Gorbachev and Bush: The Last Superpower Summits. Conversations that Ended the Cold War 9789633863459

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Gorbachev and Bush THE LAST SUPERPOWER SUMMITS CONVERSATIONS THAT ENDED THE COLD WAR

NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE COLD WAR READERS Series Editor MALCOLM BYRNE Previously published: THE PRAGUE SPRING ‘68 UPRISING IN EAST GERMANY, 1953 THE 1956 HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION A CARDBOARD CASTLE? FROM SOLIDARITY TO MARTIAL LAW MASTERPIECES OF HISTORY THE LAST SUPERPOWER SUMMITS

Gorbachev and Bush THE LAST SUPERPOWER SUMMITS CONVERSATIONS THAT ENDED THE COLD WAR SVETLANA SAVRANSKAYA and THOMAS BLANTON Editorial Assistant ANNA MELYAKOVA

Central European University Press Budapest New York

©2020 by The National Security Archive Fund, Inc. Published in 2020 by Central European University Press Nádor utca 9, H-1051 Budapest, Hungary Tel: +36-1-327-3138 or 327-3000 Fax: +36-1-327-3183 E-mail: ceupress @ press.ceu.edu Website: www.ceupress.com 224 West 57th Street, New York NY 10019, USA All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the permission of the Publisher. ISBN  978-963-386-344-2 paperback ISSN 1587-241 Library of Congress Control Number: 2019954975

Printed in Hungary by Prime Rate Kft., Budapest

Table of Contents

Preface and Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xix Main Actors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxv Chronology of Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxix Chapter 1

THE MALTA SUMMIT, 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Document No. 1:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, 12:33 p.m. –12:46 p.m., January 23, 1989 Document No. 2:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 CIA Intelligence Estimate: “Moscow’s 1989 Agenda for U.S.–Soviet Relations,” February 1989 Document No. 3:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Memorandum from Scowcroft for the President: “Getting Ahead of Gorbachev,” March 1, 1989 Document No. 4:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Record of Conversation between Gorbachev and Baker, Moscow, May 11, 1989 Document No. 5:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Memorandum from Scowcroft for the President: “Scope Paper––Your Visit to Poland,” June 29, 1989 Document No. 6:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Letter from Bush to Gorbachev, July 21, 1989 Document No. 7:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Shevardnadze, Washington, 2:00 p.m. – 3:05 p.m., September 21, 1989 Document No. 8:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Letter from Bush to Gorbachev, November 22, 1989 v

Document No. 9:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Memorandum from Baker for the President: “Your December Meeting with Gorbachev,” November 29, 1989 Document No. 10:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Record of Conversation between Gorbachev and John Paul II, December 1, 1989 Document No. 11:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, First Expanded Bilateral Meeting, Malta, 10:00 a.m. – 11:15 a.m., December 2, 1989 Document No. 12:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, First Restricted Bilateral Meeting, Malta, 12:00 p.m. – 1:00 p.m., December 2, 1989 Document No. 13:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, Luncheon Meeting, Malta, 1:30 p.m. – 2:45 p.m., December 2, 1989 Document No. 14:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, Second Restricted Bilateral Meeting, Malta, 11:45 a.m. – 12:45 p.m., December 3, 1989 Document No. 15:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, Second Expanded Bilateral Meeting, Malta, 4:35 p.m. – 6:45 p.m., December 3, 1989 Document No. 16:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 Memorandum from Rice to Scowcroft, December 5, 1989 Document No. 17:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 Chernyaev Diary, January 2, 1990 Chapter 2

THE WASHINGTON AND CAMP DAVID SUMMIT, 1990 . 93 Document No. 18:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 Memorandum from Scowcroft for the President: “Objectives for U.S.–Soviet Relations in 1990,” January 1990 Document No. 19:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, 7:04 a.m. – 7:30 a.m., January 31, 1990 Document No. 20:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 Memorandum of Conversation, Gates–Kryuchkov, KGB Headquarters, Moscow, 3:00 p.m. – 5:15 p.m., February 9, 1990 vi

Document No. 21:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Kohl, Camp David, 2:37 p.m. – 4:50 p.m., February 24, 1990 Document No. 22:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, 7:14 a.m. – 7:51 a.m., February 28, 1990 Document No. 23:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Shevardnadze, Washington, 10:00 a.m. – 11:40 a.m., April 6, 1990 Document No. 24:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 Cable from U.S. Embassy Moscow to Department of State: “Gorbachev Confronts Crisis of Power,” May 11, 1990 Document No. 25:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148 Record of Conversation between Gorbachev and Baker (with Delegations), Moscow, May 18, 1990 Document No. 26:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 Memorandum from Scowcroft for the President: “Scope Paper––The Gorbachev Summit,” Late May 1990 Document No. 27:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Kohl, 7:34 a.m. – 7:43 a.m., May 30, 1990 Document No. 28:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, First Private Meeting, Washington, 10:54 a.m. – 12:45 p.m., May 31, 1990 Document No. 29:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186 Record of Conversation between Gorbachev and Bush, Washington, 4:00 p.m. – 6:00 p.m., May 31, 1990 Document No. 30:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, Second Private Meeting, Washington, 11:00 a.m. – 11:48 a.m., June 1, 1990 Document No. 31:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201 Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, Second Plenary Meeting, Washington, 11:50 a.m. – 1:00 p.m., June 1, 1990 Document No. 32:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, Final Private Meeting, Camp David, 11:15 a.m. – 12:59 p.m., and 3:00 p.m., June 2, 1990 Document No. 33:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217 “Briefing Allies on Washington Summit,” U.S. Department of State Cable, June 15, 1990 vii

Document No. 34:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, 9:26 a.m. – 10:06 a.m., July 17, 1990 Chapter 3

THE HELSINKI SUMMIT, PARIS, AND THE WAR IN THE GULF, 1990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227 Document No. 35:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Baker–Shevardnadze, 1:29 p.m., August 7, 1990 Document No. 36:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247 Letter from Bush to Gorbachev, August 20, 1990 Document No. 37:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249 Letter from Bush to Gorbachev, August 29, 1990 Document No. 38:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251 Memorandum from Scowcroft for the President: “Your Meeting with Gorbachev in Helsinki,” circa early September, 1990 Document No. 39:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254 Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, Private Meeting, Helsinki, September 9, 1990 Document No. 40:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270 Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, Plenary Meeting, Helsinki, 2:30 p.m. – 5:00 p.m., September 9, 1990 Document No. 41:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Kohl, 12:36 p.m. – 12:46 p.m., September 11, 1990 Document No. 42:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280 Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Shevardnadze, New York, 1:15 p.m. – 1:50 p.m., October 1, 1990 Document No. 43:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284 Letter from Bush to Gorbachev, October 20, 1990 Document No. 44:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286 Letter from Gorbachev to Bush, November 6, 1990 Document No. 45:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290 Memorandum from James Baker to the President: “My Day in Moscow, November 8, 1990,” November 9, 1990

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Document No. 46:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295 Record of the Main Content of Conversation between Gorbachev and Bush, Paris, November 19, 1990 Document No. 47:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303 Record of the Main Content of Conversation between Gorbachev and Bush, Paris, November 20, 1990 Document No. 48:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304 Letter from Gorbachev to Bush, December 27, 1990 Document No. 49:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, 8:02 a.m. – 8:25 a.m., January 11, 1991 Document No. 50:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, 9:23 a.m. – 10:34 a.m., January 18, 1991 Document No. 51:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, 11:15 a.m. – 11:43 a.m., February 23, 1991 Chapter 4

THE MOSCOW SUMMIT, 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319 Document No. 52:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336 Record of Conversation between Gorbachev and Baker, Moscow, March 15, 1991 Document No. 53:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 342 Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Shevardnadze, Washington, 1:40 p.m. – 2:25 p.m., May 6, 1991 Document No. 54:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, 9:03 a.m. – 9:47 a.m., May 11, 1991 Document No. 55:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352 Handwritten Memorandum from Hewett for the President: “President Gorbachev’s Remarks on Relations with the U.S.,” circa May 25, 1991 Document No. 56:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, 4:30 p.m. – 4:49 p.m., May 27, 1991 Document No. 57:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 358 Letter from Bush to Gorbachev, June 19, 1991 ix

Document No. 58:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 360 Memorandum from Scowcroft for the President: “Meeting on Soviet Economic Issues and the London Economic Summit,” June 20, 1991 Document No. 59:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, 10:00 a.m. – 10:38 a.m., June 21, 1991 Document No. 60:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367 Letter from Bush to Gorbachev, circa Early July 1991 Document No. 61:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371 Letter from Gorbachev to Bush, July 14, 1991 Document No. 62:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374 Memorandum of Conversation, Gorbachev–Bush, London, July 17, 1991 Document No. 63:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377 Memorandum of Conversation, G-7 Meeting with President Gorbachev, London, 2:20 p.m. – 6:15 p.m., July 17, 1991 Document No. 64:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 386 Memorandum from Eagleburger for the President: “Your Visit to the USSR,” July 25, 1991 Document No. 65:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390 Record of Main Content of Conversation between Gorbachev and Bush, First Private Meeting, Moscow, July 30, 1991 Document No. 66:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 402 Memorandum of Conversation, Gorbachev–Bush, Expanded Bilateral Meeting, Moscow, 12:55 p.m. – 1:22 p.m., July 30, 1991 Document No. 67:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405 Memorandum of Conversation, Gorbachev–Bush–Nazarbayev, Luncheon Meeting, Moscow, 1:28 p.m. – 2:07 p.m., July 30, 1991 Document No. 68:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 408 Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Yeltsin, Moscow, 3:55 p.m. – 4:30 p.m., July 30, 1991 Document No. 69:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411 Record of the Main Content of Conversation between Bush and Gorbachev, Novo-Ogarevo, July 31, 1991 Document No. 70:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425 Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Kravchuk, Kiev, 1:45 p.m. – 2:15 p.m., August 1, 1991

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Chapter 5

MADRID, 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 429 Document No. 71:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Gonzalez, 1:51 p.m. – 2:02 p.m., August 19, 1991 Document No. 72:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 443 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Yeltsin, 8:18 a.m. – 8:35 a.m., August 20, 1991 Document No. 73:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 445 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, 12:19 p.m. – 12:31 p.m., August 21, 1991 Document No. 74:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 448 Memorandum from Scowcroft for the President: “Developments in the USSR,” September 5, 1991 Document No. 75:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 452 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, 9:22 a.m. – 9:50 a.m., September 27, 1991 Document No. 76:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, 1:30 p.m. – 2:00 p.m., October 5, 1991 Document No. 77:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 458 Scene Setter for Meeting with President Gorbachev, circa Late October 1991 Document No. 78:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 460 Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, Luncheon Meeting, Madrid, 12:30 p.m. – 1:15 p.m., October 29, 1991 Document No. 79:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 465 Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, Private Meeting, Madrid, 1:20 p.m. – 2:35 p.m., October 29, 1991 Document No. 80:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 471 Record of Dinner Conversation between Gorbachev, Bush, González and King Juan Carlos of Spain, October 29, 1991 Document No. 81:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 480 Chernyaev Diary, November 2, 1991 Document No. 82:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 488 Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Yakovlev, Washington, 3:10 p.m. – 4:00 p.m., November 19, 1991 xi

Document No. 83:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 492 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, 9:01 a.m. – 9:37 a.m., November 30, 1991 Document No. 84:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 496 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Yeltsin, 1:08 p.m. – 1:36 p.m., December 8, 1991 Document No. 85:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 499 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, 3:37 p.m. – 4:11 p.m., December 13, 1991 Document No. 86:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 503 Record of Conversation between Gorbachev and Baker, December 16, 1991 Document No. 87:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 513 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Gorbachev–Bush, 10:03 a.m. – 10:25 a.m., December 25, 1991 Selected Bibliography  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 517 Index  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 523

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Preface and Acknowledgments

This volume documents at the highest levels the most eventful three-year period in modern international history, from early 1989 through 1991. In this brief time, the world recognized the Cold War was over, the Soviets ended their Afghanistan war, Communism collapsed in Eastern Europe, the Chinese crushed internal dissent at Tiananmen Square, the Berlin Wall came down, Germany reunified, a U.S.-led coalition defeated Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, Nelson Mandela emerged from prison in South Africa, and Russian nationalists (with help from Ukraine and Belarus) dissolved the Soviet Union. Throughout these three tumultuous years, the leaders of the world’s superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, met face-to-face in a series of summits, starting at Malta in December 1989, and for the last time, at Madrid in October 1991. Their intense discussions, captured in these summit transcripts, reveal Mikhail Gorbachev and George H.W. Bush as highly informed observers, and often as protagonists of events, although both presidents were stunned by the speed and acceleration of history in these years. The documents show each leader achieved a primary goal—for Gorbachev, ending the Cold War, and, for Bush, keeping unified Germany in NATO—while both failed politically, with Gorbachev ushered ignominiously out of the Kremlin in December 1991 and Bush losing his re-election bid less than a year later. More than 20 years of research and dogged pursuit of documents have produced this book, beginning as early as 1993, when the Gorbachev Foundation released in one of its first publications the Soviet transcript of Gorbachev’s Malta summit with Bush.1 This was only four years after the event itself, which should have cast doubt on the U.S. government’s claims that the American documents deserved continued classification. It would take 15 more years and repeated Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests for us to obtain the U.S. record of the Malta conversations. Along the way, we drew very helpful guidance from the road map to the U.S. classified record provided by Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice in their early book (1995) quoting directly from still-classified memos to tell the story of German unification.2 Professor Zelikow came personally to the Archive after the book was published to sit with us for several hours designing declassification  For the English translation and extensive context on 1989, see Svetlana Savranskaya, Thomas Blanton, and Vladislav Zubok, Masterpieces of History; the Soviet transcript takes up pp. 619-646. 2  See Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed.

1

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requests for the documents cited in the footnotes. The footnotes, giving titles and dates and other specifics, were a public service to begin with, and the FOIAs and Mandatory Declassification Review requests (MDRs) that Professor Zelikow helped us design ultimately resulted in opening many of these documents for other scholars to use. Two other landmarks in getting key records released also came in the 1990s. Most importantly, Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany unilaterally authorized the 1998 publication of over 1,000 pages of his highest-level documents in an edited volume on the 1989-1990 unification process, including his transcripts of conversations with Gorbachev, Bush, and other leaders, without asking their permission.3 The volume served its purpose, cementing for scholars the fact of Kohl’s leading role against competing claims, for example, from Kohl’s foreign minister and uneasy coalition partner Hans-Dietrich Genscher. The second invaluable development, also in 1998, was the publication of the joint memoir by George H.W. Bush and his national security adviser Brent Scowcroft quoting in detail from the still-classified memcons and providing excerpts from their contemporaneous diary entries on the summits.4 Later that year, the Bush Presidential Library opened on the campus of Texas A&M University in College Station, Texas, which soon became an almost annual pilgrimage site for us. It still took until 2008 for the Library to open the first of the full Bush transcripts of his summits with Gorbachev. Even in 2019, as we write, U.S. government securocrats are reviewing still-classified records from those Bush Library files, and we continue to get notices from the dedicated archivists at College Station that yet another item from one of our requests dating back to 1998 and 2008 has now come through. Another complicating factor for this book was the creation by Scowcroft of a separate filing system under his personal control for the key Bush-Gorbachev communications, apparently as the result of media leaks early in 1989 attributed by Scowcroft to senior NSC staff. Even Zelikow and Rice, with their continuing security clearances, were unable to locate or review key memcons that, as it turned out, were tucked away in the separate Scowcroft files.5 Not until our repeated declassification requests (and those of many other researchers) compelled the system to move the “Special Separate USSR Notes Files” into declassification review, could we begin to put together a complete set of the Gorbachev and Bush summits transcripts. Core to this volume are the leaders’ own words. This compilation contains every word Gorbachev and Bush said to each other from 1989 through 1991, with only a few exceptions where notetakers and interpreters were told to put

 See Hanns Jurgen Kusters and Daniel Hofmann, Deutsche Einheit.  See George H.W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, The World Transformed. 5  For examples of missing memcons, see Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, p. 410 footnote 72, p. 453 footnote 42, p. 454 footnote 47. 3 4

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away their notebooks. The spoken word makes this book remarkably readable, and turns the reader into a fly on the wall, listening in on the cruise ship at Malta, or on the deck at Camp David, or at the dacha in Novo Ogarevo outside Moscow, inside Secret and Top Secret discussions whose transcripts stayed in locked safes until the Freedom of Information Act (on the U.S. side) or the Gorbachev Foundation (on the Russian side) released them from bondage. What’s missing from the memcons? There were interpreters at all these conversations, since Bush spoke no Russian and Gorbachev had only studied German in school, and there were notetakers present at all but two. One of the latter was the biological weapons demarche from Bush to Gorbachev at Camp David in June 1990; we have a photograph showing the grim-faced Soviet leader, but the interpreters’ notebooks are shoved in the back of their pants. Yet we know from the Soviet side what Gorbachev heard, since he described the conversation in subsequent interviews, and responded to Bush afterwards in several letters, while there are parallel messages echoing key points of the demarche that were written by the U.S. and UK ambassadors in Moscow.6 Similarly, again a photo provides the evidence and shows only the American interpreter present, at the White House on June 1, 1990, when Gorbachev pulled Bush aside in the hallway after dinner and pleaded with him for the trade deal Bush had postponed because of Soviet pressure on the Baltic republics. We know what was said at least in summary from Bush’s own diary account, and also from the references before and after in the actual summit transcripts. The notetakers also apparently declined to capture the cruder moments in the Bush-Gorbachev conversations when the often-all-male group would indulge in sex jokes, for example in one of the outdoor Camp David sessions.7 More important for this volume were the missing details in the transcripts from the American side of the “one-on-ones” (actually three-on-threes, with notetakers and interpreters) where Scowcroft was the sole U.S. notetaker. In contrast, Gorbachev’s aide Anatoly Chernyaev created a far more complete record, with the discussion rendered in full paragraphs, while Scowcroft’s notes are telegraphic at best, and at worst illegible (a word his secretaries typed frequently when transcribing the national security adviser’s yellow legal pads).8 By privileging the spoken words of the two leaders, this volume includes only by reference the voluminous intelligence briefings and the policy documents that the two governments generated around the summits, and that so informed both leaders. On the U.S. side, for example, the national security decision directives that relate to the summits are widely available, including in the Digital National

 See David Hoffman, The Dead Hand, pp. 350, 361.  See the self-censored example in James A. Baker III with Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy, p. 254. 8  For example, Scowcroft rendered a full hour of the Malta summit into a single page of notes, see Document 84: Second Restricted Bilateral Meeting, December 3, 1989. 6 7

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Security Archive published by ProQuest,9 so even though President Bush followed his own directives diligently, this volume leaves them out except in his words. Similarly, the formal Soviet Politburo protocols are also helpful to see that side of the decision making, but their language is far more stilted than Gorbachev’s conversation ever was, so we have favored the latter. Likewise, even though we obtained hundreds of pages of talking points and speech drafts on both sides, we cut them in favor of the actual words spoken. (A handful of crucial items by close aides such as memos to the respective presidents and diary entries are included for context.) In our headnotes and particularly the essays introducing each of the summits, we have made our biases and our analyses plain. But we also provide the reader the documents on which we are basing those conclusions. Judge for yourself. We come away from the documents with strong feelings about missed opportunities, about blindness on both sides, about the ways the world would be a safer place today had the summits included more empathy. Yet we also marvel at the ways the summits produced almost the opposite of the Cold War, practically a jointly guaranteed peace. We call this book and its companion volume on the Gorbachev-Reagan summits “the last superpower summits” because there is only one superpower today. Reading the transcripts, the memcons, the telcons, the letters, one almost gets nostalgic for the quality of the conversation, which briefly reached the level of global partnership on settling regional issues, and reflected a remarkable degree of understanding of mutual interests. There certainly were elements of manipulation, going both ways, especially around the unification of Germany in NATO and the first Gulf War, that left resentments which plague international relations even today. But the meeting of the minds fairly leaps from the pages of these extraordinary documents, which more than most, “speak for themselves,” for they are mostly the spoken word. Of the summits, Malta 1989 and Washington 1990 were likely most important because they helped dampen any superpower sparks that might have flown in a time of revolutionary change in Europe, set off by Gorbachev and by Eastern Europeans (Solidarity, dissidents, reform Communists, and emigrants, in pretty much that order). Helsinki and Paris 1990 brought the extraordinary sight of the two superpowers actually working together to solve, rather than to foment, regional conflicts. Moscow 1991 realized the signing of the START Treaty for the 50 percent cuts in strategic nuclear weapons that Reagan and Gorbachev had originally agreed to at Reykjavik. Madrid 1991 was especially poignant, with Gorbachev working for peace in the Middle East together with the Americans, while his standing at home was   The ProQuest series includes both a complete series of available Presidential Directives from Truman through Obama, and a voluminous and authoritative reference collection, compiled and edited by Svetlana Savranskaya, of more than 2,000 documents covering U.S.-Soviet relations during the whole period of the end of the Cold War from 1985 through 1991. See https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/digital-national-security-archive

9

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about to bottom out completely. At the very end, in the fall of 1991 (almost too late) the summits and their “arms race in reverse” actually dramatically reduced the nuclear threat. After the August 1991 coup attempt in Moscow, President Bush realized he was about to lose his Soviet partner and ordered unilateral tactical nuclear withdrawals that were rapidly matched by Gorbachev. This nuclear roundup would play a key role in making sure none of the thousands of Soviet nuclear warheads scattered around the republics ever found their way into the hands of terrorists. (This underappreciated success story will be the center of our next book, documenting the Nunn-Lugar program that helped denuclearize the former Soviet Union in the 1990s). Here in the last superpower summits the quality of conversation is striking, even if one superpower was a declining equal. The documents feature no small irony in that the core Bush administration advisers in 1989 such as Brent Scowcroft and his deputy, Robert Gates, did not actually think the Soviet Union was declining, and at least at first saw Gorbachev as simply the new Brezhnev, an iron fist in a velvet glove, just better at public relations. We documented that Bush attitude, the resulting Gorbachev frustration, and the revolutionary events of 1989 in our previous CEU Press book, “Masterpieces of History”: The Peaceful End of the Cold War in Europe, 1989. There we also published for the first time in English the Soviet transcript of the Malta summit; so here in this volume we use the American memoranda of conversation instead (they are almost completely congruent, and the few differences that exist we highlight in our headnotes). The serious researcher will read that book together with this two-volume summits collection, because we did not repeat the Masterpieces documents, even when they were most profoundly on point. Similarly, a serious reader will consult the online series of annual postings, translated by Anna Melyakova and edited by Svetlana Savranskaya, of the late Anatoly Chernyaev’s invaluable diary—since he was so often an eyewitness to these summits. Anatoly Chernyaev ranks first on the list of the intellectual debts we amassed as we built these books. He and the Gorbachev Foundation set a world standard for openness during the 1990s, not only publishing the Soviet records of the summits, but also Politburo protocols and Central Committee memoranda and more. Anatoly Sergeyevich constantly provided us with his insights and his unique analysis as we worked on the summits volumes; his positive reception of the first, combined edition of this book gave us renewed energy; and we mourn his passing at the age of 95 in 2017. We thank Vladlen Loginov for his stewardship of the extraordinary series of Gorbachev Foundation volumes that are a treasure trove for all scholars, especially now that the Foundation’s reading room is closed. Our second debt is to the wide bookshelf of memoirs, first-person accounts, documentary volumes, and subsequent scholarship on these transformative years. A longer listing of works on which we drew may be found in the selected bibliography, but here we want to express appreciation for the ones we found most revealing. In addition to the Helmut Kohl documentary volume and the joint BushScowcroft memoir mentioned earlier, we read with interest the personal letters xvii

and diary entries in Bush’s 2013 collection.10 The most useful insider accounts of the Bush presidency may be found in Secretary of State James Baker’s memoir and the relevant sections of Robert Gates’s review of his career.11 Comparable to and somewhat competitive with the Zelikow-Rice volume credited earlier is fellow NSC aide Robert Hutchings’ book combining memoir and scholarship.12 Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott captured the action during the Bush years practically in real time, accompanying Baker on his trips and interviewing many eyewitnesses such as Chernyaev to create an unusually colorful and candid account full of the atmospherics and personalities, and published almost immediately afterwards in 1994.13 Jack Matlock, who was so crucial for our Reagan volume, spanned the two administrations as ambassador to Moscow, and provided us key insights comparing and contrasting them, in addition to his unequalled reporting and analysis of the last years of the Soviet Union.14 Sir Rodric Braithwaite, Matlock’s peer as the British ambassador to the Soviet Union, always gave us support and wise advice, together with invaluable access to his diaries and cables. We also thank Pulitzer Prize-winner David Hoffman whose journalism, books, and thoughtful comments provided real inspiration, in addition to his donation of documents. For the larger picture on the last several decades of the Cold War, we referred again and again to Raymond Garthoff’s magisterial volumes.15 On Gorbachev, the recent biography by William Taubman, who previously won the Pulitzer for his account of Khrushchev, has become the gold standard.16 For special insights on Gorbachev’s thinking, as well as much appreciated help with documents and interviews, we thank Andrei Grachev, who participated in those dramatic events in 1991.17 More recently, Jeffrey Engel has written a truly excellent narrative history of the Bush foreign policy, drawing extensively from the newly declassified documents.18 While he was teaching at Texas A&M, Jeff also generously supervised a team of students who worked with us to open the Bush memcons and telcons, and then to digitize and publish them for the benefit of all researchers, so he doubly deserves our thanks.

 See George H.W. Bush, All the Best, George Bush: My Life in Letters and Other Writings.  See Robert Gates, From the Shadows. 12  See Robert Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War. 13  See Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels. Former NSC aides fault the book for reliance on the State Department view, see Zelikow and Rice correction footnotes on pp. 422, 466, 468. 14  See especially, Jack Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire. 15  See Raymond Garthoff, The Great Transition, as well as Détente and Confrontation, and My Journey Through the Cold War. 16  William Taubman, Gorbachev: His Life and Times. 17  See especially Andrei Grachev, Gorbachev’s Gamble. 18  See Jeffrey A. Engel, When the World Seemed New: George H.W. Bush and the End of the Cold War. 10 11

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We benefited in major ways from excellent documentation work by several other leading scholars. We thank Mary Sarotte not only for her numerous successful mandatory review and FOIA requests at the Bush library, but also for the manifold insights in her multiple published articles and books on the Bush years.19 Likewise, Josh Shifrinson doubled down on a number of parallel document requests and produced an award-winning article, among other publications, about Bush and the issue of NATO expansion.20 We also very much appreciate Jim Goldgeier coming to us in the late 1990s with ideas for systematic documents requests on the Bush and Clinton years, and following those up with his own excellent scholarship.21 Many extraordinary scholars stimulated and even provoked this book, and we especially thank Melvyn Leffler, Jim Hershberg, Vlad Zubok, Marie-Pierre Rey, Frederic Bozo, Horst Telschik, Timothy Garton Ash, and Greg Domber. Other sources we consulted include the useful, small Bush biography by Timothy Naftali, which is limited by length and sources not declassified at the time he wrote (2007).22 Also useful but limited by adopting almost exclusively the subject’s point of view is the more recent and more wide-ranging biography by Jon Meacham, which includes extensive quotations from the Bush diaries.23 We owe special appreciation to the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies for approving and hosting at the annual ASEEES convention our series of panel discussions on summits, which over the years during the making of this book and the companion Reagan volume have included Matlock, Taubman, Zubok, Sarotte, Shifrinson, Goldgeier and other much-appreciated colleagues, who provided comments and critiques that clarified our thinking and helped correct our mistakes. This book would not exist without the dedicated work of the world-class staff at the George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, at Texas A&M. Robert Holzweiss and his superlative records manager Zachary Roberts, together with their other colleagues from the reading room to the audio-visual collections, were always extraordinarily helpful, insightful, responsive, knowledgeable, and hospitable. Their familiarity with the files and with the whole difficult declassification process proves on a daily basis the remarkable value that a decentralized presidential library system provides to researchers and should caution us that consolidating the records review process in Washington could be counter-productive. Essential financial support for the National Security Archive and for the research that produced this book comes from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, where the indefatigable Vartan Gregorian leads a brilliant team including Deana Arsenian, Stephen Del Rosso, Patricia Moore Nicholas, and Carl  Especially Mary Sarotte, 1989.  See Joshua R. Itkowitz Shifrinson, “Deal or No Deal,” International Security (2016). 21  See James Goldgeier, Not Whether But When, and Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, Power and Purpose. 22  Timothy Naftali, George H.W. Bush. 23  Jon Meacham, Destiny and Power. 19 20

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Robichaud, among others. General support and project support for the National Security Archive that helped make this book possible came from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, where first Mary Page and then Emma Belcher and her “nuclear challenges” team provided invaluable long-term funding. We also thank Nicole Bagley and the Brenn Foundation for underwriting several productive writers’ retreat opportunities at the Musgrove conference center, each of which brought another chapter of this book to fruition. We must express our gratitude to the Central European University Press, our publishing home for the entire series of National Security Archive Cold War Readers. Former editor-in-chief Krisztina Kós shepherded the series and current editor Linda Kunos always significantly improved the product, especially in the making of two summits books from one giant volume. Special thanks also go to former CEU rector John Shattuck, who was the original chair of the Archive’s board, and to István Rév, head of the Open Society Archives in Budapest, for making the CEU partnership so robust. At the National Security Archive, Malcolm Byrne has been invaluable for the completion of both summits volumes, for the continued operation of the whole organization, and for the extraordinary quality of the entire series of readers with CEU Press. Working closely with us as the original summits book grew and then was trimmed was our dear colleague, Anya Melyakova, who was the keeper of the manuscript as well as the exemplary translator of Chernyaev. We also thank the diligent interns who worked on this manuscript over the years—Allison Brady, Danielle Thomas, Matthew McGorrin, Christopher Johnson, Peter Oster, Robin Taylor, and Kian Byrne. Many others at the Archive stepped up to fill the voids left by book duties, and we particularly thank the Archive’s administrator, Sue Bechtel, our finance czar Steve Paschke, and public service coordinator Dr. Mary Curry. Another colleague, expert metadata creator Vicki Jacobs, built the index for which future readers will be thankful. These last superpower summits, the conversations that ended the Cold War, are now finally on the record, from both sides, just in time to mark the 30 years that have passed since the Berlin Wall came down in 1989. This book should remind us about contingency, about choice, about accident and coincidence, about the way the Cold War ended long before the Soviet Union did, and about the ways American policy tried to keep the Soviet Union together (contrary to current myths). This book has lessons to teach us about dialogue, about empathy, about mutual security. Most importantly, these historic actors come alive in their own words, and take us back to that time when human civilization hovered on an existential brink. These leaders, Mikhail Gorbachev and George H.W. Bush, walked us back from that nuclear brink, and this is their story, as they said it at the time, in their secret sessions, to each other. Just listen. Thomas Blanton Svetlana Savranskaya Washington D.C., October 10, 2019 xx

Main Actors

Akhromeyev, Sergey Fedorovich: marshal of the Soviet Union; chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, 1984–1988, military adviser to Gorbachev, 1988–1991. Andreotti, Giulio: prime minister of Italy, 1989–1992. Arbatov, Georgy Arkadievich: director of the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, 1965–1995; member of the Central Committee of the CPSU, 1990–1991. Baker, James: U.S. secretary of state, 1989–1992. Bessmertnykh, Alexander Alexandrovich: Soviet ambassador to the United States, 1990–1991; foreign minister of the USSR, January–August 1991. Broomfield, William: Republican Congressman from Michigan, 1957–1993. Bush, George H.W.: vice president of the United States, 1981–1989; president of the United States, 1989–1993. Byrd, Robert: Democratic U.S. senator from West Virginia, 1959–2010. Carlucci, Frank: assistant to the president for national security affairs, 1986– 1987; United States secretary of defense, 1987–1989. Casey, William J.: director of central intelligence, 1981–1987. Chebrikov, Viktor Mikhailovich: chairman of the KGB, 1982–1988; secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, September 1988–September 1989. Chernyaev, Anatoly Sergeyevich: foreign policy adviser to Gorbachev, 1986– 1991; member of Central Committee of the CPSU, 1986–1991. Delors, Jacques: President of the European Commission, 1985–1995. Dobrynin, Anatoly Fedorovich: Soviet ambassador to the United States, 1962– 1986; head of the CPSU International Department, 1986–1988. Eagleburger, Lawrence: U.S. deputy secretary of state, 1989–1992. Falin, Valentin Mikhailovich: head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, 1989–1991. Fascell, Dante: Democratic congressman from Florida, 1955–1993. Fokin, Vitold: prime minister of Ukraine, 1990–1992. Gates, Robert M.: deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1987– 1989; deputy national security adviser, 1989–1991; director of central intelligence, 1991–1993. González, Felipe: prime minister of Spain, 1982–1996. Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeyevich: general secretary of the CPSU, 1985–1991. Gromyko, Andrei Andreyevich: foreign minister of the USSR, 1957–1985; chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, 1985–1988. xxi

Hartman, Arthur A.: U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, 1981–1987. Juan Carlos I: king of Spain, 1975–2014. Kaifu, Toshiki: prime minister of Japan, 1989–1991. Kampelman, Max: head and ambassador to the United States Delegations in Negotiations with the Soviet Union on Nuclear and Space Arms in Geneva, 1985–1989. Karpov, Viktor: deputy foreign minister of the USSR, 1990–1991. Kohl, Helmut: chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1982–1998. Komplektov, Viktor Georgievich: Soviet ambassador to the United States, 1991– 1992. Kornienko, Georgy Markovich: deputy foreign minister of the USSR, 1981– 1986. Kravchuk, Leonid Makarovych: chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR; 1990–1991; president of Ukraine, 1991–1994. Kryuchkov, Vladimir Alexandrovich: chairman of the KGB, 1988–1991; member of the CC CPSU Politburo, 1989–1990. Ligachev, Yegor Kuzmich: member of the CC CPSU Politburo, 1985–1990; head of the Department of Organizational Party Work, 1983–1988. MacEachin, Douglas: director, CIA Office of Soviet Analysis, 1984–1989; later deputy director of intelligence. Major, John: prime minister of the United Kingdom, 1990–1997. Matlock, Jack: special assistant to the president and senior director of European and Soviet Affairs at the NSC, 1983–1987; U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, 1987–1991. McFarlane, Robert C.: assistant to the president for national security affairs, 1983–1985. Mitterrand, François: president of France, 1981–1995. Nazarbayev, Nursultan: prime minister of Kazakh SSR, 1984–1989; first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakh SSR, 1989– 1991. Nitze, Paul: special advisor to the president and secretary of state on arms control, 1984–1989. Palazhchenko, Pavel: chief English interpreter for Mikhail Gorbachev and Eduard Shevardnadze, 1985–1991. Peres, Shimon: prime minister of Israel, 1984–1986. Perle, Richard N.: assistant secretary of defense for global strategic affairs, 1981–1987. Poindexter, John: assistant to the president for national security affairs, 1985– 1986. Pope John Paul II: born Karol Wojtyla in Poland; Pope, 1978–2005. Powell, Colin: assistant to the president for national security affairs, 1987–1989; chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1989–1993. Reagan, Ronald W.: president of the United States, 1981–1989. xxii

Rice, Condoleezza: Soviet and East European affairs specialist on the National Security Council staff, 1989–1991. Ridgway, Rozanne L.: U.S. ambassador to the GDR, 1983–1985; assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, 1985–1989. Ryzhkov, Nikolay Ivanovich: chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, 1985–1991; member of the CC CPSU Politburo, 1985–1990. Scowcroft, Brent: assistant to the president for national security affairs, 1989– 1993. Shevardnadze, Eduard Amvrosiyevich: foreign minister of the USSR, 1985– 1990, November–December 1991. Shultz, George P.: secretary of state, 1982–1989. Sokolov, Sergey Leonidovich: marshal of the Soviet Union; defense minister, 1984–1987. Solomentsev, Mikhail Sergeyevich: chairman of the CC CPSU Party Control Committee, 1983–1988. Teltschik, Horst: national security adviser to Chancellor Kohl, 1982–1990. Thatcher, Margaret: prime minister of the United Kingdom, 1979–1990. Vorotnikov, Vitaly Ivanovich: member of the CC CPSU, 1983–1990. Webster, William G.: director of the FBI, 1978–1987; director of central intelligence, 1987–1991. Weinberger, Caspar W.: secretary of defense, 1981–1987. Yakovlev, Aleksandr Nikolayevich: member of the CC CPSU Politburo, 1987– 1990; senior adviser to Gorbachev, 1985–1991. Yazov, Dmitri Timofeyevich: marshal of the Soviet Union; member of the CC CPSU, 1986–1991; defense minister, 1987–1991. Yeltsin, Boris Nikolayevich: first secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU, 1985–1987; member of the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR, 1989–1990; member of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 1989–1990; chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian republic, 1990; president of Russia, 1991–1999. Zaikov, Lev Nikolayevich: head of the Politburo Commission on Nuclear and Conventional Arms Control; CC CPSU secretary for defense industry; member of the CC CPSU Politburo, 1986–1990. Zimyanin, Mikhail Vasilyevich: member of the CC CPSU, 1966–1987.

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Chronology of Events

1989 January 20: George H.W. Bush is inaugurated president. Within three days, he calls Mikhail Gorbachev to promise no “foot-dragging” in the improvement of relations. February 15: The USSR completes its military withdrawal from Afghanistan on schedule. March 6: Negotiations on conventional arms in Europe open in Vienna. March 7: James Baker receives Shevardnadze at the U.S. ambassadorial residence in Vienna for their first private meeting. March 16: The CC CPSU adopts an agricultural reform program that would break up the central agricultural ministry and allow individual farmers to lease farmland. March 26: Elections to the new Soviet Congress of People’s Deputies take place. Many Party and military officials lose to independent candidates. Boris Yeltsin and Andrei Sakharov win seats by large majorities. April 2–4: Gorbachev visits Cuba where he finds Fidel Castro critical of Soviet reforms. He encourages Castro to engage with the United States. April 6: Gorbachev travels to Great Britain. In a private meeting with Thatcher, he describes Bush’s policy “pause” as “intolerable.” April 9: Soviet troops kill at least 20 Georgian nationalist demonstrators in Tbilisi. April 20: The CPSU Politburo denounces the use of military force in Tbilisi. April 25: One thousand Soviet tanks leave Hungary, marking the first stage of the planned Soviet withdrawal of 500,000 troops and 10,000 tanks from Eastern Europe by 1991. May 15–18: Gorbachev visits China for the first Sino-Soviet summit in 30 years, and announces the “normalization” of relations. May 18: The Lithuanian Supreme Soviet declares sovereignty. May 25–June 9: The new Soviet Congress of People’s Deputies meets for the first time and elects Gorbachev president. The congress is televised and has a powerful public impact. June 4: Chinese government troops with armored vehicles crush protests in Tiananmen Square, while voters in Poland give the opposition Solidarity movement a sweeping victory over the Communist Party in elections negotiated through the Roundtable process. June 19: START negotiations resume in Geneva. xxv

July 6: Addressing the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, Gorbachev declares the USSR will not block reform in Eastern Europe and will promote comprehensive European political and economic integration in the framework of a “common European home.” July 9–13: Bush is hailed by crowds in Poland and Hungary where he meets with the reform Communist leadership and with opposition figures in both countries. July 22: The Lithuanian Parliament declares the 1940 Soviet annexation of the Baltics illegal. August 18: Aleksandr Yakovlev holds a press conference to denounce “unequivocally” the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact which led to the annexation of the Baltics. However, he states that the Soviet government still considers the Baltics a part of the USSR. September 8–10: Rukh—the nationalist movement in the Ukraine—holds its constituent congress in Kiev and displays the banned blue-and-yellow flag of independent Ukraine. September 12: Boris Yeltsin visits Washington, meets with Scowcroft and insists on seeing Bush. The president agrees to “walk in” and meet with Yeltsin for 15 minutes. September 22–23: Eduard Shevardnadze and Baker meet at the latter’s ranch in Wyoming. September 29: Margaret Thatcher stops in Moscow on the way from Japan. She speaks disapprovingly to Gorbachev of the idea of German unification. October 26: Shevardnadze calls for the dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. November 9: The Berlin Wall effectively falls after a bungled press briefing by Politburo member Günter Schabowski leads to an erroneous television bulletin announcing that the border to the west is open. Surging crowds convince confused border guards to open the gate at Bornholmer Strasse, starting a cascade through other gates and into West Berlin. December 1: Gorbachev meets with Pope John Paul II. He promises to reestablish diplomatic relations with the Vatican and enact a law guaranteeing freedom of conscience and the legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. December 2–3: The Malta summit takes place. December 18: The European Economic Community and the Soviet Union sign a 10-year commercial agreement. 1990 February 9: Baker tells Gorbachev in Moscow that NATO will expand “not an inch” to the East if the USSR agrees to German unification in NATO. March 12: The Supreme Soviet elects Gorbachev president of the USSR. May 30–June 4: The Washington/Camp David summit takes place. June 7: The last leadership meeting of the Warsaw Pact takes place in Moscow. xxvi

July 15–16: Chancellor Helmut Kohl meets with Soviet leaders in Moscow and at the resort town of Arkhyz for final talks on German unification and related matters. August 2: Saddam Hussein invades Kuwait. August 3: The United States and USSR issue a joint statement condemning Iraqi aggression. Baker later calls this “the day the Cold War ended.” August 6: The United States launches Operation Desert Shield in the Persian Gulf. September 9: Gorbachev and Bush meet in Helsinki for a one-day informal summit to discuss the Persian Gulf. October 15: Gorbachev is awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. The announcement is received negatively by many Soviets. Gorbachev decides not to attend the ceremony. November 19–21: The Paris CSCE summit takes place. Participants sign the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and adopt the Charter for Europe. Gorbachev and Bush meet on the margins of the summit. December 20: Shevardnadze steps down as foreign minister, accusing Gorbachev of a political swing to the right and warning of a coming dictatorship. 1991 January 13: Bloody Sunday takes places in Vilnius as Soviet interior troops with tanks attack protesters, leaving 15 dead and several hundred wounded. The tragedy follows other recent acts of suppression in the Baltics by Soviet forces. January 15: Soviet Ambassador Alexander Bessmertnykh is recalled from Washington and named foreign minister. January 16: Operation Desert Storm is launched in the Persian Gulf. Gorbachev tries unsuccessfully to delay the start of military action by 48 hours to allow one more effort to talk to Saddam Hussein. January 28: Bessmertnykh visits Washington. He hands Bush a letter from Gorbachev on the Baltics, saying the use of force was not a presidential policy and will not be repeated. February 23: The ground offensive in Iraq begins overnight. Gorbachev calls Bush hours beforehand to try to persuade him to postpone the operation. March 17: An all-Union referendum takes place on preserving the Soviet Union as a “renewed federation of equal sovereign republics.” Seventy-seven percent of respondents vote in favor, the highest totals coming from the republics of Central Asia. March 31: The Warsaw Pact ceases to exist. April 23: At a state dacha outside Moscow, Gorbachev and nine republic leaders launch the “Novo-Ogarevo process” of drafting a new Union treaty. May 6: Shevardnadze visits the United States as a private citizen and urges Bush to support Soviet reform and Gorbachev. xxvii

June 12: Yeltsin is elected president of the Russian Federation. June 14: CFE agreements, refining the treaty signed in November 1990, are ratified by CFE ambassadors in Vienna. June 19–21: Yeltsin makes his first visit to Washington as Russian president. July 17: Gorbachev addresses the G-7 summit in London. He hopes to garner major financial support from the West and to win agreement to integrate the USSR into international economic institutions. In one-on-one meeting with Bush, the two presidents finalize the remaining issues with the START Treaty. July 29–August 1: The Moscow summit takes place, featuring the signing of the START Treaty. The night before the summit, Gorbachev receives a commitment from nine republican leaders to support the new Union Treaty. During the summit, Bush meets separately with Yeltsin and with Nursultan Nazarbayev, leader of Kazakhstan. August 1: Bush travels to the Ukrainian capital where he delivers what is dubbed the “Chicken Kiev” speech. August 19–21: An anti-Gorbachev coup takes place, led by the heads of the KGB and the military. Gorbachev is placed under house arrest at Foros on the Black Sea. In Moscow, Yeltsin consolidates democratic forces to resist the takeover. The coup crumbles on the third day. September 27: Bush calls Gorbachev to inform him about a breakthrough initiative on unilateral nuclear arms reductions he is about to unveil. Gorbachev responds enthusiastically and soon offers his own far-reaching proposals. October 29–30: The Madrid summit on the Middle East takes place. December 1: A referendum in Ukraine overwhelmingly (92 percent) approves a declaration of independence passed by the Rada the previous August. December 8: Three key republic leaders—Yeltsin (Russia), Kravchuk (Ukraine) and Shushkevich (Belarus)—meet at Belovezhskaya Pushcha, in Belarus near the Polish border. They declare the Soviet Union dissolved and a new entity, the Commonwealth of Independent States, established. Yeltsin calls Bush ahead of Gorbachev to inform him. December 25: Gorbachev resigns as president of the USSR, symbolically terminating the existence of the Soviet Union. He calls Bush to inform him and the two briefly revisit their joint achievements.

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Chapter 1

THE MALTA SUMMIT, 1989

One of the few high-level American officials to survive the transition from Ron-

ald Reagan to George H.W. Bush (other than Bush himself), the U.S. ambassador to Moscow, Jack F. Matlock, Jr., also participated in both presidents’ summits with Mikhail Gorbachev. So Matlock’s judgment of the Malta summit carries the distinctive weight of first-hand comparative experience. He subsequently wrote, “Next to the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting at Reykjavik, [Malta] probably achieved more substantively than any other U.S.-Soviet summit meeting, even though no major agreements were signed.”1 Regarding Reykjavik’s impact, Matlock clearly meant the effect on Gorbachev of Reagan’s insistence on nuclear abolition, and the resulting reduction in the Soviet sense of threat and encouragement of an arms race in reverse, as evidenced soon after Reykjavik in the 1987 agreement to eliminate intermediate range nuclear missiles (INF). As for Malta, Matlock’s assessment is actually a severe criticism of the Bush administration, which had declined to engage Gorbachev for almost its first full year—the Bush “pause,” which Matlock described as “self-imposed lethargy” in Washington.2 Gorbachev had sought to engage president-elect Bush as early as the Governors Island meeting in New York in December 1988, but Bush demurred, instead launching a strategic review of U.S.-Soviet relations that cloaked the reality that the transition from Reagan to Bush was one from doves to hawks—that is, disbelievers in Gorbachev as a true reformer. Leading the hawks was national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, who had opposed the INF Treaty as destabilizing for Europe, and who brought to the White House his belief in the continuing Cold War, a commitment to “restoring” the credibility of nuclear deterrence, and a resentment of Gorbachev as a new iron fist inside a velvet glove who was simply fooling the world with his “enervating” propaganda. A retired Air Force general and nuclear traditionalist, Scowcroft meant to halt the leaps and bounds of arms control in the Reagan years, and saw cuts in nuclear weapons as inherently dangerous—raising incentives for “breakouts” and “bolts from the blue” first strikes, and reducing NATO’s credibility against all those Soviet tanks.3  Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire, p. 272.  Ibid. p. 200. 3  Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, pp. 12–13, 115–117. In sharp contrast to Scowcroft’s skepticism, the career CIA experts in the Office of Soviet Analysis predicted continuing Soviet defense cuts, an eagerness for conventional forces reductions, a willingness to be flexible on verification, and Gorbachev’s commitment to “political leverage in1 2

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Throughout 1989, judging by the candid memoir authored by Bush with Scowcroft,4 the White House mentality was marked by insecurity and anxiety over the general awareness that Gorbachev was more popular globally and had the initiative on proposing new departures in security policy—never quite recognizing that Gorbachev’s proposals might well be in the U.S. national security interest.5 Throwing out the “mush” produced by the so-called “strategic review,” Scowcroft seized instead on a four-page memo by his Soviet affairs aide, Condoleezza Rice; yet the very first point of the Rice memo focused on the “image” of U.S. foreign policy leadership rather than on any specific acts of leadership.6 When the President demanded some new initiatives for a big spring speech, the best Scowcroft’s aides could do was resurrect an Eisenhower-era proposal for “Open Skies”—totally obsolete in the age of spy satellites.7 When Secretary of State James Baker held his first face-to-face meeting with Gorbachev, in Moscow in May, the American felt “upstaged” by the Soviet announcement of a 500-missile cut in short-range nuclear weapons in Europe, rather than taking the offer and asking for more in a cascade of cuts.8 The Soviet short-range nuclear forces (SNF) announcement highlighted the dramatic contrast between the Gorbachev and Bush policies in the first half of 1989. For the Americans, enormous official energy went into their top priority of modernization—not cuts—of short-range nuclear missiles in West Germany. Fearful of the “denuclearization” of Europe, Scowcroft and the National Security Council staff generated dozens of memos and interventions with the Germans in an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to persuade Helmut Kohl to go along with upgrading the 88 short-range Lance nuclear missiles (in bureaucratic jargon—FOTL, or “follow on to Lance”).9 Kohl, of course, saw only dead Germans in the event of Lance usage. He faced significant anti-nuclear protests from West Germans who felt the same way, and understood that there were plenty of U.S. submarine-based nuclear weapons to deter any Warsaw Pact attack. Despite repeated American invitations, Kohl’s top foreign policy aide, Horst Teltschik, cancelled out of a scheduled March visit to stead of military strength to promote the USSR’s security.” See CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, “Moscow’s 1989 Agenda for US-Soviet Relations,” SOV 89-10012X, February 3, 1989 (Bush Presidential Library Copy). 4  Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, see for example pp. 40, 43, 71, 78, 114. 5  For extended analysis of the Bush administration’s characteristic insecurity, see Blanton, “U.S. Policy and the Revolutions of 1989,” in Savranskaya, Blanton and Zubok, eds., Masterpieces of History. 6  Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 40. 7  Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, p. 71. 8  Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 71; see also Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, pp. 67–68. 9  See, for example, Don Mahley Memorandum for Brent Scowcroft, “Next Steps on SNF,” January 30, 1989 (Bush Library 2010-2911-MR, declassified June 22, 2012); Brent Scowcroft Memorandum for the President, “Short-Range Nuclear Forces and NATO’s ‘Comprehensive Concept,’” n.d. (Bush Library 2010-2914-MR, declassified September 13, 2012).

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Washington on the SNF issue, and even Kohl ducked out on scheduled phone calls to Bush in April—much to the dismay of the Americans.10 For Gorbachev, who had overridden the strident objections of his military in 1987 to junk deployment of the new short-range Oka missile in order to clinch the INF deal, the Americans’ Lance obsession was doubly objectionable, both heightening the arms race and avoiding serious discussion of short-range nuclear weapons—as the Soviet leader pointedly reminded Baker during the May Moscow discussion. Gorbachev specifically offered to withdraw all the Soviet nuclear weapons from “the territories of our Warsaw Pact allies, provided the U.S. reciprocates.” But the flustered Baker missed the moment, insisting that before talks could even begin, the Soviets would have to reduce their “advantage in tactical nuclear arms”—to which Gorbachev pointed out, counting air assets, “we are evenly balanced, but it is a terrible balance at a very high level.”11 Gorbachev’s frustration with the Bush “pause” and review of policy made the Soviet leader more than eager for a summit meeting, but he would have to wait until the very end of a most momentous year. In the interim, he raced to make his “new thinking” effective—in international relations by completing his promised pullout from Afghanistan on February 15, and even domestically, with the first free elections to the Supreme Soviet in March 1989. The Soviet leader campaigned for his idea of a “common European home” by visiting London (April), Bonn (June), Paris and Strasbourg (July), Helsinki (October), and even Rome to meet with the Pope (November), before he would see Bush at Malta (December). In between, he re-opened talks with the Chinese, holding the first Sino-Soviet summit in decades; helped inspire the Tiananmen Square demonstrations that would be crushed in June 1989; and followed up his U.N. speech from December 1988 by announcing a 10 percent cut in the Soviet defense budget. On specific arms control measures, the Soviet side kept the proposals coming, starting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze’s speech in Vienna in January arguing for a 25 percent cut in both NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. In fact, as a well-placed Western official later pointed out, Gorbachev “moved so rapidly to satisfy Western demands in these negotiations [conventional forces in Europe] that he created coordination problems in the [NATO] alliance. Some of the Western proposals had been made on the assumption that Moscow would never accept them. When it did, some of the allies began to wonder if they could live with their own proposals.”12  Philip Zelikow Memorandum for Brent Scowcroft, “Next Steps with the Germans on SNF,” March 13, 1989 (Bush Library 2010-2911-MR, declassified June 18, 2012): “Teltschik will not be coming this week” and “other political factors are at work…” Also, “Telephone Call to Chancellor Kohl,” April 21, 1989 [talking points labeled “The President Has Seen”] (Bush Library 2010-2914-MR, declassified June 6, 2012): “We’ve been trying to engage you for some time on this issue….” 11  Document No. 74. 12  See the discussion of “Soviet Foreign Policy Reborn” and quote in Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire, p. 192. 10

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The contrast with the American pause became all too vivid for President Bush. On May 21, 1989, for example, Bush saw a New York Times editorial that opined: “Imagine that an alien spaceship approached earth and sent the message: ‘Take me to your leader.’ Who would that be? Without doubt, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev.” With some like-minded pressure from long-time friend James Baker, still upset after his Moscow visit, the president began pushing for “something to get the ball rolling” that he could present at the upcoming NATO summit. Yet, resistance from the secretary of defense, Dick Cheney, and especially the Joint Chiefs of Staff, meant that Baker could not win his preferred proposal of 25 percent troop cuts in Europe (echoing Shevardnadze from January). The ultimate American position meant a 20 percent cut in U.S. troops, and included an overall ceiling on both U.S. and Soviet forces in Europe that would mean disproportionate reductions for the Soviets. But Gorbachev was pleased that at least his U.N. speech was finally achieving some resonance in Washington. Perhaps more importantly for the Americans, the conventional forces proposal succeeded in changing the subject from Lance modernization, which had created such a split in NATO and between Kohl and Bush, and helped Bush achieve a successful NATO meeting.13 Allies like Mitterrand and even Thatcher had encouraged Bush to reach out to Gorbachev directly, but not until Bush went to Eastern Europe in July 1989— where he heard the reform Communists, such as Jaruzelski in Poland and Németh in Hungary, make the same plea because engaging the Soviet leader created political space for them to make change—did Bush overrule Scowcroft and the hawks and ask Gorbachev for a meeting. Bush’s explicit intention—contrary to subsequent American mythmaking—was to slow down the process of change in Eastern Europe. Bush was distinctly unimpressed when he met the dissidents and oppositionists like Lech Wałęsa in Poland, who called U.S. aid proposals “pathetic,”14 or Janos Kis in Hungary whom Bush quickly concluded should not be running his country.15 The well-informed account by Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott points out that Bush called for a Europe “whole and free” when he landed at the Warsaw airport, “[b]ut in the way he conducted himself throughout his visit, Bush made it clear that he was in no hurry to see that day come. Quite the contrary, he was nervous about how rapidly the Iron Curtain was becoming unraveled” and wanted to “shore up the holdovers of the old regime, whom he saw as forces for gradual change, against the longtime dissidents, who struck him as being recklessly impatient.”16 In this, Bush and Gorbachev were actually on the same page.

 Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, pp. 73–79.  For the colorful details of these uncomfortable meetings, see Sebestyen, Revolution 1989, pp. 301–305. 15  Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 126. 16  Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, pp. 88–92. 13 14

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About his trip to Poland and Hungary, Bush wrote in his memoir: “I realized that to put off a meeting with Gorbachev was becoming dangerous. Too much was happening in the East—I had seen it myself—and if the superpowers did not begin to manage events, those very events could destabilize Eastern Europe and Soviet-American relations.... I saw that the Eastern Europeans themselves would try to push matters as far as they could.”17 Characteristically, on the plane ride home from Europe in July when Bush sent his note to Gorbachev proposing the informal meeting that would take place at Malta, the president spent more time (and far more space in his memoir18) reaching out to the Communist dictators in China, who had murdered their pro-democracy demonstrators in 1989, than to the Communist reformer in Moscow who had refused to do so.19 Between the July idea of a Bush-Gorbachev meeting and the December reality at Malta, Eastern Europeans rushed in and took apart the Stalinist empire, including the Berlin Wall. Originally intended by the Americans as an “interim” session to prepare for a full-scale summit in 1990, the Bush-Gorbachev meeting at Malta would take on a life of its own, symbolically bringing the Cold War to a close. Stormy weather and raging seas in Malta would play havoc with the meeting planners’ idea of alternating U.S. and Soviet ships as picturesque sites for the meetings—thus providing something of a metaphor for the rush of events in Eastern Europe that played out beyond the control of both superpowers. In effect, the geopolitics of Europe had largely been overturned by the time of the Malta meeting. Certainly Bush’s reticence and embrace of the Communist reformers in the summer of 1989 had helped. Even more important was the forbearance of Gorbachev, his refusal to use force to repress even revolutionary changes of government in Eastern Europe, and his outright permission (to the Hungarians in March 1989, for example) to open their borders.20 Going into the Malta summit, the Bush team was determined not to repeat Reagan’s theatricals. Reagan had successfully relieved the Soviet sense of threat through substantive arms control discussions with Gorbachev, including remarkable commitments to the abolition of nuclear weapons. For Bush, instead, as dozens of National Security Council and State Department memos make clear, Malta was meant to avoid any substantive discussion of arms control, and simply convey, as Secretary of State Baker wrote in his briefing memo on November 29, “a public sense, here and abroad, of a new pace and purpose to the U.S.-Soviet

 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 130.  Ibid., p. 132 compared to pp. 156–159. 19  For Bush’s actual letter to Gorbachev, July 21, 1989, see Document No. 76. This 3-page note “which I have personally written,” contains the characteristic Bush sentence: “In my view, it would be preferable to avoid the word ‘summit’ which is, at best, overworked, and at worst, a word whose connotation is one of a momentous happening.” 20  For extended analysis and documentation on these points, see Savranskaya, Blanton and Zubok, eds., Masterpieces of History. 17 18

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dialogue with you leading as much as Gorbachev”—public relations in place of substance.21 In this context, Jack Matlock’s ranking of Malta with Reykjavik in terms of substantive importance carries no small irony. Reading the Bush administration documents preparing for Malta, one sees references to Reykjavik repeated almost as epithets, as the epitome of everything the Bush officials did not want to have happen at Malta. For example, when NSC staffer Philip Zelikow summed up foreign reaction on November 2, 1989, to the announcement of Malta a month hence, he specifically mentioned how careful Bush diplomacy had undercut the “spectre of another ‘Reykjavik.’” The memo went on to say, “These foreign reactions once again drive home our need to be on guard against rising expectations of concrete agreements or major policy pronouncements.”22 When NSC staffers Arnold Kanter and Robert Blackwill wrote up a memo on “Possible Initiatives in the Context of Malta” for Scowcroft, they commented “it appears as though Cheney and Powell” [the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs] “may resist all efforts to advance any concrete ideas or initiatives at Malta. They are innately suspicious of any such approach, worry about the appearance or reality of ‘Reykjavik II,’ and argue we are running serious risks of allowing Malta to force decisions about the defense program and budget that have yet to be made.”23 Kanter and Blackwill argued against this mindset by defining the challenge as “to get something from the Soviets for the defense budget cuts we probably will be making in any event”; but Scowcroft and the president actually shared the CheneyPowell view, at least until they saw Gorbachev first-hand at Malta. The internal National Security Council documents signal a major missed opportunity at Malta to meet Soviet arms reductions proposals halfway. The evidence suggests that the Bush pause during 1989 delayed both strategic and tactical demilitarization for at least two years (the START Treaty would not be signed until 1991, and only in September of that year would Bush withdraw tactical nuclear weapons from U.S. bases and Navy ships). At that point Gorbachev had lost most of the domestic power to deliver on his side. Perhaps most striking on this point is the briefing memo from arms negotiations adviser Gen. Edward Rowny, who described the START Treaty as having “potential risks and few gains” and saw any reductions in naval weapons as “all losers for us”—recommending that  Document No. 79.  Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft, “Foreign Government Reaction to the President’s Announcement of His Upcoming Meeting with Gorbachev,” November 2, 1989 (Bush Presidential Records, White House Office of Records Management, Subject File: C.F. Bush Library FOIA 1999-0273-F). The memo was couched as a draft for Scowcroft to send on to Bush, but the national security adviser scribbled in the margins, “Unnecessary. CIA had run down of reactions (public + private) in PDB [President’s Daily Brief] this a.m. Thanks anyway.” 23  Arnold Kanter/Robert D. Blackwill, Memorandum for Brent Scowcroft, “Possible Initiatives in the Context of Malta,” November 24, 1989 (Bush Library 2008-633-MR). 21 22

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Bush say up front that the “US Navy is not on the bargaining table.” The American position going into Malta insisted that “the meeting must not become an ‘arms control summit’” since the Bush administration believed that Reagan had gone much too far in embracing Gorbachev and major arms reductions.24 By 1991, of course, Bush would reverse course on almost all these positions, but for practical purposes too late to help Gorbachev demilitarize the Soviet Union. The naval nuclear weapons case provides one of the clearest examples of Bush administration obtuseness in 1989. Gorbachev would explicitly propose at Malta the removal and destruction of all naval tactical nuclear weapons but find no resonance at all on the American side.25 Yet within the NSC staff, experts well knew that removal of naval tacticals was very much in the U.S. national security interest. A pre-Malta paper titled “Naval Arms Control” in the Arnold Kanter NSC files describes the circumstances under which naval tacticals would ever be used as implying “a catastrophic failure of U.S. defense policy”—i.e., a nuclear war with the USSR. In other words, they were weapons “that we don’t want to have to use.” The paper notes: “Removing tacnucs from all ships (subs and CVs included) and most importantly, Soviet Naval Aviation, has several advantages: nuclear weapons at sea are an equalizer of what are really very unequal navies and elimination avoids trading navies with the Soviets in a nuclear war at sea— that would be a win for the Soviets; removes START stumbling block; removes NCND [neither confirm nor deny presence of nuclear weapons] “problems for port visits; great political payoff for U.S.” It would also heighten the U.S. advantage in conventional weapons.26 Taking Rowny’s and the navy’s side against such rational arguments, Scowcroft vetoed any mention of naval arms control in Kanter’s draft overview of possible initiatives for Malta,27 and that was that, until September 1991. The consensus view of the U.S. intelligence community two weeks before Malta helps explain the lack of urgency on the part of the Bush administration to wrap up arms control deals with Gorbachev. Expressed in a National Intelligence Estimate titled “The Soviet System in Crisis: Prospects for the Next Two Years,” the general consensus assumed that the current crisis in the USSR would continue even beyond the two-year timeframe, that “the regime will maintain the present course,” that Gorbachev was “relatively secure” in his leadership role, and that there was a less likely scenario of “unmanageable” decline that would lead  Department of State, Information Memorandum to Secretary Baker from Gen. Edward L. Rowny [Special Adviser for Arms Control], November 17, 1989, obtained through the Freedom of Information Act by the National Security Archive. 25  Document No. 85. 26  “Naval Arms Control,” n.d., Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, Arnold Kanter Files, Subject Files, Summit (Malta) – November 1989 [3]. (Bush Library FOIA 1999-0273-F, declassified May 28, 2008). 27  See Brent Scowcroft, Memorandum for the President, “How to Think about Naval Arms Control,” n.d. (Bush Library 2008-0627-MR, declassified August 15, 2012). 24

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to a “repressive crackdown.” In hindsight, the dissenting view from the CIA’s deputy director for intelligence, John Helgerson, was more correct, predicting further progress towards a “pluralist—albeit chaotic—democratic system” in which Gorbachev’s political strength would “erode” and he would “progressively lose control of events.” 28 For the National Security Council meeting just before Malta, Bush’s talking points were all about lowering expectations. Implicitly contrasting his own prudence with Reagan’s abolitionism, the points decry negotiating with “reckless abandon,” and simply set a goal of getting a “better handle” on how to deal with the Soviets.29 Bush’s briefing book for Malta betrays the administration’s actual priorities—Eastern Europe and its revolutionary changes were far down on the contents list, along with arms control.30 Pride of place was Central America, where Bush’s right flank in domestic politics believed Castro was the devil, the Nicaraguan Sandinistas were a Communist beachhead pointed at Texas, and Gorbachev himself was the enabler and perhaps even the mastermind behind revolutionary movements in the hemisphere. In the Malta discussions, the Soviet leader called the American presumptions laughable: “It is not quite clear to us what you want from Nicaragua. There is political pluralism in that country, there are more parties than in the United States. And the Sandinistas—what kind of Marxists are they? This is laughable. Where are the roots of the problem? At the core are economic and social issues.” Likewise on Cuba: “The issue now is how to improve the current situation. There is a simple and well-proven method: one has to speak directly to Castro. You must learn: nobody can lord it over Castro.”31 Malta’s most significant outcome was simply the reassurance it provided to the two leaders through a face-to-face meeting, and the building of a personal relationship on which both would rely in the next two difficult years. In effect, Malta marked the beginning of actual diplomacy, which would be especially important for the German unification endgame of 1990, not to mention Gorbachev’s own reluctance to order domestic repression and pushback (the tragic interventions in the Baltics notwithstanding). Gorbachev, for example, told Bush at Malta: “First and foremost, the new U.S. president must know that the Soviet Union will not under any circumstances initiate a war. This is so important that I wanted to repeat the announcement to you personally. Moreover, the USSR is prepared  National Intelligence Estimate 11-18-89, “The Soviet System in Crisis: Prospects for the Next Two Years,” November 1989, in Fischer, ed., At Cold War’s End, pp. 49–81. The Helgerson dissent is on p. 75. 29  Brent Scowcroft to the President, “National Security Council Meeting, November 30, 1989,” George H.W. Bush Library, NSC Files, FOIA request F93-1217. 30  The President’s Meetings with Soviet President Gorbachev, December 2–3, 1989, Malta [Briefing Book for the President]. Excerpts (contents pages, selected released pages). Source: George H.W. Bush Library, FOIA request 99-0273-F. 31  Document No. 110, Soviet Transcript of the Malta Summit, in Savranskaya, Blanton and Zubok, eds., Masterpieces of History. 28

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to cease considering the U.S. as an enemy and announce this openly.”32 When Gorbachev bristled at Bush’s repeated reference to “Western values” (a phrase found throughout the U.S. briefing materials for Malta), Bush heard him. Just before Malta, Gorbachev had found agreement on this point with Pope John Paul II, when the two of them discussed “universal human values” and the Pope commented, “it would be wrong for someone to claim that changes in Europe and the world should follow the Western model.”33 Even though Bush told Kohl on December 3 that Gorbachev did not understand Western values,34 the American president subsequently adopted Gorbachev’s phrasing, saying in his Brussels remarks immediately after the summit that the need to end the division of Europe was in accord with “values that are becoming universal ideals.” The Malta transcript showed little trace of the fierce winter storm that disrupted the planned meeting venues (the leaders ultimately met only on the refurbished Soviet cruise liner, Maxim Gorky, safely moored to the dock). Interestingly, in an extended discussion with Baker and Shevardnadze, the two sides approached agreement on a negotiation to end the protracted war in Afghanistan, where the Soviets had already completed their withdrawal although the Najibullah government had not fallen as the Americans had expected. Baker bluntly remarked, “Stop your massive assistance to Kabul”—to which Gorbachev responded, “Leave this empty talk behind,” telling the Americans that tribal leaders are already talking with Najibullah, that the Afghan “dialogue itself will clarify this issue” in a “transition period.” “If the Afghans themselves decide that Najibullah must leave—God help them. This is their business.” Apparently the biggest surprise to the Americans was Gorbachev’s insistence that the U.S. should stay in Europe, that the two superpowers “are equally integrated into European problems” and that they need to work together to keep those problems from exploding.35 The American president responded with classic  Ibid.  Document No. 80. 34  Memorandum of Conversation of George H.W. Bush, John Sununu, Brent Scowcroft, and Helmut Kohl, December 3, 1989, Document No. 111 in Savranskaya, Blanton and Zubok, eds., Masterpieces of History. 35  Condoleezza Rice subsequently called Gorbachev’s position at Malta on the U.S. staying in Europe “revolutionary change” (see Sebestyen, Revolution 1989, p. 403), but Gorbachev had explicitly made such assurances—to the Trilateral Commission delegation in January 1989 in answering a question from Henry Kissinger, repeatedly in conversations with Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Kohl, among other leaders, and publicly in his famous Strasbourg speech on June 6, 1989. The Americans in the White House (in contrast to the State Department’s INR, for example) were apparently not listening, and as late as November 21, 1989, President Bush had suggested to West German Foreign Minister Genscher, much to the latter’s surprise and disagreement, that Gorbachev would propose at Malta the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Germany and Europe—the old American fear that the Soviets were attempting to “decouple” the U.S. from Europe. See Bush-Genscher memcon, November 21, 1989, George Bush Library, released under 2007-0051-MR. 32 33

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expressions of reserve, insisting that he did not intend to posture over East Germany even though he was under severe domestic political pressure to “climb the Berlin Wall and to make broad declarations.” Bush affirmed his support for pe­ re­stroi­ka, and reassured Gorbachev that they both remember the Helsinki Final Act’s pronouncements on the inviolability of borders. In general, the American wanted to talk about practical details, such as specific congressional amendments on the U.S. side or arms deliveries in Central America from the Soviet bloc, while Gorbachev preferred to initiate broader philosophical discussions: “The world is experiencing a major regrouping of forces.”36 But both men were clearly uneasy about the dramatic transformations taking place in Eastern Europe. Bush frankly pronounced himself “shocked by the swiftness” while Gorbachev acknowledged, “look at how nervous we are.” After warning Bush not to provoke or accelerate the changes, the Soviet leader in particular seemed to ask what kind of collective action they should take. He stressed the Helsinki process as the new European process and also mentioned the comment by former French President Giscard d’Estaing in January 1989 about a federal state of Western Europe: “Therefore, all of Europe is on the move, and it is moving in the direction of something new. We also consider ourselves Europeans, and we associate this movement with the idea of a common European home.” Gorbachev hoped for the dissolution of the blocs—“what to do with institutions created in another age?”—and suggested that the Warsaw Pact and NATO become, to an even greater degree, political organizations rather than military ones. On the German question, neither leader expected events to move as fast as they would the following year. Just days before Malta, on November 28, Helmut Kohl announced his “10 Points” towards confederation, in a Bundestag speech the Soviet Foreign Ministry denounced as pushing change in “a nationalist direction.” At Malta, Gorbachev attributed the speech to politics and said Kohl “does not act seriously and responsibly.” But then Gorbachev asked whether a united Germany would be neutral or a member of NATO, suggesting that at least theoretically he has imagined the latter, although he may simply have been acknowledging the U.S. position. His clear preference was for the continuation of two states in Germany and only very slow progress towards any unification: “let history decide.” Bush was not eager for rapid progress either: “I hope that you understand that you cannot expect us not to approve of German reunification. At the same time ... [w]e are trying to act with a certain reserve.” After Malta, the Americans raced to catch up with the arms control opportunities on offer from Gorbachev. Scowcroft seems not to have recognized the irony in his own memo to the President for the NSC meeting on December 5,

 The American memcons of the Malta conversations are published in this volume, while the Soviet transcript first appeared in English in Savranskaya, Blanton and Zubok, eds., Masterpieces of History, Document No. 110, pp. 619–646.

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1989: “We came out of Malta with a lot of momentum and have laid to rest the notion—for now—that the Administration is dragging its feet and is unwilling to engage the Soviets.”37 The draft talking points by NSC aide Condoleezza Rice for that NSC meeting reminded the participants: “The President has now committed himself to an ambitious arms control agenda before the June 1990 summit” and “the bureaucracy must not get in the way of the completion of the treaties.” Yet the START deal would not be done until 1991 because of recalcitrance from Defense Secretary Cheney and the U.S. Navy over on-site verification (the Soviets were willing to be more open than the American sailors)38 and cherished weapons like submarine-launched cruise missiles. (In a classic contradiction between actual national security interests and the parochial concerns of the military service involved, the U.S. had far more coastal metropolises that could be threatened with these weapons than the Soviet Union did.) On the Soviet side, Gorbachev’s senior foreign policy aide, Anatoly Chernyaev, saw the main point about Malta as the “normalcy” of the summit, the shared understanding that the Soviet Union and the United States were partners and that neither would attack the other; therefore, the threat of nuclear war was a thing of the past, as was the Cold War itself. Chernyaev saw Gorbachev making an intentional effort at Malta to discard the old reality of the Soviet threat, of the “terror” projected by the USSR in Europe as a result of its invasions and repressions. In Malta, according to Chernyaev, Gorbachev and Bush “gave hope to all humanity,” and just before Malta, at the Vatican, Gorbachev and the Pope “spoke like two good Christians.” The world had changed indeed.39

 Brent Scowcroft [memorandum to the President], “National Security Council Meeting, December 5, 1989 (Bush Library 2005-0965-MR). 38  For example, during the productive September 1989 ministerial between Baker and Shevardnadze in Wyoming, the secretary of state promised to address Soviet concerns about U.S. early-warning radars in Greenland and Great Britain. But the Pentagon reflexively vetoed the very idea of Soviet site visits to Thule and Fylingdales, seeing no benefit in confidence building or reciprocity, and predicting only pressure on the allies that might threaten modernization plans for the radars. See Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) [Paul Wolfowitz], Memorandum for Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Arms Control and Defense Policy [Arnold Kanter], November 1989, Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, Arnold Kanter Files, Summit (Malta) – November 1989 [5] (Bush Library FOIA 1999-0273-F and 2008-0634-MR). 39   Excerpt from Anatoly Chernyaev’s diary, January 2, 1990. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/ NSAEBB/NSAEBB317/chernyaev_1990.pdf. 37

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Document No. 1: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, 12:33 p.m. – 12:46 p.m. January 23, 1989

In his first phone conversation with Gorbachev as president, Bush establishes the practice of direct calls to the Soviet leadership, which were to prove very productive. Gorbachev is eager to engage with the new president and reminds him several times of their conversations on Governors Island. After his U.N. speech and major unilateral cuts in conventional forces in Europe, Gorbachev hopes that the tremendous momentum in U.S.-Soviet relations that was achieved in collaboration with Reagan will continue uninterrupted. To emphasize their progress on all aspects of the U.S. agenda, the Soviet delegation had just announced at the conclusion of the CSCE review conference in Vienna that all political prisoners had been released and that jamming of foreign radio stations had stopped. However, Gorbachev was not the only one worried about where the new administration stood in terms of their changing relationship. Outgoing Secretary of State George Shultz would later recall in his memoir: “I was apprehensive that the ‘new team’ did not understand or accept that the cold war was over.”40 Indeed, the Bush administration’s lengthy policy review would introduce a setback and a frustrating “pause” in U.S.-Soviet relations in 1989, which Chernyaev later dubbed the “lost year.”

The President said he appreciated very, very much the cordial message of congratulations which he received from the General Secretary. He said this was a thank you call to express his appreciation. General Secretary Gorbachev said he welcomed the call and was very pleased to speak on the telephone with the President. He again wished to congratulate him on his inauguration. The President thanked Gorbachev and said his intention was to go forward as they had discussed on Governors Island. He was undertaking policy reviews immediately which would come up with ideas on how to improve the bilateral relationship and the policies started by President Reagan. He could assure the General Secretary that there would be no unnecessary delay. He just wanted to take a new look at policies and would then be ready to move forward as quickly as possible for both sides. General Secretary Gorbachev thanked the President for his words. He said that, for his part, he wished to reaffirm all that they had discussed on Governors Island. Everything he had told the President remained valid. General Secretary Gorbachev said that he had familiarized himself with the President’s speech and  Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 1139.

40

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found new elements that were of interest and importance in it, especially on the subject of the U.S.-Soviet relations. Combined with what the President had just said, it strengthened his conviction that the two would expand relations and build upon the assets which already existed. The President thanked Gorbachev and said he had just two points to make. He wanted the General Secretary to know that his son and grandson had been deeply moved by their visit to Armenia. This had not been a political trip but rather a way to express how Americans felt about the enormous tragedy in Armenia. The President said he and Mrs. Bush were very grateful for the warm way in which their son and grandson had been received. General Secretary Gorbachev said he wished to confirm that this very human gesture had been very well received by the Soviet public. The President thanked Gorbachev and said his second point was that the General Secretary had been very generous in his time with Henry Kissinger. General Scowcroft would be inviting Kissinger to the White House in the next few days, and they would listen attentively to what Kissinger reported. They would not necessarily believe everything because this was, after all, Henry Kissinger but they knew that the General Secretary had been generous with his time, and they would listen attentively to what Dr. Kissinger said. General Secretary Gorbachev thanked the President for this information and said he hoped that the President would find something of interest in what Dr. Kissinger reported. The President said he had one last point. He hoped that Jim Baker, after consulting in Europe with Allies, would be able to establish a relationship with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze along the lines of the one Secretary Shultz had had. The President said that Jim Baker was very close to him, and a good working relationship with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze would benefit U.S.-Soviet relations. General Secretary Gorbachev said he understood fully and would do everything in his power to assure the relationship between the two foreign ministers would not only be maintained, but also expanded and multiplied. The President thanked Gorbachev and said he looked forward to working with him to strengthen world peace. General Secretary Gorbachev said that the President could rely on full cooperation from him in this effort. Everything which they had discussed remained valid. The Soviet side would proceed from a position of realism but also see the broad perspectives and try to act in a manner which benefited both the Soviet and American people and the world community as a whole. General Secretary Gorbachev said he had heard that at 7:30 that morning the President had sworn in his White House team. He sent regards to all these people, and thanked the President for his call. He also wished to pass sincere regards from him and Mrs. Gorbachev to the President’s wife Barbara. The President thanked Gorbachev and said that his wife looked forward very much to getting to know Raisa even better. The two would get along very well. 15

General Secretary Gorbachev said he was very pleased by their conversation and wished the President all success in his activity. The President thanked Gorbachev and wished him good-bye. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA 2000-0429-F by the National Security Archive.]

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Document No. 2: CIA Intelligence Estimate: “Moscow’s 1989 Agenda for U.S.–Soviet Relations” February 1989

During the Reagan administration, the Office of Soviet Analysis at CIA produced some of the most accurate and prescient reports on the Gorbachev reforms, often in opposition to their anti-Gorbachev superiors such as CIA Director William Casey and his deputy, Robert Gates. Here, at the very beginning of the Bush administration, SOVA also shows its skills at assessing the White House mood. The discussion of Gorbachev’s “surprises,” which put the onus on Washington to reciprocate, and even place the U.S. on the defensive, are strikingly congruent with White House anxiety at the time. Disparaging the importance of Gorbachev’s unilateral conventional arms reduction announcement at the United Nations and Moscow’s START proposal at Reykjavik, the analysts misconstrue Gorbachev’s thinking about “sufficiency” and the arms race in reverse. But here the CIA is right in tune with the Scowcroft thinking that dominates the White House. The potential surprises are not assessed on whether they are in the U.S. interest, only whether they make the U.S. look laggardly—exactly the administration’s concern. Presciently, the CIA predicts the shortrange nuclear cuts that Gorbachev would propose to Baker on May 11, much to the latter’s shock and sense of being one-upped. But if Baker had read this briefing, he should not have been surprised.

SCOPE NOTE

It has been four years since the Intelligence Community produced an assessment of Soviet policy towards the United States. Since that time, Mikhail Gorbachev has become General Secretary of the Communist Party as well as head of state, and Soviet foreign policy in general and towards the United States in particular has changed considerably. This Intelligence Assessment examines Soviet positions on all issues currently under discussion with the United States and explores some of the tactical moves Moscow is likely to make in upcoming talks on arms control, regional issues, and bilateral concerns. In addition, this paper provides the domestic political, economic, and military motivations as well as the ideological framework for Soviet policy towards the United States in the coming year. KEY JUDGMENTS

Information available as of 3 February 1989 was used in this report. Gorbachev’s foreign policy is a direct outflow from his domestic agenda. One of his main priorities as General Secretary has been to obtain relief from the arms competition with the United States and its allies as well as with China in order to 17

focus on economic, political, and social recovery from the devastating legacies of Stalinism. In 1989 Gorbachev’s incentives for pursuing this course will, in our view, be even greater. For the second straight year economic performance has been in decline—because of the turmoil generated by his restructuring policies— and he faces growing budget deficits. Gorbachev’s ability to focus on his US agenda may be constrained by the plethora of domestic issues requiring attention in 1989. He will most likely be distracted by urgent problems, such as continued ethnic turmoil, consumer unrest, and the need to protect his political flanks. His foreign policy could appear episodic if the timing of his initiatives and responses are affected by such domestic demands. Moreover, the Soviets are reaching a critical juncture in the preparation of the 13th Five-Year Plan for the 1991–1995 period. Soviet political authorities have admitted that restructuring the economy will require moving some resources away from the defense sector, and military officials have stated publicly that defense spending is to be reduced. Although the need to meet key planning deadlines will not, by itself, make the Soviets more accommodating in arms control negotiations or other forums, we think it will increase their interest in reducing the uncertainties vis-à-vis the United States that would affect their defense planning. A key goal for Moscow is concluding a START agreement in 1989. Soviet statements and positions taken in Geneva lead us to believe that the Soviets’ concerns about a near-term deployment of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) have lessened, which may make it possible for them to accept less explicit linkage between a START accord and SDI limits than they have previously. Soviet officials also appear to be probing for ways to resolve the issue of sea-launched cruise missiles, which they see as the other major substantive obstacle to the conclusion of a START Treaty. Conventional arms control clearly has moved to a high position on Moscow’s East-West agenda. Reductions of conventional forces offer potential benefits to Gorbachev’s economic program in terms of labor, materials, and industrial capacity that could be redirected to the production of civilian goods. Gorbachev’s announcement of unilateral cuts is consistent with the reports that the Soviet leadership intends to trim the share of resources going to defense. It also indicates, we believe, that Gorbachev feels he cannot afford to allow decisions on resource priorities to be dependent on the outcome of what promises to be complex and protracted multinational negotiations. […] Gorbachev’s move on conventional forces is perhaps the most vivid illustration to date of his strategy of employing political leverage instead of military strength to promote the USSR’s security. Although the cuts he announced will reduce the immediacy of the Warsaw Pact offensive threat, the remaining forces will leave the Soviets secure against any plausible military initiative by NATO. Meanwhile, the resulting dampening of public and parliamentary support for NATO defense modernization could well result in an overall net gain for Soviet 18

security in Europe. Gorbachev could take a similar tack in the strategic arena if he believes the START talks are bogged down; there are a number of moves he could make that, in practical terms, would do little to change the USSR’s strategic nuclear posture but which would have a potent impact on Western public perceptions and undercut support for the US modernization programs. In other arms control arenas, we think that in the coming year the Soviets are likely to:  eek to complete the verification protocol to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty • S so that both it and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty may be submitted for ratification and work can begin on further reducing the limits for nuclear testing, in support of Moscow’s stated goal of a comprehensive test ban. • Pursue a flexible new policy on verification in all negotiations, attempting to meet demands of the West for the information and access it considers necessary to monitor compliance. • Attempts to capitalize on the Paris conference by spurring the talks on a chemical weapons ban in the Conference on Disarmament negotiations, to move closer to their goal of a verifiable global ban on chemical weapons. Regional conflicts, human rights, and economic and other bilateral issues also will continue to receive high-level attention in 1989. Progress on these issues enhances the USSR’s image abroad, provides a calmer environment for achieving arms control agreements, and moderates Soviet obligations for military and economic assistance to client states. Specifically, the Soviets are likely to:  ontinue intensive talks with the United States on ways to resolve and mu• C tually guarantee settlement of regional conflicts. In this connection, we expect the Soviets to meet their 15 February deadline for withdrawing all their troops from Afghanistan. • Maintain an active dialogue on human rights in an effort to project a better image of the Soviet Union abroad and help “legitimize” legal, social, and political reforms inside the USSR. • Attempt to enhance bilateral economic relations by pressing for elimination of US trade restrictions, seeking most-favored-nation status, and courting American firms to establish joint ventures with Soviet companies. The latter would help integrate the USSR into the world economy, allow it to acquire state-of-the-art technology and managerial and marketing skills, and boost exports to the United States. To improve the general political atmosphere, Gorbachev has put considerable energy in “normalizing” Moscow’s relations with Washington. He views such relations as critical to creating a calmer international environment that will allow the USSR to focus on the rejuvenation of its economy and society. He is likely, therefore, to continue to place great value on developing a personal dialogue with 19

the US President and between Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and the US Secretary of State as a means for providing impetus to negotiations and for sustaining continuity in a key bilateral relationship. Gorbachev has found significant advantage in surprising the United States with bold proposals or unilateral moves and is likely to continue to do so as he seeks the room to maneuver that he believes his policy of perestroyka demands. The surprise tactic puts the onus for reciprocal actions on the United States or puts the United States on the defensive. […] The Importance of Summits and Ministerials: Gorbachev uses summits as a means to establish personal relationships with foreign leaders. He values summits with the United States as critical for generating momentum in arms control talks and circumventing bureaucratic red tape at the working level of negotiations. Summits also provide a stage for asserting his role as a statesman to both foreign and domestic audiences and are an important tool for reading Washington. Gorbachev probably will continue to use Foreign Minister Shevardnadze’s meetings with the US Secretary of State as an important channel for high-level dialogue, both to provide impetus for resolving impasses in arms control talks and to keep relations in general on track. Gorbachev recognizes that some summits—such as Geneva and Moscow—primarily serve as opportunities for dialogue, while others—such as Reykjavik and Washington—can produce more tangible results. Possible Surprises: Gorbachev has given the West a number of surprises over the last four years, including the elimination of the SS-20 force, acceptance of on-site inspections for confidence building and arms control verification, withdrawal from Afghanistan, the announced unilateral cuts in Soviet conventional forces, and the declaration that the Soviet Union will begin to destroy its chemical weapons stockpiles in 1989. These moves have demonstrated a willingness to subordinate Moscow’s traditionally enduring military security factors in foreign policy pursuits to Gorbachev’s broader policy calculations, which bank heavily on the positive political impact of surprise announcements. This trend is likely to continue as the Soviet leader continues to seek the room for maneuver that he believes his policy of pe­ re­stroy­ka demands. […] The following are some possible (though not necessarily likely) proposals or unilateral moves we could see in 1989: • • • • • • • • 20

 ismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar. […] D Delink START from Defense and Space. […] Reduce the size of the SS-18 force. […] Reduce short-range ballistic missiles in Europe. […] Return the Northern Territories to Japan. […] Withdraw the Soviet brigade from Cuba. […] Seek repeal of the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson Amendments. […] Offer on-site inspection for COCOM purchases. […]

Gorbachev has found significant advantage in making surprise moves: he gains political credit that he does not have to share with Washington, and he puts the onus for reciprocal actions on the United States or puts the United States on the defensive. Most important, such steps have moved him closer to his objective— reducing the level of tension in East-West relations.

[Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA 2010-0156-F in 2013 by the National Security Archive [original in Condoleezza Rice Files, U.S.Soviet Relations (3)].]

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Document No. 3: Memorandum from Scowcroft for the President: “Getting Ahead of Gorbachev” March 1, 1989

This document reveals how justified Shultz’s concerns were about the inability of the new administration to keep up the momentum developed between Gorbachev and Reagan. The overriding need that Scowcroft sees for Bush’s foreign policy is “getting ahead of Gorbachev,” which he calls “a complicated and enduring task.” The memo gives no indication that the Cold War is over or that bold initiatives from Gorbachev, if responded to, could lead to a transformation of international relations. No new initiatives are proposed; instead, Scowcroft warns the president that now “is an especially bad time to put forth flashy proposals on the assumption that Gorbachev cannot accept them. He has surprised us before.” He complains that Gorbachev is capturing the public’s imagination, especially in Europe, and that the U.S. needs to counteract this and grab the limelight. Revealingly, the first of several goals the memo sets out is to create “the image of America’s foreign policy as driven by clear objectives.” No mention is made of Gorbachev’s groundbreaking speech at the United Nations and his unilateral cuts in Europe are only referred to as “reported.” In contrast, the memo suggests that “[i]n the European security realm, our first priority is to underscore the credibility of NATO’s nuclear deterrent through modernization.” This suggestion would lead to Bush’s failed campaign to persuade Germany to modernize Lance short-range missiles (FOTL), which took three months and a lot of effort by the administration. Scowcroft is concerned about Gorbachev’s influence on U.S. allies. The latter’s idea of a common European home is seen as a challenge, not a welcome sign of new thinking; Scowcroft suggests that the United States needs to “counter” it “by pointing out that we remain in that home as welcome guests, not as with the Soviets in Eastern Europe, as occupiers.” Finally, the memo makes clear that the administration is not likely to provide any substantial economic aid to the reforming countries, as compared to other allies: “for political and economic reasons, Japan and Europe are more sympathetic than we to East European and Soviet requests for Western investment.”

This memorandum lays out the premises that I believe should guide the way we go about developing an overall strategy for U.S.-Soviet relations. Gorbachev presents us with major challenges but also with opportunities. As you know, he is a skilled leader whose diplomatic activities have significantly altered the international community’s view of the Soviet Union. He is very good; we have to be better. Getting and staying ahead of Gorbachev is less a question of a few early and dramatic proposals than a requirement that we develop a sound strategy. Trying to match Gorbachev headline for headline, given our need for domestic and allied consensus, will lead us down the wrong path. Rather, we need to put forth 22

considered and consistent positions while negotiating from strength. We will be creative, but should seek a steady pace that can lead to real and sustainable progress. Gorbachev’s adroit diplomacy is rooted in an understanding of international politics that far outstrips his predecessors’ in breadth and sophistication. Not satisfied to number only weak and dependent states like Vietnam and Ethiopia among Soviet partners, Gorbachev is determined to improve relations with all of the global power centers, including China, Japan, and our Western European allies. Gorbachev wants to turn adversaries into potential sources of support, smoothing points of friction that drain his all too scarce political and economic resources. The rhetoric of his peace offensive has been accompanied by a willingness to make dramatic “concessions” in the military arena. Gorbachev possesses a refined understanding of the role of military power. He will sometimes conduct a tactical retreat, surrendering military advantages in order to gain the upper hand politically. Weakening NATO remains his prime international objective. If the troop cuts in Eastern Europe are carried out as reportedly planned, they will be militarily significant. The political impact will be even greater. The pictures on the day that Soviet boys begin to leave Hungary, the GDR and Czechoslovakia will do more to promote the image of a changed Soviet Union than four decades of Soviet proclamations of peaceful intent. The bold activity on the international front complements his domestic reforms. Yet the pace of change is slow in the U.S.S.R. Economic, nationality and social problems are mounting. Gorbachev enjoys the support of intellectuals but most workers are suspicious of the reforms and many bureaucrats are hostile. But whatever the reception at home, perestroika and glasnost’ are having an impact on the Soviet Union’s image abroad. Some of Gorbachev’s rhetoric (and some of the initiatives) could unsettle the postwar status quo. You may face major upheavals in Eastern Europe or in the Soviet Union itself during your Presidency. As uncertainties grow, we must preserve the traditional pillars of American postwar strength: military power, economic resilience, firm alliances and skillful diplomacy. We must continue to stress the fact that Soviet flexibility is, in large part, a response to Western, especially U.S., policies. Clearly, it would be unwise to walk away from a successful strategy which has brought us to this point. This is our agenda, not his, and we need to recapture credit for it. Yet in the current environment we cannot afford to be naysayers. Gorbachev’s “new foreign policy” cannot be dismissed as propaganda. It is often backed up by action. And we do not want to miss opportunities to improve the relationship and move to our own vision of the future. Our review of policy has begun and we will proceed with dispatch. But the worst thing that we can do at this critical juncture is make policy precipitously or in a piecemeal fashion. This is an especially bad time to put forth flashy proposals on the assumption that Gorbachev cannot accept them. He has surprised us before. 23

I suggest the following strategic approach: First, we should work on the domestic side to strengthen the image of America’s foreign policy as driven by clear objectives. The appeal of Gorbachev is his decisiveness. We cannot meet him head on if we do not appear confident about our purposes and agenda. Attending to the economic problems that weaken us abroad, including the trade and budget deficits, will reinforce our global image as strong and vital. And the spirit of bipartisanship that you have rekindled gives us an opportunity to present a united American policy for the first time in a generation. We may, at last, be able to concentrate on our core goals instead of warring over the details of implementation. Second, we need to send a clear signal that relations with our allies are our first priority. Jim Baker’s trip to Europe was a good start in this direction. Perhaps as we approach a NATO summit, you should make a major speech dealing with Europe. One of the aims of Soviet policy is to distance us from our friends. We can counter Gorbachev’s “common European home” theme by pointing out that we remain in that home as welcome guests, not as with the Soviets in Eastern Europe, as occupiers. In the European security realm, our first priority is to underscore the credibility of NATO’s nuclear deterrent through modernization. With regard to conventional arms control, the alliance must develop a political strategy soon concerning conventional force reductions and where we want them to lead. We might be able to offer an innovative proposal for a more extensive troop inspection regime and other confidence building measures. These measures should be announced as building on Gorbachev’s troop cut to reduce the possibility of “surprise attack” through our own proposals to increase transparency. Similarly, we will need to prepare carefully for bilateral arms control, including START. Arms control is not the only issue on the U.S.-Soviet agenda, but it is the one watched most closely by the world community. If we perform competently in arms control, confidence in our ability to manage the broader relationship will soar. Third, after our review of policy, we may wish to undertake initiatives with Eastern Europe. The East Europeans, to varying degrees, are taking advantage of Gorbachev’s invitation to exercise greater control over their own affairs. Eastern Europe is a weak link in Gorbachev’s strategy. We should exploit this but must do so in a prudent way. Our best lever is economic assistance to the East. But the management of East-West economic relations poses special challenges for us. For political and economic reasons, Japan and Europe are more sympathetic than we to East European and Soviet requests for Western investment. They are pressing for a weakening of COCOM procedures and restrictions. The Administration needs to establish acceptable boundaries for East-West economic cooperation and then coordinate them with our allies. Fourth, the recent settlements in Afghanistan and Southern Africa have raised hopes that U.S.-Soviet cooperation will spur agreements in other parts of the 24

world. We should work aggressively to promote regional stability, aware that the Soviet Union can be an important asset in some but not all regions. In Central America, for instance, multilateral efforts may be more effective if the Soviet Union is excluded. Finally, you will, in due course, need to lay out a vision of American power as a global stabilizing force in its own right. Whatever the state of U.S.-Soviet relations, America will continue to have interests abroad to defend. In the Persian Gulf, for instance, our military commitment provided the stability that supported the UN search for a peaceful settlement. We need to establish the principle that American power is not simply a reaction to Soviet military capability. This will be important over the next few years because Gorbachev may succeed in diminishing the sense of an overt Soviet threat in a number of areas of the world. “Getting ahead of Gorbachev” is a complicated and enduring task. The American people, our allies and the international community are looking to you for steady and confident leadership. The time that you take now to set a sure course is a good investment, one that will pay dividends throughout your Presidency. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through Mandatory Review request 2011-0766-MR by the National Security Archive.]

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Document No. 4: Record of Conversation between Gorbachev and Baker, Moscow May 11, 1989

This is the first conversation between Gorbachev and the new U.S. secretary of state. The Bush administration continues to be concerned about Gorbachev’s popularity (see previous document) and the robustness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent in Europe, and is trying to persuade West Germany to deploy a new model of tactical nuclear missile (FOTL). Responding to developments in Eastern Europe, the administration had earlier decided that President Bush would make his first major foreign policy address on the region in Hamtramck, Michigan, on April 17, 1989. However, in this conversation, the priority is still not the sweeping changes in the USSR after the first free elections of March 1989, or in Eastern Europe, but nuclear deterrence in Europe. Baker accuses Gorbachev of playing games with his revolutionary proposals to get rid of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe: “We understand the political appeal of the third zero. But that appeal is only political, not strategic, not from the standpoint of security.” Gorbachev reminds Baker that the Soviets made a big concession to Shultz in April 1987 by adding their cutting edge short-range missile, the SS-23/Oka, to the list of weapons to be eliminated under the INF Treaty in return for U.S. assurances that weapons of that class would not be deployed in Europe. Akhromeyev explains the details of the compromise achieved in 1987, which went against the recommendations of the Soviet military. Baker defends the U.S. priority to modernize the Lance missile, dismissing Gorbachev’s position as simply “trying to put us at a further disadvantage.” At the time, the Bush administration can only see Gorbachev’s bold initiatives as political challenges to its own timid stance on arms control.

Gorbachev. Greetings, Mr. Secretary of State. It is good that we are meeting. The ice has broken, and now it must begin to clear. I say this every spring. Likewise, in the context of the changes taking place in our two countries and the world as a whole, we need to think about how to continue everything that has been put in motion by the combined efforts of the Soviet Union and the United States. Baker. Thank you for your welcoming words, Mr. General Secretary. I have to say that, before my departure, I had many discussions with the president. He asked me to relay that he is very interested in my visit. He also asked me to convey that we would like to resume cooperation with the Soviet Union in all aspects of our relationship. We are striving towards an active, constructive, positive, and ever-expanding relationship with your country. The president asked me to express his appreciation for the letter you recently sent him. In particular, he wanted to let you know that he appreciates your statement that the Soviet Union has not supplied arms to Nicaragua since 1988. He 26

wanted me to ask you if you had any objections to making this public. This could be done after our meeting, or in some other manner. As I was saying to your Minister of Foreign Affairs, it would be very beneficial to us if you could give a statement on this. […] Gorbachev. First of all, let me thank you for the letter from President Bush that you brought. We take into consideration the thoughts expressed in this letter. Please let the president know that we will study his letter very carefully. I noticed at one point in the letter the president mentioned the possibility that a stronger Soviet Union might exhibit its military power in a more decisive manner, and that would cause the United States concern. I want to tell you: I am convinced that fundamentally it is in the interest of both our countries that the USSR and the USA should feel secure. And a country can only feel secure when it is strong. […] We often hear different things from Washington. However, we certainly differentiate between what the president says and what others sometimes say. Obviously Washington’s policy will be decided in Washington and not in Moscow. And the Kremlin’s policy will be decided in the Kremlin and not elsewhere. However, this does not mean that our countries shouldn’t take into account experiences of years past in our policy; we should aspire to build our policy on the basis of reality. […] Now […] regarding making public the fact that the Soviet Union has not been supplying weapons to Nicaragua since 1988. Here I would make a different emphasis. We believe that this should be seen as creating preconditions for new steps in the direction of political settlement in Central America. Maybe we did not succeed in formulating the main idea sufficiently clearly in our letter to the president. And this idea—and on this issue we worked it through with Castro, who accepted it—is that we need a moratorium for weapon supplies to the Central American region from anywhere. If you could make this public, and as one of the elements [mention] that the Soviet Union has not supplied weapons to Nicaragua since last year, then, I think it would be evidence of considerable movement of thinking and policy. […] [Gorbachev.] There is also the matter of tactical nuclear weapons. In regards to that I would like to remind you what happened here, at this very table, in April of 1987. Maybe you know what I’m talking about. There was a discussion about the so-called short-range missiles. Secretary Shultz insisted that our new short range missile “Oka,” known in the West as “SS-23,” be included in the INF Treaty, despite the fact that its range is less than 500 km. We initially objected, but in the end agreed. At the same time we agreed with Secretary Shultz that this type of missile would no longer be developed by either side. That’s exactly what happened, check the records and you will see. And now it turns out that you are planning, in the 1990s, to develop a missile analogous to our SS-23. I won’t even mention how this looks from the moral standpoint. And how does it affect the outlook for these talks? In any case, is it clear who shall bear responsibility for the consequences? 27

Together with our allies we proposed to negotiate on tactical nuclear weapons. Our intention is to review the nuclear component of dual-purpose weapons as well. You maintain that the Soviet Union has an advantage in conventional weapons. The elimination of this asymmetry in conventional weapons is essentially the first step of reductions under discussion in Vienna. Why not do the same with tactical nuclear weapons? This year the Soviet Union will unilaterally withdraw 500 warheads of tactical nuclear weapons from Eastern Europe. If you are willing, we could consider even more radical steps. Over the course of 1989-1991 we are prepared to withdraw all our nuclear weapons from the territories of our Warsaw Pact allies, provided the U.S. reciprocates. Perhaps the American people are not overly concerned about tactical nuclear weapons. But in Europe this is a critical issue. We are prepared to have an exchange of ideas with you, regarding both the conventional weapons and the tactical nuclear ones. We are ready to hear your ideas about steps to be taken in this field. I wanted to inform you of our intentions ahead of time, because we want to engage with you on real policy. I heard that the U.S. [National] Security Council has a group dedicated to discrediting Gorbachev and perestroika. Perhaps Mr. Gates is in charge of it. If this is indeed true we will never be able to deepen our relationship. From our side, we are not going to play dirty with the United States. Any attempt to do so would simply be unrealistic. But we are within our rights to expect the same from the United States. Past experience demonstrates that by working together, by seeking to balance our interests, we can move forward and find solutions that would be profitable to both sides, so to speak. I believe that, as former secretary of the treasury, this approach would resonate with you. So let us court public opinion by working together, cooperating, creating real policies. Baker. We are on the same page. We agree with you wholeheartedly and, I wish to assure you, the National Security Council. […] [Gorbachev] […] in the second stage we can reduce them by, let’s say, another 25 percent, and finally by 1997 actualize the reductions to the levels we had suggested. At the same time we can discuss the issue of tactical nuclear weapons. We don’t want to get ahead of ourselves in this regard. Baker. So you would like to eliminate the disparity, to start with? Gorbachev. We merely wish to say that the process of negotiations on nuclear weapons is crucial. It should move forward in tandem with the process of limiting and reducing weapons in Europe. The reduction of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe would not precede the elimination of asymmetry in conventional weapons. Perhaps, parallel to the second stage of reductions in conventional weapons. You mentioned that this is a politically appealing topic. But that’s not what is at the heart of the matter. This is a vital issue for Europeans, given that tactical missiles cover a significant portion of Europe’s territory. 28

Baker. I would like to disagree. The point is not that they cover a significant portion of Europe’s territory. The point is that, in great part, they have ensured peace in Europe via our flexible response strategy. And that is a defensive strategy. Gorbachev. But we are not asking you to act unilaterally. We are proposing reciprocal actions. Now let us return to the matter which we were discussing at this table with Secretary Shultz. I have to say that, in light of that discussion, your efforts to modernize missiles are unexpected. We had agreed with Shultz that such missiles would not be created. Akhromeyev. I would like to remind you that Secretary Shultz initially proposed that both sides keep 75 such missiles in Europe. However, he later agreed that this type of missiles should not be present in Europe. And we went by the premise that the United States would not create such missiles. Gorbachev. It is important to recall this if we are to maintain trust between our nations. Baker. I have a different understanding of this matter. I would like to hear from Ambassador Ridgway, who was present at those talks. Ridgway. In the course of the negotiations we had agreed to consider the SS23 missile as having a range of over 500 km. We agreed not to have systems with this range. In the framework of this arrangement we agreed not to deploy such a system, however, this did not include a missile to replace “Lance.” In April of 1987 the question before NATO was: second zero or the deployment of a certain number of missiles. NATO decided not to deploy missiles with a range over 500 km. But we were discussing completely different missiles. So I can’t agree with Marshal Akhromeyev. Gorbachev. No, this is not the case. Shevardnadze. We made a concession, and our military even criticized us for giving up the SS-23 missiles. Akhromeyev. I would like to emphasize that the SS-23 missile does not have a range of 500 km. It was included in the INF according to the so called type rule. We agreed with Secretary Shultz to count this missile as pertaining to this rule. However, the U.S. was aware that its range is less than 500 km. Gorbachev. At the time we had to move past an impasse, and we decided to accommodate the American side, though it meant going against our military. Now this brings up the question: why are we cutting the SS-23 missiles? Incidentally, I think we haven’t cut all of them yet. And now you’re dragging similar missiles here. Baker. Upgrades are necessary due to a great imbalance favoring the USSR, with your advantage in tanks and other types of conventional weapons. Perhaps at a certain stage we could begin to have this discussion, if at first you’d find it possible to decrease your advantage in tactical nuclear arms, reducing it to our level. Perhaps at that stage we will not need to upgrade. Gorbachev. In that case we could also give you a whole list of our concerns. But this is why we have the Vienna negotiations, and we are very determined to 29

achieve real results. What you are planning we see as highly undesirable, what’s more—it is harmful to the negotiation process. Baker. I just received a memo regarding the Soviet Union’s upgrades of its short-range nuclear weapons. From 1981 to1988 the Soviet Union carried out a comprehensive upgrade of tactical nuclear weapons. Thus, a large number of FROG-7 missiles were replaced by SS-21 missiles, which are more accurate and reliable. Old artillery was exchanged for self-propelled nuclear artillery. As a result, instead of the prior advantage favoring NATO in this category, now the Warsaw Pact countries have a 2:1 advantage. As the Soviet Union itself recognizes, it now has a 2:1 advantage in short range missiles, which have a triple capacity to deliver conventional, nuclear, and chemical weapons. Gorbachev. I don’t want to get into all these details right now. The place to discuss them is at the negotiations. I spelled out our position numerous times—in London, Washington, other places. I won’t repeat myself. What you are describing was already in place when the INF Treaty was signed. The situation hasn’t changed since. I brought up this issue so you could weigh our concerns regarding your modernizations. We are all for negotiating with you. We would like the negotiations to be efficient and practical. The first stage is the elimination of the asymmetry. In this general context the question of tactical nuclear arms isn’t going anywhere, we can’t get away from it. It is of great concern to the Europeans, not only in the West, but also in the East. We’ll have to untangle that knot. Think about this issue. We don’t want to butt heads with you. Shevardnadze. The best way is to start the negotiations. Gorbachev. This would also help alleviate the concerns of the public. Think about that. Baker. You’re requesting this, and we will do it. But we have a different approach. We believe that a minimal number of nuclear weapons is absolutely necessary for our flexible response strategy, which ensures continued peace in Europe. We understand the political appeal of the third zero. But that appeal is only political, not strategic, not from the standpoint of security. In order for us to be able to cooperate with you on this issue, or at least to look for a way towards such cooperation, it would be more fitting if you said: we are prepared to decrease our very significant advantage. At that point we could talk about these arms. But we can’t do it while we are at a disadvantage. I would like to again remind you of your words: there should be no suspicions between us that one side wants to put the other at a disadvantage. Here we are already at a disadvantage, you already have the advantage in tactical nuclear arms, in conventional arms. And now, recognizing the political appeal of the third zero, you are insisting on negotiations and trying to put us at a further disadvantage. Gorbachev. No, that is not the case. We don’t want misunderstanding between us on this issue. Your argument that the Soviet Union has an advantage has not convinced me. Indeed, in terms of aviation, the advantage lies with the West. If you account for everything, then in terms of tactical nuclear weapons we are 30

evenly balanced, but it is a terrible balance at a very high level. I repeat, you’ll have a tough time proving that your stance on this issue is reasonable. Baker. As I said, we understand the political appeal of your position. Gorbachev. Negotiations to radically decrease the military confrontation in Europe are now underway. Under these circumstances, the modernization of nuclear weapons, especially this type of modernization, raises many questions about the intentions of the U.S. So, I repeat, now that negotiations have started, let’s think together how to dovetail this problem into the framework of the negotiations. [Source: The Gorbachev Foundation Archive, Fond 1, Opis 1. Translated by Anna Gabrielian.]

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Document No. 5: Memorandum from Scowcroft for the President: “Scope Paper—Your Visit to Poland” June 29, 1989

Written on the eve of Bush’s departure for Europe, this paper provides a brief overview of the domestic situation in Poland (Scowcroft prepared a similar memorandum on Hungary, too), and suggests the main issues the president will face in his discussions with local leaders. The visit will take place after historic free elections in Poland on June 4 and 18 have given the Solidarity opposition movement all but one of the open seats and after the symbolic reburial of Imre Nagy in Hungary on June 16. Bush is also scheduled to speak to the Polish parliament (the “Sejm”). (An original line crossed out in the draft reads: “you will not make many more important foreign policy speeches than this one in your presidency.”) While aptly describing the situation in Poland—“Solidarity is legitimate but not in power and the regime is in power but not legitimate”—the memo does not suggest any specific steps to show support for democratic reform. In fact, the main concern here is that since “Poles look first and foremost to America and thus to you as a beacon of hope,” expressions of support would lead to “high expectations of what the United States can do to help.” In Hungary, the president is also advised to respond to requests for economic assistance without specific commitments: “[a]s in Poland, you will want to deliver a message that the responsibility for economic progress in Hungary lies principally with the Hungarians but that the West is willing to help.”41

Setting: Poland is a country of contrasts—between a dynamic political awakening and a stagnant and worsening economic situation. Solidarity’s overwhelming electoral victory left no doubts that the Communist Party is despised and mistrusted. The results have strengthened the voices of Party conservatives who never supported the Roundtable and predicted that Jaruzelski’s accommodation would produce precisely this result. On the other hand, Solidarity emerged from the victory with a crisis of identity. The union is reluctant to swap its role as outsider for a responsible place in governing Poland and imposing economic reforms. Solidarity worries that its own constituency will turn against the union in the face of the worker dislocation and unemployment that is bound to result from economic restructuring. This is, therefore, a political vacuum at the time when Poland desperately needs strong leadership: Solidarity is legitimate but not in power and the

 Information Memorandum from Brent Scowcroft to President Bush, “Scope Paper—Your Visit to Poland.” June 29, 1989, George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA 19980194-F by the National Security Archive [original in Condoleezza Rice Files, President’s Trip to Poland/Hungary 7/89 (1c)].

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regime is in power but not legitimate. The low voter turnout for the freest election in postwar Poland served notice on both the regime and the opposition that the population’s patience with perpetual economic crisis is wearing thin. Tenor and Objectives: Your visit is meant to demonstrate U.S. support for incipient democratic processes in Poland and to underscore the West’s commitment to helping the Poles through the difficult times ahead. Other Western leaders have been and are planning to go to Poland but it is not an exaggeration to say that Poles look first and foremost to America and thus to you as a beacon of hope. This leads to high expectations of what the United States can do to help. Your public statements will stress our willingness to help while exhorting the Poles to help themselves. The high point of your activities in Warsaw will be your speech before the Polish Parliament, the first such occasion in the postwar era. You will not make many more important foreign policy speeches than this one in your presidency.42 Your meetings are designed to recognize the unique contributions of Jaruzelski and the regime on the one hand and Solidarity on the other. Several Western leaders have hailed Jaruzelski as a Polish Patriot—a description this is too far for us to go to. But he is most certainly a man who, perhaps focused on his place in history, understands the necessity of compromise. It was, after all, Jaruzelski who threatened to resign if the Party did not permit the Roundtable negotiations to take place. In Gdansk, the birthplace of Solidarity, you will meet with Leach Walesa [sic] who is at once charismatic and pragmatic. Walesa is by far the most popular political figure in Poland. He is reluctant to play an overtly political role but his clout is badly needed if Poland is to begin the difficult and unpopular economic reforms ahead. Your private luncheon with him may provide an opportunity to discuss how he sees his role in the difficult years ahead. As you heard from the Polish-Americans in the Roosevelt Room, the regime and Solidarity are united by one overarching preoccupation—economic assistance—and will press you, publicly and privately, to extend further financial assistance and to plead Poland’s case for lenient terms with the IMP, the World Bank and the Paris Club. You may also find officials anxious to discuss your CFE proposal. The Poles see CFE as a mechanism to reduce their military burden while remaining in the Warsaw Pact. The message that you bring to the Poles will be watched throughout Eastern Europe, particularly in Hungary. But even Czechoslovakia, the GDR and Bulgaria, which have resisted reform, are aware that you have succeeded in forging a common strategy for the West that links economic assistance to fundamental economic and political reform. The promise of Western help is not enough now to stir the recalcitrant regimes but it is certainly a factor in their calculations of

 Sentence crossed out in the original document. [Editors]

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their political and economic future. The division of Europe began with the failure to hold free elections in Poland. More than forty years later the promise of overcoming that division rests heavily with the first signs of democracy’s return to Poland. As Walter Cronkite used to say, you are there. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA 1998-0194-F by the National Security Archive [original in Condoleezza Rice Files, President’s Trip to Poland/Hungary 7/89]

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Document No. 6: Letter from Bush to Gorbachev July 21, 1989

During President Bush’s trip to Europe, he visited Poland and Hungary and had a chance to see with his own eyes how quickly events were changing the European landscape. Gorbachev, meanwhile, had two triumphant visits to Germany and to France, where he met with leaders and gave a major address to the Council of Europe on his vision of a “common European home.” Before this moment, there was practically no direct communication between the U.S. and the Soviet leaders. Europeans strongly encouraged Bush to meet with Gorbachev personally. This letter, written by Bush personally, gives a good example of Bush’s voice. He is very cautious, but at the same time sounds very sensitive to Gorbachev’s concerns, suggesting that they meet without any agenda and in fact “avoid the word ‘summit’ which is, at best, overworked and, at worst, a word whose connotation is one of a momentous happening.” Bush certainly did not envision any major breakthroughs but was concerned that not meeting with Gorbachev for so long, while the Soviet leader was becoming so popular and a frequent visitor to European capitals, could hurt him politically. He suggests a low-key meeting in connection with Gorbachev’s visit to the U.N. General Assembly in September.

Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing this letter to you on my way back from Europe to the United States. My mind is full of the fascinating conversations that I had with people in Hungary and Poland and with the many world leaders gathered in Paris for France’s bicentennial. Let me get quickly to the point of this letter. I would like very much to sit down soon and talk to you, if you are agreeable to the idea. I want to do it without thousands of assistants hovering over our shoulders, without the ever-present briefing papers and certainly without the press yelling at us every 5 minutes about “who’s winning,” “what agreements have been reached,” or “has our meeting succeeded or failed.” Up until now I have felt that a meeting would have to produce major agreements so as not to disappoint the watching world. Now my thinking is changing. Perhaps it was my visit to Poland and Hungary or perhaps it is what I heard about your recent visits to France and Germany—whatever the cause—I just want to reduce the chances there could be misunderstandings between us. I want to get our relationship on a more personal basis. If you agree that an unstructured meeting would be productive, I would make the following suggestion. My suggestion is that you decide, on your own, to come to speak at the U.N. early in the General Assembly session—perhaps around the end of September (the 27th and 28th of September would be perfect for me, but so would other 35

dates). Immediately following your public announcement that you were coming to the United Nations, I would invite you to come to meet with me for an informal, “no agenda” visit. In my view, it would be preferable to avoid the word “summit” which is, at best, overworked and, at worst, a word whose connotation is one of a momentous happening. I would propose inviting you to visit me for a day or two of private chats. There are two alternative ways I would suggest to do this. One way would be for you to fly from New York to Washington where I would meet you at Andrews Air Force Base. We could then go by helicopter to Camp David. There, in a relaxed setting with neckties off, we could talk about any and all subjects. The very nature of the invitation would guard against the danger of “overpromise.” I would propose no more than a handful of advisers on each side. I would visualize long chats between you and me alone and, also, good discussions with my Secretary of State, NSC Adviser, and Chief of Staff present, along with their counterparts, of course. Another option would be for you to visit Barbara and me at our seaside house in Maine. Late September can be very nice there. You could fly to Pease Air Force Base in New Hampshire, about 40 minutes from New York and helicopter another 15 minutes to our home, for the same kind of talks. Camp David perhaps would offer the most privacy, but Maine would offer you a glimpse of our Atlantic sea-coast. It would also give me a chance to take you for a ride in my speed boat and maybe catch a fish. Perhaps there is some entirely different way more convenient for you, and I would welcome a suggestion. The General Assembly seems to me to provide the ideal cover needed for a “spontaneous” invitation to an unstructured, informal meeting. I do not intend in any way to put you in an awkward position and I will understand completely if, for whatever reason, you do not feel you can respond positively to my suggestion. General Brent Scowcroft and Secretary Jim Baker, plus my Chief of Staff John Sununu, are the only ones who know of this letter, which I have personally written. I hope I can demonstrate to you that some things need not “leak.” My respects and sincere regards, Sincerely, George Bush [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA by the National Security Archive.]

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Document No. 7: Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Shevardnadze, Washington, 2:00 p.m. – 3:05 p.m. September 21, 1989

The American president receives the Soviet foreign minister at the White House, just two months after making up his mind to reach out to Gorbachev for a personal meeting (see previous document). Unmentioned here is Shevardnadze’s annoyance that Scowcroft passed the invitation letter through Marshal Akhromeyev, who happened to be visiting Washington in late July, rather than through the Foreign Ministry. But now the diplomats are back in charge. Shevardnadze is on his way to Wyoming for what would be a bonding experience with Secretary of State Baker (including flyfishing together) at the latter’s ranch near Grand Teton National Park. This relatively short memcon provides a summary, in effect, for the dozens of pages of transcripts from Shevardnadze’s sit-downs with Baker in Wyoming. Shevardnadze mentions the nationalities problem in the USSR, just then cresting with mass demonstrations in the Baltics on the 50th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and gives the Americans an overview of perestroika and Gorbachev’s general program. What is most important here are Bush’s repeated expressions of support for perestroika, his compliments (“We think the Soviet leadership has handled the Polish situation admirably”), and his engagement on arms control, which is Gorbachev’s priority—or as Shevardnadze comments, “the main theme” of Gorbachev’s letter that the foreign minister is presenting to the Americans. Shevardnadze has come to Washington with concessions, such as agreeing not to count conventionally armed bombers in the negotiated START ceilings, and with proposals, such as eliminating short-range nuclear weapons and banning fissionable materials. He would continue the “arms race in reverse” discussion in Wyoming, but there would be resistance on the U.S. side, for example, against “the effort to rid the seas of nuclear weapons.”

The President: Let me welcome you to the United States. I am delighted with the letter from President Gorbachev and was very pleased to receive it. There is a great deal of interest across the country in your visit. I am pleased that you and Secretary Baker can continue your dialogue. We are very pleased with the preparations for this visit. I feel in a personal sense that I have a good relationship with President Gorbachev. We feel nothing but affection and warmth for him and I want him to understand this at a personal level. I hope he knows I want to accelerate this relationship. I can comment on your arms control proposals and Secretary Baker will later faithfully represent my views. There are no serious elements in the U.S. that want Soviet reforms to fail. Please reaffirm that to President Gorbachev, although I hope it is not necessary. We support perestroika and we do not want to complicate your reform efforts. In New York, President Gorbachev said some elements in the United States did not want perestroika to succeed. That does not 37

include either me or my Administration. Please tell him that. We have confidence in him, and please do not place great weight on the gloomy forecasts sometimes heard in both our countries. The important thing is that the reforms continue. Between us, President Gorbachev and I can create a whole new fabric of U.S.Soviet relations. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: Thank you, Mr. President. On behalf of all my colleagues I would like to greet you here in the White House. This is my first meeting with you as President. You have made a personal contribution to U.S.-Soviet relations. I would like to convey to you most warm greetings from President Gorbachev and the leaders of the Soviet Union. I recall the meeting and good talk I had with you when were Vice President, during the election campaign. The thoughts you expressed were captured in the phrase, “the new closeness.” This fully reflects our concept of U.S.-Soviet relations at the current stage. During the last few years we have gone through an important period of establishing a level of mutual understanding. Having this positive experience in building our relationship, we can move to partnership where possible, and we are ready for this further stage. The INF treaty and the steps forward in bilateral relations, such as over 40 bilateral agreements signed in the last few years, demonstrate how far our relations, including people to people contacts, have come. We can be bolder. There has been an erosion in both of our countries in the image of the enemy. The atmosphere of U.S.-Soviet relations is quite different than when I became Foreign Minister four years ago, when the tone was so confrontational. Now, we are planning a joint statement on human rights. The Soviet Union is moving toward the highest standards in this area and we appreciate your support for holding the CSCE human rights conference in Moscow. The Supreme Soviet will soon adopt new legislation on entry into and exit out of the U.S.S.R. You spoke warmly of President Gorbachev. I would like to stress the important political asset represented in your personal relationship with President Gorbachev. Nothing must spoil or poison this trust. I would not wish to idealize our relationship, but one truth is elementary. Relations between states can only develop if there is domestic stability. Therefore, we appreciate the high degree of U.S. interest in democratization and renewal in the U.S.S.R. We have reassessed and condemned our previous policies quite a bit recently, but we will not wipe out or negate the accomplishments of the decades of our country. There are tragic events in our past which are difficult to explain. But the historical goal we have traversed is glorious and only on the basis of these accomplishments can we move forward on reform. We must not forget our two countries together saved world civilization in the Great Patriotic War. There is no alternative to perestroika. We have just completed a Central Committee plenum on the nationalities problem, a painful problem. We are a union of 15 states, as stated in our constitution, which poses special problems. We believe we have now adopted policies that ensure each state will be self-governing, and that will 38

restore stability. We are creating a new political culture and we have made mistakes. But we do not see anything bad about this expanding political awareness. People in the Soviet Union are in favor of perestroika, although there are conservatives who oppose it. But our people believe in perestroika, want perestroika, and this process cannot be reversed. It is not easy to develop our new laws on the economy, including those on cooperatives—which produced 6 billion rubles of goods last year. We are trying to reduce the incompatibility of our economy with those in the West. Thus, we have emphasized joint ventures, 1500 in all and 80 with the United States. I call your attention to all this work on our economic legislation because these developments should allow more economic interaction between us. We are not asking for aid from you. We want only equal cooperation. We have no doubt, to conclude, that perestroika will succeed. I know some of my friends say we have 5 months, or 1 year, or 18 months and then we will collapse. This is not a serious view. I know my country, and predictions of catastrophe for perestroika are not serious at all. We will succeed. Let me say a few words about President Gorbachev’s letter. In the past several months, we have moved forward in arms control. But the goal of 50% reductions in START remains to be achieved. The main theme in President Gorbachev’s letter is that we must remove obstacles to agreement in Geneva on strategic arms. You were right when you said in your letter of June 20 that there is a conceptual gap on the ABM issue. We should stick to the Washington formulation and return to the subject after a START treaty is concluded. We will have to decide what is permissible under the ABM Treaty. Research and testing could be permitted except for ABM components. We would not insist on a fixed period for non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Our political decision to eliminate the Krasnoyarsk radar site demonstrates our commitment to the ABM Treaty. One important question remains and I would like to speak frankly. A year ago, your scientists visited the Krasnoyarsk radar. It would be good if our experts could visit your radars in Greenland and the United Kingdom. On the issue of SLCMs, the question is different. Important political decisions need to be taken. We should look at this problem in a broader way, in the effort to rid the seas of nuclear weapons. We hope you will join us in this effort. We should concentrate on verification, without which no progress is possible. A limit on SLCMs could be set by means of mutual obligations which would be made in connection with the treaty, but outside of it. On ALCMs and heavy bombers, we are ready not to count B-52s and other aircraft that are conventionally armed within the 1600 limit. These aircraft would be counted outside the 1600, perhaps with a limit of 100. The U.S. side should then accept a realistic counting of ALCMs and reaffirm a 600 kilometer range cut-off in defining such systems. There should be interim work on verification measures, as you have proposed, but covering all strategic offensive arms. We have the same approach to data exchanges. We hope to sign an agreement with notifications for strategic exercises. 39

We do not see any insurmountable obstacles to agreement on nuclear testing, based on work already done. Work should be completed at the end of this year and can be signed at the Summit. We would like to ban fissionable material. I will discuss this with Secretary Baker. On chemical weapons, we should speed up work on a convention banning CW. Your personal interest and that of President Gorbachev will assist that effort. It would be good for us to set a target date to complete a treaty, in 1990 or 1991. On CFE, I will discuss this with Secretary Baker. We think we can get results, as you have suggested, in 6–12 months. We are ready to work together with you. We would like to have the 35 CSCE Foreign Ministers meet in 1990 to work on a treaty and, by the end of the year, hold a Summit to sign the agreement. In order to accelerate work in Vienna, we need to start negotiations on shortrange nuclear forces. Conditions are ripe for such discussions. We could start moving toward elimination of these weapons. We are interested in your Open Skies plan. We shall participate in an international conference on this subject. We have some suggestions that we will put forward in Wyoming. Concerning regional problems, there is a great range of possibilities for cooperation: Lebanon, the Middle East, Central America, Asia, Cyprus, and other problems. I would like to discuss with Secretary Baker the situation in and around Afghanistan. This is very important to us. To conclude, Secretary Baker and I have already had useful meetings this year. We have developed a frank, businesslike relationship that makes it possible to discuss all complex problems and move toward solutions. The President: Thank you. I was hoping to hear such a broad treatment of the issues. On the regional issues, President Carter was here this morning discussing the upcoming elections in Nicaragua. The question of Nicaragua is a thorn in the side of our bilateral relationship. I want Secretary Baker to discuss this with you in detail in Wyoming. On the subject of Afghanistan, we have no interest in seeing an anti-Soviet regime installed in Kabul. Secretary Baker will elaborate on this. We should be able to find a solution to the Afghan problem. We need to make progress. On conventional forces, I am pleased with the Soviet willingness to see positive aspects in the NATO proposal. We want to move forward, keep the momentum. An early CFE agreement would be good. On START, we, despite what columnists here say, are interested in an early agreement that enhances stability and will reduce the risk of war. You are not going up against a stone wall in START. We are ready to move. Secretary Baker will go into this more later. Secretary Baker: I think the letter from President Gorbachev is interesting, but it does raise questions we will want to go into detail on in Wyoming. The President: On DST; a START treaty should not be held hostage to an agreement on Defense and Space, negotiations which should stand on their own. 40

I appreciate what you said on chemical weapons and this is an area on which we must find a solution. Secretary Baker will discuss a new CW initiative on our part. If we can reach a CW agreement, we will greatly reduce our stockpile. Secretary Baker will give you the details. As we lead up to full ban, we can make major reductions in our respective stockpiles. I also appreciate your position on Open Skies. Secretary Baker will go into this in more detail. On the issue of nuclear testing, we have made good progress on verification, and I think decisions on our side will push forward the negotiations and allow us to finalize the nuclear testing treaties in the near future. Turning to the subject of perestroika, we are fascinated by the process of reform in your country. We have great respect for the principle of cultural autonomy. We are sensitive to the changes going on in the U.S.S.R. I do not want our interest, however, to be misunderstood, to complicate developments in the Soviet Union. This is a delicate issue, and needs to be handled carefully. It is important that you and Secretary Baker have a good, frank discussion about Eastern Europe. We think the Soviet leadership has handled the Polish situation admirably. We hope you feel the same way about our policy. We want to support changes toward democracy in Eastern Europe, but do not want to be reckless or silly about it. We also admire your policy approach toward Hungary. On Eastern Europe, I want us to be in such close touch that we do not misunderstand each other’s intentions. We need to work on mutual problems together. I would love to hear your view on Cuba and Castro, who is so far behind the power curve. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: I cannot promise that, but I will discuss Nicaragua, where I will stop after New York. This will be my first visit to Nicaragua, the first by a Soviet Foreign Minister. We want a free, fair election and the Nicaraguan leaders want that too. I want to say we are not sending weapons to Nicaragua. We gave our word and we have kept it. Before the election, there will be no arms supplies to Nicaragua. The President: I hope you will have a good talk with Secretary Baker on this problem. We are troubled by the flow of substantial arms shipments into Nicaragua. The arms are coming from somewhere. I do not question what you say, but we need to talk in detail with you about this. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: It is one thing when a journalist makes such a charge, another when a U.S. official makes such a charge. We keep our word. Secretary Baker: You need to tell us who that official was and when the charge was made. The level of East bloc shipments to Nicaragua has increased and that is what we have said. If we said it was Soviet arms, then please give us chapter and verse. The President: We can iron this out, but we are concerned. The total amount of Bloc arms supplies to Nicaragua has increased. Secretary Baker: In a spirit of candor, we think arms are coming through Cuba and are East Bloc, including Soviet, in origin. 41

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: I have no reason to suspect the Cubans but, in any event, the Soviet Union cannot be held responsible for all countries with whom we have good relations. The President: We appreciate your coming. You and Secretary Baker have much to talk about. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA in 2009 by the National Security Archive.]

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Document No. 8: Letter from Bush to Gorbachev November 22, 1989

Bush informs Gorbachev about the subjects he would like to raise at Malta, while stressing that U.S. expectations are quite low. In fact, the meeting was not expected to result in any breakthroughs or signed agreements. Among the president’s priorities are developments in Eastern Europe and Central America. Arms control is the area in which the Soviets are ready to make significant progress and expect Bush to pick up where his predecessor left off, particularly on the START Treaty and disarmament in Europe. However, Bush’s letter specifies that arms control will only be treated in a “broad, general sense.” Bush advises that there will be no “December surprises” from the U.S. side. We now know from U.S. preparatory materials that the Americans were actually concerned about surprises from the Soviets. On November 17, long-time SALT negotiator and retired Army General Ed Rowny sent the president a memo that in a starkly negative tone dismissed the need to respond to Gorbachev’s arms control proposals. Rowny recommended that “[i]f Gorbachev says that Malta should move arms control forward, we should focus the discussion on process and not engage on substance. ...” Since “there are potential risks and few gains in discussing START,” various potential Gorbachev offers such as “moratoria on fissionable materials and production of strategic weapons” “are all losers for us,” and naval arms control is a “no-win situation.”43 

Dear Mr. President, After talking with Anatoli Dobrinin yesterday it occurred to me that even though we have a “no agenda” meeting you might be interested in some of the topics I would like to cover. What I set out below is not meant in any way to limit our discussions; but here is my list—a non-inclusive list. A. Eastern Europe. B. Regional differences. Central America, Angola, Afghanistan, Asia (Cambodia) & Middle East. C. The defense spending of both our countries—what effect will changing times have on levels of defense spending? D. Your vision and mine of the world 10 years from now. What are the differences when you say “Common European Home” and I say “Europe Whole & Free”? E. Human Rights. F. Arms Control—philosophy and objectives—treating this in a broad, general sense.  Information Memorandum to Secretary Baker from Gen. Edward L. Rowny, November 17, 1989, U.S. State Department, obtained through FOIA by the National Security Archive.

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Of course, you will have your own priorities. I would like to hear from you your expectations for ‘perestroika’—where does it lead down the road? I want this meeting to be useful in advancing our mutual understanding and in laying the ground-work for a good relationship. Success does not mean deals signed, in my view. It means that you and I are frank enough with each other so that our two great countries will not have tensions that arise because we don’t know each other’s innermost thinking. I will be working next week to flesh out our side’s thinking but there will be no ‘December Surprise’. If however there is some proposal not covered by the list above, I will be prepared to make it. I am writing this on the eve of our Thanksgiving Day—a day in which all Americans thank God for our blessings. I will give thanks for the fact that we are living in times of enormous promise. I will give thanks that our 5 kids and our 11 grandchildren might just have a real chance to grow up in a more peaceful, less scary world. I will give thanks that you are pressing forward with glasnost and perestroika; for, you see, the fate of my own family and yours is dependent on perestroika’s success. I look forward to seeing you. With Respect, George Bush, [Source: George H.W. Bush Library.]

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Document No. 9: Memorandum from Baker for the President, “Your December Meeting with Gorbachev” November 29, 1989

This five-page memo from President Bush’s most trusted, long-time friend and adviser provides a scene-setter and a provisional script for the president to use with Gorbachev. Baker’s summary details the very limited expectations on the American side for the Malta meeting, namely “to gain a clearer understanding” and to “probe Gorbachev’s thinking” while kicking the major issues down the road to a full-scale summit in 1990. Interestingly, Baker makes a point of spotlighting in the first paragraph the administration’s underlying public relations concern about Gorbachev’s popularity and criticisms of Bush’s “pause.”

I. SETTING

The Mediterranean encounter will be an important opportu­nity to gain a clearer understanding of where Gorbachev intends to take the USSR, how his foreign policy priorities relate to his domestic objectives, and the nature of his vision for Europe in the 1990s. It will also be an occasion to lay down markers on the obstacles we see to improved U.S.-Soviet relations and to set priorities for the 1990 Summit. Further, Malta could promote a public sense, here and abroad, of a new pace and purpose to the U.S-Soviet dialogue with you leading as much as Gorbachev. Gorbachev’s Agenda You requested, and the Soviets accepted, an open-ended and unstructured agenda for Malta. But it’s quite possible Gorbachev will bring some attention-grabbing initiatives. We’ll want to respond in ways that keep the focus on our agenda. Gorbachev comes to Malta facing massive economic and social problems on the home front. But, paradoxically, his political position within the Soviet leadership appears stronger than ever. His preoccupation with the fate of perestroyka will drive his approach to Soviet security, foreign policy and economic interests. Gorbachev also faces an increasingly uncertain situation in Eastern Europe, where he will seek reassurances about our inten­tions and signal opposition to German reunification. He may try to “leap-frog” the situation by proposing new ideas that speed the pace of military withdrawal, or novel political solutions to the architecture of Europe (e.g. a peace treaty on Germany or a Helsinki II) that could unsettle our allies. And his proposal to disband NATO and the Warsaw Pact may well come up again. 45

Gorbachev will want to accelerate progress on his two priority areas for the 1990 summit: arms control and economic relations. He may have a surprise arms control proposal, perhaps on naval forces (given the venue), but he is very unlikely to try to turn Malta into a full-scale bargaining session like Reykjavik. In the economic area, Gorbachev will seek progress on trade restrictions, commercial relations, and Soviet admission to the GATT and the international financial institutions. II. U.S. OBJECTIVES

Our objectives can be divided into several broad categories: (A) Perestroyka and Economics: to discuss perestroyka in the USSR and how Gorbachev sees its prospects and challenges. In this regard, you will have to respond to a likely Gorbachev push on bilateral economic relations, making clear that we are ready to move on a trade agreement and, once conditions merit a Jackson-Vanik waiver, also on lending restrictions like the Stevenson Amendment. You should tell Gorbachev of our readiness to recommend Soviet observer status in the GATT after the Uruguay Round ends in 1990, if the Supreme Soviet moves by then toward introducing market pricing for wholesale goods. We also want to explore avenues for technical cooperation. (B) Change in Europe: to probe Gorbachev’s thinking on the transformations underway in Eastern Europe, stressing our interest in stability through peaceful, democratic change. (C) “New Thinking” and Regional Conflicts: to underscore our concern about the contradiction between professed Soviet support for peaceful settlements and actual Soviet conduct. (D) Summit Stage-setting: to set priorities that frame the agenda for the 1990 summit, including on arms control. III. OUR STRATEGY

Perestroyka in the USSR You will want to gauge Gorbachev’s views on the prospects and challenges of perestroyka, both in the economic and political fields. Economics will have a higher profile at Malta than at any meeting in a decade. At a minimum, Gorbachev will play on sympathy for the enormity of his task to seek bilateral trade and commercial concessions, and movement on GATT and COCOM. He could adopt a more sweeping strategy aimed at immediate and full Soviet membership in the world economy. At the extreme, he might call for Soviet participation in the next Economic Summit (which you will host). Whatever the Soviet strategy, you could propose starting negotiations on a commercial agreement, once a new emigration law is passed. This would make it possible to accommodate Gorbachev’s interest in signing a trade agreement and 46

receiving MFN status at the 1990 summit, while safeguarding our human rights concerns (the period of negotiations would give us time to judge the effect of the new Soviet emigration law). In addition—or in response to a broader Soviet initiative—you can point to the various steps we proposed at the November Joint Commercial Commission (working groups on trade and investment agreements) as signs of our willingness to cooperate. Soviet officials bridle at the notion of any government offering them “technical assistance.” I suggest you speak instead of “technical cooperation” in presenting the array of programs on management training, the U.S. tax, budget and banking systems, and U.S. stock exchanges, that we could offer. We have invited, at the request of Prime Minister Ryzhkov, the heads of the Soviet Ministry of Finance and the State Bank to Washington next month, so the Soviets should be receptive to proposals in this area. While democratization is moving forward in the USSR, it has unleashed some dynamic forces that are beyond Gorbachev’s ability to control. The meeting’s informal nature makes it ideal for discussing Soviet domestic affairs. You should expect Gorbachev to pursue these topics eagerly, in the belief that self-criticism is an effective means of heightening U.S. sympathy for the fate of perestroyka. The Baltic States, and ethnic ferment in the Caucasus, are likely to be the most sensitive topics discussed. You should tell Gorbachev we stand by our nonrecognition policy on the Baltics and flag our intention of thickening our relations with the Baltic peoples. But you should emphasize that we are not out to destabilize the USSR and that we do not have a pre­conceived notion of what arrangements the Baltic states might arrive at through a democratic process of self-determination. Change in Europe A key objective at Malta is to gain a clearer fix on Gorbachev’s approach to Eastern Europe, and how the Soviets are redefining their strategic interests. You will need to make clear from the beginning that we are not interested in negotiating any “deal” or even ground rules for our relations with sovereign states. You will also want to stress our interest in reform through a peaceful, democratic process, and to remind Gorbachev that a violent crackdown (in Eastern Europe as well as the USSR) would inevitably harm our relations. We must be wary of “new ideas” coming from the Soviet side, for Gorbachev may seek our blessing or tacit acquiescence for policies designed to heighten Moscow’s control over the situation in Eastern Europe, or to involve us in commitments that they will not, or that we cannot, sustain. Gorbachev’s strategy of promoting the stable international environment necessary for perestroyka is threatened by the accelerating political changes now affecting every country in the region except Romania. Moscow’s assumptions about reform in Eastern Europe—that it would result in gradual, controlled change, and that cohesion of the Warsaw Pact could be maintained long enough 47

to allow the Soviets to restructure relations with the East Europeans—are increasingly in doubt. As a result, Gorbachev will be seeking new assurances that we will not exploit developments at the expense of Soviet security. You can extend general reassurances, but be wary of appearing to bless in advance a Soviet crackdown. “New Thinking” and Regional Conflicts You should underscore our concern about the large gap between Moscow’s rhetorical support for peaceful settlements and the actual Soviet conduct we see in specific regions. You should emphasize the importance of Soviet restraint in this area to the overall health of the relationship; if we cannot make more progress on these questions, it could have a dampening effect on other aspects of the relationship. Indeed, you might even indicate that our ability to move beyond “technical cooperation” in our economic relationship will depend on better performance on regional issues, particularly Central America. The Soviets have accepted free choice and self-determination as the only possible basis for stability in Eastern Europe. These principles need to be applied to Third World regional conflicts as well; unless there are legitimate regimes in place, troubled areas of the world will never know stability. You should stress that Soviet credibility is on the line in ensuring a free and fair election in Nicaragua and tell Gorbachev flatly that the Soviets cannot escape responsibility for Cuba’s actions. You might consider cutting through our recent arguments on arms to Nicaragua and the FMLN by suggesting a new bottom line: a substantial reduction in Soviet arms shipments to Havana. In this context you should note our concern over the ill-timed and unjustified delivery of MIG-29s. Gorbachev is certain to accuse the U.S. of ignoring Soviet concerns on Afghanistan. You can respond by building on the concept of a transition period (which was in the Wyoming joint statement). You might press him to offer a plan for a transi­tion period, which we could present to the mujahedin if it is sufficiently realistic. You could also indicate that once we begin to move toward a settlement, we are prepared to discuss a joint cut-off of arms shipments (negative symmetry). Summit Stage-setting Without plowing through every item on the five-part agenda, you will want to lay out U.S. priorities and some realistic objectives for the 1990 Summit, particularly on arms control: • O  n nuclear testing, you and Gorbachev should reaffirm that you expect to sign the TTBT and PNET protocols at the 1990 Summit. 48

• T  o give impetus to your CW initiative, you could inform Gorbachev that the U.S. has ready a draft agreement on bilateral stockpile destruction, and state that you see this as a possible signature item for the 1990 summit. (To do this, we would have to resolve quickly the inter­agency difference over the form of such an agreement.) • In START, you can say the U.S. would like to resolve all major START issues by or at the 1990 Summit, and will make every effort to conclude a treaty by that time. While CFE is multilateral, you will want to sustain pressure to wrap up a treaty in 1990. Gorbachev may press for a schedule of NATO-Warsaw Pact ministerial and summit-level meetings to hasten completion. You might respond that we are prepared to consider signing a CFE agreement at a multilateral summit, but not to set dates now. A more forward-leaning approach would be to agree to consult with the allies on the proposal to set a date for a Summit CFE signing. The U.S. public will want you to send Gorbachev the message that we remain serious about human rights progress, regardless of the other pressures he is facing. While applauding Soviet advances to date, you should note that more needs to be done. This includes resolution of some still-outstanding divided family and refusenik cases, as well as future progress toward the institutionalization of reform in Soviet law. You will also want to set priorities in the transnational area (particularly on cooperation on the environment) and in bilateral matters (agreement to our Open Lands proposal and movement on Embassy construction). If the situation warrants, you might play on the theme of expanding access to one another’s societies by suggesting you and he address one another’s peoples directly via television on a periodic basis, and that our countries consider opening small consulates or cultural centers in additional cities. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through Mandatory Review request 2005-0965-MR by the National Security Archive.]

