Global Trends Compendium: An Essential Guide to Socio-Economic and Environmental Change 9789811991622, 9789811991639, 9811991626

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Global Trends Compendium

Edoardo Monaco

Global Trends Compendium An Essential Guide to Socio-Economic and Environmental Change

Edoardo Monaco Globalisation and Development (GAD) Programme Department of Social Sciences (DSS) Beijing Normal University - Hong Kong Baptist University United International College (BNU-HKBU UIC) Zhuhai, China

ISBN 978-981-19-9162-2 ISBN 978-981-19-9163-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9163-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

To Antonietta and Michele, who prepared me for the journey of life, and to Lina, my destination.

Preface

I have always, since I first conceived of it, thought of this compendium as a “pocket compass”, a practical guide that may help readers to orientate themselves while they explore global affairs and attempt to make sense of the highly interconnected, multidimensional challenges of contemporary human development. The book is intended to be an accessible, concise, yet comprehensive reference for anyone who hopes to better understand today’s world and its dramatic complexity. My aim is to highlight a relevant selection of the demographic, socio-economic, geo-political, and environmental macro-dynamics that define our time, and to explore in a practical way the indicators that can be used to monitor their evolution over time. In general, this project stems from the need to apply “systemic thinking” to the study of the world and to develop a holistic perspective that can bridge the gap that for too long has existed across academic disciplines and their respective focuses. The macro-trends featured in the book shed light, in particular, on the change that has been occurring over time in the vast Global South—a portion of the globe encompassing over 150 “developing” countries (IMF 2022)—ranging from China to India, from Nigeria to Brazil, from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe—and accounting for over 80% of the world’s total population. The book’s ultimate—although not exclusive—target audience is undoubtedly composed of undergraduate students of subjects, such as political science, international affairs, international development, human geography, and the like. The perspective I have employed, in fact, is rooted in my aspiration to familiarise students as early as possible with a holistic and inclusive outlook, and to point them towards established, authoritative sources of data that will inform and benefit their early attempts at academic research. The rationale for this book emerged from personal, direct experience. I have spent the last 15 years working extensively as an academic and as a consultant for both firms and educational institutions in emerging contexts like China—where I am still based—as well as India, Thailand, Korea, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, and, more recently, East and Central Africa.

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Preface

In China, I was privileged enough to direct the Government and International Relations (GIR) Programme for many years, and to establish a new, unique undergraduate platform—the Globalisation and Development (GAD) Programme—at the Faculty of Social Sciences (FHSS) of one of the fastest-growing English-medium joint-venture universities in the country, the United International College of Beijing Normal University and Hong Kong Baptist University (BNU-HKBU UIC). The experience of training future leaders, preparing them for further studies and prestigious international careers, has led me to better appreciate the challenges young observers face when they attempt to grasp the big picture of world affairs—especially in my own areas of specialisation (broadly related to comparative development governance, political economy of development, and sustainability) —and the close underlying interrelations of their dynamics. These dynamics transcend the often artificial boundaries of “traditional” academic domains, as well as those of time and geographical location. The desire to overcome knowledge fragmentation and to “simplify complexity” by reducing it to a “manageable” set of key, connected notions has inspired most of my choices in terms of style and content. It be would challenging, for instance, to fully understand the current development patterns of multiple sub-Saharan African nations and the crucial role that—given their immense wealth of human capital and natural resources—they may play in the future economic order of the world, while at the same time ignoring the persisting legacy of centuries of colonialism and slave trade, the failure of Import Substitutions Industrialization (ISI), the role played by “structural adjustments” in the 1980s, and the recent, at times dramatic, trajectories of population expansion and urbanisation. It would be difficult to appropriately interpret the significance and impact of the ongoing1 COVID-19 pandemic by looking at it exclusively as a public health crisis, thus ignoring its broader environmental pre-conditions—many of which are rooted in the increasingly troubled relationship between human activities and natural boundaries—and the long-standing inequality of both income and opportunities that this latest viral menace has simply exacerbated. It is equally hard to decipher the existential challenge of climate change, facing us all as a species, without becoming aware of its historical underpinnings, of the way forward laid by the most recent scientific findings and global governance agendas, and of the need to fundamentally rethink the concept of “development” itself as a holistic pursuit that, in order to be sustainable, must transcend the mere economic realm to simultaneously embrace social inclusion and environmental preservation. I want this book to be a handy introductory guide to such broad phenomena—or “trends”—of immense global relevance. I hope it may contribute to shining a glimmer of light on the path ahead, wherever it may lead, as well as on the one behind us, which much of our present and our future heavily depend on. Zhuhai, China

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At the time of writing, i.e. October 2022.

Edoardo Monaco

Preface

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Reference International Monetary Fund. (2022) World economic and financial surveys, world economic outlook, database—WEO groups and aggregates information [online]. Available at: https:// www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2022/01/weodata/groups.htm#oem (Accessed 23 Sep 2022).

Acknowledgements

Many are the people and organisations who deserve at least some credit for the completion of this book project. First and foremost, I must thank Prof. Tang Tao and Prof. Chen Zhi, as well as Prof. Ng Chin Fai before them, for actively promoting the teaching–research nexus at the Beijing Normal University—Hong Kong Baptist University United International College (BNU-HKBU UIC) where I work, thus establishing a conducive ecosystem where knowledge creation and knowledge dissemination not only coexist harmoniously but fruitfully complement each other, even within a liberal arts context. Their efforts can only contribute to the further growth of this mighty institution: after more than 15 years of sustained successes, accolades, and ever-expanding outreach, the sky remains the only limit. Within the college, I cannot fail to mention the fundamental role that in recent years Prof. Adrian Bailey and Prof. Tzeki Hon have played in creating a work unit—the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences—where cohesion, inclusion, efficiency, and mutual support are principles driving both day-to-day activities and strategic planning. In addition, Prof. Simon Zhao Xiaobin has been a silent guide and a constant inspiration: there is literally nothing he would leave unattempted or unexplored. His dynamism and positivity are delightfully contagious. I must thank the China Biodiversity Conservation and Green Development Foundation (CBCGDF) for the warm support and kind consideration that they have extended to me personally, and to my academic projects, over the years. It’s always an immense pleasure to partner with Dr. Zhou Jinfeng, Linda Wong, and the whole CBCGDF Secretariat: their vision and unwavering commitment are actively advancing the sustainable development paradigm as well as the deepening and widening of environmental regimes in China and beyond. In particular, the recent invitation to join the China Association of the Club of Rome is an honour for which, besides Dr. Zhou, I sincerely thank also the other co-founders: Chandran Nair, founder and CEO of the Global Institute for Tomorrow (GIFT); Prof. Frederick Charles Dubee, Professor and Co-chair of the Advisory Board at Beijing Genomics Institute; and of course Dr. Jorgen Randers, Professor Emeritus of Climate Strategy,

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Acknowledgements

BI Norwegian School of Management, and one of the authors of the Club of Rome’s seminal 1972 book Limits to Growth. My gratitude goes also to the Cambridge Institute of Sustainability Leadership (CISL) at Cambridge University and GetSmarter, for giving me the opportunity, from 2020 onwards, to serve as an assessor to multiple online presentations of their flagship Business Sustainability Management (BSM) Programme, which every year reaches thousands of participants—mostly senior managers from major corporations worldwide. Being part of the “system thinking (r)evolution” and positive change that BSM and other similar online programmes of both CISL and GetSmarter bring about is a privilege I dearly cherish. Professors Ricardo Hausmann, Matt Andrews, and Robert Stavins, whom I had the chance to learn from while at the Kennedy School of Government for a series of development-governance-related executive education programmes, profoundly impacted my way of looking at economic growth and its relations with the natural environment. Their scholarly work is a constant reference, as is their ability to graciously share their vast knowledge in a rigorous yet accessible manner. My friend Wah Kwan Cheng, Associate Professor, Head of the Department of History and Heritage, and Programme Coordinator for the Master in History and Heritage at the University of Saint John in Macau, did not hesitate to lend a helping hand when it came to the arduous task of capturing centuries of relevant global events into very concise timelines. I am very grateful to all the students of the Government and International Relations (GIR) and Globalisation and Development (GAD) Programmes that I directed at BNU-HKBU UIC, for the endless curiosity, commitment, and enthusiasm they displayed while taking the courses that I taught them over the years, among which “Global Environmental Governance”, “Growth Innovation and Development: Case Studies”, “Introduction to Sustainable Development”, “Political Cultures and Economies in Transition”, and “The Global Economy”. They kept me on my toes, intellectually, by continuously informing, with their lively interest and incisive questions, different perspectives and new interpretations of the subject matter that, without such bright students, would simply not have germinated. Among GAD students, special mentions are due in particular to Calvin Zhang Qifan, and Hank Ke Shenghan, who, as successful recipients of a collaborative research grant offered by the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences (upon the initiative of its Research Committee), served as capable, dedicated, and passionate research assistants during a crucial phase of this book project. Cinnamon Sun Yuan, Assistant Instructor at the GAD Programme and GIR alum, carved time out of her busy schedule to provide precious additional research assistance and, crucially, to coordinate Zhang and Ke’s work.

Acknowledgements

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Last but not least, Marina Monaco, my older sister and more importantly a Senior Policy Advisor at the European Trade Union Confederation in Brussels, Belgium, was an invaluable source of insights in numerous online conversations pertaining to the emerging green economy and the making of a fair, inclusive labour market, in the European Union and beyond. She continues to be a role model for me, both in knowledge and in deeds.

Global Events: A Modern Timeline

1441 1492 1517 1648 1600 1602 1769 1776 —— 1789 1833 1864 1865

1896 1914 —— 1917 —— 1918 —— 1919 1920

The Portuguese bring the first West African slaves to Europe Columbus arrives in the Caribbean; European colonisation of Americas begins Start of the Protestant Reformation Peace of Westphalia ends 30 Years’ War Foundation of the British East India Company Foundation of the Dutch United East India Company James Watt patents the steam engine, which will power the first Industrial Revolution Establishment of the United States of America and issuing of the Declaration of Independence Publication of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations The French Revolution Slavery Abolition Act abolishes slavery across much of the British empire Publication of G.P. Marsh’s Man and Nature, fiercely challenging the idea of nature’s inexhaustibility Publication of The Coal Question by economist W.S. Jevons, exploring the economic relationship between resource efficiency and resource consumption First modern Olympic Games Start of the First World War First scheduled passenger airline service takes place in Florida Balfour Declaration supports possible “national home” for Jews in Palestine The Bolshevik Revolution First wave of the Spanish Flu epidemic End of the First World War Treaty of Versailles and Covenant of the League of Nations are signed Treaty of Versailles enters into force, imposing harsh reparations on Germany

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1923

1927 1929 1939 1942 —— 1944 —— 1945 —— —— 1947 —— —— 1948 1949 —— 1955 —— 1956 1957 1960 1964 1965 1969 1970 1971 —— 1972 —— —— 1973 —— 1975 1978 1979 1980 1985 1986

Global Events: A Modern Timeline

Following the Treaty of Sevres and the Treaty of Lausanne, the League of Nations redistributes the territories held by the Ottoman and German empires before the First World War to colonial powers as mandates First fully electronic television system completed The Great Depression Start of the Second World War Invention of the computer Start of the Manhattan Project, aimed at producing nuclear weapons Convening of the Bretton Woods Conference Foundation of the World Bank Convening of the Yalta Conference on post-war world order End of the Second World War United Nations and International Monetary Fund (IMF) begin operations Independence of India and Pakistan as separate countries Truman Doctrine and start of the Cold War Signing of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Establishment of the Republic of Israel declared by David Ben-Gurion Creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Establishment of the People’s Republic of China Convening of the Bandung Conference, proclaiming Afro-Asian solidarity First McDonald’s opens in California, USA Initiation of the Non-Aligned Movement by G. A. Nasser, J. Nehru, and J. Tito Ghana becomes first Sub-Saharan African country to gain independence Establishment of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Formation of the Group of 77 Establishment of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) First moon landing Earth Day is first held Creation of Greenpeace First online stock exchange reaches the market Convening of the UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm Establishment of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Publication of Limits to Growth by the Club of Rome, a seminal exploration of the ecological footprint of people and their activities First oil crisis Adoption of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) First G7 summit Deng Xiaoping announces China’s period of “Reform and Opening Up” Second oil crisis First cases of HIV/AIDS epidemic in the USA Adoption of Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant disaster in Ukraine

Global Events: A Modern Timeline

1987 -—— 1988 1989 1989 1991 —— 1992 —— —— —— 1993 1994 1995 1997 —— —— 1999 2000 2001 —— —— —— 2002 2004 2005 2006

2007

—— —— 2008 2010

2012

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Adoption of the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer Publication of the Brundtland Report (Our Common Future), introducing the concept of sustainable development Establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) The Berlin Wall is torn down The World Wide Web is invented Establishment of the Global Environment Facility World Wide Web opened to the public for the first time Formation of the European Union (EU) Adoption of Agenda 21, the Rio Declaration, and the Forest Principles at the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro Adoption of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Adoption of the Convention on Biological Diversity Convention of the World Conference on Human Rights by the UN Adoption of the UN Convention to Combat Desertification Establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Adoption of the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC Transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong from UK to China Asian financial crisis Transfer of sovereignty over Macau from Portugal to China Adoption of the UN Millennium Development Goals Start of the (ultimately unsuccessful) Doha Development Round of the WTO 9/11 terrorist attacks in USA “Global War on Terror” begins with military intervention in Afghanistan China enters the WTO Convening of the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg Indian Ocean tsunami claims 250,000 lives The Kyoto Protocol enters into force Release of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, stating that benefits of prompt action on climate change far outweigh the costs of inaction Publication of IPCC Fourth Assessment Report confirms that anthropogenic climate change is occurring and that negative impacts will very likely increase IPCC and Albert Gore are awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for disseminating knowledge about climate change First generation of iPhones is announced Global financial crisis First joint conferences of the Parties to the Basel, Rotterdam, and Stockholm Conventions on the coordinated protection of people and environment from hazardous chemicals and waste Convening of the UN Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro

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2013 2014 —— 2015 —— 2016 2020 2022

Global Events: A Modern Timeline

China announces the Belt and Road Initiative Publication of IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, confirming that the present climate change is indeed anthropogenic Russia annexes Ukraine’s Crimea Adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including the 17 Sustainable Development Goals, by the UN Adoption of the Paris Agreement by the UNFCCC Paris Agreement enters into force Global Covid-19 pandemic begins Russia invades Ukraine

Contents

1 Globalisation: An Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Globalisation and Its Controversies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1.1 The Pro-Globalisation Stance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1.2 The Anti-Globalisation Stance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 A Middle Ground? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 2 3 9 13 15

2 Population and Settlement Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Total Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Rate of Natural Increase and Fertility Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Demographic Transition Model and Population Pyramid . . . . . . . . . 2.4 Settlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17 17 18 20 25 30

3 Socio-Economic Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Economic Output and Gross Domestic Product . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Dimensions of Poverty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Human Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 Additional Reflections on Inequality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

33 33 40 50 54 63

4 Nations, States, and Beyond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Definitions: Decoding Complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 State Borders and Nation Building in the Post-Colonial South . . . . . 4.3 Regionalisation Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.1 The European Integration Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.2 Regionalisation in Asia, Africa, and Latin America . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

67 68 71 80 81 84 88

5 The Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 5.1 The Modern Human–Nature Nexus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 5.2 Climate Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 5.3 The Present Global Climate Regime: The Paris Agreement . . . . . . . 106 xix

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5.4 Natural Resources and Development: Blessing or Curse? . . . . . . . . . 109 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 6 The Quest for Sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 Sustainability: A Historical Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Sustainability Frameworks for Public and Private Sectors . . . . . . . . . 6.3 The “Just Transition” Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

115 115 122 134 138

Afterword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 Statistical Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

About the Author

Dr. Edoardo Monaco’s holistic understanding of global dynamics is the combined result of his rich and diverse academic background—spanning from law to international relations, from development economics to international management and sustainability—and his extensive international experience. In fact, besides studying across Italy (Bologna), France (ICN), the USA (Harvard), the UK (Cambridge, Oxford), and China (Yunnan), Dr. Monaco has lived for almost two decades in Asia, working—both within and beyond academia—and conducting research in a vast array of locations, including China, Bhutan, India, Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, the Philippines, as well as Central and Eastern Africa. His teaching and research interests broadly concern the political economy of development, sustainability, and the rise of the Global South, with particular regard to holistic development paradigms and their measurement, sustainable economic growth, diversification, and inclusion. Dr. Monaco currently serves as Associate Professor at the Globalisation and Development (GAD) Programme—which he established—and as Associate Head of Department at the Department of Social Sciences (DSS), Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences (FHSS), Beijing Normal University—Hong Kong Baptist University United International College (BNU-HKBU UIC) in Zhuhai, Guangdong Province, China. Since 2020, he has also held the role of assessor within the Business Sustainability Management online programme of GetSmarter and Cambridge University’s Institute for Sustainability Leadership (CISL). From 2021, he has been a member of the China Association for the Club of Rome. Dr. Monaco’s articles and op-eds have featured on multiple global media platforms, and he regularly collaborates with intergovernmental organisations, international think tanks, and consulting firms.

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Chapter 1

Globalisation: An Introduction

Perhaps the most ubiquitous term used to describe the twenty-first century world is “globalisation”. Yet “globalisation” isn’t a term or a phenomenon that can be associated exclusively with today’s world: globalisation cycles, in fact, have occurred at various stages in human history—a history that has actually occurred in large part on a “global scale” (Sachs 2020). So how can we concisely define the complexity of globalisation? What are its key determinants and components? To answer these questions, we may look back at the globalisation cycle of the mid- to late 1800s, which closely resembles the present one. Following that, we will go on to consider the primary arguments put forward by both proponents and opponents of globalisation to support their position. At the end of the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885, a handful of European powers were controlling vast swaths of land right across the world. Great Britain was the leading colonial power by land mass, as it was administering—more or less directly— around a quarter of the world’s land across much of South Asia, East and Southeast Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. France would follow, with vast colonial possessions spanning from West Africa to “Indochina” (present day Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam) and the South Pacific, making up a grand total of about 15% of the world. The Netherlands and Germany, as well as Spain and Portugal—which had by then already relinquished their three-century-long rule over much of “Latin America”— also retained colonial control over territories in various continents, none of which managed to escape the intense waves of colonial subjugation that swept the world from the early 1500s up until the first half of the twentieth century. As a matter of fact, only a handful of countries in the Global South—such as Afghanistan, Thailand, Ethiopia—remained free from colonial rule per se, although none of them managed to completely avoid foreign interference. But what exactly drove these European powers to criss-cross the world, explore unknown lands and ultimately take control over the same through economic, political and even military means? The most relevant driver was certainly the desire to acquire the vast endowments of human and natural resources that they needed to fuel their industrial expansion and trade activities. The Industrial Revolution, in © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 E. Monaco, Global Trends Compendium, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9163-9_1

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1 Globalisation: An Introduction

fact, had sprouted in Great Britain towards the end of the 1700s, and then started spreading elsewhere in Europe according to patterns that were heavily influenced by geographical proximity, along a “north-west to south-east” trajectory. Yet, what made European presence across the world as well as the administration of such complex international supply chains possible in the first place were crucial technological advances in the realms of energy, transportation and communication: James Watt’s steam engine (building on Thomas Newcomen’s earlier achievements), in fact, besides representing an important breakthrough that could power machines necessary for industrial production, also revolutionised maritime travel, making it safer, faster and more reliable than sailing ever was. This obviously constituted a massive logistical support to the movement of goods and people around the globe. Communication—essential to coordinate actions across vast territories on behalf of the metropolitan power—was also made more effective, timely and secure by the invention of the telegraph, first, and the telephone afterwards. It’s not hard to see the parallels between that context and today’s world: while colonialism is no longer a reality, countries and corporations are still pursuing political and economic interests on a worldwide scale. Supply chains have only become even more intricate, with natural resources, finished and intermediate goods, and services being exchanged more intensely than ever. Scientific and technological advances have made modern means of transportation and communication more efficient, safe and accessible: think about the evolution of air travel, or the immense impact that the internet, mobile phones and social media have had on our society in recent years. A parallel comparison of the “globalised” world of the 1800s (and its colonial economy) with the one of the present day therefore highlights a state of progress-based, economic-interest-driven enhanced interconnectedness—even interdependence—of above all economic, but inevitably also political, social, cultural and environmental, phenomena occurring right across the globe.

1.1 Globalisation and Its Controversies The debate around globalisation is lively and at times heated both in academia and within broader society. Advocates and critics vie to prove their arguments and positions, which often appear far more polarized and antithetic than they are in a reality where the phenomenon in question—globalisation—is to large extent inevitable. Below I will assess the main arguments of both camps, admittedly oversimplifying the respective stances for the sake of clarity and synthesis.

1.1 Globalisation and Its Controversies

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1.1.1 The Pro-Globalisation Stance We will start with the arguments in favour of globalisation. The first of these that supporters of globalisation will usually put forward is that globalisation is a natural, coherent expression of economic (neo-)liberalism: globalisation, they maintain, is the logical outcome of a steady evolution comprising of more than 200 years of global politico-economic decision-making and aspirations. The present global political economic order was, in fact, adopted in the immediate post World War II phase as part of the multiple outcomes of the Bretton Woods Conference1 of 1944, and was heavily inspired by principles of capitalism and liberalism: unlike mercantilism—which identified the State as the key player and ultimate beneficiary of economic activities and a positive trade balance with the rest of the world as a tool to achieve its prosperity—liberalism focused on enhancing the wealth of individuals, who would seek opportunities in the marketplace with the mere support of conducive government policies. The State would, in other words, limit its direct presence and role in the economy to assisting the entrepreneurial endeavours of its citizens, across a marketplace whose size would ultimately reflect and determine that of available opportunities. But the inspiration for the decisions made in Bretton Woods came, in turn, from a politico-economic order that the economic powers of the time had actually established earlier, in the 1800s, at the height of colonialism, when the world was already very “liberalist” in nature and inspired by principles of open borders and intense flows of goods, people, resources and capital—all facilitated by a fixed exchange rate system. It was a “golden era” of peace and prosperity, largely devoid of major conflicts among superpowers precisely because of their valuable economic interaction and mutual regard for respective spheres of influence. The present politico-economic order, therefore, is the ultimate stage on a 200-year path2 whose consistency and coherence were disrupted only during the season of conflicts—the WWI–Depression–WWII sequence—of the first half of the twentieth century, which saw a reversal of the market openness and dynamism, and therefore of the wealth and prosperity, of the 1800s. Today’s globalisation is none other than the logical expression, the outcome, the consequence of an evolution that was steadily planned for, and aimed at tapping into vast market for vast profits. Another important argument of the pro-globalisation camp is poverty reduction. As we’ll discuss more in detail in Chapter 3, which focuses on socio-economic development, poverty has quite dramatically declined, at the global level, in the last few decades: the number of people living in extreme poverty has in fact gone from more 2 billion in 1980 to around 1 billion today. Yet even advocates of globalisation 1

From the name of the village in New Hampshire, United States of America, where delegates from 44 allied nations gathered to discuss the reconstruction of the global politico-economic post-World War II. 2 This is not to ignore, of course, that momentous phenomena such as the Covid-19 pandemic and the Ukraine conflict, both ongoing at the time of writing, will not impact significantly on that politico-economic order in ways we can currently only speculate on.

4

1 Globalisation: An Introduction

themselves would acknowledge that when this trend is broken down by regions of the world or by single countries, the picture changes significantly: prosperity has indeed spread worldwide, but so far very unequally. Income inequality remains striking, both across countries and within them, with factors like “rural vs. urban” settlement, access to education and healthcare representing the most important determinants. But advocates of globalisation would argue that the patterns of poverty reduction tend to be proportional to—or at least closely reflective of—the level of market orientation of a given economy, and of its openness to the free flow of goods, services, people, resources, ideas and capital, which is typical of “globalisation” and highly conducive to growth (Oatley 2012). The competition intrinsic to the global marketplace would in principle encourage each player to develop skills, technologies, practices, productivity, products and services capable of withstanding the competition, thus encouraging an overall constructive improvement of “underperforming” systems that would therefore be destined, over time, to ultimately catch up with the best. It would in particular stimulate players to identify, even through failures and setbacks, their competitive or comparative advantages—i.e. domains in which they are the best, or at least better than others—as well as market niches that, on a global scale, would represent in any case very sizeable opportunities. In other words, self-isolation cannot help countries escape poverty: this “false idol” or “low-hanging fruit” would instead generate a misleading sense of safety, which would actually preclude the economic growth and enhanced productivity ultimately arising from tapping into an expanded market and from accepting market competition. This is evident also from the failure of the import substitution industrialisation (ISI) strategies that most countries of the Global South—many of them just born as independent states after decades, if not centuries, of colonial exploitation—attempted to implement between the 1950s and 1980s. ISI was a development strategy that, inspired by theories like structuralism, originally aimed at managing the transition from dependency on agriculture and export of untransformed commodities to industrial self-sufficiency by means of heavy government intervention and protectionism. State-run national “infant industries” were in fact meant to establish wagebased employment, operate in synchrony, and produce—within and for the home market, regardless of its size or purchasing power—all the value-added manufactured products that otherwise would need to be imported at a great cost. ISI essentially rejected the global integration that Bretton-Woods-originated platforms such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank Group and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—or GATT, which in 1995 evolved into the World Trade Organisation (WTO)—intensely promoted. Yet, despite its best intentions, the ISI model soon collapsed amid a series of severe imbalances: the necessary importation of expensive machinery far exceeded the value of exports, which would be uncompetitive due to poor technology and high production costs typical of limited, sealed-off markets lacking “economies of scale” (i.e. cost advantages per unit achieved as the volumes of production increase).

1.1 Globalisation and Its Controversies

5

State-run industries were artificially kept alive with the abuse of state budgets which soon became scarcer and scarcer, forcing governments to borrow heavily from foreign actors such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In the 1980s these vital loans became conditional on structural reforms and “adjustments”3 that would: (a) reduce the role of the government in the market in favour of private initiative; (b) improve the macroeconomic environment (especially with regard to inflation control and fiscal performance); and (c) actively integrate these nations into the world trade system. Prompted by the dire need for financial lifelines, many countries across Latin America and Africa embarked on this kind of radical reforms between 1983 and 1996 (Oatley 2012) (see Table 1.1 and Fig. 1.1). The fact that countries did embark on the structural reforms asked of them by international institutions is also reflected in the large number of new accessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the World Trade Organisation systems registered between 1980 and 2005 (see Table 1.2). Advocates of globalisation maintain that these efforts ultimately paid off: the list of economies that boomed after strengthening their market orientation, stabilising the macroeconomic environment (with particular regard to inflation control) and opening up to the world is long and covers the whole developing world, from Latin America4 to Africa to East Asia (see Figs. 1.2 and 1.3). In the latter region, the “High-Performing Economies” of Japan, the “Four Tigers” Hong Kong, Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan (China), and the three Newly Industrializing Economies (NIES) of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand had actually been among the very first to break the ISI mould—in some cases already in the late 1950s and 1960s—by seeking export orientation and specialising in products that would target the vast international market demand. China’s intense “opening up”, from the early 1980s onwards, allowed it to drag six hundred million people out of poverty in the span of a single generation and made it the second-largest economy by nominal GDP (World Bank 2020). The later and somewhat more limited reforms of the early 1990s in India—where, despite consistent growth, more significant pockets of poverty persist—further prove, in the view of advocates, the direct relationship between market openness and improved standards of living. Brasil, Russia and South Africa—which with India and China complete the line-up of the “BRICS” countries—together with the likes of Cambodia, Chile, Indonesia, Turkey and Vietnam, to name just a few, have undergone similar patterns of neo-liberal reforms and consequent economic expansion. Examples of countries whose politico-economic isolationism didn’t pay are rather extreme, including the likes of North Korea, Myanmar and Cuba. For long periods they have shielded themselves from foreign “influence”, seeking the highest degrees of self-sufficiency and sealing themselves off from the rest of the world, yet none of 3

Often referred to as the “Washington Consensus”—from the name of the institutions that composed it, namely the IMF, the World Bank and the United States Department of Treasury all based in Washington DC—which would call for developing countries to “stabilize [the macroeconomic environment], privatize and liberalize”. 4 See Appendix A.

Venezuela

Dom. Rep., Peru

Argentina, Colombia, Colombia, Nicaragua, Uruguay Guatemala, Nicaragua, Uruguay

Ecuador, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica

1989

1990

1991

1992

Barbados

Brazil, Dom. Rep., Ecuador, Honduras, Peru

Argentina, Paraguay, El Salvador, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela

Guatemala, Guyana

Mexico

1988

Bolivia, Costa Rica

Brazil, Dom. Rep.

Guatemala, Jamaica Jamaica

1986

Argentina (1978); Chile (1975 and 1985); Mexico, Uruguay (1978)

Argentina (1987 and 1985); Bolivia, Chile (1975 and 1985); Costa Rica, Peru, Uruguay (1978)

1985 (or before)

1987

Trade liberalization

Stabilization

Table 1.1 Structural reform policies

Nicaragua, Peru

Argentina

Tax reform

Privitization

Labor reform

Argentina, Jamaica

Dom. Rep., Honduras, Guatemala

Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago

Chile, Venezuela

Costa Rica, Brazil, Paraguay, Guyana

Jamaica

Mexico

Colombia, Guatemala

Barbados, Mexico

Belize, Jamaica, Argentina, Guyana, Venezuela Peru

Argentina

Chile (circa 1988)

Argentina (1978); Chile (1974–1978) Chile (1979) Chile (1975); Uruguay (1974 and 1985)

Financial reform

(continued)

Chile (1981)

Pension reform

6 1 Globalisation: An Introduction

Bahamas

Source Author’s construction based on data from Martin (1997)

1996

Panama

Belize, Bolivia

Suriname

1995

Barbados, Belize, Haiti

Ecuador, Bahamas

El Salvador Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Paraguay, Venezuela

Belize, Haiti, Suriname

Brazil

Financial reform

Tax reform

1994

Trade liberalization

1993

Stabilization

Table 1.1 (continued)

Bolivia

Chile, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago

Nicaragua

Privitization

Panama

Labor reform

Uruguay, Mexico

Argentina, Colombia

Peru

Pension reform

1.1 Globalisation and Its Controversies 7

8

1 Globalisation: An Introduction Ghana Tanzania TheGambia BurkinaFaso Nigeria Zimbabwe Madagascar Malawi Burundi Kenya Mali Mauritania Senegal Niger Uganda Benin CentralAfricanRepublic Rwanda SierraLeone Togo Zambia Monzambique Congo Cotêd'lvoire Cameroon Gabon -2

-1

0

1

2

3

Reform Index scores Fig. 1.1 Change in macroeconomic policies 1981–1986 to 1987–1991 (Note Chad, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau are excluded because of insufficient data. Source Reproduced from World Bank [1994, p. 1, Figure 1])

them have managed to outperform countries that instead integrated into the world economy. Finally, a broad additional argument that the pro-globalisation stance most often relies on is the fact that global interconnectedness promotes the finding and sharing of solutions to the many global problems facing humanity as a whole: the increasingly pressing challenges posed by the likes of climate change, resource depletion, pandemics, and conflicts both within and between countries call for constant dialogue among stakeholders regardless of their location, as well as concerted, inclusive strategies that rely on shared technology, finances and know-how. No single actor can dare to face alone the daunting tasks of modern progress.

1.1 Globalisation and Its Controversies

9

Table 1.2 Accession time of GATT/WTO members (1980–2005) Year of accession

Country/region

1981

Colombia

1982

Zambia, Thailand

1983

Maldives, Belize

1986

Hong Kong, Mexico

1987

Antigua and Barbuda, Morocco, Botswana

1988

Lesotho

1990

Tunisia, Venezuela, Bolivia, Costa Rica

1991

Macao, El Salvador, Guatemala

1992

Mozambique, Namibia

1993

Mali, Swaziland (Kingdom of), Saint Lucia, Slovak Republic, Czech Republic, Dominica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Fiji, Brunei Darussalam, Bahrain

1994

Grenada, United Arab Emirates, Guinea Bissau, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Liechtenstein, Qatar, Angola, Honduras, Slovenia, Guinea, Djibouti, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands

1996

Ecuador, Bulgaria

1997

Mongolia, Panama

1998

Kyrgyz Republic

1999

Latvia, Estonia

2000

Jordan, Albania, Oman, Croatia

2001

Lithuania, Moldova (Republic of), China

2002

Chinese Taipei

2003

Armenia, North Macedonia

2004

Nepal, Cambodia

2005

Saudi Arabia (Kingdom of)

Source Author’s construction based on World Trade Organization, The 128 countries that had signed GATT by 1994 [online]. Available at: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/gattmem_e. htm (Accessed 19 January 2022); World Trade Organization, Current status of WTO accessions [online]. Available at: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/acc_status_e.htm (Accessed 19 January 2022)

1.1.2 The Anti-Globalisation Stance Fierce critics of globalisation would systematically challenge every point the advocates make. While agreeing that globalisation is an expression of the capitalism and neo-liberalism that the Global North has been parading and promoting in principle since Bretton Woods, critics maintain that the North did not always implement what it was preaching: from the end of WWII until the early 1980s, for example, Western European economies themselves, while focusing on post-war reconstruction,

10

1 Globalisation: An Introduction 4 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4

Countries with large improvement in macroeconomic policies

Countries with small improvement in macroeconomic policies

Countries with deterioration in macroeconomic policies

Fig. 1.2 Median change in average annual GDP per capita growth rates of adjusting African countries, 1981–1986 to 1987–1991 (Source Reproduced from World Bank [1994, p. 3, Figure 2]) East Asia HPAEs East Asia without HPAEs South Asia Middle East and Mediterranean Sub-Saharan Africa OECD economies Latin America and Caribbean 0

1

2

3

4

5

6

GNP per capita growth rate (percent) Fig. 1.3 Average growth of GNP per capita, 1965–1990 (Source Reproduced from International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1993), The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy Summary [Washington, DC: IBRD], p. 2, Figure. 1)

1.1 Globalisation and Its Controversies

11

did embrace substantial elements of protectionism, as well as strong state control, subsidies and even outright ownership. This helped them face the crucial economic reconstruction and industrialisation processes, allowing them to establish self-sufficient, stable, somewhat comprehensive “national economies” first, before opening up to unfettered international competition and privatisation in the 1980s. In other words, critics point their finger at the double standards of this “selective” application of protectionism, which seemed to serve the early industrial development needs of the North, but is then discouraged in the strongest of terms when it comes the South’s. This attitude may reflect “neo-colonial” interests: most of the developing world, in fact, with the failure of import substitution industrialisation, is itself still heavily sector-based and therefore dependent on the extraction of resources and their exportation to developed economies capable of transforming them into complex, high-value-added products. Critics of globalisation believe, therefore, that the North prompted the South to open up to global market forces so that it could satisfy the needs of its own industrial sectors at the expense of a sustainable and consequential industrialisation pattern in the South, which would therefore find itself exploited and trapped in a recurrent cycle of export of commodities and import of whatever else was manufactured abroad. After all, the only “competitive advantage” many of these developing nations could harness in the 1980s and 1990s was indeed some natural endowment in the form of minerals, oil and gas reserves, fertile land and climate—often particularly suitable for exportation of cash crops like cocoa, coffee, tea, soy and oil palms. Another important criticism of globalisation concerns the claim of poverty reduction: the globally decline in income poverty rates that the advocates of globalisation parade, if dissected and analysed by world regions or by country, deliver a much different picture: one country alone—China—is responsible for the greatest share of said decline. If that one single country is excluded, statistics show a much slower decline, if any at all, especially in the regions of Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. Poverty reduction, moreover, did not immediately follow the de-facto-imposed “structural adjustments” of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Poverty rates actually spiked significantly in the short term: income fell by 8% in Latin America between 1981 and 1984, and by 1.2% throughout Sub-Saharan Africa throughout the whole 1980s (Oatley 2012; Thorp 1999; World Bank 1993). In the longer term the reforms started to pay off when, after about two decades, these poverty rates began a slow decline. Moreover, in particular in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, despite declining percentages, the actual “raw” number of people living below poverty lines remained substantially unchanged, due to demographic expansion outpacing economic progress: the number of people dragged out of poverty was essentially offset by the number still being born into it. Critics would also add that, just like development itself, poverty is an inherently multidimensional concept that transcends the mere income (or monetary) dimension.

12

1 Globalisation: An Introduction

Income represents, in other words, only one component—albeit an important one— of poverty, which if properly measured (as the UNDP/Oxford University Poverty Initiative’s Multidimensional Poverty Index or the World Bank’s Multidimensional Poverty Measure attempts to do; see Chapter 3) would display patterns that significantly diverge from and often exceed those of monetary poverty in much of the developing world. Criticisms of globalisation also tend to revolve around inequality. Inequality, too, should be considered a multidimensional phenomenon that has to do with a broad set of opportunities (or lack thereof) for development. Therefore, as we’ll discuss in Chapter 3, inequality, just like any multidimensional entity, escapes the narrow confines of one single indicator or measure. Multiple tools are necessary in order to gauge inequality accurately, ranging from the mere gap— i.e. distance—between the highest and lowest incomes to the “20:20” or “10:40” (so called “Palma”) ratios that compare the wealth concentrated in more substantial sections of society at the opposite ends of the income spectrum, or the Gini coefficient, a single measure of overall income distribution inequality, ranging from 0 (perfect equality) to 1 (complete inequality). Critics of globalisation tend to highlight in particular the growing gap between the “haves” and “have-nots”, which, they claim, is heavily contributed to by the expanding market opportunities that globalisation provides to those at the very top. And when globalisation advocates argue that the world’s Gini coefficient has plateaued, if not declined slightly, from the late 1980s onwards, the critics would respond that the world remains substantially unequal by that very standard, which in any case they criticise as more sensitive to the “middle” of the distribution curve rather than to its top and bottom. Moreover, they maintain, the stabilisation or supposed marginal decline in global Gini inequality scores would not have materialised at all without the very unique achievements of one single country: China (Lakner and Milanovic 2015; Milanovic 2012). Last but not least, its critics do recognise that globalisation can favour the generation of solutions that, in principle, are globally concerted and shared. Yet, they argue, the reality of global governance makes it very difficult for existing international institutions to reach consensus on the adoption of pretty much anything relevant (especially if it implies bearing immediate costs in exchange for delayed, uncertain and indirect benefits), since fundamentally most such platforms—with the notable exception of the European Union—tend to be inter-governmental in nature, not supragovernmental. In other words, they do not enjoy a personality or will distinct from that of their member states, which their budgets and decision-making processes ultimately rely upon heavily. This entails that transnational institutions often remain “hostage” to the national interests and politico-economic agendas of their most influential members, which often diverge dramatically from the “common good”. The resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, for instance, can be blocked by any of the five permanent members enjoying veto power. The withdrawal of the United States from active climate change cooperation during the George W. Bush (Kyoto Protocol) and Donald Trump (Paris Agreement) Republican presidencies contributed significantly to the slow overall progress of the climate regime in terms

1.2 A Middle Ground?

13

of both mitigation and adaptation. Even the recent Covid-19 pandemic (ongoing at the time of writing) saw hardly any solid, common global response brokered by the World Health Organisation (WHO) on fundamental aspects like containment measures or vaccinations: most countries adopted their own individual strategies, and sought sporadic international support from traditional diplomatic partners, thus via bilateral rather than consistently multilateral avenues. In any case, even if concerted global solutions are indeed found and strategies are finally agreed upon, their respective distribution and deployment processes generally face harsh headwinds of inequality: the South, which often lacks financial and technical capacity as well as infrastructure, tends to still depend substantially on intermittent assistance from the North. This is evident, for instance, with the cumbersome implementation of the provisions of the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change, as well as with the recent unequal worldwide distribution of COVID-19 vaccines. And, of course, critics would argue that both climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic were issues either brought about or significantly exacerbated by globalisation in the first place.

