Global Justice and Resource Curse: Combining Statism and Cosmopolitanism 2021007465, 2021007466, 9781032014630, 9781032014661, 9781003178750

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Global Justice and Resource Curse

This book explores whether any theory alone is sufficiently capable of resolving the complexity of global justice, arguing that a combination of statism and cosmopolitanism is needed. In current times, xenophobia, nationalism and populism have amplified othering in both domestic and international politics. In global justice, the dichotomy between the ‘polis’ and the ‘cosmopolis’ separates statism from cosmopolitanism. Using resource curse as a complex case of global justice, the author demonstrates how neither statism nor cosmopolitanism alone are sufficient but goes on to argue that a combination of the two theories is simultaneously necessary and sufficient to resolve the complexity of global justice. He demonstrates how statism is primarily applied to the institutional dimensions of resource curse and only secondarily applied to the interactional dimensions, while cosmopolitanism is applied to the interactional dimensions but only secondarily applied to the institutional dimensions, and therefore a combination of both theories is needed to resolve the problem of resource curse – using the strength of the former to compensate for the weakness of the latter, and vice versa. Global justice is widely taught and researched as one of the most important areas in political philosophy and political theory. This book will be of great interest to students and researchers, philosophers and political scientists of African politics, political theory, political philosophy, international relations and international development. Frank Aragbonfoh Abumere is a political scientist and philosopher with research interests in African politics, identity politics, power relations, human rights, global justice, global governance and IR theory. He is currently an associate member of the Globalising Minority Rights research group in the Department of Philosophy at the Arctic University of Norway.

Rethinking Globalizations Edited by Barry K. Gills, University of Helsinki, Finland and Kevin Gray, University of Sussex, UK.

This series is designed to break new ground in the literature on globalization and its academic and popular understanding. Rather than perpetuating or simply reacting to the economic understanding of globalization, this series seeks to capture the term and broaden its meaning to encompass a wide range of issues and disciplines and convey a sense of alternative possibilities for the future. The Redesign of the Global Financial Architecture The Return of State Authority Stuart P. M. Mackintosh Markets and Development Civil Society, Citizens and the Politics of Neoliberalism Edited by Toby Carroll and Darryl S. L. Jarvis Occupying Subjectivity Being and Becoming Radical in the 21st Century Edited by Chris Rossdale Localization in Development Aid How Global Institutions Enter Local Lifeworlds Edited by Thorsten Bonacker, Judith von Heusinger and Kerstin Zimmer The New Global Politics Global Social Movements in the Twenty-First Century Edited by Harry E. Vanden, Peter N. Funke and Gary Prevos Global Justice and Resource Curse Combining Statism and Cosmopolitanism Frank Aragbonfoh Abumere For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge. com/Rethinking-Globalizations/book-series/RG

Global Justice and Resource Curse

Combining Statism and Cosmopolitanism Frank Aragbonfoh Abumere

First published 2022 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2022 Frank Aragbonfoh Abumere The right of Frank Aragbonfoh Abumere to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Abumere, Frank Aragbonfoh, author. Title: Global justice and resource curse: combining statism and cosmopolitanism/Frank Aragbonfoh Abumere. Other titles: Rethinking globalizations. Description: Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2022 | Series: Rethinking globalizations | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2021007465 (print) | LCCN 2021007466 (ebook) | ISBN 9781032014630 (hardback) | ISBN 9781032014661 (paperback) | ISBN 9781003178750 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: International relations–Moral and ethical aspects. | Economic development–International cooperation. | Globalization. | Social justice. | Resource curse. Classification: LCC JZ1306 (print) | LCC JZ1306 (ebook) | DDC 327.101–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021007465 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021007466 ISBN: 978-1-032-01463-0 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-01466-1 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-17875-0 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by KnowledgeWorks Global Ltd.

Contents

Acknowledgementsvii Prefaceviii 1 Introduction

Global justice in the twenty-first century 1 Theories of, and approaches to, global justice 6 The scope or extensity of justice 9 The complexity of global justice 18 Summary 34

1

2 The complexity of resource curse

41

3 Resource curse as a complex case of global justice

73

An overview of resource curse 41 Africa, the epicentre of resource curse 46 Nigeria, Angola, DRC and Equatorial Guinea 52 Levels of analysis (levels of causality and responsibility) 61

Agents of resource curse: Micro level 73 Agents of resource curse: Macro level 86 The problem of contributory roles 97 The problem of degrees of responsibility 107

4 General theory of global justice

The grounds for a General theory 115 Fusion of horizons 119 Interactional moral analysis and institutional moral analysis 128 The primary and secondary applications of statism and cosmopolitanism 131

115

vi  Contents

5 The robustness of the general theory

Accommodating the complexity of resource curse 148 Arguments of the first kind 152 Arguments of the second kind 160 The negation of cosmopolitanism and statism? 166 Conclusion 172

Index

148

175

Acknowledgements

I received priceless help from numerous people without whom this book would not have been possible. I am in debt and immensely grateful to Domenico Melidoro, Wale Adebanwi, Sebastiano Maffettone and Andreas Vasilache.

Preface

Reading this book, one notices the employment of descriptive analysis, sometimes implicitly but at other times explicitly, in arguing for my prescriptive position. Just as important as the employment of descriptive analysis, is the multidisciplinary contents of the book and the interdisciplinary nature of the various analyses in the book. Although this book is primarily a political philosophy and political theory book, the descriptive analysis which permeates the book, the multidisciplinary contents of the book and the interdisciplinary nature of the various analyses in the book are very important because of the resource curse context in which the global justice discourse in the book takes place. The global justice literature relies on ideal theory and non-ideal theory but neglects the consequences of empirical research. The causal, contributory and constitutive factors, history and politics of resource curse are no less empirical matters than they are normative matters, and are no less social science matters than they are philosophical matters. Even as normative matters, they are normative in both an ethical sense (the morally right thing to do) and an institutional sense (the acceptable norms, standards or rules of behaviour that are the order of the day). While the former is solely a matter for ideal and non-ideal theory and philosophy, the latter is simultaneously a matter for empirical research and ideal and non-ideal theory on the one hand, and social science and philosophy on the other hand. Hence, empirical research on resource curse and social science debates on resource curse have consequences for the global justice of resource curse. To compensate for the empirical and social science weaknesses in the state-of-the-art, I employ descriptive analysis to aid my prescriptive analysis, make the contents of the book multidisciplinary and make the nature of the various analyses in the book interdisciplinary. From philosophy (political philosophy, legal philosophy, moral philosophy, logic and hermeneutics) to political science (political theory, international relations and political economy), from economics (development economics) to law (commercial law and international law), and from African history to African politics, the book reaches far and wide to seek helpful insights. All the while, political philosophy and political theory remain the fulcrum of the book.

1

Introduction

Global justice in the twenty-first century In ancient Greek poleis (city-states), when he was asked where he came from, that is, which particular polis (city-state) he came from, Diogenes of Sinope (404–323 BC) famously declared, ‘I am a citizen of the world.’ The Cynic’s declaration was brought into the spotlight in 2016 when Theresa May (the then prime minister of the United Kingdom) declared that ‘If you believe you are a citizen of the world, you are a citizen of nowhere.’ The ancient Cynic’s declaration resonates with our intensively and extensively globalised world. Just as it was important whether a person sees herself as, primarily, a citizen of a particular polis or a citizen of the universal cosmopolis during the Cynic’s time, so too it is important – if not even more important – whether we see ourselves primarily as members of a particular polis or the universal cosmopolis today. In global justice, the above dialectic, in essence, is particularly what separates statists or statism from cosmopolitans or cosmopolitanism. Generally, it dictates the division between relationists or relational approach and non-relationists or non-relational approach. Finally, it stimulates the debate between minimalists or minimalism and egalitarians or egalitarianism. Consequently, and ultimately, it is the key problématique of the global justice discourse. In the global justice discourse, to resolve the aforementioned key problématique, while some political philosophers and political theorists rely on a combination of ideal and non-ideal theory, generally political philosophers and political theorists rely on either ideal theory or non-ideal theory, preferring one to the other. On the one hand, ideal theory assumes strict compliance and works out the principles that characterise a well-ordered society under favourable circumstances. On the other hand, non-ideal theory deals with non-compliance or partial compliance and asks how the longterm goal of arriving at a well-ordered society might be achieved or worked toward (Rawls, 1971, pp. 245–246). However, matters of global justice are no less ideal theory matters than they are non-ideal theory matters and vice versa. Therefore, I will employ a combination of ideal and non-ideal theory in my contribution to the global justice discourse. This I shall do by using

2  Introduction non-ideal theory to analyse a complex case of global justice (resource curse) and then based on the analysis, by using ideal theory to create a general theory of global justice. Taking statism and cosmopolitanism as the major theories of global justice, I argue that neither the former nor the latter is sufficient for the theorisation of global justice (Abumere, 2016, pp. 7–8). Using the Lernaean Hydra1 called resource curse or paradox of plenty as a complex case of global justice, I show the insufficiency of statism and cosmopolitanism in resolving the problem of resource curse. Nevertheless, using the strengths of statism to compensate for the weaknesses of cosmopolitanism and vice versa through a fusion of horizons, I arrive at what I refer to as the general theory of global justice. Given its robustness, the general theory is simultaneously necessary and sufficient for theorising about global justice and resolving the problem of resource curse as a complex case of global justice. The general theory is important because it fulfils the aim of theories of, and approaches to, global justice. Essentially, theories of, and approaches to, global justice are attempts by political theorists and political philosophers to resolve, through ideal theory and non-ideal theory, the theoretical problems of global injustice in relation to the practical problems of global injustice. However, the question is what is global justice? Since ‘global’ is an adjectival qualifier of ‘justice,’ to answer the question I shall first tease out what justice is. Long before John Rawls’ (1971) ‘justice as fairness,’ justice has almost always been associated with fairness. From Plato’s Republic (ca. 375 BC) to Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics and Politics (ca. 340 BC), justice is generally seen as doing what is fair or dealing with people in a fair manner. Even in legal parlance, where justice is categorised into procedural and substantive justice, we often hear of fair and unfair trials and fair or just laws and unfair or unjust laws. Procedural justice, as the name suggests, has to do with consistently and impartially applying principles of law, following legal procedures or due process in the course of trials. Even if the principles, procedures or processes were in themselves unjust or unfair, as long as they are followed, then procedural justice is achieved. But substantive justice, in jurisprudence, goes beyond mere principles, procedures or processes to deal with the legitimacy of judgements and what is morally due to individuals or what they can morally ask of others or society. Such demands are basically the freedoms of the individuals whether those freedoms are negative, positive or republican. Justice can also be divided into distributive justice, corrective justice, commutative justice, retributive justice and so on. The concept of justice is a multifaceted one. But it can still be dealt with as that one holistic concept called justice. In this book, my intention is not to deal with the various categories of justice or to deal with justice as a holistic concept. I shall be dealing with only one category or a particular type of justice in that the focus of this book is on global justice which falls under distributive justice

Introduction 3 albeit ‘global’ distributive justice rather than ‘domestic’ distributive justice. Rawls (1999a) says we can call many things just or unjust. Just as we can call laws, institutions or social systems just or unjust, so too we can call certain actions of different kinds, be they decisions, judgements or imputations, just or unjust. Also, we can call persons themselves, including their attitudes or dispositions, just or unjust. However, for Rawls (1999a): the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society … the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation. (p. 6) In A Theory of Justice, Rawls (1971) is not only concerned with social justice, but he is particularly concerned with social justice in the domestic society. Hence, he prescribes certain principles of justice which he thinks will ensure a just basic structure which will, in turn, ensure a just domestic society. To attain a just basic structure, domestic societies are to be guided by justice as fairness. In justice as fairness, individuals sitting in the original position, behind a veil of ignorance, choose Rawls’ two principles of justice. The first principle is the liberty principle and the second principle is the equality principle. The second principle is further divided into two principles, namely, the difference principle and the fair equality of opportunity principle. First, each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others. Second, social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all. (Rawls, 1999a, p. 53) Despite Rawls’ intention to limit the application of these principles to domestic societies, the principles contributed immensely to charting the course of the debate on global justice. Two facts made Rawls’ principles of justice the centrality of the global justice debate (Blake & Smith, 2013). The first is that Rawls argued that his principles are for domestic societies and not for the global society. Except for a few remarks like the ones made in paragraph 58 of A Theory of Justice (1999a, revised edition), Rawls did not concern himself with global justice. When Rawls finally concerned himself with global justice in The Law of Peoples (1999b), he seemed to be almost negligent of the inequality which he had made a central focus in domestic distributive justice. Second, Rawls’ principles, especially the difference principle, reinvigorated or even determined the course of the global justice debate. In their first forays into

4  Introduction the global justice debate, Charles Beitz (1979; 1999) and Thomas Pogge (1989) – two leading authorities in the global justice debate – merely extended Rawls’ principles of justice, especially the difference principle, from domestic society to the global society. Therefore, arguably, Rawls can be seen as originating the contemporary debate on global justice (Blake & Smith, 2013) which has pitted statists against cosmopolitans. Taking a cue from Rawls’s (1999a) definition of domestic distributive justice (p. 6), global justice can be construed as the way in which fundamental rights and duties are distributed globally and how the division of advantages (and disadvantages) from global cooperation, competition, engagements, activities, events and conditions (institutional and interactional) are determined. My concern is not with individual states, I am concerned with the world as a whole. I see the primary subject of justice as how the world is structured. Now, let me pause to ask whether there is any critical need to be discussing global justice. Rather than answer this question by mere affirmation or negation, I will present an overview (in the remainder of this sub-chapter) of the key issues that make global justice contentious. In our world today, we have made some progress in lifting many people out of poverty. If we accept the United Nations (UN)’s threshold of poverty, we will have to accept that the end of the last century and the beginning of this century have witnessed improved economic conditions and the vanquishing of poverty for hundreds of millions of people. The economic progress manifests even more if we accept the UN’s threshold of abject poverty. We only need to look at emerging markets to see how relatively fast they have moved hundreds of millions out of poverty, especially abject poverty. Even if we look at China and India alone, given China and India’s populations, we will have to accept that our world has taken some giant strides in fighting poverty. Brazil and Indonesia too, given their populations, are a testament that poverty may possess intractability but not invincibility. If we add the economic progress of all the other emerging markets and growth economies, we might be persuaded to believe that we are witnessing the end of poverty and poverty is being made history in our time. Terence James O’Neill – Jim O’Neill – (2011) coined the acronym BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China). The acronym later came to be known as BRICS with the addition of South Africa. He used the term to show how economic power is shifting from developed to developing countries. O’Neill (2013) also coined the acronyms MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey) and MIST, also known as MIKT (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey), to show how some developing countries are the next emerging markets and growth economies the world should expect to progress rapidly and tremendously. With the memories of the East Asian miracle still fresh, there was euphoria over the aforementioned acronyms and the expected wonders emerging markets and growth economies will perform. However, poverty

Introduction 5 has not been made history and there are very strong indications that poverty will not be made history in our lifetime. All over the world, especially in low-income economies or developing countries, there are still hundreds of millions of people living below the UN’s poverty and abject poverty thresholds. These are the people Paul Collier (2007) calls the bottom billion. A cogent moral approach to the aforementioned economic issues is to adopt distributive justice, that is, adopt normative principles which will guide us in ‘the allocation of the benefits and burdens of economic activity’ (Lamont & Favor, 1996, p. 1). The limitation of this approach is that it only focuses on the economic aspect of life or it considers other crucial aspects of life to be economic. The contention is that ‘it might exclude some “goods” which are important to us but which are not usually considered part of economic life (such as education and health care)’ (Armstrong, 2012, p. 16) (emphasis in original). Since, ceteris paribus, the economic status of persons determines the sort of education and health care they can have access to, perhaps the above approach is not flawed. Even in countries where education and health care are free, it is because the governments of such countries have infused distributive justice principles into their public policy, in this case, education policy and health policy. In both relative and absolute terms, some people are well-off while others are worse-off. Distributive justice is not only concerned with both relative and absolute ‘well-offness’ and ‘worse-offness.’ Also, it is crucially concerned with ‘worst-off’ persons. While, within the structures of the state, assisting the worst-off is not always contentious, assisting the ‘merely’ worse-off is very contentious. Even more contentious is assisting the ‘merely’ global worse-off. Although assisting the global worst-off is not as contentious as assisting the ‘merely’ global worse-off, by a very big margin it is more contentious than assisting the ‘merely’ worse-off within the structures of the state. This is because while domestic distributive justice is faced with only two critical central contentions, global distributive justice is faced with three critical central contentions. For domestic distributive justice, the two critical central contentions are whether the principles of distributive justice are justifiable and, if they are justifiable, to what extent are they justifiable. Here, I use ‘to what extent’ to refer to relative and absolute worse-off scenarios. For global distributive justice, the first and second critical central contentions are the same as those of domestic distributive justice. But the third critical central contention, accepting that principles of distributive justice are justifiable, goes on to contend whether they are justifiable globally. It is this third critical central contention that mainly separates statists from cosmopolitans. I use the term ‘mainly’ because the ‘to what extent’ term also separates some cosmopolitans from some statists, and even separates some statists from other statists, and some cosmopolitans from other cosmopolitans. These separations and divides will be discussed in detail in due course.