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Document No. 10: Record of Conversation between Gorbachev and John Paul II December 1, 1989

On the way to the Malta summit, Mikhail Gorbachev stops in Vatican City for a historic meeting with Pope John Paul II, the Polish pontiff from Krakow, who has been such an inspiration to the Solidarity movement. This marks only the second time a Russian leader has met with a Pope, the first being between Tsar Nicholas I and Pope Gregory XVI in 1845. Here, the Soviet leader and his wife, Raisa, would hear the Vatican band performing first the Internationale and then the Papal Hymn. In their conversation, transcribed from notes by Aleksandr Yakovlev, the Pope raises concerns about religious freedom in the Soviet Union and the Vatican’s relations with various Orthodox and Catholic denominations, while the Soviet leader talks about the issues he plans to discuss with President Bush at Malta, such as the concept of universal human values and his distaste for the phrase “Western values.” The Pope responds by saying he shares Gorbachev’s vision, especially as far as values are concerned—“[i]t would be wrong for someone to claim that changes in Europe and the world should follow the Western model. This goes against my deep convictions. Europe, as a participant in world history, should breathe with two lungs.”

For the first several minutes the conversation was one-on-one (without interpreters). Gorbachev: I would like to say that I appreciate your words at the beginning of the conversation regarding the fact that this is a meeting of two Slavic people, among other things. I don’t mean to appear as a pan-Slavist, but I believe in the mission of Slavic people to strengthen the understanding of human values of life, peace, and goodness everywhere. John Paul II: Yes, this is so. Peace and goodness. […] Gorbachev: We already have an agreement to eliminate one type of nuclear weapon. There is a real possibility of reducing strategic weapons by 50 percent. I will discuss this with President Bush. The Hungarian talks are in progress. Even generals have begun to meet with one another. In other words, the world is changing. I must say, Your Holiness, that I am astonished by the people’s reaction to our proposals and thoughts. We are not so ambitious as to consider ourselves the vessels of some higher form of salvation. Our new European “credo” is to invite others to think about how to build a better world together. One must not claim to know the absolute truth and try to impose it on others. For example, our Western partners, including the U.S. administration, declare that they support perestroika. It is true that the majority of the public and politicians support it. But it is already being said that Europe should only be renewed on the basis of Western values 50

and anything differing from these values should be cut off. This is no way to treat nations, their history, traditions, and identities. In the past, the Soviet Union was accused of exporting revolution. Now some people are trying to export other values. This is not the path we should be taking. It reminds me of religious wars of the past. We must have learned something since then. As for religious issues, we treat them within the framework of our general understanding of universal human values. In this matter, as in others, the people are the highest authority. Everything depends on the choice of the people. It is up to the individual which philosophy and religion to practice. I think we have reached the point where we can build relations between nations and between people on the basis of respect. At one point President Reagan tried instructing me how to conduct matters in our country. I told him that we could not have a conversation like that. A conversation can only happen on the basis of realism and mutual respect. I told him: you are not a teacher and I am not a student. You are not a prosecutor and I am not a defendant. So if we want to talk about politics, about how to change the world for the better, then we have to do it as equals. He understood this and we were able to do what we did. I know that you welcomed the results of that dialogue, and I highly value your support. We plan to work with the current administration using the same principles. Each side should be able to maintain its own independence while respecting the traditions of the other side. Universal human values should become the primary goal, but the choices of this or that political system should be left to the people. Today we face the serious problem of survival. This includes the threat of nuclear weapons, ecological issues, natural resources, the information [revolution], and the scientific and technological revolution, which not only brings progress, but also complications. These are all global, universal problems. We must acknowledge them, they cannot be ignored. We have to understand these problems in order to change our way of thinking and, consequently, our policies. We have to shift from confrontation to collaboration. This will be a long and difficult road, but I do not agree with our country’s pessimists. John Paul II: Neither do I. Gorbachev: Our planet is overwhelmed with many concerns. However, if we join forces, we have a great opportunity to move in the right direction and build a new world on the basis of universal values. You mentioned problems in the Third World. I also want to talk about them. We cannot be content while millions of people are living in conditions of abject poverty, hunger, and destitution. I am familiar with your speeches on this subject. Our views coincide. […] I would also like to say that issues in your homeland—Poland—are very close to me. In recent years I have done, and will continue to do, everything I can to ensure good relations between Poland, Russia and the Soviet Union. 51

John Paul II: I thank you on behalf of my homeland. Gorbachev: […] There are major changes in other countries as well. On this note, I would like to discuss one more point: Western politicians should take a responsible approach to these changes. They are too important to be treated otherwise. If they succeed, the world will change. Right now there is the option of starting on the path of good development, even though it might be a difficult one. I think the majority of politicians truly understand this. […] John Paul II: I am grateful to you for sharing your thoughts on international issues. Naturally, we primarily touched upon European and to some extent North American problems. But there are other parts of the world where the situation is troubling. I am particularly concerned about the situation in Lebanon and, in general, the Middle East; also to some degree in Indo-China and Central America. Overall, there are quite a few places in the world with difficulties. Perhaps we could act together on this front. In these matters, the Church and the Pope can only represent the moral aspect. It would be good to help these nations to overcome the tragic situations in which they find themselves through political means. I am thankful to you for your discussion of perestroika. We are watching it from outside. You, Mr. President, carry it inside you, in your heart and in your deeds. I think we understood correctly that the strength of perestroika is in its soul. You are right when you say that changes should not come too fast. We also agree that not only structures need to be changed, but the thinking as well. It would be wrong for someone to claim that changes in Europe and the world should follow the Western model. This goes against my deep convictions. Europe, as a participant in world history, should breathe with two lungs. Gorbachev: This is a very appropriate vision. […] [Source: State Archive of the Russian Federation [GARF], Moscow. Yakovlev Collection, Fond 10063, Opis 1, Delo 394. Translated by Anna Melyakova.]

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Document No. 11: Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, First Expanded Bilateral Meeting, Malta, 10:00 a.m. – 11:15 a.m. December 2, 1989

Nasty weather at Malta played havoc with the plans of the advance teams. High waves and winds even inside Valleta harbor meant that, instead of shuttling the leaders and the delegations back and forth between the respective countries’ battle cruisers (the Slava and the Belknap), this first meeting and all subsequent sessions took place on the Soviet cruise liner Maxim Gorky, safely tied to the dock. According to the American memorandum of conversation (only declassified in 2008, some 15 years after the Gorbachev Foundation published the Soviet transcript), President Bush launches into his NSC-prepared talking points, which have the desired atmospheric effect. Gorbachev remarks almost bemusedly that now he sees the American administration has (finally) made up its mind what to do, and that it includes taking “specific steps” or at least “plans for such steps” to support perestroika, rather than to doubt it. When Bush finishes with his “non-agenda,” as he calls it, Gorbachev refers to his own 3x2 inch orange notebook and launches into a philosophical discussion, arguing that the “methods of the Cold War” have been “defeated” and thus the U.S. and USSR “are doomed to cooperate for a long time, but we have to abandon the vestiges of images of an enemy.” Gorbachev compliments Bush for not engaging in Cold War thinking or profiting from the changes in Eastern Europe. Bush responds with a revealing comment: “I have been called cautious or timid. I am cautious, but not timid. But I have conducted myself in ways not to complicate your life. That’s why I have not jumped up and down on the Berlin Wall.” Gorbachev reacts positively to each of Bush’s overtures on arms control, chemical weapons, conventional forces, future summits and so forth, but pushes back on the American leader’s Cuba and Central America focus.

The President: General Scowcroft said that his conversation with General Akhromeyev was the best that he had ever had with a Soviet official. Chairman Gorbachev: Our meeting was at your initiative. It is for me to begin and welcome you and your close associates. The first thing to do is to note and appreciate your initiative to hold this meeting. Initially, I wondered why you wanted this meeting, but now I know that a lot is happening. That is the most important thing. We have to find a dialogue commensurate with the pace of change. We need more working contacts. Since the changes underway affect fundamental things, even Ministerial contacts are not enough now. You and I have to be more active in developing personal contacts. This must be regarded as a prelude to the official Summit, but this meeting will have an importance of its own. The President: I agree. Chairman Gorbachev: I like informal meetings. I think we need more than correspondence. We need to talk to each other. Both for the U.S. and the USSR, 53

and for the world, this meeting is more than just a symbol. Our people are looking forward to our getting down to business. So welcome, Mr. President, we are at your disposal. The President: Thank you for your welcome. It is true that this particular meeting was my idea. In doing so, I had the feeling you would be most agreeable to this kind of meeting. I think I told you that when I drafted my letter on the way back from Paris, I was changing 180 degrees on the need and benefit of such a meeting. That change of heart has been well received in my country for the most part. Since the genesis of this idea, there have been so many dramatic changes in the world. I want to be sure how you view them, including in Eastern Europe, and for you to understand the way I see things. Before the end of these two days, I hope you and I can get together, perhaps with one notetaker. Chairman Gorbachev: It is very necessary, because they will get tired of us and we will get tired of them. The President: You said it, pal. But such a talk between us would be very useful. Chairman Gorbachev: I have the feeling that this is a continuation of our two previous talks. The President: I feel those were comfortable. There were no kicks under the table. With your permission, I would like to put some ideas on the table, but it is your choice. The first page is boilerplate, so I may skip it. Where it says this is a chance to have a serious discussion, I know you agree. I do want to say that the world will be a better place if perestroika succeeds. I know you had some doubt in New York. You made a statement in New York, which I still remember. You said some U.S. elements want to see perestroika fail. I can’t say there are no such elements in the U.S.—but there are no serious elements, and most Americans don’t feel that way. As we sit and try to analyze change in Eastern Europe and admire perestroika, there are bound to be differences in the analytical community. But you are dealing with an Administration and, for the most part, a Congress that want to see you succeed. What I propose to do now is to spell out positive initiatives, not in the sense of negotiating teams, but to set down a framework of areas in which we want to move forward with you. I would like to set the time of a 1990 Summit for several days in the last two weeks of June and set the day for the Ministerials. Jim’s thought is the end of January, but of course we will be flexible. Let me paint with a broad brush on the Congressional front. I want to waive Jackson-Vanik, which prohibits MFN. Two things have to happen. You are changing your emigration law and expect it to be completed early next year. Our law requires a trade agreement before MFN status can be granted. Let’s begin trade negotiations immediately. I will push the American side to move. I want it done. If that word is not out to the top people in our Administration—and I think it is—I will see to it. I would like to wrap up an agreement by the 1990 Summit. I want to remove statutory restrictions on our ability to provide export credit guarantees. Let me interrupt my note-reading to say I was impressed with what your Foreign Minister said. Some reporter, probably from the U.S., asked whether the 54

Soviet Union wanted the U.S. to bail out the USSR. He gave a good answer, reflecting the pride of the Soviet people. If it is agreeable, these steps will not be presented as the superiority of one system or against what Mr. Shevardnadze was conveying with his very good answer. But we are at a sensitive time. I am not making these suggestions as a bailing out. That is not the spirit I came here with. After Jackson-Vanik, we will explore with Congress the lifting of limitations on export credits and guarantees. I believe we can get that done: not a program of assistance, but a program of cooperation. We would like to hand over a paper with technical cooperation projects that we can pursue together. These cover a wide range of projects and topics, including finance, agriculture, statistics, small business development, anti-monopoly efforts, budgetary and tax policy, and even the role of a stock exchange. These are just suggestions. You may think some are good, and some are bad. You have expressed an interest in observer status for the Soviet Union at GATT. Let me clear the air on this one. As Mr. Dobrynin knows, we have had a difference on that issue. The U.S. has objected to Soviet observer status at GATT. I’ve changed. I believe GATT should accept the USSR as an observer, so that we can learn together. We would support that once the Uruguay round is over. We are now to-ing and fro-ing among our friends. We are fighting with the EC on agriculture. They are arguing. To complete the Uruguay Round, we have to drive to a conclusion of existing items. As soon as it is over, Soviet observer status would be good. It may even be an incentive to those at the Uruguay Round. During the intervening year, the Soviet Union could move toward market prices at the wholesale level, so that the Eastern and Western economies become somewhat more compatible. I cannot speak for all at GATT, but we will advocate this step. The Uruguay Round will end less than a year from now. There is another area in which to cooperate on [the] economic front: new cooperation between the Soviet Union and the OECD and improving East-West economic cooperation in the CSCE process. I am trying to convey that we want your views, but the main point is to lean forward on this. Regarding investment and other areas, I want to talk with you. I would like to switch to another area, one that has been contentious: human rights and the resolution of all divided families issues. We have lists which you have been given. Chairman Gorbachev: The U.S. Embassy is [sic] not been able to cope with the flood of those who want to emigrate. We will keep after you on this. (James Baker passes over the list. It is not a big list. [sic] The President: Let me bring up the most contentious issue. You know what it is. I know what is. I am not arguing with Mr. Shevardnadze’s words, but this issue of having two countries identified with the USSR swimming against the tide in Central America is a great dividing wedge between us. Somehow I would like to discuss this in this big meeting, or between you and me. In a broad context, when I was down there in Costa Rica, Carlos Andres Perez sat next to me at dinner. He gave me a lecture that I am so interested in changes in Eastern Europe, that I am neglecting the Western Hemisphere. He displayed some angst about 55

Poland: how come them and not us? I said this publicly, and want to repeat: [Costa Rican president] Oscar Arias asked me to please ask President Gorbachev to get Fidel Castro to stop exporting revolution into these fragile democracies. I know it is difficult, but I want to have a frank discussion about Nicaragua and Cuba. This is the single most disruptive factor to a relationship that is going in the right direction. It is not just the right wing in [the] U.S. Concerns run deeper than that. I know it is sensitive for you, but in the U.S. some ask, “How can they put all this money into Cuba and still want credits?” I want the record to show I have raised this in the most direct possible way. It is a gigantic thorn in one shoe for our relationship. We try to move ahead. Nicaragua promised Mr. Shevardnadze not to ship arms. They owe you an explanation. Ortega owes you an explanation. We think Christiani is trying to control his death squads on the right. He is a good man. He is trying to promote democracy. In Costa Rica, Christiani was with Ortega, who looked at the stars. Please believe me: this is not a right-wing Republican problem. The Sandinistas have not told the truth. The answer is honest elections in Nicaragua and a transfer of power. My concern is that elections will not be open. Yesterday the Sandinistas denied visas to an observer group from our Congress, one-half their supporters. One last word: given your statesmanship in the world, I would hope you will join us in calling for the Sandinistas to renew the ceasefire, conduct free and fair elections, and accept the results. This would have a very positive effect in Central America and in the U.S. Regarding Cuba, we know Castro is very complicated, but he is a major source of problems in the region. Again, I quote Oscar Arias, with whom we have had big differences. He raised this with me. We see no signs of new thinking in Cuba. Soviet supplies of advanced weaponry—including most recently MIG-29s—which Jim raised with Shevardnadze, exacerbates tension. There is no military threat to Cuba that justifies sending these weapons to Castro. The poor guy is practically broke. The best thing would be if you gave him a signal that it would no longer be business as usual. And I am going to finish, not filibuster. Chairman Gorbachev: No problem. You are doing it in a businesslike, direct, American way. The President: Arms control: I want to get rid of chemical weapons. I mean it. Let me offer a new suggestion, granting a concession on my part. If you will agree to the CW initiative I put forward at the UN in September, I am prepared to terminate the U.S. binary modernization program as soon as a global ban is in force. I hope we can get agreement to substantially reduce our stockpiles. CFE: I want to complete a CFE Treaty. High level political attention from your side and our side will be needed to get it done. I worry about getting bogged down in the bureaucracies. I would like to have a goal of a CFE Summit in Vienna to sign a CFE Treaty in 1990. On START, I want to put some steam behind the process. You and I should agree to get all our differences out of the way by the 1990 Summit and hopefully conclude a treaty by then. To that end, we need to concentrate on three issues—ALCM’s, non-deployed missiles, and telemetry encryption—to 56

be resolved at the January Ministerial meeting. I am expediting the START process. We will table most major issues by the January meeting, and will table all positions by the time of the next Ministerial following the Open Skies conference. I am instructing my negotiator in Geneva to lift the U.S.-proposed ban on mobiles and make acceptance of mobile ICBMs part of the negotiating text. I would also like you to consider an idea that would improve strategic stability. The SS-18 is the only “heavy” missile in either arsenal. I hope you will consider ending modernization of the SS-18 and deeper unilateral reductions in the SS18 force. On nuclear testing, I propose that we complete the TTBT and PNET protocols for signature at our summit next year. In addition, I propose that you announce a unilateral decision to adhere to the limits of the Missile Technology Control Regime, to which the U.S. and six other industrial powers adhere. [The Soviets didn’t seem to know what we are talking about.] On your military budget, could you consider making public the details of your budget, force posture, and weapons production figures, the way the U.S. does? As a former CIA man, I hope you got these from the KGB before our meeting Chairman Gorbachev: They say you are not publishing everything. The President: I hope you can do this as a trust-building measure. Let me raise some general points for the future. I suggest that we support Berlin as the Olympic site in 2004. This would be a fitting symbol of the new era in East-West relations. On the environment, I know you are getting hit hard. I am getting hit hard. Global climate change is a key issue. Some in the West want to shut down the whole world because of global climate change. We have resisted shutting down the economies of certain countries. We chair two of the three bodies dealing with the issue. There are two steps I intend to take. First, I will offer to host a conference next fall to negotiate a framework treaty on global climate change, after the working groups on the UN-sponsored Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change complete their final report. There is a lot of science that needs to be factored into this. We have Dr. Allan Bromley, an internationally known scientist, in the White House. I will ask him to convene a White House meeting next spring for top level scientific, environmental, and economic officials to discuss global climate change issues. I hope you will send your top officials in the field. This is my very last point. So much depends on young people, that I would like to propose that we ask our relevant officials to develop a program of university exchanges for Soviet and American undergraduates. Let’s aim to have 1000 young—say, under the age of 25—Soviet people and 1000 Americans studying in each other’s country by the start of the 1991 school year. We are not locked in by numbers; perhaps we can increase these. Perhaps a formula like this would be possible. We have good land grant colleges. This is the end of my non-agenda. Chairman Gorbachev: This has been interesting. It shows that the Bush Administration has already decided what to do. I will address your specifics, but first let me make some more general remarks. [President hands over letter from President Reagan to Chairman Gorbachev.] Let me begin with some philosophical remarks [using notes in small orange notebook 3x2 inches]. I believe it is 57

important for both of us to evaluate the period of the Cold War. You cannot rewrite history. What happened, happened. That is the privilege of history. But it is our privilege, even duty, to examine what happened. Why is this? Today, all of us feel we are at an historic watershed. We have to address completely new problems, ones we did not anticipate or expect to become so acute. Now the question is whether we should approach these problems as in the past. In that case, we are bound to fail. If we look back, not everything in the past was totally negative. We have avoided a big war for 45 years. The President: Right. Chairman Gorbachev: But still we see today that reliance on force, on military superiority, was wrong. It did not justify itself. You and I have to feel this legacy most. The emphasis on confrontation based on our different ideologies is wrong. We had reached a dangerous point, and it is good that we stopped to reach an understanding. Reliance on nonequal exchange between the developed countries and the developing world cannot go on. It has collapsed. Look at how many problems there are in the developing world that affect all of us. Overall, my conclusion is that strategically and philosophically, the methods of the Cold War were defeated. We are aware of that defeat, and the man in the street is more aware than anyone. I am not preaching, but people are having an impact on policy in the U.S. and the Congress, and in the USSR and the Supreme Soviet. But we face problems of survival, including the environment and problems of resources. People are very much aware of all that. I also believe that the USSR and the U.S.—this started in the Reagan Administration, and you were involved— have become aware that these changes need to be made. People of the U.S. and the USSR desire to move toward each other. At the political level we are lagging behind our people, who want to become closer. This is understandable, because political will and policies are complicated. Marshal Akhromeyev and General Scowcroft understand the military situation, but there are some people on each side, including scientists, who are trying to scare us. It is not easy to change their thinking, but the process is underway. I wanted to begin my remarks by saying this, because in the American political community, there is still one idea very present. It is this. The Soviet Union has begun to change its course. Eastern Europe is cracking, falling apart. The policies of the Cold War were right; those policies should not change. The only thing the U.S. needs to do is to keep its baskets ready to gather the fruit. But, recently, I know you do not agree with this. I know you heard experts give their views, but what you have said today shows President Bush has his own understanding, which is consistent with the challenges of our times. When we speak of the U.S. and the USSR something very serious is involved. We cannot permit our nations to base their policies on illusions and mistakes regarding each other. I note the President has spoken in favor of perestroika but has said appropriately that perestroika is for the Soviet Union to accomplish. We would like to hear from you something more, to hear specific steps to confirm that. Now I have heard plans for such steps. That is very important. I want to say that clearly. 58

Let me make my second point. There is a major regrouping in the world now. We are moving from a bipolar to a multipolar world. We both will have to deal with an increasingly integrated Europe. Japan is another major factor. I remember we once referred to China, which is another reality that neither of us should try to exploit against one another. China would not accept such an attempt. India is becoming increasingly dynamic. I welcome the carefully balanced position of President Gandhi. I appreciate that Gandhi wants to have good relations with both the U.S. and the USSR. What is our role in this regrouping? Mr. Dobrynin and all the others remember when we discussed this with Secretary Shultz, near the end of the Reagan Administration. He showed me interesting graphs, which were very important, very interesting. This regrouping can be accompanied by disquieting trends. For one example, Eastern Europe’s share in the world economy is not much, but look how the world is watching what is happening there. There are tensions. I can imagine that new and enormous issues will come into play, all related to limited resources. We in the Soviet leadership have been thinking about this for some time. The U.S. and the USSR are doomed to cooperate for a long time, but we have to abandon the vestiges of images of an enemy. Such approaches still exist. When we think of new challenges, we have to think about how big the U.S. and Soviet militaries are. I am not suggesting a U.S.-Soviet condominium, only describing reality. I do not call into question our allied responsibility or previous patterns of cooperation. But there must be patterns of cooperation to take account of new realities, and we are just beginning to understand those realities. There is some discussion in the U.S. about what kind of Soviet Union the U. S. would like to see: dynamic success or painful disasters. I know the kind of advice you have been receiving. It is our view that we want the U.S. to be a confident country which tackles its problems confidently: economic, technical, and social. If you want, you can check with all my interlocutors; they will confirm this in my position with world leaders. Any other approach is dangerous. It is dangerous to ignore or neglect the interests of the U.S. However, that means the U.S., too, must take into account the interests of others. The U.S. has not entirely abandoned old approaches. I cannot say we have entirely abandoned ours. Some times we feel the U.S. wants to teach, to put pressure on others. We are aware of that. I will want to hear your response, because this is how we will build bridges across rivers rather than parallel to them. This is very important. Since you, Mr. President, have several years in office, I feel it is important to be very clear on this. Maybe this one meeting will not be enough but we must understand this fundamental point [slaps table with emphasis]. The rest is details which will fit in. As for what is happening in USSR and Eastern Europe, we will have time to discuss that. But we can continue our earlier discussion. The President: I hope you have noticed that as dynamic change has accelerated in recent months, we have not responded with flamboyance or arrogance that would complicate USSR relations. What I am saying may be self-serving. I have been called cautious or timid. I am cautious, but not timid. But I have conducted 59

myself in ways not to complicate your life. That’s why I have not jumped up and down on the Berlin Wall. Chairman Gorbachev: Yes, we have seen that, and appreciate that. We have some concern on one thing: your actions in the Philippines. I appreciate your letter and want to discuss this. The President: Good. Chairman Gorbachev: I welcome very much what you have outlined, because behind these steps I see political will at the top of the U.S. government. Why is this important to me? On the basis of my cooperation with President Reagan, I remember there were times when we encountered an impasse. In Geneva, President Reagan and I may drink coffee and other things, but make no progress. When I was with Chernyaev at the Black Sea, I got a letter from President Reagan and talked with Shevardnadze. There was not much to work with in the letter. (All this was after our summit in Geneva.) I could have responded in kind but thought instead: what if we suggest meeting in a couple of weeks at Reykjavik? Maybe Reykjavik scared some in the U.S., Europe, and the USSR, but it was an intellectual breakthrough, and our relations began to move. We have accumulated a lot of possibilities in the economic area, but first it takes political will on your part to influence U.S. business. Your business people are disciplined. They were waiting for the signal of a new U.S. policy. Now they have it. As for START, our negotiators need new instructions from our level. But your remarks are very important from that standpoint. I thank you for placing bilateral cooperation at the top of the agenda. Regarding economic cooperation, we are ready to work actively to discuss those things with you without seeking to surprise anyone. The situation is this. On our side and your side, people say we have to cooperate—when we get together people say “Malta/Yalta” [animated]. We need to discuss and explain things to our allies, but I think it can be done. I welcome your proposal for Ministers to meet as early as January. Regarding economic issues, your intentions are very encouraging. Our policy is to move more and more to adjust to the world economy. Laws on property, land ownership, and lease-holding are going ahead. We will overhaul our entire structure of prices in the USSR. In the final analysis, it is necessary to move to the convertibility of the ruble. The President: Yup. Chairman Gorbachev: As we restructure our economy, I feel that it is better if we get involved in the international financial institutions. We must learn to take the world economy into perestroika. I know some in the U.S. worry that we would politicize the international financial institutions. We were ideological. So were you. But it’s a different time, and we will work on new criteria. But I appreciate your willingness to help the Soviet Union to become involved in the world economy. The Supreme Soviet has been working hard and has adopted 34 laws. The law on emigration is only on the first reading. Laws on freedom of conscience and the press are on first reading, too. These are far-reaching laws that will create a legal base for far-reaching change. There is no way back. 60

On Central America, when Shevardnadze told me about Jim Baker’s letter criticizing us about Soviet policy toward Central America, I said it was a misunderstanding. If we promise something to you, we always want to keep our pledges or you will not have trust in our relationship. We want to convince you we are not engaged in political games. We pledged we would not supply weapons to Nicaragua and we are not. I appreciate Congress’s cutting off weapons to the Contras. As soon as the Cessna crashed, Shevardnadze and Yazov asked their Nicaraguan and Cuban counterparts, and both countries strongly said they had nothing to do with that incident. So that’s the way it is. Ortega and even Castro said they are ready to explain themselves to America. After my trip to Cuba, I sent you a letter. I will be a little more specific when we have a one-on-one talk and tell you more about my talk with Castro. There are lots of weapons in Central America. A Cessna plane was used to land in Red Square, and there are experts involved in El Salvador operations. But we will keep our word. If your position doesn’t change, ours won’t. We see how you perceive this problem but don’t really understand [laugh, good-naturedly]. There is political pluralism in Nicaragua. It has nothing to do with Marxism. It is ridiculous to speak of the Sandanistas [sic] as Marxists. The roots of the current situation are economical and historical. I don’t see why Nicaragua is so unacceptable to you. They will have a new government after elections. Let the UN and the Latin Americans monitor the election. Frankly, we are not that much concerned with them. Let that process unfold. As for Cuba, Castro emerged without any assistance from us. Your country and ours have been in different situations re Cuba. Mr. President, I think we can change this, too. No one can really give orders to Cuba, absolutely no one. Castro, for instance, has his own views of perestroika, saying what he thinks [laughs again]. But we need mutual understanding. We don’t want bridgeheads in Cuba or Central America. We don’t need that. You must be convinced of that. Regarding arms control: on CW I anticipated your new position but did not know you would propose ending binary production. That is very important, so we will think that over. It certainly shows movement, although there is some disjuncture from an early global ban, which should be our goal, but we would be moving to that goal through steps. Right? Secretary Baker: That’s correct. Our position used to be to support an effectively verifiable worldwide global ban. We were having difficulty over verification. The President now says that if the Soviet Union will support the President’s UN proposal (20%-2%), that action would be taken without further progress on verification. The President would forego CW modernization. The U.S. and the USSR could agree, even coming out of this meeting, to do this. Chairman Gorbachev: The goal of a global ban remains? Secretary Baker: Absolutely. Chairman Gorbachev: Let’s get our experts together. Chairman Gorbachev: Without details on CFE, let me respond to your proposal. This is 100% the same proposal we have been pushing. It is very important. As for START, we need political will. I listened carefully to what you have 61

said. I heard nothing from you on SLCMs. I understand that you were in the Navy. The President: They didn’t have SLCMs when I was in. I’m too old. President Gorbachev: By June, it is realistic to expect that a START Treaty could be completed. But if we cannot solve SLCM by then, that could cause significant problems. You have a significant advantage. Marshal Akhromeyev and General Scowcroft have discussed some suggestions on this. The President: Maybe they can talk further. President Gorbachev: It’s a problem and both sides consider it a problem. We don’t think on all issues we have to be neck and neck. There are differences in the structures of our forces. But nuclear SLCM are a serious factor if we reduce everything else while those remain without some SLCM constraints. And the Supreme Soviet would not ratify. Secretary Baker: Come on. That’s our argument. President Gorbachev: As for nuclear testing and publicizing our military budget, we take note of your proposals. I welcome your suggestions for further cooperation. We will participate in that White House meeting. In summing up, we could particularly note these. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through Mandatory Review request 04-1944-MR by the National Security Archive.]

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Document No. 12: Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, First Restricted Bilateral Meeting, Malta, 12:00 p.m. – 1:00 p.m. December 2, 1989

These somewhat attenuated American notes of the first so-called “one-on-one” meeting between Bush and Gorbachev at Malta (actually a three-on-three with two interpreters plus Anatoly Chernyaev and Brent Scowcroft as notetakers) constitute a telegraphic rendering of the conversation. The Soviet version of the conversation (published in Masterpieces of History) is significantly more detailed, but the American version is not contradictory, and has real value for highlighting what Scowcroft saw as most important. Thus this memo puts in quotes Gorbachev’s up-front expression of Fidel Castro’s interest in normalizing relations with the U.S. Bush responds by calling Castro “a sea anchor as you move forward” and accusing the Nicaraguans of “exporting revolution” and weapons—to which Gorbachev rebuts, “There were U.S. rockets too.” In the Soviet memcon at this point, Bush admits, “That is possible;” but there is no such admission in Scowcroft’s version. After discussion of Panama and the Philippines, Gorbachev warns, “In the Soviet Union some are saying the Brezhnev Doctrine is being replaced by the Bush doctrine” of U.S. intervention. When Bush protests that Aquino in the Philippines was democratically elected, Gorbachev says so were the now-fallen governments of Eastern Europe. On the subject of Europe, Gorbachev complains about Helmut Kohl, who had just days before on November 28 pronounced his “10 Points” towards confederation without consulting with Washington, Moscow, or even his own foreign minister. “Mr. Kohl is in too much of a hurry on the German question,” Gorbachev tells Bush, who lets the Soviet leader know that Kohl’s allies (meaning Thatcher and Mitterrand) “have some private reservations about reunification.” Gorbachev agrees: “Yes I know—and they have let me know.” Bush assures Gorbachev that “we will do nothing to recklessly try to speed up reunification.”

Chairman Gorbachev: I have three points. I already referred to Central America especially Cuba. I recall a letter to you after Cuba. My talks in Cuba weren’t simple. Castro expressed caution about our policy—I explained our aims were good. I said as for our internal affairs we are doing what we want. What you do is your business. He asked me, in effect, to help normalize U.S.-Cuban relations. The President: I understand. It will stay with me. Chairman Gorbachev: I think perhaps we would think how to do it. Some contacts. We could participate but that is not necessary. I can say that Castro understands that the world is changing dramatically but he has his own sense of dignity and pride. Even raising this possibility was not easy for him. The President: What is he saying? Chairman Gorbachev: His very words, “Find a way to make the President aware of my interest in normalization.” It is on the basis of that remark that I made my comments. 63

The President: Let’s put all our cards on the table about Castro. Our allies can’t see why we care about Central America. It just isn’t a gut issue for them. For the political left in the U.S., it isn’t a gut issue. But for the fledgling democracies in Latin America and the U.S. right it is a gut issue. Castro is like a sea anchor as you move forward and the Western Hemisphere moves. He is against all this—Eastern Europe and the Western Hemisphere. Publicly Latin Americans will not criticize a colleague. But [Costa Rican President Oscar] Arias’ call was a clear indication that Castro is now totally isolated. There is another major Castro problem—the emigres (in Florida) who have strong emotions about this last dictator. We have had feelers from Castro but never with an indication of a willingness to change. Switching to Nicaragua, you said Ortega had nothing to do with [illegible]44. I am inclined to agree though I didn’t use to think so. But I am convinced that they are exporting revolution. They are sending weapons. I don’t care what they have told you, they are supporting the FMLN. I am now convinced there is a new shipment of helos going from the Soviet Union to Nicaragua. I don’t question Shevardnadze’s word on this. Chairman Gorbachev: There were U.S. rockets too. The President: I see a solution as in a verifiable election free and open and that if Ortega loses he doesn’t try to cling to power. If it is a free election, we will abide by the results. The only other open cancer is Panama, but there is no feeling that the Soviet Union wants Noriega to succeed. He is a terrible problem for us. I asked the Attorney General if our indictments were strong ones. I am seeking for him to get out. This is quite confidential. He said these are good indictments and given feelings on drugs in the U.S., I can’t drop the indictments. Chairman Gorbachev: Let me tell you how your steps are perceived in the Soviet Union. People ask are there no barrier to the U.S. action in independent countries? The U.S. passes judgement [sic] and executes that judgement [sic]. The President: There is no military operation against Colombia, but if we are asked for help against the scourge of drugs, we will help. Then I would like to mention the Philippines. I was surprised at your Philippines reaction. Acquino is democratically elected and asked for our help to prevent the palace from being bombed by the rebels. It never occurred to me that this would cause problems in the Soviet Union, though I probably would have done it anyway. But that notion never occurred to me. Chairman Gorbachev: In the Soviet Union some are saying the Brezhnev doctrine is being replaced by the Bush doctrine.

 Chernyaev’s notes indicate the key missing word is probably “Marxism.” His version reads: “Now, about Nicaragua. You said that the Sandinistas are not real Marxists. Earlier I had a different opinion, but today I would tend to agree ...” (Savranskaya, Blanton and Zubok, eds., Masterpieces of History, p. 631). [Editors]

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The President: I want to understand. Here is a democracy saying that it needs help against rebels. Chairman Gorbachev: I agree she is democratically elected. It depends on the context. In Eastern Europe there are governments, legitimately elected, that are now being replaced. The question is in Eastern Europe it is prohibited for Soviet troops to intervene. All now is interrelated. Some now are seeing that we are not performing our duty to our friends. But we have not been asked. The President: In Eastern Europe, change is peaceful and encouraged by you. In the Philippines, there is a Colonel trying to shoot his way into power. Chairman Gorbachev: I agree—peaceful change is the way. Our position is non-interference. The process of change can be painful but we believe in noninterference. Colonels can be found everywhere to do those jobs. The President: If we can stick with the notion of peaceful change, better relations will occur between the Soviet Union and the U.S. I would never give advice to a senior office holder like you. I can accept your criticism, but not on this issue, in this circumstance. Acquino is struggling to bring democracy. I would hope your criticism could be muted. I can accept it but I think that your criticism would cut the wrong way. I appreciate your explanation in the Philippines. One more comment on Latin America. I don’t want to sound like a broken record. Let me express U.S. public opinion on you yourself. There is strong support for perestroika and for establishing pluralistic answers in Eastern Europe—strong support. But I think people see support for Castro—almost—speaking frankly—as an embarrassment. He is against the causes you are advocating. Chairman Gorbachev: That is pluralism (laughs). The President: I wish we could find a way. You are spending billions into the pipeline and getting nothing for it, and it does interfere with our overall relationship. The way you have handled it is clear. Castro doesn’t just do what you say. Just to end it—anything we can do to cut support for Cuba and Nicaragua so we are not on opposite sides. Chile is moving in the right direction—not toward the U.S. but toward democracy and I don’t want these others to get in the way of what I want to do with the Soviet Union. Chairman Gorbachev: The most important thing is that we have no plan for Latin America—no bridges, no bridgeheads. That is not our policy—you have it from me. [next line illegible]45 I am moving toward democracy. Of course they are fledgling and the road ahead will be difficult. We are satisfied with that—as you—but we will not interfere.  Chernyaev’s version reads: “The Soviet Union has no plans with regard to spheres of influence in Latin America. This was and will continue to be the case. This continent is now in motion. You know it better than I do. I agree with you: the general trend is positive, democratic; dictatorships give way to democratic forms, although these are young, newly formed democracies ...” (Savranskaya, Blanton and Zubok, eds., Masterpieces of History, p. 633). [Editors]

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With Cuba, yes, we have a long relationship—responding to the economic blockade. We seek to put it on a more normal basis, especially economic. We are trading with Cuba and that meets our need—sugar, citrus, nickel—but it is much more to Cuba’s advantage. For example, we sell oil to Cuba on a market clearing basis which we could sell for much more. But Cuba is independent with its own view and we don’t want to interfere. I mention Castro’s signal because I think it shows Castro sees his interest lies in changing his relations with the U.S. and others. So please give it some thought. If you have something to share with us or something we can pass on. We can note we have had a frank conversation and understand each other better. The President: We have had feelers from him. But if he could do something in human rights. I will think carefully on it. I will let you know so we don’t get disconnected on this. Chairman Gorbachev: We could say that to him about human rights. The President: He won’t even let the U.N. in to see. Chairman Gorbachev: I haven’t finished (laughs). The President: Neither have I. Chairman Gorbachev: O.K. The President: O.K. Chairman Gorbachev: Let me address Eastern Europe. I have three points. (1) The direction of change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is such as to bring us closer—that is important. (2) What I dislike is when some U.S. politicians say unity of Europe should be on the basis of Western values. We have long been accused of exporting ideology. That is what is now being proposed by some—not you. (3) Mr. Kohl is in too much of a hurry on the German question. That is not good. I worry that this could be part of his pre-election game and not because of a strategic outlook. There are some differences in view in West Germany, within the coalition, and with the SPD. We should let Kohl know that his approach could damage things. For example, would a united Germany be outside alliances or within NATO? Answer is premature and we shouldn’t put it forth—should let it run its natural course. You and I are not responsible for the division of Germany. Let history decide what should happen. We need an understanding on this. The President: I think Kohl feels an enormous emotional response to what has happened—as does Genscher. There is some politics in his three part program and some emotional outpouring. I think he knows his allies—after they support right of the German people to reunify, have some private reservations about reunification. Chairman Gorbachev: Yes I know—and they have let me know. Unlike they and you—I am saying there are two states, mandated by history. So let history decide the outcome. Kohl assures me he will abide by understandings made in 66

Bonn. Now he says he wants to talk on the phone and Genscher is coming. I think this is an ? [sic] particular prudence. The President: I agree and we will do nothing to recklessly try to speed up reunification. When you talk to Kohl, I think you will see he agrees. But his rhetoric, you must understand, is emotional and possibly some politics, but mostly emotion. Chairman Gorbachev: It is good that things have [illegible]46 The President: The most conservative Americans salute how you have handled this issue. They are now looking back into history. I will be timid—that is how in a nutshell they describe my refusal to jump up and down at the Wall. This is no time for grandstanding—a step that looks good but could prove reckless. Chairman Gorbachev: The times we live in are of great responsibility—great opportunity but great responsibility. The President: I would like to spend some time on one other point at some time. Chairman Gorbachev: I have one other point as well—later. A point which you carefully avoided. The President: Yes, I was hoping to avoid it. Chairman Gorbachev: I once said something—You used a word that means “a test” to see if we could solve mutual problems. The President: Afghanistan is more important to you than to us. I was wrong about what would happen after Soviet troops left. Let’s discuss it. The President: Let me not blind side you. You may not want to discuss it. But I would like to know your views concerning the sensitive area of the Baltics. Chairman Gorbachev: Yes, we will. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through Mandatory Review request 04-1944-MR by the National Security Archive.]

 Chernyaev quotes Gorbachev as follows: “I would like to stress that we view positively the change that created these possibilities for normal contacts, broader cooperation and trade between the two German states,” (Savranskaya, Blanton and Zubok, eds., Masterpieces of History, p. 635). [Editors]

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Document No. 13: Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, Luncheon Meeting, Malta, 1:30 p.m. – 2:45 p.m. December 2, 1989

This American memorandum of conversation prepared from notes by Robert Blackwill provides a level of detail largely parallel to the Soviet version of the same meeting. There is mention of the 1988 Governors Island talks between Reagan, Gorbachev and Bush, and the Soviet leader’s “warm memories” of those meetings. The lunch features a lengthy and fascinating discussion by Gorbachev of economic issues and his proposed reforms, with some commiseration by Bush: “What gets you on budgeting is these unforeseen circumstances. Our savings and loan problems are costing $50 billion.” To which Gorbachev replies: “That is not much considering the size of your economy,” and then gives Jim Baker quite a nudge: “Did this happen when you were Secretary of the Treasury?” Gorbachev sees the deep problems in the Soviet economy, the “deformation of the market, the great ruble overhang” of peoples’ savings in their mattresses, reducing liquidity. But he is caught, he says, if they move to a free market: “within a week the workers would be in the streets bringing the downfall of any government.” Change will take time—“we are not agreeing” to sell land to the people, instead, “we will lease, with the right of inheritance” and the “main thing is to have many options, not to foreclose options.” Bush responds at the end that the only way to reform is to privatize: “Then, the worker has a real reason to work.”

The President: Your meeting with the Pope went well. It got very good press in the U.S. Chairman Gorbachev: It went over the limit prescribed. It was a very substantial meeting. The President: Did you and Minister Shevardnadze talk about the Middle East while we were having our one-on-one? Secretary Baker: We spent the whole time on our CW proposal. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze suggested a directive to the ministers from the two leaders. The President: The Lebanon situation is of heartbreaking concern to us. We have lots of interest in a peaceful resolution but very little influence. Chairman Gorbachev: We are doing much to improve the situation there. Minister Shevardnadze: We received a request from the President (of Lebanon) to issue a statement of support. He made a similar request to you. The President: We have already done that. Chairman Gorbachev: We made a statement to this effect with President Mitterrand and on our own. The President of Lebanon feels that our meeting could helpfully issue statement of support. I would like to see this. Perhaps we could make an oral statement for the press reaffirming our previous statements. 68

The President: I like the idea. Minister Shevardnadze: The Lebanese President writes that he intends to use force against Aoun. The President: That would mean Syrian force. He doesn’t have many foot soldiers. The outpouring of friendship for you in Italy was wonderful. It came through on our television. Chairman Gorbachev: I have warm memories of the meetings I had in New York City and the warm feelings toward me. The President: Very good. Chairman Gorbachev: When our cars were on the way to Governors Island, we learned of the earthquake in Armenia. I talked to Ryzhkov on the way. That night we were told 35,000 to 100,000 died. We were shocked and immediately took the decision to fly home. Secretary Baker: What was the final count? Chairman Gorbachev: 24,000. I haven’t seen anything like it in my life. The President: How is it now? Are your getting housing for the people? Chairman Gorbachev: We have a program worked out, but we had to be sure that the new houses were protected against earthquakes. That doubled the cost. There have been some delays, but work is progressing well. Chernobyl cost 8–10 billion rubles, including compensation to people affected. Restoring Armenia cost 12 to 14 billion rubles. There has also been a drop in oil prices. All of the above means for the next five year period we have some difficult choices. The President: What gets you on budgeting is these unforseen [sic] circumstances. Our savings and loan problems are costing $50 billion. Chairman Gorbachev: That is not much considering the size of your economy. Did this happen when you (Secretary Baker) were Secretary of Treasury? In Italy, I saw a lot of products and few customers. In our country, it is the opposite. Your shops have merchandise. Ours have none. The main problem is the deformation of the market, the great ruble overhang. We have been given a lot of advice. First, let the market decide, and let it absorb excessive liquidity—a free market. I asked our economists where in the world there is a completely free market in the last ten years. They could give me no example. If we followed that advice, within a week the workers would be in the streets bringing the downfall of any government. Others advise that we buy 16 to 20 billion rubles of consumer goods. To these advocates I say: (1) we can’t allow vital questions for our country to be decided elsewhere; (2) if we agreed to such a course, it would be a major blunder and it would make our restructuring more difficult. We need to wean our people away from a leveling principle. They need to learn how to work, to depend on themselves. Our society is changing and we must change our thinking. The President: In that regard Alan Greenspan’s visit, for example, was very helpful. The visits of some U.S. business people are very helpful. I have respect for our systems being widely apart now as you work for change inside the Soviet economy. In the U.S. there is interest in enhancing trade, and hopefully it is in your interest if we have more exchanges and visits between our economic and 69

business people talking exclusively about trade and economics. It would help for us to work together to advise our business people concerning their activities in the USSR. I don’t have a formal proposal but these activities would serve what I want—more trade and investment between our two countries. Chairman Gorbachev: That is exactly what we favor. As a general remark, we expect from the U.S. President is a political statement in support of what we are doing. Business circles in the U.S. have great potential and, as Ambassador Dobrynin can testify, are eager to move forward. That is why I attach great significance to what you said today about the economic measures you have in mind. The President: We have to move toward more compatibility of the systems, instead of the current polar situation. This can be done without putting down the other guy. Regarding statistics, we do not have perfect accuracy, but we have some pretty good people. I would like them to sit down with your folks. This is good for the investment climate. Jim Baker is reminding me of the list of ten areas in this domain where we can cooperate. Chairman Gorbachev: In some of those areas, we have ongoing cooperation. But we can do better on banking activities and fiscal issues. For example, the people of Milan have started a business school in Moscow. Secretary Baker: Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and I discussed this before in Wyoming. As a former finance minister, may I say this: this morning you mentioned ultimate convertibility of the ruble. We totally agree that is the direction you should try to go. To get to convertibility will probably require you to establish a price system. I am quite aware that economists will say to do that now and politicians will say that it’s not possible. Chairman Gorbachev: Yes. Secretary Baker: Before you do that you must take care of the ruble overhang. I wonder what steps you have decided on to take care of the ruble overhang and wanted to urge you not to forget the potential use of gold—or gold backed bonds as instruments. You could get rid of some of that overhang without dangerous side effects. Chairman Gorbachev: On this score, we are already undertaking initial measures. We are doing this within the framework of next year’s plan. We want to reduce our budget deficit by 60 billion rubles, by one-half. We want to restrain the rise in profits and earnings. So we must, first, exert strict control of excessive ruble overhang through proper taxation and, second, introduce bonds or securities that would pay a certain percent of interest. We must also use up excessive rubles by making people buy bonds that would guarantee delivery of a car from a new plant we intend to build. We are reducing our volume of industrial investments to funnel them elsewhere. We also are making the military sector produce consumer goods. In one case, we gave a government order to 325 military enterprises to produce food processing equipment. On December 12, the Congress of Peoples Deputies will go to work on our financial situation and promote economic reforms. There is one suggestion of selling land to the people. We are not agreeing to this. Rather, we will lease, with the right of inheritance. We are moving toward 70

private property, but very small and with no big business. Our eventual goal is to make all these enterprises act within the market after market mechanisms have been installed. In Italy, Soviet businesses operate in just this way. The President: If more privatization can be encouraged, this would be better for international trade, at least with the U.S. It would attract capital from our country in tremendous volumes. Chairman Gorbachev: If we have property of stockholders, for example, there are such examples in the U.S. In the U.S. it is difficult to find pure, genuine private property in [the] U.S.—perhaps only on a family farm. What counts is the degree of economic independence. What is important is to be able to dispose of the means of production and products, but this could be through leasing, cooperatives, or stockholding. Naturally, we need widespread banking and credit institution systems. If we take, Mr. President, the example of the U.S., there are many variants. The ways applied in the U.S.—or, say, U.K.—vary. Italy is different still. Sweden has mostly cooperatives. The main thing is to have many options, not to foreclose options. We have to allow certain variants to take shape. The President: But the Swedes do best when they privatize, as in Saab. Then, the worker has a real reason to work. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through Mandatory Review request 04-1944-MR by the National Security Archive.]

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Document No. 14: Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, Second Restricted Bilateral Meeting, Malta, 11:45 a.m. – 12:45 p.m. December 3, 1989

This American memcon, written by Brent Scowcroft, is the most telegraphic of all the summit transcripts, reducing a full hour of Bush-Gorbachev conversation, with only interpreters plus Chernyaev and Scowcroft present, to a single page of notes. The Soviet transcript of Malta, already published in Masterpieces of History, does not separate the sessions in the way the American does, with timestamps, so there is research value in having even Scowcroft’s distilled version. The topic could hardly be more important—the problem of nationalities in the USSR and what to do about the restive Baltics, whose incorporation into the Soviet Union by Stalin the U.S. had never officially recognized. In a foreshadowing of the ultimate breakup of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Gorbachev notes that in Ukraine “50 million are non-Ukrainian,” in Kazakhstan “Kazakhs are only 30 percent of the population,” and “destructive forces should not be allowed to undermine” a “democratic process.” Despite omitting most of the substance, Scowcroft does capture a truly characteristic Bush comment at the very end: “I didn’t respond to all arms control but we want to move forward. But we must be prudent. We are looking for ways to make further reductions, especially in manpower in CFE. I must consult with NATO.” And that’s it.

The President: I want to discuss an idea on bibles and a proposal on Billy Graham. (Described the question he is asked about the Baltics.) Chairman Gorbachev: I have discussed how we see a [illegible]. Many problems have arisen. We were ready to deal with them through greater autonomy. If separatism would become dominant, that would be dramatic. I must not create a danger to perestroika. The Soviet peoples would not understand. We lived together for fifty years, we are integrated. We have sixty million living out there in nationality areas. Fifty percent of Estonia are Russians, over 50% percent of Latvians are now Russian, Lithuanian majority in Lithuania. In the Ukraine, 50 million are non-Ukrainian. Kazakhs are only 30% of the population. Our country is that way and separatism brings out strong feelings by people. There has been a calming down but still there are problems. Ths [sic] is a sensitive issue for us. I hope you understand our position. This would bring out all sorts of terrible fires. If the U.S. has no understanding it would spoil relations with the U.S. more than anything else. The President: But if you use force—you don’t want to—that would create a firestorm. You will get that question. 72

Chairman Gorbachev: We want all to get equal treatment. If we removed our MVD troops from Nagorno-Karabakh we would have war. We are committed to a democratic process and we hope you understand. What happened here is precisely what we wanted. We are very pleased. There are some in both countries who don’t like what we are doing. But we are right. Destructive forces should not be allowed to undermine this. Let me [illegible] some. The President: What forces? Chairman Gorbachev: Sometimes lies are presented in the press, etc., i.e. that Gorbachev sold his friends down the river as a student after drinking ... [illegible] The President: I never heard of this. We have a lot of nuts. Chairman Gorbachev: I know you don’t believe it. The President: The visit is exactly what I hoped. I didn’t respond to all arms control but we want to move forward. But we must be prudent. We are looking for ways to make further reductions, especially in manpower in CFE. I must consult with NATO. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through Mandatory Review request 04-1944-MR by the National Security Archive.]

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Document No. 15: Memorandum of Conversation: Bush–Gorbachev, Second Expanded Bilateral Meeting, Malta, 4:35 p.m. – 6:45 p.m. December 3, 1989

On the original Malta schedule, the American president was supposed to host the second large session of the delegations, and thus this memorandum of conversation (prepared by NSC staffer Condoleezza Rice) begins with jokes by Gorbachev (“I am your guest”) and Bush (“How do you like my ship?”) even though they are meeting on the Gorky again. Most interesting about this American memo are the very real differences in the language of a few key phrases between Rice’s rendering (she spoke Russian herself) and that of Chernyaev on the Soviet side (as published in Masterpieces of History). The Soviet version gives Gorbachev’s language a larger sweep, as in “joint efforts for providing mutual security” versus Rice’s “joint efforts for verifiable limits on nuclear weapons.” Chernyaev quotes Gorbachev as saying the “U.S. continues to be guided by a rapid reaction strategy that was adopted over 20 years ago” in contrast to the new defensive Soviet doctrine, but the U.S. notes call the strategy one of “flexible response” not rapid reaction, which misses Gorbachev’s point. During this discussion, Bush candidly confesses “we have been surprised by the rapidity of change” in Europe and since “you are closer” to events there, “I am anxious to hear from you.” Gorbachev surprises the Americans by insisting that both the U.S. and the USSR are close to Europe and “equally involved and integrated.” Bush responds, “What I meant was that we haven’t been that close to Eastern Europe but want to become closer without damaging Soviet interests. We are involved, of course. We lead NATO. But you have been more the catalyst for change in a productive way.” Gorbachev then appeals to Bush’s “stability” focus with a proposal for a Helsinki II summit to keep the revolutionary changes in Europe within the “common European house” framework while allowing the Warsaw Pact and NATO to develop “a more political than military nature.” The two sides have a vigorous discussion of “Western values” and how the Soviets do not appreciate the phrase, at the end of which they agree on the formulation “democratic values.” The dialogue concludes with a candid review of problems in the Middle East (with Secretary of State Baker vowing: “you won’t see me on a plane” there), and in Afghanistan, where Communist leader Najibullah had survived the Soviet pullout in 1988, much to the surprise of the Americans. Bush insists “we have no desire to see a hostile regime on your border.”

Chairman Gorbachev: Well, what remains to be covered? I know our Ministers have something to cover and, after all, I am your guest today. (laughs) The President: How do you like my ship? The press was yelling at me on the Belknap that everything was cut short. I told them that we worked at lunch too. 74

Chairman Gorbachev: Overall it was five hours. We know better. If you don’t mind—because of this we could have a press conference together. The President: We have arranged to do something together and then a press conference. Chairman Gorbachev: Have you announced that? Because I think our press conference will have to be here on the Gorkii. I thought it would be better to do it here. The President: If we do that the press will think I’m dodging their questions. They will say I don’t want to answer their questions. Chairman Gorbachev: O.K. We will come out together—not for a press conference—answer a few questions. Then I will just have a press meeting not a press conference. The President: Fine. I’ll have a final answer for you after the meeting. Chairman Gorbachev: Mr. President, yesterday I responded to your proposals. Maybe you want to listen to our suggestions. I will take into account what you said. This is an informal meeting—the first—between the two of us. I want to say to you and the United States that the Soviet Union will under no circumstances start a war—that is very important. The Soviet Union is ready no longer to regard the United States as an adversary and is ready to state that our relationship is cooperative. That is the first point. Second, we favor joint efforts for verifiable limits on nuclear weapons. We are interested in continuing arms control but need to go beyond the arms race and renounce the creation of new weapons. Our military people are already cooperating. I want to thank you for giving General Yazov a chance to familiarize himself with U.S. armed forces. Third, we have a defensive military doctrine. We have given explanations to the United States of what is meant by it. I want to note that the structure of our armed forces is changing—assuming a defensive nature. They are declining in bridging, landing equipment and changing the location of our air forces. We are removing strike aircraft and putting defensive aircraft where the strike aircraft were located. We are not keeping these activities secret. Our military people are ready to meet with yours and to discuss certain suggestions for adopting and implementing defensive doctrine. Still, the U.S. is proceeding on the basis of flexible response which was in the past justified but now—now that there are recognized changes at the politicalmilitary level—why isn’t the United States moving to change the posture of its own armed forces. This is very important. I have read the Brussels Statement (I think it is sixty pages) and there is no real change as yet. Another fundamental point. We have been discussing the dynamics of negotiations. Let me point to one problem that I think is of great importance. Both of us recognized that both sides have created tremendous military power and are becoming aware of catastrophic consequences. We have shown political will to eliminate that threat. We signed the first treaty together—the INF treaty. 75

The President: Thanks for what you sent me by Dobrynin—the piece of the SS-20. Chairman Gorbachev: This is the only realistic perspective. A lot has been done and the prospects from what you did yesterday are good. But something worries us. It is the naval issue which is still outside the process of negotiation. This is an emotional issue for previous Administrations and ours and to a certain extent we understand that the U.S. is a sea power whose lifeline is the sea and ocean. We know that the U.S. has a tradition of building these kinds of armed forces. It is not an easy issue but just look at the situation. As of the early 1950s the U.S.S.R. was surrounded by naval bases—500,000 men, hundreds of aircraft, huge fleets. The U.S. has aircraft carriers with about 1500 aircraft. All that is deployed in waters adjacent to us. In this context, I am not speaking about submarines. The Vienna talks will result in lowering the confrontation on land and the prospects are good on strategic arms. We believe that soon we are entitled to expect that the naval threat to us should be reduced. I will venture an initiative. I believe we should start talks on naval arms. Maybe through confidence building measures or reducing the level of naval activities we could do something. After we are finished at CFE and START we need to go over to naval issues. I know that the U.S. faces other potential problems than the Soviet Union but in the same way that the U.S. feels Europe is important we need security from any ocean threat. Now I would like to make some remarks on the current talks. I understand that we do not want to discuss details at this meeting. But I want to make remarks on three items. I would like to continue discussion and have the military people do it. We must come to grips with problems and see them clearly. First, we must better understand the relationship between the ABM and the START treaty—taking into account the Shevardnadze proposals to Baker. Second, we believe it is important to get a handle on heavy bombers and ALCMs. If the current U.S. proposal were adopted, the overall aggregate total would be not 6000 but over 8500. We are not seeking an advantage for ourselves—the actual loads should be equalizing. Third, SLCMs. I already talked about it. If I understand you correctly, it is to resolve the START issues by the time of the Summit by the end of 1990 and have a treaty signed. Another important point too—Scowcroft and Akhromeyev have had some very useful talks. The U.S. and Soviet navies have nuclear weapons such as submarines and SLCMs and tactical nuclear weapons—nuclear mines, etc. Submarines are strategic weapons and are verifiable and will be in the structure of both arsenals. It is a part of the triad of forces. But the rest—tactical nuclear forces at sea—should be eliminated. This was suggested in informal discussions. I hope neither Scowcroft nor Akhromeyev will be offended by my now putting this on the table more formally. 76

We would be ready to do away with all nuclear forces at sea—that would be the easiest for verification. Well. The problem is reducing not only weapons but people: First, our proposal that overall aggregates should be 1.3 million a reduction of 1 million men by each side. NATO has not agreed. I think that people will find the decision to reduce weapons and not people unacceptable. Second, there is the issue of reducing the numbers of personnel deployed on foreign territory. We are proposing that the numbers of personnel be reduced to 300,000 men per alliance. This is like a proposal suggested first by the Soviet Union but your proposal does not deal with many foreign troops on the soil of the Western alliance (the UK, France, etc.) Third, our proposal is for a ceiling of 4700 front-line tactical aircraft. I also suggested that there should be a sub-ceiling on defensive interceptor aircraft. Nothing has been agreed and I want to request that the next Ministerial look at these concerns. Fourth, on open skies, we support the proposal and will participate. We intend to work positively and intend to have our military people look at it closely but we should also develop open seas, open space. [At this point Chairman Gorbachev hands over a map of U.S. bases surrounding the Soviet Union.] The President: These are U.S.? Chairman Gorbachev: You see the USSR is clear (laughs) but the Sixth Fleet is moving. The President: Where is the SLAVA? Chairman Gorbachev: Not on the map. The President: Why don’t we see how accurate this is and we’ll tell you if there are any problems. Secretary Baker: You should fill in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Chairman Gorbachev: U.S. territory is white on this map too—it isn’t filled in. The President: Should I? Chairman Gorbachev: Fill it in. Secretary Baker: When you start publishing your defense budget we can fill the whole thing in. Chairman Gorbachev: We are moving in that direction. I only want to underline the degree to which we look to peaceful relations with your country. Taking into account that a gun can shoot without anyone pulling the trigger—fewer guns means less possibility. I do not want the danger to the U.S. to be any more than it is for the Soviet Union. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: Yesterday you made a constructive proposal on chemical weapons. Chairman Gorbachev: As I said when hearing it—we believe its two broad elements: the global ban and the U.S. plan to abandon modernization form a good basis. The President: I have a question on proliferation. 77

Chairman Gorbachev: Yes? The President: I know you were not convinced that the Libyan plant was a chemical weapons plant but as we go along we should try to speak out against these kinds of incidents. People talk about chemical weapons as a poor man’s atomic bomb—horrible weapons—as our experts discuss the proposals, I would like to see if we can’t see if there is a position that we can agree on proliferation. Chairman Gorbachev: Our position is the same. We are against proliferation. I would like our Ministers to work out more specific steps. The President: We are vulnerable to the argument by small states that we have them. It will be good if we can cooperate. Chairman Gorbachev: Sure we can cooperate. We can start rapidly to reduce and then we will have a moral right to press forward. Chairman Gorbachev: How can we see the process in Europe. Let us leave the arms control file to our Ministers. The President: I have great confidence in our Ministers. The military to military work helps too. The work that Akhromeyev and Crowe started—the more I look at the problem, I think those meetings are very helpful and should continue whatever people are involved. Chairman Gorbachev: We discussed it among ourselves. It-is interesting that even when we are not at the same table we seem to be discussing the same issues. The President: Those talks can make a huge difference. Our military has clout with NATO—the European counterparts of NATO won’t do exactly what the JCS says—but as we are shifting as we proceed—the military to military contacts are very important. Now on to Europe. You are closer but I want to make a comment. We have been surprised at the rapidity of change and noted your personal reaction and that of the Soviet side to these changes. Yesterday you and I discussed, without much detail, German reunification. We cannot be asked to disapprove of German reunification. I realize that this is a highly sensitive subject and we have tried to conduct ourselves with restraint. I do not want to be positioned in a provocative way. [Gorbachev turns and asks clarification from translator.] I sent a high level delegation to Poland—top industrialists and labor leaders— not to provoke difficulties for the Soviet Union. Rather, it goes to explain from our standpoint what works in the economy. We are well aware of the Helsinki language about borders and now I am anxious to hear from you. How do you see beyond the status quo? Chairman Gorbachev: First, I reject the remark that we are closer to Europe. We are equally involved and integrated. We are well aware of your involvement and any approach that rejects the involvement and role for the U.S. would be unrealistic and unconstructive. It would be a mistake. Acceptance of your role is a basic point with us. The President: What I meant was that we haven’t been that close to Eastern Europe but want to become closer without damaging Soviet interests. We are 78

involved, of course. We lead NATO. But you have been more the catalyst for change in a productive way. Chairman Gorbachev: I took advantage of that remark to reaffirm our position because there has been speculation. You have remarked about change in Europe. Something fundamental is happening and change in Western Europe is no less fundamental. A few months ago I talked to the Trilateral Commission—Giscard, Nakasone and Kissinger. Yes. It was coordinated by Rockefeller and it was a very interesting group. I guess they all have plenty of time now. The President: They have money too. Chairman Gorbachev: President Giscard made remarks and said to me that I must be ready to deal with a United Federation of Europe—a Federated State of Western Europe. He said that economic integration is taking place now at all levels as 1992 approaches and that political structures will also develop—perhaps even supernational [sic] structures. As Europeans, we try to put this into the context of the “common European house.” I would like you to agree to give more thorough consideration to this idea because both sides have an interest. Both must—now that the whole of Europe is in a period of flux. The President: I agree. Chairman Gorbachev: As we see it, the draw between East and West is an objective process where the countries of Europe will become closer to each other. European countries will be more compatible and this is another aspect of profound change. Our viewpoint—shared by all Europeans—even in nuances as a part of Kohl our view is that we should do everything within the Helsinki context rather than ruining what has been done. A Helsinki II Summit to develop new criteria for this new phase would be a good idea. It could be attended by all who signed the Helsinki Final Act—the U.S., Canada, the Vatican, the USSR and all the Europeans. A prudent and responsible approach is important. This would be to make sure the process doesn’t result in less stability. We need to improve stability and limit the damage and make sure not to ruin the instruments that have maintained the balance but to transform the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO. They should change to a more political than military nature. Our generals have already started contacts but we need more. We need to let the economic communities interact. COMECON is looking to make changes to make it more compatible with the world economy. Such an approach must be free from surprises. Now let me mention a concept of U.S. origin: The division of Europe should be overcome on the basis of Western values. If policy is made on that assumption the situation could become quite messy. You used to make similar accusations against the USSR—the export of revolution. This is not a simple phase but a time of great responsibility. Eastern Europe is changing to be more open, democratic and to respect universal human values. 79

It is moving closer to the economic arrangements of the world economy. This opens up the possibility for a tranquil and placid pause. It is dangerous here to try to force the issues—to push it artificially in order to achieve an advantage. I believe that various options could come up in the future. We cannot expect it to be painless. The situation is acute because enormous societal forces are coming into play. I have seen that in the Soviet Union with different traditions, special features—and I see how fiercely the debate is raging about our economy and our political institutions as we move toward democracy. How to transform our federation. Prime Minister Mulroney interrogated me on how to solve this problem and discussed our experience and that of Canada. He told me things about Quebec and its ambitions—separatism in Quebec. I mentioned similar trends in the Soviet Union. I wonder why the U.S. Congress is so concerned about the Soviet federation instead of trying to help Canada which is much closer and more important to you. We can predict that developments in Europe will not always be smooth but overall I look at things optimistically. You know, analyzing things and responding to unfolding events. You can tremble and some panic but if you look at it philosophically—things fall into place. We are dealing with fundamental processes if nations and peoples are involved in the developments—one can’t expect it to be smooth. It is important to see that. These changes are deep and historical. We should not undermine this process but seize opportunities to bring together East and West. Differences will still exist. I look at the differences within the USSR and the US and Europe—there are big ones. We want mutual understanding of what is happening and we have such an understanding. Because we are aware that the process is moving we would like to have interaction so that we don’t let the process scatter so as not to find ourselves in a chaotic situation that would stop the process and throw us back. This is a special period. The President: Let me ask you to clarify. You expressed reservations about “Western values.” I can understand if this is presented with arrogance or chauvinistic pride—that would be bad. But as we discuss these matters inside NATO and Western Europe there is naturally talk of Western values. A Western value is glasnost—openness—it isn’t our word but we value lively debate, pluralism and openness. Western values are free markets and openness. But it is not something new with us. These common values have been there in U.S.-Western European relations for a long time. As we see changes that are a long [sic] the lines of what we talked about—its not in hostility that “Western values” is written. I want to be sure of the difficulty you have in our using this term—I don’t want to complicate anything. Chairman Gorbachev: Our main principle from which we proceed is the right of each country to make its own choices and also the right of nations to change 80

that initial choice. It can be painful but it is an internal matter. The U.S. is committed to a certain political, cultural, and economic choice. Let others make their choices. What God they pray to? What to worship? What is important is change and renewal in East and West and a process that is drawing us closer together. The developments will not be a copy of Swedish, Russian or any other way. It will be something redefined by the new age in the world and in Europe. The thing is there is no fear as regards any system—people are looking for their own variant. The President: We don’t differ. Self-determination is a value we endorse and it is openness that permits self-determination. Western values does not mean the imposition of our system on Czechoslovakia, the GDR or Romania. Chairman Gorbachev: That is important for us—these fundamental changes now bring nations closer together. I see how Eastern Europe is finding new forms of resolving the development of social problems—trade and technology and science. Taking processes developed in other countries too. It is a good process. Political and practical affairs will go easier if our understanding is similar. Changes will take place constructively and cooperatively in order to allow that process to attain new phases in European civilization and world civilization. We have been persuaded that there should not be one simple model in the socialist or capitalist world. The President: I told Primakov that when he said he wanted to build a Parliament like ours. I said, “Don’t copy us. We have a good system.” Chairman Gorbachev: I think your advice is appropriate and I must accept only those things that are organic. Secretary Baker: You emphasize the term self-determination. You have said governments should choose their form. We agree as long as people can choose their governments. That is what we mean by Western values—not that there should be specific forms imposed. Chairman Gorbachev: But when someone says he has the final truth you have to expect trouble. The President: Yes. Secretary Baker: There is great nervousness about what reunification of Germany would mean and we say on the basis of Western values and we mean openness and pluralism because no one wants the kind of Germany we had between 1937 and 1941. Chairman Gorbachev: Yakovlev asked why are openness, glasnost and pluralism western values? The President: Because this has been our solid foundation. Chairman Gorbachev: We share those values. Those are common values. The President: It is much more apparent that we share those values today than twenty years ago. Chairman Gorbachev: That is important. If we started to talk about the collapse of capitalism or of socialism—nothing good would come of it. We should see things as they are so as not to become involved in propaganda. 81

Mr. Yakovlev: If one were to insist on calling these Western values we could start talking about Eastern or Chinese values. That would be ideological. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: Western values—Western strength. Some are saying it is because of Western strength. The President: Let’s try to avoid words that cause you concern or us concern. We are saluting the values. Chairman Gorbachev: The direction of these changes is that we are becoming more open and an organic integration is taking place. We are abandoning those things that divide us. How do you call that? We should say a “new relationship.” Let us not make it a theological debate. That led to religious wars and we should have learned from that. Secretary Baker: Democratic values? Chairman Gorbachev: Yes. The President: I am glad we had this conversation. Chairman Gorbachev: I wanted to have this discussion take place. Now to the Middle East. What should we be doing? We’ve probed Arafat to the edge and while he is still alive something should be done. The President: There was some encouraging news yesterday to Secretary Baker that Arafat may be ready to go forward with the ten points. One suggestion relating to your possible diplomatic relations with Israel. I recognize that it is your internal matter but recognition of Israel diplomatically would be good. Some say, “Why would the President suggest that—Israel is our closest friend?” I think it would fit your requirements. We are trying to get the Palestinians and Israelis to engage in dialogue. The Baker five points were given to Shevardnadze. Chairman Gorbachev: I know them better than the ten. The President: Shamir has been pulled to the right by Sharon and Levy in his own party. It is difficult to get him to move. Chairman Gorbachev: A couple of points. I felt that we have never had more favorable circumstances than now to settle the Middle East conflict. I am able to say that because we are involved together. The U.S. was trying to solve the Middle East problem alone for many years. Alone you were unable to do that—cooperation has been established again and we are ready to contribute constructively. Pushing Arafat in the appropriate direction has given us new opportunities that could evaporate. Already he is considered a traitor by many in the PLO and other Arabs. I welcome the U.S.-PLO dialogue because maybe you can get your own clarification of Arafat’s position which is constructive. On relations with Israel it is not a problem for us. [To Shevardnadze] How many times have you been to Middle East? Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: Six. Chairman Gorbachev: As soon as we see progress on the settlement—we will recognize Israel. We have many interests in common. Many people from the USSR are living in Israel and we have good contacts with Jewish organizations, even those based in your country. 82

I am worried that the process of consolidation among Arabs may at some point make it so they could decide not to involve the US or the USSR. The opportunity must be grasped. The President: We would be pleased to see you have diplomatic relations with Israel. The mood of blanket endorsement of everything that Israel wants has been changed by the Entifadah [sic]. Israel is still a staunch ally but the mood now is that we must solve the problem. I might say on Lebanon, just across the border that we strongly supported the Tripartite effort. We have no influence with Aoun and deplore the killing of the President and are concerned about the massive Syrian presence. If Aoun can be persuaded to step aside, Lebanon can be the peaceful place we once knew. Chairman Gorbachev: We have become involved. I received representatives of the Tripartite group and gave my support. We have been interacting with Syria, the Holy See and France. Movement was afoot before the President was killed. I shall continue efforts to support the Trilateral plan. The Middle East and Lebanon—we must instruct our Foreign Ministers to think of new ways. The President: [To Baker] You had a comment? Secretary Baker: Yes. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: Let me clarify on Syria. We both support the newly elected President. The relationship between Lebanon and Syria is up to them. They will find a way. Secretary Baker: Are you not concerned that Syria, with the blessing of the President, will try to clear out Aoun and his enclave? Chairman Gorbachev: We noticed what you said—that the Syrians will take action but we don’t have that information. The President: It is not that they are massed for immediate action—various reports say they might. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: The Syrians have said they don’t want to be in Lebanon permanently and are acting in the Tripartite spirit. The President: We moved our embassy and Aoun was upset with us and threatened our people. Chairman Gorbachev: This is a useful exchange on the Middle East and Lebanon. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: One more point. The Mubarak plan. After it appeared there seemed to be potential for U.S.-Soviet cooperation. But we have been consulting less and less. President Gorbachev: Will Secretary Baker go it alone? Secretary Baker: You won’t see me on a plane to the Middle East. The President: You and I can’t dictate an outcome in the Middle East. If anyone thinks we can—that will be counterproductive. Chairman Gorbachev: I agree. We have to cooperate but not to dictate. The President: We welcome cooperation. Your experts have noticed a change in U.S. policy on this subject. 83

Secretary Baker: There have been extensive talks with Primakov and Tarasov in connection with the working groups. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: It happened after your submitted your plan. It would have been better before submitting your plan. Chairman Gorbachev: I want to ask Shevardnadze to say words in regards to Afghanistan. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: You are leaving the most difficult to me. The President: Not the most difficult on our agenda. Chairman Gorbachev and I had discussion on what we thought was most difficult. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: The Secretary and I had detailed discussions and Gorbachev asked what was its outcome. We need to think about the future instead of bickering about the past. We need to begin practical cooperation and help the Afghans begin an inter-Afghan dialogue. That is the purpose of the conference. That would set up an interim council to discuss and set up free elections to be monitored by the UN. Not only the Kabul regime, but some groups including the King seem to agree. The second part would be an international conference under the UN. I think this idea deserves attention. The third part concerns the supply of weapons. I told the Secretary that we are ready to stop arms on a reciprocal basis and a ceasefire to force the parties to the conflict to stop fighting. The sentiment of the field commanders and also in the Peshawar opposition is such that we need to do this. I have noted the U.S. suggestion about a transitional stage. I believe a transitional stage deserves attention while working around the elements so a constructive dialogue is possible. As for Pakistani violations of Geneva I—we won’t raise it here but it should be discussed quietly. Chairman Gorbachev: Why am I always returning to this question? In talks with the previous President I remember that we said that a military solution was not possible and that Geneva was a difficult process. But we managed and achieved a withdrawal of Soviet forces and that attempt must be completed by a settlement. The President: Rest assured, I want to see it settled. We have no desire to see a hostile regime on your border. Chairman Gorbachev: We also would not want to see an Afghan regime that is hostile to the U.S. either. The President: Najibullah is a major hang-up. About that the resistance groups are united. They all say that reconciliation is impossible with him there. The problem is the role for the King has gone backwards. Chairman Gorbachev: On the one hand, you say everyone rejects Najibullah. But in the year since the withdrawal—his position is stronger and many commanders and tribal authorities are cooperating with him. The President: Not enthusiastically. If you’re saying that there is a ground swell of support for Najibullah then that is news to me. It is the first I’ve heard of it. 84

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: I visited Kabul seven times. I am connected and I can confirm that his prestige and influence is growing. The opposition—almost everyone is talking to Najibullah. The decreasing influence of the King is not a good thing. He represents the moderate wing. Who would gain power—Hekmatyar? That would be a terrible outcome. The President: There is no love loss [sic] between us and Hekmatyar. Chairman Gorbachev: Let me say more. Speaking realistically—one problem is the opposition; two is Najibullah himself; three is the Najibullah regime. Let’s start the process between them. The President: The Mujahadeen... Chairman Gorbachev: They are putting out an ultimatum. What shall we do? Invade and remove Najibullah? Secretary Baker: Stop sending him $300 million. Chairman Gorbachev: Mr. Secretary you promised that he would collapse in three months. Don’t simplify things. The President: I am surprised to hear that tribal leaders talk with him. Chairman Gorbachev: Ask Hekmatyar if he is in contact with Najibullah? The President: We are not in contact with him. General Scowcroft: We are not preventing contact between the Mujahadeen and Najibullah. Chairman Gorbachev: Neither are we. We are aware of only a little of what is going on and we have been above board. They are acting in their own way and it is hard to understand. Secretary Baker: We have to sell the Mujahadeen to get the transition process going. They insist that after it is over—Najibullah would step down and then the UN suggestion would make sense. Here to fore the Muj wouldn’t even discuss Najibullah. We suggested to start with him and that he would then step down and let a legitimate government begin. Chairman Gorbachev: This can be discussed. Secretary Baker: If the Muj agreed to have members of the PDPA but not Najibullah and his closest associates? CHairman [sic] Gorbachev: I believe this is something to decide within the framework but the idea of a transitional process is appropriate and the factions will stay as now. We cannot order Najibullah out. If they decide he should go, O.K. It is the Afghan’s process and it is a developing process. No one can force him. Secretary Baker; without recognition that there will be a transfer of power the Muj won’t come to the table. Chairman Gorbachev: From whom are they to get this information? If they are so sure of themselves why are they worried? Secretary Baker: I am not sure they are so confident. For them to consider coming to table they need to know that Najibullah is willing to step down at the end. 85

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: It is worth discussion. Your information is not right. The opposition is falling apart. Chairman Gorbachev: What next? The press conference? A chat? The President: The statements and then we can take questions. Any major issues that we didn’t talk about? Ethiopia, Mengistu. Chairman Gorbachev: No we didn’t cover that but we can say that the situation in Africa has been touched upon. The Namibian settlement process— we could mention our satisfaction. Ethiopia could be mentioned—the Carter mission. The President: That is unofficial. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through Mandatory Review request 04-1944-MR by the National Security Archive.]

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Document No. 16: Memorandum from Rice to Scowcroft December 5, 1989

The contrast between the NSC meetings before Malta (“dampen expectations,” no negotiating arms control) and after Malta comes through clearly in this concise cover memo from Soviet specialist Condoleezza Rice to the national security adviser enclosing the briefing memo and talking points that Scowcroft would then forward to President Bush. “The President has now committed himself to an ambitious arms control agenda before the June 1990 summit” and “bureaucracy must not get in the way,” Rice writes. If such urgency had been present at the White House earlier in 1989, perhaps it would not have taken two more years to finish the START Treaty or make the withdrawals of nuclear weapons that would not be accomplished until a month after the August 1991 coup against Gorbachev.

I . PURPOSE

The goal of this meeting is to review commitments that you made to Gorbachev on arms control and to kick-start the bureaucracy to meet the timelines that you set for the 1990 Summit. II. BACKGROUND

As a result of the Malta meeting, we have an ambitious arms control agenda ahead of us. There are a number of controversial START issues that must be resolved urgently if we are to complete the work on a variety of U.S. positions before Jim Baker’s Ministerials—the first of which is in less than eight weeks. In addition, as Dick Cheney and Collin Powell related last time, we also need to find a way to move CFE along. Finally, work is lagging on implementing your chemical weapons initiative. The members of the NSC will need to hear from you the high priority that you place on meeting your commitments to Gorbachev, and that doing so will require their personal sustained involvement. As you told Gorbachev, you cannot afford to let the bureaucracy get in the way of meeting these timelines. We came out of Malta with a lot of momentum and have laid to rest the notion—for now—that the Administration is dragging its feet and is unwilling to engage the Soviets. The critical foreign policy test before us now is to make certain that we do not lose that momentum and that the interagency process supports the effort to meet the commitments that you made to Gorbachev. [...]

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POINTS TO BE MADE AT MEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

– As you know I talked at the Cabinet Meeting in some detail about my meetings with Gorbachev and the fol1ow-on discussions with the Allies. – The purpose of this NSC meeting to emphasize that we must get the work done so that we can meet the timelines and commitments established at Malta. – I proposed the following to Gorbachev on economic relations: – Immediate negotiation of a trade agreement so that when the Supreme Soviet codifies its emigration laws, I can waive Jackson-Vanik. I am aiming to be able to announce MFN status for the Soviet Union at the 1990 Summit. – I also proposed to Gorbachev that we discuss the development of a bilateral investment treaty. – I informed the Soviets that I intend to tell the members of GATT now that I will support GATT observer status for the Soviet Union when the Uruguay Round is completed. – I proposed expanding U.S.-Soviet technical economic cooperation and presented him with a paper proposing specific economic projects, covering topics such as finance, agriculture, statistics, small business development, budgetary and tax policy, a stock exchange, and anti­monopoly policy. – I told him that I would explore with Congress the lifting of statutory restrictions on export credits and guarantees after a Jackson-Vanik waiver is granted. – There is a lot of work to do to meet this agenda and Nick you will need to work with Jim Baker, Bob Mosbacher, Clayton and Carla to make sure that we are ready for 1990. – We have even tighter timelines on arms control: – We must meet the commitments that I made to Gorbachev to fill gaps in our arms control positions and be ready to engage in intense negotiations with Moscow on the unresolved issues. – I do not want inertia in the U.S. bureaucracy to be the cause of slippage in these timelines before the 1990 Summit. – I look to each of you to play sustained, active personal roles to insure that high quality work gets done on time. – I need to be able to make the necessary decisions so that we are well prepared for the upcoming Ministerials and the Summit. – Obviously, we are not going to cave in on issues that are important to our security but I want to be sure that we make our best effort to get this done. – I proposed to Gorbachev that we accelerate the START process in order to resolve all substantive issues and to conclude a treaty, if possible, by the 1990 Summit. – When Jim Baker meets with Shevardnadze less than eight weeks from now, they are to work out agreements on ALCMs, non-deployed missiles and telemetry encryption. 88

– We also promised to table a position on most of the START issues by the time of that meeting and on all of them by the time of the next Ministerial. – The agenda for chemical weapons and CFE is equally ambitious. – I proposed speeding achievement of a chemical weapons ban and offered to end U.S. production of binary weapons when the multilateral convention on chemical weapons enters into force, in return for Soviet acceptance of the terms of our UN proposal to ban chemical weapons. – I suggested that we sign an agreement at the 1990 Summit to destroy U.S. and Soviet chemical weapons down to 20 percent of the current U.S. level. – I proposed completing work on the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) for signature at the 1990 Summit. – Finally, I suggested that the U.S. and the Soviet Union support holding a CFE Summit to sign a CFE Treaty in 1990. – I have asked Brent to develop a detailed work program and some ideas for the best way to organize ourselves to meet these timelines. – He will be getting both the work program and the ideas to you shortly. [Source: National Security Council, obtained through FOIA F-93-1217 by the National Security Archive.]

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Document No. 17: Chernyaev Diary January 2, 1990

In this diary excerpt, Gorbachev’s senior foreign policy adviser reflects on the legacy of the Malta summit, since in the press of events he had not managed to write down his commentary. A month later, the main point about Malta for Chernyaev is the “normal” feel of the summit, the shared understanding that the Soviet Union and the United States were now partners and neither would attack the other. Therefore, the threat of nuclear war was a thing of the past, as was the Cold War itself. Chernyaev sees Gorbachev making an intentional effort at Malta to discard this old reality of a Soviet threat, of the “terror” projected by the Soviet Union in Europe through its invasions and repressions. In Malta, according to Chernyaev, Gorbachev and Bush “gave hope to all humanity.”

January 2, 1990. Glancing at my last diary entry, I realized that there was not a word about M.S.’s visit to Italy, nor the Pope, nor Malta. […] So: we were in Italy on November 24-30th, then Malta—on the ship “Maxim Gorky” from November 30th to December 2nd. […] What is this? In the past we did not know and could not understand to what terror we subjected Europe with our military might, our 1968, our Afghanistan, and the shock the Europeans felt after we installed the SS-20s. We did not want to know this: we were demonstrating socialism’s power. And now Gorby has removed this terror. The country [USSR] appeared to be normal, even unfortunate. This is it! This is why now Gorbachev is not only the “man of the year” but also the “man of the decade.” Again and again: with our revolutions we give more to others than to ourselves. We arrived at Malta at night, and again we were met with pandemonium by the Palace in honor of Gorby’s visit. About Malta—Gorbachev-Bush. A lot has been written on this “event of the century,” about everything related to it. Arbatov, who hates expenditures on naval forces, expressed himself in his sarcastically-Jewish manner: I told you that the naval forces are useless, plus the rightness of “Socialist Realism” (this is regarding the fact that we provided the ship “Maxim Gorky.” Initially the plan was to conduct the meetings in turn on the American frigate and our cruiser, but a storm got in the way. We had to conduct the talks on our ship). Now, getting to the point. Despite the sensational nature of the event, I did not for a second feel aspiration. To me (maybe because I am tired, constantly worried not to forget or miss something) it seemed like a regular, normal affair… M.S. acted like he and Bush were old pals—frank and simple, and openly well-intentioned. 90

M.S. knows that the negotiations over how many missiles we cut back today or tomorrow are not the deciding factor. The deciding factor is that the USSR and U.S. are no longer enemies. This is the most important thing.47 Khrushchev also wanted this, but ideology got in the way. He wanted to win the “war” in favor of socialism and to bury capitalism, without starting a war or spilling a drop of blood. M.S. does not believe in any ideology. He often says: are we supposed to shoot at each other because we believe in different gods? This is not just a funny metaphor, it is his true conviction. He knows that nobody will start a war against us. There is no real military threat. We need the army for the superpower prestige, and internally because there is nothing we can do with it right now. It has turned into an organic burden on society. There are more marshals and generals in Moscow than in the rest of the world! This is a political and social problem. It is fine that Arbatov and “Ogonek”48 are yelping at Yazov and Akhromeyev and tearing at their coattails, they’re in a good spot! But what is it like for Gorbachev with this horde and armada! In a word, Gorbachev played up the symbolism so beloved by people in the West to do away with the “Soviet threat.” Truly, it is unlikely that anybody believes in it anymore, except for the most unenlightened… For in reality it does not exist while there is Gorbachev and perestroika. Both of them (M.S. and Bush) truly looked “good” together—and gave hope to all of humanity. […] [Source: Diary of Anatoly Chernyaev, Manuscript on file at the National Security Archive. Translated by Anna Melyakova.]

 Emphasis in the original. [Editors] An illustrated weekly magazine and key glasnost outlet, with a progressive editor, Vitaly Korotich. [Editors]

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Chapter 2

THE WASHINGTON AND CAMP DAVID SUMMIT, 1990

The Washington summit at the end of May and early June 1990 showcased the

American president, George H.W. Bush, at his most statesmanlike, and the Soviet president, Mikhail Gorbachev, on the downward slope of what would be, for him and for hopes of reform in the Soviet Union, a “truly tragic” year.1 Gorbachev for the first time appeared at a superpower summit as supplicant rather than equal, implicitly seeking American economic help (his aides would do so explicitly), and practically begging Bush to proceed with the long-stalled “most favored nation” trade agreement. This would require the American leader to overrule his top advisers and his domestic opposition, which took exception to Soviet strong-arm tactics against the dissident Baltic republics. Yet Bush would do so, at the last minute of the summit, and Soviet coercion of Lithuania would ease; but Bush would get little credit for his statesmanship, and Gorbachev would see little aid—the benefits of the trade agreement would take years to flow, and by then the Soviet Union was no more.2 The most memorable moment for the American side at the Washington summit centered on Gorbachev’s apparent agreement to German self-determination, not only on unification but on alliances—meaning NATO membership. According to both the Russian- and English-language transcripts, Gorbachev twice affirmed the Helsinki Final Act principle that nations have the right to choose their own alliances—the second time under direct questioning from Bush, whose aides passed him notes pressing him to ask and ask again.3 Meanwhile, the Soviet delegation practically erupted against Gorbachev going beyond his brief, especially the official holding the German portfolio, Valentin Falin, and the general secretary’s top military aide, Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev. In the Bush-Scowcroft memoir, Bush remarks, “It was an unbelievable scene, the likes of which none of us had ever seen before—virtually open rebellion against a Soviet leader.”4 Subsequently, the literature would make extravagant claims for the importance of the summit, especially in accounts written by American insiders. National Security Council staffers Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, for example, called the summit “a turning point. From this time on, Gorbachev never again

 Anatoly Chernyaev, Diary “Afterword 1990,” p. 78. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/ NSAEBB317/chernyaev_1990.pdf. 2  Grachev, Gorbachev’s Gamble, pp. 202–204. 3  Document No. 29. 4  Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 283. 1

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voiced adamant opposition to Germany’s presence in NATO.”5 Their colleague (and analytical competitor) Robert Hutchings went even further in his narrative, writing, “The Bush-Gorbachev Summit thus emerged as the most important U.S.-Soviet meeting ever held. It was a summit essentially unlike any that had gone before.”6 Even foreign authors who have made careers out of questioning the Amerocentric narrative of the end of the Cold War echo this “turning point” line of thinking, most notably the French historian Frederic Bozo in his Mitterrand-centric account.7 Perhaps it was the unanimity of the Americans present (who got their versions to the public before the Soviets did), the vividness of the scene (Gorbachev’s aides in rebellion), the striking quotes in the Bush-Scowcroft memoir (published 14 years before the American memcon was declassified), that took even the best historians’ eyes off the main event of German unification—the West German negotiations with Gorbachev. Helmut Kohl was the lone holdout on the “turning point” thesis. When Bush excitedly called Kohl during the summit to let him know about the Gorbachev concession, Kohl seemed less than impressed. Zelikow and Rice concluded that Kohl “had not caught the point about Gorbachev’s conceding Germany’s right to choose to be in NATO,” even though Bush kept pressing it. “It was if the information was so startling that, even if Bush put a headline on it, it simply did not register.”8 However, a close reading of the telcon shows Kohl well understood the point, but also knew that much more would need to be done, especially financially. Kohl’s actual response to Bush was: “Precisely. We believe that. But we still have to change his mind. George, I think the economic side is more important.”9 Those watching American television would have seen Gorbachev himself make this point. Emerging from the White House on May 31, 1990, the Soviet leader held an impromptu press conference for the cameras. He said the U.S.Soviet differences over Germany had “somewhat narrowed,” but “I think it is not here that the German question will be resolved.”10 The foreign ministers would need to take up the discussion, Gorbachev said. But what he meant was that the Soviets would pursue it with Kohl. Within days of the summit, this more sober reality had sunk in. Washington’s classified briefing paper sent to U.S. embassies afterwards advised: “It is not  Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, p. 283.  Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War, p. 131. But Hutchings is too scrupulous a scholar to sustain this argument and by the end of this section of his book he consigns the summit to the status of “essential backdrop for the dramatic meeting in the Caucasus between Kohl and Gorbachev,” p. 137. 7  Bozo, Mitterrand, the End of the Cold War, and German Unification, p. 254. 8  Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, p. 281. 9  Kohl-Bush telcon, June 1, 1990. https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/199006-01-Kohl.pdf. 10  Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, p. 221. 5 6

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clear what Gorbachev’s acceptance of the principle of freedom of choice means in practice.” Far from a turning point, the paper noted, “no breakthroughs were made” on Germany, and while “Gorbachev did not object” when Bush “said in his press conference that the alliance membership was a matter for the Germans to decide, consistent with the Helsinki Final Act,” “Soviet thinking seems still to be in flux and characterized by many internal contradictions.”11 There was quite a backstory to Gorbachev’s self-determination stance. After all, his speech at the United Nations in December 1988 had emphasized “freedom of choice” as a “universal principle to which there should be no exceptions”—a focal point of what he intended to be an “anti-Fulton” manifesto (referring to Winston Churchill’s “iron curtain” speech at Fulton, Missouri).12 The persuasive reconstruction by German scholar Wolfgang Mueller of the stages of Gorbachev’s thinking and acquiescence on Germany begins with the oftenoverlooked Soviet-FRG Joint Declaration from Gorbachev’s Bonn visit in June 1989, which explicitly confirmed that all peoples should be free to choose their political and economic system. Mueller calls this a “time bomb under the communist regimes of Eastern Europe, including the GDR.”13 In effect, Gorbachev simultaneously entertained multiple and often contradictory notions around the German question; his agreement in January and February 1990 for German selfdetermination on unification was a key step towards his agreement in May–July 1990 for German freedom of choice on NATO membership, just as his willingness to accept the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 represented an earlier stage of this same “new thinking.”14 Gorbachev’s discussions with Secretary of State James Baker and then Chancellor Kohl in February 1990 have given rise to much controversy about the subsequent NATO expansion in the 1990s, centering on Baker’s assurance that “not an inch of NATO’s present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction.”15 But in both conversations, Gorbachev made it clear that “Germans themselves should decide their own future.” Baker had assured the Soviet leader of American prudence and restraint, allowing for all kinds of conditions (special treatment of the eastern zone, for example), and Kohl had come away convinced the Soviets would go along with unification, if financial aid was forthcoming. The transcripts from both the German and Soviet sides in February 1990 shows Gorbachev accepting not just U.S. troops in Europe as contributing to stability  “Briefing Allies on Washington Summit,” U.S. Department of State to U.S. Embassies in NATO Capitals, Tokyo, Seoul, Canberra, Cable 193849, June 15, 1990. 12  See Savranskaya, Blanton and Zubok, eds., Masterpieces of History, pp. 311–312. 13  Wolfgang Mueller, “The USSR and the Reunification of Germany, 1989–90,” p. 326, in Mueller, Gehler, Suppan, eds., The Revolutions of 1989: A Handbook. 14  See Svetlana Savranskaya, “The Logic of 1989,” in Savranskaya, Blanton and Zubok, eds., Masterpieces of History, especially pp. 32–38. 15  See Thomas Blanton, “U.S. Policy and the Revolutions of 1989,” in Savranskaya, Blanton and Zubok, eds., Masterpieces of History, pp. 93–96. 11

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(as Gorbachev had conveyed to Bush at Malta in 1989), but some form of NATO membership for a united Germany, under a series of conditions that might even include joining the Warsaw Pact as well.16 Back in Washington, Scowcroft and his staff were alarmed. The West German foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher (an often prickly coalition partner and rival of Kohl), had proposed on January 31 that a unified Germany would remain in NATO but with the eastern territory excluded, and that both NATO and the Warsaw Pact would fade into the overall Helsinki structure, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Scowcroft worried that Baker was “inadvertently aiding and abetting” Genscher, implicitly acceding to the dissolution of NATO, and that Kohl would agree to any deal if he got Moscow’s acceptance of unification, including a French-style NATO arrangement outside the military command structure. So the Americans invited Kohl (excluding Genscher) to Camp David—President Bush’s dacha—with the aim, in Bush’s words, to “keep Germany on the NATO reservation.”17 These February 24–25, 1990, discussions with Kohl essentially cemented what historian Mary Elise Sarotte has termed the “prefab” solution to the German question.18 Kohl summed up the situation this way: “The Soviets are negotiating. But this may end up as a matter of cash. They need money.” Yet the Americans didn’t offer a dime at Camp David. Bush responded, “What worries me is talk that Germany must not stay in NATO. To hell with that. We prevailed and they didn’t. We can’t let the Soviets clutch victory from the jaws of defeat.” Kohl repeated his point: “There will be concerns for the Soviets if Germany remains in NATO, for their security. And they will want to get something in return.” To which Bush replied: “You’ve got deep pockets” (implying the U.S. did not and would not).19 When President Bush called Gorbachev on February 28, after Kohl’s trip to Washington, he told the Soviet leader, “The Chancellor and I agreed that the unified Germany should remain in NATO; that American troops will remain in Europe as long as the Europeans want them; and that there needs to be a special status for the former territory of the GDR.” Gorbachev responded, “I must disappoint you—we do not yet have a common understanding with Chancellor Kohl.... Why do Western countries want to incorporate them into one alliance? If we find that this would negatively effect [sic] the Soviet Union, we would have to think long and hard about it.”20 Note the indeterminacy of this response, a step

 See Gorbachev’s memcon with Baker and Baker’s letter to Kohl, both on February 9, 1990, in Savranskaya, Blanton and Zubok, eds., Masterpieces of History, pp. 675–687. 17  Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, pp. 236, 243, 250. 18  Sarotte, 1989, pp. 195–214. The phrase “prefab model” appears on p. 200. 19  Document No. 21. 20  Document No. 22. 16

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back from Gorbachev’s “unacceptable” phrasing to Baker during their discussion earlier in February about any possible expansion of NATO eastward. Gorbachev did keep using the word “unacceptable” (to East German delegations in February and March, and the Pope in April)21 and the phrase “we cannot accept” Germany solely in NATO (to Baker in May) both before and after the pivotal March 18 elections in East Germany.22 Similarly, the Politburo’s instructions for the summit reiterated that “it would be politically and psychologically unacceptable for us to see a united Germany in NATO.”23 There would be outbursts all spring, driven by Gorbachev’s own frustrations and the rising tide of Soviet military and conservative bitterness at the loss of Stalin’s empire. One Moscow discussion in early May 1990 featured Gorbachev blustering about cutting off all arms control talks to prevent German unification. “Do not let Germany into NATO and that’s that! I will risk breaking the Vienna negotiations, if it comes to that.” Chernyaev had to write his boss to remind him of his own goals, which were: not to make an enemy of Germany (key to any Soviet economic future), encourage European integration, and stop worrying about Cold War notions of security. Chernyaev points out that even if Poland was in NATO (this is May 1990), it would not really threaten Soviet security.24 The key moment for German unification happened on March 18, 1990, when the East Germans surprised most observers by voting for Kohl’s Christian Democrats and his offered deutschmarks. By that point, events on the ground were driving the process. And the speed with which reunification proceeded in 1990 overwhelmed any “common home” ideas. Even French President François Mitterrand, no fan of a unified Germany, saw that reality clearly enough to have a “brutal” conversation with Gorbachev when he visited Moscow on May 25. The French leader disabused Gorbachev of the dual alliance “fantasy” (Germany in both NATO and the Warsaw Pact) and told him they could not “forbid unified Germany from choosing its alliances as agreed in Helsinki.”25 The problem for Gorbachev was how to avoid the scenario requested by Margaret Thatcher in September 1989, that Moscow prevent German unification “with our hands” (Chernyaev’s phrase), showing no fingerprints from Downing Street or elsewhere. Remarkably, Thatcher told Gorbachev that Bush did not want unification either—an interesting message in the context of the “Europe  Gorbachev, Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 19, p. 262, Gorbachev letter to the Pope, April 14, 1990. 22  See William Taubman, Gorbachev (Norton, 2016 forthcoming), author’s manuscript, Ch. 15, p. 12. 23  Politburo Instructions, May 16, 1990, Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI), Fond 89, Opis 10, doc 61. 24  Chernyaev memo to Gorbachev, May 4, 1990; Anatoly Chernyaev’s diary, 1990, May 5 entry, p. 29. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB317/chernyaev_1990.pdf. 25  Bozo, Mitterrand, the End of the Cold War, and German Unification, p. 253. 21

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whole and free” rhetoric—but by December 1989 Kohl and the evident collapse of the GDR had changed Bush’s mind.26 By February 1990, Bush would write in his diary, “Thatcher now has much more concern about a unified Germany than about a Soviet threat.”27 But Gorbachev, urged on by Chernyaev and Shevardnadze, clearly saw Germany as the door to European integration, and as the Soviet Union’s most important economic partner. Andrei Grachev astutely observed, “[a]ll the attempted bargaining [by Gorbachev] about the final formula for German association with NATO was therefore much more a question of form than serious content; Gorbachev was trying to gain needed time in order to let public opinion at home adjust to the new reality, to the new type of relations that were taking shape in the Soviet Union’s relations with Germany as well as with the West in general. At the same time he was hoping to get at least partial political compensation from his Western partners for what he believed to be his major contribution to the end of the Cold War.”28 Ultimately, time ran out on Gorbachev, and the only compensation in sight came from West Germany. Kohl had won a great deal of good will in Moscow as early as January 1990, when he responded quickly to a plea from Shevardnadze through Kohl’s top aide, Horst Teltschik, for food aid during a harsh Russian winter. Within three weeks, some 52,000 tons of German canned beef (plus pork, butter, milk powder and cheese) were on their way to Moscow.29 When a similar plea for a loan came from Shevardnadze in April, Teltschik launched a secret mission to Moscow on May 13 with two top German bankers, and the Kohl government organized an immediate government-guaranteed loan of five billion DM.30 Financial aid would come up over and over during 1990, although the NATO issue would dominate discussions. The Americans had worked with Kohl (and with NATO secretary-general Manfred Woerner) to repackage, creatively, a series of nine assurances for Moscow about reforming NATO, limiting German military strength, speeding up arms reductions, and addressing Soviet security concerns. They also set the dates for the next NATO summit (July 5–6) so that announcement of the new NATO posture would help Gorbachev during his Party Congress.31 When Baker went to Moscow for meetings with Shevardnadze on May 17 and with Gorbachev the next day, the American did not repeat Bush’s formulation to Shevardnadze on April 6: “a Europe whole and free, or as you call  See Blanton and Savranskaya, “Thatcher’s Foreign Policy ‘Failure,’” Foreignpolicy.com, April 9, 2013; and Savranskaya and Blanton, eds., The Thatcher-Gorbachev Conversations, National Security Archive electronic briefing book No. 422, April 13, 2013, http:// nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB422/. 27  Bush, All the Best, George Bush, p. 460. 28  Grachev, Gorbachev’s Gamble, pp. 157–158. 29  Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name, pp. 350–351, quoting the Teltschik memoir. 30  Sarotte, 1989, p. 159. 31  Sarotte, 1989, pp. 161–163. 26

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it, a common European home. A[n] idea that is very close to our own.”32 Instead, Baker dismissed the common home concept as “a wonderful dream, but only a dream.” Gorbachev insisted that Germany should follow the example of France—in NATO but with independent command—and if the Soviets could not persuade the Americans on this, “then I will say to the President that we want to enter NATO. After all, you said that NATO wasn’t directed against us, you said it was a new Europe, so why shouldn’t we apply?” Baker deflected any such idea, kept coming back to the role of NATO as a restraint on Germany, and rolled out the nine assurances, in which “not one inch eastward” had turned into merely a delayed transition period for NATO troops in the territory of the former GDR.33 Without mentioning any quid pro quo, Gorbachev asked Baker for U.S. financial support. According to the American notes, Gorbachev said, “I think the best way to put it is that we need some oxygen. We are not asking for a gift. We are asking for a loan; we are asking for specifically targeted loans for specific purposes.... What I will say to the President is that we’re going to need 15 to 20 billion dollars to tide us over.” Look at the peace dividend, Gorbachev urged: “If we reach agreements on arms reductions we will both save a substantial amount of resources and money. [But] now we are in a special situation.”34 The Soviet notes agree with the specifics jotted down by the Americans, but contain a much longer discussion, including Gorbachev listing examples of Defense Ministry enterprises that could quickly convert to producing consumer goods.35 The bad news for Gorbachev came from Baker—that the U.S. could not finalize the trade deal giving MFN status to the USSR when the Supreme Soviet had not passed emigration reform, and Moscow retained an embargo on rebellious Lithuania. Of course, less than a week later, on May 24, Bush would announce renewal of MFN for China, despite the butchery at Tiananmen Square. Gorbachev did not repeat the loan plea himself during the Washington summit. It was of course humiliating to fundraise when he sought to be an equal, but getting at least the trade deal came first. Later, at the end of the summit at Camp David, the subject would come up again, though not from Gorbachev directly. Shevardnadze’s rival and rising star, Yevgeny Primakov, told Baker aide Dennis Ross that the Soviet Union would need aid of “about 60 billion during the three-year period” or $20 billion per year.36 But the Americans had no intention of ponying up, despite Kohl’s urging. The Americans always had their reasons, ranging from the underwhelming economic reform plans, to the continuing Soviet subsidy for Cuba, to the lingering legal issue over U.S. property expropriated in 1918, to lack of action on emigration laws, to their own budget deficits. Kohl was the one with “deep pockets,” as Bush remarked to him in February.  Document No. 23.  Document No. 25. 34  Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 273. 35  Document No. 25. 36  Grachev, Gorbachev’s Gamble, p. 205, quoting his interview with Primakov. 32 33

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Going into the Washington summit, Gorbachev was on a downward slide. The instructions from his Politburo show real constraints on his usual improvisational style, and even the makeup of the Soviet delegation reflected conservative influence, as officers from the General Staff joined every arms control negotiation. The astute U.S. ambassador in Moscow, Jack Matlock, warned Washington that Gorbachev was “less a man in control and more an embattled leader.”37 The growing conflict between Moscow and the dissident Baltic republics especially weakened Gorbachev, and forced him into a difficult “balancing act” between threats of force or just politico-economic pressure, and between his own reform commitments and pushback from his conservatives.38 The incoherence of the various Soviet economic reform plans was on full view just before Gorbachev arrived in Washington. In April, he had announced he would use his expanded presidential powers to institute major economic reform, based on a plan authored by economist Leonid Abalkin, which included significant privatization moves as well as banking and tax changes. But when the official program was actually launched on May 23, Gorbachev’s own prime minister, Nikolay Ryzhkov—“in an act of folly or of deliberate sabotage”39—blew up the program by previewing large price increases, including a three-fold rise in the price of bread scheduled for July 1. The resulting panic buying, hoarding, and shortages led the Supreme Soviet to reject the plan in June. More importantly, this moment marked the inflection point between the Center’s declining ability to manage the economy and the growing power of the “red directors” (enterprise managers), the republics, and the black marketeers to control resources for their own benefit. As the Center’s power declined, the whole Soviet economy was contracting. What had been low rates of growth in the late 1980s (slightly more than 1 percent per year) dropped by the end of 1990 to negative growth in all the indexes, most importantly agricultural output (down 3 percent) and industrial production (down 5 percent).40 Yet these were marginal declines in 1990 (they would get much larger by 1992); the larger crisis was not in production, but in distribution, where the factory managers and the black market operators in the growing shadow economy systematically privatized (that is, stole) state resources.41 Then, while Gorbachev was in the air flying to Washington, his critic and rival, Boris Yeltsin, won election as head of the new Russian Supreme Soviet, over Gorbachev’s choices. This political watershed established a Russian nationalist base that would ultimately become the key factor in dissolving the Soviet Union in 1991.42 Gorbachev’s policy choices were constricting under pressure  Document No. 24.  Grachev, Gorbachev’s Gamble, p. 202. 39  Garthoff, The Great Transition, p. 422. 40  Ibid., pp. 418–419. 41  Reddaway and Glinski, The Tragedy of Russia’s Reforms, pp. 264–270. 42  The most useful and comprehensive discussion of the Yeltsin-Gorbachev rivalry may be found in O’Clery, Moscow, December 25, 1991. 37 38

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against reform from the conservatives, and under attack from Yeltsin for not reforming enough. Retrenchment on the Soviet side found its echo in the United States. Baker and Shevardnadze at the beginning of the year had agreed on 80 percent cuts in both countries’ chemical weapons arsenals, and expected to wrap up the START treaty for signing at the Washington summit. But the U.S. military—especially the Navy—refused to go along with any on-site inspections to verify strategic arms reductions, or limits on cruise missiles, thus turning on its head President Reagan’s maxim, “trust but verify.” Bush signed National Security Directive 40, “Decisions on START Issues,” just before the summit, and locked in delay. The very first decision in NSD 40, to protect the “Tacit Rainbow” program, illuminated the problem. Tacit Rainbow, at the time of this directive still in development and not yet in production, was intended to be a jet-powered minidrone that could hover over enemy targets (assuming massive air attacks were on their way), wait for enemy radar to light up, then destroy those air-defense radars. This system would be cancelled in 1991 before even entering production in part because of cost overruns and also because of audit findings that decoys would be more effective against ground radars. Yet the hard line taken by U.S. START negotiators attempting to leave open this kind of U.S. option for developing non-nuclear cruise missiles added years of delay on overall cuts in strategic weapons. Likewise, the language on submarine-launched cruise missiles—allowing 875–1000 of them to be deployed without any on-board verification procedures—was more the product of U.S. military service rivalries for new weapons systems than any real assessment of U.S. national security. After all, many more U.S. cities were on the coasts and thus vulnerable to Soviet SLCMs than were Soviet cities vulnerable to U.S. SLCMs—a zero option would have made the U.S. more secure.43 The overall atmosphere of crisis had been building all spring. The March 11 declaration of independence by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet drew a severe response from Moscow, including an oil and gas embargo. Bush White House files are full of memos and intelligence reports tracking Soviet pressure tactics and Baltic assertions of sovereignty, and the public debate in the U.S. assumed there would be some kind of punishment—i.e., sanctions—on the Soviet Union. However, Bush chose to use quiet persuasion, telling Gorbachev there was no chance of the MFN trade deal as long as Moscow was pressuring the Baltics. Condoleezza Rice recalled Bush was “afraid to light a match in a gas-filled room” and saw Gorbachev’s survival as the best insurance policy against a crackdown. But the characteristically outrageous Lithuanian president, Vytautas Landsbergis, lashed out at Bush’s decision not to impose sanctions or cancel the summit (“this

 National Security Directive 40, “Decisions on START Issues,” May 16, 1990, released by the U.S. Department of State under FOIA; see also Garthoff, The Great Transition, p. 424.

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is Munich”) as if Gorbachev were Hitler; and columnist George Will cuttingly wrote that “Bushism is Reaganism minus the passion for freedom.”44 Just before the summit, Bush ruminated in his diary, “I didn’t feel we had as many positive accomplishments as I had hoped. There was too much unfulfilled agenda ... enormous problems facing Gorbachev.... The man had accomplished an unbelievable amount and we should feel very lucky for that.” The Soviets and Gorbachev “needed face and standing, although everything around them was falling to pieces—their empire and their economy, and now their union. I was trying to give them that standing and face without knuckling under or acquiescing in some of their wilder plans, or giving in on issues crucial to us. We couldn’t hand them the $20 billion of financing they wanted unless they made deep economic reforms—and even then we didn’t have the money.”45 Standing and face would take the place of actual financial assistance. As NSC staffer Hutchings wrote, “Gorbachev needed a successful summit, and we meant to give him one.”46 The summit featured lots of ceremonial flourishes, including the “most glittering state dinner of the year,” 21-gun artillery salutes, and lunches with Hollywood actors Gregory Peck and Jane Fonda along with science fiction author Isaac Asimov. After a couple of days at the White House, the Bushes hosted the Gorbachevs at the Camp David dacha, where the Soviet leader tried his hand at steering a golf cart and his first (and very successful) horseshoe game.47 The substance often turned out to be more difficult than the ceremony. For instance, Gorbachev raised the issue of the trade deal during the early sessions, only to hear again how impossible it would be. Bioweapons was another sticking point. One key moment of that discussion at Camp David does not appear in any of the transcripts, but was described afterwards by Gorbachev. Bush took Gorbachev aside, “just the two of us and my interpreter,” to press the Soviet leader. Bush said that according to the CIA the Soviet Union had not complied with its international agreements on bioweapons and had not destroyed all its production facilities. Gorbachev responded that the KGB reported the mirror image to him about U.S. facilities, so “[l]et us have mutual verification. Let your people come to our weapons facilities, we also know where your facilities are, and we will come to your country.”48 In part, this was just a deflection, since U.S. and British intelligence had hard data from two defectors about the extent of the Biopreparat empire and the deceptions by the Soviet Union. In part, Gorbachev himself had been lied to by his

 See Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Era, pp. 403-404; Naftali, George H.W. Bush, p. 92, for the George Will quote. 45  Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, pp. 276–277. 46  Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War, pp. 132–133. 47  See Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Era, pp. 412–430, for the summary by the Washington Post’s chief diplomatic correspondent (state dinner description on p. 418). 48  Hoffman, The Dead Hand, p. 350. 44

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own top officials.49 And in part, the response represented the perpetual Soviet urge for parity, respect, mutuality. Yet even such mutual inspections would hardly allay Soviet suspicions because the line was a fine one between bioweapons research intended to defend against offensive use, and research that could lead to launching an attack. And the Soviets feared inspections at locations like Stepnogorsk in Kazakhstan, where gigantic fermenters lay in wait, ready to crank out anthrax spores at the first sign of war with the West, thus revealing Soviet deception on a massive scale. Of course, U.S. hands were hardly clean. A CIA disinformation campaign indicating continued U.S. biowar efforts even after President Nixon’s decision to abolish the program in 1969 certainly stoked Soviet fears and helped enable the military-industrial complex in building Biopreparat.50 Despite the occasional bumps, candor and the commonality of geopolitical positions often fairly leap from the summit’s transcripts. The nearly all-day conversation at Camp David on June 2 covered the waterfront of global issues, including remarkably compatible views on Afghanistan, where both leaders worried about radical Islamic elements and sought a Nicaragua-style solution of elections—“the problem is how to get the Resistance plugged in.”51 Similarly, both Bush and Gorbachev expressed frustration with Israel over the settlements in occupied territories, and shared views on India-Pakistan, South Africa, the Koreas, and even some interest on the U.S. side in Gorbachev playing the mediator role in reaching out to Fidel Castro. Even the MFN problem found a solution when Bush rose to the occasion. Frustrated by the formal deliberations, Gorbachev finally remonstrated with Bush personally: “After the state dinner, Gorby got me in the hall and said if we didn’t have a trade agreement, it would be a disaster—it would be terrible—repeated: a disaster. He was very agitated, and almost acted like he had not received the letter I wrote....”52 Unexpectedly, Bush decided to go for it. He agreed to Soviet MFN status, adding a secret codicil contingent on Moscow entering into a dialogue with Lithuania, and a public condition that the Supreme Soviet pass the emigration reform. The American bureaucracy was so unready for the moment that the leaders had to wait while the MFN documents were hustled together and prepared for signing. The result was the summit’s signal accomplishment. Otherwise, the meetings did not feature much of substance, other than signing the

 Ibid., p. 346. Also L. Zaikov to M. Gorbachev, “To the President of the USSR: Report on Biological Weapons,” May 15, 1990, Document 1, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/ NSAEBB528-Kazakhstan-Nunn-Lugar-Non-Proliferation-Success/. 50  Leitenberg and Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, pp. 400–406. 51  Document No. 32. 52  Bush, All the Best, George Bush, pp. 471–472. The April 29, 1990, letter to Gorbachev is on pp. 467–469, in which Bush explains the Congress would never pass the trade deal unless the Lithuania crisis is settled through dialogue, and that he, Bush, would “not be able to recommend approval” either. 49

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chemical weapons deal that cut each side’s arsenals by 80 percent even before completion of the international convention that would ban them all.53 The public view of the Washington summit focused on the ceremonial success and the evident comfort levels on both sides. But there was a huge difference between the summit’s reception in the U.S. and in Europe versus that in the Soviet Union. While Gorbachev played horseshoes, back home the economic reform program had crashed and burned. Matlock reported from Moscow that news of the summit could hardly “compete with concerns over food supplies and the election of Yeltsin....”54 And on the substantive issues outstanding—Germany’s membership in NATO or the possibility of Western financial support for Gorbachev—these would only be addressed in meetings later that summer, at the NATO summit in London on July 5–6, the G-7 summit in Houston on July 9, and Helmut Kohl’s sit-down with Gorbachev in Moscow and in the Caucasus in July. After Gorbachev saw Margaret Thatcher just after the Washington summit, on June 8 in the Kremlin, Thatcher’s aide, Charles Powell, reported: “The main interest of the meeting lay in Gorbachev’s views on Germany and NATO which are obviously still evolving. At no stage did he say that a united Germany in NATO was unacceptable. He appeared rather to be reaching round for ways to make this more palatable and explicable to his own people.”55 Gorbachev himself told Thatcher he “quite seriously and realistically understood” Bush’s point of view: “His reasoning seemed to be that without a unified Germany in NATO, there would be no NATO: without NATO, there would be no United States forces in Europe: and without that, the United States would have no political influence.”56 In turn, the subsequent NATO summit’s restatement of its strategy away from “forward defense,” its pledge that nuclear weapons would only be a “last resort,” its “non-aggression” stance toward members of the Warsaw Pact, all gave Moscow assurance that NATO was changing and no longer a threat to the USSR. The Americans took care to give Shevardnadze an advance copy of the NATO communiqué, and the Soviet foreign minister rushed out his positive assessment just in time for Gorbachev to use it in his successful domination of the Party Congress (including pre-empting Marshal Akhromeyev who was about to call the NATO language propaganda).57 Much less encouraging for Gorbachev was the G-7 summit in Houston. Even though Bush had written the Soviet leader advising him not to ask for money, Gorbachev sent a formal fundraising letter to the group, with a request for $20  Garthoff, The Great Transition, p. 426.  U.S. Embassy Moscow to U.S. Department of State, Moscow 19444, “Soviet Reactions to the Summit,” June 12, 1990. U.S. State Department, Moscow 19444, obtained through FOIA in 1997 by the National Security Archive. 55  Letter from Mr. Powell (No. 10) to Mr. Wall, June 8, 1990, No. 209 in Salmon, Hamilton and Twigge, eds., Documents on British Policy Overseas, p. 411. 56  Ibid., p. 414. 57  Grachev, Gorbachev’s Gamble, pp. 189–190. 53 54

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billion a year for three years. According to the summit memcon, Bush opened the discussion (which came right after a more positive assessment of China) by saying: “It is impossible for the U.S. to loan money to [the] USSR at this time. I know, however, that others won’t agree.”58 Immediately, Mitterrand proved the point, noting: “The Soviets will not understand our reluctance to aid Gorbachev,” we are being too “timid,” “hesitant,” “patronizing,” and “we have a chicken or egg problem—whether to provide aid first or demand reform first.” Kohl piled on: “Gorbachev’s letter represents a positive development. We should not treat it as we would a letter from the Congo.” Canada’s Brian Mulroney argued for the political gesture: if Gorbachev was “chucked out” of office “we would be in an infinitely worse position than we are today.”59 But Thatcher and Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu were with Bush, opposing aid, and the group ended up formulating a polite rejection letter to Gorbachev, offering Western experts but not money. That remained up to Kohl. Gorbachev expected his new strategic partners to share some of the “peace dividends” that perestroika had brought them, both for his own and their interests.60 But Bush thought the whole idea of a peace dividend was “weird,” as he told Kohl in February.61 The American president was busy walling off the defense budget in the infamous deal with Congressional Democrats that unread his lips on taxes. Facing budget deficits and a slowing economy, Bush agreed to new taxes as early as June (just after the summit) but he was proud of having prevented the Democrats from converting the defense budget into an ATM for domestic programs, or for foreign aid of the kind that Gorbachev was seeking.62 One Democratic senator complained about “unreconstructed old Cold Warriors [who] strap on their rusty armor and come over here on the floor and tell us, ‘Oh, no, you can’t reduce this military spending.’”63 In fact, the U.S. defense budget by this point had become completely unmoored from any realistic assessment of the security threats facing the country (there were none in Europe). Helmut Kohl was less constrained: hardly any price was too great to achieve the goal of German unification. The meetings that clinched unification and NATO membership were not with the Americans in Washington, but with the West Germans in Moscow and a village called Archyz, in the Stavropol region where Gorbachev had grown up. Kohl arrived in Moscow on July 14, and almost right away, according to Chernyaev’s real-time account: “Gorbachev confirms his agreement to unified Germany’s entry into NATO. Kohl is decisive and  Memorandum of Conversation, First Main Plenary Session of the 16th Economic Summit of Industrialized Nations, Houston, Texas, July 10, 1990 (George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, FOIA request 2000-0429-F). 59  In addition to the Memcon, see Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, p. 237. 60  Grachev, Gorbachev’s Gamble, p. 201. 61  Document No. 21: “weird thinking in our Congress today.” 62  Nelson and Perry, 41, p. 22. 63  Ibid. 58

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assertive. He leads a clean but tough game. And it is not the bait (loans) but the fact that it is pointless to resist here, it would go against the current of events, it would be contrary to the very realities that M.S. [Gorbachev] likes to refer to so much.”64 Yet the details, especially of the loans, would take more discussion at Archyz, followed by some of the most expensive phone calls in history, later in September. Only once did a Gorbachev conversation with Kohl break down—on September 7, 1990, over the price to be paid, with Kohl offering 8 billion deutschmarks and Gorbachev responding he felt “like he had fallen into a trap” and a “dead end.” By September 10, Kohl had practically doubled the previous offer, including 12 billion for troop housing and resettlement, favorable exchange rates for Soviet soldiers’ worthless holdings of East German currency, and 3 billion for Moscow in interest-free credits.65 And so the deal was done, but by then Saddam Hussein had invaded Kuwait, becoming the absolute focus of U.S. policy, and overshadowing concerns about the survival or success of Mikhail Gorbachev.

  Anatoly Chernyaev’s diary, July 15, 1990, pp. 41–42. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/ NSAEBB317/chernyaev_1990.pdf. 65  Sarotte, 1989, pp. 192–193, citing the Teltschik notes and the published German documents. 64

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Document No. 18: Memorandum from Scowcroft for the President: “Objectives for U.S.–Soviet Relations in 1990” January 1990

After the “lost year,” as Chernyaev called 1989, the Bush administration in early 1990 finally begins to focus on the opportunities in U.S.-Soviet relations. In this prescient memorandum for the president, Brent Scowcroft tells Bush that his “principal challenge” is to “engage Gorbachev.” He notes correctly that Gorbachev believes that “sophisticated diplomacy can convince his adversaries not to take advantage of him.” Yet, taking advantage of every opportunity to advance U.S. interests, which Gorbachev’s policies offer, is exactly the point of Scowcroft’s advice. He provides a good assessment of Gorbachev’s domestic troubles, including the nationalist movements in the Baltics and in the Caucasus, and the uncertain future of economic reform. But the most important developments are taking place in Europe, where the Soviets have accepted the peaceful (except for Romania) revolutions in the countries of the Warsaw Pact. Scowcroft emphasizes that the United States has to be actively involved in the German issue, but points out its special sensitivity to Gorbachev: “If there is a single external issue that might cause Moscow to reassess its course in Eastern Europe, might even bring Gorbachev down, it is the German question.” The national security adviser sees Gorbachev as Washington’s best bet for making sure the issue develops in a constructive way; he suggests that “we need to work hard to insure a successful June U.S.-Soviet summit—particularly in arms control and the economic sphere—which may boost Gorbachev’s image at home and thus his staying power.” Yet, Scowcroft is deeply skeptical about the prospects for perestroika (success would take a “miracle”) and calls on the president to concentrate on “clearer and more realistic goals: the liberation of Eastern Europe and the consolidation of pluralist rule throughout the region; and a dramatic reduction in the Soviet military threat to Europe and the United States.” Left unmentioned is the fact that these objectives have already been partially achieved due to Gorbachev’s perestroika.

This is a rare period in which we can seek to achieve a fundamental shift in the strategic balance, particularly in Europe. The future of the Soviet Union remains cloudy, but it is clearly in our interest to do what we can to prolong the tenure of the reformers—men who have inadvertently set in motion events that have put long-standing U.S. objectives regarding the Soviet Union well within our reach: freedom for Eastern Europe; a significant reduction of the Soviet military threat to the West; and the demilitarization of Soviet foreign policy in the regions. The principal challenge that you face in U.S.-Soviet relations this year is to engage Gorbachev effectively at a time when he faces mounting chaos at home; declining influence and authority in Eastern Europe; and uncertainty about the future of Russia’s traditional nemesis, Germany. Gorbachev’s sense of security 109

stems from still powerful Soviet military forces and the conviction—bordering on faith—that sophisticated diplomacy can convince his adversaries not to take advantage of him. But there are observable cracks in Moscow’s confidence about the fruits of the new foreign policy—particularly where Germany is concerned— and that Soviet insecurity is likely to grow. 1990 promises to be another very difficult year for Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership. The Soviet Union’s ills are worsening. Problems like whether the Communist Party of the Soviet Union should have a constitutionally guaranteed “leading role”—precluding fair competition with other parties; whether a command economy can be expected to produce the needed economic turnaround; whether to have private property; whether territory belonging to Azerbaijan should be transferred to Armenia; whether the Baltic states—and other republics—should be allowed to secede from the Union and similar issues cannot be resolved through Gorbachev’s usual jawboning and equivocation. If they continue to grow worse, they could be his undoing. Over time, the Soviet population—while appreciating his role in initiating reform—has increasingly come to see Gorbachev as ineffective and indecisive. Nationalists from Armenia and Azerbaijan to the Baltics regard him as a man without a bottom line and it is Gorbachev, not the nationalists, who has retreated in the face of repeated challenges. The saving grace for Gorbachev at this time is that he is still regarded by moderate nationalists in the Republics as their best hope for the peaceful achievement of their goal—total independence. But moderates, to say nothing of extremists, may take Gorbachev’s continuing appeasement as weakness, leading them to press even harder (as with the mass demonstrations in Lithuania when Gorbachev visits there.) That in turn will further alarm conservatives, who already see these trends as a threat to the integrity of the Union. Challenges to Gorbachev’s power will probably increase markedly in the next year. Within the last two months, Gorbachev has reportedly threatened to resign twice. The first Baltic elections in Lithuania at the end of February and the 28th Party Congress, now scheduled for October 1990, will be crucial tests for him. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

The Soviet leadership will be anxious to keep U.S.-Soviet relations moving forward. Gorbachev cannot afford, in the face of mounting failures at home, to have his foreign policy line discredited too. Objectively, the U.S.-Soviet relationship has never had better prospects from our point of view. Your meeting at Malta infused U.S.-Soviet relations with a greater sense of direction—pointing toward the June Summit. On arms control, human rights and the incipient economic agenda, there is every reason to be optimistic that the progress made in 1989 can be sustained and perhaps Moscow can even be moved to be more sensible on Central America. But it is, of course, the unraveling of communist power in Eastern Europe that has changed the strategic environment and the face of U.S.-Soviet relations. 110

Soviet domination of Eastern Europe has been the most enduring and most fundamental source of American conflict with Moscow. Thus, our central and overriding objective in 1990 should be to facilitate the continued and graduated withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Eastern Europe. A preeminent challenge, in this regard, is to help the FRG and the Soviet Union to manage their relationship. If there is a single external issue that might cause Moscow to reassess its course in Eastern Europe, might even bring Gorbachev down, it is the German question. With that much at stake for the United States, we will need to be intensively involved in the increasingly complicated diplomatic environment in Europe which will be ever more preoccupied with the future of Germany. While we can do little to affect internal Soviet politics, we should do what we can to prolong perestroika as long as Gorbachev continues to tolerate the diminution of Soviet power in Eastern Europe. If Moscow maintains its present course, it will be impossible within a few years for the Soviet Union to do anything about the changes in Eastern Europe, short of all out invasion. With this in mind, we need to work hard to insure a successful June U.S.-Soviet Summit—particularly in arms control and the economic sphere—which may boost Gorbachev’s image at home and thus his staying power. We must grasp while we can the chance for an early CFE agreement which would bring the conventional military balance into line with the new political realities in Eastern Europe. These reductions will also facilitate the orderly withdrawal of Soviet military power from the territory of its former allies. Rapid progress toward an “Open Skies” accord also would institutionalize Soviet openness on an unprecedented scale. Finally, it is important that you continue to engage Gorbachev personally while emphasizing that it is the process of perestroika, not the man, on which U.S. policy is based. As 1990 begins, the uncertainties surrounding the future of the Soviet Union and Gorbachev have only multiplied. At present, Gorbachev appears to be playing for time in the hope that, by some miracle, perestroika will succeed in creating a stable and prosperous Soviet Union. We have clearer and more realistic goals: the liberation of Eastern Europe and the consolidation of pluralist rule throughout the region; and a dramatic reduction in the Soviet military threat to Europe and the United States. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through Mandatory Review request 2011-1462-MR by the National Security Archive.]

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Document No. 19: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, 7:04 a.m. – 7:30 a.m. January 31, 1990

As rumors of new disarmament proposals from Gorbachev begin circulating in January 1990, President Bush takes Scowcroft’s advice to heart and pushes a new proposal to significantly reduce levels of conventional troops in Europe—down to 195,000 (from the presently negotiated 275,000). The rationale is to “get ahead of Gorbachev” and to preempt Congress, where “some weirdos […] who have all sorts of crazy ideas”66 about significantly cutting the U.S. presence in Europe could undermine the president’s policy to maintain substantial American force levels there. Bush wanted to announce the new initiative in his State of the Union address on January 31, which required persuading the allies and Gorbachev. Bush and Scowcroft decided to send the Eagleburger-Gates team to Europe while Bush would call the key leaders himself. On January 26 he contacted Kohl and shared his concerns about the “optics” involved. “I am persuaded that the best way to make these manpower reductions and to sustain the new force levels,” Bush said, “is within the arms control negotiating process, keeping the U.S. in Central Europe and NATO strong.”67 During discussions at the NSC, Bush wanted to break away from the principle of “symmetry” of forces and to define the number specifically for Central Europe, which would “put the Soviets at 195,000 and us at 225,000.”68 After all the allies were on board, and literally hours before the State of the Union, Bush finally called Gorbachev and informed him of the proposal he was about to announce. Not given any time for reflection and analysis, Gorbachev reacted positively, just as Bush hoped he would. However, this new position, which Gorbachev never discussed with the Soviet military, along with the underlying unequal numbers, became one more irritant for the General Staff and made the CFE Treaty more problematic for the Soviet Union when the Warsaw Pact later dissolved.

The President: Good morning. Chairman Gorbachev: Good morning, Mr. President. The President: I want to thank you for taking the call. I want to start by wishing you well. There have been wild rumors here in Washington and there are a lot of interesting events. Obviously, we cannot talk about everything on an open line but I am glad to have this chance to talk to you on an arms control matter. Chairman Gorbachev: Good. I welcome your initiative. I understand that our possibilities on this open channel are limited—so greetings and I welcome the

 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 212.  Bush-Kohl Memorandum of Conversation, January 26, 1990, Bush Presidential Library. 68  Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 211. 66 67

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chance to talk to you. As for the rumors, there are many here my country and in yours too. The President: That’s for sure. Maybe it is just best if I go through my proposal and then we can talk about it. Chairman Gorbachev: Good. The President: At Malta, our two governments agreed to place a very high priority on the early conclusion of a CFE treaty. Our common aim remains to sign the treaty this year. I have been considering ways to accelerate progress at the Vienna talks, and Jim Baker will be prepared to discuss the full range of CFE issues with Mr. Shevardnadze, including some new ideas on the aircraft proposal. The conclusion of this treaty is even more urgent today because of the hopeful and fast-moving events taking place in Eastern Europe. We need to do everything possible to make sure that the military situation reflects the new political realities. I have been examining with my advisors, and with U.S. allies, the question of the maximum number of troops that the United States and the Soviet side should have stationed on foreign territory in Europe when this CFE agreement has been fully implemented. I have come to the conclusion that the 275,000 figure is too high for both your country and mine. I hope you agree that we should set a new lower manpower ceiling for the treaty. My proposal is that we agree to drop the 275,000 figure for the U.S. and Soviet stationed forces and revise the current position on manpower in CFE to set a new ceiling for those forces at 195,000 in the Central Zone of Europe. 195,000 in the Central Zone of Europe is the proposal I will make. Tonight I will announce this proposal to the American people in a speech on the State of the Union. If the proposal is acceptable it will be a clear signal that the CFE negotiations in which we are now engaged can keep pace with the political events that are changing the continent. We have had consultations with our key allies and there is general agreement that this is a good, sound proposal. We intend to keep a substantial military presence in Europe for the foreseeable future—that is an Alliance decision—and it would hold regardless of the decisions you take about your own forces. I hope you recognize that the U.S. presence makes a helpful and important contribution to European stability. But for today, the issue is how to treat U.S. and Soviet manpower in this agreement and I believe this proposal is fair. It doesn’t push either side too fast but it shows a readiness to change. The main thing is we want to conclude the CFE agreement. I do not want this new proposal to delay our CFE negotiations in any way. But my experts think it is possible to accommodate this change and have an agreement that is a little more in line with current conditions. I will push our side and I hope you will push your side. It is a major priority of my Administration to conclude this treaty by the time we meet in June. 113

I know this is sudden but I wanted to give you the courtesy of telling you before my speech tonight. If you want to react now that’s fine or if you want to wait until you have had time to talk with your people. Well. Over to you. Chairman Gorbachev: Thank you for letting me know what you will tell Congress. Let me react to two or three points. First of all, we share your approach to the talks in the context of the changes now happening in the world and I agree that the Vienna talks—the pace and content of the Vienna talks—must keep pace with new realities. And I fully agree that we must push forward the process to live up to the hopes of the peoples of Europe. The President: Yes. Chairman Gorbachev: I believe that under no circumstances should we abandon or slow down the process. We need to work to find mutually acceptable solutions. As I understand it—your proposal envisions a new and lower ceiling. You have emphasized that the U.S. will maintain its military presence in Europe after the negotiations are completed. If I understand you, this is regardless of what the Soviet Union does. The President: Yes. Chairman Gorbachev: We’ll give it thought. But let me say that we will need to talk about the Central Zone of Europe and other zones. We’ll need to talk not just about U.S. and Soviet forces but other forces. Baker and Shevardnadze will have a lot to do. You and I will need to talk too. You can expect our cooperation—our constructive cooperation. And you can be assured that my response means that I am happy that we are keeping in touch to look at the most important problems today. I fully expect you will get more detailed answers from me or when Baker is in Moscow. Let me say that I share the spirit of your approach—we must act consistently with changes in Europe. The President: This call is interesting for me. As you were talking I was thinking that I wish we could talk more often without a fixed agenda because there are so many problems and changes to address. I just hope we can find ways to talk more often. Baker will talk with Shevardnadze and he has our full confidence and that is a useful channel. But I wish we could talk more often. I appreciate the spirit of this phone call and I wish you well. Chairman Gorbachev: Mr. President, I fully agree. I do believe that both of us feel the need for personal contact and work is underway to get a secure communications link for us that will allow us to talk more freely. Today the President of Brazil gave me a verbal message from you. Well, I want to thank you and I value these gestures from the President of the United States. Let me thank you—you are just beginning your working day and I wish you a good day. Raisa and I send our best to you and Barbara 114

The President: I want to say one more thing in substance. We have wrestled with the proper number in discussions here and with our allies. You’ll have your own ideas on that but let me say that the number was achieved after consultations with the Allies and with the military here. This number was not pulled out of the hat. We are, therefore, attached to the number. Chairman Gorbachev: Mr. President, I take note of this and assure you that we will look at it carefully and seriously. The President: I did have a good talk with the Brazilian President and I’m glad he remembered me to you. My best to Raisa. Chairman Gorbachev: Goodbye (in English). [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA request 2000-0429F by the National Security Archive.]

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Document No. 20: Memorandum of Conversation, Gates–Kryuchkov, KGB Headquarters, Moscow, 3:00 p.m. – 5:15 p.m. February 9, 1990

This extraordinary meeting between career senior CIA officer Robert Gates—now the U.S. deputy national security adviser—and head of the Soviet KGB Vladimir Kryuchkov took place in the office of the late Yuri Andropov at the infamous Lubyanka in Moscow. Gates arrived directly from a session between Gorbachev and Baker that would go on for more than three hours.69 Kryuchkov, who was appointed by Gorbachev to replace Chebrikov in October 1988, comes across as surprisingly progressive on many issues of domestic reform. He talks openly about the shortcomings and problems of perestroika, the need to abolish the leading role of the CPSU, the central government’s mistaken neglect of ethnic issues, the “atrocious” pricing system, and other domestic topics. The discussion moves on to foreign policy, in particular the German question. At the end of the meeting, Kryuchkov hands Gates a list of names of drug traffickers in Europe who are members of the Afghan opposition that is supported by the United States; he also criticizes the U.S. invasion of Panama. A year-and-a-half later, the two would become de facto adversaries again. In August 1991, Kryuchkov emerged as a leader of the coup attempt against Gorbachev. Gates, meanwhile, had become Bush’s nominee to direct the CIA, formally assuming his post in November. In his memoir, Gates described the February 1990 meeting as “formal and stiff,” and Kryuchkov as open about his “change of heart”—openly opposing Gorbachev in front of a senior American official.70 The transcript below does not mention any such shifts of allegiance or opinion. Either the record has been altered or the August coup affected Gates’ memory and interpretation of the discussion.