1.2 A Middle Ground? In the end, it would be reasonable for readers to ask themselves: whom should we believe? Which one of these two rather opposite positions should we embrace? Perhaps, in this as in other similar circumstances in which two stances both appear, to some extent, compelling and sensible yet also extremely distant and antithetic, a wise approach would be to look for a compromising “middle path” that may strike a balance between opposite arguments, thus drawing inspiration from the logic of both orientations and constructively identifying their respective strengths and weaknesses. This may also be the more realistic and pragmatic approach, since the reality of globalisation and its recurring cycles seems destined to stay. Over the years, many voices—including those of Nobel Prize laurates like economists Joseph Stiglitz, Amartya Sen and Mohammed Yunus5 —have called for an “improved” version of the current globalisation, where rules and institutions of global governance are reformed so as to yield benefits in a more equal and inclusive manner, while at the same time limiting the harmful spill-overs to the minimum. This perspective essentially calls for long-established organisations like the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO to become more reflective—in their agendas, as well as their management, budgeting and voting systems—of the rise of the Global South and therefore less revolve less around the will of traditionally dominant North American and Western European interests. 5

Stiglitz, J. (2002) Globalisatoin and its discontents. New York: W.W. Norton & Company; Sen, A. (1999) Development as freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Yunus, M. and Weber, K. (2009) Creating a world without poverty: social business and the future of capitalism. New York: Public Affairs.

14

1 Globalisation: An Introduction

Said perspective also strongly encourages a renewed commitment to multilateralism and pluralism through the transcending of other traditional platforms like the G7,6 which, despite bringing together economies whose combined size accounts for more than 50% of the world’s GDP, still leave billions of people completely unrepresented. Even the more recent and supposedly inclusive G20, for instance, features only one single member (South Africa) from the entire African continent, home to almost 1.4 billion people and 55 vibrant and dynamic nations.7 This would entail the establishment or strengthening of new institutions—such as the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank or the New Development Bank8 — which are the expression of emerging, rapidly expanding economies like China, Brazil and India and, consequently, of a new world order. Stronger regional cooperation platforms—from the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the East African Community (EAC) or the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)9 —would also represent highly conducive building blocks for a more effective global governance system, which would ideally come to rely on a streamlined process of international dialogue, taking place at regional and interregional levels first and foremost. In this sense, the difficult, yet steady and ultimately successful, politico-economic and social integration process that took place in Europe from the 1950s onwards represents a beacon of hope for other nations worldwide: a war-torn continent managed, in fact, to come together first as a common market, driven by shared interests in reconstruction and economic prosperity, and then, in 1992, as a holistic “Union” (the EU),

6

Members of the Group of 7: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, plus the “non enumerated addition of the European Union (Source: https://www. g7uk.org/what-is-the-g7/). The members of the G20: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union (source: https://g20.org/about-theg20/#about). 7 Number of African Union members as of January 2022. 8 As of January 2022, the AIIB has 104 approved members, while NDB has 9 approved members (Source: https://www.aiib.org/en/news-events/news/2021/AIIB-s-Membership-in-Afr ica-Grows-as-Nigeria-Joins-the-Bank.html, https://www.ndb.int/press_release/ndb-admits-egyptas-new-member/). 9 As of January 2020, the ASEAN has 10 members: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam (source: https://asean.org/about-asean/ member-states/); EAC comprises 6 Partner States: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda (source: https://www.eac.int/eac-partner-states); ECOWAS has 15 members: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo (Source: https://www.ecowas.int/member-states/).

References

15

whose members,10 by pooling sovereignty in a number of domains, conferred on it the authority to speak (and legislate) with a single voice on behalf of all Europeans. The “compromising” approach of the middle ground also suggests acceptance of the inevitable inefficiencies of the market, with its regular boom-and-bust cycles, and acknowledging the dangers of unrestrained deregulation—the so-called “race to the bottom” that tends to favour corporate interests over universal standards of fairness, transparency and inclusion. In this sense, the government retains a central role in providing, still within a neo-liberalist framework, the necessary strategic direction and ensuring that the weakest sections of society aren’t left out, but are instead protected from the effects of market distortions and downturns. Well-calibrated policies are therefore essential to provide suitable welfare safety nets and redistribute wealth in a manner that addresses inequalities appropriately and effectively. An important support for the very calibration of such policies, as well as for the measurement of achievements and shortcomings in the pursuit of improved living standards and opportunities for better health, education and overall wellbeing, may come from analysing indicators of population and socio-economic development, which will be discussed in the following two chapters.

References Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. (2021) AIIB’s membership in Africa grows as Nigeria joins the bank [online]. Available at: https://www.aiib.org/en/news-events/news/2021/AIIB-s-Member ship-in-Africa-Grows-as-Nigeria-Joins-the-Bank.html (Accessed 14 January 2022). Association of Southeast Asian Nations. (2022) Member states [online]. Available at: https://asean. org/about-asean/member-states/ (Accessed 14 January 2022). Dollar, D. and Kraay, A. (2002) ‘Spreading the wealth’, Foreign Affairs, 91(January/February), p120–33. Dollar, D. and Kraay, A. (2004) ‘Trade, growth, and poverty’, Economic Journal, 114(February), F22–49. East African Community. (2022) EAC partner states [online]. Available at: https://www.eac.int/ eac-partner-states (Accessed 14 January 2022). Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). (2021) Member States [online]. Available at: https://www.ecowas.int/member-states/ (Accessed 14 January 2022). European Union. (2022) Country profiles [online]. Available at: https://european-union.europa.eu/ principles-countries-history/country-profiles_en?page=0 (Accessed 14 January 2022). G7 UK 2021. (2022) What is the G7? [online]. Available at: https://www.g7uk.org/what-is-the-g7/ (Accessed 14 January 2022). G7 Research Group. (2016) What are the G7 and the G8? [online]. Available at: http://www.g8.uto ronto.ca/what_is_g8.html (Accessed 14 January 2022). G20 Indonesia 2022. (2022) About the G20 [online]. Available at: https://g20.org/about-the-g20/# about (Accessed: 14 January 2022). 10

As of January 2020, the EU has 27 member countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden (Source: https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/country-pro files_en?page=0).

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1 Globalisation: An Introduction

Lakner, C. and Milanovic B. (2015) ‘Global income distribution: Form the fall of the Berlin Wall to the great recession’. World Bank Economic Review [online]. Available at: https://www.gc.cuny. edu/CUNY_GC/media/LISCenter/brankoData/wber_final.pdf (Accessed 25 January 2022). Martin, B.D. (eds.) (1997) Inter-American development bank annual report 1997. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank. Milanovic B. (2012) ‘Global income inequality by the numbers: in history and now --an overview-’. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 6259 [online]. Available at: https://ssrn.com/ abstract=2173655 (Accessed 25 January 2022). Oatley, T. (2012) International political economy. 5th international edn. New York: Pearson. New Development Bank. (2021) NDB admits Egypt as new member [online]. Available at: https:// www.ndb.int/press_release/ndb-admits-egypt-as-new-member/ (Accessed 14 January 2022). Sachs, D.J. (2020) The ages of globalisation geography, technology, and institutions. New York: Columbia University Press. Sen, A. (1999) Development as freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stiglitz, J. (2002) Globalisation and its discontents. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. Thorp, R. (1999) Progress, poverty, and exclusion: an economic history of Latin America in the 20th century. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. World Bank. (1993) The East Asian miracle: Economic growth and public policy. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank (1994) World Bank Policy Research Bulletin, Volume 5, Number 2. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. (2020) GDP (current US$) (NY.GDP.MKTP.CD) [online]. Available at: https://dat abank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&series=NY.GDP.MKTP.CD&country= (Accessed 19 January 2022). World Trade Organization. The 128 countries that had signed GATT by 1994 [online]. Available at: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/gattmem_e.htm (Accessed 19 January 2022). World Trade Organization. Current status of WTO accessions [online]. Available at: https://www. wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/acc_status_e.htm (Accessed 19 January 2022). Yunus, M. and Weber, K. (2009) Creating a world without poverty: Social business and the future of capitalism. New York: Public Affairs.

Chapter 2

Population and Settlement Patterns

Demographic data—i.e. the statistical information concerning population—is essential in a number of domains relevant to the readership of this volume, ranging from public administration to development economics, from resource management to global governance. A series of rather useful and insightful indicators can be employed to decipher population and settlement patterns at local, national, international, and global levels.

2.1 Total Population The world’s total population is, as of October 2020, 7.8 billion (World Bank 2020c; see Table 2.1 for the most-populous countries). World population has grown exponentially since the early 1800s, as a consequence of, among other factors, the diffusion of industrialization and the consequent process of urbanization and improvements in living standards, which significantly reduced deaths and increased life expectancy. Before then, it had actually taken the world centuries to reach the 1 billion threshold at the dawn of the nineteenth century, from an estimated population of about 250,000 in the year 1 CE. Ten of the 20 most populous countries in the world are located in Asia—12 if Russia and Turkey are counted among them as well. Africa has four of the world’s 20 largest populations (namely in Nigeria, Ethiopia, Egypt and Democratic Republic of the Congo), Latin America two (Brazil and Mexico), North America and Europe only one each (United States and Germany, respectively). According to the Population Division of the UN’s Department of Economic and Social Affairs, the world population continues to increase and is expected to peak at around 11 billion at the end of 2100 (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2019a).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 E. Monaco, Global Trends Compendium, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9163-9_2

17

18 Table 2.1 Evolution of total world population since the 1800s

2 Population and Settlement Patterns 1804

World population reached 1 billion

1927

2 billion (123 years later)

1959

3 billion (32 years later)

1974

4 billion (15 years later)

1987

5 billion (13 years later)

1998

6 billion (11 years later)

2011

7 billion (13 years later)

2022

8 billion (11 years later)

Source Author’s construction based on UNFPA (2011, p. 2)

The reality, though, is that world population isn’t growing at the same pace everywhere: in some regions—and, more specifically, in some countries—total population numbers are growing fast, while in others they are doing so very slowly, if they are growing at all.

2.2 Rate of Natural Increase and Fertility Rates There is indeed a huge difference in population patterns around the world. To better gauge this diversity other indicators come in handy, such as the rate of natural increase (also referred to as annual rate of population change)—i.e. the rate at which population grows as an effect of the difference between crude birth rates and crude death rates (thus excluding migration)—and the total fertility rate, i.e. the average number of children that a woman will bear throughout her childbearing years (usually age 15–44, or sometimes 15–49). When it comes to the total fertility rate, a sustained value higher than 2.1—the so-called “replacement” threshold (standing at slightly more than 2 due to differences in rates of boys and girls around the world)—would normally indicate that the population is expected to grow, as the number of children would then exceed that of their parents. In 2019, the world’s average fertility rate stood at 2.45 live births per woman, while the annual rate of population change stood at +1.1%: this may look like a small percentage in absolute terms, nonetheless, if considered in relation to the world population of almost 8 billion, it translates into an annual addition that roughly corresponds to the entire population of a country such as Germany, Iran or Turkey (Table 2.2). The fertility rates and rates of natural increase right across the globe that produce the abovementioned world averages do vary greatly, as is evident in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. Fertility ranges from high figures of almost 6 children per family in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to the 1.3 children—i.e. well below the replacement level— that are the average in Japan.

2.2 Rate of Natural Increase and Fertility Rates Table 2.2 Largest countries by population (2020)

19

Ranking

Country

Total population

1

China

1,402,112,000

2

India

1,380,004,385

3

United States

329,484,123

4

Indonesia

273,523,621

5

Pakistan

220,892,331

6

Brazil

212,559,409

7

Nigeria

206,139,587

8

Bangladesh

164,689,383

9

Russian Federation

144,104,080

10

Mexico

128,932,753

11

Japan

125,836,021

12

Ethiopia

114,963,583

13

Philippines

109,581,085

14

Egypt, Arab Rep.

102,334,403

15

Vietnam

97,338,583

16

Congo, Dem. Rep.

89,561,404

17

Turkey

84,339,067

18

Iran, Islamic Rep.

83,992,953

19

Germany

83,240,525

20

Thailand

69,799,978

Source Author’s construction based on World Bank (2020c)

This diversity, though, is not random, but actually discernible. One of the most important determinants, in fact, is level of socio-economic development. Countries with a higher level of socio-economic development tend to register fertility rates that are lower than those of developing, low-income countries. This is due to a series of factors: in the least-developed countries people tend to live in rural areas, work primarily in agriculture, and often must engage in manual labour to perform functions needed to satisfy basic needs. Lack of education, or selective education patterns which tend to penalize girls—too often perceived as the ultimate performers of household duties rather than potential breadwinners—lead to unions in marriage at a young age, and thus to an early start to “childbearing age”. Moreover, in less developed countries, modern and effective methods of contraception may be unknown or inaccessible to many people. Another factor that contributes to driving fertility upwards in such countries is the relatively high infant and child mortality. It is therefore not a surprise that the 20 highest fertility rates are recorded in least developed countries (Table 2.5).

20 Table 2.3 Fertility rates in the 20 most populous countries (2019)

2 Population and Settlement Patterns Country

Total fertility (children per woman)

1

China

1.696

2

India

2.202

3

United States

1.705

4

Indonesia

2.288

5

Pakistan

3.454

6

Brazil

1.719

7

Nigeria

5.317

8

Bangladesh

2.011

9

Russian Federation

1.504

10

Mexico

2.103

11

Japan

1.360

12

Ethiopia

4.146

13

Philippines

2.526

14

Egypt, Arab Rep.

3.280

15

Vietnam

2.050

16

Congo, Dem. Rep.

5.819

17

Turkey

2.055

18

Iran, Islamic Rep.

2.146

19

Germany

1.540

20

Thailand

1.514

Source Author’s construction based on data from World Bank (2019)

2.3 Demographic Transition Model and Population Pyramid The close, consistent interconnection observed over time between population and socio-economic development patterns is best reflected in the so-called demographic transition model (see Fig. 2.1). The demographic transition model monitors the birth and death rates throughout the five stages that are most commonly associated with economic development— which spread across the globe from the industrial revolution onwards, essentially driven by the development of the industrial sector and the subsequent expansion of the service sector. These sectors in fact, typically transform and “add value” to resources, through processes that enhance economic complexity and at the same time produce wealth. The five stages of development correspond to rather typical birth and death rate trends, which in turn significantly affect the size of the total population.

2.3 Demographic Transition Model and Population Pyramid Table 2.4 Population growth (annual %) in world’s most-populous countries

Country 1

China

21 Population growth (annual %) 2020 0.3

2

India

1.0

3

United States of America

0.4

4

Indonesia

1.1

5

Pakistan

2.0

6

Brazil

0.7

7

Nigeria

2.5

8

Bangladesh

9

Russian Federation

10

Mexico

1.0 −0.2 1.1 −0.3

11

Japan

12

Ethiopia

2.5

13

Philippines

1.3

14

Egypt, Arab Rep.

1.9

15

Vietnam

0.9

16

Congo, Dem. Rep.

3.1

17

Turkey

1.1

18

Iran

1.3

19

Germany

0.2

20

Thailand

0.3

Source Author’s construction based on data from World Bank (2020b)

In the first stage—shared by the whole world before the Industrial Revolution, and now by some of the least developed countries—birth rates and death rates are both high. As a result, the size of the total population stays rather constant. In the second stage—typical of developing countries where some initial improvements in the standards of living allow at least for the introduction of the most basic health care, sanitation, safe access to food and clean water—death rates decline sharply, especially among children, but birth rates remain high: the divergence between death rates and birth rates is therefore reflected in rapid population growth. The third stage sees a progressive decrease of birth rates, as a result of furtherimproving economic conditions, driven by industrialization, urbanization, education—especially among women—as well as access to contraception, better nutrition and health care. The persisting difference between birth and death rates sustains the momentum of population growth, although at a slower pace than in Stage 2. Most developing countries are presently either in Stage 2 or in Stage 3, which also explains the overall global population growth trends.

22

2 Population and Settlement Patterns

Table 2.5 Top 20 countries by total fertility rates (2019)

Country

Fertility rate, total (births per woman)

1

Niger

6.824

2

Somalia

5.978

3

Congo, Dem. Rep.

5.819

4

Mali

5.785

5

Chad

5.649

6

Angola

5.442

7

Burundi

5.321

8

Nigeria

5.317

9

Gambia

5.154

10

Burkina Faso

5.109

11

Tanzania

4.832

12

Uganda

4.824

13

Mozambique

4.783

14

Benin

4.767

15

Central African Republic

4.645

16

Guinea

4.625

17

South Sudan

4.619

18

Cote d’Ivoire

4.593

19

Zambia

4.559

20

Senegal

4.556

Source Author’s construction based on World Bank (2019)

In Stage 4, the total population tends to stabilize, as birth rates and death rates converge at the lower end: this is typically the stage of countries that have strong industrial and service sectors and that have therefore feature complex economies, higher levels of education, sustained investment in human capital, good healthcare systems, a higher proportion of working women and fertility rates that stand around the replacement level. While most developed countries are in Stage 4, some of them have recently appeared to be entering a further stage, the fifth, in which fertility rates have fallen below the replacement threshold and the proportion of elderly people increases in relation to that of youngsters. It is worth noting that the demographic transition model does not take into account parameters like migration, nor does it indicate how much time a given country will take to reach a given stage. Yet this model can help us make sense of the fertility trends in single countries and, as shown in Table 2.6, world regions (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2020). Low-income, “least-” and “less-developed regions” (including, above all, Sub-Saharan Africa; Oceania without

2.3 Demographic Transition Model and Population Pyramid

23

Births and deaths (per thousand per year)

40

30

20

Stage 1: Preindustrial

Stage 2: Transitional

Stage 3: Transitional

Stage 4: Industrial

Stage 5: Postindustrial

10

0

Time Fig. 2.1 Demographic transition model (Note blue line = total population, yellow line = birth rate, red line = death rate)

Australia and New Zealand; Central and Southern Asia; and LLDCs), where the transformation from rural-based to industry- and service-sector-based economies has only recently begun to take place (if at all), have the highest fertility rates, combined with a relatively low prevalence of contraception, and the slowest decrease of these rates towards replacement levels. High-income, “developed”, industrialised regions like Europe and North America, Australia and New Zealand, and Eastern and Southeastern Asia, on the other hand, appear to consistently record lower fertility rates, combined with more prevalent use of contraception, that do not even reach the replacement threshold. Another graphic way to represent key aspects of population, such as age and gender structures, is via population pyramids. These typically show the raw number (or, in some instances, the percentage) of male/female population in different age groups. The large base and narrow tip of the pyramid are typical of developing contexts, where the young population far exceeds the old. Figure 2.2 shows, for instance, the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, a region where—according to the UN Population Division—in 2019 43% of people were 15 years of age or below, and life expectancy at birth for both sexes stood at 61.1 years. The pyramids can look almost reversed—i.e. with a narrower base and a bulge at the top—in contexts that are in the fourth or, even more so, the fifth stage (e.g. Western Europe, Japan, Fig. 2.3) of the demographic transition model. In Western Europe, life expectancy at birth for both sexes stands at 81.9 and the percentage of people below the age of 15 is 15.6.

24

2 Population and Settlement Patterns

Table 2.6 Regional fertility trends Region, development Total fertility rate group, country or area

Contraceptive prevalence any method, median (percentage)

Percentage of women using modern methods among all users

Percentage of married/in-union women 15–49 years

Year

1990 2019 2030 1990 2019 2030 2019

2019

World

3.2

65

2.5

2.4

42.1

48.5

49.0

91.3

Sub-Saharan Africa

6.3

4.6

4.0

13.2

28.5

34.1

87.5

61

Northern Africa and Western Asia

4.4

2.9

2.6

26.2

34.3

35.1

80.1

60

Central and Southern Asia

4.3

2.4

2.1

30.2

41.8

44.8

88.1

73

Eastern and South-Eastern Asia

2.5

1.8

1.8

50.7

60.0

59.1

95.3

70

Latin America and the 3.3 Caribbean

2.0

1.9

39.8

58.0

60.4

93.9

56

Oceania (excluding Australia and New Zealand)

4.5

3.4

3.0

20.4

28.0

30.7

81.5

62

Australia and New Zealand

1.9

1.8

1.8

56.4

57.7

58.5

96.8

55

Europe and Northern America

1.8

1.7

1.7

57.1

58.2

59.0

90.3

53

Developed regions

1.7

1.6

1.7

56.1

57.0

58.2

90.0

53

Less developed regions

3.6

2.6

2.4

38.1

47.0

47.6

91.6

67

Less developed regions, excluding least-developed countries

3.3

2.3

2.2

41.3

50.1

50.6

92.1

68

Less developed regions, excluding China

4.2

2.8

2.6

29.3

41.0

43.4

88.8

66

Least developed countries

6.0

3.9

3.4

13.0

30.9

35.3

87.6

67

Land-locked developing countries (LLDC)

5.7

3.9

3.3

17.4

31.6

36.3

91.5

66

Small island developing states (SIDS)

3.2

2.4

2.3

33.7

43.1

45.6

92.6

56

(continued)

2.4 Settlement

25

Table 2.6 (continued) Region, development Total fertility rate group, country or area

Contraceptive prevalence any method, median (percentage)

Percentage of women using modern methods among all users

Percentage of married/in-union women 15–49 years

Year

1990 2019 2030 1990 2019 2030 2019

2019

High-income countries

1.8

1.7

1.7

55.6

56.6

58.0

91.4

53

Middle-income countries

3.3

2.3

2.2

40.9

49.6

50.0

91.6

68

Upper-middle-income 2.6 countries

1.9

1.8

51.2

61.0

60.3

93.9

66

Lower-middle-income 4.2 countries

2.7

2.5

28.4

40.1

42.7

88.5

70

Low-income countries 6.3

4.4

3.7

12.5

28.0

33.7

87.1

65

Source Reproduced under Creative Commons license CC BY 3.0 IGO, from United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2020, annex table: ‘Key indicators’)

The pyramids afford a meaningful and rather detailed comparison among population structures of different regions across the world: for example, they make it possible to observe possible gender imbalances, as well as to monitor the typical development-related processes of demographic transition, one age group at a time.

2.4 Settlement In terms of settlement, population density is the indicator that, in general, monitors the number of people per unit of land. There are different kinds of population density, though, depending on the type of “people” and “land” that are taken into consideration. Crude or “arithmetic” density looks broadly at the average number of people per unit of generic land. Physiological density looks instead at the number of people per unit of arable land. Agricultural density, then, looks at the number of farmers per unit of arable land. A country or region may have very low arithmetic density, but very high physiological density: this is the case, for instance, for many countries in North Africa and Southwest Asia (aka the “Middle East”), where vast swaths of arid land that constitute the national territory end up being included in the account of arithmetic density, but not in that of physiological density. In other words, while arithmetic density is a vague indicator of the generic “space” at people’s disposal in a certain context, physiological density gives us a better idea of population in relation to the land’s “carrying capacity”—i.e. the number of people that

26

2 Population and Settlement Patterns

Fig. 2.2 Pyramid graphs typical of early stages of the demographic transition (Source Reproduced from United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs [2019b])

2.4 Settlement

27

Fig. 2.3 Pyramid graphs typical of later stages of the demographic transition (Source Reproduced from United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs [2019b])

28

2 Population and Settlement Patterns

an area could in principle “sustain” with food on the basis of its physical properties, rather than merely the number that it can “host”. The highest amount of arable land is available to people of Kazakhstan and Australia, while the lowest amount is in Singapore, China’s Hong Kong SAR and Bahrain (World Bank 2020a). It’s important to mention that the carrying capacity is not a concept that directly reflects agricultural productivity, whose non-environmental determinants, such as capital and technology, have nowadays become more and more significant. Another key factor in present-day global food distribution not reflected in carrying capacity is international trade. This explains why, for instance, a region like Sub-Saharan Africa has an extremely low crude population density, a comparatively higher physiological density, an even higher agricultural density—due to the many who still engage mostly in subsistence agriculture—and yet a rather unproductive agricultural system overall. Another important indicator is the urban–rural settlement ratio, as this can also reflect the level of development that a society is achieving. In fact, the history of economic growth—from the Industrial Revolution onwards—is essentially a history of industrialization and, inevitably, urbanization. The more a society develops industries and its service sector—heavily concentrated in urban centers for obvious reasons of convenience and efficiency—the more people are attracted to cities, where they can find livelihoods. This particular type of migratory flow—voluntary, and occurring within countries, from rural to urban areas—is by far the most common worldwide, but like any other it is the product of the complex interplay between “push and pull” factors. Worldwide, 56% of the population today lives in cities (World Bank 2020d). But the percentage is destined to grow significantly, as more and more developing countries industrialize and therefore see more people moving to the cities. As detailed in Table 2.7, in more developed countries the urban population figure is around 90%, while in developing countries it can be as low as 21%. However, Sub-Saharan African countries such as Nigeria and Democratic Republic of the Congo register urbanization rates that are slightly higher than their levels of industrialization and service sector development would normally lead us to expect: in this case, more than the pull factors attracting people to the city, there are significant push factors—such as low agricultural productivity, poor land tenure systems and, at times, conflict—that are all too common in the region and contribute significantly to driving migrants away from their rural place of origin and towards the cities.1

1

A notable exception appears to be Ethiopia, where the pace of urbanization has been slower than elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa. Yet in Ethiopia too, urbanization rates are expected to pick up significantly in the near future, as an effect of the country’s recently improved road infrastructure, secondary city development and rural-to-urban migration routes, combined with intense investment in the expansion of the manufacturing sector in a number of new industrial parks providing multiple employment opportunities.

2.4 Settlement

29

Table 2.7 Urban population (% of total population) in the world’s 20 most-populous countries Country

Urban population (% of total population) 2020)

1

China

61.4

2

India

34.9

3

United States

82.7

4

Indonesia

56.6

5

Pakistan

37.2

6

Brazil

87.1

7

Nigeria

52.0

8

Bangladesh

38.2

9

Russian Federation

74.8

10

Mexico

80.7

11

Japan

91.8

12

Ethiopia

21.7

13

Philippines

47.4

14

Egypt, Arab Rep.

42.8

15

Vietnam

37.3

16

Congo, Dem. Rep.

45.6

17

Turkey

76.1

18

Iran, Islamic Rep.

75.9

19

Germany

77.5

20

Thailand

51.4

Source Author’s construction based on data from World Bank (2020d)

As suggested earlier in the chapter, population monitoring is crucial in order for appropriate information to be available to policymakers, administrators, and analysists in different sectors, for them to assess and act upon. A country with a young population, for instance, will inevitably have substantially different governance agendas than a country with a significantly older population. The first will have to tap into its “demographic dividend”, which could ensure, in principle, a strong, dynamic, productive force to drive the economy of the country. But this will entail providing, among other things, education and employment opportunities that ultimately allow the country to actually harness such potential. Failing to do so in a manner that meets the needs of all the young people who legitimately seek these opportunities would hamper growth and potentially trigger various forms of socio-economic and political instability. The 2011 Arab Spring is a recent clear example of that very dynamic: for many years ahead of the crisis, in numerous countries like Tunisia, Egypt and others across the Middle East and North Africa that ultimately experienced upheaval, demographic trends had clearly pointed to the urgent need to address the expectations of vast

30

2 Population and Settlement Patterns

number of youngsters, who instead of being able to access productive opportunities found themselves increasingly unemployed and, often, disenfranchised. Similarly, an aging society will have to face the so-called “dependency” of an increasing number of older people—often retirees whose need for welfare services and assistance naturally increases with age—on younger people and their contribution to welfare and economic growth. This is not uncommon among industrialised societies that are between stage 4 and stage 5 of the transition model (Fig. 2.1): their progressive aging is a consequence of sustained low fertility rates and longer lifespans. The consequences of this for the local dependency ratio can often be averted only by promoting immigration. Regardless of controversial public attitudes on that matter (often conveniently manipulated by different factions for political gain), in fact many developed countries quite simply depend on a steady stream of immigrants to sustain their economies and standards of living through its provision of a productive workforce that is in desperately short supply in view of the aging local population. Another major aspect that is nowadays under growing scrutiny is the increasing overall demand for natural resources, such as minerals, fossil fuels and even land, which are, by nature, finite. While the carrying capacity of the planet and the sustainable utilisation of its environmental resources amid the current patterns of resource consumption and demographic expansion are the focus of Chapter 4 and 5, economic growth, also strongly influenced by population dynamics, is dealt with in the very next chapter.

References United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (2019a) Growing at a slower pace, world population is expected to reach 9.7 billion in 2050 and could peak at nearly 11 billion around 2100 [online]. Available at: https://www.un.org/development/desa/en/news/population/ world-population-prospects-2019.html (Accessed 19 January 2022). United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (2019b) World Population Prospects 2019 [online]. Available at: https://population.un.org/wpp (Accessed 13 December 2021). United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (2020) World fertility and family planning 2020 highlights. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/pub lications/pdf/family/World_Fertility_and_Family_Planning_2020_Highlights.pdf (Accessed 12 December 2021). UNFPA. (2011) 7 billion actions [online]. Available at: https://unfpa.org/sites/default/files/resourcepdf/7B_fact_sheets_en.pdf (Accessed 19 January 2021). World Bank. (2019) Fertility rate, total (births per woman) (SP.DYN.TFRT.IN) [online]. Available at: https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SP.DYN.TFRT.IN&cou ntry (Accessed 19 January 2022). World Bank. (2020a) Arable land (hectares per person) [online]. Available at: https://data.worldb ank.org/indicator/AG.LND.ARBL.HA.PC?most_recent_value_desc=false (Accessed 19 January 2022). World Bank. (2020b) Population growth (annual %) (SP.POP.GROW) [online]. Available at: https:// databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SP.POP.GROW&country (Accessed 19 January 2022).

References

31

World Bank. (2020c) Population, total [online]. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ SP.POP.TOTL (Accessed 19 January 2022). World Bank. (2020d) Urban population (% of total population) [online]. Available at: https:// data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS?most_recent_value_desc=false (Accessed 19 January 2022).

Chapter 3

Socio-Economic Development

Development is a complex and multidimensional pursuit that includes a variety of domains—society, economy, environment, and governance, to name just a broad few. This entails, among other things, that no single measure or even composite indicator can capture all that development encompasses, and that therefore a range of indicators should instead be used to gauge societal progress. This chapter focuses on relevant macro-trends of socio-economic progress and their key indicators.

3.1 Economic Output and Gross Domestic Product Over the years, metrics of living standards have transcended academic circles, becoming heavily referenced across different sectors of society and even penetrating “mainstream” popular culture. They concern, in fact, aspects of life that are rather “tangible”, material, and quantitative in nature—which in turn facilitates their measurement—and that affect billions of people across the globe. The first measure in this realm is certainly gross domestic product (GDP), which corresponds to the total value of goods and services produced within a country, in a given period of time. It is usually calculated by the expenditure method; this combines all recorded transactions conducted by the key actors in an economy, including, namely, government expenditure, corporate investment, consumer spending, and net exports.1 In order to take into account the population factor, GDP can be easily divided by the number of people living in a certain country so as to obtain the GDP per capita, Y = C + I + G + (X−M), where Y stands for GDP, being the sum of consumption (C), investment (I), government spending (G)and net exports (X−M).

1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 E. Monaco, Global Trends Compendium, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9163-9_3

33

34

3 Socio-Economic Development

which therefore represents a mere mathematical ratio between economic output and population: it is not an actual measure of wealth distribution. GDP was originally devised as a straightforward national accounting tool in the 1930s, by Simon Kuznets, an economist at the US National Bureau of Economic Research. Once the institutions of Bretton Woods such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank embraced it, it quickly became the standard of reference for the measurement of a country’s economy and its growth over time. Over and above this, its practical nature and popularity meant that GDP quickly (and mistakenly) came to be the single most referenced indicator of societal progress as a whole, frequently being used as if it were synonymous with or symbolic of this overall progress, even though the latter clearly encompasses far more dimensions than mere economic output (see Chapter 5). It is important to note, also, that GDP remains blind to economic dynamics like inequality, informal transactions or unpaid work, and in general to qualitative aspects of development. This is because it primarily highlights how much is formally being spent, rather than what for. Similarly, while GDP growth rates do indeed provide a useful element for evaluation, focusing exclusively on this could turn out to be misleading, as it don’t provide a clear indication of actual living standards on the ground, or of the “baseline” which growth patterns should be compared with. In other words, a high GDP growth rate, or even high GDP per capita figures, does not necessarily exclude the presence of phenomena such as poverty or inequality. Different countries with identical GDP growth rates may be experiencing significantly different economic circumstances. Before assessing relevant present-day global trends, it is important to provide a brief historical perspective on the origins of the “economic growth phenomenon”— which can be traced back to the Industrial Revolution—and its subsequent, fundamentally unequal diffusion across the globe. The Industrial Revolution represents a real turning point for world economy. The blossoming, at the end of the eighteenth century, of the secondary sector— consisting essentially in transforming, on a large scale, resources that the primary sector had traditionally concerned itself mostly with extracting—gives the start to the age of modern economic growth. Even in the context of exponential world population growth (rising from 1 billion in the early 1800s to nearly 7 billion in 2010), during the period 1800−2010 the “Gross World Product” (GWP) per capita grew at an average rate of 1.1% per year. The average rate was actually 1.5% in the period 1970−2010—driven by the booming of the tertiary sector and its typical provision of services (financial, above all). In contrast, for centuries up until the mid-1700s, in a world dominated by subsistence agriculture, the output per person had remained generally low and rather “flat” (Sachs 2015, pp.18−19; Maddison 2006; Bolt and van Zanden 2013). Industrial transformation essentially entailed adding value to resources, thus creating wealth and opportunities for a growing, urbanising population. This occurred initially only in England, where a complex set of factors combined to create an ecosystem where such a groundbreaking shift was indeed possible. Among these factors, agricultural productivity allowed the movement of large numbers of people

3.1 Economic Output and Gross Domestic Product

35

from the countryside to the city, where they would work in newly established factories—and hence no longer in direct food production. Critical also was the steady supply of natural resources, sourced locally or across colonies throughout the vast British Empire with the support of efficient transportation systems. Scientific and technological advances, promoted by dynamic universities and protected by increasingly sophisticated intellectual property right laws, produced ground-breaking inventions such as, above all, the steam engine. These are obviously very “special”, complex conditions that matured over time, that very few countries could produce spontaneously—or “endogenously”—in a short time span. In this sense, industrialisation ushered in not just the era of economic growth but also the era of divergence in economic performance, and thus of inequality, both within countries and across them. In fact, growth started to spread rather unevenly throughout the globe, to places blessed with geographical proximity, trade openness, effective governance, agricultural productivity, hospitable natural environments, and energy resources. Most of these places could at best attempt to import, or simply imitate, the technologies and approaches adopted by industrial growth leaders. On the other hand, the likes of colonies (exploited for the exclusive benefit of the metropolitan power), despotic and feudal systems, or remote and landlocked areas with extreme climates affecting both food supply and human health all remained largely untouched by the wave of industrialisation and growth. It is therefore no surprise that many countries in the Global South could embark on a steady path of economic growth only relatively recently, after the removal of the colonial yoke, when the foundations of domestic governance mechanisms were strengthened and when relations “as equals” were established with foreign economic and political partners. The “late” development of vast nations like China and India, in the last four decades, is the most prominent symbol—and driver—of the ascent of the onceexploited South: the People’s Republic of China was only partially colonised but was nonetheless subjected to intense foreign interference for a good part of the 1900s. Founded in 1949, in the late 1970s it undertook significant macroeconomic reforms that progressively opened it up to world trade integration. In the period 1981−2020 which followed its market reforms, China averaged a growth rate of almost 9.3% (see Appendixes B and C). India, formally independent from British rule since 1947, underwent similar market liberalisation reforms but around a decade later, in the early 1990s. In the period right after that, from 1991−2020, it recorded growth rates of 5.8% (see Appendixes B and C). In fact, from 1980 onwards the developing world as a whole grew more than twice as fast as the rich North, 4% on average compared with 1.7% respectively—a reversal of the status quo of the period 1960–1980, during which the South was outpaced by a similar margin (1.8% vs. 3.3) (Dollar 2004). Table 3.1 shows the average GDP growth rates of the ten most populous nations in the world in the past ten years.

36 Table 3.1 Average GDP growth rate of world’s ten most populous countries, 2010−2020

3 Socio-Economic Development Country name

GDP growth (annual %)

China

7.193

India

5.397

United States

1.761

Indonesia

4.735

Pakistan

3.526

Brazil

0.961

Nigeria

3.155

Bangladesh

6.464

Russian Federation

1.568

Mexico

1.670

Average

3.643

Source Author’s construction based on data from World Bank (2020e)

Both China and India feature prominently in the World Bank ranking of the 20 largest economies by nominal GDP: China was the second-largest economy in 2020—and is widely expected to reach the number one spot by 2030—while India ranked sixth (see Table 3.2). The list includes also other populous developing nations like Indonesia (a Dutch colony until 1949), Brazil, and Mexico (respectively Portuguese and Spanish colonies until 1822 and 1810). If the values expressed in current international dollars are also converted by the purchasing power parity (PPP) factor—which essentially eliminates the effects of the differences in price levels across countries—the ranking would look significantly different, with developing countries performing even better: China is already the largest economy in the world, while India ranks third, Indonesia seventh. Poland and Egypt are respectively nineteenth and twentieth (Table 3.3). Obviously, population size plays a big role in the abovementioned GDP rankings. To adjust for this, GDP values can simply be divided by the number of residents and thus deliver the GDP per capita. Table 3.4 shows different results again: prosperous economies with few inhabitants tend to feature at the top of this ranking. This is often due to the large wealth generated by highly developed financial services sectors (as is the case for the top three performers, Luxemburg, Bermuda and Switzerland, but also for the Cayman Islands and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region) or natural resource endowments (as is the case, for instance, for Norway and Qatar). It’s important to note that China, India, Indonesia, Brazil and Mexico are missing altogether from the list of the 20 best performers in terms of GDP per capita: as Table 3.4 shows, when their GDP is measured in relation to their vast population, in fact, the resulting quotient shows a very different picture and the gap with advanced economies—such as that of the United States—appears still stark, despite a slow yet steady convergence brought about by years of sustained growth. Table 3.5 shows GDP per capita growth rates for the most populous countries.

