Globalisation and Local Conflicts in Africa and Asia (Evidence-Based Approaches to Peace and Conflict Studies, 7) 9811688176, 9789811688171

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Evidence-Based Approaches to Peace and Conflict Studies 7

Yukiko Nishikawa   Editor

Globalisation and Local Conflicts in Africa and Asia

Evidence-Based Approaches to Peace and Conflict Studies Volume 7

Editor-in-Chief Takashi Inoguchi, Institute of Asian Cultures, J.F. Oberlin University, Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan Series Editors Jean-Marie Guehenno, Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, New York, USA G. John Ikenberry, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA Lien Thi Quynh Le, Hue University, Hue City, Vietnam Etel Solingen, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA, USA William R. Thompson, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, USA Stein Tønnesson, Peace Research Institute, Oslo, Norway Editorial Board Chiyuki Aoi, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan Bertrand Badie, Sciences Po, Paris, France Miguel Basanez, Tufts University, Medford, MA, USA Titli Basu, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, India Kerry Brown, King’s College London, London, UK Alexander Bukh, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand Pongphisoot Busbarat, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand Timur Dadabaev, University of Tsukuba, Tsukuba, Japan Richard Estes, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA Ofer Feldman, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, University of Essex, Colchester, UK Peshan R. Gunaratne, University of Colombo, Colombo, Sri Lanka Purnendra Jain, The University of Adelaide, Adelaide, Australia Koji Kagotani, Osaka University of Economics, Osaka, Japan Ken Kotani, Nihon University, Tokyo, Japan Yuichi Kubota, Nihon University, Tokyo, Japan Meron Medzini, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel Paul Midford, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway Satoru Miyamoto, Seigakuin University, Ageo, Japan Mehdi Mozaffari, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark Maung Aung Myoe, International University of Japan, Niigata, Japan Takako Nabeshima, Hokkaido University, Hokkaido, Japan Edward Newman, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK Aparna Pande, Hudson Institute, Washington, DC, USA Uddhab Pyakurel, Kathmandu University, Kathmandu, Nepal Frances Rosenbluth, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA Motoshi Suzuki, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan Shinichi Takeuchi, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Tokyo, Japan Motohiro Tsuchiya, Keio University, Kanagawa, Japan Chikako Ueki, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan Ayse Zarakol, Cambridge University, Cambridge, UK

This series aims to publish books on peace and conflict with evidence-based approaches, befitting an era best characterized by uncertainty and complexity. Even if occurrence of major wars among sovereign states has dramatically decreased, from 5 million soldiers killed between 1938 and 1945 per annum; through 100,000 soldiers killed between 1945 and 1989 per annum; to 10,000 soldiers killed between 1989 and 2019 per annum; many kinds of peace and conflict keep arising in the world, with extraordinary technological progress and unprecedented spatial coverage. All parts of the world now are so well connected and interdependent. At the same time, they easily and suddenly become sources of immense vulnerability and fragility, bringing one or another of them to the verge of collapse and destruction. The causes are diverse: climate change, migration, pandemic and epidemic disease, civil strife, religious dissonance, economic competition, arms races, terrorism, corruption—a virtual plethora of sources. Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary General, calls these and many others “problems without passports.” The basic methodological orientation sought in this series is broadly that of modern social and behavioral science. Of importance is that verifiable evidence (quantitative and qualitative, graphs and photos) be solidly attached to whatever arguments are advanced. Overseen by a panel of renowned scholars led by Editor-in-Chief Takashi Inoguchi, this book series employs a single-blind review process in which the Editor-in-Chief, the series editors, editorial board members, and specialized scholars designated by the Editor-in-Chief or series editors rigorously review each proposal and manuscript to ensure that every submission makes a valuable contribution that will appeal to a global scholarly readership.

More information about this series at https://link.springer.com/bookseries/16598

Yukiko Nishikawa Editor

Globalisation and Local Conflicts in Africa and Asia

Editor Yukiko Nishikawa Graduate School of Global Studies Doshisha University Kyoto, Japan

ISSN 2730-5651 ISSN 2730-566X (electronic) Evidence-Based Approaches to Peace and Conflict Studies ISBN 978-981-16-8817-1 ISBN 978-981-16-8818-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8818-8 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Yukiko Nishikawa

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Globalization and Nation-States in Africa and Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Yukiko Nishikawa

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Globalization and Local Conflict in Africa Energy Security and the Paradox of External Peacebuilding Interventions in Nigeria’s Niger Delta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tubodenyefa Zibima

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International Policies and Illegal Logging Exploitation Sustaining Local Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Georges Bomino Bosakaibo

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The Politics and Political Economy of Violent Conflicts in Post-war Mozambique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Manuel Francisco Sambo

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Globalization and Local Conflict in Asia Local Conflicts in Post-reform Myanmar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 Yukiko Nishikawa Imbalance Between Public Health and Intellectual Property Rights Protection Goals: Battles on AIDS Medicines in Thailand . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 Benjamas Nillsuwan Afghanistan and the Curse of Resources: Taliban’s Greed-Based Jihad in the Heart of Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 Mohammad Reza Qasemi

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Contents

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195 Yukiko Nishikawa Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201

Editor and Contributors

About the Editor Yukiko Nishikawa Ph.D., is a professor in the Graduate School of Global Studies, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan. Nishikawa obtained a Ph.D. in peace studies from the University of Bradford, U.K. Her main publications include “The Reality of Protecting the Rohingya: An Inherent Limitation of the Responsibility to Protect” (Asian Security, 2020); Political Sociology of Japanese Pacifism (Routledge, 2018); Human Security in Southeast Asia (Routledge, 2010); “Human security in Southeast Asia: viable solution or empty slogan?” (Security Dialogue, 2009); Japan’s Changing Role in Humanitarian Crises (Routledge, 2005). Her research interests include peace and conflict in Southeast Asia and security and international relations in the Indo– Pacific region.

Contributors Georges Bomino Bosakaibo Faculty of Policy Studies, Nanzan University, Nagoya, Japan Benjamas Nillsuwan School of International Affairs, The Faculty of Political Science and Public Administration, Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai, Thailand Yukiko Nishikawa Graduate School of Global Studies, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan Mohammad Reza Qasemi Political Analyst and former Diplomat, Kabul, Germany Manuel Francisco Sambo Graduate School of Global Studies, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan Tubodenyefa Zibima Niger Delta University, Amassama, Bayelsa, Nigeria vii

Abbreviations

ACLED ANC ASEAN AZT BCP BIO BMS BRI BSPP BWI CAFI CATVS CGTVS CIA CL CNDS CNE CPTPP CSSF CTLVS DAC DDC DDI DDR DGLI DIP DRC DSI EAO(s)

Armed Conflict Location Events Data African National Congress Association for Southeast Asian Nations Azidothymidine (drug) Burma Communist Party Biotechnology Industry Organization Bristol Myers Squibb Belt and Road Initiative Burma Socialist Programme Party Bretton Woods Institutions Central African Forests Initiative Chinese Association-Guided Timber Verification Scheme Chinese Government-Guided Timber Verification Scheme Central Intelligence Agency Compulsory Licensing National Defense and Security Council National Electoral Commission Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement of Trans-Pacific Partnership Conflict, Stability, and Security Fund China Timber Legality Verification System Development Assistance Committee Department of Disease Control Didanosine (drug) Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration DARA Great Lakes Industries Department of Intellectual Property Democratic Republic of the Congo Defense Services Institution Ethnic Armed Organization(s)

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x

ECD-ML EPO ETIM EU EUIPO EUTR FAO FCO FCPF FDI FIP FPIC FRELIMO FTA GATT GDP GPA GPO GSK GSP HDI HIV/AIDS ICG ICT IDP IMF IP IPR ISDS ISI ISIS ISK(P) ISOC KNLA KNU MDM MEC MIFER MNC MP(s) MRN NATO NCA

Abbreviations

Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Mouvement de Liberation European Patent Office East Turkistan Islamic Movement European Union European Union Intellectual Property Office European Union Timber Regulation Food and Agriculture Organization Foreign and Commonwealth Office Forest Carbon Partnership Fund Foreign Direct Investment Forest Investment Program Free, Prior, and Informed Consent Mozambique Liberation Front Free Trade Agreement General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Gross Domestic Product General Peace Agreement Government Pharmaceutical Organization GlaxoSmithKline Generalized System of Preferences Human Development Index Human Immunodeficiency Virus /Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome International Crisis Group Information and Communication Technology Internally Displaced Person International Monetary Fund Intellectual Property Intellectual Property Rights Investor–State Dispute Settlement Inter-Services Intelligence Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Islamic State of Khurasan Province Internal Security Operations Command Karen National Liberation Army Karen National Union Mozambique Democratic Movement Myanmar Economic Cooperation Ministry of Investment and Foreign Economic Relations Multinational Corporations Member(s) of Parliament Montepuez Ruby Mining North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement

Abbreviations

NDSP NGO(s) NLD NNPC NRF NST NWFPs ODA OECD OFAC OPEC PANDEF PAP PEA PFC PhRMA PSC PTA R&D RCEP RENAMO RFUK SADC SDN SEE(s) SFA SIPRI SIWP SLORC SOSi SPDC TPP TRIPS TUSFTA UHC UK UMEHL UN UNCTAD UNODC UNSC USA USDP USTR VPA(s)

xi

Niger Delta Stability Program Non-Governmental Organization(s) National League for Democracy Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation National Resistance Front NordSudTimber Non-Wood Forest Products Official Development Assistance Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Office of Foreign Assets Control Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Pan-Niger Delta Forum Presidential Amnesty Program Political Economy Analysis Priority Foreign Country Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America Production Sharing Contracts Preferential Trade Agreement Research and Development Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Mozambique National Resistance Rainforest Foundation UK Southern Africa Development Community Stakeholder Democracy Network State-Owned Economic Enterprise(s) State Forestry Administration Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Strategic Implementation Work Plan State Law and Order Restoration Council SOS International State Peace and Development Council Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Thailand-United States Free Trade Agreement Universal Health Coverage United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited United Nations United Nations Conference on Trade and Development United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime United Nations Security Council United States of America Union Solidarity and Development Party United States Trade Representative Voluntary Partnership Agreement(s)

xii

WB WHO WIPO WTO ZANU

Abbreviations

World Bank World Health Organization World Intellectual Property Organization World Trade Organization Zimbabwe African National Union

Introduction Yukiko Nishikawa

Abstract This introductory part sets out the genesis of this book, the different waves of globalization in the past, key questions explored in this volume and the approach that the authors of this book employ.

1 Introduction Globalization has increased the global flows of goods, services, capital, labour, entrepreneurship, and knowledge, bringing both positive and negative changes to everyday life.1 For instance, it has brought improvements in living conditions through trade, enhanced cultural diversity, and, to a certain extent, a diminished threat of war. However, it has also triggered various phenomena that have generated concern, such as influxes of refugees, immigration, spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, and violence by terrorists and extremists. The effects of globalization, whether positive or negative, do not affect individuals equally across the world. This is seen in the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020, which caused many deaths and suffering worldwide. People who suffer from COVID-19 have unequal access to medical care depending on the country they live in and, within a country, their socioeconomic condition. The effect of globalization on individuals, to a great extent, depends on where they were born, where they live, their profession, their wealth, and their social status. This tendency became clearer by the end of 2020 when some people around the world started gaining access to COVID-19 vaccines. There was no equal access to vaccination to all people around the world at the same time.

1 Globalization here loosely refers to a set of social processes in which social relations become relatively borderless qualities that are unaffected by distance.

Y. Nishikawa (B) Graduate School of Global Studies, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 Y. Nishikawa (ed.), Globalisation and Local Conflicts in Africa and Asia, Evidence-Based Approaches to Peace and Conflict Studies 7, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8818-8_1

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Although people around the world equally experience globalization as an objective reality, structural inequalities between states and within each state that have existed and expanded over the past several decades as a result of economic denationalization vis-à-vis globalization have led to distinctive impacts on individuals as well as on each state. For this reason, it is vital to grasp the complex dynamics of local events, including those in small towns, in relation to both domestic and international politics and political economy. The genesis of this book lies in this thought.

2 Where Do We Stand? There have been ebbs and flows of globalization over the past 150 years.2 Some scholars point out that every major industrial and technological change at each time in history has altered and shaped the characteristics of globalization.3 The roots of the current global economic order were laid out in the system established at the end of World War II. In 1944, delegates from Allied countries met in Bretton Woods and established the Bretton Woods System, a new system centred on free trade and open markets.4 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (which later became the World Bank) created in that year were important organizations. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), an important agreement to promote international trade by eliminating trade barriers, took effect in 1948. Although the Bretton Woods System was dissolved in the 1970s, the IMF and World Bank have remained. Many scholars indeed point out that globalization in the post-World War II context was invigorated by trade liberalization with the influence of the GATT (Amadi and Anokwuru 2018; Dreher et al. 2008). The wave of globalization since the end of World War II was also backed by technologies such as cars, airplanes, and new communication systems. Many countries have built economic partnerships and facilitated cross-border trade. The term “globalization” became a buzzword particularly after the Cold War, namely, during the 1990s. The KOF Globalization Index, which measures the extent of globalization based on economic, financial, social, informational, cultural, and 2

Globalization was recognized, at least, in the nineteenth century. For more about the history of globalization, see Findlay and O’Rourke (2007) and Stearns (2010). 3 Although there are variations in interpretation, the first industrial revolution is considered to have begun in the eighteenth century, characterized by the mechanization of production and steel power. The second revolution began in the nineteenth century, being characterized by the discovery of electricity, assembly production, and automobile production. The third revolution was from the 1970s and is characterized by partial automation and the development of computers. It is considered that we are currently in the period of the fourth industrial revolution, which is characterized by smart machines and digital technology. 4 Over 700 delegates representing 44 countries attended the Bretton Woods meeting. The principal goals were to create an efficient foreign exchange system, to promote international economic growth, and to prevent competitive devaluations of currencies. In the Bretton Woods System, gold was the basis for the US dollar. The Bretton Woods system came to an end when US President Richard Nixon announced that the USA would no longer exchange gold for US currency.

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65.0 60.0 55.0 50.0 45.0 40.0

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Year Fig. 1 KOF globalization index, de facto (1970–2016). Index can vary from 1 (minimum globalization) to 100 (maximum globalization). Source Gygli et al. (2019)

political variables, shows the further advancement of globalization after the 1990s (Gygli et al. 2019) (see Fig. 1).5 Unlike during the Cold War, worldwide trade became a reality as many countries, including China and those in the former Eastern Bloc, undertook reforms to participate in the World Trade Organization (WTO), the successor to the GATT and a global trading system set up in 1995, which deals with the rules of trade to promote free and open trade. The third industrial revolution, characterized by the development of information and communication technology (ICT), helped to connect people. For example, the Internet has facilitated globalization particularly in the sphere of communication and culture by enabling people to access foreign journals and newspapers without the difficulties involved in purchasing printed copies. Apparently, the effect of globalization in the Internet age is wider in scope and faster in speed compared with past waves of globalization. Most historians of globalization recognize the inherent economic element vital for the expansion of globalization as well as the link between an economic project and politics (Riano 2019: 2). For Wallerstein (2000), globalization cannot be understood in isolation from the historical development of the capitalist world-system. As illustrated in the global economic order, globalization since the end of World War 5

The KOF Globalization Index measures “de facto” and”de jure” globalization of each country, region, and the world and shows numerical data of each variables/factors. The de facto globalization measures actual international flows and activities while de jure globalization measures policies and conditions that facilitate flows and activities. In this volume, the de facto Globalization Index is preferred. For the list of variables, see Gygli et al. (2019) p. 545 and the following chapter.

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II and particularly since the end of the Cold War has not necessarily been value- or ideology-free because the global economic order that many countries accepted was founded on a market economy or the laissez-faire capitalism strongly in favour of liberalism. Some scholars consider that globalization has been a key driver in establishing the world order (Chomsky 1994; Epperson 1988; Slaughter 2004). Ikenberry describes “liberal ascendency” (the liberal international order) over the past two centuries and explains how it propelled the liberal capitalist system of economics and politics to world pre-eminence (Ikenberry 2009: 71). By the same token, Colin Crouch argues that “Economic globalization is mainly a project of neoliberalism, which for several decades has been the dominant ideology of the modern right” (Crouch 2019: 3). It is thus not coincidence that the liberal order became the dominant international order vis-à-vis the expansion of the capitalist system since the end of World War II and especially after the Cold War. Liberal ideals were promoted by various specialized agencies of the United Nations (UN). In fact, international assistance for development and peacebuilding undertaken by international organizations such as the World Bank and the UN agencies and major donor governments of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) promoted market economy and political liberalization worldwide throughout the 1990s (Paris 2004; Richmond 2014; MacGinty and Richmond 2009). The emergence of academic debates on the post-liberal order together with renationalization of politics, manifested in situations such as the uprising of nationalism and protectionism in the 2000s and 2010s, is further evidence that globalization has been closely linked with liberalism.6 While many countries have started to realize the risk of a China-centred global supply chain,7 the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the downsides of international integration by provoking fears of foreigners and giving legitimacy to national restrictions on global trade and flows of people. In the history of globalization, there has been an occasional “backlash” of globalization or “de-globalization” (Pieterse 2012; Crouch 2019). Even in contemporary history, large or small tides of backlash or de-globalization have occurred, such as at times of financial crisis, when then United States (US) President Donald Trump emphasized the “America-first” policy and Brexit. The European Union (EU), formed in 1993, also faced such de-globalization tendencies. It introduced a single market and facilitated the free movement of goods, people, and capital. More countries eventually joined in. After a decade, some countries faced popular resistance to EU enlargement because it enhances immigration to the richer members. By the same token, in the USA, large companies moved their factories from Michigan to Mexico or China for cheaper labour, which resulted in job losses for many workers in the USA, although the same change might have, to a certain extent, contributed to a global redistribution of wealth by generating the shift of industrial bases from high-wage countries in North America to cheaper wage areas like China and Vietnam. Nevertheless, elements of 6 7

For a discussion of the post-liberal order, see Chandler (2010), Beggs (2009). For example, the USA imposed punitive tariffs on imports from China in 2018 and 2019.

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anti-globalization have emerged in the country. The COVID-19 pandemic is another example that has generated a de-globalization atmosphere, although it is different in nature and likely to be a temporal phenomenon. A common ground in these cases of de-globalization or backlash of globalization waves, though diverse in nature, in the twenty-first century, if we perceive so, drove largely from people’s fear and concerns that movements of certain goods, people, and capital threaten their economic and political opportunities, social lives, or cultural values. Thus, globalization or globalization forces have become a part of the discussion on security, which entails not merely conventional military-oriented issues (military security) but also a wide variety of issues such as economic, political, social, ecological, and cultural security. The emergence of expanding security debates, such as human and non-traditional security, since the 1990s was not a coincidence but an inevitable consequence of deepening globalization.

3 The Puzzle: Globalization and Local Conflict Numerous studies have explored the impact of globalization on internal dissidents and conflicts (Nel 2006; Hegre et al. 2003; Gissinger and Gleditsch 1999; Sandbrook and Romano 2004; Barbieri 2005; FitzGerald and Venugopal 2006; Patman 2006; Nishikawa 2016). Nevertheless, research on the relation between globalization and internal conflicts or political dissidents consists largely of economic quantitative studies that utilize indicators such as the degree of trade openness and foreign direct investment. The increase in the number of internal conflicts in low-income countries around the world starting around the 1990s has also enhanced academic and policy research on development and conflict in the decade and after, most of which inevitably address the global economy or globalization.8 The robust findings of these studies are correlations between inequality and the rise to conflict (Stewart 2008; Gurr 1993; Muller and Seligson 1987), the political system and violence (Hegre et al. 2003), and international trade and deterrence of civil war (Martin et al. 2008). While these quantitative studies are, without doubt, important for drawing policy implications and setting priorities for effective actions, they cannot capture the multidimensional process of globalization and its effects on local actors and local political, economic, and social dynamics. The contemporary surge of nationalism and globalization or their struggle are apparently changing political identities and conflicts around the world. Some of the key questions that need to be addressed to reveal such dynamics are the following: • How does economic denationalization correlate with a renationalization of politics, thereby exacerbating political divisions or exclusion and discrimination of certain groups within a state?

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See, for example, Collier and Hoeffler (2002).

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• How does economic denationalization affect structural inequality within each state? • How has the global political economy affected national policies, thereby generating political conflict among national political and economic forces? • What effects have economic denationalization brought to statehood and stateness? These are, indeed, some of the questions addressed in this book. The cases raised in this book, one way or another, reveal the dynamics that many existing studies on conflict and globalization have not revealed. This volume explores the above questions through six cases: three cases in Africa and three cases in Asia. Studies on globalization dominantly focus on countries in Europe and Anglo-America or economically advanced countries. Only a limited number of studies have cross-regionally explored globalization through cases in Africa and Asia. This is largely because of data availability and reliability. This volume fills the existing gap in the literature. While some existing research has focused on cases either in Africa or in Asia, this volume includes cases from both regions. This is because the purpose of this volume is not to identify regionally specific characteristics and contexts in which conflicts arose with the effects of globalization but to grasp the internal political economy of these countries, which has included structural inequality exacerbated by globalization forces or global political economy. At the same time, this volume pays attention to the problem of stateness and statehood,9 which is also an important factor in explaining political divisions and conflicts in many countries in these regions largely caused by their colonial experience or that of neighbouring countries. Therefore, rather than exploring conflicts in a particular region, the volume presents cases in the two regions where the problem of stateness and statehood significantly affects nation-building and state-building. The authors in this volume roughly share the idea that globalization and denationalized economy have or have had significant effects on local politics and political economy. However, the contributing authors of this volume do not follow any similar pattern in how they have understood the effects in relation to the structural conditions in their case analyses. Each chapter, therefore, represents an individual interpretation of the effect of globalization and its impacts on local political and economic forces. All authors of this volume have a background in political science or international relations, but a few have a background in globalization studies or comparative politics. Nevertheless, all contributors agree that connection between globalization studies and comparative politics may well be the place for finding answers to the questions raised in this volume. All contributors of this volume hope that the volume may be a starting point for further research drawing on the specific insights of both disciplinary perspectives employed in this volume.

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The issue of stateness is explained in the following chapter in detail. The following works also explain the stateness problem: Linz and Stepan (1996, Chapter 2) and Croissant and Hellmann (2020).

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3.1 Organization of the Book After this introduction, in Chapter “Globalization and Nation-States in Africa and Asia”, Yukiko Nishikawa shows economic data of six targeted countries featured in this volume. It introduces the six countries’ KOF Globalization Index, data on the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, Gini coefficient, foreign direct investment, and migration remittance inflow. The data help us to grasp the overall economic conditions of these countries, in which varied changes in their political economy have occurred. The chapter also explains the broader picture of global economic and political conditions in which these six countries have made national policy choices as countries in a late development group. The chapter then identifies key factors and sets out a conceptual framework that helps us to examine the questions raised in this volume. The following six chapters are divided into two parts. The first part includes three cases from Africa, while the second part entails three cases from Asia. In Chapter “Energy Security and the Paradox of External Peacebuilding Interventions in Nigeria’s Niger Delta”, Tubodenyefa Zibima explores local conflict related to oil production and peacebuilding undertaken in the Niger Delta in the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Nigeria). The chapter reveals significant effects of global energy security policy and peacebuilding in local political dynamism, which result in sustaining conflicts in the Niger Delta. In Chapter “International Policies and Illegal Logging Exploitation Sustaining Local Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo”, Bomino Georges Bosakaibo looks at how conflicts have been maintained through illegal logging exploitation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The chapter reveals that the lack of national mechanism to enforce the law or effective governance has affected the local community vis-à-vis external logging corporations in DRC. In Chapter “The Politics and Political Economy of Violent Conflicts in Post-war Mozambique”, Manuel Francisco Sambo explores how the liberal peace economics model introduced in the Republic of Mozambique (Mozambique) decades ago has been delivered and examines how and why peacebuilding efforts led by the international community in the country failed to address varied socioeconomic problems. The chapter critically investigates how the country has become a breeding ground for political violence vis-à-vis grievances and deprivations deriving largely from liberal peace economics. In Chapter “Local Conflicts in Post-reform Myanmar”, Yukiko Nishikawa explores local conflicts in the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (Burma/Myanmar),10 which has experienced significant changes since 2011. It shows how reforms undertaken after 2011 have shifted local stakeholders’ relations and also changed the dynamics of the political economy. The reforms obfuscated long-sustained power relations of local stakeholders while such reforms gave 10

The country’s name (Myanmar or Burma) is still a matter of controversy. In this book, the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (hereafter simply Myanmar and Burma when writing about events before 1989), is used. This usage is neither a political statement nor a judgement on the right of the former military rulers to have changed the name.

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impressions of change and improvement and thus brought more investment into the country. In Chapter “Imbalance Between Public Health and Intellectual Property Rights Protection Goals: Battles on AIDS Medicines in Thailand”, Benjamas Nillsuwan explores politics and conflict related to AIDS drugs in the Kingdom of Thailand (Thailand). The chapter reveals how regional and international rules and agreements affected national policy choices and limited access to affordable medicines for the most vulnerable people in the country. In Chapter “Afghanistan and the Curse of Resources: Taliban’s Greed-Based Jihad in the Heart of Asia”, Mohammad Reza Qasemi sets out the changing political situation and conflicts in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Afghanistan) and explores how the people in the country continue to suffer from grievances despite the fact that the country has rich mineral resources. While the future of the country remains uncertain, there are clear tendencies of increasing control by the Taliban, particularly in the resource-rich areas in the country. From these case studies, the concluding chapter reveals how, if any, local conflicts were affected by globalization forces and how the global political economy affected local politics and economy that entail structural inequality within each country. It then examines how the stateness or statehood problem in these countries has generated negative effects on national governance and inequality deepened by economic growth (and vice versa) in these countries in relation to ethnoreligious, class, or intra-state regional disparities.

References Amadi L, Anokwuru C (2018) Economic globalization and inequality: exploring the linkages. Issues Bus Manage Econ 6(1):1–13 Barbieri K (2005) Economic globalization and civil war. J Polit 67(4):1228–1247 Beggs D (2009) Postliberal theory. Ethical Theory Moral Pract 12(3):219–234 Chandler D (2010) International state building: the rise of post-liberal governance. Routledge, New York Chomsky N (1994) World orders. Pluto Press, Old and New Collier P, Hoeffler A (2002) “Greed and Grievance in Civil War”, Policy Research Working Paper; No. 2355. World Bank, Washington DC Croissant A, Hellmann O (2020) Introduction: rethinking stateness and democracy in East Asia. In: Croissant A, Hellmann O (eds) Stateness and democracy in East Asia. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 1–24 Crouch C (2019) The Globalization Backlash. Polity, Cambridge Dreher A, Gaston N, Martens P (2008) Measuring globalization—gauging its consequence. Springer, New York Epperson R (1988) The new world order. Publius Press Findlay R, O’Rourke KH (2007) Power and plenty: trade, war, and the world economy in the second millennium. Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford FitzGerald F, Venugopal R (eds) (2006) Globalization, violent conflict and self-determination. Palgrave Macmillan, New York Gissinger R, Gleditsch NP (1999) Globalization and conflict: welfare, distribution, and political unrest. J World-Syst Res 5(2):327–365

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Gurr TR (1993) Minorities at risk: a global view of ethnopolitical conflicts. United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC Gygli S, Haelg F, Potrafke N, Sturm J (2019) The KOF globalisation index—revisited. Rev Int Organ 14(3):543–574 Hegre H, Gissinger R, Gleditsch NP (2003) Globalization and internal conflict. In: Schneider G, Barbieri K, Gleditsch NP (eds) Globalization and armed conflict. Rowman and Littlefield, New York Ikenberry GJ (2009) Liberal internationalism 3.0: America and the dilemmas of liberal world order. Perspect Polit 7(1):71–87 Linz JJ, Stepan A (1996) Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: southern Europe, south America, and post-communist Europe. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London MacGinty R, Richmond O (2009) The liberal peace and post-conflict reconstruction. Routledge, London Martin P, Mayer T, Thoenig M (2008) Civil war and international trade. J Eur Econ Assoc Papers Proc 6(3):541–550 Muller E, Seligson MA (1987) Inequality and insurgency. Am Polit Sci Rev 82(2):425–451 Nel P (2006) Globalization and violent political dissent in developing countries. In: Patman GR (ed) Globalization and conflict: national security in a ‘New’ strategic era. Routledge, New York Nishikawa Y (2016) The effects of global economy on contemporary conflicts. In: Otsubo TS (ed) Globalization and development: leading issues in development with globalization, vol I. Routledge, London, pp 337–357 Paris R (2004) At war’s end: building peace after civil conflict. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Patman GR (ed) (2006) Globalization and conflict: national security in a “New” strategic era. Routledge, New York and London Pieterse J (2012) Twenty-first century globalization: a new development era. Forum Dev Stud 1–19 Riano N (2019) Globalization’s liberalism. https://voegelinview.com/globalizations-liberalism. Accessed 27 Sep 2020 Richmond O (2014) Failed statebuilding: intervention and the dynamics of peace formation. Yale University Press, New Heaven and London Sandbrook R, Romano D (2004) Globalisation, extremism and violence in poor countries. Third World Q 2(6):1007–10030 Slaughter A (2004) A new world order. Princeton, Princeton University Press, Oxford Stearns NP (2010) Globalization in world history (trans Hoban W). Routledge, London and New York Stewart F (ed) (2008) Horizontal inequalities and conflict: understanding group violence in multiethnic societies. Palgrave Macmillan, New York Wallerstein I (2000) Globalization or the age of transition? A long-term view of the trajectory of the world system. Int Sociol 15(2):251–267

Yukiko Nishikawa is a professor in the Graduate School of Global Studies, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan. Nishikawa obtained a Ph.D. in peace studies from the University of Bradford, U.K. Her main publications include “The Reality of Protecting the Rohingya: An Inherent Limitation of the Responsibility to Protect” (Asian Security 2020); Political Sociology of Japanese Pacifism (Routledge 2018); Human Security in Southeast Asia (Routledge 2010); “Human security in Southeast Asia: viable solution or empty slogan?” (Security Dialogue 2009); Japan’s Changing Role in Humanitarian Crises (Routledge 2005). Her research interests include peace and conflict in Southeast Asia and security and international relations in the Indo–Pacific region.

Globalization and Nation-States in Africa and Asia Yukiko Nishikawa

Abstract This chapter provides background information on the themes and case studies in this volume. The first part of the chapter introduces several indicators to grasp the globalization and economic situations of the six countries featured in this volume. It is to gain an overall picture of globalization and the economic situations of the six case countries. The second section of this chapter focuses on the nation-state and nation/state-building that the six case countries, more or less, have experienced vis-à-vis globalization. The section attempts to identify characteristics and conditions that the states in Africa and Asia had to face for their state- and nation-building in the globalized world. The chapter provides a broader picture of the theme of this book in relation to the six cases introduced in this volume. Keywords Globalization index · Growth · Inequality · Political economy · State-building

1 Introduction This chapter attempts to illustrate a framework to explore different cases in the following chapters. The exploration in this chapter will help us to understand broader contexts in which six different cases are studied. The six cases featured in this volume include Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mozambique, Myanmar/Burma, Thailand, and Afghanistan. These countries have experienced violent or political conflicts with the influence of globalization, some of which are continuing. Nevertheless, each country has had distinctive experiences of armed or political conflict(s) with diverse paths of state-building and nation-building with different degrees of globalization. The first section sets out a concept of globalization and findings of the KOF Globalization Index. The section explains how the concept of globalization is understood in this volume and also introduces the six counties’ globalization index, gross Y. Nishikawa (B) Graduate School of Global Studies, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 Y. Nishikawa (ed.), Globalisation and Local Conflicts in Africa and Asia, Evidence-Based Approaches to Peace and Conflict Studies 7, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8818-8_2

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national product (GDP) per capita, Gini coefficient, flow of direct foreign investment, and migrant remittance inflow. Such data allows a grasp of the broader context in which the six countries have undertaken state-building. The second section explores an aspect of globalization closely linked with global economy and international politics in relation to national policy choices. It reveals the characteristics that countries in the late-development group have had to face both economically and politically in relation to early developed countries. The last section then introduces a conceptual framework to understand the relations among globalization, state-building, and nation-building in countries that have a stateness problem. State-building and peacebuilding are not simple technical fixes but have deeper effects on local political and economic dynamics. This framework will help us to understand such external and internal dynamics vis-à-vis globalization.

2 Globalization as a Multifaceted Phenomenon It is now widely recognized that globalization is multifaceted and includes economic, political, and social aspects. Therefore, globalization extends beyond such indicators as the scale of trade, capital movement, and economic openness. In fact, many indicators to measure globalization, such as the Kearney/Foreign Policy Magazine Globalization Index, the Maastricht Globalization Index (Martens and Zywietz 2006; Figge and Martens 2014), and the CSGR Globalization Index (Lockwood and Redoano 2005), encompass non-economic elements to measure globalization in their index. For example, the CSGR Globalization Index includes social and political aspects together with economic considerations to measure globalization. The Kearney/Foreign Policy Magazine Globalization Index includes factors related to personal contact, technological connectivity, and political engagement together with economic integration to measure globalization. Some studies have explored the relations between globalization and issues related to various social dimensions, such as economic globalization and human rights (De Soysa and Vadlamannati 2011), overall globalization and human development indicators (Sapkota 2011), globalization and life expectancy (Bergh and Nilsson 2010), and poverty (Bergh and Nilsson 2013). These studies demonstrated positive relations between globalization and the targeted issue. In this book, globalization is considered to be multifaceted and is broadly defined as a phenomenon that entails the process of connecting varied actors and creating networks on a global scale through flows of people, goods, capital, information and ideas.1 It is distinguished from such concepts as internationalization, liberalization, or universalization, which include similar elements of globalization and are often used interchangeably. This volume avoids defining these concepts respectively because it is not necessary to distinguish all these concepts when globalization is considered as a pluralistic and multifaceted notion. 1

The definition is based on Dreher (2006).

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In connection with these concepts, two prominent characteristics of globalization are highlighted. The first concerns an increase in interdependence, interconnections, and transnational flows on the globe and thus it enhances our recognition that the world is becoming a single place. The point is well discussed as key features of globalization, such as cross-border flows of goods and people. The second characteristic is about the compression and the intensification of social relations in terms of time and space. An event that occurs in one place can be shaped by events that have occurred miles away (Giddens 1990: 64). It is an invisible aspect of globalization that entails hierarchies of power and the nature of socio-political and economic relations.

2.1 The KOF Globalization Index and Six Selected Countries Among many different indexes that measure globalization, the KOF Globalization Index is referred to in this section because it not only entails multidimensional aspects in measuring globalization (see Table 1) but also covers a wider number of countries (203) than other indices and covers the extended period from 1970 to 2016 (version 2019).2 The index is updated annually. Many previous studies have utilized this index. Table 1 shows the variables and weights employed in the KOF Globalization Index.3 The index encompasses economic, social, and political aspects. The economic aspect includes trade and financial globalization, while the social aspect includes interpersonal, information, and cultural globalization. The political aspect includes four variables: embassies in countries, international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and United Nations (UN) peace-keeping missions. These different aspects together define the overall index. Although the KOF Globalization Index is the most cited (Dreher 2006; Gygli et al. 2019), the variables of indices are, to a great extent, decided based on data availability and quality and thus cannot avoid shortcomings. Dreher (2006), for example, points out that the KOF Globalization Index does not include variables to measure migration and religion. In addition, while the number of McDonald’s restaurants and IKEA outlets are used to measure cultural globalization, such data may be synonymous with westernization rather than globalization (Potrafke 2015: 513). Moreover, many globalization indices cannot count intensities, distances, and network sizes (Gygli et al. 2019: 550). Apparently, other data for each country are required to overcome such drawbacks. Nevertheless, the globalization indices together with other data may help us to grasp certain aspects of globalization that may demonstrate different pictures from our assumptions and expectations.

2

For more details about the Globalization Index, see Gygli et al. (2019), Dreher (2006), and Potrafke (2015). According to Potrafke, it is the “most often used globalization index.” 3 ‘Weights’ here means that to what extent each variable has importance when measuring globalization or relative values among the listed variables.

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Table 1 Indicators of the KOF globalization index (de facto) Indicators

Weights

Economic globalization, de facto

33.3

Trade globalization, de facto

50.0

Trade in goods

38.8

Trade in services

44.7

Trade partner diversity Financial globalization, de facto

16.5 50.0

Foreign direct investment

26.7

Portfolio investment

16.5

International debt

27.6

International reserves International income payment

2.1 27.1

Social globalization, de facto

33.3

International voice traffic, de facto

33.3

International voice traffic

20.8

Transfers

21.9

International tourism

21.0

International students

19.1

Migration Informational globalization, de facto Used internet bandwidth

17.2 33.3 37.2

International patents

28.3

High technology exports

34.5

Cultural globalization, de facto

33.3

Trade in cultural goods

28.1

Trade in personal services

24.6

International trademarks

9.7

McDonald’s restaurant

21.6

IKEA stores

16.0

Political globalization, de facto

33.3

Embassies

36.5

UN peace keeping missions

25.7

International NGOs

37.8

Source Gygli et al. (2019) p. 545

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According to the KOF Globalization Index, overall, globalization has proceeded throughout the period between 1970 and 2016. A common tendency among economic, social, and political globalization is that each increased prominently since the 1990s until the onset of the financial crisis in 2007 (Gygli et al. 2019: 560). Many scholars agree that globalization increased strongly between 1990 and 2007. Rodrik (2011) considers globalization since the 1990s as “hyper-globalization.” Scholars also point out both desirable consequences and certain negative effects brought by globalization (Potrafke 2015; Crouch 2019; Rodrik 2011; Subramanian and Kessler 2013), and some of the critiques are related to hyper-globalizationc. Rodrik (2011) explains that hyper-globalization is globalization that has gone too far. For example, the Bretton Woods regime, which he considers “a shallow multilateralism,” was a roaring success, was superseded in the 1980s and 1990s because of “a more ambitious agenda of economic liberalization and deep integration” under which controls on international capital markets were removed, trade agreements extended beyond traditional focus, and developing nations came under severe pressure to open their markets to foreign trade and investment. Figure 1 shows the KOF Globalization Indices of the six countries considered in this volume. As Fig. 1 illustrates, all six countries have had similar tendencies of increasing globalization. Among them, Thailand and Nigeria have been the most exposed to globalization throughout the period (1970–2016). Globalization became prominent in Afghanistan and Mozambique after these countries ended their respective wars and started receiving international assistance after the 1990s and the 2000s, respectively. In Myanmar, the level of globalization has increased since the late 1980s after it ended a socialist era, although its trade largely remained with neighbouring %

85.0 75.0

Thailand

Nigeria

Burma/Myanmar

Congo DRC

Afghanistan

Mozanbique

65.0 55.0 45.0 35.0 25.0

Year Fig. 1 KOF globalization index (de facto). Data Source Gygli et al. (2019)

2016

2014

2012

2010

2008

2004

2006

2002

1998

2000

1996

1994

1990

1992

1988

1984

1986

1982

1980

1978

1976

1974

1970

1972

15.0

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US$ 9000 8000

Thailand

Nigeria

Burma/Myanmar

Congo DRC

Afghanistan

Mozanbique

7000 6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018

Year Fig. 2 GDP per capita (nominal). Data Source IMF data

countries until the 2010s because of sanctions posed against the military junta by the USA and other major OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) donor countries. The six countries’ globalization tendencies reflect the timing that these countries entered into the global or regional capitalist economy. For some countries, globalization became possible because of the end of war, while for others their economic policies allowed integration with the global economy. Figure 2 shows the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita for the six countries between 1990 and 2018. The overall economy was better off in countries that had higher levels of globalization according to the KOF Globalization Index: Thailand and Nigeria. In fact, these two countries are now categorized as middle-income countries in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) List of official development assistance (ODA) recipients.4 The other four countries are among the least-developed countries in the DAC List. While the KOF Globalization Index shows increases for the four lesser-developed countries from the late 1990s or the early 2000s, increases in their GDP per capita occurred only after the 2010s. Nevertheless, as the level of globalization increased, the level of GDP per capita also increased in Myanmar and, to a limited extent, in Mozambique and Afghanistan. Figure 3 shows the Gini coefficient for the six countries since the 1990s. The Gini coefficient was high in all six countries and thus inequality was persistent throughout the period. Among the six countries, inequality was reduced after the 2000s for Thailand, Nigeria, and, to a limited extent, Afghanistan. Although causal relations are unclear, GDP per capita, Globalization Index, and Gini coefficient were all improved 4

Based on the DAC List of 2020. While Thailand is listed in the group of upper-middle-income countries (per capita GNI $3956–$12,235 in 2016), Nigeria is listed in the group of lower-middleincome countries (per capita GNI $1006-$3955 in 2016).

Globalization and Nation-States in Africa and Asia

0.75

17

Thailand

Nigeria

Burma/Myanmar

Congo DRC

Afghanistan

Mozanbique

0.7 0.65 0.6 0.55 0.5

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

0.45

Fig. 3 Gini coefficient of inequality (adults/equal split). Coefficient of 0 represents complete equality; coefficient of 1 represents complete inequality. Data Source World Inequality Database

in Thailand and Nigeria. Afghanistan shows clearer correlations between the level of globalization, the level of GDP per capita, and, to a limited extent, improvement in the level of inequality. After Afghanistan started to receive official assistance from donor countries and international organizations and entered into the global economy in the 2000s, GDP per capita increased while inequality was slightly reduced. Because the extent of improvement has been small, more careful and in-depth studies are needed to identify the real effects of globalization. Nevertheless, opening a country to the global economy seems to have brought certain positive changes, at least statistically, to the economy in Afghanistan. Figure 4 shows migrant remittance inflows for the six countries. Although the scale of remittance inflow is significantly different among the six countries, inflows greatly increased in Nigeria and Thailand after the 2000s, while in other four countries, the increase occurred after the 2010s on a limited scale. In Myanmar, Mozambique, Afghanistan, and DRC, the increase in both remittance inflow and the level of GDP per capita started increasing after the 2010s. In these countries, the KOF Globalization Index increased in the late 1990s (Myanmar and Mozambique) or in the early 2000s (Afghanistan and DRC). Although more in-depth studies are necessary, it is not possible to categorically deny some correlations between globalization, increased GDP per capita, and the amount of remittance inflow in these four countries. Although it is not the purpose of this section to compare these countries based on the available data, the above data demonstrate distinctive economic contexts in which each country has had different exposures to the global political economy despite having experienced the same global economic and political events in the same era. As numerical data on political and cultural dimensions of globalization are

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US$ million

25000

Thailand

Nigeria

Burma/Myanmar

Congo DRC

Afghanistan

Mozanbique

20000

15000

10000

5000

0

Fig. 4 Migrant remittance inflows. Data Source World Bank calculation based on data from IMF Balance of Payment Statistics database and data released from central banks, national statistical agencies, and World Bank country desks

limited in these countries, the data presented in this section are merely relevant to the economic dimension of globalization. Nevertheless, the data exhibited underlying economic contexts in which certain political events occurred.

3 Africa and Asia in Global/Regional Economy and Politics The six countries featured in this volume must be understood as an extremely constrained late-development group emanating out of colonialism5 or its effects as influenced by dynamic superpower relations as in so many other countries in Africa and Asia. Thailand and Nigeria are middle-income countries while Myanmar, Mozambique, Afghanistan, and DRC are among the least-developed countries according to the 2020 DAC List. Nevertheless, both Thailand and Nigeria are among the late-development group because they, in particular Thailand, have reached their current economic level in a relatively short period of time. In many late-development countries, elite groups and other social forces have tried to promote their interests under the given conditions and opportunities by forming development policies, relations with superpowers, increasing market price of particular natural resources available in the country, and through the continuously shifting relations of production. Globalization has been particularly symbolic in such contexts because the comparative advantage of a country can be easily taken over by a new 5

Thailand is not a post-colonial state. However, its neighbours were colonized and thus it is sensible to consider that the country also had a certain influence of colonialism.

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competitor as illustrated by the workforces of Eastern Europe, Vietnam, or China that were added to world production. In the Cold War context, many countries and particular social forces were economic beneficiaries of the US-dominant world in relation to capital transfer, ideological and security support, and market access (Stubbs 2005). Understanding the effects of globalization on the late-development group, therefore, requires political and economic makeup in an integrated sense. In addition, it demands locating them in the larger vibrant relations of production, capitalism and international rules and regulations that have historical and political roots beyond their given territories.

3.1 Political Economy of Globalization Except for a small number of isolated tribes, no community is untouched in today’s world. A simple examination of trade relations can lead to this conclusion. Since the inception of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, 164 countries (as of March 2017) have become the members and 97% of all current world trade occurs among WTO members. The six countries featured in this volume are all members of the WTO. While Thailand, Nigeria, Mozambique, and Myanmar became members in 1995, the DRC joined in 1997, and Afghanistan became a member in 2016. Accordingly, it is reasonable to state that except for Afghanistan, the other five countries have been embedded in capitalist economies since the end of the 1990s. It also means that these countries had externally conditioned challenges as well as opportunities as late-developing countries in the global capitalist economy while some had significant impacts from proxy wars related to the Cold War. Thailand and Nigeria have received flows of foreign investment and aid from relatively soon after the Cold War. Other countries have had narrow flows of investment and aid before the mid-2000s (see Fig. 5). The latter group were, nevertheless, bounded by multilateral lenders, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, through the conditionality programs of neo-liberal structural adjustment.6 Myanmar was the only country of the group that could receive aid from such multilateral organizations after its transition to the quasi-civilian government in 2011. Irrespective of the timing, in these states, elites who shaped reform agendas and the contours of market relations have commonly benefitted from marketization. This reality becomes apparent by the fact that in countries that have experienced growth, such as those in East and Southeast Asia, newly emerged middle classes often serve multinational enterprises (Hameiri and Jones 2020: 16). In addition, among the six countries, Nigeria, DRC, Afghanistan, and Myanmar are resource-rich countries. While resource management is vital in these countries to prevent resource-related conflicts, they have not been able to organize and manage their varied resources, such as oil, timber, metals and minerals, gems and precious 6

For more about the structural adjustment in Asia–Africa, see Aziz (1990), Harvey (1996), and Campbell and Loxley (1989).

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Y. Nishikawa Nigeria

Burma/Myanmar

Congo DRC

Afghanistan

Mozanbique

2018

2016

2014

2010

2012

2008

2006

2002

2004

2000

1998

1994

1996

1992

1988

1990

1984

1986

1982

1978

1980

1976

1972

1974

1970

FDI, net inflows (current US$)

Thailand

Fig. 5 Net flows of foreign direct investment. Data Source IMF Balance of Payments database, data from the UN Conference on Trade and Development, and official national sources

stones. In some of these countries, natural resource extraction tends to be largely subject to the informal economy.7 Although the informal economy can potentially be more innovative, resource-efficient, and resilient, in some countries, the reality will be a mixture of unfair competition, lost revenue, environmental degradation, and human rights abuses. Even for countries in which the resources are controlled by the state, various internal and external stakeholders act for their own personal gains and interests. As a result, gains from such resources provide little benefit to the resourceproducing communities (see Chapters “Energy Security and the Paradox of External Peacebuilding Interventions in Nigeria’s Niger Delta”, “International Policies and Illegal Logging Exploitation Sustaining Local Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo”, “Local Conflicts in Post-reform Myanmar”, and “Afghanistan and the Curse of Resources: Taliban’s Greed-Based Jihad in the Heart of Asia”). Although growth has been achieved in some countries in the late-developing group, this situation does not capture the true picture of asymmetrical and uneven development (see Chapter “The Politics and Political Economy of Violent Conflicts in Post-war Mozambique”). For many countries that have entered the global economy as latecomers, it was impossible to achieve export-led growth without investment from other countries to start production and without markets in which their products are consumed. In such an international environment, the state remains the key entity when struggles for power and resources occur. Indeed, in resource-rich countries like Nigeria, while there has been the continuous flow of oil rent, distribution depends on state-sanctioned processes (see Chapter “Energy Security and the Paradox of 7

The informal economy here is meant broadly as economic activity, enterprises, jobs, and workers that are not subject to taxation or regulation of the state.

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External Peacebuilding Interventions in Nigeria’s Niger Delta”). Nevertheless, denationalization or trans-nationalization of capital flows has necessitated the state to reconfigure to attract and manage capital flows. The political economy of internal conflicts in these countries, therefore, should be viewed as an outcome of an interplay among local, national, regional, and international forces. Dietrich Jung points out that unlike the industrialized countries in the North, globalization occurred in company with “violent war economies” instead of a “pacified market structure” in large parts of the world (Jung 2003: 2). Jung explains that the revenues of wars in such countries came from varied sources, including local resources, from ties to formal and informal markets, humanitarian aid, foreign military assistance, international political rents, and diaspora donations (Jung 2003: 2– 3).8 These points are clearly illustrated in Chapter “Energy Security and the Paradox of External Peacebuilding Interventions in Nigeria’s Niger Delta”, which explores energy security and oil-related conflict in Nigeria’s Niger Delta, and in Chapter “Afghanistan and the Curse of Resources: Taliban’s Greed-Based Jihad in the Heart of Asia”, which shows various resources that sustain the Taliban in Afghanistan.

3.2 International and Regional Rules for an Order in the Globalized World As globalization has increased the flow of goods and people across the globe, it has become apparent that rules and regulations are required to minimize risks and drawbacks brought about by such movements. Similarly, the advantages of increased interdependence among countries can be promoted by better management. International efforts to control and manage cross-border issues, such as infectious diseases, financial crises, and trafficking, among others, are an inevitable consequence of closer human interaction in today’s globalized world. In fact, there is an increasing number of treaties and international political institutions in the contemporary world. For example, Brown states that between 1648 and 1945, there were about 12,000 international treaties, whereas between 1945 and 1995, the number of new treaties grew significantly, reaching around 55,000 (Brown 2012: 203). He also points out a significant increase in the number of customary legal regimes and international political institutions around the world. Several scholars have noted the increase in the number of international institutions and treaties over the past 50 years (Johnston 1997: 8; Held et al. 1999: 53). The growth of international regulations and regulatory aspirations, including commerce and finance, human rights, intellectual property, environmental protection, and information technology, among others, is apparent from the increased academic research on global governance, international constitutionalism, and international and

8

Similar issues are addressed in Nishikawa (2016).

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regional regimes from legal, political, and social perspectives.9 A common ground for scholars to study such phenomena exists in the regulatory aim of creating an order in the global (and regional) realm, although there are various thematic areas. The existence of diverse international regimes and treaties in the contemporary world suggests that it is necessary for states and other actors to set certain standards that regulate their relations with other actors in a given area. However, given that the enforcement of international and regional agreements largely depends on states themselves, they may retain some freedom in their choices and actions. Accordingly, such international and regional rules, treaties, and regimes reflect contemporary globalization. At the same time, varied international and regional rules and regulations often limit or influence a country’s commodity price and availability of certain goods as well as policy choice, which can have serious implications for individuals. For example, a regional agreement can potentially limit access to affordable medicines and life-saving vaccines (see Chapter “Imbalance Between Public Health and Intellectual Property Rights Protection Goals: Battles on AIDS Medicines in Thailand”). This was indeed a serious concern when ten member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and its trading partners, China, Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, had meetings in 2017 concerning the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).10 This is because the RCEP extended pharmaceutical corporation power through broader intellectual property protection, which hampers trade and competition in life-saving vaccines and generic medicines. This episode illustrates how much each state’s decisions vis-à-vis regional and global rules, regulations, and agreements seriously affect individual’s lives through influencing the balance between corporate gains and public goods such as public health, environment, and security. Although there are various regimes or thematic rules, regulations, and agreements in the contemporary world, in each field, varied actors, including corporations, governments, non-governmental organizations, and regional and international actors, compete as well as cooperate to decide the necessary frameworks for an “order” in the globalized world. While such frameworks for an order are vital to reduce the risks of varied threats often emerging in the globalized and interdependent world, the framework can potentially become a cause of political and social conflict that may threaten one’s life. Global frameworks are usually made in asymmetries of access to the decisionmaking processes. The countries in the late-development group have particularly limited influence in shaping the rules and regulations. For example, many decisions for the monetary framework for cooperation in the world have bypassed the IMF and taken place in the “Group” sphere, such as the G5 or the G7. Although the G20 includes some countries in the late-development group, the vast majority of 9

Scholars in international politics explore such an international order predominantly from an institutional perspective in reference to “regimes” or “governance,” whereas lawyers often consider them from the perspective of “the legal order beyond the nation-state” or the international legal order. See, for example, Petersmann (2000), Fassbender (1998), and McGinnis and Movsesian (2000). 10 See Smiley (2017).

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countries in the group are outside such decision-making processes. As a result, the outcomes also reflect the asymmetries of decision-making. For this reason, there is an international or regional dimension to inequality and conflicts that may occur in a state. Although there are many cases in which inequalities and conflicts derive from national governments, some examples can be raised to illustrate global/regional rules, or a lack thereof, that enhance inequalities and conflicts within a country or constrain government actions. Chapter “International Policies and Illegal Logging Exploitation Sustaining Local Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo” explores illegal logging exploitation in the DRC and illustrates how bad governance and noncompliance of laws contributed to the uncontrolled logging by foreign industrial companies, resulting in sustained social conflicts among local stakeholders. Accordingly, in these countries, it becomes more difficult to improve the well-being of the local population. The most vulnerable people are often disadvantaged because of unregulated capital flows. Given these examples, it is sensible to argue that globalization has a complex relation with conflicts that often arise within and between states as well as between the state and corporations, non-governmental actors, or regional and international actors. Many of these conflicts arise because of international and regional rules and regulations, or a lack of them. Each government is expected to find appropriate balance between national policies and international/regional rules by calculating gains and loss. This process should also aim at protecting individuals, although this is frequently not the case.

4 Globalization, Growth, Inequality, and Stateness: Dynamics of Local Conflicts in Africa and Asia Dani Rodrik formulated a renowned thesis of trilemma in The Globalization Paradox in 2011. He argued that it is not possible to realize economic hyper-globalization, sovereignty (national self-determination), and democracy altogether because only two among these can be achieved at one time (Rodrik 2011: 200–201). The thesis generates several questions particularly in relation to the late-development group because such countries are expected to achieve economic growth, democracy, and good governance while minimizing inequality by international financial institutions and major OECD donor countries, in many cases after globalization came to the point of hyper-globalization.11 Here, several questions are raised when exploring globalization and local conflicts in countries in the late-development group: How can the countries that recently entered the global economy achieve democratization and nation-building while maximizing the positive effect of globalization? What

11

Rodrik suggests that the scope, velocity, and size of globalization dramatically changed from the late 1990s.

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are the real effects of globalization on countries that are late-developing and postcolonial states, many of which have a stateness problem? How and why are a certain group of people in such countries with the stateness problem likely to suffer from globalization? Why are some of the late-developing countries more vulnerable to internal conflicts despite achieving economic growth with a help of increasing trade and foreign direct investments? To investigate the dynamics of local conflicts in Africa and Asia, this section conceptualizes the dynamics of globalization, economic growth, inequality, and the stateness problem in the countries that have similar conditions with the cases featured in this volume. Some of the issues pointed out in this section will be elaborated in the case studies in the following chapters.