Kryuchkov received Gates in his office in the New KGB Building. After exchanging greetings, Gates informed Kryuchkov that he had just left the meeting between Gorbachev and Secretary Baker, which was still underway after more than three hours. Gates said that Gorbachev had been explaining what had taken place during the just concluded Central Committee plenum, joking that the latter had been so eventful that it would take all day for Gorbachev to finish. […] Kryuchkov said “of course, perestroyka is encountering problems,” and that had been reflected in the debates at the plenum. We should have planned for the changes to take place over a longer period of time, he said, because the hardest

 See Savranskaya, Blanton and Zubok, eds., Masterpieces of History, Document No. 119, pp. 675–684. 70  Gates, From the Shadows, p. 491. 69

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thing of all to change is the way people think. It takes time, especially to bring about substantial changes. We had hoped to bring about large-scale change quickly, but it was more than our people could take. Change should be applied gradually, like oxygen. Too much too quickly could make one dizzy. Nevertheless, he continued, there is no way back now. We must push ahead. We will make adjustments as we go, making sure we remain in touch with the people, checking their views and attitudes. We had to do this so the leadership would not go one way, the people the other. Kryuchkov argued that Article Six of the constitution, which gave the party the leading role in the society, need not be “eternal.” It had been inserted in the new constitution in 1977, but no longer corresponded to reality. It should be either changed or omitted entirely. Doing so would present no big problem. Its presence had spoiled the party. Party decisions were too easily turned into law. The party was not then or now equivalent to society as a whole, and neither was the Central Committee. Since the article no longer corresponded to reality, if it remained in force it could cause philosophical and practical problems. As for establishment of a multi-party system, he said, many informal organizations already exist which function like parties. Nevertheless, a multi-party structure should be introduced gradually. Standards and regulations should be established concerning registration, minimum requirements for membership, etc. A monarchist “party” now exists which wants to restore a monarchy. That obviously is not in keeping with the times, and such a party is out of place. Nevertheless, all such groups have a right to exist. There are some quite extreme groupings—anarchists, for example. Formal requirements should be put into place governing their activity. They are not, he continued, like companies. The U.S. had many companies—15 to 18 million, he understood, some of which lasted only a few days, some for decades. But parties should not be such temporary phenomena. […] For many years we should have been paying more attention to interethnic disputes. But we had this idea that everything was developing without a problem. We were wrong. In regard to Eastern Europe, we should let things take their own course, give them a chance to develop normally. But of course we could not “forget the results and costs of the war.” Kryuchkov noted that that had been a brief outline of his thinking and his presentation. He assumed that U.S. analysts would take a closer look at the latter and the results of the plenum. […] Gates said he would like to outline briefly for Kryuchkov three general problems he sees the USSR facing now. The first concerns interethnic relations. Gorbachev had inherited the problems of an Empire in this regard. Many of the regions that now made up the USSR had not joined the Empire voluntarily, but by force of arms. Many now want independence, and want it quickly. The time needed to work out a form of voluntary federation thus might not be available. Second, political developments are outrunning economic developments in the society. And the problem is that many of these economic problems need to be tackled at the same time. Moreover, many of these changes are such that they 117

require painful adjustments by the people. Thus, this process of change is indeed difficult. Third, reform is weakening the old institutions before new institutions can be put in place. The society’s ability to implement necessary change is thereby also weakened. Gates said one thing is difficult to understand, however. What has caused the recent, sharp increase in crime, especially large-scale, organized crime? There have even been reports of hijacking of trains. Kryuchkov said that Gates’ observations deserve serious study. But they represent a view from the outside. And for all of us, our analysis is supplemented by our emotional reactions. History has it uses. Gates is correct when he says that not all of the regions had incorporated themselves voluntarily. There are perhaps no parallels easily drawn between the U.S. and the USSR, but the Civil War in the U.S. indicated that not all of the fifty states had agreed to their incorporation either. History was history, but it could not by itself be allowed to be a determining factor. History could not be ignored, but “if it is put up front, it just complicates our life.” New factors always arose. In the case of the USSR, over the past seventy years, growing interdependence among the republics had increasingly tied them together, especially economically. The Baltic states, for example, got more from the rest of the Soviet Union than they gave. Estonia got cotton, oil, energy, grain, forage, non-ferrous metals, and so on. Of course it also contributed to the rest of the USSR, but not as much. The most dependent of all of the republics was Lithuania, which was paradoxical, for it is exactly there that the drive for independence is most developed. But the interdependence of all of the republics is now very strong. It had developed because of an intentional policy, the result of a conscious effort by the center to develop the outer periphery of the country. No republic can leave tomorrow without feeling this interconnection. Interdependence painfully affects the Union. Armenia now wants to shut down a plant that is polluting the area. But the plant produces something on which seven hundred fifty other plants depend. Nevertheless, there is much in what Gates had to say. Much effort has to be devoted toward developing a new federation as soon as possible. Some areas want political independence, with continuing economic interdependence. Even that possibility cannot be rejected out of hand. Concerning shortages in goods, Kryuchkov said, we in fact have increased the number of goods considerably in the past five years. The problem is the enormous increase of money in people’s hands, plus our “atrocious” pricing system. Wage and pension increases have contributed to the problem of the ruble overhang, but the main culprit is conversion of very large amounts of what in the past had been non-liquid funds—columns of figures in accounting books—to cash. In the old days if an enterprise had 50 million rubles, 40 million would have been non-liquid. Under the new system much more of it was available in cash. So now we have hundreds of billions of rubles of “bad money”—money not backed up by goods—circulating in the system. […] 118

Gates asked how Kryuchkov personally viewed prospects for reestablishing order, putting the economy on the right track, and resolving the interethnic problems. Is he a pessimist or an optimist? Kryuchkov replied that the German philosopher Berghoff had discussed the problem of pessimism and optimism in a treatise. He had concluded that a pessimist lost nothing, for if he was wrong, he simply shrugged his shoulders and no one paid attention to him. An optimist, however, staked everything on his bet, and stood to lose it all. Nevertheless, Kryuchkov continued, I am an optimist. We have no choice but to change the system, because other kinds of change in the USSR and around its borders make change in the system inevitable. It was unfortunate that some of this change had come about only after loss of life. But we should strengthen our laws to avoid such loss. And we had to continue with politicization of the people to create the need for enterprise among the people, and to transfer power to individual enterprises and local councils in order to develop responsibility at those levels. With increasing frequency this was now happening. In a number of areas around the country local citizenry or local party members have risen up against inefficient or corrupt party organs and booted the rascals out. That is encouraging, and a sign that what we want to happen is happening. […] Gates asked if the Soviet Union would permit private property—the large scale ownership of land and equity. Would peasants be able to pass land on to their children? Kryuchkov said that cooperative land-holding is now possible, and groups of 15–20 people in essence control the land they farmed. But we wish to protect our people from exploitation in the Marxist sense, when people could enrich themselves purely from the labor of others. Your political systems in the West are more sophisticated. In most countries there are two parties, liberal and conservative. After several years of moving toward the left under liberal democrats, the conservatives were voted in to provide the people a rest. A great system. Thatcher had now been in power for what—thirteen years? It was time for a change. Kryuchkov said that the question of selling land is not yet decided. There are two points of view—one for, one opposed. Peasants could not be given the land free of charge. But if they were asked to pay for it they would reply that they should not pay for something they—“the people”—already owned. The new laws on land and on property would include provision for leases unlimited in time. But people would be reluctant to leave the kolkhozes, especially the more economically stable. In Eastern Europe they would not dissolve the kolkhozes, especially in Czechoslovakia and the GDR, where there was an ideal proportion of collective and individually-owned land. Gates said he would like to pursue that issue further, but knew that Kryuchkov was busy, and would like to move on to two other subjects. First, the German question. Events are moving faster than anticipated. We might see some GDR initiative after the 18 March elections. Under these circumstances, we support the Kohl-Genscher idea of a united Germany belonging to NATO but with no expansion of military presence to the GDR. This would be in the context of continuing 119

force reductions in Europe. What did Kryuchkov think of the Kohl/Genscher proposal under which a united Germany would be associated with NATO, but in which NATO troops would move no further east than they now were? It seems to us to be a sound proposal. There are in any case only three options for a unified Germany: either it would be a member of NATO, neutral, or a member of the Warsaw Pact. Gates said that alignment with the Warsaw Pact clearly was not possible in terms of present realities. A neutral Germany would suffer from the same insecurities and uncertainties regarding its security that Germany had experienced before World War I. In an effort to assure its security it would be tempted to develop nuclear weapons and turn in different directions, seeking reassurance. A large, economically powerful Germany just could not be neutral. The third option, membership in NATO, would provide for a secure Germany integrated in Western Europe which the Soviet Union would have no reason to fear. It would anchor Germany in a way that would leave it secure, able to exercise a positive economic influence (including in the East), and without being a security problem for the USSR. Kryuchkov replied that as Gates should know, the events in the GDR concern the Soviet people. The other countries are different. But the USSR had paid a terrible price in World War II—20 million killed. “We can’t exclude that a reborn, united Germany might become a threat to Europe. We would hate to see the US and USSR have to become allies again against a resurgent Germany.” “Germany’s technical possibilities and intellectual potential are well known. It is difficult to predict what directions its military and technology might take.” That is no idle question, for “influential forces in the FRG do not wish to recognize the results of the War or to accept the post-World War II borders.” The Poles are also concerned. We never said that Germany could never reunite—but the basis on which reunification took place was always important to us. Trust between the US and USSR is growing, true, but that trust still had to be “materialized.” The Soviet Union, under present circumstances, could have “no enthusiasm” about a united Germany in NATO. We should look for other options. You, Great Britain, and France would develop a common view, and we in the Warsaw Pact would do so, and we would discuss them. We need not hurry so much. Kohl and Genscher had interesting ideas—but even those points in their proposals with which we agree would have to have guarantees. We learned from the Americans in arms control negotiations the importance of verification, and we would have to be sure. The U.S. had to participate in World War II even though it had been protected by oceans. Now the oceans were meaningless. An interdependent world would not allow any great power to escape involvement in a new war. “People here say that we have had peace for forty-five years because Germany is divided.” And of course Japan did not become a military superpower. But the question of German unity is a very serious one, and requires far-reaching, frank exchanges of opinions between the US and USSR. 120

Gates said he had two points to make on professional matters. First, Kryuchkov would have noted that Vladimir Apinidze had returned to the USSR, without any publicity. Kryuchkov nodded assent. Second, could Kryuchkov frankly state what had happened to Major General Dimitry Polyakov (“Donald”)? Kryuchkov replied that he had been shot in 1988. He added that Polyakov had “told all.” “We know everything, and you know everything.” Gates said that Kryuchkov occupied an especially responsible position at this time of momentous happenings. It was very important that our foreign ministers and heads of state met to discuss matters of mutual concern. It was also important that he and Kryuchkov be able to discuss matters in this channel. Gates said that if ever Kryuchkov believed that a special meeting was necessary, that could be arranged through existing channels. We preferred not to use the intelligence channel for political issues. And, of course, we should not meet without the knowledge of our foreign ministers. Kryuchkov nodded assent. Kryuchkov thanked Gates for his observations, which were useful, whether or not one necessarily agreed with them all. Though he was an optimist, he continued, that does not mean that he is not aware of the many problems the country faced. There is a struggle underway between those who want change and those who do not. Each side might have to make concessions. “A political climate is being formed in which on occasion certain actions might have to be taken. The external reaction would be important. It would be one thing to understand our actions, perhaps even to support us. It would be another to attempt to take advantage of our problems.” We heard nice words from you, but if there were no corresponding action—for example, development of good trade relations—your intentions would be interpreted differently. We are not asking for material assistance, “for anything free.” Our resources are such that we do not need that. Our increasing contacts with the U.S. had helped us increasingly to understand the U.S. and its foreign policy, though we could not approve of Panama, where you invaded a small country in order to try one possible criminal. Noriega may be a very evil fellow, but that was too much. On the other hand, we understand and support your struggle against narcotics trafficking. Kryuchkov then handed Gates a list of names prepared by the KGB which he said were persons engaged in drug running operations in Europe and the U.S. They happened to be members of the Afghan opposition. He added with a smile that it was a rare opportunity in which he could kill two birds with one stone— promote the struggle against drugs and show the U.S. the true face of its alleged friends. He asked that Gates not reveal the source of this information. How Gates used it was of course up to him. If the U.S. did nothing more than end that supply channel that would be enough. Gates said he would quickly respond to four points Kryuchkov had made. First, he noted that twice in the discussion Kryuchkov had made reference to the possibility that the U.S. would be tempted to take advantage of Soviet domestic troubles for its own ends. He said he wished to repeat with all seriousness that 121

the President did not want to cause problems for Gorbachev or perestroyka. He supports perestroyka as something very much in our mutual interest. Gates added with a smile that sometimes he thought Gorbachev regarded him as a “bad influence” in Washington. Gates continued that that was not the case. He supported the President’s view on perestroyka fully. Second, as the President had made clear in Malta, we are prepared to move ahead in some areas of trade. He recalled the Presidents’ comments on MFN, the Stevenson amendment and a new Trade Agreement. Third, he also wanted to emphasize that the U.S. was aware of Soviet security concerns about a reunified Germany, and understood that they must be treated seriously. Fourth, on Panama, the U.S. had Treaty arrangements authorizing our presence and that, in violation of those rights, Americans had been harassed and even killed. We had intervened to protect our citizens, our Treaty rights, and to remove an indicted drug dealer who had thwarted a free election. The Panamanians received us as liberators. Our troops would be out by the end of February. […] [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through Mandatory Review request 2011-0841-MR by the National Security Archive.]

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Document No. 21: Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Kohl, Camp David, 2:37 p.m. – 4:50 p.m. February 24, 1990

This is an exceptionally important meeting, where the final deal on German unification on Western terms is being worked out. As the transcript shows, Kohl plays a pivotal role in the process. The West German chancellor arrives at Camp David without Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher because the latter does not fully share the Bush-Kohl position on full German membership in NATO, and he recently angered both leaders by speaking publicly about the CSCE as the future European security mechanism. At the beginning of the conversation, Kohl expresses gratitude for Bush and Baker’s support during his meetings with Gorbachev in Moscow in early February, especially for Bush’s letter stating Washington’s strong commitment to German unification in NATO. Both leaders express the need for the closest cooperation between them in order to reach the desired outcome. Bush’s priority is to keep the U.S. presence, especially the nuclear umbrella, in Europe: “if U.S. nuclear forces are withdrawn from Germany, I don’t see how we can persuade any other ally on the continent to retain these weapons.” He refers sarcastically to criticisms coming from Capitol Hill: “we have weird thinking in our Congress today, ideas like this peace dividend. We cannot do that in these uncertain times.” Both leaders are concerned about the position Gorbachev might take and agree on the need to consult with him regularly. Kohl suggests that the Soviets need assistance and the final arrangement on Germany could be a “question of money.” Foreshadowing his reluctance to contribute financially, Bush replies, “you have deep pockets.” In this conversation, Bush does not treat his Soviet counterpart as a partner, but as a defeated enemy. Referring to the Soviet position against Germany in NATO, he says: “To hell with that. We prevailed and they didn’t. We cannot let the Soviets snatch victory from the jaws of defeat.”

Chancellor Kohl: I have a couple of items I’d like to discuss with you. First, I want to thank you for inviting me here. Second, I want to thank you for all your signs of friendship since you became President. The letter you wrote to me before I went to Moscow will go down in history as an important document in the history of US-German relations. And we will not forget what Secretary Baker did for me in Moscow, briefing me on his talks with Gorbachev before I saw him. It was decisive. German-American friendship is stronger now than it has ever been in the postwar period. It is vital. This is not just true in a military sense. [...] Now, turning to the subject of German unity, the developments are so dramatic I can hardly believe it. Communism in the German Democratic Republic has collapsed like a house of cards. It looked like a giant, but it was hollow. We now are trying to stabilize the situation so one does have time to search for reasoned approaches. My ten-point program of last November has been swept away. 123

The psychological situation in the GDR was OK until Christmas, but the Modrow government collapsed in January. Let me give you two examples. Thousands of people are running away every day, and Modrow doesn’t know how to create confidence. 350,000 people came to the FRG, and 200,000 of them are less than 30 years old. Their numbers included dentists, physicists, engineers, and skilled workers. Between January 1 and today, an entire city’s worth of people left the GDR. In seven weeks, the total has been over 100,000. We must find a way to persuade people to stay. Productivity in the East is in sharp decline. Everyone wants to be paid in Deutsche Marks. Shortages are increasing. The corruption trials of the former GDR officials are having disastrous consequences. Of the 15 most important officials in the GDR a year ago, 10 are in prison. That used to be the leadership of the GDR. In the rest of the country, the corruption is just as bad. [...] Chancellor Kohl: […] Germany doesn’t want neutrality in any way. This would be a deadly decision. There is no serious interest in it. A united Germany will be a member of NATO. One needs a precise definition for Germany’s NATO membership, however. We will also need a transition period. NATO units, including Bundeswehr forces dedicated to NATO, cannot be stationed on East German soil. It wouldn’t work to have the Soviet group of forces in East Germany remain there indefinitely because it would compromise German sovereignty. And we have to decide what we will do about the East German New People’s Army, with its 200,000 soldiers. And if West Germany is a member of NATO, should it be done in the way we are handling France? What about German military integration of the new Germany? Is this a good idea? But we do not want any special status for all of Germany, as occurred after 1918. That is why NATO is so important. Concerning nuclear cooperation, we must think about what will happen with nuclear artillery, Lance, and the Follow-On-To-Lance (FOTL). What will your Congress say about FOTL? And how will these weapons be seen in Eastern Europe? But we must remain in NATO, and US forces must remain in Europe. The President: I would like to make a few general comments. We are going to stay involved in Europe. We have some pressure here to lower the level of US troops and defense spending. We are being asked: who is the enemy? The enemy is unpredictability, apathy, and destabilization. But we will stay in Europe. It will be a tough fight. As for FOTL, FOTL is dead as a doornail. Chancellor Kohl: We will be getting into a nuclear discussion well before 1992. It will be an election issue this year. On the Lance business, I want to avoid the impression that the US caved in to public opinion in Europe. The President: Congress is very unlikely to fund the FOTL program. The concept of Germany being in NATO is absolutely crucial. I hate to think of another France in NATO. We need full participation for Germany in NATO. It will be stabilizing for Europe. We will continue to keep US troops in Germany and in Europe despite the pressure. 124

I’m concerned when I hear the Polish Prime Minister talk about keeping Soviet troops in Eastern Europe. I’m not enthralled when I hear Poland might want the Soviets to stay because of the issue of the Polish-German border. I don’t like that, and I don’t want to accept that. We want to play a key role with you in all of this. You know and I know your European neighbors are nervous about this. Sometimes I forget to consult. But you and I must take care to consult with our smaller NATO partners. Chancellor Kohl: Yes. The President: Genscher made this statement to the Italians in Ottawa, that: “You’re not in the game.” This offended Italy, and some of the other guys. I will try to be sensitive to their concerns. Genscher must be sensitive too. I’m not suggesting that you haven’t been. Chancellor Kohl: I totally agree. I wasn’t in Ottawa, but I had to take some of the consequences of Genscher’s act. And I didn’t like it. It was totally unnecessary. It’s not my style either. There are domestic political reasons for this. Genscher is having trouble with his party. Everyone is confused but me. I’m doing OK, but the other parties are in disarray, including the FDP. As for the Ottawa matter, I realize, of course, that I have to do a master resuscitation with Andreotti and the others. I’ll do the same thing with Francois Mitterrand at some time. He has been holding firm. Most of the French people are on our side, but the political class is against us. But we have to keep working the problem. Copenhagen, and Norway, are also hard cases. The Netherlands and the UK are also problems. Margaret Thatcher: I can’t do anything about her. I can’t understand her. The Empire declined fighting Germany—she thinks the UK paid this enormous price, and here comes Germany again. The President: We don’t look at it that way. We don’t fear the ghosts of the past; Margaret does. But you and we must bend over backwards to consult, recognizing our unique role in history. I called Margaret today just to listen to her, which I did for an hour. Chancellor Kohl: In the FRG there is anger among Germans because we have been reliable partners for over 40 years. Why doesn’t that help? Logic doesn’t help. The President: The United States can and will help. When you say Germany will be staying [in] NATO with full membership, that helps. Margaret told me today that everyone expects German unity (although six months ago she felt differently). But she said everyone is worried about the uncertainties. Germany being fully involved in NATO helps. We don’t support the idea of Polish reparations. On the Polish border, it has cycled over here as an issue. I know you have political problems, but the more you can do on this the better it will be. We feel that US nuclear weapons are an essential part of the US military presence in Germany. If US nuclear forces are withdrawn from Germany, I don’t see how we can persuade any other ally on the continent to retain these weapons. 125

Because there is uncertainty, we need a nuclear presence in Germany. Our public sees the nuclear deterrent as the protection for our boys. I worry that if we lose nuclear weapons, domestic support for US troops would erode. On the Two Plus Four, we don’t want the Soviets to use this mechanism as an instrument to force you to create the Germany they might want. I am concerned that the Two Plus Four not get in the way of your dialogue with the GDR on the nature of unification. I worry that too early an engagement in Two Plus Four talks will stimulate the Soviets to interfere. I told Margaret that the Two Plus Four should focus on giving up Four Power rights and responsibilities for Germany as a whole and for Berlin. I would hate to see the Two Plus Four get involved in the issue of Germany’s full membership in NATO. Chancellor Kohl: Gorbachev will have his views on NATO. Secretary Baker: I believe Gorbachev and Shevardnadze believe US forces are a stabilizing presence. The Soviets haven’t yet decided on their final position on Germany and NATO. The President: Full German membership is linked to our ability to sustain US troops in Europe. You must understand that. Chancellor Kohl: I like that very much. I want America in Europe, and not only its military presence. I want to eradicate the concept of a Fortress Europe. Hundreds of steps are required, but we must make Fortress Europe an impossibility. Secretary Baker: NATO is the raison d’etre for keeping US forces in Europe. If the Soviets want the US in Europe, they have to accept NATO. We couldn’t have US forces in Europe on the soil of a non-full member of NATO. Chancellor Kohl: The Soviets are negotiating. But this may end up as a matter of cash. They need money. The President: On US-Soviet relations, we want to see Gorbachev succeed. We want a successful US-Soviet Summit which will give him a boost at home. We want a CFE agreement signed. A CSCE Summit. A START accord this year. Having said that, the Soviets are not in a position to dictate Germany’s relationship with NATO. What worries me is talk that Germany must not stay in NATO. To hell with that. We prevailed and they didn’t. We can’t let the Soviets clutch victory from the jaws of defeat. We have weird thinking in our Congress today, ideas like this peace dividend. We can’t do that in these uncertain times. We can’t let the Polish Prime Minister dictate how many Soviets stay. We have to stay together and work things out. Chancellor Kohl: The Soviets could stay in Germany for a limited time if that could be a solution, if the time is limited. But it must not be for an extended period. The President: Just so we don’t say: All the Soviets must leave, so all the US troops must leave Germany too. Chancellor Kohl: No. As I said, there is a difference between being 6000 kilometers away and being 600 kilometers away. It is a ten-to-one difference. You must stay even if the Soviets leave Germany. 126

The President: On a CSCE Summit, I have agreed to participate in a CSCE Summit this year, if we can complete a CFE treaty that can be signed at the meeting. The Summit should review how we are doing in the three CSCE baskets. I hope that the Summit will endorse new CSCE guidelines for the conduct of free elections, to help us protect the emergence of real democracy in Eastern Europe. While this CSCE Summit may acknowledge, in some way, the activities of the Two Plus Four, we do not want the CSCE Summit to be centered on Germany, or to be a meeting which tries to undermine Germany’s full membership in NATO. Finally, we need to try to strengthen the CSCE process. But I’m sure you agree with me that the CSCE cannot replace NATO as the core of the West’s deterrent strategy in Europe and as the fundamental justification for U.S. troops in Europe. If that happens, we will have a real problem. Chancellor Kohl: I don’t want the CSCE Summit to be a forum for discussion of the German problem. But Gorbachev needs a CSCE Summit. And you will make lots of progress in arms control at a US-Soviet Summit. You can work on progress in the three baskets. Secretary Baker: What else should we discuss? How about procedural next steps on the Two Plus Four process? The President: And domestic politics in Germany. We support you because of your principles, and because we have a big stake in this. We feel comfortable with you at the wheel. Chancellor Kohl: We will stick to two tracks: a domestic German track and an international track. It is important that you continue US-Soviet disarmament, so that no one can say the German issue is slowing progress in arms control. I will push EC integration with all my weight. There will be a special EC Summit on the last Saturday in April. We need as many consultations as possible. We need to talk frankly with the Soviets. It would be good for the US to talk to the Soviets outside of the Two Plus Four about German membership in NATO. That way the Soviets will understand that there is total US-FRG agreement without any games. The Soviets may be more willing to tell you their real price tag for their agreement. Secretary Baker: It is important that we send strong public signals about continued full German membership in NATO. Chancellor Kohl: Of course. We are in complete agreement. There will be concerns for the Soviets if Germany remains in NATO, for their security. And they will want to get something in return. The President: You’ve got deep pockets. Chancellor Kohl: Now, as to the Two Plus Four, we have to work very closely together. After the elections, we will keep you informed about developments with the two Germanys. The Soviets will be likely to influence the new GDR government. We must coordinate every step, along with the UK and France. On domestic developments, the mood of people in the FRG is in favor of unification, but they are afraid of the sacrifices required. These won’t be major sacrifices in a historical sense, but people are worrying. We now pay 22 billion DM to subsidize Berlin, and 30 billion DM in tax privileges for Berlin per year. These 127

costs will disappear. If I add up the balance sheet after 10 years, then we will be making money. Now, on the political situation in the GDR. Someone who lives in Leipzig has to be 79 years old to have participated in free elections before. They would have been 21 years old in November 1932. That says all there is to say. In East Berlin, 32,000 people are employed in State Security. This has left an impact, has shaped the people. There is no middle class. There are no wealthy people. The social structure is warped. It will take some time. It is a peasant and worker state. All of a sudden a market economy will be introduced. The first election won’t be typical. It will take two or three elections before things take on a clearer shape. I want this March 18 election, then local elections in May, then the Land elections in the GDR, then a federal election in December, and then—next year—all-German elections. We had the same situation in 1946-49. If I can win this year in the FRG election, I can win next year in the all-German election. This will give me time. If I postpone elections, I would no longer be in charge. The GDR’s new government will have to make many unpleasant decisions, about inefficient industries, the consequences of introducing supply and demand, and on the environment. They will have to make these decisions. They will have to begin being real politicians. Secretary Baker: There would be all-German elections in 1991. Chancellor Kohl: If I have any influence… Secretary Baker: What if the laender try to join the FRG under Article 23? Will that force you to move the elections up? Chancellor Kohl: No. I want a graduated strategy from successful monetary union, to the federal elections in December 1990, to all-German elections in 1991. I want to involve GDR politicians in the future of a united Germany. The SPD in the GDR is the strongest party. It is a region where that party has had long-time historical strength. This will stir up some emotion. Then, there are the so-called conservative parties—the former Liberals, the former Christian Democrats. People remember that they cooperated with the SED. After the first elections, time will be needed. Only two people are important in the GDR elections. Willy Brandt, who is 75 years old, and myself. I’ll have six campaign appearances in the GDR. Hundreds of thousands of young people come to my rallies. But, whatever happens in the election, the new GDR government will have to face its responsibilities. We will need time before all-German elections. The President: What do your political opponents in the FRG say about your handling of German unification? Chancellor Kohl: They criticize me for not putting enough money into the GDR. I’ll do that after March 18. People will stay home only when they have cold cash in their hand. It’s the same problem Gorbachev has. The President: Do you think your German domestic political opponents will try to oppose full German membership in NATO, and US troops in Germany? Chancellor Kohl: As far as NATO is concerned, everyone is in favor of full membership. Some in the SPD discuss German membership in NATO along 128

French lines. I don’t think it will be a big issue. On US troops, there may be more varied opinions. Worse still, in the next two months, FOTL and nuclear artillery will be coming up in all the parties. The debate will intensify. The ranges of these missiles makes these systems politically untenable. There must be a decision made by the US, and not made under pressure. The Soviets would have to remove theirs too—that would be the US proposal. Secretary Baker: We hope we will have a CFE agreement in June or September. The President: What would you like us to do on FOTL? What would help you most? Chancellor Kohl: For the US President, it is essential that he not give up under external pressure. The question is, of course, to try to involve the Soviets. General Scowcroft: FOTL funding will be gone by May. Chancellor Kohl: The initiative should be yours, not with Congress. Couldn’t one raise this with the Soviets? Secretary Baker: Maybe we could lump no modernization of Lance in with our position going into the SNF negotiations. General Scowcroft: The Soviet systems are, by and large, already modernized. Chancellor Kohl: There will be a debate in your Congress on this starting in four to six weeks, which will instantly give us a debate in Germany. The President: We want a position that will help you, and not undermine the Alliance. The authority of the President is also important here. General Scowcroft: There are two ways we can do it: (1) we can fight to keep the money in; or (2) we can let you announce the cancellation for your political benefit. Secretary Baker: Last year’s debate in the Alliance was about SNF negotiations. If we could fold FOTL into SNF negotiations, that might help with the Congress. Chancellor Kohl: Nuclear artillery is also a part of the SNF issue. We must keep that in mind. Secretary Baker: Maybe we can begin SNF negotiations this year, folding in FOTL. Chancellor Kohl: My problem is with your debate in Congress. Secretary Baker: There could be an announcement in the next 30 days that we will not fund FOTL in FY 91, as we wait to see what will happen in the SNF negotiations. Chancellor Kohl: It would be good to make a decision soon. But if you said to Congress that you might ask for a modernized Lance next year if SNF negotiations fail, that would be worse for me than the present situation. Mrs. Thatcher talks to me in a way I wouldn’t accept from anyone else. She is isolating herself from her own countrymen. I once told her that I was postChurchill, but she was pre-Churchill. […] [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA by the National Security Archive.] 129

Document No. 22: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, 7:14 a.m. – 7:51 a.m. February 28, 1990

Bush calls Gorbachev to congratulate him on the successful presidential election in Nicaragua—the possibility of which the U.S. administration doubted until the last moment—but also to inform him about his conversations with Helmut Kohl at Camp David. Democratic elections in Nicaragua became a reality in part due to Soviet pressure on the Sandinistas to engage in the process of national reconciliation and in part thanks to the active engagement of the Contadora group of Central American countries under the leadership of Costa Rican President Oscar Arias. On Germany, however, the Soviet leader is slow to engage, and is not ready for a specific dialogue about Soviet conditions for reunification. He does not see how the election momentum in Germany is outpacing his vision of a gradual European security process. Hearing about the Bush-Kohl meeting of minds on unification, the Soviet leader replies: “I must disappoint you—we do not yet have a common understanding with Chancellor Kohl.” He repeats several times that unification would have to happen in the context of the all-European process, having in mind his ultimate vision of the common European home, but he is not ready to go beyond general statements. Bush feels no need to press him because the momentum in Germany is on his side.

The President: Good morning. How are you? President Gorbachev: Good morning. But it is good afternoon here already. The President: I have been reading about your changes and the strengthening of the Presidency. It is all over our newspapers this morning. President Gorbachev: Yes, Mr. President, yesterday was a long and difficult day. I am sorry that I could not take your call when you wanted. The President: That is alright. I fully understand and this was not an urgent matter. I wanted to talk with you about Nicaragua and to fill you in on my conversation with Chancellor Kohl this past weekend. President Gorbachev: I will listen with pleasure to your comments but first, are you well? The President: Very. I am going to the West Coast today. Barbara and I are both well. The weather is miserable and cold in Washington. But we are fine. President Gorbachev: I am pleased to hear that. I wish you and Barbara the best. The President: The same to you and your family. Now, may I read through a few talking points and then we can discuss anything you would like. President Gorbachev: I am listening. The President: The elections in Nicaragua were free and fair and this was a victory for democracy and the Nicaraguan people. This election was received 130

well by the Venezuelan, Costa Rican and Mexican Presidents as well as other democratic leaders. I want to thank you and the Soviet leadership for your role in bringing about the free and fair elections. I noted the forward-­leaning statement that came out of the Soviet Union, not only recognizing the results of the elections but offering to help. The initial statements of reconciliation and congratulations from Daniel Ortega were encouraging but now there are troubling signs that he will not give up the army and the police—the Ministry of Interior. I think Perez and other leaders will impress on him the need to transfer power. I hope you will use your influence too. We will use whatever influence we have with the Contras that they lay down their weapons. The fighting should be over now. My plea is that we work together with the countries of the region to bring about the peaceful establishment of the government. If we could do that it would send a wonderful signal to the rest of the non­-Latin world that we can work together. Now I intend to make a couple of comments on the Kohl visit but if you have comments on Nicaragua—What do you want? President Gorbachev: Let me respond. We in the Soviet Union proceeded from the assumption that the Nicaraguans should take care of their internal problems. Therefore, we supported the electoral process. We in no way interfered with that process and we are maintaining normal relations. At this stage you can assume that we will not interfere in their internal affairs. We want the Nicaraguans to solve their own problems based on political methods. That has been our policy and it will continue. If there is a need on any point for the two of us to consult, we can be in touch on this. I can say that it is only from you that I have heard of this unpleasantness. Maybe that is because I have been so busy. We have not been approached by either side, at least I don’t know of any approach. I will look into this matter after this call. The President: I am just referring to some statements that came out yesterday and maybe its Ortega trying to control his extremist elements. But there was an explicit statement about the army and the police. If you can influence them quietly. I have no specific appeal to you today, these were just general comments. President Gorbachev: Alright. The President: On the Kohl visit—we feel it was helpful. We agree with Kohl that German unity is a positive development. We expressed our common goal of building a democratic and united Germany which—in firm alliance with its longstanding allies and as a part of an increasingly integrated Europe—will be one of the pillars of stability and peace in Europe for the long­term. The Chancellor and I agreed that the unified Germany should remain in NATO; that American troops will remain in Europe as long as the Europeans want them; and that there needs to be a special status for the former territory of the GDR. 131

There seems to be increasing concern in West and East about what might result from a united Germany but it is our view that the unification of Germany should not abridge the legitimate security interests of any state in Europe. The FRG is ready to work with its neighbors, the Soviet Union and its allies to promote peace and stability in a rapidly changing Europe. Chancellor Kohl and I had long talks about this and I am sure that it is true. I am sure you know this but we did discuss the Soviet Union’s role. Your personal role in respecting changes in Eastern Europe has been crucial. That led Kohl to encourage me to have as much contact with you and to move forward on the arms control front. I told Kohl that you wanted to move forward in arms control too and that we would. One last point. Thank you personally for your generosity with your time when Jim Baker was in Moscow. Thank you for that. President Gorbachev: Very well, Mr. President. To this second part of your remarks let me say that we share the point of departure. This means that we agree that there should be common security as the result of the events in Europe and those connected with the unification of Germany. I believe that both of us understand that we regard this in the context of the post­war, all-European process. In this context, not everything is clear in the position of Chancellor Kohl. This provokes concern with many Europeans including with us. Even in the FRG itself it is being mentioned that Kohl has not spoken in recognition of the post-war borders. I had to mention this in my interview in Pravda. This point requires clarity. Another element is the future of a united Germany in the context of common European security. Given the fact that European security is important to world security this is a key matter. You have said that you have a mutual understanding with Kohl. I must disappoint you—we do not yet have a common understanding with Chancellor Kohl. You have said that no one should be concerned about these changes and about the threat of a united Germany. But then if that is so, if you believe a united Germany would not be a threat—Why do Western countries want to incorporate them into one alliance? If we find that this would negatively effect [sic] the Soviet Union, we would have to think long and hard about it. And after these remarks, I want to invite you to continue to consult with me and with Chancellor Kohl and I will do the same. Mr. President, I hope you will regard with understanding our special situation in this. I hope we will find mutual understanding and a solution to this common problem. And of course I am pleased with Secretary Baker’s impressions of our session in Moscow and also with the work we were able to do. It shows how much progress we can make when we work together. Mr. President my remarks were a little long but the points you made were more important. Thank you for taking the initiative of this phone call. That is twice and I am in debt. I will have to draw some conclusions from this. I am sending my regards— I hope we can continue our cooperation and dialogue. The President: I appreciate your comments. Some day we’ll have a better line to talk more frankly. Let me assure you that the reservations you have 132

raised—are not just reservations of the USSR—there are concerns throughout Western Europe. I hope you will have no reservations about speaking frankly. I wanted you to know that even with our history of loss of life ourselves, we believe a united Germany need not be an aggressive force or threat. Finally in response to your question of why we want Germany in the Western alliance— I must say to guard against uncertainty and instability. President Gorbachev: To your last remark—We need to continue the dialogue and I hope we can use all means available to us. Eventually I hope we can weigh all factors and find the approach that can be consistent with the interests of our two countries, the united Germany and Europe as a whole. The President: I agree. If it is agreeable to you, I want to say that we chatted on matters concerning the elections in Nicaragua and issues of Eastern Europe. You are free to say what you wish but it is better sometimes to be on the same wavelength. President Gorbachev: We will say what the subjects were but without details. The President: Good. President Gorbachev: Let me wish you a good trip West. The President: I look forward to seeing you. We want to make progress on the agenda that Jim and Mr. Shevardnadze talked about. I am looking forward to another visit with you. President Gorbachev: I too Mr. President am looking forward to our visit and hope for success. The President: Good day. Regards to Raisa. President Gorbachev: Goodbye, Mr. President. (In English) The President: That’s very good. Goodbye. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA 2000-0429-F by the National Security Archive.]

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Document No. 23: Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Shevardnadze, Washington, 10:00 a.m. – 11:40 a.m. April 6, 1990

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze delivers a letter to Bush from Gorbachev, in which the Soviet president reviews the main issues before the coming summit. Economic issues are at the top of the list for the Soviet Union, specifically Most Favored Nation status and a trade agreement with the United States. Shevardnadze expresses concern about the lack of progress on these issues and the U.S. efforts to prevent the EBRD from extending loans to the USSR. He stresses that they are not asking for help, “we are only looking to be treated as partners.” Addressing the tensions in Lithuania, Bush says that he does not want to create difficulties for Gorbachev on domestic issues, but notes that he must insist on the rights of Lithuanians because their incorporation within the USSR was never recognized by the United States. On arms control, both sides point to some backtracking by the other and express a desire to finalize the START Treaty quickly. Shevardnadze mentions the upcoming CSCE summit and the Soviet expectation that it will discuss the new European security structures. Bush does not contradict this but ties it to the issues of the U.S. presence in Europe and German unification in NATO. He declares that he wants to “contribute to stability and to the creation of a Europe whole and free, or as you call it, a common European home. A[n] idea that is very close to our own.” The Soviets—wrongly—interpret this as a declaration that the U.S. administration fully shares Gorbachev’s idea.

The President: Let me say, welcome. You come at a complicated and interesting time. Jim has filled me in and I would like you to pay my personal respects to President Gorbachev. Please say anything that is on your mind. Our relationship is absolutely vital and I want it to be better. You know that the Baltics have caused a complication in our relationship. It is necessary to overcome that and I look forward to the Summit with President Gorbachev which I hope will be a productive meeting. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: Thank you for your hospitality and attention. May I express my genuine satisfaction about the talks and negotiations while I have been here. I share your view that we are in a complicated time of dynamic events in Europe, in Asia, and in Africa. I met with the Secretary of State in Africa and there we both felt the atmosphere of change. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are great powers and have a special responsibility to our people and those of the world. We are guided by a very large responsibility. I want to convey from President Gorbachev and from the entire Soviet Union regards. Mrs. Gorbachev also asked that I pass her regards to Mrs. Bush. She wanted you to know that she values their relationship as well and hopes that it evolves over time. 134

The relationship between Secretary Baker and I has become one in which we have the ability to discuss international problems in an open, candid, frank and realistic way. I want to give you the original of the letter from Gorbachev. You have a copy. I will not recount its contents. There are ideas there about the problems and issues that Gorbachev thinks are important. I thought that I should raise a few points. I brought a small piece of paper with general comments about U.S.-Soviet relations and their development. You have participated for a long time in the U.S.-Soviet dialogue and you probably remember what the dialogue was like when it began in 1985. I remember it as one of mutual complaints and recriminations. I remember sharp exchanges on humanitarian affairs, sharp recriminations about regional behavior, mutual feelings of animosity. The exchanges were quite emotional. A lot has changed. The process of getting to this point was difficult and painful. You were a participant in establishing the new relationship. Now looking at the agenda we have an extremely broad range of questions on which we engage: arms control and disarmament, humanitarian issues, regional issues, transnational affairs. Only the UN is a forum that encompasses as broad a range of issues as the U.S.-Soviet dialogue. The Summit agenda is very important. I think that it is becoming a norm that we discuss things openly and I think it is important that we have now a date for the Summit. Setting the date itself gives us a very important mark toward which to move. It will become like Malta pushing progress forward. Concerning the goals of U.S.-Soviet relations, let me say that Gorbachev speaks of a possibly unique evolution of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship. Talks that I have had here confirm this possibility. I know you are following our exchanges. We have been working well, have built a good relationship between ourselves. It is possible now to have constructive negotiations. Personal relations between us allow us to discuss even the toughest problems openly, allowing us to be totally candid and then to implement. After Malta, much has changed. There are improvements and movement forward in the arms control talks despite the fact that we have very many important differences still. On the ABM Treaty on space we made good movement in Wyoming, on ALCM and SLCM we had good movement, no difficult questions remained. We have made progress on mobile ICBMs, telemetry encryption and non-deployed missiles. We have made good progress in the conventional arms talks. Despite skepticism, I believe that we have good prospects for the completion of those talks before the end of the year. Then nothing will stand in the way of the meeting of the 35. We have made substantial progress on chemical weapons. I want to emphasize the importance of your proposals as discussed with me by the Secretary of State. Your readiness to stop at some point the production of chemical weapons will be an important step forward for us. We will be examining your proposals over the next few days and will reply soon. Despite problems in strategic arms, chances are still good to initial a treaty in June. Our intention to prepare and adopt a declaration of intent on future arms control despite certain differences is useful. There is mutual understanding that strategic arms control should be an 135

ongoing and continuing process. I think that the content of a statement should be obvious assuming we can find a way to agree. On the protocol of nuclear testing, I have always said that the nuclear testing protocols are very important to us. Nuclear testing causes significant domestic problems for us. There are protests against nuclear testing. You have in the past had public protests too and the problem may become difficult for you in the future so we should move forward on nuclear testing. If we are able to prepare agreement on conventional arms we believe the practical preparations should begin for a Summit of the 35 and then after the Summit a CFE treaty could be signed. Subsequent phases could be identified for further conventional arms talks. We should identify a program for the future. I will not speak in detail about the unification of Germany. At the next CSCE Summit, we will have to prepare and design some fundamental European security structures, some guarantee of security against a background of development not only in Germany but development in Eastern Europe. It used to be that any Soviet proposal immediately brought a negative response from the United States. We did the same thing. It is now happening that we are jointly proposing resolutions in the UN and other countries are voting for our proposals. This is a change. […] It is still important that we work to continue to reject certain stereotypes that are a legacy of the past. The discussion of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development seems to be in that category. We hear that you do not want the Soviet Union to be able to get loans. This should be a thing of the past, we are not looking for your help. We are only looking to be treated as partners. The sooner we abandon stereotypes the better for all of us. […] The problems of inter-ethnic relations are more dramatic. In the Trans-Caucuses [sic] we have even had clashes and bloodshed. In Central Asia, in the Baltic republics, we have problems. The legal process has been lagging behind our political process. In the Constitution of 1977, which all republics adopted by referendum, there is the right of the republics to secede. But a mechanism was not established. No one asked what the conditions were, the circumstances under which this could happen. That was lacking. The laws that we adopted were unfortunately adopted after Lithuania took its steps. I know that this is being discussed here. I said at the airport that that is OK. We understand that it is an issue of debate in the United States and everyone can voice his opinion. I have said and I wish to reiterate that our main weapon is dialogue. With any state that is true but particularly with our own people. Perestroika and democracy, the right to self-determination, these are all a part of our program. Dialogue must be open, candid and frank with our people and with our leadership. The course of developments is difficult to predict. Different ethnic groups there [in Lithuania]—not everyone supports the Supreme Soviets ideas about secession and relations among the republics. We must make sure that there are no inter-ethnic clashes. In Lithuania, for instance, there are 350,000 Russians, 300,000 Poles, 100,000 Byelorussians; these are important numbers. There are also big factories that belong to the central government. We have concluded that it is necessary to have Presidential 136

authority in the Soviet Union to deal with some of these problems. In establishing that authority, we did it only to protect democracy. Gorbachev wanted me to tell you that he will adhere to the principles that he has stated. The President: I would like to reply. This is what I was hoping you would do—explain your positions. I will not go into arms control. You and Secretary Baker will discuss that. I hate to start on a less positive note—but the feeling of our side is that we have moved back from positions that we thought we had agreed. I know you want progress—I do too. If we can stay with the progress we have made in the past and then move ahead I think we will get an agreement. I want an agreement. More talk is necessary but you should know that our people feel that there has been some pulling back on your side. Let us see if we cannot get back on track. You ended your remarks on the Baltic states, laying out your constitutional issues, I need to make a few remarks: 1) We do not want to complicate, for the Soviet leadership, problems that you view as internal problems. Gorbachev knows that I am not using excessively hot rhetoric. As a matter of fact, I am under fire here for not using hot rhetoric. Not having recognized, however, the incorporation of Lithuania, we are in a position where we must support self-determination, and recognize their stated desire for independence, and democracy. We must hold to this position. Churchill said, “Jaw, jaw, jaw; not war, war, war.” What he meant was, engage in dialogue. I know you have reservations about the word “negotiation,” we aren’t using that word. But let me say I think we are responsible for the restrained response of the Europeans. There must be a solution for this problem because that can keep our relationship on track. We are caught up in fifty years of history. We are respectful of your views and of your problems. But there must be dialogue and discussion. I don’t know if I have the right to be optimistic or pessimistic. But today I have heard that some discussions have begun and that is good. I agree with what you say about the relationship. There is less suspicion though it is not completely removed. You cannot say that it has been removed on your side and I cannot say that it has been removed on my side. I hope the people will understand that we support perestroika and also Gorbachev’s handling of these difficult situations. We have seen you help bring about a peaceful evolution in Eastern Europe and there are, we understand, ethnic problems of the union in the Soviet Union. We are sympathetic, strongly sympathetic, to the Lithuanians and their desire for self-determination. I hope you will go forward into discussions with them. We don’t have a desire to interfere in your affairs, but the force or perceived crushing of Lithuania would be a problem. I know people think I hide behind the Congress and some Congress people, including Bob Dole, have told me they have had good conversations with you. When Primakov was here, he asked about the system and I said it was a difficult one. He thought I was some sort of heretic. But it is a good system. We want to move forward with you in arms control and on the economy. The Congress has a lot to say about that and as I said we all feel very strongly about the Lithuanian people and their rights. Gorbachev has said certain principles underlie perestroika. Given that and given 137

our own principles, if the aspirations of the Lithuanian people were suppressed I, too, would feel strongly about it. I want you to communicate the strength of my feelings to Gorbachev. Let me return for a moment and say that we must recapture any lost momentum, set the stage for closing out any issues at the final Ministerial. We have an ambitious timetable. We will bring as much to closure as possible. We have a lot of work to do. There needs to be a lot of effort at the expert level. We’ve been able to sustain considerable progress during this turbulent period. I don’t want to lose that progress. I will instruct our negotiators to go back and redouble their efforts. I hope you will do the same. On CFE, let me say, that I cannot imagine serious preparations for CSCE unless we have a CFE Treaty. I am confident that we will. I appreciate what you said about my proposal on chemical weapons. Let me say that I am troubled by the lack of progress on the original initiative on Open Skies. Your government will have to accept a really open regime, not just token flights, not just in good weather, not just in daylight. All must be open if we are going to have an effective regime. I told our military and intelligence services that they were going to have to accept this kind of openness. Not everybody liked it. This sends an important signal as to what kind of relationship we are building. It is more than symbolism, but it is also an important symbol and it will benefit our overall relationship. On human rights, let me say that I am pleased with the number of emigrants. We’ve made dramatic progress and this helps our overall relationship. This is far more than symbolism, it is the emotional issue. I am working toward a waiver of Jackson-Vanik and we are making progress on a trade agreement. I hope your emigration law will have been passed so we can move forward on Most Favored Nations status. Let me communicate to you my personal interest in direct flight for Jewish emigrants to Israel. Please reconsider your position on this. Finally, let me say that the tolerance of ethnic and religious differences are not automatic fruits of democracy. It is necessary to work at it. On Germany, let me just say that we are interested to see that the Soviet Union and the West European countries have some similar concerns. I have talked with Chancellor Kohl and even though unification is coming fast, it is proceeding in an orderly fashion. The Two Plus Four will be a useful way to dissolve the Four-Power rights and responsibilities but we should not put new constraints on a sovereign German state. Germany has been a good democratic ally. You know that we, the Germans, and the West European countries agree that the unified Germany should remain a full member of NATO, including its integrated military structures. Even some of the East European leaders are coming to that conclusion as a major element of stability in Europe. NATO is also the anchor for American military forces in Europe and thus our commitment there. You and President Gorbachev have said that you want the United States to remain in Europe. The United States will keep a significant military presence in Europe as long as our allies want us to. You should understand that a strong NATO is the best way to ensure our presence. 138

We are working with you and the other European countries to strengthen the CSCE. CSCE will be an important pillar in the new Europe but we should not try to make it do more than it can. Those of us who remember when Europe was not at peace do not want to return to notions of collective security that almost inevitably fail. I understand you might be skeptical. I am often reminded of the enormous loss of life in World War II in the Soviet Union. Marshall Akhromeyev has told me about the 20 million people that you lost and I am not unsympathetic but I would urge that we stay in close touch. The U.S. willingness to stay in Europe is a stabilizing force. I want to convince Gorbachev of that. That it is in our interest and in the interest of a Europe whole and free and the common European home as you call it. It’s not all that popular a position here at home. No President would want to stay in Europe if no one wants us to stay. There are pressures in the United States for us to go home, but they are containable pressures. I believe that stability is enhanced by a U.S. presence. You know our position on NATO. We feel strongly and we must convince you that a Germany in NATO is no threat to the Soviet Union. People ask me who is the enemy? I say unpredictability. An expanded NATO mission does not mean a threat to Soviet interests. NATO will take into consideration the new conditions. On regional issues I agree that we have entered into a new phase. In Nicaragua we believe that the dialogue contributed to the change there. We still have reservations about Castro. And in the days of perestroika, he is a tremendous holdout. He is the old guard. We look forward to a peaceful resolution of Afghanistan. Let me say again, that we are not interested in seeing a radical regime that would exacerbate or threaten Soviet interests. It is not in the U.S. interest or in global interest to have that happen on your border. There is no thinking that there should be an alignment of our interests against yours. Secretary Baker: We agreed we have discussed Afghanistan for fifteen months and that we find ourselves closer to a positive approach now. The President: I was pleased when Secretary Baker conveyed your thinking on the Summit. Everyone wondered if moving this up a few days meant that there was some dire emergency. They asked if we had Lithuania in mind. I said that when things were more complicated there was even more reason to have discussions. It was more important. We are in total accord that an early Summit is a good idea. We have shortened the fuse and we will have to work hard but I am very happy about the arrangement. Let me now, if I may, invite you in to receive a personal letter. I hope that the Summit comes through with flying colors. Let me just say just one more word. I am not regarding the Soviet Union as a foe. We have our differences. We have come a long way in five years. I do worry about instability. Stability is something that we are for. Whatever we do in Europe we will keep stability in mind. Let me say too that I am hopeful that in the Middle East we will be able to more [sic] forward. The days of trying to exclude the Soviet Union from this process are over. We urge you to use your influence there as much as possible—to participate in whatever talks happen. On the economic 139

side, the problems do require attention. We want discussion on how we can facilitate what you’re trying to do in your economic reform. There I would point to something like the Greenspan visit. So, let me summarize—my own assessment of where we are. This is a vitally important relationship. Problems are now arising because of Lithuania—that makes our relationship more difficult than three months ago. We are determined not to contribute to the difficulties that you face at home. I don’t however want to convey a relaxed feeling. We feel strongly about the Lithuanians’ rights. I am determined to move forward in arms control. I want to contribute to stability and to the creation of a Europe, whole and free or, as you call it, a common European home. A [sic] idea that is very close to our own. I want you to convey my warm best wishes to Mr. Gorbachev. I want to tell him that I won’t tell him my problems if he doesn’t tell me his. There are enough for both of us to go around. […] Secretary Baker: I heard you say that there was an acknowledgement of Lithuania as an internal Soviet issue. What the President said was that it is your position that this is a domestic issue. The President: We have never recognized the incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union. You must understand. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: I have not come here to ask for anything on this. We have our laws, our rules. It is our state. We have our constitution. We will act within them without violence because it is against our principles to use violence. The U.S. position is up to you and to the American leadership. We are grateful for your restraint and for your support but your position is up to you. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA in 2009 by the National Security Archive.]

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Document No. 24: Cable from U.S. Embassy Moscow to Department of State: “Gorbachev Confronts Crisis of Power” May 11, 1990

This remarkable cable from U.S. Ambassador Jack Matlock in Moscow just weeks before the Washington summit describes for the summit planners in Washington the severe “crisis of political power” facing Gorbachev, who seems “less a man in control and more an embattled leader.” The cable details the many signs of crisis, which is “of Gorbachev’s making, if not of his design” because “[f]ive years of Gorbachev’s perestroika have undermined the key institution of political power in the Soviet Union, the Communist Party,” without replacing it with any coherent, legitimate governance system. Full of specifics about “the powerful social forces his reforms have unleashed” and prescient about the various possibilities to come, the Matlock cable implicitly signals that Gorbachev would be coming to Washington on the downward curve of his power and his ability to deliver any of the items on the American agenda. In effect, the arms race in reverse that had been on offer from Gorbachev at the previous summits with Presidents Reagan and Bush now would be slowed to a crawl.

1. Confidential—Entire Text. Summary 2. The U.S.-Soviet Ministerial will find the Soviet Union in a crisis of political power and facing fundamental choices—of Gorbachev’s making if not of his design. His own popularity is in sharp decline (though he remains the most popular Soviet political leader), and he himself appears on the defensive. His position is imperiled not by conservative apparatchiki or men on white horses, but rather by the powerful social forces his reforms have unleashed. The recent hesitancy on Party and economic reform and toughness over Lithuania are more likely the result of Gorbachev’s own desire to keep society from unraveling and reform on track than concessions forced by conservatives. 3. Gorbachev has yet to fashion a coherent system of legitimate power around new state institutions to replace the old Party-dominated, Stalinist one he has extensively dismantled. In the absence of a strong center of power, Soviet society has fragmented along ethnic lines ad [sic] polarized on the political spectrum. The Party itself, as yet still the dominant political institution, is beset by factional struggle and probably doomed to split at the 28th Party Congress this July or shortly thereafter. 4. The success of Gorbachev’s effort to modernize Soviet society and at the same time keep the federation together appears increasingly problematical. 141

Democratization and market reforms are here exacerbating regional, ethnic, and class tensions and thus complicating the forging of the national consensus needed for further reform. True to his past, Gorbachev is probably inclined to move boldly to resolve the current crisis. He has said that the next year or year and a half will make or break the reform process. Nevertheless, he may find there is no bold departure that will allow him to keep both reform on track and the federation together. 5. If Gorbachev is forced to act in the short run, he may have to sacrifice pushing ahead with reform—at least temporarily—to maintain the Union, or risk his own political position. He has, however, already begun to prepare the public for the partial dissolution of the Union through the law on secession and the willingness to consider confederal relations between Moscow and the Union republics. He could eventually put together a coalition for continuing with reform even at the expense of accepting a truncated Union. 6. Despite the problems, Gorbachev has a reasonable chance of remaining at the helm for some time to come. His position is under pressure, not lost. Bold, effective use of his powers as president could reverse the current decline in his popularity and authority. No matter what Gorbachev’s fate, change will continue in the Soviet Union for objective reasons, though its course will be uneven, at best, and could even be interrupted by an authoritarian interregnum. End Summary. Crisis of Political Power 7. The mid-May U.S.-Soviet Ministerial will find the Soviet Union and Gorbachev in the midst of a deep crisis of political power. Standing at the center of a crumbling political order, Gorbachev looks less a man in control and more an embattled leader. Polls suggest that his popularity has dropped sharply over the past several months, even if he remains the country’s most popular political figure. Criticism of him and his policies has grown sharper and more open, witness the jeering marchers on Red Square this May Day and public allegations of corruption. Gorbachev’s own repeated protestations to the contrary, many Soviets, including embassy contacts across the political spectrum, wonder whether he has a clear sense of where he wants to take the country and how to get there. Many already regard him as a spent political force. 8. The signs of crisis are legion: sharply rising crime rates, proliferating antiregime demonstrations, burgeoning separatist movements, deteriorating economic performance and stalled economic reform, confusing signals on party reform, and a slow, uncertain transfer of power from party to state and from the center to the periphery. These domestic shocks to the system are compounded by the pell-mell unraveling of the Soviet security system in Eastern Europe, also unaccompanied as yet by the establishment of any credible alternate European-wide institutions. 142

9. It is a crisis of Gorbachev’s making, if not of his design. Five years of Gorbachev’s perestroika have undermined the key institution of political power in the Soviet Union, the Communist Party. Gorbachev has: – Compromised the Party’s right to rule by gutting Marxism-Leninism, legalizing a multiparty system, and permitting revelations of the Party’s past crimes, present corruption, and historically inept economic management; – Undercut the Party’s ability to rule by removing it from the day-to-day management of the economy and insisting on the separation of party and state; and – Seriously strained the Party’s will to rule by abandoning regional Party leaders faced by mounting public discontent, refusing to provide detailed policy guidance, and trimming the privileges of power. – Moreover, Gorbachev has further undercut the authority and power of the Party by personal example, by preferring the role of President to that of General Secretary. At the same time, the flight from Communism in Eastern Europe over the past several months has only further shaken the Soviet Communist Party, making Communism appear the swamp of the past instead of the wave of the future. New System Has Not Coalesced 10. As Gorbachev himself has admitted, he has yet to create a new system to replace the old Party-dominated, Stalinist one he has thoroughly discredited and extensively dismantled. To be sure, the elements of a new system are present: the new executive presidency; the reformed, more democratic system of Soviets; greater respect for the rule of law. They have not yet matured into a coherent whole, however. – The Presidency with its two advisory bodies, the Presidential Council and the Council of the Federation, is still in the formative stages. These bodies are not playing the key decisionmaking role the Politburo once did; The USSR Supreme Soviet remains too understaffed, underinformed, and –  inexperienced to be an effective legislature. The emergence of many republic and lower-level Soviets with a greater claim to legitimacy could marginalize the All-Union Supreme Soviet, while giving priority to regional interests over All-Union concerns. Moreover, none of the Soviets have adequate control over budgets or resources, which is necessary for true political clout. – The building of an independent judiciary, the key institutional guarantee of the rule of law, remains largely a promise. 11. More important, the new system itself lacks full legitimacy, though in this regard it is at least better off than the Party. Rhetorically, Gorbachev and his allies have sought legitimacy in democratic principles. Practically, however, 143

Gorbachev scarified his legitimacy as President by insisting that he be elected, not by popular vote, but by the Congress of People’s Deputies. The Congress itself is far from a democratically elected body. Society Fragmented and Polarized 12. In the absence of order imposed from the center, an increasingly politicized Soviet society has continued to fragment along national lines and polarize on the political spectrum. – In the past two months, the three Baltic States have declared their independence and Ukrainian separatists won big in Soviet elections in Western Ukraine. Moscow’s grip over events in Transcaucasia is tenuous. Sentiment for independence in Moldavia is growing. Emerging Islamic fundamentalism has given a new edge to anti-Russian and anti-Soviet attitudes in Central Asia. – Across the country, Gorbachev and his reform program are coming under increasing pressure as left ad [sic] right-wing populism gains strength, organizes, and attacks Gorbachev and his brand of reform. Workers are organizing—largely by industry and region—to secure their share of a diminishing economic pie, with little regard for the greater interests of the country as a whole. Party Splitting 13. At the same time, a bitter struggle is underway in the Party, which despite Gorbachev’s reforms remains the dominant political institution, not so much for its soul as for its property and resources. Deep splits in the leadership are now public knowledge, as Gorbachev challenges “Ryzhkov’s” economic reform program and Shevardnadze and Ligachev trade charges over the Tbilisi tragedy of April 1989. 14. Party factions now exist in all but name. The leftwing, centered on the “democratic platform,” is waging an insurgency—apparently with some success— for control of Party organizations. The rightwing has apparently focused its hopes on the creation of a Russian Communist Party as a counterweight to what it sees as a too liberal All-Union Party. Bowing to the inevitable, the Party leadership has just endorsed such a Party and moved to coopt [sic] it after having railed against it for the past year. Non-Russian republic parties, where they have not already collapsed before national movements (as in the Baltics and Transcaucasia), are increasingly infected by nationalism and are pushing for a federal party structure. For the time being at least, the center, led by Gorbachev, is trying to keep the disparate factions united in a single party. Most observers, however, expect the Party to split at the 28th Party Congress this July or shortly thereafter. 144

Gorbachev on the Defensive 15. Gorbachev’s political position is indeed imperiled, but not by conservative apparatchiks or men on white horses. The new political system, however tentative its beginnings, has provided him defenses against a palace coup like the one that deposed Khrushchev even if the other party leaders were united enough to attempt one (which they are not). The threat of a military coup is limited not only by the military’s tradition of professionalism, but also by the fissures in the military itself, especially between senior and junior officers. Moreover, public sensitivity to the possibility of a military coup has complicated the task of any plotters who might be tempted by the breakdown of the country’s other powerful institutions and organizations. 16. Rather, Gorbachev is threatened by the powerful social forces his reforms have unleashed. Recent moves by Gorbachev—the Central Committee “open letter” blasting party radicals, the tough stand on Lithuania, and the hesitancy on economic reform—are more likely the result of Gorbachev’s own desire to keep society from unraveling and reform on track than concessions forced by conservatives. 17. Against the background of growing social unrest, perestroyka, an effort to modernize Soviet society economically and politically while holding the federation together, looks increasingly problematical. The effort is becoming more deeply mired in internal contradictions. – Gorbachev has not been able to forge a new national consensus around democratization to replace the old one based on Marxist-Leninist ideology, buttressed by the liberal use of coercion, that was incapable of fostering the modern, high-tech society Gorbachev wants. Indeed, democratization and glasnost’ have only exacerbated regional, ethnic, and class differences and undermined efforts at consensus building. – The lack of a national consensus impedes rapid movement on economic reform. “Shock therapy” along Polish lines strains the fabric of even a united society; it would likely tear the Soviet Union apart. Piecemeal reform, however, leaves reform at the mercy of conservative opponents still entrenched in the economic ministries. – In short, the two goals of perestroyka—modernization and a strengthened Soviet federation—increasingly appear to be mutually exclusive. Another Bold Departure? 18. For five years, Gorbachev has confounded the doomsayers. When faced by grave challenges, he has moved boldly and outmaneuvered his opponents while radicalizing and accelerating reform across the board. He is probably inclined to do the same at this critical juncture. He has noted several times that the next year or year and a half will make or break the reform process, 145

so he realizes he cannot delay bold departures indefinitely. But there are limits to the bold departures Soviet society will tolerate, especially if they do not produce the promised economic well-being. Events are pushing Gorbachev toward a choice he has tried hard to avoid, since there does not appear to be another bold departure capable of keeping both reform on track and the federation together. Preparing to Sacrifice the Union? 19. If Gorbachev is forced to act in the short run, he may have to sacrifice pushing ahead with reform—at least temporarily—to maintain the Union, or risk his own political position. A policy that would permit the dissolution of the Union still faces substantial resistance within the political elite, where the military in particular would sacrifice reform for the territorial integrity of the Soviet motherland. But he has also already begun to prepare the public for at least partial dissolution. The law on secession sets high hurdles, but they are not too high for some of the republics—particularly Lithuania. Moreover, as an alternative to secession, he has recently abandoned his firm opposition to both confederal relations between Moscow and the Union republics and the creation of a Russian Communist Party. The latter should push the Party further toward an ethnic-based federal structure. A confederal state structure and a federal party one would spell the end of the Soviet Union as a unitary state and might make it a unified one in name only. Thus, down the road a bit, Gorbachev may be able to pull together support for sticking with the reform process, even if doing so requires accepting a truncated Union. Will Gorbachev Hang On? 21. Despite growing problems, Gorbachev has a reasonable chance of remaining at the Soviet helm for some time to come. His position is under pressure, not lost. Should he demonstrate an ability to use his new power as President boldly and effectively on the nationality and economic crises he faces, he could reverse the current decline in his popularity and authority. If he vacillates, the probability of his removal will increase. Change Will Continue, but Setbacks are Also Possible 22. No matter what happens to Gorbachev personally, the pressure for change from an increasingly restive and well-informed populace will continue over the longer term. The course of change will at best be uneven in coming years, however, and we do not ezclude [sic] the possibility that an authoritarian interregnum might interrupt it. An authoritarian successor regime, however, if one should occur, would be incapable over any extended period of dealing with the underlying problems of Soviet society. It, or its successor, 146

would be pushed for objective reasons to choices similar to those Gorbachev newe [sic] faces. 23. Leningrad minimize considered. Matlock. [Source: U.S. State Department, Moscow 15714, obtained through FOIA in 1997 by the National Security Archive.]

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Document No. 25: Record of Conversation between Gorbachev and Baker (with Delegations), Moscow May 18, 1990

This fascinating conversation covers a range of arms control issues in preparation for the Washington summit and includes extensive though inconclusive discussions of German unification and the tensions in the Baltics, particularly the standoff between Moscow and secessionist Lithuania. Gorbachev makes an impassioned attempt to persuade Baker that Germany should reunify outside of the main military blocs, in the context of the all-European process. Baker provides Gorbachev with nine points of assurance to prove that his position is being taken into account. Point eight is the most important for Gorbachev—that the United States is “making an effort in various forums to ultimately transform the CSCE into a permanent institution that would become an important cornerstone of a new Europe.” This assurance notwithstanding, when Gorbachev mentions the need to build new security structures to replace the blocs, Baker lets slip a personal reaction that reveals much about the real U.S. position on the subject: “It’s nice to talk about pan-European security structures, the role of the CSCE. It is a wonderful dream, but just a dream. In the meantime, NATO exists. …” Gorbachev suggests that if the U.S. side insists on Germany in NATO, then he would “announce publicly that we want to join NATO too.” Shevardnadze goes further, offering a prophetic observation: “if united Germany becomes a member of NATO, it will blow up perestroika. Our people will not forgive us. People will say that we ended up the losers, not the winners.” On arms control, the Soviet negotiators are intent on avoiding more concessions while agreeing with the U.S. insistence on making an exception for the Tacit Rainbow missile, which exceeds the Soviet-sought range limit on cruise missiles, and accepting—after some debate—the American demand that the issue of inspections of SLCMs on naval vessels be resolved through a separate non-binding political statement that is not part of the treaty. Here we find the Soviet leader channeling Reagan’s famous proverb, “trust but verify,” while the Americans duck any verification measures. Baker even rejects Gorbachev’s proposal for what would be purely symbolic inspections of “two ships a year,” something that would help Gorbachev with his domestic critics. Soviet frustrations are evident as Gorbachev resentfully describes American concessions on START as “just sunflower seeds,” while Shevardnadze laments that “two days will not be enough to list all our concessions” from recent negotiations. The last, one-on-one, part of the conversation deals with the situation in Lithuania.

[Shevardnadze was present at the first part of the conversation.] Gorbachev: I am glad to see you in Moscow, Mr. Secretary. The regularity of our meetings is evidence of the fact that we not only want to maintain the capital we have accumulated, but we aim to increase it. And capital likes it when it grows. 148

The very fact that in the context of current events our contacts are becoming more, rather than less, dynamic, is significant in itself. The opposite would have happened in the past. When difficulties would arise in some part of the world— since we and you are involved everywhere one way or another—we would start looking at each other sideways and even take steps to slow down the development of our relations. Nowadays, the bigger and more difficult the problem, the more active our dialogue. I appreciate this. At the same time I have to say that I’ve been observing the events unfolding and I’m coming to the conclusion that the United States has not yet finalized the process of determining its relationship to the Soviet Union. I’ve said many times before that at times like these, times of great changes, we cannot view our relations in the context of one presidential term. We are building the foundation for more than just the relationship between our two countries—we are setting up new relationships throughout the whole world. We are essentially the architects and builders of a new world. I think that something is troubling you after all. I think there are two main problems. First, there is the question of whether you should get seriously involved with us. We know that you have different advice and opinions on this. So far, at least, the President and you have shown restraint and withstood the pressure; you are holding your position. I value that. Secondly, I was under the impression that we formed a mutual understanding about the kind of relationship we would like to have between our countries at the current stage. One of the central points of this mutual understanding is that both of us would like to see the other side strong and confident in its security—not just military security, but also economic and national as a whole. We are interested in a strong, confident United States, and you are interested in a strong, confident Soviet Union. As far back as two-three years ago we predicted that we are standing at the threshold of a major regrouping of forces in the world. Back then we decided that in these circumstances, our cooperation is not only useful, but absolutely vital for us and for the whole world. However, I think that periodically, when the time comes to move from the philosophical level to implementation with specific political actions, we see relapses of the past. We see actions based on the traditions and habits of the past decades. I see that sometimes, when we are going through critical moments in our relationship, so to speak, you want to take advantage of the situation, to get the better of us. In the past, I would have simply taken note of this and continued to watch the situation. But right now our relationship is such that I can openly share my impressions with you. What am I talking about specifically? You are a clear thinker, and I value that. That is why I will speak with you frankly and clearly. Let’s look at Eastern Europe. Everything that is happening there now corresponds to what we discussed 149

before. I hope you see that our actions strictly follow what I told you then. At the same time, I have information that the goal of your policies is to separate the Eastern European countries from the Soviet Union. Or take the question of German unification. Your position on this issue is contradictory. I do not know what drives it. Maybe you are afraid of European unification? I have said many times, both here and in Europe, and I can confirm it right now: we understand the necessity of American participation—not necessarily military participation—in all European processes. That is a given. But now you say: both Germanys are peaceful, democratic countries, and there is no reason to see any danger in what is happening. You say that we are exaggerating the danger. But I told President Bush, if this is the case, if you don’t consider it an important factor, then why not agree to have united Germany join the Warsaw Pact? Or another aspect: you say that we can trust the Germans, that they’ve proven themselves. But if this is the case, then why include Germany in NATO? You respond that if Germany does not become a part of NATO, it could create a problem in Europe. So it turns out you do not trust Germany. I would understand if you provided some other, realistic arguments. I will be frank with you. If you said that Germany’s absence in NATO would disrupt the existing security structure in Europe, I might have understood you. In that case let us think; let us look for a way to replace the current security structure, which is based on the existence of two military-political blocs, with some new structure. Let us think how to move towards this new structure. But you say that NATO is necessary right now and will be necessary practically forever. And you immediately add that the Soviet Union continues to have a large army and is strongly armed, that is why, so to speak, NATO will always be necessary. In general, I repeat, your position and your arguments are contradictory. They do not agree with the core approaches we agreed to instill in our relations. What is my point? Once again I will be frank. If a united Germany enters NATO, it will create a serious shift in the correlation of forces, the entire strategic balance. We will be faced with the question of what our next step should be. You are a logical thinker, so you understand this. Evidently we would have to halt all discussions in the sphere of disarmament; we would have to analyze what changes to make in our doctrine and positions at the Vienna negotiations, to our plans for reduction of military forces. The question arises why we are doing all of this. And it is a very serious question. We would like to count on a serious approach from your side. And when we see signs that you are playing a game, we grow worried. Is it necessary? Can we allow our relationship to turn into a petty intrigue? The Soviet Union is undergoing major changes; we are going through a renewal, which is an inevitably difficult process. We see that sometimes you are tempted to take advantage of the situation. I think doing that would be a very big mistake. And finally, the synthesizing aspect. We inform you about our plans. By carrying out perestroika and transforming our politics through New Thinking, we would like to move towards the West, the United States. We would like to open 150

our country to the world. We said that our goal is to integrate our country as fully as possible into the political, economic, and cultural processes taking place in the world. We had an understanding with you that new relations between the USSR and the U.S. will benefit not only our countries, but, considering the central position of our countries in the world, it would benefit the whole world. Now I ask myself: does the U.S. Administration follow the understanding we reached? I will tell you how it looks from Moscow. From here we see the whole spectrum, and we see many nuances. We note many positive aspects in your position. At the same time, some elements worry us. Right now we are approaching a major turning point in the Soviet Union, which will determine the future of our economy in the short and medium term. Naturally, it will reflect on all the other spheres of life in our country—political, social, cultural, interethnic relations, and international relations. We have come to the point where we need to introduce a regulated market economy in our country. This is a pivotal step in our perestroika. We are talking about fundamental changes at the very core of our economy. I am talking about property privatization, antimonopoly measures, and the introduction of all types of property—stock ownership, cooperative property, collective property, private property. We will be reforming the bank system, organizing a stock market and commodity exchange, building a tax system, creating a social security system, and doing price reforms. It will be a radical change. Therefore, we are talking about a critical point in our perestroika. And at this stage we have a right to count on the understanding and solidarity of our partners. In any case, events somewhere in Nagorno-Karabakh or Vilnius should not take up more of the Administration’s and Congress’s attention than this monumental turning-point. I will say more: we need not only understanding from our partners, but cooperation as well. What is the U.S. doing? The U.S. welcomes perestroika, as you mentioned numerous times, Mr. Secretary. You quite competently described the problems we are facing today in our perestroika. At the same time, you caution everyone against helping the Soviet Union. You say: let them take care of themselves, helping them will only slow down the real perestroika. I cannot understand that argument. It seems like instead of showing solidarity during this time, you would prefer that we figure out this mess ourselves. You might even think that if our situation gets worse, that won’t be such a bad thing for you. I am saying all of this so you can think it over before our meetings in Washington and Camp David. Will we continue what we started together, or will we step away from the coordinated approach and understanding of the roles and positions of our countries, our relationship during this historic period? We both have to choose right now. I thought the choice had already been made. However, recently there have been moments when it seems that you are still deciding.

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I wanted to say all of this in a confidential conversation, rather than in a meeting with a bigger group. I think this will be useful for the President when he is preparing for our meeting. Baker: Mr. President, it is very good that you decided to raise these issues in a narrow circle. And in general it is good that you brought them up. This gives me the opportunity to respond to these legitimate concerns. It will also give President Bush the opportunity, after he reviews the transcript of this conversation, to concentrate his attention on questions that are legitimate and appropriate topics for discussion. It is true that at the early stages of this administration there was a period when we were deciding what our relationship with the Soviet Union should be. However, this period ended almost a year ago, after my trip to Moscow, my meeting with you, and lengthy conversations with E.A. Shevardnadze. Right now we are not debating the nature of our relationship with the USSR. We know very well what we would like the relationship to be. As I said in Wyoming, we would like our relationship to shift from competition to dialogue and cooperation on all fronts. Naturally, this will depend not only on the actions of the United States, but of the Soviet Union as well. However, I want to assure you that the U.S. leadership is not debating whether to place our stakes on your policies and perestroika. The President and I made the decision last year, and we will adhere to it firmly. In October of last year I made a speech in which I emphasized that we will look for new avenues of cooperation with the USSR. I talked about the need to look for points of mutually beneficial contact. It is true that there is a great deal of debate in the United States whether your efforts will be successful. It is no secret that there are some people who would prefer to see you fail. These are the “Cold War” warriors, people who can’t give up old habits. There are also quite a few people who criticize me and the President for placing too much hope in your success and for taking actions to help you. This is all true. But I appreciate the fact that you noted our restraint, and our refusal to give in to the strong pressure we are under right now. I told E.A. Shevardnadze numerous times that I had my doubts whether we could hold on to our current positions. We cannot forget that there are some substantial differences between us. For example, it is no accident that the flags of independent Baltic nations still hang in the lobby of the State Department. We never recognized their incorporation into the USSR. I touched upon this subject for the first time last year, on the way to Wyoming. Today, when this issue is quite critical, we would really like to see the beginning of a conversation that could eventually lead to a solution. At no cost do we want instability in the Soviet Union. We say this constantly. The President and I are always emphasizing that we are not seeking unilateral advantages from the changes happening in the Soviet Union. We are not playing political games or seeking to win. Later I would like to show you that our position on German unification aims to take your position and your concerns into consideration. 152

I’ve been asked on many occasions: what can we do to assist perestroika? I think that our first priority should be to help create a stable international environment for perestroika. That is exactly what I am trying to do. During my last two addresses to the U.S. Congress I had to answer a multitude of questions regarding Lithuania, I had to defend our position. I was subjected to some serious criticism. The President and I were accused of giving up on our principles. I responded that our support for the aspirations of the Baltic States peoples does not contradict our support for perestroika. I emphasized the important interests at stake in our relations with the Soviet Union. The agreement on conventional armed forces, START, continued cooperation in resolving regional conflicts—cooperation that did not exist in the past, but that we were able to establish in the past two years—all of these are of great importance to us. Our policy shift from competition to cooperation does not mean we will always agree on everything. I mentioned our disagreement on the Baltic republics. It is based on history. At the same time, we understand your concern that the Baltics do not create a precedent for the other republics. I told E.A. Shevardnadze on several occasions that we take into account the legal differences between the Baltic States and other Soviet republics. We have disagreements over Cuba. We understand that you have certain obligations to this country. But our differences remain. And yet, despite these differences, we have to keep moving from competition to cooperation. We understand the difficulties you are facing, and what kind of pressure you are under. We believe that everything you are doing right now—changing the political, social, and economic approaches that have formed in your country over the last 70 years—is a courageous effort and we support it. Over the last year and a half we succeeded in shifting American public opinion in the direction of supporting your policies. Still, we have a vocal minority that wants to continue the “Cold War,” they don’t want to trust the Russians. When the events started in Lithuania, when the economic embargo was introduced, some people started saying, “Look, Bush and Baker are naïve, while the bear remains a bear.” Allow me to say a couple words about your remark that we are cautioning others against helping the Soviet Union. You must be talking about our position on the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Indeed, due to internal political reasons, our position is that we cannot support the use of American taxpayer money to subsidize loans to state-owned enterprises or institutions in the Soviet Union. Moreover, under the current regulations of the Bank, the Soviet Union could borrow the entire amount of its contributed capital, which would be very difficult for us to push through Congress. This is due to the fact that, according to our data at least, you continue to allocate significant resources, 14–15 billion dollars per year, to support regimes in countries such as Cuba, which engage in subversive activities against other countries. Therefore some people, some congressmen, say: “How can we support giving American taxpayer money to the Soviet Union, when the Soviet Union supports 153

Cuba?” The same goes for direct loans, which I discussed with your Minister of Finance when he was in Washington. Gorbachev: Yes, he said that the Secretary of State flatly rejected this option. However, other countries are willing to assist us. For example, I was in Sverdlovsk recently and visited a factory that used to profile in the defense industry and space. Right now it is in the process of conversion. They have good plans, highly qualified workers, engineers. The problem is that the conversion will take 2–3 years, and in the meantime, while military production is stopped, their financial position is very difficult. Philips has expressed interest in this factory. In the beginning they were only interested in the factory’s research work; they were not interested in investing money for conversion. Naturally, they are careful people. However, when we showed them the factory, they apologized and agreed to full cooperation. In two years this enterprise will be producing consumer goods competitive on any market. This is an example of cooperation. Of course, we have long traditions with West Germany in this sphere. But I am convinced and I have said this many times, there can be no stable relations between the USSR and the U.S. if they are not supported by economic ties. What do we have right now? Grain purchases from the U.S. But is this real economic cooperation? Baker: I agree with you completely. Gorbachev: As for our connections with other countries, which you don’t like, I can tell you this: in our administration and our Supreme Soviet there is a sentiment to build economic relations in a new way, in the spirit of new political thinking and in accordance with our country’s domestic priorities. So we will rebuild them. But we cannot do it in one day. Only the United States can, for example, in one fell swoop impose an embargo on grain deliveries to the Soviet Union. Baker: That was not under our administration. It was a big mistake, and it will not happen again. A few months ago President Bush talked about the need to expand economic ties with the Soviet Union. I also think we have to look for ways to establish economic cooperation. However, I have to try to explain to you some of the historic factors in our domestic policy that we have to take into account in our country. We cannot give consent to grant loans (in excess of the Soviet Union’s contributed capital) with funds allocated to the EBRD from American taxpayers, while we will be told that the Soviet Union is subsidizing countries like Cuba. At the same time, as you know, yesterday the United States voted together with other countries to grant the Soviet Union observer status in GATT. Gorbachev: But you hesitated for a long time. Others agreed sooner. Baker: Yes, like Japan, we hesitated because there are different opinions in the U.S. on this subject. Gorbachev: Yes, here too. Baker: I know that. Gorbachev: We are being told that we supposedly betrayed the developing world; we threw it under the bus of imperialism. As if we are some kind of social 154

security for developing nations. They accuse us of betraying the Arabs, of practically fighting on the side of Israel. Right now this is compounded by the problem of Soviet emigrants settling in the Israeli occupied territories. In my opinion it is a real provocation, aimed at pitting the U.S. and USSR against each other. We are being accused of giving away too much in the disarmament negotiations, that we are surrendering our positions, etc. In general, there is a major struggle, and in these circumstances I hope I can expect that you won’t simply wait around for the fruit to fall into your basket. Baker: No, we are not going to wait and do nothing. Gorbachev: Because first, the harvest has to ripen. Otherwise you could end up with an empty basket. Baker: We are for economic cooperation with the Soviet Union. For example, yesterday I suggested to E.A. Shevardnadze the idea of Soviet participation in the program to promote the development of Central American countries on an international basis. A similar program is being implemented in Eastern Europe by the “Group of 24,” and it has raised 14 billion dollars for countries such as Poland and Hungary. In September, in Wyoming, I said that we are ready for broad technological and economic cooperation with the Soviet Union, which we hope will be beneficial to both countries. We can defend mutually beneficial cooperation in Congress. However, we cannot get support for programs that involve the use of U.S. taxpayers’ money. Yesterday I said that as you develop your major economic measures, we are ready to help with consulting and offer the services of our chief experts and economists. Gorbachev: I plan to raise the question of economic cooperation with the President. Today, when we are preparing for a major, radical economic turn, it is important for us to get some temporary reinforcement. The transition to a market economy may be accompanied by more serious complications, and we will need some oxygen during this time. Moreover, we are not asking for a gift, we need targeted loans. We have, for example, some Ministry of Defense enterprises that, after a 100–200 million investment, will soon start manufacturing civilian products worth 1–2–4 billion. To avoid major complications associated with the introduction of new prices and market mechanisms, we will need trade credits as well. We estimated that we would need around 15–20 billion, which we will start to repay in 7–8 years. It’s not much, and the need arose only because of the circumstances. We wanted to postpone the implementation of radical economic reforms for a little while, however, political processes took such a turn that the old command economy system is being dismantled completely. We need to move faster to replace it with a new, market system. We need the resources I’m talking about in order to maneuver. Overall, 20 billion is not such a great sum for you or for us, but under the circumstances, we need it precisely at this moment. We are planning to present a market economy transition program to the Supreme Soviet by 155

May 25th. So I will bring up this question with the President. I must say, in the West this has generally been met with understanding. Baker: The President is familiar with this issue. I discussed it with your Minister of Finance in Washington. When I return home, I will think it over again and speak with the President. Gorbachev: We discussed it with a number of European representatives, and the necessary amount is mostly starting to emerge. However, we need understanding from your side, as well. The situation demands it. I personally don’t like being in debt, but I am a realist and see that this solution is necessary. Baker: I believe that you will not have much difficulty in obtaining credits for this sum in the West, especially if you are willing to take them with a respective mortgage, which, as I understand, you are. I will speak with the President about it. Gorbachev: I want to emphasize that only part of the credit will go towards the purchase of goods; the rest will go into investments, possibly including joint ventures, expanding production, conversion, etc. Baker: I will try to convey to the President the importance you place on U.S. participation in this program. Gorbachev: Precisely. After all, it would be strange if now, when we are talking about improving Soviet-American relations, the United States did not respond and participate. I recently watched a documentary on the history of Soviet-American relations. It is truly a story of missed opportunities, the list is staggering. So I ask myself: will we really let ourselves miss this opportunity, too? Baker: I will speak with the President. Please understand that due to domestic politics in the United States, giving a direct loan to the Soviet Union, or credits through multilateral financial institutions such as the EBRD, is met with traditional negative context. Gorbachev: It could be done some other way, for example through a consortium. Baker: You see, partly because of the inertia of historical stereotypes and partly for valid reasons, many people in the U.S. will say that we simply cannot give loans to the Soviet Union while it continues to supply MiG-29 airplanes to Cuba or resorts to economic pressure on the Baltic States. Of course to this you would say: are Vilnius or two-three MiG-29s really more important than perestroika in the Soviet Union? And this is a legitimate question. However, we cannot ignore a certain atmosphere that exists on the American political stage. The vast majority of our senators are in favor of halting the development of economic relations with the USSR until the problem in the Baltics is resolved. I don’t need to tell you how sensitive the subject of Cuba is in the U.S. We have to take all of this into consideration. Before saying a few words about the German issue, I wanted to emphasize that our policies are not aimed at separating Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union. We had that policy before. But today we are interested in building a stable Europe, and doing it together with you. 156

You say: if the U.S. trusts Germany, why include it in NATO? My reply: if you trust the Germans, then why not give them an opportunity to make their own choice? We are not forcing them to join NATO. The reason we want unified Germany to be a NATO member is not because we are afraid of the Soviet Union, but because we believe that unless Germany is solidly rooted in European institutions, conditions could arise to repeat the past. You’ve studied history as I have, you remember the League of Nations. It’s nice to talk about pan-European security structures, the role of the CSCE. It is a wonderful dream, but just a dream. In the meantime, NATO already exists and participation in NATO will mean that Germany will continue to rely on this alliance to ensure its security. Gorbachev: And yet, what is the purpose of NATO? It was created for a different time, what is its purpose now? Baker: If Germany is not firmly rooted in the existing security structure, there will be an entity in the heart of Europe that will be concerned with ensuring its security by other means. It will want nuclear security, whereas now, this security is provided by the U.S. nuclear umbrella. If Germany remains in NATO, it will have a much easier time renouncing its nuclear, biological, or chemical potential. At the same time, I want to say that we understand why Germany’s membership in NATO presents a psychological problem for the Soviet Union. Gorbachev: Let’s examine this issue from a military standpoint. Right now, when the Warsaw Treaty is rapidly turning into a purely political organization, Germany’s membership in NATO will strengthen your military alliance. Baker: In the immediate, short-term, maybe. However, we are currently talking about a change, about adapting NATO, giving it a more political nature. We recognize the importance of reducing the Bundeswehr. However, we have a disagreement regarding the best platform to negotiate this. But we understand your concerns and we are taking them into account. I don’t think that we are trying to get unilateral benefits. We want stability in Europe, and we wish success to perestroika. Same as you, we went through two wars that were the result of instability in Europe. We do not want this to happen again. Allow me to give you some examples of ways in which we tried to take your completely legitimate concerns into consideration as we developed our policy towards Germany. First. We proposed to review the reduction and limitation of the Bundeswehr at the second phase of the Vienna talks, which should begin immediately after the signing of the first agreement on conventional armed forces. We spoke about this with the Germans, and I think they will agree. Second. President Bush proposed to hasten the start of negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons. Third. We proposed, and the Germans agreed, that Germany would pledge not to produce, develop, or acquire chemical or biological weapons. 157

Fourth. We proposed that for an agreed transition period, NATO troops would not be stationed on the territory of the GDR. Fifth. We also proposed that for an agreed transition period Soviet troops would remain on the territory of the GDR. Sixth. NATO will undergo an evolution to become more of a political organization. Moreover, there will be a major review of military strategy in light of the reduced effectiveness of the Warsaw Pact and the need to strengthen the political role of the alliances, as you mentioned. Seventh. We put a great deal of effort into reaching an agreement on Germany’s borders. Right now we have a solid understanding that a united Germany will include only the territory of the GDR, FRG, and Berlin. This is important to the Poles, as well as some Western European countries. Evidently it is also important to the Soviet Union. Eighth. We are making an effort in various forums to ultimately transform the CSCE into a permanent institution that would become an important cornerstone of a new Europe. This institution would include all the European countries, the Soviet Union, and the United States. I proposed to hold a meeting of foreign ministers of 35 countries this September in New York, to prepare for the Summit of the CSCE. And finally, the ninth point. We are actively trying to make sure that the Soviet Union’s economic interests are duly considered during the unification process. We are fully aware that including a united Germany in NATO is a political problem for you. Nevertheless, we believe that if a united Germany is firmly anchored in the framework of this time-tested security institution, it will never want to have its own nuclear capability or its own independent military command. Militarily, NATO will look completely different as the result of the changes currently taking place in Central and Eastern Europe. Of course, if Germany does not want to remain a member of NATO, then it won’t. The United States cannot force Germany to be in NATO. This is not a question of whether we trust the Germans. We sincerely believe that NATO is the structure that provides the greatest stability in Europe. And not only in terms of East-West relations. There are a few pockets of instability in Europe, arising from inter-ethnic rivalries, ethnic tensions, etc. Often this happens in European countries that have nothing to do with the tension between the East and the West. The fact that Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary supported our approach is not the result of American diplomatic efforts. We welcome their position, but we did not actively seek it. Incidentally, we expressed our opinion that it would be good for some of these countries to establish regional associations. So, I understand your concern, it is quite legitimate. I hope that my explanations were useful to you. Gorbachev: What if your words turn out to be prophetic and a united Germany will not want to remain in NATO? You say that you can’t force it. What will happen then? Baker: I would like to ask you in turn: if Germany is not in NATO, what do you propose? 158

Gorbachev: I would like us to do something during the negotiations, before the unification. We have this opportunity right now. When this process is finished, we won’t have any more opportunities to suggest anything else. That’s the point. Your reasoning is based solely on the idea that a united Germany must be a member of NATO. You are not offering any alternatives. At the same time, you say that at some point Germany could decide not to be in NATO. Let’s imagine what would happen when the negotiations are over. Germany will have the right to leave NATO, but we won’t have a chance to offer any alternative. Right now we have this opportunity, we have the rights and responsibilities of the four victorious powers. The unification process is not yet complete. If we decide that a united Germany will not be a member of any military organization, then of course the question arises about its status. I think it should be a democratic, demilitarized country with clearly defined borders, etc. It would be a new situation, and we would need to secure it in a final peace settlement. The settlement could include your nine points. This would be something everyone could understand. It would be a more or less of a middle ground, though of course Germany would still be closer to you, but the balance would be better. Baker: You are suggesting that the document stipulate that Germany would not have the right to remain in NATO? Gorbachev: Germany would be outside any military groups. The same as many other countries. Baker: So you are talking about a neutral Germany? Gorbachev: I don’t know. Maybe non-aligned. Maybe some special status. For example, France has a special status. To conclude this part of the conversation, I would like to suggest: let us thoroughly think about this one more time. We will think, and you should think. Let us continue this conversation in Washington. And if none of my arguments convince you, then I’ll suggest to the President and announce publicly that we want to join NATO too. After all, you say that NATO is not directed against us, that it is just a security structure that is adapting to the new reality. So we will propose to join NATO. Baker: E.A. Shevardnadze was asked about this at a press-conference in Bonn. Shevardnadze: At the time, I responded that we have not yet submitted an application for admission to NATO. Gorbachev: In any case, it is not a purely hypothetical question. It’s not some absurdity. Baker: This is interesting. You said there are many neutral and non-aligned countries. This is true. But it is by their choice, not because someone forced them to take this status. Gorbachev: Well, maybe the Germans will take this status themselves. In any case, there should be some fallback option. Your position is based on only one option. It is what you want. But we want something else. We can’t proceed just based on what you want. 159

Baker: We want it only because they are asking for it themselves. You say that it is unacceptable for you. But neutrality cannot be imposed. You cannot demand it as a condition for the termination of the four powers’ obligations. This would be contrary to the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, which clearly states that countries have the right to participate in alliances. Moreover, such an approach would place Germany in some special category; it would cause a great deal of resentment and hostility on the part of the Germans. In other words, it would sow the seeds of future instability, which is exactly what we don’t want. Gorbachev: What makes you think that resentment will occur only if Germany is not a part of a Western alliance? Baker: There will be resentment if Germany is separated into some kind of special category, if it is forced to do something against its will. If Germany makes its own choice to become a member of the Warsaw Pact, that would be a different matter. Gorbachev: If they want to join the Warsaw Pact, what would your response be? Baker: We will not object, if it would truly be their free choice. Gorbachev: Thus, we can note that you would react with understanding to such a request. Baker: The Helsinki Final Act states that any country can be a member of any organization or alliance. Gorbachev: Can I conclude that should a united Germany want to become a member of the Warsaw Pact, the United States would meet this with understanding? Baker: We would say: in our view, Germany should be a full member of NATO, however only by its own choice. Gorbachev: And still, in principle: if a united Germany, based on the principle of the freedom of choice, uses its right to choose the organization it wants to belong to, and decides to become a member of the Warsaw Pact, will you be able to give your consent to that? Baker: We will say that, in our opinion, it is the wrong decision from the point of view of future stability. However, we will uphold the Helsinki principles. Gorbachev: I see. Well, I am satisfied: you essentially gave arguments in support of my position. Because we are saying that a united Germany’s membership in NATO will change the correlation of forces that has ensured stability in Europe for the past 45 years. Therefore, our argument is a mirror of yours. Baker: No, I cannot agree with that. Gorbachev: We must look for a way to combine our approaches. The unification of Germany is a new reality, and this new phenomenon is testing our ability to find solutions based on a balance of interests. After all, we have said this is what we strive for. Right now, when this approach is subjected to the first serious test, we must look for a mutually acceptable solution. Baker: Let me ask you: would you consent to Germany’s free choice to remain a member of NATO? Gorbachev: I am honest with you and I told you: if a united Germany will belong to NATO or the Warsaw Pact, it will lead to a change in the strategic 160

balance in Europe and the entire world. I think in the current situation you should not leave us stranded. It is a very important moment, and if this happens we could take completely unexpected steps. So let’s look for mutually acceptable solutions. Shevardnadze: I would like to say, Mr. Secretary of State, that when you are thinking about united Germany’s membership in NATO, you forget that no one has yet cancelled the Potsdam Agreement. Theoretically, this Agreement defines the structure, military-political status, and conditions such as denazification, demilitarization, and democratization of Germany. It also defines our rights, the rights of the four powers. Right now we are being asked to surrender these rights, but on the basis of a unilateral decision, which only takes into account the interests of the West and does not take into account our concerns. Secondly. I think the Secretary of State is right when he says that we must consider the public opinion in the United States. And you are talking about the minority of your population. So, I want to say: I am certain that if united Germany becomes a member of NATO, it will blow up perestroika. Our people will not forgive us. People will say that we ended up the losers, not the winners. One more thing. I do not share your opinion that pan-European security is only a dream, some kind of fantasy. The CSCE process is a reality. We have to think about European security structures that would not be based on blocs. We can create them. Gorbachev: And our potential membership in NATO is not such a wild fantasy. After all, there was a big coalition at one time, so why is it impossible now? Baker: I understand your point that you cannot be left standing on your own right now. Frankly speaking, this is exactly why we proposed the “2+4” mechanism. We recognize the necessity of your participation in regulating the European process, including the process of German unification. Gorbachev: Exactly right. Baker: We understand your domestic political factors as well. Gorbachev: Yes, we are already hearing people say that the mechanism has turned into “1+4.” And the Soviet Union is the one, while Germany is in the Western four. Baker: And one more thing. I said that pan-European security is a dream. What I meant is that it is a dream today. We made concrete proposals on how to build its structures in order for it to become a reality. In the meantime, we consider it important for Germany to be firmly anchored in security institutions, so it is not tempted to create some kind of security structure of its own. We think it is important for Germany to be a member of the European Economic Community, even though we are not members. We have seen the past results of having a separate, neutral Germany. Shevardnadze: Two words on the issue of the size of the Bundeswehr. We think a decision on this matter should be made in the framework of the “six,” and afterwards consolidated in the framework of the CSCE, at the Vienna 161

negotiations on conventional armed forces. After all, the issue of unified Germany’s military potential has to be tied to the external aspects of German unification. Gorbachev: Summing up, I want to say that we had a good session of “throwing around ideas” before the meeting in Washington. I recently gave a speech in connection with the 45th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany. I talked about the 27 million Soviet citizens who died in the war. But I did not tell the whole story. We lost the best part of our population. And the 18 million wounded and shell-shocked! And the damage to the health of those who, hungry, cold, and poorly dressed, worked on the home front. It was an enormous shock for the entire nation. Therefore, this is a very complex situation. Our people will not accept a unilateral decision. Not only we, but you too will find yourselves in conflict with our people. So think about it again. In conclusion, I want to say—do not believe the people who claim that the Soviet Union would like to drive the United States out of Europe. On the contrary, we are convinced that it is impossible to achieve anything in Europe without the United States. Baker: We never believed such claims. Gorbachev: Although I am sure that you hear this thesis thrown around, as we do. [conversation continued with delegations] Gorbachev: Greetings to my colleagues on both sides. We need your help. I think that the importance of the Secretary of State’s visit is clear. It is determined by the fact that this visit is happening literally on the eve of the summit. We will review what we already have and what still remains to be done. We have time to accomplish more. Today I would like to hear your information about the state of [negotiations] on the strategic offensive weapons. Maybe we will be able to resolve some issues right now, and on some, we will issue home assignments. Baker: E.A. Shevardnadze and I had comprehensive discussions on many issues related to reduction and limitation of armaments, economic cooperation, regional problems, in particular on Afghanistan and Cambodia. Today, in the second part of the day, we will continue our discussion of regional issues and also we will hear reports of the groups on human rights and transnational problems. I would like to mention the fact that there was some progress on eight out of twenty names on the list, which President Bush gave you on Malta. Gorbachev: If we are talking about progress, Ambassador Matlock has created probably the longest line in Moscow in front of his Embassy. Matlock: It is becoming shorter. Baker: Unfortunately, in one case, “progress” meant that the person on the list passed away. Seven received an exit permit. However, twelve people are still being refused an exit visa. Mainly with reference to their knowledge of state secrets. However, none of them had access to classified work for at least ten years. 162

Therefore, we would ask you to give some consideration to this list before your departure for Washington. Gorbachev: We’ll see. Baker: The majority of our conversations focused on arms reductions and limitations. As you know, we gave E.A. Shevardnadze our new proposals in Bonn, which the Soviet side then responded to. Over the course of further negotiations we made some progress, but, unfortunately, we cannot yet say that the main questions of strategic offensive weapons have been resolved. President Bush hopes that an agreement on SLCMs and ALCMs will be achieved before your visit to the US. It is very important to him to be able to announce during the visit that we reached an agreement on the main points of the future treaty. In the course of this meeting we discussed some other aspects of strategic offensive weapons as well. As far as I know, we made some progress on the issue of non-circumvention [as in the text] [sic] and a few others. We are also prepared to discuss issues concerning the reduction of conventional armed forces, although we do not consider bilateral discussions to be a forum for negotiations and a way to reach an agreement on this issue. The progress made in preparing the protocols for the nuclear testing agreements gives us every reason to believe that these protocols will be ready for signing at the Summit. We also moved forward in preparing a joint statement on non-proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons, as well as missiles and missile technology. We are very close to agreement on a bilateral agreement on the destruction of chemical weapons. This will be a big step forward and we are sure that it will be well received around the world. Shevardnadze: As the Secretary of State noted, the issues of disarmament were the priority at our meeting. I think as the result of our work we have good preconditions to announce in Washington that we have an agreement on the main points of a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons. Two problems appear to be the most difficult and delicate. These are airlaunched and sea-launched cruise missiles. I will go over the unresolved issues in these spheres. The question of limiting the number of heavy bombers with ALCMs. The United States is against any kind of limits. Now the Secretary of State has in principle given his consent to establish limits, however, the proposed level—180 units—is too high. Perhaps in the course of this meeting we will be able to reach a compromise. The second issue concerns the feasibility of discerning nuclear SLCMs from non-nuclear ones. The United States is against such an approach, since they say our agreement not to include any control measures removes the question of distinguishability. This is a serious hurdle. The lack of distinguishable features would prevent us from having a real idea of the state of affairs in this sphere. We have not yet agreed on the exchange of information regarding naval nuclear weapons with ranges exceeding 300km. 163

We have not resolved the issue of excluding American non-nuclear missiles “Tacit Rainbow” from the treaty on the range limit of ALCMs. According to the agreement reached in Moscow in 1988, it was supposed to be counted as a nuclear missile. The American side is asking to make an exception. Gorbachev: In general, how do things stand with control? This is a very important question if the future treaty is to pass the Supreme Soviet. Shevardnadze: We have reached agreement on the majority of questions in this sphere. Baker: We have not fully resolved the issue of control over ground mobile ICBMs. Shevardnadze: According to the current position of the U.S., the Soviet side would have to send 40–50 notifications on the movement of such missiles daily. We are for control, but such an approach would create serious difficulties. I think we should continue discussing this question in the working groups. Gorbachev: Indeed, it looks like you are avoiding control over SLCMs, which are mobile missiles, while demanding 40-50 notifications per day on our mobile missiles. Mr. Secretary of State, you recall how in the beginning the United States did not want to discuss SLCMs at all, while we said that without an agreement on this problem, there would be no treaty at all. So we made a serious concession, we are practically saying that we will take your word for it. What will we tell the Supreme Soviet, how can we explain this decision? Baker: I will reply to your question. I will start with the fact that two weeks ago we had big differences on the [subject of] SLCMs and ALCMs. The main differences concerned three issues. The question of range of ALCMs. From the beginning you argued for the range limit of 600 kilometers. Marshal Akhromeyev even insisted that he reached an agreement on that with P. Nitze several years ago. We don’t think so. Our initial position was 1500km. Before the meeting in Bonn, our position was 800km, yours—600km. In Bonn, I told the Minister that if we find a satisfactory resolution on other elements of the package, and in particular, if an exception could be made for the missile “Tacit Rainbow,” the range of which is over 600km, then we will agree with your position on the range limits, because you explained to us that your entire anti-air defense system is built on the assumption of precisely that range. The second issue—the problem of the overall limit on the number of SLCMs. You raised it twice in your conversations with me. Gorbachev: And I raised it about ten times before you. Baker: In Bonn I said that even though we always rejected that approach, we are ready to establish the limit of 1000 units. But I have to be honest—such a decision does not sit well with many of us. Third issue—the limit on the number of heavy bombers. In Bonn I said that having met you halfway on two of the three main issues, we expected that you would agree with our position on the third one. However, yesterday we showed flexibility. 164

The fact of the matter is that President Bush really wants all issues resolved before the Washington summit. So, yesterday we agreed to the approach you were proposing, on the basis of which heavy bombers over a certain limit would be counted by their real ALCM armament. The only question is the quantitative parameter of this limit. Thus, we met you halfway on the three main issues that divided us three weeks ago. There still remains the question of the range limit of SLCMs covered by the political statement. Our position is 300km, yours is 600km. We understand that you have a significant number of SLCM in the range between 300km and 600km. But yesterday for the first time the Soviet side raised the question of including other naval nuclear arms in the statement, besides SLCMs. Now I will explain why it is quite difficult for us to accept your proposal on differentiating between nuclear and non-nuclear SLCMs. First and foremost, SLCMs are covered by political statements that are not part of the treaty. Nuclear ALCMs are covered by the treaty itself, therefore it is quite natural to differentiate them from non-nuclear [missiles]. We have thousands of non-nuclear SLCMs. A special feature of their production is that it is the same as the nuclear. You are essentially asking us to transfer the approach developed for ALCMs to a completely different situation. I would say it would be pushing the control over SLCMs through the back door. But we always maintained that they could not be controlled. That is why they are considered separately. As for your argument that you won’t know how many SLCMs we have, this is not the case. [Our] budget is published, and you know how many nuclear and non-nuclear sea-based cruise missiles we produce every year. In conclusion, I would like to emphasize one more time that we made great efforts in order to meet you halfway on the main issues of the SLCMs and ALCMs. Shevardnadze: If I start listing everything that happened in the course of our negotiations, two days will not be enough to list all our concessions. Gorbachev: That’s true; the American side should not assign all the credit for achieving the agreement to itself. Shevardnadze: It would be difficult for us to defend this treaty in the Supreme Soviet. We made the biggest concession to agree to resolve the issue of SLCMs on the basis of a political statement. Gorbachev: How can we convince the Supreme Soviet? Shevardnadze: This will not be easy. Besides, we gave up [our right] of inspection of any submarines and ships with SLCMs. Therefore, we have all the right to expect that the United States would move more in the direction of our position, as we have done, taking into consideration the specific concerns about which the U.S. side told us. Gorbachev: If your unwillingness to agree to inspections of ships with SLCMs is related to your concern that all your ships would be subject to such 165

inspections, then maybe we could agree on the following: let us establish a minimal quota, let us say, two ships a year, which would be subject to selective inspections. Or does your position consist of the condition that an alien foot should never be able to step on an American ship? Baker: We, of course, would prefer precisely this solution. We do not want to start movement down this slippery road. Gorbachev: A quota—one or two selective inspections per year—would permit us to tell the Supreme Soviet that some control was envisioned. What is it that bothers you? Tell me honestly. Baker: We always held the position that SLCMs could not be controlled and therefore could not be considered in this treaty. And we welcomed your willingness to agree to the resolution of this in the framework of a separate statement. Gorbachev: We welcome the appreciation you showed of how serious this issue is for us. If it is not resolved, there would be no treaty. But we have to do something on the inspections. Baker: We agreed to establish an overall limit on the number of SLCMs. It was not easy for us. But if you are saying that the absence of inspections of SLCMs puts the treaty in danger, then the situation truly becomes very different. You are asking how you would persuade the Supreme Soviet. Gorbachev: And ourselves too. Baker: We will also have to persuade ourselves and the Congress. For example, the treaty does not envision a prohibition on modernization of the heavy ICBMs, even though we were seeking it actively. You, however, are telling us that there could be no talk about such a prohibition. So we had to meet you halfway, even though in our country very few people are happy about that. This is the logic of compromise. Gorbachev: I think that every position about which we are negotiating should presuppose some form of inspection. We agreed to a separate document on the SLCMs. But in order for that to be a serious document, we need a mechanism of control or inspection. You are worried that in that case almost the entire American fleet would suddenly be subject to inspection. OK, we are willing to free you from that [concern], by establishing the quota of two inspections per year. This is an insignificant number, considering the fact that you have hundreds of ships. Baker: If we propose to the Congress to approve the limitations on any kind of weapon systems, then the Congress would ask—is that possible to inspect. The SLCMs are not possible to inspect. Neither you nor we can inspect them. Gorbachev: We only propose selective inspections. One or two per year. And you are against any inspections. Why? Baker: Because the SLCMs are not part of the treaty. And precisely because they cannot be controlled effectively. And as far as it is the fact, we cannot agree to a regime that does not provide an opportunity for an effective control. “Some kind” of control would be a mistake. The Congress would not agree to that, they would say it was a fiction. The Congress would say to us that if the treaty was not limiting the SLCMs and that the issue was resolved by a political statement, then 166

why would you need to establish a system of inspection, which would not be effective anyway. We made very serious progress in the direction of your position on the SLCMs and the ALCMs. We accepted your position on the range limits of the ALCMs, on the overall limits on the SLCMs on limiting the number of heavy bombers. All these issues, which were left “hanging” during the last five or six years, were resolved in the last two weeks. Shevardnadze: If one was to count concessions, then the biggest concession is the agreement by the USSR to resolve the issue of the SLCMs on the basis of a political statement. Baker: We admit that. Gorbachev: In the treaty on the 50 percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons, the Soviet Union made such a concession that the American side did not even anticipate. I am talking about the agreement to cut the number of our heavy missiles by half. We agreed to that in Reykjavik. Compared to that, American concessions are just sunflower seeds. Baker: Tell that to the Congress. Gorbachev: Are you inviting me? Seems to me that this is the first time. Seems like members of Congress don’t want me to speak there for some reason. I will continue. If you look at the structure of the Soviet forces subject to reductions, you will see that the Soviet Union is destroying hundreds of very modern missiles. And you will be cutting the old trash, recyclables, which you would be eliminating in any case. As far as submarines are concerned, yes, here you are cutting more modern weapons as well, but on the whole, the situation is such that our Supreme Soviet could ask the legitimate question: why does the Soviet leadership agree to such reductions, which weaken the basic units of our arsenal? If one looks at the prospects of our further negotiations, then what are the consequences of the current American position? The United States is taking out the strict limitations or strict inspections of precisely the kinds of weapons—planes, sea and air-launched cruise missiles—that focus on development and modernization, and to which the Soviet Union has been paying less attention. What are the implications of such a position? It would make further negotiations more difficult. Baker: I agree with your words that the Soviet Union made a big concession by agreeing to a political statement on SLCMs. We acknowledge that this made the treaty possible. But as soon as you agreed to it, certain consequences were to follow. For our part, we feel that we also made significant concessions to the Soviet Union. In particular, [we agreed to] establish a limit on the total number of SLCMs and a formula to limit the number of heavy bombers. I do not think that our agreements will complicate the process of arms reductions and limitations. Let alone that limits under the treaty will be in effect for at least fifteen years, I want to mention the possibility of accepting at the summit a joint statement for future negotiations on strategic offensive weapons. We made good progress in preparations and the work continues. 167

Gorbachev: And what will the military men who are here with us today say about this? Akhromeyev: The main breakthrough on the SLCM issue was achieved in Washington in 1987. Everyone here knows that this is where the foundation was laid. In a joint statement, the parties agreed to establish a separate limit on the number of SLCMs and find means of control. If we didn’t find these means, it is because only one side was interested in this, the Soviet Union. The United States was not. Therefore, the lack of control, as noted by President Gorbachev, really does create a problem. Gorbachev: We will be suspicious of your intentions. The question will arise whether we can trust the United States. Baker: Every year we will make a statement on cruise missiles, they will be politically binding in nature. The American system is quite transparent, and it is inconceivable that the United States could produce SLCMs in violation of the agreement. This is guaranteed by the open nature of our defense budget. Gorbachev: If this is the case, then why is it not known how many nuclear SLCMs you are planning to produce? Baker: It seems you know how many. The level proposed by the Soviet side—760 units—is almost entirely in line with our plans. The difference is only two units. Gorbachev: What we know is another question. Our intelligence services work, and so do yours. And it seems they are feeding each other information (general laughter). Baker: By the way, the joint statement from the Washington summit does not say that the parties will find a solution to the issue of control over SLCMs. It says they will seek a solution. And we tried to find it. Gorbachev: So maybe we should add a formula to the text of the political statement that the parties will seek a solution to this problem? This way, we will at least confirm the old position. Baker: You are suggesting to repeat the Washington formula? Gorbachev: At least if such a political statement will be made simultaneously with the conclusion of a treaty on SLCMs, if the sides state that they will continue to search for a solution to this problem, we will be able to convince the Supreme Soviet. If we can’t make progress, then at least let us confirm the old position. Otherwise it will be a setback. It seems to me that the phrasing that both sides would keep searching for a solution to this problem, which was included in the political statement, would help both you, and us, to avoid many problems in the course of ratification. I would ask you to think about this. Bartholomew: Right now we are working on the basis of the Soviet draft of the document. And it did not mention the means of inspection. It only talks about the measures of cooperation. Gorbachev: Yes, I know. But please allow the President of the USSR to have his own opinion. 168

The issue of ratification of the future treaty is an exceptionally important issue. If we sign the treaty and it is not ratified, it would be trouble, a scandal. Baker: That already happened once before. We will think about your proposal. Gorbachev: The issue of limits of heavy bombers with ALCMs. This is an important thing. We proposed the limit of 120 planes, and above that—according to the actual number of ALCMs. Your proposal is 180 heavy bombers. The difference is 60 planes. [This is] a big difference, corresponding to 1,200 units of ALCMs. Maybe we should split that difference in half and establish the limit of 150 planes. Baker: I agree. Next issue. Gorbachev: Range limits. Here I take your position. Baker: Are you ready to make an exception for Tacit Rainbow? Gorbachev: Yes, I am ready. Baker: The issue that remains is the range limits for SLCMs. Gorbachev: We need to agree on the number of nuclear-equipped SLCMs. Let’s meet each other halfway. In other words—800 units. Baker: I think we should split the difference between our current position and your current position—760 and 1,000. Then the limit should be 880 units. Gorbachev: I agree. But then we need to affirm that both sides would be seeking methods of inspection of SLCMs. Baker: This is your proposal. Gorbachev: At least it allows us not to step backward. Baker: We will consider it. We still have planned conversations today and tomorrow. But I would like to be reassured that you propose to restate the formula that was included in the Washington joint statement. In other words, you are not proposing that the two sides would announce that they would actually implement the stipulations of the political statement. They would just be seeking ways to inspect SLCMs. This will be just a statement of intentions. Gorbachev: Yes, I propose the Washington formula. It would not be easy for us to defend this position in the Supreme Soviet, but at least we will be able to say that we have been seeking and will continue to seek a solution for this issue. Otherwise, it might seem that this issue was buried. Baker: If we accept your proposal, then you will not raise the issue of distinctive features of nuclear-equipped SLCMs? Gorbachev: I think we will accept the formula that at the next stage [of negotiations, both] sides would raise all the issues of concern to them. We can remove them for right now. Baker: I want to return to the question of range limits for SLCMs. The statement will include SLCMs with a range over 600km. With regard to the confidential exchange of data, we believe the data should be confined to SLCMs with a range of 300-600km, and not other nuclear weapons like bombs, etc. Gorbachev: I understand your position. I think we agreed on some things, but some details remain that need to be worked out. Let us not rush through this. Baker: But my consent for the range of SLCMs will depend on the details. Gorbachev: The decisions will be made in a package. 169

Baker: I repeat, I can agree to a range of 600km on the condition that we will come to an agreement on what information will be transmitted in the 300-600km range. Gorbachev: This question should be worked out. We will have a statement on future negotiations on strategic offensive weapons and strategic stability. In that statement we could note that the sides will review the issues on which they were not able to reach agreement in the treaty on 50 percent reductions. Baker: I agree that we will have such a statement, if we can agree on wording. Some more questions on strategic offensive weapons have not been resolved yet. I don’t know if we have the opportunity to discuss them right now. I am talking about the issue of flight tests of heavy ICBMs, and the question of limiting the number of warheads on mobile ICBMs. Shevardnadze: We made a good proposal on this issue. Our former position was 1,600 units. Now we are proposing 1,200. However, the U.S. proposal of 800 units is not fair. Baker: We met you halfway. Before we had no position at all. Gorbachev: We need to find a compromise solution. Baker: Between 1,200 and 800. We also would like to find a solution on the issue of limits on flight testing of heavy missiles. You know our former position on this issue. You rejected it. But we have to show something to Congress. Shevardnadze: The United States currently proposes to limit the number of flight tests to two per year, and in addition to that the Soviet Union would be required to stop production of such ICBMs by 1993. If the U.S. insists on this proposal, this could negate all our work. As far as the issue of heavy ICBMs is concerned, we have already made all the concessions that we could have made. Akhromeyev: This issue was resolved in the Washington statement at the highest level. Gorbachev: Our work is not finished with this treaty. The next stage will involve the solution of more difficult tasks. And then we would be able to consider many issues, including those related to the heavy ICBMs, MIRVs, mobile ICBMs and so on. Baker: If we agree that the treaty does not stipulate limits on the production of the heavy ICBMs, then we probably have a right to count on you to move toward our position on the issue of test flights to some extent. Gorbachev: This is beyond the limits of this treaty. Right now we are not prepared to tell you anything on this issue. It would only slow down our work. I do not know, maybe to some extent, the statement about future negotiations and strategic stability would “swallow” this issue, and would give you something with which you can go back to Washington. But right now we are not ready to solve this issue, it would only complicate everything. Baker: I promised to think about your proposal to restate the Washington formula on inspections in the statement on SLCMs. Maybe you could think of a 170

different version that would move toward our position on the issue of test flights for heavy ICBMs. Gorbachev: I think these are two different issues. We are now seeing outlines of a statement about future negotiations and strategic stability, and I think that at the second stage of our negotiations, we could very well discuss heavy ICBMs. I do not see [any] connection with the issue of SLCMs. Baker: I did not imply that there was a connection. I would like to hope that before my departure from Moscow we would be able to resolve the two remaining issues relating to SLCMs, and that way the issues of SLCMs and ALCMs would be removed. Without [any] connection with these issues, we have concerns about the issue of heavy ICBMs. I told Minister Shevardnadze yesterday that our initial position, which is still on the table of negotiations in Geneva, presupposed cessation of testing, production and modernization of such missiles. We dropped it and asked only to set a limit—two flight tests per year and cessation of production in 1993. In the course of the negotiations, I realized that the position of ceasing production is impassable. All right. Now I am only asking for one thing: consider whether you can accept any wording in the treaty that would limit the scope of testing of these highly destabilizing missiles. Gorbachev: As I understand, the discussion of strategic offensive forces problems will continue. It seems we did some good work and made some decisions. I want to thank all the participants of this discussion. Baker: Thank you, Mr. President. (After talks with the delegations, the conversation was continued once again one-on-one.) Baker: I would like to thank you for your time and attention. I appreciate it, and the President appreciates it. I would like to bring up the Lithuania issue. It has been repeatedly discussed between us; we had extensive conversations with E. A. Shevardnadze on this problem. As I told him, we tried to influence the Lithuanians through indirect channels, to get them to take a more moderate position. We said the same thing to our allies. At the same time as I was talking with E.A. Shevardnadze, we had indirect contact with Landsbergis. It so happened historically that our countries have different positions on this issue. At his last press conference, President Bush acknowledged that this problem is creating some tension. That is why we really wanted the Lithuanians to put their decisions on hold on their own initiative and agree to come to Moscow to start negotiations. We put pressure on the Lithuanians but at the same time refrained from certain concrete steps that Congress would have liked to impose on us. As I said to Shevardnadze, today I have to meet with Prunskiene. I simply cannot renege on this meeting because the President received her at the White House. I will say the same thing to her that we conveyed to them by other channels: they should suspend their declaration of independence, come to Moscow and open a dialogue. I would like to ask you: if they take this path, can we expect 171

a dialogue? I am sure that should a dialogue begin, especially before our next summit, it would greatly improve the atmosphere for your meeting with President Bush. Such is political reality, it is necessary to take it into account. Gorbachev: Yesterday N.I. Ryzhkov and I met with Prunskiene. Baker: I know about this. Gorbachev: I must say that our platform for maneuvering is limited. It takes a great deal of skill to execute a broad maneuver on this rather limited platform. I won’t lay it out for you in detail. We are still committed to a political settlement of this problem. Yesterday we agreed that she will try to get a resolution at the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania to freeze the implementation of Lithuania’s Independence Act. Baker: And she agreed? Gorbachev: Yes, she will try to get it done. The situation is currently pushing us and them towards a resolution. I told her that the Congress of People’s Deputies adopted a resolution, declaring the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania’s decisions invalid. For me as President, these decisions simply do not exist. However, I told her that I will try to make the argument, though it will be difficult, that the decision to freeze [the Act] is viable and enables us to start a dialogue. I have to tell you that the overwhelming majority here is not prepared to accept this and is insisting on introducing presidential rule. So we will have to prove that this approach is acceptable. At the same time I told her that she will have to do some work to prove that the present resolution is the best possible and viable compromise. I told her: if you had to rescind the Independence Act, you would be accused of letting Moscow bring you to your knees. If, however, you freeze its implementation, then you can say that the Act still exists, but is not being implemented. All told, we spoke until 11 p.m. last night, and in the end she said that she will try to get it done. If the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania accepts such a decision, we will immediately create working groups and begin negotiations on all issues. The economic sanctions will be lifted and a normal process will get underway. Baker: If the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania votes to freeze their declaration but at the same time it will remain as a declaration of intent, you will accept it? Gorbachev: That problem is somewhat different. We are talking about freezing this declaration and beginning a discussion with the Center regarding realizing the Lithuanian people’s right to self-determination. I told her it is entirely possible that we may be able to work out single, common position. At the same time it is also possible this won’t happen and we will have a referendum, with the Center’s opinion on one side, and the Lithuanian opinion on the other. If the people decide to leave the Soviet Union, then we will begin the process of division. This won’t be a simple task. For example, a few days ago a delegation of ethnic Poles came to Moscow and declared that in the case of Lithuania’s secession they would like to join with the Russian Federation. Approximately 500,000 Russians and Belarusians live in Lithuania. If the American administration goes to such great lengths to rescue 172

any American from trouble, then how do you expect us to act? It is likely that a significant portion of Russians will want to leave Lithuania and return to the Soviet Union. This also needs to be resolved. Remember that France gave Caledonia 10 years for divorce proceedings. There will be a great number of economic problems, a complex intertwining of economic concerns. We will have to agree on the format of economic relations. Military, defense questions. We have missiles there. This all needs to be resolved. That is why we are inviting them to have a normal constitutional process. Lithuania has always been connected to Russia, its market has always been here. But we won’t impose anything on them. If they want to leave, that’s their right. But you have to do things considerately, taking all problems into account. For instance, it turns out that in 1940 Stalin gave a few regions of Byelorussia to Lithuania. Now Byelorussians are demanding the return of their land. Baker: When I was speaking to Congress I specifically mentioned the fact that Vilnius was not part of Lithuania until 1940. Gorbachev: As well as Klaipeda. Instead of merging it with Kaliningrad Oblast, Stalin gave it to Lithuania. As for the Byelorussians, they say their republic suffered from the Chernobyl disaster. Many districts of Gomel Oblast had to be resettled due to the radioactive fallout. Even now they want to use the former Byelorussian regions to settle their citizens there. They adopted a resolution, which we tried to keep under wraps by the way, but they made it public it themselves. I told Prunskiene yesterday: look at this mess you’ve made. We are in favor of giving Lithuania economic and political autonomy, with the possibility of choosing a special status, such as a confederate. But at the same time all the issues must be resolved—humanitarian, territorial, etc. We will seek a solution for this problem. We will do everything we can to untangle this knot to everyone’s best interests. Baker: Do you think that she will succeed in convincing the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania? Gorbachev: I think she will. There is already a split among them. Baker: On Brazauskas’ side? Gorbachev: Yes. We appreciate your position and your determination to help us find a way out of this situation. Right now it is important to show restraint. We will see how events unfold. Recently some comrades visited rural regions of Lithuania and saw that people there do not support the separatists. They are happy with the current situation; they receive concentrates from the Center, the existing network. I think this is why the Lithuanian leadership is afraid of a referendum. Baker: Only 40 percent of the population voted for the current Supreme Soviet. Gorbachev: Exactly. So, we will untangle this knot. You have to understand that we could have taken a completely different route and acted more harshly, if we ourselves hadn’t been the initiators of the 173

democratization and reform process in our country. I’m under tremendous pressure; I’m getting telegrams with demands to take decisive action. I’m being told: look at what the American president does to protect his citizens! I’m going to show your President these telegrams. We are firmly committed to our line and we are committed to a political settlement of this problem. Baker: We wish you success in this and all of your efforts. I would like to affirm once again that the President and I support you, support perestroika, and we will act accordingly. [Source: The Gorbachev Foundation Archive, Fond 1, Opis 1. Published in Gorbachev, Sobranie sochinenii, v. 20, pp. 13–29. Translated by Anna Melyakova, Svetlana Savranskaya, and Chris Johnson.]

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Document No. 26: Memorandum from Scowcroft for the President: “Scope Paper—The Gorbachev Summit” Late May 1990

On the eve of the summit, the U.S. national security adviser places the issues to be discussed into the context of the “declining economy, political polarization and ethnic strife” afflicting the Soviet Union, and Gorbachev’s need for external support. Scowcroft encourages Bush to treat Gorbachev as an equal and a leader of a great power, but he does not advocate for any actual assistance. The memorandum outlines where Bush could persuade Gorbachev to move even closer to the U.S. position and away from supporting his allies in the Third World. The priority is to persuade Gorbachev to acquiesce on the German issue, “making absolutely clear that full German membership in NATO is not negotiable,” even while bearing in mind the sensitivity of the issue for the Soviet population. Scowcroft notes that Gorbachev is now prepared to ask directly for economic assistance whereas earlier the Soviets “pridefully” avoided the topic and spoke only about equal trade and economic relations. To get aid, however, Scowcroft believes Gorbachev would have to make more concessions because it is inconceivable that Congress would act “while Moscow supports Cuba, blockades Lithuania and opposes German membership in NATO.”

In the last few days, you have heard scholars of the Soviet Union give very different assessments of the severity of Moscow’s problems. My view is that while the Soviet Union is not in danger of imminent collapse, the now familiar list of woes—the declining economy, political polarization and ethnic strife to name a few—have most certainly seriously worsened since Gorbachev’s meeting with you at Malta. More importantly, Gorbachev is increasingly blamed personally for the chaotic state of affairs by a population that values order above all else. The Soviet leadership faces critical decisions this summer concerning the Soviet Union’s political and economic future. The Communist Party could split at the Party Congress in July, launching the Soviet Union on the road to a multiparty system; challenges will increase from rebellious republics; and the leadership will submit its economic program to a national referendum in hopes of finally gaining political legitimacy to launch desperately needed reform measures. Gorbachev is a leader with much on his mind and far more than at Malta, Soviet internal difficulties will be the backdrop for your meeting with him. Given his domestic difficulties, you will want to reassure Gorbachev that you continue to support him and are committed to maintaining a cooperative U.S.Soviet relationship. But he must also understand that your support for perestroika is not unconditional. In this regard, you should explain why his policy toward the Baltic States, which is a departure from the principles that he himself set forth for perestroika, has had a negative impact on the relationship. You will want to 175

reiterate with him the critical link between continued reform in the Soviet Union, a forthcoming Soviet foreign policy—particularly regarding Germany—and further improvements in U.S.-Soviet relations. This Summit also gives you an opportunity to move toward closure on several of the essential agreements that would codify the gains of the last year. The most important of these is to complete the unification of Germany and assure its continued full membership in NATO. You need to seek to persuade Gorbachev to—at a minimum—acquiesce in German membership in NATO. But if in the long-run that proves to be impossible for him, you will want to have established a clear record—particularly with the German public—of reasonable attempts to take into account Soviet concerns. With Gorbachev it will be important to show that you understand the sensitivity of the German problem for the Soviet Union while making absolutely clear that full German membership in NATO is not negotiable. Moscow’s concern over its deteriorating security position in Europe has stirred contradictory impulses in the Soviet leadership concerning CFE. On the one hand, the Soviets know that a CFE accord is a precondition for the CSCE Summit that they so want. But at the same time, the fact that the Soviet security situation has shifted dramatically since CFE began has apparently led the leadership to reassess precisely what it wants and needs from a CFE agreement. The CFE negotiations need a political push from Gorbachev in order to resolve the outstanding issues. You will want to impress upon Gorbachev that CFE is the most important building block of a new Europe—one that will bring the military situation on the continent into line with the new political realities. Similarly, you may want to press Gorbachev on “Open Skies,” reiterating once again the importance—symbolically and in reality—of a regime committed to openness and transparency about military activities. In addition to trying to bring to closure these key issues on Europe, this is a good time to engage Gorbachev on Afghanistan and perhaps on Cuban assistance to the FMLN in El Salvador. The Soviets are not prepared to abandon their allies precipitously but as the domestic situation worsens they will face ever harder choices about their foreign policy adventures. Gorbachev should understand that regional conflicts can still have a negative effect on the overall U.S.-Soviet relationship and that their solution—as in the case of Nicaragua—makes it easier for you to support perestroika. Finally, Gorbachev will undoubtedly place high priority on economic matters. Should you decide not to sign the trade agreement because of Soviet policy in Lithuania, there will be some awkwardness in exploring the future of U.S.-Soviet economic relations. Nonetheless, you will have the chance to hear Gorbachev detail his economic reform program and to discuss the many economic agreements that will be signed at the Summit. In conversations with Helmut Kohl and Jim Baker, Gorbachev has signaled his intention to seek economic assistance from the West. The exact form of the assistance that he seeks is not clear. You should be aware of how significant a 176

departure this step entails for Gorbachev. The Soviets have pridefully refused to ask for “assistance” or “help” in undertaking perestroika. You will remember Shevardnadze’s comment that talk of economic help “offends Soviet sensibilities and that this possibility did not come up at Malta.” If in fact he does request direct assistance, it will be important for you to tell Gorbachev honestly that your ability to assist the Soviet economy depends in large part on whether Moscow is ready to take further steps that support Western interests, especially concerning Germany and total Soviet military withdrawal from Eastern Europe. It is inconceivable that Congress would appropriate funds for the Soviet Union while Moscow supports Cuba, blockades Lithuania and opposes German membership in NATO. The Soviet Union is a great power and has said to now that it wished only to engage in equal commercial and economic relations with other states. That Moscow is contemplating an appeal to the West for help is a measure of the leadership’s own sense of a deepening economic crisis. One of the consequences of that state of mind may be a need to demonstrate that the Soviet Union’s superpower status is in tact [sic] and—for Gorbachev personally—to show that he is your equal. A chronic sense of inferiority has always driven the Soviets (and the Russian tsars before them) to insist on equality and reciprocity in dealings with foreign governments—particularly the United States. In the current circumstances, where nothing seems to be going right for Moscow, you may find that desire for at least the appearance of equality exaggerated. More than anything, Gorbachev will want to avoid any suggestion that he and his country are on their last legs. This Summit allows Gorbachev to demonstrate that whatever the state of affairs at home—his foreign policy is moving forward. For that reason if no other, the Soviets will come to this Summit trying to show that the U.S.-Soviet relationship, the centerpiece of the new foreign policy, is alive and well. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through Mandatory Review request 2008-0824-MR by the National Security Archive.]

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Document No. 27: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Kohl, 7:34 a.m. – 7:43 a.m. May 30, 1990

The West German chancellor rings up President Bush before Gorbachev’s arrival in Washington for the summit to urge him to make three points to the Soviet leader. The first is that Bush and Kohl have a firm joint position on the “future membership of a united Germany in NATO without any limitations.” The second is that Kohl believes it is possible to “find a sensible economic arrangement” with Gorbachev—meaning major West German financial aid and credits—because he “needs help very much.” Third, “it is of immense importance that we make further progress in disarmament.” (Interestingly, in the Bush-Scowcroft version of this conversation in their joint memoir, A World Transformed (p. 278), Kohl’s third point about disarmament is left out altogether. On Gorbachev’s need for financial aid, the president is circumspect, commenting only: “I remember your private conversation with me. ... We have problems with that, related to Lithuania.” The U.S. is running its own budget deficit, and Bush has no intention of providing major financial support to Gorbachev—that would be up to Kohl.

The President: Helmut! Chancellor Kohl: Good morning! How are you? The President: I am getting ready for the big visit. I am glad to hear your voice. Chancellor Kohl: That is why I am calling. I wanted to exchange views for a couple of minutes. One thing, George: you can rely on our fullest support. I acknowledge very much what you have done for us and appreciate your friendship and reliability. One thing that is very important for Gorbachev to understand is that irrespective of developments, we will stand side by side. And one sign of this cooperation are the links between us by the future membership of a united Germany in NATO without any limitations. You should make this clear to him, but in a friendly way, and also make it clear that is the view I hold. There should be no doubt about that. A second point: we can find a sensible economic arrangement with him. He needs help very much. He should also know that we have no intention of profiting from his weakness. A final point: it is of immense importance that we make further progress in disarmament. The President: I appreciate your comments very much. On the German Question, as it is called, I don’t expect much breakthrough. I won’t change my views, but I will assure him we are side by side. We will layout our views on the Two Plus Four, including the need to terminate Four Power rights at the time of unification, with no new constraints on German sovereignty. We want him to come out feeling he has had a good Summit, even though there are no 178

major breakthroughs. I think we can do it. We have a wide range of agreements to sign. On the economic side, I remember your private conversation with me. Subsequently, that has been raised, with Jim Baker. We have problems with that, related to Lithuania. But I will take your advice. I don’t want him to think we are taking advantage of him because of his weakness. We will move the arms control agenda forward, but he must realize that on conventional forces, those are Alliance decisions. We can talk about this in general terms, but on matters like the levels of German forces, beyond those already on the table, we cannot make commitments. We really appreciated your offer to help on levels of the Bundeswehr, but we feel it is a little premature. Brent Scowcroft has gotten to Horst Teltschik on that. But it was a very generous offer on your part. Chancellor Kohl: George, to make this very clear: the wind blew some rumors my way, and I instructed Teltschik to approach Brent Scowcroft. I said we can discuss everything, but we have to agree beforehand before we reach agreement. Nothing is going to change on that. You can rely on it. The President: Good. I think we are up to date. I look forward to seeing you next week. Chancellor Kohl: I am very much looking forward to it. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library.]

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Document No. 28: Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, First Private Meeting, Washington, 10:54 a.m. – 12:45 p.m. May 31, 1990

In his memoir (p. 279), Bush describes the first one-on-one meeting in the Oval Office (with Scowcroft, Chernyaev and translators present) as “largely philosophical, the kind each of us had hoped to have at Malta.” This first conversation of the summit goes significantly longer than planned, forcing the delay of the first plenary session, but the tone between the leaders is strikingly direct and candid. They assure each other of their commitment to cooperation and further arms control negotiations. Bush draws Gorbachev’s attention to the situation in Lithuania and how difficult it is for him politically to sustain support for perestroika while Moscow pressures Lithuania to stay in the Soviet Union. Bush says he will try to continue to show patience, but he mentions that Lithuanian opposition leaders are comparing him to Neville Chamberlain, the appeaser of Hitler, “for supporting you [Gorbachev] and not the great American principles of democracy and freedom.” In the discussion of economic reform, Gorbachev tells Bush that the Soviets are not ready yet for a market economy and will need two years for transition. Bush compares this to being “pregnant: you can’t do it half-way,” to which Gorbachev presciently replies: “But neither can you have a baby in the first month. We want to avoid an abortion.”

The President: Welcome. We can open with anything you wish. We want this meeting to be seen as successful. We will try hard for a sense of success to present to the outside world. One more thing: we have this meeting, then expanded meetings, then Camp David, with you and me, then Baker and Shevardnadze. I think the private sessions will be most remunerative. There should be no press and no leaks. That is how I see it unfolding. President Gorbachev: My sincere greetings. It is good to be here in the White House. I am not a diplomat—you have studied me—I have no intention of becoming one. I believe the current time is such that we need to understand each other and to develop policies with respect to each other, and to others, which are predictable. I share your approach to this meeting. It should have a positive result. I am sure we can achieve that. I think our colleagues can complete the reviewing work. Our mission is to complete the philosophical discussion on issues we discussed even in 1987 and then at Malta. We said in the former meeting that if you were elected we would want to continue the work begun with President Reagan, and we took a further step at Governors Island. Then, I believe we did the right thing at Malta by not waiting for a formal meeting. I would like to salute you. After Malta, events were developing, and they could have gone differently without Malta and the understandings we reached 180

there. The processes continue, putting an even heavier load on us. That makes this meeting even more important. Let me make several points to begin our philosophical exchange. I think you agree that the center of world politics is the Soviet Union. What happens there is of monumental importance for you and the world. I value the positions you have stuck to. I know it is not easy, as it is not easy for me. While giving credit to our predecessors, we have to accept that we have a special task at this watershed in history. We cannot avoid that responsibility. The fact that we are using all forms of dialogue is appropriate. Let me outline the first point of my thoughts; these have not changed basically since the Reagan period. First, since we are in a radically new phase of our relations, we need a radically different view of, and approach to, each other. You may or may not agree, but the confrontation we got into after World War II wasted our time and energy, while others—the former vanquished—were moving ahead. Now they (the vanquished) are behaving very arrogantly. Japan’s empire is now extending to you, to us, and to Western Europe. Germany likewise is a very powerful center in Europe and areas around Europe. Even countries like China and India in the developing world are moving. The world is changing in dramatic ways. The U.S. alone, despite its power, can not lead the world by itself. Playing “cards” against each other is not the way to go. What kind of country would each like the other to be? We don’t want a weaker U.S. with infringed interests—this would create instability—and in U.S. political circles it is gradually becoming popular to see a stronger but democratic Soviet Union developing. Perestroika is how we hope to make that happen. We are moving toward a Soviet Union that is progressive, dynamic, free and turned toward the outside world and the U.S. If you analyze our statements and our initiative, you will see that we are not trying to infringe upon U.S. interests, especially security. This is our choice, and we are trying to get all sectors of Soviet society to accept this. It is not easy, but we are making progress. As a result, the image of the U.S. as a hostile and aggressive power is fading. But, realistically—I must be honest—every day I get reports; there are many in the Soviet Union telling me the U.S. is continuing to move and is trying to take advantage of perestroika to seek unilateral advantage. That is not surprising; you must have the same kind of people. The President: Why do your people think this way in a period of budget cuts and so forth? President Gorbachev: Public opinion as a whole is supportive and backs our policy. But at the same time some signal vigilance and are suspicious, for example war veterans, the military, and also the military/industrial complex. On balance, most want a good relationship and are for expanding cooperation. I believe our policy will be getting more and more support, but our people will follow very closely the steps taken by the U.S., especially in the security field. Let me conclude on this first point. I think we should build on what we have started, keep 181

it going, and accelerate it. People in the Soviet Union will judge your policy by your attitudes towards perestroika and towards trade and finance. The most harmful thing right now as our system is moving to open up is that there is not fair play. That could lead to a reversion to old ways, a sliding back from the ambitious policies we want to pursue. I say this because some in your press say that Gorbachev is weak and you should press your advantage. I am glad you have taken a firm policy line in favor of better relations and support of perestroika. That was in the U.S. interest, but I want you to know we appreciate it and I am sure the world does as well. As we take steps in various areas that will stimulate more contact and a better interrelationship, I have told international business that those who are with us now will be remembered, and those who stayed on the sidelines will lose out in the long run. This is a central point in my observations. All other points are subsidiary, so I would like to re-emphasize it. There is a regrouping in the world, and U.S.-Soviet relations are vital in this process—the question is, can we cooperate? When we do, people feel better, except for fears of condominium; but when we quarrel, people worry. Our conduct thus far has avoided the condominium idea. We cannot freeze our relations, however; we must move forward or we will fall behind. The President: I am most worried that we will not have enough time. This is fascinating. We need time, because under these philosophical points lie many specific issues. There is a significant change in U.S. attitudes toward the Soviet Union, although there is emerging suspicion. I was looking at some polls; they show strong personal support of you. This is partly because of the way you personally interact, but also because you have done things which only recently would have been impossible for Americans to contemplate. You wondered at Governors Island whether there were elements that wanted perestroika to fail. I said that, if so, it was very much a minority view; it is even more so today. We do have elements, in my party, who are still suspicious and don’t want to deal from equality and mutual respect. They are a small minority. We do not intend, either directly or indirectly, to play “cards” against you: China, India, etc. That is offensive to me, and I will not engage in it. Our people are probably not sufficiently sensitive, for example, to Soviet losses in World War II. As we wrestle with arms control, not only have I become more sensitive to that issue, but all my people have as well. We are attuned to that driving point for the Soviet Union, the fact that so many lost their lives. I wanted to get that comment on the table before we get—inevitably—to Germany, so you would know that I am sensitive to that historical fact. We do not want winners and losers. I wrote into my arrival comments the disproportionate responsibility that the Americans and the Soviets have for world structure. We respect the standing of the Soviet Union. Yes, you have problems, but you should understand that as long as I am in this office there will be no attempt to downgrade the position which the Soviet Union rightly occupies. You must believe my sincerity on this point as we get into detailed issues. You gave 182

me that map at Malta with the blue flags. I asked the CIA to see how accurate your intelligence was. They gave you high marks. President Gorbachev: I am sure your data on us is even better, because your technology is better. The President: But you get it all from Congress. President Gorbachev: Not all. The President: I told Brent that we have to convince you that these flags don’t mean that we are trying to surround, to encircle the Soviet Union. Some of it we can do by words; some must be by actions. The U.S. has not been a historic threat to the Soviet Union, nor vice versa. Problems arose only when the Cold War developed. I would like to go back to your first point. Obviously our commitment to democracy and freedom is well known. As we adhere to those principles, we are not trying to complicate life for the Soviet Union. There are several problems we need to discuss, here or in a bigger meeting— however you wish. Germany heads the list of difficult questions. CFE is very important, and maybe we can make progress. I understand you have hangups there which tie into the German problem. We don’t want a Soviet Union that is threatened by any power. We may have very different ideas about the future of Germany. Will they return to their old ways, or have they learned and paid their dues? I am of the latter view. I think that, after 40 years, Germany is different now. But I wouldn’t want to see a Soviet Union threatened by some new force. Nor do I want to single out Germany in a way which threatens to make history repeat itself. The last point I would make is that I am respectful of the internal affairs of another country, and I know the Lithuanian problem is extraordinarily difficult. We are looking at your economic reforms to see how they will help cooperation and deepen our relationship. Gorbachev has 70% approval in U.S. opinion polls because Americans are saluting what you are doing. We want these trends to continue—we relate to all that—but that is entirely your business. We visualize a Soviet Union which does not seek regional gains. If you see us doing things like putting in a radical Afghan regime which seems to be against your interests, that is bad. The same is true for us with respect to Cuba. My last point brings us back to the Baltics. To the degree that we see a commitment to your own principles of self-determination, we can cooperate. I have tried to conduct myself in a constrained way because I know you have big problems. But I am being hit both on my left and on my right by those who say that I am subordinating U.S. dedication to principle. I will be honest: some of Landsbergis’ moves could look to you like putting a finger in your eye. President Gorbachev: When I have wanted to speak in strong terms on this issue, I have said that Bush would settle this in 24 hours, because in the U.S. the Constitution is respected. The pre-perestroika leadership did not have respect for our Constitution, so the people don’t. Now we are moving to become a people with respect for laws. 183

The President: I understand, but you saw Landsbergis equating me with Chamberlain because I showed too much understanding of your position. I am getting into too much detail, but I see a world in which these fundamental principles continue to be worked out in your country. We need to work together. One last point. You mentioned the arrogance of some nations. In some of our speeches we too may seem that way, although I think we are not. Many in the U.S. think the Japanese are that way, but it is in the U.S. and Soviet interest that we work together with Japan. I have recently come to that point of view, although in the war I was shot down by the Japanese. What I see is a Soviet Union which can shed its historic fears, just as the U.S. is shedding its historic fears of Japan. This is the end of my speech. I am not sure I have covered your points well; if not, we can continue. President Gorbachev: I welcome this kind of discussion. Let me take five minutes more. (Continues, despite General Scowcroft’s discouragement.) The phase of perestroika that we are now going through is probably decisive. Our political system has changed in a decisive way. In the elected bodies, all the way up, we have totally new people. Those functions which were the province of the party are now done by the Supreme Soviets. This is now formalized in constitutions and in local government statutes. Looking at our union, we are now in the actual process of reforming that federation. Now we have adopted measures, which now means we must implement them. This means more self-government, etc. I sent a letter to the Council of Federations to prepare for a discussion of all this, to rebuild our federation. The difficulties will be fundamental. Different Republics may have different relationships, but our basic decision is for a free market economy. Two thirds of the speakers at the Ryzhkov plan’s presentation were negative, but the next day it was 50-50. Some started to comment on the positive aspects and on how to improve them. I was in the country, but thought I should talk to the people. So I dictated something and then talked simply and directly. I think people are beginning to understand what it means, the market. I said that those who work hard and put out quality products will profit by markets. Others will have to change so as not to be left behind. I said, let’s organize a market economy—so the next day the Supreme Soviet debate was very different. They even took the notion of a referendum off the table by a 3-1 margin. They decided that the government and the parliamentary committees will work on it together for a week and try to come together. We are not ready yet for a market economy. We have a centralized economy and we must take account of this as we move. It seems easy to you. The President: I see. But it’s like being pregnant: you can’t do it half-way. President Gorbachev: But neither can you have a baby in the first month. We want to avoid an abortion. We are beginning with bread because it was so distorted. I am trying to get people to understand, and it is beginning to work. We need about two years for the transition. Kendall wants to tell the two of us how to interact on this. I told him to find a time. 184

The President: He will be here tonight; I am drinking his vodka. President Gorbachev: For us, the decisive issue is the transition to a market economy. We hope to interact with you at this moment. The President: We should talk about the practical end of it. Jim has described your talk with him. We have differences, but let’s talk about them. President Gorbachev: We need maneuvering room during this transition. The sums are not very big, but it is important that they be available. The U.S. would not need to provide it all, but you should be supportive. It is important that we not fail in this effort. The President: I agree, but you must know about my political constraints. At the plenary, I will call on you to discuss what you wish and we will go on from there. I have no surprises. President Gorbachev: Good. The President: Our Vice President is very well connected to our right wing. He has had a difficult time with our press, but he can be very helpful with arms control, etc. I wanted him to be involved as much as possible for that reason, and I would like to have him join us for a moment. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through Mandatory Review request 2011-0841-MR by the National Security Archive.]

