in South Africa The current housing system of South Africa is severely unequal. According to Sobantu et al. (2019: 2) “despite this policy commitment, the country has a housing gap of 2.1 million while more than 7 million people have resorted to informal settlements.” This status quo of the South African housing system resulted from the apartheid system which legally ordered that non-white could not live in white designated areas but had to live in designated non-white townships or impoverished rural areas

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known as Bantustans or homelands. Africans were not allowed to own homes in the urban areas (Ntema, 2011). Consequently, Africans crowded the townships and various informal settlements. In 1983, there were political reforms that brought about some changes. The reforms introduced black local authorities and allowed the sale of state homes to Africans. However, these changes did not produce much of the intended results; protests by impoverished black communities continued demanding access to necessary resources and opportunities including housing. According to Sobantu et al. (2019: 1), “[t]he history of exclusion in the South African context makes housing inseparable and indivisible from the human rights discourse chiefly because of the elevated levels of poverty, inequality and unemployment.” The dawn of the constitutional era, 1994 brought the much-anticipated reforms and transformation in many areas of life including housing. The government introduced the Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) to enable local governments to deal with service delivery programs. The intention was that IDPs would result in sustainable new housing settlements located close to job opportunities, social services, and economic development nodes. Informal settlements have been a contentious issue, with some of them located on land unsuitable for development but close to livelihood opportunities. Nevertheless, the perpetuation of apartheid geography and spatial planning remains a concern. The National Development Plan (NDP) recognizes that South Africa is yet to achieve its NDPs objectives of breaking down apartheid spatial geography through land reform, more compact cities, decent public transport, and the development of industries and services that use local resources and/or meet local needs. Urban areas remain divided along racial and class lines, which not only reinforce colonial and apartheid legacies, but denies spatial justice to most of the country’s population.

What Constitutes Adequate Housing? The Housing Act 107 of 1997, the Breaking New Ground 2004 policy, and the National Housing Code (NHC) 2009 outline what constitutes adequate housing. The NHC (2009: 54) specifies the minimum size of houses as 40 square meters of floor area with: “(a) Two bedrooms (b) A separate bathroom with a toilet, a shower and a hand basin (c) A combined living area and kitchen space with a washbasin (d) A ready board electrical installation, where electricity supply is available.” The

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Breaking New Ground recognizes the need to build houses and sustainable communities in areas located within range of access to employment opportunities, schools, and provided basic infrastructure.

South Africa’s Legal Framework on the Right to Housing South Africa has assumed an obligation to guarantee and protect the right to housing of its citizens from international, regional, and national legal instruments. At the national level, the right to housing in South Africa is guaranteed and protected under the Constitution and a broad range of legislation such as the Housing Act of 1997, Rental Housing Act, National Housing Development Agency, Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act, 3 of 1996, the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act, 31 of 1996, the Extension of Security of Tenure (ESTA) Act 62 of 1997 and the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from, and Unlawful Occupation (PIE) Act 19 of 1998. Section 26 of the Constitution provides: 1. Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. 2. The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realization of this right. 3. No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions. In terms of this provision, the state is obliged to take reasonable legislative and other measures within its available resources to achieve the progressive realization of this right. Section 26 provides for a degree of security of tenure by protecting persons against eviction or the demolition of one’s home without an order of court made after considering all relevant circumstances. In addition to the right to housing, through Section 28, the Constitution protects by establishing the rights of children to basic shelter, and through Section 25 entrenching property rights and providing that no one may be deprived of property except in terms of the law. The Constitution further enjoins courts, tribunals, or forums to consider international

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law when interpreting the Bill of Rights. It is for this reason that the international law on the right to housing is worth highlighting. The right to adequate housing is guaranteed in various international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). Article 25 (1) of UDHR provides that “everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care.” Article 11 of the ICESCR provides for the “right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.” The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights does not expressly provide for the right to housing but rights linked to adequate housing including the right to property in Article 14, right to best attainable state of physical and mental health in 16 and protection of the family in Article 18(1). The South African Human Rights Commission (2016) underscores: Although the right to housing or shelter is not explicitly provided for under the African Charter, the corollary of the combination of the provisions protecting the right to enjoy the best attainable state of mental and physical health, the right to property, and the protection accorded to the family, forbids the wanton destruction of shelter because when housing is destroyed, as property, health, and family life are adversely affected. It is thus noted that the combined effect of articles 14, 16 and 18 (1) reads into the Charter a right to shelter or housing.

The Constitutional Court Government of South Africa v Grootboom, access to adequate housing is intrinsically linked to some other crosscutting rights. These include rights such as the right to public participation, equality, human dignity, and access to information. There is an indisputable link between the right to adequate housing and other rights. The core protections provided by the right to housing, as well as the right to health and the right to food, are so fundamental to human dignity and the preservation of life that they can never be suspended, even in a state of emergency. In this context, states must address the housing needs of homeless people on an urgent and priority basis to ensure their equal protection against the virus and the protection of the broader population.

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The measures introduced by the government to curb the COVID-19 pandemic depend on the availability of housing for people to maintain social distance, self-isolate, and adhere to curfews. These measures have not considered the plight of the poor or those who find themselves lacking access to adequate housing. The poor therefore remain vulnerable and lockdown measures have increased their risk of contracting the virus either from overcrowding or due to lack of adequate sanitation required for the regular washing of hands. Sharif and Farha (2020) argue, At the most extreme, people experiencing homelessness must choose between sleeping rough or in shelters where physical distancing and adequate personal hygiene are almost impossible. Homeless populations and people living in inadequate housing often already suffer from chronic diseases and underlying conditions that make COVID-19 even more deadly.

The issue of housing is at the center of all preventive measures instituted by the government and yet most of the poor now find themselves confined to their small spaces thereby increasing their vulnerability. It would be interesting in the future to observe quantitative studies illustrating the impact of COVID-19 on either the poor or homeless people. The government should be commended for issuing regulations that prevent any evictions during COVID-19. However, this regulation is not easily enforceable, especially for the poor who are either unaware of such protection or simply cannot afford a lawyer.

Conclusions and Recommendations COVID-19 pandemic will leave glaring inequalities in South Africa. Even though these inequalities are historical, COVID-19 has either exposed them for all to see or it has exacerbated them. In instituting COVID19 Regulations and control measures, the government did not consider this reality. The approach used in education was a “one size fits all” and the approach in respect of access to adequate housing simply ignored the plight of the poor, especially the homeless. It is recommended that the post-COVID-19 recovery plan should consider the inequalities in education. The government should devise a plan that caters to all, and no one should be left behind in the catch-up

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processes. The government of South Africa should consider global health threats and devise a remote learning strategy that caters to all learners. The government needs to ensure that there are varied teaching delivery methods, with each method designed to suit the conditions of all learning environments. The curriculum should be made flexible and be able to adapt to all learning needs. There needs to be an investment in telecoms and telecoms infrastructure which will help remove structural obstacles currently creating an unequal enjoyment of the right to education. In respect of the right of access to adequate housing and the existing inequalities, it is recommended that the government place housing at the center of COVID-19 control measures. It was shown that access to adequate housing allows for the effective implementation of hygienic measures such as regular hand washing as well as maintenance of social distancing. The current squalor conditions in informal settlements leave the poor vulnerable to the pandemic.

References Akinnusi, T. (2020). ‘The state must prioritise a residential housing construction programme’ Mail and Guardian. 19 July 2020. available at https://mg.co.za/opinion/2020-07-19-the-state-must-prioritise-a-res idential-housing-construction-programme/ [Accessed 9 October 2020] Andrew, A., Cattan, S., Costa-Dias, M., Farquharson, C., Kraftman, L., Krutikova, S., Phimister, A., & Sevilla, A. (2020). Learning during the lockdown: Real-time data on children’s experiences during home learning. Blundell, R., Costa Dias, M., Joyce, R., & Xu, X. (2020). COVID-19 and Inequalities. Fiscal Studies, 41(2), 291–319. Burgess, S. and Sievertsen, H. H., (2020). Schools, skills, and learning: The impact of COVID-19 on education. VoxEu. org, 1. Carlitz, R. D., & Makhura, M. N. (2020). Life under lockdown: Illustrating tradeoffs in South Africa’s response to COVID-19. World Development, 137 , 105168. Chürr, C. (2015). Realisation of a child’s right to a basic education in the South African school system: Some lessons from Germany. Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal/potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad, 18(7), 2405–2455. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Cucinotta, D., & Vanelli, M. (2020). WHO declares COVID-19 a pandemic? Acta Bio-Medica: Atenei Parmensis, 91(1), 157–160. Department of Housing. (2004). “‘Breaking New Ground’—A Comparative Plan for the Development of Sustainable Human Settlements.”

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Department of Human Settlements. (2009). The National Housing Code. Pretoria: Government Printers. Francis, D., & Webster, E. (2019). Poverty and inequality in South Africa: Critical reflections. Development Southern Africa, 36(6), 788–802. Government of South Africa v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC). Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School & Others v Essay N.O. and Others (CCT 29/10) [2011] ZACC 13 Housing Act 107 of 1997 Joe Slovo Community v Thubelisha Home (CCT 22/08) ZACC 16; 2009 (9) BCLR 847 Keki´c, D. & Miladinovi´c, S., (2016). Functioning of educational system during an outbreak of acute infectious diseases. Retrieved from: https://www.resear chgate.net/publication/309728224. Mahaye, N. E. (2020). The impact of COVID-19 pandemic on education: Navigating forward the pedagogy of blended learning. Research online. Moses, E., Van Der Berg, S., & Rich, K. (2017). A society divided: How unequal education quality limits social mobility in South Africa. Synthesis report for the Programme to Support Pro-Poor Policy Development (PSPPD). Stellenbosch. Muvunyi, F. (2020). Coronavirus: South Africa’s social divide and economic woes exposed Available at https://www.dw.com/en/coronavirus-south-africas-soc ial-divide-and-economic-woes-exposed/a-53739914 Naidoo, V. (2010). Government responses to street homelessness in South Africa. Development Southern Africa, 27 (1), 129–141. National Housing Code 2009 News24. 23 (2020, May) Parents, Cosas join forces to stop govt’s ‘irrational’ reopening of schools available at https://www.news24.com/news24/southa frica/news/parents-cosas-join-forces-to-stop-govts-irrational-reopening-ofschools-20200523 Normandin, A., (2020). Ensuring the right to education in times of COVID19. Available at https://leidenlawblog.nl/articles/ensuring-the-right-to-edu cation-in-times-of-COVID-19 [Accessed 7 September 2020] Ntema, L. J. (2011). “Self-Help Housing in South Africa: Paradigms, Policy and Practice.” PhD thesis, University of the Free State O’Donovan, D., (2016). Socio-Legal Methodology: Conceptual Underpinnings, Justifications and Practical Pitfalls. Legal research methods: Principals and practicalities. Organization of African Unity (OAU), African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“Banjul Charter”), 27 June 1981, CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) RSA (Republic of South Africa). (2011).National Development Plan 2030. Pretoria: National Planning Commission (NPC), Office of the Presidency.

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Seleoane, M. (2003). The right to education: Lessons from Grootboom. Law, Democracy & Development, 7 (1), 137–169. Sharif, M. M., & Farha, L. (2020). Housing is both a prevention & cure for COVID-19. Inter Press Service (13 May 2020) Available at http://www.ipsnews.net/2020/05/housing-prevention-cure-COVID-19/ [Accessed 7 September 2020] Sobantu, M., Zulu, N., & Maphosa, N. (2019). Housing as a basic human right: A reflection on South Africa. Southern African Journal of Social Work and Social Development, 31(1), 1–18. South African Human Rights Commission ‘Access to Adequate Housing.’ (2016) Available at https://www.sahrc.org.za/index.php/focus-areas/accessto-justice-adequate-housing/access-to-adequate-housing#:~:text=The%20r ight%20of%20access%20to%20adequate%20housing%20is%20provided%20u nder,may%20be%20evicted%20from%20their [Accessed 10 September 2020] Spaull, N., (2013). Poverty & privilege: Primary school inequality in South Africa. International Journal of Educational Development, 33(5), pp. 436– 447.https://nicspaull.com/2014/01/12/education-in-sa-still-separate-andunequal-extended-version-of-citypress-article/ Staunton, C., Swanepoel, C. and Labuschagine, M., (2020). Between a rock and a hard place: COVID-19 and South Africa’s response. Journal of Law and the Biosciences. The Department of Basic Education 30 April 2020 Statement by The Minister of Basic Education, Mrs Angie Motshekga on The Basic Education Sector Recovery Plans for The Reopening of Schools, Following The COVID-19 Lockdown Adjustment of Regulations. Available at https://kfmulaudzi.files.wordpress.com/2020/05/3rd-COVID-sta tement-by-minister-of-basic-education-30042020-e-final.pdf The Head of Education Committee (HEDCOM) (2020a). Basic Education on official closure of schools for Teachers and Administration Officials. 18 March 2020a. The Head of Education Committee (HEDCOM). (2020b). South Africa. Framework for a Curriculum recovery plan—post COVID-19. 11 April 2020b. UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III) UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16. (1966, December). United Nations. Treaty Series, 993, 3. UNICEF. (2020, August). COVID-19: “At least a third of the world’s schoolchildren unable to access remote learning during school closures, new report says.” Available at https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/COVID-19least-third-worlds-schoolchildren-unable-access-remote-learning-during

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CHAPTER 10

Double Tragedy’! Poverty and Inequality as Sources of Community Fragility During COVID-19 Lockdown in Zimbabwe’s Urban Spaces Kwashirai Zvokuomba and Dean Masimba Marunza

Introduction The history of influenza pandemics, stretching from the 1889 flu outbreak, the Spanish flu of 1918 to 1919, the Asia flu of 1957, the Hong Kong flue of 1968, to the most recent H1N1 and Zika viruses, has shown that epidemiologically, the world has been an unsafe place. Unlike the previous epidemics, Coronavirus, known as COVID-19, despite its similar characteristics with its predecessors, has managed to bring the

K. Zvokuomba (B) Department of Sociology, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] D. M. Marunza International Relations Department, Portsmouth University, Portsmouth, UK

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. Dorasamy (ed.), Governance Challenges During the COVID-19 Pandemic in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11244-7_10

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world economies to a halt. This paper is part of a broad range of critical examinations of how communities and economies were affected by the pandemic, especially the poor urban communities which already had elevated levels of social, political, and economic fragility. This study used an ethnographic survey, guided by Giddens’ (1984) theory of structuration and agency to reflect at the various levels of fragilities within the context of COVID-19 lockdown measures. The first part of the data presentation and analysis discusses the political environment in the highdensity suburbs of Harare and the implications of lockdown measures which the government used as a scapegoat to pursue its own politically motivated measures. The paper goes on to review the food crisis and the political economy of the informal livelihoods and how all this was connected to the poor housing and the health delivery systems. Thus, the study concluded that COVID-19 strict lockdown measures forced the poor to deploy multifarious strategies for their survival as ‘agency’.

Justification of the COVID-19 Study Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 epidemic, a plethora of studies (Kavanagh, 2020; Rubin & Wesseley, 2020; Webster, 2020) focusing on the virology, epidemiology, and clinical aspects of the virus were commissioned. Many other socio-medical studies were already in existence since the advent of medical anthropology and sociology. Thus, the COVID19 outbreak was not the first major international pandemic, for there were many others including the 1918 Spanish flue, the Ebola outbreaks in Central and West Africa and many others of varying magnitudes including cholera and typhoid outbreaks in Zimbabwe. However, there is a dearth of social science literature on these major influenza outbreaks. The 1918 Spanish flue only got social commentaries instead of in-depth investigations. This article does not only provide a new perspective on a new epidemic but also sets out to provide field-based evidence on the implications of COVID-19 on poor Zimbabwean urbanites. The study reflects on how COVID-19 altered most aspects of the social, political, and economic wellbeing of Harare’s high-density urbanites. In a broad sense, the study of the COVID-19 epidemic as a socio-medical, political, and economic phenomenon opened a window to reflect on the politics of health, wellness, and disease within a context of novel lockdowns and quarantines. These allow scholars to raise questions on human rights and the dignity

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of the citizenry by the state. The COVID-19 outbreak brought aboard the whole community of nations under a generic form of quarantine and confinement as economies were brought to a grinding halt by a unique biological phenomenon with socio-political and economic implications that deserve diverse research lenses.

Contextualization A multiplicity of scholarship on urbanization and urbanism (Musemwa, 2012; Chiumbu & Musemwa, 2012; Yoshikuni, 2007; Potts, 2012; Dube & Chirisa, 2012; Tevera & Chikanda, 2000; Madaka, 1995) acknowledge that the growth of Salisbury later named Harare, developed a hierarchy of urban sites reflected in present urban planning settings. On one side, there are low-density suburbs, which are on the general northeast side where residential locations such as Borrowdale, Mt Pleasant, Greendale, and Marlborough are located. On the southwestern end are the high-density suburbs, Yoshikuni (2007) called the former ‘native locations’ created by a colonial government to contain and manage African people. This study’s interest was the former ‘native locations’ and its characteristics of overcrowding, poor social amenities, and sanitation services. As a way of controlling inflows of the black population into the urban spaces, the colonial governments introduced restrictions and ‘passes’ for residents, non-pass holders were arrested and sent out of the town. Chigudu’s (2020) acknowledges the introduction of these social control systems as an attempt to introduce ‘orderliness’. However, the author only reflected on the heavy-handedness of the colonial governments. The assumption was that at independence, all aspects of urban life witnessed many positive changes. Musemwa (2012) describes population growth in the high-density locations as ‘galloping urbanism’ and that little was done particularly to upgrade Mbare flats, the Joburg Lines section, parts of Mufakose, Mabvuku, and St Mary residential high-density suburbs. The 1930s– 1940s type of accommodation remains standing up to the present day. The massive rural to urban migration led to the creation of informal structures around the high-density suburbs, which again attracted new evictions and restrictions by the post-independence government. Musemwa (2012) has summed this up as the former ‘Sunshine City’ turned into ‘a landscape of disaster’ regarding water, accommodation, and other social services. Similar developments happened in Nairobi, Lagos, Cairo,

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Mumbai, and Cape Town to mention a few cities (Potts, 2012). About the outbreak of Ebola in West Africa, Anderson and Beresford’s (2016) highlight and argue that there is the embeddedness of disease in fragile political and economic systems. Thus, the fragile Zimbabwean political and economic systems were a recipe for disaster as the COVID-19 pandemic went viral.

