God's Twofold Love: The Theology of Jacob Arminius (1559-1609) 9783666569081, 9783525569085, 9783647569086

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© 2010, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen ISBN Print: 978-3-525-56908-5 — ISBN E-Book: 978-3-647-56908-6

Reformed Historical Theology Edited by Herman J. Selderhuis in co-operation with Emidio Campi, Irene Dingel, Wim Janse, Elsie McKee, Richard Muller

Volume 14

Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht

© 2010, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen ISBN Print: 978-3-525-56908-5 — ISBN E-Book: 978-3-647-56908-6

William den Boer

God’s Twofold Love The Theology of Jacob Arminius (1559–1609) Translated by Albert Gootjes

Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht

© 2010, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen ISBN Print: 978-3-525-56908-5 — ISBN E-Book: 978-3-647-56908-6

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Contents

Abbreviations ..........................................................................................

9

Preface.....................................................................................................

11

1. Introduction....................................................................................... 1.1 Historical Introduction ........................................................... 1.1.1 Life and Work of Jacobus Arminius...................... 1.1.2 Other Works of Arminius ......................................

13 13 13 23

1.2 1.3 1.4 Part 1:

State of Scholarship ............................................................... Method ................................................................................... Summary and Conclusion ...................................................... The Theology of Jacobus Arminius

2. God’s Justice in Arminius’s Theology I: Prolegomena.................... 2.1 The Concept of “Justice” ....................................................... 2.1.1 The Basic Principle: To Each His or Her Due....... 2.1.2 Remunerative and Vindictive Justice .................... 2.1.3 Justice and Its Relationship to Mercy .................... 2.1.4 Justice and Its Relationship to Freedom ................ 2.2 God’s Justice in the Structure of Arminius’s Theology......... 2.2.1 God’s Justice: A Structurally Determinative Concept in the Doctrine of God............................. 2.2.2 Fundamental Concept for Religion........................ 2.2.3 The Core Concept of Arminius’s Theology .......... 2.3 The Knowability of God’s Justice ......................................... 2.3.1 Arminius’s View of Scripture................................ 2.3.2 Arminius’s Intellectualism..................................... 2.3.3 God’s Justice: A Frequent and Important Theme.. 2.3.4 The Certainty of Theology..................................... 2.4

34 40 46

49 49 49 52 54 55 59 59 63 70 71 72 74 75 76

Summary and Conclusion ......................................................

79

3. God’s Justice in Arminius’s Theology II: God, Creation, Sin and Gospel (Evangelium) ...........................................................

81

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6

Contents

3.1

3.2 3.3

3.4

Justice as Divine Attribute ..................................................... 3.1.1 Place and Function Within God’s Attributes......... 3.1.2 Implications for God’s Acts of Creation and Providence.......................................................

81 81

God’s Justice and (the Fall Into) Sin...................................... God’s Justice and the Gospel (Evangelium): Christ, Predestination and Covenant...................................... 3.3.1 Christ as the Foundation of the New Covenant and of Predestination.............................................. 3.3.2 The Object of Predestination ................................. 3.3.3 Perseverance and the Means God Gives for It....... 3.3.4 Divine Foreknowledge and Middle Knowledge in Arminius’s Doctrine of Predestination .............. 3.3.5 The Four-Decree Structure of Predestination in the Declaration of 1608..................................... Summary and Conclusion ......................................................

106

86

113 114 122 134 143 148 151

4. God’s Justice in Arminius’s Theology III: The Primary Foundation of Religion ................................................ 154 4.1 Duplex Amor Dei ................................................................... 154 4.2 The Relationship Between Arminius’s Two “Foundation” Statements ............................................... 167 4.3 4.4 4.5

Salvation................................................................................. 168 Assurance of Faith ................................................................. 168 Summary and Conclusion ...................................................... 176

5. Arminius and Reformed Theology ................................................... 5.1 Controversial Elements in Arminius’s Theology .................. 5.1.1 Predestination: Absolute or Conditional? .............. 5.1.2 The Operation of Grace: Irresistible or Resistible? 5.1.3 Atonement: Particular or Universal? ..................... 5.1.4 The Human Will: Bound or Free? ......................... 5.1.5 Sanctification, Perseverance and Assurance: Securitas or Certitudo? .......................................... 5.2 Arminius on Doctrines Characteristic of Reformed Theology ............................................................... 5.2.1 Fall, Original Sin and Sin ...................................... 5.2.2 The Essence and Necessity of Grace ..................... 5.2.3 Faith .......................................................................

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178 178 178 179 185 187 194 197 197 200 202

Contents

5.3 Part 2:

7

5.2.4 Justification ............................................................ 203 5.2.5 Sanctification and Good Works............................. 207 Summary and Conclusion ...................................................... 207 The Reception and Theologico-historical Context of the Theology of Jacobus Arminius

6. Te Reception of Arminius’s Theology in the Hague Conference (1611) ................................................................. 6.1 Introduction, Method and State of Scholarship ..................... 6.1.1 Introduction and Method ....................................... 6.1.2 State of Scholarship ............................................... 6.2 Iustitia Dei and Duplex Amor Dei in the Hague Conference. 6.2.1 Predestination......................................................... 6.2.2 The Place and Function of Christ and the Atonement........................................................ 6.2.3 Assurance of Salvation and God’s Justice............. 6.2.4 Grace and the Operation of Grace ......................... 6.2.5 Perseverance .......................................................... 6.2.6 The Status quaestionis ........................................... 6.3 Summary and Conclusions..................................................... 7. Theological Context of Arminius’s Theology .................................. 7.1 Introduction ............................................................................ 7.2 Voluntarism, Intellectualism and the Knowability of God’s Justice................................................. 7.2.1 Calvin’s Voluntarism ............................................. 7.2.2 God’s Essence........................................................ 7.2.3 The Unknowability of God’s Justice ..................... 7.2.4 Summary and Conclusion ...................................... 7.3 The Debate On the Cause of Sin: Is God auctor peccati? ..... 7.3.1 The Middle Ages.................................................... 7.3.2 The Sixteenth Century ........................................... 7.3.3 Summary and Conclusion ......................................

211 211 211 214 217 217 231 238 239 257 266 279 280 280 281 282 287 288 292 294 296 299 321

8. Conclusions....................................................................................... 325 Bibliography............................................................................................ 329 Index of Subjects..................................................................................... 337 Index of Names ....................................................................................... 341

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© 2010, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen ISBN Print: 978-3-525-56908-5 — ISBN E-Book: 978-3-647-56908-6

Abbreviations

As a rule, the abbreviations follow S.M. SCHWERTNER, Internationales Abkürzungsverzeichnis für Theologie und Grenzgebiete, 21993. The list below includes only those abbreviations not found in Schwertner, or that depart from it. See the bibliography for further details on the titles listed below. A31A AAC AC AN AR9 CHRC CO DLGTT DR7 DRCH EP

Ep.Ecc. ETG HaC HSC OR PrD PuD ST TNK UP Z

Apologia 31 Articuli (in: Arminius, Opera theologica) Appendix AC (in: Arminius, Opera theologica) Amica cum D. Francisco Iunio de praedestinatione per litteras habita collatio (in: Arminius, Opera theologica) Articuli Nonnulli (in: Arminius, Opera theologica) Analysis cap. IX ad Roman. (in: Arminius, Opera theologica) Church History and Religious Culture Calvin, Calvini Opera Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms De vero et genuino sensu cap. VII epistolae ad Romanos dissertatio (in: Arminius, Opera theologica) Dutch Review of Church History Examen modestum libelli, quem D. Gulielmus Perkinsius apprime doctus theologus edidit ante aliquot annos de praedestinationis modo et ordine, itemque de amplitudine gratiae divinae (in: Arminius, Opera theologica) Limborch/Hartsoecker, Praestantium ac eruditorum virorum epistolae ecclesiasticae et theologicae Arminius, Examen thesium D. Francisci Gomari de Praedestinatione (1645) Letter to Hippolytus a Collibus (in: Arminius, Opera theologica) Schriftelicke Conferentie (1612) Oratio (in: Arminius, Opera theologica) Disputationes Privatae (in: Arminius, Opera theologica) Disputationes Publicae (in: Arminius, Opera theologica) Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae Tijdschrift voor Nederlandse Kerkgeschiedenis University Press Zwingli, Sämtliche Werke

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Preface

Even though it has always been widely debated, the theology of Jacob Arminius (1559–1609) has not received the scholarly attention one would expect. Those who belong to a Reformed church will not infrequently hear the names of Arminius and his famous opponent Gomarus, and in this community “Arminius,” “Arminians” and “Remonstrants” tend to stand for anything and everything heretical. For them it is an issue of life and death, where the struggle over the decisive function of the free will, by its very nature hostile to the notion of free grace, at the cost of God’s sovereignty finds sympathy even among their own. For that reason, people often (rightly or wrongly) point to the appeal of the Evangelical movement for Reformed believers today as an example of the draw Arminian thought continues to exercise. Not only in the Netherlands, but throughout the entire world, a large part of non-Roman Catholic and non-Lutheran Christianity identifies itself as either “Arminian” or “Calvinist.” Given this remarkable influence of the theology of Arminius, it is all the more surprising how little research has been carried out on it. It is only since the 1980s that the academic world has seen some motion on this front. The present study – a doctoral dissertation defended June 27, 2008, at the Theological University Apeldoorn – intends to contribute to the understanding of Arminius’s theology by focusing on the theological motive that lay at its very foundation. The first part of this study posits that the leading motif of Arminius’s theology lay in a careful defense of the justice of God. The second part will look at the reception of his theology in the discussions between Remonstrants and Counter-Remonstrants during the Hague Conference (Haagsche or Schriftelicke Conferentie) of 1611. Finally, Arminius’s theology will be placed in the context of the sixteenth-century debate on the cause of sin and God’s relationship to evil. The issue surrounding Arminius and the Synod of Dordt (1618–1619) has fascinated me for years. It gets at the very core of the Christian confession. Election, Christ’s atoning work, grace, the appropriation of salvation and the human role in it, perseverance and assurance, calling and proclamation – all were burning issues in the seventeenth century, and Christians will continue to reflect on them existentially.

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12

Preface

I would like to express my gratitude to Herman Selderhuis, my dissertation supervisor as well as editor of the series Reformed Historical Theology from Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, for accepting this work for publication in his series. Albert Gootjes is to be thanked for his efforts and competence in producing the present translation. The apostle Paul concludes Romans 9–11, the chapters which have throughout the ages been of central importance for reflection on God’s work of election, with thanksgiving and praise. How appropriate it is to cite these words once again at the beginning of this study and at the end of the process that produced it, to express my thanks to God and to acknowledge the limits of our human knowledge and understanding. It is my prayer that this study will lead to the greater thanks and praise of my Lord and God. Oh, the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable his judgments, and his paths beyond tracing out! “Who has known the mind of the Lord? Or who has ever been his councillor?” “Who has ever given to God, that God should repay him?” For from him and through him and to him are all things. To him be the glory forever! Amen. (Rom. 11:33–36 NIV)

Nunspeet, June 2010

William den Boer

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1. Introduction

1.1 Historical Introduction 1.1.1 Life and Work of Jacobus Arminius Jacobus Arminius,1 or Jacob Harmensz, was born in Oudewater in the province of Utrecht in 1559. His father died around the same time. The priest Theodorus Aemillius (until 1574), and then Rudolphus Snellius, successively served as his guardians. Snellius took Arminius with him to Marburg where he studied and later taught Ramistic logic, in order to make it possible for Arminius to study at the Paedagogium. During this stay in Marburg, Oudewater was burned to the ground by Spanish troops, who also murdered its inhabitants, including Jacobus’s mother, sister and older brother(s). On October 23, 1576, Arminius matriculated at the university of Leiden, which had been established on October 3, 1574. He was its twelfth student. Aside from the subjects that formed part of the artes liberales, Arminius most likely also attended lectures in theology during this time. The local shopkeepers’ guild (Kramersgilde) of Amsterdam later made it possible for Arminius to pursue studies out of the country at its expense, with the condition that he serve the church of Amsterdam upon the completion of his studies. On January 1, 1582, Arminius enrolled at the Genevan Academy under Theodore Beza. He enrolled again on December 10, 1584, having come ————— 1 BANGS, Arminius (1971), remains an excellent study on Arminius’s life and work, and was corrected and expanded on several points by Eef Dekker in his dissertation (DEKKER, Rijker dan Midas). See also HOENDERDAAL, “Jacob Arminius”; HOENDERDAAL, “Life and Struggle”; HOENDERDAAL, “Arminius, Jacobus/Arminianismus”; BAKHUIZEN VAN DEN BRINK, “Arminius te Leiden”. Numerous summaries and evaluations of the biographical and theological studies on Arminius that appeared before 1991 have already been given, and I in general follow what has been remarked by MULLER, God, Creation, and Providence (1991), DEKKER, Rijker dan Midas (1993), WITT, Creation, Redemption and Grace (1993), STANGLIN, Assurance (2007) and CLARKE, Ground (2006), cf. STANGLIN, “Arminius and Arminianism: An Overview of Current Research”, 3–16. At the moment, there appears to be no need for a new biographical study of Arminius. For that reason, I will not give a comprehensive overview, but rather a short outline of Arminius’s life and work with special focus on the points relevant to this study. For a comprehensive, annotated bibliography of the works of Arminius, see STANGLIN/MULLER, “Bibliographia Arminiana”, 263– 290.

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14

Introduction

back to Geneva some time before August 27 that year. In the intervening time, most probably because he foresaw problems in Geneva for giving private lessons in Ramistic logic,2 Arminius publicly defended theses on eight occasions in Basel, beginning in September 1582. These disputations were held under the presidence of Johann Jakob Grynaeus (1540–1617), who was very taken in by Arminius’s intelligence. Arminius interrupted this second stay in Geneva only one time with a journey to Zürich. In the summer of 1586, Arminius went to Italy where he spent some seven months at the university of Padua, studying with the renowned Jacopo Zabarella (1532–1589). Before leaving for Amsterdam in the fall of 1587, where he was ordained as pastor on August 27, 1588, Arminius once again spent several months in Geneva. Most probably around 1590, Arminius was asked by Martinus Lydius, professor at Franeker, to respond to two pastors from Delft, Reginaldus Donteclock3 and Arent Cornelisz,4 who had refuted the views of Dirck Volckertsz Coornherts on predestination that departed from those of Beza. This detail, along with several others,5 allows us to conclude that it was around the year 1590 that Arminius began to doubt the correctness of Beza’s predestinarian viewpoint.6 However, neither Coornhert, nor Donteclock and Cornelisz, seem to have been considered acceptable alternatives. And so from 1590 onwards, Arminius was hard at work trying to come up with what he thought to be a biblical view of predestination. From November 6, 1588, to September 30, 1601, Arminius preached on Paul’s letter to the Romans. His Amsterdam colleague Petrus Plancius (1552–1622)7 responded to his exegesis of Romans 7 (1591) by accusing him of Pelagianism, an over-dependence on the church fathers, departure from the Belgic Confession and Heidelberg Catechism, perfectionism, and errant views on predestination.8 Arminius responded with his De vero et genuino sensu cap. VII epistolae ad Romanos dissertatio, first published in 1612, where he explained that the “I” of Romans 7 is not a regenerate person, nor “purely” unregenerate, but one who through the work of the Holy ————— DEKKER, Rijker dan Midas, 23. BLGNP 2, 173–176. 4 BLGNP 4, 104–107. 5 See DEKKER, Rijker dan Midas, 28 Cf. Letter from Arminius to Grynaeus, March 23, 1591, in: BRANTIUS, Historia Vitae Ar6 minii, 23–27. In this letter Arminius explains to Grynaeus what disputes are arising on such topics as (the object of) predestination, free choice and original sin. Arminius asks Grynaeus, for whom he had great respect, for advice. The letter contains a confession from Arminius as well: “Credo in unico Christo salutem nostram positam, hujus nos mera gratia per Spiritus Sancti efficaciam fide participes fieri ad remissionem peccatorum et vita renovationem.” BLGNP 3, 291–295. 7 8 DEKKER, Rijker dan Midas, 31. 2

3

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Historical Introduction

15

Spirit has come under the law, and is thus in the process of regeneration.9 An important section of this work will receive extensive treatment in 3.3.3. In 1593 Plancius once again raises objections to Arminius’s exegesis, this time on Romans 9. We know how Arminius understood this chapter from the extant consistory records of the deliberations that were sparked by Plancius’s objections,10 and especially from the long letter – published posthumously – he wrote to Gellius Snecanus11 in 1596 on the latter’s commentary on Romans 9. The distinguishing feature of Arminius’s exegesis is that he considers that the overall scope of Paul’s epistle to the Romans, justification by faith, should also govern the exegesis of chapters 9 through 11. Jacob is the type of those who seek to be justified by faith in Jesus Christ, while Esau stands for those who reject the Gospel and try to be justified by their own works of the law. God elects the first group, while the second is the object of reprobation.12 For that reason, Dekker has described Arminius’s view of predestination as a “predestination by property” (eigenschappen-predestinatie): God elects those who have the property of faith, and condemns those who have the property of unbelief. In section 3.3.2 we will not only flesh out Arminius’s view of predestination as found in his letter to Snecanus, but also consider the accuracy of Dekker’s description. On December 10, 1596, Arminius met Franciscus Junius (1545–1602), professor at Leiden.13 This meeting was to lead to an extensive correspondence between the two, focused particularly on the object of predestination. From this epistolary exchange that took place in different stages throughout 1597, it becomes clear that Arminius is above all concerned that sin committed from a free will must be presupposed in the object of predestination. Arminius cannot conceive how God could otherwise not be held accountable for sin and the origin of evil. Copies of these letters, which were published posthumously as Amica cum D. Francisco Iunio de praedestinatione per litteras habita collatio (1613), appear to have circulated in manuscript form, and as early as 1597 were seen by a number of individuals including Plancius.14 It is remarkable that in this phase of Arminius’s life and work, his view of predestination clearly already had the form it would continue to have, even though his extant works contain barely any treatment on free choice, and certainly no carefully nuanced exposition. The election of believers, the reprobation of unbelievers, sin presupposed in the object of predestination – ————— 9 10 11 12 13 14

Cf. the account in SELDERHUIS, Handboek, 415. BANGS, 149; DEKKER, Rijker dan Midas, 31–32. BLGNP 2, 213–215. Cf. the account in SELDERHUIS, Handboek, 416. BLGNP 2, 275–278. BLGNP 3, 292; DEKKER, Rijker dan Midas, 33 n. 72.

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Introduction

all are themes that pertain to God’s relationship to sin and evil. Arminius calls those who argue that sin followed necessarily and infallibly from God’s decree “blasphemers of God’s goodness and justice.” As will be demonstrated extensively in this study, the focus on God’s goodness and especially his iustitia remained characteristic of Arminius’s theology until his death in 1609. Between 1599 and 1602, Arminius wrote his Examen modestum libelli, quem D. Gulielmus Perkinsius apprime doctus theologus edidit ante aliquot annos de praedestinationis modo et ordine, itemque de amplitudine gratiae divinae, a “varied collection of arguments and quotations.”15 In this work Arminius responds at length to William Perkins’s (1558–1602)16 De praedestinationis modo et ordine, et de amplitudine gratiae diuinae Christiana et perspicua disceptatio (1598), which the latter had written against Nicholas Hemmingius’s (1513–1600) Tractatus de gratia universali (1591).17 From the way Arminius corrects Perkins’s summary of parts of this treatise, it is clear that he was very familiar with it. According to Dekker, the Examen Perkinsiani and the pro gradu disputations form Arminius’s most important work: “It is particularly in this Examen Perkinsiani that Arminius unfolds his theological insights. For that reason we can say that the structure of his theology is actually already there by the time the position as professor comes into view.”18 As such this observation is correct. However, as has been noted above, the same could be said about the correspondence with Junius, even if it focuses more narrowly on the object of predestination while the Examen Perkinsiani treats a much wider range of topics. When both Franciscus Junius and Lucas Trelcatius Sr.19 passed away in 1602, Franciscus Gomarus (1563–1641)20 was the only remaining professor of theology at Leiden. However, the calls to have Arminius appointed to fill one of the vacancies at the same time aroused protests from those who had suspicions concerning his orthodoxy. Gomarus also protested, almost undoubtedly at the urging of others. Yet a “friendly conference” between Gomarus and Arminius, held on May 6–7, 1603, in the presence of both supporters and opponents of Arminius’s appointment satisfied Gomarus completely. In spite of their differences, he no longer doubted Arminius’s orthodoxy in the fundamentals of doctrine. This is remarkable, given that the topics that came up during this conference included not only Arminius’s ————— 15 16 17

DEKKER, Rijker dan Midas, 38. RGG 5, 224; VAN BAARSEL, Perkins. FRANDSEN, “Hemmingsen”, 18–35. For Hemmingius (Niels Hemmingsen), see: RGG4 3,

218. 18 19 20

DEKKER, Rijker dan Midas, 37–38. BLGNP 6, 315–317. BLGNP 2, 220–225.

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Historical Introduction

17

exegesis of Romans 7, but also his views on free will, contingency, God’s will, foreknowledge and predestination.21 After an examination on June 19, 1603, Arminius defended his doctoral theses De natura Dei on July 10, 1603. Dekker calls these theses “one of the richest, but at the same time most compact, sources for a nuanced understanding of Arminius’s theology.” Section 4.1 will show that, and how, Arminius clearly expressed his view on God’s justice already in this first public event. In terms of content, the duplex amor Dei is already fully present. On July 11, 1603, Arminius delivered his oration on the occasion of receiving the degree of Doctor of Divinity, speaking on the priesthood of Christ. Section 3.3.1 will show that the contents of this public address are of fundamental importance for Arminius’s theology as a whole. This is true also for the three inaugural addresses in which Arminius in September 1603 set the tone of his work as professor. In these addresses as well – on theological prolegomena: the object, author, goal and certainty of theology – God’s righteousness and justice have a central place (see especially 2.2.2). Both the central and fundamental place of Christ in predestination, as well as the primacy of God’s love for justice within his twofold love for justice and humanity (duplex amor Dei), receive attention in Arminius’s exhaustive treatment of Gomarus’s theses on predestination, the Examen thesium Gomari. In response to the disputation on predestination that was held under Arminius’s presidence on February 7, 1604, according to the regular repetitio cycle, Gomarus held his own disputation on predestination on October 31 outside of the repetitio cycle, something that was unusual though admittedly not unheard of.22 This was the first clear sign of discord between the two professors. Arminius’s Examen thesium Gomari, published in 1613, reveals much about Arminius’s theological point of departure, as well as method. The most significant themes are God’s justice and Christology. Sin, the cause of the separation between God and humankind, must first be removed through Christ before predestination can take place as the means to restore humankind before God. God’s decree to send his Son to restore what was lost is therefore not predestination itself, but necessarily precedes it. Arminius also considers whether predestination as understood by Gomarus, Calvin and Beza, does not make God the author of sin, which ————— 21 See, for example, DEKKER, Rijker dan Midas, 39, and STARREVELD, “Verslag”, 65–76. For Arminius’s time at the Leiden university and his working relationships there, see especially STANGLIN, Assurance, 23–35. 22 DEKKER, Rijker dan Midas, 44 n. 141.

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Introduction

is of “all the blasphemies which can be uttered against God, the most grievous.”23 The differences within the university of Leiden soon spread unrest in the churches. Classis Dordrecht asked synod South Holland to put an end to the controversy in the academy, as well as the broader unrest in the church. Halfway through 1605, however, it seemed that there was a good relationship of understanding between Gomarus and Arminius.24 They were able to put at ease the university curators, alarmed by the prospect of synodical interference in the internal dealings of the university, with a declaration they signed together with Trelcatius and Cuchlinus on August 10. In this declaration they agreed that there was no difference whatsoever regarding the fundamental doctrines.25 At the end of August, the synod of South Holland decided to honor the request of classis Dordrecht to ask the curators to question the three professors of theology on the controversial issues. On November 9, the synodical deputies Franciscus Lansbergius26 and Festus Hommius27 presented nine questions to the faculty, but the latter refused to cooperate. Yet Arminius managed to get a hold of these nine questions, and towards the end of 1605

————— 23 ETG 154 (III 654–655). Where applicable, references to the English translation of Arminius’s works will be given in brackets. These refer to the reprint (!) effected by Baker Book House (1991) of The Works of James Arminius, translated by James Nichols and William Nichols, 3 vols. (vol. 1–2, London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, Brown and Green, 1825–1828; vol. 3, London: Thomas Baker, 1875). The reference to the reprint-edition is significant because it corrects a pagination error in volume 1 of the nineteenth-century edition. In the Baker reprint the orations occupy p. 321–770 instead of p. 257–706 as in the original. Translations are taken from the same, with modification where necessary. 24 Cf. BANGS, Arminius, 270; Letter from Arminius to Wtenbogaert, June 7, 1605, Ep.Ecc. 77. 25 “Ex Gestis Academicis. Professores facultatis Theologicae, quum ipsis relatum esset, Classem Dordracenam hac gravamen forma conceptum inter caetera posuisse, Quum in Ecclesia et Academia Leidensi, rumor sit, controversias quasdam circa doctrinam reformatorum Ecclesiarum obortas esse, censuit Classis, necessarium esse, ut de iis controversiis quam tutissime citissimeque, componendis Synodus deliberet, ut schismata omnia et offendicula qua inde oriri possunt, tempstive amoveantur, conserveturque unio Ecclesiarum reformatarum contra adversariorum calumniam; D.D. Curatoribus et Consulibus sciscitantibus, num qua ipsis controversiae istiusmodi essent perspectae, re inter se primum examinata seorsim perpensaque, unamimiter responerunt: Optasse se, a Classe Dordracena melius ordinatiusque in hac re actum esse: Inter studiosos quidem opinari se plura disputari, quam ipsis gratum sit; inter se vero, hoc est facultatis Theologicae professors, nullum discrimen, quod quidem constet, esse in fundamentis doctrinae. Daturos quoque operam, ut quae inter studiosos disputations istiusmodi obortae sunt mnuantur. Actum X. Aug. Anno 1605. Subscripsere, Iacobus Arminius pro tempore Rector Academie. Franciscus Gomarus. Lucas Trelcatius.” ARMINIUS, Disputationes Magnam partem S. Theologiae complectentes. 26 BLGNP 4, 292–293. 27 BLGNP 2, 251–254; WIJMINGA, Festus Hommius.

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he wrote his Responsio ad questiones novem.28 The questions concern such issues as the relationship between election and faith, original sin, good works, the gracious character of faith, assurance, perseverance and the possibility of perfection. For our present inquiry, what is particularly important is that in the context of the second point it is asked whether from the assumption that God determines and governs all things – also evil human acts for good ends – one must conclude that God is the author of sin. We fully agree with Dekker who notes that particularly this question “was considered by Arminius to be of greatest relevance. His own answer to this question is a ‘yes,’ and is argued extensively in different places throughout his works.”29 We can only guess as to why Arminius in a letter to Johannes Wtenbogaert30 on these nine questions, treats every single question except this second one concerning God’s authorship of sin. Was it because they were so fully agreed on this point that Arminius felt no need to devote a further word to it?31 Question five is also important. Here it is asked whether God has the right to demand faith from those who through the fall into sin are no longer capable of coming to faith by themselves, and whether God has given enough grace to all to whom the Gospel is proclaimed so as to be able to come to faith should they so desire. These questions make it clear that the synodical deputies had a good grip on the issues that surrounded the controversy in which Arminius had become embroiled. In May of 1607 a group of pastors met to prepare for a national synod that was going to be organized.32 The delegates included not only Arminius, but also Gomarus, Wtenbogaert, Johannes Bogerman33 and Sibrandus Lubbertus.34 The Conventus praeparatorius can be considered a “milestone in the history of the Remonstrant disputes,”35 because it marked the end of the pre-history. Here the two parties were able to size up each other’s strength, and diverging opinions were laid out and defended, with the result that the disunity increased. The dispute sharpened and also became known beyond the boundaries of the Netherlands, particularly with the letters Lubbertus sent to theologians outside of the Dutch Republic. Lubbertus sent letters reporting on the Conventus to Paris, Heidelberg, Scotland, Geneva and Zürich. Arminius and Wtenbogaert, on the other hand, did all they could to ————— 28 These questions have been reproduced (sometimes in abbreviated form) in: DEKKER, Rijker dan Midas, 45. 29 DEKKER, Rijker dan Midas, 46. 30 BLGNP 2, 464–468; ROGGE, Wtenbogaert. 31 Letter to Wtenbogaert, December 31, 1605, Ep.Ecc. 81 (I 179–180; II 69–71). 32 See DE GROOT, “Conventus”, 129–166. 33 BLGNP 2, 73–76. 34 BLGNP 1, 143–145. 35 DE GROOT, “Conventus”, 163.

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counter them. Their complaints about the allegations being spread against them, which they finally brought to the very States of Holland, led to the States’ decision to summon Arminius and Gomarus before the High Council in order to explain their views.36 This meeting took place on May 30 and 31, 1608.37 The letter Arminius wrote on April 5, 1608, to Hippolytus a Collibus, ambassador of the Palatinate to the Netherlands, is not only to be considered a good summary of his views on several of the debated issues,38 but it also gives considerable insight into the point of departure for his theology. It thus speaks not only about the need to avoid any line of reasoning that has God’s authorship of sin and evil as consequence, but also about the normative function of justice for God’s acts. At the end of his letter, Arminius adds that he is tired of being burdened with new complaints on a daily basis, and having to respond to them. That Arminius was not exaggerating is clear from the lists39 that circulated from 1606 onwards of heresies Arminius (and to a lesser extent Adrianus Borrius40) was said to be promoting. In 1608 Arminius manages to get a hold of such a list, by now inflated to 31 articles, and responds to them in his Apologia D. Iacobi Arminii adversus articulos quosdam theologicos. Arminius’s defense was probably not published officially, but in manuscript form it at any rate was known already at the end of 1608.41 Here Arminius time and again points to the context in which he made certain statements, and also remarks on the lack of precision with which views attributed to him were formulated. In addition to the issues that came up in the earlier list of 9 questions, the 31 articles also treat necessity and contingency, and what must be understood by “sufficient grace.” Returning to May 30 and 31, 1608, we see Arminius and Gomarus appear before the High Council in order to lay out their views so as to arrive at a mutual understanding, and “to see whether they could be moved to agreement, to brotherly friendship and to the right hand of fellowship.”42 Because Gomarus refused to give an account before a secular government, the decision was instead taken that Arminius and Gomarus would respond to each other in writing. When, at the end of the discussions that followed ————— DE GROOT, “Conventus”, 162–164. Cf. HOENDERDAAL, Verklaring, 9–15. See below. 38 Cf. DEKKER, Rijker dan Midas, 46. 39 Cf. HOENDERDAAL, Verklaring, 12. 40 BLGNP 2, 84–85. 41 See DEKKER, Rijker dan Midas, 47, n. 155 and 156. For text (and Dutch translation), see DEKKER, Rijker dan Midas, 273–276 (appendix 5). 42 As cited in HOENDERDAAL, Verklaring, 16: “sulcks te sien of men se tot accoord broederlijcke vrundschap ende onderlinge hantgevinge kon bewegen”. 36 37

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this decision,43 the president of the High Council announced to the States that the differences did not concern the fundamental articles of salvation, Gomarus protested and claimed that he would not dare to appear before God’s judgment seat with such views. Arminius responded that he was unaware of any deviation from Scripture or confession, and would be ready to defend himself before a national or provincial synod, or before the States. A request was thus sent to Arminius on October 20, 1608, to appear before the States of Holland and to give a declaration of his sentiments there. Arminius did so on October 30, and himself would later claim that he there openly stated his views. Arminius’s declaration was then passed to the States in written form, and first published in 1610. The Declaration of Sentiments (Verclaringhe) is the last extensive account extant where Arminius himself wrote up his views on the debated issues. In the minutes of the States of Holland from October 30, 1608, we find a concise record of Arminius’s greatest concerns: Following the events of this assembly as recorded above, there appeared today in the same assembly Doctor Jacobus Arminius, Doctor and Professor at the University of Leiden. Following the customary exhortation to declare his thoughts openly on the issues he was pondering, he declared (upon the firm assurance made to him by the assembly that the things he would reveal to it would not be brought up in classis or any other church assembly, in the university or on the pulpit) predestination and its consequences to be the most important issues: that is, that God has determined from eternity to create the greater majority of people to destruction and the smaller part to salvation without any consideration of their works, as is being taught in the University of Leiden. He said that this conflicts with God’s nature, and that this doctrine therefore was not the foundation of Christian salvation [...].44

According to these minutes, therefore, Arminius’s greatest difficulty is with a doctrine of predestination that teaches creation to destruction, and is for that reason in conflict with God’s nature. The contents of the Declaration ————— 43 Dekker notes that Arminius wrote up his objections in 26 theses, and Gomarus in 31. He argues that Arminius’s articles can be read as a first draft of the Verclaringhe. DEKKER, Rijker dan Midas, 49 n. 165. 44 Cited in HOENDERDAAL, Verklaring, 18: “Achtervolgende voorgaende aenschrijven deser Vergaderinge, is huyden in deselve verschenen Doctor Jacobus Erminius, Doctor ende Professor in de Universiteyt tot Leyden, en heeft op de vermaninge aen hem volgende het gedaene aenschrijven, rondelijck te willen verklaeren, op hetgene hij in bedencken hadde, geseyt ende verklaerdt, dat op de vaste verseeckeringhe die hij hem vertrouwde, van dat het geene haer geopent soude werden, niet en soude gebracht werden in Classikale, ofte andere Kerckenvergaeringe, in de Universiteyt, nochte op den Predickstoel het meeste te wesen, het stuck van de Praedestinatie ende gevolge van dien; als te weten, dat Godt van eeuwigheyt af beslooten hadde, het meerendeel der Menschen te scheppen tot verdoemenisse, ende het andere minderdeel ter saligheyt, sonder eenigh aensien der Wercken, gelijck sulcks in de Universiteyt van Leyden werde geleert, ende dat hij seyde sulcks te strijden tegen Godes natuyre, ende daerom die Leere niet en was het fondament der Christelijcker Salichheyt […].”

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confirm that this was indeed an accurate summary. The Declaration is not only Arminius’s last work, but on a number of points it also represents the most full and crystallized expression of Arminius’s conviction. Precisely because of the setting in which the declaration was made, a certain rhetorical element is not absent in it.45 Yet even when this is taken into account, one must conclude that in the Declaration Arminius has more than purely rhetorical concerns, and is not just there to try and persuade his audience, which was trained more in politics than in theology, with solid and convincing arguments. The Declaration is also very significant because of its theological content. This is not so much because new issues come up, but because Arminius here expresses his views very clearly, in some cases in a way that we do not see in his earlier writings.46 Early in 1609, Arminius falls seriously ill from the tuberculosis he had suffered from for many years already. On July 25, he still presides over a public disputation on calling, but it turns out to be the last. A “friendly conference” organized by the States between Gomarus and Arminius on August 13 brings him to his feet one more time.47 However, in the course of the conference Arminius becomes so sick that he has to return home. On September 12 he writes to the States that he will most likely be unable to make good on his promise to put everything down in writing one more time. He dies little more than a month later on October 19, no more than 50 years old. The pamphlet war which had broken out continued unabated.48 The dispute was now public, and had already resulted in such polarization that even the death of Arminius could not bring it to an end. In January 1610 some forty pastors met together in Gouda under the leadership of Wtenbogaert. It was here that the Remonstrance was produced as a defense of Arminius’s position. This Remonstrance became the cause of serious unrest, and led to a States-organized conference to discuss its contents. This conference, which became known as the Hague Conference, as well as the records of the discussions that took place there, will receive attention in the second part of this study. ————— 45 In my opinion, this is also why the terminology is “less sharp” than, for example, in the Examen Perkinsiani, as has also been noted by DEKKER, Rijker dan Midas, 51. That Dekker on this basis questions whether the Verclaringhe can serve as an accurate and complete summary of Arminius’s thought can be attributed to his own interest in, and preference for, systematic precision. 46 Only in this limited sense is Hoenderdaal correct when, in reference to the Declaration, he remarks that he has the impression that throughout the course of the entire struggle, Arminius’s definitive views were formed only late. HOENDERDAAL, Verklaring, 14. 47 See the report of this conference in a letter from Hommius to Lubbertus. This letter can be found in WIJMINGA, Festus Hommius, Appendix G. Section 4.1 below will deal with this letter. 48 Cf. HAKKENBERG, Controversy.

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1.1.2 Other Works of Arminius We still need to remark on the extant Arminius works that have not come up in the biographical survey above. These include his “note-book” (aantekeningenschrift),49 and particularly the disputations that were held under his presidence at the university of Leiden. Finally, Arminius’s correspondence, which has already been referred to above occasionally, may also be listed as a separate category.50 Articuli nonnulli This note-book contains more than two hundred loose statements or considerations from Arminius, and was first published in 1613 as the Articuli nonnulli.51 Originally the theses were marked with certain signs to indicate agreement or disagreement, but these marks were not included in any printed edition. As result, we lack explicit certainty with respect to Arminius’s view of the theses recorded, and this factor must be taken into account when using the Articuli nonnulli. However, there are so many parallels between these theses and the rest of Arminius’s writings that his view on almost all of them can be determined with virtually complete certainty. Disputations and Authorship For the majority of the available sources of Arminius’s theology, there are no questions regarding authorship, and/or whether the contents indeed reflect Arminius’s viewpoint. Yet a difficult issue, which in my opinion cannot be solved, is the authorship of the academic disputations that were held in Leiden under Arminius’s presidence from 1603 to 1609, and which constitute a significant portion of his extant writings. In the Opera theologica (1629) the 25 public and 79 private disputations cover a total of 258 pages. Stanglin’s ventures into the archives have unearthed another 36 hitherto unknown disputations which likewise belong to Arminius’s tenure as professor. His extensive discussion on the issue of authorship for the disputations is a significant contribution.52 In what follows, I too will treat this ————— DEKKER, Rijker dan Midas, 52. The extant letters to and from Arminius, inventoried by DEKKER, Rijker dan Midas, 256– 259 (Appendix 1), can mostly be found in Ep.Ecc. MARONIER, Arminius, and BANGS, Arminius, have made extensive use of them in their biographies, and many letters were fully or partly translated by James and William Nichols in their annotations to the translation of Arminius’s works. 51 The complete title is: Articuli nonnulli diligenti examine perpendendi, eo quod inter ipsos Reformatae Religionis Professores de iis aliqua incidit controversia. 52 STANGLIN, Assurance, 36–58. See also STANGLIN, The Missing Public Disputations. 49 50

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question, but arrive at a different conclusion. Thereafter I will support my conclusion with further argumentation, and finally lay out its consequences as well. First, however, it will be necessary to give an unambiguous definition of what is understood in this study by the word “view” (understanding, meaning, standpoint). Because we are attempting to uncover Arminius’s deepest personal and theological motives (cf. 1.3), with “view” we mean someone’s personal and complete conviction. Understood in this way, “view” stands in contrast to an exposition of that personal conviction where, for whatever reason relating to form and/or content (e.g. for the sake of caution), the situation in which that exposition was made must be taken into account. Here the context, audience, expected impact or desired reaction play a great role. What we mean is that in such a situation, the connection between a person’s conviction and a public exposition of it can actually be so distant that the latter is not in a direct sense representative of the former. It goes without saying that the distinction drawn here between view/conviction and expression is somewhat theoretical, and that in practice the difference is more gradual. What is more, those who work with written records have only the written expression of a personal conviction, and must proceed from the assumption that the author intends to express his personal conviction openly, and that this author, except where the situation gives reason to think otherwise, does not intend to mislead later readers or researchers. When this methodological standpoint is applied concretely to the case of Arminius, it has important consequences. The circumstances in which the works attributed to Arminius were produced vary widely. His sixteenthcentury, posthumously-published works, his personal letters to friends, colleagues and acquaintances that were not intended for publication, and his personal notes can all virtually without reserve be classified as “personal conviction.” However, especially after his appointment as professor, Arminius increasingly – in terms of both intensity and the number of people involved – came under pressure from the polemics and the suspicion directed against him. As result, when reading Arminius’s public statements from this period, one must take serious account of the caution with which he will have broached the controverted topics. And in the case of the disputations, there are also the issues of genre and authorship. Arminius’s Declaration of Sentiments which he made before the States of Holland in 1608, forms a sort of “middle category.” Arminius promised to speak openly of his deepest convictions, on the condition that the governmental body that was by and large favorable to him – his audience there – would not make his declaration public. Although it was public and made in a polemical context, the necessity of giving a clear and straightforward explanation, together with the promise of secrecy by those present, will have inspired

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enough confidence in Arminius to speak openly and without dissimulation. A comparison of its contents with other “non-suspect” sources shows that Arminius did indeed most likely speak openly and without reserve. With respect to disputations, Rouwendal has written the following: From ca. 1250 onwards, part of the normal task of each magister (master, professor) was the regular organization of disputations. The magister assigned a topic (quaestio: question) that was treated during such a disputation. He then drew up a number of theses (articuli) on this topic. A previously appointed student (respondens: respondent) had to respond to the objections (objectiones) directed against him by other students. Notes were made of both objections and responses, so that at the conclusion of the disputation a collection of both was available, which the magister then used for the definitive determination (determinatio: determinatio; or solutio: solution) sometimes held on the next day, but usually in the week that followed. Also this written determination was given the name disputatio. However, such written disputations did not give a literal record of the course of the disputations themselves, and must therefore be distinguished from them.53

The fact that it is not always possible to determine with complete certainty whether it was the magister or the respondens who wrote the disputation, or whether it is a mixture of the views of both magister and respondens, poses considerable problems for the question of authorship.54 This lack of certainty applies to both types of disputations (pro gradu and exercitii gratia),55 and as a rule falls away only if the title explicitly indicates who authored that particular disputation. The following quotation from Willem Otterspeer’s history of the university of Leiden is illustrative: The author of the theses was often not, as has long been thought, the praeses of the disputation, but rather the defendens himself. However, these disputations were often

————— 53 ROUWENDAL, “Leerwijze”, 57: “Vanaf ongeveer 1250 behoorde het met regelmaat organiseren van disputaties tot de vaste taak van elke magister (meester, professor). De magister gaf een onderwerp (quaestio: vraagstuk) op dat tijdens een dergelijke disputatie behandeld werd. Hij stelde over dit onderwerp een aantal stellingen (articuli) op. Een van te voren aangewezen student (de respondens; beantwoorder) diende de door andere studenten aangevoerde tegenwerpingen (objectiones) te beantwoorden. Zowel de tegenwerpingen als de antwoorden werden genotuleerd zodat men aan het einde van de disputatie van beide een verzameling had, die de magister gebruikte voor de definitieve beantwoording (determinatio; beslissing, of solutio: oplossing) van het probleem, meestal op de volgende collegedag. Deze op schrift gestelde beantwoordingen kregen ook de naam disputatio. Zulke geschreven disputaties gaven echter geen letterlijk verslag van het verloop van een disputatie en moeten derhalve onderscheiden worden van het gebeuren zelf.” 54 Cf. e.g. FREEDMAN, “Process”: “Disputations were normally held by a presider (praeses) together with one or more respondents (respondens; respondentes) and with one or more opponents; in most cases, the authorship of disputations is not specified.” 55 A pro gradu disputation is one held for the purposes of obtaining an academic degree; the exercitii gratia disputations were those held for the purposes of instruction and practice in the skill of debating.

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more a matter of diligent copying than original thought, and the literature on which the theses were based was limited to a number of easily accessible sources. Private disputations, and disputations collected under the name of the professor, on the other hand, were often composed by the praeses.56

For the purposes of cataloguing, the general rule is indeed to identify the praeses as the author, unless there are strong indications to the contrary. There is much to be said for that, all the more because the magister was always held responsible for the content of the disputations that were held under his presidence. However, when disputations are intended to be used for the analysis and description of the thought of a magister, a greater amount of certainty is needed. There is no reason whatsoever to assume that the problems of disputation authorship do not apply to those held under Arminius’s presidence. In his discussion of authorship, Stanglin considers the arguments of Ahsmann57 who, against the usual assumption and apparently in contrast to the practice at most universities,58 has argued that in the period studied by her (1575–1630) at Leiden, it was as a rule the student himself who formulated the theses.59 Ahsmann’s arguments can be summarized as follows: 1. Many unpublished disputations have been found in manuscript form from the hand of the defendens. 2. A letter from a law student who writes that he wrote his own theses. 3. Petrus Cunaeus, professor of law at Leiden, often cites the disputations of students without mentioning the name of the praeses, and in his journal writes that a certain student wrote (conscripserat) 156 theses – the assumption being that the remarkable thing is the large number of theses, rather than student authorship. 4. The dedicatory page suggests student authorship, as do the carmina gratulatoria written by fellow students which commonly closed disputations in praise of the respondens’s erudition. Stanglin considers Ahsmann’s first two arguments weak, and further highlights the fact that her study concerns the law faculty. He thus suggests that her arguments cannot simply be transferred to the faculty of theology. For Stanglin, Ahsmann’s fourth and strongest argument is also rendered impotent by that fact. “Rather than indication of his authorship, the student is merely dedicating and being praised for his performance in the face of opposition.”60 Stanglin concludes: ————— 56 57 58 59 60

OTTERSPEER, Groepsportret, 236. Otterspeer bases himself on AHSMANN, Collegia. AHSMANN, Collegia, 311–323. STANGLIN, Assurance, 47, cf. n. 114. STANGLIN, Assurance, 47. STANGLIN, Assurance, 49.

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even if the text of the disputation theses did not originate with the student, the success of the disputation depended on the student’s ability to defend against objections with appeals to proper scriptural or traditional authority and with clever, logical argumentation. His performance, the culmination of years of education, was rightly dedicated to those who influenced the training that made the defense possible. Therefore, the dedications and congratulatory poems, rather than providing evidence for student authorship, can be seen as consistent with the following evidence for professoral authorship.61

Stanglin accepts the disputations as “accurate representations” of Arminius’s theology, and summarizes “convincing evidence” in the form of four arguments: 1. In his letter to Hippolytus a Collibus, as well as in the Declaration, Arminius himself refers to his public disputations. “Without doubt, Arminius would not point the magistrates inquiring about his theology to the composition of students.” Also in letters to his friends, Arminius claims authorship of certain disputations. Never does he name the respondens, or suggest that the student made any kind of contribution. 2. The praeses, in this case Arminius, regularly defended the theses over against an opponens. “The defense that Arminius gives is not in order to rescue the student’s reputation, but to deliver his own theses from charges of heterodoxy.”62 3. The disputations held under the presidence of Arminius and his colleagues were by their contemporaries considered to be the composition of the professors. To establish this point, Stanglin points to Wtenbogaert’s observation that Arminius’s private disputations can be considered a sort of systematic theology.63 What is more, disputations were published under the name of their authors. Although the title pages of the original disputations contained the names of both the presiding professor and the respondent, the professors themselves were praised or blamed for the content in the disputations. A professor’s responsibility for thetical content was not limited to a kind of general oversight of the shape of the disputation, but his responsibility extended to the minutest details.64

In all cases where professors were approached regarding the content of disputations, “the professors never blamed the content of the disputations on student input. This silence would seem to preclude any notion of students contributing anything meaningful to the actual text of the printed theses.”65 4. A comparison of disputations with other writings from the same professor, as well as with other disputations held by the same profes————— 61 62 63 64 65

STANGLIN, Assurance, 50. STANGLIN, Assurance, 52. The validity and use of this argument will be considered below. STANGLIN, Assurance, 53. STANGLIN, Assurance, 53.

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sor on the same subject, shows “striking similarities” and “much verbal similarity” or even “verbal dependence,” thus suggesting one common author. After these arguments in favor of professorial authorship, Stanglin gives two “genuine caveats.” 1. The first two disputations over which Arminius presided contain “some things not exactly in accord with his own opinions.” If Bertius’s testimony is to be accepted, “then there are public disputations over which Arminius presided that he neither composed nor completely endorsed.” So how can we be certain of authorship for any public disputation? Stanglin points out that we are here dealing with a unique situation, and that this exception in fact confirms the norm of professorial authorship. What is more, given that the disputations themselves increasingly became a means of polemic among the faculty, it is a safe assumption that Arminius only tolerated student authorship as a concession for students who were not yet used to his oversight.66

2. A second caveat is based on a letter from Arminius to Wtenbogaert, where he writes about a certain disputation that he wrote it himself, and that Wtenbogaert should be able to see this from the style and structure of the disputation. However, in the postscriptum Arminius writes: “I also add other theses to be disputed tomorrow, which not I, but the respondens put together, only with very few things changed and added by me” (Addo etiam alias theses cras disputandas, quas non ego, sed ipse Respondens confecit, pauculis a me tantum mutatis et additis). Here we thus have clear evidence that at least one disputation was written by the respondent himself. Stanglin admits that a degree of caution must be exercised with respect to authorship, but adds that “Arminius’s statement still falls short of overturning my hypothesis.” He gives the following reasons: 1. It is reasonable for Arminius to note explicitly that he authored a certain disputation, precisely because he includes with the letter a disputation that he did not write himself. 2. Arminius also indicates that he made several corrections, which confirms that what is written does not conflict with his own view. It also proves 3. that Arminius granted latitude of authorship on less controversial topics, such as the human nature of Christ. It is hard to imagine him allowing a student to compose theses on predestination or any other explicitly soteriological topic that would likely come under the sharp scrutiny of his faculty colleagues.

Stanglin concludes: ————— 66

STANGLIN, Assurance, 55.

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In light of the overwhelming evidence that professorial authorship of the public practice disputations in the Leiden faculty of theology was the rule during the time of Arminius, we may confidently affirm that the disputations are accurate portrayals of the presiding professor’s thought.67

Stanglin wants to apply the “criterion of continuity,” so that there is to be doubt only if a disputation conflicts with another disputation from the same professor. Even if the student was the principal author, according to Stanglin one should still assume that “absolutely nothing contained in the theses would contradict the professor’s opinion.”68 The greatest objection against Stanglin’s view is that in most cases a high degree of certainty, but no absolute certainty, can be achieved. Every disputation over which Arminius presided will show more or less clear traces of his involvement, also when authored by a student. However, when we are attempting to determine the nuances of Arminius’s own theology, his “view” as defined above, the nature of the disputation as a pedagogical tool and the uncertainty of authorship make Arminius’s disputations unsuitable as basic source material. However, even when authorship is established without any degree of doubt, it does not ipso facto guarantee that the contents of that disputation are representative of the author’s thought. From the conclusion cited above, it is clear that Stanglin considers a resolution to the question of authorship at the same time to settle that of representativeness of thought. This is a weak link in a strong chain of arguments for professorial authorship. It is further also striking that Stanglin himself later on argues that there is a certain ambiguity in the genre of the disputation itself. This observation, correct in itself, ought to have made him more careful when it comes to the value of the disputations, and the conclusions based on them. [T]here is a degree of ambiguity inherent within the disputation genre itself. As pointed out above, the theses are frequently stated so succinctly that they require a great deal of unpacking and context to uncover the latent divergences of thought, which undoubtedly would have been more conspicuous when the disputation was publicly defended. Inasmuch as Protestant theologians relied on biblical language and categories that are ambiguous and imprecise, the terminology in the disputations often underdetermined the contested issues. Thus, Arminius may be employing nomenclature and causes identical to those of the other Leiden theologians, but not necessarily intending an identical meaning at each point.69

————— STANGLIN, Assurance, 57–58. STANGLIN, Assurance, 58. 69 STANGLIN, Assurance, 111; cf. 44: “The written form of disputations tended to be less controversial than the public performances, where opponents were expected to raise objections and press respondents for more doctrinal precision.” These and other similar remarks on the nature of 67 68

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But it is not only the pedagogical-academic genre of the disputation that urges caution with respect to representativeness of thought. Also the polemical context and the tense relations between the professors are of great significance. They will have made Arminius careful about coming out for his views publicly and in the context of a disputation. More than once Arminius explicitly refused to give his view openly on certain issues when he was asked to. He repeatedly made it conditional on being carried out before the government, to whom he as professor was first of all responsible. It is worthwhile to cite once more from the minutes of the States of Holland from October 30, 1608: Following the events of this assembly as recorded above, there appeared today in the same assembly Doctor Jacobus Arminius, Doctor and Professor at the University of Leiden. Following the customary exhortation to declare his thoughts openly on the issues he was pondering, he declared (upon the firm assurance made to him by the assembly that the things he would reveal to it would not be brought up in classis or any other church assembly, in the university or on the pulpit) […].70

Would this same careful and reserved Arminius have expressed his divergent views openly and freely during public (and private) disputations, if this could unnecessarily have brought attention to him and caused him to be discredited? People would surely have been ready to pounce on any uncareful statements made during the disputations, but precisely in these publiclyheld disputations there is so little which could arouse suspicions of heterodoxy that Arminius himself freely referred to them such as in his letter to Hippolytus a Collibus and in his Declaration. To defend himself, he appeals to what he had stated in the public disputations “written by me” (“a me conscriptas”).71 However, this does not mean that for this reason in these disputations we encounter Arminius’s “view.” He may well have referred to his non-controversial and publicly-held disputations specifically in order to allay suspicion. It is also very understandable that Arminius would not openly distance himself from the content of the disputations over which he presided. After ————— disputations make unnuanced assertions such as “disputations are key for understanding a professor’s theology” (STANGLIN, Assurance, 44) questionable. 70 Cited in HOENDERDAAL, Verklaring, 18: “Achtervolgende voorgaende aenschrijven deser Vergaderinge, is huyden in deselve verschenen Doctor Jacobus Erminius, Doctor ende Professor in de Universiteyt tot Leyden, en heeft op de vermaninge aen hem volgende het gedaene aenschrijven, rondelijck te willen verklaeren, op hetgene hij in bedencken hadde, geseyt ende verklaerdt, dat op de vaste verseeckeringhe die hij hem vertrouwde, van dat het geene haer geopent soude werden, niet en soude gebracht werden in Classikale, ofte andere Kerckenvergaeringe, in de Universiteyt, nochte op den Predickstoel […].” 71 HaC 938 (II 690).

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all, they were both accessible and consistently uncontroversial,72 so that casting doubt on authorship or distancing himself from the contents would raise doubts as to Arminius’s dependability for parts of the disputations from which he would distance himself, which would in turn produce doubts as to the representativeness of the disputations for his view as a whole. A passage from the letter Arminius wrote to his close friend Borrius about the public disputation De libero hominis arbitrio, eiusque viribus is very illustrative in this regard. This letter in fact proves that authorship does not imply that the contents are necessarily representative of the views of the author. I transmit you my theses on free choice [de libero arbitrio], which I have composed in this [guarded] manner, because I thought that they would thus conduce to peace: I have advanced nothing which I consider at all allied to a falsity. But I have been silent upon some truths, which I might have published: For I know, that it is one thing to be silent respecting a truth, and another to utter a falsehood; the latter of which it is never lawful to do, while the former is occasionally, nay very often, expedient.73

That there could be a difference between the written version of the disputation and what came up during the actual oral defense is clear from a letter Arminius wrote to Wtenbogaert, where he evokes a disputation on the first sin of Adam and Eve, and implies the need to be careful not to take a disputation as representative of the author’s thought without qualification. Arminius writes: I composed the theses myself, as you will easily perceive from their style and order [ex stilo et ordine]. I have used much freedom in them; but I indulged myself in still greater liberty in the course of the disputation: For, I openly confuted [confutavi] necessity, and established [stabilavi] contingency, before both Gomarus and Trelcatius: I wish that you had been present.74

When Arminius writes in his letters that he had written a certain disputation, and as cited above at least one time adds that this should be clearly visible from the style and content, the very least this implies is that he is neither by definition nor always the author. Above we referred to Arminius’s appeal to the disputations he had written in his letter to Hippolytus a Collibus and the Declaration, and remarked ————— 72 This was proved one more time well after Arminius’s death in the heat of the conflict between Remonstrants and Counter-Remonstrants with the 1615 publication of the fourth series of Leiden disputations presided over by Gomarus, Arminius and Trelcatius Jr. Cf. STANGLIN, Assurance, 43. “The Leiden theology represented in the fourth repetitio was judged to be a significant statement of academic theological curriculum, for it was published as the Syntagma disputationum theologicorum in 1615.” 73 Letter to Borrius, July 25, 1605, Ep.Ecc. 78 (I 267–268.300.302; there I 267). Arminius here refers to PuD XI (II 189–196). 74 Letter to Wtenbogaert, August 3, 1604, Ep.Ecc. 70 (I 176–177; II 150–151; there II 150); cf. STANGLIN, Assurance, 56. Arminius here refers to PuD VII (II 150–157).

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that this is not of itself overwhelming reason to accept these disputations as representative of his personal conviction. A part of Stanglin’s third argument must be treated separately. This is his claim that Arminius’s private disputations were intended as the groundwork for a sort of systematic theology.75 He points to the title they received at their posthumous publication: Disputationes privatae, de plerisque Christianae religionis capitibus, incoatae potissimum ab auctore ad corporis theologici informationem.76 Clarke goes one step further77 when he follows James Nichols’s opinion – earlier rejected by Muller78 – based primarily on a letter from Arminius to Wtenbogaert from 1599, where Arminius writes that he is engaged in setting up an order for a synopsis of theological loci, and considers it clear “that this Synopsis is substantially the same as the Private Disputations, and was begun a few years ago before Arminius was considered or considered himself for the post at Leiden.”79 However, it is difficult to see why Arminius would begin to write and prepare private disputations when there was no prospect of a professorship. Also the intent to write a synopsis of theological loci is not necessarily connected to later disputations, although the research and collected materials from earlier would without doubt be useful to other ends such as the composition of theses for private disputations. One more argument could be mentioned yet, namely, that Arminius informed Wtenbogaert of his intention to write a synopsis, and that the latter referred to that same intention in his preface – admittedly signed by Arminius’s nine orphans, but most likely written by Wtenbogaert – to Arminius’s exegesis of Romans 7: To these considerations we may add, that our father had determined within himself, if God had granted him life and leisure, to write a system of the whole of the christian

————— 75 STANGLIN, Assurance, 39: “In the case of Arminius, we at least know that the collection of his private disputations served as the groundwork of the theological system he never finished writing.” Cf. 67: “Despite his intention to do so, Arminius never ordered and gathered his loci into a separate book for publication […]. However, because there is such a close relationship between loci and the disputationes in which Arminius did engage, these terms may be used interchangeably when referring to the theological topics Arminius treated in the university setting.” 76 STANGLIN, Assurance, 39, n. 86: “This fact is evident in the full title,” with a reference to Nichols’s preface in Works (II 318). 77 CLARKE, Ground, 40–42. 78 MULLER, God, Creation, and Providence, 50. 79 CLARKE, Ground, 41. This on the basis of a letter to Wtenbogaert, February 18, 1599, Ep.Ecc. 44 (as translated by Clarke): “I am engaged in constructing an order for a synopsis of Common Places in Divinity (Synopsi locorum Theologiae); I have determined to re-read all the ancient and modern divines which are to hand and which can be obtained […]. I am making a beginning with the doctrine of God, who is first in order and dignity in theology. In this I shall consider both nature and persons.” BANGS, “Introduction” in Works I, xviii, is of the opinion that the private disputations were indeed an attempt to construct a “body of divinity,” but considers Nichols’s connection to what Arminius was writing in 1599 to be dubious.

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religion, not drawing it out of the stagnant lakes of Egypt, but out of the pure fountains of Israel, and to inscribe it to your mightiness. As he was unable to execute his purpose, partly through the multiplicity of his engagements, and partly through the lingering nature of his disorder, you have here, in the place of the other work, the present commentary: For in no other way than this can the design of our father now be fulfilled.80

However, one would then expect Wtenbogaert to have published not Arminius’s commentary on Romans 7, but rather his private disputations. Thus Wtenbogaert himself does not draw a line between the private disputations and Arminius’s planned synopsis, and with that every direct link between the two falls away. Also Stanglin points to Wtenbogaert’s preface to Arminius’s work on Romans 7 in order to bolster his third argument concerning Arminius’s intention with his private disputations. He likewise appeals to Carl Bangs, although the latter only bases himself on Nichols and gives no additional support. Furthermore, in 1612 Wtenbogaert remarked that Arminius’s private disputations contain a sort of systematic overview of theology. However, this remains Wtenbogaert’s opinion, and says nothing about Arminius’s own intentions.81 This is also true for the title given to Arminius’s private disputations at their publication, since it is not clear who was responsible for it. On examining the facts, it appears that the connection often draw between Arminius’s intention to write a synopsis of the theological loci and the private disputations later held under his presidence originates from the secondary literature, and has little or no founding in the primary sources. With that, Clarke’s early dating of the private disputations can also be discarded. The implications of his early dating for the comparison that is often made between Arminius’s (earlier) public and (later, developed) private disputations are obvious.82 Stanglin’s reliance on Wtenbogaert’s testimony is questionable, but at least much less speculative. However, his view does little to strengthen his position on disputation authorship, and particularly ————— DR7 822 (II 486). STANGLIN, Assurance, 44, n. 101. 82 Cf. CLARKE, Ground, 41: “This might seem a quibble, hardly worth mentioning, except that Muller’s theological approach is considerably influenced by his belief that the Private Disputations do not date back earlier than 1603 in any form, and are generally later than the Public Disputations where the latter are on the same subject”. Clarke here cites MULLER, God, Creation, and Providence, 212: “Since […] the Public Disputations almost invariably seem to have been a first draft [of system] and the Private Disputations a refinement, the absence of a doctrine of creation from the former […] points towards the theses of the Private Disputations as a first attempt at doctrinal definition, perhaps lacking the polish of [the] final theses on the essence and attributes of God.” 80 81

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on the question as to whether or not their contents are representative of the author’s personal conviction. As I see it, the disputations cannot as such be used as primary source material for a careful analysis and exposition of the thought of the professor under whose presidence they were held. I base this on the following arguments: 1. the uncertainty with respect to authorship; and 2. even in the case of certainty with respect to authorship, the remaining uncertainty as to whether or not the contents of the disputations really represent the author’s viewpoint at that time. The implication is, of course, that much of the material that has for centuries been used without any question – though in Stanglin’s case, with careful consideration – as source for Arminius’s theology falls away. Without doubt, the disputations for the large part contain Arminius’s views, or at least do not conflict with them. This last observation to a degree moderates the ramifications of the standpoint I have taken in my study for the appreciation of those which did use the disputations as primary source material. The above does not mean that the disputations will not be referred to at all as a faithful representation of Arminius’s views. However, there is not enough of a basis to consider the disputations and other writings to which the above-mentioned difficulties and questions do not apply as source material on the same level. For the purposes of studying Arminius’s theology, the disputations will be used as sources of secondary importance. Their use will be sparing and curtailed, and in principle never to attribute something to Arminius that cannot be found in his writings, and certainly not when they conflict with the contents of his writings. The disputations are without doubt important for the climate in which Arminius laid out and developed his theological thought, and when they contain the same views found elsewhere, they can serve as confirmation. Finally, the disputations can be used in order to detect, with a certain degree of uncertainty, views of Arminius that cannot be traced in other writings. The fact that the present study will not use the disputations that were held under Arminius’s presidence as a primary source has consequences of which it will later be determined whether they were determinative for the final conclusions (see chapter 8).

1.2 State of Scholarship Arminius scholarship took on a definitive new direction particularly with the work of Richard A. Muller at the end of the 1980s, as well as Eef Dekker’s dissertation (1993). Before their studies, Arminius’s theology was

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almost exclusively approached from the five most controversial points as expressed in the Remonstrance (1610), the disputes that followed it, and finally the decisions made at the Synod of Dort (1618–1619). It was more the rule than the exception that scholars excised particular elements from the whole of Arminius’s thought, and then used them for their own purposes. The result was that for centuries, the “historical Arminius” and his “whole” theology, and with that the deepest roots of the early seventeenthcentury conflict on predestination and related issues, were hidden from view. Muller, Dekker, and more recently F. Stuart Clarke and Keith D. Stanglin, have put an end to such approaches. Their evaluations of the earlier Arminius studies are adequate,83 so that it will suffice to concentrate on more recent scholarship. Below a general overview will be given of the more important results and directions since 1980. An overview at the end forms the transition and introduction to the present study. Muller showed that Arminius was a Protestant scholastic, well aware of contemporary theological discussions within Reformed, but also Lutheran and Roman Catholic circles. Arminius was also well versed in patristic and medieval theology. He worked eclectically with his sources, but his theology can primarily be characterized as modified Thomism.84 Arminius was thus part of Reformed scholasticism as it developed in his time, and this observation should forever put to rest the characterization of Arminius as an anti-scholastic in the biblical-humanistic tradition.85 With that, the absolute contrast that has often been drawn between biblical humanism and scholastic method must be seen as an a-historical construct.86 ————— 83 MULLER, God, Creation, and Providence, 3–14; DEKKER, Rijker dan Midas; CLARKE, Ground, 1–9; STANGLIN, Assurance, 2–10; 2: “the scarce quantity and often deficient quality of scholarship dealing with Arminius are surprising.” Cf. STANGLIN, “Arminius and Arminianism: An Overview of Current Research”, 3–16. See also WITT, Creation, Redemption and Grace, 187– 210; MULLER, “Christological Problem”, 145. HICKS, Theology of Grace, a.o. 1–3.25. The earlier studies referred to here include: LAKE, “Theology of Grace”; HOENDERDAAL, “Theologische betekenis”; DELL, Man’s Freedom and Bondage; SLAATTE, Arminian Arm; BROWN, Analysis of Romans 7; HUGGINS, Romans 7. 84 MULLER, God, Creation, and Providence, 39; STANGLIN, Assurance, 158. 85 Cf. STANGLIN, Assurance, 3–4: “far from being anti-scholastic, more recent scholarship has correctly shown that, in addition to being a biblical, humanist theologian, Arminius, like his contemporary friends and foes, was theologically trained in the scholastic method, and was not opposed to using that training skillfully to his advantage. Even a cursory reading of the majority of his works demonstrates his continuity with the development of Protestant scholasticism.” For Arminius’s theological method, see STANGLIN, Assurance, 58–70; 64: “Arminius’s own contemporaries widely acknowledged his skill in logic.” On the same page the view of “older scholarship that Arminius was more of a biblical humanist than a scholastic” is also rejected as unfounded. See further MULLER, “Arminius and the Scholastic Tradition”. 86 Cf. VAN ASSELT, “Protestantse scholastiek”, 65–66, who on the point of the relation between scholasticism and humanism points to the important study of KRISTELLER, Renaissance Thought.

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Muller’s focus on Arminius’s views on the doctrines of God, creation and providence has shown that these generally non-controversial loci are of fundamental importance for understanding his theology. The choices Arminius made in these loci have consequences, and they give rise to the controversial positions for which he became (in)famous. Muller later abandoned his initial careful characterization of Arminius as a “theologian of creation,” but did show the important place the doctrine of creation occupies in his thought. “God’s self-limitation” that is to have been inherent in Arminius’s doctrine on creation, and which forms one of the important conclusions in Muller’s work as well as that of his student Raymond A. Blacketer, has been contested by Dekker. Our own research will show that the latter was indeed correct in his critique. In his dissertation (1993), Eef Dekker made a careful, systematic analysis of Arminius’s thought on freedom, grace and predestination. His repeated claim that Arminius’s theology is at times incoherent and inconsistent so that it cannot always be determined precisely what Arminius thought about a certain topic, comes from the system Dekker himself used as his measure and imposed on Arminius’s theology from the outside.87 As result, historical and systematic points are not always easily distinguishable. Nevertheless, Dekker made significant contributions to Arminius scholarship, among them the observation that Arminius is continually concerned to maintain two levels of freedom for human acts. On this basis Dekker calls Arminius a “theologian of freedom.” Also this characterization can be disputed, and will be treated further below. It was also in 1993 that William G. Witt defended his dissertation on Arminius. His voluminous (unpublished) dissertation,88 which does not make use of Muller’s significant study (1991), in general gives a good description of Arminius’s theology. Witt depicts Arminius primarily as a Thomistic theologian, and identifies the source of Arminius’s departure from the mainstream of Reformed theology above all in his intellectualism, as opposed to the voluntarism that was more prevalent among his contemporaries. This is an interesting interpretation, which will be treated more extensively in 2.3.2 and 7.2. ————— 87 Cf. VAN DEN BRINK, “Armer”, 15.17, on the methodology of DEKKER, Rijker dan Midas. Van den Brink argues that Dekker identifies in Arminius’s works dilemmas which would have been entirely foreign to him. “Was het niet veel beter geweest om Arminius eerst eens voor zichzelf te laten spreken, zijn theologie toetsend aan zijn eigen begrippenkader, en het geheel pas in laatste instantie te spiegelen aan hedendaagse ontwikkelingen in de logica? Dat zou methodisch in elk geval helderder geweest zijn. Nu lopen historische en systematische overwegingen van het begin af aan op een soms wat wonderlijke manier dooreen.” 88 WITT, Creation, Redemption and Grace.

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In 2006, Keith D. Stanglin defended a dissertation written under the supervision of Richard Muller on Arminius’s view of the assurance of faith.89 His thesis is that Arminius’s main motive for departing from the mainstream of Reformed theology was to safeguard the assurance of faith. Arminius’s divergent views on other issues such as predestination and free will were thus a consequence, and not the cause. Arminius thought that the Reformed doctrine of predestination led either to despair (desperatio), or to carelessness (securitas). Arminius was said to have posited his doctrine of certitudo over against those two.90 Stanglin places Arminius in his academic context at the university of Leiden and his colleagues there. The constant comparison of Arminius’s theology with that of his colleagues Gomarus, Trelcatius and Cuchlinus provides good insight into their differences, as well as the large overall agreement in many of the loci. The advantage of such an approach is that the differences stay within their original context, thus producing a balanced and realistic overview. However, for several reasons Stanglin’s conclusion on Arminius’s leading motive cannot be maintained. An evaluation of his arguments will be given below in the sections dealing with Arminius’s views on assurance (see 4.4 and 5.1.5). With the published version of F. Stuart Clarke’s dissertation (2006), another attempt was made to characterize Arminius’s theology. Under the title The Ground of Election: Jacobus Arminius’ Doctrine of the Work and Person of Christ, Clarke gives a penetrating Christological interpretation of Arminius. Clarke shows that the person and work of Christ take a fundamental role in Arminius’s theology, and form the basis for his understanding of predestination, grace, and other doctrines. Although Clarke recog————— STANGLIN, Assurance. The following quotation clearly highlights Stanglin’s main conclusion: “Attempts to understand Arminius’s theology in continuity and discontinuity with Reformed theology are incomplete without recognizing the important role of the doctrine of assurance. The tight causal connection Arminius drew between Reformed theology and the problematic experience of assurance among believers is one of the fundamental bases in his polemic, enabling him to connect his rejection of unconditional predestination with the tradition’s rejection of despair and security. Arminius claimed that Reformed soteriology inclined people to these two vices and was thus fraught with irremediable problems. His polemic against Reformed theology and construction of a distinctive system must therefore be seen in light of the problems he identified in the doctrine of assurance of salvation.” STANGLIN, To Comfort the Afflicted, 229–230. Cf. STANGLIN, Assurance, 10: “This study will reveal the central importance of assurance as a decisive factor in the thought and polemic of Arminius and explore the connection between assurance, predestination, and the doctrine of God. […] Arminius’s soteriological system […] was intended to grant full assurance of salvation to Christian believers. Indeed, this book will show that Arminius’s interest in the doctrine of assurance and his engagement in the significant debate over this issue may very well be an important foundation and driving force of his polemic against certain aspects of the Reformed theology of his time. His reaction against supralapsarianism, traditionally regarded as the starting point of Arminius’s polemic, is itself the consequence of his thought concerning true assurance of salvation.” 89 90

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nized91 that Arminius saw Christology as being connected to God’s justice – i.e. the satisfaction of God’s justice made by Christ’s atonement is the conditio sine qua non for the distribution of God’s grace – he still did not give God’s justice the place and function it deserves. As we will show below, Christology becomes such an important theme for Arminius exactly because the Evangelical theology is not possible without the satisfaction of God’s justice. But after he identifies this function of God’s justice in the thought of Arminius, Clarke passes over the importance of God’s justice for many other important aspects of Arminius’s theology, and instead turns his full attention to Christology. It is in this respect that Clarke’s study falls short. Nevertheless, on many points his work does give a balanced exposition of Arminius’s theology. In Simon Episcopius’ Doctrine of Original Sin (2006), Mark A. Ellis compares Episcopius and Arminius in their views on original sin. His exposition of Arminius’s understanding is in general correct, and assuming that this will certainly be the case for Episcopius who is the main subject of his work, this comparative study offers some highly interesting perspectives. However, we cannot adopt Ellis’s conclusions. On the one hand, Ellis remarks that there are “significant differences between Arminius and Episcopius in both content and method.” On the other hand, he concludes that these differences “are not because Episcopius abandoned Arminius, but because of following through and working out the methodological and theological impulses he received from his master.”92 Yet in terms of Reformed theology, the differences Ellis has identified are of too fundamental a nature to allow them to be characterized merely as a logical development. For example, in connection with Episcopius’s view of grace, Ellis writes that Episcopius maintained its necessity; only God can provide the necessary sacrifice for sins, and only grace can bring a person to repentance. However, Ellis also points out that the role of faith has been radically altered in comparison to Arminius. Episcopius focused on repentance and good works more than on the work of salvation. “In his insistence on repentance and works, Episcopius appears to have abandoned justification by grace through faith alone.”93 One of the developments that can be traced in Episcopius’s thought is that he does still speak of the Holy Spirit as God’s grace in the (early) disputations, while in the (later) Institutiones theologicae the only thing that appears to be said is that grace is necessary to bring people to repentance. For the rest, the work of the Holy Spirit is absent. “Its absence in the section on redemption and grace was a radical variation from ————— 91 92 93

Cf. e.g. CLARK, Ground, 34.36. ELLIS, Episcopius, 185. ELLIS, Episcopius, 165.

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both Arminius and his previous writings.”94 Ellis concludes that a consistent line of thought that remains throughout Episcopius’s works is that he “insisted grace and mercy were balanced by justice and equity.”95 What Ellis seems to overlook is the fact that the emphasis Arminius placed precisely in this context on Christ, faith and imputation, has in Episcopius shifted to the requirement of repentance and good works! The following conclusions drawn by Ellis are also difficult to reconcile with his claim that Arminius’s thought saw its logical development in Episcopius: However, he [Episcopius] changed most dramatically regarding the doctrine of original sin. Instead of beginning with original sin and moving to personal sins as both he and Arminius had done before, he focused on the effects of personal rebellion against God. Sin and bondage did not come from fallen nature but from sinful acts. […] He strongly affirmed the need for the substitutionary death of Christ as a propitiatory sacrifice for sin; however, the role of faith had changed, if not disappeared. The message had become one of repentance, and he no longer gave a dynamic role to the power of the Holy Spirit to overcome the dominion of sin.96

It seems somewhat forced when Ellis on the one hand identifies a “radical change” in Episcopius’s theology and method, and on the other hand maintains that the “mature” Episcopius can still be considered the legitimate heir of Arminius’s theology in spite of the significant differences he has just outlined. Part of the problem may come from Ellis’s misunderstanding of what Arminius means when he considers theology to be practical, not theoretical. Ellis writes: “Another implication of Arminius’s connection of intellect and will with religious duties led to what became a hallmark of Arminian theology, that theology is not speculative, but practical. The intellect must receive revelation, but always with the objective of living in righteousness and holiness.”97 Theoretical knowledge is about knowledge as such, while practical knowledge is directed to its effect. For Arminius the practical character of theology implies that it incites worship of God and the attainment of the goals established by God. Thus for Arminius, “practical” does not in the first place mean that it is directed to sanctification and walk of life, but rather to worship of God, and only through that to “living in righteousness and holiness.” In my opinion, there certainly was a significant theological shift from Arminius to Episcopius. This shift can be characterized as one from “faith and justification” to “repentance, sanctification and good works.” ————— 94 95 96 97

ELLIS, Episcopius, 165. ELLIS, Episcopius, 166. ELLIS, Episcopius, 166. ELLIS, Episcopius, 67.

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Introduction

The studies on Arminius’s theology from the past twenty years have provided much information on, as well as deeper insight into, his thought. For the time being, they will continue to direct further research. Back in 1993, Dekker already pointed out that particularly Muller’s work was pioneering. Such efforts indeed command respect. Nevertheless, there are significant reasons not to consider research on Arminius’s theology to be exhausted. Particularly the different characterizations of Arminius’s theology, as well as the quest for its structures and motives, have not yet produced convincing results. In my opinion, all preceding scholarship has passed over Arminius’s leading motive that lies at the very root of his departure from the majority of his Reformed colleagues. This motive also represents the link between the various motives and characterizations that have been proposed in the aforementioned studies.

1.3 Method Because this study focuses on the defining characteristic or Leitmotiv of Arminius’s theology, I have decided to follow an analytical approach. After the sources have been selected, they will be analyzed in chronological order. Such an approach also makes it possible to trace any developments there may have been in Arminius’s thought.98 It is also very helpful for tracing out the themes with which Arminius occupied himself, as well as the reasons that led him to write about those particular themes, so as to be able to discern the motives behind the development of his theology. Arminius’s early works are also of interest because they are each and every one of them writings that were not published until after his death. There we find his early reflections that would during his lifetime have been available to only a select few. To be able to understand why, later as professor at Leiden, Arminius was subjected to so much criticism on certain elements of his theology, it is very important to discover and follow the origins, development and background of the views for which he was criticized. At this point it seems very appropriate to highlight Peter Opitz’s methodological considerations in his monograph on Bullinger’s Decades.99 The issues Opitz faced in his study on Bullinger are largely comparable to the circumstances I encountered in my study of Arminius’s theology. Also the method for which Opitz opted in light of the state of research can be applied with good results to a study on Arminius. After laying out the state of scho————— 98 For more on this approach and the results of the research into Arminius’s sixteenth-century works, see DEN BOER, “Defense or Deviation?”. 99 OPITZ, Bullinger.

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larship, Opitz states that it goes without saying “that in the present state of scholarship, the time is not yet ripe for a comprehensive exposition of ‘the’ theology of Bullinger, which would have to be able to depend on countless focused studies and discussion by experts in the field.” Opitz is willing to try “to push through to the very core of his position, and so to work for a certain insight into Bullinger’s theological ‘profile.’” One of the difficulties Opitz encountered was the lack of secondary literature, which forced him to place the greatest emphasis in his study on the primary sources. The interaction with secondary sources is limited to several isolated instances.100 That circumstance, and the method Opitz used, apply to the present study on Arminius as well. For the sake of clarity, and because it is so highly applicable, I will cite Opitz’s conclusion in its entirety: In view of the present state of affairs, a method suggests itself which begins analytically and attempts to develop an approach from the exegesis of several important passages in the Decades, which in turn leads to the discovery of central arguments and broad theological themes – themes which must, however, be proven again from those same passages. In the sense of Dietrich Ritschl’s view (developed particularly for religious language) of “normative statements” or “implicit axioms,” in Bullinger’s exposition of “Reformed” doctrine we are looking for leading ideas that provide guidance from the background, as it were. Such ideas become visible in concepts and formulations which appear time and again, and at key moments, from biblical passages to which Bullinger repeatedly retreats, but also in themes and thematic complexes which have special weight. If one wants to try and unlock Bullinger’s thought as it were from the inside out, it can be a matter neither of re-examining it from an already-available external criterion, nor of stepping out of the hermeneutical circle referred to above. Its goal must instead be to let itself be guided methodically by this search, and so to arrive at a “controlled understanding” which continually remains in touch also with Bullinger’s own terminology without staying too closely attached to it.101

————— OPITZ, Bullinger, 14. OPITZ, Bullinger, 16: “Angesichts dieser Sachlage legt sich ein Vorgehen nahe, das zunächst analytisch einsetzt und aus der Exegese einzelner wichtiger Textpassagen der Dekaden eine Frageperspektive zu entwickeln versucht, die zum Auffinden zentraler Argumentationen und übergreifender charakteristischer theologischer Züge führt; Züge, die sich dann allerdings wieder an den Einzeltexten bewähren müssen. Im Sinne von Dietrich Ritschls im Blick auf religiöse Sprache überhaupt formulierter These von den “regulativen Sätzen” bzw. “impliziten Axiomen” wird in Bullingers Darstellung der “reformatorischen” Lehre nach gleichsam steuernd im Hintergrund stehenden Leitgedanken gesucht. Solche werden sichtbar in Begriffen und Formulierungen, die wiederholt und an entscheidender Stelle auftauchen, an Bibelstellen, auf die Bullinger wiederholt rekurriert, aber auch in Themen und Themenkomplexen, denen besonderes Gewicht beigemessen wird. Will man Bullingers Denken gleichsam von innen heraus aufzuschliessen versuchen, kann es weder darum gehen, es von einem bereits vorhandenen externen Kriterium her zu untersuchen, noch aus dem eben angedeuteten hermeneutischen Zirkel auszusteigen. Ziel muss es vielmehr sein, sich methodisch geleitet darin zu bewegen und so zu einem “kontrollierten Verstehen” zu gelangen, das in stetem Kontakt auch mit Bullingers eigener Begrifflichkeit steht, ohne ihr dabei verhartet zu bleiben.” 100 101

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Also Opitz can “follow the [necessary] placement of Bullinger’s theological accents in their historical and dogmen-historical context [...] only selectively, and in the paths laid out by Bullinger himself.”102 One difference between Opitz’s work and the present one is that we do not limit ourselves to one work, but examine the entirety of Arminius’s corpus. Whereas Opitz posits “that from the notion of ‘community’ a unifying perspective can be distinguished in Bullinger’s theological reflection,”103 for Arminius it will be argued that it consists in the iustitita Dei which has its place within the broader concept of the duplex amor Dei. In following this method, an attempt will be made to arrive at an authorial-intent104 interpretation of Arminius’s theology in as far as that is possible. The tenability of the results produced by this study will be sought not only in the rationality of the argument and the consistency of the whole, but also in subjecting the motive identified to the criterion of consistency. For the thesis to hold, it must be shown that this motive is consistent with the entirety of Arminius’s theology, and with the way he evaluated the different theological currents of his time. As I worked through what Arminius wrote over the course of his life, I was able to identify the leading motive not only from explicit remarks, but also implicitly from the structure and points of departure that mark his theology. From the headings given to various subsections it will already be clear what I consider to be the determining motif of Arminius’s theology. Iustitia, or righteousness and justice, will show itself to be the dominant attribute of God in Arminius’s thought, and together with the doctrine of God be of fundamental significance for the form and content of most other loci. This thesis, that God’s justice is the leading motive of Arminius’s theology, will be developed logically. Its importance for the structure and constituent parts of Arminius’s theology will also be outlined. We have chosen to draw as independent a theological portrait of Arminius as possible. The historical and theological context do play a role throughout, and the polemical circumstances will ensure that Arminius’s contemporaries will also be given attention. However, in the interest of attaining a view on Arminius’s theology free from all distractions, I have avoided juxtaposing it with other theological portraits. Constant comparison with his contemporaries, as Stanglin has done, has the advantage of consistently drawing attention to what is particular to Arminius’s views. The disadvantage, however, is that one could give the impression that his views are significant or interesting only when they depart from those of others. Yet Ar————— 102 103 104

OPITZ, Bullinger, 16. OPITZ, Bullinger, 17. Cf. LORENZ, Constructie van het verleden, 83–102.

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minius’s theology as such deserves to be described and evaluated as a coherent whole. For that reason I have attempted to examine Arminius’s theology in its historical context as he himself would have looked at it. One factor that lies at the basis of this decision is that it is difficult to determine the real value of a comparison with another theologian. For who, or what, is the norm according to which someone may be judged in order to determine whether his particular views are to be considered different or divergent? For that reason, questions such as “Who else said this?” “What arguments did his opponents bring in against this point?” or “But what did Gomarus, Lubbertus, Hommius, etc., think about this?” have intentionally been passed over for the largest part. Arminius’s theologico-historical context will, however, be dealt with explicitly in part 2 by way of an analysis of the Hague Conference, and further through an attempt to place the defining aspect of Arminius’s theology in the broader context of sixteenth-century theology. Chapter 5 also contains a “comparison” on certain points between Arminius and “the Reformation.” The term “the Reformation” can only be maintained improperly. Within the Reformed tradition itself there were “different trajectories. [...] It is clear that Reformed theology was not a uniform whole, and certainly not monolithic.”105 Van Asselt points to the oft-used “Calvin against the Calvinists” method in studies on Protestant scholasticism: The treatment of a particular doctrine by a later scholastic author is compared to the same doctrine in Calvin. Such a method produces – already from the very fact that there is a difference in genre between Calvin’s writings and the scholastic genre of seventeenth-century dogmatic works – the desired result without fail. What is more, research is focused on the influence of one theologian, who is then held as normative for the entire future development. This method, however, takes no account of the complexity and great variety of (post-Reformation) Reformed theology and its traditio-historical Sitz im Leben. Research has shown, however, that there was not just one Reformed theology, but multiple trajectories, a whole series of Reformed theologies in the sixteenth century.106

————— VAN ASSELT, “Protestantse scholastiek”, 66. VAN ASSELT, “Protestantse scholastiek”, 66: “Men vergelijkt de behandeling van een bepaald leerstuk door een latere scholastieke auteur met de behandeling van datzelfde leerstuk door Calvijn. Een dergelijke procedure levert – alleen al vanwege het verschil tussen het genre van Calvijns geschriften en het scholastieke genre van de zeventiende-eeuwse dogmatische geschriften – bij voorbaat al het gewenste resultaat op. Men concentreert bovendien het onderzoek op de invloed van één theoloog, die als maatgevend wordt beschouwd voor de gehele latere ontwikkeling. Deze procedure houdt echter geen rekening met de complexiteit en grote variatie van de (postreformatorische) gereformeerde theologie en haar traditiehistorische ‘Sitz im Leben’. Onderzoek wijst uit dat er niet één, maar meer trajecten waren, een reeks van gereformeerdere [sic] theologieën in de zestiende eeuw.” 105 106

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Introduction

There is no such thing as “the Reformation,” and this observation also complicates comparative studies. It is too simple to discard Arminius as a deviation from the Reformed theology by way of a few comparisons. It is actually just as easily possible, and certainly more realistic, to place him within the spectrum of the sixteenth-century reform movement. The term “movement” here also points to the multi-faceted, dynamic and ever-developing character of the theology that grew out of the Reformation.107 One further argument in favor of giving as independent a portrait of Arminius as possible is the fact mentioned earlier, that Arminius has consistently been viewed as a Remonstrant, and has thus been studied from the perspective of the Synod of Dordt (1618–1619), in spite of the fact that he did not even live to see the Remonstrance of 1610, never mind the five articles the Synod would later draft against the Remonstrants. Especially in the anglo-Saxon world “Arminians” and “Calvinists” are still each other’s polar opposites – most likely because in the eighteenth century the Wesley brothers, in reaction to the “Calvinists” in general and particularly the Whitefield-wing of the Methodist movement, “embraced and boasted their identity as Arminians.”108 Countless examples could be given of what the name “Arminius” has come to mean. While one wears this name with pride, to the other it is an abhorrence. It is wholly another question, however, whether the theological views associated with Arminius really have anything to do at all with the “historical” Arminius. The objective of the present study demands first of all a clarification of the concepts involved. For that reason, chapter 2 is devoted to the prolegomena related to God’s justice in Arminius’s theology. Attention will first be given to the different meanings of the concept of “justice,” and its relationship to other themes in Arminius’s theology (2.1). Next, the place God’s justice has in the structure of Arminius’s theology will be traced in order to give a first impression of the importance it has for his view on the doctrine of God and for his theology as a whole (2.2). This will in turn be followed by a study of the important – certainly for the theology of that time – ques————— 107 Cf. MULLER, “Arminius’s Gambit”, 252: “There is, as indicated in the initial examples from Calvin and Bullinger, a spectrum of opinion in the Reformed theology of the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. It is not the case that there was a monolithic Reformed doctrine of predestination, and while it is certainly true that Calvin’s doctrine represents one of the strictest formulations of the divine decree and perhaps the formulation that is least sensitive to traditional discussions of divine permission and secondary causality, it is also the case that his views were balanced out in the Reformed tradition by the milder formulations of Vermigli and Musculus. As for Calvin’s successor, Theodore Beza, we must recognize (contrary to much received opinion) that Beza softened somewhat the impact of this doctrine of predestination by stressing, far more than Calvin, the concept of divine permission and the role of secondary causality.” 108 RICHEY, “Methodists”, 3. Cf. PETERSON/WILLIAMS, Arminian, and WALLS/DONGELL, Calvinist.

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tion of the knowability of God’s justice, that is, the epistemological aspect of the iustitia Dei in Arminius’s thought. The purpose is not only to make clear how important this aspect of the doctrine of God was for Arminius’s theology, but also to shed some light on how it was possible that a topic such as God’s justice, which was indeed discussed but fundamentally undisputed, still came to be at the root of the well-known disputes (2.3). Chapter 3 lays out how Arminius’s view on God’s justice was influential on a number of main parts of his theology: the doctrines of God, creation and providence, (the fall into) sin, and Gospel (3.1–3). Chapter 4 focuses on Arminius’s concept of the duplex amor Dei as the foundation of religion, as well as on the primary place justice occupies there. Arminius’s theology is tightly summarized in that concept, and the relevance and significance of the place God’s justice has in his theology become clearly visible. The material treated in chapters 2 and 3 find close resonance in chapter 4. Chapters 2 through 4 form the core of the entire study, and explore Arminius’s theology principally from the perspective of his Leitmotiv. Arminius’s relation to Reformed theology forms the subject of chapter 5. The controversial elements in his theology will first be treated (5.1): predestination, the operation of grace, atonement, will, sanctification, perseverance and assurance. These will be outlined without a special focus on the place God’s justice has. There are two reasons for this. In the first place, this approach will serve as a check on what precedes. Does a focus only on the controversial elements give us the same picture as an analysis of Arminius’s entire theology? And what are the consequences of the answer to that question, whether positive or negative? In the second place, and proceeding from the first, this approach is important for the question of the reception of Arminius’s theology and of his Leitmotiv by those who either rejected or followed him on the disputed doctrines. Did they still have a good understanding of Arminius’s actual intention as they focused on the controverted points? And did they recognize clearly enough the (divergent) character of the non-controversial elements in his theology that nevertheless were or could have been at the root of the controversial elements? In 5.2 Arminius’s viewpoints on several subjects typical to Reformed theology will be examined. This will reveal most clearly that there has never been such a thing as “the Reformation.” Also from the views of Arminius that are treated in this chapter will it become clear that there was room for differences of opinion. In connection with several important topics in Reformed theology, we will trace where Arminius stood within that broad spectrum of Reformed Protestantism. These topics are Arminius’s conception of the fall into sin and (original) sin, the essence and necessity of grace, faith, justification, sanctification and good works.

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Introduction

Part 2 of this study will consider the reception and theologico-historical context of Arminius’s theology on the basis of the results arrived at in Part 1. Chapter 6 traces the extent to which Arminius’s leading motive, the iustitia Dei, and his theological construct, the duplex amor Dei, were received in the documented dispute over the Remonstrance – i.e. in the Hague Conference (1611) – which became determinative for the debates as they continued. In chapter 7 an attempt is made to place Arminius’s theology in a meaningful way within the context of sixteenth-century discussions on the justice of God. A summary and tentative conclusions are added at the end of each chapter. Final conclusions will be drawn in chapter 8.

1.4 Summary and Conclusion Chapter 1 begins with a historical introduction in the form of a brief overview of Jacobus Arminius’s (1559–1609) life and work. Here it becomes clear that throughout the years there is a consistent focus on God’s justice, even when there is mounting tension in the university, church and Dutch Republic in connection with Arminius’s views. What continually drives Arminius is the careful avoidance of lines of reasoning whose consequence is to make God the author of sin and evil. His Declaration of Sentiments (1608) contains the fullest and most developed account of his convictions, particularly as formulated in the concept of the twofold love of God (duplex amor Dei). With respect to sources, it is argued that the public and private disputations held under the presidence of Arminius cannot be used as primary source material for a study like the present one. The disputations are not without qualification representative of Arminius’s views. With respect to the state of scholarship, it was shown that studies into Arminius’s theology have all passed by the leading motive of his thought that lies at the very foundation of his departure from the theology of his Reformed colleagues. In terms of method, this study follows an analytical and chronological approach. An argument is constructed to illustrate that the leading motive of Arminius’s theology lies at bottom in God’s justice (iustitia Dei), rooted in the broader concept of the duplex amor Dei. An attempt will be made to give an independent theological portrait of Arminius in as far as that is possible.

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Part 1: The Theology of Jacobus Arminius

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2. God’s Justice in Arminius’s Theology I: Prolegomena

2.1 The Concept of “Justice” 2.1.1 The Basic Principle: To Each His or Her Due The basic principle (una essentia) of what Arminius understands with “justice” is the suum cuique tribuere1 that goes back to Aristotle2 and Cicero,3 and has functioned as its basic definition throughout the centuries also for theology.4 Justice functions within the context of a relationship to someone or something else, and aims at fairness (aequitas).5 Justice means that each person receives his or her due, and for Arminius within the relationship between God and humankind, it means that the obedient will receive what is their due according to God’s promise, and sinners what is their due according to God’s threats. With the description above, we are also introduced to several terms that belong to the semantic field of “justice”. That field determines the meaning for and colors the concept of “justice” in Arminius’s thought. The words “obedience” and “sin” or “disobedience” point to the legal character of justice: justice presupposes a functioning law. “Reward” and “threat” come out of a covenantal context. Both law and covenant contain promises the two parties involved can make, or the rules that the one party can impose on the other. Further, justice, law and covenant can only exist where there is room for freedom. This can be illustrated by following the consequences of the possibility of sin or disobedience as im————— 1 Cf. AC 539 (III 134): “Simili illustrabo. Iustitia in Deo est una essentia, suum nempe cuique tribuens: obedienti quod ipsius est ex divina promissione, et peccatori quod ipsius est ex comminatione. Ex eo autem, quod iustitia obiecto applicat retributionem poenae, necessario colligitur obiectum illud poena dignum, et propterea peccato obnoxium esse [...].” See also Verklaring, 77 (I 624). 2 ARISTOTLE, Ethica, 1129a–b. 3 Cf. MCGRATH, Iustitia Dei, 16–17.74. 4 Cf. Calvin’s commentary on Exodus 3:22, where his definition of justice appears in close connection with his voluntarism: “Quibus videtur haec ditandi populi ratio iustitiae Dei parum consentanea, parum ipsi considerant quam late pateat iustitia de qua loquuntur. Fateor eius esse proprium, tueri ius suum cuique, prohibere furta, damnare fraudes et rapinas.” And a little further down: “Neque tamen hoc modo eum facio exlegem, etsi supra omnes leges eminet eius potestas, quia tamen voluntas eius certissima est perfectae aequitatis regula, rectissimum est quidquid facit: atque ideo legibus solutus est, quia ipse sibi et omnibus lex est.” (CO 24,49). 5 Cf. ARISTOTLE, Ethica, 1137a–1138a on the relationship between justice and equity.

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God’s Justice in Arminius’s Theology I: Prolegomena

plied in law or covenant. For Arminius there can be no doubt whatsoever as to the fact that sin can only be sin if it can be avoided. When there is coercion or necessity, the absence of being able to make a choice, one can no longer speak of sin or disobedience (see 2.1.4). Without freedom, there is no such thing as either obedience or disobedience. As a consequence, without freedom there is no law or covenant, nor is there justice. There is no room for promises, threats, exhortations, or the like. Also reward and punishment, inasmuch as they are inseparably tied to a law and thus to justice, are out of the picture. The concept of justice is thus closely connected to a number of issues which are in fact so closely tied together that no element from this system can be undone without consequences extending also to other elements. Justice is therefore at the core of this nexus. When one of the topics connected to justice is being examined, one or more of the other topics also resonate because of their connection to justice. As an example, when Arminius speaks about sin, his understanding of the concept of justice means that it presupposes freedom and law as well, and therefore also a lawgiver, reward, punishment, etc. Having established this, we arrive at the core of this study: Arminius’s view of justice. This concept is so key to his theology that we should try to keep the whole in sight. For that reason, before we go on to mention several other important connotations that relate to the concepts surrounding justice, we do well to return to the basic definition with which this chapter began. The essence of justice is that each receives his due. When it comes to fairness or (legal) equality in the relationship to another person or thing, as a rule the first thing that comes up is the mutual human relationship, the ethical or moral relationship of the person to the law or to God, or else God’s relationship to humankind. All of these elements can be found in Arminius’s theology, but the basis of his reflection on justice and its application to theology is in God’s own, essential justice. In God there is, of course, no relation to another person or thing. For that reason it is important to remember that God does not so much have justice as attribute, but rather that God is justice6 – as will be expanded on further below. Once God’s essential justice is established, it is possible to draw out the implications for the way in which God’s faculties and qualities are related to each other, and how they function (see 2.2.1 and 3.1).

————— 6

Cf. BECK, Gisbertus Voetius, 359–380.

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Logic Also logic, including the law of non-contradiction, is closely related to justice. Logic is an eternal, uncreated law7 to which everything and everyone is bound; it governs all actuals and possibles, and thus also touches on what is arbitrary, unordered and unexpected. Black is and remains black, it neither may nor can all of a sudden be called white; yes is and remains yes, and does not suddenly change to no. This principle applies in a special way to the distinction made within the field of actuals between necessity and contingency.8 Particularly on this point does Arminius show himself careful and consistent. One of the most serious errors you could commit is to confuse and intermingle necessary and contingent things. Contingency is completely free of necessity; only one necessary link within a whole chain of contingent causes makes the final effect necessary as well.9 Arminius’s extreme care on this point pertains closely to his concern for God’s justice. Should there be even one necessary link between God and human sin within a chain of otherwise contingent causes, that sin is necessary and inevitable, God is its author, and that sin is no longer sin.10 In theology, something that conflicts with logic and orderly thought soon results in absurdities and blasphemy. Arminius often notes this as he points to what he considers logically flawed lines of reasoning used by his colleagues at the university. Order The theme of “justice and logic” naturally overlaps with that of “justice and order”. In thought there is a certain order, and the same is true in being. Logic implies a logical order, and order adapts itself to the object. An important example of the insistence on a logical thought progression in Arminius’s theology related to his concern for God’s justice is that God’s justice must first be satisfied in the sacrifice of Christ before God can love a sinner to salvation. In the first place, it does not agree with God’s justice to love a sinner in an absolute sense (without any sort of condition), that is, without ————— EP 691–693 (III 354–358). A31A 140 (I 751): “Necessarium et Contingens dividunt totam Entis amplitudinem.” ETG 32 (III 552): “necessarium et contingens integram entis amplitudinem dividunt.” 9 A31A 141 (I 752). Cf. AC 503 (III 81–82): “Ille sciat contingentiam et necessitate non respectibus, sed integris essentiis dissentire, totamque entis amplitudinem dividere; et propterea conincidere non potest. Necessarium est quod non potest non fieri; contingenter sit, quod potest non fieri.” 10 Cf. AC 595 (III 213–214). There is therefore not one set of moral laws that applies to God, and another that applies to people. One and the same thing cannot be morally good if performed by God, but morally wrong if performed by a person, provided that account is taken of the distinction between God as Creator and lawgiver and people as his creatures as it relates to the obligation of obedience. 7 8

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his justice being satisfied. In the second place, it does not agree with the honor due to Christ when He takes merely a subordinate place in relation to human salvation as the means to execute God’s absolute will to save humanity (see 3.3.1).11 Harmony With this last point we also touch on the next characteristic of justice, that it always seeks to do what is completely right in relation to its object; it seeks what is “fitting”. The verbs decere (“to fit, agree with”) and convenire (“to agree with”) are regularly used by Arminius to indicate that something does or does not agree with the nature of a particular object or subject.12 Arminius uses the auxiliary verbs posse (“to be able”) and debere (“to ought”), with or without a negating non, for the same purpose. What is remarkable about Arminius’s writings is that he at times states that God cannot do something, or else that he has to. It is not fitting for God or for one of his attributes, or God has to or may not do something because He is who He is, because something does or does not fit with his nature or revelation, or with the object or the nature of the object of God’s acts. The relationship to justice is clear: justice gives to everyone their due. To put it another way: justice gives and has to give what is fitting to its object, and can do no other. “Harmony” appears to be an apt description of this attribute of justice. Justice thus ensures that there is harmony between object and subject, and it secures all the relationships and connections that exist within the object, within the subject, and between the object and subject. 2.1.2 Remunerative and Vindictive Justice In 2.1.1 it was shown that one can hardly speak about the basic principle or essence of justice without entering concretely into the diverse forms which justice can acquire precisely because its essence is to give to each his or her due, and thus takes on a form that befits the object. Also the various relationships between justice and a number of other matters were mentioned earlier already because of their essential importance to the concept of justice as a whole. Here we will deal explicitly with the most important manifestations of justice: remunerative (rewarding) and vindictive (revenging) ————— 11 See Verklaring, 85–86 (I 630–631); ETG 136 (III 640): “quia peccatum separat hominem a Deo, at praedestinatio ad salutem est unionis: ergo causa separationis meritoria amovenda prius.” Cf. ETG 137 (III 640). 12 See, for example, EP 741–743 (III 430–432); cf. AN 950 (II 709), where condecentiam is further also connected to aequitatis.