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Document No. 29: Record of Conversation between Gorbachev and Bush, Washington, 4:00 p.m. – 6:00 p.m. May 31, 1990

In this famous “two anchor” discussion, the U.S. and Soviet delegations deliberate over the process of German unification and especially the issue of a united Germany joining NATO. Bush tries to persuade his counterpart to reconsider his fears of Germany based on the past, and to encourage him to trust the new democratic Germany. Baker repeats the nine assurances made previously by the administration (see Document No. 25), including that the United States now agrees to support the panEuropean process and transformation of NATO in order to remove the Soviet perception of threat. Gorbachev’s preferred position is Germany with one foot in both NATO and the Warsaw Pact—the “two anchors”—creating a kind of associated membership. Baker intervenes, saying that “the simultaneous obligations of one and the same country toward the WTO and NATO smack of schizophrenia.” After the U.S. president frames the issue in the context of the Helsinki agreement, Gorbachev proposes that the German people have the right to choose their alliance—which he in essence already affirmed to Kohl during their meeting in February 1990. Here, Gorbachev significantly exceeds his brief, and incurs the ire of other members of his delegation, especially the official with the German portfolio, Valentin Falin, and Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev. Gorbachev issues a key warning about the future: “if the Soviet people get an impression that we are disregarded in the German question, then all the positive processes in Europe, including the negotiations in Vienna [over conventional forces], would be in serious danger. This is not just bluffing. It is simply that the people will force us to stop and to look around.” It is a remarkable admission about domestic political pressures from the last Soviet leader.

[...] Gorbachev. Thank you for the warm greetings. As I can see, there are familiar faces around this table, and this is also a good sign. Today, in our one-on-one conversation we remembered our first meeting, when you were Vice-President, and I would like to stress in the presence of all our colleagues, that the constructive impulse, which was born then, did not die, but to the contrary, was enriched with new energy. Sometimes it happens that with a change of a political position, intentions and practical actions change radically. Fortunately, your example, Mr. President, is of a different nature. You used the new opportunities to fill out your principled positions with practical content. It is especially important if one considers that you became President of the most powerful nation in the world—United States of America. The combination of the realistic principles and practical approaches opened new favorable opportunities for the Soviet-American cooperation. This is the moment of great importance, because we are talking about contacts between leaders of two great powers that bear special responsibility for the global 186

developments and which play, without exaggeration, a historic role in the international arena. Starting from the valuable experience of joint work that we accumulated, I would like to express hope that this meeting will be substantive and will enable us to arrive at common understandings on big issues. And here the atmosphere of mutual understanding and good working relations that characterizes the contacts of our foreign ministers and all of those individuals whose efforts allowed us to make significant steps toward each other will help us. In other words, our relations are distinguished by the quality, which allows us to discuss the most difficult issues and to not avoid the most acute problems. This is the first statement of fact. The second moment that we should mention is related to our morning one-on-one conversation. It went overtime, but the President and I did not notice the passing of the time. I asked my interlocutor to share his opinion on the main issue: how do they in America, in the American leadership would like to see the Soviet Union, and how do they see the future of Soviet-American relations through the prism of U.S. national interests. It sounds like this question belongs to the philosophical category, but we live in the period, in which a lack of philosophy and even more so poverty of philosophy would inevitably affect practical policies. I was deeply satisfied with the agreement that I felt on the main issue—in the epoch of deep changes, when entire Europe started moving, the Soviet Union is changing beyond recognition, and whatever they say, changes are taking place even in the United States—the Soviet-American interaction is an irreplaceable factor of predictability and stability. Such a conclusion is not idealism, not an effort to paint over differences and concerns, which, by the way, were mentioned today during the greeting ceremony at the White House. Such interaction is a source of confident development of both of our states with their great potential and specific problems. Of course, you know your problems better, but I think we also have common concerns. In particular, I said that we are witnessing a certain paradoxical situation, when countries defeated in World War Two are starting to get ahead of us in the most important sphere of human development. It is as if they leave it to us to carry the burden of competition, of running the arms race. Some side maneuvers are clearly visible already. And now, unfortunately, forces emerged in our own countries who cling to the inertia of competition, who do not want to break the stereotypes of animosity. However, thanks to God and to our own joint efforts, we were able to break out of the vicious circle, to start breaking the structures of confrontation, to translate good intentions into real actions. Yes, the President reserved a detailed conversation on this topic, but even from what I have already heard, I could see how the understanding of the need for Soviet-American cooperation is growing. This is very important. And when today we start dealing with concrete problems, this general understanding will have to pass a difficult test. 187

Going back and taking an inventory of the road traveled so far, we inevitably come to one clear conclusion. It is simple and clear. Nothing good will happen in Europe, in international relations as a whole, and even in internal politics if we exclude cooperation—obviously cooperation on the basis of reciprocity—with the U.S. administration. This truth can be stated in a different way—it is in our own interest to avoid hurting U.S. interests so that our American partners would not have a reason for a feeling of vulnerability, for suspicions that their security is damaged by the Soviet Union. If we allow this, one can imagine how the United States would react—the same way as we would have reacted ourselves. Another thing is clear too—that sometimes—such is the human nature—one could be tempted to try to achieve some dividends on their own, for their own interest. I am convinced that if the Soviet or the American leadership would take that approach, it would be the deepest misapprehension. And in this connection I appreciate the clear position of the President and of the Secretary of State, which they took in a difficult situation—difficult not only in the international perspective, but also in terms of the composition of forces in the United States. You emphasized the element of Soviet-American interaction and therefore, not only preserved what was accumulated already, but also created a good capital for further progress. If we had not established personal contact earlier, if our ministers had no experience of cooperation, and most importantly, if [the] Malta [summit] hadn’t taken place, then I am convinced that our countries would not have been prepared for the events in Eastern Europe, and especially in Germany. And that means that we could have made big mistakes. Because during periods of high tension one match could spark a bonfire. Now we can register the fact that the acute period of cardinal changes proceeded quite calmly in principle, even though the changes themselves sometimes assumed some quite sharp shapes both in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union. In this connection, I would like to propose to you right away to focus on the picture of the changing Europe and the processes launched by the German unification as one single phenomenon. Because all this is so interconnected that you cannot separate one from another. Even if you take the strictest criteria, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are changing in the direction of cooperation with other states, they open new parts of themselves to the common human civilization. This is precisely what creates a basis not only for dialogue, but for core changes in the forms of cooperation and leads us right up to the new structures of security in Europe. I would stress that the main issue is how the process would go in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. As far as the problems created by the German unification, they, with all their importance and acuteness—and they do have a global scale—still, they are a phenomenon of a second order. That is why we should concentrate our efforts on the deepening of the European processes—to determine the necessary sequence of steps and timelines. 188

We share the U.S. administration’s aspiration to achieve a fastest agreement in Vienna, so that it could be signed at the all-European summit. In addition to everything else, this agreement on stages would allow us to hold a comprehensive discussion about the new tendencies of the European development, to exchange opinions about how to build relations in the new Europe. And here it is absolutely clear that we cannot build a new Europe without an active participation by the United States. Just as well, nothing good will come out of the attempts to isolate the Soviet Union. Maybe not “isolate” but just to “squelch.” If we notice such maneuvers, then, I will say directly, an adequate reaction will follow. This is like in hockey— a puck in one goal leads to the other side’s response. And all this in the context of a harsh power game. One should clearly perceive such a prospect. But I would like to emphasize another thought. We are genuinely ready for a long-term dialogue with the United States in all directions of global politics. The logic of events itself brought us to this conclusion—because it is precisely through this cooperation that our two countries would get the best chance to have a positive impact on the ongoing rapid changes. Europe should now move forward without stopping—increasing the tempo, making an accent from Helsinki-1 to Helsniki-2. Here, in my view, we have a good understanding. However, the moment of truth has come: how do we combine further all-European process with a fair resolution of the external issues, which emerged as a result of German unification? Combine in such a way, so that this powerful promising tendency toward growing European cooperation would not fizzle. There are several options here, including the familiar one, which you are trying to push through with such persistence. But in truth, I still do not believe that it is your only option. In my opinion, there can be no president who does not have a reserve on such an important issue. On my part, I am ready to suggest three or four alternative solutions. However, let’s have our ministers deal with the concrete issues—they are very good at it. I would like to pose the big question, the principal question—the stakes are too high; what is happening in the world now and in our relations is too important to allow ourselves to stumble on one, even a super-complex problem. We will not be forgiven for such a retreat, they will ask how come that presidents of the United States and the Soviet Union did not have enough good will and imagination at the key moment. All this is so serious that right now the entire world is literally looking at our approaches and concrete positions with a microscope. Here it is so important to come to an agreement that authorship of a compromise does not matter—whether it would be proposed by Bush or Gorbachev, Scowcroft or Akhromeyev. The main thing is that the proposed version of a solution should be adequate for the constructive vector of the all-European process, that it would encourage strengthening of trust and would not become a stick in the wheel of the cart. 189

I think there is [a] real [possibility] to find such a solution model for the external aspects of German unification that would not only not undermine, but to the contrary, would strengthen positive tendencies in the Soviet-American dialogue in Europe and in the entire world as well. A model that would include some length of time and that would be synchronized with the European processes. Then, after going through a transition period, we would arrive at some new structure of relations in Europe, including the relations in the sphere of security. During such a period, it would be necessary to quickly change the nature of the opposing blocs, to transform them from military [blocs] into primarily political organizations. In our view, such positive intentionality would be solidified by some kind of agreement between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO. Parallel to that you could come up with an initiative directed toward reform of the NATO doctrine, and the Soviet Union would bring its concrete military structures in accordance with its new defensive doctrine. We could develop exchanges between headquarters, and we could jointly discuss the levels of armed forces of the future united Germany. Simultaneously, we could raise the more general questions related to interaction of security structures of the USSR and the USA. Finally, such a creative approach could also inspire some new options for ensuring the security of united Germany—which would, let us say, stand on two pillars—not only in the West, but also in the East. As a hypothesis I would suggest that it could be some form of associated membership. I have to admit that the thoughts that the Secretary of State shared with us in Moscow also gave a push to our creativity, which is characterized by a search for mutually beneficial continuous steps. I hope that you also will not let down our hopes and will offer something new. Because if we come to an agreement, then I am confident that the Germans will agree with us. Bush. Thank you for your explanations. As I understand it, we have some fundamental differences on the German issue. Possibly, the roots of it are in the different historical heritage of the USSR and the USA. Your concern, your mistrust toward a united Germany is too deep, it ignores Germany’s last 50 years of experience with democracy. At the same time, one can understand your fears. We also fought Hitler, but our losses do not stand any comparison with the 27 million Soviet lives sacrificed in the armed struggle with Nazi Germany. And yet, as it seems to me, our approach to Germany is more realistic, and has better timing because the processes of German unification are unfolding faster than any of us could have imagined, and there is no force that can put a brake on them. That is why the mistrust oriented toward the past is an especially bad adviser here. It seems to me that our approach to Germany as to a close friend is more pragmatic and constructive, although, I have to tell you honestly, it is not shared by everybody in the West. Some West Europeans, just like you, do not trust either Germany or Germans as a whole. However, we all in the West are united in one [concern]: the main danger lies in separating Germany from the community 190

of democratic states, in trying to impose some special status and humiliating conditions on her. It is precisely this kind of development of events that could lead to a revival of German militarism and revanchism—which is exactly the concern you have. It seems to me that without forgetting about those violations of human rights that took place in Nazi Germany, we have to at the same time take into consideration her recent democratic experience, and start from the notion that Germans deserve their respected and equal place in the family of democratic nations. Thus, to sum it up, I wanted to say that we approach Germany from different positions, although the [recent] transformations, as you pointed out correctly, are now changing the faces of both the Soviet Union and the United States, being in direct contradiction with the established stereotypes. Of course, we do not possess a crystal ball, and we cannot predict the future. However, as far as we can see the nearest future, the biggest evil would be to try to separate united Germany into a special category. Not only West Europeans but also most of the countries of Eastern Europe agree with us on this. At the same time, united Germany should not be anybody’s enemy, and the process of incorporating it into the new Europe would stipulate deep involvement of the USSR, and a fair consideration of your country’s interests. And one more question. I think you would after all agree that some U.S. presence in Europe is necessary, even though some people even in the United States itself are inclined to a different point of view. They complain about the disproportionally big burden in defense and economic maintenance of Europe, which Americans had to take upon themselves. However, if we start from the position that prevails in our country, then the U.S. political, economic and military involvement in the life of Europe is indispensable for the security and stability of the entire Old World. Sometimes people ask me—with tongue in cheek—so who is the enemy of the U.S. in the new, transformed beyond recognition Europe? And I respond with conviction—confusion, instability, unpredictability. As difficult as it could be, I want to assure you that the American presence in Europe does not threaten interests of the Soviet Union in any sense whatsoever. More than that, right now our presence there is a guarantee of stability. Of course we are acting in the conditions of democracy, and, if the new generation of Germans decides so, we will pull out of Germany. However, today, I reiterate, the mood is completely different. These moods are strengthened by NATO traditions, by many of the chapters of the North Atlantic Treaty. Taking into account everything I said, I am asking you again to overcome your fear of united Germany, and to leave the past behind. On this road you will find in us reliable partners, and together we will be able to show the rest of the world that we are able to rise above selfish interests, that we are working for the common good. I understand that you will probably find nothing new in my words. But believe me that this is my sincere conviction, and if I am not right, then I am asking you not to hesitate to point out my mistakes to me. I will only add that I am 191

trying not to rush to conclusions and moreover, not to make any sudden or politically extravagant steps. I remember, when the Berlin Wall fell, my political opponent accused me of cowardice, of not being sufficiently energetic in welcoming that development. However, I took into account your appeal to show caution, to act in a sensitive manner, bearing in mind the fragility of new processes in Europe and in the Soviet Union. As far as [my response to] my critics, I said then that I did not intend to dance on the ruins of the Berlin Wall like a little boy. Believe me, we are not pushing Germany toward unification, and it is not us who determines the pace of this process. And of course, we have no intention, even in our thoughts, to harm the Soviet Union in any fashion. That is why we are speaking in favor of German unification in NATO without ignoring the wider context of the CSCE, taking the traditional economic ties between the two German states into consideration. Such a model, in our view, corresponds to the Soviet interests as well. Therefore, I am asking you to point to me where [you think] I am mistaken. Gorbachev. First of all, I think I understood the main source of your concern. You see the U.S. presence in Europe as a factor of stability, and you are worried about the prospects of its preservation. Well, I already said that now the U.S. presence in Europe is even necessary (what will happen in the future, life will show). I am talking precisely about the military presence, because the U.S. economic and political participation in European affairs is an uncontestable constant. Europe is the natural center of global politics, and if we allow diversions here, then consequences will be felt throughout the entire world. Soviet-American cooperation represents one of the pillars on which the European political space is resting. That is why we are in favor of taking your interests into account, which means we are in favor of U.S. presence in Europe. However, you are making a methodological miscalculation when you connect your presence with NATO only, and when you worry that if the FRG pulls out of the North Atlantic Treaty, it would mean the beginning of the end for NATO and therefore the beginning of the end of your military presence on the continent. I do not agree with this conclusion, but I understand your concern. Especially as far as today’s reality is concerned—when one probably could not do without NATO anyway. I also see your efforts to change NATO functions, to try to invite new members into this organization. If the course aimed at the transformation of the union, at its political diffusion into the all-European process is serious, then, naturally, it is a completely different business. But then the question arises about transforming NATO into a genuinely open organization, the door to which could not be closed to any state whatsoever. Then, probably, we could also think about becoming a member of NATO. However, today, honestly speaking, there are very few facts for such a radical conclusion. Now about another topic. You are extremely concerned about the health of united Germany, from which you calculate the health of NATO. You are so 192

concerned about it that you forget about the health and interests of the Soviet Union. And this, in turn, does not help either stability or predictability at all. Instead of fixating on the membership of the future united Germany in NATO, let us better think about how we could bring the military-political blocs, which still divide Europe, closer together. Let us say, why would one reject from the getgo FRG’s membership simultaneously in NATO and in the Warsaw Pact? Such a double membership could become a binding element, some sort of forerunner of the new European structures, and at the same time, it would anchor NATO. In the practical sense, united Germany could make a statement that it would abide by all the obligations inherited from both the FRG and the GDR. That the Bundeswehr would still be under the orders of NATO, and the troops in the GDR would answer to the government of the new Germany. Simultaneously, the Soviet troops would remain on the territory of the present GDR during the transition period, and all this could be supplemented by some kind of an agreement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This way we would alleviate the concern of other countries and speed up the construction of the European security system’s future structures. We don’t have to accomplish everything at once. A step-by-step approach is possible. For example, we would welcome change in the NATO doctrine already at the next meeting of this bloc. A natural question arises: if NATO does not plan to fight with us, then with whom? Not with Germany? Bush. I already said—with instability. Gorbachev. Do you really think that the more weapons [you have,] the more robust stability would be? It seems to me that the past decades should have convinced you that confrontation and the arms race put a heavy burden on peoples’ shoulders. All right, we tossed this thought around, as they say; now let our ministers search for concrete solutions to external aspects of German unification. Let them search taking into account the progress in the Two Plus Four negotiations, making sure that they preserve our rights as based on the results of World War II. I would not recommend anybody to treat them jokingly—they will end only at the final stage of the overall settlement. One of the spheres that might be fruitful for such searching [for solutions] could be a discussion of the content of the transition period: what do we fill it with, which structures, how do you change alliances and what kind of common documents do you prepare? In this connection I am ready to publicly sign the following commitment: if at any time during the transition period the Unites States has a feeling that the Soviet Union is trying to infringe on their interests, then Washington has an unquestionable right to break out of the agreement and to undertake corresponding unilateral measures. But we will never allow that to happen. Because that would contradict our own interests. 193

Bush. This is very good. I will take this statement of yours into consideration. However, I would like to correct one wrong impression. I don’t think at all that the more weapons there are the more stability there will be. To the contrary, the Unites States is striving toward the fastest agreement in Vienna and to an immediate move to even deeper reductions in the framework of Vienna-2. In all this, naturally, we are ready to respect the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union. Maybe I should not be saying it, but it seems to me that it would be incorrect to draw parallels between the withdrawal of Soviet troops from countries that do not need them any longer and the prospect of reducing the U.S. presence, which is welcomed by practically all Europeans and which represents a stabilizing factor. Gorbachev. I think we can agree on this. But one has to have a clear understanding that if the Soviet people get an impression that we are disregarded in the German question, then all the positive processes in Europe, including the negotiations in Vienna, would be in serious danger. This is not just bluffing. It is simply that the people will force us to stop and to look around. And I would really prefer not to do it. I would like to move the Soviet-American dialogue ahead, and to strive for a swift achievement of agreements in Vienna and in other forums. In this connection, it is really important that we achieve a very clear understanding here in Washington. Otherwise, everything will become more complicated, and there are no objective reasons for that. Moreover, additional flexibility is possible, of course, if it comes from both sides. Let us say, I remember how the Secretary of State hinted to me in Moscow that he was not against going back to our old proposal—to limit the number of Soviet and American troops not by 195 thousand but by 225 thousand. Well, we can think about that. Baker. I would like to use the opportunity to emphasize the main thought— we are trying to take the interests of the Soviet Union into account to the fullest extent, and the nine points that I presented in Moscow speak to that effect quite clearly. Let me recount them briefly. – We agreed to support the creation of pan-European structures, which we avoided earlier. – We announced NATO’s adaptation to the new situation by strengthening its political component. – We are trying to move in the direction of limiting armed forces as quickly as possible, including the Bundeswehr. Obviously, it would require a very close contact and trust on the part of the Germans. – We assured the Soviet Union that during a defined period there would be no NATO troops in the GDR. – We are willing to allow the Soviet troops to stay in the GDR for a short period of time. The President intends to discuss this issue with you in more detail later. – We gave new impetus to the discussion of the problem of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. 194

– Already today we are trying to ensure a solution on the [issue of] borders that would be final and satisfactory for everybody. – We and the Germans reached an understanding regarding the obligations of future Germany to renounce possession of nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons. – The United States is trying to create favorable political conditions for further development of Soviet-German economic relations. All this is clearly aimed at ensuring the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union. Shevardnadze. We are prepared to work on all these issues with the Secretary of State. However, the central issue of the military-political status of future Germany requires a decision at the presidential level. We also have to determine the content of the transition period, during which united Germany would continue to have obligations both before NATO and the Warsaw Pact. And this is not just a chimera, because parallel to that, the two blocs will be moving closer together, the military confrontation will be taken down and the basis for collective security in Europe will be established. Bush. NATO is the anchor of stability. Gorbachev. But two anchors are better. As a seaman, you should be able to understand that. Bush. And where will we find the second anchor? Gorbachev. In the East. Let our Ministers think about what it would be concretely. Bush. Yes, let them think about it. But we have to take into account the exceptional pace of German unification. After the successful conclusion of the consultations in the framework of the Two Plus Four, a new Germany is right around the corner. And at that moment we could only rely on NATO. Of course we should discuss expanding of the role of the CSCE process, but I will tell you honestly, that it is simply too ponderous to expect any fast and concrete result [from it]. Gorbachev. We do not exclude any options. It is possible that NATO and the Warsaw Pact will continue to exist in some form during a longer period of time than we can imagine right now. As I already said, they could conclude some kind of agreement, accounting for the creation of united Germany and the metamorphoses of their own organizations as well. At the same time, there would be an option of an associated [simultaneous] membership in the WTO and NATO. Because if we want to put an end to the split of the continent once and for all, the military-political structures should be synchronized in accordance with the unifying tendencies of the all-European process. Today it might sound as a surprise, but we are entering an absolutely new period of European politics. Besides, World War II had already witnessed the birth of a very unusual coalition united by a common noble goal. Is it that we are more stupid than Stalin and Roosevelt? Bush. We need to learn from their mistakes too. 195

Gorbachev. So let us create a new free coalition, change doctrines and institutes, establish the primacy of politics over military structures. Baker. How do you see the coexistence of the new NATO and the new Warsaw Pact in practical terms? Gorbachev. First of all—a concrete agreement between the blocs, which would give rise to multiple exchanges and the creation of joint organs for strengthening trust and preventing crisis situations. These processes would provide a good encouragement for the Vienna agreements as well, serve as political insurance for them. However, if we do it differently, if we include powerful united Germany in one alliance, then it would immediately create an unbalanced situation, and issues would arise to which nobody would be able to find an answer. Bush. Do you agree with our starting thesis that we should not create a special status for united Germany? Gorbachev. I would agree [with it] if you accept an associated membership, the principle of blocs moving closer together with united Germany acting as a mediator of the process; i.e., a situation that does not change the present obligations of either the FRG or the GDR. And it would be followed naturally by the reform of the blocs themselves, in an organic linkage with the Vienna and the allEuropean process. The terrible losses that we suffered in World War II are also the political reality of today. And no one should be able to forget about it. Bush. Still, it is hard for me to understand you. Maybe it is because I do not feel threatened by the FRG, I do not see an aggressive power in this democratic state. If you don’t break your psychological stereotype, it will be difficult for us to come to an agreement. And an agreement is possible, because both Kohl and we want to cooperate with you in every sphere. Gorbachev. There should no lack of clarity here. We do not have fear of anybody—not the U.S., not Germany. We just see the necessity of changing [our] relations, the need to break the negative and to create a constructive model. This is our free choice. I hope nobody here believes in the nonsense that one of the sides won the Cold War. Thoughts like these glide on the surface, grasping only the tip of the iceberg. The conclusion must be completely different: 50 years of confrontation have proven the Cold War’s absurdity and that it only leads to self-destruction. Now about trust. You assert that we do not trust the Germans. But then why would we give the green light to their unification aspirations? We could have given them the red light, we had requisite mechanisms. However, we gave them the opportunity to make their choice by democratic means. You, on the other hand, are saying that you trust the FRG, but you are pulling her into NATO, not allowing her to determine her future on her own after the final settlement. Let her decide on her own what alliance she wants to belong to. Bush. I fully agree with that. But the Germans have already made their choice quite clear. 196

Gorbachev. No, you are just trying to put them under your control. Bush. If Germany does not want to stay in NATO, it has a right to choose a different path. This is what the [Helsinki] Final Act says too. Gorbachev. Then let us make a public statement on the results of our negotiations, [where we will say that] the U.S. President agreed that sovereign Germany would decide on its own which military-political status it would choose—membership in NATO, neutrality or something else. Bush. It is the right of any sovereign country to choose alliances. If the government of the FRG—I am talking purely hypothetically—would not want to stay in NATO, or even tell our troops to get out, we would accept that choice. Gorbachev. That’s how we will formulate it then: the United States and the Soviet Union agree that united Germany, upon reaching the final settlement, taking into account the results of World War II, would decide on its own which alliance she would be a member of. Bush. I would propose a somewhat different formulation: the United States is unequivocally in favor of united Germany’s membership in NATO, however, if it makes a different choice, we would not contest it, we will respect it. Gorbachev. I agree. I accept your formulation. Bush. Maybe our Ministers should discuss this issue in more detail. Gorbachev. I am only for it, but let them discuss inclusion of this formulation in some kind of a summary document along with our ideas about the transition period. Baker. Whatever you say, but the simultaneous obligations of one and the same country toward the WTO and NATO smack of schizophrenia. Gorbachev. It is only for a financier, who puts cents together into dollars. Politics, however, is sometimes a search for the possible in the sphere of the unfamiliar. Baker. But obligations to the WTO and NATO are adversarial obligations. Gorbachev. Here, here, you are closer now. You started to talk about rivalry, and that would lead to confrontation. It means nothing is changing. Therefore, by pulling united Germany into one bloc you would be breaking the balance radically. And then we will have to decide what to do in that new situation—whether to continue to sit in Vienna, and so on. Let us after all reject the logic of confrontation and search for a constructive outcome. Falin. I would like to clarify one moment. We are talking about replacing temporary structures, even though they existed for almost 50 years with permanent [structures], in which the Soviet Union and the U.S. could unite for the entire foreseeable future. You said yourself that in the future the FRG could raise the issue of withdrawing from NATO. That is why it would be good for us to think about the future too, to make calculations about the future security structure. Here only a pan-European system, into which united Germany would be integrated on equal conditions with everybody else, can give us guarantees. If we are united by our understanding of our common ultimate goal, then we can agree on the transition period. The main thing is to reject military 197

confrontation, to come to an understanding that security in Europe is indivisible. In this sense unification of Germany should become the end of the division of Europe, and not [the event] that solidified [the division of Europe] for the future. Bush. So what should we do about the public statement? Shevardnadze. I would not do it in a rush; I would proceed cautiously, taking into account the fragility of the current progress both in the two-plus-four framework, and in terms of preparations for the pan-European summit and the Vienna agreements. Bush. And still, what are we going to say if we are asked about the results of this discussion? Gorbachev. We will respond that we devoted this entire plenary session to consideration of the situation in Europe, including the settlement of the external aspects of German unification. On the basis of this exchange of opinions we agreed that the foreign ministers and experts would continue their work on the issues that were raised here. And if we are asked if our positions moved closer, we could say that we had a serious and useful exchange of opinions, and that now we understand each other’s approaches and positions better. Besides that we could add that during the discussion we proposed ideas that require additional consideration. Let them be intrigued by what kind of ideas those were. Bush. I agree. That’s what we will do. [Source: The Gorbachev Foundation Archive, Fond 1, Opis 1. Partially published in Galkia and Chernyaev, Mikhail Gorbachev i germanskii vopros and in Gorbachev, Sobranie sochinenii, v. 20, pp. 202–211. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.]

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Document No. 30: Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, Second Private Meeting, Washington, 11:00 a.m. – 11:48 a.m. June 1, 1990

After showing flexibility on German unification during the previous day’s discussions, the Soviet leader now aims to achieve his main political goal—to get Bush to agree to sign a trade agreement with the Soviet Union. Gorbachev explains how important this agreement would be for him and makes a personal plea to the U.S. president in their one-on-one conversation. Bush repeats his earlier contention that Congress will never assent while Gorbachev faces an unresolved situation in Lithuania, implying that he would first have to allow Lithuania to leave the Union. Gorbachev’s impression from his meetings with the congressional leaders is very different—that they do not have a “cerebral problem” with the agreement. He is offended by Bush’s lack of commitment: “You have chosen the Baltics over me and let’s leave it at that.” The Soviet leader is also deeply concerned about the reaction back home: “everyone knows a trade deal was part of our summit. So we have some explaining to do.”

President Gorbachev: This visit is a major event. The atmosphere is important. The meeting with Congressional leaders led me to believe there is now a new atmosphere. My contacts with ordinary people show a real change for the better. Thanks for your cooperation—you can count on mine. I told Congressional leaders we were worried about the trade agreement. We looked on it as an organic part of the summit—equal with START. These two were the principal pillars of the summit. Business people have been visiting—they now feel they have a chance. In practical terms, an agreement would not cause much of an increase in real trade for years. But an agreement would let a serious business effort begin. The Japanese and Germans, who are everywhere, would not have a monopoly. Of course, we could say that since we are working well with the Europeans, why worry about a trade agreement with the U.S.? I am looking to the long term. Our long-term relations cannot thrive without a trade underpinning. The President: I agree. President Gorbachev: Moreover, we are moving to a market economy, closer to the U.S. If this visit included an agreement, this would be an important political signal. I wanted to emphasize these points. The President: What you said last night made a real impression on me. Here is my letter to you (President read the letter). The letter has never been made public. I wanted to explain to you how our political process works. You think Lithuania is an internal matter, but it has a real impact on my political situation. We want a trade agreement. It is in the U.S., and I hope, in the Soviet, interest. If not for Lithuania 199

we wouldn’t be discussing this issue at all. I was hopeful when you sat down with Mrs. Prunskiene. You heard Mitchell and his linking it with the People’s Republic of China. What you saw was political linkage. How do we get out of it? President Gorbachev: I didn’t feel Congress had a real cerebral problem with it. I talked with Bentsen also who was positive. The President: If a dialogue went on, and the blockade were lifted, the agreement would go through in a minute. The only hangup is Soviet economic might being used against Lithuania and the absence of dialogue. I understand why you can’t have us in your internal affairs and I don’t want to. But it is a dilemma. I know Congress. I know I can’t get it through Congress with the present situation. President Gorbachev: We have each made our points. I can’t force you to agree with my points. You have chosen the Baltics over me and let’s leave it at that. The President: But what are the chances of getting talks going? You have said you would do that. President Gorbachev: As I told Congress, I favor a dialogue within a constitutional framework, but I won’t talk outside of that framework. I want to return to the original situation and proceed toward discussing proceedings. I have some more words. Lithuania is progressing toward some kind of dialogue when I return. The President: Maybe we can discuss this tomorrow. Because of history, we have a special problem with Lithuania. We want a trade deal. I don’t want to publicize any conditions because that makes it look like I am dictating to you. But there is no point in sending up legislation and having the hell kicked out of it. President Gorbachev: OK. I see you have given thought to this. I see no way to work harder. We are without a trade deal today and have been without a trade deal for many years. This is not a life and death issue. But everyone knows a trade deal was part of our summit. So we have some explaining to do. The President: I know. They were yelling at me yesterday. It troubles me because I want this summit to be a success. Let’s try to work it out. President Gorbachev: It is more my problem. I have explained it to you and know it is in your hands. The President: Let me ask about my April 27 letter. I wonder whether you actually saw that letter. Our bureaucracy.... President Gorbachev: Mr. President, I read everything. The President: OK. Last night, you didn’t seem to be familiar with it. President Gorbachev: It can’t happen that a letter from the President of the United States wouldn’t be shown to me. They would not last on my staff if that happened. Let us say our concerns about the Baltics are as deep as yours. We want to find a solution because otherwise it would be a blow to Perestroika. But life is not always under our own control. The President: Let me give it some more thought and we will discuss it again tomorrow. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through Mandatory Review request 2011-0841-MR by the National Security Archive.] 200

Document No. 31: Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, Second Plenary Meeting, Washington, 11:50 a.m. – 1:00 p.m. June 1, 1990

In the plenary portion of the talks on strategic arms control, Gorbachev states his ultimate goal—“we have a firm intention to sign the treaty this year. That is the most important thing.” Soviet chief negotiator Viktor Karpov offers a detailed report on progress achieved both on strategic nuclear arms reductions and on finalizing the CFE Treaty to be signed in Paris at the CSCE summit in November 1990. Several major differences between the sides remain. The Soviet delegation argues for limitations on, and the eventual cessation of, all nuclear testing, but the United States is not ready for a ban. On the handling of nuclear warheads removed from missiles, the Soviets argue for their physical destruction, “so that they cannot be used in the future.” The Americans prefer putting removed warheads in storage. Both sides agree to leave Soviet heavy ICBMs and MIRVed warheads to later negotiations. The Soviet side accepts the U.S. position on Tu-22 heavy bombers and expresses its willingness to discuss naval aviation when the U.S. is ready. Gorbachev voices concern over U.S. cooperation with Britain on the modernization of British nuclear forces. He reminds Bush that at Reykjavik the Soviets agreed not to count British and French forces but if the U.S. helps them to modernize, it would change the existing balance. One significant achievement that Karpov and his counterpart, Reginald Bartholomew, highlight is the finalization of a bilateral agreement to eliminate chemical weapons, which would stand as one of the most successful pacts ever between the two sides. No breakthroughs are reached until later in the day when negotiators return to the topic of trade relations and Bush decides he can sign an agreement by finessing the emigration law requirement and adding a secret codicil that requires the USSR to suspend its blockade of Lithuania and launch a serious dialogue.

Bush. Let’s begin our discussion with issues of arms control and listen to the experts. Gorbachev. I give the floor to V.P. Karpov, to summarize the work done during and before the visit, so we can understand where we stand. [...] Gorbachev. From what you said, I get the impression that there are questions that have to be addressed before we can sign the documents. This could be done in parallel in Geneva, and, it seems, some things can be done here. Otherwise we cannot sign the documents. [...] Gorbachev. Your experts believe that there are grounds for signing [the treaty] already this year? Karpov. Yes. Obukhov. I would like to add that one more document has been agreed upon—a joint declaration on non-proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons, as well as missiles and missile technology. 201

Bush. I suggest that James Baker also summarize our positions. [...] Bush. I am very pleased and impressed by what I heard. We are not that far apart. Perhaps only on questions of non-circumvention and some other issues, like heavy ICBMs and “Backfire.” Therefore, I suggest that these issues be reexamined in the afternoon. In the statement about future negotiations we should give them an impetus, indicate their positive momentum. This would not only help to create a positive atmosphere in the relations between our two countries, but would also be well received around the world. [...] Gorbachev. Mr. President, I agree with what you said, that a great deal of work has been done and we have come a long way. I would like to say here that we have a firm intention to sign the treaty this year. That is the most important thing. In this regard, I would like to suggest the following formula: there are issues that are important to work out the full format of the treaty. We have to have clarity here. It is obvious that there are also issues that should allow us to sign a statement on the basic elements of the future treaty already today. We must do it. I would ask Shevardnadze and Baker to do the necessary work by 17.00. Here is what troubles me. We had an understanding of what the cooperation between the United States and Great Britain in nuclear matters means. Now it turns out that our partners have a different understanding. We thought that such cooperation is limited to the modernization of submarines and the transition to a system of “Trident-2” and does not encompass other issues. If something arises now like a broad interpretation of the 1972 ABM Treaty, it would be dangerous. It goes against logic, because we have the Reykjavik agreement that up to a certain point we do not include British or French nuclear weapons. That was our concession that opened the way for negotiations. At the same time, we noted the understanding that at some point, when we come to deep cuts in nuclear weapons, these members of the nuclear club would join us. By the way, we can find the corresponding statement by Thatcher, that when the U.S. and USSR sign an agreement on 50 percent reductions, then Great Britain would be ready to join and review nuclear weapons issues. In his usual manner, Mitterrand also expressed this idea, and even China responded. Right now we are approaching 50 percent reductions, and all the other members of the club have to participate. Suddenly, we see that instead of connecting to the nuclear club, an idea is proposed that, if implemented, would allow building nuclear weapons on the side. This is illogical. Therefore, we reiterate our understanding of British modernization. We are only talking about the “Trident-2” system. Everything else is out of the picture. We need arguments, not Bartholomew’s emotions. Right now we are asking ourselves what our negotiating partners want. Suddenly, something akin to a bypass shows up. Though one would think that we should do the opposite and include England and France. It is also important to stress the idea of the connection of the future agreement with the 1972 ABM Treaty, precisely in the understanding of 1972, which was confirmed in December 1987. This is important, since we are approaching the initialing of the elements of a future agreement. 202

As for future intentions, I think we could really surprise the people in the U.S. and USSR, as well as around the world, if in our mission statement, today, we suddenly define, clearly and specifically, what we want to do, before we even begin the negotiations. This is not serious. Then why have the negotiations at all? It would be reasonable to raise the question the same way as was done in Reykjavik, when we did something unprecedented and agreed to 50 percent reductions in heavy ICBMs. We then stated that geographic and other factors are different in the U.S. and USSR. We told the U.S. that you are concerned about Soviet heavy ICBMs, and we are concerned about other systems, and we proposed to address all elements of strategic forces. We offered to reduce all elements by 50 percent, so the situation would be the same, but at a different level. So, we reached the current level, and the subject of future negotiations should be all elements, and the fourth element—SLCM. So let’s move in that direction. Otherwise, misinterpretations could arise, and the agitated public will throw so many elements at us that everything will get bogged down. Today we already have coordinated elements, and our experts are in talks to tally things up and see what we can do. Let our ministers do some work, and it would be good if some results were reported by 17.00. Bush. I agree. One more question—open skies. We have differences here. But we are talking about the concept of openness, it should be attractive to the Soviet Union. Gorbachev. We support this idea in principle, and we supported it immediately. But we need clarifications here: what can be observed from this open sky— the whole Earth or selected areas. I think progress is possible here. […] Gorbachev. In other words, we actively support your idea and are ready to work constructively on an agreement. Today we should do this work at the level of experts, and the prospects are encouraging. Shevardnadze. The main issue is that the side being verified gets to choose the plane. All other issues can be resolved. Bush. My experts told me that we have big differences here. When we put this idea forward, our own bureaucracy opposed it. Now we have a new era—the era of openness, and we should have a common commitment to the idea of openness. Bartholomew. I want to clarify that we would like our Soviet colleagues to come to an agreement with us on quotas, planes, and territories, so all of this can be somehow documented in a joint statement. However, this does not seem possible. Bush. I think that both sides are interested in this question. Our agreement would send a message to the whole world. But if we cannot come up with a joint statement, there is nothing we can do. Gorbachev. In any case, we can note that we worked constructively and are ready to continue this work. Regarding Vienna. Lately, there was talk that we are slowing down the work there. We want to reach an agreement as early as this year; an agreement that would make it possible to hold a CSCE Summit. This is the starting point, everything else is details. [...] 203

Bush. We still have regional issues. Let the ministers work on them, and we will come back to them tomorrow. Gorbachev. Let them do some more work. In any case, there is great interest in these issues, as can be seen from the press. If Afghanistan comes up, we will not forget to mention Central America. You probably already received a telegram from Mengistu. A single phrase would be enough to get the negotiations going. It is important to show that we are concerned about peace. Let our ministers work and report to us in Camp David. Bush. I have prepared a list of questions that does not exclude anything, including Afghanistan, Kashmir, etc. Gorbachev. I received a telegram from Bhutto. Bush. Bob Gates just returned from there and he is very pessimistic. Gorbachev. Let him go back and return an optimist. Bush. I just want to inform you that we intend to touch upon Central America, Cuba, Africa, South Africa, South Korea, the Middle East—these are just some of the questions that we would like to discuss. Gorbachev. All right. I also have my notes. [Source: The Gorbachev Foundation Archive, Fond 1, Opis 1. Partially published in Gorbachev, Sobranie sochinenii, v. 20, 2011, pp. 233–238. Translated by Anna Melyakova.]

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Document No. 32: Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, Final Private Meeting, Camp David, 11:15 a.m. – 12:59 p.m., and 3:00 p.m. June 2, 1990

This almost day-long conversation takes place at the presidential dacha at Camp David. The atmosphere is relaxed and the interaction very sincere, addressing the most sensitive issues in U.S.-Soviet relations. The conversation features precisely what Reykjavik lacked—“an exceptional level of trust,” in the words of Georgy Arbatov. Gorbachev is elated that Bush has finally consented to sign the trade agreement, which gives him a victory to take back to Moscow, a means to allay conservative criticism at home, and at least a symbolic means to address the economic crisis at home. Bush and Gorbachev discuss several sensitive issues—Israel, India-Pakistan, and Cuba. Bush is extremely sensitive to domestic politics. While he tells Gorbachev that he is “in a big fight with Shamir over settling immigrants in the occupied territories,” his administration “is seen as anti-Israel.” Agreeing that Israel is a problem for both of them, he is very aware of the Israeli lobby in Congress and reluctant to take any steps to resolve the situation. Gorbachev is concerned because a lot of Soviet Jewish émigrés end up in the new settlements in the occupied territories and that could mean limiting Jewish emigration from the USSR. Bush sees the problem but is not responsive to Gorbachev’s suggestions. On Cuba, the U.S. side demands that the Soviet Union stop its military and economic support of the Castro regime and put pressure on Castro to change the human rights situation. The Soviet leader notes that Castro “is criticizing us more than you,” and that “teaching lessons to Castro is useless.” Gorbachev is eager to play the role of mediator between the U.S. and Cuba, as he promised the Cuban leader. Gorbachev’s secret dream was that his new thinking and personal mediation would result in normalization of relations between the U.S. and Cuba. But here, too, Bush points to the insurmountable domestic political issues. He already has his eye on the 1992 elections. The conversation moves to Afghanistan, where surprisingly both sides express similar positions. The Soviets are willing to work with Najibullah regarding the transition but in such a way that he would not be “kicked out.” The U.S. side agrees that it is hard to quarrel with this position: “We can’t argue against Najibullah staying in power, à la Nicaragua, but the problem is how to get the Resistance plugged in.” Both sides express concern with radical Islamic elements. In the rest of the conversation, the two leaders discuss the situation in Angola, South Africa, Cambodia, Cyprus, Japan and in both South and North Korea. There is a striking understanding and similarity of positions on virtually every issue. What this record leaves out is the discussion on biological weapons that took place during Gorbachev and Bush’s private walk at Camp David, during which Bush confronted his counterpart with information that the U.S. had received from their British partners after the defection of Soviet biological weapons expert Pasechnik in the fall of 1989. Only two weeks earlier, on May 14, the British and American ambassadors to Moscow, Rodric Braithwaite and Jack Matlock, had presented a démarche on biological weapons to the Soviets.

205

This memcon is a draft, not a final version. It contains numerous handwritten insertions and strike-throughs by NSC staffer Ed Hewett. Since a number of his edits seem to reflect substantive corrections to the text, they are retained here. (The italicized passages are insertions.)

[DRAFT]

President Gorbachev: In this setting, maybe we can think of some good things to do. But first let me take one step back. Yesterday was an important day. My main thought is that it is good to make good statements and declarations but yesterday, in addition to philosophizing, the right decisions were made. I am pleased with the way we are working on the right actions. Without this, nothing is possible. I promise you my constructive efforts. Naturally, we will not always agree. Optimum solutions are difficult. I would like Camp David to be a place where we repeat what we said yesterday and reaffirm the kind of relationship we want. We should reaffirm that relationship from Camp David, including regular meetings, and a regular secure phone link so that we can exchange views frequently. The President: Do you want to say all this at our press conference? President Gorbachev: Yes. The President: I agree. So far, I think our meeting is being portrayed this way. President Gorbachev: Yes, even the pictures now are showing the closeness— ourselves, the Ministers, the two ladies, all showing closeness. The President: We will keep it going. We will take some hits on trade and arms control from the Right, but I think we can manage it. We talked last night about trying for meetings without all the trappings. President Gorbachev: I have been told the Supreme Soviet has three pages of questions for me. I said I will answer more than that when I get back. I included two Committee Chairmen in my delegation for this reason. One represents our military-industrial complex, and I also brought the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. Now they are not on the sidelines and it is important that they see how these things work. Soon I will have a Warsaw Pact meeting, and it will be a new Warsaw Pact. Only Shevardnadze and myself and Jaruzelski are old members—all the others are new. I will report the results to you. The President: Just a technical point. We will have a secure line in a year operation and a direct line this fall. (Description of secure line.) President Gorbachev: Shall we go through our points? The President: Fine. There are points I must raise: human rights, refuseniks, immigration, and human rights in general. You want us to take more Jews. We are taking more—about all we can. There are many vestiges of anti-Semitism. We have skinheads and you have a problem too, and to the degree you could speak out publicly: that would help. It helps me. We would encourage direct flights to Israel. You should know that I am 206

in a big fight with Shamir over settling immigrants in the occupied territories. My administration is seen as anti-Israel. It stems from my saying no settlements in the occupied territories and East Jerusalem. This caused a firestorm here and on the Right in Israel. (Described what Netanyahu had said.) We are a true friend of Israel. In our new relationship I hope that you can take account of anti-Semitism, direct flights to Israel, refuseniks, and keep up human rights progress. It would help me a lot. If we can separate anti-Semitism from policy it would help. President Gorbachev: Let me respond. We will seek to cooperate on the full spectrum of human rights. On immigration, here is information the readout on refuseniks. There are twenty on the list. We have given exit visas for five, a temporary departure for one, a temporary visit for one to Great Britain (probably with relatives), one is dead, and there is nothing on the other eleven. We will have more involvement an announcement but that is my report for now. I agree that we do have to take a stand against anti-Semitism. I have spoken out in general and I will find a way to speak out specifically. The President: That would help. It is a world-wide problem and if we are seen cooperating on it that would help. President Gorbachev: We do have a problem between the Russian and Jewish intelligentsia. We will speak out but I don’t want to take sides; here we have to find a way. There are many organizations, some even Fascist which say ugly things. Israel, in letting that settlement go on in Jerusalem has caused an outcry in the Arab press. Even Mubarak said he would have to protest in our press that we are settling the West Bank and replenishing the Israeli army. They are trying to put us against each other. Maybe Israel should be told that if they settle in the occupied territories I will have to stop immigration. The President: It sounds easy, but it is complicated. Individual settlers settlements make it hard to be clear on it. President Gorbachev: Our Ministers could consult on the language. We must try to figure out a solution. The President: Saying no more than this to Israel would get world Jewry up in arms. We could not sign up to that. President Gorbachev: Maybe Baker and Shevardnadze can work something out. The President: It is a risky issue for a joint statement. President Gorbachev: I am not thinking of a joint statement but just getting our policies coordinated. Secretary Baker: I just wanted to say that in 1988 we started a dialogue that let us talk to both parties and move forward on a peace process. It would be helpful if you could let Arafat know that our dialogue can continue only if he speaks out on Abu Abbas. Otherwise, we cannot continue the dialogue. President Gorbachev: He has disassociated himself, but not condemned the attack. Secretary Baker: That is right, but the basis for our dialogue is that there must be no terrorism. 207

Minister Shevardnadze: We got a telegram from Arafat which says: “Violence is getting out of control. Close to explosion. Exacerbated by US veto.” I don’t know why you had to do that—it (the UN resolution) would have pacified the situation. Secretary Baker: (Describes U.S. actions.) President Gorbachev: Let’s think about this. There is a lot of truth to what Arafat says. If there is an explosion, he will be totally isolated. We have worked hard to get Assad and Arafat to work together, as well as Benjedid, and especially Mubarak.. Mubarak is easier, and so is Benjedid. Qadhafi is a problem. But maybe we can work on sending Goulding. We will work on Arafat to clam [sic] things down. I am having lunch with Perez de Cuellar on Monday. I will tell him this. We will do it even against Israel if necessary. The Pres: I am having lunch with Perez de Cuellar on Monday. I will tell him this. We will do it even against Israel if necessary. Secretary Baker: And remember, we cannot continue the dialogue if he is tied to terrorism. President Gorbachev: But Arafat thinks this is patriotic resistance. It is tough for him to speak out. Secretary Baker: But he disassociated himself from it. Minister Shevardnadze: Shamir is more difficult. The President: (Describes U.S. problems with Shamir over settlements.) Minister Shevardnadze: Maybe this is a time to mention the idea of an international conference. We support your idea of a dialogue but we should think of a conference also. President Gorbachev: Everyone but Shamir supports a conference. If we started preparations for a conference we could recognize Israel immediately. Secretary Baker: As Eduard knows, we don’t reject a conference but for now I would not appear at a conference. Under the right circumstances we could go along with one, however. Right now the circumstances are not right. Back to Arafat. The timing of that attack was terrible. We want to keep the pressure on for the dialogue, and this gives Israel a way out. Minister Shevardnadze: Israel would go along with a conference? Secretary Baker: No. (Describes situation.) President Gorbachev: Let’s have Eduard and Jim talk about it. Maybe we can get Israel to take the first step towards a conference. We could jointly guarantee Israel’s existence as a state. We could establish immediate diplomatic relations; then we could be helpful. The bigger Arab nations could make statements recognizing the realities and the Israeli situation. We have contact with Jewish organizations. Eduard has met Peres and Shamir. We could establish consulates. The President: You have gained much by your immigration policy. (Talks about Max Fisher comment.) Secretary Baker: One thing you said is interesting. Israel complains that among the Arabs no one but Egypt recognizes Israeli’s right to exist. That could help. President Gorbachev: We have worked with Arafat to bring him around. 208

Secretary Baker: We will talk. President Gorbachev: When Mubarak came to Moscow he spoke of a freeze, one free zone without nuclear or chemical weapons (jokes, toes curling up). Maybe we could look at it and support Mubarak. There are too many capabilities weapons there. They are different from the Europeans; they get all fired up. We really should think about it, because the region is so heavily armed. The President: I Israel would resist that. President Gorbachev: Let Eduard and Jim think about it. The President: Let’s move to other regional issues, starting with India and Pakistan. We are concerned about a war. Bob Gates came back with negative assessment. We should stay in touch. Everyone would be a loser in such a war. In the 1970’s we tilted toward Pakistan and you tilted toward India. The situation is different now. We won’t try to take advantage of you. We don’t have a dog in that fight, even though we like Bhutto. We would encourage an immediate cease fire. We are open to suggestions. If the situation heats up I hope we can work together. Maybe not, but I don’t want it to disrupt us. President Gorbachev: I had a call from Singh—the morning I was coming here. He wanted me to know that he would do his best to calm things down. I responded that I would welcome a solution to this old problem. I want good relations with both India and Pakistan. We never broke with Pakistan, even in the worst days of Afghanistan. It is therefore in our interest that the situation not become more acute. Let’s keep in touch. The President: I understand that you have a problem with making a joint statement, but maybe we could deal with this at the press conference. President Gorbachev: It might be sensitive for India and Pakistan if we were concerting on them, but at the press conference would be a good way to do it. (Discussion on what is going on.) Let’s stay in close touch, and let’s do the press conference thing (i.e. deal with the issue by responding to press questions). The President: My other regional items include Africa, Ethiopia, etc., but I need to register a point on Cuba. Jim and Eduard have talked about Afghanistan. On Cuba, we think Castro is swimming against the tide; he is unreconstructed. Many think we are picking on him, but he is an outcast. If you changed your economic relationship with Cuba, that would push him. He won’t take the Ortega route. President Gorbachev: Castro supported the Nicaragua solution. The President: That was because he thought that Ortega would win the election. But maybe we could use that as a model. Secretary Baker: As in the case of Nicaragua, if Castro were to change we would change our policy. President Gorbachev: Let me say a few words on this. I agree that there can be no peace in Central America if Cuba is isolated. We are not doing that, but we see that you have that syndrome. I spoke about it to the Vice President. He said he had gone to the Caribbean six times, and I said “you did not stop in Cuba.” We should analyze Castro. He is criticizing us more than you. In the Cuban missile crisis, he kept Mikoyan running around the island for a week. Teaching 209

lessons to Castro is useless. When I was there, I could see they were tense. I told him I was not trying to change the way he does things, but let me do things my way as well. Then they relaxed and it went alright. If you got in touch with him I think he would respond, but trying to force him to change would be useless. He has told me, “I will not take U.S. dictation, but if they will sit and talk ....” Maybe we could set something up that is not bilateral. He is ready to hear you out—to talk at any level. It is better if he hears from you rather than from us. A change in our economic relations is coming. It will be based on buying the things we need, although I realize it will not be at market prices. It can be sold for dollars on the world market. Also, we buy citrus and nonferrous metals. We are beginning to put our economic relations on a realistic relations [sic]. Before, no one even thought about the economic aspects of our relations. The Latin Americans show more understanding of the role of Cuba, so it is not that simple. There is a remaining problem to discuss: the Contras. The President: I think that is back on track. General Akhromeyev: I have a personal relationship with Castro, and he says he is prepared to go very far. He understands the problem. The President: Let me tell you about the U.S.-Cuban problem. (He describes the Cuban-American patriotic community.) Therefore there is a lot of emotion in this issue for Americans the Cubans. (Hands him a Congressional letter on Cuba). I hear what you have said on Castro and I hope you understand our feelings on the issue. Let’s keep it on the table. Secretary Baker: We haven’t asked Castro to give us something before we sit down to talk, only that he cease subversion in El Salvador and Latin America— that is all. President Gorbachev: Do you want us to convey this to him? The President: It would be helpful. President Gorbachev: If El Salvador improved visibly there would be a change by you? The President: Yes, but I won’t give him a State Dinner! Secretary Baker: El Salvador has a freely elected government, and he is subverting it. The President: I don’t like seeing Umberto Ortega as head of the army in Nicaragua because the armed forces were a Party. Minister Shevardnadze: Just a word on Cuba. We are having some discussions with the US on Cuba in quest of some imaginative solutions. If the U.S. treats Cuba as an equal, things might work—as in the case of Angola, where we made it work after they got treated like equal partners. On El Salvador, I think that Castro may undertake a serious discussion. President Gorbachev: What do you want us to do? Secretary Baker: Here is a wild suggestion: that you tell him the President said that there will be an improvement in relations and a dialogue, if he will firmly sign on to and support Esquipulas, which bans the export of insurgency to Central America. 210

The President: That only deals with a small part of the problem. For the establishment of full relations with Cuba the people must be able to have free elections, and must enjoy human rights, like letting people out of jail, etc. For normal relations, Castro cannot be the only one out of step in the hemisphere. President Gorbachev: For now we will convey to him suggestions that will permit the dialogue to begin. Then it can progress. The President: I must tell you that the Soviet relationship to Cuba sours the US view of you. Secretary Baker: The MIG-29 is a big issue for us psychologically. The President: Why don’t we break for lunch then we can rest and get back together at 3 p.m. (Lunch break) President Gorbachev: (Begins with a discussion of the differences between the Soviet and US federations, emphasizing the nationalities aspect of the Soviet federation. Describes the fight between Stalin and Lenin on the nature of the federation, saying that after Lenin died Stalin left the law the same but ruthlessly created a military state. Then Stalin said that the nationalities problem no longer existed; there was a “Soviet” nationality. So once the dam burst, the nationalities issues burst out into the open. The Byelorussian language had almost died out.) The President: Shall we return to our agenda? I dominated the discussion with my subjects this morning, although we didn’t raise Afghanistan. President Gorbachev: I would be happy to discuss Afghanistan. The President: On Afghanistan, we would really like to be disengaged. We would like to cut loose, and we have no interest in a radical, and Muslim administration. We are also worried about the radicals, and we are not trying to install and anti-Soviet fundamentalist regime. (Described the political arrangements that the U.S. seeks.) If they got underway, we would stop our aid to the Mujahedin. If we could both state that no party would be able to subvert the process and state that a neutral body would arrange the elections, we would have a good outcome. Najibullah could participate but not as head of government. Hebmaytyar [sic] is an undesirable conservative. I asked whether you can live with a short supervised period where Najibullah could participate but step aside from government. President Gorbachev: There is mutual understanding for a neutral period plus a mechanism for conducting an election leading to a broad-based government; also, for a UN role for a transition period and in the conduct of elections. Do we understand that neither the government nor the opposition would transfer the government to a neutral authority. So the only hope is elections on the basis of the status quo. Let them conduct their elections in their own way. We can’t remove Najibullah or Hekmaytyar [sic] from the scene. Najibullah is beginning to put more strings on us. The President: He thinks he is getting stronger. President Gorbachev: He thinks he is getting more support. Some former opposition members are managing local government under the general supervision of government forces. 211

Minister Shevardnadze: We need a new approach, because neither side has the leverage to achieve a solution. The President: How does Najilbah [sic] feel about elections? Minister Shevardnadze: I have talked to him. He favors a Nicaragua-type solution, with a group charged with developing elections. President Gorbachev: Would Najilbah [sic] be willing to step aside as part of a normal process, but not be kicked out? Minister Shevardnadze: Yes, but not as a withdrawal. Then a conference could set up an election process. Our differences are not great. We can’t get Najibullah out. Actually, this process is getting under way. He is inviting Zahir Shah to take the highest position. President Gorbachev: We would like a neutral regime, not one hostile to the U.S. The President: We can’t argue against Najibullah staying in power, a la Nicaragua, but the problem is how to get the Resistance plugged in. President Gorbachev: Neither the Mujahedin nor Najibullah will conduct the elections. The UN or the OIC will do it. Najibullah does not want to be kicked out. That is his minimum condition. Secretary Baker: It is difficult for us to argue against the Nicaraguan model. Our problem is with the Resistance. We need something for them to show that elections would be fair, that supervision would be neutral, and that the outcome would be observed. What about Najibullah taking a head of state role during this period to demonstrate that a transition authority would conduct the election and provide security. President Gorbachev: Najibullah would be a kind of interim acting president during the election? Secretary Baker: Yes, but with something less than full authority. President Gorbachev: We must think about it. The President: Let’s have Jim and Eduard talk some more about this. President Gorbachev: Yes, let’s, because there are lots of areas of agreement. Minister Shevardnadze: We could try to formulate three or four points on which the Afghans could agree: on the transition period for elections and the conduct thereof, on the role of the UN, etc. We would agree that Afghanistan would be unified, neutral, and demilitarized. President Gorbachev: And the only solution to Afghanistan is a political solution. The two sides should recognize each other. There would be four or five principles on which we could agree. Minister Shevardnadze: This would be similar to Nicaragua and to what we are trying to do in Angola, etc. It is a tested process. The President: How about Ethiopia? President Gorbachev: We have an appeal from Mengistu. Minister Shevardnadze: The essence of his letter is that he would agree to the UN as observers in his talks with Eritrea. They were opposed to any outside body until now. One other element: they agree to Massawa for humanitarian relief, 212

subject to the sovereignty of Ethiopia. The Eritreans must agree. The US and the Soviet Union should suggest an international conference for an overall settlement in the horn of Africa. That should come from us, not them. Our two groups have been working on language. Another issue was our cargo planes for relief—we agree, on condition that the Eritreans don’t shoot them down. Secretary Baker: How about a joint appeal that the Eritreans should not shoot, on the basis that people will starve if they do. The President: This is about all we can do today. President Gorbachev: If we can issue a joint appeal, let’s conclude and let our experts work on it. (Dennis brings a paper that is given to Obukov and it is read to Gorbachev.) Secretary Baker: I think that a joint statement on aid involving Soviet planes and US food would look good. President Gorbachev: On Southern Africa, we don’t have a big disagreement on what is happening in South Africa. In Southern Africa we are already working together. We will be flexible toward changes in South Africa, supporting those people who are working peacefully to abolish apartheid. We would encourage a joint statement here. The President: Mandela is a hopeful person to conduct a dialogue with de Klerk. Both of them are coming here. The Europeans may ease sanctions, but we will not do that. Minister Shevardnadze: A unique situation may be emerging with both sides urging a peaceful solution. We should stimulate this process. Secretary Baker: On Angola, we would like to pursue the election route. You say that Dos Santos is not quite ready. But we should push in that direction. The two sides are talking and we have offered talks under our joint sponsorship. Minister Shevardnadze: One new element: Savimbi offered to meet with us. Dos Santos does not object and we will do it privately. The President: What shall we discuss next? President Gorbachev: Korea—a lot of things worry us on the peninsula. I think we agree the two sides should engage in dialogue. A small step was taken in the release of U.S. troops. Politically, that is an important gesture. We are worried there is no agreement between North Korea and the IAEA, and they are very touchy about any contacts we have with South Korea. Those contacts are economic, and they are good. South Korea would like Siberian resources, and we are willing. Roh asked for a contract and we agreed, thinking it would be kept quiet. I am worried about the reaction of the North. We have told Kim there is no change in our policy, no recognition. We have said were [sic] just meeting with the South Koreans to make their acquaintance and to promote Korean dialogue. We don’t know what will come of it. Once again, we may be accused of betrayal. The President: We think it is a good thing you are seeing Roh. Our concern is Kim and his blocking of the IAEA agreement and the lack of moderating behavior. South Korea’s reaching out is good. If Kim could accept safeguards, it would 213

help. We are worried about instability on the peninsula. Earlier, we would have been upset about your talking to the South Koreans. This is no longer the case. President Gorbachev: We will try to explain ourselves. The President: North Korea made one positive move: their return of the remains of five US soldiers. President Gorbachev: We did our bit on that. Minister Shevardnadze: The Koreans asked if the US would provide them with non-nuclear generators guarantees. Then maybe they will sign on with the IAEA. The President: Will there be a more moderate government in Korea? We don’t know much about it. President Gorbachev: These Eastern systems are hard to figure out. The way is being paved to transfer power to the son. They have swallowed Hungary’s establishment of relations with South Korea, but it will be different when we make contact. We should Think about more nuclear guarantees. General Scowcroft: If they would guarantee not to attack South Korea. President Gorbachev: Why not? General Scowcroft: We have tried formulations before but we can look at it again. The President: Let’s talk about Japan. It can be helpful; they can help with economic assistance, as they have in Eastern Europe. Kaifu is stronger now, and we are working pragmatically on trade. Many feel Japan is buying up the U.S., but I don’t worry about that. Japan might be helpful if you could deal with the Territories. It is your business, but I think you would find it beneficial. I commend Kaifu to you—and hope he is still in power when you go there. President Gorbachev: We decided it was worthwhile for me to visit next year. Meanwhile, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev and Yeltsin will visit this fall. The Japanese know in principle that the Territories issue is clear, but their involvement in our Eastern Territories has been unsatisfactory thus far. For a long time they resisted any economic discussions, and they still think the economic relationship benefits us more than them. Their Foreign Ministry is conservative through and through. There is people contact, but no real business being conducted. When we move to a market system and open up to foreign firms, I think they will change. But 97% of the Soviet people oppose any movement on the Islands. The President: Let’s move on to Cambodia. President Gorbachev: I think there is some hope there. I am slightly optimistic. Our common task is to solidify the agreements that the four sides made, and to help set up the supervisory organization. I have statements from Sihanouk and from Hun Sen which are very similar. There is some convergence emerging. The President: We have little influence, but we will urge cooperation. We will talk to the PRC even though we are without much influence with them. We hope that you will also do so. President Gorbachev: My impression is that the Chinese are acting more positively. Shevardnadze discussed the issue with Li Peng and they are now 214

normalizing relations with Vietnam. The fact that China and Vietnam are talking is sending a signal to Phnom Penh. (There was a humorous discussion of Cuba, sugar and moonshine. The President described the US sugar problem and Central American sales of coffee and sugar to the US.) Secretary Baker: (Renews our proposal for the Soviet Union to join the G-24 in helping Central America.) President Gorbachev: Our cooperation with Nicaragua in the past will continue. We are considering it (the proposal regarding the G-24). The President: What is next? President Gorbachev: Cyprus. Vassilliou has written to both of us. He wants us to support a UN mission to Cyprus to break the deadlock. Minister Shevardnadze: In order not to antagonize Greece or Turkey, the best way is for each side to support UN efforts. The President: What is left? General Scowcroft: We need to discuss coordination for the press conference on Germany and Lithuanian [sic]. President Gorbachev: We could say we had a good exchange, that both sides presented their arguments and made their case, and that it is not just a question between the two of us. As a result we decided that these consultations should continue. That is the shortest formula. The President: They will press me on trade, that I said Lithuania complicated the situation. I will say that the trade agreement is in the best interest of both sides. The next step is early, emigration legislation (on immigration) and that is where it stands. They will ask how about Lithuania. I will say I expressed myself fully on Lithuania but the next step is early emigration legislation. Secretary Baker: They will ask whether there is a side deal. When I was asked, I said I could not talk about private conversations. The President said it will be difficult to get trade legislation through Congress and that is true, but that issue does not arise now because the next step is Soviet emigration legislation. President Gorbachev: The rest of it I will say. We have to bear in mind that rigid linkage should be avoided. We had a direct discussion of Lithuania. I discussed the situation and the prospects. We are looking for, and I expect I will find a solution within the framework of our Federation. Each Republic can withdraw or change the form of its relationship, but this must be in the established framework. The President: The more you can explain that to the US, the better. I will just stay away from linkage. President Gorbachev: And we will point out that it is not just one agreement, we have agreements on grain, aviation, etc. I will say that we cannot take away the right of self-determination, but since it is a constitutional right it must be done constitutionally. The President: The press is now more positive. Time and Newsweek said you were in trouble. That created a tough environment, but you have shown yourself completely in charge. 215

President Gorbachev: It is a complex period, but we have to accept a pluralism of views. Not everyone will agree with us, or we wouldn’t have pluralism. Secretary Baker: (AFL and Donets Conference) [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA request 2009-0275S and Mandatory Review request 2011-0842-MR by the National Security Archive. (Original in Brent Scowcroft Collection, Special Separate USSR Notes File, Gorbachev Files, Folder: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July-December 1990 [2].)]

216

Document No. 33: “Briefing Allies on Washington Summit,” U.S. Department of State Cable June 15, 1990

This five-page cable, prepared two weeks after the Washington summit, provides the Bush administration’s fullest version of the meeting’s results in the form of briefing points for U.S. diplomats to deliver to the allies. Classified SECRET, this briefer includes several additional paragraphs of description just for the allies, as well as quotes from the “candid” exchanges with Gorbachev. For example, the cable quotes Gorbachev as saying, were it not for the development of close working relations with Washington, the “rapid pace of change in Europe could have provoked a real clash of interests between the two countries, like ‘putting a match to a bonfire.’” Probably the most awaited news from this summit was on Germany in Europe, but this cable states that “no breakthroughs were made,” only that “some new ideas emerged,” to be discussed by the ministers. While Gorbachev agreed that “freedom of choice” under the Helsinki Final Act could apply to Germany’s decision on alliance membership, the cable stresses that Soviet decision making is “in flux and characterized by many internal contradictions.” This portrayal of the outcome contradicts the subsequent triumphalist description of the Washington summit as the moment when Gorbachev finally conceded Germany’s unification in NATO. In fact, Gorbachev and Kohl did not make their decisions until their meeting in Arkhyz in mid-July.

Overview • When Presidents Bush and Gorbachev met last December in Malta, they laid out a broad agenda to guide the further development of U.S.-Soviet relations. • Much of that agenda has now been completed; the Washington Summit produced significant and concrete agreements spanning the range of U.S.-Soviet issues. • In total, the sides concluded 14 agreements and released 11 joint statements. These reflect a maturing of U.S.-Soviet relations, as we press forward with President Bush’s goal of challenging our past history of confrontation and building a relationship of enduring cooperation. • But significant differences remain between us on important issues. First of all was the question of the Baltics. – Gorbachev explained his position and the conditions under which Moscow would be prepared to begin a dialogue with Vilnius. He said the Soviets did not insist that the Lithuanians annul their declaration of independence, only that they suspend it and pursue negotiations within the framework of Soviet Law. – The President reaffirmed our non-recognition policy and support for the Baltic peoples’ strivings for self-determination. 217

– We left the Soviets with no doubts as to our concern over the lack of dialogue and Moscow’s economic sanctions, and of their effect on U.S.-Soviet relations. • The atmospherics of the summit were good. The presidents approached problems in a cordial and constructive way, even on issues where they disagreed. – As the President noted, it was a mark of how far the U.S.-Soviet relationship has come that his discussions with Gorbachev on difficult issues could be characterized by a spirit of candor and openness, with the sides seeking not only to understand the other’s position, but to build cooperation. – Indeed, Gorbachev at one point observed that, had U.S.-Soviet working relations not been so well developed last year, the rapid pace of change in Europe could have provoked a real clash of interests between the two countries, like “putting a match to a bonfire.” • So we believe we have a good basis for tackling those unresolved issues that remain on our agenda. • The leaders agreed to meet on a regular basis with a focus on working encounters. Gorbachev invited the President to make a state visit to the Soviet Union. Germany and Europe • Presidents Bush and Gorbachev had an in-depth exchange of views on the changes underway in Europe, with particular focus on the process of German unification. • While no breakthroughs were made, some new ideas emerged that will be explored in upcoming discussions between foreign ministers and in the Two-Plus-Four. • The President said in his press conference that the alliance membership was a matter for the Germans to decide, consistent with the Helsinki Final Act. Gorbachev did not object. • But Soviet thinking seems still to be in flux and characterized by many internal contradictions. • Gorbachev repeatedly emphasized the importance of a transition period. • It is not clear what Gorbachev’s acceptance of the principle of freedom of choice means in practice. • President Bush reiterated our approach to German unification, stressing that there should be no discriminatory constraints on German sovereignty and no singularization of a united, democratic Germany. • He assured Gorbachev that no one wanted to isolate the Soviets. • He reviewed the Nine Points we have developed to address the Soviets’ legitimate security concerns, and stressed that Germany’s membership in NATO was a factor for stability and security in Europe. • He also noted the benefits to the USSR of economic relations with the new Germany. 218

Regional Problems • The two presidents discussed regional issues during the third day of the summit at Camp David. • The discussions were held in an atmosphere that was very relaxed, freewheeling and marked by extraordinary candor and openness. • Many ideas were exchanged and a broader basis for cooperation was established on some issues. Although no breakthroughs occurred. • The two presidents discussed Afghanistan and agreed that there was a measure of common ground in the approaches of the two sides. – In particular, we agree on using the electoral process as a mechanism for establishing a permanent government. We also agree that a transitional authority should prepare for and conduct elections. • The critical area of difference remains the role of Najibullah in a transition period. – President Bush expressed our concern about Soviet insistence that Najibullah retain the advantages of incumbency during a transition process—a position that makes it very difficult to get such a process started. Particularly, given the strength of resistance views about Najibullah. • On the Middle East, President Bush raised U.S. concerns about the recent attempted Palestinian terrorist raid against Israel, expressing the view that Yassir Arafat had to condemn that act, and disassociate himself from its sponsors. • The Soviets agreed Arafat should condemn that incident. • The two presidents had a candid exchange on the emigration issue and the question of Soviet Jewish emigrants settling in the occupied territories. – President Bush pushed for implementation of the Aeroflot-El Al Direct Flights Agreement to assist the process of emigration and to alleviate hardships posed by the lack of direct air links between Moscow and Tel Aviv. • President Gorbachev complained about the attitude of Israel on settlements in the occupied territories and urged the U.S. to do more in that regard. –  Gorbachev noted that the USSR had been bombarded with criticism from Arab countries on the issue of Soviet Jewish emigration and implied during his joint press conference with President Bush that, if Soviet concerns are not heeded by Israel, he may have to give further thought to issuing exit permits. – He stated his hope that Israel would provide assurances after further discussions with the U.S. on the issue of new settlements in the occupied territories. • The Soviets said nothing during the private summit discussions, however, to indicate any backsliding from their commitment to permit open Soviet Jewish emigration. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has subsequently confirmed to Secretary Baker that Soviet emigration policy would not change. • The two sides also discussed the volatile situation in Kashmir agreeing to watch the situation carefully and to urge restraint in continuing parallel approaches to India and Pakistan. 219

• T  he two leaders reviewed the situation in Central America and Cuba. Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze also discussed this subject. • Both sides agreed on the need to support the Esquipulas peace process. • The President and the Secretary urged the Soviets to use their influence with Castro to get Cuba to end arms shipments to the FMLN in El Salvador and support a negotiated solution to the Salvadoran conflict. – While suggesting that the U.S. make direct approaches to Cuba in an effort to improve bilateral relations, the Soviets said they would probe the Cubans on the issue of arms to the FMLN, and would also continue economic aid to Nicaragua. • On Asia, President Bush raised the issue of the Northern Territories, pointing out that the U.S. fully supports the Japanese claim to those islands. – He urged President Gorbachev to resolve this issue with Japan, since this would contribute greatly to a reduction of East-West tensions. – The Soviet side offered its standard reply on the issue, that it is a bilateral problem to be settled between the USSR and Japan. Gorbachev also referred to his planned trip to Japan in 1991. • The two sides also discussed Cambodia. The President felt it was important to support the efforts of Japan, Thailand and other states to resolve the differences among the Cambodian parties. – They also took note of the progress made so far in the Perm Five meetings on the external aspects of a comprehensive settlement. • The two presidents also discussed the Korean Peninsula. – In the context of his upcoming meeting with ROK President Roh Tae Woo in San Francisco on June 4, Gorbachev explained that the USSR intended to improve its relations with the Republic of Korea and underscored the economic potential to be gained for Moscow from better ties with Seoul. – He admitted that it would complicate Soviet relations with North Korea, but said that Moscow would go ahead with its plans nevertheless. • President Bush raised the North Korean nuclear problem, expressing U.S. concerns about the failure of the DPRK to sign and implement an IAEA Nuclear Safeguards Agreement. – The U.S. noted that on several occasions the North had been given standard negative security assurances from the U.S. • Gorbachev replied that the USSR was concerned as well about North Korean failure to act on its obligations. He said the Soviets had approached the North on this issue and suggested the U.S. consider a direct approach to Pyongyang. • Asian regional security issues were not brought up by either side. • The presidents discussed the situation in Africa, focusing on Southern Africa and the problems in Angola and South Africa. – The two leaders offered their strong support for an intra-Angolan dialogue and the current process underway between the two parties to the conflict. 220

– On South Africa, both expressed optimism about the possibilities for a settlement, since President de Klerk and Nelson Mandela were engaged in talks. • As a symbol of our growing ability to cooperate in the resolution of regional conflicts, the two presidents also issued a joint statement on Ethiopia. – The statement calls for a UN-led relief effort that would use Soviet transport to carry American food to those in need in Northern Ethiopia. The statement also expresses the hope that the peace efforts would succeed. [Source: U.S. State Department, State 193849, obtained through FOIA in 1997 by the National Security Archive.]

221

Document No. 34: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, 9:26 a.m. – 10:06 a.m. July 17, 1990

President Bush calls his Soviet counterpart after several crucial events have taken place in rapid sequence during the first two weeks of July. Immediately after Gorbachev’s return from Washington, he met with the new leadership of the transformed Warsaw Pact in Moscow and announced that the division of Europe had ended and the socialist alliance now would cooperate with NATO. This notion was echoed by the London Declaration through which the Western allies reached out to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe with “a hand of friendship.” The 28th Congress of the CPSU, the last in the history of the Soviet Party, was also held during the first half of the month—described by Gorbachev here as “perhaps the most difficult and important period in my political life.” The Congress subjected the party leader to scathing criticism from both conservative Communists and the democratic opposition. He managed to defend his program and win reelection as general secretary, but he had very little to show from his engagement with the West, especially after ceding so much ground on German unification and ultimately agreeing to allow a unified Germany to join NATO. While Gorbachev fought for his political life as Soviet leader, the Houston summit of the Big Seven debated ways to help perestroika, but because of U.S. opposition to credits or direct economic aid prior to the enactment of serious free-market reforms, no concrete assistance package was approved; the group went no further than to authorize “studies” by the IMF and World Bank. Gorbachev counters that given enough resources the USSR “could move to a market economy,” otherwise, the country “will have to rely more on state-regulated measures.” Finally, Gorbachev mentions the crucial agreements he has just reached with Kohl in Moscow and the Caucasus resort of Arkhyz, although he declines to discuss them on an open phone line. In Arkhyz, he at last accepted German unification in NATO and received Kohl’s pledge of a substantial economic package and help with Soviet troop relocation from East German territory.

The President: Hello. President Gorbachev: Hello. Good afternoon, Mr. President. The President: Good afternoon, or good morning from here. Congratulations on the success of the Kohl visit. President Gorbachev: Thank you. The President: As a matter of fact, I just talked to Chancellor Kohl and he is pleased. He thinks the agreements you reached are good not just for Soviet-German relations, but for U.S.-Soviet relations too. Needless to say, we are pleased with your comments that a unified Germany has the right to choose its alliance membership. This showed great statesmanship on your part, and we feel good 222

about it. I hope we can make similar progress on CFE and on START in the months ahead. But the main purpose of my call, as Chair of the Houston G-7 Summit, is to give you a brief report on that meeting. I will follow-up in writing. I also know that Kohl discussed this issue with you, too. President Gorbachev: Thank you. The President: I hope you noticed from our communique that we all stressed our willingness to help the Soviet Union, but that perestroika will depend on the success of your reforms. So, we tried to include positive language on that and hope you noted it. We made the point that western technical assistance should be provided now, which is something you mentioned in your letter to me. I think the U.S. can play an important role here. I hope we can get our people together so that we can intensify this technical cooperation. We have in mind focussing [sic] on one particular area where we could work together—on transportation and food distribution. We could perhaps work together in that area. As you know, we have legal obstacles in providing credits, but we did agree that some of the western countries could provide credits now to the Soviet Union. The communique called for asking the IMF to convene a study with the World Bank, the OECD and the EBRD on the Soviet economy, if that would be welcomed by you, and to make recommendations on how our assistance could be most helpful to your reforms. All the Houston participants agreed we wanted the Summit to give momentum to assistance to the USSR and to you [sic] own reform efforts. So, it is our collective view that the Houston and London summits should make clear to public opinion everywhere that the U.S.­-Soviet confrontation is over, and that, working together, we’ll make a peaceful post-war world. Now if you have a minute more, I would like to tie this in to the NATO Summit. President Gorbachev: Yes. I agree. The President: I know you already received my message. I was gratified by your and Shevardnadze’s comments on the actions taken in London. I remember your telling me when you were here in Washington that you would be watching the outcome of the NATO Summit. I hope you have seen the transformation of the NATO Alliance, and hope that is the way it was read in the Soviet Union. So, what we tried to do was to take account of your concerns expressed to me and others, and we did it in the following ways: by our joint declaration on non-aggression; in our invitation to you to come to NATO; in our agreement to open NATO to regular diplomatic contact with your government and those of the Eastern European countries; and our offer on assurances on the future size of the armed forces of a united Germany—an issue I know you discussed with Helmut Kohl. We also fundamentally changed our military approach on conventional and nuclear forces. We conveyed the idea of an expanded, stronger CSCE with new institutions in which the USSR can share and be part of the new Europe. 223

We tried to shift the emphasis in the document to envisioning a Europe in which no power feels isolated. You know my view that NATO is a stabilizing force, especially with a unified Germany not isolated but as a full member. So what I tried to do there, and in our talks, and in my previous talks with Akhromeyev, was to show an Alliance adapting to new realities and not a threat to anyone. I should also mention that the paper from which NATO worked was a U.S. paper, and I am proud of my colleagues for this U.S. role. I hope that you can study it and that we can discuss it. So, may I make two points in conclusion? As a politician, I watched with awe and respect the way you concluded and handled the party Congress. In Houston, we were supposed to be working on economic matters, but all of us watched with fascination your efforts to move on political and economic reform with perestroika. It is fair to say that all of us want you to succeed. And a last point on economic matters. To coin a phrase, I don’t want the Soviet people licking sugar through a glass. We have some constraints but we do want to help. I really mean that. I want you to get the benefit of the reform process. I think you know what I mean about licking sugar through a glass. That’s my report. President Gorbachev: Thank you, Mr. President. I thank you for what you have said. I will give a short response. I would start with an issue you mentioned in the latter part of your talk— the results of the party Congress. I believe that through reasons you understand that the Communist Party remains a powerful political organization. Its position and actions will largely determine the course of events in our country. And it is only natural given the new situation and the period we are going through that the Communist Party has renounced its monopoly on power. New parties will emerge and new political public organizations will be created. And my task, and that of my close colleagues on perestroika, was that this position taken by the Communist Party be more in line with the aims we have set in these reforms. At the moment, we have reached a stage when we are about to embark on major reforms on the economy and on a new federation between the republics. I have in mind new relations with the republics on economics and other matters. I have to say, all-in-all, it was not an easy period for me. They were not easy days and nights. It was perhaps the most difficult and important period in my political life, but we have now achieved the tasks we set for ourselves. And as a result of this, we now have a profound understanding in the party and in society of the need to have new, major changes. The most important aspect is that we create a social environment to undertake these reforms. And I am also relating this to the results of the Houston meeting and the things you have just said. That is to say, we have to have ready by the end of the summer and early fall, a broadly defined program for transition to a market economy which could be begun as early as January 1, 1991. We’ll have to make great efforts and perhaps in this sense we count on your cooperation. 224

There are two schools of thought. The one more current in the U.S. is that the less help given the Soviets, the better they will able to carry out reforms. The other, to which we subscribe, is that if we have enough resources, including financial resources at this important stage in the development of a market economy,—enough resources, then we could move to a market economy. If we find we do not have enough resources and financial reserves, we will have to rely more on state-regulated measures. But I believe the second school of thought is more reasonable and substantiated. In this respect, I greet the positive tone of Houston under your Chairmanship. Let me also say some words on the Kohl visit. We managed to bring our points of view closer together. And, in fact, the results take into consideration our common interests—of Germany, yours and ours. I believe that without the meeting in Washington and at Camp David, without the results of the NATO Summit and the London Declaration, without the major work in my conversation with Kohl and your talks with Kohl, without the activities of our foreign economic agencies, without this real political action it would have been difficult to arrive at the proximity in our points of view. We achieved all this because we understood each other’s position. We tried to take into account each other’s views. I consider the results of my conversation with Kohl to be quite positive. I hope that Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary Baker will discuss specifically this particular subject. I believe they will discuss these specific points which are best not discussed in this phone conversation. If these agreements are respected, we could achieve positive results. That is all I wanted to add. I agree with you that the development of this process make [sic] us hopeful that positive results will be achieved in Vienna and on the CSCE process and that there are good prospects for the CSCE meeting we have discussed. And in conclusion, let me say I am glad to hear the voice of George Bush over the phone. Our conversation makes me hopeful for the future. The President: Let’s stay in touch. Congratulations with your agreement. I’ll tell the press we had a constructive discussion about the Houston and NATO Summits. President Gorbachev: Yes. I think we can do this in a short way—these two topics. The President: All right, sir. Let’s do it and it is nice to speak to you. President Gorbachev: All the best, Mr. President. Good-bye. The President: My best to Raisa. President Gorbachev: Also, my best to Barbara. Good-bye. The President: Good-bye. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA 2000-0429-F by the National Security Archive.]

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Chapter 3

THE HELSINKI SUMMIT, PARIS CSCE SUMMIT, AND THE WAR IN THE GULF, 1990

W

hen Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the new post-Cold War relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union encountered its first real test. It was especially crucial for the Soviet side, confronting Mikhail Gorbachev with a difficult challenge to his foreign policy of new thinking. Would he abandon a traditional Soviet ally in the Middle East and side with his Cold War opponents—the United States and the U.N. coalition—or would he play the traditional superpower game, trying to undermine U.S. influence in the region? In the end, Gorbachev was able to rise above factional strife and show himself to be a true partner who consistently followed his liberal-internationalist ideas and stuck by the coalition. In the process, President George Bush tried to do everything to ensure Soviet support as key to creating and sustaining an effective international alliance. In the Persian Gulf, as in other issue-areas, U.S.-Soviet interaction proved to be central to ending the Cold War. Two important summits took place during the period of the Gulf crisis—an unplanned gathering in Helsinki and the Paris meeting, which was supposed to be about post-Cold War European structures, but where the Gulf conflict remained the center of attention. Both summits seemed to confirm the new, unprecedented nature of the superpower relationship, combined with a high degree of Soviet involvement in—one might even say true integration into—Western political decision making and efforts to build new security structures and principles in Europe. This was also the period when, as a direct result of his successful interaction with the Soviet Union on the Persian Gulf, President Bush and Brent Scowcroft first talked about the concept of a “new world order.” That notion, dreamed up while fishing for bluefish off Kennebunkport on August 23, later became the key slogan for Bush’s vision of the post-Cold War system.1 In this new world order, the two superpowers could be guarantors of international security, jointly involved in addressing cases of aggression and regional conflict. In the months leading to the war in the Gulf, both the Soviet Union and the United States essentially reversed their traditional positions in the region. The Soviet power base always consisted of the anti-Israeli, anti-American Arab “rejectionist” states. Iraq was the most important member of this coalition, after Egypt, under Anwar Sadat, reoriented its policy toward the United States. Iraq under Saddam Hussein was a valuable commodity—a Third-World client that paid its debts. Baghdad bought large amounts of Soviet weapons, and employed  Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 355.

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a significant number of Soviet military specialists and engineers.2 Still, in this case, the USSR decisively condemned the actions of its ally, steadfastly stood by the international coalition and voted for all U.N. resolutions. When the U.S. decided it was time for military action, its Soviet partner raised objections and tried to win time for diplomatic action, but ultimately fell in line. Washington’s behavior during the Persian Gulf crisis also differed significantly from its Cold War patterns. The United States traditionally maintained a policy of preventing the Soviet Union from playing a role in the Middle East, and not allowing a Soviet military presence in the Gulf. However, on the advice of Secretary of State James Baker, the U.S. suggested to the Soviets that they join a military coalition in the Gulf, and eventually agreed to Moscow’s proposal for a joint Middle East peace conference. There was also internal opposition in the United States, which doubted Soviet motives in the Gulf and objected to Bush’s willingness to allow the USSR entrée into the region. As Beschloss and Talbott pointed out, when Baker suggested to the State Department the idea of the Soviet Union contributing to the international coalition, “he provoked much the same kind of complaints that Shevardnadze had stirred in the Foreign Ministry. U.S. diplomats fired off memos warning that to invite the Soviet Union to send forces to the Gulf region was to discard four decades of diplomacy aimed at keeping the Soviets out.”3 Things were changing fast on the U.S. side. As late as October 1989, National Security Directive (NSD) 26, “U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf,” stated the following U.S. position: “Access to Persian Gulf Oil and the security of key friendly states in the area are vital to U.S. national security. The United States remains committed to defend its vital interests in the region, if necessary and appropriate through the use of U.S. military force, against the Soviet Union or any other regional power with interests inimical to our own.”4 The same NSD recommended that “as a means of developing access to and influence with the Iraqi defense establishment, the United States should consider sales of non-lethal forms of military assistance, e.g., training courses and medical exchanges, on a case by case basis.”5 Less than a year later, however, the Bush administration learned to trust Gorbachev and started seeing the bilateral relationship in less adversarial terms. The most important developments that intervened here were the Soviet withdrawal  Different sources provide different numbers of Soviet citizens in Iraq. During his conversation with Bush in Helsinki, Gorbachev mentions 196 military specialists and over 3,000 Soviets overall living in Iraq. Karen Brutents, the International Department official responsible for the Middle East, gives the number as 8,000, which is probably exaggerated. Shevardnadze also mentions 8,000 in his memoir, while Evgeny Primakov, at the time the USSR’s most respected Arabist, indicates the number was 5,000 in his memoir. 3  Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, p. 251. 4  National Security Directive 26, October 2, 1989, p. 1. Collections of the National Security Archive. 5  Ibid., p. 2. 2

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from Afghanistan, the Malta summit, and the interaction with Gorbachev on German unification. As a result, the United States found itself having to cooperate with the principal power against which the NSD had stipulated the possible use of military force, and to push jointly against the regime with which the directive had proposed developing cooperation in the military sphere. INVASION AND THE JOINT STATEMENT

When news of the invasion of Kuwait came, Shevardnadze and Baker were in Irkutsk, immersed in arms control discussions. The Soviet foreign minister was incredulous but not yet seriously concerned because all the information he had about Saddam Hussein led him to believe that the Iraqi dictator would not attempt a major invasion of the neighboring state.6 In fact, U.S. intelligence had not concluded that an invasion was imminent either, even though both the CIA and KGB had detected the concentration of Iraqi forces along the Kuwaiti border. The superpowers’ first major decision in the crisis was to issue a joint statement condemning the invasion and calling for an arms embargo and the unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. This move would largely determine Moscow’s future stance on the conflict. Gorbachev’s own position was not immediately clear because he was already known to be a strong opponent of using force to resolve international conflicts. Even Anatoly Chernyaev, Gorbachev’s closest adviser, doubted that he would give his full support to the U.S. position because in the end it might lead to military action.7 Baker recalls in his memoir that “when [Dennis] Ross first surfaced the idea with me, I really did not believe that we could get a joint statement. The Soviets would be cautious; they’d want to talk to Baghdad, then wait and see. The Arabists in the Foreign Ministry would oppose a joint statement.”8 And yet, the joint statement was signed on the basis of the American text drafted by Ross. For Washington, the decision was momentous, changing security calculations in the region. Baker called August 3, 1990, the day of the joint statement, “the day the cold war ended.”9 He did not assign equal significance even to the unification of Germany, which was agreed upon that same summer. During the negotiations, the U.S. side used the promise of the new superpower partnership as a lever. Baker later wrote that “if Shevardnadze resisted, I was prepared to say that our failure to agree on a worthwhile statement would be a painful reminder that the relationship between our nations wasn’t what I had thought, and that I would have no choice but to relay that sobering conclusion to the President.” 10  Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom, p. 100.  Chernyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev, p. 283. 8  Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, p. 7. 9  Ibid., p. 1. 10  Ibid., p. 15. 6 7

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Immediately, opposition emerged in the Foreign Ministry, just as Baker had anticipated. But Shevardnadze was not the problem. Sergey Tarasenko, Shevardnadze’s closest aide, recalled that the foreign minister had a “shouting match” with the Ministry’s Middle East experts who protested the idea of going along with the Americans. The main criticisms, which were consistently voiced throughout the crisis, especially during the military stage, were as follows: – Soviet support would only help the U.S. increase its military influence in the Gulf. American troops might remain permanently in Saudi Arabia. – The Soviet Union would suffer a loss of prestige among its Arab allies, whom it had cultivated over 40 years. – Iraq might take Soviet citizens hostage. There probably would be loss of life, and their blood would be on Gorbachev and Shevardnadze’s hands. – Iraq was a paying customer, an important source of hard currency. If the Soviet Union joined the United States, it would lose the massive investment it had made in Iraq. (Soviet officials anticipated a loss of approximately $1.2 billion in trade and payments, primarily from tripartite oil deals between the USSR and Iraq for deliveries to Bulgaria, Romania, and India. It was also understood that Iraq would not be able to pay its debt, which was unofficially estimated to be between $5 and $20 billion.) – Most of Iraq’s weapons and military technology were of Soviet origin. Soviet military specialists helped train the troops. If war broke out, it would pit Soviet arms against American arms, and might undermine the image of the Soviet Army and Soviet military technology. – “Marching under U.S. orders” against Iraq would be equivalent to “losing” the Middle East to the United States.11 Gorbachev’s position became even more difficult several days later, on August 6, when Washington informed him about the beginning of Operation Desert Shield—the massive U.S. naval and ground force deployment in the Gulf starting with 200,000 troops in Saudi Arabia. When Baker called Shevardnadze to get his reaction to the deployment, the Soviet foreign minister was gloomy. He had just had to go through the fight in his own agency, and in their discussions about the joint statement Baker had assured him that he would be consulted and that the United States was not seeking a military presence. Their actions, however, ran contrary to their assurances.12 From the very beginning, the Soviets were afraid that the U.S. would press for a military solution and that this deployment would serve as a precedent for taking action without consulting the USSR anytime they suspected it would disagree with their option. Later, during his meeting with Bush in Helsinki on September 9, Gorbachev also tersely pointed out the difference between consulting the Soviet Union and simply informing it about the deployment.13

 Interview with Sergey Tarasenko, June 25, 1996, Moscow.  Telcon, Baker-Shevardnadze, August 7, 1990. 13  Document No. 39. 11

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Bush, meanwhile, shared none of Gorbachev’s cautiousness about military force, believing from the very beginning that it might be the only way to thwart Saddam’s ambitions in the region. Although he did not want to speak publicly about it, Bush recalled that he “could not see how we were going to remove Saddam Hussein without using force. … I asked [Brent Scowcroft] impatiently when we could strike.”14 He called Margaret Thatcher, who saw the situation in “remarkably similar ways” and was even more decisively in favor of the military option. Bush also called King Fahd since “Saudi Arabia would be indispensable to any military moves we might make, and might itself be in danger.”15 Fahd on the one hand expressed a similar assessment, saying “I believe nothing will work with Saddam but use of force,”16 but on the other hand avoided an answer to Bush’s offer to deploy TACAIR, which made Bush worry the Saudis were ready for a compromise. On August 4, the NSC meeting at Camp David concentrated on military options. Bush made numerous phone calls to world leaders—though not to Gorbachev, knowing about his strong objections. In his memoir, Bush wrote that Colin Powell “felt I really had declared war on Iraq that Sunday.”17 However, there was still hope that a peaceful solution rooted in strong U.N. sanctions was possible. Furthermore, deciding on the military option so early on, according to Baker, would “lose the Soviets” and make it extremely difficult to attract needed international support. By the end of August, the U.S. position was based on working through the United Nations to reverse the aggression while simultaneously building a military coalition and preparing the legal ground for military action if Saddam did not comply with U.N. resolutions. On the Soviet side, meanwhile, all efforts aimed at avoiding the military option. Only Shevardnadze shared the American belief that, whether it was desirable or not, Saddam Hussein could only be dealt with militarily. Baker pointed out the difference in attitudes in a memo to Bush: “While I think Shevardnadze is not enthusiastic about using force, he is more inclined to think it will have to be used eventually. For his part, Gorbachev’s image of the new international order is such that he has a hard time reconciling the fact that we might need to use force in this initial test.”18 At this point, Gorbachev turned to Yevgeny Primakov, the dean of Soviet Arabists, who now became the voice of internal opposition against acquiescing to Washington. Primakov was widely respected in the Soviet leadership and by Gorbachev personally. He wanted to negotiate with Saddam directly and to try to promote Soviet interests in the region by playing an independent peacemaker role. Echoing his colleagues, he emphasized that the Soviet Union had a treaty of  Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 353.  Ibid., p. 320. 16  Bush-Fahd Memcon, August 2, 1990, Bush Presidential Library. http://bushlibrary.tamu. edu/research/pdfs/memcons_telcons/1990-08-02—Fahd.pdf. 17  Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 333. 18  Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, p. 313. 14 15

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friendship with Iraq, and should base its response to the aggression on the obligations contained in that treaty. He suspected that the United States was already bent on a military solution and mistrusted Baker’s assurances that Bush was not in favor of using force against Iraq. Another big concern of Primakov and other Arabists was that Soviet support for the American position against an Arab state would result in serious discontent among the Muslim population of Central Asia. This argument carried great weight at a time when nationalist movements threatened to tear the Soviet Union apart, an issue of a special concern for Gorbachev.19 Primakov promoted an idea that strongly appealed to Gorbachev and the majority of the political leadership at the time: Moscow could offer a comprehensive Middle East solution if Saddam would cooperate and if the Americans would agree to the Soviet plan. This was the concept of the “invisible” package as the basis for the Soviet peace plan: Saddam would announce the unconditional withdrawal of troops, but would be given assurances that after the pullout members of the U.N. Security Council would immediately initiate a genuine process for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. In addition, they would commit to a new security structure in the Middle East, in which the Soviet Union would finally assume the role of leading peacemaker and partner of the United States.20 Primakov did not see the situation in the same moral terms as Shevardnadze, and in his memoir he specifically mentions his response to the foreign minister’s moral appeals, pointing out that not negotiating with Saddam was actually an immoral act because it would endanger the lives of Soviet citizens in Iraq.21 Primakov was also categorically against using force, which made Gorbachev especially receptive to his arguments. The Soviet leader decided to make Primakov his personal envoy on the Persian Gulf crisis, a move that infuriated Shevardnadze and created a split between him and Gorbachev. Throughout the fall of 1990, Primakov made repeated missions to Iraq, other Arab countries, and Washington. Even though his strategic goal was the same as the Americans’ proclaimed objective—to persuade Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait without a war—he was widely seen as trying to undermine the coalition’s common stance against Saddam. The cautiousness of Gorbachev and his willingness to explore this “two-channel” approach signaled his precarious political situation in addition to his ambivalence in the face of a potential military conflict. The Helsinki Summit The next important step in forming the international coalition against Iraq’s aggression occurred on September 9, 1990, in Helsinki. The meeting was called on short notice at Bush’s initiative. The president’s top priority for the session   For a detailed account of Primakov’s view of the crisis, see Primakov, Minnoe pole politiki, pp. 61–86. 20  Ibid., p. 68. 21  Ibid., p. 63. 19

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was to maintain close cooperation between the Soviet and U.S. leaderships in order to keep pressure on Saddam Hussein.22 Pre-summit analyses on the American side showed that the USSR was in serious economic trouble and pointed to Gorbachev’s inability to implement the center’s decisions in the context of “deepening fissures in the union” and his tensions with “bolder republic leaders,” especially Yeltsin.23 On the other hand, a CIA assessment of Soviet goals in regional policy concluded that Gorbachev’s priority in conflicts such as in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan and Cambodia was actually to “sustain the momentum in Moscow’s growing relationship with the United States and the West.” On the Persian Gulf especially, “Gorbachev and Shevardnadze have demonstrated the extent to which the USSR now gives priority to its relations with the West.” The CIA document also notes Gorbachev’s desire for a comprehensive Middle East peace settlement, concern about the use of force and a preference to act through the United Nations.24 Two main themes emerge from these documents—the importance of the U.S.-Soviet partnership for Gorbachev and his need to address the domestic crisis. This probably was the most harmonious summit for Gorbachev and Bush, the point when they began to call each other by their first names, and when Gorbachev fully embraced the concept of the “new world order” as congruent with his vision of the post-Cold War international system. Gorbachev brought Primakov and Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev to the meeting, both of whom were deeply concerned about the disastrous consequences of a possible military course of action and determined to prevent Gorbachev from making unnecessary concessions to the United States that might lead to the use of force. Gorbachev also brought a comprehensive settlement plan, which included a number of steps for troop withdrawal and the subsequent removal of sanctions, but most importantly an international conference on the Middle East as a direct outcome of the crisis. The summit consisted of two long sessions. In the first, the leaders discussed the Gulf crisis and made several important breakthroughs. Bush opened with praise for U.S.-Soviet cooperation on Iraq and said he saw “a possibility for a new world order—out of this crisis and tragedy could emerge new opportunities.” He expressed hope that “as the result of these talks you could tell Saddam Hussein” that if the coalition countries were compelled to use force, Gorbachev would “support these efforts.” Then Bush offered important assurances, welcomed by the Soviet leader, on the status of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia: “We do not aim to keep American troops in the Gulf on a permanent basis. This is not one of the intentions behind the American presence in the Gulf. … Frankly, the American people would not support such plans.”  Document No. 38.  Gorbachev’s Position and the Soviet Domestic Scene, CIA, SOVA, September 4, 1990, Bush Presidential Library. 24  Underlying Goals in Soviet Regional Policies: The Persian Gulf, Afghanistan and Cambodia, CIA, SOVA, September 6, 1990. Bush Presidential Library. 22 23

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Bush then proceeded to the most important point of his statement, the announcement of a crucial change in U.S. policy toward the USSR, which turned out to be not only the high point of the summit for Gorbachev but a decisive moment in the relationship: And now, to put all my cards on the table, I would like to say the following. For a long time, during the “Cold War” years, U.S. policy was that the Soviet Union should not play any role in the Middle East. … I want to assure you that the former U.S. position on the Soviet Union’s involvement in the Middle East affairs has changed. The new order, which I hope can be created after this instability, presupposes that the United States and Soviet Union will apply more positive collaborative efforts to regulate not only this problem, but the rest of the issues in the Middle East.25

Bush finished his presentation on the high note of a promise of real and lasting partnership, which pleased the Soviet leader more than anything else: “Mr. President, I appeal to you as a respected friend, an equal, an important partner and participant in the events whose role is quite significant. Let us look to the future, with an understanding that we are talking about more than the current problem, we are talking about very great things.” And so, ambushed by this unprecedented talk of partnership and assurances about the American presence in the Gulf, Gorbachev had the feeling that his priorities had already been addressed before he had even presented his plan. It was “Mission Accomplished” in terms of being accepted as a partner in the Middle East and in building the new world order. Moreover, to his ears the phrase about further collaboration on the Middle East sounded like Bush would have no problem with convening a conference on the region—a key Soviet objective. Gorbachev then launched into a detailed presentation. He remarked on the fruitful cooperation so far, with the exception of the U.S. deployment in Saudi Arabia, on which the Soviets had not been consulted, and Bush accepted the criticism, saying only that the troops had been sent at the request of Saudi Arabia. The Soviet leader then reiterated what he had heard Bush say—that the U.S. was not striving for a permanent military presence in the Gulf and that he would prefer a non-military solution to the crisis. Gorbachev again strongly emphasized his opposition to a military course of action, except “if Iraq attacks Saudi Arabia or Jordan. In all other cases, the use of force should be ruled out.” The Soviet plan included the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and their replacement by inter-Arab forces under the U.N. flag; a reduction of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia; suspension of U.N. resolutions; and their revocation after a full Iraqi pullout. The culmination of the plan was an international conference that would discuss Kuwait’s independence along with other regional issues, including Palestine and Lebanon. The final element of the Soviet proposal seemed to follow logically  Document No. 39.

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from Bush’s statement on Soviet and U.S. collaboration in the Middle East, made just minutes before: “At this conference we could also discuss the question of creating a security system that would be guaranteed by the Soviet Union, the United States, and the five permanent members of the Security Council.” Nothing in Gorbachev’s statement diverged from the vision Bush had presented. In response, Bush said that although he agreed to some of these points, he was concerned that Saddam would feel like he had achieved his objectives in Kuwait. But Gorbachev disagreed, pointing to the complete and unconditional withdrawal called for in the Soviet plan. In fact, for Gorbachev, it was the United States that had already achieved a strategic victory in the conflict—with the U.N. resolutions, international condemnation of Iraqi aggression, and the international coalition firmly behind U.S. policy in the region. There was no need any longer for military action. Bush had repeated, “I want to assure you once again that we are in favor of a peaceful resolution,” to which the Soviet leader responded, “It would be madness to take military action against Iraq if it does not take any new military steps itself.” Gorbachev then pressed his counterpart to move on the proposed plan: “Can we make some kind of decisions here about a plan? No. But if we do nothing, then why meet at all?” Several times during the conversation, Bush insisted, “I agree with everything you said,” yet he was not prepared to make commitments regarding the Soviet plan. The two agreed instead to let their experts examine the proposals. Bush asked Gorbachev to make a joint statement urging Iraq to comply with all U.N. resolutions as a condition for ending its international isolation. But the statement did not mention the international conference on the Middle East—a linkage advocated by Primakov. At the same time, Bush privately promised that the U.S. would agree to a Soviet-American sponsored conference after the crisis was over. This was crucially important to Gorbachev because, once again, even if not formally included in the statement, it signaled a reversal of America’s 45-year policy of trying to keep the Soviets out of the Middle East. Bush also repeated his assurances about avoiding military force and departing Saudi Arabia after the crisis. So in a way, even though there would be no direct linkage to the conference in the Middle East, the first meeting felt like it brought several major accomplishments to Gorbachev. That made him willing to compromise on the final text of the joint statement, which, in the view of Soviet experts, was significantly watered down compared to the initial draft, and did not include major elements of the Soviet plan.26 In the second session of the summit, Gorbachev no longer pressed the Americans to adopt his plan. This turnaround was “astounding” for the U.S. participants, according to Scowcroft: “Gone, virtually without a trace, was the Gorbachev of the morning defending his Iraqi client. It was, to me, an amazing—and exceedingly reassuring—turnabout. We had narrowly escaped a crisis.”27  Brutents, Nesbyvsheesya, p. 527.  Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 368.

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Transcripts of the Helsinki summit are fascinating for what they show about how much the Persian Gulf crisis meant for the U.S.-Soviet relationship beyond just cooperating to repel an aggression. Both sides framed the issue as a test of the emerging world order and of the sincerity of Soviet intentions. In a most unusual way, Gorbachev saw a direct link between the superpower status of the Soviet Union and its support of the United States in the Gulf. To be a partner with Washington in this conflict was a way of salvaging superpower status at a time when his country was approaching economic collapse. In Tarasenko’s words, “we were sinking as a state, the status of great power was only in our memory. The only way for us to hold on as a great power was to hitch ourselves to the American locomotive.”28 The second afternoon session was devoted to various issues, but mainly the Soviet internal situation and specific problems surrounding the next steps in economic reform. This was the deepest discussion so far of Soviet economic needs, and the United States’ positive engagement on all the issues raised by Gorbachev was unprecedented in the bilateral relationship. The difficulties facing the Moscow leadership were enormous. Gorbachev said he had made the choice for radical reform but now had to “hold the society together,” reflecting his concern over the inevitable rise in inflation and unemployment that would result from price liberalization and a reduction in the money supply. He spoke about the need to gain the consensus of the republics’ leaders for any economic measures. The embattled leader made it clear to Bush that he was hoping for American economic assistance and political support: “We are speaking of a need for help. The numbers are not great, and we are not asking for grants, just loans that we will pay back with interest. The coming 3–5 months will be critical. Your position will be of great importance.”29 Baker, who was about to lead a group of senior U.S. businessmen to Moscow, spoke about opening new horizons in the area of developing energy reserves and hydrocarbon processing. He mentioned negotiations on an investment treaty. Scowcroft cited a joint civil aviation project where “the Soviet Union would provide the body, the U.S. the engine and the Israelis the avionics.” President Bush spoke optimistically about other joint projects that could be carried out. He made clear his limits: “As you know, we don’t have the cash for large economic assistance.” At the same time, he vaguely hinted at bigger things in the future: “I don’t want to be under false colors, but the climate for cooperation is continuing. … We have some constraints, but out of this new order we can find a way.”30 This again was something Gorbachev wanted to hear; his need for U.S. economic support was as great as ever, even if it did not involve direct financial aid. Matlock suggests in his memoir that Gorbachev made his concessions on Gulf policy, aware

 Interview with Tarasenko, June 25, 1996, Moscow.  Document No. 40. 30  Ibid. 28 29

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that the “American willingness to be supportive of reform in the Soviet Union might not survive Soviet opposition to Western policy in the Gulf.” 31 The summit ended with a joint statement that included reaffirmation of U.S. and Soviet resolve in the Gulf, a signal of Soviet support for further actions if Saddam did not fully comply with U.N. resolutions, and only a very vague hint of future cooperation on the Middle East. Soviet hopes for economic support did not materialize; Bush had offered nothing more in real terms than a further normalization of economic relations, along with distant promises of better things to come. On the flight home, the U.S. president was in an “expansive mood” and told his aides he felt “elated.”32 A day later he told Chancellor Kohl, “We got everything we wanted.”33 Buildup for U.N. Resolution 678 and searching for alternatives. In the months after the Helsinki summit, both the American and the Soviet sides tried to pursue their respective priorities in the Gulf against rising domestic opposition. In the U.S. Congress, Senator Sam Nunn convened televised hearings on the administration’s policy in the Gulf. His position was that the United States should limit itself to sanctions, even if it took a couple of years, but not resort to military force. As chairman of the Armed Services Committee, he posed a real obstacle to the administration’s plans. On the Soviet side, the situation was even more complicated, and paradoxical. Most of the Supreme Soviet and the majority in the Soviet leadership, including Gorbachev himself, opposed the use of force and an increased American presence in the Gulf, but Gorbachev also felt the need to try as hard as he could to maintain his partnership with the United States while finding a non-military solution. Primakov argued that Gorbachev could allow himself more flexibility and freedom of action if he played the role of superpower peacemaker distinct from the United States. That way the USSR would not be seen as being mentored by the United States internationally, maintain its allies in the Arab world, and consequentially drive a better bargain with Washington in terms of economic assistance, if that was the issue. In pursuit of this goal, Gorbachev allowed Primakov to set off on an international mission to persuade European and American leaders that a Soviet “peace plan,” which would give Saddam a “face saving” opportunity and accomplish the goal of the international coalition—the unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait— without a war. During this mission Primakov worked directly at cross-purposes with the foreign minister, making Shevardnadze’s political position at home even more vulnerable.

 Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire, p. 412.  Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, p. 257. 33  Bush-Kohl Telcon, September 11, 1990, Bush Presidential Library. 31 32

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Shevardnadze felt that Primakov was undermining his authority by acting on issues that were entirely in the domain of the foreign minister without even a pretense of consultation. Primakov went directly to Gorbachev, bypassing Shevardnadze, and insisted that he should go on an independent peace mission. According to Tarasenko, the foreign minister was furious that Gorbachev actually consented against his vocal opposition. This was when Shevardnadze began to think about resignation.34 In early November pressure started to build for adopting a U.N. resolution that would authorize the use of force if all other means failed. Secretary Baker traveled to Moscow and met with Gorbachev on November 8. Although he came to try to persuade Gorbachev of the need for such a resolution, he also gave the Soviet leader additional assurances that the United States did not intend to keep up its military presence in the region: “We want every single one of the American soldiers to return home as soon as possible. We envision keeping only the naval presence in the Gulf that has been there for several decades. … We do not want a military solution because we would have to suffer the heaviest casualties.”35 Gorbachev responded, emphasizing the need to keep the United Nations at the center of each and every decision on Iraq. Part of why the Soviet leader eventually agreed to the resolution authorizing military force was that at least it retained decision-making on Iraq firmly in the hands of the international institution—which was at the core of his thinking on the new international order. While both leaders tried to build a consensus and defend their Persian Gulf policies at home, they managed to attain an unusual level of bilateral cooperation. A notable example occurred when Shevardnadze warned his State Department counterparts about the Primakov mission to Washington on October 18 via his aides, and encouraged them to disregard Primakov’s “peace plan,” which they gladly agreed to do.36 As Beschloss and Talbott emphasized, “it was yet another watershed in the relationship between the two countries: the Soviet Foreign Minister and the U.S. State Department were conspiring to undermine the Kremlin’s special envoy.” 37 Another important episode occurred on November 8, when at Baker’s initiative General Howard Graves gave Shevardnadze a classified briefing on the U.S. war plan and the state of readiness of American forces. Baker described the event in his memoir as “an extraordinary exchange of military information from one former foe to another. In another era, it would have been the most far-fetched thing imaginable that a high-ranking U.S. military officer would be authorized to brief the Soviet Foreign Minister on our war plans against a Soviet client state.”38  Interview with Tarasenko, June 25, 1996, Moscow.  Conversation between Gorbachev and Baker, November 8, 1990, Moscow, AGF, Fond 1, Opis 1. 36  Interview with Tarasenko, June 25, 1996, Moscow. 37  Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, p. 274. 38  Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, p. 310. 34 35

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The Paris Summit On November 17 Gorbachev arrived in Paris for the summit he hoped would be the realization of his dream—a common European home built on the structures of the CSCE and envisioning the dissolution of both military blocs. The summit produced the Paris Charter for a New Europe, popularly described as covering Vancouver to Vladivostok. The meeting also resulted in the decision to institutionalize the CSCE and the long-awaited signing of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). While the ceremonial aspect of the summit was important, and the conversation about the future of European institutions was needed, Gorbachev understood that after Germany’s unification in NATO, and the German-French understanding on the need to build strong Western European integration, his vision of a common European home would no longer be taken seriously in the West. For the United States, the European forum represented above all an opportunity to solidify support for further measures against Iraq. As Bush put it in his memoir, “what should have been a historic occasion was overshadowed by the threat of war.”39 In Bush and Gorbachev’s conversations with various leaders, Iraq was a top priority, including the need to adopt U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 authorizing “all necessary means,” understood by all to signify that the military option was now the centerpiece on the table. Margaret Thatcher took an especially hard line on Iraq in Paris. She called for more decisive steps to remove Saddam and destroy his army. When Gorbachev asked if she felt any chance for a political solution was left, she told him that in her view the United States was too cautious and what was needed was a ground war: “[Y]ou cannot return territory by air strikes. We need armored troops, artillery, that is why we are sending not only ships, but tanks, the entire armored brigade. … Maybe we will have to act even earlier.” Gorbachev, however, cautioned that “it would be worse than Vietnam. When one enters a country, one has to have some idea about how they are going to leave it.” He predicted a long and bloody conflict that would alienate populations and leave the Middle East a zone of turmoil for years.40 For Bush and Gorbachev, Paris was a direct continuation of their conversations at Helsinki. It was symbolic that in speaking with his main international partner Gorbachev made virtually no mention of his European vision. There were two themes—Soviet economic reform and the attendant need for U.S. aid, and the conflict in the Gulf, more specifically the U.S. need for Soviet support of the U.N. resolution authorizing force. Bush opened the meeting expressing genuine concern and reassurance: “I am glad to see you. I think about you all the time. You are living through a difficult time. Of course, I do not want to meddle in

 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 407.  Conversation between Gorbachev and Thatcher, November 20, 1990, Paris, AFG, Fond 1, Opis 1.

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your internal affairs in any way, but let me say this: we will try to do anything we can in order to help you in this difficult task.”41 Gorbachev had traveled to Paris immediately after a very stormy session of the Supreme Soviet on November 18, during which he was blasted by conservatives and democrats alike for the lack of results from economic reform. He described for Bush the danger of instability in the country, and hinted that he might have to resort to unpopular courses of action in the near future: “we will have to use methods resembling harsh administrative measures, so that we do not allow the unfolding processes to descend into chaos. Everybody had to resort to such methods at crucial turning points in history, including President Roosevelt.”42 Turning to the Persian Gulf, Bush appealed to Gorbachev’s abhorrence of war, telling him about his visit to U.S. military bases in Germany and looking into the eyes of young soldiers. He then made an appeal: “I need your help on this issue. We must push for a U.N. resolution, which would sanction necessary measures, i.e. use of force, so that we can persuade Saddam Hussein that he must comply with U.N. demands.” Bush talked about the solid support he was enjoying at home and assured Gorbachev again: “I do not want to use force. However, I have come to the conclusion that such a resolution is needed. And, thinking about how we want to build our relations for the future, I believe that your support would serve as clear evidence of our partnership. This is why I am asking you to help me.”43 In response, the Soviet leader reassured Bush that he could not abandon his partner at such a critical juncture and that he had decided to support the U.N. resolution. But at the same time, he warned strongly against using force. Assuming Bush was committed to a peaceful outcome, he saw Resolution 678 as another step in increasing pressure on Saddam rather than as an actual green light for a military strike. At that moment, Soviet diplomacy was very active in the countries of the Middle East. Primakov believed he could get Saddam to back down, and Gorbachev essentially agreed, thinking it was just a question of time. Gorbachev’s discussions at the Paris summit with other leaders—Brian Mulroney, Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand—also focused on the Gulf crisis as the top international issue. In each conversation he argued against using force and in favor of strong international solidarity led by the United Nations, which in his mind would lead to more lasting results—especially resolution of the larger, festering conflict in the Middle East. Meanwhile, the main U.S. objective with European leaders at the summit was to build strong support for the use of force resolution and not allow Saddam an opportunity to split the coalition with gambits such as releasing hostages.

 Document No. 46.  Ibid. 43  Ibid. 41 42

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Moving toward a military solution Soviet backing for the resolution proved indispensable for creating a powerful international partnership willing and capable of reversing the Iraqi attack. From the first day of the invasion through the end of the ground war the Soviet Union provided unwavering support to the U.S.-led coalition, and was Washington’s main partner. Ironically, the importance of Moscow’s cooperation declined once the useof-force resolution passed, because most of its leverage had come from its ability to prevent military action, or otherwise to undermine American efforts in the region. After passage of Resolution 678, the United States carefully watched events unfold in the Soviet Union where Gorbachev, under criticism for the failure of his domestic reform and for his entanglement with the United States in the Gulf, steadily moved towards the conservatives and abandoned his democratic allies. On December 18, a senior group on Soviet contingencies headed by Condoleezza Rice described the situation in the country as “a creeping crackdown,” and a CIA analysis noted that Gorbachev had taken a “significant turn to the right.”44 Just two days later, their worries escalated with the sudden resignation of Eduard Shevardnadze, who had warned about the coming dictatorship. His departure was a reaction to what he saw as Gorbachev’s growing reliance on conservative leaders like Yazov and Kryuchkov, but also, in a large part, to his treatment by Gorbachev during the Gulf crisis. Now the U.S. pondered what their reaction should be in the event of a serious conservative backlash in the USSR. A Scowcroft memo to the president on December 21 outlined possible scenarios and options, pointing quite accurately to the increased possibility of violence in the Baltics, where the army might “take advantage of the tense environment to create a pretext for the use of force. … [A]n incident could flare without Gorbachev’s knowledge or acquiescence.” This was exactly what happened three weeks later. However, the memo concluded that while Gorbachev might have to take harsh steps to hold the Union together, “we will most certainly have the task of continuing our geostrategic cooperation with the Soviet Union—particularly in the Gulf—in the face of the rapid unraveling of the Soviet leadership’s commitment to internal reform.”45 Meanwhile, as the New Year (1991) rolled in and U.S. intentions were becoming more clear, Gorbachev tried desperately to keep his American partners from initiating military action, hoping at the same time to persuade Saddam to agree to a full and unconditional withdrawal. In January 1991, Gorbachev created an emergency group on the Persian Gulf, which included Primakov, Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov, and KGB head Vladimir Kryuchkov but also Gorbachev’s most liberal adviser, Anatoly Chernyaev. The Soviet leader spent hours on the phone with European leaders and with Bush trying to persuade them to  Memorandum from Condoleezza Rice to Robert Gates, November 18, 1990, Bush Presidential Library. 45  “Responding to the Toughening Line in Moscow,” Memorandum to the President from Brent Scowcroft, December 21, 1990, Bush Presidential Library. 44

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give negotiations a chance. In his conversations with Bush, Gorbachev spoke about loss of life and economic destruction, while also agreeing that Saddam’s position was untenable and that he was not responding to diplomatic overtures. Gorbachev tried to postpone the start of the air campaign but then, once it started, agreed it had been inevitable because of Saddam’s intransigence.46 As early as January, the United States saw Gorbachev’s efforts to work out a peaceful solution as a problem and a nuisance. Washington was concerned that Saddam might actually comply with U.N. resolutions, which would undermine the grounds for Desert Storm. Gorbachev’s entreaties added to U.S. concerns and there was very little talk of the partnership. Scowcroft in his memoir speaks about Gorbachev’s mediating efforts with condescension, and tellingly admits: “we could not let him interfere with our Gulf diplomacy or our operations at a critical moment.”47 The fact that the USSR’s value as a partner had declined, and that the Soviet leaders were only informed rather than consulted about important military and political moves made even some reformers skeptical about U.S. intentions in the Gulf. Some felt deeply frustrated that the United States was still playing a geopolitical game while demanding Soviet cooperation. Chernyaev’s reaction when he heard the news of the beginning of the ground war was characteristic of the exasperation of policy makers who were deeply committed to new thinking and a new vision of world order. In his diary he wrote about Gorbachev’s last efforts to persuade Western leaders not to start the ground offensive after Saddam had agreed to withdraw troops on February 22, during Tariq Aziz’s visit to Moscow: “[The West was] deliberately confusing [Gorbachev]. Sometimes he felt it, but continued to believe that the criteria of the new thinking would work, that trust meant something. Not in this case! What had worked was the traditional logic of politics: might, riches, interests determine what is right. And it is not that hard to find a moral explanation for actions against Hussein.”48 Gorbachev was incensed at this treatment at the time and complained bitterly to other leaders such as Rajiv Gandhi.49 But in retrospect, he came to a more measured conclusion in his memoir: “I knew that George Bush in his heart wanted to use the occasion to crush Saddam’s regime with all military might. But he was also ready for a political settlement, although without compromises. However, Hussein, by his ambitious, insolent actions, which aggravated [his] illegal aggression, ‘helped’ the U.S. President to carry out the military option.”50

 Document Nos. 50 and 51, among other examples.  Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 470. 48  Anatoly Chernyaev’s diary, February 25, 1991. 49  Gorbachev-Gandhi memcon, February 23, 1991, Gorbachev Foundation Archive, Fond 1, Opis 1. 50  Gorbachev, Ponyat’ perestroiku, p. 287. 46 47

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Document No. 35: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Baker–Shevardnadze, 1:29 p.m. August 7, 1990

Baker calls Shevardnadze to hear his reaction to the U.S. decision to deploy forces in Saudi Arabia as a deterrent to Saddam Hussein’s assault on Kuwait, which was the subject of a message from Baker to Shevardnadze delivered that same day by Ambassador Matlock. Shevardnadze wonders “what he was being consulted about” if the decision has already been made and the deployment is about to begin. Just days earlier, on August 3, in a joint statement condemning the Iraqi invasion, Baker and Shevardnadze agreed to consult about the next steps. The Americans also assured the Soviets they would avoid using military force in the region at all costs. Gorbachev was furious because to agree to the joint statement he had to go against the advice of his experts and put the lives of about 5,000 Soviet citizens working in Iraq at risk. The Soviets were especially concerned about the consequences of stationing any outside military in the region or relying on a military response. Shevardnadze emphasizes that “the Soviet Union would consider this action exceptional, extraordinary and temporary and any military forces should leave as quickly as possible.” On the phone with Shevardnadze, Baker says that the action is being taken in response to a request from Saudi Arabia. However, Bush’s memoir makes it clear that the reluctant Saudis had to be persuaded to accept the deployment, which was in fact a U.S. idea.51

Subject: The Secretary’s Telephone Conversation with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze The Secretary wanted to make sure Shevardnadze had received the message Ambassador Matlock had delivered earlier in the day. He stressed that the actions described in the message were taken purely for Saudi Arabia’s defensive needs. The Secretary said he was leaving on Wednesday (8/8) for Ankara at the President’s request to consult with the Government of Turkey. On Friday, the Secretary will be in Brussels for a NATO meeting. He said he would welcome the opportunity to meet with the Soviet Ambassador in Brussels to brief him. The Secretary also raised the possibility of a multinational naval force to prevent the export of Iraq and Kuwait oil if the U.N. resolution on sanctions is not effective. He asked if the Soviets would have an interest in participating in such an effort. Shevardnadze asked if a decision on the matters raised in the message had already been taken. The Secretary said the President had reached the decision yesterday evening (8/6). Shevardnadze then wondered what he was being consulted  Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, pp. 327–329, 335.

51

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about. He reminded the Secretary of their airport conversation in which he had asked the Secretary not to rely on military force. He stressed that the Soviet approach had not changed. He said that after the second U.N. resolution on sanctions Iraq should have been given the opportunity to tell the world its attitude on the document. Shevardnadze said it is very difficult to say what the consequences of the American action will be. The Soviet Union would consider this action exceptional, extraordinary and temporary and any military forces should leave as quickly as possible. He added that the Soviets are prepared to discuss any future plans and ideas, and suggested the military staff committee of the U.N. Security Council as a possible forum. He also noted that the Soviet Ambassador in Brussels would be prepared to meet with the Secretary in Brussels. The Secretary replied that only one thing had been decided and there are still many other multilateral efforts to contain Saddam Hussein’s aggression which have not been decided. He said no offensive actions were planned—it was strictly to deter; the decision was taken at the request of the Saudis; the U.S. considered this an extraordinary matter; and the assistance would remain only as long as the Saudis wanted it. In keeping with their airport conversation, the Secretary assured Shevardnadze that the U.S. does not intend to strike at Iraq, but the U.S. reserves the right to protect its citizens, and to defend Saudi Arabia and the free flow of oil. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through Mandatory Review request 2011-0842-MR by the National Security Archive.]

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Document No. 36: Letter from Bush to Gorbachev August 20, 1990

In this letter, Bush expresses his appreciation for Gorbachev’s support for the international coalition against Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. The president mentions that something truly unprecedented is occurring—“Jim Baker is discussing with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze Soviet participation in a multinational naval force to enforce the U.N.-mandated economic sanctions levied against Iraq and Kuwait.” Throughout the Cold War U.S. policy has been to try to keep the Soviet Union out of the Middle East. Now, as symbolic proof that the Cold War has, indeed, ended, Bush invites Soviet military participation to enforce a U.N. decision alongside U.S. and other Western forces. The rest of the conversation focuses on the subject Gorbachev wants badly to discuss—economic assistance—but no concrete commitments are made.

Dear Mr. President: Thank you for your recent letter which I read with great interest. Before turning to the many issues that you raised, I want to note my satisfaction that we have been able to cooperate effectively, both bilaterally and especially in execution of our duties as members of the United Nations Security Council, at this difficult time in the Persian Gulf. I believe that our joint statement was a significant step forward in the development of a productive U.S.-Soviet relationship. I am hopeful that we can continue to work together to do all that is needed to repel Iraq’s aggression and achieve the objectives laid out by the United Nations. I took note of your strong words condemning the Iraqi action in your August 17 speech at Odessa. We now must all do our part—having worked together to secure their passage—to ensure the strictest observance of the U.N. resolutions, particularly UNSC Resolution 661. In that regard, Jim Baker is discussing with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze Soviet participation in a multinational naval force to enforce the U.N.-­mandated economic sanctions levied against Iraq and Kuwait. I hope too that your government will join with others in collective efforts to secure the safe passage of the innocent nationals of several countries who are still inside Kuwait and Iraq. This, and the protection of the lives of the diplomats serving in the region, are high priorities for the United States. We are coordinating our efforts with the European Community and hope that you will be willing to do the same. Turning to our economic relationship, I am pleased that you found the decisions taken by the United States and its G-7 partners at Houston to be helpful. As you know, the G-7 countries agreed to study closely how best to contribute to effective economic reform in the Soviet Union. The study that the international economic organizations have launched, at the request of the G-7, should help us 247

all to understand better the problems that you face and what can be done to address them. As you know, Secretary of State Baker and Secretary of Commerce Mosbacher will bring a delegation of senior businessmen with them to Moscow in September. I believe that this initiative, coupled with my recent decision to remove the ceiling on the number of Soviet business people who are permitted to live and work in the U.S., will serve to strengthen and expand commercial relations between our two countries. My Administration is also currently examining ways to expand and focus our technical cooperation projects in a few key areas, for example food processing and distribution, energy exploration, and the development of the financial sector. We will continue to look for areas of common interest, including perhaps housing. I also believe that cooperation in the field of economic education will have considera­ble pay-offs, particularly in the long-term. Jim Baker will have some further ideas on this when he comes to Moscow in September, and we would look forward as well to hearing your views. I continue to watch closely the exciting changes taking place in your country. Our experience here has taught us that pluralism is nothing to fear, but rather to foster and embrace. Our contacts with democratic forces outside of Moscow should be interpreted as an effort to understand better the entire range of opinion in your country. We have accomplished a great deal in the past year, and I look forward to the remaining tasks. I fully agree with your assessment that we have laid the foundations for further mutual cooperation, and am confident that a new era of peaceful relations lies ahead. Sincerely, George Bush [Signed] [George H.W. Bush Library, George Bush Handwriting File.]

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Document No. 37: Letter from Bush to Gorbachev August 29, 1990

After the August 3 joint U.S.-Soviet statement condemning the Iraqi aggression, Bush is determined to keep Gorbachev on board and have him play an active role in the coalition. He also believes that “it is important that the two of us are seen, hopefully, in agreement on the major question of the Persian Gulf.” Bush is planning a major address to the nation the week of September 10 and wants to showcase the unity with Gorbachev in order to solidify his domestic support. In this letter, he invites Gorbachev on very short notice to meet informally in Geneva or in Finland to discuss their cooperation on the Gulf. Gorbachev chooses Helsinki.

Dear Mr. President: I have been thinking a lot lately about U.S.-Soviet relations. I am very pleased with the way in which we have been able to work together at the U.N. in the face of Iraq’s aggression against Kuwait. I truly believe that the actions taken by the United Nations will not only revitalize that organization, but will be recorded as truly historic and meaningful. I remember our meeting at Camp David. We talked there about getting together more frequently and about talking informally without an agenda. With those conversations in mind, I am wondering if you would be able to meet me in Switzerland or possibly Finland for one day of talks. I am very anxious to discuss the Middle East crisis with you, and, of course we can discuss many other subjects as well. I think such a meeting, showing the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. staying in touch, working together on a major problem sends a very good signal around the globe. For your very private information, I am planning a speech to the American people early in the week of September 10th. In that speech I will discuss the Persian Gulf crisis. Our meeting should come before that speech, so I can report to the American people on our meeting and on U.S.-Soviet cooperation. Thus, I propose that we meet on either Friday, September 7th or Saturday, September 8th. Regrettably, I would not be able to meet later on in September due to our domestic budget matters. In fact, I had to cancel a long scheduled South American trip planned for mid-September. I would suggest small meetings (similar to Camp David format). A proposed schedule might look like the following: 9:00 a.m. – 11:30 a.m. – Meeting (3 or 4 on each side) 1:30 p.m. – Lunch (8 or 9 on each side) 249

2:00 p.m. – 4:30 p.m.—Meeting (3 or 4 on each side) 5:00 p.m. – Joint Press Conference and Departure I have been staying in close personal touch with world leaders over the first two weeks of the Gulf crisis. I feel it is important that the two of us are seen, hopefully, in agreement on the major question of the Persian Gulf, but in any event having frank and serious personal contact. Perhaps it is better, given the short time span of the meetings, that the wives not accompany us; but if Raisa wishes to be there, I am confident Barbara will enthusiastically attend. Either way is fine with me. As to location—our mutual friend Sadruddin Khan once offered his lovely home on Lake Geneva as a meeting place. From a security standpoint, it would be perfect, and I am sure he would agree to letting us meet there. He knows nothing of this proposal, however. If Finland were preferable to you, I expect their President would be most agreeable to providing a good place to meet. I realize that this is very short notice, but that, too, has great appeal to me. As things dramatically change around the world, we should now, more than ever, be in close contact. I would appreciate your letting me know as soon as possible if this idea of a meeting in early September has appeal to you.

Sincerely yours, with personal best wishes – George Bush [signed]

[Source: George H.W. Bush Library, George Bush Handwriting File.]

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Document No. 38: Memorandum from Scowcroft for the President: “Your Meeting with Gorbachev in Helsinki” Circa early September, 1990

The national security adviser provides Bush with a concise and accurate analysis of what Gorbachev has to face this coming autumn—a “daunting and unprecedented number of challenges to his power and authority.” The main problems relate to ethnic issues and economic reform. In this weakened condition, Gorbachev is more likely to accommodate Washington on a whole range of topics, like German unification. Scowcroft notes that “Gorbachev and Shevardnadze have redefined some of the basic principles underlying Soviet foreign policy.” The crisis in the Persian Gulf presents a special challenge. The memo correctly notes that the Soviet leadership now faces “an intense policy debate in Moscow, especially within Shevardnadze’s Foreign Ministry, where Middle East specialists are reportedly furious with the USSR’s tough stance against Iraq.” And yet, Gorbachev is expected to keep the alliance with the United States intact. Scowcroft also suggests that Bush engage the Soviet leader on the entire spectrum of bilateral relations—finalizing START by December, CFE in time to hold the Paris summit in November, and removing the final limitations against Germany joining NATO. On the economic front, however, the memo suggests that the president “put off for the time being, as you did at the Washington Summit, another request for outright financial assistance” and instead discuss a forthcoming economic mission to Moscow by Baker and Commerce Secretary Robert Mosbacher.

Gorbachev comes to Helsinki at a critical juncture in his five­-year tenure as leader of the USSR, facing a daunting and unprecedented number of challenges to his power and authority this autumn. The forces he unleashed at the beginning of his rule through his policies of perestroika and glasnost have come to a head and have produced a time of uncertainty and instability in the Soviet Union that will require all his energies and political skills in the months ahead. At first glance, Gorbachev’s establishment of the Executive Presidency in March, his triumph over conservative forces at the July party congress, and his successful meetings with you and Kohl earlier in the summer, appear to have given him wide breadth of maneuverability in Soviet politics. But his freedom to chart his own course is partly illusory. His actual power to make fundamental reform decisions appears to be slipping as aggressive Republic leaders like Boris Yeltsin, and radical reformist mayors such as Gavril Popov of Moscow and Anatoly Sobchak of Leningrad have embarked on entirely new and independent paths to change without consulting the Kremlin. Gorbachev must face several critical problems simultaneously this autumn. The most serious is structuring a coherent and workable economic reform 251

program which can successfully lead the country through the transition from a command economy to one based on free market principles. He must also quiet ethnic tensions and manage critically important Union negotiations which could redefine the relationship between the center and republics. He confronts these dilemmas at a time when his own authority, popularity and power are in precipitous decline. No longer able to impose solutions on the country as he and his predecessors once did, he must now compromise and form coalitions with new leaders and institutions in Moscow and beyond. And since the Communist party has been irreparably weakened, Gorbachev must try to invigorate his new power base, the Presidency and the Presidential Council, to steer through these crises. Gorbachev returned from his summer vacation in the Crimea seemingly intent on regaining the initiative he had lost on economic reform and the union question since you met in June. On economics, he sought a compromise with his rivals by making a quick, tactical alliance with Yeltsin on the latter’s 500-day economic reform plan, in opposition to Prime Minister Ryzhkov’s more conservative program. But he has waffled in recent days, angering Yeltsin and confusing everyone else. He will have to announce a new economic reform plan soon—probably a day or two after you meet—which will signal whether he is indeed committed to deep and speedy reforms advocated by Yeltsin and many of his personal advisors, or the more gradualist approach of Ryzhkov which the Supreme Soviet rejected last spring. If he cannot reverse the now pervasive sense the [sic] he is indecisive, he risks irrelevancy as bolder leaders emerge. As these domestic issues preoccupy him, Gorbachev is likely to continue to seek accommodation with us on foreign policy issues, as he has in the Gulf crisis and on German unification. Gorbachev and Shevardnadze have redefined some of the basic principles underlying Soviet foreign policy. Rejecting the old thinking that embraced revolutionary client states, thereby alienating the West, they seem to have opted to tend first their most important relationships abroad—with the U.S., Japan, China and Germany, to promote stability. This sharp break with the past may or may not persist, but it has been brought into sharp focus by the Gulf crisis. There is now an intense policy debate in Moscow, especially within Shevardnadze’s Foreign Ministry, where Middle East specialists are reportedly furious with the USSR’s tough stance against Iraq. Since the coming months are critical to his efforts to stem chaos we should use this period to wrap up ongoing negotiations on arms control and regional issues and invigorate our economic relationship. You may see Gorbachev more than once this autumn, and so your meeting in Helsinki will be important in shaping the prospects for progress across a broad range of issues. Your first priority at Helsinki should be to give Gorbachev a detailed view of events in the Gulf, and to encourage the continued, close cooperation between us so that international pressure is kept on Saddam Hussein. You might also suggest we come to an agreement on other, contentious regional issues, such as Afghanistan by proposing a mutual cutoff of arms to the warring parties and elections. 252

It will also be important to review European security issues at Helsinki. On German Unification, you might stress that all Four Power rights should be suspended so that Germany will be fully sovereign from the date of unification (expected October 3). Following up on your September 6 telephone conversation with Kohl, you could also express your concern that there should be no further limitations placed on Germany’s full participation in NATO. You should also seek his agreement to say publicly that both sides commit themselves to sign a START treaty in December, and to push for more rapid progress at CFE so that we can move forward to a CSCE Summit in Paris in November. You could review with him our goals, and NATO’s for the future of CSCE. Finally, Helsinki gives you the chance to open a new chapter in our increasingly important economic relationship with the Soviets. While you will want to put off for the time being, as you did at the Washington Summit, another request for outright financial assistance, there is much you can suggest to put our economic relations on a new and higher plane. You could propose focusing our technical assistance efforts on some of these problems, by offering our public and private sector help in food processing, energy, housing and other areas that he deems useful. You could also point to the Mosbacher-Baker Presidential Mission, which begins the day following the Helsinki meeting, as a demonstration of your interest in expanding trade and investment. We have told the Soviets many times that we want to help them accelerate the integration of their economy into the world market system and normalize our bilateral relationship. But access to our private capital markets and to government-backed credit depends on Soviet good faith at the negotiating table. And attracting western investment depends ultimately on Soviet willingness to allow repatriation of profits and national treatment. The message on economics he may really need to hear yet again at Helsinki is that our ability to assist him in any meaningful way depends very much on the scope and pace of his own reforms in the months ahead. [Source: U.S. State Department, obtained through FOIA in 1999 by the National Security Archive.]