Methodological and Theoretical Geographies Located within the qualitative research design and grounded in the social constructivist paradigm, the study captured peoples’ social realities through the engagement of inductive reasoning as an epistemological philosophy. This was done by using in-depth interviews and recording of life biographies using both notebooks and audio recorders. These were triangulated by researcher observations and transact walks across the suburbs. Twenty research participants, five from each suburb, with additional five key informants, were selected for the study. In the suburbs of Mbare, Highfields, Mufakose, Mabvuku, and St Mary, residents gave their life experiences, which were aided by a perusal of archival and other secondary data sources from the Harare City Council Archives. This helped in historicizing and exploring the research problem and brought out how communities were not only affected but how they also responded to the COVID-19 lockdown measures. Thus, we approached the data generation processes and used the concept of multiple ontologies as we appreciated that interlocutors’ realities that they differed from household to household and from suburb to suburb as well as among individuals. There was the acknowledgment that lockdowns particularly the aspect of quarantines and self-isolation affected not only the movements of people but the psycho-social support systems of people, their general wellbeing, their ubuntu and economic wellness, hence, their realities were reviewed differently. As such we purposively targeted the research participants of Mbare the oldest residential area in Harare and others around the wider Harare geographical area focusing on overcrowded forms of accommodation which turned out to be dormitory type regarded by Yoshikuni (2007) as the former ‘single and bachelor quarters’. Describing them Tevera and Chikanda (2000: 37) said, ‘the hostels are single-roomed, and occupants use communal toilets situated in the middle of the block’ and these are still run by the Harare City Council Housing Department. Thus, the interviews were conducted at the hostels or inside the

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rooms. Research participants would narrate their brief background and experiences of living in a lockdown setting in the context of the type of accommodation and livelihoods. The study was guided by the structuration and agency theory located in Giddens (1984) sociological ideas of how relationships between individuals and social forces are intertwined. It is premised on the view that that relationship influences individual behavior patterns. In this article, we utilized Chipenda’s (2012) conceptualization of agency as the ability of an individual to work independently and make his own choices. Thus, we argue that structuration and agency as a theoretical framework made it feasible to appreciate and understand how residents in the said suburbs of Harare responded to COVID-19 lockdowns within the general context of the globe. Individuals and groups deployed acceptable and non-acceptable strategies, mechanisms, and behaviors to survive in an unfriendly environment characterized by a shortage of food and limited spaces to manipulate livelihoods. Thus as ‘agency’ residence utilized their capacities to survive, deploying innovations using the available social structures and breaching the lockdown regulations in defiance of the same social systems.

COVID-19 Epidemic and Political Fragility This part of this paper holds the thesis that around the world, compromised states struggle to balance the COVID-19 lockdown measures with draconian controls and curfews. We reflect and regard it as the COVID19 lockdown question. In this paper, we adopt the (Mcloughlin, 2012) definition of political fragility as a form of statehood in which there are not only low levels of government performance in providing human security, but sometimes lack the institutional capacity to provide basic services to the population. Therefore, these circumstances at a higher level may leave a big political vacuum which results in a failed state. We acknowledge and argue that in the Zimbabwean case, pockets of political fragility existed, and it became difficult to hold on to a rigid definition of a fragile state. However, due to the amount of violence and human rights abuse committed against perceived political opponents by the state as it took advantage of the COVID-19 lockdown measures, the term ‘fragile state’ in this context revealed different patterns of fragility and vulnerability on both the state and the community.

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During the peak period of the international COVID-19 lockdown, early to mid-2020, international news channels including CNN reported that Brazilian President Bolsonaro was widely criticized for using the COVID-19 induced lockdown to fire senior police officers and members of the judiciary who were leading a state capture and corruption investigation on his family. On the other side, the Chinese government also used the COVID-19 lockdown to end the ‘One country two systems’ policy on Hong Kong through a continued crackdown on pro-democracy movements and protestors. In Africa, the Egyptian president Fattah El Sisi used the COVID-19 outbreak to amend emergency powers further entrenching and strengthening the military’s grip on power. In all these cases, a common denominator was the clampdown on human rights, with the rights to protest, assembly, and freedom of speech all under attack. In our study, where the scales had already tipped toward authoritarianism before the emergence of COVID-19, we argue that the onset of COVID19 Lockdown provided cover for the further consolidation of power and abuse of human rights by the ruling elite. We further argue that a legitimate cause for the strengthening of public health was being used to mask and justify a state-led crackdown on opposition dissent. The government of Zimbabwe’s shocking campaign to persecute political opponents ramped up once again during the COVID-19 lockdown measures. Journalists, members of the opposition, and human rights activists were arbitrarily arrested on trumped-up allegations instituted under the guise of enforcing COVID-19 lockdown. The News Day Newspaper of 14 May 2020 reported the arrest of three members of the main opposition MDC Alliance party, Joana Mamombe, Cecilia Chimbiri, and Netsai Marova at a joint military and police checkpoint for violating lockdown orders. All three women reported subsequently being abducted, tortured, and sexually assaulted despite government officials publicly mooting wild theories claiming that the allegations were fabricated, and are a manifestation of a mysterious ‘third force’. The same also happened to a whistle-blowing journalist, Hopewell Chin’ono who had led a successful media campaign against corruption through which he exposed government and ‘First Family’ corruption involving government COVID-19 resources. The whistleblowing had led to the arrest and dismissal of the then Minister of Health, however, the journalist cum political activist Hopewell Chin’ono and opposition political party activist Jacob Ngaribvume were arrested on allegations of ‘incitement to participate in public violence’ (Guardian Newspaper 30 July 2020).

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The Zimbabwe branch of the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) has also documented several cases of torture and harassment of journalists and media personnel critical of government operations during the COVID-19 lockdowns. Field-based evidence from Harare’s high-density suburbs revealed and pointed to the issue of orchestrated persecution of those with opposing views. About the above, a twentyyear-old man stated categorically why he would not question government positions and participate in politics. He said, Ini zve politics handidi, unofa urimudiki, regai vakuru vadziite. Isu tichirikudawo upenyu. (Politics is dirty, you die young. Let the old people engage in it, at least they have experienced life more than us).

These common comments expressed fear of state brutality by security agencies not only by the youth but by the general populace. Political sociologists use it to explain voter apathy in elections. With regards to the previously mentioned, Raftopoulos (2012) posits that in Zimbabwe, the devastating effects of brutalizing the populace by security agents are compounded by a form of ‘state capture’ by the ruling political party that eventually enjoys subtle control even over the judiciary such that court decisions on political cases are subjective. Thus, the onset of Lockdown in Zimbabwe presented the country’s authoritarianist system with lesser scrutiny and public watch in which transparency and accountability were compromised. It, therefore, was evident that the Zimbabwean government deployed COVID-19 lockdown doubly to consolidate imperial power and hide behind following COVID-19 international health guidelines. Even Chan’s (2020) commentary on Zimbabwe under lockdown highlighted the issue of unjustified brutality over those with divergent views especially members of the opposition, independent media, and civil sector. In his view, the heavy-handedness of the state in Zimbabwe cannot help the country manage the global COVID-19 pandemic, nor could it fix the flawed economic situation characterized by hyperinflation and elite corruption. We argue therefore that COVID-19 in Zimbabwe unlike in other parts of the world where it was only a health crisis, it was a livelihoods crisis, food insecurity, sanitation crisis, unemployment and more so known for the looting of COVID-19 resources by the elite and an opportunity to exhibition and entrench authoritarianism by the state.

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‘What Do We Eat’? Food Crisis in Urban Spaces Under COVID-19 Lockdown Measures The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic triggered a food crisis for many in the world but worsened in countries like Zimbabwe which already had food security fragilities. According to the World Food Programme (WFP, 2020) report, the COVID-19 pandemic doubled the number of people exposed to food insecurity and severe or acute hunger from 175 million to almost 265 million globally. While COVID-19 originated as a health emergency, its impact on food security provided fertile ground to further marginalize the vulnerable groups. While the latest response from the government, in terms of administration of lockdowns partially addresses the spread of the virus through limiting interactions of humans, it turned its back on the already existing crisis of poverty and food security. Lockdowns and restricted movements posed an enormous impact on the households’ ability to earn money for the purchase of food particularly in urban areas and limited access to adequate nutritious food, especially for the poor. The absence of humanitarian aid and government agencies that provide food to the urban poor has always been worrisome. In the period preceding the onset of the COVID-19 lockdown, the ‘face’ of the food crisis was characterized by acute shortages of the staple maize meal and other basic commodities such as cooking oil, bread, and sugar for both urban and rural communities. The closure of major industries together with the shutdown of all major ports of entry through which food was imported into the country, worsened the scarcity of basic commodities and resulted in a spike in prices. Nevertheless, the glaring catastrophe under COVID-19 was worsened by the shutting down of ‘green markets’ and the popular Mbare Market where farmers from all regions supplied the urbanites with farm produce. This was part of the Harare food security system. Farmers’ failure to provide the most needed commodities resulted in a food crisis for residents in lockdowns. As has been discussed above, most residents in high-density suburbs for example Mbare, earn their livelihoods from street vending or street trade. They buy and sell any commodity on demand, hence, such residential areas evolved into ‘trade centers’. Thus, many people from other sections of the city visit these areas to replenish their food reserves was also stopped. Our field visits when the lockdowns were slightly relaxed showed that women-headed households and those with many orphans and the

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disabled were the most affected. Those with physical challenges who had previously become street traders in the corners of the Harare suburbs retreated into their homes. Food insecurity became a lived reality and a daily experience such that one grandmother retorted the following: What we eat with my grandchildren here comes from what we get from our ‘business’ activities individually and as a family. I sell vegetables and tomatoes at the corner of the street there. My older grandchildren hassle around and in the end, bring something home. The other one is a tout at the bus terminal, which is not functional. Therefore, lockdown means no food for us so we wait for starvation to death

The research has established that humanitarian aid from international agencies was targeting rural communities before the COVID-19 outbreak and by the time of our field visit, there was nothing spared for the urban poor in the former ‘native locations’ hence they were pushed to what Rutherford (2017) regarded as the ‘margins of the margins’. Neither the government nor the humanitarian agencies were able to provide basics to the vulnerable groups in Harare. Our interviews established that individuals and households went out of the way to devise strategies and methods of circumventing detection by law enforcement agents to scavenge for food resonating with Giddens (1984) theory of agency. Such maneuvers exposed many residents in high-density suburbs to infections as they transversed the local spaces looking for food and exposed themselves to harassment by law enforcement agents. The COVID-19 lockdown measures equally ‘locked out’ farmers in their rural spaces such that they could not bring agricultural products to the urban markets. Mbare green market serves the greater Harare with perishable agricultural produce but during this period such activities could not take place. Lockdown measures immobilized the access of fresh food including staple cereals and vegetables. We, therefore, argue that the militarized enforcements of lockdown in Harare did not only expose residents to infections but to eating foods unsuitable for human consumption as well as abuse by law enforcement agencies. We witnessed harassment of desperate people by law enforcement agents and read stories from local newspapers including personal testimonies.

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‘Hydrology of Despair’ Health, Water, and Sanitation In Zimbabwe, a modernized water and sanitation, as well as the health delivery system which focused on curative care, has always had an urban bias Gumbo (1995). Over the years, Harare the capital of Zimbabwe remained unchanged as it continued to have the colonial legacies hang around it with only two central government hospitals servicing the whole city and two local council hospitals too. From the time of ESAP in the early 1990s to the 2000s when Zimbabwe’s international relations plummeted due to a chaotic land reform that targeted white-owned farms, (Moyo, 2010), the health delivery system deteriorated to low levels with the lowest just before and during the COVID-19 outbreak when medical staff stopped offering their labor. Our visit to the hospitals and interviews of the few medical personnel revealed that it was not only the problem of remuneration that affected the hospitals, but the non-availability of equipment meant for COVID-19 management. Thus, the COVID-19 epidemic came on the back of a health delivery system that was already affected by a poor political economy of health. Our evidence concurs with Elhawary et al. (2010) which posits that the state of the health delivery systems and sanitation in most African countries is reflective of the political and economic fragility in conflict and post-conflict situations. While Zimbabwe might not have been in an open conflict involving armed bandits, state security agents have always been deployed to harshly deal with dissenting voices. With a lack of investment, lack of resources, and lack of capacity of hospitals in Harare, the COVID19 outbreak became a disaster within an existing health disaster, similar to the Ebola outbreak in the DRC. McPake et al. (2015) argue that Ebola outbreaks exacerbated the situations in the DRC, as compared to the same outbreak in the peaceful West African region. We share McPake et al. (2015) arguments that politicians who make political decisions concerning upgrading health infrastructure commit themselves toward the maintenance of their authority and political power at the expense of the public good. In addition, during such periods, Newbrander (2007: 7) said, ‘…the system of health service delivery deteriorates, leaving health professionals little to work with and eventually migrate to countries with supportive environments’. In the Zimbabwean case, field evidence showed that Harare residents during the lockdown period had no option to use available and traditional medical care systems

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that they had abandoned since the introduction of western medicine. A Harare woman resident in Mbare suburb became the focal and referral point for women who required midwifery services. She could not remember how many clients she helped to give birth. She had the following to say: I charge them a nominal fee so that I can be able not only take care of my family but buy protective and other sundries for assisting in giving birth. I cannot remember the number of women I helped. I am only helping members of the community who cannot access hospital services.

Giddens’ (1984) theory of structuration and agency points to situations when individuals and groups either in compliance or defiance of community norms and rules of survival adopt certain practices. In this case, reverting to the traditional midwifery practices became a pragmatic approach to a problem. In these conditions of medical centers being partly closed with no basic medication and health staff, the only alternative was to seek traditional medical services. In the socio-economic circumstances, street traders played hide and seek with law enforcement agents as they sold home-based remedies, including lemon fruits, oranges, pieces of garlic and ginger, and a whole lot of other forms of tea leaves believed to have medicinal properties. Our research team had the opportunity to purchase some of the medicines for home consumption in response to the COVID-19 situation. Our behavior equally fed into Giddens’ (1984) theory of ‘agency’. The water and sanitation situation were made worse by the COVID19 requirements as residents’ movements were restricted. Most of the water infrastructure was old and broken down which contributed to the outbreak of cholera and typhoid in Harare’s high-density suburbs (Mahiya, 2018). Humanitarian organizations and church-based institutions as well as private corporates contributed in some ways including by drilling boreholes so that communities could access safe and clean drinking water. But the few water points became the meeting points for residents as they queued for the ‘precious’ liquid exposing themselves to infections. There were several reported cases of people, who engaged in fistfights at communal water points in Mufakose, Mbare, and other highdensity suburbs. Around the hostels, sewage water could be seen flowing along some designed canals meant for irrigating vegetable beds along with

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the low-lying areas. These situations represented a collapsed social, political, and economic infrastructure that needed urgent repair; hence, we argue in this study that COVID-19 was a disaster that befell another disaster consequently pushing many ordinary people onto the peripheries.

Housing and Type of Accommodation We share Chigudu’s (2020) position that epidemics are many things at the same time. They are medical problems that do not only require biological and pharmaceutical solutions. In the Harare study, the COVID-19 outbreak represented a medical problem with socio-cultural, political, and economic implications. The 2020 COVID-19 outbreak was a representation of the aftermath of the Native (Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration Act Number 6 of 1946. The Act had led to the setting up of ‘native urban locations’ Madaka (1995). The project included the construction of dormitory-type flats as a form of accommodation for blacks and these were called hostels. Only registered members of a particular hostel and dormitory would reside in such a place. Municipal police would ‘flash out’ anyone who was not registered, private companies equally built such types of accommodation in the western high-density suburbs. Our observations and interactions with the interlocutors within the observance of lockdown measures reveal that the same dormitory and single rooms for ‘bachelors and single’ persons still existed as they were in the 1960s in Mbare, Highfields, Rugare, Tafara, Mabvuku Mufakose and Kambuzuma high-density suburbs. With varying sizes of rooms, the accommodation originally meant for ‘bachelors’ now accommodates families. The study established that the bigger dormitories were now divided by some varying cheap materials to accommodate more families and households resulting in a single dormitory room taking up to an average of 20 people. The Total lockdown within the context of COVID-19 for Zimbabwe’s urban spaces meant that residents had to confine themselves in such small spaces and restrictive accommodation. For the single quarters, it meant many people spend hours, days, weeks, and months in a single room only accessing the outside environment when they visited communal public facilities like toilets and bath spaces. The moment residents stepped outside the door of their rooms; they would be regarded by the lockdown regulations as having contravened a section of the COVID19 lockdown curfew rules. The colonial legacies on accommodation and

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water sanitation facilities required that one had to come outside either in a communal passage or totally outside the hostel to access toilets and other facilities. With a collapsed water system, especially in Mabvuku Tafara suburbs, the City Council in collaboration with non-Governmental organizations and International Funders facilitated the drilling of communal boreholes. However, these would not be enough for everyone, hence, many residents dug deep wells near their places of residents. Based on our observations, we argue that lockdown measures partly reduced the movements of people during the pick period but did not ‘lockdown’ completely. A big population in Harare’s high-density suburbs continued to roam around the open spaces of their ‘locations’ in search of water at public water points, visit public ablution facilities, fetching for food and one interviewee whom we pseudonymized Blaz Mehlo said: We are searching for fresh air here under the pretext of fetching water and visiting the toilets. These rooms cannot afford to accommodate us in our numbers. If COVID-19 is a reality here, we, therefore, are going to infect each other in our rooms and all of us die. Can’t you see this former dormitory is too small for us?

Our analysis has shown that upstream factors, such as the political and economic circumstances, the political will to make meaningful changes to the accommodation of the residents, and the economic and political meltdown all resulted in downstream poor service provision by both local and central government. COVID-19 outbreak found fertile ground to manifest its dark side where residents could not easily observe precautionary regulations such as social distancing and self-quarantine. Mark the Hasler had the following to say: Total lockdown in these circumstances is equivalent to imprisonment. What crime did we commit? Solitary confinement in prisons is done to hard and dangerous troublesome criminals

Until governments approach the issue of urban accommodation as a human rights issue, future infectious disease outbreaks may find the communities more fragile and vulnerable. Sis Bessie who shared one room with six children including two adults argued that total lockdown in our circumstances in a five-meter room meant death due to hunger, death due to charcoal fumes, and death due to sanitation problems. Thus, the

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COVID-19 lockdown measures were equated to being thrown into the Bindura town’s Chawagona Hapana Prison and faithfully staying there for a life sentence. One loses it on all fronts.

The Informality of Livelihoods and the ‘Kusi Kufa Ndekupi’ Idiom The ‘informality’ of the economy was felt during the Harare COVID19 lockdowns. While the informal sector is a broad area that cannot all be covered in this article, it has aspects that were directly compromised by COVID-19 lockdown, particularly people’s livelihoods. A highlight of the dominance of the informal sector in Zimbabwe by Crush et al. (2015) is informative and further states that in 2011, 84% of the Zimbabwean population was into that sector for survival and livelihoods. That percentage could have grown as the formal economy continued to falter. Kamete (2007) argues that this comes at the backdrop of the failure by the government and other stakeholders to acknowledge the sector as central to the economy in the prevailing circumstances. Another outstanding research work by Chirau and Chamuka (2013) highlights how the informal traders particularly the youth become major players, potentially becoming politically ‘land mined’ by forming youth vigilante militias that did not only control certain trading areas but invaded CBD spaces too, (Njaya, 2014). These included car wash centers in certain open spaces including car repairs, local and foreign currency trading, touting, and illicit beer and drug sale. It is against this background that the study reflected on how the informal economy was affected and how individuals and groups responded to it. Field-based evidence showed the failures of the informal economy in the ‘old locations’ to meet the requirements for partial opening of business. They did not have the required documentation that was a pre-requisite for the opening of business. The most dominant activities included street trading which could not have such requirements. We concur with (Njaya) that street trading does not require exceptional skills it is the quality of the commodities and the pricing that determine whether goods would be purchased or not. However, with the COVID19 lockdown, street traders were barred from doing their business. The most known market in Mbare where all hardware materials are sold is called Siya-So where thousands of people manufacture through ingenious innovations and creative goods and equipment used in various businesses

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including mining, motor vehicle maintenance, agriculture, roofing, and many other aspects of the economy. All these were closed, hence, our argument that the COVID-19 lockdown measures worsened an already bad state for Harare’s urban poor.