6  Introduction

Theories of, and approaches to, global justice To say that morally the worst-off or the worse-off ought to be assisted implies that they are ‘entitled to assistance,’ and correspondingly, there are those whose ‘duties’ are to provide such assistance. Extending principles of distributive justice to the global arena: global distributive justice … suggests that there are some entitlements of justice which have global scope and which also suggest that there are some duties of justice which have global scope. (Armstrong, 2012, p. 17) (emphasis in original) Although Samuel Freeman (2006a) asserts that global distributive justice requires the distribution of every available good to everyone, global distributive justice does not necessarily suggest that every principle of distributive justice is valid globally. But it suggests that at least some principles of distributive justice are valid globally (Armstrong, 2012, p. 18). If it is accepted that the worse-off and the worst-off are entitled to assistance, does the corresponding duty of assistance lie with individuals, collectives, states, or some other entities, and what sort of duty should it be? (Ibid.). No matter the entity the duty lies with, is it a duty of justice or a duty of charity? Comparatively, duties of justice are more demanding, while duties of charity or humanitarian duties are less demanding. Duties of justice ‘are more fundamental in their objective’ (Armstrong, 2012, p. 19) (emphasis in original) because they deal with the most pertinent issues such as the causal roles of moral agents and their corresponding responsibility, the justice-relationship between the haves and the have-nots and between the well-off and the worse-off. Unlike duties of justice, humanitarian duties are superficial because they posit that the well-off should help the worse-off not based on any justice-relationship but simply because both of them share a common humanity (Armstrong, 2012, p. 20). This infers that the well-off cannot be said to have played any role in the conditions that make the worse-off poor or even abjectly poor. More crucially, it implies that the well-off are only moved voluntarily by compassion to do the worse-off a favour. For these reasons, it can be argued that humanitarian duties attempt to address global distributive justice problems without dealing with the ‘how’ and ‘why’ the problems originated (Tan, 2004, p. 21). Nevertheless, that the duties of justice are fundamental, while humanitarian duties are superficial might not be the most helpful way to distinguish between the two. Arguably, the most helpful ways to distinguish between the two are that humanitarian duties are less stringent than duties of justice, and duties of justice are enforceable while humanitarian duties are not (Armstrong, 2012, p. 21). Duties of justice are more stringent to the extent that they can be enforced, while humanitarian duties are less stringent to the extent that they cannot be enforced. Here, stringency refers to the firmness of duties and the difficulty in avoiding such

Introduction 7 firm duties (Ibid.). While enforceability refers to the justifiability of compelling moral agents to perform certain duties in case the agents are unwilling to perform such duties (Armstrong, 2012, p. 22). So, moral agents will be required to perform their duties of justice even if they have to pay a high price for the performance (Miller, 2007, p. 248). Even if we successfully resolve the problem of justice versus humanitarian duties by opting for duties of justice or humanitarian duties, another ‘what sort of duties’ question arises: are they positive or negative duties? (Armstrong, 2012, p. 23). Positive duties are duties ‘to do something good,’ while negative duties are duties ‘not to do something that is bad’ (Rawls, 1971, p. 114). Negative duties are easier to justify than positive duties. Negative duties simply demand that we refrain from harming others. Although determining what constitutes ‘harming others’ is contentious. Also contentious is to what extent actions performed by moral agents ‘indirectly’ harm others. Positive duties are not necessarily dependent on the failure, previously, to respect negative duties. But to some extent in the global justice discourse, positive duties are based on the fact that some moral agents have previously failed to respect their negative duties. Because such agents failed not to do harm to others, consequently they have the duty to rectify their harm. If positive duties are only about rectifying the failure of negative duties, positive duties will not be very contentious. They are very contentious because they go further to argue that the well-off should assist the worse-off whether or not the well-off are responsible for the conditions that make the worse-off poor or abjectly poor. Onora O’Neill (1986) argues that insofar our decisions and actions affect other people, there is a connection between us that should be governed by duties of justice, especially principles of distributive justice. Nevertheless, while our negative duties to refrain from harming the poor may be readily accepted as duties of justice, it is not readily admissible that positive duties to the poor are duties of justice (Gilabert, 2005). But Simon Caney (2005) argues that global distributive justice can be justified on the same fundamental grounds on which domestic distributive justice is justified. For Caney (2005), domestic distributive justice rejects discrimination against fellow citizens not merely because they are fellow citizens but fundamentally because they are fellow humans and it is wrong to discriminate against fellow humans (p. 107). Since citizens and non-citizens are all humans, and fellow humans, the standard justifications of domestic distributive justice principles can equally serve as the standard justifications of global distributive justice principles. For Samuel Black (1991), to deny the above claim is to commit the fallacy of restricted universalism because of an argument for distributive justice: that ascribes rights and claims on the basis of certain universal attributes of persons, cannot at the same time restrict the grounds for those claims to a person’s membership or status within a given society. (Black, 1991, p. 357)

8  Introduction But even among political philosophers and political theorists who argue for global distributive justice, there is a perennial contention regarding the extent to which principles of distributive justice should be applied in terms of positive duties. On the one hand, minimalists think that principles of global distributive justice ought to be applied to global distributive inequality in order to meet the basic needs and rights of the economically worse-off (Armstrong, 2012, p. 34). ‘Once the basic needs and rights of the worseoff are satisfied, the remainder inequalities between the worse-off and the well-off are morally permissible’ (Abumere, 2016, p. 10). On the other hand, egalitarians think that meeting the basic needs and rights of the economically worse-off is insufficient. They say, given that most of the remainder economic inequalities are morally objectionable (Ibid.), we have a duty of justice to eradicate the remaining economic inequalities. In effect, the egalitarian argument is that inequalities are only permissible if they are not morally objectionable, and since most inequalities are morally objectionable, therefore most inequalities are not permissible. (Abumere, 2016, p. 9) David Miller simultaneously supports minimalism and opposes egalitarianism; for him, the only important thing is the existence of ‘a fair basis for global cooperation and that the global institutional order ensures that every society has enough opportunities to be able to develop’ (Abumere, 2016, p. 10). The distinction between duties of justice and duties of charity/humanitarian duties (the nature of duty) and the distinction between positive and negative duties (category of duty) are vital but minor distinctions. The distinctions between relational and non-relational approaches (the grounds of justice), cosmopolitanism and statism (the scope or extensity of justice) (Miller, 2007, p. 253) and minimalism and egalitarianism (the degree or intensity of justice) are the major distinctions. Assume we have accepted that principles of distributive justice are justifiable. Assume we have also accepted that principles of global distributive justice are justifiable. In other words, assume we have accepted that there are negative and positive duties which are not merely humanitarian duties but are duties of justice, and these duties of justice are global. Now, the pertinent question will be: why is global distributive justice justifiable, that is, on what grounds is global distributive justice based? On the one hand, in dealing with the above question, relationists base their arguments on the realities of our world (Armstrong, 2012, p. 25). Some relationists say the fact that we share certain institutions globally or are in certain ways bounded together globally means global distributive justice is justifiable. Other relationists say the fact that we do not share certain institutions globally or are not in certain ways bounded together globally means that global justice is unjustifiable (Ibid.). The relational approach

Introduction 9 emphasises the common relationships that bind subjects and agents of justice together (Maffettone, 2013, p. 127). For this approach, justice is based on the following desiderata. Generally, justice is member-based (Ibid.). Specifically, a subject or agent of justice must be part of a relationship. Failure to be part of the relationship means you do not have rights and duties within that relationship. In other words, you do not owe those who are part of that relationship any duty and they do not owe you any duty within the confines or jurisdiction of that relationship. On the other hand, in answering the above question, non-relationists base their arguments on the realities of human nature. They say that global distributive justice is justifiable because of ‘what we share simply by virtue of being humans’ (Ibid.). For the non-relational approach, the conception of justice is not dependent on any relationship between the subjects and agents of justice (Sangiovanni, 2007). It is not based on any special relationship such as compatriotism, citizenship, and so on. For the non-relational approach, the conception of justice can be based on humanity, basic human needs, natural prerogatives and sufferance, etc. (Ibid.).

The scope or extensity of justice The discussion in the preceding sub-chapter is aimed at giving the reader an overview of the global justice debate; it overviews the contentious arguments which will be dealt with in detail in the rest of the book. It is in the remainder of the book that how the issues discussed in the preceding sub-chapter fit into statism and cosmopolitanism will be evident, and it is in the remainder of the book that I show how statists and cosmopolitans use such issues to argue for one theory and against the other theory. In the current sub-chapter, I juxtapose cosmopolitanism with statism in order to give the reader insights into the cosmopolitan and statist discourse and then elucidate those insights in detail. Given the various strands and tenets of cosmopolitanism and statism, attempting to provide super-definitions for cosmopolitanism and statism is always problematic. The best approach is to explicate cosmopolitanism and statism such that the various strands and tenets are covered by the explications. These explications of cosmopolitanism and statism are general construal rather than super-definitions! Summing up the various strands and tenets, generally, cosmopolitanism is a theory of global justice which says that ‘all persons stand in certain moral relations to one another; we are required to respect one another’s status as ultimate units of moral concern’ (Pogge, 1992, p. 49). The crux of this construal is that all persons have equal moral worth and deserve equal moral consideration no matter their geographical location, political constituency, economic status, religious belief or social affiliation and otherwise. Although cosmopolitanism can be conceived as relational cosmopolitanism or non-relational cosmopolitanism, legal cosmopolitanism or moral

10  Introduction cosmopolitanism, and interactional moral cosmopolitanism or institutional moral cosmopolitanism (Pogge, 2010, pp. 114–115), the elements in the above construal are the core that makes a cosmopolitan strand or variant cosmopolitan. This construal is merely an operational construal! This operational construal is meant to give the reader an insight into what cosmopolitanism entails. On statism, I note that there are different strands of statism. For instance, Hobbesian statism says justice is totally inapplicable to the international realm. Rawlsian statism sees justice at the international realm as only existing between peoples.2 Nagelian statism says we can only plausibly talk about and practically have charity rather than justice on the international level. There are other strands apart from the aforementioned ones. Summing up the various strands and tenets, generally, statism is a theory of global justice which on the one hand says that in the state, justice is simultaneously theoretically plausible, practicably realisable and in fact a necessary element (Abumere, 2016, p. 21). On the other hand and more crucially, it conversely holds that either justice is simultaneously theoretically implausible, practicably unrealisable and in fact not an element in the global system; or justice is only partially theoretically plausible, partially practicably realisable and in fact only partially an element in the global system. While some statists hold the first, strong or radical view, others hold the second, weak or moderate view. What I said about the construal of cosmopolitanism in the preceding paragraph is entirely true of this construal of statism. This construal is merely an operational construal! This operational construal is meant to give the reader an insight into what statism entails. Although each cosmopolitan and statist has her specific arguments for supporting cosmopolitanism or statism, such particular arguments are derivatives of the general arguments that divide cosmopolitanism and statism. Statism is based on special relationship and the basic structure. It is apt to say it is, firstly, based on the special relationship and, secondly, on the basic structure. On the one hand, and more importantly, it is based on the vertical relationship that exists between the state (sovereign) and the citizens. On the other hand, it is based on the horizontal relationship among the citizens. Combining both relationships, statism is based on the relationship that exists within the state among the members (including the sovereign) of the state. This special relationship, in other words, is the special and primary cooperation within a state that separates a state and its members from any other special and primary cooperation of other states and their members, and the general and secondary cooperation that might exist on one level among states and on another level among different members of different states. The special relationship is the special and primary cooperation that necessitates the basic structure. Thus, statism is based on the basic structure that exists within the state and which helps the state to determine the just and fair distribution of the rights and obligations and the advantages

Introduction 11 and disadvantages within the aforementioned cooperation. In other words, the state is a vehicle of social cooperation, whereas the world as a whole lacks this characteristic. In this Rawlsian basic structure, in order to protect the inviolability of persons, the state has mechanisms which ensure that the separateness of individuals is respected and the advantages and disadvantages resulting from the social cooperation of persons are fairly distributed (Rawls, 1999a, p. 258). For statists, the vertical relationship between the state and citizens and the horizontal relationships among citizens are unique and essential thereby making states the prominent institutions. They see the socio-political structures and conditions of the state as different from those that obtain on the global level. Hence, they conclude that the moral requirements that ‘should’ be demanded within the state are different from any moral requirements, if at all there is any, that ‘may’ be demanded on the global level. However, cosmopolitans reject the above argument. They deny the prominence of the state. They argue that the so-called prominence of the state is a mere description of ‘what is’ rather than a moral prescription of ‘what ought to be.’ For them, our relationships as humans should have precedence over our relationships as citizens. Furthermore, they argue that the conditions that obtain within the state also obtain largely on the global level. Thus, moral demands and requirements applicable within the state should also be applicable to the global level. Statism maintains the special nature of the state among human associations and, on such basis, regards citizenship or membership of state as the only, or at least the major, important relation. Statists think only states have this sort of special relation. To argue for this position, statists rely on different arguments such as the coercion argument, the reciprocity argument and the framing argument (Maffettone, 2013, p. 129). Many statists argue for their position on the grounds of coercion and cooperation. While some statists base their arguments on cooperation or the horizontal relationship among citizens, others base their arguments on coercion or the vertical relationship between the state and citizens (Nagel, 2005). Those who argue on the ground of coercion understand the basic structure as a coercive apparatus, while those who argue on the ground of cooperation understand the basic structure as a cooperative apparatus (Blake & Smith, 2013). For statists like John Rawls, Michael Blake, Thomas Nagel, Samuel Freeman and Mathias Risse, the presence of political-legal coercion within the state and the absence of politico-legal coercion on the global level make principles of distributive justice ‘more demanding requirements’ within the state (Blake, 2001). Although this does not mean that there can be no principles of global distributive justice, it does mean that such principles will be ‘less demanding requirements’ and secondary. Such principles will be akin to those Rawls (1999b) argued for in The Law of Peoples, for instance, a duty of assistance to burdened societies, remedying cases of severe poverty and gross violation of human rights (pp. 105–106). While for Rawls, Blake, Risse