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Document No. 39: Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, Private Meeting, Helsinki September 9, 1990

Gorbachev comes to Helsinki with a comprehensive plan for dealing with Saddam Hussein prepared by Soviet experts. It provides for a declaration of withdrawal by Iraq, restoration of the Kuwaiti government, introduction of an inter-Arab peacekeeping force and the subsequent withdrawal of all outside forces from the region. A key element is to convene an international conference on the Middle East that would address the Israel-Palestine issue as part of a general settlement in the region. Bush’s main purpose at the summit is to confirm Gorbachev’s full and consistent support for current and future U.N. sanctions including the potential use of force against Saddam Hussein. He reminds the Soviet leader that in August they “demonstrated to the whole world that ... they are together, side by side” and declares that he now sees “a real possibility for a new world order.” Bush makes several commitments to Gorbachev, which Gorbachev repeats back to him as a matter of clarification: about a temporary nature of U.S. military presence in the region and about his preference for a non-military solution. Throughout the conversation, Gorbachev warns Bush about the possibly catastrophic consequences of using military force in the region. Bush comments several times that the U.S. does not intend to keep its troops in the region on a permanent basis and would prefer not to use force. Bush makes a personal plea, using words Gorbachev longs to hear: “Mr. President, I appeal to you as a respected friend, an equal, an important partner and participant in the events whose role is quite significant.” Bush adds a further sweetener, repeatedly alluding to future expanded cooperation with the Soviet Union in the Middle East, essentially agreeing to Gorbachev’s idea of international conference, but without linkage to Saddam’s withdrawal from Kuwait. But Gorbachev goes one step further, suggesting that the new world order could be based on “an axis that would give stability to ongoing processes”—an axis such as Soviet-American cooperation.

Bush: It is good to see you, Mr. President. Gorbachev: I am happy to welcome you. I am very glad that we are meeting, although I must say that it was difficult for me to find time. There is a great deal of work at home. Bush: It is good that while we were in Camp David we agreed to meet should the need arise, as we are doing right now. The fact that we agreed to hold this meeting was well received around the world. Gorbachev: I already had an opportunity to tell the press that even though President Bush and I maintain various forms of contact at all times, during moments like these we need personal meetings for more in-depth discussion of the problems at hand. 254

Bush: I agree. As can be expected, among the issues we will discuss today, the situation in the Persian Gulf is of the utmost importance. In what order would you like to proceed? I would, of course, like to acquaint you with our thoughts. At the same time I would very much like to hear what you have to say. But from the start I want to emphasize that it was good that the Soviet Union and the United States demonstrated to the whole world that right now, during the crisis in the Persian Gulf, they are together, side by side. So, perhaps you would like to start? Or I could first acquaint you with our view of the situation in the Gulf. Gorbachev: I would agree to listen to you first, Mr. President. (Jokingly added) See how easy it is to reach an agreement with me! Bush: All right, then, let’s go straight to the point. So far, we have had good cooperation on this issue. We understand that at first it was difficult for the Soviet Union and for you personally to assume such a position, because of your longlasting relations with Iraq. If we look at the situation more broadly, I see a real possibility for a new world order—out of this crisis and tragedy could emerge new opportunities. However, a very definite principle has to lie at the heart of this new world order. We cannot allow Saddam Hussein to profit from his aggression. I am not sure he realizes that we, the United States, are fully determined to achieve this. I know from a number of sources that he doubts my determination. I hope that you will try to convince him otherwise. We will not accept failure in our efforts to achieve the goals set by the United Nations. We have developed a strategy aimed at this, and I believe that this strategy has a good chance of success. We prefer sanctions as the means to achieve the goal of Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait and the restoration of Kuwait’s leadership. I would not like to see an escalation of conflict. I do not want to use military force. I know that you agree with this approach. However, Saddam Hussein must understand that if he does not withdraw from Kuwait, we are prepared to use force. Maintaining the status quo is unacceptable. In the meantime, Saddam Hussein has started a de facto dismantling of Kuwait. As for the response to this in America, the American people and the U.S. Congress support me. People are especially outraged at Saddam Hussein’s actions against innocent civilians, who may include Soviet citizens. If you meet with him, I ask you to let him know the following: his use of innocent people as a “shield” will not make me yield an inch of our policies. I believe that such actions could serve as grounds for a Nuremberg-type trial. I would like our discussion of the Persian Gulf crisis to be in-depth and thorough. I hope that as the result of these talks you could tell Saddam Hussein that should the countries with troops in the region (and there are already 23 such countries) ultimately be compelled to use force to eliminate the consequences of Iraqi aggression, you would support these efforts. Perhaps it will be difficult for you to take such a stance, but I would welcome it if you deemed it possible. 255

I cannot fail to mention to you the serious concern I have for the American citizens at our embassy in Kuwait. Two more points. During the flight here, journalists on the airplane asked me: will you ask Gorbachev to send troops to the region? I said that we have no plans to make such a request. However, let me assure you that should you make this decision, the United States would welcome it. The second point seems especially important to you. We do not aim to keep American troops in the Gulf on a permanent basis. This is not one of the intentions behind the American presence in the Gulf. If Saddam Hussein remains in power, then any mechanisms developed to safeguard against the recurrence of aggression and the possible use of nuclear weapons would not be American, but international. I repeat—we do not have plans to directly or indirectly keep American troops in the Gulf region. Frankly, the American people would not support such plans. I would also like to touch upon one difficult and sensitive matter. It has to do with how Americans view the situation. I am talking about the Soviet military advisers in Iraq. We know that their numbers are not great. Still, if they were to be withdrawn from Iraq in light of the sanctions, it would make a very good impression on the world public opinion and especially on public opinion in the U.S. And now, to put all my cards on the table, I would like to say the following. For a long time, during the “Cold War” years, U.S. policy was that the Soviet Union should not play any role in the Middle East. Naturally, the Soviet Union did not agree with this line and was displeased with the U.S. position. And although I am convinced that it would be a great victory for Saddam if he could involve the issue of Arab-Israeli relations in the crisis caused by his aggression, I want to assure you that the former U.S. position on the Soviet Union’s involvement in Middle East affairs has changed. The new order, which I hope can be created after this instability, presupposes that the United States and Soviet Union will apply more positive collaborative efforts to regulate not only this problem, but the rest of the issues in the Middle East. Finally, the last point. The closer we can bring our positions today, the more favorable the prospects for a new world order will be, for the development of Soviet-American relations, and, of course, first and foremost for a quick settlement of the current crisis and liquidation of Saddam Hussein’s aggression. Mr. President, I appeal to you as a respected friend, an equal, an important partner and participant in the events whose role is quite significant. Let us look to the future, with an understanding that we are talking about more than the current problem, we are talking about very great things. Whatever small discrepancies exist in our approach—and I must say that thanks to the Soviet side’s efforts at the United Nations these differences have narrowed considerably—it is very important for us to speak together, from a unified position, at the forthcoming press conference. On Tuesday I will make a televised address to the American people. I would like the tone of my statements to be positive and optimistic. I would like to say that we have turned over the “Cold War” page; we are done with it once and for all, as is depicted in the cartoon that you gave me. 256

Gorbachev: I think it is a very good cartoon. It was drawn by our veteran cartoonist Abramov. Bush: It will be kept at Camp David along with the map you once gave me, the watch and other souvenirs. Gorbachev: Mr. President, I appreciate the confidence and magnitude of the thoughts you just shared with me. Yes, we are going through a difficult crisis. It is a severe test of the positive achievements we made in recent years in the sphere of international relations. It is a test of the changed nature of relations between the USSR and the U.S., of their strength and stability. Of course, I do not forget what a crisis in the Persian Gulf means in its own right, its scope and the dangers associated with it. But I think there is something greater here. If we do not find a way to deal with this conflict, a great deal will be lost. The question is—can we act on the new stage of world politics, which we entered after the end of the “Cold War;” and most importantly, how will we act? This is a very serious question that warrants much thought. In fact, we are facing a global choice. You are talking about a new order. Indeed, we have to live in a new way and build relations in a new way. The price is very high. As I said, if it were not for Malta and the new level of relations between us, the processes that unfolded in Eastern Europe and in connection with the unification of Germany would have created a situation far tougher than the Persian Gulf crisis. Bush: Absolutely. Gorbachev: Given the level of military confrontation in Europe, we might have gotten into a mess that we would not be able to get out of. And now we are faced with a no less difficult test. You will probably agree that the events in Eastern Europe were more difficult for us than for the U.S. I will tell you frankly that it has taken a tremendous effort and a great force of political will to literally step over ourselves and overcome old practices that seemed immutable and to act as was required by the changed reality. To this day I have to explain our position at various forums in our country, proving the need for new thinking and new approaches to what is happening in the world, convincing people of the correctness of our political steps domestically and abroad. It is not always easy, especially when the situation is complicated by people in the West who supply analysis based on old thinking. Still, the vast majority of our society understands the Soviet leadership’s position. In the current situation in the Persian Gulf, the United States finds itself in the more difficult position. I understand it very well, maybe even better than some people in the U.S. I think by now I know your country pretty well, especially your public opinion. People expect quick victories from the president. Incidentally, the same is true for us. People want strong, decisive action. Even in such a monumental undertaking as our perestroika, which requires time and tremendous effort, many expect quick results. So I understand your position. In these difficult circumstances, the most important thing is to maintain the new system of relations we developed, the cooperation between our countries. We see the difficulty of your position as president, and frankly speaking, we feel 257

a sense of complicity with what you are doing, and we sympathize. It is very important that we abandoned the former approach, which presupposed that what is bad for the United States is good for the Soviet Union and conversely, what’s bad for the Soviet Union is good for the United States. Bush: I agree. Gorbachev: I mentioned this the other day to Senator Dole, your friend and, as I understand, fellow Republican. What we are doing in the Soviet Union is in our interest, but it is in your interest that we succeed as well. Because in the world that is coming together now, the United States will not be able to cope alone. There has to be an axis that would give stability to ongoing processes, and Soviet-American cooperation is such an axis. It is necessary for the Soviet Union and the United States to be strong, confident states. You should have no doubt that this is exactly our position and it has not changed. We did not hesitate to condemn Iraq’s aggression against Kuwait. We will strictly abide by the U.N. Security Council resolution. I must say, however, that at the initial stage of the conflict we had some difficulties when you first made the decision, and then notified us about it. Bush: Which decision do you mean? Gorbachev: I am talking about the decision to send American troops to the region. We only heard about it when these forces were already in motion. I do not mean to say that it influenced our political approach, but it somewhat complicated the situation. Perhaps this happened because our new relations are still in the forming stages. Bush: This is an interesting observation. When we sent our troops to the region, we did so at the request of Saudi Arabia. The situation was very acute, Iraqi troops were already south of Kuwait City. However, I accept your words as constructive criticism. Evidently, I should have called you then. I want to assure you that we did not intend to act behind your back. Gorbachev: In general, we were able to work together, shoulder to shoulder. We were able to mobilize the U.N. Security Council and virtually the entire world community. And this was a huge achievement. In light of this, the U.S. presence in the region is perceived differently. Bush: I agree. Gorbachev: It is clear that the international community cannot move to a new peaceful period in its history without a mechanism designed to protect the peace process from such problems, without a response mechanism for such conflicts. In this situation, you have assumed the primary mission to repel Iraqi aggression. Here I come to the central point of my argument, followed by suggestions on how to proceed. Let us see where we are, what has been achieved. The threat hanging over Saudi Arabia has been removed. The entire world has condemned Saddam Hussein’s aggression, pinning him to the pillory. The infrastructure that provides the world’s supply of oil from one of the most important sources has been protected and preserved. Thus, the American president and the entire world community 258

have something to say. Important strategic objectives have been achieved. However, not all of them. The problem of Kuwait is unresolved. Of course, it must be addressed. We, like you, have a wealth of information from the region and from around the world in connection with this crisis. What you just said is very important to me. In my opinion, there are three key points. Firstly, you, like us and virtually the whole world, want the Kuwait problem to be resolved. Secondly, you made an important statement regarding the U.S. presence in the region; you said that you do not strive to preserve this presence on a permanent basis. And thirdly, you said that you prefer a non-military solution to this problem. I understand that right now we all seem to be under pressure, especially you. People want decisive action from you. Indeed, decisiveness is required here. But if this implies the use of military force, then it is a dangerous path. Until now we have worked together on a multilateral basis. But a unilateral military action by the U.S. would lead to consequences that would be unacceptable to you and everyone else. I do not want to sound like I am saying some great truths. The following is the logic behind our argument. If Iraq does not attack Saudi Arabia or Israel via Jordan, then the United States will appear to be the initiator of military action. At the present stage, if Iraq maintains the status quo and someone deploys military action against it, what will happen? Bush: You mean if we launch military action without provocation from Iraq? Gorbachev: Yes. Observe how Iraq is acting right now. Marshal Akhromeyev showed me this on the map of Iraqi troop locations. The main contingents are deployed in the hinterland, not near the Saudi border. Should military action be launched against these forces, it would inevitably lead to major losses and human casualties. The memories of Afghanistan and Vietnam are still fresh in our countries. It is deep in the people’s consciousness. Very soon people will start saying that the president did not choose the best course of action, that he became involved in military actions that claim thousands, or tens of thousands, of victims. No, we must find other ways. I talked about losses, the human casualties. But we must not forget about the economic consequences, either. If the region is incapacitated, the economic consequences will be huge. Saudi Arabia already complains that it is difficult to fund the presence of your troops. This is at a time when Saudi Arabia’s oil revenues have increased. What would the financial losses be if the region was essentially destroyed? We are not talking about billions, but trillions of dollars. We will all be the devil knows where. And another point. Even now we see and must admit that Hussein enjoys a certain sympathy from some people in the Arab world, a significant part of the Arab masses. He is a hero to them, a champion of the Arab cause, the person who is not afraid to confront the United States. If a massive war with a great deal of destruction breaks out in this region, where the Arab people have enormous wealth, then the Arab world will turn against you. You will be accused of giving an inadequate response to the situation. We must 259

remember that our psychology, the psychology of Americans and Europeans, is one thing, while the psychology of the Muslim world is another. It is all dark. To them we are all barbarians and infidels. You will appear as enemies, violators of Arab holy sites. While we’re at it, I would like to mention that we both understand the dangers of Islamic fundamentalism. This is a big threat, and we have to cooperate in counteracting it. Bush: Allow me to interrupt you for a minute. I think you assume that all of Arab public opinion would be on Iraq’s side. Saddam Hussein is indeed trying to present this as a conflict between the Muslims and Satan. But I think that he will not succeed. Firstly, more than half of all Arabs live in Egypt, and this country spoke decisively against Iraqi aggression. The League of Arab States also took a firm stance. Therefore, it seems to me that Saddam failed to present his aggression as a conflict between Arabs and the West, as a struggle with the unfaithful. Gorbachev: Mr. President, the situation is not quite like that. In particular, there has been less criticism of Saddam Hussein at the latest meetings of the Arab League. The fact of the matter is that even if there is an understanding of what is happening at the state level, at the level of public opinion and Islamic opposition, Saddam Hussein is perceived differently. And if we take the Arab leaders that we can work with—Mubarak and even Assad—they may find themselves in a difficult position. This could activate powerful forces, which are right now lying at the bottom, so to speak. I will be frank with you. You are probably aware that some Western countries are beginning to grow wary. Should events start developing in a different direction, they will evidently have to distance themselves from you. Bush: I agree. Gorbachev: There is one more important thing. The unity of the Security Council could be disrupted. For example, we can assume almost with certainty that China’s position will change, and that is a country with veto power. I think the American public will also take it very hard. Therefore we must seek another path. Of course, it is clear that Saddam Hussein will not leave Kuwait easily. In a recent exchange with all our partners, everyone emphasized the need for the strictest observance of the U.N. imposed embargo. And I have to say, the situation inside Iraq is changing. Saddam Hussein is also in a difficult position. Whatever statements he might be making right now, he will eventually have to take a sober look at the situation. We have many strong experts on the Arab world and, in particular, on Iraq. We discussed the situation with them. They carried out a detailed situational analysis and came to an explicit conclusion. The only situation that would justify the use of force against Iraq is if Iraq attacks Saudi Arabia or Jordan. In all other cases, the use of force should be ruled out. Bush: What if he, say, hits Israel with two Scud missiles? Gorbachev: Then that would be a different situation. However, I do not think that he will go there. 260

Indeed, one cannot agree with the status quo. We cannot allow the aggressor to benefit from the aggression. But all our experts believe that we should not drive Saddam Hussein into a corner. This will not give us a solution. We have to look for an option that would allow Saddam to at least party save face. Such is reality. It is not pleasant from a moral standpoint. What if we take a certain set of interrelated steps, a sum of measures? Namely: – If Iraq announces that it will free the detained foreign nationals and withdraw troops from Kuwait, the United States and other members of the U.N. Security Council would make a statement that they will not attack or bomb Iraq. Furthermore, if these two statements are made and Iraqi troops are withdrawn –  and replaced by inter-Arab forces, whose composition would be subject to agreement and would be under the U.N. flag and control, then the United States would begin to reduce its military presence first in Saudi Arabia, possibly only symbolically at first. As in Kuwait, in Saudi Arabia the withdrawn troops would be replaced with inter-Arab forces under U.N. auspices. After this, the U.N. Security Council would issue a decision to suspend its resolution on the embargo against Iraq. Upon the completion of Iraqi troop withdrawal, the relevant resolutions would be revoked. Bush: This would be contingent on the withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait? Gorbachev: I will say more about this. Bush: Of course, my question is hypothetical. Gorbachev: This plan has some other elements as well. By the way, we ran it by the Arabs. If Saddam rejects this plan, he will expose himself in the eyes of the world, in the eyes of the Arabs. It would prevent sympathy for Saddam Hussein from growing in the Arab world. You said that Saddam Hussein wants to heap all the problems in one pile and link it to the Arab-Israeli conflict, Palestine, and Lebanon. This is true, and he wins this way. We have to take into consideration that the issue of Israeli occupation of Palestinian land is very sensitive. That is why we believe that we must take this card out of his hands and use it in our common interest. You have probably thought about this too. An international conference with the participation of the U.N. Security Council members and the Arab states could discuss the problem of restoring Kuwait’s independence; as well the other regional problems, including the Palestinian and Lebanese issues. Kuwait’s independence should be the starting point. At this conference we could also discuss the question of creating a security system that would be guaranteed by the Soviet Union, the United States, and the five permanent members of the Security Council. I must say that the European capitals have shown interest in this idea, and some similar proposals have been put forward. If Israel would agree to take part 261

in such a conference, probably not right away but in the second stage, we could agree to establish diplomatic relations with Israel as compensation. This plan is acceptable to many Arabs. Of course, Saddam Hussein can reject the idea of withdrawing troops. But since this issue is tied to the discussion of Palestine and Arab lands, public opinion would condemn him for the continuation of Israeli occupation, for missing a chance to resolve this problem. He would show the Palestinians that he is only speculating on this issue. We believe that in combination with the embargo, the proposal of a settlement plan would put him in a difficult position and would limit his room to maneuver. We asked our experts for their views on the blockade of Iraq. But the blockade cannot be implemented without using force; therefore, war could break out at any moment. This would mean the end for any peaceful settlement plans. At the same time, we believe it is possible to make the economic embargo stricter. Right now, Saddam Hussein succeeds in exploiting the theory that the Soviet Union and the United States have ganged up on him, so to speak, they are starving the Iraqi people, and it is practically a genocide against Iraq and the Arab people. This argument has some impact on the Arab masses. It must be taken into account. There is one more important point in the plan we have in mind. The current government of Kuwait, i.e., the government in exile, and Saddam Hussein’s government should come to the negotiating table to discuss the future relations between the two countries and the financial issues that the two countries had discussed. Afterwards, provisions could be made for elections or a referendum, or some other option. We believe that such an approach would allow us to take the initiative, deprive Hussein of propaganda points that he is tallying in the Arab world, and take away the halo of a hero of the Arab people. If Saddam accepts this plan, we will be able to find a package solution. But more likely, at least at first, is that Saddam Hussein will reject this plan. And yet, if this or a similar proposal will be put forward, we will appear in a different light, as true supporters of a political solution. Yes, we have shown determination and solidarity in condemning aggression, but at the same time we offer a chance. We topple Saddam Hussein from his current position, from which he extracts certain dividends. We provide the opportunity for a new process to start; we protect the U.N. resolutions and everything that has already been achieved. These are my thoughts, Mr. President. I did not touch upon certain particulars, for example, the issue of Soviet experts in Iraq. By the way, they are not advisers but technical specialists who are serving contracts between the Soviet Union and Iraq. And their number has already decreased by 30–40 people. If there were 196 people at the beginning of the conflict, now there are about 150. Bush: Yes, we have similar specialists in Iraq; specifically employees of the Bechtel and IBM corporations. But we are trying to get them out of Iraq because we believe that the contracts are nullified with the adoption of U.N. resolutions. Gorbachev: We are reducing the number of our people in Iraq, too. By the way, we are losing 1.2 billion U.S. dollars by winding up relations with this 262

country. But we are doing it because otherwise there would be very different losses. In conclusion, I would like to say that we are using our role and our position based on principled positions. We joined forces to support pertinent U.N. resolutions; we consider it necessary that the situation be returned to the original position, although, of course, changes are possible during the settlement process. But I repeat, our fundamental position has not changed—we are for settlement, we are for a solidarity approach. You, Mr. President, expressed many interesting ideas; we have taken note and will be sure to respond. Indeed, it is very important that our talk today results in a demonstration of cooperation between our countries and our joint commitment to remedy the situation and restore justice. In front of me I have the text of Saddam Hussein’s speech from yesterday, in which he addresses both of us. He says that Iraq has not invaded either one of our countries. Iraq has no intention of harming our interests. He goes on to talk about the history of Kuwait, that it is a product of British colonialism. He says: Iraq’s prime minister Said, a friend of the West, said in his time to the British that Iraq would not agree to the creation of this state. Prime Minister Kassem, friend of the Soviet Union, said the same thing. When the Americans invaded Panama, Hussein continues, the U.N. Security Council and the Soviet Union were silent. Now, when events are taking place on Arab land, when the matter at hand is our business, everyone protests. The White House and the Kremlin must know that they are dealing with a people who can stand up for themselves. Later he talks about the unity of the Arab nation, that the Iraqi people have been elected by God and deserve the support of all Muslims. And so on. Bush: That’s bullshit. Gorbachev: But it is calculated. Bush: The only truth in that statement is when he says that Bush is not a Muslim and that he eats pork. The rest is lies. And now about the plan. I think that he will accept this plan, even latch on to it. But most of the world would see this as our colossal defeat. Because this way, he would succeed in shifting the focus of the situation—he would be able to tie it to the Israeli-Palestinian problem, which is precisely what he wants. This issue remains unresolved for years, and we cannot allow Iraqi aggression to be tied up with this issue. I allow that your experts may know more than ours, but on one point I would disagree with them. I do not think that Saddam succeeded in becoming a symbol of the Arab struggle with the infidel. Firstly, the aggression undermined his credibility, which is clear to many people in the Arab world. Secondly, he failed to win over Assad, Mubarak and in general the majority of the members of the League of Arab States. Saddam would like us to believe that he speaks on behalf of the entire Muslim world. But Arabs tell me that this is not the case. Therefore, no matter what he says, I do not consider him to be such a giant. If the adopted plan left the question of Kuwait open in any way, it would be a major defeat for the United Nations and a blow to the new world order. 263

Gorbachev: But the central point, the key point of the plan is precisely that Iraq has to withdraw from Kuwait. Bush: Yes, the plan contains some points with which I agree. Gorbachev: And he probably will not accept the plan. Bush: Why, he would get almost everything that he wants. He would achieve his strategic goals in Kuwait. And the American troops would leave the region without any guarantees. Gorbachev: No, the Kuwait question would be resolved. Inter-Arab forces would be introduced and, of course, there would be international guarantees with the participation of the United States, the Soviet Union and the U.N. Security Council permanent members. Bush: That is positive, I agree with that. Gorbachev: The current Kuwait dynasty would be restored; after all, it is with these people that Iraq has to conduct negotiations on financial and economic matters. The rest will be the business of the people of Kuwait; they will decide their own internal questions. Bush: You are referring to the election? Gorbachev: Yes. Bush: Yes, taking that into consideration, I think Saddam would reject such a plan. Of course, he would like to tie his aggression to the Arab-Israeli issue, but he put too much at stake when he occupied Kuwait. He will not want to part with the fruits of his aggression. I want to assure you once again that we are in favor of a peaceful resolution. Let us think about this plan and throw around some ideas, so to speak. We are taking into account many considerations that were expressed by the Arabs themselves, particularly the Maghreb countries and others. Of one thing I am firmly convinced. It would be madness to take military action against Iraq if it does not take any new military steps itself. Bush: This is true, but as I said before, right now Saddam is destroying Kuwait, he is dismantling this country step by step, machine by machine. Not to mention the loss of life, the enormous suffering of the Kuwaiti people. Gorbachev: That is why we must act quickly. That is the essence of this plan. If you take military action, it could ruin all the progress. We already have the strategic victory. The functionality and security of the oil infrastructure in the Middle East is preserved. Therefore, the U.S. President can say that we are operating from a position of strength, not a position of weakness. The most important thing is not to lose momentum, but to act carefully, responsibly, and to avoid human suffering. I do not understand what Saddam Hussein wins here. Bush: When I was listening to your presentation, I thought at first that your plan leaves open the question of restoring the current rulers of Kuwait. Gorbachev: This is an important point. We foresee that negotiations between the current government of Kuwait and Iraq would resume on the regulation of financial claims, etc. So this is being taken into account. Right now Saddam is exploiting the subject of the Arab-Israeli conflict. If we add this element by 264

proposing a conference—and by the way, this idea is well-received in Western European capitals—then he will either have to accept this plan and leave Kuwait, or reject the plan, thereby rejecting the very idea he is trying to exploit right now in the eyes of the Arabs. Bush: But let us imagine that he will reject the plan. What will happen then? Gorbachev: Then it will be necessary to continue the political pressure and the embargo. But he will lose the support that we have to admit he has right now. Because he will reject the things he is proposing right now. This will expose him in the eyes of the Arab people. The result will be a powerful isolation of Saddam Hussein. Bush: And if he agrees to the plan, he will have to withdraw from Kuwait and the current Kuwaiti leaders will be restored to power, but at the same time he will achieve a conference on the Palestinian question and the withdrawal of American troops. Gorbachev: The U.S. troops will be withdrawn gradually, when Iraqi troops are out of Kuwait. The U.S. troops will be replaced by Inter-Arab forces, and only after international guarantees will be provided. Bush: There is another thing I am worried about. Whatever is proposed, it should not be presented as a Soviet-American plan. To many people it would seem strange if our two countries worked out the settlement of this issue. Perhaps it should be an action of the U.N. But I must say that the ideas you expressed are very interesting, and we will have to give them some serious consideration. My concern is that we are dealing with a very unstable individual, who could undertake some kind of provocation, most likely against the U.S. rather than against the USSR. For example, he could organize a terrorist act, which would guarantee that we would have to make a response. If he wants to provoke us, he will do it. All the Arab leaders are telling us the same thing: he is a cruel, unstable, ambitious man who is ready for any provocation. This worries me, because we cannot sit idly by in the face of obvious provocation, we cannot limit ourselves to words. Gorbachev: I would like to respond to your comment. Can we make some kind of decisions here about a plan? No. But if we do nothing, then why meet at all? That is why I think that if we have some kind of idea which seems fruitful, we should think about the mechanism to start this process, which would result in some kind of plan or set of measures. Then it’s not important who proposed what and when. The result is important—a multilateral effort and a settlement mechanism. Bush: I agree. I would not want to send out a signal that we are working on this problem on our own. The important thing is to start searching for a solution and finally reach an agreement on an acceptable approach. In this regard, I agree with you. Gorbachev: Today we could say that we had a broad discussion of the problem and that we believe it is possible to find an approach that would allow us to untangle this dangerous knot. Now we have to work together to prevent this problem from escalating into an even more dangerous crisis. 265

Bush: I agree with almost everything you said, except for one phrase. Instead of saying that “we believe it is possible to find a solution” we should say “we will look for a solution,” because I am still not sure that there really is one. Gorbachev: The last point has to do with what you said about a possible provocation from Saddam Hussein. I think that we have the same assessment of this person—the political, moral, and psychological aspects. But we believe that the potential of this personality will come out if he is driven into a corner. On the other hand, if we give him an outlet in the form of a political process, which would at least partially create the impression that there are no winners or losers and we are not bringing him to his knees in front of the whole world, so to speak, then he will not resort to a provocation. This is the opinion of people who know him, who have interacted with him personally for decades. So, I believe that the point and the outcome of this meeting should be the following—it is like two sides of the same coin. We once again demonstrate our solidarity and our determination to find a solution to this problem. At the same time we will show that we are considering approaches that would allow us to solve this problem with minimal losses and by political means. At the same time we understand with what and whom we are dealing. Bush: I like the idea of showing the world that we are prepared to do our part, and even a little more, for a peaceful settlement. At the same time, we must act very carefully so as not to undermine the collective efforts that were taken within the U.N. framework. Some people in our country are voicing ideas for various compromises, for example, on the basis of elections in Kuwait. The elections would determine what would happen in Kuwait, who would rule Kuwait. Of course, if this leads to the restoration of the regime, that would be good. But if such elections are presented as a condition for the settlement, in my opinion that would undermine the collective position we took. It must be completely clear that aggression cannot be rewarded in any way. If it appears that any benefit came from the aggression, that this outrageous act resulted in even partial success, then two or five years down the road we will have to face a similar problem. Gorbachev: But if Saddam gets absolutely nothing and finds himself cornered, then we can expect very severe retribution. This is a man who can strike in a way that would cause us to lose much more than if we gave him some kind of break, some kind of outlet. Therefore, we should not bring him to his knees. Nothing good will come of it. Bush: Do you think one could reach a compromise with Hitler? Gorbachev: I think these are disparate phenomena, there is no analogy. Bush: Granted, Saddam Hussein is not a global phenomenon, but they are comparable in terms of personal cruelty. Gorbachev: Mr. President, George, I appeal to you as a friend. We have to choose. Choose from the available options, though I understand that the choices are limited and unpleasant. But I think that if the president who has already reached the U.S.’s main strategic goals in this situation, acts in a way to avoid entangling America in an enormous conflict that could lead to a breakdown of the 266

structures that ensure the world oil supply, it would be seen as a major victory. I think everyone would agree with that. Of course, right now there are suggestions that your prestige and the like are on the line. But we have to act wisely, act in a way that would allow us to save people and preserve the oil. Of course, you could strike him. But you have to choose. We really are dealing with a paranoiac, and because of this we have to give him some kind of carrot. Ultimately, everyone will win if the consequences of aggression are overcome, and international law and justice are restored. Bush: I agree with everything you said. We do not aspire to receive the laurels of individual or collective victory in the fight against Saddam Hussein. But in order to ensure that the new order we are both striving for is preserved in the future, we must find an answer that would give us a guarantee against future aggression. As I understand it, many of the provisions in your plan are aimed precisely at this goal. The only problem is that should we include the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in this plan, it might be such a carrot that would create the impression that the aggression was a success. Such a result would cause me very great concern. Gorbachev: But that would not be the carrot. The carrot is that we recognize him as a partner. If we do not include the Israeli-Palestinian problem in our plan, he could say, “I put forward a comprehensive plan, which, however, was ignored.” But if we include the Israeli-Palestinian question and he rejects the plan, then he will discredit himself in front of all the Arabs. Everyone will see that he was bluffing and speculating on this issue, which is a very acute one for Arabs. If he agrees, then Kuwait will be restored, the situation in the Persian Gulf will be restored, and there will be guarantees, the process of regulating the Arab-Israeli conflict will begin, and already at the first stage we would restore our relations with Israel without waiting for the final settlement of the Palestinian problem. This would be a serious step for us, our “compensation.” I repeat, including the Israeli-Palestinian problem into the plan would not be the carrot for Saddam Hussein. If he rejects the plan, he will expose himself in the eyes of the Arabs and will get no support from them. At the same time, by including this question we would give support to the moderate forces among the Arabs, such as Mubarak. Bush: But already there practically exists a conference that deals with the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait. I am talking about the multilateral efforts at the U.N. Security Council. Gorbachev: This entire plan would also be under the auspices of the U.N. It would be carried out in the U.N. format, and with the participation of U.N. Security Council members and Arab states. If Saddam rejects this plan, then we will win time, and he will be isolated and will look like a maniac with whom the world should have nothing to do. And yet, he is not a maniac. A member of the Presidential Council, Academician Primakov, has known Saddam for a long time, and states that Saddam Hussein is not a schizophrenic. He is a person to be reckoned with. Of course, before you speak with the others, it may be good to sound him out. Maybe send somebody to him without telling him the essence of the plan. 267

Bush: I think that in any case we should try to probe him. We do not have access to him. Considering your history of relations with Iraq, if you could somehow feel him out, it would be extremely constructive. But if you speak with Mubarak, he will tell you: Saddam can no longer leave Kuwait; too much is at stake, he has already suffered too many losses. Gorbachev: Assad says the same thing. Bush: If he leaves Kuwait, he is done for. Gorbachev: It is important to build the whole process around this. Bush: If you and I have any difference in interpretation, it is the following. I do not think that we need any additional proof of the fact that this is an unreasonable person. Your argument is at least partially based on the idea that he has yet to reveal his true intentions. Gorbachev: We must call his bluff. Should he accept this plan, it would start a process that ultimately would benefit everybody. Bush: I want to clarify—your idea is based on the Iraqi, American, and other troops withdrawing first, and only then convening an international conference? Gorbachev: An agreement must be reached on the conference and its format. The process will begin based on this agreement. This would be tied to Iraq’s announcement that it will free detained citizens and withdraw from Kuwait; as well as the U.S.’s and U.N. Security Council’s announcement that they will not attack Iraq. During the first stage, Iraq would withdraw troops from Kuwait and the inter-Arab forces would introduce their troops. The United States would withdraw some symbolic number of troops, which would also be replaced by interArab forces. As for a military presence in general, it should be carefully weighed. When structures and safeguards are established to ensure security in the region, the U.S. military will be able to leave. Bush: The ruling Kuwait regime would be restored? Gorbachev: Yes. Bush: Well, let us think about it and discuss it. I would like to ask my adviser Brent Scowcroft whether he has any questions or ideas related to this. Scowcroft: No, not yet. One main question remains. If he rejects this plan, can we indefinitely put up with a stalemate, with the current status quo? Gorbachev: If he rejects the plan, we will continue to pressure him and increase Iraq’s isolation. Internal processes could start in that country as people begin to see that there is no way out with this man. Then the Iraqi people will hold him responsible for their burdens, not us. Bush: By the way, even now there is a growing concern that the measures we are taking against Iraq should not result in starving children in that country. This question has been raised. Gorbachev: We think that under the embargo, bread and medicine should be sent to Iraq. The question is, under whose auspices it should be done. You touch upon a very important point. Bush: Naturally, we do not want children to die of hunger. But if we see that humanitarian concerns necessitate an exception to be made in the sanctions, then 268

it would be necessary to make the deliveries through the Red Crescent or analogous channels, so Saddam could not feed his troops with this bread. Gorbachev: Absolutely. Bush: Now I would like to address a completely different question. Chancellor Kohl invited me to Germany in order to participate in the October 3rd ceremony on the unification of Germany together with you. I told Kohl, quite honestly, that it would be difficult for me to fulfill his request. It will be just a month before the congressional elections, and I’ve already had to cancel a trip to South America, which both I and the South Americans considered to be quite important. How important do you think this event is? I know that it is very important for Kohl. But it is unlikely that I will go. If I do not participate, will it create any problems for you? Gorbachev: No. I am also very busy with domestic issues right now. We will have a big fight over the transition to a market economy. Moreover, I will have to lead the development of the Union Treaty. As you can see, the future of our country is being decided, so it would be very difficult for me to get away. When Kohl invited me, I told him that I consider this event very important; it marks the end of an historical era. But as to the level of participation, I said that I would consult with you and others. Bush: If you do not ask me to change my decision, I will call Kohl and tell him, without mentioning our conversation, that unfortunately I cannot come. Gorbachev: I will not go. Bush: I take this as a personal gesture. Gorbachev: In this matter we do not need to have any disagreements. Bush: You will not participate in the Summit for Children? Gorbachev: I cannot go. Bush: I will go because it is taking place in New York. Gorbachev: I think we should not lose sight of the question of your visit to the USSR. I assume that we will continue to work on strategic and conventional arms agreements. In both cases it is possible to reach an agreement. We could tell the press that we discussed these questions, and while certain issues remain, we expect to achieve a positive result. We will not go into the details. Bush: I agree. I would really like for the work to go faster. I intend to tell Jim Baker to spur our bureaucracy, because our position remains unchanged: we sincerely wish to reach an early agreement on the negotiations. Gorbachev: I agree with you, except I prefer to say “experts” instead of “bureaucrats.” We have exhausted our time, but we will continue the conversation after lunch in an expanded format. [Source: Gorbachev Foundation Archive, Fond 1, Opis 1. Translated by Anna Melyakova. Published in Gorbachev, Sobranie sochinenii, v. 22, pp. 45–56]

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Document No. 40: Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, Plenary Meeting, Helsinki, 2:30 p.m. – 5:00 p.m. September 9, 1990

In the second part of their conversation, after lunch, Bush assures Gorbachev that “[he has] taken on board seriously your views that a peaceful solution [in the Gulf] is needed.” Unexpectedly, Gorbachev accepts the U.S. version of the joint statement virtually without changes and does not talk about the need for a concrete plan of action as he did in the morning. The final statement refers only to “broader peace efforts in the Middle East.” It does not mention an international peace conference, which Gorbachev’s plan has envisioned. Gorbachev now moves to his top priority— economic reform. He describes his vision of a gradual transition to price liberalization and a free market, hoping that after showing so much cooperation on Iraq he will be treated as a partner in the economic realm, too. Bush emphasizes again that the U.S. does not have the resources for economic aid but declares that “out of this new order we can find a way.” They do discuss some technical cooperation, especially in the energy sector, and the U.S. side shows interest in joint exploration of Soviet oil and gas resources, but they are not willing even to forgive the Kerensky debt—Russian pre-revolutionary obligations. A brief discussion on regional issues covers national reconciliation in Cambodia and Afghanistan, where the Soviet Union is advocating for a national election on the Nicaraguan model, with U.N. observers.

President Bush: I thought we had a very good discussion this morning. I have taken on board seriously your views that a peaceful solution is needed. I understand there is a statement, which we need to discuss, that would be seen as an enormous success. I think we would then have exhausted the Persian Gulf discussion. If this is agreeable, let’s move on. I’m not equipped to negotiate arms control now. As I said, we are very much committed and awaiting resolution. I’ll go back and encourage our negotiators to get going. President Gorbachev: Now you are speaking of negotiators respectfully. President Bush: They should get it done; they’re hung up on technicalities. I am open to hearing about the future of Europe. There is the IMF. We could talk about economic issues. We don’t have an agenda. President Gorbachev: I want to greet my colleagues with whom we have worked with success. I want to support what the President has said—our colleagues and yours can take full note. The President and I think it is very important to make sure at this phase of mutual development that we act together, supported broadly by the UN. I recall in 1967, the evolution of crisis and comparing it to now. We are channeling our energies differently. We have barred 270

the possibility of any further action on his [Saddam]52 part. We have adopted an embargo and protected oil resources. Based on those criteria, a lot has been accomplished. We can contemplate the next phase to make sure U.N. Resolution 660 is accomplished. We will have acted not from a position of weakness but of strength. There are some hot heads who have been hinting that we are acting from weakness. We have been able to discuss developments fruitfully and agreed to work together. I’ve said that as regards arms talks, it is possible to complete the talks and negotiations on CFE and START. The Foreign Ministers will have to work in a very substantive way. I have done some work on the Statement on page 1. There are some amendments that we would like to suggest: In para 1: “Iraq’s illegal invasion”: I want to omit illegal because yesterday he wanted to prove it was legal. The word invasion makes it entirely clear. President Bush: “Illegal” strengthens it. President Gorbachev: I think he is trying to exploit the point—invasion is invasion. Even now in the resolutions being adopted in the U.N. the humanitarian aspect is being provided for. We should also take out “should be monitored.” Saddam has said there is no pressing humanitarian need. We have agreed that it must be monitored, but we cannot describe everything. You have mentioned children; maybe we should reflect this. We could mention children, and that we want to resolve the crisis—“consistent with the U.N. Charter”—as soon as the objectives have been achieved. It is essential at this stage to work actively to resolve all conflicts. President Bush: That links the Palestinian question with Saddam’s illegal act. I want to ask the Secretary of State to respond. Secretary Baker: Deletion of the word “illegal” is no big matter. If you want to, no problem. Minister Shevardnadze: Maybe “aggression” is better. Secretary Baker: The only fundamental difference is the issue of food. Let me skip and go to “our preference to resolve.” There’s no problem with a small change—“determined to see it end”—no problem. “Once the objectives mandated by U.N. 660–665 resolutions” have been achieved. President Bush: OK. General Scowcroft: “The resolutions listed above.” President Gorbachev: OK. Secretary Baker: You suggest it is essential. The change would be to “is.” I want to say that it is essential to work actively, to avoid future, present or past tense. President Gorbachev: OK. The paragraph on food is inconsistent with the U.N. Security Council’s discussions. We need to add something about the children. “Control” is meant to  Bracketed clarification in the original. [Editors]

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make sure only those who are truly deserving. I would speak specifically of children. This doesn’t change the essence. President Bush: Let me comment on a problem here. What we are doing is accepting the argument that the humanitarian clause needs to be enacted. We must be careful that we don’t accept Saddam’s view. If we now say that the Indians, etc., would send food and say that the humanitarian clause has been triggered. I accept that the U.N. has spoken, but my reservation is that I don’t know that there are shortages. We are told that they have a good stock. Secretary Baker: Why not reference the U.N. resolution, and (1) provide for embargo exceptions in humanitarian conditions; (2) note the sanctions committee is in process of determining the meaning; and (3) that the US and USSR agree that monitoring is necessary, with priority to children. President Gorbachev: The idea of referring to the resolution is correct. It will show our humanism, but then you are saying US and USSR imports must be monitored to ensure that food reaches strictly those to whom it is destined. President Bush: We also need to have the right to put medicine in the same category. Secretary Baker: Let’s have drafters work on it. We agree that commercial sales of food is not what is meant by humanitarian exception. President Gorbachev: Yes, indeed. President Bush: This statement will have a strong positive impact. President Gorbachev: Even reiterating our position will so do. President Bush: I understand President Reagan is coming soon. President Gorbachev: We have prepared for him. I will receive him. President Bush: He is a little older. I have great affection for him. I am interested in how we can be a positive influence on your reforms. I would like to think that out of being together on the Iraq crisis that we can work together better. I wondered if that should be left for later when we helped formulate change in NATO. I wanted a signal to be seen, that east-west confrontation had given way to cooperation. The NATO meeting in London was enthusiastically approached. I hope it was read as a real change. What shall we talk about? Economic problems? President Gorbachev: OK. You are right that we, in the context of our reform, have reached the decisive phase. This explains all the debate and turmoil. We have been able to keep the turmoil within debate, which has sometimes been sharp. In some places there has been conflict. Still, overall, any global confrontation or civil conflict has been averted. In a country with our complicated history, structures are not simple. We are overloaded with problems. That we have avoided conflict is good. Now all is to be decided. It is understood that we must move toward a market. It will mean substantial changes. There is an understanding that to move, it is necessary to have a different situation. How do we get there? We must change property relations. There is a very difficult process of phasing out state property—lease holds, cooperatives—and selling off small and medium enterprises. It means privatization in many forms and new motivation 272

for individuals: peasants to own farms or family shops. In setting up shareholders, we create new participants in the market. We need to reform banks, create antimonopoly laws. Everything is ready; stock exchanges are being set up right now. We are approaching a complex society with a dislocated consumer market. It could result in a price explosion. There is now a sharp debate about whether we should raise prices in a centralized way. The government wants a centralized rise in prices. Shatalin wants price stabilization first, and then let the market set the prices. This means absorbing ruble overhang and adjusting incomes. This discussion is in the final stages. A decision will be given and the program of transition announced as of Oct. 1. President Bush: When you submit the plan to the Republics, do they have to act on it and pass laws? President Gorbachev: We must not just consult them, we need their consent. President Bush: How long a time frame do you envision? President Gorbachev: For stabilization, we need 3–5 months to stabilize the market to begin to release some prices in 1991–­1992. The transition period will come only then, and it will be long and hard. People worry about price inflation and unemployment. The whole of society must learn how to act; this may seem strange to you. We will need tremendous effort. Unpopular measures will be enacted, but we must hold the society together. But we cannot wait. If we do not act radically, it will be dangerous. Money will cease to work and barter will take over. There will be economic chaos with each collective working selfprotectively. We must muster the will, and this is not a simple thing. The Russian Communist Party Congress shows there will be problems. We need also to have some sort of room for maneuver, to saturate the market with products, to make people feel that the change in prices will bring something to the consumer. A reduction in the money supply, an increase in production of consumer goods— I hope Western countries can help with the specifics. We are speaking of a need for help. The numbers are not great, and we are not asking for grants, just loans that we will pay back with interest. The coming 3–5 months will be critical. Your position will be of great importance. I hope that when Baker comes to USSR he can discuss specifics, not just in terms of bilateral relations, but things that will have an effect on others. President Bush: There are certain areas where we can move forward. I touched briefly on energy cooperation; that could be done in the short range. We could free up some technologies that have been held up, like horizontal drilling. There we can move forward. I hope Shevardnadze can talk about what you need in the short-run. As you know, we don’t have the cash for large economic assistance. I don’t want to be under false colors, but the climate for cooperation is continuing. There is still some old thinking, but I think we are on common ground now. This statement will help, and I will refer to it. Maybe it will swing some heads. We are negotiating at Andrews Air Force Base, trying to figure out how to cut the budget. We have some constraints, but out of this new order we can find a way. 273

Secretary Baker: It’s important to clear away the legal underbrush. For example, if you can get your negotiators to engage meaningfully on the Kerensky Debt claims, we might be able to repeal Stevenson and Byrd. In terms of getting a Trade Agreement, we are watching your discussion on passage of emigration legislation. You need to get it approved; it will help give us some freedom to maneuver. President Gorbachev: We are about to pass new legislation on foreign investment. We intend to take the first steps to convert the ruble. Secretary Baker: We are also negotiating a Bilateral Investment Treaty. One of my assistant secretaries of State told me we are in a position to complete a draft for a later meeting. We would be in a better position to cooperate on loans and grants. Governor Sununu: There is big difficulty in encouraging private investment. They don’t know who to negotiate with—the Republics or the center. The uncertainty is the biggest problem. If you can make it clear, we’d be able to move more quickly. President Gorbachev: I believe we are on our way to—we are reexamining— major Union programs. We will send Union money to fund programs with the Republics. They can also cooperate between regions. All enterprises are able to have independent access to the market. We see vast opportunities; some partners have already found each other, particularly in conversion of defense complexes. I understand the process is well underway. The Soviet Union will not disappear, but we need production, etc. President Bush: Have you thought about gold backing of some instruments? You could raise a specific amount of money. President Gorbachev: There will be some new opportunities. We want the normal ruble to be gold backed too, and we will devalue it. This question was analyzed, and we must move toward convertability [sic]. Otherwise it will interfere with market reforms. Sound finances, a reliable ruble, and diversity of ownership will help. Secretary Baker: As you know, we are briefing businessmen. There is a great potential to further develop energy reserves. The US can make the technology. President Gorbachev: We can have very good cooperation in this area. Secretary Baker: Let’s take it out of the U.S. realm, for example, if a French company wanted to risk its money, would the USSR grant concessions? President Gorbachev: I think there are some well considered proposals for the Tenpiz Oil fields involving an entire consortium with Chevron. All in all we must develop the oil, gas, and energy industry. We sustain great losses now. We listen to good proposals. Another subject which should be positively evaluated concerns laying a EuroAsia communication channel based on fiber optics. The Japanese are interested in it. But we want to hear from you—the US must look into everything agreed on. There are problems involving the US Administration and the Soviet Aviation Minister. 274

General Scowcroft: I believe this concerns the development of a civil aircraft. Yes, the Soviet Union would provide the body, the US the engine, and the Israelis the avionics. President Bush: Another important area is energy. Cooperative development of hydrocarbons with other countries would beneficial [sic]. I understand ARCO is coming to your country. Companies are aware of the need to safeguard against appearance of “owning” the resources of the USSR. They are prepared to be flexible. President Gorbachev: Maslykov is in charge of this; he will work out all proposals. Perhaps you could talk with them. Secretary Baker: Companies are worried that the Republics will come back and say there is no deal. President Gorbachev: We understand. Shevardnadze: In Irkutsk we described long term projects. General Akhromeyev: The President of Texaco will make a report. He is working both with the central organization and the Russian Federation. Mr. Primakov: He raised the problem correctly. This document has to be dealt with in great detail. There is speculation at this time about why don’t you get access to just some Republics, not to all Union Republics. The main recipient will be the central government. It is a much different matter to do it between enterprises. We are open to creation of markets, and the Union republics want to participate. But only those who produce goods should participate. But we should not forget the importance of the central government. President Gorbachev: We ask whether anyone asks what state General Motors belongs to. We are in the phase of passing declarations which people might have thought then alarming. Now we are tackling the economy, which demands the establishment of a unitarian state. Russia was particularly decisive, although they continue to thrust out statements. People are getting sober. This is now the foundation of an economy—communications, information, finances, single currency, a single custom system—there is no getting away from it. President Bush: I believe it would be helpful, strictly on trade, to have some state officials talk about how trade and taxation works. Would it be helpful for you? President Gorbachev: I think after a while it would be helpful. Primakov: Republic governors can receive them on a level of friendly bilateral exchange. President Bush: There are many people who understand what you’re trying to do. Maybe this is for the near future. On regional subjects, I think we’re close on Afghanistan and Cambodia. I feel like a mouse in a trap. I don’t want the cheese just out of the trap. I want to ask Jim to say what we’re thinking; I know Eduard and Jim have talked about it— let’s get them resolved. Secretary Baker: Recent developments hold more promise on Afghanistan, and we are closer to an agreement. On July 18, we said we would have 275

a dialogue with Vietnam. The Perm 5 has a framework agreement, and we are fairly satisfied with it. We said we would begin with Phnom Penh, and you with Sihanouk. He has indicated he will attend. I am very hopeful that maybe we can find resolution. We would appreciate anything you can do to press on this matter. On Afghanistan, the question is one of the degree to which Najibullah would cede authority. We’re getting closer. We need to revive the detailed proposals, but we’re very close. One solution could be a temporary transfer authority, and then we could consider negative symmetry within that context. But we don’t want a hostile government. President Bush: I know we can get them done. Shevardnadze: It is right that we should continue and work out the fundamentals like free elections, uninvolvement, presence of some organization in Cambodia, such as U.N. representatives there, etc. Five documents were agreed among the Perm 5 on the internal aspect. The Chinese are serious and changing, but internal contradictions remain. We and you could have been more active if it had not been for Iraq. But we are on a good track and making natural headway. There are some new elements, such as consenting to hold free elections under the sponsorship and rigorous control of the UN. We should set up a committee for holding elections and overseeing government and Presidential functions—these should be turned over to that committee, including the army, militia, etc. I think in Moscow we can analyze it all. Also, the President received Najibullah—the Afghans are showing greater flexibility. President Bush: Is the U.N. election idea new? Shevardnadze: It would be just the way it was in Nicaragua. President Bush: And there would be observers? President Gorbachev: We think we should set up committee for that purpose. President Bush: Creating a U.N. presence in Cambodia could be expensive, perhaps $5 billion. General Scowcroft: May [sic] we should discuss what we will say at the press conference. Shevardnadze: A question is sure to be asked about the President’s visit this year. President Gorbachev: Our position is that an agreement remains in effect to meet; we just need to speed up work. President Bush: We didn’t put any conditions on our next visit. I will say I’m looking forward to it, hope to have a START agreement in place, we’re hoping to do it this year, and that we discussed it. President Gorbachev: Your formula is acceptable. President Bush: I’ll mention that there is no specific date, but that we want to do it, maybe at the end of this year or early next year. What questions, Marlin, should we be ready on? 276

Marlin Fitzwater: The situation in the Gulf and whether you made any new plans. President Bush: I would say we want a peaceful resolution, and that our statement speaks to our fundamental resolve. Marlin Fitzwater: A question may also arise on Soviet participation, troops in particular. President Bush: If economic assistance comes up, we can say that some businessmen are on the way. Secretary Baker: The use of force question may also come up. President Bush: The statement is very good; it deals with all of this. Who will read it? If you get Russian copies, we can do it in English. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA 2000-0429-F by the National Security Archive.]

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Document No. 41: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Kohl, 12:36 p.m. – 12:46 p.m. September 11, 1990

Bush calls Kohl in high spirits to inform him on the results of the summit. He tells the German leader that Gorbachev “came across with a stronger statement than we had anticipated. We got everything we wanted.” Noting Gorbachev’s strong concern about possible use of force, Bush expresses his hope that sanctions could work so that force would not be necessary. He also informs Kohl that he will not be able to attend the ceremony of German unification on October 3, as he has already informed Gorbachev in Helsinki. Kohl expresses understanding and full support for the U.S. position in the Gulf.

The President: Hello, Helmut! How are you? I wanted to give you a report on my meetings in Helsinki. Chancellor Kohl: It made an excellent impression. I spoke with Gorbachev yesterday on the telephone. We talked about other things, but also about this. He is very pleased. The President: I am glad. He came across with a stronger statement than we had anticipated. We got everything we wanted. He is very concerned about the use of force, but I had a very frank and open discussion with him about what might happen if there should be a provocation. We addressed ourselves to the food question also. I think he agrees with us that regular shipments of foodstuffs are banned by the U.N. sanctions. However, some kinds of humanitarian shipments, especially for children, could be considered so long as there are international observers to ensure that the food gets to the children. He thinks the sanctions will work. I am beginning to think so, too. Yesterday, Fahd, Ozal, and Mitterrand all told me the sanctions are having a serious impact on Iraq. So I am basically pleased and just wanted to touch base with you. A second issue: I am very sorry I won’t be able to come on October 3. Brent has already conveyed that to Horst Teltschik. It is a horribly complex time for me. I hope you understand. I hate letting you down like this. Chancellor Kohl: George, let me say on that last point that of course I have total understanding for your position. I indicated that when we last spoke. The President: I know you did. I appreciate your understanding. Chancellor Kohl: Among friends, it must be possible to say when there are problems without creating a big hubbub. We have come a long way together and have a long way to go. Let me suggest on that day that you send a message to the Germans. The President: Absolutely. Would you like a televised or a written message? 278

Chancellor Kohl: A televised message would be very good. The President: We will get a tape and have our people contact your Embassy to get the right size and specifications. I will get that out well in advance. Chancellor Kohl: That is a very good idea. As to Helsinki and what you told me about the Gulf situation, I totally agree with you. I welcome it if sanctions are taking effect. In my discussions with Jim Baker I will try to work together with him as to what we Germans can do. At the very latest, in one week’s time we will be able to say what the Germans can do and will do. I want to help, but you know the limits we have. But under no circumstances do I want a situation in which the Germans are made out to be the number one exporter, but when responsible action is required they are not there. That is not our policy. The President: We understand that. Don’t worry about that. Maybe things are moving out there. I still worry about terrorist acts, but I am encouraged that those close to the scene think the sanctions are taking hold. Chancellor Kohl: I hope so, too. The President: It was good talking to you, Helmut. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained in 2009 by the National Security Archive.]

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Document No. 42: Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Shevardnadze, New York, 1:15 p.m. – 1:50 p.m. October 1, 1990

Shevardnadze arrives in the United States to attend the U.N. General Assembly and to finalize the CFE and START treaties with Baker. In this meeting at the White House, President Bush and the Soviet foreign minister devote most of their time to discussion of the Persian Gulf. The Soviet Union is working with its Arab allies to put pressure on Saddam Hussein to withdraw and to persuade him there is no alternative to fulfilling the U.N. sanctions. The Soviet priority here is to keep the resolution peaceful and not to resort to force. Bush praises Soviet efforts in the region but asks Shevardnadze to give “more thought to what happens if sanctions against Iraq are not effective.”

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: Congratulations on your brilliant speech. You must be very tired. The President: There are big domestic issues, with the budget situation. We are trying to get the deficit down. There will be a big fight with Congress, even in our own Party. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: Still, you must be happy to know how many parties you have. We don’t even know how many we have. The President: Ours sometimes act like more than two. On this budget agreement, only one third of the Republicans in Congress are for what I want to do. Let me start by saying that I meant what I said in the U.N. about U.S.-Soviet cooperation. I know your historic relations with Iraq have made your position difficult. Jim has filled me in on his many conversations with you. Let me say just one thing on the arms control front. As I said in Helsinki, it is important that both I and President Gorbachev push our bureaucracies to get this done. Jim has a certain flexibility, because I want to see a successful conclusion. We will need to be as flexible as possible. There are only two other subjects I would ask you to touch on if you would. First, on Salvador, we are troubled that the FMLN will not go forward toward a peaceful resolution of that question. Second, having seen the text of your outstanding speech, I want to ask if you have given more thought to what happens if sanctions against Iraq are not effective. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: Thank you, Mr. President. First, I would like to convey best wishes and best regards from President Gorbachev. Let me say at the outset, we regard as very timely your letter of September 17. It is an excellent idea to give the Secretary of State and me the necessary authority to make decisions—not because we love power and authority. 280

The President: I’m not so sure about that on our side. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: We are at a stage when decisions must be taken. It is impossible to do in Geneva or Vienna, so we have to do it. I think we can now say, given what we have achieved, that we can confidently state that the Paris Summit will take place and be a success. There are still some problems with aircraft, but we can solve these if James helps. Secretary Baker: Our flexibility is already on the table. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: Second, we have reason to hope for substantial progress on START. Two or three major questions can be settled soon, right away. Then there will be another meeting with James in November. I think we can resolve all questions, thanks to your support. This means in November we can probably discuss your visit to Moscow and the timing. The President: I want very much to come. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: Let me again refer to your speech today. I think your U.N. address will be of great impact in the future in solidifying the positive trends we see in the world. I think it was very important what you said about U.S.-Soviet relations, because if we are to speak of a new world order, U.S.-Soviet relations will be the main support of that order. This is the sixth UNGA I have attended. Comparing the remarks made by the U.S. over the years, I note a new quality in our relations. I am emotional when I say that. The President: I feel the same way. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: Thank you for what you said about the Soviet Union. If I may speak frankly and openly, it is very important for us, given the problems we face at home. I regard as very important the substantial support you expressed for the UN. I think I know the response, having talked to several of my colleagues. Your remarks were appreciated by everyone. Concerning Iraq, it was difficult for us to take the initial decision. I knew Saddam was a difficult man. I remember the question James asked in Irkutsk: whether I thought that the concentration of troops would result in an invasion. I said no, because I didn’t think it logical. But we took the right decision. Either we support the new world order, or we support the law of the jungle, as you said in your speech. It is either of those two. What we have done is right. It is very important that your speech was a clear, constructive stand in favor of a peaceful resolution. All points of emphasis were very important. I think a peaceful resolution is possible. I have been discussing this with James Baker. I think the Arab factor is very important. We have to get them united against Saddam Hussein. I think this is possible. You know the position that Yemen took before, and I know that you worked with Yemen and others. We did, too. At the U.N. Security Council everyone thought Yemen would vote against. Even the speech of their foreign minister seemed against. When he raised his hand in favor, I was surprised. He hadn’t had time to change his speech but must have received last minute instructions. I think Jordan will also take a more constructive stand, and we can work with the Algerians. Maybe we should discuss patterns of our work in parallel with the Arabs. I firmly believe we can realistically hope to 281

make Saddam Hussein withdraw from Kuwait. He must see that there is no other way out. I know the capacity of that country. It is not so powerful. Grave internal problems are about to emerge. One danger is the risk of an adventurous step. The President: Yes, a provocation. I worry about that very much. It might be a terrorist act. Terrorists were speaking at that conference in Jordan. This is very worrying. I share your concern that the man might act irrationally. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: Yes. He is capable of that, but if he gets no support from the Arab world it will be difficult for him to take such a step. Today you pointed to further steps in the process, including Arab-Israeli negotiations. You have stolen some of our important arguments. The President: What we don’t want is to let him link the invasion to Israel. That is not acceptable. But to hold out hope to get progress on the Israeli-Palestine question is correct. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: Yes, I think that’s right. There will be further consultations with Jim about how to work with the Arabs, and also about how to act in the Security Council if there is not a successful result on the basis of the resolutions. The President: I have seen your statement and appreciate it. I encourage you to talk to Jim Baker. I’m just not sure Saddam will act rationally. That is what is troubling me. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: Yes, indeed. There is this risk, this danger, but there is also another possibility. He could make a turnabout and leave Kuwait. He is a man capable of that kind of act, too. The President: Someone else said the same thing. Brent Scowcroft: Perez de Cuellar. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: I met Saddam eighteen months ago in the context of mediation between Iran and Iraq. I was trying to persuade him to take elementary steps, which he said were categorically impossible. Now two months ago he made a complete turnabout. So I would not rule this out if he feels he is in total isolation and if the Arabs indicate this to him. For self-preservation, he might reverse himself. It was important in your speech that you said there could be a discussion of broader issues after an Iraqi withdrawal. The Iranian factor is very important. There is certainly some reaction in the country to a foreign military presence, but as for Iranian attitudes toward the invasion and aggression their views are very clear. Both Rafsanjani and their foreign minister told me their views. You mentioned Salvador. I will be discussing this with Jim Baker. There is some movement. We are working with the guerillas. They are difficult, but the government, too, is not easy to deal with. We are ready to establish diplomatic relations with the Government of El Salvador. Yesterday we reestablished relations with Honduras. It is possible with Salvador, too. It would expand our ability for dialogue. Yesterday we also established diplomatic relations with South Korea and have established consular relations with Israel. The President: I think this is very important. 282

Secretary Baker: On the Secretary General’s mediation, Gonzalez, Salinas, and Perez have agreed to act as “friends of the Secretary General” to see if they can move forward. We need someone who can have influence on Cuba. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: It is difficult to find such a person. I will try. I will talk again with them, but I have done so a number of times. The President: I know you have. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: They’re in a difficult position, economically and socially. The President: There [sic] are isolated, in this hemisphere at least. It is an irony: Cuba could be a wonderful participant in this hemisphere under different circumstances. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: It will take them some time to really comprehend what is happening in the world. He is a man with some vision, but it needs to change. The President: I appreciate you coming over. I am looking forward to hearing from Jim about your discussions. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: I think we will be able to discuss the entire range of issues. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA 2000-0429-F by the National Security Archive.]

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Document No. 43: Letter from Bush to Gorbachev October 20, 1990

As Gorbachev’s personal envoy to the Middle East, Yevgeny Primakov, is about to arrive in Moscow after meetings with Saddam Hussein and a stop in Washington— where he spoke with Bush—the U.S. president sends an urgent message to Gorbachev through Matlock and Chernyaev. Although he was in favor of Primakov’s mission to probe Saddam, he is now concerned that Primakov discussed with the Iraqi dictator what would happen after the withdrawal, including hints about an international conference on the Middle East. Bush is anxious that the withdrawal be truly unconditional, as agreed with Gorbachev in Helsinki, and he is especially concerned about possible linkage to the Israeli-Palestinian problem. Bush warns that if there is linkage, “[Saddam] would profit from his invasion, and in doing so, he would likely acquire a standing of heroic proportions in the Arab world.”

For Ambassador Matlock’s eyes only. Dear Jack: Please deliver to Cherniaev the following message from President Bush to President Gorbachev. It should be delivered before Primakov returns to Moscow, Saturday evening, October 20. Begin text: Dear Mr. President: I have just seen Yevgeniy Primakov and heard his report on his meeting with Saddam Hussein. At the outset, let me say how much I appreciate the fact that you sent Mr. Primakov here and the spirit of his visit. It is yet another indication of just how much the relationship between our two countries has developed. I welcomed his observations based on his long acquaintance with Saddam Hussein. Our discussions were useful. I know that you will hear first-hand from Mr. Primakov about our discussion. But I wanted to write to you right away in order to underscore several of my concerns about some elements of our conversation. I am afraid that going to Saddam with a proposal detailing what we are willing to do after he withdraws would violate the basic principles you and I embraced in Helsinki. Rather than insisting on Saddam’s unconditional withdrawal, this approach would offer him significant “face-savers” that he would inevitably present as a “reward.” In other words, he would profit from his invasion, and in doing so, he would likely acquire a standing of heroic proportions in the Arab world. He would be seen as someone who can overcome all odds, and his way of doing business would become the norm in the Arab world. It would eliminate any chance we 284

have of brokering peace talks between Israel and the Arabs. That is not a prescription for peace and stability in the area. In addition, it would run counter to the view I know we share that in dealing with this first real crisis of the post Cold War era, we cannot permit an aggressor to profit in any way from aggression. Anything less would repeat the mistakes of the 1930’s. Indeed, Saddam would misread this and see it as a sign of weakness. Rather than paving the way to his withdrawal, an approach of this kind would probably convince him that the coalition against him is beginning to unravel. I remain convinced that the signs of Saddam’s recognition of his real situation—something about which Mr. Primakov spoke—result from the real pressure of the whole world being against him. The two of us—the United States and the USSR—have led the way. Our cooperation has cemented the international consensus. It reflects our new and growing partnership and it also reflects our joint responsibility in shaping a new international order where aggression has no place. Our cooperation, our resolve, and our collective efforts to increase the pressure on Saddam Hussein are the only way to settle this crisis peacefully. He must come to see that there is no place in the world for his aggression, no excuse for his brutal destruction of a country and its people, and no tolerance whatsoever for his inhumane and uncivilized treatment of innocent men, women and children. As I explained to Mr. Primakov, I am now more convinced than ever that we must succeed in this matter because of Saddam Hussein’s treatment of our embassy’s people in Kuwait and because of the systematic brutalizing and dismantling of Kuwait, a member of the United Nations and the Arab League. I believe Saddam is slowly getting the message; that is why he is prepared to probe now. We should not weaken our common front or the messages we send, Mikhail. Sincerely, George Bush [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA 1999-0304-F12 by the National Security Archive.]

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Document No. 44: Letter from Gorbachev to Bush November 6, 1990

In response to Bush’s October 20 letter, Gorbachev informs the U.S. president about his recent visits to Spain and France, where he hoped to build his own coalition for a political solution in the Persian Gulf and persuade the Europeans that a military solution in Iraq should be avoided. This is also the message of this letter to Bush. Although Soviet envoy Primakov’s mission did not produce concrete results, Gorbachev has decided to give it more time and not cut off contacts with Saddam Hussein because “there is still a chance to prevent bloodshed.” He also explains his choice of words at the October 29 Paris press conference, where he called the use of force “unacceptable.” In Russian, he says he used the word “undesirable” [неприемлем]. However, he warns Bush again that, “if a war should break out taking thousands of human lives this would also be a blow on [sic] the process geared toward a new world order.”

Dear Mr. President, I wish to share with you my thoughts prompted by your frank and friendly letter of October 20, and not by that letter alone. Let me tell you that the difficult problems outlined in your message constantly preoccupy myself, too. In this context, please accept my sincere thanks for the confidentiality with which you related your impressions from your discussions with my special representative. Let me tell you very frankly that it was precisely this kind of reaction—consistent with the new nature of our relationship, both personal and on the state level—that I was counting on. This is why, in the same spirit of trust and desire to fully understand one’s partner that has developed between ourselves, I would like to convey to you my assessments dealing with the two major recent events in the Soviet and, actually, the world politics. I am referring to my state visits to Spain and France. It is quite possible that someone may have pondered this question: How did Gorbachev manage to carve out some time for talks abroad when there is such a mountain heap of problems inside the country, at such a point critical for perestroika? Indeed, it was not an easy thing to do, but you, like perhaps no other leader in the world, understand the special responsibility of our countries for what is happening in the world, and hence, the enduring need to weigh and to coherently balance the internal and external factors. I couldn’t really postpone those talks that were long overdue, particularly on the eve of the truly historic pan-European meeting in Paris. First, about Spain. I will not burden you with recounting the official results— you no doubt know them. Perhaps, at first neither I, nor the Spanish leaders expected such a condensed and super-substantive conversation. But for me the experience of Spain and its 286

people who found the strength to overcome the consequences of a protracted dictatorship in an orderly and peaceful fashion and to break into the open field of free democratic development and take a worthy place in the international community, was very important. All of us were most favorably impressed by the royal couple who played such an important role in the critical period of Spain’s transition to democracy. As a result of our talks—and those were facilitated by the substance of our conversations, the very spirit of the new dialogue, and the nature of the documents agreed upon—our relations with Spain have been given a well-assured prospect. Now about my visit to Paris where we shall all soon see each other. Every meeting with President Mitterrand adds something new, both to our politics and French ones. Essentially, this is an interaction—extremely important for both our countries and Europe—based on trust, which was reflected in a unique treaty on concord and cooperation. This is a new word in contemporary diplomacy. This is also a symbol of the viability of the “two-tier approach” where one track, which is the Helsinki multilateral process, goes parallel with and complements the other, which is the development of the bilateral relations. And I cannot fail to point out here once again that I trace back the beginning of a new stage in the European and world politics to the agreement that you and I reached—not to consider each other as enemies. A major place in the talks in both capitals was given to reviewing the economic ties which are particularly essential to us at present. In this regard, I am quite satisfied with the results. We found understanding and a sincere desire to help. In Paris, as in Madrid, despite the shortage of time, we were able to touch upon all the main European and world problems. And, of course, a great deal of attention was devoted to the situation in the Middle East, and above all, to the Persian Gulf crisis. The mission of my special representative, E.M. Primakov, continued, and the Security Council discussions went on during the same days. As you know, we wanted to take advantage of even the smallest chance in Bagdad, and this is why we asked you and other Security Council members to postpone a little bit the vote on the resolution which has now been adopted. Let me tell you the main thing from the outset: in Bagdad, as in other capitals, we are proceeding strictly from the positions that you and I agreed to in Helsinki. We have maintained this posture and shall continue to do so firmly. Our unanimity is key to restoring justice in that region. I have said it publicly, and will tell you again: the aggression must be reversed and the aggressor himself cannot expect a reward. In my private conversation with President Mitterrand I stressed once again: all of us opposing the aggression “in our broad mutual understanding should strictly, consistently and firmly abide by the decisions adopted collectively by the U.N. Security Council”. At the news conference in Paris I said: we cannot allow, we must not give any excuse to Iraq, to President Hussein’s regime to imagine or hope for some 287

kind of altercation between us, between all those who oppose his aggression. Not a single crack, not even the smallest fissure. You and I—and we had complete understanding on it in Helsinki—are committed to a political solution, for a new war in the Middle East would have incalculable consequences. And for the sake of a peaceful settlement we shall, if need be, intensify efforts in all areas—political, economic, and moral pressure on the aggressor. I even told Mitterrand, guided by our discussions in Helsinki, that it is my deep conviction that “even the presence of the US troops and those of other countries pursues the objective of achieving a political solution and restoring justice”. Our ministers have already exchanged their impressions about E.M. Primakov’s trips to Bagdad. Let me give you my personal view: thanks to the toughening of the sanctions Saddam Hussein appears to have begun to ponder the dangerous impasse he has gotten himself into. We relayed to Saddam Hussein our arguments and conclusions based on the serious situation in which Iraq has found itself. Hussein was told that if he did not pull out his troops from Kuwait, a military strike might become inevitable. Some shifts seem to begin to lurk at this time, but it is certainly too early to speak about serious results. In a few days we shall discuss this in more detail here with Mr. Baker. Contacts with Saddam Hussein must not be broken off, while there is still a chance to prevent bloodshed. After all, if a war should break out taking thousands of human lives this would also be a blow on [sic] the process geared toward a new world order. This, too, if you will, would be a “reward”, albeit terrible, for the aggressor. It was with this in mind that I said at the news conference in Paris that such a path is unacceptable to all. (Incidentally, used in this context in some media this term was translated as “inadmissible”, “unfeasible”. This gave rise to misunderstandings even at the diplomatic level. The Russian meaning of this word is “undesirable”.) In Paris I stressed the need for an active use of the Arab factor. The inner logic of this idea is to prevent the “let-somebody-else-do-it” tendency among the Arabs who sort of shift all the responsibility on the Security Council and you, the United States. They should be tied more firmly to the real process of defusing the crisis. Let them think and offer their suggestions demonstrating their active involvement in the international efforts. It would be easier for Saddam Hussein to backtrack if the Security Council resolutions (without any substantive digression) were draped in an Arab-Moslem mantle. There is one more priority aspect in our peaceful diplomatic efforts (as in yours, for that matter)—the lives of our citizens in Iraq. As the USSR President, I am simply duty-bound to do all in my power so as to prevent loss of life among them. You understand that given our present situation at home, this is of particular importance. After the meetings with my representative Saddam Hussein knows what importance I attach to this. I don’t want to delude myself, but the Iraqi leadership’s agreement to the gradual departure of the Soviet specialists and the softening of Bagdad’s position with respect to the hostages from some other countries make me hope that some sprouts of realism may yet germinate in Bagdad. The rejection of a barbaric tactic of hostage-taking, displayed by the world 288

community, is yielding some results. Pressure should be intensified in this area as well. In dealing with the immediate task of rebuffing Hussein in his unlawful claims on Kuwait, one should not, I believe, put off the more general problem of the future of that region, including the curbing of the arms race there, confidencebuilding measures, the regional security structure, the Palestinian problem and, generally, that of Arabs-Israel. I recognize that it is tactically not advisable to directly link this whole range of problems (or even one—Palestinian) with eliminating the consequences of Hussein’s aggression. But we would benefit from creating the hope in the Arab world that you and I, and the Security Council, keep all this within their field of vision and shall promptly address it after Kuwait’s sovereignty has been restored. Those are the thoughts, George, that I wanted to share with you at this no easy time. I think that in Paris we will have an opportunity to have a more detailed conversation. Sincerely, M.GORBACHEV [Source: George H.W. Bush Library.]

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Document No. 45: Memorandum from James Baker to the President: “My Day in Moscow, November 8, 1990” November 9, 1990

In this highly revealing memorandum, Baker informs the President about his “rather extraordinary” recent discussions with Shevardnadze (for four hours) and Gorbachev (two hours) in Moscow. Baker’s mission was to persuade the Soviet leaders to agree to a U.N. resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq. Here he describes the differences between the two officials on the subject. Even through Shevardnadze is not in favor of using force now, he thinks it would have to be used eventually; he is also highly skeptical of the peace missions, not only by Primakov, but also by the Europeans. Gorbachev is “torn” about the use of force, but wants to avoid it in principle because “[his] image of the new international order is such that he has a hard time reconciling the fact that we might need to use force in this initial test.” Baker explained to the Soviets the U.S. position that the resolution must be passed this month while the United States chairs the UNSC and because the next couple of months represent a brief window before “the rainy season, Ramadan, the Hajj.” A skillful diplomat, Baker saved his strongest arguments for Gorbachev, appealing to his need for close ties with the United States. He concludes: “I believe their stake in good relations and desire for partnership with us will lead them in the right direction.” On the domestic situation, Baker noticed Gorbachev’s increasingly tough rhetoric about the need for stability and order, noting with concern that “[he] was uneasy about the tone and direction of these comments. I don’t know if they presage some kind of crackdown, but we will have to watch the situation closely.”

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT From: James A. Baker, III Subject: My Day in Moscow, November 8, 1990 1. Secret—Entire text 2. I have had long and rather extraordinary discussions with Shevardnadze and Gorbachev today. I’ll give you the full blow-by-blow when I get back. For now, let me pass on the highlights of the day and our discussions. We talked about the Gulf for nearly six hours (four with Shevardnadze, two with Gorbachev). Each listened, explained their concerns, and noticeably moved during the course of the discussions. Shevardnadze, in particular, came close to our position that a UNSC resolution authorizing force should be passed this month and become operative six-eight weeks later. He actually called Gorbachev on the phone and pushed hard to have him go along with our approach. He went out to Gorbachev’s dacha twenty minutes before me to lobby him further. Gorbachev is close but not there yet. 3. In general, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze seemed to be acting on certain assumptions: 290

A) The US and the Soviet Union must stay together on the gulf. They both said it’s essential to the success of th [sic] policy, and is reflective of the fact that our mutual well-being, and futures are linked. (Shevardnadze went so far as to say that a failure by us in the Gulf would damage perestroika. Our success would be a success for them—and our failure would be a real blow to them. Gorbachev said much the same thing.) B) Saddam Hussein must clearly unmistakably fail. They emphasized that his aggression must be reversed. Any hope for a new peaceful era depended on this, and on denying him any victory—no matter how small. To this end, we could not stand still. We had to be active now in pursuing further steps to reverse his aggression. (Activity that did not appear to mean peace missions. Shevardnadze was critical of the Nakasone, Brandt, and, yes, Primakov missions. For his part, Gorbachev noted our disappointment with Primakov’s mission and said he, too, had been disappointed.) C) Gorbachev and Shevardnadze felt sanctions might yet work and it’s premature to play our last diplomatic card—a card that leaves us no choice but to use force if it fails. While prepared to be active in pursuing more steps in the UNSC to build the pressure on Saddam, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze (certainly at the beginning of the day) were ambivalent about a UNSC resolution that authorizes force or “all means necessary to implement UNSC resolution 660.” It’s not that they reject the idea of setting a deadline or even posing an ultimatum. It’s that they still feel it’s too early to do that. 4. I explained long and hard why time and circumstances would not be on our side. Indeed, I outlined why if we couldn’t pass such a resolution this month we might not be able to do so for several months—something that could get us into the rainy season, Ramadan, the Hajj, and all the way to next summer before the use of force could be contemplated. 5. Shevardnadze found this argument compelling, because he saw how this might make it difficult for us to sustain our forces in the area. I emphasized this point and also said if we couldn’t sustain our forces or had to reduce them it would convince Saddam that he could prevail. 6. As a result, Shevardnadze began to change his position, a position that was premised on further UNSC resolutions that would show international solidarity, heighten pressure on Saddam and basically exhaust all diplomatic, nonmilitary options over time. 7. To a lesser extent Gorbachev bought this line of argument but I found him torn more about having to use force at all. (While I think Shevardnadze is not enthusiastic about using force, he is more inclined to think it will have to be used eventually.) For his part, Gorbachev’s image of the new international order is such that he has a hard time reconciling the fact that we might need to use force in this initial test. He reflected that sentiment in his letter to you and he said as much to me today, observing that we want this era to be different from the Cold War and based on different kinds of norms. 291

8. I answered him in two ways: first, it’s hard to establish recognized norms of civilized and peaceful behavior if a brutal aggressor who quite simply rejects these norms is allowed to succeed because the will to use force is absent. Second, that the only way to produce a peaceful outcome—our clear preference—was to convince Saddam that if he didn’t withdraw peacefully he would be forced out militarily. Only when Saddam becomes convinced that a massive military response was imminent would a peaceful outcome become possible. 9. That was the paradox. That was the reason that our approach would give us a chance to resolve this peacefully—i.e., Saddam would realize that the international community would support the use of force and he would have only a limited amount of time to avert a certain defeat. Nothing else would signal him so starkly and credibly. And yet a resolution passed now, but operative only after the beginning of the year, would also show that we had given him every chance to withdraw peacefully. And, indeed, that we had given sanctions a fair amount of time (five and one-half to six months) to work. 10. Shevardnadze said several times that he saw the logic of my arguments, and I felt Gorbachev, too, was being persuaded by them. But he didn’t want to be pushed into making a decision today, and clearly a part of him would still like to delay going down such a definitive path. I think that’s why he suggested a kind of interim step: pass two resolutions. The first would warn Saddam that if he didn’t withdraw by a certain date, we’d pass a second one that would effectively authorize the use of force. 11. While noting that we he was clearly trying to be responsive, I said I saw several problems: – Our original UNSC resolution 660 called for immediate withdrawal. Now we’d be passing a resolution tht [sic] gave him some time to do so. This would actually look like a retreat from our earlier position. – Having passed the first resolution, what if we couldn’t get the second resolution. Procedurally, we probably couldn’t get both resolutions through this month and we might have real problems once Yemen was in the chair. Substantively, Saddam might pull back partially or for the first time offer a realistic, if unacceptable, partial deal as a way of undercutting consensus behind the use of force. – If we never got to the second resolution, we would have shot our wad and be finished trying to work through the UNSC. That would have the effect of destroying the UNSC as a credible mechanism for pre-empting, managing, or settling conflicts in this new era. 12. Gorbachev’s response was to say, well it was just a thought, and he needed to think more about this. Shevardnadze later tried to say that we might formally link the two resolutions, making the second one “predetermined” if Saddam had not pulled out by a certain date. Interestingly, Tarasenko argued against his boss saying you couldn’t guarantee such a linkage, you’d look feckless if you couldn’t deliver the second resolution, and this would in all 292

likelihood ensure a move away from the UNSC and to the use of Article 51 to liberate Kuwait. 13. The upshot: they want to look at options and get back to us before Paris. I emphasized we didn’t want to push them but we needed to be able to act while we had the chair at the UNSC and if no decision were made until Paris we might not have time afterwards. 14. My own sense is that in the end they will go along with us. Gorbachev made a real point of saying they’d stick with us. And he emphasized the importance of acting under UNSC authorization, not Article 51, particularly because it would ensure our continued unity. As I said several times, we saw the extraordinary value of them participating with us if force was needed, but understood their problems (internal preoccupation, Afghan syndrome) with not doing so. It would be far harder for us to understand their blocking us from the clearly preferred option of a UNSC resolution. They got the point, and I believe their stake in good relations and desire for partnership with us will lead them in the right direction. But it may take some time and effort to get there. Other Issues and Impressions 15. Gorbachev and the national holiday. Gorbachev seemed buoyed by the lack of serious violence or counter-demonstrations yesterday. He didn’t mention the incident on Red Square and Shevardnadze downplayed it. Gorbachev felt that the real “silent majority” (his words) had spoken yesterday by not heeding the calls for counter-demonstrations. I wonder if this is wishful thinking or an accurate reading, particularly because I had the sense that the threat of crackdowns and violence might have diminished the crowds. 16. Gorbachev’s hints at the need to impose order. Gorbachev spoke of the need to create tolerance and that this might be the key to achieving a market economy. However, he also said there was a yearning for order and stability and said some “tough steps might be needed. We couldn’t sacrifice the reform process for the sake of someone’s ambitions or accept the disintegration of our society.” He said a fine line had to be maintained between moving forward and preserving stability. I noted that was a line that was very important to maintain. While he said it was important to reject the conservative ability to exploit the desire for stability, I was uneasy about the tone and direction of these comments. I don’t know if they presage some kind of crackdown, but we will have to watch the situation closely. 17. Getting food from the outside for the winter. Gorbachev noted a paradox: moving toward the market had led collective farmers to withhold their produce from certain areas and cities, requiring the center to hold food reserves as a kind of insurance policy. He would be going to the Germans and other Europeans for emergency food supplies on a credit or grant basis for this purpose. He said he might be coming to us once he knew his needs better. He’d be interested in soybeans, among other things, and we may want to look at what we could do if we decide to be responsive. 293

18. Arms control. I think we’ve finally closed out the nettlesome CFE issues. But every time you think you’ve settled everything, something else crops up. In any case, I think—and hope—we’ve finally done it. On START, we closed out the non-circumvention issue, and may, with some effort, be able to resolve the remaining issues in our next ministerial. That would put us on track for a January Summit. (Gorbachev is eager to nail down the Summit date, but joked that a mid-January Summit might be especially interesting given what we might be doing in the Gulf at that time.) Baker #4037 [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA request 2009-0275S and 98-0099-F/3 by the National Security Archive. (Original in Brent Scowcroft Collection, Special Separate USSR Notes File, Gorbachev Files, Folder: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July-December 1990 [2].)]

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Document No. 46: Record of the Main Content of Conversation between Gorbachev and Bush, Paris November 19, 1990

An interesting aspect of this one-on-one conversation, occurring on the margins of the Paris CSCE summit, is that neither Gorbachev nor Bush mentions the grand themes of European integration or the common European home, which has been Gorbachev’s highest aspiration. Instead, they focus on their immediate priorities—the domestic situation in the USSR and the war in the Persian Gulf. This is a moment where both leaders need each other probably more than ever. Gorbachev essentially warns Bush that he is going to introduce “methods resembling harsh administrative measures” for restoring order in the country, especially to deal with economic crimes, saying that even President Roosevelt had to take similar steps. He tells Bush about his recent speech to the Supreme Soviet and the deputies’ approval of his proposals dealing with “order and discipline,” even “presidential rule, a presidential system, where executive power will be directly under the president’s control.” This is exactly what Shevardnadze will warn about when he resigns unexpectedly in the end of December, “the coming dictatorship.” Although not endorsing it directly, Bush reacts with understanding, raising only the issue of the Baltics. He tries to persuade Gorbachev to let the Baltic republics leave the Union and not resort to violence there. After discussing the Soviet internal situation, Bush asks to “turn to the most difficult, festering issue”: the Persian Gulf. Now, as never before, Bush needs Gorbachev to ensure a U.N. Security Council resolution on the use of force. This request goes against Gorbachev’s often-expressed preference to avoid violence in the Gulf and could be damaging for him domestically because of the strong opposition to military action among the Soviet leadership. Bush uses all his power of persuasion to sway Gorbachev to lend his support. He confides that he wanted to speak in private in order to “pour out my heart to you.” He insists that he does not want to use force either. Gorbachev eventually agrees, in part because it is important for him to manage the Gulf conflict strictly within the U.N. framework where the USSR has veto power. The conversation is filled with assurances of partnership and the future possibilities of U.S.-Soviet relations. In fact, after the Soviets vote in favor of the U.N. resolution, Gorbachev is never genuinely consulted about the course of action in the Gulf, while the United States mainly restricts its consultations to its NATO partners and Saudi Arabia.

[…] Bush: I think that the decision to award you the Nobel Peace Prize, which was received very warmly in the United States, also represents an expression of confidence that you would be able to find answers to all the hard questions that you are faced with. 295

[…] You are living through a difficult time. Of course, I don’t want to interfere in your internal affairs in any way, but let me say this: we will try to do all we can to help you in this difficult cause. Gorbachev: Thank you. You are right when you say that we are living through a difficult time. But it cannot be otherwise, if we are really changing, implementing cardinal transformation of our society. There is no road back, notwithstanding all the problems and underwater rocks that we discovered. I constantly say to my colleagues and to our citizens: we should look for answers to our problems by moving forward, not by casting backward glances. However, the rate of transformation, the speed of the movement, the priorities are a different issue. Here one has to think. Each country has its own priorities, and even each of our republics differs from the others, has its own distinctive features. But we all must move forward, in the understanding that we don’t have much time. Henceforth—the need for decisive actions. What is the utmost concern of our society right now? First of all it is instability—economic, political, and in the interethnic sphere. That is why people more and more express themselves in favor of stability, for decisive actions of the authorities, for strengthening of the government, so that we do not lose everything that we achieved in the years of perestroika and the democratic reforms. That is why to some extent, sometimes, we have to use methods resembling harsh administrative measures, so that we do not allow the unfolding processes to turn to chaos. Everybody had to turn to such methods at the sharp turns of history, including President Roosevelt. How did events unfold recently? I was working on measures for a transition to a market economy, stabilization of the monetary-financial sphere, speeding up the discussions of the union treaty and restructuring of the power structures. But after the two-week parliamentary recess for the anniversary of the revolution, the deputies came back from their electoral districts, where constituents gave them a thrashing, and immediately they demanded to change the agenda of the Supreme Soviet, and to discuss the issue of the situation in the country. They stated that they wanted to hear the president, and I agreed to speak to them on the next day. My testimony contained an assessment of the situation and proposals about how to move forward. The deputies agreed with my assessment, but not quite with the proposals. They saw them as insufficient. After listening to them for the whole day, I sensed that people wanted more decisive, even harsh, steps, without waiting for the new union treaty or other decisions. I already had ideas about what specifically had to be done, but I thought I would introduce them a bit later. But there I saw that I had to propose them now; that I could not wait. I worked all night on my speech, where I presented eight points, which we need to implement urgently. One hundred fifty people signed up to speak. You could feel great tension in the room. I asked for the floor. The room fell silent. After I gave a short speech, the room was silent at first, and then broke into applause. Bush: We saw it on television. It made a very good impression. What will happen now? 296

Gorbachev: We will be moving in the same direction as we did before, but we will carry out serious organizational changes. In essence, we are talking about presidential rule, a presidential system, where executive power will be directly under the president’s control. New structures will be created—economic, political, oversight—to ensure this. Bush: And what would Yeltsin’s place in this [system] be? Would it strengthen your position in relation to the Russian republic? Gorbachev: You know, in our society, people are mainly in favor of political stabilization; they reject those who rock the boat. And one more thing—in all the republics people speak in favor of the union more and more decisively. And people raise the question—what is preventing cooperation between Gorbachev and Yeltsin? I answer them honestly—nothing is preventing it. There is a great objective need for such cooperation now. People tell us—if you cannot agree [with each other], you are not good for anything. Yeltsin built his reputation on negativity. People used to say—good job, he criticizes Gorbachev himself. However, now he has power, he has authority and, accordingly, responsibilities. And people are asking: what has changed? And he continues to blame the Center for all the problems. Bush: As if he does not have to do anything himself. Gorbachev: I think the society must sort it out. The strengthening of the presidential power is intended for stabilization of the situation in the country and circumscribing the opportunities for destructive forces. The new government will comprise reasonable, capable people regardless of any external circumstances. I will try to include him [Yeltsin] in this process. Unfortunately, around him, and also in the Moscow City Soviet and in Leningrad City Soviet, there are many windbags, who are not capable of doing anything. If not for the Center’s assistance, Moscow and Leningrad would be in trouble. Bush: For us it is hard to understand. We have a clear division of powers between the center and the states. We understand what you want to achieve: to preserve order and unity, which are necessary for the republics. And when that man sends his foreign minister and trade delegations everywhere, announcing that he couldn’t care less about the Center, we just simply do not understand that. Gorbachev: I told him that he must state clearly his position regarding the preservation of our Union. He then said that he had already spoken in that regard. But I said that such a statement was necessary, and finally he agreed and made an appropriate statement. But double morality is unacceptable. You cannot be saying one thing and doing another thing. I think that those structural changes that we will implement will force him to define his position faster: either we work together or one will have to leave. And that’s what’s interesting: as soon as I raised the issue of order and discipline in my speech, literally on the next day Moscow stores started to fill up. This means that there were manipulations, actions by the mafia. Now we will deal with it seriously. 297

As soon as we get home, we intend to publish the draft of the Union Treaty, which will delineate clearly the powers of the Center and the republics. Bush: The text of the speech prepared for me for this conference included references to Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. However, after I read the text, I left out those references. I understood that this could put you in an awkward situation. As you know, the United States had never recognized inclusion of those republics into the USSR. And when you talk about preservation of the Union, I recall Camp David where we discussed this question. You said then that your Constitution provides for a possibility of an orderly transition to independence for republics. And although I did not mention this issue in my speech, I hope that you understand that we have many people of Baltic origin in the United States and we hope that you will be able to ensure orderly progress in the process of self-determination. I repeat, I understood your problems and I did not want to add to them from outside. But we hope that it would be possible to find a way, which would allow [them] to carry out such a process of self-determination. What do you think about this? Gorbachev: Lately we have been consulting often and extensively about the Union Treaty. At the same time, we started certain processes with the Baltics, and the current situation there is quite interesting. The situation there has worsened lately. The positions of the existing authorities are in danger. In Latvia and Lithuania the press launched a campaign of criticism. They sharply criticize Landsbergis, especially after he stated that he wants to get back his father’s property. Peasants, workers, leading representatives of intelligentsia express sharp disapproval. The president of the republican Academy of Sciences spoke out recently. People tell the authorities: it was better under the communists—and you are scroungers, self-seekers, you are good for nothing, just grabbing cars, dachas and other things. Meanwhile, even worse extremists, people who collaborated with Hitler in their time, and their children are lurking behind the backs of the present authorities. All in all, we have a lot of information that the situation there is close to an explosion. Bush: But isn’t it a fact that practically the entire population there is in favor of independence? Or, let’s put it this way—that the majority would like to see their republics independent sooner or later? Gorbachev: Not in a single republic does the leadership want to hold a referendum on this issue. Not even in Lithuania, where 80% of the population is Lithuanian. Bush: You mean they are not confident that everybody would support them? Gorbachev: Yes. We will publish the draft of the Union treaty, and when the treaty is ready, the republics will sign it. And then we will start a “divorce procedure” with those who will not sign. Bush: In the framework of your Constitution? Gorbachev: Precisely. Bush: Now I suggest we turn to the most difficult, festering issue: the situation in the Persian Gulf. Jim Baker and Eduard Shevardnadze have been 298

discussing this problem in depth. You graciously received the secretary of state in Moscow. We take your position very seriously. I understand your words that we need prudence, patience and restraint. A couple of days ago, when I was Chancellor Kohl’s guest, I visited his native town, where you were recently. And then I visited one of our military bases and looked into the eyes of our boys, who are young enough to be our kids or grandkids. And I thought: how I wish they did not have to go into battle. I think that you too, when you took office, had the same feeling when you looked at the young Soviet soldiers. I need your help on this issue. We have to get a U.N. resolution passed that would authorize the necessary measures, namely the use of force, in order to persuade Saddam Hussein that he must fulfill the demands of the United Nations. Frankly speaking, I do not see any other way to persuade him that he must do what the entire world demands of him. We are dealing with a hard, unpredictable person. In terms of cruelty, he is right up there with Hitler. You know, I got in trouble for comparing him to Hitler. But looking at it, even Hitler did not block foreign embassies and did not use people as human shields. And when many American Jews said to me that one cannot compare Saddam to a person who was guilty of mass extermination of an entire nation, I responded that today they surrounded the American Embassy, tomorrow it might be somebody else’s [embassy], not even mentioning the hostages—here he does not show mercy to any country. I want you to know: in the United States right now the mood on this issue is not completely clear-cut. But if you look at the opinion polls, half of those who do not approve of my actions, believe that I should have attacked earlier. You add to those the 60% of Americans who support me, and you see solid support. But I do not want to use force. However, I came to the conclusion that such a resolution is necessary. And thinking about how we want to build our relationship in the future, I believe that your support would serve as strong proof of our partnership. This is why I am asking you to help me. And not even me so much—who knows, in two years, somebody else could become president. I am asking you to help do what is just. If you cannot give me your final answer right away, I would be prepared to understand you, but still, please keep in mind that your answer is extremely important for us. Our two countries were opponents, but today we are working together. If you cannot help me in this case, we will still interact. But I am asking you to help [us] send this signal to Saddam. We believe that this would be sufficient to make Saddam do everything that is required of him. I wanted to talk about this to you in private, not in the presence of our colleagues, for two reasons: to pour out my heart to you and to avoid putting you in a situation where you would have to give a final answer right now. Gorbachev: I have thought it all over—our conversation with Baker, and your letter, Mr. President. This moment is exceptionally important not just for both of 299

us, but also for everything that we started to do in the world. If we do not prove now that we are capable, at this new stage of global development, of dealing with this kind of problem, it would mean that what we started does not mean all that much. If you and I are not capable to stop aggression, annexation, blatant violation of international law, it means that we are not doing what we should. No, we must prove the opposite, and that means that we must find a solution to this problem. This is first and most important. Second. Due to the choice that we made in the Soviet Union (and I believe that you made a similar choice in the United States), we do not want to see the United States and its president in a difficult, critical situation. And if in this situation we part our ways, take separate roads, that would mean that we have not achieved much in our relations. Although, of course, in the future, we will probably have differences, and then we will have to sit down at a table and discuss them. But in this case, I am convinced, we must stay together with you. In my heart of hearts, probably just like you, I very much want to avoid blood, avoid losses, avoid American boys being killed, because such bloodshed would be a blow against the U.S. president. And it would also be very bad for regular Arabs. That is why we prefer decisively that this settlement should be achieved without spilling blood. And I start from the assumption that you are also in favor of this. Because if the war starts, it could be much worse than Vietnam. This is the dilemma that we must resolve. On the one hand—to try to avoid a military solution. On the other—to undertake one more step that would increase the pressure on Saddam Hussein. When I was talking with Jim in Moscow, I implored him not to take the road of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. We have to determine clearly that we would be acting strictly with the U.N. framework. This is very important. Maybe for some part of the U.S. public opinion, this is not so clear. They may say why bother with the United Nations, with the Security Council, while Saddam Hussein is getting more insolent and is treating the United States like an insignificant state that can be forced to its knees. But I think that the position that you and I took is the right and responsible position. Thus, after comprehensive thinking and analysis, we came to the conclusion that we should agree to passing of a U.N. Security Council resolution. We believe that this should be a two-tier resolution, so to say, that it should combine your proposal and mine. The first part should contain essentially an ultimatum to Iraq to fulfill the U.N. resolutions. But we will give him a deadline, give him one last chance to change his mind. In the second part, it will say that in case this requirement is not fulfilled, all appropriate measures could be taken to restore justice. We agree that such a resolution should be passed while you still hold the chairmanship of the Security Council. In addition, we believe that during the period when the ultimatum is in force, we need to undertake a number of steps. I think our countries should find a possibility to meet with the Iraqi leadership at some level, for example at the level of 300

foreign ministers, and present them with our demands: you must leave Kuwait, free the people, otherwise the mechanism will be put into force, which would truly put you on your knees. Another option [would be] to send Peres de Cuellar with this message, as it was done during the Iran-Iraq war. However, this option appears to be weaker than the direct bilateral approach. Bush: This bilateral approach, seems to me, has big advantages. What do you think should the term of the ultimatum be? Gorbachev: Let us say, until the middle of January. After that, it would be permitted to use all appropriate means, and there would be no need for passing one more resolution. This would create a bridge to further actions, and this decision would be made while the United States still holds the chairmanship of the Security Council. About China’s position. We see that the Chinese are starting to maneuver. However, I do not think that they would veto the proposed resolution. Bush: I think that if you and I take this approach, then the Chinese will follow us. You know that we have problems with the Chinese, but we start from the assumption that the Chinese do not want to be in isolation. Gorbachev: It seems to me that you should lift the sanctions against China. Bush: There are some legal problems here. I vetoed the congressional resolutions directed against China. And so far, I was able to defend my position. In general, I agree with you, but in our crazy system … Gorbachev: Now not only yours. Bush: In any case, if you are talking with the Chinese, tell them that our administration is persistently aspiring to normalize relations. Cooperation in the U.N. framework will allow us to do even more in this direction. I highly appreciate the position that you presented. I am very happy that we are coming to an agreement. We will act tactfully so that we can take your considerations into account as we develop the draft resolution. Such a resolution, formulated appropriately, will become a powerful signal and will allow us to save people’s lives, lives of American soldiers. I do not want war. Gorbachev: I think that such a two-tier resolution, in combination with our additional steps, will force Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait. As far as the actual language is concerned, I think that we should not use the words “military force” in the resolution. And Shevardnadze and Baker should discuss which concrete steps we would undertake so that we would not be just sitting there with our hands in our laps. Besides, I think we should restrain all kinds of travelers and make sure the Iraqis understand that they will have to deal only with those who adopted the U.N. resolutions. Bush: As far as military force is concerned, it must be clear from the formulation that it is not excluded. To tell you the truth, I am not a lawyer and I do not understand clearly what is the difference between the words “necessary” and “appropriate” measures. Gorbachev: Formulations should be such that Saddam would understand everything. 301

Bush: Thank you, I am very grateful [to you] for your position. What are we going to tell the press? Gorbachev: I think that first of all, we should confirm our line based on principle. The aggression must be repelled, and we intend to achieve this, acting within the framework of the United Nations, of its Security Council. Bush: What are we going to say specifically about our conversation? Gorbachev: We carried out a very serious exchange of opinions, analyzed the situation and came to the conclusion that our common approach has been and remains correct. We agreed that we should keep working together in the future, working within the framework of the U.N. Security Council in such a way that the aggressor does not get any leniency or reward. We came to the conclusion that in the nearest future, the situation should be addressed again in the framework of the U.N. Security Council. And we don’t have to mention the resolution yet. Bush: I agree. I would like to say a couple of words about the conversation that you had with Jim Baker in Moscow. As far as I understand, you might soon need urgent assistance with food products and medicines. I am fully and wholeheartedly in favor of providing such assistance. I want you to know this. If need arises, we will be ready to act. Gorbachev: Thank you, Mr. President. Bush: Now I think we can join our colleagues, tell them about the results of our conversation and end this evening with a friendly dinner. [Source: Gorbachev Foundation Archive, Fond 1, Opis 1. Published in Gor­ ba­chev, Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 23, p. 176–181. Translated by Svetlana Sav­ran­skaya.]

302

Document No. 47: Record of the Main Content of Conversation between Gorbachev and Bush, Paris November 20, 1990

This brief conversation takes place during a break in the European summit in Paris. Gorbachev has just received a report from his Middle East envoy, Yevgeny Primakov, about Saddam Hussein’s new willingness to negotiate with Bush in order to delay passage of the U.N. resolution on use of force.

Gorbachev: To continue our yesterday’s conversation, I would like to let you know that I received a telegram from Ye. M. Primakov, in which he informs me about S. Hussein’s new step. S. Hussein expresses his readiness to repeal his decision about freeing Western and Japanese hostages in “groups” over three months and to free them all at the same time. He is also ready to start any negotiations with G. Bush. The only precondition that he sets is that Iraq would be guaranteed access to deep-water areas of the Persian Gulf. Bush: This is an interesting report. It is clear that his precondition about the deep-water areas of the Gulf will create difficulties. Our ministers are having a separate conversation right now. Do they have this information? Gorbachev: No. I will send it to them right now. You and I will exchange opinions after they discuss this issue. Bush: I agree. [Source: Gorbachev Foundation Archive, Fond 1, Opis 1. Published in Gor­ba­ chev, Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 23, p. 185. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.]

303

Document No. 48: Letter from Gorbachev to Bush December 27, 1990

Gorbachev writes this letter to Bush after Shevardnadze’s sudden resignation, in order to try to assure the U.S. president of the continuity of the relationship they have built. In his resignation speech, Shevardnadze warned of a coming dictatorship. He resigned partly in response to Gorbachev’s turn to the right and a government reshuffling, but also because for the last three months he believed he had increasingly lost Gorbachev’s trust on the Persian Gulf and other issues. In the letter, Gorbachev expresses his deep regret over his former foreign minister’s decision, describing what he sees as his aide’s inability to withstand criticism. He makes no mention of administrative measures, having already warned Bush about the coming expansion of presidential power during their conversation in November (see Document 115).

Dear George, In the spirit of the friendly and trusting relationship that has developed between ourselves, I consider it to be my duty to convey to you some explanations concerning Eduard’s resignation. It has caused great agitation within the world public opinion and in the political quarters, a lot of guesses and, frankly, speculations that go far beyond this truly unfortunate episode. I said right there at the Congress—and you are aware of it—that to me his statement was totally unexpected. This is really so and this is what was particularly upsetting—not only because of his act of disloyalty to the President—the fact that he did so without consulting and without telling me in advance, his old friend and comrade, has no justification. That he was extremely tired, that the terrible workload had worn him out, that he, as we say, was giving it his damnedest without sparing one bit of himself and at some point broke down—all that is true, and therefore one would like to be sympathetic to what he did, but there is no way I can approve of it. Whatever criticism there had been voiced against the Foreign Minister regarding the policies for which he had, after the President, the foremost responsibility, be that the criticism from Parliamentarians or from socio-political groups, and still less by certain media organs and all kinds of extremists and demagogues, did not justify such a reaction on the part of Eduard. Criticism, including unjustified, unfair criticism, even one that hurts, is something which is inevitable in a democratic society to which we have resolved to aspire. You, George, know this better than I, and if everyone is going to resign in response to criticism, no serious policy, especially at a crucial, extremely difficult and turbulent stage in a society’s development, will actually be possible to pursue. I talked with Eduard, even though I realized that he would not be able to go back on his resignation, for it would be a loss of face for him, an impossible 304

thing to do, given his sense of honor and dignity. I value very highly his contribution to our new foreign policy, to working out and implementing cardinal decisions, above all those concerning US-Soviet relationship, thanks to which you and I were able, within a short period of time, to change the very nature of world politics, the entire international atmosphere—both in Europe and in other major parts of the world. I believe those have been historic accomplishments on the path toward a peaceful period of our civilization, and I hope they are irreversible. I also greatly appreciate Eduard’s role as a man of initiative and courage and as a consistent advocate of a profound internal perestroika which is proceeding with such difficulties at home. In both of those roles I shall be missing him very much, although I don’t believe he is going to leave the political scene altogether, but, rather, will assume a position of authority within those new government structures which are now being considered by the Congress of People’s Deputies. I cannot as yet tell you who the new Foreign Minister will be. Haven’t decided myself yet. But of one thing you can be absolutely firmly assured—our policy course, the new thinking policy course toward strengthening trust and cooperation between the leadership of both our countries shall remain unchanged in terms of substance as in form. This goes for our bilateral relations. This goes for the European process. This goes for all the arms control and security issues. This goes for the Persian Gulf and all other things on which you and I have both understanding and agreement. Everything stands unchanged. I would have no objection, if you thought you could tell Jim about my letter. Give him my kindest regards. Taking this opportunity, I am sending you and all your wonderful family my sincere greetings for the New Year and, as I think I can now also add, Christmas greetings. I hope we shall exchange our televised New Year messages to each other’s people. All the scheduling concerning preparations for our meeting in Moscow remains without change. I will be happy to give you here a friendly welcome. Sincerely yours, M.GORBACHEV [Source: George H.W. Bush Library.]

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Document No. 49: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush-Gorbachev, 8:02 a.m. – 8:25 a.m. January 11, 1991

Gorbachev initiates this call to bring Bush up to date on events in Moscow, including recent budget discussions in the Supreme Soviet that resulted in 20 percent overall cuts and a major reduction in military spending. His real priorities, however, are Lithuania and the U.N. Security Council deadline of January 15 for an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. Bush implores Gorbachev not to use force against nationalist movements in the republics and Gorbachev agrees, but adds, “we only intervene when the situations threaten the lives of people.” His careful words indicate that the possibility of violence is being discussed within the Soviet leadership where Gorbachev is under pressure to introduce presidential rule to crack down on opposition. Just two days later Lithuania would erupt as troops fired on demonstrators, killing 15 people. Turning to the Persian Gulf, Gorbachev—perhaps paradoxically—is still attempting to forestall the impending use of force. He offers to send another personal envoy to Saddam Hussein after clearing specific ideas with Bush. The latter agrees to meet with Alexander Bessmertnykh, about to replace Shevardnadze as foreign minister, to hear the Soviets’ proposals, but he is “not optimistic about avoiding the use of force.” Bush remains firm regarding the January 15 deadline and fears that Saddam will use discussions with a Soviet envoy to circumvent the date.

The President: How are you sir? President Gorbachev: Hello George. I wanted to call. I think that all of us are very busy. The President: Very, very. How are things there? We’ve been very busy with the Gulf. President Gorbachev: Well, things are moving now and we finally have a budget. We had to work hard to get an economic agreement with all the republics, but we have finally done it. The President: That’s good. President Gorbachev: In the process of adopting the budget, we adopted cuts of approximately 20%. The Supreme Soviet has reduced the military budget by 20 million rubles, so I can report that we are disarming. The President: Very interesting. President Gorbachev: We have been working hard to analyze critically all the parts of the budget, and I myself worked very hard on it for a month. We have done a lot of work. In addition, in our movement to a market economy in order to maintain economic links with the various republics we have completed the process for the required agreements on food supply and economics. 306

Tomorrow I will chair a meeting of the Council of the Federation. We will begin to discuss candidates for the Prime Minister and his deputies and also take further steps to work on the Union Treaty. We have some problems in the Baltics, particularly in Lithuania, and also in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh, which you know. We are doing all that is possible to avoid sharp turns and radical steps, but it is a difficult situation. But now, bearing in mind that we are on an open line, I want to make a proposal about the Persian Gulf. But first maybe you would like to say something. The President: I am so hopeful that you can avoid the use of force. You know our position on that; we’ve talked about it many times. Your relations with all of the outside world would be better if you can avoid the use of force—I think you know this. President Gorbachev: George, this is what we’ve been trying to do. We only intervene when the situation threatens the lives of the people. Now I and also the Supreme Soviet are under a lot of pressure. People are demanding I introduce Presidential rule. So far I have been trying to avoid that. Well, let me say that frankly the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania and especially Mr. Landsbergis seem not capable of any movement. Also, I sent a letter to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet asking them to restore constitutional law. Lithuania has taken no action so far. Today the news is quite bad. There are demonstrations and strikes. You know what my style is in such matters, it is much like your style. I will do all I can to take such steps to reach a political solution. The President: I appreciate that. We look at it through the different eyes of history, but I appreciate your trying to explain it to me now. President Gorbachev: Well, we will be acting in a very responsible manner. But it is not all within our control. Today there was even some shooting. The President: Oh my God. President Gorbachev: Let me say that I will do my best in order that extremes are avoided in this situation. But only then will I take such steps. The President: What are your thoughts on the Gulf, Mikhail? President Gorbachev: George, I wanted to ask you something. In Hussein’s letter to me, in answer to one I sent to him, I felt that he is ready to listen to Moscow. He asks for my advice. If I do something in this regard, I want to do it in close coordination with you. I know Shevardnadze is in close touch with Jim Baker. So if you do not object, I could take a step, I could send a personal envoy with some ideas. If you think this is a useful thing to do, I could send someone. Or I could send Mr. Bessmertnykh to talk to you in private to tell you my ideas. The President: My reservations are about the date January 15. I talked to de Cuellar, and impressed on him that it would be bad if Saddam Hussein could delay a final decision past January 15. The 15th is a real date, and I think that he’ll try hard to talk to get past that date. What concerns me about a personal envoy is the timing rather than the substance. President Gorbachev: George, maybe we’ll do this. You’ll have a look at those ideas. Bessmertnykh could tell them to you today, and if you agree with them, I could send an envoy tonight. 307

The President: Well, that’s wonderful. We’ll see him today, we’ll wait for him to call or we’ll call him, whatever you think best. President Gorbachev: Okay, well after that if we agree, we’ll decide on timing. The President: Thank you. We’ll wait for Bessmertnykh and get back in touch with you. Thank you for this cooperation. Mikhail, one other thing, I am not optimistic about avoiding the use of force. I have been optimistic, but not after the de Cuellar mission. In any event we should all be looking for ways to peace. I will be delighted to talk to Bessmertnykh, and I will look at those ideas, but that’s my assessment. President Gorbachev: George, we will work together. Looking at the whole spectrum, I am against working in an uncoordinated way. We will use very strong language with Saddam Hussein. We must stay optimistic. The United States and the USSR can do many good things together. The President: Well, we’ll look forward to talking with Mr. Bessmertnykh. But we can’t let him stand up to the opinion of the rest of the world. President Gorbachev: I agree. The President: Thanks so much for calling. I look forward to seeing your ambassador. Good night. President Gorbachev: Thank you. Good bye. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through Mandatory Review request 2004-1937-MR by the National Security Archive.]

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Document No. 50: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, 9:23 a.m. – 10:34 a.m. January 18, 1991

Gorbachev calls Bush a day after the United States launches Operation Desert Storm, starting with a massive aerial bombardment campaign against Iraq. Hours before the call, Iraq attacked Israel with Scud missiles, raising the prospect of direct Israeli involvement in the conflict. At the start of the conversation, Gorbachev fully agrees with the necessity of using force against Saddam Hussein and reaffirms his commitment to Iraq’s compliance with all U.N. resolutions. However, Gorbachev is very concerned about the loss of life, especially civilians, if the bombing continues. He believes that Saddam is already weakened enough that he would not represent a threat to the region and that now is the time to pause the bombing and allow Iraq an opportunity to withdraw from Kuwait. Gorbachev has asked his ambassador to Iraq to make the following offer to Saddam Hussein: if he agrees to withdraw all troops from Kuwait, there will be a pause to allow him to do so. Gorbachev believes that in that situation he and Bush would be able to “continue U.N. Security Council cooperation and new security structures in the Middle East.” Bush is highly skeptical about a bombing halt now, believing it would weaken coalition resolve and leave Iraq with a partial victory, especially after the strikes on Israel the previous day. He tells the Soviet leader the move “may be premature” and would even “put an end to the new world order you and I want.” Referring to the Baltics, where Soviet paratroopers cracked down on nationalist protests on January 12 and 13, Bush, rather than trying to put pressure on Gorbachev, says, “I really empathize with you this week. … We are so hopeful the Baltic situation can be resolved peacefully.”

The President: Mikhail, how are you? President Gorbachev: George, good afternoon and greetings. This is not a simple time for both of us. The President: No, it is not. It is a very complicated time. President Gorbachev: Yes, indeed. It is almost the end of the day in Moscow and getting dark. It is morning in Washington. The President: Yes. It is 9:20 a.m. in the morning. President Gorbachev: Well, I would, of course, like to engage first in a discussion of the Persian Gulf situation. The President: I would be glad to fill you in from our end. I also welcome any thoughts from yours. President Gorbachev: First of all, I would like to say that our doubts, yours and mine, about Saddam Hussein have proven right. He is the kind of person against whom force is necessary. I have a full understanding of this burden to the nations of the world. Now, casualties have occurred and the situation is developing. We have to think about what to do next. 309

The President: That is true. I hope we can all agree on full compliance with the U.N. resolutions. President Gorbachev: In my statement, I reaffirmed our position of principle. I said Saddam Hussein was to blame, and that war had become inevitable. I said it would be necessary for Iraq to leave Kuwait and comply with the U.N. resolutions. The President: I thought it was an outstanding statement. President Gorbachev: Now that war is beginning, our number one priority should be to shorten it and make sure it does not spread. The President: I worry about that, too. When Saddam Hussein fired the missiles on Israel, he was trying from his side to make the war spread. President Gorbachev: Yes, and I think your position is good. Your advice to the Israelis was timely, appropriate and right. The President: We are trying to figure out what they might do. I hope it does not encourage the war to spread and draw others into it. President Gorbachev: Yes, indeed. I think this is precisely what Saddam Hussein wants to see. The President: We are worried about the Jordan equation, Mikhail. I want to know what you think about that. President Gorbachev: Mr. President, let me first share with you my thinking on further steps. The President: Please. I’d be delighted to hear them. President Gorbachev: First of all. Two days of powerful military action have moved the situation to a new phase. Saddam Hussein before that showed ambitious and threatening behavior and contempt for the U.S., U.N. and the USSR. Now we can speak of his political defeat. This is my first point. The second point is that with the enormous damage done, the irreparable damage to the military and industrial potential of Iraq, now we have a different Iraq. Any ambition to dictate its will in the region has no material basis. And I believe that an important victory has been achieved. That is a victory that is important for you domestically and important for the world. The aggressor has been taught a lesson. And I think that now, George, think about this. What is the purpose of continuing military action? The cost of bombing and air missions and participation of the land forces would mean many more casualties among the American forces and victims among the c­ ivilians in Iraq. I understand you don’t want that, not only among American troops, but it would mean a major loss of life among civilians. The President: Exactly. I feel strongly about that. President Gorbachev: This is a very important statement. So now what can we have if the strikes continue, strikes against people. This military action could change the character of the war. And I don’t underrate Saddam Hussein. He may still have some land military capability. Based on all this today, in the middle of the day, I instructed my Ambassador in Baghdad to get in touch with Saddam Hussein and to ask him a question. My 310

question is: if there is a pause in the full development of the military option, would he be able to state he would leave Kuwait. I asked for an urgent answer. In the meantime, I wanted to inform you about that contact. And my question to you is: if he agrees, although it is difficult to suppose he will do that, would you be ready to pause in the military option. And if Saddam Hussein rejects this proposal, I’ll publicly speak about this. People have to know with whom they are dealing. And I also know you are worried about the possibility if Saddam Hussein leaves Kuwait peacefully, that he will have a tremendous military potential to destabilize the Middle East. But that has been taken care of. And in that new situation, we could continue U.N. Security Council cooperation and new security structures in the Middle East. This is what I was going to say. The President: Let me respond in some detail. In the first place, we have no evidence that he’ll accept this offer of yours. Secondly, the concept that the military superiority that has given him arrogance in the Middle East has been resolved is not correct. A lot of his military power is still intact. He could continue to dominate his neighbors. What we would have to consider carefully at any time in the cessation of hostilities is the following: would the cessation of hostilities make a hero of him in the Middle East? At this juncture, his having attacked Israel and the continued use of the SCUDS and the Republican Guards make me feel he could claim victory out of the rubble of defeat. There is another point that would concern me. The coalition forces at this juncture are highly motivated, including the Arab participants. They would feel a cessation now would clearly be a victory for Saddam Hussein. It would put them in an extraordinarily weakened position in my view. They would see this as the one thing we said we wouldn’t do—compromise. They would see Saddam Hussein, though weakened, with a military still intact, his ground forces in particular. So I think this effort may be premature. But, Mikhail, let me add a personal note. I continually worry about the loss of life you talked about in your message today. But we have been so far very lucky in that category. By that I mean we are targeting carefully and going the extra mile to protect against the very attack he launched on Israel yesterday. The targeting specifically excludes religious sites, mosques and damage to hospitals, schools and population centers. It has been precise and our analysis so far is that we’ve been successful in that regard. But, so nobody likes this. There is no joy in what is happening at all. I think we’re now in a position to solve this problem. But I must say I really feel we have got to stay the course until it is abundantly clear that he will unilaterally and without concessions or conciliation leave Kuwait. I would be interested in what your Ambassador learns. I hate to hold out hope to Saddam Hussein and would not want to hold out hope that talks or negotiations about this would satisfy the coalition. And what he did yesterday in attacking Israel with city-busting weapons, that complicates things. If the fighting 311

stopped this minute, he would say the attack on Israel brought the war to an end and made him victorious. That would put an end to the new world order you and I want. He would march out and say that striking Israel had brought the war to an end. Instead of being the humiliated braggart, he would be the victor, and others would see that. I am thinking of Egypt when I say that. That is my thinking. I think it accurately reflects the thinking of the coalition partners, but I haven’t talked to them about what you have mentioned to me, obviously. I think the other coalition partners would agree with what I’ve told you here today. None of us want to see a vacuum in Iraq, an Iraq so weak and impotent that it would be destabilizing. So weak that it would be subject to aggression from its neighbors. We don’t want to see that and we would work with you and others to stop that. In other words, we don’t want to wipe out Iraq. So I would— President Gorbachev: If you are through then a few words from me. The President: I welcome your thoughtfulness and your concerns. I encourage you to stay in touch. I thought you were entitled to a frank assessment of the situation. Please go ahead. President Gorbachev: First of all, I would repeat. We will be with you to the very end, committed to the end. We will maintain the same position on the Saddam Hussein regime. The fact that hostilities have begun, the blame is fully with Saddam Hussein. The difference between us is on the following. You believe Iraq retains a significant military power that could threaten its neighbors, and that it will not comply with the U.N. resolutions. But, please, George, consider the central point I am making in this conversation. The first phase of action against Saddam Hussein was fully justified and has brought practical, strategic results. We, you and I, agree that if Saddam Hussein had left Kuwait a week ago, talks could have begun. But first he had to leave. If he were to leave Kuwait now, he would be weakened, rendered powerless for many years to come. It would be a lesson to everyone. ([Illegible words] minutes later) The President: Mikhail, we were cut off some time ago. President Gorbachev: George, I thought communications was our problem, but it seems the U.S. has problems too. The President: Always, always. We can put a man on the moon but can’t talk to Moscow. President Gorbachev: Still, yours is better than ours. The President: I’m not so sure about that. President Gorbachev: What was the last point I was making? The President: You said we agreed if Saddam left completely, the talks could begin and he would be weakened. That was the last thing I heard. President Gorbachev: There are two possibilities. One, I assume that the U.N. resolutions are complied with. The other possibility is to use all forces and begin a new phase in hostilities. That means a greater loss of life. We must think of the long-term political consequences. We must think of the loss of opportunity. 312

So, George, my concern is that we make sure not to lose the opportunity now that we have attained strategic objectives. We have taught a lesson to the aggressor. Our new U.S.-Soviet cooperation, the spirit of our common values, means it is important to do the right thing. Stop in this phase. I am thinking about the casualties of U.S. forces and the loss of life among civilians and Iraqi soldiers. The President: I understand your concerns and share them. But I worry that if we stop short of full compliance with the U.N. resolutions, this man will pull victory out of the jaws of defeat. That would be a terrible example for the future. I agree with you on bloodshed. But I don’t think our objectives have been achieved yet. There is no evidence he will comply with the U.N. resolutions right now. He could do that this very minute if he wanted to. President Gorbachev: George, well I think there is no difference between you and me on the need for compliance. There is no doubt that is valid and in effect. And there are no cracks, there must be no cracks on this. And at the same time, I think that the President of the U.S. and the President of the USSR must think of how to get out of this situation. This new phase brings me to the conclusion that we can take steps, all of us. The President: Let’s stay in touch. I would be interested in what your Ambassador hears. We cannot end up in negotiations or conciliation. Please think what the attack on Israel last night did to this equation. It’s a whole new dimension. I saw the Soviet statement and thought it was good. Let’s think about it. Stay in touch. I agree with you that the Presidents of the U.S. and USSR must find a way to resolve this thing. One point of possible difference. Maybe you think he has been pounded more than we think. We think he still has a powerful military component in place. President Gorbachev: George, I think we have had a timely discussion. I hope we’ll talk again soon. The President: I appreciate the call. Let me add in conclusion that I really empathize with you this week. Let me simply reiterate what we said to your very able new Foreign Minister, Mr. Bessmertnykh. We are so hopeful the Baltic situation can be resolved peacefully. It would really complicate things. We want to clear up CFE and START and go the extra mile on those two. We’ve not lost interest in either of them. President Gorbachev: I take note of this very important point. I would like to shake your hand and hope to talk soon. The President: The phone lines are open. Call day or night. It doesn’t matter what time of day it is. Good luck to you on this and all the problems you have at home. President Gorbachev: Thank you. I shake your hand. The President: Good-bye. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library.]

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Document No. 51: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, 11:15 a.m. – 11:43 a.m. February 23, 1991

As the USSR celebrates Soviet Army Day, the United States is poised to begin the ground campaign to drive Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. In this last conversation just before the start of the invasion, Gorbachev still hopes to persuade Bush to delay the invasion, even for 24 to 48 hours, in order to convene the U.N. Security Council and prepare a joint resolution. He informs Bush that Saddam Hussein is now willing to withdraw from Kuwait City within four days. “That is to say, we have a white flag from Saddam Hussein.” But Bush has already given his ultimatum to the Iraqi leader and is not willing to backtrack. Despite Gorbachev’s plea—“George, let’s keep cool”—he explains that he has no flexibility, that the previous U.N. resolutions have been disregarded, and that unless something decisive happens in the next several minutes the ground attack will commence as announced. He praises Gorbachev’s role in attempting to resolve the crisis and appreciates his diplomatic efforts to avoid bloodshed but does not want to give him “a false impression that there is any more time.”

The President: Hello, Mikhail, how are you? President Gorbachev: Greetings. The President: Greetings. President Gorbachev: Fine, George. We have a holiday today. We are waiting for congratulations from the chief of the U.S. armed forces to the chief of the Soviet forces for Red Army Day. The President: I hope this is in train. Are our greetings on the way? President Gorbachev: Well, we began the celebration yesterday of the 73rd anniversary of the Soviet army—but the real day is today. People here—some of my assistants were on the front in World War II. Yakovlev and Chernyaev were on the front in the trenches in World War II. They want this working day to end so that they can begin to celebrate. The President: Please convey my personal congratulations as the Commander in Chief of the American armed forces. What is the latest in the Middle East? President Gorbachev: This is precisely what I want to talk about. To continue yesterday’s discussion—after our talk yesterday, something has happened that changed the situation. In Baghdad, an official statement has been issued that agrees to full and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait as specified in the U.N. Resolution and that it will happen from Kuwait City within four days. That is to say, we have a white flag from Saddam Hussein. Now it is evening here in Moscow. In the afternoon Tariq Aziz had a press conference here in Moscow and set forth that acceptance. Yesterday, after we 314

talked, I gave the suggestions and thoughts from you that were discussed on the phone to Aziz and also my own view. I think that our very firm position and your severe demands have made possible that statement of acceptance. And now we have a new situation that is new for both of us. And I believe that we must weigh carefully the entire situation and discuss what we must decide to do next. I understand the meaning of your demands that have their own logic. Let me say that today I talked to the leaders of a number of countries and many of them said that there are no differences in the two sets of demands that are insurmountable. To put it briefly, the fact that we have been together from beginning to end has been of decisive importance in making sure that this new situation has come about. Let me say something else, without what the U.S. has done, there would not have been this kind of change in the Iraqi position. And I asked Mr. Ignatenko, my Press Secretary, to communicate that particular thought to the world press. He has already done that in a press conference. Let me now complete my thoughts and then I want to listen to you. After we talked yesterday, I have been thinking what should we do now? And how should we act in order to make certain that there are no doubts about our ability further to cooperate? By the way, this is something that I felt in my discussions with other leaders. They all want the same thing. President Mubarak said very frankly and straightforwardly—“to me the most important thing is that the U.S. President and the Soviet Union continue to stand together.” Based on that—I want to propose the following: That at this new stage, we together, the U.S. and Soviet Union, cooperate in the framework of the U.N. Security Council and find a way that would incorporate all the elements of the ideas that we both put forward in a joint resolution. I believe that it is this that would make it possible for our two countries to continue to work together and to attain the desired goal—the desired result. This is all I wanted to say at this point because we had a wide-ranging philosophical discussion yesterday. The President: Thank you sir. Jim Baker had a good long talk with Bessmertnykh late last night and for you [that] was this morning. I don’t believe that Saddam has ever believed me or how strongly the U.S. feels. Yesterday while you were trying to work all this out—their spokesman went out and called me a liar about the burning up of those oil wells. And once again there have been a bunch more oils wells set on fire overnight. They are continuing to use a scorched earth policy and stalling and this has made a profound impact on me and on other coalition partners. And they want to negotiate back from an existing United Nations mandate. So we put down a time when they could demonstrate good-faith. We are in a difficult position—I can’t be seen to be saying something and then not be sincere. I can’t say you must move out by noon and—with no movement and continued destruction of the oil fields—do nothing. Particularly, when there are still conditions—you have worked hard—but there are still conditions. And we too have had extensive consultations—before you and I talked—and there is a solid view that he is stalling particularly as it relates to damages and he just wants to do it in a different way. 315

I do not believe there can be any flexibility in what we can do at this point, even though I know that they are talking in informal conversations in the U.N. Security Council. The best thing, I agree, is for us to be together. I think I have tried, you have tried and Jim and Bessmertnykh have tried. I agree with the premise. You see, we think our position is the United Nations position. So I would again appeal—with respect for your fantastic efforts—that you support the position of the U.N.—unconditional withdrawal—absolutely without conditions. They say its [sic] unconditional and they have dropped some conditions— thanks to your intervention—but there are still conditions. Our countries, those involved, feel that now is the time to come to the full U.N. position—already enshrined in the U.N. resolutions. Jim tried to make it clear to Bessmertnykh. We cannot put anything on hold— I have been out there and others have strongly supported that position. I can understand that Iraq doesn’t want to accept the conditions but I can’t wait. I don’t think we should give the Iraqis any other choice but the instant acceptance of these conditions immediately. That is where we are and I think the difference we have is that you think they have agreed to unconditional withdrawal and we and others with us do not agree. Let’s not let this divide the U.S. and the Soviet Union. There are things far bigger than this conflagration which is going to be over very soon. President Gorbachev: George, let’s keep cool. Although, of course, all of us are human beings, I think both of us understand that what we need is not Saddam Hussein—his fate has been determined. Our concern is to take advantage of the opportunity before us in order to obtain the goal we set together within the framework together [sic] in the U.N. Security Council and also to prevent a tragic phase in the further development of the conflict. Saddam Hussein wants to stall but we are not simpletons. Without wasting time, within 24–48 hours we should raise this in the U.N. Security Council and have a very tough discussion and consider this there. I would accept your idea that within this general understanding we have between us—Baker and Bessmertnykh should work out the details and we would be able to get it done. I want in particular to be understood by you that what I am saying are the words of a friend in the spirit of cooperation. And I fully share what you have just said that there will be many questions to work out. So, George, let me shake your hand and let me say good-bye in a spirit of full understanding. The President: Mikhail, I appreciate that spirit but I don’t want to leave a false impression that there is any more time. Of course I will ask Jim to talk about this but I do not want you to feel that there is any inclination for the U.S. and the coalition to delay. I will talk to Jim about he and Bessmertnykh. You have mentioned the human life aspect about which we talked yesterday and I agree. But I do think this man is stalling and what he is doing to the oil wells in Kuwait and the people there argues against any reasonableness on his part. I don’t want to mislead you. I don’t feel inclined to wait. I will talk to Jim but don’t want to leave the impression that I can delay. We will see what we can do but unless 316

there is something in the next few minutes that he does what has been demanded of him by the coalition under the U.N. mandate and resolutions. I will talk to Jim. But thank you very much. President Gorbachev: Good. I understand what you have just said but I think with all we have been through—one or two days may not be decisive in one sense but in another they could be very decisive and we can do what is right. The President: Thanks. President Gorbachev: Thanks. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library.]

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Chapter 4

THE MOSCOW SUMMIT, 1991

T

he July 1991 superpower encounter in Moscow was the last full superpower summit between the United States and the Soviet Union. Its main formal achievement was the long-awaited signing of the START Treaty, which Ronald Reagan had hoped to sign with Mikhail Gorbachev in 1988. It was the completion of old business rather than the breaking of new ground. The most memorable and consequential part of the summit was the almost five-hour talk between Gorbachev and Bush at Novo-Ogarevo, a presidential retreat and dacha on Moscow’s outskirts, on July 31, where the new spirit of partnership permeated every item on the agenda—from Soviet internal problems to regional issues around the globe. The U.S.-Soviet partnership was what Gorbachev was relying on at this moment in his effort to rescue perestroika and preserve the USSR as a state and as a global power committed to new thinking. To the Soviet leader, the NovoOgarevo conversation in particular meant that his new thinking was becoming the new paradigm of international relations. However, the Moscow summit came after the London economic meeting of the G-7 where Gorbachev had arrived with an appeal to the international community for financial aid to the struggling Soviet economy, but returned home with nothing in terms of real commitments. Internal problems—the failing economy and nationalism, which were breaking the country apart—were the main Soviet priorities. The meeting with Bush provided the Soviet leader with a partial respite from the depressing domestic scene—a forum where he could talk and act like a global leader and see real results from his innovative approach. Gorbachev called the Moscow summit in his memoir a “stellar hour for the new thinking and foreign policy originating from it.”1 The U.S. side did not see it as significant at all. Raymond Garthoff described the meeting as “transitional” in the context of the changes taking place in the world.2 For Bush, the year 1991 saw an unprecedented jump in his approval ratings after the decisive military victory in the Persian Gulf—89 percent support in February—then a slow and steady decline throughout the year, dipping to an abysmal 29 percent in July 1992.3 After Desert Storm, the president had to shift his focus from foreign policy, where he was most comfortable and successful, to domestic issues, where he was forced to face early signs of a recession in the  Gorbachev, Zhizn I reformy, p. 307.  Garthoff, The Great Transition, p. 465. 3  http://www.gallup.com/poll/116677/presidential-approval-ratings-gallup-historical-statistics-trends.aspx. 1 2

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U.S. economy, which put severe constraints on his ability to contribute to Soviet reform in a meaningful way. This general withdrawal of the American electorate from foreign affairs and especially its unwillingness even to consider significant foreign aid, found its expression in the startling result of a special Senate election in Pennsylvania. Harris Wofford, a Democrat, who had concentrated heavily on the recession and domestic issues, beat Bush’s attorney general, Richard Thornburgh. The dynamics were succinctly captured by a GOP county commissioner: “When the year first started, center stage was the wonderful victory in the Mideast. But by the year’s end, that’s a faded memory, all we have is the economy. ... A lot of voters are saying, ‘We don’t like your economy, Mr. President,’ and Dick Thornburgh is our vehicle.”4 In U.S.-Soviet relations, the year began with the conflict in the Persian Gulf where Saddam Hussein had refused to withdraw his troops from Kuwait in defiance of several U.N. Security Council resolutions. Gorbachev manipulated all his skills and levers, including sending the old Arabist Yevgeny Primakov to Iraq and to the United States to try to forestall the use of military force against Iraq. However, Saddam’s half-hearted concessions were insufficient, and the United States took charge of an international coalition in an aerial and ground war that drove Saddam out of Kuwait, but did not pursue him to Bagdad. By early March, the main fighting was over. The American military option had worked, and Gorbachev was left feeling that his choice (diplomatic pressure) had not been given enough time to bear fruit.5 In the USSR, January 1991 erupted with major nationalist tensions in the Baltics, which led to the use of force by federal units in Vilnius and Riga. It was not clear immediately if Gorbachev had given the orders or even how informed he was about the developments. The Baltic crisis seriously strained his relationship with Bush, making the U.S. president vulnerable to his own right wing because of his support for Gorbachev. Still, the administration handled the crisis constructively—making strong statements but not allowing it to spill over to other aspects of the relationship, and, most importantly, not throwing itself uncritically behind nationalist demands for full sovereignty and thus a breakup of the Soviet state. In early May, when Bush met with leaders of the three Baltic states, he encouraged them to negotiate with the Kremlin and spoke about his cooperation with Gorbachev.6 Bush’s diary notes show how sensitive the Baltics issue was for him and how he tried to adhere to a balanced position.7 However, because of developments there, the fighting in the Middle East, and foot-dragging on the last details  Katharine Seelye, “Wofford Stuns Thornburgh, Sends Message to DC,” Philadelphia Inquirer, November 6, 1991. 5  Document No. 51. 6   Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Landsbergis–Savisaar–Godmanis, May 8, 1991. Bush Presidential Library. 7  George Bush’s diary notes, March 17, 1991, Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 501. 4

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of START, the Moscow summit, originally scheduled for February 1991, had to be postponed until late July. Like Bush, Gorbachev was finding that domestic problems had to be given priority over foreign policy. His ultimate task was to keep the Soviet Union together in a new, decentralized and more democratic form. On March 17, 1991, the USSR held a national referendum on a new Union. Although six out of 15 republics refused to participate, in the remaining nine the turnout was over 80 percent, and 77 percent of voters expressed their preference for keeping the Union together. Interestingly, 71 percent of Ukrainians (with 83 percent turnout) supported the Union, as did 95 percent of the voters in Kazakhstan (with 88 percent turnout). The results invigorated Gorbachev, who launched a set of negotiations called the “Novo-Ogarevo process”—after the location of the talks. On April 23, the participating republican leaders and Gorbachev signed the “9+1” agreement to prepare the final, new Union Treaty. The Bush administration was naturally keenly interested in Gorbachev’s political situation and his ability to deliver on his commitments—or even to survive long enough to sign the long-awaited START Treaty. On April 10, David Gompert and Ed Hewitt, who had just replaced Condoleezza Rice on the National Security Council staff, asked the CIA for an analysis of the post-Gorbachev succession—who the main actors would be, and the likely scenarios. The assessment came back on April 29, just as Gorbachev was breathing fresh life into his new Union. The analysis opened quite drastically: “The Gorbachev era is effectively over.” It was probably the most prescient CIA analysis of the perestroika years. The most likely scenario in the report bore an eerie resemblance to the upcoming August coup. The analysts came to the conclusion that Gorbachev was likely to be replaced either by reformers or hard-liners, but more likely the latter. They pointed out that “there is no love between Gorbachev and his current allies and they could well move to try to dump him.” They then listed possible conspirators—Vice President Yanayev, KGB chief Kryuchkov, and Defense Minister Yazov, among others. The report predicted that the “traditionalists” would find a “legal veneer” for removing their erstwhile leader: “most likely they would present Gorbachev with an ultimatum to comply or face arrest or death.” If he agreed, Yanayev would step in as president, then the conspirators would declare a state of emergency and install “some kind of a National Salvation Committee.”8 Although the memo concluded that “time is working against the traditionalists,” it probably strengthened the determination of the Bush administration to get its arms control priorities done while Gorbachev was still in power.

 Directorate of Intelligence, “The Gorbachev Succession,” April 29, 1991. George Bush Library, obtained by the National Security Archive through FOIA 99-03030F/2.