3.1 Economic Output and Gross Domestic Product Table 3.2 World nominal GDP ranked by country 2020 (top 20)

Country name

37 GDP (current US$)

1

United States

20,893,746,000,000.0

2

China

14,722,730,697,890.1

3

Japan

5,057,758,958,706.6

4

Germany

3,846,413,928,653.7

5

United Kingdom

2,764,197,653,965.1

6

India

2,660,245,248,867.6

7

France

2,630,317,731,455.3

8

Italy

1,888,709,443,687.5

9

Canada

1,644,037,286,481.3

10

Korea, Rep

1,637,895,802,792.9

11

Russian Federation

1,483,497,784,867.6

12

Brazil

1,444,733,258,971.7

13

Australia

1,327,836,171,068.5

14

Spain

1,281,484,640,043.6

15

Mexico

1,073,915,880,822.5

16

Indonesia

1,058,423,838,345.1

17

Netherlands

913,865,395,789.9

18

Switzerland

752,248,045,730.1

19

Turkey

719,954,821,683.3

20

Saudi Arabia

700,117,873,253.3

Source Author’s construction based on data from World Bank (2020d)

In fact, out of the ten most populous countries in the world—which, combined, account for about 4.5 billion people, i.e. around 56% of the world’s total population of nearly 8 billion—only one, the United States, can be classified as “high income”. A formal classification by income tiers is carried out by the World Bank annually, based on Gross National Income (GNI) per capita in current USD (using the Atlas method exchange rates). GNI measures the total domestic as well as foreign value added claimed by residents, and it thus comprises GDP plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from non-resident sources. GDP and GNI figures tend to be close for the majority of countries, although not identical. The World Bank defines as low-income countries those where the GNI is lower than $1,046; as lower-middle income countries those where it is between $1,046 and $4,095 (including, among others, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Nigeria); as uppermiddle income countries those where it is between $4,096 and $12,695 (including the likes of Brazil, China, Mexico, Pakistan, Russian Federation); and as high-income countries (e.g. United States) those where it exceeds $12,695. In July 2019, globally, about 75% of the world’s population lived in middleincome countries: the number of low-income countries declined from 66 in 2003

38 Table 3.3 World GDP PPP ranked by country 2020 (top 20)

3 Socio-Economic Development Country name

GDP, PPP (current international $)

1

China

24,274,130,797,200.80

2

United States

20,893,746,000,000.00

3

India

8,972,134,487,506.71

4

Japan

5,251,498,131,441.79

5

Germany

4,516,934,682,331.35

6

Russian Federation

4,133,083,560,983.54

7

Indonesia

3,300,948,636,284.09

8

Brazil

3,152,232,742,596.70

9

France

3,147,996,259,903.87

10

United Kingdom

3,082,001,918,324.00

11

Italy

2,494,730,457,977.03

12

Mexico

2,423,129,222,555.29

13

Turkey

2,371,086,313,389.97

14

Korea, Rep

2,243,095,240,953.81

15

Canada

1,827,709,602,976.19

16

Spain

1,815,608,483,589.18

17

Saudi Arabia

1,627,278,285,458.09

18

Australia

1,345,933,829,389.82

19

Poland

1,305,744,215,882.04

20

Egypt, Arab Rep

1,289,649,795,936.20

Source Author’s construction based on data from World Bank (2020g)

to 31 in 2019, while the number of high-income countries climbed to 80 from less than 50 in the early 1990s. The number of middle-income countries stood at 107 in 2019 (47 of which were lower-middle-income and 60 upper-middle-income) and has remained rather stable over time due to the fact that countries have transitioned either in or out of this group in roughly equal measure (Prydz and Wadhwa 2019). While a country’s transition from low to middle income usually follows rather established patterns that tend to reflect an economy’s reallocation of resources and overall shift from agricultural subsistence to commercial agriculture and basic industry, the transition from middle income to high income is often less straightforward and volume-based, and instead more quality-driven, as it entails higher levels of service sector development and overall economic complexity, requiring increased technical and financial capacity, investment, innovation, and thus, often, abundant time (Hidalgo et al. 2007). The term “middle income trap” refers, in fact, to the rather frequent “stagnation”—a plateauing of per capita income and loss of competitiveness—affecting various economies in this category, from Latin America to the Middle East to East Asia (Griffith 2011).

3.1 Economic Output and Gross Domestic Product Table 3.4 World GDP per capita ranked by country/region 2020 (Top 20)

39

Country/region name

GDP per capita (current US$)

1

Luxembourg

116,014.6

2

Bermuda

107,079.5

3

Switzerland

87,097.0

4

Ireland

85,267.8

5

Cayman Islands

85,082.5

6

Norway

67,389.9

7

United States

63,413.5

8

Denmark

61,063.3

9

Singapore

59,797.8

10

Iceland

59,270.2

11

Netherlands

52,397.1

12

Sweden

52,274.4

13

Australia

51,692.8

14

Qatar

50,124.4

15

Finland

48,773.3

16

Austria

48,586.8

17

Hong Kong SAR, China

46,323.9

18

Germany

46,208.4

19

Belgium

45,159.3

20

Israel

44,168.9

Source Author’s construction based on data from World Bank (2020f) Table 3.5 World most populous countries GDP per capita 2020 (top 10)

Country/region name

GDP per capita (current US$)

1

China

10,434.8

2

India

1,927.7

3

United States

4

Indonesia

3,869.6

5

Pakistan

1,188.9

6

Brazil

6,796.8

7

Nigeria

2,097.1

8

Bangladesh

9

Russian Federation

10

Mexico

63,413.5

1,961.6 10,126.7 8,329.3

GDP Per Capita Source Author’s construction based on data from World Bank (2020f) Population source Author’s construction based on data from World Bank (2020k)

40

3 Socio-Economic Development

These patterns are also reflected, to some extent, in the workforce participation breakdowns by sector. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimates that, in 2019, 22.6% of the total workforce worldwide was employed in industry: this marks only a slight increase from 21.9 in 1991. The 2019 workforce participation rates range from 12.6% in least developed countries (LCDs) to 23% in the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) group of advanced economies (World Bank 2020b). The most significant change appears to have occurred, instead, in the service sector, which employed 34.4% of the global workforce in 1991 but 50.5% in 2019: in that year, in fact, LDCs recorded an average estimated employment in services of 32.1% (up from 19.2% in 1991), while for high-income countries the figure was 74% (up from 62.6% in 1991); Sub-Saharan Africa stood at 36% (up from 26% in 1991) and South Asia at 34% (22.85 in 1991) (World Bank 2020c). The change in the percentage of the workforce employed in agriculture worldwide followed a similarly steady trajectory but in the opposite direction, declining from 43.7% in 1991 to 26.7% in 2019: in South Asia it went from 62.5% in 1991 to 41.8% in 2019, in Sub-Saharan Africa from 63.4 to 52.8%. In LDCs it went from 72.3 to 55.2%, in high-income countries from 6.4 to 2.7% (World Bank 2020a).

3.2 Dimensions of Poverty Poverty is a multidimensional concept—so much so that it could be considered the reverse of development itself (see Chapter 5). Its extreme form can be generally defined as the inability to satisfy one’s most basic needs, ranging from food to energy, from water to sanitation, from medical care to education. There is obviously a significant economic dimension to poverty—including but not limited to income and material assets concretely affecting living standards—but it may also involve cultural, social, political and even environmental aspects: poverty can therefore have various connotations and originate from a broad range of causes. The World Bank is the group of international institutions that, more than any others, is entrusted with the task of poverty-related action. According to its statistics (World Bank 2021b), the number of people living below the so-called “international poverty line” of $1.90 a day (often referred to the “extreme poverty” threshold2 ) declined from 1.9 billion in 1990 (36.2% of the total population) to 689 million people (9.2%) in 2017 (see Table 3.6). This was possible to large extent because of the robust and consistent economic growth occurring in various parts of the world: growth is, in fact, a necessary component of poverty reduction, yet alone it is not sufficient to eradicate poverty altogether and promote overall, holistic development. Nevertheless, zooming in closer to the poverty phenomenon at regional or national levels, the picture becomes more pixelated, complex, diverse.

2

$1.9, $3.2, $5.5.

3.2 Dimensions of Poverty

41

Table 3.6 Poverty headcount ratio (% of population) at $1.90 a day of world’s 10 most populous countries (2011 PPP) Country/region

Most recent data Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day (% of population)

China

2016

0.5

India

2011

22.5

United States

2018

1.0

Indonesia

2019

2.7

Pakistan

2018

4.4

Brazil

2019

4.6

Nigeria

2018

39.1

Bangladesh

2016

14.3

Russian Federation 2018

0.0

Mexico

1.7

2018

Source Author’s construction based on data from World Bank (2020l)

For instance, one single country appears to have contributed more than any other to the global achievements: since the late 1970s, China alone has lifted about 800 million people (i.e. 42% of the abovementioned overall 1.9 billion) out of poverty, largely thanks to profound market reforms that opened up the market, spurred entrepreneurship and sustained an average growth of more than 9% to this day. Moreover, while many people have indeed been dragged out of poverty in the past 20 years, many have continued to be born into it: while the relationship between demographic patterns and development is intricate, as discussed in Chapter 2, higher fertility rates among poorer communities tend to be a relatively established phenomenon, on account of the general lack of contraception, lower levels of education and women’s empowerment, and the rural need for labour and higher mortality. Some regions, including, above all, Sub-Saharan Africa but also South Asia, have in fact recorded encouraging economic growth rates (especially in fast-changing economies like, among others, Bangladesh, India, Ethiopia, Ghana, Rwanda, and Tanzania3 ) that have expanded the middle class and reduced the share (or “headcount rate”) of people living in poverty. Still, this reduction has been slower than elsewhere in the developing world (i.e. East Asia and Latin America), especially when the trends are observed in terms of raw numbers: millions are still living in poverty due to the demographic expansion having occurred mostly at the lowest end of the income ladder, which inevitably has ended up offsetting some of the beneficial effects of growth itself. Table 3.7 shows that the majority of the 20 countries with the highest incidence of extreme poverty are located in Sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic that hit the world in 2020 has for the first time since 1998 interrupted the steady downward trend of overall poverty rates, thus reversing, in many countries as well as globally, some of the hard-won gains of the 3

International Monetary Fund (2021) and Goretti et al. (2019).

42

3 Socio-Economic Development

Table 3.7 Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day of poorest 20 countries worldwide (2011 PPP) (% of population) Country

Most recent data

Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day (% of population)

Madagascar

2012

78.8

Congo, Dem. Rep

2012

77.2

South Sudan

2016

76.4

Burundi

2013

72.8

Malawi

2016

69.2

Somalia

2017

68.6

Guinea-Bissau

2010

68.4

Central African Republic

2008

65.9

Mozambique

2014

63.7

Uzbekistan

2003

61.6

Zambia

2015

58.7

Rwanda

2016

56.5

Togo

2015

51.1

Mali

2009

50.3

Angola

2018

49.9

Turkmenistan

1998

49.8

Benin

2015

49.6

Tanzania

2017

49.4

Niger

2014

45.4

Liberia

2016

44.4

Source Author’s construction based on data fromWorld Bank (2020l)

past two decades. At the time of writing, in fact, it is estimated that the increase in the number of people living in poverty by the end of 2021 will have been between 70 and 150 million (Calvi 2021; World Bank 2021b; Lakner et al. 2021). This is in large part due to the slower growth, if not contraction, of national outputs: for instance, growth in Bangladesh slowed to 3.5% in 2020 (from 8.1% in 2019), while in Pakistan and India the economy actually shrank by 0.9% and 7.2%, respectively (from + 1.1% and + 4% in 2019) (Appendix C; Goretti et al. 2019). By mid-2021, this is likely to have brought 2 million people in Pakistan back into poverty, with the poverty rate increasing from 4.4% to 5.4%, while in India the number of extreme poor have been 46 million more than immediately before the pandemic (World Bank 2021d; Staff 2021; Kharas and Dooley 2021). In Sub-Saharan Africa, again by mid2021 the economy of the most populous country, Nigeria, contracted by 1.8% (from + 2.2% in 2019), thus increasing its mid-2021 poverty headcount by 7.4 million. This represents the biggest change in the region from pre-pandemic levels; the next greatest changes were in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which

3.2 Dimensions of Poverty

43

added at least 3.3 million and 1.9 million, respectively, to their poverty headcount (Appendix C; Kharas and Dooley 2021). Climate change (see Chapter 4) is also expected to push up to 130 million people into poverty by 2030, especially, again, in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, where many of the global poor are currently concentrated, often in areas that are highly exposed to floods and sensitive to extreme weather events that may severely affect livelihoods (World Bank 2021a). The combined effects on recent poverty trends of the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change have led the World Bank to revisit its commitment to reducing the global extreme poverty rate to 3% by 2030, suggesting that this will not be achievable unless there is “swift, significant, and substantial policy action” (World Bank 2021c). In general, divergences in economic performance across nations are as rooted in the Industrial Revolution as economic growth is. Industrialisation brought about value-adding activities and wealth-generating economic complexity (Shaw 2010) that triggered significant growth, but its spread has been, to this day, extremely uneven—although not random at all. Many scholars have researched the patterns of diffusion of economic growth away from its birthplace—England—over time, as well as the reasons for persisting inequality among countries. Columbia University Professor Jeffrey Sachs resorted to what he defined as “clinical economics”, identifying seven categories and multiple sub-categories (Sachs 2005, 2015) that may be used to investigate the reasons why development has proven rather elusive for some countries over time. Said categories include extreme material deprivation—a condition preventing governments from making even the most minimal investment; bad macro-economic policies; budgetary mismanagement; poor governance, driven especially by factors such as lack of capacity, discipline, transparency and accountability; culture, intended as a society’s attitudes towards, in particular, gender equality, education and family planning, which crucially affect demographic patterns; and political circumstances, both within the country and beyond, encompassing domestic instability, uncertain rule of law (which heavily affect private sector investment), conflict (be it overt or covert, direct or indirect) with other nations, foreign interference (or, in the past, outright colonial rule). The often-overlooked seventh category of physical geography completes the poverty checklist by addressing multiple aspects that can play a decisive role in either facilitating or impeding a country’s development: these include a country’s size, climate, topography, proneness to natural disasters, access to the sea, and availability of natural resources. Vital undertakings such as food supply, trade, logistics, electricity generation and distribution, housing and the like are heavily affected (budget-wise, in particular) by physical geography. The landlocked nature of many developing countries features also in the list of “development traps” that the Oxford University economist Paul Collier presents in his best seller The Bottom Billion. Collier built on the analysis of geographical constraints to international supply chains and overall economic growth that Sachs had pioneered, comparing the economic performance over the years of 44 landlocked countries worldwide and highlighting possible reasons why 32 of them—16

44

3 Socio-Economic Development

in Africa, 12 in Asia, 2 in Latin America, and 2 in Central and Eastern Europe— are developing economies at best, with 17 actually featuring in the United Nations’ list of 46 LDCs, where again Africa is most prominently present, with 33 national economies (UNCTAD 2022a, b, c). Collier’s detailed comparative analysis concluded that the “quality of neighbours” matters significantly: landlocked countries—particularly those devoid of natural resources—depend more than non-landlocked countries for their development on “growth spill-overs” from neighbours, and more precisely on the ability of their neighbours to constitute not only efficient “corridors” to international markets but also direct markets themselves. In other words, landlocked countries draw very few of the benefits they desperately need from a “neighbourhood” plagued by the same or other “poverty traps”. Among these traps Collier includes: internal conflict, appearing to be more frequent in low-income, commodity-export-dependent, low growth contexts; bad governance, especially in small countries where access to education is limited; and overdependence of low-income countries on “rents” from abundant yet volatile4 natural resource exports, which in turn tend to induce autocracy (particularly detrimental in the ethnically diverse societies that are common across the Global South, especially in Africa) or “dysfunctional” democracies that fail to produce opportunities for economic diversification and sustained, pro-poor growth (Collier 2007). It is important to clarify that the abovementioned geographical constraints or the persistence of “poverty traps” are not per se unescapable predicaments but simply difficult circumstances that extra efforts—in terms of holistic governance and public policy—can still overcome. There are in fact various examples, even in Africa itself, of countries that have managed to grow and reduce poverty despite all odds: Rwanda, for instance, presented multiple reasons for concern up until the early 2000s, when the country began one of the most remarkable turnarounds on the global development scene. The country had formerly been a colony subjected to a particularly brutal and divisive colonial rule—first by the Germans and then by the Belgians—that placed ethnic groups (in particular the Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority) at odds with each other. After independence, the brewing division sown by colonisers erupted into the 1994 civil war and genocide that killed about 800,000 (mostly Tutsis)—amounting to about 10% of the then total population (Monaco 2021). Despite this tragic event, and without the support of any particular natural resource endowment, this small, landlocked country surrounded by low-income, restive neighbours such as Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania and the particularly volatile Eastern fringes of the Democratic Republic of Congo—against which Rwanda fought two “Congo Wars” between 1996 and 2003 (claiming at least 4 million lives)—invested a lot in national reconciliation and reforms aimed at igniting pro-poor growth. Attention was dedicated to kickstarting women’s economic and political participation, strengthening key agricultural value chains (such as those of coffee and tea), promoting dynamic, budding sectors like 4

Given the inevitably fluctuating “price cycles” of commodities on international markets. See in this regard: “Commodity price cycles: causes and consequences” (Vasishtha 2022).

3.2 Dimensions of Poverty

45

tourism, air travel and ICT. This picture well reflects how the challenge of being landlocked may be overcome by actively pursuing expansion via the skies or the virtual space. Mauritius—a small, remote, densely populated and ethnically diverse island in the Indian Ocean with very limited natural resources—equally proved capable of overcoming its many challenges after independence from French rule by developing strong democratic institutions that enacted sound pro-growth policies aimed at developing a vibrant, export-oriented manufacturing sector as well as highly dynamic service sectors such as finance, tourism and ICT (Frankel 2010). Mauritius has featured consistently among the very best performers in Sub-Saharan Africa when it comes to transparency and accountability in governance, as well as rule of law: most recently, for instance, it ranked first in the 2020 the “Ibrahim Index of African Governance” report and third in the 2021 “World Justice Project Rule of Law Index” ranking, behind Namibia, second, and Rwanda at the top (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2020; World Justice Project 2021). The approach to the study and evaluation of the poverty phenomenon has evolved significantly over the years. It has, in fact, come to transcend the mere monetary dimension and to embrace its inherently multidimensional nature, in the context of a similar evolution towards a holistic redefinition of the pursuit of progress that began in the 1990s with the introduction of the human development index (discussed later in this chapter) and culminated with the adoption of the Sustainable Development Agenda 2030 and the related Sustainable Development Goals (covered in Chapter 5). The global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) well reflects this evolution, meaningfully complementing the assessments that have traditionally been based on income thresholds: devised by the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI) in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), since 2010 the MPI has been employed annually to gauge “acute multidimensional poverty” across more than 100 developing countries. The MPI measures each person’s deprivations across ten indicators ranging from nutrition to sanitation in three equally weighted “dimensions of poverty”, namely: (a) health, (b) education and (c) living standards. Each indicator is equally weighted within its dimension (health and education indicators carry 1/6 weight each, while each standard of living indicator is weighted 1/18). Someone determined to be multidimensionally poor is therefore someone who is “deprived” in at least one-third of the ten indicators, as per Table 3.8, while severe multidimensional poverty occurs when the deprivation score is 50% or more. The MPI values go from 0 to 1: the higher the value, the higher the level of multidimensional poverty. It is sensitive to changes in both the incidence of multidimensional poverty (i.e. the proportion of multidimensionally poor people) and its intensity (average deprivation score among the multidimensionally poor), of which the MPI is essentially a combined product (UNDP and OPHI 2021). Given the Alkire-Foster methodology at its core, the MPI allows for multiple informative disaggregations of MPI value, incidence, and intensity, as well as of the contribution of each indicator by particular groups or areas (OPHI 2021a).

46

3 Socio-Economic Development

Table 3.8 MPI dimensions, indicators, deprivation criteria and weights Dimensions

Indicator

Deprivation criteria

Weight

Health (1/3)

Nutrition

Any undernourished person under 70 years of age

1/6

Child mortality

A child under 18 has died in the household in the five-year period preceding the survey

1/6

Education (1/3)

Years of schooling No eligible household member has completed six years of schooling

1/6

School attendance Any school-aged child in the household is 1/6 not attending school up to the age at which he/she would complete class 8 Living standards (1/3) Cooking fuel

A household cooks using solid fuel, such as dung, agricultural crop, shrubs, wood, charcoal, or coal

1/18

Sanitation

The household has unimproved or no sanitation facility or improved but shared with other households

1/18

Drinking water

The household’s source of drinking water is not safe or safe drinking water is a 30-min or longer walk from home, round trip

1/18

Electricity

The household has no electricity

1/18

Housing

The household has inadequate housing materials in any of the three components: floor, roof, or walls

1/18

Assets

The household does not own more than 1/18 one of these assets: radio, TV, telephone, computer, animal cart, bicycle, motorbike, or refrigerator, and does not own a car or truck

Source Reproduced from OPHI (2018); Alkire et al. (2020); OPHI (2021b)

The results of the Global Multidimensional Poverty Index 2021 identified acute multidimensional poverty in 21.7% of 5.9 billion people across 109 countries—of which 26 are low-income countries, 80 middle-income countries and 3 high-income countries—i.e. roughly 1.3 billion people. This isn’t far from the 22% over 107 countries that was revealed in the Global Multidimensional Poverty Index 2020. The multidimensionally poor in 2021 appear to be predominantly rural dwellers (84%) and youngsters under the age of 18 (644 million). Just under 10% are over the age of 60, suggesting the presence of factors like the relatively short life expectancy and high fertility rates that are typical of developing contexts. Looking at gender, ethnic, and racial cleavages, the 2021 MPI stresses, in particular, that 836 million of those who are multidimensionally poor live in households where not a single girl or woman has completed six years of schooling.

3.2 Dimensions of Poverty

47

The various deprivations they suffer include lack of adequate sanitation (lacking for about 1 billion people), nutrition (788 million), and drinking water (568 million), and poor school attendance (481 million). Table 3.9 shows the MPI values, the percentage of people living in multidimensional poverty and in severe multidimensional poverty, the contribution of different dimensions to multidimensional poverty and the percentage of people living below the income poverty line of $1.9 per day for the ten most populous nations in the world and six developing regions (namely the Arab States; East Asia and the Pacific; Europe and Central Asia; Latin America and the Caribbean; South Asia; Sub-Saharan Africa).5 More than a billion (around 85%) of the 1.3 billion multidimensionally poor people live in either Sub-Saharan Africa (556 million) or South Asia (532 million), regions also heavily affected by persisting levels of income poverty (see appendix D for a list the ten countries with highest MPI value). As far as a more direct relationship with the latter is concerned, the percentage of people living in multidimensional poverty tends to exceed that of people living in extreme income poverty (i.e. on less than PPP $1.9 a day) in the majority of countries covered in the survey (43 out of 60 countries where both data are consistently available for the period 2009–2019)—at times by a rather significant margin: India has a multidimensional poverty rate of 27.9% vs. an income poverty rate of 22.5%; for Mauritania the figures are 50.6% vs. just 6%; for Myanmar, 38.3 vs. 1.4%; for Pakistan, 38.3 vs. 4.4%. This appears to be the case even at a regional level, as the Global Multidimensional Poverty Index 2021 reveals that South Asia has a multidimensional poverty rate of 29% versus an income poverty rate of 19.2%, while the rates for Sub-Saharan Africa stand at 53.4 and 43.7% respectively, for Arab States at 14.5 and 4.9%, for East Asia and the 5 List of countries by region—Arab States (20 countries or territories): Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, State of Palestine, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen; East Asia and the Pacific (26 countries): Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Fiji, Indonesia, Kiribati, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Viet Nam; Europe and Central Asia (17 countries): Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan; Latin America and the Caribbean (33 countries): Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; South Asia (9 countries): Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Islamic Republic of Iran, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka; Sub-Saharan Africa (46 countries): Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Kingdom of Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, South Sudan, United Republic of Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe (UNDP 2020a).

3.8

46.4

N/A

0.014

0.198

0.016

United States

Indonesia

Pakistan

Brazil

0.004

Europe and Central Asia

14.5

0.071

0.023

Arab States

0.026

Mexico

East Asia and the Pacific

6.6

N/A

Russian Federation

1.0

5.4

N/A

24.6

0.254

0.104

Nigeria

Bangladesh

38.3

3.6

N/A

27.9

0.016

0.123

China

India

3.9

0.1

1.0

6.5

1.0

N/A

6.5

26.8

0.9

21.5

0.4

N/A

8.8

0.3

Multidimensional Severe Health (%) poverty multidimensional poverty (%) (%)

(Value)

Country

35.2

52.8

27.6

26.3

68.1

N/A

17.3

30.9

49.8

27.6

34.7

N/A

31.9

39.2

24.8

35.5

34.6

13.7

N/A

37.6

28.2

22.9

41.3

26.8

N/A

23.4

25.6

22.4

36.9

39.1

18.2

N/A

45.1

40.9

27.3

31.1

38.5

N/A

44.8

1.1

1.2

4.9

1.7

N/A

14.3

39.1

4.6

4.4

2.7

N/A

22.5

0.5

(continued)

Population living below income poverty line (%)

Education (%) Standard of PPP $1.90 living (%) a day (2009-2019)

Contribution of deprivation in each dimension to overall multidimensional poverty

Population in poverty

Multidimensional Poverty Index

Table 3.9 Multidimensional poverty index

48 3 Socio-Economic Development

29.0

0.131

0.286

South Asia

Sub-Saharan Africa 53.5

10.2

1.8

21.9

29.0

36.3

29.5

28.6

26.3

48.6

42.3

37.4

43.7

19.2

4.2

Population living below income poverty line (%)

Education (%) Standard of PPP $1.90 living (%) a day (2009-2019)

Source Reproduced under Creative Commons license Attribution 3.0 IGO from UNDP and OPHI (2021)

53.4

6.9

0.030

Latin America and the Caribbean South Asia

Multidimensional Severe Health (%) poverty multidimensional (%) poverty (%)

(Value)

Country

Contribution of deprivation in each dimension to overall multidimensional poverty

Population in poverty

Multidimensional Poverty Index

Table 3.9 (continued)

3.2 Dimensions of Poverty 49

50

3 Socio-Economic Development

Pacific at 5.4 and 1.2%, and for Latin America and the Caribbean at 6.9 and 4.2%. There are some notable cases of the opposite, i.e. where the rate of multidimensional poverty is lower than that of income poverty: this occurs, for example, in Lesotho (19.6 vs 27.2%), Rwanda, (54.4 vs. 56.5%), South Africa (6.3 vs. 18.7%), and Togo (37.6 vs 51.1%) as well as, regionally, in Europe and Central Asia, although by a rather narrow margin (1 vs. 1.1%). More broadly, in the two decades preceding the Covid-19 pandemic, most countries (70 out of a total of 80 that allowed such trend analysis in 2021, and 65 out of 75 in 2020) experienced some significant MPI value reduction at some point: encouragingly, 14 of the 20 countries that saw their MPI value reduce the fastest are located in Sub-Saharan Africa (such as Sierra Leone in the period 2013–17, and Ethiopia in 2016–2019) and three were in South Asia. The fastest reduction was in Sierra Leone (2013–2017) during the Ebola epidemic, followed by Togo (2013/2014–2017), Mauritania (2011–2015) and Ethiopia (2016–2019).

3.3 Human Development Just as the MPI entailed the overcoming of a narrow view of poverty as a mere monetary matter, the Human Development Index represents a significant shift towards a more holistic perception—and therefore measurement—of development that transcends the market output domain, and thus GDP. As observed in the very first section of this chapter, GDP is by no means a perfect or exhaustive measure of all that matters economically in a society, given its multiple “blind spots” and inherent limitations, let alone of all the many diverse domains of progress—ranging from society to environment to governance. Yet the very fact that it is a practical, straightforward, easily comparable single figure contributed to its ubiquitous use, and to the increasing perception of it as a meaningful indicator of development at a time when—from the end of World War II onwards—the world and its new institutions placed significant emphasis on maximising economic reconstruction and industrialisation efforts. Developed by the Pakistani economist Mahbub Ul Haq with critical contributions on welfare economics and social choice theory from Indian economist and philosopher Amartya Sen, the Human Development Index compounds into a single practical measure the average achievements across three key dimensions of human development: life expectancy, education and standards of living.6 The HDI values range between 0 and 1: the higher the value, the higher the level of human development. Thresholds establish four broad groupings as follows: very high development (HDI value of 0.800 and above); high development (0.700–0.799), medium development (0.550–0.699) and low development (below 0.550).

HDI = (I Health . I Education . I Income )1/3 where I (dimension index) = (actual value – minimum value)/ (maximum value – minimum value) (UNDP 2020b).

6

3.3 Human Development

51

Table 3.11 shows the HDI values and their key dimensions, together with the GNI per capita, for the ten most populous nations in the world, six developing regions, LDCs,7 small island developing states,8 OECD countries,9 and the world as a whole. Table 3.12 shows the HDI trends from 1990 to 2019 for the same countries and regions, observed by noting the HDI values at four moments in time: 1990, 2000, 2010, 2019. All but two of the ten top-ranking countries in 2020 by HDI value are Western European nations: Norway, Ireland, Switzerland, Iceland, Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, and Denmark. China’s Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong and Australia are the only non-European territories in the top ten. The lowest end of the ranking is instead entirely dominated by Sub-Saharan countries: Eritrea, Mozambique, Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone, Mali, Burundi, South Sudan, Chad, Central African Republic, and Niger (Appendix E; UNDP 2020a.). Several attempts have been made over the years to further “adjust” and complement the HDI, so as to make this composite measure reflective of even more relevant dynamics of modern development. Particular attention has been dedicated to the various dimensions of inequality, and this had led to the emergence of the socalled Inequality-adjusted Human development Index (IHDI), which since 2010 “discounts” the average achievements in the key dimensions of health, education and income according to respective levels of inequality, thus delivering a distributionsensitive average level of human development. In conditions of perfect equality, the IHDI would be equal to the HDI; as inequality rises, so does the difference between the (higher) HDI and the (lower) IHDI, which essentially constitutes the cost of inequality in terms of human development. Table 3.13 shows the IHDI values and rankings relative to those of the HDI, alongside key shares of income held by relevant groups and the 2010–18 Gini coefficient (a measure of inequality discussed in more detail later in this chapter) for the ten most populous nations in the world, six developing regions, LDCs, small island developing states, and OECD countries.

7

The 46 least developed countries are Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Gunea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Zambia (UNCTAD 2022b, c) 8 The 38 small island developing countries are: American Samoa, Anguilla, Aruba, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Commonwealth of Northern Marianas, Cook Islands, Curacao, French Polynesia, Guadeloupe, Guam, Martinique, Montserrat, New Caledonia, Niue, Puerto Rico, Sint Maarten, Turks and Caicos Islands, U.S. Virgin Islands (UN DESA 2022b). 9 Members of the OECD: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States (OECD 2022).

52

3 Socio-Economic Development

The countries whose loss in human development potential is high, i.e. above 20%, include Panama, Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Algeria, Maldives, Suriname, Paraguay, Bolivia, Belize, Egypt, Gabon, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Bhutan, India, Honduras, Bangladesh, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Eswatini, Ghana, Timor-Leste, Nepal, Kenya, Cambodia, Congo, Zimbabwe, Papua New Guinea, Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania, Madagascar, Lesotho, Ethiopia, Malawi, and Niger. Those where the loss exceeds 30% include South Africa, Namibia, Zambia, Angola, Cameroon, Pakistan, Mauritania, Benin, Nigeria, Côte d’lvoire, Togo, Senegal, Sudan, Gambia, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Guinea, Yemen, Mozambique, Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone, Mali, Burundi, South Sudan, and Chad. In some extreme cases, it exceeds 40%: Comoros, Haiti and Central African Republic (UNDP 2020a). From 2014 onwards, in the UNDP Human Development Reports the Gender Development Index (GDI) arose as a tool to take into account gender inequalities by calculating a ratio between the distinct HDI values for female and male populations. The dimensions and indicators remain unchanged from those of the HDI (see Table 3.10) and are all identical for men and for women, except for life expectancy’s minimum and maximum thresholds (respectively set at 22.5 and 87.5 years for women, 17.5 and 82.5 years for men). Table 3.14 shows the GDI scores in key dimensions and the estimated income per capita for women and men in the same range of states and groupings shown in Table 3.13. In the case of the GDI, the closer the ratio is to 1, the narrower the human development gap is between male and female populations. Countries are then conventionally divided into five groups on the basis of their absolute deviation from gender parity: Group 1 contains countries where the deviation from is the lowest, i.e. up to 2.5%, thus suggesting the highest levels of equality in HDI achievements between men and women; Group 2 contains countries with a deviation from gender parity of between 2.5 and 5%; Group 3 contains countries with a deviation of between 5 and 7.5%; the deviation of countries in Group 4 is between 7.5 and 10%; and countries in Group 5—the ones with the highest levels of human development inequality between men and women—register a deviation from gender parity that exceeds 10%. Table 3.10 Key dimensions of the Human Development Index Dimensions

Indicator

Minimum Maximum

Life expectancy

Life expectancy (years) at birth

20

Education

Expected years of schooling (years) for children of 0 school entering age

18

Mean years of schooling (years) for adults aged 25 0

15

Standards of living GNI per capita (2017 PPP$) Source Author’s construction based on UNDP (2020b)

100

85

75,000

3.3 Human Development

53

Table 3.11 The Human Development Index and its components HDI ranking 2019

Country/Region name

HDI value (2019)

85

China

0.761

76.9

14.0

131

India

0.645

69.7

12.2

6.5

6,681

17

United States

0.926

78.9

16.3

13.4

63,826

107

Indonesia

0.718

71.7

13.6

8.2

11,459

154

Pakistan

0.557

67.3

8.3

5.2

5,005

84

Brazil

0.765

75.9

15.4

8.0

14,263

161

Nigeria

0.539

54.7

10.0

6.7

4,910

133

Bangladesh

0.632

72.6

11.6

6.2

4,976

52

Russian Federation

0.824

72.6

15.0

12.2

26,157

74

Mexico

0.779

75.1

14.8

8.8

19,160

0.705

72.1

12.1

7.3

14,869

2019

Arab States

Life expectancy at birth (years)

2019

Expected years of schooling (years)

2019

Mean years Gross of schooling national income (years) (GNI) per capita (2017 PPP $) 2019 8.1

2019 16,057

East Asia and the Pacific

0.747

75.4

13.6

8.1

14,710

Europe and Central Asia

0.791

74.4

14.7

10.4

17,939

Latin America and the Caribbean

0.766

75.6

14.6

8.7

14,812

South Asia

0.641

69.9

11.7

6.5

6,532

Sub-Saharan Africa

0.547

61.5

10.1

5.8

3,686

LDCs

0.538

65.3

9.9

4.9

2,935

Small island developing states

0.728

72.0

12.3

8.7

16,825

OECD

0.900

80.4

16.3

12.0

44,967

World

0.737

72.8

12.7

8.5

16,734

Source Reproduced under Creative Commons license Attribution 3.0 IGO from UNDP (2020b)

The Gender Inequality Index (GII), instead, considers more broadly the issue of gender inequality by gauging disparities in the three dimensions of reproductive health, empowerment and participation in the labour market (Table 3.15). Table 3.16 shows the GII and its key indicators, again for the same set of nations and groups of nations as in Tables 3.12 and 3.13. The 10 lowest-ranking countries by GII standards are Côte d’Ivoire, Niger, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Afghanistan, Mali, Central African Republic, Chad, Papua New Guinea and Yemen. The Northern and Western European countries of Norway,

54

3 Socio-Economic Development

Table 3.12 Human Development Index trends Human Development Index (HDI) Value HDI rank

Country

1990

85

China

0.499

131

India

0.429

17

United States

107

Indonesia

154

Pakistan

84

Brazil

161

Nigeria

2010

2019

0.588

0.699

0.761

0.495

0.579

0.645

0.865

0.886

0.916

0.926

0.523

0.603

0.665

0.718

0.402

0.447

0.512

0.557

0.685

0.727

0.765

0.482

133

Bangladesh

0.394

0.539

0.478

0.557

0.632

52

Russian Federation

74

Mexico

0.735

0.722

0.781

0.824

0.656

0.708

0.748

0.779

Arab States

0.556

0.614

0.676

0.705

East Asia and the Pacific

0.517

0.595

0.688

0.747

Europe and Central Asia

0.662

0.675

0.739

0.791

Latin America and the Caribbean

0.632

0.690

0.736

0.766

South Asia

0.437

0.501

0.580

0.641

Sub-Saharan Africa

0.404

0.426

0.501

0.547

LDCs

0.353

0.403

0.489

0.538

Small island developing states

0.599

0.646

0.706

0.728

OECD

0.786

0.835

0.874

0.900

World

0.601

0.644

0.699

0.737

0.613 N/A

2000

N/A

Source Reproduced under Creative Commons license Attribution 3.0 IGO from UNDP (2020b)

Finland, Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, France, and Iceland occupy 8 of the 10 top positions, besides Australia and South Korea.