4.1 Politics of State-Building The six countries featured in this volume are, more or less, undertaking state-building and nation-building. Nevertheless, their state-building and nation-building cannot be achieved according to the same rules under which states in Europe worked toward state-building and nation-building. They must conform their choices and actions to the current norms and power relations of the existing hegemonic international system. Although these countries are in different phases of development, all have experienced significant impacts from global political and economic policies. Nonetheless, the policies have not been the same throughout recent decades. Current international development policies are much different from those in the post-Cold War eras, urging improvements in governance and public–private partnerships. In the post-Cold War era, there have been several characteristics in the global policies towards the late-development group in general and post-conflict countries in particular. As part of state-building operations, market liberalization and privatization of state-owned enterprises have been at the core of policies of multilateral organizations and major OECD donors following the Washington Consensus that aimed to limit the role of the state in the market. Moreover, apart from reforming formal rules and institutions, informal economic and political structures have also been relevant in post-conflict countries. This is largely because unlike conventional understanding of political economy in conflict and post-conflict countries, scholars have pointed out that transformation of political wartime economies is governed by local economic and political logic (Nishikawa 2016: 317–318; Cramer 2006; Keen 1998). Therefore, even after conflict ends, a challenge arises to transform such war-time economies and the structures of political power and authority that sustain them (see Chapter “Afghanistan and the Curse of Resources: Taliban’s Greed-based Jihad in the Heart of Asia”). Accordingly, informal political and economic structures, particularly in countries emerging from conflict, have to be transformed. Beyond such internal contexts in late-developing and post-conflict or conflictprone countries, the presence of UN missions, donor governments, consultants, or international agencies, forms an integral and key part of the political economy of state-building efforts (Hameiri and Jones 2020: 51). Those international actors often

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assume state functions, such as maintaining security, and thus become part of the politics of the countries of concern. For this reason, it is vital to recognize international state-building and peacebuilding policies that significantly affect the actors who exercise power in the countries of concern, rule state institutions, and control economic resources. International state-building efforts by OECD donor governments and multilateral organizations, in fact, typically promote capacity-building of formal institutions and efficiency of service delivery of the government. These efforts are often criticized as technocratic and template-driven based on the idea that failure of state derives from low capacity (Berdal and Zaum 2013: 53–54). Moreover, scholars have pointed out drawbacks brought about by “liberal” international peacebuilding undertaken in post-conflict countries since the 1990s (Paris 1997, 2004; Richmond 2010; MacGinty 2011; Paris and Sisk 2009). Paris, for example, criticized such peacebuilding as colonialism because liberal peacebuilding that promotes liberal economic principles, such as privatization and marketization, benefited the donor countries (Paris 2004). In such contexts, external actors apparently change local political dynamics by changing institutions and local concepts of legitimacy (Whalan 2010). Chapter “The Politics and Political Economy of Violent Conflicts in Post-war Mozambique” explores the violent conflicts in post-war Mozambique and illustrates how such liberal peacebuilding and state-building generated political violence as well as election-related violence and strengthened the existing political power. Although some economic growth was achieved with the help of international financial institutions after a peace agreement was reached between the government and a resistance group in 1992, Chapter “The Politics and Political Economy of Violent Conflicts in Post-war Mozambique” shows how “structural forms of violence” including poverty and inequality, exacerbated the low quality of life of the general population. State-building and peacebuilding do not remain technical fixes but usually cause deeper changes in the political dynamism among the local actors. In such changing contexts, in many cases, local elites are actively involved in the process to maintain their power and achieve personal economic interests. This is largely because many cases of state-building and peacebuilding fail to account for the existing informal and traditional authorities and power relations in the local communities. Local conflicts in any late-developing country in the hyper-globalized world must be studied and discussed with taking all or some of the above-mentioned points into considerations. The six countries considered in this volume, in fact, exhibit problems related to some or even all of these issues, although to different extents at different times. A common tendency that underlies the six cases and perhaps other cases is that globalization has not only affected the economic sphere but also the political and social spheres of state affairs through, for example, international assistance, direct foreign investment, and international rules and regulations or lack thereof. Nevertheless, it is difficult to deny that pre-existing conditions have led to diverse effects of globalization on individuals. For example, the local conflicts in the cases introduced in this volume demonstrate that some of the fundamental causes of such conflicts existed before hyper-globalization began or before the wave of globalization reached these countries. Although the countries under consideration are formal

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members of multinational organizations as sovereign states, many remain internally fragmented or contested polities. Within each country, tribal, ethnic, religious, or local groups or political parties, instead of the state, have been the key points of reference for shared identities and legitimacy (Jackson 1990). When we recognize the fact that not all countries have taken the same path concerning economic growth, inequality, or the occurrence of conflict, the conditions that each country has faced are also important factors to sensibly understand the effects of globalization. In fact, the six countries differ enormously according to their local traditions, their extent and timing of integration into the global economy, the structure of the economy, political system, state capacity, the ability of state institutions, the form of governance, and their experience of colonization or the threat of it. All these different factors, more or less, contribute to their state-building and nationbuilding. Accordingly, it is not possible to draw a particular model that explains why and how local conflicts arose vis-à-vis denationalization of their economy or globalization forces. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify some of the core factors that, with the effects of globalization forces in a form of trade, investments, or internationally agreed rules and regulations, have been likely to have enhanced the risks of political instability and violent conflicts in their local context in relation to statebuilding and nation-building. The following section, therefore, sets out commonly perceived internal dynamics vis-à-vis globalization of the countries introduced in this volume.

4.2 Globalization and the Nation-State: Internal Dynamics The effects of globalization on each state are diverse. While there are divided opinions over whether economic globalization is good or bad, many economic studies show that increased trade and investment around the world with the help of globalization have benefited most countries in terms of GDP growth and the income level over the past several decades.12 Although diverse findings exist, studies that concluded 12

Various scholars have studied the relation between globalization and economic growth and varied results exist for the positive relation between globalization and economic growth even among studies that utilized the KOF Globalization Index (Potrafke 2015). Dreher explored 123 countries’ data as samples between 1970 and 2000 and showed that globalization positively correlates with economic growth around the world. According to Dreher’s study, developing rather than industrialized countries enjoy economic growth during globalization. Some other studies also show similar results concerning the positive globalization effect for economic growth. See Quinn et al. (2011), Bergh and Karlsson (2010), Villaverde and Maza (2011), and Chang and Lee (2011). By the same token, Ali and Imai studied 41 African states between 1970 and 2009 and concluded that economic globalization positively correlated with economic growth (Ali and Imai 2015). Otsubo explored numerous data to investigate world trade, GDP, and remittance in different income groups. His study shows that irrespective of income group, world merchandise trade and trade in goods and services has been steadily increasing since the 1960s while the world GDP also increased, although the growth rate of GDP has been milder than that of the increase in trade. His study also shows that FDI started to grow significantly in all income groups after the 1990s. See Otsubo (2016) pp. 24–34. Rao

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positive relations between globalization and economic growth dominate in quantitative studies. The positive effects of globalization are generally pointed out in relation to per capita GDP as well as growth in income. Joergen O. Moeller indeed states that “For almost all emerging markets or developing economies, globalization has brought about a significant rise in GDP per capita and lifted millions of people out of poverty” (Moeller 2021: 28–29). At the individual level, the effect of globalization is also diverse even within a state. Nevertheless, there seems to be more severe negative effects of globalization on the people in general and on vulnerable people in particular in countries that have a stateness problem or the problem of statehood. The stateness problem has drawn attention from several scholars in the past in exploring and measuring the strength and effectiveness of a state, state capacity, and democracy (Linz and Stepan 1996; Croissant and Hellmann 2020; Anderson 2017). The term “stateness” as used in this volume concerns the following four dimensions: (1) the monopoly of violence and political order, (2) fundamental administration and its effectiveness, (3) agreement on citizenship or the political members’ attachment to the state, and (4) law-enforcement capacity.13 The first point is linked with Weber’s definition of the state. The second point concerns the fundamental infrastructure for state power to be exercised or a functional bureaucracy. The third point is related to the extent to which the members of a political community are attached to the state. The fourth point concerns the extent to which the rules and laws of each country can be enforced by the state or state institutions, such as the police and the courts. Stateness is, therefore, a factor that effects the stability and inner workings in any type of political regime (Snyder 2006: 222–224). Countries with a stateness problem are likely to have contestations concerning the regime’s legitimacy and/or the membership of the political community (citizenship). The problem of stateness can be easily intermingled with cultural factors of diverse actors within a country, such as language, religion, and ethnicity as well as class differences, because these cultural factors often become fault lines that divide the nation when exclusion or discrimination occurs in the political and/or economic process (see Chapter “Local Conflicts in Post-reform Myanmar”). For countries that are undergoing the statebuilding and nation-building process, stateness is a vital issue and is often discussed in relation to state-building and democracy. The importance of the stateness issue in this volume is emphasized because of its relation with state governance vis-à-vis the country’s effort for economic growth (in terms of income level and GDP per capita) and the trade-off relation with income inequality. Figure 6 is an illustration of the internal context of each state. Figure 6 shows key aspects of the above-stated hypothesis. The globalization– growth–inequality triangle in Fig. 6 is a picture of country’s development strategy. and Vadlamannati (2011) found that economic growth accelerated with globalization in developing countries rather than developed countries. 13 The first three points are indeed addressed by Croissant and Hellmann in their study on the nexus between stateness and democracy. Linz and Stepan emphasized the third point among the three dimensions by stating that “When there are profound differences about the territorial boundaries of the political community’s state and profound differences as to who has the right of citizenship in that state, there is what we call a “stateness” problem.” See Linz and Stepan (1996) p. 16.

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Globalization Trade, Finance, Rules & Regulations

Intnl/regional policies/ agreements OECD donors, G7, Intnl financial institution trade-off?

Growth Income/GDP

Inequality Income

Good Governance

Resource export

Access to Resources Democratic Governance

Democratization

Tendencies of predatory economy Pro-elites growth Military's influence

Mutual relations

Increase conflict risk

Stateness/Statehood Nation-building Belonging

Fig. 6 Globalization effects and the stateness problem. Source By the author

Many countries have experienced economic growth with a help of globalization (trade, finance, and investment). In fact, the countries featured in this volume, which includes middle- and low-income countries and the least-developed countries, indeed experienced economic growth measured by GDP per capita over past several decades (see Fig. 2). Resource-rich countries are significantly influenced by globalization forces because the export of natural resources is strongly influenced by factors that include global market prices, international rules and regulations, industrial companies, and multinational corporations. Many economists have revealed correlations between long-term growth and inequality. For example, Dreher and Gaston’s study revealed that globalization has effects on income equality in OECD countries (Dreher and Gaston 2008). Ostry and coworkers pointed out that lower inequality drives more durable growth (Ostry et al. 2014: 6) while Alesina and Rodrik (1994) revealed that inequality is associated with slower and less durable growth. Zweunyller found that “more inequality is associated with lower long-run growth rates” (Zweunyller 2000: 5). Similarly, Tabassum and Majeed (2008) found that more inequality hampers growth in the long run. In the field of development economics, it is considered that even when

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economic growth accelerates, this will not contribute to poverty reduction in cases where income distribution gets worse (Otsubo 2016: 53). These findings suggest that the countries featured in this volume require specific efforts for growth while lessening inequality for sustainable growth (see Chapter “The Politics and Political Economy of Violent Conflicts in Post-war Mozambique”). Accordingly, reducing inequality often becomes an important policy for those countries that have effective and capable governance.14 In development economics, “pro-poor growth” has, in fact, become a fashionable term.15 With such discussions in economics, the importance of good governance has been emphasized by major international organizations and OECD governments in their aid or development assistance policies (Agere 2000; UNDP 2014) (➀ in Fig. 6), which use various indicators to measure quality of governance, such as government effectiveness, control of corruption, and rule of law. In this context, the importance of democracy or democratic principles is also emphasized in many international aid policies (Dietrich and Wright 2012; Knack 2004: 252). For countries rich in natural resources, economic growth over the past several decades can be explained as a result of increasing natural resource rent. This is largely because the global use of natural resources has accelerated and trade in materials has grown dramatically (Schandl et al. 2016). Findings show that since the 2000s, there has been rapid growth in volumes of four major primary commodities (energy, timber, metals and minerals, and food) and relative stabilization since (Schandl et al. 2016: 26). Nevertheless, majority populations in such resource-rich countries have not improved their living standards largely because of exploitable rent-seeking by relevant stakeholders within the countries and by external actors (see Chapters “Energy Security and the Paradox of External Peacebuilding Interventions in Nigeria’s Niger Delta” and “Afghanistan and the Curse of Resources: Taliban’s Greed-Based Jihad in the Heart of Asia”). For example, Schandl et al. state that “Nigeria’s material standard of living is in fact even lower than its low domestic material consumption per capita” (Schandl et al. 2016: 124), while economic growth measured by GDP per capita has been achieved over the decades. Accordingly, in many cases, inequality existing in the country has been expanding and it is likely that national governance has not been able to manage (legally or structurally) internal and external actors who seek resource rent. Good governance and democratic principles together with the quality of governance in economic and political aspects of state-building have been emphasized in development policies of major international organizations and OECD donor governments. Nevertheless, further consideration is required for countries with a stateness problem because these countries either have authoritarian tendencies or strong military control over the economy as well as in politics (➁ in Fig. 6). This is largely 14

Indicators may be used to measure the effectiveness of governance. For example, the Worldwide Governance Indicators suggested by the World Bank include six indicators to measure the quality of governance: (1) violence and accountability, (2) regulatory quality, (3) political stability and absence, (4) rule of law, (5) government effectiveness, and (6) control of corruption. 15 For more details about “pro-poor growth,” see Ravallion (2004).

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because a stateness problem is commonly the cause, symptom, and consequence of insurgencies and political dissidents following disagreement on who are the members of the political community (citizenship) or the legitimacy of the regime. For this reason, many scholars have studied whether democracy is possible in countries with a stateness problem (the stateness-first thesis) (Linz and Stepan 1996; Sqapi 2019; Croissant and Hellmann 2020). This consideration generates a hypothesis: in countries that have a stateness problem, there is an unavoidable structural condition that tends to enhance the risk of political instability or violent conflict (➃ in Fig. 6) vis-à-vis the internationally promoted growth strategy under globalization (trade, finance, and investment), which may allow a certain extent of economic growth but is unlikely to benefit the vulnerable population because the government contests its legitimacy or the membership of the political community (citizenship) with a certain group of people and thus does not equally distribute national resources. For resource-rich countries, typically, there is the predatory nature of the state and such a state does not equally distribute benefits from national resources to all of the population. The state often does not provide economic, political, and social opportunities while establishing and maintaining mutually beneficial relations with external multinational or industrial companies for exploitation of natural resources. As a result, conflicts are inevitable in many cases between the government and those who are not allowed to access the resources or who are excluded in these countries. There are indeed studies that revealed correlations between inequality and the rise to conflict (Muller and Seligson 1987; Stewart 2008). Although distribution is key to reduce inequality in each state, the countries that suffer from a stateness problem are unlikely to have a good system of governance or governing for redistribution of benefits to the vulnerable population because a stateness problem resides at the heart of the problem of governance of the country (➂ in Fig. 6). A stateness problem typically divides the nation along certain socio-cultural or politico-ideological lines. Access to and distribution of national resources in such countries is usually unequal among such different cultural or ideological groups, depending on how well each group has maintained relations with influential politicians, local or national, who are in higher positions in the socio-political hierarchy. Because the degree and composition of the stateness problem and structure of governance as well as the state’s institutional framework are diverse, there will be no fixed form of effect caused by the stateness problem. Rather, varied problems will arise that generate exclusion, discrimination, or marginalization of certain group(s), depending on the existing divisions (or fault lines) in the country. While a stateness problem provides a firm ground for structural inequality, discrimination, or exclusion (usually intermingled with ethnicity, linguistic, religious, or regional differences), the elements of good governance, such as rule of law and effectiveness, tend to be applied in the existing unequal and discriminatory structure (see Chapter “Local Conflicts in Post-reform Myanmar”). Such fault lines may also exist along with different political groups or parties in the post-conflict election process (see Chapter “The Politics and Political Economy of Violent Conflicts in Post-war Mozambique”). Gudrun Ostby indeed explained a significant relationship

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between horizontal inequality and the onset of violent conflict in close connection with ethnicity, religious, and regional disparities (Ostby 2008).16 Having a stateness problem, accordingly, affects varied inner workings irrespective of regime type and is likely to structurally affect economic, political, and social spheres of the most vulnerable population in the country. In reality, in countries with a stateness problem, the economy tends to become predatory and benefit the small number of elites (pro-elite economy) or the military entirely controls the economy (➁ in Fig. 6). Moreover, critiques arose concerning the promotion of democracy or democratization at the early stage of development or state-building by international organizations or OECD donor governments because it enhances competition among political actors while state institutions are still weak (critiques to liberal state-building or peacebuilding) (Paris 2004; Richmond 2010; MacGinty 2011). From these considerations, the growth–inequality–stateness triangle can be drawn and issues identified in Fig. 6 are likely to be relevant to many post-colonial states in Africa and Asia. This indicates that while globalization is an objective reality, its effects are diverse, depending on stateness vis-à-vis governance, which would be one of the key factors when exploring the effect of globalization in countries in the process of state-building and nation-building particularly. Moreover, although this point is not reflected in Fig. 6, in the contemporary world, there are also direct effects of globalization on stateness. For example, a group of people who are discriminated or excluded in a national political community can easily obtain help and support from neighbouring countries or international groups (religious, ethnic, terrorist, ideological, or criminal groups) that have extensive networks around the world. Some extremist groups are indeed active in different parts of Africa and Asia, providing financial and arms support as well as recruiting fighters. Such support by non-state actors is possible with low cost and at short notice because of advances in information and communication technology (ICT) in the contemporary world. Internal dissidents or insurgencies can be then sustained and accordingly prolong internal conflicts in many countries (Nishikawa 2016). This point indicates that, in the current world, there are more challenging environments for nation-states to overcome a stateness problem. While globalization provides more opportunities for economic growth through trade and investment in many countries, its effects need to be carefully studied in countries with a stateness problem. This is because in such countries, benefits brought by economic growth vis-à-vis globalization do not necessarily help the most vulnerable populations within the country. In the worst-case scenario, benefits obtained from economic growth expand powerholders’ resources and help to sustain the discriminatory structure and the regime. Therefore, it is vital to qualitatively study the mechanism concerning how and why benefits brought by economic growth are not distributed to the most vulnerable populations in countries that have

16

Horizontal inequality here means “…inequalities in economic, social, or political dimensions or cultural status between culturally defined groups.“ See Stewart (2008) p. 3.

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a stateness problem and that have rich natural resources, and in what ways international policies, rules, or regulations, or a lack thereof, affect local politics vis-à-vis economic considerations. The following chapters, more or less, offer answers to these questions.

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Yukiko Nishikawa is a professor in the Graduate School of Global Studies, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan. Nishikawa obtained a Ph.D. in peace studies from the University of Bradford, U.K. Her main publications include “The Reality of Protecting the Rohingya: An Inherent Limitation of the Responsibility to Protect” (Asian Security 2020); Political Sociology of Japanese Pacifism (Routledge 2018); Human Security in Southeast Asia (Routledge 2010); “Human security in Southeast Asia: viable solution or empty slogan?” (Security Dialogue 2009); Japan’s Changing Role in Humanitarian Crises (Routledge 2005). Her research interests include peace and conflict in Southeast Asia and security and international relations in the Indo–Pacific region.

Globalization and Local Conflict in Africa

Energy Security and the Paradox of External Peacebuilding Interventions in Nigeria’s Niger Delta Tubodenyefa Zibima

Abstract The conflict over resource ownership in the Niger delta leading to the destruction of oil infrastructure and the ensuing violence and instability resulted in a significant reduction in daily oil production, and as a corollary, affecting Nigeria’s contribution to global oil supplies as well as foreign exchange inflows. However, while the violence in the region has abated and oil production has increased to record levels, the conflict is still latent as the structural drivers of conflict and a sense of volatility still persists. Drawing from the above, this chapter looks at the linkage between state and global energy security concerns and the nature and content of the response to the resource conflict in the Niger Delta region. Using available data on the content on external peacebuilding interventions, it is argued that external peacebuilding interventions are significantly shaped by the prevailing state-sanction conflict management strategy that commodifies peace and by the need to sustain, stabilise and increase oil production in the region as opposed to resolving the structural drivers of the conflict. The chapter concludes that as such, external interventions fail to contribute to peacebuilding as programmatic content is largely influenced by the need to conform rather than reform. Keywords Nigeria · Niger delta · Energy security · Peacebuilding · Oil · Resource conflict

1 Introduction The instability in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria is by expression a resource conflict, one over resource ownership and access, leading to the destruction of oil infrastructure. The ensuing violence and instability have caused significant reduction in Nigeria’s daily production capacity. As a corollary, this reduction in daily production capacity affected not only Nigeria’s contributions to global oil supplies but also foreign exchange inflow. Given the impact of the conflict on oil production T. Zibima (B) Niger Delta University, Wilberforce Island, Amassama, Bayelsa, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 Y. Nishikawa (ed.), Globalisation and Local Conflicts in Africa and Asia, Evidence-Based Approaches to Peace and Conflict Studies 7, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8818-8_3

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and revenue inflows, there have been a number of state-led and external interventions to build peace in the region and to sustain oil production. Interestingly, the nature of the conflict in the Niger Delta is peculiar. This peculiarity arises from the major drivers of conflict in the region and the role of specific identifiable state and non-state actors. Key conflict actors in this regard and in the light of the identifiable issues have emerged over time to expand from tripartite1 to multiple and operating at different levels of governance. The emergence of coordinated violence against the state and oil infrastructure in the regions by militia groups such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) saw the crystallisation of the different conflict actors in a struggle over resource ownership that has evolved into struggles over access to resource rent. The crystallisation of manifest conflict and violence targeting oil infrastructure draws largely from the fact that state and oil company responses to the conflict in the region have mainly been efforts towards ensuring uninterrupted oil extraction and production. This has evolved from targeted militarisation of the region and host communities to actual engagements and negotiated ceasefires with organised militias in the region. Also, unlike other conflict regions with militia actions, there have been fewer civilian casualties from attacks by the Niger Delta militia as compared to military invasion of oil-bearing communities in the region. In the Niger Delta, as in the Middle East and South America, efforts to build peace and bring about stability have been implemented through not only state action and intergovernmental organisations but also the intervention of donor and development agencies like UKaid, USAID and the European Union through funded research, projects and programmes. In turn, these agencies operate indirectly by funding local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society organisations with knowledge and networks in the local area to implement programme objectives aimed at promoting and ensuring stability. Nonetheless, the role of the state in managing the conflict in the Niger Delta has been well discussed (Zibima and Allison 2013; Ebiede 2017; Obi 2014; Watts and Ibaba 2011). This chapter focuses on how the structure and content of the state conflict management strategy in the Niger Delta is connected to energy security goals. As a corollary, this chapter interrogates how the specific strategy of conflict management affects eventual peacebuilding interventions, the role of local conflict actors and the need for sustainable peace in the region. This focus of this chapter emerges from the consideration of the impact of conflict on energy security especially on extraction and access to oil resources. In this context, the analysis in this chapter draws from evidence of the impact of the instability in the region and how this has affected oil production. Through the strategic implementation of a Presidential Amnesty Programme (PAP) in 2009, the violence in the region was managed and oil production has

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At the onset of the conflict, the literature identified a tripartite actor interaction: the Nigerian state, the multinational oil companies and the host communities. This cluster of actors have fragmented into several clusters with overlapping network linkages.

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increased to record levels. Importantly, while initially touted as a holistic peacebuilding strategy, the PAP has only succeeded in bringing about a significant decline in hostilities and the destruction of oil infrastructure in the Niger Delta. This has left unresolved structural and legal issues that underscore the conflict over ownership and control of the crude oil resource. Despite the success of the PAP in reducing violence and attacks on oil infrastructure, a sense of volatility persists. The PAP formalised a state-sponsored rent redistribution system that patronised insurgent/militant leaders through state oil infrastructure surveillance contracts—a strategy that reduced attacks and stabilised oil production. However, this approach still leaves unresolved the structural paradoxes that underscore the conflict over resource ownership. From this perspective, the PAP instituted a conflict management approach where actor engagement is disconnected from structural reforms that sustain peace and stability. The implication of this strategy on the latency of the conflict in the region is that state patronage of militant leaders has created hybrid forms of leadership in communities that are host to large oil infrastructure and has had strategic implications on eventual peacebuilding interventions. One of the outcomes of state patronage is the emergence of parallel informal governance structures controlled by militant leaders that compete with traditional governance structures. This is because the specific strategy of the PAP has created avenues for power contests and competition between insurgents that create and recreate new forms of conflict and struggles over access to oil rent. Outside the PAP as an overt state role in managing the resource conflict in the Niger Delta, its specific strategy of directly engaging with militant leaders as against structural reforms in managing violence in the region has highlighted the role of these strongmen in conflict management in the region. This has set the pace and strategy for ensuing externally funded peacebuilding intervention strategies as implemented by non-profit organisations (NPOs) in the region. This has created an intervention culture in the region that focuses on individual conflict actors as opposed to engagements arising from a holistic assessment of dynamics and drivers of conflict (both structural and otherwise) in resolving or transforming the conflict in the Niger Delta. As noted, the interaction of NPOs with prevailing security architecture is critical to operational success in peacebuilding interventions (Irrera 2011). What begs the question then would be framing what counts as success and whether it is tied to overall resolution of underlying conflict issues and the sufferings they create. The role of NPOs and NGOs in peacebuilding is situated around transforming structures and institutions from being drivers of conflict to pillars that support and sustain peace efforts and outcomes (Campbell 2017). From objective realities, how far do such interventions deviate from an understanding of the structure of conflict, the target stakeholders and linkages to oil infrastructure? Are stakeholders’ actions motivated more by structural violence than physical violence, and what interests drive possible deviations? Are these drivers shaped by the environment of intervention or programmatic decisions motivated by recipient–donor obligations? What does this tell of immediate goals of peacebuilding efforts as against longer term outcomes? In this regard, short-term outcomes only feed continued production and linkages to

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global energy security (tie this in with the dynamics of energy transition). Also, while these NPOs have been criticised for failing to effectively support peacebuilding at the local level, there is also a need to understand how prevailing and emerging local-level conflict dynamics affect and shape funded peacebuilding interventions. Based on the above dynamic, the following questions become the focus of this chapter. First, to what extent does the nature of conflict and the state’s response affect the content of external peacebuilding intervention as implemented by NPOs in the region? Second, how well do global energy security concerns and the fluctuating global interest and response to internal conflicts shape the programmatic content of peacebuilding interventions in the Niger Delta? In our engagement with the above issues, attention is given to how oil in the Niger Delta has impacted politics, rule and conflict. Thus, our focus is on how this has in turn shaped peacebuilding interventions in the region. In this chapter we argue that external peacebuilding interventions in the Niger Delta have not deviated in principle and practice from the systematic architecture of the PAP. The impact of this on peacebuilding interventions undermines a sustainable resolution of the conflict and instead underscores the confluence of global and state interests in continuous oil production in the Niger Delta. Rather than contributing to building peace, this situation paradoxically reinforces a political economy of oil that embeds Nigeria within an energy security driven by the need for increased oil production. The rest of the chapter is segmented into the following.

2 Energy Security and the Political Economy of Oil in Nigeria’s Niger Delta Energy security has emerged as a core aspect of global energy discourse. Within this discourse, issues such as access to energy, the global energy market, energy infrastructure spanning borders, the role of primary energy suppliers and the financial and technological foundations of energy production and supply constitute the policy considerations around energy security (Chester 2010). Energy security concerns as such revolve around the stability of these linkages, at least from a global perspective. For primary energy producers, maintaining production and supply in response to global demand and domestic revenue needs while managing localised political and economic pressures is what shapes domestic energy security policy. Nonetheless, within the energy security discourse, access to supplies, support infrastructure networks and the stability of the global energy market are core issues. The combination of these issues creates an unstable energy enclave coupled with the internal political dynamism of the world’s major energy exporters. With increasing issues around the stability of primary energy supply structures, and growing instability in producing countries especially in the Middle East (Atzori 2013) and Africa, the understanding of energy security is evolving. This evolution is grounded by the difficulties around sustaining uninterrupted access and supply to fossil fuels, to one

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where energy security includes efforts to develop alternative and cleaner energy sources as a way of reducing global reliance on fossil fuels like oil. The analysis in this chapter is approached and operationalised within the local policy direction towards energy security and the expressive forms of state policy towards energy security. We focus on the micro-dynamics of sustaining production of primary energy, especially in contexts where access to energy sources is highly politicised and embedded in state and elite survival and functionality. The focus thus is directed towards an understanding of state response to emerging local and global energy security pressures and outcomes. Given the fluctuating nature of the global energy market, energy security is a volatile policy area because the state response is shaped significantly by local dynamics and global considerations. It is from this perspective that we interrogate the nexus between energy security policy, local institutional differentiation and impact on political and economic processes. Essentially, in the context of limited statehood,2 questions arise on how energy security obligations shape power and political contests, what strategies are employed to manage political pressures and how this affects global energy outcomes and response. Given these considerations, the understanding of the specific domestic political and economic processes and influences on energy security becomes important. It is in this context that a political economy analysis of oil in the Niger Delta is made. In applying a political economy analysis in connecting energy security goals and oil in the Niger Delta, we draw from the two strands of limited access order (North et al. 2009) and political settlement theory (Khan 2010). The limited access order interrogates the nexus between economic outcomes and political stability, and highlights the insignificance of the application of formal rules within elite networks in making political and economic decisions that deal with access to rent and distribution. In this context, while elites strive to keep networks small and compact, elite membership presupposes a situation where survival is dependent on patrons commanding large followership and capacities for mobilisation. Also, the functionality of the limited access order ensures stability especially in the context of resource extraction because the capability of any one patron to challenge and disrupt extant power relations is relative to outsiders’ capacity to challenge the circle. Stability is ensured as with effective distribution of rent through cooptation. Periphery elites challenge of the system through the expression of disruptive tendencies has direct impacts for the capacity of the limited order to accumulate and allocate. This logic explains the specific impacts and outcomes of disruptions to oil production and the corollary disruption in accessible rent as well as the state’s strategy of coopting local-level periphery actors with disruptive capacities. Mushtaq Khan’s political settlement theory (Khan 2010) emphasises the workings of a functional patron–client relationship and the direction of flow of obligations, 2

Limited statehood is used to identify and delineate geographical or functional parts of any state where the ability to enforce collectively binding decisions or exercise a monopoly over the use of violence, or both, is lacking or absent on the one hand, or is curtailed along territorial, sectoral, social or temporal dimensions. See Börzel and Risse (2010), Risse (2017).

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which is often vertical. It denotes the linkages between vertically positioned elites at the top, mid and lower levels and the network dependence that binds. Analytically, the limited access order and the political settlement theory predefines contexts of perpetual power contests for access (Mcloughlin 2014). Stability in this context on a seemingly fragile network of interconnected obligations and expectations is dependent on the distribution and redistribution of benefits. The implication of this arrangement on political stability rests on the logic that the nature of the spread (whether expanded or limited) determines the nature of the contests of elite claims to power and the potential for social disruptions. It explains strategies for managing external threats and challenges to elite networks and structures. However, it can also be argued that the patterns of political settlement in any social context with prevailing elite struggles can create a limited access order. Essentially, in scenarios of power contests with no definable trajectory of obligation, rent distribution or processes of cooptation, the competition for political survival and access to rent can lead to cooperative behaviour and the emergence of new networks of relationship. Conversely, in scenarios of existing networks, unmet expectations, settlements and benefits can lead to the collapse of extant networks through the emergence of new challenges and elite realignments. A political economy analysis of oil in Nigeria and the Niger Delta is here applied to situate peacebuilding interventions and energy security within the prevailing economic and political processes and drivers of conflict around oil rent management and emerging elite struggles for access. By focusing on the economic and political processes, specifically the nature of relationships between actors at the state and local levels, the nature of power contests, and how this shapes oil rent distribution and management, power, access and exclusion in the region, we interrogate peacebuilding and energy security from two perspectives. The first is tied to the global energy security dynamics (international oil demand with transnational oil companies as major actors and extraction/supply dynamics), and the second is how at the local level it creates multilevel spaces for violent competition and access to oil rent. Using the limited access order and the political settlement framework in understanding the political economy of oil in Nigeria and its linkage to global oil supply and demand can be explained in terms of Nigeria’s membership of the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), including OPEC’s strategy of influencing oil prices and supply through a collective approach. The utility of this strategy is determined by stability in the production quota of member countries, motivated also by the fact that many member countries depend on oil revenues for national budget funding (Young and McKee 2016). More importantly for our analysis is the country’s political elites’ understanding of this dynamic and the implication it has on oil rent inflows that underpin patron–client relations in the country. Volatile and rapidly shifting production capacities of member states undermines the applicability and success of OPEC’s collective action strategy. The implication of this situation for Nigeria as a member country is that production levels from oil infrastructure in the Niger Delta region must be stable. This stability is systematically tied to stability and less violence in the region, which has seen intermittent conflicts since the 1990s. In this regard, we can explain Nigeria’s position and role in the global

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energy security template as it relates to crude oil supplies and demand to be functional in the sense that both primary producers like Nigeria and major consumers like the United States and China fulfil separate and differentiated responsibilities determined by international and domestic politics. The way in which Nigeria has maintained its commitments to OPEC has been shaped by domestic politics and conflict in the Niger Delta and has required successive governments to informally initiate transactional strategies to maintain stability and oil production and outputs in the region. It is this outcome that requires a second explanation. As such, to understand the political economy of oil in Nigeria, the Niger Delta, and the emergence of multilevel spaces for violent competition and access to oil rent, a critical point of departure will be to consider the dynamic mix between a number of issues that, although operating at different levels and scales, are essentially part of the complex web of oil, politics and conflict (Oppong 2020) sustained by oil revenue inflows.

3 Oil and Violent Conflict in the Niger Delta: Emerging Complexities Wars have been fought and peace deals negotiated in efforts to secure access to oil resources globally (Kaldor et al. 2007). Securing access to oil/energy supplies, whether by a coalition of international actors as was the case in Iraq and the Middle East, or by local actors as in Angola, Nigeria and Indonesia, has contributed little to ensuring stability and global energy security. The global energy sector still retains its characteristic volatility, especially with issues of pricing and political instability in locations of supply. This makes energy security a complex policy arena. However, within the context of the energy-conflict nexus, violent internal conflicts in primary exporters have had the potency to shape energy economics, especially oil supplies and prices. In essence, politics and policies to ensure energy security and manage the impacts of domestic conflicts on oil/energy supplies have had differing impacts. For one, conflicts over oil are shaped largely by local social constructions as much as state responses. Second, changing dynamics of conflicts over oil resources respond to changing political outcomes more than strategic intervention frameworks. The implication of this on energy security policy may, in the long run, have unintended outcomes shaped more by political economy considerations than programmatic and intervention and content of peacebuilding interventions. Drawing from the above analogy, critical to understanding the nexus between oil and conflict in the Niger Delta will be the understanding of the highly political nature of the drivers of instability in the region, the contentions over the definition of natural and legal rights over crude oil resources, and the distribution of the costs (negative externalities) and benefits of oil exploitation and extraction (Le Billon 2005). The ensuing conflict and instability brought to the fore seething disagreements and disputes over access to, control and use of crude oil resources. Complicating the nexus between oil and conflict in the Niger Delta is the peculiar intermix between

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horizontal inequalities arising from structural and legal aspects of the governance of crude oil resources by the Nigerian state as well as the vertical inequalities in the region accentuated by environmental damage from decades of oil extraction and how these combined to proliferate perceptions of grievances and support for violence (Rustad 2016). Nonetheless, the specific expressions of the link between oil and conflict in the Niger Delta has evolved and is still evolving. Specifically, the pervasive support for the insurgency and the use of violence against the economic interests of the state has evolved into pervasive participation in violent competition for control of spheres of local governance and access to oil rent. Competition over access to fluid oil rents have created newer forms of embedded conflict as constructions of masculinity underpin mobilisation and the use of violence in the pursuit of socioeconomic gains (Ashamole 2019). Emerging microlevel conflict forms are not systematically disconnected from the struggles over oil resources. However, the changing dynamics only lends credence to the fact that struggles over oil tend to transform socio-political configurations in locations of extraction (Schritt 2018). In the Niger Delta context, such changes have gradually transformed the nature of local governance spaces, leading to the emergence of hybrid governance structures with spaces of personalised authority. In a context with embedded layers of conflict, peacebuilding interventions must be designed to address these layers either separately or as parts of a wider conflict scenario. However, the nature of state intervention in managing and addressing the conflagration in the region treated emerging forms of conflict as insignificant, glossing over the fact that the politics over oil resources and rent have systematically shaped and reshaped the environment of conflict (Ebiede 2017). This approach has created opportunistic spaces with varying degrees of violence determined by the value of rent available or accessible. From this emerging reality, the conflict dynamic in the region is responding to the changing global political economy of oil as much as it does to the growing revenue needs of the state. This is an economy where material production and service delivery contribute little to revenue but largely depend on crude oil revenues in a volatile oil market. This situation has been made worse by the COVID-19 pandemic and dwindling oil prices, which have combined to shape the state’s interest in regulating production capacities in line with global market demands. More so, even with increased production, the Nigerian state still contends with the glut in the oil market through trade-offs that reduce value. The implication of the above is that with increasing national- and local-level elite attention on a dwindling yet most viable source of rent, competition becomes more fierce and more violent. This has the potential to complicate both state-led and external peacebuilding interventions and outcomes. This is because the different levels of power and strata of competition create multiple levels of conflict connected only by the struggle for access to oil rent. This creates pockets of power that operate as existential threats to sustainable peace in the region. Tackling the increasing competition and pockets of power will in turn require transactional outcomes and the commodification of peace, a situation that sustains the drive for energy security and oil production while undermining efforts at building sustainable peace.

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With the state as the main distributor of oil wealth, and local patrons occupying intermediary positions, the struggle and competition for access to oil rent and the conflict it creates may get even more complex. Where this is the case as objective reality shows, it would get even more difficult for peacebuilding interventions to untangle the intricacies and negotiate settlements and outcomes that are not dependent on expected current and future distribution of oil rent.

4 Oil, State-Sponsored Conflict Management and the Foundations of Peacebuilding Paradox in the Niger Delta It has been argued that the availability of distributable rent among rebel leaders increases the chances of success of peace negotiations in resource conflict contexts. This is more likely where the resource exploitation and extraction process depend on peace (Humphreys 2005). This possibility highlights the role of the state in determining rent distribution especially where continued inflow depends on continued extraction. However, the specific outcomes of the place of distribution to peace outcomes is also shaped by the peculiar combination of actors involved in rent-seeking behaviour. The hallmark of the Nigerian state-led conflict management efforts in the Niger Delta is the 2009 Presidential Amnesty Programme (PAP). From an analytic standpoint, a structural implication of the PAP and its influence on successive peacebuilding strategies and outcomes in the Niger Delta is how it has enhanced the significance of the array of key local conflict actors and the significance of rent distribution in directing negotiated peace in resource conflict contexts (Zibima and Allison 2013; Eke 2016; Watts and Ibaba 2011). Within the mapping of these actors and the nature of interactions with the state, the confluence of interest is consolidated by competition for access to oil revenue. This competition operates in the context of a state-sponsored patronage system underwritten by oil rent. In this regard, engagements and interactions have systematically evolved with the changing capabilities to distribute rent and microlevel actors to mobilise violence that directly affects oil production and output in the region. This scenario highlights the strategic and economic importance of stability in the region that is necessary for the state and global partners to pursue their economic interests around energy security (Ushie 2013). The PAP was designed in the context of a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme. However, while the DDR facilitates the preliminary phase of broader peacebuilding efforts that address root causes (Davidheiser and Nyiayaana 2011), the PAP architecture and its implementation operationalised a DDR process that was only procedural in implementing the commodification of peace in the region. In peacebuilding theory, peace is only sustainable where it addresses the roots of grievances (Obi 2014). Predominant literature reports on the

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PAP agree that the programme deviated from core ideology of holistic peacebuilding but succeeded in reducing volatility. However, in so doing, the PAP created spaces for increased contestations arising from the commodification of the peace process (Obi 2014; Ushie 2013; Eke 2016; Watts and Ibaba 2011; Iwilade 2017). In this case, the PAP succeeded in reducing hostilities without addressing the root causes of the conflict in the region and that relative stability has endured though fragile at best. This it was able to do given its specific intervention model. Nonetheless, the more veritable implication of the PAP is its impact in succeeding intervention efforts as the resulting analysis will show. The specific architecture of the PAP and the intervention model it implemented, in real terms only, served as a symbolic state dedication to peacebuilding efforts in the Niger Delta. The failure of the PAP for midwifing a holistic peacebuilding outcome in the Niger Delta highlights the resolution of social and environmental injustices in contexts of resource conflicts as critical to sustainable peacebuilding. Local violent reactions motivated by these perceived and actual grievances evolved to eventually constitute a viable threat to oil production in the region and the neo-patrimonial networks that feed from oil rent. The PAP became an institutional response for realigning microlevel patrons with and into national-level state-capture networks. The failure of the PAP to address extant social and environmental injustices in the Niger Delta but succeeding in reducing violence and destruction of oil infrastructure is as such from one quarter argued to be an expression of the Nigerian state’s effort to manage emerging challenges from the Niger Delta to a collapsing neo-patrimonial network founded on and sustained by access to oil rent (Iwilade 2017). Given the PAP’s engagement strategy with the Niger Delta militants and the nature of benefit distribution and redistribution, the programme entrenched an economic solution to the threats posed by challenges arising from violent responses to actual and perceived grievances. For example, available data shows that in just 2 years (2010 and 2011), the total national budgetary allocation for administering the PAP was US $819 million. Out of this amount, US $19.3 million was earmarked as take as a grant, US $193.5 million was expended on stipends for insurgents, while US $580.6 million was spent on feeding during training for the period in preparation for reintegration.3 Despite its successes in reducing the spate of violence and attacks on oil infrastructure, the PAP had some obvious demarcations from other successful DDR programmes such as an implementation framework drawn from best practices and developed based on the political peculiarities of the region, a template to coordinate a sustainable demobilisation and eventual integration, and a sustainable timeline for termination (Ikelegbe and Umukoro 2016). What the PAP gave primacy to and entrenched was the establishment of a multilayered system of disarmament, ‘mobilisation’ and compensation. Its operational processes emphasised and encouraged a flexible intervention template amenable to changing political conditions in the country. The PAP’s idea of disarming, mobilising and compensating created opportunistic spaces for the exploitation of the programme by institutional and local actors. 3

These values are compiled from several source documents on the implementation of the PAP.

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Processes of compensation for demobilised fighters were layered to give control of redistribution to militant warlords. These warlords in turn exploited the process of redistribution and compensation to remobilise supposed ‘demobilised’ fighters. This outcome in itself defeated the idea of demobilising and dismantling fighter networks and the communication channels that support the mobilisation of force against the state. Across the Niger Delta states, warlords functioned as intermediaries between the PAP secretariat and the demobilised fighters. These warlords exerted enormous influences in the determination of beneficiaries for preparatory programmes for reintegration. These created incongruities in the programme and its implementation outcomes. The PAP entrenched the necessary conditions that support oil extraction in the region to maintaining and satisfy production quota commitments. The state’s faltering in maintaining its daily production levels would be disastrous economically for a rentseeking entity like Nigeria on one hand. On the other hand, exploration is serviced by joint ventures and production sharing contracts (PSC) with multinationals and unmet cash call requirements by the state. Any reduction in production systematically affects oil revenue inflows, and capital obligations to support continued production. The logic behind the PAP’s stakeholder engagement gave local powerbrokers with disruptive capabilities significant leverage in negotiating peace deals and outcomes. This leverage was further elevated with the emergence of contested spaces of informal local governance structures. Systematically, this leverage was exploited not only in negotiations with the state but increasingly with multinational oil companies and eventually intervention agencies working on conflict in the region. It is this peacebuilding operational environment that external interventions now operate in. Importantly, these operations contend with local elite pressures with the potential to shape the programmatic content of these interventions.

5 Peacebuilding in the Niger Delta: NPOs and the Paradox of Post-2009 Interventions The role of NPOs in peacebuilding discourse and practice in the Niger Delta is here understood and operationalised within the context of donor–civil society relations where funding results in NPOs implementing donor-driven mandates (Dosch 2012; Campbell 2017; Sakue-Collins 2020). Donors like multilateral agencies with stated interests in peacebuilding often lack the necessary legitimacy in direct engagements aimed at supporting peace, especially at the most local and communal levels. In such contexts, local NPOs provide the needed linkage and representation of legitimacy and acceptance within local populations. Notedly, the participation of NPOs in peacebuilding interventions depends largely on support from not only states but also international organisations as well as multilateral donors (Daniella 2011) and the rendering it gives externally funded peace or conflict research and peacebuilding efforts in the region.

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With regards to a global energy security outlook, both primary oil-producing and major oil-consuming states are linked to the extent that conflicts in the former affect oil supplies and pricing as well as economic outcomes. Understanding the economic implications on major consumers is tied to the prevailing incapacity of primary producers to muster the technological know-how to drive extraction and the resulting dependence on transnational corporations to operate the extraction industry. Thus, conflicts over oil and impacts on production by extension affect major consumers from a global economic standpoint. This dynamic has largely necessitated the increased role of external actors in peacebuilding interventions in most primary oil-producing states, highlighting not only the role of governments but those of multilateral agencies and transnational corporations in conflict management (Idemudia 2017). However, while the economic interests behind peacebuilding intervention is understood, the implemented aspects of specific interventions are executed in objective conditions that are not divorced from prevailing political and institutional circumstances in the recipient country. This consideration has significant influences on what needs to be done and even more so on how it is done, or the contest between implementing donor-driven interest while managing the contextual hurdles generated by formal and informal politics in the location of intervention (Menocal 2014). This brings to the fore the challenge of managing the pressures of state–society relations while implementing programmes that are aimed to achieve predefined external economic goals (Leftwich 2011). With reference to peacebuilding interventions anchored by externally funded NPOs, existential reality shows the paradox between interest-driven interventions and context-driven implementation. Essentially, it highlights the objective reality of interventions that do more to protect donor interest through the specific nature of its programmatic aspects of the intervention. It is from this angle this chapter interrogates a post-PAP externally funded intervention in the Niger Delta and how the specific political economy of oil has shaped this intervention and the state’s interest as driven by rent-seeking elites around crude oil production and global energy security concerns. We identify programmatic constraints and opportunities within specific interventions and how their management shaped external interventions outcomes.

5.1 The Niger Delta Stability Programme, Oil and Peacebuilding in the Niger Delta The Niger Delta Stability Programme (NDSP) was a two-year external intervention in the Niger Delta funded from the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF), a global security and stability support initiative of the government of the United Kingdom (UK). The CSSF is a lateral fund launched in 2015 and is utilised to respond to conflict and tackling instability in locations with significant UK interests, especially where instability threatens those interests. The fund is a product of the UK

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government’s 2015 Strategic Defense and Security Review. The CSSF has funded interventions in about 80 countries. The CSSF, as partly implemented by UKaid, espouses three core objectives: (i) strengthening global peace, security and governance, (ii) strengthening resilience and response to crises and (iii) tackling extreme poverty and helping the world’s most vulnerable (UK Government 2018). The NDSP intervention (2017–2019), with an annual budget of £800,000, was implemented out of the Niger Delta by the Nigeria office of a UK-registered NPO, Stakeholder Democracy Network (SDN). Other than the NDSP, there were a number of other interventions funded by the CSSF including the Nigeria Regional Maritime Security Programme, the Nigeria Organised Crime Programme, the Nigeria Security and Justice Reform Programme and the North East Security and Stabilisation Programme (UK Government 2018). In this section, we analyse the NDSP strategic engagements in pursuit of its core mandate of contributing to stability and peacebuilding in the region. This is done through a deconstruction of the NDSP framework of engagement as outlined in its programme document and work plan in the context of the environment of implementation. The NDSP implementation strategy was developed around a number of pillars segmented into security and governance, economic diversification, oil theft and illegal refining, environment clean-up and political economy analysis. These pillars of intervention were designed to manage potential disruptions that may emerge from the actions of the federal government, the responses of local elites and the community, and the roles of multinational oil companies, and how these may affect stability and economic viability in the region.

5.2 Security and Governance Pillar The security and governance pillar of the NDSP was framed around the logic of the nexus between governance outcomes and stability. Underpinned by the narrative that insecurity in the Niger Delta is a direct outcome of years of government neglect and underdevelopment, the security and governance pillar aimed to provide support and technical assistance to the federal government’s strategy of developing the region through dedicated transfers of revenues to specific sectors. The federal government’s efforts were to have been implemented under a policy approach called the Strategic Implementation Work Plan (SIWP). The SIWP was a product of meetings and negotiations between the Nigerian state and the Pan-Niger Delta Forum (PANDEF), a group of regional and local elites in the Niger Delta. The specific parties to the negotiations that led to the creation of the document included a crosssectional technical group and state ministries, departments and agencies. Notable inclusions were the Ministry of Petroleum Resources, the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs, the Niger Delta Commission, the Presidential Amnesty Programme (PAP) and PANDEF representatives. The SIWP outlined laudable pathways to development in the region without concrete institutional, procedural or legal considerations for its implementation.

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The primary objective of the SIWP was to synergistically mainstream the 20-point agenda of the Federal Government and the 16-point agenda of the PANDEF on the development of the Niger Delta region into a coherent plan of action across sectors that included: improving the operating environment of businesses in the region (₦6,995,000,000); youth engagement through job creation (₦76,318,427,876); improving access to energy through gas-to-power projects (₦17,449,346,062); incentive for peace investment scheme (₦171,544,262,543); regional infrastructure development (₦1,544,369,247,613); environmental protection, remediation and clean-up (₦53,177,900,778); incentivising local investments in oil and gas (₦4,324,600,000); establishing a regional development fund (₦110,602,500,000); reintegrating militants through education (₦30,433,323,880); youth-focused chambers of commerce (₦43,151,000,000); Federal Government partnership with states (₦774,427,208) and policing for peace (₦6,000,000,000). However, more than just demarcating the financial responsibilities for delivering the SIWP between the state and private sector, the plan embedded aspects of the government’s budgetary implementation within the formalistic operations of specific ministries without recourse to the administrative issues around budget implementation and ignoring the specific context of the issues the SIWP was intended to resolve. More so, financial responsibilities for the implementation of the SIWP were shared between the federal government and operating multinational oil companies in the region. By its programmatic logic, the NDSP intervention under the security and governance pillar emphasised the potential benefits of creating local environments that would support the implementation of the SIWP. This it intended to achieve through supporting state-level engagement for the implementation of the SIWP; providing technical assistance in monitoring the implementation; mapping, identifying and engaging non-state actors involved in providing security as a necessity for operationalising the SIWP. Implicitly, the logic of implementation of this pillar aligns with and reinforces the underlying interests of the Nigerian state towards a conflict management strategy that supports continuous production as against a sustainable resolution of the conflict issues in the region. The plan projects the drive of nationallevel elites in engaging local-level elites in ways that manage potential disruptions to the political stability and economic processes on the region. The huge financial implications of the SIWP implementation in the region held a promise for increased financial inflows to the region providing opportunities for benefit capture by local elites at the state and community levels. From its strategy of engagement and the programmatic content, the NDSP’s support to the SIWP ignored the political and contextual environment within with the SIWP was to be implemented. Importantly, the NDSP streamlined its programmatic content to align with the state’s engagement rather than engage to connect the state and communities on structural issues. In so doing, the intervention engaged with coordinated top–bottom elite-driven solutions to resolving the conflict in the region and in so doing systematically glossed over the significance of engaging with structural drivers of the conflict. The SIWP solution was disconnected from objective reality because it did not resolve the contextual and foundational issues that

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recreate poverty and engender perceived and actual grievances underlying violence and instability in the region. Essentially, goals of identifying, mapping and engaging with non-state actors involved in security in the region systematically creates avenues for engaging with local elites. This strategy to stabilisation ignores the hybrid forms of governance and unaccountable authority that emerged as a result of the commodification of peace negotiations institutionalised by the PAP. The multilayered structure to hybrid local authority and governance arising from the emergence of militant generals as strongmen creates a volatile and fragile local elite structure. This is even more complex because the PANDEF represents a loose network of local elites espousing representation of the interests that appear to compete with the economic interest of the region: militant strongmen.

5.3 Oil Theft and Illegal Refining Pillar The oil theft and illegal refining pillar was designed to manage the economic externalities to the oil companies, the state and oil revenue arising from the activities of oil thieves and illegal refiners in the region. To effectively do this, the NDSP identified areas of engagement and intervention that cut across the actors and processes of oil theft. One was to investigate and review pipeline surveillance contracting approaches and its role in stabilisation. Recommendations could then be made to reform and replace the current pipeline surveillance contracting systems, and to develop models of alternative livelihoods for participants in illegal refining. In perspective, pipeline surveillance contracts were put together as part of the PAP deals with militant generals to reduce proliferating cases of pipeline sabotage and oil theft. As such, across the Niger Delta state, major militant leaders became surveillance contractors to the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and its joint venture partners (major transnational oil companies) operating in the Niger Delta. Given the lucrative value of these contracts across the region, it provided a viable sphere of competition between local elites vying to secure and keep these contracts. The informal nature of the contracting process, usually awarded outside established public procurement rules, highlights the network nature of the state’s strategy at managing the instability and ensuring stable oil production. The processes and nature of oil pipeline surveillance contracting points to the transactional nature of the relationship between state-level elites and local-level actors given that a return to violence has become a functional threat for securing contracts from the state and the NNPC (Olawoyin 2018). While the NDSP implementing agency understands the potential hurdles to reforming a state-sanctioned private reward system for elite groups, its programmatic engagements on illegal refining do not signify any form of policy deviation but rather appears to beg the question. As the implementing organisation noted in one of its policy briefs on oil pipeline surveillance, ‘the concept of pipeline surveillance contracts in the Niger Delta is a misnomer. They rarely involve any actual

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surveillance, but are used as a disguised “payment for peace” to agitator groups and as patronage for political allies’ (SDN 2019:1). The implication is that while the organisation understands the political dynamics around contracting and how the state instruments the process to distribute benefits and manage violent disruptions to oil extraction, its programmatic position belies that fact. More so, surveillance contracting to monitor oil pipelines in the Niger Delta has become susceptible to changing political dynamics, especially political party alliances in the region. Securing and renewing surveillance contracts by militant leaders has over the years been influenced mostly by party affiliations and linkages to political patrons. This, in effect, undermines the very logic of the NDSP strategy in supporting the effective management of oil theft and its impact on oil revenue streams for the state and elite groups. Again, the programme content for the NDSP raises a number of issues with implications for overall stability outcomes in the region. The NDSP strategy, while it may consider embedding recommendations within a new region-wide security architecture, failed to identify avenues synergising with extant security structures. More so, while the likelihood for a resurgence of violence remains high, a change in the status quo may create not only avenues for newer actors to enter the fray but may also incentivise violent responses from extant beneficiaries of the contracting system. The strategy as such failed to achieve any recordable success for a number of reasons. First, for operational reasons, programmatic interventions like this are hamstrung and may not be in their interest to openly challenge or attempt to overhaul elite-supported political and economic processes that are built on benefit capture and rent distribution. Second, stability as it supports unchallenged oil extraction may be threatened where obvious attempts are made to disrupt rent-sharing processes between state-level elites and local-level elites. In contexts of functional elite networks and the rentier nature of economic processes, reform attempts, especially external reform attempts, are construed and interpreted as challenges to state authority and may lead to proscription. In effect, any reform strategy that develops more viable strategies and processes to surveillance contracting but with no supporting institutional change will only succeed in developing policy approaches divorced from political and economic contexts. This is an important consideration because extant institutions, as they support rent distribution and avenues for cooptation, may have foundational impacts on the success or failure of implementing strategic interventions. While it may be difficult to ascertain whether the inherent contradictions of the NDSP were part of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the UK government’s strategic planning or the internal organisational positioning of the implementing NPO, the fact remains that programmatic contents of donor-funded projects often are in practice representations of the strategic concerns of the funder rather than the implementing agency. This is systematically expressed in the direction and content of the identified pillars and how, in the long run, expected project outcomes while they do not deviate from the energy security goals of the state and multinational oil companies, they highlight inherent paradoxes of external peacebuilding attempts

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and efforts in the region. More than the inherent contradictions in engagements as part of implementing the NDSP, shifting political and economic considerations could have contributed to the failure of such interventions to contribute to meaningful and sustainable peace in the region.