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ARMS CONTROL: START/CFE/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

After Desert Storm, U.S.-Soviet relations returned to their usual course with a focus on arms control, regional issues, and the challenges of Soviet domestic reform, which took on larger and larger importance as the year progressed. Bush felt confident after Gorbachev’s letter of January 28 that the crackdown in Vilnius and Riga would not lead to more aggressive actions by the center, such as the introduction of a state of emergency or direct presidential rule. When Baker came to Moscow on March 14–17, his main tasks were to review START, discrepancies on CFE, regional issues, especially the Middle East after the Gulf War, and Soviet internal developments. In his meeting with Gorbachev on March 15, Baker also directly addressed the issue of biological weapons, which the Bush administration chose to tackle in a confidential way, without public exposure.9 On START, there were only three remaining issues: the encryption of missile telemetry, the counting of warheads on MIRVed missiles at a lower number than the maximum of those actually deployed, and the definition of the parameters of “new” missile types.10 But in fact, the main problem was within the United States, personified by the national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, who was still mistrustful of Soviet intentions and therefore stubbornly unwilling to reach any compromises with Moscow on downloading MIRVed warheads and the possibility of a breakout. As General Colin Powell noted at the time, “I’m not as exercised about it as Brent. … The situation is changing so fast and so profoundly that someday we’ll wonder why we ever argued about this.”11 Indeed, they were still arguing over the details of the treaty that Reagan had been prepared to sign back in June 1988. Baker and Bessmertnykh negotiated over these last obstacles during their meetings in Moscow in mid-March, in Kislovodsk on April 24–25, in Cairo on May 12–13, and finally in Washington on July 11–14. Gorbachev was under severe pressure from his own military not to commit to anything they might see as a concession. To protect himself from this criticism, he brought the military in to participate in all negotiations—and not just the irreplaceable Marshal Akhromeyev but Chief of the General Staff Mikhail Alekseyevich Moiseyev as well. The negotiations dragged on with little progress until the July meeting between Baker and Bessmertnykh, and the last details had to wait until Gorbachev and Bush resolved them directly during their breakfast meeting in London on July 17, just before Gorbachev addressed the G-7 leaders.12 On conventional weapons in Europe, the Soviet military was in a state of near rebellion, resorting to every possible loophole to avoid full compliance. They moved a large amount of equipment from Europe to beyond the Urals where it  Document No. 52.  Garthoff, The Great Transition, p. 463. 11  Quoted in Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, p. 373. 12  Document No. 62. 9

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would not be covered by agreements, and insisted on an interpretation of naval coastal defense that would place it outside of the treaty.13 Baker raised the issue of violations in his meeting with Gorbachev in March, and subsequently in every conversation with Bessmertnykh. Using the implicit linkage between compliance on CFE and the signing of START, Gorbachev was able to convince the military to accept additional obligations, which helped them to save face, but in fact ensured that the treaty would be implemented within the framework of the original text. General Moiseyev brought a compromise proposal to Washington in May that allowed some progress in the CFE negotiations. Bush also had to push Gorbachev on CFE in a phone call on May 27.14 Finally, the Soviet side agreed to make a unilateral statement regarding additional obligations outside the treaty, on June 14 in Vienna.15 The CFE accord, which had been negotiated on the assumption that the Warsaw Pact was the main concern, lost much of its core significance on July 1 when the Warsaw Treaty Organization was dissolved by its members. Still, one issue on the arms control agenda remained unresolved—even during the subsequent U.S.-Russian relationship: the Soviet military biological weapons program. Not much had changed in the Soviet response since Baker had presented the U.S. papers in March. On May 11, Bessmertnykh produced a formal reply to U.S. concerns, which the Americans concluded contained a “cover-up on every point.”16 The administration knew it would have to brief Congress on the issue before the summit. Therefore, the U.S. side decided to raise it one more time at a personal meeting between the two heads of state before the Moscow summit. On June 19, Bush sent a very direct letter to Gorbachev informing him that “the congressional leadership has now been briefed,” and demanding full transparency on the issue, warning that there was a chance “the Senate will not ratify either treaty unless and until the Soviet Union begins to dismantle its biological weapons program.” Gorbachev in response requested a full study from the Defense Ministry and charged his trusted military adviser, Akhromeyev, to provide a final report to him personally. The long and winding report arrived on July 13, and while it acknowledged a military biological program prior to 1986, it basically denied the USSR was presently in violation of the 1972 convention, pointed to the vagueness of the convention itself, and stated that mutual inspections were needed if U.S. concerns were to be met.17 Akhromeyev’s report and the official papers prepared by the Defense Ministry allowed Gorbachev to continue to deny the existence of the program when Bush raised it in their private meeting after lunch and before the opening of the G-7.  Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest levels, pp. 288–290 and 363–369.  Document No. 56. 15  Garthoff, The Great Transition, p. 462. 16  Hoffman, The Dead Hand, p. 361. 17  Marshal Akhromeyev Memorandum to Gorbachev on Biological Weapons, July 13, 1991. Gorbachev Foundation Archive, Fond 2, Opis 2. 13 14

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The record of this part of the meeting is still classified in both the U.S. archives and at the Gorbachev Foundation. The only available account of this “friendly but firm” conversation exists in Chernyaev’s memoir. When Bush pressed Gorbachev to respond to American accusations, the Soviet leader replied, “George, I have figured it out. I can tell you with confidence: we aren’t making biological weapons. … I asked for a report on this matter. The report is ready, it’s been signed by Minister of Defense Yazov and other people. I told you the essence of this report, its main conclusion. I suggest we finish with this.” Chernyaev believes that the military had been misleading Gorbachev all along, and so after the July 17 conversation with Bush he wrote a memo to his boss asking what exactly he knew about the biological program and whether it was possible he was being deceived.18 The United States was not willing to let the issue go, but the whirlwind of global events pushed it aside, and later the coup complicated matters even further. THE LONDON G-7 SUMMIT

In spring 1991 it became painfully clear to both sides that many aspects of U.S.Soviet relations and certain larger issues of international life in the near future would be determined by the state of Soviet internal affairs. Even though Gorbachev had won his March 17 referendum on the future of the Union, the actual Union Treaty became part of the intense and personal struggle between him and Boris Yeltsin. Now, after his tactical shift to the right in late fall 1990, which did not yield much success, Gorbachev tried to recreate an alliance with the democratic forces in both the center and the republics. He even tried to engage Yeltsin, whom he needed most of all in the process of creating the new Union. At the same time, the conservatives Gorbachev had brought to power earlier—Boris Pugo, Kryuchkov, and Yazov—still occupied key positions in the government. They openly criticized the embattled leader for the failure of his domestic reforms and for selling out to the West in foreign policy. The premonition of a coup d’etat hung in the air as the country sank deeper and deeper into economic crisis. In one more analysis, entitled The Soviet Cauldron, the CIA’s SOVA office produced another scenario of a putsch in which hardliners would come to power by handicapping or detaining Gorbachev and using emergency powers to sideline if not murder other democratic leaders. The paper also predicted an easy victory for Yeltsin in the Russian presidential election scheduled for June 12.19 In this situation, Gorbachev placed his hopes in obtaining economic assistance from the West to jump-start his economic reform and feed a population weary of empty shelves and promises. On May 23, Gorbachev made a public plea for financial aid, seeking $100 billion. Many in Russia quietly hoped for  Chernyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev, p. 358.  CIA, Office of Soviet Analysis, “The Soviet Cauldron,” April 1991.

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a “Marshal Plan” from the West at the upcoming London summit. Former Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, visiting Washington as a private citizen in early May, encouraged his American counterparts to help Gorbachev, emphasizing how crucial the next months would be and how essential agricultural credits would be to staving off the crisis. He declared, “the American public cannot seem neutral to events in the Soviet Union.”20 The thinking in Washington could not have been more different. Bush’s economic team was deeply uncertain about the direction of the Soviet economic reform and unwilling to make financial commitments on political grounds. The magnitude and significance of the Soviet transformation seems to have been widely underappreciated. As Beschloss and Talbott note, Bush complained to his advisers about Gorbachev’s repeated pleas of support: “The guy doesn’t seem to get it. He seems to think that we owe him economic help because we support him politically. We’ve got to give him a lesson in basic economics. Business is business. Loans have to be made for sound financial and commercial reasons.”21 Bush understood, of course, that “sound financial reasons” would not appear in the Soviet Union any time soon, but he was well aware of domestic political realities and the elections upcoming in 1992. One of Gorbachev’s priorities was to obtain agricultural loans from the United States. He made an urgent plea to Bush to provide $1.5 billion in loans in his letter of March 20. In response, Bush sent a small delegation including his senior adviser on Russian and Eurasian affairs, Ed Hewett, Undersecretary of Agriculture Richard Crowder, and Assistant Secretary of State Eugene McAllister to study the system of food supply in the Soviet Union, which was in a particularly severe crisis. After a long meeting with Gorbachev on May 25, Hewett wrote a memo to Bush emphasizing the need to provide “not only supportive words, but material support” for Gorbachev, and pointing to the fact that every time the Soviets fulfilled requirements set by the United States, they found themselves faced with new conditions.22 The memorandum made an impact. In his June 10 letter, Bush finally responded to Gorbachev’s request and granted $1.5 billion in three tranches. The letter included more conditions—the aid had to be fairly distributed among the republics, and assurances given to the U.S. side of a firm commitment to market reforms in the Soviet food distribution system, which the U.S. Agricultural Mission in May had found to be the most problematic link in the country’s food supply system.23 On May 20, the Supreme Soviet passed laws on free travel and emigration in hopes of breaking the impasse with Washington over the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. In April and May, Grigory Yavlinsky, an author of the Five Hundred Days  Document No. 53.  Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, p. 378. 22  Hewett Memorandum, Document No. 55. 23  Bush Letter to Gorbachev, June 10, 1991, Bush Library, National Security Archive FOIA 99-0303-F/1. 20 21

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Plan who now was working with Graham Allison of Harvard on a proposal for economic reform aptly named the Grand Bargain, tried to persuade Gorbachev to make an appeal for financial aid at the meeting of the G-7 in London. Margaret Thatcher supported the idea. When Thatcher came to Moscow in the end of May, Gorbachev practically rehearsed his speech to the G-7 with his trusted partner, although she was no longer prime minister. Thatcher suggested that he not agree to associate status for the Soviet Union in international financial institutions and that the Soviets pass appropriate laws regulating free market economic activities before appealing for new loans.24 While in Moscow, she invited Matlock to the British ambassador’s residence and asked him to deliver a message to “my friend George” that he needed to invite Gorbachev to the G-7 and “lead the effort just as he did with Kuwait,” to provide a substantial package of Western aid.25 In Washington, the administration faced the same quandary of wanting Gorbachev to succeed yet not wanting to waste money on an uncertain outcome in an unfriendly domestic setting. At the same time, Bush knew that the West Europeans believed the West, including the United States, should prepare a significant financial aid package in order not to let Soviet reforms fail. Kohl and Mitterrand were especially vocal in this regard. Bush did not want to look stingy in front of the allies, and sought a solution. On June 21, he convened his top advisers to discuss “Soviet economic issues and the London economic summit.” In his preparatory memo to the president, Scowcroft outlined two main issues for the meeting—how to announce a limited package of trade and technical assistance and “whether or not we should be prepared with a more ambitious response to Gorbachev in London.” Scowcroft’s concern in the memo was that Kohl “may well push for substantial financial aid with no political or economic conditionality, and the French and Italians would likely follow the German lead.” For Scowcroft, such aid would result in “wasted resources and do nothing to encourage the transition to a market economy.” The meeting came to the conclusion that the USSR has not yet created the conditions in which such aid could be used efficiently, and that the United States could not afford to provide this kind of aid for domestic political reasons. At the same time, they could not afford looking stingy in the eyes of their allies, so at the G-7 Bush would be rhetorically supportive but discourage others from making major commitments by raising a note of caution. The allies needed to be dissuaded, so Bush called Kohl on June 24 to make sure he did not provide excessive commitments to Gorbachev and to “prevent a summit split on a key issue” in case the American and allied positions clashed.26 Bush also wrote letters to each of the allies explaining his administration’s stance and  Memorandum of conversation between Gorbachev and Thatcher, May 27, 1991, Moscow, Gorbachev Foundation Archive, Fond 1, Opis 1. 25  Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire, pp. 537–538. 26  Memorandum for the President from Brent Scowcroft, “Meeting on Soviet Economic Issues and the London Economic Summit,” June 20, 1991. Bush Library, National Security Archive FOIA 2000-1933-F. 24

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cautioning against providing financial aid to the Soviets before they committed to serious market reform. In his memoir, Gorbachev described preparations for his presentation at the G-7 as a comprehensive process that included internal discussions and analysis of dozens of proposals and scenarios for economic reform. One of the most attractive plans was the Grand Bargain prepared jointly by Yavlinsky and Allison. Gorbachev asked Yavlinsky to accompany him to London in part to show his seriousness about reform, but Yavlinsky declined. On July 11 the Soviet leader sent a personal message to G-7 leaders, attaching plans for economic reform approved by the Novo-Ogarevo group of republic leaders who were willing to form a new Union. Bush was still not convinced that Gorbachev should be invited to the meeting. (Gorbachev noted that even after all the leaders supported the idea of inviting him, the United States had reservations.) The Soviet leader described a letter he received from Bush right before the meeting as having a “heavy subtext and even elements of pressure.”27 The Bush administration remained cool on the subject of aid but also aware that other leaders were more willing to help Gorbachev. Kohl and Mitterrand encouraged Bush to be more decisive in offering real support. However, even after Gorbachev’s appeal to global leaders in his letter, there was no consensus on aid. On July 17, the Soviet and American leaders met early in the morning, before Gorbachev’s scheduled presentation to the G-7, and wrapped up the remaining START issues. Bush described it as a “momentous and exhilarating moment” because a historic arms control agreement had finally been reached,28 but it was not enough for Gorbachev, who had made last-minute concessions on START precisely in hopes of gaining U.S. economic support. Gorbachev’s performance on July 17 was passionate, reflecting his need for something tangible to show the population back home that he could still deliver on his economic promise. He committed himself to comprehensive market reform and democratization, and promised a new Union with a decentralized power structure, but also a single convertible currency and a federal tax system. He made a strong plea for joining international financial institutions as the fastest way to integrate the USSR into the world economy: “What we need now is a new measure of trust. We want to move into the international economic arena. If we’re not admitted into the IMF, the World Bank, GATT and the EBRD, it won’t work. We need them to provide oxygen to breathe.”29 What he did not see was how inconsistent and ambivalent Prime Minister Pavlov’s “anti-crisis” reform plan looked to the West, and how its adoption actually diminished any desire on the American side to commit to aid. What the plan called a “single economic space” for the Soviet republics looked to the Bush

 Gorbachev, Ponyat’ perestroiku, p. 320.  Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 508. 29  Document No. 63. 27 28

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administration like a “single economic disaster zone.”30 The Grand Bargain proposed by Yavlinsky and Allison did not have solid political backing in Moscow and therefore was rejected in Washington, too (though mainly because it would require large-scale U.S. financial assistance). However positive the verbal reaction of world leaders, none of them made a commitment to direct economic aid outside of “technical assistance” and offering associate status at the IMF, along with general words of support for perestroika. Gorbachev thus came home empty-handed. On the other hand, Bush’s gambit worked—the United States did not look like an outlier in refusing to lead the effort to boost Soviet reform. THE MOSCOW SUMMIT

After the last START issues were resolved in London, the Moscow meeting became more of a ceremonial occasion for Bush and his team than a working summit. It remained important for Gorbachev to show his countrymen that the international partnership was still working and bringing domestic benefits, although the main reductions in military expenditures were coming from the CFE and not from START. The meeting also came at a crucial moment in his fight for a new Union Treaty, when his alliance with the reformers was making tentative progress. Plus, even though perestroika was in crisis at home, Gorbachev believed new thinking was transforming international relations on the basis of principles he personally championed—the non-use of force and universal human values. The biggest domestic benefit would come from the integration of the new USSR into Europe and more generally into the system of international financial institutions. Gorbachev was in a hurry. At 3 a.m. the night before Bush arrived in Moscow, he concluded a long meeting in Novo-Ogarevo with Yeltsin and Nazarbayev— presidents of the two most important republics. They were now committed to the new Union Treaty, and scheduled the signing for August 20. That day was supposed to be the beginning of a new era of political and economic reform. During the meeting, the trio also decided that after signing the treaty several of the key conservatives would be removed from their posts, naming specifically Kryuchkov, Yazov and Pugo—all future members of the coup. Unbeknownst to Gorbachev, the KGB had bugged the meeting room on Kryuchkov’s orders.31 This information undoubtedly contributed to the sense of urgency on the plotters’ part. The first session of the Moscow summit did not even touch on the subject of arms control. Gorbachev, even though politically weakened by the crises at home, was eager to engage the Americans and move fast to deepen reforms domestically and internationally. Bush was impressed by his energy and wrote in his diary, “Gorbachev was marvelous, and how he could stand up to all the  Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, p. 388.  Gorbachev, Ponyat’ perestroiku, p. 327.

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pressures against him I simply did not know.”32 When the two met alone, on the morning of July 30, the Soviet leader pressed for aid and the removal of barriers for cooperative ventures, specifically complaining about COCOM restrictions. Gorbachev said he was “counting on U.S. assistance” at a “crucial moment” in terms of food supplies, medicines and consumer goods. He also asked for assistance in getting the IMF loans that would support price liberalization and the convertibility of the ruble.33 Bush again refrained from any commitments but used the Chevron case (the company was seeking preferential terms for its investment in Kazakhstan, but local experts and government would not agree to them) to highlight difficulties that American companies were experiencing when doing business in the USSR. For his part, the president was interested in the progress of the new Union Treaty, making it clear to Gorbachev that the United States was not trying to undermine the process, and that the administration was firmly behind him and not the secessionist republics. Bush even said it would have been fine with him to go to Leningrad instead of Kiev; he “just wanted very much to visit one of your cities.” He emphasized that he rejected Landsbergis’s invitation to Vilnius during the summit. Speaking about the coming U.S. elections, Bush said he was “afraid of 1992,” and that his Soviet policy, and closeness with Gorbachev in particular, were being criticized by both conservatives like Jesse Helms and by the “crazy liberals who want to teach you [Gorbachev] about human rights.”34 The expanded bilateral session that followed the one-on-one meeting was supposed to include presidents Yeltsin and Nazarbayev. Gorbachev had intended this to be a rather ceremonial event designed to showcase the unity and cooperation he had achieved with republican leaders. But at the last moment, Yeltsin, who by now had been elected president of the Russian Federation and had already been received by Bush at the White House in June, refused to attend the luncheon and instead requested a separate meeting with the U.S. president.35 Both meetings—with Nazarbayev and the separate session with Yeltsin—concentrated on issues of economic cooperation with those republics. However, Bush felt that Yeltsin was trying to use the meeting in his political game against Gorbachev. He complained to Scowcroft he had been “ambushed” by the Russian leader.36 On July 31 the motorcade took Bush and his team to meet with Gorbachev in Novo-Ogarevo, a more relaxed setting than the capital. Both wore casual clothes, with Gorbachev dressed all in gray—shirt, sweater and slacks—and Bush sporting a polo shirt. They sat outside on wicker chairs accompanied only by Chernyaev, Bessmertnykh, Baker, Scowcroft, and long-time interpreter Pavel  Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 511.  Document No. 65. 34  Ibid. 35  Don Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Era, p. 456. 36  Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, p. 413. 32 33

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Palazhchenko.37 The minutes of this five-hour conversation read like a novel—a discussion of a blueprint for a new Soviet Union and a new system of international relations based on an innovative concept of security. Gorbachev initiated the discussion on international issues, raising the idea of a non-military concept of strategic stability, the integration of Europe on the basis of the CSCE process (including the USSR and Eastern Europe), and the need for cooperation in Africa. He assured Bush that he was not going to play the “China card” and that the Soviets were interested in the normalization of U.S. relations with China. Both leaders found common ground in their cautious and surprisingly non-judgmental reactions to the Tiananmen Square repression by Chinese authorities in early June 1989. Gorbachev also spoke about Japan and ASEAN, environmental degradation and the demographic crisis. He saw the need for great power cooperation in every sphere. He was especially proud of the progress the Soviet Union and the United States had achieved working together on removing the Cold War dynamic from regional conflicts. He believed that jointly they could help launch a national reconciliation process in every regional conflict by encouraging their respective allies to cooperate with each other. Bush agreed “in principle” with the need to cooperate on regional crises as they had done in Southern Africa and asked for Soviet help with Nelson Mandela, whom he considered to be “out of touch,” saying that “we would welcome any steps that would bring him closer to reality of the modern world.” By contrast, he spoke strongly in support of South African President F.W. de Klerk. ­Gorbachev repeatedly put off a personal meeting with Mandela, partially because he knew the Americans’ attitude toward him. Bush mentioned the India-Pakistan conflict as another issue that could benefit from Soviet help—admitting the Pakistanis had lied to the U.S. about their work on nuclear weapons, and asking the Soviets to work with their Indian allies. The conversation barely addressed arms control. Gorbachev asked about the next stage of negotiations on strategic weapons reductions and the long-discussed comprehensive test ban. The Soviets tried to set a date for starting talks on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, but the U.S. side did not respond. And on the issue of biological weapons, the Soviets asked for a visit by their experts to the United States before August 26 and reiterated their agreement to invite American experts and to continue consultations. Surprisingly, the Soviet side did not even mention the controversial ABM systems or the statement on observance of the 1972 ABM Treaty, which they had previously tried so hard to get from the Americans. Instead, they ended up making a statement of their own at the signing of the START Treaty while the U.S. side kept its silence. The two most important regional issues discussed were Yugoslavia and the Middle East. On the former, Gorbachev spoke very strongly, as if he could foresee the events of the near future. Mindful of nationalist claims in the Soviet  Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 513.

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republics, he warned that “even a partial disintegration of Yugoslavia could create a chain reaction that will be worse than a nuclear bomb.” He wanted the summit joint statement to include language of respect for “territorial integrity,” noting that “seventy percent of interstate borders in the Soviet Union are in essence not defined.” Bush was reluctant to lend his support out of concern not to create problems for the EEC, observing that Germany maintained strong support for Slovenian independence.38 On the Middle East, the two leaders found their positions were remarkably similar, giving grounds for optimism that they might be able to make crucial progress on the Palestinian issue. Bush stated his strong opposition to Israeli settlements but expressed doubt about Israel’s willingness to negotiate on the matter. He asked Gorbachev to use his influence with the Palestinians so as not to give the Israelis an excuse to shun the negotiating table. Interestingly, both leaders were critical of their allies in this exchange and, in a way, agreed to cooperate behind their backs to bring them to the table. It was an expression of what Gorbachev believed their unique great-power role could be in mediating regional conflicts. The two principals decided to convene a conference on the Middle East in October 1991, calling it a possible breakthrough.39 During the summer, especially now that he believed the new Union Treaty process was robust, Gorbachev felt he needed the support and approval of the U.S. president—both to reaffirm his own role as a world leader and to be able to wrest financial support from the United States. All the while he knew in his heart that the American leadership did not fully trust him and his reforms. Now, in their most relaxed conversation, Gorbachev decided to press the issue directly: “we made a choice in favor of reforms, and no ideological breaks, no dogmas and stereotypes can stop me. The main priority for me today is to solve the issues with our statehood, the move toward a new economy.” He called the Americans “our strictest judges.” The approach seemed to work. For the first time in all their experience together, Bush actually addressed the issue head-on, essentially admitting that he had not fully trusted his Soviet counterpart before: “I have much more confidence in your willingness to change than I did before,” the president said. “I trust your intentions and after our conversation yesterday I am more confident than I was before this visit that you know where you want to go, and how to get there. I would like you to be certain that we trust your intentions.”40 It might indeed be the case that only then did Bush grasp what Gorbachev and his reforms were truly about—too late to be able to act meaningfully, however. After returning to Moscow, Bush and Gorbachev signed the long-awaited START Treaty, which would reduce U.S. strategic arms by 25 percent and Soviet strategic arms by 35 percent, and decided to begin further consultations on

 Document No. 69.  Ibid. 40  Ibid. 38 39

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strategic weapons reductions in October. The Soviet side made a unilateral statement that tied START reductions to observance of the 1972 ABM Treaty. For all the hard work that went into it and the fanfare surrounding the signing of the treaty, as Garthoff pointed out, it brought the totals of strategic nuclear weapons “roughly to where they were when START negotiations began in 1982.”41 After Moscow, Bush flew to Kiev with very mixed feelings. According to Robert Hutchings, the reason for the president’s trip to Ukraine was “to show understanding for the aspirations of Ukrainians and others,” but his speech to the Ukrainian parliament was intended “to promote the ongoing negotiations between Gorbachev and republic leaders toward the new Union Treaty. Neither objective was achieved.”42 The speech to parliament considered the possibility of the violent disintegration of a nuclear superpower and the context of unfolding events in Yugoslavia. In retrospect, it appears to have been a most sensible and balanced address, and was arguably one of the president’s best speeches, but at the time the media ridiculed it as the “Chicken Kiev” speech. In it, Bush drew a distinction between liberty and formal state independence, a point that could have been very useful for many in the Soviet republics at the time—had they listened—especially in light of the rise to power of authoritarian and nationalist leaderships in many of them over the next several years. Bush declared that “freedom is not the same as independence. Americans will not support those who seek independence in order to replace a far-off tyranny with a local despotism.”43 Naturally, the speech sounded offensive to Ukrainian nationalists, as if Bush was siding with Moscow against the republics, which, in a way, was exactly what he meant to do as long as the new Union Treaty appeared viable. The last superpower summit ended on a high note—the START Treaty was signed, trust between the two presidents seemed to be reaffirmed in word and deed, and new horizons of cooperation had been outlined. At the August 1 NATO briefing, Undersecretary of Defense Reginald Bartholomew emphasized the different nature of this first post-Cold War summit. No longer were complicated arms control issues the focus, but both governments began to lay the groundwork for a new era in relations. However, the summit meant different things to Gorbachev and to Bush. Gorbachev gave an exceptionally high assessment of it in his memoir, devoting seven pages to the issues and concepts discussed, and presenting it as the ultimate example of what was possible globally if the two superpowers found a way to work together.44 By contrast, Bush and Scowcroft were quite reserved in their assessment and barely mentioned the substance of the negotiations with the

 Garthoff, The Great Transition, p. 466.  Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War, p. 329. 43   Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush, 1991, v. 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 1007. 44  Gorbachev, Zhizn’ I reformy, pp. 301–307. 41 42

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exception of the Soviet internal problems and the Union Treaty.45 Yet, the quality of the conversation between the two leaders was truly unprecedented, the level and scope of cooperation between the two powers quite unbelievable for such old rivals. It was also inevitable that both would shift their focus to domestic issues. For Gorbachev, it looked like the United States would finally get behind his idea for a new Union Treaty and accept his views on domestic reform. The U.S., however, remained wary of the viability of his plans, unwilling to move fast on strategic arms control, and mostly focused on the 1992 electoral campaign. Bush’s innate caution and political considerations made him unwilling to commit to any serious economic aid even if he now trusted his counterpart more than ever. For the American team, the 1991 Moscow summit was a ceremonial occasion, a useful visit to affirm the new quality of bilateral relations and to demonstrate the administration’s achievements. But in their eyes it was far from the breakthrough and “stellar hour” described by Gorbachev.

 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, pp. 510–513.

45

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Document No. 52: Record of Conversation between Gorbachev and Baker, Moscow March 15, 1991

In this excerpt of a much longer conversation, the U.S. secretary of state raises the “extremely sensitive” issue of Soviet compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972. The first U.S. and British démarches on the subject were made in May 1990, and Bush raised it with Gorbachev during their private Camp David discussions on June 2, 1990. Gorbachev had always denied that the Soviet Union had a military biological program, but at the same time the Soviets believed that the U.S. was also secretly engaged in similar activities. The Soviet leader had proposed an exchange of experts to visit both countries’ suspected biological facilities in summer 1990, but after the U.S. delegation’s visit the concerns only deepened. Here Baker confronts Gorbachev for the first time with some astounding facts about Soviet activities and concludes that the USSR had a “program of creating a potential for an offensive capability in biological weapons.” Gorbachev’s reaction is denial, but with notes of uncertainty—could it be that the Americans are right and his own military has been feeding him wrong information? He asks for an official document listing the alleged transgressions. Gorbachev is also suspicious because Baker does not consent to immediate reciprocal visits by Soviet experts. Both sides agree to keep this conversation and related information in strictest confidence so as not to undermine the relationship and the ongoing arms control negotiations.

Gorbachev: I am glad to welcome you, Mr. Secretary of State. Baker: I am happy to be here. I greatly appreciate your willingness to devote time for this meeting. I would like to inform you that we had good discussions with A. A. Bessmertnykh. Gorbachev: You and he can use time very effectively, working without interpreters. But that probably has its own difficulties—because you do not have time to come up with all kinds of tricky answers. You just have to say what is on your mind. I hope you can see that nothing has changed in our approach to Soviet-American relations. We are still open for dialogue, and I wanted to mention that from the start, because it is of principal importance. We are coming out of a difficult phase right now. We have things to discuss and to do now. Baker: Yes, there is much to do. First of all, I would like to affirm what you said about the importance of dialogue between the USSR and the USA. In the last several years we have achieved wonderful progress. And as I said to you multiple times, including here, there would have been no progress if not for your personal efforts. […] I told you during our meeting last September that, in my view, you demonstrated exceptional political courage. I still believe that, as does President Bush. 336

I would like to express my appreciation for the answer you just gave to the correspondents to the question about the dinner this evening, to which I am inviting leaders of the republics and some other people. I want you to know: we will keep making it clear to them and to the press that we are dealing with the Soviet Union only through the Center, through your government. Gorbachev: The only thing I would like to say about this dinner is that I found out about it from the U.S. press. And the minister was informed about it belatedly. Baker: If that is so, I am sorry about that. […] We constantly emphasize that we support the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union. We recognize the USSR, in all its borders, excluding the Baltics, from 1933. When we visit other countries, we also meet with representatives of the opposition. When leaders of other states visit the United States, they also meet with representatives of our opposition—the leadership of the Democratic Party. Gorbachev: Is there a real difference between Democrats and Republicans? Baker: Yes, and a big one. Gorbachev: I have never noticed that. Baker: We have a very strong competition between parties. We insist that even though our visitors can have contacts with Democratic leaders, they have to deal with us as the U.S. government. We deal with you in the same way. We will consistently mention this in our public statements and in our contacts with those people with whom we meet. At the same time, I cannot fail to mention the fact that our countries have different opinions regarding the Baltics. However, we have discussed that many times before. Gorbachev: However, we remember that you explained and confirmed that you recognize the Baltic republics in the borders of 1939. Baker: Yes, this is so. We are doing everything possible to make sure that our actions in this aspect of our relationship will not lead to an aggravation of the confrontation between the Center and the Baltics. We are in favor of resolving this problem through dialogue and negotiations. We are refusing to recognize the Baltics officially, even though they very much desire it. We are saying that there is no need for such a recognition because we have never annulled our recognition of those states. During more than 40 years the U.S. position has been that we do not recognize the forceful incorporation of the Baltic republics into the USSR. However, we are trying to act with appropriate understanding of the importance of U.S.-Soviet relations. [...] President Bush and I give our most active support to your policies and to you personally. We want you to succeed. We want it as much as you do, and maybe even more. Gorbachev: Not likely. Baker: You are probably right. Then let me be more precise: we want you to succeed very, very much. It is important not only for the USA and the USSR but also for the entire world. 337

Today you often see, including in the press, statements to the effect that President Gorbachev’s policy has shifted to the right. […] We want to believe that those correctives that you introduced to your course are directed exclusively toward ensuring success of the reform and democratization, that there has not been a fundamental change and retreat from your course, that you are not captured by the forces of the past. We want to believe it, and we do believe it. Gorbachev: So do you want to believe or do you actually believe it? Baker: Both. I spoke with President Bush recently and we both came to the conclusion that if you do not change your course, your place in history is guaranteed. [....] Baker: Now I would like to raise one more extremely sensitive issue in the sphere of arms control. I am doing so at the personal request of the president. President Bush raised this issue in a conversation with you, I spoke about it with E.A. Shevardnadze. Possibly Prime Minister Thatcher raised it too. I am talking about our concerns regarding [your] non-compliance with the convention banning bacteriological weapons. Gorbachev: I remember the discussion of this issue at Camp David. It was also raised by John Major in our recent conversation. I told him: give it to us in written form. Baker: I will do that. Gorbachev: We also want our experts to go on an analogous mission. We should compare, what is the difference. Maybe some misunderstanding emerged between us. I understand that this process has different stages, and maybe that is giving rise to some doubts. But we made a principally important decision, and carried out great work. Baker: However, some facts discovered in the course of the trip by our experts only deepened our concerns. I could very briefly present them to you, or maybe to the minister. Gorbachev: We need an official document, where all this is stated. But do I understand you correctly that you would welcome a reciprocal visit by Soviet experts? Baker: In principle, we gave our agreement to it. However, in terms of dates, the trip by your experts would have to be determined by the completion of the first round of visits. I am not at all saying that we retract our initial agreement. But as far as the dates for the reciprocal trip, we have a certain position on this issue, which we already stated firmly during the preliminary discussion with your delegation in London. That is why now, after serious questions emerged in light of what we saw during the trip we would like to resolve those first and only after that organize any additional trips by our experts and trips for your experts to our facilities. Of course, our agreement remains valid in principle. It was given on the basis of the conditions coordinated in London. I would like to give you a list of possible steps the Soviet side could undertake that would allow us to restart the entire process. In addition, I would like to briefly list the facts that caused our concerns. 338

We are talking about the existence in the USSR of a colossal military-biological program, which employs 25,000 people, and [within which] 10 scientificresearch organizations and 20 industrial enterprises were created. Forty percent of its financing comes from the Defense Ministry. The leadership of this program is also military, and 40 percent of the research [projects] are secret. We believe that activities of such scale exceed considerably any possible needs of research on protection from bacteriological weapons. These facilities have a large number of special explosion bunkers for testing the impact of various biological agents on animals. Some of those bunkers are recently built. We do not see any explanation for this fact other than the following: a program for developing the potential for an offensive capability in biological weapons is being carried out. The centers have a large number of stationary and mobile fermenters, which also exceed the needs of defensive research. Besides, we noted extremely high levels of defense around these centers. Gorbachev: Well, we have a strict defensive [regime] in any case. Baker: I will give you a detailed list. Gorbachev: Yes, by all means. It is possible that you are simply not taking into account the extremely high degree of monopolization and concentration of any industry in our country. This originated back in the 1930s, when we, by the way, borrowed some approaches from you. For example, Academician [Yuri] Ovchinnikov has created huge research centers in microbiology, where all activity in this area of the country is concentrated. When the president told me about this problem at Camp David, I requested information from our experts, and proposed, so that there would be no doubts, to organize visits by experts. Maybe it is all fantasy? Baker: No, we do not think so. We were hoping that our visits would alleviate our concerns, but in the end they only deepened them. In many instances, when our experts posed a question, they were told that only the military could give answers. Gorbachev: Okay, give me your list. But do I understand you correctly—you do not want our experts to visit you? Baker: Not now. First of all we have to remove the concerns that emerged in the course of our visits. This issue was raised by us, because we had grounds to believe that the Soviet Union is conducting some activity in violation of the Bacteriological Weapons Convention. The Soviet side raised the issue of strict reciprocity. We agreed to reciprocity, but only in principle. Gorbachev: But now I am having doubts myself. I proposed to your experts to come here, and they did. But you don’t want our experts to come [to the U.S.]. Baker: You can look at how this issue is reflected in the agreement between our delegations. Gorbachev: It is not the legal side that is important here, not the “hooks,” but real politics. But after all, give me your paper, and we will look at it. Baker: We have not informed Congress about this issue yet, but we will have to do it sooner or later. And Congress, as you know, does not keep secrets very well. 339

Gorbachev: We can also say something. Bessmertnykh: I see a danger here. We tried to keep this whole issue and the exchange of visits away from any publicity, keeping in mind that it is extremely sensitive and has to stay confidential. Gorbachev: Yes, and the president talked to me about this topic during our walk, in private. Bessmertnykh: Of course, we should get your paper. As a lawyer, I can tell you that everything you mentioned here is just circumstantial evidence. What kind of argument is this—the program involves many people, big buildings, etc.? What if one were to take your big enterprises, General Motors, for example? Baker: I understand you. And I would like to emphasize that we have been dealing with this issue very quietly, because we understand the great damage that public revelations about it could do to our efforts at arms control. But I think you understand: we cannot not inform Congress about the existence of this problem. Of course we will provide this information during closed sessions, but leaks are quite possible. If we give you the list of our concerns and if you start taking measures to address them, then we would be able to say that these problems do not interfere with our efforts at arms control and do not affect the overall character of Soviet-American relations. Gorbachev: Mr. Secretary of State, your position looks extremely strange to me. This is some kind of unilateral pressure. Baker: We do not have such intentions. Gorbachev: We do not want any misunderstandings [doubts] to be left here. We could have responded to your raising this problem with some “deaf’ paper, but instead we invited you here. Maybe it would have been better not to invite you at all, and then there would be nothing like this. Baker: No, we would have had to inform Congress anyway, because we had these concerns. But then it would have been even worse. And now we at least can say that we drew the Soviet Union’s attention to this issue and the Soviet side is currently taking steps to correct the situation. From the very beginning, we presented concrete data to you and expressed our concerns. And of course, it is good that you invited us to visit your sites. At the least we can say to Congress that the Soviet Union has responded, it did not close the doors to us. It is still possible to save the situation. And we are not saying that your people cannot come. But right now we need to close the first stage. Maybe you could remove our concerns. And then we do not exclude anything, our agreement in principle remains in force. But it is necessary first that you adopt some measures. These are also matters of trust between our countries, questions of abiding by arms control agreements. Gorbachev: I do not like all this. You put us in a situation where we have to report to you on everything you raise on your side. In order to close this issue, I would like to confirm: we are abiding by our agreements and we are ready to carry out an exchange of visits, in order for both sides to be assured of that. 340

And you have no grounds to doubt our compliance with our agreements, or, even more so, to suspect any ill intentions [on our part]. Baker: Are you ready to accept our document? Gorbachev: Yes. Baker: We will do that, and you will give us a response to the issues raised in it, and then we can discuss briefly what the situation is with the visits. Let us do so in a short period of time. Gorbachev: Good. Let us not make a tragedy out of it. It is very unpleasant that such suspicions arise. [Source: Gorbachev Foundation Archive, Fond 1, Opis 1. Published in Gor­ba­ chev, Sobranie sochinenii, v. 25, pp. 39–54. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.]

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Document No. 53: Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Shevardnadze, Washington, 1:40 p.m. – 2:25 p.m. May 6, 1991

Bush meets Shevardnadze in the latter’s unofficial capacity as president of the Foreign Policy Association, a think tank he just created. Shevardnadze resigned as foreign minister in December, warning against approaching dictatorship, and protesting Gorbachev’s turn toward the conservatives. But here he comes to seek support for the embattled reform program. He describes the dismal situation in his country, pointing specifically to economic instability, the crisis with nationalities, and the rising conservative opposition. He regrets that his government was “late” on several critically important issues, especially the Union Treaty: “if we had offered this treaty in 1987 or even 1988, all would have signed it.” But most of all the former foreign minister is “concerned, indeed frightened, by the pause in our relations.” He urges Bush not to delay the next summit and to keep engaging with Gorbachev. The two then discuss the Gorbachev-Yeltsin relationship and wonder why they cannot find a way to work together. Shevardnadze appeals to the president to secure agricultural credits for the Soviet Union and to move quickly on CFE and START in order to spur demilitarization. For Bush, however, finalizing these two treaties remains the primary precondition for holding the summit.

The President: Welcome. I am most interested to hear how it is at home. Jim (Baker) will fill me in on your talks. I am glad you had a chance to meet with the Vice President. When I think of all the hard work we put in on this relationship, I am anxious that it stays strong. Some criticize us for staying too close to Mikhail Gorbachev. We will deal with him with respect and friendship as long as he is President. Still, we are concerned with some of the directions of change. Mr. Shevardnadze: Mr. President, first of all President Gorbachev sends his very warmest greetings. We had extensive discussions before I left. He values his relationship with you. I have three points I wish to make: First, things are really very tough with us. The American public cannot seem neutral to events in the Soviet Union. We have a new relationship, and the whole world has gained as a result. It is a historic achievement. Second, the level of instability in the Soviet Union is a subject of concern for our people, and for the whole world. The instability is now very serious. Economic instability. Today I said we missed the boat on the economy. We had tremendous aspirations during those first years. We knew we had to go to the market, introduce price reform, make a radical shift. 342

But we believed we were not ready. Nobody knew what a market really was. We were late. Now we are in a political conflict, a battle, growing lawlessness. Nationalities. I told Jim about this one. We didn’t do all we should have done. I am not criticizing the President here, but rather myself. We’re offering now a Union Treaty which six republics do not want to sign. If we had offered this treaty in 1987 or even 1988, all would have signed it. Again, we were late. We had an idea, but we felt the people were not ready. It seems we miscalculated. Conservative opposition. We did not take our opposition into account. When we started perestroika and new thinking—which were revolutionary—we should have thought of how to create a constructive opposition. But, because we did not think that way, the result was a conservative opposition. You have conservatives here, but they are of a different type than ours. The President: Here conservative is a good word. Mr. Shevardnadze: They exist—in the apparat, the security services, the army and the party. And they are well-organized. But what of the democratic movement? They have no platform. They consist of people running hither and thither. They have no real structure. In the recent past Gorbachev signed a joint statement [with the nine republics], which is not trivial. Moreover, for good or ill, we have gotten moving on price reform, which was tough. Third, most encouraging is that the democrats have begun to move, after all the problems last year stemming from the lack of a platform and of a [sic] organizational structure. The new democratic movement is not directed against the President, but rather as a defense of the President. All he has now is a right wing to lean on. He needs a stable structure on the left which will give him an alternative to the right. The population is upset now. There are tremendous social frictions stemming from a sense of disappointment. This is a dangerous situation. If we cannot address social problems in the next three to four months people might come out in the streets. They could ask for someone with a strong hand to restore order. Will this affect the international situation? If we can’t stabilize it, then it no doubt will have a strong effect. There will be no need to talk of “new thinking.” I am trying to be realistic. I hope reason will prevail. All of this has an effect on U.S.-Soviet relations. I am concerned, indeed frightened, by the pause in our relations. There are, of course, reasons—the Persian Gulf, for example. We were good partners in the Middle East. Certainly there were times where we had slight disagreements. The President: Those didn’t bother us at all. We understand Mikhail Gorbachev’s position. The Soviet Union stayed with us to the end. Mr. Shevardnadze: I agree. With respect to the pause. As a private person— no one told me to say this, although I did just talk to President Gorbachev. I am 343

simply here to see old friends—I am afraid of the pause. We cannot allow the dynamics of this relationship to slide backwards. Mr. President, no matter what happens in the Soviet Union, U.S.­-Soviet relations will determine the political climate until the end of the century. Mikhail Gorbachev is of the same mind. We should not allow a retreat from the agreements we have achieved. No serious barriers remain on CFE; really only a few pieces of equipment. The remaining issues on START seem to be essentially technical. If we can manage to resolve these two, then we ought to have a summit. If you bear in mind the considerable progress made in the USSR, then you shouldn’t delay any longer. A longer pause would lead to doubts (about the U.S.Soviet relationship), which would not serve either side. The President: I want a summit. The problem is that we have CFE and START as preconditions. That is the way it has evolved. We also have other differences—over the Baltics, grain credits, and others—but these should not stand in the way of a summit. I would like to see the two arms control agreements, and then get on with the Summit. I’d like to do the summit in a way that strengthens Gorbachev. I wish he could make progress on the economy and the republics. The best thing he could do for the Baltics is to free them. That would bring an enormous benefit in terms of public opinion. This is not a sine qua non. If I went to have a summit today, some groups in the US would be upset. That won’t keep me from doing it. What about economic reform? Can we expect more steps soon? Mr. Shevardnadze: He already has taken a couple of steps. Unfortunately many were half-measures. Now we’re living in this crisis situation. We have 3–4–5 months. If we don’t give people basic staple goods then we can expect a crisis from the high prices and empty shelves. We need to get over the next few months. The reforms will continue no matter what. There is no way back. But if the crisis grows worse, dictatorship comes. The President: Yel’tsin stands mainly for the things we like to see: – free the Balts – Cuba – Afghanistan – Radical economic reform So, from what we hear, he shares many of our goals. But why haven’t people rallied around that message? Why can’t Gorbachev and Yel’tsin get together? Is it personal? Is it that Yel’tsin can’t deliver? Mr. Shevardnadze: It is hard to talk about a man until he becomes #1. I know him relatively well. He is talented, energetic, strong. What will happen later? He’s shooting for the top spot. Relations between Yel’tsin and Gorbachev are not simple. The overall situation is that they found the will to begin the dialogue. Many called for this. Look at Gorbachev and Reagan, with the images of the Soviet “evil empire” and the US as a “center for imperialism.” Nonetheless we started a dialogue, so why can’t Yel’tsin and Gorbachev get together? Confrontation is not in the interest of people. 344

The President: Would Yel’tsin be strongly opposed to the military and the KGB? Mr. Shevardnadze: When we talk about the military, it is always in terms of conservative, right-wing forces. I personally know many progressives in the military, especially at middle levels. They have good feelings towards Yel’tsin. There are military offices who support him. The President: It’s hard to sort it all out from here. Indeed there is a tendency to look at the military as a monolith. Mr. Shevardnadze: When they issue orders they are carried out. But there are different points of view [within the army]. Look, for example, at the issue of military reform. The President: If you were here in this chair, what would you do to try to preserve and strengthen the US-Soviet relationship? What two or three things would you like to see me do? Mr. Shevardnadze: I know you wish to support reforms. The most important things are: First, at a minimum we must try to keep our cooperation at the level we have already achieved by moving ahead on CFE and START. This will lead to demilitarization which helps democratization and reforms. Demilitarization is the best way to help the Soviet Union. The threat of instability in the Soviet Union is worse than that posed by Saddam Hussein. The President: So that’s number 1. What else? Mr. Shevardnadze: Second, if I may be frank: develop economic relations. On a specific matter, you supported us last year on farm credits. I know this has now resurfaced. As a citizen I cannot but ask you to do it again. It is not by accident that I say the next few months are critical. We must let people feel something tangible. I know it is hard, but if it is possible, give the credits. The President: The law is quite restrictive on credit­worthiness. There may be ways to get around it. Candidly, I’d like to do it, but it could be hard. Jim, is there any way around this? Secretary Baker: We talked to Eduard about this. The President: Is there no way to secure the loans? I don’t want Mikhail Gorbachev to misunderstand me. I want to do this. There is strong support from our agricultural areas. But credits without market reforms don’t solve any problems. Mr. Shevardnadze: Mr. President, you can’t stop the reforms. Even if we can’t maintain a single Soviet Union, reform will continue. Russia, Kazakhstan, and republics are already doing reform. Up to now the greatest fact was the power of the center. No longer. Reforms will go on. The President: Would any of these credits go to Baltic states? Mr. Shevardnadze: We can set those conditions. I can tell Mikhail Gorbachev it will only work if we divide up the benefits. The President: I think it will only work that way. In terms of U.S. politics, if that could be arranged it would be very helpful. Mr. Shevardnadze: I’ll tell Mikhail Gorbachev. I think we can find a solution. The center and the republics have ties. The republics just declared that they want 345

to be independent. It would be foolish to break off every tie. The republics’ economies will remain closely tied to each other. Their political relationships may change dramatically. The President: Did you talk to Jim Baker about Iraq? Secretary Baker: We talked on Iraq, and on many other aspects of the Middle East situation. The President: Working together in the Middle Easy would help a lot. Was there resentment in the Soviet military about the way we conducted the war? Mr. Shevardnadze: I can’t say that all the Soviet military were resentful. There were people who had a stake in the outcome, and they got upset. For those military advisors who sat in Iraq since 1972, this was a fiasco. The President: We should continue these high-level military-to-military contacts—Akhromeyev and Crowe were a good thing. Moiseyev seemed an interesting fellow. Mr. Shevardnadze: It is a good idea. But we have to be demanding with the military. They meet like good fellows, and tell each other all their secrets. But when it comes time to sign on the dotted line, the balk. They like each other, and are very polite. The cooperation with Akhromeyev, which resulted in very good relations, didn’t give us much. The President: Akhromeyev seems to have moved away from the U.S. I’ve seen some hard-line statements from him. Mr. Shevardnadze: The SOYUZ group in the Congress has some very reactionary people in it. Akhromeyev is in that group. We have to listen to them. Secretary Baker: No one pushes any more the way Eduard did when he was in office. Mr. Shevardnadze: The move from totalitarianism to a government based on laws is tough. SOYUZ and other groups don’t allow diverse discussion. The President: I see I’m behind schedule. It was a joy to have you here. If there is any way we can be of help to you on this trip, please call Jim. I will never forget your personal contribution. If you decide to get back into politics you would find lots of support. Mr. Shevardnadze: I appreciate that. I am grateful to you for all of your cooperation. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA 2000-0429-F by the National Security Archive.]

346

Document No. 54: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, 9:03 a.m. – 9:47 a.m. May 11, 1991

Bush calls Gorbachev after Shevardnadze’s recent visit. Both men express concern about the sense of drift in bilateral relations. This is the first conversation between the two since Gorbachev’s call to Bush on February 23, when he made a last-ditch effort to avoid a ground war in the Persian Gulf. Gorbachev hints at a major decision on the anti-crisis economic plan he will have to make in the coming days and weeks, even the possibility of “very drastic measures.” Bush’s focus is on arms control. He reiterates that finalizing the CFE is a precondition for a summit, and declares that he also wants START to be ready to sign. Gorbachev concurs and says that it should be a “very large-scale summit.” The two leaders talk about China, agreeing that Beijing should not be isolated. However, on the topic most important to Gorbachev—economic assistance—Bush remains uncommitted, citing the need for a new economic reform plan and an emigration bill as preconditions.

The President: Mikhail, this is George Bush. How are you? President Gorbachev: I am very happy to hear your voice. And I am happy that your mild condition is behind you. The President: I’m up at Camp David and I feel good. My heart is perfect and once I get this thyroid under control I will be totally normal. President Gorbachev: Well, George, I hope you will quit jogging several miles every morning and confine yourself to horseshoes. The President: I wanted to talk with you today—I don’t want to see our countries drift apart. I read Matlock’s report and it had me concerned. And when Eduard Shevardnadze was here, he said the same thing. President Gorbachev: My dear George, I thought since we have covered a lot of ground to reach the current state of our relations, that when we reached it, it was well received. So I decided to share my immediate concerns quite sincerely so I could prevent a bad turn in the relationship. The President: Good. First, I remain firmly committed to a strong cooperative relationship with you. I tried to make that clear in my press conference the other day. I know what you stand for. As long as you continue down the reform path with measures like the new agreement with the nine republics, you’ll get nothing but praise from me. Lastly, you are correct. Some in the U.S. want us to pull back now. I don’t want to do that and will not do that. President Gorbachev: I am very happy to hear that. I wish to repeat the phrase you used—I also am firmly committed to cooperation. Acting together we have accomplished a great deal. I am quite convinced we should continue to develop our relations which is in the national interests of the U.S. and USSR. I intend to 347

stand by that approach in the USSR. It enjoys support among people in the USSR but there are some, of course, who have doubts. Of course, we are going through a special transition period. There are new forms of doing things and no ready-made solutions. Some advocate one thing and some another. We will have to go through this period and shape a new life drawing from the experience and support of others. One very important point to share with you is that we are faced with so many difficulties. Virtually all of the republics felt we had to stand together. We are now finishing the anti-crisis program. You know about it. People from all the republics are now in a Moscow suburb working to complete it. So, I want you to understand that it will take an effort to make it succeed. Because there are so many things we simply didn’t know before. There is no guarantee, given the size of the country and its problems, that we may not get something we didn’t expect. I think the biggest mistake would be for us to stop or succumb to pressure or move in reverse. And in this type of situation, I sometimes have to take very drastic measures. So, George, this is what I wanted you to keep in mind. In a normal situation, some of these steps would have been seen as unacceptable. But we have to make allowances for this period. And when I’m looking to you, George, for assistance, it is because I am in this kind of situation. I really need it. And I appreciate the political support and friendly feelings I’ve been getting. My hope is that these feelings will stay unabated. The main thing for you, George, is that you must know I’ve made the choice—there is no alternative for me. I am going to do everything I can to continue moving along the track of renewal. Now this is what I wanted you to know. We are at a very important moment. The specific point is that I will take some major decisions in the next few days and weeks. Well, I’ve been going on for some time now but since we had not spoken in a while, I thought I would be specific about things. The President: Mikhail, if you have time, I want to touch on arms control and economic issues. President Gorbachev: That is what I thought we would do after discussing this general overview. The President: If it is okay with you, I would like to start with arms control. The CFE problem, frankly, is putting a strain on our relationship. Our biggest concern is naval infantry. It is causing a problem not so much here in the Administration but is very difficult across our public opinion. We will see Moiseyev and hope his visit will lead to a rapid solution of this corrosive issue. Having gotten CFE done, I believe we could then get our experts to overcome the difficulties on START. Both of us should make sure that gets done. If we can get a CFE solution, I would be anxious to have a summit this summer and make every effort to get START ready for signature. I think we have narrowed the differences but am anxious to get your views. That is about all I have to say on arms control. 348

President Gorbachev: Well, George, I want you to know I want to resolve quickly the first issue in the near future. Moiseyev will bring something to help push things in that direction. I also share your desire to have a treaty ready to sign. It is simply a duty for us to go ahead with the treaty on fifty percent reductions, especially since we have already accomplished a lot. And, of course, if that goes well, we could have a very large-­scale summit this summer. The President: I would like to do that very much. President Gorbachev: That is my goal too. Of course, we could have an interim meeting if there are delays, but our goal should be a large-scale meeting. The President: I agree with that. President Gorbachev: I also think there is a chance, George, to succeed in our cooperation in the Middle East. Alexander and Jim are moving on the same track. There is a possibility of cooperation there as in the Persian Gulf. The President: I think it is very good that Jim and Sasha are working together. They will meet in Cairo. It is a wonderful arrangement we are talking about. I hope Israel and the Arabs will be cooperative. President Gorbachev: I think if we act together, we can push them in the right direction. The President: At some point, we may have to do so publicly if the BakerBessmertnykh shuttle diplomacy doesn’t work. President Gorbachev: Okay, I agree to give that some thought at a later point. Now within the next three days, I will see the leader of China in Moscow. At the conclusion of this meeting, I will brief you on the visit. Now let me give you my views. We appreciate the role of China on the Persian Gulf—its cooperation there and in other areas. China’s positive decision was well thought out. The President: Our relations with China are strained more than I want. I have the MFN question. There is big opposition in Congress. But I want to find a way to renew their MFN. I don’t want to isolate China. If you can convey that, I would appreciate it. Is Li Peng or Yang Shangkun coming? President Gorbachev: No, Jiang Zemin. I think we can proceed with what we agreed as we talked in the limousine. The President: Right. I would like to talk about economic issues now. President Gorbachev: Yes. The President: One, I know you are in a difficult economic situation. You have explained that at the beginning. In the spirit of frankness, our experts don’t believe Pavlov’s anti­-crisis program will move you fast enough to market reform. If there are more steps toward a market reform effort, then we could do more and help especially with the international financial organizations. I think... Excuse me, go ahead. President Gorbachev: Excuse me for interrupting. The President: I just wanted to say that it would lead quickly to Special Associate Status in the IMF and World Bank. There is also great interest here in the emigration bill that is to be voted on. If that passes and meets internationally acceptable standards, then it would enable us to take steps to normalize the 349

economic relationship; steps such as the trade agreement, and most favored nations status. Then we could go to Congress to repeal the legislative restrictions that make trade and finance so difficult for us. I have several more points but maybe I should stop there for your comments. President Gorbachev: I would like to comment on that, George. Among our pressing problems is stabilizing the economic relationship between regions and even enterprises. There are many pitfalls here. The central and republic authorities are on to this issue and are moving to solve it. This is one of the most pressing tasks at hand. I would call it an emergency task. We have done a lot on the planting campaign in the rural areas and have been rather successful at that. In April, agricultural production was up 3–4 percent compared to last year. But there are still difficulties. We are at the end of spring and summer is coming. Last year’s reserves are depleted and there is still no new harvest so we have some difficulties. On Pavlov’s program, it has been very seriously changed. But, George, you must always bear in mind the realistic context of our society. The overriding focus of the Pavlov program is to fight inflation through drastic fiscal measures and at the same time stimulate entrepreneurship. You know there are many provisions in the Pavlov program for stepped-up privatization and destatization. There is more economic freedom. It is under strong fire from the trade unions and some in the party organizations. Some call it anti-people and even inhuman. And you know, George, you will reach a different conclusion depending on whether or not you look at the Pavlov program from an academic angle or from a realistic context of society. This is no longer just Pavlov’s program by the way since it has been accepted by all the republics. So much for the current situation. On your other points, I wish to propose something else. What if for the purposes of continuing this discussion, I send over Primakov and Yavlinsky to discuss the possibility of cooperation in the G-7 framework and other international organizations? I know that there is emerging cooperation at the G-7 experts level with your people and ours. But even your experts think it is time to elevate these discussions to a governmental level. The President: We could talk about that. But I’m not sure exactly what you mean. President Gorbachev: What I have in mind is that the G-7 will discuss cooperation with the USSR and the place and role of the G-7 in these developments. There is the possibility of Soviet participation in the IMF and participation by the head of the Soviet state in the G-7 session. I’ll send Primakov. He will have a package of items to discuss in a closed session. The President: That is a good idea and I have one to add on agriculture. President Gorbachev: I just received your letter. I welcome the idea and am prepared to join. The President: Would May 20 be too soon for the team to arrive? President Gorbachev: No, it is fine. I will give the appropriate instructions tomorrow. There is much to be done to prepare for his. 350

The President: I think we can be very helpful. I want you to know that I want it to lead to what you need in agricultural credits. President Gorbachev: I welcome this very much. I just got the translation of your letter before our conversation. It is a very exciting idea and very encouraging. And I will appoint tomorrow the people who will start work on this. The President: Good. I will instruct our people to come in a positive frame of mind—to try to help and not find problems but find reasons to help. After that, Mikhail, it seems to me that at the summit we could discuss financial institutions, energy, the environment and housing. We can discuss this at our meeting. President Gorbachev: George, these are important and encouraging subjects. I discussed some of these with Mitterrand. George, I am really happy that we had this substantive conversation. It had been some time since we had a conversation like that. The President: Let me ask you a personal question. How is your health? President Gorbachev: So far, I am hanging tough. The President: That is good. You are my friend and I want to prove that and work with you. I don’t like stories in our press that put you down. I hope you noticed that I took them on in public the other day. President Gorbachev: Well, thank you for those words. I share your approach on this and other issues. I have made a choice, a serious choice on relations with the U.S., providing it is reciprocated, and will follow that course. The President: That is wonderful. It is nice talking to you and good luck. President Gorbachev: Thank you, George, and the same to you. Best regards to all at Camp David, especially Barbara. The President: She just walked in the room and just walked out. She is on her way to the gym. President Gorbachev: I am glad to hear that. The President: Okay. Good-bye. President Gorbachev: Good-bye. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA 1999-0204-F/1 by the National Security Archive.]

351

Document No. 55: Handwritten Memorandum from Hewett for the President: “President Gorbachev’s Remarks on Relations with the U.S.” Circa May 25, 1991

Bush’s senior director for Soviet affairs on the NSC staff, Ed Hewett, reports on his meeting with Gorbachev during his trip to Moscow to discuss the agricultural credits Gorbachev badly needs to proceed with reform. In this description, he finds Gorbachev not a “desperate man” but confident and comfortable with his return to a radical course. At the same time, Gorbachev is clearly “frustrated by what he sees as our reluctance to work with him, and our tendency to ‘move the goal posts.’” Gorbachev believes that some actors within the Bush administration are working intentionally to disrupt U.S.-Soviet cooperation on agriculture and in other spheres. He is “particularly upset at what he sees as our tendency to raise our requirements every time he meets those we have set.” For example, even after the Soviets passed an emigration law, credits were not forthcoming and new conditions were set. Gorbachev “clearly expects now not only supportive words, but material support.”

On May 25, 1991, Undersecretary of Agriculture Richard Crowder, Assistant Secretary of State Eugene McAllister and I met for 2 ½ hours with President Gorbachev to discuss the results of our study of the food situation and the food distribution system in the [Soviet Union]. Gorbachev was accompanied by Yevgeny Primakov, Deputy Prime Minister Senko, and Stepan Sitarian (nominated, but not yet confirmed, as a deputy prime minister). USSR. A separate memo outlines our conclusions about the Soviet food distribution system and ways we could cooperate with the Soviets to speed the move toward markets. In the course of the conversation President Gorbachev expressed deep concerns over the state of US-Soviet relations. These concerns, which are similar in tone, but more extensive, than those he expressed to Ambassador Matlock three weeks ago, were clearly intended for you to hear. I report his remarks without comment. While the tone of these remarks is serious, Gorbachev looked rested, was in a generally good mood (except at the end when we discussed food credits), and exhibited his usual sense of humor. These are not the remarks of a desperate man; on the contrary, he seems comfortable with his return to a radical course, and with the progress he is making with the republics. But they are the remarks of a man frustrated by what he sees as our reluctance to work with him, and our tendency to “move the goal posts.” 352

President Gorbachev believes you are under tremendous pressure from the right to let him fail. He wondered out loud how genuine our stated desire was to cooperate with the USSR on agriculture, noting that it might better serve the purpose of some—the US if the Soviet Union remained dependent on food imports from the US. He expressed gratitude that you and Secretary Baker have resisted these pressures and stood by him. But he still wonders whether others in the White House are out to undermine the relationship. He provided little evidence to support his impressions, but what he did say was illuminating. – He was stung by our efforts to stop the Soviet-French fiber optic deal. He sees us using COCOM here to hold back our competitors. “If,” Gorbachev said, “you want part of the business, then join up with the French.” – Our response to his request for grain credits seems to genuinely mystify him. From his point of view, he is living up to the long-term agreement, he pays his bills, and he buys food from American farmers. He particularly needs it now, and we’re balking. He pointed out that this is the only major economic tie we have, and now we’re threatening to cut even that one off. – He is convinced we asked all US embassies to check up on Soviet food purchases from other countries. He wondered if you were even aware this was happening, or if “other groups” were doing this without your knowledge. Neither Undersecretary Crowder or I know of any such effort and we told him so. Gorbachev is particularly upset at what he sees as our tendency to raise our requirements every time he meets those we have set. “We adopted the immigration law,” he said, “and now the US finds another obstacle to our cooperation.” Now you say only if “real” reforms are undertaken can we cooperate. The President bristled at unspecified instances, where he feels like we have told him what to do. “We did not complain when you choose that well known anti-Soviet Robert Gates to head the CIA, although it hardly pleased us.” President Gorbachev was clearly not expecting full responses to these remarks. Indeed at one point he looked at me and said he was saying these things so that “the President’s special assistant” could hear them first hand. I did point out to him that he had Bob Gates wrong, to which he responded with a smile, “fine, I have my opinion of Robert Gates, you have your opinion of Kryuchkov.” I also used my own appointment as evidence that you were quite serious about supporting perestroika, noting that I had worked for years with some of his advisers in their efforts to devise a successful reform package. He took all that in without comment. Gorbachev emphasized on several occasions during the 2 ½ hours that it was necessary to preserve the “choice we have made” in the US-Soviet relationship. He said he would fight to save the relationship even if you would not. He believes he is moving as quickly as is prudent to create a market economy, and that 353

we should not be so sure we understand his society that we can tell him how rapidly he should move to the new system. He assured us the USSR is ready for further integration into the world economy, and indeed eager for it. It is, Gorbachev feels, as much in our interest as it is his that the effort succeed. He clearly expects now not only supportive words, but material support. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through Mandatory Review request 2011-0412-MR by the National Security Archive.]

354

Document No. 56: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, 4:30 p.m. – 4:49 p.m. May 27, 1991

Bush calls his Soviet counterpart to urge him to move ahead on the START and CFE treaties, repeatedly making resolution of the last remaining differences on both documents a precondition for the summit in Moscow: “I hope we can solve CFE and START and that I can then come to Moscow. That would be a historic step and I very much want to come to Moscow. Mikhail, I really want to come there.” At this time, the Soviet military is backtracking on CFE and moving equipment from the European part of the Soviet Union to the Urals in order to avoid limits agreed to in November 1990. Gorbachev raises the issue of economic assistance and Bush promises to discuss it with his envoys, Yevgeny Primakov and Grigory Yavlinsky, during their upcoming trip to Washington. He also says he will “do whatever is possible to get over the limits” of agricultural credits—music to Gorbachev’s ears.

President Gorbachev: Hello, Mr. President. The President: Mikhail, how are you? I am calling to say that I really would like to go to a summit if we can reach an agreement on CFE and get a START agreement. President Gorbachev: George, I very cordially greet you. And I would like to say that both of us have a lot of work in Moscow and in Washington. Since we both have a lot of work, I hope there will be good results for both of us. I am pleased we are in touch and working hard. I hope you can hear me well, George (there were phone line difficulties throughout the call). The President: I am wondering if you have received my letter to you on General Moiseyev’s visit. I know you have so many other things on your mind, and I want you to know I’m with you. I don’t mean to press you on the CFE but I am eager to get past this obstacle. First, I want to reiterate directly what I said in my letter about General Moiseyev. He showed real statesmanship and, I think, has helped prepare a solution. He also impressed me with his commitment to our relationship and to what you stand for. President Gorbachev: Yes, I received it. The Moiseyev visit was good. I appreciated the attention you gave to it. I hope that in Lisbon Bessmertnykh and Baker will be able to wrap up that work. The President: Moiseyev is a statesman and I knew that as a military man he had good reasons to say what he did. He described his core problem. He would rather not take 1100 pieces of equipment in the naval infantry, especially another 753 armored vehicles, out of service. As I said in my letter, he had practical military arguments for his view. But the issue transcends this equipment. This CFE problem is an obstacle to the summit. 355

President Gorbachev: I considered carefully your points. I listened to Moiseyev’s report and instructed my people on the basis of your letter to urgently prepare a proposal for Lisbon. I hope they will be able to solve it. The President: I hope we can solve CFE and START and that I can then come to Moscow. That would be a historic step and I very much want to come to Moscow. Mikhail, I really want to come there. President Gorbachev: That coincides with what we want. That would be an enormous historical step forward. That is the way it will be and we should assume we must move to complete work on START. The President: Moiseyev said the differences between us are very narrow and I agree with him. President Gorbachev: I do too. I think there will be a solution in Lisbon. The President: By the way, Primakov and Yavlinskiy will be in town this week and we will discuss with them economic issues in general and credit guarantees. President Gorbachev: I think Primakov will give you a more detailed idea of what I had in mind during our last call. The concept of cooperation at this critical phase in reform and critical passage in our process of change is important. The President: When Primakov and Yavlinskiy return to Moscow, I am sure they will communicate the results of their meetings. President Gorbachev: Yes, George, I very much hope we will cooperate at this very important phase in our reform process. The President: We will discuss with Primakov not only broad issues, but also in particular the credit issue. We are leaning forward and are not stepping away from you. We want to strengthen the general relationship and I do really want to come to Moscow. President Gorbachev: George, I think we must both be pragmatic and practical and take a long-term view. This is a unique chance which we must not miss. If we do, then I think we will miss quite a lot. The President: I appreciate your meeting with our agricultural team. I will be talking with them. Brent Scowcroft has talked to them briefly. They have some good ideas you and I could pursue together. President Gorbachev: They had a good visit and good discussions here. They have some facts and material to analyze and certain conclusions that were interesting for me to hear. I can see you have sent competent and constructive people. Therefore our discussion was meaningful. The President: Well, I am glad they had a good visit with you. You know Mikhail, as far as credits in general, there are some limits. When it comes to grain in particular, the Soviets will always be good for it. We’ll do whatever is possible to get over the limits. President Gorbachev: Mr. President, yes I am also hopeful. I am pleased to hear what you have just said. You don’t know how happy that makes me, especially that last line. (At this point, Gorbachev said but his interpreter did not translate: Can I quote you as having said that?) 356

The President: We wish you all well. I hope we meet soon in Moscow and have a long discussion because there is a lot to talk about. President Gorbachev: Yes, I think both of us feel the summit is possible and what is most important, is necessary. I would like to wish you and your family, especially Barbara, the best. Please tell that to Barbara. The President: Please send my greetings to Raisa and your family. We want to support the relationship. We have to talk again soon and keep up contacts often. I want to say that here I am not playing games. We will do everything we can to support you. President Gorbachev: I very much appreciate what you have just said and I could repeat the same words and say that to you. Goodbye. The President: Goodbye. Thanks a million. And let’s get that conventional arms treaty thing resolved. I really want to go to Moscow. (After the President left the line, Gorbachev and his interpreter stayed on the line unsure if the conversation had ended. After asking if it had, Gorbachev asked his interpreter when he could get him a transcript of the conversation. The interpreter said he would do so at 8:00 a.m. May 28. Gorbachev then said he thought it had been a very interesting call, full of substantial content.) [Source: George H.W. Bush Library.]

357

Document No. 57: Letter from Bush to Gorbachev June 19, 1991

This “eyes only” letter raises once again (see Document 122) the very sensitive subject both sides have tried to keep from public and congressional attention—the Soviet military biological weapons program. The president informs Gorbachev that the congressional leadership has now been briefed on the subject and expects him to take concrete steps to show compliance with the 1969 Biological Weapons Convention. Gorbachev tried to address the issue within the Soviet leadership starting in 1986, but his efforts met with resistance and obfuscation on the part of the military and civilian bureaucracies. Soviet experts were convinced the United States also had a secret program and insisted on full reciprocity of inspections. In this letter, Bush reiterates earlier U.S. demands that the USSR come clean on its past and present activities and open its facilities to international inspection, or both countries will face a problem of “great dimensions and consequences.” The letter prompts Gorbachev to ask for an official report from his chief military adviser, Marshal Akhromeyev.

Dear Mikhail: You and I have been able to speak frankly to each other about a number of subjects in the past and have been able to find solutions to difficult problems. You made a decisive step on CFE that has allowed all 22 nations to put that matter behind us. The steps I have proposed on START are offered in an earnest effort to reach final agreement as soon as possible on a treaty that we could sign at a summit. Your response to my letter demonstrates your personal commitment to these same goals. There remains, however, a serious problem that I first raised with you a year ago at the Washington Summit—the Soviet biological weapons program. Prime Minister Thatcher has spoken about this with you as well. And Jim Baker has discussed it with you and with Ministers Shevardnadze and Bessmertnykh several times. Based on Soviet assurances that you no longer had such a program, we deferred briefing our Congress until after the visit to several Soviet facilities earlier in the year by a team of U.S. and U.K. experts. But the visit reinforced rather than diminished our concerns that the Soviet Union has a military biological weapons program whose nature and scope go far beyond any legitimate defensive needs permitted by the biological warfare convention. In the spirit of frankness and good will that has characterized our communications, I must tell you directly that this is a problem that you must solve before it jeopardizes what we are both trying to achieve in our relationship. Contrary to the claims of Soviet experts, the Soviet Union has a large-scale, offensively-oriented program to develop biological weapons in contravention of an international 358

treaty. You and I cannot ignore this fact without risking all that we have accomplished and hope to achieve in our steadily improving relationship. There is only one solution: for the Soviet Union to dismantle this program and provide concrete evidence that it is doing so. Otherwise, we are facing a treaty compliance problem of grave dimensions and consequences. We have done everything possible over the last year to help you solve this problem, but with little apparent progress. With CFE ready for review by our Senate and a START Treaty within reach, this problem now takes on increased urgency. The Congressional leadership has now been briefed about the Soviet program. With its role in approving arms control agreements and other important legislation that will be key to many other aspects of our cooperation, Congress will not ignore Soviet biological weapons activities. There is a very real chance that the Senate will not ratify either treaty unless and until the Soviet Union begins to dismantle its biological weapons program. I am willing to take additional steps now if it will help you solve this problem. I am prepared to have my experts meet with yours as soon as possible to discuss in detail our findings at the facilities they have visited thus far and remedial steps that could be taken by the Soviet Union, as summarized in the papers Jim Baker gave to Sasha Bessmertnykh in March. After that meeting of experts, and again in the spirit of helping you resolve this matter, the United States would be willing to host a visit of a Soviet team to U.S. facilities, before U.S. experts conduct additional visits to Soviet facilities of concern. The visits in the United States would demonstrate how biological research can be conducted in full compliance with the treaty. In the meantime, I urge you to waste no time in taking steps to terminate the Soviet biological weapons program. Please let me know if you are ready to undertake the experts meeting and subsequent visits I have proposed so that we can begin to put this matter behind us. George Bush [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA by the National Security Archive.]

359

Document No. 58: Memorandum from Scowcroft for the President: “Meeting on Soviet Economic Issues and the London Economic Summit” June 20, 1991

In this memo, National Security Adviser Scowcroft summarizes the main points for discussion at the meeting scheduled for the next day to discuss Soviet economic issues and the upcoming London economic summit. One of the main topics is “whether or not the U.S. should prepare a more ambitious strategy for the London summit that promises Western support for Soviet adherence to and implementation of a truly wide-ranging economic reform program.” Just recently, Harvard scholar Graham Allison and leading Soviet economist Grigory Yavlinsky proposed a “Grand Bargain” reform program that would follow all the main liberal guidelines but require major international financial support. The government-sponsored Anti-Crisis plan is seen as unacceptable, but there is not much trust in the Yavlinsky plan either. Scowcroft weighs in on the side of caution. Regarding the London summit, his concern is that Kohl “may well push for substantial financial aid [to the Soviet Union] with no political or economic conditionality, and the French and Italians would likely follow the German lead.” The U.S. did not want to be left looking stingy. Knowing that Kohl was about to go to Moscow, Bush called him on June 24 to make sure he was not going to provide excessive commitments to Gorbachev.

I. PURPOSE

In preparation for the London Summit, to review with your key advisors the U.S. approach to Gorbachev’s call for Western economic assistance to support internal reform efforts. This meeting should result in decisions on two key issues. First, when and how you should announce the current package of trade and technical assistance measures. Second, whether or not the U.S. should prepare a more ambitious strategy for the London summit that promises Western support for Soviet adherence to and implementation of a truly wide-ranging economic reform program. II. BACKGROUND

Soviet Economic Reform Debate The current debate in the USSR on economic reform pits Pavlov and the AntiCrisis Plan against the just announced Yavlinskiy/Harvard plan. The Anti-Crisis Plan relies on centralized decision making and official decrees to generate the move to a market economy. We told Primakov that this would not work. The 360

Yavlinskiy plan presents a much more realistic approach on the policy reform side, incorporating the standard policy adjustments required of countries in economic crisis. However, this approach sets unrealistic requirements for Western support of each stage of reform. While some reports indicate that Gorbachev is looking seriously at Yavlinskiy’s reform plan, it already faces strong opposition from hardliners, including Prime Minister Pavlov. Current U.S. Response Currently, the U.S. response to Soviet calls for aid to further economic reform consists of a package of measures designed to normalize our economic relationship with the USSR: (1) sending the trade agreement to the Hill and granting the Soviets MFN; (2) repealing Congressional restrictions on EXIM and OPIC; (3) expanding technical assistance with $20 million in Congressional funding; (4) special associate status at the IMF and World Bank. We would also include a new Peace Corps program for the USSR and special projects on food distribution, energy and defense conversion. Secretary Baker announced some of this package on Tuesday in Berlin. There is interagency agreement on all elements of this package, with the exception of the Peace Corps. We have not yet presented Peace Corps for interagency review. While this package will create a basis for expanded trade and investment, it cannot by itself galvanize a massive Soviet restructuring of its economy. Technical assistance will help particular sectors of the economy, but the payoff will only come in the medium to long term. Nonetheless, the package demonstrates your commitment to improving our bilateral relationship and would be well received by Gorbachev. Were the Soviets to take full advantage of this package, they would receive critically needed advice in restructuring their economy while receiving assistance that would help reduce the need for food and other imports and help promote energy exports. Issue for Decision: Whether you should announce the entire package, including sending the trade agreement to Congress and granting MFN, in a speech before you go to London or wait for the London Summit itself. I recommend that you announce the package in a speech before London to strengthen your position with Gorbachev and your G-7 colleagues before the meetings. A Possible Initiative for the Summit In London, individual G-7 heads will probably come prepared to give Gorbachev a cautious, conditioned response with no promise of large amounts of financial assistance. However, they may find themselves, when face to face with him, inclined to do more. Kohl, for example, may well push for substantial financial aid with no political or economic conditionality, and the French and Italians would likely follow the German lead. The absence of conditionality would 361

result in wasted resources and do nothing to encourage the transition to a market economy. In these circumstances, you may wish to seize the initiative—and thereby prevent a Summit split on this key issue—by preparing a more ambitious strategy. Under one possible alternative, the U.S. and G-7 could indicate a willingness to consider mobilizing substantial financial assistance to the USSR if the Soviets work closely with the IMF to design and put into action a far-reaching economic reform program. It is unrealistic to expect the Soviets to produce such a plan themselves. A brief description of one such possible initiative is at Tab C. Secretary Brady is not necessarily opposed to a more ambitious strategy, and may come to the meeting with some specific ideas of his own. Others may also offer alternatives. Issue for Decision: Whether or not we should be prepared with a more ambitious response to Gorbachev in London. If so, the NSC, State, Treasury, and OMB should develop such a strategy for your consideration next week. [...] [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA 2000-1933-F by the National Security Archive.]

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Document No. 59: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, 10:00 a.m. – 10:38 a.m. June 21, 1991

Right after the meeting on Soviet economic issues, Bush receives a phone call from Gorbachev. The day before, Bush tried to call Gorbachev but they were unable to connect. Yeltsin had been in Washington, and Gorbachev was eager to hear about his rival’s visit—and to brief Bush on the progress of Soviet economic reform. Bush comments on Yeltsin’s cooperative attitude toward Gorbachev and mentions that he “made it very clear [to Yeltsin] that you are our man. That is my obligation and I am personally pleased to work with you as President of the USSR.” Gorbachev thanks Bush for contacting him through Jack Matlock with information about a possible coup against him, but assures the president that “this is 1000 percent impossible.” (Almost exactly two months later, the August putsch occurs.) When Gorbachev begins discussing economic reform, Bush expresses his desire to avoid “confrontation over the economic question [at the London summit]. I don’t want to be crosswise with our European partners.” Bush suggests they talk more before the summit—hoping to lower Gorbachev’s expectations for financial aid.

The President: Mikhail, can you hear me? President Gorbachev: Yes. The President: Please go ahead. Is this your call or were you returning my call of yesterday? President Gorbachev: George, I recognized your voice immediately and send you my cordial greetings. I am very sorry that we couldn’t talk yesterday. It was the result of some confusion. I feel uncomfortable that we couldn’t talk. So, I had to punish some people here for that! The President: No problem at all. Yeltsin was here and he suggested that we call you. He made statements in support of you, by the way. It was his idea and it was understandable it couldn’t be done on short notice. President Gorbachev: Good. Are you pleased by your meeting with Yeltsin? The President: Yes I am, more so than in our previous meeting. He came with a big democratic victory. In private meetings and in public he said he was working with you. We worried frankly that there might be a difference so broad between you that we might be in a delicate situation. But as your Ambassador undoubtedly reported, I made it very clear that you are our man. That is my obligation and I am personally pleased to work with you as President of the USSR. I think he understood and I hope your Ambassador reported it that way. I said this inside the meeting as well as outside. President Gorbachev: Yes, indeed, that is true George. 363

George, I would like to say on this basis that I have every reason to value your position and you personally. Your association and attitudes help us to pursue this difficult process of reforming our country. I would also like to say that over the years we have created value in the relationship for all of us and that this creates responsibility for us. I particularly value your attitude on practical developments such as finalizing the CFE problem and agreeing to move on START. You responded to my personal appeal on food and found a solution. I wrote to you and found your response to be very satisfactory. And I appreciate it. Now I am preparing for our meeting in London with the G-7, our collective meeting and for our one on one. I would like to take this opportunity to speak about the current domestic situation. I felt you may have been concerned about the internal situation here and I appreciate that concern. What is happening here in our political institutions and in public opinion is that Perestroika and reform have reached a stage that we feel we must move faster and more decisively. We have gone far to dismantle the old forms of life and now have to go quickly on 1) economic reform; and 2) on relations between the center and the republics. And the most important fact is that, while six months to a year ago the people were not ready for change, they are now ready and are pushing us forward. We are currently preparing and implementing major decisions and reforms on property, market infrastructure and the union treaty. There is a new attitude too in favor of cooperation with western countries. The aim is to make that cooperation part of integrating the USSR into the world economy. What is also very important is that, within our society, I feel there is a desire and an intention for consensus and national accord to cooperate on the difficult problems we have to address in the coming months. I will do my best to make sure that this process is not sidetracked. I will make sure it gains momentum. So in that sense I value highly the recent development in my relations with Boris Yeltsin. Over the past few days there was an attempt in the Supreme Soviet by a group of reactionary deputies to create problems. I spoke today in the Supreme Soviet and resolved the problem in a decisive way and really got support. And the people against me got a thrashing from the other deputies today. So, George, I think for the time being that is a good enough report to you on events in the USSR. We will soon meet and talk. In the meantime ... The President: All right. First, that was a very helpful report. I just read an Agence France Presse story on your meeting in the Supreme Soviet. That was a very strong message you gave them. And I wonder whether that had a connection with the message Matlock passed to you yesterday. I would like to explain how that came about. President Gorbachev: George, I told the Ambassador to reassure him and you that this is 1000 percent impossible. The President: That’s good. I conveyed the message to Yeltsin at the specific request of Popov. And I did so but I wanted you to understand I was not trying to interfere in internal matters. But I felt it was important you be informed. 364

President Gorbachev: Well, I regarded that as a gesture of concern and trust on your part. I took the occasion to convey the information you needed. Let me say, George, in a direct way that we are in a decisive stage and my assessment is the greater force is on our side. I still understand we have to be concerned by the financial and economic situation of the country. It creates a situation where certain forces try to denigrate and frustrate our process of reform. They may try but they will not succeed. The President: We talked here this morning, we had a big meeting, on the Economic Summit in London. Frankly, one of the reasons I want to move fast on START is to be able to talk with you about the realities on our side. I would love to have a Camp David-like chat about the economic problems of the USSR and then about our own problems and what we may or may not be able to do. President Gorbachev: George, but I think we will find time to talk in London. The President: Yes, no question. I am determined to do so. President Gorbachev: Yes. The President: We won’t blindside you. But it is very important that the G-7 be seen to be progressing and understanding as opposed to confrontation over the economic question. I don’t want to be crosswise with our European partners. So, we are having what we call our “Sherpa” meetings with the other six countries. I would like to suggest that before the G-7 meeting, I will be in touch with you or Baker with Bessmertnykh. We will give you our latest thinking so we don’t blindside or embarrass you. And we can give you an idea of what the Europeans are thinking. At the start of the conversation you said you were calling me back. I would welcome your calling anytime and I will feel free to call you if there is anything to report. President Gorbachev: George, yes, I appreciate this remark and we will talk one or two times. The President: That sounds good to me. Thank you for the call. The Yeltsin visit has done nothing to embarrass the Center. I think it is coming out that Yeltsin is prepared to work with you. Our concern before the visit was that it would focus on the difficulties between you and Yeltsin. Those fears have been allayed. Read the U.S. press on this. He handled it well and I hope you think that we have. I want to do nothing to undermine you there. In the meantime, we will.... President Gorbachev: Let me say, as I have said recently, that Yeltsin has taken a constructive position. I responded fully and am committed to expand cooperation with him and there are no obstacles. But of course sometimes we are pressed and he is too. He has to stick to this position of cooperation. The President: Let me tell you that I am going off in a few hours to Camp David to play horseshoes. I hope you have a good restful weekend. President Gorbachev: Please throw one for me. The President: You own the Camp David record—the first guy to throw a ringer on his first throw. President Gorbachev: Is this recorded in the history of Camp David? The President: Yes, the picture of you is still there. 365

President Gorbachev: Thank you, George. I think we have had a meaningful talk in the spirit of partnership and friendship. Please give my best to your associates and to Barbara from me and Mrs. Gorbachev. The President: We will do that. One last word and then I promise I will let you go. This will be the last sentence. It relates to Bob Strauss. When I was Chairman of the Republican party in 1973–74, Strauss was Chairman of the opposition party. He is still a strong Democrat. He is a very constructive individual given this time of economic problems. He is constructive, progressive and I think he will be of help to you if you are interested. He is not a diplomat and doesn’t have the language. You will find him engaging and plugged in to the Congress and my Administration. He has my confidence and that of Jim Baker. President Gorbachev: George, I would like to say that here in the USSR diplomatic and political circles, we have heard all positive feelings about this appointment. He will have my full support and attention as the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow. The President: Okay, good-bye. President Gorbachev: I wish you all the best and shake your hand. Good-bye. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA 2000-0429-F by the National Security Archive.]

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Document No. 60: Letter from Bush to Gorbachev Circa Early July 1991

One of Gorbachev’s priorities for the summer of 1991 was to be invited to the G-7 summit in London so that he could address key world leaders with an appeal to help Soviet reform and convince them that the program will work. Gorbachev was hoping the USSR could join the IMF and the World Bank as a full member and that his commitment to market reform would yield major international support at the G-7. Bush was initially reluctant to invite Gorbachev to the summit, precisely because it might put Washington on the spot while they were unwilling to commit to providing financial assistance. Margaret Thatcher and François Mitterrand were the main proponents for inviting Gorbachev. In this letter, written after Bush’s conversation with Helmut Kohl on July 8, to which the letter refers, Bush tries to play down Gorbachev’s expectations and to channel his requests away from the United States and toward the IMF and World Bank. Bush suggests that Gorbachev apply for associate status, which would give Moscow access to the staff and experience of both organizations, and in turn help the USSR draw up a “comprehensive economic reform program,” and “apply methodologies developed in devising programs for other economies.” Bush promises technical cooperation on several fronts such as setting up wholesale food markets and advising on defense conversion, but there is no hint of an assurance on financial aid. At the end of the letter, Bush advises Gorbachev not to raise the issue of restructuring or rescheduling of the Soviet national debt (which Soviet experts believe is badly needed) at the London meeting because it is “likely to be seen in the international community as an act of default.”

Dear Mikhail: On the eve of the London meetings I want to outline my thinking on what the G-7 countries, and in particular the U.S., can do to support your efforts to reform the Soviet Union. You and I will have a chance to talk briefly at lunch before the afternoon session, but I thought it might be useful for me to lay out my approach beforehand. Helmut Kohl called and summarized for me the main points of your meeting with him in the Ukraine, and it appears that your thinking about London mirrors ours. I want to emphasize that my G-7 counterparts and I are united in a desire to see reforms succeed in the Soviet Union. Market reforms and democratization are not just in your interest, but also in the world’s best interests. It is for that reason that I and the other G-7 leaders actively support and are prepared to help the reform process in your country. Although we have an interest in the success of Soviet reforms, we also know that Soviets, not outsiders, will determine the fate of reform. It will be primarily Soviet resources, not imported resources, which will serve as the basis for a 367

successful turnaround in the economy. At best the industrialized countries can make a difference only if there is a strong, unmistakable, commitment in the USSR for democracy and markets. Even then, as the experience in Eastern Europe is showing us, the road ahead is not easy. The decisive consideration here, it seems to me, is the clear commitment to a market economy. We in the United States believe in markets and private property because they have assured our prosperity, and we are convinced they will do the same for you. If you are convinced that a market economy is a solution to your problems, then we can help you establish it in the USSR. But if you still feel that a quick move to markets is too risky, and that therefore it is necessary to retain for some period administrative controls along the lines outlined in the Anti-Crisis Program, then it will be more difficult for us to be helpful. If you are fully committed to market reforms, then I would propose we move forward simultaneously in several areas. First, it is necessary to establish a relationship that will enable you to design a reform program for your country that enjoys international credibility. That is best done by working directly with the IMF and the World Bank, both of which have vast experience in designing such programs, and both of which are familiar with the Soviet economic situation as a result of the study of your economy they undertook last year at the behest of the G-7 leaders. This is the thinking behind my proposal for “Special Associate” status for the USSR at the IMF and the World Bank. “Special Associate” status would provide immediate access to the experienced staff of these institutions. The relationship would begin with an exchange of data and an intensive review of recent developments and current policies, which we hope would shortly provide the basis for the development of a comprehensive economic reform program. In the process of drawing up the program you would be able to apply methodologies developed in devising programs for other economies. This would help you to identify the key elements of a successful program, including how your own abundant resources could be put to best use to ensure the success of your efforts. You have, it seems to me, significant reserves to draw on in your reform efforts, including a large gold stock, and the possibility to reduce dramatically defense expenditures and foreign aid flows. The resulting program would testify to an all-out effort on your part to mobilize your own resources to the fullest possible extent. Such a program would enhance international confidence in your approach to dealing with your economic problems, and would greatly assist you in attracting foreign investment and other sources of foreign capital. If you agree that this makes sense, and the other G-7 leaders support this approach, then the IMF and the World Bank can start to work immediately after London, so that no time is lost. The G-7 leaders would naturally be very interested in this process, and I would certainly want to be helpful to it. Of course the bulk of the work would be done by you and the international institutions. At the same time that we launch this process, I also want to begin expanding our mutual efforts to make progress in particular sectors where you can show 368

fairly quick and obvious results. I know how important it is to have some early demonstrations of success. – Secretary of Agriculture Ed Madigan is following up on the Food Mission I sent in May, and he will soon be coming to you with proposals to bring over a primarily private-sector delegation to help a few key cities set up wholesale food markets on a demonstration basis. Successes here could bring a quick improvement in the food situation. – We are working with your people to find a good time to [sic] for Deputy Secretary Donald Atwood to bring over some of our leading defense industrialists to explore defense conversion with leaders of your defense-industrial complex. In the meantime, Japan will be sending a team to the Soviet Union this month to start a dialogue on defense conversion. We will have several U.S. officials participating in that team. – We have sent several missions over this summer to work with government and industry officials in your energy sector to help you devise a strategy for attracting more energy investment. This is an area with significant potential for early hard currency returns. By moving now to provide you technical assistance in these areas, we can demonstrate early results from reforms, which will be important in sustaining popular support for the entire reform process. In the corning months I will be working with you to find other areas where we can be of help, and I look forward to your ideas on where we can make a difference. The efforts to make progress in key individual sectors, while separate from the overall process of devising a reform strategy, are at the same time closely linked to that strategy. Privatization of the food distribution system will only be truly successful if the government stands behind an aggressive program to introduce markets which gives the “green light” to locally-based entrepreneurs. Western firms will only invest heavily in Soviet energy when it is clear who owns the energy resources, and how they can get their profits out of any investment they make. Defense conversion will move ahead quickly when Soviet defense firms find there is a real market, promising good profits, for whatever new products they can develop. One final point. Some of your advisors have suggested that you may wish to raise the issue of debt restructuring or rescheduling at the meeting. Before you take the step of raising this important issue, you should consider the possible repercussions. A formal request for debt rescheduling is likely to be seen in the international community as an act of default. One immediate effect will be to cut the Soviet Union off from international credit. My advice is that you make every effort to avoid such a disruption in your relationship with the international financial community at this critical time. Instead, I believe you should concentrate on working with the IMF and the World Bank on a credible economic reform package that will command support around the world. Mikhail, I very much look forward to our meeting in London, and to working with you in devising a process supportive of your efforts to reform the Soviet 369

Union. Your perestroika has transformed Soviet politics and foreign policy. I and my G-7 counterparts stand ready to support your efforts over time to bring that same revolutionary transformation to the Soviet economy. Sincerely, [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA 1999-0303-F by the National Security Archive.]

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Document No. 61: Letter from Gorbachev to Bush July 14, 1991

Before going to the G-7 summit, Gorbachev wants to clear up the delicate issue of bioweapons, discussed furtively at previous meetings. Following Gorbachev’s request, Akhromeyev submits a report on the Soviet programs on July 13 that concludes the Soviet Union has not violated the 1972 convention banning such weapons, but that the convention did not draw clear boundaries between prohibited activities and research for defense against similar weapons, nor did it contain a proper verification mechanism. Gorbachev writes to Bush, “I would like to reaffirm that the USSR has no program for developing biological or toxin weapons.” He suggests that there should be meetings of experts to exchange opinions “on such issues as the types of activities permitted or prohibited under the Convention, the types and quantities of microbiological or biological agents and toxins, as well as instruments and equipment, permitted for protection purposes.” He believes the two sides should work out a verification mechanism for the convention. He also asks Bush to allow a Soviet delegation to visit the relevant U.S. sites.

Unofficial translation Dear George, I have carefully studied your letter of June 19, 1991 regarding biological weapons. We have indeed started a frank dialogue on a broad range of subjects in the course of which we were able to reach a number of important decisions. As a result, it became possible to radically change the contents and the spirit of the relations between our two countries, which had a favourable effect on the overall situation in the world. It is important that we sustain and develop our interaction and remove the remaining problems in the relations between our countries. I must admit being preoccupied by the fact that questions which both our sides have with regard to compliance with the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons still remain unresolved. I agree with you that this problem should be settled and that everything should be done to make both sides confident that the Convention is being fully complied with. I am convinced that the course we have embarked upon this year, one of reaching a high-level agreement on exchanging visits to facilities that cause concern, is the right one. Nothing but openness and straightforwardness will help resolve this complex question. It was in this spirit that we arranged a visit by U.S. and British experts to four of our facilities last January. During that visit our guests had unrestricted access to any buildings at the facilities and a possibility to talk with the personnel, they were provided briefings on all questions raised 371

concerning operation of those facilities, and were allowed to take pictures and to take and remove samples. With this degree of openness, it is unclear why the U.S. experts concluded upon departure that “the visit has reinforced rather than diminished U.S. concerns”. I do not think we should be too receptive to the reasoning of those who have no interest in promoting trust and openness in Soviet-U.S. relations and who opposed such visits from the outset. I would like to reaffirm that the USSR has no program for developing biological or toxin weapons. We expect to receive confirmation that there is no such program in the United States either. However there is yet another aspect to this question. Regrettably, we still have no agreement as to the boundary between activities permitted by the Convention to defend against such weapons and prohibited activities aimed at their development. Until such criteria exist, suspicions regarding activities limited by the Convention are likely to arise from time to time. To avoid this, it is necessary jointly to develop such objective standards, taking into account the differences in levels of technological development as well as in the history of biological research in our two countries. This is not an easy task, yet unless we resolve it and on this basis subsequently establish a verification mechanism for the Convention, any significant progress in removing mutual concerns will hardly be possible. A return visit by our experts to U.S. biological facilities whose activities give rise to questions on our part would be an important step towards this goal. In this connection we welcome your reiteration of readiness to host such a visit after the meeting of experts. For practical reasons we believe that the meeting of experts should be held in the United States before August 15, to be immediately followed by a return visit by Soviet experts to the U.S. facilities. We suggest holding one more meeting of experts from the two countries to discuss the results of the visit to U.S. facilities. It would be desirable to complete these meetings and visits before the start of the Third Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons. We also would have no objection to having the questions which you mention in your letter addressed at the meeting. It is our view that the experts should also exchange opinions on such issues as the types of activities permitted or prohibited under the Convention, the types and quantities of microbiological or other biological agents and toxins, as well as instruments and equipment, permitted for protection purposes, and obtain U.S. answers to Soviet questions transmitted in Houston in December 1990. It goes without saying that in order to set the proposed scheme in motion, it is extremely important for the Soviet side to receive, at least three or four weeks in advance of its visit to U.S. facilities, data and materials necessary for the immunization of Soviet experts, as well as information on safety requirements at these facilities in accordance with the guidelines agreed in London. I hope that this schedule of our further exchanges does take into account the specific proposals contained in your letter and is satisfactory to you. I am 372

confident that as we proceed along the road of openness and greater mutual trust we will also be able to resolve the problems pertaining to the implementation of the biological convention. I would like to take this opportunity and express my hope for a good degree of cooperation and interaction between the U.S. and the USSR delegations this September during the Third Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons, whose depositaries are the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom. I think it is necessary to do everything possible for the Conference to help strengthen this important international instrument. M. GORBACHEV [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA 1999-0304-F/1 by the National Security Archive.]

373

Document No. 62: Memorandum of Conversation, Gorbachev–Bush, London July 17, 1991

After meeting in the early morning, Gorbachev and Bush are able to finalize the remaining issues holding up the START Treaty, thus opening the way to their bilateral summit at the end of July. In their lunch conversation before the G-7 session, which Gorbachev is about to address, the Soviet leader makes one last push to convince his U.S. counterpart that a major international aid effort is needed to help the Soviet Union get through its most difficult period. Many times before this conversation, Bush has made it clear to Gorbachev that the U.S. is not willing to commit money, and that he should not raise the issue of financial assistance at the G-7. Exasperated, Gorbachev feels obliged to retort: “it is strange to me to find $100 billion for regional war, but none to make a [sic] Soviet Union a new country.” Bush suggests again that to increase the chances of American aid the Soviet Union must cut its ties with Cuba and embark on rapid market reform. This record of discussion is heavily excised and it is obvious the summary is incomplete. The Soviet record is much more detailed but, at this writing, not available in full at the Gorbachev Foundation. From the Soviet record, we know that in the brief one-on-one session at the end of this conversation Bush and Gorbachev discussed the supersensitive issue of biological weapons and, once again, Gorbachev, relying on the recent report from Akhromeyev, denied any violations of the convention. According to Chernyaev, who was present at that part of the meeting, Gorbachev said to Bush: “George, I have figured it out. I can tell you with confidence: we aren’t making biological weapons.”46

The President: Welcome. We will talk here, and then at the end talk alone for five minutes or so. We don’t have much time—about an hour. President Gorbachev: In this day and age that’s a lot. President Bush: Thank you for sending Bessmertnykh and Moiseyev to meet on START. [Excised two lines] President Gorbachev: I am very glad to see you all. We have accomplished a lot. We have, I think, convinced all that we are true to our word. I know you are a very substantive man. That means when you make a decision we can move forward smartly. [Excised paragraph] In the Soviet Union we have come a long way toward democracy. Just a short time ago we didn’t have strong support for our approach, but now we do. We  Chernyaev, My Six Years, p. 358.

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have also converted military industries, developed cooperatives, leasehold, and privatization. We now have over 1000 commercial banks; 40,000 individual farms. Privatization is on its way. Even defense-related companies are becoming joint-stock companies. We are about to adopt a big package of business related legislation. We have made a final choice and must move fast. [Excised four lines] It is strange to me to find $100 billion for regional war, but none to make a [sic] Soviet Union a new country. We need mutual understanding and reciprocating steps. We will press on and extract ourselves. But we need a new kind of cooperation and understanding you mentioned in your letter. The world is in transition to a new order and needs U.S.-Soviet cooperation. Sometimes Europeans worry about Soviet-U.S. engagement, but not this time. Perestroika we need, and will do. But in our transition if we have concurrent effort at critical points.... it’s not just money. We have a two-tiered economy, and we need a political push. That is my piece. President Bush: [Excised two lines] We seek a democratic, market-oriented Soviet Union, integrated into the world economy, having found a resolution of the problems between the center and the republics. The latter is essential for capital flows. We also seek cooperation on all global issues. I know your historical relations with Iraq and appreciate the bold decision you made on the Gulf. The last point is philosophical. People ask me, “Who is the enemy?” I want the American people to say that the Soviet Union is not the enemy. I still think I must sell you on that. (The President refers to the map President Gorbachev gave him at Camp David with a blue flag for every American base). To the degree your people feel encircled, and we feel missiles aimed at New York, we fail. So my friend, the point is to reduce the level of suspicion. One practical problem we see is the modernization of your missiles. That is overridden by what you have done in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. A sixth point is cooperation on regional issues (I don’t consider Iraq regional). I mean the Middle East Peace process, Angola, etc. I want that unprecedented kind of cooperation to continue. We don’t seek economic catastrophe in the Soviet Union. What do you mean by a political push? I must look at everything in light of US interests—and your success is one of them. If I have projected something different, I apologize. President Gorbachev: Then how should we end the G-7 Meeting? President Bush: You don’t yet have a market economy, etc. You need our technical advice to help you integrate into the world economy. You need a political push. President Gorbachev: And a mechanism to implement it. President Bush: Yes. I will work with my G-7 colleagues to make it work. The best thing you could do politically is to cut loose of the Baltics, Cuba. I don’t have time to discuss others. [Excised paragraphs] 375

[President Gorbachev:] Mayor Popov raised a question with you of an American University in Moscow. Let’s work on it. How about a Summit meeting on July 31 and August 1? President Bush: How about July 30–31? [NB: The two presidents then adjourned for a brief one-on-one [Excised rest of paragraph]] [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA 1999-0303-F/ by the National Security Archive.]

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Document No. 63: Memorandum of Conversation, G-7 Meeting with President Gorbachev, London, 2:20 p.m. – 6:15 p.m. July 17, 1991

As John Major puts it in the opening, this is indeed a “historic meeting—the first of its kind.” Finally, the president of the Soviet Union would be speaking to the elite club of industrialized capitalist nations. At the session Gorbachev presents a detailed outline of his economic reform and describes the “crucial political choice” that arises when transitioning from one system of values to another. His ultimate priority, and his request to the G-7 leaders, is the integration of the USSR into the world economic system. The reform program cannot succeed without such integration, he says. He implores his counterparts: “let me be frank: will you be well-wishers, onlookers, or active supporters? I’ll answer your questions, but [I] want you to answer mine.” At this time, the new Union Treaty is almost complete, with nine republics willing to sign. Gorbachev reaffirms his commitment to repay debts and does not ask for rescheduling: “We accept the rules of the game, but bear great burdens and need solidarity.” Solidarity comes in the form of words from other speakers but there are very few actual commitments to help the Soviet Union out of its predicament. Alone among the speakers, François Mitterrand reminds his colleagues “the USSR needs serious, sensible assistance.” He advises Gorbachev not to move too radically with privatization, but to choose a “middle path,” a “happy synthesis between private enterprise and the role of the state.” He concludes: “This is not the moment to refuse your interest in integrating yourself in our common history.” Other leaders have more questions for Gorbachev, implying that he should move faster toward a market economy. In his reply, the Soviet leader addressed the pace of reform citing the social factor: “I would like to speed it up, but can’t go any faster. Society could not stand it. … Economists like Leontief or Galbraith will always say ‘why have a ministry to move to a market.’ But there is no pure, unregulated market economy.” Very soon, Russia will try to move to a pure market economy, but with disastrous results for society. At the end of the session, Chairman Major outlines six ways to help the USSR, which nevertheless fall far short of what Gorbachev is trying to achieve.

Prime Minister Major: We’re all very pleased that President Gorbachev is here. We are among his well-wishers. We’ve all heard that President Bush and President Gorbachev have resolved START. We’re all very pleased. This is an historic meeting—­the first of its kind. I’m delighted that it’s taking place. We’ve all studied your letter. We agree with much of what you have to say. We have moved from confrontation. We’re united behind your efforts. We want to integrate you into the world economy. The USSR has immense human and natural resources. There are immense challenges, but limitless opportunities. We accept your personnal [sic] commitment to reform. We hope you’ll talk in detail, not just on the nature of economic reform, but also how it will be implemented… 377

so we can help you. You can also learn what we can do to help out and our inhibitions. Our interests: the budget deficit, the money supply, etc.; center-republic relations (including with regard to the deficit and debt); the question of private property—personal property and private ownership of companies. These seem vital to economic reform. The area where we are best equipped to help is technical assistance, know-how, on macroeconomic and microeconomic reform (e.g., energy). The key is to create a climate of confidence to attract increased investment. Your country needs an irreversible reform process. This is for the Soviet people to do, but we will do what we can to help. The international institutions can help; we need to explore this issue with you. I’d like to invite you to share your thoughts. President Gorbachev: Thank you. I’m pleased to be here with you and all your colleagues. My being here is a symbol of the profound changes which have taken place in international relations. This meeting of state leaders is important. You share a special responsibility because of the role played by your countries. You help shape the world. I understand the real historic context and that this dictates what’s possible. But it also dictates the need for a new level of trust. This is a strategic moment. Let me point to some important elements, and also respond to yesterday’s Political Declaration. Enormous gains have been achieved in disarmament and in resolving regional conflicts. There is a real chance for progress, but we must be realistic. Dangers arise from the transitional situation in the USSR. This requires special intellectual effort. There is a crucial political choice. We’re leaving behind one system of values that regulated relations between states to a new understanding, new methods of achieving security—collective security versus old alliances. There is also instability, both political and economic. We also see how the legitimate desire for national self-determination has negative implications: nationalism, separatism, sometimes with religious overtones. There are dangers to the political environment. A balanced approach is needed; we have a unique responsibility. Let me share some thoughts on the real dangers that confront us… The inviolability of borders; changing international institutions. The USSR wants to be part of the world economy. There are questions about how to organically incorporate it. We believe it is in our long-term interest to integrate ourselves. We will also renew our federation. This will help us move together, with fewer social costs, and to overcome our distorted economy; perhaps the most distorted economy in the world. We expect reciprocating steps from you. Like lifting legislative barriers; letting the USSR participate in international economic institutions; and a number of other steps. I have long lists on each. We need reciprocating steps. Let me be frank: Will you be well-wishers, onlookers, or active supporters? I’ll answer your questions, but want you to answer mine. We’ve decided on irreversible moves. But it will be impossible to move to radical reform outside the world market. So integration isn’t a self­-serving policy, it’s a strategic move. 378

A few words on the economy. We had a dramatic situation late last year and early this year. We had to maneuver between the ultra-radicals and those who would slow down or reverse reform. So we had an acute, critical situation. Even well-tested political leaders broke down under pressure. It was like an earthquake, with the roof shaking over our heads. Let me tell you: Gorbachev was playing for time to save perestroyka. The mechanism of self-preservation was not to suspend change, but to radicalize it. This was reflected in the 9 +1 process. We arrested the situation. We got some time to implement anti­-crisis measures. But we cannot waste time. Dangers still exist. We must address the transitional problems in the second half of 1991 and in 1992. First, our plan is social accord. Second, to radicalize the economy. Third, to seek new international economic cooperation with the industrialized economies. We did reach accord with the republics. We can debate specific elements, but we need all three of these. Also for the social aspect, there is a growth of support (for reform) from below. Some say this is the most important social change. I agreed with President Bush. His mission came, with Ed Hewett and others. I talked to them, to Hewett, a Special Assistant to the President who knows the USSR, who said that something unprecedented has happened. New people have emerged. In particular, Moscow has changed, but not the provinces; but now they have, too. Our reforms began from above; now they have support from the people. Democratic forces are more active. There are new democratic groups—movement is rapid. We have moved toward a new Union Treaty based on federalist principles. Eight of the republics have approved it; Ukraine will decide in September. We’re looking for the optimal combination of sovereignty and a new, unified state. Let me emphasize the importance of the referendum, in which a large percentage of the population favored maintaining the Union. There will be no change in the direction of the process underway. It’s important to avoid extremes. Before, the republics had no freedom, no oxygen; it was all unity. Now the hotheads want to move to disintegration. There are adventurists, separatists. We can’t put 70 million people out of our borders. We’re economically interrelated. All our problems must be tackled together. So we can’t separate or divide our Union. But we can redistribute authority and achieve a new balance—a common economic space with unified finances and a central bank. We need a new role for our republics. President Delors is looking at me very closely because he has many questions. President Kohl, too. I understand this. We need the Union. Take the Yugoslav example. This concerns all of us. It gives us an idea of what could happen if the Union disintegrates. That’s why I proposed the referendum; the people supported it. So do 9 republics, with 93% of the people and 97% of the territory of the USSR. The sovereign republics will have broad authority. We will devise a new constitution and then hold elections. There will be new authorities, elected by the people, who have a mandate for reform. This new government will have 379

new terms of reference. As for the other republics, some will hold their own referenda, e.g., Armenia, Moldova, even Georgia. A large majority are for union. Even their polls show 70–80% in favor of a new union. The Baltics are a special case. We will rely on a constitutional framework. It’s up to them to decide. If they want to separate, we’ll have a divorce procedure to figure out the way to do so. This is especially important because there are many Russians there, defense interests, infrastructure, etc. We will do this through a constitutional process without violence. The key is self-determination. We have to respect this. On economic matters, we’ve got 13–15 of the republics. This is a multifaceted process. (Others have these problems, too, e.g., Prime Minister Mulroney is tackling the question of Quebec constitutionally.) We’ll do it in the same way. We’re radicalizing economic reform. We’re in a process of transition, not just declaring our intentions. We’re gaining ground, though there are many contradictions. We have legislation on the rights of private property and entrepreneurship. We already have these laws—did you know that? We have come a long way; it’s described in the paper on legislation I gave you. Reform has accelerated over the past six months. There are new, non-state producers, and private initiatives in banking and commodity exchanges. There is debate in the Communist Party about these new sectors. The process also applies to the defense sector. In 1988–90, cooperatives grew by over 200%. These are not collectives, but cooperatives, and they employ 6 million people, with an output of 70 billion rubles. Leaseholders account for 7% of industrial output. Shareholding exists in large enterprises. There are 3,000 joint ventures. Over 47, 000 individual firms. 15,000 non-state cooperative banks. Soon we’ll adopt antimonopoly legislation. We need to accelerate more in the next 1–2 years; no more than 2. We’re in transition from centralized demand to economic regulation of business. We want to commercialize most of our industry. There is equality and protection of all forms of property. We have laws on foreign investment. There are problems of ruble convertibility. I’ll address this later. Step-by-step, we’ll liberalize prices. We’ll move from a situation which 35% of our prices are unregulated to one in which 70% are unregulated. We’re creating a market infrastructure. We need your help above all on defense conversion. On private property, our legislation permits 100% foreign ownership. Each republic decides on its own. Russia has a communal tradition. The situation is not the same in Central Asia, which is less likely to accept private ownership. Each republic will decide this on its own, probably by referendum. Reselling of leasehold rights is possible if there is interest. Regarding macroeconomic stabilization: This is not the most important issue. I set out our program, with figures, e.g., those required by international economic institutions. We will go as far as socially acceptable. Neither of us would want to see the process become socially impossible. The deficit is being reduced, to no more than 10% of GNP. It will be covered by bonds and the state banks. We will raise interest rates and will change our tax policy. We will freeze deposits to 380

use to buy shares. There are some 250 billion rubles in the hands of enterprises. Some ask why isn’t Gorbachev cutting military expenditures, when he will solve the question of links with Cuba and Afghanistan. I’ve tried to tell you about the real process of arms procurement. We’ve cut 29% since 1988. Procurement of APCs is down by a factor of four. I’ll cut more. What we’ve done already has created social tension. The best brains, etc., are in this sector. Now they’re idled. This will add to problems in the Army. Now the Army and the defense industrialists basically support us. We will implement the withdrawal from Germany, including with regard to humnitarian [sic] and economic problems. We will continue the defense conversion process. New Economic Cooperation: We’re responding. We’ve created better conditions for foreign investment, and recognize the need for this. We’re going to make the transition to ruble convertibility. If we do, many of our problems will take care of themselves. Convertibility is under study. Your involvement can consist of some financing, more likely oriented to specific projects. Paying debts— we will pay them. We have great potential. With some space, etc., we will earn currency to pay our debts. We accept the rules of the game, but bear great burdens and need solidarity. You have a list of projects, many of which have been developed by your businesses. They want a political signal. We’re opening up our defense sector—80% of it, our “holy of holies.” This is important for you to see. We share the burden and the responsibility. To promote cooperation in investment, we’ll accept international groups to monitor certain areas. This brings me to this question: How shall we complete this meeting? We don’t have a lot of time. We need to say something. These are not just the USSR’s problems. We need to show we can cooperate, what the mechanisms of cooperation are. All of you say, let’s discuss. I am looking to President Bush, hoping he’ll say something. We need a follow-up mechanism; we need to create one. We need to say something politically, too. There needs to be follow-up. We need an arrangement around the Chairman, and I’ll look to the Chairman. I invite your Economic/Finance Ministers to come to Moscow to follow up on this discussion. This is agreed with the republics. All our debts will be repaid. New relations will come and we will establish an Inter-Republican Committee to develop projects for you. Finally, the USSR is closely linked to Eastern Europe. We’ve acted badly. Both. We had a bad divorce. We know we have to cooperate with Eastern Europe. We understand the need for this. There are natural links. The sooner we cooperate with you, the sooner we’ll cooperate with them. President Havel said to help the USSR is to help us. A clearing system of accounts—­Chancellor Kohl is working on this. German unification.… I’d like to thank all. I got carried away. I’ll stop. Prime Minister Major: I’ll invite President Bush to speak. The President: First, I want to note START. This is in the interests of all of us. We’re trying to hammer out the details before we get to Moscow. I will go there later this month. This treaty is historic; it’s the first sign of a reduction of our 381

massive stockpiles of strategic weapons. I’m not trying to bring this issue into the G-7, but wanted to note it. It sets a good tone. I don’t have much to say. As for a follow-on mechanism, each nation has its own bilateral problems to work out. For example, Prime Minister Kaifu has special concerns. You’re right about follow-on. We should have the Chairman of this group coordinate common areas with USSR; this is the way to do it. We could also discuss the IFIs, which are important as purely economic coordination mechanisms. As you move toward a market, participation in them will be very important. It gives you worldwide contacts. So I’m enthusiastic about a follow-on mechanism. Someone, I’m not an expert, can discuss follow-on with the IFIs. The political push will come through the Chairman. We can do without organizations, so they don’t compete with existing ones. So the bilateral issues will be considered separately. This leaves nations with special problems the flexibility to move bilaterally. I’d like to ask a question: Experts raise the question of working out the details of the union treaty. (You are moving in this direction.) It is critical to investment, taxing rules, etc. For example, jurisdiction over offshore platforms, we’ve found, is very complex. And we’ve had many years to sort all this out in the United States. But it’s critical to attracting investment. It can get you multi-billion dollar energy development; this would overshadow aid. It’s the same with food distribution. I’ve met with our Soviet experts; they all say this is key. Yours was an outstanding presentation. […] President Mitterrand: We have no right to doubt expectations. But we have to get over certain doubts. It’s the problem of the chicken and the egg: will the USSR establish itself first, or does it need assistance now, recognizing the risk of failure? Consider this question against the background of your actions over the past 5 years. History will remember your actions as extraordinary. We’ve considered the USSR (as a country) since 1917; since 1924, you’ve had relations with the satellites. Your perestroyka has made it possible to move to a new system, to free many peoples from their recent occupation. German unification was made possible by your policies. So your actions argue for belief. What you have done is a fact; there is hope for the future. There are great problems. Look at Germany. It has emerged as a great power in 50 years, and it has difficulty assimilating five states. What does this say about the USSR, without the same degree of prosperity, unity, with the system of the Czars? It will be much harder. The alternative is upheaval. We can’t settle this in an afternoon. All this is the basis for feeling we’re taking the right road. The USSR needs serious, sensible assistance. […] I wouldn’t say privatize everything. I’m of a socialist temperament; this is true of most of us around the table. There is a happy synthesis between private enterprise and the role of the state. This operates in all states. Some don’t admit it. It’s not for us to tell you what system to have if we have a common basis, e.g., private property. Investors want their profits. Your country needs a middle path to permit external assistance. You need to take stock of what has worked elsewhere. 382

You have substantial resources and great wealth. But this hasn’t always produced added wealth. You have unproductive technology. The distribution system doesn’t allow you to get the most out of your resources. Some of our kings sought wives in Russia. This was not just because they were beautiful, but because of an alliance of interests. In 1492, the first emissary from Moscow reached Florence. This is not the moment to refuse your interest in integrating yourself in our common history. […] President Gorbachev: I thank you for the atmosphere. It makes it possible to express our common concerns. Thanks for your remarks on your positions; notwithstanding differences, they cast light on the viewpoints regarding cooperation and on world politics at large. This moves us toward our organic integration. There seems to be reason to say, if I understand correctly, that there is not just support, but agreement to set up a specific framework. There is the question of the forms of cooperation. All of what we were doing here is necessary for all of us. The fruitlessness of the command system and state ownership brought us to a state where we can’t harness our potential. Logic has driven this home to us. We need the mass of society to understand, and not just at the intellectual level. We need to change our dogma, our psychology, etc., in the Party and everywhere. We are forming new structures, competition, new people in the processes, and new attitudes toward ownership. We need to create confidence in our economy. We’re just starting at this, however. We understand the scale, the history, and the burden on society. We’re a country of 120 different nationalities. Everything is converging on this moment. We’ll travel this path. We appreciate your expressions of support. There won’t be any disappointment regarding “new thinking.” There is a growing process of mutual understanding. What we need now is a new measure of trust. We want to move into the international economic arena. If we’re not admitted into the IMF, the World Bank, GATT and the EBRD, it won’t work. We need them to provide oxygen to breathe; we’ll fit into the political process. We’re talking about mutuality. If I’m going too far, or am too optimistic, then let me know. I hope not. As for your specific questions. You’re interested in business. So are we. There can be no stability without radical reform. On macroeconomic stability, we understand your approach. Let me respond. The Union Treaty covers all major aspects of foreign policy—with a mechanism. Nuclear power is part of the union’s purview, as well as transport, communications and meteorology. Then there’s the broad field of joint response. This includes individual projects where investments might be carried out. We’ll have a single market, a single currency, a central bank, central authority, and federal taxes (among 7 of 9 republics). We’re still discussing this with Russia and the Ukraine. Now we’re looking at mechanisms. We discussed Hamilton, Bismarck, a range of world experiences. I won’t sign the Union Treaty without a federal tax. I want a strong center and strong republics on the basis of distributed power. 383

Regarding the convertible ruble: We need this. Without it, we’ll be delayed. McDonald’s vice president wants to invest rubles, but he needs dollars for investment. At what exchange rate? It’s up to 40 rubles to the dollar. The commercial relationship between the ruble and the dollar doesn’t correspond to reality. We face great difficulty on this issue. I have files on projects in the pipeline. The stabilization fund is a technical matter; let our experts examine this. We’ll get convertibility anyway without this fund, but lack of it would slow us down. For Prime Minister Mulroney: On price decontrol, we’re aiming to decontrol 70% of all prices during 1991–92. This will double the level currently decontrolled. We’ll just be keeping 3–4 items controlled. The question is bound up with assessing goals. I’m not saying give us goods. I’m saying for each specific step toward a market, in good time, in sequence, in synchronization. On the pace of reform: I would like to speed it up, but can’t go any faster. Society could not stand it. There are always disputes. Economists like Leontief or Galbraith will always say, “why have a ministry to move to a market.” But there is no pure, unregulated market economy. We shall move toward reform of property, monetary reform, and private enterprise—but let society decide. We’ll adopt a legislative framework and give (the republics) the freedom to choose. As for Cuba and Vietnam, our relations have changed radically. We’ve cut aid to Vietnam three-fold. Aid to Cuba has been halved. We get more from the Cubans than the reverse as of July, e.g., sugar, citrus. Cuba will be gradually integrated into the normal processes. Things are moving. Regarding Vietnam, we helped to introduce big rice producers to the market. Cuba and Vietnam will become normal members of the world community. It is extremely important to tell the world of our brainstorming; not for applause, but to show the fact and the breakthroughs achieved. I hope the Chairman will work for positive contact. We also need a mechanism. Prime Minister Major: Let’s consider what we’ll say in our press conference. There will be huge interest. We need some message. It should be a positive one and will be historic. Let me sketch out my views. I will be brief. I’ll stress the frank, substantive nature of our discussions in a cordial, free atmosphere. I’ll welcome the START agreement and the positive response it received. Regarding dimension and style, I’ll emphasize “across the table” not around the table with set speeches; and the questions and answers. I’ll say we agreed to promote Soviet integration into the world economy. And I’ll discuss some specifics: (1) Special Association with the IMF and the World Bank and the other organizations. I would include mention that this is an enormous step forward, which will bring benefits, expert advice and a wealth of experience. (2) Ask the 4 major international institutions (IMF, IBRD, OECD and EBRD) to work closely together, especially on creating a market economy. (3) We’ll intensify our technical assistance, especially in energy, defense conversion, transport, nuclear safety, and food distribution—both bilaterally and through the international institutions. 384

(4) On trade: I should mention the consequences of the collapse of trade with the USSR’s neighbors and that we’d like to see trade reestablished. Also more trade access. (5) Regarding follow-up, I’d note that this isn’t a one-off occasion, but is part of a continuing dialogue. The agreed mechanism would be the Chairman of the G-7—to keep in close touch with the USSR, visit it, and maintain liaison with the others. After the visit, we could report on progress. Chancellor Kohl would do the same. And it would be desirable for Finance Ministers and Small Business Ministers to accept the invitation to visit. These are six particular ways to follow up. This is the beginning, not the end. It’s the first step toward helping the USSR become a full member of the international economic community. I’d like to request comment, beginning with Gorbachev. President Gorbachev: I’ll be positive. This was an important political discussion among statesmen. We determined certain areas as directions for our cooperation. We’ve not yet exhausted our cooperation, but are started on it. I’d like to thank you all. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA 2000-0429-F by the National Security Archive.]

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Document No. 64: Memorandum from Eagleburger for the President: “Your Visit to the USSR” July 25, 1991

On the eve of the president’s trip to Moscow, the acting secretary of state advises him on the main issues to be raised during the upcoming summit. Eagleburger describes the fundamental choices the Soviets are facing and states that “the outcome of this internal struggle over the USSR’s political and economic fate has become our dominant foreign policy concern, as Soviet behavior abroad has become more cooperative.” He makes the important observation that the U.S. model enjoys a powerful appeal right now in Soviet society: “we should seize on [the] widespread popular respect—even envy—of American political democracy and market capitalism.” His suggestions are to build on what has already been achieved in resolving Third World conflicts in Angola, Cambodia and Central America, and to pressure the Soviets to end their assistance to Cuba and the Najibullah regime in Afghanistan. Regarding the economic sphere, all he has to offer is technical assistance, and then only if Congress passes “an appropriation of $15 million for this purpose.” If the Soviets present “an ambitious arms control agenda, including further START reductions, SNF, naval arms control, and a comprehensive test ban,” the president should address those issues “in a more conceptual way”—meaning without concrete counterproposals.

Your visit to the Soviet Union follows up a successful London Summit, where President Gorbachev received strong backing for his reform efforts and Soviet integration into the world economy. You will arrive in Moscow in a position of unquestioned strength. Gorbachev, and the Soviet people as a whole, very much look to you and to the United States for support in the future and as a model—both to shore up the remnants of their superpower status and as a guide to success. The Soviet people and their leaders are being increasingly forced to confront some fundamental choices: – whether finally to abandon the communist command economic system and embrace a democratic, free-market society; – whether the Baltics, Armenia, Georgia and Moldova should be allowed to become independent; and – what kind of union will replace the monolith created by the czars and commissars. The future of the USSR is in the balance. With the Soviet economy in steady decline, the battle lines are drawn between political forces struggling over a broad range of issues: a new Union Treaty, the introduction of genuine market reforms, and independence for the Baltics. The outcome of this internal struggle over the USSR’s political and economic fate has become our dominant foreign 386

policy concern, as Soviet behavior abroad has become more cooperative. While we have only limited influence over the course of change, we can make clear our strong support for market reform and democracy. Your visit can show the Soviet people and their leaders where we stand on the key choices they face. Thus, your visit presents an unparalleled opportunity to redefine and reinvigorate our relations with an evolving Soviet Union. As the Paris CSCE meeting is generally seen as having sealed the end of the Cold War, this will be the first post-Cold War summit. Signing the START Treaty will symbolize the progress we have made. But perhaps more importantly, it will also symbolize the end of an era when rivalry and the arms race dominated the superpower agenda. In Moscow, you will have the chance to be a catalyst to move our relations into the new era of cooperation of which you have often spoken. The agenda of this new era must be based on shared values and support for freer, more democratic societies; it must be focused on cooperation between our governments in building a more stable, peaceful world. Much hard work lies ahead to make this transition. The normalization of our economic relationship remains stymied by Soviet inability to create a satisfactory climate and to finalize agreements which will open up new possibilities for trade. In the political sphere, joint cooperation with the Soviets in the Gulf, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America has given real meaning to the concept of “new thinking,” but Moscow remains reluctant to move on Afghanistan, Cuba and with Japan. You need to challenge the Soviets to resolve these last remaining vestiges of confrontation and get on with building a more stable international order. Gorbachev may present an ambitious arms control agenda, including further START reductions, SNF, naval arms control, and a comprehensive test ban. You can address future arms control efforts in a more conceptual way—increased emphasis on non-proliferation (including setting up a new senior-level working group), agreements that build incrementally on START and CFE rather than replace them, and more attention to stabilizing measures. You could specifically propose that the consultations on next steps in START begin this fall in the existing Arms Control Working Group, that we commit to a quick conclusion of Open Skies, that the Soviets remove the impediments to implementation of the bilateral CW destruction agreement, and that the U.S. and USSR work together to complete the CW convention by next spring. Compliance problems with agreements in place, particularly BW and INF, are a big obstacle to all of this, and must be rapidly corrected. DEMOCRATIZATION, THE MARKET AND THE DEVOLUTION OF POWER

The United States has a clear stake in the outcome of the revolutionary political drama now gripping the Soviet Union. While foreign policy choices force us to focus on key individuals, we must not lose sight of the broad political currents sweeping the Soviet Union. Democratic ideals, nationalism, age-old ethnic divisions and raw competition for political power are among the motivating factors of the key actors on the Soviet political stage. 387

While not ignoring the lingering suspicions generated by forty years of Cold War, we should seize on widespread popular respect—even envy—of American political democracy and market capitalism. The Soviet Union, its people and its leaders all look to the U.S. as a model for success. Your visit to Moscow will provide you a bully pulpit to speak not simply to the leaders of the Soviet Union, but to all its peoples and give them our message on democracy and free markets. It is in our interest to see the peaceful end of the Soviet empire as we have known it since 1917—a strong, totalitarian central government able to mobilize the vast human and material resources at its control in the service of global confrontation with the Democratic west. The sine qua non for eliminating this threat is a substantial devolution of economic and political power. As the “Nine-plusOne” agreement suggests, this process is now underway. It deserves our support. In addition to giving broad rhetorical support to democratization, economic reform and the entrepreneurial spirit, it will be important to press Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders hard on the need to take concrete steps now to open up the Soviet economy. Negotiations on a bilateral investment treaty, a tax treaty and a settlement of pre-1933 claims have continued, but are still far from conclusion. Just as the Soviets need to move on basic economic reforms, they need to create conditions necessary to attract American investment and expertise. You may wish to signal our intention to increase substantially our technical assistance efforts, based on what we hope will be an appropriation of $15 million for this purpose (passed by the House). Progress in setting up on-going relations with the IMF and World Bank will also help speed reform. TOWARD A NEW PARTNERSHIP IN WORLD AFFAIRS

We have accomplished a great deal with Moscow over the past year, transforming Soviet adventurism into collaboration to resolve conflicts in Angola, Cambodia and Central America. Cooperation before and during the Gulf War would have been unthinkable only a few years ago. It changed the entire strategic calculus of that conflict, and has helped us in our current cooperative efforts to convene a Middle East peace conference. Despite this progress, two of the most enduring vestiges of the Cold War and U.S.-Soviet confrontation remain—Cuba and Afghanistan. In addition, “new thinking” has yet to translate into a more flexible Soviet approach on the Northern Territories with Japan. Gorbachev undoubtedly feels constrained politically in his attitude toward these issues, given their symbolic value and their substantial importance for conservatives in the Soviet system. While financial drains alone would argue for curtailing outlays to Cuba and Afghanistan, these problems remain the best examples that Gorbachev is not a free agent; he must calculate carefully lest he open himself to further conservative charges of selling out Soviet interests. You will want to press him again (pushing in particular on Gorbachev’s apparent offer to cut aid to Cuba by two-thirds), reminding him of his own self-interest in getting these issues resolved. 388

Eduard Shevardnadze recognized that the path of cooperation with the U.S. in the long run promised the Soviets more genuine security—and a continuing role as a major player in the international arena—than the maintenance of both an empire in Eastern Europe and proxy states in the Third World. Criticism for selling out to the West in Eastern Europe and on CFE has made Gorbachev and his advisors particularly careful in engaging us on new projects. In stressing our desire to build a new partnership of international cooperation, you will want to emphasize to Soviet audiences how this cooperation can benefit the Soviet Union. There are a number of particular issues on which we will want to work cooperatively now and in the years ahead, including: – establishment of a new framework for European security; – managing ethnic tensions and economic dislocation in Eastern Europe and the Balkans (Soviet cooperation could become particularly important in putting together an effective international response to large-scale violence in Yugoslavia); – pressing for a Middle East peace conference; – controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in a number of developing nations; and – cooperating on other transnational problems, such as the environment. THE BALTICS

Finally, there is no single issue with more immediate potential to derail U.S.-Soviet relations than Soviet handling of the Baltic states’ desire for independence. Despite denials by Gorbachev and Bessmertnykh of any official authorization, intimidation tactics continue, including bombings of Baltic buildings and twentyfive attacks on border posts by the Ministry of Interior black beret troops. Two persons have died and many have been injured in recent months. Negotiations between the three Baltic states and the Soviet government continue at a slow pace. Some Balts believe the Soviets had been stringing them along to avoid antagonizing the West in the run-up to the G-7 summit. It will be important to impress upon Gorbachev in private our own strong support for Baltic aspirations and warn him again of the dangers inherent in the continuing intimidation of the Baltic peoples. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through Mandatory Review request 2009-0302-MR by the National Security Archive.]

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Document No. 65: Record of Main Content of Conversation between Gorbachev and Bush, First Private Meeting, Moscow July 30, 1991

The first one-on-one conversation of the Moscow summit is entirely devoted to economic reform in the USSR and U.S.-Soviet economic relations. In his memoir, Bush notes that “Gorbachev was marvelous, and how he could stand up to all the pressures against him I simply did not know.” The Soviet leader stayed up all night before Bush arrived, but he felt he achieved a very important result. Gorbachev informs Bush that they have just completed work on the Union Treaty and the latenight meeting he has just held with Yeltsin and Kazakh leader Nursultan Nazarbayev on the eve of Bush’s arrival was a success—both Russia and Kazakhstan committed to the early signing. Now the Soviets would move fast on privatization and commercialization of enterprises. Gorbachev talks about the opposition to reform—“especially among the managers of farms, in the military, among party functionaries”—but he believes it is losing ground. Now that they are meeting one-on-one, Gorbachev decides this is the time to ask for meaningful support, something he could not do at the G-7 meeting: “As per our agreement, I did not speak about this publicly in London, but now I would like to talk to you frankly about it. We expect real support from your side to win the decisive battle for reform.” Bush brings up the issue of Chevron, which was willing to invest a billion dollars but under conditions Soviet experts judged unfavorable to the Soviet Union. Although Bush states that “of course I did not come here to defend Chevron’s interests,” he returns to the issue many times. Gorbachev promises to resolve the problem. For his part, he hopes for Bush’s help in removing certain COCOM restrictions so that, among other benefits, space cooperation between Soviet and U.S. firms can attract the needed investment. The two presidents discuss Bush’s upcoming visit to Ukraine. Bush gives Gorbachev strong assurances that he will not do anything to support separatism in Kiev: “I want to assure you that during my trip to Kiev, neither I nor any of my accompanying party will allow anything to happen that could aggravate the existing problems or interfere in the questions of when Ukraine will sign the Union Treaty.” In fact, Bush tells Gorbachev, “I would be willing to visit Leningrad instead of Kiev.” He has already refused Landsbergis’s invitation to come to Vilnius. At the end of the conversation, Bush expresses his concern about the upcoming election year, “a time when reality is replaced by rhetoric, when sides in the political struggle exchange blows ... for instance, Senator Jesse Helms or rabid liberals who want to teach you about human rights.”

