Global Security Watch--Egypt: a Reference Handbook : A Reference Handbook 9781567207569, 9780275994822

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GLOBAL SECURITY WATCH

EGYPT

Praeger Security International Advisory Board

Board Cochairs Loch K. Johnson, Regents Professor of Public and International Affairs, School of Public and International Affairs, University of Georgia (U.S.A.) Paul Wilkinson, Professor of International Relations and Chairman of the Advisory Board, Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St. Andrews (U.K.) Members Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies (U.S.A.) The´re`se Delpech, Director of Strategic Affairs, Atomic Energy Commission, and Senior Research Fellow, CERI (Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques), Paris (France) Sir Michael Howard, former Chichele Professor of the History of War and Regis Professor of Modern History, Oxford University, and Robert A. Lovett Professor of Military and Naval History, Yale University (U.K.) Lieutenant General Claudia J. Kennedy, USA (Ret.), former Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army (U.S.A.) Paul M. Kennedy, J. Richardson Dilworth Professor of History and Director, International Security Studies, Yale University (U.S.A.) Robert J. O’Neill, former Chichele Professor of the History of War, All Souls College, Oxford University (Australia) Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland (U.S.A.) Fareed Zakaria, Editor, Newsweek International (U.S.A.)

GLOBAL SECURITY WATCH

EGYPT A Reference Handbook Denis J. Sullivan and Kimberly Jones

PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL

Westport, Connecticut

•

London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Sullivan, Denis Joseph. Global security watch—Egypt : a reference handbook / Denis J. Sullivan and Kimberly Jones. p. cm. — (Global security watch, ISSN 1938–6168) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978–0–275–99482–2 (alk. paper) 1. Egypt—Politics and government—1981- 2. National security—Egypt. I. Jones, Kimberly, 1967- II. Title. DT107.87.S85 2008 355’.033062—dc22 2008009954 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright  2008 by Denis J. Sullivan and Kimberly Jones All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2008009954 ISBN-13: 978–0–275–99482–2 ISSN: 1938–6168 First published in 2008 Praeger Security International, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.greenwood.com Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

To Marie Lorraine Secrest Sullivan, mother and champion and To Christopher and Prof. D.J. Simpson

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Contents Chapter 1: Security in Egypt: Setting the Stage

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Chapter 2: Securing the State

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Chapter 3: Internal Insecurity: Mainstream Muslim Brothers and Marginalized Militant Movements

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Chapter 4: Egypt and the United States: Strategic Partners?

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Chapter 5: Egypt’s Key Regional Relations and Its Position in the Global Community

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Chapter 6: Egypt, the Divided State

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Appendix A: Biographies

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Appendix B: Chronology

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Appendix C: Documents

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Glossary

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Bibliography

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Index

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CHAPTER

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Security in Egypt: Setting the Stage

Following President Sadat’s death in 1981, President Muhammad Hosni Mubarak assumed office. Since then, he has sought to bring about internal stability, improve and firmly establish democratic practice, the rule of law and help realize social peace and national unity. Mubarak’s main concern centers on achieving comprehensive development.1 —Egyptian State Information Service, 2005 My country is a great country, old civilization, the cradle of one of the greatest set of attainments in mankind. But despite its greatness as a country, as a society, as a culture, it has a terrible political regime, and we are trying to change the regime or to make it more democratic. And the regime is resisting and, as I said, eliminating anyone who is too loud-voiced or who is credible enough to be listened to. And it is a struggle, like struggle in other third world countries between the forces of democracy and the forces of autocracy and the forces of theocracy. We have a three-way struggle in our country. We, as democrats, are fighting both the autocrats and the theocrats. And in that fight, it is—we sometimes feel lonely, as if we are crying in the wilderness, because, unfortunately, countries like the United States and some other Western powers have been supporting the autocrats for the sake of stability.2 —Egyptian human rights activist, Saad Eddin Ibrahim, October 2007

Discussions of Egyptian history likely evoke images of pyramids and mummies, King Tut and other Pharaohs, Alexander the Great, Antony and Cleopatra—all important attributes of Egypt’s 7,000-year civilization. More relevant for understanding the development of contemporary issues of state security and strategic

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challenges, however, are Napoleon Bonaparte’s invasion of Egypt in 1798; Muhammad Ali’s nineteenth-century ‘‘modernization’’ efforts; engineering projects such as the Suez Canal and the Aswan High Dam; manifestations of British colonialism and their legacy; Egypt’s relations with regional neighbors, particularly Israel and the Sudan; as well as the evolution and enduring relevance of the Muslim Brotherhood. Also key are the domestic, regional, and international roles played by Egypt’s three seminal, twentieth-century leaders: Gamal Abdel-Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak. Early in the twenty-first century, despite the appearance of political and military stability, Egypt may, in fact, be standing at the edge of a governance precipice as the state remains grounded in rigid (rigor-mortis-like) authoritarianism, while the population, including a struggling civil society, readies itself to make the leap to democratization. This dichotomy has far-reaching implications for relations between citizens and the government as well as Egypt’s foreign-affairs posture, particularly in the Middle East. State repression of civil, political, and religious actors, the ineffectual provision of social services, and two religious divides, between Coptic Christianity and Islam on the one hand, and secular and conservative Islamic traditions on the other, make for an incendiary domestic environment. This continued overreliance on security services to quash dissent could result in a population more amenable to less democratic methods of regime change and/or the development of stronger linkages between regional Islamist groups, whether they be political, militant, or some combination thereof. This chapter sets the historical and political stage on which Egypt’s contemporary strategic, security, and military issues are played out. Like any good story, this one starts at the beginning, with the state’s precolonial history, moving quickly to colonial and postcolonial years, including the rise of Nasser, the reign of Sadat, and the rule of Mubarak. From there, the chapter moves into an exploration of Egypt’s political structure and conditions, concluding with a brief assessment of regime stability. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND Precolonial History

Egypt is one of the oldest continuously existing civilizations, and some even call it the first ‘‘nation-state’’ as Upper and Lower Egypt were unified around 3100 BCE (before the common era). While Egypt’s own Pharaohs were supreme in the Old Kingdom (2686–2181 BCE), the Middle Kingdom (c. 2040–1782 BCE), and the New Kingdom (1570–1070 BCE), foreign occupiers also ruled for centuries—‘‘Libyans’’ (945 BCE), Kushites (or ‘‘Sudanese,’’ 748 BCE), Assyrians (667–663 BCE), and Persians (525 BCE). Perhaps the most famous foreign occupier was Alexander the Great, who founded ‘‘his city,’’ Alexandria, in 332–331 BCE. Alexander and his Ptolemaic successors ruled Egypt until Cleopatra’s death

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in 30 BCE. Her passing ended the long reign of the Pharaohs (Cleopatra was the last Pharaoh) and led to Rome’s assertion of complete control over Egypt. In 384 CE (common era), Rome ordered the closing of Egypt’s pagan temples and imposed its form of Christianity on the population. When the Roman Empire split, Egypt gravitated into the sphere of the Byzantine Empire, based in Constantinople (present-day Istanbul). The Arabs brought Islam to Egypt in 639 CE, precipitating the end of the ‘‘Roman-Byzantine’’ era in 642 CE. The Arabs did not immediately impose Islam on the Egyptians; rather, they began the slow process of transforming Egypt into both an Arab and a Muslim state, even as Christianity and Judaism continued to flourish.3 Egypt’s Islamic history is also replete with outside conquerors—Salah el-Din (Saladin), a Sunni Kurd, was sent to rule Egypt in 1169 on behalf of the Fatimids a Shi’i dynasty. Instead of ruling in their name, he returned Egypt to its Sunni path, promoted education, and allowed Egypt to regain its centrality in Muslim civilization. He also defended Egypt and Jerusalem against the Crusaders, a feat the Fatimids could never accomplish. His Ayyubid Dynasty (1171–1250), based in Egypt, controlled Palestine, Syria, and finally Iraq. The Mamluks succeeded their Ayyubid ‘‘owners’’; they ruled Egypt from 1250– 1516. They were a foreign (i.e., non-Egyptian) ethnic and linguistic group, primarily Turks, Kurds, Circassians, and Greeks, who were initially slaves of Ayyubid rulers, brought to Egypt to help rule it. Although the Mamluks were defeated by Ottoman forces in January 1517, the Ottomans brought them back to help administer Egypt. This Ottoman-Mamluk rule lasted until 1798 when Napoleon Bonaparte marched into Egypt as the newest conqueror. Through the combined efforts of the Ottomans and the British, Napoleon’s reign lasted only until 1801. The primary leader of the Ottoman-British move was Muhammad Ali Pasha, who was technically ‘‘second in command’’ but stayed in Egypt after French and British troops left; by 1805, Egypt was in some anarchy, with Mamluks fighting one another and resisting Ottoman authority. Muhammad Ali Pasha established both order and a dynasty. He died in 1848, and his family ruled Egypt until 1952 when Gamal Abdel-Nasser led the coup against King Farouk and the British occupation. As Muhammad Ali and his successors modernized and/or ‘‘Westernized’’ Egypt, they brought the country into a ‘‘tricky’’ relationship with the West: they sought to emulate the West and the modern military it boasted while they asserted Egypt’s independence and, at the same time, allegiance to the Ottoman Sultan. Colonial Era

Egyptian leaders sought to learn much from the West (military, scientific, and economic techniques, as well as many cultural norms), yet they wanted to retain

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much of their own culture and certainly their political, if not economic, independence. Muhammad Ali’s successors granted numerous economic concessions to Western powers, e.g., in railroads (built between 1851 and 1856 by the British) and especially the building of the Suez Canal (in 1854, to Ferdinand de Lesseps, a French diplomat and engineer). While Great Britain initially opposed construction of the Suez Canal (which opened in 1869), it became the largest shareholder in 1875—buying the shares of Egypt’s Khedive (‘‘Viceroy’’) Ismail Pasha. The Suez concession was in effect a time bomb as Egypt grew financially dependent on the British and the French; ensuring the protection of the Canal became one of Britain’s primary concerns when it invaded and occupied Egypt in 1882 (see below); maintaining control of that same Canal would be its rationale behind another invasion in 1956. The Egyptian public was increasingly fed up with its government’s complex relationship with both the Ottoman Sultan and the West, and Egyptian army officers took the lead in demanding independence for Egypt. The troops were led by Ahmad ‘Urabi, appointed minister of war in 1882. ‘Urabi actually worked to quell riots that broke out in Alexandria in 1882, yet the Khedive called upon Britain and France to protect Egypt (i.e., the Khedive’s throne) from the increasingly popular Ahmed ‘Urabi. The French wanted nothing to do with this, but the British played along; ‘Urabi attempted to resist the British invasion, and his ‘‘revolt’’ was supported by several sheikhs of Al-Azhar University and especially by the mufti (Islamic jurist) of Egypt, Muhammad Abduh—a leading Islamist reformer who sought political independence for Egypt, as well as education improvements and scientific advancement within the context of a reformist Islam. Britain was then welcomed by the Khedive to occupy his country, and neither would stand for the powerful combination of Al-Azhar University and the Egyptian army joining forces in calls to end dependence on Europe. Egypt’s Reformist Islamic Movement: Al-Afghani, Abduh, Rida, and al-Banna

Coinciding with, and in response to, all of the machinations of colonial powers—Ottoman, British, and French, in particular—Egypt was also home to one of the most significant popular and intellectual movements in Islamic history: the reformist movement of the late nineteenth century, led by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–1897). The modern-day Muslim Brotherhood (established in 1928 and still dominant in the twenty-first century) is the culminating expression of views formed in the mid-nineteenth century under al-Afghani. Most scholars believe al-Afghani was born in Iran; al-Afghani claimed he was born near Kabul, Afghanistan. All agree he was educated in Iran (Tehran) and Iraq (Karbala and Najaf ), in various centers of Shi’i learning. In 1855–1856, he traveled to India, witnessed the egregiously discriminatory nature of British

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colonial rule, and saw the threat to Islam (and Hinduism) that Western colonialism brought to the peoples of India and beyond. He called for Muslim solidarity against Western imperial-colonial rule; still, his words and works influenced nationalist (as well as Islamist) movements in Egypt, Turkey, and Iran. He advocated for the rule of law and constitution government as the best responses to the dominant monarchies and autocracies, and their colonial masters. Al-Afghani came to Egypt to teach in 1871; he brought a message of ‘‘thisworldly Islam’’ and called upon Muslims there to embrace Islam as the religion of ‘‘reason and science—a dynamic, progressive, creative force capable of responding to the demands of modernity.’’4 He also sought to create his pan-Islamic ‘umma (Islamic community, if not ‘‘nation’’), free from imperialcolonial rule. His teachings led to a confrontation with the Khedive Ismail, who was later deposed by the Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II. Ismail’s successor, Khedive Tawfiq, sent al-Afghani into exile, and the latter went to London (by way of India) and Paris. Al-Afghani’s principal disciples were Egypt’s Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905) and Syria’s Rashid Rida (1865–1935), both of whom had a considerable impact on the development of Muslim political thought in Egypt. All three of these Islamist thinkers and activists have an enduring legacy on Islamism in contemporary Egypt. Al-Afghani’s most influential work was a collaboration with Abduh, a revolutionary journal called al-‘Urwat al-Wuthqa (The Firmest Bond). It championed pan-Islamism (or, Islamism, in common parlance) and influenced secular nationalists, including ‘Urabi and his revolt of 1882. Muhammad Abduh was a leading force inside Egypt’s nationalist and anticolonial movement. He was, after all, a leading member of the ‘ulama (Islam’s scholarly elite), a reformer within al-Azhar University, and the mufti of Egypt (the chief judge of the shari’a courts). He helped mold public opinion by way of editing Egypt’s official public record, or gazette. His support for the ‘Urabi Revolt (1882) led to his exile from Egypt until 1888. Abduh’s goal for Egyptians as for all Muslims was revival: ‘‘spiritual, scientific, educational, legal, political, linguistic, and other. Strengthening Islamic societies’ moral roots could not be done by a return to the past.’’5 Rather, Muslims must accept ‘‘change’’ and adapt the principles of Islam to that change. Abduh’s disciple, Rashid Rida, was much more of a traditionalist. Rida published al-Manar magazine from 1898 until his death in 1935; he led the conservative Salafiyya movement, which was the primary force opposing secularism and nationalism in the 1920s and the 1930s. Hassan al-Banna, born in rural Mahmudiyya (northwest of Cairo) who later became a secondary school teacher in Ismailiya, was greatly influenced by Rida and the Salafiyya movement when he founded al-Ikhwaan al-Muslimuun (the Society of Muslim Brothers, or the Muslim Brotherhood) in 1928. While al-Banna endorsed the secular nationalists in their shared goal—ridding Egypt of the British—he parted company with

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them by calling for the establishment of shari’a (Islamic law) and an Islamic government. The history of the Brotherhood, and al-Banna, are discussed in great detail in Chapter 4. British Occupation and Colonization

Britain’s occupation of Egypt in July 1882 lasted until 1954 (with its last gasp of colonialism being the 1956 Suez War). Throughout that time, Britain faced continuous resistance to its occupation; yet, it maintained control over the government, the finances, the foreign policy, and the military of Egypt throughout. Popular resistance to Britain grew, especially after 1928 with the birth of the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as more secular opposition movements in Egypt— including the Wafd Party. The Wafd was formed as a political party after World War I, when a delegation (wafd) from Egypt went to the Paris Peace Conference (1919) to demand complete independence from Britain. Saad Zaghlul (who participated in the 1882 revolt) led the wafd (delegation)—and so would lead the Wafd (party). While Zaghlul was arrested, released, and exiled several times, the British took notice. In 1922, Britain unilaterally ended its ‘‘protectorate’’ status over Egypt, and Egypt’s ‘‘independence’’ was declared; a constitution was adopted in 1923. The Wafd rejected this so-called independence, as Britain reserved complete control over certain areas; Zaghlul was allowed to go back to Egypt, and he became Egypt’s prime minister in 1924. Egypt’s struggle for full independence plus the Wafd’s struggle to maintain its own independence from the monarchy and the British continued during the 1920s through the 1940s. Ultimately, the Wafd split and other parties emerged—including fascist ones such as Misr al-Fatat. Meanwhile, the Muslim Brotherhood maintained strong support throughout. In World War II, Britain took control of all Egyptian military facilities, even though Egypt proclaimed neutrality in the war. While the government had to support Britain in the war, most Egyptians did not. Britain ignored constitutional principles and installed its own candidate as prime minister. Seeking to rebuild popular trust in British control, the British imposed the Wafdist leader Mustafa Nahhas. But this merely discredited the Wafd rather than ‘‘crediting’’ Britain. After World War II, a new political force emerged in the form of the Free Officers Movement, made up of Muhammad Neguib (a figurehead), Gamal Abdel-Nasser (the real leader), Anwar Sadat (with close ties to the Muslim Brothers), and other officers. With the Arabs’ defeat in Palestine after Israel declared independence in May 1948, and Egypt in the forefront of that disaster, both the Free Officers and the Muslim Brothers gained more popularity as well as ‘‘ammunition’’ against the corrupt, ineffective government of King Farouk. Yet, Britain remained in control of Egypt. Still, resistance against the British grew, and in January 1952, rioting broke out in Cairo. On ‘‘Black Saturday,’’

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January 26, British and other foreign-owned shops, bars, nightclubs, and hotels were burned down. Several months later, on the evening of July 22, the Free Officers took over key areas of government, primarily the king’s palace at Abdin plus radio and other communications facilities. Egyptians woke up on July 23 to the news that a bloodless coup had occurred, and on July 26, King Farouk abdicated his throne. The House that Nasser Built: 1952–Present

The Free Officers repealed the constitution and banned all political parties after 1952. In June 1953, the monarchy was formally ended and a ‘‘republic’’ was declared. While General Muhammad Neguib was the titular head of the ‘‘revolution,’’ Gamal Abdel-Nasser was the real power behind the Free Officers Movement. He officially became prime minister in 1954 (at which point General Neguib was completely removed from power). Nasser quickly renegotiated the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and formally ended Britain’s occupation of Egypt; however, an important clause allowed Britain to use the canal base in times of war. Still, Nasser was hailed as the man who saw the peaceful removal of Great Britain from Egypt. Wooed by the United States and the Soviet Union, Nasser asserted a position of nonalignment. (Nasser’s nonalignment was more strongly asserted after the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] attempted to buy his cooperation, apparently with $3 million in cash, which Nasser used instead to build his Burg al-Qahira, or Cairo Tower, in Zamalek.) The United States sought to bring Egypt into the Baghdad Pact of 1955; Nasser was interested in the arms the United States could provide, but not the terms—alignment with it against the Soviet Union. Nasser instead signed an arms deal with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. The United States then tried to secure a close relationship with Nasser and Egypt on economic matters and promised to finance (along with Britain and the World Bank) the construction of the Aswan High Dam, a project dear to Nasser and his political legitimacy by way of economic development objectives. While he initially balked at accepting this offer, Nasser eventually agreed to the financially restrictive terms set by the United States, but he had waited too long; his anti-Israel rhetoric and his growing ties with the Soviet Union led Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to rescind the offer in July 1956. Incensed, Nasser announced on July 26 that he would nationalize the Suez Canal to finance the construction of the dam and would accept the Soviet Union’s offer to construct the dam (although the Soviets probably did not make such an offer until after Nasser announced this). Britain was outraged (to put it mildly) at Nasser’s nationalizing ‘‘its canal.’’ Prime Minister Anthony Eden worked publicly with France (and both colluded secretly with Israel) to retake the canal—although their real aim was to overthrow Nasser. The United States (at the direction of President Dwight D. Eisenhower

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and Secretary Dulles) worked feverishly to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis and thought it had British and French agreement—until the October 29–31 invasion by Israel, Britain, and France. The United States intervened, forcing the three to end their invasion and Britain’s reoccupation of Egypt. This is one of the greatest cases of ‘‘unintended consequences’’ of the twentieth century as Nasser became a larger-than-life Arab hero and eminent ‘‘nonaligned’’ leader throughout the world. Nasser’s success at nationalizing (and retaining Egyptian government control over) the Suez Canal encouraged more of the same. After July 1961, Nasser adopted a program of rapid industrialization—to be financed by nationalizing banks, factories, stores, and public utilities. Earlier, in the 1950s, he instituted a sweeping program of land reform and wealth redistribution—aimed against the ancien re´gime and upper classes. His ‘‘Arab socialism’’ (or, as some call it, ‘‘state capitalism’’), as well as his arrogating unto himself the mantle of Arab unity and anticolonialism, not only made him a hero among Arab masses across the Middle East, but it also put him on a path of ‘‘hot war’’ with Israel and ‘‘cold war’’ with fellow Arab leaders, especially in Saudi Arabia. Nasser’s subsequent humiliating defeat at the hands of Israel in the Six-Day War of June 1967 brought him down to size, if not flat on his back. He resigned at the climax of that war, yet popular protests (either orchestrated by the government or a genuine expression of popular support, or both) brought him back to his seat as president. Yet, he was never the same. His economy failed after 1967; his political stature was greatly diminished in Egypt and much of the Arab world. He died of a heart attack in September 1970, having just secured a ceasefire agreement between King Hussein of Jordan and Yasser Arafat of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to end their bloody confrontation in Jordan known as Black September. Anwar Sadat: From Yes-Man to Autocrat and Peacemaker, 1970–1981

Anwar Sadat, Nasser’s vice president, assumed the presidency upon Nasser’s death. Sadat was considered a transitional figure, as the CIA had little respect for him and Nasser’s close friends dismissed him as ‘‘Sayid Na’m Na’m,’’ or Nasser’s ‘‘Yes-Man.’’ By May 1971, Sadat consolidated power by dismissing those pro-Nasser opponents (claiming there was a coup being planned against him) and announcing a ‘‘Corrective Revolution.’’ Sadat crucially received the backing of the armed forces in this ‘‘revolution.’’ Having few other supporters, Sadat embarked on a risky path of encouraging Islamist thinkers and leaders, as well as students on university campuses, in hopes of building a constituency that was markedly distinct from that of Nasser. Sadat encouraged the development of Islamic student associations to offset the still-dominant pro-Nasser (‘‘leftist’’) student movement. Sadat also brokered an

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agreement with the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood who agreed (1) to reject violence against the government and indeed against civilians and (2) to play within the rules set by Sadat if the group’s members wanted a share of political power in Egypt. Abroad, Sadat sent signals to Washington of a desire to reestablish ties severed during the 1967 war and a willingness to negotiate with Israel on the principle of ‘‘land for peace.’’ His strongest signal came in July 1972 when he expelled 15,000 Soviet military advisers from Egypt, but he received an insignificant response from the United States. Sadat told Newsweek, ‘‘Every door I have opened has been slammed in my face by Israel—with American blessings. The Americans have left us no way out.’’6 Sadat stated this as motivation for his decision to go to war in 1973, along with Syria, in a surprise attack on Israeli troops occupying Egyptian and Syrian lands. Sadat’s goals were the return of the Sinai and the reopening of the Suez Canal; but having received little from the United States in response to his earlier overtures, he engaged in war not out of expectation that he could defeat Israel but more to re-engage the United States in Middle East diplomacy. Sadat found a receptive audience in Henry Kissinger, then Secretary of State, who immediately re-engaged with Egypt (and Syria) through his ‘‘shuttle diplomacy’’ among Egypt, Syria, and Israel. Sadat had no strong commitments to any particular ‘‘ideology.’’ He was a pragmatist rather than an ideologue, and so he could engage in war in order to make peace with Israel more likely. He did, however, attempt to create an image of himself as ‘‘the Believer President,’’ not out of true religious duty but to develop his own constituency and to sideline those still dedicated to Nasser. Through his policy of infitah (economic opening), Sadat promoted an image of himself as pro-capitalist—but not because he was. Indeed, Sadat maintained the Nasserist policies of state control over the economy. Sadat envisioned Arab capital (especially petrodollars from Saudi Arabia) combined with Western technology (especially all he could get from the United States) as the way to promote fiscal development in an economy that had long been stagnant because of Nasser’s policies and Sadat’s own inability to change them fundamentally, as well as the seemingly impossible task of tackling the demographic time bomb of Egypt’s high birthrate. Sadat made peace with Israel for similarly pragmatic reasons. He negotiated at Camp David in 1978 and signed the peace treaty itself in 1979. However, when he was assassinated in October 1981, much of the world assumed it was because of his making a separate peace with Israel. In reality, Egyptians know that it was more due to his increasingly autocratic policies at home—including his last great dictatorial acts in 1981 (just weeks before his murder) when he censored the press and arrested thousands of critics and opponents of his regime. Khalid Islambouli, the brother of one of those arrested, was an army lieutenant involved in the plot to assassinate Sadat during the October 6 parade marking

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Sadat’s great ‘‘victory’’ over Israel in 1973. Islambouli, who was connected with the Egyptian Islamic Jihad movement, shouted, ‘‘I have killed Pharaoh,’’7 after he assassinated Sadat. Mubarak and the Unimaginable Reign (Twenty-Six Years and Counting)

Hosni Mubarak, whom Sadat appointed as vice president in 1975, sat next to the president on the parade grounds when the latter was assassinated on October 6, 1981. As per the 1971 constitution, Mubarak assumed the presidency and (as of mid-2008) has been entrenched there ever since. While initially claiming he would honor the constitution, Mubarak has instead perverted the constitution to further his own power through a series of amendments packaged as democratization measures. Thus, Mubarak has the best of both worlds: he claims to seek both constitutional reform (through amendments) and democracy, yet he flagrantly ignores the rule of law and that very constitution whenever he sees fit. For all of his years in office, from 1981–2007, in particular, Mubarak has maintained the Emergency Law (which effectively suspends the constitution he pretends to uphold) in order to crush his political opposition and secure his longevity in power. Mubarak came to prominence as the air force chief of staff and then the air chief marshal, and thus the primary strategist of the 1973 war against Israel. If Nasser is considered a ‘‘socialist,’’ and Sadat loosely considered a ‘‘capitalist,’’ there is no easy label for Mubarak. Like Sadat, he tolerates Islamists (if they are pro-regime), yet like Nasser as well as Sadat, Mubarak is quick to imprison serious opposition, Islamist and secular alike. Upon assuming power, Mubarak maintained close ties to the United States, especially in relation to economic and military aid upon which Egypt is dependent. Mubarak finalized the conditions of Egypt’s peace with Israel, which caused Israel’s complete withdrawal from the Sinai in 1982. He also strengthened state control over the economy (ostensibly to promote efficiency and to maintain the social security safety net or social contract established by Nasser) and vowed to curb corruption that became rampant under Sadat. In the early twenty-first century, he loosened those controls, and Egypt’s economy grew significantly (e.g., more than 4 percent per year for several years). President Mubarak reestablished Egypt’s relations with Arab states, which had officially banned Egypt from the Arab League and other venues in the wake of the Camp David Accords. He also supported Saddam Hussein’s war against Iran from 1980 to 1988, thus facilitating his country’s ‘‘return to the Arab fold.’’8 All the while, Mubarak has maintained Egypt’s peace with Israel, which most consider a ‘‘cold peace’’—no hostilities, but very little enthusiasm coming from Cairo for the relationship. Yet, at the same time, Mubarak remains a strong advocate of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and a final peace agreement; he regularly

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has hosted Israeli, American, Palestinian, Jordanian, and other international leaders in Egypt (at Taba and Sharm el-Sheikh especially). Indeed, Mubarak was one of Yasser Arafat’s strongest allies until Arafat’s death in 2004.9 In 2002, Mubarak began promoting his second son, Gamal, as a leader within the governing National Democratic Party (NDP), an ironic name given the lack of plurality in the political system. While father and son spent 2002 through 2007 denying the speculation, most people in Egypt as well as observant analysts abroad believe the president has been grooming his son to succeed him. The fact that President Mubarak has never named a vice president (and thus an ‘‘official’’ heir apparent) for his entire career (1981 and beyond) has merely fueled this speculation. Additionally, Gamal’s appointment as assistant secretary-general of the NDP in 2006 positions him to quickly move into a successor role should his father not finish his ‘‘Nth’’ term in office. GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS—STRUCTURES AND CONDITIONS Government Structure

The Arab Republic of Egypt is, nominally, a democratic system; in reality it is authoritarian and has been in its current form since Nasser established the regime in 1952. The Republic has 26 governorates (districts), each with its own governor—all appointed by the president. There are three branches of national government—the executive, the legislative, and the judicial—although the latter two are not fully empowered. The executive branch is led by the president of the Republic who, until 2005, was not directly elected by the people; instead, a candidate had been nominated by a 2/3 vote of parliament and ‘‘endorsed’’ in a popular referendum. Given that all parliaments since 1952 have been controlled by the president’s political party (currently, the NDP), there was no chance for an opposition candidate to get nominated by parliament. In 2005, Mubarak theoretically paved the way for increased public participation, creating the constitutional space for the country’s first multiparty presidential elections. In practice, however, the rules for nomination proved nearly impossible to surmount as the government mandated that only officially approved parties could field presidential aspirants. Mubarak announced the electoral changes in February 2005. Just a few months later, in early May, Egypt’s parliament (dominated by the NDP) approved an amendment to article 76 of the constitution, legalizing the participation of multiple candidates in presidential elections. On May 25 a public referendum was held on the amendment and was a matter of dispute. 10 Voters apparently turned out in small numbers: estimates ranged from 15 to 20 percent by nongovernmental analysts, while the government estimated more than 50 percent. Regardless of the degree of participation, the amendment was approved.

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Parliament then enacted Law No. 174 ‘‘On Regulating the Presidential Elections,’’ which came into force in July 2005. The law, which then reflected article 76, states the following: Article (2): For an applicant to be accepted as a candidate to presidency, he shall be supported by at least 250 elected members of the People’s Assembly, the Shura Council, and local popular councils on governorate level, provided that those shall include at least 65 members of the People’s Assembly, 25 of the Shura Council and ten of every local council in at least 14 governorates. The number of members of the People’s Assembly, the Shura Council and local popular councils on governorate level supporting candidature shall be raised in pro-rata to any increase in the number of any of these councils. In all cases, support may not be given to more than one candidate. Article (3): Political parties, founded at least five years before the starting date of candidature and have been operating uninterruptedly for this period, and whose members have obtained at least 5% of the elected members of both the People’s Assembly and the Shura Council, may nominate for presidency a member of their respective upper board, according to their own by-laws, provided he has been a member of such board for at least one consecutive year. Article (4): As an exception to the provisions of Article 3 hereof, any political party may nominate for the first presidential elections [held in 2005], to be conducted following the enactment of this Article, a member of its higher board, established before May 10, 2005 according to its by-law.

The law thus places enormous obstacles in the path of future opposition candidates for president requiring candidates to garner 250 signatures from elected officials in parliament or other ‘‘elected’’ bodies in Egypt, all controlled by Mubarak’s ruling NDP. The law also only allowed opposition parties with at least 5 percent of the seats in parliament to run their own candidate; however, a 2007 amendment changed this requirement to 3 percent. This change still effectively limits the challenge to the NDP. In terms of other executive-level officers, the president chooses a vice president (who likely will be the president’s successor if the president is killed or incapacitated; this is how Sadat succeeded Nasser and how Mubarak succeeded Sadat). In the past, such candidates came from the military establishment (army or air force primarily).11 As noted previously, Mubarak (since becoming president in 1981) has not named a vice president. The president also appoints a prime minister, who is the head of government, as well as a cabinet and council of ministers; he even appoints all governors (there are 26 governorates in Egypt), as well as university presidents. Egypt has a bicameral legislature comprised of the Majlis al-Sha’b (People’s Assembly) with 454 seats: 444 are elected by popular vote, and 10 are appointed

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by the president; members serve five-year terms; and the Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Assembly or Shura Council) with 264 seats: 176 are elected by popular vote, and 88 are appointed by the president; members serve six-year terms. The 26 governorates are divided into 222 electoral districts, with the smallest having 2 and the largest having 25 (Cairo). The judicial branch is led by the Supreme Constitutional Court, empowered, as the name suggests, to hear constitutional cases; it is an independent court. Other courts, starting at the top of the judicial ladder, include the Court of Cassation, seven High Courts of Appeal in the governorates, Tribunals of First Instance, and Summary Tribunals in the districts. Egypt also has state military or security courts from which there is little meaningful appeal. These exceptional courts allow the Government of Egypt to avoid pesky matters of civil liberties and enables it to prosecute any opponents it deems fit, including human rights and democracy activists, Islamist as well as secular political opponents, homosexual men, and feminists. Historically, the judicial branch has a degree of independence from both the legislative and executive branches. Courts issued rulings that made the executive branch change policies or laws and even overturned elections (as in 1987 and 1990). However, in 2005, the judicial scrutiny of the 2005 electoral processes resulted in accusations of government fraud and misconduct. This, in turn, led to Egyptian executive level government retaliation as two senior judges were called before a disciplinary tribunal.12 In early 2007, as proposals to further amend the Egyptian Constitution advanced (and ultimately passed), a leading Cairo paper reported, In the wake of 2005’s presidential and parliamentary polls, conducted under full judicial supervision, judges who exposed cases of rigging have been subjected to punitive measures in what is seen as a vindictive campaign by state officials. Realizing that tactic will not work, argue reformist judges, the government has now decided to curtail the role of judges in supervising the vote, hence the proposal to amend Article 88 of the constitution.13

Egyptian law is based on civil law and Islamic law, shari’a. Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution states, ‘‘Islam is the religion of the state and Arabic its official language. Principles of Islamic law (Shari’a) are the principal source of legislation.’’14 Political Conditions

Elections were held in 2005 for both the president and parliament (Majlis al-Sha’b). International attention accordingly focused on Egypt’s purported legal movements toward democratization, the above-noted theoretical allowance for more competition through multiple candidates in presidential elections. At the same time the Egyptian government engaged in a series of ‘‘nose-thumbing’’

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exercises violating international democratic norms and laws. These include the arrest and detention of a presidential candidate, Ayman Nour; the attacks on, and detention of, political demonstrators; as well as the roundups of hundreds of so-called Islamists. Opposition movements and groups, particularly Kifaya (‘‘Enough’’) and the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as respected human rights commentators such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) critiqued the laws and the conduct of the elections. The system is set up such that political parties are regulated by a governmentcontrolled Political Parties Committee that can deny parties the right to register and operate openly. This Committee regularly asserts this power, especially against leftist and Islamist parties. In early 2007, Human Rights Watch stated, ‘‘The government has for decades used the political parties law to fix elections before they begin. . .Egypt needs a new political parties law that respects Egyptians’ rights to form political parties and to vote for whomever they choose.’’15 Additionally, until the 2000 elections, there was no independent monitoring of polls, campaigns, and party activities. Other election laws work to permit the government to assure greater or lesser majorities—e.g., by choosing singlemember district voting procedures over proportional representation system, the government assures it can ‘‘get out the vote’’ to its overwhelming advantage through its vast patronage system, control of security forces, and control of the airwaves and other media. At the time of the 2005 elections, there were approximately under two dozen ‘‘recognized’’ political parties. In addition to the NDP, the primary opposition parties include the New Wafd Party, the National Progressive Unionist Party (NPUP) or Tagammu, the Nasserist Arab Democratic Party or Nasserists, the Socialist Labour Party (for years in alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood), the Liberal Party or al-Ahrar, the Party of Tomorrow or al-Ghad, and the Green Party of Egypt. The other smaller parties include Democratic Unionists, Misr al-Fatat (‘‘Young Egypt,’’ a revival of the prerevolution party), the Social Justice Party, the Democratic People’s Party, the Umma Party (Islamic community), Al-Takaful (Solidarity), and the Egypt Arab Socialist Party. On election day, furthermore, police are usually out in large numbers, and there is considerable intimidation of voters, especially in areas considered Islamist strongholds; police even rely on hired thugs to help them coerce and harm voters. During parliamentary elections in 1995, some accounts say that police intimidation resulted in as many as 87 people being killed and 1,500 injured on election day; in 2000, 10 were reportedly killed and around 60 injured.16 The lack of electoral legitimacy is difficult to measure due to the complexities of expressing political allegiance in Egypt. The elections of 2000 are a case in point. Public displeasure with the Mubarak regime was high leading up to those elections; internal political problems within the ruling party also had surfaced.

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The ruling party chose old-guard candidates to run in mostly safe districts, and this caused younger generation candidates to run as independents. The result was while the NDP won 388 seats (around 85 percent of the 444 elected to parliament), only 175 of those 388 were the ‘‘official’’ (usually old-guard) candidates. The other 213 ran as ‘‘independents’’ and then rejoined the NDP after they won; thus, voters expressed their frustration and elected a majority of nonNDP candidates (the 213 independents plus another 54 true independents or other opposition party members). The other 54 included 17 Muslim Brothers (the largest bloc of any opposition group), even though the Brotherhood is an outlawed organization. Notably, the 17 ran as independents, but Egypt being what it is, everyone knew they were Muslim Brotherhood candidates. The September 2005 election was a seminal one in Egyptian political history. Allegations of fraud and low voter turnout marred the first contested presidential election there. Moreover, Ayman Nour of the secular liberal al-Ghad Party, an opposition candidate, was arrested, held, released, and detained again. He was subsequently tried and sentenced (mere weeks after the December parliamentary election in which he also ran, while allegations hung over him during polling) on charges widely believed to be trumped up to discredit his candidacy. Thus, as expected, Mubarak claimed his fifth six-year term with 88.6 percent of the vote in a field of ten contenders. Nour finished second with 7.5 percent of the vote; Nu’man Gomaa, leader of Egypt’s original liberal party, the Wafd, was third with less than 3 percent. When the results were in, Nour stated, ‘‘The results have no relation to reality. . .We won’t give legitimacy to something that is illegitimate.’’17 Nour requested another polling, which was rejected by the Presidential Election Commission (PEC). Notably, after initially denying domestic Egyptian nongovernmental organizations poll access to engage in electoral monitoring, the PEC announced civil society observers would indeed be permitted on election day.18 There had been considerable international pressure, coupled with the significant domestic demands, for such electoral monitoring. The Independent Committee for Electoral Monitoring (ICEM), a coalition of Egyptian civil society organizations, said a key problem it faced in its task was the lack of clear voting procedures and a division of responsibility between polling agents, monitors, and supervising judges. In a report the ICEM faulted the government for not allowing final vote count monitors and stated, ‘‘The electoral process remains vulnerable and easily manipulated by the very same stakeholders of the election outcome.’’19 Voter turnout was very low: only 23 percent of 32 million registered voters cast their ballots (7.3 million voters translates into 10 percent of Egypt’s overall population of around 74 million people). Still, 23 percent is larger than previous presidential elections in the 1980s and the 1990s, when turnout was estimated to be around 15 percent.

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Just two months later, the 2005 parliamentary elections (People’s Assembly) began and were conducted in three rounds. The first round began on November 9, stage two on November 20, and the third and final round on December 1. Electoral turnout was low, and all three phases were marred by varying degrees of fraud and violence. The Egyptian Association for the Support of Democratic Development (EASD), which had 159 monitors covering 23 districts in the first round of the elections, reported incidents of NDP supporters intimidating voters. In other areas, the EASD said there were widespread allegations of vote buying.20 The Independent Committee for Election Monitoring said violations included ballot stuffing, inaccurate lists of registered voters, and intimidation.21 Sherif Mansour of the independent Ibn Khaldun Centre for Development Studies (renowned activist Saad Eddin Ibrahim’s organization) said, ‘‘The situation is getting worse and worse, and the operation is deteriorating in many spots; we have a lot of examples of interference in favor of the NDP.’’22 Regarding the second round, Judge Yehya Al-Rifai noted, ‘‘This phase will be more tense than the first round. The government will try to interfere with the polling process in a bid to prevent the surge of the Muslim Brotherhood . . .There is more fraud than the judges can cope with.’’23 An independent Muslim Brotherhood candidate said, ‘‘What is happening today is beyond imagination. Which other country uses drugged-up thugs to beat up the sons of the nation? They are ready to use their knives to prevent citizens from voting.’’24 Beyond the election’s notoriety for the negative aspects, positive steps were also taken as diverse elements of civil society coalesced to challenge the NDP’s reign. Opposition groups joined to form the United National Front for Change (aka National Front for Political and Constitutional Change) in October 2005, seeking to find electoral and organizational strength in numbers. The coalition encompassed ten groups, including Kifaya, the Nasserist Party, the liberal Wafd, the Marxist Tagammu Party, and the Muslim Brotherhood. Notably absent was the Ghad Party, led by Ayman Nour, Mubarak’s primary opponent in the presidential election. At the election’s conclusion, 311 seats went to the ruling NDP, 112 to independent candidates, including 88 seats to the Muslim Brotherhood, 6 seats to the liberal Wafd Party, 2 seats to the leftist Tagammu, and 1 seat to Ayman Nour’s new al-Ghad Party. The opposition Muslim Brotherhood’s win of 88 seats represented a fivefold increase over its percentage of seats in the outgoing parliament (the Brotherhood won 17 seats in the 2000 elections). Human rights groups from New York to London to Cairo condemned state electoral conduct. Yet, despite their efforts to the contrary, the NDP’s hold was loosened somewhat. Although barely 25 percent of parliament is beyond NDP control, it is unlikely their losses will be taken lightly or that major concessions will take place. Just a couple months after the parliamentary elections, President Mubarak postponed local council elections, scheduled for April 2006, for two years.

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The official reason was to allow sufficient time for constitutional devolution. Most Egyptians and external observers, however, understood the so-called postponement to be a reaction to the electoral successes of the Muslim Brotherhood and a fear of having it repeat or improve upon its record at the local level, or in a governmental worst-case scenario, set itself up for a presidential challenge in 2011. Although this last point may indeed be a concern, given the Brotherhood’s lack of legal status as a party, and the government’s ability to manipulate the electoral laws (and their implementation) to its liking, it is difficult to imagine to imagine Mubarak (or some members of the international community) allowing such a scenario to play out. In June 2007, things did not look much better for Egypt’s upper house of parliament as elections for the Shura Council were held with 88 seats at issue, 11 of them uncontested. A leading newspaper reported the following: Not that the results were ever in doubt: with most major opposition parties boycotting the poll and a massive clampdown on the Muslim Brotherhood both before and during the vote, the results are a foregone conclusion. Official NDP candidate or independent NDP candidate? In most constituencies that was the only question to be answered, except, of course, in those constituencies where two official NDP candidates were running against each other.25

INTERNAL INSECURITY AND THE ISLAMIST CHALLENGE

Egypt is home to approximately 77 million people and at least 90 percent are Muslim, with the remainder primarily Coptic Christian. Nearly all of the 70 million Muslims are Sunni; most estimates place Shi’a at under 1 percent of the total population. While the Egyptian government does not officially recognize the Shi’a as a religious sect in Egypt, Al-Azhar acknowledges it as a legitimate branch of Islam, permitting Muslims to follow or convert to it, since the early 1960s, and they teach Jaafari (Shi’a) jurisprudence Islam is far from a monolithic movement in Egypt (or elsewhere). Egypt’s approximately 70 million Sunni Muslims find a variety of philosophies, theologies, and partisan groups from which to choose as they express their political and religious beliefs. However, the Government of Egypt often fails to make a distinction between the various groups that are politically active (i.e., Islamists) but that also compete against their Islamist colleagues for the hearts, minds, and membership of the Egyptian religious opposition. Instead, the government tends to lump together anyone known as an Islamist into one category—a threatening opponent of the regime—and deals with the variety of opposition in a similar, harsh manner. In doing so, it exacerbates a conflict between Islam and the state and in the past (during 1990–1997 especially) fueled a cycle of violence, even to the point of drawing in otherwise nonviolent opposition groups, both secular and Islamist.

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Foremost among the nonviolent opposition groups is the Muslim Brotherhood. Established in 1928, it is the longest-standing and the most popular political movement in Egypt; while there are Muslim Brothers throughout society, including in the army and in government agencies, the Brotherhood officially acts in opposition to the government. However, it is not allowed to openly compete for political power, due to the government’s proscription of the organization. Instead, the Brotherhood has formed unofficial but very real alliances with established parties, including the Wafd (from 1984–1987) and the Labour Socialists (since 1987). Another party that is not officially recognized is the Wasat (Center) that has tried (without success) since 1996 to receive government approval to operate openly and run in elections. The party was formed when several reformists within the Brotherhood split off after years of frustration with the powerful yet (then) stagnant Islamist movement. Generally, Egypt’s main opposition (parties and movements) is all over the ideological spectrum—secularist left: Tagammu/NPUP and Nasserists, ‘‘Islamist left’’: Labour (with Muslim Brotherhood), secularist right: Wafd and al-Ahrar (Liberals), and center: Wasat and al-Ghad. Within the Islamist trend, one can distinguish between the ‘‘good ones’’ (i.e., nonviolent Islamists), including the Wasat and Labour-Muslim Brotherhood alliance, as well as looking at the Brotherhood by itself, regardless of party connections with Labour; and the ‘‘bad ones’’ (i.e., militant Islamists), including Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Group. The distinction between ‘‘good’’ and ‘‘bad’’ Islamists comes down to the question of tactics primarily, where violence is rejected or accepted as the main distinguishing factor. Beyond that, both groups seek an Islamic state, although even on this goal there is much disagreement (including within the Brotherhood itself, where some seek not an Islamic ‘‘state,’’ but a reformed Islamic ‘‘society,’’ and wish to stay out of politics). In seeking to quell the voices of moderate Islam, the Egyptian government, in effect, creates a space for Islamists who are conservative in belief and radical in action. Further, through actively repressing segments of the population, engaging in a range of human rights violations, and tolerating corruption, the government undermines its own legitimacy and fosters feelings of anger, resentment, and humiliation among a population that already lacks basic social services, job prospects, quality housing, transportation, education, and health care. While the promise of democracy looms large for much of the population, the expectation of disappointment probably looms larger. Egypt faced a serious problem with terrorism in the 1990s due in large part to the fact that there was an actual ‘‘cycle’’ of violence. Whether terrorists struck first (as they did in October 1990, when they assassinated Egyptian Prime Minister Rifaat al-Mahgoub) or responded to government crackdowns on them, their organization, and/or their recruiting grounds (as when the government carried out raids at Cairo University, rounding up or killing scores of ‘‘suspected’’

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terrorists), the fact remained that quid led to quo. This continued in the 1990s until the outrageous terrorist attack in Luxor when militants killed 58 tourists at the Queen Hatshepsut temple. Until that attack, the majority of Egypt remained fairly neutral, not really affected by (or even interested in) what most saw as a political war between the state and a minority of Islamists. Indeed, Luxor marked a turning of the tide in public sympathy for the government and related controls and attacks on Islamists. The Egyptian populous was horrified by violence and was concerned about the impact the attack would have on the tourism industry and thus the livelihoods of tens of thousands. In short, thereafter, the public ‘‘gave no quarter’’ to Islamists and, Egyptian society being what it is, with secret police and public security a matter for anyone who cares to participate, Islamists found themselves in a losing battle, having lost the ‘‘hearts and minds’’ argument with the Egyptian people. Consequently, after 1997, terrorism came to a quick halt; the state, however, maintained its repressive approach—through human rights abuses in practice (torture, detentions, and so forth), as well as law and policy—through restrictions on a variety of civil liberties. Early in the twenty-first century, after a seven-year lull, Egypt was again the site of violent attacks, although the Islamist credentials of some of the perpetrators were questioned. In October 2004, bombs exploded near the Israeli border outside the Taba Hilton Hotel, killing nearly three dozen. In April 2005, an attack on a popular Cairo shopping area killed three in addition to the attacker. Later that month, a nail bomb exploded near a Cairo museum, injuring seven. A short while thereafter, that attacker’s sister and fiance´e opened fire on a tourist bus in another part of Cairo. In July 2005, car bombs exploded in the popular tourist destination of Sharm el-Sheikh, killing scores and wounding hundreds. In April 2006, more than 20 were killed and more than 60 were injured in bombings at the Red Sea resort town of Dahab. Security crackdowns, mass detentions, and allegations of torture at the hands of security forces ensued. Yet, it is these very same policies and state actions that promoted terrorism, or at least served as a recruitment tool, throughout the 1990s. They also are the major factors in the short-lived terror campaign that led to Anwar Sadat’s assassination in 1981 and the subsequent (and failed) efforts to foment a revolution in the days immediately following that event. The assassination in 1981 was much like the 1997 slaughter—so outrageous that the Egyptian public, even if sympathizing with Islamists’ disdain or hatred of the government and its repressive policies, turned against the Islamists for the tactics they employed, rather than embracing them for the goals they sought to achieve. If the Government of Egypt continues its repressive policies without relief, if civil society and the international community’s calls for more open political processes and institutions go unheeded, if education and health care remain appallingly poor, and if Islamists of various ‘‘stripes’’ (militant as well as nonmilitant;

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political as well as apolitical) remain the primary target of government repression, then indeed, Islamist militants might easily decide to reinvigorate their efforts to topple or otherwise harm the government. If the Islamists choose their targets carefully—avoiding civilians, ignoring tourists, and generally keeping the Egyptian public out of the fight—then the public might also refrain from helping the government in its efforts to uncover or track down militants . . .unless the militants once again engage in such outrageous, inhumane, and intolerable acts that the public again finds itself the victim more than the state. ROLE AND INFLUENCE OF THE MILITARY

While Egypt is not a military dictatorship in technical terms (since the president is officially a civilian now), it is a military-backed authoritarian system; Mubarak rules with the support of the military (he is a former air force officer) as well as the security services. And Mubarak (like Sadat and Nasser before him) can always count on these security services when he needs them—for example, whenever there is an election for parliament (1995, 2000, and 2005), the security forces round up scores—and sometimes hundreds if not thousands—of Muslim Brothers (and other regime opponents) who are candidates for office and their supporters. Egypt’s military courts are used by the government for swift justice. The president of the Republic can refer suspects to the military courts for any crime. The authority of military courts to try civilians has been supported by Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court. Under military courts, civilian defendants have no due process. While military judges are lawyers, they are also military officers appointed by the Minister of Defense and subject to military discipline. Verdicts issued by military courts cannot be appealed through normal channels. Instead, verdicts may be subject to a procedural review by a military appeals court and confirmation by the president. Still, the regime frequently ignores the courts when it can—e.g., the Ministry of Interior continues to exercise sweeping powers of arrest and detention of dissidents and frequently ignores court decisions. And, of course, there is the continuing reliance on Emergency Law regime (initiated with Law No. 162 of 1958) in effect without interruption since 1981 and renewed in April 2006 for an additional two years. The Emergency Law allows the government to simply ignore the rule of law, the courts, judicial review, and other areas where it would have to negotiate with (or subject itself to monitoring by) the two other branches of government. Notably, the 2007 amendments (to article 179) effectively constitutionalized this legal regime, overriding other rights therein such as article 44 (protection of home from unwarranted search), article 45 (privacy and security of communications), and article 41 (freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention). (See Appendix C for excerpts from the Egyptian Constitution.)

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Egypt’s military has appeared less prominent in recent years than it had been from 1952 through the 1980s. Yet, it remains the backbone of the state: it is the ultimate power behind the throne and would be called upon if the regime feels threatened; the last time that happened was in 1986 when the army was called in to put down a rebellion by Central Security conscripts. If militant Islamists ever got to such a point, the military would act again if it believed the regime (its support and its power base) was in danger; yet, there is no sense that the Mubarak administration is anything but secure (even if not very popular). In the current debates (which began to emerge in 2001–2002 and remain active as of the winter of 2008) about Gamal Mubarak as a possible successor to his father, there is much buzz about the military feeling snubbed by President Mubarak. ‘‘Heirs’’ to the presidency always have come from the military, and the military continues to want Mubarak to name a vice president from its ranks. His actions, or his failure to act, will result in a power struggle, which necessarily would bring the military and a presumed heir apparent (Gamal or another designee) into negotiations, if not actual political arm-twisting behind the scenes. CONCLUSION

Egypt’s history, whether calculated over 7,000 years or even just the past 200 years, has been one of strongmen (Pharaohs, emperors, colonial overlords, and military men) as well as popular movements for change (anticolonial, pro-reform, nationalist, pro-democracy, Islamist, feminist, and so on). That dichotomy will continue to play itself out in the streets of Cairo and a few other major cities, and far less so in the rest of the country. Just as Egypt has been one of the most significant ‘‘centers’’ for all of the movements extant in the Arab World, it will continue to play a central role in the ongoing struggle for popular participation in political life, even as its elites hold fast to their (and their predecessors’) traditions of denying the popular will to be fully expressed. In terms of regime stability, Mubarak—like Sadat and Nasser—is in little to no danger of being overthrown. His government, like theirs, is ‘‘stable’’ and relatively secure in power. Mubarak relies on three primary vehicles to promote his government’s stability: the military, the secret police (mukhabarat), and the ruling party. These three pillars of the regime—with Emergency Law as their constant companion—can thwart any opposition and silence any dissent that they choose. Mubarak is not a dictator to the same degree as the former leaders of Iraq (Saddam Hussein) or Syria (Hafez al-Asad); however, he perpetuates authoritarian rule with few effective limitations to his power. Change is unlikely to occur from within his regime, and it cannot really occur from outside Egypt (for example, the United States). Mubarak has historically divided and conquered by manipulating and controlling the number of political opposition parties that can be active, crushing any that become too vigorous, and otherwise controlling

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all public institutions (parliament, the military, universities, and the media) that might be used to challenge the government. Mubarak continues to use the tools of both confrontation (repression, use of military tribunals, and so forth) and co-optation (promoting a limited ‘‘Islamization’’ within the system) using the language of political reform. Despite the state’s political stronghold, in 2005, civil society made giant strides forward buoyed by the government’s false democratic promise. The result is that there is no going back, at least not without significant costs to the regime. These ‘‘democratic’’ concessions may have been an attempt to salvage the legacy of an 80-year-old president or an attempt at popular appeasement. Either way, the public has a taste for positive political change, and it will not easily be satisfied. NOTES 1. Egyptian State Information Service, ‘‘Modern Egypt,’’ 2005, http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/ History/Modern/080700000000000001.htm. 2. ‘‘Egyptian Human Rights Activist Saad Eddin Ibrahim Defies Threats, Arrests to Challenge U.S.–Backed Mubarak Government,’’ Democracy Now, October 10, 2007, http:// www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=07/10/10/1414240&mode=thread&tid=25. 3. Judaism flourished until the mid-twentieth century. In the early years of the twenty-first century, the Jews of Egypt numbered less than 100 persons in Alexandria and less still in Cairo. 4. John L. Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 127. 5. Denis J. Sullivan and Sana Abed-Kotob, Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society vs. the State (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 9. 6. Quoted in Cheryl A. Rubenberg, Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 157. 7. John Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 90. 8. In terms of ethnic population dominance, Iran is a Persian state, formerly known as Persia (until 1935), while Egypt as previously noted is an ethnically Arab state. 9. Until his death, Arafat was the chair of the PLO and president of the Palestinian National Authority. 10. See Egyptian State Information Service, ‘‘Political Reform in Egypt,’’ http:// constitution.sis.gov.eg/en/4.htm. 11. See article 139 of the Egyptian Constitution: ‘‘The President of the Republic may appoint one or more vice-presidents define their mandates and relieve them of their posts. The rules relating to the calling into account of the President of the Republic shall be applicable to the vice-presidents,’’ http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Politics/Constitution/Text/ 040703000000000001.htm. 12. Heba Saleh, ‘‘Top Egypt Judges Face Poll Rebuke, BBCNews,’’ BBC News, April 18, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4919884.stm. 13. Mona El-Nahhas, ‘‘Judges Call for Monitors,’’ Al-Ahram Weekly On-Line, January 25–31, 2007, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/829/eg6.htm. 14. Egyptian Constitution, http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Politics/Constitution/Text/ 040703000000000001.htm.