Conclusion The article took much of its sustenance from broader research on COVID-19 and its implications on urban settings that fed into other workstreams. In this regard, conclusions were extended from that original research however highlighting insights relevant to our research site, Mbare, Mabvuku, St Marys’ and Mufakose. Firstly, we propel the discourse that the government of Zimbabwe grappled with the balancing act of maintaining a COVID-19 lockdown measure in line with the international best practices and ‘locking down’ communities in a fashion that entrenched authoritarianism. Evidence has it that the latter sufficed and prevailed over the medically oriented lockdown. The COVID-19 epidemic rode on an already politically fragile environment that resulted in the state unleashing security agents to deal with those who did not share their views. Secondly, the COVID-19 outbreak found an already existent state of disaster in the health delivery as well water and sanitation systems, particularly in Harare. The referral hospitals were underfunded, the medical staff was not at work due to pay disputes and the medical equipment was obsolete due to under-capitalization. The water and sewage reticulation system, which were under a local and central government, which had been neglected for so long, had caused the outbreak of cholera and typhoid in Harare earlier such that by the time of the COVID-19 outbreak, little had been done to ameliorate the situation. On top of all these, the COVID-19 lockdown measures were very harsh to most residents in the high-density suburbs whose livelihoods were pivoted on the informal economy. Lockdown measures meant the closure of informal and street trading spaces consequently pushing the vulnerable groups into the extreme margins of poverty. The overcrowded type of accommodation designed and meant for ‘singles’ during the colonial period worsened the lives of the people and exposed them to infections and abuse by security agents. Thus, the COVID-19 epidemic was for Harare residents a ‘disaster within a disaster’.

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CHAPTER 11

Livelihoods or Health? The Contradictions and Socio-Economic Impact of COVID-19 Lockdown on Informal Traders in Harare, Zimbabwe Washington Mazorodze

Introduction This chapter analyses the socio-economic impact of Covid-19 on the informal sector in Harare, which has a high concentration of informal traders in the country than any other city in Zimbabwe. Most of these informal traders are operating illegally. The human security concept is deployed in this chapter, as the Zimbabwean government tried to strike a delicate balance between the health security of all citizens through imposing a lockdown to curb the spread of Covid-19, and economic security and livelihoods of informal traders affected by the lockdown. In this

W. Mazorodze (B) Department of Peace, Security and Society, Faculty of Arts and Humanities, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. Dorasamy (ed.), Governance Challenges During the COVID-19 Pandemic in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11244-7_11

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chapter, informal traders are those who engage in economic activities, not accommodated in the approved government policy (Wilson, 2011, 2012). They include street vendors and other groups who engage in various economic activities informally. Street vendors are the most influential group among informal traders in Zimbabwe, which comprise the largest percentage of informal traders in the country are also commonly referred to as illegal street vendors (ISV). These street vendors sell at undesignated sites and do not pay any form of tax or rates to the HCC or the government. It suffices to say that most vendors in Harare’s CBD are illegal vendors as the CBD can only accommodate a small number of street vendors legally. This chapter uses the blanket term, informal traders, to include illegal street vendors and other informal groups conducting informal activities, which are not essentially street vending.

Background to the Informal Sector Over the past 20 years, the country’s urban centers have witnessed a phenomenal growth of the informal sector owing to the decline of the economy. A brief history of the informal sector in Zimbabwe reveals that at independence, Zimbabwe’s urban informal economy stood at 10%; by 1986, it had risen to 20% (McPherson, 1991, 1). The number of people working in the informal sector continued to grow and by 2015, 94.5% of the working people in Zimbabwe were in the informal sector (Economic Intelligence Unit, 2015). The continued increase of informal traders in Harare resulted in challenges such as vehicular and human congestion, high crime rates, disease outbreaks, among other challenges. These challenges led to clashes between informal traders and the city council, in which the latter sought to regulate the city activities while the former driven by economic challenges that the country faced, continued to trade informally and illegally arguing that informal trading provided them with the only source of livelihood and removing them banning their trade was as good as taking away their lives (Mananavire, 2017). With the outbreak of Covid-19, informal traders were ordered to vacate their areas of work, thus depriving them of the opportunity to generate income to sustain their families. Because of the nature of their jobs, informal traders survive hand to mouth without any savings. The government of Zimbabwe on 18 March 2020 decided to impose lockdown measures after four infections and one death were recorded

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(Bhoroma, 2020). This was done haphazardly without making plans to cushion informal traders from the negative economic impact of the lockdown on their livelihoods. To better understand the socio-economic impact of Covid-19 on informal traders in Harare, this chapter answered the following questions: In what ways did Covid-19 affect the livelihoods of informal traders in Harare? Did the government consider the socio-economic effects of lockdown on informal traders when it imposed lockdown? What were the contradictions of the lockdown measures on both government and informal traders in Harare and how were these contradictions addressed? What measures or safety nets did the government put in place to cushion informal traders from the negative effects of lockdown? Should health concerns precede hunger and starvation? What choices did the government have? This chapter argues that the lockdown imposed by the government to contain the spread of Covid-19 had negative implications for the socio-economic wellbeing and economic security of informal traders. The negative impact of lockdown resulted in the impoverishment of informal traders who derived their income from informal trading activities. This led to a surge in crime levels, violent conflicts, and massive starvation when the government extended the lockdown. The extension was implemented without providing informal traders with safety nets to cushion them from the effects of lockdown, yet they survived from hand to mouth. The government, though with good intentions to prevent the spread of Covid-19, imposed a blanket lockdown on the nation, it did so without assessing the negative impact it would cause to informal traders and without safety nets in place for them. The chapter rekindles debate on the validity of the government’s lockdown measures, with some scholars arguing that the government should have left the informal sector open since it employed approximately 76% of the country’s working population (Moyo & Ndoma, 2020, 1; Zimbabwe National Statistics, 2020). As if that was not enough, the government through local authorities, decided to demolish structures that were used by informal traders which Zimrights said was harsh on informal traders who had been severely affected by the lockdown imposed by the government (Jakes, 2020). The chapter informs policymakers to assess the effects of their policies on society before implementing them. This debate is grounded in the human security perspective.

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Conceptual Framework The human security concept is useful in analyzing the socio-economic impact of Covid-19 lockdown measures imposed by the government on informal traders in Harare. Human security deals with persistent threats to human life (Jolly & Ray, 2006, 14). The UNDP (1994, 24) defined human security to include non-state security issues including hunger, disease, repression, and hurtful disruptions to normal daily life are it in homes, jobs, or communities. Cilliers (2004) defined human security as the ability of people and communities to pursue a safe livelihood on equal terms with others. Human security is based on two schools of thought. The first school is the freedom from fear, which is freedom from violent conflict. The second school is freedom from want and is an all-encompassing strategy that focuses on the social and economic issues which include hunger, disease, and natural disasters (UNDP, 1994, 23– 33). The two schools of thought are however interrelated. As a result, this chapter uses the two schools of thought in analyzing the impact of Covid19 lockdown measures on informal traders in Harare and argues that in trying to secure freedom from want (health insecurities) by imposing lockdown to prevent the spread of Covid-19, the government may have triggered or caused insecurities of freedom from fear (violent conflict) and want (hunger and starvation). The chapter questions the extent to which informal traders locked down and confined to their homes by the stateimposed lockdown could pursue a safe livelihood on equal terms with others as argued by Cilliers, hurtful disruption to their normal daily lives as advanced by UNDP or persistent threats to their lives as according to Jolly and Ray. Informal traders in Harare were exposed to all the threats to their human securities during the state-sanctioned lockdown.

Methodology of the Study This article is a qualitative case study of the socio-economic impact of the Covid-19 lockdown on informal traders in Harare. This qualitative approach was adopted to make an in-depth analysis of the impact of Covid-19 lockdown measures on informal traders. The qualitative research approach emphasizes a non-numerical understanding of the dynamics of a social phenomenon in the natural setting. Gray (2004, 17) notes that qualitative research is distinguished as a highly contextual

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approach where data is gathered over long periods and in natural reallife settings. It can answer how and why questions rather than giving a brief view about the phenomenon studied which the quantitative research approach does. Qualitative research provides a deeper understanding of the social world (Gray, 2004, 7). It is based on a small-scale sample and uses data interaction methods such as interviews. It also allows new issues and concepts to be explored. The main data gathering techniques in this chapter are interviews, content analysis, and observations. Interviews were conducted from May 2020 with informal traders operating in various suburbs in Harare. Harare was chosen as it has the highest concentration of informal traders in the country who are engaged in various economic activities informally. A total of 10 informal traders were interviewed. The number of interviews may appear to be few, but the nature of qualitative research is small samples but in-depth analysis of the samples. It was important to interview informal traders as they are the ones that are living and affected by the phenomenon. However, in conducting interviews, the researcher was aware of the exaggerations and biases that could result from some interviews with informal traders. Information from interviews was triangulated with content analysis to make the chapter valid and dependable. Key informants were also interviewed from academics and civil society organizations. Key informant views were important because of their skills and positions in society. They can provide more information concerning what is happening around them (Marshall, 1996, 92). The observation method was conducted before, during, and after the lockdown period where the researcher visited the areas where informal traders used to conduct their business and assessed the state of the places which informal traders operated from. The researcher further read and analyzed relevant literature from newspapers, news, scholarly articles, among others on the impact of Covid-19 lockdown not only on informal traders but on the generality of the population from a human security perspective. Furthermore, the researcher managed to watch and listen to news concerning what measures were implemented in other countries as they tried to contain the spread of Covid-19 and cushion informal traders at the same time, especially in neighboring South Africa where informal traders were allowed to operate at various levels of the lockdown and were given financial assistance by the government. This permitted the researcher to read and analyze information beyond the area of study. The

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information obtained from these sources helped to formulate interview questions to avoid replicating what is already known in the public domain.

Government Announces Lockdown Measures: Informal Sector Overlooked On the 18th of March 2020, the Zimbabwean President announced that the country would undergo a 21 period of lockdown to prevent the spread of Covid-19 which was wreaking havoc in Europe and Asia. At the time of the imposition of Covid-19 lockdowns in Zimbabwe, the virus had infected about 390,000 people from 192 countries in the world, while claiming over 21,000 lives according to the World Health Organization (WHO) (Bhoroma, 2020). The most affected countries were China (where the virus was thought to have originated in the province of Wuhan), Italy, Spain, and Iran. On the African continent where infections and mortality rates had been lower relative to other continents, over 1500 cases across 45 countries were confirmed, while in Zimbabwe, only four cases had been confirmed and one death (Bhoroma, 2020). This was in line with the recommendations of the World Health Organization (WHO) and what interventions other governments were implementing across the whole world as a way of mitigating the spread of Covid-19. In announcing the lockdown, the President noted that citizens were to remain in their homes and only be allowed to leave their homes if they wanted to access essential services such as food and health-related services (Machivenyika, 2020). When he announced the lockdown, the President said, This means all our citizens are required to stay at home, except of course in respect of essential movements related to seeking health, to purchase and procurement of food and medicines for the essential supplies and critical services…. As far as the informal sector was concerned, food markets will be allowed to operate, although under the control of health personnel, while those trading in non-food items would be closed. (Machivenyika, 2020)

This directive meant that the informal sector in Harare was closed because only rural farmers bringing food products to Harare were allowed to sell their farm produce. Even when farmers were allowed to sell their products, people’s movements to buy these products were highly

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restricted and punishable. There was no clear position on how people were going to access these products. The government panicked and implemented these measures haphazardly without adequate safety nets to protect the vulnerable members of society. Ever since the announcement of the lockdown, there were debates on the appropriateness of imposing the lockdown without a clear strategy on how people would access services essential for their survival when most of the people were surviving on informal trading (Moyo & Ndoma, 2020). Informal traders were not considered by the government as providing essential services, and all informal traders were ordered to vacate where they operated from and stay indoors (Machivenyika, 2020). Informal trading places were hotspots for the spread of Covid-19 because of the congestion with which informal traders operate in areas such as Mbare Musika, the hub of informal activities in Harare. By imposing lockdown, the government was guided by the human security discourse which considered the Covid-19, whose confirmed cases were rising, to be the main security threat to Zimbabweans, threatening their health and lives (Machivenyika, 2020). The government considered freedom from want, freedom from disease (Covid-19) when it imposed the lockdown. The threat of the disease was real and wreaking havoc in Europe. The government saw it fit to close all informal sectors as a preventive measure against the spread of Covid-19. Therefore, it was justifiable for the government to impose lockdown on informal traders but was supposed to make sure that informal traders were protected from the unintended effects of the lockdown. For Peterson (2002), from a human security perspective, diseases were considered a security threat because of the disruption they cause to human lives. In the same vein, Covid-19 affected the capacity of citizens to enhance their livelihoods as citizens could not perform their daily duties due to the lockdown imposed by the state to curb the spread of the disease. State resources have also been drained as countries implemented and enforced several measures trying to reduce the spread of the disease. The government of Zimbabwe, just like all governments across the world justified the imposition of lockdown on the need to protect lives from the threat of the disease (Mavhunga, 2020). The president said, “We are worried that even as our numbers remain low there is the possibility of wider community spread and transmissions. Further, in about two months’ time winter will be upon us, creating conditions ideal for more infections. There is a need to take decisive measures now against

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the pandemic” (Mavhunga, 2020). However, the only difference was that the government of Zimbabwe did not provide safety nets to counter other threats such as hunger and poverty that emanated from the lockdown. On the 19th of April 2020, the first phase of the lockdown expired, and the President held another press briefing in which he extended the lockdown for 14 days (OPC, 20 April 2020). The extension of the lockdown included informal traders who were not considered by the government as providing essential services. In announcing the extension of the lockdown, the president noted, Conscious of the huge costs which come with lockdown costs to livelihood and economy, we chose caution despite its hardships. Nothing is more important than saving lives. The government has therefore decided to extend the lockdown for 14 days after which there will be a review of the situation and inform the public accordingly on the course of action to take. (ZTV, 19 April 2020, www.youtube.com)

The extension of the lockdown was not welcome by informal traders who hoped that the government would allow them to resume their activities which earned them livelihoods (Mahove, 2020). Behind the lockdown, there was no rescue package for informal traders. This was unlike in other countries where rescue packages were availed to informal traders affected by Covid-19. For example, when South African President Ramaphosa announced the lockdown for his country, he announced that the government would provide a 26.3 billion dollars (USD) rescue package for the vulnerable and businesses which included the informal sector (Aljazeera News, 22 April 2020a). The package was equivalent to 10% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP). The US president also announced a rescue package of 484 billion dollars to help small businesses (Aljazeera News, 22 April 2020a). This followed another 2 trillion dollars stimulus package, which had been earlier announced previously to help distressed business and Covid testing (Aljazeera News, 22 April 2020a). No such rescue package was availed to the Zimbabweans by the government and yet informal traders were placed under strict lockdown which put their human security—the freedom from want at risk. The disease not only affected informal traders in Zimbabwe but the world over. It was estimated that the disease will affect 1.6 billion informal traders worldwide and so far, 60% of the world’s informal traders had lost their means of livelihood (Aljazeera News, 29 April 2020b). International

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Labor Organization (ILO) Director-General Guy Ryder also lamented the crisis that informal traders faced when he was quoted saying, “They have no savings or access to credit. These are the real faces of the world of work. If we do not help them now, they will simply perish” (Aljazeera News, 29 April 2020b). Aljazeera further added that informal workers were the world’s most vulnerable people as they did not have welfare protections, access to healthcare, or the ability to work from home (Aljazeera News, 29 April 2020b). This chapter argues that while the government had no choice but to close informal traders as a preventing measure to curb the spread of Covid-19, it should have availed resources to enhance their survival during the lockdown period to enhance their human security. Failure to provide minimum resources for informal traders triggered insecurities and contradictions which confined them to starvation and threatened their lives more than before. It was only after three months after the imposition of the lockdown that the government lifted the ban on the informal sector but put some stringent measures which excluded most of the people working in the informal sector.

Government Measures to Assist Businesses During COVID-19 Lockdown Acting on the back of accusations that the government had abandoned not only informal traders but even formal businesses at the critical time of Covid-19 lockdown, on 01 April, the government through the Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprises announced that it was putting in place measures to cushion and minimize the impact of covid lockdown on the upcoming registered businesses through support for small businesses. By implication, the government referred to all small-scale businesses as informal businesses. However, this stimulus package did not include informal traders who are not registered businesses. It was not until after two months that the Ministry of Finance announced modalities for small businesses to access the ZWL 500 million (5 million USD) SME support loans set aside (Ministry of Finance and Economic Development Press Statement 4 June 2020). Businesses that accessed the loans were given 90 days to start repaying the loan. However, some stringent conditions were put in place for small businesses to access the funds. Under the guidelines and modalities for accessing the loans, the Treasury announced that the loans would be accessed through normal banking channels and

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applicants, or beneficiaries should therefore submit their requests to their banks with the requisite information. In return, banks were supposed to conduct creditworthiness assessments on the applicants. The government would be the guarantor but called upon banks to monitor and evaluate the use of the loans by beneficiaries to determine their ability to repay the loans. Conditions for accessing the loans included the following: • A valid tax clearance certificate from Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA) accompanied by a record of tax compliance history • Creditworthiness as assessed by the banks • Priority to be given to existing projects • Valid compliance certificate from National Social Security Agency (NSSA). The government pledged to capitalize Empowerment bank, Zimbabwe Women’s Micro Finance Bank, Small and Medium Enterprise Development Cooperation and Post Office Savings Bank where informal traders were expected to submit their applications to access these funds (Ministry of Finance and Economic Development Press Statement 4 June 2020). Other sectors were also allocated funds and the conditions were similar. Below is a breakdown of the sectors that were earmarked to benefit from the fund and the amount allocated. Despite the availing of these funds, informal traders failed to access the funds due to some reasons. Firstly, most informal traders do not have bank accounts as they survive from hand to mouth. Secondly, their businesses are not registered and lastly, they do not pay tax and therefore, do not have tax returns. As a result, virtually all informal traders failed to access the funds, further confining them to the murky waters of poverty. In an interview with one informal trader who used to operate at the largest informal market Mbare, Harare said, We are not registered, we do not have bank accounts and we do not pay tax, yet they put those conditions for us to access the funds. The majority of us are not able to access the funds because of the stringent conditions that they put. What is the use then of the funds when the majority of us informal traders are not able to access the funds? We are struggling to make ends meet. The government should let us work. (Interview with informal trader 30 June 2020)

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Informal traders scoffed at the availing of government funds to cushion them against the negative effects of Covid-19 which they likened to a father who comes home with food to feed the starving children only for him to put stringent conditions for the children to get the food. Moreover, Finance Minister Mthuli Ncube, announced that Zimbabwe would spend a total of $24 million on cash transfers to one million vulnerable households over the next three months starting in April 2020 (Mukeredzi, 2020). That translates to USD3 per month per household using the unofficial rate at the time. Analysts described this cash transfer as a drop in the ocean as the money allocated to each household was not enough to buy a single meal for a family of four people and the main opposition party MDC—A Spokesperson described it as ‘an insult to the people of Zimbabwe’ (Gagare, 2020).