12  Introduction and Freeman this will count as a duty of justice, for Nagel (2005, p. 118) it is a mere humanitarian duty or duty of charity (Blake & Smith, 2013). Cosmopolitans have also adopted the coercive and cooperative apparatuses arguments to argue for their position. But unlike statists who tend to stress the coercive apparatus argument more than the cooperative apparatus argument, cosmopolitans tend to stress the cooperative apparatus argument more than the coercive apparatus argument (Ibid.). Some cosmopolitans argue that the mechanism of coercion is not exclusive to the domestic realm. They argue that coercion also comes in other forms such as when states, through immigration policies, restrict non-citizens from entry (Abizadeh, 2007), and when powerful states interfere in the internal affairs of less powerful states through military, political, economic, covert or overt operations (Cavallero, 2010). They argue that even if the form and extent of coercion at the global realm are somewhat different from that of the domestic realm, there is enough coercion at the global realm to warrant global distributive justice. To exemplify the above claim, Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel (2009) argue that: states cooperated to form the World Trade Organisation (WTO); the WTO acts in the name of states; the activities of the WTO are those of the states; the WTO coerces its members and failure to comply with such coercion leads to terrible economic consequences. For Cohen and Sabel (2009), since leaving is not a practical option for its members, and since remaining in it means its members are under coercion, consequently there is a direct relationship of coercion between the WTO and citizens of member states. This also applies to the relationships between other similar international organisations and citizens of member states (Ibid.). Arguing that the sort of cooperation (horizontal relationship) among citizens within the state also exists on the global level, cosmopolitans frequently cite globalisation, especially the intensity and extensity of cross-border economic activities such as trade, as representing such cooperation. But Brian Barry (1982) argues that such trade is merely economically beneficial to the trading partners rather than creating a single cooperative unit which necessitates the sort of cooperating relationship within the state (p. 233). Nevertheless, the implication of the cosmopolitan argument is that inasmuch as some statists argue for domestic distributive justice and argue against global distributive justice on the ground of coercion, if it can be shown that there is coercion at the global realm, then there should be global distributive justice. There are other variants of both statist and cosmopolitan arguments. Among others, such variants include Andrea Sangiovanni’s, Darrel Moellendorf’s, Amartya Sen’s, Peter Singer’s, egalitarian cosmopolitans,’ and so on. Sangiovanni (2007) argues that reciprocity gives rise to a legitimate demand for the principles of distributive justice, and consequently distributive justice duties (pp. 19–20). For him, as long as individuals are involved in the collective provision of goods and services, they are owed

Introduction 13 the duty of reciprocity in order for them to benefit from the goods and services which they are involved in providing. So, to the extent and in the aspects that global economic activities are a collective provision of goods and services, it is to that extent and in those aspects that principles of global distributive justice are applicable (Ibid.). Consequently, individuals are globally owed the duty of reciprocity to the extent and in the aspects they contribute to global economic activities that are the collective provision of goods and services. Moellendorf (2011), in what he terms the principle of associational justice, argues that as long as individuals are co-members of an association that is relatively strong and largely non-voluntary, and if this association is part of the foundational rules that determine how the members publicly relate to one another, and the rules governing the association can be controlled by persons, then this association is subject to the principles of distributive justice. For him, as long as and to the extent that the international system resembles this association, there can be global distributive justice. For Sen (2009), there are two main reasons for arguing that distributive justice should not be limited to the state (p. 402). The first reason is that in order to avoid bias and be fair to others, we have to consider the interests of other people as relevant as our own interests. The second reason is that in order to avoid a narrow mindset that is focused on a local area, and in order to widen the scope of what we consider to be relevant principles of distributive justice, we need to consider other people’s perspectives as relevant. In domestic distributive justice, egalitarian cosmopolitans argue that it is unjust for a person’s life prospects to be substantially affected by the circumstances – class, religion, ethnicity, etc. – into which she/he is born. Extending this argument to global distributive justice, egalitarian cosmopolitans argue ‘that it is unjust for a person’s life prospects to be substantially affected by the country into which he or she is born’ (Altman & Wellman, 2009, p. 123). For egalitarian cosmopolitans, a person’s circumstances of birth, whether socio-economic class or country, is simply an accident, hence should not be allowed to determine the life prospects of that person. My construal of cosmopolitanism, as already presented, is neither utilitarian nor in line with Peter Singer’s (1972). While the utilitarian or Singer’s conception of cosmopolitanism seems far from mainstream cosmopolitanism, it is still worth considering. Singer, being a utilitarian, based his cosmopolitan global justice argument on the principle of utility. His concern is how to maximise utility. In other words, he is concerned with how to maximise ‘pleasure’ and minimise ‘pain.’ For him, it does not matter whether persons are members of the same state or not, whether they are party to the same basic structure or not, whether they are under the same coercive apparatus or not, and whether they are part of the same cooperative apparatus or not. For him, the well-off anywhere have a duty of global distributive justice to the worse-off anywhere. Because if we can prevent any morally bad thing

14  Introduction from happening without sacrificing anything that is of equal moral importance to what we are preventing, then we have the moral duty to prevent such bad thing from happening. In consideration of counter-cosmopolitan arguments, cosmopolitanism as a theory of global justice does not only have its main opponent in statism but also in nationalism which is akin to statism in that sometimes their arguments are the same and at other times they are at least related. For this reason, the hurdle of nationalism is one that cosmopolitanism must cross alongside the hurdle of statism. Putting all of the nationalist arguments together, the crux of the nationalist arguments is that the national unit is special and, therefore, deserves special treatment (Kymlicka, 1995a; 1995b). The consequence is that while it is logical and appropriate to have domestic distributive justice, the same cannot be said of global distributive justice (Ibid.). In other words, shared national relationships make domestic distributive justice practical and possible. But global distributive justice, as conceived by cosmopolitans, is not rooted in any such relationship. Hence, it is merely theoretical (Walzer, 1983). Generally, the differences between statists and cosmopolitans are as follows: • • • • •

They do not agree on which institutions and established rules and practices give rise to distributive justice (Blake & Smith, 2013). They do not agree on when exactly principles of distributive justice should be activated given particular institutions and established rules and practices. They do not agree on which particular principles of justice should be activated given certain institutions and established rules and practices. They do not agree on the nature of relevant principles of distributive justice given certain institutions and established rules and practices. Finally, they do not agree on the extent of applicable principles of distributive justice given certain institutions and established rules and practices.

Despite the differences between statists and cosmopolitans, there are some similarities between statists and cosmopolitans in a general sense. Both statists and cosmopolitans agree that institutions, and established rules and practices emanating from them, give rise to both a legitimate demand for distributive justice and, consequently, duties of distributive justice (Ibid.). Both statists and cosmopolitans agree that the mutual or collective participation of people in institutions and established rules and practices that are distribution-related automatically triggers principles of distributive justice. Consequently, statists and cosmopolitans generally agree on the following clauses. First, the presence of a basic structure triggers distributive justice. Second, the absence of a basic structure nullifies distributive justice. Third, the nature of a basic structure determines the nature

Introduction 15 of the principles of distributive justice that will be relevant. Fourth, the extent of a basic structure determines the extent of applicable principles of distributive justice (Ibid.). Considering the above differences and similarities between the cosmopolitan theory and the statist theory, there are various ways to seek a resolution of the dilemma the two theories present us. We can opt for an extreme position in which we say the cosmopolitan theory is completely right, while the statist theory is completely wrong. Alternatively, we can opt for another extreme position in which we say the statist theory is completely right, while the cosmopolitan theory is completely wrong. These two positions have some elements of contradiction within them. To say that cosmopolitanism is completely wrong while statism is completely right, or that cosmopolitanism is completely right while statism is completely wrong, is contradictory because of the similarities between the two theories. Therefore, to hold any of the above positions is to deny that there are any similarities between the two theories. An extreme position is to argue that both the cosmopolitan and the statist theories are completely wrong. For anyone who argues in this manner, the onus will be on her to present a theory of global justice that will be completely different from both the cosmopolitan and the statist theories and yet be plausible and practicable. Surely, this is more than a Herculean task! The reverse position is to argue that both the cosmopolitan and the statist theories are totally right. This is sheer relativism! Another way to argue for the relativism position is to say that the cosmopolitan theory is neither necessarily right nor necessarily wrong; it depends on what we say it is. And the statist theory is neither necessarily right, nor necessarily wrong; it depends on what we say it is. This is based on the argument that global justice ‘is what we make of it.’ If we say the cosmopolitan theory is right, then it is right. If we say it is wrong, then it is wrong. And if we say the statist theory is right, then it is right. If we say it is wrong, then it is wrong. There is a position which says that the cosmopolitan theory is totally right, while the statist theory is only partially right and partially wrong. This position says the statist theory is right to the extent it is similar to the cosmopolitan theory, and the statist theory is wrong to the extent it differs from the cosmopolitan theory. The reverse of this position says the statist theory is totally right, while the cosmopolitan theory is only partially right and partially wrong. This argument says the cosmopolitan theory is right to the extent it is similar to the statist theory, and the cosmopolitan theory is wrong to the extent it differs from the statist theory. The reverses of the above two positions are, firstly, to say that the cosmopolitan theory is completely wrong, while the statist theory is only partially wrong and partially right. The statist theory is only wrong to the extent it is similar to the cosmopolitan theory, and the statist theory is right to the extent it differs from the cosmopolitan theory. Secondly, the other reverse position is to say that the statist theory is completely wrong, while the cosmopolitan theory is only

16  Introduction partially wrong and partially right. The cosmopolitan theory is only wrong to the extent it is similar to the statist theory, and the cosmopolitan theory is right to the extent it differs from the statist theory. Among the above positions, statists have opted for mixed-positions. All statists argue that statism is completely right. However, some argue that cosmopolitanism is completely wrong, while others argue that cosmopolitanism is only partially right and partially wrong. The former argue that cosmopolitanism is completely wrong because they see no similarities between cosmopolitanism and statism. The latter, who see both similarities and differences between cosmopolitanism and statism, argue that cosmopolitanism is only right to the extent it is similar to statism, and cosmopolitanism is wrong to the extent it differs from statism. Like statists, cosmopolitans have also opted for mixed-positions among the above positions. They all argue that cosmopolitanism is completely right. However, some argue that statism is completely wrong, while others argue that statism is only partially right and partially wrong. The former argue that statism is completely wrong because they see no similarities between statism and cosmopolitanism. The latter, who see both similarities and differences between statism and cosmopolitanism, argue that statism is only right to the extent it is similar to cosmopolitanism, and statism is wrong to the extent it differs from cosmopolitanism. In addition, among cosmopolitans, there is a division between legal cosmopolitans and moral cosmopolitans. The dichotomy between moral cosmopolitanism and legal cosmopolitanism has been vanishing since the past half century. This is not because both sides are reaching common grounds. It is because moral cosmopolitanism has been in the ascendant, while legal cosmopolitanism has been in decline. Legal cosmopolitanism is not only in relative decline, but it is also in absolute decline. Legal cosmopolitanism defends ‘a concrete political ideal of a global order in which all persons have equivalent legal rights and duties, that is, are fellow citizens of a universal republic’ (Pogge, 1992, p. 49). Moral cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, argues ‘that all persons stand in certain moral relations to one another; we are required to respect one another’s status as ultimate units of moral concern’ (Ibid.). I shall concentrate on moral cosmopolitanism rather than legal cosmopolitanism for reasons I outline below. The major criticism levelled at legal cosmopolitanism is that it is committed to a universal republic – a world government which: would either be a global despotism or else would rule over a fragile empire torn by frequent civil strife as various regions and peoples tried to gain their political freedom and autonomy. (Kant, quoted in Rawls, 1999b, p. 36) For this reason, legal cosmopolitanism is seen as unrealistically utopian, intellectually implausible and practically unfeasible. Although in

Introduction 17 international law and political science, legal cosmopolitanism is not utopian because it is not committed to a world government. The international law version of legal cosmopolitanism is different from the political philosophy and political theory version. However, here, I am dealing with the political philosophy and political theory version rather than the international law version of legal cosmopolitanism. In a strict sense, legal cosmopolitanism is utopian as long as it is the political philosophy and political theory version. Alongside the above criticism, another problem is that, as we know, that which is legal is not always necessarily morally right and that which is morally right is not always necessarily legal. For instance, in legal parlance, when that which is legal, say a judgement, is not morally right, it is said to be procedural justice and not substantive justice. During the holocaust in Nazi-ruled Germany, it was legal for Nazis to kill Jews but immoral. While it was legal to own slaves and sell slaves, and even abuse slaves – after all, slavery itself is an abuse, the very nature of slavery is inherently dehumanising in many ways and in many cases – today it is widely accepted that slavery is immoral. Also, apartheid in South Africa, Jim Crow laws in the United States of America, and similar racial segregations were legal but today widely accepted as immoral. In view of resource curse, the main problem concerning oil extraction and trade is not illegality but immorality. Many condemnable practices and activities in the extraction and trade are very legal but are very deplorable too. The conception of cosmopolitanism as legal cosmopolitanism will rather help justify such practices. Moral cosmopolitanism itself is divided into interactional moral cosmopolitanism and institutional moral cosmopolitanism. According to Pogge (2010), institutional moral cosmopolitanism allocates indirect responsibility for the fulfilment of human rights to institutional schemes, while interactional moral cosmopolitanism allocates ‘direct responsibility for the fulfilment of human rights to other individual or collective agents’ (p. 115). In other words, on the one hand, the former postulates certain second-order fundamental principles of justice which apply to institutional schemes; ‘standards for assessing the ground rules and practices that regulate human interactions’ (Pogge, 1992, p. 50). While on the other hand, the latter puts forward certain first-order fundamental normative principles which bypass states and directly apply to the actions and omissions of persons and groups (Ibid.). In the frame of interactional cosmopolitanism, the holders of duties will all be humans and must be in a position to be able to carry out the duties. Correspondingly, ‘human right(s) … will be right(s) whose beneficiaries are all humans and whose holders are all humans in a position to effect the right(s)’ (Luban, 1985, p. 209). Furthermore, in the frame of interactional cosmopolitanism, ‘human rights impose constraints on conducts,’ while in the frame of institutional cosmopolitanism, human rights ‘impose constraints upon shared practices’ (Pogge, 1992, pp. 50–51). Despite the difference between institutional and interactional cosmopolitanism, Pogge (1992)

18  Introduction says they are not mutually exclusive, hence, it is possible to combine the two (p. 50). As an example of the successful combination of institutional and interactional cosmopolitanism, Pogge refers to the work of Rawls – although Rawls is by no means a cosmopolitan. Starting with what Pogge deems institutional cosmopolitan arguments, Rawls defends ‘a natural duty to uphold and promote just institutions’ (Ibid.). Then, combining this with what Pogge deems interactional cosmopolitan argument, Rawls also defends different types of natural duties which are not dependent on shared institutions. These natural duties include the duty of mutual assistance, the duty of the avoidance of harm and brutality, the duty of the establishment of just institutions where they are lacking, and so on (Ibid.). As already mentioned, although there are legal cosmopolitanism and moral cosmopolitanism, my focus is on the latter rather than the former or rather than both. Likewise, although there are interactional moral cosmopolitanism and institutional moral cosmopolitanism, I shall deal with moral cosmopolitanism holistically. In addition, although there are different strands of statism, I shall deal with statism holistically. Although I will be dealing with the theories holistically, some of the theorists deserve honourable mentions because of the enormous impact they have on the global justice debate. Therefore, in the next sub-chapter, I will give them their honourable mentions.