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15. Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Egypt: Political Parties Law Stifles Opposition,’’ January 4, 2007, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/01/04/egypt14958.htm. 16. Michael Collins Dunn, ‘‘Egypt’s Parliamentary Elections: An Assessment of the Results,’’ The Estimate, November 17, 2000, http://www.theestimate.com/public/ 111700.html. 17. Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), ‘‘Egypt: Focus on Presidential Elections,’’ September 12, 2005, http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=25468. 18. EOHR, ‘‘The 2005 Presidential Election: a Critical Analysis,’’ 2005, http:// www.eohr.org/report/2005/re0910.shtml. 19. Independent Committee for Election Monitoring, ‘‘Preliminary Report on Election Day Voting and Counting,’’ September 8, 2005, available at Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies, http://www.eicds.org/english/activities/news/preliminaryreport05.htm. 20. IRIN, ‘‘Egypt: Parliamentary Runoffs Marred by Reports of Violations,’’ November 17, 2005, http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=50191&SelectRegion=Middle _East&SelectCountry=EGYPT. 21. IRIN, ‘‘Egypt: European Parliament Reports Violations in Parliamentary Race,’’ November 14, 2005, http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=50084&SelectRegion =Middle_East&SelectCountry=EGYPT. 22. Quoted at the official Muslim Brotherhood Web site, ‘‘Egypt’s Islamists Claim More Seats,’’ November 22, 2005, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/Home.asp?zPage=Systems &System=PressR&Press=Show&Lang=E&ID=2083. 23. ‘‘Egypt Polls Claim First Victim,’’ Dawn: The Internet Edition, November 21, 2005, http://www.dawn.com/2005/11/21/int2.htm. 24. Ibid. 25. Karim el-Khashab, ‘‘A One Horse Race,’’ Al-Ahram Weekly On-Line, June 14–20, 2007, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/849/eg4.htm.

CHAPTER

2

Securing the State

Brothers and sisters, Egypt’s national security is my first responsibility. It is the defence of Egypt’s land and sovereignty and the independence of its will and preserving its stability and the security of its citizens.. . .Brothers and sisters, Egypt’s national security is part and parcel of the Arab security system. It is related to the security of the Gulf region, the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. It has to do with the security of water in its relation to the security of the African Horn and the African Great Lakes region, where there are the Nile sources and the countries of the basin. It is related to the security of energy and the diversification of its sources and securing its supplies, including strategic dimensions that are very important for Egypt’s present and future.1 —Statement of President Hosni Mubarak at the opening of the new parliamentary term November 2007 [A]mending the constitution last March in a way as to allow the security services to free their hands from the constitutional guarantees that protect the rights to freedom and security of person, prohibit breaking into and searching homes without a judicial warrant, protect the right to privacy, and prohibit surveillance of mail and tapping phone calls. In this way the new amendments entrench the foundations of the police state.2 —Coalition of Egyptian human rights organizations’ statement regarding Egypt’s candidacy for the UN Human Rights Council, May 2007

INTRODUCTION

Geopolitically situated in the rough and tumble Middle East, a region rife with other authoritarian regimes and concomitant popular discontent, Egypt has

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legitimate concerns about its international and domestic security. The Government of Egypt’s ability to defend itself against external and internal enemies results from the actions and interactions of a web of state institutions and related policies. These include a strong military, ubiquitous domestic security services, a virtually unchecked executive branch of government along with special legislative and judicial mechanisms, all set against the backdrop of the real and perceived roles they play in the governance and daily lives of Egyptians. At the international or regional level, Egypt appears to be secure in terms of its defensive capacity. It has a loyal and well-equipped military of sufficient strength to deter any realistic or foreseeable armed threats. Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, the United States (as discussed in Chapter 4) is firmly positioned in its corner. Egypt’s revived nuclear power ambitions may be benign, but they do draw attention to Israel and Iran, as well as Egypt’s regional defense posture. But Egypt has more to worry about internally. Short-sighted and repressive government policies and practices implemented against the Egyptian people are used to secure Mubarak’s tenure and that of his ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), but they negate the legitimacy of those in power. Thus, the regime endures at the expense of the republic and the population, but not without consequence. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

A bevy of traditional forces and agencies take part in securing Egypt against external threats. These include the military services: the army, the navy (including a coast guard), the air force, and the air defense command, as well as a national guard, all within the Ministry of Defense. Egypt also employs a border guard force. The armed forces are constitutionally mandated as article 180 of the Egyptian Constitution provides, ‘‘The State alone shall establish the Armed Forces which shall belong to the people. Their duty shall be to protect the country, its territorial integrity and security. No organization or group may establish military or para-military formations.’’3 Additionally, article 150 adds that the president is the commander in chief of the armed forces. Egypt is not a military dictatorship per se, as President Mubarak governs as a civilian leader. However, he and his two predecessors, Anwar Sadat and Gamal Abdel-Nasser, rose to power through and with the assistance of the military. According to Egypt’s Al-Ahram Weekly, In the wake of Nasser’s political victory in 1956 [the Suez Crisis], the Egyptian armed forces were regarded as important actors in the movement to free Egypt from imperialism, and Nasser was the champion of Arab nationalism. Nasser provided political, financial and military assistance to independence movements in Africa and Asia.. . . [By] 1966, 19 African states had gained their independence with Egyptian assistance. The Egyptian role led to the erosion of the French and British colonial presence in these countries.4

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Over the last few decades, Egypt’s military reinvented itself and became, as the saying goes, a force to be reckoned with. In 2007, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called the Egyptian military ‘‘one of the region’s most professional and effective.’’5 The development of Egypt’s modern military forces has been largely at the behest of two Cold War enemies: the Soviet Union and the United States. Significant Soviet military assistance to Egypt was ongoing for nearly two decades, beginning in 1955 with the famous ‘‘Arms for Cotton’’ agreement, in which the Soviet Union provided military equipment through Czechoslovakia, in exchange for Egyptian cotton. Nasser turned to the Soviet Bloc after his request for arms sales from the United States was rejected by American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who linked such transactions to Nasser’s joining the ‘‘Baghdad Pact’’; Nasser refused the conditions and sought a weapons deal with the Soviets. Czech and Soviet military aid escalated after the 1956 Suez Crisis (the Tripartite Invasion), when Britain, France, and Israel attacked Egypt in response to Nasser’s takeover of the Suez Canal. Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal Company after the United States, followed by Britain, reneged on their pledge to finance the construction of Nasser’s engineering dream project, a ‘‘high dam’’ at Aswan. Nasser needed hard currency—and lots of it—even if the Soviet Union came through with the actual construction itself, and Suez Canal tolls could provide much of the required funding. This ‘‘double push’’ by the United States in the 1950s—placing unacceptable conditions on military assistance and then reneging on financial aid—kept Nasser and Egypt firmly rooted in the Soviet camp through the 1960s, including during the debacle of the 1967 war, when Nasser’s policies and ambitions went up in flames. Sadat took control after Nasser’s death in 1970 and survived in power against most expectations (in Cairo, Moscow, and Washington), and he reversed a bevy of Egyptian foreign policies, quietly at first and then abruptly and publicly. Soviet influence and arrogance began to wear thin on Sadat (who was even more anti-Communist than Nasser himself ). In 1972, the Egyptian president ‘‘announced to gasps and grins that he had decided to boot Soviet ‘advisers’ out of Egypt. What was more, to the astonishment of possibly even Anwar Sadat, the Russians went. They [left via] huge Soviet jet transports that began arriving at Cairo West airbase in numbers large enough to unsettle normal air traffic over the Mediterranean.’’ 6 Then, in March 1976, President Sadat unilaterally renounced the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 1971. Egypt’s dreams of military independence, however, were short-lived as Soviet influence was soon replaced by that of the United States. However, this relationship has had significant benefits: the United States helped Egypt secure the return of the Sinai Peninsula, occupied by Israel in 1967, and, since the mid-1970s, provided at least $60 billion in military and economic assistance to Egypt (see Chapter 4). More than half of the total monies have arrived as part of the U.S. Foreign Military

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Financing program, which enables Egypt to purchase U.S. military equipment and services on its defensive equipment wish list. Acquisitions include F-16 jet fighters, M1A1 tanks, armored personnel carriers, Apache helicopters, antiaircraft missile batteries, and aerial surveillance aircraft.7 Neither the United States or the former Soviet Union has been the sole source of weapons funding or equipment, as Egypt has diversified its suppliers. For example, its missile program began in earnest in the 1960s. With West German assistance, Egypt began developing three missile systems: al-Zafar (375-km range), al-Kahir (600-km range) and al-Ra’id (1,000-km range); however, with the withdrawal of West German assistance in 1966, these programs were abandoned. In the 1980s, Egypt aligned with Iraq and Argentina in an effort to develop a short-range, solid-fueled missile known in Argentina as Condor-II and in Iraq as Badr-2000 (the internal Egyptian designation is not known publicly). In 1989, Cairo ended the cooperative relationship with Baghdad, but it is likely that domestic-based efforts continue on this missile. Egypt has been more successful in its pursuit of Scud-B and perhaps Scud-C manufacturing capabilities.8

Scud-B parts and production technology were acquired from North Korea in the 1980s and the 1990s.9 Additionally, unconfirmed reports from 2000 and 2001 claimed that Egypt purchased complete Nodong systems and missile engines from North Korea.10 Egypt also engages in domestic production, in part through the Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI), which provides a range of military equipment including aircraft, electronics, and missiles and related servicing.11 These are made available for the national defense, as well as for fellow Arab states and other customers such as China. The AOI was established in 1975 by Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. It is currently chaired by the president of Egypt and has ‘‘an independent corporate personality.’’12 The AOI owns ten factories, including the Arab British Company for Dynamic Industries, the Sakr Factory for Developed Industries (rocket development), AOI Aircraft Factory, AOI Electronics Factory, AOI Engine Factory, Arab Company for Organic Fertilizers, Atico Factory (fiberglass and wood products), Semaf Factory (rail vehicles and related products), Kader Factory (guidance systems), and the Helwan Factory for Developed Industries. The AOI is also part of two joint ventures: one is with DaimlerChrysler outside Cairo employing 680 and producing Jeep vehicles; the other is with Rolls-Royce called the Arab British Engine Company, employing nearly 500, engaged in the repair and overhaul of turboshafts and engines of helicopters, light aircrafts, as well as tanks and trains. In 1994, James A. Bill and Robert Springborg noted, ‘‘By the early 1980s, [Egypt] was the Third World’s ninth leading producer of weapons, manufacturing annually approximately $1.4 billion worth of arms. Two percent of the urban labor force (85,000 Egyptians) [in 1993] are employed in the arms industry,

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which makes Egypt the Third World’s fourth-largest employer for weapons production.’’13 In the fall of 2007, the military production sector had $3.3 billion in total investments, and it was able to meet 75 percent of its domestic requirements for medium-sized weapons and ammunition.14 Egypt’s army is the backbone of its military, comprised of 310,000 with an additional 375,000 reservists.15 One observer notes, ‘‘Like the presidency, the army has traditionally been immune from criticism in Egypt, given its ‘special status’ as the founder and protector of modern Egypt. Although that position has been weakened to some extent, the army still plays an extremely important political and economic role in Egyptian society.’’16 Its equipment includes a variety of tanks, including the U.S. M1A1 Abrams (more than 800), artillery such as the domestic Sakr, as well as antiaircraft armaments (the Stinger and others) and infantry weapons (from the Browning to the AK-47).17 Egypt’s navy pales in terms of size and influence relative to that of the army; however, upgrades have been under way. In terms of its strategic projections, ‘‘The Egyptian Navy is a two-sea force, with emphasis changing from the threat perceived as coming from Israel and Libya in the Mediterranean and Gulf of Suez to a wider role in the Red Sea.’’18 The force includes 18,500 seamen, including a coast guard contingent of 2,000 and 14,000 reserves.19 The navy’s fleet contains the Ambassador MK III Missile Boat, along with other fast delivery missile craft, minesweepers, and frigates. Egypt’s border guard answers to the Ministry of the Interior and numbers approximately 20,000.20 One of its most notable deployments is along the border with the Gaza Strip (discussed in Chapter 5) pursuant to a 2005 agreement with Israel. Egypt fields two types of military air services—an air force and an air defense command, with approximately 100,000 serving between them. Notably, Egypt’s air defense command was founded in the wake of the 1967 war when its air force, for a variety of reasons, proved ineffectual. Its founding goal was to create an effective missile barrier against Israeli incursions. Jane’s noted in 2007, ‘‘While the air force does not have the political influence the army enjoys, it is arguably the country’s most elite and Western-oriented service. Unlike the army, with its massive bureaucracy, the air force is comparatively more efficient, with bettereducated officers. A heavy emphasis is placed on training and modernization.’’21 Indeed, in 2004, Air Defense Lt. Gen. Sami Anan reported, ‘‘We have successfully developed our weapons via a precise and realistic plan that meets the necessary requirements of the modernization . . .[which] has been carried out over several phases to ensure the continuity and balance of our air defence system. . . We have completed the upgrading of existing radar systems and brought in more advanced systems with tremendous capabilities for working in differing circumstances.’’22 These have come to include U.S.–designed HAWK missiles and Hawkeye aircraft. In terms of Egypt’s broader air force capacity, as noted above,

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Egypt employs the U.S. F-16 and the Apache (helicopter), as well as the French Dassault Mirage and the Russian MiG. The military’s role in domestic law enforcement has been limited; however, it has been called upon to respond to perceived public threats and misdeeds. For example, it was involved in quelling the 1977 food riots, which occurred in response to Sadat’s decision to cut subsidies for bread and other essential foodstuffs. Dozens were killed and hundreds were wounded in the melee. The State Security Investigations Sector was said to have detained more than 2,000 people on related charges.23 The army next responded to (and quashed) the uprising of the Central Security Force conscripts in 1986. In response to a supposed enlistment extension of a year, the conscripts rioted, setting fire to tourist hotels and nightclubs. The army (and defense establishment more generally) is known to have authority to do as it pleases, without scrutiny, even by the parliament. There is a general and specific lack of defense budget transparency. The army runs its own factories and other income-generating enterprises, including tourist hotels and travel companies. And if citizens wish to complain about army expansion into private property, the citizen will almost certainly lose the argument. For example, in early 2004, an army bulldozer sought to bring down a gate to the Patmos Christian Centre, located next to a military facility.24 The building was said to be in violation of zoning laws dictating road proximity. This was a repeat performance by the army, when it brought down another length of the Patmos compound wall in 2002.25 NUCLEAR ENERGY AMBITIONS AND REGIONAL NONPROLIFERATION

Egypt has thus far successfully walked the nuclear tightrope—advancing its civilian research program and rhetorically seeking, at times, to offset Israel’s widely acknowledged but undeclared nuclear weapons capacity and Iran’s blustery attempts to get there. Although Egypt is not a member of the nuclear club, it started down an exploratory path in the 1950s with the creation of the Egyptian Atomic Energy Commission. Its nuclear program has been under the auspices of the Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority, a self-described ‘‘institution of excellence devoted for the development and utilization of nuclear science and technology for peace, welfare, safety and security of the Egyptian society.’’26 Egypt’s Nuclear Material Authority has responsibilities concordant with its name and oversees the supply chain from exploration to distribution. Despite the occasional glare of international attention, Egypt has a relatively modest civilian nuclear inventory, with room and plans to grow its nonweapons capacity.27 Current holdings include two research reactors, both located at the Nuclear Research Center at Inshas, a hub of Egyptian nuclear activity: one is a 2 MW (megawatt), constructed in 1958, having reached criticality (the point at which a nuclear reaction is self-sustaining) in 1961. Designated the ETRR-1

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(Egypt Test and Research Reactor), it was brought on-line with the help of the Soviet Union, and its fuel was maintained with Russian assistance.28 The other, the ETRR-2, is a 22 MW reactor; contracted with an Argentinean company called INVAP in 1992, it went critical in 1997. Egypt also has a fuel fabrication laboratory, the ‘‘Fuel Manufacturing Plant,’’ which supplies the ETRR-2 and whose production capacity is conflictingly reported at 24 or 40 fuel elements per year. Other facilities include the National Center for Radiation Research and Technology and the Hot Laboratories and Waste Management Center. Egypt’s stop-and-start plans for a nuclear energy program, which had gone as far as awarding construction bids, were shelved for a variety of reasons and were ultimately halted in the wake of the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster. Twenty years later, in September 2006, in a sizable policy shift, President Mubarak’s son Gamal, an assistant secretary-general of the NDP, raised the issue of a nuclear-powered Egypt in the party’s annual conference. It is noteworthy that an announcement of this magnitude with domestic and foreign policy implications was made by the young Mubarak, the president’s heir apparent. His statements were confirmed by his father in his closing address. Very quickly, the conference statements seemed to take on a life of their own. Within days, Al-Ahram Weekly noted the ‘‘Supreme Council for Energy created an ad-hoc committee comprised of five ministries—including electricity and energy, petrol and defence—to explore the nuclear option. It was the first time the council had convened in 18 years.’’29 Political movement was also afoot as the Shura Council and the People’s Assembly (both controlled by the NDP) took supportive actions. The Egyptian Minister for Electricity then affirmed Egypt’s plans to build a 1,000-megawatt nuclear power plant at al-Dabaa on the Mediterranean coast.30 Al-Dabaa has been on the drawing table for over 25 years, since the early 1980s.31 According to the State Information Service, in October 2007, the Nuclear Power Plants Authority (NPPA) announced ‘‘that Egypt’s nuclear program will initially incorporate the establishment of a number of reactors operating with the total combined capacity of 4 thousand watts and that al-Dabaa is considered the best location in terms of nuclear safety regulation.’’32 The NPPA further stated other possible locations will be scouted and the program could expand as necessary. However, shortly thereafter, Egyptian Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif said al-Dabaa had not been confirmed as the location.33 In the lead-up to the 2007 NDP conference, President Mubarak reasserted his authority in the area as he said, I told the Egyptian people last year that the peaceful application of nuclear energy is not a monopoly of anyone and that we do not start from nothing.. . .Over the past year I followed up the studies in this context, which I directed the government to prepare. I also followed up the discussions of the Higher Council for Energy over this important national issue and the several ongoing contacts with the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Authority]. As I am speaking to you today, and in the light of these studies and

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discussions, I announce before you Egypt’s decision to start a programme to build a number of nuclear stations to generate electricity.34

The president added that a Higher Council for Peaceful Application of Nuclear Energy would be established and other relevant administrative restructuring would take place along with legislative changes to facilitate the development of civilian nuclear energy in Egypt. Notably, Egypt has received, at minimum, rhetorical support for its new nuclear venture from the United States and the European Union. Even more interesting, perhaps, is Iran’s stated willingness to assist Egypt.35 There is general agreement that Egypt does not have an active nuclear weapons program. Egypt signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968 and ratified it in 1981.36 (Note this treaty allows Egypt to pursue nuclear energy.) Egypt’s record with the treaty’s watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has been generally good, minus some disclosure hiccups in 2005: Allegations and revelations surfaced about unreported materials and experiments (some from decades past), and concerns were raised about a possible secret weapons program. However, Egypt said it was in full compliance with its obligations and explained, in part, that there was a reporting requirements misunderstanding. The IAEA stated, ‘‘it is regrettable that some [Egyptian nuclear] activities have not been reported to us, although, again as we have said before we haven’t seen a proliferation concern.’’37 Egypt has, in fact, repeatedly affirmed its commitment to nonproliferation, particularly in the Middle East. However, during the early years of Egypt’s nuclear program, concerns arose about neighboring Israel’s not-so-secret nuclear ambitions pursued at its facility at Dimona. In July 1995, Dr. Salah Hedayat, former Minister of Scientific Research under Nasser, reported Egypt sought Russian and then German assistance to speed up its program.38 Other reports indicate that Egypt tried to purchase weapons from Russia and China. Egypt’s weapons ambitions were said to diminish under President Sadat. However, allegations about Egypt shopping in the nuclear black market do still surface from time to time. For example, specific concerns arose about interactions with North Korea (regarding, for example, ballistic missile technology) and nebulous linkages with rogue Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Khadeer Khan’s nuclear network.39 These ongoing issues are largely due to Israel’s widely acknowledged but undeclared nuclear program, which has been a proverbial thorn in the side of Middle East nonproliferation for decades. In 1974, Egypt (and Iran) pushed for United Nations General Assembly action around the idea of the ‘‘Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.’’ The resulting resolution called for open inspections of state programs and acceptance of and adherence to the NPT regime.40 Since then, the General Assembly has repeatedly reaffirmed the call, often by consensus. Egyptian officials overtly criticize Israel’s program, engage in diplomatic posturing, and have stated their intention to

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expand their civilian nuclear program. In 1999, Ahmed Maher, who had just finished a stint as Egyptian ambassador to the United States, stated, I think the maintenance of a nuclear arsenal in the region means that there will, inevitably, be an arms race. You cannot tell countries in the region not to seek to acquire nuclear arms, when Israel alone is not subjected to any such control, and is allowed to maintain an unfettered arsenal. But again, this is not a US–Egyptian problem [as such]. It is rather a problem between those who want regional stability and those who are not prepared to eliminate this cause of instability. The US supports denuclearisation, but it argues that Israel is in the middle of negotiations where it is going to be asked to give concessions and [therefore it is better to avoid antagonising Israel’s] security-mania at this point.. . .You cannot tell countries in the region not to seek to acquire nuclear arms, when Israel alone is not subjected to any such control, and is allowed to maintain an unfettered arsenal.’’41

Several years later, after a stretch as foreign minister, Maher said, The United States is adopting a position that is based either on ignoring this fact [Israel’s nuclear activity] or trying to justify in a roundabout way Israel’s possession of such weapons on the pretext that it is situated in a hostile environment, and thus accept an unprecedented link between the attainment of peace between Israel and all its neighbors, or even non-neighboring potential enemies, and between its relinquishment of nuclear weapons. . . .The gist is that the non-proliferation system has proved to be a failure. The treaty has not become universal and, on the contrary, there have been withdrawals from it. The number of countries possessing weapons has increased and the calls by nations like Egypt for creating a geographical area free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East have not been heeded.42

Maher went on to posit the possibility of moving toward a regime of disciplined proliferation rather than nonproliferation. Earlier that year, in January 2005, Egypt officially reaffirmed ‘‘its position of principle, which calls for the universality of the NPT and for all nuclear installations in the Middle East be placed under the IAEA Safeguards System.’’43 Just a few months later, at the NPT review conference, the government statement said, ‘‘In our view, it is not possible from now on, to measure the credibility of the Non Proliferation Regime in the region, without real progress towards the accession of Israel as a Non Nuclear Weapon State to the NPT.’’44 As 2007 began to draw to a close, another row developed between Egypt and the European Union regarding the latter’s voting abstention on an IAEA nonbinding resolution calling for a nuclear-weapons-free Middle East. The Egyptian foreign minister, speaking a short time thereafter, said, ‘‘It is a scary thing to allow the Middle East to witness the mushrooming of one or two or three nuclear capable states.’’45 The foreign minister likely chose his words carefully, creating visceral visions of the consequences of Israel’s unchecked proliferation. Although there are legitimate proliferation concerns with most nuclear programs, Egypt’s need to maintain good relations with the United States should help limit its willingness to covertly experiment with weapons’ development

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and shop for actual devices. The reality, however, is that, in terms of nuclear power and weapons, the region is unbalanced, and most states, including Egypt, have exercised restraint in seeking to offset their threat potential. To ensure that this restraint continues, Israel should acknowledge its nuclear weapons program and refrain from further significant nuclear provocations. Moreover, Iran’s ambitions must continue to remain just that. DOMESTIC INSECURITY

Egypt’s international defenses, thanks in large part to the support of the United States, are well established in contrast to its approach to domestic security. Although President Mubarak’s tenure has endured without serious challenge, and crime is relatively low throughout Egypt, the government’s security forces operate in a constant (and erroneously perceived) state of insecurity. Accusations of their egregious, ongoing, and systematic violations of human rights, ranging from physical harassment to unwarranted detentions to torture, are all too common. Facilitating these abuses are legislative acts and judicial mechanisms that render vulnerable populations (Islamists, secular activists, and others), at the mercy of the state. Egypt fields several multiple services, several of which come under the purview of the Ministry of the Interior; these include the General Directorate for State Security Investigations (also termed SSI, State Security Investigations Sector, the SSIS, or Mubahath al-Dawla), which has a special counterterrorism role, including interrogations; the police; and the Central Security Force (CSF or al-Amn al-Markazi), a paramilitary organization that supplements the police. The CSF has a variety of functions, including policing public demonstrations, monitoring curfews, and repressing Islamists, political as well as militant. Connected to the presidency is Military Intelligence as well as the General Intelligence Service (Mukhabarat al-Aama), which also has a counterterrorism focus, engages in investigations and, as the name suggests, intelligence, with transnational and domestic foci. Allegations of state abuse generally center on the SSI, the CSF, the Mukhabarat, as they are commonly termed, and the police. Although an exhaustive review of state security services’ abuses is beyond the scope of this chapter, a select violations-based assessment sheds a bright light on the magnitude and scope of the problem. Egypt’s domestic and international human rights obligations provide a wide range from which to choose. Herein we examine the state’s use of arbitrary detention, torture, and freedom of assembly as three very frequently mentioned in relation to Egypt. The rights also undermine the most basic trusts citizens should have in their government. A state that violates these rights not only hinders democratic development, but also incites fear, resentment, and anger in the population, effectively creating security concerns rather than mitigating them. In fact, in the early 1990s when Egypt was

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engaged in a crackdown on both militant and nonviolent Islamists, heavyhanded methods of dealing with Islamist opponents were predicted to ‘‘prove counter-productive in the long run—and even in the short run.. . .[Mubarak’s] regime spares no effort to antagonize the masses and alienate the elite. Ordinary Egyptians already endure economic crisis and structural adjustment. They require no further harassment in the form of increasing police brutality.’’46 Sadly, the Government of Egypt continually ignores such warnings, which also serve as accurate predictions that repressive policies continue to be counterproductive and detrimental to the regime itself. Emergency Law

Although the analysis of state violations of human rights below looks at individual categories of guarantees, Egypt’s Emergency Law (and to a lesser extent, the Anti-Terrorism Law) is the overarching umbrella under which most state abuses take place. The Emergency Law has been in force since 1981, implemented in the wake of President Sadat’s assassination. The authorization for the law is found in article 148 of the constitution, which allows the president to declare a state of emergency for a specified time frame. It has been regularly extended; in April 2006, it was renewed for another two years, despite promises to the contrary. As part of his 2005 presidential campaign, Mubarak said he would repeal the law. In the fall of 2007 legislative rumblings about a new antiterror law were growing louder and the Muslim Brotherhood was not looking forward to the draft: Hussein Ibrahim, the parliamentary spokesman of the Muslim Brotherhood, said the law would ‘‘be drafted to accommodate Article 179 of the constitution which gives the president of the republic unprecedented powers to detain citizens on suspicion of involvement in terrorist crimes and refer them to a court of his choosing, including military tribunals.’’47 In 1993, the Government of Egypt submitted a report to the United Nations, presenting an overview of its human rights situation. It justified the Emergency Law as a necessary step and noted, When a state of emergency has been legally proclaimed, the President of the Republic is empowered to take appropriate measures to avert the danger threatening the country and maintain security and order. He may impose restrictions on freedom of assembly, movement and residence, order the arrest and search of suspicious persons who pose a threat to security, censor correspondence and the press, determine the working hours at public institutions, issue any work assignments, seize movable and immovable property (without prejudice to the provisions of the Mobilization Act concerning complaints and compensation), withdraw licenses for firearms and explosives and evacuate or isolate any areas.48

In 2007, the government took things a step further: rather than repealing the Emergency Law, the state constitutionalized key aspects thereof when

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amendments were made to article 179. The new language further strengthens the government’s hand, thus weakening civil liberties and human rights, by precluding three other constitutional articles from hindering Egypt’s domestic ‘‘war on terror’’: article 44 (protection of home from unwarranted search), article 45 (privacy and security of communications), and article 41 (freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention). Amnesty International said the amendments represented the ‘‘most serious undermining of human rights safeguards in Egypt since the state of emergency was re-imposed in 1981.’’49 Additionally, the Anti-Terrorism Law (no. 97) of 1992 gave the government sweeping powers in determining who is a ‘‘terrorist’’; the government also determined that simply belonging to a ‘‘terrorist organization’’ was a capital crime. In 1993, the UN Human Rights Committee stated it was ‘‘particularly disturbed by the adoption in 1992 of law No. 97 on terrorism.. . .The definition of terrorism contained in that law is so broad that it encompasses a wide range of acts of differing gravity.’’50 Unjust Arrests, Detentions, and Trials

Egypt’s justice system is broken. It collapsed under the combined weight of arbitrary arrests, detentions, and exceptional security and military courts. This should be unsurprising given that, as of 2007, the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights determined that approximately 18,000 people were held in administrative detention, without charge or trial pursuant to orders issued by the Ministry of the Interior. 51 These practices and policies are (il)legally enshrined in the constitution, as amended in 2007, the Emergency Law, and a variety of other legislative provisions. Prior to the 2007 amendments, the Government of Egypt maintained that despite using special laws to thwart what it perceives as terrorism, it has complied with its own basic constitutional provisions, as well as international legal guarantees. In terms of arbitrary arrest and detention, the Emergency Law, in concert with the 2007 constitutional amendments, effectively permits this practice when undertaken in the name of counterterrorism. Specifically, article 179 of the constitution explicitly negates another constitution protection (article 41), which provides ‘‘no person may be arrested, inspected, detained or his freedom restricted or prevented from free movement except under an order necessitated by investigations and preservation of the security of the society.’’52 To further thwart opposition, legal or otherwise, Egypt has created a bifurcated court system, an ordinary civil and criminal judicial structure as well as a security or emergency court apparatus. The emergency court system is bound by executive oversight and offers no subsequent, impartial, civil judicial review or relief. Additionally, under article 6 of the Military Orders Law the president may transfer cases to military courts during a state of emergency. During a state of

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emergency, military courts may hear the gamut of criminal cases. Finally, recall the other component of the 2007 amendment to article 179, which allows the state to refer defendants to any judicial body authorized under law so as not to interfere with the state’s ability to safeguard the country against terrorist threats. These laws and practices are in violation of Egypt’s international legal obligations, most notably under (a) the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) of which Egypt is a state party; (b) the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the passage of which Egypt supported in the UN General Assembly in 1948; and (c) the regional African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.53 For example, article 9 of the ICCPR explicitly states: 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law. 2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him. 3. Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. It shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, and, should occasion arise, for execution of the judgment. 4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.

The UDHR also guarantees against arbitrary arrest and detention (article 11) as does the African Charter (article 6), and there are additional provisions in all three for fair legal proceedings and trail (ICCPR, article 14; UDHR, article 11; and African Convention, article 7). Two distinct groups have historically borne the brunt of governmental injustice: the Muslim Brotherhood and suspected militants.54 State targeting of the Brotherhood, particularly through arrests and detentions, is widely perceived as part of a comprehensive strategy to weaken its position as a legitimate political opposition group. During the 2005 election season, domestic and international media reports were rife with accounts of arbitrary arrests and detentions of Brotherhood members. Individual sweeps resulted in incarcerations of dozens to hundreds of members, and more than 1,000 were likely detained during the parliamentary elections.55 After the elections, things did not improve: between March and October 2006, nearly 800 Brothers were detained and held.56 High-profile leaders were targeted in addition to the rank and file. For example, in December 2006, security forces arrested Khairat al-Shatir, deputy

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supreme guide of the Muslim Brotherhood (along with more than a dozen other Brotherhood members and more than 100 students).57 In late January 2007, a criminal court dismissed the charges against al-Shatir and ordered his release, along with his codefendants. Security forces, however, quickly rearrested the freed men. Human Rights Watch stated, ‘‘Re-arresting these men moments after their acquittal shows a complete contempt for the rule of law and shocking disrespect for the court.’’ 58 Less than a week later, President Mubarak explicitly ignored the court decision and ordered the cases (along with about two dozen others) transferred to a military court. In May 2007, an administrative court ruled Mubarak’s order invalid. However, a short time thereafter, the Supreme Administrative Court reversed that decision on appeal. The military trials of al-Shatir and dozens of others were under way in September 2007. Essam El-Erian, sometimes described as head of the Brotherhood’s political bureau, and several others were arrested in August 2007. A few months later, in October, a criminal court ordered the release of El-Erian and several other group leaders that were picked up. El-Erian has been repeatedly arrested, having been released from custody just three months prior to his 2007 incarceration. Alongside of the nonviolent Brotherhood’s travails, the government engages in roundups and ‘‘trials’’ of suspected militants, especially in the wake of attacks against civilians, tourists, and government interests. After the Taba Hilton bombings in October 2004, the SSI engaged in a massive campaign of arbitrary arrests and detentions in the area. According to one report, ‘‘When suspects could not be found, security agents often detained family members, including women.’’59 Egyptian and international human rights groups estimated that thousands were detained in the operations, although the government put the number at several hundred. 60 In November 2006, at the conclusion of the trial of the alleged bombers, an emergency court affirmed the death sentences of Muhammed Gayiz Sabbah, Usama ‘Abd al-Ghani al-Nakhlawi, and Yunis Muhammed Abu Gareer for their supposed part in the Taba attack. The defendants said their confessions were forced, acquired by torture, including electric shocks. They were effectively held incommunicado and denied access to counsel. Ten others received sentences of imprisonment ranging from 5 to 25 years in prison for their purported roles. In the wake of the bombings at Sharm el-Sheikh in 2005, which resulted in 80 dead and an estimated 100–200 wounded, the Bedouin of the Sinai were singled out as a prime target of security services raids as they were accused of either explicit involvement or complicity. Thousands were arrested after the bombings.61 One U.S. source, generally understood to be hawkish and pro-Israeli, linked the security forces’ repression with the radicalization of the population: After the Taba bombings, human rights organizations reported that Egyptian security forces arrested up to 2,400 Bedouins, including women and children, out of a population of around 100,000. The crackdown radicalized some Bedouins, who became willing to collaborate in a vengeance against the state. Similar security measures used in the Nile

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Global Security Watch—Egypt Valley during the 1980s and 1990s led to a spiral of violence between security forces and supporters and families of suspected terrorists. The same seems to be happening now in Sinai.62

This (mis)treatment of militants is not a new phenomenon: during Egypt’s battles with Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Group in the 1990s many people essentially disappeared into the system, some only to emerge months later for trials without due process. In 1992, Human Rights Watch reported the following abuses: • Incommunicado detention by State Security Intelligence (SSI) forces immediately following the first days of arrest at locations that are not prisons, such as SSI office buildings, SSI offices, police stations, or Central Security Forces military camps. • Unsupervised interrogation by SSI officers of detainees at these locations, often for one week or longer, without the presence of prosecutors from the Ministry of Justice or private attorneys.63

In a security sweep in August 2005, approximately 3,500 police participated in an operation that resulted in more than 500 detentions.64 Torture

Torture is a violation of Egypt’s domestic and international legal obligations. The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights writes, ‘‘Torture seeks to annihilate the victim’s personality and denies the inherent dignity of the human being. The United Nations has condemned torture from the outset as one of the vilest acts perpetrated by human beings on their fellow creatures.’’65 Indeed it is prohibited in numerous international declarations and treaties, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (article 5). Torture is also outlawed in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (article 7), and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. In terms of domestic law, Egypt’s constitution implicitly prescribes torture in article 42: ‘‘Any person arrested, detained or his freedom restricted shall be treated in such a manner that preserves his human dignity. No physical or moral harm shall be inflicted upon him.. . .Any statement proved to have been made by a person under any of the aforementioned forms of duress or coercion or under the threat thereof, shall be considered invalid and futile.’’66 Article 126 of the Egyptian penal code also prohibits torture, but limits it to cases of physical abuse when used against an accused person to extract a confession. Suffice it to say, this is a sizable legal loophole ripe for exploitation. The U.S. Department of State’s annual human rights reports regularly address torture in Egypt. In fact, many reports about Egypt include torture in their introductory paragraphs as an area of concern. (See Chapter 4 for further discussion.)

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The Department of State is not alone. In 2007, the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) noted there were 567 documented cases of torture inside police stations ‘‘including 167 deaths which EOHR strongly suspects were the result of torture and mistreatment. These cases are merely a limited sample amongst hundreds of other cases received by EOHR in which documentation was has to achieve whither by EOHR or by the victims.’’67 In just part of 2007, EOHR documented 26 cases, three of which resulted in deaths. 68 Amnesty International stated (in 2005) that ‘‘the widespread and systematic practice of torture in Egypt has persisted despite its prohibition under domestic and international law.’’69 In 2004, Human Rights Watch wrote, Torture in Egypt is a widespread and persistent phenomenon. Security forces and the police routinely torture or ill-treat detainees, particularly during interrogation. In most cases, officials torture detainees to obtain information and coerce confessions, occasionally leading to death in custody. In some cases, officials use torture detainees to punish, intimidate, or humiliate. Police also detain and torture family members to obtain information or confessions from a relative, or to force a wanted relative to surrender.70

The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights concurred and found torture to be widespread, legal controls weak, and repercussions rare.71 There have been several well-publicized incidents of ill-treatment and torture. In 2006, four Tunisians were detained in connection with an alleged militant cell, which had organized to fight the U.S.–led occupation in Iraq. The Tunisians were beaten, subjected to electric shocks, blindfolded, deprived of sleep, and forced to watch the torture of their cell mates while detained by the SSI in its office in northern Cairo.72 Also in 2006, the SSI detained two men, Karim al-Sha’ir and Mohamed al-Sharqawi, both bloggers, as they left a nonviolent rally. During and subsequent to the arrest, both men were beaten. Al-Sharqawi said at least 20 officers were involved in the beatings, and once at the Qasr el-Nil police station, he was subsequently sexually assaulted and then raped with a cardboard tube. One of al-Sharqawi’s attorneys said, ‘‘I hadn’t seen anyone that badly tortured in 12 years.’’73 Pursuant to the Emergency Law, further detention of both was ordered, and they received limited medical attention. Notably, at the time, al-Sha’ir and al-Sharqawi had been recently released from detention for participation in other protests. In another case, Mamdouh Habib, an Egyptian national, was picked up in late 2001 in Pakistan and moved to Egypt, where he said he was tortured with techniques including suspension from hooks on a wall, sleep deprivation using dousings of cold water, and shocks with an electric cattle prod, all before being transferred to the U.S. detention facility at Guantanamo Bay.74 One widely reported case of Egyptian state torture was that of Imad Kabir, a bus driver who had an altercation with police and was subsequently taken into custody. After his detention, officers sodomized him with a broomstick.

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To make the incident further degrading, they recorded the rape with a cell phone video camera, which they broadcast in his neighborhood as a warning. In a rare display of state accountability for torture, two police officers were sentenced to three years’ imprisonment for the crime. However, many human rights observers know Kabir’s story is but a straw in a haystack of abuse; the unique aspect of this case was the police dissemination of the video, which received publicity and garnered attention the government did not want. This was the real reason these officers, unlike many others, faced charges. Indeed, in 2002, the United Nations Committee against Torture expressed concerns about the many consistent reports received concerning the persistence of the phenomenon of torture and ill-treatment of detainees by law enforcement officials, and the absence of measures to ensure effective protection and prompt and impartial investigations. Many of these reports relate to numerous cases of deaths in custody; [and]. . .particular concern at the widespread evidence of torture and ill-treatment in administrative premises under the control of the State Security Investigation Department, the infliction of which is reported to be facilitated by the lack of any mandatory inspection by an independent body of such premises.75

This was not a new phenomenon: the UN Special Rapporteur made a similar observation about the SSI and the police in 1996.76 Freedom of Assembly

Article 54 of the Egyptian Constitution recognizes the right to assembly: ‘‘Citizens shall have the right to peaceable and unarmed private assembly, without the need for prior notice. Security men shall not attend such private meetings. Public meetings, processions and gatherings are allowed within the limits of the law.’’77 This right is also guaranteed in international law, including the ICCPR (article 21), the UDHR (article 20), and the African Convention (article 11). In practice, however, security forces frequently crack down on opposition demonstrations, arresting participants, physically abusing them on site and then again, while in custody; examples follow. In the spring of 2003 as thousands of Egyptians demonstrated against military action in Iraq, security forces violently repressed those gathered. Attendees were beaten, attacked with water cannons, and many were arrested. Women reported being threatened with rape. Attorneys who had previously represented demonstrators were also battered and detained. Most of the detainees were whisked off to a Central Security Forces base, while others were held at SSI headquarters.78 In May 2005, at rallies protesting the constitutional referendum to allow for so-called competitive presidential elections, female activists were attacked and sexually molested. Notably, police officers and plain-clothed security forces were in attendance. According to those present, busloads of men arrived and, with

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apparent police consent, proceeded to attack the demonstrators. Some members of the security services actually corralled demonstrators so they could not escape the beatings. Some incidents were caught on camera, and they received wide reporting in domestic and international media. In late July 2005, after Mubarak announced he would seek another term as president, Kifaya helped organize demonstrations against the perpetuation of his reign and the undermining of democratic norms. Human Rights Watch provided the following eyewitness account: A cordon of uniformed Central Security [forces] blocked the way, surrounding a few dozen protestors. Every now and then the cordon opened and a group of plainclothes men with truncheons dragged out a protestor, often beating the protestor as they did so. Other demonstrators and bystanders started chanting. The police chased them up al-Tahrir Street towards al-Faliki Square. There were now 100 or more demonstrators, followed by 50 or 60 plainclothes men and maybe 200 from Central Security. The Central Security [forces] would surround a small group, and those in plainclothes would grab whoever it was they had picked to arrest.79

In the spring of 2006, at demonstrations protesting election fraud and calling for an independent judiciary, cane-wielding police severely beat protestors. The U.S. Department of State said, ‘‘Particularly troubling are reports of Egyptian police tactics against demonstrators and journalists covering the event that left many injured. We urge the Egyptian Government to permit peaceful demonstrations on behalf of reform and civil liberties by those exercising their rights to freedom of assembly and expression.’’80 Muslim-Christian Tensions

Another aspect of domestic stability is community relations and intercommunal conflicts. The regime imposes itself on its Muslim majority and Christian minority in its own effort to ‘‘keep the peace’’ when such relations are shattered or threatened. There are numerous examples of Muslim-Christian tensions—e.g., in Upper Egypt, and in cities and towns where the Coptic Christian minority is more sizable. In some cases, basic crimes get elevated to ‘‘Muslim-Christian strife’’; in many other cases, those tensions lead to crimes of violence. Church burnings are an occasional manifestation, along with incidents such as those which unfolded in Alexandria in October 2005, when Copts attending a play were attacked resulting in three deaths, and again in April 2006, when those going to mass were attacked, leaving one person dead. The state offers little help to Copts, most especially when they turn to the police for protection. As often as not, Copts are either turned away without having their complaints acted upon or they may be detained by the police for suggesting there is intercommunal violence. When two Copts were killed in 1998 in al-Kosheh in Sohag (Upper Egypt), human rights activists accused the

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police of imprisoning and mistreating over 1,000 Copts, rather than focusing on finding the killers. This is a very common complaint by Copts and by local and international human rights organizations. Thus, Copts, knowing they are unlikely to receive any help from their government, tend to rely on their own church leaders who frequently work behind the scenes with Muslim leaders to quell such divisions in their local communities. When American politicians (mostly U.S. congressional representatives) attempt to intervene, this further complicates matters. First, Copts do not always welcome this support, as it fuels misunderstanding inside Egypt. Additionally, opposition political parties in Egypt frequently say ‘‘hands off Egyptian Copts,’’ because they do not trust U.S. motives, and U.S. politicians are generally silent when it comes to human rights abuses against the vast majority of Egyptians, the Sunni Muslim population.81 A USAID official noted that the organization has directly assisted Copts, although not as per se targeted religious support, but rather as economic and other assistance, with more than $2 million in grants to 40 Coptic nongovernmental organization (NGOs), nearly $12 million to restore sacred Coptic sites, and $200 million for water treatment, all awarded since the turn of the millennium. While this is a drop in the proverbial multibillion dollar aid bucket, it is nonetheless significantly appreciable assistance to a minority Christian group in a Muslim dominant state.82 INSECURITY IN EGYPT

The strength of Egypt’s security and police apparatuses and their combined disregard for human rights and civil liberties means that the government can indeed control Egyptian society, but the methods it uses weaken its legitimacy to govern. Egyptians have long tolerated the authoritarian rule that Nasser established, but only while their basic economic needs have been met. In this informal arrangement, Egyptians have had to forgo personal, social, and political liberties such as free and fair elections, recognized rights of association and assembly, and other aspects of democracy. This was the social contract established under Nasser and maintained, albeit with some major violations, by his successors. But this contract is now null and void as the government denies its citizens their basic liberties and political rights at the same time it fails to provide citizens the basic social and economic necessities long promised by the regime. NOTES 1. ‘‘Egyptian President Gives Speech at Opening of New Parliamentary Term,’’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, November 14, 2007, accessed via LexisNexis. 2. ‘‘19 Egyptian Human Rights NGOs Appeal to the United Nations: Egypt Is Not Fit for Membership of the UN Human Rights Council,’’ May 14, 2007, http://www.hrinfo.net/en/ reports/2007/pr0514-2.shtml.

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3. http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Politics/Constitution/Text/040703000000000001.htm. 4. ‘‘The Three-Year War,’’ Al-Ahram Weekly, June 5–11, 1997, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/ archives/67-97/sup8.htm. 5. Kathleen T. Rhem, ‘‘Egypt Vital to Peace in Middle East, Gates Says,’’ U.S. Department of Defense, American Forces Press Service, April 18, 2007, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/ newsarticle.aspx?id=32846. 6. ‘‘The Soviet Flight from Egypt,’’ Time, July 31, 1972, http://www.time.com/time/ magazine/article/0,9171,877930,00.html. 7. The U.S. Department of State, the U.S. General Accounting Office, and the U.S. Congressional Research Service have all produced a variety of reports and fact sheets about U.S. military assistance to Egypt. 8. Nuclear Threat Initiative, ‘‘Egypt: Profile,’’ December 2006, http://www.nti.org/ e_research/profiles/Egypt/index.html. 9. Center for Nonproliferation Studies, ‘‘CNS Special Report on North Korean Ballistic Missile Capabilities,’’ March 22, 2006, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/pdf/060321.pdf. 10. Ibid. 11. See http://www.aoi.com.eg. 12. Arab Organization for Industrialization, ‘‘About Us,’’ http://www.aoi.com.eg/aoi_eng/ about_us/about_us.htm. 13. James A. Bill and Robert Springborg, Politics in the Middle East (New York: Harper Collins, 1994), 267. 14. Gerrard Cowan, ‘‘Egypt Will Not Privatise Military Production, Says Minister,’’ Jane’s Defence Industry (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group, 2007). 15. Jane’s, ‘‘Army,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment—North Africa (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group, 2007). 16. Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘‘Egypt—Country Report,’’ (London) November 2006, 15–16. 17. Jane’s, ‘‘Army.’’ 18. Jane’s, ‘‘Navy,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment—North Africa (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group, 2007). 19. Ibid. 20. Jane’s, ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment—North Africa (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group, 2007). 21. Jane’s, ‘‘Egypt—Air Force,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment—North Africa (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group, 2007). 22. ‘‘Marking Air Defence Day,’’ Al-Ahram Weekly On-Line, July 1–7, 2004, http:// weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/697/eg11.htm. 23. Janet Stevens, ‘‘Political Repression in Egypt,’’ MERIP Reports, April 1978, 18–21. 24. U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Egypt,’’ Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2004, February 28, 2005, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41720.htm. 25. U.S. Copts Association, ‘‘Egypt: Army Attacks Christian Center Near Cairo,’’ March 15, 2002, http://copts.com/english1/index.php/2002/03/15/egypt-army-attacks-christiancenter-near-cairo/. 26. Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority, ‘‘EAEA Mission,’’ http://www.eaea.org.eg/ mission.html. 27. For more information on Egypt’s nuclear inventory, see the Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority, http://www.eaea.org.eg/; the Federation of American Scientists (FAS),

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Global Security Watch—Egypt http://fas.org/nuke/guide/egypt/index.html; the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), http://www.sipri.org/contents/expcon/cnsc3egy.html; and Jane’s Information Group security reports. 28. International Atomic Energy Agency, ‘‘Research Reactor Details: ETRR-1,’’ Nuclear Research Reactors in the World, http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/rrdb/. 29. Amira Howeidy, ‘‘Time for the N Word,’’ Al-Ahram Weekly On-Line, September 28– October 4, 2006, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/814/eg1.htm. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Egypt State Information Service, ‘‘Egypt and Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East,’’ 2007, http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Politics/Foreign/issues/mass_destruction/ 040308050000000001.htm. 33. ‘‘Egyptian Prime Minister: No Final Decision on Best Location for Nuclear Reactor,’’ Middle East News Agency (Cairo), October 31, 2006, http://www.mena.org.eg/index.aspx. 34. ‘‘Egyptian President Announces Establishment of Nuclear Power Plants,’’ Nile News TV, October 29, 2007, Open Source Center. 35. ‘‘Iran Ready for Nuclear Cooperation with Egypt,’’ Islamic Republic News Agency (Tehran), November 19, 2007, http://www2.irna.ir/en/news/view/line-17/ 0711191065220332.htm. 36. FAS, ‘‘Nuclear Weapons Program,’’ February 4, 2005, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/ egypt/nuke/index.html. 37. International Atomic Energy Agency, ‘‘IAEA Director General Briefs Press on Iran, Egypt,’’ press briefing, February 28, 2005, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2005/ press_briefing.html. 38. ‘‘Egypt Unveils Nasser’s Secret Nuclear Weapons Programme,’’ Deutsche PressAgenteur, July 24, 1995, LexisNexis. 39. See, for example, Bill Powell and Tim McGirk, ‘‘The Man Who Sold the Bomb,’’ February 6, 2005, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1025082-3,00.html; and Paul Kerr, ‘‘IAEA: Egypt’s Reporting Failures ‘Matter of Concern,’’’ Arms Control Today (March 2005), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_03/Egypt.asp. 40. United Nations General Assembly, ‘‘Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Region of the Middle East,’’ Resolutions adopted on the reports of the First Committee, GA Res. 3263 (XXIX), http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/738/65/ IMG/NR073865.pdf?OpenElement. 41. Dina Ezzat, ‘‘Friends, Not Allies,’’ Al-Ahram Weekly On-line, October 7–13, 1999, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1999/450/intrv1.htm. 42. Ahmad Mahir, ‘‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation between Realities and Illusions,’’ Akhbar al Yawm, February 26, 2005, Open Source Center. 43. International Atomic Energy Agency, ‘‘Communication Dated 1 February 2005 from the Permanent Mission of the Arab Republic of Egypt Concerning Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of Egypt,’’ information circular, INFCIRC/638, February 8, 2005, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2005/infcirc638.pdf. 44. H.E. Ambassador Ahmed Fathalla, ‘‘Statement before the General Debate of the 2005 Review Conference of the NPT,’’ May 3, 2005, http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/ statements/npt03egypt.pdf. 45. ‘‘Egypt Criticizes EU for Nuclear Vote Stance,’’ The Irish Times, September 22, 2007, LexisNexis.