Strategies Used by Informal Traders to Survive During the Lockdown in the Absence of Government Bailout Faced with the prospect of hunger and starvation due to the lockdown and failing to access the fund availed by the government, informal traders adopted some strategies to ensure their survival. Because their livelihoods had been affected by the lockdown, they had to find ways of providing for their families without which they could face hunger and starvation. Interviews conducted with informal traders revealed that some informal traders in Kuwadzana high-density suburb resorted to selling a variety of foodstuff which included vegetables, groceries, among other products they could sell. Others sold these products indoors while others were brave enough to sell at shopping centers in their neighborhood despite risking arrest by the police. A few others sold these products from the back of their cars while stationed at one place and others chose to move around the streets in their suburbs advertising their products from their cars. Some traders resorted to selling goods in their cars with loudspeakers inviting clients to come out of their houses to buy whatever they would be selling (Interview with an informal trader in Kuwadzana suburb 12 August 2020). The greatest challenge they faced was where to get the goods to sell from since most of the products they sold were foodstuff. It was difficult for them to move from one place to another due to restrictions imposed by the government.

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However, despite the opening of the Mbare farmers market, for one to move from their locations to go to Mbare Musika where farmers delivered their products one needed to have a pass. This did not deter the informal traders to continue with their business. They organized themselves into groups of 10–15 people and hired mini-buses and would wake up early in the morning around 3 am to go to Mbare Musika to buy their goods and return to their neighborhood before police roadblocks were mounted (Interview with vendors 14 June 2020). By the time roadblocks were mounted around 6 am, they would have returned and started selling from their homes. In this way, the strategy benefitted both the traders and the kombi operator who are both informal traders to survive during the lockdown. Both groups of informal traders had been banned by the government, yet the government did not provide safety nets for these groups to survive during the lockdown which compromised their human security, the freedom from want. In some cases, the mini-bus crew bribed the police for them to get free passage. However, the cost of police roadblocks was passed down to the traders who had hired the kombi (Interview with informal trader 14 June 2020). This was because police sometimes mounted roadblocks during the night and when they encountered such cases, they had to pay their way to the market. They usually paid a bribe of between $USD 5 to $USD10 per trip. The cost of these bribes would be passed to informal traders who would have hired the kombi. Interviews held with informal traders revealed that they had no choice but to pay the bribe or risk being turned back without buying their products for reselling or arrested and made to pay ZW$500 which was equivalent to 5USD (Interview with informal trader 6 July 2020). The second option was unattainable as they eked out a living through selling, so they had to pay bribes to the police to be allowed to access the market since they survived through buying and selling. Informal traders, however, lamented this situation where they had to play hide and seek with authorities. They wanted to be permitted to trade and move to the markets without restrictions. They argued that they were losing a lot of money through paying bribes and the mini-buses they hired were also expensive since they risked their vehicles at a time when minibuses had been banned by the government. Others stationed themselves at major road junctions in the suburbs selling goods from the back of their cars or car boot. A few others sold their goods at major shopping centers, but they were selling from their

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cars fearful of the police and soldiers who normally patrolled these areas. All these were strategies that informal traders resorted to as a way of surviving under lockdown as they had been banned from selling at their usual selling points. A few other informal traders tried to sneak back to their workplaces, but they were prevented from accessing their workplaces which were sealed by security forces. Along the way, the government introduced strict measures which prevented people from getting into town where most informal activities were conducted. All traffic into town from the suburbs was stopped and passengers were asked to produce a letter from the employer which specified that the individual was a critical employee and was required to work during Covid-19 lockdown. The letters were supposed to be stamped by the police. Those who were found without these letters were either turned away or fined. Although many informal traders managed to fake these letters, they failed to operate as their places were always manned by security forces, a move which was described by opposition politicians as the militarization of Covid-19 by the state. An informal trader that was caught working without the requisite requirements was either beaten up or arrested and asked to pay a fine of ZWL 500, which was equivalent to 5 USD. Most informal traders caught trying their luck could not be able to pay this amount and were incarcerated for an unspecified time. The continued arrest and harassment of citizens by the security forces for failing to observe lockdown regulations resulted in contradictions and strained relations between security forces and the general public. On one hand, security forces were implementing lockdown regulations and on the other hand, the public sought to hustle to survive.

More Security Challenges for Informal Traders as Harare City Council Demolished Their Infrastructure During COVID-19 Lockdown As if the lockdown had not posed enough security challenges for informal traders, the government of Zimbabwe through the Ministry of Local Government and Public Works instructed the Harare city council through a letter dated 8 April 2020 to demolish illegal structures belonging to informal traders in the country’s high-density areas and city centers. The letter stated,

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at the ninth cabinet meeting, it was resolved that local authorities should take advantage of the national lockdown to clean up and renovate Small and Medium Enterprises and informal traders’ workplaces so that these areas will be more conducive to operate from when the business reopens. (Zimpricecheck.com)

HCC proceeded to demolish all illegal structures such as tuck shops in high-density areas where informal traders derived their incomes from. The demolition of illegal structures at a critical time as Covid-19 lockdown not only put the livelihoods of informal traders at risk but also the general population which depended on these informal traders for their survival too. Despite informal traders’ complaints that they were not given alternative places to conduct their economic activities when the council demolished their structures, HCC proceeded with demolitions. Council defended the demolition of illegal structures and the council spokesperson had this to say, “The council was taking advantage of the low human traffic during the lockdown to move the stands to properly designated sites” (Maphosa, 2020). Council denied the allegations that it was destroying informal traders’ livelihoods and argued that it was simply complying with the government directive to create order and those whose structures had been destroyed will be relocated to designated new markets that were being constructed (Matendere & Chikandiwa, 2020). The picture below shows Harare city council bulldozer demolishing illegal structures in Harare under government directives. Informal traders blamed the council for destroying their livelihoods by demolishing their structures during the lockdown period. One informal trader who was interviewed by Herald said, Yes, we are aware that our cabins were illegally built but these were our source of income. We do not have any formal employment and we earn our living through informal trading. Now that our source of income has been destroyed, we have nowhere to turn to for survival. The Council should regularise our cabins, or prepare some strategic sites, before destroying our tables. (cf. Maphosa, 2020)

The above statement disputes the council’s position that it sought to relocate the affected informal traders to new markets which they argued were not ready. Another informal trader whose structure was demolished also had this to say,

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A big percentage of the Zimbabwean population, particularly the urban dwellers survive on informal trading. This is how we survive. Our industry is not fully functional and the only way to feed our families is through informal jobs. The council should have considered all that. They should also have created alternative places where we can do our business. Yes, they said there are places where we will be allowed to do business, but the places are not ready and cannot accommodate us all. (cf. Maphosa, 2020)

As a result of the demolitions of the informal traders’ places, life became unbearable for informal traders who had nowhere to turn to. Most of them relocated to rural areas where life was presumably better. One resident commented about the lockdown imposed by the government and the subsequent demolitions of informal traders’ infrastructure which were carried out by the city council when he said, The lockdown caused more harm than good. Why did the government choose to lock us in our homes? The City Council also decided to demolish people’s infrastructure during their absence. Crime rates and burglaries have increased because people have nowhere to start since the government decided to ban their informal economic activities. We implore the government to let the informal economic activities resume because we are no longer secure in our homes. We are leaving in fear of losing our properties to thieves because they are also hungry. (Interview with a resident of Kuwadzana high-density suburb 20 August 2020)

A business analyst commented about the imminent lockdown announced by the President through The Independent, a weekly newspaper when he noted that, The imminent lockdown in the local market will also put pressure on various producers and the small to medium enterprises (SMEs) who are operating on thin budgets or in survival mode due to economic decline. Informal traders at various home markets such as Makokoba (Bulawayo), Glen View furniture market, Mbare (Harare), and others will be severely affected by the increasingly possible lockdown. The impact of the pandemic will reach every household and business directly or indirectly, while denting economic recovery hopes for Zimbabwe which had anticipated a 3% growth rate in 2020. (The Independent 29 March 2020)

The above statements reiterate the view that the lockdown imposed by the government, while it was a noble idea to mitigate the spread

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of Covid-19 generated some insecurities and contradictions among the general populace.

Health vs Livelihoods: Informal Traders’ Freedom from Fear and Threat In the early days of the lockdown, some informal traders resisted the call by the government to cease all operations and were harassed by government security forces. The harassment of informal traders by security forces was reported a few days after the lockdown in Mutare (the eastern border town) when Zimbabwe Republic Police confiscated three tonnes of vegetables belonging to vendors accusing them of defying the lockdown regulations that were imposed to prevent the spread of Covid19 (Zinyuke, 2020). It was not only in Mutare where informal traders faced such harassment from state security. In Harare, informal traders had their products confiscated by security forces who patrolled all suburbs enforcing lockdown regulations and some were beaten up. The greatest danger faced by informal traders was hunger and starvation. Many analysts noted that while the government had good intentions of protecting citizens from the spread of Covid-19 by enhancing their health security and freedom from want when it imposed the lockdown, it should have also considered their livelihoods which depend on hustling day in day out. By confiscating products that belonged to informal traders who were trying to make a decent living, security forces were committing human insecurity and violating informal traders’ freedom from want and fear. The government should have put in place measures to ensure both the health needs of the informal traders and their livelihoods bearing in mind that most of the working people were in the informal sector. An analyst interviewed argued that the government was incapacitated and did not have adequate resources to provide for everyone affected by Covid-19 (Interview with analyst 31 July 2020). Debates, therefore raged on as two schools of thought have emerged. The first school of thought opposes the lockdown on informal traders arguing that locking people down in their homes when they are used to finding survival means from the streets did not solve the problem but created another problem of poverty and hunger threatening their economic security (Gukurume & Oosterom, 2020). In this sense, the government removed people from the streets where they survived and confined them to their homes to die of hunger and starvation. This school of thought recommends that informal traders should

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have been allowed to operate under strict health guidelines despite the threat of Covid-19. An analyst interviewed supported the government’s decision to impose lockdown on informal traders as the areas of their trade could be epicenters of the Covid-19 outbreak due to the high volumes of people who operate from their workplaces and the difficulties of regulating the informal sector to observe safety regulations (Interview with an analyst 14 May 2020). Therefore, allowing informal traders to continue operating could be disastrous for the health of both informal traders and their clients, hence the government’s decision to suspend all informal activities. Even if this analyst supported the government’s position to suspend all informal economic activities, he recommended that the government should have provided informal traders with rescue packages to sustain themselves during the Covid-19 period to prevent the hunger virus among informal traders. As a result, the government was in a dilemma as allowing informal traders to continue with their business could result in the spread of the disease to unmanageable levels, putting the lives of not only traders at risk but the clients as well. Banning informal traders also raised contradictions as the traders survived on hustling and most of the working people were employed in this sector. Vinga (2020) highlighted that according to Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency, there were 975,880 people employed in the informal sector in Zimbabwe. There was an intense debate on what government priority should be. Should it be on livelihoods or health security? All informal traders who were interviewed by the researcher noted that the government should have allowed them to continue with their business under strict conditions because they survived on money that they generate from selling daily (Interviews with informal traders 30 May 2020). However, the failure by the government to recognize the informal sector as an essential service when most of the working people belonged to this sector showed a lack of acknowledgment of the importance of this sector by the government. Informal traders were more concerned with their livelihoods than with the disease (Covid-19). While not undermining the importance of health security, they noted that food security took precedence and was equally important, hence government should have given it a priority. They argued that their health security depended on their livelihoods and yet the government had decided otherwise. The

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fact that informal traders played hide and seek with security forces reiterated the fact that they were more concerned with their livelihoods than with the disease. In an interview with Los Angeles Times (30 March 2020), a woman interviewed noted that it was better to get coronavirus while looking for money than to sit at home and die from hunger. This showed that informal traders preferred to continue working and generate income for their survival than confine themselves to government-directed lockdown. This reinforced the point raised above that their livelihoods were more important than the disease (Covid-19). In a related issue, the New Zimbabwe reported that Bulawayo informal traders defied the lockdown as hunger struck them. A survey conducted by New Zimbabwe in Bulawayo CBD revealed that livelihoods were more important than Covid-19. A money changer who was interviewed had this to say, “I need to feed my family brother. I cannot stay at home for more than three weeks without coming to work. Right now, my landlord is demanding rent and I need to raise that rent” (Pindula News, 22 April 2020). From the above statement, it can be noted that informal traders were negatively affected by the Covid-19 lockdown and opted to take the law into their hands by resuming their activities without approval from the government as they suffered from poverty. Again, it showed that informal traders valued their livelihoods more than the disease. Analysts also highlighted that the imposition of lockdown on informal traders who are the majority of would result in increased crime levels as informal traders would resort to committing crimes to feed their starving families. Another analyst highlighted that the government risked plunging the country into a violent conflict as the hungry informal traders could decide to undertake a violent demonstration against the continued lockdown by the government (Interview with analyst 15 June 2020). Whatever the outcome, informal traders felt let down by the government and were negatively affected by the Covid-19 lockdown imposed.

Conclusion and Recommendations Covid-19 triggered contradictions of health security and food security among the informal traders in Zimbabwe. While the government should be commended for mitigating the spread of Covid-19 through lockdown measures, informal traders felt the pinch as they were prohibited from conducting their normal daily activities which ensured their survival from

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hand to mouth. This chapter argued that there was a contest between health security and economic/food security and the government chose the former. However, in trying to solve the health insecurities of the people of Zimbabwe, the government created another massive problem of the same magnitude as the one it tried to solve. Informal traders were subjected to massive poverty through lockdown measures which prevented them from resuming their economic activities for a living. Government should have come up with a strategy to cushion informal traders from the negative effects of the lockdown. Without social security measures for the informal traders, the government should have considered informal traders as an essential service so that modalities could be put in place for the informal sector to operate under strict health guidelines than to completely shut it. This would not have put the lives of most of the people at risk of food insecurity since most of the people were operating as informal traders. This calls for the need by the government to regulate the activities of the informal sector so that it becomes easy to regulate the sector in times of crises like Covid-19. The informal sector has been unregulated for a long time, and it is high time the government of Zimbabwe regulates this sector as it has the potential to transform the country’s economy. In the future, the government should be able to deal with the informal sector in a manner that recognizes this sector as the biggest employer in the country, which therefore should be accorded the importance it deserves. This chapter also recommends that the informal sector should make efforts to formalize so that it can be recognized by the government and benefit from government programs such as the availing of funds to cushion the sector from the effects of calamities as Covid-19 as members of this sector failed to access the funds because they could not meet the requirements needed for them to access the funds. The chapter further recommends increased consultation between the government and the informal sector so that the policies implemented by the government would be fully supported by the informal sector.

References Aljazeera News. (2020a). South Africa announces $26bn COVID-19 rescue https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2020a/4/22/ package (online). south-africa-announces-26bn-COVID-19-rescue-package-2020-04-22. Accessed 6 October 2020.

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Aljazeera News. (2020b). Half the world’s workers face losing their jobs, says ILO (online). https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2020b/4/29/ half-the-worlds-workers-face-losing-their-jobs-says-ilo-2020-04-29. Accessed 6 October 2020. Bhoroma, V. (2020, March 29). Assessing the economic impact of corona virus. The Independent (online). https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2020/03/ 29/assessing-the-economic-impact-of-coronavirus. Accessed 29 March 2020. Cilliers, J. (2004). Human security. A conceptual framework for review: African Human Security Initiative. Economic Intelligence Unit. (2015, June 23). Informal employment dominates. Economic Intelligence Unit (online). http://country.eiu.com/article. aspx?articleid=453276029&Country=Zimbabwe&topic=Economy. Accessed 9 September 2022. Gagare, O. (2020). Zimbabwe: Caught between the pandemic and an incapable state (online). https://gga.org/zimbabwe-caught-between-the-pan demic-and-an-incapable-state-2020-08-22. Accessed 7 November 2020. Gray, D. E. (2004). Doing research in the real world. Sage. Gukurume, S., & Oosterom, M. (2020). The impact of Covid-19 lockdown on Zimbabwe’s informal economy. Institute of Development Studies (online). https://www.ids.ac.uk/opinions/the-impact-of-the-COVID-19-loc kdown-on-zimbabwes-informal-economy. Accessed 7 November 2020. Jakes, S. (2020). ZIMRIGHTS concerned over attacks of informal traders (online). https://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-national-byo-184186. html-2020-04-26. Accessed 6 November 2020. Jolly, R., & Ray, D. B. (2006). The human security framework and national human development reports: A review of experiences and current debates. UNDP. Los Angeles Times. (2020). In Zimbabwe, starving people are willing to risk corona virus to get food on the table (online). https://www.latimes.com/ world-nation/story/2020-03-30/in-zimbabwe-you-win-coronavirus-or-youwin-starvation-2020-03-30. Accessed 20 July 2020. Machivenyika, F. (2020, March 28). Covid-19: Zimbabwe in total lockdown … President issues stay-at-home order. The Herald (online). https://www.her ald.co.zw/COVID-19-zim-in-total-lockdown-president-issues-stay-at-homeorder. Accessed 6 November 2020. Mahove, C. (2020). Zimbabwe informal workers cry foul over new lockdown restrictions (online). https://elitshanews.org.za/2020/07/23/zimbabweinformal-workers-cry-foul-over-new-lockdown-restrictions-2020-07-23. Accessed 6 November 2020. Mananavire, B. (2017, January 22). Police vendors clash in typhoid crackdown. Daily News.