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justice. Thereafter, we will treat several of justice’s other important relations (2.1.3 and 2.1.4). Remunerative (Rewarding) Justice One of the two most important forms in which justice manifests itself is reward. Justice functions within the context of God’s law and covenant, and on that basis manifests itself among others as remunerative justice. A further distinction must also be drawn between a Legal reward and an Evangelical reward. The first functions within the context of the covenant of works. Where the law of works applies, reward is awarded according to merit, to what is earned. God promised Adam greater bliss on the condition of perfect obedience to his demands. After this first covenant was rendered inoperative through the fall into sin, Legal rewards were no longer possible. The new or Evangelical covenant (foedus) of grace that God established after the fall (on the basis of the pactum with the Son, where it was determined that the Son as Mediator would satisfy the demands of God’s justice in the place of humankind), just as the old covenant, has its demands. However, these demands have an Evangelical character. Remunerative justice no longer rewards according to merit, but is “of God’s grace in Jesus Christ, who of God is made unto us righteousness and sanctification”.13 This is true also for the good works of the believers. Also they are not rewarded except “of grace, united with mercy, and on account of Christ”.14 Because God in love placed the sins of humanity on his own Son, all those who believe in Him are free from sin. They receive the reward of their righteousness. Although they have sinned, they will be considered righteous in Christ. Vindictive (Revenging) Justice The opposite of remunerative justice is vindictive justice. Those who transgress and disobey the demands of God’s law and covenant receive the punishment they deserve. Vindictive justice applies only to sinners. In Arminius’s view, the object of punishment is therefore a sinner who deserves punishment because of sin committed voluntarily and without necessity, and in spite of the requisite necessary and sufficient grace of God.15 ————— 13 14

AC 470 (III 34). HaC 964 (II 729): “Ex gratia, misericordia iuncta, et propter Christum.” Cf. AC 471 (III

35). 15 AC 585–586 (III 200). Cf. EP 649 (III 290): “at homo vires a Deo accepit sufficientes ad persistendum contra insultum Satanae, et numinis ipsius assistentia suffultus fuit.”

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Arminius in this context continually warns against a danger that he sees looming up. Some, among whom Arminius identifies Calvin as an example, consider the manifestation of God’s vindictive justice to be necessary. However, the connection between vindictive justice and sin would imply that sin must in that case also occur necessarily. From a series of logical deductions Arminius also concludes that the above implies that creation becomes nothing but a means that serves the execution of the decree of predestination. The argument runs as follows: the decree concerning the fall into sin must precede the decree of creation rather than coming between creation and fall, otherwise that which necessarily follows creation (in this case, the fall) would not have been intended by God in creation, which would be impossible. To posit that the manifestation of God’s vindictive justice is necessary implies the necessity of (the fall into) sin, which in turn implies that creation is a means to execute the decree of predestination.16 The necessity of sin has enormous implications not only for the doctrine of creation, but also for anthropology and the doctrine of God, particularly his justice. For Arminius, a proper view on vindictive justice is extremely important, because in it a number of crucial theological themes come together. Also reprobation is a manifestation of God’s vindictive justice.17 In the context of Arminius’s thought, this observation has the consequence that one’s view of reprobation must satisfy all the conditions that pertain to vindictive justice. The most important condition is that the object of reprobation can only be those who have sinned according to their free will. 2.1.3 Justice and Its Relationship to Mercy Justice and mercy at first appear to be each other’s polar opposites, and in certain long-standing traditions have indeed been viewed that way.18 For that reason, Arminius’s understanding of the relationship between these two concepts will now be investigated. Mercy (misericordia) is the communication of some good with respect to a miserable sinner. It goes without saying, then, that mercy (just as vindictive justice, see 2.1.2) presumes sin and misery in its object. For Arminius, this also implies that mercy cannot be considered one of God’s essential attributes, but rather that it is a special application of God’s goodness inas————— Verklaring, 103 (I 652). AC 471 (III 34). 18 See, for example, VAN SLIEDREGT, Beza, 275–277. Cf. BC art. 16, where election proceeds from God’s mercy, and reprobation from his justice. Also Arminius affirms in PrD XXI (II 352), albeit very carefully (commodo aliquo sensu ut quodam respectu), that justice and mercy can be opposed to each other. 16 17

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much as it is goodness-communicated-to-those-in-misery. This also highlights the most fundamental relationship between mercy and justice: God can only be merciful when his justice has been satisfied; or, God’s justice prevents Him from being merciful without first of all being just. “Goodness is an affection [or disposition] in God to communicate his own good so far as his justice considers and admits to be fitting and proper.”19 Mercy therefore presupposes not only sin, but also that justice has been satisfied. The price Christ the Mediator paid for sins is thus the condition for God to be able to display and offer his mercy to sinners. Without that satisfaction, God not only does not want to forgive sins, he also cannot. This explains why the manifestations of God’s mercy such as the offer of the gospel and the proclamation of forgiveness of sin through faith in Christ, never stand apart from their relationship to justice. God cannot offer forgiveness to and demand faith in Christ from a sinner if that sinner has not first satisfied God’s justice, that is, if Christ has not died for that sinner. Arminius’s view on the extent and intention of Christ’s atonement, and his position in the conflict that arose over it, are directly related to the mutual relationship between justice and mercy (see 3.3.1). In 4.1 it will be shown that the relationship between justice and mercy is a key starting-point for the duplex amor Dei, the concept fundamental to Arminius’s entire theology. For the sake of completeness, it also ought to be mentioned that there can be no such thing as a necessary manifestation of God’s mercy, because this would imply the necessity of sin (see 2.1.2 on the necessary manifestation of God’s vindictive justice). 2.1.4 Justice and Its Relationship to Freedom As was noted already in 2.1.1, justice presupposes freedom. Arminius’s view on the relationship between justice and freedom is of fundamental importance for understanding his entire theology. As far back as in Aristotle do we find the claim that justice presupposes freedom. No act can be either just or unjust unless that act was done with full knowledge and from one’s own volition; there can be no ignorance or coercion.20 As was noted before, justice, freedom, and a number of other concepts are all closely related in one nexus. If that nexus were to be set up hierarchically, freedom would rank very high. There can be neither reward nor punishment when that which is to be rewarded or punished takes place ————— 19 20

Verklaring, 78 (I 624). ARISTOTLE, Ethica, 1109b–1111b.1134a.1135a.1136a.

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under coercion or necessarily. Justice also presupposes law, and law presupposes freedom, so that there would be no such thing as “good”, and certainly no “evil”, if that which is called “evil” were unavoidable. When everything, including sin and the fall, occurs necessarily, it is God who is the author of sin, it is God who actually sins and is in fact the only one who does, and thus sin is no longer sin.21 If we are going to posit that God compels to evil, we must understand it to mean that He effects it by the means of Satan’s work, and in a way that can easily be reconciled with his justice.22 If someone cannot believe even if he or she wills to, and further cannot even will to believe, he or she also cannot be punished justly (iure puniri) for that unbelief.23 When faith is worked through an irresistible force, and when that faith is irresistibly sustained so that one is saved necessarily according to the decree, neither predestination to salvation nor predestination to eternal death are in any way just or fair. These are the objections Arminius maintains against all those who teach an unconditional predestination.24 With the term “unconditional predestination” I mean a doctrine of predestination where election and reprobation are effected without any condition whatsoever; to put it in Arminius’s own words: without any consideration of sin or unbelief (citra ullum peccati vel infidelitatis respectum), faith or righteousness, “without account being taken in the decree of any righteousness or sin, obedience or disobedience.”25 Often we could also speak of a “doctrine of absolute predestination”. However, this term does not quite accurately depict the view that considers God’s foreknowledge of sin a necessary condition for reprobation. Although the terms “supralapsarianism” and “infralapsarianism” were (just) not yet in use in Arminius’s time, for the sake of clarity I will at times use the term “supralapsarianism” for the view where the object is unfallen man, and the fall a means to the execution of the decree. All variations of the doctrine of predestination against which Arminius protested for the reasons noted above – whether they would later be classed as supralapsarian or infralapsarian – will in this study be referred to collectively with the term “doctrine of unconditional predestination”. When Arminius uses the term “absolute” to describe also his own ————— EP 694 (III 359); A31A 143–144 (I 760–762). EP 708 (III 380): “isto modo, qui facile cum iustitia ipsius conciliari potest”. 23 EP 754 (III 448). 24 Letter to Wtenbogaert, January 31, 160, Ep.Ecc. 81 (II 71); cf. HSC 32 about Nicasius vander Schuere. 25 See, for example, EP 689 (III 351): “Deum nudo et absoluto decreto, citra ullum peccati vel infidelitatis respectum, certos homines eosque paucos elegisse: reliquam autem hominum multitudinem eodem decreto reiecisse, quibus Christum non dedit, et quibus Christi mortem utilem esse noluit.” See also EP 627.689–690.694 (III 258.351–352.359); Verklaring, 70.82.87 (I 618.628.632); RQ9 184 (II 64–65). Cf. MAHLMANN, “Prädestination”, 1174. 21 22

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view of predestination, it does not apply to his doctrine as a whole, but to only two of the four decrees of which that doctrine is comprised (see 3.3.5).26 Justice stands and falls with freedom and contingency. For that reason, it is only to be expected that Arminius gives considerable attention to these issues as well as to the liberum arbitrium. Arminius does not think that freedom stands on its own, and for that reason he also does not want it to be pursued for its own sake (cf. 5.1.4). Nor is it as such in conflict with grace, but it is so closely tied to the concept of justice that the latter cannot exist without freedom. One example will suffice to illustrate the close connection between the concepts of justice, freedom and grace. There can only be grace (misericordia) where there are sinners trapped in misery. Misery presupposes sin, sin presupposes a law and justice and therefore also freedom. For this reason Arminius concludes that there can only be grace where there is real transgression of an enforceable law, that is, sin that was committed freely and that could have been avoided. In short, grace not only presupposes justice and law, but also freedom. Real freedom, real contingency, by definition excludes any form of necessity – not only necessity of coercion, but also necessitas inevitabilitatis which does not remove spontaneous assent (spontaneus assensus), but does still take away freedom.27 For Arminius, therefore, spontaneity does not constitute freedom. As he sees it, spontaneity goes together very well with something that is naturally or absolutely necessary, and is not sufficient for responsibility.28 Eef Dekker defines “real” freedom as “freedom from necessity” or “freedom of indifference”, and cites Arminius: “The liberty of the will consists in this, – when all the requisites for willing or not willing are laid down, man is still indifferent to will or not to will, to will this rather than that.”29 For Arminius, the technical concepts “freedom as regards its exercise” (quoad exercitium) and “freedom to the species of action” (quoad speciem actionis) together form the complete freedom of the will.30 In his dissertation, Dekker has argued convincingly that Arminius is continually concerned to protect two degrees of freedom for human actions: God’s ————— Verklaring, 104 (I 653); cf. RQ9 184 (II 64–65). EP 708–711 (III 381–384). 28 Letter to Wtenbogaert, January 31, 1605, Ep.Ecc. 81 (II 71). 29 AN 952 (II 712): “Libertas arbitrii consistit in eo, quod homo positis omnibus requisitis ad volendum vel nolendum, indifferens tamen sit ad volendum vel nolendum, ad volendum hoc potius, quam illud.” 30 EP 733 (III 417–418): “Ex hac explicatione apparet creaturam peccantem actum peccati committere plena libertate voluntatis, tum quoad exercitium, tum quoad speciem actionis, quibus duobus omnis voluntatis libertas circumscribitur. […] Libertas enim quoad exercitium est, qua potest velle et agere, et volitionem actionemque suspendere. […] Libertas quoad speciem actionis est, qua potius hunc quam illum actum vult et agit.” Cf. DEKKER, Rijker dan Midas, esp. 135–136. 26 27

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freedom and that of humanity. On this basis Dekker identifies Arminius as a “theologian of freedom”.31 However, precisely because Arminius thinks freedom is not something to be pursued for its own sake, and certainly not for the sake of autonomy and self-determination as Dekker himself actually points out,32 I consider this characterization less than apt and somewhat confusing. In defending freedom, Arminius’s main concern is for justice, primarily that of God. The following subsection will further explore the place God’s justice receives in the structure and content of Arminius’s theology. With respect to freedom and responsibility, Arminius takes a position that departs significantly from that of Peter Martyr Vermigli as adopted by early Reformed Orthodoxy. In Ethica book III, chapter 1, Aristotle treats the criteria for responsibility. The concept of hekousion is of fundamental importance, but the meaning of that hekousion is ambiguous and varies between freedom of the will and spontaneity.33 Luca Baschera has demonstrated that Vermigli, whose commentary on Aristotle’s Ethica was very influential, “tends to understand hekousion as ‘spontaneous,’ making therefore mere spontaneity the criterion for an action to be considered as imputable.”34 He “derives from his analysis of the Aristotelian text a negative definition of voluntary as ‘absence of coercion’ and ‘spontaneity.’ Such a concept of voluntary forms the sufficient condition for an action to be considered free and therefore imputable to the agent.”35 ————— 31 Dekker, Rijker dan Midas, 59: “[Het is Arminius] steeds te doen om de twee graden van vrijheid. Hij zet zich volledig in om juist die tweede graad van vrijheid, de eigen ruimte voor de menselijke vrijheid, te waarborgen. In die zin kan hij ‘theoloog van de vrijheid’ worden genoemd.” See also p. 237. Cf. criticism in CLARKE, Ground, xvii: “My second idea, to write on Arminius’s doctrines of grace and predestination, had already been done by Dekker, but Dekker had placed them in the context of human freewill, which I considered was wrong, and still do.” 32 DEKKER, Rijker dan Midas, 155–156 and passim. 33 ARISTOTLE, Ethica, 1109b–1110b. See ARISTOTLE, Ethica, ed. PANNIER & VERHAEGHE, 339. 34 BASCHERA, “Vermigli”, 329. See also JAMES, Vermigli and Predestination, 81–89; STROHM, Ethik, 104: “Aristoteles gibt nicht nur die Hauptfragen und grundsätzlichen Unterscheidungen in der Willenslehre vor, sondern er bestimmt auch die Darlegung der reformatorischen Auffassung vom unfreien Willen.” 35 BASCHERA, “Vermigli”, 331. Baschera has illustrated that Vermigli’s interpretation of Aristotle on freedom and responsibility was very influential for Reformed orthodoxy, while VAN ASSELT, Reformed Thought on Freedom, provides much information on the development of his views. See for example TE VELDE, “Zanchi on Free Will”: “For the state of man after the fall, the freedom of the will is maintained, but in a more limited sense. There is no longer a freedom from all necessity, but only from (violent) coercion. This is still an important kind of freedom, because it leaves intact man’s responsibility for his deeds and because it secures God from the accusation of being the author of (actual) sin.” Cf. STROHM, Ethik, 442. See also GOUDRIAAN, Reformed Orthodoxy and Philosophy, 173–187.

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In contrast to Arminius, Vermigli held that people do not have libertas indifferentiae. They sin spontaneously, and thus voluntarily in that limited sense. “Vermigli succeeds in reconciling necessity and freedom in terms of necessity as certainty. Above all, this reconciliation is due to a particular notion of freedom as absence of coercion or as spontaneity.”36 This fundamental difference between Arminius and at least the mainstream of Reformed Orthodoxy on the nature of the freedom on which responsibility and justice depend had enormous consequences. Arminius’s opponents considered freedom of indifference after the fall to be not only impossible, but also unnecessary for human responsibility for sin; necessity, inevitability and spontaneity do not exclude each other, and spontaneity – or the absence of coercion – was considered sufficient for responsibility. Arminius did not accept this view on freedom, and for that reason had to attribute freedom of indifference to the human will in order to maintain both responsibility and justice.37 This fundamental difference of opinion contributed significantly to the fact that the differences appeared to be unresolvable.

2.2 God’s Justice in the Structure of Arminius’s Theology God’s justice has an important place in the structure of Arminius’s theology on three levels. The first concerns God’s justice as He is in Himself. Who is God in his nature or essence, and what place does the attribute of justice there have (2.2.1)? The second level concerns the remarkable place Arminius gives to justice as fundamental concept for religion in general, for which reason it also becomes distinctive for his own theology (2.2.2). The third level concerns the constant attention Arminius gives to justice in ways aside from the first two which are already so fundamental. Justice remains a consistent, prominent and pervasive theme as an essential element in Arminius’s theology, fostered from its place within the doctrine of God and as the foundation of religion (2.2.3). 2.2.1 God’s Justice: A Structurally Determinative Concept in the Doctrine of God Before we describe Arminius’s position, it would be helpful to give a brief survey of the history of the concept of justice in the tradition that forms the ————— 36 37

BASCHERA, “Vermigli”, 334; cf. 340. Cf. PuD IX (II 177); X (II 188–189); DEKKER, Rijker dan Midas, 134–135.234.

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background to Arminius’s application of it. In that tradition, Aristotle, Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas were the major players. Some of the chief characteristics will be outlined below. History of the Concept of Justice Already Plato (424–348 BC) attributed to justice a place among the four cardinal virtues. However, he considered it to be foundation of all other virtues, and in fact to encapsulate all virtues. Aristotle (384–322 BC), who devoted a separate chapter to justice in his Ethica, took over Plato’s view. As he saw it, justice is perfect virtue, the highest of all virtues. Every virtue is taken up into justice.38 However, Aristotle limited justice to pertaining to the other, and for that reason assigned it a place in the juridical context where it has a distributive function. “Equality” is the basic principle,39 so that Aristotle can define “justice” as a virtue by which each receives his due as determined by law; injustice is when one receives an alien good, not according to law. Ulpianus’s (d. 228) legal definition of justice became normative. He defined justice as the constant and perpetual will to give each person what is rightly his or hers: Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum unicuique tribuendi.40 Throughout history, these definitions remained normative for theology, ethics and politics. In patristic ethics, justice is also included among the cardinal virtues. Augustine likewise maintained the four chief virtues as civic virtues. Justice seeks to give to each person his due (sua cuique tribuere), and is the harmony of all virtues.41 In the Middle Ages, the concept of justice was considered from three perspectives: the justice of God (doctrine of God), the justification of the sinner (soteriology), and human moral justice (ethics). The concepts themselves were taken over from ancient philosophy.42 Anselm of Canterbury (ca. 1033–1109) made an independent contribution to the development of the concept of justice. He spoke of an ontological rectitudo in which all that exists partakes, and only by that does something become “just”. Also moral justice, rooted in real freedom, is deter————— ARISTOTLE, Ethica, 1129b. ARISTOTLE, Ethica, 1131a. 40 ARISTOTLE, Ethica, 1129b–1130a; HAUSER, “Gerechtigkeit”, 330–331. 41 HAUSER, “Gerechtigkeit”, 332: “Iustitia, cuius munus est, sua cuique tribuere, unde fit in homine ipso quidam iustus ordo naturae”; HÖDL, “Gerechtigkeit V”, 424: “In der wechselseitigen Verknüpfung der vier Tugenden mit den drei Seelenkräften/-teilen ist die Gerechtigkeit Maß und Mitte, Entsprechung und Ausgleich (Harmonie) der Kräfte und Tugenden der Seele. […] Gerechtigkeit is das Ganze der Tugenden”. 42 For the history of the concept of the iustitia Dei in the scholastic tradition and in Luther, see BORNKAMM, “Iustitia dei”, 1–25. 38 39

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mined by this rectitudo. Only the will that maintains its justice for the sake of justice itself can be called just. This forms the essence of justice.43 God is the only one who is not determined by a non-essential rectitudo. God not only has justice, but He is just in his very essence. Anselm insists on this even when in his Cur Deus homo? justice appears – as Hauser would say – to impose a certain necessity on God. Anselm resolves the apparent conflict within God’s attributes, such as between justice and mercy, by pointing to the essential unity in God’s being, and thus to the mysterious coincidence of all attributes. Here Hauser, whose description I follow, clearly refers to the simplicitas Dei.44 Thomas Aquinas (ca. 1225–1274) was the one who gave shape to the classical view of justice. God is the source of justice. However, justice in the sense of one of God’s attributes is much more than a philosophical concept. Thomas further superimposes justice on mercy since justice can distribute only from God’s overflowing goodness: “An act of divine justice always presupposes an act of mercy, and is founded on it”. (Opus autem divinae iustitiae semper praesupponit opus misericordiae et in eo fundatur) For Thomas, the justification of the sinner clearly comes forth from God’s goodness. In his ethics, Thomas writes elaborately about justice as moral virtue. Using Ulpianus’s definition, he builds on Aristotle’s views.45 He attributes ————— 43 ANSELM, De veritate, Capitulum XII, p. 152: “Iustitia igitur rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata.”; cf. ANSELM, De libertate Arbitrii, 78. 44 HAUSER, “Gerechtigkeit”, 332. 45 Cf. ST II/II, q.58, a.12 on justice as the most excellent of all virtues: “Respondeo dicendum quod si loquamur de iustitia legali, manifestum est quod ipsa est praeclarior inter omnes virtutes morales, inquantum bonum commune praeeminet bono singulari unius personae. Et secundum hoc philosophus, in V Ethic., dicit quod praeclarissima virtutum videtur esse iustitia, et neque est Hesperus neque Lucifer ita admirabilis. Sed etiam si loquamur de iustitia particulari, praecellit inter alias virtutes morales, duplici ratione. Quarum prima potest sumi ex parte subiecti, quia scilicet est in nobiliori parte animae, idest in appetitu rationali, scilicet voluntate; aliis virtutibus moralibus existentibus in appetitu sensitivo, ad quem pertinent passiones, quae sunt materia aliarum virtutum moralium. Secunda ratio sumitur ex parte obiecti. Nam aliae virtutes laudantur solum secundum bonum ipsius virtuosi. Iustitia autem laudatur secundum quod virtuosus ad alium bene se habet, et sic iustitia quodammodo est bonum alterius, ut dicitur in V Ethic. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit, in I Rhet., necesse est maximas esse virtutes eas quae sunt aliis honestissimae, siquidem est virtus potentia benefactiva. Propter hoc fortes et iustos maxime honorant, quoniam fortitudo est utilis aliis in bello, iustitia autem et in bello et in pace.” Cf. ST II/II, q.58, a.5. According to Thomas, following Aristotle’s view on justiceas comprehending every virtue, justice is a general virtue. For the sense in which justice can be called general, cf. ST II/II, q.58, a.6: “Hoc autem modo, secundum praedicta, iustitia legalis dicitur esse virtus generalis, inquantum scilicet ordinat actus aliarum virtutum ad suum finem, quod est movere per imperium omnes alias virtutes. Sicut enim caritas potest dici virtus generalis inquantum ordinat actus omnium virtutum ad bonum divinum, ita etiam iustitia legalis inquantum ordinat actus omnium virtutum ad bonum commune. […] Et sic oportet esse unam virtutem superiorem quae ordinet omnes virtutes in bonum commune, quae est iustitia legalis, et est alia per essentiam ab omni virtute.”

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to justice as chief virtue a place among the acquired habitus which then has a narrower application through its bearing on the other (est ad alterum) and by the principle of equality (debitum secundum aequalitatem).46 According to Thomas, there is a direct connection between justice and the will, because a just act demands obedience, and thus knowledge and a free choice: Then for an act to be virtuous in any field whatever it has to be voluntary [voluntarius] and to spring from a stable [stabilis] and firm [firmus] disposition; the Philosopher teaches in book 2 of the Ethics that the requirements of a virtuous act are that it is done, 1. knowingly, 2. from choice and for a fitting end, and 3. unwaveringly. The first is included in the second, since, as the Ethics say, what is done in ignorance is involuntary. Hence the definition starts with the will in order to show that the act of justice has to be voluntary, and qualifies this as lasting and constant in order to indicate the firmness of the act.47

Arminius Arminius adopts the basic definition of justice from the tradition. For example, in his Declaration he cites Ulpianus’s definition word for word: God’s justice is “a perpetual and constant desire in Him to render to every one that which is his due.”48 Justice is determinative and essential to God, so that already in his commentary on Romans 9 Arminius declares that “God, who, just in Himself, nay, existing as Justice itself, does nothing, and, indeed, can do nothing, except what is most thoroughly in agreement with that nature of His.”49 On the one hand justice is one of the many attributes of God, on the other hand it is so comprehensive that it should at ————— 46 HAUSER, “Gerechtigkeit”, 331–333; HÖDL, “Gerechtigkeit V”, 428. Cf. MACINTYRE, Whose Justice?, 196–201. 47 ST II/II, q.58, a.1: “Ad hoc autem quod aliquis actus circa quamcumque materiam sit virtuosus, requiritur quod sit voluntarius, et quod sit stabilis et firmus, quia philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod ad virtutis actum requiritur primo quidem quod operetur sciens, secundo autem quod eligens et propter debitum finem, tertio quod immobiliter operetur. Primum autem horum includitur in secundo, quia quod per ignorantiam agitur est involuntarium, ut dicitur in III Ethic. et ideo in definitione iustitiae primo ponitur voluntas, ad ostendendum quod actus iustitiae debet esse voluntarius. Additur autem de constantia et perpetuitate, ad designandum actus firmitatem.” Cf. ST II/II, q.59, a.2: “Facere ergo iniustum ex intentione et electione est proprium iniusti, secundum quod iniustus dicitur qui habet iniustitiae habitum. Sed facere iniustum praeter intentionem, vel ex passione, potest aliquis absque habitu iniustitiae.” Cf. ST II/II, q.59, a.3: “Sed contra est quod iniustum pati oppositum est ei quod est iniustum facere. Sed nullus facit iniustum nisi volens. Ergo, per oppositum, nullus patitur iniustum nisi nolens.” 48 Verklaring, 77 (I 624). 49 AR9 787 (III 499): “qui in se iustus, imo ipsa iustitia existens, nihil agit; ac ne agere quidem potest, nisi quod cum ista sua natura congruit solidissime”. Cf. EP 635 (III 267). A similar, essential justice of God can be found in Anselm (see above).

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the very least be considered the primus inter pares of the chief virtues.50 The structurally determinative place of justice in Arminius’s doctrine of God will be worked out further in 3.1.1. With respect to all the distinctions that are drawn between God’s attributes, it must be remembered that these can only be made from a framework that takes account of the limits to human understanding. God’s simplicitas forbids any real distinction within the divine essence. Nevertheless, discussions on the nature of human language about God’s attributes could still be very significant and lead to important theological differences.51 2.2.2 Fundamental Concept for Religion Arminius’s series of three orations on the object, author, goal and certainty of theology deal with the theological prolegomena. That the notion of God’s justice fundamentally roots the structure of his entire theology becomes clearly visibly in these orations. At this point, one would do well to gain clear insight into the structure of Arminius’s theology, because it is here that the foundation, presuppositions and method of his theological thought become evident. Especially his first oration on the object of theology will receive attention below. Arminius makes a distinction between Legal and Evangelical theology: the first pertains to theology before the fall, the second to the post-fall situation.52 The object of both is God; in the Evangelical theology, however, Christ is added as the second, subordinate object (see further below). ————— 50 Cf. Thomas Aquinas on the relationship of the chief virtue of justice to the secondary virtues: ST II/II, q.58, a.11. “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod iustitiae, cum sit virtus cardinalis, quaedam aliae virtutes secundariae adiunguntur, sicut misericordia, liberalitas et aliae huiusmodi virtutes, ut infra patebit. Et ideo subvenire miseris, quod pertinet ad misericordiam sive pietatem, et liberaliter benefacere, quod pertinet ad liberalitatem, per quandam reductionem attribuitur iustitiae, sicut principali virtuti.” 51 For an excellent overview of the important medieval discussions on this issue, see HALVERSON, Aureol. It is also interesting to note the considerable amount of agreement there is between the views of Aureolus and Arminius on predestination and related topics. 52 AC 565 (III 170): “Gratia autem quam Christus non impetravit Evangelica dici, mea sententia, non potest. Deinde puto duplicem in universum esse viam modum et rationem obtinendae felicitatis aeternae supernaturalis. Unam strictae iustitiae et legalem, alteram misericordiae et Evangelicam: quemadmodum etiam duplex est foedus Dei, operum unum, alterum fidei; unum iustitiae, alterum gratiae; unum legale, alterum Evangelicum. Per illam viam et rationem felicitas obtinetur perfecta legis creaturae a Deo datae obedientia: per hanc vero viam et rationem obtinetur felicitas inobedientiae remissione et iustitiae imputatione. Aliam viam mens humana concipere nequit: saltem nulla alia sacris Scripturis est patefacta. Hi duo modi hunc inter se ordinem habent, ut iste praecedat, sic iustitia Dei, conditione creaturae, et natura rei ipsius postulante: alter modus sequatur, si quidem per illum priorem felicitas creaturae obtingere nequeat et Deo visum sit etiam illum creaturae proponere, quod omnino est puri puti arbitrii divini.”

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After treating the excellence of the object, Arminius makes three observations: 1. The infinity of God’s nature makes it necessary to adopt a method that is adapted to the finite human capacity. 2. According to the norm of God’s justice, there ought to be development in knowledge from grace to glory.53 3. The object of theology is not only meant to be known, but also to be worshiped. The theology of this world is practical (that is, aimed at worship), and by faith. Theoretical theology (that is, aimed at knowledge) belongs to the world to come and is by sight, and it is no longer about believing but seeing.54 Theology is thus above all practical, directed to human worship of God, ought to show development, and is methodologically adapted to the finite capacity of the human intellect. These three basic principles imply that the object of theology must be clothed55 in such a way that it advises (suadere) worship of God, and persuades (persuadere) people to do it. This rule is of great importance for Arminius: “[It] is the line and rule of the formal definition according to which God becomes the subject of our theology.”56 A caveat is in order at this point to prevent that the practical goal of theology (i.e. directed at the worship and honor of God) be misunderstood in modern terms as if it aims at an “undogmatic” or ethical theology. A “practical” theology also does not imply that it not satisfy the strictest demands of theoretical science.57 Arminius’s conviction that theology is practical does, however, produce a strong focus. He identifies three issues that must be known to attain this goal, the criterion of selection being that they serve ————— 53 Knowledge of grace must progress to knowledge of glory: “Per rectum enim usum scientiae gratiosae ad sublimiorem illam gloriosam, ex norma iustitiae divinae, est progrediendum”. It is fitting for grace to be glorified; justice, whose task it is to apportion to each what is his or her due, thus brings about the progression from grace to glory. 54 OR 30 (I 328). 55 For more on the “clothing” of the object of theology (God), see the next subsection (knowability of God’s justice). Cf. OR 50 (I 363). 56 OR 30 (I 328): ‘Atque haec postrema ratio, norma est et amussis formalis rationis, secundum quam Deus nostrae Theologiae subiicitur.’ 57 Cf. Duns Scotus’s view as summarized by VOS, Duns Scotus on Divine Love, 26: “Duns shows, however, that theology, although an important part of it is about contingent states of affairs, can nonetheless meet the strictest requirements of a theoretical science, and yet be called ‘practical science’ as well. Seen from the Aristotelian perspective, this connection of strict, theoretical science and (contingent) practical action, as it appears in ethics, is impossible. […] Compared to Aristotle, Scotus adopts a wider definition of the term ‘practical,’ although it of course remains connected to contingent action. In his opinion, scientific knowledge is practical, when it structurally precedes practical action, and this practical action is correct only when it is in accordance with this knowledge. Thus all scientific knowledge which directs practical action, can be called practical.” Cf. MACCOVIUS, Distinctiones, Decuria IV.IV, in: VAN ASSELT, Scholastic Discourse, 324–327: “Notitia est Theoretica et Practica, hoc est, nuda et effectiva. Illa est qua quis intelligit, et dicitur simplicis intelligentiae, haec est qua quis rem cognitam, solido affectu complectitur”.

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to the worship and honor of God. Moreover, the things that are selected also determine the structure of Arminius’s theology: 1. God’s nature. 2. God’s acts. 3. God’s will (voluntas).58 Knowledge of these three is necessary and sufficient (necessaria et sufficientia) to attain to the goal of theology. Arminius always uses these criteria when he evaluates the theological positions and viewpoints of others. God’s Nature The first thing that must be known is God’s nature. Arminius immediately explains that the reason is that God’s nature is worthy of worship (cultus) because of its justice (iustitia). Justice has a primary place in God’s nature, even ahead of his wisdom which can make decisions concerning this cultus, and ahead of God’s goodness which can reward true worship of God. The present study will illustrate that this direct line, which comes out of the practical nature of theology as based on necessary knowledge of God’s nature, and the connection Arminius draws between God’s justice and worship of God, together with the knowability of God’s justice (see the following section), all have profound implications for the entirety of his thought, and for the choices and assessments he makes in regard to the theology of others and the development of his own. That God’s just nature has a primary place fully agrees with what we in the preceding subsection called the structurally determinative character of God’s justice within the doctrine of God.59 This is not the first time Arminius develops his conception of God’s justice and its structurally determinative place within theology. From this oration it is clear that the important place God’s justice has in certain manuscripts from an even earlier period is not just a coincidence. God’s justice is a concept that was deeply rooted in the very structure of Arminius’s entire theology. God’s Acts The second thing that must be known with respect to the goal of theology concerns God’s acts in creation and providence. The demand made of humankind to honor God’s sovereign authority is rooted in its creation by God after his own image.60 God’s providence applies in a particular way to people, and there especially with respect to the worship and obedience they ————— 58 59 60

OR 30–31 (I 329). What this means in terms of content will, as noted before, be treated in 3.1.1. OR 30 (I 329).

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owe to God. As Creator God has the right to determine how they should worship Him. That is his providence, which he executes in a holy, just and wise manner (sancte, iuste et sapienter).61 Arminius’s views on creation and providence, and the place of God’s justice in them, will be developed further in 3.1.2. In his oration on the author of theology, Arminius notes that God, before He could promulgate a law, had to be known by humankind in two respects: 1. his nature (wise, good, just and omnipotent); 2. his authority, his right to promulgate laws, which depends on the act of creation.62 God’s Will God’s will, the third element that must be known, comes to expression in the covenant (foedus) that He enters into with humanity. There are two components to that covenant: promise and obligation. God demands to be obeyed and worshiped, and is ready to reward that abundantly.63 It is thus clear that the covenant, the way chosen by God to deal with people, takes a central place in Arminius’s theology. Knowledge of God’s nature and acts, as treated above, provides the foundation for what is involved in this covenant: worship of God. Knowledge of God’s justice is foundational for worshiping God. The central place the covenant has within Arminius’s theology, as well as the significance of God’s justice for the covenant, will be given further attention below in 3.3. Legal and Evangelical Theology The preceding pertains to the object of the Legal theology. Before the fall into sin, relatively little needed to be known for the attainment of the goal of that theology. Knowledge of only several of God’s attributes was necessary, creation and providence were exercised only in the sense of God’s preserving and sustaining work, and finally there had to be knowledge of God’s demand for obedience and the rewards He offered for that obedience. What strikes one in this context is that Arminius continually refers to God’s goodness and justice, and points to God’s just actions (boni et iusti Dei; ex iustitiae legalis norma; illum bonum et iustum; illo bono et iusto; citra iustitiae suae laesionem, ex praescripto iustitiae legalis; ex iustitia; ex debito; iuxta bonitatem [...] et iustitiam suam).64 On the one hand, this ————— 61 62 63 64

OR 31 (I 329). OR 42 (I 349–350). OR 31 (I 329). OR 32–34 (I 332–335).

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comes from the fact that we are here in the context of the Legal theology where sin is not a factor. The law and other legal elements are very much in the foreground, although even here grace (gratia) is not absent. On the other hand, this also forms the basis for what is to be said about the Evangelical theology. Determinative for the Evangelical theology is that sin must now be reckoned with as a factor, yet the way sin is taken into account is entirely consistent with the way God revealed Himself in the Legal theology: as a good and just God. Through the fall into sin (cf. 3.2), the Legal theology is no longer sufficient to attain the goal. Humankind is under condemnation, people are children of wrath and in need of justification (Homo iustificandus erat).65 However, justification through the law is no longer possible. For that reason, the Legal theology is not suited to salvation. For salvation to be possible, a new beginning must be made. It is for that reason that the Evangelical theology comes into the picture (cf. 3.1.2). The goal of theology, worship of God, remains the same. However, the three elements that needed to be known and that sufficed within the context of the Legal theology are no longer sufficient after the fall. A new revelation or theology is necessary, with other divine attributes (misericordia, longanimitas, mansuetudo, patientia, clementia) and deeds (such as a new creation, new providence, forgiveness and iustitia remissa reparanda), and new decisions from God’s will. God’s new will now consists in a new covenant or decree into which He enters with humanity.66 God’s covenant, as the way in which He has determined now to deal with humankind, here appears to be the same as God’s decree (decretum). For Arminius, therefore, the decree does not concern the “final result” but the “rules”, and is synonymous with the covenant.67 The content of this new covenant or decree is determined by who God is. God’s justice and truth (ultor iustissimus; obsistente iustitia et veritate) demanded that a Mediator intervene for this new revelation lest God’s justice and truth be even in the least bit transgressed (circa laesionem iustitiae et veritatis suae). It is a just and merciful (iustus et misericors) God who sent Christ his Son as Mediator. Because of the work He accomplished, it is also “most rightful” (aequissimum) that Jesus, too, be known, worshiped and called upon. This is impossible without faith (Rom 10:14), and faith is impossible without revelation. Thus a revelation concerning Jesus Christ was neces————— OR 32–33 (I 332–333). OR 33 (I 334): “Quin et decretum aliud de hominis salute faciendum fuit, aliud et novum foedus cum homine ineundum.” 67 For the overlap between issues such as covenant, decree, Gospel (Evangelium) and predestination, see 3.3. 65 66

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sary, and as result the foundation of the theology that will contribute sufficiently for the salvation of the sinner needs two objects: God and Christ. The Evangelical or Christian theology has two objects that may not be separated, even if the second (i.e. Christ) is subordinate to the first (subordinatum).68 After positing the unity of God and Christ, Arminius deals with the subordination of Christ as second object of the Evangelical theology. The nature of Christ’s subordination consists in this, that every saving communicatio of God with humanity, or of humanity with God, must take place through the means of Christ’s intervention (cf. 3.3.1).69 Iustitia Rigida and the Necessity of Christ’s Mediatorship It is God’s unshakeable justice (iustitia rigida) that separates humankind from God and from fellowship with Him on account of its corruption, and necessitates the subordination of Christ as object of theology in order to remove that separation. The Father, seated on a throne of iustitia rigida behind Christ, can only be approached through Christ’s blood and through faith.70 God’s justice requires that all contact between sinful humankind and God pass through Christ.71 The ordo of just mercy, and of the merciful justice of God,72 determines the necessity of Christ and of faith in Him. Yet his justice also determines that his wrath remain on unbelievers because they are outside of Christ. Arminius here notes that this can only be true if those who do not believe have first had the opportunity to be saved through faith in Jesus Christ. With this remark he betrays something of his view that within the Evangelical theology, God can only exercise his wrath once Christ has been rejected as Mediator. The only one who is capable of satis————— 68 OR 34–35 (I 335–336). Christ, the God-man and Mediator, is subordinate to God; however, that does not take away from the fact that He as Second Person, together with the Father and the Holy Spirit, is the electing God. Arminius’s insistence on Christ’s subordination must be seen in the background of his view that God, before He can proceed to election out of grace, must have a basis for that election in the atonement effected by Christ’s Mediatorship. Contra MULLER, “Christological Problem”, 158–159. 69 “Natura illius in eo consistit, quod omnis, quae Deo nobiscum est, aut nobis cum Deo, salutaris communicatio, Christi medio interventu peragitur.” OR 36 (I 338). God’s communicatio with us is: 1. his benevolent affection erga nobis; 2. his gratioso decreto de nobis; 3. his effectu salutifero in nobis. OR 36 (I 338). In all these things Christ is the Mediator: “Ubique Christus medius intercedit.” (Eph 1:6 and 5). OR 36 (I 339). Cf. OR 45 (I 354): Because God created all things, including humankind, through his Word and Spirit, there is no communicatio with humankind except through the intervention of the Son and the Spirit. Qui possit? Because God’s deeds are ad extra indivisa, and for that reason the order of his deeds ad extra is the same as the ordo processionis ad intra. 70 OR 36–37 (I 339–340). Cf. 3.3.1. 71 OR 37 (I 340–341). Cf. PrD XXXII (II 376–377); XXXIII (II 378–379); XL (II 392–393). 72 OR 38 (I 342): “ex ordinatione iusae misericordiae, misericordis iustitiae Dei.”

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fying, and has in fact satisfied, God’s justice is rejected. With his unshakeable justice, God remains hidden behind Christ; his wrath can and will be poured out only when Christ has been rejected as Mediator. Because for Arminius in a certain sense it is true – for reasons which are also related to God’s justice, and which will be explored further elsewhere73 – that everyone must have had the opportunity to believe in Christ, we can already at this point conclude that this conviction, when combined with a view of irresistible grace, would logically have implied universal salvation.74 At any rate, Arminius insists that a strong emphasis must be placed on the connection (coniunctio) between God and Christ as object of the Evangelical theology.75 Duplex Amor Dei Already in the content of Arminius’s prolegomena do we see the basic outlines of his theology. Another basic concept which likewise shows the structurally important place of God’s justice is the twofold love of God, a theme that first appears explicitly in Arminius’s Examen Perkinsiani, and is further developed until it achieves final maturity in the Declaration of 1608. Chapter 4 will expand on this concept in terms of content, but in what follows we will treat its structural significance for Arminius’s theology. Arminius identifies the twofold love of God as the foundation of religion in general, and of the Christian religion in particular. The first and most important love is that for justice, the second and subordinate love is for humankind. The latter is subordinate because there is one thing that limits it: God’s love for justice. In other words, God can love a person only when his justice has been satisfied with respect to that person. And when that is indeed the case, God will also certainly love that man or woman. Arminius goes so far as to argue that any and every form of religion is impossible if it does not maintain God’s twofold love, in that order, and with that mutual relationship.76 A proper understanding of God’s love needs to take into account its close relationship to God’s will. God’s will, logically subordinate to his intellect, is directed towards a known good. God’s love is equivalent to God’s will directed to a good.77 In 2.1 we already noted that the concept of justice is closely related to such concepts as law, reward and punishment, obedience and disobedience, ————— 73 74 75 76 77

See 3.3 and 5.1.3. OR 38 (I 342). OR 39 (I 344). Verklaring, 90 (I 634). Cf. ALTENSTAIG, Lexicon, 37. Cf. STANGLIN, Assurance, 219–221.

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sin and freedom. The certainty of reward in case of obedience and of punishment in case of disobedience to God’s stipulations – in other words, justice – is necessary to incite a free creature to worship God. Knowing this arouses fear as well as a zeal to serve God.78 If there is no justice, if there is no law, there is no stimulus to worship God and to avoid sin. For that reason justice, and the love of that justice of a just God who as Creator and Sustainer has the right to demand that people worship Him,79 are foundational concepts in Arminius’s theology. With this last point, the connection between justice as the structurally determinative concept in the doctrine of God, and justice as fundamental concept for religion, has been laid. It is the same God who is essentially just, and who through his authority as Creator, Sustainer and Lawgiver demands honor and obedience and provides what is necessary for it by the revelation of his nature, deeds and will, which are in turn the three necessary and sufficient elements for the practical goal of theology: worship of God. Given this place justice has in the very structure of the doctrine of God and of religion in general, we have an important foundation for a theology where God’s justice not only determines its shape, but is also continually referred back to. 2.2.3 The Core Concept of Arminius’s Theology Justice is not only the basis for the doctrine of God and for religion, it is also a recurrent notion and theme throughout Arminius’s theologizing. From this it is clear that Arminius consciously maintained iustitia as a structurally determinative element, and that he used and developed it towards a theology in which God’s justice is consequently, consistently and coherently defended and made use of in order to respond to critics and to root his own theology. Although word-frequency is only of a very limited use, it is nevertheless worth noting how often Arminius uses a form of the word iustitia throughout his writings. The rates vary from about 1.8/1,000 to as high as 6.1/1,000.80 The many contexts in Arminius’s theology in which the concept of justice plays a central role will be treated further below. For that reason, a summary and analysis will not be given at this point. An extra indication of the way Arminius was set on developing a theology that did justice to God’s honor can be found in his oration on religious ————— 78 79 80

Cf. Verklaring, 91–94 (I 635–638). OR 42 (I 350). DR7 1.83; EP + DR9 2.61; OR 2.48; HaC 6.12; AC 4.25; PrD + PuD 1.76/1,000.

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dissension. Here he displays a great amount of tolerance towards those who think differently. Near the end of the oration, however, that tolerance is nevertheless reigned in by the need to battle each and every falsity that conflicts with salvation and that does God’s honor an injustice. The fight against such falsities must be waged with zeal, but also with wisdom and gentleness.81 The rest of this chapter will show how, and with what zeal, wisdom and gentleness Arminius himself fought this battle.

2.3 The Knowability of God’s Justice The preceding has shown that the concept of God’s justice has an important function in the structure of Arminius’s theology. But is this not true for every (Reformed) theology? All of Arminius’s contemporaries will surely have agreed that God is just, and that his justice may not be harmed in any way. Surely on this point there would not have been any differences between them and Arminius! So what is the reason that, as I argue, Arminius’s approach to God’s justice resulted in an entirely unique theology? Arminius’s approach to the justice of God departs in two important way from the views of his contemporaries: 1. the knowability of God’s justice, and 2. the frequency with which God’s justice comes up because of the central role it has through that knowability. First we will deal with the knowability, rationality and comprehensibility (the epistemological aspect) of God’s justice in Arminius’s theology. Luther and Calvin, and many in following them, pointed to the unknowability, greatness and incomprehensibility of God’s sovereign authority and will, and to the limits of human understanding and the darkened, sinful state of the intellect, whenever something was to be attributed to God that from a human perspective conflicted with God’s justice (see also 7.2 below).82 In contrast, Arminius’s starting-point is that God is just, and that the required theology or knowledge of God has been adapted to the human understanding, because otherwise the goal of theology – worship of God – will be threatened in many ways. In order for God’s justice to serve as a means to worship Him, it must be knowable. It simply cannot be that other revelations of God’s nature, deeds and will obscure this basic condition for wor————— OR 90 (I 525–526). For this oration, see also SIRKS, Pleidooi. Cf. Luther, whom Arminius identified in his Articuli nonnuli as a theologian who incorrectly argued that in the light of the glorified state we will understand with what justice God condemned the innocent (quo iure possit Deus immeritum damnare). AN 953 (II 713). For Calvin, see CALVIN, Inst. III.24.14: The reprobate “iusto, sed inscrutabili Dei iudicio suscitati sunt, ad gloriam eius sua damnatione illustrandam”; Inst. III.23.4: “the reason of divine justice is higher than man’s standard can measure, or than man’s slender wit can comprehend.” 81 82

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ship of God and make it impossible or more difficult to understand. In fact, the converse is true. In his self-revelation, God reveals what is necessary for bringing people to worship Him. Therefore that element which is aimed particularly at producing worship of God is extremely important, and will also be clearly revealed. Theology must serve the knowledge of God’s justice, and does not darken, offend or question it. Because all of theology is measured by the strict norm of God’s justice, and because revelation aims to make God’s justice known, all the parts of theology agree with and reveal God’s justice. They never contradict or darken it. 2.3.1 Arminius’s View of Scripture The knowability of God’s justice is closely connected to Arminius’s Scripture view, which closely correlates with his intellectualism (cf. further below). Arminius’s response to Perkins’s ten axiomata in his Examen Perkinsiani clearly illustrates this. He denies that these axiomata are generally accepted, as well as that they can be attributed to the darkened state of the mind that results from sin, and goes on to critique them forcefully. Two socalled axiomata prompt him to develop his view on God’s justice. Already in connection with the first axiom does Arminius emphasize that the principle that all God’s actions are just does not allow us to attribute things to Him that would be unjust according to human standards.83 The fifth axiom treats God’s judgments, which are likewise certainly just. However, Arminius warns that we may not attribute anything to God judgments that is not found in Scripture, or that conflicts with his justice.84 That Arminius’s constant concern here is God’s relationship to sin is clear from the remarks he makes on the majority of the other axiomata, which treat such issues as God’s foreknowledge of the fall into sin as occasion (occasio) for the decree to send Christ into the world, permissio, concursus, and God’s acts according to the modus of the free will.85 God’s decrees cannot conflict with his justice as it is revealed in the Scriptures. God’s decrees do not become blameless simply when we call ————— 83 EP 635 (III 267). Cf. A31A 176–177 (II 51–52): “sed videant fratres mei ne ipsi faciant iniuriam iustitiae divinae, illi tribuendo quod ipsa respuit”. See also ETG 107–108 (III 616): “Quis ita erit absurdus et infulsus, qui ignoret Deum, cujus voluntas nunquam est injusta, facere posse jure de suo quidquid voluerit? At vero sub isto praetextu on licet nobis quidvis ex cerebro nostro confingere, et hoc ipsum juri et voluntati Dei subjicere. Multa enim confingere nos possumus secundum vanitatem mentis nostrae, quae Deus de suis creaturis nec facere velit, nec facere possit, nec velle possit, nec posse velit; quale est immeritum reprobare ad mortem aeternam.” 84 EP 636 (III 270). 85 EP 637–638 (III 272–273).

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them just. Rather, one must be able to show that a decree we attribute to God really is his. If that is indeed the case, its justice is unquestionable.86 Arminius’s view of Scripture is of great significance in this regard. That is clear from various passages where he identifies Scripture as the standard by which all that can and must be said about God’s justice is to be measured. For Arminius, one of the basic characteristics of theology is that it is adapted to the limits of human understanding. This implies that we are to turn to the Bible, to revelation,87 for knowledge of God, and that this revelation is adapted to the human understanding.88 Theology bases itself on Scripture, and both are intended to be understood by the limited capacity of the human intellect, and are thus adapted to it. This implies, for example, that “eternal truths” such as those of human logic can be applied to our reflection on revelation. Further, there is complete agreement and harmony into even the minutest details (in minutissimis) of the doctrines of the Scriptures.89 If it even begins to appear as if Scripture contains contradictions, these contradictions can simply be resolved by way of correct exegesis. And it is not just all the elements of doctrine that agree, but they are in harmony with all universal truth as contained in the totality of philosophy. There is nothing in philosophy that cannot correspond with biblical teaching. Should something appear to be an error, that can be resolved by true philosophy and the recta ratio.90 Should something conflict with Scripture or nature and be incomprehensible, it must necessarily be untrue.91 The substance and content of the Scriptures reveal their divinity, for the Scriptures describe God and Christ, their natures, and the way they have dealt with humankind. The Scriptures moreover prescribe the duties people ————— 86 EP 700 (III 368): “Sed videndum an et quo modo Deus aliquid decernat. Fieri enim nequit ut ipsius decreta cum iustitia ipsius nobis in Scripturis patefacta pugnent: quare sciendum est non sufficere ad culpam a decreto quod nos Deo ascribimus, auferendam, si addemus decrevisse sed iuste: non enim vocis istius additio iustum facit decretum, sed commonstrandum id quod Deo tribuimus decretum, revera ipsi convenire, et tum de iustitia nulla erit quaestio.” 87 Arminius addresses an argument of doubt, and points to the inadequacy of our limited understanding to determine God’s grace and justice. The Word makes us wise. “Nam de iustitiae et misericordiae divinae rationibus, non ex modulo ingenii aut adfectus nostri est statuendum, sed Deo istarum suarum proprietatum et libera administratio, et iusta defencio relinquenda.” […] “Nobis ex verbo ipsius sapiendum est.” OR 38 (I 342). 88 Cf. Verklaring, 122 (I 695), where Arminius says that God and the divine essence do not differ essentially, but that all the same not everything that can be predicated of God can be predicated of the divine essence, “om datse onderscheyden zijn na onse begrijp, na het welcke alle manieren van spreken moeten gericht zijn, alsose daerom gebruyckt worden, omdat dat wy daer deur yets verstaen zouden.” Cf. PuD IX (II 163). 89 OR 62 (I 385). 90 OR 62 (I 386). 91 ETG 45 (III 563): “Iam vero quod decretum praedestinationis, prius fit ordine quam decretum creationis, probandum esset authori, quod facere non potest, quia Scripturis est contrarium, rerum naturae contraveniens, et incomprehensibile, itaque necessario falsum.”

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owe their divine Benefactors. The way in which (quomodo) Scripture speaks about God’s dealings with humanity is that it describes God’s nature in such a way that nothing foreign to it (extraneum) or not in agreement with it (conveniens) is attributed to it.92 2.3.2 Arminius’s Intellectualism Besides Arminius’s Scripture view, also his intellectualism is decisive for his view on the knowability of God’s justice. In contrast to the voluntarists who consider the will as the final and decisive factor, Arminius argues that the will follows the last judgment of reason and wisdom.93 Not God’s will, but his knowledge and wisdom is the highest norm, and choose in God what the norm of justice shows to be good. That the combination of Arminius’s Scripture view and his intellectualism was influential for the rest of his theology can be demonstrated. In his oration on the goal of theology – the union of God and humankind – Arminius addresses the accommodation of the object of theology (God) to the intellect (mens) and will of man. The growth of the intellect (intellectus) is followed by the expansion of the will (ampliatio voluntatis). According to Arminius, this is possible because of the inborn agreement between intellect and will (ex nativa intellectus et voluntatis convenientia), and their inherent analogy (ingenita analogia) whereby the intellect seeks to will in the same degree that it understands and knows.94 Thus in his revelation, God accommodates Himself to the human capacity of understanding with the goal of moving the human will through the intellect. This approach is entirely consistent with Arminius’s view on the human will and intellect, and on the way in which God’s grace operates (see 5.1.2 and 5.1.4). Section 7.2 will deal at greater length with the significance of a voluntarist position for reflection on God’s justice. But already now it can be noted that Calvin, for example, can repeatedly appeal to the incomprehensibility of a great number of things to our understanding because God’s will is the highest norm for what is just, and because his decrees are hidden. Calvin’s ————— 92 OR 61 (I 383): “At quomodo in istis rebus tractandis versatur? Naturam Dei ita explicat, ut nihil illi tribuat extraneum, nihil non tribuat illi conveniens”. 93 EP 670 (III 322): “Et si mihi permittas, dicam, affectum in eo fuisse et desiderium liberationis, non volitionem. Volitio n. sequitur extremum rationis et sapientiae iudicium, desiderium sequitur antecedens sensuum seu affectuum iudicium.” EP 741 (III 430): “Dei enim potentia non est instrumentum affectus seu desiderii seu velleitatis divinae, sed volitionis liberae ultimum divinae sapientiae iudicium secutae.” Cf. AC 581–582 (III 194); ETG 56–57 (III 572–573). 94 OR 50 (I 363): “secundum quam intellectus se promovet ad volendum eadem proportione, qua intelligit et cognoscit”.

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position implies that it is not always possible, nor necessary, to demonstrate the justice of God’s acts. 2.3.3 God’s Justice: A Frequent and Important Theme That brings us to a second difference between Arminius and his colleagues. In his theological reflection, Arminius constantly refers and connects to, and measures against, the criterion of God’s justice. This is understandable given the place of primary importance this concept has in Arminius’s theology, as well as the fact that he had argued for its comprehensibility and knowability. In support we point to an example Arminius himself gives from his former teacher Beza. Beza admitted that we can neither understand nor explain how it is that God remains guiltless, and humanity guilty, when the latter fell into sin through the necessary ordinatio of God.95 According to Beza, however, we must trust God’s justice, and in that connection he appeals to the darkened human understanding and God’s incomprehensibility. The same can be said about Calvin (see 7.2.3). As Arminius sees it, however, many fundamental concepts have been displaced. He repeatedly points out that Calvin and Beza, although they themselves denied it, made God the author of sin. Arminius acknowledges that they themselves did not want to draw this consequence, but insists that it is an inconsistency on their part. For him, God’s justice is not something one simply confesses against all appearances of injustice, but a revelation of God that forms the basis for faith, for confidence in and worship of God. Arminius thus wants it to be shown plainly and perspicuously that God is not brought in as the author of sin according to that arrangement [i.e. the view of Calvin and Beza – wdb]; or that the opinion be altered, since it is a scandal to many, nay, a cause for many seceding from us, for a very great number not joining themselves to us.96

————— AC 499 (III 76); ETG 5–6 (III 530). AC 499 (III 76): “Quare velim plane et perspicue commonstrari, quod Deus ex illa ordinatione auctor peccati non statuitur, vel sententiam commutari; quandoquidem multis est scandalo, imo causa a nobis secedendi nonnullis, quamplurimis se nobis non coniungendi.” Cf. AN 954–955 (II 715–716). Cf. Verklaring, 94–96 (I 643–644): “Daer beneffens wordt dese leere by een groot deel der ingesetene onses Vaderlandts zoo quaet gheoordeelt, dat veele sick daeromme verclaren met onse kercken, geen gemeenschap te connen of willen hebben. Jae dat sommighe sick tot onse ghemeenschap hebben begheven, met protestatie datse die leere niet konden toestaen. Sijn oock niet weynige om dese leer wille van ons gheweecken, die te vooren met ons eenich waren, ende hebben ooc wel sommighe ghedreycht ons te willen verlaten, ten ware zy onderricht waren geweest, dat de kercke sodanige [meyninge] niet en heeft als hier verclaert is. Wijders, daer en is gheen punct der leere dat de Papisten, Wederdoopers, Lutherische meer bestrijden, ende als een occasie ghebruycken, om dese kercken swart ende de geheele leere stinckende te maken, achtende dat ghene lasteringhe tegens Godt en can bedacht ende uytghesproocken worden zo leelijck, ofte 95 96

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2.3.4 The Certainty of Theology According to Arminius, certain knowledge is of great significance for theology. That is clear from the fact that he devotes an oration to the certainty of sacred theology. He first demonstrates why this is so. However special and great the object, author and goal of theology may be, these would not be enough to awaken in someone a true desire to devote himself to studying it if there was not at the same time the not-uncertain hope of arriving at knowledge of the object and arriving at the goal.97 To each person it must therefore be made clear that there is a revelation from God, and that this revelation is supported and defended by such sure and proven arguments that its divinity is recognized. It should also be made clear that there is a way people can understand the meaning of the Word and accept it by a firm and certain faith.98 But what is certainty (certitudo)? It is an attribute of the mind or intellect, and a manner (modus) of knowledge whereby the intellect knows the object as it really is. It is the truth of the object, and knowledge of that truth, as opposed to an opinion (opinio) on something. According to Arminius, the modus of truth is twofold: necessary or contingent. The necessity of a simple (simplex) thing is the necessary existence of that thing. This applies only to God. The necessity of a complex (complex) thing is the unavoidable and necessary disposition and condition (habitudo) that exists between the subject and an attribute.99 God’s existence (esse) is necessary, as are his life (vita), wisdom, goodness, righteousness, grace, will and power. The foundation of necessity is God’s nature, the principle of contingency is God’s free will.100 In God there is complex necessity, but this is also true in reality created by Him. In God, partly because of the foundation of his nature, partly because of the principle of his free will. There are thus degrees in the necessity of a complex truth: the highest degree is attributed to the truth that rests on God’s nature ————— zy en can met goeden vervolghe uyt dese onser Doctoren leere besloten worden.” Arminius then points to Coolhaes, Herberts, Wiggertsz and Sibrandi. One of the most important reasons for Arminius’s insistence on this point, is his fear that the church would suffer harm and the papacy strengthened, “welckers destructie als des rijcks des Antechristes alle vrome Leeraeren van herten behooren te begheeren, met alle vlijdt te soecken ende so veel in hen is, te beneerstighen.” 97 OR 56 (I 374). 98 OR 56 (I 374). 99 OR 56 (I 375): “Certitudo itaque est mentis sive intellectus proprietas, et modus cognitionis, secundum quem mens cognoscit obiectum prout est, et novit se id nosse prout est: distincta ab opinione”. 100 OR 57 (I 376): “Necessitatis fundamentum est, Natura Dei, contingentiae principium, libera voluntas Dei.”

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as foundation; the rest, which proceeds from God’s will, follows later.101 Certainty can be derived in three ways: 1. through experience (the senses); 2. through knowledge (general conclusions based on axioms); 3. through faith (all that does not come from experience and knowledge).102 Having come to this point, Arminius goes on to apply these general theses to the goal of the certainty of theology. Its object is God and Christ. God is a real being, and the only necessary one because of the necessity of his nature. Also Christ is a real being, who exists through the will of God, and is likewise necessary because He will remain into eternity. What theology attributes to God partly belongs to God’s nature, and partly agrees with God’s nature through God’s free will. In God’s nature there is life, wisdom, goodness, justice, mercy (misericordia!), will and power, and that by a natural and absolute necessity. Through God’s free will, the volitions (volitiones) of God and his deeds pertaining to his creatures agree with his nature, and that unchangeably so. This means that theology is raised far above all other sciences in terms of its truth, necessity and certainty. The certainty of the intellect cannot be greater than the truth and necessity of the known object. In fact, the intellect often does not even attain to that level of truth and necessity because of some defect in its capacity. From this, Arminius concludes that the object of no other science can be known with greater certainty than the object of theology: knowledge of this object [i.e. God – wdb] may be obtained with the greatest degree of certainty, – if it be presented in a qualified and proper manner to the inspection of the understanding according to its capacity.

That “manner” is revelation, which is necessary,103 because neither the senses nor the intellect are capable of knowing this object that is known only to itself (God and Christ). Revelation is such that all its attributes, properties, affections, actions and passions are revealed at one and the same time (simul) in as far as they may be known, and are needed for our salvation and the honor of God and Christ.104 Arminius sums up as follows: We have, therefore, the truth and the necessity of our theology [Theologiae nostrae] agreeing together in the highest degree; we have an adequate notion [notio] of it in

————— OR 57 (I 376–377). OR 57 (I 377). 103 Cf. OR 59–60 (I 381): Given human nature, revelation is necessary for at least three reasons. 1. A person needs revelation in order to worship and know God. 2. Without revelation the human capacity to receive divine good would be useless. 3. Without revelation the implanted human desire to enjoy eternal good would be vain. In light of the relation between God and humankind, revelation is necessary because the latter has a duty to serve God. Because God determines how He is to be worshiped, He must reveal that way to them. A number of different divine attributes must also be revealed; in Christ this happened in an extraordinary way. 104 OR 58–59 (I 378–379). 101 102

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the mind [mente] of God and Christ, according to the word which is called “engrafted.” We have a revelation of this theology made to men by the word preached; which revelation both agrees with the things themselves [rebus quidem ipsis] and with the notion [notio] which we have mentioned, but in a way that is attempered and suited to the human capacity [verum captui humano contemperatam]. And as all these are prolegomena [ut praecedanea] to the certainty which we entertain concerning this theology, it was necessary to deal with them [praestruenda] in these introductory remarks.105

This has considerable consequences. God reveals to his people all the knowledge that is needed for their salvation and for the glory of God, and for that knowledge to function, it must be certain. Revelation thus provides adequate knowledge about God and Christ directed, in a manner adapted to the human understanding, to inciting people to worship God and to be led to salvation. We have already seen (cf. 2.2.2) that from the perspective of the practical character of theology, Arminius considered justice to be the attribute of God that most incites people to worship Him. The way God’s justice, as well as his other attributes, are revealed, is therefore adapted to the capacity of the knowing subject. It is important to see that Arminius himself also connects the certainty of theology to the non-theoretical and practical character of the knowledge of faith. The certainty of faith depends on the truth and dependability of the speaker. Not only questionable opinions (opinio), but also a clouded and complex conception (conceptio), are in fact enemies of faith (fidei est adversa). It is not just a matter of a historical faith. God demands a faith in his Word that grasps (intelliguntur) its meaning (sensus) in as far as it is necessary for salvation and for the glory of God.106 In this way its divinity will be known so certainly that believers believe it to contain not only the highest degree of truth, but also the greatest good. Then people will not only believe that God and Christ exist, but also that God is our Father and Christ our Savior. “This we consider to be the office and employment of an understanding [intellectus] that is not merely theoretical, but of one that is practical.”107 ————— 105 OR 60 (I 381): “Habemus itaque Theologiae nostrae in supremo gradu consistentem veritatem et necessitatem; habemus illius in mente Dei et Christi adaequatam notionem secundum lo,gon, qui e;mfutoj dicitur; habemus eiusdem hominibus factam per lo.gon proforiko.n revelationem, rebus quidem ipsis et notioni convenientem, verum captui humano contemperatam. Atque haec omnia certitudini, quam nòs de ista Theologia habemus, ut praecedanea, ita necessariò praestruenda.” 106 OR 60 (I 382): “Sed postulat Deus verbo suo illam haberi fidem, qua sensus illo enunciati, quantum quidem ad salutem hominum et gloriam Dei est necesse, intelligantur”. 107 OR 60–61 (I 382): “quod non theoretici modo, sed et practici intellectus munus esse arbitramur.”

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A practical theology that seeks to know God in his nature, deeds and will, therefore must have an indubitable, clear and simple understanding of his nature, deeds and will. This knowledge does have to be adapted to the human understanding, but that adaptation takes nothing away from its verity and trustworthiness, and from the fact that the conception (notio) of that theology is present in adequate form in the mind of God and Christ. From different perspectives, and on the basis of different starting-points, it has become clear that Arminius’s view on the knowability of God’s justice not only evidences important differences with respect to that of other theologians including Calvin, but above all that it has direct consequences for the place God’s justice takes on in his thought and theology. These consequences will continue to be the central focus of the following chapters, which will raise first of all the question as to the place and function of justice among God’s attributes.

2.4 Summary and Conclusion Chapter 2 lays out how Arminius understood the concept of justice. The basic principle is that each person is accorded what is his or her due. The foundation of Arminius’s understanding of justice is his understanding of God’s own, essential justice. Arminius’s view of the relationship between justice and mercy is that God’s justice must first be satisfied before he can be merciful; a position which has implications for the place Arminius gives to Christ as Mediator in the doctrines of predestination and covenant. This ordering of justice and mercy is also the point of departure for the duplex amor Dei, the concept fundamental to Arminius’s entire theology. As he sees it, justice presupposes a liberty of indifference, since without it there can be no responsibility. Here Arminius diverges considerably from the view widely held by his contemporaries (who followed Peter Martyr Vermigli), that humans do not have liberty of indifference, and that spontaneity is the sufficient condition for responsibility. In the structure of Arminius’s theology, God’s justice has a dominant place. That justice is an essential attribute of God’s nature has as result that justice is a structurally determinative concept in his doctrine of God. The object of theology, God, must be honored and therefore represented such that it incites worship of Him. It is first of all God’s nature that must be worshiped (even before his deeds or his will), because it is the justice of his nature that renders it worthy of this worship. Thus precisely within the context of knowledge and worship of God, divine justice takes a primary position in Arminius’s theology and is in fact inseparably entwined within

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it. The fact that, after the fall into sin, God as object of theology must be known also as the Christ is likewise a consequence of God’s unshakeable justice. The latter demands satisfaction before the issue of salvation even comes up. Arminius conceptualized this structurally determinative view of justice in the concept of the duplex amor Dei developed by him. If this basic principle of the twofold love of God, a love primarily for justice and secondarily for humans, is not held to in this order and in this mutual relationship, no form of religion is at all possible. From the fact that justice is a recurrent concept and theme in Arminius’s theologizing, one can deduce that he used and developed it towards a theology in which God’s justice is consequently, consistently and coherently defended and made use of in order both negatively to respond to his critics and positively to build his own theology. Arminius’s approach to God’s justice departs from the understanding of his contemporaries in two important ways. 1. God’s justice is, and in fact must be, knowable, because it is exactly the knowledge of God’s justice that incites people to worship and honor him. The limits on the human capacity to understand do not imply that God’s justice cannot be known (cf. Calvin), but that the revelation of God’s justice has been accommodated to that limited capacity, and is for that reason adequate. 2. Arminius consistently appeals to God’s justice and uses it to measure the validity of his own theology.

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3. God’s Justice in Arminius’s Theology II: God, Creation, Sin and Gospel (Evangelium)

3.1 Justice as Divine Attribute 3.1.1 Place and Function Within God’s Attributes The doctrine of God plays an important role in Arminius’s theology, and forms one of its pillars. One cannot find a full treatment of the doctrine of God in his works, yet he does address it sufficiently so that one gains insight into the place he ascribes to God’s justice among the divine essence and attributes. In discussing the freedom of God’s will, the function of justice as arbiter as well as the relationship of God’s wisdom and justice, Arminius reveals something of the way he conceives of the place and function of justice among the attributes of God.1 The Freedom of God’s Will No freedom should be attributed to God’s will at the expense of God’s justice. Arminius makes this important observation when he deals with God’s freedom to abandon people to themselves and to reprobate them. After all, justice precedes the will and is its norm. Freedom is added to the will as its modus, and is thus determined by the justice that precedes God’s will and functions as its norm.2 The freedom of God’s will does not imply that God wills all things, but rather that He wills freely everything that He wills. There are some things that God cannot will because of his justice, but this is not to be understood as a limit to God’s freedom. There is no superior entity above and outside of God, but God’s own justice sets boundaries for what God can will.3 God is likewise the causa causarum; no ratio should be sought outside of it.4 ————— 1 For the place and function of God’s justice in the thought of the Reformers and the representatives of Reformed Orthodoxy, see MULLER, The Divine Essence and Attributes, 476–497; for Gisbertus Voetius, see BECK, Gisbertus Voetius, 359–380. 2 Cf. Verklaring, 84 (I 629). 3 Arminius here teaches that there is a necessary justice in God in a way that is comparable to what Gisbertus Voetius taught later, and in a much more explicitly-developed form. See BECK, Gisbertus Voetius, 359–380. In this context Beck notes that Voetius takes on a position that is

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In his Apology, Arminius fiercely defends his thesis that it is the greatest blasphemy when one says that God is freely good. During a disputation a student had defended the possibility that necessity and freedom can go together with the thesis that God is at once necessarily and freely good. Arminius was so offended by this claim that he remarked it was not all that far from blasphemy. It is false, absurd and blasphemous. False because God is in his essence, nature and through a natural necessity good, is indeed goodness itself, the highest, first and source of all that is good. Thus He is not libere good. It is absurd because freedom is an affectus of God’s will, not of his essence, nor of his understanding, power or the divine nature as a whole. Freedom is an affection of the will, directed to an object, and is neither primary nor adequate, and differs from God Himself. Goodness, however, is an affection of God’s entire nature, of his essence, life, intellect, will, power, etc., which implies that God is good by a natural necessity. The student’s statement is blasphemous because God, if He were indeed freely good, could also be or become not good.5 Justice as Arbiter God is Himself iustitita. He is iustitia, sapientia and omnipotentia. For that reason God cannot command people to do what is unjust. And that in turn forms the foundation for our duty to obey God when He commands something. Arminius therefore does not consider it universally true that some————— rather remarkable within Reformed theology (p. 374), whereby he through his fundamental distinction between God’s necessary and contingent justice assumes a position that avoids the Scylla of determinism and the Charybdis of extreme voluntarism (p. 373). It is worth citing Beck’s summary of Voetius’s position to illuminate also Arminius’s standpoint (p. 379): “Gottes Recht als Disposition des göttlichen Willens wird von Gottes wesentlichen Eigenschaften her reguliert. Gott kann somit kein Recht ‘Setzen’, das in sich widerspruchlich wäre oder seiner eigenen Natur widerspräche. So gesehen ist Gottes Recht notwendig, woraus sich aufgrund der göttlichen Natur auch eine göttliche Selbstverpflichtung gegenüber ihm selbst und seinen Geschöpfen ergibt. Dennoch bleibt Gott frei, dieses oder jenes Recht, das keinen Widerspruch in sich oder zu seinem Wesen impliziert, zu ‘setzen’ oder auch nicht zu ‘setzen’. So gesehen ist Gottes Recht ein positives; es ist frei und kontingent. Das kontingente Recht wird vom notwendigen Recht zwar reguliert, aber nicht determiniert.” 4 EP 683 (III 342–343). Earlier, in EP 681 (III 339), Arminius had posited that God is free in election and reprobation. It is God who has the power to punish sin according to what is due, or to forgive it through grace in Christ. With both election and reprobation, God’s most free will is the causa proxima et immediata. Cf. EP 750 (III 443): God is auvtexou,sioj and therefore receives no laws from human volitions. On the other hand, there are things God does not will to occur unless a certain human volition precedes it, such as the sending of God’s Son to take away sin; God does not will it unless sin is first committed by a human being. See also ETG 119 (III 625): “Quod Deus juste facere non potest, id juste velle non potest”. 5 A31A 166–167 (II 33–34).

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thing is just because God wills it, because the converse could also be true.6 Here, too, we see evidence of Arminius’s intellectualism. A voluntarist will consider God’s will to be the highest principle, the highest norm also for determining what is just,7 but as intellectualist Arminius holds God’s knowledge and wisdom as the highest principle. Through his wisdom God knows all that is good, and his justice as arbiter (arbitratrix) determines what is just. Justice is the norm, prescribes the proper modus, is the arbiter of God’s justice and mercy (which proceeds from God’s goodness), and so of all God’s deeds.8 From the possibilities identified by God’s wisdom and justice, his will chooses the ones to realize. God’s will is thus the causa causarum, but not above and outside of sapientia and iustitia.9 Not only God’s will and wisdom, but also God’s power (potentia) depends on God’s justice. God’s potentia must be exercised according to his iustitia.10 In the aforementioned cases, with “justice” Arminius understands its allencompassing normative function: justice in the broadest sense renders to each his or her due. In what follows, it will become clear that Arminius also understands “justice” in a more limited sense. Wisdom as Mediator When speaking of justice, one can also speak of God’s vindictive (avenging) justice. Sometimes it appears as if the one justice of God conflicts with another divine justice. For example, God could will to punish a sinner on account of his vindictive justice – because his justice is “a love of righteousness and a hatred of iniquity” – while God’s justice in its comprehen————— 6 EP 693 (III 357–358). Also on this point there are remarkable similarities with Voetius: Beck, Gisbertus Voetius, especially 363.366–369.373 and 379: “Für das Euthyphron-Dilemma bedeutet dies, dass Gott dasjenige, was mit seinem notwendigen, strukturell dem Willen vorgeordneten Recht korrespondiert, deshalb will, weil es gerecht ist, während dasjenige, was mit seinem freiem, strukturell dem Willen nachgeordneten Recht korrespondiert, deshalb gerecht ist, weil er es will.” 7 Cf. Arminius’s exposition of Perkins’s view, and his response to the latter in EP 743–744 (III 433–434). The reason God does not grant some nations the means to salvation must not be sought in God’s antecedent will, which precedes all causes in and of men. 8 AR9 795–796 (III 511–513): “Iustitiae, praescribere normam communicationis […] Iustitia praescripsit modum quo decebat istam communicationem fieri; nam est bonitatis arbitratrix, vel, ut Tertullianus inquit, arbitratrix operum Dei. […] Verum iustitia normam et modulum praescripsit huius communicationis, scilicet, illam fieri non debere, nisi sub conditione […] Sed hoc non est passa eadem illa bonitas, (quam mihi matricem misericordiae hoc loco appellare liceat) quin nec ipsa Dei iustitia, bonitatis, et misericordiae arbitratrix.” Cf. ETG 19 (III 541). 9 Cf. AN 949 (II 707). 10 EP 742 (III 432): “Pendet igitur ista poena ex mera et libera Dei voluntate, quam tamen inferre non potest nisi peccatoribus, suspendente illius potentiam iustitia divina, secundum quam potentia est exercenda.”

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sive sense as “a perpetual and constant desire in Him to render to every one that which is his due”11 at the same time wills to give also to God’s goodness what is its due, which is the progression to grace (misericordia). This grace does not will that the sinner be punished. It is God’s wisdom which ensures that there is no conflict in spite of these multiple facets to God’s justice. There is thus a close relationship between God’s justice and his wisdom. God’s wisdom follows the norm of justice for determining what is good, but as the determining factor within an intellectualist viewpoint, wisdom takes into account all of God’s attributes including his goodness and grace. There is no conflict with God’s justice because his justice wills that everything, including God’s goodness, be given its due. Thus even when account is taken of all God’s attributes, wisdom follows the prescriptions of his justice. The close cooperation between justice and wisdom at times leads one to suppose that in Arminius’s thought, God’s wisdom is a function of his justice which ensures that all the demands of God’s justice are satisfied in the context of his will and acts. To illustrate this, we point to Arminius’s argument that after the fall into sin, God’s wisdom provides the “solution” for the “problem” that God’s justice demands the punishment of the sinner, but that it at the same time wills his goodness to be given what is its due (i.e. progression to grace). The solution is found in Christ Jesus the Mediator, who as substitute bore the punishment for sin and thus opens the way for God’s grace towards sinners.12 When the difference between the ways in which Arminius uses the concept of “justice” – i.e. in the “comprehensive” or the “limited” sense – is overlooked, some passages will be difficult to understand or place within the context of his thought. Precisely in these situations does God’s wisdom function as the mediating agent. This can be illustrated concretely with several examples. Arminius writes that God’s justice is something within God Himself. For that reason, justice does not necessarily need to be manifested through the punishment of a sinner. According to Arminius, God has a better way in which He can manifest it:13 in the punishment of sin in God’s Son, a much more excellent way which at one and the same time clearly shows the extent of God’s abhorrence of sin, and at the same time that it is not necessary to punish the sinner.14 ————— Verklaring, 77 (I 624). AR9 796 (III 512–513); cf. 3.1.2. 13 AC 576 (III 186). 14 AC 582 (III 194–195). “Hinc concludo, iustitiae secundum legis normam administratae declarationem necessariam non fuisse, et propterea ex necessitate iustitiae divinae poenam praepa11 12

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A correct interpretation of these statements must first of all take into account that Arminius here addresses the view of those who hold that God’s justice is limited to its vindictive function. Because within the context of Arminius’s theology God’s justice is much broader, for him there can be no such thing as a necessary (fall into) sin. It is not for nothing that Arminius reproaches his opponents for positing a (fall into) sin that is necessary since otherwise it would be impossible for God to manifest his justice. Because Arminius conceives of God’s justice not only as limited to the punishment of sinners (i.e. vindictive justice), but sees punishment as only one way in which justice can render to each its due, in the context of his thought God does not need sin in order to manifest his justice. This holds true even after the fall. There is no necessity within God’s justice to punish sinners (personally); as proof, there is the substitutionary sacrifice of Christ. Another example can be found when Arminius posits that neither justice nor grace serve themselves with respect to sinners, for then all would be punished or forgiven. Also here Arminius has his sight set on the view that understands justice merely in its vindictive function. After all, justice molds itself after its object, in this case the sinner. God’s wisdom directs both (Dei sapientia illis moderantis) justice and grace, and accords to each its place. God’s will follows the judgment of his wisdom and serves justice in such a way that there is room for grace, and vice versa.15 The next example illustrates that God’s normative justice is implicitly present in the functioning of God’s wisdom. Arminius considers “creation to destruction” to conflict with God’s wisdom because 1. God would then decree something that is not good. 2. God would then manifest his mercy and justice in an act – i.e. the decision that people must become sinners and fall into misery – that actually contradicts his mercy and justice. 3. The order of God’s wisdom, namely that He first willed to glorify humanity through the wisdom of the law and then through the wisdom of the gospel (Evangelium), is reversed when “God has absolutely predetermined to save men by the mercy and wisdom that are comprehended in the doctrine of the cross of Christ”.16 What is here included in God’s wisdom has as much to do with God’s justice and its normative function. When God determines to do something that is not good, this not only does not conform with his wisdom but also certainly not with the justice of God which functions as the norm to his decisions and to which God’s wisdom directs itself. ————— ratam non esse peccaturis; quum Deo liberum fuerit poenas peccatis debitas ab ipsis peccatoribus ablatas filio suo perferendas et persolvendas imponere.” 15 AC 581–582 (III 194); cf. Verklaring, 106 (I 653). 16 Verklaring, 77 (I 624).

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But the relationship between wisdom and justice can be illustrated even more clearly. At various times17 Arminius speaks in the context of the administratio of the means of grace about God’s justice as consisting of misericordia and severitas. God’s wisdom, “by which God knows what is proper and becoming both to his mercy and his severity”, controls these means. God’s justice thus consists of a conceptual pair which governs God’s wisdom. What is more, Arminius immediately adds that the means are administered not only according to God’s wisdom, but also God’s justice, “by which He is prepared to adopt whatever his wisdom may prescribe and to put it in execution”.18 God’s will and power thus carry out the prescription of God’s wisdom in obedience to God’s justice. God’s justice also determines the contents of the prescription of God’s wisdom. God’s wisdom conversely ensures that the diverse forms of God’s justice are all fully satisfied. Summary The function of God’s justice is determined to a large extent by the place it has in God’s essence. Justice is universally normative, and for that reason is of determinative influence on all faculties and attributes. There is no momentum in God, where iustitia does not exercise its influence. According to Arminius, justice functions as the arbiter of all God’s words, acts and willing. Every faculty has its own function, but all faculties have justice as it were as “quality control”: justice, as the “sum total of all virtues,” determines the how, the manner in which the faculties express their function. 3.1.2 Implications for God’s Acts of Creation and Providence Justice functions as the arbiter of God’s faculties. It thus goes without saying that this has consequences for God’s acts in creation and providence, particularly as they apply to humankind. In the public and private disputations a distinction is made between God’s justice in his words (in dictis) and in his works (in factis).19 In Arminius’s writings, we find neither the careful, systematic exposition of God’s justice in scholastic fashion as in these disputations, nor the precise terminology. One would be tempted to conclude that outside of the classroom, Arminius was less concerned with an analytical exposition of such fundamental issues as God’s justice than with their application. ————— 17 18 19

A31A 139 (I 748); HaC 943 (II 699); AN 957 (II 719). Cf. PrD XXI (II 350). Verklaring, 106 (I 653). PuD IV (II 132–133); PrD XXI (II 350–351).

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Creation Arminius’s view on the place and function of justice in the doctrine of God has far-reaching implications for his views on God’s acts of creation and providence, and many others. God, the highest good (summum bonum), creates out of nothing (nihilum), and that which comes from this source of all good can also only be good. God has the right (ius) to take back that which He has given. With respect to creation this means that God has the right to take from creation its state of being, and to return it to a state of non-being or nihilum. His goodness, however, makes it impossible for God, without there being a reason for it from his justice as expressed in the covenant or the law, to bring the good He created into a state of less than nothing, or misery – the presupposition being that misery is less than non-being. This would make God the author of evil. As brought into existence by God, creation is most sound and good. “Creation to damnation” is impossible because damnation is the act of a righteous judge, and a righteous judge does not condemn just anyone, but rather those who become wicked through their own fault.20 Legal Theology Before we deal with permission and sin, Arminius’s view of the pre-fall theology needs to be treated. This pre-fall theology has already been dealt with as the Legal theology (or theology of Law). Before the fall, God had a plan and purpose for creation itself, as well as a covenant that fit the pre-fall circumstances. Arminius thus considers it a grave error to posit creation as means to execute the decree of predestination, since it overlooks this fact that God had bestowed on creation its own nature and its own purpose. “For creation is not about the execution of the decree of predestination.”21 Furthermore, because predestination belongs to the supernatural and creation to the natural, they differ in genus and modus and may not conflict (impingere). The supernatural can add something to the created nature and can extend beyond it, but it still cannot do anything that conflicts with it. For Arminius, these principles belong to the dogmata vera.22 Also the order between God’s attributes does not allow creation to be a means to the execution of the decree of predestination. Arminius argues that God’s attributes, through which creation was effected, have a place in ————— EP 691 (III 354); see also ETG 76.124 (III 590.630); cf. PrD XXI (II 352). AC 597 (III 217–218): “Creatio enim non est de exsecutione decreti praedestinationis”. 22 AC 604–605 (III 226–227). “Licet enim modo differant creatio et praedestinatio, et genere, tanquam naturale et supernatuale, tamen eiusmodi praedestinatio et reprobatio vera esse nequit, quae impingit in conditiones creationis. […] Nam supernaturalis actio potest creatae naturae aliquid addere, ordinemque naturae excedere; adversus autem creationem nihil statuere.” 20 21

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God’s nature at an earlier “structural-moment” (momentum)23 than those attributes which pertain to predestination.24 Arminius means that creation proceeds from God’s goodness, while predestination arises out of his grace – where the latter is a particular form of God’s goodness, and thus a later “structural moment”. On the basis of this structure or relative order in God, Arminius concludes that creation precedes predestination. And for that reason, creation cannot be the means to execute the decree. The pre-fall situation of humanity was one of nature and grace.25 God endowed his rational creatures with the ability (capax) to attain to a higher perfection. This perfection is union with the highest good26 (God) which forms the beatitude of his rational creatures. The ultimate goal of theology is unio Dei cum homine.27 But ratio demands that this cannot be bestowed outside justice. For that reason the law, and the condition of obedience to it, was given to humankind. That was the first decree pertaining to the ultimate goal of the rational creatures and to the glory of God in the manifestation of his most excellent goodness and justice. God’s goodness, together with his justice, would then have been manifested through the divine promise had humanity partaken in that highest good through its perseverance (statio). God’s vindictive justice would have been manifest if his rational creatures had made themselves unworthy of that highest good through their disobedience.28 In order to achieve that unio Dei, mankind depended on God’s grace.29 First Covenant, Fall and New Covenant The topic of the covenant has already come up a number of times. Arminius considers the covenant to be the way by which God associates with humanity.30 The first relationship between God and his rational creatures pertains to ————— I thank Antonie Vos for his help with the translation of momentum. EP 644 (III 282). 25 EP 649 (III 291): A person can do nothing good without the aid of God’s special grace, which also applies to Adam before the fall. Cf. AC 512 (III 95) and AC 554 (III 153): man has never existed, not even before the fall into sin, in puris naturalibus, that is, without supernatural grace. 26 Also in the Evangelical theology the ultimate goal of everything is complete union with God; God is everything and in everything. The most important matter (consummationem principalem) is unio with God, which under the administration of the Evangelical theology is attained through complete unio with Christ. AAC 616 (III 243). 27 OR 49 (I 361–362). 28 EP 640–641 (III 277–278). 29 AC 554 (III 153–154). 30 For Arminius’s view of the covenant, see MULLER, “Federal Motif”, 103–108; GRAAFLAND, Verbond, 186–210. For criticism of Muller, cf. HICKS, Theology of Grace, 94–95. 23 24

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giving and receiving.31 God takes the initiative and determines the two sides of the covenant: 1. A prior promise of God by which He binds Himself to a certain duty in relation to humanity, and to all that this duty entails. 2. The duty that is in return required from these people.32 This duty consists in priesthood and kingship, which were originally one office. God tells the priest as mediator of the covenant what is required of the covenant partners as their duty, and what He wants them to do because it is to their good. Through his sin, Adam lost all rights to this priesthood in conformity with God’s unmovable justice (iuxta immotam regulam iustitiae divinae). However, Adam did not fall by himself. All those whom he represented, whether they already existed or not, fell with him from that priesthood and from that covenant of which the priest was the mediator and administrator. There was no longer anyone who could fulfill the priesthood according to the demands of the covenant. With that, also that priesthood itself came to an end.33 The fall into sin resulted in the complete abandonment of God’s original plan for humanity. This covenant had demanded full compliance with the demands of the covenant and the law. God’s justice demanded condemnation because of disobedience. However, God’s justice at the same time, and in accordance with its nature, wanted also his goodness to be rendered (reddi) its due. What befits God’s goodness is that it be promoted and make clear what it actually is: grace. Grace is the affectus of goodness towards those who have fallen into misery.34 God’s wisdom discovered the only way (modus) for God’s justice to be completely satisfied, while God’s goodness could at the same time be fully displayed in the form of mercy. That solution is Jesus Christ the Mediator (cf. 3.1.1).35 In a pactum, God’s Son presents Himself to God in order to bear the punishment for sin in the place of humanity, and as Mediator to effect atonement between God and humankind thereby satisfying God’s justice (cf. 3.3).36 The pactum between the Father and the Son forms the basis to the new covenant (foedus) established by God with humankind so that the original goal of theology, the union of humanity with God, could still be reached. That difference between the Evangelical theology and the Legal theology also means that the goal of the ————— 31 OR 10 (I 406): “Primus omnium, qui inter Deum et Homines respectus est, dati et accepti constat rationibus”. 32 OR 11 (I 406): “Constat enim foedus omne Dei cum hominibus initum duabus partibus, promissione Dei priore, qua se hominibus ad officium aliquod et officii actus convenientes obstringit, et praescriptione posteriore officii, quod ab hominibus vicissim stipulator, et de quo homines Deo mutuum respondent.” 33 OR 11–13 (I 406–409). 34 AR9 796 (III 512–513). 35 AR9 796 (III 513): “Invenit itaque, sapientia modum, quo redderetur caussae quod meruit, et bonitati quod decuit: nempe Iesum Christum Mediatorem”. 36 OR 16 (I 415); OR 39 (I 343).

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Evangelical theology is no longer simply union with God, but now also with Christ (see 2.2.2), and is the visio and fruitio of both, to the glory of Christ and God.37 Also the new covenant with humankind is established in strict agreement with the norm of God’s justice. God’s justice demands that the new covenant be no less conditional than the first.38 This claim must be explained from the perspective of Arminius’s thought, where justice implies a form of conditionality in the form of a law or precept; it is a condition for religion that some form of justice is in function39 (cf. 4.1). The condition of the new covenant can no longer be full obedience to the law. Yet justification through works of the law is not only no longer possible, but within the new covenant it is also no longer the condition at all. To seek to be justified before God in that old way not only undermines sin and misunderstands the new situation, it also undermines the meaning of the person and work of Christ, the Mediator of the new covenant. Is He after all not the second, subordinated object of Christian theology, who must be known as its object? The new condition which befits the character of the new covenant was set by God as being bound to Christ Jesus through faith. The only way to share in the merits of Christ’s sacrifice is to be bound to Him through faith, through which all the merits and blessings of Christ are offered to and appropriated by the believer. Providence With God’s providence (providentia), Arminius understands all of God’s acts for the sustaining and governing of creation. Providence is therefore subordinate to creation, and for that reason never goes against creation,40 but is accommodated to it.41 This means, for example, that providence treats humanity as having free choice from God, and that God will not withhold the necessary concursus.42 God’s sovereign authority to demand honor from humankind is rooted in its creation after God’s image.43 God exercises care (curat) for the manner in which He is to be worshiped, and for the obedience that is due to Him, in a holy, just and wise way (sancte, iuste et ————— OR 51 (I 364). AR9 796 (III 513). 39 Letter to Wtenbogaert, undated [1599], Ep.Ecc. 45 (II 749); Verklaring, 90 (I 636). 40 AN 953 (II 714). 41 A31A 144 (I 761): Otherwise providentia, which ought to be accommodated to the creature, would be aimed directly against the creature: “secus providentia quae creationi debet esse accommodata, ei directe adversabitur.” 42 Concursus will be treated below. 43 OR 30 (I 329). 37 38

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sapienter).44 God can also make one of the elements of his providence depend on an earlier element or an earlier deed.45 Providence and Sin: Divine Permissio Evil has no existence in itself and there is no such thing as ultimate evil; in every evil there is therefore still some good. The nature of a thing is not evil; the ratio of evil is not that the will is directed to evil, but rather to an unfitting good, or else in an improper way or to an improper end. Evil does not exist except in the good.46 The possibility of evil is present in creation because human beings, as rational creatures, have free choice (liberum arbitrium) which entails the possibility of breaking the covenant with the Creator. God hates sin in his essentia or existentia and did his very best to avoid sin,47 but did not effectively will to avoid it because that would not fit with the original institution of humankind.48 The consequence is that humanity could sin, though not that they would sin. God never intended the disobedience that is sin, or covenant breaking. God’s withholding act (actus negativus) which precedes (the fall into) sin (for without such a withholding act on the part of God, sin would never occur at all) must be either an act of providence, or of reprobation/passing over. According to Arminius, it could never be an act of reprobation. His strongest argument is that not everyone is reprobate, although all people do commit sin. If the fall into sin, which does pertain to everyone, were a consequence of reprobation, there would be no elect. Further, reprobation is an unchangeable, final and definitive act of withholding effective help. From the fact that God does not withhold that effective help from everyone, one may conclude that the divine act of withholding which preceded the fall was not an act of reprobation, and therefore one of providence instead. That withholding, providential act does not necessarily bring about the fall into ————— OR 30 (I 329). AC 584 (III 198): “Iam vero quod ad partium harum inter se ordinationem attinet et connexum, dico fieri posse ut posterioris actus ex prioris aliquo actu dependeat, atque ita, ut ab illa priore actus posterioris in unam partem determinetur.” 46 EP 702 (III 370–371). “Verum ratio mali in eo non consistit quod fertur in malum voluntas, sed quod fertur in bonum non debitum, vel non debito modo et fine.” “Malum enim non est nisi in bono.” Cf. EP 723–725 (III 403–407). 47 EP 649 (III 290–291). Examples of means used by God to prevent sin include: 1. a command not to sin; 2. necessary and sufficient preventative grace; 3. threats of punishment; 4. the promise of reward for obedience. Cf. PrD XXX (II 372). 48 AC 572 (III 179): “inconveniens primae institutioni hominis”. EP 646 (III 285): “etiamsi Deus malum impediret, dummodo ista impeditio non fieret modo primaevae hominis institutioni non conveniente; et liberum est Deo peccatum impedire, sed modo non pugnante contra arbitrii libertatem.” See also EP 701 (III 369–370). 44 45

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sin, because providence was intended to guide the human race to eternal life and provided the necessary and sufficient means to obtain that eternal life. Yet it was left to the human will to make free use of these means.49 God’s providence is over absolutely everything, including sin, although Arminius makes a careful distinction between the deed itself and the sin in that deed.50 Arminius gives an extensive, precise and careful treatment of the relationship of God’s providence to sin.51 He is careful especially because a lack of care will soon lead to all kinds of absurdities and even blasphemy.52 As he remarks himself, he is always utmost concerned to avoid two things: to make God the author of sin, and to take away the freedom of the human will.53 Elsewhere54 he adds that God must also not be portrayed as a an “idle spectator”. Following the tradition, Arminius defines the relationship of God’s providence to sin as “permission” (permissio).55 In contrast to others, including Calvin, who would not hear of permission if it implied that something could occur outside of, without or against God’s will, Arminius as result of his view on God’s iustitia sees permissio as an act of the will that finds itself somewhere between willing and not-willing. Because God is actively involved in everything that happens, whether effectively or by permission, and because God is nevertheless not the author of sin, there must be some kind of divine permissive act which is capable of acquitting Him of the charge of being the author of sin. However, one may not attribute to God’s providence any act that conflicts with his justice.56 God wills the permission of sin, but this does not imply that God wills sin. On the contrary, permission is an act of the “will at rest”. God had to allow ————— 49 AC 571–572 (III 179): “Nam providentia ordinavit hominem in vitam aeternam, et media contulit ad illam consequendam sufficientia et necessaria: reliquens (ut decebat ex institutione prima) hominis arbitrio usum liberum istorum mediorum, et nolens libertatem illam impedire ne rescinderet quod instituerat”. 50 HaC 942 (II 697); Verklaring, 111–112 (I 657–658). 51 In the Examen Perkinsiani, Arminius devotes an extensive excursus to permissio: EP 713– 734 (III 389–419). He notes that much depends on a correct treatment of this topic: “quia magnum in eo ad totum hoc negotium expediendum positum est momentum.” EP 644 (III 283). Cf. PuD VII (II 153–154). 52 EP 726 (III 408): “In quo sane docendo tanto magis est enitendum, quanto proclivior est lapsus in istam absurditatem et blasphemiam iis, qui providentiam divinam agentem, impedientem, permittentem adstruunt quidem, sed non satis destincte, accurate, diligenter singula inter se comparantes et conferentes et ab invicem distinguentes.” Cf. A31A 170 (II 40). 53 HaC 942 (II 697–698). 54 EP 734 (III 419); cf. below. 55 Arminius defines divine permission as: “Permissio Dei est Actus voluntatis divinae, quod Deus efficientiam aliquam vel iure vel potentia vel utroque modo sibi possibilem suspendit, quae efficientia, si a Deo usurparetur, actum aliquem creaturae rationalis vel circumscriberet vel reipsa impediret, ad quem actum praestandum creatura eadem propensionem habet et vires sufficienties.” EP 714 (III 390). 56 Cf. EP 727 (III 409): “attribuamus alienos et eius iustitia indignos.”

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sin because He had created the human race with free choice in order to test its free and voluntary obedience. The manner in which God does or prevents something does not take away freedom from humanity; divine permissio allows human beings freely and voluntarily, according to the modus of the human will, to do either good or evil.57 As result, permission does not consist in withholding that which is necessary to fulfill the law ordained by God, but rather in withholding effective prevention.58 Elsewhere it becomes clear that divine permission pertains to the governing aspect of providence.59 Although permission is an act of the “will at rest”, this does not mean that God is not most actively involved in such an act of permission. God’s permission is not empty, but demands many providential provisions on his part. In order to explain how Arminius understands this, we first need to see how he understands it that God can prevent a deed. In order to prevent an act, God can use certain hindrances in will (voluntas) or in power (potentia). Thus, God can prevent that someone wills to do something, or is able to do something. In order to impede the ability to an act, God has four possibilities (modi) at his disposal (see the following paragraph for these modi). Each modus of prevention is in itself sufficient to prevent an act. To put it another way, in order to produce an effect, a complete cause is required; the absence of one necessary causa is sufficient to prevent the effect. This ends our treatment of the possibilities God has at his disposal to prevent an act. Permission of an act is the mirror image of the prevention of an act. Also permission has four modi. If God actually wills to permit something to the ability of the creature, He only needs to ensure that this is not prevented. He therefore must exercise care for all four modi. These modi pertain to the following: 1. the existence and life of the creature must be maintained; 2. the capacity of the creature may not be taken away or diminished; 3. no evenly great or greater capacity may be placed over against it; 4. the object of the will of the creature may not be taken away, but must be maintained. God is actively-providentially involved in securing all four of these modi.60 Thus divine permission is indeed an act of the “will at rest” with respect to ————— EP 696 (III 361–362). EP 645 (III 284): “permissio non est cessatio ab actu illuminationis et inclinationis. […] Est quidem permissio cessatio ab impediendi actu. […] Est enim permissio actus medius inter velle et nolle, remissae scilicet voluntatis.” Cf. EP 722–723 (III 402): “Hoc ex permissionis modo colligi nequit; omnibus enim modis impediendi abstinet Deus permittens: quod ni faceret, impediret, et per consequens neque actus neque peccatum fieret.” ETG 116 (III 622–623). 59 Cf. AC 583–584 (III 196–198). Here, apart from the works of sustaining and governing, also creation comes under the wider umbrella of God’s providence, and permission belongs to the creative activity of providence. As we have seen elsewhere, providence is subordinated to creation but at the same time inseparably connected to it. See also EP 647 (III 287). 60 EP 715–716 (III 391–393). 57 58

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the deed as sin, but God is still actively-providentially involved so that permission remains permission, rather than becoming prevention. Arminius distinguishes between God’s free government and his government defined and determined by the preceding act of creation. Permission belongs to the latter form of God’s government: God’s permissive government takes its point of departure from the act of creation whereby he bestowed a liberum arbitrium on the human race.61 Arminius argues that the way God wills sin in the views of Perkins, Beza and Calvin does not succeed in acquitting Him of the charge that He effectively wills sin.62 Calvin’s attack on the scholastic distinction between permission and will is treated separately. Arminius does acknowledge – in contrast to others who did maintain this serious charge – that Calvin, even though he does at times speak improperly, nevertheless cannot be accused of the blasphemies of the Manichees because throughout his writings he clearly acquits himself and his doctrine of that accusation.63 However, Arminius considers it exceedingly useful to distinguish between different forms of divine permission because such a distinction allows God’s goodness, wisdom, power and above all his iustitia (bonitas, sapientia, potentia, quin et iustitia) to be displayed most clearly. It is also in this way that it becomes most clear that God is innocent and free of sin in all his acts, including those of prevention and permission, and is in no way the author of sin.64 Some theologians are too careless in their treatment of these issues, and so end up with all kinds of absurdities and blasphemy.65 When treating permissio, one must be most careful not to deny those deeds that do indeed belong to God’s providence, or else to attribute to it things that are foreign to it and in fact unworthy of his justice (eius iustitia indignos).66 Earlier we already saw that Arminius is most insistent on the need to be careful when speaking about permission so that God does not end up being the author of ————— AC 583–584 (III 196–198). Cf. EP 703 (III 372): “qui Deum ab efficientia peccati excusari nequit.” Cf. EP 711 (III 384–386). 63 EP 703–704 (III 372–374). Cf. A31A 179 (II 57): According to Arminius, the truth is often to be found between two extremes. The same is true of Pelagianism and Manicheism. Those who find the middle road between them are truly catholic, neither doing God’s grace an injustice as the Pelagians do, nor harming free will as the Manichees do. ETG 14.77 (III 537.591): “Caveamus ita incidere in Pelagianismum, ut in doctrinam ipsa Manichaea pejorem non prolebamur.” Cf. DEN BOER, “Met onderscheidingsvermogen”; DEN BOER, “Cum delectu”. 64 EP 726 (III 407–408). In his correspondence with Junius, Arminius writes that he would like the former to explain clearly and convincingly (solide) how everything can depend on God’s providence, while God still is not to blame because He is the distant cause, and guilt is always attributed to the proximate cause: “ille mihi rationonem rectem tenere non videtur”. AC 493 (III 67). 65 EP 726 (III 408). 66 EP 727 (III 409). 61 62

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sin, while sin nevertheless does not occur outside of his efficientia, either. All the distinctions Arminius maintains are intended specifically to avoid these two errors.67 This explains why Arminius is so surprised that he was being accused of making God the author of sin in the way he spoke of the efficientia and justice of God’s providence with respect to evil. If the length of Arminius’s response to this accusation in his Apology is in any way indicative, it would seem that this charge really bothered him. Arminius begins by outlining three ways in which God would indeed become the author of sin. 1. If God wants absolutely to realize his own work by means of a creaturely act, while that act cannot be performed without sin. 2. If the creature then has no other option but to perform that act. 3. If God, by inciting his creature to evil, intends that the creature also sin. After this, Arminius goes on to show that his view is actually directly opposed to all three of these matters. In the first place, God’s intention is not to realize his own work absolutely through the means of the acts of his creatures. Secondly, God wills only under the condition that the free will of his creatures responds to the enticement from his side. In the third place, God’s intention is to test his creatures to see whether they will remain obedient even when they are being enticed not to be obedient. Should there be no possibility to resist evil, it is no longer a test but coercion to necessary disobedience. Arminius’s amazement at the stupidity of those who accuse him precisely on this point is very significant. He considers it stupefying that someone who has even the slightest knowledge of theology would dare to make such an accusation against someone like him who has after all dared to disagree openly with certain views and dogmas of his brothers for the very reason that he thinks their views lead to the conclusion that God is the author of sin! But he himself teaches no such blasphemy: God is not the author of sin. However, he at the same time does not withdraw anything from under God’s providence that according to the Scriptures should be attributed to it.68

————— Cf. EP 734 (III 419). A31A 169–170 (II 39–40): “Mirandum igitur et multum mirandum, quempiam rerum Theologicarum aliquomodo peritum, ausum fuisse mihi hanc calumniam ex istis verbis struere: mihi inquam, quem scieunt hac sola de causa nonnullis ipsorum sententiis et dogmatis accedere non audere, quia existimem ex illis sequi, Deum esse authorem peccati: idque hac de causa, quod arbitrer illos ea docere, unde concludere pussum bona et certa consequentia, Deum praecise intendere peccatum creaturae, inde sic administrare omnia ut posita illa administratione homo necessario peccet, et non possit ipso actu et reipsa actum peccati omittere.” Cf. HaC 943–944 (II 699–700). 67 68

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Concursus Providence includes God’s concursus69 or sustaining cooperation. Arminius appears to have reflected on it carefully, which is only natural considering the close relationship of concursus to his views on God’s justice, and particularly on God’s relationship to sin. God will never refuse his concursus, neither of general governance nor of special grace.70 Without divine concursus, a human being cannot do anything. God’s cooperation is necessary for each and every deed. For example, in order to follow God’s command to faith, a person is dependent on God’s concursus. Should God deny the help needed to believe, one may conclude that God does not will that person to believe.71 Withholding the necessary concursus amounts to the same thing as a most general and effective hindrance (impedimenti generalissimi et efficacissimi).72 Since it is impossible for the one will of God to be opposed to another will of God,73 his general command to believe requires Him to not withhold his concursus. This actually implies the provision of sufficient grace,74 a non-irresistible working of this grace. For if the sufficient grace that is granted universally were irresistible, no one would ever be lost. God sustains the nature that sins, but Arminius maintains that the question as to the degree and nature of God’s concursus in such a creature needs to be considered very carefully. Every form of coercion or necessity in the breaking of a commandment makes the one who does the coercing guilty. For that reason, the modus by which God is the cause of the deed, but not of the evil in it, needs to be explained in a most careful way.75 Arminius does not withdraw any act that involves sin from under God’s efficacy; God is the causa of all the acts of his creatures. However, his efficientia must be explained in such a way that the freedom of the creature is not shortchanged ————— 69 Cf. MULLER, DLGTT, 76: “concursus or concursus generalis: concurrence or general concurrence; a corollary of the doctrines of God as primum movens and of providence as continuata creatio that defines the continuing divine support of the operation of all secondary causes (whether free, contingent, or necessary). For any contingent being to act in a free, a contingent, or a necessary manner, the divine will which supports all contingent being must concur in its act. This concursus is, therefore, generalis, or general, i.e., it belongs to the order of creation and providence rather than to the order of grace, and enables all acts of contingent being to occur, whether good or evil.” 70 EP 719 (III 397–398). 71 EP 667 (III 319): “Qui enim vult negare alicui auxilium necessarium ad fidei actum praestandum, ille idem vult ut iste talis non credat.” 72 Arminius draws a comparison with creation: not willing to create prevents nothing from becoming something; not willing to maintain prevents something from still being something. EP 668 (III 319). 73 EP 667 (III 318): “Nulla enim qualiscunque Dei voluntas seu volitio alteri cuilibet contraria esse potest.” Cf. EP 668 (III 319–320). 74 Cf. AAC 618–619 (III 247); AC 546 (III 146); AC 567 (III 173); AC 572 (III 179); EP 649 (III 290); A31A 145–146 (I 763–765). 75 EP 707 (III 378–379).