The complexity of global justice Honourable mentions Some theorists have an enormous impact on the global justice debate because they pioneered the contemporary debate. Some have an enormous impact because they changed the course of the debate. Yet there are other theorists, who neither pioneered the debate nor changed the course of the debate, yet have some impact – even if it is not enormous – because they attempt to provide alternatives to the existing theories. I think all these theorists – the pioneers, the course-changers and the alternative-providers – have helped the cause of global justice by their contributions. They deserve, and will receive, honourable mentions. Nevertheless, no theorist is receiving any prize because I remain convinced that neither cosmopolitanism nor statism is sufficient for the theorisation about global justice. On the honourable mentions list, John Rawls and Thomas Nagel are representatives of statists, while Charles Beit and Thomas Pogge are representatives of cosmopolitans. Rawls’ The Law of Peoples (1999b) is arguably the most important work on statism in the last century. One might contend that Rawls is not a statist, but I hold a contrary view. Samuel Freeman (2009) argues that ‘Rawls’s recognition of the duty to assist burdened peoples … renders his Law of Peoples a so-called “weak” cosmopolitan position’ (p. 439). When taken sui generis, read in isolation or

Introduction 19 understood out of context, the duty of assistance can easily make one think that Rawls is a weak cosmopolitan. However, I think within the context of The Law of Peoples what the duty of assistance makes Rawls is not a weak cosmopolitan but rather a weak statist. On the one hand, since there is no contention whether Nagel is a statist or a cosmopolitan or whether he is a weak statist or a weak cosmopolitan, and since there is no contention whether Beitz and Pogge are cosmopolitans or statists or whether they are weak cosmopolitans or weak statists, I will not dwell a lot on them in this chapter, I will dwell a lot on them in the contexts in which they are most required, for instance, Beitz in Chapter 2 and Pogge in Chapter 4. On the other hand, I think it will be helpful to give a detailed presentation of Rawls’ Law of Peoples in order to dispel the assumption that he is a cosmopolitan, even if a weak cosmopolitan, and to prove that he is a statist, even though a weak statist. A detailed presentation of Rawls’ position on global justice is essential because, as earlier mentioned, arguably, Rawls can be seen as originating the contemporary debate on global justice (Blake & Smith, 2013) which has pitted statists against cosmopolitans. Rawls’ justice as fairness principles, especially the difference principle, reinvigorated or even determined the course of the global justice debate. Alfred North Whitehead (1979) may be right or wrong that, ‘The safest general characterisation of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato’ (p. 39). Nevertheless, that Rawls originated the contemporary debate on global justice does not make Rawls the Plato of global justice and it certainly does not equate the global justice discourse with a footnote to Rawls. Rawls’ law of peoples Robert Nozick (1999), admitting the revolutionising effect of A Theory of Justice (1971), says political philosophers and political theorists will have to work within Rawls’ framework or they will have to explain why they choose not to work within the framework (p. 183). Just as A Theory of Justice revolutionises how political philosophers and political theorists think about (domestic) distributive justice, so too (although to a lesser extent) The Law of Peoples (1999b) revolutionises how political philosophers and political theorists think about global justice. However, The Law of Peoples is an elaboration of Rawls’ view on global justice which he first expressed in A Theory of Justice. A key characteristic of the Law of Peoples is that it is a realistic utopia. In Rawls’s (1999b) words, the scenario described in the Law of Peoples is realistic because ‘it could and may exist. I say it is also utopian and highly desirable because it joins reasonableness and justice with conditions enabling citizens to realise their fundamental interests’ (p. 7). In other words, it is realistic in that it accommodates the real situation of our world, it deals with people, institutions and the world as they are, and it is actually practicable or can be

20  Introduction applied to international political structures of our world. It is also utopian because it points to what international political arrangements ought to be. The Law of Peoples is geared towards showing ‘how a world society of liberal and decent peoples might be possible’ (Maffettone, 2010, p. 293). In other words, The Law of Peoples is geared towards the formulation of the framework of the foreign policy of well-ordered peoples. So it is no surprise that the model, in terms of methodology, Rawls uses in The Law of Peoples is the one he first used in Political Liberalism (Ibid.). The difference is that while in Political Liberalism the model is used for domestic liberal democracies, in the Law of Peoples the model is used in the international relations of well-ordered societies. The Law of Peoples is divided into four parts. The first and second parts deal with the ideal theory. The third part deals with non-ideal theory. The fourth part is the conclusion. Also, to the book itself – The Law of Peoples – rather than to the theory, ‘Law of Peoples,’ Rawls added another part titled ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited.’ In terms of methodological procedure, in the Law of Peoples, Rawls started from ideal theory and then proceeded to non-ideal theory. The ideal theory explicates the theory of the Law of Peoples. While the non-ideal theory deals with just war doctrine (jus ad bellum and jus in bello), outlaw states, burdened societies and global distributive justice. According to Rawls (1999b), ‘By the “Law of Peoples” I mean a particular political conception of right and justice that applies to the principles of right and justice and norms of international law and practice’ (p. 3) (emphasis in original). He distinguishes among reasonable liberal people, decent people, outlaw states, burdened societies and benevolent absolutisms. Reasonable liberal people and decent people are referred to as well-ordered peoples (Rawls, 1999b, pp. 63, 92–93). But outlaw states, burdened societies and benevolent absolutisms lack the moral characteristics of well-ordered peoples, hence they are not well-ordered. By definition or description, reasonable liberal people are liberal democracies. Decent people are people who, although do not qualify as liberal people, are externally neither aggressive nor expansionist, and internally respect human rights (pp. 4–5). Outlaw states are expansionist and aggressive, internally they meet no requirements of well-ordered peoples and externally they threaten the peace of others. Burdened societies, unlike outlaw states, are neither expansionist nor aggressive. Nevertheless, they lack the means to be well-ordered due to unfavourable historical, social, cultural, political and economic factors (Rawls, 1999b, p. 106). While benevolent absolutisms respect most human rights but do not allow their members any significant participation in the process of political decision-making. Hence they are not well-ordered (Rawls, 1999b, p. 63). Rawls’ focus was on liberal people. So, compared to how he dealt with liberal people, he sparingly dealt with other categories. Although Rawls devotes a reasonable amount of time to dealing with decent people, he mainly does so to show how liberal people should relate to decent people.

Introduction 21 To show how such relationships should be, Kazanistan, a decent hierarchical people, is given as an example of decent people. Even outlaw states were only sparingly dealt with (Maffettone, 2010, p. 294). He mainly dealt with outlaw states in terms of the grounds on which liberal and decent peoples should intervene in outlaw states. Furthermore, he mainly dealt with burdened societies in terms of the grounds on which they should be helped by liberal and decent peoples. Finally, apart from telling us what benevolent absolutisms are, he did not go into details to deal with them. To liberal peoples, Rawls assigns three fundamental characteristics: they have ‘a reasonably just constitutional democratic government,’ they are ‘citizens united by common sympathies’ and they have ‘a moral nature’ (Rawls, 1999b, p. 87). Although decent peoples are considered to be well-ordered, they are still not (thoroughly) liberal because they fail to guarantee all, but only guarantee some, of the human rights that liberal people guarantee (Maffettone, 2010, p. 302). Internationally they are neither aggressive nor expansionist, and domestically they: respect human rights and impose certain moral duties on all individuals through a system that, being governed according to a broadly shared conception of the good, administers justice in a reasonable egalitarian way. (Maffettone, 2010, p. 301) While the above qualities qualify decent peoples to be called decent, yet they are not qualified to be called liberal. The enforcement of rights is not only what makes liberal peoples distinctive. They only go to war in extreme or ‘urgent’ cases (particularly against out-law states), for example, in cases of self-defence and extreme violation of human rights and principles. And they have a duty of assistance to burdened societies. Rawls does not consider burdened societies to be outlaw states because they are neither aggressive nor expansionist. However, since they lack the necessary conditions to become well-ordered, well-ordered people have a duty of assistance to assist them in order for them to be well-ordered. In other words, burdened societies are to be helped by liberal and decent peoples in providing the necessary conditions that will help them qualify to be part of well-ordered peoples (Maffettone, 2010, p. 307). Finally, the ultimate goal or the long-term project of the Law of Peoples is to eliminate such evils as unjust wars, genocide, mass extermination, starvation, abject poverty, religious bigotry, violation of liberty of conscience and all forms of oppression (Rawls, 1999b, pp. 6–7). For Rawls, since these evils are products of political injustice, the elimination of political injustice – especially the worst forms of political injustice – will help in eliminating these evils. But for political injustice to be eliminated, just social policies, or decent social policies at least, must be followed and just social institutions, or decent social institutions at least, must be established (Ibid.).

22  Introduction The foreign policy of liberal people ensures that they follow just social policies and establish just social institutions. While the foreign policy of decent people ensures that they at least follow decent social policies and establish decent social institutions. Hence, liberal people and decent people are committed to eliminating political injustice and ultimately the aforementioned evils (Rawls, 1999b, pp. 105–106). Given that the Law of Peoples is not about outlaw states, burdened societies and benevolent absolutisms, but rather about well-ordered people especially liberal people, with the particular aim of the derivation of principles that will guide their international affairs, especially the foreign policy of liberal people, Rawls’ first focus was on liberal peoples. To derive the principles that will determine or guide the international relations of liberal people, he had recourse to his notion of the original position. Albeit, in this case, he has two original positions rather than one. The first is the familiar one which is applicable to domestic democratic liberal societies. In this first original position, representatives of individuals or citizens behind the veil of ignorance choose impartial principles that will govern the affairs of their domestic liberal people (Rawls, 1999b, p. 31). In the second original position, as postulated in the Law of Peoples, the representatives of peoples stand behind a veil of ignorance to choose the principles that will govern foreign relations, and to choose the organisations that will facilitate different aspects of foreign relations. Furthermore, Rawls argues that decent peoples would choose the same principles and organisations chosen by liberal peoples. Hence the third original position in which representatives of decent peoples stand behind a veil of ignorance to choose the principles that will govern their foreign relations and to choose the organisations that will facilitate different aspects of foreign relations. In summary, there are three original positions. The first original position is the domestic one for liberal democratic people in which individuals or citizens are represented. The second original position is the international one for liberal peoples in which peoples, rather than individuals or citizens, are represented. While the third original position is the international one in which decent peoples are represented. He refers to the first original position as the ‘first use’ of the original position, while he refers to the second original position as the ‘second use’ of the original position (Rawls, 1999b, p. 40). Given that the third original position or the ‘third use’ is merely an extension of the second original position or the ‘second use,’ Rawls would continue to refer to the first and second original positions or the first and second uses without reference to the third original position or the third use. So, hereafter, I shall do likewise. In establishing the Law of Peoples, Rawls (1999b) says we start: with principles of political justice for the basic structure of a closed and self-contained liberal democratic society. We then model the parties in

Introduction 23 a second but appropriate original position in which, as representatives of equal peoples, they select the principles of the law of peoples for the society of well-ordered peoples. (p. 86) In this second original position, Rawls argued that both liberal and decent peoples would accept the same Law of Peoples. But some differences between the first and second uses of the original position are glaring. While individuals are the subject of the first use of the original position, peoples are the subject of the second use of the original position – albeit peoples are represented by their representatives who of course are individuals. Also, while the first use of the original position is in the domestic context, the second use of the original position is in the international context. More importantly, as Rawls (1999b) notes, there are three key differences between the first and second uses of the original position: 1 A people of a constitutional democracy has, as a liberal people, no comprehensive doctrine of the good … whereas individual citizens within a liberal domestic society do have such conceptions, and to deal with their needs as citizens, the idea of primary goods is used. 2 A peoples’ fundamental interests as a people are specified by its political conception of justice and the principles in the light of which they agree to the Law of Peoples, whereas citizens’ fundamental interests are given by their conception of the good and their realising to an adequate degree their two moral powers. 3 The parties in the second original position select among different formulations or interpretations of the eight principles of the Law of Peoples as illustrated for the restrictions of the two powers of sovereignty (p. 40). Consequently, on the one hand, the first original position allows room for individuals to choose from alternative principles of justice in which justice as fairness is an alternative. On the other hand, the second original position does not present representatives of peoples with different alternatives to choose from apart from different formulations of the Law of Peoples (Rawls, 1999b, pp. 39–40). Furthermore, just as he rejects utilitarianism in the first original position, so too he rejects utilitarianism in the second original position. While he argues that individuals in the first original position will choose justice as fairness rather than utilitarianism or any other principle of justice, he does not present utilitarianism as an alternative – not even as an implausible, irrational or unreasonable alternative – to the eight principles of the Law of Peoples (Maffettone, 2010, p. 300). Although Rawls allows that some other principles can be added to the eight principles which he said will be chosen in the second use of the original position, he holds that his eight principles will be chosen. In deriving the principles, just as: ‘in examining the distributive principles in justice as fairness, we begin with the baseline of equality,’ in examining the principles

24  Introduction of Law of Peoples we also begin with equality but ‘the equality of and the equal rights of all peoples’ (Rawls, 1999b, p. 41). The principles are: 1 Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be respected by other peoples. 2 Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings. 3 Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them. 4 Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention. 5 Peoples have the right to self-defence but no right to instigate war for reasons other than self-defence. 6 Peoples are to honour human rights. 7 Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war. 8 Peoples have the duty to assist other peoples living under unfavourable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime (Rawls, 1999b, p. 37). Since I am dealing with global distributive justice rather than other sorts of global justice, rather than focus on other aspects of the Law of Peoples I shall focus on the eighth principle namely: ‘Peoples have the duty to assist other peoples living under unfavourable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime’ (Ibid.); or in short the ‘duty of assistance’ (Rawls, 1999b, p. 106). Rawls (1999b) says following a principle of distributive justice to address social and economic inequalities in societies is not necessarily the only way or even the best option to choose when well-ordered peoples are carrying out their duty of assistance towards burdened societies. For him, the problem with principles of distributive justice is that most of them do not have a particular aim or threshold at which assistance will stop (Rawls, 1999b, p. 106). Remember the reason for assistance is that burdened societies lack the necessary and sufficient conditions to be well-ordered, and well-ordered people are to help provide those conditions. So once those conditions are met, the assistance should stop. According to Rawls (1999b), on the contrast between cosmopolitanism and the Law of Peoples, it is this threshold that differentiates the Law of Peoples from cosmopolitanism (p. 120). To illustrate the problem with cosmopolitan principles of global distributive justice, Rawls imagines two hypothetical scenarios. In the first hypothetical scenario, two societies, say, society A and society B, started off with the same amount of resources or wealth at the same threshold. Since societies A and B are either liberal or decent, they are both well-governed. Society A industrialises and maximises its savings, but society B remains agrarian and engages in a life of leisure. Hence, after some decades, society A’s wealth doubles that of society B. According to Rawls (1999b), global distributive justice or cosmopolitanism would demand that society A should be

Introduction 25 redistributing its wealth to society B until society B becomes as wealthy as society A (p. 107). For him, this is wrong. Hence, the Law of Peoples, rather than cosmopolitanism, should be opted for. In other words, the eighth principle or duty of assistance, rather than global distributive justice, should be opted for. In the second hypothetical scenario, two societies, say, society A and society B, started off with the same amount of resources or wealth at the same threshold. Since societies A and B are either liberal or decent, they are both well-governed. Both societies have rather high population growth. And both societies respect the human rights of women or provide the elements of equal justice for them. Society A stresses these human rights or elements of justice so that its women flourish economically and politically. This leads to a lower birth rate per woman which in turn drives the population growth to zero. Hence, society A is able to increase its level of wealth in the long run. But society B’s population growth was not reduced because its women cherish certain religious beliefs and social values which encourage a high birth rate. So, after some decades, society A’s wealth doubles that of society B (Rawls, 1999b, pp. 117–118). According to Rawls (1999b), global distributive justice or cosmopolitanism would demand that society A should be redistributing its wealth to society B until society B becomes as wealthy as society A (p. 107). Again, for Rawls, this is wrong. Hence, the Law of Peoples, rather than cosmopolitanism, should be opted for. In other words, the eighth principle or duty of assistance, rather than global distributive justice, should be opted for. The Rawlsian illustrations above are quite comprehensible if we consider the three guidelines Rawls says should be followed in carrying out the duty of assistance. The first guideline reveals the similarities between the principle or duty of just savings in domestic liberal societies in A Theory of Justice and the duty of assistance in The Law of Peoples (Ibid.). The guideline is to note that a society does not have to be wealthy in order to be well-ordered (Rawls, 1999b, p. 106). He believes that: A society with few natural resources and little wealth can be well-ordered if its political traditions, law, and property and class structure with their underlying religious and moral beliefs and culture are such as to sustain a liberal or decent society. (Ibid.) Although some societies are wealthier than others, it is not the aim of the duty of assistance to redistribute wealth in order to increase or maximise the wealth of burdened societies or equalise wealth among societies. After all, just as it is not all well-ordered peoples that are wealthy, so too, it is not all burdened societies that are poor. Rawls (1999b) argues that except in very few cases, generally, there is no society that will not be well-ordered if it is well-governed (p. 108). The second guideline is to note that the political