3.4 Additional Reflections on Inequality The concept of inequality emerges multiple times in the sections above, and it is clear that, just like poverty and development, it transcends the mere monetary dimension, including instead all of the many realms in which access to opportunities to escape poverty, marginalisation and exclusion is hindered by factors related not only to income but also to gender, ethnicity, race, class, caste, sexual orientation, religious or political beliefs, provenance and the like. Inequality is a burden that significantly hinders a society’s overall ability to pursue inclusive, holistic and sustainable progress. It is therefore particularly important,

0.824

0.779

Russian Federation

Mexico

52

0.621 0.697 0.596 0.475

0.747

0.791

0.766

0.641

East Asia and the Pacific

Europe and Central Asia

Latin America and the Caribbean

South Asia

0.531

0.705

0.613

0.740

0.478

0.348

0.570

0.384

0.590

0.808

0.475

0.639

2019

Arab States

74

0.539

0.632

Nigeria

Bangladesh

161

0.765

0.557

0.718

0.926

0.645

0.761

2019

133

Pakistan

Indonesia

107

Brazil

United States

17

154

India

131

84

Country

China

HDI rank

85

25.9

22.2

11.9

16.9

24.7

21.3

10.2

24.4

35.4

25.5

31.1

17.8

12.7

26.4

16.0

2019

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

– 13

2

3

– 2

– 20

– 4

2

– 11

– 1

2

2019

Difference from HDI rank

Value

Value

Overall losses (%)

Inequality-adjusted HDI(IHDI)

Human Development Index (HDI)

Table 3.13 Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI) SDG 10.1

19.2

12.9

19.7

17.3

20.7

14.9

18.3

21.0

15.1

10.4

21.1

17.2

15.4

18.8

17.2

2010–2018

Poorest 40%

30.9

37.8

27.2

29.5

26.6

36.4

29.9

26.8

32.7

42.5

28.9

30.4

30.5

31.7

29.3

2010–2018

Richest 10%

Income shares (%) held by

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

15.8

N/A

20.2

N/A

15.3

28.3

N/A

N/A

20.5

21.3

13.9

2010–2017

Richest 1%

(continued)

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

45.4

37.5

32.4

43.0

53.9

33.5

39.0

41.4

37.8

38.5

2010–2018

Gini coefficient

3.4 Additional Reflections on Inequality 55

0.384

0.538

0.728

0.900

0.737

Small island developing states

OECD

World 20.4

12.1

24.6

28.6

30.5

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

SDG 10.1

17.6

17.9

15.4

17.9

N/A

Poorest 40%

30.6

28.7

N/A

30.8

33.9

Richest 10%

Income shares (%) held by

Source Reproduced under Creative Commons license Attribution 3.0 IGO from UNDP (2020b)

0.587

0.791

0.549

0.380

0.547

Sub-Saharan Africa

Difference from HDI rank

Value

Value Overall losses (%)

Inequality-adjusted HDI(IHDI)

Human Development Index (HDI)

LDCs

Table 3.13 (continued)

17.1

15.1

N/A

16.3

16.4

Richest 1%

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Gini coefficient

56 3 Socio-Economic Development

Bangladesh

Russian Federation

Mexico

133

52

0.961

0.953

East Asia and the Pacific

Europe and Central Asia 0.768

0.731

0.760 0.636

0.960

0.823

0.596

0.504

0.856

0.904

0.881

0.760

0.456

0.694

0.922

0.573

0.744

2019

Arab States

74

1.007

Nigeria

161

0.745

0.993

Pakistan

Brazil

154

84

0.940

Indonesia

107

0.820

India

United States 0.994

131

0.957

2019

0.806

0.760

0.743

0.792

0.817

0.660

0.572

0.765

0.612

0.738

0.928

0.699

0.777

2019

77.7

78.0

73.9

77.9

77.8

74.6

55.6

79.6

68.3

74.0

81.4

71.0

79.2

2019

Female

71.1

73.1

70.4

72.2

67.1

70.9

53.8

72.2

66.3

69.6

76.3

68.5

74.8

2019

Male

(years)

Female

Male

Value

Value

17

China

85

Ten most populous Countries

HDI Rank 2019

Human Development SDG 3 Index Life expectancy at birth

Gender Development Index

Table 3.14 Gender development index

14.5

13.7

11.9

15.0

15.3

12.0

9.4

15.8

7.6

13.7

16.9

12.6

14.0

2019

Female

14.8

13.6

12.4

14.6

14.8

11.2

10.6

15.1

8.9

13.5

15.7

11.7

14.0

2019

Male

9.9

7.7

6.5

8.6

11.9

5.7

5.7

8.2

3.8

7.8

13.5

5.4

7.7

2019

Female

(years)

10.7

8.4

8.1

8.9

12.1

6.9

7.7

7.7

6.3

8.6

13.4

8.7

8.4

2019

Male

Mean years of schooling

Expected years of schooling (years)

SDG 4.3

SDG 4

12,373

11,485

5,092

12,765

19,694

2,873

4,107

10,535

1,393

7,902

50,590

2,331

12,633

2019

Female

(continued)

23,801

17,827

23,923

25,838

33,640

7,031

5,692

18,120

8,412

14,966

77,338

10,702

19,308

2019

Male

(2017 PPP $)

Estimated gross national income per capita

SDG 8.5

3.4 Additional Reflections on Inequality 57

0.887 0.714

0.874

0.959

0.978

0.943

LDCs

Small island developing states

OECD

World

0.570

0.757

0.907

0.749

0.572

0.577

0.692

0.772

2019

75.0

82.9

74.1

67.3

63.3

71.3

78.7

2019

70.6

77.7

70.0

63.5

59.8

68.7

72.4

2019

12.7

16.6

12.9

9.4

9.5

11.9

15.0

2019

Female

12.7

16.0

12.7

10.4

10.6

11.5

14.3

2019

Male

8.1

11.9

8.5

4.1

4.9

5.5

8.7

2019

Female

(years)

9.2

12.1

9.2

5.8

6.7

8.4

8.7

2019

Male

Mean years of schooling

Expected years of schooling (years)

SDG 4.3

SDG 4

Source Reproduced under Creative Commons license Attribution 3.0 IGO from UNDP (2020b)

0.718

0.500

0.516

0.824

0.894

South Asia

0.755

2019

0.978

2019

Female Male

(years) Female

Value

Value Male

Human Development SDG 3 Index Life expectancy at birth

Gender Development Index

Sub-Saharan Africa

Latin America and the Caribbean

HDI Rank 2019

Table 3.14 (continued)

12,063

34,593

12,281

2,033

2,937

2,393

10,708

2019

Female

21,323

55,679

21,334

3,846

4,434

10,416

19,046

2019

Male

(2017 PPP $)

Estimated gross national income per capita

SDG 8.5

58 3 Socio-Economic Development

3.4 Additional Reflections on Inequality Table 3.15 Gender Inequality Index dimensions and indicators

59

Dimensions

Indicator

Health

Maternal Mortality Ratio (MMR) Adolescent Birth Rate (ABR)

Empowerment

Share of parliamentary seats held by each sex (PR) Population with at least some secondary education (SE)

Labour market participation

Labour force participation rate (LFPR)

Source Author’s construction based on UNDP (2020b)

albeit at times challenging, to rely on metrics that can effectively identify the drivers, nature and extent of inequality in all of its multiple manifestations, as well as the negative impact it can have on social cohesion, political stability, and even economic growth (Berg and Ostry 2011; International Monetary Fund 2022). This is undoubtedly more straightforward when it comes to the inherently more quantitative—and thus more easily quantifiable—monetary aspects. Yet, as already suggested in regard to both economic growth and income, in the case of development and of poverty respectively, the ease of calculation should not mislead the observer into believing that income metrics may be perfect, all-encompassing or necessarily more relevant than all others. As we’ll discuss in Chapter 5, in fact, one of the pillars of the emerging sustainable development paradigm is the very recognition of the multidimensional nature of modern challenges, and thus the acknowledgement of the essential role that multiple indicators can play in looking at nuances from different angles, in order to acquire the most comprehensive understanding of relevant dynamics possible. In fact, the approaches to measuring inequality are multiple even in the mere income sphere. A popular, rather simple approach is based on the Gini coefficient, named after Corrado Gini, the Italian economist who devised it in the 1910s, which measures the degree to which the distribution of income among households (or individuals) within a given economy deviates from an ideal, perfectly equal distribution: the deviation value can range from 0, representing a state of perfect equality, to 1, representing instead a state of perfect inequality (see Table 3.17). As per appendix F, the ten most unequal nations by Gini standards are South Africa, Namibia, Suriname, Zambia, Sao Tome and Principe, Central African Republic, Eswatini, Colombia, Mozambique, and Brazil (World Bank 2020h). The ten countries with the lowest inequality are Slovenia, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Belarus, Moldova, United Arab Emirates, Iceland, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and Belgium. Despite its widespread use, the Gini coefficient does have limitations, the most prominent of which concerns the fact that this single figure does not clarify where

2019

2019

0.256

Europe and Central Asia

N/A

N/A

N/A

0.518

71

0.322

50

133

N/A

95

0.324

Mexico

74

0.225

0.537

N/A

0.408

121

135

Arab States

Russian Federation

52

0.480

0.538

46

123

East Asia and the Pacific

Nigeria

Bangladesh

161

Brazil

84

133

Indonesia

Pakistan

107

154

United States 0.204

17

0.168

0.488

China

India

85

131

39

Rank

Value

Ten most populous countries

HDI rank

Gender Inequality Index

Table 3.16 Gender inequality index

2017 29

20

73

135

33

17

173

917

60

140

177

19

133

27.8

22.1

46.8

60.4

20.7

83.0

107.3

59.1

38.8

47.4

19.9

13.2

7.6

2015-2020

(births per 1,000 women ages 15–19)

Adolescent birth rate

Maternal mortality ratio (deaths per 100,000 live births)

SDG 3.7

SDG 3.1

23.1

20.2

18.0

48.4

16.5

20.6

4.1

15.0

20.0

17.4

23.7

13.5

24.9

2019

(% held by women)

79.9

69.4

49.3

62.2

96.3

39.8

N/A

61.6

27.6

46.8

96.1

27.7

76.0

2015-2019

88.1

76.5

55.8

64.2

95.7

47.5

N/A

58.3

45.7

55.1

96.0

47.0

83.3

2015-2019

45.0

59.2

20.7

44.2

54.8

36.3

47.9

54.2

21.9

53.1

56.1

20.5

60.5

2019

(continued)

70.0

76.5

73.0

78.5

70.2

81.4

57.9

74.1

81.7

81.9

68.2

76.1

75.3

2019

Male

Female

Female

Labour force participation rate

(% ages 15 and older) Male

Population with at least some secondary education

SDG 4.4

(% ages 25 and older)

Share of seats in parliament

SDG 5.5

60 3 Socio-Economic Development

N/A

N/A

149

204

18

207

412

535

43.3

22.9

57.7

94.8

104.9

26.0

63.2

2015-2020

(births per 1,000 women ages 15–19)

24.6

30.8

25.1

22.8

24.0

17.5

31.4

2019

(% held by women)

61.0

84.1

59.1

24.1

28.8

31.3

60.4

2015-2019

68.3

87.0

62.8

34.6

39.8

48.4

59.7

2015-2019

47.2

52.1

51.9

56.6

63.3

23.2

52.1

2019

74.2

69.1

70.6

78.2

72.7

77.0

76.9

2019

Male

Female

Female

Labour force participation rate

(% ages 15 and older) Male

Population with at least some secondary education

SDG 4.4

(% ages 25 and older)

Share of seats in parliament

SDG 5.5

Source Reproduced under Creative Commons license Attribution 3.0 IGO from UNDP (2020b)

0.205

0.436

OEDC

World

N/A

N/A

0.559

0.458

LDCs

Small island developing states

N/A

N/A

0.505

0.570

South Asia

Sub-Saharan Africa

73

2017

2019

2019

N/A

(deaths per 100,000 live births)

Adolescent birth rate

Maternal mortality ratio

Rank

SDG 3.7

SDG 3.1

Value

Gender Inequality Index

0.389

Latin America and the Caribbean

HDI rank

Table 3.16 (continued)

3.4 Additional Reflections on Inequality 61

62 Table 3.17 Gini coefficient of world’s ten most populous countries

3 Socio-Economic Development Country/region

Year of survey

Gini value

China

2016

0.385

India

2011

0.357

United States

2018

0.414

Indonesia

2019

0.382

Pakistan

2018

0.316

Brazil

2019

0.534

Nigeria

2018

0.351

Bangladesh

2016

0.324

Russian Federation

2018

0.375

Mexico

2018

0.454

Source Author’s construction based on World Bank (2020h)

exactly in the income distribution the inequality lies, thus providing limited actionable information to policymakers. It is also considered to be far more sensitive to changes in the middle than at the top or at the bottom of the distribution (Sumner 2013). Other metrics of income inequality can be employed as meaningful complements or alternatives to the Gini index. In particular, the shares of GNI held by various subgroups—such as the richest 1, 10, or 20%, or the poorest 20 or 40% (featuring also in the IHDI; Table 3.13 above)—can be closely compared as in the case of the “20:20 ratio”, or the most recent “Palma Ratio”, named after the Chilean economist Jose Gabriel Palma, who developed it in the early 2000s. This particular ratio is obtained by dividing the income share of the top 10% by the share of the bottom 40%, thus conveying a more intuitive and meaningful statement on income distribution beyond the consistent share held by the middle class, which typically captures the remaining 50% of GNI (Cobham and Sumner 2013; Palma 2006, 2011). Table 3.18 reveals the ratios of the top 20% to the bottom 20% and of the top 10% to the bottom 40% in the world’s ten most populous nations. After almost two centuries of increase, global income inequality by Gini standards, despite being still relatively high—i.e. at around 0.6—has been decreasing slowly but steadily for at least two decades (Milanovic 2013).10 This is due to the rapid and intense growth experienced by populous nations across the Global South, such as China and India. In the same period, though, in-country inequality has increased in most countries of the world, although to different extents depending on their stage of development: it grew in over three out of four advanced economies and in almost two out of four emerging or low-income economies. The macro-forces contributing to income inequality are multiple, and may be both international and domestic in nature: among them, the IMF includes the growing role played in the modern economy by technological innovation, requiring higher 10

IMF and Bourguignon instead agree on an even earlier start of the decrease, from the 1990s onwards (Bourguignon 2015).

References

63

Table 3.18 Income shares/ratios in the world’s ten most populous countries Country/region

Share highest Share lowest 20:20 20% 20%

Share top 10%

Share top 40%

10:40 ratio

China

45.3

6.5

7

29.3

17.2

1.7

India

44.4

8.1

5.5

31.7

18.8

1.7

United States

46.9

5.2

9

30.5

15.4

2

Indonesia

45.5

6.9

6.6

30.4

17.2

1.8

Pakistan

41.1

9.1

4.5

28.9

21.1

1.4

Brazil

57.8

3.1

18.6

42.5

10.4

4.1 2.2

Nigeria

42.4

7.1

6

32.7

15.1f

Bangladesh

41.4

8.6

4.8

26.8

21

1.3

Russian Federation

45.1

1.7

26.5

29.9

18.3

1.6

Mexico

51.7

5.4

9.6

36.4

14.9

2.4

Sources Author’s construction based on World Bank (2020i); World Bank (2020j); UNDP (2020b), available under Creative Commons license Attribution 3.0 IGO

proportions of skills and capital—more easily available to the already privileged; globalisation and the dramatic expansion of markets; fluctuations in the price of primary commodities; and development, labour and fiscal policies that fail to promote redistribution, financial inclusion, and social mobility. A growing body of research, in fact, confirms that income increases for those in the middle and at the low end of the income distribution (i.e. the middle class and “the poor”) can generate a more sizeable, widespread and durable boost to overall economic growth than increases for those at the very top do (International Monetary Fund 2022; Dabla-Norris et al. 2015).

References Alkire, S., Kanagaratnam, U. and Suppa, N. (2020) ‘The global multidimensional poverty index (MPI): 2020 revision’, Oxford Poverty & Human Development Initiative [online]. Available at: https://ophi.org.uk/ophi-mpi-methodological-note-49/ (Accessed 3 March 2022). Berg, A.G. and Ostry J.D. (2011) ‘Warning! Inequality may be hazardous to your growth’, IMFblog [online]. Available at: https://blogs.imf.org/2011/04/08/inequality-and-growth/ (Accessed 1 March 2022). Bolt, J. and van Zanden, J.L. (2013) ‘The first update of the Maddison project re-estimating growth before 1820’, The Maddison Project [online]. Available at: https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicalde velopment/maddison/publications/wp4.pdf (Accessed 23 February 2022). Bourguignon, F. (2015) The globalization of inequality. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

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Calvi, D. (2021) Entrepreneurship, innovation and evidence to drive poverty alleviation, Harvard Kennedy School [online]. Available at: https://www.hks.harvard.edu/events/entrepreneurshipinnovation-and-evidence-drive-poverty-alleviation#:~:text=According%20to%20the%20W orld%20Bank%2C%20the%20number%20of,point%20to%20as%20possible%20solutions% 20to%20this%20problem%3F (Accessed: 9 March 2022). Cobham, A. and Sumner, A. (2013) ‘Putting the Gini back in the bottle? ‘the Palma’ as a policyrelevant measure of inequality’ King’s International Development Institute, King’s College London [online]. Available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20130423083249/https://www.kcl. ac.uk/aboutkings/worldwide/initiatives/global/intdev/people/Sumner/Cobham-Sumner-15Marc h2013.pdf. Collier, P. (2007) The bottom billion: why the poorest countries are failing and what can be done about it. New York: Oxford University Press. Dabla-Norris, E. Kochhar, K. and Tsounta, E. (2015) ‘Growth’s secret weapon: the poor and the middle calss’, IMFblog [online]. Available at: https://blogs.imf.org/2015/06/15/growths-secretweapon-the-poor-and-the-middle-class// (Accessed 10 March 2022). Dollar, D. (2004) ‘Globalization, poverty, and inequality since 1980’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No.3333 [online]. Available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/ 10986/14128 (Accessed 1 March 2022). Frankel, J.A. (2010) ‘Mauritius: African success stories’, African Successes, 4. Goretti, M. Kihara, D. Salgado, R. and Gulde, A. (2019) ‘Is South Asia ready for take off?: a sustainable and inclusie growth agenda’, International Monetary Fund departmental papers/policy papers, Available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Departmental-Papers-Policy-Papers/ Issues/2019/10/29/Is-South-Asia-Ready-for-Take-Off-A-Sustainable-and-Inclusive-GrowthAgenda-47125 (Accessed 9 March 2022). Griffith, B. (2011) “Middle-Income Trap.” in Frontiers in Development Policy, Raj Nallari, Shahid Yusuf, Breda Griffith, and Rwitwika Bhattacharya, Eds. Washington: World Bank. Hidalgo, Cesar A., Bailey Klinger, Albert-Lazlo Barabási, and Ricardo Hausmann. (2007) The product space conditions the development of nations. Science, 317 (5837), p482–487. International Monetary Fund. (2021) Sub-Saharan Africa: one planet, two worlds, three stories. World economic and financial surveys [online]. Available at: https://data.imf.org/?sk=5778F64551FB-4F37-A775-B8FECD6BC69B (Accessed 9 March 2022). International Monetary Fund. (2022) The IMF and income inqeuality: introduction to inequality [online]. Available at: https://www.mendeley.com/guides/harvard-citation-guide/ (Accessed 7 March 2022). Kharas, H. and Dooley, M. (2021) ‘Extreme poverty in the time of Covid-19’, Brookings Institution, Available at: https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/05/ KHARAS_paper1.pdf (Accessed 9 March 2022). Lakner, C., Yonzan, N., Mahler, D.G., Aguilar, A.C. and Wu, H. (2021) ‘Updated estimates of the impact of COVID-19 on global poverty: Looking back at 2020 and the outlook for 2021’, World Bank Blogs [online]. Available at: https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/updated-estimates-imp act-covid-19-global-poverty-looking-back-2020-and-outlook-2021 (Accessed 9 March 2022). Maddison, A. (2006) The world economy, volume 1: a millennial perspective and volume 2: historical statistics. OECD development centre [online]. Available at: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/ development/the-world-economy_9789264022621-en (Accessed 23 February 2022). Milanovic, B. (2013) ‘Global income inequality in numbers: in history and now’, Global Policy, 4(2), p198–208. Mo Ibrahim Foundation. (2020) Ibrahim index of African governance: key findings. Available at: https://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/2020-key-findings (Accessed 9 March 2022). Monaco, E. (2021) ‘Opinion—Rwanda and the DRC: converging at last?’ E-International Relations, 18 August [online]. Available at: https://www.e-ir.info/2021/08/18/opinion-rwanda-and-the-drcconverging-at-last/ (Accessed 4 February 2022). OECD. (2022) Our global reach [online]. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/about/members-andpartners/ (Accessed 11 March 2022).

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World Bank. (2020b) Employment in industry (% of total employment) (modeled ILO estimate) (SL.IND.EMPL.ZS) [online]. Available at: https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source= 2&series=SL.IND.EMPL.ZS&country= World Bank. (2020c) Employment in services (% of total employment) (modeled ILO estimate) (SL.SRV.EMPL.ZS) [online]. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.SRV. EMPL.ZS World Bank. (2020d) GDP (current US$) (NY.GDP.MKTP.CD) [online]. Available at: https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&series=NY.GDP.MKTP.CD&cou ntry=#(Accessed 23 January 2022). World Bank. (2020e) GDP growth (annual %) (NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG) [online]. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2020e&start=2010 (Accessed 23 January 2022). World Bank. (2020f) GDP per capita (current US$) (NY.GDP.PCAP.CD) [online]. Available at: https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&series=NY.GDP.PCAP.CD&cou ntry=# (Accessed 23 January 2022). World Bank. (2020g) GDP, PPP (current international $) (NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD) [online]. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD?name_desc=false World Bank. (2020h) Gini index (World Bank estimate) (SI.POV.GINI). Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?most_recent_value_desc=false (Accessed 25 January 2022). World Bank. (2020i) Income share held by highest 20% (SI.DST.05TH.20) [online]. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.DST.05TH.20 (Accessed 29 January 2022). World Bank. (2020j) Income share held by lowest 20% (SI.DST.FRST.20) [online]. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.DST.FRST.20 (Accessed 29 January 2022). World Bank. (2020k) Population, total (SP.POP.TOTL) [online]. Available at: https://databank. worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SP.POP.TOTL&country= (Accessed 23 January 2022). World Bank. (2020l) Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population) (SI.POV.DDAY). [online]. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.DDAY? most_recent_value_desc=false Accessed 29 January 2022). World Bank. (2021a) Climate change [online]. Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/ climatechange/overview#1 (Accessed 11 March 2022). World Bank. (2021b) Measuring poverty [online]. Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/ topic/measuringpoverty#1 (Accessed 1 March 2022). World Bank. (2021c) Poverty [online]. Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/ overview#1 (Accessed 11 March 2022). World Bank. (2021d) The world bank in India [online]. Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/ en/country/india/overview#1 (Accessed 1 March 2022). World Justice Project. (2021) Mauritius ranked 45 out of 139 countries on rule of law, Rule of law index [online]. Available at: https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/Mau ritius_2021%20WJP%20Rule%20of%20Law%20Index%20Country%20Press%20Release.pdf (Accessed 1 March 2022).

Chapter 4

Nations, States, and Beyond

The terms “nation” and “state” have come to be used almost interchangeably in today’s common conversations. Technically speaking, though, the words aren’t synonyms: they refer to concepts that are essentially different, that emerged and subsequently became increasingly convergent as a result of historical processes of worldwide relevance—important global trends, as a matter of fact—that are to some extent ongoing. What defines a state? What constitutes a nation? What are the criteria by which communities across the world identify themselves? What is the “principle of selfdetermination” that appears central to the present international order? These are some of the questions this chapter attempts to address and answer, as concisely and efficiently as possible. I dedicate particular attention to the at times slow, complex, and even conflictual process of building both nations and states, especially in regions of the world that experienced colonialism, whose legacy, throughout the entire Global South, cannot possibly be overstated, as it profoundly affected—and continues to affect to this day—multiple dimensions of former colonies’ development patterns. The chapter will also look beyond the nation and state levels, exploring the phenomenon of regional integration, which grew significantly right across the globe from the immediate post-Second World War phase onwards. While regional platforms have ultimately reached, for various reasons, different degrees of ultimate success, “regionalism” as a whole undoubtedly represents a key global trend that may have crucial consequences for the ability not only of selected groups of neighbouring countries but of the entire world to tackle the increasingly interconnected and steep common challenges ahead.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 E. Monaco, Global Trends Compendium, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9163-9_4

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4.1 Definitions: Decoding Complexity An independent state is essentially a political entity, or in other words an organised administrative structure of power that claims exclusive and permanent jurisdiction over a territory delimited by specific borders and the people living within them. These three “factual” criteria for statehood—namely a permanent population, a defined territory, and a government—are considered sufficient by the so-called declaratory school of thought, which refers in particular to the provisions of the articles 1 and 3 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (Gómez 2016). In contrast, proponents of constitutive theory maintain that recognition by other states—for example in the form of diplomatic relations—is essential for a state to be defined as such, in addition to the three factual criteria mentioned above. The lack of clear and definitive consensus between these two main schools of thought has contributed to numerous ambiguities that remain unresolved to this day. No international body can recognise states on behalf of all members of the international community (not even the UN itself can do that). For this reason, cases of entities recognised by some states and not others, on the basis of a wide range of factors—often geo-political and geo-economic in nature—are frequent, ranging from Palestine to Kosovo, from Transnistria to Western Sahara. Similarly, there are multiple cases of states that are indeed universally recognised and in principle fulfil all of the factual criteria, but that in reality are unable—for reasons such as persisting unrest, mismanagement, and lack of financial and technical capacity—to perform even the most basic of government duties. These include the likes of Yemen, Somalia, Syria, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Afghanistan, Chad, and Myanmar, all of which feature as among the most unstable countries in the 2022 Annual Fragile State Index Report compiled by the Washington DC-based Fund for Peace (Fund for Peace 2022). The concept of nation is instead a social one: it refers to a group of people that, essentially, feels as one. This sentiment may be rooted in a variety of factors; these may include, but are definitely not limited to, similar cultural traits (such as language, religion), race, historical background, and geographical location. The highly heterogeneous nature of the “shared identity” at the heart of a nation makes it obviously hard to gauge, and far more complex to “build”—as such a process would involve an entire people’s collective conscience—than a state, which in principle could be artificially created by formal politico-diplomatic means, and even by force. The principle of self-determination, upon which much of the current international order is ostensibly built, could be defined as the right of people who feel as one to rule themselves, and thus, essentially, as the right of a nation to also constitute a soverieign state. This is the “nation-state ideal” that philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau first theorised and that then spread across Europe via the French Revolution and the Napoleonic expansions, that took prominence in the post-First World War phase of intense redrawing of international borders following the defeat of the vast AustroHungarian, German, and Ottoman Empires, and that is enshrined in the very first

4.1 Definitions: Decoding Complexity

69

article of the United Nations Charter (United Nations 1945), which all member countries subscribe to. Yet the ideals of both nation-state and national self-determination are not always reflected in reality. Today, in fact, many states can be defined as multi-national, or in other words not coinciding with one national group only. This occurs as a consequence of many factors, including, for example: . Persisting cultural—mainly linguistic and religious—diversity; . The recent waves of globalisation, intended as a worldwide process of increased convergence and interconnectedness of economic, political, and social affairs, and the related growth of international migration, which has completely changed the make-up of societies across the globe, especially in the developed world; . Artificially drawn state borders, in particular across the many former colonies in the Global South (as discussed in a later section of this chapter); and . The need for cohesion and cooperation in the face of challenges and competition, which advises against a possible hyper-fragmentation of governance. Even a mature, relatively long-established and not particularly large Western European state such as the UK—formally the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, for instance, can be defined as a multinational state. It can be said to incorporate at least five possible “nations”– the English, the Scottish, the Welsh, and the (Northern) Irish, as well as a comprehensive “British” one—before we even consider the large communities of immigrants, especially from South Asia, who may or may not share common cultural traits with their fellow British (or English, or Scottish, etc.) citizens. Something similar could be said, for various reasons ranging from migration to cultural diversity, of Spain, Italy, Germany, Canada, the United States, and Australia, to name just a few. And that is not to mention vast swaths of post-independence Sub-Saharan Africa, South-West Asia (or the Middle East), South Asia, and insular South-East Asia, where the definition of state borders following the end of colonial rule often took into very limited consideration the actual national sentiments and socio-cultural identities on the ground, instead merely reflecting the territorial extent of a given colonial power’s control. Ethnicity also plays a role in determining patterns of social identification, thus adding layers of complexity to the abstract simplicity of the nation-state equation. It is a concept whose definition has often divided scholars: the one factor, though, that more than any other defines ethnicity—and thus an ethnic group—is language. There are about 7,000 languages spoken in the world today, according to most linguists. Around 20 of them are spoken as a first language by over half of the world’s population combined. More than 25% of the remaining languages are spoken by communities not larger than 10,000 people. Around 700 languages are spoken by communities of less than 1,000 people overall. Although many languages, as a result of globalisation, urbanisation, and cultural homogenisation, can be considered “endangered” given their limited number of active

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speakers, there is to this day a high degree of linguistic—and therefore ethnic— diversity across the world. This would be exponentially multiplied further if we were to also take into account dialects, or variations of the same language across regions. Language—i.e. ethnicity—may play a role in determining a people’s sense of belonging, in the ways a state is run and a nation defines itself. In states where more than one language is spoken, even the basic, unavoidable selection of at least one official language—i.e. the language to be used by the administration—may become sensitive. The governments of many post-colonial, multi-ethnic states in Africa, for example, ended up choosing the former coloniser’s language as the official one, not because it was particularly beloved or widespread (quite the contrary) but simply because it was the most neutral and thus safest in terms of preserving ethnic balance. Some states go so far as to pick a “national” language as well—a move that may be even more controversial in linguistically diverse societies, as it is not strictly necessary for the administration of the country and therefore is often reflective of a particular “national sentiment” agenda. Religion is also a very important determinant of social identity. The number of religions in the world is far smaller than that of languages, with the main ones included in just four broad groupings: Dharmic religions (e.g. Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism), Abrahamic religions (e.g. Judaism, Christianity, and Islam), various forms of animism, and syncretic religions (a mixture of animist and Dharmic or Abrahamic traditions). However, sectarian differences—different interpretations and traditions of the same religion—are multiple: many, and quite distinctive, are the forms of Christianity (Catholic, Coptic, Orthodox, Protestant etc.), Islam (Sunni, Shia etc.), or Buddhism (Theravada, Mahayana etc.), and their possible further sub-differentiations multiply this diversity still further. Tribal and clan identities—i.e. those of social groups larger than a family, more or less loosely connected by kinship—also matter greatly especially in the Global South. All of these factors of group identity serve to paint a picture of real-world complexity and diversity that the traditional, old-school view of a single national group ruling itself in an ideal, “sanitized” nation-state simply does not reflect. The political map of today’s world comprises states whose borders often contain more than one national group, as well as more than one ethnic group, religious group, sect, tribe, or clan. In other words, present, static state borders can hardly represent the fluidity and dynamism of social identities—from the national to the ethnic, from the religious to tribal—on the ground. This is particularly true in much of the developing world, where the process drawing of existing borders was recent and far from spontaneous or people-centred. Indeed, it was instead troublingly artificial and top-down and therefore resulted in what is commonly referred to as the “tyranny of the map” and in the plight of “nations without states”, separatist movements and general, development-crippling unrest.

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4.2 State Borders and Nation Building in the Post-Colonial South Hope is brewing across the Global South. The potential for further economic growth, modernisation, and overall progress is immense, given in particular the abundant human capital and the vast natural resource wealth that many countries can rely on. As we have highlighted in other sections of this book, though, steep development challenges persist, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, where stubborn and widespread forms of poverty remain prevalent. A hefty portion of said challenges can be traced back to the often very recent—and even ongoing— complex process of nation-building and establishment of solid state institutions which followed independence from colonial rule. In order to better appreciate the origins and nature of this predicament in these two regions and elsewhere in the developing world, we must first look further back at the waves of colonialism that overcame almost the totality of the Global South between the late 1400s and the second half of the 1900s, and their legacy. Throughout these almost five centuries, broadly speaking, colonialism underwent a series of distinct, yet consequential phases (Rothermund 2006). It all began between the late 1400s and the mid-1700s with the early maritime explorations and settlements of the Portuguese, the Spanish, and the Dutch, whose living standards at home were, at the time, not much higher than elsewhere in Europe or the rest of the world, but who had managed to gain control over the trade of particular goods (e.g. textiles, spices, precious stones, and metals) and become highly skilled seafarers. The control of Latin America and present-day Indonesia began right from the very first explorations and soon became rather pervasive and “permanent” in nature; the coastline of Africa and present-day India, instead, only saw the creation of sporadic bridgeheads and outposts in this first phase. A second phase, lasting roughly from the mid-1700s to the mid-1800s, saw the consolidation of colonial rule and was dominated by Great Britain, by then an industrial, financial, and technological superpower that was able to leverage its competitive edge to gain control—at first, through powerful private companies like the East India Company, then replaced by the British government itself—over, above all, much of South Asia. In particular, the mastering of technology like the steam engine and the telegraph was instrumental in making maritime voyages and communication across distant lands faster and safer. This phase also saw the independence of much of Southern America from the Spanish and Portuguese domination that had begun in earnest right from the very “discovery” of these lands around three centuries earlier (see Table 4.1). European imperialism peaked in its third phase, from the mid-1800s to the early 1900s, when the grip over Asian colonies was consolidated and further expanded and an entire continent, Africa—already weakened by centuries of slave trade— was divided up among European powers by means of diplomatic arrangements that systematically excluded the participation of African representatives. As a result, in the short span of a few years surrounding the Berlin Conference of 1884–85, a vast

72 Table 4.1 Independence dates of countries in Latin America and the Caribbean

4 Nations, States, and Beyond Country

Year

Independence from

Colombia

1821

Spain

Mexico

1821

Spain

Venezuela

1821

Spain

Costa Rica

1821

Spain

Guatemala

1821

Spain

Honduras

1821

Spain

Nicarugua

1821

Spain

Panama

1821

Spain

Haiti

1825

France

Brazil

1825

Portugal

El Salvador

1839

Spain

Dominican Republic

1844

France

Cuba

1902

Spain

Jamaica

1962

UK

Trinidad and Tobago

1962

UK

Guyana

1966

UK

Barbados

1966

UK

Bahamas

1973

UK

Grenada

1974

UK

Suriname

1975

Netherlands

Dominica

1978

UK

Saint Lucia

1979

UK

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

1979

UK

Belize

1981

UK

Antigua and Barbuda

1981

UK

Saint Kitts and Nevis

1983

UK

Source author’s construction based on data from Rothermund, D. (2006) The Routledge companion to decolonization. 1st edn. New York: Routledge

continent that till then had been run mostly by Africans found itself almost completely colonised (with the only notable exceptions of Ethiopia and Liberia). The colonisation of inland Africa, beyond the few bridgeheads along the continent’s coastline that had been well known for centuries to European sailors heading to the Orient, therefore began rather late, compared with that of Latin America (the earliest region both to be colonised and to reach independence) and even Asia. It followed a few decades of geographical explorations financed by European governments, headed by the legendary likes of David Livingstone, Henry Morton

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Stanley, and Pierre Savorgnan de Brazza, among others, who “opened up” previously “unknown” lands that till then had appeared unfamiliar and inhospitable from both environmental and socio-cultural standpoints. In this context, scientific breakthroughs in, for instance, the management and treatment of tropical, insect-borne diseases, like the use of quinine for malaria, also contributed to the sustained and pervasive European colonisation of vast swaths of Africa. The artificial nature of what became known as the “Scramble for Africa” through diplomacy is still visible in the odd, somewhat geometrical shapes that many African states retain to this day, which were forged at the time of independence along the very boundaries of the prior colonial administration. Many of these borders were in fact originally drawn by the imperialists on simple maps, with rulers, mostly on the basis of their exploitative interests, and thus in complete disregard of actual identities on the ground.1 A fourth phase of colonialism lasted from the beginning of the First World War to the end of the Second World War, and essentially identifies a period of time when colonies had become important to sustain the war efforts of the European powers who ran them, as they became crucial sources of funds (despite the overall devaluation of commodities) and troops. This only increased the malcontent in many colonised societies and spurred independence movements whose rise in prominence could only be, at best, stalledduring the season of world conflicts. At the end of the Second World War, the British were too weak to regain control over their restive possessions across South Asia, where colonial rule had become by then more of a costly problem than an asset. This gave way to the fifth and final phase of colonialism. This began with the— by then, inevitable—independence of present-day India and Pakistan in 1947, which in turn opened the way for the subsequent independence of other British colonies in the region (e.g. Sri Lanka, Burma), and soon after (during the 1950s) of various European colonies in South-East Asia (see Table 4.2). Factors contributing to the acceleration of decolonisation following the end of the Second World War and the further erosion of the already weak legitimacy of the colonial paradigm also include Japanese imperial expansion in the 1930s and 1940s, from which colonial powers were unable to defend their own East and South-East Asian colonies; and the redistribution of territories lost by the Ottoman and German Empires in the First World War as “mandates”.2 This happened according to rather unprecedented principles of “non-annexation” (i.e. on a temporary basis) and as “sacred trusts of civilisation” (i.e. supposedly in the ultimate interests of the locals). While North Africa reached independence by and large in the 1950s, Sub-Saharan Africa (including much of the Sahel Belt) was overall the last region to decolonise. 1

A prime example is the shape of present-day Namibia, which includes a thin stretch of land in the north-east (today its “Zambesi” administrative region) that, at the time of the Scramble, was demanded by the German colonisers to guarantee themselves access to the Zambesi river and thus to connect their possessions in south-west Africa to those in eastern Africa (much of present day Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania). 2 Following the Treaties of Sevres and Lausanne in 1920 and 1923, the League of Nations, a shortlived precursor of the United Nations that emerged soon after the First World War, distributed these “mandates” to existing European colonial powers.

74 Table 4.2 Independence dates of countries in Asia

4 Nations, States, and Beyond Country

Year

Independence from

Iraq

1932

UK

Lebanon

1941

France

Indonesia

1945

Netherlands

Philippines

1946

USA

Syria

1946

France

Jordan

1946

UK

Pakistan

1947

UK

India

1947

UK

Israel

1948

UK

Myanmar

1948

UK

Sri Lanka

1948

UK

Laos

1949

France

Oman

1951

UK

Cambodia

1953

France

Vietnam

1954

France

Malaysia

1957

UK

Kuwait

1961

UK

Singapore

1963

UK

Maldives

1965

UK

Yemen

1967

UK

United Arab Emirates

1971

UK

Bahrain

1971

UK

Qatar

1971

UK

Papua New Guinea

1975

UK/Australia

Brunei

1984

UK

Hong Kong

1997

UK

Macau

1999

Portugal

East Timor

2002

Portugal

Source author’s construction based on data from Rothermund, D. (2006) The Routledge companion to decolonization. 1st edn. New York: Routledge

Organised independence movements were indeed present in the continent, but on a lesser scale than in Asia, and the decolonisation of Sub-Saharan African countries in many cases occurred as a result of changing perspectives internationally rather than local activism alone (see Table 4.3). The reaching of independence was an immense achievement, but it was by no means the end of trouble for many newly independent entities: quite the opposite.

4.2 State Borders and Nation Building in the Post-Colonial South Table 4.3 Independence dates of countries in Africa

Country

Year

75 Independence from

South Africa

1910

UK

Egypt

1922

UK

Libya

1951

Italy

Sudan

1956

UK

Morocco

1956

France

Tunisia

1956

France

Sudan

1956

UK

Guinea

1958

France

Garbon

1960

France

Ghana

1957

UK

Senegal

1960

France

Togo

1960

Germany/France

Madagascar

1960

France

Democratic Republic of the Congo

1960

Belgium

Benin

1960

France

Niger

1960

France

Burkina Faso

1960

France

Côte d’Ivoire

1960

France

Chad

1960

France

Central African Republic

1960

France

Republic of the Congo

1960

France

Gabon

1960

France

Mali

1960

France

Nigeria

1960

UK

Mauritania

1960

France

Cameroon

1960

France/Germany

Somalia

1960

Italy

Sierra Leone

1961

UK

Burundi

1962

Germany/Belgium

Rwanda

1962

Germany/Belgium

Algeria

1962

France

Uganda

1962

UK

Kenya

1963

UK

Tanzania

1961/1964

Germany/UK 1961 (Tanganyika) and 1964 (Zanzibar) (continued)

76 Table 4.3 (continued)

4 Nations, States, and Beyond Country

Year

Independence from

Malawi

1964

UK

Zambia

1964

UK

Gambia

1965

UK

Botswana

1966

UK

Lesotho

1966

UK

Mauritius

1968

UK

Swaziland

1968

UK

Equatorial Guinea

1968

Spain

Guinea-Bissau

1974

Portugal

Mozambique

1975

Portugal

Angola

1975

Portugal

Seychelles

1976

UK

Djibouti

1977

France

Zimbabwe

1979

UK

Namibia

1990

Germany/South Africa

Eritrea

1993

Italy/UK/Ethiopia

Source author’s construction based on data from Rothermund, D. (2006) The Routledge companion to decolonization. 1st edn. New York: Routledge

Internationally, many of these states sought to distance themselves from foreign interference after decades, if not centuries, of sheer exploitation. This led many newly independent developing countries to come together into the Non-Aligned Movement (Azerbaijani Chairmanship to the Non-Aligned Movement 2022), an international cooperation platform of like-minded developing countries sharing similar concerns and legacies, meant to be distinct from two main “blocs” that the polarizing forces of the Cold War had already produced worldwide—hence the term “Third World”, originally referring merely to a “third alternative” that the group hoped to represent, and only later, by association, (mis)used to refer broadly to “less developed countries”.3 At home, most newly independent countries had to face the often complete lack of physical, social, and politico-economic infrastructure. In this regard, it is worth noting that, before colonisation, the slave trade in all its main forms combined— the trans-Saharan, East African or “Indian Ocean”, and trans-Atlantic trades—had already robbed Sub-Saharan Africa of at least 20–25 million people.

3

Non-aligned countries also established the still-operational “Group of 77”, a platform created to help its membership (which increased over time to the current number of 134) from the Global South “articulate and promote their collective economic interests and enhance their joint negotiating capacity on all major international economic issues within the United Nations system and promote South-South cooperation for development.” (Group of 77 2022).

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Colonies, in essence, were run in the interest of the metropole, not of the locals. Any investment was performed to be instrumental to the administration and exploitation of colonial resources, not to ensure the sustainability or efficiency, let alone the self-sufficiency, of local economies, which were pried open to global markets, as exporters of raw commodities, before they even existed domestically. This drove many former colonies to implement strict Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) strategies soon after independence, precisely to protect their first state-owned “infant” industries from foreign competition. The strategy, in fact, was meant to satisfy the domestic demand for manufactured, value-added products by replacing expensive foreign imports with locally made equivalents. This would also favour the establishment of broad wage-based employment as an alternative to agriculture. Unfortunately, as explained in Chapter 1, the heavily state-centred ISI failed to produce the intended results due to a series of imbalances, above all the persistent budgetary deficits that ultimately led to overborrowing and thus debt, as well as the current account deficit resulting from uncompetitive exports due to the lack of an economy of scale and the expensive imports of machinery. In the 1980s, much-needed loans were ultimately conditioned by financial institutions like the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to “structural reforms” that de facto reopened the markets of the Global South to strong forces of competition and neoliberalism, returning many of them to the less-than-enviable state of exporters of primary commodities and importers of goods manufactured abroad. Some types of colonial administration—which varied greatly even across colonies under the same colonial ruler—turned out to be particularly exploitative, brutal, and ultimately burdensome for the overall development of independent countries over time. The “divide and rule” paradigm—widespread especially, but not exclusively, in Sub-Saharan Africa—consisted in artificially magnifying ethnic cleavages among controlled populations (which often had peacefully coexisted, despite diversity, for centuries prior to colonial intervention) so as to weaken the local front and involve only selected minority groups in the colonial administration as “favourites”. These favoured minorities would in turn be made responsible for ensuring the timeliness and effectiveness of “deliverables”. The indirect rule that this favoured contributed significantly to an even greater detachment between colonizers and the local context. Sowing seeds of ethnic distrust to serve imperialist interests translated into decades of outright conflict in multiple post-colonial societies. For example, in Rwanda, decades of deliberately honed divisions between the Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority culminated in the genocide by the former against the latter in 1994; and in Myanmar, the conflict between the Karen (as well as multiple other minorities) and the Myanmarese continues to undermine the country’s overall stability. This trend was exacerbated by the fact that newly independent states’ borders were at times hastily conceived, in the often challenging, murky circumstances surrounding independence negotiations between rulers and whatever local representatives had emerged as most prominent at the time, to reflect the territorial extent of a particular colonial power’s administration, not actual ethno-religious or historical identities on the ground.