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in any way, and that the guilt for sin does not fall on God. One must be able to show that God is the effector of the act, but only the permissor of the sin; that God is at the same time the effector and permissor of an act, while the creature remains its real cause.76 God allows the free choice of the secondary cause (the human being) control over the influence proper to an act, and when that second cause is at the point (momentum) of following that influence, God freely and according to his own judgment joins his universal influence and concursus to the creature’s influence, knowing that without his influence the act would not be produced. It would not be right for God, who has given his law and with it left certain acts to the freedom of his creatures, to make that law in vain (frustra) by withholding his concursus. God also decided to put his creatures’ obedience to the test by the law. Arminius asks Perkins why God would withhold his concursus from an act that is naturally good, yet morally wrong on account of the law that has been added (for example, Adam and Eve’s eating of the fruit that was as such good, but forbidden according to the command of God), if God by giving the law testifies and proclaims that He wills his creatures to abstain from that act insofar as it is morally wrong, but not insofar as it is a natural act. It is the giving of the law that makes an act wrong: should God withhold his concursus, it would mean that God does not will that act to occur as a natural act. The one means of prevention is moral (the law), the other is natural (the withholding of concursus). Should the latter be exercised, the first – i.e. the law – would not be needed.77 From the above it becomes clear that when a creature sins, this is done with the total freedom of his will both with respect to the exercise as well as to the kind (species) of the act, the two aspects that together form the whole freedom of the will (see 2.1.4). It is therefore necessary to distinguish between the existence and essence of the sinful act. Its existence depends on the libertas voluntatis quoad exercitium. The essence (species) of the sinful ————— 76 EP 731–732 (III 415–416). Here Arminius explains why God must be not the mediate, but the immediate, cause of a sinful act, and how He is the natural and necessary cause of an act, but in no way its moral cause. In the first place, God can work mediately, for example as first causa moving the creature to an act; when that act is sin, God is the causa and author of that sin. Therefore, God cannot be mediately involved in a sinful creaturely act. In the second place, God can also be the immediate causa, and together with the creature form the total causa. If that second causa is free, it has the potestas to influence the act or not to influence it. With its particular influence, the second causa then determines the general influence of God with respect to this particular act, and forms the species of the act. In that case, the causa secunda is guilty and the act is sin with respect to the second causa, but God is free from all blame. For that concursus and influxas Dei contributes nothing to the free will of the creature. God’s concursus is not the moral causa of a sinful act, only the natural and thus the necessary causa, to which sin can in no way be attributed. 77 EP 732–733 (III 416–417).

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act depends on the libertas voluntatis quoad speciem actionis. God freely joins his concursus to the exercise of the sinful act in the first momentum and instans of that deed. In that way, God becomes the permissor of sin when He leaves to the sinner the free control of the influence proper to an act; and He is the effector of the sinful act by joining his concursus to the influence of the creature, without which concursus an act would never come to pass.78 God’s Will At the beginning of 3.1.1 we already noted that Arminius’s view on the justice of God was important for his view on God’s will. Central here is the oneness of God’s will. That oneness means that there are not two conflicting or contradicting wills in God,79 although distinctions of course do need to be made according to the different objects of his will. In his willing, even as in providence,80 God takes into account his antecedent volitions and acts. These include the freedom He gave to his creatures as an essential attribute, a freedom that in fact needs to be defended in order to safeguard his own justice. One of the distinctions Arminius here makes is the aforementioned distinction between an antecedent will and a consequent will.81 Between these two wills there are the decisions of the will of his creatures. The relationship between these wills is logical rather than temporal. God wills antecedently that all people be saved, but consequently that all those who believe and persevere be saved and that those who persist in their unbelief be doomed. Since these two decisions of the will have different objects, they do not conflict.82 Furthermore, God’s antecedent will is conditional so that not everything God intends at the deepest level is realized, although this still does not imply that his will can be neutralized through a stronger opposing will. This would be the case should God’s antecedent will be absolute, but it is not. God’s consequent will, on the other hand, is always realized because its foundation is his foreknowledge of the decisions of the contingent will of the creatures.83 ————— EP 733 (III 418). EP 699 (III 366); A31A 140 (I 750). 80 AC 584 (III 198). 81 EP 744 (III 434–435). Cf. MULLER, God, Creation, and Providence, 201. 82 EP 740–741 (III 429–430). Cf. EP 742–744 (III 431–434). The reason God does not grant some nations the means to salvation must not be sought in God’s antecedent will, which precedes all causes in and of men. 83 EP 663 (III 312). 78 79

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Arminius illustrates the above in the following manner in the context of explaining God’s universal decree of salvation. God wills antecedently that all people believe and are saved, but his consequent will is that He be glorified in the just condemnation of unbelievers.84 That the conflict between these two wills is only apparent comes from the antecedent/consequent distinction. Arminius proves the existence of an antecedent and consequent will in God by, among others, pointing to the divine attributes of goodness and justice. These two ensure that God cannot will the eternal death of the rational creatures made in his image without taking sin into consideration.85 This is the reason that Arminius suggests, for example to Gomarus, that the causa impulsiva of condemnation is not God’s good pleasure but his just will (voluntas Dei justa).86 Throughout his treatment of God’s will, it is clear that Arminius’s view is shaped by his understanding of God’s goodness and justice. These two attributes form a fixed, ordering and regulating element in Arminius’s thought. A distinction which Arminius is not willing to maintain is the one between the will of God’s good pleasure (beneplaciti) and God’s revealed will (signi). This is true at the very least when the distinction is intended to explain away contradictions in God’s will. God cannot decide things and then keep these decisions concealed when they contradict with the decisions that have been revealed. Arminius writes to Perkins that he would be glad to have the latter explain to him how it can be that God can sincerely will those to believe in Christ, of whom He has willed that they be outside of Christ and from whom He has decided to withhold the means necessary for faith. For Arminius, withholding these means is the equivalent of not willing their conversion.87 God commands nothing for which He refuses to give the means necessary to obey this command, unless someone first becomes unworthy of the means by his or her own fault. Faith in Christ is neither necessary nor required by God until after the fall into sin, and after God changed the condition for salvation from obedience to the law to faith in ————— EP 667 (III 317–318). EP 744 (III 434–435); cf. ETG 59 (III 574–575). 86 ETG 105–106 (III 614). 87 EP 668 (III 319–320): “Hic sane nulla est voluntatum pugna, sed diversi tantum volendi gradus quoad nos, seu potius diversae Dei secundum diversa obiecta volitiones: secundum quos tamen gradus non potest dici volens et nolens idem obiectum, volens nempe conversionem et nolens conversionem unius eiusdemque hominis; observatis legibus iustae oppositionis. Velim mihi explicari quomodo Deus ex animo velit ut in Christum credat ille, quem a Christo alienum esse vult, et cui necessaria ad fidem auxilia negare decrevit; hoc enim est alcuius conversionem nolle.” Cf. EP 669 (III 320–321): “ita esse negotium praedestinationis pertractandum, ut voluntas euvdokiaj in revelatam non impingat”. Cf. also BOUGHTON, “Supralapsarianism”, 85: “Perkins also believed that God could command men to act contrary to the moral law and in so commanding them not contradict his divine nature.” 84 85

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Christ.88 At that time people had not yet made themselves unworthy of the means God grants to be obedient to this command. We should also note that Arminius’s intellectualism again plays a role in these issues (cf. 2.3). God Respects the Modus of the Object of his Acts For Arminius (once again because of his view of God’s justice) it goes without saying that God always respects the particular nature of humanity, including the essential attributes with which He endowed it at creation, in the way He deals with people.89 God’s potentia works in conformity with the modus – whether necessary or contingent – of the object of God’s power.90 God’s grace thus never acts in a way that conflicts with human nature. Free choice, in that it is essential to humanity, is never destroyed by God’s grace, but is rather maintained and strengthened. God, therefore, according to this statement, may be blamed for the one or the other of these two things, (with which let no man charge His maker!) – either for creating man with freedom of will, – or for hindering him in the use of his own liberty after he had formed him with a free agent. In the former of these two cases, God is chargeable with a want of consideration, in the latter with mutability, – and, in both, with being injurious to man as well as to himself.91

In Arminius’s correspondence with Junius we find a clear passage92 where Arminius explains that God promised his people in paradise also supernatural bliss on the condition of obedience. “Therefore God has passed no one by, considered in their first [i.e. unfallen – wdb] nature.”93 In his providence, God prepared supernatural bliss for his people, including all the means sufficient to attain to it, such as the assistance of his grace. That which was received as a gift of creation cannot be taken away, unless it is the just reward for previous sins according to the judgment of God’s justice.94 In this way God does not withhold (negat) even his grace unless He has first been deserted (desertus) by his people.95 The same is true for God’s ————— 88 EP 670 (III 323): “necessaria esse coepit, postquam Deus impetrandae salutis conditionem ab obedientia legali in fidem in Christum transtulit.” Cf. A31A 161–162 (II 23–25). 89 Cf. AC 592 (III 209): A higher principium (such as God) deals with a lower principium (such as the human will) without going against the modus (i.e. free or contingent) of that lower principium. 90 A31A 141 (I 752–753). Cf. PrD XVIII (II 344). 91 Verklaring, 80 (I 626). 92 AC 546–549 (III 145–150). 93 AC 546 (III 145): “Ergo Deus neminem in prima natura consideratum praeteriit.” 94 AC 549 (III 150): “Et quod creationis dono quis habet, id non adimitur ei, nisi praecedente peccati merito ex iustitia Dei.” 95 AC 546 (III 146): “Deinde quod Deus sua providentia homini praeparavit, id eidem non negat per praeteritionem electioni oppositam, nisi ex praevisione quod homo providentiae ductu ad

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promises. What God promises to all on the condition of obedience, He cannot withhold from some through a certain and definitive decree except on the basis of foreseen disobedience.96 God’s Right, Power and Freedom Arminius gives special attention to God’s relationship to the human race. God’s right over his creatures, writes Arminius, is not infinite and is not determined by God’s omnipotence. God’s right is founded on three elements: 1. God’s beneficence; 2. the wicked deeds of his creatures; 3. the contract between God and his creatures. God’s right is no greater than the beneficence and wicked deeds on which that right is founded. If these limits on God’s right are not taken into account, all kinds of absurdities will result and injustice will be attributed (impingo) to God.97 Furthermore, God’s freedom to perform a certain deed is not absolute, but is subject to two restrictions: 1. God’s own (just) nature; 2. a (logically) preceding act of God that conflicts with this other deed.98 God’s lordship (dominium) is preceded and limited by justice.99 These conditions surrounding God’s right, power and freedom have important consequences, as can be illustrated concretely with the following example. God’s right over his human creatures is no greater than the finite existence He gave to them at their creation (where there is thus a beneficence and a preceding act). The essence of the human race consists in its nature, including free choice. The covenant promised supernatural bliss on the condition of obedience. Also after these gifts it was still possible for God to return the human race to its original state of nihilum. However, God’s just nature prevents Him from going against the nature He has given to the human race and the covenant He established with it, and placing humankind in misery without the intervention of sin (i.e. on the basis of the conditions of the covenant).100 From this it naturally follows that God can————— illud non sit perventurus, sed sua sponte et libere deflexurus. Praeparavit autem Deus primo homini in eo omnibus supernaturalem felicitatem; dedit enim illi media ad illam comparandam sufficientia; accedente adiutorio gratiae divinae (si tamen hoc est necessarium in isto statu) quod illi non negat, nisi prius ab eo fuerit desertus.” 96 AC 573 (III 181). 97 EP 656–657 (III 301–302): “Ius enim illud non est infinitum.” Cf. EP 644–645 (III 283– 284). AN 953 (II 713); ETG 52.121–122 (III 569.627). Cf. PrD XXVII (II 365). 98 AC 477 (III 43). Cf. the limitations that a theologian like William Perkins attributes to God’s infinite power: BOUGHTON, “Supralapsarianism”, 85. 99 ETG 123–124 (III 629–630): “ex justitia que dominium antecedit et circumscribit.” Also God’s grace is limited by God’s justice and equity, see PuD VIII (II 161–162). Cf. PrD XXII (II 352). 100 EP 656–657 (III 301–302); EP 692–693 (III 356–357): “Blasphemum est dicere, Deum posse citra iustitiae suae damnum et noxam punire et affligere aeternaliter innocentem creaturam

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not lead his people to sin in the absolute modus, that is, by coercion and against their liberum arbitrium; and that finally, even aside from all the discredit this would do to God’s justice and the countless resulting absurdities and blasphemies,101 all religion as such would become impossible. Creation as Divine Self-Limitation? The restrictions in Arminius’s theology by which God is limited in his dealing with the human race have led Muller and Blacketer to speak of God’s “self-limitation” in creation.102 The structure of God’s relationship to his creatures inherent in creation is said to imply that God is limited in his possibilities, his absolute power and his sovereign freedom. This view agrees with the interpretations with which Arminius was confronted in his own time, and which he opposed. However, it is questionable whether this does justice to Arminius’s own view. In order to arrive at a satisfying answer, we first need to examine what Muller and Blacketer have identified as God’s “self-limitation”, and then to consider whether Arminius really held to such a limitation. Arminius himself pointed out to his opponents that no limitations are placed upon God from something that is greater than, or outside of, God. It is not creation that limits God, but God’s own nature. Precisely because God binds himself to his antecedent acts (of good will; or, beneficence), He reveals who He essentially is: the just and good God, faithful to his covenant and promises. God furthermore binds Himself freely to the acts He freely committed beforehand. “His will is circumscribed [circumscripta] within the bounds [terminis] of justice.”103 The same holds true for election and reprobation. Against Perkins, Arminius remarks that the question is not whether God’s will is the cause of election and reprobation, but whether, antecedent to election and reprobation, God’s will does not have sin as meritorious cause for reprobation, and ————— suam: verum, Deum posse creaturam annihilare sine eius peccato. Multum enim diversa sunt punire et annihilare: Hoc enim est aufferre esse quod dedit ex gratia, illud esse inferre et quidem infinite miserum; citra tamen ullum meritum peccati.” 101 Cf. A31A 143–144 (I 760–761). 102 MULLER, God, Creation, and Providence, 207: “What is more, in the case of Arminius’ system, this statement of goals and ends, with its drawing together of the themes of divine intellect, will, and goodness, and the end and good of the creature, provides a basis for the subsequent declaration, in the doctrine of creation and providence, of a divine self-limitation in creation resting upon the structure of God’s relationship to his creatures.” Cf. 212.220.227–228.232– 234.238–243.268.280–282; MULLER, “Patterns”, 431–446; BLACKETER, “Covenant”, 203.208. Cf. DELL, Man’s Freedom and Bondage, 144.146. For criticism, see WITT, Creation, Redemption and Grace, 307–311 and DEKKER, Review of “God, Creation, and Providence”, 170–171. 103 AC 477 (III 44): “Nam voluntas illius circumscripta est terminis iustitiae.” Cf. HICKS, Theology of Grace, 72–73.

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whether sin is not required as condition in the object of election and reprobation: “God,” indeed, “is not bound by created laws,” but He is a law to Himself; for He is justice itself. And that law according to which it is not allowable to inflict punishment on any one who is not deserving of it, is not created, nor made by men, nor does it hold any such place amongst men; but is the eternal law, the unmoveable divine justice, to which God is bound by the immutability of His own nature and justice.104

Another argument is that God’s omnipotence is not an absolute power (potentia), but a potestas: it is a potentia qualified by right and authority, and regulated by iustitia as norm.105 Within the context of the absolute distinction between necessity and contingency – which divides all actuals into two groups106 (cf. 2.1.1) – Arminius remarks that it is not proof of inability in God that He cannot make something that is necessary contingent, or that what is done necessarily be done contingently. For that would imply a contradiction in God against the first and universal notion implanted in God’s mind, among others that something cannot at one and the same time be and not-be. That God is unable to do this is no sign of inability, but of boundless power (invariabilis potentiae). That something is what it is proceeds from God’s potentia. Should it be so that it is at the same time not what it is, God’s actual potentia would be overcome, or else aside from God’s potentia there would be another, as great but contradictory power, on account of which something is and at the same time is not. This, “of all absurdities, is the greatest absurdity.”107 In the context of God’s permission to sin, Arminius shows his desire to sail a clear course between the Scylla of God’s authorship of sin, and the ————— 104 EP 693 (III 357): “Deus quidem non excusaris obligatus legibus creatis, sed sibi ipsi est lex, est enim ipsa iustitia. Et lex ista secundum quam nemini licet poenam inferre immerenti, non est creata, neque ab hominibus facta, aut inter homines tantum locum habens: sed est lex aeterna, et immota iustitia divina cui Deus ex immutabilitate suae naturae et iustitiae est obligatus.” 105 AR9 794 (III 510); EP 742 (III 432): “suspendente illius potentiam iustitia divina, secundum quam potentia est exercenda.” 106 AC 503 (III 81–82). Cf. OR 57 (I 376): “Duplex autem est veritatis, ut in re est, modus; necessarius et contingens: secundum quem res, tum simplex, tum complexa, necessaria vel contingens dicitur.” 107 EP 713 (III 388): “Et ausim dicere citra blasphemiam, ne Deum quidem omni sua omnipotentia efficere posse, ut quod necessarium est contingens sit aut liberum, et quod necessario fit, libere fiat. Implicat enim contradictionem; non posse non fieri, et posse non fieri, et contradictionem oppositam primae et generalissimae notioni mentibus nostris divinitus insitae, de quolibet affirmare aut negare verum est. Et res non potest simul esse et non esse, simul hoc esse et non esse. Illud autem non posse Deum, non est impotentiae, sed invariabilis potentiae signum. Quod enim res est id quod est, per actualem Dei potentiam est; Si fiat ut simul et eodem tempore hoc non sit, iam actualis Dei potentia aut vincitur, aut habet potentiam partem sibi oppositam, qua fit ut res quae per potentiam Dei est, eodem tempore non sit. Quod est absurdorum omnium absurdum maximum.”

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Charybdis of the withdrawal of an event from under God’s efficacy (efficientia). He speaks of a “special care” that must be exercised. The whole deed, both as actus and as sin, most be attributed to providence: as act to efficient providence, and as sin to permissive providence. It is characteristic of Arminius’s thought that he here, too, ends with the remark that however it may be, it is better to withdraw an act from God’s efficacy than to ascribe a sin as sin to God’s efficacy because more grievous injustice is charged upon God if He is called the cause of sin, than if He is exhibited as an idle spectator of an act.108

Although Arminius is convinced that there is no need whatsoever to inflict either of these injustices upon God, if he did have to choose, God’s justice is more important to him than God’s efficacy in all events. But within Arminius’s own view, there is no need for a choice or conflict between God’s justice and efficacy, because the that and the how of God’s involvement in all things are both determined by God’s justice. From the above one can conclude that Arminius’s view on God’s iustitia is in the background of all he writes about the relationship between God and his creation. This must be taken into account when Arminius deals with the limits that apply to God’s dealings with creation. For that reason it is not correct to speak of God’s self-limitation in terms of a limiting of the freedom of his will, as Muller and Blacketer do.109 It is not creation itself that limits God in his freedom, but rather God’s nature and his antecedent acts, and in both it is his justice that is revealed: to give each his or her due.110 In the case of the created human being in the pre-fall state, God has no right, ————— 108 EP 734 (III 419): “Caeterum, quocunque modo res ista explicetur, cavendum est sedulo, tum ne Deus auctor peccati statuatur, tum ne actus ipse efficientiae Dei substrahatur: hoc est, ut totus ille actus, tum qua actus, tum qua peccatum rite providentiae Dei subiiciatur: qua actus efficienti, qua peccatum permittenti providentiae. Si tamen in alteram partem inclinandum erit, minus peccabitur si substrahatur actus efficientiae divinae qua actus est, quam si peccatum efficientiae Dei tribuatur qua peccatum est. Praestat enim Deo actum aliquem adimere qui ipsi competit, quam malum actum tribuere qui ipsi non competit; eo quod gravior iniuria Deo irrogetur si peccati causa dicatur, quam si actus otiosus spectator perhibeatur.” 109 With a reference to Muller, Blacketer remarks: “Arminius discernment of the shape of theological system was defined not only [by] the divine essence and attributes and the divine revelation in Scripture, but also ‘by the concept of a divine self-limitation in the work of creation.’ The result is a cosmos that is rather independent of God, a God who is subject to law (Arminius’ Thomistic intellectualism), and a strong tendency toward rationalism.” Blacketer goes on to claim that Arminius views creation as “a relatively independent realm, even largely independent of its Creator”. BLACKETER, “‘Covenant”, 203. However, he takes absolutely no account of the context in which Arminius speaks of God’s relationship to creation, namely, that of God’s goodness and justice (cf. BLACKETER, “Covenant”, 202 n. 53!). Arminius’s view on God’s works of creation and providence further makes it absolutely impossible to maintain that there is room in his view for human independence from the Creator. 110 Cf. EP 644–645 (III 283–284).

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no reason, to change his beneficence into ill-will. There is no divine selfdetermination in creation that is not inherent to God inasmuch as He is God, and therefore just. Should God “limit” Himself less than He actually does in creation, He would become unjust and assail his very essence.111 The Integrity of Creation For Arminius, the integrity of creation implies that the fall into sin was an unintended and avoidable result of a completely free decision of the will of Adam and Eve to be disobedient to God. For God’s initial plan with the human race, consisting in supernatural bliss on the condition of perfect obedience to God’s law and covenant stipulations, the fall into sin means a complete break. There is no way that Arminius can consider creation as a step towards, or a necessary means for, what some say to be God’s actual plan, which is the manifestation of his justice in the condemnation of one part, and the manifestation of his mercy in the salvation of the other part of the human race. Even aside from the question as to whether that condemnation or salvation is to be considered on the basis of persistent unbelief and persevering faith or as result of an absolute predestination, such a view on creation and on God’s first covenant with humanity can for Arminius in no way be made to agree with God’s justice.112 However one may want to speak of creation to damnation, for example as a creation to just condemnation – which is to say, not without the intervention of sin – , it is and remains false. Creation to just condemnation is done in agreement with justice, but it is not just to determine a non-sinful creature for condemnation. In fact, it is the greatest injustice and a most terrible evil. Even Satan could not dream up such a wicked thing, not even in his most perverse thoughts! Just the thought of it leads Arminius to break out into a prayer that God stand up for his honor in the face of all the perversities that are uttered against Him, and correct the thinking of those who do speak that way.113 In his epistolary exchange with Junius, Arminius devotes a section to God’s original plan for his creation.114 Here he emphasizes not only that it was not necessary for the universe that there be sin, but he also emphatical————— Cf. HAMM, Promissio, 11.21, for similar lines of thought in the theology of Augustine. ETG 85–88.91–92 (III 598–600.602–603). 113 ETG 92 (III 603): “Perversa etiam est illa loquendi ratio, quod Deus creaturam non peccatricem justae damnationi destinat; quia justae damnationi non destinat nisi ex justitia: at justitiae non est destinare non peccatricem creaturam ad damnationem; sed summae injustitiae et perversissimae malitiae, qua pejorem ne ipse diabolus animo suo sceleratissimo concipere posset. Adesto Deus, et vindica gloriam tuam a linguis perversa de te loquentium; imo potius corrige mentem illorum, ut linguas suas tibi consecrent, et vera teque digna posthac juxta tuum verbum recte pronuntient.” 114 AC 593–594 (III 211–214). 111 112

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ly denies that the avoidance of sin would not be to the good of the universe. God’s plan in creating the universe and his ordinance were that the human race would be subjected to Him, and the rest of creation in turn to the human race. The fall into sin had disastrous effects for this plan and this order, because humankind became rebellious against God while the other creatures are no longer under human dominion and are in fact armed for its destruction. This implies that the plan (ratio) of God’s providence whereby he sustains and governs all things is different from how it would have been in a sinless state. It would have been best had the universe remained in the state of integrity in which it had been created by God. Sin neither in itself nor per accidens contributes to the plan of the universe. Not in itself, because sin does not follow from the Creator’s intent; not per accidens, since through sin an end was made to God’s original plan for creation. Sin does not first of all offend a finite good, but an infinite good – God’s justice and will. It is only secondarily that sin harms a finite good – the human race and its felicity. Sin does not manifest God’s wisdom and goodness, but it is dishonoring to God. God does use sin to manifest his attributes, so that Arminius ends by arguing that it would be more correct to say that sin is per accidens the occasion (occasio) for the manifestation of God’s honor. Had God not been able to triumph over sin and to restore order to sin (idque in ordinem redigere) by means of his attributes, He would never have allowed (nullo modo passus fuisset) the fall to take place.115

3.2 God’s Justice and (the Fall Into) Sin For something to be sin and to be punishable, it must satisfy a number of conditions. Sin is defined as a transgression of the law, and for that reason is a violation of God’s will.116 Sin presumes a just law, as well as a real freedom to sin or not to sin. Real freedom is the freedom of indifference, defined as not only the possibility to choose –a instead of a, but also to be able to choose instead of a not only –a but also b. All necessary and sufficient conditions to make a choice for any one of these are present, and at the exact moment when one makes a choice for one, one also has the possi————— 115 See also EP 646–647 (III 285–287): Nothing good would come from sin, if God in his mercy and wisdom did not find a way to obstruct the natural course of sin and to take from it an occasion (occasio) to derive from sin some benefit that actually conflicts with the nature of sin. One should also not do evil so that something good may come, for this only leads to circular reasoning. Nor may one speak of a “happy fault”. Redemption comes only by occasio: “redemptionem ex culpa non nisi occasionaliter exstitisse”. Cf. ETG 114 (III 621). 116 EP 702 (III 372): “Definitio autem peccati est quod sit trangressio legis, et propterea violatio voluntatis Dei.”

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bility to chose one of the others (cf. 2.1.4).117 A sin that arises necessarily from God’s act of passing over, or else from his withholding of grace because it so pleased Him to do so (i.e. not as punishment for sin), cannot be punished justly by God.118 Not only do you then make God the author of sin,119 it also means that only God really sins, so that sin is no longer sin.120 Of all the blasphemies one could possibly utter against God, the most serious (gravissima) is the one that makes Him the author of sin.121 The use of the superlative illustrates the intensity of Arminius’s zeal to turn on anything that could give rise to this blasphemy. Those who say that sin came necessarily or infallibly from God’s decree are called blasphemos [...] in bonitatem et iustitiam Dei. People like Calvin who, as Arminius claims, were not aware that their doctrine had this consequence and elsewhere in their writings argue the opposite, are excused.122 God did know infallibly that sin would come to pass, but this certainty or necessity is not derived from God’s decree, but it is an infallibility deriving from God’s all-encompassing foreknowledge. God’s foreknowledge entails a necessitas consequentiae, but does not impose any necessity on what is foreknown.123 This distinction between necessity and infallibility is of great importance for Arminius, and is often applied by him.124 The relationship of God’s justice to the fall implies that there is no simpliciter divine decree to persistence in hardening, because that “will do the greatest injustice to God, and will contradict clear Scripture.”125 And there is no way one can prove that God prepared the occasion (occasio) for predestination (i.e. the fall), either. This conflicts with God’s justice, makes God the author of sin and sin an unavoidable necessity.126 It is an axioma Theologicum that God is not the cause of the fall (defectio).127 Arminius, who continually shows himself to be an ardent defender of the use and need for all kinds of (theo)logical distinctions,128 is convinced that there is no distinction whatsoever that can prevent God from becoming the author of sin and ————— 117 AN 952 (II 712): “Libertas arbitrii consistit in eo, quod homo positis omnibus requisitis ad volendum vel nolendum, indifferens tamen sit ad volendum vel nolendum, ad volendum hoc potius, quam illud.” 118 AC 569 (III 175); AC 592 (III 209). 119 EP 681–682 (III 340). 120 EP 694 (III 359). Cf. Verklaring, 84–85 (I 630), also for what follows. 121 ETG 154 (III 654–655): “Inter omnes blasphemias quae Deo impingi possunt, omnium est gravissima qua author peccati statuitur Deus”. 122 AC 591 (III 208). 123 EP 709 (III 382). 124 AC 592 (III 209); EP 704–705 (III 374–375). 125 AR 9 797 (III 514): “Deo maximam iniuriam faciet et apertae Scripturae contradicet”. 126 EP 643 (III 281); cf. EP 681–682 (III 340). 127 EP 650 (III 291). 128 Cf. AC 592 (III 209); EP 704–705 (III 374); EP 707 (III 379).

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the cause of Adam’s sin when predestination and reprobation apply to humanity before the fall.129 When God does harden the “vessels of wrath” with his all-powerful will, this is because they deserve it. The justice of God’s wrath is in that case completely unquestionable.130 God is free to decide that the sinner will be punished, but He does not punish until after that human being has actually sinned. In that respect, God’s power (potentia) is dependent on God’s justice; God’s potentia must be exercised according to his iusitia.131 Not only an active hardening on the part of God, but also a “passive” abandonment of a person to him- or herself is not in line with God’s justice and cannot be defended if it implies that the object removed or withheld is the only thing that can prevent sin – that is, if the object withheld is grace. Every divine decree that has sin as a necessary effect is both impossible and untenable.132 After Junius denies this last thesis, Arminius expresses himself even more clearly. Should the grace necessary for obedience to the law be withheld, it is not the human being that is the cause of sin, but rather the one who gives the law but not the means necessary to obey it. A transgression of the law cannot be called sin if the law is unjust. Arminius shows something of his convictions that run the deepest when he then cries out: “as if God were reaping where He had not sowed, which is far from the good and just God!” The Bible texts he cites in this context come up more often in his writings.133 Because of his justice, God owes the human race the ————— 129 Cf. AC 476 (III 42) with AC 478 (III 44–45). See also AC 493 (III 67); AC 500–505 (III 77–84); AC 575 (III 184); EP 647–649 (III 288–290). 130 AR9 798–799 (III 517): “Concedamus enim vi omnipotentis voluntatis indurari vasa irae, an hoc, iustitiae irae divinae vel tantillum adimet, quum ipsi meriti sint indurationem, in Dei autem arbtrio sit poenam infligere, quo ipsi visum est modo?” Cf. AR9 792 (III 506–507). 131 EP 742 (III 432): “Pendet igitur ista poena ex mera et libera Dei voluntate, quam tamen inferre non potest nisi peccatoribus, suspendente illius potentiam iustitia divina, secundum quam potentia est exercenda.” 132 AC 566 (III 171); AC 585–586 (III 200). Junius on the one hand attributes the fall into sin to the human free will, but on the other hand says that it depends on God’s most wise will whether through a gift of grace no sin should be committed. He does note that it may be “somewhat harsh” (duriusculum) if one were to say that the necessity of committing sin depends on God’s will which does not give, or even takes away, the required grace, but he does not deny that this may be said. AC 589 (III 205). Cf. EP 705 (III 376–377). Cf. Verklaring, 101–102 (I 647). There Arminius evaluates two views on predestination that consider neither creation nor fall as God-ordained means to the execution of the antecedent decree of predestination. The reason that their proponents do not dare to “ascend to such a great height as the inventors of the First scheme have done” is that they want to avoid making God the cause of sin. Arminius respects this intention, but thinks that when considered more closely, also these views will show that they do place Adam’s fall as means to the execution of the predestination decree. 133 AC 567 (III 173): “Dei velut metentis ubi non seminavit, quod abest a bono et iusto Deo”. The text referred to is Matt 25:24/Luke 19:22, which is also cited by Arminius in AAC 617–618 (III 246) and EP 644–645 (III 283).

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ability to follow a law He promulgated, unless it through its own power robs itself of that ability.134 In that event, God is not obligated to restore that ability. God does not owe anybody anything simpliciter, but God can make Himself indebted to his creatures whether by a promise, or by requiring something that they cannot accomplish without his grace (cf. 5.1.2).135 Sin is the cause that allows God to punish. It is not the causa immediata, proxima or praecipua, but rather the causa meritoria, the meritorious cause. Without this causa, God would not justly (iuste) be able to ordain anyone to punishment.136 According to Arminius it can be illustrated undeniably that God becomes the author of sin when, as Perkins believes, the determination to punish proceeds from an abandonment by God that is not tied to a preceding sin.137 A relative abandonment, however, may be posited. God did abandon our first parents in the context of the fall insofar as He did not effectively help them. He therefore did not actually interfere to prevent the fall from taking place.138 However, God on the other hand did provide sufficient grace not to sin. God does not desire sin, and for that reason always provides enough hindrance for his human creatures to avoid sin (cf. 3.1.2).139 In the Examen Perkinsiani, Arminius calls the question as to God’s sufficient and efficient grace, and their administration and dispensation as well as the causes for that dispensation, a “most difficult and almost inexplicable discussion”.140 The same appears to be the case several years later from the fragment of a letter Arminius wrote on July 8, 1606. Arminius here notes that the distinction between gratia sufficiens and gratia efficax must be admitted, for otherwise neither the freedom of the will nor God’s justice can be defended.141 However, the issue as to how grace can be sufficient, and

————— Arminius denies that man has lost, or can lose, this ability. For his arguments, see 3.3. AC 567 (III 173): “Deus quidem nemini quidpiam debet simpliciter; nemo enim illi dedit ut retribuatur ei: sed potest Deus aliquo suo actu se debitorem homini facere, vel promisso, vel postulatione actus.” Cf. AC 572–573 (III 181): “At potuit tamen praestare Legem, alioquin Deus est iniustus qui ponit Legem creature non praestabilem.” See also: AAC 617–618 (III 246); ETG 145–146 (III 647–648). 136 EP 686 (III 346): “citra quam Deus neminem ad poenam iuste ordinare posset.” 137 EP 687 (III 348): “facies enim desertione ista Deum peccati auctorem, quod argumentis irrefutabilibus commonstrari potest.” 138 EP 688 (III 349). 139 EP 720–721 (III 399). 140 EP 688 (III 349). 141 Cf. AN 959 (II 721–722): “Necessario ponenda est gratia sufficiens, quae tamen effectum non sortitur culpa eius cui contingit: secus iustitia Dei in condemnatione infidelium defendi non potest.” 134 135

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yet not realize that for which it is sufficient, and on what the efficacy of grace depends, is something that continues to interest him.142 Arminius’s views makes it necessary for him to leave room for acts performed by creatures for which these creatures are in a final and comprehensive sense responsible. This is true above all for sin, the fall into sin, and for unbelief as resistance against God’s plan and offer of salvation. Arminius wants to be most certain that it is indeed the human being who bears the responsibility, and that God is in no way to blame. As he sees it, this must and can be maintained while still preserving the fully gracious character of salvation. This is also possible if real freedom with respect to sin in the end implies that a person can persist in refusing God’s insistent offer of grace. Arminius time and again points out that the Scriptures express themselves clearly on the possibility to resist God’s grace. Yet it is striking that in his systematic and dogmatic reflection on grace, Arminius never appears to go farther than a double negative: grace is not irresistible. Furthermore, it is not grace itself that is not irresistible, but rather the way in which grace works. Arminius argues that this cannot be avoided if one wants to maintain both God’s justice and human responsibility for sin, evil and unbelief. In this connection, one would do well to emphasize once again that it is the question of God’s relationship to (the fall into) sin that grips Arminius. After all, particularly this topic is directly relevant to God’s justice! For that reason, an absolute decree of reprobation where there is no antecedent sin in the object of reprobation meets with Arminius’s strong resistance.143 This is clear, for example, when he treats the issue of causality. A universally first and highest cause is independent of other causes, although it does not rule out that something else can be the occasion (occasio) without which that universal first cause would never perform this act. For Arminius, this applies also to the decree of reprobation and for damnation.144 That Arminius here mentions only reprobation, and not election to salvation, highlights the starting-point of his objections to an absolute doctrine of predestination. Arminius considers an absolute reprobation to be impossible because God can only react with grace and justice to sin and misery that are already present (in his foreknowledge), and not the other way around.145 Predestina————— 142 For this letter see DEKKER, Rijker dan Midas, 169–172. Cf. AN 959 (II 722): “Efficacitas, quae distincta est ab efficientia ipsa, a sufficientia differre non videtur.” 143 Cf. EP 680–681 (III 338–339). 144 AC 493 (III 67): “Universalis causa non habet causam supra se, et prima summaque causa ab alia causa non pendet, ipsi enim termini istam in se rationem concludunt: sed fieri potest ut universali primae et summae causae occasio producendi certi alicuius effectus ab alia causa praebeatur, quem extra istam occasionem prima causa nec proponeret in se producendum, neque produceret actu extra se, imo neque proponere seu decernere producendum neque producere posset. Tale est decretum de damnandis nonnullis, et damnatio ex illo.” 145 AC 493–494 (III 68).

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tion does not have an extrinsic cause (causa extrinsica), but it does find its occasio in God’s everlasting and eternal foreknowledge of sin.146 In the context of his treatment of the consequences of the fall, Arminius once again shows that his primary concern is for God’s justice. He writes: I confess that the mind of [animalis] a natural and carnal man is obscure and dark, that his affections are corrupt and inordinate, that his will is stubborn and disobedient, and that the man himself is dead in sins. And I add this, that teacher obtains my highest approbation who ascribes as much as possible to divine grace; provided he so please the cause of grace, as not to inflict an injury on the justice of God, and not to take away the free choice to that which is evil.147

The two provisos with which the above citation closes both pertain to God’s relationship to evil. We should also not overlook the fact that Arminius does not speak of free choice as such, but explicitly qualifies it as to that which is evil (ad malum). For it is precisely the freedom to do what is wrong that is the condition to maintaining God’s justice. Because “some of our doctors” teach that sin is necessarily derived from the decree of reprobation, Arminius considers one should add that the decree to punish those who do not persist in their original state is not established without a certain divine foreknowledge of future sins.148 Sin, as Arminius suggests can be planissime concluded, is thus a required condition in the object of election and reprobation.149 He makes this point repeatedly, and it remains his most important argument among all his objections.150 Compared to Thomas Aquinas151 and Calvin, as well as to the doc————— 146 AAC 612 (III 238): “ergo praedestinatio haec a causa extrinseca non sit, est tamen a peccato occasionata, ut loquuntur.” AAC 613 (III 239): “ut ut enim peccatum Deum ad praedestinandum non moverit (est enim proprium peccati effectum iram Dei mereri) tamen haec talis Praedestinatio non nisi occasione peccati facta est, quod Deus in tempore futurum ab aeterno, pro infinitate suae scientiae, praevidit.” EP 656 (III 301): “Est vero actus ille ex mera Dei voluntate, sed non citra respectum mali in creaturis, mali inquam quod consideratur non ut causa Deum movens ad electionem, sed tanquam conditio in obiecto actus istius requisita.” 147 HaC 944 (II 700–701): “Fateor mentem Hominis animalis et carnalis esse obscuratam, affectus pravos et inordinates, voluntatem immorigeram, hominemque in peccatis esse mortuum: Et addo illum doctorem mihi maxime probari, qui gratiae quam plurimum tribuit: modo sic causam gratiae agat, ne iustitiae Dei noxam inferat, et ne liberum arbitrium ad malum tollat.” Of his own doctrine of predestination, Arminius writes: “In every particular it harmonizes with the nature of grace by ascribing to it all those things which are due to it, and by reconciling it most completely to the justice of God and to the nature and liberty of the human will.” Verklaring, 109 (I 655). 148 AAC 618 (III 246–247). 149 AC 495 (III 69). 150 AC 507 (III 88): “Horsum etiam omnia adferri argumenta possunt, quibus comprobatur peccatum esse conditionem in obiecto praedestinationis requisitam.” Cf. various arguments in AC 530–531 (III 121–123); AC 540 (III 136); AC 575 (III 184); AAC 618 (III 246–247). Also in the Examen Perkinsiani does this theme come up repeatedly, cf. EP 639–642 (III 274–279); EP 650 (III 292); EP 685 (III 346); EP 691 (III 355).

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trine of predestination as held to by their followers, it is Augustine who is most favorably received by Arminius – he is said to differ greatly (multum [...] distat) from the others – exactly because he does posit sin in the object of predestination. Those who neglect to do this wander far from the beaten path (multum a recta via aberrent). At the end of his epistolary exchange with Junius – fully devoted to the question of the object of predestination – Arminius emphatically concludes: “In addition to this, by the sole circumstance of sin being added to the object of the decree, and rightly [recte] explained, all the absurdities and blasphemies accustomed to be fastened upon the decree of predestination and reprobation may be repelled, and solidly refuted, as inconsequent.”152 The fact that the word “rightly” (recte) was italicized in the original implies virtually everything that is tied to Arminius’s position on God’s justice, such as the freedom of the will and the related views on the operation of grace. Arminius elsewhere adds many arguments to support his conclusion. Because Jesus Christ came to save his people from sin, that which was received in and through Christ presupposes sin. The sending of the Son to save is an internal deed of God which with respect to its nature follows foreknowledge of acts that depend on the creaturely (and thus contingent) will, and for that reason it depends on God’s foreknowledge of the fall.153 If one refers to the “blessings in Christ”, these imply both sin and faith. There can be no such thing as vindictive (avenging) justice unless there be sinners, nor can there even be mercy (misericordia) unless there be people in misery (in miserum). In the perfect, natural state before the fall, human beings were neither sinners nor in misery, and this means that neither justice nor mercy pertain to them in that original state.154 “When you hear any mention of mercy, your thoughts ought necessarily to revert to Christ, outside of whom ‘God is a consuming fire’”.155 In the context of election and reprobation, sin is not the causa for one person being damned and another saved, but it nevertheless is the meritorious cause on the basis of which a person can be ————— 151 For Thomas Aquinas, see also EP 682 (III 341). Arminius says that he greatly respect Aquinas, but not in his view that the decree of reprobation is the will to permit someone to fall into sin, and the assignment of the punishment of condemnation for sin. According to Arminius, Aquinas makes two mistakes: he places the decree of reprobation before sin; and he makes permission an attribute of the decree of reprobation, while permission should actually be attributed to the decree of general providence since all have sinned. 152 AC 610 (III 235): “Accedit huc quod per solam peccati circumstantiam obiecto decreti additam et recte explicatam, omnes absurditates et blasphemiae decreto praedestinationis et reprobationis impingi solitae repelli possint, et solide ut inconsequentes refutari. (mg Nota bene.)” 153 AC 492 (III 66). Cf. AC 532 (III 123–124); AC 535 (III 128–129). 154 AC 495 (III 71); cf. AC 512 (III 94); ACC 612 (III 237). 155 OR 36 (I 338): “Ubi misericordiae mentionem audis, necessario Christum cogitare debes, extra quem Deus ignis consumens est, ad perdendum peccatores terrae.”

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damned, and is the required condition in the object.156 The grace of predestination is Evangelical, not Legal (Evangelica, non legalis), and for that reason this grace can only have a sinner as its object. The grace of predestination consists in the forgiveness of sin and in regeneration, in turning aside from sin and repentance to God.157 Election and reprobation presuppose the existence of sin. Sin as such is not the cause of reprobation; in and through Christ there are after the fall still people who are elected and freed from their sin.158 However, sin is indeed what makes it possible for God to condemn justly. As an aside, we note that Arminius’s argumentation here appears to lean towards seeking the cause for reprobation in not being saved from sin in and through Christ. A relationship between God’s justice and (the fall into) sin which has not yet received the attention it deserves is the demand of God’s justice that sin be punished. Through the fall, the covenant was broken. God’s original goal for creation and his covenant can therefore no longer be attained through human obedience, and God’s justice demands satisfaction. God’s justice further seeks to have his goodness be given its due as well. God’s wisdom offers the solution that fully satisfies all the conditions: Jesus Christ, who as Mediator bore the sin of others in their place, satisfied God’s justice and at the same time became the means by which God’s goodness would progress to mercy through the offer and gift of grace.159

3.3 God’s Justice and the Gospel (Evangelium): Christ, Predestination and Covenant God’s justice touches on many aspects of Arminius’s view of the gospel (Evangelium). All the parts that have already been treated not only come together under the concept of the gospel, but they also find their focus there. With “gospel” I mean that which is particular to what Arminius understands with the “Evangelical theology”, the theology that came into effect after the fall. In the Evangelical theology, we are dealing with the way God willed to reconcile fallen humanity to Himself again. God still wanted them to be able to arrive at the original destination of bliss in total union with God. In Arminius’s view of the Evangelical theology, the main themes to be treated ————— AC 496 (III 71). Cf. EP 680–681 (III 338–339). AC 562 (III 167). Cf. AC 564–565 (III 169–170). 158 Cf. AC 497–498 (III 73–74): It is not necessary (on account of God’s justice) that sinners be punished or condemned, because the ransom obtained by Christ’s satisfaction is sufficient for the redemption of all sinners. 159 Cf. AR9 796 (III 512–513) and 3.1.2. 156 157

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are Christ, predestination and covenant, where each in its own way brings together God’s justice and the gospel. The last paragraph of 3.2 on the relationship between God’s justice and (the fall into) sin already showed that God’s justice, which requires satisfaction for sin, and his goodness, whose due it is to progress to mercy (misericordia), are both given their rightful place through God’s wisdom in the sending of Jesus Christ as Mediator. At various times Arminius emphasizes that after the original plan was rendered impotent by sin, God was completely free to institute a new plan for creation ex mera misericordia. He is also completely free to decide to whom He will and will not give his grace.160 But Arminius does add an important qualification, namely, that justice governs this freedom (iustitia tamen moderante). Just as before the fall God’s justice prevented Him from electing and reprobating because both presuppose sin, so also after the fall God’s justice continues to govern his dealings with his creation.161 Various topics will need to be treated in the context of this section on God’s justice and the gospel. They are: 1. Christ as foundation of the new covenant and of predestination. 2. The object of predestination; or, to put it another way, who will and will not be saved in the Evangelical theology. Here also Arminius’s interpretation of Romans 9, as well as his view on the relation between election and reprobation, will be treated. 3. The third topic is the order by which, and the means through which, salvation will be effected. 4. God’s foreknowledge and middle-knowledge are treated in the context of Arminius’s understanding of predestination. 5. Finally, Arminius’s comprehensive, four-decree structure as found in his Declaration of 1608 will be examined. 3.3.1 Christ as the Foundation of the New Covenant and of Predestination The most important condition for God and humankind to be able to associate with one another again is the just response to the sin that broke the first covenant (see 3.1.2). The only possibility that does not eternally condemn humanity is for God to have his Son suffer and bear the punishment for sin. For that reason, Christ’s mediatorship literally takes a fundamental place within Arminius’s conception of the Evangelical theology. “For Christ is the foundation of that blessing, not as God, but as qeanqrwpoj, the Media————— AR9 788 (III 500). Cf. ETG 19 (III 541): “sed quia creavit ideo jus habet salandi et damnandi, illo modo quem ipsi sapientia sua et aequitas dectabit.” 160 161

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tor, Saviour, and Head of the Church.”162 As Mediator, Christ provided a foundation for (substernitur) the gospel; his office as Mediator thus includes a large part (bonam partam) of what must be revealed in the gospel.163 After the breaking of the first covenant, God out of grace initiated another, new covenant. This covenant would not be as the old one, but was a covenant of grace. God’s justice and truth would not allow such a new covenant of grace except by means of a Mediator and Surety (sequester et sponsor) between God and sinner. That necessitated a sacrifice of atonement (necessitas sacrificii expiatorii), a new priesthood that would atone for sin and guarantee the way to God’s throne of grace for human beings in spite of their sinful state.164 The necessity of a Mediator and Surety arises from God’s unmovable and unrelenting justice, through which He hates all injustice.165 Therefore, when God the Father wants to appoint his Son to that office of Mediator and Surety, there is a “conflict” between justice and mercy. Justice means that each person receives his or her due (suum cuique tribuere). Because it has to admit that the throne of grace is more exalted than its own court, justice is satisfied when both – i.e. justice and mercy – are given their due. God’s wisdom is what allows this cooperation, and the atoning sacrifice satisfies both. This sacrifice is a voluntary entrance into death as the required payment, which at one and the same time satisfies justice and opens the way for mercy. For that sacrifice, a priest and a sacrifice were needed. It was to be a human being who would make that sacrifice, but in the condition in which human beings stood, in sin and bound under the tyranny of both sin and Satan, they had neither the will nor the strength to will out of love, and by virtue of this office to fulfill those duties which would be to the profit of others.166 God’s wisdom decided that the Mediator would thus be born of man, but conceived by the Holy Spirit. The Word of God presented Himself and was appointed priest from the covenant (ex pacto), confirmed with an oath – which ratification, in contrast to the first covenant, made this covenant of grace unchangeable. The pactum consists of a demand and a promise from God which Christ freely accepted. God swore that the heavenly rest would be attained through Christ, through faith in Him.167 In the pactum with the Son, God united the two highest offices of priest and king. This union is at the same time the highest proof that justice and ————— 162 AAC 614 (III 241): “Nam Christus fundamentum istius benedictionis est, non qua Deus, sed qua qeanqrwpoj, mediator, salvator et caput Ecclesiae.” 163 OR 47 (I 347–348). 164 OR 13 (I 410). 165 OR 14 (I 412). 166 OR 14 (I 412). 167 OR 16–17 (I 415–418).

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mercy can cooperate to produce human salvation.168 The fruit of Christ’s priestly service consists in the following: 1. The establishment (pactio) and confirmation (confirmatio) of a new covenant (novi foederis). 2. The demand for, reception of, and application of all the blessings needed for the new covenant partners: forgiveness, adoption, and the Spirit as the bond of union. 3. A new, Eucharistic and royal priesthood. 4. The leading of the entire believing church to God. This final element of Christ’s priestly service represents not only the goal of the first three, but also the goal of God’s first covenant with humankind.169 The pactum between God the Father and his Son has a foundational place in Arminius’s theology.170 This is true even when Arminius does not explicitly refer to such a pactum. After the fall which destroyed the first covenant of works, the pactum is the condition and foundation of the foedus, the new covenant of grace.171 In the above, it has already been made clear that this follows directly from Arminius’s view on the justice of God. God’s justice unrelentingly demands satisfaction before God can be gracious towards sinners. When Arminius explains that he means that God’s love for the world for which He gave his Son (cf. John 3:16) precedes the ————— OR 19–20 (I 422). OR 20–24 (I 423–430). 170 Contra LOONSTRA, Verkiezing, 24, who actually speaks of an “isolated position”. Loonstra did, however, notice that the important thing for Arminius was that the decree of salvation not be subordinated to the decree of election, for otherwise God’s love for justice and for sinners would be harmed. He recognized that God’s decree of salvation in Christ formed the foundation for Arminius’s doctrine of predestination. He remarks, however, that this is never developed towards a pactum salutis between Father and Son, and suggests that Arminius may himself have realized that a covenant between Father and Son could hinder him in his view on predestination. According to Loonstra, such a hypothesis is justified on the basis of the polemics that have taken place since the time of his death (p. 25). In my opinion, Loonstra – as well as the polemicists after Arminius’s death themselves – did not recognize the specific context of God’s justice in which the pactum functions as foundation of covenant and election in Arminius’s thought. GRAAFLAND, Verbond, 193–195, is ambivalent in his evaluation of Arminius’s view. On the one hand he points to the character of the covenant between God and Christ as a covenant sui generis that has its own place within the plan of salvation, while he on the other hand remarks that it was not Arminius’s intention to view this pactum as a third covenant, somehow connected to the other two covenants. This pactum in fact has only the function to indicate that, and why, the “other” covenant of grace has been instituted by God as eternal. Graafland suggests that Arminius’s pactum is “in reality” only concerned with what is eternal. However, in that he overlooks the foundational character of the pactum as guarantee of the satisfaction of God’s justice. Also Graafland’s remark that Arminius at this time follows neither the line of Reformed Orthodoxy, nor (as yet) the humanist Reformed line, in my opinion results from his approach to Arminius that does not do justice to the latter’s thought. 171 There is thus no identification of the pactum with the foedus, although there is a relationship in which the latter is founded on the former. Cf. BLACKETER, “Covenant”, 212: “It appears that Arminius either identifies the pactum between the Father and Son with the foedus gratiae, or at least founds the latter upon the former.” 168 169

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cause of predestination (i.e. the merits earned by Christ’s death172), the background for such a remark can be found in his distinction between pactum and foedus. As the agreement between God the Father and God the Son, the pactum is the condition and foundation of the foedus in which Christ, not as God but as God-man or Mediator, through his death on the cross brings about real reconciliation between God and the sinful human race. This is in turn the condition for, and cause of, predestination understood as God’s decision to save those who believe and to condemn those who remain obstinate in their unbelief. Here the meaning of foedus and predestination are intertwined; in our treatment of Arminius’s four-decree structure of the Declaration of 1608 (cf. 3.3.5), these two concepts, as well as their mutual relationship, will be examined more carefully. As was noted, one of the differences between pactum and foedus is that in the former God the Son is involved as God, while in the latter it is of utmost importance that God’s Son here is the God-man and serves as Mediator between God and man. Arminius identifies the relationship between Christ and God the Father as one of subordination. The nature of Christ’s subordination consists in this, that every soteriological communicatio of God with human beings, or vice versa, occurs through the means of Christ’s intervention (cf. 2.2.2).173 It is God’s unmovable justice (iustitia rigida) which separates humanity from God and from communion with Him because of its sin, and to undo that separation Christ’s subordination is necessary as object of theology. The Father is seated on his throne of iustitiae rigidae behind Christ, and can only be approached by means of Christ’s blood and through faith.174 The necessity of the subordination of the Son has to do with the huge gulf between our corruption and God’s holiness and rigid, unshakeable justice, which keeps us separated from God as if by an impassable cleft, were it not that Christ underwent the full extent of God’s wrath and bridged that gap.175 Therefore, unless we believe in Christ, we cannot believe in God. The consideration of this necessity is of infinite use, because it produces confidence in the conscience of the believer, and confirms the necessity of the Christian religion.176 ————— AAC 614–615 (III 241). “Natura illius in eo consistit, quod omnis, quae Deo nobiscum est, aut nobis cum Deo, salutaris communicatio, Christi medio interventu peragitur.” OR 36 (I 338). God’s communication with us is 1. his benevolent affection with respect to us (erga nobis); 2. his “gratioso decreto de nobis”; 3. his “effectu salutifero in nobis”. OR 36 (I 338). In all these things Christ is the Mediator: “Ubique Christus medius intercedit.” (Eph. 1:6 and 5) OR 36 (I 339). 174 OR 36 (I 339). 175 OR 37 (I 341): “Illa ex nostrae contagionis et vitiositatis ad Dei incontaminabilem sanctitatem et inflexibilem iustitiae rigorem comparatione ortum ducit”. 176 OR 37 (I 341). 172 173

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With respect to the relationship between providence and predestination, Arminius argues that providence, since it is all-encompassing, precedes predestination by nature and in order, and is also the cause for the sending of the Son as Redeemer, the Head in which predestination is founded (Eph. 1).177 Christ is not only the means, but also the meritorious cause of election. To be elect in Christ means to be elect in the Mediator, that is, in the Head. For God loves no one to eternal life except in Christ. From that it follows that no one is considered by God to be in Christ except those who are through faith grafted into Christ, and that election therefore pertains only to believers. The phrase in Christo denotes the meritorious cause.178 Those who in their conception of predestination consider Christ to be the subordinate cause of salvation do Him “no small injury”;179 it does not befit the honor Christ is due.180 One of Arminius’s greatest objections to the predestinarian views of his opponents thus also concerns the place of Christ.181 In his Declaration, Arminius supports his claim that the doctrine of unconditional election as taught by his colleagues cannot function as the foundation of Christianity and of salvation precisely by pointing to the place of Christ: 1. It is not the foundation of christianity: (1) For this predestination is not that decree of God by which Christ is appointed by God to be the Saviour, the head, and the foundation of those who will be made heirs of salvation: Yet that decree is the only foundation of christianity. (2) For this doctrine of predestination is not that doctrine by which, through faith, we as lively stones are built up into Christ, the only cornerstone, and are inserted into him as the members of the body are joined to their head. 2. It is not the foundation of salvation: (1) For this predestination is not that decree of the good-pleasure of God in Christ Jesus on which alone our salvation rests and depends.182

Election is in Christ, and there is no one who is in Christ except those who believe. For that reason no one is elected but those who believe in Christ.183 ————— 177 EP 647 (III 287): “Agnosco autem permissionem medium decreti non praedestinationis sed providentiae, qua haec contra illam distinguitur: providentiae inquam gubernatricis et administratoris, quae non modo non prior est natura et ordine praedestinatione, sed et causa missionis Filii tanquam Redemptoris, qui caput est in quo praedestinatio facta est, ut doce Apostolus Ephes. 1.” As has been noted earlier, and as will also be laid out more at length below, the providential appointment of Christ as Mediator is in the Declaration the first decree of predestination (see 3.3.5). 178 EP 651 (III 293). 179 AN 951 (II 711). 180 Verklaring, 85–86 (II 630–631). 181 As correctly noted by CLARKE, Ground. 182 Verklaring, 71 (I 618–619). Cf. ETG 150 (III 651). 183 EP 756 (III 452). “Electio enim est in Christo facta. At nemo in Christo est nisi fidelis. Ergo nemo in Christo eligitur nisi fidelis.” Cf. EP 757 (III 453); ETG 39–40 (III 558): “Ad Ephes.

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In Arminius’ theology, Evangelical grace is directly linked to the merits earned by Christ.184 God can love no sinner unto salvation unless that sinner is reconciled to Him in Christ.185 This implies that predestination is possible only in Christ. The payment of the ransom precedes election (prius electione est).186 And Christ has been given to sinners, so that for Arminius it is clear that (in God’s foreknowledge) there is no election or reprobation before sin, nor before the appointment of Christ to the office of Mediator, nor even before Christ’s fulfilment of this office in the atonement.187 In his Examen thesium Gomari, Arminius speaks sharply about the place Christ receives in Gomarus’s doctrine of predestination. Gomarus had remarked that predestination is the very core of the gospel itself (potissima ipsius Euangelii materia). If that is indeed the case, replies Arminius, then Jesus Christ, who is the most important object and core of the gospel (objectum et materia Euangelii est praecipua), cannot be omitted from the definition and essence of predestination. In Gomarus’s theses on predestination, however, there is no mention of Jesus Christ except when he treats the means to the execution of the decrees.188 In Arminius’s mind, this is not a coincidental omission on Gomarus’s part, but is indicative of an essential difference in approach between Gomarus and himself. Arminius fully agrees with Gomarus that predestination touches the very core of the gospel, but if that is true then Jesus Christ and his mediatorial work must take a fundamental place in it as well.189 One logical argument that appears repeatedly is that things must be communicable before they are actually communicated. For that reason, the death and resurrection of Christ must in God’s foreknowledge precede the gifts that flow from his death and resurrection. Since it is predestination that distributes these gifts earned by Christ, predestination must follow them (in ————— Particula nos, nobis saepe utitur; at eo significat illos non qua homines sed qua fideles: eatenus enim in Christo sunt, et communionem habent cum Christo, quin et destinati ad communionem cum Christo.” 184 AC 565 (III 170): “Gratia autem quam Christus non impetravit Evangelica dici, mea sententia, non potest.” 185 Cf. EP 653 (III 296). God can love no sinner outside of Christ. John 3:16 thus does not speak to God’s electing love; faith intervenes between God’s love and eternal life. 186 EP 672–673 (III 326–327). 187 EP 641–642 (II 278–279). 188 ETG 4–5 (III 529). One of those in whose thought Christ has a fundamental place only in the context of the execution of the decree of election is Arminius’s teacher, Beza, cf. SINNEMA, “Beza’s View of Predestination”, 230.232. 189 Cf. ETG 136 (III 639): “et in Christo non praedestinati nisi peccatores, nisi fideles; illi enim soli Christo indigent, et hi soli in Christo sunt. Quare si nos probaverimus in Christo ipsum decretum praedestinationis fundatum esse, uno ictu totam hanc thesium compagem destruxerimus.”

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God’s foreknowledge). Arminius significantly adds: “What may be concluded herefrom I leave to the consideration of the intelligent.”190 Christ has earned the blessings, and He at the same time earned the right to be the Head and to have the authority to distribute the blessings. Through his work He received these blessings from the Father and inherited the titles of Head and King. He became the author of eternal salvation for all those who obey Him. Those who believe are predestined in Him to partake of these blessings through union (unio) with Him. God’s love in Christ (born, dead, raised and now established as Head) for those whom He destined to partake of eternal life is the causa of predestination.191 When Arminius writes these things, the distinctive element is clearly his dependence on arguments based on the doctrine of God and the natural order,192 just as in the epistolary exchange with Junius. One should note once more that Arminius shows himself capable of establishing his own doctrine of predestination – i.e. the decree to grant salvation in Christ to those who believe – without developing a particular view on the freedom of the will. Arminius’s view on justice is of such structurally-fundamental importance for his thought that his view on the freedom of the will flows from it as consequence, and only in that way comes to be an important and integrated part of his theology. Aside from other arguments that will be raised later on, this observation is an important ground for my hypothesis that it is not the freedom of the will, but rather God’s justice, that forms the source for Arminius’s theology. Before we go on to treat the object of predestination and the means of grace, we first need to lay out Arminius’s understanding of the sufficiency and efficiency of Christ’s sacrifice in relation to the distinction he draws between the procurement, exhibition and application of the atonement. As Mediator, Christ has procured (comparare) forgiveness and atonement for the whole world: the world is thus atoned for before God. Next this atonement, or rather the Mediator, is exhibited or offered (exhibere) to the world ————— 190 AAC 614 (III 240): “Praedestinatio enim non facit ut res illae sint communicabiles, sed reipsa illas communicat. Communicabiles factae sunt res illae per sanguinem et mortem resurrectionemque Christi, per quam nobis illa bona apud Patrem sunt acquisita et impetrata. Quumque prius sit aliquid communicabile quam actu communicetur, hinc sequitur praedestinationem morte et resurrectione Christi esse posteriorem in praescientia et praeordinatione Dei. Unde quid concludi possit intelligentibus dispiciendum relinquo.” 191 AAC 614 (III 241); cf. AAC 615–616 (III 242–243). 192 Cf. AAC 614 (III 241), where Arminius on the basis of the natural order of things presupposes that Christ was first made Head of those who would be saved, and that only thereafter specific people are determined in Christ to share in that salvation. In this context, Arminius is speaking about different decrees: “Ego naturae ordine praeire puto decretum quo Christus constitutus est caput salvandorum isto decreto quo aliqui in Christo ad salutis participationem sunt destinati.” Cf. 3.3.5 for Arminius’s four-decree structure.

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through the Word and Spirit so that it may then be applied (applicare). Between the procurement and application, there is the offer (exhibitio) of the Mediator through the Word and Spirit.193 The sufficiency of Christ’s sacrifice is of utmost importance for Arminius. Without sufficiency, no actual satisfaction is possible. A condition for sufficiency is that payment has really been made, for how can payment be sufficient if it is not actually a payment, if it has not been paid? It is precisely the efficacy of Christ’s death in the atonement that makes the payment sufficient.194 “Christ died ‘for all,’ and ‘for the life of the world,’ and that by the command and grace of God.” But the decree of predestination sets no bounds to the universality of the price paid for all by the death of Christ. For it is posterior to the death of Christ and its proper efficacy. For it relates to the application of the benefits obtained for us by the death of Christ: but death is the price by which those benefits were acquired. Wrongly, therefore, and in inverse order is it expressed, when Christ is said to have “died only for the elect and predestinated.” For predestination rests not merely on the death, but also on the merit of the death of Christ: and therefore Christ has not died for the predestinated, but those are predestinated for whom Christ has died, though not all. For the universality of the death of Christ extends more widely than the object of predestination. Whence also it is concluded that the death of Christ and its merits are antecedent by nature and order to predestination. And what else is predestination but the preparation of the grace gotten and obtained for us by the death of Christ? and the preparation belonging to the application, not to the acquisition itself of grace not yet existing. For the decree by which God determined to give Christ to the world as its Redeemer, and to appoint Him the Head of the faithful only, is prior to the decree by which He determined to apply the grace gotten by the death of Christ to some through faith by the act itself.195

————— 193 EP 670–671 (III 323–324). For the distinctions pertaining to the procurement, exhibition and application of atonement, cf. EP 735–737 (III 421–424). 194 EP 736 (III 422): “quum idcirco sufficiens sit pretium mors Christi pro mundi vita, qui efficax fuit ad peccatum abolendum et Deo satisfaciendum.” 195 EP 671–672 (III 324–325): “Decretum autem Praedestinationis nihil praescribit universalitati pretii per mortem Christi pro omnibus soluti. Est enim morte Christi eiusque propria efficacitate posterius. Nam pertinet ad applicationem beneficiorum morte Christi nobis partorum: at mors est pretium, quo ista beneficia sunt comparata. Perperam igitur dicitur et ordine inverso, cum Christus pro electis tantum ac praedestinatis mortuus dicitur. Praedestinatio enim non tantum morte, sed et merito mortis Christi innititur: et propterea non mortuus Christus pro praedestinatis, sed praedestinati, pro quibus Christus est mortuus, licet non omnes. Nam mortis Christi universalitas latius se extendit obiecto praedestinationis. Unde etiam concluditur, mortem Christi eiusque meritum praedestinationem natura et ordine antecedere. Et quid est Praedestinatio aliud, quam praeparatio gratiae nobis morte Christi parte et comparatae? et praeparatio ad applicationem pertinens, non ad ipsam gratiae nondum existentis acquisitionem. Decretum enim Dei quo statuit Christum dare mundo Redemptorem, eumque statuere caput fidelium tantum, prius est decreto, quo statuit gratiam morte Christi partam nonnullis actu ipso per fidem applicare.”

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Christ is the foundation of both the decree of election and the execution of that decree. He is the Mediator for the procurement of salvation and for its application. Election is thus “not only ‘through Him,’ but also ‘on account of Him,’ and ‘in Him.’”196 The reason is that God’s justice demands satisfaction for sins. This in turn explains why for Arminius everything comes down to this, that the acceptance into grace and love, the conferral of glory, and the preparation of the means necessary to salvation are all in Christ as the only foundation (unico fundamento).197 3.3.2 The Object of Predestination Christ can be Mediator only for those in whose place He went to the cross; Christ’s sacrifice, the procurement of atonement, must be distinguished from the result of that procurement, which is the actual atonement itself.198 The latter can be received only through faith and Christ’s Spirit. Through the procurement, however, it is possible (possit) for God – because his justice which has been satisfied does not prevent it – to forgive the sins of sinners and to grant them the gift of the Spirit. God was already inclined to that in his mercy, and out of that mercy He gave Christ as Redeemer. However, his justice prevented Him from forgiving merely out of mercy. In the meantime, what remains undiminished is God’s right to grant all the benefits earned by Christ that are to be distributed freely according to God’s mercy in Christ to those to whom it pleases Him to grant them, and according to whatever conditions it pleases Him to establish.199 ————— EP 657 (III 302–303): “per illum, sed et propter illum, et in illo.” EP 657–658 (III 303–304). Cf. AAC 612–613 (III 238–239): Christ is the foundation of the decree and of the execution of the decree. We have been taken up into Christ as Head. In the order of causes, He was first established and predestined (NB: the predestination of Christ!) to be our Head; after that we are predestined in Him as his members. This is the reverse of the order found in Beza. 198 EP 673–674 (III 327–328). 199 EP 675–676 (III 330–331): “propriam et immediatam mortis passionisque Christi effectionem, et videbimus ab illa hominum neminem excludi posse. Illa autem est, non actualis peccatorum ab his illis ablatio, non actualis peccatorum remissio, non iustificatio, non actualis horum et illorum redemptio, quae absque fide et Spiritu Christi nemini contingunt; sed reconsiliatio Dei, remissionis, iustificationis et redemptionis apud Deum impetratio: qua factum est ut Deus iam possit, utpote iustitia, cui satisfactum est, non obstante, hominibus peccatoribus peccata remittere et Spiritum gratiae largiri: ad quae effecta cum peccatoribus communicanda propendebat quidem iam ante ex misericordia; Ex illa enim Christum dedit mundo Salvatorem, at per iustitiam ab illorum actuali productione impediebatur. Interea Deo ius suum integrum manet illa bona (quae ipsius sunt ex natura, quorum communicationem peccatoribus hominibus disiderabat ex misericordia, a obstante iustitia, actu instituere non poterat, et quae iam iustitia ipsius sanguine ac morte Christi pacata actu potest largiri) iis quibus visum, et istis conditionibus quas praescribere volet, impartiri.” 196 197

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Christ by his satisfaction has obtained eternal redemption and the right of remission of sins; but sin is not remitted except to those who actually believe upon Christ.200

The relationship between the fundamental place of Christ and the object of predestination, the election of believers to salvation and the reprobation of those who persist in their unbelief, becomes clearly visible in this way. Arminius emphasizes that faith is the decisive factor for entering the rest God has prepared in his Son out of his love for sinners.201 Not only the cross, but also the faith of the cross, is necessary for salvation, because God determined in his decree that faith in Christ be necessary.202 Also the promise God made to Christ in the pactum makes faith necessary. “Christ therefore by the decree, the promise and the covenant of the Father, has been constituted [constitutus] Saviour of all that believe on Him.”203 According to Arminius, the doctrine of the gospel is the gate of heaven, opened wide: it will allow those who believe to pass through easily (facile admittet credentes).204 God cannot acknowledge and love any sinners as his own unless He first knows them as believers in Christ.205 And because no one is in Christ except in faith, it follows that “God acknowledges for His own, and loves to eternal life, no sinner, except as He regards him as a believer in Christ, and by faith made one with Him.”206 Arminius continually occupied himself with the question of the object of predestination. This is to be explained from the close connection this issue has with God’s justice. An improper view on the object of predestination implies a direct assault on God’s justice. Over the years, Arminius raised many arguments against the supposition that the object of predestination is a creatable, created or fallen person, and in favor of his own view that the object can only be a believing sinner (election) and an unrepentant unbeliever (reprobation). In what follows, a number of Arminius’s statements will be examined. Further, attention will be given to the relationship be————— 200 EP 737 (III 424): “Nactus quidem est Christus satisfactione aeternam redemptionem et ius peccatorum remittendorum, sed non remittitur peccatum nisi actu credentibus in Christum.” 201 OR 17–19 (I 418–421). 202 Cf. also EP 749 (III 441): “Deus fecit decretum de eligendis fidelibus solis et condemnandis infidelibus. [...] statuit particularem electionem fidelium, et particularem reprobationem infidelium.” 203 OR 38–39) (I 343): “Constitutus est ergo Christus decreto, promisso, et pacto Patris, Salvator omnium in ipsum credentium.” 204 OR 55 (I 372). 205 EP 652–653 (III 296): “Deum neminem ex peccatoribus pro suo praediligere et amare posse, nisi eum in Christum crediturum praenoverit, atque ut credentem in Christum intuitus fuerit.” Cf. EP 653 (III 296): “Deinde neminem in Christo et propter Christum agnoscit Deus pro suo, nisi ille idem sit in Christo.” 206 EP 653 (III 297).

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tween election and reprobation, the two constituent parts of predestination, in relation to the distinction within the object of predestination. In his exegesis of Romans 9, Arminius lays down the foundation for his view on predestination in a way that will remain consistent throughout the years that follow. An important point of departure for his exegesis of Romans 9 is that the chapters 9–11, which since Augustine have traditionally been held as the loca probantia of (double) predestination, are to be viewed from the perspective of Paul’s letter to the Romans as a whole. This is the contrast between Paul’s preaching of justification by faith in Christ, and those who seek to be justified through works of the law. Arminius considers Jacob the type of the first, and Esau the type of the second group. It is not a coincidence that Arminius’s exegesis, which he first sent in a letter to Gellius Snecanus, was published posthumously as an appendix to his Examen Perkinsiani. For in this latter work, precisely the same view on Romans 9 can be found. The children of the promise are those who are justified through faith in Christ; the children of the flesh are those who seek to be justified through works of the law.207 Here Arminius saw the real predestination expressed: God has decided that those who believe in Christ are to be justified, and that those who seek justification through works of the law are to be condemned because they are not in Christ. On this ground, Eef Dekker has characterized Arminius’s doctrine of predestination as “predestination by property” (eigenschappen-predestinatie); God does not predestine individuals, but people with the propertye of either “faith” or “unbelief”.208 This is an appropriate characterization, although one must remember that this predestination is for Arminius only one part of predestination. The entire decree of predestination consists, apart from the “predestination by property,” also in the decisions concerning the sending of Christ as Mediator, the distribution of the means of grace and a decree to save or condemn individuals on the basis of God’s foreknowledge. Only the so-called “second decree” in Arminius’s doctrine of predestination as laid out in the Declaration (see 3.3.5) can thus be characterized as “predestination by property.”209 When the context of the “predestination by property” is not taken into account, this characterization can soon lead to misunderstandings.210 Clarke rejects the term “predestination by property” and characterizes Arminius’s doctrine of predestination as “covenantpredestination.”211 ————— EP 652 (III 295). Cf. SELDERHUIS, Handboek Nederlandse Kerkgeschiedenis, 416. DEKKER, Rijker dan Midas, 182–185.215.227. 209 DEKKER, Rijker dan Midas, 227, himself makes this identification: “In het tweede besluit herkennen we de eigenschappen-predestinatie”. 210 Cf. GRAAFLAND, Verbond, 187: “kwalitatieve verkiezingsleer”. 211 CLARKE, Ground, 91. 207 208

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In his epistolary exchange with Junius, Arminius calls predestination that part of providence which pertains to the government (administratio and gubernatio) of the human race. On this basis he concludes that just as providence is subordinate to creation, so predestination as pars providentiae in terms of order comes after the act of creation or the decision to create, so that the object of predestination cannot be the uncreated person.212 As far as Arminius is concerned, there are no distinctions that can avoid making God the author of Adam’s fall into sin when predestination and reprobation pertain to people before the fall (cf. 3.2).213 The decree to punish those who do not persist in their original state is not established until after God foresaw future sin. Arminius writes that this must be added because some of “our doctors” teach that sin follows necessarily from the decree of reprobation.214 Arminius defines predestination215 as “the preordination to life eternal of those sinners who shall believe in Christ, and, on the other hand, the precondemnation to eternal death of those sinners who shall persevere in their sins.” Faith comes from the merciful work of God, and hardening in sin comes from one’s own evil nature and from God’s just abandonment.216 This predestination is the foundation of the Christian faith, of salvation and of the certainty of salvation; it is the materia Evangelii, the Summa Apostolicae doctrinae.217 Arminius emphasizes once more that we are here dealing with a praeordinatio or pre-ordaining. Ordinatio is not a decision that something happen, but rather an ordering of what has happened. Such an ordering or regulating of events does not impose any kind of necessity on these events.218 The causa of predestination is God’s love in Christ.219 Predestination includes the means whereby those who have been predestined will certainly and infallibly come to salvation. These means are the forgiveness of sins, and the renewal and continuous support of the Holy Spirit to the very end. Reprobation, on the other hand, includes the with————— 212 AC 507 (III 87): “Praedestinatio est pars providentiae administrantis et gubernantis humanum genus; ergo posterior natura actu creationis, vel proposito creandi.” 213 AC 478 (III 44–45). 214 AAC 618 (III 246–247). 215 Arminius calls the doctrine of predestination “very difficult” (sane difficilis), especially because people attribute to the Scriptures what they themselves have thought up. EP 638 (III 273). 216 EP 639–640 (III 276): “qua illa est peccatorum in Christo crediturorum ad vitam aeternam praeordinatio, et contra peccatorum in peccatis perseveraturorum ad aeternam mortem praedamnatio. Crediturorum inquam, ex dono Dei gratioso, et in peccatis perseveraturorum ex propria malitia et iusta desertatione Dei.” See also HaC 943 (II 699). 217 AN 957 (II 719). 218 EP 635 (III 268); EP 640 (III 276). Cf. EP 698 (III 364): “Ordinavit tamen Deus Adami lapsum, non ut existeret, sed existentem, ut serviret illustrationi iustitiae et misericordiae suae.” 219 ACC 614 (III 241).

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holding of these means.220 Arminius makes it clear that only sinners need and can receive these means. This has consequences for the object of election and reprobation. It is important to remember that neither predestination (or election) nor reprobation are absolute in Arminius’s thought. Predestination concerns God’s decision to save those who believe in Christ; those who believe in Christ therefore receive the aforementioned means. Reprobation concerns God’s decision to condemn the sinners who persist in unbelief; from them God withholds forgiveness and the Spirit. The Spirit is the Spirit of Christ, the Mediator and Head. He is the “bond of our union” (vinculum unionis) with Christ through whom there is communion with Christ and through whom the benefits of Christ are received.221 Arminius defines election as “the decree of God by which He from eternity has determined to justify believers in Christ, and to receive them to life eternal, to the praise of His glorious grace.”222 Arminius denied that in this way faith is an act of the human free will and no longer a gift of God’s grace. The definition of predestination does not deal with the question of the cause of faith. For that reason, Arminius suggests one thing may be added to the definition: believers, namely those to whom God has decided to grant faith. There are therefore two decisions: 1. the decision whereby God decided to justify believers and accept them as his children. 2. the decision whereby He decided to give faith to some, and to withhold it from others. They are two sententiae, two certain divinely-ordained decrees. They have different objects to which different attributes must be ascribed as well. All of this must be kept in mind if one wants to represent the order and modus of predestination correctly (recte).223 When Arminius deals with the order of election and faith, he admits that faith is not an effect of election, but a necessary condition foreseen by God in those who will be elected. Arminius reproaches his opponents for representing his notion of conditionality in a hateful (odiosus) way. They do this by passing in silence over on the role of God, from whose goodness and ————— EP 641 (III 278). OR 47 (I 358). 222 EP 651 (III 293–294). 223 EP 651 (III 293–294): “Electio est decretum Dei, quo apud se ab aeterno statuit fideles in Christo iustificare, et ad vitam aeternam acceptare, ad laudem gloriosae gratiae suae. At inquies, Ergo fides ponitur esse humani arbitrii, et non donum gratiae divinae. Nego sequi. Neque enim hoc dictum fuit in definitione. At non expressa fuit fidei causa, fateor; sed necesse non fuit. Verbo addi poterit si quis volet, fideles, quos fide donare decrevit. Sed vide mihi, an unum sit, nostro considerationis modo decretum, tum quo statuit Deus fideles iustificare et in filios adoptare, tum quo decrevit nonnullis fidem dare, aliis vero eandem negare. Hoc mihi verisimile non sit. Sunt enim duae sententiae et certo Dei decreto determinatae; sunt etiam discrepantia subiecta, et divers iisdem attributa adsignantur. Hoc ego existimo animadvertendum fuisse ad ordinem et modum praedestinationis recte tradendum.” See also EP 749 (III 442). 220 221

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gift also Arminius admits that faith derives.224 Faith is indeed a condition, but it is an evangelical condition; that is, God in his grace ensures that this condition is fulfilled.225 When faith is said to be foreseen in those who will be saved, the causes that are absolutely necessary for faith are not excluded but included. The principal causes of faith are prevenient, accompanying and subsequent grace.226 Voluntary acceptance does not make a gift unworthy of the name “gift”. Thus faith is the effect of God who enlightens the mind and seals the heart, and is his pure gift. The means that are necessary to be able to believe, and to which people are elected, are the hearing of the Word of God and the partaking in the Holy Spirit.227 Faith as Requirement (Only) In the New Covenant and After the Fall Faith is not required as such, but became necessary only after God changed the condition for eternal bliss from obedience to the law to faith in Christ.228 After nothing came of the Legal theology because of the fall, God chose to establish a new covenant with the human race in Adam. On different occasions Arminius pointed out that God excluded no one from this new covenant. The difference in God’s love for one person over against another is not so great that He should decide to deal with some only according to the strict demands of the law, but with others according to his mercy and grace in Christ offered in the gospel.229 This observation is important for determining the consequences of original sin (peccatum originale): does original sin as such make people guilty and liable to eternal death? Arminius responds to this question with a question of his own: if some sinners are condemned only because of Adam’s sin, and others because they reject the Gospel, would this not mean that there are two peremptory decrees of condemnation, and two judgments – one according to the law, another according to the gospel? Arminius further remarks that it is not original sin that makes a person guilty, for original sin ————— A31A 138 (I 745). A31A 139 (I 748). 226 A31A 139 (I 749): “Quum itaque fides a Deo praevisa dicitur in salvandis, non tolluntur, sed potius ponontur illae causae, sine quarum interventu fides non esset; inter quas primariam statuo Dei gratiam praevenientem, concomitantem, et subsequentem”. 227 RQ9 185 (II 67). 228 EP 670 (III 323). In a letter to Wtenbogaert, undated [1599], Ep.Ecc. 45 (II 736), Arminius calls this the law of faith: “Jam vero duplex est lex Dei, una operum, altera fidei.” 229 EP 675 (III 330): “Scio quidem filanqrwpi,an istam Dei non esse omnimodo aequalem erga omnes et singulos homines, sed et nego tantum esse discrimen istius erga homines amoris divini, ut cum hisce non nisi secundum legis rigorem suae agere instituerit, cum aliis vero secundum misericordiam suam et gratiam in Christo Evangelio ipsius explicatam.” Cf. EP 689 (III 351). 224 225

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is in itself already a punishment for Adam’s sin. One rather becomes liable to judgment by sharing in Adam’s sin through one’s connection to him.230 Before the fall into sin, Adam was not able to believe in Christ because such a faith was not required at that time. This implies that also after the fall, God could not require this faith from Adam. That is, He at least could not require it without being ready to grant Adam the aid of grace that was necessary and sufficient for faith in Christ, “and therefore to bestow faith itself in Christ.”231 Elsewhere Arminius remarks very forcefully that God “cannot by any right” (non posse ullo iure) require faith in Christ of a fallen human being if that person is of himself or herself unable to have that faith, unless He is also ready to grant sufficient grace for a person to believe if willing, and unless Christ has died for him or her.232 Arminius further finds it absurd to suppose that Adam already had the capacity to believe in Christ before the fall, on the basis of which God could require that faith after the fall. He gives the following arguments to establish this point: 1. Faith in Christ before the fall would be frustranea, since there was no necessity or purpose for it. 2. Before the fall God could not require faith in Christ because faith in Christ is faith in Him as Savior from sin. Therefore, one who believes in Christ must first believe that he is a sinner. 3. Faith in Christ belongs to the new creatio through Christ as Mediator between the sinner and God, and thus not to the first creatio. 4. Faith in Christ is required by the gospel. In the Scriptures, law and gospel are depicted as opposites. No one can be saved through both at one and the same time.233 Arminius concludes that if the human race had had the ability to believe in Christ in the primaevo statu at a time when this faith in Christ was not necessary, and if that ability was then taken away after the fall at the precise moment when it began to be necessary, then if God did indeed make such a decision it would be miram, completely in conflict with his wisdom and goodness whose task it is to provide what is necessary for those who live under the care and administration of these attributes.234 Arminius’s heatedness on this point, as well as the strong expressions he employs (Dico itaque, affirmo et assevero, profiteor et doceo), make it clear that he is here dealing with a topic that is close to his heart. A number of important elements in his theology are therefore treated in this context: the difference between the Legal and Evangelical theology; the substantially different way in which God communes with humanity after the fall, that is, ————— 230 231 232 233 234

RQ9 184 (II 65). A31A 161 (II 23). RQ9 185 (II 66); AN 959–960 (II 721.723). A31A 161–162 (II 23–24). Cf. PrD XLIV (II 401). A31A 162 (II 25).

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in Christ; God’s right to demand, or not, certain things from humanity; and the related distinction between sufficient and necessary means to faith. We have already encountered all of these elements before, and have seen that they are consistently linked to Arminius’s view of God’s justice. This emphasizes once more that God’s justice is the constant determining motif in and behind Arminius’s arguments. Two further examples can be mentioned in support of this fact. In his reaction to Perkins’s defense against the accusation that he teaches that the greater majority of the human race is excluded from Christ and all saving grace, Arminius clearly shows that he considers this accusation warranted because of Perkins’s view on the eternal and unchangeable decree of election and reprobation. If Perkins were consistent, he would have to admit that he teaches that God sent Christ as Mediator only for the elect, that Christ assumed human nature and died only for them, made atonement only for them, has earned the Spirit and salvation only for them, has offered grace only to them, has called only them to faith, and has given faith through the internal call only to them. According to Arminius, Perkins would further have to admit that the reprobate are excluded from all of these things and that there is no hope whatsoever for them. Before Arminius poses critical questions of his own in response, he posits that God could have condemned the entire human race without being unjust. However, this is not the real question. The real issue is whether God, once He decided to send his Son as man to die for sin, willed that He take on human nature for a limited number of people and suffer death for a few although that payment could have been sufficient for the sins of all. To put it another way, did God decide within Himself to deal with the greatest part of the human race according to the strictness of his justice, according to the norm of the law and the condition it requires, while He wills to deal with a few according to his mercy and grace, according to the gospel and the righteousness of faith, and the conditions of the gospel? Further, did God decide to impute Adam’s sin to some personally, without the hope of forgiveness? According to Arminius, this is the center of the issue.235 In a letter to Wtenbogaert on the Responsio ad Quaestiones Novem, Arminius remarks that it would involve many absurdities to suggest that God deals with some according to the law, and with others according to the gospel. One of these absurdities is that God would then be more strict towards a number of people than towards the angels, although the latter ————— 235 EP 735 (III 420–421): “hoc est, an Deus apud se statuerit, cum maxima parte hominum agere secundum iustitiae suae rigorem, secundum normam legis et conditionem in lege requisitam, cum paucis vero secundum misericordiam et gratiam suam, secundum Evangelium et iustitiam fidei, conditionemque in Evangelio propositam: an statuerit paucis aliquibus, peccatum quod in sua persona in Adamo perpetrarant, imputare citra ullam remissionis spem.”

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sinned more grievously. After all, the angels all sinned for themselves, and were not persuaded to sin.236 The position outlined in the above paragraphs has important consequences. It implies, for example, that Christ procured atonement for all people, for without that atonement, without the satisfaction of God’s justice, God cannot show grace to a sinner, nor demand of a sinner that he believe in Christ, nor offer that atonement. God does not dissimulate, which would indeed be the case if He were to demand of the reprobate that they believe in Christ while Christ has not been given to them as Savior. The reprobate cannot be called disobedient if God demands faith only from the elect.237 It also means that it is not someone’s sin that excludes him from salvation, but only his not being united to Christ in faith, his not being “in Christ” but “estranged from Christ”. The gospel is for all, is offered to all in whatever form or manner. A serious and well-meant offer of the gospel implies that God also grants in sufficient measure all those things necessary to accept the offer.238 That people are still lost does not, therefore, depend on God and his grace, but on the people themselves who despise and reject this grace. This rejection is purely out of their free choice, an incomprehensible choice against God’s grace in spite of everything that God has done through his Spirit and Word to bring that person to faith and repentance.239 Arminius’s argument based on the difference between the situation in the Legal and Evangelical theologies returns when Perkins adds that the inability to accept God’s promises is voluntary and inherited, and thus cannot be excused. According to Arminius, Perkins here confuses the inability to follow the law of Adam for the inability to accept the gospel offered in the Word. Before this last promise of God, no act was performed by humankind through which an inability to accept this promise is engendered. The rejection of the promise of the Gospel cannot be imputed as guilt if at the moment when the promise was made one was unable to accept that promise to begin with.240 ————— 236 Letter to Wtenbogaert, Jan. 31, 1605, Ep.Ecc. 81 (II 69); Verklaring, 93 (I 637). Cf. ETG 101–102.132–133 (III 611.636–137). 237 EP 663–664 (III 313); ETG 101–102.142 (III 611.644). 238 Cf. AN 959 (II 721). 239 Cf. A31A 145–146 (I 763–765). 240 EP 746 (III 437): “Erras Perkinse, et confundis impotentiam praestandi legem ab Adamo in nos propagatam, cum impotentia credendi in Christum et accipiendi gratiam Evangelicam nobis verbo ablatam.” Cf. EP 772–773 (III 476–478): “Videtur ergo concludendum quod Deus fructus postulare non possit ab iis, quibus ipse, licet ipsorum merito, ademit vires, necessarias ad fructus proferendos. Persistamus in arboris similitudine. Arbor quae fructum non fert meretur excidium: at ubi isto supplicio affecta est, nemo ullo iure ab illa fructum postulare potest.” Cf. EP 747 (III 439) for Arminius’s distinction between the unworthiness of the human race on account of the first sin, and unworthiness through rejection of the grace offered.

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Sin and Condemnation There is a necessary relation between sin and God’s preterition and condemnation of the sinner. The natural result of sin is therefore that all sinners are passed over and condemned. But because in some sinners the efficacy of the natural sin (i.e. condemnation) is obstructed by the power of a superior cause (i.e. God’s will), those sinners to whom God does not will to grant his grace (misereri noluit) are passed over and condemned, while those to whom God decided to grant his grace (statuit misereri) are not passed over or condemned.241 By sinning freely, man made himself a slave to sin (peccato mancipium fecisse), as result of which he is necessarily subjected to the power of sin until freed through Christ the Mediator.242 The Relationship Between Election and Reprobation The way in which Arminius goes on to outline the relationship between election and reprobation deserves careful attention. In one way, election and reprobation or preterition have a fully symmetrical relationship inasmuch as they are the two sides of predestination. In his correspondence with Junius, Arminius speaks of predestination or election “which must be opposed to that [i.e. preterition – wdb] at the same moment, (for neither is without the other, and they are spoken of in opposition).”243 The two sides of predestination thus cannot be separated. If the one is posited, the other must be posited as well. Election includes reprobation; the latter is related to the first as a necessary consequence (electio, quae includit reprobationem tanquam necessaria consequentia et copula iunctam). Election and reprobation are juxtaposed as affirmative et negative. An act (actus) ascribed to the one must be ascribed to the other in its opposite form.244 However, for Arminius this symmetrical relationship of election and reprobation is completely logical in nature. If a certain part of a group is chosen, it implies that the other part of that group is not chosen. Because election is a kind of choice, election implies non-election or reprobation. ————— 241 AC 601 (III 222): “Atque hac ratione peccatum praecedit tum praeteritionem tum praedamnationem, et si efficientia eius naturalis consideretur, omnes peccatores erunt praeteriti et damnati, non aliqui tantum: Verum quia efficientia peccati naturalis vi causae superioris, quae est voluntas Dei, impeditur in nonnullis: hinc sit, quod illi peccatores sunt praeteriti et damnati, quorum Deus misereri noluit, illi non praeteriti neque praedamnati, quorum Deus statuit misereri.” 242 AC 601 (III 223): “Et quis ignorat hominem quia libere peccavit, se peccato mancipium fecisse, et propterea peccato necessario subiacere, usque dum liberatio fiat per Mediatorem Christum?” 243 AC 571 (III 178–179); ETG 98–99 (III 608). 244 EP 650 (III 292). See also EP 679 (III 337): “Nulla enim Electio citra reprobationem”; EP 682–683 (III 341).

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For Arminius, the foundation of the relationship of opposition between election and reprobation is God’s justice and equity. God’s justice determines that He gives life to those who obey his will, and death only to those who are disobedient.245 However, the symmetry between election and reprobation disappears when it comes to the ratio that governs them. For example, when Arminius explains that God’s consequent will with respect to hardening in sin, blinding and a refusal of grace depends on God’s foreknowledge of unbelief, disobedience and obstinacy, he immediately adds that it does not follow from there that God decided to give faith to those who He foresaw would be obedient. For far different [longe dispar] is the ratio of the acts of the Divine mercy and justice. For the latter have their cause [causa] from men; the former have their occasion [occasio], indeed, from men, but their cause [causa] from God alone.246

Elsewhere Arminius deals with the question whether people do not in fact elect or reprobate themselves if they have the freedom to accept or reject the grace offered to them by God. Arminius responds that this is true in one sense. By accepting the offered grace with the help of common grace, a person can make himself worthy of election. However, another person becomes worthy of reprobation by rejecting that same grace. On the other hand, it may not on this ground be concluded that election and reprobation are to be attributed to human beings. Election and reprobation are to be ascribed to God who judges and rewards one’s worth or unworthiness. Also here Arminius makes a distinction between election and reprobation. When it comes to reprobation, the people themselves are completely (omnino) the meritorious cause of their condemnation, and therefore of their reprobation (reprobatio est voluntas damnandi). The human being him- or herself is the figulus, the potter, of his or her own condemnation; the ratio of that condemnation is demerit (although God could forgive this demerit should He will to). The ratio of election, however, is mere gratuita. It is not just un-

————— 245 ETG 58–59 (III 574): “et omnino necesse sit ex rei ipsius natura, oppositos esse praedestinationis divinae actus, unum ad vitam, alterum ad mortem, recte distribuitur praedestinatio in illam quae ad vitam est, et in illam quae ad mortem est. […] At hujus oppositionis et distributionis fundamentum est justitia et aequitas Dei, secundum quam vitam non dat nisi obedientibus voluntati ipsius, mortem non infert nisi immorigeris: alioquin quum sit bonus et summum bonum, et amans creaturarum citra discrimen, omnibus universe bonum illud quod est vita aeterna communicaret, et sic nulla esset ad mortem praeordinatio.” 246 EP 662–663 (III 312–313). “Neque inde sequitur Deum decrevisse fidem dare iis quos praevidit obedituros. Longe enim dispar est ratio actuum misericordiae et iustitiae divinae. Hi enim causam habent ad hominibus, illi occasionem quidam ab hominibus habent, causam vero a solo Deo.” Cf. ETG 152 (III 652).

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merited, but in fact goes against what people merit (etiam contra demeritum)!247 When Arminius produces different arguments in his treatment of Perkins’s definition of reprobation in order to prove that the object of reprobation – “certain people who are passed over” – is not sufficiently qualified because as he sees it they are not sinners, he adds the following: But when I put sin as the meritorious cause of reprobation, do not suppose that on the other hand I put justice as the meritorious cause of election. For sin is the meritorious cause of the reprobation of all sinners universally: and election is not only from grace not due, which man did not deserve, but also from grace taking away his sinful demerit.248

Perkins rejects the view of those who teach that election takes place on the basis of God’s foreknowledge of faith, and reprobation on the basis of foreknowledge of unbelief or rejection of the gospel. Arminius reacts to these two positions with two additions which clearly evidence the different way in which he approaches faith and election on the one hand, and unbelief and reprobation on the other. He further qualifies the faith of which Perkins speaks by adding that “God has out of grace decreed to bestow [it] upon the same by the ordinary means ordained by Himself”.249 Unbelief, on the other hand, is further qualified with the phrase “the whole fault of which rests with the reprobate themselves.”250 A similar distinction between election and reprobation becomes visible when Arminius remarks that grace does not work irresistibly, but that condemnation much less (multo minus) comes from an irresistible necessity imposed by God.251 After laying out his four-decree structure in the Declaration, Arminius concludes: ————— 247 EP 751 (III 444–445): “Etiamsi homo gratiae communis ope gratiam oblatam acceptando, se dignum electione faceret, et alius eandem repudiando reprobatione dignum se praestaret: non tamen ex eo sequeretur, electionem et reprobationem esse hominis, sed Dei dignitatem et indignitatem iudicantis et remunerantis. Et de reprobatio omnino verum est, hominem sibi esse causam meritoriam damnationis, et propterea reprobationis, quae est voluntas damnandi. Quare etiam figulus potest dici suae damnationis, ratione istius meriti: licet Deus si vellet meritum hoc illi condonare posset. At electionis alia est ratio: illa enim est mere gratuita, non tantum non ex merito, verum etiam contra demeritum hominis.” 248 EP 681 (III 339): “Quum autem peccatum pono meritoriam causam reprobationis, ne existimato me iustitiam contra ponere causam meritoriam Electionis. Est enim peccatum causa meritoria reprobationis omnium inuniversum peccatorum. Et Electio est non tantum ex gratia indebita, quam homo non promeruit, sed etiam ex gratia pravum demeritum tollente.” 249 EP 749 (III 441): “Electionem ad salutem esse secundum praescientiam futurae fidei, quam Deus ordinariis mediis ab ipso ordinatis conferre iisdem ex gratia decrevit.” 250 EP 749 (III 441): “Reprobationem vero secundum praescientiam infidelitatis, sive contemptus Evangelii, cuius culpa tota residet in ipsis reprobis.” See also ETG 50 (III 567): “at fidelem futurum ex gratia Dei, infidelem propria sua culpa et vitio.” 251 EP 750 (III 443); cf. 5.1.2.