6 The Goal of Peacebuilding Interventions in the Niger Delta: Global-State Convergence, Local Discontinuities Given the programmatic strategies and outcomes of external peacebuilding efforts, deconstructing and understanding the confluence of global and local interests that drive peacebuilding interventions in the region, the analysis points to several issues that intersect. These issues are maintaining access to oil through uninterrupted production, maintaining elite positions in relation to the state and rent distribution, significance of oil rent in managing localised pressures and disruptions to the state’s economic and political interest and the nature of the operational environment these create for peacebuilding efforts. These issues have analytically emerged from identifiable dynamics arising from the specific political economy of oil in the region, governance contradictions and competition over access to oil rent. In understanding the specific outcomes of peacebuilding interventions and how programmatic implementations contribute to outcomes, we look at the following structural and attitudinal issues, the inherent contradictions and how these feed into the global energy security politics in Nigeria and the Niger Delta. Inherently, the state’s energy security interests, pressures from the global energy market and revenue needs of the state, rather than operate as separated outcomes, converge to shape interventions. These interventions in turn operate to sustain a cycle of elite power contestations that recreates the environment of conflict in the region. As the engagement with the NDSP shows, there is a two-way interaction between the goals of peacebuilding in the region and the specific environmental dynamics wherein the programme is implemented. At the point of convergence between state and global energy security outcomes, there is a continuous evolution of the local governance context in the region. The current political context does not support sustainable peacebuilding outcomes because the prevailing governance context in the region has evolved to be one where support for resource conflict de-escalation is now found in the expressive forms of adaptive state capture mechanisms that link national and local actors. This is a political environment that NPOs do not operate in without becoming overtly political, becoming parties to state capture processes that align national and local interest clusters, made possible and sustained by continuous access to oil rent. The specific nature of rent distribution supported by the state has evolved to shape the interest of microlevel conflict actors and entrepreneurs. Cooptation of local actors into lucrative state capture networks increases local competition over domination and accumulation. That is, it increases local competition for power and

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the incidence of local-level leadership conflicts and the emergence of unaccountable authority. Within the functional rent distribution networks, the status quo remains viable. Technically, emergent structures of governance are only functional where they reinforce access to rent for local elite networks. Proposed reforms of extant structural and governance defects, as coordinated by NPOs through funded interventions will be resisted not only by local elites but possibly by the state as a way of managing potential social disruptions. As structural and governance defects operate, they enable and give essence to a state-sponsored patronage system fuelled by oil rents. Interventions may unsettle precarious power arrangements and thus create pockets of violence that undermine production capacity for multinationals and the state. Domestic structural reforms may not affect global energy security to significant levels as production output may stabilise in the long run. The focus thus rests on the particular trajectory of the convergence of global4 and local extraction interests and the trajectory of dependence and support.

7 Conclusion Overall, the conflict environment in the Niger Delta, rather than being amenable to peacebuilding efforts, operates to shape these efforts and interventions towards a specific political economy outcome. This outcome is the evolving and constant contestations for power, control and access to oil rent. As a corollary to the continuous flow of oil rent, struggles for and actual distribution are supported by statesanctioned processes. The combination of the nature of elite struggles, at the national and local levels, and the efforts towards managing actual and potential disruptions to oil production combine to create conditions that are antithetical to positive and sustainable peacebuilding outcomes. Importantly, non-state-funded intervention for peacebuilding in the region systematically lends itself to the pressures of the extant structures and processes created by state-sanctioned strategies for managing conflict, a functional strategy for achieving the state’s energy security goals. Programmatic contents are designed to implicitly complement rent capture structures, as opposed to providing technical and institutional support to reforming drivers of conflict. Given that it is not currently in the interest of the state to support the enabling environment for correcting the structural, governance and legal defects that underpin the conflict in the region, interventions may achieve little in the aspect of structural reforms. What is created is a context where viable peacebuilding interventions will contend with increased political pressures that undermine programmatic interventions for reform and resolution of the structural drivers of conflict. Also, the social memory arising from state-sanctioned rent distribution mechanisms support the possibilities of a never-ending cycle of local challenges to state authority and the management of resource rents. Essentially, the conflict situation in the Niger Delta 4

As represented by the major oil multinationals like Chevron, Total, ENI and Royal Dutch Shell.

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systematically recreates structures and processes that perpetuate conflict, while the programmatic interventions of NPOs only combine to highlight the convergence of state energy security needs, conditioned implicitly by global energy demand and market dynamics.

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Menocal RA (2014) Getting real about politics: from thinking politically to working differently. Overseas Development Institute, London. http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/ publications-opinion-files/8887.pdf North D, Wallis J, Weingast W (2009) Violence and social orders: a conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history. Cambridge University Press, New York Obi C (2014) Oil and the post-amnesty programme (PAP): what prospects for sustainable development and peace in the Niger Delta? Rev Afr Polit Econ 41(140):249–263 Olawoyin O (2018) Niger Delta youths protest alleged highjack of oil pipeline surveillance contracts. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/regional/south-south-regional/298126-niger-deltayouth-protest-alleged-hijack-of-pipeline-surveillance-contract.html. Accessed 6 May 2021 Oppong N (2020) Does political settlements analysis capture the unsettling politics of oil in Africa? Rev Afr Polit Econ 47(166):676–686 Risse T (2017) Human rights in areas of limited statehood: from the spiral model to localization and translation. In: Hopgood S, Snyder J, Vinjamuri L (eds) Human rights futures. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 135–158 Rustad SA (2016) Socioeconomic inequalities and attitudes towards violence: a test with new survey data in the Niger Delta. Interactions 42(1):106–139 Sakue-Collins Y (2020) (Un)doing development: a postcolonial enquiry of the agenda and agency of NGOs in Africa. Third World Q. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2020.1791698 Schritt J (2018) Crude controversies: disputes along Niger’s petro-infrastructure. Hist Anthropol 29(5):645–669 Stakeholder Democracy Network (SDN) (2019) Pipeline surveillance contracts in the Niger Delta, policy brief. https://www.stakeholderdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Pipeline-sur veillance.-Brief.-2019.pdf. Accessed 4 May 2021 Ushie V (2013) Nigeria’s amnesty programme as a peacebuilding infrastructure: a silver bullet? J Peacebuilding Dev 8(1):30–44 UK Government (2018) Conflict, stability and security fund. https://www.gov.uk/government/org anisations/conflict-stability-and-security-fund/about. Accessed 3 May 2021 Watts MJ, Ibaba SI (2011) Turbulent oil: conflict and insecurity in the Niger Delta. Afr Secur 4(1):1–19 Young MH, McKee L (2016) OPEC’s strategies in an expanding energy. J Energy Secur. http:// www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=593:opecs-strategies-in-anexpanding-energy-market&catid=131:esupdates&Itemid=414. Accessed 30 April 2021 Zibima T, Allison TF (2013) The state in conflict management: the amnesty program and the nature of stakeholder cooperation in Nigeria’s Niger Delta. Niger Delta Res Digest 7(1):1–33

Tubodenyefa Zibima is a development practitioner and currently affiliated to the Niger Delta University, Wilberforce Island, Bayelsa State, Nigeria. Zibima holds a Ph.D. in International Development (Conflict and Peacebuilding) from the Graduate School of International Development, Nagoya University, Japan, where he studied as a Japanese government (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology: MEXT) scholarship student. His current research focuses on corruption, peacebuilding, conflict management, extractives, and environmental regulation. He is published on these themes in refereed journals and book chapters. He can be contacted via [email protected]

International Policies and Illegal Logging Exploitation Sustaining Local Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo Georges Bomino Bosakaibo

Abstract The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has the second-largest area of rainforest in the world as natural resources. Decades of poor governance and continuous conflicts favoured the illegal logging exploitation in detriment of the country benefit. The 2001 reform resulted to the 2002 forest code to improve the forest management. However, the forest code implementation has shown its limits and weaknesses. Therefore, this chapter explores international regulations and policies supposed to contribute to the legal logging exploitation but seem to support the illegal logging exploitation in generating local conflicts in DRC. Besides, the identification of key challenges is also important to think about mechanisms that can fill the gap between the multilateral policy initiatives and practices in the local contexts. The chapter argues that international policies, in a way, favour the illegal logging even though through the multilateral cooperation, they suggest laws and policies to improve the forest governance in the DRC. Unless, those factors and challenges are identified, the gap between international policies and practices in the local context cannot be filled. Keywords International policies · Multilateral cooperation · Illegal logging exploitation · Forest resources · Local/internal conflict

1 Introduction The natural resources of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) constitute the second-largest rainforest area in the world. Forests contain key elements that help the world and the country to alleviate climate change. However, decades of poor governance and continuous conflicts have favoured illegal logging exploitation to the detriment of the country’s benefit. The local riparian forest populations encounter difficult situations as logging companies ignore them in the process, and it is mostly the autochthon people who G. B. Bosakaibo (B) Faculty of Policy Studies, Nanzan University, Nagoya, Japan © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 Y. Nishikawa (ed.), Globalisation and Local Conflicts in Africa and Asia, Evidence-Based Approaches to Peace and Conflict Studies 7, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8818-8_4

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are discriminated against and marginalised. These communities are often frustrated because industrial logging companies do not keep promises made in the social contract’ agreements. Such a situation generates conflicts between these communities and loggers. Many community members are unaware of their rights in relation to the laws governing forest use, and the situation is exacerbated by changes to the law and measures that remain pending. The 2001 reform produced the 2002 Forest Code, which sought to improve forest management in the country. However, the implementation of the forest code has shown its limits and weaknesses. Indeed, poor forest governance in many forest countries and particularly in DRC, is partly caused by illegal logging, which has become a global problem. Illegal logging neglects efforts to control and maintain forests at a certain level in an equitable manner, causing deforestation, social conflicts and loss of income for the government. As the international community became conscious of illegal logging as a global problem, some countries have global policies to counter illegal logging. Therefore, this chapter explores international regulations and policies that are supposed to contribute to legal logging exploitation. In reality, such regulations and policies appear to support illegal logging exploitation and thus, generating local conflicts in DRC. Given such international and national contexts, the identification of key challenges for DRC is important considering mechanisms that can fill the gap between the multilateral policy initiatives and practices in local contexts. In order to explore the above-mentioned situation in DRC, this research utilises secondary data gathered from reports, journals, books and Internet sources. It uses the main different timber regulations provided by the USA, European Union (EU) and China to analyse the gathered data. This chapter argues that international policies, in a way, favour illegal logging even though they suggest laws and policies to improve forest governance in DRC through multilateral cooperation. Unless relevant factors and challenges are identified, the gap between international policies and practices in the local context cannot be filled. This chapter is articulated as follows: after this introduction, Sect. 2 presents an overview of international rules with regard to investment and forest product trade from China, EU and the USA; Sect. 3 examines the dynamics of illegal logging exploitation in DRC, especially highlighting the limitations of national regulations and policies; Sect. 4 investigates different conflicts related to illegal logging; Sect. 5 explores how illegal logging poses threats to social peace; Sect. 6 discusses the key challenges in multilateral forestry cooperation between DRC and some developed countries and organisations; the chapter ends with a conclusion.

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2 Overview of International Laws Linked to Illegal Logging in Forest Product Trade and Investment Defining illegal logging is a contentious task. While environmental nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) tend to support a wider definition including all important acts of the practice, governments and industry representatives prefer a narrower criterion (Ministerial Conference on the Protocol of Forest in Europe 2005). Interestingly, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) refers to timber trade and logging activities as illegal whenever ‘wood is harvested, transported, processed, bought, or sold in violation of national laws’ (FAO 2005: xiv). This definition is consistent with other widely recognised definitions. Nevertheless, by making reference to ‘national laws’, these definitions bring into question the appropriateness of national regulations and whether developing countries possess appropriate established forest law (Brack and Umpfenbach 2009). Inversely, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) provides that legally harvested timber is an attempt to initiate constructive duties that must be achieved for logging operations to be legitimate (WWF 2003). The lack of a universally agreed definition has been contributing to a considerable disparity of illegal logging quantification. Moreover, the complexity of data collected on the global trade of timber and log products further hampers its quantification. Consequently, international figures tend to diverge. However, most scholars agree that illegal logging is, at minimum, widely committed (Ministerial Conference 2007). Under comprehensive definitions, evaluators suggest that illegal activities make up more than 10% of the international timber trade. Scholars also think that more than half of all logging and timber business activities carried out in the developing world are illegal (Brack 2006; Bridegam et al. 2015: 5). The prominence of these activities is seen in China, which is called the ‘motor of the global timber trade and being among the most notorious players in the supply chain with most imports being illegal’ (Waite 2012: 322 323). Wood product processors are widely ignorant of the raw timber origin, and China does not manage the validity of the imported wood. Experts consider that a significant portion of the wood products imported into China comes from unsustainable or illegal timber operations (Waite 2012: 323). The effects of this unlawful trade are countless and widespread and expand into social, economic, political and environmental areas. Despite long-lasting consequences, it was only in the 1990s that the international community started expressing its concern over the situation. In fact, illegal logging was mentioned as a global concern in the Group of Eight (G8) countries’ 1998–2002 Action Plan. This decision motivated the World Bank to organise the first major international workshop on Forest Law Enforcement in 1999 (Callister 1999). In addition, the World Bank’s 2001 ministerial Conference in Indonesia generated another international organisation concerning the Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade (FLEGT) and drafted the Memorandums of Understanding (Waite 2012: 327). It acknowledged the individual members’ commitment to making a domestic law to

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alleviate illegal logging worldwide. There are new measures that have been implemented to exclude illegal timber products from their markets (Waite 2012: 327). The section proceeds by exploring three relevant forest product policies, namely, the US Lacey Act of 2008, the European Union Timber Regulation and China’s Timber Legality Verification System Initiative. The section ends with a comparative examination of the three policies.

2.1 The 2008 US Lacey Act The USA responded to the global problem of illegal logging by revising the Lacey Act in 2008. Originally enacted more than 100 years before, the Lacey Act was developed to protect wildlife from trafficking. With its amendment in 2008 encompassing plant products, the USA initiated the world’s first prohibition on the trade of illegally sourced wood products. Under the Lacey Act amendment, it is illegal to import, export, transport, sell, receive any plant products in the country in violation of the laws of foreign countries (Waite 2012: 333). The 2008 Lacey Act has three components that help to effectuate its purpose: (i) a prohibition of any trade in plant products of unlawfully sourced wood products from any state in the country or any foreign country; (ii) a requirement for importers to declare on some wood products including information on nation of harvest, species, the quantity and measure and the value of the product; (iii) punishments for the terms of the law violation (Waite 2012). These sanctions potentially encompass forfeiture of goods and vessels, fines, and possible jail time. The Lacey Act is applicable to the whole supply chain. Any illegal activity refers to a product that may not be lawfully traded in the USA. Every party is impartially blameworthy under the law, not just the U.S. market placer. The prohibition on trade in unlawful origin wood products applies to all products except for certain scientific specimens and food crops and has been enforced since the law was enacted in 2008. It encompasses common products such as raw logs, sawn timber, plywood, composite materials, furniture, pulp, paper and musical instruments (Waite 2012). The function of the Lacey Act was meant to be simple and flexible to adjust to the needs of individual businesses. The act encourages US buyers to purchase lawfully sourced timber, but it is left entirely to the buyers themselves to accomplish that goal in a positive way. Being fact based, the law is not documented based. This means that a certificate or verification of legal origin is not necessary but also refers to the non-existence of documents, stamps, licenses or marks that are accepted as final proof of legality. The use of ‘due care’ depends on each individual US buyer to determine its best process and avoid unlawful timber in the market in taking its own risk profile and comfort level with its suppliers. However, the definition of due care related to the timber industry is not clear because the courts sometimes create an interpretation shown by argument as inapplicable to the logging industry (Waite 2012: 335). In

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practice, the procedures for due care are probably close to those considered for risk management under the due diligence requirements of the European Timber Regulation.

2.2 European Union Timber Regulation The European Union Timber Regulation (EUTR) is an EU policy that was defined in 2003 to fight persistent unlawful logging and its related trade. In essence, the EU policy claims that illegal logging occurs when timber harvest violates national laws. From 3 March 2013, the EUTR prohibited unlawfully harvested timber and products made from such timber on the E.U. market. The regulation compels operators in the EU market to establish systems that guarantee the timber’s legal origin. The definition of legal timber is founded on the law of the harvesting country. The regulation governs various timber products, including furniture, pulp and paper, logs and sawn wood (EU 2003: 10 11). The EUTR functions in such a way that traders who bring timber or timber products to the EU market for the first time must apply ‘due diligence’; the regulation applies to timber harvested within the EU or imported and to imported timber products. The core of ‘due diligence’ obligation is that operators are expected to undertake a risk evaluation and risk management to minimise the risk of supplying illegally harvested timber; or products containing unlawfully harvested timber to the EU market (EU 2003: 18). This implies that operators must have access to information on their supplier, the tree species and the country of harvest of the timber as a prerequisite to ensure that their supply includes only lawfully harvested timber. A competent authority is appointed by each country in the EU to be responsible for the enforcement of the regulation. EU countries must also determine the penalty types and ranges that apply in cases of non-respect compliance with the law. Indeed, the member countries form monitoring organisations that the European Commission must recognise. These organisations are exclusive entities and give EU operators due diligence mechanisms that are ready to use. Thus, operators can advance their own system or apply one developed by a monitoring organisation. The EUTR is one measure under the EU FLEGT (Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade) Action Plan that has several elements to support countries that produce timber, trade in timber, public procurement, private sector initiatives, and financing and investment. The EUTR also supports the Action Plan with existing legislative instruments that address the underlying motives of illegal logging (E.U. 2003: 6). Another measure is the use of bilateral agreements between the EU and partner countries. These agreements, called Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs), are bilateral agreements between tropical wood exporting countries and the EU and have the objectives that of boosting forest governance and guaranteeing wood imports derived from legal sources (Saunders 2009; Waite 2012). Timber exports

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from these countries must be accompanied by a FLEGT license (Waite 2012: 329). FLEGT-licensed timber is considered risk free and requires no further due diligence measures from the importer under the EUTR.

2.3 China’s Timber Legality Verification System Initiative In 2011, China’s State Forestry Administration (SFA) developed a national draft called the China Timber Legality Verification System (CTLVS) (EU FLEGT Facility 2017). The draft followed various other measures for checking the legality of timber in other countries. For Chinese timber, the existing permit system was considered to provide enough and sufficient guarantee of legality (EGILAT 2019: 16). Two other systems were suggested for the verification of legality for imported timber. One system is a Chinese Government Guided Timber Verification Scheme (CGTVS) with bilateral agreements signed with agreement countries; the second is a Chinese Association Guided Timber Verification Scheme (CATVS), which is a voluntary code (Greenpeace International 2015). The CGTVS involves negotiation between the Chinese government and the government of a timber-producing country to define timber legality, verification methods, management mechanisms and valid export documentation to produce a signed bilateral agreement. Under the agreement, the timber-generating country should make sure that its timber harvesting, processing and export activities comply with legal procedures and verification methods. As such, China will only receive legal timber with valid export documentation delivered by the timber-producing country according to the bilateral agreement. The CATVS is for non-agreement countries. Under this strategy, China industry associations and their counterparts in timber-producing countries recognise each other in a timber legality verification system to be applied. China industry association’ members, on a voluntary basis, can use the documents issued by these associations in timber-producing countries to apply for a legal certificate from the Chinese authority. It is necessary for members to also follow the rules established by industry associations regarding timber legality. The CGTVS and CATVS systems call for authorised Chinese organisations, either government or industry associations, to provide timber legality certificates. The Chinese Customs Office will verify the certificates when timber products from Chinese companies are exported. Despite these advances, the effectiveness of Chinese regulations is questioned, and policies to prevent the importation of illegal timber needs to be reviewed for improvement. On 28 December 2019, China revised the country’s Forest Law and banned Chinese companies and investors from trafficking in illegal logging. In over last 20 years, these changes are the first revisions made to China’s Forest Law. Its effectiveness could enhance global efforts to suppress the sale of illegally harvested timbers. In article 65, the revised law states that no unit or individual may purchase, process or transport timber that he/she clearly recognises as being practically felled or indiscriminately felled in forest regions. The changes came into force in July

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2020. The stipulation specifying that traders must ‘clearly know’ that logs have been sourced unlawfully for sanctions to be applicable to them, for example, could be hard to achieve. The amended Forest Law was established to regulate the use of domestic forests within China rather than those of trading partners abroad. However, an article that impacts on the relevant law to China’s import markets shows a sign of government determination to inspect the activities of importers. China’s law revisions go after a series of proceeding adopted in the EUTR, the US Lacey Act and the Australian Illegal Logging Prohibition Act in modern years, which impose harsh sanctions against companies found to be importing unlawful timber.

2.4 Comparison Between the Three Regulations Against Illegal Logging Although the three regulations were passed for the same reason, the EUTR differs from the Lacey Act and CGTVS in several important areas: • Application to the supply chain: The EUTR only applies to companies that harvest or import ‘market’ timber of illegal origin, and not to companies along the supply chain. The CGTVS applies to other companies and investors dealing with unlawful timber. • The products concerned: The EUTR only applies to a specific list of wood products. Charcoal, musical instruments, picture frames, printed books and certain types of furniture are notable exemptions. The CGTVS applies to forest and wood products. • Due diligence: Not only does the EUTR prohibit the importation of illegal timber, but it also imposes a legal contract on importers to use due diligence when purchasing timber. Failure to do so is considered an offense. Due diligence also requires companies to be cautious in their choice of sources and practices to avoid supporting violence and becoming accomplices in activities that lead to serious human rights violations (CCFD-Terre Solidaire 2014: 6). However, the Lacey Act does not encompass a need for due diligence but encourages ‘due care’ in the instance of law infringement (Lovegren and Burmester 2013; Momii 2014). Nevertheless, the Lacey Act does not provide specific guidance on the constitution of ‘due care’. Furthermore, China insists that the producing country use legal procedures and verification methods before China accepts legally harvested timber through the CGTVS based on valid export documentation delivered by the country of origin. • Observer organisations: To help the implementation of the due diligence obligation, the EUTR also contains regulations for the official acknowledgment (and verification) of third-party ‘monitoring organisations’, which companies can employ to help them practice due diligence. In contrast, the CGTVS only requires a valid export document to prove the legality of the timber from the country of

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production. Due diligence is perhaps the most important difference between the three laws. The companies spoke about the legal obligation to follow certain procedures designed to reduce the probability that the timber they import is of illegal origin. Failure to do so is a punishable offense, and government officials do not need to prove that the timber is of illegal origin. In contrast, the Chinese CGTVS Customs Office scrutinises certificates when companies from China sell their timber products abroad. The standard of proof required to initiate proceedings is therefore much lower for the EUTR than for the US Lacey Act. This means that a wide range of evidence can be useful to facilitate implementation and enforcement. Like the Lacey Act, the EUTR addresses specific types of offenses in the country of origin, while China insists that the producing country ensure all legal procedures and verification. Here, the offenses concerned are those that go against the legislation governing stumpage rights, harvesting processes (such as environmental controls), taxes related to timber harvesting, as well as trade and customs controls on a specific sector. Unlike the Lacey Act, the EUTR also includes offenses related to the use and tenure rights of local populations affected by logging. However, China does not mention offenses regarding the rights of the local populations. Although the EUTR applies to all member countries of the EU, it is up to each member state to vote on the national laws that set out the sanctions to be applied, define the organisations responsible for the implementation of the law and those responsible for enforcing it within its borders. From March 2016, the maximum penalties applicable under the EUTR were significant in all member states despite the delay for Hungary to take the basic legal and regulatory measures. At that time, the ban component had not resulted in any prosecution, and no penalties had been applied for breach of due diligence. However, interesting cases were underway concerning the due diligence obligation of the EUTR. One concerned a Dutch company about imports of tropical sawn timber from Cameroon. The other concerned a Swedish company importing teak from Myanmar, sold via Thailand. The first case was opened based on evidence obtained by an NGO.

3 Illegal Logging Exploitation in DRC In many developing countries with natural resources, illegal exploitation and commercialisation is critical challenge. In DRC, illegal logging is, in parallel with other resources’ smuggling, a matter of great concern, especially for the communities that are directly affected. This section considers the limits of existing national policies on logging in DRC and then elaborates on the activities of foreign logging companies and their impacts on the country.

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3.1 The Limitations of National Policies on Logging The DRC has several laws and policies designed to improve national and local forest management and governance. The 2002 Forest Code is the most important legal paper that lays out the fundamental principles for better forest policy and greater protections of local communities in forest production. The purpose of forest reform was to restore state control over a sector seriously affected by corruption and illegality caused mostly by decades of political instability and civil war. The Code calls for better forest control and oversight, implementation of sound forest plans and improved preservation of local people’s rights (Forest Legality Initiative 2013). Moreover, companies must contribute to rural development and to the implementation of national and provincial forest councils to boost transparency and dissemination of future timber rights. According to the processing/manufacturing laws, both national and foreign companies should process their wood in the DRC to exercise the local processing industry and add value to their wood and wood products before export (Forest Code, Art. 109). Only national operators and those with processing facilities are permitted to export 30% of raw logs during a 10-year period (Forest Legality Initiative 2013). Although the law is still somehow unclear, the intention was to attain 100% in-country processing at the end of the 10 years period. Companies are also asked to report the volume of products extracted (Ministerial Order of 3 October 2002, Art. 22). The weakness of regulations, documentation and monitoring of processing facilities are obvious, which makes it difficult to develop successful traceability programmes and fend off raw timber’s unlawful export (Forest Legality Initiative 2013). In 2002, the government similarly delivered a significant moratorium on the new forest concessions’ allocation and forbade the exchange, relocation or restoration of old titles. In 2008, the Minister for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Tourism lengthened the moratorium for an additional 3 years. A serious problem with some of these regulations and edicts is that unscrupulous officials and foreign companies exploit loopholes to make use of artisanal permits, which are designed only for local community timber operations to exploit the tropical forest (Lawson 2014: 11). Frequently, the endangered wengé tree and other species are targeted by these logging companies. Trade laws require actors involved in the export and trade of timber to acquire a permit to sell, purchase or export from the Forest Management Directorate at MECNT. According to the law, exporting companies are asked to process at least 70% of their production before exporting (Forest Code, Art. 109). Log exporters must respect their export quota and pay export taxes in the Customs and Excises Directorate (Instruction No DG/DD/DT/ADG/004/07 dated 12 April 2007). Both the 2002 Forest Code and the Ministerial Order of October 2002 set the conditions for transportation of forest products and the sanctions connected to them in case of provision violation. Indeed, the forest administration must grant a special circulation permit to accompany any transported forest products. Among other information, permits contain the identities of the issuing official and the logging company

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representative, the transport itinerary, the final destination and the allowed product volume (Ministerial Order of 3 October 2002, Art. 58 & 59). Articles 120–125 of the 2002 Forest Code inscribe the DRC’s harvest-related tax criteria. Article 120 provides that there will be no exemption from the payment of duties, fees and taxes prescribed by the Code or subsequent lawful measures for the logger, processor or exporter of forest products. Companies running concessions and involved in the export are subjected to five types of taxes and royalties and the forest and finance ministries fixe the rate. Companies must submit quarterly reports to the forest administration giving details of the harvested timber volume during each period. The forest administration uses these documents as the foremost reference to fix the amount of forest royalties that logging companies have to pay (Ministerial Order of 3 October 2002, Art. 55 & 57). However, the tax recovery rate stands far below the due contribution of forest revenues to the national economy because of worldwide illegalities and, to a large extent, DRC’s poor governance (Forest Legality Initiative 2013). The illegal market is bolstered by regulatory unpredictability and a lack of implementation of existing laws. The buyers acquire logging titles often with no payment proof. Taxes are often incorrectly calculated. Timber harvests regularly go over the authorised volume, regulations are unsuccessfully enforced and artisanal logging is poorly monitored and is overexploited (Forest Legality Initiative 2013). A serious lack of resources for forest control and law enforcement is exacerbated by the non-collection of forest taxes. In reality, the government has provided a weak response to the issue of illegal logging, reflecting the country’s overall low level of governance. This incapacity implies that the government has never carried out an official examination of the nature, area and driving forces of illegality in the timber industry in the DRC (Lawson 2014: 11). The majority of experts consider the lack of political will and existence of corruption as the biggest obstacles to a better response. Several problems affect sector governance. Although the 2002 Forest Code contains many elements of good practice, several crucial rules of application continue to be missing. The level of transparency of information related to the forest is also very low. The DRC’s forest regulation implementation structures are basically flawed for every factional purpose because law enforcement lacks resources and coordination, and infringements are rarely detected. Furthermore, the penalties imposed are not sufficiently dissuasive. The penalties for forest officials for breaches of the law are clarified and defined in the laws and range from disciplinary action to a criminal conviction. Important provisions are comprised in generic laws with regard to the entire civil service, as well as in decrees peculiar to forestry. However, there is no document of application of these provisions (Lawson 2014: 13).

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3.2 Foreign Industrial Logging Companies and Their Impacts There are many forms of illegal logging mainly logging in protected areas, logging in established concessions but of prohibited species or logging in established areas of legal species but in excess of the permitted cut. The impacts of these activities are observable on Non-Wood Forest Products (NWFPs) availability and on animalbased NWFPs. In fact, while the quantities of some NWFPs harvested after logging were decreased, the availability of others increased or remained unchanged. This pattern illustrates the evidence for plant-based NWFPs, while logging operations have reduced the number of animals hunted in the forest for animal-based NWFPs. The impacts of timber harvesting on the NWFP accessibility are positive, negative or neutral. However, evidence of neutral impacts is scarce (Ndoye and Tieguhong 2007: 18). Local people’s perceptions of the impacts of timber harvesting varies depending on whether the NWFP product is of animal or plant origin. For the impact of timber harvesting on plant-based NWFPs, positive impacts underscore the fact that the passage of logging vehicles creates roads/trails that allow increase access to some NWFPs. The timber companies remove trees like sapelli, kossipo, sipo and iroko, which also removes most of the NWFPs associated with these tree species. Sapelli is not only exploited as timber, but also produces caterpillars that are sought after by local people for consumption and sale (Ndoye and Tieguhong 2007: 18). A negative consequence of timber exploitation is the destruction of other trees that provide NWFPs. Local people place great value on forest products, and they are widely consumed. The transport and use of heavy machinery in forests destroys NWFPs wild yams (tubers), leafy vegetables and various lianas, which are important for health, food and income (Ndoye and Tieguhong 2007: 18). The accessibility of honey, Raffia, caterpillars, some species of wild yams and mushroom showed a general decrease, while other products were available in greater commercial quantities because of a population expansion, but there was a general decrease in their accessibility in the forest. As far as the effects of timber harvesting on animal-based NWFPs are concerned, it is important to note that bushmeat has become very rare for local people as logging roads have opened access to forest areas. Many people enter the forest to seek bushmeat for food or to gain income while waiting for the company to hire them. The number of animal species has dropped while the numbers of grasscutters and porcupines have multiplied because of abundant grasses on the forest floor following logging (Ndoye and Tieguhong 2007: 20). All in all, the effects of logging have led to disruptions in socioeconomic survival strategies of local people. According to Ndoye and Tieguhong (2007), significant disadvantages include the prohibition of farming by cutting down trees and disappearance of streams (associated with traction by logging vehicles); price increases for common commodities; forest destruction; the disappearance of many medicinal plants and animals; increasing poaching activity and theft. Nevertheless, the presence

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of logging companies has some advantages as follows: payment of annual forestry and wildlife fees, with a proportion earmarked for community development; potential employment for young people; improved access or closer proximity to public authorities and services; increased opportunity to sell agricultural products, livestock and forest products; open roads; extension of knowledge and discovery of new product values and eating habits (Ndoye and Tieguhong 2007: 20 21). There are also some negative consequences on the local communities. Local people provide local food items and local labour but tend to receive poor compensation. With continued logging activity, there is a decrease in agricultural activities of local people within the forest concession, while a general lack of knowledge in the local people population regarding the law and the company’s rights can quickly lead to grievances (Ndoye and Tieguhong 2007: 21). There is often no respect of agreements reached with some local populations on the exploitation of the forest. Most of the companies recognise that agreement is essential for their activities to proceed without local conflict. However, logging companies frequently fail to respect negotiations with local people. Regarding the respect of cahier des charges, only a few percent had been realised (Ndoye and Tieguhong 2007: 21). With increased activity in forest areas, rapidly increasing village populations put pressure on forest resources and push them towards scarcity. Concerning potential antagonism between the local communities and logging companies, local people frequently complain of a lack of employment opportunities within the company, insufficient access to treatment in the company’s clinic and shortcomings in receiving other social benefits supposed to be provided by the company. However, there is a positive perception of the presence of some of the industrial logging companies in the exploitation of the forests where the local economy has boomed during the company’s operation. For local communities, the main advantages of nearby logging activities include the availability of building material residues from the mill site; active sales of agricultural products with the emergence of a new market; decreased unemployment due to the employment of young people by the company; improved transportation because of better roads and access to vehicles (Ndoye and Tieguhong 2007). However, the following disadvantages are associated with nearby logging activities: the destruction of trees that provide NWFPs (e.g. caterpillars); opening of tracks into the forest, which favours poaching; animals moving away because of the noise of logging vehicles and chain saws. While many logging companies are aware of the value NWFPs such as caterpillars for local consumption and income, many operate in a business-like way to cut costs and raise profit. Following this logic, trees are felled and sold with little regard for their NWFP value to local communities (Ndoye and Tieguhong 2007: 29). This mode of operation illustrates the fact that industrial logging companies do not care about the local community profit. Consequently, there is an impact on forest resources and on local communities. Many companies have neglected to include local riparian populations in negotiations over access to the forest. While some benefits like roads and schools were

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encouraging, some promised local projects were never realised because of the misappropriation of funds. Unfortunately, the local communities’ expectations are sometimes grandiose and exaggerated. They also expect that good roads, schools, water supplies and health centres be constructed (Ndoye and Tieguhong 2007: 29), but such expectations are difficult to meet while keeping the company operating. However, if a company agrees and accepts the cahier des charges during negotiation with the local community, this implies that the company is able to meet all the demands. In some cases, companies had avoided felling trees close to farms, while in others the companies did not care and destroyed the farms.

4 Illegal Logging Related Conflicts While international and national policies fail to address or even create conditions conducive to illegal logging in DRC, the persistence of the phenomena is among the main drivers of conflicts. As explained in this section, illegal logging in DRC is associated in different ways with various conflicts in the country.

4.1 Emergence of Social Conflicts and Repression by SODEFOR The continual deterioration of living conditions of local populations has led to an impasse as industrial logging sustains social conflict. In its 2007 report, ‘Le pillage des forets du Congo’ Greenpeace addresses ‘the question of the deterioration of local population living conditions on the sites of Sodefor exploitation’ (Greenpeace International 2007: 56). Ultimately, very few of the local population were hired by the company with only a pittance for compensation. The Greenpeace report mentions acts of repression that took place in 2005 and 2006 following requests from the local people. A lack of response from the company led to ‘protests by the local population against Sodefor’s lack of respect for commitments resulted with violent intervention by the police and the military’ (CNCD 2011: 17). In 2005, 23 people were arrested in the villages of Bobila and Mbelo in Equateur Province for setting up roadblocks to prevent the passage of logging equipment following Sodefor’s refusal to comply with the social contracts’ responsibilities (SCR) agreement. In February 2006, after villagers blocked the road again, soldiers and police went to Mbelo to violently arrest members of the community (CNCD 2011: 17). Civil society and the Congolese press, in particular, theReseau Ressources Naturelles (RRN) DRC, reported similar events in 2010. In January 2010,

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27 people working at the ‘Mike12’ site in Oshwe stood for their rights to obtain satisfaction of their demands from their work for Sodefor. This request led to a conflict with Sodefor that has lasted for more than a decade. These workers were arrested and imprisoned in Inongo, more than 450 km from their village. Two people died shortly after their release according to a report (CNCD 2011: 17). The events of January 2010 have different origins depending on the source of information. According to the company, in a letter to the RRN DRC, ‘Sodefor was embroiled in a quarrel that arose between two groups because of a boundary conflict between the “traditional chiefs of the two groups”’. However, the advocacy report of Congolese civil society organisations published in March 2010 was unequivocal: Sodefor is at the origin of an intra-community conflict, it has moved boundaries, helping to expand the territory of the Mbijankama group to the detriment of the Bokongo group (CNCD 2011: 17). In addition, the Bokongo group’s request for customary royalties paid and an SCR agreement was not signed in accordance with the 2002 Forest Code. The civil society report recommendations were not implemented, and both local communities and the Congolese civil society continued to mobilise, as evidenced by the September 2010 protests in Oshwe City. It is important to note that Sodefor has proven share of responsibility in these recurring social conflicts, whether it is a question of failure to respect its commitments to the local population, violations of fundamental human rights or even in confrontation with different local ethnic groups. Similar cases occur in the logging of rosewood (mukula) in Zambia and DRC.

4.2 Ugandan–Thai Company Dara Forest in Collaboration with Armed Groups Logging companies have exploited, under the guise of different rebel factions, considerable volumes of timber for export to different foreign nations, including the USA and China. The involvement of Burundian, Rwandan and Ugandan actors in this operation also cannot be denied. To secure the army protection, the loggers paid money and performed various services to the armed groups, including transporting troops and weapons (Barume 2007). The case of the Ugandan–Thai Dara Forest Company is one of many examples that illustrates the complicity between loggers and several Congolese armed branches. Dara Forest is a subsidiary company of DARA Great Lakes Industries (DGLI), which also holds a Ugandan logging company, Nyota Wood Industries. In 1998, Dara Forest was established in Eastern DRC but only obtained its 100,000-hectare logging concession from a rebel movement (Rassemblement Congolais pour la DémocratieMouvement de Liberation, RCD-ML) in 2000 (Barume 2007). Before obtaining this concession, the main activity of Dara Forest was the purchase of timber from local loggers.

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Dara Forest was established in Mangina in the Beni territory, in the province of North Kivu and possessed an industrial sawmill. Its activities extended to other locations, including Komanda, Djugu and Mambassa. Forest’s annual timber exports are estimated to 45,000 cubic meters (Barume 2007). It is noteworthy that a simple phone call from a Ugandan military commander or the RCD-ML is enough to allow Dara Forest trucks to pass through Congolese customs without paying taxes. On other occasions, when it was impossible for the company to obtain the intervention of a senior military officer, vehicles transporting logs benefited from an armed escort by members of the RCD-ML or the Ugandan Army, as needed (Barume 2007). It appears that Dara Forest has acted with blatant disregard for the law that establishes social and environmental rights. Furthermore, because of it logistical and financial connections with RDC-ML, Dara Forest has attracted the enmity of the armed factions opposing RDC-ML. This caused battles and amplified the rivalry between the various belligerents (Barume 2007). Other consequences are the collateral damage and human death that these battles have caused.

4.3 Conflicts Related to Timber in Kongo-Central The sustainable management of forests in Kongo-Central and in the DRC in general is closely linked to the development of the national forest territory, national zoning and recognition of traditional rights and forest practices. Management also requires the resolution of disputes over ownership and land use (Gata 2007: 47). In Kongo-Central Province, traditional rights are the foundation of forest resource management. The repercussions of logging concessions on the economy and the resulting conflicts over land ownership and use were denounced by Yamba. For example, conflicts concerning forest resources exploitation in the untapped concessions of bankrupt industrial companies would have been magnified by the invocation of traditional rights. There was not sufficient foresight of free space for the rural populations’ activities in the configuration of the supply guarantees’ distribution for industrial timber operators in the Bas Fleuve. Rural people carry out survival activities that generate nearly all conflicts that are linked to ownership and land use. The existence of conflicts was revealed after an investigation was carried out in 2003 in the Bas-Fleuve region. Clan members often express dissatisfaction with the ways in which royalties paid by industrial and artisanal exploiters are distributed. Moreover, conflicts between operators are often linked to the non-materialisation of operating limits leading to encroachment in supply guarantees. In 2002, the Mbanda company was allowed to cut timber in Sumbi based on a request to contribute to the war effort. A supply guarantee conceded to CFT company by SPIAF, a technical service of the Environment Ministry, covered the area that Mbanda exploited. Therefore, CFT company seized and sold all the timber taken by Mbanda. When the case was taken to court, CFT was ordered to reimburse Mbanda because SPIAF admitted that it had mistakenly granted a supply guarantee. In addition, the government requisitioned logs from

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operators in the ports of Matadi and Boma as war contribution effort. This action fueled serious conflicts between loggers. This case involved Soforma, the owner of the requisitioned timber and Mbanda, a logger used by the government to sell these timber (Gata 2007: 48). Conflicts between industrial loggers and rural populations cut across several categories, notably a lack of compensation for the destruction of crops in farmers’ fields during logging activities, shortfalls in payments to local populations for logging their clan forests, the skimming of forest concessions subsequent to agricultural activities (shifting slash-and-burn agriculture) and charcoal production by the populations. In addition, there are frequent shortfalls in funding by the investors for local development projects; cutting of valuable forest species and sawing timber in loggers’ concessions; the succession of customary rights holders calling into question and revising of the SCR agreements signed by their late parents and non-compliance with SCR agreements in favour of local communities and forestry legislation by loggers (Gata 2007: 49). Apart from these issues, illegal exploitation remains despite the denunciation from local and international NGOs.

5 Illegal Logging as Threat to Social Peace Illegal logging not only undermines efforts focused on the sustainable management of forests, but also endangers the social peace around the sites of loggers’ activities. This situation is illustrated in different situations. First, there is dubious acquisitions of securities and violation of the moratorium. In its report on le pillage des forets du Congo, Greenpeace International (2007) devotes a section to the acquisition of new titles in 2002 and 2003 by the NordSudTimber (NST) group. However, large forest areas with little or no productivity were abandoned, while new titles were obtained after the signing of the moratorium. Although these titles saw their legality confirmed in 2004 and 2005, NST subsidiary Sodefor did not deny that it operated in areas that were protected by the moratorium but preferred to speak of ‘redefinition’ or ‘exchange’ of old titles rather than the acquisition of ‘new’ securities, which would constitute a violation of the moratorium. Greenpeace claimed that these new titles violated the Forest Code, both by the fact that these titles were granted by mutual agreement and by the area granted without consulting local populations, to address only the less technical elements. These new titles were also granted in the absence of an adequate zoning plan provided for by the Forest Code to guarantee social justice and ecologically sustainable development (RENOI-RDC 2019: 1). Greenpeace considered that the revision of forest titles has made it possible to launder illegal titles in a process that has been greatly beneficial to Sodefor. Violation of the moratorium on the allocation of new forest concessions by presidential decree in 2005, the following companies: Ets Kitenge Lola, CFT, SOMIFOR, FODECO and Maniema Union (RENOI-RDC 2019: 1). Moreover, the signing of forest concession contracts between the State and Ets Kitenge Lola, on the one hand, and CFT, on the other hand, by virtue of ministerial decree

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no. 038/CAB/MIN/EDD/WF/AAN/05/2018 of 16 April 2018, the taking over by the Congolese state of the concessions 001/11, 002/11, and 003/11 of 4 August 2011 granted to Forestière Sari constitute a deliberate act of violation of the moratorium and that of article 83 of the 2002 Forest Code (RENOI-RDC 2019: 1). Second, there is change of use and transfer of forest concessions in violation of the law. In 2017, the Minister of the Environment changed the use of the industrial logging concession SOMICONGO under a conservation concession by the violation order 28/CAB/MIN/EDD/AAN/05/2017 (RENOI-RDC 2019: 2). According to this decree, the allocation of forest conservation concessions by mutual agreement was to take place at the end of the public inquiry procedure prescribed by Article 84 of the Forest Code and the regulations in force relating to the fixing of the price of the drill to be conceded. The evidence indicates that there was no public inquiry, and the price decree was never made public. In 2018, the cession of old concessions to new companies and the takeover by the state of old concessions sold to forestry companies were observed. Regarding the transfer, several concessions were transferred to the following companies in violation of the procedure: SCICOBOIS to Maniema Union (CCF 009/16 of 2 November 2016 and CCF 016/18 of 15 October 2018) in Mongala Province. Five concessions from SIFORCO (CCF 052b/14) to Booming Green RDC were authorised by decree no. 025/CAB/MIN/EDD/AAN/TNT/ 05/2017 of 19 October 2017 (RENOI-RDC 2019: 2). Regarding the takeover by the State of the former forest concessions in Tshopo Province: La forestière 001/11 of 4 August 2011 was ceded to Ets Kitenge Lola CCF 006/118 of 11 June 2018. La forestière 003/11 of 4/08/2011 at the CFT under CCF 005/18 of 28/05/2018; La forestière 002/11 of 4/08/2011 at the Ets Kitenge Lola under CCF 007/18 of 11/06/2018. In Equateur Province: 1 TB 013/11 (GA 001/004) to Maniema Union 2 CCF 006/18 of 06 June 2018 (RENOI-RDC 2019: 2). It is important to question the regularity of these transfers with regard to the problems and claims in relation to the obligations of the former concessionaires who, in principle at the time of the transfer, must transfer the liabilities and assets to the transferor (RENOI- RDC 2019: 2). Decree no. 022 /CAB/MIN/ECN-T/15/JEB/2008 of 7 August 2008 fixing the authorisation procedure for the sale, rental and exchange or donation of a forest concession clearly says, ‘Only concessions whose management is accompanied by a development plan drawn up and approved may be subject to transfer’ (article 3 paragraph 1) (RENOI-RDC 2019: 1). The beneficiaries of ceded concessions must not have in the last three years one or more offenses such as (a) illegal logging, (b) illegal trade or export of forest products, (c) non-compliance with the clauses of any contract of previous forest concessions, particularly related to environmental protection and biodiversity as well as socioeconomic infrastructure for the benefit of the neighbouring populations; (d) failure to pay the surface royalty for any other concession held (RENOI-RDC 2019: 2 3). The conditions, as prescribed by the texts, have not been met and there is evidence that justifies the many irregularities in these transfers, according to RENOI-RDC (2019: 3).

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6 Challenges in Multilateral Forestry Cooperation Between DRC and Some Developed Countries and Organisations This investigation uncovers how major European companies like Sodefor, Ets Kitenge Lola, CFT, SOMIFOR, FODECO, SCICOBOIS, SIFORCO and Booming Green are implicated in the unlawful rainforest exploitation in DRC. Their international connections to illegal logging trading operations are maintained by donor support for industrial logging, a cruel mix of political instability in DRC, the corporate secrecy peddled by the world’s tax havens and inappropriate legal frameworks to stop illegal logging exportation to major consumer markets. The companies are the ‘winners’ in this situation because they have hidden ownership due to their financial means gained from the destruction of the rainforest countries particularly from DRC. The local populations remain the losers as the companies fight to keep the status quo bypassing national and international laws. The local populations depend on the rainforest for their livelihoods, including the species that inhabit the forest, all of which are affected by climate change. Apart from the local population as the losers, it has been revealed that governments, the donors, importers and traders many among them have made open pledges around long-lasting forest practice are complicit in allowing the companies to exploit these conditions (CCFD-Terre Solidaire 2014: 5). The above-mentioned companies, mostly based in Europe, are the owners of huge timber concessions in the DRC’s forests. The timber in these forests is harvested illegally on 90% of their sites, with the complicity of the government. The affected area covers more than 40,000 square kilometers, with half of the harvested trees being vulnerable or endangered species like wenge tree, mukula and other species (RFUK 2019). Norsudtimber is splitting its contracts without sanctions despite its detailed denial. This research sheds light on the failure of donors, governments and traders to shut out the destruction of Congo basin rainforests despite the existence of domestic and global political and legal systems that should defend it. The result is a complete network collapse. The failure of the DRC government to uphold its own laws illustrates the broken-down system. The DRC government is supposed to be in the front position of defense against unsustainable or illegal logging activities. The 2002 Forest Code lays down the fundamental ideas for better forest policy for local riparian people and in production forests. It contains the reforms to restore state control over corruption, but its implementation encounters various obstacles that make it impossible to be applied. Laws and decrees have ambiguity where foreign companies and unscrupulous state officials use artisanal permits that are supposed to be used only for local community timber operations. The DRC limited national policies on logging have been illustrated by the weakness of regulation, documentation and monitoring of processing facilities. Consequently, there is no way to develop effective traceability to prevent raw timber exportation. The trade law exists and requires the exporting companies to process at least 70% of their products before exporting, respecting the quota and

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paying export taxes. However, belonging to international and regional trade organisations, particularly the VPA FLEGT with EU since October 2010, the DRC government has not shown any progress in promoting the traceability of the logging process. This is evidenced by the country being in collusion with perpetrators of unlawful logging by companies like Sodefor and others mentioned in this study, by its lack of law enforcement against those companies. Even though the 2002 Forest Code addresses the harvest-related tax, the tax recovery rate is far below what the forests revenues must contribute to the domestic economy. This is the consequence of weak governance favouring the widespread illegalities connected to regulatory inconsistencies and lack of enforcement of existing laws. The mess around logging titles in the DRC led the government to declare a moratorium on the assignment of new forest concessions and prohibit the exchange and relocation of old titles. After 9 years, the DRC government has announced its resolutions to lift the moratorium on the assignment of new industrial timber concessions despite the lack of an effective solution for the previous illegal logging. Moves have already begun to allocate more concessions in the rainforest to yet more loggers, while these previous ones already operating unlawfully continue without sanction. This situation demonstrates the incapacity of the government to respond to the salient problem of illegal logging, characterised by lack of political will and corruption as obstacles to a better response. The above-mentioned problems open the door to industrial companies to illegally exploit the forest with the complicity of the government. Thus, the government bears part of responsibility in the local conflict provoked by the industrial companies because of its lack of national legislation enforcement to ensure verification for traceability of export timber. These government weaknesses at the national level compromise the E.U. timber regulations and Lacey Act implementation during the export process. Although the EU timber regulation and the Lacey Act are designed to prevent illegal logging in exporting and importing countries, the laws must be enforced to achieve the expected results. The case of DRC shows that these laws have yet to be put into practice because of the behaviour and continuous involvement of companies in illegal logging ignoring these international and national laws. The global policies and laws made by EU and USA are supposed to be implemented and enforced in collaboration with the export country to make the companies work within the law. On the contrary, in the case of industrial logging companies in DRC, the importing countries that enacted the regulations are the same as those supporting those various industrial companies that are involved in the illegal logging in DRC. In doing so, the industrial companies continue to get involved in illegal logging that benefits not only the exporting timber companies but also to the import countries.