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Only a few very well-established, defined political power structures existing before colonial rule re-emerged from colonisation with borders that resembled their pre-colonial selves. This happened, for instance, in “mainland” South-East Asia, to Burma, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos—all kingdoms well before the advent of the British and the French. In most other cases, though, pre-colonial power structures were lacking, or were simply ignored, the political map of newly independent states bearing little to no resemblance to them. This was the case in much of Sub-Saharan Africa, insular South-East Asia and post-mandate South-West Asia (the Middle East). As a result, these regions feature states that tend not to reflect cohesive national sentiments and that may still be perceived by many as artificial creations of direct colonial origin. The mismatch between statehood and nationhood that manifested from independence onwards, on top of instances of ethnic “score-settling” and conflict of colonial making, has delayed the development of countless countries across the developing world. For instance, India and Pakistan did not exist as distinct entities, politically, economically, or culturally, before the dramatic and unexpected “partition” of 1947 was carried out along religious lines. Vast communities of mostly Hindus and Muslims, as well as Buddhists and Christians, had coexisted for centuries throughout the whole Indian subcontinent. Yet at a late stage of the negotiations, as a result of the change of heart and power ambitions of the leadership of the Muslim League—a faction of the local independence movement long closely aligned with the secular Indian Congress Party—the decision was made to grant independence not to a unitary India but to a Hindu-majority India and to a state, called Pakistan, with non-contiguous borders, occupying two broad areas of the British Raj with Muslim majority, ignoring the actual presence of both Muslims and Hindus in every city across the subcontinent. This triggered riots and mass migrations of epic proportions, and it saw large ethnic groups like the Bengali people suddenly split between India and either East Pakistan (which became Bangladeshi in 1971, after more bloodshed) or West Pakistan. Today, India and Pakistan are nuclear powers that remain at constant odds with one another over territorial disputes (e.g. in Kashmir) whose roots can still be traced to the unfortunate circumstances of the partition itself. The Philippines—a country of over 7000 islands—was colonised for three centuries by the Spanish, from whom the locals ultimately absorbed important cultural traits, like Catholicism. The Philippines ended up under US control after the Spanish–American Wars of 1898, before reaching independence in 1946. The Muslim (“Moro”) regions consisting of portions of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago—which had never fallen under Spanish control—were only subdued and brought under the same administration as the mostly catholic Visayas, Luzon, and Northern Mindanao during the short-lived period of American rule: this was enough, though, to ultimately see these southern Muslim regions included in the Philippines state created upon independence. This generated a great deal of conflict and instability in the country and beyond, considering the vast international linkages of local terrorist groups like Abu Sayyaf, which recently abated, albeit only

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in part, after the concession by the central government of substantial administrative autonomy. There have been similar situations in the rest of insular South-East Asia and the Malaysian peninsula. Indonesia today comprises over 16,000 islands in the region where the Dutch managed to establish colonial control (as part of the “Dutch East Indies”). The Dutch presence, however, did not extend homogeneously across all islands in the regions: in some cases, they fell short of controlling entire islands: this occurred most notably on the vast islands of Borneo and New Guinea, or in smaller Timor, where the Dutch had to “share” control with other colonial powers (British, Germans, Portuguese). This inevitably contributed, when independence came, to the creation of states whose borders cut right across islands, and thus across peoples’ ethno-religious identities and national sentiments. The result was unrest and even conflict, the implications of which were both international and domestic in nature. While most international controversies—from the Malaysian–Indonesian Confrontation of the early 1960s to the invasion by Indonesia of the formerly Portuguese East Timor in 1975—have today been solved, thanks in part to the creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967 and its predecessor, the 1961 Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), multiple instances of domestic tensions persist. This has been the case in places like mineral-resource-rich Western New Guinea, also known as Papua, where the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) has for decades fought for independence or substantial autonomy from Indonesian control. Similarly, in Thailand’s southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and parts of Songkhla, close to the Thai–Malaysian border which owes its definition to the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909, the Malay-speaking Muslim majority has long lamented politico-economic marginalisation and forced cultural assimilation by the Bangkok-based central government that they see as exclusively reflecting the Thai-speaking Buddhist majority in the country. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)—an immense state about the size of continental Europe right at the heart of the African continent, created out of the “Belgian Congo”—encompasses so many different ethnic groups4 that multiple linguae francae (one of which is French, also the official language) must be utilised in the country to allow basic business interaction among peoples who would otherwise not understand each other’s first languages. The DRC consistently ranks among the poorest (and most “fragile”, if not “failed”) countries in the world, despite remarkable mineral resource wealth that includes the “3Ts & G” (tin, tungsten, tantalum, and gold), highly coveted by the modern electronics industry, as well as cobalt, copper, uranium, and more. When the DRC became independent in 1960 after undergoing arguably the most inhumane of forms of colonial rule, perpetrated by King Leopold II and his agents, it featured an astonishing lack of intellectual capacity for governance and development, with only a handful of Congolese medical doctors, lawyers, and engineers (Snow, cited in BBC 2013; Weiss 2012). The country faced ethnic conflict right from its very inception, when the mineral-rich Katanga region—a distinctively 4

Ethnologue lists 214 living languages - https://www.ethnologue.com/region/MAF (Ethnologue 2022).

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shaped strip of land that occupies part of the Copper Belt that the DRC shares with Zambia—attempted to break away soon after the proclamation of independence. The restive Eastern DRC has instead suffered from the presence of multiple armed groups for at least three decades—remnants and offshoots of those involved in the Rwandan civil war of 1994, financing much of their activities through the control of mining activities. This has wrought havoc to the point that various nations (Angola, Chad, Namibia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe on one side, and Uganda and Burundi on the other, supporting the main belligerents DRC and Rwanda, respectively), in 1996–97 and 1998–2003, ended up being engulfed in two major conflicts which led to the deaths of over 4 million people and the displacement of at least 2 million more (Monaco 2021). Nigeria—the most populous country in Africa, encompassing multiple ethnic and religious groups—went through similar secessionist movements when the independent Nigerian state was forged at the end of British colonisation. The early attempt of the Igbo people (about 20% of the total population) of Biafra to break away was brutally suppressed, but to this day malcontent still brews in the oil-rich region, especially in regard to the management of resource export revenues. Another reason for dissatisfaction is the inability of the central government to quell the longstanding security crisis in the Muslim north of the country, where episodes of violent extremism and terrorism—perpetrated by organisations like Boko Haram—have become almost endemic. Last but not least, much of the map of present-day South-West Asia (or Middle East, as it is most commonly known5 ), as some rather geometrical state borders again suggest, was also more the product of high-level power plays and the diplomatic reasoning of one moment in time—the post-WWI phase of French and British mandates, in particular—than of spontaneous, inclusive grassroots processes reflective of locally rooted social identities and historical events. The establishment in 1948 of the state of Israel, stemming from 1917 Balfour Declaration and Britishmandate Palestine; the geo-political “invention” of a (then) Christian-majority state of Lebanon; and the largely arbitrary, artificial bounds of Iraq, Syria, and Yemen have left a destabilising legacy of controversy, unrest, and violence that has undoubtedly slowed the pursuit of development and wellbeing for vast populations involved.

4.3 Regionalisation Trends Since the late 1940s, states have increasingly attempted to come together in platforms aimed at fostering peace, security, economic prosperity, human rights, and sustainability. Countries were driven to seek concerted, shared solutions through dialogue 5

The term “Middle East”, although widespread, does imply a point of view that is markedly Eurocentric, owing its origin, in particular, in the British distinction in the 1800s among various portions of the “East”, based on their proximity to the metropole—Near East (roughly the Balkans and present-day Turkey), Middle East (the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf), East (the Indian subcontinent), and Far East (Pacific Rim countries).

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and collaboration, capable of making a difference internationally, by various factors, including: . The need to forge a new world order following the First World War–Depression– Second World War sequence and amid rising Cold War tensions; . The pressure to rebuild entire economies, improve living standards, and reduce poverty in both war-torn Europe and newly independent countries in the South; . The powerful, converging forces of globalisation; and . Multiple successive environmental crises, from depletion of the ozone layer and desertification to biodiversity loss and climate change. These platforms were in some cases global in nature. Examples include, above all, the United Nations and its many agencies; and the “Bretton Woods” financial institutions—the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) Group, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—that evolved in 1995 into the World Trade Organisation (WTO). In many more cases, though, platforms were and are regional in scope, involving countries that share some level of geographical proximity, as well as common cultural traits, historical background, and political and socio-economic interaction.6 Regional platforms represent important building blocks for the kind of global governance that the ever-expanding global challenges of our time require, as they represent crucial filters and “aggregators” of individual states’ stances. The forming of regional—rather than national—positions can greatly facilitate the global decisionmaking process, which prior to their formation was so often hostage to divergent national agendas, particular interests, and voting mechanisms that frequently allowed a few powers to override the will of an overwhelming majority—as occurs, for instance, with the permanent members of the UN Security Council. Regional platforms can effectively complement, rather than challenge or outperform, the role played by global bodies, whose development, peace, and security goals they often share, as confirmed by the strong encouragement for regionalisation that comes from organisations such as the UN and the WTO.7

4.3.1 The European Integration Experience Regional organisations have therefore arisen, over the years, for a variety of purposes, right across the globe—as Appendix G illustrates in greater detail. Yet the process 6

There is no particular consensus on how to identify regions—rders, which inevitably depend on what criteria are used in any given context. 7 See Chapter 8 of the UN Charter https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-8 (UN 1945) as well as WTO rules including Paragraphs 4 to 10 of Article XXIV of GATT; the 1979 Decision on Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries; Article V of GATS https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regrul_e.htm (WTO 2022).

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of regional integration that occurred in Europe8 in the second half of the twentieth century is particularly remarkable, considering its depth and scope and, even more so, the grim context and steep challenges amid which it originated. During the first half of the same century, in fact, Europe had been torn apart by severe acrimony and profound discontent. This in turn fuelled extremist ideologies that ultimately led to conflicts so violent and dramatic that they soon engulfed the whole world, claiming millions of lives. Immediately after the end of the Second World War in Europe, there was a particularly firm intention to learn from the mistakes of the post-First World War phase, when the cessation of military hostility was not followed by true reconciliation or the formation of a new, sustainable, inclusive order. The issue of “reparations” is emblematic in this sense: the responsibility placed on Germany to repay the winning sides well beyond its abilities plunged the country—and subsequently the region— into a socio-economic and political crisis that constituted fertile ground for the rise of the National Socialist German Workers’ (Nazi) Party and, consequently, a new conflict. The full release of reconstruction funds—coming mostly from the only financial superpower of the time, the US—soon after the Second World War was formally conditioned on a joint management approach that had to include both “winners” and “losers”—in order to affirm right away the core principles of concerted governance and shared prosperity as pillars of a new order aiming at lasting peace and stability. The European regional integration process stands out also for its slow but steady and ultimately successful process of “deepening and widening”, which dragged the continent out of the catastrophic aftermath of intense nationalist rivalries and established a paradigm that many other regional organisations over the years have tried to emulate and learn from. This process began with the establishment of the Council of Europe, a pan-European body lacking particular executive powers but symbolically relevant for its endeavours to protect democracy and human rights and to promote integration and harmonisation of legal norms. Also set up were ad hoc sectoral platforms that were key to the common, regionwide reconstruction efforts of the time, such as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. Soon, the integration efforts of the “original six” (Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands), inspired by leaders like Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, led in 1975 to the establishment of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the broader European Economic Community (EEC). Forming this common market of about 200 million people required each party to engage in intense negotiations and accept inevitable compromises, which would ultimately inspire the further regional integration process for years to come. A custom union was completed in 1968, following the launch of the Common Agricultural Policy in 1962. The 1970s saw the launch of European political cooperation, the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS), and the definition of 8

Western Europe to be precise, up until the fall of the Berlin Wall, which removed the “Iron curtain” and freed Eastern Europe from Soviet control, thus allowing European regional platforms to expand eastwards.

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the European Currency Unit (ECU) to expand credit facilities and effectively manage currency fluctuations. In 1979, direct democracy in the election of members of the European Parliament (in existence since 1952 as a Common Assembly of the ECSC) was implemented. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty (or the Treaty on European Union, TEU), building on the provisions of the 1986 Single European Act (SEA), created a unique entity, the European Union (EU), which responded to the uncertainties reverberating across the region as a result of the fall of the Berlin Wall by once and for all transcending—in name and in deeds—the mere economic cooperation sphere. The European Union, in fact, not only brought about the harmonisation of monetary matters, the creation of a common currency (the first Euro coins/notes would be in circulation ten years later), and the establishment of the European Central Bank (ECB). Crucially, it also introduced a “social chapter” and the concept of “common foreign and security policy”. In general, the historic Maastricht Treaty—integrated and amended by treaties like thoseof Nice (2001) and Lisbon (2007), which improved and streamlined the decision-making process—marked the establishment of a platform which eventually ended up with uniquely “supra-governmental” powers in multiple sectors. Such competences would supersede those of members states’ governments, thereby allowing the EU to transcend the mere “intergovernmental” dimension that remains dominant across most other regional organisations, thanks to decades of intense negotiations centred, in essence, around the very concept of “pooling sovereignty” for the common good. Regional security and foreign policy, though, remain rather elusive. The EU has struggled to reach consistent common positioning on the many international challenges it has faced thus far, from former Yugoslavia and the Balkans to Iraq, Darfur, Somalia, Libya, and, most recently, Ukraine. Member states—as if clinging to the last significant remaining prerogatives of unfettered sovereignty that separate the current EU from becoming a federalist “United States of Europe”—have at times resorted to their own differing foreign policy strategies, or have simply deferred matters to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), a highly organised, Europe-centred (yet including the likes of USA, Canada, and Turkey) security organisation established in 1949 to counter the soviet bloc’s Warsaw Pact (which dissolved in 1991 after the collapse of the USSR) and still very crucial to the region’s collective defence and military operations. In terms of widening of the membership base, the European integration process was ultimately joined by many more than the “Original Six”, over the years: Great Britain, Denmark, and Ireland acceded in 1973; Greece in 1981; Portugal and Spain in 1986 following the end of local authoritarian regimes; Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995; Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia in 2004; Bulgaria and Romania in 2007; and Croatia in 2013 (EU 2022b). In particular, the significant eastward expansion that occurred in the early 2000s was driven by the intention to finally stabilise a once politically vulnerable portion of the continent, whose budding liberal economies also presented vast opportunities in terms of low-cost production, consumption, and abundant young labour force mobility. As of 2022, the number of member states in

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the European Union stands at 27,9 amounting to about 450 million people overall. While all are members of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), 19 decided to share the euro (e) as their single official currency (EU 2022a).

4.3.2 Regionalisation in Asia, Africa, and Latin America Considering Asia’s sheer size, as well as its high level of social, political, and economic diversity, it is not surprising that it lacks a comprehensive “pan-Asian” regional organisation such as those that exist in Europe, Africa, and Latin America (respectively the EU, the African Union/AU, and the Organisation of American States/OAS). The most advanced of the Asian regional platforms is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), established in 1967 by the five “Founding Fathers” (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) to enhance security, stability, and development. ASEAN now encompasses ten members, with East Timor fast approaching becoming the 11th. The cornerstones of ASEAN’s modus operani—the so-called “ASEAN Way”—are consensus, non-interference in members’ states internal affairs, and the avoidance of military intervention and thus peaceful cooperation as means to solve political disputes. In addition, a prolonged tendency, in its first decades of existence, towards informal processes rather than rigorously legalistic patterns has inevitably constrained and delayed the development of a strong regional governance system and the actual operationalisation of most declared intents. It was only in the 1990s, in fact, that ASEAN established a free trade area (1992’s ASEAN Free Trade Area, or AFTA) and only in the early 2000s (with the Bali Concord II in 2003 and the Charter in 2007) that despite remaining rather lean and nimble, it gained legal personality, established three “pillar communities” (Economic; Socio-cultural; Security), and formalised reference frameworks for governance accountability, compliance, and trade disputes (Karns 2015; ASEAN 2022a, b, c). ASEAN is credited with spearheading, from the 1990s onwards, rather consistent and wide-ranging interregional dialogue, via multiple platform configurations. With China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, for instance, ASEAN launched the ASEAN Plus Three (APT), which soon further branched out to establish the East Asian Summit (EAS), including, among others, India, Australia, New Zealand, and, more recently, the US and Russia (EAS 2022). From 1994 onwards, the ASEAN Regional Forum emerged as the only multilateral security dialogue organisation in the Asia–Pacific region to date: its being anchored to the principles of non-interference and consensus allowed a diverse array of powers like USA, Japan, the European Union, North Korea, and, above all, China, to overcome their initial reluctance and join (ARF 2022). Another growingly relevant organisation in Asia is the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), a multilateral platform initiated by China in 2001 to engage the central Asian nations of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan 9

Following the “Brexit” referendum of 2016, Great Britain left the European Union in 2020.

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in coordination with the other major superpower in the region, Russia, with regard to matters of security and crime control (SCO 2022). Despite its grand designs, instead, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), set up in 1985 to bring together Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and, from 2007, Afghanistan, has de facto been unable to produce any actual shared achievement on a consistent basis due, in particular, to the ever-present tension between its key members and nuclear powers, India and Pakistan. Another body that has been poorly institutionalised—as its largely run by a council of foreign ministers from each member state—and only partially effective is the Arab League (or League of Arab States, LAS). This was established as early as 1945 in a complex context of intense pan-Arab sentiment, decolonisation (or the end of mandates), and search for identity, which is still closely reflected in its official charter (Arab League 2012). The organisation’s 22 current members hail mostly from SouthWest Asia and North Africa (a region often referred to also as Middle East and North Africa, or MENA), but also from East Africa: while major cultural traits like language (Arabic) and religion (Islam) represent strong common denominators across virtually all of these states, relevant social, economic, political, and diplomatic cleavages persist too. Thus far, the organisation has been able to cooperate, speak, and act as one only rather sporadically: the support offered to the Palestinian cause against Israel up until the 1980s, for instance, was particularly cohesive; yet little was actually achieved to prevent or solve the ongoing civil wars—and related humanitarian disasters—in Libya, Syria and Yemen. Only marginally more integrated has been the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), formed in 1981 by six rich, oil-exporting monarchies (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates) that share common interests for selfpreservation, strong relations with the United States, and deep concerns over the growing influence in the region of Shi’a superpower Iran.10 Tensions between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, subject to occasional flare-ups such as the “blockade” of 2017, appear to linger, thus casting doubt over the future stability of the GCC as a whole. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU)—a loosely-structured intergovernmental body that proved unable to live by the principles of non-interference, equal weight of all member states, and acceptance of borders’ status quo upon which it had been established in 1964—was replaced by the African Union (AU), a new and improved pan-African regional platform, in 2002. The AU retained all the aforementioned OAU principles, but crucially provided for exceptions to non-interference in case of grave circumstances such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. It is also possible for the AU to temporarily suspend11 or even expel

10

Iran—technically a theocracy, following the revolution of 1977–79—is the only country in the world where Shi’a Muslims are amajority (of 90%). The only other countries where, although by small margins, Shi’a Muslims outnumber Sunni Muslims, who otherwise constitute over 80% of the world’s Muslims, are Azerbaijan, Bahrain (although it is run by a Sunni royal family), and Iraq. 11 As it did, most recently, with Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea.

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governments deemed to be illegitimate or to have significantly deviated from the agreed standards of democratic governance and respect for human rights. The shift from non-interference to “non-indifference” (International Refugee Rights Initiative 2017) required more thorough institutionalisation and therefore the creation of suitable decision-making bodies and governance mechanisms within the AU, such as the assembly of all heads of state and government, which makes all major decisions, resolves disputes, and issues recommendations to the Executive Council; the AU Commission; the Pan-African Parliament; the agency New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD); and the Peace and Security Council, which can authorise peacekeeping missions (such as those in Darfur, Somalia, and Comoros), implement sanctions in reaction to unconstitutional changes of government, and in general undertake initiatives and actions it deems appropriate in the face of potential or actual conflicts (e.g. Togo, Mauritania, Mali). The ability of the AU to consistently enforce its core goals, and in particular the “peace and security” that it considers essential preconditions for much-needed economic development (African Union 2001), has been inevitably hampered over the years by divergent views among members—as of today, all 55 countries on the African continent12 —and by the severe lack of financial resources and related dependency on donors, further exacerbated by the recent Covid-19 pandemic. Yet the AU is widely credited with being, since its very inception, actively committed to mobilising resources, setting the development agenda, and promoting the values of democracy, good governance, and rule of law on a continent where, for a long time after independence, autocracy, violent conflicts, and the abuse of human rights had been rampant (Tieku 2022) and where, despite significant improvements and widespread economic growth, multiple complex crises persist. Multiple sub-regional blocks also exist, often with overlapping members. These include the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the East African Community (EAC), to name just a few. They aim at promoting economic prosperity via greater market integration. These platforms appear to have, in most cases, enhanced intra-bloc trade significantly, but they also seem to have brought about only limited increases in intra-African trade. The latter is instead specifically targeted by the most recent African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). This agreement—entered into force in March 2019 and ratified by 44 countries as of October 2022 (Tralac 2022)— ambitiously aims at creating a deeply integrated, continent-wide market in line with the aspirations of the AU’s Agenda 2063 (African Union 2019), by eliminating tariffs, cutting red tape, and simplifying customs procedures. It is estimated that this will lead to at least a 7% income increase for the continent and the dragging of 40 million Africans out of extreme poverty by 2035 (Echandi et al. 2022). Intergovernmental dialogue has been promoted in the Western hemisphere since 1948 by the Organisation of American States (OAS). The platform brings together all 35 countries in the Americas—Latin American members as well as Canada and the United States (OAS 2022)—in order “to achieve an order of peace and justice, 12

Including the controversial Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara).

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promote their solidarity, strengthen their collaboration, and their sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence”. The OAS Charter also includes generic commitments to, among other things, democracy, poverty reduction, and limitation of conventional weapons. The main body of the OAS is the General Assembly, where all countries have equal voting rights, and decisions are made usually by consensus. The Permanent Council of OAS reports to the General Assembly, whose decisions it implements, while also overseeing the work of the Secretariat. The history of OAS— like that of most regional organisations—has been marked by different phases and by a track record that includes both successes and failures: during the first two decades of the Cold War, for instance, the USA successfully managed to utilise its politicodiplomatic weight within the platform to advance its own anti-communist agenda in the region and isolate Cuba, to the point of causing its suspension from OAS, ultimately lifted only in 2009. The OAS also notably failed to intervene to stem the wave of right-wing dictatorial power grabs that swept across the region in the 1960s and 1970s, only to later return to a more active role of promoter of democratic norms, by effectively responding—in diplomatic, financial, and military terms—to various coups and election crises from the 1980s onwards. Sub-regional initiatives to promote economic cooperation and shared development have also arisen in the Americas, with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Mercosur (Mercado Común del Sur) standing out as the most successful. Since its very establishment in 1994 NAFTA has been rather unique, as it created a free trade area between two developed economies, the USA and Canada, and one from the South, Mexico. Mercosur, meanwhile, emerged in 1991 from the diplomatic reconciliation between long-time rivals Brazil and Argentina, which served as catalyst for the creation, with Paraguay and Uruguay, of a vibrant low-tariff trade bloc that, despite not being yet the perfect custom union it aspires to be, now integrates 300 million people across four countries that, combined, would be the world’s 5th-largest economy (Mercosur 2022). Venezuela also joined Mercosur in the early 2000s, but it was suspended in 2016 following the collapse of democratic institutions in the country. As the overview provided in this chapter has explored, from the 1940s onwards the world has seen the number of its sovereign states almost double, today reaching 193 UN members, as a result of decolonisation and the increasing affirmation of the principle of self-determination. Nevertheless, the current political world map cannot by any means be considered fully reflective of the many complex social identities such as national, ethnic, religious, and tribal groupings. Nor can it be deemed universally accepted either, as territorial disputes are still frequent and many actual entities are still, at best, only partially recognised as sovereign and thus lack fully fledged membership of the international community. In these senses, the aforementioned map is hardly definitive, as it appears instead subject to a slow but constant flux which may still redraw boundaries over time and, de facto, shift more and more powers to ever-growing and increasingly relevant regional platforms coming into being for a vast array of purposes—from defense to ideology, from identity to prosperity. While headwinds of nationalism, particularism, and populism are intense—as “Brexit”,

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Trumpism, and the recent rise of far-right political movements in the West suggest— concerted transnational dialogue, at regional, interregional, and, ultimately, global levels appears essential to effectively manage the typically multidimensional and highly interconnected challenges of modern societal development.

References African Union. (2001) Constitutive act of the African Union [online]. Available at: https://au.int/ sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf (Accessed: 24 October 2022). African Union. (2019) Agenda 2063: The Africa we want [online]. Available at: https://au.int/en/ agenda2063/overview (Accessed: 24 October 2022). Arab League. (2012) Charter of the Arab League [online]. Available at: https://arableague-us.org/ wp/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Charter%20of%20the%20Arab%20League.pdf (Accessed: 24 October 2022). ASEAN Regional Forum. (2022) About ARF [online]. Available at: https://aseanregionalforum. asean.org/about-arf/ (Accessed: 24 October 2022). Association of Southeast Asian Nations. (2022a) Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II) [online]. Available at: https://asean.org/asean-charter/ (Accessed: 24 October 2022a). Association of Southeast Asian Nations. (2022b) Our communities [online]. Available at: https:// asean.org/our-communities (Accessed: 24 October 2022b). Association of Southeast Asian Nations. (2022c) Significance of the ASEAN Charter [online]. Available at: https://asean.org/asean-charter/ (Accessed: 24 October 2022c). Azerbaijani Chairmanship to the Non-Aligned Movement. (2022) NAM members and observers [online]. Available at: https://www.namazerbaijan.org/pdf/Members-and-observers. pdf (Accessed: 23 October 2022). BBC News (2013) DR Congo: Cursed by its natural wealth. [online]. Available at: https://www. bbc.com/news/magazine-24396390 (Accessed: 20 October 2022). Börzel, T. and Risse T. (2016) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. East Asia Summit. (2022) About the East Asia Summit [online]. Available at: https://eastasiasummit. asean.org/about-east-asia-summit (Accessed: 24 October 2022). Echandi, R. Maliszewska, M. and Steenbergen, V. (2022) Making the most of the African continental free trade area: Leveraging trade and foreign direct investment to boost growth and reduce poverty. Washington, DC: World Bank. Available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/han dle/10986/37623. Ethnologue. (2022) Languages of the world [online]. Available at: https://www-ethnologuecom.proxy.library.uu.nl/region/MAF?ip_login_no_cache=%B7k%0E%D4r%1E3O&cache (Accessed: 24 October 2022). European Union. (2022a) Countries using the euro [online]. Available at: https://european-union. europa.eu/institutions-law-budget/euro/countries-using-euro_en (Accessed: 24 October 2022a). European Union. (2022b) Country profiles [online]. Available at: https://european-union.europa. eu/principles-countries-history/country-profiles_en (Accessed: 24 October 2022b). Fund For Peace. (2022) Fragile states index annual report 2022. Fragile states index [online]. Available at: https://fragilestatesindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/22-FSI-ReportFinal.pdf (Accessed: 20 October 2022). Gómez, M.A. (2016) Montevideo Convention of 1933 & UN articles on responsibility of states (2001) [Online]. Available at: https://h2o.law.harvard.edu/text_blocks/28904 (Accessed: 20 October 2022).

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International Refugee Rights Initiative. (2017) From non-interference to non-indifference: The African Union and the responsibility to protect [online]. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/ world/non-interference-non-indifference-african-union-and-responsibility-protect (Accessed: 20 October 2022). Karns, M.P., and Mingst, A.K. (2015) International organizations: The politics and processes of global governance. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Mahat, N. (2019) The heart of Africa is bleeding out: The forgotten war in DR Congo. The perspective [online]. Available at: https://www.theperspective.se/2019/02/07/africa/the-heart-of-africais-bleeding-out-the-forgotten-war-in-dr-congo/ (Accessed: 21 October 2022). Mercosur. (2022) About Mercosur [online]. Available at: https://www.mercosur.int/en/ (Accessed: 24 October 2022). Monaco, E. (2021) Opinion—Rwanda and DRC: Converging at last? E-International Relations [online]. Available at: https://www.e-ir.info/2021/08/18/opinion-rwanda-and-the-drc-con verging-at-last/ (Accessed: 21 October 2022). Organization of American States. (2022) Who we are [online]. Available at: https://www.oas.org/ en/about/who_we_are.asp (Accessed: 21 October 2022). Rothermund, D. (2006) The Routledge companion to decolonization. 1st edn. New York: Routledge. The Group of 77. (2022) About the group of 77 [online]. Available at: https://www.g77.org/doc/ (Accessed: 20 October 2022). The Shanghai Cooperation Oranisation. (2022) About SCO [online]. Available at: http://eng.sec tsco.org/about_sco/ (Accessed: 20 October 2022). Tieku, T.S. (2022) The African Union at 20: A look at successes and failures. The Africa Report [online]. Available at: https://www.theafricareport.com/174348/the-african-union-at-20-a-lookat-successes-and-failures/ (Accessed: 24 October 2022). Tralac. (2022) Status of AfCFTA ratification [online]. Available at: https://www.tralac.org/resour ces/infographic/13795-status-of-afcfta-ratification.html (Accessed: 23 October 2022). United Nations. (1945) United Nations Charter (full text) [online]. Available at: https://www.un. org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text (Accessed: 20 October 2022). Weiss, H. (2012) ‘The Congo’s independence struggle viewed fifty years later’, Cambrdige University Press, 55(1), pp. 109–115. Wikipedia. ‘List of intergovernmental organizations’. (2022) Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/List_of_intergovernmental_organizations (Accessed: 15 May 2022). World Trade Organization. (2022) The WTO’s rules [online]. Available at: https://www.wto.org/ english/tratop_e/region_e/regrul_e.htm

Chapter 5

The Environment

5.1 The Modern Human–Nature Nexus Nature is the ultimate source of both life and livelihood. All that we consume and all that we produce originates from it, is transformed, and eventually returns to it in the form of waste. Natural resources—from land to water, plants, animals, minerals, even the heat of the sun or the tide of the ocean—are not only simply essential to our survival and to the smooth functioning of our economic activities, but they are also closely interconnected with each other to form systems and cycles the balance of which is crucial and yet extremely fragile. In the last two centuries, population growth combined with the progressive worldwide diffusion of industrialization—whose key function is precisely to transform and add value to the natural resources extracted within the primary sector of the economy—have placed immense strain on the planet’s natural systems and overall “carrying capacity”. Already in 1798, when the global population was about to pass the threshold of 1 billion, in his “Essay on the Principles of Population”, the British classical economist Thomas Malthus expressed serious concerns about the ability of a growing population to sustain itself. He envisioned a gloomy future in which the food supply would simply not keep up with uncontrolled population growth: demographic expansion would always occur in times of abundance and be followed, in endless cycles, by times of distress, famine, and disease brought about by the inevitable lack of adequate natural resources. Between the early 1800s and today, the world population has grown from a billion to almost 8 billion, yet, fortunately, Malthusian predictions haven’t materialized. This has been achieved thanks to various advances—often referred to collectively as a “Green Revolution” (or “Third Agricultural Revolution”)—of the mid 1900s that significantly improved agricultural productivity and expanded and sustained the overall food supply, including through the introduction of new machinery; better

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5 The Environment

fertilizers and pesticides; better storage, preservation, and transportation methods; the transplanting of crops from one region of the world to others; genetic engineering and improved breeding of domesticated animals; and the opening of new swaths of land to intensive commercial agriculture. This improved productivity has been somewhat undermined more recently, however, by a decline in resource efficiency— the ratio of use of materials per unit of GDP—that has occurred from the early 2000s onwards, as much of the global production began to shift to less material-efficient economies—like China and India—in South and East Asia. Increased agricultural productivity has been essential to sustaining the process of urbanization that has progressively accompanied industrialization patterns across the globe and that has driven, so far, more than half of the world’s population (56%) to cities in search of a better life and employment in secondary and tertiary sectors. In the process, agriculture has grown into a sector that—often inefficiently—guzzles ever-increasing quantities of water, land, fertilizers, energy, and labour, so as to fulfill the needs of both humans and livestock (Sagasta et al. 2017; FAO 2020). The rise of industrial mechanization and the expansion of cities have also exponentially increased the need for abundant, affordable energy, which fossil fuels— namely coal, oil, and gas—have reliably fulfilled for the past two hundred years, at the expense of an atmosphere in which greenhouse gases like CO2 have accumulated in ever-higher concentrations. Sanitation, housing, mobility, and waste disposal are among the many other dimensions in which increasing pressure has been created as a result of the trends of population growth and urbanization—trends which are not expected to subside in either the short or the medium term. Moreover, the fact that in the last few decades an increasing number of people have begun to escape poverty has resulted in an expansion of the middle class in multiple regions across the populous Global South. In turn, our species’ consumption—at times unfettered overuse—of natural resources, not only to satisfy our basic needs but also to pursue profit, status, or leisure, has led to unprecedented rates of extraction of primary materials, such as minerals, metals, fossil fuels and timber. A 2016 report from the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) International Resource Panel (IRP) indicates that extraction more than tripled in just four decades, from 22 billion tons in 1970 to 70 billion tons in 2010, and it is projected to reach 180 billion tons in 2050 (UNEP 2016). Global material extraction per capita increased from 7 to 10 tonnes in the same 40-year period. According to the report, the concrete risks of these unsustainable consumption patterns—which have far outpaced population growth—include the complete depletion of resources that are fundamental for the stability of our socio-economic systems, as well as the further exacerbation of challenges like climate change, air pollution, biodiversity loss, acidification and eutrophication of the world’s soils and water bodies, and soil erosion (Dauvergne 2008). High-income countries tend to consume on average almost ten times the quantity of materials that the poorest countries consume, and twice as much as the world average. In 2010, North America and Europe—home to only around 13% of the world population—led the rankings of annual per capita material footprints—the

5.1 The Modern Human–Nature Nexus

93

amount of material required for final demand (consumption or capital investment) in any given country—at 25 and 20 tonnes respectively. This compares with Asia– Pacific, West Asia, and Latin America, recording less than half of that at between 9 and 10 tonnes each, and Africa, which stood at about 3 tonnes. Brazil’s per capita material footprint in 2010 was 13 tonnes, while China’s was 14 tonnes in the same year, up from around 3 in 1990, epitomising the rapid ascent in affluence and closely related demand for resources in developing nations (UNEP 2022a, b). In order to reduce environmental pressure arising from such trends, it is imperative to design policies that are aimed at decoupling rapidly escalating material use from economic growth, at accounting for the massive environmental and social costs connected with resource overuse, and at reversing the post-2000 decline in resource efficiency discussed above. In general, the dramatic mark of human activities on the environment has become so evident that scientists have coined the term “Anthropocene” to identify the current geological era, which followed the Holocene—the age of remarkable climatic stability, which, in the last 10,000 years, significantly contributed to human civilization. In the face of mounting environmental challenges, ranging from climate change and ever-increasing levels of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to the loss of biodiversity, from the thinning of the ozone layer to the massive employment of fertilizers in agriculture and the overuse of groundwater reserves, scientists have extensively warned of the catastrophic consequences that crossing certain boundaries of “safe operation” will have on our species’ way of life and, in the long-term, its very survival (Rockstrom et al. 2009). Instances are common of overexploitation well beyond “sustained yield” thresholds that would preserve the self-regenerative capacity of a renewable resource. Conflicts frequently arise from competing, and at times incompatible, demands for the same asset, such as forests, for instance: some interest groups may wish to clear them so as to use the land for agriculture or real estate, while others may wish to harvest them for timber. Others again may want to preserve them for recreation purposes, or to protect the important role that they play in absorbing carbon dioxide and releasing oxygen. Indigenous communities may depend on non-timber forest resources for their livelihood, or attach to nature spiritual or cultural values that crucially define their identity. The management of environmental resources and of the issues that affect them should inevitably be holistic, as it requires rigorous analyses and solutions that are not only scientifically sound but also economically and politically viable, socially fair, and culturally sensitive. The economic dimension is particularly crucial: most of the causes and consequences of environmental challenges are, in fact, economic in nature. The traditional view of an inevitable trade-off between the “mutually exclusive” goals of economic growth and environmental preservation is being eroded by the growing evidence of powerful synergies that are indeed possible between these two “mutually enforcing” pursuits. Consensus is also growing around the notion that existing economic (even financial) instruments and “market-based” approaches—from “green bonds” to the trading

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of carbon credits—may be harnessed to drive and motivate change within existing, mainstream frameworks. But markets are not perfect venues with all-encompassing thaumaturgical properties; for instance, they have traditionally failed to absorb the hefty socio-ecological costs—the so called “externalities”—that have for decades eluded the traditional producer–consumer dynamics and have instead been unloaded onto nature and society at large. These “costs”, for long considered difficult to identify and quantify, are increasingly subject to successful valuation processes that attempt to estimate the worth of environmental assets, the services they produce, and the damage they suffer. These can be use values, reflecting the direct use of the resource; non-use values, such as the existence value or the bequest value, which refer to people’s willingness to pay merely to preserve a resource; and “option values,” reflecting willingness to pay to preserve a resource for possible future use (Tietenberg and Lewis 2010). Governments are therefore required to intervene, yet their intervention is hampered by circumstances that are inherent to environmental governance. First of all, environmental challenges are often international, if not altogether global, in nature, therefore governments are often required to engage each other in dialogue, and thus conceive, in a concerted manner, the most suitable regimes—i.e. binding sets of rules, norms, and strategies—to control, mitigate, and possibly solve them. Being sovereign entities, even when states convene in the context of international summits, secretariats, and intergovernmental organisations often created precisely with the purpose of facilitating negotiation on issues of common relevance, they may be driven by national interests and not necessarily by the common good. Among the drivers of states’ (voting) behavior in these circumstances are domestic politicoeconomic factors, such as the relevance to the country’s economy of particular economic sectors, electoral dynamics, the role of different constituencies, groups of interests and lobbies, cost–benefit analyses, and diplomatic relations. Consensus is usually achieved when the national interests of most countries involved happen to converge, and inevitably when resolutions entail limited levels of specificity, commitment, and enforceability—as happens in the case of framework conventions, guidelines, codes of conduct, and other similar types of broad “soft law” mechanisms. Secondly, environmental issues are in many cases “intergenerational” in nature, and this causes a sort of “short circuit” between the immediate, specific, direct costs that would have to be born to implement any solutions and the actual benefits, which are instead delayed, indirect, shared, and thus hardly identifiable. Moreover, the issues often revolve around “goods” that are essentially public, such as clean air, clean water, or biodiversity. Public goods are goods whose consumption is non-divisible and non-excludable in nature: in other words, their consumption by some does not diminish their availability to others. Also, once provided, public goods provide benefits even to those who haven’t paid for them at all. These characteristics typically encourage market inefficacies and disincentivize any consumer contribution to the very availability or maintenance of public goods.

5.2 Climate Change

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5.2 Climate Change Climate change is certainly not the only challenge facing our species kind, but it is arguably the most urgent, existential, and complex to tackle. It is the epitome of a global threat, as it requires, in principle, concerted, coordinated action by all nations. State actors’ wildly diverging politico-economic agendas typically hamper shifts and decisive action. The economy plays a decisive role in the climate crisis: while our planet is not new to mutations—even dramatic ones—of weather patterns per se, the ongoing process is relatively fast, and most importantly, unlike any other before, it is human induced. Since the 1800s, a larger and larger population across the globe has engaged in economic activities—at both industrial and household levels—that have emitted unprecedented and steadily growing amounts of GHGs into the atmosphere. GHGs draw their name from the warming effect they produce on the planet’s climate, as the atmosphere traps heat radiating from Earth toward space: acting just like the windows of an actual greenhouse, they essentially allow sunlight in but also seal the heat in, preventing the Earth from releasing it into space (Twardy 2007). These GHGs include water vapor, the tropospheric ozone (O3 ), carbon dioxide (CO2 ), methane (CH4 ), nitrous oxide (N2 O), and the industry-intensive “fluorinated” gasses like chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and perfluorocarbons (PFCs), nitrogen trifluoride (NF3 ), sulphur hexafluoride (SF6 ) (Unites States Environmental Protection Agency 2022a). Just like climate change, the greenhouse effect too is, in essence and within certain fundamental physiological limits, a natural phenomenon that is actually positive and conducive to the very survival of our species on Earth, as it prevents the climate on our planet from getting too cold (i.e. to below-freezing temperatures). What is concerning is the rising anthropogenic contribution to the greenhouse effect over the last two centuries. In fact, besides water vapor—not directly affected by human activities1 —all other GHGs listed above originate from human activities and are, with the exception of the relatively short-lived tropospheric ozone, often referred to as long-lived greenhouse gasses (or LLGHGS), because they linger in the atmosphere for periods of time ranging from a few tens of years to millennia, depending on the gas. Carbon dioxide is perhaps the most significant of all GHGs due to its major share (66%) of contribution to the greenhouse effect, or more specifically “atmospheric radiative forcing” (i.e. heat-trapping capacity), brought about by LLGHGs (World Meteorological Organization and Global Atmosphere Watch 2021).2 It also tends to have a particularly long residence (duration of stay) in the atmosphere—in the range of a few hundred years.