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It conduces most conspicuously to declare the glory of God, – his justice and mercy. It also represents God as the cause of all good and of our salvation, and man as the cause of sin and of his own damnation.252

God’s Antecedent and Consequent Will For the structure of Arminius’s view on the order of God’s decrees, it is important to recall his distinction between God’s antecedent and consequent will (see 3.1.2). The importance of this distinction for his view of predestination is the division of God’s decrees of predestination into antecedent and consequent decrees. The following example will show how important this was in the dispute between Arminius and his opponents. That God does not make any promises to the reprobate is apparent, according to some, from two things: 1. From the fact that God in his decree of reprobation decided not to give the promise. 2. From the fact that God never fails as to his end. From God’s procurement of the “removal of innocence,” it can therefore be concluded that this was the intention of God who “yet is never frustrated in His end” (qui tamen fine suo nunquam frustratur). Arminius recognizes the significance of these objections. If these two are taken away, the whole issue will become a whole lot clearer. Arminius remarks that he will abandon himself to the help of the Holy Spirit, and adds that he is the type of person who is willing to be corrected and earnestly seeks the truth. He then writes the following as argument: It is false to say that God, through the outward preaching, calls to faith and repentance some to whom He has decided not to give faith and repentance according to an immutable decree. It reverses the order of God’s decisions and acts. The one is a decision of God’s antecedent will, the other (the decree to blind, to harden, to withhold grace) is from God’s consequent will. The foundation of God’s consequent will is his foreknowledge of unbelief, disobedience and obstinacy.253 3.3.3 Perseverance and the Means God Gives for It254 God distributes the means necessary for faith and salvation according to an eternal decree. The distribution is effected in a way God knows to agree with his justice, that is, with his mercy and severity. However, Arminius believes that one need know nothing further about this decree, except that ————— 252 253 254

Verklaring, 109 (I 655). EP 662–663 (III 311–312). Cf. 5.1.2, 5.1.3 and 5.2.3.

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faith is a pure gift of God’s gracious mercy. But unbelief must be attributed partly to human guilt and wickedness, and partly to God’s just vengeance according to which He abandons, blinds and hardens sinners.255 It is in his exegesis of Romans 7 that Arminius explains at length the way in which God brings people to faith. The sermons Arminius preached on Romans 7 in 1591 led to complaints and suspicions that were directed against him, for he here abandoned the traditional interpretation which, in line with Augustine’s anti-Pelagian exegesis, holds that this passage refers to a regenerated person. The Examen Perkinsiani256 and the Apology,257 among others, prove that Arminius never changed his mind on this point. Arminius suggests that the inner struggle Paul describes in Romans 7 is not one of a person in a state after conversion, but of someone who is in the process of being converted. For him, before the work of the Holy Spirit – i.e. regeneration in all its constituent parts258 – is completed, a number of things necessarily occur.259 Arminius thus divides the unregenerate into two categories: 1. those who are without any knowledge of the law, and consciously sin without any twinge from the conscience, without any desire for salvation. 2. those who are in the very process of being regenerated.260 ————— 255 HaC 943 (II 699): “Concedo esse aliquod decretum Dei aeternum, secundum quod media ad fidem et salutem necessaria administrat; idque prout novit iustitiam, hoc est misericordiam et severitatem suam decere; sed de eo nihil amplius scire necessarium arbitror, quam fidem esse purum putum donum gratiosae misericordiae Dei; incredulitatem vero partim culpae et malitiae hominum, partim iustiae Dei vindictae peccatores deserentes, excoecantes, obdureantes esse tribuendam.” AN 957 (II 719). 256 EP 765 (III 466). 257 A31A 157 (II 17). The word irregenitorum can be understood in two ways: 1. those who do not have anything of the Spirit that pertains to regeneration, not even the first principle; 2. those who are being regenerated (renascuntur; those who are in the very process of regeneration) and who feel the actus of the Spirit that belong to the preparation or essence of regeneration, but have not yet been regenerated (regeniti sunt). They have been led (adducti) to the recognition of sin, lament over it, long to be freed from sin, etc., but are not yet equipped with the power of the Spirit (mortificatio and vivificatio). 258 DR7 827 (II 494): “ab eadem perfecta (quod ad partes illius essentiales, licet non quoad quantitatem et gradum)”. Strictly speaking, for Arminius also true and living faith in Christ precedes regeneration. Faith unites with Christ, and that unification results in mortificatio and vivificatio. Cf. DR7 830 (II 498). 259 DR7 824 (II 489): “quae regenerationi necessario praecedanea sunt”. The issue here is the distinction between regeneratio (the work of the Holy Spirit) and regenitus (the accomplished work). Cf. DR7 827 (II 494). 260 DR7 829–830 (II 497–498): “Iam vero irregenitus est, non tantum qui prorsus caecus est, voluntatem Dei non noscens, sciens et volens citra ullum conscientiae morsum peccatis se contaminans, nullo sensu irae Dei affectus, nullo terrore poenae compunctus, nullo onere peccati pressus, nullo desiderio liberationis incensus: sed etiam qui voluntatem Domini novit, sed non facit, viam iustitiae agnovit sed ab ea regreditur, opus legis in suo corde scriptum habet, cogitationes habet sese mutuo accusantes et excusantes, qui sermonem Evangelio cum gaudio exciptit, ad tempus in eius luce exultat, ad baptismum venit, sed id ipsum verbum corde bono aut non exciptit, aut saltem fructum non profert: qui peccati sensu adficitur, qui onere peccati premitur, tristitia

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Through the preaching of the law, the Spirit wants to convince people of the goodness of the law. When this is accomplished, that person comes to be under the law, and this begins the process of regeneration.261 Intellect and conscience are now led by the law.262 People no longer sin without feeling something in their conscience, and without experiencing any resistance from the will.263 However, these people also discover that righteousness cannot be attained through the law and that the law is in itself powerless, so that they are forced to seek refuge in Christ and in grace.264 The powerlessness of the law, which is in itself holy, good and life-giving, is a result from the power of indwelling sin.265 It has subjected the will (voluntas) to itself.266 There is a will (velle, velleitas) to do otherwise,267 for the mind (mens) is convinced by the law. However, as long as it remains under the law, the mind is volens nolens compelled (compellere) to satisfy the desires of sin.268 In this state of being under the law, the person is in such a way enslaved to ————— secundum Deum afficitur, per legem iustitiam acquiri non posse novit, ideoque ad Christum confugere compellitur.” Cf. DR7 835–836 (II 508): “Unde homo sub lege existens ad gratiam confugere compellitur, ut eius beneficio et auxilio a pravi et noxii istius domini tyrannide liberari possit.” Within the status irregenerationis, Arminius distinguishes duplicem alium statum: these are ante legem vel sine lege, et sub lege. DR7 846 (II 525–526). 261 The number of ways in which the law is at work determines the degree and order (gradus et ordines) in which one is under the law. DR7 827 (II 493). Consent to the law is the first effect of the work of the law: “Nisi enim homo sub lege consensum praebeat Legi quod bona sit, sub lege omnino non est: id enim est primum legis effectum in illis quos sibi subiiciet, ut de sui aequitate et iustitia illos convincat, et quo facto necessario existit consensus iste.” DR7 843 (II 521). Other ways in which the law works are the following: “Est enim Legis effectum hominem de iustitia Dei convictum peccati convincere, ad obedientiam urgere, propriae infirmitatis convincere, liberationis desiderio incendere, ad liberationem quaerendam compellere”. DR7 843 (II 520). Arminius remarks that consent to the law is not a work of the flesh, and does not come from the depraved nature. DR7 845 (II 524). 262 DR7 827 (II 494): “ut sub lege sit qui legis ductu”. 263 DR7 846 (II 526): “iam vero sub lege constitutus patrat quidem peccatum, sed contrae conscientiam et renitente voluntate.” Nevertheless, no one sins without the assent of the will: “Voluntas enim cogi non potest.” DR7 856 (II 544). Cf. DR7 900 (621), where the resistance and the assent of the will are mentioned. Assent is necessary for sin to be reckoned as sin, cf. DR7 932 (II 678): “quod si voluntarium non est, peccatum esse desinit.” 264 These preparatory stages are necessary but not saving, and are the work of grace and the Holy Spirit. DR7 854–855 (II 541–542). Arminius writes that the effect of the law normally is that a person is led (transferendo et traducendo) to the grace of Christ. DR7 880 (II 587). Arminius here appeals to Augustine who speaks of the desire for grace and of the will to regeneration: “desiderare auxilium gratiae initium gratiae est.” “ex dolore correptionis voluntas regenerationis oriatur.” DR7 882 (II 589). 265 DR7 835 (II 507): “Sed peccatum ita est potens in hominbus sub lege existentibus, ut ipsa lege abutatur ad illos effectus in homine sibi subdito producendos”. 266 DR7 836 (II 509): “quod signum evidens est voluntatis subiugatae, et alterius potestati subiectae: peccati nempe”. 267 DR7 837 (II 510): “velle mihi adest”. 268 DR7 837 (II 510): “homo sub lege existens peccato dominari non possit, sed ipse peccati concupiscentias volens nolens explere compellatur”.

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sin that he does not serve it in full agreement, but under the protests of the conscience.269 This “inconsistent state”270 in the unregenerate under the law is caused by the struggle between the faculties, between the mind or conscience – which propose good things – and the desires of sin – which incite to evil.271 In this struggle between the faculties, we see the battle between God and sin: God controls the mind and uses it to fight sin and the flesh; sin controls the flesh and uses it to subject the mind to sin.272 Each aims to have that person over whom the battle is being fought to live according to either the flesh or the intellect.273 Both fight to influence the person and move his or her will (voluntas), for without the latter’s assent (assensus) neither opponent can accomplish his goal.274 Arminius adds that when also the Spirit of Christ becomes involved in the battle, He will surely win. He is more powerful than the law, which can command and is directed to the same goal as the Spirit, but is nevertheless powerless to help.275

————— 269 DR7 841–842 (II 518): “sub Lege existentis, qui ita est peccati servus, ut illi non pleno consensu sed reclamante conscientia serviat.” Sin is in the first place caused by the sin that remains in the person still “under the law”, and by that person inasmuch as he or she is still slave to sin. Slavery implies a certain coercion, so that the effect (i.e. sin) is attributed primarily to sin as cause. DR7 845 (II 524–525). 270 Arminius calls it a “inconsistentum statum”. DR7 880 (II 587); cf. DR7 883 (II 591): It is a gradus between two status, necessary to bridge the great gap that exists between those states. 271 DR7 842 (II 519): “Deinde nego in homine irregenito, qualis qualis ille sit, luctam nullam mentis sive conscientiae cum affectibus et desideriis carnis et peccati inveniri: quin aio et adfirmo in homine sub lege existente necessario luctam esse inter mentem et conscientiam iusta et honesta praescribentem, et affectus peccati ad illicita et vetita impellentis.” Cf. DR7 827 (II 493): “peccati, [...] tyrannide et dominio quod in subditos suos violenter exercet, eos vi sua in sui obsequium compellendo; cui frustra efficacitas et vis legis opponitur”. For the emphasis on the necessity of this struggle, cf. DR7 843 (II 520, cf. 521): “ista autem sine lucta adversus peccatum inhabitans confici non posse notissimum est.” 272 DR7 878 (II 582). 273 DR7 878 (II 583): “vel secundum carnem, vel secundum mentem ambulet.” 274 DR7 878 (II 583): “suasione utens erga hominem, sine cuius assensu neutra pars isto fine potiri potest. Mens carni adversa voluntati hominis suadet, ut quod iustum, sanctum, et bonum est faciat, repudiato delectabili: Caro menti repugnans eidem voluntati suadet et post habito quod iustum et sanctum est, amplectatur quod in praesens delectationem et utilitatem adferre potest. Effectio mentis in voluntatem est volitio boni, et mali odium: Effectio carnis in eandem est volitio mali, et nolitio boni: quae est voluntatis nunc in hanc nunc in illam partem mutatio.” 275 DR7 878–879 (II 583–584): “Quod si ad hanc pugnam accedat fortior vis spiritus Christi, qui non in tabulis lapideis litteram legis inscribat, sed in tabulis cordis carneis amorem et timorem Dei imprimat, tum alium eventum non sperare modo licet, sed et certo obtinere datur […]. […] homo [...] secundum spiritum ambulet, hoc est, motum, actum, et ductum spiritus sancti in vita sua sequatur: qui motus, actus, et ductus in eundem quidem finem tendit, ad quem lex Dei et mentis hominem ducere conabantur […]. [...] non lex, sed spiritus Christi causa sit quod homo secundum legem Dei vitam suam instituat. Lex enim iubere novit, at iuvare non potest”.

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Thus the faculty that undergoes a radical change when a person comes to be under the law is the mind.276 The mind receives knowledge of the law, sometimes even some knowledge of the gospel, and assents to it. Not the whole person, but only the rational faculty (knowledge) of that person comes to be governed by the good (the law). That change is therefore also limited to willing the good, and longing for277 salvation. The desires of the flesh, still governed by sin, still occupy the leading place and hinder the accomplishment of what is good and the attainment of salvation.278 Distinctive for regeneration is that you do not simply want the good, but that you also do it.279 Arminius thus distinguishes two kinds of wills in those who are under the law.280 Each will follows a judgment concerning the object, so that a double will presupposes a double object. On the one side there is the “Judgment of general estimation” that follows the mind and reason; on the other side is the “Judgment of particular assent” from the senses and desires, from sensible knowledge. If the will of the unregenerated person who is under the law follows the “Judgment of general estimation” of the mind, it wills what is prescribed by the law and not what it forbids. But if the same will follows the “Judgment of particular assent”, it wills the coveted evil and not the good.281 Arminius considers the general ————— 276 Arminius usually speaks of the mind (mens), although he uses animus synonymously. DR 7 881 (II 588). For the priority of the intellect, and for the place, function and relationship of the three human faculties (intellect, will and affections) in Arminius’s theology, see also MULLER, “Priority”. Cf. MALLINSON, Faith, 208–214 for Beza’s view. 277 DR7 932 (II 679): “desiderare liberationem”. 278 DR7 848–849 (II 530–532): “at nego in irregenitis, nihil esse praeter carnem, irregenitis inquam, illis qui sub lege sunt [...]. Est ergo in hominibus sub lege existentibus caro et aliquid praeter carnem, nempe mens cognitione legis imbuta, eique consentiens quod bona sit, et in nonnullis irregenitis praeter carnem mens cognitione Evangelii collustrata: illud autem aliud a carne, hoc ipso capite non Spiritus ab Apostolo, sed mens appellatur. [...] non obstante boni alicuius in mente hominis sub lege existentis inhabitatione, causa propria et adaequata redderetur, cur in isto tali homine peccatorum affectus vigeant, et omnem concupiscentiam operentur: quae haec est, quod in carne istius hominis bonum non habitat, in qua si habitaret bonum, iam non sciret modo et vellet bonum, sed et ipso opere adimpleret, affectibus a bono inhabitante domitis et subactis, legique divinae subiectis.” 279 DR7 852 (II 538): “non enim tantum vult id quod bonum est homo regeneratus, sed etiam facit”. Cf. DR7 853 (II 539); 912 (II 643); 919–920 (II 657). 280 DR7 851 (II 535): “duplex esse istius volitionis genus [...] volendo, qua vult illud; qua non facit nolendo: ideo enim non facit quia non vult, licet voluntate tanquam serva peccati compulsa ad nolendum. Rursus circa unum idemque obiectum malum versatur nolendo et volendo: Nolendo qua illud non vult et odit, volendo qua idem facit; Non enim faceret nisi vellet, licet voluntate impulsa ab inhabitante peccato ad volendum”. Cf. DR7 926–927 (II 669), and the reference to Thomas Aquinas there. 281 DR7 851–852 (II 536): “Volitio igitur et nolitio omnis, quia sequitur iudicium hominis de re obiecta, pro iudicii diversitate etiam est diversa. Iudicium autem ratione causae suae est duplex. Aut enim proficiscitur ex mente et ratione approbante legem quod bona sit, et bonum existimante quod lex praescribit, malum contra quod vetat: aut proficiscitur ex sensu et affectu, et cognitione,

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judgment to be the antecedent judgment, and the particular judgment the final judgment. The will that follows the antecedent judgment and is therefore not effective, is in fact not a volitio (or nolitio), but a velleitas (or nelleitas): it is the will as act of the will (and therefore incomplete).282 The will that follows the final judgment is the volitio efficax, a complete will that has an effect.283 From this it becomes clear that particularly the affections are determinative for the state of the unregenerate who are under the law. For that reason, regeneration also does not consist only in the illumination of the mind and the forming of the will, but also in the suppression and ordering of the affections so that they begin to follow the law.284 In order to be regenerated or born again, a person does not just have to will the good, but also to do it. To this end, a complete will is necessary, including the renewal of all faculties: mind, affections and will.285 In order to accomplish this, the Spirit and grace work in the person so that he becomes convinced of his weakness and inability, as well as of the powerlessness of the law to righteousness. If that person then seeks to flee to Christ as the end of the law, and if the law has thereby fulfilled its pedagogical purpose in leading people to Christ, the same Spirit begins to preach the gospel. He pours faith into them, and unites the believers with Christ so that they share in all his blessings and forgiveness, and begin to live in Him and from Him.286 These people are no longer under the law but under grace, ————— ut loquuntur, sensuali, seu hausta a sensibus, approbante quod utile, amoenum, et delectabile est, licet vetitum, improbante quod noxium, inutile, et inamoenum est, licet praescriptum. Illud iudicium dicitur generalis aestimationis, hoc particularis approbationis seu operationis, Hinc volitio alia est ex iudicio aestimationis generalis, alia ex iudicio particularis approbationis, atque ita nolito. Unde voluntas sequens iudicium generalis aestimationis vult quod lex praescribit, non vult quod lex vetat: at eadem voluntas secuta iudicium particularis approbationis vult malum delectabile sive utile quod lex vetat, et non vult bonum molestum et noxium quod lex praescribit.” 282 Cf. MULLER, DLGTT, 323. 283 DR7 852 (II 537): “Est volitio nolitio sequens ultimum iudicium de obiecto factum; est alia non ultimum, sed antecedens iudicium sequens. Respectu illius erit volitio circa bonum huius respectu volitio circa malum illi oppositum, et contra: atque ita de nolitione. Et repsectu illius erit volitio, huisus respectu erit nolitio circa idem obiectum, et contra. Sed volitio et nolitio sequentes non ultimum iudicium, non tam volitio et nolitio simpliciter et absolute dici possunt, quam velleitas et nolleitas: sequentes vero ultimum iudicium simpliciter et absolute dicuntur volitio et nolitio efficax, quam effectus sequitur.” Arminius borrow the terms non plenam voluntatem and completam voluntatem from Thomas Aquinas. 284 DR7 853 (II 539): “Regeneratio non tantum mentem illuminat, voluntatem conformat, sed et affectus cohibet et ordinat, et membra externa, et interna in obsequium legis divinae dirigit. Matth. 7. 21. non qui voluerit sed qui fecerit voluntatem Patris ingreditur in regnum coelorum”. 285 Cf. DR7 839 (II 514). 286 DR7 855 (II 543): “Istis per legem peractis, incipit uti idem Spiritus praedicatione Evangelii qua Christum patefacit et revelat, fidem infundit, fideles cum Christo in unum corpus compingit, in communionem bonorum Christi ducit, ut remissione peccatorum per nomen ipsius impetrata, in illo et ex illo porro vivere incipiant.”

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and are governed and led by indwelling grace.287 The turning-point from being unregenerated to becoming regenerated, from sub lege to sub gratia, is therefore attained when the law has fulfilled its purpose. The law will then have produced a certain conviction in that person, namely, that they need the gospel and Christ. If the will assents, the person comes under grace. Through faith he is then united with Christ, and the result is regeneration in all its parts (mortificatio and vivificatio). Arminius strongly emphasizes that the law with all its efficacy cannot free an unregenerate person from the power of sin.288 Yet this process is still the manner in which God prepares a person for repentance and regeneration.289 But it is only in Christ offered through the Gospel and received by faith, that forgiveness of sins and the power of the Spirit to renewal can be obtained.290 A regenerate person is one whose mind has been cleansed of the darkness and vanity of the world, and has been enlightened with true, saving knowledge of Christ and with faith. The affections (affectus) are put to death and freed by God from their slavery to sin; new desires (desideriis) agreeing with the divine nature and equipped for a new life are kindled. The will is called to order and to God’s will. The capacities and faculties, aided by the power of the Spirit, fight against sin, the world and Satan, are victorious over them and produce fruit for God worthy of conversion. The evil lusts of the flesh disappear, and good is done in the measure of faith and the gift of Christ. Regeneration grows – albeit with stumbling – throughout the course of life, and reaches perfection only after this life.291 The regenerated ————— 287 DR7 856 (II 544): “aliud est aliquem praeparantis gratiae effectum sentire, et aliud sub gratia esse, sive a gratia inhabitante regi, duci, agi.” 288 DR7 830 (II 498): “in quibus lex omnem suam efficacitatem exservit, qui propterea sub lege esse reciproce dicuntur.” Cf. DR7 932–933 (II 679). 289 It is the initia or also the causae that prepare (praeparare) for repentance and regeneration. Cf. DR7 828–830. In most cases, God uses a gradual process of repentance, cf. DR7 843 (II 520): “Velim hic etiam adversariis in mentem venire, quibus gradibus Deus suos a vitae pravitate ad se convertere sit suetus.” 290 DR7 831 (II 501): “utrumque autem nobis in Christo per Evangelium oblato et fide apprehenso contingere, tum peccatorum per fidem in sanguine eius remissionem; tum Spiritus Christi vim, qua peccato resistere ab eius domino libertati per eodem Spiritum, possimus, et victoriam de eodem referre, Deoque in novitate vitae servire.” Cf. DR7 837 (II 511). 291 DR7 829 (II 497): “Regenitus est, qui habet mentem a tenebris et vanitate mundi purgatam, et vera salutarique Christi cognitione et fide illuminatam, affectus mortificatos, et a Dominio et servitute peccati liberatos, novisque et divinae naturae convenientibus desideriis accensos, et ad novam vitam comparatos, voluntatem in ordinem redactam, et voluntari Dei conformem, vires et facultates adversus Peccatum, Mundum, Satanam decertare per auxilium Spiritus sancti potentes, et victoriam de iis repartare, fructusque Deo et poenitentia dignos proferre: qui etiam actu ipso adversus peccatum decertat, et victoria de illo reportata, non quae carni et concupiscentiae adlubescunt, sed quae Deo grata sunt facit; hoc est, actu ipso declinat a malo et bonum facit; non perfecte quidem, sed pro mensura fidei et donationis Christi, pro modulo regenerationis inchoatae in hac vita, et paulatim promovendae, denique post hanc vitam perficiendae: non quod ad partes

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person no longer lives under the rule of sin but under the dominion of grace, and through its power can easily withstand sin.292 The Spirit works by advice and counsel (suasio). In the subsection that follows (3.3.4), this will be expanded on in the context of Arminius’s acceptance of the concept of middle knowledge (scientia media). The normal means and instrument of conversion is the preaching of God’s Word by mortal human beings; every person is thus bound to it. The Holy Spirit has not, however, so tied himself to these means that it would be impossible for Him to work in a supernatural way without the intervention of human beings.293 God has established a decree, as Arminius admits in his Apology, according to which He has determined to distribute the means to faith and salvation. This distribution is carried out in accordance with what God knows to be fitting (decere), that is, in agreement with his iustitiam et misericordiam et severitatem.294 With the offer of the Mediator (which belongs to the appropriation of the Mediator and is therefore subordinate to predestination – that is, it belongs to the execution of the decree), God demands faith and works this faith when the internal suasio of the Spirit is added, and He binds Himself to give salvation to those who believe.295 God thus brings about the appropriation or execution of predestination through faith as means, worked through the internal suasio of the Spirit. ————— essentiales, sed quod ad quantitatem attinet, ut dictum est antea: non semper citra interruptionem: impingit enim aliquando, labitur, aberrat, peccat, Spiritum sanctum tristitia afficit, etc. sed subinde et plaerunque.” For the gradual perfection, see DR7 839 (II 513): “Quod homo non plene et perfecte regeneratur, quamdiu in hac vita est, concedo iuxta Scripturam, sed recte intellectum, nempe ut illa perfectio non de ipsius regenerationis essentia partibusque essentialibus, sed quantitatis gradu et mensura intelligatur.” Cf. DR7 839 (II 513–514): “Regenerationis enim negotium non ita habet, ut homo secundum aliquas suas facultates regeneratus, secundum aliquas maneat prorsus in vetustate depravatae naturae: sed ita est comparata secunda ista nativitas, ut prima, qua homines nascimur, integre quidem humanae naturae participes, at non in perfectione virili: sic quoque omnes hominis facultates vis regenerationis pervadit nulla excepta, at non perfecte primo momento, gradatim enim provehitur, et per quotidianos profectus, usque dum ad plenam et virilem aetatem in Christo producatur. Unde totus homo secundum omnes suas facultates, mentem, affectus, voluntatem, regenitus dicitur, et propterea secundum istas facultates regenitas spiritualis.” 292 DR7 832 (II 502): “At cum non amplius sub lege, sed sub gratia iam sitis, peccatum omnino vobis non dominabitur, sed vi gratiae facile illi resistetis, et membra vestra arma iustitiae Deo praestabitis.” Cf. DR7 837 (II 510): “Si enim bonum habitaret in carne mea, iam actu possem praestare ad quod mens et voluntas inclinant.” Cf. DR7 843 (II 520) for Arminius’s view on the regenerate and the struggle between the flesh and the Spirit: “Spiritus plaerunque superat, evaditque superior”. Cf. DR7 869.871–872 (II 567.571–573). 293 A31A 160 (II 21). 294 A31A 139 (I 748). Cf. PrD XVI (II 394–395); XVII (II 396). 295 EP 659 (III 305–306): “oblatione vero ista fidem postulat, Spiritusque interna suasione accedente fidem efficit, et obstringit se ad dandam salutem credenti.”

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The promise and offer are universal, and precede faith. The outward preaching is the call, and the promise goes out to all who hear it. A distinction must be maintained between the promise, the human act of acceptance (i.e. faith), and the act by which God bestows the promise on believers (promise, acceptance, bestowal).296 Here it becomes very clear that faith is an instrument, and not an end in itself. According to Perkins, the promise is only for the believers, while the command to believe goes out to believers and unbelievers alike. Arminius disagrees. If the promise is not extended to all who receive the command to believe, the command is unfair, in vain and useless (iniquum, vanum et inutile). The promise is the only object of faith (promissione quae unicum est fidei obiectum). It is impossible to believe a promise that is not extended to you. All the same, Arminius notes that it is correct to determine the extent of the appropriation of the promise more narrowly than its offer. The command to believe and the promise, however, are not for believers or unbelievers: they precede faith and unbelief since they demand the one and forbid the other.297 For the necessity of the universal proclamation, Perkins points to the preachers’ inability to know either their audience or God’s intention to take away the excuse of some of the listeners. In the church, the elect are mixed together with the reprobate. For that reason the preachers must proclaim repentance to all without discrimination, because they do not know how many elect there are who will repent. Further, God intends to leave those who do not repent without excuse. Arminius expresses amazement at these remarks from Perkins, accusing him of showing himself completely different here than in his others writings! The command, which after all includes the promise, goes out to both elect and the godless, but Perkins limits the promise to those who appropriate it according to God’s decree. Arminius responds that if Perkins were consistent, also the command should pertain only to the elect. According to Arminius, one also cannot compare the elect with the godless, although a comparison is possible between elect and reprobate, and godless and godly. The word “godless” includes also the elect.298 For an admonition it holds true that the excuse can only be taken away if the admonition is rejected, and the rejection of such an admonition ought not be inevitable. God does not ensure that the reprobate cannot be excused, for that reverses the order. It is rather so that those who cannot be excused – ————— 296 297 298

EP 659 (III 306). EP 659–660 (III 306–308). EP 660–661 (III 308–309).

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those, therefore, who have rejected an admonition that they could have followed – are reprobated. For reprobation is just. Thus it is either on account of original sin, or because of unbelief and rejection of Christ, that people are without excuse.299 In his Declaration, Arminius points to the dangers that lurk behind a doctrine of unconditional predestination for the ministry of the gospel.300 Such a doctrine may make preachers slow and negligent in their preaching. But his own conception of predestination, Arminius argues, promotes the ministry of the gospel.301 3.3.4 Divine Foreknowledge and Middle Knowledge in Arminius’s Doctrine of Predestination According to Dekker, the theory of middle knowledge lies at the very heart of Arminius’s view on God’s knowledge.302 Muller similarly calls it a concept fundamental to his re-conception of the doctrine of predestination and his soteriological synergism.303 The theory of middle knowledge seeks to resolve the problem of the relationship between human free choice and divine grace, foreknowledge, providence, election and reprobation.304 With middle knowledge it is possible, for example, to explain how God’s grace can be infallibly effective, while a person can at the same time reject God’s grace out of free choice. The medieval theory of God’s knowledge that is presupposed in middle knowledge is as follows: God knows Himself and the sum total of all possibles outside of Himself. This knowledge exists independently of his will, and is consistently called the scientia naturalis. God knows also the sum total of actuals past, present and future. He knows reality after, or rather because, He decides with his will to actualize certain possibles. This knowledge of actuals is called the scientia libera because it presupposes an act of God’s free will. ————— 299 EP 664 (III 314): “Dico et alio modo mihi istam propositionem videri a vero absonam, quia statuit reprobos inexcusabiles fieri, quum ordine inverso illi qui sint inexcusabiles reprobentur. Iusta enim reprobatio, et propterea reprobi ante actum reprobandi inexcusabiles, ante actum externum reipsa inexcusabiles, ante decretum reprobandi praevisi seu praesciti ut inexcusabiles. Si reprobati propter peccatum originis, propter hoc inexcusabiles; si propter incredulitatem et reiectum Christum reprobati, propter illam incredulitatem inexcusabiles.” 300 Verklaring, 88–89 (I 633–634). 301 Verklaring, 110 (I 655). 302 DEKKER, “Molinist?”, 346. 303 MULLER, God, Creation, and Providence, 154. 304 In what follows, I rely particularly on the clear summary and exposition by DEKKER, “Molinist?”, 338–342. For the theologico-historical background, see for example, CRAIG, Problem. Craig here shows “how Christian thinkers committed to both divine knowledge of the future and to freedom reconcile those commitments.” (p. XIII).

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The difficulty with this theory that distinguishes two kinds of knowledge is that it appears to leave no room for human free choice. God determines which possibilities are actualized, and thus it is also God who determines the acts of the human will. The name of Luis de Molina (1535–1560) is inseparably linked with the theory of middle knowledge (Molinism), which introduces a third kind of divine knowledge as solution to the aforementioned problem. Middle knowledge is situated between the first two kinds of knowledge listed above, and consists in the knowledge God has preceding the act of his will of what the possible creatures would do from their own free will when faced with particular circumstances. Because God also determines the circumstances, He infallibly knows what a human being will freely do – for example, whether he will reject or accept God’s grace. In the context of the present study it is not necessary to lay Molina’s theory out in detail, nor to determine to what extent Arminius adopted Molina’s thought,305 and certainly not to give a systematic evaluation of the middle knowledge concept itself and to evaluate Arminius’s use of it.306 What is pertinent in this context is to note that Arminius did make use of this concept, and then to consider why he did so. The following exposition will limit itself to these two issues. Arminius implicitly uses middle knowledge in his excursus on God’s providence in the Examen Perkinsiani. He does this when he deals with the question as to how God can prevent the will of a creature to will a particular ————— 305 MULLER (God, Creation, and Providence, 154–166) and DEKKER (Rijker dan Midas, 76– 103) concluded that Arminius adopted middle knowledge, while WITT (Creation, Redemption and Grace, 336–370) has argued against their interpretation. Witt sought to illustrate with numerous citations that Arminius merely asserts that God knows what rational creatures can do in a given situation, while Molina also taught that God knows what rational creatures will do given particular circumstances. According to Witt, Molina’s theory has deterministic consequences that are absent from Arminius’s thought. DEKKER, “Molinist?”, 337–352 once again defended that Arminius was indeed a Molinist. In my opinion, in the following quotations both Witt and Dekker touch on an important aspect of Arminius’s thought relating to middle knowledge. “The point is […] that God is in no way responsible for humanity’s sin. […] neither does he choose (as in Molinism) a possible world in which, given the circumstances in which Adam is placed, God knows that Adam will certainly sin”; WITT, Creation, Redemption and Grace, 366–367. Witt thus emphasizes that Arminius’s use of middle knowledge was intended to show that not God, but humankind itself, was fully responsible for sin. Dekker points to God’s involvement in spite of human freedom (“it may be clear that Arminius only wanted to make use of a new, even more systematically satisfactory theory in order to build his own theology in which ample place for human freedom was formed, without implying that God would not really predestine anymore. Elements of such a theology Arminius found in Molina.” DEKKER, “Molinist?”, 350), an issue that relates to God’s “genuine control over what people genuinely free will do. Certainty of knowledge is thus combined with freedom of the human will.” (DEKKER, “Molinist?”, 351). That God is not responsible for sin, together with the remaining certainty of God’s knowledge, are indeed two elements that are fundamental to Arminius’s use of Molina’s scientia media. 306 Of the enormous amount of literature, I mention only DEKKER, Middle Knowledge. Cf. CRAIG, “Calvinist-Arminian Rapprochement?”.

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act for which the creature has sufficient inclination and capacity. Arminius responds that this is possible in two ways: 1. According to the modus of nature, the impulsio physica, which leaves no room for the freedom of the will. 2. According to the modus of the will and its freedom, the suasio or advice. Suasio (moral suasion) occurs through argumentation, convincing of the will, at a time when that will is inclined to something for which it has sufficient capacity. Through suasio, the will is prevented from doing that to which it was actually inclined. The work of prevention, however, is not necessary but nevertheless certain. Because God has in his infinite wisdom foreseen that the mind of the rational creature will be convinced by this particular argument, whereas that particular conviction will prevent a certain act, there is no need for God to use any other kind of obstruction – i.e. the impulsio physica – to achieve his goal.307 God’s preventative activity has no necessary consequences that depend on his omnipotence (omnipotentia), but it is still effective and certain with respect to the outcome because of his foreknowledge (praescientia). God knows which arguments will move the consciousness (animus) of a particular person in those particular circumstances and at that particular moment in time, and to the end to which God wills that person to be moved according to his mercy or justice.308 Already in his epistolary exchange with Junius does Arminius show himself to be aware of this concept of middle knowledge.309 Here in the Examen Perkinsiani, he uses it even if he does not mention it by name. The combination of ————— 307 EP 716–717 (III 393): “Actio qua agit in voluntatem [...] secundum modum voluntatis et libertatis ipsius, suasio dicetur commode. Impedit ergo Deus voluntatem vel actione physica, vel suasione, ne velit illud ad quod aliquo adfectu propendet. [...] Suasione impedit Deus voluntatem, quando argumento aliquo persuadet voluntati ne velit actum perpetrare, ad quem aliquo suo affectu fertur, et cui efficiendo vires habet aut habere sibi videtur sufficientes. Unde non necessario quidem, sed certo impeditur voluntas. Quia veto Deus pro infinitate sapientiae suae praevidit ex propositione iustius argumenti persuasum iri animum creaturae rationalis, et ex persuasione exstituram actus impeditionem, necesse non habet ut alio impedimenti genere utatur.” See also A31A 141–142 (I 754–755). 308 EP 718 (III 395–396): “Neque singula ista seiuncta ab aliis usurpantur a Deo ad impediendum actum, quem vult non perpetratum, sed etiam bina vel terna aliquando iunctim proponuntur, prout Deus novit expedire ad impediendum actum, quem vult impeditum. Quae vero actio illa sit qua Deus argumenta, ad impediendam voluntatem proposita, animo creaturae ad actum propensae et viribus pollentis persuadet, hic ex professo non agimus. Certum tamen est, qualiscunque illa sit, efficacem esse ad impediendum, certoque impedituram: quae efficacia et certitudo non tam ex ipsa omnipotentia actionis divinae, quam ex praescientia Dei dependet, scientis quae arguemta isthoc rerum statu et tempore animum sint motura hominis, eo quo Deus illum inclinatum cupit, sive pro misericordia sua sive pro iustitia.” 309 Dekker has demonstrated that in 1597 Arminius did not yet hold to scientia media, although he at that time did deepen himself in studying the concept. It was some time between 1597 and 1603 that Arminius accepted middle knowledge, as is also evident from the passage of the Examen Perkinsiani cited above. DEKKER, Rijker dan Midas, 100–101; DEKKER, “Molinist?”, 350–351.

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an infallible efficacy on God’s part of events that lie within the capacity of a rational creature endowed with liberum arbitrium (free choice) shows the unmistakable influence of Molina’s middle knowledge. God knows from eternity that with the help of a certain kind of grace, a person will either receive or reject Christ. God can decide to permit that person to reject Christ, or to cooperate with him so that he receives Christ in faith.310 Also such passages presuppose the theory of middle knowledge.311 It can further be illustrated that Arminius’s use of middle knowledge is directly related to his concern for the justice of God. As he writes in his response to the thirty-one articles, God’s determination of future contingencies can be understood in two different ways. First, Arminius calls it a determination by God when the secondary cause is free to obey or not to obey. Such a determination he is willing to maintain. The second possibility is that God’s determination takes place in such a way that all freedom and indifference disappear, so that there is no longer room for the free and uncoerced creature to do anything else. But if the word “determined” be received according to the second acceptation, I confess, that I abominate and detest that axiom (as one that is false, absurd, and preparing the way for many blasphemies) which declares that “God by his eternal decree has determined to the one part or to the other [alterutram partem] future contingent things:” – By this last phrase understand “those things which are performed by the free will of the creature.”

It is falsum because otherwise providence, which ought to be accommodated to the creature, stands directly over against the nature of the creature. It is absurdum, because it is a contradictio in adiecto; it calls something that is determined on all sides “contingent.” It thirdly results in all kinds of blasphemies: 1. It makes God the author of sin and leaves humankind without guilt. 2. It makes God the real, actual and only sinner. 3. According to this doctrine God would need sinful people and their sins in order to reveal his justice and mercy. 4. Sin would no longer be sin.312 When all the elements relating to Arminius’s use of middle knowledge are gathered together, we can draw the following conclusions. Arminius nowhere appears to accept middle knowledge in order to show that God, in spite of human freedom, through his administration of the means and cir————— EP 752 (III 446). See also A31A 176–177 (II 51–52): “Sed ad huius rei explicationem pertractandum esset de gratiae divinae et liberi arbitrii seu voluntatis humanae concursu et concordia”. This is an almost explicit reference to Molina’s De Concordia. Cf. A31A 140 (I 749). 312 A31A 143–144 (I 760–762): “Si vero secundo sensu sumatur vox determinationis, fateor me hoc axioma quo dicitur, Deum futura contingentia (intellige quae a libera creaturae voluntate pattantur) decreto suo aeterno determinasse ad alterutram partem: tanquam falsum, absurdum, et multiplicis blasphemiae praevium, abominari et exsecrari.” 310 311

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cumstances still determines in an “absolute” sense who will and will not be saved. That reproach continues to be made against proponents of middle knowledge to this very day,313 but at least in Arminius’s case such a thought does not even appear to enter into question. Arminius had at least three things in mind when he integrated the concept of middle knowledge into his theology. 1. In the first place, the theoretical basic condition for human contingency, so that aside from God’s necessary knowledge of all possibles and his free knowledge of the things that are realized through the decision of his will, there is still room for actuals that are not realized through the decision of his will. The theory of middle knowledge offers precisely that possibility. 2. If one wants to create room for creaturely contingencies without harming God’s foreknowledge and its certainty – an attribute essential to God’s being! – , one must necessarily posit a divine knowledge of actuals that did not come into existence through a decision of God’s will, but of which God still does have certain foreknowledge. The theory of middle knowledge offered Arminius a strong theoretical basis for maintaining God’s omniscience, predestination and grace, as well as human freedom, all at one and the same time. Through it, Arminius could maintain creaturely contingency, and yet that this did not come at the cost of God’s omniscience.314 3. Thirdly, Arminius uses middle knowledge to illustrate that God remains able, in spite of human freedom, to govern all things as He wills: God knows what result will follow from a certain “administration” (beleydinghe) of means and circumstances in combination with creaturely contingency. However, He does not have this knowledge because He can “determine” human freedom through the means and circumstances, but purely because of his all-encompassing foreknowledge through which each moment is for God an eternal “today” or “now.”315 God through his infinite wisdom knows all things as present, and therefore infallibly knows all futures as well, even those that are contingent.316 Necessity and foreknowledge both result in certainty with respect to futures, but with the important difference that certainty and creaturely contingency do easily go together, while this is absolutely not the case for necessity and contingency. As I see it, Arminius’s intention with the adoption of scientia media does not fit with the suggestion that middle knowledge still makes it possible for God to determine which person will or will not be saved. Theoretically this ————— Cf. WITT, Creation, Redemption and Grace, 363–364. Cf. e.g. AC 462 (III 22): According to Beza, God’s wisdom and providence demand that the object of election and reprobation be considered as “to be created”. Cf. PrD XVIII (II 344). 315 Cf. e.g. EP 657 (III 303): “mentis divinae cui omnia sunt praesentia”. 316 EP 742 (III 431): “neque potest incertitudo tribui voluntati illius qui infinita sua sapientia omnia sibi habet praesentia, et omnia etiam maxime contingentia certo praescit futura.” See also A31A 141 (I 753); ETG25–26 (III 547–548). 313 314

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possibility does not undermine creaturely contingency, but in practice it does leave people with the feeling that they are being determined in spite of all freedom they do have. Practically speaking, it also leads – or could lead – to wrong notions concerning God and the justice of his government, and it is precisely against such accusations that Arminius is always on the guard. Arminius uses middle knowledge only to show that creaturely freedom does not need to be defended at the cost of God’s omniscience, and that God in that sense is therefore not dependent on human decisions. With it, Arminius could counter an important objection made by his opponents. Arminius insisted that there had to be creaturely contingency if one wanted to defend God’s justice. Arminius could use middle knowledge as an argument to deny that creaturely contingency harms the essential divine attribute of omniscience. This in turn implies that Arminius’s use of scientia media must be seen within the context of his concern for the doctrine of God, where he was convinced that God’s justice neither could nor needed to be defended at the cost of his omniscience, and vice versa. 3.3.5 The Four-Decree Structure of Predestination in the Declaration of 1608 In Arminius’s theology, concepts such as God’s will and decrees, predestination, gospel and covenant are at times virtually synonymous, and all agree with the more dense concept of the duplex amor Dei (see 2.2.2 and 4.1) in spite of the perspective and connotation each contribute. Arminius’s view of predestination is the foundation of the Christian religion, of salvation and of assurance. It is the “sum and the matter of the gospel; nay, it is the gospel itself.”317 There are numerous (early) passages where the relationship between covenant and predestination, and the position of Christ in respect to these two, are not yet unambiguous. This can be attributed among others to the different meanings and nuances these concepts can have. In this section we will consider Arminius’s exposition of predestination in the Declaration. In this treatment of predestination, which can be characterized as comprising a four-decree structure, Arminius appears to unite into a coherent whole all elements that appear to be relevant to him. It is the most balanced exposition of Arminius’s view on predestination that is available. One change that appears to have developed over the years concerns the sending of Christ as Mediator. At first this belonged to the doctrine of providence, but in 1608 it forms the first decree in predestination. What remains, however, is the fundamental place and function of Christ’s mediatorial ————— 317

Verklaring, 106 (I 654).

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work. Another example of development is the distinction between 1. God’s decision to justify believers in Christ and to accept them as his children, and 2. Predestination, through which God decided to grant faith to some and not to others through different means. This we find clearly expressed already in the Examen Perkinsiani,318 but it was at least implied in Arminius’s early exegetical work on Romans 9. In spite of all the differences and nuances, no essential changes took place, so that the best source for Arminius’s doctrine of predestination is indeed his most developed exposition of it as found in the Declaration of 1608.319 As was noted before, Arminius calls predestination the sum and matter of the gospel, even the gospel itself. This indeed characterizes his entire approach. It is from that perspective that Arminius decides to divide predestination, or the gospel, into four separate decrees with a particular order. In the structure and content of his doctrine of predestination, his theological direction comes to clear expression. It also becomes clear that the content of the doctrine of predestination is the same as what Arminius ascribes to the covenant, the foedus that God established on the basis of his pactum with God the Son.320 This pactum remains the basis for the covenant, or predestination, or the gospel. The distinctive elements of Arminius’s four-decree predestination structure are: 1. The fundamental and prominent place of Christ the Mediator and his atonement (see 3.3.1). 2. The establishment of the conditions of the new covenant, that justification and thus the unio Dei as final goal can be reached only through the means of faith in Christ, with the consequence that those who continue to reject Christ in unbelief will be excluded from the covenant. Further, the new covenant means that the way of justification by works of the law has been undone through the fall into sin, and become impassable. In fact, it stands directly opposed to the way of the new covenant, so that faith and the act of faith are directly contrary to, and imply a rejection of, attempts to be justified by works of the law (see 3.3.2). 3. The giving and “administration” of sufficient and necessary means of grace (see 3.3.3). The means are administered according to God’s wisdom “by which God knows what is proper and becoming both to his mercy and his severity,” and agree with God’s justice “by which He is prepared to adopt what————— 318 EP 654 (III 298): “Non est una praedestinatio qua Deus decrevit fideles in Christum iustificare et in filios adoptare, cum illa qua decrevit hisce et non illis per certa media fidem donare. Hic enim est decretum de fide danda, ibi de fidelibus iustificandis et adoptandis; quod sane decretum propter subiecti et attributi diversitatem unum esse non potest.” Cf. ETG 69–70 (III 584). 319 Verklaring, 104–106 (I 653–654). 320 See EP 748 (III 440). Cf. EP 756 (III 451). Cf. GRAAFLAND, Verbond, 195, who correctly remarked that even though Arminius continually spoke about election, what he wrote about it coincided in content with what he writes about the covenant.

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ever his wisdom may prescribe and to put it in execution.”321 God’s justice thus ensures that God’s wisdom, where both mercy and severity (misericordia et severitas) have a place, is followed. The pair “mercy and severity” is closely related to iustitia, as Arminius on several occasions322 speaks in the context of the administratio of the means about God’s justice as consisting of misericordia and severitas. The relationship between justice and wisdom has been treated above already (see 3.1.1). 4. The element of God’s certain foreknowledge and middle knowledge, through which Arminius wants to maintain certainty and God’s omniscience on the one hand, and the freedom of the human will on the other (see 3.3.4). The full account of Arminius’s four-decree structure is as follows: I. The first unconditional and absolute decree of God concerning the salvation of sinful man, is that by which he decreed to appoint his Son Jesus Christ for a mediator, redeemer, saviour, priest and king, who might destroy sin by his own death, might by his obedience obtain the salvation which had been lost, and might communicate it by his own virtue. II. The second unconditional and absolute decree of God, is that in which he decreed to receive into favour those who repent and believe, and, in Christ, for his sake and through him, to effect the salvation of such penitents and believers as persevered to the end; but to leave in sin and under wrath all impenitent persons and unbelievers, and to damn them as aliens from Christ. III. The third divine decree is that by which God decreed to administer in a sufficient and efficacious manner the means which were necessary for repentance and faith; and to have such administration instituted (1) according to the divine wisdom, by which God knows what is proper and becoming both to his mercy and his severity, and (2) according to divine justice, by which He is prepared to adopt whatever his wisdom may prescribe and to put it in execution. IV. To these succeeds the fourth decree, by which God decreed to save and damn certain particular persons. This decree has its foundation in the foreknowledge of God, by which he knew from all eternity those individuals who would, through his preventing grace, believe, and, through his subsequent grace would persevere, – according to the before-described administration of those means which are suitable and proper for conversion and faith; and, by which foreknowledge, he likewise knew those who would not believe and persevere.323

————— 321 322 323

Verklaring, 106 (I 653). A31A 139 (I 748); HaC 943 (II 699); AN 957 (II 719). Verklaring, 104–106 (I 653–654).

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3.4 Summary and Conclusion Chapter 3 illustrates how Arminius’s view of God’s justice was very influential on several main points of his theology: the doctrines of God, creation, providence, sin/fall, and gospel (Evangelium). The function of God’s justice is determined to a large extent by the place it is accorded by Arminius in God’s very essence. Justice is universally normative, and for that reason decisively influential on all divine faculties and attributes. Justice functions as the arbiter of all God’s words, works and willing. For the work of creation the above implies that it is perfectly sound and good, and that for that reason one cannot propose a “creation to destruction,” nor consider creation as the means to execute the decree of predestination, or the like. The fall brings an end to God’s original plan for humanity. Because God’s justice demanded the condemnation of humanity for its disobedience, his justice had to be satisfied before a new covenant could be established. In a pactum with the Father, Jesus Christ the Mediator presented Himself to take upon Himself the punishment for the sin of humankind, and in that way to satisfy the justice of God. This pactum thus forms the basis for the new covenant God established with humanity. God determined the condition of this new covenant to be union with Christ through faith. By it the benefits of Christ are apportioned, and the justice of God is no longer an obstacle to union with God. Arminius further deals in great detail with God’s providence. As he understands it, the way in which many treat it makes God the author of sin. He painstakingly lays out the nature of permission (permissio) so as not to make God the author of sin on the one hand, nor on the other to leave sin outside of the bounds of God’s control. Also divine concursus is dealt with in this context. Arminius developed a clear view of the relation of the divine will to the human will. God takes into account the freedom that he has given to rational creatures as essential attribute, a freedom which must also be maintained as guarantee for God’s justice. God’s law, power and freedom are bound by his justice. This implies that God’s self-limiting is not a consequence of the act of creation, for it is rather his inherent, essential justice that limits him in his freedom. With respect to the relationship between God’s justice and (the fall into) sin, an important point of departure is the fact that sin presupposes a just law and real freedom. Any form of necessity is thus excluded. A sin which occurs necessarily, whether from an active hardening or through a passive preterition, could not justly be punished by God. Moreover, this would also

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make God the author of sin. Sin is the only cause for divine punishment, and God always grants enough grace so as to be able not to sin. A consequence of Arminius’s view is that he has to make room for creaturely acts for which the creatures themselves bear the ultimate and complete responsibility. This is true first and above all for sin, the fall, and unbelief as resistance against God’s plan and offer of salvation. An absolute decree of reprobation, which does not presuppose sin in its object, thus arouses sharp opposition from Arminius. Sin must be taken into account when it comes to the object of election and reprobation. God’s justice is also determinative for the way God acts in the context of the Evangelical theology which went into effect after the fall. It implies first of all that the sin which broke the first covenant must receive its just reward. The only way for this to be accomplished without condemning all of humanity to eternal destruction is the substitutionary sacrifice of Jesus Christ as Mediator. For that reason, Christ’s mediatorship takes a fundamental place in Arminius’s Evangelical theology: the pactum is the foundation for the new covenant. Christ is the meritorious cause of election. Because only faith can unite with Christ, through which union his righteousness is imputed to the sinner, election to salvation only concerns those who put their faith in Christ. Arminius’s view on the place of Christ with respect to election allows him to present his own doctrine of election – i.e. the decree to save believing sinners in Christ – without needing to develop a specific view on the freedom of the will. Arminius’s understanding of the freedom of the will is a consequence that flows from the fundamental place (God’s) justice has in his thought. The faith required in the doctrine of election is a gift of God, and was required only in the new covenant and after the fall into sin. Before the fall, faith in Christ was not necessary and thus not required, either. Another consequence of the above is that after the fall, God could not require this faith in Christ without giving the (means of) grace that would be necessary and sufficient to attain to it. Also here concern for God’s justice is consistently the driving force behind Arminius’s arguments. Although God’s justice determines that, aside from election, there also be reprobation, this does not imply a symmetry in the causes of election and reprobation. The meriting cause of reprobation is in the person, whereas election is purely from grace. Arminius uses the theory of divine middle knowledge in order to show that there are contingent human actions, and that this creaturely contingency does not undo God’s omniscience and foreknowledge, nor their certainty. Through his middle knowledge, God further remains capable of determining all things through his will in spite of human freedom.

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In his fourfold decree-structure as found in the Declaration of Sentiments of 1608, Arminius combines all elements that relate to salvation into a coherent whole. For him, the doctrine of predestination forms the very content of the gospel. This results in a doctrine of predestination consisting of four separate, and particularly ordered decrees, whose structure and content clearly reflect Arminius’s theological vision: 1. The fundamental place of Christ the Mediator and the atonement He effected to satisfy God’s justice. 2. Faith as the only means to share in the new covenant and the imputation of Christ’s righteousness. 3. The just giving and administration of the sufficient and necessary means of grace. 4. The element of God’s certain foreknowledge and middle knowledge, through which Arminius wants to maintain certainty and God’s omniscience on the one hand, and the freedom of the human will on the other.

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4. God’s Justice in Arminius’s Theology III: The Primary Foundation of Religion

4.1 Duplex Amor Dei In section 2.2 we showed that justice as an attribute of God is not only determinative for God’s essence and acts, but also forms the most important attribute of God’s nature for inciting people to worship Him. The latter will now be considered in greater detail. Examen Perkinsiani Already in his response to Perkins does Arminius implicitly1 and explicitly speak of God’s twofold love and the mutual relationship between these two loves: God’s love for justice, and his love for his creatures. It comes up implicitly when Arminius states that God seriously wills all to be saved, but that the persistent wickedness of some forces Him to will their condemnation. It does not befit (decere) God to correct the wickedness of human beings in modus absolutus. God wills their condemnation because He does not want his justice to perish.2 God loves his creatures and wants to save them, but his love for justice and obedience is greater than his love for humanity and its salvation. God’s twofold love comes up explicitly in a passage on the angels. God wills three things with respect to them: 1. their salvation, 2. their obedience; 3. their condemnation in case of disobedience. God wills the first out of his love for his creatures. The second He wills out of his love for justice and for the obedience his creatures owe Him. God holds obedience as much more important than the salvation of the angels, in fact, so much so that He would much rather have the former for Himself than the latter for the angels. God thirdly wills the condemnation of the disobedient angels from out of that same love for justice. He cannot leave

————— 1 Already in premature form, although with clear basic principles, does the primacy of God’s justice above his freedom to be merciful (or not) to human beings appear in AR9 788 (III 500). 2 EP 741–742 (III 430–431).

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the violation of his justice unpunished, because punishment is the only means to restore it to order (in ordinem redigendi).3 Examen Thesium Gomari Many elements characteristic to Arminius’s theology can be found in his reaction to Gomarus’s theses on predestination from 1604. This also holds true for the duplex amor Dei. Just as God wills to punish disobedience with eternal death, so God does not will the salvation of the human race as end before its obedience. Arminius concludes from this that although God has a great love for humankind, His love for justice and obedience is even greater. One who can distinguish well between two goods will love the greater good with a greater love – and our all-wise God distinguishes perfectly, Arminius adds.4 Articuli nonnulli Towards the end of his life, Arminius returns numerous times to the twofold love of God precisely in the context of defending his theology. In the Declaration of 1608, the twofold love of God has become conceptually crystalized as the duplex amor Dei, or tweederley liefde Godes. In the intervening years, Arminius sharpened and developed this concept, and incorporated it into a cornerstone of his theology. Aside from the Articuli nonnulli, the disputations held under Arminius’s presidence between the composition of the Examen Perkinsiani and the Declaration are the only source to track this development in Arminius’s thought. That Arminius dealt with it in the Articuli nonnulli is yet another important indication that he consciously reflected on God’s twofold love. The notes unmistakably reflect Arminius’s thought on this point as a comparison with the later Declaration shows.5 When dealing with God’s nature, Arminius posits that God loves both justice and his creatures. However, ————— 3 EP 743 (III 432): “Ponantur enim ordine tria volita divina circa Angelos: Salus Angelorum, obedientia Angelorum; condemnatio, inobedientia Angelorum. Illam vult Deus ex amore erga creaturas suas, istam ex amore erga iustitiam et obedientiam a creatura sibi debitam: atque ita quidem ut istam magis sibi velit praestari, quam illam velit creaturae hanc vult ex eodem amore erga iustitiam, cuius laesionem non potest ferre impunitam, quandoquidem sola punitio est ratio illam in ordinem redigendi.” 4 ETG 51–52 (III 568–569): “At tantum abest, ut Deus salutem hominis tanquam finem prius velit quam obedientiam ejus, ut inobedientiam velit punire aeterna morte: unde constat Deum qui hominum amantissimus est, amantiorem esse justitiae et obedientiae: majus autem bonum magis amat qui recte inter duo bona discernit: et discernit optime sapientissimus Deus.” Cf. ETG 58–59 (III 574). 5 Verklaring, 77–78 (I 624).

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God’s love for justice is greater than his love for his creatures, which observation leads Arminius to draw two conclusions. In the first place, God does not hate his creatures except on account of sin. “For God hates nothing except unrighteousness.”6 Second, God loves no creature absolutely to eternal life, unless that creature be considered righteous. Arminius further explicitly notes that it does not matter whether the righteousness demanded is Legal or Evangelical.7 The term duplex amor Dei may not occur in the Articuli, but in terms of content the concept is fully present. Also the relationship to Arminius’s objections to the theological viewpoints of his colleagues is evident from the aforementioned inferences in the Articuli. First, sin is the condition in the creature that is the object of God’s wrath. In other words, the object of reprobation must be a sinner (from his or her own free will). Secondly, righteousness is the condition in the creature God loves. Therefore, within the Legal theology there must be perfect obedience, while in the Evangelical theology this condition is fulfilled on the one hand by the fundamental place of Christ’s mediatorial work, and on the other by the fundamental place of the faith that binds to Christ and through that bond is considered by God as righteousness. Disputations Already in Arminius’s pro gradu theses De natura Dei (1603), which were included as the fourth public disputation in the collected theses, do we see the theme of God’s twofold love and the all-important priority of justice. The passage that deals with God’s will concludes the constructive section of the disputation with the remark that God “wills the evils that are punishments, because he would rather have the order of justice preserved in punishment, than suffer an offending creature to go unpunished.”8 Arminius continues by raising the following question: Can God have two opposite determinations of his will pertaining to one and the same object, and can one determination of his will have opposite objects? He explains that at this time one must consider those attributes which are analogous to the human affections and moral virtues, such as love, hate, goodness, mercy, desire, wrath, justice, etc. These can be subdivided into two groups, where the first are primary or principal, and the second group consists of those that can be derived from the preceding. The primary or principal ————— 6 ETG 105 (III 613): “Deus enim nihil odit praeter injustitiam, quae proprium est et adaequatum objectum odii divini; et propter illam odit impium qui illi renunciare non vult.” 7 AN 949 (II 707). 8 PuD IV (II 130): “sic vult mala poenae; quia mavult ordinem iustitiae servari in punitione, quam impunitatem creaturae peccatricis.”

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attributes are love (and hate as its opposite) and goodness; connected to these are grace, kindness and mercy. Love is an affection of unio with God, and has God and the good of justice as objects, as well as the creature and its felicity.9 Hate is an affection of separatio in God, whose object is injustice and the misery of the creature.10 However, because God primarily loves Himself and the good of justice and at the same time hates injustice, and because He loves the creature and its felicity secondarily and at the same time hates the misery of the creature,11 God hates those creatures that persist in unrighteousness and love their misery.12 With this line of thought, Arminius has actually introduced the duplex amor Dei. He continues in the same line a little further when he writes: Anger is an affection of rejection [depulsio] in God, through the punishment of the creature, who has transgressed his law; by which He brings upon the creature the evil of misery for his unrighteousness [injustitia], and takes the vengeance which is due to Himself, as an indication [indicem] of his love of righteousness and his hatred of sin.13

In what follows, Arminius calls iustitia the moderator (moderatricium) of all affections.14 Justice is also the eternal and constant will in God to give to each its due (cf. definition of Ulpianus): to God Himself what is due to Him, and to the creature what is its due. Arminius considers this justice in both its words and its acts. Truth and consistency are found in all its words, and fidelity in its promises. It occupies itself with two things: disposing and remuneration. With the disposing acts of justice, God determines all things in his actions according to his wisdom, according to the norm of equity that is prescribed or commanded by his wisdom. With remunerative justice, God

————— With references to Prov 16:4, Ps 11: 7; John 3:16; Wis 11:24–26. With references to Ps 5:5; Ezek 25:11; Deut 25:15–16 etc.; Isa 1:24. 11 With references to Ps 11:5; Deut 28:63. 12 With a reference to Isa 66:4. PuD VI (II 130): “LXVII. Amor est affectus unionis in Deo, cuius obiecta sunt Deus ipse et bonum Iustitiae, Creatura et felicitas illius. Odium est affectus separationis in Deo, cuius obiectum est iniustitia et miseria Creaturae. Cum autem Deus praecipuè amet se et bonum iustitiae, eodemque momento iniquitatem odio habeat; creaturam verò eiusque beatitatem secundario amet, et isto momento miseriam creaturae odio habeat; hinc fit, ut creaturam in iniustitia pertinaciter perseverantem odio habeat et amet miseriam illius.” 13 PuD VI (II 132): “Ira est affectus depulsionis in Deo per punitionem Creaturae legem ipsius transgressae, qua creaturae infert malum miseriae pro iniustitia, et vindictam sumit debitam sibi, tanquam indicem amoris erga iustitiam, et odii adversus peccatum.” 14 PuD VI (II 132–133): “LXXIV. Quae in Deo analogiam habent virtutum moralium, velut moderatricium istorum adfectuum, sunt partim ad omnes affectus generales, ut iustitia; partim speciatim nonnullos concernunt, ut patientia, et quae irae sunt et poenarum ex ira moderativae.” 9

10

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gives creatures their due according to their works in accordance with the covenant (ex pacto) He established with them.15 Also in public disputation XII De Lege does Arminius bring up the twofold love of God, now in the context of the moral law. The use (usus) of the moral law changes according to the state of a person. Its primary use, and God’s original intent with it according to his love for justice and his creatures, was that humankind would be made alive through the moral law. Humankind would fulfil the law, and on the basis of that accomplishment be justified and receive the reward that was promised to it ex debito.16 In public disputation XIV on the offices of the Lord Jesus Christ, Arminius writes that Christ paid the full price for our salvation to God through his priesthood, whereby He has satisfied God’s justice and placed Himself between us and the Father, who was justly angry on account of our sins.17 It does not conflict with the merits and satisfaction of Christ which belong to Him as Priest and Sacrifice, that it is God Himself who said that He loves the world and gave his only Son, delivered Him over to death, reconciled the world to Himself in Christ, and saved us and forgave our sins out of his grace. For the affection of God’s love must be considered in two ways: first, as love for his creatures; second, as love for justice, which is connected to a hatred for sin. God wants to satisfy both loves. He satisfied his love for the creature and sinner when He gave his Son as their Mediator. He satisfied his love for justice and his hatred for sin when He imposed on Christ the office of Mediator by the shedding of his blood and his death. And He would not permit Him to be the Surety for sins except when sprinkled with his own blood, through which He could atone for sin. Again, He satisfied his love for his creatures in forgiving sin, and He forgave sin freely through his love for his creatures – although He had already satisfied his love for justice in laying the plague on his Son, in which our peace resides. The effect of this plague was not that God would love his creatures, but because his love for justice no longer prevented it, He out of his love for creatures forgave their sins and gave them eternal life. In this respect it can ————— 15 PuD IV (II 132–133): “LXXV. Iustitia est aeterna et constans in Deo voluntas suum cuique tribuendi: Deo ipsi quod ipsius est, et creaturae quod illius est. Hanc in dictis et factis ipsius consideramus. In dictis omnibus veracitatem et constantiam, in promissis fidelitatem. Factorum est duplex, dispositiva et remunerativa; illa est, secundum quam Deus omnia in actionibus suis ex sapientia sua ad aequitatis ab illa vel praescriptae vel monstratae normam disponit. Ista est per quam Deus creaturae secundum opus ipsius ex pacto cum ipsa inito reddit quod ipsius est.” 16 PuD XII (II 198): “IV. Usus legis moralis varius est secundum varios status hominis. Primarius et à Deo per se intentus iuxta amorem ipsius erga iustitiam et creaturam suam, erat ut homo per illam vivificaretur, hoc est illam praestaret et ex eius praestatione iustificaretur, et praemio per illam promisso ex debito afficeretur.” 17 PuD XIV (II 220–221).

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rightly be said that God satisfied Himself and took pleasure in the Son of his love.18 The close relationship between God’s justice and wisdom, the combination of what befits God and his twofold love for justice and for his creatures, comes out in one sentence in the private disputations on providence. There Arminius calls God’s wisdom the rule (regula) of providence according to which the latter acts. Wisdom always reveals what God ought (deceat) to do according to equity, whether it be according to his goodness, or severity, or love for justice and creatures.19 The significance of the above excerpts from the disputations that relate to the duplex amor Dei is not so much in the content, since they do not contain any important divergences from what we find in Arminius’s earlier, contemporary or later extant writings. Of greatest importance is simply the fact that there are traces of the duplex amor Dei even in the disputations. One may therefore conclude that it had become deeply embedded in Arminius’s thought, and thereby continually exercised its influence and came to the fore either implicitly or explicitly whenever the opportunity arose.20 One such opportunity was the Declaration Arminius made before the States General of the Netherlands in 1608. Declaration As has been noted before, the concept of God’s double love had become fully developed and conceptually crystalized as the duplex amor Dei or tweederley liefde Godes by 1608 in the Declaration of Sentiments. The ————— 18 PuD XIV (II 221–222): “XVI. Neque vero merito et satisfactioni Christi, quae illi tanquam Sacerdoti, et victimae conveniunt, repugnat, quod Deus ipse dicitur mundum dilexisse et Filium suum dedisse, in mortem tradidisse, mundum sibi in Christo reconciliasse, nosque redemisse, et peccata gratis remittere. Nam duplex in Deo considerandus est amoris affectus, unus erga creaturam, alter erga iustitiam, qui habet iunctum odium adversus peccatum. Utrique isti amori voluit Deus satisfacere. Amori erga creaturam et peccatricem satisfecit, quum Filium dedit, qui mediatoris partes perageret: amori verò erga iustitiam et odio adversus peccatum satisfecit, quum Filio imposuit mediatoris munus per sanguinis sui effusionem et mortem obeundum: eumque admittere noluit intercessorem pro peccatoribus nisi proprio sanguine adspersum, in quo expiatio peccatorum fieret. Rursus satisfacit amori erga creaturam quum peccata remittit, et gratis remittit, quia et amore erga creaturam remittit: quamquam imposita Filio plaga, in qua pax nostra fuit, amori suo erga iustitiam iam satisfecerat. Nam illa plaga non est effectus, ut Deus creaturam suam amaret, sed ut non obstante amore erga iustitiam, ex amore erga creaturam peccata remitteret, et vitam aeternam largiretur. Quo respectu etiam rectè dici potest, Deum sibi ipsi satisfecisse, et seipsum placasse in Filio dilectionis suae.” Cf. PuD XVII (II 233); PrD XIX (II 346); XX (II 347–348). 19 PrD XXVIII (II 367): “VI. Regula providentiae secundum quam actus suos producit, est sapientia Dei, monstrans quid Deum deceat, vel secundum bonitatem, vel secundum severitatem ipsius, vel secundum amorem ipsius erga iustitiam, vel erga creaturam, semper secundum aequitatem.” 20 Cf. LOONSTRA, Verkiezing, 24.

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duplex amor Dei is now explicitly the “foundation of Religion” in general, and of the Christian religion in particular.21 There appears to be no essential change in content from the earlier writings, but the way it comes up in the Declaration as well as other later writings justifies the conclusion that it was an important notion in Arminius’s thought, and that he himself became more conscious of it. As evidence, we point particularly to the “foundation” language just mentioned, the connection Arminius draws between the rejection of this foundation of religion and a doctrine of predestination that reverses the order and mutual relationship of the two divine loves, as well as the extensive passages on the twofold love of God itself and on the importance of a correct understanding of it.22 Arminius’s exposition of the duplex amor Dei in the Declaration thus deserves close attention. The context of this exposition is Arminius’s explanation in the form of twenty arguments as to why he rejects a “supralapsarian” – to use an anachronistic term – doctrine of predestination, where creation and fall are means to the execution of God’s absolute decree. In his four “head” summary of supralapsarianism, the emphasis falls on justice and God’s relation to sin. Of the twenty arguments, the nineteenth is by far the most extensive and treats God’s twofold love as the foundation of religion. However, already in the seventh argument, on God’s nature, does God’s justice come up, defined as “a love of righteousness and a hatred of iniquity” and “a perpetual and wise desire in Him to render to every one that which is his due.”23 Even if the term is not explicitly mentioned, the argument is still based on the duplex amor Dei,24 and Arminius’s view of justice likewise forms the background for other arguments either explicitly or implicitly. ————— 21 Already in a letter to Wtenbogaert, undated [1599], Ep.Ecc. 45 (II 749), does Arminius connect the non-functioning of God’s justice to the fundamental (funditus) decay of religion: “nisi Deo justitiam ipsius prorsus adimamus, et misericordiae divinae administrationem liberae ipsius voluntati auferamus. Quo facto, et misericordiae seu bonitatis divinae infinitati salutis dispensatione adscripta, perit funditus religio, et omnibus in universum hominibus, imo et diabolis, vita aeterna adsignatur.” 22 Verklaring, 90–94 (I 634–638). 23 Verklaring, 77 (I 624). 24 Verklaring, 78 (I 624): A doctrine of absolute predestination conflicts with God’s justice as defined by Arminius: “(1) It is at variance with the first of these ideas of justice in the following manner: Because it affirms, that God has absolutely willed to save certain individual men, and has decreed their salvation without having the least regard to righteousness or obedience: The proper inference from which, is, that God loves such men far more than his own justice. – (2) It is opposed to the second idea of his justice: Because it affirms, that God wishes to subject his creature to misery, (which cannot possibly have any existence except as the punishment of sin,) although, at the same time, he does not look upon [or consider] the creature as a sinner, and therefore as not obnoxious either to wrath or to punishment. This is the manner in which it lays down the position, – that God has willed to give to the creature not only something which does not belong to it, but which is connected with its greatest injury: Which is another act directly opposed to his justice. In accordance, therefore, with this doctrine, God, in the first place, detracts from himself that which

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The entire nineteenth argument is devoted to the duplex amor Dei. Its content, length, and relationship to the other arguments allow one safely to conclude that its placement near the end of the Declaration does not imply it is subordinate to the earlier arguments, but is instead where Arminius finally builds his argument up into a climax. God’s twofold love – “without which there neither is nor can be any Religion” – is the foundation of religion “considered in general.” With that, Arminius indicates that he first wants to consider the meaning of God’s twofold love for religion in the prefall situation, irrespective of Christ. It consists of two things: 1. a love for justice, which also produces a hatred for sin. 2. a love for “the creature who is endowed with reason, and (in the matter now before us,) it is a love for man.” Arminius here refers to Hebrews 11:6: “Anyone who comes to God must believe that he exists and that he rewards those who earnestly seek him.” God therefore displays his love for justice in that he does not will to give eternal life except to those who seek him. His love for humankind is that He wills to give them eternal life, should they seek God.25 The section that follows contains an extremely important passage on the mutual relationship of these two loves of God. Arminius writes: A mutual relation subsists between these two kinds of love, which is this: The latter species of love, which extends itself to the creatures, cannot come into existence, except so far as it is permitted by the former, [the love of justice]: The former love, therefore, is by far the most excellent species; but in every direction there is abundant scope for the emanations of the latter, [the love of the creature] – except where the former [the love of justice] has placed some impediment in the range of its exercise. – The first of these consequences is most evidently proved from the circumstance of God’s condemning man on account of sin, although he loves them in the relation in which he stands as his creature; which would by no means have been done, had he loved man more than justice, and had he evinced a stronger aversion to the eternal misery of man than to his disobedience. – But the second consequence is proved by this argument, that God condemns no person, except on account of sin; and that he saves such a multitude of men who turn themselves away [or are converted] from sin; – which he could not do, unless it was his will to allow as abundant scope to his love for the creatures, as is permitted by justice under the regulation of the Divine judgment.26

According to Arminius, it is exactly this relationship that is reversed in the doctrine of absolute predestination. This reversal occurs in two ways: 1. When it is stated that God wills to save some “absolutely” without taking their obedience into consideration in his decision to save, God’s love for ————— is rightly his own, and then imparts to the creature what does not belong to it, to its great misery and unhappiness.” 25 Verklaring, 90 (I 634). 26 Verklaring, 90 (I 634–635).

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humanity is placed before his love for justice. In that case, God loves the person more than justice. 2. When God is said to will to condemn some “absolutely” without taking account of their disobedience in his decree, there is taken away from his love for creatures that which rightly belongs to it, and God then hates his creatures without this actually being necessary from his love for justice and his hatred for sin. It is then no longer true that sin is the one and only deserved cause of God’s hate.27 Arminius goes on to remark that the extent to which this works to uproot the very foundation of religion can readily be demonstrated. The end of religion, which is practical (cf. 2.2.2), consists in the worship of God. For this reason, the parable Arminius relates to illustrate that the reversal of the order of God’s love overturns the foundation of religion, pertains precisely to what incites fervent worship of God in obedience to his commandments: Suppose a son to say, “My father is such a great lover of justice and equity, that, notwithstanding I am his beloved son, he would disinherit me if I were found disobedient to him: Obedience, therefore, is a duty which I must sedulously cultivate, and which is highly incumbent upon me, if I wish to be his heir.” – Suppose another son to say: “My father’s love for me is so great, that he is absolutely resolved to make me his heir: There is therefore no necessity for my earnestly striving to yield him obedience; for, according to his unchangeable will, I shall become his heir. Nay, he will by an irresistible force draw me to obey him, rather than not suffer me to be made his heir.”28

Arminius goes on to apply the principle of God’s twofold love to the Christian religion which is founded on the former. This [twofold – wdb] love, however, is to be considered in a manner somewhat different, in consequence of the change in the condition of man, who, when he had been created after the image of God and in his favour, became by his own fault a sinner and an enemy of God. God’s love for justice on which the christian religion rests, is, first, that justice which he declared once, which was in Christ; because it was his will that sin should not be expiated in any other way than by the blood and death of his Son, and that Christ should not be admitted before him as advocate and intercessor, except when sprinkled by his own blood. – But this love of righteousness is, secondly, that which he daily manifests in the preaching of the gospel, in which he declares it to be his will to grant communication of Christ and his benefits to no man, except to him who becomes converted and believes in Christ.29

The change from the way God’s love for justice manifested itself in the Legal theology is that in the Evangelical theology, Christ is central as the ————— 27 28 29

Verklaring, 90–91 (I 635). Verklaring, 91 (I 635–636). Verklaring, 91–92 (I 636).

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one who atoned for sin through his death in order to satisfy God’s justice. Sinners profit from this justice and share in the righteousness won by Christ through faith in Christ. Communion with Christ is established through faith in Him, and his righteousness is imputed to those who believe. As to the changes in the Evangelical theology for the way God’s love for humankind, now considered as sinners, is revealed: God’s love of miserable sinners, on which likewise the christian religion is founded, is, first, that love by which He gave his Son for them, and constituted him a saviour of those who obey Him. – But this love of sinners is, secondly, that by which he hath required obedience, not according to the rigour and severity to which he was entitled by his own supreme right, but according to his grace and clemency, and with the addition of a promise of the remission of sins, provided fallen man repent.30

God’s love for humanity is thus revealed in his gift of Christ to them, so that they may share in salvation through obedience consisting of faith and repentance. The gracious character of the Evangelical theology comes out even more in the way God demands the obedience of faith and repentance: not as in the first covenant, according to the strict demands of perfect obedience to God’s right, but in the way of grace, that is, in Christ. Arminius is moreover convinced that a supralapsarian view of predestination conflicts with the foundation of the Christian religion in two ways. First, in the case of election, when it reverses the order of God’s love and subordinates God’s love for justice to his love for humanity. Second, in the case of reprobation, not only is the order there reversed, but God is even made to act injustly: First, by stating, “that God has such a great love for certain sinners, that it was his will absolutely to save them before he had given satisfaction, through Jesus Christ, to his love of justice, and that he thus willed their salvation even in his own foreknowledge and according to his determinate purpose.” Besides, it totally and most completely overturns this foundation, by teaching it to be “God’s pleasure, that satisfaction should be paid to his justice, because he willed absolutely to save such persons:” Which is nothing less, than to make his love for justice, manifested in Christ, subordinate to his love for sinful man whom it is his will absolutely to save. – Secondly, it opposes itself to this foundation, by teaching, “that it is the will of God absolutely to damn certain sinners without any consideration of their impenitency;” – when at the same time a most plenary and complete satisfaction had been rendered, in Christ Jesus, to God’s love of justice and to his hatred of sin: So that nothing now can hinder the possibility of his extending mercy to the sinner, whosoever he may be, except the condition of repentance: Unless some person should choose to assert, what is stated in this doctrine, “that is has been God’s will to act towards the greater part of

————— 30

Verklaring, 92 (I 636).

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mankind with the same severity as he exercised towards the devil and his angels, or even with greater.”31

Arminius also wants to look more closely at the passage from Hebrews 11, which was cited earlier, in order to illustrate the way in which the twofold love of God is the foundation of all religion, as well as “the mutual relationship that subsists between the two, as we have already described them.” In Hebrews 11:6 two things are laid down as foundations to religion, in opposition to two fiery darts of Satan, which are the most pernicious pests to it, and each of which is able by itself to overturn and extirpate all religion: One of them is carelessness [securitas], the other despair [desperatio]. Carelessness operates, when a man persuades himself, that, how inattentive soever he may be to the worship of God, he will not be damned, but will obtain salvation. Despair is in operation, when a person entertains a persuasion, that, whatever degree of reverence he may evince towards God, he will not receive any remuneration. In what human mind soever either of these pests is fostered, it is impossible that any true and proper worship of God can there reside. Now both of them are overturned by the words of the Apostle: For if a man firmly believes, “that God will bestow eternal life on those alone who seek him, but that He will inflict on the rest death eternal,” he can on no account indulge himself in carelessness. And if he likewise believes, that “God is truly a rewarder of those who diligently seek Him,” by applying himself to the search he will not be in danger of falling into despair.32

As Arminius sees it, both carelessness and despair undermine religion in a most dangerous way. Both are further greatly promoted by a supralapsarian view of predestination. For not only do God’s two loves not function properly if at all, but their internal relationship is also overturned. At the end of his exposition, Arminius summarizes and emphasizes once more the fundamental importance of the duplex amor Dei for religion. It also appears as if Arminius’s view on the assurance of faith (see 4.4) comes up “automatically” whenever carelessness and despair are removed. Through a proper understanding of God’s twofold love, carelessness and despair disappear so that the assurance of faith begins to function properly. The foundation of the former kind of faith by which a man firmly believes, “that God will bestow eternal life on none except on those who seek Him,” is that love which God bears to his own justice, and which is greater than that which He entertains for man: And, by this alone, all cause of carelessness is removed. But the foundation of the latter kind of faith, “that God will undoubtedly be a rewarder of those who diligently seek Him,” is that great love for man which neither will nor can prevent God from effecting salvation for him, except he be hindered by his still greater love for justice. Yet the latter kind of love is so far from operating as a hindrance to God from

————— 31 32

Verklaring, 92–93 (I 636–637). Verklaring, 93 (I 637–638).

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becoming a rewarder to those who diligently seek Him, that, on the contrary, it promotes in every possible way the bestowment of that reward. Those persons, therefore, who seek God, can by no means indulge in a single doubt concerning his readiness to remunerate: And it is this which acts as a preservative against despair or distrust. – Since this is the actual state of the case, this twofold love, and the mutual relation which each part of it bears to the other and which we have just unfolded, are the foundation of religion, without which no religion can possibly exist. That doctrine, therefore, which is in open hostility to this mutual love and to the relation that mutually subsists between them, is, at the same time, subversive of the foundation of all religion.33

Arminius also refers to his own view of predestination, the four decrees (see 3.3.5), as the “foundation of the Christian religion; because in it the twofold love of God may be united together, God’s love of justice, and his love of men, may with the greatest consistency be reconciled to each other.” Furthermore, it prevents despair to the necessary degree.34 From this, it is clear that Arminius himself was aware of the connection between his view on predestination and the concept of the duplex amor Dei. His view of predestination was so conceived that the duplex amor Dei could come to full expression and be fully accommodated. It thus goes without saying that despair and carelessness, which follow from an incorrect view of predestination and God’s twofold love, fall from sight when the latter is properly construed. Earlier we saw how in the context of the Evangelical theology, God’s primary love for justice results in a fundamental place for Christ with respect to God’s grace in the gospel (see also 3.3). Conference of August 1609 A record of the last “friendly conference” between Arminius and Gomarus, held in August 1609 at the request of the States, but discontinued due Arminius’s illness to which he would shortly thereafter succumb, has been preserved in a letter from Festus Hommius to Sibrandus Lubbertus. Hommius’s notes reveal that Arminius once more expanded on the duplex amor Dei, and that he did so at length. Arminius explained why he rejected that predestination is the destining of certain individuals to their own supernatural ends (esse destinationem certarum singularium personarum ad suos fines supernaturales):

————— 33 34

Verklaring, 93–94 (I 638). Verklaring, 110 (I 655).

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I. Because it overturns the Christian religion whose foundation of every religion is the duplex amor Dei: 1. love of justice; 2. love of man. Both are overturned by the doctrine of predestination. II. Because it overturns the Christian religion whose foundation is the same twofold love. Love of justice requires that God save no one but a believer, and condemns no one but an unbeliever. Love of man requires that He does not condemn a person unless he is a sinner. Predestination overturns both. 35

Also about irresistible grace did Arminius according to Hommius’s report say that it “conflicts with that duplex amor Dei of 1. justice, and 2. humanity” (pugnat cum duplici illo DEI amore. 1. Justitiae. 2. Hominis.) These two quotations show that God’s twofold love continued to be an important argument for Arminius against the supralapsarian view of predestination right up until the end of his life. It must further be noted that Arminius thought his objections against “supralapsarianism” also applied to the two other views on predestination, including “infralapsarianism,” that he briefly summarizes. These latter two views do want to avoid making creation and fall “a mediate cause foreordained by God for the execution of the preceding decree of Predestination.” The second view places election and the first part of reprobation (i.e. preterition) before the fall, while in the third view both election and reprobation in their entirety come after the fall. Arminius claims, however, that a careful examination will lead one to conclude that “the fall of Adam cannot possibly, according to [the latter two – wdb] views, be considered in any other manner than as a necessary means for the execution of the preceding decree of Predestination.”36 And even if one could not conclude the necessity of the fall from them, “yet all the preceding arguments which have been produced against the first [i.e. supralapsarian – wdb] opinion, are, after a trifling modification to suit the varied purpose, equally valid against the two latter.”37

————— 35 “I. Quia evertit Religionem Christianam cujus fundamentum omnis Religionis est duplex Amor DEI. 1. Amor justitiae. 2. Amor Hominis. Uterque evertitur doctrina de Praedestinatione. II. Quia evertit Religionem Christianam cujus fundamentum idem duplex amor est. Amor justitiae exigit ut DEVS neminem salvet nisi fidelem, neminem damnet, nisi infidelem. Amor hominis ut hominem non damnet nisi peccatorem. Utrumque evertit Praedest.” The letter can be found in WIJMINGA, Festus Hommius, Appendix G. 36 Verklaring, 101 (I 648). 37 Verklaring, 103 (I 653).

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4.2 The Relationship Between Arminius’s Two “Foundation” Statements Arminius did not call just the duplex amor Dei the foundation of the Christian religion. Various times he refers also to his own view of predestination as the “foundation of Christianity, and of salvation and its certainty [i.e. assurance of salvation – wdb].”38 This is one of the reasons that led Stanglin to his main conclusion that “Arminius’s search for true assurance of salvation emerges as a decisive factor in his famous dissent from Reformed theology.”39 In my opinion, this conclusion is not justified for reasons I will outline in 4.4. Before that, however, it will be necessary to examine the relationship between the two foundation statements. A careful study will reveal that the two actually form a complex, yet coherent, unity, and must not be regarded as either parallel or contradictory statements. Predestination is 1. the foundation of Christianity; 2. the foundation of salvation; and 3. the foundation of assurance. “Christianity” is identical to “the Christian religion.” If we combine these data with the expressions relating to the duplex amor Dei, we arrive at the following: The foundation of the Christian religion is the duplex amor Dei. God’s love for justice is the foundation for the belief that God saves only those who seek him, and thus it is also the foundation of salvation (and at the same time, a means to prevent carelessness, securitas). God’s love for humanity is the foundation for the belief that God surely saves those who seek him, and thus it is also the foundation of the assurance of salvation (and at the same time, a means to prevent despair, desperatio). The preceding comparison shows that these two separate foundation statements of Arminius have the same content, and form a more-or-less consistent and coherent whole. In 4.1 we could already come to the same conclusion from statements in Arminius’s own Declaration concerning the relationship between God’s twofold love, predestination and the assurance of faith.40 God’s love for justice is thus the primary foundation of Christianity and salvation, while God’s love for humanity is the secondary – subordinate to God’s love for justice – foundation of Christianity, of salvation, and of the assurance of salvation. The relationship of God’s love for justice to the assurance of salvation is as follows: in that God’s love for justice is primary and precedes God’s love for man, the assurance of salvation cannot become securitas or carelessness. ————— 38

A31A 139 (I 748); Verklaring, 106 (I 654), cf. 69 (I 617); HaC 943 (II 699); AN 957 (II

719). 39 40

See the book description on www.brill.com [Dec. 1, 2009]. Verklaring, 110 (I 655–656).

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The relationship between the duplex amor Dei and predestination is that the first is the broader concept on which the second is based. A correct understanding of predestination is in terms of content fully in line with the duplex amor Dei. Finally, as has been illustrated above (see 3.3.5), predestination, covenant and gospel are concepts with considerable overlap in Arminius’s theology, are at times even used more or less synonymously, and further all come under the broader umbrella of the duplex amor Dei. In terms of content, the duplex amor Dei is the most full, and for that reason determines the way the other more general or specific concepts must be understood.

4.3 Salvation For Arminius, an unconditional doctrine of predestination is damaging to human salvation. It hinders true sorrow for sin since the conscience is not affected by sin; sin was committed according to an unavoidable necessity resulting from God’s decree. It takes away assurance, for one would be as a dead man before grace, unable to feel or hear it, and unable to agree with or be obedient to it (and thus be converted, etc., on account of an unavoidable necessity). Zeal for doing good would also be obstructed, even as the zeal for prayer and a life lived in proper fear and trembling. It also leads to a despair when it comes to doing what must be done, and obtaining what one wants.41

4.4 Assurance of Faith Assurance of faith or salvation is closely related to, and results from, different elements within soteriology. In the Reformed tradition, the doctrine of predestination (and perseverance) formed one of the pillars of the assurance of faith. Already in Arminius’s exposition of Romans 9 do we find clear expressions on the assurance of faith. His view did not undergo any change thereafter. The firmness (firmitas) of salvation comes from God’s decision (propositum) to save those who believe in Christ, and in that way to seek justification and salvation. At the same time (simul), assurance (certitudo) is engendered in a person as acording to the following conclusion: “I believe in Christ, therefore (ergo) I am saved or elected.” This proposition ————— 41

Verklaring, 86–87 (I 631–632).

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finds its proof (firmamentum) in the fact that God decided from eternity to save those who believe in Christ.42 As will be shown in greater detail below, God’s decision must here be taken synonymously with predestination, the gospel and God’s twofold love. For Arminius, the assurance of faith is at bottom anchored in God’s eternal decree. A believer receives concrete assurance if he has knowledge of this decree, and as believer in Christ can then conclude that his salvation is thereby guaranteed. Arminius could therefore maintain that predestination is the foundation of the assurance of faith just as well as his colleagues did. However, the fundamental difference lies therein, that Arminius had a different view on predestination. For him, predestination does not consist in an electing or reprobating of certain people as such, but rather of people who believe or do not believe. For that reason, assurance of faith is also not a duty or demand from God, but a consequence of God’s promise that He will surely save those who believe. Unless one doubts God’s will for believers, it is impossible that a person who believes and knows that he or she believes should doubt of his or her own salvation.43 Assurance therefore does not belong to the essence or demand of faith, but is a necessary fruit of a properly functioning faith. The doctrine of election must be taught with moderation to those in the church who have a weak faith, without causing them to stumble. Arminius knows from experience (haec scribo expertus) that those who are weak in faith begin to doubt the minute they hear that they cannot be certain of their own election unless they believe what they are taught concerning election and reject everything else: does the assurance I feel come from the witness of the Spirit, or from a certain persuasion or presumption?44 In the pactum God established with the Son, he united the two highest offices in Christ, which is the greatest proof that iustitia and mercy work together for human salvation. That, too, leads to the greatest assurance of salvation earned by this royal priest. Through his priesthood He earned salvation; through his priesthood He was made King, and thereby received the right from the Father to dispense salvation.45 In this unity of priesthood and kingship, also the whole church composed of believers is united with ————— 42 AR9 786 (III 497): “Hoc proposito nititur salutis nostrae firmitas ut apparet, et simul in nobis eius certitudo. Hoc enim Enthymemate illam concludimus, Ego sum fidelis, vel ego credo in Christum; ergo ero salvus, vel ergo sum electus. Cuius firmamentum est in hac propositione: Quotquot credunt in Christum, illos statuit Deus ab aeterno immutabiliter salvare; quibus verbis propositi istius summa continetur.” 43 RQ9 186 (II 67); cf. AN 960 (II 723). 44 EP 680 (III 338). 45 OR 19–20 (I 422–423).

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God Himself in a most intimate and inseparable way.46 It is evident here that (the satisfaction of) God’s justice, and therefore Christ’s priesthood, are of fundamental importance for the assurance of faith. In his Declaration, Arminius writes that through the “action of the Holy Spirit” (drijvinghe des heylighen Gheestes) and the fruits of faith, and through one’s own conscience and “the testimony of God’s Spirit” (mede ghetuygenisse des H. Geestes), one can receive assurance. But because God is more than our heart, and because it is He who judges us, “I dare not place this assurance on an equality with that by which we know there is a God, and that Christ is the Saviour of the world.”47 At this point we need to deal at length with Stanglin’s main conclusion that the doctrine of assurance was determinative for the formation of Arminius’s theology, and the driving force behind his polemics against certain aspects of the Reformed theology of his time.48 Here Stanglin’s conclusions differ considerably from our own. Stanglin uses rather strong expressions to characterize the importance of assurance for Arminius’s theology, and for the background to the Leiden debates: “one of the great motivating factors”, “central importance”, “decisive factor”, “important foundation and driving force”, “point of departure”, “fundamental criterion for the orthodoxy of a predestinarian system”, “quintessential condition”, “priority of place for assurance”, “one of Arminius’s key criticisms”, “recurring theme in many of his works”, “impelling factor”. In summary, “In a sense, assurance is the impetus and sine qua non of the debate, the root of the controversy. Arminius’s system has been called a theology of creation; perhaps it could also be called a theology of assurance.”49 We need to consider whether Stanglin’s conclusions are justified. To this end, a number of ambiguities in Stanglin’s study will first be highlighted, followed by an examination of his thesis as such. The first ambiguity concerns the heavy emphasis Stanglin places on the determinative significance of the academic disputations. In 1.1 I have already argued at length why I do not follow Stanglin on the authorship of the disputations. Yet another issue is Stanglin’s own claim that his research is heavily based on the academic disputations,50 that the public disputations ————— 46 OR 20 (I 422): “quid de hac coniunctione censebimus, in qua totius Ecclesiae fidelium et Dei ipsius lucem inaccessam habitantis unio unitissima et nunquam separanda consistit!” 47 Verklaring, 115–116 (I 670–671). See also ETG 149 (III 650): “Euangelium docet fideles et resipiscentes ad vitam aeternam electos esse: (hoc est definitio electionis:) at vero ego sum fidelis et vere resipiscens; sic enim testatur mihi conscientia mea, et Spiritus sanctus simul testatur cum corde meo: Ergo ego sum electus ad vitam aeternam.” 48 STANGLIN, Assurance. 49 STANGLIN, Assurance, xiii.10.91–93.113–114.145.149.173.193.243–244. 50 STANGLIN, Assurance, xiii.

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are an “essential source for knowledge of the debates,” a “necessary component for knowing the full story of the Arminian controversy”. The 35 previously unpublished disputations which Stanglin unearthed are another important part of his emphasis on the disputations, and of the originality of his research. Without these lost disputations, an overview of Arminius’s theology is “incomplete and perhaps even insufficient. Without the disputations, we can, at best, only maintain a cautious confidence in our interpretation of Arminius.”51 It is remarkable, however, that in Stanglin’s study it is neither the published nor the previously-unpublished disputations that shed new light on Arminius. A comparison of Arminius’s disputations with those of his Leiden colleagues instead shows significant agreement in the majority of cases – which is in itself, of course, a significant observation. However, when it comes to illustrating how Arminius’s views on the assurance of faith diverges, the disputations are rarely used. In the section on the “A Priori Grounding” of assurance, where the greatest differences between Arminius and his colleagues are noted, we find only one reference to a disputation. This concerns the oft-cited public disputation 15, from which Stanglin also drew the citation in the front-matter of his book.52 One of the previously unpublished disputations, De iustificatione from 1603, is cited remarkably often, especially to illustrate the points of agreement between Arminius and his colleagues. However, it is precisely for this disputation that there are doubts concerning authorship, a fact to which Stanglin himself has pointed extensively.53 Aside from this discrepancy between the insistence on the great significance of the disputations on the one hand, and the lack of importance precisely these same disputations appear to have for establishing Stanglin’s main conclusion, another ambiguity needs to be pointed out. This concerns the discrepancy that exists between the heavy emphasis in the citations above on the significance of the assurance of faith as the driving force and point of departure for Arminius’s theology and polemics with his colleagues, over against the rather meager support from a very limited number of sources when Stanglin lays out Arminius’s own view on the assurance of faith. Aside from the aforementioned public disputation 15, the Declaration forms the most important source together with passages from two letters.54 Extensive citations are also taken from the preface to the Opera signed by Arminius’s children, though most likely composed by Wtenbogaert.55 This —————

54

STANGLIN, Assurance, 45, cf. 76. STANGLIN, Assurance, 180. STANGLIN, Assurance, 54–56. Cf. 105–110.212. These are two letters to Wtenbogaert: Oct. 1, 1602, Ep.Ecc. 56, and Dec. 31, 1605, Ep.Ecc.

55

STANGLIN, Assurance, 175–176.

51 52 53

81.

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means that the strongest argument comes from the Declaration of 1608, a late work which is further of a different genre than most of Arminius’s other works, and originally intended for an audience composed of magistrates. Precisely for such an audience one might expect the emphasis to be placed on a practical issue such as the assurance of faith and the avoidance of carelessness and despair, which would function in that context as a powerful and persuasive argument and be expressly intended that way as well. Stanglin did succeed in showing that Arminius was concerned with the assurance of faith and with the dangers that lie on either side of it (securitas and desperatio).56 However, these two do not so much pose a danger for certitudo, the epistemological aspect of salvation, as for salvation itself (i.e. ontologically) and the sanctification that is inseparably connected to it. Arminius’s fundamental concern was the ontological basis for assurance. It was precisely on this point that he and his colleagues parted ways, as Stanglin has indeed illustrated. Aside from the issues related to sources, other arguments could be mentioned to show that the assurance of salvation was not the great motivating factor in Arminius’s theology. One cannot maintain that Arminius would have had no difficulties with the ontological doctrine of salvation of his colleague had the epistemological aspect in his opinion not led to securitas and desperatio. This touches on a third ambiguity in Stanglin’s study, in that he on a number of occasions considers also the problem of evil as a formative element in Arminius’s theology: “The frequency with which Arminius pressed this point indicates how central it was to his polemic and that the resolution of the problem of evil was a formative factor in his own doctrine of predestination.”57 At one point he identifies the problem of evil as the first of “two primary impelling factors”. “The motivation to resolve the problem of evil drove Arminius to reconcile God’s grace and omniscience with human freedom (per Molina), which affected the doctrines of creation, predestination, salvation, and God.”58 Related to this, Stanglin on the one hand argues that Arminius’s view on the assurance of faith was formative and determinative for the shape of his doctrine of predestination,59 while he on the other hand posits that “Arminius’s conditional predestination arises from the need to reconcile divine grace with human willing and resolve the problem of evil that he detected in supralapsarianism.”60 Nowhere does Stanglin connect these two factors (i.e. the problem of evil ————— 56 57 58 59 60

For the last part, see especially STANGLIN, Assurance, 150.175.177.179.181.187.189.191. STANGLIN, Assurance, 88. Cf. 78.87.92.113–114.243. STANGLIN, Assurance, 113. STANGLIN, Assurance, 10.91–93.186.244. STANGLIN, Assurance, 92.

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and assurance) in a way that would illustrate why these two elements simultaneously motivated Arminius to conceive of predestination as he did. The omission of such an attempt to bring these two most important motives together also becomes visible when Stanglin points to the duplex amor Dei as proof for his thesis that assurance of faith lay at the core of the matter. Nowhere does Stanglin work out what God’s primary love for justice means in the duplex amor Dei, what background it has in his thought, and how this justice relates to the assurance of faith.61 Stanglin draws a distinction between the three fundamentum statements of Arminius. The first is the duplex amor Dei, which consists of God’s love for justice and God’s love for miserable sinners (miseros peccatores). The two remaining fundamenta, Christ as fundamentum electionis and the second of Arminius’s four predestination decrees as fundamentum Christianismi, Salutis, et Certitudinis de Salute, according to Stanglin pertain only to God’s secondary love for sinners. In Stanglin’s exposition, therefore, God’s primary amor erga justitiam has a rather isolated place without any connection to the two other fundamenta, which are closely related to God’s antecedent or consequent will, faith and Christ. God’s primary love for justice, however, is integrally related to the assurance of faith as Arminius understood it, and cannot be separated from it. Stanglin’s one-sided exposition of God’s secondary love in the duplex amor Dei is problematic and results in a distorted view. As has been outlined above, Arminius’s view on the assurance of salvation can be found already in writings from before his appointment to Leiden. Stanglin, however, by and large overlooks this. It is further clear that Arminius deeply entered into questions related to predestination from 1590 onwards. Stanglin’s emphasis on the significance of the academic context for the polemics surrounding Arminius, and his claim that Arminius was moved to counter all forms of an absolute doctrine of predestination especially because of his Leiden colleagues’ supralapsarianism, cannot be reconciled with these data. For too long, historians and theologians have located the starting point of Arminius’s conditional predestination in a reaction against Bezan supralapsarianism. I have already argued that the culprit may very well be supralapsarianism, but it would more likely be the supralapsarianism located in Leiden, not Geneva. In other words, it is the presence of supralapsarianism all around Arminius in Leiden, not just Geneva or Cambridge, that continues to drive the intensity of his polemic against all forms of unconditional predestination.62

————— 61 62

Cf. e.g. STANGLIN, Assurance, 89–91.219.221.229.230. STANGLIN, Assurance, 92; cf. 33–34.

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Of course, Arminius’s position as professor of theology will have been of great significance for the direction of the conflict. The supralapsarianism of his colleagues will certainly not have been without influence. However, it does not fit with what is known about Arminius’s views from before 1603, his time of study in Geneva, his exposition of Paul’s letter to the Romans, his epistolary exchange with Junius and his response to Perkins, and further with Arminius’s broad ecclesiastical and theological outlook, to attribute so much influence to the specific context at Leiden in the years 1603–1609. All the same, Stanglin’s portrayal of the considerable consensus among the Leiden theologians on many points is very insightful for a proper contextualization of Arminius’s thought.63 Precisely because the question motivating Stanglin’s research is so close to our own, although it led to a different conclusion, it was necessary to consider his arguments and proofs in detail. The questions I raised justify the conclusion that the valuable elements in Stanglin’s study still do not allow us to adopt his main thesis, which stands in need of significant adjustment. Arminius refers to God’s decree to justify believers and to exclude unbelievers from justification and salvation (i.e. the election of believers) as the “foundation of Christianity, of salvation and its certainty [i.e. assurance of salvation – wdb]”.64 This phrase was most probably not coined by Arminius himself. We note that in the Declaration, after laying out his opponents’s view, Arminius continues as follows: “These opinions concerning Predestination are considered, by some65 of those who advocate them, to be the foundation of Christianity, salvation and of its certainty”. Arminius similarly chose words whereby he appears to indicate that this phrase is not his own in the Examen thesium Gomari, where he outlines a view of predestination “which is said to be the foundation of Christianity, of our salvation, and of our certainty about salvation”.66 The suspicion that Arminius here adopts an existing phrase67 and appropriates it for his own theology, is confirmed by the fact that he employs it a number of times exactly when he ————— 63 See, for example, the discussion on the assurance of faith, STANGLIN, Assurance, 198.202– 204.235. 64 “fundamentum Christianismi, salutis et certitudinis de salute”; A31A 139 (I 748); Verklaring, 106 (I 654), cf. 69 (I 617); HaC 943 (II 699); AN 957 (II 719); PrD XL (II 393); ETG 34– 35.150 (III 554.651). 65 Some others consider that knowledge of this predestination is not “the foundation of Christianity or of salvation, or that it is necessary to salvation in the same manner as the doctrine of the Gospel”. Verklaring, 71–72 (I 619). 66 ETG 34–35 (III 554): “quod dicitur esse Christianismi, salutis nostrae et certitudinis de salute fundamentum”. 67 For the use of the phrase in the discussion between the Remonstrants and Counter-Remonstrants, see HSC 33.61.71.