Gorbachev. Welcome, Mr. President. There is important and necessary work ahead of us. Our continuous contact and regular meetings have created an atmosphere that makes it possible to get to work without lengthy introductions. I don’t know if anyone has calculated the number of meetings, telephone conversations, and letters we have had. 390

Bush. The more the better! Although the press sometimes jokes that I just love talking on the phone. But I think it is important not to lose touch. Gorbachev. I agree. Yesterday in an interview with an American journalist, I said that the U.S. president is a solid person with a high sense of responsibility, a person with whom you can do business and move forward even on the most difficult issues. How should we plan our agenda? Tomorrow we have a “Camp David-style” meeting. We will be in the countryside, in an informal setting; we can talk with our jackets off. I think in the course of this conversation we could talk about how we envision the future, how we intend to continue working to ensure strategic stability, in the broad sense of the word, between our countries and in the world. I sense from our discussions that you are interested in these questions. Bush. Yes, this is true. Gorbachev. There is a little time allotted to the meeting with our delegations. During this meeting we could focus on economic cooperation. There are new elements in this sphere. Our ministers will also do some work. A.A. Bessmertnykh and James Baker already did a good job yesterday. Mr. President, I would like to return to an idea I expressed at our last lunch meeting in London. I proceed from the assumption that we want to be predictable with respect to each other. This means having predictable policies and an understanding of how we would like to see each other. This question, it seems, is of particular interest to you at a time when our country is experiencing such profound changes. I understand that the U.S. president wants to have a clear idea of what is going on, which direction the changes are taking, and what can be expected. Upon my return from London, I told my colleagues about what happened at the meeting, and received their full support, both in Moscow and in the republics. We will continue to unwaveringly follow the chosen path of democratization in our country, including market reforms and movement toward cooperation with all Western countries. In this, our relations with the U.S. and Europe are of particular importance. We have no illusions, we understand that our transition to a new society that ensures pluralism both in the political sphere and in private property, our transition to a new federation, has not been easy, and will continue to present challenges. But I want to say that we have passed the point of no return. Turning back is impossible. It would be a big mistake to even try to do it, to reverse our path under the pressure of the difficulties we face. At first, the understanding that we need to move forward more radically to democratize our society was mainly in the political circles, in the intelligentsia. Now it is spreading more to the workers, peasants, and all working people. But although they would like the changes and reforms to happen painlessly and without too many difficulties, it has not worked out that way. We have completed work on the Union Treaty. In saying this I mean the Ukraine. At the referendum this republic was in favor of the Union. Although 391

there are those who are against it. Nevertheless, the majority—2/3, if not 3/4— are for the preservation of the Union. Now we are discussing when to begin the process of signing the Agreement. It is possible that not everyone will sign it right away, we may start with two-three republics, and then the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine will make the according resolution. Other important steps will follow. We will adopt a new constitution, on the base of which we will hold a general election—for the president and the Supreme Soviet. We will form new government agencies, which will be significantly reorganized. Bush. So some republics will sign it first, then Ukraine, and then you will adopt the constitution? Gorbachev. Yes. And the constitution will be based on the Union Treaty. There are proposals to include the Union Treaty as an integral part of the constitution. Before the end of the year there will be another important event that was discussed at the recent CC CPSU Plenum. That is the Party Congress, which will adopt the new program. Some very important changes are taking place here as well. Reform is gaining momentum in the party, just as it is in society as a whole. This is important, considering the role the party has played in society for decades. I came to the conclusion that the time is ripe to propose a democratic and reform-oriented draft of the program. There were some attempts to evade this at the Plenum, to convince members not to accept this draft as the foundation, not to publish it for public comment. But in reality, this line was supported by no more than 13–14 people. So now we have a new draft program that reflects the vision of the future of our society that I described to you. Bush. In the United States, the prevailing view is that the opposition stems mostly from a small group of the “old guard,” which is apparently dominated by the military men. Is this impression correct? Gorbachev. I have to say that opposition exists in all layers of society, but it is losing ground. And yet it is there—among the workers, the peasants, and especially among the managers of farms, in the military, among party functionaries, and in some parts of the intelligentsia. The opposition can be quite loud, the more so because some of the media are providing them with a platform. We have to take that into consideration. However, the cooperation and agreement at the level of leadership of the republics and the Union is gaining momentum. The most difficult months are ahead of us—the remainder of 1991 and 1992. They will be decisive. It is very important that people are beginning to act independently in politics, in the economy, in the party. This is new. I wrote in my letter to the leaders of the G-7 before London that we have 47,000 farms. Just recently I received the latest statistics. We now have 69,000 such farms. That means that 22,000 new farms were created in one-and-a-half to two months. People are beginning to develop a taste for independent business. 392

On the other hand, many people still expect the government to take care of everything—from major issues, to the very minor ones. It is a very strong tradition of ours. We will accelerate the commercialization of the enterprises, privatization, and denationalization. Legislation has already been adopted on these issues; there is movement that gives people the opportunity to work. But we must take into account previous experience also, including that of Eastern European countries. Look at what the Germans had to deal with in the former GDR. Recently one of my advisers talked with one of the leaders of Saxony. They are also going through privatization and denationalization. The process was slow while the board of trustees—created in the FRG—was dealing with it. Right now they created 12 regional bodies with similar objectives. Privatization has sped up. We will also implement organizational measures aimed at accelerating this process. Yesterday I spoke with Yeltsin and Nazarbayev, and we agreed to accelerate this movement at the level of the republics. At the same time, we do not want to repeat the mistake of our predecessors, who forced people into collective farms. We want to give people economic freedom, so that everyone can choose a form of ownership and management. But this process should not proceed spontaneously, we need to direct it, we need to find appropriate organizational forms. In this regard, we will benefit from working with you, as well as with Western European countries. I am referring to cooperation in the sphere of training cadres, providing consultative and technical assistance, aiding the creation of a market infrastructure. Right now this process is developing and we are going to create a special agency to coordinate this work from our side. We see that our people are realizing their potential very quickly as they get drawn into the work of joint ventures. One such promising start-up is a joint venture between Fiat Automobiles and our VAZ [Volga Automobile Plant] automobiles. If I am not mistaken, half or even more percent of the shares will be owned by Fiat. They have a long-standing relationship so it will be easier for them to find common ground. Bush. Do you know [Gianni] Agnelli? Gorbachev. I met him. We understand that we have to move faster to create favorable conditions for Western businesses, which would bring competitiveness, technology, and technical and market experience. This is an important incentive. There were, however, some speeches at a recent Plenum that again derided us for private property and talked about capitalism and socialism. But Professor Denisov, a USSR People’s Deputy from Leningrad, spoke up and said that it is time to stop these foolish speeches and start creating a socially-oriented market. People must have the motivation and incentive to work. As for exploitation, it can happen both in state-owned and private enterprises. Without glasnost we could not have had such diversity of opinion, and now political pluralism as well. In the beginning of perestroika we saw that the 393

political structure was not receptive to reforms. Now the situation is changing. Although sometimes glasnost is taken to such an extreme that I don’t know how to keep it balanced. I think only through a democratic and legal platform. And we have to keep moving forward. I believe that society will then begin having different responses; we will have new songs, so to speak. Thus, in the coming months we have three main tasks: to complete the Union Treaty, to stabilize our finances, and to work actively on denationalization and privatization. Yesterday, I was discussing one idea with Yeltsin and Nazarbayev. After signing the Union Treaty, we may want to take some time before adopting a new constitution and holding elections. That is, we would hold the elections after a period of stabilization has passed, when the situation will be more favorable. We must be strategic. If we hold the elections in the most critical moment of reform, the conservatives may take advantage of the difficulties to blame everything on the reformers. Then the conservatives would claim that they embody common sense and deserve support. And indeed, they could receive a part of the vote. So we have to calculate everything carefully. We are thinking about this. The second conclusion is that we need to be more decisive about reforms, we need to implement them more quickly. What do we need for this? As per our agreement, I did not speak about this publicly in London, but right now I would like to talk to you frankly about it. We expect real support from your side to win this decisive battle for reform. Bush. What kind of real support do you have in mind? Gorbachev. When we commence price deregulation, we would like to get some support for this major step at the appropriate, precisely calculated moment. We would need goods, food, and medicine. Then, of course, there is the issue of the ruble’s convertibility. The finance ministers should discuss this question. Tomorrow we are receiving the British chancellor Norman Lamont. We need a carefully calculated, planned and jointly coordinated action. Of course, we ourselves have great potential to increase production of consumer goods through the modernization of our industries. We have a packet of large-scale projects. I think we could discuss more concretely such questions as foodstuffs, money conversion, and energy when your teams of experts arrive. I like your idea about these teams, and I gave orders to prepare specific proposals by the time they arrive. Thus, soon we will be taking some very important, even dramatic steps. I repeat, this is the decisive period. This is the glimpse at our internal situation that I wanted to give you. Bush. What you said is very interesting and useful for my understanding of the situation. Allow me to make some general remarks. I got the impression that some people here believe that there are substantial forces in the United States that are seeking to achieve the collapse of the Soviet Union, or at least its economic collapse. It is true that in my own party there are some people on the far right who claim that this would serve our interests. And on the left we have liberal democrats who attack you on human rights issues, 394

they think that we should take advantage of the difficult period the Soviet Union is going through in order to impose something on it from the outside. When it seemed that Gorbachev and Yeltsin were going at each other, that there could be no reconciliation between them, some people in the U.S. argued that we should bet everything on Yeltsin. But the administration never shared these views, and neither did the American people. I do not know what I need to do to convince the public in the Soviet Union and in Europe that our policy, our choice is to support you. Gorbachev. I want to say that our people know your position. We know that you support reform in our country, that you support the president of the USSR. But we do hear the things you just described. We know that there are critics who say that you should take advantage of the Soviet Union’s difficulties. And some people here think that that is precisely what the United States is doing. But I constantly publicly defend the progress in our relationship. Bush. I noticed that. At one point, Secretary of State Baker and I were criticized for supposedly hesitating in our relations with the Soviet Union, for being too careful and not taking advantage of new opportunities. But then the press reversed its position and began to write that Bush is too fond of Gorbachev, almost like Thatcher. I think that we cannot allow the media to influence such an important relationship—the relationship between our two countries. Gorbachev. That is a very important phrase. Bush. We are far from happy about your economic difficulties. Some Europeans, our friends and allies with whom we consult, consider that we really are too slow, that we are not sufficiently active. Gorbachev. Yesterday, Peter Jennings tried to get me to say that President Bush is stalling in cooperation with the Soviet Union. I replied that I cannot say that. I know the president’s position and how much he has done for our relationship. Perhaps, I told him, it is a matter of the decision-making style. And no matter how hard the journalist tried to get me to say some words, I resisted because I know your position. Bush. You are right. Plus, some Europeans want to hide behind the United States. I am on par with any European in wanting the Soviet reforms to succeed. By the way, I think that we can do even more to help than they can. The scale of our economy is larger; we have more technology, more ingenuity. We can cooperate along the lines of what you described, and we will cooperate. Now regarding a different issue—the republics. You mentioned Ukraine. I want to assure you that during my trip to Kiev, neither I nor any of my accompanying party will allow anything to happen that could aggravate the existing problems or interfere in the question of when Ukraine will sign the Union Treaty. Gorbachev. Yesterday I told the journalist that naturally we have no objection to your trip to Ukraine, just as I was able to visit Minnesota and California during my trip the United States. Bush. By the way, most of Minnesota voted against me in the elections. 395

Gorbachev. I was told that. That is why during my trip there I spent some time with representatives of the Republican Party. As for Ukraine, the following factor could have played a role. It was reported that shortly before your visit, the Heritage Foundation prepared a report recommending that the president make a visit to Ukraine to encourage separatist sentiments there, because it is strategically important. Bush. I am not aware of this report. But I hope that you were informed that I emphasized the need for utmost tact in setting the agenda for the visit. I would be willing to visit Leningrad instead of Kiev, for example. I would like to visit one of your cities. But in no way do I intend to support separatism. Kiev was included in the program only after your minister of foreign affairs said that you are completely satisfied with this choice. Of course we have disagreements over the Baltic region. Landsbergis very much wanted me to stop by Vilnius on my way home. We certainly understood that we should not do that. At the same time, I have to say that, in our opinion, it would be best if you could find a way to cut away these republics, to set them free. It would have a fantastic effect on public opinion. But you know my point of view. This is your affair. The most important thing is what you just talked about—privatization and economic reform. Let Brady discuss all these issues related to finances and convertibility of the ruble when he comes to Moscow. Let us see what we can do. I think what you told me about work on the Union Treaty and new relations with the republics is encouraging. This is the way to move forward. I would like to raise one issue as an example, although maybe not the best one. Shortly before my departure, the president of the company Chevron visited the White House and spoke with Brent Scowcroft. He spoke about a billion dollar transaction which, if implemented, would allow the Soviet Union to earn money that could be used to purchase consumer goods, to invest in the energy sector, and to fund the economic changes in the USSR. He said that this deal got caught up in bureaucratic red tape and fell victim to the conflict between the republics and the Center. Suddenly, new committees were set up to study this deal, which had been agreed a long time ago. Of course I did not come here to defend Chevron’s interests, but this is an example of a certain kind of problem. Gorbachev. We discussed this issue yesterday with Nazarbayev. I am in favor of this project. The signal came at the last moment not from the bureaucracy, but from one of the research institutes. I received a letter stating that the conditions of this project are not favorable for the Soviet side. So this is the opinion of professionals. I asked everyone associated with this project to carefully examine it, because I think it is an important project. I hope that we will be able to resolve this problem. Bush. I feel somewhat uncomfortable talking about a specific company’s project. But the fact of the matter is that the successful implementation of such a project would send a great signal to other entrepreneurs. And a hundred such transactions would bring a hundred billion dollars. You would get a surge of similar offers. 396

Of course, if one of your institutes suddenly raised some issues, it is up to you. But such difficulties create a certain impression in U.S. business circles. And if—I am not talking about this particular project—the Union Treaty would reduce barriers to business, it would be simply amazing. The Americans are eager to do business with you. They see a huge market and potential opportunities. They believe that it is possible to take advantage of these opportunities without harming the natural resources of the country. If it would be possible to remove the barriers—whether they are coming from research institutes or local authorities who cannot agree with the Center—it would be crucial to the success of your reforms. Gorbachev. When we make the ruble convertible, it will open many more opportunities. We have adopted federal legislation on foreign investment. It is a good law. Bush. Do the republics support it? Gorbachev. Yes. In fact, some republics have supplemented it with their own laws, which create more opportunities for foreign investment. We used to think that a convertible ruble will come sometime later. And now we came to the conclusion that we have to introduce it sooner. This would solve many problems, and the companies that can take advantage of it will provide an example for the rest. Bush. I think that deals like the one with Chevron will allow you to reach convertibility faster. They will earn hard currency for you, which is very important. Therefore, you should give an impetus to all those involved in this matter to put some effort into it. Now, while we are alone, I would like to ask you a delicate question. I am talking about the possibility of issuing bonds under your gold reserves. I understand that everything associated with gold is very sensitive. Gorbachev. We perform these operations to a certain extent, but not on a large scale. This is not the main thing that can help us on our road to recovery. And frankly, I think that our ability to do so is exaggerated. I believe that we should proceed more boldly with the implementation of practical projects. And while we are speaking in private, so as not to make this too dramatic, I will give you a list of interesting projects that are suspended because of COCOM regulations. I would like to draw your attention to the project for a trans-Soviet communications line that would span 14,000 kilometers. It would close the global ring. This line would be operated jointly by our Ministry of Communications and the company US WEST. However, the project is on hold because of the ban on the supply of high-speed terminals. One of the sections of this project is supposed to go under Lake Baikal. We are working together with France on this segment. Again, because of one component, the whole project is suspended. President Mitterrand was very surprised by this and promised me to see what he can do. We know that the United States is interested in working with us on the creation of space carriers. We are also interested, as well as some other countries. Here again we come up against the COCOM ban. 397

Bush. I will inquire about the details of this issue. It seems the difficulties arise because of possible military applications. Gorbachev. This is regarding collaboration on the projects “Hotol” and “Ariane 5.” We have achievements and a backlog in the creation of liquid fuel rocket engines that are installed on our large carriers. And we are ready to cooperate with other countries and with you in this sphere. Bush. I accept your list and I’m ready to see what can be done. COCOM restrictions cause difficulties not only for the Soviet Union. I do not mean to put you on par, but Iran ran into a similar problem when it recently wanted to buy Airbus aircraft. The company was ready to sell them, but the aircraft uses some technology that is prohibited for export. The deal had to be canceled. Gorbachev. In this instance, we are ready to share missile technology with you. Bush. Perhaps in some cases it is the legacy of the Cold War. We will look into it. Gorbachev. It is an interesting project. You people are interested in it, and thus space could be an example. Bush. We’ll see, and we ask you to pay attention to some projects that interest American business. I mentioned Chevron only as an example. Gorbachev. I discussed it with Nazarbayev. He is also unhappy. We have an understanding and we will move this issue forward. Bush. In my opinion, the deal is beneficial in part because it will earn you hard currency, which can help to solve the food and other problems. Gorbachev. I would like to ask you something while I am here with you one on one. Is there any way to forego the International Monetary Fund trial period, so we could use its services? This would be important for us; it would allow us to shorten the transition period. Bush. First of all, we proposed a special associated status not because we wanted to belittle the Soviet Union. The G-7 has no intention of putting you on Burkina Faso’s level. Gorbachev. It is not a matter of prestige for us. The question is as follows: in the framework of associate membership, can we receive practical assistance in addition to consultative assistance? Bush. Possibly. It depends on what your understanding of this entails. We were surprised when immediately after the G-7 summit we received your request. Although, of course, you have every right to issue such a request. Gorbachev. I signed it before London, so the paper was sent. Bush. I repeat, it all depends on what you have in mind when you talk about practical steps. Perhaps some things can be accelerated regardless of the membership status. But the main point is that before significant loans are made available, certain economic requirements must be fulfilled. And this is not just the American position. It is necessary to provide the requisite information, to follow the “rules of the game” of the World Bank, the IMF, and the Paris Club. 398

Gorbachev. We could make this available. Let it be called associated membership, it only matters that it is alive and not half-dead. Bush. I would prefer to see it in a positive light. The special status is not discriminatory. International financial institutions want to assist your reforms. Gorbachev. When all is said and done, if the bank does not want to grant a loan for economic reasons, then it can refuse at any moment. Bush. Of course. I think we should continue this discussion at the finance minister level. These are technical questions. The main thing I want to emphasize is that we are not behaving in a discriminatory fashion towards you. Gorbachev. Okay. Bush. One more question: if you could wave a magic wand, what would you want from the IMF in terms of involvement in your reforms? Gorbachev. I think that on the basis of cooperation, perhaps in the framework of a special status, we could discuss problems that the bank could be of particular value in resolving. I am talking about such critical issues as convertibility and the problem of structuring our debt. It would also make it easier for us to work with other countries on major projects, since so much depends on the bank’s position. In general, we want to get out of this transitional phase as quickly as possible in order to open the country up for collaboration, first and foremost for direct links to manufacturers and international investors. Yesterday we discussed this very thoroughly with Yeltsin and Nazarbayev. Precisely two or three republics have the greatest potential for large-scale projects. And they also feel that we must move more quickly to get through this transitional phase. Bush. Thank you. Your clarifications were helpful. Gorbachev. Let your people and the Europeans think about it. We would like to have the opportunity to get on your market and start earning money through several projects. For example, the market for launching satellites is valued at 12–14 billion dollars. We could launch a portion of these satellites, and Western partners are interested. But once again COCOM is in the way. We are prepared to guarantee that we will fulfill all requirements regarding secrecy. The money we will earn could go towards projects in the energy sector, and the distribution of food. I gave an order to prepare our ideas about cooperation, including in the sphere space carriers and satellite launches, in time for the visit to Moscow by the U.S. deputy secretary of defense to discuss convertibility issues. We need a cooperation mechanism that would allow us to make money and pay off our debts to you. Bush. That is interesting. He reported to me several days ago. In addition, Secretary of Agriculture Edward Madigan is planning to visit you. This is also an important sphere. Gorbachev. But here we cannot make any money. There is nothing that we can sell to you. Bush. I mentioned this only because resolving the food distribution issue would allow you to achieve self-sufficiency. 399

Gorbachev. And, in that way, save money. True. The most important thing, however, is for us to open up the way for large projects. Once one gets going, others will follow. Bush. I agree. We will very carefully assess your list of projects, taking into consideration the changes that have taken place since you came to power. Gorbachev. In terms of COCOM, the problem can be surmounted by making individual decisions on concrete issues. Bush. We will particularly examine those specific sectors where you could earn hard currency. All the same, one fundamental problem remains. You remember the map with the blue flags you gave me in Helsinki. It hangs in my office at Camp David. Your military men are still apprehensive; they think that the Soviet Union is surrounded on all sides. This belief creates a dangerous situation for us. Both of us continue to modernize our missiles. You know what problems this creates for us in Congress. All of this somehow fails to reflect the new realities we are talking about. I am speaking about this in a general philosophical sense right now: for many years we were taught to hate one another. And now we need to think about how to cooperate in all spheres. Gorbachev. The vast majority of our people does not want to (and believe that they will not) go to war with the United States. But politicians and military men have to take reality into account, i.e., the fact that our countries maintain such powerful weapons. What can be done? I think that tomorrow we could discuss in a philosophical sense the changing world and our ideas about it. I would like to say a thing or two, and would also like to listen to you. Moreover, we should not only talk about it in a philosophical sense, but also in a practical sense. The situation in the world is changing and it is time to think about where we are, and where we are going. Bush. In such matters, neither you nor I are entirely free. We have ties to the legacy of recent, and not so recent, history. These are realities you have to reckon with. I think that the contacts between our military men play a certain role in resolving this problem, for example, the trip by General Powell and his reception by General Moiseyev. Gorbachev. Yes. George Bush. The position you took on Iraq’s aggression, which, I know, was not an easy one for you to take, played a huge positive role. Yes, let us discuss this tomorrow. It seems to me that many questions still have no practical answers. I understand that COCOM is interfering. But it exists because of former, and in some circles current, apprehensions. Gorbachev. When you approach the problem from this end, cooperation is even more necessary than when seen from a purely economic point of view. Processes in the world are developing in such a way that cooperation between us is simply essential. This world needs some sort of axis that would make it possible to channel the development of events in a positive direction. Without cooperation between us it would be difficult to do. 400

Bush. You said that the years 1991–1992 will be a critical period for your internal reforms. I will tell you as a friend: I am afraid of 1992. I spoke about this with Brent [Scowcroft] and several friends. You know it is an election year for us, a time when reality is replaced by rhetoric, when sides in the political struggle exchange blows. I can tell you what kind of mood the Americans are in. They are not afraid. They believe that our relations are better than they were and can be better still. But we have a complex system: in the next year one-third of the Senate will be re-elected, as well as every member of the House of Representatives and the president. In the midst of electoral passions, real positions and disagreements are distorted and exaggerated. It comes as no surprise to me that Peter Jennings tried to drive a wedge between us. We have republicans, liberals, conservatives. And while everyone recognizes the significance of Soviet-American relations, it is not easy to move the matter forward. Of course, it is not as difficult as it once was, since the American people mostly support glasnost, perestroika, and our meetings. There are, needless to say, also other voices—for instance, Senator Jesse Helms or rabid liberals who want to teach you about human rights. Gorbachev. I understand. I am already completely familiar with this system. We have a similar process. I say everywhere: the Americans cannot give us anything on a platter, but it is not a problem for me to defend and advance SovietAmerican relations everywhere. [Source: The Gorbachev Foundation Archive. Fond 1, Opis 1. Partially published in Gorbachev, Otvechaya na vyzov vremeni, pp. 281–28, and in Gorbachev, Sobranie sochinenii, v. 26, forthcoming. Translated by Anna Melyakova and Matthew McGorrin.]

401

Document No. 66: Memorandum of Conversation, Gorbachev– Bush, Expanded Bilateral Meeting, Moscow, 12:55 p.m. – 1:22 p.m. July 30, 1991

This brief, “expanded bilateral” meeting between Bush and Gorbachev also included President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, Soviet Prime Minister Pavlov, Bessmertnykh, Moiseyev, Matlock, Baker, Scowcroft, and others. Bush and Gorbachev summarize the main points of their one-on-one conversation, stressing the need to cooperate, the importance of associate membership for the USSR in the IMF, the development of special “great” projects that could be arranged jointly by U.S. and Soviet companies, and the commitment to developing relations further. Gorbachev emphasizes that, paradoxically, the Soviet Union wants “to depend more on you— but that is our line.” Bush promises to be forthcoming and underscores their commonality of interests: “We will help. I approach this in terms of what is in the interest of the U.S. But what is good for the U.S. is good for you.”

President Gorbachev: I want to welcome you. I understand we will be having lunch soon. I am satisfied with the visit. We’ve already talked about a wide range of issues. First, I want to say that I am prepared to develop relations, and to fill them with a new quality. This is our choice. This is the Soviet leadership line. We will return to this question tomorrow in the fresh air of Novo Ogarevo to ponder where we stand and act in this situation. As I said on the eve of the meeting in the U.S., if the relationship becomes weaker, we will defend it. It is important. We have a joint interest in cooperation, in Europe, and elsewhere. You can act on the assumption that this is our choice. It meets the long-term interests of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Second, Mr. President, I explained the peculiarities of developments in the USSR. I am grateful to you for your interest. I consider it the wish of the President of the United States to understand our reality. I see interest based on a search for ways to cooperate today. This is not an easy matter. The questions you raised enable me to say our partnership is growing. We are trying to understand each other better. We also discussed economic cooperation. We want to depend much more on the U.S. in economic terms—not slavishly or out of weakness. We want to develop and build our relationship. We should be predictable for you. When countries are linked by economic cooperation at a certain level, they become more predictable. It might seem a paradox that we want to depend more on you—but that’s our line. 402

We discussed in the one-on-one the subject of “great” projects, which can only be done with the participation of the U.S. These are concrete proposals. We are awaiting those delegations you discuss in your letter [before the London G-7 meeting]. But I remind you, there are [also] some issues of great importance for us: 1.) large projects, and 2.) convertibility. I discussed this with the President, and we agreed to work on it at the expert level. Also, as I told you in London, it is important that we have cooperation. But we are hampered by restrictions on your part. I would like to return to that topic. I advanced an idea. We need to earn money to pay back for services we receive from you. We want, for example, machinery for the food industry. We cannot, however, pay you with the additional food we produce. You don’t need more food. The money must come from other sources. We need to link cooperation in areas such as food production with space research, defense conversion, etc. We could develop liquid hydrogen engines. Your experts like our technology there. Or, we could launch satellites, which is a $12 billion market. There are probably other areas. The remnants of the Cold War need to be eliminated. [Excised paragraph] President Gorbachev: I ask once again in the presence of the delegation that the President instruct them to consider membership [for the USSR] in the IMF. I have big problems in the next 1–2 years. Call us what you like—“associate members,” “half associate members.” It is important for us to use that fund. So, I express satisfaction with the beginning of our discussions, as we are raising major issues of discussion. The President: Thank you. I know we are short of time. I would like to offer a few brief comments before lunch. First, U.S.-Soviet cooperation does not run counter to our interests. What we are talking about with the Soviet Union is in our interest. Second, I agree that the partnership is growing. Your willingness to welcome our administration people—Agriculture and Treasury—is important. They can work out the details, for example, on the IMF and the World Bank. Third, I am grateful to the military for their hospitality to Colin Powell. That kind of military exchange is useful. It reduces the chance of surprises. Fourth, on IFI’s, just one word. Associate membership is not an effort to put down the USSR. The Soviet economy is so potentially enormous, and facing enormous problems, that it requires special handling. It could dominate other countries. We’re talking about exactly what you want, without the burden of full membership. Everyone has the right to apply. [Excised paragraph] Sixth, on projects. We’ll look over the specific projects you raised. We can talk later about what we are doing—the trade agreement, MFN, Stevensen and Byrd. 403

We will help. I approach this in terms of what is in the interest of the U.S. But what is good for the U.S. is good for you. President Gorbachev: I am sure mutual interest will advance our cooperation. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA 1999-0303-F/1 by the National Security Archive. Original in Scowcroft, Brent, Files, Presidential Memcons, Presidential Meetings—Memorandum of Conversations 7/24/91-9/24/91.]

404

Document No. 67: Memorandum of Conversation, Gorbachev–Bush–Nazarbayev, Luncheon Meeting, Moscow, 1:28 p.m. – 2:07 p.m. July 30, 1991

After an arduous final round of discussions with other republic leaders at Novo-Ogarevo, an estate on the outskirts of Moscow, Gorbachev emerges on July 25 with a landmark agreement on a new Union Treaty. He now wants to engage his republic allies directly in the dialogue with Moscow’s American partners. Nazarbayev is Gorbachev’s strongest backer in the process and the most promising republic leader who shares the ideals of perestroika. Virtually half of this conversation among the three presidents is taken up with discussion of the stalled Chevron deal (see Document No. 65). Bush repeats his insistence at the morning session that he “is not carrying water for Chevron,” yet he makes sure his counterparts are aware that the opportunity represents a “wonderful example of partnership.” Nazarbayev expresses some concerns while the Americans clearly indicate they want the deal to go through without further delay. Nazarbayev turns the discussion to the natural riches of Kazakhstan and attempts to impress the U.S. side with the republic’s investment prospects. In the second part of the conversation, the leaders congratulate each other on the successful completion of the START Treaty, which they will sign the next day, and which has direct relevance to Kazakhstan—home of the infamous Semipalatinsk test site and location of significant numbers of strategic nuclear weapons.

Secretary Baker: President Nazarbayev, what are the four outstanding issues in the Chevron deal? President Nazarbayev: The fifteen areas were reduced to four by negotiation. Now there is criticism of this deal because it is supposedly contrary to the interests of the Soviet Union, mainly because profits are too high. First, the rate of return is 27.9 percent, while Chevron gets 22 percent world-wide. Second, there is the issue of royalties. President Bush and Secretary Baker know the oil industry—7.5 percent royalties are too low. Third, the Soviet Union has spent $850 million developing the Tengize oil field. The U.S. side owes us 50 percent of that sum. Chevron has agreed to that. Fourth, this is a rich, complex oil field. In addition to oil, there are by products, for example, one million tons of sulphur, as well as polyethylene. We want Chevron to help us attract other companies to develop those products, since Chevron is clearly reluctant to develop them. This is a huge deal: twenty-five years, renewable up to forty. Over the first forty years the total revenues will be $169 billion, from an investment of $86 billion, with a new profit of $65 billion. 405

President Gorbachev: In general, the negotiations are going “normally.” There is nothing insurmountable. The President: This is very helpful, very interesting. It is difficult to pin profits down to dollars and cents. To a degree, a deal is a deal, and the contract should go forward. Holding to that principle will attract business. They feel that they had a deal, then a committee was formed. I am glad to hear it is on the way to being resolved. How do we attract capital? When we say there is a deal, then there is a deal. We’re not lecturing. I don’t have all the answers. Even in our country, businesses have problems with bureaucracy. President Gorbachev: As the Secretary of State will appreciate: no matter what, we will reach an agreement with the Japanese. [Excised: a paragraph spoken by President Bush, and two lines spoken by President Nazarbayev] President Gorbachev: Right. By next meeting, probably there will be no more problems. President Nazarbayev: I put the deal back on the table after people were afraid it would collapse. The deal is in the national interest. But there was lots of press about it. I decided we needed 40–60 days to finish it up. We called on the services of our experts to make sure all concerns are cleared up. The President: It is very important to get it down. I am not carrying water for Chevron. But this is a wonderful example of partnership. It would stimulate other deals. President Nazarbayev: Sure, I know. I met with Johnson and Johnson. [Excised: two lines spoken by President Gorbachev] President Nazarbayev: One word with Yeltsin took three hours. “Federal tax.” Finally Yeltsin agreed. The President: Let’s get rid of communiqués. I’m talking about the G-7 communiqués. This is my proposal for better relations—ban communiqués. President Gorbachev: We’ve lost communiqués, which has improved the dialogue. But the foreign ministers love communiqués. Secretary Baker: No, the foreign ministries love communiqués. The President: I hope you feel as good as we do about work on the [START] treaty. President Gorbachev: It took ten years. Such work! I knew we had done it done when neither our scientists or experts understood the remaining details. So I said, “…put them aside and sign it.” The President: I told the experts: “I’ll impose my view on shroud, telemetry, etc.” I looked around and I knew more than they did. President Gorbachev: Exactly! I’m sure we’ll all benefit from the treaty. Imagine the amount of beer our negotiators consumed. General Moiseyev: I should have bet Bartholomew during the last meeting. I asked him, “…will there be a summit or not? He had his doubts.” 406

Under Secretary Bartholomew: I said there would be no summit unless you went farther in your position. President Gorbachev: I offer a toast to our negotiations. President Nazarbayev: Why not come by Alma-Alta [sic]? See Baikonor [sic]. The President: There just isn’t time. President Gorbachev: You have a choice of where to go. The President: We are very free. The problem is time. President Nazarbayev: I’m sure we’ll see you. I hope we’ll see Secretary Baker. I’m good friends with Matlock. Matlock promised to hunt. President Gorbachev: Can Scowcroft hunt with a rifle, or just missiles? President Nazarbayev: We have all types of climactic zones in Kazakhstan: deserts, mountains, steppe, arid areas. We grow grain. President Gorbachev: It is a very tough climate. There are nice areas. President Nazarbayev: We ship ten million tons of grain to other republics. We produce 60–90 percent of non-ferrous metals in the Soviet Union—140 million tons of coal and 26 million tons of oil. We could increase oil output to 100– 150 million tons a year, while our needs are only 12 million tons a year. President Gorbachev: Of course, preservation of the environment should be discussed. There has been lots of mismanagement in agriculture for decades. We are at the very beginning [in addressing environmental issues]. President Nazarbayev: We had considerable oil reserves around the Caspian Sea. We’re not poor. U.S. business will find proper conditions. The President: What are you doing with the sulphur? President Gorbachev: We buy it. We’re importing sulphur now. Ambassador Komplektov: It belongs to the joint venture. We will collect no taxes for the first five years, then 50 percent of the normal tax for the next five years. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA 1999-0303-F/1 by the National Security Archive. Original in Scowcroft, Brent, Files, Presidential Memcons, Presidential Meetings—Memorandum of Conversations 7/24/91-9/24/91.]

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Document No. 68: Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Yeltsin, Moscow, 3:55 p.m. – 4:30 p.m. July 30, 1991

This conversation is held at Yeltsin’s insistence after he refused to join a previous meeting with other republic leaders. Bush records in his memoir that Yeltsin said he did not want to take part in a “faceless mass audience,” and that he clearly expected to be treated as an equal with Gorbachev. During their conversation, Yeltsin thanks Bush for the successful initiation of economic cooperation, which they had agreed to during his visit to Washington in June. He strongly reassures the U.S. president about the Union Treaty and Russia’s support for it: “the Union Treaty is no longer a draft—we resolved the final problem yesterday and initialed an agreement—there is no longer any obstacle to going ahead.” He also suggests that the United States and Russia can now formalize their relationship, but Bush suggests they do so after the Union Treaty is signed. Unexpectedly for the Americans, Yeltsin ends the session by inviting Russian journalists into the room, turning it into a fullblown media event.

President Yeltsin: Mr. President, welcome to the Kremlin. I would like to introduce you to my team (Yeltsin proceeded to say a few words about each). We covered many issues in our private meeting together. Now I would like to welcome President George Bush and the U.S. delegation to the office of the President of Russia. This is the first time ever in the l000-year history of Russia that there is a democratically-elected President in the Kremlin. There are two flags in the Kremlin—the Russian flag and the Union flag. This is new and unique. The President: That is a long time. To those of you who were not with President Yeltsin in Washington, I would like to say that his visit to the U.S. was very good and very helpful. He conducted himself in such a way that led to an improvement in relations between Russia and the U.S. President Yeltsin: Thank you very much. I would like to say that there have been twenty-eight days since Washington, since we met, and a lot has happened since then. We agreed there to upgrade relations in the following four areas: food storage and processing; management training; defense conversion; and joint transportation projects. I am happy to say that there has been movement in all four of our working groups in these areas. I would like to commend in particular the Department of Commerce for this progress. I would also like you to know that there is no allergy on Gorbachev’s part for this program. In view of the fact that the Union Treaty is no longer a draft—we resolved the final problem yesterday and initialed an agreement—there is no longer any obstacle to going ahead. Russia has no more tax problems. So, I would like to see now movement toward formalizing our contacts. Perhaps at our next meeting, since 408

today’s is too short, we could move to sign a MOU on the four projects and on our contacts and cooperation. This is based on the Union statement, the Union Treaty which says that the Union will coordinate foreign policy of the states of the Union. I would like to clear up the matter of the tax provision in the Union Treaty. This was not a personal issue or feeling on the part of the President of Russia but a strong feeling on the part of the Parliament. We want control of the budget. We want to know where our taxes are going. We want to see the defense budget reduced in very real terms. We want control of expenditures. You have some budgetary control. We do not. The President: Is this something that has been resolved by your agreement with the center? President Yeltsin: No. The treaty reached with Gorbachev was a compromise between the two of us. He removed one line and I initialed that page. So there are no more problems on the tax issue. The treaty calls for a fixed Union tax rate to be agreed upon by the republics. Secretary Baker: Is this figure agreed upon or is it a figure to be agreed upon? President Yeltsin: For this year, it is agreed at 23.4 billion rubles. For 1992, it will be a fixed percentage rate. President Yeltsin: No. We have only agreed to agree on a fixed rate in the future. The rate of taxation will differ from one republic to the next. The center will make an estimate of spending for us. Now, do I understand that you support my idea of formalizing the basics of our relationship? The President: Which relationship? Do you mean the U.S. and Russia or yours with the center? I am unclear about what you are asking. We do want to look forward to cooperation with you. Secretary Baker: President Yeltsin, the answer will depend on what the Union Treaty says about the authority of the republics to enter into agreements with other countries. We will have to see this new Union Treaty. President Yeltsin: This matter is open for signature; all the Union Treaty problems have been resolved. The Union Treaty will be open for signature in August and states the following formula: sovereign states can pursue their own independent foreign policy, including foreign economic policy, but coordination of their actions internationally will be vested in the Union which will have responsibility for treaties and strategic relationships. But the specifics of the relationship will be channeled through the republics. This is the way it will be. The President: Please give us a copy of the Union agreement. When it is finally worked out, we will study it and work within it but not ahead of it. I don’t want to plough new ground. President Yeltsin: I understand. I would not want to hand over an initialed version but will give you a copy when it is final. The President: In the meantime, please continue your contacts with the Secretaries of Commerce, Treasury and Agriculture. These will be important contacts in the meantime. Well, the Ambassador tells me we are being kicked out. 409

President Yeltsin: We are not kicking you out, protocol is doing that. The President: Well, you look very fit. You look good. President Yeltsin: I play tennis daily. The President: The Russians have some good tennis players. President Yeltsin: Yes, Chesnakov, Andrei Chesnakov is very good. Prime Minister Silayev: I played tennis with your brother and beat him! The President: Which brother? I have three brothers. Prime Minister Silayev: I can’t remember his name, it was the younger one, I think. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA 1999-0303-F/1 by the National Security Archive. Original in Scowcroft, Brent, Files, Presidential Memcons, Presidential Meetings—Memorandum of Conversations 7/24/91-9/24/91.]

410

Document No. 69: Record of the Main Content of Conversation between Bush and Gorbachev, Novo-Ogarevo July 31, 1991

This session is fascinating in several respects. In retrospect, the disjuncture between how Bush and Gorbachev viewed the importance of the new U.S.-Soviet partnership in international affairs was never so blatant as in their later recollections of this particular conversation. In his memoir, Gorbachev describes the meeting as “the star hour of new thinking,” and devotes a full seven pages just to the conversation “on the veranda in Novo-Ogarevo.” But he does not mention that six Lithuanian guards had just been killed by Soviet troops at the Byelorussian border. In the Bush/Scowcroft memoir, the recap covers a full page but focuses on the “Lithuanian incident.”47 The conversation is also noteworthy as a significant meeting of the minds, and for reflecting an entirely different quality of discussion compared to most previous Cold War summits. The two leaders offer a tour d’horizon of global problems in search of joint solutions, even in regions such as the Middle East where they have only recently been locked in a zero-sum contest but are now virtually conspiring together, neither hesitating to criticize their own regional allies. Gorbachev informs Bush that the Soviet Union is ready to recognize Israel at the start of the conference on the Middle East. They also bring up South Africa, where Bush describes Nelson Mandela as “out of touch”; developments in China; and the nuclear aspirations of India and Pakistan. Among other important remarks, Gorbachev suggests that the two sides discuss a “new concept of strategic stability” that would not be “reduced to military parity, equality, and the military aspect of security.” Bush comments on Yeltsin’s behavior as an “illustration of the challenges you face” and tells Gorbachev: “I want to assure you that from our side we will not take a single step that would complicate your situation. We believe in you and trust your intentions.” Interestingly, on the issue of chemical weapons, the Soviets are constrained by their new green movement. When Baker suggests that chemical weapons could be destroyed in the Arctic, the environmentally conscious Gorbachev objects: “That would be even worse. Scientists warn us that due to the slow rate of reproduction of biological processes in the Arctic, it is a place where the ecological balance cannot be disturbed under any circumstances.” In the last part of the conversation, Gorbachev raises an issue that is constantly on his mind—Yugoslavia—and the implications for his own country if the principle of territorial integrity and inviolability of borders is disregarded by the European powers: “even a partial disintegration of Yugoslavia could create a chain reaction that will be worse than a nuclear reaction.” He reminds Bush that “seventy percent of interstate borders in the Soviet Union are in essence not defined.” He then prophetically mentions Ukraine as a possible hot spot, with Crimea and Eastern Ukraine as possible self-determination crises. “The question is: what will be left of Ukraine?”

 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 513.

47

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Novo-Ogarevo, July 31, 1991 Gorbachev. Welcome to these Russian lands, Mr. President. I hope that here, in this setting, we will have a fruitful conversation. I think we could continue discussing some of the topics outlined yesterday, and then listen to our ministers, who have been discussing some issues in detail. I would like to continue my thoughts from yesterday. There has been great progress in world politics recently. However, there are still processes which we cannot ignore. Our dialogue, the partnership that is developing, the atmosphere of our contacts—these are all valuable elements that make it possible for us to discuss the most difficult issues. We should see what has paid off, and move forward, developing new approaches. In particular, I would like to think about a new concept of strategic stability. I think we should consider what to include in this concept. In the past, this concept came down to military parity, equality, and the military aspect of security. I think that now we need a new approach, because a new situation has developed. We are rejecting the stake on military strength and on the arms race, and new processes are emerging in our economic relations. We cannot fail to notice elements of political and economic instability if we look at the world today; and not just in Europe, where the instability manifests itself most clearly. It should be in our field of vision. Lately, national and sometimes religious elements have come into the picture. I think it is important that all of us are in favor of stimulating the democratic nature of the ongoing changes. We see that totalitarian and authoritarian regimes are on their way out. I think we brought about this process with our actions, and we want it to continue. The question is how to keep this process in a constitutional and legal framework, how not to allow this process to spill over into turmoil and chaos, which have dangerous consequences. This is one aspect of the reality and its consequences. Further, Mr. President, I think that we have to see the other aspect of reality—the emergence of new centers in the world. In particular, I am talking about the integration of Europe. This is not only the union of Western Europe. The northern countries are also eager to join this circle, and some Central and Eastern European countries are making attempts to join as well. If we do not connect this to the CSCE process, we will miss a very important phenomenon. The creation of such a center of economic, political, and military power could even create problems for the European process that we are a part of, and which we need. From this I will move on directly to Africa. You and I have done a great deal of work here. But the question arises: what’s next? Among other things I am talking about a country like South Africa. Considering the experience of our relations, we should not allow a situation to arise in which you are doing one thing, and we are doing something completely different. I think we should keep such factors as China and India in our field of vision. Together they hold 2 billion people. These two countries have ambitious national 412

plans. I do not want to judge them. They are large and ancient nations that want to break through to a better life. I believe that so far both of us have acted responsibly regarding China, refusing to “play the card.” And China would not allow it. We want you to be confident that we will not allow actions that would skew the strategic balance. I can assure you that we would welcome the return of your relationship with China back to normal. I was in China during the student demonstrations of 1989 and found myself, as they say, in hot water. Bush. Yes, it completely overwhelmed your visit. Gorbachev. Nevertheless, I remained calm. Deng Xiaoping and his colleagues tried to do the same. It is a pity, of course, the way things worked out with Zhao Ziyang. Bush. Yes, it affected our relations. Gorbachev. Soon after that I was in France and gave a speech at the Sorbonne, where thousands of professors and students tried to make me condemn China. They asked difficult questions. I told them that I felt sorry about what happened and that I wanted the situation to normalize as quickly as possible. But at the same time, I said, we are talking about a billion people who are looking for a way to a new life. This cannot be an easy task. And I must say, my response did not cause a negative reaction from the auditorium. Recently, the CC CPC [Communist Party of China] general secretary Jiang Zemin visited us. He told me about his conversation with Jimmy Carter, who, as a good Christian, started giving him advice on human rights. In response, the Chinese statesman told him that the world should be grateful to the State and government that manages to feed, clothe, and somehow keep in decent order one billion people. Bush. That’s a pretty good answer. Gorbachev. And regarding free emigration, he told me: “We will allow it, if you are willing to receive tens and maybe even hundreds of millions of people.” Why am I reminiscing about this? Because I think that China is a special case for analysis. In June our representatives took part in a session of ASEAN. This is a symbol of new tendencies in the world. I would like to verify their impressions from the meeting. They felt that a growing number of countries in that region are noticing Japan’s economic expansion. People are even talking about a Japanese economic empire. Moreover, there is a sense that Japan might not be content with only its economic role and will want to become a military power. They say Japan will continue collaborating with the U.S., but will try to use this partnership for its own purposes. I could say much more. About the problem of resources, water, the environment, demographic processes that could lead to a doubling of the Earth’s population in 30–50 years. The question arises: what role should our countries play, considering these realities, tendencies, and processes? What relations should we build between our two countries? 413

But first I would like to say that considering the global tendencies we analyzed, I am more and more convinced that we made the right choice when we started the transformation of our society, following the path of reform and organic incorporation into the world economy. My tactical conclusion is this: we have to move toward a more stable state, we have to overcome instability in the economy and in politics. We made a choice in favor of reform, and no ideological brakes, no dogmas and stereotypes can stop me. Today my main priorities are to solve the issues with our statehood and to move toward a new economy. And I will stimulate public agreement in every possible way. Perhaps American leaders are our strictest judges in all of this. We understand this. After all, you want to be sure of our intentions, of what we are doing. It seems this confidence has not fully formed yet. Yesterday the president and I had a thorough discussion and I became convinced that the questions of our collaboration and new forms of collaboration, and the desire to understand us better— the Administration is taking all of this seriously. And I appreciate it. Bush. First of all I would like to emphasize that in the changing world we will be very happy to see a strong, economically sound, and changed Soviet Union. In this respect, today I have more confidence in your willingness to change than I did before. I trust your intentions and after our conversation yesterday I am more confident than I was before this visit that you know where you want to go, and how to get there. I would like you to be certain that we trust your intentions. We believe that you want to be a strong participant in world politics. In order to do this, you want to carry out reforms within legal bounds and avoiding chaos. We are not worried about this approach; we welcome it. You started talking about Europe. We may have some difficulties with the Europeans ourselves. Our choice is to strive to maintain our involvement in Europe. You mentioned the CSCE process. We will continue to support it, of course with the participation of the USSR. We are trying to convey to our West European friends that we want to be present at the take-off, not just at landing. This means that we do not want to be put before the fact of some economic initiatives (not only regarding the Soviet Union), without being consulted ahead of time. With respect to Africa. We would welcome any actions on your part in support of de Klerk. We think that Mandela is out of touch. Partially for this reason, the ANC is lagging behind the democratic reforms taking place in the world. Mandela salutes Gaddafi, Castro, and others; it is impossible to understand. We would welcome any steps that would bring him closer to the reality of the modern world. I will also try to work along these lines. I am confident that de Klerk is following a truly new policy, that he really is ready to dismantle apartheid. In principle I agree with you—the cooperation we began in Namibia, Angola, and other African countries should continue. I am concerned about the India-Pakistan subcontinent and China. We discussed this with Major—it is difficult to keep this process on an even track. 414

About China. People in the U.S. still remember with bitterness the events in Tiananmen Square. However, there can be no question of playing the China card. Secondly, we want to have a positive impact on China, I do not want to break off contact with them. As you said, we want to bring our relationship with China back to normal. It was easier for us with Zhao Ziyang. I do not know Jiang Zemin. We would like to raise the level of contacts with China. It was very difficult to uphold the most favored nation status with China; I even had to use the presidential veto. Congress wants to punish China. But I think it is a very important country in the global context. With respect to India, I would hope that the Soviet Union could use its influence there to a greater extent. India and Pakistan tied a complex knot on the question of nuclear weapons. Of course, the Pakistanis lied to us when they said they were not working on nuclear weapons. However, they are right in one thing: they are offering to conclude an agreement with India to renounce nuclear weapons. But India has the bomb and does not want such an agreement. Gorbachev. The Indians keep asking us: does Pakistan have the bomb or not according to our data? We tell them that according to our sources Pakistan does not have nuclear weapons yet. But perhaps that information is not entirely accurate. Bush. We know for sure that Pakistan lied to us. They tried to create nuclear weapons. Baker. We have long advocated that India, China, the Soviet Union, Pakistan and the United States should come together to discuss the issue of nonproliferation. But India continues to refuse. Maybe you could convince them that a discussion of the problem of stability and nonproliferation would be in their interest. Gorbachev. I think we will talk with them on some specific issues. Bush. You mentioned ASEAN and talked about the concern in some parts of Asia about the problem of so-called Japanese imperialism. I think if you could find some way to solve your territorial dispute with Japan, it would guarantee their economic cooperation. By the way, we also have widespread anti-Japanese sentiments in the U.S. But I tell Americans: you should not be worried about Japanese investments, they ultimately benefit us. The difficulty arises because there is not sufficient reciprocity. The Japanese market is not very open. If you could have economic cooperation with them, it would be the best guarantee against military adventurism on their part. But, of course, we will be careful. We do not want the concerns you mentioned to become a reality. In conclusion, I would like to say that we are not at all worried about your intentions; we trust you and hope that we can show it. We understand what kind of difficulties you face. Just one example—Yeltsin’s behavior at yesterday’s lunch. We don’t want to meddle, but last night we talked about it among ourselves. For the Americans it was an illustration of the challenges you face. He always wants to get equal status with you. I want to assure you that from our side we will not take a single step that would complicate your situation. We believe in you and trust your intentions. We want to work with you to reform the Soviet economy. 415

Gorbachev. I see that we are thinking along the same lines. As the situation develops, we cannot avoid reflecting on it. We have to think about how we will build our relationship, how we will see each other. We have to come to conclusions that should be transformed into real political action. I think today’s conversation is useful in this regard. Now I suggest we listen to our ministers. They have been talking since the day before yesterday and have discussed a wider range of issues. Baker. I would first like to make a brief comment in relation to the conversation about ASEAN and Japan. I think the concerns some countries have are to a certain extent caused by the legacy of the past. And I would say that in Asia there are concerns not only about Japan, but about China and India as well. As for your specific question, I do not feel that Japan seeks to play a military role. The relationship between the U.S. and Japan in the sphere of security that developed after the end of World War II is regarded by the ASEAN countries as a very important factor. They see it as a deterrent for Japan. This is comparable to the support many European countries show for the continued presence of American troops in Europe, especially after German unification. I recall that last year you and E.A. Shevardnadze told me about the importance of the presence of U.S. troops. My opinion regarding Japan: it would like to play a greater political role, but not military. Bush. They would like to play a major role in the U.N. Baker. Japan wants to become a permanent member of the Security Council. Gorbachev. After this exchange of opinions I would like to spend some time on issues such as the Middle East in light of the lessons of the crisis in the Persian Gulf, and the prospects of our cooperation in the region. Also our disarmament plans going forward and taking into consideration the need for a real mechanism against the proliferation of weapons and technologies of mass destruction, and limiting the arms trade. We cannot ignore the fact that both your and our industries are growing increasingly interested in selling weapons to third countries. And, finally, we need to discuss the situation in Yugoslavia. Bessmertnykh. Secretary of State Baker and I focused our discussion on issues such as the resumption of negotiations on strategic arms, the Middle East and other regional issues, and bilateral relations. Additionally, specific questions regarding the next stage of disarmament talks were discussed at the level of our deputies, R. Bartholomew and A.A. Obukhov. We agreed that if the presidents approve this decision, the negotiations on defense and space will resume on September 30, in accordance with the SovietAmerican statement from June 1, 1990. They will be held within the framework of the Geneva Nuclear and Space Arms talks. Deputy ministers confirmed that they will be based on the mandate agreed upon in January, 1985. We also discussed starting consultations for future talks on Nuclear and Space Arms and strategic stability. If the two presidents agree, these consultations will begin in early October. Gorbachev. I think we should agree. 416

Baker. I want to add that we agreed that in the event of the presidents’ consent, the consultations will be carried out at the level of Bartholomew-Obukhov. Bessmertnykh. We also discussed the small issue of the phases of reductions in Soviet heavy ICBMs. The U.S. side asked us to confirm that the statement regarding this contained in the exchange of letters with the USSR minister of foreign affairs is legally binding. We confirmed this. Gorbachev. I want to ask a question on the first point—about the next phase of negotiations on strategic arms. What about the other members of the nuclear club? After all, the situation is changing right now. Baker. We intentionally did not discuss this question. Bessmertnykh. We are still at an early stage right now. I think that later we could discuss this question at the upcoming consultations or at the level of Foreign Ministers. We discussed some other disarmament questions. We were unable to agree on a date to resume the negotiations on limiting nuclear testing. The Soviet side offered to do it, but the American side prefers to wait and see how the control regime based on the 1974 and 1976 agreements will function. With regard to the consultations on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, the United States has not yet completed consultations with its NATO allies and cannot give a date for consultations with us. We discussed the issue of biological weapons, based on the messages exchanged between the presidents. In general, we agreed that a meeting of experts will take place. We would prefer if this happened before August 26th. But if the American side cannot do it earlier, we will have to comply. However, we would like the Soviet group of experts’ visit to take place immediately after the meeting. Bush. I will not repeat what I told the President in London. I just want to emphasize that we attach great importance to the meeting of experts. This issue must be addressed; we are extremely concerned about it. I do not know why we cannot come to an agreement here. Let the experts meet. Gorbachev. We want to be absolutely honest about this issue, we want complete clarity. It is important that the American experts who visit us this time should be the same ones as last time, so we do not have to explain everything all over again. And secondly: we would like for the American side to set the dates for the Soviet experts’ visit to the U.S. We have a general agreement on this, and let us not delay the realization of this agreement. Bessmertnykh. On the issue of arms control we discussed the possibility of creating two working groups that would conceptually discuss the following issues. Firstly, the issues of deterrence, predictability and stability, not only in the military but also in connection with regional situations and potential conflicts. We could try to clarify the role of the USSR and U.S. I think it is an interesting idea, and if the presidents agree, we could discuss it in detail. The second working group would deal with non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related technologies. Gorbachev. I support this. 417

Baker. I would like to add one thing. We briefly discussed the question of joint efforts to complete the work on the Chemical Weapons Convention next year. The United States made a new proposal on challenge inspections. The Soviet side noted the progress in the position of the U.S. Specifically, we removed the requirement to keep two percent of the stock and the right to a retaliatory strike. There is one issue left—challenge inspections. If we can resolve it, we will be able to agree on a global chemical weapons ban in the spirit of the proposal made a few years ago by George Bush when he was vice president. There is one problem from the Soviet side. It has to do with the timeframe for the destruction of chemical weapons. You agreed to provide a schedule for the destruction. Bessmertnykh. We are indeed getting closer to the goal. The United States removed some positions that were making it difficult to move ahead. As for challenge inspections, we advocated that they should be allowed in all cases when necessary. Right now the experts are discussing this issue. As for the timeframe of the destruction of chemical weapons, the USSR president recently approved what is essentially a national elimination program, and the Cabinet of Ministers is working out specific details of the program right now. I hope that soon we will be able to provide the necessary data; although we really are having great difficulty finding a location for the destruction of the weapons, and potentially with the schedule as well. Gorbachev. I will add, so that you have an idea of our difficulties. Our democracy is still young, and our “green bloc” was able to close down one thousand three hundred factories for ecological reasons. So, in Yerevan the “Nairit” plant is closed, which was unique in the country. Baker. Can it be located somewhere in the Arctic? Gorbachev. That would be even worse. Scientists warn us that due to the slow rate of reproduction of biological processes in the Arctic, it is a place where the ecological balance cannot be disturbed under any circumstances. Bush. Yes, we also had great difficulty in solving this problem; we located the plant for the destruction of chemical weapons on an atoll in the Pacific. Baker. Three more questions on arms control. The question of accelerating negotiations on “Open Skies.” After the completion of the Vienna talks and START, we decided to work on a bilateral basis, and, if possible, to create conditions to resume multilateral talks on “Open Skies.” Also, we would like the Vienna-1A negotiations to be completed by March 1992, i.e., before the Helsinki-2 meeting. Finally, we stressed that we would like to get a comprehensive letter from you, in which you list all facts and everything concerning your views on the diplomatic line regarding the SS-23 missiles in Eastern Europe. This is a major political issue in the U.S. We know that you presented démarches to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and other countries. However, information on these issues is scattered. It would be great if it was collected in one place, so we could present it to the Senate and close this issue, which is currently being used by opponents of arms control. 418

Gorbachev. All right. Bessmertnykh. We compared our positions on “Open Skies” and noted that our positions are moving closer to each other. We are preparing a letter that will contain responses to the considerations put forth by NATO. The letter will be sent after the president’s approval. As for the Vienna-1A talks, they are specifically dealing with the question of the number of troops, and we hope that by the Helsinki Conference this stage of the negotiations will be completed. On the SS-23, we prepared information for the American side and will transfer it in the course of this visit. Gorbachev. Very well. Let us now discuss the Middle East, if the ministers are not completely confused over this issue yet. Baker. You know, Abraham Lincoln said that any road is good as long as it ultimately leads you to your goal. The Middle East is a region where we can go beyond basic cooperation and be partners. Both our countries are making great efforts and trying to influence the different sides. Only because of this work we now finally have a chance. Of course, it is only a chance for now and there are many obstacles ahead of us. During my last visit, Prime Minister Shamir, in his usual manner, made it clear that Israel was ready to agree to the approach we are proposing. Knowing the Israelis, I expect that they will add some conditions to their agreement. He will probably say that he has to discuss it with his Cabinet. The question of the Palestinians’ representation is not fully decided. Shamir will probably demand some assurances from the United States, so we will have to work on that. Bush. What kind of assurances? Related to security? Baker. Not quite. In part, it is a question of representation, in part an assurance that if they support the process, the question will not be advanced to the level of the U.N. Security Council. In addition, the Palestinians seek assurances from us, as they do from you, that our policies will remain unchanged. I told the Israelis, the Palestinians, and the Jordanians that we have certain fundamental positions that we do not change. However, each of the sides is essentially asking us to change our position on this or that issue. The president instructed me to go to Jerusalem tomorrow, where I will try to get a statement from Shamir that he accepts our proposal. It is an extremely difficult task. Gorbachev. We received a letter from Arafat, he is asking for clarification of the positions on six points. Baker. Israel is also asking us to make some statements that we cannot make. Faisal Hussain reached out to us, same as he did to you. Each side wants us to guarantee the outcome. But even together, we cannot guarantee the outcome. Let’s see what we can do in Jerusalem. I do not want to predict anything, but maybe something will come of it. We prepared a statement that the two presidents could give here in Moscow. 419

Gorbachev. I reviewed it. I think it is a fitting document. Bush. I would like to hear your opinion on Arafat. We think that he backed the wrong horse and really damaged his position after the Iraqi aggression. Nevertheless, we see that he still remains a spokesman for the Palestinians in the Arab world. Do you think his positions will strengthen or weaken? Bessmertnykh. President Gorbachev instructed me to meet with Arafat in Geneva after my trip to the Middle East. We also have regular contact with the PLO. We know that there are significant differences within the PLO Executive Committee. Arafat’s position has weakened somewhat. However, the fact remains that the PLO does not make any decisions without him. So we have to work with him. Baker. We should go over how you will respond to questions about the Middle East at the press conference. Gorbachev. I think it would suffice to stick to the prepared statement and not deviate from it. Baker. The history of the Palestinians is a history of missed opportunities. That was the case in 1948, in 1967, after Camp David. Right now there is a new opportunity. Our task is to bring Israel to the negotiating table. It is very important to have an understanding that at the first stage, when the transitional arrangements will be discussed, there should not be people from East Jerusalem at the table from the Palestinian side. Otherwise there will be no peace process. Israel’s position is to refuse to negotiate with the PLO. Therefore, we have to arrange it so the PLO leadership in Tunis can direct its people behind the scenes, but have only Palestinians from the territories in the delegation. We are developing a fairly sophisticated system of relations that will make it possible for the Palestinians not to feel like they are giving up their claims to East Jerusalem. But if this issue comes to the forefront there will never be peace, there will be no peace process. East Jerusalem has to be the last issue in the negotiations. When I am asked about Palestinian representatives, I refuse to comment. I only say that the question has to be resolved to the satisfaction of all sides. Gorbachev. They will try to pry answers out of us on a number of positions. Firstly, on the role of the PLO; secondly, on the Palestinians’ self-determination; and thirdly, on the return of Arab territories. Baker. Let us emphasize that we are cooperating, and we aim to establish a peace process. We will not go into details. The statement speaks for itself. Gorbachev. Indeed, the main thing is our cooperation. If the process does begin in October, it will be a historic opportunity for a settlement. Bessmertnykh. We think that the invitation to the peace conference should be sent on behalf of both presidents. We are working on the text of the invitation, which will consist of more than just polite phrases. It will form the basis for the peace conference. Considering the historic nature of the conference, it would be appropriate for the presidents of the U.S. and USSR to open the conference. As for the venue, Israel prefers Washington, and the Arabs prefer Cairo. It seems that a European city would work as a compromise. We are discussing this issue. 420

Gorbachev. I think we may remember these days as the beginning of a breakthrough. Bush. I hope so, but I am still worried about Israel’s response. It has not agreed yet. Gorbachev. For our part, we are ready to establish diplomatic relations with Israel in connection with the conference. You can tell this to the Israelis. Bush. Before the start of the conference? Bessmertnykh. Perhaps in conjunction with the start of the conference. We have come a long way in the practical aspect of our relations. Gorbachev. In general, we are ready. By the way, our people were recently in Israel and said that Russian speech can be heard everywhere in Tel Aviv. Bush. Israeli settlements in the occupied territories are a burning issue. We strongly oppose this. In the past, American Jews fully supported Peres’s policy of not building more settlements. However, their position changed under Shamir’s influence. Still, I think American Jews are becoming more aware of the harm of the settlement policy. We will try to change Israel’s mind, but it is very difficult. Gorbachev. The Arabs are staunchly criticizing us, too. They are demanding that we put an end to emigration to Israel. When Mubarak was here he warned me that we will make a public statement about it, and he did so at a press conference. Baker. We will give the Palestinians a number of points, like we gave Assad four points on the role of the UN. As a result, the Palestinians will be able to say that they are not giving up their position on East Jerusalem and will be able to raise the issue at negotiations over the final status. The Palestinians will benefit if they give us enough concessions to allow us to bring Israel to the negotiating table. Just between us, I think that Israel would prefer if this did not happen. Our strategy is to get the Arabs to say yes first, then it will be almost impossible for Israel to say no. Although, who knows. Bush. The U.S. administration is often criticized for not supporting Israel enough, for not supporting it automatically. We support Israel’s legitimate concerns, but we cannot support its every position. We cannot support Israeli radicalism. I think we will be able to withstand the criticism. Many Jews in the U.S. actually feel that the settlements are a mistake. Anyway, what is written in the newspapers ultimately does not harm us. It gives Jim the chance to speak more firmly with Israel. But we cannot guarantee that Israel will listen to us. Gorbachev. I understand what you are saying. Baker. I want to stress once again that the Palestinians should not give Israel any excuse to avoid participating. The question of East Jerusalem would give Israel the perfect excuse. We never recognized the annexation of East Jerusalem. But we cannot ignore the fact that 98 percent of Israelis support it. Therefore, this issue should be excluded from public debate. Gorbachev. What’s happening with Yugoslavia? Bessmertnykh. We tried to put together a short statement on this issue, because everyone is waiting for our word. We have not finished this task yet. The 421

main issue is as follows. We believe that based on the wording adopted by all the foreign ministers of the CSCE at the meeting in Berlin, the statement should mention the principles of territorial integrity and unity of Yugoslavia. However, the United States has tactical difficulties with this. Bush. Were you able to bring the positions closer? Baker. Here is the problem. Because the European Community is playing a leading role in the effort to resolve the situation in Yugoslavia, and we support this, we consulted about this text with the minister of foreign affairs of the Netherlands, since he is the chairman of the EEC. The Dutch are saying that this text would create difficulties. They agree with the first part of the statement, which mentions the necessity of negotiations and a constructive dialogue. However, the specific mention of territorial integrity and unity, even though it is in the Berlin statement, would be problematic. There is disagreement within the EC about the tactical approach in this matter. In particular, this is the disagreement between Germany and other EC countries, which they do not want to aggravate. Bush. Indeed, Germany came forward with the recognition of Slovenia. Maybe we really should opt for a short statement consisting of two-three declarations. We could note our concern about the events in Yugoslavia, call on everyone to respect the ceasefire, and condemn the use of force to deal with political problems. Let the Yugoslavs decide their own fate through negotiations. Bessmertnykh. We have a joint position in support of Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity. The question is whether to mention it in this statement. It is a question of tactics. Baker. The Berlin statement mentioned more than just territorial integrity. We are in favor of a peaceful settlement; we are against unilateral actions that would anticipate the results of the settlement. Perhaps the presidents could voice their support for the Berlin statement, but we should avoid loaded wording like territorial integrity and self-determination. Self-determination is what the Germans are insisting on. We do not disagree in principle. There are positions on which we are united. We are not departing from the Berlin statement. But we do not want to create difficulties for the EC. Gorbachev. I will speak on the essence of this issue. Before the start of this conversation, when the President was walking toward the building, Mr. Scowcroft and I had a conversation. I told him that even a partial breakup of Yugoslavia could create a chain reaction that will be worse than a nuclear reaction. That is why this is a decisive moment. If I started listing the potential territorial problems that would arise in that situation, I would not have enough fingers on my hands to count them, in fact, all the fingers in this room would not be enough. Seventy percent of interstate borders in the Soviet Union are in essence not defined. Nobody worked on it before; everything was solved on a routine basis, almost at the regional soviets levels. 422

When the prime minister of Greece Mitsotakis was here, I jokingly asked him whether Greece has any claims on Central Asia, since Alexander the Great reached it in his day. Just a couple of weeks after Lithuania adopted the Act of Restoration of Independence and recognized the entry into the USSR as illegal, Byelorussia raised the question about returning its territories, which were given to Lithuania when it entered the Soviet Union. This includes the Vilnius region, where 40 percent of the population are Polish-speaking, and where there are many Russians. Klaipeda belonged to Russia for 500 years. After the war, Stalin gave it to Lithuania at Sniečkus’ request. There is a dispute about this territory as well. But then what will be left of Lithuania after it separates? When Moldovans started talking about joining Romania, the population of one-third of its territory immediately objected, they do not want to leave. The same is true in Ukraine. When western Ukraine started talking about independence, Crimea announced that if this happens it would go to Russia. Moreover, Crimea was declared itself autonomous as the result. And residents of the Donets Basin remembered that after the Revolution, a Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Soviet Republic was created there. So they said they may want to restore it. Hungary’s claims to Ukrainian territories also came up. The question is: what will be left of Ukraine? That’s how sensitive this subject is. I promise you that tomorrow there will be talk of Poland’s western territories, about Transylvania, Macedonia. About a million Turks live in Bulgaria. In a word, if we do not keep the issue of territorial integrity and inviolability of borders under control, chaos will break out from which we will never extricate ourselves. When shortly before London I discussed this question with Kohl, he asked me what to do about the principle of self-determination of minorities if we insist on territorial integrity and inviolability of borders. I told him that I do not see a contradiction here, but the process has to take place within a constitutional and legal framework. This is my position on the Baltic States as well. There is such a web of territorial, economic, national, political, and security interests that the only solution is the constitutional process. For us it is a matter of principle. So I would ask you to find wording that would make it clear that these principles remain in force for us. Bush. Yes, we should think about how to factor this in. Baker. I would like to read an excerpt from a telegram from our embassy in the Netherlands. Van den Broek believes that we will undermine efforts to bring Slovenia and Croatia into the settlement process if we stress the principles of territorial integrity and unity, because they believe it would predetermine the outcome of the process. The reference to the Berlin declaration creates a special problem for the “12.” They do not depart from that statement. However, the Germans want to balance it with a reference to the Paris Charter, which mentions 423

self-determination. Preserving the unity of the EC is crucial in order for it to be able to play a constructive role. The situation is difficult enough as it is. Gorbachev. I think we should at least make a reference to the principles of the CSCE. Let us still try to make a statement. We will work on the wording. Bush. I think we are close to an agreement. I would ask you to revise the text in light of this discussion and show it to us. [Source: Gorbachev Foundation Archive, Fond 1, opis 1. Partially published in Gorbachev, Otvechaya na vyzov vremeni, pp. 284–287, and in Gorbachev, ­Sobranie sochinenii, v. 27, forthcoming. Translated by Anna Melyakova.]

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Document No. 70: Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Kravchuk, Kiev, 1:45 p.m. – 2:15 p.m. August 1, 1991

This very brief meeting with the Ukrainian leader (30 minutes including translations) presents many of the most pressing dynamics in U.S.-Soviet relations at this critical juncture—just three weeks before the attempted coup in Moscow. In the room is one of the coup leaders-to-be, Gorbachev’s own vice president, Gennady Yanayev; but the atmospherics are full of the kind of independent thinking, here by the Ukrainians, that would—before the end of the year—break up the USSR. The Americans in the room have not yet seen the U.S. domestic reaction to the president’s recent speech, in which he cautioned Ukrainians: “Americans will not support those who seek independence in order to replace a far-off tyranny with a local despotism. They will not aid those who promote a suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hatred.”48 Within hours, the phrase “Chicken Kiev,” coined by New York Times columnist William Safire, would dominate conventional wisdom about the speech, yet in the context of the disintegration of Yugoslavia then taking place, Bush’s choice of language probably deserves more credit. Here, he simply comments: “I want to deal respectfully with the center” and responds to the Ukrainian request for “most favored nation” status by saying “we are already doing MFN which covers all of the USSR, so you will benefit from that.”

The President: I was very moved by the welcome of all those people along the route as was every other American with me coming into Kiev today. Chairman Kravchuk: Mr. President, welcome to Kiev, welcome to Marinskiy Palace. First, I want to say to everyone here that I am very satisfied by my talks with the President in the car and in our meeting. I was also satisfied by your comments on many issues. I hope you and your party have felt that the Ukrainian people deeply respect the American people and your policies by this welcome. I also hope, Mr. President, that you will understand the aspirations of Ukraine for cooperation in different fields. We believe friendship and cooperation are very important for us. I would like the forthcoming U.N. General Assembly to take into account the political forces in our country and to treat them with respect. We are following resolutely state sovereignty. We want to enrich the existing union and want to become part of the union community, the European and the international communities. As a U.N. member, Ukraine is willing to participate in U.N. General Assembly meetings and discuss our wider participation in this and other international organizations.  Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush, 1991, v. 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 1007.

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We have great economic problems in Ukraine. I would also like to say that the establishment of your Consulate here will contribute to relations with our countries. I would be satisfied if the U.S. would permit us to open a Consulate in the U.S. As I said to the President in the car today, I also want to thank you for your assistance for Chernobyl and hope it will continue. I think the donors conference on Chernobyl will give a new emphasis to Chernobyl problems. The nuclear agency in Vienna gave a report, a rather modest assessment of the problem. The conference will help with an objective view of this problem. The President: First, I want to say how pleased we are to be here in Ukraine and are sorry that time is so short. I am moved by the warmth of the reception you and your people gave us on the streets. The dramatic results of perestroika and glasnost have produced a new opening for the U.S. and Ukraine. I have had a chance to explain to Chairman Kravchuk that we’ll deal officially with the center. I told him of my deep respect for President Gorbachev. But as the Union Treaty is worked out, I understand it will allow more direct dealings with the republics. In the meantime, we can go forward with economic issues, with nuclear safety. There are a lot of areas where the U.S. can be helpful. On our Consulate, I am delighted it is here. A reciprocal opening would have to depend on the details of the Union Treaty. I hope you will agree with that. I know we are short of time but there is a delicate balance here and I want to deal respectfully with the center. And yet we have a couple of hundred years of tradition with the U.S. and other countries dealing in many ways. There may be some standard thing but Ukraine has a tremendous following in the states where there are well over one million Ukraine-Americans. This allows us to start off with a lot going for us on both sides. So, I think I will leave it there for now, but I would be glad to respond to questions you or your associates may have. Prime Minister Fokin: It is a great privilege for me to consider myself as your personal friend after this meeting. I will not repeat what Chairman Kravchuk has said. I followed your airport speech with great attention. I am satisfied by the fact that the propositions I will make will respond to your ideas on cooperation with the U.S. I would like to suggest: First, I think Ukraine should be given Most Favored Nation status and, based on this, I suggest that relations between Ukraine and the U.S. should be expanded. Second, concerning U.S. investments, they will be guaranteed here by the National Bank and the ministries. They can be made in new projects or in reconstruction. What I would like to stress is that these are not loans but investments of any possible scope up to $5 billion. For this purpose, we should set up a joint commercial bank based on shares. Third, the American side should participate in the privatization of industries here: in coal mining, mechanical engineering, and light industry. After the reconstruction of industries, we could use them to renew our economy. U.S. firms will be given the possibility to trade freely here. 426

Fourth, we can guarantee investments of rubles in joint ventures, primarily to produce consumer goods. Fifth, we would like to establish a Ukrainian-U.S. association which would open shops and stores here in Ukraine and in those parts of the U.S. with heavy concentrations of Ukrainian-Americans (Fokin handed a list of ideas to the President). The President: Well, we will have to take a look at these ideas. Of course, we are already doing MFN which covers all of the USSR, so you will benefit from that. We will look at all five areas but it doesn’t sound like we can’t do any of these. Trade is no problem. And the new projects, we’re for them. Small business is a big part of U.s. [sic.] employment and we could help you with that. Let me get back to you with a more specific response. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA 1999-0303-F/1 by the National Security Archive. Original in Scowcroft, Brent, Files, Presidential Memcons, Presidential Meetings—Memorandum of Conversations 7/24/91-9/24/91.]

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Chapter 5

MADRID, 1991

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fter the successful Moscow summit and in anticipation of the signing of the new Union Treaty, scheduled for August 20, Mikhail Gorbachev went on a long overdue vacation in the Crimea. While he and his family badly needed this break, many could not understand why he would go away during this crucial period. And, indeed, the hard-liners, brought to power by the general secretary himself, struck the day before the Treaty was scheduled to be signed. Gorbachev found himself under house arrest in the resort town of Foros with no connection to the outside world while a state of emergency was introduced around the country. The news reached George Bush in Kennebunkport early in the morning of August 19, and left him acutely troubled. His reaction, however, was ambivalent—on the one hand he felt deeply for his embattled partner, but on the other, he was already beginning to weigh the possibility that he might have to “live with the new leaders, however repulsive their behavior.” In his first press conference after hearing about the coup, Bush called the hard-liners’ actions “extra-constitutional” and “disturbing,” but did not condemn them outright.1 In his initial telephone conversations with European leaders, John Major, Felipe González, and Helmut Kohl encouraged Bush to try immediately to get through to Gorbachev directly and make strong public statements on his behalf. Unable to reach Gorbachev, Bush finally spoke to Yeltsin on August 20.2 As it became clearer the coup would not succeed, the words from the Bush administration started sounding more decisive in support of Gorbachev and Yeltsin and in denunciation of the “Emergency Committee” in Moscow. When Gorbachev finally reached Bush, his tone was emotional: “My dearest George, I am so happy to hear your voice!” The Soviet president was eager to reconnect with his main international partner and resume his role on the world stage. But it was a different Gorbachev returning to a different country. The centrifugal processes that he tried to prevent with the signing of the Union Treaty were now in full force. The republican leaders had tasted sovereignty and were concerned about the possibility of hard-liners coming to power in Russia. At the same time, each of them was attempting to hold on to their own centers of power and not let the opposition form new governments. Eventually, almost all first party secretaries would become leaders of new independent states. To achieve that, they had to take the banner of nationalism away from the authentic nationalist and dissident  Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, pp. 520–521.  Document No.72.

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movements—a process that was especially important in Ukraine, where the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, professional Soviet apparatchik Leonid Kravchuk, maneuvered to coopt both the nationalist Rukh and the dissident opposition.3 In early September, the Bush administration was attempting to readjust its policy to the USSR and to decide to what extent the continued existence of the Union was in the interests of the United States. Bush and Baker believed that keeping the Union going, even with a weak center, was the best alternative to violent disintegration. (The Americans did not know at the time that tactical nuclear weapons were spread about in 14 of the 15 republics while strategic nuclear weapons were stationed in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus.) At a key NSC meeting on September 5, senior members of the administration presented their views. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney was the strongest proponent of encouraging the rapid disintegration of the USSR because he saw the fracturing of the former enemy as a diminution of threat. When he argued that “the voluntary breakup of the Soviet Union is in our interest,” Baker reminded him of Yugoslavia.4 Shockingly, Brent Scowcroft wrote in his memoir that he “thought there was positive benefit in the breakup of command and control over strategic nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union to several republics. Anything which would serve to dilute the size of an attack we might have to face was, in my view, a benefit well worth the deterioration of unified control over the weapons.”5 By comparison, President Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis worried about a single bomb landing on an American city. Here, President George H.W. Bush seems to have been one of a very few U.S. actors to see both the opportunity and the danger. Gorbachev was not going to be around much longer to make the arms-race-in-reverse happen. So Bush insisted on pushing the envelope, and given the reality in the Soviet Union, with so many ideological blinders about Soviet behavior in tatters on the floor of the Situation Room, the NSC agreed with the president’s push to offer significant and unilateral disarmament initiatives. With the apparent exception of Scowcroft and Cheney, the United States’ leadership was extremely concerned about the state of nuclear command and control in the Soviet Union. In the beginning of September, Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, visited Moscow and met with Gorbachev. When the senator asked the Soviet president whether he had been in control of the nuclear button during the coup, Gorbachev did not give a clear answer.6 That was because he was not in control. The visit added fuel to Nunn’s existing concerns and led him to launch a campaign to put together an aid package  The best analysis of politics of Ukrainian independence is in Plokhy, The Last Empire, pp. 158–161. 4  Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 541. 5  Ibid., p. 544. 6  Record of conversation between Nunn and Gorbachev, September 1, 1991, Gorbachev Foundation Archive, Fond 1, Opis 1; Sam Nunn testimony at the National Security Archive critical oral history conference, September 26, 2013. 3

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to help the USSR secure and dismantle its nuclear weapons. Notwithstanding the reluctance of the Bush administration and open resistance on the part of Cheney, by mid-November Nunn’s idea found its realization in an unprecedented bipartisan congressional initiative that became known as the Nunn-Lugar Program, which would last 20 years and become arguably the single most successful cooperative security program ever established between the United States and Russia. Bush’s understanding that the sand was running out in the hourglass jumpstarted U.S. thinking, propelling it past a fistful of hard-and-fast previous positions on matters like tactical nuclear weapons on U.S. Navy ships. Never in the U.S national security interest (with far more coastline to protect than the USSR), the Navy’s sticking point came apart quickly when the president ordered immediate moves toward denuclearization—ironically, based on a proposal Gorbachev had first tabled at Malta in 1989. Bush’s urgent post-coup search for deep disarmament initiatives led to a dramatic package of proposals and unilateral moves, which he presented to Gorbachev on September 27 in hopes that Moscow would reciprocate. The Soviets responded with their own counterproposals on October 5. Both sets of initiatives were truly groundbreaking but they came too late in the game, after Gorbachev was already unable to push them through to full implementation. Yet, without this back-and-forth, hundreds if not thousands of nuclear warheads would have been in place in more than a dozen Soviet republics at the point of the Soviet Union’s demise. In the history of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists’ Doomsday Clock, spanning virtually the entire atomic age, this set of agreements in the fall of 1991 produced the biggest shift away from midnight. On the U.S. side, Bush offered the repatriation and destruction of all tactical nuclear weapons based in Europe, removal of all tactical nuclear weapons from U.S. Navy vessels, a halt to the installation of Tomahawk cruise missiles, and a lowering of the alert level. He also called on Gorbachev to start negotiations on eliminating MIRVs (most of them stationed in Ukraine) and on security measures for dismantling nuclear warheads and promoting nuclear safety. In his response, Gorbachev offered even deeper cuts in strategic weapons (50 percent over the limits just negotiated in START I). He repeated his long-standing proposal, first put on the table in 1988 while Reagan was still in the White House, of a “third zero”—elimination of all tactical nuclear weapons. This was probably Gorbachev’s top priority in arms control, second only to the complete abolition of all nuclear weapons. He also announced a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing and expressed his support for a global test ban while committing to a reduction of the Soviet Army by 700,000 troops. The Soviet leader also repeated the proposal he first made during the 1991 Moscow summit, to create a U.S.-Soviet strategic stability group to prevent and resolve international crises. These proposals gave Gorbachev an opening to invigorate his “autumn offensive,”7 on which he had embarked in early September, both in domestic  Plokhy, The Last Empire, p. 29.

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politics and internationally. Yeltsin might have had the popular imagination, the podium in the Supreme Soviet, the ability to undermine Gorbachev in the republics, and the initiative for political change, but Gorbachev retained a special camaraderie with international leaders, and the status of official representative of whatever Soviet federation survived—something Yeltsin could only envy. That was Gorbachev’s survival strategy. On September 10, the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE opened in Moscow. The achievement was bittersweet. It was Gorbachev’s dream to have a CSCE meeting in the Soviet capital as a way to recognize how the country had changed—in fact, Shevardnadze had proposed it in November 1986, in his speech to the opening session of the CSCE Vienna review conference. At the time it was met with a skeptical and even negative reaction from Western delegates. After a lot of work by the Foreign Ministry together with its U.S. counterparts and an unprecedented domestic opening, the West was finally persuaded. Gorbachev was enthusiastic; he addressed a hall filled with foreign ministers and ambassadors who had come to Moscow mainly to pay respects to the man responsible for the tremendous change that made the gathering possible. To a large degree, they already viewed him as a president without a country; the Soviet Union had entered a period of final disintegration after the August coup. Gorbachev probably was the only person at the meeting who still believed in the possibility of integrating the Soviet Union into Europe. In the perceptive words of his spokesman, Andrei Grachev, “he was inspired by an almost religious faith in the feasibility of finally joining these two separate worlds and a burning desire to bring this about.”8 The humanitarian conference was in some ways the crowning symbol and the final note of Gorbachev’s domestic reform. Delegates could see the results of deep changes in the human rights sphere accomplished by perestroika. Sergey Kovalev, a former political prisoner and now deputy of the Supreme Soviet (he had been a guest at the Spaso House dinner hosted by Reagan on May 30, 1988), addressed the session with a fairly harsh speech setting new challenges for Soviet human rights performance. Several dissident groups took part in the sessions and international NGOs were welcome participants with unobstructed access to anybody they wished to contact. While traditional human rights concerns were being addressed and removed, the danger of nationalism was rising in the republics, threatening the rights of minorities and the very existence of the USSR. Instead of being a step to the European future for the country, the humanitarian conference’s main achievement was that it took place after all. Ironically, its main value was less in its results than in the process of preparing for it. The Soviet leadership had been required to make considerable concessions in order to attain this prize—confirmation that European values were taking root now in the Soviet Union.  Ibid., p. 25.

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Visiting secretary of state Baker found Gorbachev revitalized by the experience: “the shaken Gorbachev of late August was gone, replaced by his former self—the Soviet reformer with little if any self-doubt.”9 Baker also wrote to Bush about the newfound closeness and cooperation between Yeltsin and Gorbachev— although it was not to last. With Yeltsin on vacation later in September, Gorbachev was able to play the role of global statesman and gracious host. He resumed his flurry of international meetings. He met with Giulio Andreotti and Hosni Mubarak to discuss the Middle East and the upcoming Madrid conference. On October 1, he met with Henning Christopherson, the vice president of the European Commission, and soon after that with Michael Camdessus, director of the International Monetary Fund, to discuss the economic structures of the new Union Treaty and international assistance. U.S. secretary of agriculture Edward Madigan came to discuss the agricultural credits Bush had promised at the Moscow summit. Negotiations with John Major about a program of emergency aid were especially active, resulting in a preliminary pledge of 10 billion dollars on November 14. Gorbachev understood that ensuring external aid was the strongest means of keeping his new Union project on track.10 Another major shared concern of both superpowers was Yugoslavia. Both presidents saw the specter of a disintegrating USSR in the microcosm of Yugoslavia and tried to prevent the general collapse in the Balkans. According to Gorbachev’s spokesman and adviser, Andrei Grachev, “the nightmare of Yugoslavia tormented him,” yet he also believed that if he could help to keep it together it would provide serious ammunition against nationalists in the Soviet republics.11 At the end of September, Gorbachev made a public statement on Yugoslavia calling for a ceasefire, and invited leaders of Serbia and Croatia to Moscow. On October 15, Slobodan Milosevich of Serbia and Franjo Tudjman of Croatia met in Moscow and after a full day of negotiations with Gorbachev—first oneon-one and then in a long trilateral session—produced a ceasefire agreement. To Grachev’s question, both leaders responded that “the experience of perestroika gives Gorbachev the moral right to advise us, and we are prepared to listen to his recommendations.”12 It was no small feat simply to bring the two antagonists to the table, but the ceasefire agreement did not last—a bad omen for Gorbachev’s own Union project. The Soviet leader’s domestic agenda—specifically, the fight to keep the Union together as a Union of Sovereign States (in other words a confederation)—was front and center in all interactions between the superpowers in 1991. The treaty that was negotiated at the governmental residence at Novo-Ogarevo was moribund after the coup. The process had to be started anew. The coup also  Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, p. 527.  Gorbachev, Zhizn’ I reformy, vol. 2, pp. 609–612. 11  Plokhy, The Last Empire, p. 18. 12  Ibid., p. 45. 9

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resulted in some significant changes in the political landscape. The Congress of People’s Deputies disbanded itself in early September 1991, leaving in place a quite dysfunctional Supreme Soviet at the Union level. Legislative initiative had shifted to the Russian parliament, still named the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. The KGB was eliminated, broken into three agencies, thus also weakening ties that bound the republics together. A new structure was created— the State Council consisting of leaders of the republics—designed to negotiate the new treaty and oversee the process of transition. It held its first meeting on October 11. Grachev described it as an “awkward imitation of the U.N. Security Council composed of former members of the Politburo.”13 However, Gorbachev put his faith and hopes in this Council. Very soon it produced a vague Economic Community Agreement, signed on October 18 (Ukraine signed on November 6). The accord included a commitment to a single currency and the preservation of economic ties. Yeltsin supported it and acted cooperatively. Meanwhile, negotiations for a political agreement were proceeding. For a fleeting moment in midOctober, it seemed that Gorbachev’s project was on the right track, providing a promising setting for the Madrid conference. Bush and Gorbachev arrived in Madrid on October 28, ready to preside together over the opening of a very ambitious conference, which grew directly out of their understandings reached during the Helsinki summit in September 1990. During Helsinki, Gorbachev had asked to link the resolution of the Kuwait crisis and withdrawal of Saddam Hussein’s troops with a comprehensive international conference on the Middle East. Bush refused the linkage but promised that after the Persian Gulf conflict the superpowers would co-sponsor a meeting on the region. After months of diplomatic efforts, most importantly by Secretary Baker, but also by Soviet diplomats, the main Middle East actors were about to meet in Madrid. Moscow granted diplomatic recognition to Israel just days beforehand. The mere fact that U.S. and Soviet leaders would open the event together was an important symbol of the end of the Cold War. As recently as October 1989 U.S. national security strategy had demanded that the “United States remains committed to defend its vital interests in the region, if necessary and appropriate through the use of U.S. military force, against the Soviet Union or any other regional power with interests inimical to our own.”14 Now the United States was bringing its former opponent into negotiations as a partner in resolving this festering conflict. And yet, it was another of many accomplishments that came too late. Gorbachev and the Soviet Union were losing influence and their ability to carry out joint agreements. The Middle East was no longer a priority for Moscow. Instead, Gorbachev wanted Madrid to serve as a forum where the two presidents would discuss the fate of the world on the eve of the conference and cement their cooperation as the key global security dynamic. He was also hoping  Grachev, Final Days, p. 93.  National Security Directive 26, October 2, 1989, US Policy Toward the Persian Gulf, p. 1.

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to get to talk to Bush privately about his need for urgent assistance for his reform program—to keep the USSR from disintegrating and to show Yeltsin who still had the ear of global leaders. For his part, however, Bush was expecting to see a president without a country, almost anticipating losing Gorbachev as a partner in his diary: “Reports recently that he might not be around long. The briefing book indicates this may be my last meeting with him of this nature. Time marches on.”15 The scene-setter memo for the summit declared succinctly, “Prospects for a political union, and therefore a long-term role for Gorbachev as union president, seem nil.”16 The briefing book’s prediction turned out to be on target. As Gorbachev rode to the airport on the way to Madrid, Yeltsin addressed the Russian parliament with an explosive speech. (Gorbachev spoke with Yeltsin about it ahead of time but the latter did not reveal the full content.) The address asked the Supreme Soviet for emergency powers to implement radical economic reform, including speedy price liberalization. This unilateral program, not discussed or coordinated with other republican leaders, essentially undermined previous economic agreements, and decisively chose the “go it alone” path for Russia, including dramatic cuts in funding for most central structures. (The Foreign Ministry would be cut by 90 percent.) From the Soviet transcript of the Bush and Gorbachev one-on-one meeting in Madrid, we know that the U.S. side had information about the content of the upcoming speech and contacted the Russian leadership with requests to tone it down, but the attempt was in vain.17 As a result, a lot of discussion in Madrid was focused on this speech by Yeltsin—Gorbachev’s counterparts were quite shocked by it and wanted to hear his reaction and his assessment of Yeltsin’s position. Gorbachev was in a delicate position; he felt he had to defend Yeltsin because cooperation with the Russian president was a sine qua non for the success of the new Union Treaty and its viability in the eyes of global leaders. Yet he was deeply hurt by what he perceived as a betrayal on Yeltsin’s part, and it was impossible to hide this behind polite phrases about his support for Yeltsin’s economic reform. Gorbachev believed at the time that Yeltsin was under the influence of his close advisers, and that this explained his frequent turnabouts. In his memoir he dates the turning point in Yeltsin’s evolution to a particular moment in September 1991, when Yeltsin’s secretary of state, “the evil genius” Gennady Burbulis, brought to his boss in Sochi a secret memorandum entitled “Strategy for Russia in the Transition Period.”18 Drafted by Burbulis, it called for the speedy formation of a Russian state that would be the sole legal heir to the Soviet Union and would embark on a radical economic reform alone, leaving behind the center and the rest of the republics. This was the strategy—to get rid of Gorbachev by dismantling the Union.  Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 548.  Document No. 77. 17  Document No. 81; Gorbachev Foundation transcript donated by Andrei Grachev. 18  Gorbachev, Zhizn’ I reformy, p. 589. 15 16

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Gorbachev’s interlocutors in Madrid, including King Juan Carlos, expressed their sincere outrage at Yeltsin’s speech and their support for Gorbachev. Bush spoke very frankly: “I hope you know the position of our government: we support the center. Without giving up contacts with the republics, we support the center and you personally.” He even mentioned that his speech in Kiev had cost him politically—on the eve of an election year he was seen as clinging to Gorbachev rather than throwing his support behind the “democratic forces” led by Yeltsin.19 All conversations involved detailed discussions of the new Union Treaty. Gorbachev insisted on a single country with unified armed forces and a popularly elected president, a unified power grid, a transportation network, communications, space exploration, and a single economic space. At different times Gorbachev agreed with Bush that Yeltsin was trying to substitute Russia for the center in the new structure but then also said that Yeltsin understood the need for the center and realized that Russian economic reform was impossible without it. In the first conversation of the summit, at lunch in an extended format, Gorbachev was upbeat and joking, presenting all the recent developments in a positive light and giving assurances of rapid progress on the Union Treaty and on the secure control of nuclear weapons. After lunch, with only Bush, Scowcroft, Shevardnadze and Chernyaev remaining in the room, the tone became more somber. Following a brief discussion of the conference and Yugoslavia, the conversation shifted to an analysis of the Soviet internal situation and the Yeltsin speech. Gorbachev focused on his real main priority—obtaining urgent financial assistance—and he appealed to Bush in very assertive terms, asking for 10-15 billion dollars and arguing that if the “current crisis escalated then we—you and us—will pay much more later.”20 But for Bush at the moment, even $1.5 billion was a problem and he was fairly straightforward about his electoral concerns. Assurances and emotional support notwithstanding, Gorbachev would be going home empty-handed. At the press conference, interpreter Pavel Palazhchenko noticed that as the Americans “watched Gorbachev, their expressions were skeptical, cold and indifferent.... [T]hey had now concluded that Mikhail Gorbachev belonged to the past.”21 The high point of the summit was the state dinner hosted by King Juan Carlos along with Prime Minister González, the foreign leader Gorbachev felt was closest to him in his thinking and ideas. The four-hour conversation ranged from Soviet domestic to international subjects and allowed Gorbachev to play the role of global statesman once again. Yeltsin’s speech was one of the first subjects. Bush was concerned by Yeltsin’s statements about the borders and Russian minorities in the republics, especially in Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Gorbachev noted the volatility of the Ukrainian situation: “Ukraine in its present form emerged

 Document No. 81.  Document No. 79. 21  Palazhchenko, My Years with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, p. 339. 19 20

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only because the Bolsheviks did not have a majority in the Rada, and they added Kharkov and Donbass to the Ukraine. And Khrushchev passed the Crimea from Russia to the Ukraine in a brotherly gesture.” Crimea, he said, decided to stay with Ukraine only on the assumption that Ukraine would be inseparable from Russia, which might change if Ukraine decided not to join the Union.22 Gorbachev made a passionate statement about his determination to see his country hold together: “I will do everything to preserve the Union, of course a renewed one, with extensive rights for sovereign republics, but at the same time with the kind of center they need, which would service the single economic space, ensure defense with unified armed forces, ensure a coordinated foreign policy and everything that one should not disrupt—a single power grid, transportation and communications, ecology.” Most of the dinner conversation focused on Gorbachev’s domestic situation, his hopes for the new Union and his struggles with Yeltsin. Although all the principals were outspoken in their sympathy for his predicament, they also understood that his chances were slim. Madrid turned out to be the last superpower summit. On the way back from Madrid, the Soviet leader stopped in Latche, France, for a visit with François Mitterrand at his vacation home. Their conversations were anticlimactic, akin to a long goodbye. When Chernyaev looked at his notes from Latche, he realized that their remarks looked “like a bequest … or if not a bequest, then parting words to political descendants.” They spoke about the U.S. role in Europe and about NATO. However, when Gorbachev put forward his vision that the new Union would be the second pillar of stability in Europe and counterbalance NATO, Mitterrand rather dismissively pointed out that currently there was just a single pillar, the Western one. He offered the consolation that “it is important that the transformations in the Soviet Union contributed to the politico-economic rapprochement between East and West, and the creation of what you call the common European home.” Surprisingly, Gorbachev did not pick up on the subject of the European home, which represented probably the greatest missed opportunity of the period in his mind, but he shared the French president’s concern about NATO’s possible future encroachment on the political role that the CSCE and other European organizations played on the continent. Gorbachev spoke about his vision for the new democratic Union as an active player in Europe and internationally. Although the atmosphere was warm and genuinely friendly, Mitterrand no longer treated him as the partner with whom he was going to build new European structures. The door to the European home was closed for the time being, maybe even forever. Upon arriving home, Gorbachev found his new Union project disintegrating even further. He was able to stanch the process by applying pressure on Yeltsin and threatening resignation, but that would not work for long. On December 1, Ukraine held a referendum in which 70 percent of the population voted  Document No. 80.

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for independence. Kravchuk was elected president and made it clear to Yeltsin that he was not going to be part of the new Union Treaty negotiations in any form. On December 8, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus signed the Belovezhie agreement to dissolve the USSR and create a Commonwealth of Independent States. Yeltsin rushed to phone Bush to inform him, emphasizing that Gorbachev did not know yet about it.23 Gorbachev actually heard the news from Belarus’s leader, Stanislav Shushkevich. The most prominent non-Slav republic leader, Nursultan Nazarbayev, had declined to join the Belovezhie crew, demanding instead a meeting in Almaty, Kazakhstan, to produce a successor federation. From now on, the remaining superpower interactions would be about ensuring an orderly transition and control over nuclear weapons. In his last extended trip to the Soviet Union, James Baker held extensive discussions with Gorbachev, Yeltsin, new Defense Minister Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, Shevardnadze, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev and other key people in Moscow before traveling to Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus. Baker found Yeltsin “swaggering” and Gorbachev “subdued” but engaged and expressing his full support for the transition. Baker’s conversation with Gorbachev was especially warm and substantive, both of them expressing their determination that the democratic transformation would continue within the new structures. In addition to nuclear issues and economic reform discussions, Baker also tried to make sure that the new authorities would treat Gorbachev with respect and not try to demean him. Gorbachev accepted his predicament gracefully; he did not try to do anything to undermine his successors. Baker was impressed by the loyalty displayed by the president, Shevardnadze and Yakovlev to the end.24 On December 25, just before delivering his farewell speech as president of the USSR, Gorbachev phoned his trusted partner, George Bush. He “was not bitter about the collapse of the Soviet Union” but asked Bush to continue to provide support for Russia’s democratic development. Gorbachev expressed appreciation for all they had done together and his hope for a future partnership in some new form. The U.S. president felt that he was “caught up in history” at some “enormous turning point.” This turning point was also the end point of the superpower summits. Gorbachev said a simple “good bye” and shook Bush’s hands virtually; Bush responded, “good bye.” These were the parting words in the long conversation that ended the Cold War and transformed the world.

 Document No. 84.  Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, p. 573.

23 24

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Document No. 71: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–González, 1:51 p.m. – 2:02 p.m. August 19, 1991

At 6:00 in the morning of August 19, hard-line Soviet officials made the stunning announcement that they had removed Gorbachev from power—for “health reasons”— and were declaring a nationwide state of emergency. The Soviet leader, on holiday in the Crimea, had already been taken into custody and his exact whereabouts were not known for three days. When news of the coup broke, President Bush was also vacationing—in Kennebunkport, Maine. His inclination, as well as Scowcroft’s, was to act cautiously and avoid statements of condemnation until more information was available. In his first press conference from Maine, he used the word “extraconstitutional” to refer to the putsch. Bush wanted to stay in Kennebunkport, but after conversations with John Major and other European leaders, who all encouraged him to be more resolute, he decided to fly to Washington for a day. Felipe González, a Spanish socialist, whom Gorbachev called his closest interlocutor among all the European leaders, called Bush while he was on the plane and encouraged him to try to reach Gorbachev directly and to undertake “strong diplomatic action in all fora possible.”

The President: Felipe, how are you? This is George Bush. Prime Minister Gonzalez: I am fine. And you? The President: Doing fine. I’m very much concerned about events in the Soviet Union. Indeed, I’m about to land in Washington to talk about these matters. What’s on your mind? The same thing? Prime Minister Gonzalez: Yes, as a matter of fact, I was in the countryside myself. I’ve just returned to the city. We just held an emergency meeting. We think that events are going to turn into a coup plus an “involution.” What consequences do you think will come out of this? The President: It’s a little early to say. I’m trying to calm down any discussion of military action while encouraging the return to reform. I think it’s very early to say what will happen. Yeltsin has strong personal support and I’m hoping that the coup will be reversed, but I’m not sure how that can happen. What we are doing is saying that this is outside the legal process, that it is not a legal step and that we want to see the reforms continue. We are going to support Yeltsin’s appeal for the return to the reforms but we are stopping short of trying to answer questions about whether we will take some military action. I think it’s very important we not go overboard here. Prime Minister Gonzalez: Yes, this is definitely not the time to try to find any course of military action or foster such a step. This is definitely the time for strong diplomatic action in all fora possible. George, I wanted to tell you that 441

I myself have tried to talk directly to Gorbachev, although I knew it was practically impossible, but I think you should try to get in touch directly. The President: I think that’s a good idea and may just try it when I’m in the White House. John Major also tried to reach Gorbachev and was told no lines were available. I expect I would get the same answer. But I think there is some good symbolism in trying to reach Gorbachev. Prime Minister Gonzalez: Yes, I think that would be a very good gesture because we don’t want to have the image of Gorbachev falling right now. We don’t want them to think we don’t feel anything as far as Gorbachev is concerned and we don’t want to destroy his image. The President: I agree with that. Yeltsin is expressing strong support for Gorbachev, all of which is good. Prime Minister Gonzalez: Yes. Evidently he wants to recover Gorbachev’s image because he wants to restore legality. The President: This new vice president made some statement a little while ago, saying he hoped he would be able to work with Gorbachev in the future. He says Gorbachev is tired. We are confused as to what that means. Prime Minister Gonzalez: Yes, I think that’s what he tried to say, and I think it was a joke, in bad taste and rather cynical as far as remarks go. The last point I want to make is that we have to concentrate on supporting the East European countries. We have to show solidarity with them. The President: No question about that. I will be talking to a couple of those leaders myself this afternoon or certainly by tomorrow morning. They are concerned. Major has already received a call from the President of Hungary. Prime Minister Gonzalez: Yes, precisely. The European Community will meet tomorrow. We’re going to issue a statement indicating respect for the process of reform and also for all the steps that have been adopted in the past. We also hope that there will be some statement of support for Gorbachev, at least so that he can recover his personal freedom. The President: I hope so too, and we certainly agree with that. Let me discuss the idea of trying to call Gorbachev as an expression of that. Prime Minister Gonzalez: That’s fine, and let’s try and keep in touch over the next few days. The President: OK, let’s do it and thanks for the call. We’ve just landed in DC. I’ll go in and go to work. I hope to go back to Maine tomorrow. We have good communications there so if you want to give me a call, do so. Prime Minister Gonzalez: OK, thank you very much. The President: Goodbye my friend. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA 1999-0303-F/3 by the National Security Archive.]

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Document No. 72: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush –Yeltsin, 8:18 a.m. – 8:35 a.m. August 20, 1991

Early in the morning on the second day of the coup, unable to get through to Gorbachev, Bush calls Yeltsin to seek his views on the situation in Moscow. He finds the Russian president determined to resist the rebellion and restore Gorbachev to power. Yeltsin calls the situation “critical,” encourages Bush to speak to Gorbachev directly and denounces the putsch in the most decisive terms as “unconstitutional, illegal” and having “no force on Russian territory.” To Bush’s suggestion that he “would be prepared to call Yanayev,” the Soviet vice president who is leading the putsch, Yeltsin responds: “No, absolutely, you should not do that. An official call from you would legitimize them.” As later events have shown, Yeltsin’s decisive actions, including his memorable speech from atop a tank outside Parliament, would catalyze the democratic opposition in Moscow and contribute directly to the failure of the coup.

The President: Just checking up to see how things are going from your end. President Yeltsin: Good morning. The President: Good morning. I just wanted a first hand report on the situation from your end. President Yeltsin: The situation is very complex. A group of eight individuals essentially put together an anti-constitutional coup. President Gorbachev is located in Foros in the Crimea. He is absolutely blocked, no way of reaching him. President Yanayev is using the pretext that Gorbachev is ill, but this is not confirmed. Essentially a committee of eight people has taken over the presidency and established a state of emergency in Russian territory, and the Baltics. Troops have been brought up to Moscow, not only in the city, but in Moscow district and surrounding towns. And by issuing decision 1 and 2 the group has exposed itself as no more than a right-wing junta. I appeared before the people and soldiers and I said that actions of the Committee were unconstitutional, illegal, and have no force on Russian territory. The building of the Supreme Soviet and the office of the President is surrounded and I expect a storming of the building at any moment. We have been here 24 hours. We won’t leave. I have appealed to 100,000 people standing outside to defend the legally elected government. Basically this is a right-wing coup, each member of the group is well known. They want to take over the democratically elected leadership of Russia, Leningrad, Moscow, and other cities. This morning I gave Lukyanov, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, ten demands, the first of which is to meet with Gorbachev. Mr. President, it would be good if you yourself could demand to speak on the phone with Gorbachev and to rally world leaders to the fact that the situation 443

here is critical. We’ve also announced a strike and practically all factories and plants are at a standstill. We will continue demanding this until the Committee is thrown out and tried in court. We are not losing any hope or faith unless they resort to the most extreme and bloody measures. Of course a wounded animal is the most dangerous thing and we have no assurances that they won’t resort to extreme measures. The President: You have our full support for the return of Gorbachev and the legitimate government. We will reiterate that early today. I tried to place a call to Gorbachev yesterday and couldn’t get through. But I like the idea of saying publically that I want to talk to him. I would be perfectly.… President Yeltsin: Yes, thanks for saying that. If Gorbachev is sick then we should demand international doctors, like the WHO, examine him. The President: We saw that you made that suggestion. I agree that it is a good idea. President Yeltsin: Yes, we have changes happening so fast that we should talk at the end of the day tomorrow. Things are literally changing hour by hour. The President: I’m happy to do that. I hope that the lines will not be cut off. President Yeltsin: Yes, Mr. President. I do appreciate your attention and support. The Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev has flown to the U.N. to report to the Secretary General. The President: I suggest that I call you at 5:00 tomorrow your time. You can try to call here. I’ll try to call you, but if I can’t get through, you try here. The number is.… President Yeltsin: Understood. The President: I would be prepared to call Yanayev, but I don’t want to do anything to legitimize the regime. What is your thought on that. President Yeltsin: No, absolutely, you should not do that. An official call from you would legitimize them. We tried to send a group to the Crimea to meet with Gorbachev but he is surrounded by three circles of armed guards and KGB. The President: We’ll keep trying to reach him. We’re not hopeful but it legitimizes the Gorbachev regime. President Yeltsin: Mr. President. Thanks so much, these are very good positive steps. They will help all of us here. The President: I will do all I can to keep the European countries on board—all of them. I talked to a number of leaders yesterday, [sic] are very supportive of the position you outlined and the position I outlined to them. President Yeltsin: Thanks very much. The President: Good luck and congratulations on your courage and commitment. We sympathize and pray with you. All the American people support you. What you’re doing is absolutely right. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA 1999-0303-F/3 by the National Security Archive.] 444

Document No. 73: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, 12:19 p.m. – 12:31 p.m. August 21, 1991

The coup in Moscow crumbled on the third day and the democratic forces emerged with a clear victory. Gorbachev was returning to Moscow as president, but he did not yet understand how these three days had weakened his power, consolidated progressive forces around Yeltsin and undermined his plans for a new union treaty (set for signing on August 19). After trying for two days, the U.S. military switchboard was finally able to get through to Gorbachev in the Crimean resort of Foros, just one hour after he became reconnected to the world. When Bush picks up the phone, the Soviet president greets him warmly as “my dearest George.” In the conversation that follows, Gorbachev briefly describes his conditions during the last four days— entirely cut off from land and sea, and without any communications. He expresses his appreciation for the positions Yeltsin and other republic leaders took in refusing to support the coup and observes that the “society is different now,” so “things like this will not work.” He is relieved that his overthrow “was prevented by democracy.” He thanks Bush for his principled position during the coup, calling him “stalwart” in his support. For his part, Bush is relieved to be talking to “the same old Mikhail Gorbachev, one full of life and confidence.”

The President: Oh my God, that’s wonderful. Mikhail! President Gorbachev: My dearest George. I’m so happy to hear your voice again. The President: My God I’m glad to hear you. How are you doing? President Gorbachev: Mr. President, the adventurers have not succeeded. I have been here four days. They tried to pressure me, using every method. They had me blocked by sea and land. My guards protected me, we withstood the challenge. The President: Where are you now? President Gorbachev: I’m in the Crimea. It’s only been one hour since I have assumed Presidential powers. I have maintained full contact with the Republic leaders and handed over the Ministry of Defense to Moiseyev. He is to follow my orders only. Troops are to move out of the city or back to where they are normally based. The President: That’s good. President Gorbachev: Everything we’ve done together to improve cooperation with the republics has worked beautifully. All of them have taken positions of principle. The greatest opponent of these illegal acts was Yeltsin, the Supreme Soviet, Kravchuk, Nazarbayev, and K… 445

The President: Well I was damned worried about it. President Gorbachev: You know this was a terrible tragedy. It showed that the adventurers won’t succeed. The society is different now. Things like this won’t work. The President: Where are the adventurers? President Gorbachev: Some are coming this way to me. I don’t know what they are bearing in their hands. The next two days I must make all these crucial decisions. The President: Have you talked to Yeltsin yet? President Gorbachev: He was the first one. The President: I don’t know what news you’ve been getting, but we’ve been supporting Yeltsin and you as President of the USSR. President Gorbachev: I have to congratulate you and the position you took from the first minute. You have been stalwart. Thanks for taking off from your vacation. You affected everyone with your strong statements, except Qadhafi. The President: Don’t know what news you got in the last few days. President Gorbachev: I was cut off completely. The President: Were you filled in just now? President Gorbachev: Yes, everything started with me now. The President: When are you going back to Moscow? President Gorbachev: Either tonight or early tomorrow morning. The President: Good luck. If I can say or do anything I will be available night or day. Don’t hesitate to call. President Gorbachev: Yes, George, absolutely. I will have the need to talk to you. I have to go back to take some urgent, necessary steps and then we will have some matters to discuss with you. The President: I’m happy that you are safe and back. Barbara is here and sends her love to Raisa. President Gorbachev: George, thank you and Barb both for your position of principle, but also for your humanity and friendship. The President: Just glad you’re well. I want to say to the press and the world that we’ve had this conversation. President Gorbachev: Yes, I’d only be thankful to you for that. The President: I’ll get that message out to the whole world now. Bless you and your family. President Gorbachev: We want to keep going ahead with you. We will not falter because of what happened. One thing is that this was prevented by democracy. This is a guarantee for us. We will keep working in the country and out to keep cooperation going. The President: Sounds like the same old Mikhail Gorbachev, one full of life and confidence. Once you get back we’ll talk about what to work on since our talks in Moscow. 446

President Gorbachev: OK, George. Please proceed on this basis. Good-bye. The President: Good-bye. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA 1999-0303-F/3 by the National Security Archive.]

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Document No. 74: Memorandum from Scowcroft for the President: “Developments in the USSR” September 5, 1991

Shortly after the August coup, Scowcroft gives the president a survey of the rapidly changing USSR. The main focus of this memo, prepared for a key NSC meeting on future strategy toward the Soviet Union, is the relationship between the weakened center and the republics, and more urgently, between Yeltsin and Gorbachev. Scowcroft notes Yeltsin’s forceful move to gain control over the center and to place ethnic Russians in all significant posts in the provisional government. This “second coup” by Yeltsin is combined with his “warning on borders to Kazakhstan and Ukraine that they could not depart the union without leaving behind the Russianized portions of their republics.” The national security adviser emphasizes the U.S. interest in having Yeltsin and Gorbachev collaborate to keep the union together. He is aware of the dangers of disintegration and worries that “despite the rhetoric supporting markets and democracy, it is not at all clear that all republic leaders, or any one leader at all times, will stick to a market-based, democratic, development strategy.” Scowcroft notes that Ukraine remains a wildcard and that although President Kravchuk agrees with the need to keep the Union together, “his political situation is tenuous, and Ukrainian independence is the one cause uniting virtually all political factions in that republic.” This is a perceptive description of the internal situation Gorbachev faced in early fall 1991. However, Scowcroft’s policy recommendations are very limited: “The best we can do in this situation is to push hard for the new union and its constituent republics to engage with the IMF and the World Bank in drawing up economic programs which attempt to head off that inflationary spiral.”

Today’s decision by the Congress of People’s Deputies to step aside in favor of an interim bicameral legislature giving a dominant role to representatives of the republics concludes the first phase of the revolution triggered by last month’s failed coup. The major decisions now seem to be made, and the next few months will be devoted to finalizing them in a new union treaty and constitution which formally create a voluntary union of probably ten republics (Moldova and Georgia seem certain to opt out). From the U.S. perspective, several parts of this unfolding revolution deserve particular attention: – The course of the struggle between Gorbachev and Yel’tsin for influence over the new Union. Gorbachev has, through sheer determination and political skill, carved out a role for himself in the new union, although his power and authority are greatly diminished since you saw him in Moscow. – The role of the new center, whose legitimacy and powers flow solely from the republics. In particular the role of Russia will be key. Whether or not a strong center can be maintained, particularly in defense and foreign 448

policy, will have a key effect on our ability to carry out a normal bilateral relationship. – The political, social and economic situation of the republics—particularly Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan—whose leaderships can no longer blame the economic crisis on the center they destroyed. GORBACHEV AND YEL’TSIN

Yel’tsin’s popularity and influence, on the rise since Spring 1990, were obviously boosted by last month’s events. But he made several mistakes in the first days after the coup by moving too quickly and openly to put Russians in control of the Union. Before the coup, under Yel’tsin’s leadership Russia had for some time moved subtly but unmistakably to infiltrate union institutions, which was already causing some discomfort, particularly in the Asian republics. But Yel’tsin’s attempt at what looked almost like a “second coup” during August 22–24—where he dictated a provisional union government to Gorbachev composed solely of Russians—combined with his warning on borders to Kazakhstan and Ukraine that they could not depart the Union without leaving behind the Russianized portions of their republics, frightened other republican leaders. This gave Gorbachev the opening he needed to create a new constituency, primarily in the non-Slavic republics. Gorbachev was already working in this direction before the coup, something which was quite apparent in the prominence Gorbachev gave Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbayev during the Moscow Summit. Since the coup, Gorbachev has subtly played on other republic leaders’ fears of Yel’tsin to develop support for separate economic and political unions, both of which have now been agreed to by the Congress of People’s Deputies. Yel’tsin has gone along with this, even supported it, apparently because he still believes Russia needs some form of loose association with other Soviet republics, and because he also admits the continued usefulness of a center. Ukraine is the wildcard in this. Both Yel’tsin and Gorbachev feel that Ukraine must stay in the Union. It is a huge economy tightly integrated with Russia, and an abrupt separation would be disastrous. Kravchuk may agree, but his political situation is tenuous, and Ukrainian independence is the one cause uniting virtually all political factions in that republic. It is likely in the end that Kravchuk will not win the key December elections, but that Ukraine will stay in the union, primarily as a way to try to control Russia. In the weeks to come Gorbachev and Yel’tsin will most likely continue to work together, but also to jockey for position by playing to their respective constituencies—Yel’tsin to Russians; Gorbachev to other republics. The other lever Gorbachev has on Yel’tsin is the sixteen autonomous republics in Russia, most of whom seek independence from Russia. Notice that in the final version of the interim arrangements agreed to today Russia received 52 seats in the new body representing the republics, while all other republics only received 20, but the extra seats are there explicitly to give representation to the autonomous republics within Russia. 449

If Yel’tsin should lose his taste for the union, he could decide to give up on Gorbachev. Gorbachev will then lose much of his constituency, since his main value is to keep Yel’tsin in check. Such a scenario would lead to uncontrolled disintegration. But so far that seems an unlikely outcome. Both Yel’tsin and Gorbachev, for much different reasons, seem content to work together for this new union. It is very much in our interest that they do so. THE ROLE OF THE NEW CENTER

There will be a center in this new union, and it may turn out to be fairly powerful in areas of most concern to us: defense and foreign affairs. The republican leaders seem to understand that an army under centralized operational control, but with effective oversight by authorities chosen by the republics, makes the most sense. Certainly such an arrangement reassures the outside world. Also certain is the fact that republic-based armies would create hugh [sic] defense burdens on republics who need to maximize the resources they devote to economic development, as well as creating a very real threat of replicating Yugoslavia’s tragic course. Foreign affairs will be more complicated, for them, and for us. Over the last year Russia has been moving to infiltrate the union foreign affairs bureaucracy, and Yel’tsin seemed basically satisfied with the results. Now Russia will want more, as will other republics. The “one plus ten” statement to the Congress of People’s Deputies even suggested that each republic could join the UN, implying (probably without knowing it) that each republic would become de facto a sovereign state. We will probably find over time that there is still a union-level foreign policy, and that we will deal on the major issues with the Union’s foreign minister. But we will also almost certainly see changes in Soviet foreign policy as the republics assert their right to influence the agenda. Aid to client states will most likely collapse, and soon. An aggressive arms control stance, favoring dramatic reductions in arms and a halt to nuclear testing, seem increasingly likely. A new union treaty will probably give the republics the right to conduct their own official relationship with foreign countries. That means we will come under increasing pressure to establish direct diplomatic and economic ties with republics. On most lower-level diplomatic issues—visas for example—we may find that we are dealing primarily with republics. In the economic area the republics are now getting the autonomy they have long sought. Each republic will now effectively control its own resources, the enterprises on its soil, its foreign commerce. The envisaged economic union will most likely be a loose one, devoted primarily in what will probably be a vain attempt to head off protectionism and “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies. There will probably be an attempt to retain a single currency and to enforce a tight monetary policy, but both seem unlikely outcomes. It is very likely that the leaders of the republics, individually and collectively, will choose to print money and tolerate inflation, in a vain attempt to avoid unemployment. The best we can do in this 450

situation is to push hard for the new union and its constituent republics to engage with the IMF and the World Bank in drawing up economic programs which attempt to head off that inflationary spiral. This should be one of our key emphasis as we talk to Soviet and republic leaders. This arrangement seems almost guaranteed to lead to a dramatic fall in defense expenditures. The 500-Day Plan which Yel’tsin and Gorbachev worked out in summer of 1990, which Gorbachev subsequently rejected, called for a system much like they now have adopted. One of the most striking provisions of that plan was that defense expenditures for the Union would be determined by the size of voluntary contributions from the republics. The new system basically works that way, which surely means defense expenditures will fall. But how rapidly they will fall depends on how republican leaders, particularly in Ukraine and Russia, react when they discover that declining defense expenditures mean increasing unemployment in their biggest factories. This is why it is so important for us to work closely with the Soviets on defense conversion. THE POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE REPUBLICS

In this new world it will be much more important than in the past for us to be aware of political, economic, and social conditions in the republics. In the past a republican leader’s position on key issues was determined by Central Committee staff in Moscow. Now it will be determined in the ballot boxes, and in some cases on the streets, of his republic. Kravchuk’s position on Ukraine’s participation in the Union will depend on the politics of the Ukraine, which could be much different than the politics of the Union. As in the past, economic considerations will dominate politics for the foreseeable future. Having destroyed central power, the republican leaders have also eliminated their best excuse for the terrible economic conditions in which their constituents live. Now they will have to move quickly to show results. Despite the rhetoric supporting markets and democracy, it is not at all clear that all republic leaders, or any one leader at all times, will stick to a market-based, democratic, development strategy. They will find, as Gorbachev has, that it is terribly tempting to resort to central commands as an interim solution. This is where active engagement by individual countries and international institutions, particularly the international financial institutions (IMF, World Bank, EBRD) targeted directly at republics, can make a difference. This revolution is very much a victory for those who seek to integrate into the global system, and a defeat for those who feared western influence. The fluidity of the situation, and the search for a model, gives us now more influence than we have ever had in the Soviet Union. The issue for us is if, and how, we choose to use that influence. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA 2000-1202-F/2 by the National Security Archive. Original in NSC Burns, R. Nicholas Files and Hewett, Ed, Files, USSR Chron file: September 1991.] 451

Document No. 75: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, 9:22 a.m. – 9:50 a.m. September 27, 1991

After the September 5 NSC meeting on strategy toward the USSR, and throughout the month of September, Bush and his national security team work on a major package of unilateral nuclear arms reductions in the expectation that the Soviet leadership would reciprocate the U.S. moves. Although these proposals were indeed unprecedented, practically all had already been offered by Gorbachev, some as early as 1988. At the time, however, the incoming Bush administration was more concerned with the “robustness” of the nuclear deterrent in Europe than with reductions in nuclear arsenals, and refused to discuss Soviet proposals on shorterrange and tactical weapons. Now, finally, Bush is ready to move, prompted by concerns about strategic command-and-control in the quickly disintegrating Soviet Union. The two most important items in the U.S. proposals are the de-MIRVing of ICBMs and elimination of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and aboard ships. By proposing to eliminate MIRVs, the U.S. is specifically targeting the nuclear missiles stationed in Ukraine, since the majority of those have multiple warheads. In this conversation, Gorbachev responds to the American initiative enthusiastically and promises to give his response within a couple of days after consulting with Soviet experts.

The President: Mikhail, how are you? President Gorbachev: George, hello. I received your letter. I very much want to talk. The President: Good. First, I want to extend my cordial best wishes. I would like to go through the talking points and get a reaction to them. President Gorbachev: OK. In general I discussed them with my colleagues from the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and asked them to give me a preliminary analysis. I listened to the experts. This is a major initiative of the President of the United States. That is my opinion, and that of my closest associates. There is only one thing: you are doing this unilaterally, and you call on us to consider our steps. Is that right? The President: Yes. Correct. We’ll spell out what we do. In some categories, we’ll spell out how the Soviet Union could take similar steps. For example, we cancel ICBM’s except for single warheads, and would like to say that the Soviet Union is doing the same thing. On dismantling nuclear warheads, where I propose we open discussions on the safe dismantling of nuclear warheads, on how we might enhance the safety and security of nuclear weapons, and how to improve nuclear command and control. I’d like to say you and I agree that this would be a good thing to do. 452

President Gorbachev: George, thank you for those clarifications. Since you’re urging that we take steps, I can only give an answer in principle—since there is much that must be clarified—and that answer is a positive one. The President: I understand. How about if I say that I’ve consulted with Mikhail Gorbachev, and although he has had no time to study my initiative, that I am inclined to believe his response will be positive. President Gorbachev: I think that will be very good. I wanted to say that since you’ll be talking at 8:30 our time, I could go on our news program “Vremia” at 9:00, mention that we’ve talked, and then on that program give a positive response. The President: There’s just one complication. I won’t give the speech now until 8:00 p.m. our time—3:00 a.m. your time. I changed that because we wanted to be on prime time so that the majority of the American people could hear it. President Gorbachev: OK, then I’ll respond tomorrow. The President: Very good. President Gorbachev: There are certain points on which I have some questions. First, we hope that we will get more detailed information from you on each point. Is that agreed? The President: Absolutely. President Gorbachev: Do you have any intention to include other nuclear powers in this process? Are you calling on them to get involved? The President: I consulted with Major and Mitterrand. I haven’t asked them to be involved. We will take the lead. It is certainly our intention to consult further with them. The response from Major and Mitterrand, with whom I talked just a few minutes ago, was certainly very positive. But I am not calling on them to do something now. This is more a U.S.-Soviet superpower relationship. President Gorbachev: That’s clear. In connection with your far-reaching proposals, is the question of nuclear testing included? It was one situation when we had many nuclear systems and programs. Not that you are contemplating major reductions, perhaps you consider moves on testing. The President: We’re reluctant on testing. Clearly we will consider the effect of our proposals on testing. We are not talking here about testing, and we will need to be in contact on that. Clearly it will raise the issue in the U.S. and elsewhere. We will need to consult on that. President Gorbachev: OK, George. Another point which was not clear to us: does your initiative affect carrier-based arms control and the strategic-based nuclear [naval] fleet? The President: Carrier based nuclear forces, definitely yes. The strategic fleet is not affected. Land-based navy planes will have their nuclear weapons removed from them and from their bases. President Gorbachev: OK, thank you. In conclusion, I would like to know your view on the following question. What forum can we use to clarify the points that arise about the U.S. initiative? When you were here, we talked of setting up 453

a group to discuss strategic stability. Maybe that group is the appropriate one to clarify all remaining questions? The President: That’s an interesting idea. I like that. Let me get back to you soon. It should be broader than just military, but obviously the military should be comfortable with this. President Gorbachev: OK. Thank you. I want again to congratulate you on this major proposal. It is a historic initiative, comparable to Rejkavik [sic]. The President: I also wanted to run it by Yel’tsin. I don’t know where he is. He was on vacation, but I don’t know where he is now. We sent him the information. I would like to do the courtesy of calling him. If we miss him, tell him we tried. President Gorbachev: OK, I’ll do that George. I also want to say that I appreciated meeting with Jim and discussing with Brady the U.S. financial system. The President: Thank you for the courtesy of receiving them. We’re urgently trying to follow up on those conversations. President Gorbachev: Thanks. I sent today information to Major for the G-7, including detailed data on the situation of our balance of payments, debt, and our possibilities. He will be in touch with you to give the information on my behalf. The President: OK. I look forward to seeing it. I am very pleased at your positive response. President Gorbachev: I’m sure. I glad [sic] to hear of your significant initiative. Raisa sends her best to Barbara. The President: Thank you and thank you for sending that fascinating tape. I looked at it with interest. Thank you. President Gorbachev: Thank you for the flag. That, too, is a reflection of that troubled time. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA 2000-0429-F by the National Security Archive.]

454

Document No. 76: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, 1:30 p.m. – 2:00 p.m. October 5, 1991

Gorbachev calls Bush before his scheduled televised speech to announce the Soviet response to the U.S. nuclear reduction initiatives of September 27. In addition to accepting Washington’s proposals, the Soviet leader is going to announce a oneyear moratorium on nuclear testing, a reduction in the size of the Soviet army by 700,000 men and a goal of complete elimination of tactical nuclear weapons. He will also propose to start negotiating deeper reductions in strategic nuclear weapons, aiming for a 50 percent cut immediately after START I is ratified by both legislatures. While some of these proposals would later materialize in START II, negotiated with the new Russian government, the proposals to eliminate all tactical nuclear armaments would represent a major missed opportunity on the part of the Bush administration. By the time the U.S. was willing to put tactical weapons on the table, their Soviet counterpart could no longer deliver. Tactical arms remain a non-negotiable part of the current Russian arsenal and a great concern of the United States.

The President: Hello, Mikhail? President Gorbachev: Mr. President? Is that you George? The President: Mikhail, I didn’t recognize your voice. President Gorbachev: We generally say that if someone doesn’t recognize you, you’ll be a wealthy man. The President: I hope so. President Gorbachev: I’m glad to hear you. All these days, despite the considerable problems here, I’ve been looking into your initiative. I asked Pankin to send a written version of my proposal—which I will be announcing in about an hour—to Bartholomew. I wanted to give you a brief summary of the primary points. I emphasize again the importance of this initiative by the President of the United States. I greet the approach of the President, focused on nuclear disarmament, unilateral actions, and an appeal for action. In a concrete sense, in the area of tactical nuclear weapons, we are reacting adequately to the initiative of the President. At the same time we are developing initiatives to continue these trends. We want to fully destroy tactical nuclear weapons on sea forces, on a mutual basis to withdraw tactical armaments of sea forces, including bombs. The weapons withdrawn should be stored at bases in nuclear stockpiles. I also suggest that the other nuclear powers join the U.S. and the Soviet Union in these far-reaching measures. 455

I want to offer further confirmation for my past support for a speedy ratification of START. Also, in the strategic area I will announce the following initiatives: – H eavy bombers will be taken off alert. Their nuclear arms will be stockpiled. – We will cease the modernization of tactical nuclear missiles for bombers. – We will stop the modernization of mobile, small-size, ICBM’s. – We will not increase beyond exiting numbers those ICBM’s on railroads. – We will not increase the number of ICMB’s with MIRVed warheads. – All ICBM’s on railroads will be kept in permanent places. – We will take off of alert 530 ICBM’s, including 134 MIRVed missiles. – We intend to make deeper cuts than those called for in START, going to 5,000 warheads by the end of the period called for in START, rather than the 6,000 called for in the treaty. – We propose the U.S. begin talks right after ratification of START to radically reduce strategic nuclear armaments, cutting by 50%. – We are ready to discuss with the U.S. side their suggestions for creating a non-nuclear system of strategic defense. We suggest creating a common system for advanced prevention against “eventual” nuclear strikes. – I will today announce another 1-year moratorium on nuclear testing, and invite the other powers to join us. – I will also suggest to elaborate together with the U.S. a plan to stop the production of fissionable materials. – There are other points—I won’t list them all. – We will reduce our army by 700,000 men. – If you don’t mind, I will be ready to suggest a new Summit may be on the horizon to discuss the situation. – Those on the main points. The President: Very bold. We’ll look at the details when we receive them. I commend you on your forthcoming statement. This is very exciting. We will look carefully at every detail, and then get back to you to tell you our thoughts on all these proposals. President Gorbachev: George, I think our experts have already started their talks. They’ll be able to look at the details. New spheres of cooperation are being opened. Some hours ago I talked to Yeltsin. He asked to transmit greetings to you. The President: OK. President Gorbachev: Regarding general problems, we are in quite an important phase now. The twelve republics have drafted an agreement on economic union. I plan to convene on the 11th a State Council meeting to finalize the agreement. Basically the draft is the one you know—the Yavlinsky Program. Working with Yeltsin and the experts, we’ve prepared a new draft of the Union Treaty. It is now being circulated among the republics. There are many nuances here. The pressures are increasing on Yeltsin. I still get significant 456

confirmation that Yeltsin will follow the agreement we reached together. I know of your activities, they have been conveyed. I believe there is a common understanding here. This morning I met with Michel Camdessus, Director of the IMF, and we exchanged letters confirming the Soviet Union as an Associate member. All this means we have a lot to do here. I appreciate the support we are receiving. Now, goodby [sic]. Say hello to Barbara. In a few minutes I’ll be speaking on Soviet T.V. The President: Thanks for the courtesy of this call. Barbara and I are at Camp David. Tomorrow the King of Spain will be here. I will be following the coverage of your speech with great interest. I am sure it will be received well worldwide. Both of us have a responsibility to really do something for the generations that follow us. Barbara just walked out of the room. She sends her very best to Raisa. I’ll be in touch. Thanks for the call. President Gorbachev: OK. All the best.… [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA 2000-0429-F by the National Security Archive.]

457

Document No. 77: Scene Setter for Meeting with President Gorbachev Circa Late October 1991

This succinct and prescient scene-setter, prepared most likely by Brent Scowcroft before the president’s departure for Europe, describes Gorbachev’s slow but steady loss of power and Yeltsin’s aspirations for independence that “would destroy what’s left of the Union.” The prospects for a political union with Gorbachev as its head, therefore, “seem nil,” implying the possibility that this could be the last of the “U.S.-Soviet meetings.” The memo advises the president to focus on nuclear arms control but not to go into detail, and it correctly identifies points that Gorbachev is likely to raise on the topic. The memo also lists the steps the Bush administration has taken to support market reform.

This could be the last “U.S.-Soviet” meeting, and possibly your last with Mikhail Gorbachev as President of the USSR. Events are moving so fast, and power devolving so quickly to Russia, Ukraine, and other republics, that Gorbachev may soon totally lose the influence he has enjoyed. Power is quickly flowing away from Mikhail Gorbachev. His effort to create a voluntary economic union has produced a vague agreement to set up a “commonwealth” based on 27 other yet-to-be-negotiated agreements. Even that vague agreement has failed to attract Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia or Moldova. And while Russia has joined, its leaders are increasingly drawn to declaring independence, which would destroy what’s left of the Union. While Yeltsin and Gorbachev have worked closely together much of this year, that arrangement may soon end as Yeltsin asserts Russia’s role as successor to the Union. Prospects for a political union, and therefore a long-term role for Gorbachev as union president, seem nil. Gorbachev has indicated a desire to discuss with you the current economic and political situation, and he will most likely describe a somewhat more orderly and optimistic scenario for the creation of a new, voluntary, union. Gorbachev retains some role in foreign and defense policy, and you will want to discuss those areas with him. You can refer to the letter you just sent expressing your pleasure at his very positive response to your September 27 initiative, but avoid detailed discussions since that letter covers the main points. He may press you on a nuclear test ban, and renew his call for 50% reductions (below START) in warheads. You may wish to explore his views on the republics and nuclear weapons, and about how the evolving center-republic relationship affects the ratification of START and CFE. Finally, you should press once again on the illegal biological weapons program. 458

You also can report to Gorbachev on the measures we are taking to normalize relations with the union and the republics, and to support market reforms: – Gorbachev complained at the Summit about COCOM limits. You can assure him that the remaining limits are few, and that you have removed some that still exist. Gorbachev wanted IMF involvement in the Soviet economy, and now he has –  it. You can discuss with him ways to make the best use possible of that aid. – You can assure him of our leadership in the G-7 efforts to solve Soviet debt problems, and ask him to urge republic leaders to work closely with the G-7. – Gorbachev is concerned about food and medical shortages this winter. You can tell him we’ve taken the western lead on both accounts. We delivered $2.5 billion in agricultural commodities in 1991 and over $18 million in medical supplies. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA 2000-1202-F/2 by the National Security Archive.]

459

Document No. 78: Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, Luncheon Meeting, Madrid, 12:30 p.m. – 1:15 p.m. October 29, 1991

This is the two leaders’ first conversation on the eve of the Madrid summit, which formally opened on October 30. Gorbachev is upbeat and in a joking mood with the U.S. delegation. As the previous scene-setter memo suggests, his aim is to present the domestic situation in a more optimistic and positive light than is warranted. He reports to Bush that the economic agreement he has been advocating for has been signed by 12 of the 15 republics and that the new Union will also include a single army and a centrally controlled foreign policy. Bush is concerned about nuclear command-and-control issues given certain recent statements from Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Gorbachev reassures him in the strongest terms that “everything regarding these weapons is 100% under central control” and that there is “no intention to break up into national armies.”

President Gorbachev: This is a great occasion. It was probably difficult to arrive at this point in the conference, yet even more difficult times are ahead. Everyone, of course, has an agenda. Jim Baker must be an honorary citizen of some of the Middle Eastern countries he visited, and of the Gaza Strip. Perhaps we will want to add some additional thoughts on these issues. I understand today that there was an attack against an Israeli bus. President Bush: Dennis (Ross), is there anything more on that? Mr. Ross: Nothing much more than yesterday. President Gorbachev: Perhaps we should clear up what really happened before linking it with the conference. President Bush: No one believes we should stay away and let the perpetrators succeed. President Gorbachev: This is a good location for the conference. President Bush: Choosing the conference site was an interesting process. There were so many places that were off bounds because one or another party vetoed them. The Syrians vetoed the Hague; the Palestinians, Geneva. President Gorbachev: You spent the night on the plane. President Bush: Yes. I left after dinner with the Queen of Thailand. Barbara did not come. President Gorbachev: Please convey my warmest regards to her. I saw a picture of you talking to me on the phone at the end of the coup, with Barbara standing beside you. 460

We’ll be able to talk more about that later. President Bush: Have the perpetrators gone to trial? President Gorbachev: No. This is a very complicated matter. President Bush: Yanaev was my host on the trip to Kiev. President Gorbachev: I know. President Bush: It is more complicated when you knew someone. President Gorbachev: How do you think I felt? Yanaev was my friend from university days, 40 years ago. This just demonstrates how far we’ve changed our country. There was a big difference between his understanding of the situation and mine. President Bush: It was stupid to try to overthrow you. President Gorbachev: This is what generals do sometimes (pointing to General Scowcroft). President Bush: Are you pointing to Scowcroft? President Gorbachev: But I mean bad generals. President Bush: If Brent Scowcroft wants my job, or Baker’s for that matter, he can have them. President Gorbachev: I don’t want to abandon my job. This is a crucial time. We’ve left everything behind, and to leave now would be to leave the country in a grave situation. All the superficial things you see are on the surface—decisions, speeches, etc. They are not the crucial things. Speeches are not what we need today. The issue is how we actually make the transition to a market economy. It will be difficult. The social situation is very tense. But there is also a change. People are ready to accept hardship, if they believe there will be a better life. President Bush: I remember the last two times we met, you said that change is irreversible. Of course there will be bumps along the way. This may be an improper question, but do you have a concern about a second attempted takeover. President Gorbachev: I still think we have more chances, better chances, on our side. We just had a congress of workers from the entire country. I received a delegation from the congress. They’re for the market. Most represent large factories. The first step they believe is to give shares to the workers so that they can share in the control of profits. They are ready to work in a market situation. They said that if we’ll do that, then they’ll support us in everything. Even in the defense industry, they’re ready to accept reforms. If we move decisively, in coordination in our country, and also with your support, we’ll get the situation in hand. But there might be real bumps, especially with the price liberalization. We need to struggle to resolve the myriad of challenges: 1.) price liberalization, 2.) a stable financial situation, that is, an anti-inflation policy, and 3.) stimulate entrepreneurs to start producing, to fill the market with consumer goods. We signed the economic treaty. Yesterday a Memorandum of Understanding was signed on debt. Yesterday and today I had calls from Moscow on this. It has 461

been difficult, but they signed it. This morning I have a memo on my table about the agreement. The meeting between the G-7 Deputies and the Prime Ministers and Finance ministers of the republics was very useful for our country. I heard it was also important for the G-7. It was useful for us to learn, and to work in association with other countries. President Bush: You were satisfied at the outcome of the meeting with G-7 representatives? President Gorbachev: Yes. President Bush: Ambassador Strauss filled us in on his conversation with David Mulford. I gather twelve signed.… Bob? Ambassador Strauss: Mr. President, ten signed it yesterday… President Gorbachev: All twelve signed. Also there will be additional discussions with the Baltics because they hold a portion of the debt. President Bush: The Balts will never accept collective responsibility for all the debt of the USSR. President Gorbachev: We’ll talk. I have set up three delegations to talk with the republics, led by Sobchak, Yakovlev, and Shevardnadze. They will discuss the entire range of problems with the Balts. Increasingly they (the Baltic leaders) are reminding us of the need for cooperation. President Bush: One area I’d like to talk to you is in working together on nuclear issues. I don’t know if you got my letter, but I discuss there the whole concept of working together to guarantee security and safety of nuclear weapons. We see half way around the world republics making certain statements about nuclear weapons. I’d like to hear your view. This is a situation where the center has a role, and you have a stake. President Gorbachev: George, a lot of what you hear in the press is not reliable. The press may have a duty to say such things, but....We will talk in detail about the domestic situation. The voices you sometimes hear, even in the Ukraine… that’s not the real Ukraine. For example, they criticized the economic treaty, saying that they would not sign it. Now they will sign it. I don’t need to tell you what an election campaign means. Some people overreach in the process. Kravchuk says one thing one place, another in other places. President Bush: When is the election? President Gorbachev: December 1. Please be patient. Even Kravchuk has left no doubt on his position about the central control of nuclear weapons. The same is true of Nazarbayev. You need have no concerns. Everything regarding these weapons is 100% under central control. No one can come close to nuclear weapons outside the central command. Yeltsin talked yesterday about the need for a common army. This [sic] an agreed point we have followed for a long time. That position on a common army is in the draft union treaty which Yeltsin and I sent to the republics. There is no intention to break up into national armies. We will talk more later. 462

Secretary Baker: One of my jobs is to move the Senate to ratify START. We testified that this was going well. Then the Ukraine announced a 450,000 person army. Senators then ask, “What does that mean for the Kiev Military District?” I can’t answer. This may be simply posturing in the style of democrats in the U.S. It’s Strauss’ fault. Minister Pankin: He’s (Strauss) doing that now in Moscow. Secretary Baker: He’s used to it. President Gorbachev: The President made the right choice (in Strauss). Ambassador Strauss: I’m the only real democrat. Secretary Baker: That’s “Democrat” with a capital “D.” President Gorbachev: I understand that what Ukraine has said echoes in Congress. The President may even have heard reports about discussions of a possible nuclear exchange between Russia and Ukraine. I worry how that is perceived. There will be total clarity in this as a result of military reform. Whatever variant we take, the Armed Forces will be under my control. I am also convinced that there is no other way regarding our foreign policy. But for both foreign policy and the armed forces, the single control will be implemented giving much more of a role to the republics. If, for example, the republics implement some specific policy, then that’s better; it makes it possible to implement agreed-upon policies. I’d like to discuss more in our conversation. Please bear this in mind: we are establishing a new state. Actual responsibility in the country and interaction with our partners—we’ll find an optimum solution to all our partners, consistent with our interest and that of all our partners. Above all, we want to put an end to the totalitarian regime. This is our responsibility, our prerogative. You also wanted us to put an end to that regime. Until recently you, and many in my country, thought the changes were going too slowly. But we needed to prepare our society for these steps. All must understand that this is not an easy process. There will be mistakes in strategy and tactics. Some believe the current stage is “funereal.” But I talked with an entrepreneur, a well-educated man, who is head of an association of joint ventures. He said, “Mr. President, you always say “crisis, crisis.” But how else can you destroy a totalitarian system without crisis? I fought Pavlov, who proposed an “anti-crisis” program. How can you eliminate totalitarianism without a crisis? When Pavlov proposed an anti-crisis program, he was saying he was against changing the system. We sat around a table and listened to him. He was serious. He believed the kind of state we had was normal. But it had to be dismantled. It reminds me of a story from medieval times. A traveler sees something being built. One said to him—we’re carrying huge stones, which should be the work of slaves. Another said, we’re building a cathedral. This is a time when you can hear all kinds of views in our country. There are democrats of all kinds in the country, and they now have a chance to implement real change. It is important now to preserve what was created after August. 463

President Bush: There is no danger of going back to the August events? President Gorbachev: No. Things cannot get back to that stage. The real danger is unrest stemming from the dissatisfaction of the people. People are for reform. Those who attempted the coup opposed reform, the union treaty, indeed all we were trying to do. They could not accept the new kind of life, the new society. Our people in general are in favor of change, the market economy. President Bush: I’m worried about the army and dislocation problems. President Gorbachev: That is a problem. On October 21 I proposed for people released from the army that they get free land and a loan to develop that land. But there are even more basic problems. The army is just part of the problem. Well, I think they have served us all the food they are going to serve us. Ambassador Strauss: Before we go I want to thank you for your hospitality to me in Moscow. President Bush: Yes. Thank you very much for what you’ve done for Bob Strauss. President Gorbachev: We’ve never had that late-night supper and long chat I promised. I won’t delay much longer. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA 2000-0429-F by the National Security Archive.]

464

Document No. 79: Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, Private Meeting, Madrid, 1:20 p.m. – 2:35 p.m. October 29, 1991

Meeting again prior to the start of the Madrid Conference, Gorbachev and Bush engage in a private conversation (Scowcroft, Baker, Chernyaev and new Soviet foreign minister Boris Pankin with interpreters from each side are present), giving Gorbachev the opportunity he has been waiting for to be able to explain his concerns to Bush directly. The two begin with a discussion of the upcoming summit, which they agree is “unprecedented” in that the superpowers have managed to work together to bring all parties in the Middle East conflict to the negotiating table. In the Middle East, in Yugoslavia, in Cyprus, their joint efforts are producing real results. However, the main issue here is the Soviet domestic situation and Gorbachev’s urgent need for financial aid. The day before, Yeltsin delivered a key speech to the Russian Supreme Soviet asking for emergency powers to implement radical economic reform. Bush expresses concern about his intentions and poses a perceptive question: “Does Yeltsin’s Russia want to take over the center?” Gorbachev points to the republics’ reactions to Yeltsin’s earlier statements about frontiers and Russian ethnic minorities, remarking that it stirred “separatist movements and talk about Russian empire.” Still, Gorbachev is generally positive about cooperating with Yeltsin and even about his speech—although he may simply be engaging in wishful thinking. The Soviet leader makes a desperate bid for loans, repeating the plea several times during the conversation. He needs $10–$15 billion and emphasizes that [i]f the current crisis escalated then we—you and us—will pay much more later.” But Bush and Baker are not focused on “later”; the president notes that Congress has its eye on Chicago, not the Soviet Union, a reference to the upcoming presidential campaign. The U.S. is willing to provide only $1.5 billion and even that would have to be earmarked for agricultural and medical assistance.