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Maphosa, V. (2020, April 24). Council destroys illegal vending cabins, stalls. The Herald (online). https://www.herald.co.zw/coucil-destroys-illegal-vendinfgcabins-stalls. Accessed 2 October 2020. Marshall, M. N. (1996). The key informant technique. Family Practice, 13(1), 92–97. Matendere, B., & Chikandiwa, H. (2020). Council demolishes Mbare vendors’ stalls. Newsday (online). https://www.newsday.co.zw/2020/04/council-dem olishes-mbare-vendors-stalls. Accessed 20 July 2020. Mavhunga, C. (2020). Zimbabwe begins lockdown to fight Covid-19 (online). https://www.voanews.com/science-health/coronavirus-outbreak/zimbabwebegins-lockdown-fight-covid19-2020-03-30. Accessed 6 November 2020. McPherson, M. A. (1991). Micro and small scale enterprises in Zimbabwe: Result of a countrywide survey. Gemini Technical Report, 25. Moyo, N. S., & Ndoma, S. (2020, August 20). Covid-19 lockdown a crisis for informal traders disadvantaged by government inaction. Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 385 (online). https://media.africaportal.org/documents/ ad385-zimbabwes_COVID-19_lockdown_a_crisis_for_informal_traders-afr obarometer-19aug20.pdf. Accessed 6 November 2020. Mukeredzi, T. (2020). Zimbabwe’s triple threat: Coronavirus, food shortages, and an economy in meltdown (online). https://www.thenewhumanitarian. org/news/2020/04/09/zimbabwe-coronavirus-food-economy-2020-04-09. Accessed 10 April 2020. Peterson, S. (2002). Epidemic disease and national security. Security Studies, 12(2), 43–81. Pindula News. (2020). Hungry Bulawayo residents ignore stay at home order (online). https://news.pindula.co.zw/2020/04/22/hungry-bulawayo-reside nts-ignore-stay-at-home-order-2020-04-22. Accessed 23 July 2020. UNDP. (1994). Human development report 1994: New dimensions of human security. Oxford University Press. Vinga, A. (2020). Informal sector employs 238,000 workers—ZIMSTAT (online). https://www.newzimbabwe.com/informal-sector-employs-238-000-workerszimstat-2020-03-27. Accessed 20 July 2020. Wilson, T. D. (2011). Introduction: Approaches to the informal economy. Urban Anthropology and Studies of Cultural Systems and World Economic Development, 40(3/4), 205–221. Zimbabwe. Ministry of Finance and Economic Development Press Statement. (2020, June 4). Press statement: Guidelines and modalities on accessing the ZWL18.02 billion economic recovery and stimulus package. Zimbabwe. Office of the President and Cabinet. (2020). President Mnangagwa’ speech on the extension of the lockdown (online). http://www.theopc.gov.zw/ index.php/562-president-mnangagwa-s-speech-on-extension-of-lockdown2020-04-20. Accessed 6 November 2020.

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Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency. (2020). 2019 labour force and child labour survey report. ZIMSTATS. Zinyuke, R. (2020, April 3). Police confiscate vegetables. The Herald (online). https://www.herald.co.zw/lockdown-police-confiscate-vegetables/. Accessed 20 July 2020. ZTV News. 2020. President Mnangagwa extends lockdown by 14 days (online). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=srT2cF_JQyU-2020c-04-19. Accessed 20 May 2020.

Online Sources https://news.pindula.co.zw/2020/04/03/watch-zimbabwe-police-confiscategoods-belonging-to-lockdown-defying-vendors. Accessed 15 May 2020. https://zimpricecheck.com/market-intelligence/harare-city-council-destroysmarket-stalls-at-the-behest-of-the-national-government. Accessed 20 April 2020. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/zimbabwe-extends-coronavirus-loc kdown-weeks-200419152145245.html. Accessed 10 June 2020. https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2020/03/29/assessing-the-economic-imp act-of-coronavirus/. Accessed 29 March 2020.

Notes Interview with analyst 14 May 2020; Harare. Interview with analyst 15 June 2020; Harare. Interview with analyst 31 July; Harare. Interviews with informal trader 30 May 2020; Harare. Interview with informal trader 10 June 2020; Harare. Interview with informal trader 14 June 2020; Harare. Interview with informal trader 30 June 2020; Harare. Interview with informal trader 6 July 2020; Harare. Interview with informal trader in Kuwadzana suburb 12 August 2020; Harare. Interview with Kuwadzana resident 20 August 2020; Harare. Interview with vendors 14 June 2020; Harare.

CHAPTER 12

Government as the Leviathan: A Comparative Study on Government Policies on the Informal Sector During COVID-19 Pandemic in Zimbabwe and South Africa Happy Mathew Tirivangasi , Louis Nyahunda , Taurai Zingwena, and Thembinkosi E. Mabila

Introduction The world has witnessed the epidemic of a novel Corona Virus, COVID19, produced by the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) virus (Paules et al., 2020). COVID-19 was discovered in the Chinese city of Wuhan in December 2019. (Phelan et al., 2020).

H. M. Tirivangasi (B) · L. Nyahunda · T. E. Mabila Department of Research Administration and Development, University of Limpopo, Mankweng, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] L. Nyahunda e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. Dorasamy (ed.), Governance Challenges During the COVID-19 Pandemic in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11244-7_12

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The World Health Organization (WHO) declared a public health emergency on January 30, 2020, in reaction to the virus’s rapid spread and the resulting deaths worldwide (WHO, 2020a, 2020b). On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) labeled it a pandemic due to its continued spread. As of the 16th of September 2020, infections had reached a total of 29.9 million people, with 944,140 deaths and more than 21 million people regaining their health in various places around the world (Worldometers, 2020). The pandemic was a major source of concern for many countries, and national governments worked tirelessly to safeguard their citizens. According to WHO, in reaction to the pandemic’s consequences, all international borders have been blocked, with no inbound planes authorized, and all road ports have been closed as of April 3, 2020 (Sandford, 2020). To contain the COVID19 outbreak, it was critical to maintaining social isolation and proper cleanliness (WHO, 2020b). Nationwide lockdowns were implemented as the world grappled with the consequences of COVID-19 and how to prevent the spread of the pandemic after it was discovered that they were extremely effective at combating the virus, as was the case in the Chinese city of Wuhan, where the virus first appeared in the summer of 2009. Lau and co-workers (Lau et al., 2020). South Africa and Zimbabwe, among other Southern African countries, have both implemented national lockdown legislation. According to South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, who announced the implementation date on March 3, 2020, a nationwide lockdown would be effective from March 26, 2020. Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa announced a state of emergency on March 30, 2020, with the first day of the emergency beginning on March 30, 2020. The country came to a full halt for several months, with all commercial transactions, both domestically and internationally, halted. The two administrations prohibited individuals under a stay-at-home order from leaving their homes,

T. E. Mabila e-mail: [email protected] T. Zingwena Department of Agriculture Economics, Education and Extension, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected]

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except for those necessary to provide critical services or those in an emergency. Individuals engaged in the procurement of food, the provision of health care, and those who are members of or provide critical services were free from these restrictions, as were those engaged in the supply of critical services. Because it is the government’s job to safeguard the general public’s safety in any given situation, the state needed to implement such rules. However, the COVID-19 had significant consequences for individuals who worked in the informal sector, which were felt most sharply by people in the informal sector. The fact that 75% of Zimbabwe’s population is employed in the informal sector proves the hardships endured by the Zimbabwean people throughout the country’s years of isolation and repression. The South African government constructed a safety net for its most needy inhabitants, allocating 500 billion rands (Chutel, 2020) for this goal. The Zimbabwean government, on the other hand, lacked a comparable program to aid its population, the majority of whom rely on the informal sector for livelihood. According to a 2018 estimate by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Zimbabwe’s informal sector is the second largest in the world, ranking first among African nations and second overall. Zimbabwe’s manufacturing industry is projected to account for at least 60% of total economic activity (IMF, 2018). A significant effect of the government’s shutdown of public marketplaces in the informal sector, except for those selling food, has been the exposure of millions of unemployed Zimbabweans to economic shocks, as they lack access to medical treatment, insurance, payment, or any other source of income. This highlights the issue of the government’s role during the pandemic, as well as the appropriateness of the actions employed.

The Role of the State During the COVID-19 Pandemic: The Government as the Leviathan The COVID-19 pandemic posed a serious threat to the continued existence of human beings on the planet since it has an indirect impact on the population because of the spread of natural causes that caused the epidemic. It is becoming increasingly clear that the impact of this pandemic is being felt as the government implements lockdown and social distancing measures. The rich continue to fare far better than the poor as the most vulnerable populations suffer the consequences of poverty,

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inequality, climate change and COVID-19, unemployment, and inadequate service delivery. During the pandemic, the government pursued a variety of programs, prompting this chapter to raise important questions about the role of government during the crisis. In a democracy, the state’s power is obtained from the electorate, who have given their freedom for authority to serve one common purpose: to run state affairs on behalf of the public. When Hobbes discusses the origins and purpose of the state, he points out that human beings are vulnerable and insecure when the state is absent from the scene. During the English Civil War, Hobbes made the profound observation that “fear and I were born twins” (Hobbes, 1967). The renowned scholar had watched and escaped the notably terrible conflict by fleeing to France during the war. Having seen that life in a state of nature was “solitary, poor, terrible, brutish, and short,” Hobbes was concerned for his safety, as he noted that conflict or civil wars created by humans made it “solitary, poor, ugly, brutish and short.” Hobbes (1651) argued in his book “Leviathan” that citizens should cede their freedoms to an authority that could provide them with protection in exchange for protection. Citizens should relinquish their rights and engage in a contract with the ruler or the authorities in exchange for certain benefits. The government’s legitimacy is dependent on its ability to fulfill the terms of the contract while also keeping citizens secure. The philosopher Thomas Hobbes thought that when men are left to their own devices, they always seek out their interests, which leads to conflict. People will take part in a “war of every man against every man” if they are left to find their way in the world, and life will be “nasty, brutish, and short” (Tirivangasi et al., 2021). Considering this circumstance, Hobbes prioritized the protection of human beings over the wishes of an individual. Briefly summarized, Hobbes prioritized human safety before individual rights, liberties, or advantages. When considering the lockdown, if one loses his or her money, freedom of movement, or just becomes weary of sitting at home, it makes no difference other than the fact that you are alive and safe. According to Hobbes, what matters is that you have delegated authority to a higher authority to save your life, and that authority has instructed you to remain at home. Concerning the national lockdown, which entails closing borders, preventing internal movement or migration, confining people to their homes and neighborhoods to prevent the spread of illness, governments have made it a priority to close borders and

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prevent infection from spreading. This procedure would still be considered necessary if the activities of the government were to ensure the preservation of human life. The absence of Industry in such a situation results in the absence of Agriculture because the fruits of agriculture are unpredictable; as a result, there is no Culture of the Earth, nor the use of the commodities that can be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; and no moving Instruments (1996, p. 1) Hobbes and Tuck (1996). Hobbes goes on to say that there is “no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society” without which there is “no society” (Hobbes & Tuck, 1996, 1). The world has not entered the Hobbes era in its entirety, but for months, countries have closed their ports to international travel, with no gatherings of more than 50 people being permitted in South Africa and Zimbabwe, trade across borders being restricted to medical imports and exports, fuel traders, and those who export and import food; industries have been closed around the world, except for those classified as essential industries, which have been allowed to continue operating. In the beginning of the pandemic, before both South African and Zimbabwean governments understood the pandemic, a number of activities were banned for instance, there were no sporting events, nor were there any theatre or music performances, nor were there any church activities. It is becoming clear that the world is entering a period of uncertainty, as expressed by Hobbes, who writes, “And, worst of all, constant fear and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.“ Hobbes believes that the world is entering a period of uncertainty because the governments are placing a high priority on protecting their citizens. The COVID-19 sparked widespread dread of death and terror, resulting in violent protests erupting across the United States of America and other countries. Although South Africa and Zimbabwe did not encounter the whole Hobbes requirement for isolation, many aspects of the state of nature were visible as the state shifted from being a democratic state to becoming more of an authoritarian state. As the government’s emphasis was shifted to the most critical industries, the informal sector continued to suffer as the policies of the government took effect. The COVID-19 virus is perceived as the adversary, and the combat against it might be seen as the state of war. According to Hobbes, the activities of the government as the leviathan are justifiable since they would contribute to the greater good, which would be a condition in which there are no

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deaths or new infections because of the COVID-19 epidemic. Hobbes’ position, which follows in a similar vein of argumentation, is that allowing citizens to do anything they want would result in a state of chaos, a “war of all against all,” in which the strong would get food, vaccines, and the right to life (Tirivangasi et al., 2021). Furthermore, the enemy (COVID19) is a behavioral sickness that would eliminate all humans if they did not practice social distancing since it would spread swiftly if they did not. As a result, the governments who imposed the lockdown limitations did not consider such operations of the informal sector to be a top priority. Although governments around the world have assumed a strong state role in controlling the spread of the epidemic, the democratic rights of citizens must be respected. This includes access to good service delivery as well as healthy and nutritious food among other fundamental needs. Also, according to Hobbes, the legitimacy of a government or ruler is satisfied when the state can supply the wants of its citizens and protect them from dying because of their actions. Zimbabwe’s informal sector employs more than 75% of its population, making the social safety net essential to keeping the vulnerable population alive. In South Africa, where unemployment is high and a large proportion of the population relies on grants, and many migrants rely on the informal market, the government’s policies on the informal market are becoming increasingly important to the country’s vulnerable populations. In implementing Hobbes’ conditions of the social contract, governments would put in place policies that serve the preservation of life rather than the endangerment of human existence, as opposed to the current situation. As this chapter discusses the state of the informal sector in Zimbabwe and South Africa before COVID-19; how government interventions affect the operations of the informal sector during the pandemic; and policy recommendations, the informal sector in Zimbabwe and South Africa is described as follows: It is interesting to observe who the government represents and whose interests it represents, given that it wields total dictatorial power during a key moment of human history.

The State of the Informal Sector in Zimbabwe Before COVID-19 Pandemic To understand the influence of COVID-19 on the informal sector, it is necessary to first understand how the informal sector functioned before the outbreak of the disease. Several researchers, including Onishi and

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Moyo (2017), have found that the proportion of Zimbabweans employed in the informal sector increased from 84 to 95% between 2011 and 2014. Thus, Zimbabwe’s informal economy has grown to become one of the world’s most significant (Medina & Schneider, 2018). These estimates are consistent with the International Labour Organization’s (ILO, 2020) assessment that the informal sector employs approximately 85.8% of all workers in Africa. The informal sector employs about 85.8% of all workers in Africa. When compared to the condition in 1980, when Zimbabwe gained independence from the United Kingdom, these data are starkly opposed (Gumbo & Geyer, 2011; Mukorera, 2019). According to Ndiweni and Verhoeven (2013), only ten percent of Zimbabwe’s labor force was working in the informal sector in 1980, a number that has since increased to about twenty percent. Millions of qualified Zimbabweans have fled the country in search of greener pastures in neighboring countries because of the country’s increasing unemployment rate, which increased from 80 to 94% between the fiscal years 2007 and 2008 (Ndiweni & Verhoeven, 2013). Citizens who were unable to evacuate the country found employment in the informal economy, where they were able to prove themselves as business owners and entrepreneurs. People turn to economic creativity to help themselves and achieve long-term sustainability in their lives, according to some academics, who argue that one of the primary drivers of the informal sector in Zimbabwe is that it serves as a form of protest against a government that is failing to provide needed jobs and services; as a result, people turn to economic creativity to help themselves and attain long-term sustainability in their lives (Ndiweni & Verhoeven, 2013). When it comes to economic shocks, women in Zimbabwe (who are among the most susceptible demographics) rely on the informal sector, which allows them to strike a balance between working at home and engaging in economic activities that would eventually lead to financial independence (Ngundu, 2012). Female employment in Africa’s informal sector accounts for 89.7% of total employment, as opposed to 82.7% for men, according to the International Labour Organization (ILO, 2020). This shows the critical role played by the informal sector in ensuring the survival of women in Africa. It consists primarily of informal traders, makorokoza (illegal gold panners), cross-border dealers, money changers, commodity brokers, and even some informal educators, according to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The informal sector in Zimbabwe includes vendors with street booths who sell vegetables and

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secondhand clothing, as well as those who work in the formal sector (Tawengwa, 2020).

Informal Sector and South Africa Pre-COVID-19 South Africa is widely acknowledged as one of the countries that effectively supported a formal economy in the post-apartheid era. According to Fourie (2018), the South African economy employs approximately 2.5 million workers and business owners who earn enough money to sustain their families. Additionally, the informal sector has created around 850,000 salaried jobs. Despite South Africa’s 27.2% unemployment rate, which is one of the highest in the world in 2018, and poverty, the number of people entering the informal economy is still modest (Burger & Fourie, 2019). In contrast to the Zimbabwean case study, this is also true in the United States. Despite this, South Africa continues to have an informal sector, which, depending on the scenario, may be visible or invisible to the broader population. According to Bernstein (2020, 2), South Africa’s informal sector is made up of street sellers and spaza businesses as a result of a lack of observation and analytical awareness. The researcher emphasizes, however, that this is a sector that encompasses “a wide variety of industries and trades, including, but not limited to spaza shops, fast food outlets, bakeries, shebeens and taverns, backroom rentals, hawkers, taxis, mechanics and panel beaters, and hair salons.” Although many people refer to the informal sectors as street vendors (those who are visible to the public), Fourie (2018) notes that the industry in South Africa is highly diverse and includes a variety of industries that employ a huge number of people. Khambule (2022) and Statistics South Africa (2020) recognized that the South African informal economy includes a diverse variety of commercial operations carried out by food sellers, domestic workers, trash pickers, and market merchants. Despite its obscurity as a sector of the economy, South Africa’s informal sector provides important services to its residents. According to Wegerif’s (2020) survey, more than 70% of South Africans get some of their food from the informal sector. This is because the homes and workplaces of community members are easily positioned nearby. Second, informal sector enterprises run on a more flexible schedule and provide lower prices, as well as the option of extending credit to regular customers at no interest to those who purchase in quantity. These are business ethics

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that cannot be practiced informal firms or a formal setting, as such businesses are profit-driven and governed by a certain set of professional interests. As seen by this, the informal sector is critical to the population’s livelihoods in South Africa.