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46. Ahmed Abdalla,’’ Egypt’s Islamists and the State: From Complicity to Confrontation,’’ Middle East Report (July–August 1993): 29. 47. Gamal Essam El-Din, ‘‘Worries over Anti-Terror Bill,’’ Al-Ahram Weekly On-Line, November 15–21, 2007, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/871/fr1.htm. 48. Government of Egypt, ‘‘Core Document Forming Part of the Reports of States Parties,’’ UN doc. no. HRI/CORE/1/Add.19, January 15, 1993, 11, http://daccessdds.un.org/ doc/UNDOC/GEN/G93/151/53/PDF/G9315153.pdf ?OpenElement. 49. Amnesty International, ‘‘Egypt: Proposed Constitutional Amendments Greatest Erosion of Human Rights in 26 Years,’’ press release, March 18, 2007, http://www .amnestyusa.org/document.php?lang=e&id=ENGMDE120082007. 50. United Nations Human Rights Committee, ‘‘Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Egypt. 09-08-93,’’ August 9, 1993, UN doc. no. CCPR/C/79/ Add.23, http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/7df500aff19a2a15c12563dc004ae3f0? Opendocument. 51. Amnesty International, ‘‘Egypt: Systematic Abuses in the Name of Security,’’ April 2007, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE12/001/2007, citing the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights. 52. See http://constitution.sis.gov.eg/en/2.htm. 53. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘‘The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Magna Carta for All Humanity,’’ http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/miscinfo/carta.htm. Also, for a list of human rights treaties to which Egypt is a signatory or party, see University of Minnesota Human Rights Library, ‘‘Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties: Egypt,’’ http://www1 .umn.edu/humanrts/research/ratification-egypt.html. 54. Note: this is not meant to imply that militants in Egypt constitute a cohesive group as does the Brotherhood. 55. Maamoun Yousset, ‘‘Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood Leader Says Arrests of Members Are Attempt to Intimidate Voters,’’ Associated Press, November 29, 2005, LexisNexis. 56. Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Egypt: Crackdown on Muslim Brotherhood Deepens,’’ news release, October 26, 2006, hrw.org/english/docs/2006/10/24/egypt14433.htm. 57. BBC News, ‘‘Egypt: Cracks Down on Brotherhood,’’ December 14, 2006, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6178841.stm. 58. Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Egypt: Muslim Brotherhood Detainees Face Military Tribunals,’’ February 15, 2007, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/02/15/egypt15329.htm. 59. Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), ‘‘Egypt: In Wake of Dahab Blasts, North Sinai Residents Fear Arrest Campaign,’’ May 4, 2006, http://www.irinnews.org/ Report.aspx?ReportId=26596. 60. Mustafa El-Menshawy, ‘‘Rights Groups Interrogate Taba Investigation,’’ Al-Ahram Weekly On-Line, December 2–8, 2004, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/719/eg3.htm. 61. Harry De Quetteville, ‘‘Suspicion over Egypt Bombings Falls on Bedouin,’’ Daily Telegraph (London), July 31, 2005, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/07/ 31/wegypt31.xml&sSheet=/news/2005/07/31/ixnewstop.html. 62. Khairi Abaza, ‘‘Sharm al-Shaykh Bombings: The Egyptian Context,’’ August 12, 2005, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch 1023, http://www .washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2355. 63. Middle East Watch, ‘‘Egypt: Arrest and Detention Practices and Prison Conditions,’’ March 1992, 3–4, http://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/e/egypt/egypt923.pdf.

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Global Security Watch—Egypt 64. Associated Press, ‘‘500 Seized by Police in Sinai,’’ International Herald Tribune (Paris), August 23, 2005, www.iht.com/articles/2005/08/22/news/egypt.php. 65. United Nations High Commission for Human Rights, ‘‘Combating Torture,’’ May 2002, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs4rev1.pdf. 66. http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Politics/Constitution/Text/040703000000000001.htm. 67. Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, ‘‘Torture in Egypt. . .Criminals Escaping Punishment,’’ August 8, 2007, http://www.eohr.org/press/2007/pr0808.shtml. 68. Ibid. 69. Amnesty International, ‘‘Torture and Secret Detention: Testimony of the ‘Disappeared’ in the ‘War on Terror,’’’ August 4, 2005, http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ engamr511082005. 70. Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Egypt’s Torture Epidemic,’’ February 2004, briefing paper, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/02/25/egypt7658.htm. 71. Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, ‘‘Torture in Egypt: An Unchecked Phenomenon,’’ 2004, www.eohr.org/report/2004/re4.htm. 72. See, for example, Amnesty International, ‘‘Forcible Return/Torture/Fear of Further Torture,’’ Urgent Action, January 5, 2007, http://www.amnestyusa.org/actioncenter/actions/ action7869.pdf. 73. Human Rights First, ‘‘Freed Activist Asks You to Help Release Others Still Detained in Egypt’s Jails,’’ June 29, 2006, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/middle_east/egypt/ alert_062906_sharqawi.htm. 74. See Dana Priest and Dan Eggen, ‘‘Terror Suspect Alleges Torture,’’ Washington Post, January 6, 2005, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A51726-2005Jan5.html. 75. United Nations Committee against Torture, ‘‘Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against Torture: Egypt,’’ December 23, 2002, UN doc. no. CAT/C/CR/29/ 4, http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/CAT.C.CR.29.4.En?Opendocument. 76. See United Nations Economic and Social Council, ‘‘Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, in Particular: Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,’’ UN doc. no. E/CN.4/1996/ 35, January 9, 1996, http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G96/101/56/PDF/ G9610156.pdf?OpenElement. 77. http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Politics/Constitution/Text/040703000000000001.htm. 78. See, for example, International Freedom of Expression Exchange Clearing House, ‘‘Writers and Journalists among Arrested Anti-War Protesters,’’ Africa News, April 2, 2003, LexisNexis; and Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Egypt: Crackdown on Antiwar Protests,’’ March 24, 2003, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2003/03/24/egypt5422.htm. 79. Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Egypt: Security Forces Attack Opposition Demonstrators,’’ August 2, 2005, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/08/02/egypt11554.htm. 80. U.S. Department of State, daily press briefing, May 11, 2006, http://www.state.gov/r/ pa/prs/dpb/2006/66163.htm. 81. George Fahim of al-Wafd opposition newspaper made this ‘‘demand’’ of the United States, as reported in Al-Ahram Weekly, ‘‘The Meanings of al-Kosheh,’’ by Nadia Abou-ElMagd, February 3–9, 2000, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2000/467/eg7.htm. 82. James R. Kunder, ‘‘U.S. Assistance in Egypt,’’ May 17, 2006, written testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on International Relations Sub-Committees on Middle East and Central Asia, http://www1.usaid.gov/press/speeches/2006/ty060517.html.

CHAPTER

3

Internal Insecurity: Mainstream Muslim Brothers and Marginalized Militant Movements

Unfortunately, the security doesn’t only intimidate, arrest, confiscate money and shut down companies, but it throws the detained MB [Muslim Brotherhood] members in prisons that lack the minimum required human rights, while they include ill and aged persons, something that put their lives at stake. We declare that our minds are open and our hearts are open as well and we are ready to discuss all issues with all political powers including the government to reach solutions for Egypt’s problems within framework of all-embracing national agreement. Despite all this tyranny, persecution and terrorism, we will continue—God willing—our method, won’t deviate from it and we won’t be enticed to any other method.1 —Mohamed Mahdi Akef, supreme guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, January 2007 Their aim is jihad, and our aim is Islam.2 —Nageh Ibrahim, a leader of the Islamic Group, speaking about a key difference between his organization and al-Qaeda in August 2006

Since the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, the modern Egyptian state has faced varying types of Islamic opposition.3 Eighty years later, the Brotherhood remains Egypt’s largest opposition group—Islamic or otherwise— and is considered a forerunner and an inspiration for many contemporary Islamic movements. After decades of ‘‘fighting the state’’ (the British, the Egyptian monarchy, and Nasser’s regime), the Brotherhood renounced violence in the 1970s and today focuses on religious, social, and political activities.

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Political and religious opposition in Egypt, however, is not always confined to the ballot box or the mosque: For example, in 1997, militants in Egypt attacked tourists at Luxor, killing scores of people and wounding dozens more. After the attack, the New York Times reported that since the then-current campaign of violence began (in 1992), more than 1,200 people had been killed, including scores of foreigners.4 Post-Luxor, Egypt enjoyed a lull of almost seven years from so-called Islamist violence until October 2004 when tourists again bore the brunt of militant dissatisfaction. The Islamic Group and Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) have been the two largest, active militant groups. Members of the former are believed to have been responsible for the attack at Luxor and are known for their association with Sheikh Abd al-Rahman, imprisoned in the United States for the first bombing of the World Trade Center in New York. The latter group’s members are infamous for their relationship with Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, now a key al-Qaeda figure. Islamism, also termed political Islam (including militant and nonviolent manifestations), has endured (even if it waxes and wanes over time) in Egypt for various reasons. These include the following: • the persistence of poverty and unemployment and the government’s general failure to provide for the socioeconomic well-being of its population; • the government’s policies of secularization and co-optation; • the government’s repressive and otherwise inhumane treatment of Islamist opponents; • state manipulation of Islamic symbols and language for political legitimacy; and • Egyptian policies vis-a`-vis the United States, Europe, Israel, and Arab states (most or all of which may be viewed as illegitimate by many Islamists).

This chapter begins with the founding and development of the Muslim Brotherhood and reviews its success at the polls. Purported links with militant and political Islamist groups beyond Egypt are also explored. Egypt’s two major militant groups, the Islamic Group and EIJ, are considered as well, with an eye toward understanding their history and record of violent activities. A brief review of recent attacks in Egypt rounds out the chapter. THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

Egypt’s contemporary Islamic social and political activity grew out of the work of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, the (Society of ) Muslim Brethren (the Muslim Brothers or Brotherhood). In the past, the Brotherhood utilized violence as a means to its ends (an Islamic state); however, in the 1970s the group opted to focus and rely on the proverbial ballot box rather than the bullet. In the years since then, it has become the key political and social opposition group in Egypt. Its historic renunciation of violence, however, has not stopped a variety of political observers

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and government officials from linking the Brotherhood to active militant groups, including so-called branches or wings such as Hamas in Palestine. In recent years, Egypt’s policy toward the Brotherhood is oft-described as ‘‘banned but tolerated,’’ although government actions during the conduct of and subsequent to the 2005 parliamentary elections was generously described by many as less than tolerant. In June 2007, Human Rights Watch stated, ‘‘The Egyptian government has never convincingly justified its continued ban of the Muslim Brotherhood, which has renounced violence for more than 30 years.’’5 Human Rights Watch ‘‘called on the government to lift the ban, and to cease arresting people solely for their alleged membership in the organization.’’6 Al-Banna to Banned

The Brotherhood was founded in 1928 by a small group of Egyptian men; the most notable among them was Hassan al-Banna, a schoolteacher from Ismailiya (along the western bank of Suez Canal) who spearheaded the movement. The Brotherhood emerged in response to the British occupation of Egypt and colonialism more generally. Also at issue were secularization policies, as well as Western cultural imperialism, and questions regarding the revival of the Islamic caliphate. Indeed, al-Banna stated the West was responsible for ‘‘abuses that have done injury to their [Muslims’] dignity, their honor, and their independence as well as commandeered their wealth and shed their blood.’’7 Al-Banna, however, did not place blame only on the West as he also called on King Farouk of Egypt to reorient the country on a more genuine Islamic path, one where the shari’a was paramount. The Brotherhood itself was modeled on the example of the Prophet Muhammad and his first Islamic religiosocial reformation or revolution. . . .Like Muhammad, they [Egypt’s Brotherhood and Pakistan’s Jamaat i Islami] established communities of true believers who were distinguished from the rest of society and were totally committed to the struggle (jihad) to transform society. They did not leave (hijra) their societies, but instead organized their followers into an Islamic community or party (jamaa) within the broader (un-Islamic) society, forming a group of committed, like-minded Muslims who were to serve as the dynamic nucleus to transform society from within.8

Over the next two decades, the Muslim Brotherhood grew in rural and urban areas. The mid-to-late 1940s was a period of turmoil in Egypt as well as change for those who emerged bloodied, embittered, and emboldened after World War II. Within Egypt there were power struggles among a variety of groups, most notably that between the Wafd and the Muslim Brotherhood. The question of Palestine also loomed large as the Brotherhood assisted its Arab brethren in their struggle against the establishment of the State of Israel. This aid included training, the provision of supplies, and volunteers.9 As the decade began to draw to a close, the Brotherhood stood accused (and in some cases guilty) of a variety of militant

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activities, including bombings as well as the assassination of a judge (who sentenced a member to prison) and the commander of the Cairo police force. The Egyptian government subsequently decreed that the Brotherhood should be disbanded and its assets seized in December 1948. Weeks later, a member of the organization assassinated the Egyptian prime minister, Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi Pasha, who was a key figure behind the crackdown on the organization. The tit-for-tat strikes continued, and less than two months later, in February 1949, the Egyptian government killed Hassan al-Banna, whom one expert observer refers to as the ‘‘martyr par excellence.’’10 Two years later, the ban on the Brotherhood was lifted. Gamal Abdel Nasser, then a key player in the Free Officers Movement, a military association dedicated to removing the monarchy, persuaded the Brotherhood that the two groups could do more to foment change in Egypt together than they could apart. Nasser and Sayyid Qutb, an Islamist intellectual and Brotherhood ideologue (who, along with the organization as a whole), consorted in the lead-up to the coup of July 23, 1952, that removed King Farouk from power. Qutb and Nasser each went on to have profound effects on the Arab and Islamic worlds that still resonate today. Nasser became the effective leader of Egypt in 1954 and inspired domestic nationalization policies, regional panArab sentiment, as well as the ‘‘Third-World’’ nonaligned movement. Manifestations included the Egyptian state appropriation of the Suez Canal and the creation of the United Arab Republic, a formal union with Syria.11 Qutb, who developed a disdain for the lack of morality in the West after living in the United States, is said to be the ideological inspiration for some of today’s Islamist, militant groups. Qutb and the Brotherhood, however, did not fare as expected in Nasser’s new Egypt. After the coup, Qutb did briefly consult with the fledgling new regime, with a legitimate, if false, expectation of a Brotherhood share in power and due consideration for an Islamic state. Despite its cooperation, the Brotherhood failed to receive any meaningful government positions and a lack of genuine government contemplation for an Islamic society. Nasser understood the actual and potential power of the Brotherhood within and outside of Egypt, and he sought to eliminate any and all perceived threats to his authority. Thus, just a few months after its support for the 1952 coup, the Brotherhood once again found itself on the wrong side of the law, and Qutb, along with other members, was jailed. He was sentenced to 15 years of hard labor and served 10. While imprisoned, he endured and witnessed the appalling mistreatment of Brotherhood members—many were killed and more were tortured. Nasser’s larger crackdown forced many Brothers underground, and some left Egypt. Qutb’s prison experience further radicalized his thinking and led to a direct call for action. Qutb, a prolific writer, embodied this line of thinking in Ma’alim fi al-Tariq (Signposts along the Road, also known as Signposts or Milestones) that

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served as a critique of the existing state, a guide to changing it, and provided a model for replacing it with an Islamic one. In Signposts, he elaborated on the idea of jahiliyyah (traditionally, the ‘‘state of ignorance’’ before the revelation of Islam). For Qutb, Egypt was in such a ‘‘state,’’ and it was a conscious societal effort to stray from the Islamic path; he found much of the materialistic world in this same condition of ignorance. He thus called for jihad in its broad sense, a struggle on behalf of Allah. Signposts was published in 1964; by 1966, Qutb, along with other Muslim Brotherhood activists, was again under arrest for plotting a coup against Nasser. Egyptian police reportedly found copies of Signposts in all the homes of others who were investigated at the time. 12 Qutb was sentenced to death; he was hanged on August 29, 1966, with his followers regarding him as a martyr. .

Mutual Accommodation and State Repression

In the year following Qutb’s death, Egypt suffered another loss albeit of different proportions: the Six-Day War. On June 5, 1967, Israel attacked Egypt (and later Syria and Jordan) in what its leaders called a ‘‘preemptive strike.’’ In a matter of hours, Israel destroyed Egypt’s air force while its planes sat on the ground, defeated its army, and seized the Gaza Strip as well as the whole of the Sinai Peninsula. Egypt stood humiliated on the world stage and sought to reinvent itself domestically, restoring credibility. Egypt’s secular, nationalist path was perceived as leading to defeat and occupation. Islam was (and continues to be) the solution, according to the Brotherhood, for what has ailed Egypt—authoritarian politics, military defeat, and economic despair. In 1969, a book authored by al-Banna’s successor, Hassan Al-Hudaybi, Du’ah la Qudah (Preachers not Judges) was said to mark a profound shift away from Qutb’s understood notions of radical revolution and division between apostates or kafirs and believers (both within and outside of Islam). Instead, Hudaybi encouraged Muslims to work collectively and across society toward an Islamic state and promoted personal responsibility for one’s own adherence to Islamic codes. Dr. Mohamed Habib, Deputy Chairman of the Muslim Brotherhood, called the book one of the organization’s most recognized works and said it emphasized the group’s advocacy of peace and coexistence.13 Habib noted the book ‘‘laid an emphasis on the mistakes of extremist groups in understanding and interpreting Qutb’s ideas; such extremist groups misinterpreted Qutb’s views and adopted ideas contradicting the basic principles of MB [Muslim Brotherhood] group laid down by Imam Hassan al-Banna who adopted an approach based on peaceful democratic change, developmental societal work and political reform.’’14 After Nasser’s death in 1970, the Brotherhood and other Islamists reached new levels of accommodation under President Sadat as they were allowed to

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reorganize and regroup. Brotherhood members were released from prison, and they resumed publication (banned under Nasser) of their flagship publication al-Da’wa (The Call). During the 1970s, the Brothers also officially renounced violence, although they have said they never engaged in terrorism. They have acknowledged that members committed acts of violence against the state, but note that many charges have been manufactured by the government.15 During this time, the Brotherhood also pushed for the implementation of the shari’a as part of Egyptian law. At the same time, Sadat encouraged the formation of jama’at Islamiyya or Islamic student associations. Notably, Sadat was perceived as a pious, devout Muslim and began calling himself al-Ra’is al-Mu’min or the Believer President; however, his embrace of the Brotherhood was not per se due to personal, religious benevolence.16 Rather it was part of a grand political strategy to co-opt Islamists and use religion as an organizing tool, creating a power base and offsetting other opposition. Ultimately, in 1980, Sadat pressed for an amendment to article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution and declared the shari’a as the ‘‘principal source’’ of legislation. Nevertheless, the sum of Sadat’s actions served to embolden Islamists, including the Brotherhood, who became disillusioned with other state policies (again, Western orientation and fiscal failures) and saw his negotiation of ‘‘peace’’ with Israel, via the Camp David Accords of 1978, as traitorous. Remarkably, other Muslims were, at the same time, disillusioned with the Brotherhood, which had previously adopted a tone of moderation and practical accommodation with Sadat’s regime. Increasing criticism and activism from regime opponents in the late 1970s led to heightened and grossly disproportionate state repression, including efforts to place many mosques under state control and outlawing the activities of the then powerful jama’at Islamiyya. New formal Islamist groups, political and militant, were also forming, including al-Jama’a (or al-Gama’a) al-Islamiyya, better known as the Islamic Group. Sadat’s repression of Islamists reached new heights (or depths) in September 1981, when he ordered the detention of thousands, including many Muslim Brothers (as well as Christian leaders). One commentator wrote that Sadat morphed from the ‘‘paternalistic pious head of the Egyptian family to the single-minded, threatened, vindictive dictator who eliminates any criticism of him and any opposition to his programs.’’17 Weeks later, on October 6, 1981, Sadat was assassinated. Banned but Tolerated?

After Sadat’s assassination, President Hosni Mubarak sought to chart his own governance path while attempting to heed the stumbling blocks encountered by his predecessors. Initially, he tried to separate the ‘‘bad’’ militant Muslims (or those perceived as such) from the ‘‘good’’ moderate Muslims, i.e., the Muslim Brotherhood. In so doing, he hoped to delegitimize the radicals and prop up

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the Brethren and other centrists with the idea that he would have some control or receive acquiescence from them in exchange for their favored status. Nearly three decades later, Mubarak is still in power and government levels of tolerance have waxed and waned throughout the years. Mubarak has ended his initial ‘‘separation’’ between good and bad Muslims. Now all Islamists are bad, including the still banned but not much tolerated Muslim Brothers. One mechanism the Brotherhood used to circumvent its ‘‘open secret’’ nature was the forming of unofficial but very real alliances with established parties such as the New Wafd Party in 1984 and the Socialist Labour Party in 1987. Notably, the Wasat (Center) Party has tried (without success) since 1996 to receive government approval to operate openly and run in elections. The Party was formed when several ‘‘reformists’’ within the Brotherhood split off, after years of frustration with the powerful yet stagnant (in their minds) Islamist movement. History was made in 2005 when, for the first time, the Muslim Brotherhood (although still illegal) effectively campaigned under its own name, as candidates overtly promoted their affiliation and platform. They fielded approximately 150 candidates in a third of Egypt’s 222 constituencies (each of which has two seats, for a total of 444) and won 88 seats. The election was replete with controversy, exemplified by widespread fraud, mistreatment of voters and candidates by thugs and ‘‘gangs’’ (apparently protected, financed, or otherwise supported by the police and security forces), the police closure of many polling stations (seen as pro-Brotherhood), and the arrest of many Brotherhood members. One media report encapsulated two monitoring bodies’ experiences: ‘‘Violent behavior by a crowd of thugs. . .was clearly organised against us, and aimed to intimidate supporters of opposition candidates,’’ McMillan-Scott [head of the European Union monitors] said. . .The EASD [Egyptian Association for Supporting Democratic Development], which fielded 159 monitors to cover 23 districts in the elections’ first round, also reported incidents in which voters were intimidated by NDP supporters. In other areas, he said, allegations of vote buying were rife.18

The arrests of Brotherhood members and supporters in the run-up to and the conduct of the 2005 elections made headlines in Egypt and abroad. More than 1,000 Brothers were detained during the polling season. In the early months of 2007, hundreds of members were arrested and detained, dozens of whom faced military tribunals, from which there is no civilian appeal.19 In mid-2007, in the run-up to the Shura Council elections, the Committee for the Defense of the Detainees noted more than 600 detainees were held, not including those who were picked up and released.20 Also making headlines, albeit less prominent ones, was a perceived shift in U.S. posture toward the Brotherhood, as during the 2005 elections, a senior U.S. Department of State representative suggested American officials might be in touch with victorious members of the group. The official reportedly said, ‘‘I would expect us to meet with the independent candidates.’’21 However, the Department

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of State also noted the United States would respect Egyptian law prohibiting contacts with the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization, but noted Muslim Brotherhood candidates were elected as independents.22 At the conclusion of the 2005 parliamentary elections, the Washington Post stated in an editorial, President Bush should refuse to be spooked by Mubarak’s would-be boogeyman. Though the Muslim Brotherhood is indeed fundamentalist, it renounced violence decades ago and has joined with secular opposition groups in calling for a genuine parliamentary democracy in Egypt. ‘‘[W]e are serious about pushing forward the process of reform, actualizing democratic transformation and building a development renaissance on all fronts,’ said an essay published in Al-Ahram last week by a senior Brotherhood figure, Essam Erian. That’s an agenda the administration should be able to endorse— and promote as an example for other Islamic movements in the Middle East.’’23

Meanwhile, a Muslim Brotherhood leader denied the organization was approached by, or that it approached, the United States for talks. Brotherhood Supreme Guide Mohamed Mahdi Akef told Al-Ahram that his organization did not trust the United States, which wanted to reach out to the Brothers simply to engage in dialogue ‘‘to arouse people against us. They also know we will clash with them from the very first round because of their policies in Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine. As for the views in Washington to engage Islamists, again this is in the interests of the US administration. We don’t think they have anything to offer us that will be in our interest.’’24 And yet in March 2007, a U.S. congressional delegation, led by House of Representatives Majority Leader Steny Hoyer (D-Maryland), did meet with members of the Brotherhood who were elected to parliament. The seven Democrats and four Republicans convened with members of the Brotherhood’s parliamentary bloc, including its leader, Dr. Muhammad Sa’d al-Katatny. The meetings occurred at the parliament building and at the residence of the U.S. Ambassador to Egypt, Frank Ricciardone. In the latter half of 2007, a draft document widely referred to as a party platform emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood and sent observers scurrying to understand the meaning of positions proposed therein. In the program, the Brotherhood addresses a wide range of topics—from civil society and governance to foreign policy to the role of women.25 The draft document stressed the shari’a as the source of legislation (in line with the Egyptian Constitution), the value of shura (consultation between the rulers and the ruled), and the necessary role of Islam within a civil and civic society. Additionally, according to the Brotherhood, because shari’a would be implemented by the head of the Egyptian state, that person should be a Muslim, thereby excluding Copts from the presidency. Women were also excluded for the state’s highest office. The draft program adopted an unequivocally faith-based approach, which should not be surprising given that the Muslim Brotherhood is, above all else, an Islamic organization. Throughout the document, the principles of equality and social justice are stressed. Still, the program rightly caused apprehension.

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The head of the Al Ahram Center for Strategic and Political Studies said, ‘‘It establishes a religious state. . . .It’s an assassination to the civic state.’’26 Another respected analyst highlighted concerns about the treatment of certain topics. These included perpetuating the ambiguity between the movement and a future political party, interventionist economic policies, the actual implementation of shari’a, and what he termed the ‘‘undermining of the civil state.’’27 Criticism has also been internal. The Brotherhood’s political leader, Essam el-Erian, who was jailed as the draft emerged and the initial hullabaloo ensued, thought the text was released prematurely and proposed redrafting a point on the role of an Islamic religious commission and questioned the approach to women and non-Muslim political candidates. El-Erian generated an additional flurry of commentary when he stated, ‘‘If the MB [Muslim Brotherhood] were to ascend to government, they would recognize Israel and respect the treaties, but changes will be introduced into the Camp David Accord according to what suits us. This does not mean that we will declare war, but we will revise the agreements and treaties according to the Egyptian interests.’’28 Shortly thereafter, el-Erian clarified, ‘‘The MB has not and will not recognize Israel, because we can never recognize usurpation of land by force, and this is compatible with the shari’ah opinion and international conventions.’’29 However, he said, Any government inherits a legal situation that it is not allowed to change away from the constitutional mechanisms. Therefore, such a government has to resort to the Egyptian people represented by the elected parliament and popular referenda.. . .Any government elected according to the democratic criteria ought to adhere to the system and fulfill the [country’s] pledges and commitments until they are changed by democratic methods and constitutional means.30

One can certainly question whether the ‘‘slip’’ and subsequent clarification were intentional, designed to divert attention from the platform. However, it is also a possibility that the Muslim Brotherhood’s willingness to deal with the realities of the cold peace as a government was intended to show moderation and pragmatism in the face of concerns about its otherwise ‘‘conservative’’ draft document. In a mid-August 2007 interview, Brotherhood Deputy Supreme Guide Dr. Mohamed Habib said any future Muslim Brotherhood party would be but one aspect of the larger organization and that given the current political and legal context, party formation was not an option because the Political Parties Affairs Committee is an illegitimate entity. Moreover, according to Habib, the establishment of a party is not the end game; it is the change of the political situation that is key.31 In mid-November 2007, Habib addressed concerns about the platform. Key was that the role of a religious council would be consultative—seeking the nonbinding advice of shari’a scholars on a range of matters—with the actual legislative authority rightly resting with the People’s Assembly. He also stated the Brotherhood’s position on the proscription of Copts and women from the presidency was juristic (i.e., legal, not political).32

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Still, the Brotherhood draft platform has presented more questions than answers regarding the organization’s strategy and future. These include the following: Was the document a well-timed policy trial balloon designed to float a more conservative position to gauge reaction and/or appease certain segments of supporters? Was the program a draft inclusive of the collective leadership’s thought processes that was specifically released at a time when certain figures were imprisoned to offer plausible deniability in the wake of potential negative reactions? Alternatively, did the program and its timing indicate a serious existing or emergent split within the leadership or rank and file? Finally, did the Brotherhood intentionally offer a more conservative platform that would ultimately be liberalized so it could offer the willingness to revise as evidence of moderation and inclusion? In sum, the Brotherhood (or some therein) appears to be ratcheting up the role of Islam within the Egyptian state and society through the draft platform; whether this is mere rhetoric or a move toward making an Islamic state a reality remains to be seen. Subsequent revisions and indeed the finalized draft may close this paragraph of the Brotherhood’s internal political workings; however, the story is far from over. Debunking the Terrorism Label

The Muslim Brotherhood is regularly lumped into discussions and analyses of al-Qaeda and other militant groups by those who should know better. For example, Steve Emerson states, ‘‘The dream of a world under Islam has engendered Muslim dissidents everywhere in the world over the last two decades. Almost every Islamic country has its militant faction, often two or three. The Hamas of Palestine, Hizballah of Iran, the Islamic Salvation front and Armed Islamic Group of Algeria, An-Nahda of Tunisia, the Muslim Brotherhood and alGama’at al-Islamiyya of Egypt,. . .—all share the same goal of an Islamic world, or, as they refer to it, a Khilafah.’’33 Widely read New York Times editorialist Thomas Friedman cites Ma’moun Fandy’s analysis: ‘‘The world worries about highly enriched uranium, but ‘the real danger is highly enriched Islam’. . .That is, ‘highly enriched Sunnism’ and ‘highly enriched Shiism’ that eats away at the Muslim state, the way Hezbollah is trying to do in Lebanon or the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt or al-Qaeda everywhere.’’34 Applying a term like ‘‘highly enriched’’ to the Muslim Brotherhood and then sandwiching them between the most revered and reviled groups in the Middle East renders the organization itself radioactive in the eyes of his readers. Other attempts, intentional or not, to connect the dots between al-Qaeda and the Brotherhood include repeated mentioning of Qutb’s influence on Osama bin Laden and al-Zawahiri. For example, on the third anniversary of 9/11, the Washington Post published a story rife with provocative descriptors of the Brotherhood

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such as ‘‘sprawling and secretive’’ and incidents of their alleged linkages with U.S. law enforcement investigations of terrorism and terrorist financing.35 The reporters went on to say that Qutb who, ‘‘advocated militant jihad against nonbelievers and revolution against impure Muslim states, was hanged by Egypt in 1966. Qutb’s books would later provide the philosophical underpinning for jihadists such as bin Laden as well as many Islamists in this country.’’36 As noted above, Qutb has had a profound influence on the Brotherhood’s development; however, overlap in adherence to one man’s approach across space and time falls far short of scientific or legal proof of a current connection or fraternal affection. Fundamentally, al-Qaeda and the Brotherhood espouse very different types of jihad: the former advocates a jihad of violence; the latter supports political and social jihad. There are, however, several more general points missed in these and in many other analyses. First, the Brotherhood, as an organization, has steadfastly stood by its renunciation of violence for over 30 years. One researcher found the group’s nonviolent path concordant with its concerted efforts at democratic and constitutional change.37 An organization leader, Ahmed Hasanein, stated, ‘‘The Brethren are given credit for terrorism even if they condemn the act. This is a major injustice. It is wrong to accuse Islam for the activities of an individual who undertakes an action not approved by religion.’’38 Second, the Brothers and al-Qaeda have had an ongoing, public spat. In early January 2006, al-Zawahiri, often referred to as bin Laden’s number two man or the group’s chief strategist, released a videotape to the Al Jazeera media network. On the tape, he condemned Egypt’s then-recent elections, U.S. manipulation thereof, and insinuated that the Muslim Brotherhood had been co-opted by the process. According to a statement posted on the Brotherhood’s Web site, the deputy chief of the Brotherhood responded and said the Brotherhood has its own agenda for change and reform, which they believe, can only happen by peaceful means and through different legal and constitutional channels. Resorting to force will open the doors wide for evil and create a total chaos in which those who think they are more powerful can overthrow governments regardless of its legitimacy. . .the Muslim Brotherhood has long stated its acceptance of democracy and political pluralism as well as peaceful transfer of power through ballot boxes. [The] Brotherhood believes in empowering the people to choose their own leaders and govern themselves within the boundaries of Islamic law.39

Notably, the Brotherhood is not on the United Nations Security Council’s list of entities associated with al-Qaeda (and the Taliban).40 Nor is it on the United States government’s list of ‘‘Foreign Terrorist Organizations.’’41 The other militant organization with which the Muslim Brotherhood is frequently connected is Hamas and with good reason. They have a history; that is relatively undisputed. The development of their relationship over time, however, is another matter. Nebulous words such as ‘‘linked’’ or ‘‘connected’’ are frequently bandied about without clarification of their meaning.

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The birth of Hamas and the related role of the Brotherhood as parent or midwife are part of a complicated tale of Palestinian intrafactional politics and regional entanglements. As noted previously, the Brotherhood was involved in the Palestinian resistance to the Israeli occupation, specifically in the Gaza Strip, which Egypt controlled until the 1967 war, and it set up branches there starting in the mid-1940s. By the mid-to-late 1960s, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin was the leader of the movement there, and in 1973 the group set up al-Mujamma’ al-Islami (the Islamic Center), a hub of nonviolent, religious and educational activity. By the end of the decade, ‘‘the scope and organizational efficiency of the Mujamma’ made it the spearhead of the MB’s [Muslim Brotherhood’s] mainstream in the Gaza Strip.’’42 In the years that followed, issues related to the marginalization of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the emergence of Islamic Jihad, the 1987 eruption of the Intifada (the popular Palestinian uprising against the Israeli occupation), and concerns on the part of the rank and file, among others, led to the creation of the separate entity of Hamas, which would undertake other forms of resistance on behalf of Palestinians.43 Sheikh Yassin and others from the Brotherhood led Hamas; Yassin remained a prominent Hamas figure until Israel assassinated him in March 2004. In terms of their current relationship, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood lends rhetorical support to its brethren in Hamas. In March 2006, Supreme Guide Akef issued a statement in the wake of the Hamas electoral victories in the Occupied Territories, calling for support of Hamas. He said, Palestinians felt that their hope of liberation and sovereignty was diminishing. They searched and found a resisting group that was not influenced by worldly pleasures, not seeking posts, not giving up arms nor struggle. This group share the Palestinians their hard life, provide them with services in all fields of life, including health, education and culture. Its principles, methods and programs are derived from true Islam. So the Palestinians supported and trusted it in the municipal elections, then in the legislative one. Thus, it was the first liberating movement in the world to get to authority in a free parliamentary elections, and under occupation.44

In 2007, Palestinian rivalries between Hamas and the PLO factions grew to violent clashes that resulted in the collapse of a Palestinian ‘‘unity’’ government. Hamas effectively ‘‘took over’’ Gaza, and the PLO leader and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (of rival Fatah) dismissed Prime Minister Ismail Haniya (of Hamas) from office. Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood was reportedly called upon to mediate the situation. Abbas and Hamas Political Bureau Chief (in exile) Khaled Mish’al were said to have phoned Brotherhood leader Akef requesting his intercession to resolve the crisis.45 Notably, the Muslim Brotherhood refused to join a statement in Egypt’s parliament disparaging Hamas’ actions in Gaza. The group said the statement was ‘‘‘totally biased in favor of the rogue group from Fatah’ and urged Egyptian institutions against taking sides because it ‘threatens the Palestinian cause.’’’46

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Thus while one can conclude that in decades past some Brotherhood members engaged in violence against the Egyptian state and supported Palestinian resistance to the establishment of the State of Israel, there is little if any evidence to support the application of the word ‘‘terrorist’’ to the group today. Indeed, it has stood by its renunciation of violence and supported peaceful, democratic, constitutional change in Egypt. The Brotherhood as a Social Welfare Provider

The Muslim Brotherhood has long held mutually self-reinforcing roles in national politics and social service in Egypt. The group is, in fact, both a political and a social organization, an opposition movement, and a community welfare agency. The Muslim Brotherhood has been particularly active in the areas of health care and education. The organization and its supporters run schools, hospitals, day-care facilities, job training centers, tutoring programs, Qur’anic instruction classes, after-school activities, and numerous others. Even U.S. President George W. Bush recognized the strategic importance of its role. In discussing trepidations about the level of U.S. engagement in the Middle East, he explained, ‘‘I’m concerned because I believe it will be a missed opportunity to help people realize that—if you’ve got a Muslim Brotherhood doing a better job of providing health care and education, the way to deal with that is to do a better job than they are, as opposed to ignoring the realities on the ground.’’47 An observer noted the Brotherhood has ‘‘built considerable grass-roots support by providing much needed social services in impoverished areas. Such activities have earned it a reputation for competence and honesty, often in contrast to the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), popularly perceived as selfserving and corrupt.’’48 One of the group’s most notable successes in the provision of social services was in the wake of the October 1992 earthquake in Egypt as it was the quickest to provide relief, quicker by far than even the Egyptian army and the government.49 Indeed, ‘‘The Brotherhood’s engineering and medical branches built shelters and medical tents that served thousands of victims. The group’s growing financial resources provided for an influx of food, clothing, and blankets, and the Brotherhood even donated US$1,000 to every newly homeless family in the city. The municipal government’s response had been slow, giving the Brotherhood an opportunity to promote its own cause.’’50 Muslim Brotherhood members also are very much involved in capitalist ventures, such as factories, investment companies, and agricultural enterprises. Brothers are found in all circles of Egyptian public and private life, including the army, universities, medical and legal professions, and government agencies. The Brothers also are quite successful in union elections. Their candidates have dominated (until the government began to reverse this trend in the early 1990s) the executive boards of lawyers’, doctors’, and engineers’ syndicates (unions).

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The Muslim Brotherhood has historical resonance, organizational capacity, intellectual and humanitarian motivation, as well as a tested and sustained popular base of support to make it the single-most important opposition force in Egypt in recent decades. Moreover, it has a stated commitment to democratic change. According to a leading Brother, I feel our commitment to democracy should not be the real concern of Western intellectuals and policymakers; our belief in democratic processes is ideological not tactical. The real concern should be the negative impact of government crackdowns on moderates and the entire democratic process in the Middle East. The Muslim Brotherhood is a moderate, mainstream movement that is capable of overshadowing radical ideologies, yet we are only able to do so effectively in an atmosphere of freedom.51

While the Muslim Brotherhood is a ‘‘clear and present danger’’ to the governing regime, the threat posed is strictly political (as it has been for decades), in stark contrast to those discussed below. MILITANT RESISTANCE

Making one’s way through the mass of information about militant groups in Egypt is a bit like trying to find a route through a maze: There is no clear-cut path, and so-called facts can be misleading. Obstacles presented include the various names used by or ascribed to the two main organizations, Islamic Group and EIJ; overlapping membership; and questionable attributions of credit and/or responsibility. To add to the confusion, groups have also reinvented themselves and their agendas over time to respond to internal and external political constraints and opportunities. Militant organizations also have become quite adept at public relations and have a stake in perpetuating various ‘‘truths,’’ as they may want to shore up certain perceptions while sweeping others under the proverbial carpet. Governments too have a role as they may minimize or maximize the nature of the threat to justify a range of counterterrorist policies. Arising out of the urban center of Cairo and such Upper Egyptian towns as Asyut and Minia, Egypt’s militant groups have been both victimizers and victims. They assassinated one president, attempted to kill another, and they have massacred tourists and terrorized Coptic Christians. They have also joined forces beyond Egypt’s borders as they were a part of the Arab resistance to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and certain individuals had a significant role in the 9/11 attacks. This time period and environment are known, of course, for spawning al-Qaeda, an organization whose ‘‘strategist in chief ’’ (al-Zawahiri) has been a member of EIJ. Indeed, both groups have been intertwined with the myth and reality that is al-Qaeda through purported mergers and organizational splits. As targets of the state, they have also endured tremendous repression at the hands of Egyptian state security forces. As noted above, Egypt’s leaders have intermittently sought to play the Islamist card when it has suited them, while at

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other times bringing the weight of the state to painfully bear down on militant (and political) groups. The Islamic Group Background

Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (‘‘the Islamic Group’’) is a factionally divided Egyptian militant organization, with one branch adhering to cease-fires in the late 1990s and another affiliating itself with Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda. The group is also referenced as GAI, EIG, al-Gama’a al-Islamiya, Jama’a al-Islamiya, and al-Jama’at al-Islamiyya. Herein the group will be termed al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya or the Islamic Group. The Islamic Group became active in the mid-to-late 1970s and has had a national focus. It grew out of Egypt’s aforementioned religious student organizations (jama’aat Islamiyya), which had taken different organizational and philosophical tacks. In the 1980s, they ‘‘recruited heavily among the unemployed young graduates of the new rural universities of the Nile valley and these new cadre were able to mobilize the rural or recently urbanized poor using, in an echo of contemporaneous anti-Shia agitation in Pakistan, violent rhetoric directed at local Coptic Christians.’’52 Two tales have emerged about the evolution of the group, and the truth is likely a combination of both. According to an Islamic Group head, Tal’at Fu’ad Qasim, some leaders actually left the Islamic Group and joined the Muslim Brotherhood in the late 1970s.53 Contrastingly, others have said the organization is an offshoot of the Brotherhood, and some Brotherhood members, disillusioned with their politically oriented approach, were said to have broken ranks to join more militant groups. Sadat initially adopted ‘‘the enemy of my enemy approach’’ and gave the Islamic Group (and others) wide latitude to offset leftist political opposition movements in Egypt. (Recall that Sadat also encouraged the jama’aat.) Clearly, the Islamic Group has a vested interest in being historically perceived as a true resistance movement rather than a pawn of the state. Accordingly, Qasim says charges of state support are pure ‘‘Propaganda.. . .In fact, al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya was the only organization to confront the state. Many members suffered as a consequence.’’54 By the early 1980s, Sadat’s Egypt was troubled on many fronts. Class divisions deepened, students were demonstrating, and the Islamist movements he supported were growing, providing fertile soil for political discussions and dissent.55 Sadat ultimately reversed course and targeted the Islamic Group and other organizations, jailing their leaders. This culminated in a major crackdown in September 1981. A month later Sadat was assassinated when several soldiers emerged from a military vehicle and charged the presidential reviewing stand during a commemorative parade.

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One can find different groups credited with taking part in Sadat’s killing. The Islamic Group, by its own admission, is a culprit. After attempting to assassinate President Mubarak in 1995, the group issued a statement that said ‘‘The Islamic Group, which was honored with carrying out the will of God against Sadat because of his apostasy, injustice and betrayal of Islam, was obliged to implement the will of God on Mubarak the Unblessed because he went even further down the same path.’’56 The news report that printed the statement, however, said observers were skeptical of the claim because EIJ had been long considered responsible. The Islamic Group’s Qasim asserts, ‘‘Gama’at al-Jihad had no role in the assassination of al-Sadat or the events in Asyut; al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya was responsible. Jihad was simply caught up in the arrest campaign in 1981, and we met in prison. They are brothers and have exerted efforts in this sacred struggle. But they had no role in the events of 1981.’’57 In 2006, 25 years after Sadat’s death, Nageh Ibrahim (a leader of the Islamic Group), was released after being jailed for two decades for his part in the assassination plot. He stated, ‘‘If I could turn back time, we wouldn’t have killed Sadat. We would have appreciated his value.’’58 One of Egypt’s leading scholars, Mustapha Kamel al-Sayyid, says the two groups actually merged in 1981, after which Sadat was assassinated. They purportedly split in 1984 because of leadership differences.59 The Egyptian government’s State Information Service states vaguely that Sadat ‘‘was assassinated by Muslim extremists while reviewing a military parade commemorating the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973.’’60 Among those having served time for Sadat’s assassination was Sheikh Omar Abd al-Rahman, also known as the Blind Sheikh, who was subsequently convicted and jailed for life in the United States for his role in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. In the 1980s, Sheikh Rahman was part of an international group of radical Muslim activists who were in Pakistan and Afghanistan to help oust the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. Other key figures present at the time were Osama bin Laden, Abdallah Azzam, and fellow Egyptians al-Zawahiri and Mohamed Atta.61 Rahman has served as the spiritual guide to the Islamic Group, as well as to EIJ. In the 2006 interview with Nageh Ibrahim, he was asked about Rahman’s position within the organization. Ibrahim stated they were demanding his extradition to Egypt because we still remember his words when he said that he would very much rather be imprisoned in Egypt than in the United States. Dr. Omar Abdul-Rahman still is the overall Amir of the EIG, no one has removed him, Sheikh Karam Zuhdi is the chairman of the EIG Shura Council, and his relationship with Dr. Omar Abdul-Rahman is good. Some people might not know that Sheikh Omar was the one who selected Sheikh Karam to assume this position. Sheikh Omar still is the symbol of the EIG; we respect and appreciate him. Furthermore, as a group we have a great capacity for loyalty, and we have never denied anyone.62

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It is unclear how Rahman is leading from a prison cell, and let alone one that is in the United States. Notably, his attorney, Lynn Stewart, was convicted (many believe unjustly) of providing material support to a terrorist organization for publicizing messages he provided to her in prison. Major Attacks and Government Responses

The Islamic Group had several targets trained in its proverbial sights; they ranged from government officials to Coptic Christians to those critical of its approach to change and its interpretation of Islam. However, according to an expert observer, ‘‘The violent attacks between 1981–1997 focused solely on the Egyptian regime, and the organisation refrained from targeting regimes, organisations or individuals outside Egypt. Al-Gama’a’s literature never indicated it had any regional, let alone international, aspirations.’’63 Ascertaining responsibility for militant attacks in Egypt is easier said than done. Although the Islamic Group and EIJ have been two of the more active groups, there are others of varying cohesion, sophistication, and endurance. Further, groups have strategic reasons for claiming responsibility for violence, forgoing it, or in some cases attributing violence to others. To compound the problem, some news accounts from the 1990s attributed attacks to nebulous groups of ‘‘Islamic militants.’’ Finally, although Egypt has detained and convicted many, many militants over the years, human rights abuses inflicted in the investigative process, including the persistent use of torture, undermine many prosecutions and thus subsequent understandings of the ‘‘facts.’’ That being said, there are significant attacks for which Islamic Group responsibility is alleged or apparent that bear mentioning. In November 1992, the New York Times reported, The militants’ declaration of war on foreign tourists has already threatened an industry that pumps $3 billion a year into the Egyptian economy. The militants are also driving Coptic Christians, who make up 10 percent of Egypt’s population of 56 million, from rural villages, and they have cowed many of their critics with the assassination in June of Farag Foda, a well-known anti-fundamentalist writer.64

During his unsuccessful campaign for a parliamentary seat in 1990, Foda said, ‘‘I’m fighting terrorism. I’m not fighting the people who pray, but I’m fighting the people who abandoned dialogue and who fight now with the Kalashnikov.’’65 Two years later, in 1992, masked men on motorcycles killed him with a barrage of bullets in broad daylight, while his son and a companion who were with him were wounded. The Islamic Group claimed responsibility, and more than a dozen members were tried for his murder. They justified his murder by saying it was their ‘‘Islamic duty’’ to kill such an apostate.66 Then in 1993, a series of nail-bomb attacks took place. The Islamic Group specifically denied responsibility for one that went off in a cafe´ and resulted in four deaths and more than a dozen wounded, the majority non-Egyptians.

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In addition to proclaiming innocence regarding the attack, the group’s statement interestingly added, ‘‘The Gama’a has carried out about 20 operations targeting the tourist industry and the casualties among the tourists themselves were negligible, in accordance with our policy of ‘tourism, not tourists.’’’67 By June 1993, the death and injury tolls were climbing and bombs were still exploding. An attack in an economically challenged Cairo suburb of Shubra killed seven and wounded 20. The Islamic Group was perceived by some, including the government, as responsible for this and other attacks. This was despite previous pronouncements to the contrary, a failure to claim responsibility for the incident, and a comment by its lawyer that the attack ran contrary to the Islamic Group’s aims.68 Moreover, poor Egyptians have been among the more sympathetic to the Group’s cause. Others, meanwhile, raised serious questions about the ultimate beneficiary—the government—that was able to wield a much heavier hand against Islamists because of public disgust over the attacks. In 1995, the Islamic Group claimed responsibility (although EIJ was also implicated) for an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate President Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. In a prepared news release, the Group said members did it to ‘‘save the Egyptian people who are now living in a state of poverty and distress.’’69 Initially, Egypt blamed Sudan for the attack; Sudan at that time was led by Hassan Turabi, who had hosted and harbored both bin Laden and al-Zawahiri. Here, too, the truth is likely somewhere in between. Veteran observer Burke notes, In April 1995 al-Zawahiri chaired a meeting in Khartoum [Sudan] attended by members of both al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya and Islamic Jihad. The continuing violence in Egypt had provoked a massive response from the authorities and the militant groups were suffering heavy losses as tens of thousands of Islamic activists, few of whom were actually connected to terrorists, were rounded up. Despite al-Zawahiri’s efforts, the groups failed to reconcile their differences and al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya decided to attempt a spectacular attack on President Mubarak.70

The leader of the Islamic Group’s effort was said to work in one of bin Laden’s Sudanese business ventures, although he was not an al-Qaeda member.71 Back in Egypt, the following year, masked men opened fire on a group of Greek tourists in front of Cairo’s Europa Hotel. The tourists were waiting to board a bus in the Giza district, not far from the pyramids. The Islamic Group claimed responsibility and said the attack was intended for Israeli travelers in retaliation for events in Lebanon. The Group’s members were apparently taken aback when they found out their targets had been Greek, and they were wrongly informed.72 A Cessation of Violence and a Splitting of the Ranks

By mid-1997, the tide was beginning to turn as imprisoned leaders of the Islamic Group and EIJ called for a cessation of hostilities against Egypt. The statement was directed

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‘‘to all our brothers to halt military operations inside and outside the country.’’ The highly publicized signed statement was read at the July 5 opening session of a military court trial of over ninety civilians, including five women. The government was reportedly unresponsive to this call for a unilateral cease-fire, and it was not heeded by some cadres on the ground, as violence intensified.73

Then, in September 1997, militants hurled a petrol bomb and directed machine gun fire at a tourist bus in front of the Egyptian Museum in Cairo. Among the ten dead were six German tourists and four others. The day after the attack, some international media reported the Islamic Group was believed to be behind the attack. The Egyptian government initially suspected a man released from a mental hospital, where he was incarcerated for a previous attack on tourists, and his brother.74 The two were subsequently executed. Just two months later, in November 1997, in a widely condemned attack, some members of Islamic Group undertook the infamous assault at Luxor (Egypt). They killed scores of international tourists and several Egyptians. The Islamic Group distributed a report (a regular issuance) after the attack; therein it conveyed regret about the casualties and noted the incident was not sanctioned by the Group. 75 Speaking of the Luxor attack several years later, a former member of the Islamic Group’s Shura Council, Usamah Rushdi, said, I became convinced that Shaykh Rifa’i Taha (May God secure his release) made a big mistake when he issued a statement on the night of the incident claiming responsibility because he heard of it only from the radio and did not have any prior knowledge or was responsible for it. But he tried to exploit the incident politically and that was an unsuccessful stand on his part. It put the IG [Islamic Group] in a big quandary and saddled it with a burden it could not and were unable to bear, namely, the bad consequences resulting from the killing of this number of foreigners who had nothing to do with the issue.76

After the Luxor attacks, the Islamic Group again called for a cessation of fighting and formally renounced violence in 2002.77 In September 2003, Egypt freed more than 1,000 of the group’s members. Another 900 (or more) members were released in April 2006, including founder Nageh Ibrahim. However, the group’s moves toward moderation apparently crystallized a rift or split within the group, as evinced by the Luxor attack. Organizations such as the Center for Defense Information and the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism state that Mustafa Hamza, supportive of nonviolence with Egypt, leads one faction, while Rifa’i Taha Musa, who supports continued attacks, leads another.78 Taha, along with Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and others, signed the World Islamic Front statement (of 1998) calling for the death of Americans and their allies.79 For this deed, Taha was reportedly removed from the Islamic Group’s Shura Council and forced to withdraw from the statement not long after signing it.80 Taha was allegedly replaced by Hamza who was also a leader of the military wing and reportedly involved in the assassination attempt on Mubarak in Addis Ababa.