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6.1 Global Policy Donors and the Support for Industrial Logging Governments who participate on the board of the Central African Forests Initiative (CAFI), such as Germany, Norway, the U.K. and France, belong to the EU and are moreover hung to assist the industrial logging extension due to their gain from the activities. They established the EUTR to stop the illegal logging but most of the EU members like France and Norway refuse to terminate their support to logging companies. These countries also supported the lifting of the moratorium despite evidence that companies like Sodefor used violent police and military interventions against local protests the company’s failure to respect its commitments in Mongala Province in 2005 and in Oshwe territory in 2010. The company not only failed to respect its commitments to the local population, but also violated basic human rights and brought different local ethnic groups into confrontation. The company and the importing countries bear responsibility for these recurring social conflicts. Considering the logging of mukula redwood in the south-eastern part of DRC, its extraction has been repeatedly denounced by the Catholic Church. However, Chinese investors in complicity with some Congolese politicians continue to log the redwood in undermining national and international laws. There is evidence that China has a hard time controlling its logging companies and businessmen abroad. Therefore, China’s revised law that entered into force in 2020 is difficult to be implemented. This ineffectiveness of the law proves China’s responsibility for illegal exploitation in the DRC. The arrest of a Chinese representative of Maniema Union 2 on charges of illegal logging demonstrates non-compliance with national and international laws. If China and DRC seriously enforce these laws, this case would not happen. In addition, this Chinese representative of the logging company was accused in court but released a few months later. His release provoked indignation in civil society organisations because justice was not achieved. The civil society cast doubt on the validity of the release and accused the courts of corruption. Cases such as this undermine the credibility of the Congolese law and the Chinese timber import law when illegal logging can continue without consequences or punishment. Another logging company named Dara Forest is an illustration of the complicity that exists between logging companies and various Congolese armed factions. This company acted in disregard of the norms relating to social and environmental rights. It used its logistical and financial means to support the rebel movement. This action caused battles with the other armed factions with collateral damage among civilians due to trade of natural resources supporting a brutal conflict (CCFD-Terre Solidaire 2014: 5). It is noteworthy that a Ugandan Thai company has also failed to respect the laws against illegal logging advocated by the Lacey Act. Similarly, Sodefor, part of NST, exploited protected areas in 2004 after the moratorium and its violation. Other companies have received concessions taken over by the state such as Forestiere Sari, Maniema Union and others. This is a wilful violation of the moratorium that demonstrates the state’s neglect of its own laws in favour of the various foreign logging companies. In fact, all these companies are unlawfully extracting timber,

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and the lifting of the moratorium has allowed those loggers to continue to ransack and exploit DRC rainforest. Indeed, the violation is not limited only to the moratorium but also to the change in use and transfer of logging concessions. According to the procedure, the ministerial decree allocates the concessions after the public inquiry prescribed by Article 84 of the Forest Code but there is no evidence of any inquiry for the concessions of SOMICONGO, SCICOBOIS to Maniema Union, SIFORCO and Booming Green DRC. This demonstrates the disorder in the sector and lack of respect for the procedures and state laws. These practices that are contrary to the law and to sustainable management illustrate the companies’ engagement in illegal exploitation. Several companies have operated without a logging permit and beyond the limits of the concession contrary to the law. The Chinese company Maniema Union 2 operating in Equateur has used artisanal permits reserved only for nationals and forbidden for foreigners according to the law. The companies’ complicity with the Congolese artisanal loggers manipulates or corrupts the administration that issues the permits. Sometimes, both artisanal and industrial loggers exchange the artisanal logging permit without the knowledge of the forest administration. This act shows how financial power dominates over the work of administrative officials who are poorly paid and easily subject to corruption Indeed, by regular monitoring, the administration is supposed to be aware of the use of the artisanal permit. This demonstrates the irregular and weak control in detecting the problem. The DRC administration is sometimes involved in granting such illegal permits. The law requires that logging cannot start before a logging permit is acquired. However, Chinese Booming Green harvested timber in Mongala and Tshuapa for 2 months before being granted a permit. The above practice violates the provisions of Articles 20 and 21 of ministerial decree no. 84 of 29 October 2016 on conditions and rules for timber harvesting. Both the companies and the Congolese state do not respect or apply the laws as provided and give free rein to illegal exploitation. The Forest Code that is supposed to regulate the forest sector is not respected. The operator must make a declaration of timber produced under Section 84. However, several companies exceed the volume such as Booming Green in Yakata, which maintains a blur in the ratio of cut timber. The industrial logging companies contradict themselves when they justify their actions. They affirm that the loggers can, in fact, bring development to local indigenous populations and environmental sustainability to the DRC’s rainforests. This is a euphemistic and self-serving theory called ‘sustainable forest management’ as the drive behind the idea that encourages cutting up trees in the sustainable manner in theory, with inadequate scientific support, and poor evidence in practice. In their plan, most of industrial logging companies operating in DRC think about reforestation to reproduce species to be integrated in the silviculture practices in their concessions but practically nothing is done. While global policies from importing countries defend the right of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) of the local communities, at the same time these local communities cannot choose freely vis-à-vis the powerful companies to agree about the realisation of social contracts like access to health and education. These social contracts are made entirely conditional due to their investments on the one hand

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and the acceptance of logging activities inside forests on which they depend for their livelihoods on the other hand. The logging companies in complicity with the national administration in DRC do not respect consultation with the local community. There are many cases where the companies start logging in the neighbouring concessions without any consultation with the riparian communities. These actions illustrate how companies supported by the importer countries put aside the national laws during the logging process. Traders and importers show shortcomings in exercising appropriate due diligence. Logs harvested by European-based companies are exported to markets in Europe, Asia and the USA. Most logs from DRC are imported by the mentioned regions even though DRC has signed bilateral agreements with EU FLEGT, China and the USA that require the signatories to exercise due diligence for logging markets on paper at least, they are led, mostly through tax havens and laws to that fail to regulate or control unlawful logging. The definition, legality and sustainability of the supplies in the large-scale capital investments in the forest sector must be given clear meaning. Unfortunately, due diligence is not improved because in the huge consumer and processing markets, established laws to prevent this global trade remain unenforced. In the EU and USA, although such laws exist, application and enforcement have been patchy and weak. The consequence of weak law implementation leads to illegal logging rather than its eradication. The global policies of importing countries like those of the USA and in the EU to address illegal logging are merely documents that remain unenforced as these countries continue to support the logging companies in illegal logging. Such illegal logging also fuels local conflicts as shown in the case of DRC. Therefore, global policies are indirectly fuelling local conflicts rather than stopping the logging companies that are instigators of several local conflicts and impacts on local and forest communities.

7 Conclusion This chapter explored the inability of international and local regulations in controlling illegal logging in the DRC and has identified key challenges filling the gap between multilateral policy initiatives and practices in the local contexts. Illegal logging exploitation and internal conflicts in DRC have occurred as a result of the limited national policies on logging. The 2002 Forest Code is a policy for reforms of the forest sector to restore state control of sustainable management and improve people’s rights. Companies are supposed to contribute towards rural development but this is not the case because the companies have little respect for the law. Problems like the lack of transparency, law enforcement, resources, coordination and penalties are not dissuasive. The lack of control over the activities of foreign logging companies impacts the livelihoods of the local people who depend on them for food or income. Harmony in local communities is also impacted through the social conflicts fuelled by the companies, and their repression of local populations who for their rights with abuses of human rights.

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Key challenges in multilateral forestry cooperation between DRC and some developed countries and organisations have been revealed through limited implementation of FLEGT VPAs (EU). Deficiencies in DRC law mean that it cannot ensure effective traceability to prevent raw timber exportation. This has two implications: the international regulation encounters obstacle for its policies implementation in DRC due to endogenous factors and the failure of international policies like EUTR to promote national legislation. Various government weaknesses at the national level prevent the implementation of the Lacey Act and EUTR during the export process. On the other hand, the global policymakers have been unable to end their financial and political support to various industrial logging companies that have been the objects of this study. The global policymaking countries essentially play two sides of the one coin by legislating against illegal activity and then, condoning illegal logging activity through their support of that breach national and international laws. The activities of companies also fuel various social conflicts that lead to human rights abuses. Thus, global policymakers are indirectly fuelling local conflicts as they continue to support companies that choose to not comply with local and international laws. While policymakers continue on this course, there appears to be little prospect of combatting the problems of illegal logging. All the necessary laws are in place, but they remain unenforced and without impact. The points discussed in this chapter confirm that international policies, in a way, favour illegal logging in the DRC even though law and policies have been designed through multilateral cooperation to improve forest governance. These factors and challenges need to be tackled to fill the gap between international policies and practices in the local context to avoid illegal logging and social conflicts.

References Barume A (2007) Exploitation Forestière et Conflit Armé dans l’Est de la République Démocratique du Congo. In: Counsell S, Long et C, Stuart W (eds) Concessions à la Pauvreté, Rainforest Foundation UK and Forests Monitor UK. https://www.rainforestfoundationuk.org/media.ashx/ concessions-a-la-pauvrete.pdf. Accessed 29 March 2021 Brack D (2006) Illegal logging. Chatham House. http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/ public/Research/Energy,%20Environment%20and%20Development/bp0806illegallogging.pdf. Accessed 22 April 2021 Brack D, Umpfenbach K (2009) Deforestation and climate change: not for felling. The World Today 65(10):7–9 Bridegam P et al (2015) The effects of the 2008 lacey act amendment on international trade in forest products, CINTRAFOR, Working Paper 125 Callister JD (1999) Corrupt and illegal activities in the forestry sector: current understandings, and implications for world bank forest policy. http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website00530/WEB/ PDF/CALLISTE.PDF. Accessed 6 Nov 2021 CCFD-Terre Solidaire (2014) Natural resources at the heart of conflict, acting to produce ambitious European legislation. https://ccfd-terresolidaire.org/IMG/pdf/ccfd-natural-resourcesat-the-heart-of-conflict.pdf EGILAT (2019) Timber legality guidance template for China, Guidance document from 5th EGILAT, Qingdao, China

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E.U. (2003) Communication from the commission to the council and the European parliament forest law enforcement, governance and trade (FLEGT) proposal for an E.U. Action Plan, Brussels COM 251 final. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52003D C0251&from=EN. Accessed 5 May 2021 EU FLEGT Facility (2017) Introduction to China’s timber legality verification system, EU FLEGT facility. https://www.euflegt.efi.int/publications/introduction-to-china-s-timber-legality-verificat ion-system. Accessed 5 May 2021 FAO (2005) Forestry Paper 145, Best practices for improving law compliance in the forestry sector 5. ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/008/a0146e/a0146e00.pdf. Accessed 5 May 2021 Forest Legality Initiative (2013) Democratic Republic of the Congo. https://forestlegality.org/risktool/country/democratic-republic-congo. Accessed 14 April 2021 Gata T (2007) Typologie des Conflits liés à l’Exploitation Industrielle du Bois dans la Province du Kongo Central (RDC). https://www.rainforestfoundationuk.org/media.ashx/concessions-a-lapauvrete.pdf. Accessed 13 Dec 2020 Greenpeace International (2007) Le pillage des forêts du Congo. www.greenpeace.org/france/for ets-du-congo; https://cdn.greenpeace.fr/site/uploads/2017/02/LePillagedesForetsduCongo.com pressed.pdf. Accessed 7 May 2021 Greenpeace International (2015) Opportunity knocks, how and why Chinese importers need to help fight illegal logging in the Congo Basin. https://www.greenpeace.org/static/planet4-netherlandsstateless/2018/06/Opportuniy_Knocks.pdf. Accessed 5 May 2021 Lawson S (2014) Illegal logging in the democratic Republic of the Congo. Chatham House, London. https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/‘home/chatham/public_html/sites/def ault/files/20140400LoggingDRCLawson.pdf. Accessed 6 Nov 2021 Lovegren N, Burmester A (2013) Understanding the lacey act, dovetail partners INC A trusted source of environmental information. https://dovetailinc.org/upload/tmp/1580142623.pdf Ministerial Conference on the Protocol of Forest in Europe (2005) Combatting illegal harvesting and related trade of forest products in Europe: report for the MCPFE workshop. Madrid, Spain. http://www.foresteurope.org/filestore/foresteurope/Publications/pdf/illegal_2007.pdf. Accessed 7th May 2021 Momii M (2014) Trade in illegal timber the response in the united states a Chatham house assessment, energy, environment and resources. Chatham House Ndoye O, Tieguhong J (2007) Impact of timber harvesting on the availability of non-wood forest products in the Congo Basin, forest harvesting case study 23, FAO. http://www.fao.org/3/a1105e/ a1105e.pdf. Accessed 2 May 2021 Rapport de mi-parcours du Groupe d’experts sur la République démocratique du Congo, Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/S_2020_1283_F.pdf. Accessed 7 Nov 2021 RENOI -RDC (2019) Déclaration de Réseau National des Observateurs Indépendants sur la Gouverance Forestiere en RDC. Kinshasa, RDC Resource Extraction Monitoring (REM) OI-FLEG RDC (2012) Atelier de L’OI-FLEG RDC (REM) Panorama, Perspectives, Lundi 18 JUIN 2012, Cercles Elais. Kinshasa, RDC. https://www.rem. org.uk/documents/REM_CR_OI_RDC_2012.pdf. Accessed 6 Nov 2021 RFUK (2019) Donors called on to address breakdown in forest governance in DR Congo as Chinese company accused of widespread illegal logging. https://www.rainforestfoundationuk. org/global-donors-called-to-address-forest-governance-breakdown-in-dr-congo-as-chinese-com pany-accused-of-widespread-illegal-logging. Accessed 30 Apr 2021 Saunders J (2009) EFI policy brief 3, what is a voluntary partnership agreement: the European Union approach 4–10 (EU FLEGT Facility ed., 2009). http://www.efi.int/files/attachments/pub lications/efi_policy_brief_3_eng_net.pdf Waite SH (2012) Blood forests: post lacey act, why cohesive global governance is essential to extinguish the market for illegally harvested timber. Seattle J Environ Law 2:317–342. http:// www.unece.lsu.edu/responsible_trade/documents/2013Mar/rt13_18.pdf. Accessed 6 Nov 2021

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WWF (2003) Guidelines for investment in operation that impact forests 15. http://assets.panda.org/ downloads/wwfinvestmentpol7oct03final.pdf. Accessed 27 Apr 2021

Georges Bomino Bosakaibo is currently an assistant professor at the Faculty of Policy Studies, Nanzan University, Japan. He is a catholic missionary priest from the congregation of Divine Word Missionaries. Bosakaibo obtained an M.A. degree in International Development (2013), and a Ph.D. in International Development (International Cooperation) (2018) at Nagoya University, Japan. He completed his B.A. in Philosophy at the University of Saint Augustin in Kinshasa in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and jointly from Pontifical Urbaniana University in Rome, Italy, in 2000. He has a B.A. in Theology from Tamale Saint Victor’s Major Seminary (Ghana) jointly from Pontifical Urbaniana University in Rome, Italy, in 2006. His research interests include governance, public administration, natural resources, and peacebuilding related to development in developing countries.

The Politics and Political Economy of Violent Conflicts in Post-war Mozambique Manuel Francisco Sambo

Abstract The outbreak of the insurgency in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province in 2017 and RENAMO’s return to violence in 2013 reveal that nearly three decades after the end of the civil war and the implementation of post-war peacebuilding often regarded as a success story, new and old violent conflicts in Mozambique persist. This chapter examines the political and political economy dynamics that fuel these violent conflicts in post-war Mozambique, considering the increasingly globalized world. The chapter argues that, in Mozambique, the expectation that democratization would result in inclusive politics and a free-market economy would produce national prosperity, which together would sustain a lasting peace, did not materialize. Instead, democratization backslid producing and reproducing forms of political exclusion while the economic model implemented did not address or even exacerbated socioeconomic problems such as poverty and inequalities. Moreover, political exclusion, poverty, and inequalities are, ultimately, a breeding ground for the occurrence and recurrence of violent conflicts in the country. Keywords Mozambique · Political exclusion · Poverty · Inequalities · Violent conflicts

1 Introduction In March 2021, many were shocked by an armed attack in Palma, a district in Cabo Delgado Province, northern Mozambique. This attack was widely reported by the major international media outlets, perhaps because it targeted a district near one of the biggest foreign direct investment (FDI) projects in Africa’s recent economic history. The US$25 billion investment in a liquified natural gas project is led by the French multinational corporation (MNC) TotalEnergies.1 Following the attack, the 1 Anadarko made the final investment decision in 2019 and later sold the assets to TotalEnergies (formerly known as Total).

M. F. Sambo (B) Graduate School of Global Studies, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 Y. Nishikawa (ed.), Globalisation and Local Conflicts in Africa and Asia, Evidence-Based Approaches to Peace and Conflict Studies 7, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8818-8_5

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project was postponed sine die for security concerns. Moreover, many expatriates were killed or remained trapped for days amid the brutal violence. However, the widely televised attack only made more visible to the international community an insurgency that has been ongoing since 2017. The outbreak of the insurgency caught many by surprise. Equally surprising was the resumption of the violent conflict between the Government of Mozambique and the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) in 2013. RENAMO and the Government of Mozambique have signed, on 4 October 1992, a general peace agreement (GPA), putting an end to 16 years of devastating civil war that resulted in almost one million deaths and untold social and economic impacts. The negotiation and implementation of the GPA were supported mainly by the Western peacebuilding and development community. Following the signing of the agreement, a robust and multidimensional post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction program was implemented. The positive results of these efforts caused the international interveners to firmly believe that Mozambique was a success story of the liberal-inspired and internationally led peacebuilding and state-building interventions. Considering that, globally, the recurrence of civil wars trumped new onsets (Von Einsiedel et al. 2017), and that after the GPA Mozambique experienced almost two decades of sustained economic growth, regular elections, and a near absence of political violence, such praise was worthy. Furthermore, Mozambique’s achievements seemed to legitimize the ideals of the Western-dominated global political and economic governance. In other words, Mozambique’s apparent success seemed to testify that post-conflict countries can make their way to peace and prosperity by accepting and implementing the major liberal peacebuilding proponents’ reforms and the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI) prescriptions. However, the assessment of Mozambique’s post-war2 situation remains contentious among scholars.While some maintain positive views about Mozambique’s peacebuilding process (e.g., see Manning and Dendere 2018), others have challenged the narrative of successful post-war peacebuilding and reconstruction (e.g., see Bueno 2019; Hanlon 2010; Muchemwa and Harris 2019). Most of the critics have focused on how the peace agreement and the subsequent international peacebuilding interventions failed to deliver sustainable peace in Mozambique. This chapter extends this criticism by assessing whether the global political economy or global politics contributed to the (re)occurrence, persistence, or exacerbation of old and new violent conflicts in Mozambique in the post-war period. In this sense, this chapter’s point of departure is the recognition that political violence remains a key feature in post-war Mozambique. Moreover, it is noted that the Cabo Delgado insurgency and the recurrence of a localized conflict waged by RENAMO are just the most visible among other forms of latent, manifest, structural, and direct violence that became part of Mozambique’s sociopolitical and economic spheres in the post-war era.

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In this chapter, the post-war period refers to the post-GPA period.

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The chapter argues that incidents of violent conflicts in Mozambique reveal that, contrary to the expectation of a peaceful and prosperous country after the peacebuilding interventions and the implementation of the BWI prescribed reforms, the real effects of the global political and economic footprint in the country are more nuanced. Put simply, this chapter contends that the BWI prescripts shaped the Mozambican economy to follow the logic of the global political and local elite’s economic interests rather than the imperatives of building and sustaining peace in the country. In this sense, the premise that free markets, trade liberalization, and privatizations result in national prosperity, and that prosperity in turn results in peace did not materialize. Instead, the implemented economic model failed to address or even exacerbated structural forms of violence such as poverty and inequality. Moreover, the democratization process supported by the liberal peacebuilding and state-building agents did not consolidate; rather, it reproduced forms of political exclusion in the country. This chapter claims, then, that these political and socioeconomic forms of deprivation are, ultimately, the breeding ground for direct violence, as seen, for instance, in the outbreak of the insurgency in Cabo Delgado and the recurrence of RENAMO’s violent conflict. The remainder of this chapter flows as follows. The first section traces how Mozambique transitioned, in 10 years, from (1) a socialist economy to a market economy, (2) a war-torn society to (negative)peace, and (3) single-party rule to multiparty democracy. In doing so, it offers the necessary background for how external actors made their way to Mozambique and shaped its politics and political economy. The second section presents the outcomes of the transitions discussed in the first section. In essence, the section makes the case that these transitions enabled Mozambique to sustain a negative peace for more than two decades while reproducing structural risks of violent conflicts. The third section demonstrates how the politics and political economy of a precarious peace constructed mainly by collusion of global interests and the interests of local elites contributed to the outbreak of violent conflicts in Mozambique.

2 The Decade of Triple Transition Detailed accounts of Mozambique’s post-independence political and economic developments abound3 ; nevertheless, succinct background information at this stage is helpful. Mozambique, as an independent state, was born out of violence. The country achieved its independence from Portugal in 1975 after a 10-year-long liberation war. The struggle for independence was conducted by Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO). During the liberation war, FRELIMO received its logistical and political support mostly from socialist countries such as the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba. As a result, socialism seemed a natural path after independence. Indeed, during

3

For example, see Andersson (1992), Alden (2001), and Pitcher (2002).

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its Third Congress in 1977, 2 years after the independence, FRELIMO decided to adopt a political regime based on Marxist–Leninist socialism. Other motives may also have played a role in this decision. For the newborn state to penetrate the society, FRELIMO portrayed the Portuguese presence in Mozambique as a manifestation of capitalist imperialism and domination and promised to replace it with a different economic system, apparently less exploitative to the people. Furthermore, FRELIMO inherited a fragile or fragmented economy with a poor endowment of capital and skilled labour and no structured local private sector. This was in part because “at independence, many Portuguese owners, managers, and technicians fled, often destroying equipment and administrative records on their way” (Castel-Branco et al. 2001: 2). Therefore, FRELIMO appears to have had very few choices if not to let the state take the lead of the economy and try to make it stand on its feet. Consequently, many economic assets were nationalized, and the production and commercialization of goods and services became centrally planned by the state. The adoption of socialism also had its political facet. Domestically, FRELIMO took control of the state as the sole legal and legitimate ruling party. Under its rule, many controversial policies aimed at state- and nation-building were adopted. The set of policies included re-education camps, restriction of religious beliefs (including traditional religions), and assassination of political opponents often treated as traitors. Externally, FRELIMO adopted a foreign policy marked by strong international activism. Mozambique’s external role comprised, among other things, direct support to liberation movements in the region and beyond. Most remarkable was Mozambique’s support to the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in the former Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa. Most of the economic and political decisions that FRELIMO made in the aftermath of independence, although understandable in their context, fueled dissatisfaction both at home and abroad. Internally, with poor economic performance and restrictions of political and religious freedom, FRELIMO’s popularity and legitimacy were eroded, especially in rural areas. Externally, FRELIMO helped ZANU to fight Ian Smith’s regime in Rhodesia in a move that backfired. Rhodesian security services took advantage of local dissatisfaction in Mozambique and created RENAMO as a rebel group. Upon the collapse of Ian Smith’s regime in 1980, the South African Apartheid regime took the role of major RENAMO sponsor as retaliation to Mozambique’s support to the ANC. Fueled by local dissatisfaction and supported by external actors, RENAMO waged a 16-year war in Mozambique. The effects of the civil war’s escalation coupled with natural disasters that occurred in the late 1970s and into the 1980s and an unfavourable international economic environment placed Mozambique on the brink of collapse (Alden 2001). Indeed, RENAMO controlled vast areas of the Mozambique national territory, and economically, the country was facing a severe depression with economic growth in negative values. In the face of this, FRELIMO’s Government was convinced that changes were imperative if the state and the regime were to survive.

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Structural changes take time and are complex by nature. While revolutions are abrupt, transitions are slower. By definition, transition implies that “the economic, political, and ideological instances of the social structure that comprise a given formation are transformed” (Mittelman 1981: 14). If compressed to key developments, it was in the decade from 1984 to 1994 that Mozambique experienced structural and fundamental transitions. Of course, it can be argued that precedents and important developments started before and continued after that period. In any case, in that decade, Mozambique transitioned from a socialist economy to a free-market economy, from a devastating civil war to (at least negative) peace, and from singleparty rule to a multiparty democracy. This triple transition meant, in a way, the deepening of Mozambique’s integration into an international order that was increasingly dominated by the West. Also, it meant an increasing opening of the country to the influence of global (political and economic) forces.

2.1 From Socialism to Market Economy On 24 September 1984, Mozambique became a member of the BWI, namely the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Hence, the year 1984 is regarded as a landmark of the country’s shift to capitalism. Undoubtedly, Mozambique’s road to a market economy was marked by various decisions taken over several years. However, joining the BWI was a meaningful decision in the context of a polarized global political economy typical of the Cold War. In fact, one of the key requirements of BWI membership was to adopt a free-market economy. Several factors were remarkable in Mozambique’s integration into global capitalism. It is relevant here to consider two of them. First, the BWI welcomed Mozambique into the capitalist system mostly to fulfill the geopolitical interests of the Western powers in the context of the Cold War instead of Mozambique’s interests in rebuilding the economy. In reality, Mozambique’s political instability at the time of its application to the BWI was regarded by these institutions as an impediment, but Western political interests in having Mozambique in the world capitalist system outweighed the associated economic risks. Second, Mozambique’s relationship with BWI and major state economic actors in the capitalist world was critically affected by the huge power asymmetry that characterizes the contemporary global political economy. In a capitalist world, money speaks louder than many other considerations. It is not surprising, for instance, that the IMF, both formally and in practice, is dominated by the states with the largest contributions (quotas). From these two premises, the modes of interaction between Mozambique and the BWI become understandable. Geopolitical interests meant that Mozambique could receive loans that it would hardly be able to pay back. Power asymmetry meant that Mozambique could hardly influence how those loans should be used and, most importantly, the conditions attached to them. Put simply, global politics or the

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political economy exercised much more influence in Mozambique than the other way around. Accordingly, Mozambique’s initiation into the capitalist system implied several fundamental reforms. The BWI guided Mozambique into, among other policies, privatization, trade and market liberalization, and public expenditure reduction. For some, despite these reforms, Mozambique did not become an ideal liberal or neoliberal economy. Rather, continuities with the past socialist experience drove the country to a political economy that “appears to be somewhere between Marx and the market, between a centralized, state-driven economy and one largely run by the private sector”(Pitcher 2002: 6). In any case, since the inception of (neo-)liberal transformations, the subsequent policies remain, at best, controversial. Critics and supporters have presented several arguments and counterarguments, mostly from the economic perspective. This chapter discusses the policies’ outcomes from the peace and conflict standpoint. For now, we turn to the second transition.

2.2 From Civil War to Peace With time, a military settlement of the civil war in Mozambique proved to be almost unattainable. Rather, regional and global geopolitical changes coupled with the dwindling domestic popular support for both parties and the deteriorating economic situation seemed conducive to a negotiated settlement (Alden 2001). As mentioned before, in the 1980s, multiple crises bought the Mozambican economy to its knees. Moreover, the human and economic costs of the protracted conflict make the decline in popular support unsurprising. Regionally, major changes came first with the collapse of the Rhodesian minority regime that created and supported RENAMO in its first years. The second major change was the developments in South Africa that culminated in the collapse of the Apartheid regime, which took on the support for RENAMO after the collapse of the Rhodesian regime. The FRELIMO Government also saw its external support almost vanishing, especially with the corrosion and collapse of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, there was increasing international pressure for peace negotiations, although often hampered by some local elites in the Government who still regarded RENAMO as a terrorist organization and a puppet of external interests hostile to Mozambique (Chan and Venâncio 1998). The first meaningful attempt to find a negotiated settlement of the conflict followed the logic of what was, at the time, perceived as the nature of the war. For the FRELIMO Government, the war in Mozambique was essentially an act of destabilization driven by external actors, namely the Rhodesian and Apartheid regimes. This being so, the Government sought an agreement with the South African Apartheid regime. The agreement, commonly known as the Nkomati Accord, was signed in 1984 and took the form of a non-aggression pact. In essence, the FRELIMO-led Government promised to stop its support for the ANC in exchange for Apartheid’s termination of the support to RENAMO. However, the Nkomati Accord was not fully implemented given that Apartheid’s covert support

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to RENAMO continued, at least until the Songo meeting between the presidents of Mozambique (Joaquim Chissano) and South Africa (Peter Botha) in 1988, where they reaffirmed their commitment to the agreement. After unfruitful attempts involving Kenya and Zimbabwe, the productive and conclusive peace talks between the Government and RENAMO were held in Rome, Italy. However, like any complex negotiation process, especially ones following long and sustained hostilities, the peace process was marked by progress and setbacks.4 The parties reached a final agreement in 1992, formalized by the signature of the GPA on 4 October. While the transition from a centrally planned economy (socialism) to a market economy (capitalism) was highly influenced by global actors, especially the BWI, the transition from war to peace had a high degree of national ownership. That is not to say that external actors were sidelined. Instead, throughout the negotiation and implementation of the GPA, states and international (governmental and non-governmental) organizations had their role. For instance, the deployment of a United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operation (known as ONUMOZ) is seen by many observers as a decisive factor for the peace agreement to survive the environment marked by mistrust between FRELIMO and RENAMO. However, the fact that the terms of the GPA were not imposed, but rather emerged from the understandings between FRELIMO and RENAMO is indicative of a certain degree of ownership. It also serves as evidence that the FRELIMO Government did manage to refuse external pressure to form a government of national unity after RENAMO contested the 1994 general election.

2.3 From Single-Party to a Multiparty Democracy In many conflict-affected countries, adopting a democratic political regime represents one of the key elements of the peace process. This was also the case in Mozambique. However, the design of a new constitution prescribing democratic norms of power acquisition and exercise in the country was made in anticipation. Indeed, the transition from single-party rule to multiparty democracy was one of the most remarkable features of the 1990 constitution adopted before the peace agreement. Overall, the democratization process went so well that Mozambique became, arguably, one of the most successful cases of democratization in Africa in the 1990s (Wood 1999). Viewed from a merely electoral perspective, Mozambique maintains a remarkable record of having held, to date, six presidential and legislative elections (in 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014, and 2019). FRELIMO has, so far, won all presidential and parliamentary elections and remained at the forefront in local elections. Thus, if FRELIMO’s predisposition to adopt a multiparty democracy (political liberalization), along with economic liberalization, was strongly rooted in the belief that the party would reap the largest benefits (Alden 2001), it was not mistaken.

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In summary, this section demonstrates how, from the ashes of war, a failed socialist experiment, and one-party autocratic rule, Mozambique was, in a decade, remade according to the Western image and likeness: a formally capitalist, democratic, and stable state. These transformations repositioned Mozambique on the global stage. In fact, the country became one of the West’s favourite destinations of foreign capital (official development aid and FDI) in Africa. The following section unpacks these flows and assesses whether they helped to sustain conditions conducive to conflicts in post-war Mozambique.

3 Globalization and the Making of a Precarious Peace Liberal peacebuilding is rooted in the idea that democracy and free markets (capitalism) result in shared prosperity, inclusive and representative politics, and ultimately in self-sustaining peace. Indeed, in the post-Cold War era, this set of premises resulted in “an implicit agreement between international actors, the UN, IFIs [International Financial Institutions], and NGOs [Non-governmental Organizations], on a ‘peacebuilding consensus’ aimed at the construction of the liberal peace” (Richmond 2010: 22). In essence, Mozambique’s transition epitomizes this generation of global peacebuilding. As stated earlier, the country hosted robust and multidimensional international interventions, especially in the political and economic spheres. Nevertheless, the promise of a liberal self-sustaining peace shaped by the “peacebuilding consensus” has not been fulfilled to date. Instead, economic and political dynamics since the 1992 GPA, while marked by important progress, also exhibit significant flaws and setbacks. Specifically, despite remarkable economic growth, poverty and inequalities remain high, and democratic governance descended into a hybrid (or arguably authoritarian) regime. Accordingly, what was meant to be a liberal peace translated into a precarious and fragile peace. This outcome is, in part, a result of the role of global political and economic dynamics. As Richmond (2010: 24) had noted, in some instances, “the role of IFIs has effectively driven economic structural adjustment and development projects through neoliberal strategies, which have failed to provide the sorts of economic opportunities and welfare that would be expected within a liberal state.” The same can be said about political reforms.

3.1 The Coexistence of Economic Growth, Poverty, and Inequalities Mozambique’s post-war economic growth was impressive. From 1993 to 2014, the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew, on average, 7.9%; this was almost twice the 4.4% average of non-oil Sub-Saharan African economies in the same period

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(World Bank 2016). Among the many drivers of post-war economic growth, the political stability that followed the war’s end, the inflow of official development aid (ODA), and FDI were critically important (Nucifora and da Silva 2011). With political stability, for instance, many internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees could return to their farms, helping to relaunch the country’s so crucial agricultural sector. The inflow of ODA in the post-war years was consistently around 15% of the country’s GDP (Clément and Peiris 2008) and helped to boost public services delivery. The inflow of FDI, in its turn, increased from an average of 1.5% of GDP in 1993–1998 to an average of 5.2% in 1999–2010 (Nucifora and da Silva 2011), providing much-needed private investment. Economic growth is extremely important for poverty reduction, especially in lowincome countries. Without growth, “if the same level of total consumption had been distributed perfectly equally among Mozambicans in 1996, every man, woman, and child would have lived in absolute poverty” (Arndt et al. 2006: 572). However, whether Mozambique’s economic growth has been pro-poor or pro-elites is debatable. We can recall the resumption of the agricultural sector and the ODA inflow, which was largely directed to social sectors such as health and education. With this, poverty reduction, as measured by the Human Development Index (HDI)—which incorporates life expectancy, years of schooling, and income—registered significant improvements after the civil war. As the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Report on Mozambique revealed: Between 1990 and 2019, Mozambique’s HDI value increased from 0.227 to 0.456, an increase of 100.9%. […] Between 1990 and 2019, Mozambique’s life expectancy at birth increased by 15.6 years, mean years of schooling increased by 2.7 years, and expected years of schooling increased by 6.2 years. Mozambique’s gross national income per capita increased by about 172.7% between 1990 and 2019 (UNDP 2020: 2).

This is consistent with the findings from Arndt et al. (2006) who examined data from 1996 to 1997 and from 2002 to 2003 and point to significant increases in consumption along with all segments of income population in the country, including the poorest. As a result, the authors concluded that a slight rise in inequality notwithstanding, economic growth in Mozambique has been pro-poor. However, even considering these improvements in consumption and HDI, the World Bank has openly recognized that in Mozambique, “the poor did not benefit as much from growth as the more affluent” (World Bank 2016: 9). Perhaps with similar concern, some have cautioned that despite poverty reduction between 1992 and 2012, hunger persists, and malnutrition and diseases such as malaria, HIV/AIDS, and tuberculosis are on the rise, calling into question the current development paradigm (Phiri 2012). This reality is visible both in rural and urban areas. However, the incidence is higher in rural areas, where the vast majority of the population resides. Indeed, with declining productivity in the agricultural sector in Mozambique, rural poverty is worsening (Cunguara and Hanlon 2012; Cunguara and Moder 2011). In part, it may be related to the Government’s reduced interventionism in the economy, precluding the adoption of productivity-enhancing and market-protection policies. Interestingly, the World Bank, a firm advocate of neoliberal policies, had recognized

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the poor performance of the agricultural sector in Mozambique. According to the World Bank: the overwhelming majority of rural households cultivate small plots for subsistence farming and exhibit low rates of adoption of productivity-enhancing inputs and technologies, and limited access to production support services (extension, credit, etc.), which together result in low levels of productivity (World Bank 2016: 12).

It is also important to consider the relevance of the extractive sector, which is dominated by foreign investors, and is increasing in the Mozambican economy. The sector grew from 1.2% of GDP in 2009 to 13.6% in 2018 and is expected the grow further when gas production starts in the northern region (Macuane and Muianga 2020). The major FDI projects, usually called “megaprojects,” include coal and natural gas exploration by MNCs from the West (e.g., ENI and TotalEnergies) and emerging economies (e.g., Vale, Jindal, and Sasol) but also aluminum production by Mozal and other projects. In 2009, the total FDI was as much as US$890 million, a sharp increase if contrasted to the mere US$32 million in the period of 1991–1995 (UNCTAD 2012). Moreover, in 2019, Anadarko and its co-ventures announced a final investment decision worth US$25 billion for a liquified natural gas project in the Cabo Delgado province (DW 2019). The project is the largest single investment in Mozambique’s history (nearing twice the total GDP in 2019) and is arguably one of the largest in Africa. With an economy concentrated on the extractive industry, the effectiveness of GDP growth in reducing poverty has worsened substantially (Castel-Branco 2010). As noted earlier, the extractive sector is dominated by foreign investors, and more intriguingly, the sector is export-oriented, capital-intensive (rather than labour-intensive), enjoys substantial tax exemptions, and has a low connection with the rest of the economy. As a result, the extractive sector contributes to GDP growth but is relatively ineffective in job creation and the improvement of the welfare of the majority of the population, including the communities in the surrounding areas. Unsurprisingly, inequality, measured by indices such as the Gini, Generalized Entropy, and Atkinson indices, has been increasing (Gradín and Tarp 2019). In simple terms, this denounces the tendency of concentration of wealth in the richer segments of the society. The implications are evident. Taking inequality into account, even the positive picture of a rising HDI becomes blurred. For instance, “Mozambique’s HDI for 2019 is 0.456. However, when the value is discounted for inequality, the HDI falls to 0.316, a loss of 30.7% due to inequality in the distribution of the HDI dimension indices” (UNDP 2020: 4). Moreover, high levels of inequality offset the poverty-reducing effects of economic growth. According to the World Bank (2016), if inequality in Mozambique had not increased, poverty would have reduced by 26.8% instead of the 16.3% registered between 1997 and 2009, and consequently, the poverty level would have decreased to 41.6% instead of 52%. The problem of poverty is further complicated by Mozambique’s high fertility rate. Despite a widening use of contraceptives, the country’s fertility rate is, as of 2019, 4.8 children per woman (UN 2020), above the 4.6 sub-Saharan Africa average. Hence, the country’s economic growth is further offset by high population growth, resulting

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in low GDP per capita. The National Institute Statistics’ data indicate that the GDP per capita is, since 2016, around $500, a sharp decrease since 2014 (see Fig. 1). These figures place Mozambique among the poorest countries in the world. Oftentimes, policies such as SUSTENTA5 seem to raise hopes of rural poverty and inequality reduction. However, with the expansion of basic services and the diversification of the economy still far from desirable, poverty and inequality may persist. Theoretically, whether poverty and inequality can constitute root causes of different forms of political violence is controversial. One of the most resounding theoretical assumptions suggesting a link between poverty and or inequality and conflicts is found in the 1970 seminal book Why Men Rebel by Ted Robert Gurr. Gurr (1970) presents people’s discontent (or relative deprivation) as one of the key predictors of violent conflicts. The assertion is further supported by other scholars such as Nafziger and Auvinen (1997, 2002). Grievance-oriented theories are, however, contested by other scholars who, for instance, argue that greed offers better explanations of political violence, while “objective indicators of grievance add little explanation” (Collier and Hoeffler 2004: 588). In reality, even those who see grievances (especially poverty and inequality) as conflict predictors recognize that these factors are not alone at play when violent conflicts erupt. Furthermore, some scholars highlight that horizontal (rather than vertical) inequalities are more related to violence outbreaks (e.g., see Mine et al. 2013; Stewart 2008). It is, nevertheless, hard to ignore the fact that many of the most devastating forms of direct political violence in the contemporary world are mostly concentrated in low-income and highly unequal societies. In post-war Mozambique, grievance-related popular contestations occur recurrently. In 2008, 2010, and 2012, the Mozambique capital city Maputo and Matola 5

SUSTENTA is the Government’s flagship program in the agricultural sector. It seeks to provide family farming with technology, funding, linkages with the market, planning, subsidies, infrastructure, and environmental and social safeguards.

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city were taken by popular unrest. Several factors worked together for the outbreak of the popular unrest, among them, the high living costs (especially food and transport), which make a decent life almost unattainable to the poorest segments of the urban population in Mozambique (Brito et al. 2015). In reality, inequality (objectively demonstrated earlier) may generate contestations if perceived by the population. Perceptions of unequal resource distribution exist among several Mozambicans, as evidenced by one of the interviewees quoted by Brito et al. (2015: 35) stating that: There are many riches, but only a small group benefits! Not even that money that they give, 7 million, is given between them in the neighborhoods. Who is given is the head of the neighborhood (…). The rest do not get anything (…)6 The cost of living, people have been murmuring, until now they are murmuring (…) Most of them live selling oranges (…) There is no job.

These poverty and inequality-related popular unrests also took place in other cities throughout the country, but to a much lesser degree. If anything is to be inferred, it is that perceptions of deprivation are relatively widespread in Mozambique. On all three occasions that unrest flared up, a significant degree of violence was used by the protesters and the police. Also recurrent are popular contentions over the land (and its resources) or complaints of exclusion revolving around FDI projects. Perhaps one of the most noticeable cases in point happened in the ruby mining area in Cabo Delgado. Cabo Delgado’s ruby reserves are arguably the most significant contemporary ruby discovery globally, and they were leased to Montepuez Ruby Mining (MRM). MRM is a joint-venture company owned by the United Kingdom-based Gemfields Group Limited (75%) and a Mozambican company, Mwriti Limited (25%).7 Since the discovery of the ruby deposits in 2009, disputes have been acute between impoverished local artisanal miners (considered illegal) and the multimillion-dollar MRM. Local communities that exist in the area leased to MRM have been claiming their customary rights over the land and its resources. The exploitation of ruby in Cabo Delgado is, therefore, conflictual, often turning violent. The MRM patrols the concession area with the support of Mozambican police and private security companies. On several occasions, security forces have killed several artisanal miners found in the MRM-leased area, turning the situation into “blood ruby” mining (Valoi 2016). Accordingly, a consulting firm report commissioned by MRM concluded that “the most significant risks at MRM are related to social issues: (1) conflict with illegal miners; (2) resettlement of local people who reside in the concession area; and (3) the potential for local people to perceive that MRM is not providing enough tangible benefits to the local community” (SRK Consulting 2015: 139). Mozambique has been a member of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) since 2009 and is reported as displaying “significant progress” in resources 6

In reference to 7 million meticais (Mozambique’s currency) of the District Development Fund, a program that aimed at galvanizing development at the district level in Mozambique during the Armando Guebuza presidency. For a discussion about whether this program worked for empowering local communities, see Maschietto (2016). 7 Information retrieved from the Gemfields website available at: https://www.gemfieldsgroup.com/ assets/montepuez-ruby-mining-limitada/ Accessed on 21 June 2021.

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governance (EITI Mozambique/I2A Consultoria e Serviços 2019: 13). Nevertheless, the ruby conflicts represent a widespread pattern of poor resource governance in Mozambique, which often benefits the political elites and foreign investors to the detriment of poor local communities (Alberdi and Barroso 2020). In a way, this poor governance might have contributed to the outbreak of a deadly and devastating insurgency in Cabo Delgado Province in 2017, as discussed later in this chapter. All in all, in the post-civil war era, Mozambique has, with the support of external actors, sustained remarkable economic growth. However, although resulting in overall improvements in human development indicators, the current path of economic growth fails to address deep-rooted grievances (especially rising inequality and poverty). In other words, the post-war liberal state engulfed in the logic of the global political economy is leaving many Mozambicans behind. Worryingly, this social injustice is a form of structural violence and a systematic risk of violent conflicts.

3.2 The Coexistence of Democracy and Political Exclusion Along with a capitalist economy, democratic governance is a cornerstone of a liberal state and its logic of sustaining peace through respect of individual rights. In its basic form, a democratic polity implies the participation of all citizens in the decisionmaking, either directly or through elected representatives. Moreover, a democratic system is thought to be inclusive; that is, it takes into consideration the preferences and interests of a wide range of political actors. Mozambique’s democratic history is one reminiscent of democracy as a dynamic process, with moments of progress (deepening democratization towards its consolidation) and regress (de-democratization or democracy backsliding and descending into authoritarian rule). Following the transition discussed earlier in this chapter, much of the trajectory of democratic governance in Mozambique indicates significant setbacks with FRELIMO strengthening its grip on power to the detriment of those outside the ruling party. The Economist Intelligence Unit produces one of the most recognized evaluations of political regimes in the world. In its accounts, Mozambique has, since 2006, been declining consistently up to reaching the all-time low level in 2020 and, since 2018, is characterized as an authoritarian regime (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2021). A similar trend is noticed by the Variety of Democracy (V-Dem) Index, another wellrenown governance index. V-Dem indicates a decline in all indices of democracy in Mozambique, namely deliberative, electoral, participatory, egalitarian, and liberal democracy to the point of, in 2020, presenting levels below those in 1994, except for the participatory democracy index (see Fig. 2). Also signaling the deterioration of the political environment in Mozambique, The Fund for Peace (2021) indicates that Mozambique is worsening consistently over time in terms of state fragility. As the state becomes more fragile and the ruling party

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Fig. 2 Mozambique democracy indices (1994–2020). Source V-Dem; retrieved from https://www. v-dem.net/en/analysis/CountryGraph/ Accessed 25 June 2021

stronger, it is unsurprising that only 27% of Mozambicans perceive a difference between the state and the ruling party8 (see Vines 2021). When democracy arrived in Mozambique in the 1990s, the global political environment was highly favourable for its inception. After the Cold War, liberal internationalism became a dominant form of international interventions. In Mozambique, this implied that external impulses for a liberal democracy were very high. Being an aid-dependent country, Mozambican elites had enough reasons to please Western donors by accepting democratic institutions. Importantly, FRELIMO won with a thin margin in the first and second multiparty elections, showing a highly competitive domestic environment common in vibrant democracies. However, domestic and external dynamics have changed meaningfully since then. First, since the first multiparty elections in 1994, FRELIMO won all presidential elections and increased its seats in the national parliament meaningfully. In 1994, FRELIMO had 129 members in the national parliament; in 2019, it had raised the number to 184. In the opposite direction, RENAMO’s presence in the parliament almost halved from 112 in 1994 to 60 in 2019, out of 250 seats. Second, with the discovery of huge natural resources in Mozambique in recent decades, Western donors have concentrated their attention on securing access to these resources; thus, they reduced their pressure for democracy and good governance (Hanlon 2010). Accordingly, the former United States (US) ambassador to Mozambique, Professor Dennis Jett, had criticized Western donors, MNCs, and international organizations for not only tolerating anti-democratic practices but also supporting the ruling elite 8

Data reported by Afrobaromer available at https://afrobarometer.org/countries/mozambique-0. Accessed on 6 June 2021.

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in sustaining what he called a “borderline failed state” and “sham democracy” (Jett 2020; see also Grimm and Weiffen 2018; Le Billon 2008; Pérez Niño and Le Billon 2014). Third and also related to natural resources, the inflow of FDI implied, on the one hand, a relative enlargement of public revenue sources, further reducing the Western donors’ leverage. On the other hand, it implied the involvement of prominent FRELIMO figures in lucrative businesses that made the party economically stronger (Mairoce et al. 2021). Last but not least, the rise of non-Western development partners (especially China) provided the Mozambican rulers with an alternative to the West and its prescriptions of democracy and good governance. Despite democratic backslidings noted in international evaluation reports mentioned earlier, it seems exaggerated to label the current Mozambican regime as authoritarian. Although contested on the grounds of lack of transparency, Mozambique has managed the feat of holding six regular presidential elections, electing three different presidents (though from the same party). Despite frequent complaints of crackdown, independent media is significantly vibrant and civil society organizations are sufficiently active. Seen on the broader context of flawed democratic governance in many post-colonial states, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, Mozambique’s performance is more nuanced. In this sense, it seems that Mozambique is closer to a hybrid or semi-democratic regime rather than an authoritarian one. Evidently, in the country, formal democratic institutions coexist with neo-patrimonial practices, rampant corruption, manipulation of state institutions by ruling elites, etc. From the conflict risk standpoint, this is concerning. In fact, semi-democracies (hybrid regimes) are found to be more prone to political violence than fully authoritarian or fully democratic states (e.g., see Hegre et al. 2001). In short, this section elaborated succinctly on how external political and economic factors resulted in a political economy and politics that sustain structural violence and structural risks of violent conflicts in post-war Mozambique. In essence, it made the case that the active participation of international actors was crucial in rebuilding the country in the aftermath of a long and devastating civil war (especially fostering economic growth and democratization). However, it did not erase (or even deteriorate) some of the very factors that have contributed to the outbreak of the war in the past; namely, poverty, inequalities, and political exclusion. Furthermore, these socioeconomic and political factors may have become conducive to the reoccurrence of violent clashes between RENAMO and the Government as well as the outbreak of other forms of violence, especially the insurgency in Cabo Delgado. The following section of this chapter concentrates on these two major post-war violent conflicts in Mozambique.

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4 Challenging the Precarious Peace: Violent Conflicts in the Post-war Era

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The precariousness of peace in post-war Mozambique means that the use of violent means for political ends in the country did not cease after the GPA and the subsequent peacebuilding interventions. Instead, events such as protests, riots, attacks against civilians, and armed clashes have frequently taken place in the national political sphere. The Armed Conflict Location and Events Data (ACLED) project produces one of the most comprehensive and updated records of political violence occurrences in the world. According to ACLED records, Mozambique’s deadliest political violence events started in 2013, as seen in Fig. 3. This was predominantly due to the reignition of armed conflict between RENAMO and Government forces9 after almost 20 years of peace (i.e., absence of war). Vines (2017: 140) corroborates with the data noting that, in 2013, armed clashes between RENAMO and Government forces killed no less than 60 people in the country. Following peace talks between RENAMO and the Government, the intensity of violence reduced in 2014. However, difficulties in reaching a new peace agreement meant that violent acts were still present, significantly rising in 2016.

Year Fig. 3 Fatalities per year because of political violence in Mozambique (1997–2020). Constructed with data from ACLED; retrieved from https://acleddata.com/data-export-tool/ Accessed 25 June 2021. The data includes deaths from battles, explosive/remote violence, protests, riots, strategic developments, and violence against civilians 9

In the public discourse, the conflict has not been recognized as an armed conflict; rather, it has been called a “politico-military crisis.“ There is no universal definition of armed conflict. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) defines armed conflict as “a contested incapability that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” (available online at https://www. pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/ accessed 10 July 2021). Based on UCPD definition, RENAMO and the Government forces were, in fact, in an armed conflict.

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While by the end of 2016, RENAMO and the Government agreed on a truce, Fig. 3 also shows a substantial increase in political violence-related fatalities in Mozambique in 2017, with a steep rise since 2018 (from around 200 deaths to nearly 1800 in 2020). This increase was, by far, a result of the outbreak of the insurgency in Cabo Delgado in 2017. It is noteworthy that ACLED records, like other similar conflict databases, rely on news reports and other informants in the field; considering that many of the killings remain underreported or even unreported, especially in Mozambique where media coverage of the conflicts has been seriously restricted, the actual figure is certainly much higher. Another way of assessing the severity of conflicts is the number of refugees and the IDPs they produce. Confrontations between RENAMO and Government forces have forced many to abandon their homes internally, and more than 11,000 people have fled from Tete Province to Malawi, while more than 2500 escaped from Manica Province to Zimbabwe (Vines 2017). In Cabo Delgado, a province of 2 million inhabitants, the insurgency caused, by mid-2021, more than 700,000 IDPs in what the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2021) considers “one of the fastestgrowing displacement crises in the world.” Moreover, many have attempted to cross the border to neighbouring Tanzania. There are different ways of reading these post-war violent conflicts in Mozambique. Broadly, one may understand these conflicts as pointing out flaws in the liberal institutionalist state-building and peacebuilding in constructing a Weberian state, specifically the failure to institutionalize and monopolize the use of violence after the civil war in Mozambique. This top-down and institutionalist approach, however correct it might be, does not properly account for the several socioeconomic and political dynamics that seem to fuel violence in the country. Here, we try to interpret political violence in Mozambique by looking at the political and political economy dynamics outlined in the previous section. In other words, we attempt to see how poverty, inequality, and political exclusion, reinforced in part by global economic and political dynamics, contributed to the outbreak of the two main focuses of political violence in post-war Mozambique.

4.1 Bullets and Ballots Politics: RENAMO’s Return to Violence RENAMO’s history is remarkable. From being a proxy of Rhodesia and then of the South African Apartheid system, the group has managed to become a powerful rebel group with control over a large extension of the territory. In 2002, RENAMO had become the largest opposition party in Africa in terms of seats in the national parliament (Vines 2017). This should be understandable, not least because as a rebel group, Rhodesia and South Africa provided significant resources for RENAMO’s war, and after the civil war, international actors such as the UN have provided large amounts of funds to support the group’s transformation from rebel to political party.

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It is worth remembering that a central goal for RENAMO in the 1992 GPA was to emerge as a legitimate and important political actor to be taken into account in the distribution of political power and economic resources in the country. With the new multiparty democracy introduced with the 1990 constitution, RENAMO’s quest for political and economic power shifted from bullets (violence) to ballots (elections). Accordingly, RENAMO has disputed all legislative and presidential elections since 1994. In the first two general elections (held in 1994 and 1999), RENAMO’s good fortune was impressive. In the 1999 elections, the party’s presidential candidate, Afonso Dhlakama, even came close to victory with roughly 48% of votes against the 52% earned by FRELIMO’s candidate Joaquim Chissano (see Fig. 4). However, in subsequent elections, RENAMO’s fate was less fortunate. In this sense, electoral results were not helping to achieve RENAMO’s central goal. Consequently, despite the absence of armed conflict from 1992 to 2012 between RENAMO and the FRELIMO-led Government, electoral tensions have been a constant. For instance, RENAMO boycotted the 1998 local elections and in 2000 organized several demonstrations in the country’s major cities challenging the results of the 1999 general elections. The settlement of these tensions has been made through ad hoc negotiations that Vines (2017, 2021) calls elite bargains. In essence, during the Joaquim Chissano administration (1995–2004), RENAMO’s President Afonso Dhlakama was often consulted, creating an environment resembling inclusive governance, at least at the elite level. In fact, when it comes to political inclusion in post-war Mozambique, a particularly important aspect has been to consider RENAMO’s interests in the decision-making. Such an inclusion at the political level in Mozambique (and elsewhere) was critically important in preventing the war’s recurrence (Call 2012). However, this form of political inclusion has, over time, eroded, especially during the Armando Guebuza presidency (2005–2015). Fig. 4 Legislative election results in Mozambique. Source Institute of Social and Economic Studies. Electoral cartography available at https://www.iese. ac.mz/cartografia-eleitoral/#/ Accessed 1 July 2021

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Fig. 5 Presidential election results in Mozambique. Source Institute of Social and Economic Studies. Electoral cartography available at https://www.iese. ac.mz/cartografia-eleitoral/#/ Accessed 1 July 2021

In fact, from the onset of President Armando Guebuza’s rule, an assertive approach to RENAMO was adopted. Apparently, during the Guebuza administration, the Government intentionally tried to reduce RENAMO’s political power while strengthening FRELIMO’s influence in the society and state apparatus. For Mairoce et al. (2021), the erosion of political inclusion (or better, elite bargains) was due to the windfall of FDI, which increased the FRELIMO economic power and incentives to attempt to fragilize and eventually reduce the political significance of RENAMO. In reality, the authors go further and blame this Government behaviour for the recurrence of RENAMO-localized conflict from 2013. However, we should also consider that the Guebuza administration’s assertiveness was coupled with the fact that RENAMO’s electoral results were, over time, shrinking. In the aftermath of the 2008 local elections and 2009 general elections, it was more than evident that RENAMO’s political power was fading away. In the local elections, RENAMO failed to win a single municipality; on the contrary, FRELIMO managed to regain control of the municipalities RENAMO had won in 2003. With this, FRELIMO dominated local governance in Mozambique, except for Beira, won by Daviz Simango, a RENAMO dissent. In the general elections, RENAMO’s candidate to presidential elections, Afonso Dhlakama, lost with just 16% of votes, while FRELIMO’s candidate, Armando Guebuza, was reelected with 75% of votes, and the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM)10 candidate Daviz Simango gained 8.56% of votes (see Fig. 4). In the legislative elections, out of 250 seats in the national parliament, RENAMO gained 51 (17.69%), FRELIMO 191 (74.66%), and MDM 8 (3.93%) (see Fig. 5). It is noteworthy that the elections were held amid allegations of lack of transparency, so it is unsurprising that RENAMO rejected the results on the grounds of widespread fraud.

10

MDM (Movimento Democrático de Moçambique) is a political party formed in 2009 by RENAMO dissidents.