The Effect of COVID-19 on the Informal Sector in South Africa and Zimbabwe: An Examination of Government Measures The South African and Zimbabwean governments implemented responses to the COVID-19 pandemic that was similar, however, they differed in terms of how they were conducted. As an additional measure to combat the consequences of the national lockdown measures, Khambule (2022) points out that the South African government established emergency relief funds, tax relief, small business funding, and the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) to try and mitigate the effects of the lockdown measures. In response to the economic downturn, these responsive steps were designed to help stabilize the economy and improve the lives of vulnerable populations, such as those who are unemployed or have lost their source of livelihood income. Because of the allocation of R500 billion in social and economic relief funds, this step was made possible (King, 2020). A safety net was given for those who worked in the informal sector and whose enterprises were harmed by the disaster, as they would also be eligible for assistance through the government’s general disaster relief program. In context, the South African government, following Hobbes’ prediction that a legitimate government must protect the people from death and provide them with safety and security, had the relief materials ready for its citizens. According to Zhou (2020), the Zimbabwean government, on the other hand, announced a ZW$18 billion COVID-19 economic recovery and stimulus plan, which will be implemented in 2019. These funds were intended for use in areas such as agriculture and mining. They also included help for small and medium-sized businesses, the growth of social safety nets and food assistance, and the establishment of a health sector support fund (Zhou, 2020). Those who had lost their incomes because of the collapse of the informal sector were not eligible for this financial package. The government’s top objective was to strengthen the formal sector entities that provide services that are critical to the government’s

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revenue and the livelihood of the people. This was the government’s top priority. But their demands were ignored because they were not officially recognized by the government despite the enormous number of citizens who are reliant on the informal sector for their livelihood. Furthermore, because of the lockdown measures, people will be prevented from doing their normal commercial activities, except for those that are necessary and provide vital services, which will have an impact on the operation of the informal sector. In the absence of revenue streams, these businesses would fail because they lacked other sources of income to sustain themselves. Informal firms, according to scholar Charman, lack resilience, which means that they will be unable to withstand the shocks of the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, when a household loses one of its members the resources allocated to the business are depleted, necessitating the need to seek new capital. Because of a lack of capital injections or assistance from the government during a period of economic distress, these businesses will either close or struggle to remain in business. The informal sector in Zimbabwe will face significant challenges in rebuilding connections with their former networks, according to Gumbu (2020), who conducted a study on the impact of COVID19 on the informal sector in Zimbabwe. Because the supply chain has been disrupted, it will be difficult for informal traders to reconnect with their former networks. Because of their small size and limited financial resources, most informal traders lack adequate expertise to mitigate shocks, as well as flexibility and resistance to withholding shocks. Because the informal sector businesses are not registered with the government, it is difficult for them to receive help from the government. Both South African and Zimbabwean enterprises suffer from a lack of resilience, which is a problem that affects both informal sector firms and formal sector firms. Similarly, in the South African context, street traders were also prohibited from running their businesses in Johannesburg due to the breach of the social distancing mechanism. We approached the Economic Development Department. We came up with ways for us to operate in a specific street in Johannesburg, where our members are dealing with second-hand clothing: De Villiers Street. We have about two hundred and ten members. We told the Department that we would alternate shifts: half would work one week; the other half would trade the following week. We went to De Villiers Street; we practiced social

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distancing. We did our best. The Department came and they inspected us. Then they just said, ‘there is no social distancing, there is too much crowding’ – that was the reason they gave. We instructed our lawyers to write a letter to them. (cf. Bernstein, 2020, 5)

We can see from this account how informal traders in South Africa were forced to continue business activities to maintain their standard of living. Similarly, people congregate in areas where informal sector enterprises run, endangering the general public’s safety. As a result, the governments of South Africa and Zimbabwe claimed their authoritarian rights to secure their populations’ safety and prevent the pandemic’s spread. According to the South African definition of informal traders, the bulk of informal workplaces in Zimbabwe was characterized by close relationships between market actors, which contradicted social distance metrics (Gumbu, 2020). Because informal laborers usually expose their families, even if they are still at home because they live in overcrowded and unsanitary conditions that make virtual social distance impossible. Typical highrisk regions for virus spread include Harare’s informal marketplaces such as Mbare Musika, Mupedzanhamo, and Glenview Complex (Gumbu, 2020). Women and girls were forced to queue for water because of a shortage of markets in their communities, such as an insufficient supply of safe drinking water, placing them in danger of infection. As a result, employees in the informal sector are particularly exposed to occupational health and safety risks, as they lack access to medical treatment and financial stability in case of illness (Gumbu, 2020). After prohibiting the public from accessing industries and towns, including those in the informal sector, the government approved the operation of select entities classified as essentials. These entities were allowed to continue operating their businesses because they added value to the entire population. A formally recognized sector of the economy was represented by recognized firms. Both the Zimbabwean and South African governments provided clearance for critical firms to continue working throughout the closure. As a result of the restrictions, millions of informal laborers were compelled to work from home, and some were forced to close their businesses. This is in stark contrast to the reality of who contributes to both countries’ economies, since research has shown that, except for South Africa, the informal sector accounts for most of the economic activity on the continent. Khambule (2022) concluded that the South African government faced criticism for not incorporating the

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informal sector in declaring it a key public utility. For instance, Khambule notes that the informal sector provides essential community services; for example, informal food vendors provide the same services as large enterprises, but on a smaller community size (Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, 2020). Zimbabwe’s informal economy accounted for 59.4% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2004. (Schneider & Klinglmair, 2004). This contribution to the economy was inevitable as the number of persons involved in informal marketplaces increased over time. Coltart (2008) and Medina and Schneider (2018) assert that the informal sector’s economic activities will continue to contribute to the country’s gross domestic product (GDP), and as such, the sector’s contribution must be recognized and rewarded. While the informal sector’s impact on the South African economy remains negligible, it will continue to be critical to Zimbabwe’s economy. The president of Zimbabwe, Emmerson Mnangagwa noted the importance of the informal sector and he said during the lockdown level 2: All our people in the informal sector, who have not formally registered themselves or their enterprises, are directed to do so forthwith…once they can prove that such registration has been made, they can resume their operations. Upon resuming their work, they are compelled to adhere to the laid down COVID-19 prevention requirements, such as the wearing of masks, washing or sanitization of hands and social distancing. (cf. Mrewa (2020, 1)

In addition, the Zimbabwean government is currently struggling with the formalization of businesses in the informal sector, and as a result, it recognizes the chance to register these businesses. A similar prohibition was imposed by the government of South Africa against the operations of the informal sector. Specifically, Wegerif (2020) points out that the government of South Africa applied the provisions set down in the Disaster Management Act, 2002 (Act No. 57 of 2002), and that the spaza stores were not allowed to run unless they obtained licenses from the government. Since the implementation of this Act, local authorities in Zimbabwe’s largest towns have taken advantage of the national lockdown to reconstruct and legitimize the informal economy establishment, according to

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Mukeredzi (2020). This was conducted by the deconstruction of designated markets and illegal vending stalls across the city, which served as hotspots for the transmission of the COVID-19 virus. This act was classified as an infiltration of the informal sector, which resulted in the creation of terrains for political conflicts for control, which had major consequences for the vendors’ livelihoods. Because they are less likely to obtain the promised cushion fund help or the permitted legalized space of operation following the epidemic era, there is doubt and concern among non-partisan members. Many informal business owners may find themselves with little alternative but to use their meager business money for personal consumption in this situation. In the aftermath of the COVID19 pandemic, this will result in a temporary or permanent reduction in investment, as well as the incurring of significant debt. Furthermore, the demolishment of illegal vending malls throughout the city was intended to inspire more people to enter the informal sector by providing a positive example.

Conclusion According to the findings of the study, the informal sector contributes significantly to the economies of both South Africa and Zimbabwe. The vast growth of the informal sector in emerging and developing countries serves as evidence of this point. When the economy contracts and subsequent aftershocks occur, a large number of people lose their jobs, and the informal sector fills the void by providing them with alternative forms of employment. Furthermore, the informal sector provides services that are both economical and inexpensive, and it does so close to the neighborhoods where people live. With the onset of the COVID-19 epidemic, the operations of the informal sector economy were brought to a halt. According to Thomas Hobbes, the state is referred to as the Leviathan, and the government’s responsibilities during the COVID-19 epidemic are discussed in this chapter. As a condition of safety and security, citizens relinquished their liberties to the government. A social compact requires the government to ensure that people’s lives are not jeopardized to sustain the legitimacy of the government. Considering the COVID-19 and the uncontrolled informal sector, the government makes tough decisions to halt the operations of the unregulated informal sector to prevent the pandemic from spreading even further. The governments of South Africa and Zimbabwe

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have taken the position that informal sector businesses must formalize by registering their businesses with the government. The registration of businesses enables the government to keep track of these businesses and to offer them disaster relief help to support their livelihood.

Policy Recommendations • The creation of vertical linkages between formal and informal businesses setting up a network of wholesalers and retailers would ensure the viability and sustainability of business firms run by the informal sector owners. The established businesses create a product and those who operate in the informal sector would take the product to people’s doorstep. • Creation of dialogue between the government and the representatives of the informal sector firms on the steps required for these business enterprises to be registered or to be granted short- and long-term permits to allow continuity and access to relief by the state intervention mechanisms. • Adopt enabling approach rather than policing all the informal sector firms, the government should name the firms that are essential to the local communities through the help of the local municipalities or councilors and enable them to have facilities that allow them to operate efficiently during the pandemic or time of emergency.

References Bernstein, A. (2020). South Africa’s informal sector in the time of Covid19. https://media.africaportal.org/documents/south-africas-informal-sectorin-the-time-of-covid-19.pdf. Accessed 1 September 2020. Burger, P., & Fourie, F. (2019). The unemployed and the formal and informal sectors in South Africa: A macroeconomic analysis. South African Journal of Economic and Management Sciences, 22(1), 1–12. Chutel, L. (2020). South Africa’s big coronavirus aid effort tainted by corruption. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/19/world/africa/corona virus-south-africa-aid-corruption.html Coltart, D. (2008). A decade of suffering in Zimbabwe. In Development policy analysis. CATO Institute.

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Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs. (2020). Disaster management act, 2002: Amendment of regulations issued in terms of Section 27(2). COGTA. Fourie, F. C. V. N. (2018). The South African informal sector: Creating jobs, reducing poverty. https://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/books/the-south-africaninformal-sector-providing-jobs-reducing-poverty. Accessed 1 September 2020. Gumbo, T., & Geyer, M. (2011). ‘Picking up the pieces’: Reconstructing the informal economic sector in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. Town and Regional Planning, 59, 53–64. Gumbu, Y. L. (2020). COVID-19’s impact on the livelihoods of informal traders in Zimbabwe. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/author/gumbulorreta/. Accessed 1 September 2020. Hobbes, T. (1651). Leviathan: Or, the matter, form and power of a commonwealth ecclesiastical and civil. Paris, April, Morays Universal Library, London. Hobbes, T. (1967). Hobbes’s Leviathan. Pipol Klaccik. Hobbes, T., & Tuck, R. (1996). Hobbes: Leviathan: Revised student edition (Cambridge texts in the history of political thought) by.” Botting, E. H. (2020). A novel (coronavirus) reading of Hobbes’s Leviathan. History of European Ideas, 1–5. International Labour Organization. (2020). The impact of the COVID-19 on the informal economy in Africa and the related policy responses. https://www.ilo. org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---africa/---robidjan/documents/briefingnote/ wcms_741864.pdf. Accessed 1 September 2020. International Monetary Fund. (IMF). (2018). Zim has second largest informal economy. Retrieved on 03 March 2020 from https://www.herald.co.zw/zimhas-worlds-second-largest-informal-economy-imf/ Khambule, I. (2022). COVID-19 and the informal economy in a small-town in South Africa: Governance implications in the post-COVID era. Cogent Social Sciences, 8(1), 2078528. King, S. (2020). Ramaphosa announces R500-billion Covid-19 package for South Africa. https://mg.co.za/article/2020-04-21-ramaphosa-announcesr500-billion-covid-19-package-for-south-africa/ Lau, H., Khosrawipour, V., Kocbach, P., Mikolajczyk, A., Schubert, J., Bania, J., & Khosrawipour, T. (2020). The positive impact of lockdown in Wuhan on containing the COVID-19 outbreak in China. Journal of Travel Medicine, 27 (3), taaa037. Medina, L., & Schneider, F. (2018). Shadow economies around the world: What did we learn over the last 20 years? International Monetary Fund. Mrewa, T. (2020). Zim lockdown: Informal sector urged to register enterprises. https://www.cite.org.zw/zim-lockdown-informal-sector-urged-to-reg ister-enterprises/. Accessed 1 September 2020.

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Mukeredzi, T. (2020). ‘Dying of hunger’: Zimbabwe street vendors hit by coronavirus clampdown. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronaviruszimbabwe-idUSKBN23N0LJ. Accessed 1 September 2020. Mukorera, S. Z. (2019). Willingness to formalize: A case study of the informal micro and small-scale enterprises in Zimbabwe. Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship, 24(01), 1950001. Ndiweni, E., & Verhoeven, H. (2013). The rise of informal entrepreneurs in Zimbabwe: Evidence of economic growth or failure of economic policies? African Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 2(3), 260–276. Ngundu, K. (2012). The impact of the informal economy on the social and economic development of women headed households in Chegutu Urban district in Zimbabwe (Doctoral dissertation, University of Pretoria). Onishi, N., & Moyo, J. (2017). Trade on the streets, and off the books, keeps Zimbabwe afloat. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/04/world/afr ica/zimbabwe-economy-work-force.html?_r=0. Accessed 1 September 2020. Paules, C. I., Marston, H. D., & Fauci, A. S. (2020). Coronavirus infections— More than just the common cold. JAMA, 323(8), 707–708. Phelan, A. L., Katz, R., & Gostin, L. O. (2020). The novel coronavirus originating in Wuhan, China: Challenges for global health governance. JAMA, 323(8), 709–710. Ramaphosa, C. (2020). Statement by President Cyril Ramaphosa on further economic and social measures in response to the COVID-19 epidemic. Sandford, A. (2020). Coronavirus: Half of humanity now on lockdown as 90 countries call for confinement. https://www.euronews.com/2020/04/02/ coronavirus-in-europe-spain-s-death-toll-hits-10-000-after-record-950-new deaths-in-24-hou. Accessed on 17 September 2020. Schneider, F., & Klinglmair, R. (2004). Shadow economies around the world: What do we know? IZA. Statistics South Africa. (2020). Jobs in the SA formal sector up in the 3rd quarter of 2020. https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=13890 Tawengwa, T. (2020). Dealing with Zim’s informal sector. https://www.sunday mail.co.zw/dealing-with-zims-informal-sector. Accessed 1 September 2020. Tirivangasi, H. M., Nyahunda, L., Mabila, T. E., & Mugambiwa, S. S. (2021). Implications of the marginalisation of social sciences in the fight against the Covid 19 pandemic: A humanities perspective. International Journal of Criminology and Sociology, 10, 1533–1541. Wegerif, M. C. (2020). “Informal” food traders and food security: Experiences from the Covid-19 response in South Africa. Food Security, 12(4), 797–800. World Health Organization. (2020a). Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19): Situation report, 82. World Health Organization. (2020b). WHO director-general’s opening remarks at the media briefing on COVID-19-11 March 2020.

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Worldometers. (2020). COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic. https://www.worldo meters.info/coronavirus/ Zhou, J. (2020). Zimbabwe: A look at Govt’s coronavirus economic stimulus package. https://allafrica.com/stories/202006120549.html. Accessed 1 September 2020.

CHAPTER 13

Pandemic Within Pandemic: Corruption as an Impediment to Effective Management of COVID-19 in Nigeria and South Africa Omololu Fagbadebo and Nirmala Dorasamy

Introduction The crisis of governance in Africa has remained endemic. Entrenched corruption culture in the continent compounded the pains of citizens who often face challenges of worthy livelihood amid abundant resources. The management of the COVID-19 pandemic further exposed African leaders’ penchant for abuse of power, which aggravated the consequences of the epidemic, with poverty and hunger. Citizens were exposed to the

O. Fagbadebo (B) Department of Public Management, Law and Economics, Durban University of Technology, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] N. Dorasamy Department of Public Management and Economics, Durban University of Technology, Durban, South Africa e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. Dorasamy (ed.), Governance Challenges During the COVID-19 Pandemic in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11244-7_13

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vulnerable environment created by the pandemic while relief materials and other infrastructure deployed to combat the rising cases of the infection became objects of public stealing. Thus, the festering culture of corruption created an environment for raging pandemic within the corruption pandemic. As the COVID-19 pandemic rages, citizens were battling the government over the corruption pandemic characterized by public theft of relief materials and other resources earmarked for containing the further spread of the virus. Director of the Kenyan chapter of Transparency International, Sheila Masinde, noted that corrupt practices, as witnessed during the COVID-19 pandemic “is becoming a trend [in Africa]”, stating that the “concerns were already there even before Covid19. But Covid-19 has just allowed another level of looting, with public procurement being a key epicenter of corruption across the board in different countries” (cf. Schipani et al., 2020). Health workers complained over a lack of protective equipment, citizens protested over stealing and diversion of relief materials, and expressed their anger against rampant mismanagement of public healthcare resources. With the hashtags #arrestCovidthieves, #stopCovid19thieves, African citizens berated leadership insensitivity to the plights of the vulnerable people who have remained the victims of failed public policies (Schipani et al., 2020). In Nigeria, the government claimed it spent N37.06 m ($96,000) for 1,808 pieces of face masks, an equivalent of about $53 per piece (Schipani et al., 2020). This is not only outrageous but also criminally audacious. From the Africa CDC website, the most expensive face mask goes for US$4.10 while the least goes for US$0.08. In terms of infection rate, African countries have fewer cases of COVID-19 infections, compared to other countries. Nevertheless, government handling of the existing cases was characterized by public outcry over allegations of corruption and unethical practices. “In a stark reminder of the pervasive presence of corruption, leaders across the continent are facing public outrage over a string of suspect contracts” (Schipani et al., 2020; Africa CDC, 2021). This is a manifestation of rampant abuse of power by the leadership that has remained an albatross that defied rational solutions. While citizens suck in their helplessness occasioned by the pandemic corruption, the leaders continue to exploit public resources to the detriment of the public during the COVID-19 era. While citizens were exposed to the hardship generated by the lockdown, leaders took the advantage

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to steal public resources designated for relief materials. In Nigeria, while citizens were living in hunger, government officials hoard food items and other relief materials earmarked for public consumption. COVID-19 patients were treated poorly, while public officials looted the resources. In South Africa, officials looted the fund established for the welfare of unemployed citizens. The procurement process became a network of corruption. Other African countries experienced the corruption pandemic during the COVID-19 pandemic thereby compounding the bourgeoning governance crisis. This paper seeks to address some of these preexisting pandemic situations that have compounded the crisis of governance generated by the management of the COVID-19 pandemic.

COVID-19 Cases in Africa Africa has minimal cases of infections and deaths compared to the cases in advanced countries. South Africa has the highest cases, 1,554,975, in Africa with 53,173 deaths, 1,480,632 recoveries, and 10,055,899 tests. Nigeria has recorded 163,498 cases, 2,058 deaths, 153,788 recoveries, and 1,803,177 tests, leading to the heist cases in West Africa. Cameroon leads the highest figure in Central Africa with 61,731 cases, 919 deaths, 56,926 recoveries, and 1,257,949 tests. In East Africa, Ethiopia is leading with 223,665 cases, 3,078 deaths, 166,752 recoveries, and 2,422,730 tests. Morocco is leading in North Africa with 500,323 cases, 8,873 deaths, 486,913 recoveries, and 5,565,254 tests (John Hopkins University 2021; Africa CDC 2021) (see Table 13.1). Table 13.1 COVID-19 data in Africa (2021, March 8) Region Central Africa East Africa North Africa Southern Africa West Africa Total

No of cases 143,039 534,862 1,278,492 1,922,733 441,848 4,320,974

No of death 2,312 9,565 36,728 60,569 5,796 114,970

Recoveries 128,601 407,775 1,119,442 1,814,385 412,458 3,882,661

No of tests 2,572,583 7,292,282 10,652,236 14,505,364 6,071,247 41,093,712

Source Generated by the authors from the data provided by the Africa Centre for Disease Control and Prevention. https://africacdc.org/covid-19/

These numbers were mostly associated with the poor management of the infection, because of insufficient infrastructural facilities to provide the

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necessary support for such emergency health disasters. The next section provides an analysis of the preexisting healthcare infrastructural pandemic in Nigeria and South Africa.