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In early 2005 Egypt confirmed Hamza was in custody.81 In the years leading up to his official detention, Taha had apparently ‘‘disappeared’’ or was extradited from Syria and then taken into Egyptian custody. His wife had said she was unable to confirm his whereabouts for several months. Regarding the various disputes, she stated he resigned from the Islamic Group’s Shura Council to give others a chance to lead, and his issues with the cessation of violence were issues over process, not substance. 82 The intrigue deepened in 2004 when the London-based Islamic Al-Maqrizi Centre said Taha was indeed in an Egyptian prison; however, he had not been executed (in accordance with a prior sentence).83 During an interview with the imprisoned leadership, Karam Zuhdi and Ibrahim said they heard Taha was in prison and that he did have reservations about the ‘‘peace’’ initiative and had been dismissed from the Council. However, in 2006, Ibrahim, now out of prison, attempted to explain, ‘‘Rifa’i Taha is a member of the EIG Shura Council. When he was released from prison he was objecting to the initiative; however, after that he agreed to the initiative when he was arrested in 2001. Later on, the initiative was the reason for sparing him the enforcement of two in absentia death sentences. Despite this previous disagreement, Taha did not split from the EIG, because we, in the EIG, do not have any dissidents.’’84 One can thus surmise that the Islamic Group leadership has had reservations about Taha; however, it has a greater strategic interest in preserving the appearance of organizational integrity, particularly now that many key members are out of prison and face different leadership challenges. In August 2006, controversy erupted when al-Qaeda’s al-Zawahiri, in a videotaped message, said his group had joined forces with the Islamic Group. The al-Qaeda leader said that some in the Egyptian organization had lost their way and had placated their own government as well as that of the United States; however, others, such as their spiritual leader, Sheikh Rahman, had remained true to the cause, and it was those who held steadfast in the group’s mission who were joining with al-Qaeda to stand against ‘‘the enemies of Islam: The Crusaders, the Jews, and their treacherous agents.’’85 Al-Zawahiri introduced Mohamed Hakaima in the video as a key player in Gama’a; however, Diaa Rashwan, an expert at the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, said, ‘‘I think he doesn’t represent anybody here in the country,’’ and described him as a ‘‘low-ranking member.’’86 According to al-Jazeera, ‘‘Egypt analysts have downplayed al-Zawahiri’s announcement that a ‘big faction’ of the Gamaa had switched over, saying there was no evidence al-Qaeda had major support within the group’s ranks.’’87 In response, the Islamic Group issued its own statement published on its Web site that stated, The Egyptian Al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyah asserts the incorrectness of the Al-Zawahiri statement that was broadcast on Al-Jazirah in regards to the joining of Al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyah to Al-Qa’ida organization, and denies the statement on the whole and in

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its details . . .. All that is left to say is that al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyah and the Al-Qa’ida organization are in a profound disagreement on the way they look at the reality, the goals they target, and the strategies they plan.88

In an interview, Zuhdi was asked if he was concerned some members might join al-Qaeda; he replied, ‘‘I have no fear at all, God be praised. Al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyah is a very strong group, very cohesive and firm.’’89 Egyptian Islamic Jihad

Egytian Islamic Jihad is also known as EIJ (or also as EIG, with ‘‘Gehad’’ the Egyptian version of Jihad), Islamic Jihad, Al-Jihad (al-Gehad), or the Jihad (or Gehad) Group. It is known for its attacks against targets outside of Egypt and is infamous for its role in the assassination of President Sadat and its connection to, or indeed ‘‘merger’’ with, al-Qaeda. Beginnings

The evolution of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad is quite murky and evokes disagreement. Tanzim al-Jihad, considered by some to be an alias or precursor organization, was founded in Alexandria in the 1970s by a Jordanian student, Slaim al-Rahhal, and Hasan Halawi.90 Fawaz A. Gerges states that the Jihad Group ‘‘evolved into Tanzim al-Jihad (widely known as Egyptian Islamic Jihad).’’91 The manifestation of the two, major distinct groups, Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Group, according to Kepel, arose out of Sadat’s 1977 so-called peacemaking trip to Jerusalem. Thereafter, the jama’at islamiyya stepped up their verbal assault on the regime, but no real action was proposed to the troops; jama’at violence took the form of physical action against morals offences by couples, musical recitals, film shows and so on. These acts turned the campuses into terra islamica, but there was nevertheless a chasm between word and deed of which those who later became Jihad militants were well aware.92

Among the key actors were Mohammed ‘Abd al-Salam Faraj (Farag), who played an indispensable role in EIJ’s development as its primary ideologue and leader, and Abbud al-Zumur, who served as a military and strategic planner. Faraj’s most famous or infamous work was Al-Jihad: Al-Farida al-Gha’iba (Holy War: The Neglected Duty or Holy War: The Missing Religious Precept). Therein, Faraj picked up on the ideas of Qutb and expounded the on the principle of jihad, which he viewed as armed struggle. He believed jihad was an obligation on par with the other five pillars or precepts of Islam—fasting/sawm, pilgrimage/hajj, prayer/salah, the declaration of faith/Shahadah, and almsgiving/zakat. Although both works built on that of the Muslim Brotherhood’s al-Banna, they are also in contrast as he emphasized the civil nature of jihad as a personal and social struggle. In Faraj’s jihad, he sought to supplant the apostate regime and replace it with an Islamist one.

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The Changing Face of the Struggle

Sadat’s assassination in 1981 was a key turning point for the Islamic Group and EIJ, both in terms of their reported roles and the impact that their leaders’ imprisonment had on the future of militancy in Egypt and around the globe. Al-Zumur was said to be a primary conspirator along with Zuhdi (the aforementioned member of the Islamic Group). Khaled al-Islambuli actually carried out the killing, apparently in revenge for his brother’s arrest and torture during the infamous roundup of September 1981. Notably, his brother was in the Islamic Group, and he was said to be involved with EIJ. Faraj, Khaled al-Islambuli, and his accomplices were all executed in April 1982. While in prison, members of the EIJ (and the Islamic Group) engaged in a process of reorganization. During this period, al-Zawahiri rose to public prominence during his incarceration, as he became a fiery spokesperson for those detained and he spoke English, so he could communicate to an external audience. From a relatively young age, al-Zawahiri actively consorted with others who were impatient for change and sought to create a ‘‘true’’ Islamic state, and early on he became involved with a group called Yehya Hashim.93 After al-Zawahiri’s release in 1984 (he served only three years), he left Egypt and went on to Saudi Arabia and then to Pakistan, as he stepped into the role for which he is most infamous: Osama bin Laden’s strategic and religious advisor, leading to his role as a key figure in what would become al-Qaeda. As previously noted, a number of militant Egyptians also went to South Asia to assist the Afghanis; these Egyptians, along with Saudis and other Arabs, came to form the so-called ‘‘Arab Afghans.’’ Burke states, ‘‘The Egyptians were known as ‘thinkers and the brains’ among the Arab Afghans.’’94 He goes on to cite an Egyptian filmmaker who spent much time with bin Laden and the militant Egyptian Essam Deraz, ‘‘bin Laden had followers but they weren’t organized. The people with Zawahiri had extraordinary capabilities —doctors, engineers, soldiers. They had experience in secret work. They knew how to organize themselves and create cells. And they became the leaders.’’95 The early-to-mid 1990s are peppered with accounts of EIJ members’ and organizational activities, primarily outside of Egypt. EIJ developed a different track record of attacks than the Islamic Group; the former focused more on international targets and high-level officials, although there is more than one instance in which the latter claimed responsibility for an attack, but others held EIJ responsible. Examples include the Egyptian Embassy bombing in Islamabad, Pakistan, which killed more than a dozen and injured many more, and the attempted assassination of Mubarak in Addis Ababa. EIJ members had reportedly moved to Ethiopia in the years prior to the attempt on Mubarak’s life and attempted to blend in with the locals.96 On the domestic front, the October 1990 assassination of one of the highestlevel Egyptian leaders, Speaker of the Parliament Rifaat al-Mahgoub, was initially

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believed to have been carried out by the Palestinian group Abu Nidal. According to the New York Times, ‘‘Though some speculated that Egyptian Muslim fundamentalists were behind the attack, President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt said a week before the murder that Iraq had sent agents to Egypt to carry out sabotage. Baghdad has denied any link to the attack. Abu Nidal is believed to be based in Iraq.’’97 Not long thereafter, however, Mubarak focused security forces’ attention inward. He rounded up hundreds if not thousands of so-called Islamists and their supporters in an effort to rout extremism. EIJ was ultimately held responsible and members were said to confess. EIJ’s ‘‘domestic’’ attacks all but ceased in 1993 subsequent to two other assassination attempts, the first against Interior Minister Hassan Al-Alfi and the second against Prime Minister Atef Sedky. In February 1998, when al-Zawahiri signed the statement of the World Jihad Jews and Crusaders, he did so as the emir of the Jihad Group in Egypt. After holding the United States responsible for a variety of crimes and sins in the Middle East and elsewhere, the statement calls on Muslims to attack Americans and their allies as part of their duty.98 One analytic report stated, The move caused another split within EIJ. Some members were already critical of al-Zawahiri for not concentrating sufficient resources on the group’s initial aim of overthrowing the Egyptian government. An estimated 200 al-Zawahiri loyalists based in Afghanistan remained with him, and became increasingly inter-linked with other Al-Qaeda factions. In 1999, evidence at a trial of Islamists (which convicted al-Zawahiri in absentia) in Egypt claimed that it was Osama bin Laden who was instrumental in persuading the EIJ to abandon attacks on the Egyptian government, which he believed were too costly and difficult, and to concentrate on anti–US activities.99

EIJ (specifically al-Zawahiri’s followers therein) and al-Qaeda ‘‘merged’’ in 2001 (although some sources say 1998). EIJ is often referenced as al-Zawahiri’s group, and his ‘‘faction’’ or those loyal to him are sometimes termed Vanguards of the Conquest (or Talai’ al-Fatah) when they are not otherwise lumped in with al-Qaeda. Recall that in 1997, imprisoned leaders of EIJ (and the Islamic Group) called for a cessation of hostilities against Egypt. The statement was directed ‘‘to all our brothers to halt military operations inside and outside the country.’’ Nabil Muhammad al-Mughrabi, a founder of EIJ, released a statement through his lawyer in July 2000 and said, ‘‘Relying on a clear religious stand, out of full conviction, and for the sake of Islam and the Muslims, I support the initiative to halt military operations, which the historic leaders of the AlJama’ah al-Islamiyah [the Islamic Group] launched in July 1997.’’100 Clearly, calls for cessations of hostilities from imprisoned leaders may be due to ulterior motives; however, given organizational factionalism, they are particularly noteworthy.

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LOOKING BEYOND THE ISLAMIC GROUP AND EIJ

As noted earlier, militancy in Egypt has not been restricted to EIJ and the Islamic Group, although they are the most often discussed. After a post-Luxor respite from major violence, Egypt was once again rocked by militant attacks in 2004. On October 7, 2004, a truck bomb detonated at the Hilton Hotel in Taba in the Sinai, a spot frequented by Israeli tourists. Two other bombs exploded at Ra’s al-Shitan, a camping area also popular with Israelis. Dozens were killed and more than 150 were wounded. Various groups claimed ‘‘credit’’; they included the Tawhid Islamic Brigades; al-Jama’ah al-Islamiya; and the Battalions of the Martyr Abdullah Azzam, Al-Qa’eda in the Levant and Egypt. A Palestinian, a Sinai Bedouin, and Egyptian militants were identified at varying points of the investigation as being responsible. Several others were implicated in various levels of involvement as thousands were rounded up and detained in the wake of the blasts. In early April 2005, a reported ‘‘suicide bomber’’ killed four people in Cairo after a homemade nail bomb exploded near tourists in the Khan al-Khalili bazaar. The dead were two French, one American, and the attacker; the wounded numbered nearly 20. A group calling itself the Islamic Glory Brigades in the Land of the Nile claimed responsibility. The group said the attack was undertaken in protest of the regime’s tyranny and U.S. regional policies.101 In late April 2005 two attacks occurred near major tourist attractions. Near the beginning of rush hour, Ehab Yousri Yassin threw himself off the ‘‘6 October flyover’’ (bridge) while holding a nail bomb that exploded. He landed in Abdel-Moneim Riyad Square in downtown Cairo, killing himself and injuring several others. Yassin was being chased by policemen when he jumped from the bridge. A short while later on the same day, two women, his sister and fiance´e, opened fire on a tour bus. According to police, the two women then fatally shot themselves (or one shot the other before killing herself ). Allegations of links between these attacks and the incident at the Kahn al-Khalili bazaar were alleged. In late July 2005, the resort city of Sharm el-Sheikh in the Sinai bore the brunt of militant dissatisfaction and coordination as three locations came under attack. One bomb attack occurred at the Ghazala Gardens Hotel, the second at a parking lot not far away near another hotel and nightspots, and a third at an outdoor cafe´ in the Old Market. The human toll was tallied at more than 80 dead and approximately 130 wounded. Al-Qaeda was blamed and the Martyr Abdallah Azam Brigades, Mujahidu Misr, Sinai Martyr’s Group, and Al-Tawhid WalJihad all claimed responsibility. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy noted, ‘‘The Taba bombings took place on October 7, one day after the anniversary of the 1973 war between Egypt and Israel. Mubarak portrays himself as a hero of that war, and the Taba bombings struck a border town that is popular with Israeli tourists and a frequent site for Israeli-Arab peace talks.’’102

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An analyst from Egypt’s Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies sagely observed, Over the past nine months, bombings have taken place in Taba, Sharm el-Sheikh, Al-Azhar and Abdel-Moneim Riad Square in Cairo. It is tempting to lump the four attacks together but that would be a mistake. The attacks in Abdel-Moneim Riad and Al-Azhar were randomly planned, individually motivated, amateurishly conducted, and involved homemade explosives. In Taba and Sharm al-Sheikh, sophisticated explosives were used against multiple targets and with deadly effect. This was another caliber of operations altogether.103

LOOKING FORWARD

In terms of security, the only threat posed by the Muslim Brotherhood is political. The Brotherhood has succeeded, despite the repressive efforts of the state, because it offers a positive alternative to the ruling, ineffectual, corrupt National Democratic Party. That alternative is a potent and (culturally and politically) legitimate combination of religion, politics, and social services. The Muslim Brotherhood’s record of popular victories and platform of ‘‘Islam Is the Solution’’ resonates because the Egyptian government and the international community have failed the people of Egypt. The Brotherhood, like any political actor, is not perfect; however, it is also not an Islamist bogeyman that should be feared, except perhaps electorally. The physical threat posed by militants is obviously more acute. Mubarak’s regime, however, has exaggerated the magnitude of the ‘‘Islamic threat’’ in order to crush a broad category of opponents, both the small minority of militants as well as the larger, nonviolent opponents it ‘‘fears.’’ Still, Mubarak enjoys significant international attention and substantial assistance and so has continued his repressive policies relatively unchecked. Meantime, the militants are in disarray and some confusion. The Islamic Group has distanced itself from al-Qaeda and renounced violence. EIJ, or at least the faction of it that joined al-Qaeda, has moved on to other international targets, which is where much of its agenda had long focused. The sporadic attacks, horrific as they are, do not appear to indicate the emergence of a new, major group with much staying power. In an ideal world, Egypt’s current militant threat could be countered with oldfashioned police and investigative work and the support and engagement of communities across Egypt. However, the Egyptian people have little reason to trust, let alone cooperate with, the state, which has for too long engaged in the politics of fear. NOTES 1. Mohamed Mahdi Akef, ‘‘Muslim Brotherhood’s Statement over Raids, Detentions,’’ January 9, 2007, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/Article.asp?ID=670&SectionID=70. 2. Abduh Zaynah, ‘‘Dr. Najih Ibrahim of the Egyptian Islamic Group Talks to Asharq AlAwsat,’’ IshwanWeb.com, August 14, 2006 (Najih in Egyptian dialect is often spelled Nageh),

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Global Security Watch—Egypt http://www.ikhwanweb.com/Home.asp?zPage=Systems&System=PressR&Press=Show&Lang =E&ID=5002. 3. There are not any significant secular threats to Egypt’s national security. 4. Douglas Jehl, ‘‘70 Die in Attack at Egypt Temple,’’ New York Times, November 18, 1997, LexisNexis. 5. Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Egypt: Muslim Brothers Arrested Ahead of Elections,’’ May 30, 2007, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/05/30/egypt16018.htm. 6. Ibid. 7. Hasan al-Banna, Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949): A Selection from the Majmu’at Rasa’il al-Imam al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna, trans. and annot. Charles Wendell (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 48. 8. John Esposito, Islam the Straight Path (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 154. 9. Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969). 10. Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh (Berkeley: University of California Berkeley Press, 1993), 28. 11. The United Arab Republic existed until Syria seceded in 1961; however, Egypt continued to use the name until 1971. 12. Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt, 42. 13. ‘‘An Interview with Ayman al-Zawahri’s Uncle,’’ September 15, 2006, IkhwanWeb.com, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/Home.asp?zPage=Systems&System=PressR &Press=Show&Lang=E&ID=5180. 14. Ibid. 15. Saliih ’Abd al-Maqsiid, ‘‘Ten Charges against the Society [Muslim Brotherhood].’’ Liwa’ al-Islam, February 1989, 14, in Sana Abed Kotob, ‘‘The Accomodationists Speak: Goals and Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt,’’ International Journal of Middle East Studies 27, no. 3 (August 1995). 16. See, for example, R. Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1995), 82. 17. Fadwa El Guindi, ‘‘The Killing of Sadat and After,’’ Middle East Insight, January/ February 1983, 23, cited in James A. Bill and Robert Springborg, Politics in the Middle East (New York: Harper Collins, 1994), 223. 18. Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), ‘‘Egypt: Parliamentary Runoffs Marred by Reports of Violations,’’ November 17, 2005, www.irinnews.org/report.asp ?ReportID=50191&SelectRegion=Middle_East&SelectCountry=EGYPT. 19. Heba Saleh, ‘‘Egypt Cracks Down on Illegal Muslim Group,’’ Financial Times (London), February 7, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/3077672a-b6e7-11db-8b c2-0000779e2340.html. 20. ‘‘A Total of 814 MB Members Have Been Arrested, Including 646 Detainees Who Were Arrested during the Election Campaign of the Shura Council,’’ from the Muslim Brotherhood Web site, Ikhwanonline, June 10, 2007, BBC Monitoring International Reports, LexisNexis. 21. ‘‘US Softens Stand on Brotherhood,’’ AlJazeera.net, December 11, 2005, http:// english.aljazeera.net/English/archive/archive?ArchiveId+16958. 22. Ibid. 23. Jackson Diehl, ‘‘Mubarak Outdoes Himself; Election Fraud Backfires,’’ Washington Post, editorial, December 5, 2005, LexisNexis.

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24. Amira Howeidy, ‘‘We Take Nobody’s Permission,’’ Al-Ahram Weekly On-Line, December 15–21, 2005, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/773/eg5.htm. 25. The paper Al-Misri Al-Yawm published the draft excerpts of the platform over the course of several days, from August 10 through August 14, 2007. 26. Maggie Michael, ‘‘Muslim Brotherhood’s Hard-Line Platform,’’ Associated Press, October 10, 2007, LexisNexis. 27. Amr Hamzawy, ‘‘Egypt: Regression in the Muslim Brotherhood’s Party Platform,’’ Arab Reform Bulletin, October 2007, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/ index.cfm?fa=view&id=19648&prog=zgp&proj=zdrl,zme. 28. ‘‘Al-Iryan Criticizes the Muslim Brotherhood Program,’’ Al-Hayah, October 13, 2007, Open Source Center. 29. Muhammad Salah, ‘‘Al-Iryan: If I Become General Guide, I Will Not Recognize Israel; There Is a Difference Between Muslim Brotherhood Group and Muslim Brotherhood Government,’’ Al-Hayah, October 20, 2007, Open Source Center. 30. Ibid. 31. Husayn Mahmud, ’’Dr Habib Says Citizenry Is Compatible with the Shari’ah and Is the Basis of the Platform of the MB Party,’’ Ikhwanonline, August 2007, http://www .ikhwanonline.com. 32. ‘‘Habib on MB Party Program, Dialogue with West,’’ Ikhwanweb.com, November 11, 2007, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/Article.asp?ID=14588&LevelID=1&SectionID=0. 33. Steve Emerson, American Jihad (New York: The Free Press, 2006), 2. While Emerson is not specifically stating the Muslim Brotherhood is a militant group, he is contextualizing it in such a way that only the very well informed would likely conclude otherwise. 34. Thomas Friedman, ‘‘The Silence that Kills,’’ New York Times, editorial, March 2, 2007, LexisNexis. 35. John Mintz and Douglas Farah, ‘‘In Search of Friends among the Foes; U.S. Hopes to Work with Diverse Group,’’ Washington Post, September 11, 2004, LexisNexis. 36. Ibid. 37. Kotob, ‘‘The Accomodationists Speak, 333. 38. al-Maqsiid, ‘‘Ten Charges against the Society [Muslim Brotherhood],’’ cited in Kotob, ‘‘The Accomodationists Speak,’’ 333. 39. ‘‘Muslim Brotherhood Rejects al-Zawahiri Statements and Stresses on Peaceful Reform,’’ IkhwanWeb.com, January 11, 2006, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/Home.asp?zPage =Systems&System=PressR&Press=Show&Lang=E&ID=3669. 40. United Nations Security Council, ‘‘The Consolidated List Established and Maintained by the 1267 Committee with Respect to al-Qaeda, Usama Bin Laden, and the Taliban and Other Individuals, Groups, Undertakings and Entities Associated with Them,’’ June 8, 2007, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/consolist.shtml. 41. United States Department of State, ‘‘Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs),’’ fact sheet, October 11, 2005, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm. 42. Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 20. 43. Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Hamas; see also Khaled Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000). 44. ‘‘Akef: How Can We Support Hamas,’’ IkhwanWeb.com, March 1, 2006, http:// www.ikhwanweb.com/Home.asp?zPage=Systems&System=PressR&Press=Show&Lang=E&ID =3988.

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Global Security Watch—Egypt 45. ‘‘Abu-Mazin and Mish’al Ask for the Brotherhood’s General Councilor’s Intervention to Solve the Crisis between Fatah and Hamas,’’ Al-Misri al-Yawm, July 3, 2007, Open Source Center. 46. ‘‘Muslim Brotherhood: Hamas Not to Blame,’’ UPI, June 21, 2007, LexisNexis. 47. President George W. Bush, ‘‘Remarks by the President on the Global War on Terror,’’ East Grand Rapids High School, Michigan, April 20, 2007, released by the White House Office of the Press Secretary, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/wh/83362.htm. 48. IRIN, ‘‘Egypt: Social Programmes Bolster Appeal of Muslim Brotherhood,’’ September 30, 2007, http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=26150. 49. David Hirst, ‘‘Islam on the Warpath in North Africa,’’ Guardian (Manchester), April 24, 1993, LexisNexis. 50. John Walsh, ‘‘Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood: Understanding Centrist Islam,’’ Perspectives on the Untied States 24, no. 4 (Winter 2003), http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/print.php? article=1048. 51. Dr. Ahmad Fahmy, ‘‘MB Responds to Marc Lynch’s Memo Published in Foreign Policy,’’ October 22, 2007, http://ikhwanweb.com/Article.asp?ID=14436&SectionID=147. 52. Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 139. 53. Hisham Mubarak, ‘‘What Does the Gama’a Islamiyya Want? An Interview with Tal’at Fu’ad Qasim,’’ Middle East Report (January–March 1996): 41–46. 54. Ibid., 40. 55. James A. Bill and Robert Springborg, Politics in the Middle East (New York: Harper Collins, 1994), 222. 56. John Lancaster, ‘‘Egyptian Group Says It Tried to Kill Mubarak; Islamic Militants Cite ‘Poverty and Distress’ of Populace as Reason for Assassination Attempt,’’ Washington Post, July 5, 2005, LexisNexis. 57. Mubarak, ‘‘What Does the Gama’a Islamiyya Want?’’ 43. 58. Associated Press, ‘‘25 Years after Sadat’s Assassination, Many Call Egypt Politically Paralyzed,’’ International Herald Tribune (Paris), October 4, 2006, http://www.iht.com/ articles/ap/2006/10/06/africa/ME_GEN_Egypt_After_Sadat.php. 59. Mustapha Kamel Al-Sayyid, ‘‘The Other Face of the Islamist Movement,’’ Working Papers, number 33 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2003), http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/wp33.pdf. 60. Sammar Ibrahim, ‘‘Anwar Al Sadat,’’ Profile, Egypt State Information Service, 2005, http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Publications/349/515/520/546/547.htm. 61. For detailed accounts of the Islamic resistance in Afghanistan, see Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror; and Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (New York: Penguin, 2004). 62. Zaynah, ‘‘Dr. Najih Ibrahim of the Egyptian Islamic Group Talks to Asharq Al-Awsat.’’ 63. Diaa Rashwan, ‘‘Two Targets, One Enemy,’’ Al-Ahram Weekly On-Line, June 9–15, 2005, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/746/focus.htm. 64. Chris Hedges, ‘‘As Islamic Militants Thunder, Egypt Grows More Nervous,’’ New York Times, November 12, 1992, LexisNexis. 65. Tony Walker and Shahira Idris, ‘‘Islamic Murder Awakes Fears among Egyptian Elite,’’ Financial Times (London), June 10, 1992, LexisNexis. 66. Caryle Murphy, ‘‘Killing Apostates Condoned,’’ Washington Post, July 22, 1993, LexisNexis. 67. ‘‘Bombs Rock Cairo Coffee Shop. London Shopping Area; Muslim Militants Claim They Didn’t Do It,’’ Houston Chronicle, February 28, 1993, LexisNexis.

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68. Mark Nicholson, ‘‘Bombs Raise Suspicion and Fear in Egypt,’’ Financial Times (London), June 21, 1993, LexisNexis. 69. Lancaster, ‘‘Egyptian Group Says It Tried to Kill Mubarak.’’ 70. Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror, 139. 71. Ibid., note 31. 72. ‘‘Muslim Militants Admit Cairo Attack,’’ Chicago Sun Times, April 21, 2006, LexisNexis. 73. Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Egypt,’’ Human Rights Watch World Report 1998 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), http://www.hrw.org/worldreport/Mideast-03.htm. 74. ‘‘Gunmen Strafe Police in New Attacks as Egypt Counts Cost in Wake of Tourist Massacre,’’ Guardian (Manchester), September 20, 1997, LexisNexis. 75. ‘‘Gamaa Islamia: Luxor Attack Carried out without Approval of Leaders,’’ Arabicnews.com, December 2, 1997, http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/971202/ 1997120232.html. 76. Muhammad al-Shafi’I, ‘‘Leading Figure in Egyptian Islamic Group Criticizes from the Netherlands the ‘Apology Statement’ and Calls It the Leaders’ ‘Collective Repentance,’’’ Al-Sharq al-Awsat (London), June 22, 2002, Open Source Center. 77. Heba Saleh, ‘‘Egypt Hails Militants’ Truce,’’ BBC News, July 13, 2002, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2126747.stm. 78. See, respectively, http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/algamaa.cfm and http://www.tkb.org/ Group.jsp?groupID=3760. 79. See Federation of American Scientists, ‘‘Jihad against Jews and Crusaders,’’ http:// www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm. 80. Abduh Zinah, ‘‘Report Profiling Five Egyptian Terrorists on US Most Wanted List,’’ Al-Sharq al-Awsat (London), December 20, 2001, Open Source Center. 81. Galal Nassar, ‘‘The Hamza Connection,’’ Al-Ahram Weekly On-Line, January 13–19, 2005, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/725/eg5.htm. 82. ‘‘Egyptian Islamic Group Leader Rifa’i’s Wife Interviewed on Husband’s Disappearance,’’ Al-Majallah (London), April 28, 2002, Open Source Center. 83. ‘‘Egypt: Islamic Group Leader Reportedly in Cairo Prison,’’ Al-Quds al-Arabi (London), December 2, 2004, BBC Worldwide Monitoring, LexisNexis. 84. Asharq Al-Awsat, ‘‘Dr. Najih Ibrahim of the Egyptian Islamic Group Talks to Asharq Al-Awsat,’’ August 14, 2006, http://www.ikhwan.tv/Home.asp?zPage=Systems&System =PressR&Press=Show&Lang=E&ID=5002. 85. ‘‘Al-Zawahiri Announces Egypt’s Islamic Group Leaders Joined Al-Qa’ida,’’ Al-Jazeera, August 5, 2006, Open Source Center. 86. Cynthia Johnston, ‘‘Egypt Islamist Group Denies Uniting with Al-Qaeda,’’ Daily Star (Egypt), August 8, 2006, http://www.dailystaregypt.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=2544. 87. ‘‘Egyptian Group Denies al-Qaeda Tie-Up,’’ AlJazeera.net, August 11, 2006, http:// english.aljazeera.net/English/archive/archive?ArchiveId=24970. 88. Original statement in Arabic at http://www.egyptianislamicgroup.com, Open Source Center translation. 89. ‘‘Egypt’s Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyah Leader on Opposition to Violence, Qa’idah,’’ Today’s Encounter, Al-Jazeera, BBC Worldwide Monitoring, August 25, 2006, LexisNexis. 90. For one discussion of EIJ’s early years, see Jala Mustafa in Al-Islam al-Siyasi fi Misr: Min Harakat al-Isiah ila Jama’at al-‘Unf (Cairo: Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 1992). 91. Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy Why Jihad Went Global (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 9.

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Global Security Watch—Egypt 92. Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt, 205. 93. Ahmed Moussa, ‘‘Egypt’s Most Wanted,’’ Al-Ahram Weekly On-Line, October 18–24, 2001, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2001/556/11war3.htm. 94. Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror, 72. 95. Ibid. 96. Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 178. 97. Alan Cowell, ‘‘Mideast Tensions; Egypt’s Parliament Speaker Is Assassinated by Gunmen,’’ New York Times, October 13, 1990, LexisNexis. 98. World Islamic Front, ‘‘Jihad against Jews and Crusaders,’’ February 23, 1998, http:// www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm. 99. Jane’s, ‘‘El-Gihad,’’ Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group), January 2005. 100. ‘‘Egypt: Jailed Jihad Founder Supports Peace Initiative; 2 MB Members Arrested,’’ Al-Hayah (London), July 11, 2000, Open Source Center. 101. ‘‘Egypt: Islamic Group Claims Responsibility for Cairo Blast, To Release Videotape,’’ Al-Jazeera, April 9, 2005, Open Source Center. 102. Khairi Abaza, ‘‘Sharm al-Shaykh Bombings: The Egyptian Context,’’ August 12, 2005, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch 1023, http:// www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2355. The Washington Institute is a U.S.–based think tank, generally regarded as pro-Israeli. 103. Diaa Rashwan, ‘‘Was It Al-Qaeda,’’ July 28–August 3, 2005, Al-Ahram Weekly OnLine, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/753/op33.htm.

CHAPTER

4

Egypt and the United States: Strategic Partners?

U.S. policy on Egypt is aimed at maintaining regional stability, improving bilateral relations, continuing military cooperation, and sustaining the March 1979 EgyptianIsraeli peace treaty. Successive Administrations have long viewed Egypt as a leader and moderating influence in the Middle East, though in recent years, there have been increasing calls for Egypt to democratize.1 —U.S. Congressional Research Service, March 2007 Egypt’s foreign policy towards the United States is based on [the] following two axes: [1] Partnership in the Middle East peaceful settlement and maintaining stability in the Middle East region; [2] Strategic cooperation through military ties and EgyptianAmerican Strategic Dialogue. Egypt has found in the USA the pivotal party that would guarantee the Middle East peace process due to the strong US–Israeli relations and Washington’s influence on Tel Aviv. In turn, the United States recognized the huge influence Egypt has on the Arab countries and the region as a whole.. . .The United States is Egypt’s second largest trade partner after the European Union.2 —Egyptian State Information Service, July 2007

This chapter assesses the contemporary U.S.–Egypt relationship. Given the centrality of this relationship to the foreign policies of both and certain domestic policies of the latter, the chapter covers a lot of ground and is thus divided into two parts. In the first part, after discussing the evolution of the partnership, special attention is given to U.S. economic and military assistance and Egypt’s strategic position as a benefit to U.S. interests. The second part examines human rights

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in Egypt and its related policies toward democratization. This is undertaken against the backdrop of alternating U.S. policies of benign neglect and selective concern for such issues. Both parts assess Egypt’s role in the ‘‘war on terror,’’ domestically as it has grappled with homegrown militants and in the post 9/11 context as a U.S. regional and global ally. The conclusion reached at the end of this evaluation is straightforward: Egypt’s relations with the United States will continue to be its most important foreign policy concern; from a U.S. perspective, relations with Egypt have been neglected in recent years and have focused mostly on the so-called war on terror while paying insufficient attention to Egypt’s central role in Middle Eastern affairs, beginning with Iraq and Israel/Palestine. EVOLUTION OF A STRATEGIC ‘‘PARTNERSHIP’’

While Egypt boasts that its relationship with the United States dates back to 1830, when the latter signed a trade pact with the Ottoman Empire, the contemporary partnership dates from 1974. Just after the 1973 Ramadan/Yom Kippur War, the United States and Egypt re-engaged in open discussions, especially via Henry Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy, which eventually culminated in President Anwar Sadat’s willingness to make peace with Israel. Sadat accomplished that peace due to the leadership of U.S. President Jimmy Carter, who masterminded the Camp David Accords of 1978, and of course with the agreement of Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. After hammering out the Accords at Camp David, Carter, Sadat, and Begin gathered again in March 1979 for the Rose Garden signing of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. Sadat’s primary goal (at Camp David and in the Rose Garden) was not to reach a peace with Israel as much as it was to achieve a strong partnership with the United States. His objectives were as follows: (a) securing U.S. help in returning the Israeli-occupied Sinai Peninsula back to Egypt and (b) delivering much-needed military and development assistance. While Egypt has received enormous benefits from this peace, Sadat and Egypt paid a high price for it in the early years (1979–1985): political turmoil at home, expulsion from Islamic and Arab organizations (the Arab League especially), boycotts, and a reduction in Arab aid. Many in the West believe Sadat also paid with his life, but in Egypt, his assassination in 1981 is understood as a consequence of his dictatorial policies and repressive actions at home rather than his peace with Israel. Despite these political costs, Egypt retained a strategic role in the region, and in the 1980s, the Arab world welcomed Egypt back into the fold. Egypt had made concrete overtures to maintain its peace with Israel while also courting its Arab critics, most notably by providing strong support to Iraq during its eight-year (1980–1988) war against Iran. Egypt continues the delicate balancing act of nonbelligerence (a cold peace) with Israel, close (or warm) ties with the United States, and patient but strong leadership among Arab states.

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Three decades of partnership is no small achievement; yet, Egyptian and U.S. officials might have been able to boast of an even lengthier relationship (50-plus years) had the United States not committed what U.S. President Richard Nixon said was ‘‘one of the greatest mistakes that we made.’’ Nixon was referring to the Eisenhower administration’s withdrawal of an offer to finance construction of the Aswan Dam. That 1956 ‘‘mistake’’ put U.S.–Egypt relations on hold for another 18 years, until 1974. The United States values its relationship with Egypt for various (and obvious) reasons: • Egypt’s geography, demography, as well as its political and military leadership within the Arab world combine to make it a strategic asset from the U.S. point of view, particularly regarding the security of oil supplies to the United States. • Egypt is the first (as well as the most significant and strongest) Arab state to make peace with Israel and remains key to securing a sustained Palestinian-Israeli dialogue, and ultimately a peace agreement based on a two-state solution, as advanced by certain (but not all) interested parties such as the United States, as part of the ‘‘Quartet’’ (the United States, Russia, the European Union, and the United Nations) in the Road Map for Peace.3 • The United States has depended upon its partnership with Egypt to conduct military exercises, test equipment, and even test the politics of military operations within the Arab world. Operation Bright Star (joint military exercises among the United States, Egypt, and other countries first conducted in 1980) as well as the development of the M1A1 Abrams Tank inside Egypt are but two important and tangible aspects of this partnership. • Intelligence cooperation, especially in the ‘‘global war on terrorism’’ has been valuable.

Egypt values its relationship with the United States for its own various (and obvious) reasons, all of which boil down to (a) U.S. support for Egypt’s military, and thus for its governing regime, and (b) U.S. support, in the form of both aid and trade, for Egypt’s economy. Outside the political or state-to-state relationship, there has been a positive people-to-people relationship between Egyptians and Americans. Americans remain fascinated by Egypt, even if they tend to focus on the pharaonic past and tradition; the U.S. educational system helps to maintain that focus on and appreciation of (ancient) Egypt. Egyptians also are fascinated by the United States and generally effusive toward Americans living in or touring Egypt. Even with the U.S. occupation of Iraq (starting in 2003) and President George W. Bush’s neglect of the Palestinian issue and unwavering support for Israel, there has been very little explicit, or tangible, anti-Americanism in Egypt—and when such sentiments are expressed in demonstrations or in the media, they are clearly aimed at U.S. foreign policy (not at ‘‘America’’ writ large) and occur primarily when Israel is seen as acting aggressively against Palestinians, Lebanese, or other Arabs. Indeed a British investigative documentary reported, ‘‘When you talk to most liberal-minded secular people in Egypt the refrain is always the same: the US is admired but the reality of its efforts to help out in this

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region has always been a disappointment and is a disappointment still.’’4 Largescale demonstrations did occur in the first week of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003, perhaps the most anti-American spectacle witnessed in Egypt in decades. Notably, those demonstrations also quickly took on an anti-Mubarak as well as an anti-American tone, and the Egyptian security forces crushed them within a matter of days. The still-evolving U.S.–Egypt partnership has weathered many storms and challenges. In the 1980s, U.S.–Egypt relations were strained owing to Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon and the siege of Beirut; in protest, Egypt removed its ambassador to Israel, which created a major obstacle between Washington and Cairo. Relations worsened in the aftermath of the hijacking of the Achille Lauro cruise liner in 1985 by Palestinian militants (led by Abu Abbas). The problem came when U.S. Navy F-14 fighter jets intercepted the Egypt Air plane, which was flying the hijackers to freedom in Tunisia. Mubarak said he allowed them to leave Egypt because he was not aware that the hijackers had killed an American who was onboard the ship, a claim that was later questioned. Egypt was likely trying to walk yet another Middle East diplomatic tightrope balancing domestic concerns and discontent, the flailing peace process, including relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and its real and perceived proximity to U.S. policies in the region.5 The plane was forced down in Italy, and the Italian prime minister of the day released Abbas because he said he believed he was a mediator instrumental in freeing the ship rather than a hijacker. He also chastised the U.S. government for going after the Egypt Air flight because Egypt had been essential in ending the Achille Lauro crisis.6 Abbas, who was allowed to leave Italy unimpeded, was arrested by U.S. forces in Iraq in 2003.7 Although Egypt was indispensable to the U.S.–led coalition against Iraq in 1990–1991, the two countries later differed strongly over policies regarding Iraq and Libya. This challenged Egypt to strike yet another delicate balance between its U.S. and Arab interests. The steadiness was tested yet again in 1996 when the United States used its UN Security Council veto power and was the sole vote that blocked a second term for UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Egypt’s former foreign minister. To further complicate matters, across the years, Washington’s constant and unflinching support of Israel has remained a constant challenge to the relationship. Despite such differences, both countries see their national and international interests as firmly linked. In the aftermath of 9/11 as the Bush administration declared a global war on terrorism, Egypt has not refrained from displaying a somber ‘‘I told you so’’ attitude. Throughout the 1990s the Egyptian government led its own internal ‘‘war on terrorism’’ that garnered a great deal of criticism from the United States and others. Much of that criticism was appropriate, given Egypt’s treatment of militant and dissident subjects and its ongoing failure to practically distinguish between militant opponents—e.g., the Islamic Group and Egyptian Islamic

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Jihad—and nonviolent groups, primarily the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan). Since 9/11, Egypt believes its actions are better understood in U.S. government circles, especially since Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda owe a good deal of their success to Egyptian militant Islamists who have served in leadership roles in that terror network, most notably, Ayman al-Zawahiri. The United States and Egypt are now overlapping in their ‘‘counterterrorist’’ practices. For example, in mid-November 2001, President Bush signed an executive order allowing the trial of noncitizens suspected of terrorist activities to be held in military rather than in civilian courts.8 That same week, President Hosni Mubarak charged 94 people with forming an underground terrorist group and propagating ‘‘antigovernment literature’’; it was the first military trial in Egypt in nearly two years.9 Remarkably, a Department of State source said there was a ‘‘diminished American voice of condemnation toward the use of military courts in Egypt’’ as a result of the U.S. decision to use military tribunals in its own war on terrorism.10 An expert observer said the human rights report for 2002 (released March 2003) ‘‘moved from condemning state security courts two years ago, to last year changing the language to make such courts seem less bad. This year, the report says that Egypt is bringing inappropriate cases in those courts—but does not take issue with the courts themselves.’’11 To make (human rights) matters worse, Several reports suggest that, since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has deported several suspected Al Qaeda operatives to Egypt (along with other Arab countries) in order to be interrogated and possibly tortured. Some observers have questioned the credibility of U.S. human rights policy toward Egypt, if, on the one hand, the United States condemns Egyptian practices of torture and illegal detainment, and, on the other hand, the United States condones Egyptian government behavior when it suits the interests of U.S. national security.12

Further discussion of whether human rights play a significant role in the U.S.–Egypt partnership is found later in this chapter. Equal Partners?

William B. Quandt viewed ‘‘the structure of U.S.–Egypt relations’’ in 1990 as one with an enormous power imbalance, making ‘‘a relationship of real equality almost impossible.’’13 The glue that binds Egypt and the United States—the State of Israel—has made the partnership more triangular than bilateral. Egypt and the United States have struggled either to ignore these realities or to overcome them. They have sought to expand and make permanent their relationship beyond the obvious; i.e., while Egypt is central to U.S. foreign policy regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Middle East peace process, both states agree that economic and military objectives are as essential to their partnership as is diplomatic interdependence.

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Since the mid-1970s, the U.S.–Egypt partnership has been measured in dollars, primarily the amount transferred to Egypt in the form of U.S. economic and military assistance. In that time, Egypt has received around $25 billion in economic aid and more than $30 billion in military aid. Between 1948 and 2006, Egypt received a total of $29.5 billion in economic aid and $35 billion in military aid. After Egypt joined the Gulf War coalition against Iraq in 1990, the United States gave Egypt another significant gift: forgiveness of nearly $7 billion in debt. Currently, Egypt receives less than $2 billion annually in both forms (about $490 million in economic grants and $1.3 billion in military aid); in contrast, Israel receives in excess of $2.5 billion annually from the United States (and with various other commitments, that amount often exceeds $4.5 billion annually). In 1994, in an effort to move the partnership from one based on aid to one based on trade, Egypt and the United States established the U.S.–Egypt Partnership for Economic Growth and Development. Focusing on commercial ties, the U.S.–Egypt Partnership has functioned to ‘‘initiate public-private sector dialogue on polices aimed at expanding economic growth and job opportunities in Egypt, and at building mutually beneficial economic and commercial ties between the two countries.’’14 By 1998 Egyptian officials began using their controlled media to publicize their dissatisfaction with their U.S. partners, especially Vice President Al Gore, for taking Egypt for granted and generally neglecting the U.S.–Egypt Partnership, for which Gore was largely responsible.15 Frustrated by this neglect and always seeking equal treatment with Israel, Egyptian officials launched their own initiative to enhance ties to the United States. Thus, Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa presented the Egyptian–U.S. Strategic Dialogue Draft Project to U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in 1997. Both foreign ministers officially inaugurated the dialogue on July 10, 1998.16 Three years after its launch, a new U.S. ambassador to Egypt, David Welch, discussed the project with Egypt’s leading daily newspaper, Al-Ahram. He suggested that such a relationship had actually existed for many years: ‘‘I have always thought we had a strategic dialogue with Egypt and its leadership. Our work as diplomats is to package those dialogues in some manner and find an institutional framework for their conduct. [Of course,] more can be done in this area, though. And you will see in the coming weeks and months very strong evidence of a dialogue at a strategic level between our nations.’’17 Trade and Aid: U.S. Economic Assistance by the Numbers

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is the primary spigot through which U.S. economic support to Egypt flows. Between 1975 and 2007, USAID–Egypt has targeted nearly $25 billion on

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• ‘‘Creating Jobs/Trade & Investment’’: $15.149 billion; • Improving basic education: $1.06 billion; • ‘‘Healthier planned families’’: $919 million; • Democracy and governance (nongovernmental organizations [NGOs]; citizen participation): $1.03 billion; • Infrastructure (water, wastewater, electric power): $5.68 billion; and, • Environment: $235 million.18

The United States has consistently emphasized the political economy aspect of this assistance and its overall fundamental importance. In 1986, a USAID officer in Cairo offered, ‘‘US aid to Egypt is all about keeping peace with Israel; the two are at peace—end of story.’’19 In 2004, in congressional hearings on aid to Egypt, U.S. Representative Henry Hyde, chair of the Judiciary Committee, argued, The Egyptian economy has often under-performed its peers, despite important natural advantages and massive assistance from the United States and other donors. Despite that massive assistance, or perhaps because of it, Egypt’s economy and political system have largely resisted reform. This might be a matter of indifference in other parts of the world, but Egypt’s longstanding relationship with the United States, its leadership position in the Arab world, its critical location, and its path-breaking peace with Israel, make its development a matter of great concern to Americans. Which is why we have a massive assistance program to begin with. There are poorer people than the Egyptians, people who are objectively more deserving of our aid if poverty alone were the criterion.20

The U.S. Department of State remarked that the shift in assistance from infrastructure, health, food supply, and agriculture toward market-based economic development, good governance, and training programs is reflected in the motto, ‘From Aid to Trade.’ The Commodity Import Program, through which USAID provides hundreds of millions of dollars in financing to enable the Egyptian private sector to import U.S. goods, remains one of the largest and most popular USAID programs.21

The education sector has also been a key recipient of U.S. support, with over $1 billion provided since 1975. American policy makers understand Mubarak’s linkage of ‘‘education reform to national security, espousing a broad definition of social security that encompasses the political, economic, and military dimensions.’’22 U.S economic assistance is indeed linked with democracy, governance, and issues of national security, both American and Egyptian. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) noted, [M]ost experts agree that, prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, economic reform superseded political reform in the West’s relations with Egypt, as well as other Middle Eastern countries. However, with the recent push for democracy in the Middle East seen as a counterweight to Islamic militancy and intellectual and social stagnation, U.S. policy regarding Egypt has been reinvigorated, as policy makers seek to balance U.S. security and economic interests with U.S. democracy promotion policies.23

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The reality however, is that in more than three decades of assistance, Egypt remains a virtual dictatorship, one in which the per capita gross national income (GNI) was less than $1,350 in 2006.24 Some might reason that if aid alone is insufficient to help to promote democracy and human rights in Egypt, perhaps trade could create additional momentum. This line of thinking, however, misrepresents part of the fundamental nature of Egypt’s democracy problem—it is an issue of government disempowerment more than one of civic or popular empowerment. It also fails to acknowledge the primary impetus behind the trade initiative—peace in the Middle East or at least that involving Israel, rather than domestic harmony in Egypt. The private sectors (of both Egypt and the United States) are seen as important parties to the bilateral (and trilateral, with Israel always involved) relationship. One of the most promising initiatives to promote private sector investments and trade between Egypt and the United States is the Qualified Industrial Zone (QIZ) protocol. In 1996, the United States Congress authorized the president to allow Egypt (and Jordan) to export products to the United States duty-free, as long as these products contain certain inputs from Israel. In order for a QIZ article to gain duty-free entry, Israel must contribute at least 11.7 percent of the content requirement. In December 2004, eight years after congressional authorization, Egypt, Israel, and the United States reached an agreement to establish the trade partnership necessary to take advantage of the legislation. Today, Egypt has QIZs in four industrial zones: Greater Cairo (with ten different sites), Alexandria, Suez Canal (three sites), and the Middle Delta governorates of Gharbia, Dakahlya, Minufia, and Damietta. Egypt’s textile and clothing companies have been the primary beneficiaries of the QIZ initiative with 548 companies approved for participation, 93 of which had exports valued at $288.5 million during the last nine months of 2005. U.S. buyers of QIZ products include The Gap Inc., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., and Target Corporation.25 However, while Egyptian industry has benefited, recall that the QIZ trade initiative is part and parcel of an American effort to keep Egypt (and Jordan, which has a separate QIZ relationship with Israel) working closely with Israel, as well as the United States, in support of ‘‘the Middle East peace process by encouraging regional economic integration.’’26 Military Assistance

The United States has been providing Egypt with more than $1.3 billion in military assistance annually since 1979 (approximately $35 billion in total).27 The impact of the funds on Egypt’s defense purchasing power are obvious: the $1.3 billion received in fiscal year 2005 comprised more than 80 percent of Egypt’s total military procurement budget.28

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The year 1979 was seminal in Egyptian–U.S. relations because of Egypt’s formal peace arrangements with Israel. This official end to hostilities created the opening for the United States to supplant Egypt’s former military patron, the Soviet Union. After a Soviet and Czech arms deal with Egypt in 1955, and especially after the U.S. ‘‘pushed’’ Egypt further into the Soviet camp in 1956 by ultimately refusing to finance the Aswan Dam project, Egypt became increasingly reliant on its communist patron. This increasing reliance soon translated into increasing disdain for the Soviets, which eventually led to Sadat’s nullification (in 1976) of the 1971 Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.29 Sadat had planned for years to ‘‘return’’ to a proU.S. policy, and he secured this with the Camp David Accords (1978) and the Peace Treaty with Israel (1979). Former U.S. ambassador to Egypt Edward S. Walker, Jr., characterized the arrangement as ‘‘both a reward and a security deposit. Having turned his back on the Soviets, Sadat needed this [U.S.] support to secure his position with his military and to send a clear message to every Arab state that opposed his peace initiative not to intervene.’’30 Nearly 20 years later Anthony H. Cordesman (a leading Middle East defense expert), in an op-ed entitled ‘‘Weapons of Mass Preservation’’ (focused on arms sales to Arab states), noted that critics of a proposed U.S.–Saudi arms program ‘‘have also taken aim at the administration’s proposed increases in military aid to Israel and Egypt. That, too, is misguided. The success of Israel’s peace with Egypt and Jordan is heavily dependent on American military aid to Egypt.’’31 In terms of dollar flow, U.S. foreign military assistance to Egypt is undertaken through a series of channels that include foreign military sales (FMS), foreign military financing (FMF), and international military education training (IMET). The U.S. General Accounting Office summarizes, ‘‘Generally, FMF provides financial assistance in the form of credits or guarantees to U.S. allies to purchase military equipment, services, and training from the United States. Recipient countries can use the assistance to purchase items from the U.S. military departments through the Foreign Military Sales (‘‘FMS’’) process or directly from private U.S. companies through direct commercial sales.’’32 Table 4.1 indicates the provision of FMF and IMET funds. The transfer of actual military technology has been ongoing through the FMF program. Such FMF purchases total more than $7.8 billion for the period 1999– 2005. The dollar amounts break down into weapons purchase percentages as follows: vehicles: 19 percent, maintenance of equipment: 15 percent, aircraft: 14 percent, communications and support equipment: 10 percent, weapons and ammunition: 9 percent, supplies and supply operations: 9 percent, other: 9 percent, missiles: 8 percent, and ships: 8 percent. 34 Specific examples of purchases since 1979 include 220 F-16 aircraft, three dozen Apache helicopters, and 880 M1A1 (Abrams) tanks.35

Table 4.1 U.S. Military Assistance to Egypt ($ in thousands)

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) International Military Education and Training (IMET)

33

FY2007 Request

FY2006 Estimate

FY2005 Actual

FY 2004 Actual

FY2003 Actual

FY2002 Actual

FY2001 Actual

FY2000 Actual

1,300,000

1,287,000

1,289,600

1,292,330

1,291,550

1,300,000

1,297,140

1,300,000

1,235

1,188

1,1264

1,369

1,232

1,217

1,119

1,006

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U.S. assistance to Egypt’s regional neighbors compares as follows: between 2001 and 2004, Egypt concluded $6.5 billion in arms transfer agreements, $5.7 billion of which was with the United States. Comparatively, Saudi Arabia had $5.6 billion, $3.8 billion supplied by the United States; and Israel was at $4.8 billion with U.S. supplies at $4.4 billion.36 Note that Israel still receives more military aid from the United States than does Egypt; these figures refer to transfer agreements. The IMET funds enable Egyptian military forces to attend Technical and Professional Military Education courses, enhancing training opportunities, specifically on military equipment from the United States and building relationships. Since 1995, more than 6,600 Egyptian military students have taken part.37 The Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) program is funded by the U.S. Department of State and assists other countries in improving their export control regimes.38 The original programmatic focus of EXBS was potential WMD (weapons of mass destruction) source countries in the former Soviet Union; in more recent years the program expanded to include other potential transshipment hubs, such as states in the Middle East.39 In 1990 the CRS reported, ‘‘The United States stationed 1,200 military personnel in Egypt as of mid-1989. The presence of a large number of United States advisers in Egypt was a source of some political friction. The United States planned gradually to reduce the number in conjunction with the long-term Egyptian goal of self-sufficiency.’’ 40 Nearly two decades on, current and projected personnel strengths of overseas military program management in Egypt has been consistent at 48,000 (28,000 military personnel, 8,000 civilians, and 12,000 ‘‘locals’’).41 Operation Bright Star, a military exercise, organized by the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), is an area of direct U.S.–Egypt military cooperation. The first effort in 1980 was undertaken solely between the United States and Egypt. After its successful launch, the United States and Egypt turned it into a biennial event after 1983, and it now includes an array of forces. For example, Bright Star 05/06 (occurring in 2005) involved 12 nations.42 Notably, U.S. participation in two scheduled Bright Star operations was canceled: once during the first Gulf War (1991) and another planned for 2003 was called off because of the ‘‘war on terror.’’ Bright Star is part of the U.S. Department of Defense’s ‘‘theater engagement strategy and is designed to improve readiness and interoperability and strengthen the military and professional relationships among U.S., Egyptian and participating forces.’’43 Notwithstanding the flow of money, military hardware, and personal exchanges between forces, the U.S.–Egypt military relationship continues to include Israel and its interests, not simply U.S.–Egypt interests. In 2004, a former Egyptian military officer writing for the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo, highlighted the prominence of Israel’s security interests in the U.S.–Egypt military assistance dynamic:

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Global Security Watch—Egypt A clear example of this issue is the Harpoon missile sale to Egypt. In November 2001, the U.S. State Department provided a preliminary notification to Congress for a proposed sale of 53 Harpoon Block 2 missiles to Egypt. Israeli security officials attempted to dissuade the Americans from following through the planned sale. They considered the satellite-guided missile as disastrous to Israel’s national security and suggested that the sale be postponed until the situation in the region becomes more stable. Under the Israeli pressure the United States reached a compromise to restrict the Harpoon missile system ability to hit ground targets. Israel not only tried to block the Harpoon sale to Egypt but tried to benefit from the situation and presented a plan in May 2002, to upgrade jointly the AGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship cruise missile used by the Israeli Navy.44

Prior to the U.S. military actions to topple Saddam Hussein in Iraq, President Mubarak told a group of students in Alexandria, ‘‘If you strike Iraq, and kill the people of Iraq while Palestinians are being killed by Israel. . .not one Arab leader will be able to control the angry outburst of the masses.’’45 Apparently disregarding its own concerns, however, Egypt has allowed the United States overflight privileges and access to the Suez in support of its military campaign in Iraq.46 Observers speculated that civil war in Iraq could lead to Egyptian involvement on behalf of anti-Iranian interests; that has not happened and instead Egypt has so far remained relatively ‘‘on the sidelines.’’47 THE UNITED STATES AND EGYPT: HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN WRONGS

Like many international relationships, the one between Egypt and the United States has been tested and threatened. In addition to the (largely) regional security challenges they confront, the strength of their commitment has been tried by a number of domestic ‘‘political’’ and human rights issues. For the most part, these have focused on minority rights (for Coptic Christians especially) as well as political opposition rights; very few other ‘‘human rights’’ issues have been considered problematic.48 This is not to say Egypt is a model of respect for human rights, nor does it indicate the United States does not care about human rights abuses in Egypt. Rather, the United States has rarely sought to confront Egypt publicly or use strong-arm tactics privately to address Egypt’s myriad of human rights abuses. The overriding U.S. concern for political stability—a topic that Egyptian officials consistently raise—means that other U.S. interests are virtually ignored. Thus, the United States ‘‘is hamstrung in its relationship with Egypt. Short-term interests in stability appear to conflict with longer-term interests in economic and political liberalization that would promote long-term stability.’’49 Central to U.S. foreign policy is Israel’s security and the Middle East peace process as well as aid and trade within the context of a strong and stable Egypt within the partnership and in the region as a whole. Although these issues are strongly interrelated with human rights, policy formulation and implementation have not treated them as such, much to their detriment.