26  Introduction culture of a society determines its poverty or wealth level or status. Rawls famously asserts: that the causes of the wealth of a people and the form it takes lies in their political culture and in the religious, philosophical, and moral traditions that support the basic structure of their political and social institutions, as well as in the industriousness and cooperative talents of its members, all supported by their political virtues. (Ibid.) So, well-ordered peoples have no easy way or formula to change the socio-political culture of burdened societies. Given that the economic status or condition of a society is dependent on its political culture, foreign aid in form of fund dispensation will not help change the economic condition of a society because a mere dispensation of fund cannot change a society’s political culture (Ibid.). But emphasising on human rights could change the behaviour of the rulers which will, in turn, make them considerate of their people’s well-being (Rawls, 1999b, p. 109). The third and final guideline is to note that the duty of assistance is meant ‘to help burdened societies to be able to manage their own affairs reasonably and rationally and eventually to become members of the Society of well-ordered Peoples’ (Rawls, 1999b, p. 111). This is what Rawls refers to as ‘the target of assistance’; when reached, assistance is to be stopped even if the formerly burdened society (now well-ordered) is still relatively economically poor (Ibid.). So, when carrying out the duty of assistance, the well-ordered people must not treat burdened societies paternalistically but rather respect their freedom and equality which are the ultimate goals of the duty of assistance (Ibid.). Due to ‘the target of assistance,’ and the other assertions in the previous paragraphs, there have been many criticisms levelled at the Law of Peoples. I will not attempt to consider all of them here, but I will dwell on the most salient ones. 1 Critics have argued that Rawls’ dependence on the traditional Westphalian notion of states and international relations is problematic and even the notion is somewhat out of tune with current global realities. Andrew Hurrell (2001) and others have argued that given the level of globalisation and other forms of integration in our world today, international factors in many ways affect the way a society is shaped. So to talk of peoples as if they were a distinctively separate state does not reflect the situation of our world. Certainly, a look at regional organisations, especially the European Union, and a look at other organisations or institutions such as the UN, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, African Union, etc. will reveal to us that apart from globalisation – which has clearly figuratively removed boundaries of state – such institutions and organisations as mentioned above have made states figuratively less sovereign and more confederated.

Introduction 27 However, Rex Martin and David Reidy (2006) contend that although the Law of Peoples’ view of international relations is Westphalian, it is not merely Westphalian, it also goes beyond the Westphalian view (p. 6). In other words, although Rawls starts with the Westphalian view of international relations, he goes beyond that view. Rawls (1999b) contends that peoples are different from states in that while states are seen as merely rational, peoples are simultaneously rational and reasonable (p. 87). Hence, while states do not respect the priority of rights, on the contrary peoples respect the priority of rights. Nevertheless, as Sebastiano Maffettone (2010) notes, the notion of peoples is closer to the notion of states than to the notion of individuals (p. 293). While political realists prefer the notion of states, cosmopolitans prefer the notion of individuals. Hence, we can deduce that Rawls is closer to political realists than cosmopolitans. In support of Rawls, Samuel Freeman (2006b) argues that the Law of Peoples is not meant to address issues of global justice. Rather it is meant to formulate a foreign policy for liberal democracies that will guide them in their relationships with one another and with non-liberal democracies. Also, Joseph Heath (2005) argues that the Law of Peoples is an attempt to counter political realism which is inclined to discounting moral principles from international relations, and not an attempt to formulate principles for global justice. Hence, Freeman (2006b) and Heath (2005) opine that the criticisms that Rawls gives no consideration to issues of justice are misplaced. 2 Thomas Pogge (1994, p. 197) and Andrew Kuper (2000) have argued that Rawls’ conception of peoples and the way he attempted to use it in the Law of Peoples is flawed. It is common knowledge that most countries in the world are populated by more than one ‘people,’ and it is also abundantly evident that many people have different affiliations and identities. 3 In the second original position, well-ordered peoples are free and equal. The principle of reciprocity guides the relationships of well-ordered peoples. Accordingly, peoples have the duty to respect one another’s interests concerning their choice to remain independent and to have the benefit of self-respect (Maffettone, 2010, pp. 299–300). Kuper (2000), among others, argues that peoples have all sorts of citizens with different beliefs and political leanings. So, in decent hierarchical societies, there will be citizens who have liberal ideas but will be suppressed by the peoples. If, as Rawls says, decent peoples should be tolerated and not interfered with, then this will have to be done to the detriment of liberal values because liberal peoples will be tolerating decent hierarchical peoples who are suppressing liberal values and the individuals who hold such values. In other words, Rawls is in a way granting to illiberal states the right to suppress its citizens who are liberal. Even when the liberal citizens are the majority, the decent hierarchical people has thus been given the legitimacy to oppress or suppress them. It is on the above note that Darrel Moellendorf (2002) argues that in a bid

28  Introduction to get a foreign policy that favours almost every people, Rawls readily sacrifices justice (p. 15). While Bruce Ackerman (1994) argues that the Law of Peoples is merely nothing but a modus vivendi between liberal democracies and illiberal regimes (p. 383). However, Leif Wenar (2006) argues that Rawls is much more concerned with the legitimacy of liberal people using their coercive apparatus to deal with other states rather than concerned with ideas such as human rights, justice, etc. (p. 100). The logic of Wenar’s (2006) argument is that in the international system a peaceful and stable environment is a precondition for justice (p. 110). To think that justice can flourish in the international system in the absence of peace is not to know the value of peace and stability. It can be safe to say that peace and stability are prior to justice, and if so, Rawls is right to focus on peace and stability rather than justice. The stability envisioned by the Law of Peoples is different from that of political realists. While political realists’ model of stability is based on the balance of power or modus vivendi, the model of stability envisioned by the Law of Peoples is based on the respect for principles (Maffettone, 2010 p. 301), namely the principle of independence (non-intervention except in ‘urgent’ cases) and the principle of self-respect. 4 Pogge, contra Rawls, is of the view that although the lifestyle of citizens and especially the political culture of a people contribute to the economic conditions of a people, they are not the sole factors. Sometimes and in some cases, perhaps even in many cases, they are not the most important factors. The most important factors are international and external. Hence, Rawls is mistaken when he thinks the economic condition of a people is solely based on the people, and to see a people in Westphalian terms as utterly independent of other peoples is a mistake. This argument of Pogge (2001) is based on what he refers to as international borrowing privilege and international resource privilege. To illustrate how developed countries determine the economic conditions of poor countries to a large extent, Pogge employed the notions of international borrowing privilege and international resource privilege which can be explained in the following way. The international community often pays no attention to the fact that the leadership of a poor country is corrupt, dictatorial, etc. As long as the leadership is in charge of the state, it is recognised and accepted by the international community as having the legitimate authority simultaneously to sell the resources of the state and to borrow on behalf of the state. As usually happens with poor states with corrupt leaders, a huge part of the funds realised from the selling of the resources goes into the private pockets of the corrupt leaders and, so too, a huge percentage of any money borrowed goes into their private pockets at the expense of the people. These two situations worsen the conditions of poor states, encourage rogues to want to come to power because of the benefits, and even when

Introduction 29 a democratic leader does eventually come to power, she/he will be left with a huge debt to pay and sometimes depleted resources. Given the above scenario, the poor state in question cannot be said to have been insulated from the wealthy states and the wealthy states do not have the moral justification to insulate or isolate themselves from the problems of the poor state. In this case, the Westphalian notion of state, which Rawls adopted, fails to capture the interdependence of states. Rawls, having adopted that notion, is also guilty of turning a blind eye to this interdependence (Ibid.). However, Samuel Freeman (2006b) argues that actually the sort of countries described by Pogge which stand in a position of oppressors in the international system are the sort of states that are referred to as out-law states in the Law of Peoples and, as such, liberal peoples are not to extend their policy of tolerance to them (Rawls, 1999b, p. 117). 5 Kok-Chor Tan (2000) and Darrel Moellendorf (2002) have argued along the following line. Rawls has no logical basis upon which to argue that while the parties in the first original position will be interested in socio-economic equality for all in the domestic liberal society, those in the second original position will not be interested in socio-economic equality for all internationally. If the parties in the first original position are interested in socio-economic equality because they care for themselves (because they would prefer a well-off life to a worse-off one), and care about fellow citizens (because their common institutions, especially the political, which they share, create enough grounds for this); the second parties logically will also care about themselves because they prefer a well-off life to a worse-off one, also the common institutions and integrations which bind peoples together in our current world are likewise enough grounds for them to care about the socio-economic wellbeing of all. However, Joseph Heath (2005) argues that the international system neither has strong enough global structures nor has enough global basic structures (pp. 201–203). The rule of law is the basic instrument in the domestic society that facilitates political justice and given that the rule of law is absent at the international level, there is more or less nothing to facilitate political justice on the international level. In addition, David Reidy (2004) argues that persons do not share any global self-understanding in which persons are understood as morally and politically free and equal persons (p. 310). On his part, Wenar (2006) argues that international relations are not interpersonal but international (p. 103). Persons are not the subject of international relations. Rather, states are the subject of international relations. Therefore, Rawls is right to make peoples, rather than persons, the subject of the Law of Peoples. 6 Rawls’ list of human rights is limited due to his fixation on the eight principles which would be chosen by well-ordered peoples in the second original position and his quest to respect plurality as a liberal

30  Introduction (Maffettone, 2010, pp. 304–305). Pogge (1994) argues that Rawls offers no convincing arguments why well-ordered people will restrict themselves to the eight principles or rights which Rawls says they will choose in the second original position (pp. 214–215). Furthermore, he says Rawls does not even convincingly argue why they will choose those principles or rights instead of some other principles or rights. Also, Kuper (2000) argues that Rawls made a serious blunder when he failed or decided not to include democratic rights in the rights well-ordered people would choose in the second original position (pp. 655–658). In the same vein, Amartya Sen (1999) argues that it is known that authoritarian or non-democratic governments are a strong factor which threatens and in fact negatively affects the well-being and lives of peoples and even abuse their human rights (pp. 147–148, 154–155). Hence, to neglect to consider democratic rights as Rawls did is a weakness of the Law of Peoples. However, some proponents argue that Rawls’ list of human rights is by no means limited, at least, as limited as critics think. According to Reidy (2006), Rawls’ basic rights are at the moral heart of the rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (pp. 170– 171). Furthermore, he argues that Rawls does not actually claim that his basic rights are the only basic rights, but rather implies that they are among other basic rights which can be chosen. He adds that a closer look at the Law of Peoples will reveal that Rawls even included alongside his basic rights some Universal Declaration of Human Rights articles such as articles 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16 and 17 (Ibid.). 7 Kuper (2000, p. 383) and some other critics argue that the Law of Peoples is not adequately a realistic utopia as Rawls claims it is. They argue that since it fails to give consideration to every substantial reality such as globalisation, global interdependence and global domination of some countries by others, it cannot be adequately realistic. Also, since it fails to depart from the Westphalian notion of states and traditional international law and international relations, it cannot be said to be a utopia. On the criticism that the Law of Peoples is not utopian enough, a counter-argument is that Rawls, although aims at utopia, tries hard to keep the Law of Peoples real. It is for this reason that the Law of Peoples might be seen as not utopian enough. If this ‘not utopian enough’ is due to the Law of Peoples being realistic, then it cannot be seen as a weakness (Rawls, 1999b, pp. 5–6). Furthermore, on the argument that the Law of Peoples is not realistic enough, a counter-argument is that Rawls does not consider factors of global interdependence which might lead to oppression because his focus was not on the formulation of principles that will lead to a just society. Rather he was concerned with formulating principles that will help us realise a peaceful or stable society (Audard, 2006, p. 73).

Introduction 31 Why Rawls is a statist Looking at the detailed presentation of the Law of Peoples, one will realise that, as earlier mentioned, in the context of The Law of Peoples, what the duty of assistance makes Rawls is not a weak cosmopolitan but rather a weak statist. I shall give five reasons to support my assertion. Firstly, according to Rawls (1999b) himself, the difference between cosmopolitanism and the Law of Peoples is that cosmopolitanism, rather than being concerned with whether societies are just or unjust, is ultimately concerned with individuals’ well-being and consequently how to make the lives of the worst-off individuals in the world better-off (p. 120). But the Law of Peoples, unlike cosmopolitanism, is not concerned with individuals. It is rather concerned with the justice and order of well-ordered peoples. Secondly, as Beitz (2000) says, Rawls’ Law of Peoples is the most sophisticated thesis on the side of social liberalism in the global justice debate (pp. 677–678). By social liberalism, Beitz simply means statism – although he did not use the term ‘statism.’ After all, the term ‘social liberalism’ was only used by Bietz ‘for want of a better term.’ His definition, or rather description, of social liberalism reveals that it is synonymous with statism. He says social liberalism holds the view that the international system is populated by states, that international relations principles only apply to states, and that international relations principles are justified only by the consideration of the interests of states (Ibid.). Then he goes on to say that cosmopolitan liberalism is the most famous alternative view to social liberalism. Of course, by cosmopolitan liberalism he means cosmopolitanism. Beitz (2000) says while the cosmopolitan view – like social liberalism – is logically consistent with a world that is populated by domestic societies or states, but – unlike social liberalism – it does not grant domestic societies or states any moral privilege over persons or individuals. The logical consistency of the cosmopolitan view with a world populated by domestic societies is only at face value. Because, for the cosmopolitan view, our social world is not composed of peoples as Rawls would have it; it is rather composed of persons (Ibid.). Consequently, cosmopolitanism, unlike Rawls’ Law of Peoples, holds the view that international relations principles should apply to persons and be justified based on the consideration of the interests of persons (Ibid.). Thirdly, Beitz (2000) also says that the major theoretical difference between Rawls’ Law of Peoples and cosmopolitanism is that, unlike the latter, the former is inclined towards regarding peoples as independent moral agents (pp. 677–678). For cosmopolitanism, it is only individuals, and not domestic societies, who are moral agents in their own right. Fourthly, Nagel (2005) says: If Rawls is right, perhaps there can be something that might be called justice or injustice in the relations between states, but it bears only

32  Introduction a distant relation to the evaluation of societies themselves as just or unjust: for the most part, the idea of a just world for Rawls would have to be the idea of a world of internally just states. (p. 115) In other words, unlike cosmopolitans who recognise individuals, Rawls – in his global justice discourse – only recognises ‘peoples’ and not individuals. Fifthly, Nagel (2005) also says there are two conceptions of global justice; the one or first conception is cosmopolitanism, while the other or second conception is the political conception – by which he means statism. ‘Unlike cosmopolitanism, the second conception … is exemplified by Rawls’ view,’ and in this conception, the existence of sovereign states ‘is precisely what gives the value of justice its application, by putting the fellow citizens of a sovereign state into a relation that they do not have with the rest of humanity’ (Nagel, 2005, p. 120). Hence, Nagel (2005) concludes that this conception reaches the same conclusion as Hobbes: justice is only applicable within the state; outside the state, there is no justice (pp. 121–122). Nagel, Beitz, Pogge, Miller, Risse and Maffettone Nagel is the second statist I mentioned because of the sheer influence which his article, ‘The Problem of Global Justice’ (2005), has had on the discourse on statism in particular, and the debate on global justice in general. Thomas Hobbes’ and Rawls’ ideas permeate Nagel’s article. This is not to say that Nagel’s argument is not original. What it means is that the Nagelian argument is predicated on Hobbesian and Rawlsian ideas. Since Hobbes is more a political realist than he is a statist, mentioning Hobbes echoes political realism. Although political realism and statism have a great deal of similarity, they are not quite the same. The obvious similarities are that both are state-centric and deny the existence of justice at the international or global arena. In addition, the obvious difference is that while statism is a perspective on global justice, political realism is an international relations theory. Cosmopolitanism is the main opponent of statism, while liberalism (an international relations theory) is the main opponent of political realism. Given the close resemblance statism shares with political realism, they are easily – albeit erroneously – taken to be the same thing. However, they are not. Hence, statism should not be equated with political realism. I think by permeating his argument with Hobbesian ideas, Nagel committed the sin of equating statism with political realism. Beitz’s very influential Political Theory and International Relations (1979; 1999) contributed to the emergence of contemporary global justice debate in particular and the establishment of the academic sub-sub-field of international political theory in general. Beitz was one of the first theorists to globalise Rawls’ theory of justice. By so doing, Beitz gave birth to contemporary cosmopolitanism. Pogge (1989) was also one of the first theorists to globalise Rawls’ theory of justice, but more importantly, he is one of