President Gorbachev: Let’s spend a couple of minutes over how to organize these talks. I have two or three days myself. President Bush: As do I. President Gorbachev: I suggest a couple of areas. First on the Middle East Conference. I have a couple of problems. We need to talk in detail on our internal situation. Not only on the economic situation, but what we are doing now. President Bush: This is fine. We can’t cover everything, but why don’t you start? President Gorbachev: On the Conference, I will be brief. It proves again the kind of cooperation we have been able to achieve over the past couple of years. Some ask whether it is worth it now to cooperate with the Soviet Union and what Gorbachev represents? I must note here your balanced attitudes on this question. 465

I think we still have much work to do together. The assets we have deployed together over the past period make us see that cooperation is preferable. Through our efforts, especially Baker’s, we now have a beginning for this unprecedented Conference. My impression is that we must be cautious and that the participants will doubt a need from time to time to continue. Not that we should work instead of them, but we are facilitators of the process. We should given [sic] them a chance to work for themselves. I spoke with the President of Cyprus. He hopes you and I will find a way to solve that Cyprus problem. This was my first meeting with him. He seems a serious man. President Bush: He’s a very good man. We hoped for progress, but then the Turks pulled back. President Gorbachev: He said that now that we are working together, we should remember that the Cyprus situation was created by force and should be solved not by force, but by negotiations. In other situations we have not put up with force. In Yugoslavia the situation is of much concern. They seem unable to engage in a political process, despite assistance by all. I don’t know if you have considered raising this in the UNSC. Maybe we should think about it. President Bush: Some believe this is an internal matter and that the UN should stay out. President Gorbachev: External intervention is inadmissible. But taking a principled stand would be useful. President Bush: The Security Council did pass a resolution not too long ago. Secretary Baker: Now there is no effective central government. President Bush: We’re open-minded. Let’s keep talking. Did your talk with the leaders offer any hope? President Gorbachev: They went back with promises of cease fire and good offices. Secretary Baker: The UNSC did impose an arms embargo, and it seems to be effective. President Gorbachev: This is a bad precedent for this to happen after the Paris CSCE conference. President Bush: Yes. The EC is not united on this issue. President Gorbachev: Yes. Some were hasty in saying there is no more Yugoslavia. That is not helpful. Maybe we should have additional exchanges on this. CSCE may not be able to continue if we can’t deal with this. President Bush: May I say a word about the Conference? We appreciate your role, especially with Syria and the Palestinians. We must continue to work together with the Syrians to attend the multilateral conference, and ensure that the Palestinians not mess things up. If we are to succeed, we must stay together. President Gorbachev: I agree. Should we react to the terrorist act? We’ll get a question. General Scowcroft: We have to understand it first. 466

President Gorbachev: So we could do that, and say it is an attempt to scuttle the conference. President Bush: I see two problems. We need to encourage Syria to participate in the organization of a multilateral meeting. The other is the site for the followon conference. The Arabs want Madrid. Israel wants everything to be done in the region. We need a compromise formulation. President Gorbachev: Today we can focus on this in the talk with Shamir. We shouldn’t focus solely on this or the issue of multilateral talks. We need a balance. Secretary Baker: But we either need to start in four days or we might not start at all. Rhetoric in this conference will be extreme. President Gorbachev: It is a question of Golan, 242, and the Settlements. President Bush: These are all tough issues. I will say all must think anew. President Gorbachev: There will be nothing new in my remarks. Shall we move to the second topic? President Bush: Are you coming to the Reagan Library opening on November 3? President Gorbachev: I got a letter from him. He is a charming man. Now, about our domestic problems and where we are. On the surface much is happening. The question is how to end the crisis. The only way is to accelerate reform—market-based political and economic freedom. There must be a single market. Awareness of this is growing. The central question is the future of our state. After August there is a running debate and statements by reporters of declarations of independence, which didn’t change anything. They are just a prelude from which to take steps to voluntary association. Some reacted to Russian statements about frontiers. That spurred support for separatist movements, and talk about a Russian Empire. It was a bitter dispute. It was difficult to reach a stage of a joint statement by 10, but the process is now launched. The treaty has been signed in the form developed by Yavlinsky. Some have said it represents a return to the center, but cooperation requires some sort of collaboration. Ukraine said it will shortly sign the economic treaty. We worked with Yeltsin on the draft union treaty and have sent it to the republics. It calls for a unitary state, not a free commonwealth. It will have central institutions and foundations. It will have control over areas of energy, transport, communications, and R and D. We have responses from most of the republics. Nazarbayev suggests the center be stronger, and others agree. Yeltsin has comments, but the process seems to be on its way. The State Council will meet on November 11 to discuss it. Yeltsin is under severe pressure by those who support a different concept. People who think Russia should shed other republics and go ahead alone. Yeltsin understands what that would mean. Russia then would be in a period of upheaval and other republics would be in a state of chaos. Other regimes would rise—even Yeltsin could be jettisoned. Yeltsin understands, but he is easily swayed. 467

His speech had two parts. On the economy he stuck to our agreed approach, although on some questions he was a bit rash. That’s not too dangerous because he follows a path to economic reform. So that is a positive part of the speech. It was a dramatic and brave decision—not his usual populism. It is difficult for him, but he did it. I spoke to him yesterday and said I would support that positive part of the speech. But the rest of the speech was worrisome. Although he reaffirmed support for the Union, he retreated on some issues in the union treaty. He also made some rash statements on issues of great importance. Still I will give him support because he is pushing reform. President Bush: Does Yeltsin’s Russia want to take over the center? We can’t see over the horizon. President Gorbachev: That is a direct question. That was happening when I returned from the Crimea. That worried the republics and the democrats. It took a big effort on my part to hold the line. That process was stopped. I helped Yeltsin to get out of his box by accepting the decisions he made during the coup. His present situation is not entirely calculated. Today a new union gives form to Russian leadership of the republics. They can’t accept direct Russian direction. Most republics support a center. He and I had a good understanding about this, and his speech was somewhat disappointing. If he goes to separatism that would be a disaster for all. My view is we will find an optimum solution for the economic and political treaties. I am working with each republic on this. A crucial time for us and the West is approaching. What kind of Soviet Union is wanted? You need to take a clear stand and put forward a program of support. Yavlinsky called last night. He told me that the G-7 had done careful work and would report to their heads to make final decisions. I request you to take the initiative and accept that decision. What is it? $370 million in cash needed today. One billion financial credits expected from Saudi Arabia and Korea. Finally, $2.5 billion is needed for standby in case of need, and to deal with dangers in this critical situation. You all understand what is happening that the implications. But now this seems to be a brake [unreadable words] yesterday they did sign a MOU on foreign debt. [Unreadable words] point. President Bush: Let me be [unreadable words] know my position has been support for [unreadable words] not exclusively—and you. In [unreadable words] to that effect which was sharply criticized. [Unreadable words] reckless nationalism. We maintain [unreadable words] others—not behind your back. Many worry [unreadable words] Yeltsin speech meant, and how good the credit [unreadable words]. Our law requires certification [unreadable words]. The G-7 saw good signs of intent to [unreadable words] creditworthiness are desperate. How can we [unreadable words] don’t know yet. In our view we can do something [unreadable words] the republics to participate since they [unreadable words] for something 468

less we have to deal with G-7 [unreadable words] situation is worse than expected. So we [unreadable words] need additional assurance the republics are involved. President Gorbachev: The MOU is just that. The republics have recognized the debt, and declared responsibility for it. They authorize the central bank to do it in their behalf and all will provide for servicing the debt and its obligations. Let me be very frank. $10–$15 billion is not much for us and repayment is not a serious problem. If the current crisis escalated then we—you and us—will pay much more later. You mention the demands of Congress and Treasury. In a routine situation that is sensible. But in this crisis situation, routine decisions are not possible. Political decisions are required. President Bush: That is why I asked you about the possibility of a reactionary coup. Another new element is my situation at home. It is not like yours, for which I am grateful. But the Democrats forget foreign affairs, and focus on Chicago, etc. Congress says, how can you certify the credit? We must put it on the line as a medical and agricultural credit. I can’t say what your need is—only you can. I can tell you what I can do now: $1.5 billion for the winter while you sort out the union-republic situation. If that is insulting to you, I will go back and consult and see what might be done. But if you want something now, I can do this for two reasons: it is agriculture, and the republics are now involved, so credit is better. It is something we can start with. But if that puts you in trouble at home, maybe we should just defer. But I can’t do more right now. President Gorbachev: We have two problems. The food crisis exists and we hope for $3.5 billion before the new harvest. Second, we need decisions regarding the work of the G-7 experts. President Bush: What is the second? President Gorbachev: The G-7 agreed about the current debt payout situation. $370 million cash to continue; faster action by Saudi Arabia and Korea for $ 1 billion; and, last, $2.5 billion standby. We will invite the IMF and the World Bank to supervise our activities in the use of our credits. The G-7 representatives have all the necessary data. The main G-7 worry was the need for a MOU of joint responsibility for foreign debt and a judicial person to be responsible for it. That has been done. Secretary Baker: The President is talking about $1.5 billion–$165 million in grants; $250 million in credits now, and $1 billion in 60 days. The President says that is what the U.S. can do now. It doesn’t get into project aid like food processing, etc. People can’t eat projects. This is really all we can do now. We want stability. You remember our telling you in June of a possible Pavlov Coup. We heard disturbing reports on this speech last Friday (he describes them). We went to Russian officials and questioned this. We think we had some effect. So we are doing what we can. If we knew where the speech does not accord with your union agreement, maybe we could help you on that. 469

President Gorbachev: They all want to show they can handle with contacts with the U.S. It is a messy situation. I think we can handle it. I am confident, but it won’t be easy. That is why I am so insistent in raising the aid issue now. President Gorbachev [sic]: We will talk to our G-7 counterparts when I get back. President Gorbachev: On Arms Control we can say we examined the issues. On aid why don’t we say we had a full discussion of all aspects of the current situation and we will continue after we have heard a report from the G-7 deputies. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA 2000-0429-F by the National Security Archive.]

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Document No. 80: Record of Dinner Conversation between Gorbachev, Bush, González and King Juan Carlos of Spain October 29, 1991

This dinner conversation hosted by King Juan Carlos the evening before the Madrid summit becomes a virtual love fest as the king, Prime Minister González and President Bush take turns expressing their wholehearted support and appreciation for Gorbachev and his efforts to preserve the Union in a new democratic and decentralized form. It evolves into a fascinating discussion of the internal dynamics of the Soviet Union as it slides toward collapse. After the Soviet leader presents his detailed vision for the new Union and describes the scale of the challenges facing him, Bush sums up Gorbachev’s predicament as a “stunning, breathtaking drama.” González calls for preserving the Soviet Union as a “second circle,” without which “there will be no important pillar of stability in Europe and in the world.” About one-fourth of the conversation is devoted to the personal relationship between Yeltsin and Gorbachev; the three Western leaders were shocked by Yeltsin’s recent speech to the Russian parliament the day before, where he essentially announced that Russia would initiate a separate reform process and cut its financial support for the center. Gorbachev attempts to make lemonade out of this lemon, speaking positively about Yeltsin and his speech, and observing that the Russian president falls easily under the influence of others but that his heart is in the right place. He goes on to name the source of negative influence in this case—Yeltsin’s secretary of state, Gennady Burbulis, whom Gorbachev believes was the author of the idea of Russia going it alone and thus destroying the Union. The four leaders also discuss the ethnic complexity of Ukraine, with its population of 15 million Russians and strong separatist movements in the Crimea and Donbass, as well as Kazakhstan, which they do not believe can exist without the Union. While all express their preference for a strong center, Bush reflects on his preoccupation—the electoral campaign, which has the “striking ability to distort” the issues, and which he thinks about “with horror.”

Gorbachev. Tomorrow we are opening a conference that has become possible as a result of the end of the “Cold War.” The road to success will be difficult. Terrorist acts25 are an effort to disrupt the conference. But we must do everything to keep the participants in place. Today I spoke with [Yitzhak] Shamir. After we raised the question of the necessity of holding bilateral negotiations here in Madrid, he agreed that we could start them here. Bush. I did not know about that. This is a step.  Separate deadly incidents occurred in the West Bank, Lebanon, and Turkey on the eve of the conference. [Editors]

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González. We are saying that the conference, in the end, should “give birth to a baby.” But of course, at least a “conception” should happen here. Overall, we must note that all sides have now come to the conclusion that they cannot, that it is not in their interest, to leave the conference. Bush. Shamir is a very difficult partner. We took very serious measures with respect to credit assurances; [we] were not afraid of the Jewish lobby, on which he counts; [we] were not afraid of all his sharp expressions. Now he is at the conference. But it will not be easy with him. Gorbachev. When Shamir started telling me that we should hold bilateral negotiations in the capitals of the countries of the region, so that he would be close [and] could participate personally, give instructions and so on, I said—why should we, Mr. Prime Minister, create a situation like this? If we conduct negotiations in the region, there will be more emotions, more pressure from the press, from public opinion. You will often have to play on the “other’s field.” Wouldn’t it be better to play on a neutral [field]? In general, we are trying to “work” with him. Bush. This is good. We will strive to have the participants of the negotiations themselves carry as much as possible of the burden of responsibility. Gorbachev. As we stated at the press conference: we brought the parties to the negotiating table, and we have no intention of disappearing now. But the main responsibility is on them now. Bush. Tomorrow I will make a mainly boring, general speech. Hope you don’t fall asleep. I will call for a constructive [approach]. Gorbachev. I said to Shamir: you are the first to speak, and we are counting on you to introduce a constructive tone. I am not going into details tomorrow. Notwithstanding all our internal difficulties, we are full of determination to play a constructive role in the world. And when we create the Union of Sovereign States, it will become a powerful positive factor in the international arena. But we are facing a serious struggle. The coup-plotters have seriously undermined the future of the Union. They said they were going to save the country. And some people in the press are throwing out the question: where are the real patriots now: walking free or in jail? Juan Carlos. Does this really have resonance? Gorbachev. Yes, it finds a certain resonance. There are still many people who believe that democracy and the Constitution are good, but the main thing is that there should be order. González. For decades people were injected with a negative attitude toward “formal democracy.” The actions of the coup-plotters are an example of how these kinds of people are destroying something they allegedly wanted to save. Nobody encouraged the centripetal tendencies in the USSR as much as they did. Meanwhile Europe and the world need the Union. Two main circles are being created in Europe—one is in the West leaning toward the EU. The other should be in the East. It is the current Soviet Union, the Union of Sovereign States, for which you stand. If there is no second circle, then there will be no important pillar of stability in Europe and in the world. This would be a dangerous vacuum. 472

Gorbachev. I am constantly saying: we need the Union, we must not tear the threads that were created over the centuries. But our partners in the international arena also need the Union. Because chaos and constant instability in our country will create a threat for everybody. And I will do everything to preserve the Union, of course a renewed one with extensive rights for sovereign republics, but at the same time with the kind of center they need, that would serve a single economic space, ensure defense with unified armed forces, ensure a coordinated foreign policy and everything that one should not disrupt—a single power grid, transportation and communications, ecology, etc. In our country now many people think that we can separate and then come together again, that it would be sufficient just to have free association or a commonwealth. But I will insist on a full-blooded Union, I will not abandon it. Bush. We are all concerned about this issue. What are the chances, in your view, that you will succeed in realizing your vision? How do you see the actions of the Ukraine? And how should one understand Yeltsin’s latest speech? By the way, [Marlin] Fitzwater informed me that the first reactions of the mass media in the United States to our joint press conference came under titles like this: “Bush supports Gorbachev and turns his back on Yeltsin.” I don’t know, maybe he dramatizes the situation, but it would be bad if they succeeded in creating such a perception. You know that nothing like that happened. And at the press conference I tried to emphasize the need of cooperation between the center and the republics, even though there were questions posed in a different spirit. Gorbachev. Yes, I appreciate it, George. I am convinced that we should not allow a situation where Gorbachev and Yeltsin are pitted against each other. Bush. You promised today that you would tell us all about this in detail in the evening. Gorbachev. Yes, it is not easy to figure it all out. In my analysis, I separate Yeltsin’s speech into two parts. The first one—this is the part that deals with the economy. Here, even though there are some moments that could cause objections—there are things that are voluntaristic, without mechanisms for realization (but that is just objective reality, and we are working on those now)—still, here we should emphasize the positive. In fact, this is within the framework of what I was talking about at the Supreme Soviet; it develops and adds concrete details to certain stipulations. He talks about the need for financial stabilization and price liberalization. These are painful measures, and he has finally decided to pursue them. And I will support him. Because he—let’s give him credit—takes responsibility for the radical, painful steps. And we really cannot do without them. The other part of the speech is political. He called me yesterday, and we discussed some of it. He asked what to say about Ukraine. I suggested that he should say that we keep hoping that Ukraine will be with us, in the Union, and that’s what he said. In the speech, there is confirmation of the need for the Union, it says that Russia will not destroy the Union, but there are also things that lead away from the agreements that were affirmed in the draft of the Union Treaty, which he and I sent to the republics. And the majority of the republics supported that concept, and sent us their considerations. Yeltsin has also sent [his]. 473

Juan Carlos. I understand, the situation is complex. But here everybody noted the political aspect, and first of all the call for cutting the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs by 90 percent. One has to think about how such things are perceived abroad! González. This is, so to speak, a metaphor. But a unified state cannot exist with such a “metaphor.” Gorbachev. I fully agree with this. And that is why I am saying that we are facing a serious struggle, because I am calling not for an amorphous union, not for an amoeba, but for a union state. And in the draft of the Union Treaty, which Yeltsin and I sent out, it says so: union state. There are some things in the speech that lead away from that. Bush. And he called me, he said that he wants to tell me about the substance of the speech, assured that it would be devoted to the economy, said all the good things. But he said nothing about the other part of the speech. How can that happen? I don’t understand it. Juan Carlos. Mr. President, maybe it sounds harsh, but our relationship allows me to ask you this question—isn’t he clipping your wings? Gorbachev. I would say that is not the right question. The problem is somewhat different. I think that in his soul he is sincerely in favor of the Union, he understands that not a single republic, not even Russia, can live without it. And this realization finds its expression in the fact that he works in contact with me; lately we have been working very closely together, working very intensely on the Union Treaty. However, he—even though he creates the impression of a strong and confident person—in reality he falls under influences very easily, in particular under the influence of certain forces, of people who are saying that Russia should throw off this burden, the republics are only a hindrance, the union with them is unprofitable, and that we need to go forward independently. Hence the idea that Russia should take upon itself the status of legal heir of the Soviet Union. And this idea, even though in a veiled state, in a form of denial, showed up in the speech. And one of the people who accompanies me here, Yegor Yakovlev, said: upon reading this speech, one can say that Yeltsin is going to try to destroy the Union, but in such a way that he could shift the blame to the other republics. But this way is dangerous, deadly. And that would be trouble for Russia. González. I think he would want to shift [the blame] to the other republics and to the center. Bush. But who are those forces you were speaking about? Who are these people? Gorbachev. [Gennady] Burbulis, for example. He is a person with great influence on Yeltsin. And when a leader falls under influences so easily, it is hard to do business with him. Here, Mr. President, you were vice president for eight years, and now you are in your fourth year as president. We have known each other for a long time. Tell me, has there been at least one time when I gave you my word and did not keep it? Bush. No, it has not happened once. 474

Gorbachev. A politician can not always give his word, but having given it, he has to keep it. Yeltsin—such is the reality we have to live with—is a person who is not always reliable. González. Exactly. I remember talking to him during my visit to the Soviet Union. He started by saying that the center is a nuisance to us, that they did not need the center and so on. I tried to persuade him that Russia needs the Union, and the Union cannot be without the center, and in the end he agreed with me. After that conversation I went to the Kremlin for negotiations with President Gorbachev. When I arrived, I learned that in the meantime Yeltsin had been talking to the press and said just the opposite, perverted everything. Gorbachev. Yes, this is the kind of person we are working with. Such is the reality. Honestly speaking, you cannot let him go for one day. You work with him, come to an agreement, and then it turns out that you have to start everything all over again. But I do not want us to be completely disappointed in him. I will work with him. All in all, if you consider his speech yesterday as a whole, the positive elements outweigh [the negative ones]. There is, first of all, the readiness to undertake decisive steps on the economy, affirmation of a single monetary system, and so on. This is important, this is the first time he is talking about what needs to be done. Today, it would be a big mistake to go for a fight, for a confrontation with Yeltsin. And I will be working with him, and with other leaders of the republics. By the way, they all want to work directly with you, to establish contacts, to emphasize their relations with you. And this gives us an opportunity to let them know of a certain position. I can see that you are not indifferent to how things will turn out in our country. Bush. Yes, I received Kravchuk and [Kyrgyz president Askar] Akayev. We do have contacts with the republics, and we are trying not to undermine your positions. And I always say that we are interested in having the republics find agreement with the center, we want to help you, and for this it is necessary that you come to an agreement. And of course, there are the military issues, disarmament, and nuclear weapons. I always emphasize President Gorbachev’s role. And when Ukraine started to make statements on these issues, this caused great worry. Gorbachev. Yes, these are serious issues. But we have to have in mind that politics gets in the way here, electoral calculations. On December 1, Ukraine will hold presidential elections. After that, a lot will change, I think. They already realized what impression they had created with their “outbursts” regarding nuclear weapons and the Ukrainian army. Bush. Yes, senators are asking what kind of a new army of 450,000 men they are talking about when we need to ratify the CFE Treaty. Gorbachev. However, you have to keep in mind that whatever Kravchuk is saying (and he is saying different things—one thing in the Crimea and another in Kiev), and whatever the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet is adopting, this is not the same as the people’s opinion. I am convinced that the people of such a multinational republic as Ukraine will ultimately make a decision in favor of the Union because we cannot simply separate from one another in a country where 475

75 million people live outside of their ethnic units. There are 15 million Russians in the Ukraine, according to the most conservative estimates. Only 40 percent of Kazakhstan is Kazakh. Juan Carlos. Only? González. Kazakhstan as such is just nonsense. Gorbachev. Apart from the Union, yes. And that is why Nazarbayev is firmly pro-Union. We never had any internal borders. How is it possible to divide oneself, how do you cut up everything? Ukraine in its present form emerged only because the Bolsheviks did not have a majority in the Rada, and they added Kharkov and Donbass to the Ukraine. And Khrushchev passed the Crimea from Russia to the Ukraine as a fraternal gesture. And when talk started about the secession of Ukraine, then a powerful movement against that began in the Donbass, in the south, and in the Crimea. The Crimea finally made the decision that either Ukraine will be in the Union, or we are returning to Russia. Kravchuk went to the Crimea, tried to calm them down. The situation is made even more difficult by the careless statements of Yeltsin and his circle about borders and territorial claims. This is an explosive topic. González. All this proves that in the modern states the notion of self-determination cannot be taken to the absurd. Secession is absurd. To what degree can one divide up? Up to self-determination of a town? That would be the logical result if one starts splitting up. Bush. You are saying that Kravchuk is maneuvering before the elections. But will he be able to win? Many people in my country think he would not. Gorbachev. I think he will win the elections. He tells me: wait until December 1; after the elections I will be able to speak definitively. Bush. And you think that after the elections he would definitively speak in favor of the Union? Gorbachev. I am not sure of that. But I am firmly convinced of one thing—it is not possible to tear Ukraine and Russia apart—they will be together. González. Of course, it is impossible to tear Russia from Russia, it began in Kiev. Gorbachev. Many things today stem from the immaturity of our politicians, who emerged on the wave of perestroika. These are very different people. I look at them: here is a person who yesterday put all his energy into the service of the old regime, was its passionate proponent, and now he is an ultra-radical, a passionate demolisher of the center. And that is not before August, but now, when all the totalitarian structures have been swept away. There is no longer a center that would personify those structures. And they continue fighting against it. González. This is a typical example of a “pseudo-discussion,” an argument without a subject. How can they now fight against the center, as if nothing has changed? This reminds me of a joke about the president of Colombia, who, upon coming to power in 1980 announced that he was breaking relations with Spain. He was asked: why? He [said:] because Spain stole our gold. Yes, they say, but that happened 500 years ago. That is right, he says, but I just found out about it today. 476

Gorbachev. Or the joke about the man who was still blowing up trains in Belorussia twenty-five years after the war. He was caught and said: I am a partisan. But twenty-five years have gone by, you are blowing up the wrong things. González. The problem is that the republics see themselves as possessing substantial legitimacy, because they recently held democratic elections. Of course, your main problem is time, the objective zeitnot. But you were also being undermined by the sequence of events. If the same kind of elections were held simultaneously or earlier at the all-Union level, then maybe the situation would be different now. Gorbachev. This is only partially true. The first free elections were held in our country in 1989, when people’s deputies of the USSR were elected. And the majority of individuals who now are playing the leading roles in the republics, in the districts, emerged then. And that sequence was justified by the fact that our changes started from the top. Bush. I agree with that. Gorbachev. But this is not the main thing. Our society will not be able to bear such a split, such destruction. I am sure of that and I will be doing everything for the Union. And not for any Union, but for a full-fledged one. Once I said exactly this to the presidents of the republics: if I see that we are moving not to a unitary union state with a popularly elected president, with a single economic space, unified armed forces and so on, then I will not enter the race as a candidate for the presidency, I will have to separate myself from it. I think that there is a chance to create a full-blooded new union where the republics would enjoy genuine sovereignty, but where Russia will play a special role. It has objectively the leading, forward role. But now the republics do not accept any direct leadership. The only opportunity for Russia to fulfill this role of hers is through the new center, where all the republics would be represented and where Russia, due to its weight, potential, and capabilities would be able to realize itself, to lead the others. In this, one could say, lies its historic mission. But as I have already said, we will have to fight for this. Juan Carlos. And you believe that you will be able to win in this fight? We are with you with all our hearts. Gorbachev. I think that there is a chance, and I am confident that we should achieve it. And I speak about it openly. When Shushkevich announced his candidacy for the position of chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Belarus, he consulted with me, and I told him: “You are not some kind of politician who has nothing else to do and who does not know any other trade. You are a physicist, a professor, you can come back and lead an institute. What do you have to lose? Therefore, I suggest that you state [your position] clearly, what you stand for.” And he stated clearly: for the Union. And he got almost 70 percent of the vote. And his rival, a strong person, by the way, only got 25 percent. And I declare clearly and definitively: I am for the union state. There will be struggles, it will be hard, but I will work with everybody, individually and all together. And if I see that the other concept is winning, then I will speak about it, and I will not be president. 477

But I repeat—we have a chance to create a union state, a new [state], with strong republics, but above all a democratic [state]. González. Democratic, but necessarily with a strong executive. Strong [executive] power of course is not a sufficient condition for the existence of a democratic state, but it is a necessary condition. Gorbachev. I absolutely agree with that. For us today, it is a serious and very difficult problem, and I have been speaking about the need to strengthen executive power at all levels for a long time. González. If one talks about the United States, there the foundation of strong federal power is in the fact that 60 percent of government spending is done at the federal level. And the decisive instrument of executive power is the presidential veto power. It is, of course, a marvelous instrument. And more: you can win elections by a margin of one vote, issue the veto with a margin of one vote—and nonetheless, this decision would be respected, complied with by everyone, without a sound. Juan Carlos. It is not like that yet in our country. They say that only a sizable majority is persuasive. González. You see, Mr. President Bush, how we are jealous of your system. However (the King is probably not listening), I have to admit that the monarchy has served the interests of contemporary Spain quite well. I, as a person without any “monarchic inclinations,” can say it openly. Juan Carlos. I heard what the chairman of the government just said. We are talking about a monarchy of a modern type. But the press needs topics, and so they try to “pour acid” into our relationship with the head of the government all the time, to depict us as rivals. Gorbachev. Many people in my country are trying to do just the same—to put a wedge between me and Yeltsin. There are people, there are forces, who are interested in it and are working on it all the time. Bush. And I have to face the coming year—an election year. I will tell you honestly—I think about it with horror. We have a striking ability to distort all the issues, to waste time on the issues that are not really important during electoral campaigns. You never know what will fall down on top of you. Of course I do not want, Mikhail, to compare these concerns with the gigantic task you are trying to solve today. It is a stunning, breathtaking drama. We are holding our breath as we watch it unfold, and we wish you luck. Gorbachev. I see in your words, Mr. President, an understanding of the fact that the preservation and renewal of our Union, the solution to our problems— and they can only be solved within the Union—is necessary not just for ourselves, although for ourselves first of all. It is important and beneficial also for you, for our Western partners, for the entire world. That is why I was telling you today in our conversation that now, during the particularly difficult, decisive period of transition from a totalitarian political and economic system to a democracy and markets, we especially need the support of our partners. It is getting late already, so I will speak very briefly about one more issue. I am meeting with President Mitterrand tomorrow. 478

Bush. Give my special regards to François. Gorbachev. I will pass them on, by all means. It is likely that I will have to respond to his proposal regarding a meeting of four nuclear powers. What do you think about that? Bush. He did not talk about this with me personally, as strange as that is. We know about this idea, we might have some questions, but he did not address me. Gorbachev. We have some questions too. For example, why is China not mentioned, what should we do about it? We need to think how to react to this idea of Mitterrand. There are things there to weigh and maybe to discuss. Bush. It is really a question—regarding China. González. There is one important thing behind this idea of Mitterrand—he is feverishly seeking a way to finally leave behind De Gaulle’s idea of “strike forces.” Some movement in that direction was noticeable some time ago. But you know how to do it beautifully? You know, when one person lies on a bed, and he suddenly changes his pose, everybody notices that. But when there are four or five people lying on that bed, one can make all kinds of body movements unnoticeably. Gorbachev. That is a good way to put it. By the way, Mr. President, your allies—the British and the French—got alarmed when I agreed to discuss limited ABM systems with you. They started feeling uncomfortable, afraid that creation of such a system would devalue their own nuclear forces. And they are concerned that the Soviet Union would abandon its position on the ABM Treaty. We, of course, support this treaty, we think that it has contributed greatly to stability. Bush. I know that they had certain questions. We consulted with them. I still think that we will not have a big problem with them, we will be able to explain everything to them and remove their potential concerns. I reconsidered the concept of SDI, and now we are talking about a genuinely limited ABM system. Gorbachev. Well, it is really late, and tomorrow we will have a big day. I think it is time to thank his Royal Highness for the wonderful evening and the magnificent dinner. Juan Carlos. I was very glad to be the host for such company. Thank you for the very interesting conversation. We all gained a lot from it. Mr. González and I, of course, would like to join President Bush in wishing you, Mr. President, success in the great cause of transforming your country. Gorbachev. Thank you for these words of support. [Source: The Gorbachev Foundation Archive, Fond 1, Opis 1, donated by Andrei Grachev. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.]

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Document No. 81: Chernyaev Diary November 2, 1991

Once again, the best chronicler of the “stunning, breathtaking drama” (Bush’s phrase) unfolding in the USSR is Anatoly Chernyaev. In his descriptions of the meetings in Madrid, which provide crucial details missing from official memcons, Gorbachev’s closest adviser captures the most important and poignant moments of the summit. For him, the critical meeting is the conversation with Bush, Baker and Scowcroft on October 29 (see Document No. 79), where Gorbachev delivers his unrequited plea for help. This entry in his diary reveals an episode left out of the U.S. record, in which Baker informs Gorbachev of “one thing that the President cannot say,”—namely, that the American side learned about the contents of Yeltsin’s October 28 speech to Parliament beforehand and contacted Yeltsin’s people to express their disapproval of it, specifically the intended “call to liquidate the Soviet Foreign Ministry” and the ominous statement about protecting Russian minorities abroad. Yeltsin went ahead with the speech anyway, to the surprise of the Bush administration. Chernyaev relates the back-and-forth about aid in minute detail, again going well beyond the official memcon. In the latter part of this entry he describes Gorbachev’s visit to Latche, France, to meet with François Mitterrand, which was in part a debriefing about Madrid, and in part, as Chernyaev looks back on his notes, a “bequest … or if not a bequest, then parting words to political descendants.”

November 2, 1991, Saturday Morning What happened in Madrid? Before the start of the conference on the Middle East, Gorbachev and Bush, the co-chairs of the conference, talked thoroughly about everything in the presence of Baker, Scowcroft, Pankin. I was there too. M.S. started by praising both of them—this conference is another example of the effective partnership between the USSR and the U.S. in world politics. For M.S., this is especially important at a moment when, as he told Bush himself, both here and in the U.S. people are asking: does the Soviet Union exist, and what does Gorbachev represent? He expressed his appreciation to the President and to Baker, and to the U.S. Administration for the “balanced approach” in this matter. They agreed on behavior tactics for each of them and for both of them together during the opening of the conference and afterwards: to act in a way so the sides (the Arabs and Israel) assume the responsibility for resolving these issues, as opposed to shifting this on the superpowers. M.S. agreed and said that he recently met with the President of Cyprus in Moscow. He called him a good person (with which President Bush agreed) and relayed the Cypriot’s request: “to demonstrate (U.S. and USSR) a joint commitment to resolving the Cyprus problem.” “We cannot allow the use of force (by 480

the Turks),” M.S. said. He relayed Vassiliou’s opinion that if things remain the same, it would set a bad precedent. M.S. commented on this information by saying that in other similar cases we would not accept the use of force. That was the end of the discussion of the Cyprus problem. They discussed Yugoslavia, establishing that the situation is deteriorating. M.S. suggested returning to the Yugoslav issue at the UN Security Council. Bush reacted skeptically, along the lines of: some members of the Security Council and staff of the UN Secretariat believe that it is an internal affair, and they do not want to get the UN involved. Gorbachev agreed that intervention is unacceptable. “But if the UN states its position, it could have certain consequences.” “The UN has already stated its position,” Bush objected, “We support the EC’s [European Council] efforts. You spoke with representatives of Serbia and Croatia. Do you think it was helpful?” he asked, not without a hint of malice. Baker joined in the conversation, “Regrettably, there are disagreements among members of the EC as well. It is difficult for them to maintain a unified approach. Some Europeans want to recognize the independence of the republics. I tried to oppose this, but Germans ran ahead of us.” “I also spoke about this with Kohl when we met near Kiev,” M.S. noted. “I am worried about this. After all, we are not talking only about Yugoslavia. How can we continue the European process, if we can’t solve problems like these?” “Let’s keep in touch on this matter,” Bush concluded. What the American president and secretary of state were impatient to hear from Gorbachev, and what he himself wanted to share with them, were our domestic affairs. “Today, the main question for us is how to recover from the crisis,” Gorbachev began. “We need to speed up the reforms and move ahead on the path of political and economic freedom, within the framework of a common market economy for all the republics.” “The central issue,” he explained, “is statehood. The August events spurred the desire to declare independence. But, they did not change anything in principle,” Gorbachev declared, to my surprise. “They only created the foundation to move toward the creation of a truly voluntary Union of Sovereign States. Yeltsin spoiled the situation when he brought up the territorial question of boundaries. This strengthened the separatist tendencies in Ukraine. They started talking about Russia’s imperial pretensions. “Under these conditions it was difficult to work out a joint statement of the ‘10+1.’ But gradually, the process got underway. The economic agreement, developed under Yavlinsky, is the beginning of the center’s rebirth. It will be a new center.” He said he was certain that Ukraine will sign the agreement. “Together with Boris Nikolayevich, we are conducting major work to reform our State. We prepared and sent to all the republics a draft Union Treaty. We are talking about creating precisely a union state, not some association or community. It will be a state with unified armed forces, a coordinated foreign policy, and a unified market. The Union will be responsible for a unified energy system, 481

transportation, communications, ecology, essential research and some other areas. On November 11th the State Council will review the draft, subject to comments and amendments. “Unfortunately, Yeltsin is under pressure from certain people who claim that Russia must shed the burden of other republics and go forward on its own. I spoke with Boris Nikolayevich and he assured me that he understands what this would lead to. It would result in great difficulties for Russia, it would mean several years of turmoil. For the other republics it would be catastrophic.” “For the other republics?” Bush asked with some surprise. “I repeat, it would cause serious shocks even in Russia. And Yeltsin understands this, but unfortunately, he is influenced by a certain kind of people. Analyzing his speech from yesterday, I see two sides in him, two parts. One side confirms the position for the Union. The other side moves away on some specific issues from the provisions included in the draft Union Treaty, on which we worked together. He makes rash, biting remarks about statehood. Obviously, it will cause a reaction from a number of the republics. “But on the whole, I have to support him right now. Because if reforms start in Russia, they will start in the other republics as well.” “The key question is this,” Bush interrupted. “Do you think that Russia, and Yeltsin, are trying to take over the center? What do they want? Do they want to narrow even further the role of the center, and your role? This makes it difficult for us to determine positions. We are having a hard time making sense of the situation.” Gorbachev acknowledged that such attempts are taking place. But he is certain that Russia needs a new Union center. This is the only legitimate format through which Russia could have a leading role in the republics. They will not accept direct control from Russia. That is why they support a Union center. The majority of them support a general election for the president. “I thought I had an understanding with Yeltsin about this. But his last speech is disappointing. If he isolates Russia and destroys the Union, it would have devastating consequences for Russia. I,” M.S. said, “remain optimistic. I continue working with the republics together and separately. I would like to emphasize: today it is a fundamental, life-changing question not only for us, but for the West and the United States as well. You have to make a strategic choice. Right now we need support to continue the reforms, for the future of the Union depends on it, the kind of Union that I am convinced the United States and other countries need.” Turning to specifics, M.S. asked [the American side] to decide the question of a food credit for 3.5 billion dollars and debt payments. For the latter, we require emergency assistance in cash in the amount of 370 million dollars, plus the financial loan from Saudi Arabia and South Korea (1 billion). “I think we all understand,” M.S. pressed, “what is at stake. What happens with the Soviet Union will have repercussions for the entire world process.” In response, Bush made a telling speech, which I will try to reproduce in detail (especially since it helped when writing it down to hear first the English version and then the translation). 482

“I will be extremely frank with you,” Bush started. “I hope you know the position of our government: we support the center. Without giving up contacts with the republics, we support the center and you personally. Even before the coup, I made a speech in Ukraine, for which I had some price to pay at home. I was criticized for allegedly ‘selling’ Ukraine. Of course, there was no such thing. But I spoke out against mindless nationalism. “We maintained contact with Yeltsin and will continue to do so, as well as with leaders of the other republics, but we are not doing it behind your back. I asked this question because in the Congress and in the administration, many people were surprised by his speech, they cannot understand what it means. The issue of the Soviet Union’s creditworthiness is tied to this matter. “According to our laws, I have to attest to Congress that our borrowers are creditworthy. I cannot circumvent the requirements of our legislation. We believe that we can meet you halfway with loans, but not fully. We must have confidence that the republics are fully aware of their responsibilities. We want to help you, but we need certain additional guarantees regarding the republics’ positions.” Gorbachev interrupted. “Let us speak frankly. Ten-fifteen billion dollars is not such a great sum that we would not be able to pay it back. If we miscalculate right now, we will have to pay a much higher price down the road. We are not talking about something ordinary and routine. We are talking about an enormous country that is going through great transformations, and routine approaches are unacceptable here. References to the Congress and experts do not convince me. We need a political solution.” Bush: “I want to assure you of our understanding. That is why I am asking you once again: do you consider a return to a totalitarian regime a possibility? This would be bad for the entire world, and for the United States, because it would put an end to our fruitful cooperation.” “Precisely for this reason we need concrete action,” M.S. chimed in. “Nevertheless, I have to take into account public opinion at home in the U.S. I cannot argue with the figure you named for food credit. But we cannot fully satisfy this request. Right now we can make a decision only to allocate an agricultural credit in the amount of 1.5 billion dollars, and a part of it would be available now, while the second part only after January 1st. We hope that this will help you to get through the period when you finally decide the relations between the center and the republics. “You know how strongly Secretary of the Treasury Brady spoke in support of the Soviet Union at the IMF session in Bangkok. It even irritated other members of the G-7. If you prefer that this question is not discussed openly right now, let’s do that. A billion and a half is the maximum we can do right now. We could come back to the question of an agricultural loan later, when the republics’ level of participation is more defined. But the present sum should allow you to get the process started. “I don’t want the announcement of a sum that may seem inadequate to cause you difficulties at home. Perhaps it would be better not to announce anything, 483

but this is the maximum that we can provide at this time. And while Secretary of State Baker can sometimes work wonders in Congress, we have to be realistic.” After assurances from M.S., James Baker took the floor. “Allow me to make a general statement. I think you know that we support and will strive to continue to support your efforts to reform the Soviet Union. You know that we influenced the other donors, particularly Saudi Arabia. The president in essence went as far as providing direct U.S. government loans, which means they are guaranteed in full. We believe now it is necessary to have the republics’ signature on the loan documents. This will give the president the legal basis to raise the issue before Congress. “At the moment we can provide approximately 1.5 billion dollars: 250 million as a gift in food aid and provided free of charge. The rest as credit guarantees. Out of that, 250 million would be available right now, and 1 more billion in 60 days. This is what we can do right now. “With regard to new projects on food, we will pursue them, but they will not give a quick effect. We understand that our proposal does not fully cover your needs. But in these circumstances, this is what we can do. “I will tell you one thing that the president cannot say. You know that we were in contact in June of this year, when there were rumors of Pavlov’s coup. We stressed that we are interested in the stability of the Soviet Union, and in letting the Soviet people determine their own future. And we believe that this is a significant argument to show that we understand the need for a Center. Last week we received alarming signals about the content of Yeltsin’s upcoming speech, including the fact that there will be a call to liquidate the Soviet Foreign Ministry, and a statement that Russia will protect Russian minorities wherever they might be, etc. We appealed to RSFSR officials and asked: what is happening, why is such a speech being made on the eve of a peace conference on the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict? This would undermine the Soviet Union’s efforts. We expressed the hope that it would not happen. We were surprised that on the question of minorities there was no mention of the Helsinki process. It appears that the republics will be concerned, and you will have to regulate this process. We will try to do something from our side; it is possible that we may be able to help in some way. We would be interested in receiving specific information on what parts of the speech deviate from the agreements you reached in the development of the Union Treaty.” “Yeltsin called me the day before his speech at the Parliament of Russia and did not say that the speech will have controversial positions,” Bush noted. “He said only good things,” Baker added. “You must take into account,” M.S. explained, “that the leaders of the republics want to demonstrate that they have contacts with the U.S. president, they want to play this card to satisfy their ambitions. I think we can straighten out this situation, it will be a challenge. But that is why I am raising the question of food credits and financial support so persistently. I need it right now.” “I would just ask you to consider that I am in a different situation than I was before. Of course, I will speak with our representative at the G-7,” Bush summed up. […] 484

The trip to Latche (October 30)—President François Mitterrand’s farm in the Pyrenees. This was a remarkable event in many respects. I looked at my notes a week after the event and saw that they look like a bequest… or if not a bequest, then parting words to political descendants. I have a duty to record as much of it as I can recall. […] There were only a few of us with Gorbachev: Raisa Maksimovna, Andrei Grachev, myself, the interpreter, and security. The rest of the people who accompanied him to the conference in Madrid flew directly to Moscow from Spain, or were dropped off on the way to Latche in the district town of Soustons. […] “We are in the most critical period right now,” M.S. said. […] “In the context of the global situation, I put the question this way: what is the West interested in, what is the world interested in? That the Soviet Union continue to exist. Reformed, democratic, dynamic, economically healthy—in other words, completely new—but a Union.” “What I think about it,” F.M. started to respond, “you already made the decisive action, you destroyed the system that had been out of order for a long time. Your second action is this desire to resolve the issue of the Union and the republics. A certain mentality has formed that creates a centrifugal tendency. It is encouraged from the outside. France’s position is not to succumb to opportunistic circumstances. I am using absolutely cold reasoning: it is in France’s interest to have an integral force in Eastern Europe. If there is a collapse, we will go back to what you had before Peter the Great. It would be a historic catastrophe and would contradict France’s interests. […] I am for your country’s rebuilding in 2–3 years on a federal-democratic basis. This is the best scenario for the rest of Europe. […] “France will not contribute to the centrifugal forces. And I think,” F.M. said, “that this position is shared by all old European countries with long history, which have ancient traditions and deep European experience. I am talking about England, France, Spain, and Portugal.” “The people at home should know the positions of the main actors of world politics on this key issue,” M.S. responded. “Last night the Spanish King hosted a dinner for me and Bush. González was present. At this dinner, he fiercely defended his point of view, which is similar to what you told me right now, for a few minutes even forgetting the protocol and that the King was present. “They unanimously expressed surprise at some passages in Yeltsin’s speech at the Congress of the People’s Deputies. Especially over the idea that the MFA should be reduced tenfold, which would call into question the very need for a common foreign policy mechanism for the Union. At the press-conference before the King’s dinner, President Bush took a very strict position and very clearly expressed his support for the Union policy.” “This is very good,” F.M. said, “I remember how in April of last year Bush and I met in Miami, and the conversation touched upon the Baltic problem. I told him then: yes, the Baltic States have to become independent. This is a position of principle. But do not rush to recognize them. We need to give Gorbachev time 485

for constitutional reforms. Everything must be done consistently and gradually, not vice versa. Bush supported this approach, even though it was very difficult for him, because the Congress and the public demanded an immediate recognition of the Baltic States. So President Bush understands the situation well. “Bush supports a democratic Union, and its incorporation into the global economy. But he listens to public opinion and he is cautious, while from all sides people whisper in his ear: don’t lose, so to speak, you have elections coming up. I keep telling him: a new Union in Eastern Europe is an issue that has to be viewed globally, not in the context of a political situation. Preserving the Union is a vital issue for Europe. It seems that I have his understanding on this point. But Bush is somewhat indecisive and cautious.” “I have told Bush repeatedly,” M.S. joined in, “that this is an extraordinary situation and that we must not act in a routine manner, but take into account the uniqueness of the events. I think he understands me. After all, he decided to offer us a large food credit.” “I understand that to deny you substantial aid right now would mean to make the process of reforming the Union very fragile.” “If,” M.S. summarized, “it is our common goal to have a new Union as the largest bastion of democracy and peace, then we must not waste time on trifles. Especially because we are not talking about handouts. Everything will be returned. But we need the help right now, right this moment.” […] The second conversation took place over an evening meal in the other chalet, which served as the dining room and bedroom. The composition of the group was “extended”: Raisa Maksimovna and Danielle, Danielle’s sister, the Mitterrands’ youngest son, Gorbachev and I, and Pierre Morel—F.M.’s adviser. […] “… Of course, you know,” F.M. moved his thought in a different direction, “that the Americans are tempted to extend the functions of NATO and turn it into a political, rather than military, alliance. I take a different view on this subject. I think that NATO should continue to remain faithful to the foundation on which it was created. If NATO was vested with functions that are in principle under the jurisdiction of the CSCE and the EC, it would be very bad. The European process was largely made possible by the concerted efforts of the Soviet Union and France. You, of course, remember that France was practically the only country to support your initiatives in the sphere of European cooperation. Our collaboration yielded good results. So let us not allow the fruits of our cooperation to be eliminated. If we give NATO excessive powers, the non-NATO members will feel ill at ease. In addition, the role of the Paris Charter for New Europe will decrease.” Responding to M.S.’s remark about the U.S.’s European role, Mitterrand continued his verbal essay: “Europe is also America. This situation will persist for some time. I agree that the U.S. will continue to play an important role. It’s simply the recognition of existing realities. But in the future, Europe should be in Europe proper. It is important that the transformations in the Soviet Union contributed to the politico-economic rapprochement between East and West, and the creation of what you call the common European home.” 486

“A great deal here depends on how America sees the future united Europe, and how it sees Japan,” M.S. joined the conversation. “These are two sore spots for the Americans, especially if we are talking about Europe as the area between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains. After all, this is a vast expanse with almost 600 million inhabitants, and with enormous scientific-technical, economic, and intellectual potential. This is where we should seek the answers to the major questions of world politics. This is also where we can find the answer to the positions of different countries on the changes in the Soviet Union; including an explanation to the adjustments that can be seen in Germany’s European policy. I am talking about what recently came up in the Baker-Genscher statement. This is also why Germany supports the new idea for NATO, which you mentioned earlier. It is not impossible that the Germans are planning to increase their influence in the East this way, and get a free hand in regard to Hungary, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and further east. “…This is my view, and it is tied to my assessment of the future. There are two pillars. One of them is the European Community, which is acquiring a system of political institutions. The other is a Union of sovereign states on the basis of the former USSR. There is also interaction between them within the framework defined by the documents of the European process and disarmament agreements. The roles and presence of Europe, the USA, and Canada fit into this concept. But this has to be a European policy, not an American policy towards Europe. “Of course, it would be important to have the support of both these pillars,” F.M. supported the idea. “But one of the pillars has been created already. As for the other pillar, it is still not clear what exactly is happening. If all the people in your republics (and that’s almost 300 million people) were Gorbachevs, then the issue would be resolved.” “That’s fine,” M.S. laughed, “This is how I understand the task before me: I have to strengthen the second pillar.” “We also want this,” F.M. cheerfully assured him. “Did you notice that in my statement for the TV cameras I just spoke in favor of a Union that is strong, cohesive, and reinforced by federal ties? This would be very important not just for your countrymen, but for the interests of France, and Europe in general. France will never, under any circumstances, encourage the destruction of the Union. Under Stalin, this position was fraught with certain problems. But even then, at the time of de Gaulle and Stalin, France and the USSR were allies. This is even more important now, when your country is becoming truly democratic.” […] [Source: Chernyaev, Sovmestnyi Iskhod, pp. 1004–1011. Translated by Anna Melyakova.]

487

Document No. 82: Memorandum of Conversation, Bush–Yakovlev, Washington, 3:10 p.m. – 4:00 p.m. November 19, 1991

After the coup, Aleksandr Yakovlev, Gorbachev’s long-time aide who resigned from the CPSU just days before the putsch (which he predicted), returned to the president’s side, as did Eduard Shevardnadze, who agreed to serve again as foreign minister. During this meeting with the American president, Yakovlev talks about the situation in the country after a pivotal State Council meeting on the Union Treaty on November 11. Although Ukraine signed the economic agreement, final decisions will be made after the December 1 presidential elections and independence referendum in Ukraine. Yakovlev is concerned about the ethnic picture in the republic where the populations of Crimea, Donetsk, and the most important industrial areas are heavily Russian and have already expressed separatist tendencies. On nuclear weapons in Ukraine, he reassures the president of the reliability of Moscow’s system of central control. He also speaks positively about the working relationship between Gorbachev and Yeltsin, but shares his real concern about the viability of Russian economic reform. Bush expresses support for both Gorbachev and Yeltsin but laments the isolationist mood in his own country—“like 1938”—which he claims places limits on his ability to provide assistance.

Mr. Yakovlev: Thank you very much for receiving me. First I wish to hand you a letter from a good friend of yours. The President: (reading from the letter) Gorbachev met with Lew Preston, and signed an agreement with the World Bank. He visited with Strauss. He comments on the Crowder/Hewett mission. I won’t read it all now, but I’m delighted to have it. Mr. Yakovlev: Mikhail Gorbachev asked me to inform you on our country now. The last meeting of our State Council was radically different from previous ones. It was a dramatic change in mood. I was not particularly anxious to be present at earlier meetings because I didn’t want to be disappointed. I said that to Mikhail Sergeyevich, and he told me to be patient. This meeting was much different. The question of nuclear weapons, was resolved. Yeltsin took a very constructive position. He spoke on the economic treaty, and also on defense policy. He agreed that there would be no republican armies. He spoke on foreign policy, and changed his previous position. Yeltsin was named as head of a working group to submit a proposition for changing the foreign affairs apparatus, combining foreign economic and foreign affairs departments. Before I left for this trip he had presented to the State Council a proposal to sharply decrease the staff of the foreign affairs bureaucracy by: 488

– closing trade representations, moving instead to have enterprises themselves handle trade representations; – cutting diplomatic staff by 32% –33%, both at home and abroad; and – changing the policy process by including people from the union republics in the process. The President: How will you decide what republics get what embassies? Mr. Yakovlev: By different means. Some republics want a minister in the Soviet embassy—Russia, for example. The embassies will have a Russia department. The U.S. is a special case here, since all republics are interested in being represented in the U.S. Beyond that, the southern republics are more interested in the muslim [sic] world. The position of the center is strengthening a little bit, within reasonable limits. The announced decision to close 70 ministries was a shock. But then we began to receive from republics proposals to maintain one ministry or another. That’s psychology. We’ll make use of that psychology. All republics agreed to a single committee on culture. That’s really strange to me. I would have closed that one first. But the republics thought differently. About mood: Mikhail Gorbachev’s mood on November 11 was much improved. Of course, he was always an optimist. But I know what’s in his mind. Now his mood is really improving. Of course he is really worried about Ukraine. Something unreasonable might embarrass him. The President: What will happen after the elections in Ukraine? Mr. Yakovlev: They signed the economic treaty, the food treaty, and have worked with the G-7. But I want to say something else. Mikhail Gorbachev must have discussed the national question with you: there are 12 million Russians in Ukraine out of 50 million. Donetsk has declared its autonomy. The Crimea has the intention to have a referendum on becoming a republic independent from Ukraine. All industrial areas of Ukraine are populated by Russians—Donetsk, and Kharkov. Chornovil wants to be independent. […] The President: It depends on what “independence” means. Mr. Yakovlev: No one knows. Unfortunately we have at least 1000 different understandings of “independence.” No one knows. The President: One concern is the weapons. How do you see that working out. Control? Ratification? Safe dismantling. How will Kravchuk approach these? Mr. Yakovlev: Don’t expect risks, unexpected steps. They’ll look to the west, watch for western reaction. Of course, we won’t give up our weapons. They’re guarded by central authorities. Secretary Baker: But some troops have moved over to the republics. Mr. Yakovlev: I know some of the colonels may talk very demonstratively. This doesn’t mean they actually will act as they talk. There may be a solution to this. Maybe we can discuss it at some level in the future. We probably can destroy some types of weapons in Ukraine. […] 489

The President: Domestic considerations are important here. The Baltics were a powerful issue. Now it’s Ukraine. There are a lot of Americans with great interest. Also, we’re getting it from Croats. They want us to go to “general quarters.” Secretary Baker: What happens when Ukraine declares independence? Do the Russians say no? Next is Armenia’s declaration of independence. Mr. Yakovlev: It will be a mess. There probably will be no civil war in Ukraine. Secretary Baker: Are you talking of the Russians in Ukraine? Mr. Yakovlev: There are 12 million of them—many in mixed marriages. There are 25–30 million mixed marriages. What sort of war could it be? Secretary Baker: A normal war. What happens when Russia starts charging Ukraine the world market price for oil? Mr. Yakovlev: This is “rope pushing” now. Yeltsin learned that Ukraine was selling oil for dollars. So Yeltsin cut oil production. [Yakovlev and the President look at a map] Mr. Yakovlev: Ukraine will be very small. Dr. Hewett: Will Russia recognize Ukrainian independence? Mr. Yakovlev: Yes. […] I frankly don’t see what liberalizing prices will bring us. I said to Yeltsin that freeing prices without competition is dangerous. Yet demonopolization is not moving ahead. The problem is what happens after the ministries are disbanded. Take, for example, the metallurgical industry with 1100 enterprises. None of them have started to restructure yet. They’re still producing the same old products, but selling at prices three to four times higher than before. That means economic laws won’t work. And in the current social and economic conditions, it is especially difficult. The peasants don’t need money, so they won’t sell. There are no goods. Yeltsin did what Ryzhkov did: he announced price changes ahead of time, and people hoarded. Yeltsin understood what he did after the fact, which is too late. I am especially concerned about Moscow. All revolutions begin in the capital, as do all counter-revolutions. The law of political dynamics suggests that if this fails, a dictatorship will appear. I said this on Soviet television. The President: What about Yeltsin’s frame of mind? Is he worried now? Mr. Yakovlev: Yes. He understands the situation better now. I meet with him personally. For the first time he is criticized as sharply as Gorbachev. He’s not used to it. When he was criticized by the party press, he was proud. Now it is a different matter. But he feels strong now. It was a big disappointment that the Congress of People’s Deputies did not support him on Chechen-Ingushetia. In short, he is facing the reality Gorbachev faced long ago. It has brought them close. They talk every day; seek each other’s advice. They have frank conversations (I see them). The President: We’re trying hard from here to deal with both. I’m not writing off Gorbachev; nor am I either elevating or downgrading Yeltsin. I’m not 490

intervening. I want to have respectful relations with both—and not blind-side one of them. Here I am criticized for being too much for Gorbachev. I don’t want the Russian people to misunderstand… It is a delicate matter. Mr. Yakovlev: I know. You told us before… The President: I hope its [sic] properly perceived by Russians. I’m trying to be balanced. Mr. Yakovlev: Gorbachev and Yeltsin will never be friends. But that’s not necessary. They can have good business-like relations. I have good relations with Mikhail Gorbachev and Yeltsin. We had differences some time ago, but not now. The President: Does Shevardnadze have close relations with Yeltsin as well as Gorbachev? Mr. Yakovlev: I don’t think I would call Shevardnadze’s relations with Yeltsin close, but they respect each other. They are both strong characters, and both have a strong hand. […] The President: […] I wish you well, I repeat. We want you to succeed. We will try to help. If you need to be in touch… There is a mood of isolation now in people. It’s stupid; not in our interest. Pull back America—it’s almost 1938. I’ll be caught up in the election the whole year. It makes it a little more difficult to help. […] [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA 1999-0304-F/1 by the National Security Archive.]

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Document No. 83: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, 9:01 a.m. – 9:37 a.m. November 30, 1991

Just one day before the Ukrainian referendum on independence and presidential elections, Bush calls Gorbachev to clear up the unpleasant situation that has resulted from a leak regarding Washington’s readiness to recognize Ukrainian independence. Gorbachev expresses his disappointment mildly in this conversation, saying only that the revelation “was taken negatively. It appears that the U.S. is not only trying to influence events, but to interfere.” In fact, some in Gorbachev’s circle regarded Washington’s attitude as a betrayal. Here Bush attempts to explain his position on Ukraine, outlining the main U.S. interests, including centralized control of nuclear weapons, and expressing hope that a sovereign Ukraine would be more amenable to cooperation on creating a new Union. Gorbachev reiterates his desire for a viable political union and reminds Bush of their last conversation in Madrid where Western leaders expressed their preference for preservation of a unified and reformed Union.

The President: Hello. President Gorbachev: Hello, George. I am glad to hear your familiar voice on the phone. The President: I’m calling on a matter of some concern regarding Ukraine. I have read statements on the Soviet side that concerned me, and I’m sure you’re concerned. President Gorbachev: George, I am glad that you initiated the conversation. I regard this as a continuation of our discussion in Madrid. The President: I would like to run through some talking points I’ve worked out with Jim Baker and Brent Scowcroft, and get your reaction. President Gorbachev: OK, I’m ready to listen and take notes. The President: First, I want to commend you on mediating the AzerbaijanArmenia dispute. It is very good, and we commend you for that. President Gorbachev: We will try to take precisely that approach to end that conflict. But it is hard to expect immediate results. The differences are large. The President: I know. Now, on the Ukraine. Everything points to an overwhelming vote supporting independence. Worldwide this will be a powerful signal, really a celebration of the new atmosphere created when the attempted coup was put down. You know our tradition as a democratic nation. We must support the Ukrainian people. But we want to do so in a way that encourages a peaceful transition to a new order, built on a productive relationship with the center, and a friendly Ukrainian-Russian relationship. We don’t want to inadvertently create difficulties for you or Yeltsin. 492

But if the referendum turns out as anticipated, then the only question is when and how we and other countries recognize Ukrainian independence. It would seem to us that recognizing Ukrainian independence could well bring them back into the union treaty process. When you remove any question about accepting their sovereignty, then they can participate without concern that doing so somehow signals their lack of independence. Look, if we move towards recognition, I would need to be clear that arrangements are made providing for the following points: – collective, central control over nuclear weapons; – a non-nuclear Ukraine, which is signatory to the NPT (the Non-Proliferation Treaty); – respect for human rights, with equal rights for minorities; and – the implementation of existing treaties (the START and CFE treaties). We will also continue to urge the Ukrainian government to implement market reforms, and to accept responsibility for its share of the Soviet Union’s debt. I am asking Jim Baker to send a special emissary to Kiev to begin discussions on these points and others. We want a cooperative relationship with Ukraine. This emissary’s discussions will help us determine our next steps. We will be making a statement shortly after the referendum that explains our approach. The statement will also note our desire to work closely with you and President Yeltsin. Obviously we will not say that we are recognizing Ukraine until these matters are worked out. I have not yet talked to Yeltsin. Clearly I want to do that. I am also consulting with NATO allies on our approach to the new situation. These are the key points. I’d like to get your reaction. Ambassador Strauss conveyed Shevardnadze’s concerns here. I hope what I’ve said allayed those concerns. President Gorbachev: OK, George. I’ll try to say something. What we are discussing is of key importance, not only for our relations, but also for the future of the union. It is something of interest not only for people here, but also in Europe and the entire world. Above all, it involves the fate of the union. I won’t hide that the leak from the White House saying that serious consideration was being given to recognizing the independence of the Ukraine by the U.S.—especially because that leak came on the eve of the referendum—that this was taken negatively. It appears that the U.S. is not only trying to influence events, but to interfere. Second, the majority of the republics have declared independence. That does not prevent them from participating in the formation of a new Union of Sovereign states. In fact, sovereignty gives them the freedom to participate. Thus the referendum does not automatically mean that Ukraine has broken ranks with the Soviet Union, that this is the end of Ukraine’s relationship with the Union. We want very much that in this subtle and important question, there is no rush. I would like to recall the situation in Yugoslavia, which has led to the 493

current state of affairs. But, George, the current situation is even more complicated than that of Yugoslavia. If someone in Ukraine says that they are seceding from the Union, and someone says they are supporting them, then it would mean that 12 million Russians and members of other peoples become citizens of a foreign country. Crimea has already stated that if Ukraine distances itself from the Union, then Crimea will act to review the status of Crimea in Ukraine. The question of Donetsk will also emerge. We must all act—and I hope for understanding from you on this, because it is important what position the President of the United States takes—act in a way that does not push developments in the wrong direction. Bear in mind the advice of those who want the process to develop naturally. Time is needed for that. Here Yeltsin has forces pushing for an independent Russia, and toward a return of all Russian lands, including those now in Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and others. If this process unfolds, that would be a catastrophe for Russia, Ukraine, and the rest of the world. Thus I would recall our last talk in Madrid, where we discussed the general interest of the U.S., and Europe in the retention of a reformed, democratizing Union. Those are the thoughts I wanted to outline to you. I just talked to Yeltsin. We will be paying close attention to the referendum in Ukraine. Possibly after the referendum I will arrange a meeting between the Presidents of Russia and Ukraine. So, I urge you to be very prudent and balanced, taking steps without haste, and to cooperate. The President: First of all, I want to cooperate. We are welcoming independence to guard against radical elements in Russia and Ukraine. I want to support the reasoned position you’ve outlined to work with the parties. Mikhail, if the referendum goes as expected, what will you and Yeltsin say about independence—not recognition—but independence? President Gorbachev: We will say what I already said, and I hope Yeltsin says. Independence strengthens the sovereignty of Ukraine, and gives the possibility for free dialogue with other republics to discuss further cooperation, including political and economic union—a political union including defense. We cannot agree with separatists who like to use the vote for independence as a vote for secession, for breaking with the union. Every state of the U.S. is sovereign, but we deal with the United States as a strong state. The President: Very true. The recognition of the aspirations of Ukrainians to be independent will pave the way to resolve these thorny issues standing in the way of political and economic reform. Mikhail, believe me, I am not trying to embarrass you or Yeltsin, and I’m not trying to mingle in your internal affairs. I want to make another point once again. I do not want to inadvertently play into the hands of radicals in Russia or Ukraine. I will closely consult with you and with the Russian Republic. Jim Baker will stay in close consultation with Eduard. We will work hand-in-hand to cooperate 494

on borders, nuclear weapons, and center-republic relations. I just wanted to personally discuss this with you. President Gorbachev: Yesterday I had a meeting of the Political­-Consultative Council. Yakovlev, Shevardnadze, Popov, Sobchak, Yavlinsky, Petrakov, Bakatin, and Yegor Yakovlev were there—a well-seasoned team of reform-oriented people steeled by experience. The main question was that of political union. All of them spoke. We met from 3:00 to 9:00 at night. Everyone said that political union is vital, essential. Without it, the result could be a catastrophe for the Soviet Union, you, and for the world. All the members of the council agreed to do all possible to speed up that process, to urge politicians to move to signing of the treaty. I tel [sic] you so that you have an idea what we discuss among ourselves, how we all think. The President: I needn’t tell you we have great respect for those names here. They are steeled by their trials, and that makes an impression on us. President Gorbachev: George, I highly value this call, and our direct, friendly conversation. I am deeply convinced that our cooperation and interaction with the U.S. Administration—which is only possible with a renewed union—is vitally necessary. It is very important for the entire world. The President: We are following events closely. I am always available, as is Jim Baker, any time. Now I’ll try to call Yeltsin. President Gorbachev: OK, George. I shake your hand. I and my colleagues wish you and your associates the best. Heartfelt greetings from Raisa to you and Barbara. The President: I’m under a little pressure at home. I can’t understand what you have been through, but people are piling on me, so I can understand a little of what you’re experiencing. So, I wish you success. President Gorbachev: Thanks, and goodbye. The President: Goodbye. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA 2000-0429-F by the National Security Archive.]

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Document No. 84: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Yeltsin, 1:08 p.m. – 1:36 p.m. December 8, 1991

This extraordinary conversation takes place less than 10 minutes after the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus have signed a declaration dissolving the Soviet Union and announcing the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Yeltsin, sounding nervous and inebriated,26 emphasizes that he could not wait to call the U.S. president, repeating twice during the call, “Mr. President, I must tell you confidentially, President Gorbachev does not know these results.” The agreement between the three leaders was not planned in advance but was drafted throughout the previous night, and the signers were concerned about the center’s reaction. In the call, Yeltsin makes it sound like he already has Nazarbayev’s support and that the Kazakh leader is on his way to join the group in Minsk. In fact, Nazarbayev was in Moscow at the time and did not intend to go to Minsk. Bush is quite astonished but also very careful in how he responds. He notes later that he felt “a little bit uncomfortable” and wrote in his diary that he was “worrying about military action.”27 He was also anxious about the fate of his partner, Gorbachev, but limited himself to expressing the hope that all issues would be resolved peacefully by the participants themselves and not by outside parties.

The President: Hello, Boris, how are you, sir? President Yeltsin: Hello, Mr. President, very fine to welcome you. Mr. President, just as we had agreed that when extraordinary events took place, we would inform each other, I inform you and you inform me. Today, a very important event took place in our country, and I wanted to inform you myself before you learned about it from the press. The President: All right, thank you. President Yeltsin: We got together today, Mr. President, the leaders of the three states—Byelorussia, Ukraine, and Russia. We gathered and after many lengthy discussions that lasted about two days agreed that the system in place and the Union Treaty everyone is pushing us to sign does not satisfy us. And that is why we got together and literally a few minutes ago signed a joint agreement. Mr. President, we, the leaders of the three states—Byelorussia, Ukraine and Russia—noting negotiations to the new treaty are at a standstill, have seen objective reasons that the formation of independent states has become reality. Also noting that the rather short-sighted policy of the center has brought us to economic and

 Serhii Plokhy reports that Yeltsin “celebrated every article in the agreement” with Soviet champagne and was “not quite in a good form,” The Last Empire, p. 310. 27  Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, pp. 555–556. 26

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political crisis—affecting all means of production and various layers of society— we, the community of independent states of Byelorussia, Ukraine, and Russia, have signed an accord. This accord, consisting of 16 articles, is basically a creation of commonwealth or group of independent states. Mr. President, this accord creates a so-called commonwealth of states, including an article that this is an open commonwealth, open to all states, including all the former members of the union. The President: I see. President Yeltsin: The members of this commonwealth have a goal for strengthening international peace and security. They also guarantee all international obligations under agreements and treaties signed by the former Union, including foreign debt. We are also for the unitary control of nuclear weapons and nonproliferation. This accord was signed by the heads of all states involved—Byelorussia, Ukraine, and Russia. The President: Okay. President Yeltsin: The room from which I am calling also contains the President of Ukraine and Chairman of Supreme Soviet of Byelorussia. I also just finished speaking with President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan. I read to him the full text of the accord, including all 16 articles. He is fully in accord with all of our actions and he wants to sign the accord. He is about to fly to the Minsk airport to sign it. President Bush: I see. President Yeltsin: This is very serious. These four states form 90% of the national product of the Soviet Union. This is an attempt, a step, to maintain a commonwealth, but to free us from the global center which had issued commands for over 70 years. This is a very serious step, and we hope, we are sure, we are certain, that this is the only way out of the critical situation we find ourselves in. The President: Boris, are you.… President Yeltsin: Mr. President, I must tell you confidentially, President Gorbachev does not know these results. He knew that we were to meet—in fact, I told him myself we would meet. Surely we will immediately send him the text of our accord as certainly he will have to make decisions at his level. Mr. President, I was extremely, extremely frank with you today. We four states feel there is only one possible way out of this critical situation. We don’t want to do anything secretly—we will give a statement immediately to the press. We are hoping for your understanding. The President: Well, Boris, I appreciate your call and your frankness. We will look immediately at the 16 points. What do you think the center’s reaction will be? President Yeltsin: First of all, I talked with Minister of Defense Shaposhnikov. I want to read the 6th article of the agreement. As a matter of fact, Shaposhnikov fully agreed and supported our position. I am now reading Article 6: “The member countries of the commonwealth will cooperate for international security and peace, as well as arms control and reduction of armaments and expenditures for defense. They will aim for arms control, including complete 497

elimination of nuclear arms and complete disarmament under strict international controls.” The President: Uh huh. President Yeltsin: “They will respect each other’s attempts to create non-nuclear states/nuclear free zones and/or neutral states.” The President: I see. President Yeltsin: Please note well the next paragraph, Mr. President (and I urge the interpreter to translate this precisely): “The states will keep and support united command over common military and strategic space. They will work out, develop, and codify unitary command over the military, will provide for single control of nuclear weapons, and will work out all procedural sides of this.” Dear George, I am finished. This is extremely, extremely important. Because of the tradition between us, I couldn’t even wait ten minutes to call you. The President: First, I am very grateful to you. Second, we will study the 16 points with great interest as soon as we receive them. President Yeltsin: I am sending them immediately. The President: We will owe you a reaction—we will get back to you. We are grateful for your exceptional courtesy. President Yeltsin: I am very satisfied. This is really, really hot off the press— this is the latest information. To be frank, even Gorbachev doesn’t know, although we shall inform him right away. The President: Thank you again for this special courtesy to the United States. We will work with you and others as this develops. Of course, we hope this whole evolution is a peaceful process. President Yeltsin: Yes, absolutely. The President: Please pay my respects to the other two presidents, and Nazarbayev when you see him. President Yeltsin: Mr. President, thank you for all your understanding of our position and your support. For the situation we are in, we could not do so otherwise. President Bush: We certainly want to study this carefully. We realize this must be sorted out by participants, not outside parties like the United States. President Yeltsin: We guarantee this, Mr. President. President Bush: Well, good luck, and thank you for your call. We are interested in the reaction from the center and other republics. Time will tell, I guess. President Yeltsin: I’m sure all other republics will understand and join us very soon. The President: Thank you again for your call after such an historic happening. President Yeltsin: Goodbye. The President: Goodbye. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through Mandatory Review request 2004-1975-MR by the National Security Archive.] 498

Document No. 85: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Bush–Gorbachev, 3:37 p.m. – 4:11 p.m. December 13, 1991

Amazingly, given the whirlwind of events in early December, this is the first direct conversation between Bush and Gorbachev since November 30. Both leaders are stunned by the unexpected developments unfolding around them, especially by the December 8 proclamation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (see Document No. 84), which followed the December 1 referendum in Ukraine that demonstrated strong support for independence (even in the Crimea and the Donetsk region). In response, Bush decided to send Secretary Baker to Moscow, Kiev and ­Alma-Ata to clarify the security situation. In this conversation, Gorbachev continues to try to explain the situation to Bush within the framework of a possible Union treaty, or a series of treaties that would retain some role for the center and his own position as president. Bush reiterates his determination not to interfere and to try not to influence events in any way. Gorbachev’s profound confusion is almost palpable in the way he repeats one of his favorite words—“process”—so many times.

The President: Mikhail, this is George Bush. Can you hear me? President Gorbachev: Good day, George. Or good evening since it is evening here. The President: I’ve been thinking of you. I had a call from Boris Yeltsin today. And I asked Jim Baker to ask Shevardnadze if we should talk. I wanted to get an update from your side. I just wanted to pass along the message that we are not trying to influence events there in any way. I am thinking of you professionally and personally. I wondered what you could say to shed light on what is for us a confusing situation. President Gorbachev: The situation has become difficult and complicated. This was unexpected for me. Perhaps it was not unexpected for others, but it was for me. On November 25 we agreed on a draft union treaty. We signed a State Council resolution—Yeltsin and me and others. There were eight republics, except for Ukraine. We sent the draft to the Supreme Soviets of the republics for ratification. We published it for general discussion among the people and sent it to the USSR Supreme Soviet. Yeltsin participated at all stages in cooperating with me. Then he changed course radically by turning up in Minsk. For two days, I had no contact from him. The situation had changed. He made no attempt to contact me and so this was an unexpected change for me. I had tried to get the treaty process going. I have to say that I had information on the readiness of the Supreme Soviets of the republics to approve the union treaty. A positive outcome was being prepared by the Russian parliament, but all 499

of a sudden Yeltsin made a change. In politics anything can happen especially when one deals with such politicians. And they say now that the process is at a dead end but I don’t understand what they are talking about because everyone had agreed except for Ukraine. Okay, so Ukraine wanted to become independent. But it had indicated it could be part of the economic and defense treaty—that is what Kravchuk indicated to me and what he is indicating now by his actions. So what is different? Ukraine could have been part of some of the union treaties. The process is pointed in a different direction now. So what do I think of this? We are politicians. We deal with realities and have to act accordingly. The new process is continuing and has begun to justify some of my fears. And so things are not going forward smoothly. The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet has limited the rights on citizenship. On foreign policy, they are talking only about consultation, not coordination. There are also illegal aspects—there is an effort to destroy the all-union parliament with negative and illegal measures. I have taken the following position. The situation in general is very difficult. Since the process is going on, it should proceed within the framework of the constitution. I will abide by the decisions of the republics. The Minsk statement was published in an impromptu fashion and there are many things that are not clear. The country was a whole and now could break into pieces. I want the other republics to participate in the process; otherwise it would be against the constitution. I want the concept of the commonwealth to acquire more meaning. So far my former colleagues have a dim idea of the commonwealth. Their experts are asking mine for help. My most serious comments are how will the commonwealth function and act? Many questions are unclear, including whether the commonwealth will be a subject of international law. For us and for the U.S. this raises questions about their statement. Who will take up the obligations of the USSR on START, on CFE and on other treaties? Who will take up the obligations of the USSR on thousands of economic treaties? If the commonwealth is not a subject of international law, what will become of the Security Council seat? All this looks like the work of amateurs. I am working on the process, trying to get this out of a primitive situation. They have refused my role. I understand this situation, even if I don’t share the approach. Yesterday I gave a quick and negative statement. Today there was a positive result with the Russian and Byelorussian Supreme Soviets. Their deputies will be reinstated in the all-union Supreme Soviet. Otherwise it would be an unconstitutional act. This morning, I talked to Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kravchuk about the armed forces and what Kravchuk’s unconsidered actions have led to. Yeltsin confirmed he will do nothing to undermine the unity of the armed forces. Kravchuk promised he would not violate agreements and would remain in accord with the defense agreement. His actions were not thought through and I sent two Generals to see him. The situation in general, George, on the armed forces and strategic weapons is under control. There is no danger here. 500

Right now I am using my role as President and as a politician to get the process moving to a constructive and legal basis. We need fast decisions in this country now. How do I see my role in the future? If the commonwealth is an amorphous organization with no mechanism for foreign policy and defense and economic interaction, then I do not see any role for myself. Now as I see the situation—and I think the commonwealth was a mistake—we must have greater coordination among the republics; otherwise we will not get out of the situation, the mudslide that we are in. I speak with Boris Yeltsin regularly. I spoke with him two to three times today. We discuss specific political issues and I express my thoughts to him. I will meet with the Asian republics in the next few days. This is the situation here. I am doing what I can to move the process forward in a constructive vein. The situation is very tense. Society can bear no more difficulties. How do I see the role of the U.S. and the West? In the political realm, we need to stimulate the process of making the commonwealth come alive with real institutions. There must be some kind of state council, a parliament, economic organization to agree on economic policy, a unified military command. Otherwise, there will be a negative effect on our domestic and foreign policy. In economics, I would like to count on your direct attention to t­he following. We have two real dangers. First, I do not want to scare you about the situation but we need your immediate help to normalize the situation. Second, the transition to the market and to freeing prices will be very difficult and could produce a severe social reaction. You must understand our situation now, George. Only two percent of our products are bought and sold at the market. To think that the market can regulate everything tomorrow is an illusion. So I am suggesting to the republics that they take steps to stimulate producers, farmers, traders and even state enterprises. Before making the transition to free prices, we must take steps to protect the poorest part of our population. A threat exists in the productive sector because a disruption in economic ties will lead to a decline in production in January and February. There might not be a sufficient amount of goods despite the freeing of prices. We need financial aid for more goods and aid to convert the ruble and open the country to foreign capital. If we apply this set of political and economic measures gradually, we might avert a negative reaction in the transition to free prices. These are briefly the steps we need to take and we can discuss them in more detail when Jim Baker is here. The President: I appreciate your full explanation. Jim Baker is prepared to discuss these issues in detail. I know it is an extraordinarily difficult situation. Do not hesitate to call me if you need to. I recognize the state of flux and transition. President Gorbachev: George, I think Jim Baker’s Princeton speech should not have been made, especially the point that the USSR had ceased to exist. We must all be more careful during these times. The main thing is to avoid confrontation. The President: Let me be clear that I want to avoid confrontation. I don’t want to interfere. I accept your criticism. I do not think Jim said it quite that way—he 501

said only “the USSR as we have known it” would be very different. That is a constructive suggestion that I will pass to him. President Gorbachev: I think we had a friendly conversation, at least I hope so. The President: Absolutely. President Gorbachev: There is journalism and there is politics and we know the difference. The President: Thank you very, very much. My best to Raisa during the holidays ahead. I will be in close touch with Jim on the trip. I invite you to call me at any time day or night. President Gorbachev: Thank you, George. Please give my and Raisa Maximovna’s best to you and Barbara. If necessary, I will call you. The main thing is to keep the situation from getting worse in order to maintain the things we did together for Europe and the world. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through Mandatory Review request 2004-1975-MR by the National Security Archive.]

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Document No. 86: Record of Conversation between Gorbachev and Baker December 16, 1991

After the reality of the USSR’s disintegration became clear to U.S. policymakers, the secretary of state embarked on a trip to the four nuclear republics to see with his own eyes how the transition was being handled. His first meeting with Yeltsin and his foreign minister, Andrey Kozyrev, was not very encouraging because Kozyrev could not answer many of Baker’s questions.28 This transcript of the meeting with Gorbachev shows the Soviet president swaying between condemning the Minsk agreement of December 8 that established the Commonwealth of Independent States and expressing his determination to help this new structure succeed because it might be the only way to prevent total chaos and disintegration. Gorbachev is surrounded by two of his closest advisers—Shevardnadze and Yakovlev. Although both men resigned their posts to protest the direction of policy, they returned to close ranks behind him following the coup. Gorbachev is unusually subdued and admits it is “possible that to some extent I made some miscalculations and even serious mistakes.” He is still half-hoping that one final session of the USSR Supreme Soviet might produce a call for a referendum on the Union. He clearly continues to believe that the breakup is not final, that “the people do not have the sense that the Commonwealth means the breakup of the country. People still think that we will have one country, and that all the economic, cultural, and human connections will remain.” Baker says that he shares Gorbachev’s view that the “Brest Agreement,” as he refers to the Minsk statement, is “merely a shell,” but he wants more detail about how the transition would take place. He is reassured that Gorbachev and Yeltsin seem to have a plan, and an understanding of how the command and control structure would work in the Commonwealth. Gorbachev worries that the worsening situation in the country could make people embrace a dictatorship, and that democrats will have to make undemocratic moves. He is concerned with the number of ground forces, especially in Ukraine, and the condition of ethnic Russians in the republics. Baker shares his apprehensions when speaking about the Baltic states: “right now Russians are turning into second-class citizens, and in Lithuania the Poles also.” He assures Gorbachev they will remain friends and possibly even partners. There is no mistaking the warm and trusting, if not already nostalgic, tone of this conversation, the last personal meeting Gorbachev would have as president with a high-level representative of a Western state.

Gorbachev. I welcome you as a partner and friend. Baker. Thank you. Gorbachev. It’s good that you and the president decided to make the trip here at this time. It is in our mutual interest to make sure that the work of the recent  Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, pp. 566–567.

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years continues. There are some things that are more important than our personal interests, our careers, and even our views. Our country is entering a period of truly fundamental changes in all spheres, and the most important thing for me is that these processes stay in the constitutional framework as much as possible, based on political decisions, rather than spilling into chaos and lawlessness. I remain committed to my position—we have to reform our multinational but nevertheless united country. When people say that this process hit a dead end, they are wrong. The issue lies elsewhere, and you should know that. At a meeting of the State Council on November 25th, we all agreed upon and signed a resolution to send the Union Agreement to the Supreme Soviets. I supported this, as did all the republic leaders who were present. I personally spoke with leaders of six republics, I spoke with Nazarbayev. The draft was supposed to be approved last week. My experts worked with Yeltsin’s experts. The draft was reviewed in Russia’s Supreme Soviet and I have their positive conclusions from this review. Nazarbayev wanted the draft to be approved on December 10th. But we came upon a dead end because of Ukraine. The question came up— should we all stumble into this dead end, or should we continue the process and let Ukraine join in when it realizes how necessary it is. Yeltsin asked me, how do we ensure Ukraine’s participation? I told him that if Russia and other republics sign, Ukraine will catch up with the rest. It is already a member of the Economic Agreement. It could become an associate member.… Right now I don’t want to go into the reasons why this happened. It is our problem, and the responsibility should lie with us. It is possible that to some extent I made some miscalculations and even serious mistakes. It is possible that you did the same. But that is not the issue right now. Right now we are dealing with realities that are important to both of us. My role, as I see it, is to use the powers of the presidency and my political power overall to make sure that this process—the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States that is going through all the republics right now—does not lead to even greater disintegration of the country. This is a real danger. As a man of experience, you understand that the Minsk Agreement was easy to adopt, but is useless for real life. It is too general. It’s similar to the statement President Reagan and I made in Geneva that nuclear war is unacceptable and can have no winners. But the question arises: what’s next? In my view, my role is to help define this process, to develop a framework and foundation, and most importantly, to set up mechanisms to keep it alive. Right now the question of the Armed Forces is more or less—I emphasize, more or less— worked out. [This is the] question that is particularly on everyone’s mind here and in the world, one that is important for our partners. Still, the rest of the issues require a lot of work. In the meantime, society is in a state of uncertainty, instability, and disintegration. There is very little time and we have to take urgent action. Together with my longtime colleagues, who are present here, I want to help to establish the principles and institutions of the Commonwealth, to work out 504

procedures that would ensure continuity. I will work in this vein for as long as it is necessary and appropriate, considering my constitutional responsibility for the country, for what happens in it, and for the consequences. This should be done without getting emotional, but in the spirit of maximum responsibility. I wish them luck, although I do not believe they can succeed. And still, I want them to succeed, because if they do not, everything we worked for and our future is at stake. But all that is philosophy, so to speak. Considering that you already spoke with two ministers and Yeltsin, I would like to hear your opinion on these conversations and discuss whatever interests you. Baker. Thank you very much. First of all, I would like to emphasize that we did everything possible not to get drawn into the political issues that have to do with your internal affairs. This has been our policy previously and we continue to stand by it during this visit. You, the people at this table, have for several years been our partners and—more importantly—our friends. You remain our friends and, as I told representatives of the press, maybe you will remain our partners. Whether this happens depends on the internal developments in your country. But in any case, you are our friends. And we are very saddened when we see disrespect shown towards you, including during this visit. I can honestly tell you and we are against this kind of behavior. Last night I had a good conversation with Eduard Shevardnadze. He said the same thing that you just emphasized right now: you see your responsibility in making sure the transformation proceeds in an organized and constitutional way, because if this process is not a success, the disintegration will spread, with all the ensuing negative consequences for the Soviet people and the world. We share your view that the Brest Agreement is merely a shell. Moreover, there have already been contradictory statements—statements that are contrary even to the provisions of this agreement. Gorbachev. Yes, I talked about this possibility and turned out to be a prophet. The prophecy came true very quickly, I did not want that. So I had to get involved. I spoke several times with Kravchuk and Yeltsin. I think it is important to act in such a way as to prevent the aggravation of the situation. I wanted our conversation to be in this narrow circle because we know each other well and can speak without restrictions. It’s clear that the Minsk idea will need a great deal of work if Ukraine is already questioning the status of open borders, freedom of movement, residence, and employment; they are only talking about contacts based on the agreements. Instead of a coordinated foreign policy they are talking about only consultations in the sphere of foreign policy. The incomplete formula on defense is also subject to change. I cannot help but get worried when on December 12th, the day when Yeltsin was speaking in the Supreme Soviet, the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine made the decision to introduce a system of vouchers, i.e. an independent currency that will circulate alongside the ruble, and Kravchuk declared himself commander in chief. A situation could arise during the further development of the Belavezha Accords, something could happen and Ukraine could walk away. There is already a 505

possibility that Kravchuk will not be going to Alma-Ata. Nazarbayev called me twice over the last couple days, he is very concerned. In Ashgabat, they have a more mature understanding of the situation. It is possible that Russia will stomp its foot and say “We are tired of all this.” This attitude has been around for a long time. So they will stomp their foot, but what then? The situation could become strained and decisions would be made quite differently. There are already signs of authoritarian approaches. During these difficult times we might regard that with some understanding, though Aleksandr Yakovlev probably would not agree with me on that. But you can live with authoritarianism for a while, even though the democrats are very concerned. At their two-day Congress they discussed this question: what happens to democrats when they come to power? One famous democrat, Gavriil Popov, already decided to step aside. But I am afraid that it will not stop at authoritarianism. The situation is very difficult, and if the republics don’t come to an agreement, the disintegration could be exacerbated and we could face the worst case scenario. I am talking about dictatorship. The people are so victimized that society might support dictatorship. This is why I want the Commonwealth agreement to be successful, not to fall apart. I wanted to tell you about this in confidence because we are all thinking about it right now. Baker. I would like to tell you the following very confidentially. At a meeting this morning it was conveyed to us that you and Yeltsin are in the process of discussing a kind of transition period from mid-December to mid-January; during this period work will be done on the implementation of the Brest Agreement. I would like to ask, if you consider it possible to discuss this with us, whether this is your understanding as well? And the second question: what should we be doing right now, if you consider it important that the Brest Agreement is implemented? In particular, what is your opinion on how we should deal with requests for diplomatic recognition? Finally, how do you see the future of the Armed Forces in the context of the Brest Agreement? We were told that the Commonwealth will be similar to the British Commonwealth, except for one thing—the defense component. The sphere of defense will include everything except the army, namely strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, aviation, air defense and the navy. But at the same time, each of the ten states will have its own foreign policy. If this is the case, how can there be a unified defense policy? Who will be the commander in chief? Gorbachev. We had an agreement about this with Yeltsin. I told him, “You ‘closed down’ the Soviet Union and went ‘on a spree,’ which is essentially a coup. The Supreme Soviet has no idea what’s going on, but you already briefed the president of the United States.” I told Yeltsin that my position remains the same. But if they made their choice, I have to create the constitutional preconditions for a new process. They need a consensus. If they want to look like democrats, instead of highway bandits, they have to take it into consideration. 506

Thus, we needed a process and I said let’s think about what it will be. Considering the fact that the Asian republics still needed to develop their positions, and the fact that the Russian parliament had not expressed its views at the time, we assumed the process would take until mid-January. So there was this understanding, and in this context they were supposed to adjust some of their steps. For example, they had nearly announced that the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs was closing. We agreed that we will decide what to do with existing departments as the process develops and new Commonwealth institutions take shape. For a time things calmed down, but suddenly I find out that they are making rather important decisions behind my back. They made a very impudent statement that the Soviet Union no longer exists. This means there is no constitution, no laws, no structures to regulate defense, the border regime, there is no role in the UN, etc. This is such an amateurish approach that our culture, especially political culture, is dying. There is already no Soviet Union, and there is not yet a Commonwealth. What do we have then? We must ensure continuity. I remember how much you worked with Shevardnadze to develop the implementation mechanisms of our treaties, to find answers to the questions of “what, how, when?” And here they are deciding the fate of a nation based on this kind of improvisation. Thus, the first and most important condition is that the process must happen within the constitutional framework. I think your position should aim to achieve this, because it would benefit all of us. How to deal with [requests for] recognition? I think we should proceed calmly and without rushing. Firstly, we have to see what kind of Commonwealth will emerge, whether it will be a subject to international law. When the relationship between the Commonwealth and the world is established it will become clear what to do about recognition. Otherwise, the process may become complicated or fail, which would be disadvantageous for the Commonwealth, for the world, and for the U.S. as our partner. Baker. I would like to note that the requests are not for the recognition of the Commonwealth. We are talking about recognition of individual states. Gorbachev. I understand. It needs to be tied to the formation of a viable Commonwealth. Food aid would be a real support for us right now. There is a danger of the situation reaching a critical mass and simply exploding, which would sweep away all governments. About the future of the armed forces. The armed forces would benefit from a well-defined Commonwealth. Therefore, it is important to stimulate the formation of the Commonwealth using all available channels of influence, including the question of recognition. We have to keep in mind one thing about the Asian republics. Ukraine, or rather the current Ukrainian politicians, is not interested in their participation. These politicians are mostly interested in Russia’s resources. This is a mistake, of course, and a very serious one. If these republics sense that they are being pushed aside, the process will become more difficult and they may start 507

thinking about alternative options. It would complicate the issue of the armed forces as well. Overall, the Asian element is playing a positive role right now. The Asian republics have taken a more civilized and European position than the European republics. However, we can assume that they have a reserve position that would involve greater integration with Muslim countries. This is a subject on which we could have a whole separate discussion. In any case, there were discussion in Ashgabat to extend the railroad construction to Beijing and Istanbul. So, it is important not to isolate these republics, but rather to include them. They can have a healthy influence, including on the issue of the armed forces. They have a clear position—they are for united armed forces and very strict control over nuclear weapons. Right now we hear a lot of statements about the transfer of all nuclear weapons to Russia; that Russia will assume all the debts and will be the legal successor to the Soviet Union on all the big questions. Of course, such of statements can only be made from inexperience and arrogance. I will refrain from using stronger language here. Thus, it is necessary to have a full agreement about the Commonwealth, in order to channel all aspects of this process in the right direction. To make it clearer what will emanate into the world from this space. Baker. We are told that the Brest Agreement will be supported at the meeting in Alma-Ata. I think the question of what is required from the constitutional point of view is essentially a political question here. But I would like to ask: if the meeting takes place and the republics support the Brest Agreement, even though it has shortcomings as we discussed, what else will be necessary to consider the process to be within the constitutional framework, in your view? I understand that we have no part in this, but I would just like to know your position. Gorbachev. At the minimum, we would need a final session of the Supreme Soviet. After the other republics join and sign, there we need to be an exchange of ratification documents to express the official position of the CIS states. Then there should be a session of the Supreme Soviet to legally draw up the cessation of the Soviet Union’s existence and the start of the Commonwealth. Moreover, by the time of this final session, it is necessary to have outlined the main contents of a defense alliance; it is necessary to have a clear plan for building and managing the armed forces, especially strategic forces. At that point, the Supreme Soviet could conclude its mission and disband. The Commonwealth of Independent States would create new agencies and institutions. And one more thing: there has to be an agreement on foreign policy. The international community needs to know with whom they are dealing—whether it’s ten states with foreign policies, or a political entity with a coherent foreign policy that would be the successor to the Soviet Union, particularly in the UN Security Council and on the major agreements concluded by the USSR. I think it is possible, I am even sure of it, that the Supreme Soviet will support the agreement on the Commonwealth of Independent States. After all, life 508

requires us not to lose time. But the Supreme Soviet may not want to assume the responsibility for “shutting down” the USSR and could vote for a referendum or plebiscite, despite the current political fatigue. I am criticized nowadays, people say that Gorbachev wants to undermine the ongoing process and that’s why he is calling for a Congress of People’s Deputies, and so on. But I understand the responsibility of this moment; I understand what kind of question we are addressing. A country is ceasing to exist. There was one country, even with contradictions, but now it begins to divide into independent states. This means that we have to divide the whole mass of the economy, human relations, and so on, and so forth. This is very serious, and only the people have the right to decide something like this. If you ask the question—are you for the Union or the Commonwealth—you will get a clear answer. As president, I could not help but comment on this. After all, I proposed a referendum on the future of the Union. This referendum took place and the people had their say. I can’t just forget that 80 percent of the population voted in the referendum, and 75 percent of the voters were in favor of the Union. I think that in the current tense situation, the Supreme Soviet will deem it unnecessary to hold a referendum. And that’s a good thing. Still, I keep telling my colleagues that we should protect ourselves for the future. This is an exceptionally important decision; such decisions get to be made only a few times in all of history. Baker. What would happen if there was a referendum and a significant majority in, say, four republics voted for the Commonwealth, while the majority in the country as a whole would be in favor of the Union? Would that mean that several republics would form a Commonwealth and at the same time the Union will continue to exist in a smaller form? Gorbachev. I think if there is a referendum, the people will vote for the Union. All polls indicate that while the politicians are in favor of “softer” forms of cooperation, the people are still for the Union. We even receive letters from people blaming us for giving up the Union too easily. Then again, it is possible that they might support the Commonwealth. Most likely, the Supreme Soviet will not deem it possible to hold a referendum, but it would be better to remove this question. Shevardnadze. Without it, the decision would not be very constitutional. After all, there was a referendum on the Union. Just a few months ago, people were in favor of a single country. Who cancelled that? Gorbachev. It turns out that Democrats are burying the democratic choice of the people. Shevardnadze. In Ukraine, 70 percent voted for the Union at the time. Baker. But in another referendum, they voted for independence. Gorbachev. [Illegible text for one page] [...] Gorbachev. […] what would happen should the situation explode. Of course we will pay the highest price, but others will as well. Baker. No, he did not raise this question. Gorbachev. Even though we had agreed about this. This is a real necessity. 509

Baker. We understand that. This was offered, and particularly this issue was raised before the Europeans. But beside the stabilization fund, as we understand, there is an urgent need for medical supplies and food aid this winter, due to the severity of the situation. I mention this because I agree with you completely: the time for talks is over. There is too much talk and no action. I know you have been having an awful time with your bureaucracy, and I want to share what is happening right now. We prepared two large shipments of medication, they are already loaded on large transport airplanes. This is the sixteenth aid delivery. Of course in itself is not too much—in the amount of $6 million. The aid is designated for hospitals in Moscow, Minsk, and Yerevan. However, the Ambassador informed me that some agency, I think a Russian one, is refusing to allow employees of the International Red Cross into the country to monitor the distribution of aid. And one of the main difficulties in mobilizing major help from the Americans and other countries is precisely that many people think that much of the aid is stolen and does not reach the designated recipients. Gorbachev. My position is that in all spheres—credit, finance, investment— we have to have institutions and mechanisms that would include not only our people but also representatives from the EU and the United States. All our bureaucracy right now is in the republics, in the workplace. This is what impedes land reform, corporatization, privatization. Another thing I want to mention. The process of defining the Commonwealth may be complicated by the fact that the people do not have the sense that the Commonwealth means the breakup of the country. People still think that we will have one country, and that all the economic, cultural, and human connections will remain. For example, Nazarbayev says, “We are together after all; we will work things out together.” But in order to maintain this feeling [of unity], we have to very carefully consider the principles and mechanisms that will contribute to the preservation of real connections, and form new ones in the process of reforms and transition to a market economy. This is very important, because if people feel that the Commonwealth leads to greater disintegration, that it will not save us from the collapse of everything we have, then there will be a very terrible reaction. We will have tremendous problems! This is my consistent position, I stand by it. I believe that we should stop the disintegration, because if the situation explodes, all our progressive models will crumble and it will discredit any course of change. Baker. This is how it was explained to us: the Commonwealth will consist of 10 separate, completely independent states, each of which will have its own foreign policy. It is not clear yet whether there will be certain economic relations, and if yes, what will they be? Will there be joint responsibility in the field of defense and strategy? The republics will not have their own Air Force, but each will have its own army. Gorbachev. After Minsk I talked with Boris Nikolayevich, and Nazarbayev was present. I asked him questions, and it seems those were painful minutes for 510

him. First of all, I asked whether the independent states would have their own ground troops. He said yes. So, after they sign the agreement in Alma-Ata, Ukraine will have an army of 470,000 people. Shevardnadze. Larger than united Germany’s army. Gorbachev. By 100,000 people. Baker. We will ask about this in Kiev. Gorbachev. Of course they will say that they don’t need such an army. But the distinctive feature of land armies is that they are stationed along the border. Then Russia will have to think about its ground forces, what they will be and where. Just think about it—how do you divide them, who do you relocate where? It’s some kind of nightmare. So I ask them, are they are idiots or responsible politicians? Today, 80 percent of the officers and generals in the Kiev Military District are Russian. I confirmed this with the district commander in the Ministry of Defense. Of course, the Ukrainian democrats will want to cleanse the army of so many Russians. But it will be madness. I asked them about this, but did not get any answers. They say that Gorbachev has lost touch with reality. But I pose these questions to Yeltsin because they are important to the people. This has not been thought out. For example, the question of citizenship. Now 12–14 million Russians (just the ethnic Russians, not to mention the so-called Russian speakers) [sic] will find that they live in another country, abroad. Yeltsin says that this issue will be addressed through dual citizenship. But I give this example. Let’s say a guy from Ukraine served in Kazakhstan, got married and settled down there. If there is common citizenship, then he will maintain all his rights and social security and so on. But if not, what will happen with his civil rights, with the whole structure of human relations? It will be destroyed. R. Strauss (Ambassador). Mr. President, I would like to ask, how do you envision the course of events with any alternative approaches? For example, if there is a referendum or a decision by the Supreme Soviet or a group of republics. I can well imagine that on December 21st the republics will agree, but then eventually fall out. But this will take time. The question is, what will life be like in the meantime? Gorbachev. Of course, they will convene on December 21st, but the question is what will they be signing. I think they should sign a document that would recognize the need to establish the Commonwealth on the basis of certain principles and, at the same time, the need to establish mechanisms to facilitate the transition. We need to impress this idea upon them. Because all we have right now is just mantras; nothing is developed from the political and economic points of view. I reminded Yeltsin: you were the first to recognize the Baltic States, you signed agreements with them that ensured the protection of civil rights. And what’s the result? Latvia and other republics are passing citizenship laws that essentially create a category of second-class citizens. Who are these people? Russians. This is the work of the democrats that you spent decades fighting for. 511

In talks with the Balts we pointed out that we have objects of strategic defense, space communications, and early warning systems on the territory of these republics. They said we will find agreements on everything. And what’s happening now? They are shouting, “Russians, get out!” Same as others are shouting at Americans in some countries. They had said there would be a process, that it would take time. This is the price of mantras when you need real policy. Baker. What you said is absolutely true. As Eduard knows, when this issue was being discussed in the U.S. government and some people would advocate increasing pressure on you regarding the Baltic states, I always used this argument. Right now Russians are turning into second-class citizens, and in Lithuania the Poles also. We remember well the statements Landsbergis made and can clearly see what is happening now. This is precisely why we are concerned about what is happening here. We do not want this to happen again. We know what happens when disintegration comes down to the lowest common denominator. We are aware of what is happening in Checheno-Ingushetia, Transdniestria. We see what is happening in Yugoslavia. We warned against this. We understand that it could happen here, and with a lot more violence. Gorbachev. Precisely. Baker. That’s why back in September of 1989, when we met with Eduard in Wyoming, I said: right now the most important thing for you is to reach a Union Treaty. We know how much effort you put into it. Gorbachev. The putschists cut off this possibility the day before the signing. This conversation has been frank and open. I want to reiterate: there is a real process and we need to engage in it, using political opportunities and influence in order to enrich it and lead to a timely conclusion. Otherwise we face a great danger. A politician has to think about the country and the people who are going through a critical time. If this choice is made, I will try to help the process to be more stable and enriched. I wish you success in your difficult mission. I hope it will allow you to better understand the situation, and allow us, even in this difficult situation, to maintain effective cooperation. Please convey my greetings and best wishes to George Bush from all of us who know him well. Baker. Thank you very much. I noted your words: we have to use the issue of recognition in order to facilitate the process of forming the Commonwealth. Gorbachev. To form a full-blooded and viable Commonwealth. Baker. I will write that down as well. Gorbachev. Otherwise the country will perish, which would be trouble for us all. Present were: R. Strauss, D. Ross, M. Tutwiler, E.A. Shevardnadze, A.N. Yakovlev, A.S. Chernyaev. [Source: The Gorbachev Foundation Archive, Fond 1, Opis 1. Translated by Anna Melyakova.] 512

Document No. 87: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Gorbachev–Bush, 10:03 a.m. – 10:25 a.m. December 25, 1991

Less than two hours before announcing his resignation as president of the USSR, Gorbachev places a call to Bush. This is their last conversation as the leaders of the two superpowers—now close partners rather than Cold War rivals. The warmth and appreciation they have for each other is evident, as is their pride in having accomplished so much together. Gorbachev sounds high-minded and statesmanlike as he discusses the future, asking Bush to support Yeltsin and Russia’s reforms, and to help the republics achieve separation without disintegrating even further. He expresses his own determination to support Yeltsin and to remain active in political life: “I do not intend to hide in the taiga, in the woods.” He also tells Bush how much he values “our cooperation together, our partnership and friendship.” Bush responds with praise and affection, reminding Gorbachev of their meetings at Camp David, quipping that “the horseshoe pit where you threw that ringer is still in good shape,” and inviting Gorbachev to visit again. The U.S. president would come to miss this unprecedented partnership, which helped transform the world.

The President: Hello, Mikhail. President Gorbachev: George, my dear friend. It is good to hear your voice. The President: I greet you on this momentous day, this historic day. I appreciate your calling me. President Gorbachev: Let me begin by saying something pleasant to you: Merry Christmas to you, Barbara and your family. I had been thinking about when to make my statement, Tuesday or today. I finally decided to do it today, at the end of the day. So let me say first Merry Christmas and very best wishes. Well, let me say that in about two hours I will speak on Moscow TV and will make a short statement about my decision. I have sent a letter to you, George. I hope you will receive it shortly. I said in the letter a most important thing. And I would like to reaffirm to you that I greatly value what we did working together with you, first as Vice President and then as President of the United States. I hope that all leaders of the Commonwealth and, above all, Russia understand what kind of assets we have accrued between the leaders of our two countries. I hope they understand their responsibility to preserve and expand this important source of capital. The debate in our union on what kind of state to create took a different track from what I thought right. But let me say that I will use my political authority and role to make sure that this new commonwealth will be effective. I am pleased that already at Alma-Ata the leaders of the commonwealth worked out important nuclear and strategic agreements. I hope that in Mensk [sic] they will 513

take decisions on other questions to assure a mechanism of cooperation among republics. George, let me say something to you that I regard as very important. The President: Okay. President Gorbachev: Of course, it is necessary to move to recognize all of these countries. But I would like you to bear in mind the importance for the future of the commonwealth that the process of disintegration and destruction does not grow worse. So, helping the process of cooperation among republics is our common duty. I would really like to emphasize this to you. Now, about Russia—this is the second most important emphasis in our conversations. I have here on my desk a decree of the President of the USSR on my resignation. I will also resign my duties as Commander-in-Chief and will transfer authority to use the nuclear weapons to the President of the Russian Federation. So I am conducting affairs until the completion of the constitutional process. I can assure you that everything is under strict control. As soon as I announce my resignation, I will put these decrees into effect. There will be no disconnection. You can have a very quiet Christmas evening. Again, about Russia, let me say we should all do our best to support it. I will do this to support Russia. But our partners should do this too and should play a role to help and support it. As for me, I do not intend to hide in the taiga, in the woods. I will be active politically, in political life. My main intention is to help all the processes here begun by Perestroika and New Thinking in world affairs. Your people, the press here, have been asking me about my personal relationship with you. I want you to know at this historic time that I value greatly our cooperation together, our partnership and friendship. Our roles may change but I want to assure you that what we have developed will not change. Raisa and I send to you and Barbara our very best wishes. The President: Mikhail, let me say first how grateful I am for this call. I listened to your presentation with great interest. We will stay involved, particularly with the Russian republic whose enormous problems could get worse this winter. I am delighted you won’t plan to hide in the woods and that you will be active politically. I have total confidence that will benefit the new commonwealth. I have written you a letter to be posted today. And in it I express the conviction that what you have done will live in history and be fully appreciated by historians. I appreciate your comments on nuclear weapons. This is of vital significance internationally and I commend you and the leaders of the republics for what has been a great process. I note with interest that the constitutional responsibilities on this issue have been passed to Boris Yeltsin. I assure you we will have good cooperation on this. And now, Mikhail, on the personal side. I have noticed the wonderfully strong statements from you on your relationships with me and Jim Baker. I appreciate them very much since it is exactly the way I feel. You found me at Camp David with Barbara and three of our kids and grandchildren. One of our kids is in Florida and the other with family in Virginia. 514

The horseshoe pit where you threw that ringer is still in good shape. That reminds me that in my letter to you, I say that I hope our paths will cross soon again. You are most welcome in the U.S. Perhaps we could even meet here at Camp David when you have straightened out your affairs. Our friendshp [sic] is as strong as ever and will continue to be as events unfold. There is no question about that. I will, of course, deal with respect, and openly with the leaders of the Russian republic and the other republics. We will move forward with recognition and respect for the sovereignty that each has. We will be working with them on a wide array of issues. None will interfere with my desire to stay in touch and I welcome suggestions from you whatever your new role may be. But I do want to keep intact the friendships that Barbara and I value very, very much. And so at this special time of year and at this historic time, We salute you and thank you for what you have done for world peace. Thank you very much. President Gorbachev: Thank you, George. I was glad to hear all of this today. I am saying good bye and shaking your hands. You have said to me many important things and I appreciate it. The President: All the best to you, Mikhail. President Gorbachev: Good-bye. [Source: George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through Mandatory Review request 2004-1975-MR by the National Security Archive.]

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INDEX

A ABM Treaty (1972) British and French exemption from, 202 non-withdrawal period, 39 See also Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) Afghanistan drug trafficking and, 116, 121 elections in, 211–12, 276 national reconciliation, 84, 270 Soviet-U.S. cooperation in, 84–5, 205 Soviet withdrawal from, 5, 11, 67 Africa, Soviet-U.S. cooperation in, 212–13, 412–13, 414 Allison, Graham, 328–30, 360 Andreotti, Giulio, 125, 435 Arafat, Yassir, 82, 207–8, 219, 419–20 Arbatov, Georgy A., 90, 205 Armenia dispute with Azerbaijan, 110, 492 earthquake in, 15, 69 independence and, 110, 380, 386 arms control, 452–54, 455 air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), 56–7, 88, 135, 163–67, 169, 171 biological and chemical weapons, 325– 26, 336, 338–41, 358–59, 371–74, 458 compliance on, 19, 324–25, 359, 387 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 164–71, 201, 202–3, 417, 452, 456 Open Skies Treaty and, 418–19 sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), 39, 62, 76, 103, 148, 163–71, 203 verification, 13, 75–7, 165–70 See also specific treaties arms race economic burden of, 187, 193 in reverse, 3, 17, 37, 141

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 332, 413, 415–16 August 1991 coup against Gorbachev, 326, 445–47 Bush and, 441–42, 443–44 effects on Soviet political landscape, 435–36 international reaction to, 431–32, 441–42 New Union Treaty and, 431–32, 435–36 results of, 448–51, 460–64, 472–73, 488–91 U.S. readjustment of policy after, 432–33, 448 U.S. warns Gorbachev of, 363, 364–65 Yeltsin and, 443–44, 449–50

B Baker, James A. III, 4–8, 15, 17, 26–31, 37, 148–74, 245–46, 290–94, 336–41, 503–12 Baltics Gorbachev and, 67 nationalist movements in, 67, 72, 118, 137, 380 Soviet-U.S. relations and nationalism in, 322, 337–38, 389 U.S. recognition and, 140, 337 violence in, 290, 293, 306, 307, 322 Yeltsin and, 511 See also Lithuania Belovezhie agreement (dissolution of the USSR), 440 Berlin Wall, fall of, 7 Bush and, 12, 53, 59–60, 192 Gorbachev and, 97 Bessmertnykh, Alexander A., 306, 307–08, 315–16, 324–25, 331, 336, 340, 349, 374, 389, 402, 416–22 biological weapons, 324–26, 332, 336, 338–41, 417

523

Soviet program, 205, 325–26, 336, 338– 41, 358–59, 371–74, 458 Brezhnev Doctrine, 63, 64–5 Bush, George H.W., 3–4, 22 August 1991 Soviet coup and, 432–33, 441–42 domestic problems, 321–22 on financial aid to Soviets, 107, 123 “pause” in Soviet-U.S. relations, 3–7, 14, 109, 342, 343–45, 347 relations with Gorbachev, 10, 14–6, 22, 35, 95, 112, 295–96, 332–33, 351 transition from Reagan administration, 3 visit to Poland and Hungary (1989), 32–34 visit to Ukraine (1991) and Chicken Kiev speech, 334, 390, 395–96, 425–27, 483 Byrd, Robert C., 274, 403

C Camp David summit (1990). See Washington and Camp David summit (1990) Casey, William J., 17 Castro, Fidel, 10, 41, 56, 61, 63–66, 105, 139, 205, 209–11, 220 CC CPSU. See Politburo of CC CPSU Central America Cuba and, 283 Soviet arms into, 27 Soviet diplomatic relations with, 282–83 See also Iran-contra scandal (1986) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analysis of Gorbachev, 9–10, 243, 323 intelligence estimates, 9–10, 17–21 CFE. See Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty Chebrikov, Viktor M., 116 chemical weapons ban/limits on, 19, 20, 40–41, 56, 77, 89, 105–6, 201, 418 disposal of, 411, 418 proliferation of, 77–78, 417 verification of, 418 Cheney, Richard B., 6, 8, 13, 87, 432–33 Chernobyl nuclear accident (1986), 69, 173, 426 Chernyaev, Anatoly S., 13, 14, 60, 72, 74, 90–91, 99–100, 180, 231, 243, 244, 326, 439, 480–87

524

Chevron, 274, 331, 390, 396–98, 405–6 China, 59, 202, 215, 252, 301, 347, 411, 479 Gorbachev visit to (May 1989), 413 India-Pakistan and, 414–15 Persian Gulf war and, 349 Soviet relations with, 5, 17–18, 23, 260, 349, 412–13 Tiananmen Square protests (1989), 5, 7, 101, 332, 413, 415 U.S. relations with, 7, 101, 332, 349, 413, 414–15 CIA. See Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) COCOM. See Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) Cold War, end of, 247, 387, 437, 471 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 40, 127, 332, 387, 412, 414 Helsinki Final Act, 12, 95, 97, 160, 217, 218 Moscow conference (1991) and, 434 Vienna conference (1986–1989) and, 14, 161–62, 203, 225, 434 common European home, 12, 22, 24, 35, 43, 79, 99–101, 130, 134, 139–40, 229, 241, 412, 295, 439, 486 Germany and, 100–1 Gorbachev’s Strasbourg speech, 5 Mitterrand and, 439 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Belovezhie agreement, 440 Bush–Gorbachev talks on, 499–502 dissolution of USSR and, 496–98 establishment of, 496–97, 499–500, 503–5 Gorbachev reaction to, 503, 505–12 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty German reunification and, 111, 126–27, 176, 183, 241, 251 NATO and Warsaw Pact in Europe, 28– 30, 33, 74, 222, 223 Soviet military and, 28, 324–25 START and, 56, 61, 76, 87, 223, 251, 253, 280, 294, 313, 325, 342, 344–45, 348–49, 355–56, 358–59, 387, 458 treaty on, 40, 49, 89, 112, 113–14, 126– 87, 201, 241, 280, 294, 475 Warsaw Pact dissolution and, 112, 325

Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), 24, 46, 331, 353, 390, 397–400, 459 CSCE. See Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Cuba, 20, 41–42, 205, 209–11, 215, 220, 283, 388, 432 Soviet relations with, 48, 66, 101, 153–54, 156, 205, 375, 381, 384, 386, 387, 175, 176, 177, 183, 344, 374 U.S. relations with, 10, 56, 61, 63–64, 65–66, 209–11

D Defense and Space. See Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) Delors, Jacques, 379

E Eagleburger, Lawrence S., 112, 386 economic aid agricultural loans for USSR, 327, 345, 483 Bush and Grand Bargain, 328–30 European initiatives on, 321, 326–30, 360–62, 364, 374–75, 398, 462 IMF and Soviet need for, 222, 270, 329– 31, 350, 367–69, 402 U.S. response to Soviet appeals for, 361, 415–16, 465 Economic Community Agreement (USSR), 436 emigration, 205, 219, 327–28 “refuseniks” (see under human rights) Soviet law on (1990), 46–47, 54, 60, 88, 101, 105, 138, 201, 205, 327, 352 U.S. Congress and, 54–55, 88, 215, 349–50, 421 Europe, Eastern change in, 6–7, 12, 35, 47–48, 59–60, 74, 79–82 peaceful revolutions in, 109, 387–88 Soviet role in, 65, 109–10, 132 See also German reunification question

F Falin, Valentin M., 95, 186, 197 Five Hundred Days Plan, 252, 327–28

Fokin, Vitold P., 426–27

G G-summit in Houston (1990), 106–7, 222– 25, 247–48, 372 G-7 summit in London (1991), 365, 384–85 Bush-Gorbachev meeting at, 374–76 Gorbachev’s appeal for economic aid, 321, 326–30, 360, 364, 374–75 Mitterrand support for Soviet Union, 377, 382 Soviet reforms and, 360–62, 367–70, 377–84, 462, 468–70 Gates, Robert M., 17, 28, 112, 116–22, 204, 209, 353 German reunification question, 95–100, 124–26, 129, 161, 186, 187–190, 278 Baker’s nine points on, 186, 194–95 East German elections (1990) and, 99, 119–20 financial aid and, 96, 97, 100–1 Gorbachev and, 66–67, 95, 96–99, 106, 107, 130 Helsinki Final Act and, 95, 97, 160, 217, 218 Kohl “10 points” on confederation, 12, 122 NATO membership and, 96–99, 119–20, 124–29, 131, 150, 156–61, 193, 195–97 Polish border and, 125, 195 security concerns and, 132–33, 190–91, 194, 197–98, 218 Two Plus Four negotiations and, 126–27, 138, 178–79, 193–98 See also Europe, Eastern See also Kohl, Helmut Gonzalez, Felipe, 283, 431, 438, 441–42, 471–72, 474–79, 485 Gorbacheva, Raisa M., 15, 50, 250, 485, 486 Gorbachev, Mikhail S., 326, 436–37 August 1991 coup against, 363, 431 Baltic crackdown and, 324 CIA analysis of, 243, 323 leadership style, 433–34 political influence and, 326, 436–37 popularity of, 3, 22 relations with Bush, 7, 14, 53, 440 relations with Yeltsin, 344, 435

525

resignation of, 513–15 U.N. speech (December 1988), 6, 97 Governors Island summit (1988), 3, 14 grain trade, 154, 353, 356 Grand Bargain economic reform plan, 328–30 Gulf War. See Persian Gulf war (1990–1991)

H Helms, Jesse A., Jr., 331, 390, 401 Helsinki summit (1990) atmosphere at, 235, 254 Eastern Europe and, 257 goals for, 234–35, 254, 270 joint statement on, 270–72, 276–77 Persian Gulf war and, 234–40, 254–57, 260–69, 270 preparations for, 251–53 results of, 239, 266, 278–79 human rights, 434 Moscow Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, 434 “refuseniks”, 49, 206–7 Hussein, Saddam, 229–30, 255, 263, 284, 307–8 See also Iraq invasion of Kuwait

I IMF. See International Monetary Fund (IMF) inspection, on-site. See arms control: verification Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty mutual force reductions in Europe, 26–31 Oka/SS-23 missiles and, 5, 26–27 International Monetary Fund (IMF) Gorbachev meets with vice president of, 435 New Union and, 448, 449–51 Soviet membership in, 367–68, 390, 398–99, 402–04, 459 Iraq invasion of Kuwait (1990), 229–31, 232–34, 259, 307–8 Soviet-U.S. cooperation and, 229–31, 291, 298–301 Soviet-U.S. Joint Statement on, 231, 245–46

526

See also Hussein, Saddam See also Persian Gulf war (1990–1991) Israel, 261–62, 264–65, 282, 289, 309–13, 333, 349, 354, 419–21, 467, 480 Palestine and, 219, 254, 256, 263, 267, 284–85, 419–21 Persian Gulf war settlement and, 354 Soviet policy and, 82–83, 138, 155, 206– 8, 219, 229, 411, 436 U.S. policy and, 205–6

J Jackson-Vanik Amendment, 327–28 Jaruzelski, Wojciech, 6, 32–33, 206 Juan Carlos I, 438, 471–79

K Kaifu, Toshiki, 107, 214, 382 Karpov, Viktor P., 201 Kissinger, Henry A., 11, 15 Gorbachev meeting with, 15 Kohl, Helmut Arkhyz summit with Gorbachev, 217, 222 arms control and, 178 Bundestag “10 points” speech on confederation, 12, 63, 123–24 financial aid to Soviets and, 107–8 Lance modernization and, 4–6 Lithuania and, 179 relations with Bush, 4–6, 123–33, 178– 79, 278–79 relations with Gorbachev, 63, 107–8, 225 See also German reunification question Kovalev, Sergey A., 434 Krasnoyarsk radar station dismantling of, 20, 39 Kravchuk, Leonid M., 425–26, 432, 440, 445, 448, 449, 451, 462, 475–76, 489, 500, 505–6 Kryuchkov, Vladimir A. August 1991 coup and, 323, 330 Gorbachev relations with, 116, 243, 326, 353 meeting with Gates (February 1990), 116–22 Kuwait crisis. See Iraq invasion of Kuwait

L Lance missiles/Follow-On-To-Lance (FOTL), 4–5, 6, 22, 26, 29, 124, 129 Ligachev, Yegor K., 144 Lithuania, 103, 136–38, 156, 171–74, 180, 183, 217, 322, 331, 390, 396, 411, 423 See also Baltics London Declaration on Europe, 222–23, 225

M Madrid summit (1991) atmosphere at, 436–38, 460, 471 CSCE and, 466 goals for, 433, 436, 456 key events of, 480–84 preparations for, 458–59, 460–61, 465–70 regional issues and, 466–67, 480 results of, 480–87 Yeltsin speech to Russian parliament and, 437–38, 465 See also Middle East Major, John, 338, 377, 431, 435, 441, 442 Malta summit (1989) arms control and, 8–9, 12–13, 56–57, 60–62, 73, 74–78, 87, 113 atmosphere at, 7, 11–12, 53 Bush suggestion for, 7, 35–36 Central America and 10, 55, 64–66 climate change and, 57 German question and, 12 goals for, 7–10, 43–44, 45–49, 54 naval nuclear weapons issues, 9, 76–77 preparations for, 43–44, 45–49 results of, 3, 10, 12–13, 86, 87–89, 90–91 Soviet-U.S. trade relations, 55–56, 69–71 Mandela, Nelson, 213, 221, 332, 411, 414 Matlock, Jack F., Jr., 3, 8, 102, 106, 141, 162, 205, 245, 284, 328, 363, 364 Middle East Gorbachev’s comprehensive settlement for, 235, 254, 260–69 international conference on, 254, 436 Soviet-U.S. cooperation in, 68–69, 82–85 U.S. policy for Soviet role in, 11, 236, 237, 247–48, 254, 256 See also Madrid summit Military-industrial complex, Gorbachev on U.S., 181

Milosevic, Slobodan, 435 missile defense system. See Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) Mitterrand, François, 6, 63, 125, 202, 278, 329, 453, 478–79 on financial aid to Soviets, 107, 328, 329, 377, 382 Gorbachev and, 68, 242, 287–88, 367, 439, 480, 485–87 Moscow summit (1991), 321, 322–23, 330– 35, 344, 376, 411–12 atmosphere at, 321, 330–35, 390 CFE/START and, 330, 342, 344–45, 347, 355–56, 364 goals for, 347, 348–51, 386–89 new Union Treaty and, 330–31, 333, 405, 408–9 preparations for, 347–51, 355–57, 386 results of, 333–35 START signing and, 321, 324, 405, 406–7 See also Novo-Ogarevo (Moscow) meeting

N nationalism in the Soviet Union, 37, 80–81, 72–73, 102, 146, 183–84, 215–16, 296–98 Baltics, 67, 72, 118, 137, 380 Lithuania, 101, 103, 110, 118, 134, 136–37, 145, 146, 148, 171–73, 180, 199–200, 217, 298, 322, 411, 423 Ukraine, 72, 144, 334, 390, 395–96, 411, 423, 425–27, 431–32, 438–39, 449, 471, 481, 490, 492–94 Yeltsin and, 465, 467–68 NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) naval nuclear weapons Gorbachev’s proposals to remove, 9, 76–78 U.S. military and, 9, 37, 78 Nazarbayev, Nursultan Gorbachev relations with, 393, 394, 405 Moscow summit (1991) and, 330–31, 405–7, 449 nuclear weapons and, 462 Soviet dissolution and, 440, 476 Nicaragua Bush and, 26–27, 40, 41, 48, 56, 64, 130–31, 210

527

Contadora process, 130 elections in, 40, 41, 130–31 Gorbachev and, 10, 64, 130–31, 215 Iran-contra scandal and Reagan and, 10 Shevardnadze visit to, 41 Soviet-U.S. cooperation toward, 56, 65 Soviet bloc weapons to, 26, 27, 41–42, 48, 61, 64, 131 See also Iran-contra scandal (1986) Nixon, Richard M., 105 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 5–6, 22, 27–30, 100–1, 106, 439 expansion of, 97, 99, 119–20 German reunification and, 12, 45, 66, 95–101, 106–7, 119–20, 123–29, 131, 138–39, 148, 150, 156–61, 176–77, 178, 186, 190–93, 195–97, 217, 218, 222, 223–25, 241, 251, 253 Soviet Union proposed membership in, 159 Novo-Ogarevo (Moscow) meeting, 331–33, 412–24 See also Moscow summit (1991) Nuclear and Space Arms Talks, 416–17 nuclear testing, 41, 48–49, 57, 62, 136, 201, 433, 450, 453, 455–56 ABM Treaty and, 39–40 ban on, 40 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET), 19, 89, 57 Threshold Test Ban Treaty, 19, 57 verification and, 41 Nunn-Lugar Program, 432–33 Nunn, Sam, 239 Moscow visit (1991), 432

O oil, 66, 69, 405–06 Chevron, 274, 331, 390, 396–98, 405–6 embargo on, 103, 270, 271 field destruction, 315, 316 Persian Gulf conflict and, 230, 232, 245– 46, 258–59, 264 Soviet supply of, 407, 490 Oka/SS-23 missiles. See under Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty Olympic Games, 57

528

Open Skies Treaty, 4, 40, 41, 57, 77, 111, 138, 176, 203, 387, 418–19 Operation Desert Shield, 232 Operation Desert Storm, 244, 309, 321, 324

P Palazhchenko, Pavel R., 331–32, 438 Palestine, 82, 236, 254, 261, 262, 333 Panama, 63, 64, 116, 121, 122, 263 Paris CSCE Summit (1990), 241–42 atmosphere at, 241, 290, 295 Bush-Gorbachev meeting during, 241–42, 295–302, 303 CFE Treaty and, 201, 241, 251, 253 Charter for Europe, 241, 423–24, 486 goals of, 242, 295 Persian Gulf war and, 295, 299–302 results of, 243–44, 387 Soviet domestic concerns and, 242, 295–98 Pavlov, Valentin S. “anti-crisis” program, 329, 349–50, 360– 61, 402, 463 coup d’état rumors and, 469, 484 Peres, Shimon, 421 perestroika, 46–47, 110, 116–17, 161, 222, 323, 326, 379, 387–88 Bush and, 37–38, 44, 50, 53, 58, 107, 175, 180 Soviet-U.S. relations and, 109–11, 150– 53, 181–82 Perez de Cuellar, Javier, 208, 282, 293, 301, 307–8 Persian Gulf conflict. See Iran-Iraq war (1980–1988) Persian Gulf war (1990–1991), 229–31, 233, 235–38, 247–48, 255, 257, 259–60, 266–67, 281–82, 284, 300–2, 307–8, 321, 346–47 comprehensive settlement on, 235, 254, 260–69 conference on Middle East linkage with, 436 Gorbachev efforts to prevent use of force in, 234, 235–37, 239, 254, 260–69, 278, 286–87, 290, 306–8, 322, 347 Helsinki summit (1990) and, 229, 234–40, 254–69

Israel-Palestine conflict and, 267, 284–85, 289 military solution for, 232–33, 243–44, 245–46, 255–56, 258, 286, 288–89, 290–94 Paris CSCE summit and, 229, 241–42 Saudi Arabia and, 258–59 Soviet position on, 232, 233–34, 251–52 Soviet-U.S. coalition during, 230–31, 236–39, 243, 249–50, 254–57, 280 U.N. resolutions on, 239–44, 254, 258, 280, 290, 291–93, 295, 299–301, 303 See also Iraq invasion of Kuwait (1990– 1991) See also Primakov, Yevgeny M. Philippines, 64–65 Politburo of CC CPSU, 116, 222, 392 Pope John Paul II, 5, 11, 13, 50–52, 68, 90, 99 Powell, Colin L., 233, 324, 400, 403 presidential elections Russia (1991), 102, 326 U.S. (1992), 327, 395–96, 401 Primakov, Yevgeny M., 233–34, 236, 239– 40, 284–85, 303 See also Persian Gulf war (1990–1991)

R Red Square (Moscow), Cessna landing on, 61 Rice, Condoleezza, 4, 74, 87, 95, 96, 103, 243, 323 Ridgway, Rozanne, 29 Rust, Mathias, 61 Ryzhkov, Nikolay I., 69, 144, 172, 184, 252, 490

S SALT. See Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) Scowcroft, Brent, 9, 12–13, 17, 36, 37, 53, 58, 63, 72, 76, 98, 112, 129, 175, 179, 180, 189, 229, 233, 237, 238, 360, 396, 401, 432, 441, 448, 466, 480 Gorbachev and, 3, 22–25, 109, 184, 244, 251, 324, 328, 407, 461 INF and, 3–4 SDI. See Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)

Shevardnadze, Eduard A., 5, 37–42, 134–40, 245–46, 280–83 “pause” in Soviet-U.S. relations and, 342, 343–45 Persian Gulf War and, 282, 230, 234–35, 239–40, 247, 251, 252, 290–91, 295, 298–99, 304, 347, 416 resignation of, 234, 240, 295, 304–5, 342, 503 Wyoming meeting with Baker, 37, 40, 48, 70, 135, 152, 155, 512 Short-range nuclear forces (SNF), 386, 387 Bush–Gorbachev differences on, 4–5 Bush’s September 1991 initiative, 432–33 Lance missiles/FOTL, 4–5, 6, 22, 26, 29, 124, 129 Shultz, George P. INF negotiations and, 26–27, 29 SNF. See short-range nuclear forces (SNF). Soviet Communist Party Central Committee (CC CPSU). See Politburo of CC CPSU Soviet economic reforms, 68, 69–71, 102–3, 184–85, 224–25, 272–75, 360–62, 380–81 G-7 summit in London (1991) and, 321, 326–30, 360, 364, 374–75, 462 Gorbachev and, 293, 437, 465 Grand Bargain, 328–30 price liberalization, 461 ruble and, 60, 68, 69–70, 118, 273–74 U.S. support of, 415–16 Soviet Union agricultural loans, 327, 345, 483 armed forces, 3n3, 124, 306–7, 325–26, 433 coup d’état against Gorbachev (see August 1991 coup against Gorbachev) dissolution of, 102–3, 141–47, 297–98, 333, 337, 379–80, 411, 422–23, 432–35, 439–40, 462–64, 488–90, 496, 503–12 domestic issues, 117–19, 121–22, 295–96, 326 economic aid needs, 153–56, 177, 238– 39, 247–48 economic crisis in, 296–98, 344, 347–48, 364, 383–85, 467 force reductions in Europe (see under Warsaw Pact) Grand Bargain, 328–30 nationalism within (see nationalism in the Soviet Union)

529

new thinking and, 5, 48 new Union Treaty (see Union Treaty) political reform in (see perestroika) territorial integrity of, 146, 333, 337, 411, 422–23 START Treaty. See Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) Star Wars. See Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) strategic arms control. See arms control: verification Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) Soviet nuclear additions since, 251–52 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), 39, 280, 324, 456 ABM Treaty linkage with, 334, 339 SDI and, 40 signing of, 321, 324, 332, 333–34 as Soviet priority, 37 See also ABM Treaty (1972) Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) ABM Treaty and, 479 START and, 18 Strauss, Robert S., 366, 462–64, 488, 493, 511

T tactical nuclear weapons in Europe Bush initiative on, 157, 194, 433, 452–54 follow-on to Lance (FOTL), 4–5, 6, 22, 26, 29, 124, 129 Gorbachev proposals on, 26, 27–30, 417, 455–56 Teltschik, Horst, 4–5, 100, 179, 278 Thatcher, Margaret, 63, 99–100, 107, 125, 129, 202, 241, 338 Moscow visits (1987, 1991), 328 relations with Bush, 6, 233 relations with Gorbachev, 106, 367, 395 Tudjman, Franjo, 435

U Ukraine, 426–27, 438–39, 492–95 Bush visit to Kiev (1991), 334, 390, 395–96, 425–27 independence referendum, 439–40, 490, 492 nationalism and, 334, 425–27, 432, 475–76

530

nuclear weapons and, 462–63, 489 presidential elections in, 475 Union Treaty and, 391–92 Yeltsin’s speech to parliament of, 438–39, 471, 485 Union Treaty, 298, 326, 379–80, 391–92, 439–40 conservative opposition to, 343 Gorbachev seeks support for, 333, 383 Gorbachev-Yeltsin struggle and, 326 nationalities and, 343 “Novo-Ogarevo process”, 321, 323, 329– 31, 402, 405, 411, 412–24, 435 “pause” in Soviet-U.S. relations and, 343–44 power structure of, 297–99, 329, 364, 409 signing of, 390, 391–92, 408–9 Soviet national referendum on (March 1991), 323, 326 support for, 472–78, 495 See also Novo-Ogarevo (Moscow) meeting United Nations (U.N.) Resolution 678 on Iraq-Kuwait, 239–44, 290, 295, 299–301, 303 United States (U.S.) attitudes toward Gorbachev, 3–4, 22–25, 26 CIA analyses of Soviet policy, 17 concern over Gorbachev’s popularity, 22–25, 26 congressional conditions for aid to USSR, 175, 177, 199–200 economic relations with USSR, 238–39, 241, 273–74 military budget cuts, 273 military presence in Persian Gulf, 235–36 role in Europe, 11–12, 78–79, 112–15, 122, 138–39

V verification. See under arms control

W Warsaw Pact, 12, 45, 47–48, 74 conventional forces in Europe, 112 force reductions in Europe, 5 Washington and Camp David summit (1990), 95–96, 103–6, 135, 148–49, 205

arms control and, 162–71, 201–4 atmosphere at, 95, 102–5 109, 141–47 CFE and, 87, 89, 136, 138, 176, 183, 201 German unification and, 186–98 goals of, 103–5, 95, 169, 180–81, 199– 200, 201 joint statement on, 206 preparations for, 134–40, 141–47, 175–77 results of, 105–6, 217–21 START and, 103

Y Yakovlev, Aleksandr N., 488 Yanayev, Gennady I., 323, 425, 443–44

Yazov, Dmitri T., 75, 91, 243, 323, 326, 330 Yeltsin, Boris N., 408–09, 437–39, 471, 485 Commonwealth of Independent States and, 496–97 cooperation with Gorbachev, 365, 408, 415, 435, 436 elected president of Russia, 102 relations with Bush, 331, 344, 363, 408, 410, 496–98 rivalry with Gorbachev, 297, 331, 344, 448, 449–50, 491, 496 Yugoslavia, disintegration of, 332–33, 411, 421–24, 425, 432, 435, 466, 481, 493–94

531

The Malta Summit 1989

This aerial view of Marsaxlokk harbor, southeast of Valletta on Malta, showed the original plan for the first Bush-Gorbachev summit, with the two leaders shuttling back and forth between the Soviet missile cruiser Slava (left) and the U.S. Navy cruiser Belknap (right). But winter storms forced all sessions to the Soviet passenger ship Maxim Gorky, tied to the dock (center top). Dec. 1, 1989. (Credit: George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, P0874-15A)

Before the storms began, the American delegation prepared, here in the officers’ wardroom of the USS Belknap, already decorated with U.S. and Soviet flags on the tables. Facing the camera from left are Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Secretary of State James Baker, President Bush and national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, Dec. 1, 1989. (Credit: George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, PO8478-13)

Onboard the Maxim Gorky, Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush shook hands to begin the first plenary session of the Malta summit, Dec. 2, 1989. To the far left is Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze; to the right is Secretary of State Baker. (Credit: George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, P08481-18)

Lunch on the Maxim Gorky was apparently a buffet, with staff first to the food while the leaders continued to talk. From left, Gorbachev, Politburo member Alexander Yakovlev, and top Gorbachev military aide Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev sat across from Scowcroft and President Bush. (Credit: George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, P08488-18)

Accommodations on the Soviet luxury liner surpassed those on the U.S. Navy cruiser, the Americans admitted—including comfortable couches, Dec. 2, 1989. (Credit: George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, PO8489-06)

President Bush and General Secretary Gorbachev summed up the Malta summit at their final press conference on board the Maxim Gorky on Dec. 3, 1989. (Credit: George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, PO8509-22)

The Washington and Camp David Summit 1990

The Washington summit arrival on May 31, 1990, featured high ceremony on the White House lawn, here with formal greetings from President Bush for Mikhail Gorbachev, now president of the USSR. (Credit: George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, P13298-18)

Inside the White House, in the private residence, First Lady Barbara Bush hosted a coffee for Raisa Gorbacheva on the first day of the summit, May 31, 1990. (Credit: George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, P13290-17)

The chandeliers in the East Room of the White House cast golden tones over the state dinner honoring the Gorbachevs on May 31, 1990. President Bush sat just to the right of the fireplace, talking through an interpreter to Raisa Gorbacheva, while the table to the left of the fireplace included Gorbachev with Barbara Bush and actor Morgan Freeman. (Credit: George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, P13341-21)

Gorbachev pulled Bush aside during the summit—here in the Red Room at the White House on June 1, 1990—to make a personal plea for the trade deal the Americans had stalled over the issue of Soviet pressure on the Baltic states against their declared independence. Bush ultimately agreed to sign the deal, with some caveats. (Credit: George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, P13378-06)

Gorbachev had never been to Camp David, the American president’s official dacha, so Bush made a point of moving the summit there via helicopter, and then scrambling through the woods with interpreter Palazhchenko, Gorbachev and a coterie of security agents, June 2, 1990. (Credit: George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, P13410-16)

The American president also gave golf cart driving lessons to Gorbachev, here with Pavel Palazhchenko in the back seat and some anxiety on the faces, June 2, 1990. (Credit: George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, P13410-26)

The working sessions at Camp David met on the deck, outdoors, here clockwise from top left, interpreter Peter Afanasenko, Baker, Bush, Vice President Dan Quayle (the only one in a tie), Scowcroft, Shevardnadze, Gorbachev and Akhromeyev (back to camera), June 2, 1990. (Credit: George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, P13412-08)

The principals gathered for a group photo at Camp David, all smiles except for the Soviet marshal at right. From left, Baker, Barbara Bush, President Bush, Raisa Gorbacheva, President Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, Scowcroft, Akhromeyev. June 2, 1990. (Credit: George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, P13437-14)

The most difficult moment of the Camp David discussions came when Bush, with only interpreters Afanasenko (right) and Palazhchenko present, delivered the American démarche about Soviet biological weapons, arguing that either Gorbachev was witting or he was being lied to. The Bush Library caption: “Presidents Bush and Gorbachev discuss a particularly sensitive issue in private at Camp David.” (Credit: George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, P13413-25)

The Gorbachevs were known for always taking long walks together at the end of the day, discussing everything that had come up, and Camp David’s sidewalks and trees framed this characteristic scene, June 2, 1990. (Credit: George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, P13435-04)

Bush presented Gorbachev with this plaque holding the horseshoe Gorbachev had landed as a ringer on his first try at Camp David, June 2, 1990. (Credit: George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, P13411-15)

The Helsinki Summit 1990

The one-day Helsinki summit on Sep. 9, 1990, organized at President Bush’s initiative and located at the Finnish Presidential Palace for Gorbachev’s convenience, focused on achieving a joint U.S.USSR statement on the Gulf crisis. Here, senior Bush aides reviewed drafts; clockwise from Bush are Baker, White House Chief of Staff John Sununu, Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater, Dennis Ross, Condoleezza Rice, and Scowcroft. (Credit: George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, P15615-02)

Presidents Bush and Gorbachev announced their joint statement at a concluding press conference in the Finlandia Hall, Helsinki, Finland, Sep. 9, 1990. The statement committed to showing “aggression cannot and will not pay,” and to working together to solve the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict—a major change in U.S. policy that would lead to the 1991 Middle East peace conference. (Credit: George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, P15623-25A)

The Paris CSCE Summit 1990

Presidents Gorbachev and Bush met again in Paris on Nov. 19, 1990 at the summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), where the parties signed the treaty cutting conventional forces and pledged non-aggression. The CSCE group photo included Bush (front row left, with Kohl behind him), Mitterrand (center) and Gorbachev (front row right, next to Vaclav Havel, in front of Thatcher). (Credit: George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, P17572-22A)

Bush and Baker represented the U.S. at the CSCE summit, Nov. 19, 1990. Gorbachev had hoped the CSCE would replace both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, but the Americans insisted on NATO as their primary structure for Europe’s future. (Credit: George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, P17559-02A)

The Moscow Summit 1991

Just before the last superpower summit in Moscow in July 1991, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev met at the G-7 session in London, where Gorbachev expected significant financial aid but went away empty-handed. Here at Lancaster House, July 17, 1991, front row from left, are: Bush, Gorbachev, John Major (U.K.), Mitterrand, and Kohl. Back row from left: Jacques Delors (European Community), Giulio Andreotti (Italy), Brian Mulroney (Canada), Toshiki Kaifu (Japan), and Ruud Lubbers (Holland). (Credit: George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, P23789-26)

The Moscow summit began with the welcoming ceremony in St. Catherine’s Hall in the Kremlin, where Mikhail and Raisa Gorbachev greeted George and Barbara Bush with flowers, July 30, 1991. (Credit: George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, P23959-11)

During the first day of the Moscow summit, in the afternoon, Gorbachev walked Bush through the Kremlin and out to Red Square—here in a Kremlin hallway with interpreters Palazhchenko (left) and Zarechnak (center), July 30, 1991. (Credit: George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, P23959-18)

Gorbachev provided the tour guide commentary for Bush on the cobblestones of Red Square on July 30, 1991, with St. Basil’s Cathedral behind them, the Kremlin walls to the right, and interpreters Zarechnak (center) and Palazhchenko (right). (Credit: George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, P23976-07)

This photograph captured a moment of high drama at the beginning of the state dinner in the Hall of Facets at the Kremlin on July 30, 1991. Late arrival Boris Yeltsin (far right) attempted to take Barbara Bush’s arm to escort her in to dinner, but Raisa Gorbacheva (in the green dress) intervened and stayed between the two as they moved to the tables. (Credit: George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, P24003-19)

The great achievement of the Moscow summit was the signing of the long-negotiated START Treaty, dramatically reducing nuclear weapons (back to the levels both sides had in 1981). At Gorbachev’s state dacha at Novo Ogarevo, Baker and new Soviet Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh observed Bush and Gorbachev signing the initial documents, July 31, 1991. (Credit: George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, P23934-03)

Presidents Gorbachev and Bush chatted in their shirtsleeves on the porch at the Novo Ogarevo dacha after signing the START Treaty papers on July 31, 1991—just three weeks before the August 1991 coup. (Credit: George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, P23934-30A)

The August Coup and the Final Meeting, Madrid 1991

The final Bush-Gorbachev meeting took place in Madrid in October 1991, at the jointly-sponsored Middle East peace conference, which Gorbachev had persuaded Bush to accept back at the Helsinki summit of 1990 as a quid pro quo for Soviet support against Saddam Hussein. Their joint press conference in Madrid, Oct. 29, 1991, was the last public expression of the superpower partnership. (Credit: George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, P25956-29)

Success in diplomacy abroad, such as this handshake at the Madrid conference on Oct. 30, 1991, was Gorbachev’s last card to play in trying to keep the Soviet Union together after the August 1991 coup and Yeltsin’s ascension. (Credit: George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, P25967-14)