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Because the United States is thought to be able to influence Egypt’s conduct on human rights, this part of the chapter begins with selective highlights of relevant U.S. domestic legal obligations regarding foreign affairs and assistance, as well as a review of some of the tools the United States wields, effectively or not, in dealing with Egypt’s human rights violations. The section proceeds to two case studies in which the United States publicly involved itself in Egypt’s abuse of civil and political rights, that of Saad Eddin Ibrahim and Ayman Nour. Concluding is a focus on counterterrorism: First, Egypt’s efforts at stemming militant activities within its borders and U.S. reactions. Second, and finally, is a look at how the United States has used Egypt in its prosecution of the ‘‘global war on terror’’ and the human rights consequences. Human Rights and U.S. Policy toward Egypt

In recent years, the United States has long made a rhetorical exercise, and to a less significant extent, real action, out of promoting human rights around the globe. Various administrations have placed emphasis on different regions based on national security concerns and political climate. In his second inaugural address, President George W. Bush stated, ‘‘All who live in tyranny and hopelessness can know: the United States will not ignore your oppression, or excuse your oppressors. When you stand for your liberty, we will stand with you.’’50 However, when it comes to state oppression in Egypt, the United States has largely turned a proverbial blind eye to the problems beyond modest shaming in select annual reports. Indeed, the United States has not only failed to stand with Egypt’s downtrodden, it has in some cases facilitated or enabled state repression. U.S. law mandates security assistance may not be provided to any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights. Security assistance may not be provided to the police, domestic intelligence, or similar law enforcement forces of a country, and licenses may not be issued under the Export Administration Act of 1979 [50 App. U.S.C. 2401 et seq.] for the export of crime control and detection instruments and equipment to a country, the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights,

barring a special presidential waiver (the traditional loophole used for many allies of the United States).51 U.S. law also requires the Department of State to prepare annual reports on the human rights practices of countries receiving assistance and submit them to Congress.52 These are the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. The same prohibition holds true for development assistance, No assistance may be provided. . .to the government of any country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, including torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges, causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction and

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Global Security Watch—Egypt clandestine detention of those persons, or other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, and the security of person, unless such assistance will directly benefit the needy people in such country.53

During the 1990s the language about Egypt in these human rights reports evolved from caution and uncertainty over how to acknowledge or even criticize a U.S. ‘‘friend,’’ to increasing honesty about human rights abuses, to a more bureaucratic and formulaic recital of the facts. The formula is such that one official in the Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor acknowledged that people ‘‘skip to paragraph four’’ (or thereabouts) of nearly any Country Report to see what the U.S. assessment of the situation is: whether, for instance, it is ‘‘good,’’ ‘‘improving,’’ ‘‘worsening,’’ or ‘‘poor.’’54 The 1999 Department of State report observed that the Egyptian government continued ‘‘to commit numerous serious human rights abuses,’’ but also acknowledged that ‘‘its record again improve[s] somewhat.’’55 The report issued in February 2001 noted Egypt ‘‘generally respected the human rights of its citizens in some areas, and its record improved somewhat over the previous year, primarily due to a decrease in terrorist activity by Islamic extremists; however, the Government’s record was poor with respect to freedom of expression and its treatment of detainees, among other areas.’’ The report also criticized ‘‘the arrests of thousands of members of the Muslim Brotherhood in the months before [parliamentary] elections.’’ 56 In the report issued in 2004, ‘‘The Government [of Egypt] respected human rights in some areas; however, its record was poor, and in many areas serious problems remained.’’57 In 2005, The [Egyptian] government’s respect for human rights remained poor, and serious abuses continued in many areas. The following human rights problems were reported: limitations on the right of citizens to change their government; existence of the state of emergency, in place almost continuously since 1967; torture and abuse of prisoners and detainees, including deaths in custody; poor conditions in prisons and detention centers; impunity; arbitrary, sometimes mass, arrest and detention, including prolonged pretrial detention; executive influence on the judiciary; denial of fair public trial and lack of due process; political prisoners; restrictions on civil liberties—freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association; some restrictions on freedom of religion; corruption and lack of transparency.58

Notably in 2005 the United States noted a significant shift in Egyptian citizens’ ability to change the government (referring to ‘‘limitations’’ on their ability); in previous years the situation was characterized as a lack of a meaningful ability or something very similarly phrased. The 2006 report read very much the same: The government’s respect for human rights remained poor, and serious abuses continued in many areas. These included limitations on the right of citizens to change their government; a state of emergency, in place almost continuously since 1967; torture and abuse of prisoners and detainees; poor conditions in prisons and detention centers; impunity; arbitrary arrest and detention, including prolonged pretrial detention; executive branch limits on an independent judiciary; denial of fair public trial and lack of due process;

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political prisoners and detainees; restrictions on civil liberties—freedoms of speech and press, including internet freedom; assembly and association; some restrictions on religious freedom; corruption and lack of transparency; some restrictions on NGOs; and discrimination and violence against women, including female genital mutilation.59

Clearly, these reports have tremendous utility as a carrot or stick when wielded by U.S. foreign policy makers; and yet, Congress and the White House can (and do) ignore or fail to heed the findings. At a minimum, the reports do put governments on notice that the United States takes human rights practices into consideration on bilateral issues. They also may provide some recognition, if not meaningful protection, to local human rights activists and monitoring groups. Additional tools at the disposal of the United States to encourage human rights compliance are used to varying degrees and include the mobilization of ‘‘shame’’ (or international reproach) and quiet diplomacy; the former is more an idea in theory rather than practice regarding Egypt. Indeed, the U.S. government has relied heavily on quiet diplomacy in dealing with Egyptian violations of human rights. One Department of State official suggested it fell to ‘‘the U.S. ambassador to Egypt to whisper in Mubarak’s ear that we have a concern’’ about a particular human rights issue.60 The official elaborated that ‘‘in private, Egypt is beat up a lot. But we don’t pillory Egypt in public. Then again, we tend not to pillory any important country in public. We talk to Egyptians in private. The [U.S.] ambassador has to deliver the message but we can’t cross the line from advice to badgering. If we do, the GOE [Government of Egypt] gets mad, backs off, but they don’t tell us to get lost.’’61 For example, in the fall of 2007, the White House issued a statement in response to then recent events saying, ‘‘We are deeply concerned at the Egyptian Government’s recent decree authorizing the imminent closure of the Association for Human Rights Legal Aid, a human rights NGO, as well as the conviction and sentencing of several newspaper editors. These latest decisions appear to contradict the Egyptian Government’s stated commitment to expand democratic rights.’’ 62 The Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded that the White House statement ‘‘is an unacceptable interference in Egypt’s internal affairs. [And] the U.S. statements reflect distortion of facts, whether intentional or unintentional, as well as ignorance about the Egyptian legal and political reality.’’63 USAID also addresses human rights in Egypt. The joint strategic plan for 2004–2009 (fiscal years) issued by USAID and the Department of State affirmed, U.S. diplomacy and foreign assistance will be stalwart in support of democracy and human rights, not only because they are worthy of our traditions, but also because a more just world will be a more stable and prosperous world. We will support movements for democracy and human rights abroad consistently, responsibly, and prudently. The Department and USAID will play key roles in promoting and defending democratic reform and the recognition of human rights abroad.64

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Stating such objectives and realizing them are two different things, however. For example, during President Bill Clinton’s administration, four areas were targeted with U.S. foreign aid: economic growth, population and health, protecting the environment, and promoting democracy. But at the end of the Clinton administration, USAID’s performance reports for fiscal years 2000 as well as 2002 acknowledged that efforts in the last of these areas—a program aimed at encouraging ‘‘more transparent and accountable government institutions’’—had ‘‘failed to meet expectations.’’65 In 2007, Ismail Sabry Abdallah, a former Egyptian government official who negotiated the first USAID contract with Egypt (in 1974), noted the agency should decrease Egyptian governmental support and increase civil society support ‘‘in order to realize the sort of economic and political reforms that the United States and the Egyptian people desire.’’66 He further stated, ‘‘[USAID] is distributed by the Egyptian government in an anarchic way, through personal contacts and political influence.’’67 Historically, some other U.S. agencies have had similar experiences. The U.S. Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) attempted to undertake a program on human dignity and civil disorder management for police forces in Egypt in 1999. The project aimed ‘‘to provide professional law enforcement services based on democratic principles, respect for human rights and the rule of law.’’68 By 2001 this project had been suspended. One official involved in this effort recognized that the police and military establishments are under little or no political pressure to reform in general or to respect human rights in particular.69 Several other U.S. governmental actors play a role in promoting (or at least in raising concerns about) human rights in Egypt. These include Congress through the debate and passage of resolutions, committee hearings, and decisions on budget and appropriations. For example, Congress can reproach Egypt directly when it comes to renewing the $2 billion annual aid package. In a June 2000 meeting of the House Appropriations Committee to consider the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations bill for fiscal year 2001, Representative Robert B. Aderholt (R-Ala.) added the following text to the paragraph about U.S. financial aid to Egypt: ‘‘Nevertheless, the Committee is concerned about ongoing violence experienced by the Christian minority in Egypt. The Committee urges Egypt to expedite the investigations of the murders of 2000 and 1998 in Al-Kosheh, and of the 1998 interrogations.’’70 The representative acknowledged ‘‘Egypt is a valuable ally and has greatly helped U.S. efforts to advance peace in the Middle East,’’ but he also drew attention to the fact that Christians in Egypt, particularly Copts, face ongoing violence and are in need of full protection of the Egyptian judicial system. He continued, There were two murders [of Copts] in 1998 and allegations of brutal interrogations by the Police; 1014 Christians were arrested and interrogated. . ..When tourists were killed in Luxor [in 1997], the reaction of Cairo was swift and decisive, including the

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appointment of a new Minister of the Interior, who oversees the police. That sent a powerful message throughout the country, and Egypt is currently a very safe country to visit. The great majority of Muslim citizens of Egypt are law-abiding and desire peace. I am afraid that because of concerns about possibly energizing extremist Muslim groups to the point of violence, Cairo is reluctant to prosecute Muslims when there are incidents of violence against Christians.71

Despite such reproaches, one wonders about the effect, if any, Congress has regarding human rights in Egypt. Sometimes, it seems that legislative public warnings (while, at the same time, authorizing billions of dollars in annual aid to Egypt) are merely a pawn in a political game played out by two partners who would prefer not to deal with this sensitive topic. For example, a 2007 bill, the ‘‘Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2008’’ making its way through Congress contained the following language as it passed out of the House of Representatives: Assistance for Egypt SEC. 699. (a) Foreign Military Financing Program—Of the funds appropriated by this Act for Egypt under the heading ‘‘Foreign Military Financing Program,’’ $200,000,000 shall not be made available for obligation until the Secretary of State certifies and reports to the Committees on Appropriations that the Government of Egypt has taken concrete and measurable steps to: (1) Enact and implement a new judicial authority law that protects the independence of the judiciary; (2) Review criminal procedures and train police leadership in modern policing to curb police abuses; and (3) Detect and destroy the smuggling network and smuggling tunnels that lead from Egypt to Gaza.72

Understandably, these conditions caused quite a stir in Egypt. Egypt’s official Middle East News Agency reported an official statement from Egypt’s ambassador to the United States, in which he said aid ‘‘is not an endowment’’ but rather an ‘‘investment of US interests in the Middle East region,’’ and the government would reject ‘‘any foreign interference’’ and ‘‘arm-twisting policy.’’73 An independent daily said, ‘‘The US Administration has many tools [to use] if it really wants its allies to respect human rights, at the forefront of which is to set a good example to its allies in this regard.’’74 The U.S. Senate developed its own language: Rule of Law and Border Security in Egypt (a) The Senate makes the following findings: (1) Fighting in Gaza during the summer of 2007 demonstrated that the terrorist organization Hamas, which unlawfully seized control over Gaza in June 2007, has been able to achieve a dramatic increase in the quantity and sophistication of arms at its disposal. (2) Without these arms, the terrorist organization would not have been able to seize control over the Gaza territory.

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Global Security Watch—Egypt (3) There is substantial evidence that a significant proportion of these arms were smuggled across the border between Gaza and Egypt. (4) The Egyptian military is a capable force, made possible in substantial part by a close relationship with the United States. (5) Concurrent with the escalation of dangerous arms smuggling across the border between Egypt and Gaza has been a retrogression in the rule of law in Egypt. (6) This loss of hard-earned ground has been characterized by reports of harsh reaction by the Government of Egypt to dissent, including the jailing of political opponents. (7) The United States has provided [economic] aid to Egypt in excess of $28,000,000,000 over the past three decades. (b) The Senate— (1) reaffirms its long-standing friendship with the people of Egypt; (2) believes that our friendship with Egypt requires the Senate to address such vital policy concerns; (3) urges the Government of Egypt to make concrete and measurable progress on restoring the rule of law, including improving the independence of the judiciary and improving criminal procedures and due process rights and halting the cross-border flow of arms to Gaza; (4) believes it is in the best interest of Egypt, the region, and the United States that Egypt takes prompt action to demonstrate progress on these matters; and (5) urges the Department of State to work vigorously and expeditiously with the Government of Egypt and the Government of Israel to bring the border between Egypt and Gaza border under effective control.75

However, even if legislators were to step outside the rules of the game and actually withhold or reduce U.S. aid to Egypt, it might only harden the resolve of the Egyptian government to resist U.S. demands to reform its human rights practices. Punishing Egypt is not feasible, given that Egypt will more likely ‘‘get mad. . .get more nationalistic, defensive, and unresponsive,’’ even if ‘‘they hear us.’’76 Independent authorities, such as the Commission on International Religious Freedom, and the judicial branch, particularly the federal immigration courts play important roles. Immigration judges are on the ‘‘front lines’’ as they hear complaints from Egyptians seeking political asylum in the United States. Some requesting protection fear they will be subject to unlawful imprisonment or torture upon their return while others remain concerned their daughters will be forced to undergo genital mutilation, and Copts especially dread possible persecution at the hands of militant groups. Unfortunately, judges’ decisions have not always offered protection to individuals and their families (in the case of minor children) from the persecution and torture they would otherwise expect at home.77

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U.S.–based NGOs, particularly human rights groups, also can mount public campaigns against state violations such as torture as well as criticize Egyptian legislative and other acts against freedom of speech, assembly, and religion. Human Rights Watch and Freedom House have been notably active in terms of criticisms in annual reports as well as the issuance of action alerts and press releases. NOUR AND IBRAHIM: VIOLATORS OF THE (UNSTATED) RULE (DO NOT CHALLENGE MUBARAK)

Human rights rarely seem to improve in Egypt due to U.S. or other foreign pressure, but rather are attributable to Egypt’s willingness to improve them for strategic reasons such as domestic political gain, for example, when government officials say they have ‘‘won’’ against Islamists or recognize their tactics are counterproductive. Egypt is, in fact, very good at resisting U.S. pressure, including in high-profile cases of human rights violations against U.S. citizens and Egyptian democracy activists, two of whom are explored now in more depth. Ayman Nour is the imprisoned leader of Egypt’s Hizb al-Ghad (‘‘Party of Tomorrow’’ commonly known as ‘‘al Ghad’’), convicted on charges related to forging signatures required to establish his party. A co-defendant in the trial, Ayman Ismail Hassan, previously admitted faking the affidavits for Nour; however, he subsequently recanted and said his statement was coerced upon threats to his family. Hassan was later found hanged in his cell. This tragic and ongoing story has reverberations far beyond the formation of a political party, no small feat unto itself. Ayman Nour was initially arrested and charged in January 2005, after first being stripped of his parliamentary immunity. Nour then challenged Mubarak by declaring his own candidacy for president for the September 2005 elections. Nour’s trial was postponed until after those elections, a move that kept the charges hanging over him and arguably tainted his candidacy. Still, Nour was the second place finisher in Egypt’s first-ever multicandidate presidential election, garnering approximately 7 percent of the popular vote. Observers say that this showing was Nour’s ‘‘second crime’’; the first was having the audacity to run against President Mubarak, who had served unopposed since 1981. Later that fall, in the first round of parliamentary elections, Nour—a sitting member of parliament in the Cairo district of Bab al-Sharia— lost his seat of ten years to a former security officer running on the National Democratic Party ticket. Nour was ultimately sentenced to a five-year term of imprisonment, some of which he has served in a prison hospital because of health issues including diabetes. He and his supporters have complained of abuse in prison as well as a denial of proper medial care and inability to access legal counsel. Nour had hundreds of supporters at the court chanting ‘‘Hosni Mubarak’s rule is illegal! The trial is

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illegal!’’ when the verdict was rendered in December 2005.78 Riot police were also present. Nour’s lawyer, Amir Salim, stated the decision against him will ‘‘go into the dustbin of history. . .This is a political verdict that will be annulled by the appeal court.’’79 Much like the imprisonment of Professor Saad Eddin Ibrahim (discussed below), Nour’s detention has posed significant problems for the Bush administration.80 The United States has a number of regional priorities and would like to view Egypt as a key ally in areas of political reform, security cooperation, intelligence sharing, and promoting peace (or at least stemming violence). Nour’s imprisonment, however, serves as a proverbial wrench in the works. Egypt’s active criminalization of Nour caused a public row with the United States, which unfolded during 2005 and continues to reverberate. In February 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice canceled a planned trip to Egypt in protest of Nour’s imprisonment. Members of the U.S. House of Representatives added their voices to the growing choir of concerns and drafted a concurrent resolution (which did not pass) that noted ‘‘the promotion of democracy, freedom, and liberty is central to United States national security policy,’’ condemned Nour’s arrest, and called on the Egyptian government to release him immediately.81 Indeed, at least four other congressional resolutions were drafted that were critical of Egypt’s actions. Several months later, after Nour’s release on bail, for which Secretary Rice is often given credit, she traveled to Egypt as part of a larger Middle Eastern trip and met with Nour. At the conclusion of Nour’s trial in December 2005, the White House spokesman said his conviction ‘‘calls into question Egypt’s commitment to democracy, freedom, and the rule of law.’’82 The Department of State issued a press release and said it was troubled by the Egyptian court decision convicting civil reformer and former presidential candidate Ayman Nour. Mr. Nour’s trial has been marred by irregularities and inconsistencies, and has failed to meet the international standards of transparency and respect for rule of law that the Egyptian Government has publicly espoused. Mr. Nour’s detention and sentencing raise serious concerns about the path of political reform and democracy in Egypt, and is inconsistent with the Egyptian Government’s professed commitment to increased political openness and dialogue within Egyptian society.83

Despite these and other efforts, one commentator termed the U.S. response ‘‘weak’’ and said it ‘‘bolstered the regime’s confidence and led it to resist US calls for democratic reform more aggressively.’’84 Before Nour, and indeed since, the case of Saad Eddin Ibrahim has been the other big human rights thorn in the side of U.S.–Egyptian relations. Ibrahim, a U.S. citizen and Egyptian national who serves as a respected professor of sociology at the American University in Cairo, founded the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies in the late 1980s. The Center’s mission is to address ‘‘social, economic, political and cultural dimensions [of development].

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The center’s conception of development aims at freedom, democracy, justice and creativity.’’85 Ibrahim’s Egyptian legal nightmare began in June 2000 when he was arrested and held without charges, along with several others from the Center. The State Security Investigations Sector handled detainee interrogations. A total of 28 would eventually be charged. Ultimately, the indictment alleged four charges including deliberately disseminating false information abroad harmful to Egypt’s interests, bribery, accepting foreign funding from the European Union without government permission, and defrauding the European Union. During the course of the proceedings, the prosecutor said Ibrahim jeopardized his ‘‘country’s stability and sow[ed] the seeds of disunity.’’86 In May 2001, after seven months, the State Security Court convicted Ibrahim and his 27 co-defendants on three of the four charges; the state could not make its bribery case.87 Ibrahim received a sentence of seven years of hard labor; his co-defendants received sentences ranging up to five years of hard labor. In February 2002, Egypt’s highest appeals court, the Court of Cassation, overturned the conviction, called for a retrial, and released Ibrahim temporarily. One significant question remained unanswered: whether the temporary release was due to repeated (albeit quiet) U.S. pressure. Ibrahim’s lead defense lawyer, Ibrahim Saleh, ‘‘denied claims that the ruling was due to international pressure. ‘Egypt’s judicial system does not respond to pressures of any kind and is completely independent.’’’ He cited the February 2002 ‘‘verdict as ‘the best example of that.’’’88 This is almost certainly the case, given that the courts do enjoy a reputation for relative independence from the executive branch. Still, U.S. Ambassador Welch ‘‘welcomed’’ the decision by the court to overturn the conviction of Ibrahim and the 27 others. To make sure there was no doubt about the U.S. position, Welch added, ‘‘We have repeatedly expressed our concern about the fairness of the process with the Egyptian government, and hope that the case against Dr. Ibrahim will now be dropped.’’89 The charges, however, were not dropped. The State Security Court retried Ibrahim, and in July 2002 he and several colleagues were again sentenced to prison terms; Ibrahim, for a second time received seven years with hard labor.90 The following month, the Bush administration announced at a press conference that Egypt would ‘‘not be welcome’’ to a potential additional $38 million in aid in the coming year because of the detention of Ibrahim. At the time, the administration was under pressure from journalists as well as democracy and human rights advocates and said only that it would oppose additional foreign assistance to Egypt. Even so, this was a major new development in the efforts to free Ibrahim and promote democracy in Egypt. In December 2002, the Court of Cassation again overturned the State Security Court conviction and commenced a new trial that concluded in March 2003 with Ibrahim’s acquittal on all charges.91

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Ibrahim believes he was arrested because ‘‘authorities were unhappy with his involvement in a planned NGO project to monitor the [2000] parliamentary elections and by reports he issued on the status of Coptic Christians.’’92 One U.S. Department of State official expressed confusion over Egypt’s motives: ‘‘I still don’t understand the logic of this case—why the GOE [Government of Egypt] undertook to stop Ibrahim and his group. Perhaps they had reasons; perhaps good reasons; or perhaps no legitimate concerns at all—other than he is an annoyance to the government. Regardless, we are concerned about this. He is a U.S. citizen after all.’’93 While the Egyptian government’s reaction to Ibrahim’s research work and activism were chilling, the division, confusion, and frequent ambivalence among Egyptian NGO leaders, academics, and journalists was also cause for concern. Their lack of unity and support stemmed in part from their differing opinions on whether to protest Ibrahim’s arrest and Security Court trial, whether to accept ‘‘outside intervention,’’94 or whether to simply put trust in the rule of law and judicial process in Egypt.95 U.S. embassy officials in Cairo and Department of State officials in Washington expressed frustration over the lack of attention that Egyptian citizens gave to the case: ‘‘When we went to Saad Eddin’s trial to show our public support, Egyptian human rights organizations [HROs] were nowhere to be seen. Was their neglect due to jealousy? Was it due to these HROs being co-opted by the Government of Egypt? Or were they simply kowtowed and intimidated by their government? All are plausible, although I fear that ‘jealousy’ is the more likely answer.’’96 Ibrahim’s story or saga, however, does not end there. In the spring and summer of 2007, several researchers at his Ibn Khaldun Center were arrested and imprisoned. Also during the summer of 2007, Ibrahim held a ‘‘democracy conference’’ in Qatar and spoke with President Bush at a conference in Prague. While out of the country, Ibrahim was threatened with arrest should he return to Egypt; he went into exile and became a nomadic democracy activist, with visiting research appointments in the United States, Romania, Qatar, and elsewhere. In August of that year, Ibrahim published an op-ed in the Washington Post, denouncing his government’s crackdown on opposition groups and individuals.97 All of these ‘‘crimes’’ were enough for Mubarak and company to accuse Ibrahim of slandering Egypt, as well as Islam (the government’s efforts to put a wedge between Ibrahim and Egypt’s population). The real ‘‘crime’’ is that Mubarak blamed Ibrahim for the aforementioned congressional legislation vote to condition the release of $200 million in U.S. military aid to Egypt ‘‘on human rights reform and more aggressive policing of the border with the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip.’’98 Ibrahim supported such conditionality; Mubarak went on the political attack. While Secretary of State Rice helped pressure for the release of Nour in 2005, in the summer of 2007 she failed to publicly condemn Mubarak’s attacks on democracy advocates and

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committed the United States to $13 billion in additional military aid to Egypt over the coming decade. Ibrahim’s case is an important one because it shows, to some extent, what the United States can do when it musters the necessary political courage. However, the injustices suffered by Ibrahim and his colleagues should not be the test case on whether the United States generally supports human rights in Egypt—he is the exception rather than the rule. His case was widely reported in the United States so as to virtually ensure that U.S. officials would voice their concern— privately and publicly. Moreover, U.S. officials were taken to task by Egyptian, U.S., and other human rights advocates for supporting Ibrahim but ignoring his co-defendants. Only Ibrahim received special treatment from U.S. officials, and ‘‘only because of his U.S. passport did we care.’’99 The real test cases are those human rights abuses committed against individuals who have no advocates, internationally or at home. EGYPT AND THE UNITED STATES: COUNTERING TERRORISM AT WHAT COST

‘‘Counterterrorism’’ was an important U.S. policy long before September 11, 2001, but afterward it attained preeminent status. As noted in Chapter 2, Egyptian forces, including the military and internal security officials, engage in significant human rights abuses against militant and nonviolent groups and individuals. U.S. objections regarding these egregious and systematic violations barely rise above a whisper. Indeed, post-9/11, their protests are barely audible if spoken at all. Recall that security forces’ criminality is rarely discouraged let alone punished in Egypt. Mubarak’s regime has, in fact, justified such abuses by saying they are countering terrorism, which resonates with the United States’ own similar preoccupation. In 2003, Human Rights Watch reported, ‘‘Egypt has a long history of using anti-terrorism decrees and emergency rule to suppress peaceful dissidents, as well as to punish opponents advocating or using violence. But repressive measures have intensified since the September 11 attacks.’’100 In short, counterterrorism trumps human rights concerns. Militant violence has been a part of the conflict in Egypt between state and society for years. The 1981 assassination of Sadat, the 1997 murder of 58 tourists and 4 Egyptians by militants in Luxor, the 2005 bombings at Sharm el-Sheikh, and the multiple assassination attempts on President Mubarak— these are among the better known of many such incidents. These attacks notwithstanding, the Egyptian government has not faced a serious domestic threat to its existence, although the Islamist societal and political challenge has been present for decades. This is not a minimization of militant groups’ impact on Egyptian life, particularly in the 1990s; rather, it is meant to highlight that Egypt’s state-society conflict is often exacerbated by the policies, attitudes,

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and actions of government/political officials, not opposition groups, violent or otherwise. Egypt has pulled out nearly all the proverbial stops in finding ways to repress its population. As noted earlier, such measures have included the Emergency Law, aided by a restrictive ‘‘law of associations’’ limiting NGO activity, and the nationalization of private mosques, attempting to forge a single, governmentcontrolled voice of Islam across Egypt. These measures, in conjunction with increased arbitrary detention, physical repression, and torture, have diminished the slight popular support the political system previously enjoyed. The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch have long been critics of Egyptian ‘‘counterterrorist’’ activities, and other groups have documented hundreds of cases of torture by government officers, primarily against Islamists.101 However, it took some time for the U.S. government to acknowledge its most important ally in the Arab world has a human rights problem. In some ways, the United States is still in denial, at least publicly, as to the magnitude and impact. According to one U.S. official who has contributed to the Department of State reports on human rights practices in Egypt and elsewhere, ‘‘[O]ur human rights officers do care about human rights, getting the facts right, and being bold.’’102 This official acknowledged once the Department of State gets ‘‘the facts’’ from its human rights officers in the field, ‘‘we massage the report but keep it honest. We also talk to Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and other NGOs and include their comments.’’ Massaging facts is important, according to this official, because even when ‘‘we just establish the facts, it’s difficult to get all these [into the report] because we need to certify countries on human rights practices and we can’t help countries with gross human rights violations,’’103 even when they are U.S. allies. This raises questions about whether Egypt is in gross violation of human rights, U.S. complicity through inaction or insufficient action, and the related reasons such as maintaining the aid package. In 1993 the U.S. Department of State acknowledged ‘‘there is convincing evidence that police and security forces systematically practice torture.. . .Most torture is perpetrated by officers of the Interior Ministry’s GDSSI [General Directorate for State Security Investigations].’’104 By 1995 the Department of State was even more direct: ‘‘There continued to be widespread human rights violations in 1994.. . .Security forces committed human rights abuses in their campaign against terrorist groups, but frequently victimized noncombatants as well.’’105 In its 1999 report the Department of State noted, Torture and abuse of detainees by police, security personnel, and prison guards is common.. . .Torture takes place in SSIS [State Security Investigations Sector] offices, including its headquarters in Cairo, and at Central Security Force camps. Torture victims usually are taken to an SSIS office where they are handcuffed, blindfolded, and questioned about their associations, religious beliefs, and political views. Torture is used to

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extract information, coerce the victims to end their antigovernment activities, and deter others from such activities.106

In 2003 (reporting on 2002) the report noted, ‘‘In combating terrorism, the security forces continued to mistreat and torture prisoners, arbitrarily arrest and detain persons, held detainees in prolonged pretrial detention, and occasionally engaged in mass arrests.’’107 The 2006 report said, ‘‘Numerous cases of torture were documented,’’ and cited an EOHR statistic of ‘‘59 cases (38 nonfatal) between April 2005 and April 2006.’’108 Direct criticism in these reports, however, has yet to translate into direct American government policy to influence Egyptian government policy. From the perspective of U.S. policy makers, given the choice between an amenable nondemocratic government and the rise of an unknown quantity or an Islamist movement such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the former option appears the more attractive. The reality is that if the United States gives too much support for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in Egypt, then it might (ironically) politically enable the Muslim Brotherhood, a notion that makes many in Washington uncomfortable. Their electoral advances thus far, combined with the regional successes of Hamas and Hezbollah, has created many a political headache for the United States. Thus, when in April 2007, a U.S. congressional delegation met with Muslim Brothers who also were sitting members of Egypt’s parliament, more than a few eyebrows were raised. One can certainly question whether some in the United States are hedging bets in a future showdown between the Mubarak regime and the popular Muslim Brotherhood. Less likely, however, is that there is a campaign being waged to promote greater participation for Egyptian opposition movements, even if they are ‘‘Islamist.’’ Indeed, Saad Eddin Ibrahim said, ‘‘Another reason for U.S. silence [about human rights in Egypt] is Mubarak’s exploitation of Islamophobia, rampant in many Western circles.’’109 Either way, the Government of Egypt will continue to play the ‘‘stability and security’’ card, and call for ‘‘patience’’ in the campaign for democracy and reform. In terms of Egypt’s support for the U.S. war on terror, after the United States began its offensive in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001, President Mubarak stated, ‘‘We support all measures taken by the United States to resist terrorism, because we suffered from terrorism before.’’110 Less than a year later, Egypt’s assistance in the war on terror was summarized as thus: In the immediate aftermath of September 11, President Mubarak strongly condemned the attacks. Mubarak’s regime has generally supported the Bush administration’s response to September 11, including the war in Afghanistan. However, it is worthy of note that Egypt did not join the U.S.–led war in Afghanistan, nor has it offered to send peacekeepers there after the war.. . .Mubarak’s support has included sharing intelligence with the U.S., allowing U.S. airplanes to fly over Egypt, and taking actions to weaken terrorist financial networks.111

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One key area where Egypt is said to provide assistance is in the highly controversial practice of U.S. renditions. Renditions are understood as the secret transfer of detainees to non–U.S. jurisdictions. One source reported that a former CIA analyst who helped set up the project said Egypt was an obvious choice because it is the ‘‘largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid after Israel, Egypt was a key strategic ally, and its secret police force, the Mukhabarat, had a reputation for brutality.’’112 In 2005, former government officials estimated 100–150 ‘‘terrorist’’ suspects were rendered to countries including Egypt, as well as Jordan, Pakistan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia.113 The imprecise number leads one to wonder whether they lost track of who went where or feared revealing the actual magnitude of the operation. One U.S. official said they sought assurances that ‘‘people are being handled properly in respect to human rights.’’114 However, a former CIA agent, Robert Baer, said, ‘‘If you want a serious interrogation, you send a prisoner to Jordan. If you want them to be tortured, you send them to Syria. If you want someone to disappear—never to see them again—you send them to Egypt.’’ 115 Former U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, visiting Egypt in 2006, echoed the requirement of U.S. human rights assurances, but said, ‘‘I’m not going to confirm that there have been any [suspects sent to Egypt], and I’m certainly not going to talk about the numbers—it’s intelligence activity and we just don’t do that.’’ The Egyptian Interior Minister also rebuffed the notion Egypt received or tortured rendered suspects.116 Meanwhile, Amnesty International reported that in 2005 the Egyptian prime minister said the United States had rendered between 60 and 70 detainees to Egypt.117 In 2007, the Italian government was struggling through a domestic criminal case against its former head of military intelligence, accused of assisting the United States in rendering a suspect to Egypt. It was also attempting to deal with charges against more than two dozen CIA operatives allegedly involved in the rendition. News reports said Osama Mustafa Hassan Nasr, also known as Abu Omar, an Egyptian cleric, ‘‘was kidnapped on a Milan street, bundled into a van, whisked to a U.S. airbase at Aviano in northern Italy, flown to another U.S. base in Germany and taken to Egypt for interrogation.’’118 He was initially held, tortured, and released in 2004, but then picked up again shortly thereafter and detained under the Emergency Law until February 2007 when he was again released. Egypt has also assisted in so-called reverse renditions in which suspected ‘‘terrorists’’ are secretly turned over to the United States from other countries, including that of Abdul Salam Ali al-Hila, one of the most notorious cases. He was a Yemeni businessman and reportedly a Yemeni government intelligence officer who visited Egypt on business in September 2002. Within several days of arriving in Egypt his family lost contact with him for more than a year and a half. In early 2004, a letter he wrote was smuggled out of Bagram Airforce Base in

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Afghanistan to Pakistan. In the letter, al-Hila stated he was abducted by Egyptian authorities.119 After spending 16 months in Afghanistan, al-Hila was moved to the U.S. detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Al-Hila was on the March 2006 list of detainees released by the United States Department of Defense.120 These incidents are only the tip of the rendition iceberg. The practice raises serious questions about violations of U.S., Egyptian, and international law that merit impartial, international investigation and honest answers. They also give pause for concern about the duplicitous policies and repercussions of what many have termed the ‘‘outsourcing of torture’’ despite official government assurances to the contrary. The United States has already come under tremendous criticism in the Middle East for its support of Israel and actions perceived as contrary to Arab interests, while at the same time touting democracy and human rights. Additionally, although Egypt has been back in the Arab fold for some time, its leaders are still trying to reclaim what they see as their rightful place: a preeminent Middle East power. Serving as a U.S. torture proxy while claiming to advance democratic reforms should stall their ascent, domestically and regionally. (To be sure, other Arab states also take part in renditions, notably Syria and Saudi Arabia; however, they are differently situated as Syria is part of the ‘‘Axis of Evil,’’ and Saudi Arabia controls access to Mecca and has tremendous regional ‘‘purchasing power.’’) And so, nearly $2 billion in annual U.S. aid to Egypt may ‘‘buy’’ its maintenance of a cold peace with Israel, but it should not also ‘‘buy time’’ for the disappearance of rendered subjects into Egypt’s substandard detention facilities and torture chambers. RELATIONSHIP OUTLOOK: STABLE WITH SOME ROCKY PATCHES

In May 2006, Al-Ahram Weekly reported, ‘‘Congressional hawks, who in the past called for the elimination of military aid to Egypt, are rattled by the advance of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt’s latest parliamentary elections and by the HAMAS win in Palestine.’’121 The article cited a congressman, generally considered to be pro-Israeli, who said, ‘‘The last thing I want is to see Egypt fail; Egypt must not fail.. . .They are a large secular society that has done much good. Our relationship with them is very important.’’122 These comments are illustrative of the complex nature of U.S.–Egyptian relations: The United States and Egypt have interests that are intertwined, overlapping, and, at least rhetorically, in opposition, particularly in the related areas of democratization. However, because both states’ understanding of national security emphasizes security—as it relates to real physical protection through the abilities of the police and military powers of the state—then concerns about civil and political rights will remain on the diplomatic back burner. Following is a summary of the key challenges the two states will face and prospects for relations in the years to come.

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Key Challenges

One key challenge, tied to the question of political will, may be the overriding one: the inherent complexity of implementing ‘‘reform’’ programs in Egypt. The U.S.–Egypt partnership is a delicate one; it demands a sensitive approach from the United States but also an understanding from Egypt that sometimes the United States has to be more direct and less nuanced in discussing national interests. Because of the U.S. occupation of Iraq and support for Israel—especially when Palestinians suffer and die in greater proportion to Israelis—along with other U.S. policies that are unpopular within Egypt, an occasional resurgence of anti-American sentiment in Egypt and the region as a whole is to be expected. For the most part, ‘‘anti-American’’ continues to mean ‘‘anti-American policy’’ (or anti-American government). Pushing Egypt at those times would certainly be counterproductive. Furthermore, while the United States should promote respect for genuine democracy in Egypt, in so doing it must maintain some public distance between itself and Egyptian human rights activists. Too much U.S. support could be perceived as co-optation. A second major challenge is posed by the perceived double standards in U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. For example, Egyptians regularly condemn U.S. interference in their internal affairs, especially on issues related to human rights, and point to the U.S. refusal to apply similar pressure on Israel for its abuses of human rights of Palestinians or its continuing occupation of Palestinian lands. Additionally, Washington sometimes disproportionately focuses on the concerns of Egypt’s Coptic Christians, as demonstrated especially through congressional statements and efforts to withhold aid, rather than addressing Egyptian state interference with the practices and political expression of the Muslim majority. If, in their calls for an end to abuses, U.S. policy makers more explicitly demonstrate concern for Egypt’s Muslim majority, and if they ask more of allies such as Israel, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia in terms of respecting human rights, Egypt would find it harder to deflect U.S. concerns about its human rights policies and practices. Meanwhile, the Government of Egypt has its own duplicitous track record with which to contend—pretending to advocate for ‘‘democracy’’ while, in fact, restricting in law and practice domestic civil liberties. This is exacerbated by governmental support for the U.S. war on terror and, repressive, targeted domestic containment of the Muslim Brotherhood, Kifaya, and others. This should be of great concern to the United States because President Mubarak does have the ability to remain a meaningful interlocutor with groups like Hamas while at the same time, working to thwart Muslim Brotherhood activities at home. This ability, however, is limited. Egypt is a combination of a police state and a military regime. To have a significant impact on Egyptian human rights policies, therefore, the United States

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must find ways to work more effectively with Egypt’s police and military force to encourage respect for human rights. The Federation of American Scientists noted, for example, that IMET ‘‘is increasingly the remaining military assistance program that can be used by Congress to sanction nations it finds to be abusing the rights of its people. At the same time, IMET may also be the only instrument available that might assist in changing the attitudes of military-dominated governments and lead to a reduction in human rights abuses and greater levels of democratic government.’’123 Interactions through IMET funding and other mechanisms could promote humane confinement conditions, nontorturous interrogation techniques, and due process rights. This is, of course, problematic given U.S. renditions to Egypt; however, if the United States were improving its own counterterrorism practices in this regard at the same time, all the better. The reality is that many Egyptians feel, rightly or wrongly, they have seen little positive benefit from U.S. assistance, particularly that of the military variety. Indeed, it is Egypt’s own population in recent years that has borne the brunt of regime dissatisfaction. Programs already exist to promote discussion of freedom of expression and assembly, to foster the rule of law, and to strengthen civil society. A challenge will be reviewing and expanding these initiatives to ensure that they are not perceived by Egyptians as examples of U.S. condescension or self-righteousness. In addition, the vast existing network of Egyptian, Palestinian, Lebanese, Jordanian, and other Arab civil society organizations should be enlisted to spearhead such efforts. Persuading the Egyptian government to agree to such involvement of nongovernmental organizations will be difficult at best; nevertheless, the case should be made and pushed by the United States. Prospects

In foreign affairs, Egypt is able to play a significant role in support of U.S. objectives—e.g., supporting a reformed Palestinian Authority and a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine—yet Israelis and Palestinians both must want Egypt’s involvement (e.g., in promoting greater security in Gaza), or Egypt’s potential contributions will not materialize. In economic affairs, there is little prospect that U.S. aid to Egypt will end anytime soon. Although calls from various corners may increase and grow louder for increasing conditions or faster weaning of economic assistance, the power of the purse (along with the leverage that comes with the purse strings) is something from which neither state will easily disengage. In human rights and democratization, much of the debate continues to shift to Egypt’s political stability. There are no indications to suggest that the Egyptian government is teetering on the brink of collapse. In fact, state apparatuses are quite effective in uncovering threats, preventing them, and/or retaliating against

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groups and individuals that sponsor them. Such effectiveness is part of the problem. The strength of Egypt’s security and police forces and their combined disregard for human rights and civil liberties means the government can control Egyptian society, but the methods it uses remove its legitimacy to govern. Egyptians have long tolerated the authoritarian, nondemocratic rule established by Nasser, but only so long as their basic economic needs have been met and so long as their personal and social liberties have remained relatively unencumbered by political processes. As the United States weighs its response options, the default setting seems to be ‘‘better the devil you know’’—i.e., a nondemocratic but friendly regime rather than a popularly elected movement that has not been able to demonstrate its approach toward values the U.S. preaches. Shades of Hamas’ victory and the subsequent collapse of Gaza, the Algerian state’s response to Islamist victories in the 1990s and the ensuing violence there, combined with the more recent experience of the Taliban in Afghanistan (1990s–2000s) frighten off policy makers who want democracy and stability. Even though these images are in no way parallel to Egypt or its nonviolent Islamist opposition (the Muslim Brotherhood), American diplomats and much of the political establishment (from Congress, to the White House, and throughout the Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, and so on) prefer the current authoritarian regime to its possible replacements. NOTES 1. Jeremy M. Sharp, ‘‘Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations,’’ Congressional Research Service (CRS) report for Congress, March 29, 2007, 2. Emphasis added. 2. Egypt State Information Service, ‘‘Egyptian–US Relations,’’ http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/ Politics/Foreign/EgyptUS/040309000000000001.htm. Emphasis added. 3. Note: Other ‘‘solutions’’ to the seemingly intractable Israeli-Palestinian conflict have been proposed, most notable a unitary state. See, for example, Ali Abunimah, One Country (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006). 4. Justin Webb, ‘‘Love and Hate for US in Egypt,’’ Death to America, BBC Radio 4, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6592759.stm. 5. See, for example, George Russell, ‘‘The U.S. Sends a Message,’’ Time, October 21, 1985, http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,960162,00.html. 6. Samia Nikrumah, ‘‘A Tactical Move,’’ Al-Ahram Weekly On-Line, April 24–30, 2003, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/635/re4.htm. 7. Notably, like the highjacking itself, Abbas’s arrest is not without controversy as the Palestinians assert it violates the terms of the Oslo Agreement, under which PLO members may not be charged with crimes committed prior to 1993. 8. See The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ‘‘President Issues Military Order: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism,’’ November 13, 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011113-27.html. 9. BBC News, ‘‘Terror Suspects Face US Military Trials,’’ November 14, 2001, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1655169.stm. In Egypt, the defendants’ families cried

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foul: ‘‘These people have done nothing,’’ said one angry mother. ‘‘We are paying the price for America’s so-called war against terrorism, and the government wants to show that it is being cooperative.’’ ‘‘Islamists Face Military Trial,’’ Al-Ahram Weekly On-Line, November 22–28, 2001, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2001/561/eg7.htm. 10. Denis Sullivan, interview with U.S. Department of State official instrumental in developing the human rights report for Egypt, Washington, D.C., April 4, 2002. 11. Elissa Massimino, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, ‘‘Statement on 2002 Department of State Human Rights Country Reports,’’ March 31, 2003, http:// www.lchr.org/media/2003_alerts/0331.htm. 12. Ibid., 25. 13. William B. Quandt, The United States and Egypt: An Essay on Policy for the 1990s (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1990), 5. 14. See U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Fact Sheet: U.S.–Egyptian Partnership for Economic Growth and Development,’’ May 29, 1996, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/bureaus/nea/ 960529USEgyptianEconomic.html. 15. ‘‘The slow development of the Egyptian–U.S. partnership in the past year has alerted authorities in both capitals to the political problems that may obstruct the partnership initiative. Diplomatic circles in Egypt and the United States did not conceal that Vice President Al Gore, President Mubarak’s partner in the initiative, had postponed his visit to Egypt three times in the last year for political reasons.’’ Abdel Azim Hammad, ‘‘Letter from Cairo,’’ Al-Ahram Weekly On-Line, April 30–May 2, 1998. 16. Given their steadfast commitment to the pursuit of a comprehensive and just peace, regional stability and welfare, and security for all, ‘‘the United States and Egypt have found it incumbent upon them to engage more closely through the mechanism of the Strategic Dialogue, to further promote these shared objectives in the Middle East and to exchange assessments on how best to realize them.’’ U.S. Department of State, Statement of James Rubin on U.S.–Egypt Agreed Joint Statement, July 15, 1998, http://www.usembassy-israel .org.il/publish/press/state/archive/1998/july/sd2716.htm. 17. Thomas Gorguissian, ‘‘In America’s National Interest,’’ Al-Ahram Weekly On-Line, August 16–22, 2001, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2001/547/eg2.htm. 18. USAID, ‘‘About USAID/Egypt: Program Overview,’’ http://egypt.usaid.gov/ Default.aspx?pageid=367. 19. Denis Sullivan, interview with USAID–Egypt Mission Officer in Cairo, October 5, 1986. 20. ‘‘U.S. Economic Assistance to Egypt: Does It Advance Reform?’’ Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 108th Congress, June 17, 2004, Serial No. 108-160, http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa94284.000/ hfa94284_0f.htm. 21. U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Background Note: Egypt,’’ August 2006, http:// www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5309.htm. 22. Fatma H. Sayed, ‘‘Security Donors’ Interests, and Education Policy Making in Egypt,’’ Mediterranean Quarterly 16, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 69. 23. Jeremy M. Sharp, ‘‘U.S. Democracy Promotion Policy in the Middle East: The Islamist Dilemma,’’ CRS report for Congress, June 15, 2006, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/ RL33486.pdf. 24. World Bank, ‘‘Egypt, Arab Republic Data Profile,’’ http://devdata.worldbank.org/ external/CPProfile.asp?SelectedCountry=EGY&CCODE=EGY&CNAME=Egypt%2C

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Global Security Watch—Egypt +Arab+Rep.&PTYPE=CP. This is not to say that the economic situation of Egypt has not improved but rather to question the ratio of and the expected return on U.S. investments. 25. American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt, ‘‘Egypt & the U.S.: Investing in Partnership’’ Doorknock Mission to Washington, D.C., March 2006, http://www.amcham.org.eg/ BSAC/ustrade/pdffiles/QIZBrochure06.pdf. 26. United States Office of the Trade Representative, ‘‘Fostering Trade in the Middle East: An Israel-Egypt Trade Partnership,’’ December 14, 2004, http://www.ustr.gov/Document _Library/Fact_Sheets/2004/Fostering_Trade_in_the_Middle_East_An_Israel_Egypt_Trade _Partnership.html. 27. See United States Department of State, ‘‘Background Note: Egypt’’; see also Charles Levinson, ‘‘$50 Billion Later, Taking Stock of US Aid to Egypt,’’ Christian Science Monitor, April 12, 2004, http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0412/p07s01-wome.html. 28. U.S. General Accounting Office, ‘‘Security Assistance: State and DOD Need to Assess How the Foreign Military Financing Program for Egypt Achieves U.S. Foreign Policy and Security Goals,’’ April 2006, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06437.pdf. 29. United States Library of Congress, ‘‘A Country Study: Egypt,’’ 1990, http://lcweb2. loc.gov/frd/cs/egtoc.html. 30. Ambassador Edward S. Walker, Jr., ‘‘United States-Egyptian Relations: Strengthening Our Partnership,’’ SAIS Review 17, no. 1 (1997): 149–150. 31. Anthony H. Cordesman, ‘‘Weapons of Mass Preservation; Arming Arab States,’’ New York Times, August 27, 2007, 6. 32. U.S. General Accounting Office, ‘‘Security Assistance.’’ 33. See respective Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations for the Near East available from the United States Department of State. http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/ cbj/. 34. U.S. General Accounting Office, ‘‘Security Assistance.’’ Sources cited therein include the U.S. Department of Defense and the GAO. Note numbers are rounded. 35. U.S. General Accounting Office, ‘‘Security Assistance.’’ 36. Richard F. Grimmet, ‘‘Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1998– 2005,’’ Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, October 23, 2006, http:// www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL33696.pdf. 37. Michael Coulter, ‘‘Review of U.S. Policy and Assistance Programs to Egypt,’’ testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, May 17, 2006, http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/archives/109/ cou051706.pdf. 38. U.S. Department of State, ‘‘The EXBS Program: Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance,’’ http://www.state.gov/t/isn/export/ecc/20779.htm. 39. Ibid. 40. U.S. Library of Congress, ‘‘Country Study.’’ 41. See ‘‘Supporting Information’’ for Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations for the Near East available from the United States Department of State, http:// www.state.gov/documents/organization/60657.pdf (at 600) or, http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/ rls/cbj/. 42. United States Joint Forces Command, ‘‘USJFCOM Supports Exercise Bright Star 05/ 06,’’ September 10, 2005, http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2005/pa091005.htm. 43. United States Department of Defense, ‘‘Exercise Bright Star to Begin Sept. 10,’’ September 6, 2005, http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2005/nr20050906-4664.html.