Introduction 33 the global justice theorists today. While Beitz gave birth to contemporary cosmopolitanism, Pogge is the primus inter pares among cosmopolitans. For Beitz (1999) and Pogge (1989) (the early Beitz and the early Pogge), just as the state is a vehicle for social cooperation so too the international system is a vehicle for social cooperation due to the extent of globalisation and interconnectivity. More importantly, for them, the basic structure does not only exist on the domestic level, it also exists on the global level. Hence, just as the domestic basic structure ensures that the inviolability of persons is respected domestically, so too the global basic structure should ensure that the inviolability of persons is respected globally. Following the above line of argument, perhaps it will not be far-fetched to say that for Beitz and Pogge (the early Beitz and the early Pogge), cosmopolitanism would see the whole world as a global basic structure. Arguably, relational cosmopolitanism is more prominent than non-relational cosmopolitanism on the cosmopolitan side of the debate on global distributive justice. ‘Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge are the most well-known authors of relational cosmopolitanism’ (Maffettone, 2013, p. 131). For this key reason, alongside the above reasons, Beitz and Pogge deserve their honourable mentions. Beitz and Pogge on the cosmopolitanism side, and Rawls and Nagel on the statism side, bring to fore the dichotomy between the two distinction-lines in global justice. Hence, their works give us a two-fold advantage. Firstly, they help us deal with some of the most original and salient arguments in the global justice debate. Secondly, they help us create a balance in terms of juxtaposing cosmopolitanism with statism. However, to reiterate, this is only an honourable mentions list. I will reserve the discussion of my specific agreements and disagreements with some of the theorists for Chapter 5, where I expatiate on my general theory. To conclude the honourable mentions, I will mention some ‘alternative’ theorists who have attempted to challenge the two dominant theories. In the remainder of this sub-chapter, without discussing their challenge of the dominancy of statism and cosmopolitanism in detail, I present how different or similar their theories or approaches are when placed on a spectrum that has statism and cosmopolitanism at two opposite ends. In recent times, some theorists have deemed statism and cosmopolitanism to be either individually implausible or at least individually inadequate in dealing with the subject of global justice (Miller, 2007; Risse, 2012; Maffettone, 2013). As a result, there have been attempts to proffer alternative theories or approaches which are deemed plausible and adequate to deal with the subject of global justice. The alternative theories or approaches are neither completely different from statism nor completely different from cosmopolitanism. In essence, these alternative theories or approaches are a mélange of some of the characteristics of both statism and cosmopolitanism, and in effect, each of the alternative theories or approaches either tilts towards statism, cosmopolitanism or is middle-of-the-road. (Abumere, 2016, p. 8)

34  Introduction Among the alternative theories or approaches, David Miller’s (2007) national responsibility (although Miller is a statist, he is a weak statist), Thomas Risse’s (2012) internationalism or pluralist internationalism and Sebastiano Maffettone’s (2013) liberal internationalism are outstanding (Abumere, 2016, pp. 7–8), and hence will receive honourable mentions. While Miller’s national responsibility tilts towards statism in that it is more statist than cosmopolitan, Risse’s internationalism or pluralist internationalism tilts towards cosmopolitanism in that it is more cosmopolitan than statist and Maffettone’s liberal internationalism is much more middle-ofthe-road between statism and cosmopolitanism. Although these prominent attempts have been made to provide alternative theories or approaches to statism and cosmopolitanism – that is, given that there are already global justice theories that combine statism and cosmopolitanism – I still think there is a need for a general theory because the above alternative theories or approaches are not robust. As already mentioned, Miller is effectively a statist although a weak statist, while Risse is a quasi-cosmopolitan. On his part, Maffettone forges the bridging of the dichotomy between statism and cosmopolitanism by arguing for a ‘reconciliation’ of both sides in order to arrive at a neutral and an intermediary position. Although he sits perfectly between statism and cosmopolitanism, there is still a deficiency in his theory which I will explain in Chapter 5, where I expatiate on my general theory. Nevertheless, since what I will attempt to do in this book is to do a balanced combination of statism and cosmopolitanism, his liberal internationalism comes closest to my general theory because his liberal internationalism comes closest to creating an adequate balance between statism and cosmopolitanism (Abumere, 2016, pp. 15–16).

Summary What I will attempt to do in this book, as already outlined, is essentially at once an acknowledgement of the weaknesses of statism and cosmopolitanism, and a provision of an alternative to the exclusive reliance on statism by statists and the exclusive reliance on cosmopolitanism by cosmopolitans (Ibid.). As already mentioned, even when we deal with the theories holistically, neither cosmopolitanism nor statism is sufficient for the theorisation about global justice. This insufficiency is a consequence of the complexity of global justice. Nearly two decades ago, Nagel (2005) started his influential article, ‘The Problem of Global Justice,’ with the concession that our world is unjust (p. 113). He added a caveat that there is no comprehensible view on what international or global justice might mean and what its requirements might be or what its principles might entail. Nagel’s description of global justice reflects the complexity of the subject. Any attempt to simplify the subject is largely likely to be tantamount to reductionism, just as any attempt to proffer a simple solution to the complex problems of global justice will be a project in futility.

Introduction 35 Theories of, or approaches to, global justice, whether cosmopolitanism or statism, relational approach or non-relational approach, and minimalism or egalitarianism, are only properly applicable to special cases of global justice. The problem with these theories and approaches is that some are useful for interactional (micro) analysis while others are useful for institutional (macro) analysis; and some are applicable to some cases while others are applicable to other cases. Hence, they are special theories and approaches for special cases. Since, standing alone, each special theory or approach lacks the characteristics of general theory, no singular theory is sufficient for the theorisation about global justice. The main question I ask in this book is whether there is any one theory that is simultaneously necessary and sufficient for dealing with global justice. In responding to the question, I shall be working with the following hypotheses. First, there is no one theory that is simultaneously necessary and sufficient. While each theory is necessary, none is sufficient. Second, consequently, we should neither jettison any one theory nor totally accept any one theory. Third, then we should adopt a multifaceted approach. In the multifaceted approach, we use the different theories as lenses to see the different facets of global justice in terms of ascertaining causality and assigning responsibility to parties involved in cases of global justice. Here, we can see cases of global justice more accurately as cases of global injustice because cases of global injustice reflect the absence of global justice within some specific spatio-temporal circumstances and events. The crux of the discussion in this sub-chapter is that to deal with the complexity of global justice, we need a ‘general’ theory or approach that is an intermediary and neutral theory or approach between the extremes of statism and cosmopolitanism, relational and non-relational approaches, and minimalism and egalitarianism. While the extremity of these hitherto theories and approaches means they cannot be applicable to cases and issues which their opposite theory or approach is applicable to, the ‘intermediariness’ and ‘neutrality’ of the ‘general’ theory or approach makes it applicable to cases and issues on both sides. Due to its ‘general’ applicability, I refer to it as a general theory or approach, while I refer to the hitherto theories and approaches as special theories and approaches due to their limited applicability. However, is the general theory of, or general approach to, global justice plausible? On the one hand, answering in the negative, many theorists may argue that the general theory or approach is implausible. On the other hand, answering in the affirmative, in this book, I shall argue that the general theory or approach is necessary and plausible because it has the following characteristics. Firstly, it is not applicable to only special cases; it is also applicable to general cases. Secondly, it is not useful for only interactional (micro) analysis or only institutional (macro) analysis; it is useful for both interactional (micro) and institutional (macro) analyses. Thirdly, it can use the strengths of one theory or approach to compensate for the weaknesses

36  Introduction of its opposite theory or approach. One way to arrive at the general theory and tackle the complexity of global justice is to opt for the fusion of horizons between cosmopolitanism and statism. However, the question is, can there be a plausible fusion of horizons between statism and cosmopolitanism? Statists and cosmopolitans think that such fusion of horizons is implausible. I think such fusion of horizons is simultaneously plausible and necessary. Therefore, I will argue for a position in which, given the strengths and weaknesses of both cosmopolitanism and statism, the horizons of the two theories will be fused in order to have a better understanding of global justice and a better solution to issues of global justice especially complex cases of global justice such as resource curse. In this fusion of horizons, I will use the strengths of cosmopolitanism to compensate for the weaknesses of statism and use the strengths of statism to compensate for the weaknesses of cosmopolitanism. Focusing on cosmopolitanism and statism, I aver that none of the theories is completely right or wrong; they are partially right and partially wrong. I do not base my argument for their rightness and wrongness on how similar to and different from each other they are. I base my argument on how helpful or unhelpful they are in the theorisation of global justice. Do they give us a better comprehension of global justice? Are they helpful in the resolution of global injustice? Can they resolve complex cases of global justice such as migration and resource curse? These are the metrics that determine the helpfulness or unhelpfulness of theories of global justice. There might be particular and simple cases of global justice in which one theory, cosmopolitanism or statism alone, might just be simultaneously necessary and sufficient. Nevertheless, generally, cases of global justice are usually complex, and in these cases, none of the theories is simultaneously necessary and sufficient. Therefore, having a simple case in which one theory is simultaneously necessary and sufficient is an exception rather than the norm. While having complex cases in which none of the theories is simultaneously necessary and sufficient is the norm rather than the exception. Therefore, when I talk about the necessity and sufficiency of theories of global justice, I am talking about them in relation to the norm, rather than in relation to an exception, in global justice. The case of resource curse is a typical complex case of global (in)justice. I shall use resource curse to contextualise the debate in this book. Margaret Moore (2019) says that ‘At present, we lack a general theory to examine our relationship to resources’ (p. 3). Mine is not a general theory that examines our relationship to natural resources although examining some aspects of such relationship is a positive externality of my general theory. She goes on to say that we need: a political theory of resource justice which examines the varied nature of human beings’ relationship to the natural world and thereby helps us to answer the question of what is at stake in any particular claim to a resource. (Moore, 2019, p. 4)

Introduction 37 My general theory is an attempt to answer the question, what is at stake when individuals, collectives, corporations, the state and the global institutional order have causal, contributory or constitutive roles in resource curse in Africa? As she aptly says, ‘Once we know what is at stake, we can formulate a normative analysis of resource justice, including the rights and duties that we have in relation to a particular resource’ (Ibid.). The normative analysis I shall formulate, given what is at stake in resource curse, will go beyond resource justice to global distributive justice in general. I shall focus on resource curse in Africa, with special illustrations from Nigeria, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Equatorial Guinea. Africa is the most resource-cursed continent in the world, although this does not mean that every resource-rich country in Africa is resourcecursed. For instance, Nigeria, alongside South Africa, is one of the most politically influential, one of the largest economies, and one of the most natural resource-rich countries on the continent. While Nigeria is the largest economy in Africa, South Africa is the most industrialised economy and the second-largest economy in Africa. Nigeria is evidently resource-cursed, but South Africa does not seem to be resource-cursed. Nigeria has become infamous for its Niger Delta phenomenon. The Niger Delta is a place known for crude oil, natural gas, environmental pollution, injustice, conflicts, poverty, petro-dollars and petro-naira. It is a dialectical Delta – a place of internal contradictions. It is a place of riches and poverty at their extremes, a place of human rights activists and perpetrators of injustice, and a place of the innocent and the guilty. Therefore, using Nigeria and other countries such as Angola, DRC and Equatorial Guinea in particular for the purpose of illustration, in the next chapter, I will engage in a descriptive analysis of resource curse in Africa.

Notes

1. In Greek mythology, the Hydra of Lerna is a multi-headed dangerous serpent. 2. Here, ‘peoples’ is understood as John Rawls used it in The Law of Peoples (1999b).

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2

The complexity of resource curse

An overview of resource curse In Chapter 1, I engaged in four kinds of discussion. In the first kind of discussion, I introduced the subject matter of this book and the problématique of the subject matter. In the second kind of discussion, I explained why global justice is worth discussing. In the third kind of discussion, I discussed the theoretical and conceptual differences between cosmopolitanism and statism. I juxtaposed cosmopolitanism with statism. This was meant to achieve two objectives. First, it was aimed at giving us an overview of the various arguments cosmopolitans and statists use in defence of their theories. Second, it was aimed at showing us the large extent to which cosmopolitanism and statism are different, and the less extent to which they are similar. Finally, the fourth kind of discussion was aimed at proffering reasons why when discussing the theorisation about global justice, the ultimate distinction is between cosmopolitanism and statism; hence, when discussing the theorisation about global justice, it is apt to focus on cosmopolitanism and statism. I averred that, generally, cases of global justice are usually complex, and in these cases, neither cosmopolitanism nor statism is simultaneously necessary and sufficient. As already mentioned, one of such complex cases is resource curse. Consequently, in this chapter, I discuss resource curse as a typical complex case of global injustice which reflects the absence of global justice within some specific spatio-temporal circumstances and events. For reasons already mentioned in Chapter 1, the general context of the discussion is Africa while the specific context is Nigeria, Angola, DRC and Equatorial Guinea. Richard Auty (1995) introduced the concept of ‘resource curse’ into development economics to describe a situation in some natural resourcerich countries whereby ironically those countries are poor because of their natural resources. Well governed resource-rich countries are not resourcecursed. Australia, Botswana, Canada, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States of America for example, have abundant natural resources, but do not seem to be plagued by either underdevelopment or poor governance. Nevertheless, reliable econometric studies support the resource

42  The complexity of resource curse curse thesis. For instance, Jeffery Sachs and Andrew Warner (1995) showed that from 1970 to 1989, the average growth rate of many resource-rich countries were about 1 percent slower than the growth rate of non-resource-rich countries. Paolo Mauro (1995) and Carlos Leite and Jens Weidmann (1999) showed that resource-rich countries are prone to corruption. Furthermore, Leonard Wantchekon (1999) showed that ‘a one percent increase in resource dependence as measured by the ratio of primary exports to GDP’ results in an almost 8 percent increment in the possibility of dictatorship (p. 2). Also, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (1998) showed that resource-rich countries, compared to non-resource-rich countries, are more prone to civil conflicts. In addition, Michael Ross (2003) linked resource wealth to an exacerbation of poor governance in contexts where there is a centralisation of power. Macartan Humphreys et al. (2007) argue that in order to understand resource curse, we must first understand why and how natural resource wealth differs from other types of wealth of countries. They mention that the former differs from the latter in two ways which are as follow. The first factor is that: unlike other sources of wealth, natural resource wealth does not need to be produced. It simply needs to be extracted (even if there is often nothing simple about the extraction process). Since it is not a result of a productive process, the generation of natural resource wealth can occur quite independently of other economic processes that take place in a country; it is, in a number of ways, “enclaved.” (Humphreys et al., 2007, p. 4) (emphasis in original) The second factor is that oil, gas, and many other natural resources are non-renewable resources. Thus, economically these resources should be properly seen as assets rather than sources of income (Ibid.). The above factors generate a host of problems among which, and the most of which, is rent-seeking behaviour. ‘Rent-seeking has to do with using political means at the political realm to try to get economic rent’ (Abumere, 2015a., p. 239). Economic rent is the variation between the total cost of production and the total price of the product which may be goods or services or both goods and services (Abumere, 2015b, p. 82). In Africa’s extractive industries, economic rent is the variation between the value of production (minerals) and the cost to extract the minerals. The mineral ‘extraction cost consists of normal exploration, development, and operating costs as well as a share of profits for the industry’ (Humphreys et al., 2007, pp. 379–380). The Scottish economist, Adam Smith (1776[1999]), introduced the word ‘rent’ into economics with his division of income into profits, wages and rents. Another British economist (this time around an English economist rather than a Scottish economist), David Ricardo, popularised the term in his famous discussion of rent in land which was a main factor of production in Ricardian England. According to him, rent is ‘the payment to a factor of