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comes out openly for his views: in his letter to Hippolitus a Collibus, in his Apology and in his Declaration. A number of times it is written in italics, which is an added indication that we are dealing with an already existing formula that Arminius merely cited from elsewhere. Also in Arminius’s notes, the Articuli nonnulli, can it be found. In one note Arminius calls his view of predestination the foundation of Christianity, of salvation and of assurance, while in the next note he denies that an absolute doctrine of predestination is its foundation. Also here it is thus quite possible that Arminius adopted an already current formulation, adjusted it and integrated it into his own theology. It occurs one time in Arminius’s private disputations, as concluding thesis to a disputation on the predestination of believers. Arminius writes that this predestination (haec praedestinatio) is the foundation of Christianity, salvation and assurance. The emphatic haec appears to presuppose that there is yet another doctrine of predestination, which fits seamlessly with Arminius’s earlier use of the formulation in a polemical and apologetic context. Earlier (4.2) we saw that the content Arminius supplies for the fundamentum statement of his opponents fits well with Arminius’s own fundamentum concept. Since the one fundamentum statement was most likely taken over from others, it ought not to be taken on its own but must be explained from the perspective of Arminius’s own theology and particularly from his own fundamentum concept, the duplex amor Dei. Arminius can therefore accept the existing phrase, but understood in an “Arminian” way. However, it remains a phrase taken over from others. In Arminius’s own concept, an explicit notion of assurance of faith is absent, although in the Declaration it does form the occasion for rejecting the two dangerous “pests of religion,” carelessness and despair, and therefore also the basis for an understanding of the assurance of faith which as a golden mean intervenes between the two extremes of carelessness and despair. There is thus a close relationship between Arminius’s duplex amor Dei and the assurance of faith. However, on the basis of Arminius’s adoption (and adaptation) of the fundamentum statement that explicitly includes the assurance of faith, one cannot conclude that for that reason Arminius was most concerned with the assurance of faith, and that it formed his deepest theological motive for seeking a divergent theology. Assurance of faith was certainly an important issue for Arminius, and he was convinced that the assurance of faith itself was threatened through his opponents’ views and could not be founded on a doctrine of absolute predestination. However, this was not the core issue, but rather a symptom of an even more fundamental problem. That deeper problem was caused by the failure to protect God’s justice. Arminius for that reason constructed his own fundamentum concept around the theme of God’s love for justice in relation to God’s love for humankind.

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Only a correct understanding of God’s twofold love, in their proper mutual order and relationship, can provide the Christian religion with a solid foundation. And when the Christian religion has a solid foundation, aside from a proper understanding of the doctrines of God, humanity, free choice, atonement, etc., one will also gain a biblical understanding of the assurance of faith and thereby avoid the two “pests of religion” (securitas and desperatio), making room for a certitudo of faith that protects and promotes a proper fear of God. For that reason Arminius also states that his own view of predestination “greatly promotes the salvation of men”: It is also the power, and the very means which lead to salvation, by exciting and creating within the mind of man sorrow on account of sin, a solicitude about his conversion, faith in Jesus Christ, a studious desire to perform good works, and zeal in prayer, and by causing men to work out their salvation with fear and trembling. It likewise prevents despair, as far as such prevention is necessary.68

4.5 Summary and Conclusion In chapter 4, all elements relating to the place and function of God’s justice in Arminius’s theology are brought together in the concept of the duplex amor Dei. He had used this concept already early on, but appears to have developed it further over the course of the years. By 1608 it is fully crystalized, and forms the cornerstone of his theology, a basic concept in which his theological motives are most clearly evident. God’s twofold love is the foundation of (the Christian) religion. It consists in 1. primarily a love for justice; 2. secondarily, and subordinate to the preceding, a love for humanity and its salvation. The order of these two loves is of fundamental importance: the second love can operate only insofar as the first allows, and is allowed to function only where the first does not prevent it. This implies that God does condemn sinners, in spite of his love for humanity, precisely because he loves justice more than humanity. However, it also implies that God cannot condemn anyone except on account of sin, and that he saves all sinners who have been made righteous through faith in Christ. The core of Arminius’s objection to the doctrine of predestination as taught by his opponents is that, as he sees it, it reverses the internal order of the love of God. There God’s love for humanity is placed ahead of his love for justice if he wills the salvation of some without taking into account their faith in Christ. If it is taught that God reprobates or wills to condemn some people without consideration of their sin or disobedience, no account is ————— 68

Verklaring, 109–110 (I 655).

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taken of either of God’s two loves at all and God in fact appears to be acting unjustly. It is also for this reason that Arminius refers to the four-decree doctrine of predestination as the foundation of the Christian religion, since it is exactly there that he sees God’s twofold love properly expressed. According to him this is not so in the view of his opponents, which promotes either carelessness (securitas) or despair (desperatio). Arminius’s view on the assurance of faith, which maintains the golden mean between carelessness and despair, ought thus to be considered the consequence of his concept of the duplex amor Dei. For this reason, the position that holds the doctrine of assurance as decisive for the formation of Arminius’s theology and as the driving force behind his polemics against certain aspects of Reformed theology (so Stanglin 2007) cannot be maintained.

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5.1 Controversial Elements in Arminius’s Theology 5.1.1 Predestination: Absolute or Conditional? In his epistolary exchange with Arminius, Junius wrote that predestination excludes any and every condition, including sin; sin is not taken into account.1 As has already been noted, Arminius on the other hand does posit conditions in the object of predestination: sin, Christ’s satisfaction and participation in it by means of faith. God predestines a person at a “moment” when the latter has not only natural, but also supernatural gifts. As long as that person possesses them, God does not pass him or her by. On this basis Arminius concludes that prior to predestination, God had foreseen that humankind would lose these supernatural gifts through its own sin and transgressions.2 Sin is thus once again condition in the object of predestination. As we noted in 3.3 in connection with the asymmetry of election and reprobation, Arminius makes two important additions to Perkins’s depiction of the view that sees election as based on God’s foreknowledge of future faith, and reprobation on foreknowledge of unbelief or rejection of the gospel. Arminius qualifies faith more closely as a faith which “God has out of grace decreed to bestow upon the same by the ordinary means ordained by Himself.”3 With respect to unbelief, Arminius adds that “the whole fault [...] rests with the reprobate themselves.”4 This, as well as what was noted in chapter 2, allows us to conclude that Arminius held predestination to be fully conditional, the most important reason being God’s justice. We add, however, that Arminius did not consider his doctrine of predestination “conditional” as understood by his opponents, where conditionality undoes the fully gracious character of predestination. Since predestination is tantamount to gospel and new covenant, ————— AC 520–521 (III 107). AC 526–529 (III 115–120). 3 EP 749 (III 441): “Electionem ad salutem esse secundum praescientiam futurae fidei, quam Deus ordinariis mediis ab ipso ordinatis conferre iisdem ex gratia decrevit.” 4 EP 749 (III 441): “Reprobationem vero secundum praescientiam infidelitatis, sive contemptus Evangelii, cuius culpa tota residet in ipsis reprobis.” 1 2

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comes from God’s own good pleasure in fallen and sinful people, and is founded on the gracious sending of God’s Son as Mediator and atoning sacrifice, Arminius escapes the charge that he teaches a conditional predestination and makes salvation depend on humanity in any way. It was precisely the absolute element that Arminius’s opponents did not find in his theology – for them, the conditio sine qua non of a Reformed doctrine of predestination – that was unacceptable to Arminius because of the implications for God’s justice. Whether or not predestination as understood by Arminius is conditional in a “Pelagian” sense as this word was used by his opponents (i.e. that salvation in the end depends on a human accomplishment on which God exercises no influence), in the end depends on the way one defines conditionality. 5.1.2 The Operation of Grace: Irresistible or Resistible? In 3.3.3 we summarized how Arminius understood the process of regeneration as he worked it out in his exposition of Romans 7 as an early witness to his view on the operation of grace and the Spirit, as well as the importance of the contrast between law and works over against Christ and faith. The debate on the operation of grace is closely related to the distinction between sufficient and efficient grace. This forms the topic of the present section. At the end, an attempt will also be made to answer the question whether grace as understood by Arminius should be characterized as resistible or irresistible. Saving grace (gratia salutaris) can be understood in two ways: 1. The grace that can bring salvation and is sufficient. 2. The grace that certainly and actually brings salvation and is efficient.5 Middle knowledge (see 3.3.4) has an important role in the distinction between sufficient and efficient grace. Arminius argues that the effect of the concursus of efficient grace is that the will, which by nature has a flexibility in either way, certainly and unfailingly inclines to that to which grace incites it. The work of the Spirit and the drawing of the Father occur in such a way that they do not take away the freedom of the will and choice; they work in a way God knows to be fitting and adapted (aptum et congruum) for moving people certainly and infallibly.6 Arminius always uses the words “certainly” and “infallibly” from the perspective of his view on God’s all-encompassing foreknowledge ————— 5 AC 575 (III 185): “Illa enim gratia salutaris potest accipi pro gratia quae salutem conferre potest et sufficienti; et pro ea quae salutem certo et reipsa confert, et efficaci: item pro gratia quam Deus homini in primaevo statu contulit, et pro gratia quam homini confert in statu peccati, ut inde liberatus in Christo, vitam per illum ex morte obtineat.” 6 EP 770–771 (III 473–474).

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by which He also foreknows all creaturely contingencies, but which excludes any form of necessity. Molina’s scientia media provided him with the theoretical model of God’s knowledge that allowed him to accommodate these distinctions and views. Arminius cleverly remarks about Perkins’s analysis of the Scripture passages used by the proponents of sufficient grace that he must have taken them over from Bellarmine, since the latter treats the same passages and that in the same order. About Isa 5:4 (“What more could have been done for my vineyard than I have done for it?”), Arminius notes: God has done all He can, and He expects fruit; therefore, He has done what is sufficient. Unless God’s expectation was irrational, He had full knowledge on account of which He could expect fruit in all reasonableness. God’s knowledge that a sufficient capacity will have no effect does not take away from the sufficiency of those causes that make his expectation justifiable and reasonable. That knowledge prevents God from being mistaken, and for that reason exspectatio is attributed to God only as an anthropomorphism.7 Arminius had earlier already appealed to Isa 5:4 in order to prove that it is never God’s final goal or intention in itself to take away someone’s excuse, but only an unintended possible effect. People need to be admonished to carry out their duty, invited to faith and repentance, and prodded along. God satisfies Himself and his love for his creatures through this long-suffering and patience. God can intend to take away the people’s excuse only if He foreknows that the admonitions will be in vain because of the wickedness – not weakness – of those who are being admonished. Those who are hardened through their own fault can then deserve being hardened by God Himself.8 There is no page of Scripture that does not clearly show that someone can resist grace through obstinacy. “Is man, then, a log which by mere and pure necessity assents to grace? If that is false, then man consents freely [libere consentit], and therefore was not able to consent, that is, to resist.”9 God does not give efficient grace to everyone, but He does not just abandon those to whom He gave the grace whereby they can be saved to their lot, even if He did not give them the grace through which they would ac————— 7 EP 772 (III 476). For Isa 5:4 cf. EP 661–662 (III 310); ETG 144 (III 646). Cf. HSC 153.193–194 for a similar appeal to Isa 5 by the Remonstrants. In HSC 210, the CounterRemonstrants speak about “de vermaerde plaetse Esa. 5. vande ghelijckenisse des Wijngaerts, die de voorstaenders vande Vryen wille voornamelijck altijdt ghebruycken”. Cf. 210–213. 8 EP 661–662 (III 310). 9 EP 776 (III 482): “An homo stipes est qui per puram putam necessitatem naturalem assentiatur gratiae? Si id falsum, homo ergo libere consentit, et propterea potuit non consentire, id est, resistere.”

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tually (actu) be saved.10 To call people to salvation, God uses an efficacy that is permitted (fas), fair and in agreement with God’s justice and mercy.11 Sufficient grace is not withheld from the reprobate, but efficient grace is; faith and repentance were given to the reprobate in such a way that they could have accepted them through the necessary and sufficient means God had given them. They are justly said to be without excuse.12 As has already been noted in 3.2, Arminius was of the opinion that God does not owe anyone grace simpliciter et absolute, but that He could place such an obligation on Himself through a promise and through the demand of an act that is not possible without that grace.13 This obligation that God imposes upon Himself is based on his justice (see 3.1.2). This leads Arminius to conclude that God’s justice is also determinative for the necessity of the sufficiency of God’s grace.14 In the context of the discussion of middle knowledge (see 3.3.4 above), a distinction was drawn between the modus of nature (impulsio physica) and the modus of the will (suasio).15 This is an important issue also in the context of the resistibility of grace. God has determined to save believers by grace, that is, by gentle and sweet suasion [suasio], fitting or congruous to their own free choice; not by almighty action or motion, which they neither will nor can resist, nor can will to resist. Much less [multo minus] does the damnation of some proceed from irresistible necessity imposed by God.16

Grace is thus resistible, or rather, not irresistible: in that sense, it should also be characterized as recommendation or moral suasion. Arminius elsewhere speaks of a sweet and gentle suasion by which God has determined to move people to assensus. This movement not only does not take away ————— EP 775 (III 481). ETG 61 (III 576). 12 EP 665–666 (III 316). 13 AAC 617–618 (III 246). 14 For this reason BLACKETER, “Covenant”, 207, is not correct in arguing that Arminius’s view of a universal prevenient grace is a component of “the created order itself.” Not the created order itself, but God’s justice “obligates” God in particular circumstances to distribute prevenient grace universally. Also Blacketer’s remark that Arminius has “a rather ‘naturalistic’ view of grace” is not warranted. God’s nature can in certain circumstances indeed “obligate” Him to surround creation with grace, but this does not make grace a “constituent of the created order itself.” 15 Also called the “modus of freedom,” see EP 770 (III 473): “at nos homines movemur secundum modum libertatis, quam Deus voluntati indidit, unde liberum arbitrium dicitur.” 16 EP 750 (III 443): “Deus statuit salvare credentes per gratiam, id est, lenem et suavem liberoque ipsorum arbitrio convenientem seu congruam suasionem, non per omnipotentem actionem seu motionem, cui resistere nec velint nec possint, nec velle possint. Multo minus damnatio nonnullorum ex ineluctabili a Deo necessitate imposita proficiscitur.” 10 11

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the free assent of the liberum arbitrium, but actually supports it.17 This support of free choice must be understood in the sense that it is impossible to choose the good without God’s grace. God’s grace thus frees the essentially free will, saves18 it (cf. 3.4), so that it is (once again) able to choose the good. Should grace not leave free choice intact, for Arminius this would mean that grace is no longer grace (cf. 4.2). That the essentially free choice needs the support of grace emphasizes once more that it is not so much a matter of the contribution of human free choice, but rather its dependence on divine grace. It is typical for Arminius that immediately after this characterization of grace as suasio, he remarks that God’s relation to reprobation is much less a matter of irresistible necessity. The two go together. That God does not in an irresistibly necessary way impose condemnation on some implies that also grace does not have this irresistibly necessary character. The emphatic “much less” illustrates that Arminius is much more repulsed by the idea of an irresistibly necessary condemnation, than an irresistible operation of grace. Middle knowledge comes up once again in the context of the suasio when Arminius introduces the distinction between a sufficient and efficient suasio. The passage that introduces it states that no one can have faith and repentance unless God grants them.19 Scripture and nature teach that the bestowal of these gifts (faith and repentance) takes place according to the modus of suasio (per modum suasionis). This suasio occurs through the Word as means. Externally through the preaching of the Word, internally through the Holy Spirit who works – or rather, cooperates – so that the Word is understood20 and accepted with a firm faith. The Word is powerless without the Holy Spirit, and is thus always accompanied by his cooperation.21 To sin against the Holy Spirit is to reject, persecute and blaspheme ————— 17 EP 755 (III 450): “non modo non tollat, sed stabiliat etiam.” It is difficult to determine whether or not Arminius contradicts himself in the following quotation: “[...] fidem ita esse merae voluntatis Dei, ut voluntas illa non utatur omnipotente et irresistibili motione ad fidem ingenerandam hominis, sed leni suasione et accommodata ad movendam voluntatem hominibus pro modo libertatis ipsius: ac propterea causam totalem cur ille credat, iste non, esse voluntatem Dei et liberum arbitrium hominis.” The voluntas Dei in any case is not on the same level as the liberum arbitrium hominis as if there are two equally strong cooperating causae. The liberum arbitrium is after all dependent on God’s grace to come to faith. I myself prefer another reading, which takes account of the fact that Arminius explicitly notes that he is reproducing the view of Perkins’s opponent, Hemmingius: “Respondebit ille cum quo tibi hic negotium, fidem ita esse [...].” EP 757 (III 453–454). 18 Cf. 768 (III 470): “liberum arbitrium servatur”. 19 EP 665 (III 314–315): “fidem et poenitentiam nisi Deo dante haberi non posse”. 20 This phrasing betrays Arminius’s intellectualism. 21 EP 665 (III 315): “Est autem inutile citra Sp. sancti cooperationem; quare iunctam sibi semper habet Sp. sancti cooperationem.”

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the truth of which one is persuaded in the mind through the suasio of the Spirit. The internal suasio of the Holy Spirit is twofold: 1. Sufficient (through it people can will, believe and repent). 2. Efficax (through it people will, believe and repent). Sufficient suasio is applied according to the decree of providence, with certain foreknowledge that it will be rejected by the human free will. Efficient grace is administered according to the decree of predestination, with certain foreknowledge that people will will, believe and repent. After all, they are administered in the way God knows to be most suited for persuasion and for producing repentance.22 The distinction between a decree of providence and predestination, together with God’s foreknowledge and the fact that He knows that He must convince people in a fitting manner presupposes the scientia media. In the present context we must also address the distinction between common and particular grace. Arminius remarks that the issue is fiercely debated. Is the grace through which someone accepts God’s grace common (or: are there people who reject God’s grace but still participate in it?), or particular and personal? Arminius relativizes the problem, however. For even common grace is undeserved, comes from God’s gracious good pleasure (gratuiti favoris divini), and incites praise of God. Whether God’s grace is particular or common, both obtain free assent23 from the human being, and of both types of grace God foreknew that they would procure assent from that person. If one wants to speak of particular grace, it must be understood in such a way as to leave room for the free will, while for common grace one must conceive of it such that the human can still be held accountable for rejecting it and God remains free of all injustice.24 In the background there is clearly the issue of sufficient, necessary and efficient grace. When the distinction between particular and common grace means that common grace is not sufficient to be able to believe, for Arminius this would also imply that someone is an unbeliever out of necessity or coercion and therefore cannot be blamed, and that it is actually God who must be reproached for being unjust. ————— 22 EP 665 (III 315–316): “propterea quod ita accommodatur prout Deus novit congruum esse persuadendo et convertendo illi cui adhibetur.” 23 Cf. AN 959 (II 722). 24 EP 751–752 (III 445): “Caeterum an gratia oblata homini etiam ab illo accipiatur ope gratiae quae illi communis cum aliis repudiantibus eandem gratiam, an vero auxilio gratiae illi peculiaris, in controversia forte est. [...] Annon omnia illa sunt gratuiti favoris divini? [...] Quid ad hanc rem magnopere facit, sive gratiae communis ope sive peculiaris oblatam benedictionem fuerit amplexus, si tam illa quam haec adsensum hominis liberum impetraverit, et certo impetratura a Deo praescita fuerit? [...] ita peculiarem illam gratiam explicandam esse, ut cum libero arbitrio consistere possit: et gratiam communem ita describendam, ut homo per illius repudiationem condemnatione dignus haberi possit, Deusque ab iniustitia alienus demonstrari.” Cf. ETG 61 (III 576).

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A letter sent by Borrius to Episcopius, occasioned by the conflict that arose during the last disputation held under Arminius’s presidence on July 25, 1609, on the call to salvation, is illustrative. Borrius reports that Arminius began to explain that he did know how grace and freedom do not relate; grace is not irresistible. Significantly, Arminius then also claimed not to know how they do relate; this is something only the Holy Spirit knows.25 This detail is yet another indication for the Arminius’s line of thought. It is not human freedom that forms the point of departure or the goal; instead, the non-irresistibility of grace must be maintained so that God’s justice can still be defended. Although this quotation does not allow us to suggest that Arminius finally did not teach resistible grace but only that it is not irresistible, the paradoxical phrase he chose to use still does give us an indication as to Arminius’s main concern. Grace is 1. Undeserved kindness shown to poor, miserable, sinful people. God gives his Son, justifies these people, and then accept them as his children. 2. The infusion of all the gifts of the Spirit – in mind, will and affections – that belong to regeneration. 3. Continuing assistance and support of the Spirit in the regenerate. In short, for Arminius the grace of God consists in the commencement, the continuance and the consummation of all good, and to such an extent do I carry its influence, that a man, though already regenerate, can neither conceive, will nor do any good at all, nor resist any evil temptation, without this prevenient and exciting, this following and co-operating grace.26

The one difference over against the views of his opponents does not lie in grace or free choice, but in the irresistible character of grace, and thus concerns its “mode of operation”.27 It is good to emphasize once again that Arminius’s intention in promoting a non-irresistible operation of grace was not to promote the human contribution in salvation at the expense of grace, but rather that his reflection on God’s sufficient and efficient grace led Arminius to reject an irresistible operation of grace because of God’s justice.

————— 25 Letter of Adrianus Borrius to Simon Episcopius, July 30, 1609, Ep.Ecc. 130: “Dixerat Arminius antequam hic opponeret, nec posse se nec audere definire modum quo Spiritus sanctus utitur in hominis regeneratione et conversione: si quis hoc audeat, jussurum ut probet: posse se dicere quomodo non fiat, videlicet non per vim irresistibilem; sed quomodo fiat, non item: solum enim illum hoc nosse qui scrutatur profunditates Dei.” Cf. DEKKER, Rijker dan Midas, 170. 26 Verklaring, 114 (I 664). 27 Verklaring, 114 (I 664).

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5.1.3 Atonement: Particular or Universal? According to Arminius, atonement extends to all people. Not to reprobate and elect, but rather to humanity in general, irrespective of and antecedent to their election or reprobation. As will by now be clear, this is inextricably connected to Arminius’s view of God’s justice which makes it impossible for Him to love a sinner and thus to elect him28 outside of Christ’s substitutionary atonement. This conviction implies that for several different reasons, atonement must be universal with respect to procurement (comparatio) and offer (exhibitio). However, this is not true for its application (applicatio), because that depends on the acceptance of Christ’s sacrifice through faith. Arminius wants to maintain a clear distinction between the suffering of Christ, and the fruit of the suffering, salvation and the appropriation of salvation. Faith stands between procurement and application according to God’s decree:29 But if we determine that any man is excluded from that effect [of Christ’s office as Mediator – wdb], we determine at the same time that God does not remit his sins, not because He can but is unwilling, but because He cannot, since justice stands in the way, and because He willed not to be able; for He willed that His justice should be satisfied before He should grant any one the remission of his sins, and He was unwilling that His justice should be satisfied in behalf of such an one.30

Arminius thinks all kinds of absurdities result if one holds that Christ died only for the elect.31 Not only does this not agree with the order of God’s decrees, it is also problematic for God’s will and ability to make atonement for the sins of all people. If we suppose such a method of mediation that the sins of all elect are actually removed and transferred to Christ, [...] then at the same time it must be laid down, that, according to the very rigour of God’s justice and law, both immunity from punishment and eternal life are due to the elect, and that they can demand those benefits

————— EP 679 (III 337): “nomen ipsum Electionis dilectionem significat”. EP 677 (III 333); EP 678 (III 334); cf. EP 678 (III 335): “Perpetuus est error confusionis dispatatorum, seu compositionis dividendorum. Impetratio enim et ipse actus impetratorius confunditur cum applicatione, et ille in huius locum substituitur.” EP 679 (III 336). 30 EP 676 (III 331): “Quod si iam statuamus ullum hominem ab isto effecto exclusi, statuimus simul Deum illi peccata non remittere, non quia nolit cum possit, sed quia non possit, utpote iustitia obstante, et quia voluit non posse: propterea quod voluerit iustitiae suae satisfieri antequam peccata cuiquam remitteret, et noluerit iustitiae suae pro illo tali satisfieri.” 31 EP 676 (III 332): “Quantis autem absurditatibus et haec et illa sententia laboret, non facile est dicere.” 28 29

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from God by the right of payment and purchase, without God being able to require of them by any right faith in Christ and conversion to Himself.32

For those for whom Christ did not die, for whose sins atonement has not been made, this similarly means that faith in Christ cannot justly (nullo iuro) be demanded of them. They also cannot be condemned justly because of their unbelief, nor can Christ be justly appointed as their judge.33 That everyone is required (according to the Scriptures) to believe in Christ as Savior, that He died for all of them and obtained reconciliation with and salvation from God, implies that its procurement is also for all.34 All are called, and therefore (proptereae) all have been redeemed by Christ.35 According to Arminius, a proper understanding of justification can shed much light on this. The righteousness fulfilled (praestita) by Christ is not ours as to its fulfilment, but as to its imputation through faith (imputata per fidem). Arminius concludes that Christ took on the humanity of all people (omnium hominum persona): of sinners, godless people, enemies of God (personam hominum peccatorum, impiorum, Dei inimicorum) regardless of election and reprobation.36 There is no sin so great that God can be prevented from doing something about it, if only (modo) God wills it. And He wills it (vult), if only (modo) we are ready (patiamur) to let our ignorentia and infirmitas be corrected through his light and power, and to let our malitia be won over by his bonitas.37 God wills it, if only ... we do! This conditionality of human readiness brings us to the question of the freedom and bondage of the will.

————— 32 EP 676 (III 331–332): “[...] Mediationis rationem [...] ut omnium Electorum tum peccata actu ab illis ablata et in Christum translata sint; […] iam simul statuendum est secundum ipsum iustitiae Dei et legis rigorem electis deberi et immunitatem a poenis et vitam aeternam, eosque ista bona a Deo postulare posse iure solutionis et emptionis: absque eo ut Deus ab iis postulare possit ullo iure fidem in Christum et conversionem ad ipsum.” 33 EP 676 (III 332): “nullo iure potest ab illis fides in Christum postulari, nullo iure illi propter infidelitatem condemnari, neque Christus iisdem ullo iure iudex statui.” For the same arguments, see also EP 738 (III 425–426). 34 EP 745 (III 435). 35 EP 746–747 (III 438): “Imo si consideremus vocationem qua quis aut in se aut in parentibus vocatus est, omnes in universum homines illius vocationis sunt aut fuerunt participes; et proptereae omnes a Christo redempti.” 36 EP 676–677 (III 332): “Iustitia a Christo praestita non est nostra qua praestita sed qua per fidem nobis imputata, adeo ut ipsa fides nobis ad iustitiam imputari dicatur. Rom. 4.5. Quae phrasis recte intellecta clarissimam lucem toti huic tractatui adferre potest. Concludo itaque Christum omnium in universum hominum personam sustinuisse, eo quo dictum est modo, et non electorum tantum.” 37 OR 48 (I 360).

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5.1.4 The Human Will: Bound or Free? Arminius was not a proponent of individual autonomy. Rather, in defending the freedom of the will his only concern is that God’s justice stands and falls with it, and it is in this (indirect) way that freedom becomes an important essential attribute for humanity as God’s rational creatures. From Arminius’s writings it becomes clear in different ways that he does not begin with autonomous human freedom. It is, for example, entirely from his voluntary love that God after the fall decided for a new beginning with humanity, established a new covenant, sent his Son, etc. It depends on God’s grace in Christ, and on the Holy Spirit’s work in calling and regeneration that proceeds from it, whether or not a person “dead in sin and iniquity” is reconciled with God through union with Christ. It is therefore God’s voluntary and gracious choice still to reconcile to Himself by the gospel a humanity that is no longer able to attain to bliss by perfect obedience to his commandments. God wills that all people be saved, and does all that is necessary for it in giving Christ as Mediator and distributing the means of grace. God has decided that only those who believe in Christ will be saved, while unbelievers will be condemned because they are outside of Christ. It is in this situation that the human race finds itself after the fall into sin. It is now slave to sin, can no longer attain to glory through its own works, and fully depends on God’s grace. In Christ God offers his grace to all, and gives all the sufficient grace and means to believe in Christ and to persevere in that faith. As has been illustrated above, the manner in which this grace works is nevertheless not such that people are coerced to believe in Christ. They can still refuse and reject God’s grace and the Holy Spirit. That is their freedom. In the background everything we have already discussed in connection with God’s justice is at play. A human being must accept the grace of God on which he or she is fully dependent, although it can be resisted. Making the right choice depends entirely on grace, while the rejection of grace is something that in spite of the grace and everything else that God has exercised remains purely the fault of that person who does the rejecting. All that can be attributed to God’s grace must be attributed to God’s grace, with the one condition that it is not at the expense of God’s justice. Arminius explicitly denies that humankind has a free choice (liberum arbitrium) to believe when he deals with the consequences of the distinction between an antecedent and consequent will in God. He emphasizes that it does not follow as consequence that people are given the free choice (liberum arbitrium) to believe or not to believe. The distinction in God’s will is fully consistent (optime consentit) with the condition that no one has faith unless God grants it (nisi Deo dante). In the very next phrase, however, Arminius hastens to add that it nevertheless “cannot be denied that there

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exists in man a free choice not to believe.”38 The distinction Arminius maintains between the role of human beings and their free choice to believe or not to believe, fully agrees with his asymmetrical treatment of the difference between election and reprobation (see 3.3.2), and with his intention to attribute to God’s grace as much as possible when it comes to salvation, but to attribute to humanity as much as possible when it comes to condemnation because it is precisely in God’s relationship to sin, evil and condemnation that the question of God’s justice becomes a most pressing issue. By its very nature, the liberum arbitrium is flexibile. Even if in the state of sin it has been given over to evil, it is nevertheless still capax boni. This capacity is not a gift of grace, but it belongs to free choice by its very nature. Yet [the liberum arbitrium – wdb] will not actually be bent to good except by grace, which is as it were the form that brings forth the power and capacity of matter into action; although it is of itself sufficient for evil.39

With this, Arminius wants to indicate two things. On the one hand, he maintains the essential freedom of the will as basic principle; the will can by nature choose between good and evil. On the other hand, the will which of itself has the sufficiency for doing evil, is dependent on grace in order to choose the good. Arminius cites Augustine’s De praedestinatione Sanctorum: “To be able to have faith and charity belongs to the nature of men; but to have them belongs to the grace of believers” (Posse habere fidem et charitatem naturae est hominum, habere autem est gratiae fidelium). According to Arminius this should not to be interpreted to mean that everyone has that grace through which each the liberum arbitrium is actually moved to the good, but it means that everyone has a liberum arbitrium which is flexibile in both directions – to good and to evil – when grace draws near (accedente gratia).40 In connection with the results of the fall and original sin, Arminius makes it clear that the will is not just injured, but is trapped, ruined and useless. It has lost its freedom, and is powerless without the aid of grace. In ————— 38 EP 742 (III 432): “Neque magis hinc sequitur, quod hominibus peristam distinctionem tribuatur liberum credendi vel non credendi arbitrium. Nam optime consentit cum ista conditione, neminem fidem habere nisi Deo dante: quanquam negari non potest inesse homini liberum non credendi arbitrium.” 39 EP 768 (III 470–471): “flexibile enim est natura sua: et ut malo addictum in statu peccati, ita capax boni; quam capacitatem illi gratia non donat: inest enim illi a natura. At reipsa ad bonum non flectetur nisi per gratiam, quae instar formae est potentiam et capacitatem materiae in actum producentis, quanquam per se sufficiens sit ad malum.” 40 EP 768 (III 471): “omnibus insit tale arbitrium quod flexile [read: flexibile, wdb] sit in utranque partem accedente gratia.”

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the unregenerate, the free will is only a capacity to resist the Holy Spirit and to reject the grace offered (see 5.2.1). In the post-fall state (inden stant der afwijckinghe ende der zonden), man is not capable, of and by himself, either to think, to will, or to do that which is really good; but it is necessary for him to be regenerated and renewed in his intellect, affections or will, and in all his powers, by God in Christ through the Holy Spirit, that he may be qualified rightly to understand, esteem, consider, will, and perform whatever is truly good. When he is made a partaker of this regeneration or renovation, I consider that, since he is delivered from sin, he is capable of thinking, willing, and doing that which is good, but yet not without the continued aids of divine grace.”41

The free choice is saved (servatur) by grace, which salvation takes place as follows. It is the subject of God’s bestowed grace (gratia data) which can be rejected, but not resisted. If this first grace is not rejected, people receive God’s subsequent grace (gratia subsequente) which can not only be rejected, but also resisted.42 A little later Arminius remarks that grace restores (restituat) the free choice.43 If grace were to move the human will not according to the modus of freedom but according to the modus of nature, it would not be the liberum arbitrium but the human nature that would be saved. In that case, free choice would be taken away by grace, while it is essential to grace that it not take away, but rather correct the nature itself where it has become sinful.44 Arminius defends himself against the reproach that, in maintaining free choice, he is blowing new life into the old heresy of Pelagianism. The great difference between the Pelagians and himself is that the former attribute the faculty of doing good either to nature or else partly to grace, while he himself attributes it to grace in its entirety. Even if grace were universal, writes Arminius, so that everyone possesses the power (potentia) to have faith and to be saved should he or she will to, it still does not follow that nature and grace extend just as far (aeque late patere) when that power is given by God to the human nature. The capacity to believe may well be from nature (as gift of God), but faith itself is from grace. The same is true for the relationship between being able to will and willing.45 That a person can follow grace with his will must be explained as a potentia remota, which is entirely ————— Verklaring, 112–113 (I 659–660). EP 768 (III 470). 43 EP 769 (III 472). 44 EP 770 (III 474): “Nisi enim statuamus hominis adfectum alio moveri posse, etiam tum cum movet gratia efficax, sequetur voluntatem hominis non secundum modum libertatis, sed secundum modum naturae moveri, et sic non liberum arbitrium, sed hominis natura salvabitur. Liberum vero arbitrium, saltem quod ad usum ipsius, tolletur per gratiam, quum gratiae sit non tollere sed corrigere naturam ipsam, sicubi vitiosa facta est.” 45 EP 775–776 (III 482). 41 42

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passive, a capacity by which one can obtain the potentiam activam et propinquam which is necessary for willing to accept grace in actuality. Arminius significantly adds: non est Pelagianum, and then wishes that “those who nowadays treat of the dogma of predestination would prove that their doctrine does not infer fatalem necessitatem.”46 The public accusation made against Arminius was that he did not hold faith to be a pure gift from God, but as something depending partially on God’s grace and partly on the capacity of the free will, so that a person can believe or not believe if only he or she wills to. Arminius, however, considers this statement false on numerous counts and rejects it. He admits that a thorough elaboration of this issue demands a discussion of the concursus and concordia of God’s grace and the free choice or free will of a human being. In his Apology, however, he betrays his view in a parable he relates. Suppose that a rich man gives alms to a poor beggar. Does that gift cease to be a pure gift just because the beggar stretches out his hand to receive the gift? Can it in that case justly be said that the gift depends partly on the generosity of the giver, and partly on the freedom of the receiver, although the beggar would not have come into possession of the alms if he had not received them with his outstretched hand? Can one correctly say that the beggar, because he is always ready to receive, can have the alms or not just as he wills? If these principles do not hold in the case of a beggar who receives alms, how much less (quanto minus) are they valid with respect to the gift of grace? For the reception of that gift, even more acts are required of divine grace! Arminius in no way wants to do grace an injustice (iuiuria). He warns his brothers to be careful that they themselves not do an injustice (iniuria) to either God’s justice (iustitia) – by attributing to it what it rejects – or to God’s grace – by changing it into something that can not be called grace.47 With the latter he no doubt means changing grace into a coercion. From the image of the beggar and the connection immediately made to God’s justice, it once again becomes clear what Arminius’s main concern is in his defense of the liberum arbitrium. Grace must remain grace; free choice therefore ought to be maintained, but its state is one of full dependence on God’s grace. Further, God’s justice needs to be satisfied as well. Also that presupposes the freedom of the will, because otherwise God would have to be held accountable for the unbelief and sin of the human race. ————— EP 776 (III 482). A31A 176–177 (II 51–52): “sed videant fratres mei ne ipsi faciant iniuriam iustitiae divinae, illi tribuendo quod ipsa respuit, imo et gratiae divinae, illam in aliud quiddam, quao gratia dici nequit, transmutando”. 46 47

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One could ask whether Arminius does not for strategic reasons hide his actual concern (i.e. human autonomy) behind an appeal to safeguard God’s justice, so that the latter is only a means for introducing a divergent anthropology and making it palatable. Arminius’s extant writings, including unpublished writings and letters to friends, offer no clue for pursuing this suggestion. Arminius is so constant, consistent and coherent in his concern for an unviolated and unquestionable divine justice, also in the way he embeds human free choice in his view on God’s justice and grace, that there is no reason to doubt the authenticity of his intentions. As far as I can tell, Ellis has properly interpreted Arminius’s statements on the relationship between grace and free will. He chose to convey the relationship as an “interplay,” because for him the terms “synergism”, “collaboration” and “cooperation” do not express it adequately. One reason is Arminius’s consistent juxtaposition of faith and works. Arminius further gave “a nearly passive quality to the assent of the will to the illumination of the mind by the Spirit. Arminius responded to Perkins’s accusation of Pelagianism by writing that man’s willingness to follow divine grace was one of ‘remote ability, and that which is purely passive.’ […] A person is saved not so much because they chose to accept, but because they did not choose to reject.”48 In my opinion, this is a very helpful formulation. It was being rumored of Arminius that he taught sufficient grace to be given by the Holy Spirit to all to whom the Gospel is preached, so that a person can believe if only he or she wills to. However, he emphatically denies ever having expressed it in this way, because as such the statement is subject to different interpretations. Arminius does not accept sufficient grace understood as an infused habitual grace which makes people apt to (aptos) join faith to Gospel (ad fidem praestandam Evangelio). Sufficiency must be attributed to the assistance with which the Holy Spirit accompanies the preaching of the Word that He normally uses as the instrument to work efficaciously in the hearts of the hearers. It is not so that people receive the capacity together with sufficient grace, after which the Spirit and grace calmly wait to see whether they make good use of it and come to faith.

————— 48 ELLIS, Episcopius, 84. Cf. the conclusions on p. 85: “Even so, Arminius did not believe that people experienced salvation because they wanted it, or chose to believe, but because they chose not to resist the Spirit. Thus, he was neither Pelagian nor Semi-Pelagian.” See also MULLER, “Priority”, 68–69: “What we see, by way of contrast, in Arminius’ teaching is the smallest possible opening for human initiative in the work of salvation – so small that it is difficult to label it synergism in the sense of an equal cooperation between the divine and human wills in the movement of the individual toward grace.”

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Grace must be attributed its own, most important function (potissimas partes) of persuading the will to assent to the preached Word.49 Not only Arminius’s view on the fall into sin (see 3.2) – i.e. that all sin in Adam50 – but also his remarks about those who have sinned and resisted grace and rejected it in their parents or grandparents, deserve attention when we are dealing with his view on the nature of the freedom of the human will.51 Arminius can, for example, write that all are called to the truth, whether in person or in their parents, grandparents or great grandparents. The heathens have excluded themselves from the covenant through their own sin and guilt, whether through their own sins or through those of their ancestors. As punishment for the rejection of his Word, God can therefore permit not only parents, but also the following generation, to walk in their own ways, which can go on, Arminius adds, as long as God’s justice and their sins demand it.52 Arminius’s main concern is therefore not the freedom of the will, but the firmness of God’s covenant with his creatures. Arminius sees himself forced to make room for creaturely freedom that depends on God’s grace so as not to end up with a conflict with God’s justice and with all kinds of causal connections and relations. The doctrine of God, and from there also the doctrine of creation, are therefore determinative for anthrolopology and soteriology. No one is called to salvation except those whom God wills to be called; those who are condemned are the ones who choose darkness in spite of the light that has come.53 People must “be able to believe if they will to” and “be able to will to believe.” If they cannot do this, they can also not be punished justly (iure puniri) for their unbelief.54 About the covenant and the relationship between children and parents, Arminius writes: “For the ratio is eternal in God’s covenant, that children are comprehended and reckoned in their parents.”55 Also the following statement deserves attention: it is true “that the Spirit breathes not in all, ————— 49 Cf. A31A 145–146 (I 763–765). Arminius thinks that he hereby satisfies the condition that he placed on the way to speak about the assistance of the Spirit and its sufficiency; namely, that this be done in a manner which avoids Pelagianism to the greatest degree (ut Pelagianismus quam longissime evitetur). A31A 145 (I 764). 50 AC 560 (III 162–163). 51 EP 685 (III 345). 52 EP 746–747 (III 438): “vocationem qua quis aut in se aut in parentibus vocatus est”. See also EP 738–739 (III 427–428); EP 776–777 (III 483–484). 53 EP 738 (III 426): “Nemo autem ad illam vocatur quem Deus ad illam pervenire nolit: omnes autem homines qui condemnabuntur eo nomine condemnabuntur, quod quum lux in mundum venerit, ipsi tenebras magis quam lucem amaverint.” 54 EP 754 (III 448): “Nam nisi possint credere, imo et velle credere, non possunt iure puniri eo quod crediderunt.” 55 EP 685 (III 345): “Perpetua enim est foederi Dei ratio, quod Filii in Parentibus compraehendantur et censeantur.” Cf. also EP 755 (III 451): “quod alii populi ab alienati sunt ab ista promissione [i.e. in Gen 3:15 – wdb], sua vel parentum culpa”.

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that Christ does not reveal the Father to all, and that all are not drawn by the Father.”56 Although not everyone is called by the revelation of Christ and the gospel, all people are still given some kind of call. A call outside of the gospel is not immediately saving, and precedes the saving grace by which Christ is offered. If the first, non-saving call is properly used, people receive from God also the saving grace in Christ.57 God has freely decided to follow certain volitions (volitiones) of his creatures with volitions of his own; for example, the act of the will to faith He follows with forgiveness and eternal life, while unbelief He follows with eternal condemnation. Without a free volition, a person cannot come to knowledge of the truth, that is, to faith. God’s will is not hindered by the freedom of the human volition, for God’s will is conditional. If God wills a volition (velit suam volitionem) connected in the proper order and manner to a human volition preceding salvation, then it is not surprising that this person, should he or she refuse to assent to God (assensus), is excluded from salvation by that same volition of God.58 Arminius thus teaches that each person has a free volitio, the ability to assent to God or not. Arminius again hastens to answer the question as to whether or not this implies that a person elects or reprobates him- or herself. No, answers Arminius, for the human being is completely (omnino) the meritorious cause of condemnation, while election is out of pure grace and even goes against what the person actually deserves.59 When he is asked whether the Scriptures teach that a human being has a free choice, Arminius responds with a rhetorical question: “Why else would there be threats and promises?”60 Biblical teaching is rejected by the human mind (mens) and will, which are the two most important faculties a human being possesses, according to whose prescription and mandate the other faculties are either moved or remain in a state of rest. When the doctrine of the Scriptures is accepted and believed, the mind is won over and the will conquered (expugnata) by the Author of the mind and will, that is, by God.61 It is God who in Christ, and through the work of the Holy Spirit who uses the Word, convinces the mind of the truth in a most clear way, and who seals its certainty most powerfully ————— EP 755 (III 450). EP 777 (III 484). 58 EP 751 (III 444): “quod [...] citra illorum liberam volitionem fieri nequit.” “At quum Deus velit suam volitionem istam cum volitione hominis debito ordine et modo coniunctam salutis praecedaneam esse; mirum non est hominem suum adsensum negantem Deo, a salute excludi, ipsa eadem determinatione et proposito voluntatis divinae.” 59 EP 751 (III 444–445); cf. 3.3. 60 EP 776 (III 482): “Quorsum alioquin minae et promissiones?’ 61 OR 65 (I 390–391). 56 57

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upon the hearts. Therefore all honor for this revelation, whose goal is unity with God and Christ, belongs to God and Christ in the Holy Spirit.62 Arminius sometimes makes remarks that to us appear to be positively “deterministic.” One example is when he says that God does not know people will believe until after He has predestined them to faith: He has foreknowledge that they will come to believe through his gift, which gift is prepared through predestination.63 Such statements are yet another indication for the fact that Arminius’s main concern is not an absolutization of human freedom. However, they must still be read in an “Arminian” way, that is, from the context of Arminius’s theology. In the case of the statements cited above, this means that God’s foreknowledge and his scientia media are involved in predestination to faith. The emphasis on God’s gift as source for faith is likewise typical of Arminius.64 We conclude that Arminius’s view on the freedom of the human will is inextricably tied to, and proceeds from, his concern for the safeguarding of God’s justice. Nowhere is human freedom, never mind autonomy, an independent theme in Arminius’s theology. 5.1.5 Sanctification, Perseverance and Assurance: Securitas or Certitudo? In the Examen Perkinsiani, Arminius treats perseverance very carefully. He is not comfortable with saying that true, saving faith can be completely and finally lost, even though a number of the church fathers appear to affirm this possibility.65 He instead emphasizes that it is of little use to say that falling away is impossible since that leads to laxity, and that while the only thing that can cause a person to fall is his or her own will. It instead suffices to encourage people to perseverance. The Scripture says nothing about the ————— OR 71 (I 401). EP 654 (III 298): “Deum non praescire homines credituros prius, quam praedestinaverit ut credant. Praescivit enim eos suo dono credituros, quod donum praedestinatione praeparatum est.” 64 This paragraph shows that Van den Brink errs at least in respect to Arminius in the following passage when he writes: “Juist de remonstrantse visie (zoals klassiek verwoord door Arminius) gaat naar mijn waarneming uit van een concurrentieschema, dat zich uit in compromisdenken. Want waarom is die paar procent menselijke bijdrage, die in mindering gedacht moet worden op Gods werk, anders zo onopgeefbaar? In elk geval wilde men telkens de menselijke factor als een aparte, nadrukkelijk van Gods genade onderscheiden element gehonoreerd zien.” VAN DEN BRINK, “Remonstranten en reformatorischen”, 45. Cf. HICKS, Theology of Grace, 67: “it is its lack of autonomy or independece of God’s grace that gives Arminius’ theology the ring of monergism. […] Arminius would have sided with Luther in his debate with Erasmus […] Arminius is a monergist in that it is all of grace, but he is a synergist in that man must consent.” See also PLATT, Dutch Theology, 226. 65 EP 757 (III 454): “Quod fides vera et salutifera totaliter vel finaliter excidat, non facile ausim dicere: [...].” 62 63

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inflexibility of the will, because such comfort would not serve to confirm the believer.66 A little later Arminius says that no one perseveres except it be willingly and freely (volens et libere).67 In the Articuli nonnuli Arminius draws a connection between the doctrine of perseverance and carelessness. The conviction by which a believer assures him- or herself that it is impossible that he or she fall away from the faith, or that he or she will not do it, does not contribute to the kind of comfort that opposes itself to despair or to the doubt that goes against faith and hope. Such a conviction instead contributes to securitas, diametrically opposed to that salutary fear with which we are called to work out our salvation, a fear that is most necessary in this life beset with temptation.68 One of the most important elements for Arminius in his reflection on the perseverance of believers is being and remaining united with Christ as condition of perseverance. Only in Christ can perseverance be obtained, and only through faith is union with Christ,69 and therefore also assurance, possible. According to Arminius, 1 John 3:9 is the strongest proof against the possibility of falling away from faith. He explains it in the following way. As long as the seed of God is in a person, that person cannot sin to death. But gradually (paulatim), through one’s own fault and neglect that seed can be taken away from the heart. In this way, just as the first creation after God’s image has passed away, so also the second bestowal (communicatio) can pass.70 A little later, Arminius speaks about someone who is a real member of Christ, but then slowly dies, step by step, is first half dead, then completely dead, and finally ends up no longer being a member of Christ.71 No one can tear any of the sheep from Christ’s hand, but the sheep themselves can wander away.72 Arminius also finds indirect indications in the Scripture that falling away should not be thought of as impossible. One example is the necessity of daily prayer referred to in the Scriptures. The warning that, for example, ————— 66 EP 758 (III 455): “Defectus enim ille [...] per ipsam voluntatem deficientis, de cuius voluntatis inflexibilitate nihil Scriptura dicit propterea quod utile non sit istud consolationis argumentum usurpare ad confirmationem fidelium.” 67 EP 767 (III 468). 68 AN 962 (II 726): “Persuasio, qua quis fidelis sibi certo persuadet se a fide deficere non posse, saltem se non defecturum a fide, non tam solatio servit adversus desperationem seu dubitationem Fidei et Spei adversam, quam securitati ingenerandae, quae saluberrimo timori, quo salutem nostram operari iubemur, et qui in hoc tentationum loco magnopere est necessarius, directe adversatur.” 69 Cf. EP 762 (III 460–461). 70 EP 759 (III 457): “quamdiu autem semen Dei in illo est, non peccat ad mortem, sed potest paulatim ipsius vitio et negligentia semen illud ex corde eius auferri, atque ita perire secunda illa communicatio, quemadmodum prima creatio ad imaginem Dei periit.” 71 EP 767 (III 470). 72 EP 762 (III 461).

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one can again begin to live in sin when already dead to sin in Christ would also be useless should it be impossible for one who is in Christ actually to begin to live in sin once again. The mortificatio of the flesh is a life-long process, and also those who believe in Christ can produce fruits that are so bad that they are worthy of destruction. Such a person can be cut off finally, unless he repents again and returns to God.73 Behind Arminius’s views there is also a pastoral motif. He considers it utmost damaging and dangerous to suppose that a regenerated person does not sin with the full consent of his or her will (pleno consensu) because the conscience protests against the sin he or she wants to commit. Everyone who hears this and has even the smallest sense of justice and injustice will be inclined (proclive) to convince himself that he, because he did not sin with the full consent of his will, has sure proof for his regeneration. However, for Arminius to sin against the conscience is still to sin with full consent. Such sinning with full consent cannot coexist with the grace of the Holy Spirit, from which Arminius draws the conclusion that a regenerated person can sometimes lose the grace of the Spirit.74 To remain in Christ is for Arminius always the determinative condition for growth and perseverance in faith, and for the reception of final salvation. Assurance is never in the believers themselves, or even in the covenant. Should the covenant itself guarantee that people will continue in it, such promises as the gift of fear which prevents a person from falling away from God (cf. Jer 23) would be useless. The promises are sufficient if only one does not forget oneself and the grace of God (modo sibi ipsis et gratiae Dei non desint).75 People are not believers by listening to and understanding the Word, but by agreeing with (approbatio) and accepting it (apprehendere).76 God wills eternal life only for those who believe and are repentant, and so as long as someone through sin has made himself worthy of eternal condemnation and has not shown true repentance, God does not will that he or she receive eternal life in that state. Only from God’s foreknowledge that a certain person will really rise out of sin can it be said that an individual will certainly not fall from God’s grace.77 In his oration on the priesthood of Christ, Arminius writes that as long as someone has a mortal body, that person will not be able to offer to God as he or she ought, at least if no strenuam luctam or strong resistance is offered in the face of Satan, the world and one’s own nature, and victory is ————— 73 74 75 76 77

EP 759–760 (III 457). EP 766 (III 466–467); cf. AN 961–962 (II 725). EP 760 (III 458); cf. AN 962 (II 726). EP 760–761 (III 459). EP 761 (III 460).

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attained over them.78 Believers have more than enough to fight and overcome sin, etc., “yet not without the assistance of the grace of the same Spirit.” Through his Spirit, Jesus assists them in all their temptations, offers them his hand, and, “provided they stand prepared for the battle, implore his help, and be not wanting to themselves, Christ preserves them from falling.”79 Arminius’s view of the assurance of faith as certitudo standing between desperatio and securitas flows from his theology as a whole, and is not an isolated element. We have already concluded that there is a close connection between Arminius’s duplex amor Dei and his view of the assurance of faith. Assurance is a necessary fruit – not an essential requirement – of a proper view of faith. For Arminius that proper view of faith is naturally found in a correct understanding of God’s twofold love as foundation of theology. When you have a clear understanding of it, and especially of the proper mutual relationship between the two divine loves, certitudo will be the result of faith, and despair and carelessness as the two “pests of religion” will be avoided (see 4.4).

5.2 Arminius on Doctrines Characteristic of Reformed Theology 5.2.1 Fall, Original Sin and Sin The supernatural gifts of knowledge, righteousness and holiness that God had given at creation are not corrupted, but have been taken away; not even a trace remains after the fall, and only the corrupted moral virtues remain.80 In his correspondence with Junius, Arminius cites Augustine who says that after the fall the liberum arbitrium has been lost.81 In paradise God wanted to test Adam’s obedience. Adam and Eve are the “roots and principal individuals of the human race, in whom, as in its origin and stock, the whole of mankind is then contained.”82 All people sinned in Adam, and sin is transgression of the law. No one can transgress a law that does not apply to him or her, and thus the law that Adam transgressed was given to all people of whom it is said that they sinned in Adam.83 ————— OR 24 (I 430). Verklaring, 114–115 (I 664). 80 AC 526 (III 115): “Dico enim agnitionem [...], iustitiam [...] et sanctimoniam [...] non corruptas, sed sublatas esse; nullaque earundem in nobis post lapsum manere principia.” 81 AC 526 (III 116). 82 AC 560 (III 162): “Communis ut Adamo et Evae tanquam humani generis radicibus et individuis principalibus: in quibus totum humanum genus ut in origine et stirpe sua tum continebatur, est praescripta.” 83 AC 560 (III 162–163). 78 79

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That sin exists necessarily in Adam’s descendants on account of their conception and birth in sin is according to the modus of merit, through the intervention of God’s judgment (iudicium) and sentence (sententia). God imputes the first sin to Adam’s offspring no less than to Adam and Eve themselves, because they themselves sinned in Adam.84 Thus Adam did not fall alone. All those – whether they already exist or not – whom he represented fell together with him from the priesthood and covenant of which the priest was the mediator. No one could fulfill the conditions of the priesthood any longer according to the demands of the covenant. With that, the priesthood itself came to an end.85 In the Examen Perkinsiani, Arminius takes over a comparison from Cardinal Contarini’s De libero Arbitrio et Praedestinatione. There are two weights in a stone: a natural one and an alien one. The same is true for a person. Through the first sin there is a weight that can be called “inborn.” Another weight comes from each person’s own wickedness, which impedes the power of grace that suffices to remove the inborn weight.86 For the interpretation of this comparison, we turn to article 31 in Arminius’s Apology. Here it is asked whether God can justly be angry on account of original sin, if original sin is a punishment dealt out by God for the sin of Adam and for our sin in him. Would that not go on to infinity? Arminius does admit that original sin is sin, but denies that it is actual sin. According to him, a distinction must be drawn between actual or real sin and that which is the cause for other sins.87 Original sin is not a sin that has actually been committed and can be punished by God, but as God’s punishment for the sin of Adam in whom all sinned, it is still the cause of other sins, the so-called “alien” weight of the stone that comes from the person’s own wickedness. Articles 13 and 14 of the same Apology are devoted to the issue of original sin. The difficulty with these articles is that they treat teachings of Borrius, and not directly those of Arminius. With some reserve as to whose view it actually is, we nevertheless summarize the views there expressed in the conviction (cf. 3.3.2) that Arminius could have agreed with it. In Adam, God after the fall entered into a covenant of grace with all people. Children ————— 84 AC 603 (III 224): “Loquimur hic de existentia respectu actus Adami, non de eius necessaria existentia respectu nostrae corruptae conceptionis et nativitatis. Hoc enim posterius prioris illius effectus est per modum meriti, intervedente iudicio et sententia Dei, primi peccati reatum omnibus Adami posteris non minus quam ipsi Adamo et Evae inputantis; propterea quod et ipsi in Adamo peccaverant.” 85 OR 13 (I 410). 86 EP 770 (III 473): “Ita est homini agnata ex primo primi parentis peccato gravitas quae nativa dicitur, vel dici potest. Est alia ex propria malitia hominis adscita, quae non tam inest, quam adest, ad impediendum ne gratiae sufficientis vires ad tollendam gravitatem nativam id efficiant quod sine impedimenti istius positione valerent.” 87 A31A 181 (II 59–60). See also RQ9 184 (II 65).

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who died without actually committing sin thus have not broken this covenant. If they were punished for Adam’s sin, these children would be worse off than adults. There is no reason to suppose that God willed to impute Adam’s sin to his offspring even before they actually sinned themselves, for otherwise God would be more harsh in his dealings with these children than with the fallen angels.88 Once more (cf. 3.2) I will cite a statement from Arminius that is typical of his thought. Arminius here connects a grim description of the results of the fall into sin with a full confession of the necessity of grace, with the one condition that God’s justice remain unviolated and (that therefore) the human race be held fully responsible for sin. I confess that the mind of a natural and carnal man is obscure and dark, that his affections are corrupt and inordinate, that his will is stubborn and disobedient, and that the man himself is dead in sins. And I add this, that teacher obtains my highest approbation who ascribes as much as possible to divine grace; provided he so please the cause of grace, as not to inflict an injury on the justice of God, and not to take away the free choice to that which is evil.89

Also Ellis notes that Arminius very clearly emphasizes the essential unity of Adam with the entire human race. The consequences of the fall are very serious. The falls means a loss of the in-dwelling and assistance of God’s Spirit – according to Ellis, synonyms for God’s grace.90 The result is ignorance and blindness, and the intellect judges the Gospel to be foolishness. The fallen intellect perverts the natural Revelation. The will is not only injured, but trapped, ruined and useless. It has lost its freedom and without the assistance of grace it is powerless. The unregenerate have a free will, but only as a capacity to resist the Holy Spirit and to reject the offered grace.91 In short, “Arminius rivals Calvin in his description of fallen ‘Adam.’”92 According to Ellis, what is new in Arminius’s view is that “Arminius employed Adamic unity to argue against unconditional reprobation.” If sin is the result of reprobation, then Adam and his offspring are all reprobated. ————— A31A 154 (II 11–12). HaC 944 (II 700–701): “Fateor mentem Hominis animalis et carnalis esse obscuratam, affectus pravos et inordinates, voluntatem immorigeram, hominemque in peccatis esse mortuum: Et addo illum doctorem mihi maxime probari, qui gratiae quam plurimum tribuit: modo sic causam gratiae agat, ne iustitiae Dei noxam inferat, et ne liberum arbitrium ad malum tollat.” Cf. ELLIS, Episcopius, 84. 90 ELLIS, Episcopius, 80: Grace is an abstraction for the Holy Spirit. “Grace is the Holy Spirit, and the renewing of grace is a renewal of immediate union between God and humanity through the indwelling of the Spirit”. 91 ELLIS, Episcopius, 73; cf. 179. 92 ELLIS, Episcopius, 74. 88 89

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The essential unity of Adam and humanity thus makes the doctrine of individual election or reprobation impossible.93 As Ellis sees it, for Arminius Adam’s fall marks the junction of two central issues in his theology: Adam sinned freely, and neither God’s foreknowledge nor his decree imposed any necessity on Adam to sin. Otherwise God would be the author of sin.94 That original sin is considered as punishment rather than as sin means that original sin does not render one guilty, and is therefore not punished.95 The punishment for Adam’s sin consists in the absence of the supernatural gifts endowed at creation, but not in a habitus opposed to these original gifts. According to Ellis, Arminius chooses against the Calvinist view that apart from the loss of the supernatural gifts, there is also the corruption of the natural gifts, and for the Thomistic view that original sin consists purely in the loss of the supernatural gifts.96 However, that conflicts at any rate with Arminius’s remarks on original sin in his correspondence with Junius that I referred to at the beginning of this section, that also the moral virtues are corrupted.97 Ellis is correct, however, in his account of Arminius’s view that if some were to be punished for their original sin or original guilt, and others for their rejection of the Gospel, it would imply that there are two peremptory decrees of human condemnation, and two judgments, one Legal and the other Evangelical.98 5.2.2 The Essence and Necessity of Grace Junius poses the question whether grace must be considered as God’s benevolence, or as spiritual gifts. As Junius sees it, the latter belong to another order than creation inasmuch as they are supernatural, while Arminius believes that there has never been such a thing as a “purely natural” human being. For God created humanity in grace, that is, after his image, which means through a supernatural grace.99 For Arminius, grace is directed to (supernatural) perfection. This principle is constant, and applies to both the pre-fall situation as well as after the fall.100 That election is ex gratia means that it is either a progression of ————— 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

ELLIS, Episcopius, 75.78. ELLIS, Episcopius, 69. ELLIS, Episcopius, 78. ELLIS, Episcopius, 76; cf. 179. AC 526 (III 115). ELLIS, Episcopius, 78. AC 512–520 (III 95–106). AC 526 (III 117).

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goodness towards the supernatural good for people in puris naturalibus, or for people in sin. In the latter case, gratia is also called misericordia.101 Grace is one in itself and in its essence, but is applied according to the modus and ratio of the object. The grace that was necessary after the fall into sin in order to attain the same goal as was intended before the fall has been immensely increased and multiplied (vehementer aucti et multiplicati).102 The nature of God’s grace fits the nature of the person. It does not destroy the free choice, but improves it and guides it. According to the Scriptures, God’s grace is resistible and serves the good rather than aiming to make the reprobate fall even harder.103 Without the assistance of God’s grace a person can do no good, and this is true even of Adam before the fall.104 Arminius argues that those who do suppose that Adam could do good before the fall without God’s grace are not far from Pelagianism.105 This applies to those who claim that heathens would be able to accomplish something without grace as well.106 Salvation is out of God’s free and undeserved love.107 About the well-known scholastic maxim “God will do what is in Him, for the man who does what is in himself” (Facienti quod in ipso est, Deus faciet quod in se est), Arminius not only says he would want to add that it is not de condigno but ex congruo, but also that he would not adopt it without adding the following: “God will bestow more grace upon that man who does what is in him by the power of divine grace which is already granted to him, according to the declaration of Christ: to him that hath shall be given” (Facienti quod in ipso est vi gratiae divinae quae ipsi iam obtigit, huic Deus maiorem gratiam largietur: iuxta dictum Christi: Habenti dabitur). Thus also to be able to do what is in your power depends on God’s grace.108 It is important to understand precisely what is meant with “grace.” For example, what exactly is “saving grace” (salutaris gratia)? For Arminius, distinguishing between the first or second, prevenient or subsequent, operating or cooperating, knocking or opening or entering grace is most important to avoid a theologically disastrous mess. If it is so easy to end up in heresy, one would do well to be most careful.109 ————— 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109

AC 532 (III 123–124). AC 609 (III 234). Verklaring, 83–84. (I 629) EP 649 (III 291). A3A 158–159 (II 19). A31A 156 (II 15). EP 680 (III 338). A31A 157 (II 16). A31A 158 (II 18).

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The liberum arbitrium is without grace “unable to begin or to perfect any true and spiritual good” (nullum verum et spirituale bonum incipere aut perficere). With grace, Arminius understands “that which is the grace of Christ and which belongs to regeneration.” This grace is simplicer et absolute necessary for the enlightening of the mind, the ordering of the affections and the inclination of the will to the good. It is a grace that precedes, accompanies and follows, spurs on, helps, works that we will, and cooperates so that we do not will in vain.110 According to Arminius, things go wrong if we understand (foreseen) faith as coming from our powers, and not as a gift from God worked in us.111 5.2.3 Faith Because Arminius understands predestination in a manner totally different from most of his contemporaries, misunderstandings quickly arise when Arminius says that predestination pertains to believers. In Arminius’s view, faith is the condition for election and reprobation, but if we take account of the terminological confusion, faith still does not occupy a place that differs fundamentally from that accorded to it in the Reformed tradition. Faith is the medium for becoming like Christ112 because it unites with Christ, through which unity Christ’s righteousness is imputed to the believer, forgiveness of sins is granted and the Spirit of renewal received, after which the process of mortificatio and vivificatio takes place so that one more and more resembles Christ. Faith has an eminent (eximium) place among the “helps of grace” (adiumenta gratiae) through which salvation is obtained.113 It is “inspired through the Spirit and Word” (per Spiritum et verbum inspirata).114 It is a benevolence and gift from God,115 a means ordained by God.116 It is a condi————— 110 HaC 944 (II 700–701): “Gratiam, et quidem quae Christi est et ad Regenerationem pertinet [...] dico necessariam esse simpliciter et absolute, ad mentis illuminationem, affectuum ordinationem, et voluntatis ad bonum inclinationem [...] Haec praevenit, comitatur, subsequitur. Haec excitat, adiuvat, operatur ut velimus, et cooperatur ne frustra velimus”. 111 EP 653 (III 297): “nisi addat, fidei quae ex nostris viribus sit emersura, et non ex Dei dono in nobis ingeneranda.” Cf. BLACKETER, “Covenant”, 218: “Arminius is optimistic both about the human ability to fulfill the covenant obligation of faith in Christ and about the ability of believers, by doing what is in them now that the gospel has been engraved on their hearts, to conform to the moral law.” Here no account is taken of the complete and perpetual dependence on grace as taught by Arminius. 112 EP 652–653 (III 297). 113 EP 749 (III 440). 114 EP 758 (III 454). 115 A31A 138 (I 745). Cf. PrD XVI (II 394). 116 ETG 45 (III 563).

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tion, but an Evangelical one; that is, God through his grace makes us to fulfill that condition.117 Free acceptance of a gift does not make it unworthy of the name “gift.” So faith is an effect of the enlightening of the mind, and the sealing of the heart through God, and it is his free gift. The means that are necessary to be able to believe, and for which people are elected, are the hearing of the Word of God and sharing in the Holy Spirit.118 According to Arminius, faith is a gracious and gratuitous gift of God, bestowed according to the administration of the means necessary to conduce to the end; that is, according to such an administration as the justice of God requires either towards the side of mercy or towards that of severity. It is a gift which is not bestowed according to an absolute will of saving some particular men: For it is a condition required in the object to be saved, and it is in fact a condition before it is the means for obtaining salvation.119

A distinction must be made between faith as quality or habitus, and faith as work. Actual faith justifies, that is, the act of faith is reckoned as righteousness on the ground of Christ’s obedience.120 God demands actual faith, and for the capacity actually to believe, God gives what is habitual (the habitus of faith).121 The link between faith and justification forms the subject of the following subsection. 5.2.4 Justification God laid the sins of humanity on his own Son, so that all who believe in Him may, freed from sin, receive the reward of their justification. Even though they have sinned, believers are not considered as sinners but as justified in Christ.122 While he was alive, but also very often after his death, Arminius has been accused of departing from the biblical and Reformed teaching on jus-

————— 117 A31A 139 (I 748): “Si quis dicat, esse quidem conditionem, verum Evangelicam, et quam ipse Deus in nobis praestet, vel quod melius est, quam Deus praestare nos faciat gratia sua; ille non contradicit huic veritati, sed illam confirmat”. 118 RQ9 185 (II 67). 119 AN 960 (II 723–724): “Fides est donum Dei gratiosum et gratuitum, datum secundum administrationem mediorum ad finem necessariorum ducentem, hoc est, quam postulat iustitia Dei vel in partem misericordiae vel severitatis, non datum secundum praecisam voluntatem salvandi fingulares aliquot homines. Est enim conditio in obiecto salvando requisita, et prius quidem conditio quam medium ad salutem obtinendum.” 120 Cf. AN 964 (II 728). 121 Letter to Wtenbogaert, Jan. 31, 1605, Ep.Ecc. 81 (II 70). 122 EP 743 (III 433).

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tification.123 In his Apology, Arminius writes the following about justification. God as Judge judges a believer either from the throne of justice on the basis of merit, or else from the throne of grace through the atonement in the blood of Christ. However holy a believer may be, however many great works of faith, hope and love he or she may have accomplished, God will not declare him or her righteous without stepping down from the throne of his strict justice and taking his place on the throne of grace, and out of grace ————— 123 A clear example of this is the assessment made by Kersten – and called into question by the present study – when he writes: “Het is dan ook godslasterlijk als de Arminiaan beweert, dat, als God den mensch rechtvaardigt, Hij van de stiptheid van Zijn recht afstaat en den troon van Zijn genade beklimt. Treffend was het antwoord, dat Gomarus op deze Gods gerechtigheid krenkende voorstelling gaf. Hij toch zeide voor den Hoogen Raad der Staten, dat hij met zulk een gevoelen niet zou durven sterven en voor Gods oordeel verschijnen.” (KERSTEN, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek II, 177) But Kersten not only misunderstood Arminius, he also differed significantly from him in his view of justification. From his understanding of justification as depending on an “allervolkomendste voldoening”, Kersten concludes that any and every human work is excluded as ground for justification, and that it is not a believer, but a sinner, who is justified. From the fact that every human work is excluded as ground, Kersten concludes that it is a sinner, not a believer, who is justified. With an appeal to all Reformed theologians since the Synod of Dort (1618–1619), Kersten goes on to teach an eternal justification as distinguished from an actual justification: “[…] de Gereformeerden hebben tegen de Socinianen, Roomschen en Remonstranten dan ook met klem en nadruk volgehouden, dat de uitverkoren zondaar door God gerechtvaardigd wordt, eer hij gelooft, hoewel alleen door het geloof de in Christus verloste Diens gerechtigheid toegeëigend en dadelijk gerechtvaardigd wordt.” (KERSTEN, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek II, 181). “Niet één Gereformeerde kan de rechtvaardigmaking vóór het geloof loochenen, en deze is van eeuwigheid in het besluit Gods. Op welken anderen grond zijn de uitverkorenen door den Vader van eeuwigheid aan Christus gegeven, dan op grond daarvan, dat het Lam, ter volkomen voldoening aan de geschonden gerechtigheid Gods, is geslacht van de grondlegging der wereld? Christus stelde Zich Borg voor de schuld der ter zaligheid gepraedestineerden en deze borgstelling is door den Vader aanvaard ter verzoening van hun zonden. Zoo is van eeuwigheid, in de sluiting van het Verbond der Verlossing, Gods recht voldaan en de vrijspraak gevallen.” (Idem, 185). However, also Arminius teaches that the satisfaction of God’s justice through the Suretyship of Christ in the pactum with the Father necessarily precedes each bestowal of grace by God to the sinner. In contrast to Kersten, however, Arminius holds this Suretyship to form the basis for the gospel in every respect, so that in this decision there is no distinction yet between predestined and non-predestined sinners. Christ dies for sinners irrespective of their election or reprobation. Further, for Arminius faith is not a work, but the very opposite of a work: justification by works and justification by faith are polar opposites. For Kersten, faith is no more than the appropriation, in the sense of becoming conscious, of the already eternally-existent state of justification. For Arminius, however, faith is not only an instrument that appropriates and receives the promises of God and in that way contributes to justification, but it is also something required by God and the way for the believer to respond to that requirement. God accepts faith because of its character as work, as a work of obedience to the gospel. Faith is reckoned as righteousness not as an instrument, but as a work, on account of Him whom the act of faith grasps: “itaque fides non qua instrumentum, sed qua actio imputatur in iustitiam, quanquam propter illum quem adpraehendit.” A31A 175 (II 49–51). Kersten’s charge that God’s justice is diminished in the Arminian vision, or that God there even abandons his justice, is therefore completely incorrect. The very basis of Arminius’s doctrine of justification is found in the satisfaction of God’s justice in the sacrifice of Christ.

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reckon as righteousness the whole of that good with which that person appears before Him.124 A correct interpretation of these statements must take into account Arminius’s distinction between the Legal and Evangelical theology. Within the Legal theology, human beings are judged on the basis of their obedience to the agreements that were in place within the covenant of works. In the present context, Arminius refers to that as the “throne of God’s strict justice.” God came down from that throne after the fall when He decided to establish a new covenant with the human race in which it is no longer perfect obedience to the law that is determinative, but rather faith in Jesus Christ as Mediator of the new covenant. This Mediator has satisfied God’s justice with his substitutionary sacrifice, on account of which God considers as righteous all those who are united with Christ through faith. Because faith unites with Christ and therefore makes people share in his benefits, faith is reckoned as righteousness. This is what Arminius understands when he speaks of God’s “throne of grace.”125 God is no less just and maintains his justice, but He does this from the throne of his grace in Christ. In Christ all that the believing sinner has received in Christ is not reckoned to that sinner according to merit, but according to grace in Christ. The following quotation, which follows immediately on what Arminius writes about God descending to his throne of grace confirms this: I know, the saints who will be placed before the tribunal of the divine justice, have had faith, and through faith have performed good works: But, I think, they appear and stand before God with this confidence or trust, “that God has set forth his Son Jesus Christ as a Propitiation through faith in his blood, that they may thus be justified by the faith of Jesus Christ, through the remission of sins.”126

The basis of Arminius’s doctrine of justification is formed by the satisfaction of God’s justice in the sacrifice of Christ. The place Arminius attributes to faith in justification, thus not only as instrument of righteousness but also as condition qua act, is directly related to his strict application of logic. On several occasions Arminius points out that it is not correct to state that Christ’s righteousness is imputed (imputare) to the sinner. Christ’s righteousness is not reckoned or taken as righteousness, but is itself righteousness. That which is taken as righteousness by God is therefore not the actual righteousness of Christ, but rather the act of faith on the part of the sinner. Faith is not righteousness, but through God’s decree is taken as righteousness on the basis of the fact that faith unites with Christ, through which all that pertains to Christ is put on the account of the believing sin————— 124 125 126

A31A 173–174 (II 46–47); see PuD XIX (II 257) for the same. Cf. AC 565 (III 170). A31A 175 (II 48).

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ner. For Arminius, this line of thought is nothing but a clear use of concepts and their meaning, with the consequence that faith receives all emphasis as instrument, but also as act demanded by God. That Arminius emphatically gives to faith a place in contrast to works, completely antithetically,127 must, along with his view on faith as gift of God, be taken into account when comparing his view with others. Faith, and faith alone, is reckoned as righteousness. The act of faith, faith itself, is reckoned as righteousness. However, this does not imply that Christ is excluded from justification, or that we are justified because of the worth of our faith. For it is out of grace that faith is reckoned as righteousness, so that all intrinsic value is removed from faith itself. And this is “not without Christ, but in reference to Christ, in Christ, and on account of Christ” (non est extra Christum, sed respectu Christi, in Christo, et propter Christum).128 That God reckons the righteousness of Christ as being accomplished for us and for our well-being, is the reason why God reckons our faith (i.e. the faith that has Christ and his righteousness as object) as righteousness, and that is the reason why He justifies us through, from and by means of faith.129 After giving a thorough exposition of his view on justification, Arminius in the Declaration once again summarizes its essence, and further adds that he would gladly subscribe to what Calvin wrote on justification in Book Three of the Institutes: For the present, I will only briefly say: I believe that sinners are accounted righteous solely by the obedience of Christ; and that the righteousness of Christ is the only meritorious cause on account of which God pardons the sins of believers and reckons them as righteous as if they had perfectly fulfilled the law. But since God imputes the righteousness of Christ to none except believers, I conclude, that in this sense it may be well and properly said, to a man who believes faith is imputed for righteousness through grace, because God hath set forth his Son Jesus Christ to be a propitiation, a throne of grace, through faith in his blood.130

————— PrD XLVIII (II 408). HaC 945 (II 702). 129 HaC 945 (II 702): “quia hoc ipsum, quod Deus nostro bono et pro nobis iustitiam Christi praestitam esse censet causa est, cur Deus fidem nostram, quae Christum eiusque iustitiam habet pro obiecto et fundamento, nobis in iustitiam imputet, nosque fide ex fide, per fidem iustificet.” 130 Verklaring, 124–125 (I 700). Cf. PrD XLVIII (II 406). Cf. HICKS, Theology of Grace, 110: “Arminius’ doctrine of justification must be accounted as Reformed as he always claimed it was.” 127 128

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5.2.5 Sanctification and Good Works One of the attributes of a regenerate person is that he not only wills the good, but also actually does it.131 Arminius admits that there is indeed a battle within the regenerate between the Spirit and the remaining weakness and corruption, but that weakness is not such that it is not constantly overpowered by the power of the Spirit so that people do what is good and grow in that.132 The good works of believers are not rewarded except “out of grace, united with mercy, and on account of Christ.”133 When Arminius is accused of teaching that perfect fulfillment of the law is possible, he with an appeal to Augustine distinguishes between the possibility and actuality of perfect obedience to the law. Arminius considers that when its possibility is denied, the free will that wills it is violated, as are the power and grace of God who effects it through his assistance. Augustine (De natura et gratia contra Pelagium, cap. 69) says: “We most firmly believe that a just and good God could not command impossibilities.” Arminius fully agrees but wants to avoid conflict, since one would do better to devote one’s time to pray for what is still lacking.134 Elsewhere Arminius once again confesses the possibility of perfect obedience to the law. He adds, however, that this is not possible according to the strictest measure of God’s highest perfection, but only when taking into account God’s mercy where the capacity God grants for obedience to the law is proportional to the measure of perfection – which it indeed is within the Evangelical covenant. Also now does Arminius add, however, that the possibility is not all that important, if only one confesses after Augustine that perfection is possible only through the grace of Christ.135

5.3 Summary and Conclusion Chapter 5 considers Arminius’s relation to Reformed theology. Central place is first given to the controversial elements of Arminius’s theology: ————— 131 DR7 852 (II 538): “non enim tantum vult id quod bonum est homo regeneratus, sed etiam facit”. Cf. DR7 853 (II 539); 912 (II 643); 919–920 (II 657). 132 DR7 832 (II 502): “At cum non amplius sub lege, sed sub gratia iam sitis, peccatum omnino vobis non dominabitur, sed vi gratiae facile illi resistetis, et membra vestra arma iustitiae Deo praestabitis.” Cf. DR7 837 (II 510): “Si enim bonum habitaret in carne mea, iam actu possem praestare ad quod mens et voluntas inclinant.” See DR7 843 (II 520) on the regenerate and the struggle between flesh and Spirit: “Spiritus plaerunque superat, evaditque superior”. Cf. DR7 869.871–872 (II 567.571–573). 133 AN 964 (II 729): “Ex gratia, misericordia iuncta, et propter Christum.” 134 A31A 178–179 (II 55–56). 135 RQ9 186 (II 68); AN 961 (II 724–725); Verklaring, 116–118 (I 672–691).

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predestination, grace, atonement, will, sanctification, perseverance and assurance. These show themselves to be integrally related to his (noncontroversial) concept of God’s justice. The controversial elements have thus consistently been judged in isolation, apart from their relation to God’s justice. Secondly, Arminius’s views on doctrines which are distinctive for Reformed theology are laid out, where the majority of the themes treated are those for which Arminius was also accused of heterodoxy: the fall and (original) sin, the essence and necessity of grace, faith, justification, sanctification and good works. When the breadth of Reformed theology in the sixteenth century is taken into account, it appears that also with these themes there are no divergences in Arminius that cannot be explained from his understanding of God’s justice within the context of the duplex amor Dei.136

————— 136 For a more elaborate discussion of the Reformed character of Arminius’s theology, see my “Met onderscheidingsvermogen”, especially 269–273 (English version: DEN BOER, “Cum delectu”) where I also go in on the argument recently offered by Muller (2008) that also a strictly historical approach produces the conclusion that Arminius was not Reformed according to the “confessional standards of the Dutch church”. See MULLER, “Arminius and the Reformed Tradition”.

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Part 2: The Reception and Theologico-historical Context of the Theology of Jacobus Arminius

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6. The Reception of Arminius’s Theology in the Hague Conference (1611)

6.1 Introduction, Method and State of Scholarship 6.1.1 Introduction and Method The Remonstrance itself states that the concrete occasion for its composition on January 14, 1610, was the request the States of Holland and WestFriesland made to the pastors on November 23, 1608, to give their reflections on the Belgic Confession and Heidelberg Catechism. The debates surrounding Arminius at Leiden had by that time already caused a certain group of pastors to become suspect and to be accused of seeking “a change in religion” (veranderinge van Religie). However, the members of this group considered it entirely legitimate and in line with Reformed thinking to revise the Confession and Catechism, or at least to subject them to thorough study, given that they were human documents.1 These remonstrating pastors thought it most necessary now that some of their opponents showed themselves to hold to views that conflicted with Confession, Catechism and God’s Word itself. They thought their opponents were trying to cover a strange theology in all kinds of ways using the Confession and Catechism, and to convince others of it.2 If the Confession and Catechism on examination did indeed appear to teach those things the Remonstrants considered to conflict with God’s Word – although the Remonstrants deny that this is so – then “the Remonstrants would be forced [...] to declare that the aforementioned Confession and Catechism conflict with God’s Word on those points of doctrine, because the Remonstrants hold those points of doctrine to conflict with God’s Word.”3 In five points the Remonstrants expand on that view they fully reject. The five theses they drafted as their own – and, as they argued, biblical and confessional – view, have become best known as the “Five Articles of the Remonstrants.” The Remonstrance was the product of a meeting involving some forty preachers under the leadership of Wtenbogaert, and was presented several ————— 1 2 3

For a historical introduction and the Remonstrance, see HSC 1–12. HSC 5. Cf. 7.63 HSC 5.

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months later to the States of Holland and West-Friesland. All the classes in this area were then ordered by the States “not to examine or burden with the lofty mysteries that are currently overly disputed in the churches (may God remedy this!) the ministers who are now in office, or have yet to enter into office [...], and to bear with one another’s views in love.”4 This government-imposed tolerance of the Remonstrant position caused considerable commotion and generated much opposition. On December 10, 1610, deputies of the provincial synod, following instructions from the churches of Amsterdam, Schiedam, Hoorn, Enkhuizen and Edam, declared in a meeting of the States that they were ready to prove in an official synod that the Remonstrant articles conflicted with God’s Word, the Confession and the Catechism. They requested the States not to impose on the churches these articles which had never been examined by an official synod, but instead to permit a provincial synod to make a decision concerning them. In response to this request, a decision was made on December 22, 1610, to organize a “friendly conference” (vrundlycke Conferentie) involving six representatives from each party in order to discuss the five articles. This conference would make it clear whether or not each party could tolerate the views of the other on the five controverted points. If not, a status quaestionis would be drawn up. Between March 11 and May 20, 1611, a number of meetings were held between the two parties. The Remonstrant participants were Johannes Wtenbogaert, Adriaan van den Borre (Borrius), Eduardus Poppius, Nicolaus Grevinchovius, Johannes Arnoldus and Simon Episcopius. Their opponents, who came to be known as the “Counter-Remonstrants” after their opposition to the Remonstrance, were Ruardus Acronius, Libertus Fraxinus, Petrus Plancius, Johannes Bogardus, Johannes Becius and Festus Hommius. The conference became known as the Hague Conference (cf. place of meeting) or Schriftelicke Conferentie (cf. title of the published proceedings which first appeared in 1612). The conferences were held partly orally, partly in writing. The two parties were by turn given a chance to respond to the other’s theses, arguments and refutations. Throughout, the participants could speak with each other in order to give or ask for further information. The published proceedings (Schriftelicke Conferentie) contain first a commission of the States of Holland and West-Friesland, followed by the text of both the Remonstrance and Counter-Remonstrance. Thereafter we find the written accounts of the discussions concerning such things as the pieces ————— 4 Resolutions of the States of Holland from June 25, 1610; cited in Wijminga, Hommius, 96: “de kerkendienaars, die jeegenwoordig in dienste zijn, als diegeene, die als nog in diensten sullen moogen koomen, bij examen of andersints niet en sal ondersoeken of beswaaren met de hooge Mysterieuse poincten, die jeegenwoordig al te seer (God beetert) in der kerken gedisputeert werden […] en elkanderen in hunne gevoelen in der liefde [zal] dulden.”

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submitted by the two parties on each article of the Remonstrance (the third and fourth articles were combined; this determined the structure of the ensuing discussions so that even the treatment of these issues in the Canons of Dort has the title “The third and fourth heads of doctrine”). These discussions followed a set pattern. They began with the Counter-Remonstrant response to a Remonstrant article, to which the Remonstrants then gave their refutation. The Counter-Remonstrants responded to this refutation, to which the Remonstrants were then given one last opportunity to respond. The account of these rounds of discussion are followed by a summary from each party as to what they consider to be the points of difference, as well as suggestions to the States for how the issue can be resolved most satisfactorily and quickly. When the last meeting between the two parties took place on May 20, the discussion stage had actually not yet been completed. The second round of debates on articles 2, 3/4 and 5 took place only in writing, as did the summary, status quaestionis and final suggestions to the States. On November 29, 1611, the last pieces were submitted. The whole report was then published in 1612 following orders from the States of Holland and WestFriesland. Afterwards different Dutch editions were also printed, as well as two Latin translations – one from the Remonstrant side, the other from the Counter-Remonstrants. The Schriftelicke Conferentie therefore took on an important place among those documents that were particularly significant for the disputes over the five Remonstrant articles before, during and after the Synod of Dort 1618–1619. The Remonstrance was a direct result of the polemics surrounding Arminius’s theology, and was composed shortly after his death. Hoenderdaal has shown convincingly that a significant part of the five positive theses in the Remonstrance was taken over directly from Arminius’s Declaration of 1608.5 With that, the Remonstrant preachers under Wtenbogaert’s leadership let it be known that they not only followed Arminius on the issue of church and state, but also shared his theological convictions on at least the topics covered in the five articles of the Remonstrance. From the Remonstrance one can draw a direct line to the discussions over it during the Hague Conference. It is in this context that the question of the reception of Arminius’s theology by the earliest Remonstrants and their opponents must be considered. It is clear that the five articles of the Remonstrance were from the beginning, and especially after the Hague Conference, determinative for the direction the ensuing debates would take. The Remonstrance was more or less intended as a summary, but at the same time began to function as a ————— 5

HOENDERDAAL, Verklaring, 38–41.

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filter. I am convinced that the dispute became so narrow, and the issues so removed from the context in which they stood in Arminius’s thought, that one cannot speak of a broad theological continuity from Arminius to the Remonstrants. The five topics addressed in the Remonstrance were indeed part of Arminius’s theology as well. In that sense, the Remonstrants are without doubt “Arminians.”6 However, the first part of this study has shown that these topics were in Arminius’s thought directly related to his view on God’s justice, and grew out from it. The Remonstrance not only meant that the theological discussion became even more significant politically, but also that – as is more pertinent to the present study – it from then on was limited to four or five theological themes, and therefore separated from Arminius and his theology. In light of this, the natural next step is to examine the reception of Arminius’s theology by tracing the extent to which his fundamental principle (iustitia Dei) and its theological concept (duplex amor Dei) (re-)appear in the documented dispute (Schriftelicke Conferentie) that became determinative for the following debates. 6.1.2 State of Scholarship Copinger is a typical example of the way many have treated the Hague Conference: “No good resulted from the conference and no determination in favour of either party was come to.”7 Because the intended result of the conference was not achieved, it is regarded as a failure. That the “byproduct” of the conference, the Schriftelicke Conferentie, contains an enormous amount of material for our understanding of the controverted points and gained a lot of influence for the direction of the ensuing dispute has not sufficiently been recognized. In 1874–1876, Rogge published a three volume work on Johannes Wtenbogaert and his time.8 In the second volume (1875), he also devotes some attention to the Hague Conference. However, it is especially the historical aspect that occupies Rogge’s attention, and his sympathies for the Remonstrant cause come out in an overly pronounced way throughout his work. In 1899, Wijminga defended a dissertation on Festus Hommius.9 This work provides a detailed account of the life of Hommius and of his active ————— 6 Cf. STANGLIN, Assurance, 112: “It would be anachronistic, however, to impose the five Remonstrant articles as a summary of Arminius’s distinctives, even if he would have agreed with them in principle.” 7 COPINGER, Treatise, 69. 8 ROGGE, Wtenbogaert. For the Hague Conference, see part 2, p. 70–102. 9 WIJMINGA, Festus Hommius. For the Hague Conference, see p. 104–122.

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involvement in the Remonstrant controversies. Hommius took a prominent and leading position among the Counter-Remonstrant ministers. “As an academic theologian, he was well-versed in the issues; he had been involved in the struggle against the Remonstrants from the very beginning and on every point.”10 Wijminga describes Hommius’s involvement in the composition of the Counter-Remonstrance11 and at the Hague Conference as follows: Because Hommius, in our opinion, was at this point the leader and spokesman of the Counter-Remonstrants, and because this meeting was of the greatest importance for the history of the immediately following years – after all, already here the lines the Synod of Dort would follow in composing its Canons were drawn – I decided that I should not limit myself too much here. As result of the conference, Hommius soon became involved in other tasks.12

Wijminga thus recognized the great importance of the Hague Conference, and provides important factual details. In terms of content, however, he only occupied himself with the already well-known broad lines of the Schriftelicke Conferentie. The year 1906 saw the appearance of a dissertation from Louvain on the doctrine of predestination in the Reformed church of the Netherlands up to and including the Synod of Dort 1618–1619.13 Van Oppenraaij wanted to show that Dutch Calvinism was first moderate and tolerant, but that over time it was the rigid Calvinist pastors who came to gain more and more influence. This led to the Remonstrant controversy which finally brought about the elimination of the supporters of this ancienne doctrine from the Reformed church.14 Van Oppenraaij gave considerable attention to the Ha————— 10 WIJMINGA, Festus Hommius, 279–280: “Als wetenschappelijk Theoloog was hij volkomen op de hoogte; den strijd met de Remonstranten had hij van den beginne af en op elk punt meê doorgestreden.” 11 “Zeer waarschijnlijk hebben zij na onderlinge bespreking de redactie aan Hommius opgedragen, gelijk zij dat bij andere missiven, die namens hen afgegeven werden, wel meer deden, zooals wij later zullen zien en kan aldus het vaderschap der Contra-remonstrantie aan hem worden toegekend.” WIJMINGA, Festus Hommius, 108. 12 WIJMINGA, Festus Hommius, 121–122: “Omdat Hommius, zooals ons bleek, hier de hoofdpersoon en woordvoerder der Contra-remonstranten geweest is en deze vergadering voor de geschiedenis der eerstvolgende jaren van het grootste gewicht geweest is – hier toch werden eigenlijk reeds de lijnen getrokken, waarlangs de Dordtsche Synode zich bij de vaststelling harer Canones bewogen heeft – meende ik mij hier niet al te zeer te mogen bekorten. Weldra werd Hommius ten gevolge van de conferentie weer in anderen arbeid gewikkeld.” 13 VAN OPPENRAAIJ, Prédestination. For the Hague Conference, see p. 166–170 and 180– 209. 14 “Grâce à l’influence de la communauté néerlandaise de Londres, le Calvinisme se montra au début modéré et tolérant; le decretum horribile de la prédestination absolue n’y trouva pas d’adhérents.” VAN OPPENRAAIJ, Prédestination, vii. See also p. 120: “Les premiers réformés néerlandais s’écartaient du point fondamental des doctrines dogmatiques de leur maître Calvin;

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gue Conference, and treated also the circumstances in which the meetings were held. More importantly, Van Oppenraaij appears to have been the first to lay out the positions and arguments of the Remonstrants and CounterRemonstrants, primarily with an extensive summary of the Schriftelicke Conferentie.15 However, a real analysis cannot be found. In 1965, Polman published an article on the doctrine of eternal reprobation at the Hague Conference of 1611.16 Here he calls the Schriftelicke Conferentie one of the richest sources for the controversy between Remonstrants and Counter-Remonstrants.17 Polman closely follows the debate on reprobation during the conference, and finishes his article with a dogmatic treatment and evaluation of the issues. Also Godfrey, in his dissertation18 (1974) on the debates on the atonement during the Synod of Dort 1618–1619, devoted attention to the Hague Conference. As to the Counter-Remonstrant theological arguments, Godfrey limited himself to sketching broad lines because of the continuity with the discussions held during the Synod of Dort.19 Aside from continuity, Godfrey also points to a difference between the Conference and the Synod on the way the death of Christ was spoken about.20 ————— sans se préoccuper de réfuter la prédestination absolue, ils professaient dans leurs livres dogmatiques, empruntés à la communauté de Londres, la prédestination conditionnelle et les doctrines qui en découlent: l’universalité de la grâce; la liberté de l’homme sous l’opération de la grâce et la possibilité pour les fidèles de déchoir de la foi et de leur salut. Ces opinions mitigées ne tardèrent pas de se modifier; sous l’influence des prédicants calvinistes rigides, soit étrangers, soit indigènes mais qui avaient reçu leur formation théologique dans des universités calvinistes du dehors, les synodes, dès qu’ils purent se réunir, introduisirent comme livres dogmatiques la Confession néerlandaise et le Catéchisme de Heidelberg qui proclament la prédestination absolue. Pourtant des prédicants à l’esprit plus pénétrant et plus indépendant continuait à defender l’ancienne doctrine.” Cf. the final conclusions, p. 258–261. 15 “C’est surtout dans les écrits échangés par les deux partis lors de la conférence de La Haye que nous retrouvons le plus facilement les points controversés entre arminiens et gomaristes par rapport à la prédestination et aux articles connexes, ainsi que les arguments et contre-arguments apportés de part et d’autre.” VAN OPPENRAAIJ, Prédestination, 180. Here he treats the period up to and including the year 1614. 16 POLMAN, “Verwerping”, 176–193. 17 POLMAN, “Verwerping”, 176. 18 GODFREY, Tensions. For the Hague Conference, see 106–116. 19 “To trace in greater detail the theological arguments presented by the Contra-Remonstrants at this Collatio is unnecessary. The skeleton of their thoughts as indicated received flesh and sinew in the details inferred later from references in the works of William Ames and from the discussions at the Synod itself. The aim is not to minimize the importance of this earlier debate, but rather to spare repetition.” GODFREY, Tensions, 113–114. 20 “Throughout this conference the Contra-Remonstrants tended to speak of the dead of Christ in moderate terms – “pro solis fidelibus” rather than “pro solis electis.” Such moderation was absent at the Synod of Dort. Whether the terminology at the Collatio reflected a less rigid or polarized stage in the controversy or whether it reflected a desire to use the most conciliatory language before the civil authorities who were known to have Remonstrant sympathies is uncertain.” GODFREY, Tensions, 113.

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Sinnema’s dissertation21 (1985) placed the issue of reprobation at the Synod of Dort in the background of the history of this doctrine. In this context he, like Polman, treated the discussions on the doctrine of reprobation during the Hague Conference, which he considers “the most important meeting of the two sides before the Synod of Dort, particularly for clarifying the issues in debate, and so it deserves special attention.”22 In his brief overview of several dogmen-historical and exegetical aspects in his thesis23 (1997) on the relationship between church and state in the region of Holland 1570–1620, Hofman made extensive use of the Schriftelicke Conferentie. Finally, Verboom (2005) provides a brief overview of the discussion, and adds several personal observations.24 In sum, it appears that the nineteenth-century studies provide information especially on the historical circumstances surrounding the Hague Conference, while the twentieth-century studies enter more in on the content and the dogmen-historical significance of the conference. Also noteworthy is the fact that scholarship has appeared to work descriptively, providing summary rather than analysis. Especially from such an important meeting as the Hague Conference, where there were many opportunities for attack and defense, arguments and exegesis, one would expect a clear and nuanced image of the views of each party. It is therefore rather surprising that the Schriftelicke Conferentie, although a very substantial account of the differences between the Remonstrants and Counter-Remonstrants,25 has been used so infrequently for determining their respective views.

6.2 Iustitia Dei and Duplex Amor Dei in the Hague Conference 6.2.1 Predestination The first part of the written and oral discussions between Remonstrants and Counter-Remonstrants treats the first article of the Remonstrance, which is on predestination. The Remonstrants have great difficulties with two existing views that differ from each other only with respect to the object of predestination. The Remonstrants describe the two views as follows: ————— SINNEMA, Reprobation. For the Hague Conference, see p. 158–167. SINNEMA, Reprobation, 159. Vgl. p. 167: “Seven years later the two sides would face each other again at the Synod of Dort with basically the same difference of agenda.” 23 HOFMAN, Eenich achterdencken. For the Hague Conference, see p. 368–381. 24 VERBOOM, Belijdenis. For the Hague Conference, see p. 133–159. Cf. VAN ASSELT, “Willem Verboom”. 25 VAN ‘T SPIJKER, “Enkele aspecten”, 44. 21 22

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I. That God (as some say) by an eternal and unchangeable decree ordained from humanity, which He did not consider as created and much less as fallen, some to eternal life and others to eternal condemnation, without taking any account of righteousness or sin, obedience or disobedience, only because it so pleased Him to reveal the glory of his justice and mercy or (as others say) saving grace, wisdom and free power, having ordained also the means that serve the execution of the same by an eternal and unchangeable decree, according to whose power those persons ordained to salvation must necessarily and inevitably be saved and cannot be lost, and those persons ordained to condemnation (which constitutes the greatest part) must necessarily and inevitably be condemned and cannot be saved. II. That God (as others say), willing to make a decree from eternity within Himself to elect some people and to reprobate others, considered the human race not only as created but also as fallen and corrupt in Adam and Eve our first parents, and as such worthy of damnation; from which fall and condemnation He has decided to save some and lead them to glory through his grace in order to display his mercy; and to leave others, both young and old, even children of covenant partners who have been baptized in the name of Christ and die in infancy, in their damnation by letting his just judgment stand in order to declare his justice; and all this without any consideration of repentance and faith in the ones, or unrepentance and unbelief in the others. For the execution of this decree, God uses such means through which the elect are necessarily and inevitably saved, and the reprobate are necessarily and inevitably lost.26

The first view thus sees, as a consequence of God’s wisdom,27 man-to-becreated (i.e. neither created nor fallen) as the object of predestination, which is completely absolute, and whose necessary consequence is the salvation of the elect and the condemnation of the reprobate through the means God ordained to execute the decree. The only source or cause of predestination is God’s good pleasure, and the only goal is the manifestation of the glory of God’s justice in the reprobate, and the manifestation of God’s mercy in the elect. The second view differs from the first in that it considers the latter to call God’s justice into question, since God there appears to be the cause and author of sin.28 For that reason the proponents of the second view posit that the object of predestination is created and fallen man; these people are worthy of condemnation, and can thus be justly condemned. Election remains absolute and applies only to a certain number of the sum total of those who are liable to condemnation. To execute his decrees, God uses means whereby the elect are necessarily saved and the reprobate necessarily lost. ————— 26 27 28

HSC 6. Cf. HSC 36.108. See HSC 36; cf. 101.