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RENAMO’s dwindling political influence and the increasing concentration of political and economic power in the governing FRELIMO party under President Guebuza came in a critical moment of Mozambique’s political economy. On the one hand, since the 2000s, “Mozambique’s natural resource economy heated up, raising the stakes of political power” (Manning and Dendere 2018: 257). Moreover, “while competition over resource rents intensified elite competition, inequality and poverty also created grievances that have deepened popular anti-government sentiment” (Pearce 2020: 789). It has, indeed, been argued in the previous section of this chapter that the persistence and worsening of poverty and inequality coupled with poor democratic governance created a structural risk of violence in Mozambique. It is crucial to note that RENAMO ex-combatants’ disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) was not complete after the 1992 GPA. Taking advantage of a caveat in the GPA, which allowed the group to keep several armed men to provide security for its President, RENAMO maintained several active combatants, possibly thousands, and kept significant weaponry. Moreover, RENAMO’s demobilized fighters remained highly connected in informal networks ranging from friendship and marriage to patronage, making them easily susceptible to remobilization (Wiegink 2015). Therefore, the combination of (1) RENAMO’s declining political influence, (2) FRELIMO’s rising control of power and resources, (3) the increased value of political power (due to natural resources rents and inflow of FDI), (4) increasing grievances at the populace level, and (5) the RENAMO’s possession of armed men, offer a suggestive set of factors that may help to understand the increasing tensions between RENAMO and the Government. Furthermore, it may explain RENAMO’s shift to bullets and ballots politics. Bullets and ballots politics should be understood as the coexistence of violence and elections as a means of achieving more political power. Ideally, democracy implies that access to political power is attained and legitimated by electoral processes. However, as Vines (2017: 149) has noted, “the renewed conflict since 2013 remains very much about RENAMO seeking to extract an elite bargain through violence.” Achieving or reinforcing political power through violence in this context does not necessarily imply a return to war. Indeed, notwithstanding the use of violence since 2013, it is highly improbable that RENAMO ever intended to resume the war. Without the kind of military support RENAMO had during the civil war, it is questionable whether the group would even handle a war in similar proportions to those of the 1970s and 1980s. However, RENAMO’s capabilities to destabilize the country should not be underestimated. Instead, RENAMO’s possession of armed men and its ability to remobilize former fighters were translated into major leverage in pushing for new concessions from the FRELIMO-led Government through threats and use of low-scale, sporadic, and localized violence. In this sense, bullets and ballots coexisted from 2013 to 2019 in a seemingly calculated manner that did not aim for a return to war but intended to push for new concessions from the Government. The strategy of pushing risky events to the brink of violent conflicts to achieve advantageous outcomes is, especially in international politics, known as brinkmanship. In essence, brinkmanship intends to force an opponent to make concessions by creating an impression (based on credible

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threats) that one is willing and capable of using extreme methods to achieve the stated goals. To be credible, however, threats of violence are sometimes accompanied by actual actions. From this lens, it is possible to understand a series of events that took place from 2013 to 2019, which eventually escalated and deteriorated into a low-scale and localized armed conflict. At the discursive level, signs of violence were evident as early as 2009. Indeed, after losing the 2009 general elections, Afonso Dhlakama threatened to restart the war in Mozambique (DW 2014). Nevertheless, the actual armed conflict occurred, with some interruptions, from 2013 to 2019. The conflict may be divided into two phases. The first phase started in April 2013 and lasted roughly 18 months, with an end in September 2014. The second phase began in June 2015 and ended in May 2018. Although RENAMO’s initial attack occurred in April 2013, the first phase of the conflict should be traced back to at least October 2012. A few days after the 20th anniversary of the GPA, celebrated on 4 October 2012, Afonso Dhlakama revived one of his military bases in Santunjira, Sofala Province. From this base, Dhlakama remobilized RENAMO’s ex-combatants, retrained them, and started pressuring the Government for new negotiations. RENAMO’s strategy seems to have worked, at least for bringing the Government to the negotiation table. In effect, in December 2012, negotiations between the Government and RENAMO began. And while RENAMO and Government delegations were holding negotiations in Maputo city, armed clashes were frequently happening in different provinces throughout the country. Trying to compensate for its diminishing power in national and local politics, especially after the 2008 and 2009 elections, in the negotiations, RENAMO called for more inclusion of its members in the civil service and public companies, armed forces (Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique—FADM) and police, as well as for the revision of the electoral legislation, especially regarding the composition of the National Electoral Commission (CNE in the Portuguese acronym). For the Government, the central goal in the negotiations was to completely disarm RENAMO’s armed men (commonly referred to as residual forces). By completing the disarmament of RENAMO’s residual forces, the Government presupposed that RENAMO still had political and economic demands in the future, but its ability to use force (waging war or simply destabilizing the country) would be over. RENAMO’s demand for the inclusion of its members into the police and armed forces was based on the Government’s alleged breach of the GPA. For RENAMO, the Government failed to incorporate its former combatants in high-ranking and key positions of the security and defense forces. Paradoxically, RENAMO’s call for the inclusion of its members in the civil service and public companies was based in the accusations of state partisanship by the governing FRELIMO party. This is paradoxical because the inclusion of RENAMO’s members in public institutions and companies is not a step toward de-partisanship; instead, it is the deepening of an undesirable practice of clientelism consubstantiated in providing access to the state based on political party affiliations.

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Regarding the CNE, it is worth recalling that RENAMO’s accusations of widespread fraud by the ruling FRELIMO are a common discourse before and after elections in Mozambique. Accordingly, the electoral legislation in Mozambique has been frequently revised before elections, and the composition of the CNE has often been reframed. However, this is also paradoxical. Attempts at making the CNE more independent have resulted in an electoral commission made up of members of the major political parties (those with seats in the National Assembly); that is, a partisan commission, although with representatives of civil society organizations. Being so, the electoral legislation and the CNE have been sources of further tensions in almost every electoral cycle. On the one hand, the electoral legislation’s frequent revision shortly before the elections ends up producing misunderstandings over its interpretation. On the other hand, the partisan CNE is not sufficiently professional to manage and deliver credible electoral processes. Instead, RENAMO and other political and civil society actors have questioned its independence, transparency, and fairness. Unsurprisingly, the negotiations of a new political settlement were prolonged and marked by several inconclusive or even unproductive sessions. To add more pressure on the Government for concessions, in 2013, RENAMO boycotted local elections as it did in 1998. With general elections scheduled for October 2014 approaching, discussions about the composition of the CNE gained a new impetus, and a consensus was achieved in February 201411 (Notícias 2014). A possible RENAMO boycott of general elections would damage the legitimacy of the electoral process and further deepen the political instability in the country. Another contested point in the negotiations was the presence of national and international mediators and observers. The Government accepted the RENAMO’s demand for mediation and observation. With this, conditions were created for a ceasefire agreement to be negotiated. In August 2014, the parties agreed and signed on a ceasefire agreement, which was preceded by the parliament’s enactment of an Amnesty Law for all crimes committed since the onset of the armed conflict. The ceasefire agreement was ratified by the President of Mozambique, Armando Guebuza, and RENAMO’s President Afonso Dhlakama in September 2014. This agreement ended the first phase of the armed conflict and was crucial for the 2014 presidential, legislative, and provincial elections. Ceasefire and elections notwithstanding, critical aspects of the first phase of the armed conflict remained unresolved. More critical among them were ways of granting more political and economic stakes for RENAMO and the complete disarmament of RENAMO’s fighters. Despite the defeat, RENAMO’s results in the 2014 general elections were far better than those achieved in 2009 (see Figs. 4 and 5). Interestingly, RENAMO’s voters (as has traditionally been) were mostly concentrated in the central and northern regions. In fact, even having lost at the national level, the party and its candidate won the majority of votes in the provinces of Sofala, Manica, Nampula, Zambézia, and Tete. Thus, in a way, it seems reasonable to believe that 11

The agreed provisions expanded the CNE composition from 13 to 17 members, of which 5 were from FRELIMO, 4 from RENAMO, 1 from MDM, and the remaining 7 from civil society organizations. The provisions were later transformed into law by the parliament.

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the improved RENAMO’s results may indicate that resorting to violence not only pushed for concessions from the Government but also revitalized RENAMO voters who may have identified themselves with RENAMO’s discourse of fighting against FRELIMO’s pro-elite (and supposedly regionalist) economic policies that benefited the ruling elite and only tricked-down in the southern region of the country in detriment of the central (and eventually northern) region. The 2014 results shaped the dynamics of the second phase of the conflict. Indeed, in the aftermath of the 2014 general elections, RENAMO again accused the ruling FRELIMO party of electoral fraud and presented two proposals. First, the party pushed for a bipartisan government (or a management government) that would temporarily rule until new elections were organized. The FRELIMO government promptly rejected the proposal. RENAMO then shifted its attention to demand the right to rule the provinces where it won. RENAMO intended to do so by pushing for the revision of decentralization law to have the power to nominate governors in the provinces where it had the majority of votes in 2014. FRELIMO questioned the proposal’s constitutionality. In March 2015, Gilles Cistac, a leading constitutional lawyer who supported RENAMO’s proposal, was assassinated in circumstances that remain unclear, thus deepening the tensions in the country. RENAMO resumed the use and threat of use of violence to push for concessions. In June 2015, Dhlakama admitted to having ordered the ambush of government forces in Tete Province, reportedly killing around 35 soldiers (AllAfrica 2015). This event halted the ceasefire signed in 2014. Accordingly, the conflict escalated in different provinces of the country, especially in the central region. The heightening of the conflict included reported attempts to assassinate RENAMO’s President and Secretary-General and other prominent figures by government forces. In 2016, negotiations resumed. However, difficulties in reaching an agreement were paramount, not least because the topics on the table were highly sensitive for the parties. The key points of the negotiations in this phase were the decentralization proposal and RENAMO’s complete disarmament. Nevertheless, the resumption of negotiations this time was benefited by a more dialogue-oriented President of Mozambique, Filipe Nyusi, elected in the 2015 presidential elections. Indeed, Filipe Nyusi traveled to the bush to meet Afonso Dhlakama in his hiding and frequently called him his “brother,” signaling a more dialogue-prone environment. By the end of 2016, Nyusi and Dhlakama had agreed on a temporary truce, which was later extended indefinitely. After roughly four decades as RENAMO’s leader, Afonso Dhlakama died from heart disease in 2018. His successor, Ossufo Momade, signed a peace agreement with Filipe Nyusi in August 2019. The deal put an end to the 6-year-long armed conflict. In essence, the peace deal revised the decentralization law (including constitutional reforms), allowing the election of provincial governors. With this, RENAMO expected to be able to elect governors in the 2019 elections. The expectation was founded on the 2014 electoral results in which RENAMO gained the majority of votes in at least five provinces. Importantly, the peace agreement also established the complete DDR of RENAMO’s ex-combatants.

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Whether RENAMO will cease the use of violence in its quest for political and economic inclusion in Mozambique with the 2019 agreement is still uncertain. RENAMO’s expectations of winning the elections in some provinces were not realized. Instead, in the 2019 elections, FRELIMO strengthened its hold on power beyond what it accomplished in 2014 (see Figs. 4 and 5). RENAMO once again rejected the electoral results, but violence did not resume. Instead, the DDR proceeded, despite missing deadlines due to financial constraints. Worryingly, however, the peace deal did not include mechanisms for more political and economic inclusion of the wider population, especially addressing problems of poverty and inequality in the country. As Elísio Macamo, a prominent Mozambican sociologist, has noted, “FRELIMO and RENAMO have developed an attitude towards politics that boils down to the belief that whatever is good for them is necessarily good for the people they claim to represent” (Macamo 2017: 203). This being so, he argues, negotiations have revolved around the accommodation of FRELIMO and RENAMO’s interests instead of dealing with issues related to ordinary people. Moreover, a critical and immediate challenge to the peace agreement emerged upon Dhlakama’s death. A RENAMO splinter group, a self-proclaimed Military Junta, arose challenging RENAMO’s current leadership and refusing to recognize the 2019 peace agreement. The Military Junta called for new peace talks with the Government, refused to join the ongoing DDR, and has carried out sporadic attacks, especially in the central region of Mozambique, thereby further perpetuating violence in post-war Mozambique.

4.2 A Rebellion of the Poor and Marginalized? The Insurgency in Cabo Delgado In 2017, a devastating violent conflict erupted in Mozambique, specifically in Cabo Delgado, the northmost province of the country. It is widely accepted that the conflict began with an armed attack on 5 October 2017,12 curiously, the day after the Mozambique Peace and Reconciliation Day. The attack that marked the starting point of the insurgency in Cabo Delgado targeted police stations (including the local Police Command headquarters) and other government institutions in Mocimboa da Praia district.13 It was reported that as a result of the attack and confrontations with the police, at least 14 people died among the attackers and the police (DW 2017).

12

Matsinhe and Valoi (2019) point to an earlier attack on a police station in Mogovolas district in the neighbouring Nampula Province in August of the same year as the actual starting point; however, it is difficult to establish a link between the referred attack and the violent extremism in Cabo Delgado. 13 In this chapter, the conflict in Cabo Delgado is referred to as insurgency because of the group’s attempts at controlling populations, territory, and its resources (undermining established authorities), a behaviour consistent with insurgent organizations.

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The Government of Mozambique and other governments in the world have been calling the group behind the conflict in Cabo Delgado, a terrorist organization.14 In reality, the Government of Mozambique at first denied the existence of a terrorist organization in the province. Instead, the Government had preferred to call the attackers “faceless evildoers” or “bandits.“ It was only in April 2020 that the National Security and Defense Council (CNDS in the Portuguese acronym)15 declared that in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique is “in the presence of an external aggression perpetrated by terrorists” (Carta de Moçambique 2020). The CNDS decision was propelled by claims of responsibility made by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s (ISIS) over some of the attacks in 2019. Likewise, in March 2021, the US State Department declared the group operating in Cabo Delgado as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.16 The group’s terrorist activities in Cabo Delgado have escalated almost uncontrollably since 2017. In fact, the Global Terrorism Index published by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) reveals, in its most recent edition (2020), an alarming scenario in Mozambique if placed in a global perspective. According to the index, Mozambique recorded, in 2019, the third-largest increase in terrorism-related deaths in the world (the second in sub-Saharan Africa, just below Burkina Faso) and had the sharpest rise in terms of terrorist activities in sub-Saharan Africa outside the Sahel (IEP 2020). As a result of terrorism, Mozambique reportedly lost, in 2019, US $63 million, an increase of 129% if compared to 2018, one of the largest increases in the world (IEP 2020). With this trend, the IEP ranked Mozambique as the 15th most terrorism-impacted country out of the 135 evaluated in 2019. More worryingly, in 2020 and 2021, terrorist-related deaths in Cabo Delgado deteriorated dramatically. Indeed, by 2020, the violence had killed over 2500 people (Louw-Vaudran 2021; see also Fig. 3), and by mid-2021 had displaced over 700,000 people, signaling a worsening scenario. The conflict is already perceived as a regional (Buchanan-Clarke 2021) and global threat, mostly because of the nature of the group behind it. Accordingly, the international community’s disregard has given room to a growing mobilization of actors and resources from the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) region as well as from the wider international community to Cabo Delgado. The SADC Double Troika decided to deploy the region’s Standby Forces to Mozambique to beef up the fight against the insurgents (AllAfrica 2021). At the global level, actors such as the European Union, Portugal, and the USA have deployed humanitarian or military assistance (mostly capacity-building) to Mozambique, while Rwanda deployed 1000 troops (military and police). 14

This chapter acknowledges the conceptualization of the group as a terrorist organization and its use of terrorist methods, yet the chapter refers to the conflict as an insurgency (see note 13 of this chapter). Therefore, the terms insurgent and terrorist are used interchangeably. 15 CNDS is presided over by the President of Mozambique and advises the President on issues related to sovereignty, defense, and national security. 16 US State Department Media Note available at https://www.state.gov/state-department-terroristdesignations-of-isis-affiliates-and-leaders-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-mozamb ique/. Accessed on 6 July 2021.

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For many observers and, apparently, the Mozambican authorities alike, the nature and motivations of the insurgency in Cabo Delgado were, at the onset, unknown. This is somewhat understandable given that extremist violence and religious terrorism have been largely absent in Mozambique’s recent history. Moreover, despite a rapid propagation of terrorism and violent extremism in Africa in recent decades, the southern region of the continent where Mozambique is located was, until then, the least affected by contemporary terrorist and extremist organizations. Nonetheless, in the past, one of the major terrorist attacks of the 1990s in the world took place in southern Africa, specifically in Tanzania (affecting the American embassy), and one of the masterminds behind the attack fled to South Africa passing through Mozambique (Rifer 2005). Also, Morier-Genoud (2020) reports the existence of groups with radical ideologies in Cabo Delgado in 1989–1990. However, the reality is that roughly 4 years after the conflict’s outbreak, several aspects pertaining to its nature and dynamics remain unknown or, at best, contentious. In part, this is due to the group’s scarce appearance to the wider public and its deficient communication. The group has not (perhaps intentionally) come out expressing its identity and goals consistently and clearly (see Heyen-Dubé and Rands 2021). This section does not intend to offer a fresh explanation of the conflict’s root causes. Rather, it systematizes some of the main narratives in the study of the conflict and highlights how Mozambique’s post-war politics and political economy made the country vulnerable to this type of violence. In this endeavor, a good point of departure is the group’s identity. Local populations, who had no doubts about who was behind the 5 October 2017 attack, diverged in the group’s designation: while some called it Al-Shabaab, others called it AlSunnah Wal-Jamâa (Morier-Genoud 2020). The name Al-Shabaab became the most preferred designation by locals and several media outlets, and thus, it was popularized nationwide and beyond. Arguably, the preference for the name Al-Shabab is because this name means “youth” in Arabic (and the majority of the group’s members are young), and the group’s use of force is reminiscent of the Somali terrorist group Al-Shabaab; moreover, the group itself has used the name in some written notes (Morier-Genoud 2020). However, the US designates the group as ISIS-Mozambique based on the group’s alleged link with the original ISIS.17 The existence of a group with religious connotations and popularly known as AlShabab in Cabo Delgado predates the outbreak of the violent conflict. Despite the group’s unclear communication, it is known that it preaches a radical or extremist version of Islam that opposes the secular state and society and the moderate Islam practiced by the majority of the Cabo Delgado Muslims. According to Chichava (2020), the group stands for (1) the rejection of lay education in favour of Islamic religious education; (2) obligatory use of the Islamic veil, covering the face, leaving only the eyes visible; (3) the ban on the use and possession of civil identification documents; (4) not greeting state leaders; (5) not taking part in national events; (6) 17 US State Department Media Note available at https://www.state.gov/state-department-terroristdesignations-of-isis-affiliates-and-leaders-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-mozamb ique/. Accessed on 6 July 2021.

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the rejection of the national flag; (7) the amputation of the limbs of adulterers and thieves; (8) no collaboration with or form part of the Government or state institutions; (9) the rejection of the state’s courts in favour of Islamic courts; and (10) a ban on the sale and consumption of alcohol. Now, regarding the root causes or motivations of the conflict, contentions run deeper. Indeed, different and competing narratives exist, some with compelling shreds of evidence and others highly speculative. The narratives can systematically be divided into two dimensions: external and internal drivers. Those who believe that the conflict is driven by external forces can be further divided into two narratives. First, some argue that the conflict in Cabo Delgado is part of a global spread of terrorism and violent extremism fomented by ISIS, especially in Africa. In fact, since ISIS’s territorial defeat in Iraq and Syria, the group decided to spread its activities to other countries, mostly creating alliances with local extremist groups in countries such as Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Sahel countries. The narrative that the violent conflict in Cabo Delgado is part of ISIS’s global jihadism is embraced by the Government of Mozambique and seemingly by other governments in the West. Accordingly, the June 2021 meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Global Coalition against Daesh/ISIS (to which Mozambique and other African states attended as observers) reiterated the need to extend the Coalition’s operations to support the fight against ISIS beyond Syria and Iraq by covering Africa, especially the Sahel and Mozambique.18 ISIS has, indeed, claimed several attacks in Cabo Delgado. However, the extent of the link between the terrorist group in Cabo Delgado and ISIS is dubious. Makonye (2020) has found relevant links between the Cabo Delgado so-called Al-Shabab and ISIS as well as with other terrorist organizations in Africa (see also Habibe et al. 2019). However, Morier-Genoud (2020), although recognizing that from 2019 the insurgent group in Cabo Delgado engaged in the process of internationalization (especially forging an alliance with ISIS), contends that this did not necessarily change the group’s internal nature and dynamics (see also Heyen-Dubé and Rands 2021). Moreover, despite the presence of foreign fighters in Cabo Delgado coming from Somalia and countries in the Great Lakes region, especially Tanzania, the vast majority of the fighters are local (or rather, from different parts of Mozambique) and have been reported as speaking Portuguese (the official language of Mozambique) and local languages spoken throughout the country (Macalane and Jafar 2021). The second external-oriented narrative points to the dynamics of global energy markets. Cabo Delgado is home to one of the biggest natural gas discoveries of recent years. The gas exploitation was under preparation until an attack in Palma district in March 2021 forced TotalEnergies to interrupt the multibillion-dollar operation for security concerns. Thus, for some, the insurgency in Cabo Delgado is driven by the major natural gas exporters in the global energy market to hinder or delay Mozambique’s entry into the global natural gas market. One of the most outspoken proponents of this narrative happens to be one of the most prominent Mozambican 18

See the meeting’s communiqué available at https://theglobalcoalition.org/en/rome-ministerialcoalition-communique/. Accessed on 6 July 2021.

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war veterans, Jacinto Veloso, who also served as National Director of Intelligence Services and Minister of State Security, among other relevant government positions, and is currently a member of the CNDS. In an article published in the Mozambican newspaper, Savana, Veloso argued that in Cabo Delgado: We are dealing with a mega-operation conceived, directed, and executed from outside the country to, at least, slow the natural gas projects because they are considered a serious commercial threat to the giant economic interests of big companies involved in identical projects in the region, which are competing for the same markets (Veloso 2020).

Veloso did not mention which states or companies he thinks are behind the conflict in Cabo Delgado, nor did he point out the competing projects in the region. Yet, it is known that in Mozambique’s neighbour Tanzania, there is a 30 billion-dollar natural gas project similar to (and potentially competing with) the ones developed in Cabo Delgado. Nevertheless, there is, so far, a lack of sufficient evidence to connect the competition for international energy markets with the outbreak of the terrorist insurgency in Cabo Delgado. It is, therefore, unsurprising that this narrative is seldom discussed in the few scholarly works already produced. Instead, Heyen-Dubé and Rands (2021) argue that despite some incidents that may suggest the opposite, armed attacks in Cabo Delgado have not intentionally and strategically targeted the foreign gas investments in the province. Veloso resorts to past experiences such as American use of radical groups to counterbalance the Soviet Union in Afghanistan as evidence of the use of proxies in global politics. In this sense, Veloso does not deny the role of ISIS in Cabo Delgado; rather, he believes that gas exporters merely instrumentalize ISIS to destabilize the gas project in Mozambique. Different scholars embrace a rather opposite line of analysis. This line contends that the insurgency in Cabo Delgado is essentially local; in other words, its drivers are internal problems in Mozambique. The internal-oriented narratives are also split into two dimensions. On the one hand, some understand the insurgency as a problem of religious radicalization in Cabo Delgado. For instance, Morier-Genoud (2020) takes a historical and sociological perspective and singles out two fundamental phases of the insurgency. The first phase dates back to around 2007 when the group emerged as an Islamist sect with young people in some districts preaching a radical Islam, which, among other things, rejected a secular state and society (see also Chichava 2020). The mainstream and moderate Muslim leaders opposed the radical movement and eventually lobbied with the state to repress the radical sect; in this, the police resorted to violent repression. The second phase started around 2016 when the group shifted from Islamist sectarianism to armed jihadism in response to the religious and state (violent) repression. On the other hand, some analysts argue that the genesis of the terrorist insurgency in Cabo Delgado lies in the dire socioeconomic problems extant in the province. Proponents of this view assert that while the conflict might mask itself as jihadism, it has its origins in poverty, inequality, and exclusion (or marginalization) (Alden and Chichava 2020; Hanlon 2020). Looking at socioeconomic conditions as the root causes of the conflict in Cabo Delgado is appealing for many; however, this reasoning raises some theoretical and

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empirical problems. Theoretically, it is highly contested that poverty, inequality, and socioeconomic exclusions are root causes of terrorism or extremist violence (Abadie 2006; Krueger and Laitin 2003; Piazza 2006). Instead, some of these studies suggest that other factors such as social cleavages and state repression (or levels of political freedom) are better predictors of terrorist and extremist violence. Empirically, although Cabo Delgado indeed has several socioeconomic problems, this is not the poorest province in Mozambique. Therefore, the fact that only Cabo Delgado is witnessing the outbreak of the insurgency raises questions of why Cabo Delgado and not other provinces. Furthermore, poverty, inequality, and socioeconomic exclusion have been in Cabo Delgado for decades, so why did these ever-present conditions produce violence only in 2017? Proponents of socioeconomic problems as the root causes of the conflict resort to two arguments. First, they see the boom in natural resources in Cabo Delgado as catalysts of violence on the flammable grounds of social dissatisfaction and frustration. Indeed, Alden and Chichava (2020: 2) make the case that the “onset of a resource scramble has seen an influx of economic migrants and spurred rent-seeking by the elite with multinationals. As a result, local communities have become even further marginalized.” It is interesting to see how the role of natural resources in the conflict is bifurcated. On the one hand, natural resources exploitation may have ignited hostile behaviour from external energy competitors, as suggested by Veloso (2020). On the other hand, natural resources discovery may have generated unmet expectations of development for local communities, resulting in frustration and aggression (Alden and Chichava 2020: 2). Second, proponents of socioeconomic factors as the root cause look at religious extremism and suggest that some youngsters embraced a more radical version of Islam to the tipping point of violence in the context of several socioeconomic deprivations (Matsinhe and Valoi 2019). Feijó and Maquendzi (2019) bring together natural resources, extremist ideologies, and dire socioeconomic conditions to comprehensively explain the conflict. In their view, the conflict lies in the intersection of unmet expectations (created by a natural resources boom), rising inequalities, and poverty and was triggered by extremist and radical identity movements. That poverty and inequality caused the conflict is unlikely or not sufficiently proven. But as this chapter has been arguing, post-war Mozambique embraced a form of politics (democracy with political exclusion) and political economy (economic growth with poverty and inequalities) that placed the state at a structural risk of violence. Thus, whatever the root causes and triggering factors might be (either energy competition, global or local jihadism, or even others), and whatever vested interests may exist (from within and without the country), it is contended here that bad socioeconomic conditions in Cabo Delgado were permissive to the political violence. In fact, from a rational choice theory perspective, poverty reduces the opportunity cost of joining the terrorist group. In other words, engaging in violence becomes a feasible alternative for unemployed youth in Cabo Delgado (and beyond) who join the insurgency attracted by promises of payments and shares in the spoils of the conflict (Heyen-Dubé and Rands 2021; Habibe et al. 2019: 16). Inequalities, in their

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turn, may provide moral justification for the violence masking it as a rebellion of the oppressed and marginalized. Moreover, in Cabo Delgado, there is a persistent perception of political exclusion of some ethnic groups. Specifically, the Mwani (mostly Muslim and residing in the coastal area of the province) perceive a certain political disadvantage compared to the Makonde (mostly Christians residing in the far north districts of the province). This perception of political exclusion has legitimated the discourse of the extremist group who present themselves as fighters seeking more inclusion of the Muslim Mwani in the decision-making. Therefore, a reasonable inference is the further questioning of the nature of the conflict based on the motivations of those involved. While some join the conflict as a result of their radicalization, others simply embrace the insurgency as a way of compensating for the lack of better socioeconomic opportunities in Mozambique’s post-war precarious peace; that is, they are simply engaged in a violent contestation of poverty, inequalities, and political exclusion.

5 Conclusion Roughly three decades have passed since the signing of the peace agreement in 1992, which ended the 16-year war between RENAMO and the FRELIMO-led Government. This chapter has examined how the politics and political economy of the post-war era contributed to the outbreak of new and the recurrence of old violent conflicts in Mozambique, especially considering the effects of the increasing forces of globalization. Since the 1980s, Mozambique has undergone fundamental transformations in the political and economic spheres. The transition from a socialist economy and single-party rule to a market economy and democratic governance paved the way for the country’s integration into the Western-led international political and economic system. With the advent of peace in 1992, Mozambique became one of the most favourite destinations of ODA and FDI from the West. Moreover, the BWI and other bilateral donors sought to consolidate a liberal state in Mozambique, both economically and politically. The expectation was that with democracy and a free-market economy, Mozambique would become a prosperous and peaceful country. What the examination of the nearly three decades since 1992 shows is a rather nuanced picture. Democracy backslid into a hybrid regime (or arguably authoritarian) that sustains different forms of political exclusion. The political economy produced and reproduced an unequal society and, despite impressive economic growth, many were left living in poverty. Consequently, violent conflicts remain present in the country. In fact, RENAMO’s resumption of armed violence in 2013 and the outbreak of the insurgency in Cabo Delgado in 2017 are simply the most salient forms of contestation of a political system marked by exclusion and a political economy that fails to address or even exacerbates poverty and inequalities. This outcome is mainly due to domestic political dynamics, chief among them, a pro-elites political and economic governance.

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Thus, as in Myanmar’s case (see Chapter “Local Conflicts in Post-reform Myanmar”), it might be inaccurate to argue that globalization did cause violent conflicts in Mozambique. This is despite signs of the influence of globalization of radical ideas in the insurgency that erupted in Cabo Delgado. In reality, radical ideologies may spread, but whether violence follows depends on the conditions on the ground. Nevertheless, the role of globalization cannot be underestimated. What became evident is that globalization in Mozambique is functioning as a doubleedged sword. From one side, the inflow of FDI and ODA is helping to rebuild the country and avoid relapse to war. On the other side, these inflows are helping to sustain and exacerbate structural risks of different forms of political violence. In this sense, this chapter upholds the idea that socioeconomic inequalities pose a significant risk to peacebuilding (see Richmond 2014). Moreover, it supports the idea of a peacebuilding approach more focused on addressing people’s needs, fears, and indignities—that is, human security-oriented peacebuilding (see Newman 2011).

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Macalane GL, Jafar JS (2021) Ataques Terroristas em Cabo Delgado (2017–2020): As Causas do Fenómeno pela Boca da População de Mocímboa da Praia. Universidade Rovuma, Pemba Macamo E (2017) Power, conflict, and citizenship: Mozambique’s contemporary struggles. Citizsh Stud 21(2):196–209 Macuane JJ, Muianga C (2020) Natural resources, institutions, and economic transformation in Mozambique, vol 2020, 136th edn. UNU-WIDER Mairoce C, Silberberger M, Zweynert J (2021) Multinational enterprises, political institutions, and violence: a case study from Mozambique. J Inst Econ 17(1):133–151 Manning C, Dendere C (2018) Mozambique: a credible commitment to peace. In: Joshi M, Wallensteen P (eds) Understanding quality peace: peacebuilding after civil war. Routledge, New York, pp 257–274 Makonye F (2020) The Cabo Delgado insurgency in Mozambique: origin, ideology, recruitment strategies and social, political and economic implications for natural gas and oil exploration. Afr J Terrorism Insurgency Res 1(3):59–72 Maschietto RH (2016) Beyond peacebuilding: the challenges of empowerment promotion in Mozambique. Palgrave Macmillan, London Matsinhe DM, Valoi E (2019) The genesis of insurgency in Northern Mozambique. Institute for Security Studies Mine Y, Stewart F, Fukuda-Parr S, Mkandawire T (eds) (2013) Preventing violent conflict in Africa. Palgrave Macmillan, London Mittelman JH (1981) Underdevelopment and the transition to socialism: Mozambique and Tanzania. Academic Press, New York Morier-Genoud E (2020) The Jihadi insurgency in Mozambique: origins, nature and beginning. J East Afr Stud 14(3):396–412 Muchemwa C, Harris GT (2019) Mozambique’s post-war success story: is it time to revisit the narrative? Democracy Secur 15(1):25–48 Nafziger EW, Auvinen J (1997) War, hunger, and displacement: an econometric investigation into the sources of humanitarian emergencies. UNU-WIDER. Working Papers 142. September 1997 Nafziger EW, Auvinen J (2002) Economic development, inequality, war, and state violence. World Dev 30(2):153–163 Newman E (2011) A human security peace-building agenda. Third World Q 32(10):1737–1756 Notícias (2014) COMPOSIÇÃO DA CNE: Governo e Renamo alcançam consenso. https://www.jor nalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/politica/10797-composicao-da-cne-governo-e-renamo-alcancamconsenso. Accessed 12 May 2021 Nucifora AMD, da Silva LAP (2011) Rapid growth and economic transformation in Mozambique. In: Chuhan-Pole P, Devarajan S (eds) Yes, Africa can: success stories from a dynamic continent. World Bank, Washington DC, pp 65–79 Pearce J (2020) History, legitimacy, and Renamo’s return to arms in central Mozambique. Africa 90(4):774–795 Pérez Niño H, Le Billon P (2014) Foreign aid, resource rents, and state fragility in Mozambique and Angola. The Ann Am Acad Polit Soc Sci 656(1):79–96 Phiri MZ (2012) The political economy of Mozambique twenty years on: a post-conflict success story? South Afr J Int Affairs 19(2):223–245 Piazza JA (2006) Rooted in poverty? Terrorism, poor economic development, and social cleavages. Terrorism Polit Violence 18(1):159–177 Pitcher MA (2002) Transforming Mozambique: the politics of privatization, 1975–2000. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Richmond OP (ed) (2010) Palgrave advances in peacebuilding: critical developments and approaches. Palgrave Macmillan, London Richmond OP (2014) The impact of socio-economic inequality on peacebuilding and statebuilding. Civil Wars 16(4):449–467 Rifer M (2005) SADC and terrorism: where is the regional strategy? Afr Secur Rev 14(1):107–116

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SRK Consulting (2015) A competent persons report on the Montepuez Ruby Project, Mozambique. 195. https://xmbl.files.wordpress.com/2015/07/u6362_mrm_cpr_mining_report_ final_v3a_clean.pdf. Accessed 4 June 2021 Stewart F (ed) (2008) Horizontal inequalities and conflict. Palgrave Macmillan, London The Economist Intelligence Unit (2021) Democracy index 2020: in sickness and in health? https:// www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2020/. Accessed 4 May 2021 The Fund for Peace (2021) Fragile states index annual report 2021. https://fragilestatesindex.org/ wp-content/uploads/2021/05/fsi2021-report.pdf. Accessed 24 June 2021 UN (2020) World fertility and family planning 2020: highlights. United Nations, New York UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2021) Mozambique: the cost of inaction as of June 2021. Mozambique situation report. https://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/mozamb ique-cost-inaction-june-2021. Accessed 1 July 2021 UNCTAD (2012) Estudo sobre a Política de Investimento: Moçambique. United Nation, New York UNDP (2020) Human development report 2020: the next frontier—human development and the Anthropocene. United Nations, New York Valoi E (2016) The blood rubies of Montepuez. Foreign policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/ 05/03/the-blood-rubies-of-montepuez-mozambique-gemfields-illegal-mining/. Accessed 3 July 2021 Veloso J (2020) A Situação em Cabo Delgado: O Cenário Mais Provável. https://www.open.ac.uk/ technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/files/Veloso-Sav ana-07-06-2020.jpeg. Accessed 6 July 2021 Vines A (2017) Afonso Dhlakama and RENAMO’s return to armed conflict since 2013: the politics of reintegration in Mozambique. In: Themnér A (ed) Warlords democrats in Africa: ex-military leaders and electoral politics. Zed Books, London, pp 21–155 Vines A (2021) Violence, peacebuilding, and elite bargains in Mozambique since independence. In: McNamee T, Muyangwa M (eds) The state of peacebuilding in Africa. Palgrave Macmillan, London, pp 321–342 Von Einsiedel S, Bosetti L, Cockayne J, Salih C, Wan W (2017) Civil war trends and the changing nature of armed conflict. UNUCPR. Occasional paper, 10 Wiegink N (2015) Former military networks a threat to peace? The demobilisation and remobilization of Renamo in central Mozambique. Stab: Int J Secur Dev 4(1):56 Wood G (1999) Democratization in Mozambique: trends and practices. Democratization 6(2):156– 170 World Bank (2016) Accelerating poverty reduction in Mozambique: challenges and opportunities. World Bank, Washington DC

Manuel Francisco Sambo is a Ph.D. candidate at the Graduate School of Global Studies, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan. Sambo holds a M.A. in International Development (specializing in Peace and Governance and Economic Development Policy and Management) from Nagoya University, Japan. He completed a B.A. (Hons) in International Relations and Diplomacy at the former Higher Institute of International Relations, Maputo, Mozambique. His research interests include peace, conflicts, security, and development policies in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Globalization and Local Conflict in Asia

Local Conflicts in Post-reform Myanmar Yukiko Nishikawa

Abstract Myanmar has experienced significant changes since the 2010s. It ended long military rule and undertook reforms under the quasi-civilian government as a result of the 2010 general elections. Although the military’s seizure of power in 2021 set back the positive image that the country has obtained since 2010, if we understand the nature of the state, Myanmar, the event in early 2021 was not astonishing. This chapter reveals the nature of the state, Myanmar, and examines the effect of globalization in post-reform Myanmar. ‘Disciplined’ democracy is a symbolic term to represent the reforms. Nevertheless, the country suffers from more nationalist movements and extremism under democratization movements, thereby generating increased violence and local conflicts, particularly in the borderlands. While such international norms as democracy and the rule of law have been embedded in the country’s reforms, careful investigations reveal that the pretense of democracy and the rule of law enhances marginalization, discrimination and exclusion vis-à-vis hegemonic state-building. A new dynamism of political economy developed since 2011 has significantly changed power relations of the state, military, entrepreneurs, foreign investors and local people. Keywords Myanmar · Democracy · Reforms · Political economy · State-building

Y. Nishikawa (B) Graduate School of Global Studies, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 Y. Nishikawa (ed.), Globalisation and Local Conflicts in Africa and Asia, Evidence-Based Approaches to Peace and Conflict Studies 7, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8818-8_6

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1 Introduction Myanmar has undergone significant changes since 2011.1 The country ended a long period of military rule and undertook various reforms under a quasi-civilian government after Thein Sein took office in 2011. General elections were held in November 2010 in accordance with the 2008 Constitution. As a result, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), reinforced by the military or Tatmadaw, obtained the ruling position. Since then, the USDP government has undertaken economic, political and administrative reforms. For example, it established a National Human Rights Commission in 2011 and loosened its censorship of the media in 2012. With reference to the varied changes and reforms, former United States President Barack Obama praised the political progress and upgraded diplomatic relations with Myanmar in 2012. The victory of Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy (NLD) in the 2015 elections led to optimism that the country can become more peaceful and democratic. In addition, the NLD’s victory in the 2020 elections once again enhanced such an image of change and democratization of Myanmar.2 Nevertheless, in early 2021, the military seized power, claiming electoral and voter fraud in the 2020 elections. It set back the country’s positive image gained in the post-2010 period. Beyond this political turmoil, the country continues to suffer from violence and increased extremism in addition to armed conflicts in borderlands. Although the country’s powerholders emphasize terms such as ‘disciplined democracy’ and ‘prevalence of law and order’ in the Constitution and its official statements, in-depth investigation reveals that marginalization, discrimination and exclusion of certain groups within the country have been exacerbated. Various reforms were undertaken with an emphasis on achieving ‘disciplined democracy’, whereas many new development projects were implemented partially due to the increased inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI). Since 2011, the reforms carried out in Myanmar were seemingly consistent with the development assistance policies enhanced by major donor countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Myanmar government advanced marketization and privatization in the economic sphere and called for the establishment of a democratic system and law and order in the political sphere, which exhibited an impression of promoting the rule of law. This chapter illustrates the processes of change that occurred in Myanmar between 2011 and 2020 and reveals how internationally promoted norms such as democracy 1

Myanmar (officially the Republic of the Union of Myanmar) was formerly known as Burma. The Burmese military changed the country name from Burma to Myanmar in 1989. The name remains a matter of controversy. In this chapter, the official English name (hereafter, simply Myanmar) is used when explaining post-1989 events, whereas Burma is used when exploring pre-1989 events. Using the name ‘Myanmar’ is neither a political statement nor a judgement on the right of former military rulers to change the name. 2 In the elections held on 8 November 2020, the NLD obtained a majority of seats in union parliamentary and regional and state parliaments.

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and the rule of law or pretense of them were utilized and how economic liberalization contributed to despotic state-building while leaving a positive image of Myanmar. The underlying study of this chapter aims to understand how the country utilized such norms as democracy and the rule of law to exclude certain groups of people in the country or used to justify the exclusion of certain groups in the militarized governance. Another point of interest is how the new political economy, which emerged as a result of privatization and as part of the post-2011 economic reforms, strengthened the existing inequality within the country. By exploring these aspects, the study examines the effect, if any, of globalization on the local political and economic dynamics in the country and whether it has influenced the ongoing conflicts. The changes and reforms observed in Myanmar since 2011 failed to alter the hegemonic economic and political structures of the country. Instead, the structure became obscured because of the increased investment of capital into the country and the image of democratic change. The main reason for this change is the existing economic and political structures in Myanmar, which were developed under military rule after 1988, as well as the new reforms undertaken. Any international norm introduced to the country was selectively adopted, modified under a political process, embedded into the existing hegemonic economic and political structures and applied within the military’s discourse of the sovereign right and sovereignty. Therefore, this chapter explores the influence of the reforms undertaken since 2011 on local politics and the economy through the increased inflow of FDI and ultimately reveals the nature of the state, Myanmar. The exploration in this chapter helps us to understand why the country was returned to military rule in 2021. This chapter firstly elucidates how Myanmar undertook liberal reforms and maintained the established military state and military capitalism at the same time. It reveals the internal causes and external conditions that generated liberal reforms. It then explores the true meaning of ‘disciplined democracy’ as emphasized by the military and the military-backed government. By doing so, it demonstrates how the idea and practice of disciplined democracy resulted in the division of the nation by excluding certain groups of people within the country. The final section illustrates the influence of the military’s understanding or interpretation of sovereignty, sovereign rights and citizenship on its compliance to liberal norms in hegemonic state-building. On the basis of these explorations, this chapter explains how reforms through capital flows enhanced divisions within the society of Myanmar.

2 Adopting Liberal Reforms in Myanmar Changes in Myanmar became apparent since 2010. The country released Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest in 2010, dissolved the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC; the official name of the military government)3 in 2011, and released 3

From 1988 to 1997, the military government was known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), which replaced the Burma Socialist Programme Party. In 1997, the SLORC was abolished and re-established as the SPDC.

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more than 200 political prisoners as part of a general amnesty in the same year. Such changes partially made up those reported around the world, which were generally positively received. For example, the USA formally eased economic sanctions on Myanmar in September 2012 in response to the reform efforts. Nevertheless, the true meaning and effects of the reforms should be carefully examined because of a number of areas that remain the same.

2.1 Continuity of Military Control The reforms observed in the 2010s were not planned immediately prior to the 2010s but long before. With the drafting of a new constitution, general elections were held to elect members of national legislative bodies as part of the Roadmap to DisciplineFlourishing Democracy, which was announced by General Khin Nyunt in August 2003. The roadmap included a seven-step process for achieving ‘democracy’ in the country, namely, to (1) convene the National Convention, which has been suspended since 1996; (2) establish a democratic system; (3) draft a constitution that includes principles advocated by the National Convention; (4) hold a national referendum to approve the Constitution; (5) hold free and fair elections to convene national legislative bodies (Hluttaw); (6) convene the Hluttaw with elected members; (7) build a new democratic state by elected leaders. For the SPDC, drafting a constitution was the most important component of the roadmap. The Constitution was approved and enacted in 2008. Nevertheless, the key principles presented in the Constitution were formulated beforehand by the military between 1993 and 1996. In 1992, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), which was the former military government formed in 1988 and who took over the SPDC in 1997, announced six objectives. Within the six objectives, the National Convention drafted the Constitution of the state (SLORC Order No. 13/92). The objectives raised by the SLORC are, in fact, in the 2008 Constitution (The Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar) as basic principles. Introduction of the Constitution presents these principles as follows: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)

Non-disintegration of the Union Non-disintegration of national solidarity Perpetuation of sovereignty Flourishment of a genuine, disciplined multi-party democratic system Enhancement of the eternal principles of justice, liberty, and equality in the Union Participation of the Defense Service in the national political leadership role of the State.

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Except for some differences in wording, the six objectives announced in 1997 and the objectives raised in 2008 are identical.4 As illustrated by the six objectives presented by the SLORC and the basic principles in the 2008 Constitution, the military outlined the contour of the country as early as the 1990s. The contents of the Constitution grant the military some power within the political sphere of the country. For example, the Constitution stipulated that the Commanderin-Chief of the military holds the power to nominate military personnel responsible for exercising executive power on matters of defence, security and border administration (17-c). Furthermore, the Commander-in-Chief can nominate ministers of Home Affairs, Border Affairs and Defense (232-b-ii), which are key ministries of the country. A quarter of seats in the parliament are allotted for the military, who can wield the power to veto decisions made by legislators (109-b). In the past, the military has nominated 25% of parliament members as stipulated in the Constitution without failure. In other words, military-nominated members can block any proposal for the constitutional amendment. In fact, in March 2020, the ruling NLD proposed a constitutional amendment to reduce the military’s political role by amending 14 provisions of the Constitution, such as reducing the military’s share of seats and removing the military’s veto for amending the Constitution. However, military-appointed lawmakers and the former ruling and military-backed USDP objected to the proposal except for two proposed amendments.5 Although the reforms are considered necessary to establish a democratic country, the Constitution guarantees that the military remains in the political sphere and enables them to supervise key decisions. Not only active military officials but also retired officials who serve in different branches of government promoted the influence of the military (Egreteau 2015). The military’s hold of certain powers in the political sphere is now granted by the Constitution. Therefore, the rationale behind the decision of the military-backed government to put a high priority on constitution drafting in the seven-step process for achieving democracy in the roadmap is understandable. Myanmar’s reforms undertaken since 2011 should be then considered a part of the military’s plan to establish a ‘militarized’ governance. Alternatively, it can be viewed as a governance to which the military continues to hold oversight power over the country’s decisions, which was started by the SLORC, rather than a genuine change for democracy. Regardless, the military and government use the term ‘democracy’ elsewhere in official statements.

4

The six objectives announced in 1997 were: (1) Non-disintegration of the Union, (2) Nondisintegration of national solidarity, (3) Consolidation and perpetuation of sovereignty, (4) Emergence of a genuine multi-party democratic system, (5) Development of eternal principles of justice, liberty, and equality in the state, and (6) Participation of the Tatmadaw with a leading role in the national politics of the state in (the) future. 5 The two amendments are regarding changes of the language used in the Constitution about people with disabilities.

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2.2 Privatization for the Maintenance of Military Capitalism In the economic sphere, the military also retains its key position for the business and finance of the country. The involvement of the military or Tatmadaw in business as early as the 1950s is well recognized. Founded in 1951, the Defense Services Institution (DSI) became the largest military-owned business conglomerate in the country at the time. During the socialist era, commercial activities were restricted and, thus, the military was involved in the business at a very small scale. Accordingly, large-scale commercial activities by the military were not observed until after 1988. The expansion of the military’s business grew in parallel with its modernization in the post-1988 era. The SLORC undertook a series of market reforms, invited FDI and revived state-owned economic enterprises (SEEs). Once nationalized in the 1960s, the enterprises of the military soon became involved in joint ventures with foreign companies. The business expansion was assumed to meet the budgetary needs of the increasing number of troops and their families during the period. In the 1990s, the military established its owned conglomerates: the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (UMEH) and the Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC).6 The UMEH engaged in small and medium-sized enterprises and industries, whereas the MEC provided military access to the supplies of materials for heavy industry. The two conglomerates controlled several major companies in Myanmar, including companies involved in banking, jade, gem mining, trading, fisheries and pharmaceuticals (McCarthy 2019: 14). The UMEH and MEC were exempt from income tax and commercial tax until 2011, while their financial situation was never disclosed to the public. Accordingly, their privileges were apparent. The economic policy in the 1990s promoted ‘professionalization’ and ‘privatization’. In this context, the SEEs were allowed greater independence. The SEE Law, which was introduced in 1989 and revised in 1997, aims to bestow monopoly powers to SEEs in various sectors, such as the exploration and extraction of petroleum, gas, jade and precious stones, and the operation of railway, banking, insurance, television, postal and telecommunication services. The SEEs dominated many sectors of the country from infrastructure to service industries and thus the economy. Moreover, they were afforded privileges and thus controlled the financial and economic sectors of the country. The government’s finance relied on taxes paid by the SEEs. According to Bauer et al. (2018), the SEEs have generated approximately half of the country’s revenue since 2010–2011. In addition, SEEs can recommend tax exemption to the Myanmar Investment Commission (Bauer et al. 2018: 3). Thus, they shape investments in the private sector by exerting considerable influence over the country’s economic performance. Moreover, they monitor compliance with contracts among companies in the private sector. Managers of SEEs had the discretion to give licenses and contracts to partners and suppliers in the private sector across twelve economic sectors, such as forest plantation, extraction of petroleum and natural gas,

6

Myanmar’s conglomerates are multi-industrial but lack presence in other countries.

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air transport services, banking and insurance services and postal and telecommunication services. Moreover, the SEEs hold enough power to determine who can access the important resources of the country. Like the 2008 Constitution, the SEE Law defined the structure of control and domination of the state in the economic sphere. Since the 1990s, the economic structure of Myanmar has been similar to state capitalism or, in this case, ‘military’ capitalism. Kurlantzick (2016) proposed that state capitalism is characterized by a high degree of state control of key companies and a certain degree of openness to the world economy given that such openness will not threaten state control over key industrial sectors. The economic policy of Myanmar after 1988 has exhibited these characteristics. Furthermore, the privatization promoted in the 2011 reform period was in line with the privatization program introduced in 1995, which aimed to privatize SEEs. The Privatization Commission was founded in 1995 and renamed as the Privatization Commission for State-owned Economic Enterprises in 2011. Thus, the reforms undertaken in 2011 were part of the military’s effort to transform the government into ‘military’ capitalism, which was initiated after 1988. During the first phase of the privatization (1995 and 2007), small and mediumsized enterprises were transferred to private sectors, whereas the relevant ministries retained large enterprises to maintain established patterns of rent-seeking (Ford et al. 2016). However, several profitable businesses were transferred to the UMEH and MEC with privileges. During the 1990s, many private business groups with strong connections to the military emerged. Such groups are called cronies (Bunte 2007: 102). The number of privatized SEEs increased, whereas a wide range of sectors were included in the second phase after 2008 (Turnell 2010). Ford et al. (2016) stated that the regime intended to reinforce its control over the economic sector before the 2010 elections. For this reason, it accelerated privatization in the second phase. In this process, many profitable assets were transferred to individuals with businesses and connections with high-ranking ruling elites. For example, Tay Za, the owner of the Htoo Group of companies, became a famous purchaser of SEEs during the privatization through his connections with powerful generals.7 The Office of Foreign Assets Control of the US Department of the Treasury imposed financial sanctions against Tay Za and his family in 2008 and called him a business ‘tycoon’ as he deals with arms and maintains close ties with the military.8 As exemplified by the case of Tay Za, large and lucrative assets were transferred to close associates of the military without undergoing formal processes (Ford et al. 2016). In addition, many assets were given to the UMEH and MEC, which are managed by military and public officials.

7

The Htoo Group of Companies was founded as Htoo Trading Company in 1990. It engaged in timber exports, rice milling and other businesses. 8 See the following press release by the US Department of the Treasury: ‘Treasury Action Targets Financial Network of Burmese Tycoon and Regime Henchman Tay Za’, 2 May 2008. (accessed 20 September 2020).

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For these reasons, one can argue that the 2011 reforms were implemented to reinforce the established system of military capitalism after the military asserted its governing position in the economic system. Therefore, continuity and changes occurred simultaneously in the economic system after 2011. On this point, the International Crisis Group (ICG) pointed out that personal connections remain important for businesses in Myanmar, whereas power and decision-making are more diffuse (ICG 2012: 5–6). In 2011, the government made the UMEH and MEC subject to corporate and import taxes, which had been previously exempted. Moreover, the government collaborated with international institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF, to develop a policy priority based on a neoliberal economic policy prescription. Nevertheless, the military’s influence remains substantial in the existing economic system.

2.3 Conducive Environment for Reforms The military continues to be influential within political and economic spheres in Myanmar. However, the post-2011 reforms changed the military leadership, particularly at the local and regional levels as it transferred administrative responsibilities to chief ministers among the regions (ICG 2012: 12). In this sense, the reforms denote the continued process by the military, which began after 1988. However, the emergent question is why the reforms were seemingly coherent with liberalism, such as the emphasis on democracy and market reforms. Myanmar became isolated from international assistance because of its military rule. In particular, after the 1988 coup d’état and the military’s refusal to transfer power to the NLD despite its victory in the 1990 general elections, the USA and other major donor countries imposed sanctions on Myanmar. For example, the USA refused to recognize the change in the country’s name, refused to approve licenses for the export of military-related items to Burma/Myanmar and opposed Burma/Myanmar’s membership in multilateral financial organizations. During the one-party socialist era in the 1970s and 1980s, Burma established aiddriven trade relations with other donor countries, such as Japan and West Germany. In particular, aid from Japan significantly increased during the 1980s, and made up approximately 71% of the foreign aid received by Myanmar. Moreover, aid from Japan constituted approximately 20% of the national budget of Myanmar (Carr 2018: 3). However, foreign relations with Myanmar halted after the violent suppression of protests in 1988; all foreign assistance to Myanmar was suspended, and foreign embassies in Myanmar were closed. At the time, Japan, West Germany, the USA, the United Kingdom (UK) and other European states suspended their support.9 Although

9

The OECD members’ change to review their policy towards Myanmar began in the early 2000s. At the time, governments of the UK, Australia and the European Union initiated re-engagement.

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US$ mil.