1

The amount of water vapor in the atmosphere is, however, indirectly affected by human activities: the progressive and general warming of the planet’s climate in fact leads to increased evaporation from water bodies as well as land, which in turn raises the levels of atmospheric moisture. 2 Intended here as share of radiating force by LLGHGs (WMO 2021).

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Carbon dioxide is released into the atmosphere by burning fossil fuels such as coal, natural gas and oil, solid waste, trees, and other organic materials, and via certain chemical reactions, like, for instance, those occurring in the production of cement.3 Not all fossil fuels produce the same levels of carbon dioxide: oil tends to release around 50 percent more CO2 than natural gas, and this is still only half the amount that coal releases. Carbon dioxide can be cleared (i.e. sequestered) when it is absorbed by plants as part of the biological carbon cycle: deforestation—i.e. the clearing of forests to make room for agriculture, infrastructure, urban expansion, and the exploitation of timber—therefore significantly contributes to CO2 accumulation in the atmosphere and, in turn, to the greenhouse effect, as it curtails sequestering capacity (Unites States Environmental Protection Agency 2022b). The second most relevant contributor—at about 14%—to the greenhouse effect is methane (CH4 ), a gas that is released by livestock, the decomposition of organic waste in open waste landfills, and the production and transportation of fossil fuels. Nitrous oxide (N2 O)—the contribution of which to the radiative forcing by LLGHGs stands at around 7%—is released mostly through the use of fertilizers in modern agriculture, via the combustion of fossil fuels and solid waste. It is also used in the treatment of wastewater and, in medicine, as an anesthetic. Tropospheric (also referred to as “ground-level” or even “bad”) ozone (O3 ) is a pollutant that is formed via a chemical reaction between volatile organic compounds (VOCs) used in industrial operations and the burning of fossil fuels and nitrogen oxides in the presence of sunlight (Unites States Environmental Protection Agency 2022a). Fluorinated gases are human-made, extremely potent GHGs that are employed in sectors such as industrial and commercial refrigeration, air conditioning, insulation, electronics, and more. Some of them, like chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), are also powerful ozone-depleting gases, the use of which was phased out in recent years by the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer of 1987 and its later amendments. Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), the most common fluorinated gasses that were meant to replace them given their far lesser impact on the ozone, are also now also being phased down as an effect of the 2016 Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol due to their powerful greenhouse effect—potentially remaining in the atmosphere even for millennia, as it is the case for PFCs (UNEP 2022c, d). Given the impact of GHG emissions on the environment, their concentration in the atmosphere is regularly monitored by a number of scientific organisations and observatories around the world. Levels of concentration are usually compared with pre-industrial levels: all of the main three LLGHGs—carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide—have been steadily increasing over the years, and in 2020 they stood respectively at 149%, 262%, and 123% above 1750 levels. 3

Around half a metric ton of carbon dioxide for each metric ton of cement produced (World Bank 2020).

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Table 5.1 shows in detail the mean annual levels of CO2 in the atmosphere from 1959, those of CH4 from 1984, and those of N2 O from 2001 onwards—gauged in parts per million (ppm) or parts per billion (ppb). Tables 5.2 and 5.3 display, respectively, the CO2 emissions (in kilotons) of the ten most populous countries and the ten countries that emit the most CO2 worldwide. It’s no surprise that rapidly industrializing large nations China and India both rank in the top three of CO2 emitters. This is evidently not the case when emissions per capita are considered—as displayed in Tables 5.4 and 5.5. Since the debate on climate change first emerged and proposals over a possible international regime to contain it began to be floated, the reference to nationwide figures as opposed to the use of per capita data has been more than controversial. There are, in fact, many potentially diametrically opposite implications over responsibilities, counteractions, and North–South relations depending on which of the two statistics is examined. Take India and China as examples: despite being two of the three largest emitters on a country-wise basis, due mostly to their large population, their per capita emissions are only a fraction of those of many high-income countries. Their right to provide “development opportunities” to their people—many of whom still live in some form of poverty—has therefore long been perceived as threatened by any call for climate action on the basis of overall national data as opposed to per capita data. Regional data on the contribution to climate change of CO2 emissions differ significantly over time. Looking at the period 1990–2019, in fact, the share of emissions from East Asia grew significantly—from 13% in 1990 to 27% in 2019—while the shares of Europe and North America progressively decreased from 18 to 12% and from 16 to 8% respectively (see Table 5.6). Yet, in a broader historical perspective that looks at the share of cumulative anthropogenic emissions of CO2 in the period 1850–2019 (Table 5.7), North America tops the chart with about 23%, followed by Europe at 16%, and only then East Asia at 12% (IPCC 2022b). Higher concentrations of GHGs have inevitably brought about slow yet consistent increases in global temperatures from pre-industrial levels onwards: the annual global surface temperature has increased at an average rate of + 0.08 °C per decade since 1880, but the pace seems to have picked up significantly in the last four decades (+0.18 °C per decade since 1981), in close relation to the industrialization of large portions of the developing world and the consequent spiking of emissions of GHGs (NOAA 2022b). Other indicators that signal a climate change momentum are the fact that 10 of the warmest years on record have occurred since 2005; moreover, in the 80 years from 1900 to 1980, a new temperature record was set on average only every 13.5 years, while this occurred every three years in the 1981–2019 period. The global land and ocean temperature in 2021 was 1.04 °C above the pre-industrial average.4 Figure 5.1 shows the global average surface temperature patterns from 1880 to 2020 (NOAA 2022b). 4

A 21-year span that is considered a reasonable surrogate for pre-industrial conditions (1880–1900) (NOAA 2022a).

98 Table 5.1 Global annual mean data at Mauna Loa, CO2 (ppm), CH4 (ppb), N2 O

5 The Environment Year

Mean CO2 ppm

Mean CH4 ppb

Mean N2 O ppb

1959

315.98

N/A

N/A

1960

316.91

1961

317.64

1962

318.45

1963

318.99

1964

319.62

1965

320.04

1966

321.37

1967

322.18

1968

323.05

1969

324.62

1970

325.68

1971

326.32

1972

327.46

1973

329.68

1974

330.19

1975

331.12

1976

332.03

1977

333.84

1978

335.41

1979

336.84

1980

338.76

1981

340.12

1982

341.48

1983

343.15

1984

344.85

1644.69

1985

346.35

1657.28

1986

347.61

1670.08

1987

349.31

1682.71

1988

351.69

1693.19

1989

353.20

1704.54

1990

354.45

1714.42

1991

355.70

1724.84

1992

356.54

1735.51

1993

357.21

1736.49

1994

358.96

1742.06

1995

360.97

1748.80 (continued)

5.2 Climate Change Table 5.1 (continued)

99 Year

Mean CO2 ppm

Mean CH4 ppb

1996

362.74

1751.46

1997

363.88

1754.54

1998

366.84

1765.54

1999

368.54

1772.39

2000

369.71

1773.37

Mean N2 O ppb

2001

371.32

1771.24

316.36

2002

373.45

1772.69

316.94

2003

375.98

1777.31

317.62

2004

377.70

1777.03

318.26

2005

379.98

1774.14

318.91

2006

382.09

1774.93

319.82

2007

384.02

1781.39

320.44

2008

385.83

1787.00

321.50

2009

387.64

1793.54

322.27

2010

390.10

1798.90

323.19

2011

391.85

1803.11

324.21

2012

394.06

1808.02

325.05

2013

396.74

1813.39

325.94

2014

398.87

1822.61

327.09

2015

401.01

1834.25

328.17

2016

404.41

1843.12

328.95

2017

406.76

1849.67

329.74

2018

408.72

1857.31

330.90

2019

411.66

1866.60

331.88

2020

414.24

1879.09

333.03

2021

416.45

N/A

N/A

Source Author’s construction based on data from National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (2022a)

The consequences of rising global temperatures are hard to predict with absolute precision, yet scientific research is becoming more and more consistent in prospecting a future plagued by a multitude of risks in a wide range of domains, from food production to water resources, from ecosystems and biodiversity to weather patterns and irreversible climatic shifts (Stern 2007). Yields of food crops are likely to decline in already vulnerable regions, as well as beyond, depending on the extent of the temperature increase: levels of rainfall will be affected by the loss of soil moisture due to faster evaporation, contributing significantly to the increased incidence of phenomena like extreme droughts, heat waves, cyclones, and the desertification of

100 Table 5.2 CO2 emissions (kt) of ten most populous countries (2018)

5 The Environment Country

CO2 emissions (kt)

1

China

10,313,460

2

India

2,434,520

3

United States

4,981,300

4

Indonesia

583,110

5

Pakistan

208,370

6

Brazil

427,710

7

Nigeria

130,670

8

Bangladesh

9

Russian Federation

10

Mexico

82,760 1,607,550 472,140

Source Author’s construction based on data from World Bank (2018b)

Table 5.3 CO2 emissions (kt) of top 10 emitters (2018)

Country

CO2 emissions (kt)

1

China

10,313,460

2

United States

4,981,300

3

India

2,434,520

4

Russian Federation

1,607,550

5

Japan

1,106,150

6

Germany

709,540

7

Korea, Rep

630,870

8

Iran, Islamic Rep

629,290

9

Indonesia

583,110

10

Canada

574,400

Source Author’s construction based on data from World Bank (2018b)

some regions, including the African Sahel Belt, the whole Mediterranean Basin, and multiple areas in South Asia. The melting of glaciers and ice sheets at the poles will trigger rising seawater levels, which will in turn threaten many populous coastal cities around the world— from Hong Kong and Shanghai to Miami, London, and New York, to name just a few. The impact on agricultural productivity and urban settlement alone will have severe socio-economic implications for overall growth and development and is likely to trigger new, climate-change-driven migratory flows. Developing nations with limited capacity for adaptation to the new reality, especially in tropical and subtropical regions, and small, low-lying island states are among the most existentially threatened. In the South Pacific, the low-lying island state of Kiribati, for instance, has already purchased land in Fiji to accommodate its

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101

Table 5.4 CO2 emissions per capita of top 20 emitters (2018)

Country

CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita)

1

Qatar

32.4

2

Kuwait

21.6

3

United Arab Emirates

20.8

4

Bahrain

19.6

5

Brunei Darussalam

16.6

6

Palau

16.2

7

Canada

15.5

8

Australia

15.5

9

Luxembourg

15.3

10

Saudi Arabia

15.3

11

United States

15.2

12

Oman

15.2

13

Trinidad and Tobago

12.8

14

Turkmenistan

12.3

15

Korea, Rep

12.2

16

Estonia

12.1

17

Kazakhstan

12.1

18

Russian Federation

11.1

19

Czech Republic

9.6

20

Libya

8.8

Source Author’s construction based on data from World Bank (2018a) Table 5.5 CO2 emissions per capita of world 10 most populous countries (2018)

Country

CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita)

1

China

7.4

2

India

1.8

3

United States

4

Indonesia

2.2

5

Pakistan

1.0

6

Brazil

2.0

7

Nigeria

0.7

8

Bangladesh

9

Russian Federation

10

Mexico

15.2

0.5 11.1 3.7

Source Author’s construction based on data from World Bank (2018a)

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Table 5.6 Global net anthropogenic GHG emissions by region (1990–2019) GHG emissions (GtCO2 -eq yr−3 ) Regions

Year 1990 (%)

2000 (%)

2010 (%)

2019 (%)

East Asia

13

16

24

27

North America

18

19

14

12

Latin America and Caribbean

10

11

11

10

South-East Asia and Pacific

7

7

7

9

Africa

7

8

8

9

Southern Asia

7

8

8

8

Europe

16

13

10

8

Eastern Europe and West-Central Asia

14

8

7

6

Middle East

3

4

5

5

Australia, Japan and New Zealand

5

5

4

3

International shipping and aviation

2

2

2

2

Source Author’s construction based on Figure SPM2 from IPCC (2022b) Table 5.7 Historical cumulative net anthropogenic CO2 emissions per region (1850–2019)

Region

Share of CO2 emissions (%)

Estimated CO2 emissions (GtCO2 )

North America

23

560

Europe

16

380

Eastern Asia

12

296

Latin America and Caribbean

11

270

Eastern Europe and West-Central Asia

10

252

South-East Asia and Pacific

8

182

Africa

7

160

Australia, Japan and New Zealand

4

108

Southern Asia

4

92

Middle East

2

56

International 2 shipping and aviation

40

Source Author’s construction based on Figure SPM2 from IPCC (2022b)

5.2 Climate Change

103

Fig. 5.1 Global average surface temperature (Source Reproduced from National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [2022b])

total population of about 120,000 when rising sea water levels force them into “climate refugee” status (Climate Change, Republic of Kiribati 2014; National Statistics Office, Ministry of Finance of Republic of Kiribati 2021). In its 2018 report Global Warming of 1.5 °C, the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)—established in 1988 by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) as the most authoritative global platform for the study of climate change—concluded with a “high level of confidence” that human-induced climate change is expected to reach 1.5 °C between 2030 and 2052 if it continues to increase at the current rate (IPCC 2018a). Multiple long-term adverse consequences would be triggered at the 1.5° increase threshold, and even more so at 2 °C, to a proportion that would ultimately depend on the actual scale and rate of warming, as well as on factors like geographic location, levels of development and vulnerability, and the choices and implementation of adaptation and mitigation options. Such consequences would include increases in mean temperature in most land and ocean regions; hot extremes in most settled regions; heavy precipitation in several regions; the probability of drought and precipitation deficits in some regions; and risks to health, livelihoods, food security, water supply, human security, and economic growth.

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Fig. 5.2 Climate change impacts and risks for selected natural, managed, and human systems (Source Figure SPM.2 from IPCC [2018b])

Global warming of 1.5 °C rather than 2 °C would entail, among other consequences, lower sea lever rises (by about 0.1 m) and a less dramatic impact on already strained land, biodiversity, and terrestrial, freshwater, and coastal ecosystems, thus preserving more of the “natural services” that the environment spontaneously provides to humankind (see Fig. 5.2). According to the 2018 report, moreover, in order to maintain global warming within 1.5 °C above preindustrial levels, global net anthropogenic CO2 emissions would need to decrease by almost 50% from 2010 levels before 2030, and then to reach net zero by 2050. To limit global warming to below 2 °C, CO2 emissions would have to decline by about 25% by 2030 and reach net zero in 2070. This would require unprecedented “rapid and far-reaching transitions in energy, land, urban and infrastructure (including transport and buildings), and industrial systems”. Deep emissions cuts across sectors, a wide portfolio of mitigation options, some employment of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) to compensate for residual emissions, and achieving net negative emissions would be necessary to return global warming to 1.5 °C following a peak. Estimates of the global emissions outcome of current nationally stated mitigation ambitions would not limit global warming to 1.5 °C, even if supplemented by very challenging increases in the scale and ambition of emissions reductions after 2030: avoiding overshoot and reliance on future large-scale deployment of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) would only be achieved if global CO2 emissions start to decline well before 2030, thus, essentially, leaving us with a very limited window of opportunity for meaningful action. More recently, in 2022, the IPCC’s scientists working on the 6th Assessment Report further detailed the urgent and substantial action required to meet the steep climate challenges ahead (IPCC 2022a, c).5

5

Assessment Reports are the most comprehensive publications by the IPCC. The Sixth Assessment Report (AR6)—which follows the 2014 Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), is due to be completed by the year 2022.

5.2 Climate Change

105

Limiting the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels would, according to these new determinations, instead entail reaching net zero CO2 emissions worldwide by 2050 at the latest, while in order to contain the global temperature increase to 2 °C, net zero CO2 emissions would have to be reached by 2070. The IPCC report finds that in 2019, around 34% of total net anthropogenic GHG emissions came from the energy supply sector, 24% from industry, 22% from agriculture, forestry, and other land use (or “AFOLU”), 15% from transport, and 6% from buildings. Yet if emissions from electricity and heat production are attributed to the sectors that ultimately utilize them, 90% of these indirect emissions are allocated to the industry and buildings sectors, increasing their relative GHG emissions shares from 24 to 34% and from 6 to 16% respectively. The report points to some reasons for optimism and, most importantly, useful, actionable ways forward. In the period 2010–2019, the rate of increase in GHG emissions was slower than in previous decades, despite the fact that levels in the decade leading up to 2020 were the highest in recorded history, due to increases in virtually every sector.6 This has been accompanied also by a steady reduction—by about 80%—in the price of energy from cleaner, renewable sources such as solar or wind, as well as in the cost of batteries. Moreover, a growing number of policies have been introduced to increase energy efficiency and slow down deforestation. An effective combination of conducive policies, proper infrastructure, and viable, accessible technology is in fact crucial not just to promote but also to concretely implement the energy transition and thus the decarbonization across multiple sectors that is necessary to avert disasters that would be ultimately impossible to control. Both existing and new urban centers—the source of roughly 70% of total GHG emissions—would need to aim to slash their emissions by reducing energy consumption, shifting to electrified transportation powered by low-emission sources, and boosting natural carbon uptake and storage. Low-emissions electricity, hydrogen, and carbon capture and storage would be beneficial also for the secondary sector: industries would need to engage in innovating production and consumption processes by introducing thorough life-cycle assessment and shifting to already available circular models, boosting their rates of reuse and recycling of products and key materials, so as to also better control waste generation and management. Despite not being able to compensate for the environmental shortcomings in other sectors, the primary sector too, and in particular agriculture, forestry, and other land use, has the power to bring about significant reductions in GHG emissions. Such landrelated activities, if better managed, could also contribute to the removal and storage of hefty quantities of carbon dioxide. This would positively impact the economy, by securing livelihoods as well as the supply of food, water, and wood, besides favouring the preservation of biodiversity and better climate change adaptation.

6

From average 2.1% per year between 2000 and 2009 to 1.3% per year between 2010 and 2019 (IPCC 2022a).

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5.3 The Present Global Climate Regime: The Paris Agreement The Paris Agreement, reached during the 21st Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) held in Paris in December 2015, is a key element in the current quest for an effective global climate change regime.7 It came into effect on November 4, 2016, thirty days after a double threshold was met, when at least 55 Parties to the Convention, accounting for at least 55% of the total GHG emissions, deposited their instruments of ratification (UN 2016). To date, 193 out of 197 Parties to the Convention are Parties to the Paris Agreement, making it, de facto, the first legally binding global commitment to tackle climate change. The aims of this relatively concise pledge8 are actually very ambitious, as they include, most prominently: (a) containing the global temperature rise in the twentyfirst century well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, while also pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius; (b) increasing the ability of countries to deal with the impacts of climate change; (c) making finance flows consistent with a low GHG emissions and climate-resilient pathway. To reach these goals, the Paris Agreement attempts to establish a transparent framework for action and support that relies on fresh financial resources as well as new technology-transfer and enhanced capacity-building mechanisms. At its core is of course the action required of all parties, which are not bound to a predetermined, mandated target but only to put forward their best efforts via “nationally determined contributions” (NDCs), whose progress should be regularly reported and built on. As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, environmental issues—from air pollution to deforestation, from biodiversity loss to ozone depletion—are often global in nature, as their causes and consequences transcend a single state or even a particular region of the world. Issues concerning “global commons”—i.e. shared resources and complex ecosystems of planetary relevance—require, ideally, a globally concerted, common response. This is of course difficult to accomplish, as sovereign states—making decisions on the basis of agendas driven by domestic socio-cultural and politico-economic interests and diplomatic considerations—still dominate the decision-making scene, populated also by inter-governmental organizations (essentially made of and by states, not existing above or regardless of them, as would be the case for the extremely rare “supra-governmental organisations”) and, to some extent, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private businesses. 7

Reaching and ratifying an international agreement are two different processes, as one happens on the international stage while the other crucially follows at domestic level, allowing single countries to actually turn the agreements into binding, enforceable law. 8 Comprising of 29 articles (UN 2015).

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While a detailed timeline of the “sustainability movement” will be provided in Chapter 6, it is important to note, in the context of this chapter, that the Paris Agreement represents a crucial step in the steady evolution of environmental regimes well beyond the climate realm. In fact, many of the key characteristics and principles of the Paris Agreement are inspired and informed by the experience of other environmental regimes, and by principles consolidated over years, if not decades, of global debate. In particular, the Agreement closely reflects multiple distinctive aspects of the ozone regime—mainly comprising the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer of 1985 and the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer of 1987, later further amended and expanded—which is often referred to as the most successful environmental regime to date. The ozone regime, just like the climate regime, targets issues—many of which in both cases are rooted in dominant modern economic practices, even though those at the core of climate change are far vaster in scope and scale—affecting the atmosphere, as highlighted by scientific community. The ozone regime emerged in the 1980s as an attempt to tackle the thinning of the stratospheric layer of ozone gas (O3 )—an important natural barrier to the harmful UV-B and UV-C solar radiations—which scientific research connected mostly to the use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) as cooling agents in refrigeration systems and air-conditioning, but also as propellants in aerosol sprays and solvents in multiple other industrial sectors. In the case of both climate change and the ozone layer, the regimes began with broad, generic framework conventions (the 1985 Vienna Convention for the ozone regime, the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change for the climate) that later grew into more sophisticated, structured, and somewhat binding international agreements over the years. Most importantly, the Paris Agreement—inspired by the ozone regime and aimed at overcoming the shortcomings of 1997 Kyoto Protocol, the binding targets of which did not apply to the developing world or to some developed countries, including the USA, which never ratified it—attempts to bring as many state actors as possible on board by identifying the “lowest common denominator”: the minimum level of action that will ideally incentivize every country to subscribe to the agreement’s provisions. In order to simultaneously include and appease the Global South, in particular, the Paris Agreement recognizes “common but differentiated responsibilities” (CBDR), just as the ozone regime had done before. In this regard, different requirements are applied to parties on the basis of their historical contribution to the problem (often, given the weight of industrial activities, more attributable to richer countries); their level of socio-economic development, given its impact on their ability to implement at times rather costly infrastructural adjustments; and thus their eligibility and need for financial and technical assistance (FTA). This is an orientation that emerged rather early on within the global sustainability movement, right from the 1987 publication by the World Commission on Environment and Development (often referred to as the “Brundtland Commission”, after its Chairperson, the then Prime Minister of Norway Gro Harlem Brundtland) of the

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report Our Common Future (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987). It was later further reinforced in the Declaration on Environment and Development adopted at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in June 1992 (UN 1992). And it is reflected in a series of fundamental tenets that became somewhat recurrent from then on. They include, first and foremost, the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” (or CBDR), according to which all parties should contribute to solving environmental issues that inevitably impact all, although to different extents, in proportion to the responsibility they bear for causing the problem in the first place (“polluter pays”), and their capacity financial and technical capacity. This principle, as discussed, was present in the main legislative architecture of the ozone regime, where it was used to inform a sophisticated system of differently conceived and timed bans across countries; it was the core rationale of the Kyoto protocol (and also, according to some, the very cause of its ultimate failure), essentially exempting most developing countries—some of which were major emitters of GHGs—from key binding commitments. On the basis of this experience, the Paris Agreement also incorporated the principle of CBDR in an attempt to strike a delicate but definitive balance between the stance of the South, inclined to have limited historical responsibilities, urgent and legitimate poverty reduction priorities, and insufficient “capacity,” and that of the North, keen to emphasize the fundamentally global nature of environmental challenges, the critical role played by some large, fast-growing, highly polluting economies, and the dangers of conditioning any environmental action on the receipt of FTA. Another important principle that, despite seldom being overtly mentioned, infused major environmental regimes up until the Paris Agreement is the so-called principle of “additionality”, which, as promoted by the developing world, aimed to ensure that official development assistance (ODA) for environmental action would be added, not diverted from existing programs with other purposes. In this regard, a fierce criticism of the Paris agreement targets precisely the fact that FTA and technology-transfer mechanisms remain, to this day, rather limited, unspecified, and uncertain. The funding that developed countries had promised to transfer to developing countries to help them sustain mitigation and adaptation efforts has so far been only partially provided, if not missing altogether. This has been further aggravated by the economic dynamics that accompanied the COVID-19 pandemic and the recent conflict in Ukraine (with the related energy crisis), which have inevitably affected the budgets of major economies around the world. Even more fundamentally, critics, especially the scientists and environmentalists among them, also take issue with the (over-)reliance of the Paris Agreement on NDCs, considered to be too vague and “soft” on parties to bring about the kind of unprecedented action required to avert the most dramatic impending scenarios. In other words, they argue, the diplomatic success of unprecedented, almost universal, subscription to such an agreement on climate—admittedly achievable only through a “sufficiently vague” set of requirements—ends up falling short of mandating a clear, definitive, science-based way forward.

5.4 Natural Resources and Development: Blessing or Curse?

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The ozone regime, in this regard, is actually credited with having somewhat solved the first modern environmental global crisis by following a rigorously scientific precautionary approach, which drove the shift to more sustainable practices. It did this essentially through mandated bans (although differently timed across countries on the basis of development levels) on harmful chemicals such as CFCs and, later on, HCFC and HFCs), to be replaced by substitutes that would allow relevant economic sectors to survive. In the climate realm, instead, multiple increasingly viable alternative pathways to the current “business as usual” approach are being all but ignored, due to vested interests and misconceived shift cost estimations that still prevent the increasingly urgent change the planet demands.

5.4 Natural Resources and Development: Blessing or Curse? Looking back at the history of economic development around the world, it is evident how environmental determinants have, all along, been impacting growth patterns of societies globally. Mere physical geography and location matter immensely: for instance, landlocked, isolated countries prone to natural hazards, diseases, and extreme climate have traditionally faced steeper (albeit not insurmountable) governance challenges in regard to ensuring sustained food supply, accessing foreign markets, building and maintaining infrastructure, and, more broadly, achieving shared overall progress and wellbeing. Historically, energy sources have also turned out to be very instrumental, as countries with abundant reserves of, in particular, fossil fuels like coal, oil, and gas have found it significantly easier and cheaper to fuel their industrial expansion. Together with other geologic resources—such as rocks and minerals, ranging from diamonds to gold, from cobalt to lithium, from uranium to the ever more prominent “rare earths”—that we draw from the earth’s lithosphere, these energy sources are important to sustaining a country’s own economic growth both through their direct use, where possible, and through their very lucrative export. In fact, revenues (often referred to as “rents”) from the sales of natural resources to foreign buyers can, in principle, be very beneficial to the public finance of any country: extractive industry investment is typically capital intensive and long term, and it potentially impacts both physical infrastructure (e.g. ports, railways, airports, road networks, energy networks, water systems, etc.) and local employment patterns significantly. Yet natural resource exports are no guarantee per se of comprehensive economic development, improved standards of living, and wellbeing for the local society at large, especially in developing countries that may lack the financial and technical capacity to locate—let alone extract—such resources. There are many countries, in fact—from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan to East Timor and Papua New Guinea, to name just a few—that, despite being endowed with immense

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stocks of natural resources in high demand internationally, are afflicted by some of the most profound and persistent forms of poverty in the world. In many instances, in fact, resource wealth has given way to severe lack of economic diversification, dangerous over-dependency on the export of one or a few commodities, vast “gap” inequality, corruption, mismanagement, autocracy, and even conflict: this phenomenon has become known as the “resource curse”9 —as opposed to the “blessing” that natural resource endowments should, in principle, represent. The relevant issues most commonly associated with development paths that are based mainly on resource exports are numerous, but they usually include some of the following: . The “asymmetry of information” that often occurs in negotiations for the concession of mining rights in developing countries between foreign investors— equipped with vast, globally sourced knowledge of the many scientific, legal, and economic aspects of the target resource and its market—and developing countries’ officials, who often lack the necessary capacity to avoid unequal deals that often bind them for long periods of time (Sachs 2013); . The lack of transparency which surrounds most investment contracts, often kept out of the purview of key branches of government, which creates fertile ground for corruption and mismanagement10 ; . The risk of non-renewable resource depletion, avoidable only via careful, sustainable management of natural resource stocks and effective economic diversification strategies; . The extreme volatility of commodity prices, due to global market trading and, often, mere speculative maneuvers, which may in turn affect mining operations and thus, ultimately, exporters’ income flows: this reinforces the need for competence among governance actors and, again, diversification; . Missing linkages between extractive projects run by foreign entities and the rest of the economy: this may occur in regard to physical infrastructure (often built with the exclusive purpose of serving only the mining operations themselves, not the wider community), employment opportunities (few, especially at the upper management levels, reserved to locals, and nurturing skills that can hardly be utilized in other sectors), input suppliers, and service providers (which remain foreign, i.e. within the global network of the international investors); . The repatriation of most earnings, which do not remain in the developing country that hosts the mining operations of major international investors;

9

This term is used, in this context, in a broad sense that transcends the more technical and specific “Dutch disease” definition, which indicates economies where resource exports typically cause a rise in the value of the currency, thus making other potential exports uncompetitive. For this and more on natural resource governance and its relationship with poverty and development, see Paul Collier’s The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It, and The Plundered Planet: Why We Must - and How We Can—Manage Nature for Global Prosperity (Collier 2007, 2011). 10 With some exceptions, such as, for example, Liberia, Peru, and Ghana.

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. The risk of triggering a “race to the bottom” among developing countries, attracted by the appeal of the massive capital flows that extractive projects can mobilize, which may reduce (if not waive altogether) local requirements (if any) in terms of taxation, protection of the local natural environment, public health, indigenous communities’ rights, and the like. The above issues could be tackled with a combination of measures. First and foremost, intervention should be aimed at strengthening and bringing more transparency to the overall legislative mechanisms that regulate contract allocations and conditions for investment in the mining sector in developing countries, as well as auditing and monitoring systems of contract execution and revenue streams over time. Coordination and cooperation between the private sector and governments (of both investors’ home countries and recipient countries) should also be devised to be mutually beneficial, so that investment (especially in infrastructure) can be expanded, thus improving market access, reducing cost, and attracting further investment, as well as improving standards of living on the ground. Meaningfully mobilizing local and regional actors such as banks and small or medium enterprises to take part, even indirectly, in the goods and services procurement networks and broader supply chains would complement the traditionally limited direct employment rates associated with extractive projects. Accurate environmental impact evaluations must be embedded in the negotiations and management of mining operations, so as to take into consideration the everincreasing costs that not only developing countries (often disproportionately) but also investors themselves may ultimately pay in regard to extreme environmental disruptions. At the same time, and perhaps most importantly, natural resource management should ideally be an integrated, functional component of comprehensive national development strategies that ensure sustained, simultaneous investment in all the complementary “capitals”—human, natural, technological, infrastructural, entrepreneurial—that are essential for truly sustainable development in the social, economic, and environmental domains.

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Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. (2020). FAOSTAT [online]. Available at: https://www.fao.org/livestock-systems/global-distributions/chickens/en/ (Accessed: 7 August 2022). Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2018a): Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty [Masson-Delmotte, V., P. Zhai, H.-O. Pörtner, D. Roberts, J. Skea, P.R. Shukla, A. Pirani, W. Moufouma-Okia, C. Péan, R. Pidcock, S. Connors, J.B.R. Matthews, Y. Chen, X. Zhou, M.I. Gomis, E. Lonnoy, T. Maycock, M. Tignor, and T. Waterfield (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA, 616 pp. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009157940. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2018b): Summary for Policymakers. In: Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty [Masson-Delmotte, V., P. Zhai, H.-O. Pörtner, D. Roberts, J. Skea, P.R. Shukla, A. Pirani, W. Moufouma-Okia, C. Péan, R. Pidcock, S. Connors, J.B.R. Matthews, Y. Chen, X. Zhou, M.I. Gomis, E. Lonnoy, T. Maycock, M. Tignor, and T. Waterfield (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA, pp. 3–24. https://doi.org/ 10.1017/9781009157940.001. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2022a) Climate Change 2022a: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [P.R. Shukla, J. Skea, R. Slade, A. Al Khourdajie, R. van Diemen, D. McCollum, M. Pathak, S. Some, P. Vyas, R. Fradera, M. Belkacemi, A. Hasija, G. Lisboa, S. Luz, J. Malley, (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009157926. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2022b) Figure SPM2 from IPCC, 2022b: Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [P.R. Shukla, J. Skea, R. Slade, A. Al Khourdajie, R. van Diemen, D. McCollum, M. Pathak, S. Some, P. Vyas, R. Fradera, M. Belkacemi, A. Hasija, G. Lisboa, S. Luz, J. Malley, (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA. https://doi.org/10.1017/978100915 7926.001. Available at: https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/figures/summary-for-policymakers/ figure-spm-2/. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2022c) The evidence is clear: The time for action is now. We can halve emissions by 2030 [online]. Available at: https://www.ipcc.ch/2022c/04/04/ ipcc-ar6-wgiii-pressrelease/ (Accessed: 6 August 2022). National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. (2022a) Annual CO2 means / Global CH 4 annual means / Global N 2 O annual means [online]. Available at: https://gml.noaa.gov/ccgg/tre nds/ (Accessed: 6 August 2022). National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. (2022b) Assessing the global climate in 2021 [online]. Available at: https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/news/global-climate-202112 (Accessed: 6 August 2022). National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. (2022c) Climate change: Global temperature [online]. Available at: https://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/cli mate-change-global-temperature (Accessed: 6 August 2022). National Statistics Office, Ministry of Finance of Republic of Kiribati. (2021) 2020 population and housing: General report and results [online]. Available at: https://nso.gov.ki/wp-admin/ admin-ajax.php?juwpfisadmin=false&action=wpfd&task=file.download&wpfd_category_id= 146&wpfd_file_id=1952&token=&preview=1 (Accessed: 11 August 2022). Rockstrom, J., et al. (2009) ‘A safe operating space for humanity’, Nature, 461 [online]. Available at: https://www.nature.com/articles/461472a.

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Chapter 6

The Quest for Sustainability

The global quest for sustainability is a relatively new yet increasingly dominant pursuit of societies, governments, and businesses alike. As a consequence, growth, development, and progress as a whole have begun to be viewed as far less monodimensional and “materialistic” endeavours than in the past: a more holistic interpretation of these phenomena has been gaining ground since the 1960s, calling for an appreciation of the underlying interconnection of social, environmental, and economic affairs, and the consequent need to achieve simultaneous, complementary results in all of these domains in order to fulfil the necessary conditions of a truly sustainable development path. This new paradigm encourages the “embracing of complexity” (Sachs 2015) as well as a profound redefinition of the very targets of societal development and, consequently, a revision of the parameters utilised to measure it. This chapter provides a brief overview of the recent history of the modern concept of sustainability, from its sporadic and at times controversial emergence to the global, holistic goal-based agendas of today. It also presents the key challenges and opportunities related to going beyond economic and quantitative metrics in attempting to gauge the pursuit of far more complex aims than solely economic growth and to ensure so-called fair transition in the face of growing calls for green economies.

6.1 Sustainability: A Historical Perspective Sustainability is not an entirely new concept, since multiple philosophical and religious traditions right across the globe have encompassed, for centuries, principles of universal harmony, complementarity, holism, and inclusion. However, the modern notion of sustainability as a governance paradigm and as a broad discipline emerged in the context of the intense “boom” phase of industrial reawakening and economic reconstruction that followed the end of the Second World War in the United States,

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 E. Monaco, Global Trends Compendium, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9163-9_6

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Publication of Silent Spring by Rachel Carson

Publication of Limits to Growth by the Club of Rome; UN (Stockholm) Conference on the Human Environment

Publication of Brundtland Commission’s report Our Common Future

1972

1987

1962

Millennium Summit; Adoption of the “Millennium Declaration” and MDGs; establishment of UN Global Compact

UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20)

2012

2000

1968

1983

1992

Publication of “The Tragedy of the Commons” by Garrett Hardin

Establishment of the Brundtland Commission

UN Conference on Environment and Development (“Earth Summit”); publication of “Rio Declaration”, “Agenda 21”, and “Rio Forest Principles”.

2004 Publication of “Who Cares Wins” by UN and financial leaders

2015 UN Sustainable Development Summit; adoption of “Agenda 2030” and SDGs; signing of Paris Agreement; approval of Addis Ababa Action Agenda

Fig. 6.1 Sustainable development: a modern timeline (Source Author’s construction)

Western Europe, and, to some extent, parts of the newly independent developing world. A series of “milestones” are often used as references and relevant markers of the progressively growing attention paid to sustainable development within both intellectual and institutional circles (see Fig. 6.1). Examples of intellectual milestones are influential publications such as the 1962 book Silent Spring by Rachel Carson, addressing the harmful impact that agricultural pesticides can have on animal species and human health; the popular 1968 article by evolutionary biologist Garrett Hardin entitled “The Tragedy of the Commons”, which shed light on the dramatic governance challenges possibly arising—at local, national and international levels—in relation to the ever-increasing demand for access to shared resources that would inevitably be brought about by global population growth; the 1972 book Limits to Growth by the Club of Rome, containing a scathing and controversial (at least initially) research-based assessment of the wide array of risks associated with blind and careless exploitation of natural resources for shortterm economic gain. Limits to Growth, in particular, takes aim at issues like resource depletion, environmental pollution, and demographic expansion in a comprehensive, “systemic” perspective, thus de facto introducing what will go on to become a fundamental tenet of sustainability—the overcoming of “silo” mentality in favour of so-called “system thinking” (Monaco 2021). The year 1972 would also see the convening of the first-of-its-kind United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held in Stockholm, Sweden, from 5 to 16 June, which crucially placed environmental issues on the international governance agenda and kickstarted the dialogue between Global North and Global South over their interdependence across areas as diverse (though interconnected) as economic growth, air pollution, water management, and human wellbeing. The pioneering Stockholm Conference culminated in the adoption of a few pivotal, albeit rather broad, principles for the management of the natural environment that were ultimately

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included in the Stockholm Declaration and the Action Plan for the Human Environment. Participants in the conference also resolved to establish the now prominent umbrella-organisation that is the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). In 1983 the UN General Assembly approved the setting up of a special World Commission on Environment and Development, which became informally known as the Brundtland Commission from the name of its chairperson, former Prime Minister of Norway Gro Harlem Brundtland. The commission was established precisely to start exploring: . possible long-term environmental strategies for achieving sustainable development to the year 2000 and beyond; . avenues of mutually beneficial cooperation among countries at different stages of socio-economic development aimed at managing the delicate interplay of people, resources, environment, and development; . global governance tools to tackle growing environmental concerns; and . definitions of long-term environmental issues, agenda for action and aspirational goals for the world community. The work of the commission was ultimately presented in the 1987 publication Our Common Future—also referred to as the Brundtland Report—which is credited with formulating one of the first and, still to this day, most-cited definitions of “sustainable development” as an undertaking that would meet the needs of present generations without compromising the ability of future ones to fulfil theirs (UN 1983). Such a form of development would not “renounce” growth and prosperity but instead would usher in an era of a qualitatively and quantitatively “improved” growth, that would become inclusive, shared, and achieved within the boundaries of environmental resources and the planet’s ability to absorb the consequences of human activities. The report’s definition well reflects the complexity of sustainable development, and its significant spanning over multiple dimensions of both time (present/future) and space (globally, and across social, environmental, and economic domains). Overall, the report paints a comprehensive picture of the extent of the issues facing humanity—from demographic and urbanisation patterns to energy use, from dwindling resources and impact on ecosystems to food security and industrial productivity—and broadly points to a way forward that is centred upon common action and institutional cooperation at the highest levels of governance, crucially clarifying the fact that humanity has, finally, the technological and intellectual capacity to bring about the advocated paradigm shift. On the occasion of 20th anniversary of the Stockholm Conference, in 1992 the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED)— frequently referred to as the Earth Summit—gathered world leaders, scientists, and NGO representatives from some 180 countries to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in order to promote balanced, integrated approaches to human socio-economic development and production/consumption patterns, mindful of nature’s centrality and boundaries, and also to draft agendas of reference for international action and cooperation in various realms of sustainable development. The Earth Summit lead to the publication of the Rio Declaration—a brief yet poignant collection of 27 universal principles,

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guiding and inspiring the future efforts of the international community as a whole; Agenda 21—a vast plan for action laying out broad sustainable development strategies to be implemented by the turn of the new century; and the first-of-its-kind “NonLegally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests” (UN 1993), commonly known as the Rio Forest Principles. Moreover, two framework conventions that went on to be become key to the global environmental regimes in the fields of, respectively, climate change and biodiversity conservation were open for signature in Rio: the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC; UN 1992b) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD; UN 1992a). The grand Millennium Summit held in New York in September 2000 served as a platform where the outcome of about two years of institutional and diplomatic efforts were presented, culminating in the adoption by some 189 members of the so-called Millennium Declaration (UN 2000), containing clearly and concisely stated fundamental goals—dubbed Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)—that required urgent efforts by national governments and international organisations, both governmental and non-governmental, by the year 2015. The eight aspirational goals included: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

eradicating extreme poverty and hunger; achieving universal primary education; promoting gender equality and empowering women; reducing child mortality; improving maternal health; combatting HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensuring environmental sustainability; and developing a global partnership for development.