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With predestination, the Remonstrants themselves understand: I. That God by an eternal, unchangeable decree decided in Jesus Christ his Son, before the foundation of the world, to save from the fallen and sinful human race, in Christ, for the sake of Christ and through Christ, those who through the grace of the Holy Spirit believe in the same Son Jesus, and who persevere to the end in that faith and obedience of faith through that grace, but conversely to condemn the unrepentant and unbelieving in their sin as estranged from Christ, and to leave them under his wrath; according to the testimony of the holy gospel in John 3:36, “Whoever believes in the Son has eternal life, and whoever disobeys the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God remains on him,” and a number of other passages from the Scriptures.29

As will become clear, there are two elements in this definition of predestination that the Remonstrants consider absolutely crucial: 1. The fundamental place and function of Christ. 2. The place and function of faith and unbelief. The Remonstrants themselves were convinced that the eternal and gracious character of election was not called into question. The first of these elements (i.e. the place of Christ) will be treated at length in our description of the proceedings concerning the second article of the Remonstrance. The Counter-Remonstrants reacted fiercely to the way the two views above were described and attributed to them by the Remonstrants. Before the States General they declared that they rejected the descriptions “described there”30 as being drawn up in “a most hateful way” and as “containing an abominable doctrine.”31 On several occasions the Remonstrants later cleverly point to this reaction when they argue that the CounterRemonstrants do actually hold to a view of predestination, or elements of it, that they themselves had earlier rejected as “abominable.”32 What makes it abominable is directly related to the inevitable decree of God according to which humanity would necessarily fall into sin, and which therefore makes God the author of sin.33 According to the Remonstrants, their CounterRemonstrant opponents at the Hague Conference do not dare to state out loud that everything good and evil depends on an inevitable necessity, yet there are others who do teach it without diffidence.34 The Counter-Remonstrants argue that the sentiment of their opponents “agrees more with human reason [...] than with the doctrine of the Re————— HSC 7–8. HSC 38. 31 HSC 20.21.23.31.32.38.92.110. 32 See e.g. HSC 81: “Souden de broederen Contra-Remonstranten desen wech in willen, soo en souden sy d’eerste vijf Articulen onser Remonstrantie, dewelcke sy met ons als grouwelick hebben verworpen, niet in ernst verworpen hebben, maer t’ghevoelen inde selve uytghedruckt noch in den boesem draghen, dat wy niet en verhoopen.” Cf. HSC 92.101.388. 33 HSC 101; cf. 102. 34 HSC 102. 29 30

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formed Churches which is grounded only in God’s Word.”35 They express their view in ambiguous words that to a degree conflict with God’s Word, the Confession and the Catechism.36 About predestination in general – “that high point” – the CounterRemonstrants remark that it should be spoken about in our churches moderately and carefully according to the rule of God’s Word, only to promote God’s unmerited grace and to take away all human merit and worth, as well as to strengthen the firm comfort of believers in such a way that no one will have just cause to be offended by it.37

The Remonstrants attribute to them things that they have never wanted to allow or teach, and unjustly draw “several troubling consequences” from the Reformed doctrine.38 Of the seven articles of the Counter-Remonstrance, particularly the first three are important for the doctrine of predestination which the CounterRemonstrants claim to be taught in all the churches. 1. As in Adam the whole human race, created in the image of God, has with Adam fallen into sin and thus become so corrupt that all men are conceived and born in sin and thus are by nature children of wrath, lying dead in their trespasses so that there is within them no more power to convert themselves truly unto God and to believe in Christ than a corpse has power to raise itself from the dead; so God draws out of this condemnation and delivers a certain number of men who in his eternal and immutable counsel He has chosen out of mere grace, according to the good pleasure of his will, unto salvation in Christ, passing by others in his just judgment and leaving them in their sins. 2. that not only adults who believe in Christ and accordingly walk worthy of the gospel are to be reckoned as God’s elect children, but also the children of the covenant so long as they do not in their conduct manifest the contrary; and that therefore believing parents, when their children die in infancy, have no reason to doubt the salvation of these their children. 3. that God in his election has not looked to the faith or conversion of his elect, nor to the right use of his gifts, as the grounds [oorsaken] of election; but that on the contrary He in his eternal and immutable counsel has purposed and decreed to bestow

————— HSC 19; see also 23. HSC 20; cf. 26.27. 37 HSC 20: “[...] in onse Kercken matichlijck ende voorsichtelijck pleech ghesproken te worden nae den Reghel van Gods woort, alleen tot voorstant van Godes onverdiende genade, ende wechneminge van alle menschelijcke verdiensten ende waerdicheyt, als oock tot versterckinghe vanden vasten troost der geloovigen, in sulcker voegen, dat dien aengaende met recht niemant sich daer aen en heeft te stoten.” 38 HSC 20.23. 35 36

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faith and perseverance in godliness and thus to save those whom He according to his good pleasure has chosen to salvation.39

In light of the Remonstrant assertions mentioned above, it is remarkable that the point of departure for predestination is the fall into sin, and the human condition that arose from it. The object of predestination is thus fallen man, even though the Counter-Remonstrants consistently remark that they see no fundamental difference from the view that takes its point of departure in creatable man.40 The Remonstrants suggest that there are ambiguities hidden under the words “certain particular persons”. For with that expression, one could mean either people considered by God as not yet created, or people considered as created but lying in sin outside of faith in Christ, or people considered as believing in Christ. For all are, even if considered in different ways, “certain particular persons.” [...] Why is this description so ambiguous and uncertain? No doubt in order to cover with that one general description the two views we reject: the one which would have God in predestination consider man as uncreated; the other which would have God regard him as lying in original sin, outside of Christ. For that one shoe fits on both of those feet, but it is in fact so big that it will also fit on ours.41

————— 39 HSC 21; translation from DE JONG, Crisis, 211. For a definition, see HSC 40: “Onse meyninghe is dan dese, dat door verkiesinghe ter salicheyt inde schriftuere verstaen wort, een eeuwich onveranderlijck besluyt Gods, vvaer door hy van eeuwicheyt uyt alle andere menichten heeft uytghesondert seeckere bysondere Persoonen, welcker ghetal seecker ende hem bekent is, om de selve tot prijs sijnder eerlijcker genade salich te maecken, ende vvaer door hy oock met eenen besloten heeft, tot dien eynde Iesum Christum desen uytverkorenen te gheven tot een Middelaer ende Salichmaecker, ende in hen het gheloove crachtelick, dadelijck, ende seeckerlick te vvercken, ende alsoo door den gheloove in Christum, als door een middel tot dien eynde gheordonneert, salich te maecken.” 40 HSC 23–24: “Belangende nu dat eenighe Leeraers onser Kercken, jae oock D. Martinus Lutherus selve, wat hoogher gaen int aenmercken van Gods raet ende ordonnantie, aengaende der Menschen salicheyt, als hier te vorens is verhaelt, daer over en is tot noch toe noyt eenige oneenicheyt ofte strijt geweest in onse Kercken, ende dat daerom, dat hoe wel dese twee meyninghen daer in verschillen, dat d’eene stelt, dat Godt in sijnen eeuwighen raedt den Mensche aenghesien heeft als ongheschapen, d’andere dat Godt uyt den ghevallen Menschelijck geslachte eenige ter salicheyt vercoren heeft, d’andere voorby gaende, nochtans soo comen sy beyde met malcanderen over een int fondament, twelck is, eerstelijck, datter is een seker getal der uytvercorene kinderen Gods, die niet en connen verloren gaen, daer nae dat Godt in dese verkiesinge niet en heeft gesien opt gheloove, ofte yet goets, dat inde uytverkorene is alsoo weynich als in den ghenen die hy voorby gaet, voor ende aleer dat hy dat selve in hen werckt, ende dat in sulcker voughen, dat sy vanden haren daer toe niet en brenghen, maer dat het gheloove ende de Godsalicheyt vruchten zijn der Verkiesinge.” See also HSC 31. 41 HSC 75: “schuylen onder de woorden Seeckere besondere Persoonen: want daer voor connen verstaen werden, ofte Persoonen by Godt aenghesien als noch niet gheschapen: ofte Persoonen aenghesien als gheschapen, ende legghende inde sonde buyten tgheloove in Christum: ofte, Persoonen aengesien als in Christum geloovende: want alle dese hoe wel verscheydelick aenghesien, zijn seeckere bysondere Persoonen. […] Waer toe dese beschrijvinghe soo dobbelsinnich ende op schroeven gestelt? ontwijffelick, om onder soo eenen generale beschrijvinghe te bedecken beyde

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The Counter-Remonstrants constantly emphasize the total inability of the fallen human being to repent and believe, and from that basis the unconditional character of election.42 Faith, repentance and perseverance are fruits of election and means to salvation, and thus also means to the execution of the decree. Reprobation is not discussed explicitly within the seven articles. The very careful remark is made that God passes over the non-elect, that He leaves them in their sin, and that this is a just judgment. However, immediately after the seven articles, attention is devoted particularly to reprobation. It is true, however, that this teaching appears strange to the human understanding particularly with respect to the reprobate and unrepentant sinner, and that it is hard to swallow for those who are still weak in faith and have no well-trained insight into God’s Word. For that reason this doctrine ought to be spoken of soberly and carefully, so that those who are not enflamed against the doctrine of truth with a misguided zeal and hate have no cause to slander our churches over it; but similarly when one remarks that God has determined to condemn no one except on account of sin and that He moves no one to sin, and also that those who lie dead in their sins do sin freely even if they can do nothing but sin, one shall not make him stumble on this doctrine. For what cause have we to be offended by the judgments of God against godless and unrepentant sinners? Why do we not allow God to deal with those same godless people according to the perfect rule of his justice, instead of wanting to evaluate those same judgments of his that for us are incomprehensible and unsearchable? Why do we need to be concerned about those whom God in his just judgment has abandoned and reprobated? Do we want to make ourselves the advocates and supporters of the reprobate and unrepentant sinners over against God’s just judgment, or do we think that God will not know how to defend his justice unless we think and speak of Him in a way different from the way He Himself speaks in his Word? Let us rather say together with the Royal Prophet, “Lord you are just, and all your judgments are just,” Ps 119:137. And, “You shall be proved right in your words, and remain pure when you are judged,” Ps 51:6.43

————— de ghevoelens die wy verwerpen, t’een, der ghener die willen dat Godt int predestineren den Mensche hebbe aenghesien als ongheschapen: t’ander, der ghener die willen dat Godt die hebbe aenghemerckt als leggende inde Erf-sonde, ende buyten Christum: want op beyde dese voeten past dese schoe, die oock soo ruym is ghemaeckt dat hy mede can passen op den onsen […].” 42 Cf. HSC 53: “dat d’oorsaecke waeromme Godt voorghenomen heeft, eenighe menschen aldus te verkiesen, ende andere niet, alleen is zijn welbehagen ende loutere ghenade, ende niet om dat hy voorsien heeft, dat d’eene soude in Christum gelooven ende d’andere niet: Ende dat dien volgende t’gheloove niet en is een oorsake oft conditie, de verkiesinghe ter salicheyt voorgaende, maer een vrucht uyt de verkiesinge ter salicheyt voortcomende ende volghende”. 43 HSC 23: “Wel is waer, dat insonderheyt ten aensien vande verworpene ende onbekeerlijcke sondaren dese Leere den Menschelycken verstande vreemt dunckt, ende is een harde spijse voor den genen die noch swack zijn inden geloove, ende geen wel gheoeffende sinnen in Godes woort en hebben: Daerom ooc van dese Leere in onse Kercken soberlijc ende voorsichtelijck

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What causes offense in reprobation is precisely the apparent injustice44 that appears to be attributed to God. The Counter-Remonstrants, however, present three reasons which they consider sufficient as response: 1. God wills to condemn no one except on account of sin. 2. People sin freely, although they can do nothing else – God moves no one to sin. 3. God is completely just, and can defend his justice even if it is for us incomprehensible and unknowable.45 The Counter-Remonstrants consider it unnecessary to go in on the lofty and difficult questions that pertain to it.46 The Remonstrants are not satisfied with this: Because the Remonstrant evaluation of the doctrine of predestination as held to also by many in these churches arises mostly from the difficulties they see in reprobation as these same people explain it, it is for that reason necessary that they know what the Counter-Remonstrants believe about it. Because our opponents from all corners slander our churches especially over this doctrine, it is therefore most necessary to examine what is taught about reprobation.47

The Counter-Remonstrants, however, do not agree. They emphatically refuse to open up on issues related to their view of reprobation, among others because they consider that it does not pertain to the ————— pleech gesproken te worden, sulcx dat de ghene, die niet met eenen verkeerden yver ende haet tegen de leere der waerheyt ontsteken en zijn, geen oorsake en hebben van onse Kercken daer over te lasteren: maer evenwel wanneermen aenmerct, dat Godt niemant en heeft voorgenomen te verdoemen, dan om der sonde, ende dat hy niemant tot sonde en beweecht, maer dat ooc de gene die doot leggen in hare sonden, al hoe wel sy anders niet en connen dan sondigen, evenwel vrywillichlijck sondigen, so en salmen hem aen dese Leere so niet stooten. Want wat reden hebben wy ons te stooten aen de oordeelen Gods over de godloose ende onbekeerlijcke sondaren? waerom en laten wy niet liever Godt na den volmaecten regel sijner gerechticheyt begaen met den selven godloosen, dan dat wy de selve sijne onbegrijpelijcke ende ons onbevindelijcke oordeelen willen gaen ondersoecken. Wat behoeven wy ons te becommeren met den genen die Godt in sijn rechtveerdich oordeel verlaten ende verworpen heeft? Willen wy dan ons selven voorspreeckers ende voorstanders maken van de verworpene ende onbekeerlijcke sondaren tegen Gods rechtveerdich oordeel, of meynen wy dat Godt sijn rechtveerdicheyt niet en sal weten te verantwoorden, ten zy dat wy anders van hem gevoelen ende spreken, dan hy selve in sijn woort spreect? Laet ons veel liever met den Coninclijcken Propheet seggen, Heere ghy zijt rechtveerdich ende alle uwe oordeelen zijn rechtveerdich, Psal. 119.v.137. Ende ghy sult recht behouden in uwe woorden, ende reyn blijven, wanneer ghy gerechtet wort. Psa. 51.v.6.” 44 Cf. HSC 55–56. 45 Cf. HSC 42: “wy ghevoelen ende leeren dat Godt niemandt en verdoemt, noch niemandt voorghenomen heeft te verdoemen, dan rechtveerdichlijck om harer eygen sonden wille.” 46 HSC 42: “onnoodich te zijn die hooge ende sware questien, dit stuck belanghende, in te treden”; cf. 48: “subtijle ende spineuse vraghen.” 47 HSC 46; cf. 45.107. Cf. 388: “wy [hebben] veel eer oorsake om ons te stooten aen dat harde ende aen-stootelijcke ghevoelen van eenighe Leeraers inde Gereformeerde Kerck, sulcx als wy dat in onse eerste 5. Artijckelen hebben vervatet: Een ghevoelen by den Broederen selve inde Conferentie voor afgrijselijck ende grouwelijck verclaert. Ende soo’t den Broederen belieft hadde hare meyninghe int stuck vande Reprobatie te verclaren, soo’t betaemde, dan soude de aenstotelijckheyt van hare opinie noch claerder zijn ghebleken.”

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status quaestionis or controversiae, which now has arisen (may God remedy this!) in the doctrine of the churches in this country. For we would have tolerated the Remonstrants’ view on it [i.e. reprobation – wdb], if only they had been willing to admit that God out of pure grace and according to his good pleasure has elected to salvation those whom it pleased Him to save without any consideration of their faith as an antecedent condition.48

Because the Counter-Remonstrants refused to give their view on reprobation, the Remonstrants took the liberty to draw conclusions themselves from what their opponents held concerning election. This amounted to the claim that God has reprobated certain particular persons as particular persons, without consideration of any quality in them, to eternal destruction or condemnation as their end, without willing to give them Christ and faith, in order to bring those who are reprobated through their unbelief as a fruit of this reprobation certainly (and we add, inevitably) to their determined end (to use their words).49

If unbelief follows from the decree of reprobation, God cannot justly condemn the reprobate “because it is the greatest injustice to condemn someone for something that follows necessarily from reprobation (which is a work that is purely God’s own).”50 In the discussions on the first article of the Remonstrance, it appears that the main point of contention is whether the Remonstrants admit a predestination aside from the predestination of believers and unbelievers.51 The Counter-Remonstrants’ greatest objection with the latter is that in such a predestination God considers people as believers and takes note of their faith, which makes faith a (moving) “condition” or “cause.” The CounterRemonstrants themselves consider the object of predestination to be “certain particular persons,” and faith a fruit of election.52 God has decided to call the elect through the preaching of the Gospel and to draw them in with his Spirit. Faith is given to no one but the elect.53 Also the ————— 48 HSC 43: “[...] Statum quaestionis ofte Controversiae, die nu, Godt betert, int stuck der Leere inde Kercken hier te Lande is ontstaen. Want men soude de Remonstranten haer ghevoelen daer over wel vrij ghelaten hebben, soo sy slechts hadden willen bekennen, dat Godt uyt loutere ghenade nae sijn welbehagen ter salicheyt verkooren heeft, die ghene die’t hem belieft heeft, sonder eenich ooghemerck te nemen op haer geloove, als op een voorgaende conditie.” 49 HSC 108: “[...] sekere besondere personen als besondere personen, ende sonder eenige qualiteyt inde selve aen te sien, heeft verworpen ten eeuwighen verderve of verdoemenisse als tot haer eynde, sonder hun Christum ende t’gheloove te willen gheven, om die ghene die so verworpen waren door t’ongheloove, als een vrucht deser verwerpinghe tot haer bestemt eynde (so sy spreken) seeckerlijck (Wy doen daer by onmijdelijck) te brenghen.” 50 HSC 109–110; cf. 100. 51 Cf. e.g. HSC 65–66. 52 HSC 30, see also 24.39.41.54; cf. 40: “Hier leydt de voornaemste knoop des gheschils.” 53 HSC 52.

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means to come to faith God does not make common to all men. For first of all, He does not have all people hear his Word; and furthermore, He does not draw all those who do hear the Word through the power of his Spirit so that they come to Christ. Therefore He has also not elected all to salvation, but only some particular people.54

The connection between the means and election is thus so strong that from the fact that not everyone hears the Word and not all hearers are drawn by the Spirit, it follows that not everyone is elect. The Remonstrants are of the opinion that no argument in the entire Scripture is more probable than this one.55 However, as they see it, the line of reasoning behind it arises from that inquisitive reason of men, which desiring to enter into God’s secret judgments and to understand what the cause might be that God has not had, and does not have, the gospel of salvation preached to so many thousands of people among the Gentiles and elsewhere; and unable themselves to go far enough in that, they finally can find no solution but this, that there must necessarily be an absolute and unconditional decree or determination of predestination.56

The Remonstrants consider that such a decree agrees neither with God’s nature nor with the Scripture, and sets the door wide open either for living a profligate life, or else for despair. It further renders the preaching powerless,57 and God would dissimulate when the gospel is preached to those whom He has decided to reprobate. Their condemnation would then not be based on their unbelieving rejection of the gospel, for the reprobate are ordained to condemnation “without consideration of this unbelieving rejection.”58 This does not fit with God’s nature; in fact, it is contrary to it.59 The Remonstrant doctrine of reprobation, on the other hand, is reasonable and fair, and removes every claim to innocence from the reprobate.60

————— 54 HSC 52: “middelen om tot den geloove te comen en maeckt God niet allen menschen ghemeyn. Want eerstelijck en laet hy niet allen menschen zijn woort hooren: Daer nae so en treckt hy niet alle die zijn woort hooren door de cracht zijnes geests, dat zy tot Christum comen. Ergo so en heeft hy oock niet alle, maer alleen eenighe bysondere persoonen ter salicheyt verkoren.” 55 HSC 82.86. 56 HSC 82: “uyt des menschen curieuse vernuft, twelck willende treden in Gods heymelicke oordeelen, ende doorgronden wat d’oorsaeck mocht wesen, dat Godt so vele duysenden menschen onder den Heydenen, ende elders het Euangelium der salicheyt niet en heeft doen of noch en doet predicken: ende niet connende hun selven daer inne ghenoech doen, eyntelick gheen ander wtcomste en hebben weten te vinden dan dese, datter nootsakelick moest wesen een absoluyt ende precijs decreet, of besluyt van Predestinatie […]”; cf. 87: As wise, merciful and just King, Christ determines where He will send his Word, not according to an absolute decree, “maer om andere oorsaken inden mensche selve schuylende, ons onbekent ende Christo bekent”. 57 HSC 82, see also 83. 58 HSC 84: “sonder aensien van dit ongheloovich verstooten”; see 110. 59 HSC 106. 60 HSC 105.

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The Counter-Remonstrants believe that if it “depends on the human will (willekeur)” whether or not they will use the gift of faith, it would diminish the honor that is due to God and take away the only comfort people have.61 The Remonstrants acknowledge that they indeed admit of no other predestination than that which was recorded in the Remonstrance.62 It goes without saying that they appeal to Scripture for support. However, for the present study particularly the theological arguments are important. The Remonstrants focus their attack on absolute reprobation,63 where for example the creation of the reprobate, as well as God’s abandonment of them, the withholding of the means of grace, blinding, hardening, persistence in sin, raising up for judgment, and casting into eternal condemnation are all called “fruits of reprobation.” As a case in point, they cite the “appalling view” (schrickelijck gevoelen) of Nicasius van der Schuere, who wrote about God’s ability to cast man into condemnation and to predestine him before he is born; and once born, to cast him into the abyss of hell from the very beginning, before he has done anything wicked. Why would He then not all the more have the ability to move and direct the heart of man to sin? For what is more – to damn those who have done no evil, or to move and direct those same people to sin? And after God wills to condemn the reprobate, does it make any difference how He condemns them – whether He moves and directs them to sin, or else condemns them even before that?64

————— HSC 24.41.55.71–72. HSC 34. 63 Cf. HSC 81: “Waer soude dat heen loopen, dat Godt, ghelijck hy sonder op het gheloove in Christum te sien soude barmherticheyt ter salicheyt bewijsen, oock also zijne strengicheyt bewijsen soude aenden mensche als aen een besonder persoon, sonder te sien op eenighe qualiteyt van sonden?’ 64 HSC 32: “den Mensche tot verdoemenis te verwerpen ende te predestineren eer hy geboren is: ende ghebooren zijnde, van stonden aen, eer hy eenich quaet ghedaen heeft, inden afgront der hellen te verwerpen, Waeromme en soude hy niet veel meer dat vermoghen hebben des Menschen herte tot der sonden te bewegen ende te regeeren? Want vvat is meer, te verdoemen den ghenen die gheen quaet ghedaen en heeft, ofte den selven totte Sonde te bevvegen ende regeeren? Ende naedien Godt de verworpene vvil verdoemen, ist niet even ghelijck hoe dat hyse verdoemt? Weder dat hyse totte sonde beweecht ende gheregeert heeft, ofte daer te vooren?” For Van der Schuere, see BLGNP 3, 324–325. Van der Schuere (of: Verschuere) (ca. 1540–after 1584) published his Een cleyne of corte institutie, dat is onderwysinghe der christelijcker religie, ghestelt in locos communes in Gent in 1581. Vanhees reports that the work met with considerable opposition, especially in respect to the section on predestination and the cause of evil: “Op de nat. synode te Middelburg in 1581 werd het boek als onstichtelijk beoordeeld. Van der S. bekende schuld en beloofde het drukken tegen te gaan. Toch bleven er exemplaren in omloop; zowel op de conferentie in Leeuwarden (1596) als in de particuliere synode van Noord-Holland (1597) en in de kerkenraad van Amsterdam (1610) werd het geschrift veroordeeld als strijdig met de evang. waarheid. In de controverse tussen de remonstranten en de contraremonstranten zou het opnieuw aan de orde komen, maar door beiden worden afgewezen.” Vanhees notes that it was reprinted in Rotterdam in 61 62

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The Remonstrant objection implicitly concerns the doctrine of God that is connected to such a doctrine of reprobation. On the one hand they see a great difference between the view of those who see the object of predestination as uncreated man, and with that “call creation a way to condemnation,” and those who hold “that God in predestination considered man as created and fallen.”65 On the other hand, both views err in the place they give to Christ and faith in predestination. In both, the attributed place dishonors Christ, and calls God’s justice into question. In the case of the elect, because they are elected in Christ without previously made satisfaction; in the case of the reprobate, because they are reprobated either without previously committed sin, or else for sin that was necessary and inevitable. Because of the parallel between election and reprobation66 – acknowledged also by the Counter-Remonstrants themselves67 – the latter is also a consequence of that view which considers fallen man the object of predestination. Since election is unconditional, reprobation must be unconditional as well. If the decree to establish Christ as Savior follows the decree of election, it is “absurd, and clearly serves to dishonor Christ.”68 Likewise, God’s justice is also called into question in this view of predestination where fallen people are the object: If the appointment of Christ as Savior follows the election of certain particular persons to salvation, then in terms of order God has ordained certain particular persons to salvation before He had ordained the satisfaction of his justice. But that is again absurd and nonsensical because it is impossible for God to apportion salvation to sinners (to whom alone predestination extends) without in terms of order first determining the satisfaction of his justice. The first can therefore not be true.69

————— 1612, thus after the Hague Conference. Apparently he was unaware of the “recent” (onlancx) Amsterdam reprint mentioned in the HSC. 65 HSC 33. 66 See HSC 35.37.46.107. 67 HSC 41: “Ten tweeden begeeren de Broeders, dat wy ons oock sullen verklaren over het stuck der verwerpinghe: waer op wy antwoorden, dat wanneer wy stellen een eeuwich besluyt van verkiesinghe van seeckere bysondere Persoonen, dat daer uyt oock claerlijck can verstaen worden, dat wy mede stellen een eeuwich besluyt van verwerpinge of verlatinghe van seeckere bysondere Persoonen: want daer en kan gheen verkiesinghe wesen, of daer moet oock verwerpinghe of verlatinghe zijn. Wanneer wt een seecker ghetal eenighe worden wtverkooren, soo worden daer mede oock d’andere verworpen: want diese al neemt die en verkiest niet.” 68 HSC 109. 69 HSC 109: “So de bestemminghe Christi tot een Salichmaecker volcht op de verkiesinge van seecker besonder persoonen ter salicheyt, so heeft God eerst in ordere seeckere besondere personen de salicheyt toebestemt, eer hy bestemt hadde de voldoeninge van sijne gerechticheyt: Maer dit is wederom absurd ende ongherijmt, om dat het by God onmogelijck is salicheyt den sondaren (over de welcke alleen de Predestinatie haer uyt streckt) toe te bestemmen, sonder al

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The Counter-Remonstrants appeal to the immutability of “the essence and nature of God” in order to prove that “also his will and counsel must be immutable.” From God’s immutability the Remonstrants infer that God from eternity decreed to save those who persevere in faith and to condemn those who do not believe, because this is evident “from the execution God performs in time of the decree He made from eternity concerning human salvation and condemnation.”70 In contrast to the Counter-Remonstrants, the Remonstrants distinguish “consider as believers” and “taking note of faith” from viewing faith as condition or cause of election. As they see it, the Counter-Remonstrants confuse “the cause that moves God to elect, with the way in which God considers people in election, as if the cause of a matter and that which merely precedes it are one and the same thing.”71 And as to the manner in which He considered faith in election – i.e. as cause or as condition – we reply that in any case it is not as cause, nor even as anything that to even the slightest degree would go against God’s saving grace. Since this has been established, we do not think that one ought to be concerned about this any longer, but that the occasion ought to be determined by God the Elector.72

The Remonstrants view faith as “a gift of God given to us out of grace.”73 Thus they see no reason, as the Counter-Remonstrants do, to contrast it with God’s good pleasure and grace, as if faith and grace were mutually exclusive.74 In election faith is not considered as a condition that must yet be fulfilled, but it is an already-fulfilled condition; election to salvation is thus absolute with respect to the believer.75 God’s election is a decision of the grace and good pleasure of God in Christ, according to which He for the sake of Christ and through Christ wills to save all those who believe in Him, not because they believe in Him, but only out of pure grace and mercy.76

————— eerst in ordre de voldoeninge sijner gherechticheyt, bestemt te hebben. Soo en can dan het eerste niet waerachtich zijn.” 70 HSC 60; cf. 70. 71 HSC 35. 72 HSC 35: “Ende wat aengaet de maniere, hoe hy t’gheloove int verkiesen heeft aenghesien, te weten, als oorsaecke oft als conditie: daer op segghen wy, dat het in allen ghevalle niet en is aenghesien als oorsake, noch als yet dat de salichmakende ghenade Godts soude mochen int minste teghen zijn: twelcke vast ghestelt zijnde, so en houden wy niet datmen sich vorder in desen behoeft te becommeren, maer de gheleghentheyt hier van Gode den Verkieser behoort te laten bevolen wesen”; see 93.94.105. 73 Cf. HSC 106: “Dat ten lesten geseyt wort dat God den mensche t’gheloove geeft sonder sijn toedoen, als uyt hem selven, is oock ons gevoelen: maer is hier buyten propoost.” 74 HSC 37; see 93: “even of ghenade ende gheloove waren strijdende dingen”. See HSC 94. 75 HSC 106. 76 HSC 74: “[...] is een besluyt der ghenade ende welbehaghens Gods in Christo, volghens twelck hy om Christi wille, ende door Christum wil salich maken alle die in hem ghelooven, ende

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The Counter-Remonstrants remark that when faith is contrasted with works as is done by the Remonstrants, election becomes nothing but “that God decided to save not the one who works, but the one who believes.” In that case, God would elect “not particular people, but conditions or qualities.”77 The Remonstrants indeed oppose justification by works with justification by faith. This is precisely the reversal that took place after the fall into sin,78 and forms the very core of the gospel. Faith and grace stand in contrast to works and law.79 “If it is not from works, it is from faith and thus from grace.”80 Also if the Remonstrants say “that God in election looked upon those who persevere in faith in order to save them,” then it is “not on account of faith, but for the sake of Christ whom they accept through faith, understanding also with persevering faith nothing but faith that remains until the end.”81 According to the Remonstrants, election to salvation thus depends on “God’s infallible foreknowledge according to which He knows who believe in Him, will become his sheep and people, and who will not.”82 In election, faith is considered as a certain and realized gift from God.83 Should God have willed to save Jacob without consideration of faith, and to condemn Esau without any consideration of unbelief, there would be good reason to doubt that this agrees with God’s justice. Not so much in the case of Jacob, “who was saved in any case,” but rather “in the case of wretched Esau who was hated, reprobated and (according to this view) from eternity predestined to eternal condemnation without any consideration of his wickedness.”84 On the contrary, it does closely agree with God’s justice that He did not will to save by works those people who had transgressed his law, but rather to save them by faith.85 After the covenant of works was undone, it was not unjust on the part of God not to grant righteousness to those who work, but instead to those who believe in Christ.86 From this discussion on predestination, the following conclusions can be drawn for the main question of this chapter. The Remonstrant objection against unconditional predestination appears to be driven in two different ways by theological arguments that pertain to God’s justice. Absolute re————— dat, niet uyt oorsaecke dat sy in hem ghelooven, maer alleen wt louter ghenade, ende barmherticheyt.” 77 HSC 69. 78 Cf. HSC 103. 79 Cf. HSC 81. 80 HSC 107. 81 HSC 96. 82 HSC 89; cf. 106. 83 HSC 101. 84 HSC 104. 85 HSC 104. 86 HSC 105.

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probation – where unbelief follows from reprobation – is not possible because it is most unjust to punish someone for something that necessarily follows from reprobation. If uncreated and unfallen man is the object of predestination, God even becomes the author of sin. According to the Remonstrants, absolute election conflicts with God’s justice because God’s justice must be satisfied before He can destine sinners to salvation. Election is thus in and through Christ received by faith. When the Remonstrants call unconditional predestination “absurd and abominable,” it appears that they were thinking particularly of God’s injustice, especially as it would be manifested in reprobation. God’s justice is also the reason that it is “absurd and nonsensical” to posit that in terms of order, God elected certain sinners to salvation even before He had determined the satisfaction of his justice. From the Counter-Remonstrant side, God’s justice forms the reason for positing created and fallen man as the object of predestination. They defend God’s justice in unconditional reprobation with an appeal to the incomprehensibility of God’s judgments, and maintain that it cannot be grasped by human reason. However, God Himself will surely be able to defend his justice. For this reason the Counter-Remonstrants complain that the Remonstrant view is more in agreement with “human reason” than grounded only in the Reformed doctrine as based on God’s Word. The Remonstrants also draw false and bad consequences from the Reformed teaching; this observation once again illustrates that the Counter-Remonstrants want to distance themselves from a(n overly) rational approach. The CounterRemonstrants with their view of absolute predestination therefore do not situate the problem of God’s justice in God, but rather in the human understanding. God’s justice is no issue when it comes to the place of Christ in the decree of predestination, although for the Remonstrants the opposite was true. One can therefore conclude that there was some kind of continuity between Arminius and the Remonstrants with respect to the function of God’s justice in their arguments. This is at any rate true when the issue concerns predestination itself. The Counter-Remonstrants’ appeal to the unknowability of God’s justice, on the other hand, shows influence from the likes of Calvin (see 7.2). God’s justice plays virtually no role in any CounterRemonstrant argument, neither to establish and defend their own views, nor to attack those of the Remonstrants. The frequency and emphasis with which the Remonstrants use God’s justice as an argument is, however, rather sparse. Two questions arise: 1. Does God’s justice also play a further role in the debate between Remonstrants and Counter-Remonstrants? 2. Do there appear to be, as was the case between Arminius and his opponents, diamet-

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rically opposed points of departure (e.g. the knowability of God’s justice) for issues in which one would not expect agreement, so that attempts at reconciliation appear to have been doomed from the very outset? 6.2.2 The Place and Function of Christ and the Atonement In connection with the first article, the issue of Christ already came up a number of times, particularly with respect to the place He occupies in relation to predestination. For the Remonstrants, Christ is the foundation of predestination.87 Election is in Christ and for that reason pertains to believers, for no one is in Christ if he or she does not believe in Christ.88 The Counter-Remonstrants posit that Christ is also the one who elects,89 or that it is God who elects through Christ.90 Christ is indeed the foundation of salvation, but they do not follow the Remonstrants in maintaining Christ as the foundation of predestination.91 God according to his good pleasure has predestined us in Him, or predetermined us to acceptance as children through Jesus Christ, that is, He predestined us to receive actual acceptance through Jesus Christ as children; and further, just as no one receives actual acceptance as children but through actual faith, as can be seen from John 1:12 and Gal 3:26, to which our brothers have also appealed although these passages are not against us, so also from these passages one cannot but conclude that God predestined us to be accepted as children of God through faith in Jesus Christ and for his sake, and through this means to be brought to salvation.92

The Counter-Remonstrants do not connect the place and function of Christ with election and God’s justice, as the Remonstrants did. This appears to be one of the most important points of divergence between the two parties in the discussions on the second article as well. This second article of the Remonstrance is devoted to the extent of the atonement: what does it mean ————— HSC 33.37.88. HSC 58–59.61.78. 89 HSC 67. 90 HSC 71. 91 HSC 70. 92 HSC 67: “Godt [heeft] naer het welbehaghen sijns willens in hem selven ons […] ghepredestineert, ofte te vooren gheschickt tot aenneminge der Kinderen door Jesum Christum, dat is, dat hy ons daer toe heeft ghepredestineert, dat wy door Jesum Christum de dadelijcke aenneminghe der Kinderen souden verkrijghen, ende volghens dien, alsoo de dadelijcke aenneminge der Kinderen niemandt en verkrijcht dan door dadelijck geloove, ghelijck te sien is uyt Johan. 1.12. Gal. 3.26. welcke plaetsen de Broeders oock hebben aenghetogen, doch teghen ons niet en zijn: soo en can oock wt dese plaetse anders niet worden besloten, als dat Godt ons daer toe heeft ghepredestineert, op dat wy door t’gheloove in Jesum Christum, ende om sijnent wille tot kinderen Godts souden aenghenomen worden, ende door soodanighen middel ter salicheyt ghebracht.” 87 88

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to say that Christ died for all people? The Counter-Remonstrants “readily agree that the suffering and death of Christ is of such value and power, that it is in itself sufficient to pay for the sins of all people.”93 However, they further posit that the procurement of the atonement, the vicarious work, the actual removal of sin and guilt, the placing in a state of grace and so its appropriation, are all so inextricably tied to each other that they pertain to the same group of people – not to the unbelievers and unrepentant.94 In contrast, the Remonstrants distinguish between the procurement and the actual appropriation of atonement: the first pertains to all without exception, the latter only to those who repent and believe. “It is then a persistent error that our brothers commit, and one that has often been pointed out to them, consisting in the confusion of procurement – which is for all – with actual appropriation – which is for only a few.”95 Throughout the discussions, numerous logical and exegetical arguments come up. Given the particular question to which this study is directed, the following will focus on a number more fundamental, systematic-theological motives. One Remonstrant argument that is raised a number of times refers back to the relationship between election and atonement. Election is grounded in Christ. On the basis of “the necessary precedence, in terms of order, of the merits of Christ before the determination or election of certain people to salvation,”96 the Remonstrants argue that “what in terms of order precedes election to salvation cannot have taken place for the elect as elect.”97 Their reason lies in their view that God’s justice must first be satisfied before He can display his mercy to sinners. When we say that Christ has procured forgiveness of sins for all, we mean that Christ accomplished so much when He satisfied God’s justice that God has, without violat-

————— HSC 111; cf. 124–125.135. HSC 112.114.124. 95 HSC 167: “Dan t’is de gheduerighe mislach die de Broederen begaen, ende die dickwils aenghewesen is, bestaende in vermenginghe van de verwervinghe, die voor allen, met de datelijcke toeeygeninghe, die maer eenigen gheschiet.” 96 HSC 118–119. 97 HSC 118; cf. HSC 155: “Geven wy den Contre-Remonstranten dit argument te bedencken: Indien men simpelick houden wil dat Christus voor sijne schapen, voor zijne gemeynte etc. als sodanich zijnde, ghestorven is, dat dan inde ordre yemant eer een schaep Christi ende van zijne Gemeynte is geweest, eer Christus voor hem ghestorven was, ende hem met zijn bloedt verworven hadde, twelck absurd, ongherijmt, ende onwarachtich is. Ergo is Christus niet voor sijn schapen als sodanige gestorven, maer wel voor sijn schapen als sondaren ende verloren menschen, welcke qualiteyt, also hun met anderen, die by ghebreke van gelove noyt Christi schapen gheworden zijn, gemeyn is, so is oock Christus int gemeyn mede voor hen ghestorven.” 93 94

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ing his justice, once again opened the door to his grace for sinful man, although no one will come to share in that grace except through faith.98

God’s justice therefore forms the most important argument for distinguishing the procurement from the “actual enjoyment” of the atonement, and for the logical precedence of procurement to faith or unbelief. Procurement extends to all sinners in general; faith and unbelief come up only when one is dealing with the election that is founded on this procurement.99 The “universality of Christ’s suffering” thus does not conflict with the “particularity” of the election of certain particular persons.100 The Remonstrants link the distinction between procurement and application to the way Scripture speaks about the twofold love that God and our Lord Jesus Christ have for us, the first of which we call an antecedent love, which precedes our conversion, faith and love of God, and is shown to us when we are still enemies; the other consequent, which is shown to us by God and Christ after we are converted to Him and love Him. The first love is most fully displayed by God in that “He gave his Son for our reconciliation”, John 3:16; 1 John 4:9,10; Rom 5:8, and by Christ, in that “He laid down his life for us,” 1 John 3:16; Eph 5:2. The second love (which is spoken of in John 14:22,23, “Whoever loves me, loves also the Father, and I will love him, and will reveal myself to him, etc.”: see also Acts 10:34; Heb 11:6) was most fully displayed in that God and the Son dwell in us when we believe in and love them, and makes us share in the fulness of the benefits obtained.101

————— 98 HSC 147: “Als wy dan seggen dat Christus voor allen de vergevinge der sonden heeft verworven, hebben wy daer inne dese meyninghe, namelijck, dat Christus, voldoende de gherechticheyt Gods, so veel heeft teweghe ghebracht, dat God sonder quetsinge van sijne gherechticheyt, den sondigen mensche de deure wederom heeft open ghestelt tot sijne genade, hoewel niemant tot de ghemeynschap van dese ghenade en sal ingaen dan door t’ghelove”; cf. 121: “om dat nae de waerheyt des Evangeliums gheen salicheyt noch wille van salicheyt over den sondighen Mensche by God en kan zijn, dan door de doot ende verdiensten Christi.” 99 HSC 146–147; cf. 146: “ghelijckmen seggen mach, dat een Medecijn meester sijne medecijne voor alle crancken bereydt heeft, sonder onderscheyt of alle crancken die sullen ghebruycken of niet, hoewelse niemandt helpen en sal dan diese ghebruycken, also ist oock gheleghen met de versoeninge in Christo: allen isse verworven: voor allen isse bereyt: ende evenwel en hebben d’onghelovige paert noch deel daer aen, om dat sy die door ongelove verwerpen: twelck niet soude connen gheschieden, wanneer sy henlieden van te vooren (midts ghelovende) niet en ware. toebestemt, ende Christus voor henlieden niet gestorven en ware.” 100 HSC 170. 101 HSC 164: “tweederley liefde die Godt ende onse Heere Jesus Christus ons toedragen, d’eene mogen wy noemen eene voorgaende liefde, namelijck die onse bekeeringhe, gheloove, ende liefde tot God voorgaet, ende ons bethoont is als wy noch vyanden waren: d’ander volgende, die van Godt ende Christo ons bewesen wort, na dat wy tot hem bekeert zijn, ende hem lief hebben. D’eerste liefde is opt hoochste daer in betoont van Godt, ‘dat hy ons zijn Soone tot onse versoeninghe heeft ghegeven’, Johan. 3.16. 1. Johan. 4.9.10. Rom. 5.8. Ende van Christo, ‘dat hy voor ons zijn leven inde doodt ghegheven heeft’ 1 Johan. 3.16. Ephes. 5.2. De tweede liefde (vande welcke ghesproken wort Johan. 14.22.23. ‘Die my lief heeft, die sal oock den Vader lief

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This quotation speaks explicitly of God’s “twofold love,” the duplex amor Dei, where the first, precedent love has to do with the satisfaction of God’s justice through the atonement. However, this similarity does not mean that the Remonstrants adopted Arminius’s concept of God’s twofold love. For the Remonstrants, God’s primary love is a love for humankind and not in the first place to justice, although God’s love for humankind does there take shape in atonement for sin, that is, the satisfaction of God’s justice. The secondary love of God is not a general love for humanity or all creatures and their glory, but his love for believers. In short, just because the Remonstrants use the same terms as Arminius does not guarantee that they also took over the underlying concepts. A little later, the Remonstrants reject the notion that God would “as to order first have loved man to salvation, and out of that love elected him to salvation, before He determined to give Christ his Son.” Also this statement reminds one of Arminius’s rejection of a reversed order of God’s twofold love as he found it in the thought of his opponents, but once again God’s justice is not explicitly referred to nor expanded on more amply in terms of content.102 Other arguments more-or-less connected to the doctrine of God come up from discussions on the call to salvation and the command to believe, both of which do not go out merely to the elect. If God earnestly calls people to salvation through Christ’s blood, it implies that Christ died for all those who are called, for otherwise God would act “hypocritically” (gheveynsdelijck) in the call.103 If God gives the command to believe in Christ crucified, it means that Christ died for these people, for God does not command people to believe an untruth. If Christ had not died for all even though they are all commanded to believe, it would mean “that they do not sin in their unbelief, and that they are in the end not justly lost because of their unbelief.”104 Connected to this is that for the Remonstrants, sufficiency presupposes actual procurement, as well as the will on God’s part to extend to all what is sufficient for all.105 The Remonstrants also point out that their colleagues may well emphasize that they believe Christ’s death is sufficient “for the whole world, even for many thousands of worlds,” but that they ————— hebben, ende ick sal hem lief hebben, ende sal hem my selven openbaren’: etc. oock Actor. 10.34. Hebr. 11.6.) werdt hier in opt hoochste bethoont, dat den Vader ende den Sone, als wy ghelooven ende haer lief hebben, wooninghe in ons maecken, ende ons de volheyt vande verdiende goederen deelachtich maecken.” 102 HSC 174. 103 HSC 119; cf. 161.172–173. 104 HSC 120. 105 HSC 149.

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furl the sail of God’s grace once again only shortly after appearing to have unfurled it, when they say in article 4 of their Counter-Remonstrance that God delivered his Son Jesus Christ to the death of the cross in order to save the elect. Likewise, that although the suffering of Christ is sufficient to pay for the sins of all, according to the counsel and decree of God it nevertheless has the power to atonement only in the elect and true believers, etc.106

From that, the Remonstrants draw the conclusion that the “CounterRemonstrants agree with Beza, Piscator, etc., who openly teach that with respect to God’s counsel, Christ did not die for the reprobate in sufficiency, or power, or in any other way.”107 The Remonstrants illustrate the absurdity this involves in the following way: A physician boasts that he has a remedy to all illnesses which he offers to all the sick, inviting them to come and be healed. But in the meantime he has neither the desire nor the will to heal all the sick; indeed he has determined to leave the greatest majority in their illnesses without consideration as to whether or not they would spurn his remedy.108

The Counter-Remonstrants insist that the atonement can be extended beyond the believers or elect only in terms of its sufficiency. Aside from a number of exegetical and linguistic arguments, they raise also certain theological issues. Thus a strong connection is drawn between procurement and the preaching of salvation. Because one can share in the salvation procured only through faith in the preached Word, universal procurement would imply that the Word would also have to be preached to all. Given that this is clearly not the case, the atonement is not procured for all either.109 Not only Scripture, but also experience, teaches that God does not will the salvation of all people, and that not all will in fact be saved. This is clear among others from the fact that daily many thousands are lost, and not all people are called to salvation, not all who are called repent, and not all are given and presented the means to come to knowledge of the truth, which is the preaching of the Word. From this it is clear that God does

————— 106 HSC 147–148: “t’seyl der genade Gods, dat sy te voren so ruym schenen uytghespannen te hebben, wel haest weder in crimpen, wanneer sy segghen in hare Contre-Remonstrantie Articule 4. dat God sijnen Soon Iesum Christum inden doot des cruyces heeft overghegheven om zijne uytvercoren salich te maken. Item, dat, hoewel het lijden Christi ghenoechsaem is tot betalinghe voor aller menschen sonden, nochtans dat het selve volghens den raedt ende besluyt Godes alleen inden vvtvercoorenen ende vvare Gheloovighe sijne cracht heeft tot versoeninge etc.” 107 HSC 148. 108 HSC 149: “Een Medecijn-meester roemt sich dat hy een remedie heeft teghen alle cranckheden, die hy den crancken aenbiedt, de selvighe noodende haer selven te laten ghenesen: ende daer en tusschen en heeft hy noch sin noch wille alle crancken te heylen, jae heeft bestemt verre den meesten deel in hare cranckheden te laten sterven, sonder opmerckinghe of sy sijner medecijne souden versmaden of niet.” 109 HSC 113.

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not will, that is, did not determine to bring all people to salvation and knowledge of the truth, and that He therefore also did not assign and apply the means to salvation to all, although God the Lord does take delight and pleasure in it when man turns to Him and lives, Ezek 18:23.110

The Remonstrants protested against this argument. The reason that the Word is not preached everywhere is not to be found in the death of Christ, or in an eternal, absolute, merciless decree of predestination that conflicts with God’s nature and the Scriptures, but rather in “man’s own antecedent sins and wickedness.”111 “If we do not know where to go any more with our absolute predestination,” we should not seek refuge in “human reason” (Menschelick vernuft), but rather cry out: O the depths of the wisdom and knowledge of God, whose judgments and ways are incomprehensible and unsearchable. For although we believe that the Scripture is explicit, and that we must firmly believe that God wills to have compassion on all, yet the manner and way God uses for this, and the decision to send the Word of atonement here and not there, remain largely hidden from us.112

For the Counter-Remonstrants, what Christ earned, as well as faith, are considered by God in election as means. In that sense, election to salvation is founded in Christ Jesus.113 The Counter-Remonstrants consider that the Remonstrant argument on the order of election has been sufficiently refuted. They claim that it is “absolutely nonsensical” that the “all-wise God would ordain the means before the end.”114 If God had decided in his “allwise counsel” that Christ would atone for the sins of those who would never be reconciled to God, it would mean either that Christ’s death was not powerful enough to execute God’s counsel, “or that God was not wise enough in his counsel and determined to do something that He can or does not will ————— 110 HSC 138–139: “dagelijcx vele duysenden verloren gaen, ende niet alle menschen ter Salicheyt gheroepen, niet alle gheroepene bekeert, ende niet alle menschen den Middel om tot de kennisse der waerheyt te comen, welcke is de Predicatie des woordts gegeven ende voorghedraghen wordt. Waer uyt dan claerlijck blijckt dat Godt niet en wil, dat is, niet en heeft voorghenomen alle menschen tot Salicheyt ende kennisse der waerheyt te brengen, ende dat hy daerom ooc de middelen ter salicheyt alle menschen niet en heeft toe gheschickt noch toegheeyghent, hoe wel God de Heere een behaghen ende welghevallen heeft, dat de mensche hem bekeere ende leve, Ezech. 18.23.” 111 HSC 161–162. 112 HSC 162: “O diepte der rijckdommen der Wijsheyt ende kennisse Godts, welckers oordeelen ende vveghen onbegrijpelijck ende onvindelijck zijn. Want gheloovende dat de Schrift uytdruckelijck seydt, ende dat wy vastelijck ghelooven moeten, namelick dat Godt sich aller erbarmen wil, soo blijft ons noch even wel de maniere ende weghen die Godt daer toe inne gaet, als van twoort der versoeninghe hier te senden ende elders niet, ten meesten deel verborghen.” 113 HSC 126. 114 HSC 127; see 108.

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to carry out,” “both of which are nonsensical and abominable.”115 Not a word is said about God’s justice. It is only remarked that “no dishonor would be done to Christ the Lord,” and that salvation would not posited as available outside of Christ “if one were to say that the suffering and death of Christ is the only means through which all those who will be saved obtain salvation.”116 The Counter-Remonstrants claim that also the argument based on the external call does not hold. In the external call, God does not have proclaimed that Christ died for all just like that, but “joined to the external call to salvation there is always the required condition of faith and repentance. Thus it is not proclaimed absolutely to each and every person that Christ has died for him in whatever state he may be, but only for the repentant and believing sinners.” For that reason there is also no hypocrisy in God: On the contrary, God would act hypocritically if he were to let it be proclaimed that Christ died for each person without distinction, and when the unrepentant and unbelieving thereafter find out that Christ’s death does not benefit them whatsoever. Further, to speak more properly, God does not call to salvation all those who are outwardly called, for the only people whom He calls to salvation, that is, to whom He lets salvation be proclaimed, are the believing and repentant. The unrepentant and unbelieving He calls to repentance before He calls them to salvation.117

Also the command to believe in Christ does not imply in an absolute sense “that Christ died for all those whom God in general has presented with the command to believe in Christ.” It is a conditional command. Christ died only for those who obey this command and therefore believe and repent. God commands no one to believe a lie “because it is undoubted and sure that Christ died for all those who truly believe that He has died for them.”118 An unrepentant sinner must repent and “believe in Christ according to the content of the holy Gospel.”119 Before he actually does this, he has no reason at all to believe that Christ has procured atonement also for him personally, “which no one can know according to this teaching before he believes.”120 The Counter-Remonstrants, however, emphasize the other side, ————— HSC 143. HSC 127. 117 HSC 132: “Ter contrarie God soude gheveynsdelijck handelen indien hy liet vercondighen dat Christus voor een yeder mensche, sonder onderscheyt, soude ghestorven wesen, ende dat daer nae de onboetveerdige ende ongeloovige souden bevinden dat Christi doot haerlieden gantschelijck niet te nut en comt. Daer beneven om eyghentlick te spreken en roept God niet ter Salicheyt alle die ghene die wterlijck gheroepen worden, want hy roept alleen ter Salicheyt, dat is, laet de Salicheyt alleen vercondighen den gheloovighen ende boetveerdighen: De onboetveerdighe ende ongheloovighe roept hy eerst tot bekeeringhe eer hyse roept ter Salicheyt.” 118 HSC 133. 119 HSC 134. 120 HSC 141. 115 116

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the “hope of salvation.” For unbelievers there is a means by which they can elude deserved condemnation, namely, “if they believe. And not a single person is cut off from the hope of salvation absolutely as long as he is alive, nor is anyone in particular told that Christ has not died for him, for no one can say that of another as long as he is alive.”121 As long as there is life, there is hope. “From whom is the hope taken away that God will not grant also to him in his own time that he repent and believe in Christ?”122 What must or can these people believe then? Before he comes to faith, sinful man doubts whether Christ has died for him. But all sinful people must believe without doubt that Christ has through his death paid a ransom that is sufficient to take away the sins of all people, and that the sins of all who repent and believe in Him will therefore really be taken away.123

6.2.3 Assurance of Salvation and God’s Justice It is striking that the Counter-Remonstrants undergird the assurance of faith with the same syllogism as Arminius. For both, the promise made to believers and one’s realization that one is a believer, form the foundation for the assurance of faith. The Counter-Remonstrants base assurance on God’s general promise to believers that Christ died for all believers. Believers appropriate this general promise for themselves, and from the fact that they believe they conclude that Christ has died for them.124 However, according to the Remonstrants, those who doubt whether they believe because they are in sin and do not feel the power of their faith and the witness of the Holy Spirit, will not be helped by this CounterRemonstrant syllogism. The “secret book of predestination” is for such people an abyss of despair. Because they do not experience the power of ————— HSC 139–140. HSC 140. 123 HSC 141: “De sondighe mensche eer hy ghelooft, twijfelt of Christus voor hem gestorven is: maer alle sondighe menschen zijn schuldich te gelooven sonder eenich twijfel, dat Christus door zijn doot heeft betaelt een rantsoengelt dat genoechsaem is om aller menschen sonden wech te nemen, ende dat daer door oock datelijck wech genomen worden de sonden aller der ghenen, die haer bekeeren ende in hem ghelooven […].” 124 HSC 141–142: “De seeckerheyt des geloofs ende der Salicheyt steunt na onse Leere op een algemeyn woordt der belofte allen gheloovigen int ghemeyn toebehoorende, op dese maniere: Christus is gestorven voor alle geloovigen. Daer hebt ghy het algemeen woort. Nu seght een gelovich mensche, hem dit algemeyn woort toeeygenende, Ic ben een van de gelovige: Ende besluyt: daerom so ben ic versekert dat ic ben een van de gene voor welcke Christus gestorven is. Alsoo wort door onse Leere de rechte seeckerheyt des geloofs ende der salicheyt gestelt ende bevesticht.” 121 122

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faith as fruit of predestination, they have reason to fear that they have not been predestined and that Christ has therefore also not died for their sins.125 In contrast, their own view on the universally-procured atonement may perhaps not offer a complete rest for the conscience, but a foundation for it is nevertheless laid, because it goes forth in the confidence that God (now that his justice has been satisfied through Christ the Atoner) is able and wills to forgive the sins of him, me and of every sinner who repents, without any antecedent distinction in persons through such a predestination as our brothers advocate.126

With that, the Remonstrants base the foundation of comfort in God’s justice as it was satisfied in Christ for those who doubt. “For although no one actually shares in these riches except through faith, God’s riches still extend to all: the storeroom of grace is open for all.”127 6.2.4 Grace and the Operation of Grace During the discussions on, among others, the distinction between the procurement and application of the atonement, the Counter-Remonstrants already noted that one of their objections against the Remonstrants was “that it depends principally on the human will, and not on God’s pure grace, that this procured atonement is actually applied to someone.”128 The Remonstrants denied this and attributed the appropriation to “pure grace” (loutere genade).129 In the discussions that were held on the third and fourth articles of the Remonstrance, the freedom of the human will, grace and the operation of grace were discussed extensively. According to the Counter-Remonstrants, the third and fourth article concern one issue, and for that reason they treat the two together. That issue is ————— 125 HSC 178: “Wat raet dan met een die so swack is, dat hy aen zijn gheloove twijfelt, ende midts den last des vleesches, legghende onder sware ende grouwelicke sonden, de cracht zijns gheloofs ende t’ghetuygenisse van Gods Gheest tot zijnen geest, niet en ghevoelt? als dickwils ghebeurt. Hoe sult ghy desen troosten? Wysen tot het secreet Boeck der Predestinatie? Tsal hun wesen een afgront van desperatie, want daer wt sal hy geen ander besluyt connen maken als dit: Christus is de versoeninghe der sonden voor alle ghepredestineerde. Gaet nu voort: Wat sal hy segghen? Ick ben ghepredestineert? Zijn conscientie sal hem vraghen, hoe hy dat weet? En weet hy dat niet, hoe sal hy besluyten dat Christus is de versoeninge voor sijne sonden? Ja, dewijle hy de cracht des geloofs als een vrucht der Predestinatie niet en gevoelt, heeft hy oorsaec te vreesen dat hy niet en zy gepredestineert, ende dat daerom Christus voor sijne sonden niet en sy gestorven.” 126 HSC 178. 127 HSC 181. 128 HSC 115. 129 HSC 170.

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the cause of saving faith, and the way in which faith is worked in a person, and therefore also relates to the human free will and divine grace. According to the Counter-Remonstrants, there are three ways in which one could receive saving grace: 1. Only through the free will. 2. Only through God’s grace in Christ. 3. Partly through the free will, and partly through God’s grace. “Although the Remonstrants in the third article appear to deny the first way, and in the fourth article appear to posit the second, it is nevertheless clear that they actually posit the third.” They draw this conclusion from their position that “the way of the operation of God’s grace in Christ is not irresistible.” Just like the Jesuits, the Remonstrants seize on the ambiguity in the term “irresistible” “in order to cover with it their view on the cooperation of the human will, and to make our teaching on God’s grace hateful.”130 This phrase also conflicts directly with the third article and the first part of the fourth.131 The Counter-Remonstrants’ problem with the Remonstrant view is not that a person would not be able to resist God’s Spirit, for on that point there is agreement. By nature a human being does no other,132 and can also do no other “until the time when this resistance and disobedience is overcome and removed by the Spirit of regeneration.”133 The real question is whether God’s grace would work no more powerfully in man than to let it subsequently depend on the human will whether or not God’s grace is actually received. This would imply that God’s grace does no more than to produce the sufficient capacity to be able to believe, while the non-hindering or overcoming of this grace or capacity “depends on himself [i.e. man, wdb] and on his free choice.”134 The Counter-Remonstrants believe that God’s grace in Christ works in such a way that all those who partake of this grace not only receive the capacity to be able to believe, but at the same time receive faith itself as well. God’s grace impedes, overcomes and removes all resistance in all those who receive this grace. In that sense the operation of God’s grace in Christ can be called irresistible, “although we prefer not to use that word because of its obscurity and ambiguity.”135 The CounterRemonstrants therefore do not really want to describe the distinguishing ————— 130 HSC 182; cf. 201.203. Zie 218–219: “Eer wy hier op antwoorden, soo staet aen te mercken, dat de Broeders in dit Argument rondelijck verclaren, wat sy verstaen, als sy ghebruycken die twijffelachtighe maniere van spreecken, dat het gheloove niet en wort ghewrocht Onwederstaenlijck, namelijck, dat dat selve soo vele te segghen is nae hare eyghene verclaringhe alhier, dat het gheloove niet en wort in den Mensche ghewrocht van eenen alleen, dat is, van Godt ende sijne ghenade alleen, also dat de Mensche daer in oock wat doe ofte mede-wercke”. 131 HSC 200. 132 HSC 183; cf. 201. 133 HSC 214. 134 HSC 283.202; cf. 217: “welck is de meenighe der Synergisten, ende halve Pelagianen.” 135 HSC 183; cf. 201.

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aspect of their view as “irresistible grace” in contrast to “resistible grace.” On the basis of their interpretation of the Remonstrant doctrine of grace, they argue that the latter call the sola gratia into question. The issue is “whether or not it is only the grace through which the commencement, continuance and consummation of all good works are worked in man, that works faith and repentance in man.”136 For them, resistible grace implies a denial of the sola gratia. For them, holding to resistible grace and rejecting unconditional predestination amount to teaching free will, and free will cannot be reconciled with the sola gratia.137 The operation of grace is not just “a sweet suasio and enticement” that leaves the rest up to the free will,138 but it is an “excellent and invincible divine power [...], which power cannot be overcome or completely impeded by anyone.”139 The Counter-Remonstrants also raise the consequence of such a view on the operation of grace. God’s saving grace is inseparably tied to election, and as a special grace extends only to the elect. Those who are never regenerated and never believe in Christ do not receive this grace which “always powerfully works regeneration and faith in all those who have come to share in it.”140 Those who do not believe have never received this grace. The Word is preached to many who “nevertheless are not able to believe.”141 In contrast, in his people (i.e. the elect) God works “in such a way that He bends and inclines their will so that they do not want to resist, but willingly go on to serve God.”142 The removal of the resistance of the will is the most important thing necessary when God wills to work faith in someone.143 “No one can be converted before God through his grace removes the resistance.”144 Faith is a gift of God that is actually infused into the heart.145 If God works faith, the person is completely passive.146 ————— HSC 202. HSC 203. 138 HSC 185–186. 139 HSC 186. 140 HSC 186. 141 HSC 186; cf. 214: There is an illumination of the mind and a persuasion of the truth also in the reprobate, but it does not produce enough force for them to repent should they will to, “overmidts tot de bekeeringhe niet alleen van nooden sijn Ooghen om te sien, maer oock een nieuw herte, ende wechneminghe vant steenen herte: Welcke genade dese luyden niet gehadt en hebben.” 142 HSC 187; cf. 201.219–220. 143 HSC 201. 144 HSC 220. 145 HSC 187. 146 HSC 203: “Want daer verclaren sy [i.e. de remonstranten, wdb], dat het geloove daerom in ons gewrocht wort, door een wederstaenlijcke werckinghe der ghenade, om dat t’geloove als gehoorsaemheyt in ons ghewrocht wordt: Ende vorders, dat een saecke niet en can gehoorsaemheyt ghenaemt worden, welck in yemant van eenen anderen alleen gewrocht wort, also dat hy 136 137

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There is therefore an absolute decree of election – absolute in the sense that God looked on no condition or work in someone which moved Him to save this or that person – of “individual people” whom God has determined certainly to save. God has further decided to give faith as a fruit of election, and to distribute the means that are necessary for faith according to this decree. In election, repentance and faith are thus viewed as means to the execution of the decree, and not as causes.147 They are “means God ordinarily uses externally as instruments of our conversion.” These means must be maintained because it is by them that God wills to convert, which also implies that there is no excuse to wander off into carelessness.148 Connected to this view on predestination is a “twofold call by God”: the one, which is only external, and is made through the external preaching of the Word; the other, which is internal, is further accompanied by the internal, powerful work of the Holy Spirit of regeneration.149

The preached Word is outward, external, and therefore does not penetrate through to the heart, and can be resisted and rejected, and is always rejected unless the Holy Spirit also works internally. The internal call is effected only in the elect, who through the operation of the Holy Spirit are irresistibly regenerated.150 Through the “special, powerful grace of regeneration,” a “good will” is produced.151 Although it is not to all to whom God has his Word proclaimed that He gives the grace that this external call is accompanied by the internal, powerful work of the Spirit of regeneration through which people are converted, He nevertheless has many important reasons why He still does have the Word preached to those whom He does not actually convert.152

————— daerinne niet en doet dan lijden. Waer uyt claerlijc te sien is, dat de Broeders rondelijck bekennen, als men seght, dat t’gheloove ghewrocht wordt door een wederstaenlijcke ghenade, datmen dan oock moet segghen, dat het ghewrocht wort niet van eenen anderen alleen, dat is van Gods ghenade alleen, also dat de mensche daer in niet en soude doen dan lijden, maer dat hy daer in ooc wat moet doen ofte wercken.” 147 HSC 204. 148 HSC 224. 149 HSC 207: “eene, die alleen wtwendich is, ende geschiet door de uyterlijcke Predicatie des woorts: ende eene inwendighe, die boven dien vergeselschapt is met d’inwendighe crachtige werckinge des H. Geests der wedergeboorte […]”; cf. 206. 150 HSC 207; cf. 217. 151 HSC 208. 152 HSC 221: “dat dese uytterlijcke roepinghe vergheselschapt zy met d’inwendighe krachtighe werckinge des Gheests der wedergeboorte, waer door de Menschen bekeert worden, soo heeft hy nochtans veel ghewichtighe redenen, waerom hy die lieden, die hy niet datelijck bekeert, sijn woort even wel laet verkondighen […].”

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Rather remarkably the Counter-Remonstrants consider why those reasons might not have been revealed to us – although they do not think this to be the case – even before they do give a number of actual reasons as to why God does have the Word preached to those whom He does not convert as well: And assuming that these reasons are not fully revealed to us, does it befit us to want to penetrate through into his hidden Chamber of Counsel with our understanding which is hostile to God, and to fathom his incomprehensible judgments? And since we cannot do such a thing, [does it befit us] to want to deny his clear truth which is so fully revealed to us in his Word because we cannot comprehend it in everything with our understanding, or because we think his clear truth to conflict with our understanding which we always ought to make a prisoner to God’s Word?153

Having first established that the reasons might not be fully revealed to us, the Counter-Remonstrants go on to note that God does have good reasons. One such reason is found in the inability on the part of humankind to distinguish the elect from the reprobate: For since the elect and reprobate are mixed together in the world as long as they are in this life and cannot be recognized by human discernment, the Word is presented generally to the one as well as the other, so that the elect may be converted through the preaching of the Word as external means that serves conversion and is ordinarily used by God for this end, and so that the elect are not shortchanged on account of the reprobate.154

A second reason is that God wants to show through the preaching how great the blindness and corruption of the unregenerate are, who do not understand the proclaimed Word and consider it foolishness. The third important reason is that the elect and believers learn all the better to acknowledge “the overly great and undeserved mercy that God has shown to them.”155 This happens when they notice that others to whom the Word is also proclaimed ————— 153 HSC 221: “Ende ghenomen, dese redenen en waren ons niet volkomelijck gheopenbaert, betaemt het dan ons, dat wy in sijne verborgene Raedt-camer met ons vernuft, dat vyantschap tegen Godt is, willen indringhen, ende sijn onbegrijpelijcke oordeelen doorgronden? Ende om dat wy sulcx niet en connen doen, dat wy daerom sijne clare waerheyt, die ons soo volcomelijck in sijn woordt gheopenbaert is, souden willen loochenen, om dat wy die met ons vernuft niet en konnen in alles begrijpen, ofte om dat wy houden, dat de selue strijdt teghens ons vernuft, d’welck wy altijdt onder Godts woort behooren gevangen te gheven?” 154 HSC 222: “Want alsoo d’Wtverkorene ende de Verworpene, soo langhe sy in desen leven zijn, onder malcanderen in de Werelt vermenght zijn, ende door t’doordeel [sic] van Menschen niet en connen onderscheyden werden: Soo wort het woordt int ghemeen, soo den eenen als den anderen voorgedraghen, op dat d’Wtverkorene door de Predicatie des woordts, als een uytterlijck middel daer toe dienstich, ende ordinarie van Godt ghebruyckelijck, souden moghen bekeert worden: Ende op dat om der Verwerpene wille, den Wtverkoorenen niet en soude te cort gheschieden.” 155 HSC 222.

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remain in the unbelief from which they themselves have been delivered through God’s grace, although by nature they are no better. God does not need to take away from anyone the excuse of inability, because God created humankind with the ability and because He does not owe it to anyone to restore that ability to them. Yet the Word is indeed preached to those who are never converted so as to take away their excuse of ignorance.156 The Counter-Remonstrants respond negatively against the objection that the Word of grace becomes a Word of condemnation. Through the fault of man, it does become the “smell of death to the dead.” But God does not offer anyone grace [...] so that He might reprobate them. Rather, He offers grace under the condition of faith and repentance, so that those who do not share in grace may know what the reason is that they do not receive it; namely, because the required condition is not fulfilled in them, although it was revealed and made known to them. As result, they cannot claim the excuse of ignorance.157

God executes his counsel, according to which He determined to save some and to leave others in their condemnation, in a most wise manner through the means of the proclamation of the Word. That there are among those to whom the Word is proclaimed some whom God has not determined to save powerfully, does not prove that God is hypocritical when He has the Word proclaimed to them. The arguments for this are the conditional character and limited content of the general proclamation of the promise: Such blasphemy be far from our thoughts! For when He has the promises of salvation presented and thereby also has the conditions preached which must be found in those who will partake in that salvation, He acts earnestly, sincerely and without hypocrisy. For He will truly give salvation to all those in whom these conditions are found. That He does not through his grace will to fulfill these conditions in all people does not mean that He acts hypocritically, for He has not promised to fulfill these conditions in all those to whom the Word is preached.158

————— HSC 222. HSC 223: “[…] opdat hyse verwerpen soude: maer hy biedt de genade aen onder conditie van gelove ende bekeeringe, op dat de gene, die de genade niet deelachtich worden, mogen weten welck doorsake is, waerom sy de selve niet en verkrijgen, namelijck, om dat de gheeyschte conditie van hem niet vervult en is, hoe wel de selve haer geopenbaert ende bekent gemaeckt was. Waerom sy geen onschult van onwetenheyt hebben te pretenderen.” 158 HSC 224: “Sulcke Gods lasteringhe zy verre van onse gedachten. Want als hy de beloften der salicheyt laet voordraghen, ende daer by laet verkondighen de conditien, die ghevonden moeten worden in de ghene, die der selver sullen deelachtich worden: soo handelt hy ernstlijck, sinceerlijck ende ongeveynsdelijck. Want hy waerlijck gheven sal de salicheyt allen den ghenen, in den welcken dese conditien ghevonden worden. Dat hy nu in allen Menschen dese conditien door sijne ghenade niet en wil vervullen, daer mede en handelt hy niet gheveynsdelijck: want hy en heeft dat niet belooft, dat hy in alle de ghene, dien twoort gepredickt wort, dese conditien sal vervullen.” 156 157

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The Counter-Remonstrants deny that everyone can do all that God commands. From God’s commands one can indeed learn “what we must and ought to do, but not what we can do.” Exhortations do not imply that the people themselves can contribute something to their repentance. They are external means by which God works what He requires in his people (i.e. the elect).159 What God works for the external development of the church, such as the preaching, punishment of sins, serious admonitions, blessings and chastisements, is sufficient to make something that is already good bear good fruit, but it is not sufficient to make something that is wicked good (the Remonstrants compare the church to a vineyard on the basis of Isa 5).160 When Scripture speaks of God waiting for fruit, this cannot be applied to God properly but only improperly as an anthropomorphism.161 God does not will that all people without exception be saved. The Counter-Remonstrants use a weapon commonly used by their opponents when they support their claim with a rhetorical question: “How can He will to save the Tyrians if He withholds from them the necessary means to repentance, and does not will to give them?”162 The Counter-Remonstrants see their view confirmed in those Scripture passages that describe the corruption of the human nature, and the incapacity of the unregenerate for spiritual good.163 Should the human will still be of value, one would have to attribute the act of faith to it, but this diminishes God’s grace and gives people reason to boast over those who have not accepted this grace.164 Perhaps in anticipation of Remonstrant critique on this point, the Counter-Remonstrants cited, among others, question 9 of the Heidelberg Catechism in their “Proof from the Confession and Catechism”: Does God then not do man an injustice by requiring in his law what he cannot do? Answer. No. For God so created man that he was able to do it: but man, at the instigation of the devil, in deliberate disobedience robbed himself and all his descendants of these gifts.165

The Counter-Remonstrants also consider a simple appeal to this question of the Catechism to suffice against the Remontrant criticism that “God would have acted unfairly” if He punishes people for not doing things for which ————— 159 160 161 162 163 164 165

HSC 209. HSC 211. HSC 212. HSC 217. HSC 187. HSC 188. HSC 189.

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they do not even have the ability.166 They appear to see no real threat to their view in that argument from God’s justice. The Counter-Remonstrants “deny outrightly that things unbefitting to, and in conflict with, God’s nature and sound reason follow from our doctrine.” This goes back to the earlier reproach that their view implies unwiseness and hypocrisy in God. They therefore forcefully responded that in fact, from the Remonstrant doctrine many “unbefitting things” necessarily follow that “conflict with God’s honor, goodness, omnipotence, wisdom, faithfulness and other divine attributes.”167 God’s justice is a striking omission in this list. This ends our summary of the Counter-Remonstrant view on grace and its operation. Like the Counter-Remonstrants, the Remonstrants connected their view on (the resistible) operation of grace to their view on predestination: If the means to human repentance and faith are not administered by God according to an antecedent absolute decision to save certainly these or those particular persons as mere persons without regard for any quality of repentance and faith, and to that end to give faith to these persons and not to the others, God does not work repentance and faith irresistibly.168

From a whole range of scriptural data the Remonstrants then argue that when, in spite of God’s earnest will to the contrary, people still refuse to come, do not want to listen when He calls, are disobedient when He wills that they obey and complains that they do not want to, are unwilling to come when Christ calls them, “so it is possible to resist God when He wills to convert us through his grace.”169 The Gospel demands a childish obedience which cannot be worked irresistibly because it would then no longer be called obedience.170 The demand of obedience, the threats and the commands we find in the Scriptures are all in vain if God wills to accomplish his demands and commands irresistibly. A command is of use only if there is freedom.171 ————— HSC 212; see also 222. HSC 220. 168 HSC 191: “Indien de middelen totte bekeeringe ende gheloove des menschen niet en werden van God gheadministreert nae een voorgaende absoluyt besluyt van dese ofte die persoonen int besonder, alleen als bloote persoonen, sonder eenige qualiteyt van bekeeringe ende geloove aenghemerckt, sekerlijck salich te maken, ende tot dien eynde t’gheloove te gheven, en de andere niet: So en werckt God de bekeeringhe ende t’gheloove niet onwederstaenlijck”; cf. 322. 169 HSC 192–193: “Indien men can weygheren te comen als Godt ons ernstelijck tot hem wil vergaderen, ende daer toe sijn hant gestadich uytstreckt, niet willen hooren als hy ons roept: onghehoorsaem zijn als hy wenscht dat wy doch ghehoorsaem wesen wilden, ende beclaecht dat wy hem niet ghehoorsamen willen, niet willen comen als Christus ons aenspreeckt, op dat wy salich worden: So canmen God wederstaen als hy ons door zijn ghenade wil bekeeren.” 170 HSC 196; cf. 241. 171 HSC 245–246. 166 167

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All laws given to humanity demand that people either do or not do what is prescribed; what kind of a law is it that humankind cannot transgress, and what kind of disobedience is that to which it is inevitably moved?172

There are furthermore several “absurdities” in irresistible grace which conflict with God’s nature and with sound reason. For example, that no one can be converted except those who will really be converted. Someone who is not converted would then be called to salvation in vain. This last point again raises the question of what goal God would still have in calling them. It would not be to save them. For God would then be both unwise and hypocritical if He did offer salvation, but willed to withhold the means necessary to obtain salvation, such as faith and repentance.173 It would also not be to take away their excuse, for an excuse is lost not through something that God does alone, but through something a person does against God. Someone’s excuse can be removed only by the rejection of the offer of God’s grace that is “according to God’s proper and original intention” intended to be accepted as a word of grace and life, and is not intended to be rejected as a word of death and condemnation.174 Another absurdity is the consequence that no one would be able to repent before conversion. Carelessness or doubt and despair would result.175 The reason why the Remonstrants devote not one, but two articles to grace is “to make our view clearly understood, that we do not shortchange God’s grace but attribute to it anything and everything that could be attributed to it.”176 The point of difference with the Counter-Remonstrants does not concern the free will, as the latter claim, for in that case the point of contention would center on the origin of faith; there the Remonstrants and CounterRemonstrants are agreed. The third article makes that clear enough, and was even subscribed by the Counter-Remonstrants. The difference does not have to do with the cause of faith, but the way in which this cause (i.e. grace) works.177 A non-irresistible operation of grace does not imply that the cause of faith lies partly in grace and partly in the human will. God’s grace and the human will are not two primary causes that according to their own power and nature together produce one effect, like two horses pulling a ————— 172 HSC 238: “Alle Wetten den mensche gestelt, vereysschen des menschen doen of laten, wat Wet is dat, die de mensche niet overtreden en can, ende wat ghehoorsaemheyt ist, daer toe den mensche onvermijdelick wordt veroorsaeckt?” 173 HSC 196–197. 174 HSC 197; cf. 240. 175 HSC 197–198; cf. 249: “alle cracht der vermaninghen, alle lust, vlijdt, sorghe ter bekeeringe in den menschen wert uytgebluscht ende gedempt.” 176 HSC 226. 177 HSC 226–228.

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wagon. The Remonstrants claim that they completely reject such a view.178 God’s grace and the human will are two causes that have their own order and place. God’s grace works from itself, goes ahead of man and accompanies man. The human will follows grace and accompanies grace, not from itself but from the power of grace. It is in that sense that the human will cooperates to produce actual faith. If this were not so, someone could believe without willing to believe, in which case it would also not be the person, but God in that person, who believes.179 If a person believes, it is a work of his will, and if it is its work, the will is the proximate cause. For, to put it another way, it wills what it wills having been moved and stirred by grace; and with that grace is not diminished but given its honor for being the first and only [cause – wdb] through whose power the will can will, and will all that it wills, although of itself the will wills nothing but the contrary. On the other hand, the way our brothers appear to want to have it, the human being would be nothing but a mere instrument without movement; the human being would be like the pipes of an organ, of themselves totally dumb and mute, but God through his Spirit would then play in him as air does in the organ.180

The illustration of the beggar who receives alms, which Arminius used as a good illustration of his view, is used on a number of occasions by the Remonstrants as well. Also a beggar who receives alms can reject them. Everything we have, we receive from God. Yet it is not given irresistibly, for something that cannot be rejected can actually not be called a gift.181 In the quotation below, the Remonstrants once more explain how it is possible to maintain that regeneration is purely from God’s grace, in spite of the cooperation of the human will. The state in which man is found must, as said before, also here be distinguished properly. For when one considers man as outside of God’s prevenient grace, as still fully estranged from the life of God because of lust for evil deeds, and as walking in the idleness of his mind and thinking, it is then purely God’s work alone to call and precede him through his grace. But when one considers man as raised up by preve-

————— HSC 228. HSC 229. 180 HSC 281: “Soo de mensche ghelooft, soo is het een werck des willens, en soo het haer werck is, soo is de naeste oorsaeck de wille: want andersins dat sy wil dat wilse, door de ghenade beweecht en geroert zijnde: ende die en wert dan daer door niet vercleent, maer haer eere ghegheven, dat sy de eerste is en de eenighe, door cracht van de welcke de wille kan willen, ende wil al wat sy wil, selfs van haer selfs niet willende dan t’contrarie: Anders soo’t de Broeders schijnen te willen hebben, soo sal de mensch niet dan een bloot Instrument sonder beweginghe zijn: de mensch sal zijn ghelijck de pijpen in den Orgel, van haer selven gantsch stom en stemmeloos, maer Godt door sijnen Gheest sal daer in spelen als de windt int Orghel doet.” 181 HSC 243: “Wy geven een aelmoes aen eenen bedelaer, kan hyse wederom niet wederstaen? Alle het goet dat wy besitten, hebben wy van God, ten wert ons nochtans niet onwederstaenlijc gegeven, want eygentlijck en ist geen gave datmen niet verwerpen en can.” Cf. HSC 275.283. 178 179

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nient grace, and through the power of that grace brought as far as described above, we then argue that he is God’s co-worker in the execution of his regeneration. A coworker, so that people may understand us well, not as one working to that [i.e. regeneration – wdb] of himself as our brothers claim, but as raised, prepared and strengthened to it by God’s grace which preceded him and still accompanies him with its support and aid – regeneration also remaining a pure work of God’s grace in Christ since man still does not cooperate except through grace, as is explained more closely above in the status quaestionis. In sum, we admit just as much as our brothers do that the natural man is dead in his sins, if only we are permitted so great a distinction between physical and spiritual death that there still remains in man while he is in spiritual death the natural freedom of his will, which Calvin admits, and which we with many reasons already proved cannot be taken away without violating the created nature.182

But what exactly is the difficulty with the Counter-Remonstrant view, and what pushes the Remonstrants to object to it? Several times it appears that for the Remonstrants, grace has everything to do with, and is fully in agreement with, the nature of its object, which is humanity, and with its subject, which is God. Unconditional predestination, and the related irresistible operation of grace, are in conflict with human nature which is essentially free, and – among others for this reason – it is also in conflict with God’s justice, as the Remonstrants repeatedly affirm.183 ————— 182 HSC 254: “Den staet daer in de mensche gestelt is moet oock behoorlijck hier, so voorseyt is, onderscheyden werden: want sietmen den mensche aen buyten de voorkomende genade Godts, als gantsch noch vervreemt vant leven Gods door den sin in boose wercken, en wandelende in de ydelheyt zijns verstants en der ghedachten, soo ist puerlijcken Godts werck alleen hem te roepen en voor te komen door zijn genade, maer sietmen hem aen als opgeweckt sijnde door de voorcomende ghenade, ende door cracht der selfder ghenade so verde ghebracht, als te vooren is verclaert, so houden wy dat hy een mede wercker Godes is int voltrecken sijnder wedergheboorte: Een mede wercker, seggen wy, datmen ons recht verstae, niet als van t’ syne daer toe doende, soo de Broeders spreecken, maer als van Godes ghenade, die hem is voorghecomen, ende noch met haere bystant ende hulpe vergheselschapt, daer toe verweckt, bereyt ende gesterckt: blyvende also de wedergheboorte een louter werck van Godts ghenade in Christo, dewijl de mensche doch niet mede en werckt dan door de ghenade: so als voor henen int stellen van den staet des verschils naerder is verclaert. In somma, wy bekennen ymmer so wel als de broeders dat, de natuerlicke mensche doot is in sijne sonden, alleenlijck datmen ons toestae so veel onderscheyts tusschen den lichamelijcken en Geestelijcken doot, dat de mensche in den geestelijcken doot noch hebbe behouden de natuerlijcke vrymachticheyt zijner wille, welcke Calvinus bekent, en wy met vele redenen te voren bewesen hebben hem niet te konnen benomen werden sonder crenckinge der geschapene natuere […]”; cf. 282. 183 HSC 229: “Wy hebben dickwils geseyt, ende seggen noch, dat wy te vreden zijn, datmen den Mensche ontrecke, ende de ghenade Godes toeschrijve, soo veel cracht ende eere alsmen kan, wy sullen het gaerne toestaen: Alleen dragen wy sorghe, datmen onder t’decsel van ghenade niet in en voere eene werckinghe, die na stijl der H. Schrift, gheen genade in Christo en kan genoemt werden, ende die de natuyr des Menschen niet en vernietighe, maer verbetere [sic! The opposite is intended: niet en verbetere, maer vernietighe, wdb]. Oock datmen toesie, datmen Godts gherechticheyt soo weynich crencke, als sijne ghenade.” Cf. HSC 242: “Gelijck een harde steen haer selven niet vermorwen en can, maer door cracht van buyten vermorwet wordt, dat also oock de natuyr-

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Unconditional predestination and irresistible grace, which necessarily imply a special operation of the Holy Spirit only in the elect, according to the Remonstrants leads infallibly to the supposition that God is hypocritical in his offer of grace, and is not just when He punishes sin. For where regeneration did not occur, God did not will to regenerate. He calls, commands, implores and begs to regeneration and He even has repentance preached, but He does not will to regenerate. And yet one who is not converted at the proclamation of that “powerless Word [...] ([a conversion, wdb] to which he was not able because God did not will it)” is punished all the more forcefully because of his unbelief.184 A little later, the Remonstrants once again address at length the relationship between Word and Spirit in the preaching, and the connection of that relationship to God’s justice in the punishment of the unrepentant, and his non-dissimulation (iustitia in dictis) in the preaching. And it will then be just the same with all that the preaching of the gospel entails. What God the Lord through his servant declares, invites, prays, begs, threatens, complains, and warns will always be so idle, so useless, indeed so laughable if the Word of reconciliation in the mouth of the servants can indeed do no more for the conver-

————— lijcke mensche, niet can herboren worden, sonder dat van buyten come de cracht der ghenade Gods: te weten niet om de natuyre uyt te trecken, maer om te verbeteren, want anders en ware het gheen wedergheboorte, tot verbeteringhe, maer destructie tot vernietinghe van smenschen natuyre streckende”. Cf. 252. Cf. 259: “ten overvloet verclaren, dat wy wel te vreden zijn, dat de Broeders den mensch ontrecken, en der ghenade toeschrijven soo veel macht en eere alsse connen bedencken en stellen so veel werckinghen der ghenaden Godts als moghelijck is, wy en hebben daer niets teghen: alleen dat ghecaveert, datmen onder den aenghenamen naem der Ghenade Godts niet in en voere een manier der werckinghe die nae de H. Schrift geen ghenade can zijn, en des mensches natuere in plaets van verbeteren, vernietighe: en datmen also de Ghenade verantwoort, dat aen d’andere sijde de gherechtichicheyt Godts gheen overlast en lijde.” 184 HSC 248–249: “Soo sal blijcken der Broederen volle ende ronde meyninghe te zijn, dat soo waer geen wedergeboorte dadelijck en volcht, dat oock God aldaer niet en heeft willen wederbaren, noch sijnen levendichmaeckenden Geest mededeylen: Ende daerom, al roept hy, al ghebiedt hy, jae bidt en smeeckt hy tot de weder geboorte: evenwel nochtans so en wil hy niet wederbaren: En al laet hy t’woort der bekeeringhe prediken, nochtans so ist sonder den levendichmakenden geest Christi: sonder den welcken dat noch het woordt meer crachts heeft tot des menschen wedergheboorte, als een doode letter, noch de mensche meer crachts tot zijn bekeeringe, als een doode tot zijnder opweckinghe. Ende evenwel so sal de onbekeerde mensche, om dat hy hem selven op de predicatie van dat crachtelose woort, ter bekeeringhe niet en heeft begheven (twelck hy niet en vermochte by gebreck van den wille Gods) sonder ghenade in der eewicheydt verdorven en ghestraft: jae noch des te ongenadigher gheplaecht werden, om dat hy dat woort niet en heeft aenghenomen, twelck hem doch evenwel ter salicheyt niet helpen en konde, overmidts hem Godt niet bekeeren en wilde: ende daerom hem aenbiedende t’woort, nochtans den levendich maeckenden Geest niet gheven en wilde. Welck alles tot noch toe van den Broederen ContreRemonstranten als een lasteringe verworpen sijnde, nu vanden selfden soo rondelijck en opentlijck werdt bekent. Wat nu uyt so een grove meyninghe al volcht, geven wy den Broederen in redelijcheyt selfs te bedencken. Onsent halven, wy en konnen niet sien hoe dat alsdan Godt de Heere oft ongheveynst sal zijn int aenbieden van zijn woort, oft rechtvaerdich int straffen van sodanighe menschen”.

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sion of sinners than the word of Christ, Lazarus, come out!, which then progressed to his resurrection. Indeed, is it like that with the sword of the Spirit, are the weapons of our spiritual warfare so powerless to cast down the bulwarks and to take captive the thoughts for obedience to Christ when we in following the command of Christ and through his name invite with promises and threats to repentance those who are dead in sin and – as our brothers say – as incapable of spiritual obedience and life as Lazarus was to physical life? What else would we be doing but as it were calling to the bones of the dead in the cemetery, Repent, repent, and you shall live!, while God the Lord does not will to bring people to repentance through the preached Word, but through an invincible power that is above and beyond that of the Word? What would be the result if He were to let such a Word be preached to men to their greater condemnation, without at the same time offering the live-giving Spirit who alone gives ears to hear? Would they then justly suffer punishment for not being converted through such a Word?185

The Remonstrants call such a view a “grave error” (mislach, die ghewislick grof genoech is). But there is even more that is wrong in the CounterRemonstrant view. The latter suppose that the capacity to repent is not given through the Word, but rather through the Spirit, while the Remonstrants think that the Spirit normally does not produce the capacity to repentance except through the Word as seed of regeneration and instrument to repentance, from the very beginning to its completion. “As we see it, those who look outside the Word for the operation of the Holy Spirit must fall into Enthusiasm [Gheest drijverye] and diminish the honor and power of the Word of God.” When God has the Word preached to those who will not actually be regenerated without the life-giving Spirit of Christ, He would be acting most hypocritically towards them, and thereafter condemn them even more harshly even though they are innocent. It is further impossible for God to have his Word preached for no reason but to take away from some ————— 185 HSC 257–258: “Even so veel salt dan zijn met de gantsche Predicatie des Evangelij, t’sal ymmer soo ydel, soo vergeefs, jae soo belachelick zijn wat Godt de Heere door zijne Dienaer roept, noodicht, bidt, smeeckt, dreycht, claecht, en waerschouwt, indien het woordt der versoeninghe in den mondt der Dienaren niet meer en vermach tot bekeeringhe der sondaeren, dan het ghemelde woordt Christi, Lazare coemt uyt, en vorderde tot sijnder opweckinghe. Ghewisselijcken, ist met het swaert des Gheestes soo ghestelt, zijn de Wapenen onses Gheestelijcken crijchs soo onmachtich om de bollewercken ter neder te werpen, en de ghedachten ghevanghen te voeren onder de gehoorsaemheyt Christi: wanneer wy dan na de bevele Christi door tselve woordt uyt zijnen naem ter bekeeringhe nooden met beloften, met dreyghementen, die ghene die in sonden doodt zijn, ende nae der Broederen segghen, ymmer so onbequaem tot het Gheestelijck ghehoor en leven, als Lazarus tot het Lichamelijcke was: wat doen wy anders dan oft wy opt Kerck-hof tot de doodts beenderen riepen, bekeert u, bekeert u, ende ghy sult leven? dewijl doch Godt de Heere niet door t’ghepredickte woort, maer door een onverwinnelijcke cracht boven dat woort haer wil bekeeren? Wat salt dan sijn wanneer hy den Menschen sulck een Woordt laet Predicken tot haerder swaerden verdoemenis, sonder met eenen aen te bieden den levendichmaeckenden Geest, die alleen ooren geeft om te hooren? Sullen die dan oock met recht daerom straffe lijden, datse door sulck een woordt niet en zijn bekeert?”

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people their excuse. The proclamation of the Word without the Spirit, who is the only one who “can give ears to hear,” can take away no one’s innocence. From which it must also follow that the Word of God must return empty without remedying that for which it was sent out, not because of human guilt, but because of its own lack of power. We on the contrary suppose that wherever and to whomever God has his Word preached, there He is also fully ready to work repentance with the life-giving Spirit, although not in an irresistible way since that would conflict with the nature of the Word that it pleases the Lord to use to that end.186

The difficulty that the Remonstrants have with the view of their opponents lies in “God’s intent and objective,” as if He distributed the means of grace in such a way that only certain people, and no one else, would be saved without taking account of the free will. That with the same operation of God some do repent and others do not, does not imply that Satan is at times more powerful than God. God does not have to exercise more power than Satan in order still to achieve his goal, because He has infinite knowledge. In order to make this clear, the Remonstrants use the concept of middle knowledge: even though the same operation, equally powerful in itself, is used, yet the work of the Devil and of others is resistible, while the operation of God is powerful because it is administered according to God’s infinite knowledge of such a time, of such people in such a state.187

A resistible operation of the Holy Spirit extends only to the will, not to the mind, “even though our mind cannot avoid simple knowledge” and even less “our heart, when He comes knocking on our heart. For we must notice it, whether we will to or not.”188 Furthermore, God’s Spirit and grace do not stop working at the moment when a person has received the capacity to believe, as if all that follows depends completely on the will. The Remonstrants once more sum up their articles and then give the following résumé:

————— 186 HSC 258: “Waer uyt dan oock volghen moet dat het woort Gods niet by menschen schult, maer by gebreck van eyghene cracht, ledich wederkeeren moet, sonder uyt te rechten daer toe het ghesonden was. Waer teghens wy houden dat soo waer en wien Godt zijn woort laet Predicken, daer is hy oock met den levendichmakenden Geest vol vaerdich om te bekeeren, hoe wel niet om op een onwederstaenlijcke wijse sulcx te doen, dewijl dat strijden soude tegens den aert des woorts, dat den Heere gelieft daer toe te gebruycken.” 187 HSC 261: “of schoon de selfdige werckinge gebruyckt werde, sijnde even crachtich in haer selven, maer des Duyvels ende anderer werckinghen wederstaenlick, maer Godes, crachtich, om datse nae Gods oneyndighe wetenheyt ontrent sulcken tijdt, sulcken menschen, in sulcken staet aenghedient wert.” 188 HSC 230; cf. 244.247.

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1. That humanity (standing outside of grace) in unable to think, will or do what is good. 2. That grace is not only the commencement, but also the continuance and consummation of all good, indeed of all good deeds or works that one can imagine. The cause of unbelief we place only in the wicked human will, but we deny that faith depends on the human will without the aid of grace. That is, just as we say that grace precedes in the commencement of repentance for the awakening of our will, so we also say that the same grace accompanies in the progress of repentance, although not without our will which has by now already been awakened through prevenient grace and is made fit to work with and through accompanying grace. If it is in this sense that our brothers say that our view makes repentance depend partly on the will of man, we allow it – that is, inasmuch as God does not work actual faith and repentance in us without our will which has already been awakened through grace. But we deny all cooperation of our will if one wants to separate the will from the grace of God.189

God does not work actual faith without the human will. And yet, repentance does not depend on the will because God remains the first and most important free cause of repentance, “which He produces purely from the freedom of his will without depending on any other cause.”190 The Remonstrants therefore insist that they, too, believe that God’s grace not only produces the capacity to be able to believe, but “at the same time also the act of faith itself.” He does indeed do this infallibly, but not in an irresistible way.191 The way in which God works, and can work, with the human will is different from the way He deals with the mind and affections. This is a result of the nature of the will as it was given by God at creation. At creation, God endowed the mind and affections with spiritual gifts. A similar infusion was

————— 189 HSC 231–232: “1. Dat de Mensche (staende buyten de ghenade) gheen bequaemheyt en heeft om t’goede te dencken, te willen, of te doen. 2. Dat de ghenade is niet alleen t’beginsel, maer oock den voortganck ende t’volbrenghen alles goets, jae aller goeder daden, of werckingen die men kan bedencken. De oorsaeck des ongheloofs stellen wy alleen inden verkeerden wille des Menschen: maer, dat oock alsoo het gheloove soude staen aen den wille des Menschen sonder hulpe vande ghenade, ontkennen wy, in vougen, dat ghelijck wy seggen, dat de ghenade inden beginne der bekeeringe voor gaet tot opweckinghe van onsen wille, alsoo segghen wy oock, dat de selve ghenade mede gaet inden voortganck der bekeeringhe, doch niet sonder onsen wille, die nu al is opgheweckt, door de voorkomende ghenade, ende bequaem ghemaeckt om met ende door de vergeselschappende ghenade te wercken. Ist nu in desen sin dat de Broeders seggen, dat nae onse meenighe, de bekeeringe ten deele soude staen aen des Menschen wille, wy staen het toe, te weten, soo verre dat Godt het dadelijck gelooven ende bekeeren in ons niet en werckt sonder onsen wille, zijnde nu alreede opgheweckt door sijn ghenade, maer ontkennen alle mede-werckinghe van onsen wille, daer men den wille soude willen afsonderen vande ghenade Godts.” 190 HSC 233: “evenwel en hangt de bekeeringe, (eyghentlijck te spreecken) aen onsen wille niet, aengesien God altijdt blijft d’eerste ende d’opperste vrye oorsaecke van onse bekeeringhe, die hy te weghe brengt uyt enckele vryheyt zijns willens, sonder aen eenighe ander oorsaeck te hanghen.” 191 HSC 233.

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not possible for the will, because the will is free to will good or evil. Without that freedom, humankind would not have been able to sin.192 The will thus has a natural freedom with which it was endowed at creation, a freedom that pertains to the very essence of what it is to be human and can therefore not be taken away. Without freedom, sin is impossible. The fall had enormous consequences for humankind, especially because it lost the spiritual gifts pertaining to the mind and affections. The will, however, never had such gifts, and thus could not lose them at the fall, either. Even after the fall, the will has and keeps the freedom to do good or evil with which it was endowed at creation, “although it cannot actually extend its authority in the sinful person given the darkening of the mind and the disorder of the affections.”193 The process of repentance, as understood by the Remonstrants, is directly related to human nature before and after the fall. Through the means of the mind and affections, on which He can operate in an irresistible way, God works on the human will, on which He cannot work irresistibly because of its essential freedom. Not all the unregenerate find themselves in the same situation: [...] some stand outside of all calling since they walk in the idleness of their mind and thoughts, without knowing the way of truth. Others are already called and awoken by the grace of God, and through this aid are brought so far that the mind knows the saving truth through its enlightenment and the affections are enflamed with love for the same truth in order to stir the will up to accept it. The former are in the Holy Scripture actually called “dead in their sins” because in such there is neither knowledge of, nor desire for, and even less the will to, the saving truth. But the latter are certainly not dead, for both the will and the affections have already been made alive, and as result of their power the will is also enabled to exercise its inborn faculty and capacity to will or not to will, in which the making alive of the will actually consists.194

————— 192 HSC 250: “maer inde vville en mochte soodaenighen instortinghe niet gheschieden, als die nae haeren aert vry was om oft het goede, oft het quade te willen, ende naer haer werck goedt oft quaet ghenaemt te werden, sulcx als haer t’verstandt soude verthoonen, en d’affecten haer souden aenporren, sonder welcke vryheyt niet moghelijck waer gheweest, dat de mensche oyt hadde ghesondicht.” 193 HSC 250. 194 HSC 251–252: “[…] sommighe staen als buyten alle beroepinghe, wandelende in de ydelheyt haers verstants en der ghedachten, sonder den wech der waerheyt te kennen: Andere zijn nu al reede gheroepen en opgheweckt door de ghenade Gods, ende door der selfder hulpe so verre ghebracht, dat het verstandt door verlichtinghe de Salichmaeckende waerheyt kent, ende de affecten met liefde tot de selfde waerheyt ontsteecken sijnde, den wille tot de aenneminghe der selfde porren: De eerste werden eyghentlijcken in de Heylighe Schrift doodt in hare sonden ghenaemt, om dat in soodanighe noch kennisse, noch lust en is, veel min wille tot de Salichmakende waerheydt: Maer de laetste en zijn ghewisselijck niet doot, want beyde het verstant ende affecten zijn alreede levendich gemaect, en wt cracht van dien de wille oock machtich geworden om hare

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Through God’s grace, the essentially free will is thus freed in actuality; that is, it is made capable of doing once again what is properly its own: to will, or not to will. This liberation takes place through the means of God’s operation on the mind and affections. God uses a person’s faculties to make him or her alive again. Although a person is dead in sin, he or she still possesses the “powers and faculties of the soul.” However, God does not use these powers “except according to their nature and disposition, among which powers of the soul there is also the will whose essential property is freedom, and thus it remains certain that God in no way makes a person alive irresistibly against the nature of that freedom.”195 The Remonstrants then go on to describe the process of regeneration. And in light of the fact that also regeneration and being made alive does not occur instantly with an influx of the Spirit, but begins with a work that God commands the human race itself to do, and in the doing of which the person gradually is made alive; to wit, through service to the law and after that also to the gospel, through the enlightenment of the mind to true knowledge, through the transformation of the affections toward the heavenly good offered, and finally through the bending of the will to accept the known and desired good.196

God’s grace is the “highest, first and principal cause that moves our will to assent.”197 The fact that grace overcomes all resistance in those who actually believe does not mean that it everywhere and always overcomes all resistance in all those in whom it wills to work powerfully. It is true that grace alone produces the act of faith, although with “alone” one must understand “that grace is the only, principal and highest cause of faith.” However, this does not take away the fact that “no one actually believes without an antecedent will to believe.”198 God makes an unwilling person willing, but precisely this cannot go together with a coercing and irresistible grace, which in turn implies that God does not work repentance irresistibly.199 There is an incongruity between the cause of faith and the cause of unbelief. The latter, as the Remonstrants noted before, lies only in the evil will ————— aengheschapene faculteyt en macht van te konnen willen oft niet willen int werck te stellen, waer in de levendichmakinghe van de wille eygentlijck is ghelegen.” 195 HSC 253. 196 HSC 253: “Ende dien volgende dat oock de wedergeboorte ende levendichmakinge niet en geschiet met een instortinghe des Gheestes in instanti, maer begonnen wordt van een werck dat Godt den mensche selfs beveelt te doen, ende welck doende de mensch allenskens werdt levendich ghemaeckt, te weten door den dienst des wets, en daer naer oock des Evangelij, door verlichtinghe des verstants tot ware kennisse, door veranderinghe der affecten tot het aengebodene hemelsche goet: ende alsoo eyndelijck door de neyginghe der wille om t’bekende ende begeerde goet aen te nemen.” 197 HSC 279. 198 HSC 235; cf. 237. 199 HSC 270.

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of human beings. For the Remonstrants it is important that the cause of sin and unbelief clearly and unambiguously resides in the human being. If God wants to convert people and this does not happen, this comes from “their own guilt and malice.”200 The Remonstrants suspect that the Counter-Remonstrants do not simply want to say that the cause on account of which one person necessarily must believe and another cannot believe, lies in the fact that the one is elect and the other reprobate.201 The reason that many remain unregenerated is then not that the Spirit is resisted by the person concerned, “but lies only in the fact that they have not received the Spirit of regeneration, that is, that God did not will to pour out this Spirit in them: which amounts to saying that this was due to a want in God’s will and grace.”202 The view of the CounterRemonstrants is clearly that God grants the grace of conversion only to those whom He has chosen absolutely to eternal life, and who must inevitably believe. But to the others God does not will to grant this grace. Why not? Because He has ordained them to condemnation, and therefore also to the means that lead to condemnation, such as unbelief, unrepentance, etc.203

Also the Remonstrants acknowledge that there can be such a thing as an inability to believe, but only as result of antecedent “sins and evil ... after a malicious spurning of the grace offered, after they had eyes to see but did not want to see, ears to hear but did not want to hear.”204 The Remonstrants do not want to make the Reformed doctrine revolting, but they on the contrary try to “free it from the revulsion which is attributed to it by that detestable and unscriptural teaching of the Jesuits and other opponents.”205 These opponents in fact had the same criticism on the Reformed doctrine as the Remonstrants did on the views of the CounterRemonstrants. These final remarks identify one of the Remonstrant motives for opposing the views held by their colleagues.