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Thailand Japan Malaysia

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China North Korea

1000 800 600 400 200 0 1990

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Fig. 1 Myanmar’s imports (1990–2006). Constructed from data from Asian Development Bank

Japan restored its aid in 1989 after receiving a petition from the Japan–Burma Association, the amount of aid decreased significantly in the 1990s (Kudo and Mieno 2007). Nevertheless, Myanmar opened new relations with other countries contrary to expectations that it would become isolated because of sanctions from major donor governments during the 1990s. Myanmar’s foreign policy during its isolation shifted from closed to open door and enhanced regional trade relations with neighbouring countries such as China, Thailand, India and Bangladesh (Kudo 2007: 9; Than 2005: 40; Carr 2018: 4). To overcome the dire economic situation, the military government or SLORC, which was re-established as the SPDC in 1997, accepted FDI and legalized cross-border trades with neighbouring countries. Until 1988, cross-border trade was informally carried out. Myanmar’s import and export to the above-mentioned four neighbouring countries doubled in the 1990s (Kudo 2007: 18). Figures 1 and 2 show Myanmar’s imports from China, Singapore and Thailand increased significantly whereas its exports to India and Thailand increased during the 1990s and 2000s. In addition, during this period, the SLORC endeavoured to modernize its armed forces for fear of external intervention, particularly from the USA and its allies. Thus, it conducted arms deal with other countries, such as Singapore and Pakistan (Selth 2000; Lintner 2015a: 174). In particular, Myanmar developed diplomatic relations with China more than with any other country in the 1990s and 2000s. After China withheld its support of the Burma Communist Party (BCP) in 1989, the relationship between the two countries improved. At around the time, China also tried to restore its relations with neighbouring countries because it was under economic and diplomatic sanctions by the USA and other governments as a result of the crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in 1989. China became the first country to recognize the SLORC or the military junta and provided Myanmar with its first major grant in 1991, which amounted to the US$8.9 million (Carr 2018: 4). Several states in

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India US Singapore

China Germany

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0 1990

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Fig. 2 Myanmar’s exports (1990–2006). Constructed from data from Asian Development Bank

Southeast Asia became concerned with the increasing affinity between China and Myanmar. In fact, Myanmar’s membership in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1997 was assumed to be an attempt to prevent Myanmar from being China’s adherent in Southeast Asia (Cohen 2002: 254). Myanmar and China received mutual benefits for developing and maintaining positive relations economically, politically and strategically. For example, when Myanmar was sanctioned by the USA and other major donor countries, China offered support to its key sectors, such as infrastructure, oil exploitation and SEEs (Kudo 2006: 17–19; Rehman 2009: 124). Although the amount of official investment from China was small, China’s aid and arms helped Myanmar during the 1990s. For China, Myanmar is important for its energy security and access to resources. Of particular importance is the trade between China’s Yunnan Province and Myanmar’s Shan and Kachin States. Myanmar is situated in an area that is strategically salient for China in terms of transferring trade goods directly across the Indian Ocean through Myanmar to achieve its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which connects China to Europe. Thus, China aided in the construction of roads along the Irrawaddy River to link Yunnan Province and the Bay of Bengal. Chinese enterprises are involved in Myanmar’s energy and infrastructure development, and China has enhanced its military cooperation with Myanmar (Rehman 2009: 124). Given Myanmar’s relations with neighbouring countries during the period of sanction, Myanmar appeared capable of maintaining its position even after the 2010s. Nevertheless, as soon as the USDP took office in 2011, Thein Sein initiated a process of seemingly democratic and liberalization reforms. Evidently, the reforms were a form of appeal to the USA and other countries that had imposed sanctions. In fact, major donor governments that sanctioned Myanmar changed their policies towards Myanmar. The USA removed several sanctions on foreign aid and restored diplomatic

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relations with Myanmar. Similarly, Japan resumed sending development aid and gradually increased FDI to Myanmar from 2012. The expansion of the post-Cold War civil society explains the change in Myanmar with a highlight being the Saffron Revolution in 2007,10 which was a series of demonstrations and protests led by students, political activists and Buddhist monks. However, democratization is not likely to occur only with the expansion of civil society (Schmidt 2010: 232). The government of Myanmar, in particular, is capable of curbing civil society movements. To this end, Jones argued that popular uprising was not the sole factor that generated the change in Myanmar because its broad population remained passive (Jones 2014: 4–5). Instead, several scholars explained that the change in Myanmar occurred in light of the US strategy to counter China’s expanding influence (Lintner 2015b: 175; Chenyang et al. 2016: Brennan 2018; 131). They pointed out Myanmar’s heavy dependence on China as the USA became increasingly concerned with the situation. In addition, Lintner (2015b) revealed that a military document, which belonged to Myanmar and was issued in 2004, pointed out that the country is losing its independent position because of its powerful northern neighbour (Lintner 2015b). Accordingly, Myanmar and the countries that imposed sanctions since the 1990s were obliged to review and reconsider their relations in Asia because of China’s expanding influence in the region. Indeed, the US reaction towards the change in Myanmar was prompt. Shortly after reforms were undertaken in Myanmar, the US Secretary of State visited Myanmar in November 2011. In the following year, President Barack Obama visited Myanmar. There was a conducive environment for Myanmar in its reform. Myanmar’s change could restore relations with the USA and its close allies. Myanmar, then, could balance its international relations. In reality, however, its trade relation with China was expanded despite restoring its relations with the USA. As such, Myanmar balanced its relations with the USA and China at the same time. Indeed, throughout history, Myanmar has maintained neutrality and independence in its foreign policy. In that sense, Myanmar restored the original stance of its foreign policy by restoring relations with the USA and other countries. Moreover, India shifted its relations with Myanmar and China. Although India previously supported Myanmar’s prodemocracy movements (Thant 2011: 268–270; Rehman 2009: 124),11 it reached agreements on industrial and infrastructure projects with Myanmar (Bhaumik 2007). One such project connects the eastern Indian seaport, Kolkata, with the Sittwe deep-water port in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. The trade relation between the two countries boomed and has continued. India announced the ‘Act-East Policy’ in 2014 and enhanced the connectivity between its north-east region with the ASEAN region and once displayed ambiguous attitudes towards the 10

The protests and demonstrations were triggered by the decision of the government to remove subsidies related to the price of fuel, which led a price hike of more than 60%. Although the protests were called the ‘Saffron revolution’, the monks in Myanmar wear maroon robes (instead of saffron-coloured ones). Therefore, many analysts argued that the term Saffron Revolution is inaccurate. 11 India along with other countries condemned the regime’s actions and supported the democratic protestors, whereas China remained silent during the 1988 democratic movements in Myanmar.

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Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in 2017 and 2019 (Ladwig III 2009: 93–98).12 India is also concerned about China’s expanding influence in Southeast Asia in general and in Myanmar in particular (Rehman 2009: 124). India’s policy for favourable relations with Southeast Asia and the broader Pacific in recent years is partly due to its northern neighbour (Ladwig III 2009: 88). India’s relations with China are not straightforward. Although the two countries enjoy close trade relations, reaching approximately US$25 million annually, they share an unresolved border dispute (Pardesi 2008: 67–89). Moreover, China is an important weapon supplier for Pakistan.13 In the energy sector, China and India compete to obtain hydrocarbon resources, whereas India lost the competition with China for oil assets in Nigeria, Ecuador and Kazakhstan (Ladwig III 2009: 88). In essence, the relation between the two countries remains competitive although not necessarily conflictual. Rehman argued that the bilateral ties between them are marred by ‘strong feelings of mistrust’ (Rehman 2009: 114). Against this background, the energy, infrastructure projects, military cooperation and other assets in Myanmar provide further grounds for competition between India and China in the decade to come. However, Myanmar maintains equal diplomatic relations with India and China. Although Myanmar’s trade relationship with China is more comprehensive than that with India and China remains the largest supplier of weapons for the Tatmadaw or Myanmar’s military, India maintains its wariness towards China and its rising influence in the region (Rehman 2009: 134).14 Myanmar’s restoration of its relations with countries that sanctioned it should be examined from the perspective of the changing regional and global contexts. China’s increasing influence in the region instigated shifts in the diplomatic and economic policies of many countries, including Myanmar, India and the USA as well as Southeast Asian states. Myanmar is a land-bridge between South Asia and Southeast Asia and a strategic point that links the Asia–Pacific and Indian Ocean, which is currently called ‘Indo-Pacific’ Asia. The Indo-Pacific has become a strategic region for the USA, Japan, India and Australia. Although these countries hold a distinct understanding and meaning of ‘Indo-Pacific’, the term now implies countering China.15 The four countries use the term Indo-Pacific to emphasize a ‘free, open and inclusive’ region, in which a rule-based liberal international order is maintained.16 Accordingly, 12

India later changed its attitude and sent a delegate to the Belt and Road Forum. China’s support of Pakistan is frequently viewed as China’s strategy to cope with India’s expansion (Rehman 2009: 119). 14 According to Rehman (2009), Myanmar’s wariness towards China seems related to the massive migrations from China to Myanmar. Reportedly, illegal Chinese immigrants make up over 30% of the population in Mandalay (Rehman 2009: p. 134). 15 For varied understanding, see Zhu (2019). 16 As his first foreign visit as Japanese Prime Minister, Yoshihide Suga opted to visit Vietnam on 19 October and Indonesia on 20 October 2020, with a focus on enhanced cooperation with these countries to achieve a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’.” 13

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the four countries convened in 2017 and developed a new strategy as a ‘quad coalition’ to keep their important sea routes free of any influence. Such regional dynamics reinforced Myanmar’s reforms to counter China, whereas Myanmar’s ruling elites endeavoured to discard the image of the country’s dependence on China (Lintner 2015a: 175; Maung 2015: 31). In addition, Myanmar was deeply concerned about China’s intervention and interference in its affairs during the 2007 demonstrations and the 2008 disaster caused by Cyclone Nargis (Maung 2015: 31). In addition, some concern was related to China’s varied involvement in Myanmar’s effort to achieve the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) with ethnic armed organizations.17 In fact, China is important to the NCA, particularly for Myanmar, to reach agreements with ethnic armed organizations in borderlands because China supported several ethnic armed groups by providing funding and weapons (Chaudhury 2020; Ani 2020). In a recent report published in Myanmar, a military spokesperson stated that ‘a foreign country’ supported the Arakan Army, which Myanmar declared as a terrorist organization.18 In this regard, the foreign country is assumed to be China. Evidence exists that ethnic armed groups in the borderlands in Myanmar near China use weapons made in China despite China’s non-intervention policy in the internal affairs of other countries. Apart from the Abakan Army, several reports point to close ties between China and other ethnic armed organizations, such as the United Wa State Army, the National Democratic Alliance Army and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (Chaudhury 2020). Undoubtedly, the changes and reforms in Myanmar are rooted in internal causes planned and implemented by the military with the best timing. Nevertheless, a favourable environment for Myanmar and its own development are due to the increasing influence of China in Asia and the influence of other countries that aim to counter China and maintain a liberal order in Asia.

3 Disciplined Democracy that Divides Nations Myanmar restored civilian rule only after the military completed the designs of the political system, the Constitution and the economic structure to safeguard its core vision and interests. Evidently, the military remained the ultimate overseer of politics, whereas the Constitution enshrines the military’s role and control of the country, as apparent in the many privileges of the Commander-in-Chief, promised positions of the military for security-related ministries, and the allocation of 25% of seats for 17

The NCA is a ceasefire agreement between the Myanmar government and representatives of ethnic groups, which are officially known as ‘ethnic armed organizations’. In March 2015, the draft reached agreement by many invited parties. President Thein Sein signed in October 2015. The UN, UK, Norway, Japan and the USA were witnesses to the signing. However, several invited parties declined the negotiations because they considered such negotiations unfair. For more details about the NCA, see Ganesan (2015) and Thawnghmung (2017). 18 An opinion emerged that China supported the Arakan Army to expand the Chinese influence towards western Myanmar, along which lies the India–Myanmar border.

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the military in the parliament. The military is not subject to civilian control and the transition to civilian rule proceeded as planned by the military in the roadmap. Although a multiparty system with elections for national and regional assemblies was formally established, the military maintained a key role in ultimate decisions. Accordingly, the changes and reforms since 2011 have fallen short of a genuine democratic transition. Indeed, such changes were not considered a sole result of prodemocracy opposition or pressure from the international community but were based on decisions of the military (Kyaw 2009; Taylor 2013).

3.1 Historical Background of Ethno-Religious Relations in Myanmar As the 2008 Constitution cites the ‘non-disintegration of the union’ and ‘nondisintegration of national solidarity’, one of the most imminent and unavoidable issues for Myanmar is the achievement of so-called nation-building. Many countries that experienced colonialism in the region share the concerns and challenges regarding nation-building since their independence. In particular, as stipulated at the beginning of the Constitution, Myanmar is a country in which ‘multi-national races’ reside with historical enmities. The country, therefore, continues to struggle to ‘pacify’ various ethno-linguistic groups for political consolidation. A majority of the population in Myanmar are Shino-Thai or Tibeto-Burman in origin although they are broken down into various ethno-linguistic groups (Ganesan 2017: 114). According to a national census, 89.8% of the total population in Myanmar are Buddhists, whereas Muslims constitute approximately 2.3% (Republic of the Union of Myanmar 2014: 3).19 Nevertheless, the Muslim population increases to approximately 4.3% if the census were to include groups who are not enumerated, such as the Rohingya (South and Lall 2018: 7–8).20 As such, ethnic relations in Myanmar are deep-rooted and partly exhibited in terms of a division of majority versus minority, which is similar to many countries in Southeast Asia. In addition, Myanmar shares such ethnic divisions as a result of its pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial experiences and geographic conditions. The fact that various historical narratives exist in the country demonstrates its complex realities.21 The dominant narrative of the country’s history, which is seen in textbooks in government schools, is that the unification of the territory dates back to the time of King Anawrahta’s reign between 1044 and 1077, during which Theravada Buddhism was introduced and established as the dominant religion. This narrative emphasizes 19

The same census reports Christian, Hindu and animism populations as approximately 6.3%, 0.5% and 0.8%, respectively. 20 Subedi and Garnett (2020: p. 229) reported that the Muslim population in Myanmar is approximately 4.3%. 21 The geographic reason is that although many ethnic groups are in the highlands, the majority, namely, the Bamar ethnic group, resides predominantly in the lowlands.

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three great kings (Anawrahta, Bayinnaung and Alaungphave) as the ‘unifiers’ of the territory, which would eventually be Burma/Myanmar. Critiques of this narrative point out the diversity of the people and cultures and the existence of distinctive heroes and kingdoms within the territory at around the time. This alternative narrative has been, in fact, presented in non-state curricula (Salem-Gervais and Metro 2012: 59–64). Although it is beyond the scope of this study to find the truth or introduce the details of the pre-colonial history, there have been disputes of the history of the country. In the nineteenth century, British rule was established over all territories, including Arakan, Tenasserim (currently Rakhine State and Tanintharyi Division) and Lower Burma,22 following the first (1824–1826), second (1852) and third (1885) Anglo– Burmese Wars. The end of the first Anglo–Burmese War in 1826 led to the colonization of Arakan and Tenasserim, which facilitated migrations from the Indian sub-continent to the current Burmese borders. Under British rule, the country was administered as a province of the Indian Empire until 1937. Migration from India and, to a limited extent, from China were encouraged. The migration left long-term impacts on Burma because many people from India came to Burma and worked in professional jobs because of their use of the English language and understanding of English laws and practices (Ganesan 2017: 114). Such migration led to concerns from the north-western part of the country (currently Rakhine State) and central Bamar areas (Smith 2018: 31). Furthermore, the migration heralded the rise of Burmese nationalism, in which ethnicity, compounded by religion, became a powerful theme throughout the 1920s until the 1940s (Taylor 2015: 1). The 2012 and 2017 crises related to Rohingya in Rakhine State are also linked with the situation at the time as large-scale migrations occurred from Bengal and later Bangladesh. Another legacy of colonialism was that the colonial power employed separate administrative systems and structures between Ministerial Burma, which included the lowlands and valley or the central and southern areas of the country, and Frontier areas, which included highland hills and mountains to the north, east and west. Although a strong centralized system was employed in Ministerial Burma, local political systems remained under a system of indirect rule in the Frontier areas (Clarke et al. 2019; 16). The administrative division resulted in an increased schism between different ethnic groups. In the administration during the colonial time, particular roles were decided based on ethnic groups. For example, the Karen, Chin and Kachin performed military functions because they were considered ‘martial races’. In these contexts, deep chasms between the Bamar majority and other ethnic nationalities23 were cultivated. Although the Bamar viewed themselves as superior, other groups distrusted them. The dual systems left different perceptions of identity and politics 22

The first Anglo-Burmese war in 1824 was the first of three between the British and Burmese empires. It primarily targeted the control of North-eastern India, which ended with victory for the British. As a result, the British obtained control of Assam, Manipur, Cachar, Jaintia, Arakan and Tenasserim. 23 The term ‘ethnic nationalities’ is used instead of ‘ethnic minorities’ because the leaders of nonBamar ethnic groups rejected the use of “minorities’. The term ‘ethnic nationalities’ truly captures the sense of non-Bamar groups.

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between the two areas, which exerted an impact on the country up to the present era. The insurgency in Myanmar reflects the endurance of ethnicity as a source of division in the political process. The Panglong Agreement came to be signed in 1947, which enabled the Ministerial and Frontier areas of Burma together to be independent as a state.24 Nevertheless, significant stakeholders were not engaged in this process.25 The nationalist leader Aung San advocated a federal structure for autonomy and bestowed the voluntary right to secession to the Shan and Karenni after a period of 10 years. This agreement never reached fruition after independence because Bamar leaders sought political power. The Mon and Arakanese were given no state of their own. The 1947 Constitution was adopted following the Panglong conference and reinforced the concept that political representation occurs according to ethnic identity. Resistance against the government was undertaken by the Karen National Union (KNU) in 1949, who controlled a large territory and population.26 Since then, the KNU and the government have continued a prolonged war during which repeated bilateral ceasefire deals between them from 1962 to 2010 have failed.27 An increasing number of ethnic groups formed insurgent armies and obtained territories, which eventually led to the disintegration of the union. Furthermore, the political scenario deteriorated as Bamar politicians gradually viewed the supremacy of Bamar and Buddhism. With the worsening situation, the government under U Nu took control of the country by force in 1951. Prime Minister U Nu ordered the creation of a temporary military government to the Chief of the General Staff of the military, General Ne Win, in 1958. Ne Win’s distrust of non-Bamar peoples was apparent (Smith 2018: 35). Non-Bamar peoples were marginalized from official positions in government. His ascendancy left a deep chasm between the Bamar and other nationality groups largely due to the ‘Burmanisation’ of the Tatmadaw. Although civil rule was restored in 1960 under the anti-fascist People’s Freedom League led by U Nu, abundant problems persisted in the country, such as corruption and an increasing crime rate. By 1961, the situation in the northern part of the country also deteriorated. Ne Win and a group of generals then staged a coup in 1962, which marked the end of the parliamentary government. Ne Win’s military government promoted radical socialism and created the Burmese Socialist Program Party (BSPP), which eventually became the only party allowed to exist in Burma between 1964 and 1988. The situation in the borderlands was occasionally exacerbated by interference from other countries, such as China, Thailand and the USA. In the mid-1960s, the military or Tatmadaw introduced its well-known ‘Four Cuts’ (pya ley pya) strategy for suppressing support from ethnic communities to ethnic armies. The strategy was 24

The agreement was made between the Burmese government led by Aung San and the Shan, Kachin and Chin peoples in February 1947. It accepted ‘full autonomy in internal administration for the Frontier Areas’. The full document is available online (23 October 2020). 25 Only Chin, Shan and Kachin leaders were represented. 26 The KNU was founded in 1947. The Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) is an armed wing of the KNU, which operates in eastern Myanmar. 27 The KNU and the Thein Sein government signed a ceasefire agreement in 2012.

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to sever ethnic armed groups from key inputs, such as funding, food, intelligence and recruits.28 The strategy resulted in thousands of civilian deaths and destruction of villages and led to the forcible relocation of communities to areas under firm military control. The ‘Burmese Way to Socialism’ eliminated foreign influence and many of the government’s functions were centralized under the military’s control. Since independence, the chasm between Bamar and varied ethnic nationality groups became politically and economically entrenched in the country over time. The political elites during each era were required to battle over ethnic identity and political ideology, which have been the central features of politics in the country. Attempts were made to solve ethnic relations through negotiations after the collapse of the BSPP government. The government began ceasefire agreements with ethnic armed groups from as early as 1989 after the collapse of the BCP (Ganesan 2015: 276). In the 1990s, the military reached ceasefire agreements with 17 ethnic groups. Although several of the groups were disbanded, others created new armed groups. In fact, violent conflicts currently persist, and underlying grievances remain unaddressed. In 2015, a nationwide ceasefire agreement was reached between 16 ethnic armed organizations and the Thein Sein government, although pessimism gradually increased due to limited progress (Thawnghmung 2017: 379). Although the emphasis of the 2008 Constitution on ‘non-disintegration’ is reflective of the country’s history, ‘democracy’ stressed in such a context regarding ethnoreligious politics may denote specific meanings for the military who, in reality, makes ultimate decisions on the majority of issues in the country. In other words, the term ‘democracy’ implies ‘disciplined democracy’. In fact, military-appointed lawmakers and the military-backed USDP refused to remove the term ‘disciplined’ when the NLD government proposed a constitutional amendment in March 2020.

3.2 Myanmar as Guided by Disciplined Democracy ‘Democracy’ was key for Myanmar to restore its relations with the USA and other major donor governments of the OECD, who enthusiastically emphasized the importance of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. Grugel explained such aspects as ‘discursive ordering principles for the international system’ and pointed out that ‘democratic ideals had been part of international baggage of international politics for a long time’ (Grugel 2005: 27). To a large extent, Myanmar’s stance on ‘democracy‘ reflects this global agendum in international politics. By definition, democracy is a form of governance with prescribed procedural norms on obtaining and exercising political power. Nevertheless, democratization should not be considered a set of processes driven by structural change but ‘an openended and contested process’ within a state or communities (Grugel 2005: 35). In the process, many actors, elites and non-elites are involved in the goal of defining 28

The Four Cuts strategy was first introduced against the KNU and other armed groups in lower Burma.

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the appropriate roles of institutions, state/government, and society in democracy. Grugel argued that ‘democratization can be understood as a struggle over the norms that govern society and how decisions are taken within that community’ (Grugel 2005: 35). For this reason, the processes of democratization tend to be conflictual. Dahl concluded that a democratic government features contestation and inclusion (Dahl 1971: 3). In this context, inclusion pertains to the population’s involvement in the electoral process, whereas contestation denotes the ability of political parties to compete in a fair manner. Grugel explained democratization as follows (Grugel 2005: 42): Democratization should be defined as an ongoing process of norm transformation, alongside social struggles over how to define the norms that constitute democracy. Democratization should be understood as a complex and conflictual site of struggle, in which the kinds of democracy that are thought to be desirable and the degrees of democracy that are thought to be possible are continually negotiated and renegotiated between differently motivated and differently situated actors internal and external to states.

Based on the above-mentioned theoretical exploration, Myanmar apparently undergoes closed processes in its democratization. Alternatively, scholars argue that such closed processes cannot be considered democratization because ‘inclusion’ and ‘contestation’ are allowed only within the framework and extent defined by the military. Huang pointed out that democratic politics in Myanmar is allowed given that it is ‘disciplined’ or does not challenge the core interests and vision of the military (Huang 2017: 27).29 Under ‘disciplined democracy’, only multiparty elections, which are minimally pluralistic and competitive, are allowed. Articles 6 (d) and 7 of the 2008 Constitution cite the ‘flourishing of a genuine, disciplined multi-party democratic system’ as one of the basic principles. Furthermore, Article 39 states that ‘The Union shall enact necessary law to systematically form political parties for flourishing of a genuine, disciplined multi-party democratic system’. The term ‘disciplined’ indicates limitations posed in various political processes to prevent harming the core interests and vision of the military. For this reason, many scholars point out that Myanmar’s elections and even democracy are now ‘instruments of authoritarian rule’ (Miller 2013; Schedler 2006). Although a civilian government was once established, as Huang rightly pointed out, the military retains authority in all matters related to security and defense (Huang 2017: 26). Even under Thein Sein’s ‘democratic’ government, certain activities were considered political offences (Huang 2017: 32), such as protests that raise an agenda against the policy of the state, activities that potentially threaten the image and reputation of the military, and offences that oppose the Buddhist nationalist account. When considered political offences, the government or military typically suppresses such actions in a violent manner. For example, the government cracked down on protests against the National Education Bill in 2014 and those against the China-invested

29

See Articles 40, 109 and 141 of the 2008 Constitution.

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Letpadaung copper mine project in the Sagaing region of northwest Myanmar in 2012.30 The term ‘disciplined’ bears critical importance for the military in preventing political offences and preserving its interests by limiting the rights of the citizens. Democratization in Myanmar is, in this sense, limited because ‘inclusion and contestation’, as suggested by Dahl, are allowed only within the framework designed by the military. In other words, ‘contestation’ in political processes in Myanmar exists only to a limited extent. Moreover, although ‘inclusion’ exists, it is allowed given that it does not affect the vision and interests of the military.

3.3 ‘National Races’ for the ‘Prevalence of Law and Order’ The 2008 Constitution emphasizes the ‘prevalence of law and order’, which imposes various forms of extensive limitations on citizens. Moreover, the government authority highlights law and order in its policies (Government of Myanmar 2004). The notion of ‘law and order’ or ngyeinwut-pibyaye literally means stillness, calmness, flattened or pressed. Cheesman explained that it is ‘a condition where the state’s forces bind people’s general activity, to ensure they remain decent and inoffensive, quiet and unassuming’ (Cheesman 2015: 30). It is a unique idea or ideology that promotes quietude and immobilization as a political and social ideal. Myanmar distinguishes the notion of ‘law and order’ from the rule of law (taya ubade somoye), which denotes universal law, instruction, or rule in Myanmar. Cheesman further elaborated that ‘law and order’ in practice requires a superior who determines when and how to secure and maintain. The author further stated that the widespread practice of judicial torture in Myanmar demonstrates the ‘proper relation of law and order between sovereign and subject’ (Cheesman 2015: 149). Cheesman illustrated how the law plays a political role in strengthening the governmental authority and how the idea of law and order justifies Myanmar’s use of coercive power for ‘order’ without adhering to legal limitations. The idea of law and order is to rule the people in such a manner that enables the government and military to preserve their interests, vision and image. Any act that hinders such interests, policies and image is likely to be considered a burden or an offence to ‘law and order’ that should be handled with the potential use of force. Furthermore, the notion of law and order can be utilized as a justification for the government to use force to crack down on acts that hamper its policy. As previously discussed, popular protests against certain policies or projects are good examples 30

The law enacted in September 2014 aims to reform Myanmar’s educational system. However, students and teachers criticized the law and delivered protests, which were eventually cracked down on by the government. The Letpadaung copper mine project is a China-invested project under the BRI framework. For more details on the project, see the following: ‘Myanmar: Letpadaung mine protests still denied justice’, 27 November 2015, available online: (date accessed: 20 October 2020).

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of activities that the government considers a hindrance to law and order. Evidently, such a concept of law and order is far from that of the rule of law. For Cheesman, ‘the political ideal opposed to the rule of law in Myanmar is law and order’ (Cheesman 2015: 9) because ‘the rule of law relies on general rule to maintain whereas law and order rests on particularistic commands and directives, in response to exigencies’ (Cheesman 2015: 34). Moreover, in practice, the notion of law and order in Myanmar ties together the state and particular ethnic groups or ‘national races’ as primary citizens in an extremely unique manner. The 1948 Union Citizenship Act stipulates ‘national races‘ or taingyintha as ‘Arakanese, Burmese, Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Mon or Shan race and such racial groups as had settled in any of the territories included within the Union as their permanent home anterior to 1823 AD’ (Cheesman 2017: 471). Although the idea of national races was less important even after the first coup in 1958, it had a significant meaning for political domination and exclusion during the period of the military-dominated state in the 1960s. The 1982 Citizenship Law in Myanmar then made membership in a national race the primary basis for citizenship (Cheesman 2017: 471).31 The notions of ‘disciplined democracy’, ‘law and order’ and ‘national races‘ were all norms created by the military to maintain its interests and vision. Understanding the meanings and implications of such norms can enhance the understanding that only a limited number of actors and within a limited extent can be involved in ‘the struggle to define the appropriate roles of institutions, the state and society’. In contrast to Grugel’s argument on democratization, fewer struggles from the citizens to define the appropriate roles of institutions, state and society and over the norms that govern the society in Myanmar were observed. The reason underlying this notion is that such aspects were all decided by the military. As such, the vast majority of the people were excluded from the process or given extremely limited decision-making power. The notion of disciplined democracy implies such limitations in terms of participation and contestation for the prevalence of ‘law and order’ among ‘national races’, who are the principal nations of the country. Disciplined democracy, law and order and national races are key norms in Myanmar, which are particularly related to the governance of the military. Nevertheless, these norms were formed without contestation among diverse groups of people and without negotiations ‘between differently motivated and differently situated actors internal and external to states’. Accordingly, the so-called democratization in Myanmar lacks the core processes necessary for democratization, as suggested by Dahl and Grugel. Nonetheless, the military and the military-backed government developed the norms that govern society 31

The 1982 law includes two additional but less restricted categories of citizens. The first is ‘associate’ citizen (those under the previous 1948 citizenship law), whereas the second is ‘naturalized’ citizen (those living in Myanmar for three generations). This study only partially covers issues with regard to the contexts and situations that rendered the Rohingya as outsiders due to the limited space. For in-depth details and situations regarding citizenship in Myanmar, see South and Lall (2018), Thawnghmung and Yadana (2018) and Tonkin (2018). Cheesman (2015) pointed out that the law confers rights that maintain Burman hegemony, whereas Holliday (2014: p. 404) stated that ethnic nationality groups in peripheral areas can claim merely restricted citizenship.

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without such core processes. Undoubtedly, the past struggle to address ethnic armed groups and unite the country cast a long shadow on this point because ethnic armed struggle and political oppositions have been considered offences against the military, which emphasizes the notion of law and order. The three above-mentioned norms highlighted by the military and military-backed government are reflective of ethno-religious relations and difficult and unstable political processes in the country throughout its history. The three norms explain the main concerns of the military as illustrated by the three activities considered political offences during the Thein Sein government, namely, protests against the government’s policy, activities that threaten the image and reputation of the military, and offences that oppose the Buddhist nationalist narrative. Emphasizing the preservation of disciplined democracy and the prevalence of law and order can crack down the first two. In reality, the three norms are used to justify the authority’s actions, which were frequently, by force.

4 Despotic State-Building and Local Conflicts In contrast to expectations around the world, Myanmar’s transition to democracy led to failure in the management and resolution of violent conflicts. Countries experience increased risks of instability and conflict during periods of transition or political changes, regardless of transition to democracy or autocracy (Thoms and Ron 2007: 700–702). In Myanmar, a new pattern and element of violence is observed in addition to the continued armed confrontations in the borderlands. Many scholars have pointed to the emergence of Buddhist religious extremism in the country (Subedi and Garnett 2020). In 2012 and 2017, the situation in Rakhine State (formerly known as Arakan) in the northern part of Myanmar became known worldwide because of violent clashes between the Rohingya (Muslim) and local Buddhist people and subsequent crackdown by Myanmar’s security forces, which led to thousands of refugees fleeing to Bangladesh. The Rohingya have been discriminated against and repressed by government authorities for decades. Violence and discrimination against the Rohingya are common. However, the situation in Rakhine State has been exacerbated since the 2010s as radical Buddhist groups have emerged, which shaped new dynamics of violence against the Rohingya and other non-Buddhist people. Although continuity and changes in the political and economic arenas in Myanmar remain, how did the new dynamics of violence emerge? Is it related to the political and economic reforms undertaken after the quasi-civilian government came into power? How can the emergence of Buddhist extremism be explained in relation to reforms and state-building in contemporary Myanmar? What were the effects of increased money inflows and emphasis on disciplined democracy on the local economic and political processes of state and nation-building? The current section aims to answer these questions.

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4.1 Development in the Globalized World As previously discussed, Myanmar’s contentious ethno-religious politics have a long history. To a large extent, ethnic relations are linked to the dynamics of political and economic exclusion. The exploitation of natural resources in the borderlands is also relevant in this context. Many borderland states in Myanmar, such as Rakhine, Kachin, Shan and Kayin, are rich in natural resources and, therefore, have the potential for economic benefits. Nevertheless, the people in the borderlands commonly maintain a low standard of living. For example, Rakhine is ranked the second poorest among the 14 states/regions with high unemployment rates (Subedi and Garnett 2020: 233; Ministry of Planning and Finance 2017). Despite a steady decline in the poverty rate throughout Myanmar after the reforms (from 48.2% in 2005 to 24.8% in 2017; Ministry of Planning and Finance 2017), poverty rates in Rakhine and the neighbouring Chin remain higher than the average rates in other parts of the country. A report published in 2019, the Myanmar Living Conditions Survey 2017, revealed that the poverty headcounts in Chin and Rakhine States reached 58% and 41.6%, respectively, in 2017 (Ministry of Planning and Finance 2017: 7). According to the same report, Rakhine is the second poorest state/region in the country followed by Chin State based on the annual current gross domestic product (GDP) per capita by state/region and share of the poor. The report shows that in Rakhine State, about four persons out of ten are poor. Myanmar was isolated from the global economy after 1990 until the economic and political reforms undertaken in the 2010s. The modernization policy was implemented during the post-1988 period, under which the government promoted a market economy and welcomed FDI. As a result, the country relied on FDI for its economy. In contrast to other low-income countries, it relied less on international aid, which accounts for only 4% of its revenue even now (Carr 2018: 1). In 2010, Myanmar was the 79th largest recipient of aid in the world, although it became 7th in 2015 (Carr 2018: 1). The country’s international aid increased only after the Thein Sein government came into power in 2011, which made it the third largest recipient per capita in Southeast Asia after Cambodia and Laos. Nevertheless, the amount of FDI doubled as much as that of aid, whereas remittances reached a level similar to aid (Carr 2018: 1).32 In addition, trade expanded after the 2011 reforms with the total value of imports and exports amounting to US$18 billion in 2012/2013 and US$29 billion in 2016/2017 (Carr 2018: 11). Data indicate that the influence of donor governments and international financial organizations, such as the World Bank and IMF, remains relatively limited. However, the influence of trade partners and major providers of FDI is likely large or a competition may occur among major countries that provide FDI. As previously stated, 32

The World Bank estimates that Myanmar received approximately US$1.8 billion in annual remittance in 2014. The remittance steadily increased in the following years and reached US$2.8 billion by 2018, thus accounting for 4.3% of GDP in 2019. These data are available on the World Bank website under ‘Migration and Remittances’. (1 October 2020).

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USD mil

Fig. 3 Foreign direct investment to Myanmar. Source CEIC Data www.ceicdata.com (accessed 11 November 2020)

Myanmar has become a venue for diplomatic competition among many countries, such as China, India, the USA, Japan and ASEAN countries. With such a significant increase in FDI flow (Fig. 3), optimum management of development and infrastructural projects is vital for minimizing damage to the livelihood of the locals and for distributing benefits to avoid the expansion of inequality. In particular, the borderlands are geographically separate from the central region and thus, people in the borderlands suffer from low standards of living. Expectations of improvement in infrastructure and overall living standards through development are growing among the local people (Welsh et al. 2020). In national discourses, armed conflicts are considered consequences of underdevelopment and thus believed to be resolved through development. Nevertheless, top-down or hegemonic development has resulted in predatory investments, socially and environmentally destructive manners and another version of militarization, under which wealth and power were concentrated in the hands of military and business elites despite post-2011 reforms and the launch of the NCA process. According to official data from Myanmar, gas/oil and hydropower were the dominant sectors of FDI before 2012.33 The main investors were China, Thailand, South Korea and Singapore, among others. The largest incomes are derived from oil/gas and the mining of precious stones, whereas the majority of people in Myanmar engage in farming or the agricultural sector. Oil and gas exploration has been active in Myanmar since the 1990s. Established by the end of the 1990s and providing natural gas to Thailand in 1998,34 the Yadana pipeline was one of the most controversial natural gas development projects largely because of human rights abuses by security forces

33

Data (2011–2019) were retrieved from the website of the Ministry of Investment and Foreign Economic Relations of Myanmar. (15 October 2020). 34 The Yadana project developed offshore natural gas fields. The French oil company Total signed a contract with the Burmese military in 1992.

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(Allen and Einzenberger 2013; Thet and Oye 2014). The majority of natural gas was exported, whereas a shortage of natural gas occurred in the domestic market. In the same manner, many large-scale hydropower projects were blamed for flooding and forced resettlement of the local communities. In Kachin State in 2011, for example, the Myitsone Dam project, which was a China–Myanmar joint venture, was suspended amid protests against the environmental and social costs.35 In the mining sector, local communities protested against land confiscation and environmental destruction in 2012 in opposition to the Monywa copper project.36 A large proportion of the revenue from these projects was used for the government’s needs and military expenses to ensure control as natural resources were sold to neighbouring countries. The main reason for the sell-out is that the government managed and taxed natural resources through particular line ministries and the SEEs under them (Thet and Oye 2014: 1). The share of Myanmar’s revenue from natural resources is unclear. Reportedly, tax revenues from all sectors in Myanmar for 2013/2014 reached only 23% in all budgets of the government, which comprises approximately 4.4% of GDP.37 Although the country implemented largescale projects in the oil and gas sector, the share of taxes paid by SEEs is unreported. SEEs under the Ministry of Energy, the Ministry of Mines and the Ministry of Environment Conservation and Forestry are the most profitable ones in the country (Thet and Oye 2014: 12). The above-mentioned examples illustrate how development projects were planned and managed in a non-transparent and unaccountable manner during and after the military rule in Myanmar. Peace processes led to negotiations and discussions on ‘revenue sharing’ (win ngwe kwe we mu) because the local population could not benefit from such projects. In fact, natural resource management is one of the areas for further negotiation in Myanmar’s peace agreement. As such, many stakeholders in the peace process consider it key to negotiations (Minoletti and Sandi 2018: 14–15; Thet and Oye 2014: 36). Major ethnic armed organizations have proposed that steps must be taken to ensure that community groups benefit from resource development within their state and this condition is one of the necessary elements for achieving peace in the country (Davis et al. 2014: 13–14).

35

The Myitsone Dam project is a joint venture between Myanmar’s Ministry of Electric Power and a domestic conglomerate named Asia World, and China Power Investment Corporation, which is China’s state-run corporation. The project was signed in 2006 and initiated in 2009. Former President Thein Sein announced the suspension of the project in September 2011. For details on the project and China’s interest, see Ramachandran (2019). 36 The project was jointly developed by the UMEH and China’s state-run enterprise Wanbao Mining Ltd. with a total investment of US$1.07 billion. The government of Myanmar approved the project in 2010 and planned to operationalize in 2013. 37 Data were based on the IMF (2013/2014).

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4.2 State-Building that Divides the Nation A number of factors favour continued violent conflicts in Myanmar. In the borderlands, ethno-nationalist groups, such as those from the Shan and Kachin States, benefit from cross-border political and economic networks, which enable prolonged conflicts. As illustrated in the previous section, the exploitation of natural resources has exacerbated the low incomes of local people because revenues from natural resources were not shared with the local people. The situation along with prolonged political exclusion has fuelled distrust among the people and ethnic armed organizations towards powerholders. Furthermore, mega-projects have been introduced since the 1990s with massive flows of FDI with neither accountability processes nor environmental considerations. Myanmar’s mega-projects, whether in infrastructure or mining, were realized with the help of FDI, which significantly increased since the 2010s (Fig. 3). As a result, grievances increased as disparities between those who benefit and those who do not benefit from such mega-development projects became more apparent. Furthermore, a new pattern of violence has emerged in the country: Buddhist extremism. The Patriotic Association of Myanmar, which is commonly known as Ma Ba Tha, is a renounced Buddhist extremist organization that was formally established in 2014.38 Subedi and Garnett explained that the occurrence of Buddhist extremism in Myanmar is mainly a consequence of ‘political, economic and structural conditions of hegemonic state-building and exploitative development’ instead of linking it with ‘religion or religious matters’ (Subedi and Garnett 2020: 225). The authors argued that the increasing extremism in Myanmar is a ‘product of militarized state-building and exploitative development’ and, in such a context, ‘Buddhist ultra-nationalism as the state’s ideology for state formation’ was promoted. Against this background, extremism thrived and targeted the Rohingya ‘who have been constructed as social others’ (Subedi and Garnett 2020: 225). Furthermore, the authors pointed out that the military government has promoted Buddhism and ultra-nationalist politics in the past (Subedi and Garnett 2020: 229). The Ma Ba Tha undertook a nationwide campaign to support four controversial laws (Population Control Law, Monogamy Law, Religious Conversion Law and Interfaith Marriage Law, which together are known as the ‘race and religion protection law’).39 The former USDP government introduced these laws in 2015. Therefore, 38

The Ma Ba Tha is translated into English in various ways. In essence, however, it is a nationalist Buddhist organization. Several members of the Ma Ba Tha are connected with the 969 Movement, which is also a nationalist movement composed of monks, laypeople and nuns and opposed to the expansion of Islam in Myanmar. 39 These four laws were submitted to the parliament in December 2014 and signed by former President Thein Sein. The Population Control Law requires couples to space their children by 36 months. Local authorities have the power to request 3-year birth spacing in regions with rapid population growth. The Monogamy Law, for example, prohibits a married person from having a second marriage. It applies to ‘all those who are living in Myanmar, Myanmar citizens who live outside of Myanmar, and foreigners who marry Myanmar citizens while living in Myanmar’. In cases of violations, the person will lose property rights. The Religious Conversion Law enables the

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a certain environment was observed to be conducive to increased violence against the Rohingya and other non-Buddhists in the country in the 2010s. Nevertheless, Subedi and Garnett (2020) argued that ‘religious extremism has a deeper development dimension’, and the radicalization of Buddhists, which enhanced violence against Rohingya Muslims, ‘is more political and development issues than an issue of religious violence‘ (Subedi and Garnett 2020: 239). The rise of Buddhist extremism was a result of the historically entrenched anti-Muslim narratives backed by extremely discriminatory and despotic state-building in the country. Bamar Buddhists were ‘superior’ during their rule for over five decades as a result of the military’s reinforcement of the idea. The military regime designated Buddhism as the state religion after independence, which was then carried over in the 2008 Constitution. In other words, Buddhism is recognized as ‘the faith professed by the great majority of the citizens of the Union’ (Section 361), whereas Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and Animism are recognized as ‘the religions existing in the Union at the day of the coming into operation of this Constitution’ (Section 362). In 2018, reports surfaced that the military was accused of using social media to stoke tension between Muslims and Buddhists (Robertson 2018). Conversely, the government exerted significant effort to curtail the Ma Ba Tha and urged the Buddhist authority to ban it (ICG 2017: i). Nevertheless, a dimension of popular support of the Ma Ba Tha is notable, which is connected with the movement to protect and promote Buddhism at a time of change and uncertainty (Ramakrishna 2020: 12). The divisive narratives remain in society, and countering them requires an understanding of the sources of support for the Ma Ba Tha. The situation illustrates the manner in which the military has used divisive narratives and the depth to which such narratives have permeated the society as social, political and economic changes intensified the concerns and fears of the people.

4.3 Militarized Governance and Sovereignty The long-existing chasm in the society in Myanmar and new dynamics should be understood in relation to the underlying deep distrust between the state and society. Constant threats of violence in Rakhine and other borderland states in Myanmar are not contemporary phenomena but are parts of protracted conflicts in the country. From Burma’s independence to date, the deep distrust between rulers and the ruled continues. Thus, threats of violence and coercion remain prominent characteristics of the state–society relations within the country (Callahan 2003: 221). Callahan explained that the Burmese military or Tatmadaw not only pacified a population that threatened the objectives of the state in the 1950s but also transformed apathetic populations into fervent defenders of the Union (Callahan 2003: 222). This approach remains applicable in contemporary Myanmar. The post-1988 state to regulate religious conversion and profession. Individuals who want to change their religion should be aged more than 18 years and should file an application with a local board.

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state-building and nation-building of the Tatmadaw, which led to the 2011 reforms, did not only pacify its potential enemies but also turned them into ‘disciplined’ defenders. The government identified ‘national races’ as primary citizens that encompass particular ethnic groups, whereas Buddhism was used to consolidate national identity. The favour of Myanmar’s political elites towards ultra-nationalist monks became apparent in 2012 when Ashin Wirathu was released despite a sentence of 25 years in prison. Wirathu was an influential Buddhist monk and leader of the antiMuslim movement who was arrested in 2003 on a charge of inciting anti-Muslim riots that killed ten Muslims. Even in the contemporary history of Myanmar, distinctions were made among individuals living in the territory of Myanmar according to the ethnicity of origin and religion. The nationwide ceasefire agreement can be a potential tool for the military not only to pacify the ‘enemies’ but also to make them ‘disciplined’ defenders of the country. The rise of extremism in the 2010s in Myanmar was, in a sense, an inevitable consequence of despotic state-building designed by the Tatmadaw. In this process, economic modernization and development were key for survival under the control of the small number of political and military elites. Citizens in Myanmar lack the space to make claims for their rights or to raise their voice to claim the obligation of the state to provide equal and fair treatment. As such, citizenship in Myanmar is extremely different from that in Europe. The process of the emergence of nation-states in Europe occurred as a result of a popular uprising in the nineteenth century. Democratic states in Europe drove from a particular form of citizenship (Bowles and Gintis 1987: 38; Turner 1993: 496), which took a bottom-up process (Turner 1986: 67: Turner 1993: 496). Citizenship then has an expansive nature. For this reason, in societies in Europe, it is common to witness participatory and responsible citizenry. This is considered to be ‘liberal citizenship’ (Marshall 1963; Lister and Pia 2008: 9).40 Apparently, Myanmar does not share this type of citizenship. According to Turner, there is also a ‘formal citizenship’, which is in contrast to liberal citizenship (Turner 1986: 67). Formal citizenship is primarily centered by the state and the state decides who qualifies as a citizen. Myanmar’s citizenship is similar to formal citizenship because the government defensively applies citizenship as a means of exclusion and control (Nishikawa 2020: 96). Many countries in Southeast Asia maintain this type of citizenship because we can observe that many governments in the region are cautious about fostering civil society and democracy. The way that many countries in Southeast Asia share formal citizenship is linked with the way that nation-states were formed in the region. Many countries in the region experienced colonization and states were formed as a result of decolonization. The nation-states in the region were not formed as a result of the popular uprising. Instead, their boundaries were drawn by colonial powers. Accordingly, upon their 40

Lister and Pia (2008: p. 9) explain that liberal citizenship has an egalitarian impulse because individuals are entitled to equal treatment by right. They also identified communitarian citizenship, which emphasizes duty and loyalty to the community. For more details about theories of citizenship and their history, see Bellamy (2008).

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independence, political elites in the newly independent states in the region were faced with the problem of creating nationality (Hill and Fee 1995: 18). Most states in the region are, therefore, troubled with claims over sovereignty (Hill and Fee 1995: 25). Even in contemporary Southeast Asia, governments are cautious about the categories of people they recognize as citizens. It is understandable that many states in Southeast Asia emphasize their ‘right to rule’ as a legitimate authority, whereas those states that were formed through the bottom-up process tend to highlight the state’s ‘responsibility to protect’.41 The way that a state was formed also affects the way that each state views state sovereignty and sovereign right. This is because those countries that experienced the bottomup process of state formation view ‘the nation as an organic person that obtains the supreme status of the sovereign’ (Shinoda 2000: 151). In contrast, many post-colonial and communist states emphasize ‘the supremacy of the state as the sole possessor of national sovereignty’, which is called ‘national sovereignty’ (Shinoda 2000: 152).42 The former type is recognized as ‘constitutional sovereignty’. Myanmar and many communist countries are obviously the latter types because they emphasize their right to rule the given territory. The above-mentioned theories of citizenship and distinctive views on sovereignty are consistent. Countries that experience the bottom-up process of state-formation and those that experience the top-down process are likely to have different understandings of citizenship and sovereignty. Their differences will, then, stretch to their way of governing, such as democracy and autocracy although there are variations. In that sense, state formation or how a nation-state came to exist has a significant bearing when we understand current nation-states around the world. When we realize such critically different paths of state formation and views on sovereignty, it is understandable why such international norms as democracy, human rights and rule of law are interpreted and followed in such different ways. Whereas the countries that maintain liberal citizenship and constitutional sovereignty comply with human rights, democracy and rule of law to protect individuals, countries that were formed through the top-down process are likely to use these norms to enhance the state’s right to rule the territory and the nation. The latter type of state will utilize any norm for controlling the nation. The present situation in Myanmar demonstrates such tendencies as seen in the application of ‘disciplined democracy’ and ‘law and order’.

41

This point is highlighted in Anghie (2004: pp. 209–211). Yegor Gaidar identified features of communist statehood through the example of Russia, such as inseparable relations between property and statehood, political power in the hands of a small number of administrative elites, and a weak civil society. See Gaidear cited by Kaehne (2003: p. 4).

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5 Conclusion Multiple changes have occurred in Myanmar and reforms have led to differences in the political, economic and social spheres. In the economic sphere, the new political economy dynamics that have emerged since 2011 have changed power relations among the relevant actors of the state, military, entrepreneurs, foreign investors and local people as a result of privatization and marketization. The post-2011 reforms left dual effects. First, although it reduced ties and degrees of cronyism among relevant actors, it created influential business elites in the political process. In the political sphere, the 2015 election and the NLD’s victory established the civil government in 2016 and 2020. Nevertheless, the post-2020 elections set back the country under the military rule. Although the military’s seizure of power appeared abrupt, it would have been almost expected if we genuinely understood the nature of the state and the changes in Myanmar since 2011. The post-2010 reforms formed part of the military’s effort to establish ‘military capitalism’ and ‘militarized governance’ to guarantee its oversight power for control. Such norms pertain to ‘disciplined democracy’. Moreover, the military developed the notion of ‘law and order’ to govern the society. This was because the military never viewed its sovereign rights as a ‘responsibility to protect’ the nation and grant individual rights. Instead, they viewed it as the ‘right to rule’ the nation and country. Therefore, norms, such as democracy and the rule of law, as promoted by the major donor governments of the OECD were adopted and modified within the military’s discourse of sovereignty and sovereign rights. Under the current system, any norm introduced into the country will become the military’s ‘authoritative legitimating device’ (Krivenko 2017: 3). In this political context, many mega development projects were undertaken in Myanmar with increased FDI inflows. The new projects under the existing economic and political structures generated profits for a limited number of political and military elites, whereas the local people suffered from environmental and human insecurity. State-building in Myanmar remained hegemonic and enhanced and justified the exclusion of certain groups of people within the country given the historically entrenched nationalist narratives, thus promoting division within the nation. Moreover, a new pattern of violence by Buddhist religious extremists emerged under such hegemonic state-building. Although the military continues to implement restrictive measures towards certain religious and ethnic groups, new social forces that support the nationalist narratives of the country facilitated and justified violence against particular ethnic nationalities. How then did globalization influence Myanmar, where significant changes were once made? Did globalization influence the violence and conflicts in the borderlands? Arguing that globalization caused violence or conflicts in borderlands in Myanmar is misleading because local cases of violence and conflicts have also occurred when the influence of globalization was less. Moreover, no evidence exists to prove the effect of globalization on the scale and extent of violence and conflicts. Nevertheless, globalization forces in the form of increased inflow of FDI, capital movement and

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competition between investors led to increased opportunities for grievances in many places in Myanmar, particularly in areas rich in natural resources. The main reason for such conflict is that the local people gained little benefit from mega-development projects. The country’s structural conditions and hegemonic systems exacerbated the ill-management of such projects, thus leading to the lack of benefit sharing and environmental considerations. The systems and structure of the economic and political governance in Myanmar exerted the decisive effects of globalization on individuals in general and highly vulnerable groups in particular. The effects of globalization on the people and society are largely dependent on the nature and characteristics of the state and its governance, and on the economic and political structures of a country.

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Thant M-U (2011) Where China meets India: Burma and the new crossroads of Asia. Faber and Faber, London Thawnghmung AM (2017) Signs of life in Myanmar’s nationwide ceasefire agreement? Finding a way forward. Crit Asian Stud 49(3):379–395 Thawnghmung MA Yadana (2018) Citizenship and Minority Rights: The Role of ‘National Race Affairs’ Ministers in Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution. In: South A, Lall M (eds) Citizenship in Myanmar: ways of being in and from Burma, pp 113–139 Thet AL, Oye M (2014) Natural resources and subnational governments in Myanmar: key considerations for wealth sharing, Discussion Paper No.4, The Myanmar Development Resource Institute’s Centre for Economic and Social Development, The International Growth Centre and The Asia Foundation, Yangon Thoms NTO, Ron J (2007) Do human rights violations cause internal conflict? Human Rights Q 29:674–705 Tonkin D (2018) Exploring the issue of citizenship in Rakhine state. In: South A, Lall M (eds) Citizenship in Myanmar: ways of being in and from Burma, pp 222–263 Turnell S (2010) Myanmar in 2010: doors open, doors close. Asian Surv 51(1):148–154 Turner SB (1993) Outline of a theory of human rights. Sociology 27(3):489–512 Turner SB (1986) Citizenship and capitalism: the debate over reformism. Allen & Unwin, London Welsh B, Thu N, Kueh CH, Soe A (2020) Myanmar grapping with transition. 2019 Asian Barometer Survey Report, Strategic Information and Research Development Centre, Malaysia Zhu C (ed) (2019) Annual report on the development of the Indian Ocean Region (2018): IndoPacific: concept definition and strategic implementation. Springer, Singapore

Yukiko Nishikawa is a professor in the Graduate School of Global Studies, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan. Nishikawa obtained a Ph.D. in peace studies from the University of Bradford, U.K. Her main publications include “The Reality of Protecting the Rohingya: An Inherent Limitation of the Responsibility to Protect” (Asian Security 2020); Political Sociology of Japanese Pacifism (Routledge 2018); Human Security in Southeast Asia (Routledge 2010); “Human security in Southeast Asia: viable solution or empty slogan?” (Security Dialogue 2009); Japan’s Changing Role in Humanitarian Crises (Routledge 2005). Her research interests include peace and conflict in Southeast Asia and security and international relations in the Indo–Pacific region.

Imbalance Between Public Health and Intellectual Property Rights Protection Goals: Battles on AIDS Medicines in Thailand Benjamas Nillsuwan

Abstract A dispute over medicine patent overriding occurred in Thailand when the country attempted to use compulsory licensing in 2006–2007 for the rationale of promoting access to AIDS medicines for all. Thailand had a high rate of HIV/AIDS infection, it thus adopted the public health policy which promised to offer AIDS drugs to all infectious patients. While the use of compulsory licensing is permitted by both domestic patent law and the TRIPS Agreement of the WTO, it is regarded as a drastic measure to improve access to medicines. Consternation and conflicts over the issue of patented medicines continue in Thailand as the policy of access to medicines goes on amidst consideration of mega-trade deals such as CPTPP, RCEP, and other FTAs with Investor-State Dispute Settlement mechanism. This chapter informs how the global political economy of medicines is connected to domestic conflicts in the case of AIDS drugs and how the global politics of pharmaceutical products have affected the cause of AIDS medicines conflict and the country’s policy space in the experience of Thailand. Keywords Thailand · Compulsory licensing · Medicines · Health · Conflict

1 Introduction The view that economic globalization can improve the lives of millions of people around the world through increased exchange of goods, services, and knowledge among nations is widely adopted by governments around the world. Developing countries1 can achieve better standards of living by opening their markets and joining 1 In this chapter, “developing” countries refers to “least-developed countries, low-income countries, and middle-income countries” as listed in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) list of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

B. Nillsuwan (B) School of International Affairs, The Faculty of Political Science and Public Administration, Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai, Thailand e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 Y. Nishikawa (ed.), Globalisation and Local Conflicts in Africa and Asia, Evidence-Based Approaches to Peace and Conflict Studies 7, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8818-8_7

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free trade with other nations, which provides domestic consumers the opportunity to enjoy a variety of products and services that empower them for an enriched lifestyle. However, such a view is challenged in that the global forces that come with international political and economic globalization may not always bring only desirable effects but also adverse impacts in the forms of tension, discord, and conflict into domestic politics. This chapter argues that global forces, such as international trade rules in intellectual property (IP) rights protection, can also cause tensions in countries that adopt such rules. This chapter contends how economic globalization can cause internal conflicts within states in the existing highly interconnected economies. Thailand is among Global South countries that have had been highly affected by the HIV/AIDS epidemic and have employed a health policy that commits to providing free and universal anti-viral treatment to infected citizens (Krikorian 2009; Hoen et al. 2011; Rosenberg 2014; Guennif 2017). Embracing economic globalization in the twentieth century brought several positive changes to Thailand, such as expanded economic activities and generally improved living conditions. At the same time, inequalities in various aspects have also risen. Economic globalization does not only bring greater economic opportunities for Thai citizens, but it also comes with more risks and vulnerabilities to impoverished individuals. Thailand was listed as an uppermiddle income country by the World Bank in 2011 and indeed the country had previously struggled with severely uneven social welfare distribution and quality, such as universal healthcare, or affordable essential medicines and medical treatments. Before Thailand initiated the national Universal Health Coverage (UHC) program to cover all 67 million Thai citizens in 2001, around 30% of the population had no health coverage. Eighteen million Thai citizens had no health insurance (Nam 2015: 1, 19). In addition, a lack of medicines and medical treatments were common and were considered a major weakness of the development. Ordinary citizens, especially vulnerable groups of population such as disabled people, older persons, and casual workers, were at risk of death or bankruptcy if they were unable to pay for medicine and treatment costs. Such struggles are still ongoing despite the developments of economic globalization with increased trade openness.