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44. Mohamed Kadry Said, ‘‘Assessing the United States–Egyptian Military and Security Relations’’ (Cairo: Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 2004), http:// acpss.ahram.org.eg/eng/ahram/2004/7/5/STUD8.HTM. 45. Cited in Richard Beeston, Tim Reid, and Philip Webster, ‘‘Egypt Leads Arab Revolt against U.S.,’’ Times (London), August 28, 2002, LexisNexis. 46. Clyde R. Mark, ‘‘Egypt–United States Relations,’’ CRS Issue Brief for Congress, October 2003, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/25431.pdf. 47. See, for example, Sharp, ‘‘Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations,’’ 17. 48. U.S. concern for Egyptian Copts is expressed mostly in the U.S. Congress, rather than in the U.S. Department of State annual human rights reports. For example, in those reports, in the introductory paragraphs, Copts are mentioned only three times—in reports issued in 2000, 2001, and 2002 (when looking at 1999–2007). Congress seems particularly amenable to pressuring the Government of Egypt, as it faces increasingly effective American-Egyptian Coptic Christian lobbying efforts. 49. Jon B. Alterman, ‘‘Egypt: Stable, But for How Long?’’ Washington Quarterly (Fall 2000): 116. 50. President George W. Bush, ‘‘Inaugural Address,’’ January 20, 2005, http://www .whitehouse.gov/inaugural/index.html. 51. U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, U.S. Code 22, § 2304(a). 52. U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, U.S. Code 22, § 2304(d). 53. U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, U.S. Code 22, § 2151n(a). 54. Denis Sullivan, interview with U.S. Department of State officials, Washington, D.C., February 13, 2001. 55. U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Egypt,’’ Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—1999, February 23, 2000, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/408.htm. 56. U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Egypt,’’ Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2000, February 23, 2001, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/nea/784.htm. 57. U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Egypt,’’ Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2004, February 28, 2005, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41720.htm. 58. U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Egypt,’’ Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2005, March 8, 2006, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61687.htm. Note: reformatted from bulleted list. 59. U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Egypt,’’ Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2006, March 6, 2007, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78851.htm (emphasis added). 60. Denis Sullivan, interview with U.S. Department of State official, Washington, D.C., February 13, 2001. 61. Ibid. 62. The White House, ‘‘Egypt: Setbacks on Press Freedom and Civil Society,’’ statement by the Press Secretary, September 24, 2007, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/09/ 20070924-7.html. 63. Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘‘Foreign Ministry Spokesman Describes the Statement Concerning the Freedom of Press and Civil Society in Egypt as an Unacceptable Interference in Egypt’s Internal Affairs,’’ statement by the Press Secretary, September 26, 2007, http://www.mfa.gov.eg/MFA_Portal/en-GB/MFA_News/Press_Releases/whitehouse statement2592007.htm. 64. U.S. Department of State and USAID, Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2004–2009, http:// www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/state_usaid_strat_plan.pdf.

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Global Security Watch—Egypt 65. See, for example, http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/account/fy_2000/2000_accountability _report_part_c.pdf, at C-13. 66. Levinson, ‘‘$50 Billion Later.’’ 67. Ibid. 68. ‘‘ICITAP’s mission is to help achieve U.S. criminal justice and foreign policy goals by assisting foreign governments in developing the capacity to provide professional law enforcement services based on democratic principles, respect for human rights and the rule of law.’’ From U.S. Department of Justice, International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, ‘‘The Experience of ICITAP in Assisting the Institutional Development of Foreign Police Forces,’’ n.d. 69. Denis Sullivan, interview with International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program official, August 2, 2001. 70. Hon. Robert B. Aderholt, ‘‘Investigation of Murders in Al-Kosheh, Egypt,’’ Congressional Record (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 28, 2000), E1137. 71. Ibid. 72. H.R.2764, The Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2008 (referred to Senate Committee after being received from House), June, 22, 2007. 73. ‘‘Backgrounder: Egyptian Media Angry over Conditions in US Aid Bill,’’ MENA, BBC Monitoring Middle East: Political, July 17, 2007, LexisNexis. 74. Ibid. 75. H.R.2764, The Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2008 (public print), September 11, 2007, Congressional Record, at S11459. 76. Denis Sullivan, interview with Senate Committee on Foreign Relations aide. 77. Denis Sullivan, interview with attorney, Boston, MA, March 5, 2001. This Boston attorney has argued the cases of scores of Egyptians (Copts especially) seeking political asylum through the federal immigration court system. 78. BBC News, ‘‘US Wants Egypt Politician Freed,’’ December 24, 2005, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4558316.stm. 79. Ibid. 80. See, for example, Sharp, ‘‘Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations,’’ at 12, which states, ‘‘Most analysts believe that improvements in the relationship, such as announcing the United States’ intention to negotiate a U.S.–Egyptian free trade agreement, has been put on hold in part because of the treatment of Nour.’’ 81. U.S. House of Representatives, ‘‘Expressing the Grave Concern of Congress Regarding the Arrest of Ayman Nour, the Leader of the al-Ghad Party, by the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Support of Congress for Continued Progress toward Democracy in Egypt,’’ H.Con. Res. 78, February 17, 2005. 82. The White House, ‘‘Statement on Conviction of Egyptian Politician Ayman Nour,’’ press release, December 24, 2005, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/ 20051224-1.html. 83. U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Egypt: Conviction of Ayman Nour.’’ December 24, 2005, press release, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/58478.htm. 84. Eurasia Group, ‘‘Politics: Rice Will Unsuccessfully Prod Mubarak for Reform,’’ September 29, 2006, Open Source Center. 85. See http://www.eicds.org.

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86. Khaled Dawoud, ‘‘The State versus Ibrahim,’’ Al-Ahram Weekly On-Line, February 22–28, 2001, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2001/522/eg6.htm. 87. Jailan Halawi, ‘‘Prosecution Case under Fire,’’ Al-Ahram Weekly On-Line, January 18–24, 2001, http://www.ahram.org.eg/weekly/2001/517/eg5.htm. 88. Jailan Halawi, ‘‘Prosecution Case under Fire,’’ Al-Ahram Weekly On-Line, January 18–24, 2001, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2001/517/eg5.htm. 89. Ibid. 90. Four other defendants also received prison terms: Magda al-Bey, three years; Mohammed Hassanain, three years; Nadia Abdel Nour, two years; and Marwa Zaki, two years (in absentia). 91. For extensive background on this case, see Human Rights First, http://www .humanrightsfirst.org/middle_east/egypt/ibrahim/hrd_ibr_more.htm. 92. Dawoud, ‘‘The State versus Ibrahim.’’ 93. Denis Sullivan, interview with U.S. Department of State official, Washington, D.C., February 14, 2001. 94. Saad Eddin Ibrahim’s wife, Barbara, expressed this concern to Denis Sullivan in e-mail correspondence. The Egyptian media also expressed this concern. While Ibrahim and his family and friends are right to want to avoid the appearance of heavy-handed U.S. pressure on the Government of Egypt, they must also not allow Ibrahim’s alleged crimes to go unchallenged. Thus, such U.S. intervention is understandable and desirable, given that Ibrahim is a U.S. citizen; it is also necessary for Egyptians themselves to pressure their own government to respect and abide by the rule of law. However, that is not a standard for which Egypt is known. 95. Denis Sullivan, interviews with Egyptian academics and journalists, Washington, D.C., April 4, 2001. 96. Denis Sullivan, interview with U.S. Department of State official, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Washington, D.C., August 2, 2001. 97. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, ‘‘Egypt’s Unchecked Repression,’’ Washington Post, editorial, August 7, 2007, LexisNexis. 98. ‘‘A ‘Dissident President’? If President Bush Really Feels Solidarity with Egypt’s Saad Eddin Ibrahim, He Ought to Act on It,’’ Washington Post, editorial, September 3, 2007, LexisNexis. 99. Denis Sullivan, interview with U.S. Department of State official, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Washington, D.C., April 4, 2002. 100. Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Country Studies: The Human Rights Impact of CounterTerrorism Measures in Ten Countries,’’ in In the Name of Counter-Terrorism: Human Rights Abuses Worldwide, March 25, 2003, http://www.hrw.org/un/chr59/counter-terrorismbck4.htm. 101. For example, see Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Egypt: Terrorism Trial Shows Serious Flaws: Torture Allegedly Used to Coerce Confessions,’’ December 12, 2006, http://hrw.org/english/ docs/2006/12/13/egypt14829.htm. More generally, Human Rights has numerous Web pages at http://hrw.org/doc/?t=mideast&c=egypt, listing dozens of reports, press releases, and other documents addressing Egypt’s wrongful use of torture, other ill-treatment, and imprisonment. 102. Denis Sullivan, interview with U.S. Department of State official, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Washington, D.C., February 13, 2001. 103. Ibid., emphasis added. 104. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—1992, report submitted to Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 1993), 991.

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Global Security Watch—Egypt 105. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—1994, report submitted to Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 1995). The quotation is from page 1 of a document acquired directly from the Department of State. 106. U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Egypt,’’ Country Reports on Human Rights Practices— 1999, February 23, 2000, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/408.htm. 107. U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Egypt,’’ Country Reports on Human Rights Practices— 2002, March 21, 2003, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18274.htm. 108. U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Egypt,’’ Country Reports on Human Rights Practices— 2006, March 6, 2007. 109. Ibrahim, ‘‘Egypt’s Unchecked Repression.’’ 110. Daniel Williams, ‘‘Mubarak Backs Strikes by U.S. on Afghanistan,’’ Washington Post, October 10, 2001, LexisNexis. 111. Pierre Bernasconi, et al., ‘‘Foreign Support of the U.S. War on Terrorism,’’ Washington, D.C., Congressional Research Service, July 11, 2002, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/ organization/35109.pdf. 112. Jane Mayer, ‘‘Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America’s ‘Extraordinary Rendition’ Program,’’ The New Yorker, February 2007, http://www.newyorker.com/archive/ 2005/02/14/050214fa_fact6. 113. Douglas Jehl and David Johnston, ‘‘Rule Change Lets C.I.A. Freely Send Suspects Abroad to Jails,’’ New York Times, March 6, 2005, LexisNexis. 114. Ibid. 115. Stephen Grey, ‘‘U.S. Accused of Torture Flights,’’ Sunday Times (London), November 14, 2004, 24. 116. ‘‘Gonzales Defends U.S. ‘Renditions,’’’ AlJazeera.net, July 3, 2006, http://english. aljazeera.net/English/archive/archive?ArchiveId=24146. 117. Amnesty International, ‘‘USA: Below the Radar: Secret Flights to Torture and ‘Disappearance,’’’ April 5, 2006, http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR510512006. 118. Tony Barber, ‘‘Prodi and Berlusconi Face Grilling in Rendition Trial,’’ Financial Times (London), January 10, 2007, LexisNexis. 119. Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Cairo to Kabul to Guantanamo,’’ March 30, 2005, http:// hrw.org/english/docs/2005/03/28/usint10379.htm. 120. See http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2006/d20060515%20List.pdf. 121. Emad Mekay, ‘‘Congress Told to Maintain Aid to Egypt,’’ Al-Ahram Weekly On-Line, May 25–31, 2006, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/796/eg6.htm. 122. Ibid. 123. Federation of American Scientists, ‘‘US International Security Assistance Education and Training,’’ http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/training.html.

CHAPTER

5

Egypt’s Key Regional Relations and Its Position in the Global Community

Gamal Abdel-Nasser argued in his book The Philosophy of the Revolution that Egypt was the center of three concentric circles: the Arab (and thus Middle Eastern), the Islamic, and the African. He felt no contradiction in belonging to, and attempting to guide, the Arab League, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the Organization of African Unity. For decades, Egypt was undoubtedly the most important Arab state to fight colonialism, monarchism, Cold War politics, and Zionism. Anwar Sadat’s foreign policies halted or reversed these positions. Most dramatically, Egypt negotiated a separate peace with Israel, a peace that in turn improved its relations with the United States (and its allies), yet soured relations with other Arab, Muslim, and many nonaligned states. Hosni Mubarak inherited these diverse legacies and reasserted Egypt’s leading position in Arab affairs, or at least has argued for Egypt’s dominant position. His Arab world is not the same as that of his successors. While Mubarak managed to return Egypt to the Arab fold, the country’s role in the region has changed as Jordan now has a strong role vis-a`-vis the Middle East (Arab-Israeli) peace process; Libya is no longer targeted by UN sanctions and works directly with the United States again; Saddam Hussein is dead and, of course, is no longer the ‘‘neighborhood bully’’; Iraq is a shadow of its former self (not to mention a greater threat to its neighbors), having descended into civil war and despair; and Mubarak’s own domestic troubles (rising opposition and general public dismay about his ineffective and uninspiring rule) color other regional foreign policies. Still, Egypt’s strategic, geopolitical position keeps it at the center of Arab and Middle Eastern affairs, as well as close to the center of African and Mediterranean interests. This is most obvious in Egypt’s role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,

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in which it plays host to international and local leaders seeking varying ‘‘solutions’’ to the seemingly intractable situation. Egypt also uses its influence to exert political pressure, particularly on Palestinian parties and addresses a range of border concerns (largely Israeli) relating to the Gaza Strip. Egypt’s broader regional and international concerns include the Sudan, Iraq, Iran, Libya, or the Arabian Peninsula. ISRAEL AND PALESTINE

Egypt shares a border with Israel and the Gaza Strip, which Egypt occupied (or officially ‘‘administered’’) from 1948 through 1967, until Israel conquered and occupied Gaza. Since Israel technically withdrew its troops and Jewish settlers from Gaza in 2005, Egypt has attempted to serve as an interlocutor between the Palestinian factions, specifically Hamas, the Islamic resistance movement, and Fatah, the dominant faction within the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) with which Hamas has a history of conflict. Simultaneously, Egypt seeks to broker agreements between both of these factions and the Israeli government. Egypt thus continues to walk a political tightrope above and between complex Israeli and Palestinian relations; it can neither risk popular Egyptian anger should it decry the Palestinian political (and militant) resistance to Israel’s occupation, nor can it engender too much friction with Israel because of increasing economic and security cooperation. Historical Legacy

From 1948 to 1973, Egypt was Israel’s principal Arab enemy. During this time, Egypt (primarily under Nasser) took a key leadership role in the Arab world—both politically and militarily—to promote the Palestinian cause and to utilize that cause for Egypt’s own national interests. In 1964, Nasser engineered the establishment of the PLO and placed Ahmed Shukayri, perceived as his ‘‘puppet,’’ in charge. Nasser resisted the Israeli, British, and French invasion of Egypt in 1956 and threatened Israel in the mid-1960s, although his miscalculations led to Israel’s invasion in 1967 and the massive destruction of most of Egypt’s armed forces (particularly its air force). A war of attrition ensued, which lasted into the early 1970s. When Anwar Sadat assumed the presidency in 1970, he struggled with a ‘‘no war, no peace’’ policy until 1973, when he launched (with Syria) a surprise attack on Israeli troops, in an effort to regain the Sinai Peninsula (and, for Syria, the Golan Heights), which Israel had captured in 1967. Israel was surprised at its initial losses during the war, which was touted as a victory by Egypt, even though it failed to wrest the Sinai away from Israeli control. Operating from an improved diplomatic position, Sadat then launched his peace initiative. Siding with the United States after exiting from

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the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence, Sadat made a series of disengagement and other agreements with Israel (as brokered by the United States). On September 17, 1978, U.S. President Jimmy Carter, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and President Sadat signed two agreements known as the Camp David Accords. Proving to be a historic shift in Middle East relations (and one with global impact), the accords called for (1) Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai within three years in exchange for a normalization of relations between Egypt and Israel as well as (2) a five-year transition period to provide autonomy to Palestinians inside the occupied territories. Part 1 of the accords was fully implemented; part 2 was (obviously) not executed. Egypt, under Sadat, thus chose a separate peace with Israel, yet Egypt remained central to the U.S.–led efforts to expand this peace to other Arab states (if not yet to the core player on the Arab side of this conflict, the Palestinian people). Yasser Arafat—founder of Fatah, chairman of the PLO, and later the president of the Palestinian National Authority—was raised and educated in Cairo. Throughout his political career, he came to depend heavily on Egypt—especially on Hosni Mubarak—for political advice and for support in his negotiations with Israel. Egypt regularly pressed Arafat to make concessions such as condemning terrorism and accepting Israel’s right to exist, thus opening the first dialogue between the United States and the PLO in 1988–1990. Until his death in November 2004, Arafat continued to rely on Mubarak for advice, support, and ‘‘goodwill’’ with the Israelis and the Americans. Arafat’s successor, Mahmoud Abbas (also known as Abu Mazen), continues to turn to Cairo for help— especially on matters relating to Gaza and Hamas. As noted previously, Egyptian-Israeli relations have long been characterized as a ‘‘cold peace’’: neither belligerent or hostile nor warm or enthusiastic. Egyptian papers regularly condemn ‘‘Zionism’’ (writ large), especially Israeli occupation and control over the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip; Israelis regularly condemn the Egyptian press for perceived anti-Semitism (whereas Egyptians say it is anti-Zionism). Members of the U.S. Congress frequently intervene to condemn Egypt as well and have threatened to cut Egypt’s lucrative aid package. The coverage of the second Palestinian intifada (uprising) in Egyptian newspapers and on Arab TV stations has hardened Egyptian positions against Israel. Diplomatic relations continue between the two countries, even as each is skeptical of the other. Egypt recalled its ambassador to Israel after the latter’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon; his successor was appointed eight months later. In late 2000, Egypt ‘‘recalled’’ (but did not withdraw) its ambassador as a response to Israel’s harsh crackdown on Palestinians in the second (or ‘‘Al-Aqsa’’) intifada. In March 2005, Egypt returned its ambassador after more than four years; the restoration of full diplomatic ties came in advance of Israel’s planned (unilateral) withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Egypt’s border with Gaza has been a point of

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tension for Palestinians, Israelis, and Egyptians alike. For example, once Israel withdrew from Gaza, it did not fully relinquish control over a small strip of land known as the Philadelphi Corridor, alongside Egypt and southern Gaza. This became a security headache and a diplomatic no-man’s-land, for example, when Palestinians visiting Egypt sought to return to Gaza and found they were not allowed back in. Also, while Israeli citizens have been welcomed as tourists in the Sinai, they have found it difficult (but not impossible) to enter Egypt proper (i.e., beyond the Sinai Peninsula, en route to Cairo or Alexandria). Militant attacks in the Sinai—targeting Israeli and other tourists—remain a source of diplomatic and security tension. There are regular flights between Cairo and Tel Aviv, but again tension stems from security concerns on both sides. The Rafah Crossing—The Border with Gaza

Egypt borders the Gaza Strip for eight miles along the Philadelphi Corridor (also termed the Salah al-Din [or Saladin] Route for the border road on the Gaza side). The primary border crossing between the two is at Rafah, a town split by the border.1 The area, well peppered with not-so-secret tunnels, has long been a source of consternation, particularly for Israel, as a transit route for illicit smuggling activities, for militants and criminals, between Gaza and Egypt. Tunneling was said to have begun in the early 1980s when the border was reestablished after Israel withdrew from Sinai. Initially the tunnels were used for moving some consumer goods and drugs; however, during the onset of the first intifada several years later, the tunnels became conduits for the trafficking of weapons, militants, and other people.2 In August 2005 Egypt and Israel hashed out preliminary numbers for the deployment of Egyptian forces along the border as Israel planned its corresponding withdrawal from Gaza. Initial progress then seemed stalled over an Israeli demand that Egypt not transfer weapons to the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip, a request to which Egypt acquiesced. Finally, on September 1, 2005, after much ado, Egypt and Israel signed a protocol specifying the negotiated terms of deployment. Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz said the Egyptian border guards would ‘‘pose no threat to Israel,’’ and that ‘‘the agreement commits Egypt to combating arms smuggling and terrorist infiltrations and opens the way to future security co-operation between our two countries.’’3 By mid-September, much of Egypt’s deployment was completed. Notably, at the same time the border changes were under way, Israel was withdrawing from the Gaza Strip, theoretically ending nearly four decades of military occupation. However, Israel stated that the Rafah crossing would close, and it was not prepared to give the Palestinians control of their side of the checkpoint. Ultimately, Egypt temporarily opened the crossing, allowing Palestinians massed thereabouts to pass through. This resulted in celebratory chaos as Palestinians sought to enjoy the relative freedoms Egypt offered, including reduced prices

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on consumer goods, and to rejoin with family members from whom they had been separated for years.4 Concerns were raised about those seeking to take advantage of an illicit window of opportunity, as there were incidents of weapons and narcotics smuggling. Some reports stated prices for weapons and ammunition in Gaza dropped as supplies increased. Eventually, the situation deteriorated as Palestinians trying to return to Gaza got into skirmishes with Egyptian riot police. A lack of imposed passport controls was said to make it difficult to sort out who went where. As expected, Israel decried the situation and warned of a need for a change. Between September and November 2005, the crossing was only intermittently opened. In November 2005, two further agreements were hammered out between Israel and the Palestinian Authority: the Agreement on Movement and Access and the Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing.5 Included among the provisions is the reopening of the crossing with third-party European Union monitors (EU Border Assistance Monitors) as well as a live camera feed. Additionally, Rafah would be largely restricted to the movement of people (and exports); imported commercial goods transit would go through the checkpoint at Kerem Shalom, screened by the Palestinian Authority, under the supervision of the Israelis and monitored by the European Union. Finally, at the end of the month, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas formally reopened the crossing and said, ‘‘I think every Palestinian now has his passport ready in his pocket; let them come to cross at this terminal whenever they want.’’6 Just days later, tensions increased as Israel threatened to close the Rafah crossing and others linking Israel with the Gaza Strip after an exiled Hamas official returned to Gaza. In early January 2006, Egyptian border guards came under attack as members of the Palestinian group, the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (generally understood to have membership overlap with and/or ‘‘links’’ to Fatah), used bulldozers to break through the wall at the crossing after one of the leaders had been arrested by Palestinian authorities. In February 2006, ‘‘Some Israeli officials said they suspect that Egypt is playing a double game—officially supporting Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas in his struggle with Hamas while hedging its bets because Hamas is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamic group with growing political strength in Egypt.’’7 At the same time they accused Egypt of doing little to halt weapons smuggling. A few months later, Egyptian border guards were said to have found 75 percent fewer tunnels since Hamas assumed power, an indication of their positive governance and law enforcement capacity. They also noted they had made significant law enforcement progress in their own right as 138 tunnels were located, and they confiscated thousands of rounds of ammunition and dynamite.8 The United Nations reported that in 2006 the Rafah Crossing was open only for the first six months and then it closed in June, only to be opened for 31 days

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during the remainder of the year.9 In August 2006, Al-Ahram Weekly reported Egyptian officials were ‘‘in continuous contact with their Israeli counterparts to try and regulate the crossing crisis but with little success,’’ and an Egyptian official stated, ‘‘The Israeli authorities exercise unfair pressure on the European monitors to get them to close the borders, and if they fail, they use phony security threats to intimidate the monitors.’’10 The situation failed to improve in mid-2007 after Hamas seized power in the Gaza Strip, effectively ousting Fatah, the party with which Israel would deal. And, so, Rafah closed, again. In September 2007, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) stated that the ‘‘Karni and Rafah crossings have now been closed for over three months resulting in severe personal and economic hardships for Gaza’s 1.4 million population. The closure has been effective since the first half of June following the defeat of Fatah forces by Hamas which has resulted in a break down in the former Israeli-Palestinian coordination mechanisms at the crossings.’’11 In the fall of 2007, the Egyptian military leaders presented documentation to members of the U.S. Congress that much of the smuggling into Gaza was undertaken via sea routes and elements of the Israeli military facilitated illegal movement of goods into the territory.12 In an apparent tit-for-tat exchange, weeks later, Yuval Steinitz, an opposition Israeli legislator from the hawkish Likud Party who is also a former chairman of the Knesset’s (parliament) Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, accused Egypt of permitting Hamas to acquire weapons, including 20,000 rifles, thousands of antitank missiles, tons of explosives, and dozens of Katyusha rockets.13 In sum, the hopes held by ordinary Egyptians and Palestinians for the Rafah crossing have been dashed. Their voyages have been ones of stops and starts, but mostly stops. Israel’s dictation of border policy has created humanitarian crises as thousands have been left stranded on both sides of the border with inadequate infrastructure in either Gaza or Egypt to cope. Egypt has done little to mitigate the situation for stranded travelers, and its efforts to stop illicit border activity are questionable. To make matters worse, Egypt and Israel (along with the ‘‘international community’’) have created additional security concerns: Now that Hamas controls Gaza and Gaza is economically isolated, many who sought to engage in legitimate commerce and trade may be forced to turn to the underground economy and smuggling just to survive. Egypt as Interlocutor

Egypt has, from time to time, served as an interlocutor between rival factions/ parties, between Fatah and Hamas and between Israel and Hamas. In terms of the latter relationship, Egypt is trying to balance on a fairly tight wire: The Arab Republic needs to maintain its ‘‘cold peace’’ with Israel and thereby facilitate

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accommodations with Hamas to remain in the good graces of its primary international beneficiary, the United States. At the same time, Egypt cannot be seen as a ‘‘Zionist’’ appeaser by its own domestic Islamists for fear of further empowering the Muslim Brotherhood, which has good relations with Hamas, or worse yet, providing ammunition for domestic militants to strike Jewish or Israeli targets in Egypt or the Egyptian government itself. Moreover, as a negotiator between Hamas and Fatah, Egypt shows (or attempts to) its authority as a preeminent Arab power—able to resolve disputes at the heart of the so-called Middle East conflict. Examples of diplomatic wrangling follow. Egypt has served as an intermediary between Hamas and Israel regarding Palestinian militants’ holding of Israeli military officer Gilead Shalit. In the fall of 2006, Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul-Gheith said, ‘‘Egypt succeeded in securing a swap deal with Israel to free [Palestinian] women, children, elders and those who have been serving long prison terms in exchange for the soldier’’; however, Hamas reportedly turned down the offer.14 At the time, speculation emerged that Egypt was no longer serving as an effective go-between because of tensions between Hamas and the Egyptian government; however, Egypt asserted that its role was ongoing. In early September 2007 reports surfaced that Egypt was alternately fed up with Israeli intransigence and concerned about the perception of a successfully negotiated prisoner release as a success and was therefore withdrawing from mediation efforts.15 Less than ten days later, a Hamas spokesperson confirmed Egypt’s continuing involvement, but noted it was dealing with all parties including unnamed Europeans who had become very active as go-betweens.16 At a meeting in January 2007 between President Mubarak and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, the Egyptian leader said, ‘‘I expressed to the Prime Minister my deep concern over the Israeli operation in Ramallah just before his arrival to Sharm el-Sheikh. I confirmed the necessity of avoiding these practices which obstruct our efforts to realize the comprehensive calm in Gaza and the West Bank if we are serious in talking about peace.’’17 Prime Minister Olmert added, I held long talks with President Mubarak over the ways which can lead to resuming negotiations with the Palestinian Authority chaired by Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) and they can help resume negotiations between us again.. . .I expressed my concern to President Mubarak over the smuggling of arms and money to the Palestinians via Salaheddin corridor. Of course, President Mubarak does not accept this and we will work on halting these operations.. . .Despite that Israel is concerned with maintaining the ceasefire in Gaza, some elements work on breaking the agreement.18

In the lead-up to the U.S.–sponsored meeting at Annapolis (Maryland) in November 2007 to broker (yet another) peace plan between the Palestinians and the Israelis, President Mubarak and Prime Minister Olmert met at Sharm el-Sheikh. Bilateral relations were on the agenda as was the ‘‘peace process’’ and the international summit. Israeli media reported that the Sharm el-Sheikh

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meeting would also ‘‘serve as part of a diplomatic effort to ensure broad Arab participation in the Annapolis conference.’’19 Checked off on the official list of attending delegates were a variety of Arab states, including Egypt, as expected, and to the surprise of some, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and other key international players.20 Members of the Muslim Brotherhood, ever-present in Egypt’s regional affairs, had their own opinions on the conference. General Guide Mohammed Mahdi Akef called the Annapolis gathering a ‘‘surrender conference’’ and said it was an attempt to impose ‘‘an obligatory settlement’’ on the Arab region. Dr. Mohamed Habib, the first deputy chairman, said the conference was an attempt to normalize Israeli-Arab relations, bolstering the ‘‘axis of moderation,’’ which includes the Gulf States as well as Egypt and Jordan, against the acknowledged axis of evil, although Syria (a member of the latter and less desirable axis) was present.21 Egypt has also intervened intermittently to resolve disputes between the Hamas and Fatah. In the summer of 2007, after the two failed to create a viable unity government and Hamas took control of Gaza, a Hamas spokesperson ‘‘stressed that Hamas is in constant contacts with the Egyptian leadership as part of the efforts and calls for dialogue between Hamas and Fatah.’’22 Earlier in that year, a Fatah spokesman reported the fourth in a series of meetings with the Egyptians and said, Egyptian Minister Umar Sulayman proposed the holding of a tripartite meeting by the middle of the coming week, with [the participation of ] delegations from Hamas, Fatah and Egypt headed by Minister Umar Sulayman. The logic behind holding this meeting is that [at that time] the Egyptian delegation would have had listened impartially to all parties, to all Palestinian organizations, at the forefront of which are the five organizations: Fatah, Hamas, the Popular Front, the Democratic Front and Islamic Jihad. Hence, the Egyptian delegation has crystallized a neutral idea that came out of the principles of transparency and frankness. There is a [process of ] founding a strategic solution to the crisis of the struggle between Fatah and Hamas, or what is called the internal crisis. Today the discussions dealt with what Fatah wants from Hamas. Hamas will come tomorrow to Egypt. The Egyptian delegation will discuss with Hamas all the details it discussed with Fatah. It [the Egyptian delegation] will pose a big question to Hamas regarding what it wants from Fatah.23

Previously, Egypt was considered to be seeking either a ‘‘balance’’ between the two parties or attempting to ‘‘tame’’ Hamas. The Guardian (Manchester) reported that Egypt had lobbied for the postponement of Palestinian elections because of fears of Hamas’ probable success. This was not merely an effort to prop up its Palestinian ally (Fatah), but was also out of concern for a ‘‘demonstration effect’’ at home: the apprehension that its own Islamist group, the Muslim Brotherhood, might benefit from a Hamas victory in Egypt’s local elections set for early 2006 (Egypt, in fact, postponed its own local elections indefinitely).24

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Militants Attack in the Sinai

After Egypt’s seven-year lull of violence, militants have targeted the Sinai Peninsula and, in some cases, Israelis and establishments catering to them. Recall that the Sinai is the region of Egypt bordering Israel, which Israel occupied from 1967 to 1982. The attacks on the Sinai are problematic on many levels, the obvious being the death and injury of those targeted as well as bystanders. It also causes Egypt economic dismay because of the financial losses suffered by the multibillion-dollar tourism industry. Finally, attacks could put an additional chill on the already ‘‘cold peace.’’ The first attack of the recent wave came in early October 2004 when bombs exploded in the Egyptian resort towns of Taba, Ras Al-Shaytan, and Nuwayba, not far from the Israeli border. Thirty-four people were killed and scores were wounded. Days after the attacks, Israel reported 12 of its own were among the dead, and more than 120 were wounded.25 The Israeli and Egyptian foreign ministers were in contact in the aftermath with the former asking to fly rescue workers into Sinai and requesting that vacating Israelis be permitted to cross the border without passport checks. An ambulance driver reported that things did not go so smoothly: He said that while returning to the hospital in Israel, Egyptian border guards insisted upon examining the passports of the injured. He stated, ‘‘People were bleeding and screaming in the ambulance, shouting that their documents were still in the hotel. . .And the guards then gave them forms to fill out.. . .People were in shock, crying and bleeding, and they had to fill out these forms. It took me two and a half hours to get through the border.’’26 Notably, some in Egypt (and elsewhere) were quick to consider the possibility that Israeli intelligence units were responsible for the bombings in an attempt to undermine Egypt’s tourism industry or strike at Egypt’s position as interlocutor between Palestinian factions. In July 2005, the key tourist city of Sharm el-Sheikh was targeted with bombs, and dozens were killed, mostly Egyptians, and hundreds were wounded. Notably, the location is a preeminent site for Egyptian foreign affairs—it has hosted many peace conferences and world leaders including those from Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The following month, roadside bombs near the border with Gaza detonated and damaged a passing bus belonging to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), the contingent supervising the terms of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty; two Canadians were slightly injured. The attack came as Egypt prepared for deployment of its border guard near Gaza. The MFO was again targeted by bombers in April 2006; no significant injuries were recorded. In late April 2006, three bombs reeked havoc on Dahab, another Sinai tourist town. More than 20 people were killed and scores were injured. Notably, the Israeli prime minister’s office has issued repeated warnings to Israeli tourists to refrain from going to Egypt and specifically the Sinai, and those

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already there are often urged to leave immediately when there is a perceived security threat.27 The Sinai attacks against Israeli (and other) tourists have provided for slightly improved levels of cooperation between Egypt and Israel, as both countries continue to see ‘‘Islamism’’ (or extremist movements using Islam to mobilize support) as a common enemy. Economic and Security Cooperation

Egypt and Israel have forged ahead with economic cooperation—although much of this is ‘‘hidden’’ from the Egyptian public. Throughout the late 1980s, much of that cooperation was related to agriculture and the oil trade. In late 2005, Egypt and Israel expanded an agreement enabling Egypt to export products from Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZs), containing a quota of Israeli components, to the United States free of customs duties. Specifically, the trade agreement with the United States and Israel allows the export of Egyptian products, made in specified locations, to the United States duty-free contingent upon the goods being comprised of at least 11.7 percent Israeli components. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the QIZ initiative is seen as an American effort to keep Egypt working closely with Israel, as well as the United States, in support of the Middle East peace process. Interestingly, on Egypt’s State Information Service’s Web page on foreign trade, the QIZs are encompassed within a discussion of U.S. trade and not Israel per se.28 IRAQ

Baghdad and Cairo have been historic adversaries, not only in times such as Nasser’s call to overthrow the Hashemite monarchy, which occurred in 1958, but well before and after that. When the Ba’ath (Renaissance) Party took control in Iraq with a call for Arab unity, this challenged Nasser’s presumption that he was the single Arab leader who could unify all Arab states. When Sadat signed the peace treaty with Israel, it was Saddam Hussein (who assumed power in Iraq in 1979) who led the Arab rejectionists and engineered Egypt’s expulsion from the Arab League, among other organizations, and the severing of diplomatic relations between most Arab states and Egypt. Yet, when Iraq was failing to win decisively in its war against Iran (1980–1988), Egypt came to its rescue—especially after 1984. It did so with the help of Jordan: Egyptian troops, equipment, and training went through the Hashemite Kingdom en route to Iraq and the aid of Saddam’s failing war. By the end of that war, Egypt ‘‘returned to the Arab fold,’’ and the Arab League headquarters eventually relocated back to Cairo. Hundreds of thousands of Egyptians worked in Iraq’s oil fields and other industries throughout the 1980s and 1990s. While this helped millions of Egyptians back home, due to the remittances sent by these workers, Egyptians also

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paid a high price for working in Saddam’s Iraq. In the late 1980s, thousands of Egyptians were killed and their bodies returned to Egypt, leading to popular outrage against Saddam in the streets of Cairo. According to one source, Egypt’s Al-Musawwar reported in 1999 that the number of Egyptians killed in Iraq was nearly 6,000.29 When Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1990, Egyptians were again outraged and joined the coalition to oust him, including providing troops. Yet, Egypt argued strenuously against the U.S. invasion in 2003—not out of support for Saddam, but rather for fundamental disagreement with the need to go to war at that time. Egypt also had reservations about the real and rhetorical ammunition the war would give to militants in the region: President Mubarak stated, ‘‘When it is over, if it is over, this war will have horrible consequences.. . .Instead of having one (Osama) bin Laden, we will have 100 bin Ladens.’’ 30 In 2005, Foreign Minister Aboul-Gheith stated, Egyptian diplomacy’s number one objective involves knowing and communicating with all the elements involved in the current Iraqi equation. Until April 2003, Iraq was a country governed by a central government, and all Iraqis were referred to as such. There was no references to Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds and Turkmans, as is the case now. Today, we see evidence of sectarian quotas when top government posts are allocated. And this is not something we are not happy about. Our mission is to prevent this sectarianism from escalating. We want Iraq to remain intact as a united nation that can be governed by a federal or central government, depending on the Iraqi people’s wishes. And to serve this objective, Egypt has been heavily involved in many regional and international meetings and conferences. Our second objective is to see a new Iraq emerging out of the current situation. We want to see a safe, stable and united Iraq that is democratically governed and capable of assuming its role within the Arab world. Our third objective is to see an Iraq capable of defending itself and imposing the rule of law on its territories—an Iraq that does not need the presence of foreign troops.31

Ultimately, Egypt ‘‘bucked up’’ diplomatically on Iraq—it welcomed the interim Iraqi government into the Arab League and recognized it as a legitimate administration. The Egyptian government has offered repeatedly to help train Iraq’s military and police and consequently felt snubbed by the United States and Iraq when the bulk of that training was contracted out to Jordan instead. When Iraq stabilizes to the point that it can rearm and resume a regional military footprint, Egypt will likely be leery of such a general reassertion of influence in the region and renewed competition between the two for political and military power in the Middle East. SUDAN

Egyptians proudly speak of their country as being the ‘‘gift of the Nile’’ (i.e., without the Nile, there would be no Egypt, no civilization, no history). Relations

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with Sudan, which was united with Egypt under British control and was called ‘‘Anglo-Egyptian Sudan’’ from 1899 to 1956, as well as other Nile Basin states are fundamental to Egypt’s long-term security. For several decades, Sudan has experienced horrific internal violence involving Arab, African, and Muslim interests, and these have a ‘‘downstream impact’’ (literally and figuratively) on Egypt. Thus, Egypt is frequently involved in Sudan’s problems and has reasons to be wary of (and/or concerned for) its southern neighbor. Issues of concern for Egypt regarding Sudan include the civil war between the Animist and Christian South and the Arab/Muslim North, the related situation in Darfur, the thousands of Sudanese refugees in Egypt, particularly in Cairo (a result of both the North-South civil war and the Darfur conflict), the existence of an ‘‘Islamic State’’ on its southern border, the Hala’ib Triangle, and the perennial issue—water and the Nile valley. Historical Legacy

In 1899, the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Agreement established joint control over Sudan and effectively created a superstate of Egypt and Sudan, albeit one still controlled by the United Kingdom. The 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty effectively ended Egyptian control over Sudan, against the wishes of the Egyptian government; Sudan continued to be ruled from Cairo by the United Kingdom and both flags—Egyptian and British—continued to fly in Khartoum. On January 1, 1956, Sudan was officially declared independent. Yet, Egypt and Sudan did not completely ‘‘separate’’ without dispute. A ‘‘triangle’’ of land, known as Hala’ib Triangle, was and is claimed by both Egypt and Sudan. While Nasser moved troops into the triangle in 1958 to reclaim the land, he failed and it remained under Sudanese control. The issue remained quiet until 1992, when Egypt objected to Sudan’s granting oil exploration rights to a Canadian company. Sudan-Egypt relations are not always conflictual. For example, Sudan, under President Gaafar Nimeiri (1965–1985), was one of the few Arab League countries to support Egypt and its peace agreement with Israel. Nimeiri’s rule ended when he was overthrown in a coup in 1985. President Mubarak granted him asylum in Egypt and declined Sudan’s request for his extradition. Egyptian-Sudanese relations worsened in 1995, after Egypt accused Sudan of involvement in an assassination attempt against President Mubarak in Ethiopia. The situation has remained uncertain—occasionally improved while other times strained. The Sudanese Civil War

Sudan’s civil war between the North and the South first raged from 1955 to 1972. A ten-year hiatus ensued, but this ended in 1983 with President Nimeiri’s efforts to sidestep the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement as well as with the rise of the

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Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). In a 2000 interview, Egyptian Ambassador Mohammed Asim Ibrahim stated Egypt ‘‘possesses pressure cards it has not yet used for preventing the separation of south Sudan.’’ Ibrahim declined to reveal their nature; however, he said Egypt joining the war on side of the Khartoum government would provide ‘‘another excuse for separation,’’ which Egypt was firmly against.32 Egypt was displeased with Sudan and the United States when it did not have a say in the U.S.–brokered framework peace treaty signed in July 2002 between the Sudanese government and the SPLA. This agreement called for a referendum on the issue of the secession of the southern Sudan after a six-year interim period. Egypt has also been concerned that without the balance of the South, the North would become more militantly Islamist. Throughout its diplomatic and other maneuverings, to the chagrin of much of the international community (especially the United States), Egypt has consistently supported the Government of Sudan and its ruling National Islamic Front throughout the genocide in Darfur. Cairo maintains this is an issue of national sovereignty above all else. President Mubarak has been directly engaged with Sudan and other states toward ending the conflict. For example, in 2005, the Egyptian president, along with a high-level delegation, attended a summit in Libya. During the discussions, Egypt and five others state leaders focused on Sudanese unity as a means toward a comprehensive peace as well as African Union peacekeeping. Less than a year later, President Mubarak and Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir ‘‘held a closed consultative session in Khartoum in which they tackled means of implementing the ‘Khartoum Declaration,’ the situation in Darfur, efforts exerted to peacefully settle Darfur crisis and ways of boosting bilateral relations in various fields.’’33 In early 2006, Egyptian Foreign Minister Aboul-Gheith said that Khartoum would have to approve the dispatch of any UN or other multinational troops to Darfur; he also insisted that Sudan should be allowed to investigate war crimes on its own, without international involvement.34 Egyptian support for solutions to the crisis has the added bonus of bringing Arab League support to the table. Indeed, in late 2007, Aboul-Gheith said, Egypt is an African Arab country that has fundamental interests in Sudan. The consequences of deterioration of the situation in Darfur have direct effects on Egypt’s national security. They should know at the UN Secretariat that Egypt might face tens of thousands of our Sudanese brothers who will cross to our borders. So we must achieve stability in this region. The Egyptian contribution in this connection is considered fundamental and is being encouraged by the Sudanese side and by the Arab League, especially since the Egyptian force is the only Arab force in Africa contributing to the hybrid force.35

Thus, Egypt, the country best placed to exert influence over the Government of Sudan—and receive American, European, and UN support in the process— to end the genocide instead has consistently sided with that government.

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Refugees

According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, at the end of 2005, there were 18,946 refugees in Egypt, the majority of whom (13,372) came from Sudan.36 Once in Egypt, Sudanese refugees often find themselves revictimized, both at the hands of Egyptian security services and ordinary Egyptians. For example, in 2003, a Sudanese refugee who had legal status in Egypt was detained by police (who did not identify themselves) along with other Africans. He was then jailed with Egyptian Arabs who proceeded to attack him and others who were rounded up, and the guards failed to intervene. The intake sheet at the police station was entitled (in Arabic) ‘‘Operation Track Down Blacks.’’37 In one of the most notorious examples of Sudanese refugee abuse, the Egyptian government forcibly broke up a three-month Sudanese sit-in protest of UN resettlement conditions at Cairo’s Mustapha Mahmoud Square in late 2005. More than two dozen protesters were killed, many of them children. Although Egypt released many held in the immediate aftermath, more than 150 were held into February 2006.38 A Sudanese individual, seeking asylum, waited to give a bag of food to a detained Sudanese friend and said, ‘‘They say that silence is the image of death. But we are living and dying in this silence.’’39 Further compounding the human rights violations and personal trauma, Egypt has tried dozens of refugees in military courts, and some have been sentenced to prison. One Sudanese man who faced a tribunal had to be carried into court by a fellow defendant because his legs were shattered by bullets when Egyptian security forces detained him.40 The use of lethal force against refugees, particularly at the border, is not uncommon. Egypt’s Foreign Ministry stated, ‘‘If those crossing refuse to heed the order of authorities to stop, then authorities are forced to deal with them in such a manner to ensure respect for the law.’’41 In early August 2007, in an incident condemned by the international human rights community, Egyptian border guards killed three who tried to cross into Israel. Subsequently dozens of Sudanese who had made their way through Egypt to seek refuge in Israel again found themselves on the wrong side of the law as they were expelled and sent back to Egypt. The Nile River Basin

When Boutros Boutros Ghali was an Egyptian government minister, prior to his tenure as UN Secretary-General, he said, ‘‘The next war in our region will be over the waters of the Nile, not politics.’’42 Indeed, as a desert country, Egypt depends heavily on water resource management for both its survival and development. Providing 97 percent of Egypt’s water supply, the Nile River is viewed as ‘‘the source’’ of Egyptian life.43 Ten states serve as riparian hosts: Egypt, Sudan,

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Ethiopia, Eritrea, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Kenya, including some of the world’s most impoverished (at least three states have half their population living in extreme poverty—earning less than $1/day); however, Egypt and Sudan divvy up the river’s liquid treasure. A series of three treaties have regulated Egypt and Sudan’s rights to the waterway. The most recent of the agreements, negotiated in the 1950s, entitles Egypt to 55.5 billion m3 of water a year, while Sudan can use 18.5 billion m3. The other Nile states have been prohibited from constructing any river barriers. In 2005 Aboul-Geith said, ‘‘Rest assured that it will never happen that any Egyptian official would give up our share in the Nile water. We must not forget that the river’s resources are by far greater than what Egypt and Sudan get.’’44 Egypt is classified as ‘‘water scarce,’’ and its per capita share of water is forecasted to decline to ‘‘a share of about 500m3/cap/year by the year 2025.’’45 Moreover, a significant proportion of Egypt’s growing population (nearly 80 million and counting) is densely concentrated along the Nile. Thus, relations with Sudan, through which the Nile passes into Egypt, are key for Egypt. Sudanese relations thus directly impact the well-being of Egypt’s population, in addition to all of its agricultural production, tourism, manufacturing, and other industries’ reliance upon water. The Nile Basin Initiative and the Nile Cooperative Framework inclusive arrangements supported by the World Bank and UN Development Programme are shaking up the status quo. As of mid-2007, a new agreement may simplify or complicate relations, depending on one’s perspective. Egypt’s Minister of Irrigation and Water Resources Mahmoud Abu-Zeid said a new Nile Basin agreement establishing water quotas among the riparian rivals was near completion. The minister noted the proposed agreement respected Egypt’s quota of 55.5 billion m3 meters and, in fact, increased that amount under the new agreement.46 Egypt’s relations with the Sudan are thus simple and complex: Egypt depends upon the waters of the Nile and, ergo, positive diplomatic relations with Sudan. Sudan’s civil strife and genocide in Darfur serve to muddy the political waters significantly, however, not enough for Egypt to alter course. Egypt will likely continue its hegemonic presumptions to control the Nile while at the same time maintaining relatively friendly relations with the pariah state to the south. LIBYA

For decades, the Egypt-Libya relationship has fluctuated between solidarity (including a 1972 proposal to unify the two nations) to outright hostility (including border clashes in 1977) to Libyan aid to Egypt (in the billions of dollars, especially in the 1970s) and more generally, to strong bilateral economic relations. Given the fluctuating nature of the relationship, Egypt’s military maintains its vigilance with its western neighbor. In the late 1990s, the commander of Egypt’s

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Western Military Zone (at Marsa Matruh) mobilized armed forces, artillery, and air defense units at coastal towns and in the Western Desert (on Libya’s border).47 Beyond the legitimate concern for Libyan ‘‘mischief,’’ perhaps the more dominant aspect of this relationship is an economic one, based especially on Egyptian labor finding work in Libya. Libya has hosted hundreds of thousands of Egyptian teachers, doctors, as well as oil, construction, and other workers. Egypt also occasionally hosts Libyans—especially political dissidents. Despite this economic interdependence, however, Egypt continues to maintain a strong defensive position along its border with its Libyan neighbor. Even when Egypt-Libya relations are strained, Egypt finds it necessary to support its neighbor to the west, including during times when Libya is deemed a ‘‘pariah’’ state. Egyptian officials actively lobbied the United States and the United Kingdom to end UN sanctions and the international blockade against Libya, which were imposed because of its support for terrorism and the December 1988 Lockerbie bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. In August 2003, Libya accepted responsibility for the bombing and agreed to pay a $2.7 billion settlement to the victims’ families; in September 2003, the UN voted to end sanctions. Having helped secure Libya’s compliance (with Muammar Qadhafi relinquishing suspects to the international community), President Mubarak has worked to improve even further his relations with this important neighbor. Mubarak has consulted frequently with the Libyan leader to discuss bilateral relations, the Middle East peace process, Israel and its nuclear weapons program, Iraq, Sudan, and other regional issues. In December 2003, Qadhafi announced that he would abandon his longstanding programs to develop unconventional weapons (so-called WMD or weapons of mass destruction). Egyptian journalists criticized the Libyan leader for deciding this unilaterally, rather than using the decision to leverage Israel to make similar moves. In retaliation for the criticism, Libya imposed travel restrictions on Egyptians. Egypt then retaliated against the Libyan moves with its own restrictions and relations suffered. It required a personal envoy of Mubarak to visit Tripoli and to meet with Qadhafi to bring the mutual recriminations to an end. Egypt depends heavily upon Libya as a source of employment for Egypt’s ever-burgeoning population, which puts constant pressure on Egypt’s own economy. Over 350,000 Egyptians were working in Libya in early 2004, and Egypt could not afford an escalation of tensions. INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL MEMBERSHIPS Arab League and Inter-Arab Relations

For decades, Egypt has had a competitive and at times conflictual relationship with various Arab powers—Iraq, Sudan, Libya, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan,

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among others. Whether it was Nasser’s vying for leadership of the Arab world (which pits Egypt against all of those just mentioned, and others) or Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s efforts to lord his oil wealth over Egypt, leading the charge to kick Egypt out of the League of Arab States because of Sadat’s peace with Israel, Egypt has nonetheless continued to hold sway across the region, frequently with global impact. Egypt was a founding member and the leading force behind the creation of the League of Arab States (aka the Arab League). The League was established in Cairo on March 22, 1945, by Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan, and Yemen. Neither a union nor a federation, the League seeks to strengthen economic, political, and social ties among its member states, coordinate policies, and promote common interests—to the extent possible. The League has grown to include 22 member states, from North Africa, the Levant, and the Persian Gulf (among other areas not generally known as ‘‘Arab’’), and it is generally recognized to be an ineffectual body, one that meets rarely, coordinates poorly, and serves often as a venue to demonstrate divisions in the Arab world, rather than to show common cause and unity. Still, Egypt has led this body for decades and when there have been moments of unity and common expression, it is usually Egypt that has been forging consensus behind the scenes (with frequent help from Saudi Arabia, and others). Recall that Egypt’s membership was suspended in 1979 after it signed a peace treaty with Israel. The League’s headquarters was also moved from Cairo to Tunis, Tunisia. As Egypt evinced strong support for Iraq in its war with Iran (1980–1988), individual Arab countries began to renew diplomatic ties with Egypt. Eventually, Egypt was readmitted to the League in 1989 and the headquarters returned to Cairo. Except for the years when Egypt was expelled from the League (1979–1989), all Secretaries-General of the Arab League have been Egyptian, which is to say that the leaders of the 21 other members defer to Egypt to determine who leads the organization. And the position is sometimes used to punish as well as reward a particular Egyptian diplomat. For example, when Amr Moussa, Egypt’s former foreign minister, became seemingly more popular than Mubarak among Egyptians and many Arabs (especially for Moussa’s strong criticism of Israel and the United States), Mubarak ‘‘kicked him upstairs’’ in May 2001 by naming Moussa the next Secretary-General. Moussa remains a popular, if sidelined, Egyptian and Arab voice. Arab-Arab relations are key to Egypt’s security and stability and ‘‘not surprisingly. . .Egypt has acted as a catalyst for consensus. Thus Egypt mediated the Saudi-Qatari border dispute in 1993; sought to improve relations with Jordan and Yemen, two states ostracized for their pro-Iraq position in 1990; and continues to have good relations with most of the Nile Valley States.’’48 Egypt’s ‘‘return to the Arab fold’’ has gone so smoothly since 1989 that it maintains its peace

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with Israel (the reason it was expelled in the first place), criticizes Israeli policies within the League, and has worked closely (with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the PLO, and others) to move the Arab states closer to accepting Israel’s right to exist. The 2002 Saudi Peace Plan—which emerged from an Arab League Summit in Beirut in March 2002—calls for Israel’s withdrawal of all territory it occupied in the 1967 war (the standard Arab and international view, based on UN Resolution 242) in return for all Arab states offering ‘‘normal relations’’—and peace— with Israel. Since 2000, the League has focused its attention on the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq, Palestine and the al-Aqsa Intifada, Lebanon (especially after Rafiq Hariri’s assassination in February 2005), ‘‘reform’’ in the Arab world, including elections in various Arab states, and nuclear nonproliferation with particular attention focused on Iran. Egypt will continue to be the dominant and moderating voice within the Arab League. More generally, given its history and its political proclivities, it has the potential to be the dominant voice in regional venues (Arab-Arab, Arab-Israeli, Arab-‘‘Islamic,’’ Arab-African, and Euro-Mediterranean). The United Nations

Egypt was a founding member of the United Nations in 1945, and, like any self-interested state, has used the world body as a vehicle to advance its interests in the Middle East and around the globe. Accordingly, Egypt has contributed to a variety of UN operations, including decolonization, disarmament, and peacekeeping. Egyptians have been elected to various UN bodies, including the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and the Human Rights Council. Recall that a senior Egyptian politician led the world body as secretary-general, and Egyptians have a range of issues they seek to advance through their participation. Their involvement with the UN, however, has not been without controversy. Egypt had to overcome the embarrassment of Boutros Boutros Ghali, ‘‘removed’’ as secretary-general in 1996—a shame deepened by the fact that its chief ally, the United States, engineered this removal, with the complicity of most of the Security Council.49 Egypt has been repeatedly elected to serve as a nonpermanent member of the United Nations Security Council: 1946, 1949–1950, 1961–1962, 1984–1985, and 1996–1997.50 It has also pushed to get a permanent seat on the Security Council (as have others, including India, Brazil, Japan, and Germany) and has been involved in efforts to reform the body as a component of its own policy and as a member of the Non-Aligned Movement. The Government of Egypt states, ‘‘Egypt has been seeking to obtain a UN Security Council permanent seat in an effort to increase the representation of the developing countries in the Security Council. The Egyptian stance on the Security Council membership is based

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on supporting the right of the African countries to obtain two permanent and five impermanent seats in the Security Council.’’51 In terms of peacekeeping and related operations, Egypt has been an active participant. As of the end of August 2007, a total of 965 Egyptians were deployed to the following missions:52 ! United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) Police Military observer

3 23

! United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) Police

11

! United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) Police Military observer

5 23

! United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) Military observer

1

! United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) Police

16

! United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) Police Military observer

4 8

! United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) Military observer

7

! United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) Troop Police Military observer

816 7 18

! United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) Police

17

! United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) Military observer

6

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In May 2007, Egypt was elected to serve on the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC) (which replaced the UN Commission on Human Rights) until 2010. It received 164 of 192 possible votes. The African regional group, of which Egypt is a member, holds 13 states; there were four vacancies. Only four countries, including Egypt, put themselves forward as candidates. Although many states with less than perfect human rights records are on the Council, the paradox of Egypt’s submission of its candidacy to stand on the world stage as a guardian of equality, freedom, and justice given its own poor domestic record was not lost. A coalition of 19 human rights groups in Egypt put forth a petition of opposition to the candidacy and stated, The undersigned NGOs would like to express their surprise that the Egyptian government is applying for membership of the United Nations Human Rights Council and their amazement at the falsifications of the government’s true stance on human rights included in such application. This is especially true in the light of the infringement the Egyptian government in the last few years on legislative and constitutional safeguards of human rights, as well as their practices that fly in the face of the most basic human rights principles and values.53

Notably the General Assembly does have the right to suspend HRC members, by a 2/3 vote, for gross, systematic violations during their tenures. Egypt’s foreign minister outlined Egypt’s primary issues before the UN; they included Iraq, Palestine, Darfur, weapons of mass destruction, global ‘‘terrorism,’’ nonproliferation, and the support for achieving Millennium Development Goals, as well as a seat on the Security Council. Other Organizations

In addition to its active participation in the United Nations and the League of Arab States, Egypt also belongs to the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, Organization of African Unity (termed the African Union, since 2002), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), World Trade Organization (since 1995), Conference on Disarmament, among others. Egypt also has participated, since 1994, in a NATO-Mediterranean Dialogue to promote regional security. Conclusion

In some respects, Egypt seems an unlikely candidate for regional political powerhouse (lacking, for example, the oil wealth of the Gulf States, and having made ‘‘peace’’ with Israel—especially considering Egypt’s poor record of fighting against the Jewish state). Nonetheless, Egypt commands status and respect, especially in its own backyard. It paid a heavy price for its peace with Israel— expulsion from the Arab League and other organizations— but it redeemed itself

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in the 1980s during the Iraq-Iran War and became, once again, the go-to state within the League, while maintaining its status as interlocutor between Israel and the Palestinians. The Egyptian government attempts to walk a fine line when it comes to Islamist movements—targeting the Muslim Brotherhood at home with a variety of repressive measures, while negotiating between their offspring (Hamas) and Egypt’s preferred Palestinian faction, Fatah. At the other geopolitical end of the country, Egypt befriends Sudan, the international pariah state, yet manages to stay in international good graces—a delicate balancing act indeed. It is unclear how long the Arab Republic can stay precariously perched—domestic issues will clearly play a role as they are intertwined in Egypt’s ability to maintain its acknowledged but necessary fac¸ade of democratic legitimacy and role as regional broker. NOTES 1. Egypt and Israel have another border crossing at Taba. 2. Craig Smith, ‘‘Gaza Tunnels: A Risk Worth Taking?’’ International Herald Tribune, January 24, 2006, LexisNexis. 3. BBC News, ‘‘Israel Approves Egypt Deployment,’’ August 31, 2005, http://news .bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4201868.stm. 4. Anne Barnard, ‘‘Gaza-Egypt Border Bustles with Celebrations as Families Reunite, Israelis Voice Alarm at Flood of Traffic,’’ Boston Globe, September 14, 2005, LexisNexis. 5. For the text of the agreements, see http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Reference +Documents/Agreed+documents+on+movement+and+access+from+and+to+Gaza+15-Nov2005.htm. 6. Greg Myre, ‘‘Palestinians Taking Control of a Gaza Border Crossing,’’ New York Times, November 26, 2005, LexisNexis. 7. Glenn Kessler, ‘‘Israeli Official Faults Egypt over Arms Flow into Gaza,’’ Washington Post, February 9, 2007, LexisNexis. 8. Elaine Knickmeyer, ‘‘Egypt Finding Fewer Gaza Smuggling Tunnels,’’ Washington Post, July 30, 2007, LexisNexis. 9. United Nations Relief Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Middle East (UNRWA), ‘‘UNRWA in 2006,’’ 2007, http://www.un.org/unrwa/publications/pubs07/ unrwa_in_2006.pdf. 10. Dina Ezzat, ‘‘Now Open, Now Closed,’’ Al-Ahram Weekly On-Line, August 24–30, 2006, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/809/eg6.htm. 11. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘‘OPT: Gaza Humanitarian Situation Report 13: Sep 2007,’’ September 13, 2007, http://www.relief web.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/YSAR-76ZNG2?OpenDocument. 12. Shmuel Rosner, ‘‘Egypt: IDF Soldiers Are Aiding Arms Smuggling to Gaza Strip,’’ Haaretz, October 18, 2007, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/914200.html. 13. Steven Erlanger, ‘‘Israel Urges Egypt to Act against Hamas,’’ International Herald Tribune, November 9, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/11/09/africa/09mideast.php. 14. Avi Isaacharoff and Reuters, ‘‘Egypt: Hamas Turned Down Offer to Exchange Prisoners for Shalit,’’ Haaretz.com, October 4, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/ 769490.html.