The innovative goal-based nature of this development agenda was aimed, first and foremost, to facilitate the concerted mobilisation of civil society organisations, governments, and businesses experts alike, who could conveniently rally behind straightforward, commonly understood objectives and therefore identify suitable forms of resource allocation and intervention. It was also intended to enhance compliance with the adopted goals and their sub-targets, since performance towards their achievement would be systematically monitored over time (Sachs 2015) via a series of concrete indicators (see Table 6.1). The MDG agenda—strongly advocated by then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan—turned out to be, overall, rather successful, despite persisting challenges and unequal performance across countries and world regions. Among the most notable results, there were the achievements in poverty reduction: the number of people living in poverty declined by more than half, from 1.9 billion in 1990 to 836 million in 2015 (UN 2015b). In the same period, gender equality in terms of schooling registered significant improvements in most countries, as did parliamentary representation, which grew in 90% of over 170 countries where data were available. Public health indicators also showed dramatic signs of positive change: the maternal mortality ratio decreased by about 45% globally, especially from the year

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Table 6.1 MDGs, targets and indicators Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) Goals and Targets

Indicators

Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger Target 1.A: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the 1.1 Proportion of population below $1.25 proportion of people whose income is less than (PPP) per day one dollar a day 1.2 Poverty gap ratio 1.3 Share of poorest quintile in national consumption Target 1.B: Achieve full and productive 1.4 Growth rate of GDP per person employed employment and decent work for all, including 1.5 Employment-to-population ratio women and young people 1.6 Proportion of employed people living below $1.25 (PPP) per day 1.7 Proportion of own-account and contributing family workers in total employment Target 1.C: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the 1.8 Prevalence of underweight children under-five years of age proportion of people who suffer from hunger 1.9 Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education Target 2.A: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling

2.1 Net enrolment ratio in primary education 2.2 Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach last grade of primary 2.3 Literacy rate of 15–24 year-olds, women and men

Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women Target 3.A: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015

3.1 Ratios of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education 3.2 Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector 3.3 Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament

Goal 4: Reduce child mortality Target 4.A: Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate

4.1 Under-five mortality rate 4.2 Infant mortality rate 4.3 Proportion of 1 year-old children immunised against measles

Goal 5: Improve maternal health Target 5.A: Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio

5.1 Maternal mortality ratio 5.2 Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel

Target 5.B: Achieve, by 2015, universal access 5.3 Contraceptive prevalence rate to reproductive health 5.4 Adolescent birth rate 5.5 Antenatal care coverage (at least one visit and at least four visits) 5.6 Unmet need for family planning (continued)

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Table 6.1 (continued) Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) Goals and Targets

Indicators

Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases Target 6.A: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS

6.1 HIV prevalence among population aged 15–24 years 6.2 Condom use at last high-risk sex 6.3 Proportion of population aged 15–24 years with correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS 6.4 Orphans’ school attendance ratio to school attendance of non-orphans (aged 10–14)

Target 6.B: Achieve, by 2010, universal access 6.5 Proportion of population with advanced to treatment for HIV/AIDS for all in need HIV infection with access to antiretrovirals Target 6.C: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases

6.6 Incidence and death rates associated with malaria 6.7 Proportion of children under 5 sleeping under insecticide-treated bednets 6.8 Proportion of children under 5 with fever who are treated with appropriate anti-malarial drugs 6.9 Incidence, prevalence and death rates associated with tuberculosis 6.10 Proportion of tuberculosis cases detected and cured under directly observed treatment short course

Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability Target 7.A: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources Target 7.B: Reduce biodiversity loss, achieving, by 2010, a significant reduction in the rate of loss

7.1 Proportion of land area covered by forest 7.2 CO2 emissions, total, per capita and per $1 GDP (PPP) 7.3 Consumption of ozone-depleting substances 7.4 Proportion of fish stocks within safe biological limits 7.5 Proportion of total water resources used 7.6 Proportion of terrestrial and marine areas protected 7.7 Proportion of species threatened with extinction

Target 7.C: Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation

7.8 Proportion of population using an improved drinking water source 7.9 Proportion of population using an improved sanitation facility

Target 7.D: By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers

7.10 Proportion of urban population living in slums

Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development (continued)

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Table 6.1 (continued) Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) Goals and Targets

Indicators

Target 8.A: Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system Includes a commitment to good governance, development and poverty reduction—both nationally and internationally Target 8.B: Address the special needs of the least developed countries Includes: tariff and quota free access for the least developed countries’ exports; enhanced programme of debt relief for heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) and cancellation of official bilateral debt; and more generous ODA for countries committed to poverty reduction Target 8.C: Address the special needs of landlocked developing countries and small island developing States (through the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States and the outcome of the twenty-second special session of the General Assembly) Target 8.D: Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term

Official development assistance (ODA) 8.1 Net ODA, total and to the least developed countries, as percentage of OECD/DAC donors’ gross national income 8.2 Proportion of total bilateral, sector-allocable ODA of OECD/DAC donors to basic social services (basic education, primary health care, nutrition, safe water and sanitation) 8.3 Proportion of bilateral official development assistance of OECD/DAC donors that is untied 8.4 ODA received in landlocked developing countries as a proportion of their gross national incomes 8.5 ODA received in small island developing States as a proportion of their gross national incomes Market access 8.6 Proportion of total developed country imports (by value and excluding arms) from developing countries and least developed countries, admitted free of duty 8.7 Average tariffs imposed by developed countries on agricultural products and textiles and clothing from developing countries 8.8 Agricultural support estimate for OECD countries as a percentage of their gross domestic product 8.9 Proportion of ODA provided to help build trade capacity Debt sustainability 8.10 Total number of countries that have reached their HIPC decision points and number that have reached their HIPC completion points (cumulative) 8.11 Debt relief committed under HIPC and MDRI Initiatives 8.12 Debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services

Target 8.E: In cooperation with pharmaceutical 8.13 Proportion of population with sustainable companies, provide access to affordable access to affordable essential drugs essential drugs in developing countries Target 8.F: In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications

8.14 Fixed-telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants 8.15 Mobile-cellular subscriptions per 100 inhabitants 8.16 Internet users per 100 inhabitants

Source Reproduced with the permission of the United Nations from United Nations Statistics Division (2008)

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2000 onwards. Under-five child mortality also declined by more than half, from 90 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1990 to 43 in 2015. Between 2000 and 2015, about 6 million malaria deaths were estimated to have been averted, while over 30 million were saved from the deadly consequences of tuberculosis thanks to massive coordinated investment in prevention, diagnosis, and treatment. The number of new HIV infections per year per 100 people aged 15–49 halved between 2001 and 2013 across the developing world. Since 1990, over 2 billion people across the developing world—i.e. about 60% of the population—gained better access to sanitation. Annual official development assistance (ODA) from OECD donors to all developing countries totalled $135 billion in 2014, up exponentially from around $50 billion in 1990 (UN 2015c). It was precisely to expand, deepen, and give continuity to the achievements of the 1992 Earth Summit and the MDG agenda that the international community gathered again in Rio de Janeiro, in 2012, at the so called United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (also known as Rio + 20). The event contributed significantly to the broader post-2015 global development agenda by, in particular, setting in motion an inclusive intergovernmental process that would ultimately lead to the approval, at the UN Sustainable Development Summit held in New York in September 2015, of a new aspirational plan, the “2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, which included a set of 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 targets. The adoption of Agenda 2030 was followed by the signing of the Paris Agreement (see Chapter 5)—which at the time of writing encompasses 193 parties (UNCC 2022)—in December of the same year at the 21st Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP21) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Another important milestone contributed to making 2015 a truly momentous year for the promotion of sustainable development worldwide: the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (UN 2015a). Approved in the Ethiopian capital in July 2015 and building on the principles of both the Monterrey Consensus of 2002 and the Doha Declaration of 2008, this created a fundamentally instrumental framework on financing for development action even ahead of the finalisation of the Agenda 2030 itself. The Addis Ababa Action Agenda served as a key alignment tool for all financing flows and policies connected with the economic, social, and environmental targets of Agenda 2030, crucially complementing its concrete implementation mechanisms (UN 2016).

6.2 Sustainability Frameworks for Public and Private Sectors The 17 SDGs (Fig. 6.2) lay down an unprecedented shared blueprint for progress that aims to further the interests of both the planet and its people—present as well as future generations. It is, in other words, an aspirational call to seek economic growth

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Fig. 6.2 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Source Reproduced from United Nations [2022a])

in a manner that is fair and inclusive for all, conscious of nature’s boundaries and needs, as well as institutionally well coordinated. The four macro-areas in which the 17 SDGs and their many more specific targets operate, therefore, are economic prosperity, social inclusion, environmental preservation, and governance. Governance plays a particular double role of “ends and means”, as it is both a dimension of sustainability in its own right and a tool to achieve sustainable development in the other three areas (Sachs 2015). Such multidimensional, systemic progress cannot possibly be measured by single, mono- or “micro”-dimensional metrics that focus only on a single area such as the over-ubiquitous GDP—which, as we saw in Chapter 3, measures only economic output and is blind to relevant phenomena such as unpaid work, leisure, informal activities, and depletion of natural resources (Sen et al. 2010) and in general to quality of growth itself, as it emphasises how much is being spent, rather than what for. In keeping with this multidimensional focus, it is no surprise, that performance towards the achievement of the SDGs is monitored via some 231 unique indicators1 in multiple regular surveys, such as the yearly SDG Progress Report (UN 2022b), which looks at global and regional macro-trends, and the Sustainable Development Report (Sachs et al. 2022), which features a composite practical SDG Index based on

1

Actually, the total number listed in the global indicator framework of SDG indicators is 248, but thirteen indicators repeat under two or more different targets (UN 2017).

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the performance of single countries and world regions in all SDG indicators, which lends itself to easy comparison and rankings.2 The 2022 SDG Progress Report addresses the negative impact of “cascading and interlinked crises”, namely the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine and the worsening climate emergency—all daunting threats not just to the success of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development but also to our overall survival as a species. Table 6.2 summarises the key global findings of the 2022 SDG Progress Report 2022 in relation to each SDG (UN 2022b). The picture of a substantial lack of positive progress is shared by the 2022 Sustainable Development Report, which presents an assessment of national and regional performance trends through the use of its SDG Index (see Tables 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5).3 The global average SDG Index score appears to have been declining for two years in a row (i.e. 2020 and 2021), after years of steady annual increases in the period 2015–2019. This seems to be the consequence of the severe financial constraints imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic and rising geopolitical tensions, which have impeded the massive investment in infrastructure and human capital that the 2030 Agenda, in essence, requires. Such trends have reinforced the call on the international community—and in particular the G20—to conceive new, more transparent, and binding plans to finance sustainable development, especially across the vast low-income world where access to capital remains minimal (Sachs et al. 2022). The SDG indicators transcend the mere economic sphere and the coverage of GDP. Their nature, scope, and sheer number also denote a marked overcoming of the limitations of the mere quantitative sphere as well, as they attempt to promote a more qualitative definition of development akin to what is captured in the world “wellbeing”—which some contexts go so far as to call “happiness” (see Box 6.1).

Box 6.1 Bhutan’s Gross National Happiness In 1979, during a crowded press conference, the then 23-year-old King Jigme Singye Wangchuck, who had succeeded his father at the helm of the remote Himalayan Kingdom of Bhutan at the age of just 16, was pointedly asked by a journalist to explain the country’s dramatically low GDP figures and high poverty rates, and to outline his development agenda. As a response, the young monarch proudly declared that his main concern would be to improve

2

This is a temptation that analysists, politicians and wider public alike can hardly resist, which in turn drives the constant search for composite indexes that compound multiple data into a single figure. In this regard, it is worth noting that any such index, although undoubtedly handy, will have to rely on methodological assumptions concerning aspects like, among others, performance thresholds, normalisations, aggregations, weightings etc. whose complexity and arbitrariness are often directly proportional to diversity and scope of the data they intend to aggregate. 3 Produced, among others, by prominent economist and SDG “champion” Prof. Jeffrey Sachs.

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Table 6.2 Key global findings of the 2022 SDG Progress Report SDG

2022 SDG Progress Report key global findings

SDG 1 No poverty

Progress derailed by COVID-19 and the Ukraine crisis Around 656–675 million people expected to live in extreme poverty in 2022, 75–95 million more than in pre-pandemic projections (580) Extreme poverty rate at 9.2 in 2020—first increase since 1998 and largest since 1990 Rising inflation Rising working poverty rate (up 0.5%) for first time in 2 decades In 2020, only 43% of labour force legally protected by unemployment benefits and only 47% covered by at least one social protection cash benefit COVID-19 pandemic triggered almost 2,000 social protection measures in over 200 countries/territories, yet almost all were short-term

SDG 2 Zero hunger

Conflict, climate change, and inequalities are undermining food security worldwide 149.2 million children under age five suffering from stunting Nearly one out of three people lack of access to adequate food, and one out of ten suffer from hunger worldwide Ukraine crisis triggered food shortages for the world’s poorest people

SDG 3 Good health and well-being

COVID-19 infected more than 500 million people, directly causing 5 million deaths*, disrupted essential health services, and halted progress on universal health coverage It also led to decreasing global life expectancy, decrease in immunisation coverage, rising prevalence of anxiety and depression, and increasing deaths from tuberculosis (for the first time since 2005) and malaria The pandemic claimed the lives of almost 120,000 front-line health-care workers

SDG 4 Quality education

COVID-19 pandemic triggered a global learning crisis Children missed over half of in-person instruction 24 million learners never returned to school Remote learning worsened entrenched inequities (continued)

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Table 6.2 (continued) SDG

2022 SDG Progress Report key global findings

SDG 5 Gender equality

Slow progress in representation of women in parliaments (26.2%) Insufficient gender-responsive budgeting Women accounted for 39% of total employment but 45% of global employment losses in 2020 One out of four women experience partner violence in their lifetime Only 57% of women are making their own informed decisions on sex and reproductive healthcare

SDG 6 Clean water and sanitation

World’s water-related ecosystems degraded at alarming rate 85% of the planet’s wetlands lost over the past 300 years 3 billion people lack any monitoring on the quality of water they depend on Over 750 million experience high or critical levels of water stress 2.8 billion projected to have no safely managed sanitation, and 1.6 billion no safely managed drinking water, by 2030

SDG 7 Affordable and clean energy

Slowed progress on electrification: over 733 million people still lack electricity Declining international financial flows to developing countries for renewables Slow progress in energy efficiency 2.4 billion people still using inefficient and polluting cooking systems Renewable energy consumption share of total final energy still less than 20%

SDG 8 Decent work and economic growth Global economic recovery is hampered by COVID-19, rising inflation, supply-chain disruptions, policy uncertainties, labour market challenges, and the Ukraine crisis Global unemployment at 6.2%, above pre-pandemic levels Child labour affecting one out of ten children worldwide Productivity rebounded after pandemic, but not in LDCs (continued)

Bhutan’s “Gross National Happiness” (GNH), rather than simply expanding its economic output

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Table 6.2 (continued) SDG

2022 SDG Progress Report key global findings

SDG 9 Industry, innovation and infrastructure

LDCs left behind in global manufacturing post-pandemic recovery Lack of resilience of lower-tech industries in crisis Only one out of three small-scale industries has access to loans or lines of credit for recovery Slow recovery of airline industry after catastrophic losses due to COVID-19 (2.3 billion passengers in 2021 vs 4.5 in 2019)

SDG 10 Reduced inequalities

First rise (+1.2%, 2017–2021) in between-country income inequality in a generation Record high figures of global refugees, (+44%, 2015–2021) Almost 6000 known deaths of migrants in 2021 make it the deadliest year since 2017 One out of five people suffered discrimination on at least one ground

SDG 11 Sustainable cities and communities

Cities account for 80% of world’s GDP but also over 70% of GHG emissions Seven out of ten people expected to live in cities by 2050, up from over five out of ten today 1 billion slum dwellers Mounting municipal solid waste challenges in expanding urban centres worldwide (only 82% of solid waste being collected in 2021 and only 55% managed in proper facilities) Lack of access to public transportation for about 70% of city dwellers in Sub-Saharan Africa 99% of world’s urban dwellers breathe polluted air

SDG 12 Responsible consumption and production

Unsustainable patterns of consumption and production at the core of “triple crises” of pollution, climate change and biodiversity loss Almost 15% of food is wasted globally after harvest before even reaching markets, while almost 20% is wasted at consumer level Reliance on natural resources increased by 65% in last two decades Majority of electronic waste unsafely disposed of (continued)

What may initially have been just a witty, isolated comment has instead, since then, evolved into a structured development governance paradigm that aims at improving the general quality of life, or wellbeing, of people as ultimate goal of progress. GNH, is based on a holistic approach that targets citizens’ satisfaction in multiple relevant domains of their lives both as individuals and as members of the society. Deeply influenced by Tantric Buddhist philosophy,

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Table 6.2 (continued) SDG

2022 SDG Progress Report key global findings

SDG 13 Climate action

Window to avoid catastrophic consequences of climate change closing Energy-related CO2 emissions increased by 6% in 202 Climate finance for developing countries falling short of yearly pledges Unabated rise of global temperatures leading to more extreme weather events Large-scale disasters expected to rise by 40% by 2030 700 million people expected to be displaced by drought by 2030

SDG 14 Life below water

Oceans—which absorb over 25% of global annual CO2 emissions—are plagued by acidification as well as plastic pollution, ocean warming, eutrophication, and over-fishing 90% of fishers worldwide work in small-scale fishing and are in dire need of support due to the COVID-19 pandemic

SDG 15 Life on land

Global deforestation overwhelmingly (90%) connected to agricultural expansion (i.e. cropland expansion and livestock grazing) 10 million ha of forests lost every year Neglect of biodiversity in COVID-19 recovery spending Nagoya Protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity (regulating access to and benefit-sharing of genetic resources) ratified by growing number of parties (133 as of Feb 2022)

SDG 16 Peace, justice and strong institutions

Highest number of violent conflicts since 1946 As of May 2022, around 25% of the global population lives in conflict-affected countries Over 100 million forcibly displaced Global homicide rate declined by over 5% (2015–2020) Almost one out of six businesses worldwide receive requests for bribes from public officials

SDG 17 Partnerships for the goals

Debt-to-GNI ratio for Sub-Saharan African countries rose to over 40% in 2020 (from 23% in 2011) Rising net ODA of almost US$180bn in 2021, mainly due to COVID-19 aid; declining ODA for SDG data (down 18% in 2020) Rebounding foreign direct investment (up 64% from 2020) and remittances to developing world (up 8.6% from 2020) Accelerated internet uptake (63% of individual users worldwide in 2021 from 54% in 2019)

Note * For up-to-date statistics on COVID-19, see World Health Organisation (2022) Source Author’s construction based on data from United Nations (2022b)

6.2 Sustainability Frameworks for Public and Private Sectors Table 6.3 2022 SDG index score of ten best-performing countries

10 best-performing countries

129 2022 SDG Index score

1

Finland

86.5

2

Denmark

85.6

3

Sweden

85.2

4

Norway

82.3

5

Austria

82.3

6

Germany

82.2

7

France

81.2

8

Switzerland

80.8

9

Ireland

80.7

10

Estonia

80.6

Source Author’s construction based on data from Sachs et al. (2022)

Table 6.4 2022 SDG index score of ten most-populous countries

10 most-populous countries

2022 SDG Index score

1

China

72.4

2

India

60.3

3

United States

74.6

4

Indonesia

69.2

5

Pakistan

59.3

6

Brazil

72.8

7

Nigeria

54.2

8

Bangladesh

64.2

9

Russian Federation

74.1

10

Mexico

70.2

Source Author’s construction based on data from Sachs et al. (2022)

which values the interconnectedness of all sentient and non-sentient components of the universe, GNH maintains that true advancement of human society occurs only when both material and spiritual achievements complement and reinforce each other, promoting a sustainable balance between the economic, social, emotional, spiritual, environmental, and cultural spheres Every step towards economic growth must be measured and evaluated to ensure that its benefits are not just short term or merely financial, and that no detriment is caused to future generations or to other—equally important— aspects (and forms) of life

130 Table 6.5 2022 SDG index score of world regions

6 The Quest for Sustainability World region

2022 SDG Index score

East and South Asia

65.9

Eastern Europe and Central Asia

71.6

Latin America and Caribbean

69.5

Middle East and North Africa

66.7

Oceania

52.3

OECD members

77.2

Small Island Developing States

65.3

Sub-Saharan Africa

53.6

Low-income countries

51.6

Lower-middle-income countries

61.8

Upper-middle-income countries

71.5

High-income countries

77.5

World average

66.0

Source Author’s construction based on data from Sachs et al. (2022)

GNH represents both the ends and the means through which development should be promoted in Bhutan: it is not only the ultimate goal of governance but also the inspiring force behind every policy and a paradigm against which the whole governance system has to be continually measured GNH constitutes the rationale of every aspect of Bhutanese governance and can be said to inform the very essence of Bhutanese modern national identity The government of Bhutan claims to operate through strict adherence to the “four pillars” of GNH. These are good governance; sustainable and equitable socio-economic development; conservation and sustainable utilisation of natural environment; and cultural preservation and promotion Specific policies in each of these four dimensions are closely measured against the yardstick of GNH principles, especially since their inclusion in the 2008 constitution and the consequent establishment of the quasi-executive Gross National Happiness Commission (GNHC). The GNHC is entrusted with the key due-diligence duty of verifying the alignment of all policies with GNH principles, as well as, in general, with guiding and directing the formulation of policies, plans, and programmes in the country, so as to ensure that GNH is mainstreamed into the government’s planning, policymaking, and implementation processes (Gross National Happiness Commission 2022). In cooperation with the Centre for Bhutan and GNH Studies, the GNHC also monitors policy outcomes through surveys and related use of the GNH Index (Ura et al. 2015) Based on the same MPI Alkire-Foster multidimensional methodology (Alkire 2002, 2007; Alkire and Foster 2011; Kakwani and Silber 2013) behind

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the Multidimensional Poverty Index, the GNH Index consists of a weighted average gathered from 33 “cluster” indicators across nine domains—both subjective and objective in nature, statistically reliable, relevant to, and comprehensible by potential local respondents. These indicators represent significant components of Bhutanese citizens’ wellbeing, namely psychological wellbeing; living standards, good governance; health and education; community vitality; cultural diversity and resilience; ecological diversity and resilience; and time use. Domains are equally weighted, but the subjective and self-reportbased indicators within them generally carry lighter weight than the objective ones. “Happiness” is defined as the achievement of “sufficiency” in six of the nine domains, or, in other words, by overall positive achievement in 66% of all weighted indicators The advantages of this methodology are that it delivers a wide array of informative inputs for public policymaking, and it can coherently synthesise many different relevant phenomena in basic mathematical formulas. In addition, domains and indicators are chosen on the basis of their actual relevance to the local context; questionnaires are conceived to be understandable by their target audience; the calculation relies on a “cutoff approach” which is purposefully focused on the middle tier of achievements that are relevant to the wellbeing of most people; and the index can be broken down by groups and performance patterns can be monitored in detail over time. Above all, this methodology highlights the very sections of the population that do not yet enjoy sufficient quality of life, and so it sets very concrete, people-centered objectives for the country’s development governance agenda (Monaco 2016, 2017) In 2015, 43% of Bhutanese responding to the local GNH Survey could be defined as “happy”, while in 2010 the percentage stood at 41%, thanks mainly to improved living standards, service delivery, health, and participation in cultural activities. The overall GNH Index for Bhutan in 2015 was 0.756, up slightly from 0.743 in 2010. The 2015 Survey highlighted relevant trends such as a persisting gender gap, with 51% of men happy versus 39% of women, and a marked rural–urban divide, with 55% of urban dwellers happy versus 38% of rural inhabitants. Reductions in sufficiency levels were registered in the domains of cultural diversity, community vitality, and psychological wellbeing. Interestingly, the income rankings of geographical districts do not necessarily mirror GNH rankings, since relatively poor districts such as Gasa, Paro, and Bhumthang feature among the happiest districts in the country, in addition to the capital, Thimphu (Monaco 2016) In 2011, a Bhutanese proposal co-sponsored by other 68 nations led to the unanimous approval by the United Nations General Assembly of Resolution 65/309, “Happiness: Towards a Holistic Approach to Development” (UNGA

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2011), advocating the elaboration of measures that can better capture the importance of the pursuit of happiness and wellbeing and guide public policymaking accordingly To this day, Bhutan maintains one of the highest percentages in the world of managed protected areas—roughly half of its national territory of about 40,000 square kilometers—and a forest coverage that by law must be maintained over at least 60% of its territory, thus contributing to the Kingdom’s unique “carbon negative status” Besides governments and civil society organisations, the SDG agenda has further mobilised the private sector, by enhancing both the broad practice of corporate social and environmental responsibility (CSER) and the transparent implementation of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) criteria that can guide investors in the screening of business ventures that they might invest in. The concept of CSER first emerged in the 1970s. It steadily expanded and consolidated its relevance over the years leading up to Agenda 2030 thanks to, in particular, the establishment in 2000 of the United Nations Global Compact—the largest corporate sustainability initiative worldwide, calling on companies to closely align, on a voluntary basis, their business strategies and operations with ten principles concerning human rights, labour, the environment, and the fight against corruption, as well as, from 2015 onwards, with the SDGs (UNGC 2022b). The ever-growing number of signatories to the Global Compact at the time of writing is over 15,000, across more than 160 countries.4 The acronym “ESG” first appeared in a 2004 report, Who Cares Wins, which was the product of a collaboration between the UN and 18 financial institutions from nine different countries—including the likes of HSBC, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley—initiated by the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in order to jointly conceive a series of broad guidelines on the integration of environmental, social, and (corporate) governance criteria to guide the management of financial assets and the provision of securities brokerage services (UNGC 2004). More broadly, the report essentially represents an early, authoritative elaboration of the “business case” for sustainability: it affirms that the transparent, responsible handling of ESG issues is an integral component of effective corporate management and thus instrumental for a firm, not only in merely complying with evergrowing regulatory frameworks across multiple markets or enhancing its reputation among ever more sustainability-conscious consumers and workforce, but also to ultimately better manage its many risks, attract investment, and thus increase overall “shareholder value”. These principles have, since then, been consolidated and expanded and have found their way into different business models across a private sector that is attempting to 4

A full participants’ directory is available at www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/participants. (UNGC 2022a).

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build resilience in the face of concrete operational challenges of a varied nature— environmental, economic, political, social, technological—impacting raw material sourcing and complex supply chains, in a world that needs more food, energy, and fresh water yet is constrained by climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic, and conflicts old and new (e.g. Ukraine) (McVeigh 2022). At the same time, though, companies around the world are becoming increasingly attracted to the many opportunities that not only understanding, but deeply embedding sustainability principles within their strategies and operations, can provide. Such opportunities may range from better preparedness in case of operational disruptions generated by social, economic, or environmental crises, to an increased “shared value” for both business and society (as opposed to the narrower focus solely on shareholders) that in turn extends the “social license” needed by any business to operate successfully in the long term (Share Value Initiative 2022; World Economic Forum 2019); from growth in new goods and services (e.g. low-carbon solutions across multiple sectors) to “frugal innovation”, aiming to deliver new products and services while utilising less capital and natural resources, thus turning constraints into drivers of growth and possibly achieving greater economic, social, and environmental value through greater efficiency (Radjou and Prabhu 2015). In general, an increasing body of research tends to demonstrate that business sustainability management, despite inevitable trade-offs especially in the short term, does tend to pay off, with better overall financial performance against competitors w lack the culture and practice of sustainability (Ditlev-Simonsen 2022; Whelan and Fink 2016; Havas Group 2022; Sisodia et al. 2014; Global Opportunity Explorer 2022). This contributes to explaining the diffusion of the phenomenon, as reflected also by the exponential growth5 of Voluntary Sustainability Standards (VSS). VSS are economic, social, and environmental sustainability standards, conceived spontaneously by single businesses, business associations, non-governmental organisations, and government agencies that products and services need to meet in regard not only to their qualities or attributes but also to their production and processing methods, all along their value chains (UNCTAD 2022; UNFSS 2022). VSS are therefore not mandated by law—whose requirements they typically tend to complement or even exceed—and their implementation is often ensured via ad-hoc certifications and labelling processes. Over time, governments as well have started exploring roles that, in this realm, transcend mere surveillance and enforcement: they too, in fact, now appear to be interested in harnessing sustainability for economic growth. This is evident in the recent macro-economic strategies of major national governments and regional organisations—from the American “Green New Deal” to the EU’s “European Green Deal”—that appear to aim at lower greenhouse gas emissions, improved socioeconomic inclusion, and an overall “ecological–economic decoupling” (Davidson 2022; European Commission 2022a, b; European Parliament 2020).

5

An interesting and rather unique interactive map of VSS is published by the International Trade Center (ITC), and is available here www.standardsmap.org/en/identify.

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6.3 The “Just Transition” Challenge The ambitious climate action agreement that aims to keep the warming of the planet as far below 2 degrees Celsius as possible is strictly intertwined with social and economic dimensions, thus demanding a holistic governance approach to the multiple interdependent facets of sustainability. The emission reduction commitment undertaken in Paris in 2015 made it evident that the urgent and unprecedented “green transition” necessary to avert disastrous environmental consequences would bring about massive economic transformation and thus require rapid and far-reaching changes in a vast array of sectors—from energy to agriculture and industry, or from infrastructure to logistics and city management, to name just a few. According to the International Labour Organisation (ILO 2022a), since 2000, natural disasters have cost the world 23 million working-life years, and more than 2% of total working hours globally could be lost every year till 2030 as a result of climate change, which directly or indirectly threatens up to 40% of employment worldwide—i.e. about 1.2 billion jobs (ILO 2022a). The ILO also maintains that leaving behind the costly inaction embedded in perpetuating “business as usual” approaches and traditional “linear” economic models by implementing the climate action invoked by the Paris Agreement and by investing in circular economic models—which target economic growth and employment while at the same time reducing waste and pollution, extending products’ lifecycle, and promoting responsible sharing of physical and natural assets (UNECE 2022)—could generate up to 24 million jobs and gains of over US$23 trillion by 2030 (ILO 2022a). For this to happen, though, and thus for the greening of the economy to have an actual widespread, positive impact on employment and incomes especially in LDCs—hit hardest hit by climate change and least equipped with the capacity to deal with changing paradigms—environmental and socio-economic challenges would have to be addressed in a coordinated and complementary manner. The concept of “just transition” had already been formally incorporated into the agreements reached at 16th Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP16) to the UNFCCC in Cancun, Mexico, in 2010 (ILO 2010; ETUC 2010), which called for concerted workplace, sectoral, national, and global strategies to address the concerns, rights and opportunities of communities affected by climate change and related response policies. Even before then, at least since 1999 the ILO had been working intensely on a broader “Decent Work Agenda” (ILO 2008, 2022b) that pursued four key objectives: . promoting and implementing fundamental labour rights; . expanding opportunities for both men and women to gain decent employment and fair wages; . increasing depth and scope of social protection for all; and . upscaling tripartism (i.e. the collaboration among employers, governments, and workers’ representatives) and social dialogue.

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The rationale, research and recommendations of the ILO’s Decent Work Agenda were later thoroughly incorporated into various aspects of the UN Agenda 2030, including, in particular, a specific goal (SDG 8) dedicated precisely to the pursuit of “Decent work and economic growth” (ILO 2008, 2018). At the end of 2015, the ILO also adopted the “ILO Guidelines for a Just Transition to Environmentally Sustainable Economies and Societies for All” (ILO 2015). The Guidelines aim at reinforcing the four key principles of the Decent Work Agenda, at contributing to fulfilling sustainable development (as per Agenda 2030) in all of its key dimensions, and in particular to poverty reduction, decent work, and environmental preservation efforts—referred to in the document as “defining challenges of our times”. The greening of economies in fact presents opportunities not only to manage earth’s resources responsibly over time, increase energy efficiency, and reduce waste and pollution, but also to create the very jobs that would in turn reduce poverty and enhance social inclusion. The significant challenges that greening enterprises and workplaces could pose include, for instance economic restructuring, potentially causing workers’ displacement and possible job losses; the need to adapt to climate change in enterprises, workplaces, and entire communities in order to prevent or reduce involuntary migration, as well as loss of assets and livelihoods; and higher energy and commodity prices that could disproportionately weigh on low-income households. To meet these challenges, the ILO Guidelines recommend: . social dialogue as a crucial component of institutional framework for policy adoption and implementation; . policy coherence and coordinated “whole-of-government” approaches that align and integrate environmental, economic, social, labour, and education agendas at, ideally, international, national, local, and sectoral levels; . the mobilisation of public and private investment into environmentally sound operations that can create (decent) jobs and improve productivity all along supply chains both in fast-evolving, high-value-added sectors that can drive skill and job upgrading and in more labour-intensive, low-skill industries that guarantee employment on a wider scale; . taking into due consideration the possible impact of policies on employment, the need for appropriate social “safety nets” to protect from job losses and workers’ displacement, and the importance of skill development, social dialogue, collective bargaining, and the right to organise; . promoting cooperation and sharing of best practice within the international community, while at the same time adapting measures to the specific needs and conditions of each individual country. The ILO Guidelines identify nine policy areas to ensure the development of policy frameworks for “just transition” in the environmental, social, and economic domains: . macroeconomic and growth policies; . industrial and sectoral policies;

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enterprise policies; skill development; occupational safety and health; social protection; active labour market policies; rights; social dialogue and tripartism.

A just transition is easier to achieve if the various policy areas are looked at in an integrated manner. Policymakers therefore have to ensure that policies in one field are not undermining but instead are aiding objectives and measures in other policy fields. The concept of just transition also features in the preamble of the 2015 Paris Agreement itself, where parties take “into account the imperatives of a just transition of the workforce and the creation of decent work and quality jobs in accordance with nationally defined development priorities…” (United Nations 2015d), further confirming the ultimate, fundamental convergence of all the most recent global sustainable development portfolios mentioned in the present chapter. At the 26th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP26) to the UNFCCC held in Glasgow at the end of 2021, yet another “Just Transition Declaration” was signed by mostly OECD member countries and the European Union (see Box 6.2), reiterating the commitment and support for: . workers in transition towards new jobs; . comprehensive social dialogue and stakeholder engagement; . economic strategies pursuing wider socio-economic and industrial benefits besides mere clean energy; . opportunities for local, inclusive, decent employment; . climate resilience and, simultaneously, human rights across global supply chains; . inclusion of Just Transition progress in Biennial Transparency and Nationally Determined Contributions Reports (UN Climate Change Conference UK, 2021).

Box 6.2. Green Deal and Transition in the European Union The COVID-19 pandemic, the higher frequency of extreme weather events, and the multiple warnings from the scientific community determined the need for the EU to act swiftly to avert at least the most disastrous consequences of climate change. Rapidly reducing greenhouse gas emissions has therefore become a top priority for the European Union In December 2019, the European Commission presented the European Green Deal (European Commission 2022a) with a plan to make the EU climate neutral by 2050. This goal was then complemented, in December 2020, by the endorsement of the further intermediate commitment to reduce net emissions by at least 55% by 2030, compared to 1990 levels. These targets entailed the

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application of emissions trading to new sectors and a tightening of the existing EU Emissions Trading System (European Commission 2022c); increased use of renewable energy; greater energy efficiency; faster roll-out of low-emission transport modes and the infrastructure and fuels to support them; alignment of taxation policies with the European Green Deal objectives; measures to prevent carbon leakage; and tools to preserve and grow natural carbon sinks Such ambitious policy initiatives presented numerous potential benefits: besides the reduction of pollution, and thus the related positive impact on overall health and wellbeing, the Green Deal aims at simultaneously making the EU economy greener, creating innovation, investments, and job opportunities and reducing the dependence on energy imports and overall energy poverty, as well as boosting overall GDP growth If properly managed, the green transition is expected to generate around 1 million additional quality jobs in the EU by 2030 and 2 million by 2050, in sectors such as construction, information and communication technology or renewable energy (European Commission 2018a, b, 2019) In addition, in July 2021, the European Commission released the “Fit for 55” package (European Council 2022a), a plan to revise and align various EU laws with the its 2030 and 2050 targets6 While it is unequivocal that, at this point, the cost of inaction would be far greater than the cost of acting boldly, many of the ambitious climate policies proposed in the Green Deal and Fit for 55 package do entail significant socio-economic consequences, especially for those workers from regions and sectors that still depend heavily on fossil fuel activities and that therefore would undergo the most profound transformations A need for a stronger social dimension within the European Green Deal policies has therefore recently emerged, with the aim of offsetting the regressive distributional effects on society of climate policies. This was made all the more urgent by the breakout of the Russian-–Ukraine conflict in 2022 and the consequent sharp increase in energy prices, which exacerbated the plight of over 50 million European households that were already suffered from energy poverty In order to make the transition more just and manageable, employers’ and workers’ representatives at EU level have started calling for climate ambitions to be matched by equally ambitious social protection measures, so as to contain the higher poverty rates, job losses, and skilling and re-skilling issues potentially arising from the green transition Companies and their staff would in fact need to be supported in the transition towards an economy that, in order to be greener, would also inevitably be more digital The call for a “just transition framework” to be embedded in the Green Deal initiatives, tackling all economic sectors facing the transition throughout entire

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supply chains, was acknowledged in the COP26 “Supporting the Conditions for a Just Transition Internationally” declaration In addition, in 2022 the EU Council adopted a specific recommendation (European Council 2022b) for member states to ensure a fair transition towards climate neutrality, and in particular to tackle the employment and social implications of climate, energy, and environmental policies The adoption of a Just Transition Mechanism (JTM) and its Just Transition Fund (European Commission 2022f, e), which mobilises around e55 billion over the 2021–2027 period to alleviate the socio-economic impact of the green transition in regions currently highly dependent on coal, lignite, peat, oil shale, and carbon-intensive industries, was heralded as another important step in the right direction. Yet these instruments are still considered insufficient given the scale of the transition challenge. For instance, they fail to provide any support for other sectors heavily but less directly affected by environmental action, such as transport, construction, agriculture, or tourism In 2022, the EU Council also adopted a specific recommendation (European Council 2022b) for member states on ensuring a fair transition towards climate neutrality, and in particular on tackling the employment and social implications of climate, energy, and environmental policies The EU long-term budget allocated for the period 2021–2027 (European Commission 2022g), which secures the EU resources for its political priorities, coherently presents the greening of the economy (as well as digitalisation) as a key target. Coupled with the additional resources available in funds and investments of NextGenerationEU (European Commission 2022d)—a temporary instrument designed to boost post-pandemic recovery—the current longterm budget represents the largest stimulus package ever financed in Europe. This is therefore an unprecedented opportunity, for the Union and its member states, to manage—in a coordinated and concrete manner—the industrial and societal transition towards a greener, better economy for all

References Alkire, S. (2002) ‘Dimensions of human development’, World development, 30(2), p181–205.