2 Global Political and Economic Force in the Form of Patent Protection A form of today’s globalization is the global adoption of intellectual property rights systems in trading among individuals and, and largely, between nations. In this discussion, it is useful to briefly consider the background of the IP protection system in the international arena. The expansion of the idea that IP must and should be protected significantly altered the way that economic globalization affects the world. The global protection of IP was included in a multilateral trade organization for the first time in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Under the

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TRIPS Agreement, the protection of patents, including those for medicines, became an economic universal rule in all WTO member countries by 2005, except in the least-developed countries. Globalization in the post-war era has been marked by increased trade and trade liberalization between nations. The WTO is regarded as the centre of global trade governance in terms of setting legal and normative standards for its 164 member states (WTO 2016) in conducting trade with each other. The tone of trade agreements among nations is accordingly set by the WTO standards, including trade in goods, services, and IP rights protection. Some scholars have discussed the shrinking of policy spaces caused by some international economic rules (Gallagher 2005; Wade 2003). As Wade (2003) pointed out, the development choices of countries are increasingly constrained by the expansion of regulations that international organizations enforce (Wade 2003: 83). The rules such as TRIPS on patent production limit or handicap a state’s ability to deny patents to some products. TRIPS requires a state to protect all patents for up to 20 years and a state has less flexibility in using technology or products under patents. It is important to note that production of pharmaceutical products and their trade are dominated by transnational pharmaceutical corporations. After 1995, the pharmaceutical industry has been concentrated into a fewer number of large corporations. As such, the production of pharmaceuticals is heavily localized to high-income countries, mainly Switzerland, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Israel (Hanefeld et al. 2020: 870–871). The TRIPS Agreement established standards on protection of copyrights, patents, trademarks, industrial designs, geographical indications, layout designs of integrated circuits, and undisclosed information (WTO 2018a). The IP rights established in the TRIPS Agreement provides legal exclusivity for a certain period to recoup costs of drug research and development through patents. As a result of this trade rule, there is tension between the two needs. On one hand, it is necessary to motivate the private sector to invest in pharmaceutical research and development. On the other hand, there is a need to achieve public health goals by providing widespread access to the medicines developed. There are alarming concerns for pharmaceutical industries mainly based in high-income countries that companies based in low- and middle-income countries would take their patent technology without permission. Developing economies have deep concerns about the widening gap of technology and proprietorship of such technology between them and high income-countries. The world community has observed the competing arguments between the two sides in various negotiations at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the Uruguay Round of GATT, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The TRIPS Agreement, which started from 1995 onward, has contributed to the shift of global trade from mainly the exchange of goods to trade in services. The TRIPS Agreement is the set of rules that reflects legislation that originated in highincome countries to implement IP protection. It provides the minimum standards for all forms of IP rights protection that states need to comply with to be able to

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enter WTO membership. It is thus necessary for WTO member states to establish or modify their domestic legislation. Under the TRIPS Agreement, medicines and medicinal patents became protected for IP rights. Drug companies who own them are protected by law to prevent anyone else from producing, utilizing, and marketing their new medicines for at least 20 years. The emerging use of the Internet has led to alarmist concerns about IP infringements across borders. Continuous deadlocks between member states of WIPO in IP enforcement standards were evidence that IP issues were controversial, complicated, and facing challenge and division among diversified members (Greunen and Gobac 2020: 3–4). Economic globalization in the form of global economic regulations of the WTO created discordance between TRIPS, or later TRIPS-plus, and public health. The TRIPS Agreement notoriously prevents the export and use of generic drugs, which are the cheaper, non-original version of drugs. Therefore, any states that have a public health policy that seeks the cheapest medicines in the global market might face legal action from multinational drug corporations who contend that such a policy directly breaches the patent rights of their products. Medicine patents, as one form of IP rights, are regarded as rents in medicine pricing. Meanwhile, the need of states to procure life-saving drugs for epidemics such as HIV/AIDS to protect public health might find a barrier to access and afford the vital medications because of this medicine patent systems laid down by the TRIPS Agreement.

3 Trade or Lives? AIDS Drugs Conflict in Thailand This chapter presents that economic globalization, and its potentially adverse impacts, can be observed in several clashes over medicine patent issues. The global IP rulemaking in multilateral forums are known to occur in an arena where alliances of developing countries, activists, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) ferociously concerned that international IP rules overly favor IP rights holders, and neglect public interests (Murphy and Kellow 2013; Helfer 2004; May and Sell 2005). Conflicts that have occurred in Thailand as a result of public health policy and medicine patents are discussed herein.

3.1 Business or Punishment? The USTR and Pharmaceutical MNCs The United States has been one of the major drivers of global IP rights protection on the international stage. Before 1995, the USA advocated pushing the WTO to include IP as part of international trade rules. The TRIPS Agreement, which came

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into effect in 1995, required all WTO members to apply the TRIPS provisions to their IP law by 2000. However, it is important to note the tools that the USA has created to use with trading countries. The US Trade Act of 1974 established a “coercive mechanism” that can be used with countries having trade relations with the USA. One such mechanism is the United States Trade Representative (USTR). The USA also established “Special 301” under the later Trade Act of 1988 to deal with intellectual property rights (IPR) issues in particular. The USTR has a duty to foster strong intellectual property laws and enforcement with all trading partners, and has a political power to impose trade sanctions on partner countries it considers to have “unfair” trade practices. The USTR releases an annual Special 301 Report, indicating countries with inadequate levels of IP protection. Countries can be identified as “Priority Foreign Countries,” “Priority Watch List,” or “Watch List” according to the severity of the problem related to their IPR protection (Morin and Cartwright 2020: 560–561). Another influential and forceful mechanism used by the USA is the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) status, which was also introduced in the Trade Act of 1974. The GSP status is a preferred trading status that comes with a degree of pressure against violations of IPR of American products. With GSP status, developing countries can gain access to the US market. Countries that fail to adequately protect the IPR can be denied or revoked GSP status when the US President considers that these countries operate “unfair trade practice,” based on The Omnibus Tariff and Trade Act of 1984 (Morin and Cartwright 2020: 562; Congress 1984). For Thailand, foreign powers were the main driving force for Thailand to establish an IP protection system (Morgan 1999; Thanitcul 1994). Similarly, Thailand’s first Copyright Act was proposed by the government in 1988 to alleviate pressure from the USA. However, the resultant draft law was highly contested and unpopular and the issue led to conflicts within the then ruling Democrat Party that caused the parliament to be dissolved (Morgan 1999: 803). In relation to the medicine patent dispute in Thailand, this discussion focuses specifically on the patent issue. In 1979, Thailand introduced the first Patent Law, which only protected process patents. Later, the US government and American pharmaceutical firms played a significant role in applying strong pressure to amend Thailand’s Patent Law in 1992. The Patent Law was then revised to protect not only processes but also products. Pressure from the USA led to the patent law revision in Thailand, around 8 years before the schedule set for developing countries by the WTO in 2000 (Chokevivat 2020: s177). Such a revision was too early for a developing country without sufficient capacity in pharmaceutical production. The patent law revision in 1992 was again the result of external pressure (Supakankunti et al. 2001: 462). When the HIV/AIDS epidemic was attacking Thailand at the time, all available antiviral drugs were patented. Public health experts and bureaucrats, such as the Secretary General of the Food and Drug Administration, the Secretary of the Deputy Minister of Public Health, and the Director of the Technical Division of the Food and Drug Administration expressed concerns about the impacts of such law revisions on increasing drug prices. These individuals put pressure on Prime Minister

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Anand Panyarachun to increase the health budget, but the Prime Minister insisted on conforming to the US request as a top priority because the USA had the capacity to punish Thailand by listing it as a Priority Foreign Country (PFC) according to the US Trade Act Section 301. Such a listing would result in negative measures such as canceling the GSP to Thailand, which would adversely affect around 40% of Thailand’s total exports (Chokevivat 2020: s177). Civil society groups strongly opposed the permission of the Act to cover product patents with the grave concerns around higher drug prices and an inability of poor patients to access the lifesaving drugs because of the higher prices caused by patents. They were also anxious about monopolies on lifesaving drugs held by American drug companies. The concern around prices of AIDS medicine in Thailand continued to increase when it was estimated that Thai AIDS patients would need to spend more than US $300 or approximately 12,000 Baht per person per month for the whole treatment. In 2004, it was found that only 10,000 Thai patients per year could access anti-viral drugs subsidized by The Global Fund. Also, the country’s AIDS epidemic policy direction at the time prioritized access to anti-viral drugs rather than just controlling AIDS at the local communities (Sittikriangkrai 2009: 2). The global force of multinational drug companies and their strong lobbying power also affects the research and development of medicines. Domestic medicine inventors or researchers may lose their opportunity to research and develop particular medicines for a duration of 5 years in the process of patent application, because the patent protection was in effect since the filing date (Sutapuk and Kijtiwatchakul 2015). Although some patent applications are later rejected, they already delay the chance for any domestic drug producers to do research and make drugs. A famous Thai pharmacist, Dr. Krisana Kraisintu, experienced intimidation by powerful foreign drug companies. Dr. Kraisintu successfully developed a combined version of the AIDS drug AZT (Azidothymidine), which helped Thai AIDS patients gain access to treatment. The generic version of AZT helped cut the production cost, which lowered the overall treatment cost for Thai AIDS patients and meant that a greater number of patients could get better access to the medication they needed. Because the use of the cocktail AZT would harm their profits, foreign drug companies attempted to approach Dr. Kraisintu, but she refused to deal with them. As a result, she was pressured, threatened, sued, and blacklisted by foreign drug firms.

3.2 Patent Skeptics and Patient Outcries for Medicines Another sign of conflict appeared after the HIV/AIDS outbreak in Thailand, as the first country in Asia that was severely infected, during 1990s. The conflict was between the networks of AIDS patients and social activists against the Department of Intellectual Property (DIP), Ministry of Commerce, and foreign drug multinational corporations (MNCs) that were selling and marketing medicines within Thailand.

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In 1999, a large street protest was staged by patients and several NGOs in front of the Ministry of Public Health, calling on the ministry to urgently provide drugs for AIDS treatment. At the time, there was substantial need for the tablet drug Didanosine (DDI) as an anti-retroviral for the treatment of HIV/AIDS. Formerly, the price of treatment with DDI cost as much as 70,000 Baht per person per year. The price of double therapy, combing two medicines such as DDI and Zidovudine, cost around 90,000 Baht per person per year. Similarly, the cost of triple therapy, which combines three medicines to avoid drug resistance, was as much as 250,000 Baht per person per year (Ruxrungtham 1997: 32). When a drug patent for DDI was submitted, NGOs maintained that DDI should not be granted a patent because it was no novelty. The DDI issue urged HIV/AIDS patients and civil society groups to put forward two requests. First, the Ministry of Commerce must revoke patent registration of DDI, and second, the authority utilize Compulsory Licensing (CL) as the Thailand Patent Act allowed so that the Government Pharmaceutical Organization (GPO) could produce and provide the AIDS drug for Thai patients. In response, the government and the Ministry of Public Health remained silent on the request to use CL because of the risk of triggering negative reaction from the USTR (Chokevivat 2020: 178; Kuanpoth 2008: 17). The Ministry of Public Health avoided accusations of patent infringement by directing the GPO to produce the powdered version of DDI rather than the patented tablet version, although the powdered form was much harder for patients to take and had more side effects. In May 2001, the AIDS Access Foundation, the Thai Network for People Living with HIV/AIDS, and two AIDS patients filed lawsuits against the holder of the DDI drug patent in the Central Intellectual Property and International Trade Court. The first lawsuit was against the DIP for suspiciously allowing the patent applicant, Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS), to amend the application and to increase the dosage range to unlimited (Kuanpoth 2006). The second lawsuit was later filed in October 2002 by the Foundation for Consumer Protection of Thailand and three AIDS patients against BMS and the DIP for DDI drug patent revocation because the drug had no novelty. The NGOs and patient networks pursued the lawsuit to revoke the DDI patent until 2004 and successfully won the case. For the first lawsuit, the Court ordered BMS to return the patent to the DIP. For the second lawsuit, BMS attempted to settle with the NGO and the patients but eventually conceded to withdraw all of its patents in Thailand and withdraw an appeal in the first lawsuit. The plaintiffs finally agreed to end the second lawsuit. As a consequence, DDI became cheaper. The case of DDI demonstrated the clash between external economic forces and domestic needs and policies of Thailand. The DDI case was a triumph for those who were deeply skeptical about the drug patents, the rules, and the processes of granting patents. In the eyes of AIDS patients and activists, the DIP was perceived as too docile in the face of USTR pressure and the TRIPS Agreement. The DIP of Thailand has an image of being derided as working for the benefit of foreign patent owners, rather than advocating for the local or public interests of Thailand. However, lesser-known details of DIP relationships

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with foreign IP agencies may provide some context. Over the period of 1999–2004, the US Department of Commerce provided funding to Thailand (US $754,588) as part of an IPR trade capacity building program. In addition, the EU Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) and the European Patent Office (EPO) have several socialization programs with ASEAN countries, using the European Commission’s budget to advocate western IP standards by technical cooperation and capacity-building programs (Morin and Cartwright 2020: 564–565). This fact might partly explain the perception that the DIP favors foreign invention patent applicants in Thailand. During 2000–2003, there was vigorous action by HIV/AIDS-infected people and civil society groups for better access to AIDS medicines and treatment. These efforts finally resulted in the inclusion of anti-viral drugs into the national UHC for Thai citizens in 2005. Further lobbying to revoke the patent of combined HIV/AIDS drug Combivir, which was patented by British drug company GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), was successful in 2006. GSK decided to withdraw the patent from Thailand and India, resulting in local manufacturers being able to produce this medicine at lower prices. In 2006, civil society groups moved against the negotiating and signing of the Thailand– US free-trade agreement (TUSFTA). The agreement contained a patent protection rule that intended to extend the patent term for another 5 years. The negotiation raised concerns among Thai NGOs and activists that access to HIV/AIDS drugs would be even harder for patients who needed them. Meanwhile, the AIDS patients network also strongly supported exercising CL (Sittikriangkrai 2009: 17–18). The negotiation for TUSFTA was unexpectedly suspended immediately after the coup in 2006. Since then, Thailand–US relations have continued in the background according to the military government, but the USA has remained as a strong influence on Thailand in terms of economic force, particularly in IP protection. In 2016, a director-general of DIP expressed the will to amend the Patent Act again to make the patent registration process faster. The head of the DIP mentioned the priority of removing Thailand from the US Priority Watch List for intellectual property violations. Interestingly, the department informed the public that the Thai authority would work collectively with the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) to suppress IP piracy and violation (Bangkok Post 2016). The ISOC is a security authority that was charged with the responsibility to tackle communist movements in the past, but now also tackles various issues including IP violations.

3.3 Compulsory Licenses: Right or Taboo? Another political tension caused by economic globalization concerned the fallout after Thailand’s decision to use a safeguard mechanism and grant CLs forseven medicines during 2006–2008. CL is an allowed mechanism in the TRIPSAgreement set by the WTO. The article 31(k) of the TRIPS Agreement permits the use of patents without authorization of the rights holder, including the use by the government or third parties authorized by the government (WTO 2017).The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health in the WTO in 2001 also recognized

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and confirmed the significance of dealing with public health problems especially caused by HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and epidemics in developing and leastdeveloped countries (WTO 2001). Nonetheless, the decision and the subsequent implementations were fiercely criticized by multinational pharmaceutical firms, especially American medicine companies operating in the Thai market. The background of the decision to use CLs was the policy ambition of providing universal health coverage to all citizens, and a subsequent initiative from a group of doctors from rural areas to push this policy to the national level. The coverage aimed to provide necessary drugs, including AIDS medicines, to all Thai citizens. However, at the time, the program had little success because many of the necessary drugs had to be imported and were too expensive for the Thai authority or most Thai patients to buy. The group of doctors, nonetheless, kept pursuing their ambition and concerns to improve access to medicines for the nationwide population. The group formed by Thai doctors, nurses, pharmacists, and dentists named the “Rural Doctors’ Society” brought the agenda through the political channel through the Democrat Party, which was the incumbent political leader at the time but failed. They continued to push the agenda again through the following Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, and he accepted and adopted it as policy for his party, Thai Rak Thai Party. During 2005–2006, there was an attempt by the Department of Disease Control (DDC) to negotiate a lower price of an anti-fungal drug, Fluconazole, for AIDS patients. The patent for Fluconazole is held by an American company and negotiations, both official and unofficial, failed to achieve an outcome with no cooperation from the patent holder. Ultimately, drug firms refused to decrease the price, and declined to grant a license to the GPO. Considering a CL as a last resort, to comply with the TRIPS Article 31(h), the royalty fees were prepared as renumeration for drug firms, although they were never recognized nor the payments accepted.2 By 2007, there were almost 600,000 HIV-infected people in Thailand (Akksilp et al. 2007: 1001). At the time, the number of AIDS patients in Thailand were considered high and it was a serious public health necessity to tackle HIV infections. The decision to grant CLs started in 2006 and continued in 2007. The process was supervised by the then Minister of Public Health, Dr. Mongkol na Songkla. Initially, the process targeted three CLs (three AIDS drugs: Efavirenz, Lopinavir plus Ritonavir, and one anti-platelet drug: Clopidogrel).3 Later in 2008, the Ministry of Public Health granted another four CLs for cancer drugs (Erlotinib, Letrozole, Docetaxel, and Imatinib).4 The Thai authority stated that they were forced to act because of the extremely high prices of these medicines and the soaring number of patients who needed them (Chokevivat 2020: s178). 2

From author’s interview with a GPO researcher, 20 March 2017. The patent holder of Efavirenz was Merck Sharp and Dohme (trade name: Strocrin); the patent holder of Lopinavir and Ritonavir was Abbott (trade name: Kaletra); and the patent holder of Clopidogrel was Sanofi-Aventis (trade name: Plavix). 4 The patent holder of Erlotinib was Roche (trade name: Traceva); the patent holder of Letrozole was Novartis (trade name: Femara); the patent holder of Docetaxel was Sanofi (trade name: Taxotere); and the patent holder of Imatinib was Novartis (trade name: Glivec). 3

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The CL decision led to escalated tensions between the Thai and US governments. The reaction of the USTR was again to place strong pressure on the Thai government by expressing its strong resentment about the CLs. The USTR threatened the Thai government that it would issue a trade retaliation. As the patent holders, the pharmaceutical MNCs informed public media that the Thai government did not consult with them. They insisted that the CLs were illegitimate and could not be granted without prior consultation with the patent holders. Such claim was contrary to the TRIPS Agreement Article 31(k). USA for Innovation, a lobby group representing American pharmaceutical interests, published newspaper advertisements and information on their website months after of Efavirenz CL was granted indicating that Thai drugs made by GPO were substandard and led to drug resistance. FTA Watch, a local NGO reported that in May 2007, the GPO reacted in an immediate press conference to counter the issues raised with scientific facts and mentioned bringing a lawsuit against the lobby group for defamation. Conflicts also occurred at the government level. In February 2008, the next Minister of Public Health, who was a politician from the Thai Rak Thai Party, mentioned a plan to suspend the CL of patented drugs but was staunchly attacked by the National Legislative Assembly and the then opposition, the Democrat Party, during government policy debate. The Democrat Party leader criticized the idea of CL cancellation by the Minister and argued it would undermine Thailand’s bargaining power with trade partners and pharmaceutical multinationals. One of the members of National Legislative Assembly raised a question for the Public Health Minister’s intention to stop the CL despite the benefits of Thai patients, and required the then Prime Minster, Samak Sundaravej, to clarify such motivation on behalf of the government. Patients and health activists were anxious that the Samak government would invalidate the CLs for the initial AIDS and heart disease drugs issued in 2006–2007. Within the Ministry of Public Health, there was confusion over whether the Minister’s order to issue the second lot of CLs should continue because it was a highly contested action with serious opposition from multinational drug companies. The Federation of Thai Industries expressed support for the pharmaceutical CLs as a legitimate measure. They argued that the CL program should not be reversed just because of concerns on tariff benefits for Thai exporters. NGOs and consumer networks stressed that the Public Health Ministry could face administrative charges for negligence of duty had it decided against continuing the CL measures. However, the previous use of CLs in Thailand made an impact on some of the original drug MNCs. In 2008, Novartis, the original drug producer of Imatinib, which was a very expensive leukemia medicine (almost US $30 or approximately 900 Baht per tablet), decided to supply Imatinib for free to a number of poorer cancer patients in Thailand under the national UHC program. The market price of this medicine in Thailand was 20 times higher than the generic version produced in India. The move was to offer free drugs in exchange with the National Health Security Office to drop a plan to issue a CL on the drug, and Novartis could continue to market their leukemia drugs to other patients who could afford the market price (Ollier 2008: 12; PharmAsia News 2008).

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The Thai authority constantly insisted on full compliance with the international trade rules of TRIPS Agreements and the Thai Patent Act. However, the CL operations during 2006–2008 were initiated under the unelected military government. The CL dispute gained extensive media coverage and, inevitably, the Thai authority, particularly the Ministry of Public Health and the government, were faced with retaliation by pharmaceutical MNCs and the US government in obviously coercive and aggressive communications (Chokevivat 2020: s178, s182). Industrial associations in the USA, such as the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) and the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO) reportedly requested that the US government list Thailand as a Priority Foreign Country as part of the annual Section 301 on intellectual property report. A country listed as a Priority Foreign Country is considered by the USTR to have policies or practices that are severely harmful to American products. The country is then subjected to investigation under the US’s Section 301 provisions of the Trade Act of 1974. If the country sufficiently improves IP rights protection or negotiates in good faith with the USA, it may be removed from the list.5 After the Thai government announced the CLs for three AIDS drugs and one heart disease drug in early 2007, the giant pharmaceutical companies petitioned the US government, and Thailand was designated as Priority Watch List and has remained on the list ever since (Bangkok Post 2013). Interestingly, in 2007 there was no PFC in the USTR’s report. Instead, the USTR put countries on several watch lists, which was claimed as USTR practice, not under Section 301. Due to the Trade Policy Office’s clarification in 2008, CL is permitted by the TRIPS Agreement and the USTR informed it that the USA did not take Thailand’s CLs program to the consideration to change the status of Thailand to be the PFC and to cut the GSP (Office of Trade Policy 2008). In May 2007, the Department of Disease Control (DDC) of Thailand called a press conference to defend against the accusation by USA for Innovation, a lobbyist group, who attacked Thailand with the claim that a generic AIDS drug produced by Thailand’s GPO (GPO-vir) was substandard. GPO-vir was the first generic drug prepared as a combination of three drugs for the treatment of advanced HIV; it was formulated by Dr. Kraisintu of the GPO Thailand. DDC explained to the public that GPO’s generic drug was approved for use to save the lives of AIDS patients. The efficacy and safety of GPO-vir in first-time patients was tested in some domestic studies (Wutisatirapinyo 2005). However, it was not until 2018, when Efavirenz was produced by the GPO and was certified twice in the WHO-Prequalification program in 2018 and 2020, that the first drug from Thailand and from Southeast Asia successfully passed the WHO standard (WHO 2018b). Although AIDS has recently become a treatable disease with combinations of three to four drugs, the possibility of drug-resistant HIV continues to be a threat to human health security. New medicines for HIV treatment are still needed. Dolutegravir, a new AIDS medicine produced by GSK was introduced and a patent application for the substance was submitted in Thailand. In 2019, activists and AIDS patient 5

USTR. Background on Special 301. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/asset_upload_file694_1 1120.pdf Accessed 1 Feb 2021.

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networks continued to actively monitor developments around lifesaving medicines and their patents. The network of AIDS patients unsuccessfully attempted to suggest the government consider CL for Dolutegravir, as CL has become a very difficult tool to use. Though CL is perceived as a legitimate tool provided by the TRIPS Agreement for governments to legally use when necessary, Thai governments seem to become increasingly reluctant to use it.

3.4 More Than TRIPS: TRIPS-Plus Agreements After 1995, making preferential trade agreement has become an option for some states to use apart from multilateral deals. Chorev (2007) observed that such a trend was triggered because the efforts to promote stronger IP standards at the multilateral level had failed (Chorev 2007: 33). After the TRIPS Agreement was concluded, new preferential trade agreements (PTAs) were proposed with newer and more demanding rules for IP protection and enforcement. As Shadlen et al. (2020) has discussed, TRIPSPlus rules have been proliferating in the bilateral trade pact, especially US trade agreements. (Shadlen et al. 2020: 75–84) While developing countries like Thailand or India could choose to switch from a trade argument to a “human rights” argument in supporting their actions in making CLs, some major economies also started to move or shift away from the usual negotiation forum at the WTO by forming alternative trade groups and dealing for more stringent IP standards (Nillsuwan 2018: 13–17). As Teodoro (2020) pointed out, the USA is one of the key actors in the initiation of TRIPS-plus agreements, including the TRIPS-plus provisions in new PTAs, which have caused debates within the US legislature. Debates in Congress demonstrated the existence and recognition of the power and influence of pharmaceutical industries in agreement-making as “powerful special interests.” IP provisions in some PTAs with foreign countries, such as patent term extension and prohibition of medicine importation with PTA partners could also impact access to medicines for American consumers because powerful pharmaceutical firms can block imports of generic medicines in lower-price brand-name medicines into the United States (Teodoro 2020: 433, 440–441).

4 Beyond TRIPS-Plus: Choices and Adaptation Global economic tensions have continued in the heavily globalizing world after the introduction of TRIPS and TRIPS-plus rules. The quarrels about the need for flexibilities in IP protection rules for low- and middle-income countries are likely to continue. The public health community, development activists, and NGOs harbour concerns about the risks that come with trade agreements to promote the expansion of IP protection. Stronger standards of IP protection in the development of

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global economic rules and norms negotiated outside the WTO will continue to block generic drugs in competition in markets, thus prolonging the problem of public health budgets and access to medicines for developing countries (Townsend et al. 2016: 682). Two recent mega-regional free-trade negotiations (RCEP and CPTPP) have been the subjects of much attention from civil society groups in developing countries. The RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) is the largest recent regional free-trade deal; it was initiated by the ASEAN-10 countries and six other countries in the region (China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand). The deal would impact around one-third of the world’s GDP and populations. On 15 November 2020, the deal was signed by 15 countries after India decided not to join the RCEP deal in November 2019 partly due to the escalated tension over border disputes with China and perceived disadvantages of the RCEP for Indian businesses (The Diplomat 2020; Gaur 2020). RCEP will be in effect when at least three ASEAN countries and three non-ASEAN partners ratify it. In 2012, the ASEAN leaders adopted the Guiding Principles, which officially declared that IP norms would to be included in RCEP negotiations, with the aim to remove barriers to trade and investment by promoting economic integration and cooperation in the utilization, protection, and enforcement of IP rights (MOFA 2012). As a result, before the deal was able to be reached, just like other TRIPS-plus agreements, the IP chapter in RCEP was one of the most controversial follow-up points for Thai activists and civil society groups. The IP chapter was discussed widely. There was much fear and anxiety that RCEP would prevent contracting states from using flexibilities, such as public health safeguards, as allowed in the TRIPS Agreement. As reported in the media, India was vocal in its opposition and fervently rejected the proposal to take TRIPS-plus provisions into RCEP, especially negotiation on pharmaceutical patents (Sharma 2019: 316). Health activists in Thailand closely followed the case and constantly expressed their concerns on joining the RCEP, fearful of two major issues. First, some feared that a requirement for patent term extension would be beyond 20 years. Second, there was a concern whether the dispute settlement mechanism offered by RCEP would be the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). If Thailand signed the RCEP and accepted the ISDS mechanism, emerging cases of the private sector suing a government for using compulsory licensing would be strongly opposed. If there are future public needs to urgently produce a lifesaving drugs in cases of a pandemic or epidemic, Thai civil society groups would keep monitoring and stay alert to make movements to pressure the government to keep the right to issue compulsory licenses for needed medicines. It turned out that intellectual provisions in the RCEP agreement were more relaxed than the restrictive IP rules in the CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership). However, future international economic tension may continue due to some potential economic consequences. First, patents for future pharmaceutical products tend to involve multiple patents. Modern innovators in the USA commonly lodge several patents that relate to different aspects of the one product. This practice may increase the monopoly period of the product (Gupta

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2020: 28). It may naturally delay other producers to compete in the market and impede broader availability and accessibility of the product. In the case of necessary medicines, this kind of circumstance may not be beneficial to general public health. Second, if a government decides to use compulsory license as allowed in the TRIPS and RCEP, compensation to multiple patent owners may be too costly and could seriously burden the national budget of a developing country. Although it is regarded as a legitimate action by international trade rules, compulsory licensing tends to become an increasingly difficult option for middle-income countries. The CPTPP is another mega-regional trade agreement that has become another point of concern for the future IP considerations of Thailand. In August 2021, Thailand came to another crossroad where the decision whether to join the deal must finally be made after the long suspension due to many stumbles. Formerly, the deal was publicly known as Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which was initiated in 2005 by Chile, Brunei, Singapore, and Peru. Later the deal was joined by other interested partners and was finally signed by 12 nations including the USA. The TPP was previously known as a massive trade deal in which the level of patent protection for pharmaceutical products was greatly upgraded. However, the USA withdrew from the TPP in January 2017 by the decision and action of President Donald Trump in the first days of his presidency. The remaining partners consisted of Japan, Australia, Canada, Chile, Singapore, New Zealand, Brunei, Vietnam, Mexico, Peru, and Malaysia. They reopened the agreement and switched to the new name of CPTPP, which inherited the high standard terms of the TPP. This massive trade agreement would cover a trade volume of around US $356 billion, or equal to a market of 500 million people and accounting for 13.5% of the world economy. The CPTPP includes various new rules covering areas such as environment protection, labour, data circulation, and state-owned enterprises. Countries like Thailand, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, South Korea, and the UK (after Brexit) raised their hands for interest in participating in the CPTPP. The EU also expressed willingness to cooperate with CPTPP partners in the long run (Li and Whalley 2020: 1). Thailand could take opportunities to delay any consideration to join regional or bilateral trade deals since the coup in 2006 and again in 2014. Civil society groups and health activists in Thailand have been strongly opposed to entering the CPTPP for the fear of future harmful consequence to the country for three main issues. The CPTPP issues that sparked serious concerns are access to medicines, farming, and food security. Strong patent restrictions in the CPTPP introduced concerns that Thailand’s rights to access to medicines would be damaged and the public health system would suffer. At the administration level, the Cabinet expressed divisive opinions about pros and cons of entering the CPTPP. The Minister of Public Health reportedly sided with the civil society groups in opposing the deal, while the Minister of Commerce pushed for Thailand to join it. The news media also suggested that the then economic Cabinet leader and Deputy Prime Minister Somkid Jatusripitak eagerly pushed to join the CPTPP, although Mr. Jatusripitak denied such action to public (Bangkok Post 2020a). The former Minister of Public Health who oversaw the issuing of CLs

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for AIDS drugs in Thailand in 2006–2008, however, harshly criticized the economic team for risking the country’s interests. The CPTPP also generated hot debate among Thai activists and private sectors. The leader of the AIDS Access Foundation commented that the CPTPP will obstruct Thailand’s procurement of essential drugs under compulsory licensing. Activists recalled how the CLs helped hundreds of thousands of poor Thai patients to access HIV/AIDS drugs in the past decade. Although there was hope of boosting the country’s GDP after the COVID-19 pandemic by entering the CPTPP pact, the Thai Chamber of Commerce raised concerns of possible adverse impacts of the IP standards of the CPTPP to the Thai economy. Under the CPTPP’s IP protection level, there is a grave concern that Thai farmers can no longer freely save and reuse the seeds of patented plants. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Commerce, Jurin Laksanawisit, decided to drop the CPTPP application from the agenda in the Cabinet meeting in April 2020 because of strong opposition from civil society groups and activist networks. The Federation of Thai Industries viewed that it has been questionable whether Thailand would benefit from the CPTPP. If Thailand was to become disadvantaged, the private sector would stop supporting the country to enter the deal (Bangkok Post 2020b). In July 2020, activist groups staged a street protest against the military government’s desire to enter the CPTPP. The Ministry of Commerce expressed the view that CPTPP would boost the country’s low economic performance after the COVID-19 outbreak (Bangkok Post 2020c). In August 2020, the CPTPP was opened for new membership applications in the annual meeting among members in Mexico. Thailand, however, suspended the application for a new CPTPP membership because there was total lack of consensus among the committee in the Trade Negotiation Department of the Commerce Ministry on whether to apply and enter the deal. Some members of the committee were uncertain about the long-term benefits for Thailand. Thai authorities, farmers, and those from private sectors reminded the government that Thailand must not lose advantages in rice and farming production, which would occur under the terms of the CPTPP that requires members to accede to or ratify the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 1991. After a long hesitation, in October 2021, the Thai government led by the former junta showed the possibility of joining the CPTPP right after the news that the United Kingdom started to negotiate to join the deal, and China and Taiwan officially applied to join the CPTPP. The Administration signaled some concerns that, if not entering CPTPP, Thailand might be left behind from the future trading across the Indo-Pacific region. Further development on the CPTPP was still awaited from the government and the Ministry of Commerce.

5 Conclusion The experience of Thailand in disputes over drug patents and compulsory licensing has demonstrated that global economic forces can generate domestic conflicts or tensions according to inequities that globalization brings with it. IPR protection

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rules and norms under the TRIPS Agreement have proliferated and expanded to all WTO member states. The ensuing TRIPS-plus provisions that are further proposed and negotiated in more recent intercontinental trade deals like RCEP and CPTPP are what global economic forces look like in the form of regulations in the twenty-first century. Such forces, and the subsequent inequalities and difficulties for developing countries or less-affluent states, potentially cause more conflicts. The effects of the global IP standards on domestic tensions can be observed in Thailand’s case in three ways. First, economic globalization is generated through the universal rules in international organizations, which may come with coercive tools of major powers. Globalization may provide new opportunities for states to access new markets, products, technologies, and capital but in the globalizing process, states are not free from coercive economic measures. Globalization may give rise to powerful non-state actors, such as drug MNCs, with influence on national public policymaking in other countries. Conflicts can keep appearing as the global forces contrast to the needs and interests of domestic actors. Second, globalization leads to more common rules in trade or investment, such as IP protection for all trading states participating in the WTO, but states and non-state actors may challenge them according to the complexities of the rules. Having the agreed and common rules does not mean that states are free from external political and economic pressures from globalization. The legal tools that are agreed and permitted by the multilateral international rules, such as using compulsory licensing, may or may not work without strong insistence of governments and perseverance of domestic authorities. Lastly, globalization may exacerbate local conflicts as it brings inequalities among people especially those who lose what advantages they previously possessed. Globalization may lead to more cooperation in larger trade pacts. PTAs and FTAs are expected to generate more income and higher GDP for participating countries. However, in the case of public health, equality in access to needed medicines or vaccines cannot be guaranteed. Instead, the expanded and higher IP standards than what the TRIPS Agreement has set will continue to introduce contentions in the context of public health inequality. Difficulties that poorer and vulnerable citizens are facing may be more aggravated because of the expansion of global economic rules that come with globalization.

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Benjamas Nillsuwan is currently a lecturer at the School of International Affairs, the Faculty of Political Science and Public Administration, Chiang Mai University, Thailand. Nillsuwan completed her B.A. (Political Science) at Chulalongkorn University, Thailand (2002), an MA degree in International Relations at the International University of Japan, Japan (2012), and a Ph.D. in International Development (International Cooperation) (2019) at Nagoya University, Japan. Her research interests include international political economy, international trade and conflicts, regime complexity studies, international cooperation, and development studies.

Afghanistan and the Curse of Resources: Taliban’s Greed-Based Jihad in the Heart of Asia Mohammad Reza Qasemi

Abstract Despite Afghanistan’s geopolitical and geostrategic significance, its lucrative mineral resources—estimated to be worth 1–3 trillion US dollars which have potential positive economic impacts but are also considered as one of the major factors for the perpetuation and exacerbation of violent conflicts in the country. The minerals are considered some of the key easily accessible resources and one of the main incentives for the Taliban militants to continue to their greed-based Jihad for over two decades. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, Taliban’s initial purpose of war was based on grievance and religious identity, but since then, it has been transformed into greed for controlling natural resource-rich areas. Therefore, with the fall of Ashraf Ghani’s administration on 15 August 2021, Taliban are now mega-rich. With the economy in very poor condition and over 30 million people suffering from hunger and unemployment, there are two things that can possibly shift Afghanistan’s unstable economy into a stable one: establishing a decentralized and inclusive political system and the proper exploitation [and securing] of its mineral wealth. Keywords Afghanistan · Government failure · Greed and grievance · Local conflicts · Mineral resources · Pakistan · Peace talks · Iran · United states

1 Introduction We are at risk of the curse of plenty, [the] curse of resources. Ashraf Ghani, former President of Afghanistan In the economic literature, the curse of natural resources refers to the situation in which countries with abundant natural resources experience stagnant economic growth and recessions (Shafaie 2018). Income from natural resources within a country in the form of foreign currencies strengthens the local currency, and, as a result, the competitiveness of other local economic industries is undermined. A M. R. Qasemi (B) Political Analyst and former Diplomat, Kabul, Germany © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 Y. Nishikawa (ed.), Globalisation and Local Conflicts in Africa and Asia, Evidence-Based Approaches to Peace and Conflict Studies 7, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8818-8_8

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lack of transparency in contracts between governments and multinational resource companies means that there is little opportunity for public scrutiny of leaders and government authorities that would discourage the misuse of resource revenues. As a result, rather than being channelled into socio-economic development as national wealth, such revenue streams can be easily squandered or misappropriated to provide a platform for increased corruption. Negative outputs of natural resource extraction, particularly concerning environmental pollution and water quality degradation, are other dimensions of the curse of natural resources. The most destructive aspect of the so-called curse occurs when the government is unable to manage the proper extraction of the resources and fails to secure them. In all respects of the curse of natural resources, Afghanistan has suffered seriously over recent decades. While the global political economy has been established on the sacrifices of certain peoples and regions of the world, one of the major sacrifice zones for the global political economy has been Afghanistan. Torn by four decades of war and desperate poverty, Afghanistan is considered to be located on one of the finest treasures of minerals on the planet (Katawazai 2021). Alas, after two decades of effort at the national and international levels for peace, it has become obvious that Afghanistan is anything but a stable and prosperous country (Qasemi 2016). Considering Afghanistan’s geopolitical and geostrategic significance, its lucrative mineral resources —estimated to be worth US $1–3 trillion—have great potential to provide positive economic impacts. However, Afghanistan’s mineral resources are also considered as one of the major factors for the perpetuation and exacerbation of violent conflicts in the country. In total, the number of mineral fields in Afghanistan is at least 1400. The oil deposits in the country are estimated to be around 3.8 billion barrels mainly in the provinces of Jazzman and Balkh (Bada 2019). In addition, the mountainous regions of Afghanistan form the headwaters of several rivers that are vital for agriculture in Pakistan and Iran. The exploitation of large deposits such as gas, oil and iron ore requires huge investment and advanced technology, access to readily available high-value minerals is strongly contested by the Taliban and local strongmen. Reports indicate that in 2019, out of the total US $1.6 billion of illicit revenue, the Taliban earned more than US $464 million from the extraction and smuggling of precious stones (Shaheer 2020). Prior to the fall of Kabul on 15 August 2021, the production and smuggling of opium made up the Taliban’s second main source of income. Many researchers suggest that developing countries face a significant risk of violent conflict and poor governance if they are extremely dependent on primary commodities and fail to secure and properly exploit their natural resources. Revenues from the legal or illegal exploitation of natural resources have fuelled catastrophic conflicts in many countries across the globe (Collier 2003). Although Afghanistan has always been highly dependent on primary commodities, it has been heavily reliant on foreign aid since 2002. Both Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani’s administrations were highly dependent on foreign aid until the Ghani administration’s collapse in mid-August 2021. Now that the Taliban regime has taken over the country and it has already failed to manage the financial resources and establish a government which is

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acceptable by the people and the international community and has asked repeatedly the international community particularly the United States to unfreeze the government’s 10 billion US dollar-worth assets. Apparently, the Taliban regime seems more reliant on foreign aid and this reliance is expected to continue for many years to come. Nevertheless, natural resources are never the only origin of conflict and they do not make conflict unavoidable. However, the existence of plentiful primary commodities, particularly in low-income societies, increases the jeopardy of possible conflict. If a conflict does break out, the presence of such resources tends to contribute to prolonging it and make it more difficult to resolve (Collier 2003). In the meantime, without a coherent response, these resources—and others like them across Afghanistan—represent not just a lost opportunity but a threat to the whole country and the region. For small but high-value resources, particularly gemstones, informal exploitation using basic techniques is usually conjoined with an illicit export trade. In such a context, local powerholders are usually involved. This means that a degree of stability is maintained for periods of time but conflicts can arise again when new stakeholders become involved or when old agreements are renegotiated (Byrd 2012). Therefore, soon after the takeover of capital Kabul, conflict of interests has already arisen among different Taliban factions particularly between the Haqqani Network1 and Taliban. The Haqqani Network which makes an important part of the main body Taliban focuses on Kabul and Northern mineral-rich provinces, while the Taliban led by Mullah Hibatullah (despite being the Amir of the Islamic Emirate) have no choice but getting focused on the resources of Southern and Western parts of Afghanistan. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) suggests that arms sales by the 25 largest arms-producing and military services companies (arms companies) in the world totalled US $361 billion in 2019. This represents an 8.5% increase in real terms over the arms sales of the top 25 arms companies in 2018 (SIPRI 2020). Out of the global sales, the share of American companies is about two-thirds of global turnover, while the remaining substantial share is divided between European and Chinese companies. The popular Russian Kalashnikov and numerous Western light and heavy arms are somehow competing in Afghanistan and the Middle East. On the verge of the US troop withdrawal, Afghan diplomats of the Ghani administration were in discussion with Russian and some European arms-producing companies to purchase arms and other military equipment. These data clearly illustrate how the global political economy affects the conflicts in the Global South. The threats that regional and international terrorist networks such as ISIS, Al Qaeda and others pose to the national security of numerous countries; the interstate wars like those between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and between Saudi Arabia and Yemen; the civil wars and political unrest in the Middle East 1

The Haqqani Network is a Sunni Islamist militant organization founded by Jalaluddin Haqqani, who emerged as a top Afghan warlord and insurgent commander during the anti-Soviet war. Since 1995, it is a sub-set of the Taliban organisation. Its current leader is Sirajuddin Haqqani, the minister of interior affairs of the Taliban regime and a FBI designated terrorist. The terrorist network was one of close allies of the U.S. during the fight against the Soviet Union occupation of Afghanistan in 1980s (NCTC 2021).

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and Afghanistan; political and border disputes between many countries such as China–India and Pakistan–India; tensions in the South China Sea; and the seemingly never-ending war between Israel and Palestine, amongst others—many such conflicts between different powers at regional and global levels are somehow waged, ignited and perpetuated by deep states and global companies involved in arms, drugs, mineral resources and the energy sector, which directly benefit the said companies to the tune of hundreds of billions of dollars. Ultimately, hundreds of thousands of civilians die, millions are displaced and millions of others remain in poverty and trauma under failed and chaotic states for many years and decades to come.

2 Main Stakeholders in Afghanistan’s Political and Economic Affairs After the collapse of the Ghani administration by Taliban militants on the 15th of August 2021, Pakistan, the United States and Iran are among the key stakeholders in the political and economic affairs of Afghanistan. Certainly, Russia, China, India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar are also among the main players, but due to the limited capacity of this chapter, the author only scrutinizes the top three stakeholders in Afghanistan. Yet, we need to know who the Taliban are and what are they looking for in the heart of Asia.

2.1 The Taliban Project: The Looting Machine of Natural Wealth of Afghanistan There are four types of Taliban (Qasemi 2016: 50): 1. 2. 3. 4.

Local or Afghan Taliban: based in Afghanistan. Pakistani-Afghan Taliban: Afghan Taliban born in, trained in, working in or with considerable links to Pakistan. Pakistani Taliban: Taliban in Pakistan (non-Afghan) or Pakistani fighters in Afghanistan. Foreign Taliban: Taliban from other countries and sometimes with Al Qaeda links (Chechnya, Saudi Arabia, [, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, China’s Uyghurs] …).

Taliban are not only made in Pakistan but they are also Pakistan-led and Pakistanowned and have operated as a looting machine for the Pakistan security and religious establishments since 1995. The Taliban controlled Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001, reigning the ruined country and its deprived people with a maximum level of discrimination and religious cruelty. There is little difference between the Taliban regime of 2021 and that of 2001—at the moment, the radical regime knows how to use the mass media particularly the social media for their own benefit and propaganda,

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while the Taliban of 2001 considered the technology as a non-Islamic and Western satanic tool that aimed to spoil and divert the morals of the Muslims. However, their connection to Al Qaeda and hosting Osama Bin Laden, apparently the architect of the 9/11 attacks, and refusing to hand him over to the US government caused the overthrow of the Islamic Emirate in November 2001. Violence in Afghanistan showed a rapid increase soon after the end of the NATO military mission with the beginning of the ‘advice and assist’ role in June 2014. However, the resurgence of the Taliban became undeniable after the drawdown of peak U.S. forces in 2011 (Qasemi 2016). After the sudden fall of government to the Taliban, the general suspicion turned into certainty about the level of independence and permeability of Taliban leaders. The dominant belief at the national and international level is that the Taliban leaders are puppets for the Pakistani establishments and many other countries in the region including Iran, Saudi Arabia and even Qatar. One reason for this sentiment is the 20year settlement of all of the Taliban leaders in Pakistan, particularly in the Pakistani city of Quetta and the Iranian city of Mashhad where the two main Councils of the Taliban were located. The Quetta Council is the leading layer of the Taliban militants, and the chairman of the council is assumed as the leader of the Taliban. The Taliban were also permitted to open an office in the Qatari capital of Doha in 2013, which has since functioned as an official address of the group. With the fall of Kabul, the Taliban, once again, is in the process of being transformed into a serious threat against the region and the world. They are hosting international terrorist groups such as the Al Qaeda Network, East Turkistan Islamic Movement of China (ETIM), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Jamaat Ansarullah of Tajikistan, Lashkar e- Taibah (Let) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) of Pakistan and many more at this moment of writing this chapter. Islamic State of Khurasan Province (ISKP, ISK, ISIS-K) has also got a substantial presence in the Eastern and Northern parts of the country. Ironically, US officials have recently claimed that ISK might be able to conduct terror attacks on American soil in six months. ISK is mainly comprised of the dissatisfied Taliban hardliners and other international terrorists. The deadly attack on evacuation efforts at the Kabul airport was a clear message of the ISK’s strong presence in Afghanistan. Regarding the illicit revenue, because the exploitation of resources such as gas, oil and iron ore requires huge investment and advanced technology, the Taliban have focused on easily accessible resources that form one of the main incentives and local strongmen to fight for. Reports indicate that in 2019, out of its total illicit revenue of US $1.6 billion, the Taliban have earned more than the U.S. $464 million from the extraction and smuggling of precious stones (Shaheer 2020). Production and smuggling of opium are now the Taliban’s second main source of income. In addition, during 2020 and 2021, the Taliban sought to capture and destroy several dams across Afghanistan, particularly those near borders with Iran and Pakistan. Now that it controls almost the whole territory, its illicit revenue has multiplied. However, according to the UN report, over 30 million people are under the poverty line and sadly the number is increasing day by day since the Taliban government is

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unable to provide basic public services to the people such as salary, employment and controlling market price. During the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan in 2021, the Taliban gained a new lucrative source of income after they captured several border crossings and trade gateways to Tajikistan, Iran, Pakistan and Turkmenistan. Unlike the destruction of dams and highways, or destroying government administrative buildings and burning people’s homes, the Taliban chose to keep the border crossings operational and their fighters began collecting customs revenues (Amiri and Trofimov 2021). Annually, the total customs revenues of Afghanistan are estimated to be more than US $2 billion. The Taliban then controls the whole country and it has already agreed with Chinese and Pakistani governments on the extraction of mines in central and northern parts of Afghanistan. The following sections identify some of the major stakeholders who are linked with Afghanistan or its peace and conflict.

2.2 Pakistan: Owner of the Looting Machine Many writers point out Pakistan’s support of its looting machine, the Taliban. First, Pakistan wants strategic depth in Afghanistan, which means having a compliant government in Afghanistan, in case of war with India so that they have breathing space. Second, in case of war with India, Pakistan could send suicide bombers to India as they want to control the Taliban fighters. Third, Pakistan is uncomfortable with the Durand line dispute, which is based on the Durand border drawn up by the British Empire in the nineteenth century to separate Afghanistan from former Indian territories. The Government of Afghanistan has never recognized the Durand Line as the official border between the two countries and claims a much larger area of Pakistan as its territory (Smith 2008). Fourth, Pakistan covets the rich natural resources of Afghanistan. Therefore, it has no intention to give up on its proxy war in its neighbouring country. The natural resources of Afghanistan provide Pakistan with hundreds of millions of dollars annually. One of the main markets for Pakistan to export the minerals is its strategic neighbour, China. Having said this, one of the most significant issues that bothered ambivalent Pakistan and made it much more involved in Afghan politics, was the earnest presence of its historic rival India in many sectors of Afghanistan. The competition between Pakistan and India is not a recent issue. Rather, it goes back nearly seven decades, when India, in 1947, was divided into two, and the Durand line remained as the border between Afghanistan and the newly born state of Pakistan. Meanwhile, among its six neighbours, Afghanistan, on its east and south, has a long land border with Pakistan of more than 2600 km—most of which is uncontrollable by both sides. Both India and Pakistan have tried to influence their weaker and smaller neighbour Afghanistan in recent decades (Kerr 2011). However, since the establishment of the post-Taliban government in 2001, the rivalry between the two nuclear powers intensified, not only in economic and social activities but in political and security concerns as well. This situation entailed both

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negative and positive consequences for the people of Afghanistan. Since 2001, due to its enormous economic assistance (in terms of quantity and quality), India was marked as one of the most helpful states in the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan. The competition between India and Pakistan in Afghanistan was a proxy war and in particular, the Taliban are assumed to play as a backlash against India on behalf of Pakistan on Afghan soil. Many prominent Afghan leaders such as Rasool Sayyaf have been sheltered in New Delhi, while several political leaders including former Vice President, over 120 former members of parliament, and over 10 ministers have sought refuge in Turkey, a strategic ally of Pakistan. In short, the rivalry between India and Pakistan was mainly entrenched in two different fields. First, in a diplomatic setting, there was a dispute about who, how many and where (which cities of Afghanistan) should or should not have diplomatic missions. This was because Pakistan as a neighbouring country with tribal ties with Afghanistan claims that the Indian consulates in cities like Jalalabad and particularly in Kandahar (bordering the Baloch-dominated city of Quetta) were purposefully established to stimulate the separatist movement of the Pakistani Baloch ethnic group and organize terror attacks against Pakistani interests. Pakistanis have always expressed their discontent with the issue. In fact, in 2009, in a meeting with Pakistan’s Military Attaché in Ankara where I was also present, they strongly opposed India’s extensive presence in Afghanistan. Second, in economic terms, the rivalry was one-sided (Kerr 2011) because of the huge economy of India. The dominance of India is apparent: its ability to make huge investments and its capacity to provide economic assistance to Afghanistan. Two of the last but main contributions of India in Afghanistan are the construction of the parliament building in Kabul in 2015 and the India–Afghanistan Friendship Dam in Herat Province in 2016. For Pakistan, a chaotic or Taliban-controlled Afghanistan will provide a more lucrative market and will be easy to control. In such a situation, Pakistan reaps benefits on a larger scale by selling its low-quality products at the desired price into the Afghan market and smuggling the natural resources of Afghanistan—mainly opium, minerals, handicrafts and arms. As a result, Pakistan established and owns and leads the Taliban project to conquer Afghanistan. It then controls and loots the resources in Afghanistan. In addition, a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan would be a safe backyard for it that would prevent Pakistan from being squeezed like a hamburger between Afghanistan and India. On the other hand, India’s main question of Taliban is actually about Pakistan and China – both nuclear powers with historical animosities with India and deep ties with the Taliban. In terms of the market, businessmen in Pakistan design, polish and rebrand raw materials from Afghanistan and sell them under their brands to other countries. For example, significant volumes of jewellery, carpets and saffron are illegally transported from Afghanistan to Pakistan. Afghan refugees are involved in carpet weaving in the Pakistani cities of Peshawar and Quetta, where carpets are exported to other countries under Pakistani brands. In mid-July 2021, a series of Taliban attacks resulted in a temporary takeover of Spin Boldak, which is the trade gateway of Kandahar Province to Pakistan. While

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conducting counterattacks to retake the area, Afghan military forces were warned by Pakistani officials to stop their battle on the border area. This warning was meant to maintain the control of the border crossing under Taliban fighters. Twenty days after the fall of Kabul, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) chief Lieutenant General Faiz Hameed made an unounced visit to Afghanistan. It was the first high-level visit of any Pakistani official to Afghanistan since the Taliban took over Kabul on 15 August 2021. Pakistan claimed that the purpose of his visit was to discuss economic relations with the Taliban government but an intelligence chief rarely talks about economic relations. He was there to help the Taliban to make its mono-ethnic government and resolve differences between Haqqani Network and the Taliban over power-sharing. Subsequently, he accompanied Pakistan’s foreign minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi in a separate visit to Kabul. According to analysts and Pakistani leaders, the reasons behind Pakistan’s destructive and pessimistic interference in Afghanistan can be summarized in a few points. First, Pakistan still bears a grievance about Afghanistan’s negative stance on the membership of Pakistan at the United Nations (UN) in 1947. Afghanistan was the only country that disagreed with Pakistan’s membership at the UN. Second, since the establishment of Pakistan as a state, the Afghan government has continued to remind its neighbour of the border dispute based on the Durand line. Third, during the Cold War, particularly between 1973 and 1992, Afghanistan was on the Soviet side, while Pakistan was on the American side of the Western Bloc. Therefore, the fourth period of the antagonism (in other words, the period of exacerbation of proxy wars) was accelerated in the post-2001 era when India, to the horror of Pakistan, emerged as a major donor country, supporting and investing in the political and economic development of Afghanistan (Qasemi 2016: 55). The remaining major reason for Pakistan’s support of the Taliban and violence in Afghanistan is the natural resources (river water and minerals) in the war-torn country.