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Global Security Watch—Egypt 15. Palestinian Information Center, ‘‘Muzaini: Return of Egyptian Security Delegation to Gaza a Matter of Time,’’ BBC Monitoring Middle East, September 4, 2007, LexisNexis. 16. ‘‘Palestinian Hamas Figure on European, Egyptian Mediation to Release Shalit,’’ Al Quds al-Arabi, BBC Monitoring Middle East, September 11, 2007, LexisNexis. 17. Egyptian State Information Service, ‘‘Mubarak, Olmert Joint Press Conference in Sharm el-Sheikh,’’ January 4, 2007, http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Politics/Presidency/President/ Interview/000001/0401050300000000000197.htm. 18. Ibid. 19. Baraq Ravid and Avi Issacharoff, ‘‘PM, Mubarak to Meet in Shram al-Sheikh Tuesday for Surprise Talks,’’ Ha’aretz, November 19, 2007, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/ 925408.html. 20. U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Annapolis Conference Participants,’’ http://www.state.gov/ r/pa/prs/ps/2007/nov/95661.htm. 21. ‘‘Habib: Annapolis Conference Only Photo Op,’’ November 28, 2007, http://www. ikhwanweb.com/Article.asp?ID=14729&LevelID=2&SectionID=0. 22. Ashraf al-Hur, ‘‘Abu-Zuhri to Al-Quds al-Arabi: We Have Not Received Any Egyptian Proposal to Settle Palestinian Differences,’’ Al-Quds al-Arabi, BBC Monitoring Middle East, August 11, 2007, LexisNexis. 23. ‘‘Fatah Spokesman Interviewed by Egypt TV on Relations with Hamas,’’ Channel 1 TV (Cairo), May 28, 2007. 24. Simon Tisdall, ‘‘Egypt Leads Drive to Curb Hamas Poll Success,’’ Guardian (Manchester), June 15, 2005, LexisNexis. 25. Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘‘Terror Bombings Hit Taba and Ras a-Satan in Sinai,’’ October 10, 2004, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2004/10/ Sinai%20terror%20bombings%207-Oct-2004. 26. Steve Erlanger, ‘‘Israeli Tourists Flee after Sinai Blasts,’’ International Herald Tribune, October 9, 2004, http://www.iht.com/articles/2004/10/08/news/blast.php?page=1. 27. See, for example, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘‘Updated Travel Advisories,’’ March 7, 2007, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2007/Updated% 20travel%20advisories%207-Mar-2007. 28. See http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Economy/foreigntrade/Foreign/050501000000000001 .htm. 29. Isam al-Khafaji, ‘‘War as a Vehicle for the Rise and Demise of a State-Controlled Society: The Case of Ba’thist Iraq,’’ citing Al-Musawwar, January 4, 1999, http://content.cdlib.org/ xtf/view?docId=ft6c6006x6&doc.view=content&chunk.id=ch9&toc.depth=1&anchor.id =0&brand=eschol. 30. Reuters, ‘‘Mubarak Says Iraq War Will Produce ‘100 bin Ladens,’’’ March 31, 2003, http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0331-01.htm. 31. Assem El-Kersh, ‘‘Egypt in Iraq: Time to Reflect,’’ Al-Ahram Weekly On-Line, July 14– 20, 2005, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/751/eg4.htm. 32. Mohamed Ali Saeed, ‘‘Egypt Strongly Opposed to Separation of South Sudan: Diploma,’’ Agence France-Presse, June 20, 2000. 33. Egyptian State Information Service, ‘‘Egypt and Darfur,’’ September 2007, http:// www.sis.gov.eg/En/Politics/Foreign/issues/egypt&darfur/040308070000000001.htm. 34. Eric Reeves, ‘‘Egypt and Darfur: Cruel Intentions.’’ The New Republic, April 4, 2006. http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=w060403&s=reeves040406.

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35. ‘‘Egyptian Minister on Mideast Conference, Opposition to Egyptian Forces in Darfur,’’ Al Ahram, September 29, 2007, Open Source Center. 36. U.N. High Commission for Refugees, ‘‘Country Operations Plan: Executive Committee Summary: Arab Republic of Egypt,’’ planning year 2007, September 1, 2006, http:// www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/country?iso+egy&expand=operations. 37. Simon Apiku, ‘‘Egyptian Authorities Target African Refugees,’’ Worldpress.org, April 21, 2003, http://www.worldpress.org/Mideast/1052.cfm. 38. See, for example, Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Egypt: New Investigation Needed into Assault on Sudanese Protestors,’’ December 29, 2007, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/12/ 29/egypt17666.htm; and United Nations High Commission for Refugees, ‘‘Remaining Sudanese Detainees Released in Cairo on Saturday,’’ February 13, 2006, http://www.unhcr.org/ cgi-bin/texis/vtx/news/opendoc.htm?tbl=NEWS&id=43f0b3fa4. 39. Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Accounts from Detainees,’’ February 2003, http://www .hrw.org/press/2003/02/egypt-test0206.htm. 40. Ellen Knickmeyer, ‘‘Flight from Darfur Ends Violently in Egypt; Young Mother Killed by Border Guards while Waiting to Cross to Sanctuary in Israel,’’ Washington Post, August 19, 2007, LexisNexis. 41. Ibid. 42. Michael Klare, Resource Wars (New York: Holt, 2001), 12. 43. Egyptian Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation, Integrated Water Resources Management Plan, June 2005, 9. 44. ‘‘Egypt to Keep Its Share of Nile Water, Foreign Minister Says,’’ MENA, November 29, 2005, LexisNexis. 45. Egyptian Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation, Integrated Water Resources Management Plan, 9. 46. ‘‘99.5% of New Nile Basin Agreement Finalized: Minister,’’ MENA, July 31, 2007, Open Source Center. 47. Jane’s, ‘‘Egypt,’’ Jane’s World Armies (Surrey, United Kingdom, Jane’s Information Group, 2007), 3. 48. Ali Hillal Dessouki, ‘‘Managing Ambivalence: Egypt’s Changing Regional Environment,’’ in Egypt at the Crossroads: Domestic Stability and Regional Role, ed. Phebe Marr (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1999), 197. 49. Prior to his tenure at the UN, Boutros Ghali was a deputy foreign minister, a minister of state for foreign affairs, a member of the Egyptian parliament, and part of the secretariat of the ruling NDP. See ‘‘Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Egypt): Sixth United Nations SecretaryGeneral,’’ http://www.un.org/Overview/SG/sg6bio.html. 50. The United Nations Security Council is comprised of 15 members, 5 permanent (the United States, the United Kingdom, China, France, and Russia) and 10 nonpermanent members, elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms. 51. Egyptian State Information Service, ‘‘Egypt and UN Security Council Membership,’’ http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Politics/Foreign/IntlOrganizations/ESecurityCouncil/ 040313030000000001.htm. 52. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, ‘‘UN Mission’s Summary Detailed by Country,’’ August 31, 2007, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/. 53. ‘‘19 Egyptian Human Rights NGOs Appeal to the United Nations: Egypt Is Not Fit for Membership of the UN Human Rights Council,’’ May 14, 2007, http://www.hrinfo.net/ en/reports/2007/pr0514-2.shtml.

CHAPTER

6

Egypt, the Divided State

No regime that rules by fear can be truly secure. The rulers of such a regime may be able to keep the proverbial peasants from storming the castle gates; however, they will be hard-pressed to earn their citizens’ allegiance, trust, or active participation. As a consequence, these leaders and their regime will be ‘‘insecure,’’ both in the domestic arena and on the international stage. Thus, human security and national security are inexorably linked. Since the end of the Cold War, the concept of security has broadened and deepened beyond its traditional focus on states and military. ‘‘Deepening security’’ now means a focus on the human level, i.e., the security of communities and the individual. Security can no longer be defined, exclusively, in terms of the ability of the state to defend its territory and its principal values against military threats. Human security emphasizes the individual in achieving peace and security—at home and abroad; it takes into account nontraditional threats in the making of international politics and it engages with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as important actors.1 In the remaining pages, we revisit Egypt’s key national and human security challenges, explored in the preceding chapters, and we illustrate the ways they are linked; we offer these concluding thoughts with the hope that these challenges may be positively confronted—by political and economic leaders in Egypt and by their friends and allies abroad, most notably the United States. Fundamentally for Egypt, this means creating a unified, inclusive state rather than a secure but illegitimate one-party regime on the one hand, and a selectively disempowered, yet somehow still engaged, population on the other.

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This book has turned out to be overwhelmingly critical of the Mubarak regime. That was not the intent as we began; however, in accumulating and analyzing the data that make up the bulk of this book, the evidence provides a clear indictment showing how this regime represses its citizen-subjects, all for the ‘‘greater good’’ of maintaining its own power. The regime, much to the population’s detriment, succeeds brilliantly in that limited objective. The book also tells a positive story. Egypt has a vibrant civil society with a marginalized but active opposition determined to secure its basic rights—to assemble, to speak, to organize, to fully participate politically, to live free from torture or unlawful detentions, to practice one faith or another, and to challenge the illegitimate monopoly of power. Beyond this, Egypt has the potential to showcase itself as an economic success story, if the brief trend of the past few years continues—an inclination toward economic growth and the implementation of some good policies aimed at expanding job opportunities, tackling inflation, and cutting poverty rates. Such growth is not due to government investments as much as it is government recognition that it needs to exercise self-restraint in economic management (or mismanagement) and allow Egypt’s growing private sector and talented labor pool to have more input in economic investment and market-based planning. This political-economic analysis is beyond the scope of this book, yet it is an important subject for future research and discussion. GOVERNMENTAL STAGNATION AND INTERNAL INSECURITY A ‘‘Challenged’’ Regime

‘‘The house that Nasser built’’—the regime led by Nasser (from 1952 to 1970), Sadat (1970–1981), and Mubarak (since 1981)—is secure, if not entirely stable. It faces considerable internal challenges, but relatively few from outside Egypt. At the same time, Egypt’s security apparatuses (military, police, secret police, and hired ‘‘thugs’’ attached to the ruling party) are all too effective at maintaining the regime and thus the perks of ruling. Thus, for decades, with few meaningful threats to the system, there has been little if any change in the political status quo. The challenges that do exist include those posed by the (nonviolent) Muslim Brotherhood and, occasionally, small bands of militants who rely on Islamic messaging and often communicate, in part, through violent attacks against the regime. Absent from this group of challengers is an effective sustained, secular movement. That, too, can be credited or blamed on the effectiveness of the regime, which has divided and disempowered opposition elements and controlled the nation for more than half a century. Other ‘‘challengers’’ to the legitimacy and stability of the state include economic uncertainty, continuing poverty

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for fully half of the country’s citizens, thoroughly inadequate provision of social and human services (education, health care, public transportation, job training, and employment services), as well as a general public malaise, indifference, and frustration toward an ineffective, corrupt, ossified, and stagnant regime. Nongovernmental organizations, bloggers and e-activists, religious and secular leaders outside the control of the state, as well as other individuals and organizations that seek to challenge the state (without turning to violence) are members of Egypt’s civil society. Even as the secular opposition has failed to establish itself as a significant force in Egyptian politics, Egypt’s civil society has survived and thrived through the Sadat and Mubarak years. If there is to be a meaningful, popular, and (ultimately) a national challenge to the regime, it will likely come from within this amalgam of organizations and individual leaders. Alternatively, it may come from some unlikely source. In October 2007, thousands of residents of al-Arish in the northern Sinai demonstrated for days against the main symbol of the regime—the regional headquarters of the National Democratic Party (NDP), which was destroyed and its furniture set ablaze. Demonstrators complained about the central government’s (i.e., Cairo’s) neglect of their community and the fact that Sinai’s residents did not share in the benefits of the economic boom in tourism in much of the Sinai; they were ‘‘also angered by [about] the thousands of residents who are still in Cairo jails.’’2 Protesters demanded ‘‘the resignation of the Northern Sinai governor and the local police chief, according to a leader of the liberal opposition al-Wafd party.’’3 Given the poor track record of opposition parties in Egypt, it is less likely that the more formal elements of civil society can orchestrate such popular protests, and it is more likely they will wait in the wings to take advantage of such inevitable public displays of outrage, desperation, hopelessness, anger, and frustration against the ruling party and its security apparatus. In 2005, Kifaya was a prime example of this type of public outrage and frustration. The Kifaya (‘‘Enough’’) movement seemed to spring up overnight, but its message that Egyptians had had enough of Mubarak’s rule was not heeded in 2005. Either the call for change was not answered by the majority of Egyptians voting in the presidential election that year, or the regime continued to deny citizens their right to express their opinions, to assemble freely, to publish without restrictions, and to vote with unfettered access to the polls and with free choice on whom they cast their ballots. It was most likely a combination of these ‘‘either-or’’ options (with a heavy dose of the latter) that gave Hosni Mubarak (yet) another six-year term in office. Whether he will continue his reign until 2011, when that term expires, and whether Kifaya or some successor movement will survive are unknowns. But if there is no dramatic change in the regime or in the opposition, Egypt’s crumbling political infrastructure will continue to decline until such time as a new leader reinvigorates the system or an innovative president or movement changes the system entirely.

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State of Emergency—Disempowering Laws

Mubarak’s regime has operated under a ‘‘state of emergency’’ since he took power after the assassination of Sadat in October 1981. This emergency is both symbolic and real. It is symbolic because of the governance crisis necessitated by Mubarak’s obvious and continued efforts to maintain his rule and expand his control through a variety of mechanisms (from manipulation of Islamic symbols to blatant thuggery and other brutal tactics). It is also real in terms of the Emergency Law, continuously in force and renewed despite promises to the contrary. In 2005, the regime orchestrated a constitutional amendment—providing for direct, multiparty elections for the president of Egypt—that was whisked through parliament and followed by the requisite ‘‘popular referendum’’ process, which achieved its foregone conclusion: an overwhelmingly ‘‘yes’’ endorsement by the voting public (albeit with a remarkably low turnout). The amendment was packaged as a democratic reform, but its terms make it practically impossible for most opposition groups to field any candidates. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood was excluded from the 2005 presidential race because the law specified candidates must be party nominated, plus garner an insurmountable threshold of supporters from sitting members of parliament and other elected bodies, all controlled by the NDP. While the Brotherhood enjoyed its first-ever open parliamentary campaigning in 2005, it remains an illegal political entity. Moreover, its ability to openly campaign was limited—individual candidates were identified based upon their Brotherhood affiliations, posters were hung, and they conspicuously used the slogan ‘‘Islam is the solution.’’ Thus, there was no doubt—they were ‘‘Muslim Brotherhood candidates.’’ At the same time, hundreds of members of the Brotherhood were arbitrarily arrested and detained. The established, legal opposition parties—most notably the Wafd and Tagammu—lack the base in parliament to field viable candidates who can challenge Mubarak and the NDP in any meaningful way. The opposition thus remains divided and conquered, and the NDP is the sole effective ‘‘party’’ while the Brotherhood is the sole legitimate (if technically illegal) ‘‘organization.’’ In 2007, Mubarak also moved to ‘‘constitutionalize’’ the virtually unchecked power of the executive branch through a number of amendments, which were positioned as positive reforms. Instead, the constitution became yet another mechanism for the Mubarak regime to use to disempower Egyptians, thwart efforts to peacefully assemble and organize, and hinder speech in opposition to the establishment (party, military, police, and economic elite). State Repression of Freedom of Association

A state that is fearful of its people coming together in public and expressing their views, discontented or otherwise, is a state that is insecure. The Egyptian

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state, controlled by the regime of Nasser-Sadat-Mubarak, has exhibited this ‘‘fear’’ of its population for more than 50 years. Nasser cracked down on the Muslim Brotherhood, communists, capitalists, political parties, and the landed elite; Sadat cracked down on Nasserists, labor leaders, and many opposed to his economic restructuring; Mubarak has similarly feared and cracked down on dissent in a variety of forms: the Brotherhood, Nasserists, human rights activists, and political ‘‘centrists.’’ Despite this political culture of authoritarianism, state repression, and stifling of free speech and assembly, Egypt has a vibrant civil society, with more than 16,000 registered NGOs.4 Nasser established the bedrock of strict government control over citizens’ efforts to assemble and organize when he established Law 32 of 1964, a restrictive law of associations allowing for state regulation, oversight, and control over nongovernmental organizations. While Mubarak has claimed to allow greater freedoms of assembly and speech, in fact the legal environment became more restrictive of civil society in 2002. In that year, Law 84 replaced Law 32, but it continued restrictions on NGOs’ ability to receive foreign funding and it gives the state unchecked powers to dissolve any NGO the government sees as a threat. Human Rights Watch characterized this law as discouraging to legitimate NGO activity.5 This power is in constitutional conflict with the right to form societies (article 55 of Egypt’s constitution), to assemble (article 54), and to create unions and professional syndicates (article 56). Nonetheless, the vitality of civil society reached new levels of activism during the 2005 election season. Indeed, after the elections, Saad Eddin Ibrahim, the respected human rights activist, said ‘‘the real winner is civil society’’ and a new generation of activists was inspired.6 How such a generation will work through the continuing culture of state repression of dissent will remain the question for years to come. State Use of Torture

Egypt has been taken to task by the United Nations, human rights groups, and others about the torture of detainees. Egypt utilizes torture even though it is an ineffective method of information extraction; it creates fear and derision in the population; and it is against domestic and international laws. It persists as a cruel tool of the state to punish what it considers to be noncompliant members of the population. In its 2007 annual report, Amnesty International said, ‘‘Torture of both political detainees and criminal suspects remained common and systematic, and reportedly led to several deaths in custody. Frequently reported methods included beatings, electric shocks, prolonged suspension by the wrists and ankles in contorted positions, death threats and sexual abuse.’’7 Egypt also receives mixed signals from the United States, which on the one hand critiques it in the Department of State’s annual human rights reports, and

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on the other, renders suspected ‘‘terrorists’’ to Egypt where they can be tortured while the United States keeps its hands relatively clean. Because of international attention to the rendition issue, any claim by Egypt or the United States that it respects human rights seems a fac¸ade, as both countries effectively stand ‘‘guilty’’ on the world stage, separately and together, of torture. Both governments’ reputations are tarnished, and still both remain relatively undeterred. State Use of Arbitrary Detention

Two main groups bear the brunt of arbitrary arrests and detentions by the Government of Egypt: the Muslim Brotherhood and suspected militants.8 (Many prominent individuals who dare to challenge or criticize the regime or the president specifically also suffer: e.g., Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Ayman Nour, judges, journalists, bloggers, and so forth.) State targeting of the Brotherhood is a perennial issue and is widely seen as an effort to undermine the legitimate political opposition. Targeting suspected militants is part of the domestic ‘‘war on terror.’’ As noted previously, in the 2005 elections, there was a plethora of arbitrary arrests and detentions of Brotherhood members. These sweeps resulted in the incarceration of literally thousands of Brotherhood members and their supporters. Exceptionally Unjust Courts

To expedite its ‘‘justice’’ against opponents of the regime—civil/nonmilitant as well as militants—the Government of Egypt has operated two types of state military or security courts. To thwart opposition, legal or otherwise, Egypt has used a security or emergency court apparatus. The emergency courts are a tool of the executive branch (Mubarak and the NDP) and violate basic ideas about governmental separation of powers as well as a defendant’s civil rights. Additionally, under article 6 of the Military Orders Law, the president can (and indeed does) transfer cases to military courts during the perpetual state of emergency that exists in Egypt. Finally, the March 2007 amendment to article 179 effectively constitutionalized this approach; it provides that the state may refer defendants to any judicial body authorized under law so as not to interfere with the state’s ability to safeguard the country against terrorist threats. The Government of Egypt thus has maintained its ability to try, without judicial review, civil rights activists, democracy activists, Islamist and secular political opponents, and even, on occasion, gay men and feminists, when it deems them threats to Egyptian society. The Muslim Brotherhood: A Political ‘‘Threat’’

Islamism, or ‘‘political Islam,’’ persists in Egypt, and it is the Muslim Brothers who are rightly credited with its founding and its longevity. The Brothers

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continue to take the lead in voicing public frustration with governmental neglect and abuse of the public, and the Brotherhood—as an organization of social service providers and as individuals successful in most aspects of Egyptian life—continues to offer practical solutions and nonviolent methods of addressing the social, economic, and political ills facing Egypt. The threat posed by the Brotherhood is purely political. The Brotherhood has little to gain from being associated with violence or militancy and everything to lose. It is, as some have said, ‘‘the grandfather of all Islamist groups,’’ and has long established its political and religious credentials among various Arab populations—Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, Syria, and elsewhere. Although some militant groups such as al-Qaeda may denounce the Brotherhood and allege co-optation by the state because of Brotherhood participation in the political processes, ordinary Egyptians know they have a far better chance of improving their circumstance by throwing in with the Brotherhood than various ragtag assemblages of armed groups claiming to act on behalf of al-Qaeda or an al-Qaeda-like group. After all, it is neither the government nor militants but rather the Brotherhood that has the track record of effectively providing social services, giving voice to the broader concerns of the populous, and legitimately winning representation in parliament. In terms of the Muslim Brotherhood’s relations with Hamas in Palestine, the two groups certainly have overlapping concerns about the state of Islam in the Middle East. They also condemn the repression of Arabs resulting from the Israeli occupation and related policies as well as from illegitimate and self-serving Arab regimes ruling at the expense, rather than for the benefit, of the populations they claim to govern. Both groups have moderated their popular positions on the implementation of Islamic law and the creation of a more Islamic society, even as their overall goal of an Islamic state remains but a theoretical abstraction. In certain circles, their message rings more religiously ‘‘conservative’’ than in others. This is politics, and they are playing to their audiences—i.e., domestic groups, especially the urban poor and rural populations. Finally, in terms of Brotherhood support for Hamas, it is largely rhetorical and oriented toward policy, not focused on weapons and funds. This is not to say that there are not individual Brothers who are involved in illicit activities related to Hamas, but individual supporters do not translate into organizational support. Malcontent Militants

Egypt’s militants are less of a political threat to the regime and are more of a real threat to the lives of Egyptians and tourists. Still, the government’s response is consistently disproportionate and counterproductive. Its harsh and random security measures risk creating a pre-Luxor type of antipathy, or worse—a public empathy or sympathy for militants, which currently does not exist among the

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broader Egyptian population. Additionally, the state’s massive crackdowns against groups such as the Bedouins in the Sinai alienate those who might otherwise help the state track down the actual perpetrators of attacks. Egypt’s Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Group have officially renounced violence, although a faction of the former, sometimes termed Vanguards of the Conquest, has reportedly merged with al-Qaeda, and breakaway members of the latter reportedly declared their allegiance to Osama bin Laden and his cohorts. This renunciation of violence is not likely to have the same impact as when the Muslim Brotherhood made a similar vow in the early 1970s; neither group has ever had the type of support, legitimacy, network, or success of the Brotherhood. Still, their announcements should be taken seriously, and the Egyptian government should allow some ‘‘wiggle room’’ to these groups to test whether their pledges are real or just a tactic. Each group is, in many respects, a shadow of its former self. In terms of structure, neither is what it once was (or, in the case of al-Qaeda, what some so-called experts thought they were), and they are on the run or at least forced to lie relatively low. As for the ‘‘official’’ groups, their pledges to foreswear violence are positive developments, leading perhaps, to future attempts to participate openly in civil politics and civil society. Clearly, they have a long row to hoe to prove the durability of the commitment; however, Mubarak and the NDP are not in any hurry to open up participation to secular activists, let alone Islamist ones. Indeed, on the domestic front, the government’s harsh policies and repressive tactics toward Islamists of all stripes are rarely met with overt rebellion on the part of Egyptians. However, for much of the twentieth century, and into the twenty-first, these policies and tactics have led to an angry and frustrated public, with waves of violence crashing down around the government. In those cases, public discontent is directed ‘‘upward’’ against the regime, usually with little to no impact on the state. Still, public frustration and anger can lead to violence against the state itself, or ‘‘state interests,’’ such as tourists or tourist sites, since the state depends upon tourism revenues as one of the ‘‘pillars’’ of the Egyptian economy. The Sinai has become one such popular target for disgruntled Egyptians—be they ‘‘militant Islamists’’ or angry Bedouins who turn to violence out of anger and frustration with the government in Cairo. Thus, Sinai was the place for bombings in 2005 against the Taba Hilton, frequented especially by Israeli tourists, and in 2006 in the resort town of Dahab, where more than 20 people were killed and dozens more were injured. Two days after the Dahab attack, bombers attacked the Multinational Force and Observers base (in Sinai) near Al-Arish, killing themselves but no others. When the government proves highly effective at stifling this violence, it can get redirected ‘‘sideways,’’ between communities (e.g., Muslim—Copt, with Coptic Christians facing the brunt of this intercommunal violence in the 1990s and into the 2000s).

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GOVERNMENTAL DEPENDENCE AND EXTERNAL STABILITY

Internationally, Egypt faces few if any tangible threats—except for those linked to internal threats, i.e., militant Islamists. Still, due to its strategic location in the Mediterranean, North Africa, Southwest Asia, and ‘‘the Middle East’’—and due to its still-weak economy and dependence on neighbors for sources of water (Sudan), employment (Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan), revenues (e.g., Suez Canal tolls plus tourism dollars from Israel, Gulf Arab states, and Europe), and security (Israel and Palestine)—Egypt’s relations outside its borders are as important as those relations with its own population internally. The ‘‘Partnership’’ with the United States

The Government of Egypt maintains very good relations with the United States, despite their profound disagreement over the latter’s policy in Iraq and toward Israel as well as Egypt’s strong rejection of America’s meddling in its internal efforts, particularly when it comes to democratization. Meanwhile the United States has significant disagreements with Egypt about its internal politics, policies, and actions, and the United States struggles between (a) pushing for democratic reforms (albeit limited) and increased protection of civil and political rights for all Egyptians and (b) maintaining Egypt as a key ally in the region and in the ‘‘global war on terror,’’ in which Egypt has been very supportive. As noted above, the United States quietly condemns Egyptian state repression while at the same time, it relies on state security services for a hard-line approach to interrogating suspected militants. Balancing the Cold Peace with Israel and Security for Palestinians

Egypt cares about Israel and Palestine for a number of reasons: first, its historic role in controlling Palestine (e.g., during the Fatimid and Ottoman periods as well as ‘‘administering’’ (or occupying) the Gaza Strip from 1948 to 1967); second, and more important, Egypt needs to retain its relevance and assure a role for itself in between Israel and the Palestinians, which is a primary justification for continuing American aid to Egypt; third, Egypt worries that Islamist success in Gaza or the West Bank will have a spillover effect inside Egypt, giving further momentum to the already successful Muslim Brotherhood or the militant Islamists in Egypt competing against both the Brotherhood and the state. Thus, Egypt attempts to maintain its centrality to the Palestinians, especially when there are divisions and outright violence between Fatah (led by Mahmoud Abbas, aka Abu-Mazen) and Hamas. Egypt has improved security cooperation with Israel through strong support of the Palestinian National Authority. The focus here remains on Gaza, which borders the Sinai Peninsula and has direct connections with internal security issues in Egypt. The Sinai/Gaza border can be ‘‘porous,’’ sometimes allowing a

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significant flow of illicit goods (stolen products, drugs, and weapons), as well as criminals and potential militants to travel between the two areas. Egypt maintains a ‘‘cold peace’’ with Israel, yet it is working (sometimes quietly) to improve economic relations, most notably through the QIZ (Qualified Industrial Zones) trade arrangements with Israel, which allows Egypt to export these products duty-free to the United States. Oil sales (from Egypt to Israel), tourism (from Israel to Egypt), and agricultural cooperation (between Egypt and Israel) have been long-established economic elements in their otherwise ‘‘cool’’ relations. While not dramatic, these improved economic and security ties represent positive signs of a ‘‘thaw’’ in Egypt’s otherwise chilly relationship with Israel. However, there will not be warm relations unless and until Israel resolves the central factor of the conflict with its neighbors—the ‘‘Palestinian question’’ and the need for a just solution for the Palestinian people, with security guarantees for Israel. Nuclear Ambitions

Official state announcements by the elder and the younger Mubarak, first in late 2006, then reinforced in 2007, indicate a newfound vim and vigor to bring Egypt’s long dormant nuclear energy program back to life. The United States, the European Union, and others, most notably Iran, have indicated support for Egypt’s efforts. However, moving conception and decision to implementation will take time, money, a certain amount of international openness, and a lot of diplomatic tact. In the meantime, Israel may increase the volume and tone of its concerns and objections, and Egypt’s response, as well as the intercession of the United States, will determine the smoothness (or bumpiness) of Egypt’s path. Although nuclear weapons proliferation is a necessary concern of the international community, there is little real worry about Egypt’s development of a nuclear weapons program—Egypt has long been a rhetorical leader of nonproliferation in the region and effectively spotlights the duplicity of the international’s communities’ position toward Israel, which long ago joined the very exclusive nuclear club. Moreover, Egypt needs to stay on the good (and aid-receiving) side of the United States. Crisis on the Border: Sudan

Egypt has no choice but to stay focused on its strategic neighbor to the south, Sudan being home to the longest stretch of the Nile before it reaches Egypt. This does not mean Egypt must remain friendly to Sudan (although it has been of late), but it must remain engaged and focused. Relations deteriorated considerably between the two nations after June 1995 and the unsuccessful assassination attempt on Mubarak (in Addis Ababa). Mubarak accused Khartoum of sponsoring Islamic

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terrorism in general and the attempt on his life especially. Egypt and Sudan then clashed on their disputed border, in the oil-rich Hala’ib Triangle. But Egypt also has to temper its distrust and anger against officials in Khartoum; it is in Egypt’s interests to maintain a unified Sudan, which at times seems at risk of splintering—whether from the southern Sudanese rebels and civil war or from the chaos and genocide that has come to dominate Darfur in the west. Egypt also remains concerned about Sudanese refugees making their way into and through Egypt (onto Israel). Many Sudanese, fleeing unspeakable violence in their home country, have received less than a warm welcome—they have been victims of Egyptian security service violence and the target of some Egyptian citizens’ ire. Egypt can ill-afford another disenfranchised group taking root and organizing, nor does it wish to stand in the international spotlight for its ill-treatment of the world’s most vulnerable—refugees. At the end of the day, Egypt seeks a regional solution to both crises, preferring a role for the African Union (in Darfur) and Libya (in the south); these would allow for Egypt’s interests to receive greater attention than they would if the United States and the UN were to be involved in either dispute. CONCLUSION

As we mentioned at the start of this chapter, we did not approach this book with the intent of simply condemning the Mubarak regime. And while we have ended up doing that anyway, as well as being highly critical of U.S. policy toward Egypt, we wish to end on a positive note with a series of recommendations—for the Egyptian political establishment as well as for the U.S. government. It is our belief that meaningful political and policy changes in Egypt can lead to an improvement in ensuring human rights, democracy, justice, stability, and security for Egypt, as well as an improved partnership between Egypt and the United States. Recommendations • As Egyptians prepare for national elections for parliament (expected in 2010) and president (expected in 2011), the Government of Egypt should ensure meaningful judicial monitoring of those and other elections; it should permit international monitors to observe as well. • The government should allow all parties to field candidates for parliament and president, which it currently controls to the detriment of legitimate opposition. • The government should engage in a meaningful dialogue with civil society leaders and international human rights/legal rights organizations. This ‘‘national dialogue’’ should be meaningful, inclusive of all ‘‘civil’’ (nonviolent) and nonpartisan NGOs and the opposition press. • The government should accept NGOs and the press as partners in the campaign against corruption. • The government should decriminalize libel and slander as steps toward ensuring freedom of the press.

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• The government should acknowledge past instances of torture, renounce all future use of torture, and declare its intent to investigate and prosecute those who torture and mistreat detainees. • The government must embrace international standards on prisoners’ rights to bring Egypt into global compliance. • The government should ensure freedom of belief, thought, conscience, and religion by comporting with international treaties to which it is a state party, thereby guaranteeing domestic implementation of human rights norms. • Full, judicial independence—from financing, to appointments, to dismissals—should be guaranteed in law and practice. • The emergency court system should be obviously and publicly disbanded. • The military court system should be used only for military cases. • The military’s budget should go before the parliament for public debate.

Additionally, U.S. policy makers should do the following: • Review, revise, and clarify American interests in Egypt (and the Middle East as a whole) and work with the Egyptian government and civil society to achieve those objectives. • Be consistent in declaring and securing American objectives. • Maintain economic and military support to the Government of Egypt, even as the United States pushes Egypt to reform and ‘‘open up’’ the economy, the political space, and the public space—allowing civil society, the media, and opposition parties to operate within the bounds of the law and within their rights.

Egyptians and those who know Egyptian history, politics, and culture understand that there is little need for the current regime to attempt to rule through fear, intimidation, and repression. International ‘‘advocates’’ or allies of Egypt should know better than to support a system that props up a decaying political infrastructure, while simultaneously alienating the single largest Arab community, nearly 80-million strong. This regime is secure, but the very mechanisms it uses to maintain its power will prove its undoing. The regime will not last. Key questions, however, remain. Will the regime collapse under its own weight, be rejuvenated and transformed by its own leadership, or be ‘‘overthrown?’’ Will this change happen within 3 years, 5 years, or 20? Who (or which groups) will lead the change? And who, outside of Egypt, will work to support positive change for the vast majority of the Egyptian people? NOTES 1. Denise Garcia, Small Arms and Security: New Emerging International Norms (New York: Routledge, 2006), 59–61. 2. Ashraf Sweilam, ‘‘Egyptian Police, Sinai Protesters Clash,’’ Associated Press, October 7, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/07/ AR2007100700543.html.

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APPENDIX A

Biographies HASSAN AL-BANNA (1906–1949)

Hassan al-Banna, born October 14, 1906, was the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization considered a forefather of many contemporary Islamic (especially Sunni) political movements. Al-Banna was born in the village of Mahmoudiyya, northwest of Cairo. His father, educated at al Azhar University and an Islamic leader in his village, provided Hassan with religious guidance; however, al-Banna’s ‘‘formative influence was his Qur’anic scoool (kuttab) teacher.’’1 In his youth, al-Banna became involved with the Hasafiyya Sufi brotherhood. He memorized the Qur’an by the age of 14, and while still in school, he organized Islamic religious and social groups. He went on to attend Dar al Ulum, engage in teacher training, and became a teacher in Isma’iliyya. The Brotherhood, formed by al-Banna in 1928, emerged in response to the British occupation of Egypt. Beyond British colonialism, the founders also took issue with the perceived secularization within Egypt, Western cultural imperialism, and questions regarding the revival of the Islamic caliphate. Indeed, al-Banna stated the West was responsible for ‘‘abuses that have done injury to their [Muslims’] dignity, their honor, and their independence as well as commandeered their wealth and shed their blood.’’2 Al-Banna, however, did not place blame only on the West as he encouraged King Farouk to reorient Egypt on a more genuine Islamic path, one on which the shari’a was paramount. The Brotherhood itself was modeled on the example of the Prophet Muhammad and his first Islamic religiosocial reformation or revolution. . . .Like Muhammad, they [Egypt’s Brotherhood and Pakistan’s Jamaat i Islami] established communities of true believers who were distinguished from the rest of society and were totally committed to the struggle (jihad) to transform society. They did not leave (hijra) their societies, but instead organized their followers into an Islamic community or party (jamaa) within the broader (un-Islamic) society,

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Al-Banna’s leadership was crucial to the popularization of the organization. In 1932, he moved to Cairo to make the Brotherhood a national movement. Between 1929 and 1949, the organization grew from 4 branches to 2,000, rendering it a serious political force in Egypt. Members of the Brotherhood were involved in violent resistance against the British, in support of the Palestinian cause, and against Egyptian politicians opposed to the Brotherhood. In December 1948, the Egyptian government decreed that the Brotherhood should be disbanded and its assets seized. On December 28, 1948, a member of the Brotherhood assassinated Nuqrashi Pasha, the Egyptian prime minister and a key foe of the organization. In response, government forces assassinated Hasan al-Banna on February 12, 1949. Gilles Kepel refers to al-Banna as the ‘‘martyr par excellence.’’4 ZAINAB AL-GHAZALI (1917–2005)

Born in 1917, Zaianab al-Ghazali is an important figure in Egyptian political history; she was instrumental in advancing women’s liberty within the Islamic community (umma) and the state (Egypt).5 As a teenager, al-Ghazali worked with Huda Sha’rawi at the Egyptian Feminist Union in 1935, and two years later, left the union to start Jamiyat al-Sayyidat-ul-Muslimeen (the Muslim Sisters’s Association, or ‘‘The Muslim Sisterhood’’). Al-Ghazali disagreed with Sha’rawi’s secular approach to feminism. According to al-Ghazali, Islam provided Muslim women with ‘‘everything—freedom, economic rights, political rights, social rights, public and private rights.’’6 Therefore, as an alternative to Sha’rawi’s brand of feminism, al-Ghazali proposed the emancipation of Muslim women, but within the framework and structure of Islam. In 1937, al-Ghazali delivered a lecture to the Muslim Sisters Association at the Muslim Brotherhood’s headquarters. This marked the beginning of a long relationship between the Brotherhood and al-Ghazali. Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Brotherhood, requested that al-Ghazali merge her organization with the Brotherhood but she declined, ‘‘preferring to maintain the independence’’ of her group.7 While maintaining her organization as a separate entity, al-Ghazali also professed support for the Brotherhood. Al-Ghazali and her organization’s pledge for partnership with Brotherhood also situated them in opposition to the established political leadership. Along with the Brotherhood, the Muslim Women’s Association endured governmental crackdowns. In September 1964, President Gamal Abdel Nasser dissolved the organization and closed its headquarters. Nasser imprisoned al-Ghazali for seven years (1965–1972), during which she was tortured. Her experiences were recounted in her prison memoirs, Return of the Pharaoh. According to Miriam Cooke, this literary work qualified

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al-Ghazali as an Islamic feminist. Cooke claims, ‘‘[in Return of the Pharaoh] she narrates the miracles she performs as she endures the torture. Calling the prison hell and her jailors zabaniya, or the angels of hell, she describes her journey into the heart of hell and out again in the language of the Sufi Saint.’’8 Al-Ghazali maintained that women were an essential component of public life; however, she did not see this as interfering with familial duties. Indeed, when al-Ghazali’s first husband failed to support her work, they divorced; her second husband was more supportive. She justified her work ‘‘as a response to her call to serve God above man.’’9 While al-Ghazali’s work may not be viewed as feminist, she has become a symbol of the struggle for the rights of women in Islamic society. She stood strong to call for an Islamic society that encompassed men and women and replaced ‘‘the jahili society’’ that plagued Egypt.10 Her lifelong Islamist activist career ended when al-Ghazali died on August 3, 2005, at the age of 88. GAMAL MUBARAK (1963–)

Born in 1963, Gamal Mubarak is the youngest son (of two) of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and is widely perceived as the hereditary successor to the presidency. Egyptian educated, he received an MBA from the American University in Cairo and went into investment banking, at first in Egypt for Bank of America and then in London. When Gamal returned to Egypt after more than six years in London, he became a member of the National Democratic Party (NDP). He rose quickly to lead the Policies Committee and then to the position of assistant secretarygeneral in February 2006. In late 2006, he announced Egypt’s reinvigoration of its nuclear energy program at the annual NDP conference. He is well connected in Egypt’s business community and understood to exercise considerable sway at the cabinet level—at times even substituting for his father, chairing some cabinet sessions. Fueling dynastic rumors, during the NDP’s ninth general congress (occurring every five years), in 2007, a new statutory body was formed and charged with selecting the party’s next presidential candidate. It consists of 45 members, including Gamal Mubarak, and each member may seek the party’s nomination for president. An astute political observer from the al-Ahram Center noted that prior to this party maneuver, article 76 of the Egyptian Constitution could have precluded Gamal from running as it provides candidates must either be independents or belong to the governing body of a legal political party; before the 2007 NDP congress, Gamal Mubarak was neither. As a member of the newly created supreme body, he is eligible.11 On May 4, 2007, on his father’s 79th birthday, Gamal married Khadiga al-Gammal, 20 years his junior and the daughter of a wealthy businessman. After the wedding, Gamal stated, ‘‘I said before and I am repeating it again, the

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intention and ambition to run for president doesn’t exist.’’12 When asked if he would accept an NDP nomination, Gamal was adamant, ‘‘As long as you don’t have the desire, whatever the party says doesn’t matter. I’m not looking for any executive post.’’13 Despite such ‘‘reassurances,’’ careful steps have been taken to remove potential political and legal opposition to Gamal’s candidacy. President Mubarak has failed to appoint a vice president, the youngest Mubarak has earned/been given significant clout within the party, and the NDP statutes were altered, ostensibly, to give him a seat at the table. In 2005, Ahmed Nazif, prime minister of Egypt, said ‘‘Gamal deserved to be seen as a talented candidate, rather than just the president’s son.’’14 HOSNI MUBARAK (1928–)

Hosni Mubarak, the president of Egypt, was born on May 4, 1928, in al-Menoufiyah governorate (the Nile Delta area). He was educated at the Egyptian Military Academy and the Air Force Academy; he also attended the Frunze General Staff Academy in Moscow. He rose through the ranks of the air force from teaching at the academy to chief of staff to commander in chief. President Anwar Sadat appointed Mubarak to the post of deputy minister for military affairs in 1972 and then vice-president in 1975. Six years later, on October 6, 1981, President Sadat was assassinated, and Mubarak—who narrowly missed being killed that day—was sworn in as Sadat’s successor on October 14, 1981. Mubarak was ‘‘reelected’’ to the post in 1987, in 1993, in 1999, and, in 2005, in a race besot with controversy, he won his fifth consecutive term. Since first becoming president in 1981, some have said Mubarak has presided ‘‘over a period of domestic stability and economic development [which] means most of his fellow countrymen have accepted his monopolization of power in Egypt.’’15 Others, however, note the lack of actual democracy, security force crackdowns, and the lack of attention to the needs of the poor as hallmarks of his reign. General agreement exists around Mubarak’s consolidation of authority due, in part, to continued support from his primary ally, the United States. Mubarak’s presidency can be characterized as a perpetuation of military rule in civilian guise. Moreover, actual organized political opposition to his reign has been minor (especially if looking beyond the Muslim Brotherhood) for more than two decades. The tide started to turn in 2005, when Egypt held its first contested presidential elections. The contest, however, was mired with controversy, including difficulties of ballot access and the concerns about the actual conduct of the election. Mubarak won with 88.6 percent of the votes, and Ayman Nour, the only serious ‘‘contender,’’ garnered approximately 7 percent of the count (estimates say only 23 percent of the Egyptian voting population participated in the elections).

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An emergency legal regime has been in place for the vast majority of Mubarak’s reign, and the government has wielded enormous power to its benefit (and, correspondingly, the population’s detriment), allowing Mubarak to mute, at will, voices in opposition to his administration. Mubarak’s government couches many of its repressive actions in the language of counterterrorism, which gained particular resonance with the international community, especially the United States, after 9/11. Mubarak has maintained the ‘‘cold peace’’ initiated by Sadat via the Camp David Accords and has targeted the Muslim Brotherhood, his most significant opposition, with a variety of repressive measures, including unjust detentions, torture, and military tribunals. Journalists have also earned the wrath of the regime, and they have been regularly harassed and imprisoned for criticizing the president. While Mubarak remains the commander in chief in all respects, it is quite clear that at age 80, the president is nearing the end of his tenure. This, however, is a highly sensitive topic. For example, Ibrahim Eissa, editor of the independent weekly al-Dustour, was arrested for ‘‘reporting that the president Hosni Mubarak was gravely ill.’’16 Yet, there remains widespread debate about Mubarak’s successor. His youngest son, Gamal, is the heir apparent; he has crafted his public image and ascended the NDP hierarchy. Gamal, has, like any good son and politician, denied any such intentions; however, he remains the most probable successor to the throne. GAMAL ABDEL-NASSER (1918–1970)

Gamal Abdel-Nasser, born January 15, 1918, in Alexandria, is the single-most important political figure in twentieth century Egyptian history. Son of a postal worker, Nasser was part of the first group of underclass Egyptians to be admitted to the Egyptian Military Academy where, beginning in 1937, he studied to become an army officer. In 1939, after receiving his commission in the Egyptian Army, Nasser volunteered to serve in Sudan. During World War II, Nasser and Anwar Sadat formed a group of young military officers with strong nationalist feelings who vowed to overthrow the monarchy and expel the British. After serving in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Nasser joined Sadat and Muhammad Neguib to form the Free Officers Movement and lead the 1952 coup d’etat against King Farouk, launching the Egyptian ‘‘revolution.’’ General Neguib served as the first president of the new republic. Nasser became prime minister in 1954 (at which point Neguib was completely removed from power), and then became president in January 1956. Nasser renegotiated the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and formally ended Britain’s occupation of Egypt; however, an important clause allowed Britain to use the canal as a base ‘‘in times of war.’’ Still, Nasser was hailed as the man who saw the peaceful removal of Great Britain from Egypt. In addition to British colonialism, Nasser fought against French colonialism (e.g., in Algeria), Arab monarchism (e.g., Saudi Arabia and

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Jordan), and Zionism. He struggled to steer a neutral path between the United States and the Soviet Union, and was a founding leader of the ‘‘nonaligned movement.’’ When U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles reneged on the U.S. pledge to finance the construction of the Aswan High Dam, Nasser announced on July 26, 1956, that he would nationalize the Suez Canal to finance the construction of the dam. The resulting British, French, and Israeli invasion of Egypt, and the U.S. condemnation of support of Nasser and of Egypt, catapulted Nasser to international prestige and especially to iconic stature across the Arab world. Nasser competed with Ba’athists in Syria and Iraq for leadership of alternative ‘‘pan-Arab visions.’’ He created the United Arab Republic with Syria in 1958, which lasted until Syria withdrew in 1961. The Suez Crisis also pushed Nasser (and Egypt) into a close alliance with the Soviet Union. While considered ‘‘pro-Soviet,’’ Nasser was an anticommunist at home, and he jailed thousands of Egyptian communists. His ‘‘Arab socialism’’ in Egypt, promotion of Arab unity, anti-Zionism, and anticolonialism not only made him a hero among Arab masses across the region, it also put him on a path of ‘‘hot war’’ with Israel and ‘‘cold war’’ with fellow Arab leaders, especially in Saudi Arabia. Nasser’s cold war with Saudi Arabia also inspired one of his greatest failures—the ill-conceived effort to promote ‘‘regime change’’ in Yemen. Nasser eventually deployed over 50,000 troops in Yemen, resultant in a depletion of forces at home that would have a direct impact on Egypt’s poor performance in the Six-Day War of June 1967. Nasser’s humiliating defeat by Israel in the Six-Day War brought him down to size. He resigned at the climax of that war, yet popular protests brought him back to the presidency. Still, he was never the same. Egypt’s economy failed after 1967; his political stature was greatly diminished in Egypt and much of the Arab world. Nasser died of a heart attack in September 1970, having just secured a cease-fire agreement between King Hussein of Jordan and Yasser Arafat of the Palestine Liberation Organization to end their bloody confrontation in Jordan known as Black September. SAYYID QUTB (1906–1966)

Sayyid Qutb, born in 1906 in the governate of Asyut in Upper Egypt, is regarded as a key inspiration for many modern ‘‘radical’’ Islamist groups, including al-Qaeda. A religiously studious child, Qutb is said to have memorized the Qur’an by the age of 10; he later graduated from Dar al-Ulum, where he became passionate about literature. He went on to work for the state’s education department as an inspector and teacher. He then traveled to the United States to study the American education system, a seminal trip for him and for those who would follow in his ideological footsteps.