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The following are the legislative instruments that are subject to revision: the Emission Trading System (ETS) Directive; the Effort Sharing Regulation; the Renewable Energy Directive; the Energy Efficiency Directive; the Energy Tax Directive; the Regulation Setting CO2 Emissions Performance Standards for Cars and Vans; the Directive on Deployment of the Alternative Fuels Infrastructure; and the Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) Regulation. These revisions are complemented by new legislative proposals for a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, a Social Climate Fund, as well as two initiatives called ReFuelEU Aviation and FuelEU Maritime.

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Afterword

The present book was completed in October 2022, when both the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia–Ukraine conflict were still ongoing. Depending on how both crises ultimately unfold, they may continue to significantly impact virtually all of the global trends and related indicators dealt with in this volume—from globalisation, discussed in Chapter 1, to the quest for sustainability, assessed in Chapter 6. The COVID-19 pandemic posed significant challenges to the ability to conduct business worldwide: global value chains (GVCs) were halted altogether or slowed down dramatically, pushing affected countries and their private sectors to look inward or to near neighbours rather than outward or on different continents, in search of alternative solutions. In this regard, while it is possibly still too early to tell to what extent some impacts of the pandemic may turn out to be long term, there seems to have been a tendency to overstate the incidence of phenomena such as so-called “de-globalisation” or “trade regionalisation”. In fact, the available data on international flows of trade, capital, and information (Broom, 2021; Williamson, 2021) appear to show that the world as a whole has bounced back from COVID-19 better and faster than it did from the financial crisis of 2008–09, with flows of capital and trade returning to or even exceeding prepandemic levels—with the notable exception of the tourism sector, which remains at barely 60% of pre-COVID levels (UNWTO, 2022). Moreover, in general, major economies appear to have relied more on global trade and distant partners than close-to-home ones. Even the so-called “US–China decoupling” potentially brought about by the pandemic and recent heightened diplomatic tensions between the two superpowers does not seem to be univocally supported by the evidence that emerged at the time of writing: trade volumes of most products—excluding those impacted by particularly high tariffs, such as some IT hardware, consumer electronics, and auto parts—between the two countries had, in some cases actually, increased (Altman and Bastian, 2021; Bown, 2022). A major role in this context is likely to be played by the events unfolding in the world’s second-largest economy, China—a major GVC player for at least the last

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 E. Monaco, Global Trends Compendium, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9163-9

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144

Afterword

three decades. So far, Beijing’s strict approach to the COVID-19 threat has kept the country essentially sealed, drastically limiting the number of incoming travelers and imposing mandatory quarantine, frequent mass testing, and lockdowns that have saved numerous lives, yet have also inevitably affected the country’s productivity and connectivity. Moreover, the five-yearly partial reshuffling of the leadership and process of agenda-setting that began in mid-October 2020 in China will determine, by broad strokes, global market trends and expectations soon afterwards. Additional factors to be monitored over time include the distribution of and access to effective COVID-19 vaccines across the developing world. Ensuring that this process is effective would further speed up the global recovery and distribute its beneficial effects more uniformly worldwide. A third of the world’s population— and over two-thirds of the population in Africa—was still completely unvaccinated as of March 2022.1 while in rich countries most people have already received multiple doses. This further underscores the need for truly concerted, inclusive transnational responses at regional, if not global, levels, that transcend mere bilateral dimensions. This would contribute to setting essential governance blueprints for similar zoonotic public health crises that scientists have warned will only become more frequent in the future, as the boundaries between human and wild, urban and rural, grow ever more altered and undefisned (Monaco, 2020). The pandemic has claimed many lives and has caused many more to lose their livelihoods, especially among the most vulnerable across the developing world. As mentioned in both Chapters 3 and 6, the slow but steady progress achieved in multiple years of poverty reduction interventions—through both the MDG and the SDG agendas—has been halted by the combined effect of the pandemic and the Russia–Ukraine war. The latter has, in particular, triggered a food crisis that has already moved about 50 million people into acute hunger: Ukraine is a major exporter of grain and oilseeds, and the Russian invasion has severely constrained its production and, even more, transportation—mostly occurring via maritime routes, impeded since April 2022 by the Russian military blockade of Ukrainian ports in the Black Sea. Russian exports of agricultural products such as fertilisers (as well as wheat itself) have also been affected by economic sanctions. A deal between the two countries brokered by Türkiye and the United Nations in July 2022 has improved the situation and helped to reduce the skyrocketing prices of such commodities, but the circumstances remain, as of October 2022, highly volatile, since some port activity has resumed, but it still lags far behind pre-conflict levels (UN, 2022). The war in Ukraine has also triggered a severe energy crisis: at the beginning of 2022 Russia controlled about a quarter of the world’s exports of natural gas, as well as respectively 18% and 11% of the world’s exports of coal and oil (Masterson, 2022). Many nations, most notably in Europe, in the attempt to sanction Russia’s conduct in Ukraine while at the same time not intervening directly in the conflict, have significantly reduced their imports of Russian fossil fuels. Amid rising energy prices burdening European households and businesses, it remains to be seen what 1

https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1115142.

Afterword

145

the approaching winter may bring: currently, most EU leaders appear convinced that they should gradually phase out Russian imports, find alternative suppliers, protect consumers with some form of stimulus package, and possibly accelerate the muchneeded shift (see Chapters 5 and 6) towards renewable and therefore also ‘cleaner’ energy sources (Cooban, 2022). The actual defining of policies in these matters will be a formidable test of cohesion for the EU, a vast and diverse regional platform that, despite the meticulous ‘pooling of sovereignty’ of its members in various domains, has so far struggled to find a truly consistent, common voice on security and foreign policy, as well as on fiscal matters (Romei, 2022). After all, the region—and perhaps the world—had not been faced with similar instances of overt violation of territorial integrity by major powers since the Second World War, or by eruptions of violent nationalism since the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Yet compared with the multiple crises in the Balkans, the strife in relations with Russia poses politico-economic challenges on a far larger scale. Among other things, it tests Europe’s traditional reliance on NATO (as mentioned in Chapter 4), whose perceived eastward encroachment in a region that Russia considers, culturally and historically, rightfully or not, its own backyard was among the very drivers of Russia’s actions in the first place. Last but not least, I would like to invite readers to consider the impact of the devastating monsoon rains that hit Pakistan between mid-June and the end of August 2022, which shocked the world and will most likely intensify the debate at the approaching 27th Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in November 2022. After unusually high temperatures in the months of April and May, the monsoon rains that followed were up to ten times heavier than in previous years; combined with the unprecedented melting of Himalayan glaciers, this caused the Indus River to overflow massively (Magramo, 2022; Mallapaty, 2022). As a result, about 30 million people were displaced, at least 1400 people died, US$10 billion in infrastructure damage alone was registered in over two thirds of the country, and two million acres of cropland and 800,000 heads of livestock were lost. The fledgling local economy contributes only minimally to greenhouse gas emissions, but Pakistan is nevertheless among the ten countries in the world that are most vulnerable to the destructive effects of climate change. As a matter of fact, extreme weather events such as the recent ones in Pakistan are becoming more and more frequent. Moreover, they are disproportionately experienced in the Global South, which thus ends up bearing a large share of the costs (‘externalities’; see Chapter 5) generated by the conduct over time of the far wealthier North. This is a trend the reversal of which I would very much hope to be able to cover in future editions of the Compendium.

146

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References

Altman, S. and Bastian, C. (2021) DHL global connectedness index 2021 update [online]. Available at: https://www.dhl.com/content/dam/dhl/global/dhl-spotlight/documents/pdf/2021gci-update-report.pdf (Accessed: October 28, 2022). Bown, C. (2022) Four years into the trade war, are the US and China decoupling? Peterson Institute for International Economics [online]. Available at: https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-eco nomics/four-years-trade-war-are-us-and-china-decoupling (Accessed: October 28, 2022). Broom, D. (2021) Globalization and world trade bounce back from the impact of COVID-19: Report. World Economic Forum [online]. Available at: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/ 12/globalization-world-trade-bounce-back-from-covid-19/ (Accessed: October 28, 2022). Cooban, A. (2022) The peak in global fossil fuel emissions is just around the corner. CNN Business [online]. Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2022/10/27/energy/iea-global-outlook-rep ort-2022-climate/index.html (Accessed: October 28, 2022). Magramo, K. (2022) A third of Pakistan is underwater amid its worst floods in history. Here’s what you need to know. CNN [online]. Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2022/09/02/asia/ pakistan-floods-climate-explainer-intl-hnk/index.html (Accessed: October 28, 2022). Mallapaty, S. (2022) Why are Pakistan’s floods so extreme this year? Nature [online]. Available at: https://www-nature-com.proxy.library.uu.nl/articles/d41586-022-02813-6 (Accessed: October 28, 2022). Masterson, V. (2022) This chart shows how much Ukraine and Russia export to the world. World Economic Forum [online]. Available at: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/04/world-bankukraine-food-energy-crisis/ (Accessed: October 28, 2022). Monaco, E. (2020) Ode to fragility amid COVID-19. CGTN [online]. Available at: https:// news.cgtn.com/news/2020-04-12/Ode-to-fragility-amid-COVID-19-PBfASUwvKw/index. html (Accessed: October 28, 2022). Romei, V. (2022) Why Germany’s energy package is undermining EU unity. Financial Times [online]. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/6f80d4d2-cde7-4771-895f-f92d130cd98f (Accessed: October 28, 2022). Williamson, P. (2021) ‘De-globalisation and decoupling: Post-covod-19 myths versus realities’, Management and Organization Review, 17(1), p.29–34.

Statistical Appendices

Appendix A: GDP Per Capita for Seven Latin American Economies

Note Data for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela Source Reproduced from Thorp (1999, p. 2) © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 E. Monaco, Global Trends Compendium, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9163-9

147

148

Statistical Appendices

Appendix B: China and India Annual GDP Growth Rates and Averages from 1980 WB databank GDP growth rate averages of China and India 1980–2020 Country Name

GDP growth (annual %)

China

9.268

India

5.775

Average

7.522

Source Author’s construction based on data from World Bank (2020a)

WB databank GDP growth rate averages of China and India 1991–2020 Country Name

GDP growth (annual %)

China

9.289

India

5.812

Average

7.551

Source Author’s construction based on data from World Bank (2020a)

WB databank China’s GDP growth rates 1980–2020 Year

GDP growth (annual %)

1980

7.834

1981

5.113

1982

9.017

1983

10.770

1984

15.192

1985

13.431

1986

8.950

1987

11.657

1988

11.223

1989

4.206

1990

3.920

1991

9.263

1992

14.225

1993

13.884

1994

13.037

1995

10.954

1996

9.923

1997

9.237 (continued)

Statistical Appendices

149

(continued) Year

GDP growth (annual %)

1998

7.846

1999

7.662

2000

8.490

2001

8.336

2002

9.134

2003

10.038

2004

10.114

2005

11.395

2006

12.721

2007

14.231

2008

9.651

2009

9.399

2010

10.636

2011

9.551

2012

7.864

2013

7.766

2014

7.426

2015

7.041

2016

6.849

2017

6.947

2018

6.750

2019

5.950

2020

2.348

Average

9.268

Source: Author’s construction based on data from World Bank (2020a)

WB databank India’s GDP growth rates 1980–2020 Year

GDP growth (annual %)

1980

6.736

1981

6.006

1982

3.476

1983

7.289

1984

3.821

1985

5.254

1986

4.777

1987

3.965

1988

9.628 (continued)

150

Statistical Appendices

(continued) Year

GDP growth (annual %)

1989

5.947

1990

5.533

1991

1.057

1992

5.482

1993

4.751

1994

6.659

1995

7.574

1996

7.550

1997

4.050

1998

6.184

1999

8.846

2000

3.841

2001

4.824

2002

3.804

2003

7.860

2004

7.923

2005

7.923

2006

8.061

2007

7.661

2008

3.087

2009

7.862

2010

8.498

2011

5.241

2012

5.456

2013

6.386

2014

7.410

2015

7.996

2016

8.256

2017

6.795

2018

6.533

2019

4.042

2020

−7.252

Average

5.775

Source Author’s construction based on data from World Bank (2020a)

Statistical Appendices

151

Appendix C: Ten Most Populous Countries’ Detailed Growth Rates (and Averages) 2010–2020 WB databank China’s GDP growth rates 2010–2020 Year

GDP growth (annual %)

2010

10.636

2011

9.551

2012

7.864

2013

7.766

2014

7.426

2015

7.041

2016

6.849

2017

6.947

2018

6.750

2019

5.950

2020

2.348

Average

7.193

Source Author’s construction based on data from World Bank (2020a)

WB databank India’s GDP growth rates 2010–2020 Year

GDP growth (annual %)

2010

8.498

2011

5.241

2012

5.456

2013

6.386

2014

7.410

2015

7.996

2016

8.256

2017

6.795

2018

6.533

2019

4.042

2020

−7.252

Average

5.397

Source Author’s construction based on data from World Bank (2020a)

WB databank Indonesia’s GDP growth rates 2010–2020

152 Year

Statistical Appendices GDP growth (annual %)

2010

6.224

2011

6.170

2012

6.030

2013

5.557

2014

5.007

2015

4.876

2016

5.033

2017

5.070

2018

5.174

2019

5.018

2020

−2.070

Average

4.735

Source Author’s construction based on data from World Bank (2020a)

WB databank Pakistan’s GDP growth rates 2010–2020 Year

GDP growth (annual %)

2010

1.607

2011

2.748

2012

3.507

2013

4.396

2014

4.675

2015

4.731

2016

5.527

2017

5.554

2018

5.836

2019

1.145

2020

−0.935

Average

3.526

Source Author’s construction based on data from World Bank (2020a)

WB databank United States’ GDP growth rates 2010–2020 Year 2010

GDP growth (annual %) 2.564

2011

1.551

2012

2.250

2013

1.842

2014

2.526 (continued)

Statistical Appendices

153

(continued) Year

GDP growth (annual %)

2015

3.076

2016

1.711

2017

2.333

2018

2.996

2019

2.161

2020

−3.642

Average

1.761

Source Author’s construction based on data from World Bank (2020a)

WB databank Brazil’s GDP growth rates 2010–2020 Year 2010

GDP growth (annual %) 7.528

2011

3.974

2012

1.921

2013

3.005

2014

0.504

2015

−3.546

2016

−3.276

2017

1.323

2018

1.784

2019

1.411

2020

−4.059

Average

0.961

Source Author’s construction based on data from World Bank (2020a)

WB databank Nigeria’s GDP growth rates 2010–2020 Year

GDP growth (annual %)

2010

8.006

2011

5.308

2012

4.230

2013

6.671

2014

6.310

2015

2.653

2016

−1.617

2017

0.806

2018

1.923 (continued)

154

Statistical Appendices

(continued) Year

GDP growth (annual %)

2019

2.208

2020

−1.794

Average

3.155

Source Author’s construction based on data from World Bank (2020a)

WB databank Bangladesh’s GDP growth rates 2010–2020 Year

GDP growth (annual %)

2010

5.572

2011

6.464

2012

6.521

2013

6.014

2014

6.061

2015

6.553

2016

7.113

2017

7.284

2018

7.864

2019

8.153

2020

3.509

Average

6.464

Source Author’s construction based on data from World Bank (2020a)

WB databank Russian Federation’s GDP growth rates 2010–2020 Year

GDP growth (annual %)

2010

4.500

2011

4.300

2012

4.024

2013

1.755

2014

0.736

2015

−1.973

2016

0.194

2017

1.826

2018

2.807

2019

2.033

2020

−2.951

Average

1.568

Statistical Appendices

155

Source Author’s construction based on data from World Bank (2020a)

WB databank Mexico’s GDP growth rates 2010–2020 Year

GDP growth (annual %)

2010

5.118

2011

3.663

2012

3.642

2013

1.354

2014

2.850

2015

3.293

2016

2.631

2017

2.113

2018

2.195

2019

−0.177

2020

−8.309

Average

1.670

Source: Author’s construction based on data from World Bank (2020a)

Appendix D: MPI Multidimensional poverty index: developing countries 2021 of 10 countries with highest MPI

0.517

0.384

0.376

2018

2018

2018

Madagascar

Mali

Guinea

0.417

66.2

68.3

69.1

75.1

73.1

80.4

84.2

84.2

91.9

91.0

Headcount (%)

56.4

55

55.6

54.4

57.0

57.4

61.4

62.2

63.2

66.1

Intensity of deprivation (%)

43.5

44.7

45.5

46.1

49.9

55.8

64.6

65.3

74.3

76.3

Population in severe multidimensional poverty (%)

Population in multidimensional poverty

21.4

19.6

15.5

23.8

18.0

20.2

19.1

20.5

14.0

21.4

Health (%)

38.4

41.2

33.1

27.2

32.1

27.8

36.6

40.4

39.6

36.7

Education (%)

40.3

39.3

51.5

49.0

49.9

52.0

44.3

39.1

46.5

41.8

Standard of living (%)

Contribution of deprivation in dimension to overall multidimensional poverty

Source Reproduced under Creative Commons license Attribution 3.0 IGO from UNDP and OPHI (2021, pp. 29–31)

0.373

0.409

2011

2016/2017

Mozambique

0.461

Burundi

2019

2018/2019

Chad

Central African Republic

0.523

2010

Burkina Faso

0.601

0.580

2012

2010

Niger

(Value)

Year and Survey (2009–2020)

South Sudan

Country

Multidimensional Poverty Index

SDG 1.2

36.1

50.3

78.8

72.8

63.7

N/A

38.1

43.8

76.4

45.4

PPP $1.90 a day (2009–2019c )

Population living below income poverty line (%)

SDG 1.1

156 Statistical Appendices

Statistical Appendices

157

Appendix E: UNDP World Countries Human Development Index Ranking 2019 (Highest 10)

SDG 3

SDG 4.3

SDG 4.4

SDG 8.5

Life expectancy at birth (years)

Expected years of schooling (years)

Mean years of schooling (years)

Gross national income (GNI) per capita (2017 PPP $)

HDI Ranking

Country/Region Name

Value (2019)

2019

2019

2019

2019

2019

1

Norway

0.957

82.4

18.1

12.9

66,494

2

Ireland

0.955

82.3

18.7

12.7

68,371

3

Switzerland

0.955

83.8

16.3

13.4

69,394

4

Hong Kong, China (SAR)

0.949

84.9

16.9

12.3

62,985

5

Iceland

0.949

83.0

19.1

12.8

54,682

6

Germany

0.947

81.3

17.0

14.2

55,314

7

Sweden

0.945

82.8

19.5

12.5

54,508

8

Australia

0.944

83.4

22.0

12.7

48,085

9

Netherlands

0.944

82.3

18.5

12.4

57,707

10

Denmark

0.940

80.9

18.9

12.6

58,662

Source Reproduced under Creative Commons license Attribution 3.0 IGO from UNDP (2020, p. 343)

UNDP world countries human development index ranking 2019 (lowest 10)

HDI Ranking

Country/Region Name

SDG 3

SDG 4.3

SDG 4.4

SDG 8.5

Value (2019)

Life expectancy at birth (years)

Expected years of schooling (years)

Mean years of schooling (years)

Gross national income (GNI) per capita (2017 PPP $)

2019

2019

2019

2019

2019

189

Niger

0.394

62.4

6.5

2.1

1,201

188

Central African Republic

0.397

53.3

7.6

4.3

993

187

Chad

0.398

54.2

7.3

2.5

1,555

186

South Sudan

0.433

57.9

5.3

4.8

2,003 (continued)

158

Statistical Appendices

(continued) SDG 3

SDG 4.3

SDG 4.4

185

Burundi

0.433

61.6

11.1

3.3

SDG 8.5 754

184

Mali

0.434

59.3

7.5

2.4

2,269

183

Sierra Leone

0.452

54.7

10.2

3.7

1,668

182

Burkina Faso

0.452

61.6

9.3

1.6

2,133

181

Mozambique

0.456

60.9

10.0

3.5

1,250

180

Eritrea

0.459

66.3

5.0

3.9

2,793

Source Reproduced under Creative Commons license Attribution 3.0 IGO from UNDP (2020, pp. 345–346)

Appendix F: Gini WB Databank world countries Gini coefficient ranking (most unequal 10) Country/Region Name

Year and Survey

Gini Value

South Africa

2014

63.0

Namibia

2015

59.1

Suriname

1999

57.9

Zambia

2015

57.1

Sao Tome and Principe

2017

56.3

Central African Republic

2008

56.2

Eswatini

2016

54.6

Colombia

2020

54.2

Mozambique

2014

54.0

Brazil

2019

53.4

Source Author’s construction based on data from World Bank (2020b) Notes This table is based on the available data on the WB databank.

WB Databank world countries Gini coefficient ranking (most equal 10) Country/Region Name

Year and Survey

Gini Value

Slovenia

2018

24.6

Czech Republic

2018

25.0

Slovak Republic

2018

25.0

Belarus

2019

25.3

Moldova

2018

25.7

United Arab Emirates

2018

26.0

Iceland

2017

26.1

Azerbaijan

2005

26.6 (continued)

Statistical Appendices

159

(continued) Country/Region Name

Year and Survey

Gini Value

Ukraine

2019

26.6

Belgium

2018

27.2

Source Author’s construction based on data from World Bank (2020b) Notes This table is based on the available data on the WB databank

Appendix G: Regional Organisations Regional Organisations in Europe Institution (abbreviation)

Year established

Member states

Issue-areas covered Notes

Benelux Union

1944

Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg

Multi-purpose (starting with economy)

Council of Europe (CoE)

1949

Albania, Andorra, Democracy, human Armenia, Austria, rights Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom (continued)

160

Statistical Appendices

(continued) Institution (abbreviation)

Year established

Member states

Issue-areas covered Notes

The International 1950 Commission on Civil Status (ICCS)

Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey

International cooperation in civil status matters

Nordic Council

1952

Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Faroe Islands, Greenland, Aland

Multi-purpose

European Union (EU)

1952 (European Coal and Steel Community); 1958 (European Economic Community); 1994 (EU)

Austria, Belgium, Multi-purpose Bulgaria, Croatia, (starting with Cyprus, Czech economy) Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden

European Free Trade Association (EFTA)

1960

Iceland, Trade Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland

Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission (HELCOM)

1974

European Union, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, Sweden

Environment

Nordic Investment Bank

1975

Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania

Economy, finance

(continued)

Statistical Appendices

161

(continued) Institution (abbreviation)

Year established

Member states

Assembly of European Regions (AER)

1985

Albania, Austria, Multi-purpose Armenia, Belgium, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom

West Nordic Council

1985

Faroe Islands, Greenland, Iceland

European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT)

1986

Austria, Belgium, Security, Bulgaria, Croatia, Environment Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom

Central European Initiative (CEI)

1989

Albania, Hungary, Romania, Belarus*, Italy, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Slovenia, Croatia, North Macedonia, Ukraine, Czech Republic, Poland

Issue-areas covered Notes

Multi-purpose

Multi-purpose

Belarus suspended

(continued)

162

Statistical Appendices

(continued) Institution (abbreviation)

Year established

Member states

Visegrad Group

1991

Czech Republic, Multi-purpose Hungary, Poland and Slovakia

Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS)

1992

Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia*, Sweden

Multi-purpose

Organisation for Joint Armament Co-operation (OCCAR)

1996

Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom

Security

European 2002 Intergovernmental Research Organisation forum (EIROforum)

Issue-areas covered Notes

Russia suspended

CERN, European Research, Fusion Development development Agreement (EFDA JET), European Molecular Biology Laboratory (EMBL), European Space Agency (ESA), European Southern Observatory (ESO), European Synchrotron Radiation Facility (ESRF), European x-ray free electron laser (European XFEL), Institute Laue–Langevin (ILL)

Northern Dimension Partnership in Public Health and Social Well-being

2003

Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Russia*

Society, Health

Energy Community

2005

EU, Albania, Bosnia Energy, and Herzegovina, Environment Kosovo*, North Macedonia, Georgia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, Ukraine

Russia suspended

(continued)

Statistical Appendices

163

(continued) Institution (abbreviation)

Year established

Member states

Eureka

1985

EU, Argentina, Research, Canada, Chile, South development Africa, Singapore, South Korea, UK

Issue-areas covered Notes

European Stability 2012 Mechanism (ESM)

Austria, Belgium, Finance Cypris, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain

Three Seas Initiative

Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia

2015

Multi-purpose

Regional Organisations in Asia Institution (abbreviation) Year established Member states

Issue-areas covered

1965

Education, science, culture

Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization (SEAMAO)

Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Vietnam

(continued)

164

Statistical Appendices

(continued) Institution (abbreviation) Year established Member states Asian Development Bank (ADB)

1966

Issue-areas covered

Afghanistan, Armenia, Multi-purpose Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, Cook Islands, Denmark, Micronesia, Fiji, Finland, France Georgia, Germany, Hong Kong (China), India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niue, Norway, Pakistan, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Portugal, China, Philippines, South Korea, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Taipei (China), Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Turkmenistan, Turkey, Tuvalu, UK, US, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Vietnam,

Association of Southeast 1967 Asian Nations (ASEAN)

Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam

Multi-purpose

South Asian Association 1985 for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)

Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka

Multi-purpose

(continued)

Statistical Appendices

165

(continued) Institution (abbreviation) Year established Member states

Issue-areas covered

Asia–Pacific Network for Global Change Research (APN)

1990

Australia, Bangladesh, Research, sustainable Bhutan, Cambodia, development China, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, US, Vietnam

Northeast Asian Subregional Program of Environmental Cooperation (NEASPEC)

1993

China, Japan, Mongolia, Environment, North Korea, Russia, sustainable development South Korea

ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

1994

Australia, Bangladesh, Politics, security Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, China, EU, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Zealand, North Korea, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, US, Vietnam

Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)

1996

ASEAN, Australia, Bangladesh, China, EU, India, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Switzerland

Multi-purpose

Asia–Pacific Forum (APF)

1996

Australia, Afghanistan, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, New Zealand, Palestine, Philippines, South Korea, Samoa, Sri Lanka, Qatar, Thailand, Timor-Leste

Human rights

Mekong River Commission

1995

Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam

Water resource management, sustainable development (continued)

166

Statistical Appendices

(continued) Institution (abbreviation) Year established Member states

Issue-areas covered

Bay of Bengal Initiative 1997 for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC)

Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Thailand

Multi-purpose

International Bamboo and Rattan Organisation

1997

Argentina, Bangladesh, Environment, Benin, Bhutan, Brazil, sustainable development Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Congo Republic, Cuba, Ecuador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Uganda, Venezuela, Vietnam

Partnerships in Environmental Management for the Seas of East Asia (PEMSEA)

1999

Cambodia, China, North Marine environmental Korea, Indonesia, Japan, management Laos, Philippines, South Korea, Singapore, Timor-Leste, Vietnam

Mekong-Ganga Cooperation

2000

India, Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos Vietnam

Tourism, culture, education, transportation (continued)

Statistical Appendices

167

(continued) Institution (abbreviation) Year established Member states

Issue-areas covered

Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD)

2002

Afghanistan, Bahrain, Multi-purpose Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, South Korea, Kuwait, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, UAE, Uzbekistan, Vietnam

East Asia Summit (EAS) (ASEAN plus 8)

2005

Australia, Brunei, Multi-purpose Cambodia, China, Indonesia, India, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, US Vietnam

ASEAN Intergovernmental onference on Human Rights (AICHR)

2009

Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam

Human rights

ASEAN Plus Three (APT)

1999

ASEAN, China, Japan, South Korea

Multi-purpose

Trilateral Cooperation Secretaria (TCS)

2011

China, Japan, South Korea

Peace, prosperity

Regional organisations in the Americas

168

Statistical Appendices

Institution (abbreviation)

Year established

Member states

Issue areas covered Notes

Organization of American States (OAS)

1948

Antigua and Multi-purpose Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, US, Uruguay, Venezuela

The Caribbean Community (CARICOM)

1973 (successor to the Caribbean Free Trade Association CARIFTA 1965)

Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago

Trade

(continued)

Statistical Appendices

169

(continued) Institution (abbreviation)

Year established

Member states

Latin American Economic System (SELA)

1975

Argentina, Trade Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela

Latin American Integration Association (LAIA)

1980 (replaced the 1960 Latin American Free Trade Association LAFTA)

Argentina, Bolivia, Trade Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela

Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)

1981

Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines

Multi-purpose

Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB)

1983

Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines

Economy

Common Market of the South (Mercosur)

1991

Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela*, Bolivia*, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Surinam

Multi-purpose

Issue areas covered Notes

Venezuela, Bolivia in process of accession

(continued)

170

Statistical Appendices

(continued) Institution (abbreviation)

Year established

Member states

Central American Integration System (SICA)

1991 (reformed 1962 Organization of Central American States ODECA)

Belize, Costa Rica, Multi-purpose Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama,

Central American Parliament (PARLACEN)

1991

Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, Panama

Association of Caribbean States (ACS)

1994

Antigua and Multi-purpose Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela

Andean Community (CAN)

1996 (renamed from the 1969 Andean Pact)

Bolivia, Colombia, Multi-purpose Ecuador, Peru

Issue areas covered Notes

Multi-purpose

Bolivarian Alliance for 2004 the Peoples of Our America—People’s Trade Treaty (ALBA-TCP)

Antigua and Multi-purpose Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Nicaragua, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Venezuela

Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)

Bolivia, Guyana, Suriname, Venezuela

2008

Multi-purpose

Originally 12 member states, continuous decline of membership (continued)

Statistical Appendices

171

(continued) Institution (abbreviation)

Year established

Member states

Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC)

2011 (succeeded to the 1986 Rio Group and the Summit of Latin America and the Caribbean on Integration and Development CALC)

Antigua and Multi-purpose Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Granada, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela

Pacific Alliance

2011

Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru

Multi-purpose

Canada, Mexico, US

Trade

United 2020 (replaced the States-Mexico-Canada 1994 North Agreement (USMCA) American Free Trade Agreement NAFTA)

Issue areas covered Notes

Regional organisations in Africa Institution (abbreviation) Year established

Member states

Issue-areas covered

Southern African Customs Union (SACU)

1910

Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa

Trade

Conseil de l’Entente

1959

Côte d’Ivoire, Niger, Burkina Faso, Benin, Togo

Multi-purpose

(continued)

172

Statistical Appendices

(continued) Institution (abbreviation) Year established

Member states

Issue-areas covered

African Development Bank (AfDB)

1964

Algeria, Angola, Economy, Argentina, Austria, sustainable Belgium, Benin, development Botswana, Brazil, Bukina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Canada, Chad, China, Comoros, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Denmark, Djibouti, DR Congo, Egpyt, Eritrea, Equatorial Guinea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Korea, South Sudan, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, UAE, Uganda, UK, US, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

1975

Benin, Burkina Faso, Multi-purpose Cape Verde, Cote (starting with d’Ivoire, Gambia, economy) Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo (continued)

Statistical Appendices

173

(continued) Institution (abbreviation) Year established

Member states

Economic Community 1983 of Central African States (ECCAS)

Angola, Burundi, Multi-purpose Cameroon, Central (starting with African Republic, economy) Chad, Congo Republic, DR Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe

Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)

1989

Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia

Multi-purpose

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

1996 (superseded the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development) (IGADD 1986)

Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda

Multi-purpose

Southern African Development Community (SADC)

1992

Angola, Botswana, Multi-purpose Comoros, DR Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Issue-areas covered

Economic and Monetary 1994 Community of Central African States (CEMAC)

Cameroon, Congo Republic, Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial guinea, Gabon

Trade, finance, economic integration

West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA)

1994

Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Guinea-Bissau

Economic

Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)

1994

Burundi, Comoros, DR Trade, Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, investment Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe (continued)

174

Statistical Appendices

(continued) Institution (abbreviation) Year established

Member states

Issue-areas covered

East African Community 2000 (EAC)

Burundi, DR Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania

Multi-purpose

International Conference 2000 on the Great Lakes Region

Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo Republic, DR Congo, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Republic of South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia

Security, development, democracy

African Union

Algeria, Angola, Benin, Multi-purpose Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, DR Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Saharawi Republic, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe

2002 (successor to the Organisation of African Unity) (OAU 1963–1999)

(continued)

Statistical Appendices

175

(continued) Institution (abbreviation) Year established

Member states

The African Ministers’ Council on Water (AMCOW)

Algeria, Angola, Benin, Water resource Burkina Faso, Burundi, management Botswana, Djibouti, DR Congo, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Republic, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, São Tomé and Príncipe, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe

2002

Issue-areas covered

Regional organisations in MENA Institution (abbreviation)

Year established

Member states

League of Arab States (Arab League, LAS)

1945

Algeria, Bahrain, Multi-purpose Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria*, Tunisia, UAE, Yemen

Issue-areas covered

Notes Syria suspended

(continued)

176

Statistical Appendices

(continued) Institution (abbreviation)

Year established

Member states

Issue-areas covered

Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC)

1968

Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, UAE

Economy, petroleum management

Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)

1969

Afghanistan, Multi-purpose Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Palestinian, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Tajikistan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, UAE, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Yemen

Gulf Cooperation 1981 Council (GCC)

Bahrain, Kuwait, Multi-purpose Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE

Notes

Sources Börzel and Risse (2016), Karns and Mingst (2015), and Wikipedia (2022)

Statistical Appendices

177

Transcontinental regional organisations Institution (abbreviation)

Year established

Member states

Issue-areas covered

Notes

Eurasia Economic 1985 (successor to Cooperation the 1964 Regional Organization (ECO) Cooperation for Development RCD)

Afghanistan, Economy Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikstan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

1991

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Multi-purpose Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkimenistan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine

Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)

1992

Albania, Armenia, Multi-purpose Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, North Macedonia, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine

Intergovernmental Commission (IGC TRACECA)

1993

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Economy, trade, Bulgaria, Georgia, transportation Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Romania, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan

Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (GUAM)

1997

Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine

Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC)

1997

Afghanistan, Economy, trade, Azerbaijan, China, infrastructure Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, Tajikstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan

Multi-purpose

(continued)

178

Statistical Appendices

(continued) Institution (abbreviation)

Year established

Member states

onference on Interaction and Condidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA)

1999

Afghanistan, Security, peace Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Russia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, UAE, Uzbekistan, Vietnam

Issue-areas covered

Shanghai 2001 Cooperation Organization (SCO)

India, Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan

Multi-purpose

Collective Security 2002 (successor to Treaty Organization the 1992 Unified (CSTO) Armed Forces)

Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan

Security

Eurasian Group on Comating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG)

2003

Belarus, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, India, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan

Finance, security

Eurasian Development Bank (EDB)

2006

Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan

Economy

Organization of Turkic States (Turkic Council)

2009

Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, Uzbekistan

Security, regional integration

Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)

2015

Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia

Trade

Notes

Trans-Atlantic (continued)

Statistical Appendices

179

(continued) Institution (abbreviation)

Year established

1949 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Member states

Issue-areas covered

Notes

Belgium, Canada, Security Denmark, France, (defense) Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, United States, Greece, Turkey, Germany, Spain, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Albania, Croatia, Montenegro, North Macedonia

Group of Seven (G7)

1975 (formerly Canada, France, known as the Group Germany, Italy, of Eight G8 1998) Japan, UK, US, EU

Multi-purpose

Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS)

1986

Security, democracy

Angola, Argentina, Benin, Brazil, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo Repubic, Cote d’Ivoire, DR Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Namibia, Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Togo, Uruguay

Russia suspended in 2014 due to annexation of Crimea

(continued)

180

Statistical Appendices

(continued) Institution (abbreviation)

Year established

Member states

Issue-areas covered

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

1990 (successor to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) (CSCE 1975)

Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, UK, US, Uzbekistan

Security (collective), democracy

EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)

2017

EU, Canada

Trade

Notes

The agreement enters into force provisionally

Mediterranean (continued)

Statistical Appendices

181

(continued) Institution (abbreviation)

Year established

Member states

Issue-areas covered

Notes

Union of Mediterranean (UfM)

2008

Albania, Algeria, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Mauritania, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, Palestine, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Syria*, Tunisia, Turkey

Multi-purpose

Syria suspended

1984

Comoros, France, Multi-purpose Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles

India Ocean India Ocean Comission (IOC)

Indian Ocean Rim 1997 Association (IORA)

Australia, Bangladesh, Comoros, French, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Seychelles, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, UAE, Yemen

Multi-purpose

Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, US

Sustainable development, Environment

Arctic Ocean Arctic Council

1996

Pacific Ocean (continued)

182

Statistical Appendices

(continued) Institution (abbreviation)

Year established

Member states

Issue-areas covered

Pacific Community

1947

American Samoa, Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, France, French Polynesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Northern Mariana Islands, Papua New Guinea, Pitcairn Islands, Samoa, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, UK, US, Vanuatu, Wallis and Futuna

Environment, sustainable development, science and technique

Colombo Plan (CP)

1951

Afghanistan. Australia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Chile, Fiji, India, Iran, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, US, Vietnam

Economy, society

Notes

(continued)

Statistical Appendices

183

(continued) Institution (abbreviation)

Year established

Member states

Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS)

1975

Angola, Antigua and Multi-purpose Barbuda, Belize, Cape Verde, Comoros, Bahamas, Barbados, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Republic, DR Congo, Cook Islands, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Micronesia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Solomon Islands, Samoa, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia,South Africa, Sudan, Suriname, Tanzania, Timor Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG)

1986

Fiji, Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front of New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu,

Issue-areas covered

Notes

Decolonization, economy

(continued)

184

Statistical Appendices

(continued) Institution (abbreviation)

Year established

Member states

Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)

1989

Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong (China), Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Taipei (China), Thailand, US, Vietnam

Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP)

1993

American Samoa, Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, France, French Polynesia, Guam, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, UK, US, Vanuatu, Wallis and Futuna

Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)

1999 (renamed from the 1971 South Pacific Forum SPF)

Australia, Cook Multi-purpose Islands, Micronesia, Fiji, French Polynesia, Kiribati, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu

Issue-areas covered

Notes

Environment, sustainable development

Afro-Asian (continued)

Statistical Appendices

185

(continued) Institution (abbreviation)

Year established

Member states

Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization (AALCO)

1956

Egypt, Bahrain, International law Bangladesh, Brunei, Cameroon, Cyprus, Gambia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, North Korea, Oman, Pakistan, China, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Palestine, Philippines, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam, Yemen

1960

Belize, Colombia, Economy, Costa Rica, Cuba, finance Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, South Korea, Spain, Taiwan (China)

Issue-areas covered

Notes

Transcontinental Central American Regional Economic Integration (CABEI)

Sources Author’s construction based on Börzel and Risse (2016), Karns and Mingst (2015), and Wikipedia (2022)

References Börzel, T. and Risse T. (2016) The Oxford handbook of comparative regionalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Karns, M.P., and Mingst, A.K. (2015) International Organizations: The politics and processes of global governance. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Thorp, R. (1999) Progress, poverty, and exclusion: An economic history of Latin America in the twentieth century (Baltimore, MA: Inter-American Development Bank Publications).

186

Statistical Appendices

UNDP. (2020) Human Development Report 2020. Available at: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/ files/hdr2020.pdf (Accessed: 24 January 2022). UNDP and OPHI. (2021) Global Multidimensional Poverty Index 2021 [Online]. Available at: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2021_mpi_report_en.pdf (Accessed: 3 February 2022). Wikipedia. ‘List of intergovernmental organizations’. (2022) Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/List_of_intergovernmental_organizations (Accessed: 15 May 2022). World Bank. (2020a) GDP growth (annual %) (NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG) [Online]. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2020&start=2010 (Accessed: 23 January 2022). World Bank. (2020b) Gini index (World Bank estimate) (SI.POV.GINI).Available at: https://data. worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?most_recent_value_desc=false (Accessed: 25 January 2022).