The complexity of resource curse 43 production in excess of what is required to keep that factor in its present use’ (Henderson, n.d., s.p.). Although Ricardo is most famous for his theory of comparative advantage, it is his notion of rent that plays a crucial role in the analysis of resource curse. In 1967, building on Ricardo’s description of rent in land, Gordon Tullock (1967; 1993) originated the idea of rent-seeking while Anne Krueger (1974), in 1974, introduced the term in economics literature. Rent-seeking behaviour is common in most natural resource-rich African states because the value of natural resources usually far outweighs the cost of their extraction, in other words, there is an economic rent, that is, a variation, between the value of natural resources and the costs of extracting them. This incentivises individuals (especially politicians and their cronies), collectives and corporations (especially the privately owned) to use political mechanisms to capture the existing rents because any persons or corporations that are granted the lucrative licenses to exploit the natural resources are certain to make abundant returns on their investments (Abumere, 2015a, pp. 239–240). In Africa, this leads to a scramble for exploration of natural resources which in turn leads to negative political and economic consequences (Abumere, 2015b, p. 82) in places like Nigeria, Angola, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Liberia and Sierra Leone. The principal factors in resource curse are rent-seeking behaviour and the Dutch disease. The Dutch disease refers to ‘the currency appreciation due to resource revenue and its negative effect on the competitive position of other industries’ (Soros, 2007, p. xi). The ‘Dutch’ in the ‘Dutch disease’ has to do with the Netherlands. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Netherlands shifted focus from manufacturing industries to the gas industry when it discovered natural gas in the North Sea. Consequently, the manufacturing sector began to perform poorly (Abumere. 2015b, p. 83). In 1977, The Economist coined the term ‘Dutch disease’ to describe the aforementioned economic situation in the Netherlands (Lawson-Remer & Greenstein, 2012). The Dutch disease represents the following situation: A sudden rise in the value of natural resource exports produces an appreciation in the real exchange rate. This in turn makes exporting non-natural resource commodities more difficult and competing with imports across a wide range of commodities almost impossible (called the “spending effect”). Foreign exchange earned from the natural resource meanwhile may be used to purchase internationally traded goods, at the expense of domestic manufacturers of the goods. Simultaneously, domestic resources such as labour and materials are shifted to the natural resource sector (called the “resource pull effect”). (Humphreys et al., 2007, p. 5) (emphasis in original) The aforementioned economic condition leads to rising prices of manufactured goods, which in turn leads to rising cost of manufacturing. In a nutshell, other sectors of the economy suffer neglect when a resource-rich country diverts

44  The complexity of resource curse attention from every other sector in order to concentrate on the exploitation of natural resources. As an industrialised country, for the Netherlands, the consequence of concentrating on the exploitation of natural gas was the neglect of the manufacturing sector. Whereas, for non-industrialised countries, the consequence of concentrating on the exploitation of natural resources is often the neglect of the agricultural sector (Ibid.). For instance, in the case of Nigeria, shifting focus to the exploration and exploitation of oil and gas led to the abandonment of the agricultural sector. The solution is not that the Netherlands should have focused on manufacturing or developing countries should focus on agriculture or Nigeria should focus on agriculture rather than oil and gas. Rather the solution is that, taking into consideration absolute and comparative advantages, diversification is the best possible option. Because, a diversified economy, rather than a mono-product economy – or an almost mono-product economy – is a safer way to stable economic growth in particular and economic development in general. (Abumere, 2015a, p. 139) Alongside rent-seeking and the Dutch disease, there are other problems associated with resource curse such as unequal expertise, volatility, living off your capital, insufficient investments (in education, health, etc.), spoliation, weak and unaccountable states, threats to democracy, grievances in producing regions, military challenges to governments, political and economic interactions (Humphreys et al., 2007, pp. 3–4), and so on. However, most of these problems are either generated by rent-seeking or the Dutch disease or a combination of both. Hence I am focusing on rent-seeking and the Dutch disease rather than on these problems. Nevertheless, I will discuss a couple of the problems as a way of giving the reader an insight into what they are. Unequal expertise has to do with the fact that in many cases, international companies have a superior know-how in mineral exploration than developing countries that possess the resources. Although not all resources are very expensive and challenging to explore and exploit, the exploration and exploitation of some resources like oil and gas is simultaneously capital and technological intensive. Hence in the extraction of oil and gas, usually governments need to cooperate with multinational corporations (MNCs) that have the technical know-how, the wherewithal and long experience in the industry. In numerous instances, unfortunately, this cooperation results in a situation whereby the MNCs are more knowledgeable about, and have more information (information asymmetry) on, the oil and gas than the government. Consequently, the MNCs have a bargaining leverage on the government (Ibid.). There are solutions that can be proffered to the above problem of unequal expertise. The government can choose to stop cooperating with international

The complexity of resource curse 45 companies and rather cooperate with local companies. But this solution does not quite work well. Presumably, the local companies might not have the high capital and technology of the international companies. Even if the former has the high capital and technology of the latter, being local does not necessarily mean that the former will be patriotic. The former might just be as opportunistic as the latter. Hence, a more plausible solution might be for resource-rich countries to find ways to contract with companies, especially the high capital and technologically advanced ones which are mostly international, such that both parties will fairly share the disadvantages and advantages of their contract (Ibid.). As Macartan Humphreys et al. (2007) say, if there are many companies with high capital and know-how, this will lead to competition which will be favourable to host countries. However, competition is not that rampant in the exploration industry given the huge level of capital required for exploration. Also, the companies do not always act alone. Sometimes, in the case of foreign companies, they are supported by their foreign governments. Companies can bribe their governments in order to get the support of their governments in doing illegal or unethical business with agents of resource-rich countries. On the problem of volatility, volatility is simply ‘the fluctuation in commodity prices and its disruptive effects’ (Soros, 2007, p. xi). The problem has to do with the fact that exporting countries have little or no control over the timing of resource revenues. In other words, resource revenue is volatile (Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian, 2003, p. 4) and this volatility: comes from three sources: the variation over time in rates of extraction, the variability in the timing of payments by corporations to states, and fluctuations in the value of the natural resource produced. (Humphreys et al., 2007, p. 6) While the volatility problem might be relatively manageable in terms of some natural resources, the level of price volatility when it comes to oil and gas is very high. High volatility of prices leads to high volatility of revenues. High volatility of revenues leads to high volatility of expenditure. High volatility of expenditure leads to high volatility in economic development and the living standard of citizens. A high level of uncertainty characterises the whole economy of the resource-rich country; and this is obviously a recipe for anxiety in the ‘present’ and disaster in the ‘future’ for resource-cursed countries. Still, on volatility, natural resources can be used as collaterals by resourcerich countries. When prices of certain natural resources are high, countries rich in those resources will earn more revenue. Such natural resource-rich countries and lenders – being confident that debt will be repaid – tend to do business. Such countries have the leverage to borrow more and lenders are induced to lend more. However, when prices are low, lenders – usually lacking the confidence that those countries will be able to repay their debt the lower

46  The complexity of resource curse the prices of their natural resources – demand for repayment (Humphreys et al., 2007, p. 8). Hence, the level of volatility in the economy becomes even higher and citizens suffer the negative consequences. Economic volatility is rampant in resource-rich African countries. Nevertheless, the worst problem resource-cursed African countries face is not economic volatility. The worst problem is a three-fold curse. In the next sub-chapter, I will tease out the three-fold curse.

Africa, the epicentre of resource curse Resource curse in Africa has two characteristics. Firstly, resource-cursed African countries are plagued simultaneously by the two major problems associated with resource curse, namely the Dutch disease and rent-seeking behaviour. Secondly, at both the micro and macro levels, there are domestic and external (international or global) actors/factors involved in resource curse in Africa. These conditions are especially true of resource-cursed African countries such as Nigeria, DRC, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, and so on. The linkage between the Dutch disease and rent-seeking on one side and the linkage between domestic and external actors on the other side have causal, contributory, constitutive or engendering roles in a three-fold curse which resource-cursed countries are liable to be afflicted by. The three-fold curse in turn engenders these linkages. Leif Wenar (2016) describes the three-fold curse as proneness to authoritarianism, higher risk of civil conflict and lower rates of growth (pp. 60–62). My conception of authoritarianism is that of despotism or dictatorship whereby power is illegitimately concentrated in the hands of a single person or few persons whose main instrument of governance is violence or the threat of violence. In view of this conception, Thomas Pogge’s (2005) international resource privilege and international borrowing privilege suffice to explain the three-fold curse, and the centrality of authoritarianism. Most resource-rich African states are underdeveloped and conflict-ridden. This underdevelopment and insecurity are directly, or at least indirectly, linked to the abundance of natural resources which attracts economic rent seekers and conflict entrepreneurs. Since governing resource-rich underdeveloped conflict-ridden African states is a lucrative enterprise, there is always a vicious struggle for power and those who usually emerge as presidents, prime ministers, ministers and so on, tend to be corrupt. Pogge (2005) explains that, on the one hand, when these leaders sell the natural resources of their states, they only remit a small percentage of the revenues to the state treasuries while enriching themselves with the remaining revenues. On the other hand, using the natural resources as collateral to get loans in the name of their states, such leaders only use a small percentage of the loan for state affairs while using the remaining parts to enrich themselves (Pogge, 2005, p. 143). This situation is a quadruple-jeopardy for resource-rich African states. Firstly, their natural resources are squandered

The complexity of resource curse 47 by corrupt leaders. Secondly, they are plunged into unsustainable debts and debt traps by the same leaders. Thirdly, such leaders, having enriched themselves at the expense of the states and citizens, use their financial war-chest to perpetuate themselves in power. Fourthly, having seen how lucrative this enterprise is for the corrupt leaders, other rogues are incentivised to engage in a vicious struggle for power (Ibid.). The above condition points to the correlation between resource curse and authoritarianism. The corrupt leaders will certainly face opposition, but with their financial war-chest and the desire to remain in power, corrupt leaders have the wherewithal and the incentive to engage in carrot and stick bad governance. On the one hand, using the carrot approach, they buy off opposition and dissenting voices. On the other hand, using the stick approach, they sponsor a repressive state apparatus that represses opposition and dissenting voices. Either way, the leaders are oppressive: when they use the carrot approach, they engage in soft oppression; when they use the stick approach, they engage in hard oppression; and when they use a combination of the carrot and stick approaches, they engage in smart oppression. Hence, they quickly turn into authoritarians and remain authoritarians. Moreover, with abundant natural resources, authoritarians do not have to tax their citizens in order to sustain their repressive regimes; they simply sell off natural resources or use the natural resources as collateral to get loans. Consequently, they do not see themselves as accountable to the people (Wenar, 2016, pp. 109–111). They seem to have turned the saying ‘there is no taxation without representation’ into ‘there is no accountability without taxation.’ The vicious struggle for power because of the aforementioned incentives points to the correlation between resource curse and civil conflicts, and why civil conflicts, specifically civil wars and coup d’etat, have littered the African continent. Absent natural resources and the lucrativeness of controlling natural resources, many conflict entrepreneurs, rebels, practitioners of violence, military regimes and coup plotters will either have no incentives to engage in conflicts and violence or will have no means to prosecute or sustain their conflicts and violence (Pogge, 2005, pp. 113–115, 163; Pogge, 2010, p. 17). Consequently, there will be a lower rate of civil wars and coup d’etat on the continent. Moreover, although many rebels and coup plotters cite injustice, unfairness and bad governance as their reasons for engaging in a civil war or carrying out a coup, actually often the two major reasons for rebellion and coup d’etat in Africa are power and money. This is why when the rebels and coup plotters take over power, they become what they accused the regime they toppled of being, they do what they accused the toppled regime of doing and they fail to do what they accused the toppled regime of failing to do (Abumere, 2015b, p. 83). This does not mean that being natural resource-rich is a necessary or sufficient condition for underdevelopment, civil wars, coup d’etat or authoritarianism, or that African states that do not have abundant natural resources

48  The complexity of resource curse do not experience underdevelopment, civil wars, coup d’etat or authoritarianism. What it means is that being natural resource-rich has made many African states that are natural resource-rich prone to underdevelopment, civil wars, coup d’etat and authoritarianism. For instance, as already mentioned, money (economic incentive) and power (political incentive) are the two incentives that spur coup d’etat in Africa. Although there is a quest for power just for the sake of power or as a means to other ends, there is also a quest for power as a means to enrichment. So, the economic incentive is very strong. Consequently, absent the economic incentive, there is likely going to be a lower rate of coup d’etat in Africa. Moreover, financiers of coup d’etat and many supporters of military regimes (whether individuals, collectives, corporations or foreign states) do so sometimes for political reasons, sometimes for economic reasons, and other times for both political and economic reasons. Absent economic incentive, the support for coup d’etat and military regimes is likely to wane (Wenar, 2016, pp. 76–77; Abumere, 2015b, p. 84). When we look at many resource-cursed countries we see how conflicts, coup d’état or strong men can drive countries to the brink. Combining civil wars and coup d’etat (the first of the three-fold curse) with authoritarianism (the second of the three-fold curse), then we have underdevelopment which results from low growth (the third of the three-fold curse) (Abumere, 2015b, p. 84). In Africa, the over-dependence on natural resources by resource-rich states is what may be referred to as internal over-dependence. In contradistinction to internal over-dependence, there is external over-dependence which is a situation in which powerful foreign states1 over-depend on the natural resources of underdeveloped African states. As exemplified by the situation in DRC, external over-dependence leads to aggressive resource competition in Africa, and then to resource conflicts, and ultimately an insecure, underdeveloped state (Abumere, 2015b, p. 84) and negative consequences of climate change. External over-dependence has been in existence since the Scramble for Africa in 1884/1885 when European colonial powers partitioned the African continent for their economic interests (Ibid.) but with devastating economic, political and environmental consequences for Africa. For instance, Megan Blomfield (2019) argues that historical wrongdoings concerning natural resources are relevant to climate justice. Seeing climate change as a problem of global justice, she thinks historical injustice can explain why, comparatively, some groups are more vulnerable to the impact of climate change while other groups are less vulnerable. Reviewing colonial historical exploitation of natural resources as an important case of natural resource injustice, she argues that the legacies of colonial exploitation of natural resources almost certainly contribute significantly to climate change vulnerabilities of former colonies. Therefore, within the framework of rectificatory justice, she concludes that former colonies have right claims against their former colonisers and colonisers owe their former colonies duties of justice to rectify the vulnerabilities to climate change and the climate