————— HSC 240. HSC 228. 202 HSC 266. 203 HSC 267: “dat Godt de ghenade der bekeeringhe alleen den genen doet, die hy absolutelijc verkooren heeft ten eewigen leven, ende die moeten onvermijdelijck gelooven: maer de andere en wil Godt dese ghenade niet doen: waerom? om dat hyse absolutelijck verordineert heeft ter verdoemenis, ende alsoo oock tot de middelen die ter verdoemenisse leyden, als dan sijn ongeloove, onbekeerlijckheyt, etc.” 204 HSC 269. 205 HSC 230. 200 201

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6.2.5 Perseverance There is a large amount of overlap with the preceding in the discussions on perseverance, and such themes as the doctrine of God are hardly raised. This is not surprising considering the inseparable connection between unconditional predestination and the doctrine of the perseverance as understood by the Counter-Remonstrants. For them, doubts about perseverance imply doubts about unconditional predestination. Through this close connection, the Counter-Remonstrants cannot accept any doubt regarding perseverance, and they are forced to defend this doctrine as forcefully and to posit it as being as necessary as they did with absolute predestination in the first article. The point of departure of their objection against the fifth article of the Remonstrance is the thesis that in the doctrine of perseverance they are dealing with the foundation of the comfort of God’s children, and an “important head of doctrine.” 206 It is one of the most important points in which the Reformed churches turned aside from the “errors of the papacy.”207 As they see it, the Remonstrants on the other hand found perseverance in the human being, with the result that the assurance of perseverance and therefore also of salvation fall away. For the Counter-Remonstrants, the doctrine of perseverance is the foundation for true assurance of salvation, “without which assurance the firm confidence that is necessary for true faith cannot exist.”208 The Counter-Remonstrants themselves teach that true believers can fall into deep sins, but are still preserved in such a way “that it is certain that they will not completely and finally lose this true faith and this life-giving Spirit.” The foundation of perseverance is “God’s unchangeable decree of eternal election in the firm promise and pledge of God the Father in his covenant of grace, in the steadfast and powerful care of the Lord Jesus Christ, and in the constant and eternal indwelling of the Holy Spirit.”209 A systematic-theological proof is found in the unchangeable decree of eternal election, because

————— HSC 286; cf. 341. HSC 308. It is “een vande voornaemste hooft-stucken der Reformatie” continually and unanimously maintained against the papacy, 309. Cf. HSC 425–427. 208 HSC 309; cf. 326: “overmidts het ware gheloove bestaet niet alleen in een bloote kennisse Christi ende der waerheydt, maer oock in een vast vertrouwen op de verdiensten Christi, ende altijdt is vergheselschapt met soodanighe vruchten der Godtsalicheydt, die niet alleen uytterlick zijn, maer oock die voort comen uyt een oprecht ende inwendelick vernieut herte.” Cf. HSC 347. 209 HSC 286. 206 207

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true faith is given to no one but the elect.210 Those who do not persevere in faith never had true faith.211 The firm confidence, which belongs to the essence of faith, is founded on the assurance of salvation which finds its basis in the doctrine of the perseverance of true believers, which in turn rests on God’s eternal decree of unchangeable election. The Remonstrants defend their view by explaining that they firmly believe that true believers have “abundant power” to be able to persist in their faith to the very end. They also state that they do not “simply” (plat uyt) deny that believers cannot fall away, but only that they do not have full assurance of it. However, they tend more towards the position that true believers really can fall away from true faith, “and for that reason we shall also speak that way throughout this disputation.”212 The first argument they present is that a doctrine which is in and of itself “obstructive and damaging to true godliness and good works” for those who teach it as well as for those who are instructed in it, is not from God and for that reason ought not to be taught.213 With that, the Remonstrants take their point of departure in the practical consequences of the doctrine of perseverance, and are convinced that it will result in carelessness and “loose living, doing away with all saving carefulness.”214 Believers would be able to live in the deepest sin without being able to lose the Holy Spirit;215 there is therefore no longer any sorrow for sin, or at the very least it is reduced. To put it briefly, someone who has once believed will (according to this doctrine) have no more misgivings that he may remain forever unrepentant and be lost, and with that conversion as a whole (i.e. the killing of the old man and the making alive of the new man) perishes. These things are directly opposed to the clear Word of God which from beginning to end continually speaks out against this, and to the teaching that one can lose faith and grace that (from its nature, attribute and character) works a carefulness not to sin, produces sorrow for sins committed, promotes diligence to rise up out of sin, accomplishing this with an earnest fear that one may be hardened, indeed soon be overtaken by death, die in sin and perish; in short, since it powerfully promotes the earnestness, courage and zeal for all godly exercise.216

————— HSC 288. HSC 289; cf. 328.337. 212 HSC 296–297. 213 HSC 297. 214 HSC 298; cf. 342.346. 215 cf. HSC 304. 216 HSC 299: “[O]m int cort te segghen, daer is voor die ghene die maer eens ghelooft geen achterdencken meer, (naer dese Leere) dat sy ymmermeer onboetveerdich blijven ende verloren gaen sullen: daer mede dan voorts de gheheele bekeeringhe, dat is de doodinghe des ouden Mensches, ende de levendichmakinghe des nieuwen Mensches wert uyt geroeyt: Welcke dinghen 210 211

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The many different ways the Scriptures speak about perseverance in faith can according to “human reason” not be reconciled with a faith that cannot be lost.217 The Remonstrants have in mind all kinds of admonitions, warnings, commands, promises, threats, moral suasions, prayers that aim at making believers persist in their faith, as well as praise for those who persevere.218 Promises, covenants and means such as God’s Word are conditional in nature, and thus not absolute and inevitable but resistible.219 In this context, God’s wisdom and justice are brought up as arguments. If God, “who is wisdom, justice and righteousness itself,” in all earnestness attempts to move people to perseverance through these means, then those same people can also actually fall away from faith. For otherwise the greatest unwiseness and hypocrisy would have to be attributed to the all-wise, faithful and just God, should He work through such and so many means to move believers to perseverance, since He nonetheless not only certainly knows, but has even unchangeably and unobstructedly decided that such people shall without doubt persevere to the end, indeed that they cannot fail to persevere, just as these same people know in advance, indeed must consider and believe as completely certain, that they will persevere and can never again fall away, just as it would be most unwise and hypocritical to commend, applaud and praise those who have persevered as if they in persevering have accomplished something great and remarkable, and have obtained a great victory although according to his unchangeable will and knowledge it was impossible, or else they must persevere and overcome knowing the same about themselves, being always beyond all fear, danger and anxiety of falling away.220

————— al strijden reghelrecht teghen het uytgedruckte Woort Gods, dat vanden beginne ten eynde toe doorgaens daer teghen spreeckt ende de leere datmen het Gheloove ende de ghenade wel verliesen can, die (als uyt haer aert, eyghenschap ende natuere) de sorchvuldicheydt van niet te sondighen veroorsaeckt, de droefheydt over de bedrevene sonden te weghe brenght, de neersticheydt om uyt de sonden op te staen vordert, doende met ernst vreesen datmen soude moghen verhart worden, Jae schielicken metter doot oversnelt zijnde, inde sonden sterven ende verderven, in Somma daert crachtelick ende onderhout den ernst, de dapperheyt ende vuyrichheyt tot alle Godtsalighe oeffeninghe.” 217 HSC 299. 218 HSC 299–301; cf. 359.437. 219 HSC 348; cf. 352.354.360.376. 220 HSC 301: “Want andersins soude den alderwijsten, warachtigen ende oprechtighen Godt, de grootste onwijsheyt ende gheveynstheydt toegheschreven moeten worden, wanneer hy door sodanige ende so veelderhande middelen soude arbeyden de gheloovige menschen tot volhardinghe te beweghen, daer hy nochtans niet alleene seeckerlick weet, maer selfs onveranderlick ende onverhinderlick heeft besloten, dat soodanighe menschen buyten alle twijfel sullen volharden, jae niet en connen nae laten te volharden, oock soo dat die selve menschen al van te voren weten, jae voor gheheel seecker houden ende ghelooven moeten, datse volharden sullen ende nimmermeer afvallen connen, ghelijck het oock een groote onwijsheyt ende veynsinghe ware te roemen, te loven ende te prijsen, den genen die volhart hebben, als of sy met de volhardinghe wat groots ende wat sonderlincx uytgherecht, ende een groote Victorie behouden hadden, daer het nochtans nae sijnen onveranderlicken wille ende wel weten onmoghelick was, of sy en moesten

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If God had decided the perseverance of believers so absolutely and inevitably that there is no danger of falling away, Christ would not have prayed so fervently for their perseverance as, for example, in the case of Peter.221 A faith that, aside from knowledge, consists also in confidence as an essential element, cannot co-exist with all kinds of sins that are committed by the regenerated person. Also a faith as infused gift, as a root that remains even if the fruits and works of faith disappear, is not recognized as faith by the Remonstrants. Furthermore – should such an infused (habitual) faith exist – God recognizes as his children only those who actually believe. An infused gift of faith cannot be demanded by God, nor is it a real faith. The Counter-Remonstrants defend themselves against an important part of the Remonstrant arguments by pointing out that perseverance does not pertain to hypocrites and false believers, but only those people “who have been grafted into Christ through a true faith, and have become partakers of his life-giving Spirit, whose attribute is to fear God, to be on guard against sin, to hate it, to work out their salvation in fear and trembling.” In themselves, and abandoned to themselves, these true believers would easily lose their faith, but through God’s gracious promises and faithful protection this will not happen.222 According to the Counter-Remonstrants, the promise of perseverance and the admonition to perseverance do not conflict, if they are both applied “in proper fashion and with care, according to the situation of the congregation, each in its time and place.”223 Both serve to edification, where the admonitions to perseverance are to be considered as nothing “but means through which the promise of perseverance is completed and fulfilled.”224 The necessity of the use of means “does not take away the steadfastness of the promise, nor does the promise undo the means, but they are two things that can exist together.”225 The fact that God uses means undoes all carelessness. The CounterRemonstrants are here thinking of the case of true believers who have fallen in sin and will arise again, and on the basis of God’s promise believers also know that. However, they also know that God does not do this except through means, and that for that reason even when they are fallen it is their duty and obligation to use the means carefully through which God raises up those who have

————— volharden ende overwinnen, hebbende de selve oock ten heuren wel weten, altijdt ghehouden buyten alle vreese, perijckel ende schroom van af vallen.” 221 HSC 366. 222 HSC 308–309. 223 HSC 311. 224 HSC 312. 225 HSC 316; cf. 321.

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fallen, such as an earnest reflection on the abominableness of sin, fervent prayer, diligent listening to God’s Word, and the like. They are driven to it not as slaves by a fear of death and destruction, but as children of God powerfully stirred up and driven by the love of their Father and the awakening of the Holy Spirit.226

That the doctrine of perseverance would have carelessness as a result is unjust and “old slander” (oude lasteringhe). A true believer does not commit “all the sins that one could ever commit.” He or she sins, but “not from a boundless malice, wickedness, lust and delight in evil as in the case of an unbeliever.”227 He or she can out of weakness “fall into certain sins, which also in terms of the external act are sometimes grave.” If there is no true sorrow over these sins, loss of salvation would follow. However, God according to his promise brings the true believer to upright sorrow and “a serious betterment of life,” whose result is that a true believer will never sin again because that would conflict with the nature of true faith. A true believer will thus not misuse the doctrine of perseverance in order to become careless, but only “for his comfort, against the weakness that still remains in him against his will.”228 The doctrine of assurance “is nothing but a declaration of God’s promise that He has made to the true believer in his Word, that He will keep the true believer in the true faith to the end, externally through the aforementioned means and internally through the powerful operation of the Holy Spirit.” The means, however, are not sufficient, and they would be completely in vain “unless God also worked internally and powerfully the gift of perseverance through his Holy Spirit in the true believer.”229 With that, the doctrine of perseverance is once more connected to and based on the CounterRemonstrant doctrine of predestination. God does not act hypocritically when He uses threats and other similar means in order to spur on to perseverance those of whom He has certainly decided and promised that they will preserve. For God means it when He ————— 226 HSC 315: “door middelen, dat daerom nochtans ondertusschen haer Ampt ende schuldighen plicht is, gevallen zijnde, sorchvuldich te gebruycken de middelen, door welcke God de gevallene wederom oprecht, gelijc daer zijn ernstige overdenckingen vande grouwelicheden der sonden, yverige gebeden, vlytich gehoor des Goddelicken woorts, ende diergelijcke. Waer toe, hoewel sy niet ghedreven en worden door vreese van sterven ende verderven, als slaven, so worden sy daer toe nochtans, als Kinderen Gods, door liefde hares Vaders ende opweckinge des H. Geests, crachtelic aengeporret, ende gedreven.” 227 HSC 314. 228 HSC 313–314. 229 HSC 317; cf. 318.323–324. Cf. 322: “De smeeckinghen zijn uytterlicke middelen, by de welcke, indiense niet crachteloos en sullen wesen, moet comen d’inwendighe crachtighe werckinghe des H. Gheests, door welcke, midtsgaders door soodanige uytterlicke middelen God belooft heeft, dat hy de gave der volherdinghe in alle ware Gheloovighen sal wercken ende te weghe brenghen.”

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says that those who fall away will be lost. God also knows that the true believers are best sharpened and incited to persevere through such threats.230 “God often uses such conditional threats, not in order to point out some uncertainty of our salvation and perseverance, but in order to sharpen the laziness and negligence that is often found in true believers.”231 Also with respect to perseverance use is made of the distinction between external means and the internal work of the Spirit, just as the conditional nature of God’s speaking functions to free God from the charge of hypocrisy, which is in fact a form of injustice. When the Scriptures appear to speak about believers who abandon the faith, this is a manner of speaking that does not reflect a reality, but the appearance of it. Many hypocrites have great knowledge of the truth; of many it is said that they are sanctified because “they portray themselves as such, and have been perceived as such by others according to a judgment of love, although they have not been sanctified actually and internally.” According to the Counter-Remonstrants, a similar thing happens at baptism, which is not an internal but an external purification. The water of baptism is “the external sign of the blood of the Testament,” through which one is sanctified to the external community of faith and set apart.”232 Thus it is not true, as the Remonstrants claim, that all small children born of believing parents have received the Holy Spirit of regeneration. But just as not all adults, when they profess their faith and are then baptized actually have the Spirit of regeneration as is proven by the example of Simon the Sorcerer, Acts 8:13, are still considered as such [i.e. to have the Spirit of regeneration – wdb] by our judgment of love as long as they do not openly show the contrary; similarly, we must by the same judgment of love believe of all small children who are born of believing parents (which takes the place of their own profession of the faith) and are baptized, [that they have received the Holy Spirit of regeneration – wdb] until the time that they as adults show themselves to be otherwise, since the promise is extended to these children in general.233

————— HSC 317. HSC 319; cf. 326. Cf. 329: “Want door t’voor-stellen van sulck een groote straffe, die op d’afvallicheydt seeckerlick soude volghen, wil Godt de ware gheloovighe van den af-val afschricken ende behouden.” 232 HSC 330. 233 HSC 336: “alle cleyne Kinderen, die van gheloovighe Ouders gheboren werden, den H. Gheest der wedergheboorte souden hebben ontfanghen, maer ghelijck niet alle volwassene, als sy het gheloove belijden, ende daer op ghedoopt werden, den Gheest der wedergheboorte hebben, als blijcken can uyt het exempel van Symon den Tovenaer, Actor. 8.13.21. nochtans van ons naer het oordeel der liefde, daer voor alle moeten worden ghehouden, soo langhe sy het contrarie niet openbaerlick en betoonen, alsoo ist, dat wy dit naer het selve oordeel der liefde moeten ghelooven, van alle cleyne Kinderen die van Gheloovighe Ouders gheboren zijn (t’welck haer in plaetse van belijdenisse is) ende ghedoopt werden totter tijdt toe dat sy haer selven int opwassen anders 230 231

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Analogical to the judgment of love that applies to adults who profess their faith, so small children of believers must be considered as regenerate for so long as they do not show the contrary. The analogy to profession of faith is in fact so strong that the faith of parents takes the place of a profession of faith by their children themselves, which the children cannot yet make because of their age. Now when these children as adults through a wicked and godless life show that they do not have the Spirit of regeneration, then one may not say that they have lost this Spirit but rather that it is a sure sign that they never had Him.234

In their response, the Remonstrants emphasize that they in no way doubt that believers and saints “as such” (i.e. as believers) persevere “in the grace, favor and care of God.”235 They call this not only the foundation of the comfort of God’s children, but also a “necessary foundation of all religion, and particularly of the Christian religion which is founded on the promises of God and Jesus Christ.”236 Arminius called God’s twofold love the foundation of the (Christian) religion. It is not impossible that the Remonstrant statement on the foundation of religion relates to it. That God will surely preserve believers is also for Arminius a basic point of departure that comes directly from God’s love for justice and his love for humanity. The Remonstrants, however, do not explicitly refer to God’s justice as the source for their fundamentum statement, which makes it difficult to determine whether or not they are explicitly borrowing from, or influenced by, Arminius. With their emphasis on the function of an active faith for perseverance, the Remonstrants place their finger on the core of the difference they have with their opponents. God comforts people not as people, but as believers. True believers neither look for nor find comfort in God’s grace without finding faith in themselves. It is not the faith “that was at one time (because otherwise they take the same comfort, indeed as great a comfort, in the most abominable sins as in the greatest godliness, if only they believed at one time or another), but the faith which is still present and always remains” that gives ground for this comfort. If faith plays no role in perseverance, the result will be carelessness. It would also be most unwise on God’s part to command perseverance seriously, and at the same time to comfort those ————— betoonen: overmidts dese Kinderen int ghemeen de belofte ghedaen is.” Cf. TRIGLAND, Geessel, 667. 234 HSC 336: “Wanneer nu de kinderen in het opwassen door een boos ende Godtloos leven bethoonen, dat sy den Gheest der wedergheboorte niet en hebben, dan machmen niet segghen datse de selve verloren hebben, maer dat is een seecker teecken datse de selve noyt ghehadt en hebben”; cf. 374. 235 HSC 339. 236 HSC 340.

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whom He commands to persevere that they cannot fail to persevere.237 Perseverance is for the Remonstrants “nothing but the same, constant and continuing faith.”238 Sin, in contrast, separates humanity from God. According to Paul in Rom 8, nothing can separate believers from God’s love in Christ, but if it were posited that even this sin could no longer cause such a separation, and if even sin is included among “all things” that work together to the good of those whom God loves, this would open the doors wide to all kinds of sin.239 Doubt and despair are caused by doubt as to whether or not salvation has been prepared for the person involved, or by doubt as to the possibility of being able to be saved or to receive salvation for sure.240 Such doubt is harmful, but doubting “whether one will always remain as one is, always keep the will and heart that one has now, and through laxity, carelessness, wickedness, temptation not be changed of one’s own pure free will, is not harmful but instead praiseworthy as a cause of careful and sharp cautiousness to avoid and flee from sin, and from all opportunities that lead to it.”241 The comfort that God’s children have consists of two parts: 1. That they in the midst of all difficulties that accompany religion are certain of a great and glorious reward that has been prepared for them. 2. That they through God’s power and their consideration of the reward are more than strong enough to stand firm to the end and to overcome all enemies, “if only they keep their eyes fixed on the prize that has been set before them. For faith is their and our victory.”242 If God were to keep people in the faith through the same power and grace that produced their first creation, it would be absurd and “most unfitting.” For then those who are made alive would after regeneration be as unable as they were before regeneration. Such people would either always remain in grace and never sin, or sin through a lack of grace. The latter would imply that “man, even with the help of God’s grace that has been given to him, cannot leave more evil than he does nor do more good than he does; and that God abandons his own before they abandon Him, indeed that He cannot be abandoned by them before He abandons them Himself.”243

————— 237 238 239 240 241 242 243

HSC 340. HSC 341. HSC 386. HSC 346. HSC 346. HSC 341. HSC 342–343.

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The Remonstrants consider it an important difference that despair and carelessness are firmly avoided by their views, while “both are clearly promoted by the view of the Counter-Remonstrants.”244 God’s grace must receive the highest and only honor when it comes to repentance and salvation. Without taking away from God’s grace, however, the regenerated human will can also be called a co-cause of perseverance. For the will has been made alive through, and has received new powers from, grace “through which it can assent to and use those benefits and gifts that it receives, and then persevere in grace.” The willingness to do battle comes from God and the will, but is at the same time also fully dependent on God’s grace.245 The will is not a cause that is equal to, and cooperates with, grace, but it is a cause subordinate to grace. For it is as a rule moved, stirred up, maintained and protected to it through the grace of the Spirit; indeed, it would otherwise not even persevere for a moment. For it perseveres when it perseveres not because it wills to persevere blindly and without cause, but because it is moved through grace as through a prevenient and concomitant cause on which it depends, without which it neither would nor could will to persevere; but always in such a way that it can either accept or resist the movement and operation of the Spirit. In the latter case, it is the complete cause of its falling away, not depending on any other cause but doing from itself freely what it does. But its perseverance, on the other hand, depends only on grace as the first, highest and principal cause; nevertheless, not without the will, which grace moves and awakens to work [...].246

This quotation once again clearly illustrates the conviction and intention of the Remonstrants. They think that they can unite three things with their view on grace and the (non-irresistible) operation of grace. In the first place, that God’s grace is really sufficient for all, and is unambiguously intended for all. Secondly, that salvation must be fully ascribed to God’s grace. And in the third place, that unbelief and unrepentance, or a fall away from faith, can be attributed to the human being alone, who in spite of eve————— HSC 341; cf. 345.352. HSC 343. 246 HSC 344: “Want doorgaens so ist datse door de genade des Geestes daer toe beweeght wort, aengheporret, onderhouden ende bewaert: Jae het is onmoghelijck datse anders soude connen een oogenblick volherden: Want daerom volhert sy als sy volhert niet om dat sy wilt volharden blindelick ende sonder oorsaeck, maer om dat sy door de genade als door een voorgaende ende medegaende oorsake, daer van sy hangt, beweeght wort, sonder welcke sy niet en soude noch konde willen volherden: maer altijdt so dat sy de beweginghe ende werckinghe des Geestes ofte waer nemen ofte teghenstaen kan. In welcken laetsten ghevalle sy volkomen oorsake is van haren affval, als niet hangende aen eenighe andere oorsake, maer doende uyt haer selven vrywilligh het ghene sy doet. Maer anderssins hangt haer volhardinge alleene aende genade als de eerste, hoochste ende principale oorsaeck: nochtans niet sonder den wille, den welcken de ghenade tot het werck beweecht ende verweckt […].” 244 245

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rything still turns away from God and from his grace. Also the believer’s “willingness to do battle” is not a willingness that comes without grace, but it comes “through the grace that admonishes, moves, and prods and stirs them to it in thousands of ways.”247 The necessity of human cooperation still does not make perseverance depend on that cooperation, just as for example justification does not depend on faith, although God justifies no one who does not believe.248 6.2.6 The Status quaestionis In spite of assurance and arguments to the contrary, the CounterRemonstrants remained even into their version of the status quaestionis at the end of the conference convinced that the Remonstrants teach that faith is the cause of election. On the basis of this conviction, that was therefore not shared by their opponents, they reproach the Remonstrants for placing the first and highest cause of salvation in the human being, and not in God’s good pleasure and pure grace. “This we cannot understand as anything but a deprivation of God of his glory and a diminishing, even a destruction, of his grace.” The Counter-Remonstrants regard faith in relation to election as a subordinate means, and as fruit of election.249 As far as atonement is concerned, the Counter-Remonstrants do not understand how there can be a “middle road” between the sufficiency of the sacrifice of Christ and the actual appropriation of it. For that reason they suspect the Remonstrants, who want to teach aside from the universal sufficiency also a universally procured atonement, of teaching “a universal restoration of each and every person in a state of reconciliation with God” – in spite of insistent denials to the contrary by the Remonstrants themselves. They also remark that they do not see how it could be useful to discuss “whether for someone any good has been procured in which he had neither a share nor part, nor shall ever into eternity.” In addition to the sufficient “value and power” of the suffering and death of Christ for the atonement of all people before God, the Remonstrants teach that atonement and forgiveness has been procured for all, that it is God’s will that this atonement be extended to all, and that it is Christ’s intention and purpose really to save all people, “even those who will be lost.” There is therefore a difference of opinion as to whether or not the aforementioned three attributes, if applied to the atonement, imply that all people ————— 247 248 249

HSC 344. HSC 344. HSC 390–393.

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will really be saved, which the Counter-Remonstrants think is the case but the Remonstrants deny. The clearly expressed astonishment on the part of the Counter-Remonstrants over the fact that their opponents worry about the procurement of atonement for people who will never share in the atonement to begin with, together with their total silence about the motivations the Remonstrants had offered, reveals their lack of understanding of the views of the opposing party. Their motive related to the foundational sine qua non-character of the atonement that was actually procured. During the discussions, what was determinative for their view on election and the proclamation of grace was the conviction that each act of grace of a just God towards sinners ought to be founded in a justice that has actually been satisfied.250 What is remarkable is that the Remonstrants in their Status quaestionis pass over this last argument on the satisfaction of God’s justice, and concentrate on the well-meant offer of grace and on the question whether all can trust that this promise has been made to them.251 With respect to grace and the operation of grace, the CounterRemonstrant doctrine is marked by their view that humanity “after the fall is so fully corrupt and completely dead in sin” that it is impossible for the human will without “special operations and powerful inclinations of the Holy Spirit [...] to be inclined and determined towards true spiritual good.” Also after the fall the will does remain “uncoerced,” but it cannot choose the spiritual good if the opposition of the will is not actually and powerfully blocked and taken away, and the will “inclined and determined to assent without any coercion.” Some of the consequences of this view are that in all those in whom God works through his Spirit with the intention to produce faith and repentance, “faith and repentance will also actually be produced in them,” and that “according to this, not all people to whom the Word is preached are further given the life-giving Spirit.”252 For which reason we say that the sole and proximate cause of faith, or why it is that of two people who both listen to one proclamation of the Word and internally are sufficiently enlightened in their mind, one believes and repents while the other remains unbelieving and unrepentant, is because through a special operation of the Holy Spirit the will of the one is actually and powerfully inclined and determined to it. And if this operation of the Holy Spirit had occurred as powerfully in the other, he would have believe and repented as well.253

————— HSC 393–395. HSC 419. 252 HSC 395–397. 253 HSC 396: “Waerom wy segghen, dat de eenighe ende naeste oorsaecke des gheloofs, ofte waerom het geschiet, dat van twee Menschen die eenderley Predicatie des woorts aenhoren, ende 250 251

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Also in connection with this theme do the Counter-Remonstrants doubt the forthrightness of the Remonstrants, and suspect that they do not want to give their opinion openly and hide it with the ambiguous term “nonirresistible.” According to the Counter-Remonstrants, the Remonstrants thereby attribute to the cooperation of the human will a place as cause alongside God’s grace. Although they admit that the Remonstrants view God’s grace as the highest and most important cause of repentance, they emphasize that this conflicts with the Remonstrants’ insistence on the inborn human free choice. The emphasis the Remonstrants themselves placed throughout the discussions on the dependence of free choice on God’s grace and on its fully secondary place, is completely absent from the CounterRemonstrant summary of the Remonstrant position.254 That the Remonstrants see a direct connection between their view on the operation of grace and the carefulness to avoid hypocrisy – or injustice – on God’s part, is in the Counter-Remonstrant summary treated within the context of the proclamation of the Gospel: That God is fully ready, wherever and to whomever He has his Word preached, to bring all to repentance with his life-giving Spirit. And that God should play a dissimulating hypocrite, should He have his Word preached to one to whom He will not at once give the live-giving Spirit of Christ as well.255

However, the Counter-Remonstrants do not go in on this charge and clearly consider it to have been unnecessary after their defense in the main body of the discussions. In their account of the difference with respect to the perseverance of true believers, the Counter-Remonstrants emphasize that this perseverance applies only to true believers, and not to hypocrites, false believers or those who have only a temporal faith. There is no such thing as an absolute impossibility of falling away; left to themselves, believers could be brought to fall away.256 True believers can fall into deep sins, but they do not only receive sufficient power to fight against and overcome Satan, the world and ————— die inwendelick beyde in haer verstant genoechsamelijc verlicht zijn, d’eene gelooft, ende sich bekeert, daer d’andere in ongelove ende onbekeerlijcheyt blijft, is, om dat door een bysondere werckinge des H. Geestes, de wille des eenen daer toe dadelijck ende crachtelijck geneycht, gebogen, ende ghedetermineert wort: ende indien dese werckinge des H. Gheests ontrent den andere even crachtich gheschiet ware, dat de selve oock soo wel als d’andere soude ghelooft ende sich bekeert hebben.” 254 HSC 396–399. 255 HSC 398: “Dat waer ende wien Godt syn Woort laet predicken, dat hy oock daer met synen levendich-makenden Geest volveerdich is, om haer alle te bekeeren. Ende dat Godt den gheveynsden hypocrijt soude spelen, indien hy yemandt syn woort liet predicken, dien hy met eenen den levendich-maeckende gheest Christi niet en soude gheven.” 256 See the Remonstrants on this “unfounded distinction” (ongegronde distinctie) in HSC 427.

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their own flesh, but they are also powerfully protected so that they “never again, nor completely, nor finally lose [their faith], nor fall away from true faith once and for all.”257 At the end, the Remonstrants consider that the differences they have with the Counter-Remonstrants can be traced back to one point: the article on predestination to salvation and condemnation.258 As they see it, the CounterRemonstrants teach that predestination is a decree according to which God has from eternity decided to save some people considered simply as people or else as people who have sinned in Adam, and to condemn others. It is further a decision to bring these people either to salvation or to condemnation, and to give the elect the means to salvation in such a powerful way that they will certainly be saved, and not to give the means to salvation to the reprobate at all, or at least not in a sufficiently powerful way. The Remonstrants posit in contrast that God has determined from eternity to save certain individuals considered as believers in Christ (graciously imputed to them by God through sufficient and powerful means), and to condemn the others who through their own fault (that is, by neglecting and rejecting the means to salvation that have been given to them) did not believe in Christ.259 If one were to speak the truth honestly, one would have to acknowledge that this is what it comes down to for both parties, that the whole difference is located only in this, and that if only this point were smoothed out all the rest would be smoothed out as well. For if predestination were as the Counter-Remonstrants claim it is, all that they believe in respect to the other articles must be true as well. And vice versa, if the Remonstrant view on this point is correct, what they confess about all the other articles must be true as well. For everything hangs together.260

An important point of agreement between the parties is, for example, the conviction that election rests only on the pure grace and mercy of God in Christ, and not on any merit or worth of people. An important difference that they mention is the place and function of Christ with respect to election: is He a subordinate means, or the logically preceding foundation for ————— HSC 399–401. Cf. HSC 437: “alle de swaricheyt valt over de hooge aenstotelicke Predestinatie metten gevolge van dien”. 259 HSC 409–410. 260 HSC 410: “Alsmen de waerheydt in oprechticheyt spreecken sal, soo moetmen bekennen, dat dit de rechte meeninge is ten weder-zijden, ende dat het gheheele gheschil hier inne alleene bestaet: ende dat dit poinct alleen vereffent zijnde, alle de reste vereffent is. Want: Staet het soo met de Predestinatie als de Contra-Remonstranten seggen, so moet oock waer zijn dat sy ghevoelen van alle d’andere Articulen: Gelijck ter contrarie: indien der Remonstranten gevoelen over dit stuck waer bevonden wordt, soo sal oock waer bevonden moeten worden, t’ghene zy bekennen over alle d’andere Articulen: want het alles aen malcanderen hangt.” 257 258

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election? Another important question is whether faith comes from election as fruit, or from hearing the Gospel. The Remonstrants believe the latter, and leave the spreading of the Word to the “wise, impenetrable, just and merciful government” of the Lord. Those who are not saved are not condemned because of a lack of a sufficient grace, but rather through their own abuse of it.261 When the doctrine of reprobation comes up, it becomes clear that on this point they still have the “greatest objection” (meeste swaricheyt).262 It hides monstrous sentiments, and the Counter-Remonstrants have consistently refused to explain their view on reprobation, and that although election and reprobation are “two parts, as high and as low, and stand on the same level over against one another.” The Remonstrants identify the cause of this refusal in the Counter-Remonstrant fear that opening up on reprobation would immediately arouse disapproval as being “abominable, unfitting for the good and just God, and totally in conflict with the Holy Word.” They do agree with the Remonstrants that God has decided to condemn the unbelievers inasmuch as they are outside of Christ, but because of the parallel between election and reprobation would have to admit that they teach that, if faith is a fruit of election, unbelief must come from reprobation as a fruit as well. The characterizations used in connection with this theme make it clear that this is a touchy theme where indeed the “greatest objection” exists. Exactly in connection with this theme does the issue of God’s justice play a role, and God’s justice is again referred to explicitly. This confirms the impression that God’s justice forms an important theological motive for these earliest Remonstrants for their rejection of Counter-Remonstrant doctrine, and for their adoption of another viewpoint. According to the Remonstrants, their view on the extent of the atonement follows directly from the related doctrine of predestination. Their position on Christ as the foundation of election, antecedent in order, implies that Christ also died for all and procured salvation for all, in order to apply it to those who believe. Because also the Counter-Remonstrants teach that the power and value of Christ’s death suffices to atone for all people, the difference can be located in the question whether “Christ died in such a manner for all, that He procured for all the remedy of salvation, that is, reconciliation with God and forgiveness of sins.”263 The Remonstrants answer in the affirmative, the Counter-Remonstrants in the negative. The Remonstrants also deal at length with the Counter-Remonstrant amazement that they are ————— 261 262 263

HSC 412–413. Cf. HSC 417. HSC 417–418.

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so concerned with the sufficiency of Christ’s death for people who will never partake of it anyways: the reason why we teach that Christ procured atonement for all, although many through their own fault will not partake of it, is: because the Holy Scripture teaches it; because it is true; because it greatly promotes the honor of God and Christ, as well as the praise of his great love shown to the human race; because otherwise one cannot, without speaking an untruth, preach the gospel to the unbelievers, nor proclaim Christ to them, nor invite them to faith in Christ with the argument that Christ died for them, given that according to the Counter-Remonstrant view one does not know this before they actually believe; finally, because one otherwise cannot persuade the unbelieving and unrepentant with the Holy Scriptures that they are with their unbelief trampling the blood of Christ through which they are sanctified, Heb 10:29, and are therefore lost not by a shortcoming on the part of Christ and of his benefits, but by their own fault.264

The two most important arguments are drawn from the proclamation of the gospel which cannot really go out to each and every person if Christ did not also really die for all, and from the question whether people can really be convinced that they are lost not through a shortcoming on the part of God, but through a fault of their own. Although both elements are not totally unrelated to the issue of iustitia, one thing that is passed over is the issue whether God can offer grace without having right to this in the satisfaction of his justice through Christ’s substitutionary sacrifice. The Remonstrants find it nothing but logically consistent that the Counter-Remonstrants teach an irresistible grace.265 The only difference over against the Counter-Remonstrants with respect to the third and fourth articles therefore also concerns the operation of grace, whether it is irresistible or not, and whether grace is intended only for the elect or for others as well. While the Counter-Remonstrants are of the opinion that it involves contradiction to teach that faith is a gift from God and that it is worked resistibly, the Remonstrants rather argue that grace would lose its character ————— 264 HSC 419: “d’oorsaeck, waerom wy leeren dat Christus voor alle ende yeder de versoeninghe heeft verworven, hoe wel vele de selve door haer eyghen schuldt, niet deelachtich en worden, is, om dat het de H. Schrift leert: om dat het waer is: om dattet grootelijcx dient tot Godes ende Christi eere, mitsgaders tot lof van sijne groote liefde, den Menschelijcken gheslachte bewesen: om datmen anders sonder onwaerheydt te spreecken, den ongheloovighen het Euangelium niet predicken, noch hun Christum vercondighen, noch tot het geloove in Christum nooden mach, met dit Argument, dat Christus voor hun ghestorven is, aenghesien men dat niet en weet na der ContraRemonstranten meeninghe, voor ende aleer sy datelijck ghelooven: Eyntelijck, om datmen anders den ongheloovighen, ende onboetvaerdighen mette heylighe Schriftuere niet overtuyghen en kan, dat sy t’bloet Christi daer door sy gheheylicht waren Hebr. 10.29. met haer ongheloove vertreden, ende alsoo niet by ghebreke Christi, ende sijner weldaden, maer by haer eyghen schuldt verloren gaen.” 265 HSC 419–420.

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– and would become “coercion” (nootdwanck) – if it were worked irresistibly.266 As solution, the Remonstrants propose not to establish the nature of the operation of the Holy Spirit, because it is incomprehensible to begin with. According to the norm they adopted, it appears as if the sincerity of the gospel offer is again important, together with the listener’s own responsibility not to spurn God’s grace. The norm adopted argues that faith, just as all saving good is ascribed only to the grace of God in Jesus Christ, and that those to whom the Word of God is preached must firmly believe that the Lord has his Word preached to them with the intention of converting them; and that they must further ensure that they do not scorn this grace.267

With respect to the perseverance of true believers, it appears that “aside from truth, also one’s godliness” (Godvruchticheyt)268 is one of the points on which the Remonstrants insist. The concern for godliness, which is “the only ground and motive for these differences,”269 will make preachers afraid to “place a soft pillow under the ears of his people without intending to” by teaching that “one who once believes is from that point on free from all worry and fear of condemnation, however great a sin he may yet commit.” This is a valid concern “especially in this profligate time, where even the most dissolute have a habit of making themselves out to be believers and God’s dear children.”270 As a sort of compromise, the Remonstrants propose that while comforting God’s children with the faithful and lasting protection of their chief shepherd Jesus Christ as the one who from his side is both fully willing and able to protect them so that they do not fall away, one nevertheless at the same time warn that they must work out their salvation with fear and trembling, and in doing so ensure that he who stands does not fall. With that, one will shortchange neither the truth of the Holy Scriptures nor the Confession, and while offering the appropriate comfort of the Scriptures still protect against carelessness so that the believer may sail between despair and carelessness,

————— HSC 420–422. HSC 422: “ghelijck oock alle het Salichmakende goet, alleen de ghenade Godts in Iesu Christo werde toegheschreven, ende dat die ghene dien het Woort Godts gepredickt wort vastelijck moeten ghelooven, dat de Heer haer sijn Woordt doet predicken, in meeninghe van haer te bekeeren: ende dat sy derhalve moeten toesien, dat sy dese ghenade niet en verwaerloosen, etc.” 268 HSC 428. 269 HSC 428. 270 HSC 426; cf. 428: “dese verdorvene tijden”. 266 267

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enter into the port of eternal salvation through the grace of Jesus Christ and dock there.271

From the summary that each party gave of the other party’s viewpoint, a number of things can be concluded. The view of the Counter-Remonstrants essentially comes down to this, that they cannot see how a sinner could be saved except through a powerful operation of the Spirit through which regeneration is actually worked. The doctrines of irresistible grace, unconditional predestination, the limited extent of the atonement and the perseverance of the saints are more or less logical implications of that one conviction. The Counter-Remonstrant motivation appears to lay, aside from the glory of God, particularly in their concern for the doctrine of grace and salvation, and in the assurance of faith. As they see it, a person cannot be saved in the manner conceived of by the Remonstrants, cannot be certain of salvation, and the place the freedom of the will there occupies diminishes the honor that is actually due to God. They show little understanding for the Remonstrant viewpoint, and many of the latter group’s arguments are simply overlooked. It is continually noted that the Remonstrants are hiding their actual views with words that sound orthodox. Their teaching is novel, heretical and most clearly in conflict with Scripture and Confession. This attitude of suspicion and this lack of trust in the honesty of the Remonstrants’ intentions appear to have been the cause that during the Conference there was really no frank discussion and openness to listen, no search for the others’ motivations, and no readiness to give the benefit of the doubt to those intentions that were expressed. The ultimate result was that the two parties operated on different wavelengths, and did not get down to discussing the core of their viewpoints. One could think of many reasons for such an end to this conference. Personal and (church-) political motives, mutual lack of understanding and trust will all have played a role. As to the systematic-theological reasons, one can be more specific and concrete. What strikes one is the zeal with which rows of Scripture texts are exegeted according to each party’s own dogmatic presuppositions, while methodical reflection appears to be all but absent. There was no discussion on the nature of revelation, nor on human knowledge of God, while exactly such topics would appear to have been of ————— 271 HSC 428: “de gheloovige kinderen Godts troostende, met die ghetrouwe ende ghestadige bewaringhe haers opperherders Jesu Christi, als die aen zijne sijde volcomen ghewillich, ende machtich is, om haer te bewaren dat sy niet uyt en vallen: alle tijt daer by vermane, dat sy haer salicheyt wercken moeten in vreesen, ende beven, ende dat doende, hy die staet, toe sie, dat hy niet en valle. Hier mede en salmen noch de waerheyt der H. Schriftuer, noch Confessie te cort doen, ende den behoorlicken troost der Schriftuere aen dienende, even wel de sorgheloosheyt weeren, op dat de gheloovige also tusschen wanhope ende sorgheloosheyt heenen seylende, de haven der eeuwigher Salicheyt, door de ghenade Jesu Christi bezeylen, ende aen doen moghen.”

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fundamental importance. The place and function of Christ with respect to grace and salvation is another topic on which the two parties appear to have had fundamental differences of opinion, but in spite of the many words devoted to it, there seems to have been no actual, deep discussion. A number of times it is pointed out that this topic is closely tied to the justice of God, something which the Remonstrants were also concerned about and drew attention to, although not nearly as often as one would have expected. However, the Counter-Remonstrants did not even once enter into the questions pertaining to it, on account of which the result of that discussion was less than satisfying – as could be expected. This was also true for the view on reprobation, a very important subject for the Remonstrants because of its connection with the doctrine of God, but on which the CounterRemonstrants refused to pronounce themselves because they claimed it was not relevant. This lends support to the supposition that the CounterRemonstrants had little, at any rate not enough, attention for the motives which drove the Remonstrants. The Remonstrants set the whole discussion explicitly in a specific historical development and context. They admit that this “most offensive predestination together with its consequences, which our brothers want to have taught, [...] already has many followers and is promoted by many learned men.”272 However, their own view is not a matter of “novelties,” neither in terms of the church of old, nor in terms of the doctrine of the “Reformed evangelical churches in general,” nor in terms of the Confession of the Reformed churches in the Netherlands. From the beginning of the Reformation, different views were promoted. The Remonstrants point out that the Franeker professor Henricus Anthony recently praised Anastasius Veluanus’s Der Leecken wech-wijser. Many in the Reformed camp have read this booklet and considered it simply a “jewel.” The Remonstrants refer to this book in connection with the reproach that they are promoting new ideas, although they note that on the free will they do not speak as Veluanus.273 The Remonstrants also fiercely oppose the charges that they are promoting Arian, Samosatene and Socinian heresies, remarking that it is a “common and old practice to seek to suppress those teachers on whom one has set one’s sights with false rumors of being infected with this or that heresy.”274 The decision to revise the Confession and Catechism, as proposed by the Remonstrants, was made by the States General already in 1597 and 1606, and the Particular Synod of South Holland approved this decision in ————— 272 273 274

HSC 437. HSC 430. HSC 431.

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1606.275 The Remonstrants emphasize the human, and thus fallible, character of these writings, and defend their view on the need for revision on this basis. They then connect that to conformity to the “first principle of the Reformation” (eersten gront der reformatie), so that resistance against revision becomes nothing less than the establishment of a principle that reeks of papism. Before such a revision takes place, they do not wish to bind themselves any more than “God’s Word and the conscience allow.”276 The Remonstrants note that from the very beginning of the Reformation, peaceful forbearance and tolerance had been practiced specifically in connection with predestination. They point to the friendship between Philip Melanchthon and John Calvin, as well as the hand of fellowship Theodore Beza extended to the Lutherans after the Colloquy of Montbéliard, even though the latter party promoted a view that was “not unlike the views of the Remonstrants.” Besides, in Geneva the writings of the Lutheran theologian Nicolas Hemmingius were being published, and they clearly express the views of the Remonstrants while describing the opposing view as Stoicum fatum, Zenonis dogmata. His works were openly being printed in Geneva, and “highly recommended by the theologians there for close reading by the students, as some of the Remonstrants who have studied there can truly attest.” Another example that is noted is that of England, where William Whitaker took the one position, and Peter Baro the other. Also the Dominicans and Jesuits, and the Jesuits amongst themselves, “in fact have the same differences as we do,” which discussions have already lasted for more than twenty years (cf. more in 7.3.2).277 By placing their views in the context of discussions going on within the Netherlands and all of Europe in Protestant and Roman Catholic circles, the Remonstrants aim at acceptance and tolerance. In this regard, their positive reference to Franciscus Junius’s Eirenicon is noteworthy.278 Not without rhetorical intent do they write: We are only after truth and peace, particularly for our dear fatherland, particularly for the sake of the spiritual Jerusalem, and being at peace amongst ourselves, to resist with spiritual power the anti-Christ that is the papacy. The One who knows all, who sees our thoughts, who has heard the statements mutually exchanged numerous times, knows this.279

————— HSC 1–5.428. HSC 429. 277 HSC 434–435. For this paragraph, cf. 7.3.2. 278 See SELDERHUIS, “Frieden aus Heidelberg”, 249–257; SARX, Junius, 109–138; DE JONGE, Irenische Ecclesiologie, especially 169; VENEMANS, Junius. 279 HSC 436: “T’is alleen na waerheyt ende vrede dat wy trachten: bysonder om onse lieve Vaderlant: bysonder om des geestelijcken Jerusalems wille: ende om vrede onder ons hebbende 275 276

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What is also remarkable is that the Remonstrants call attention to a difference – or, as they see it, a contradiction – between doctrine and preaching, between theory and practice. What is consistently being taught and encouraged in the preaching does not agree with an unconditional predestination. Especially from the admonitions, threats, punishments, prayers, administration of the sacraments and the exercise of church discipline, one could not conclude anything but that all preachers share the opinions of the Remonstrants. According to the Remonstrants, this would explain why many of the Counter-Remonstrant pastors do not explain the doctrine to which they hold without variation, “or else mask and interweave [it] by speaking ambiguously and with strange distinctions so that one can no longer identify their grounds.” This in turn explains why many claim that they have never heard their preachers proclaim what is now said to be their view. When a preacher explains his view on predestination a little more clearly, others immediately recognize that it totally conflicts with the admonitions that same pastor then utters.280 The Remonstrants have no difficulty tolerating the Counter-Remonstrants as long as the latter teach predestination as an a posteriori, as many of them themselves already do out of carefulness. However, we are satisfied to tolerate them in this respect, on the condition that while teaching it one may join the warning; to wit, not a priori (that is, before), namely from the high decree of predestination, but a posteriori (that is, after), namely from faith and the fruits of faith. From that no other decree can be made than this, believers shall be saved, unbelievers shall be condemned, which is the same predestination as the Remonstrants teach.281

The Remonstrants suspect that many people in the church would not tolerate the Counter-Remonstrant view on predestination if it were taught fully and openly in all its aspects. As example they note that there are people who are not willing to listen to the Remonstrants because they ostensibly teach “that God created certain people to destruction” – which is, of course, not the view of the Remonstrants, but of the Counter-Remonstrants! “Which one has with clever tactics managed to have ascribed to the Re————— t’Antichristische Pausdom met geestlicke cracht tegen te staen. Dat weet hy die alles weet: de gedachten siet, ende onse onderlinghe propoosten menichmael ghehoort heeft.” 280 HSC 437. 281 HSC 437: “de welcke men nochtans te vreden is daer inne te dragen, mits daer van leerende, so haer eyghen cautelen mede brengen, Te weten, niet a priori, dat is van t’voorste, namentlic het hooge decreet vande Predestinatie, maer à posteriori, twelck is het achterste, namentlijck tgheloove ende de vruchten des gheloofs: Daer uyt anders geen besluyt ghemaeckt can worden dan dit, De Geloovige sullen salich, ende d’Ongeloovige sullen verdoemt worden. Twelck even is de selve Predestinatie die de Remonstranten stellen.”

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monstrants among the common people so as to make them hated for something of which they are not guilty, and which they directly oppose.”282 To summarize the above as it pertains to the central question of this chapter, it must be concluded that on the one hand there is continuity between Arminius and the Remonstrants, also as to the theological theme that was determinative for Arminius’s position. God’s justice and righteousness plays a role also in the Remonstrant arguments in respect to the five articles of the Remonstrance, sometimes directly and at other times more indirectly. The discontinuity is therefore not absolute, but appears to be relative. Arminius’s basic theological concept of the duplex amor Dei does not appear in the Schriftelicke Conferentie, and God’s justice is not the all-determining basic principle of Remonstrant thought at that period of time.283 This is clear, for example, when during the oral and written discussions on the second article, it is the satisfaction of God’s justice that forms the most important argument for the conviction that Christ’s substitutionary sacrifice was actually made for all, while that argument is completely absent from the Remonstrant version of the status quaestionis. It must be noted that the Counter-Remonstrants did not a single time enter in on any of the Remonstrant arguments based on the justice of God. Were they so sure that God’s justice posed no problem for their views that they thought they could simply ignore them? Was it out of embarrassment ————— HSC 438. Cf. the way Simon Episcopius, one of the Remonstrant participants at the Hague Conference, speaks about God’s twofold love (EPISCOPIUS, “Institutiones theologicae”, 310–311). This evidences a significant shift from Arminius’s concept of the Duplex amor Dei (see 4.1). Both equally speak of God’s primary love of justice for its own sake, it being assumed that Episcopius understands justice in the same way as Arminius. The difference comes up in respect to the secondary love. For Episcopius it is once again the love of justice, but then justice as present morally in a human being whether fully or in part; the measure of God’s love changes according to the measure of justice. However, for Arminius the twofold love of God is not a love for moral justice in a person that varies depending on the level of justice found in him or her. It is a fundamental (and non-variable) love for humankind, which can be limited by only one thing: God’s primary love for justice. One must take into account Arminius’s distinction between justice in the Legal theology and in the Evangelical theology (for this distinction, see 2.2.2). Within the Legal theology, God’s love for justice (or righteousness) that is required of humanity in order to be able to receive God’s (secondary) love is more or less moral in nature: i.e. it is connected to obedience to the conditions of the covenant. Within the Evangelical theology, however, God’s love for justice is determined primarily Christologically. The justice (or righteousness) required of humankind can only be attained through the merits of Christ’s sacrifice on the cross and through the sinner’s unification with Christ by faith, on the basis of the new covenant. The difference between Arminius and Episcopius can be described as consisting in this: for Arminius, justification forms the basis of God’s love for humankind, while for Episcopius that basis is formed by the holy state or partial sanctification of a person. Even if Episcopius first took the concept as concept over from Arminius, in terms of content there is a clear moral tendency that is absent in Arminius. 282 283

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that they avoided these questions? At any rate, it appears that they were convinced that within their own view, human responsibility for sin was not lost. From the way this is defended, it seems that Vermigli’s interpretation of Aristotle’s concept of voluntariness was of particular influence (see 2.1.4). With respect to the Remonstrants, one wonders why they did not argue more forcefully and consistently from the basis of justice, and did not insist on a satisfactory answer from the Counter-Remonstrant camp. There is no easy answer to these questions. However, it does appear to be justified to conclude that God’s justice was neither as decisive and foundational, nor as conceptually rooted, for the Remonstrants as it had been for Arminius. For that reason, it could easily and perhaps imperceptibly cede its primary place to other types of arguments. In Arminius’s theology, these arguments were subordinated to the notion of justice. For the Remonstrants, that relationship between the different arguments was at the very least substantially shifted. However, if God’s justice loses the position and relation to other arguments that it enjoyed in Arminius’s thought, that at once changes the entire framework within which discussions on issues such as predestination, atonement, free will and grace take place. On the basis of the above examination of the Schriftelicke Conferentie, we are strongly inclined to suggest that the shift in the place of God’s justice in the debates actually resulted in a different discussion where the freedom of the human will, for example, could become a goal in itself. After Arminius’s death, there were others who continued his thought. Through the political and social circumstances, the Remonstrant camp exercised great influence on many Protestants who for whatever reason did not want to belong to the Counter-Remonstrant camp, a process to which the Counter-Remonstrants probably contributed after the appointment of Vorstius as Arminius’s successor by stubbornly lumping Socinianism and Remonstrantism together as one.284 The debate extended itself, more and more people became involved, and more and more sentiments and motives began to play a role. I myself am convinced that the view on Arminius’s original theological intentions, which was never all that clear to begin with, became even more clouded through these circumstances.

————— 284 ROHLS, “Calvinism, Arminianism and Socinianism”, 3–48. Cf. SCHWEIZER, Centraldogmen II, 35.

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6.3 Summary and Conclusions Chapter 6 traces the extent to which the Arminius’s leading motive, the iustitia Dei, and his theological construct, the duplex amor Dei, were received in the discussion on the Remonstrance as documented in the Schriftelicke Conferentie (1611), which became determinative for the direction of the debates as they continued. On the one hand, there appears to be continuity between Arminius and the Remonstrants. God’s justice and righteousness play a role also in the Remonstrant arguments on the five articles, sometimes directly, at other times indirectly. The discontinuity which is also present is therefore not absolute, but appears to be relative. Yet it is significant that Arminius’s fundamental concept of the duplex amor Dei cannot be found in the Schriftelicke Conferentie, and that God’s justice does not appear to be the all-determining leading motive of Remonstrant thought at that time as it had been with Arminius. The Counter-Remonstrants did not at any time go into any Remonstrant argument that was based on the justice of God. It appears that they were convinced that within their own view, human responsibility for sin was not compromised. For the Remonstrants, God’s justice was not as fundamental nor as inherently entwined in their theology as it was for Arminius. For that reason it could easily cede its primary place to other arguments. In Arminius’s theology, these other arguments were subordinated to the concept of justice. For the Remonstrants, the hierarchy of these arguments had at the very least shifted considerably. As result, the context in which the discussion on predestination, atonement, free will and grace took place was entirely different. For this reason, it was in fact a different discussion that arose, where human freedom itself was at the center. The focus on the controversial points of Arminius’s theology thus only grew and expanded after his death and as a result of the Remonstrance, whose five articles outlining the Remonstrant position determined the direction of the entire debate that would follow. Consequently, not only the Counter-Remonstrants, but also the Remonstrants themselves, are responsible for the narrowing of the theological discussion which would hide the original roots of the debates.

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7. Theological Context of Arminius’s Theology

7.1 Introduction The theologico-historical context of Arminius’s theology has been approached from many different perspectives. Richard Muller depicted Arminius as a Protestant scholastic theologian, pointing to the influence of medieval and sixteenth-century scholastic thought. Keith Stanglin emphasized the immediate academic context of Arminius, as well as the confrontation and dialogues with his colleagues in Leiden. These are two valuable corrections to the caricature that had long prevailed, where Arminius was portrayed as an important representative from within an academic context of a (specifically Dutch) stream of Protestantism that was grafted into an Erasmian biblical humanism. It had likewise been customary to portray the likes of Veluanus,1 Sybrants, Wiggerts, Herberts, Coornhert, Coolhaes, Duifhuis, etc., as chief witnesses for such a Dutch, biblical-humanistic, tolerant national spirit, and as Arminius’s “forerunners”.2 Particularly Muller and Stanglin have made important contributions to a contextual understanding of Arminius’s theology.3 The present chapter aims at another, complementary approach. An attempt will be made to relate Arminius’s theology to the context of his time by following two lines that have been chosen on the basis of the study on Arminius’s theology in Part 1. Section 7.2 will consider whether a choice for voluntarism or intellectualism in the doctrines of God and man was influential on Arminius’s theological development. For the purposes of a comparison, John Calvin will be considered as well. Calvin speaks at different times of God’s pure will as the highest norm of justice. Even at first glance, this appears to be so diametrically opposed to Arminius’s view that God’s will and freedom are subject to the norm of justice that it makes sense to give ————— 1 Also STANGLIN, Assurance, 241, in his conclusion considers Arminius “in some ways part of the non-Calvinistic Dutch Protestant tradition that goes back to the spirit of Anastasius Veluanus.” Such a statement, however, takes no consideration of the widely divergent situations and contexts of each, which make it difficult to maintain these kinds of delineations into supposed traditions and “spirits”. 2 For an overview of the various viewpoints, as well as bibliographical references, see NAUTA, “Historiografie”, 206–227. 3 Also BANGS, “Arminius and the Reformation” (1961) is still worth reading. See also BANGS, “Arminius as a Reformed Theologian”.

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these differences our close attention. Narrowly connected to this issue is that of the knowability of God’s justice (see 2.3). Calvin’s view on the knowability of God’s justice is therefore later compared with that of Arminius. An issue that is inseparably connected to that of knowability, although it deserves our attention separately, is God’s relationship to evil and sin. Thus section 7.3 will consider how Arminius’s theology relates to the extensive discussions that were being held throughout the course of the sixteenth century as to whether or not God is the auctor/causa peccati/mali. This chapter is not meant to be exhaustive, but is more exploratory in character and is largely based on secondary literature. The two trajectories which we will follow here should be used to complement the results of earlier Arminius studies. Together they invite further efforts to place and explain Arminius’s theology from within the context of his (theologico-) historical context.

7.2 Voluntarism, Intellectualism and the Knowability of God’s Justice It has already been noted earlier that Arminius’s intellectualism was influential for the way he spoke of God’s justice. It is the intellect that is primary in God, and it selects from all possibles what is good and agrees with God’s good nature. God’s will is subject to the norm of his essential justice, and is free to realize through its potentia one of the possibles already selected by his intellect. The inseparability of God’s wisdom, knowledge and justice emphasizes once again the prominent place that God’s justice receives for Arminius with respect to God’s will. Calvin’s position on the relationship between God’s will and his justice at first glance appears to be radically opposed to that of Arminius. In different places, Calvin writes that God’s pure will is the highest norm of justice. From the theologico-historical context of Arminius’s theology, we need to consider whether the different views Arminius and Calvin had on the relationship of God’s intellect and will, and on the place and function of God’s justice in them, are at the root of Arminius’s charge that God’s justice is not safeguarded in Calvin’s theology in spite of his efforts. In what follows, we will first treat Calvin’s alleged voluntarism, and then his absolute rejection of the nominalist distinction between a potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata. At the end we will return to the main question noted above.

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7.2.1 Calvin’s Voluntarism Calvin’s undated Articuli de Praedestinatione contain his powerful but concise confession that God’s eternal and hidden decree is the cause of all things, including the fall into sin and the distinction between elect and reprobate. After three positive theses, Calvin turns defensive and treats a number of objections against his position. These apologetical theses provide clear insight into Calvin’s position. Even if the reprobate are instruments of God’s just wrath and the elect instruments of his mercy, the cause of this distinction must still be sought nowhere in God but his pure will [mera voluntas] which is the highest norm [summa regula] of justice.4

This appears to be the very opposite of what we saw above in Arminius. A decision of God’s will determines what is just; God’s will has no norm but is a norm unto itself. This view, which Calvin expresses at different points throughout his corpus, has caused many to argue that Calvin is in line with the late medieval nominalist tradition, adopts a voluntarist position,5 and in that is more or less influenced by John Duns Scotus. Among those who defend this position is Alister E. McGrath, who considers voluntarism to be typical for the early Reformation. Voluntarism was

————— 4 CO 9,713–714: “Articuli De Praedestinatione. Ante creatum primum hominem statuerat Deus aeterno consilio quid de toto genere humano fieri vellet. Hoc arcano Dei consilio factum est ut Adam ab integro naturae suae statu deficeret ac sua defectione traheret omnes suos posteros in reatum aeternae mortis. Ab hoc eodem decreto pendet discrimen inter electos et reprobos: quia alios sibi adoptavit in salutem, alios aeterno exitio destinavit. Tametsi iustae Dei vindictae vasa sunt reprobi, rursum electi vasa misericordiae, causa tamen discriminis non alia in Deo quaerenda est quam mera eius voluntas, quae summa est iustitiae regula. Tametsi electi fide percipiunt adoptionis gratiam, non tamen pendet electio a fide sed tempore et ordine prior est. Sicut initium et perseverantia fidei a gratuita Dei electione fluit, ita non alii vere illuminantur in fidem, nec alii spiritu regenerationis donantur, nisi quos Deus elegit: reprobos vero vel in sua caecitate manere necesse est, vel excidere a parte fidei, si qua in illis fuerit. Tametsi in Christo eligimur, ordine tamen illud prius est ut nos Dominus in suis censeat, quam ut faciat Christi membra. Tametsi Dei voluntas summa et prima est rerum omnium causa, et Deus diabolum et impios omnes suo arbitrio subiectos habet, Deus tamen neque peccati causa vocari potest, neque mali autor, neque ulli culpae obnoxius est. Tametsi Deus peccato vere infensus est et damnat quidquid est iniustitiae in homimbus, quia illi displicet, non tamen nuda eius permissione tantum, sed nutu quoque et arcano decreto gubernantur omnia hominum facta. Tametsi diabolus et reprobi Dei ministri sunt et organa, et arcana eius iudicia exsequuntur, Deus tamen incomprehensibili modo sic in illis et per illos operatur ut nihil ex eorum vitio labis contrahat, quia illorum malitia iuste recteque utitur in bonum finem, licet modus saepe nobis sit absconditus. Inscite vel calumniose faciunt qui Deum fieri dicunt autorem peccati, si omnia eo volente et ordinante fiant: quia inter manifestam hominum pravitatem et arcana Dei iudicia non distinguunt.” Cf. Inst. III.23.5: God’s will is the “suprema iustitiae regula”. 5 See e.g. SCHNEEWIND, Invention, 32: “Like Luther, Calvin is a voluntarist.”

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taken over from the late medieval tradition in the line of Scotus, Ockham, Biel and Rimini.6 McGrath draws a connection between voluntarism and God’s justice: The divine will is thus the chief arbiter and principle of justice, establishing justice by its decisions, rather than acting according to the basis of established justice. Indeed, a study of the meaning of iustitia Dei, the “righteousness of God,” according to the theologians of the via moderna, indicates the totally arbitrary foundations of the concept: the “righteousness of God” is nothing more and nothing less than the embodiment of the arbitrary decisions of the divine will.7

McGrath contrasts this view with intellectualists such as Thomas Aquinas, who argue that “merit is ultimately based upon justice.”8 McGrath is of the opinion that Calvin’s voluntarism is always implicitly present, and comes forcefully to the foreground in his correspondence with Socinus where Calvin shows a strongly voluntaristic approach to the ratio meriti Christi. The value of what Christ is accomplished is not intrinsic, but rests on God’s decision. “Calvin’s continuity appears to be with the late medieval voluntarist tradition as a whole, deriving from William of Ockham and Gregory of Rimini, in relation to which Scotus marks an important point of transition.”9 Should McGrath be correct, this would greatly clear up the background to Arminius’s objections to elements from the theology of Calvin and others who stood within that same tradition. In a voluntarist framework, God’s justice would be completely arbitrary, could not be fathomed by anybody, and could be defended with an appeal to the primacy – and with it, the normative function for God’s justice – of God’s will. Arminius’s choice for intellectualism would therefore by itself already explain why he, who for a number of reasons thought the defense of God’s justice and its knowability so important, constantly pointed to God’s authorship of sin as a consequence of the “Calvin tradition”. The difference between voluntarism and intellectualism then logically results in opposing positions that cannot be bridged precisely on the point of God’s relationship to sin and evil. Before these conclusions can be drawn, however, a number of characteristics of voluntarism in general, and then of Calvin’s supposed voluntarism, first need some careful attention.10 God’s will is central in voluntarism. An important distinction that was made in order to maintain God’s freedom is that between his potentia abso————— 6 7 8 9 10

MCGRATH, Intellectual Origins, 81–82. MCGRATH, Intellectual Origins, 81. MCGRATH, Intellectual Origins, 80. MCGRATH, Intellectual Origins, 100. Cf. MULLER, The Divine Essence and Attributes, 484–486.

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luta and his potentia ordinata, between what God can do and what God actually wills to do.11 What God can do is a question of God’s nature, what God actually does is a matter of God’s will. However, as soon as God realizes a possible, it is no longer under his absolute power but under his ordained power. A variation can be found in John Duns Scotus’s development of this distinction. He viewed the two potentiae more as two powers that stand side by side. For him, the distinction is juridical in nature. The potentia ordinata is the power to act de iure, while the potentia absoluta is the power to act outside of the bounds of that law (ius) and to be able to change that law.12 According to Paul Helm, there is yet another way to view the distinction between God’s absolute and ordained power: to think of God as pure will, to the exclusion of other elements of his nature including his wisdom and justice. Such a distinction, writes Helm, “we shall find Calvin scornfully rejecting.”13 The consequences that follow from this third conception can be illustrated with a quotation from Theo Kobusch: For example, God can [...] according to his potentia absoluta accept one person without any acquired form of merit, and likewise reprobate another without that person having become guilty. By virtue of his absolute power He cannot overlook a debt without being unjust, and also punish another person without preceding guilt, although such an act can actually no longer be called punishment. He can even condemn someone who is without sin to eternal damnation. From two people who in terms of all natural and supernatural ability and merit are equal, He can – as one can see from the example of Jakob and Esau – choose one and reject the other “although not de potentia ordinata” (OT VIII,22). [...] In terms of content, therefore, morality is entirely dependent on the will of God. Or as Gabriel Biel expresses it: Nec enim quia aliquid rectum est aut iustum, ideo Deus vult; sed quia Deus vult, ideo iustum et

————— 11 For a brief overview of the origin and development of this distinction, see among others HELM, Ideas, 316–320; cf. 317: “So one of the chief motivations for the introduction of this distinction is to safeguard the divine freedom; or put differently, to safeguard the contingency of what God has in fact willed.” Cf. OBERMAN, Harvest, 36–38; VAN DER KOOI, Spiegel, 167–173. 12 HELM, Ideas, 117–119. JESCHKE, Weltaktualität, 59–60; cf. 60: “Grundgedanken bei Duns, der ihn zur aus-geprägten Lehre vond der doppelten Macht inspirierte, [ist] das Grundaxiom des römischen Rechts, nach dem der souveräne Gesetzgeber per se Quelle des geltenden Rechts ist und von daher selber nicht an die geltenden Normen gebunden ist. Die Gültig-keit des Rechtes ist abhängig von der Gültigkeit des Willens. Handelt der Souverän gemäß seiner absoluten, freien Macht, wird diese durch den Akt ihres Vollzugs sofort zur ordinierten Macht. Damit stellt Duns Gottes Freiheit sicher und auch seine Möglichkeit, aktuell und spontan in das Weltgeschehen eingreifen zu können. Gottes innovative Kreativität wird so betont, jedoch auf Kosten der Gerechtigheit. […] Gottes Sozialität, seine Gerechtikeit bleibt zu wenig beachtet. Scotus ist nich am Problem der Gerechtigkeit des Rechts interessiert, sondern an der Paradigmenlosigheit des Rechts außerhalb der Mächtigkeit Gottes. Damit bleibt die theoretische Möglichkeit offen, daß die innovative Kreativität Gottes sich ins Negative für den Menschen richtet.” 13 HELM, Ideas, 319.

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rectum (for it is not so that because something is righteous or just, therefore God wills it; but because God wills it, therefore it is just and righteous: Collectorium I,423).14

Calvin likewise fervently insisted on the defense of God’s freedom. However, he lashed out repeatedly against the distinction between God’s absolute and ordained power which, as has been noted, was actually drawn up precisely as defense of God’s freedom. However, it is clear that Calvin did not turn on the distinction itself in that its intent was to defend God’s freedom, but rather against the form in which it existed and was promoted especially in Paris at the Sorbonne.15 Susan E. Schreiner and Walter Dieter Jeschke trace this resistance against an absolute power in God back to Calvin’s concern for the assurance of salvation.16 An absolute power of God that could arbitrarily undo God’s ordained and revealed will of salvation ends up undermining the assurance of salvation and is nothing but a “blaspheme diabolique.”17 Particularly in his sermons on Job does Calvin speak of a distinction between a hidden and revealed justice of God, rather than between God’s absolute and ordained power. That is, he speaks of a “double iustice en Dieu” which consists of a non-communicable iustitia Dei ipsius and a “communicably noetic [kommunikativ noetische] iustitia creaturae,” for which the iustitia Dei ipsius forms the ontological background to God’s justice.18 “Job poses the theodicy question of God’s justice. If one seeks a solution in the potentia absoluta construction, one is left with a despotic, arbitrary God.”19 ————— KOBUSCH, “Nominalismus”, in: TRE 24, 597–598. JESCHKE, Weltaktualität, 63: “Es zeigt sich, daß der Nominalismus keine einheitliche Große ist und Calvins Polemik unmittelbar auf die Pariser Schule bezogen ist. Calvin hat in Paris studiert. Er zeigt sich vertraut mit den Werken Anselms, Petrus Lombardus’, Bernhards und Duns Scotus’.” However, others have been less positive on Calvin’s familiarity with the works of especially Scotus, cf. HELM, Ideas, 346; cf. SCHREINER, “Double Justice”, 327 n. 10. HELM, Ideas, 328–329, further disagrees with Steinmetz’s repeated assertion that Calvin denied the potentia absoluta and ordinata distinction: “‘Absolute power’ or ‘absolute will’ (absoluta voluntas) has been used by the Sorbonnists in a bad, blasphemous sense, and so it is better not to use it at all. But this does not mean that Calvin rejects the thought that God’s power is not conditioned by anything outside himself.” Calvin preferred to speak about God’s infinite power. 16 JESCHKE, Weltaktualität, 66: “Mußte aus dem Grund der Heilsgewißheit die nominalistische potentia absoluta abgelehnt werden, so muß andererseits aus demselben Grund jeglicher Dualismus, der die Durchsetzung von Gottes Heilswillen gefährden könnte, ausgeschlossen werden.” This goal becomes clear in that Calvin rejects belief in chance. “Sie wird ebenso sichtbar in der Bekämpfung einer theoretisch vorstellbaren, nun aber als persona gedachten, Gott ebenbürtigen Gegenmacht. Keine Macht darf vorstellbar sein, die die Durchsetzung von Gottes Willen grundsätzlich in Frage stellen kann.” Cf. JESCHKE, Weltaktualität, 94. SCHREINER, “Double Justice”, 336. 17 CO 34,339; cf. JESCHKE, Weltaktualität, 130; STEINMETZ, Calvin in Context, 49; VAN DER KOOI, Spiegel, 166–167; FABER, Symphonie, 377–380. 18 JESCHKE, Weltaktualität, 128. 19 JESCHKE, Weltaktualität, 62. 14 15

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We now therefore see how there is a double justice in God: the one is that which we see revealed in the Law, with which God is content because it pleases Him this way; there is another justice that is hidden, which surpasses all creaturely sense and notice.20

Over against the arbitrariness of a tyrannical God, Calvin in the context of God’s providence and human suffering thus places God’s justice in the center.21 This direct connection between Calvin rejecting a potentia absoluta and positing God’s justice, can be found rather often in his writings.22 Steinmetz calls the separation of God’s power and justice Calvin’s “principal objection” to the distinction between a divine potentia absoluta and ordinata.23 Almost exclusive to the sermons on Job is the idea of a double or twofold justice in God. Job is confronted with suffering that cannot be understood, for which there is no apparent cause. In order still to defend God’s government over all things, as well as God’s justice, Calvin develops the concept of a double justice as an important “hermeneutical key”24 to understanding the book of Job. Because Calvin uses this concept almost exclusively in his sermons on Job, Schreiner argues that Calvin later distanced himself from this concept because he was uncomfortable with its implications.25 In terms of the phrase “double justice,” this is indeed true. However, materially Calvin never abandoned the distinction between a justice of God that can be understood by humankind (related to the revealed law) and acts of God whose justice is difficult to determine, but nevertheless present in hidden form – unknowable to humanity – and to be revealed in the eschaton. Calvin defended the objections and questions that arose in connection with his view on God’s omnicausality and sovereignty primarily on two fronts: 1. By the way he described and emphasized God’s essential justice and its trustworthiness, among others by proceeding from the simplicitas Dei. 2. By the way he emphasized the essential creature-Creator distinction, which means that a human being is not in a state to understand and fathom the justice of all that God wills and does (which leads to humility). As re————— 20 CO 33,496: “Nous voyons donc maintenant, comme il y a double iustice en Dieu, l’une c’est celle qui nous est manifestee en la Loy, de laquelle Dieu se contente, pource qu’il luy plaist ainsi: il y a une autre iustice cachee qui surmonte tous sens et apprehensions des creatures.” 21 JESCHKE, Weltaktualität, 137: “1. Die iustitia Dei ipsius soll Gottes Freiheit betonen. […] Diesen Aspekt der prinzipiellen Freiheit Gottes übernimmt Calvin von der nominalistischen potentia absoluta-Diskussion.” 22 See, for example, CO 2,700; CO 8,361; CO 9,259–260.288; CO 29,398; CO 31,387.402; CO 36,391; CO 38,129; CO 39,436; CO 40,309; CO 45,41. 23 STEINMETZ, Calvin in Context, 49. 24 JESCHKE, Weltaktualität, 119: “wichtigen hermeneutische Schlüssel”. SCHREINER, “Double Justice”, 323: “interpretive device”. 25 SCHREINER, “Double Justice”, 322–323.332–333.

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sult, humankind is in this life left with many apparent injustices in God, but may nevertheless trust that God is essentially just and good. In what follows, these two arguments used by Calvin will be developed further. 7.2.2 God’s Essence The point of departure for Calvin is God’s simplicity. God’s nature is best characterized by his justice: that the nature of God is just, that it is no more possible that He turn aside from justice and equity than to say that He renounces his essence and that He is no longer God.26

As Jeschke argues, justice belongs essentially to God’s nature, to his essence. It is synonymous with God.27 Because God is Judge, his nature must be just. Justice is the source of God’s acts.28 “According to Calvin, God’s essential justice is the measure for his acts of predestination and providence! With that, however, it is the unfathomable paradigm for the sum total of all God’s actual acts in the world!”29 God’s justice is for Him the “rule in Himself” (regle en soy), the norm that exists in God Himself.30 The unity of God and the justice of his nature come out also in the close connection between God’s justice and power, which are virtually synonymous.31 Calvin refers to God’s absolute power as taught by the Sorbonne professors as a diabolical blasphemy from hell. God has an unlimited power “which is always the rule of all justice. For we tear God into pieces when we would have Him powerful and no longer just. It is true that his justice will not always fully be ours.”32 ————— 26 CO 33,372: “que la nature de Dieu est iuste, et qu’il n’est non plus possible qu’il se detourne de droiture et equité, que de dire qu’il renonce à son essence, et qu’il ne soit plus Dieu.” Cf. Jeschke, Weltaktualität, 128. 27 Jeschke, Weltaktualität, 128: “Gerechtigkeit gehört essentiell zu Gottes Natur, zu seinem Wesen. Sie ist synonym für Gott.” 28 Jeschke, Weltaktualität, 128.131. 29 Jeschke, Weltaktualität, 131: “Gottes ureigenste Gerechtigkeit ist nach Calvin maßstab für sein Prädestinations- und sein Providenzhandeln! Damit ist sie aber unergründliches Paradigma für Gottes gesamtes weltaktuelles Handeln!” 30 CO 34,346; cf. Jeschke, Weltaktualität, 145. 31 CO 2,156: “Ergo, quum sibi ius mundi regendi vendicet Deus nobis incognitum, haec sit sobrietatis ac modestiae lex, acquiescere summo eius imperio, ut eius voluntas nobis sit unica iustitiae regula, et iustissima causa rerum omnium. Non illa quidem absoluta voluntas de qua garriunt sophistae, impio profanoque dissidio separantes eius iustitiam a potentia; sed illa moderatrix rerum omnium providentia, a qua nihil nisi rectum manat, quamvis nobis absconditae sint rationes.” Cf. JESCHKE, Weltaktualität, 48.136, and HELM, Ideas, 328. 32 CO 34,339–340: “laquelle toutes fois est la regle de toute iustice: car c’est deschirer Dieu par pieces, quand nous le voudrons faire puissant, et qu’il ne sera plus iuste. Vrai est que sa iustice

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It would be easier to tear light away from heat or to separate heat and fire, than to separate God’s power from his justice.33 Therefore, I not only reject what the Scholastics prattle about the potestas absoluta, I even despise it because they separate his justice from his authority [imperium].34

Also God’s will and God’s justice are inseparably connected.35 That must be remembered when Calvin apparently speaks in a voluntaristic way about God’s will as rule for justice.36 God’s all-encompassing simplicity makes it impossible to separate God’s justice, power and will. If Calvin calls God’s infinite power the rule of all justice, he does not intend to do away with the justice of God’s power. On the contrary, God’s power is one with his justice in such a way that it can be called its rule or norm. The incomprehensibility and impenetrability of God’s justice does not take anything away from its justice, but teaches us to be humble and dependent and to trust in God.37 7.2.3 The Unknowability of God’s Justice The last remark introduces us to Calvin’s second argument. There is an ontological distinction between creature and Creator, which as such entails the unknowability or incomprehensibility (incomprehensibilitas) of God. With the fall into sin this gap became even wider.38 Without a revelation on the part of God, no knowledge of God is possible at all. In his revelation, God accommodates Himself to the human understanding.39 This is true also for God’s justice. God’s own justice (iustitia Dei ipsius) is unknowable for human beings. The justice of God that can be known (iustitia communicati————— ne nous sera pas tousiours en son entier.” Cf. JESCHKE, Weltaktualität, 59; THOMAS, Incomprehensible God, 116. 33 CO 8,361: “Solis enim lucem a calore avellere, imo suum ab igne calorem, facilius erit, quam Dei potentiam separare a iustitia.” 34 CO 9,288: “Itaque quod de absoluta potestate nugantur Scholastici non solum repudio, sed etiam detestor, quia iustitiam eius ab imperio separant.” 35 See CO 35,479: “Quoy donc? Ce sont choses inseparables, que la puissance de Dieu et sa volonté. Dieu est tout-puissant: est-ce pour faire ce que l’homme aura basti en son cerveau? Fy: mais c’est pour accomplir ce qu’il a ordonné en son conseil.” 36 HELM, Ideas, 343. Helm remarks: “But we have seen that the seeming voluntarism of these remarks must be tempered by Calvin’s commitment to the idea of divine simplicity (as presumably it must be by Scotus), but especially by the inseparability of God’s will and his justice.” Cf. HELM, “Divine Providence”, 391–405. 37 Cf. CO 34,175; CO 35,60. 38 Cf. THOMAS, Incomprehensible God, 169.171. 39 For the knowledge of God in Calvin’s theology, see e.g. THOMAS, Incomprehensible God; DOWEY, Knowledge, especially 3–40; PARKER, Knowledge; VAN ECK, Humanitas, 53–54; FABER, Symphonie, 380–389.

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va) is rooted in God’s will to accommodate Himself to his creatures; it is the justice that is revealed in the law.40 As Calvin himself writes: Now on the contrary, we must adore this secret power, confessing that we are dealing here with a hidden justice that we cannot see at the present time. There are others who, in order to prove that God is just, want to abolish his power, just as today there are those who cannot accept it when it is preached that God has elected us by his unmerited goodness [bonté gratuite] and He determines all things according to his will, and that nothing happens except as ordained and governed by his hand. For since they cannot stomach that, they will come and say, “What? If God has chosen some and reprobated others in this way, it must follow that He created people to destruction. Does that agree with God’s justice?” And then, “If everything happens according to God’s will, and given that there are so many wicked things, what do you have to say to that?” Now these poor foolish or enraged folk cannot humble themselves to say, “It is true that we find it strange that God has created people whom He in no way desires to save. But we know that the justice of God is too high and deep for us. The day will come when our Lord will make us capable of knowing what is now hidden from us.”41

Jeschke argues that Calvin’s only gain with his distinction between an unknowable and knowable justice of God over the nominalist potentia absoluta speculation is in the eschatological knowledge of God’s justice.42 Thomas, on the contrary, denies any relation to nominalism: “That God has a ‘secrette’ justice need not be interpreted as the ghost of late medieval nominalism; rather, as we shall see, it is yet another instance of Calvin’s resort to incomprehensibility in the character and ways of God. We cannot expect to fully understand or justify the ways of God.”43 Both point to the function

————— Cf. JESCHKE, Weltaktualität, 130–131. Cf. MULLER, Christ and the Decree, 19. CO 34,340–341: “Or au contraire il faut que nous adorions ceste puissance secrete, confessans qu’il y a là une iustice enclose que nous ne pouvons maintenant voir. Il y en a d’autres, qui pour prouver que Dieu est iuste, veulent abolir la puissance: comme auiourd’hui ceux qui ne peuvent souffrir qu’on presche que Dieu nous a esleus par sa bonté gratuite, et qu’il dispose toutes choses selon sa volonté, et que rien n’advient sinon comme il est ordonné et conduit par sa main. Car d’autant qu’ils ne peuvent digerer cela, ils viendront proposer, Et comment? Et si Dieu en a ainsi choisi d’aucuns, et qu’il ait reprouvé les autres: il s’ensuivra qu’il a creé les hommes à perdition. Et cela est-il convenable à la iustice de Dieu? Et apres, si toutes choses se font par la volonté de Dieu, et veu qu’il y a tant de choses mauvaises, que dira-on là dessus? Or ces povres fols, ou plustost enragez, ne se peuvent humilier iusques là, de dire, II est vrai que nous trouvons ces choses estranges, que Dieu ait creé des hommes qu’il ne vueille point sauver: mais cognoissons que la iustice de Dieu est trop haute et trop profonde pour nous: le iour viendra que nostre Seigneur nous rendra capables de cognoistre ce qui nous est maintenant caché”; cf. JESCHKE, Weltaktualität, 131. 42 JESCHKE, Weltaktualität, 132. 43 THOMAS, Incomprehensible God, 117. 40 41

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Calvin attributes to God’s hidden and incomprehensible judgments, namely, that they lead to humility.44 Calvin writes: [...] sometimes we must adore his incomprehensible and secret judgments while we all draw our spirits back into humility to say, “Look, it is true that for now it looks to be against all reason. But so what? We will not win our case against God.” And then, without having any other response, we must hold to the conclusion that He is just. Since we now see only in part, seeing as in a mirror and dimly, let us wait for the day when we can behold God’s glory face to face. Then we will understand what is at the present time hidden from us.45 For we need not be ashamed when our wisdom does not go beyond that of [Paul], who went up into the third heaven and saw the mysteries that cannot be described to a mere person. And yet he could discover no other goal than this, that he had to submit himself in this way.46

As noted before, God’s will is for Calvin the rule of all justice. God’s will, however, can never be separated from his nature. God is not a lawless God, who is a law unto Himself. God’s will is free from all error, it is the highest rule of perfection, and the law of all laws.47 Calvin was further also convinced that God’s will, which is the rule of justice, is the will of a holy God. “In virtue of his godhood He is not liable to give an account of his ways; and in any case in view of the poverty of our understanding we are not competent to plumb the depths of his will. Nevertheless we can be sure, in virtue of who God is, that what He wills is just.”48 Calvin thus insists that “God’s ordination, which they complain to be the reason that they are des-

————— 44 JESCHKE, Weltaktualität, 132: “Gott wendet seine ureigenste Gerechtigkeit an, um demütig zu machen, Geduld einzuüben, Gehorsam zu schulen. Ist die iustitia communicativa eine distributive, bzw. Aufgrund der Rechtfertigung eine imputative, so ist die iustitia Dei ipsius pädagogisch (insofern ist sie ja auch kommunikativ im Ergebnis, allerdings ohne daß der Mensch sie versteht!) ausgerichtet!”; cf. THOMAS, Incomprehensible God, 117–118.168. 45 CO 33,373: “[…] toutesfois il nous faut adorer ses iugemens incompehensibiles et secrets, en recueillant tous nos esprits en ceste humilité pour dire, Voici il est vray que maintenant ceci nous semble tout contraire à toute raison: mais quoy? Nous ne gaignerons pas nostre cause contre Dieu: et puis sans avoir autre replicque, il nous faut tenir ceste conclusion-la, qu’il est iuste. D’autant donc que maintenant nous ne voyons qu’en partie, voire comme en un miroir, et par obscurité: attendons le iour que nous puissions contempler face à face la gloire de Dieu: et alors nous compredrons ce qui nous est maintenant caché.” 46 CO 49,230: “Neque enim pudere nos debet si non sapimus supra eum, qui in tertium usque coelum raptus viderat mysteria homini ineffabilia: neque tamen alium hic finem reperire poterat quam ut se ita humiliaret.” Cf. CO 33,77: “Il nous faut humilier”. Cf. CO 33,239. 47 Inst. III.23.2. (CO 2,700); cf. HELM, Ideas, 326–327. 48 HELM, Ideas, 327. Cf. Voetius’s interpretation of the position of Calvin and others: BECK, Gisbertus Voetius, 366.

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tined to destruction, is guided by equity, unknown indeed to us but indubitably certain.”49 Thomas calls God’s incomprehensibility a “fundamental motif in both the Institutes and the commentaries.” In his sermons on Job, Calvin makes of God’s incomprehensibilitas aside from “a theme in the organic development of the sermons,” also “its unifying theme”; it forms “the basis for understanding the Book of Job.”50 Muller confirms that this is true for Calvin in general when he writes that “Calvin never tires of arguing that man is incapable of reaching, grasping, comprehending the divine.”51 God’s greatness, infinite power and sovereignty for Calvin indeed stand opposed to the insignificance, limitedness and dependent state of the human race. The insignificant human being must be aware of his or her place before this great God. God’s incomprehensibility is an important consequence of the creature-Creator distinction, it belongs to his being God, and for Calvin applies just as much to God’s justice. Also his justice cannot be fathomed or scrutinized, which has as consequence that people sometimes think they can accuse God of injustice. However, nothing is more unjust, for God is most just, and this will be fully revealed on the final day. In the meantime, all insignificant people, inasmuch as they are human, must acknowledge God’s justice and honor Him because of his incomprehensible judgments. It is true that we ought always to have our mouth open in some way – but that way is to glorify God! But when we presume to subject everything to our reason and do not allow God to keep anything to Himself, what will that lead to? Is that not to despise God openly? He will want to keep something hidden from us. And why? So that we become aware of our ignorance, and so that we nevertheless do not fail to recognize that He is just, and to adore his wondrous and incomprehensible counsel.52

————— 49 Inst. III.23.9 (CO 2,706): “Nos vero inde negamus rite excusari, quandoquidem Dei ordinationi, qua se exitio destinatos conqueruntur, sua constat aequitas, nobis quidem incognita, sed illa certissima.” Cf. HELM, Ideas, 328; 331–332: “Rather what he is saying is something weaker and less startling than this, that if in fact God decrees X or has decreed X then by that very fact his decreeing of it is righteous even though we may not immediately see this, may not know the reasons that he has for decreeing it, and may in fact think what he has done cannot be just. This is compatible with the claim that, necessarily whatever God decrees he has reasons for decreeing, while the ‘fiction’ of divine absolute power is not compatible with this. For Calvin the inscrutable decree of God is therefore not a decree of pure power divorced from all other features of the divine nature, it is the decree of a necessarily holy and righteous God. We cannot presently scrutinize the reasons for the decree because they have not been made available to us.” 50 THOMAS, Incomprehensible God, 169. 51 MULLER, Christ and the Decree, 20. 52 CO 34,215–216: “Il est vrai que nous devons tousiours avoir la bouche ouverte en une sorte, c’est assavoir, pour glorifier Dieu: mais quand nous presumerons de tout assubiettir à nostre sens, et que nous ne voudrons pas que Dieu se reserve rien, où sera-ce aller cela? N’est-ce point despitter Dieu manifestement? Il nous voudra cacher une chose. Et pourquoy? Afin que nostre

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He will send us many adversities, many evils [...]. We could think that God is going too far in treating the human race this harshly. But so what? If so, we must learn through all that to confess that God is always just, and that He knows the reason why He is treating us in this way – and that this reason is good and just, even if it is unknown to us.53 7.2.4 Summary and Conclusion Neither the characterization of Calvin as a pure voluntarist (McGrath), nor the suggestion that Calvin rejected every distinction between a potentia absoluta and ordinata (Steinmetz), agrees with the facts.54 But also Paul Helms’s suggestion that Calvin is better understood as standing in the intellectualist tradition of Thomas Aquinas is doubtful.55 The accent that Calvin places on the freedom of God, together with statements that strongly tend towards the primacy of God’s will, justify the supposition that Calvin is more of a voluntarist than an intellectualist. However, those who focus only on that pass by Calvin’s main concern. Aside from God’s freedom and exalted state that results from the qualitative distinction between creature and Creator, there is also God’s trustworthiness.56 For that reason, more than one or another of God’s faculties or attributes, it is his simplicity that must be emphasized. God’s justice is further not the least important attribute of God, and is beyond any doubt. This does not take away that God’s exalted state means that the justice of his actions cannot be measured by human beings according to the law as the revealed and (therefore) accommodated norm of justice. Until the limitations on the human understanding are removed in the eschaton, the justice of God’s acts remains shrouded and thus a matter of faith. In one of his sermons on Job, Calvin’s two arguments are brought together very clearly. We must not measure God’s justice according to our own understanding, for that would limit it too much. And we must always ————— ignorance nous soit cognue, et que nous ne laissions pas cependant de recogniostre qu’il est iuste, et d’adorer son conseil admirable, et incomprehensible.” Cf. THOMAS, Incomprehensible God, 173. 53 CO 35,375: “Il nous envoyera beaucoup d’adversitez, et beaucoup de maux […]. On pourroit estimer que Dieu est excessif, en traittant les hommes si rudement. Mais quoi? Si faut-il qu’en tout cela nous apprenions de confesser que Dieu est tousiours iuste, et que’il sait la raison pourquoi il nous traitte ainsi: et qu’elle est bonne et iuste: combien qu-elle nous soit incognue.” Cf. THOMAS, Incomprehensible God, 175. 54 Cf. HELM, Ideas, 328–336. 55 HELM, Ideas, 346. 56 Cf. BAARS, Om Gods verhevenheid.

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be convinced that God’s power cannot be separated from his justice, since God cannot be divided into pieces.57 Armed with this information, it is possible to understand why Arminius holds God’s authorship of sin to be an unintended consequence of Calvin’s view. Calvin continually defended himself against such accusations, and in that continually brought up the unknowability of God’s will and justice as his most important argument. The consequence is that one can always appeal to the incomprehensibility of God’s will and the unknowability of his justice whenever his justice comes into question. It is not always possible to prove the justice in God’s actions, and so it is not an urgent concern, either. From Calvin’s perspective, it does not befit a human being to question the justice of God. In fact, it is a sign of arrogance. For Arminius, on the contrary, God’s justice and its knowability are necessary and most pressing. Like Calvin, Arminius is convinced of the absolute justice of God. However, because he considers justice and knowledge thereof to be among the foremost things that promote worship of God, he goes beyond simply positing this justice. Arminius’s view that God works on the will in regeneration through the means of the human mind in order to persuade the will, is fully consistent with that. This makes it all the more necessary that God reveal Himself to his creatures in a way that reveals his justice. The human intellect will not be persuaded by the revelation of a God who seems to be unjust, and whose justice – also in his acts – is both unknowable and unfathomable. Arminius’s intellectualist anthropology on this point stands directly opposed to Calvin’s voluntarist view. Especially for the doctrine of salvation this has far-reaching implications.58 Stanglin has demonstrated that all four “Leiden theologians agreed that the beneplacitum of God is the impulsive efficient cause of election. The divine will, therefore, with respect to the ordo salutis, can rightly be called fundamentum.”59 He highlights the “standard Reformed hesitancy to define the beneplacitum, appealing instead to mystery. For Reformed theology, God’s sovereignty means he has a right to do with creation whatever he wills, and he is righteous in so doing.” In this context, Stanglin refers to Beza’s statement that God’s will is the only rule of justice, and further cites ————— 57 CO 34,340; “Il ne faut point que nous mesurions la iustice de Dieu selon nostre apprehension (car ce seroit la restreindre par trop): mais tant y a qu’il nous faut avoir ce poinct resolu, que la puissance de Dieu ne se peut separer de sa iustice, d’autant que Dieu ne se peut desmembrer.” Cf. HELM, Ideas, 332. 58 KENDALL, English Calvinism, cf. 19.146–149 and passim, has attempted to show that Calvin had an intellectualist view of faith, while Arminius held to a voluntarist position. “Kendall and Bell both consider intellectualism to entail passivity in receiving salvation, and voluntarism to entail an autonomously human act of preparation for salvation.” Stanglin calls this a “basic misunderstanding”. STANGLIN, Assurance, 101. 59 STANGLIN, Assurance, 217.

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Kimedoncius who notes that the injustice of God is more just than any human, and that the pious believer is satisfied with this answer. “This ultimate agnosticism regarding God’s volition in the extent of salvation, this voluntas itself being a fundamentum of salvation, on the one hand preserves the free, absolute sovereignty of God in salvation, but on the other hand can cause anxiety for the soul that is already weak.”60 These examples illustrate that Calvin’s view on God’s essential justice on the one hand, and its ultimate unknowability and hiddenness on the other hand, were widely accepted and disseminated by Reformed theologians in Arminius’s time. It appears as if precisely this unknowability of God’s justice allowed Arminius’s contemporaries to adopt different viewpoints that logically imply God’s authorship of sin and his injustice. Clarke has suggested the same: A nominalist would be content to leave this [i.e. the apparent absence of love of God for the world, wdb] as an unresolved difficulty, for God’s thoughts are not like man’s, nor are his ways like man’s; God’s thoughts and ways are infinitely higher. Therefore, if God is revealed as love, then we must say that he is love but must not expect to understand how he is so, and must accept that, for example, he chooses to do apparently unloving things like reprobating some humans absolutely and unconditionally. Such names for God as ‘love’ have, from a human standpoint, no cash value. But to take such principles as Isaiah 55:8f so far is, to Arminius, to make the revelation of God in Scripture into an anti-revelation which leaves the unfortunate recipient of it more confused than he was before. If God reveals himself to his creatures as love, justice etc., then they, or at least Christians, should be able to recognise, up to a point, how God is so. Here Arminius deliberately “bucks the trend” of the increasingly nominalist tendencies of Reformed theology in his day.61

Further research needs to be carried out into the meaning of voluntarism for the Reformed movement, and whether the transition of some to an intellectualist approach, whether as result of or as intensified by the spread of Thomism towards the end of the sixteenth century, forms a background to conflicts such as those between Arminius cum suis and his opponents.

7.3 The Debate On the Cause of Sin: Is God auctor peccati? The topic of the preceding section already touched on the question that in the sixteenth century played a significant role in all theological camps and in all their discussions; this is the question of the origin of sin and evil. The central issue is always whether or not certain doctrines imply that God is ————— 60 61

STANGLIN, Assurance, 218; cf. 219. CLARKE, Ground, 122.

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responsible for evil, and must thus be called auctor peccati. Of course, this is not something that people began to think about only in the sixteenth century. It is an issue with which people have struggled throughout the centuries, especially within the context of providence and predestination where God’s sovereignty and governance over all things are important principles, and where little or no room is left for creaturely contingency.62 That also in Arminius’s time and context people were well aware of this discussion is evident from the corollarium Gomarus added to his thesis on predestination from 1604: Inquiry is made, whether that blasphemy follows from this doctrine, – that God is the author of sin. For so indeed Castellio, and his follower Coornhert, and the Lutherans, are accustomed to object to our churches, especially to Calvin and Beza, (who have deserved very well of the Church and of the truth of predestination against the Pelagians), in order to bring those illustrious restorers of the Churches into odium [...]. We, however, with the Reformed Churches, with justice [merito] deny that; and do not in the least doubt that the truth and sanctity of this opinion will endure, in spite of the gates of hell.63

There are several noteworthy points in this quotation. In the first place, the question is not whether certain doctors openly teach that God is the author of sin, but whether this blasphemy is a (necessary or logical) consequence of other doctrinal positions – in the present case, the doctrine of (unconditional) predestination. Secondly, what is said about the Pelagians implies that departure from predestination as taught by Calvin, Beza as well as Gomarus implies for Gomarus that one strays away into Pelagianism. Apparently there is no middle way (which Arminius denies in his Examen Thesium Gomari). In the third place, Gomarus makes no effort to list and address any of the arguments of his opponents. He goes no further than to deny “with justice” that this doctrine implies that God is the author of sin. In this subsection, it will be illustrated mainly on the basis of secondary literature, but also some primary sources, and with numerous examples, that the old dispute on God’s relationship to evil was indeed continued in the time of the Reformation. Not only did the Roman Catholics, Libertines and Lutherans attack the Reformed on this point, also within the Reformed camp there were many differences of opinion. One can also, with caution, speak of a certain development. It is not only the theological argumentation ————— 62 Cf. e.g. LUTHER, WA 785, who speaks about a “quaestio omnibus soeculis tractata et nunquam soluta”. SCHWEIZER, Centraldogmen I, 404. 63 Cited from ETG 153–154 (III 654). Cf. SINNEMA, Reprobation, 143; CLARKE, “Understanding”, 32. Clarke remarks in this context: “The quotation reveals much about the thoughtprocesses of Arminius’s Calvinist contemporaries.”

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that changes. Also the attitude towards those who hold different positions within the Reformed camp appears to change. A number of hard clashes result in more settled standpoints, as well as decreasing tolerance towards divergent opinions. The Reformed admit that it is difficult for the human understanding to maintain that the Bible teaches unconditional predestination but that God is neither unjust nor the author of sin, but they nevertheless maintain the two because to do otherwise would seem to represent a fall away into Pelagianism. Unity on this point is stronger, and is also considered of more importance, than the formal and material variations that the Reformed evidence in terms of the way they address the arguments of their opponents. 7.3.1 The Middle Ages Gomarus’s collarium is thus not just a passing remark or a question of tertiary significance, but arises out of theological theses that appear to be irreconcilable. Already Augustine, with his emphasis on God’s universal efficiency or predestination, experienced protests from the Pelagian side that it undermines human responsibility and makes God responsible for sin. In the fourteenth century, somebody like Thomas Bradwardine likewise drew support from Augustine in the face of similar accusations.64 It was not only Augustinian predestinarians like Bradwardine and Gregory of Rimini who in the Middle Ages had to defend themselves against the consequences that others drew from their views. Since John Duns Scotus, the nominalists concerned themselves with the question of the consequences that follow from the emphasis on God’s freedom and on the primacy of his will for the nature of God’s morality. From the various solutions and arguments that were proposed in the Middle Ages, of which a number will be briefly mentioned below, it becomes somewhat clear in what direction they sought their answers. The similarities to the debate on the same issue in the sixteenth century are striking. The following treatment of the Middle Ages thus also functions as introduction to the Reformation. Hugh of St. Victor speaks of God’s permissive acts with respect to evil: “Although God cannot be the author of sin, He does allow it.” According to Thomas Aquinas, both good and evil come under God’s providence. However, he emphatically states that God only knew and ordained evil beforehand, but that it was not intended by him. Thomas further distinguishes between evil as punishment, and evil as consequence of human failing. God ————— 64

OBERMAN, Bradwardine, 123.133.

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is “author of evil” only in the first case.65 God is neither directly nor indirectly the cause of sin. He is the cause of each act insofar as it is an act, and thus also of sin as an act. However, because sin is an act with a defect, and a defect comes from a creaturely cause and not from God, God is not the cause of sin.66 Thomas Bradwardine places great emphasis on God’s greatness and on the freedom of his will. He leaves absolutely no room for contingency, and for that reason is forced to defend himself against the accusation of making God responsible for sin. An important point for Bradwardine is that God’s greatness does imply incomprehensibility, but not arbitrariness. His opponents derived God’s incalculability from his potentia absoluta, and in that way explained the inadequacy of human knowledge. Bradwardine thought that his opponents were Pelagians, who reflected on God too much in human terms and thereby undermined his greatness. “By indicating the unlimited sphere of authority of God’s will, Bradwardine rejects the contemporary maneuvering with God’s potentia absoluta. The freedom of God’s will does not lead to arbitrariness and elimination of the norms of justice.”67 Bradwardine’s view that permissio is an anthropomorphism invented by people because they do not understand that reality, must be interpreted within that context. More than the tradition, Bradwardine understands God’s permission as a form of actual willing.68 Aside from pointing to God’s incomprehensibility, Bradwardine also uses other means to escape the accusation that he makes God the author of sin. In the first place, he denies that evil has a real essence or an actual existence over against a Marcionite dualism. He then introduces a distinction between deed and intention. “By thus distinguishing between deed and intention God can remain the universal author without being responsible for sin. The evil performed by men happens because they ‘convolunt malitiam simul cum actionibus.’”69 “A catastrophe too is God’s work, and although we cannot yet understand this it is certain that all God’s works are good. In due time it will become clear to us why and how they can be called good.”70 ————— DEN HARTOGH, Voorzienigheid, 166.173.175. ST II/I, q.79, a.1–2. 67 OBERMAN, Bradwardine, 127. OBERMAN, Forerunners, 164 n. 48; cf. 161–162 on the justice of God in punishment: “But since God is omnipotent, completely free Lord of His whole creation, whose will alone is the most righteous law for all creation – if He should eternally punish the innocent, particularly since He does it for the perfection of the universe, for the profit of others, and for the honor of God Himself, who would presume to dispute with Him, to contradict Him, or ask, ‘Why do you do this?’ I firmly believe, no one! ‘Has the potter no right over the clay to make of the same lump one vessel for honor and another for menial use?’” 68 OBERMAN, Bradwardine, 129. 69 OBERMAN, Bradwardine, 127.130–132.227–228. 70 OBERMAN, Bradwardine, 127. 65 66

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Because Bradwardine is specifically concerned “to root out autonomism and all the Pelagian boasting of human achievement,” he goes one step further by making also the intention of the deed a part of God’s plan. That which occurs without God’s will does not go against God’s will. “Sin is never the goal of God’s will, but it can be its means: ‘Deus enim nequaquam simpliciter vult peccatum sed secundum quid...’.”71 To sum up, Bradwardine thus attempts to solve the problem of God’s relationship to evil by on the one hand making evil “less evil,” and on the other hand by appealing to logical distinctions and to the shortcoming of the human understanding that will be removed in the eschaton.72 Gregory of Rimini is likewise of the opinion that God, although universally active in a way that no one can withstand Him, is still not responsible for sinful deeds. For him, God in his rejection of the condemned does not command them to do evil, but withholds from them the grace to do good.73 Gregory, too, in this context warns that we should not imagine that we can fathom all of God’s mysteries. According to Oberman, Gregory further uses the argument that all people are in a state of sin in order to be able to counter the suggestion that God is the author of sin, in order to maintain human responsibility for sin, and to illustrate the seriousness of sin.74 Oberman identifies some of the remarks that Gabriël Biel makes on the basis of his voluntarism as “extreme statements.” For Biel, God’s will has priority above any and every moral structure, and it alone determines what is good and just. God can do things of which He had earlier said that they were unjust, and by his doing them they become just: “From which it follows that the divine will alone is the first rule of all justice” (Unde sola voluntas divina est prima regula omnis iustitiae).75 It is important to note that Biel, too, refers to God’s justice and justice in general in the context of his voluntarism. What Biel remarks when he introduces predestination betrays the same attention to God’s justice: the Creator of all and the Ruler of the world can do with his creatures as He wishes without being unjust.76 ————— 71 72

OBERMAN, Bradwardine, 228. For Bradwardine see also HALVERSON, Aureol, 129–133; cf. OBERMAN, Bradwardine,

228. 73 OBERMAN, Bradwardine, 219. See also HALVERSON, Aureol, 143–157; 155: “Rimini is aware that such a reading of Paul seems to impute injustice to God and to deny human free will”. 74 OBERMAN, Bradwardine, 221: “Although the starting-point of Gregory’s doctrine of predestination is supralapsarian (election and damnation from all eternity), he must, in order to contradict God’s authorship of evil, to maintain human responsibility and to show the seriousness of sin, use infralapsarian arguments: all people are in the state of sin, but to some of them God extends His hand.” One should note that it is not so that “election and damnation from all eternity” necessarily implies a supralapsarian view. Cf. SINNEMA, “Beza’s View of Predestination”, 228; 225: “Beza was the first theologian to adopt a supralapsarian position”. 75 OBERMAN, Harvest, 96. 76 OBERMAN, Harvest, 97.