Poor Infrastructural Pandemic One of the existing pandemics in most African states before the advent of COVID-19 was decayed infrastructural facilities. Human Rights Watch (2020) noted that COVID-19 exposed the deficient healthcare services in most African countries. Health care infrastructure in the continent was not sufficient enough to for the populations to access quality healthcare services. Practitioners and health experts have noted inadequate government expenditures on health care and mismanagement of fiscal allocations as the major factors responsible for the poor healthcare delivery services. Accordingly, “a chronic lack of investment in healthcare infrastructure and equipment has made it harder for African nations to retain skilled healthcare workers, provide essential medicines, and reduce the mortality rates of perennial diseases like malaria” (Human Rights Watch, 2020). This is an old problem that had occasioned the intervention of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), now the African Union (AU). In 2001, the governments of the continents declared. WE COMMIT OURSELVES to take all necessary measures to ensure that the needed resources are made available from all sources and that they are efficiently and effectively utilized. In addition, WE PLEDGE to set a target of allocating at least 15% of our annual budget to the improvement of the health sector. (OAU, 2001)

The Abuja declaration was a sequel to the dire need for institutional intervention in the raging HIV/AIDs, tuberculosis, and other infectious diseases ravaging the continent. Nevertheless, the declaration was like any other political jamboree of playing to the gallery. Ten years after the declaration, healthcare infrastructure in the continent had grown worse. Even though some of them had increased their allocation to the health sector, very few have been able to meet up with the 15% allocation contained in the Abuja declaration (Botswana, Rwanda, Zambia, & South Africa, while some have even reduced their initial allocations (Human Rights Watch, 2020).

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In a recent survey, the report indicated that “Africa’s public health systems are notoriously ill-equipped” (Houreld et al., 2020). In the study carried out in 48 out of the 54 African countries, the survey “findings are stark”, as there were records of “severe shortages of medical personnel, especially critical care nurses and anesthesia providers” in most of the African nations (Houreld et al., 2020). In Nigeria, healthcare facilities are in bad shape, and healthcare delivery services are abysmally poor. As at the time the COVID-19 case was discovered in Nigeria, there were only 350 intensive care beds (Houreld et al., 2020). With a paltry 3.9% of its fiscal allocation to healthcare delivery infrastructure, Nigeria, despite its abundant oil resources, struggles with the basic provision of healthcare facilities. Nigeria has one of the highest maternal mortality in the globe, with 545 deaths per 100,000 live births (Chijioke, 2018; Fagbadebo & Dorasamy, 2021). Most public healthcare facilities in Nigeria are characterized by decayed structures, inadequate electricity, water supply, and poor staffing, as most qualified health workers, has migrated to other countries. Another dangerous characteristic of the country’s healthcare sector is the corruption pandemic with the increasing phenomenon of production of counterfeit, fake, and cloned drugs in pharmacy shops, a development that has compounded the health challenges of the patients. Healthcare regulatory oversight is very weak because of corruption, as importers of fake and counterfeit drugs bribe their ways for the clearance of their illicit products without verification (Chijioke, 2018). Capacity utilization is equally a hindrance and there is a serious problem with the handling, storage, and distribution of drugs which remains chaotic. This has led to a loss of confidence in all drugs whether imported or manufactured locally (Chijioke, 2018).

The country’s health ministry had indicated that the government was struggling with the annual US$ 10 billion infrastructural deficit gap in the health sector (Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission (ICRC) 2019). Indeed, the infrastructural deficit is a major developmental setback in Nigeria (Ajia, 2020). One of the promoters of healthcare facilities and infrastructural development assistance in Africa, Bill Gates, noted the poor state of health infrastructure in Nigeria, reiterating the primacy of quality infrastructural facilities to the country’s successful fight against COVID-19. According

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to him, the Nigerian government should focus on strengthening and developing its healthcare infrastructural facilities rather than the procurement of the COVID-19 vaccines (Adebowale, 2021). There is no doubt that the impact of putting money into the health system particularly the primary healthcare system will be very high in terms of saving children’s lives. Nigeria should not divert the very limited money that it has for health into trying to pay a high price for COVID-19 vaccines. I’m an advocate for the government to have more resources and prioritize health. I’m not a voter in Nigeria, so Nigeria can decide that independently. So, my advice is that the primary health care system is what is super important and that with those finite resources, you have to prioritize expenditure (cf. Adebowale, 2021).

Gates’ admonition came as the government planned to invest N400 billion (about US$ 1.5 billion) in the procurement of COVID-19 vaccines. Thus, rather than dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic through vaccination, it would be more appropriate for the government to attend to the poor healthcare infrastructural pandemic. The poor infrastructural facilities, coupled with the inadequate commitment of the government to the implementation of inclusive health policies, have led to the mass exodus of Nigerian healthcare practitioners to other countries. As of 2016, more than 3000 Nigerian-trained medical doctors had migrated to the United Kingdom, while over 5000 in the United States (BBC News, 2016, June 7). By 2020, this figure had risen to 8000 medical doctors who migrated to the UK, while over 4000 were in the United States (The Punch, 2020, July 25). The brain drain pandemic in the health sector continues to fester because of poor working conditions and infrastructural facilities in the country’s healthcare centers, incessant strike actions by health workers have compounded the preexisting pandemic in the country’s health sector before the advent of COVID-19. This has dampened the morale of the healthcare workers, who accused the government of playing politics with the health care in the country. The morale of doctors and other workforce is at an all-time low. We need our patients to understand that they are our first priority. A doctor or health care provider that is unhappy, poorly motivated, distracted will not be able to discharge his duties diligently despite the oath sworn at induction into the profession. Therefore, we call on our patients to appeal to the

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government and her officials to stop playing politics with health. (Olokor, 2021)

This becomes more pertinent since government officials depend on foreign medical facilities for their healthcare needs. In 2016, the President announced the withdrawal of government funding of foreign medical care by public officials (Igiebor, 2021). A few months after the announcement, precisely in 2017, the President embarked on medical tourism in the UK where he spent 103 days for the treatment of an undisclosed ailment (Michael, 2021). In all, he had already spent 170 days outside the country for medical treatment since he assumed office on May 29, 2015. The more recent medical trip of the President to the UK in April 2021, has attracted public outcry when the nation was in dire need of effective leadership to confront the various healthcare problems and the rising insecurity that have been threatening the county’s citizens. As Igiebor (2021) has noted, the president did not have trust in the country’s healthcare facilities and medical officials. While he left for the UK for his routine medical checkup, Nigerians in the various hospitals were being prematurely discharged because medical doctors had embarked upon a strike action that had paralyzed all activities in the various public hospitals. Although the presidency announced it was a routine medical check-up, which would last about two weeks, it appears to be yet another sign that the president does not trust Nigeria’s poor healthcare system and cannot do much to salvage it. (Michael, 2021)

Nigerian government usually spends US$1bn on foreign medical trips, an amount greater than the total budgetary allocation for the health sector (BBC News 2016, June 7). The president’s announcement was a mere political statement, as he frequently abandoned the Aso Rock Clinic, the specially equipped medical facility for the medical needs of the President, his Deputy, and their family members, that usual gulp over N1billion annually in budgetary allocation. While this infrastructural pandemic in the health sector is more profound in Nigeria, many influential South African citizens still enjoy a measure of relief, especially those with active medical aids. Medical facilities in South Africa are one of the best in the continent, and unlike Nigeria, South African leaders often patronize local medical facilities for their healthcare needs. Nevertheless, public hospitals in the country are

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not well equipped to cater to the health care needs of the majority of citizens. The COVID-9 pandemic further exposed the deficiencies in the country’s public hospitals. South Africa operates a referral healthcare system, with primary healthcare (PHC), including clinics and healthcare outreach teams at every ward, which are the first point of contact for patients (KPMG, 2017). The clinics at this level refer patients to the relevant specialists in the hospitals in their area. Above this level are the District hospitals, owned and controlled by the Provincial’s Department of Health, categorized into three: Small district hospitals with 50–150 beds; Medium district hospitals with 50–300 beds; and Large district hospitals with 300–600 beds (KPMG, 2017). This is followed by Regional hospitals, which “operate 24 hours a day and serve a defined regional population within provincial boundaries based on referrals from district hospitals” (KPMG, 2017). This category of hospitals operates within the jurisdiction of provincial Departments of Health, with 200–800 beds. There are also tertiary hospitals, which receive referrals from regional hospitals. They are not limited by provincial boundaries and provide supervised specialist and intensive care services. They are also within the mandate of provincial Departments of Health, providing training for healthcare professionals, and have 400–800 beds. There are also central hospitals, which provide tertiary and central referral services. Nevertheless, these hospitals are concentrated in the urban areas, thereby leaving a sizeable majority of South Africans in rural areas with no access to adequate health care needs. Using 2019 data, 19.5 million (33.4%) of South African 58.8 million live in rural areas (The World Bank ND). Private healthcare facilities in South Africa provide high-quality healthcare services (KPMG, 2017). While public hospitals and healthcare facilities are facing the dire need for improved infrastructures, private hospitals are well-financed and equipped with standard facilities that cater to the healthcare needs of citizens who could afford the charges. Even though the government has intensified efforts at improving the quality of healthcare delivery in its public health facilities, the outbreak of COVID19 strained the existing facilities in both public and private healthcare sectors. Hospitals at the tertiary level are expected to be better equipped to handle the various emergency healthcare challenges and novel infectious diseases, such as the COVID-19 (Thomas et al., 2020). Nevertheless, the deficiency in this regard was exposed during the COVID-19 outbreak.

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Practitioners at this level of healthcare facilities in the country noted that they were faced with challenges that ranged from insufficient staff and materials. The challenges faced at our institution have most likely been encountered by other healthcare facilities as well... Challenges still facing our institution include insufficient staff, shortages of testing kits and consumables, including PPE and disinfectants. Facilities need to have leadership teams to address various aspects of the response such as operations teams, clinical diligently involved in the delivery of high-quality care to patients with COVID-19 (Thomas et al., 2020: 966–967).

Upon the outbreak of the COVID-19, hospitals were faced with various challenges such as insufficient equipment for treating patients. For instance, Thomas et al., (2020, 965) note that practitioners were faced with “difficulty in stepping down patients requiring oxygen or other supportive care, as most step-down facilities were not sufficiently equipped and did not have nurses or doctors on-site”. There were also the challenges of “intermittent supply shortages of viral test kits or consumables once testing in the institution had commenced”, and the “lack of on-site COVID-19 diagnostic testing during the initial stages” (Thomas et al., 2020: 965). In addition to this, there was a shortage of supply of quality personal protective equipment (PPE). These challenges were facilitated by the rampant mismanagement of public resources designated to combat the COVID-19 pandemic.

COVID-19 Corruption Pandemic One of the devastating consequences of the COVID-19 lockdown regulations across the globe is the loss of jobs in the private sector. Most small-scale businesses ran aground as a result of lack of operation. In South Africa, 26% of Small, Medium, and Micro-Enterprises (SMMEs) were said to have been closed down temporarily, while 7% had already folded up (Mabuza, 2021). In December 2020, data from Statistics South Africa indicated that 11.1 million (42.6%) out of the 59.6 million population, were unemployed, including discouraged workers (Statistics South Africa, 2021). The impact of the COVID-19 lockdown restriction compounded the unemployment rate in South Africa, even though there were stimulus packages to assist SMMEs.

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The South African Government (2021) in its official portal, indicated a series of relief funds that are available to support SMMEs, such as Debt Relief Finance Scheme, Restructuring of SEFA-funded loans, Business Growth/Resilience Facility, and Spaza Support Scheme. Others are COVID-19 Agricultural Disaster Support Fund, Tourism Relief Fund, Tax measures to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, and Loan guarantee scheme. Nevertheless, these funds are available for SMMEs that are wholly owned by South African citizens. Even at that, the distribution of the funds was delayed long after the approval of the scheme (Ndaba, 2021). President Cyril Ramaphosa had, on March 23, 2020, announced the government’s approval of “R500 billion Covid-19 fund to help people and companies to deal with the rampant effects of the pandemic” (Ndaba, 2021). The Auditor-General’s COVID-19 Audit Reports, released in September and December 2020, noted that there were institutional control weaknesses as well as “significant faults in procurement and contract management processes of covid-19 relief package” (AuditorGeneral South Africa, 2020a). In the first report, the Auditor-General noted “the high risk of fraud” associated with the administration of the COVID-19 relief funds (Auditor-General South Africa, 2020a). This includes payment of the relief funds to unqualified people, inadequate record-keeping, inflation of prices in the procurement process, especially personal protection equipment (PPE), non-compliance with the procurement process, overpayment for services among other malfeasances. Another major fault line in the distribution of the relief packages was the lack of “integration and sharing of data across government platforms”, which “resulted in people (including government officials) receiving benefits and grants to which they were not entitled” (AuditorGeneral South Africa, 2020b). The Report added. Some of the initiatives did not achieve the desired results and were even abandoned because of failed coordination, monitoring, and relationships across the three spheres of government. Where implementing agents were involved, we found weaknesses in coordination and monitoring which compromised delivery, transparency, and accountability (Auditor-General South Africa, 2020b).

Out of the 21% of businesses that were closed as a result of the COVID-19 lockdown restrictions, 64% indicated that they would likely

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reopen after the lockdown, while a sizeable number of the small businesses remained vulnerable to close down unless they have access to about “R1.1 trillion in relief funding if they have any hope of staying open over the next 12 months” (Mabuza, 2021). While 44% of the major large corporate organizations have shown evidence of reopening in 2021, about 15% of the SMMEs have not been able to resume their operations. Indeed, some have folded up. Among those that are in operations, about 54% were operating below capacity, a development that necessitated the decision of about 41% of the SMMEs to retrench their workforce (Mabuza, 2021). In Nigeria, public officials allocated funds reserved for COVID-19 to themselves and their cronies and hoarded relief materials meant for distribution to citizens. The #EndSars protest in October exposed the various warehouses where government officials hid the materials and were later looted by the protesters (Orjinmo, 2020). Most of the warehouses that the protesters discovered were filled with items with the inscription of COVID-19 palliatives. One of the protesters justified the looting of the materials with the claims that they were meant for public distribution while citizens are dying of hunger. We need our palliatives. It is our right. My neighbor almost died of hunger because of COVID-19. He used to work as a security guard at a government institution, but he was sacked. What do you want him to do? I gave him beans and rice, he almost died of hunger. (cf. Obiezu, 2020)

Citizens sought to know why the relief materials that ought to have been distributed since the beginning of the lockdown were kept in the warehouse without any information from the government. Another protester who spoke with newsmen said: They didn’t share anything here. Maybe they shared for themselves. But they didn’t share for everybody and these now they are hiding it so that people may leave it, they’ll now gather them, they’ll be selling it to the people. (cf. Obiezu, 2020)

The head of Social Action Nigeria, a non-governmental organization, Ms. Vivian Bellonwu, reasoned that government action was an indication of systemic failure.

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To think that certain persons could lockdown this quantum of food and materials as we are seeing them in their premises, in their custody, and watching while people wallow in poverty and difficulty, is unthinkable. I think that it is quite mean, I think it’s highly insensitive and I think that this is a betrayal of trust of the people. (cf. Obiezu, 2020)

This spate of unethical conduct had eroded public trust in government. Aside from the visible acts of corruption that pervade Nigeria’s public sector, the conduct of public officials on issues of public interest during the COVID-19 worsened public disposition to government activities and policies. This erosion of public trust has further strengthened the proclivity of the political actors toward malfeasances since they are interested more on the retention of state power through manipulation of the preexisting crisis of governance. With the bourgeoning poverty and hunger, coupled with a weak civil society, Nigerian political elites are customed to manipulating the electorate for support during the electioneering campaign. Since accountability is a rarity in the country’s political process, systemic corruption is a valid political vice that has been transmuted to a culture of governance.

Security Pandemic One of the consequences of the COVID-19 corruption was the heightened human security challenge. The lockdown measures provided the avenue for a worsening security problem in Nigeria and South Africa. Before the advent of COVID-19, security apparatuses in the two countries were in deplorable situations. In South Africa, for instance, heightened political violence and other criminal activities were almost at a breaking point before the outbreak of COVID-19 (Onwuegbuchulam, 2021; Fagbadebo, 2021). As Faull and Kelly (2020) have noted, “despite unprecedented restrictions on movement, alcohol and the economy and a surge in policing activities, South Africans continued to kill one another at a very high rate”. South Africa is noted for gender-based violence, and it had been labeled as the rape capital of the world (SA People 2020, December 7; Fagbadebo, 2021). The South African Police Service (SAPS) had reported that an average of 116 cases of rape takes place in the country daily in 2019 (Minisini, 2021). A civil rights movement in South Africa,

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AfriForum blamed the government for the bourgeoning violent crime in the country. The government’s failure to provide an adequate criminal justice system as well as displaying a lack of urgency towards implementing drastic measures to try and address crime has resulted in the country having some of the highest levels of violent crime in the world, particularly when it comes to rape. It is noteworthy that each of the steps that have been taken by the government to address the issue is merely reactive to the crisis and that while these steps might contribute to a better response, none of them would significantly contribute to lowering the levels of violence against women (AfriForum, 2020, December 7).