2.3 The United States of America Soon after the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington D.C. and upon the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the US has been the key player. The Bush administration, using over 100,000 troops, managed to topple the Taliban regime, while the Obama administration later began reducing the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan to 14,000 and switched to an ‘advise and assist’ role in June 2014. During the Trump Presidency, only 2500 American soldiers remained and a peace agreement was signed between the US and Taliban representatives in February 2021 in Doha, Qatar. And soon after President Joe Biden came into office, he announced the decision to end America’s longest war and indeed completely withdrew from Afghanistan by the end of August 2021. The Americans have been a key factor in promoting corruption and supporting corrupt influential figures in Afghanistan. According to the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, former US President Donald Trump craved

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Afghanistan’s lithium, uranium, gold and other minerals. Trump was convinced to maintain US troops in Afghanistan in 2017 by the Afghan president, Ashraf Ghani. In 2019, SOS International (SOSi), which has connections with the US military and intelligence, obtained exclusive access to mines in Afghanistan. Some believe that Ghani’s family received a revenue stream from this association (Benn and Kopplin 2021). Nonetheless, Afghans have paid the highest price for the American war between 2001 and 2021. For instance, America’s war on terrorism has killed almost 50,000 Afghan civilians and about 70,000 Afghan soldiers. UN watchdogs say the conflict has also killed 72 journalists and 444 aid workers in Afghanistan. The war has forced 2.7 million Afghans to flee abroad, mostly to Iran, Pakistan and Europe. Another 4 million are displaced within the country, which has a total population of 35 million (Associated Press 2021). Meanwhile, 2450 American troops have been killed and 20,666 have been wounded in the war since 2001. It is estimated that over 3800 American private security contractors have been killed and the 20-year financial cost is estimated to be US $2.26 trillion (Associated Press 2021). One of the main arguments about the two-trillion-dollar American invasion of Afghanistan and its two-decade presence in the war-torn country is that America has never invaded Afghanistan to eliminate the Taliban and fight terrorism. Rather, the US came to map the natural underground resources and transport a substantial amount of uranium, lithium, gold and gemstones to America. In a recent interview, the former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad explained a similar point of view on America’s purpose for invading Afghanistan. Given the reasons, the aim of the American invasion and its 20-year presence in Afghanistan was never meant to fight and eliminate terrorism. Instead, as it happened in Iraq and Syria, the battle was mainly to control and exploit the numerous and rare mines of Afghanistan. Many believe that there were serious rivalries between American and British military forces over-controlling Helmand Province, where huge uranium resources are located. Former Afghan President Hamid Karzai accused Americans of transferring hundreds of armed fighters (probably Taliban or ISIS) to Northern provinces where minerals deposits are located. Witnesses also report seeing many American military airplanes being loaded with huge unknown boxes. Non-Americans were not allowed to approach the area where the suspicious flights and loadings were taking place. It is noteworthy that out of the two-trillion-dollar expenditure, only a few billion were given directly to the government of Afghanistan and the rest was spent on tens of thousands of American soldiers, contractors and other American citizens working in Afghanistan. The fact is that the said amount would have been allocated to the same soldiers and contractors on US soil anyway. Reports indicate that the American troops destroyed their equipment and facilities and left the Afghan troops bases with empty halls and ruined and burned military equipment. Reports also say that the Afghan military authorities noticed the abandoned bases days after the Americans left. There was no coordination and information sharing by the Americans on the evacuation of the numerous military bases across the country.

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The other main purpose of the invasion was said to be containing Russia and China by equipping and dispatching ETIM and ISK fighters to the Northern provinces of Afghanistan bordering with China and Central Asian countries, the backyard of Russia. To continue and promote its plans, America aims to establish a new military base inside Pakistan. Hence, the U.S. refused participation in the October 2021 Conference on Afghanistan that was held in Moscow. It shows that a political will for a just and lasting solution does not exist among the stakeholders of Afghanistan. Americans particularly Zalmay Khalilzad, former US ambassador to Kabul and Special Representative on Afghan Peace Process repeatedly denied the Taliban’s inclusion to the newly established government in 2002 and their proposal of peace negotiation in 2003 and 2004. Though there was the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) behind all major changes, among the public, Mr. Khalilzad was considered as the main decision-making figure in Afghanistan affairs. Since he is an AfghanAmerican and ethnically Pashtun, he is considered to be behind all presidential elections results. He also led the peace dialogue between the U.S. government and the Taliban for several years. I believe that the last nail that was hit on the coffin of two-decade hard-gained achievements of the Afghan people was the time he signed the peace deal with the Taliban in Qatar on 29 February 2020. It is said that in the confidential annexes of the Peace Deal, it had been agreed that all provinces of Afghanistan would be handed over to the Taliban fighters except the capital Kabul. He had planned to remove President Ashraf Ghani from power and replace him with the Taliban. After he resigned from his position, in one of his interviews, Mr. Khalilzad claimed that President Ghani’s insistence on remaining in power led to the fall of the government.

2.4 Iran Since the beginning of the second quarter of the twentieth century, Iran started to take issue with the status of river waters from its upstream neighbour Afghanistan. The treaties of 1939 and 1973 on water management between Afghanistan and Iran were able to hinder, to a certain extent, the tensions between both nations but have never been able to stop the conflict and argument on water resources. The conflict between the two countries over water rights could have been worse were it not for other more pressing issues in each country. Afghanistan endured coup d’états in 1973 and 1978 and the subsequent civil war of 1978–2001, while Iran went through the Islamic revolution of Khomeini in 1979 and the Iran–Iraq war of 1980–1988. Nevertheless, soon after the fall of the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan, one of the megaprojects to be given priority by the Afghan government was water management inside Afghanistan territories. Several dams were constructed in different provinces, including the Afghan–India Friendship Dam and Pashdan Dam of Herat, Shah Aroos and Shah Toot Dams of Kabul, Kamal Khan Dam of Nimroz, Shurabak Dam in Badakhshan and Bakhsh Abad Dam in Farah Province.

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In March 2021, during the inauguration ceremony of the Kamal Khan Dam in Herat Province, Afghan former President Ashraf Ghani stated that his country will give more water to Iran but only in exchange for oil. He also insisted that Afghanistan will no longer give free river water to anyone. Thus, the accelerated military operations by Taliban militants on the dams across the country illustrate how natural resources in Afghanistan are directly connected to the political economy beyond its borders. Reports indicate that former Taliban leader, Mullah Akhtar Mansoor was killed while undertaking a secret visit from Iran to Pakistan. The subsequent hidden and open visits by Taliban leaders to Iran, especially for the last conference on peace between Taliban and Afghan leaders in Tehran and chaired by Jawad Zarif (Iranian foreign minister) in early July 2021, clearly show how Iran involved in Afghan politics to safeguard its economic and political interests in Afghanistan. In the meantime, some of the Taliban’s most serious attacks have taken place in provinces bordering Iran. For instance, in July 2021, while the Taliban negotiating team was having a dialogue with their Afghan counterparts in Tehran, Taliban fighters were able to take control of several districts including three key border crossings with Iran and Turkmenistan. Iran also held another conference in Tehran in late October 2021 to discuss the Afghanistan issue in which foreign ministers of neighbouring countries including the Taliban participated. Meanwhile, reports reveal that in a secret meeting, the Taliban have initially recognized Iran’s right of water of the Afghan Hirmand River. During the battle over seizing Afghanistan, one of the strategies that the Taliban started was to focus on taking control of the dams. For instance, after 6 months of non-stop battle with Afghan military forces, in May 2021, the Dahla Dam in the southern Kandahar Province (the second largest dam in Afghanistan) was captured by Taliban fighters. Previously, in 2013, when the Taliban took control of the Sultan Dam of Ghazni Province, they emptied the dam and left it dry. They also destroyed the Shurabak Dam of Kandahar Province in 2016. Taliban fighters attempted several attacks in which tens of former government’s security forces were killed in efforts to capture Kamal Khan Dam in the south-western Nemruz and the Afghanistan–India Friendship Dam in Herat Province—both bordering Iran. Such attacks and attempts to capture and destroy dams in bordering provinces of Afghanistan were never irrelevant to Iran’s dependency on Afghanistan’s river waters for its irrigation needs. In addition, the smuggling of minerals and saffron from Afghanistan has also benefited Iran to a substantial extent. Given the famous saying ‘My enemy’s enemy is my friend’, despite fundamental differences between the type of Iran’s Islamic order and that of the Taliban’s, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been content with the Taliban’s Jihad against NATO particularly the American troops. Iran perceives the US as its biggest enemy and, therefore, the Taliban is naturally aligned with Iran’s policy towards the US Now that Afghanistan is under Taliban rule, Iran feels much safer than of the time of American’s two-decade presence in its vicinity. In human terms, the presence of over three million Afghan refugees—mainly Shiite Muslims—emerged over the past four decades has been a huge asset to Iran for development projects and in political and military causes. In 2014, the Iranian

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government was able to misuse the compulsion of Afghan refugees, establish the Liwa Fatemiyoun and dispatch the Hazara refugees of Afghanistan to fight against ISIS in Syria. Reports indicate that 10,000–15,000 Hazaras were either forced or deceived to fight against ISIS and save Bashar Assad’s regime.

3 Taliban’s Greed-Based Jihad in the Heart of Asia, Afghanistan Afghanistan’s mineral resources, worth about US $3 trillion, have been a major factor in the perpetuation of decades of violent conflict in the country. Because exploitation of large deposits of gas, oil and iron ore requires huge investment and advanced technology, the Taliban and other armed groups have fought both the central government to control more easily accessible minerals and use them to fund their insurgencies (Benn and Kopplin 2021). In 2019, out of the Taliban’s total illicit revenue of US $1.6 billion, the Taliban earned more than US $464 million from the extraction and smuggling of precious stones (Shaheer 2020). Production and smuggling of opium are now the Taliban’s second main source of income. Lapis lazuli from Badakhshan, emeralds from Panjshir, serpentine from Ghor, Wardak and Kandahar, lithium from Ghazni and uranium from Helmand are some of the most popular minerals at regional and global levels. There is an investigation as to how 6500-year-old lapis mines in Afghanistan are driving problems such as corruption, conflict and extremism in the country (Witness 2016). The Global Witness revealed that before the fall of Kabul, the Taliban and other armed groups were earning around the US $20 million each year from lapis mines. Lapis lazuli is used in jewellery around the world and accordingly, the lapis lazuli stone produced in Afghanistan has been classified as a conflict mineral (Witness 2016). There are lapis mines in the Badakhshan region, which was once one of the more stable areas in Afghanistan, even when the Taliban held power in the country. However, power politics and violent competition between local powerholders, former members of parliament (MPs) and the Taliban over the control of the mining areas made the region one of the worst-affected by insurgencies. Given the figures on lucrative resources, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the Taliban’s initial motivation for war was based on grievance but since then it has been transformed into greed-based on the control of resource-rich areas. They have become very wealthy. Around US $200 million worth of lapis was exported from the mines in Badakhshan during 2014 and 2015. Much of that stone passed through Pakistan to China, where it was used to make jewellery (Carter 2016). Since then, violence and instability increased all over Afghanistan, especially in northern parts, and the illicit export of the lapis lazuli and other gemstones to Pakistan had also shown rapid

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increases. In short, there is a direct relationship between instability and the smuggling of minerals. Although a US–Taliban Peace Agreement was signed between a US Special Representative on Afghan reconciliation and the Taliban’s deputy chief for political affairs on 29 February 2020 in the Qatari capital Doha, and despite the withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan by the end of August 2021, the Taliban did not stop their greed-based Jihad. Rather, they accelerated their offensive operations that ultimately led to the fall of Ghani’s government. Following the US President Biden’s announcement of full withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan, unexpectedly, Taliban fighters accelerated their military operations mostly on Western and Northern parts of the country, where most of the minerals, dams and border crossings with Iran, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are located. Contemporary Afghanistan under the radical Islamic Emirate of Taliban militants, over 30 million people are suffering from hunger and unemployment. All women have lost their jobs—most of whom were the only breadwinners of their families. With the takeover of Afghanistan by Taliban militants, all achievements of the Afghan people are lost. On the other hand, natural resources worth trillions of dollars lie under the feet of the people and these resources are being exploited illegally by Taliban fighters and others from which the local people get almost no benefit. Currently, the number of Taliban fighters is estimated to be between 50,000 and 80,000, while this number was much smaller before 2010. Meanwhile, the number of military personnel of the previous government was around 350,000. With corruption and insufficient salaries within the government on one hand, and a promising incentive by the Taliban group on the other, there was a considerable motivation for the local poor and some military personnel to join the extremist group. For instance, the minimum monthly wage of a Taliban militant is US $400–500, while the government salary for Afghan soldiers was US $160–200, which is rarely paid on time. Its noteworthy that one of the main reasons behind the collapse of the Afghanistan to Taliban milltants was lack of political and moral support by the key officials such as National Security Advisor, Hamdullah Mohib and President Ghani himself. General Bismillah Mohammadi, the last defense minister of Ashraf Ghani’s administration and former prominent military officers and commanders have recently stated that despite lack of NATO air and ground support, the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) were determined to fight the enemy but commanders were receiving intimidating letters and orders from National Security Advisor’s office to retreat from the battle and leave the ground to Taliban fighters. Some reports indicate that the Taliban have not been honest in the February 2020 US–Taliban deal by not cutting ties with international terror groups such as Al Qaeda. Therefore, American officials have expressed their serious concerns over the Taliban being untrustworthy. Thousands of foreign fighters, particularly Pakistani nationals, are fighting for the Taliban group. Even military officers from Pakistan were leading battles in different parts of Afghanistan. Nonetheless, as stated above, Afghanistan has countless mineral deposits and other natural resources, some of which have been discovered and are ready to be exploited,

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and some were extracted but most of Afghanistan’s mineral deposits remain intact. Hundreds of sites in various parts of the country had been identified where various deposits are said to exist. Afghanistan’s annual income out of the minerals is estimated to be US $6 billion. Therefore, the Taliban is content and so far, there is no specific plan to feed the hungry population. Images were published on social media, which demonstrates Taliban militants beating tens of teachers in the Northern Province of Badakhshan who had gathered to ask for their salaries.

4 Main Revenues of the Taliban During the Two-Decade Long Jihad While fighting against the NATO forces and Ashraf Ghani’s government, in the 2019 fiscal year, the Taliban had brought in the US $1.6 billion according to Mullah Yaqoob, son of the late Taliban spiritual leader Mullah Mohammad Omar, who revealed the Taliban’s income sources in a confidential report commissioned by NATO (Bezhan 2020). For nearly two decades, during their reign in 1996–2001 and until 2014, the Taliban’s main source of income was opium and poppy cultivation. This section raises some of the major sources of Taliban’s revenues.

4.1 Minerals In mountainous Afghanistan, the mining of iron ore, marble, copper, gold, zinc, emerald, lapis lazuli and other metals and rare-earth minerals is an increasingly profitable business for the Taliban. Taliban militants were receiving certain amounts of money from both small-scale mineral-extraction operations and big Afghan mining companies, which allowed them to keep their businesses running. If such payments were not made, the companies would suffer serious consequences. According to the Afghanistan Association of Gemstone Processing Companies, the value of gemstones being smuggled outside the country each year exceeds US $1 billion. Although the Taliban’s Stones and Mines Commission (Da Dabaro Comisyoon) claimed that prior to coming to power, the group earned more than the US $400 million each year from mining, NATO had estimated that the figure was higher at around half a billion dollars—up from the just US $35 million in 2016 (Sufizada 2020).

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4.2 Opium The 2020 Report on World Drug Supply, which was prepared by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, indicates that opium is illegally produced in some 50 countries globally. However, Afghanistan is the main producer, accounting for about 84% of world production over the half-decade, and supplies markets in neighbouring countries, Europe, the Near and Middle East, South Asia, Africa and, to a small degree, North America (notably Canada) and Oceania (UNODC 2020). The Southern province of Helmand is at the top of the list followed by Kandahar, Oruzgan and the eastern province of Nangahar as poppy-producing regions. Several districts in the said provinces have been under Taliban control in the past two and half decades. After Afghanistan, countries with substantial opium production worldwide are Myanmar with 7% and Laos and Mexico with a combined 2% of global opium production (UNODC 2020).

4.3 Extortion and Taxes The Taliban were charging taxes to people and industries in the growing swath of Afghanistan.2 They also used to issue official receipts of tax payments. Previously, for the use of highways, the Taliban were also charging taxes to drivers. The group was/is also imposing a traditional Islamic form of taxation called ‘ushr’, which is a 10% tax on a farmer’s harvest, and ‘zakat’, a 2.5% wealth tax. According to Mullah Yaqoob, tax revenues, which may also be considered extortion, bring in around the US $160 million annually. Since some of those taxed are poppy growers, there could be some financial overlap between tax revenue and drug revenue. Taliban fighters justify their illegal income by claiming that they (the Taliban) were at war with the infidels and their followers (Jihad); therefore, any income that could help to sustain and strengthen their resistance and fight against the invaders is Sharia-oriented (legitimate).

4.4 Donations Hanif Sufizada reports as follows. ‘The Taliban receive covert financial contributions from private donors and international institutions across the globe. Many Taliban donations are from charities and private trusts located in Persian Gulf countries, a region historically sympathetic to the group’s religious insurgency. Those donations add up to about US $150–200 million each year. These charities are on the US Treasury Department’s list of groups that finance terrorism ‘ (Sufizada 2020). It is known that citizens from Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and some Persian Gulf nations also help finance the Taliban. According to American counterterrorism 2

Information presented in this section is based on Sufizada (2020).

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agencies, such support contributes around US $60 million annually to the Talibanaffiliated Haqqani network. In 2015, while in conversation with a prominent Afghan businessman, he explained to me that he was supporting the Taliban and transferred money on regular basis to Zabihullah Mujahid, the spokesman and deputy minister of culture and information of the Taliban regime.

5 Taliban: A Jihadist Group or a Foreign Project? The conflict in Afghanistan is a war among regional and international intelligence. The prominent Pakistani politician Senator Afrasiab Khattak remarked: “the Taliban are not only made in Pakistan, but they are also Pakistan-led and Pakistan-owned. Violent conflicts in Afghanistan isn’t civil war. It’s Afghan resistance against Pakistan and some regional countries’ intervention through its proxies.” The fight is not about the types of political systems in Afghanistan because the Taliban claim they fought to establish an Islamic Emirate, while the government was claiming it was striving to defend the Islamic Republic. At least for the Taliban, the Emirate was not a fundamental issue; rather, they merely covered and justified their so-called Jihad (project) to control the opium, minerals, and other natural resources in the country. Meanwhile, the government led by fugitive President Ghani was through serious clashes with other anti-Taliban political figures and parties since he came to office in 2014. Ghani’s team was fighting in different lines with different so-called enemies of the state, who were mainly Uzbeks, Hazaras and Tajiks. The clashes between Ghani’s team and the local anti-Taliban leaders had generated wide-ranging feelings of chaos and dissatisfaction among the public.3 When President Biden announced the end of America’s longest war, reports indicated that 18,000 personnel would remain in the country, mainly comprised of Pentagon contractors, mercenaries, special forces and intelligence operatives— privatizing and downscaling the war, but not ending it (Kuzmarov 2021). Secret negotiations over opening a new military base in Pakistan to conduct air operations on the so-called ‘ISK Jihadists’ and claim of possible terror attack in six months by the ISK against the US interests, clearly illustrate that America has not ended its war yet; rather, it is planning to privatize and redesign it in the region. Currently, nationwide fear has caused the huge escape of capital and money to the outside of the country. Hundreds of thousands of people mainly educated have fled the country. The brain drain from Afghanistan is one of the largest and disappointing in the twenty-first century. Almost all of the Afghan diplomats across the world have quit their jobs and fled a Western country. The escape of commercial companies, local and international NGOs from Afghanistan, withdrawal of the international 3

The crisis of Commander Ali Pur in Maidan Wardak Province, the chaos in Faryab Province with Ghani’s governor appointment and clashes between the Kuchis (Pashtun nomads) and local people in Panjshir Province are some of the examples of fugitive President Ghani’s vague and suspicious local politics with the influential figures across the country.

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forces from Afghanistan, and termination and lack of continuity of hundreds of developmental projects at local and national levels led to nationwide unemployment, hunger and deprivation of millions of families in Afghanistan. The political crisis in Afghanistan is controlled and planned one—mainly designed by the U.S. and applied by Pakistan and the Taliban. According to many politicians, analysts also say that during his power between 2002 and 2014, former Afghan President, Hamid Karzai, first ignored and then supported and promoted the Taliban group. However, after serious concerns over increasing insecurity in the northern parts of Afghanistan, Americans were accused of transferring ISIS and Taliban fighters secretly to the said area via air. There are serious concerns over maintaining the security of Kabul International Airport. Turkey is a major player that might take this responsibility. Securing the airport is essential to facilitate a smooth entry and exit for foreign diplomats and officials. Given that Turkey and Qatar are the potential candidates that might be allowed to take the management responsibility of the airport. Many are deeply concerned that it will become a major gateway for the removal of precious resources outside the country. In addition to all its challenges, Afghanistan has also been hit with the COVID19 pandemic during a difficult political transition, an intensifying conflict, and significant uncertainty regarding future grant support. As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and the fall of the government, the economy is estimated to have declined sharply by mid-2021. A research report (Holden and Pagel 2012) suggests that developing countries face fundamentally higher risks of violent conflict and poor governance if they are highly dependent on primary commodities. Holden and Pagel (2012: 26) state the following: Revenues from the legal or illegal exploitation of natural resources have financed devastating conflicts in a large number of countries across regions. When a conflict erupts, it not only sweeps away decades of painstaking development efforts but also creates costs and consequences—economic, social, political, regional—that live on for decades. The outbreak of violent domestic conflict amounts to a spectacular failure of development—in essence, development in reverse. Even where countries initially manage to avoid violent conflict, large rents from natural resources can weaken state structures and make governments less accountable, often leading to the emergence of secessionist rebellions and all-out civil war.

Given the high levels of violence after successful peace settlements in El Salvador, Mozambique, Nicaragua and South Africa, a basic expectation is that in a postconflict society, violence will continue to be one of the major challenges. In most countries after a formal peace agreement, the state still has not secured an effective monopoly over the means of violence (Cramer and Goodhand 2003).

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6 The Consequences of Taliban’s Jihad in Afghanistan Since 2001, at least 60,000 civilians have been killed in the war as of August 2021. The UN says the conflict has killed both journalists and aid workers. The violent conflict and the fall of the government have both forced millions of Afghans to escape to other countries. Around 4 million people are internally displaced out of a total population of 36 million (Associated Press 2021). The Taliban have imposed restrictions on women working in the public sector. However, only women working in gynaecology are permitted to work in health services but are restricted to wearing a Hijab. Other ethnic and religious groups such as the Sikhs and the Hazaras are under persecution, humiliation, deadly attacks and forced migration on a daily basis. Currently, the Taliban host and cooperate with international terrorist groups in different parts of the country. Once again, the group is in the process of being transformed into a serious threat against the region and the world. While striving for international recognition, the Taliban have stated that to save the world from international terrorist groups, the international community must recognize their government. In the past 25 years, the Taliban has proved that it never intends to be peaceful, democratic or cooperative with the Afghan people and the international community. Their main objective was to revive the Islamic Emirate in which human rights and democratic values have no meaning. The Taliban do not seem to cut their ties with international terrorist networks; rather, they continue to recruit and are in close collaboration with terrorists and foreign states to loot the natural resources of Afghanistan. The current political crisis and the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan have already posed a major threat to the rest of the world: the huge wave of migration. Moreover, Afghanistan’s drug trafficking and terrorism would be among other potential threats that might sooner or later become a serious challenge for the world.

7 Conclusion Afghanistan has entered a new phase in its history. The withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan and the Taliban’s takeover of the country indicate the historical failure of the international community in Afghanistan. Despite the defeat of the Afghan National Army, thousands of people have vowed to resist against the Taliban ideology. According to Lina Rozbih, journalist at VOA Dari, ‘’the decision of people to pick arms against the Taliban proves that [they] don’t have popular support in Afghanistan.” Apparently, the National Resistance Front (NRF) under the leadership of Ahmad Masoud is getting popular not only in Afghanistan but also across the world. Strong support by French authorities and opening an official office of the NRF in the US are clear messages to the Taliban that their power and control might not last long if they do not comply with the international community’s expectations

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and conditions such as forming an inclusive government and respecting women’s rights. Since the Islamic Emirate of the Taliban is not an independent movement, the world must address its concerns and conditions directly to the Pakistani establishments. As the prominent Pakistani politician Senator Afrasiab Khattak says, ‘’the Taliban are not only made in Pakistan, but they are also Pakistan-led and Pakistanowned. Peaceful resistance of women in the cities and the armed resistance under Ahmad Masoud and Commander Ali Pur against the Taliban is not a civil war. It’s a national resistance against Pakistan and other regional countries’ intervention through its proxies.” Therefore, once again, the Taliban project is in the process of being transformed into a serious threat against the region and the world. Currently, in the northern parts of Afghanistan, the Taliban are hosting and cooperating with international terrorist groups such as the East Turkistan Islamic Movement of China (ETIM), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Jamaat Ansarullah of Tajikistan. In the southern and eastern provinces of the country, there is no sign of the Taliban cutting their ties with the Al Qaeda network. With the difficult economic situation of Afghanistan, there are two things that could shift the unstable economy to stability: establishing a decentralized and inclusive political system and appropriate exploitation of its mineral wealth (Katawazai 2017). Unless there is a clear strategic approach and technological capability towards safeguarding sound extraction of the natural resources with a decent legal framework, the brutal rivalry and violent conflicts will continue. The country will remain in crisis and dependent on foreign aid for decades to come. For managing the country’s natural resources appropriately, public and private institutions need to be strengthened— particularly, the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum of Afghanistan, while relevant public and private institutions across the country must be given political and technical support. If the international community fails to support the management of natural resources and the rule of law in Afghanistan, the wealth brought by the resources in the country will be looted and used to fund terrorism around the world. On the other hand, despite series of serious efforts by Pakistan, the Taliban have failed to get national and international recognition and they also lack certain basic requirements to govern the country. Therefore, the regime may soon resume looting and smuggling the natural wealth of Afghanistan to Pakistan and Iran so that the gained revenue might enable them to strengthen their economic and political power. A solid consensus on a peaceful settlement of the Afghan crisis must be established and promoted at regional and international levels. If we understand the internal and external factors of the war in Afghanistan, local and international stakeholders should hold serious and honest negotiations and all initiatives that can help build peace in the country must be supported. Regional powers like Pakistan and Iran should be pressured not to support the Taliban and they must stop interfering. To achieve lasting peace in Afghanistan, honest, transparent and genuine cooperation from the Taliban and regional countries is vital. In this context, the UN Security Council Resolution 2513 must be applied and a monitoring mechanism should be established. Continued crisis and looting of natural wealth by the Taliban and its external supporters in addition to the vast destruction, poverty, and humanitarian crisis will further pose

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three more threats to the world: 1. a surge in illicit drugs; 2. a much bigger wave of migration to the West; and 3. transformation of Afghanistan to another "Syria" where dozens of international terror groups along with the Taliban commanders will fight to get more share of the natural wealth which ultimately benefit the powers behind the regional and global political economy.

References Amiri Y, Trofimov E (2021) The Wall Street J. https://www.wsj.com/articles/taliban-find-newrevenues-as-they-seize-afghanistans-u-s-built-border-gateway-11625495521. Accessed 15 July 2021 Associated Press (2021) www.usnews.com. https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/202104-30/counting-the-costs-of-americas-20-year-war-in-afghanistan. Accessed 14 July 2021 Bada F (2019) Natural Resources of Afghanistan. https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-arethe-major-natural-resources-of-afghanistan.html. Accessed 26 May 2021 Bezhan F (2020 RadioFreeEurop-RadioLiberty. https://www.rferl.org/a/exclusive-taliban-s-exp anding-financial-power-could-make-it-impervious-to-pressure-secret-nato-report-warns/308 42570.html. Accessed 09 Dec 2020 Byrd W (2012) Political economy and conflict dimensions of Afghanistan’s mineral resources: a preliminary exploration.: United States Institute of Peace, Washington D.C. Carter S (2016) China Dialogue. https://chinadialogue.net/en/business/9067-illegal-mining-for-chi nese-market-fuels-taliban-in-afghanistan/. Accessed 15 July 2021 Collier IBAP (2003) Natural resources and violent conflict. The World Bank, Washing DC Cramer C, Goodhand J (2003) Try again, fail again, fail better? War, the state, and the ‘Post–Conflict’ challenge in Afghanistan. International Institute of Social Studies, pp 885–909 Dudgeon I (2014) Afghanistan—transition to transformation. Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra Gutowski BRA (2020) FDD’s Long War J. https://www.longwarjournal.org/mapping-taliban-con trol-in-afghanistan. Accessed 07 Dec 2020 Holden J, Pagel M (2012) Fragile states’ economies: what does fragility mean for economic performance? https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08a65e5274a31e0 0005a8/Fragile_states_economies3.pdf. Accessed 17 July 2021 Katawazai AS (2017) The Diplomat. Accessed 04 Dec 2020 Katawazai AS (2021) The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/afghanistans-mineral-resour ces-are-a-lost-opportunity-and-a-threat/. Accessed 26 May 2021 Kerr BR (2011) Indian-Pakistani competition in Afghanistan: thin line for Afghanistan? http://www. caps.af/?p=1194. Accessed 13 July 2021 Kuzmarov J (2021) The Gray Zone. https://thegrayzone.com/2021/04/16/biden-afghanistan-warprivatizing-contractors/?fbclid=IwAR14RE-nwWpbbHypMUgQbOaWv9j6v54Ae_WbIAFE tNa-fEl1kOIk1EyyRws. Accessed 29 May 2021 Qasemi MR (2016) The contributions of track two diplomacy to promoting peace talks with the Taliban. In: The contributions of track two diplomacy to promoting peace talks with the Taliban, January, p 9 Roggio B (2021) FDD’s Long War J. https://www.longwarjournal.org/mapping-taliban-control-inafghanistan. Accessed 15 July 2021 Shafaie Z (2018) BBCPersian. https://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan-43313039. Accessed 14 July 2021 Shaheer AS (2020) subhekabul.com. https://subhekabul.com/%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA% D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A8%DB%8C%D8%B1/rep orts-mullahhabitullah-my-die/. Accessed 07 Dec 2020

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Shinn J, Dobbins J (2011) Afghan peace talks: a primer. RAND, California SIPRI (2020) Global arms industry 2020. SIPRI, Stockholm Smith G (2008) Talking to the Taliban. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/. Accessed 13 July 2021 Sufizada H (2020) The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/the-taliban-are-megarich-hereswhere-they-get-the-money-they-use-to-wage-war-in-afghanistan-147411. Accessed 09 Dec 2020 UNDP (2020) Potential capacities and the possible threats: extraction of the minerals in Afghanistan. UNDP, Kabul UNODC (2020) World Drug Report 2020. United Nations, Vienna Weiss BRAC (2021) Taliban has ‘surrounded’ five Afghan provincial capitals. s.l.: FDD’s Long War J Witness G (2016) Afghanistan’s famous lapis mines funding the Taliban and armed groups, new investigation shows. https://www.globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/afghanistans-famouslapis-mines-funding-taliban-and-armed-groups-new-investigation-shows/. Accessed 15 July 2021 World Bank (2020) Afghanistan and overview. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/afghanistan/ overview. Accessed 07 Dec 2020

Mohammad Reza Qasemi is a Political Analyst and a former Foreign Service Officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan. In 2016, he received his M.A. in International Development with focus on peacebuilding from Nagoya University, Japan. Previously, in 2010, Qasemi earned his bachelor’s degree in International Relations from Gazi University, Ankara, Turkey. During 2008–2011, he worked at the Military and Commercial Attaché sections of the Embassy and Consulate General of Afghanistan in Ankara and Istanbul, Turkey. Qasemi was part of a commission to convene two international conferences on Afghan peace named “Kabul Process I and II.” In 2017, Qasemi co-founded the Kabul Peace Committee and worked as the VicePresident of the Committee. He has been a visiting lecturer in many private universities in Kabul to raise awareness about peace and to promote peaceful coexistence among youths.

Conclusion Yukiko Nishikawa

Abstract This concluding chapter summaries major findings of this volume and examines how economic denationalization correlates with renationalization of politics, how economic denationalization affects structural inequality, how the global political economy affects national policies and what effects economic denationalization has brought to statehood in Africa and Asia. In reference to the findings of the chapters of this book, the concluding chapter considers the continuing and even expanding effects of globalization vis-à-vis the countries in Africa and Asia and the future perspective of globalization’s effects on these countries. Keywords Stateness · Governance · Political economy · International agreements · Local conflicts Globalization is a phenomenon that people around the world experience equally as an objective reality. Nevertheless, its real effects on us, both positive and negative, are diverse. While one can, to a certain extent, reduce the degree of globalization effect by choosing where to live, such as an extremely urban environment or a very remote isolated town, the pragmatic effect of globalization is largely beyond an individual’s control, particularly in many countries in the late-development group in Africa and Asia. The people residing in the countries in Africa and Asia that are explored in this book indeed experience direct and/or structural violence as explicit or implicit effects of globalization or as a result of global interconnectedness. One of the sardonic situations is that as many economists pointed out, although economic growth has been facilitated by globalization forces for many countries over the past several decades and most countries in the late-development group indeed achieved economic growth by opening up their markets to the global economy, the growth seems to be a trade-off with increasing inequality and other risks, such as trade-related conflict

Y. Nishikawa (B) Graduate School of Global Studies, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 Y. Nishikawa (ed.), Globalisation and Local Conflicts in Africa and Asia, Evidence-Based Approaches to Peace and Conflict Studies 7, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8818-8_9

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and enhancing disadvantages for domestic products. Opening a country’s market to the global economy generates both opportunities and risks. As explored in Chapters “Energy Security and the Paradox of External Peacebuilding Interventions in Nigeria’s Niger Delta”, “International Policies and Illegal Logging Exploitation Sustaining Local Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo”, and “Afghanistan and the Curse of Resources: Taliban’s Greed-Based Jihad in the Heart of Asia” of this volume, for countries with rich natural resources that attract high-income countries, irrespective of the region, it is extremely difficult to avoid the effects of the global economy, global political economy or international policies. Unless there are international agreements, rules, or regulations with effective national management, natural resources are likely to be exploited by powerholders of these countries hand in hand with giant multinational companies, external investors, or illegal exploiters that operate regionally and globally. The illegal logging exploitation in DRC (Chapter “International Policies and Illegal Logging Exploitation Sustaining Local Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo”) is a typical example of such cases. Nigeria’s oil exploitation (Chapter “Energy Security and the Paradox of External Peacebuilding Interventions in Nigeria’s Niger Delta”) also exhibits similar tendencies. The large oil income is controlled by the state in cooperation with major multinational oil companies, such as Shell, Chevron, and Exxon/Mobil among others, which account for 99% of the crude oil production in the country. The illicit logging network and such oil companies structurally and continuously contribute to enhancing inequality in these countries as well as to environmental degradation and damaging livelihoods in local communities. Resourceproducing local communities are, in these cases, direct victims of exploitative activities of illegal logging companies in DRC and major multinational oil companies in Nigeria while the work and operations of these companies are part of the global economy. For countries that had experienced large armed conflicts that drew attention from around the world, such as Mozambique (Chapter “The Politics and Political Economy of Violent Conflicts in Post-war Mozambique”) and Afghanistan (Chapter “Afghanistan and the Curse of Resources: Taliban’s Greed-Based Jihad in the Heart of Asia”), the effects of globalization demonstrate a different aspect. In these postconflict countries, economic and political reforms were undertaken, which are not free from certain globally promoted values and norms. Peacebuilding and nationbuilding promoted and supported by major donor governments of the OECD and UN agencies were common strategies employed in these countries for post-conflict reconstruction and recovery with the influence of the global liberal order or liberalism, in which establishing a democratic government has become one of the core themes. Nevertheless, such efforts were questioned when election-related violence exacerbated local security and the safety of individuals. In these post-conflict countries, varied actors that continue to be against the peace agreement or post-conflict political and economic reformulation remain as volatile socio-political forces. Given that many norms and systems based on reforms according to the rubric of state-building and nation-building were developed on the assumptions and as part of the tradition

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of the liberal world, resistance against such foreign norms and systems generates nationalization or anti-globalization tendencies in such post-conflict countries. The current situation in Afghanistan exhibits a number of characteristics of such resource-rich post-conflict countries. In Chapter “Afghanistan and the Curse of Resources: Taliban’s Greed-Based Jihad in the Heart of Asia”, the author points out that the conflict dynamics shift from religious identity and grievances to greed and the control of resource-rich areas of the country. The Taliban continues to be a critical actor in this context while local power politics drastically changed upon the withdrawal of the international forces in 2021. Conflict in Afghanistan is apparently complicated by the involvement of varied external actors, including donor governments and agencies, neighbouring countries, multinational enterprises, various investors, and criminal and extremist groups, that maintain links with local powerholders. These influences have shaped the political economy and politics of Afghanistan over the last twenty years. While it is undeniable that donors and various investors worked in Afghanistan after 2001 brought certain positive effects in the country’s economy in terms of the GDP growth, their involvement in the country’s state-building has also strengthened nationalization tendencies among certain groups in the country. Taliban’s resurgence and swift control of the country in 2021, to a great extent, exhibited such tendencies although the long-term effect remains to see. Globalization in post-conflict countries allows armed groups to collect the resources necessary to sustain themselves, such as financial support and arms supply, and to mobilize people for engagement in armed conflict. Swift and easy money transactions are possible in the contemporary world, which also obliquely help, sustain, and enhance the varied activities of non-state actors both regionally and internationally. Activities of state and non-state actors in post-conflict settings, therefore, are clearly affected by globalization largely through aid flows, migrant remittance, and funds earned through illegal activity as well as trade and investments. Apparent challenges in such countries are how to achieve political consolidation while varied state and non-state actors operate in and around these countries, some of which seek opportunities for lucrative business with the help of globalization forces. In many cases, the legitimacy of the government continues to be challenged even if internationally supported elections are held because social and political forces commonly appear in post-conflict countries that are against the new political and economic transformation and attempt to destabilize the country by enhancing competition and promoting violence. In Burma/Myanmar (Chapter “Local Conflicts in Post-reform Myanmar”), various divisions (or fault lines), including ethnolinguistic and ethnoreligious differences, have been highlighted in the society even after the country’s independence through diverse assimilation policies introduced by the government and the military junta. The country’s discriminatory nation-building and hegemonic state-building throughout the country’s history continue to affect the vulnerable people in borderlands and instigate conflicts along the fault lines even after reforms were undertaken after 2011. The benefits brought by the country’s economic growth in the 2010s because of natural gas exports, increased FDI inflows, and mega-development projects did not

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necessarily help local and vulnerable people. Rather, with continued hegemonic statebuilding and exclusionary policies, the relations between diverse ethnic and religious groups have been exacerbated. The process has been complicated by external factors, such as neighbouring countries and the non-state actors who support armed groups in Myanmar. In neighbouring Thailand, access to AIDS medicines has become a source of conflict (Chapter “Imbalance Between Public Health and Intellectual Property Rights Protection Goals: Battles on AIDS Medicines in Thailand”). While HIV/AIDS medicines are vital for the treatment of many patients in the country, contestation and conflicts over patented medicines that are based by international and regional agreements as well as domestic law continue in the country. Domestic conflicts related to AIDS drugs are not a separate issue from regional and international trade deals and the politics of trade negotiations. None of the conflicts in the countries featured in this volume can be fully understood without grasping regional and global political and economic dynamism. Many conflicts in other countries in Africa and Asia would share this point in the current world. Globalization and technological development are the two key forces that challenge national and local actors in these countries. An important implication here is that globalization itself can be both positive and negative forces for local politics and economy and it can potentially contribute to both peace and conflict in the world and in each state. Nevertheless, the effects of globalization on each country and how globalization affects domestic politics, negative or positive, depends on many other factors such as domestic economic policies, social and political divisions (or fault lines) within the country, how such divisions are handled, the situations of neighbouring countries, the policies and influences of allies, and the economic and political structures of the country, among others. The six cases explored in this volume clearly illustrate that global economic and political forces have significant impacts on local conflicts. The cases also show how such global economic and political forces depend on local socioeconomic and socio-political foundations that have been, in different ways, constructed, renewed, and reformulated over each country’s history. In addition, it is undeniable that the socioeconomic and socio-political foundations of neighbouring countries are also important in determining conflict or peace. An obvious internal or domestic factor that affected conflict(s) in these countries is the problem of stateness, which is at the heart of the fragility of these countries although the core issue that generates significant impacts on the stateness problem largely depends on the country’s historical experience and the state-building and nation-building after colonial powers left Africa and Asia. Widening economic inequality within a state and between states is one of the characteristics of the globalized world. One of the causes of the fragility exists in deep socio-political divisions that are usually derived from state formation, often as a result of decolonization and demarcation of the territory decided by colonial powers. In such cases, local communities and inhabitants in border areas were not necessarily informed about the demarcation. Accordingly, political consolidation has been, even now, a major challenge for most post-colonial countries and their neighbours.

Conclusion

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Economic inequality and inequality concerning access to socio-political opportunities are likely to reflect the pre-existing socio-political divisions while a small number of powerholders predatorily control the country’s economy and resources in countries with a stateness problem. Globalization forces, one way or another, help such powerholders by linking them with external actors who invest for extraction of natural resources or who provide arms to local non-state actors to destabilize the country, which enables them to easily access to the resources. Globalization and technological development have facilitated the activities of non-state-actors by enabling them to swiftly access information, transfer goods and money, mobilize human resources on a global scale, and maintain a worldwide network. Their activities often become serious challenges for nation-states because such activities often threaten the national unity and political consolidation of a nationstate. Countries in the late-development group with a stateness problem have a higher risk of conflict during their development because inequality unavoidably appears as economic growth reflects the pre-existing divisions in each country. Inequality and the stateness problem are, in that sense, mutually influential unless the state manages and controls social divisions and inequality. Without a doubt, states around the world continue to experience gigantic effects of globalization with further development of information and communication technology. Whether countries in Africa and Asia can have more positive effects, while minimizing its negative effects, depends on how well they can handle their sociopolitical divisions and how inclusively they can carry out economic and political reforms with varied national actors. Although the significant influence of external forces, including donor governments, multinational corporations, and decisions to set international rules and regulations, or the effect of hierarchies of power and the nature of socio-political and economic relation on the globe, which become more and more intensified as a result of furthering globalization, is usually beyond their control, overcoming the problem related to stateness and inequality that exacerbates socio-political divisions will, at least, reduce the risks of conflict. The stateness problem also enhances opportunities for non-state actors who recruit and mobilize marginalized people to achieve their political or ideological goals by undertaking criminal or terrorist activities in different parts of the world. It is common that countries with a stateness problem become targets of internationally active criminal, terrorist, or extremist groups to find cronies. In some cases, such countries can become a breeding ground for extremist or terrorist groups because such countries are a suitable place for them to amass their potential associates. Globalization brings both opportunities and risks to nation-states as well as individuals. An individual’s well-being will not be improved by globalization itself. Such impacts depend on governance of each state while varied opportunities and risks are brought by globalization forces towards nation-states. In particular, multiple risks arising from conditions brought by the world economy should be managed and overcome, rather than ignored. For this to happen, nation-states must remain as critical actors within their own boundaries. Therefore, we must find ways to handle the problem of stateness and statehood, which critically increases the risk of conflict in countries in the late-development group by weakening governance, questioning the

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legitimacy of the government and harming the sustainability of economic growth vis-à-vis the negative impacts brought by increasing inequality within the country.

Yukiko Nishikawa is a professor in the Graduate School of Global Studies, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan. Nishikawa obtained a Ph.D. in peace studies from the University of Bradford, U.K. Her main publications include “The Reality of Protecting the Rohingya: An Inherent Limitation of the Responsibility to Protect” (Asian Security 2020); Political Sociology of Japanese Pacifism (Routledge 2018); Human Security in Southeast Asia (Routledge 2010); “Human security in Southeast Asia: viable solution or empty slogan?” (Security Dialogue 2009); Japan’s Changing Role in Humanitarian Crises (Routledge 2005). Her research interests include peace and conflict in Southeast Asia and security and international relations in the Indo–Pacific region.

Index

A Afghanistan, 8, 11, 15–19, 21, 110, 173–186, 188–191, 196, 197. See 00 Africa, 6, 7, 11, 18, 24, 31, 40, 76, 83, 86, 88–90, 92, 97, 99, 107–109, 187, 189, 195, 198, 199. See 00 AIDS/HIV, 8, 91, 153, 154, 156–163, 167, 198. See 00 Asia, 6, 7, 11, 18, 19, 22, 24, 31, 78, 128–132, 140, 145, 146, 158, 163, 176, 187, 195, 198, 199. See 00

B Bretton Woods, 2, 15, 84. See 00 Buddhist extremism, 139, 143, 144. See 00

C China, 3, 4, 19, 22, 43, 58–60, 62–64, 70, 76, 78, 85, 97, 127–131, 133, 134, 136, 141, 142, 165, 167, 176–179, 182, 184, 191. See 00 Civil war, 5, 65, 83, 84, 86–88, 91, 95, 97, 99, 102, 175, 182, 188, 189, 191. See 00 Cold War, 2–4, 19, 24, 87, 90, 96, 129, 180. See 00 Competition, 20, 22, 31, 39, 42–45, 51, 53, 102, 110, 111, 130, 140, 141, 148, 165, 178, 179, 184, 197. See 00 Compulsory licensing, 153, 159, 165–168. See 00 Conflict, 5–8, 11, 19, 21–26, 30, 31, 37–40, 42–48, 50, 57, 119, 153. See 00

Conflict dynamic, 197. See 00 Corruption, 29, 65, 66, 74–77, 97, 134, 174, 180, 184, 185. See 00 COVID-19, 1, 4, 5, 44, 167, 189. See 00 Crude oil, 39, 43, 44, 48, 196. See 00

D Democracy, 23, 27, 29–31, 49, 85, 87, 89, 90, 95–97, 100, 102, 111, 112, 119–123, 126, 127, 135, 136, 139, 145–147. See 00 Democratization, 23, 31, 83, 85, 89, 95, 97, 119, 120, 129, 135–138. See 00 Denationalization, 2, 5, 6, 26, 195. See 00 Disciplined democracy, 120, 121, 135, 136, 138, 139, 146, 147. See 00

E Economic growth, 8, 23–31, 84, 86, 90–92, 95, 97, 111, 112, 173, 195, 197, 199, 200. See 00 Economic interests, 25, 44, 45, 48, 51, 85, 110. See 00 Energy security, 7, 21, 37, 38, 40–45, 48, 52–55, 128. See 00 Environment, 20, 22, 31, 39, 44, 46, 47, 49, 50, 53, 54, 65, 71, 73, 86, 89, 95, 96, 100, 105, 126, 129, 131, 142, 144, 166, 195. See 00 Exploitation, 7, 23, 30, 43, 45, 46, 57, 58, 64, 67–69, 71, 72, 74, 76–78, 94, 109, 111, 128, 140, 143, 173–175, 177, 184, 189, 191, 196. See 00

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 Y. Nishikawa (ed.), Globalisation and Local Conflicts in Africa and Asia, Evidence-Based Approaches to Peace and Conflict Studies 7, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8818-8

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202 F Foreign direct investment, 5, 7, 24, 83, 91, 92, 94, 97, 101, 112, 113, 120, 121, 124, 127, 129, 140, 141. See 00 Forest governance, 57, 58, 61, 79. See 00 Forest resources, 68, 71. See 00

G Geopolitical interests, 87. See 00 Gini coefficient, 7, 12, 16. See 00 Globalization, 1–6, 11–13, 119, 195. See 00 Globalization forces, 5, 6, 8, 26, 28, 147, 195, 197, 199. See 00 Globalization index, 2, 7, 11–13, 15–17. See 00 Global politics, 84, 87, 110, 153. See 00 Good governance, 23, 29, 30, 96, 97. See 00 Governance, 8, 21, 24, 26, 27, 29–31, 38, 39, 44, 47, 49–51, 53, 54, 57, 59, 61, 65, 66, 75, 84, 90, 95, 97, 100–102, 112, 121, 123, 135, 138, 148, 155, 174, 189, 199. See 00 Government failure, 25, 64, 74. See 00 Greed, 93, 173, 184, 185, 197. See 00 Grievances, 7, 8, 44–46, 51, 68, 93, 95, 102, 135, 143, 148, 173, 180, 184, 197. See 00 Gross domestic product per capita, 16, 90, 140. See 00 Growth, 19–21, 26–31, 91, 92, 195, 197. See 00

H Health, 67, 69, 77, 91, 154–159, 161–166, 168, 190. See 00 Health insurance, 154. See 00 Health policy, 153. See 00 Human development indicators/index, 12, 91, 95. See 00 Human rights, 12, 20, 21, 63, 70, 76, 78, 79, 120, 135, 141, 146, 190. See 00 Hyper-globalization, 15, 23, 25. See 00

I Illegal logging exploitation, 7, 23, 57, 58, 64, 78, 196. See 00 Independence, 85, 86, 104, 124, 129, 132, 134, 135, 144, 146, 177, 197. See 00 Indicator, 5, 11, 12, 29, 93. See 00 Inequality, 2, 5, 6, 8, 16, 17, 23–31, 44, 83, 85, 90–95, 97, 99, 102, 106,

Index 110–113, 121, 141, 154, 168, 195, 196, 198–200. See 00 Information and communication technology, 3, 31, 199. See 00 Instability, 26, 30, 37, 38, 40, 43, 48, 51, 65, 74, 87, 104, 139, 184, 185. See 00 Intellectual property rights, 153–157, 159–166, 168. See 00 Internal conflict, 5, 21, 24, 31, 40, 43, 78, 154. See 00 Internally displaced persons, 91, 99. See 00 International agreements, 196. See 00 International policies, 32, 57, 58, 79, 196. See 00 Intervention, 37–40, 42–55, 69, 71, 76, 84, 85, 90, 96, 98, 127, 131, 188, 191. See 00 Investor-state dispute settlement, 153, 165. See 00

J Jihad, 109, 110, 173, 183, 185, 187, 188, 190. See 00

K KOF Globalization Index, 2, 7, 11, 13, 15–17. See 00

L Late-developing country, 19, 24, 25. See 00 Late development group, 7. See 00 Law and order, 120, 122, 137–139, 146, 147. See 00 Liberalism, 4, 126, 196. See 00 Liberalization, 2, 4, 12, 15, 24, 85, 88, 89, 121, 128, 155. See 00 Local conflict, 5, 7, 8, 23–26, 38, 45, 57, 58, 68, 75, 78, 79, 119, 139, 168, 198. See 00 Logging, 7, 23, 57–79, 196. See 00

M Ma Ba Tha, 143, 144. See 00 Marginalization, 30, 110, 119, 120. See 00 Market economy, 4, 83, 85, 87, 89, 112, 140. See 00 Medicines, 8, 22, 153–156, 158–161, 163–166, 168, 198. See 00 Military, 5, 16, 21, 29, 31, 38, 69, 71, 76, 88, 102, 103, 106, 107, 119–139,

Index 141–145, 147, 160, 163, 167, 175, 177, 179–183, 185, 188, 197. See 00 Military capitalism, 124. See 00 Mineral resources, 8, 173, 174, 176. See 00 Mozambique, 7, 11, 15–19, 25, 83–113, 189, 196. See 00 Multilateral cooperation, 57, 58, 79. See 00 Multilateralism, 15. See 00 Multiparty democracy, 85, 87, 89, 100. See 00 Myanmar, 7, 11, 15–19, 64, 113, 119–148, 187, 197, 198. See 00

N National races, 132, 137, 138, 145. See 00 Natural resources, 18, 20, 28–30, 32, 57, 64, 76, 96, 97, 102, 111, 140, 142, 143, 148, 173–175, 178–180, 183, 185, 188–191, 196, 199. See 00 Niger Delta, 7, 21, 37–54. See 00 Nigeria, 7, 11, 15–21, 29, 37, 40, 42, 43, 47, 49, 53, 109, 130, 196. See 00 Non-governmental organizations, 13, 22, 38, 59, 64, 90, 156, 159, 162. See 00 Non-profit organizations, 39, 40, 47–49, 52, 54, 55. See 00

O Official Development Assistance, 16, 91, 112, 113. See 00 Oil, 7, 19–21, 37–54, 128, 130, 141, 142, 174, 177, 183, 184, 196. See 00 Oil revenues, 42, 43, 45, 47, 51, 52. See 00 Opium, 174, 177, 179, 184, 186–188. See 00 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 4, 16, 23–25, 28, 29, 31, 120, 147, 196. See 00

P Pakistan, 127, 130, 174, 176–185, 187–189, 191. See 00 Peace, 7, 25, 37–40, 43–47, 49–53, 58, 72, 83–85, 87–90, 95, 98, 105, 106, 112, 121, 142, 174, 178, 180, 182, 183, 185, 189, 191, 196, 198. See 00 Peacebuilding, 4, 7, 12, 25, 31, 38–40, 42–49, 52–54, 83–85, 90, 98, 99, 113, 196. See 00 Peace talks, 89, 98, 106. See 00

203 Political economy, 2, 6–8, 17, 21, 24, 40–44, 48, 49, 53, 54, 83–85, 87, 88, 95, 97, 99, 102, 108, 111, 112, 119, 121, 147, 153, 174, 175, 183, 195–197. See 00 Political exclusion, 83, 85, 95, 97, 99, 111, 112, 143. See 00 Poverty, 12, 25, 27, 29, 49, 51, 83, 85, 90–95, 97, 99, 102, 106, 110–112, 140, 174, 176, 177, 191. See 00 Predatory economy, 30, 31. See 00 Primary commodities, 29, 174, 175, 189. See 00 Privatization, 24, 25, 85, 88, 120, 121, 124, 125, 147. See 00 Public health, 22, 153, 155–157, 159, 161–166, 168. See 00

R Reforms, 3, 7, 19, 37, 39, 51, 52, 54, 57, 58, 65, 74, 78, 84, 85, 88, 90, 105, 119–126, 128, 129, 131, 132, 137, 139–141, 145, 147, 196, 197, 199. See 00 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, 22, 165. See 00 Rent, 20, 29, 38, 39, 41–48, 52–54, 102, 111, 125, 156, 189. See 00 Resource conflict, 37, 39, 45, 46, 53. See 00

S Sovereignty, 23, 121, 122, 144, 146, 147. See 00 State-building, 6, 11, 12, 24–27, 29, 31, 84, 85, 99, 119, 121, 139, 143–145, 147, 196–198. See 00 Statehood, 6, 8, 27, 41, 195, 199. See 00 Stateness, 6, 8, 12, 23, 24, 27, 29–32, 198, 199. See 00 State-owned economic enterprises, 124, 125, 128, 142. See 00 Structural violence, 39, 95, 97, 195. See 00

T Taliban, 8, 21, 173–191, 197. See 00 Tatmadaw, 120, 124, 130, 134, 144, 145. See 00 Thailand, 8, 11, 15–19, 64, 127, 134, 141, 153, 154, 156–167, 198. See 00

204 Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 153–157, 159–166, 168. See 00

V Violence, 1, 5, 7, 25, 27, 37–39, 42, 44–46, 51, 52, 54, 63, 83–85, 93–95, 97–100, 102, 103, 105–108, 111–113, 119, 120, 139, 143, 144,

Index 147, 177, 180, 184, 189, 195–197. See 00 Violent conflicts, 25, 26, 30, 31, 43, 83–85, 93, 95, 97–99, 102, 106, 108, 109, 112, 113, 135, 139, 143, 173, 174, 184, 188, 189, 191. See 00

W World Trade Organization, 3, 19, 154. See 00