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Also for Biel it is not a matter of arbitrariness or lawlessness, but it is rather about the human inability to ascertain the motives and causes of God’s acts. Furthermore, the simplicitas of God’s essence receives more emphasis than does the priority of God’s will.77 From this brief and cursory overview of the medieval treatment of, and involvement with, the themes that so occupied Arminius, it is indeed clear that this period, too, grappled with similar issues. As soon as the intense and direct involvement of God in providence and predestination with all that happens in the worlds comes up, God’s relationship to sin and evil, and thus a theodicy, become a pressing question to which divergent answers are given.78 Not only are there differences in the arguments used to defend God’s justice, but also the degree in which they consider such a defense necessary differ. It is not surprising that the same is true of the period of the Reformation. 7.3.2 The Sixteenth Century The point of departure for Luther’s treatment of the topic of this section is his De servo arbitrio, the work that clearly illustrated the differences between the Reformed and the evangelical-humanistic program of reform, and marked the break with Erasmus.79 Here the heart of the Reformation is depicted as the dependence of the sinner, who is enslaved to sin and Satan, on God’s undeserved and freely given grace. The issue of God’s justice comes up regularly. Remarkably, Luther enters in upon that question with purely soteriological motives. The point is not the relationship of God’s providential involvement in all things to his justice, even though Luther did reflect on these questions. The focus is rather on God’s saving acts, on soteriology, and thus on predestination. This focus could form a difference between the Reformation’s treatment of this topic and that of the Middle Ages. It is a difference in degree, but nevertheless an important difference. That Luther approached the issue of the justice of God’s providence differently from that of God’s predestination is clear when he draws a parallel ————— OBERMAN, Harvest, 98–99. Cf. OBERMAN, Bradwardine, 227: “It cannot surprise us that in dealing with sin he is particularly occupied with the question how God, who is so intensely and directly involved in all that happens in the world, can be justified.” 79 For the literature on the debate between Luther and Erasmus, and on Luther’s view of God’s relation to evil, see AKERBOOM, Vrije wil; KOLB, Bound Choice, especially 62–66.166–169; NESTINGEN/FORDE, Captivation, 1–79. Cf. LUTHER, WA 786, where Luther in his conclusion expresses his respect for Erasmus and thanks him for the fact that “solus prae omnibus rem ipsam es aggressus, hoc est, summam caussae […]. Unus tu et solus cardinem rerum uidisti, et ipsum iugulum petisti, pro quo ex animo tibi gratias ago.” 77 78

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between the two. Those who see the prosperity of the godless and the misfortunes suffered by the faithful believers daily experience God’s “injustice.” Luther indicates how he deals with this by distinguishing between three lights: the light of nature, the light of grace, and the light of glory. All that is unjust in the light of nature is very simply cleared up by the light of the gospel and the knowledge of grace, which teach that the godless do flourish according to the body, although they perish in regards to the soul. The conundrum is solved very simply: there is life after this life (Esse vitam post hanc vitam). The problem that God’s providence poses is thus “resolved” through the light of grace. The difference with the problem posed by predestination becomes clear when Luther indicates that this light of grace cannot explain how God can damn him who by his own strength can do nothing but sin and become guilty. Both the light of nature and the light of grace here insist that the fault lies not in the wretchedness of man, but in the injustice of God; [...] But the light of glory insists otherwise, and will one day reveal God, to whom alone belongs a judgment whose justice is incomprehensible, as a God Whose justice is most righteous and evident – provided only that in the meanwhile we believe it, as we are instructed and encouraged to do by the example of the light of grace.80

According to Luther, the desire to understand, explain and fathom God’s justice simply exposes the big problem. In his Diatribe, Erasmus had indicated that Luther’s view implied God’s guilt, but Luther considered that Erasmus thereby betrayed that he was serving Reason as Master. People demand that God act according to human justice (iure humano), and that He do what appears to be just in their eyes, or else for them God would no longer be God. They have no respect for the hiddenness of God’s majesty, and they call God to give an account of the things He wills and does, and which appear not to be just. “Flesh does not deign to give God glory to the extent of believing Him to be just and good when He speaks and acts above and beyond the definitions of Justinian’s Code, or the fifth book of Artistotle’s Ethics! [...] Rules must be laid down for Him, and He is not to damn any but those who have deserved it by our reckoning [nostro iudicio id meruerit]!”81 Luther’s motivation is also soteriological in nature. If reason is followed here and it is suggested that God may punish only according to merit – that is to say, deservedly according to our norms – this implies that God may also reward only according to merit! For also rewarding without merit is

————— 80 81

LUTHER, WA 785. LUTHER, WA 729–730.

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unjust.82 “But then woe to us poor wretches with such a God! For who shall be saved?”83 If God saves those who do not merit it, then we think it just and good; but if He condemns those who do not deserve it, we think it unjust and unacceptable because it is disadvantageous to us. Luther thus thinks that the Diatribe is not fair in its argumentation, and that it aims only to our own advantage.84 If we are satisfied that God crowns those who do not merit it, we should not be dissatisfied when He condemns those who do not merit it. If God is just in the first case, why then not also in the second? In the first instance He pours out grace and mercy on undeserving people, in the latter his wrath and severity on the undeserving. In both cases God is unjust according to human measures, but just and true according to his own.85 For Luther the question is whether grace is earned or not. Whoever raises his own intellect or capacity to understand to the level of a norm, and thereby makes it clear that he does not understand his position before God, demands justice from God and makes condemnation and salvation to be based on merit with the result that he is left with pernicious and unbiblical teaching. Only humility and faith can still help, according to Luther. Humble recognition of being completely lost, and of the inability of the human mind to understand God’s deeds are helpful. Luther attributes it to the great human depravity that it concerns itself with God’s justice and his judgments, and takes it upon itself to desire to understand and weigh God’s judgment.86 Only in the light of glory shall such shrouds disappear. Then the faith that we now have in God’s justice will turn to sight: then we will see his justice. If God’s justice could already now be judged as just according to human norms, Luther suggests that it would not be God’s justice at all since it would not differ in any way from human justice. God is the one, true God and for that reason completely incomprehensible and unapproachable for the human understanding. Considered from that perspective, it is reasonable and even necessary that also his justice be incomprehensible. According to Luther, exactly that is also Paul’s meaning when he cries out in Romans 11:

————— 82 LUTHER, WA 730. Luther neither mentions nor addresses Christ’s imputed righteousness or faith, which forms a considerable difference vis à vis Arminius, who thereby argues that merited punishment does not imply that God can reward or save people only on the ground of their own merits, because in the latter Christ’s righteousness is imputed to them. In that sense one can indeed speak of a merited reward. 83 LUTHER, WA 730: “At uae nobis tunc miseris, apud illum Deum! Quis enim saluus erit?” 84 LUTHER, WA 730. 85 LUTHER, WA 731. 86 LUTHER, WA 784.

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O the depths of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable his ways, and his paths beyond tracing out!87 Luther’s resistance against reason as a threat to salvation does not prevent him at the end of his work from appealing to reason in order to conclude that when God foreknows and pre-ordains all things, and nothing happens except by his will, that reason itself testifies that there can be no such thing as free choice for humanity, or the angels, or for any other creature.88 To sum up, in his stance against Erasmus on the question as to how God can be just if He predestines people absolutely, Luther is driven by purely soteriological motives. He admits that there is a problem in the face of human reason, but attributes that problem to the pride and trust in reason of sinful people who dare to stand up against God and do not in faith trust that God is just, and that this justice will be revealed in the eschaton. For Luther, it is a question about the very core of the Reformation, about the soli gratia, and the limit of the human understanding – in short, the Creator-creature distinction – forms his most important argument. Of a totally different nature, but still of considerable influence, was the very philosophical De providentia of Zwingli.89 Also Zwingli brings up God’s justice, perhaps because he foresaw that his work would be attacked precisely on this point. Rome made great efforts to condemn this book, but also within the Reformed camp it aroused, aside from praise,90 sharp criticism as well. According to Den Hartogh, the criticism came from the very rigid determinism (zeer rigide determinisme) in which Zwingli ended, when he for example declares that it is according to God’s decision that one person is a murderer, another an adulterer. Also Zwingli appeals to Romans 9 in order to defend that God is not unjust: There is no chamber pot that says, “Why did you not make me a drinking cup?” God deals with us the same way, yet without his justice being called into question. For we are in God’s eyes even less than the lump of clay is for the potter.91

————— 87 LUTHER, WA 784. According to OBERMAN, Bradwardine, 220, Rom 11:33, which is also cited by Luther, is the passage that “since Duns become customary at the end of the doctrine of predestination.” See also OBERMAN, Harvest, 98: Paul’s words from Rom 9:20–21 have since Scotus been “the traditional culmination of all analyses of the mystery of election and reprobation”; “whenever used, it has stood not for the lawlessness of God but for the inscrutibility of his ways and the absolute freedom with which he, indebted to no one, made himself a debtor to those who would fulfill certain set requirements.” 88 LUTHER, WA 786. 89 BÜSSER, Zwingli und Laktanz, 72–93. 90 See e.g. DONNELLY, Scholasticism, 118n64.128.182; DEN HARTOGH, Voorzienigheid, 243. 91 Z 2,180: “denn ghein seichkachel spricht: Warumb hastu mich nit ouch zù einem erlichen trinckgschirr gemacht? Also warlich handlet got mit uns on verletzen siner grechtigheit; denn wir sind, gegen im ze rechnen, minder denn der leimscholl gegen dem hafner.”

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Zwingli was aware that he could be reproached for making God the author of evil. In order to counter this accusation, he uses logic: God is the Highest Good and people can only have knowledge of the good in a derived sense (evil as privatio boni). There is no distinction for God between good and evil, for God is above the law. And so all that He does is good – even if that is something that we as people would consider “evil.”92 In Martin Bucer, whose entire theology is determined by the doctrine of predestination,93 many elements can be found that coincide with Luther’s reaction to Erasmus. For Bucer, predestination is an irrevocable division of the human race into elect and reprobate. Stephens points out that this emphasis on election as cause of salvation did not lead Bucer to bypass the contribution of Christ in salvation. God has elected us in Christ, only through the merits of Christ’s blood.94 The meaning of Bucer’s doctrine of predestination is that man’s salvation rests on the free sovereign choice of God, made before the foundation of the world. Its purpose, besides being an affirmation of God’s sovereign love, is to deny to man any part in effecting his salvation and to offer him a sure ground for confidence (that is, in God, rather than in himself).95

Just as Luther, Bucer considers that the reason for election is now unknown, but that it will become clear in the eschaton. In the meantime, however, people must believe that God is God, and there is no need to doubt his justice. Human reason cannot grasp God’s intention anyways, and is more inclined to call God a liar than to admit its own inability. Bucer’s reply to the varied objections involves an affirmation of God’s justice and sovereignty and of man’s having no right to question God. He allows that it may offend human reason that God judges those who can do nothing different. But he is content with the affirmation that God is just, even if inscrutable. “… the judgments of God are a great abyss, they are inscrutable but just. For the Lord is just in all his ways, even where to our reason he seems otherwise.”96

Bucer similarly answers the Catholic Albertus Pighius’s charge that the Reformed make God to be the author of sin by pointing to the weakness of ————— 92 DEN HARTOGH, Voorzienigheid, 221. For Zwingli’s view on God’s goodness and justice, see also BURGER, “Entwicklung”, 71–76; STEPHENS, “Place”, 395.401. 93 See STEPHENS, Holy Spirit, 23: “The doctrine of predestination or election is one that shapes the whole of Bucer's theology. Even where it is not expressed explicitly, its stamp is to be found. The centrality of this doctrine and the way Bucer interprets it distinguish him from Luther on the one hand, and from his catholic and radical opponents on the other.” For Bucer’s view on predestination, see e.g. VAN ‘T SPIJKER, “Prädestination bei Bucer”, 85–102; DE KROON, Perspectieven, 20–46; VAN DEN BOSCH, Bucer’s Praedestinatiegedachten. 94 STEPHENS, Holy Spirit, 24–25. 95 STEPHENS, Holy Spirit, 27. 96 STEPHENS, Holy Spirit, 28. See also DE KROON, Perspectieven, 37–39.

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the human understanding. God hardens people in sin, but in a just manner; how He does that, however, remains hidden from us.97 God demands faith from everyone, but He does not give it to all, and yet He does no one an injustice. God works all in all, also the volitions and deeds in people, but they also act in following their own will: the evil through their own fault, the good through God. Bucer further considered that not necessity, but only coercion, undoes the will.98 Calvin was accused on more than one occasion, and from different sides, of making God the author of sin with his doctrine of predestination. In his De libero hominis arbitrio et divinia gratia, libri decem (1542), Pighius had described the doctrine of the bound will and the absolute necessity of all that occurs, that God works not only the good but also the evil in the godless, as the core of all doctrines shared by the Reformed heretics. This terrible error, he claimed, led to total moral indifference.99 Calvin realized that with this accusation of making God the author of sin, Pighius thought he was bringing the most serious charge one could ever make.100 Also in the Bolsec controversy (1551–1555)101 one of the most important points of criticism on Calvin’s view of predestination was that it implied God’s authorship of sin.102 Calvin made fervent attempts to assure such people as Bullinger103 that this was not true, and that his only concern was to maintain God’s grace over against Bolsec who made salvation depend on the human will. Bullinger, however, remained convinced that Calvin had made statements that at the very least made Bolsec’s accusations understandable. The way Bullinger spoke of providence and predestination is characterized by a continual concern not to make God the author of sin and evil. He stands as a mediator as he sought to keep together what were or seemed to ————— See SCHWEIZER, Centraldogmen I, 203–204. STEPHENS, Holy Spirit, 28; SCHWEIZER, Centraldogmen I, 203. 99 SCHWEIZER, Centraldogmen I, 203–204. For the dispute between Pighius and Calvin, see e.g. MELLES, Pighius; SCHULZE, Reply, 1971. 100 CALVIN, CO 6,361: “Quum ante mentiebatur, Deum nos facere mali autorem, illud erat extremum probrum, quo nos gravari posse existimabat.” Cf. CO 6,258. 101 See HOLTROP, Bolsec Controversy. According to MULLER, Review of “Bolsec Controversy”, 589, Holtrop’s study has the following problems: “the theological framework within which Holtrop places his account, the distinct absence of objectivity, the tendentious interpretations, improperly drawn conclusions, and the underlying desire to ‘prove’ a modern theological ‘point.’” See also SCHWEIZER, Centraldogmen I, 205–238. 102 See e.g. VENEMA, Bullinger, 58; HOLTROP, Bolsec Controversy, 55.59.67.90–92. 103 For the following section on Bullinger, see e.g. DEN BOER, “Briefwisseling”, 4–26, especially 6–7.11.13–16.25; VENEMA, Bullinger, 38–40.54–55.65.68–69.94.104–105.119; DEN HARTOGH, Voorzienigheid, 226–228.231–232; HOLTROP, Bolsec Controversy, 347–349; SCHWEIZER, Centraldogmen I, 258–265.275. 97 98

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be polar opposites, such as Zwingli and Bibliander, Bolsec and Calvin.104 In this context, Den Hartogh remarks that for Bullinger it was an issue of fundamental importance, and he may indeed be correct as he points out that Bullinger after all was and continued to be Zwingli’s successor, and for that reason perhaps felt it necessary continually to distance himself from the views of his predecessor.105 Bullinger always wants to avoid the two dangers of Pelagianism on the one side, and Manicheism on the other.106 He emphasizes the means and intermediate causes in both providence and predestination. The only cause of salvation lies in God’s grace in Christ, which is received by faith. The only cause of damnation, however, lies in man’s own guilt and unbelief. Formally Bullinger holds to double predestination, but whenever he gives his view he identifies predestination and election, and refuses to work out the decree of reprobation. Perhaps the likeliest explanation for this ambiguity is one which acknowledges that, though Bullinger was willing on occasion to express formally a doctrine of double predestination, he remained particularly concerned to avoid any formulation that would make God responsible for the sinful unbelief of the non-elect or that would hinder the indiscriminate preaching of the gospel to all sinners without exception.107

Thus on the one hand there is both an election and a reprobation; on the other hand, Bullinger never works out reprobation in any way. Adam’s fall is not included in God’s decree. Bullinger further avoids all questions as to the relation between God’s will and the condemnation of the reprobate. Although God always acts according to his own justice, and God’s deeds may and can not be measured according to human norms, He still does nothing against the law, and works in a way that displays his wisdom and justice. Bullinger and Calvin agree completely on the sola gratia of salvation. According to Bullinger, however, at the point where he himself begins to speak asymetrically about election and reprobation, Calvin errs. Calvin’s reference to God’s active contribution in the origin of sin and condemnation according to Bullinger does not agree with the witness of Scripture about God’s unconditional goodness towards all without distinction. God does not will that some be lost, but that all repent. Nothing may be said that undermines this truth, and one may certainly not claim that God willed the fall into sin, blinded people, hardened them, etc.! Here Bullinger clearly has in view the consequences that also Calvin drew from his refusal to speak about a “permission” on God’s part. Bullinger himself

————— 104 105 106 107

Cf. HOLTROP, Bolsec Controversy, 349. DEN HARTOGH, Voorzienigheid, 231–232. DEN HARTOGH, Voorzienigheid, 231–232; cf. ETG 14.77 (III 537.591). VENEMA, Bullinger, 104.

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places all emphasis on God’s goodness and the unconditional preaching of the gospel to all without discrimination. If someone still remains an unbeliever, it is entirely his or her own fault and it is on account of his or her sin, unbelief and rejection of the Gospel that God justly condemned this person.108

It was not only in Zürich that people were troubled with Calvin’s statements,109 for also in Bern some, just as Pighius and Bolsec, accused Calvin of making God the author of sin.110 In this context Neuser speaks about a common front of Swiss-German theologians, as well as Roman Catholic opponents of Calvin, on the point of their position on reprobation: “[This common front – wdb] composed of those who were in opposing camps connected the rejection of double predestination, the emphasis on the bonitas Dei, and the concern that God could be made the author of sin.”111 Calvin’s defense against Bolsec can for the most part be passed over, since the most important arguments have already been treated in the preceding section. For Calvin it is about a complete human dependence on, and surrender to, God, with as goal that God receive all the honor that is due to Him.112 Also the argument of the limits of the human understanding comes up different times, and in that context Calvin draws a distinction between human and divine justice.113 Some theologians agreed with Calvin on this ————— 108 DEN BOER, “Briefwisseling,” 24–25: “Calvijns spreken over Gods actieve aandeel in het tot stand brengen van zonde en verdoemenis is naar Bullingers overtuiging niet in overeenstemming met het Schriftgetuigenis van Gods onvoorwaardelijke goedheid jegens allen zonder onderscheid. God wil niet dat sommigen verloren gaan, maar dat allen tot bekering komen. Niets mag er gezegd worden dat aan deze waarheid afbreuk kan doen. Laat staan dat gezegd wordt dat God de zondeval heeft gewild, mensen verblindt en verhardt enzovoort! Hier doelt Bullinger uiteraard op de consequenties die ook Calvijn getrokken heeft uit zijn weigering om over een ‘permissie’ door God te spreken. Bullinger zelf legt alle nadruk op Gods goedheid en de onvoorwaardelijke prediking van het Evangelie aan allen zonder onderscheid. Als iemand desondanks ongelovig blijft, is dat volledig zijn eigen schuld en wordt hij vanwege zijn zonde, ongeloof en verwerping van het Evangelie door God rechtvaardig verworpen.” 109 DEN HARTOGH, Voorzienigheid, 219. 110 HOLTROP, Bolsec Controversy, 354.357–360. Cf. also NEUSER, “Kritik”, 239; SCHWEIZER, Centraldogmen I, 255. 111 NEUSER, in CALVIN, Praedestinatione, XVII: “Sie verband – die sonst in entgegengesetzten Lagern standen – die Ablehnung der doppelten Prädestination, die Betonung der ‘bonitas dei’ und die Scheu, Gott könnte zum Urheber der Sünde gemacht werden.” 112 CALVIN, CO 6,257: “Dicimus hominem non modo nihil agere posse boni, sed ne cogitare quidem, ut totus a Deo pendere discat, ac de se desperans, in illum penitus se reiicere: si quid boni egerit, illi acceptum, non sibi referat: nec dimidiam tantum illi laudem tribuat bonorum operum, sed plenam ac solidam, nihil sibi reliquum faciens, nisi quod ab eo accepit, quidquid habet.” Cf. SCHWEIZER, Centraldogmen I, 198: according to Schweizer, Pighius’s Pelagianism stands clearly “gegenüber das grosse und bedeutende Interesse, welches zu dem geschärftesten Augustinismus hinleitete, die gründliche Demüthigung des sündhaften Menschen und gänzliche Hingabe an den allein rettenden Gott.” For Calvin’s response, see also CALVIN, Praedestinatione. 113 CALVIN, CO 6,258: “Deum sic loquendo facimus malorum omnium autorem, ex iustissimo crudelem ac saevum, et infinitam eius sapientiam stultam facimus. Equidem tale iudicium a carne

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point, but did not explain how it is possible that God governs individual deeds of people by command and hidden decree, and not only by permission, while He is nevertheless not the author of sin. “The Thonon theologians did not explain how God is not the ‘cause of sin’ and the ‘author of evil’ – but they only asserted that he is not.”114 Also Viret supported Calvin when he declared that God can as the potter make different vessels from the same lump of clay, and can make use of each vessel as He wishes, according to his own good pleasure. “The cause of that will is always just, even if we do not always know it.”115 Although Muller was correct to make significant qualifications to Holtrop’s view of the Bolsec controversy as “turning point in the development of the orthodox, scholastic form of the Reformed doctrine of predestination,”116 Pighius’s and Bolsec’s forceful criticism without doubt functioned as a strong stimulus to reflect on the Reformed doctrine of predestination, for the way in which it ought to be discussed, and for the consequences of this doctrine for other aspects of theology. The Bolsec controversy not only led Calvin to write his apologetic works on predestination and many other theologians to inform Geneva of their views, also such works as Beza’s famous Tabula praedestinationis and the Consensus Genevensis of 1552 resulted from this reflection.117 Furthermore, Calvin’s own view was endorsed as result of the debate, and became the confessional norm in Geneva.118 ————— sua hominibus dictari non nego, ut Deum talem esse concipiant, quum ipsum audiunt, de arcanis suis iudiciis loquentem Sed qualis erit ista aequitas, si incomprehensibilia Dei iudicia, quae Paulus cum trepidatione adorat et miratur (Rom. 11, 33), quia excutere non audet, aestimentur ex stulta hominum ratione? Quum Paulus ipse impiorum blasphemias in medium profert, addit se loqui secundum hominem (Rom. 3, 5). Quo verbo simpliciter demonstrat, non posse hominem nisi perperam, usque ad impias et sacrilegas opiniones, de his rebus iudicare. Ergo ab ista praecipiti carnis audacia nos ad castam sobrietatem divinaeque iustitiae reverentiam convertamus. Tum intelligemus, nec Deum fieri malorum autorem, quum dicitur impios agere quo vult, et per illos opus suum peragere et exsequi: sed potius confitebimur esse eximium et mirificum artificem, qui bene etiam malis instrumentis utatur: iustitiam eius cogemur suspicere, quae non modo in media iniquitate viam inveniat, sed ipsa quoque iniquitate utatur in bonum.” 114 HOLTROP, Bolsec Controversy, 68.664. 115 HOLTROP, Bolsec Controversy, 61; cf. 72. 116 MULLER, Review of “Bolsec Controversy”, 588–589. Cf. HOLTROP, Bolsec Controversy, 363: “when Calvin’s party asserted its power in 1555 it gained a significant leverage for negotiating with the other cities. It prepared the way for the development and establishment of ‘Calvinistic’ orthodoxy. The failure of the May riot and the consolidation of Calvin’s power in the fall of 1555 were a decisive turning-point in the history of Reformed theology. Henceforth, his influence would be assured in Geneva, Zurich, Basel – and Berne.” 117 DE BOER, “Consensus genevensis”, 71–72. Cf. MULLER, “Use and Abuse”, 33–61; SINNEMA, “Decree-Execution Distinction”, 192; SINNEMA, “Beza’s View of Predestination”, 220. 118 MULLER, Review of “Bolsec Controversy”, 588–589.

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In numerous publications, Muller has illustrated the (dis)continuity between Calvin and early Reformed Orthodoxy. All kinds of scholastic distinctions can already be found in Calvin, and elements of Calvin’s views are, in contrast to what many supposed, more stringent and deterministic for the doctrine of predestination than they were in the theologians of early Orthodoxy. What is more, the Reformed doctrine of predestination can in terms of details such as divine permission and the relationship of God’s primary causality to secondary causes, as well as many other distinctions, be attributed as readily to Vermigli, Bullinger, Musculus and many others, as to Calvin.119 Unlike many of his contemporaries and successors, Calvin did not shrink from the conclusion that permission and volition are one in the mind of an eternal and utterly sovereign God: reprobation could not be viewed simply as a passive act of God. This teaching represents the more fully deterministic side of Calvin’s doctrine – a point at which the early orthodox would modify formulae and seek other models.120

Distinctions such as those encountered in early Orthodoxy have, in contrast to what has often been suggested, an anti-speculative goal, and lead to less rigid views on the decrees than what we find in Calvin.121 The controversies of the 1560s therefore did not as such lead to a more scholastic treatment of predestination, and where it did become more scholastic, this emphatically did not lead to a more rigid and more deterministic conception. However, Calvin’s view was developed in the sense that, in spite of all kinds of nuances and distinctions that were later added, the basis of his view which consists in an unconditional predestination composed of election and reprobation, slowly but surely became the dominant view, and finally virtually the only doctrine of predestination recognized by the Reformed. Those who held other views, such as Bibliander, Huber and Baro, who will be treated below, are less and less tolerated after the Bolsec controversy. Therefore, early Orthodoxy on the one hand sought answers, much more than the early Reformation, to the question as to how it can be avoided that God is or appears to be the author of sin with the doctrine of unconditional predestination. It was motivated to seek such answers by the accusations ————— MULLER, Review of “Bolsec Controversy”, 588. MULLER, Christ and the Decree, 24. 121 SINNEMA, Reprobation, 449–450: “The movement from Calvin to seventeenth century Calvinism with its growing scholastic trend toward greater precision in doctrinal formulation did not necessarily result in a more stringent doctrinal stance, as is sometimes assumed. While one cannot generalize on the basis of one doctrine, at least in the case of reprobation the advent of Reformed scholasticism brought with it a moderation of earlier Reformed theology.” Cf. VOS, “Scholasticism and Reformation”, 115: “Surely, the systematic style was philosophical in a grand way, but was it deterministic? Quite the contrary.” MULLER, Review of “Bolsec Controversy”, 589; MULLER, “Arminius’s Gambit”, 252–253. 119 120

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that were being directed against this doctrine from both within and outside of the Reformed camp, and it found in its own theological method not only the possibility of, but also good cause for, entering seriously in upon these questions. The appeal to the inability of the human understanding that had such a significant place in Calvin and others does not disappear altogether, but it did take on a much more modest place over against the arguments.122 On the other hand, it appears as if there was increasing pressure from within early Orthodoxy to agree with this view, and not to express a divergent opinion. Both of these developments become visible directly after the Bolsec controversy in the discussion that took place in Zürich from 1556 to 1560 between Peter Martyr Vermigli and Theodore Bibliander. Bibliander (1505– 1564), who assumed the chair of exegesis in Zürich as Zwingli’s successor, was a renowned humanist scholar.123 His view on predestination and free will was generally known. In 1535 he turned against what he considered the terrible doctrine according to which God would coerce people to do evil deeds through an absolute necessity. During the Bolsec affair, he claimed to be neither Pelagian nor Manichean, since the one party destroys God’s grace, while the other turns Him into the author of corruption and of all evil.124 Bibliander’s own point of departure is God’s good will with which He wills the salvation of all people. On this ground God has chosen all people in Christ before the foundation of the world. This predestination is not personal, but a predestination of disposition: in faith in the Son, and in unbelief, election becomes visible. Faith is a free gift of God, but room is left for the human will: each person can repent and seek refuge in God’s grace. A person can also resist his election. Condemnation is thus the fault of the human being, and God’s act of predestination cannot be blamed for it. God does not will condemnation, but He does know who will be condemned. That God should foreordain someone to damnation is for Bibliander irreconcilable with God’s goodness.125 In 1556 the situation in Zürich changed considerably when Pellicanus, one of Bibliander’s sympathizers, died and was replaced by Vermigli as professor in theology and philosophy. One could note a number of arguments that would justify the conclusion that at least one reason for Vermigli’s move to Zürich lay in the propagation of his own doctrine of predestina————— 122 Cf. e.g. Gisbertus Voetius’s appeal to the insufficiency of the human understanding with respect to God’s decrees in relation to contingent human actions in GOUDRIAAN, Reformed Orthodoxy and Philosophy, 153.177.192. 123 For Bibliander, see EGLI, Analecta Reformatoria II. 124 HOLTROP, Bolsec Controversy, 347–348. 125 STAEDTKE, “Prädestinationsstreit”, 536–540. See also DONNELLY, Scholasticism, 145.182.

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tion, which shows influence from Luther, Zwingli and especially Bucer,126 and his desire to purge the church of the doctrine of the free will.127 Vermigli was the first important Reformed theologian to incorporate the scholastic method and terminology in his theology. With it, he inspired, sanctioned and stimulated the use of the scholastic method and tradition for the Reformed. Vermigli’s orthodoxy was so far beyond dispute that he was not suspected of being a papist for promoting this method. Aristotelian philosophy was not considered a neutral instrument, for according to Vermigli Aristotle was a partner of Protestantism. For that reason, Vermigli came to function as a sort of bridge between the approach of Luther and Calvin, and the mature Reformed scholasticism represented by Zanchi.128 In his commentaries, Vermigli repeatedly treats the problem of God’s authorship of sin and develops his thoughts on this topic. While the treatment of this issue in the Romans commentary is still found in literary, metaphorical and non-philosophical language, Vermigli makes use of more philosophical and scholastic concepts and distinctions in the commentary on Samuel that he wrote in Zürich. According to Donnelly, he apparently felt a much more thorough treatment was necessary. The changes in and additions to the Samuel commentary “allow Martyr to stress God’s justice and sanctity without downplaying his sovereignty.”129 Muller emphasizes that the scholastic foundation of Vermigli’s argumentation does not lead to a more ————— DONNELLY, Scholasticism, 123.127–129. Cf. BOUGHTON, “Supralapsarianism”, 75–77. STAEDTKE, “Prädestinationsstreit”, 543: “Jedoch steht soviel fest, daß Vermigli seine Prädestinationslehre nicht nur um ihrer selbst willen, sondern zu der Zeit vor allem wegen Bibliander besonders ausführlich und programmatisch vorgetragen hat. Es kann kein Zweifel darüber sein, daß er die feste Absicht hatte, die Lehre Calvins in Zürich unter allen Umständen zur Herrschaft zu bringen.” See also HOLTROP, Bolsec Controversy, 350–351; DEN BOER, “Briefwisseling”, 7–8. James, on the contrary, emphasizes Vermigli’s conciliatory attitude and desire to avoid controversy, also specifically with Bibliander: JAMES, Vermigli and Predestination, 33–34. 128 DONNELLY, Scholasticism, 189.194.207; cf. DEN HARTOGH, Voorzienigheid, 97; BASCHERA, “Vermigli”, 325; JAMES, “Crossroads”, 62–78. Cf. the interesting thesis of BURNETT, “Educational Roots”: “The decision that only candidates with master’s degrees would be considered for pastoral posts guaranteed that from the mid-1580s all of Basel’s new pastors had this kind of advanced training in dialectic which in turn shaped their exegesis of Scripture.” (p. 315) The knowledge in dialectic was then applied in theology. Burnett speaks of a “dialectical turn” in the middle of the 1570s, “an important step for the development of Reformed scholasticism. A new generation of theologians, raised with the humanist conviction that dialectic was a practical discipline that should be a tool of textual analysis and trained in the use of Aristotelian dialectic, now brought that training to bear on their study of the text of Scripture. The significance of this development cannot be over-emphasized.” (p. 316–317). She concludes: “The emergence of Reformed scholasticism in the later sixteenth century has been attributed to both the polemical concerns of Protestant theologians and to the desire to systematize Protestant doctrine. The developments described in this essay point to another more basic factor: the evolution of dialectic itself, coupled with the increasing proficiency of a large proportion of future pastors in the principles of advanced dialectic.” 129 DONELLY, Scholasticism, 118. See STAEDTKE, “Prädestinationsstreit”, 541. 126 127

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rigid formulation of the doctrine of predestination, but is caused by a less openly deterministic understanding of the decrees.130 In 2.1.4 we already pointed to Vermigli’s influential view on the absence of coercion and the presence of spontaneity as the sufficient condition for reproach and therefore responsibility for evil and sin.131 Vermigli’s basic thesis is that God is not per se and proprie the cause of sin, and that nothing, not even sin, occurs outside of his will, choice and providence. Deeds are good insofar as they come from God, evil insofar as they come from human depravity. God is the cause of sin only as causa removens prohibens. If God removes his grace, which He owes to no one, sin occurs. Evil, considered not as lawlessness but rather as privatio of righteousness, is limited to the secondary causes. When asked about the reason for which God grants one person more grace and the other less, Vermigli points to God’s freedom to decide in that matter.132 In Vermigli’s commentary on Kings, there are in addition to a summary of the passage from the Samuel commentary, a number of new elements that come up. He considers the relationship between sin and the freedom of the human will. Vermigli further admits that not all people are given sufficient grace, even though they hear the gospel externally and even internally receive some grace. Donnelly remarks, “Martyr’s denial of sufficient grace gave him a simple, clear, and pure position, but the price was high for it entails what many will deem a very harsh doctrine of predestination.” The preaching of the Word is intended for the predestined. They hear it, believe and are justified. By seeing the stubbornness of the reprobate, the elect acknowledge how depraved human nature really is. Vermigli further notes that the reason God wills the Word to be proclaimed to all is that He wills that elect and reprobate live in this world without it being possible to distinguish them by human reason. “Human reason finds God’s decision to punish rather than to pity the unregenerate an open affront because reason tries to make God’s justice parallel with human justice. But there is no parallel or basis of comparison.”133 The battle on predestination between Bibliander and Vermigli resulted in February 1560 in the removal of the first from his office. Donnelly considers that Vermigli’s victory and Bibliander’s dismissal without doubt meant an important step in the process by which Zürich came to agree on the fully Reformed doctrine on grace and predestination. Also such scholars as Hol————— MULLER, Christ and the Decree, 66. BASCHERA, “Vermigli”. 132 DONNELLY, Scholasticism, 118–121; SCHWEIZER, Centraldogmen I, 287–288; JAMES, Vermigli and Predestination, 81–87; 86n116: “Unde apparet Deum illud peccatum quodammodo voluisse, ac eius quadea[n]tenus fuisse auctorem”. 133 DONNELLY, Scholasticism, 122–123. See also JAMES, Vermigli and Predestination, 59. 130 131

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trop and Staedtke have suggested that this event signals an important shift.134 Another important turning point was the Strasbourg controversy between Zanchi and Marbach on predestination. From that point on, not only the Eucharist, but also predestination became an insurmountable difference between the Reformed and the Lutherans.135 The increasing unity between Zürich and Geneva culminated in the Second Helvetic Confession (1566), which also maintains Bullinger’s typical reservations for formulating a doctrine of predestination that could compromise God’s goodness and threaten to make him the author of sin.136 In 1561 Strasbourg saw the Lutheran Marbach collide with the Reformed Zanchi, “the most thorough-going and influential in pioneering Calvinist scholasticism”137 when it comes to predestination.138 Zanchi’s view that everything that occurs, occurs necessarily, was attacked by Marbach for being fatalistic and deterministic. During the dispute, Zanchi traveled in the fall of 1561 to Heidelberg, Marburg, Stuttgart, Tübingen, Schaffhausen, Zürich and Basel in order to drum up support. He also received such support from all with the exception of Stuttgart and Tübingen. In view of all the disputes that were fought over predestination in the ten years that preceded, it is not strange that Moltmann considers this wide support within the Reformed camp for Zanchi’s predestination theses as a “first consensus, which from a historical perspective became the basis for an orthodoxReformed doctrine of predestination.”139 The humanist Sebastian Castellio (1515–1563) was in his circles the most important opponent of absolute necessity. He particularly emphasized that when one teaches that humankind is not free, and that God determines and predestines all, it results in problems for the question of evil. The “solu————— 134 DONNELLY, Scholasticism, 183–184; HOLTROP, Bolsec Controversy, 351; STAEDTKE, “Prädestinationsstreit”, 536. 135 Cf. ADAM, Streit, 30, who does argue that the dissension existed since the quarrel between Zanchi and Marbach, but that it did not become of public import until 1586. 136 VENEMA, Bullinger, 94; cf. DONNELLY, Scholasticism, 183–184; cf. SCHWEIZER, Centraldogmen I, 291: “So finden wir die calvinisch durchgebildete Lehre in Zürich und der Schweiz überhaupt nun verbreitet, mag man immerhin das Gewicht stärker darauf legen, die Missdeutung zu meiden, und darum den am leichtesten zu missbrachenden Phrasen mehr ausweichen als Calvin.” 137 DONELLY, Scholasticism, 207. 138 See also VAN ‘T SPIJKER, “Straßburger Prädestinationsstreit”, 327–342; GRÜNDLER, Gotteslehre; for Zanchi’s concern about God’s relationship to sin, see p. 105–106.121–122. 139 MOLTMANN, Prädestination, 97, see also 72–109. Schweizer is of the same opinion, see SCHWEIZER, Centraldogmen I, 448: “Der Zanchische Streit wurde für die dogmatische Entwicklung grösserer Kreise dadurch noch wichtiger, dass er mittelst der eingeholten Gutachten die völlige Uebereinstimmung der reformirten Hauptsitze rücksichtlich der Prädestinationslehre ans Licht zog, wodurch hinwieder die Lutheraner in ihrer abweichenden Entwicklung gefördert worden sind.” See also 418–470.

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tions” usually offered, such as that God has a double will (hidden and revealed) do not satisfy him, and do not solve anything. Something is not just because God wills it, but God wills it because it is just. Castellio considered whether there could be such a thing as a divine justice that is not known to us. He did admit that God’s ways and judgments are often unfathomable, but precisely the justice according to which God punishes evil and not the good is a rule that is known to humanity and must be maintained. God punishes the godless for their sins; however, He created people, not the godless, and not in order to punish them. To teach that God created certain people for eternal condemnation is, according to Castellio, a false doctrine which conflicts with God’s nature and the greatness of his mercy. It further makes God a hypocrite who secretly desires something different from what He commands. All moral efforts thus become useless. God’s will and command must necessarily agree.140 When he treats the difference between Calvin and Castellio, Schweizer remarks that Calvin considers the actual events of this world to be God’s providence. Injustice then only appears to be unjust. From God’s perspective, those things that appear to be unjust are actually wise and just, although we are not in a state to penetrate into this secret of God and to see the justice in those things which to us appear to be unjust. Castellio, on the other hand, is of the opinion that those events in our world which go against our sense of justice are not to be understood as God’s will and work, but as arising from the evil of the creature and against God’s will.141 When Castellio summarizes his objections against predestination as taught by the Basel theologian Martin Borrhaus, he points to two things. Borrhaus appears to make God the author of sin, and to ascribe hypocrisy to Him. Castellio knows that Borrhaus denies this, but wonders whether he really can be consistent in his denial. He gives several excerpts from Borrhaus’s writings and concludes from them that God is consistently made the author of sin.142 Faustus Socinus makes the same kind of criticism. He denies a predestination that takes away all piety and ends up ascribing to God many things that are unworthy of Him. If everything occurs necessarily, there is no real ————— SCHWEIZER, Centraldogmen I, 332–333. SCHWEIZER, Centraldogmen I, 333–334. 142 SCHWEIZER, Centraldogmen I, 319–356. Cf. GUGGISBERG, Castellio, 104.112.157– 158.206.241–242; 241: “An Gottes Almacht zweifelte er [Castellio, wdb] ebensowenig wie Calvin, aber er konnte nicht glauben, dass durch diese Allmacht gewisse Menschen zur Sünde und damit zur Verdammnis prädestiniert seien. Solches behaupteten nicht nur Calvin und seine Genfer Gefolgsleute, sondern auch der Basler Kollege Martin Borrhaus.” Castellio is convinced that in Calvin’s predestination, God is the author of sin and that the human race thus has its wickedness from God. For Borrhaus, see also BURNETT, “Educational Roots”, 312. 140 141

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sense in making any effort. Further, all kinds of terrible things must then be attributed to God: injustice, deceit, ignorance and wickedness. As an example, Socinus thinks it is unjust to punish someone for omitting to do something which he or she was completely unable to do to begin with.143 We now return to early Reformed Orthodoxy, of which Theodore Beza is the most well-known and most productive representative. On providence and predestination, Beza goes in a different direction than Calvin, in spite of the many material similarities. A clear example is the fact that he places permissio at the very heart of providence.144 Beza constantly dealt with the question of the origin of evil. Not the human intellect, but rather God’s will is the measure of justice. God further has reasons that are hidden from us, and nevertheless just, in the counsel of his will of condemnation. Aside from the theme of human limitation and the hiddenness of God’s judgments, Beza makes use of all kinds of distinctions such as those between first and second causes, necessity and coercion, and decree and execution,145 in order to give a rational defense as to how God can predestine and govern all things without becoming responsible for evil.146 Beza maintains a doctrine of full double predestination while nevertheless insisting that reprobation justly refers to man’s own wickedness and obstinate refusal to apply the blessings of Christ to himself. These distinctions between the eternal will of God and the economy of revelation and salvation serve as a logical transition from Beza’s statement of the doctrine of predestination and his exposition of the manner in which

————— SCHWEIZER, Centraldogmen I, 375. DEN HARTOGH, Voorzienigheid, 281. 145 SINNEMA, “Decree-Execution Distinction”, 191–207; SINNEMA, “Beza’s View of Predestination”, 222–225; 224: “A distinctive feature of Beza’s position is that he creates something of a disjunction between the decree and its execution, and ascribes separate causes to each. Hence he insists that, while the cause of reprobation lies in God’s will, the cause of actual damnation is human sinfulness. This enables him to deny that God (or his decree) is the cause of sin or a cause of damnation. Between the decree and its execution in time human agency and sin intervenes, so that God is not at all to blame.” 146 DEN HARTOGH, Voorzienigheid, 266–268.281–282; SCHWEIZER, Centraldogmen I, 367– 368.406–407; cf. HOLTROP, Bolsec Controversy, 68: “As far as salvation was concerned, Beza assigned ‘all things’ to God. But in reprobation he distinguished between God’s decisive decree and man’s guilt – or condemnation – in history.” The reason for this is that God would otherwise become the author of sin, and will something unjust. See 134, n. 188: “Here Beza argues against a ‘false logic’ that could presume – on the basis of the ‘law of contrary parts’ – that if election is the cause of faith and good works, reprobation must be the cause of unbelief and sin. At this point, he introduced his distinctions of ‘efficient and deficient,’ ‘primary and secondary’ causality.” See also SINNEMA, “Beza’s View of Predestination”, 221–222: “Beza also shared the Reformed insistence that, while the cause of reprobation lies in God’s will, the actual condemnation of the reprobate is caused by their own sin, and so their punishment is justly deserved. With this distinction between reprobation and condemnation Beza and other Reformed thinkers strongly resisted the accusation that for them God arbitrarily condemns people to death […] Beza shared the common Reformed idea that the fall into sin was somehow willed by God, but in such a way that he is not culpable as the author of sin.” 143 144

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God has eternally determined to execute his decrees. God’s decree of election and reprobation rendered it necessary that he enfold man in sin and disobedience for the sake of the justice and the utter mercy of the decree. In his doctrine of a necessary fall and a necessary imputation of sin, we encounter the clearest note of determinism in the Tabula. Yet Beza falls short of the extreme conclusion of this logic: he states explicitly that God is not the author of sin and that while man sinned by necessity, he did not sin by compulsion.147

Predestination is defended by Beza as foundation of salvation. It functions as guarantee of God’s sovereignty in the salvation of the human race, and for the efficacy of the work of Christ.148 Although at this stage of the development of Orthodoxy predestination is the object of speculative reflection, it does not become a principle from which the entire system is derived. Other concepts, such as the Trinity, the consistency of God’s will, salvation by grace alone, God as good and thus not the author of sin, the gift of salvation in Christ, all function as boundaries of a sort to the definition of predestination, which does become “more precise” but not “more rigid” than before.149 We encounter, to be sure, a rigidly theocentric causality of salvation, but it is hardly more rigid than the predestinarianism of Calvin and far more open than Calvin to the consideration of problems of secondary causality involving the divine permission.150

Weber points out that it is God’s justice that is most threatened in the Reformed doctrine of predestination. Is the execution of the decree of reprobation not actually unjust? He himself is convinced that the self-defense of the Prädestinatianer shows that they felt threatened by it. They were offended that their opponents complained without ceasing that their view made God the author of sin. That would, after all, mean the end of it.151 In spite of the more precise and less rigid formulation, in early Orthodoxy there does appear to be increasing discussion about the problem of the source of evil. According to Weber, the charge of God as auctor peccati will have been as the proverbial red cloth for a bull.152 The result was that many different attempts were made to make clear that this accusation was not warranted, and to that end made use of the scholastic tools that were available. Here we must think particularly of the development of all kinds of distinctions, at times very subtle, and very careful wording in relation to ————— 147 148 149 150 151 152

MULLER, Christ and the Decree, 81–82. MULLER, Christ and the Decree, 179; DEN HARTOGH, Voorzienigheid, 266. MULLER, Christ and the Decree, 171–172; cf. 172–173.178. MULLER, Christ and the Decree, 181. WEBER, Reformation, 90–91. WEBER, Reformation, 92; cf. DEN HARTOGH, Voorzienigheid, 93.

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reprobation such as “not having mercy on,” “leaving in” and “passing over.”153 Zacharius Ursinus, who describes the doctrine of providence as the foundation of all religion and piety, is a good example. Also for him God’s will is the rule of all justice, and the result of God’s acts is always most just, even if He uses evil and sinful instruments. Ursinus paid great attention to God’s permissio, described evil as a defectum, suggested that sin is sin not per se but per accidens, and applied numerous distinctions, including different levels of necessity.154 Among the Reformed, we see increasing uniformity on the doctrine of predestination. This became particularly clear with the conflict between Marbach and Zanchi. This development, however, did not prevent, or perhaps it actually led to,155 the dismissal of Samuel Huber (1547–1624) from Bern in 1586 after a serious confrontation with Beza’s predestination as result of the Colloquy of Montbéliard, and his switch to Lutheranism. The Lutheran Andreae, after a discussion on the Eucharist, person and work of Christ, baptism, etc., during the Colloquoy of Montbéliard pushed an unwilling Beza to express himself on predestination. Beza began his exposition with his principia: God’s wisdom leads to the necessary conclusion that He even before creation determined the end of all things, thus also the manifestation of his mercy in the elect and his justice in the remaining. Everything is deduced from the theological principle of the gloria Dei. Beza places secondary and intermediate causes between God’s hidden decree and the final execution of it. Adam explains that its actual function is the resolution of the problems that come up in the development of Beza’s thought. The differentiation is intended to make it possible for God on the one hand to be the one whose acts are finally determinative, without on the other hand having the guilt of condemnation attributed to Him.156 Huber’s protest against the Bern delegates signing Beza’s exposition of the Reformed doctrine of predestination and others, led during the Bern Colloquy of 1588 to Huber’s removal from office. When Huber then con————— Cf. WEBER, Reformation, 90–91. DEN HARTOGH, Voorzienigheid, 83–87.92–97.100.103; DONNELLY, Scholasticism, 187; WEBER, Reformation, 91. 155 Cf. ADAM, Streit, 18, who is of the opinion that “im Zuge der theologischen Verengung und Verhärtung der Positionen ein innerprotestantisches ‘Überwechseln’ bzw. ein Ausscheidungsprozeß stattfand. Im einen Falle wurde durch die Entwicklung zur Orthodoxie der Konkordienformel hin eine Reihe von Theologen zur reformierten Kirche hinübergdrängt, im andern Fall kamen Elemente Lutherscher oder luthernaher Theologie im Denken Samuel Hubers angesichts der Genfer Orthodoxie zu solcher Ausprägung, daß er nicht mehr in der Schweiz bleiben konnte.” 156 ADAM, Streit, 35–36, cf.: “ne causa huius damnationis Deo tribuatur, quae solius hominis malitiae adscribenda est.” 153 154

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tinued to sow unrest, he was taken captive and banned, after which he sought refuge in Württemberg.157 Huber’s view during the Bern Colloquy, and the reaction of several of the theologians present, are extremely interesting. Huber emphasizes the universality of the work of Christ and of the gospel. He protests against any formulation that suggests God would not have condemned humanity on account of sin and “that it so pleased Him to desire to display to them the great power of his wrath” (das im also gfallenn hab, dan er wölle an inen beweysenn sin grosse macht, sines zorns). God is not the author of damnation.158 Abraham Musculus calls the different consequences that Huber held to follow necessarily from a particular understanding of the promises simply “long-winded and useless nonsense” (lang und unnütz geschwetz). He attacks Huber’s view that the godless would be condemned only for rejecting the salvation that is offered them. God has, as he sees it, reprobated a certain number of people in a manner that is fully parallel with election: there is a distinct decree of reprobation of God (es gibt einen ausgesprochenen Verwerfungs-Ratschluß Gottes). God’s reprobation does not exclude but includes damnation on account of unbelief and sin. From Huber’s view that the godless are condemned, not through the decision of God’s counsel but only on account of their unbelief, Musculus concludes that Huber thereby locates faith and repentance in the human free will. He thus considers Huber to be a Pelagian.159 The different point of reference for the different parties is important. Musculus appeals to the consensus universalis of the Reformed churches, and thus suggests that Huber is threatening the unity of the Reformed churches. Also the Zürich delegates appeal to a certain consensus. They point to the Bolsec affair, the conflict between Marbach and Zanchi in Strasbourg, and the dispute between Vermigli and Bibliander in Zürich. In 1588 these three events were thus considered to be important markers as to what could be considered the Reformed doctrine of predestination. Adam points out that Huber, on the other hand, appeals to what he identifies as a type of Reformed theology other than that represented by Beza. The theologians to whom Huber appeals have this in common, that they all promoted a variant of Reformed theology that existed before and aside from Calvin, and was in fact largely independent of him.160 As result of all these troubles, Huber crossed lines and joined the Lutherans. In his inaugural speech of 1592 in Wittenberg, he addressed the prob————— 157 158 159 160

ADAM, Streit, 50–53. ADAM, Streit, 58–59.62.65. ADAM, Streit, 70–71. ADAM, Streit, 72–75.79.84.

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lem of intra-Protestant theological controversy.161 Theologians such as Grynaeus, Kimedoncius, Pareus, Danaeus, Tossanus, Calvin and Beza were all referred to. The most important reproach Huber directed against the Calvinists is that they make God the author of evil.162 However, it is not only the Calvinists whom Huber criticized. Also the Lutheran Aegidius Hunnius (1550–1603), since 1592 professor at Wittenberg and thus a colleague of Huber, was accused by the latter of a view of predestination that was too close to that of the Calvinists.163 What happened thereafter was a virtual repeat of the events in Bern. In 1594, Huber was dismissed and finally sent out of Wittenberg because he caused unrest and disseminated his views on predestination among the citizens and students.164 Adam describes Huber’s standpoint in his conflict with Hunnius. It is important to note because of the striking points of agreement with the thought of Arminius: God neither can nor may ever to be the author of evil. For Huber, as he shows in different ways, this is the main battle in the election question: not even a shadow of particularism is allowed to be cast on God. God may not in any case, and in no respect, be the cause or author of evil. People force Him to exclude them from salvation only through unbelief. This view without doubt implies a negative human freedom, that is, that a person can turn away from salvation. Nevertheless, as one could perhaps expect, the question of “freedom and grace” as such is not developed any further. The two formulations concerning salvation respectu Dei and respectu hominis are set diametrically over against one another, yet no attempt whatsoever is made to reconcile them. From that it becomes clear that Huber’s view is not driven by a concern to protect the freedom of the human will.165

Huber did not occupy himself with questions of the freedom of the will, even though he was accused of Pelagianism. Nowhere does he teach free ————— 161 For Huber and Hunnius, see e.g. DINGEL/WARTENBERG, Wittenberg, 184–187.207.209. 223–225; SÖDERLUND, Ex Praevisa Fide, 49.59–69; see also 153–159. 162 ADAM, Streit, 105. 163 For Hunnius, see e.g. MAHLMANN, “Hunnius”, 703–707; MATTHIAS, Theologie und Konfession, especially 137–149. 164 ADAM, Streit, 108–109. 165 ADAM, Streit, 120: “Gott kann und darf nie Urheber des Unheils sein. Dies ist für Huber, wie er verschiedentlich betont, der Hauptstreit in der Erwählungsfrage: kein Schatten des Partikularismus darf auf Gott fallen. Gott darf in keinem Falle und in keiner Hinsicht Ursache oder Verursacher des Unheils sein. Die Menschen zwingen ihn lediglich durch Unglauben dazu, sie vom Heil auszuschließen. Diese Aussage impliziert ohne Zweifel eine negative Freiheit des Menschen, insofern er sich vom Heil abwenden kann. Dennoch wird, wie man vielleicht erwarten könnte, die Frage ‘Freiheit und Gnade’ als solche nicht weiter thematisiert. Es werden die beiden Aussagereihen über das Heil ‘respectu Dei’ und ‘respectu Hominis’ in der schroffen Antithetik einander gegenübergestellt, jedoch wird keinerlei Vermittlung versucht. Damit ist deutlich, daß die Interpretation Hubers sich nicht von der Sorge um die Wahrung der menschlichen Willensfreiheit leiten läßt.”

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will, but he does admit the possibility of resisting grace, the Word and the work of Christ. But with that Huber does not want to introduce the freedom of the will as a human quality, as an anthropological essential attribute, but for him everything centers around the question of the possibility of damnation as a just punishment from God. [...] That is, the “free will” is not a central theme, but comes up only as conclusion from experience, from reality. Damnation can only be a punishment if the human being is responsible for his or her fall. That humanity bears this responsibility means that God is acquitted.166

As a last example, we come to the conflict that took place in England surrounding the thought of Peter Baro (1534–1599).167 Baro, a French refugee, was appointed in 1574 as Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity in Cambridge. Problems surrounding Baro’s generally known sentiments concerning predestination first arose in the 1590s. As result, Baro was not reappointed to this post in 1596. In that same year, Baro wrote a letter to Hemmingius in which he set forth the three different views on predestination that were current in the Reformed camp. “The first, and today the most celebrated but nevertheless no less combated” view (Prima valde quidem hodie celebrata, nec minus tamen impugnata), is that of Calvin and Beza. Baro lays out their view in ways that would later be called “supralapsarian.” According to Baro, the greatest problem with this view is that it is hardly, if ————— 166 ADAM, Streit, 120: “Doch damit will Huber nicht die Willensfreiheit als eine menschliche Qualität einführen, als anthropologische Wesensbestimmung, sondern es geht ihm um die Frage der Bedingung der Möglichkeit der Verdammung als eines gerechten Strafaktes Gottes. […] D.h., der ‘freie Wille’ ist kein zentrales Thema, sondern ergibt sich erst im Rückschluß von der Erfahrung, von der Wirklichkeit her: Die Verwerfung kann nur dann Strafe sein, wenn der Mensch die Verantwortung für seinen Abfall trägt. Solche Belastung des Menschen meint die Entlastung Gottes”; cf. 162: “Für Huber besteht das entscheidende Kriterium rechter Lehre von der Gnadenwahl darin, daß Gott keine Schuld an der Verwerfung trifft, daß auf Gott auch nicht der geringste Schatten eines Verdachtes oder einer Mitbeteiligung an dem partikularen Ausgang des heilsgeschehens fällt.” Cf. ADAM, Streit, 128–131 for Hunnius’s view which takes a middle position between the particularism of Calvinism and Huber’s universalism. According to Hunnius, election does not pertain to the voluntas antecedens of God (as Calvin and Huber would have it), but to the voluntas consequens. Election thus takes place on the basis of hearing and believing the offered message. Hunnius solves the problem as to how something that occurs later (faith) can form the basis of something that takes place earlier (election) by an appeal to the fact that all of time is for God an eternal now. 167 STANGLIN, “Baro”, 51–74; see this article for more bibliographical details. See also e.g. BOUGHTON, “Supralapsarianism”, 88–89, for examples from the English context pertaining to reflection on God’s relationship to evil. Boughton here speaks about “Perkins’s concept of God as a ‘powerful effector’ of evil who is wholly concerned with promotion of his own glory”, and about Preston who argued that “God was devoid of qualities such as justice. By willing things to be, God produced a standard of justice for men but the nature of this standard was not subject to anything in the divine essence or attributes. Consequently God had no interest in the quality, extent, duration of human suffering and took no delight in righteousness.”

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at all, possible to comprehend how God is just as much the author of evil as of good, and of human condemnation as well as salvation.168 The second view, which Baro says was held by the likes of the late Augustine, Sohn of Heidelberg, Zanchi and Bellarmine, is depicted in “infralapsarian” terms. This view has in common with the first that both posit that God from eternity decided to elect a fixed number of people, and to reprobate the others. According to Baro, it is most clear that both of these views subject humanity to an inevitable necessity. People are either necessarily saved, or necessarily lost. Baro considers these two views lead to countless absurdities (innumera nascuntur absurda).169 The most important motive for another, third view thus lays in Baro’s desire to avoid making God appear as author of sin and condemnation. This view, which Baro himself holds and attributes to Melanchthon, Hemmingius and Snecanus as well, considers predestination to be unchangeable in God, but still denies that predestination makes the human will unchangeable and that it imposes a necessity upon it, “lest by such conclusions it should cause God to appear as the Author of sin and of the perdition of men.”170

————— 168 “Licet, hoc posito, vis ac ne vix quidem intelligi posit, quomodo Deus non sit tam mali quam boni, tamque hominum exitii quam salutis autor habendus.” BARO, Summa Trium de Praedestinatione sententiarum, in: Ep.Ecc. 15, 29–30 (I 92–100). 169 “Secunda autem haec sententia cum priori illa in hoc consentit, quod utraque velit, Deum ab aeterno decrevisse certum certorum numerum eligere, reliquos vero reprobare […]. Unde manifestum est, utramque sententiam inevitabilem himinibus imponere necessitate, unis quidem ut serventur, alteris vero ut pereant. Unde innumera nascuntur absurda.” Ep.Ecc. 15, 30 (I 93–95). Cf. Baro’s summary of these two positions, Ep.Ecc. 15, 31–32 (I 99): “Duae igitur sententiae primae, ut hoc repetam, hoc nituntur fundamento, quod tamen tertia ut falsum et Sacris Literis, Deique bonitati contrarium refugit, videlicet, Deum ab aeterno, nulla habita ratione peccati, sed absoluta sua voluntate cui nemo resistere possit, longe maximam humani generis partem reprobare et ad aeternum exitium creare, (ut statuit prima) aut in Adami ruina deserere (ut secunda) immutabili atque irrevocabili decreto apud se constituisse; illos qui ex reproborum sint numero necessario atque inevitabiliter quotidie nasci et perire; utpote quos Deus, aut nunquam sua gratia dignetur, aut si quibusdam ex illis, veluti iis, qui in Dei Ecclesia versantur, eam in verbo, aut etiam Sacramentis offerat, id eum non serio, hoc est, ut per eam serventur, facere; sed contra, ut hi minus sint quam reliqui excusabiles, graviusque tandem puniantur: Neque enim pro his Christum venisse, mortuumve esse, nec ejus beneficium ad hujusmodi hominess magis, quam ad saxa aut bruta, ipsosve diabolos pertinere: quum a Deo ab aeterno reprobate et in hunc finem proprie create, vel (quod eodem recidit) in massa perdita relicti sint, ut aeterno exitio addicerentur. Hoc, inquam est duarum sententiarum priorum fundamentum, quod tertia vehementer improbat. Cui vicissim illae Pelagianismum objiciunt, sed immerito.” 170 Ep.Ecc. 15, 98 (I 98).

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7.3.3 Summary and Conclusion This ends our overview of the sixteenth-century debate on God’s relation to sin and evil. Only the most significant controversies have been highlighted, and many more examples could be given. At the end of the sixteenth century, discussions were taking place at the same time within Calvinism, Lutheranism and Roman Catholicism, which in spite of their differences, all concentrated on the decretum absolutum and the consequences of certain views for other parts of theology, in particular the doctrine of God.171 On the basis of his work on Baro and Arminius, Stanglin writes that a great deal of variety and lack of codification existed in this period of early Protestant orthodoxy (ca. 1565–ca. 1640) with respect to the fundamental Reformed doctrine of predestination and the so-called lapsarian question. The controversies involving Baro and Arminius pointed out the need for greater clarification, and helped shape the Reformed orthodoxy of the seventeenth century.172

The primary basis for Calvin’s defense of God’s justice was the appeal to the unknowability of God’s justice for the limited capacity of the human mind; secondary is his appeal to several logical distinctions. After Calvin, and in increasing measure in Reformed Scholasticism and Orthodoxy as it developed, the logical distinctions assume the primary role while the appeal to God’s unknowability lessens, and that because exactly on this point there was a (gradual) distancing from Calvin’s view. Among the distinctions used, that between various types of necessity is most important. Vermigli’s interpretation of Aristotle’s hekousion as spontaneity, where spontaneity serves as the sufficient condition for human responsibility (see 2.1.4), shows itself to have been extremely influential. The increased use of scholastic method, also for defending God’s justice in unconditional predestination, was accompanied by decreased leeway for variant interpretations. This was undoubtedly connected to the process of confessionalization that occurred simultaneously with the arrival of early Orthodoxy and Reformed scholasticism.173 Towards the end of the sixteenth century, it appears to have been a shrinking minority within the Reformed camp that did not stand by the theological and rational defense against accusations that unconditional predestination implied God’s authorship of ————— Cf. ADAM, Streit, 153. STANGLIN, “Baro”, 52–53. 173 Cf. AUGUSTIJN, “Het Nederlandse Protestantisme”, 29, on the nature of the conflicts that took place within the Reformed church in the Netherlands since the 1580s: “De tweevoudige aard der conflicten doet men het meest recht door primair te denken aan een proces van uniformering binnen de kerk in calvinistische zin, waarin algemeen gereformeerde theologieën en theologen, teruggaande op Zürich en Heidelberg, allengs werden uitgestoten.” 171 172

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sin and evil. Some, such as Huber and Baro, began to dialogue on these questions with their colleagues, but the theological climate was such that criticism of the view of the majority was hardly tolerated and could result in being marginalized. It was in this theological climate that Arminius received his theological education and as a young pastor developed his own views. With him there is no place for “Calvin’s” appeal to the unknowability of God’s justice that ostensibly results from the limits to human understanding, and at the same time he is unconvinced of the validity of the customary distinctions insofar as they do not have a place for “real” free choice. The problem of God’s justice in relation to evil thus looms large for him and demands that he think it through on his own and come up with his own position. Arminius appears to stand in the tradition of those who in the sixteenth century protested against the results of a causally deterministic system where the zeal for God’s sovereignty, the sola gratia and the assurance of faith resulted, as they saw it, in God’s authorship of sin. He distinguishes himself by his own approach, and joins himself with certain theological developments in his time. As his orthodox contemporaries, he shows great interest in the mutual relationship of Christology and predestination, but consistently with his own emphasis on the absolute primacy of God’s justice as foundation of theology.174 In the sixteenth century, a stream of theology can clearly be identified that is typified by a concern not to give occasion for the charge that God becomes the author of sin and evil. Arminius’s emphasis on God’s justice may have been the cause of his own concern for it, or else its result, or even both. His view of the knowledge (or rather knowability) of God(’s justice) was also decisive. In his departure from Calvin’s argument on the inability to comprehend and know God, and in his criticism of the validity of certain scholastic arguments used by his contemporaries, Arminius shows himself to be a theologian of his time. Within the carefully determined limits which he prepared for the free choice, dependent on God’s grace, a necessary consequence becomes visible of various elements that naturally aroused heated reactions from “Calvin/Beza”-theologians. This reaction mirrors the ————— 174 Sinnema’s conclusions on the doctrine of reprobation are fully in line with this: “It was especially his insistance that sin is the meriting cause of preterition that set his [Arminius’, wdb] position apart from the dominant trend in Reformed thinking.” SINNEMA, Reprobation, 150; cf. 447. CLARKE, “Understanding”, 33 is incorrect in arguing that the emphasis of Arminius’s criticism in the Declaration is “significantly different” from his earlier position: “Earlier criticisms, like those that predestination has reference to man as a sinner, and that the Calvinist view makes God the author of sin and denies human free-will, reappear, but in positions which indicate that they are now regarded as secondary. In general, Arminius’s standpoint has become less logical and anthropocentric and more theological and Christocentric.”

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great opposition experienced earlier by theologians who had held views similar to those of Arminius. This chapter was introduced with a citation from Gomarus’s corrollarium on his predestination theses from 1604. Gomarus limited himself to deny “with justice” (merito negamus) that this doctrine makes God the author of sin. With that, Gomarus appears to follow the broader trend and does not consider it necessary to explain and prove what for most of his contemporaries was indisputable. From that perspective, Arminius’s reaction to the corrollarium is all the more significant. He establishes the tone with the remark that the view that makes God the author of sin is the most serious blasphemy of all. He then admits that there is no one who would ever want to spew forth such calumnies about our good God; even the worst of all heretics, the Manichees, devised another god so as to not attribute to God the authorship of sin. None of the doctors of the Reformed churches can be reproached for explicitly making God the author of sin. Indeed, one cannot but acknowledge that they explicitly denied this, and superbly defended themselves from such accusations. However, someone may teach something that, unbeknownst to him, implies that God through that teaching becomes the author of sin. If that is the case, its proponents may not be accused of making God the author of sin, but they still must be urged to abandon and reject their view. It is in this way that Castellio, Coornhert, Lutherans and Catholics all charged some of the teachers of the Reformed churches that one must necessarily conclude that God is the author of sin from their views on predestination and providence. The arguments used to prove that this blasphemy results from their views should be given careful consideration. According to Arminius, it is not fair to attribute the views of some doctors, like Calvin and Beza, to the Reformed Church as a whole. Something is, and is accepted as, the doctrine of the Church only when taken up into the confessions. Arminius calls his contemporaries to consider, without regard for the persons involved, whether or not from a particular view one can draw the just conclusion that God becomes the author of sin.175 Gomarus may well pretend that the churches stand united on this point without dispute, but according to Arminius there are not a few ministers of the gospel who consider that one can justly deduce God’s authorship of sin from Calvin’s and Beza’s view of predestination and providence. Arminius closes his Examen thesium Gomari with a personal confession: “I, however, freely and openly affirm, that it seems to me to follow certainly from those theses, that God is the author of sin; nor this alone, but also that God really sins, nay, that God alone sins: whence it necessarily follows ————— 175

ETG 155–156 (III 656).

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that sin is not sin, because God cannot sin; that is, that that deed which has been committed by man, and which is called ‘sin,’ is not sin; [...] Meanwhile I profess that I detest from my soul the Pelagian dogmas.” Arminius goes on to urge Gomarus to defend himself in face of the accusations the Catholic counter-reformed Bellarmine made on this point against certain Reformed teachers. Arminius does not hesitate to say that this false doctrine has crept into the hearts of good people through Satan’s subtlety, and that they, albeit unknowingly and unintentionally, have done a work for the kingdom of Satan.176 Arminius’s asymmetrical view on the cause of salvation and of damnation, where salvation is attributed entirely to God’s grace and mercy in the atonement of Jesus Christ, and condemnation to persistent unbelief, together with the fundamental place he gives to Jesus Christ and the radical opposition he draws between faith and works, illustrates the Reformed character177 of his theology. However, the fact remains that Arminius developed and perpetuated this variation on Reformed theology in a manner, time and context in which a significant mainstream did not view it as a variation (any longer) but rather as a deviation, and it is for that reason – as may be expected in the context of Orthodoxy – that he encountered opposition. All kinds of factors of a personal and political nature hindered openness and frank discussion during Arminius’s life and especially after, and mistrust and suspicion stifled any conciliatory attitude whatsoever. Attempts at mutual understanding were rare. As result, the condemnation of Arminius and a part of the early Remonstrant doctrine lacked open discussion and well-argued refutations of the deepest theological motives that lay at the root of this theology (cf. chapter 6).178

————— 176 177

ETG 156–158 (III 657–658). Cf. section 5.3 and DEN BOER, “Met onderscheidingsvermogen”; DEN BOER, “Cum delec-

tu”. 178 Cf. SINNEMA, Reprobation, 448, for the treatment of reprobation at the Synod of Dort: “Much of the basic Remonstrant teaching that God reprobates unbelievers foreseen to persevere in their unbelief remained untouched. Though there were genuine differences, the two sides were closer than the intensity of the debates allowed them to believe.”

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8. Conclusions

Justice (iustitia) is not only in the doctrine of God, but also in the entire structure of Arminius’s theology the fundamental concept. In this concluding chapter, I would like to draw attention once again to the following highlights: God’s essence is characterized by justice (2.2.1). The consequences of this for the doctrine of God are consistently drawn (3.1). God’s justice is of primary importance for bringing a person to honor and worship God (2.2.2), and receives in the central duplex amor Dei concept a place and function that reflects that importance (4). Especially when God’s relation to sin, evil, unbelief, reprobation and condemnation come up, Arminius is very careful to protect God’s justice so that it cannot be doubted for even a moment (3.1.2; 3.2; 3.3.2; 5.2.1). Also the smallest occasion for the suggestion that God could be the author of sin – the worst blasphemy one could think up – must be zealously countered (e.g. 7.3). Over against many of his contemporaries, Arminius’s stance is remarkable when he refuses to be content when the logical conclusion (of, among others, the doctrine of unconditional predestination) implies that God is the author of sin and is avoided (as with Calvin) through an appeal to the limitation of the sinful and human understanding (2.3; cf. 7.2). Arminius’s divergent viewpoint with respect to the degree of freedom that is sufficient for responsibility is also very significant: not spontaneity or absence of coercion, but freedom of indifference is what makes a person responsible (3.1.1; 7.3.2–3). The controversial aspects of Arminius’s theology showed themselves to be inseparably tied to the aforementioned structural place God’s justice has in his thought. Arminius’s interpretation of such themes as predestination, the operation of grace, atonement, freedom of the will, and assurance of faith (5.1), were all consequences of his view on God’s justice. The particularly fundamental place and function of Christ the Mediator on account of his substitutionary satisfaction of God’s justice is worth special mention (3.3.1; 5.1.3). Everything appears to suggest that Arminius’s opponents had absolutely no or very little recognition of the inseparable context of the defense of God’s justice from which the controversial and “heterodox” themes of Arminius’s theology originated (cf. chapter 6). From that perspective, the storm of criticism that broke out over Arminius’s theology can easily be understood. The personal intentions and motivations behind Arminius’s theological viewpoints seem to have been neither recognized nor under-

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stood, and as result the controversial elements were taken out of their context and judged by norms that were essentially foreign to it. The typically Reformed doctrines that were treated in 5.2 do receive accents that fit with his theology as a whole, but they nevertheless remain well within the scope of Reformed theology (cf. chapter 7). On the basis of these conclusions, the qualification of a theology in which the human free will plays a large, or even the decisive, role in the appropriation of salvation as “Arminian” is from a historical perspective improper, since it does not do justice to Arminius’s own theological motives. The term “Remonstrant” is most probably more proper for such a theology. Arminius’s emphasis on justice as the foundation of theology and religion, and the criticism that flowed out of that on the dominant theologies where (according to Arminius, one-sided) emphasis on God’s sovereignty appeared to have repercussions for God’s justice, can be viewed as a valuable contribution to the theology of that time. Arminius was further convinced that in his theology, God’s sovereignty and grace were not harmed in any way. Free will receives its rightful place as the defining characteristic of humanity, which is particularly important when it concerns humankind’s position of responsibility before God. But as soon as it concerns the appropriation of grace, it appears that the freedom of the will to receive the gospel (Evangelium) is entirely dependent on God’s liberating grace, while the freedom of the will to sin continues to receive all emphasis. At every level Arminius’s theology shows itself to be centered on God’s justice and goodness, and on the full one-sided responsibility of humans for sin and evil. On this basis I plead – in line with Lord’s Day 43 of the Heidelberg Catechism – for a more nuanced terminology so that Arminius’s person and name are not unjustly connected to any and every view that sounds like a Remonstrant error. In 1.1 I already noted that I would finally consider whether the decision not to use the disputations held under Arminius’s presidence as primary source material was determinative for the results of this study. The following conclusions can be drawn from an analysis of the disputations vis à vis the conclusions that have already been drawn concerning Arminius’s theology: 1. The content of the disputations nowhere conflicts with our conclusions. 2. In all the disputations, the topic of God’s justice has a relatively less pregnant place in comparison to Arminius’s other writings. However, this can largely be attributed to the fact that most disputations deal with noncontroversial topics (cf. 2.2.3). When the disputations treat topics that Arminius in his other extant writings connects with God’s justice, they consistently draw the same connection. 3. The disputations do not hint at the establishment of a theological intention and motive other than what has

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been concluded above in respect to Arminius’s other writings. 4. The disputations can on many occasions only confirm the picture that emerges from Arminius’s other writings; they very clearly evidence the pattern of Arminius’s views.1 5. However, as Arminius’s own remarks also evidence, the disputations are incomplete on the controversial points and therefore not indicative of Arminius’s (full) vision on these points. There is no reason to suspect that such incompleteness applies to Arminius’s other writings as well. For that reason, it can be concluded that the primary use of Arminius’s extant writings with the exception of the disputations, and the relegation of the disputations as secondary source material, nowhere disadvantaged the results of the study. The concentration on sources, concerning which one can believe that they contain Arminius’s view completely and plainly, in fact probably allowed us to discover Arminius’s theological motives more quickly, and undoubtedly with more certainty. On the one hand, our conclusions do not conflict with what has been noted about Arminius’s theology on God’s justice in the secondary literature.2 On the other hand, they justify the conclusion that God’s justice in general, and the related concept of the duplex amor Dei, must be accorded a much more important place than has been done up to the present time. Insight into Arminius’s view of God’s justice, as well as the place and function of the concept of justice in his theology, is absolutely imperative for a clear understanding of his theology and of his motives in their original context. For that reason, there is all the more reason for renewed – or simply new – investigation of the Remonstrant conflicts and the Synod of Dort. In this context, a work from Roger E. Olson (2006) is deserving of our attention. Olson treats the “myths and realities” of Arminian theology. In chapter 4 he deals with the myth that the core of Arminianism is the free will. Olson’s response fully agrees with our own conclusions on the place and importance of God’s justice in Arminius’s theology. He writes: “Perhaps the most damaging calumny spread by critics against Arminianism is ————— 1 The most “typically Arminian” passages are the following: PuD VII (II 153–154); VIII (II 161–162); IX (II 163.177); X (II 188–189); XII (II 198); XIV (II 221–122); XVII (II 233); PrD XVII (II 342); XVIII (II 344); XIX (II 346); XX (II 347–348); XXI (II 350.352); XXVII (II 365); XXVIII (II 367); XXX (II 372); XXXII (II 376–377); XXXIII (II 378–379); XXXIX (II 391); XL (II 392–393); XVI (394–395); XLIV (II 401); XLVIII (II 406.408). 2 See SCHWEIZER, Centraldogmen II, 51.55–56.62–63.72.97–98; MULLER, God, Creation, and Providence, 113–114.138–139.195 and especially 199–202; MULLER, “Integrity”, 442.445– 446; DEKKER, Rijker dan Midas, 170–171; WITT, Creation, Redemption and Grace, 307– 310.622.678–679.690; GRAAFLAND, Verkiezing, 92–93.; HOENDERDAAL, “Theologische betekenis”, 94; HOENDERDAAL, “Debate about Arminius”, 138; HICKS, Theology of Grace, 72–73; BANGS, “Arminius and the Reformation”, 166; BANGS, “‘Arminius as a Reformed Theologian”, 221; SINNEMA, Reprobation, 149–150. cf. DELL, Man’s Freedom and Bondage, 152–153.

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that it begins with and is controlled by belief in freedom of the will. Even some Arminians have come to believe this! But it is simply wrong.”3 According to Olsen, the most important principle of Arminian theology is “the character of God.” What he writes about the Arminians is at least true for Arminius himself: Arminians believe in free will because they see it everywhere assumed in the Bible, and because it is necessary to protect God’s reputation. […] Arminians do not see any way to embrace divine determinism (monergism) and avoid making God the author of sin and evil. […] the real reason Arminians reject divine control of every human choice and action is that this would make God the author of sin and evil. For Arminians this makes God at least morally ambiguous and at worst the only sinner.4

————— OLSON, Arminian Theology, 97. OLSON, Arminian Theology, 98–99. Also interesting are Olson’s remarks about the arguments Arminians do not use against determinism: “not because they are charmed by some modern commitment to humanistic freedom […] not because they do not believe in God’s ordaining power.” For what Olson writes about Arminius’s theology, in line with our own conclusions, see OLSON, Arminian Theology, 102–105. 3 4

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Index of Subjects

Accommodation, 74, 78–79, 90, 289, 292 Anthropology, 111, 136–140, 220 Anthropomorphism, 180 Arianism, 274 Arminianism, arminians, 11, 44, 327 Assurance (certitudo), 37, 164, 167–176, 194–197, 238–239, 257–258, 261, 264, 268–269 Atonement, 89, 115, 120, 122, 130, 216, 239 particular and universal, 185–186, 266 relation to election, 232 extent, 129–130, 142, 185–186, 231– 238, 270 Autonomy, 187, 194 Believe, opportunity to, 69 Biblical humanism, 280, 299 Blasphemy, 82, 92, 102, 107, 146, 244, 285, 287, 323 Call, internal, see: Gospel, offer of the (preaching) Calvinism, calvinists, 11, 44, 200, 215, 318 Canons of Dordt, 213, 215 Carelessness (securitas), 37, 164, 167–176, 195, 197, 242, 247, 258, 260–261, 263, 265 Children (dying in infancy), 220 Christ Christology, 37–38, 114–122 foundation of election, 173 Mediator, 67–69, 84, 89–90, 114–115, 117, 119, 122, 141, 148–150, 156, 158, 179, 205 place of Christ, 17, 165, 231–238 priesthood, 17, 169–170 relation to election, 231–232, 236, 269 relation to predestination, 118–119, 122 relation to the covenant, 114 satisfaction, 38, 51, 53, 55, 85, 115, 122, 130, 158, 162–163, 170, 178, 185, 227, 230, 232, 234 subordination, 68, 117 sufficiency of his death, 232, 234–235, 271 union with Christ, 195, 202 Church fathers, 14

Church, 142, 169, 245 Coercion, necessity, 50, 56–57, 59, 95, 102, 183, 267, 304, 311, 314 Command to believe, 237, 244 Concursus, 90, 96–98, 179, 190 Conditionality of the command to believe, 237, 244 Confession, 21, 274 Belgic Confession, 14, 211, 220 Contingency, 17, 51, 57, 76, 98, 100, 103, 112, 147–148 Conventus praeparatorius, 19 Correspondence of Arminius, 23–24 Counter-Remonstrance/Remonstrants, 212– 279 Covenant, 49, 158, 229 covenant (foedus), 53, 66–67, 87–90, 101, 105, 114–117, 127, 149, 205 covenant (pactum), 53, 89, 115–117, 123, 149, 169 covenant-predestination, 124 Creation, 21, 36, 54, 65–66, 86–87, 101, 104 creation to destruction/damnation, 85, 87, 105, 227, 276 integrity of creation, 105–106, 166 Decree, 67, 169 Despair (desperatio), 37, 164, 167–176, 195, 197, 238, 247, 264–265 Determinism, 194, 308 Developments in Arminius’s thought, 40 Disputations, 16, 22, 170–171 authorship, 23–34, 171 Dominicans, 275 Duplex amor Dei, 17, 42, 45–46, 55, 69, 154–166, 173, 175, 197, 233–234 Enthusiasm, 251 Evangelical and Legal theology, 38, 53, 63, 66–69, 87–90, 113, 128, 130, 156, 162– 163, 200, 205 Evangelical movement, 11 Faith, 90, 135, 142, 178, 202–203, 224–225, 228–229 Faith and justification, 205–206 Faith and unbelief, incongruity of causes of, 255–256

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Index of Subjects

Faith, infused/habitual, 241, 260 Faith, necessity of, 117–118, 123, 126– 130, 169, 269 Fall, the, 53, 67, 88–89, 105, 127–128, 166, 197–200 necessity, 85 results, 188–189 Foreknowledge, 17, 98, 107, 110–112, 119– 120, 126–127, 133–134, 143–148, 150, 178, 180, 183, 194, 196, 229 Foundation of (christian) religion, 69, 118, 125, 154–176, 197, 263 Free choice (liberum arbitrium), 11, 15, 17, 31, 49–50, 54, 57, 91, 93, 97, 102, 111, 120, 182–184, 187–194, 199, 202, 240 Free choice and grace, 182, 189–191, 201– 202 Freedom (of indifference), 55–59 Freedom, theologian of, 36 God, (doctrine of), 81–86 acts, 65–66 authorship of sin, 17, 19–20, 51, 56, 75, 87, 92, 94–95, 103–104, 107–109, 146, 200, 218, 230, 283, 293–320– 323, 328 essence, 228, 287–288 freedom of his will, 81–82, 114 freedom, 285 goodness of, 82, 99 immutability, 228 justice and wisdom, relationship in God, 84, 86, 157, 159 justice as arbiter and norm, 82–83, 85, 90, 101–104, 108 justice as moderator, 157 justice of God and the Gospel, 113–153 justice of God, 38, 42, 44–46, 49–177 knowability of God’s justice, 65, 71–75, 79, 230–231, 281–294, 321–322 knowledge of God, 143–148 nature, 21, 64–65, 71, 155, 225, 228, 236, 246 power, 103 right and power, 101–102 right, 186, 104 self-limitation, 36, 102–105 sin (the Fall) and God’s justice, 106–113 simplicity, 63, 287–288, 292 sovereignty, 11 will, 17, 66, 98–100, 134, 193 wisdom as mediator, 83–86 wisdom, 115, 316 Godliness, 272

Good works, 53, 207, 229 Gospel, offer of the, (preaching), 19, 130, 134, 139–143, 182, 191, 193, 225, 234– 237, 242–244, 250, 252, 268, 271 Gospel, proclamation of, see: Gospel, offer of the (preaching) Grace (mercy), 54–55, 89, 110, 127, 178, 184, 228, 239–256 common and particular, 183 efficacy, 109–110, 120, 179, 180–181, 183 essence, 200–202 free grace, 11 (Ir)resistibility, 56, 96, 110, 133, 166, 179–184, 187, 199, 201, 240–242, 246–249, 252, 254–255, 265, 271– 272 necessity, 134, 199–202 operation, 239–256 sufficiency (of means), 19, 96, 109–110, 120–121, 128–129, 179–181, 183, 187, 191, 245, 264, 270 universal, 16 Hague Conference (Schriftelicke Conferentie), 11, 22, 43, 46, 211–279 Harmony, 52 Heidelberg Catechism, 14, 211, 220, 245 Holy Spirit, (work of the), 135, 182–183, 193–194, 199, see also: Testimony Human reason, 236 Humanism, (biblical), 35, 309 Imputation, 205–206 Incomprehensibility (of God’s acts), 74, 223, 243, 288, 291, 297, 309 Infallibility, 179 Infralapsarianism, 56, 166, 320 Infusion of faith, see: faith, infused/habitual Intellectualism, 36, 74–75, 83, 100, 280–294 (Ir)resistibility, see: Grace Iustitia rigida, 68, 117 Jesuits, 256, 275 Justice essence, 50 history of the concept, 59–62 remunerative and vindictive, 52–54 vindictive, 83, 85, 88 Justification, 15, 38, 203–206 Knowability of God’s justice, see: God (doctrine of) Law, 49–50, 56, 136, 140 Libertines, 295 Logic, 51, 73, 119, 131, 233

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Index of Subjects Lutheranism, Lutherans, 275, 295, 316–317, 323 Manicheism, 94, 305, 309, 323 Marcionite dualism, 297 Means, 259–260 Methodist movement, 44 Middle Ages, 60 Middle knowledge (scientia media), 141, 143–148, 150, 179–183, 194 Motive of Arminius’s theology, 40, 42, 45– 46 Necessity (necessitas), 51, 76–77, 82, 100, 103, 107, 147, 168, 219, 224, 312 of (means of) grace, 134 of sin, 54, 85, 107, 125 Nominalism, 294 Order, 51–52, 68, 120, 126, 142, 161–164, 232, 234, 236 Ordinatio (ordering), 125 Papacy, 257 Pelagianism, 14, 179, 189–190, 201, 295– 298, 305, 309, 317–318, 324 Perfection, perfectionism, 14, 207 Permissio (permission), 91–95, 97–98, 103– 104, 305, 314, 316 Perseverance, 88, 134–143, 194–197, 228, 257–266, 272 Potentia absoluta/ordinata, 283–286, 288– 289, 297 Practical theology (vs theoretical, speculative), 39, 64, 78–79, 162 Prayer, 195, 259–261 Predestination, 14–15, 17, 21, 54, 168, 124 cause, 125, 132–133, 266 definition, 126 Eigenschappen-predestinatie, 15, 124 four-decree structure, 148–150, 165 object, 15–16, 56, 111–112, 122–134, 217–231 relation of election and reprobation, 131– 134, 178, 227, 305 relation to faith, 202 relation to providence, see: providence reprobation, see: reprobation (un)conditional/absolute, 56, 161–162, 178–179, 229–230, 241 Prolegomena, 17, 49–80 Providence, 65–66, 86–87, 90–98, 100, 106 relation to predestination, 118, 125, 183, 299–300 relation to sin (Fall), 91–95, 109–110 Ramistic logic, 13–14 Reformation (the), 43–45

339

Reformed churches, 274, 295 Reformed orthodoxy, 58–59, 308, 314, 321 Reformed protestantism, 45 Reformed theology, 71, 178–208, 294 Regeneration, 113, 184, 196, 249, 262 process, 135–141, 254–255 Religion, 63–70, 90, 102, 117, 161 Remonstrance, 22, 35, 44, 46, 211–279 Remonstrants, 11, 22, 44, 212, 326 Reprobation, 54, 91, 110, 216–218, 222– 227, 243–244, 270 reprobation, cause of, 132–133, 270 Responsibility, 58–59, 110 Revelation, 77 Rhetoric, 22 Roman Catholics, 295, 306, 323–324 Romans 7, 135–141 Samosatene heresies, 274 Sanctification, 194–197, 202, 207 Satisfaction (by Christ), see: Christ Scholasticism, reformed/protestant, 35, 43, 280, 312, 321 scholastic method, 310, 321 scholastic, 94, 288, 308, 315 Schriftelicke Conferentie, see: Hague Conference Scripture (view), 21, 72–74 Self-limitation (of God), see: God Sin, 15–17, 50, 67, 112, 131, 146, 197–200 cause, 294–320 God’s abhorrance of sin, 84 necessity, 54, 85, 107, 125 original sin, 31, 38, 127–128, 192, 197– 200–221 relation to God, 160 sin (the Fall) and God’s justice, 106–113 Socinianism, 274, 278 Spanish troops, 13 Spontaneity, 57–59, 311, 321 States General, 274 States of Holland (and West-Friesland), 20– 22, 30, 211–212 Stoicism, 275 Suasion, 145, 181–183, 241, 259 Sufficiency, see: Christ, and see: Grace Supralapsarianism, 56, 160, 163–164, 166, 172–174, 319 Syllogism, 238 Synergism, 191 Synod of Dordt (1618–1619), 11, 35, 44, 215, 216–217, 327 Testimony of the Holy Spirit, 170, 238 Theology

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340

Index of Subjects

author, 63, 66 certainty, 63, 76–79 goal, 63, 71, 89–90 object, 63, 68–69, 77 Thomism, 35–36, 200, 294

Tuberculosis, 22 Voluntarism, 36, 74, 83, 280–294 Will, free, see: Free choice Will, human, see: Free choice Worship, 64–65, 67, 70–72, 78, 162, 293

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Index of Names

Acronius, Ruardus, 212 Aemilius, Theodorus, 13 Ahsmann, M., 26 Amsterdam, 13–14, 212 Andreae, Jacob, 316 Anselm of Canterbury, 60–61 Anthony, Henricus, 274 Aquinas, Thomas, 60–62, 111, 283, 292, 296 Aristotle, 49, 55, 58, 60–62, 278, 300, 310, 321 Arnoldus, Johannes, 212 Asselt, Willem J. van, 43 Augustine, 60, 112, 135, 207, 296, 320 Baars, Arie, 292n Bangs, Carl, 33 Baro, Peter, 275, 319–322 Baschera, Luca, 58 Basel, 14, 312–313 Becius, Johannes, 212 Bellarmine, Robert, 180, 320, 324 Bern, 306, 316–318 Beza, Theodore, 13–14, 17, 75, 94, 173, 235, 275, 293, 295, 307, 314–316, 318– 319, 322–323 Bibliander, Theodore, 305, 308–309, 311, 317 Biel, Gabriël, 284, 298–299 Blacketer, Raymond A., 36, 102, 104 Bogardus, Johannes, 212 Bogerman, Johannes, 19 Bolsec, Hieronymus, 304, 306–307, 309, 317 Borrhaus, Martin, 313 Borrius, Adrianus, 20, 31, 184, 212 Bradwardine, Thomas, 296–298 Bucer, Martin, 303, 310 Bullinger, Heinrich, 40–42, 304–305, 308 Calvin, John, 17, 43, 54, 71, 74–75, 92, 94, 111, 199, 275, 280–295, 304–306, 308, 310, 313, 317–319, 321–323 Cambridge, 173, 319 Castellio, Sebastian, 295, 312–313, 323 Cicero, 49 Clarke, F. Stuart, 32–33, 35, 37, 124, 294 Collibus, Hippolytus a, 20, 27, 30–31, 175

Contarini, Gasparo, 198 Coolhaes, Caspar Janszoon, 280 Coornhert, Dirck Volckertsz, 14, 280, 295, 323 Copinger, W.A., 214 Cornelisz, Arent, 14 Cuchlinus, Johannes, 18, 37 Cunaeus, Petrus, 26 Danaeus, Lambertus, 318 Dekker, Eef, 15–16, 19, 34–36, 40, 57–58, 124, 143 Delft, 14 Donnelly, John Patrick, 310–311 Donteclock, Reginaldus, 14 Dordrecht, 18 Duifhuis, Huibert, 280 Duns Scotus, John, 282–284, 296 Edam, 212 Ellis, Mark A., 38–39, 191, 199 Enkhuizen, 212 Episcopius, Simon, 38–39, 184, 212 Erasmus, Desiderius, 299–300, 302–303 Franeker, 14, 274 Fraxinus, Libertus, 212 Geneva, 13–14, 19, 173–174, 275, 307 Godfrey, W.R., 216 Gomarus, Franciscus, 11, 16–20, 22, 37, 43, 119, 155, 165, 295–296, 323 Gootjes, Albert, 12 Gouda, 22 Grevinchovius, Nicolaus, 212 Grynaeus, Johann Jakob, 14 Grynaeus, Simon, 318 Hartogh, Gerrit den, 302 Heidelberg , 19, 312, 320 Helm, Paul, 284, 292 Hemmingius, Nicholas, 16, 275, 319–320 Herberts, Herman, 280 Hofman, T.M., 217 Holtrop, Philip C., 307, 311–312 Hommius, Festus, 18, 43, 165–166, 212, 214–215 Hoorn, 212 Huber, Samuel, 308, 316–319, 322 Hunnius, Aegidius, 318

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342

Index of Names

Italy, 14 Jeschke, Walter Dieter, 285, 287, 289 Junius, Franciscus, 15–16, 100, 108, 112, 120, 125, 131, 145, 178, 197, 200, 275 Kersten, Gerrit Hendrik, 204n Kimedoncius, Jacobus, 294, 318 Kobusch, Theo, 284 Lansbergius, Franciscus, 18 Leiden, 13, 15–16, 18, 21, 23, 25–26, 30, 37, 40, 173–174, 211, 280, 293 Lubbertus, Sibrandus, 19, 43, 165 Luther, Martin, 71, 299–303, 310 Lydius, Martinus, 14 Marbach, Johann, 312, 316–317 Marburg, 13, 312 McGrath, Alister E., 282, 292 Melanchthon, Philip, 275, 320 Molina, Luis de (Molinism), 144, 146, 172, 180 Moltmann, Jürgen, 312 Montbéliard, Colloquy of, 275, 316 Muller, Richard A., 32, 34–37, 40, 102, 104, 143, 280, 291, 307–308, 310 Musculus, Abraham, 317 Musculus, Wolfgang, 308 Netherlands, The, 11 Neuser, Wilhelm H., 306 Nichols, James, 32–33 Oberman, Heiko A., 298 Ockham, William of, 283 Olson, Roger E., 327–328 Opitz, Peter, 40–42 Oppenraaij, Th. Van, 215–216 Otterspeer, Willem, 25 Oudewater, 13 Padua, 14 Palatinate, ambassador of, 20 Pareus, David, 318 Paris, 19, 285 Pelagius, 135 Pellicanus, Conrad, 309 Perkins, William, 16, 72, 94, 97, 102, 109, 129–130, 133, 142, 154, 174, 180, 191 Pighius, Albertus, 303–304, 306–307 Piscator, Johannes, 235 Plancius, Petrus, 14–15, 212 Plato, 60 Polman, A.D.R., 216–217 Poppius, Eduardus, 212 Rimini, Gregory of, 283, 296, 298 Rogge, H.C., 214 Rome, 302

Rouwendal, Pieter L., 25 Schaffhausen, 312 Schiedam, 212 Schreiner, Susan E., 285–286 Schuere, Nicasius van der, 226 Schweizer, Alexander, 313 Scotland, 19 Selderhuis, Herman J., 12 Sinnema, Donald W., 217 Snecanus, Gellius, 15, 124, 320 Snellius, Rudolphus, 13 Socinus, Faustus, 283, 313–314 Sohn, Georg, 320 Sorbonne, 285, 287 South-Holland, Synod, 18 Staedtke, Joachim, 312 Stanglin, Keith D., 26–29, 32–35, 37, 42, 167, 170–174, 280, 293, 321 Steinmetz, David C., 292 Strasbourg, 312, 317 Stuttgart, 312 Sybrants, Taco, 280 Thomas, Derek, 291 Trelcatius Jr., Lucas, 18, 37 Trelcatius Sr., Lucas, 16 Tübingen, 312 Ulpianus, 60, 62, 157 Ursinus, Zacharias, 316 Utrecht (province), 13 Veluanus, Anastasius, 274, 280 Verboom, W., 217 Vermigli, Peter Martyr, 58, 59, 278, 308– 311, 317, 321 Victor, Hugh of St., 296 Viret, Pierre, 307 Vorstius, Conrad, 278 Weber, Hans Emil, 315 Wesley brothers, 44 Whitaker, William, 275 Whitefield, George, 44 Wiggerts, Cornelis, 280 Wijminga, P.J., 214–215 Witt, William G., 36 Wittenberg, 317–318 Wtenbogaert, Johannes, 19, 22, 27, 31–33, 129, 171, 211–212, 214 Württemberg, 317 Zabarella, Jacopo, 14 Zanchi, Jerome, 312, 316–317, 320 Zürich, 14, 19, 306, 309–310, 312, 31719 Zwingli, Huldrych, 302, 305, 309–310

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Reformed Historical Theology 1: J. Mark Beach

4: Jason Zuidema

Christ and the Covenant

Peter Martyr Vermigli (1499–1562) and the Outward Instruments of Divine Grace

Francis Turretin’s Federal Theology as a Defense of the Doctrine of Grace 2007. 372 Seiten, gebunden ISBN 978-3-525-56911-5 Seiner calvinistischen Wurzeln stark verpflichtet, untersucht J. Mark Beach die Bundestheologie des Francis Turretin. Der zweifache Bund Gottes (Natur- und Gnadenbund) erweist sich als konstitutiv für die Gnadenlehre.

2: Cornelis P. Venema

Accepted and Renewed in Christ The “Twofold Grace of God” and the Interpretation of Calvin’s Theology 2007. 296 Seiten, gebunden ISBN 978-3-525-56910-8 Die Lehre von der doppelten Gnade in der Theologie Johannes Calvins steht im Mittelpunkt dieses Bandes. Cornelis P. Venema untersucht wie der Reformer Rechtfertigung und Heiligung der Gläubigen versteht.

2008. 196 Seiten, gebunden ISBN 978-3-525-56916-0 Ein tieferer Blick in Vermiglis Theologie, wie ihn Zuidema wagt, lohnt sich, um die inneren theologischen Vernetzungen seiner Zeit besser kennen zu lernen.

5: Herman J. Selderhuis (Hg.)

Calvinus sacrarum literarum interpres Papers of the International Congress on Calvin Research 2008. 302 Seiten, gebunden ISBN 978-3-525-56914-6 Dieser Band wird zu einem Wegweiser für die künftige Richtung der Calvinforschung und mitbestimmend für die Reformationsforschung im Allgemeinen, denn seine Beiträge reflektieren die neuesten Forschungen zur Biographie und Theologie von Johannes Calvin.

3: Tobias Sarx

Franciscus Junius d.Ä. (1545-1602)

6: Wilhelm H. Neuser

Ein reformierter Theologe im Spannungsfeld zwischen späthumanistischer Irenik und reformierter Konfessionalisierung 2007. 318 Seiten, gebunden ISBN 978-3-525-56912-2

Johann Calvin – Leben und Werk in seiner Frühzeit 1509–1541

Ein wichtiger Beitrag zur Erforschung calvinistisch-reformierter Theologie des ausgehenden 16. Jahrhunderts am Beispiel des Franciscus Junius d.Ä.

2009. 352 Seiten, gebunden ISBN 978-3-525-56915-3 Diese Biographie stellt die verschiedenen Zusammenhänge des frühen Lebens von Johannes Calvin dar. Der Autor fokussiert insbesondere auch die Personen und die Ideen, die sich einflussreich auf Calvin auswirkten.

© 2010, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen ISBN Print: 978-3-525-56908-5 — ISBN E-Book: 978-3-647-56908-6

Reformed Historical Theology 7: Brian J. Lee

11: Jason Van Vliet

Johannes Cocceius and the Exegetical Roots of Federal Theology

Children of God

Reformation Developments in the Interpretation of Hebrews 7-10 2009. 215 Seiten, gebunden ISBN 978-3-525-56913-9 Auf dem Hintergrund des Hebräerkommentars von Johannes Cocceius erörtert Brian J. Lee die biblischen Wurzeln der reformierten Bundestheologie.

8: Aaron C. Denlinger

Omnes in Adam ex pacto Dei Ambrogio Catarino’s Doctrine of Covenantal Solidarity and Its Influence on Post-Reformation Reformed Theologians 2010. 306 Seiten, gebunden ISBN 978-3-525-56920-7 Aaron C. Denlinger fragt, wie es zur reformierten Lehre von Adam als Repräsentanten des Bundes kam.

10: Nam Kyu Lee

Die Prädestinationslehre der Heidelberger Theologen 1583-1622

The Imago Dei in John Calvin and His Context 2009. 285 Seiten, gebunden ISBN 978-3-525-56918-4 Calvin hatte großes Interesse daran, was die Bibel über den Menschen lehrt, wer er ist, was er tut, was seine Rolle und Verantwortung in der Welt ist. Für ihn war klar: Der Menschen ist im Ebenbild Gottes erschaffen.

12: Frederik A.V. Harms

In God´s Custody: The Church, a History of Divine Protection A Study of John Calvin\s Ecclesiology based on his Commentary on the Minor Prophets 2010. 248 Seiten, gebunden ISBN 978-3-525-56922-1 Harms untersucht Calvins Ekklesiologie ausgehend von dessen Kommentar zu den Kleinen Propheten von 1557–1559. Eine Studie aus historisch-systematischer Sicht mit einem Überblick über die Auslegungsgeschichte der Kleinen Propheten.

13: Mark Jones

Why Heaven Kissed Earth

Georg Sohn (1551-1589), Herman Rennecherus (1550-?), Jacob Kimedoncius (1554-1596), Daniel Tossanus (1541-1602) 2009. 211 Seiten, gebunden ISBN 978-3-525-56870-5

The Christology of the Puritan Reformed Orthodox theologian, Thomas Goodwin (1600-1680) 255 Seiten, gebunden ISBN 978-3-525-56905-4 erscheint im Oktober 2010

Nam Kyu Lee geht der Frage nach, wie man in der Periode von 1583 bis 1622 an der Heidelberger Fakultät die Prädestinationslehre unterrichtet hat.

Mark Jones erklärt, warum der Himmel die Erde küsste, d.h. warum Gott Mensch wurde.

© 2010, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen ISBN Print: 978-3-525-56908-5 — ISBN E-Book: 978-3-647-56908-6