Also known as the “destination of femicide”, South Africa has witnessed the murder of 2700 women since 2000 (Minisini, 2021). In the first three weeks of the lockdown in 2020, there were cases 120,000 recorded cases of gender-based violence (GBV) in South Africa, with further 1000 daily records a few weeks afterward (Minisimi, 2021). In other words, the COVID-19 lockdown increased incidents of GBV without sufficient security measures to safeguard victims. Thus, while the COVID-19 pandemic increases in South Africa, “GBV is spread through social and political conditions that undermine the ability of women and girls to escape from abuse” (Minisimi 2021). While lockdown restriction was a measure to curtail the spread of COVID-19, it became a festering ground for spreading GBV as “homes become a dangerous place for women and girls during COVID-19 lockdown” (Amnesty International, 2021). This is another manifestation of the preexisting structural pandemic. According to Deprose Muchena, the Director of Amnesty International for East and Southern Africa, the lockdown that accompanied the COVID-19 pandemic “prompted an escalation in gender-based violence against women and girls in Southern Africa. It has also magnified existing structural problems such as poverty, inequality, crime, high unemployment, and systematic criminal justice failures” (cf. Amnesty International, 2021). In Nigeria, while the spate of kidnapping, terrorist attacks, and other violent crimes subsided doing the COVID-19 lockdown, nevertheless, other criminal activities generated by the lockdown continued to fester. Aside from this, Nigerian citizens became victims of brutalities in the hands of the security forces deployed to enforce the lockdown rule (BBC

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News, 2020, April 16). They extort money through harassment and kill citizens at will. Nigeria’s National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) reported 8 separate incidents of extrajudicial killings that claimed the lives of 18 people between March and April 2020, with more than 100 complaints of security harassment of citizens (BBC News, 2020, April 16). The security forces did not spare women for their spate of harassment and assault. For instance, on July 28, 2020, four policemen were alleged to have raped a 23-year-old woman arrested for not wearing a face mask in Rivers State (Obaji Jr, 2020). Similarly, in Nkpor, a town in Anambra State, security men deployed to enforce the COVID-19 lockdown was alleged to have raped another woman apprehended for not wearing a face mask. In Port Harcourt, security agents also arrested a pregnant woman who needed urgent medical attention during the lockdown on her way to the hospital. Medical workers were not spared from the police brutality and harassment during the COVID-19 lockdown period. Nurses have allegedly been harassed by policemen who threatened to arrest them for being out during lockdown even though they were working at a local pharmacy, while a pharmacist says he was arrested by policemen who forced him to pay 20,000 naira (about $52) for his release, despite authorization from the Federal Ministry of Health for pharmacies to operate during lockdown. (Obaji Jr, 2020)

The height of this security harassment and brutality was the public outcry and demonstration that greeted the operations of the Federal Special Anti-Robbery Squad (F-SARS). This special unit of the police was noted for its notoriety in wanton killing innocent citizens. The brutal killing of Hamilton Osahenhen Obazee in Benin by this unit in March 2020 triggered the first public demonstration against F-SARS (Obaji Jr, 2020). The unit was known and dreaded by the people, especially youth, for its unlawful arrests, torture, and extrajudicial killings of innocent citizens (Aljazeera, 2020, October 21). The heightened security challenge during the lockdown was aggravated by the failure of the government to have control over its security forces in their relationships with the civilian population. Corruption has promoted impunity among members of the security forces. Extortion of motorists and commuters at security checkpoints has become a tolerated culture that is known in government quarters without reprimand.

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For instance, the Nigerian police were among the most corrupt in the world, thereby making them more predators than protectors (World International Security and Police Index, 2016; Nguyen, 2010). Eric Guttschuss, a researcher with Human Rights Watch had noted that in Nigeria, police corruption often leads to cases of serious human rights abuses, which has pervaded the rank-and-file police officers, and it also undermines the rule of law (Nguyen, 20,2010). Nguyen (2010) noted that Nigerian policemen are fond of demanding bribes at roadblocks, while the senior officials engage in “embezzling millions of dollars”, stressing that “graft in Nigeria’s police is so systemic that officers are regarded “more as predators than protectors” by the people they’re supposed to serve”.

Caging the Pandemics These preexisting governance conditions in the two countries have compounded the human security and development challenges in the two countries. Matthew Page, an Associate Fellow of the Africa Programme in the Chatham House, has described the COVID-19 in Nigeria as a “fiscal flu” (Page, 2020). He described his concern about the pandemic in Nigeria thus: As virus-related deaths peak and lockdowns begin to ease elsewhere, Nigeria’s COVID-19 crisis appears to be intensifying. Infections are still increasing rapidly amid claims many deaths are going unreported, and the testing and treatment capacity remains minimal as a government-led scramble to revitalize a long-neglected health sector does not appear to be forthcoming. (Page, 2020)

With dwindling resources and the continuous mismanagement of public resources by self-serving public political and bureaucratic officials, post-COVID-19 Nigeria would be a dire fiscal strait. Coupled with the preexisting corruption culture and decayed infrastructure, the damage caused by the lockdown measures would lead to a deepening case of rabid steaking of public funds especially when another round of general election is less than two years away. COVID-19 and its stark fiscal consequences will further diminish Nigeria’s already fading resilience against slow-motion threats such as population

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growth, deepening poverty, and the effects of climate change. It is possible Nigeria’s ‘shock absorbers’ — political, economic, and social characteristics that have helped the country muddle through — are about to face their toughest test yet (Page, 2020).

In South Africa, government efforts at combating the further spread of the disease have resulted in a series of measure that has inflicted more hurts on the fragile economy. While the government is trying to extricate itself from the looting prey of the previous administration, intra-party squabbles in the governing party, the African National Congress (ANC) is diverting public attention from the bourgeoning crisis of governance and poor service delivery. Thus, curbing the COVID-19 pandemic would require stricter anti-corruption measures and a renewed commitment to effective public service delivery.

Conclusion The COVID-19 pandemic in Nigeria and South Africa has exposed the fundamental weakness in the governing of the two countries. With sufficient resources to combat emergencies, it is evident that the county’s leadership lacked in the commitment to the promotion of national interest. Thus, the pandemic has opened another network of corruption where public officials exploited an epidemic situation to compound the vulnerability of citizens. Unethical conduct and practices by political leaders, especially during national crisis amounts to gross violation of the fundamental rights of citizens to access quality public services. In this respect, public accountability instruments and mechanisms in the two countries need to be strengthened and members of the public should be more vigilant in holding political leaders accountable.

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health systems. Reuters. https://graphics.reuters.com/HEALTH-CORONA VIRUS/AFRICA/yzdpxoqbdvx/ Human Rights Watch, (2020, June 8). Africa: Covid-19 exposes healthcare shortfalls. https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/06/08/africa-covid-19-exposes-hea lthcare-shortfalls Igiebor, N. (2021, April 5). The Imperial President and his self-absorption. Tell Magazine. https://tell.ng/wikitell/the-imperial-president-and-his-self-absorp tion Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission (ICRC). (2019, May 5). Health sector: FG battles $10bn annual infrastructure deficit. https://www. icrc.gov.ng/health-sector-fg-battles-10bn-annual-infrastructure-deficit/ John Hopkins University Coronavirus Resource Center. https://coronavirus.jhu. edu/map.html KPMG. (2017). Opportunities in the healthcare infrastructure sector in South Africa. Report prepared for the embassy of the kingdom of the Netherlands in South Africa—October 2017. Mabuza, E. (2021, March 26). Quarter of small businesses closed because of Covid-19—Survey. Times Live. https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-afr ica/2021-03-26-quarter-of-small-businesses-closed-because-of-covid-19--sur vey/ Michael, J. (2021, April 1). Nigeria: Buhari heads to UK for medical treatment as doctors strike erupts at home. The Africa Report, Accessed on April 23, 2022. https://www.theafricareport.com/76967/nigeria-buhari-heads-touk-for-medical-treatment-as-doctors-strike-eruptsat-home/ Minisini, V. (2021, March 28). South Africa’s secondary pandemic: A crisis of gender-based violence. Global Risk Insights. https://globalriskinsights. com/2021/03/south-africas-secondary-pandemic-a-crisis-of-gender-basedviolence/ Ndaba, B. (2021, January 14). R1.4bn Covid-19 relief funds eludes small businesses while the pandemic surges. IOL. https://www.iol.co.za/news/ politics/r14bn-covid-19-relief-funds-eludes-small-businesses-while-the-pan demic-surges Nguyen, K. (2010, October 19). Nigeria’s corrupt police are more predators than protectors—Rights group. Reuters. https://news.trust.org/item/201010 19122300-73h4q/ Obaji, J. r. P., (2020, September 9). Women ‘abused’ by police enforcing COVID-19 rules in Nigeria. Aljazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/features/ 2020/9/9/women-abused-by-police-enforcing-covid-19-rules-in-nigeria Obiezu, T. (2020, October 27). Nigerians justify massive looting of COVID-19 supplies. Voice of America. https://www.voanews.com/covid-19-pandemic/ nigerians-justify-massive-looting-covid-19-supplies

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Index

A Accountability, 5, 12, 28, 30, 44, 81, 201, 262, 264, 268 Africa, 2–5, 12, 16, 23, 24, 27, 28, 32, 33, 47, 51, 59, 93, 94, 98, 117, 139, 141, 152, 200, 241, 253–255, 257 alcohol, 39, 264 Aljazeera news, 220, 221 authoritarianism, 23, 200, 201, 209

B bureaucracy, 18, 19, 103 business owners, 241, 242, 247

C community spread, 219 coronavirus, 2, 50, 86, 87, 91, 93, 154, 177, 181, 195, 230 corruption, 3, 12, 20–23, 26, 28–33, 59–61, 64, 77, 200, 201, 253–255, 257, 264, 266–268

COVID-19, 1–12, 15, 27, 28, 31–33, 37–45, 47–53, 57–71, 73, 75–81, 86–91, 93–104, 106–108, 115–119, 122–130, 137–141, 143, 145, 151–153, 177–183, 185, 190, 195–209, 213–217, 219, 225, 229, 230, 235–240, 242–244, 246, 247, 253–258, 260–268 creditworthiness, 222 D democracy, 17, 18, 21, 238 disaster, 15, 76, 106, 178, 197, 198, 204, 206, 209, 216, 243, 248, 256 Disaster Relief Funds, 123, 127 diseases, 8, 10, 50, 128, 138–140, 144, 145, 147, 148, 151, 152, 177, 190, 198, 207, 214, 216, 219, 220, 229, 230, 240, 256, 260, 268 domestic tourism, 7, 90, 100, 101, 104, 107, 108

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. Dorasamy (ed.), Governance Challenges During the COVID-19 Pandemic in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11244-7

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INDEX

E Ebola, 106, 127, 146, 196, 198, 204 economic challenges and opportunities, 57, 58, 61, 62, 71, 76–78, 80 economy, 1, 3, 5, 9, 21, 24, 27–30, 39, 40, 43, 44, 52, 58, 60, 61, 63–66, 68, 70–72, 76, 77, 79–81, 86, 89, 93, 94, 103, 107, 117, 118, 121, 125, 126, 128–130, 137, 142, 143, 146, 152, 153, 155, 165, 166, 178, 180, 196, 197, 204, 208, 209, 214, 220, 231, 242, 243, 245–247, 264, 268 ecosystem, 50 Egypt, 8, 9, 107, 116, 152–155, 159, 165, 166, 169–171 elite, 22, 23, 200, 201, 264 epidemic, 8, 11, 66, 127, 137–139, 141, 142, 144–146, 195, 196, 204, 206, 209, 235, 237, 240, 247, 253, 268 essential business, 178 essential services, 31, 178, 185, 218–220, 229, 231 e-tourism, 6, 7, 105–108 extension of the lockdown, 220 F farm, 202, 204, 218 femicide, 5, 265 food insecurity, 7, 51, 117, 122–124, 127, 129, 130, 201–203, 231 fragility, 9, 10, 196, 199, 202, 204 freedom from fear, 216, 228 freedom from want, 216, 219, 220, 224, 228 G gender equality, 8, 141–143, 146–148

governance, 2–5, 12, 16–21, 23, 27, 28, 33, 60, 78, 253, 255, 264, 267, 268 government, 2–7, 9–12, 16–28, 30–33, 38–41, 46, 48, 52, 53, 58, 60, 61, 63–67, 70, 71, 73, 75, 76, 78–80, 86, 87, 89, 93–95, 97, 103, 117, 118, 122, 123, 125, 127, 152, 171, 177, 178, 180, 183–185, 187, 190, 191, 196, 197, 199–204, 207–209, 213–231, 236–241, 243–248, 254–260, 262–268 H Harare city council, 11, 225, 226 health, 2–4, 7, 8, 10, 15, 16, 24–26, 37–51, 53, 58, 63, 64, 75, 78, 80, 106, 116–119, 122, 124, 125, 127–130, 137–147, 152, 155, 183, 189, 191, 196, 200–202, 204, 205, 209, 215, 216, 218, 219, 228, 229, 231, 236, 237, 243, 245, 254, 256–260, 267 health security, 213, 228–231 HIV/AIDS, 122, 127, 128, 145, 256 Hobbes, T., 11, 238–240, 243, 247 human rights, 23, 41, 45, 77, 140, 182, 187, 189, 196, 199, 200, 207, 267 human security, 1, 20, 23, 199, 213, 215–217, 219–221, 224, 264, 267 hunger, 10, 12, 41, 51, 52, 202, 207, 215, 216, 220, 223, 228–230, 253, 255, 263, 264 I illegal street vendors (ISV), 214 incubating, 37, 49

INDEX

in-depth interviews, 198 inequality, 3, 7–9, 27, 39–42, 59–61, 67, 69, 71, 77, 116–118, 121, 125, 128, 130, 137, 138, 142, 143, 145–147, 152–155, 158–160, 162, 165, 166, 168, 169, 171, 178–181, 183–185, 187, 190, 191, 238, 265 infections, 1, 3, 8–11, 47, 49, 60, 93, 117, 128, 138–141, 144–147, 203, 205, 209, 214, 218, 219, 236, 240, 245, 254, 255, 267 inflation, 262 informal economy, 10, 11, 208, 209, 214, 241, 242, 246 informal markets, 11 informal sector, 3, 11, 12, 42, 140, 143, 178, 208, 213–215, 218–221, 228, 229, 231, 237, 239–248 informal traders, 10, 11, 208, 213–217, 219–231, 241, 244, 245 insecurity, 23, 27, 30, 45, 46, 58, 59, 216, 221, 228, 231, 259 International Labour Organisation (ILO), 24, 221, 241 interviews, 6, 11, 98, 99, 103, 105, 108, 198, 203, 204, 217, 218, 222–224, 230

275

Leviathan, 11, 237–239, 247 livelihood(s), 2, 3, 7, 10, 46, 88, 93, 116, 122, 123, 125–130, 152, 178, 187, 196, 199, 201, 202, 208, 209, 213–216, 219, 220, 223, 226, 228–230, 237, 243, 244, 247, 248, 253 lockdown, 1–6, 9–12, 15, 27, 39, 42, 43, 45, 46, 50, 52, 60, 63, 66, 67, 70, 71, 73, 75, 79, 87, 91, 94, 95, 100, 103, 105, 116, 117, 122, 123, 125, 129, 130, 141, 143, 152, 165, 178–180, 183–186, 190, 196, 198–204, 206–209, 213–221, 223–231, 236–238, 240, 243, 244, 246, 254, 261–267 looting, 201, 254, 263, 268

K key informants, 198, 217 Kuwadzana high density, 223

M margins, 10, 203, 209 Mbare Musika Market place, 219, 224, 245 MDC-A, 223 migration, 24, 126, 197, 238 military intervention, 23 Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 95 Ministry of Local Government and Public Works, 225 Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprises, 221 monetary system, 126

L leadership, 5, 12, 17, 22, 58, 69, 254, 259, 261, 268 Lesotho, 7, 116–119, 121–130 Lesotho Vulnerable Assessment Committee (LVAC), 129

N national emergency, 3 National Social Security Authority (NSSA), 222 New Zimbabwe, 230

276

INDEX

O observation, 11, 72, 158, 198, 206, 207, 217, 238, 242 Okavango Delta, 6, 86–90, 95–102, 104–108 opposition party, 223 oversight, 257 P pandemic, 1–8, 10, 12, 15, 27, 28, 31, 32, 37–45, 47–49, 51–53, 57–80, 86–91, 93–96, 99–108, 116–119, 122–127, 129, 130, 137–141, 143, 145, 146, 151–154, 160, 165, 166, 168, 170, 171, 177–180, 183, 186, 190, 191, 195, 196, 198, 201, 202, 220, 227, 236–240, 243–245, 247, 248, 253–259, 261, 262, 265, 267, 268 personal protective equipment (PPE), 3, 16, 261, 262 PESTEL, 6, 61, 62, 75 petroleum, 5, 6, 30, 57–62, 64, 65, 67, 69–72, 74–79 physical distancing, 9, 66, 190 political change, 115, 119 political fragility, 199 politics, 65, 69, 118, 196, 201, 258, 259 pollution, 41, 50 poverty, 2, 3, 7–10, 23, 24, 26, 39–41, 46, 51, 52, 60, 63, 71, 74, 77, 86, 95, 102, 115–130, 137, 138, 142, 143, 146–148, 153–155, 158–160, 162, 163, 166, 168, 169, 171, 178–180, 187, 202, 209, 220, 222, 228, 230, 231, 237, 242, 253, 264, 265, 268 procurement, 3, 12, 15, 16, 31, 32, 218, 237, 254, 255, 258, 262

public policy, 3, 4 public sector, 2–5, 15–24, 26–29, 31, 33, 264 public service delivery, 2, 17, 22, 23, 268

Q qualitative research, 98, 198, 216, 217 quarantine, 10, 93, 186, 196, 198

R remittances, 7, 116, 117, 124–126, 129, 130, 152, 153 rural communities, 7, 95, 127, 202, 203 rural farmers, 218

S safety nets, 215, 219, 220, 224, 243 security threat, 219 self-isolation, 10, 37, 43, 186, 198 self-quarantine, 37, 207 severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), 235 sexual minorities, 45 small-scale sample, 217 social alteration, 5, 37, 41 social contract, 11, 33, 240 social distancing, 5, 11, 37, 40–43, 45, 46, 87, 117, 151, 178, 184, 191, 207, 237, 240, 244–246 social protection, 7, 46, 124, 127, 130, 140, 143 social security, 39, 231 socio-economic development, 7, 63, 81, 94, 95, 116–119, 122, 123, 130

INDEX

South Africa, 2, 8, 9, 11, 12, 27, 28, 31, 52, 88, 104, 107, 122, 125, 126, 129, 138, 139, 142–146, 177–181, 183–188, 190, 191, 217, 236, 239, 240, 242, 243, 245–247, 255, 256, 259–261, 264, 265, 268 Stimulus package, 3, 94, 123, 220, 221, 261 street vendors, 10, 214, 242 syndemic theory, 8, 137, 138, 144–146

T The World Bank, 59, 64, 118, 121, 123, 124, 126, 128, 154, 165, 260 tourism, 6–8, 25, 40, 42, 80, 86–91, 93–99, 101–104, 106–108, 152, 153, 155, 158–160, 162, 165, 166, 168, 170, 171, 259 tourism sustainability, 106 tuberculosis (TB), 128, 256

U unemployment, 7, 23, 24, 26, 27, 39, 41–43, 46, 59–61, 63, 71, 74, 94, 116, 117, 122–126, 130, 143, 165, 187, 201, 238, 240–242, 261, 265 US president, 220

277

V violence, 8, 41, 44, 45, 137, 138, 141–148, 199, 200, 264, 265 virus, 1, 7, 9–11, 15, 32, 37–40, 42, 43, 45–51, 53, 63, 66, 68, 69, 91, 93, 95, 116–119, 122–124, 126–128, 130, 146, 168, 171, 185, 189, 190, 195, 196, 202, 218, 229, 235, 236, 239, 245, 247, 254 W whistle-blowing, 200 wildlife, 50, 86, 88, 95, 96, 98 women, 8, 45, 137–148, 200, 202, 205, 241, 245, 265, 266 workers, 3, 11, 16, 30, 39, 46, 47, 96, 125, 126, 139, 221, 241, 242, 254, 256–258, 261, 266 World Health Organisation (WHO), 11, 15, 38, 116, 138, 140, 143, 145, 177, 218, 236 Z Zimbabwe, 10, 11, 32, 104, 139, 196, 200–202, 204, 206, 208, 209, 213, 214, 218–220, 223, 225, 227, 229–231, 236, 237, 239–241, 244–247 Zimbabwe Republic Police, 228 Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA), 222