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Qutb’s time in the United States was critical in the formulation of his beliefs and writings, which were prolific. During his stay in the United States, Qutb was repulsed by American culture, particularly what he perceived as the sexual promiscuity of women and the apparent lack of societal morals, including dancing and drinking. Additionally, Qutb, visiting a largely unjust and segregated American society, was disheartened and angered by the discrimination against Arabs he encountered as well as U.S. support for Israel. His physical distance from his homeland and growing disdain for American culture and immorality led him to find solace in piety and Islam as an all-encompassing way to live one’s life—the one true path. Upon his return to Egypt in 1951, he joined the Muslim Brotherhood. He became a major organizational player and ideological successor to Hassan al-Banna, the organization’s founder who was killed by Egyptian state agents in 1949. In 1952, Qutb played a role in the Egyptian revolution, led by the Free Officers Movement, a military association dedicated to removing the monarchy, then represented by King Farouk. The Free Officers (in particular Gamal Abdel-Nasser and Anwar Sadat) persuaded Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhood that they could do more to effect change in Egypt together than they could apart. Qutb and the Brotherhood, however, did not fare as expected in Nasser’s new Egypt. Despite their cooperation, the Brotherhood received neither any meaningful government positions nor genuine government contemplation for an Islamic society. Nasser understood the actual and potential power of the Brotherhood within and outside of Egypt and tried to quash any and all perceived threats to his authority. Within months, Qutb and a number of other Brothers were jailed. Qutb was sentenced to 15 years of hard labor, but he served only 10. While imprisoned, he endured and witnessed the appalling mistreatment of his fellow Brothers as many were killed and more were tortured. Qutb’s prison experience further radicalized his thinking and led him to a direct call for action. Qutb embodied this line of thinking in Ma’alim fi al-Tariq (Signposts along the Road, also known as Signposts or Milestones), which critiqued the then-current regime, offered a guide to changing it, and provided a model for replacing it with an Islamic state. Signposts elaborated on the idea of jahiliyyah (traditionally, the ‘‘state of ignorance’’ before the revelation of Islam). For Qutb, Egypt was in such a ‘‘state,’’ and it got there because of a conscious societal effort to stray from the Islamic path; he found much of the world, a largely materialistic world, was in this same condition of ignorance. He thus called for jihad in its broad sense, a struggle on behalf of Allah. Signposts was published in 1964; by 1966, Qutb, along with other Muslim Brotherhood activists, was again under arrest, for plotting a coup against Nasser. Egyptian police reportedly found copies of Signposts in the homes of others who were investigated at the time.17 Qutb was sentenced to death and was hanged on August 29, 1966. His followers regard him as a martyr.

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ANWAR SADAT (1918–1981)

Anwar Sadat, born to an Egyptian father and a Sudanese mother in the Egyptian village of Mit Abul Kim, was the third president of Egypt (after Muhammad Neguib and Gamal Abdel-Nasser). He came to power in 1970, upon the death of Nasser, and held office until his assassination in 1981. Sadat’s father was in the Egyptian army, stationed in Sudan, and his grandmother played an important role in his upbringing. Instead of ‘‘putting him to bed with traditional tales, she told stories of Egyptian heroes who resisted the British colonial officials.’’18 Sadat, in his autobiography, In Search of Identity, said, ‘‘Even before I saw the British I learned to hate the aggressors who whipped and killed our people.’’19 Sadat enlisted in the Royal Military Academy and went on to serve as an officer in the army. In 1942, Sadat was arrested and then imprisoned by the British for contact with Germans, a treasonous act to the British. He escaped and lived as a fugitive until the war’s end, but he was wanted as a ‘‘terrorist’’ and was arrested again in 1946 for his role in the assassination of the pro-British politician, Amin ‘Uthman (he also reportedly involved in the attempted assassination of Prime Minister Mustafa al-Nahas). Sadat was detained for more than two years before being released. He was found not guilty at trial, which coincided with the start of the first Arab-Israeli War in 1948. Within two years he returned to the Egyptian army as a captain, the rank he held when he was dismissed during legal predicaments of the 1940s. Back in the army Sadat rose through the ranks and started working closely with Nasser and was involved with the Free Officers in plotting and undertaking the coup that removed King Farouk from power in 1952. Sadat held a variety of positions including secretary of the Islamic Congress and the National Union, as well as speaker of the National Assembly until he was named Nasser’s vicepresident in 1964. When Nasser died in 1970, Sadat succeeded him and assumed the presidency. Notably, Sadat became widely known as Nasser’s ‘‘yes-man’’ (sayid na’m na’m), his loyalty unquestioned (and his independent thinking never demonstrated). This led many to believe, quite erroneously, that Sadat was weak and his presidency would be short-lived. The new president consolidated power and dismissed opponents, claiming a threatened coup and announcing a ‘‘Corrective Revolution’’ in May 1971. President Sadat’s leadership of Egypt is generally characterized by two major events: the October War of 1973 and Egypt’s peace with Israel, achieved beginning with his historic visit to Jerusalem in 1977 and the Camp David Accords in 1978. However, Sadat’s tenure was also mired by deep-rooted economic and social crises at home. Sadat did not have strong ideological commitments, but rather was a pragmatist who engaged in war in order to make peace with Israel more likely. He did, however, attempt to create an image of himself as ‘‘the Believer President,’’ not out of true religious duty but to develop his own constituency, which enabled him to sideline those still loyal to Nasser and his

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ideology. Through his policy of infitah (economic opening), Sadat promoted an image of himself as a procapitalist—but he was not one in actuality. Indeed, Sadat maintained the Nasserist policies of state control over the economy and a limitation on domestic capitalists who sought more liberal economic policies. His infitah was aimed at Western capitalists in Europe and the United States, seeking Western technologies along with Saudi and Kuwaiti oil wealth to find a home in the Egyptian economy. Sadat was interested in reestablishing ties with Washington, severed during the 1967 war, and he indicated a willingness to negotiate with Israel on the principle of ‘‘land for peace.’’ Toward that end, in July 1972, he expelled 15,000 Soviet military advisers from Egypt. The Egyptian president, however, received an insufficient response from the United States and subsequently told Newsweek, ‘‘Every door I have opened has been slammed in my face by Israel—with American blessings. The Americans have left us no way out.’’20 Sadat stated this as motivation for his decision to go to war in 1973, along with Syria, in a surprise attack on Israeli troops occupying Egyptian and Syrian lands. Sadat’s goal was the return of the Sinai and the reopening of the Suez Canal; having received little from the United States in response to his earlier overtures, he engaged in war not out of expectation that he could defeat Israel but more to re-engage the United States in Middle East diplomacy. Sadat found a receptive audience in Henry Kissinger, then–U.S. Secretary of State, who immediately re-engaged with Egypt (and Syria) through his ‘‘shuttle diplomacy’’ between Egypt, Syria, and Israel. In the aftermath of the 1973 war Sadat noted, If we look back through history we see the horrors brought upon Egypt by war—the martyrs, the destructions, the delays in development. Egypt became a backward country because of the slogan ‘‘war is supreme.’’ This is why I opted for peace. . .I thought it was important to create an atmosphere that fostered development, so that Egypt could survive and become a partner in the twenty first century before it was too late.21

Sadat negotiated at Camp David in 1978 and signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979. When he was assassinated in October 1981, much of the world assumed it was because of his peace treaty with Israel. In reality, Egyptians understood it was due to his increasingly autocratic domestic policies—including his last great dictatorial acts in 1981 (just weeks before his murder) when he censored the press and arrested thousands of critics and opponents. Sadat’s assassin, Khalid Islambouli, was the brother of one of those arrested; he killed the president during an October 6 parade marking Sadat’s great ‘‘victory’’ over Israel in 1973 and shouted, ‘‘I have killed Pharoah.’’22 NAWAL EL SAADAWI (1931–)

Considered one of Egypt’s leading feminists, Nawal El Saadawi was born in Kafr Tahla, on October 27, 1931. Saadawi was trained as a doctor and went on

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to become Egypt’s Director of Public Health. While Saadawi’s earliest works include I Learnt Love (1957) and Memoirs of a Woman Doctor (1958), in 1972 Saadawi published her first work about crises faced by Arab women titled Women and Sex. Her work and activities were extremely controversial. Saadawi also published Women in the Origin (1971), She Has No Place in Paradise (1972), Woman at Point Zero (1973), Death of an Ex-Minister (1978), The Hidden Face of Eve (1980), and Memoirs From the Women’s Prison (1984). In 1981 Saadawi was arrested for criticizing President Sadat’s policies. She said, ‘‘I was arrested because I believed Sadat. He said there is democracy and we have a multi-party system, and you can criticize. So I started criticizing his policies, and I landed in jail.’’23 She was imprisoned for 22 days and was released after Sadat’s assassination. Saadawi then continued her work and established the Arab Women’s Solidarity Association (AWSA), ‘‘promoting women’s participation in social, economic, cultural and political life.’’24 In June 1991, the government closed AWSA, and its funds were transferred to another religious women’s organization, presumably because Saadawi criticized Mubarak for participating in the U.S. war against Iraq. In 1992, Islamic militant groups threatened her with death. She went into exile for five years, during which time she lived in the United States teaching and lecturing at institutions such as Duke University, the University of Washington, and the University of Illinois at Chicago. Saadawi opposed President Mubarak in the country’s first multiparty presidential elections in 2005; however, she withdrew her candidacy. Talking about the election, she said, ‘‘It was no democracy. . .It was dictatorship under the guise of democracy, so I boycotted.’’25 Saadawi, again living in Egypt, continues to be involved with issues regarding women’s rights in the Arab world. While some claim that she tends to pursue a Western-oriented approach to feminism, she is committed to the cause of Arab liberation, for women and men. When asked about ‘‘Euro-American stereotypes of Arab women’’ Saadawi noted, ‘‘The Euro-American stereotypes of us as Arab women are part of the neocolonial war (economic, military, media etc.) to exploit our resources and justify our submission. We have to expose the lies of false democracy and false liberation of women propagated by global dictators like G.W. Bush and his men and women.’’26 AYMAN AL-ZAWAHIRI (1951–)

Ayman al-Zawahiri was born on June 19, 1951, in Maadi, a suburb of Cairo, into an influential family: his father was the dean of the school of pharmacology at Cairo University, his paternal grandfather was the grand imam of al-Azhar University, the preeminent institution of Islamic scholarship, and his maternal grandfather was the president of Cairo University and also founded King Saud

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University in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Al-Zawahiri followed (somewhat) in his father’s footsteps and went to medical school, eventually becoming a physician. From a relatively young age, al-Zawahiri actively consorted with others who were impatient for change and sought to create a ‘‘true’’ Islamic state. AlZawahiri was also greatly influenced by Sayyid Qutb, one of the more ‘‘radical’’ ideologues of the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Zawahiri reportedly joined the Brotherhood in the 1960s, although he later became known for his involvement and leadership of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, a group that targeted Egyptian officials at home and abroad. Al-Zawahiri was jailed on weapons charges relating to President Sadat’s assassination. During his imprisonment, al-Zawahiri rose to public prominence; he became a fiery spokesman for those detained and he spoke English, so he could communicate to a wider external audience. After al-Zawahiri’s release in 1984 (he served only three years), he left Egypt and went on to Saudi Arabia and then to Pakistan, as he stepped into the role for which he is most infamous: Osama bin Laden’s strategic and religious advisor (often termed the second in command or bin Laden’s number two), leading to his role as a key figure in what would become al-Qaeda. A number of militant Egyptians also went to South Asia to assist the Afghanis; these Egyptians, along with other Arabs, came to form the so-called ‘‘Arab-Afghans.’’ Al-Zawahiri has intermittently interjected himself into Egyptian domestic Islamist affairs. For example, in 1998, al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden, Rifa’i Taha Musa, a member of the Egyptian Islamic Group, and others signed the World Islamic Front statement calling for the death of Americans and their allies.27 Taha’s signature ruffled domestic militant feathers and caused controversy. Then, in 2006, al-Zawahiri stated that the Islamic Group had joined al-Qaeda, an assertion the group’s established Egyptian leaders explicitly denied. It is understood that a faction of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the group al-Zawahiri led, did indeed split off and join al-Qaeda—that faction is sometimes referred to as Vanguards of the Conquest. Also in 2006, al-Zawahiri condemned Egypt’s then-recent elections and the U.S. supposed manipulation thereof; he also insinuated that the Muslim Brotherhood had been co-opted by the process. Al-Zawahiri has been sentenced to death by the Egyptian government for his ‘‘terrorist’’ activities and is on the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) ‘‘most wanted’’ list. A $25 million reward is offered for information leading to his capture or conviction. NOTES 1. Carl L. Brown, ‘‘Al-Banna, Mawdudi, Qutb’’, in Religion and State: The Muslim Approach to Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 143.

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Appendix A 2. Hasan al-Banna, Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949): A Selection from the Majmu’at Rasa’il al-Imam al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna, trans. and annot. Charles Wendell (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 48. 3. John Esposito, Islam the Straight Path (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 154. 4. Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh (Berkeley, University of California Berkeley Press, 1993), 28. 5. Denis J. Sullivan and Sana Abed-Kotob, Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society vs. the State (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 104. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. Miriam Cooke, ‘‘Women, Religion and the Postcolonial Arab World,’’ Cultural Critique, no. 45 (Spring 2000): 174. 9. Ibid., 175. 10. Ibid. 11. Gamal Essam El-Din, ‘‘Recasting the Plot,’’ Al-Ahram Weekly, November 8–14, 2007, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/870/eg2.htm. 12. ‘‘Gamal Denies Desire to Lead Egypt,’’ BBC News, May 2, 2007, http://news .bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6614515.stm. 13. Ibid. 14. ‘‘Egyptian PM Backs Gamal Mubarak,’’ BBC News, January 17, 2007, http://news .bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4182515.stm. 15. Martin Asser, ‘‘Mubarak’s Quarter of a Century,’’ BBC News, October 13, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6045958.stm. 16. Jeff Black, ‘‘Editor Faces Jail over Mubarak Health Rumour,’’ Independent (London), October 2, 2007, http://news.independent.co.uk/world/africa/article3018374.ece. 17. Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt, 42. 18. ‘‘Anwar Sadat,’’ Historic World Leaders (Farmington Hills, MI: Thomson Gale. 2007), Biography Resource Center, http://0-galenet.galegroup.com.ilsprod.lib.neu.edu:80/servlet/ BioRC. 19. Ibid. 20. Quoted in Cheryl A. Rubenberg, Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 157. 21. Yoram Meital, ‘‘Who Is Egypt’s ‘‘Hero of War and Peace’’? The Contest over Representation,’’ History & Memory 15, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 2003): 151–152. 22. John Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 90. 23. Cited in Angelique Shofar, ‘‘Ending Subjugation,’’ Black Issues in Higher Education, May 5, 2005, 34. 24. Ibid. 25. Garance Franke-Ruta, ‘‘Woman at Point Zero,’’ The American Prospect, June 2006, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=woman_at_point_zero. 26. Shofar, 35. 27. See Federation of American Scientists, ‘‘Jihad against Jews and Crusaders,’’ http:// www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm.

APPENDIX B

Chronology THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY SECURITY OF MODERN EGYPT: CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS 1919 (March 9)

Egypt’s ‘‘first revolution’’; demonstrations against Britain’s imprisonment (in Malta) of popular nationalist leader Saad Zaghlul. Eight hundred Egyptians are killed in a week of rioting; Britain backs down and allows Zaghlul to travel to the Paris Peace Conference at Versailles, where he argues (unsuccessfully) for independence.

1922 (February 28)

Egypt gains nominal independence from Great Britain.

1928

Founding of the Muslim Brotherhood by Hassan al-Banna.

1936

Egypt and United Kingdom sign the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, requiring the United Kingdom to withdraw (by 1956) all troops from Egypt, except those necessary to protect British interests at the Suez Canal (this exception was dropped by 1956).

1948 (May)

Egypt joins Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq in invading the newly declared state of Israel. Gamal Abdel Nasser fights in first Arab-Israeli War.

1949 (February 12)

Agents of the Egyptian state assassinate Hassan al-Banna.

1952

Future president Nasser (along with Muhammad Neguib and Anwar Sadat) leads the Free Officers Movement in a bloodless coup to displace the monarchy.

1953 (June)

Egypt is declared a republic; General Neguib is the first president.

1954

Nasser becomes prime minister; Neguib is deposed.

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Nasser becomes president.

1956 (July 26)

Nasser nationalizes the Suez Canal.

1956 (October–November)

Israel, Britain, and France invade Egypt; the United States intervenes and diplomatically forces the invaders to retreat. Nasser emerges as a ‘‘larger than life’’ Arab hero.

1967 (June 5–10)

The Six-Day War; Israel attacks Egypt in ‘‘preemptive’’ strikes; defeats Egypt, Jordan, and Syria and seizes control of Sinai, the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem and the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. Later, Nasser resigns after the humiliating defeat; Egyptians demonstrate for his return to power.

1970 (September 28)

Nasser dies of natural causes; Anwar Sadat succeeds Nasser.

1973 (October)

Yom Kippur/Ramadan War; Egypt and Syria attack Israeli forces in Sinai and the Golan Heights to reclaim land lost in the 1967 War.

1977 (November 19)

Sadat makes his historic visit to Israel.

1978 (September 17)

Egypt signs Camp David Accords with Israel.

1979

The Arab League expels Egypt after Sadat finalizes peace agreements with Israel (March 26); the League relocates from Cairo to Tunis.

1981 (October 6)

Assassination of Sadat; Hosni Mubarak assumes the presidency.

1989

The Arab League readmits Egypt and relocates back to Cairo.

1993 (December 27)

Attack on tourist bus in Cairo wounds eight Germans and eight Egyptians.

1995 (June 26)

Assassination attempt on President Hosni Mubarak in Ethiopia.

1997 (November 17)

Attack at Luxor kills 58 international tourists and 4 Egyptians at the Temple of Hatshepsut.

2004 (October 7)

Bomb attacks take place on the Sinai Peninsula, near the Israeli border, killing 34.

2005 (April 30)

A bomb near the Egyptian Museum kills one and wounds eight.

2005 (July 23)

More than 80 people are killed in bomb attacks at Sharm al-Sheikh.

2005 (September 7)

Mubarak is reelected to a fifth term in Egypt’s first multiparty elections.

2005 (November 9–December 7)

Three rounds of parliamentary elections take place.

2006

Gamal Mubarak becomes an assistant secretary-general of the ruling National Democratic Party.

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2006 (April)

Bomb attacks in the Red Sea resort of Dahab kill more than 20 people.

2006 (August)

Egypt’s Islamic Group denies the assertions of al-Qaeda’s Ayman al-Zawahiri that it has joined that organization.

2006 (September 19)

At the ruling National Democratic Party conference, Gamal Mubarak announces Egypt’s intention to revive its nuclear energy program.

2007 (March 26)

A referendum on 34 amendments to the Egyptian Constitution takes place.

2007

The Muslim Brotherhood draft ‘‘platform’’ emerges causing controversy and attempts to clarify ensue.

2007 (November)

President Mubarak emphasizes Egypt’s intent to push forward with its nuclear energy program and the National Democratic Party congress.

2007 (November)

Adjustments to National Democratic Party regulations take place, paving the way for Gamal Mubarak’s ascent to the presidency.

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APPENDIX C

Documents

Following is the text, or excerpts therefrom, of key documents relating to Egypt’s security. The entries are preceded by an explanation of the development and/or importance of the text. Included are the following: 1. The Egyptian Constitution, 2. The Framework for Peace in the Middle East, 3. The Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel, 4. The Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, and 5. The Agreed Principles for the Rafah Crossing

DOCUMENT 1 The Egyptian Constitution

Egyptians have experienced many political incarnations, and, correspondingly, many constitutions. These include that of 1922, after the abolition of the British protectorate, officially abolished in 1952. The first republican constitution came in 1956 after the disbandment of the monarchy. The Constitution of Unity (with Syria) for the then-existent United Arab Republic came into being in 1958. Egypt’s modern-day constitution was promulgated in 1971. Significant amendments were made in 2005 and in 2007. In 2005, article 76 was amended via a referendum, with considerable controversy concerning its legitimacy. The amendment allowed, theoretically, for multiparty elections. In practice,

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presidential contests remain hamstrung, and Mubarak and the National Democratic Party’s perpetuation of rule is constitutionally ensured. Another contested referendum in 2007 resulted in the amendment of 34 articles. One of the more notable changes was to article 179, which essentially enshrined the controversial and repressive emergency legislation in the constitution. Other changes were instituted to article 1, from ‘‘democratic, socialist state based on the alliance of the working forces of the people’’ to a ‘‘democratic state based on citizenship’’; article 5, adding, ‘‘no political activity shall be exercised or political parties shall be established on the basis of religion or on discrimination due to gender or race.’’ Excerpts follow. Article 1 The Arab Republic of Egypt is a democratic state based on citizenship. The Egyptian people are part of the Arab nation and work for the realization of its comprehensive unity. Article 2 Islam is the religion of the state and Arabic its official language. Principles of Islamic law (Shari’a) are the principal source of legislation. Article 5 The political system of the Arab Republic of Egypt is a multiparty system, within the framework of the basic elements and principles of the Egyptian society as stipulated in the Constitution. Political parties are regulated by law. Citizens have the right to establish political parties according to the law and no political activity shall be exercised nor political parties established on a religious referential authority, on a religious basis or on discrimination on grounds of gender or origin. Article 40 All citizens are equal before the law.. . . Article 41 . . .Save for the case of being caught red-handed, no person may be arrested, inspected, detained or his freedom restricted or prevented from free movement except under an order necessitated by investigations and preservation of the security of the society.. . . Article 42 Any person arrested, detained or his freedom restricted shall be treated in such a manner that preserves his human dignity. No physical or moral harm shall be inflicted upon him. He may not be detained or imprisoned in places other than those defined by laws regulating prisons.

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Any statement proved to have been made by a person under any of the aforementioned forms of duress or coercion or under the threat thereof, shall be considered invalid and futile. Article 45 The law shall protect the inviolability of the private life of citizens. Correspondence, wires, telephone calls and other means of communication shall have their own sanctity and secrecy and may not be confiscated or monitored except by a causal judicial warrant and for a definite period according to the provisions of the law. Article 47 Freedom of opinion is guaranteed.. . . Article 48 Freedom of the press, printing, publication and mass media shall be guaranteed. . . .However, in case of declared state of emergency or in time of war, limited censorship may be imposed on newspapers, publications and mass media in matters related to public safety or for purposes of national security in accordance with the law. Article 54 Citizens shall have the right to peaceable and unarmed private assembly, without the need for prior notice. ... Public meetings, processions and gatherings are allowed within the limits of the law. Article 55 Citizens shall have the right to association as defined in the law. It is prohibited to establish societies whose activities are hostile to the social system, clandestine or have a military character is prohibited. Article 58 Defense of the motherland and its soil is a sacred duty, and conscription is obligatory in accordance with the law. Article 62 Citizens shall have the right to vote and express their opinions in referendums according to the provisions of the law. Their participation in public life is a national duty.. . . Article 65 The State shall be subject to law. The independence and immunity of the judiciary are two basic guarantees to safeguard rights and freedoms.

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Article 67 A defendant is innocent until proved guilty in legal trial, in which he is granted the right to defend himself. ... Article 76 The President shall be elected by direct, public, secret ballot. For an applicant to be accepted as a candidate to presidency, he shall be supported by at least 250 elected members of the People’s Assembly, the Shura Council and local popular councils on governorate level, provided that those shall include at least 65 members of the People’s Assembly, 25 of the Shura Council and ten of every local council in at least 14 governorates. ... Political parties, founded at least five consecutive years before the starting date of candidature and have been operating uninterruptedly for this period, and whose members have obtained at least 3% of the elected members of both the People’s Assembly and the Shura Council in the latest election or an equivalent percentage of such total in one of the two assemblies, may each nominate for presidency a member of their respective higher board, according to their own by-laws, provided he has been a member of such board for at least one consecutive year. As an exception to the provisions of the afore-mentioned paragraph, the aforementioned political parties whose members obtained at least one seat in any of the People’s Assembly or the Shura Council in the latest election may nominate in any presidential elections to be held within ten years starting from May 1, 2007, any member of its higher board, according to their own by-laws, provided he has been a member of such board for at least one consecutive year. Candidature applications shall be submitted to an independent committee, named the Presidential Election Committee. Article 148 The President of the Republic shall proclaim a state of emergency in the manner prescribed by the law. Such proclamation must be submitted to the People’s Assembly within the following fifteen days so that the Assembly may take a decision thereon. In case of the dissolution of the People’s Assembly, the matter shall be submitted to the new Assembly at its first meeting. In all cases, the proclamation of the state of emergency shall be for a limited period, which may not be extended unless by approval of the Assembly. Article 179 The State shall seek to safeguard public security to counter dangers of terror. The law shall, under the supervision of the judiciary, regulate special provisions related to evidence and investigation procedures required to counter those

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dangers . The procedure stipulated in paragraph 1 of Articles 41 and 44 and paragraph 2 of Article 45 of the Constitution shall in no way preclude such conter-terror action. The President may refer any terror crime to any judiciary body stipulated in the Constitution or the law. DOCUMENTS 2 , 3, AND 4

President Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel met with U.S. President Jimmy Carter at Camp David (Maryland) from September 5 to September 17, 1978. At the conclusion of the meetings, on September 17, 1978, President Carter, Prime Minister Begin, and President Sadat signed two agreements, the Framework for Peace in the Middle East and the Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel, together known as the Camp David Accords. Proving to be a historic shift in Middle East relations (and one with global impact), the Accords called for (1) Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai within three years in exchange for a normalization of relations between Egypt and Israel as well as (2) a five-year transition period to provide autonomy to Palestinians inside the occupied territories. The Camp David Accords led to the signing of the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty, a key feature of which was mutual recognition as was Israel’s commitment to withdraw from the Sinai (the second provision, providing autonomy to Palestinians, was never pursued as part of this agreement; Israel and the United States would later claim, at the conclusion of the ‘‘Oslo Accords’’ in 1993, that autonomy for Palestinians was finally agreed). Excerpts of all three documents follow. The Framework for Peace in the Middle East

Preamble: The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following: The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbors is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in all its parts. ... To achieve a relationship of peace in the spirit of article 2 of the United Nations Charter, future negotiations between Israel and any neighbor prepared to negotiate peace and security with it, are necessary for the purpose of carrying out all the provisions and principles of Resolutions 242 and 338. Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure

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and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Progress toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting economic development, in maintaining stability, and in assuring security. Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations. In addition, under the terms of peace treaties, the parties can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree to special security arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, the presence of international forces, liaison, agreed measures for monitoring, and other arrangements that they agree are useful. Framework: ... West Bank and Gaza: Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the West Bank and Gaza should proceed in three stages: Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, and taking into account the security concerns of all the parties, there should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government. To negotiate the details of a transitional arrangement, the government of Jordan will be invited to join the negotiations on the basis of this framework. These new arrangements should give due consideration both to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of these territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved. Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing the elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate and an agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. The agreement will also include arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order. A strong local police force will be established, which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders.

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... All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond. To assist in providing such security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the self-governing authority. It will be composed of inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. The police will maintain continuing liaison on internal security matters with the designated Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian officers. ... Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with other interested parties to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem. Egypt-Israel: Egypt and Israel undertake not to resort to the threat or the use of force to settle disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 in the charter of the United Nations. In order to achieve peace between them, the parties agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months from the signing of this framework a peace treaty between them, while inviting the other parties to the conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude similar peace treaties with a view to achieving a comprehensive peace in the area. The framework for the conclusion of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel will govern the peace negotiations between them. The parties will agree on the modalities and the timetable for the implementation of their obligations under the treaty. Associated Principles: Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions described below should apply to peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbors—Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. Signatories shall establish among themselves relationships normal to states at peace with one another. To this end, they should undertake to abide by all the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. Steps to be taken in this respect include: Full recognition; Abolishing economic boycotts; Guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law. ... The Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel

In order to achieve peace between them, Israel and Egypt agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months of the signing of this framework a peace treaty between them.

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It is agreed that: The site of the negotiations will be under a United Nations flag at a location or locations to be mutually agreed. All of the principles of U.N. Resolution 242 will apply in this resolution of the dispute between Israel and Egypt. Unless otherwise mutually agreed, terms of the peace treaty will be implemented between two and three years after the peace treaty is signed. The following matters are agreed between the parties: the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally recognized border between Egypt and mandated Palestine; the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the Sinai; the use of airfields left by the Israelis near El-Arish, Rafah, Ras al-Naqb, and Sharm El-Sheikh for civilian purposes only, including possible commercial use by all nations; the right of free passage by ships of Israel through the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 applying to all nations; the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba are international waterways to be open to all nations for unimpeded and nonsuspendable freedom of navigation and overflight; the construction of a highway between the Sinai and Jordan near Elat with guaranteed free and peaceful passage by Egypt and Jordan; the stationing of military forces listed below.

Stationing of Forces: No more than one division (mechanized or infantry) of Egyptian armed forces will be stationed within an area lying approximately 50 Kilometers (km). East of the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal. Only United Nations forces and civil police equipped with light weapons to perform normal police functions will be stationed within an area lying west of the international border and the Gulf of Aqaba, varying in width from 20 km. to 40 km. In the area within 3 km. east of the international border there will be Israeli limited military forces not to exceed four infantry battalions and United Nations observers. Border patrol units, not to exceed three battalions, will supplement the civil police in maintaining order in the area not included above. The exact demarcation of the above areas will be as decided during the peace negotiations. Early warning stations may exist to insure compliance with the terms of the agreement. United Nations forces will be stationed: (a) in part of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 km. of the Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the international border, and (b) in the Sharm El-Sheikh area to insure freedom of passage through the Strait of Tiran; and these forces will not

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be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations with a unanimous vote of the five permanent members. After a peace treaty is signed, and after the interim withdrawal is complete, normal relations will be established between Egypt and Israel, including: full recognition, including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations; termination of economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods and people; and mutual protection of citizens by the due process of law. Interim Withdrawal: Between three months and nine months after the signing of the peace treaty, all Israeli forces will withdraw east of a line extending from a point east of El-Arish to Ras Muhammad, the exact location of this line to be determined by mutual agreement. The Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of the State of Israel; Preamble Convinced of the urgent necessity of the establishment of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338; Reaffirming their adherence to the ‘‘Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David,’’ dated September 17, 1978; Noting that the aforementioned Framework as appropriate is intended to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel but also between Israel and each of its other Arab neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with it on this basis; Desiring to bring to an end the state of war between them and to establish a peace in which every state in the area can live in security; Convinced that the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel is an important step in the search for comprehensive peace in the area and for the attainment of settlement of the Arab- Israeli conflict in all its aspects; Inviting the other Arab parties to this dispute to join the peace process with Israel guided by and based on the principles of the aforementioned Framework; Desiring as well to develop friendly relations and cooperation between themselves in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the principles of international law governing international relations in times of peace; Agree to the following provisions in the free exercise of their sovereignty, in order to implement the ‘‘Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel’’;

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Article I 1. The state of war between the Parties will be terminated and peace will be established between them upon the exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty. 2. Israel will withdraw all its armed forces and civilians from the Sinai behind the international boundary between Egypt and mandated Palestine, as provided in the annexed protocol (Annex I), and Egypt will resume the exercise of its full sovereignty over the Sinai. 3. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal provided for in Annex I, the parties will establish normal and friendly relations, in accordance with Article III (3). Article II The permanent boundary between Egypt and Israel in the recognized international boundary between Egypt and the former mandated territory of Palestine, as shown on the map at Annex II, without prejudice to the issue of the status of the Gaza Strip. The Parties recognize this boundary as inviolable. Each will respect the territorial integrity of the other, including their territorial waters and airspace. Article III The Parties will apply between them the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law governing relations among states in times of peace. In particular: a. They recognize and will respect each other’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence; b. They recognize and will respect each other’s right to live in peace within their secure and recognized boundaries; c. They will refrain from the threat or use of force, directly or indirectly, against each other and will settle all disputes between them by peaceful means.

Each Party undertakes to ensure that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, or violence do not originate from and are not committed from within its territory, or by any forces subject to its control or by any other forces stationed on its territory, against the population, citizens or property of the other Party. Each Party also undertakes to refrain from organizing, instigating, inciting, assisting or participating in acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, subversion or violence against the other Party, anywhere, and undertakes to ensure that perpetrators of such acts are brought to justice. The Parties agree that the normal relationship established between them will include full recognition, diplomatic, economic and cultural relations, termination of economic boycotts and discriminatory barriers to the free movement of people and goods, and will guarantee the mutual enjoyment by citizens of the

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due process of law. The process by which they undertake to achieve such a relationship parallel to the implementation of other provisions of this Treaty is set out in the annexed protocol (Annex III). Article IV In order to provide maximum security for both Parties on the basis of reciprocity, agreed security arrangements will be established including limited force zones in Egyptian and Israeli territory, and United Nations forces and observers, described in detail as to nature and timing in Annex I, and other security arrangements the Parties may agree upon. The Parties agree to the stationing of United Nations personnel in areas described in Annex I. The Parties agree not to request withdrawal of the United Nations personnel and that these personnel will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations, with the affirmative vote of the five Permanent Members, unless the Parties otherwise agree. A Joint Commission will be established to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty, as provided for in Annex I. The security arrangements provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article may at the request of either party be reviewed and amended by mutual agreement of the Parties. Article V Ships of Israel, and cargoes destined for or coming from Israel, shall enjoy the right of free passage through the Suez Canal and its approaches through the Gulf of Suez and the Mediterranean Sea on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888, applying to all nations, Israeli nationals, vessels and cargoes, as well as persons, vessels and cargoes destined for or coming from Israel, shall be accorded non- discriminatory treatment in all matters connected with usage of the canal.

DOCUMENT 5 The Agreed Principles for the Rafah Crossing

Egypt borders the Gaza Strip for eight miles along an area known as the Philadelphi Corridor (also termed the Salah al-Din (or Saladin) Route for the border road on the Gaza side). The primary border crossing between the two is at Rafah, a town split by the border. The area, well peppered with not-so-secret tunnels, has long been a source of consternation, particularly for Israel, as a transit route for illicit smuggling activities, for militants and criminals, between Gaza and Egypt. In November 2005, two agreements were hammered out between Israel and the Palestinian Authority: the Agreement on Movement and Access and the Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing. The agreements detail provisions relating

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to movement of people and goods at the Gaza-Egypt border. The negotiations were facilitated by the United States, the European Union, and an international envoy. Although Egypt is not a per se party to the agreement, it defines border security arrangements for all—Egypt, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority— as well as the third-party European Union, providing a border assistance mission. Excerpts from the Agreed Principles for the Rafah Crossing follow: To be supplemented prior to opening by agreements on security, customs and 3rd party implementation procedures General Rafah will be operated by the Palestinian Authority [PA] on its side, and Egypt on its side, according to international standards, in accordance with Palestinian law and subject to the terms of this agreement. Rafah will be opened as soon as it is ready to operate at an international standard in accordance with the specifications of this agreement and as soon as the 3rd party is on site, with a target date of November 25. Use of the Rafah crossing will be restricted to Palestinian ID card holders and others by exception in agreed categories with prior notification to the GoI [Government of Israel] and approval of senior PA leadership. The PA will notify the GoI 48 hours in advance of the crossing of a person in the excepted categories-diplomats, foreign investors, foreign representatives of recognized international organizations and humanitarian cases. The GoI will respond within 24 hours with any objections and will include the reasons for the objections; The PA will notify the GoI of their decision within 24 hours and will include the reasons for their decision; The 3rd party will ensure the proper procedures are followed and will advise both sides of any information in its possession pertaining to the people applying to cross under these exceptions. These procedures will remain in place for a period of 12 months, unless the 3rd party delivers a negative evaluation of the PA running the Rafah crossing. This evaluation will be done in close coordination with both sides and will give due consideration to the opinion of both sides. Rafah will also be used for export of goods to Egypt. Objective criteria for the inspection of cars will be established by consensus. The criteria are as follows: Search equipment will be installed, including - Black lights - Power tools and a compressor for the tools

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- Technology to be agreed, possibly including sonic imagery, gamma detection (full vehicle or hand held), and/or millimetre wave imagery - Mirrors and bore scope equipment to search hard to reach places Personnel will be trained to search vehicles and on the use of this equipment by the 3rd party to international standards. Cameras will be installed to monitor the search process. The 3rd party will evaluate the capacity of the PA to inspect cars according to these criteria and to international standards. Once the PA develops the capacity to inspect cars to the satisfaction of the 3rd party, cars will be allowed to pass through Rafah. Until that time, cars will pass through on an exceptional basis, subject to specifications agreed in the security protocol. Rafah will be the only crossing point between the Gaza Strip and Egypt (with the exception of Kerem Shalom for the agreed period). The PA will establish clear operating procedures. Until Rafah is operational, the PA will open Rafah crossing on an ad hoc basis for religious pilgrims, medical patients, and others, in coordination with General Gilad’s office on the Israeli side. Israel will provide the PA with all information needed to update the Palestinian population registry, including all information on Palestinian ID card holders who are currently outside the country. A liaison office, led by the 3rd party, will receive real-time video and data feed of the activities at Rafah and will meet regularly to review implementation of this agreement, resolve any disputes arising from this agreement, and perform other tasks specified in this agreement. Security The PA will act to prevent the movement of weapons and explosives at the Rafah crossing. The PA will establish baggage limits for each passenger as part of the procedures. Limits will be the same as currently applied by the GoI; very frequent travellers (suitcase policy) to be agreed. Travellers, including returning residents, may use the crossing point to bring in personal effects as defined in Rule 1(e) to Heading 7 of the Annex to the prevailing Customs Tariff. Any other personal belongings or other goods shall be cleared at the Kerem Shalom crossing point. The PA will provide the 3rd party a list of names of the workers at Rafah crossing which will be shared with the Israelis. The PA will take the Israelis concerns into account. Security services from Israel, PA, the U.S., and Egypt will continue to coordinate on security issues and will participate in the security working group. On a case by case basis, the PA will consider information on persons of concern provided by the GoI. The PA will consult with the GoI and the 3rd party prior to the PA making a decision to prohibit travel or not. During this consultation,

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which will not take more than six hours, the person in question will not be permitted to cross. Customs GoI and PA will continue to apply the Paris Protocol of 29 April 1994. Rafah will be operated according to international standards and rules and the Paris Protocol. GoI and PA agree on widest possible co-operation and information sharing. GoI and PA will co-operate on training issues. GoI and PA customs will hold regular meetings to which the GoE will be invited as appropriate. Kerem Shalom PA customs officials will clear incoming cargo at Kerem Shalom under the supervision of Israeli customs agents. Both sides will discuss operating procedures at a later stage. Operations at Kerem Shalom will provide training and capacity building to PA customs staff. The 3rd party will review the PA’s customs capacity in 12 months and make a recommendation to both sides for a joint decision regarding future arrangements. In the event of a disagreement, the U.S., in consultation with the GoI, the PA, and the 3rd party, will resolve the issue expeditiously. ... ...

Glossary

Fatah — founded largely by members of the Palestinian diaspora, including Yasser Arafat, in the late 1950s. The name stands for Palestine National Liberation Movement; ‘‘fatah’’ in Arabic is a ‘‘reverse acronym,’’ whose letters stand for harakat tahrir filastin, the movement for the liberation of Palestine. In 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), an umbrella group for Palestinian resistance organizations, was formed. Fatah joined the organization and Arafat was elected chairman of the PLO in 1968. The PLO, and primarily Fatah, is considered politically secular and nationalist (in contrast to Hamas’ Islamist approach); however, it has garnered widespread and deserved criticism for corruption (as political participants in the Palestinian National Authority). It is also ‘‘linked’’ with the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, an armed group, which has carried out numerous attacks against Israel. Intifada — uprising, or literally shaking off; used in reference to two periods of Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation—the first intifada took place from 1987 to 1993, and the second began in 2000. Jama’at — Islamic associations, including student groups as well as Muslim charities. Jihad — ‘‘struggle’’ in Arabic, both individual struggle (to be closer to Allah/ God) and collective struggle (both nonviolent collective action and militant activities, akin to militant Christian Crusades, for religio-political ends).

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In current political parlance, governments and militants alike use the term to refer to an armed struggle on behalf of Allah or Islam or holy war. Kifaya — ‘‘enough’’ in Arabic. The Egyptian movement chose the name to express that Egyptians had had enough of President Mubarak’s rule. It came to prominence during the 2005 constitutional referendum process and became a very active and effective (in terms of getting its message out) opponent of the authoritarian state. Its strength has been in its ability to bring together, under a civil society umbrella, a range of groups, including secular and religious, for the advancement of democratic rights in Egypt. Martyr — see Shahid Mufti — Islamist jurist or Islamic legal expert; muftis often are the source of a fatwa, a ruling or decree aimed at interpreting Islamic law. Palestinian National Authority — interim governance unit responsible for the Occupied Palestinian Territories; established following the Oslo Accords of 1994. Shahid — ‘‘martyr’’ in Arabic; one who sacrifices or gives up his or her own life for the greater good of Islam; in contemporary parlance, ‘‘shahid’’ is increasingly (but not solely) associated with those who fight in a jihad, including ‘‘suicide bombers’’ who attack occupying forces or governments they perceive as illegitimate. Shari’a — ‘‘way’’ or ‘‘path’’ in Arabic; Shari’a is the body of Islamic law, based primarily on the Qur’an (the holy text of Islam), hadith (sayings of the Prophet Muhammad), ijma’ (consensus), analogy, and precedent. Shi’a — derived from the term ‘‘partisans (or followers) of Ali,’’ the Prophet Muhammad’s son-in-law; Shi’a Muslims believe the descendants of Muhammad through his daughter Fatima and her husband Ali are the rightful leaders in Islam, the ones best equipped to protect the ‘‘sunnah’’ (traditions or way) of the Prophet. Shi’a are the minority denomination among Muslims worldwide, perhaps numbering no more than 10 percent (although some estimate up to 20 percent); in Egypt, Shi’a number as little as 1 percent. Sunni — derived from ‘‘sunnah’’ in Arabic (meaning, the ways or traditions of the Prophet Muhammad). Sunnis are the largest denomination in Islam; in Egypt, Sunnis number between 90 and 94 percent of the entire population (and 99 percent of all Muslims, with Shi’a being only about 1 percent). ‘Ulama — Islam’s scholarly elite, the interpreters or arbiters of Shari’a (Islamic law). Ummah — ‘‘community’’ in Arabic; Islamic community of believers worldwide.

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Index Abd al-Rahman, Sheikh Omar, 42, 62, 63, 66 Al-Afghani, Jamal al-Din, 4–5 Air force (Egyptian), 28, 51, 114; Mubarak and, 10, 20 Anti-terrorism Law (no. 97 of 1992), 34, 35, 99 Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI), 27 Army (Egyptian), 4, 12, 18, 21, 25, 28, 29, 59 Arrests and detentions, 35–38, 39, 40, 41, 90, 101, Copts and, 92; of Saad Eddin Ibrahim, 97, 98, 141; international law and, 36; of militants, 37, 62, 66, 68, 141; Muslim Brotherhood and, 36–37, 47, 49, 51, 53, 90, 141; of Ayman Nour, 14, 15, 95, 96, 141; numbers of, 35, 36, 37, 38, 53, 90; Sadat and, 11, 68; state powers of, 20, 34, 35–36 Aswan Dam, 2, 7, 26, 79, 85 Al-Azhar University, 4, 5, 17 Al-Banna, Hassan, 5, 49, 50, 51, 67 Ali Pasha, Muhammad, 3, 4 Arab League. See League of Arab States

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 80, 126, 130, 135 n.49 Camp David Accords, 9, 10, 52, 55, 78, 85, 115 Central Security Force, 21, 29, 33, 38, 40, 41, 100 Constitution of Egypt, 6, 7, 10, 17, 24, 35, 54, 139; article 2, 13, 52; article 41, 20, 35; article 42, 38; article 44, 20, 35; article 45, 20, 35; article 54, 140; article 55, 140; article 56, 141; article 76, 11, 12; article 88, 13; article 148, 34; article 150, 25; article 179, 20, 34, 35, 36, 141; article 180, 25 Coptic Christians, 2, 17, 54, 55; tensions with and violence against, 41, 42, 60, 61, 63, 92–93, 104, 143; United States and, 42, 88, 92 Dahab attack, 19, 121, 143 Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), 18, 37, 48, 60, 63, 64, 67–69, 71; Sheikh Omar Abd al-Rahman and, 62; Mubarak

196

Index assassination attempt and, 63, 68; Sadat assassination, 10, 62, 68; and alZawahiri, 60, 68, 69 Emergency Law, 10, 20, 34–35, 39, 102 El-Erian, Essam, 37, 54, 55 Faraj, Mohammed ‘Abd al-Salam, 67, 68 Farouk, King, 3, 6, 7, 49, 50 Free Officers Movement, 6–7, 50 Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya. See the Islamic Group Gaza Strip, 28, 58, 93, 98, 105, 106, 114, 115, 116–18, 119, 121, 144; border issues, 93–94, 114, 115–18, 121, 144; Israeli seizure of, 51 Al-Ghad Party, 14, 15, 16, 18, 95 Habib, Dr. Mohamed, 51, 55 Hamas, 56, 58, 93, 98, 101, 103, 104, 106, 114, 115, 117–20, 144; Muslim Brotherhood relationship with, 49, 57, 58, 119, 133, 142 Al-Hudaybi, Hassan, 51 Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies, 16, 96, 98 Ibrahim, Saad Eddin, 1, 16, 89, 96–99, 101, 140, 141 Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun. See Muslim Brotherhood Iraq, 3, 4, 21, 27, 69, 78, 113, 114, 122– 23, 128, 132; Egyptian support for during war with Iran, 78, 122, 129, 133; U.S. military actions against and occupation of, 39, 40, 54, 79, 80, 82, 88, 104, 123, 130, 144 Iran, 4, 5, 10, 22 n.8, 56, 78, 88, 114, 122, 129, 134; nuclear program, 25, 29, 31, 33, 130, 145 Islambouli, Khalid, 9, 10 Islamic Group, 18, 38, 47, 48, 52, 60, 61– 67, 68 Israel, 2, 10–11, 28, 48, 55, 58, 59, 79, 80, 105, 113, 114–20, 126, 130, 132–33, 144–45, 146; Camp David Accords, 52, 78, 85, 113, 115, 129; Egyptian militant

attacks on Israelis, 64, 70, 121–22; and Gaza border, 28, 94, 114, 116–18, 143, 144–45; independence of, 6, 49; Nasser and, 7, 8; nuclear program, 29, 31, 32, 33, 145; Palestinian negotiations, 10, 11, 118–19, 133; Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ), 84, 122, 145; Ramadan War, and, 10, 62; Sadat and, 9, 18; Sinai (occupation and withdrawal), 10, 62; Six-Day War, 8, 51; Suez Canal and, 7, 8, 26; United States and, 7–8, 9, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83– 84, 85, 87–88, 102, 103, 104, 105, 122, 129 Kifaya, 14, 16, 41, 104, 138 Law of Association, 100, 140 League of Arab States, 10, 78, 113, 122, 123, 124, 125, 128–30, 132, 133 Libya, 28, 80, 113, 114, 125, 127–28, 144, 146 Majlis al-Sha’b. See People’s Assembly Majlis al-Shura. See Shura Council Military tribunals (trials), 22, 34, 53 Mubarak, Hosni, 1, 2, 15, 20, 21–22, 24, 25, 34, 37, 69, 70, 71, 101, 115, 119, 123, 124, 125–28, 129, 139, 141, 146; air force, 10, 20; attempted assassination of, 62, 64, 65, 68, 145; background, 10– 11, 52–53; nuclear program and, 30; political opposition and, 15, 16, 17, 21, 33, 41, 95, 98, 137, 138, 140, 143; political ‘‘reforms,’’ 10, 11, 12, 16, 34, 139, 140; public dissatisfaction with, 14, 80, 95; relationship with Yassir Arafat, 115; U.S. and, 80, 81, 83, 88, 91, 101, 104 Mubarak, Gamal, 11, 21, 30 Mukhabarat (General Intelligence Service), 21, 33, 102 Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Ikhwan alMuslimun), 2, 4, 18, 34, 36, 37, 47, 49, 53, 55, 67, 69, 71, 81, 104, 120, 133, 141–42, 143, 144; elections, 14, 15, 16, 17, 49, 53, 71, 139; founding/history of,

197

Index 5, 6, 18, 49–54; Nasser, 49, 140; ‘‘party platform,’’ 54–56; Sadat, 9, 52; (as) service provider, 59–60; ‘‘terrorist’’ groups and, 56–59, 61; United States, 53–54, 59, 101, 103, 106 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 2, 6, 7–8, 10, 11, 20, 25, 26, 42, 50–51, 106, 113, 114, 122, 124, 129; Aswan Dam and, 7, 26; Free Officers’ coup against King Farouk, 3, 7, 50; Six-Day War and, 8, 26, 114; Suez and, 7, 8, 25, 26 National Democratic Party (NDP), 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 25, 30, 53, 59, 138, 141, 143; Gamal Mubarak and, 11, 30 Navy (Egyptian), 25, 28 Neguib, Muhammad, 6, 7 North Korea, 27, 31 Nour, Ayman, 14, 15, 16, 89, 95–96, 98, 141 Nuclear program, 25, 29–33, 145, 151 Palestinian National Authority, 105, 117, 119 Parliament, lower house of. See People’s Assembly Parliament, upper house of. See Shura Council People’s Assembly, 21–22, 29, 30, 101, 147; and 1995 parliamentary elections, 14, 20; and 2000 parliamentary elections, 14–15, 20, 98; and 2005 parliamentary elections, 13, 15, 16, 20, 36, 49, 54, 95, 103, 139; role in choosing president, 11, 12, 139 Political Parties Committee, 14 Presidential Elections Commission, 23, 168 Al-Qaeda, 60, 81; Egyptian Islamic Jihad and, 48, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 143; Islamic Group and, 47, 61, 66, 71; Muslim Brotherhood differences with, 56, 142 Qualified Industrial Zone (QIZ), 84, 122, 145 Qutb, Sayyid, 50–51, 56–57, 67

Ramadan (1973) War (aka Yom Kippur War), 9, 10, 78, 114 Sadat, Anwar, 2, 8–10, 20, 25, 26, 29, 52, 61, 67, 85, 113, 114, 137, 138, 140; assassination/death of, 1, 6, 9–10, 19, 34, 52, 61–62, 67, 68, 99, 139; Camp David and, 9, 52, 78, 79, 114–15, 122, 129; nuclear ambitions and, 31 Shari’a, 6, 13, 49, 52, 54, 55 Sharm el-Sheikh attack, 19, 37, 71, 99, 121 Shura Council, 12, 13, 17, 30, 53 Soviet Union (USSR), 7, 9, 26, 27, 30, 60, 62, 85, 87, 115 State Security Investigations Sector (Mubahath al-Dawla or SSI), 29, 33, 37, 38, 39, 40, 100 Suez Canal, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 26, 28, 49, 50, 84, 88, 144 Taba attack, 19, 37, 70, 71, 121, 143 Tagammu Party, 14, 16, 18, 139 Torture, state use of, 19, 33, 37, 38–40, 50, 63, 68, 81, 89, 90, 94, 95, 100, 101, 102, 103, 137, 140–41, 147 United National Front for Change, 16 United States, 77–112; Boutros BoutrosGhali, 80, 130; counterterrorism, 81, 99–103, 141; economic assistance, 82– 84; general relations with, 7–9, 10, 25, 26, 27, 31, 32, 33, 48, 77, 78, 79, 81– 82, 103–6, 115, 123, 125, 140, 144, 146; Saad Eddin Ibrahim, 96–99; jailing of Sheikh Abd al-Rahman, 62; military assistance, 84–88; Muslim Brotherhood, 53–54, 59, 101, 103, 106; Ayman Nour, 95–96; Partnership for Growth, 82; (Egyptian) public’s attitude toward, 79– 80; Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ), 84, 122, 145 Wafd Party, 6, 14, 15, 16, 18, 49, 53, 138, 139 Wasat Party, 18, 53 Al-Zawahiri, Dr. Ayman, 48, 56, 57, 60, 62, 64, 65, 66, 68, 69, 81 Zuhdi, Karam, 62, 66, 67, 68

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About the Author

DENIS J. SULLIVAN is Professor of Political Science, Chair of the International Affairs Department, and Director of the Middle East Center at Northeastern University; Dr. Sullivan (Ph.D., University of Michigan) has been an affiliate in research at Harvard University’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies since 1987. Dr. Sullivan’s other books include The World Bank and the Palestinian NGO Project: From Service Delivery to Sustainable Development (2001); Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society vs. the State, with Sana Abed-Kotob (1999); Private Voluntary Organizations in Egypt: Islamic Development, Private Initiative, and State Control (1994). Recent articles and chapters include ‘‘Egypt’’ in Countries at the Crossroads (2007; co-authored with Kimberly Jones) and ‘‘Egypt’’ in Countries at the Crossroads (2005); ‘‘The U.S.–Egypt Partnership: Are Human Rights Included?’’ in Human Rights Implementation Project (2004); and ‘‘The Struggle for Egypt’s Future,’’ Current History, January 2003. KIMBERLY JONES is a doctoral candidate in Public and International Affairs (Political Science) at Northeastern University. Ms. Jones received her Juris Doctor from CUNY School of Law (2000). As a research analyst, Ms. Jones focuses on militant groups and human rights in the Middle East. States and groups of interest include the Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt, Hamas and Israel/the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Hezbollah and Lebanon, as well as Al Qaeda and its transnational impact. Ms. Jones is co-author with Denis J. Sullivan on ‘‘Egypt’’ in Countries at the Crossroads (2007) and with Nikos Passas on ‘‘Commodities and Terrorist Financing: Focus on Diamonds’’ in the European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research (2006).

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