The complexity of resource curse 49 change impacts former colonies suffer. In Africa, just as colonialism has taken a new form, namely neocolonialism as exemplified by Francafrique, so too over-dependence mutates and takes new forms. The scramble for Africa is still alive, but in a new form: ‘new scramble for Africa’s resources’ (Mahtani, 2008); the scramble for Africa’s oil (Ghazvinian, 2007); ‘Africa’s World War’ in DRC; and so on. In Africa, apart from underdevelopment, unsustainable development is another devastating effect of the combination of internal and external over-dependence on natural resources.2 I will look at this matter in the remainder of this sub-chapter. In Africa, there is a consensus on the dangers and inhumanity of poverty and underdevelopment and the urgent necessity to stay on the path of economic and political development. The economy and politics of a state are interdependent: positive development in one sphere affects the other sphere positively, and; negative development in one sphere affects the other sphere negatively. This interdependence is succinctly and accurately captured by the concept of political economy when we understand it as: the way in which the production, distribution and use of goods and services and the creation of wealth are organised by states; and the interaction between politics and economics and how they affect each other. Hence, if African states are to steer away from poverty and underdevelopment, I assert that they must have functional and viable political economies. My assertion may be one of the least of all the controversies on the continent in general and in the development discourse in particular. Resource curse is one of the most debilitating political economy cases that typify the problems of poverty and underdevelopment on the continent. It concretely presents to us the interdependence between economy and politics, and the negative consequences of the abuse of the endowment of natural resources. There is nowhere in the world that the resource curse and the three-fold curse of resource curse are more manifested than in Africa. In Africa, resource curse is dialectical! It is faced with internal contradictions which makes it a poster child of Catch-22 scenarios. This is because resource curse simultaneously leads to underdevelopment and unsustainable development. On the one hand, rent-seeking and the Dutch disease cripple the economy thereby leading to underdevelopment. On the other hand, the over-reliance on the extraction and exploitation of natural resources, although may generate a lot of funds for the government, leads to environmental depletion and pollution. The resource curse issues as discussed above lead to three fundamental problems in terms of underdevelopment and unsustainable development. Firstly, the Dutch disease cripples the economy, and rent-seeking ensures that the rich and powerful benefit from natural resource wealth at the expense of the poor who become even poorer. Secondly, on the one hand, the Dutch disease ensures that economic benefits are prioritised over healthy environments. Hence, natural resources are depleted and environments are polluted without any ethical considerations. On the other hand, rent-seeking ensures

50  The complexity of resource curse that mining, oil and gas companies are not held accountable for negative externalities such as land, water and air pollution which result from their exploration activities. Thirdly, due to the first and second conditions as explained above, societies suffer economically and environmentally. It is for these reasons that resource curse typifies the dialectics between underdevelopment and unsustainable development. There is a consensus on the dangers of unsustainable development and the urgent necessity to revert to sustainable development. That society, economy and environment are interdependent and this interdependence must be recognised if we are to have a sustainable societal development may be the least of all the controversies in the sustainable development discourse. However, some of the lingering, or at least residual, questions in the discourse are: what exactly is sustainable development; and what exactly does it entail? While the Brundtland Report’s definition of sustainable development seems to have resolved the former question, the latter question is still looming large over the sustainable development discourse. Global cooperation is definitely the chief among the key things sustainable development entails. But, here, my concern is to determine how bad governance causes, engenders or exacerbates unsustainable development. Sustainable development, according to the Brundtland Report, ‘is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987, p. 43). The hinge on which conceptualisations of sustainable development revolve around are ‘needs’ and ‘limitations’ on the one hand and ‘the present’ and ‘the future’ on the other hand. Sustainable development is mainly concerned with: the concept of needs, in particular the essential needs of the world’s poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organisation on the environment’s ability to meet present and future needs. (Ibid.) The United Nations Environmental Programme (2015) asserts that although the world has made significant progress in human development, there has been no significant reduction in environmental degradation (p. 1). This has led to negative consequences such as persistent poverty and a wider gap between the rich and the poor, the degradation of our planet and its ability to support life. It was due to the above reasons that the United Nations General Assembly established The World Commission on Environment and Development whose aim was to make the world conscious of ‘the accelerating deterioration of the human environment and natural resources and the consequences of that deterioration for economic and social development’ (Strange & Bayley, 2008, p. 24). The establishment of such a commission shows that the United Nations General Assembly goes beyond taking

The complexity of resource curse 51 environmental degradation seriously, and being concerned with economic growth and the well-being of persons in the short-run or of present persons. It also recognises the inextricable linkages between the environment, the economy and persons, and the need for a global cooperation in order to achieve sustainable development (Ibid). Tracey Strange and Anne Bayley (2008) argue that the idea of sustainable development essentially creates a paradigm shift in how we conceive the world and how we ought to relate to the planet. First, we realise that economic growth at the expense of the environment and people is unsustainable because the three are inextricably linked. Second, the systemic nature of sustainable development requires that we no longer think myopically in terms of geography and institutions but globally in order to forge strategic solutions to resolve problems of sustainable development. Third, we no longer just consider the short-run consequences of our actions vis-àvis the linkages between economy and environment; we have started thinking in terms of long-run consequences (Strange & Bayley, 2008, pp. 25–26). Strange and Bayley (2008) posit that society, environment and economy are the three pillars of sustainable development (p. 27). They argue that these pillars are interdependent to the extent that ignoring the interdependence will certainly result in developmental crisis in the long run. Societies need the environment in order to live and manage their economies. For societies to be stable and prosperous, they need vibrant and successful economies (Ibid.). And since economies are not ends in themselves but means to promote the well-being of societies, and since both economies and societies need a healthy environment in order to thrive in the long run, United Nations Environmental Programme (2015) says that these three pillars or dimensions are evidently interdependent (p. 1). The International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) (n.d.) argues that in order to understand sustainable development properly, we need to see our world as a global system that entails the following. What happens at one place affects another place. What happens in one space affects another space. What happens at one time affects another time. What happens in the past affects the present and the future, and what happens now affects the future. As many have argued, including the World Bank (n.d.), ‘meeting the needs of the future depends on how well we balance social, economic, and environmental objectives – or needs – when making decisions today’ (s.p.). For Strange and Bayley (2008), fairness entails that no one generation should unnecessarily or unjustifiably be burdened by the consequences of the actions of another generation (p. 26). Just as the present generation should not unjustifiably be burdened with the consequences of the actions of past generations, so too should future generations not unjustifiably be burdened with the consequences of the actions of both past and present generations. In other words, the role of intergenerational justice is very crucial in sustainable development. Given that recognising the interdependence among the three pillars or dimensions of sustainable development

52  The complexity of resource curse is vital for sustainable development, Strange and Bayley (2008) conclude that sustainable development is simultaneously a conceptual framework, a process and an end-goal. As a conceptual framework, it shifts our conception of the world from the predominant myopic conception to a holistic and balanced conception. As a process, it enables us, in spatio-temporal terms, to apply integration principles to all our decisions. And as an end-goal, it allows us to identify and solve particular developmental problems (Strange & Bayley, 2008, p. 30). It is important for Africa to achieve the three main goals of Rio +20 Outcome. The first goal is; leave no one behind and provide a life of dignity for all. The second goal is; achieve greater prosperity in an inclusive manner within the capacity of the earth’s life support system. The third goal is; increase capital to achieve greater resilience and secure future generations’ livelihoods (United Nations Environmental Programme, 2015, pp. 1–2). To achieve these goals, we need to be able to deduce from the foregoing discussion that man-made problems of sustainable development result from, chief among other factors, poor political governance and poor economic policies. In other words, man-made problems of sustainable development largely result from poor political economy structures, institutions and norms. In Africa, poor political economy structures, institutions and norms pose problems that go beyond sustainable development. For instance, in Nigeria, Angola, DRC and Equatorial Guinea, they typify resource curse. I will present a descriptive analysis of the Nigerian, Angola, Congolese and (Equatorial) Guinean conditions in the next sub-chapter.

Nigeria, Angola, DRC and Equatorial Guinea Nigeria is a disaster Although the Dutch disease and rent-seeking are two of the most notorious problems associated with resource curse, rent-seeking is especially prominent in Nigeria and other resource-cursed African countries because unbridled avenues exploited by political elites and MNCs make complex and exacerbate the negative political and economic consequences of natural resource-endowment (Humphreys et al., 2007, p. 4). Aaron Tornell and Philip R. Lane (1999) have shown the susceptibility of resource-rich countries to rent-seeking. While Ricky Lam and Leonard Wantchekon (1999) have highlighted how ‘a one percent increase in the size of the natural resource sector generates a decrease by half a percentage point in the probability of survival of democratic regimes,’ and this is the case due to ‘elite discretion over the process of rent distribution’ (pp. 35–36). In the case of Nigeria, the problem of resource curse is multifaceted and complex. As Ross (2003) succinctly puts it: there are five ways that mineral wealth can hurt the poor: by causing economic volatility; by crowding out the manufacturing and agriculture

The complexity of resource curse 53 sectors; by heightening inequality; by inducing violent conflict; and by undermining democracy …. Since Nigeria is remarkably dependent on oil, it has been highly susceptible to these tribulations. (p.4) These ‘tribulations’ become even more alarming when we realise that Nigeria ‘has annually received over half of its revenues – sometimes as much as 85 percent – directly from the oil sector’ (Ross, 2003, p. 2). In short, historically ‘Nigeria has grown extraordinarily dependent on oil exports: in 2000, 99.7 percent of its export income came from oil, making it the most oil-dependent country in the world’ (Ross, 2003, p. 9). The above situation consequently makes the country a rentier state, that is, a state suffering the rentier effect, a socially undesirable and economically and politically harmful situation in which governments use large revenues accruing from the sales of natural resources to pacify pressure and opposition, evade accountability and abstain from institutional reform (Ibid.). This is what makes it possible for the Nigerian government to be able to distribute a large portion of its budget as patronage (Ross, 2003, p. 12). After all, since most of the population is poor, patronage becomes the order of the day. In 2010, the proportion of those living below the poverty line rose to 69 percent. A decade later, in 2020, the proportion of those living in poverty is still very high, over 40 percent, and has not gone lower since then. Consequently, since 2018, Nigeria has the highest number of poor people in the world. In Nigeria where there is already no properly functioning rational-legal bureaucracy, the more natural resources the country is able to extract, the more rent-seeking behaviour increases and the more bad governance increases. Simply put, in Nigeria, rather than alleviating bad governance, natural resources exacerbate it. In the current policy framework to resolve the problem of resource curse in Nigeria, transparency and accountability are touted as the remedies. Such remedies have been codified mostly as principles and requirements of the Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI). The Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Act 2007 mandates NEITI to promote due process and transparency in extractive revenues paid to and received by government as well ensure transparency and accountability in the application of extractive revenues. (Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, n.d., s.p.) Nigeria joined the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2007. In the 27 February 2019 EITI report, the EITI (2019) states that Nigeria: became the first Anglophone African country to have made satisfactory progress in implementing all the requirements of the EITI Standard.

54  The complexity of resource curse It now faces the challenge of entrenching this transparency in routine government and company systems. (s.p.) The report grades countries’ progress from worst to best in the following order: no progress; adequate progress; meaningful progress; satisfactory progress; and beyond. In the report, Nigeria’s scorecard shows an overall score of satisfactory in all categories. The categories include; MSG (multi-stakeholder group) oversight, licenses and contracts, monitoring production, revenue collection, revenue allocation, socio-economic contribution, and outcomes and impact. However, the report does not amount to success because current reality contradicts the report. For instance, in the Transparency International’s (2018) Corruption Perception Index, Nigeria is ranked 144th least corrupt country among 180 countries. In terms of ‘the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean)’ Nigeria scored 27. A major reason why the EITI/NEITI framework has not worked very well is its failure to recognise that the Nigerian population has widely accepted a moral economy of patron-client relations which in turn compounds and exacerbates an already bad situation. This does not mean that the moral economy is wholly accepted. Nevertheless, what it means is that the moral economy has become dominant or pervasive. Consequently, any attempt to resolve the resource curse problem must take into consideration the compound nature of the problem. The EITI/NEITI framework has not worked very well because it is a function of poor political economy structures, institutions and norms. Among other things, losing trust or having low trust in government is one of the consequences of poor political economy structures, institutions and norms. For instance, in Nigeria, the refusal by natural persons and juridical or legal persons, specifically businesses, to pay tax is symptomatic of this low trust. Angola, a rich Country with poor people Angola has overtaken Nigeria as the leading oil producer and exporter in Africa. The Portuguese colonialists discovered oil in Angola in 1955. Just as agriculture was the mainstay of Nigeria’s economy, so too it was the mainstay of Angola’s economy. Before the Portuguese colonialists shifted focus to oil, agricultural products made up 56 percent of Angola’s export, and coffee was chief among the products (Hammond, 2011, p. 356). The Dutch disease and rent-seeking, as usual in resource curse cases, have become part and parcel of Angola. The evidence of the Dutch disease in Angola is undisputed given that Angola has effectively become an oilonly economy. Angola is not just the largest oil producer and exporter in Africa. It is also the fourth largest source of diamonds in the world (Ibid.). Angola’s oil and diamond revenues were used by both the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union

The complexity of resource curse 55 for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) to finance the 25-year civil war. The hallmarks of resource curse have followed; a corrupt, rent-seeking government which made secret deals with foreign oil companies and completely disregarded the well-being of the population. (Ibid.) Describing how the Angolan civil war was fought and won, Tony Hodges (2004) says revenues from oil and diamond were essential means to winning the war, and were the spoils the victor got for winning the war. On one side, Jose Eduardo dos Santos’ MPLA which controlled the extraction of oil was supported by Cuba and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR). On the other side, Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA which controlled the extraction of diamonds was supported by South Africa and the United States of America. It was the use of blood diamonds by UNITA to finance its rebellion that led to the creation of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. With Jonas Savimbi on one side and Jose Eduardo dos Santos on the other side, Angola fought a civil war from 1977 to 2002 that finally ended with the death of Savimbi. Add this civil war to the 13 years liberation war Angola fought against the Portuguese who would not let Angola be free because chiefly, among other factors, Angola was already booming with oil and diamond. Then we have 38 years of wars. Like the Niger Delta of Nigeria, Cabinda is the oil hub of Angola. Just as the Niger Deltans are plagued by poverty so too the Cabindans are plagued by poverty. And just as the Niger Delta is rife with conflicts, so too Cabinda is rife with conflicts. In short, injustice is the common denominator of the Niger Delta and Cabinda. So, just like Nigeria, Angola is another poster child of resource-cursed countries where corruption, conflicts, bad governance, underdevelopment and abject poverty are the order of the day. During the authoritarianism of dos Santos, lack of transparency and accountability (the secrecy which is now an ‘open secret’ and ‘transparent corruption’) which characterises the Angolan extractive industry was seriously dangerous for the country. When, due to pressure for transparency and accountability, in February 2001 British Petroleum (BP) attempted to disclose to the world its payments to the Angolan government, the government warned that BP’s contract would be terminated ‘for violation of contractually guaranteed confidentiality’; hence, BP reneged (Hammond, 2011, p. 361). The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Human Rights Watch, Transparency International, and even the Attorney General of Angola reported several and separate cases of corruption, some including billions of US dollars (Hodges, 2004, p. 130, 168). Since it gained political independence in 1975, Angola, a typical resource-cursed country, has been in the shackles of corruption and authoritarianism (Hammond, 2011, p. 348). The strongman, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, who came to power in 1979 and

56  The complexity of resource curse stayed until 2017, used oil funds to sustain his autocracy (Hodges, 2004, p. 60, 62). Historically, dos Santos’ autocracy misappropriated Angola’s natural resource wealth. With a corrupt dictator who returned MNCs favour of cash in kind, corruption became stock-in-trade in Angola (Hodges, 2004, p. 62). Jose Eduardo dos Santos’ daughter, Isabel dos Santos, is one of Africa’s billionaires. She is one of the few female billions on the continent and she is the youngest of them. Given that she has a huge stake in the extractive industry, in both the oil and diamond sectors, and in other important sectors like the communications sector, it is no surprise that she is worth an estimated US$3 billion. However, as she faces corruption charges and some of her assets are frozen in Angola and Portugal, her fortunes are dwindling. The Revenue Watch Institute (2010) reports that Angola earns US$16 billion annually from oil revenues. This is not surprising because Angola has become the leading producer and exporter of oil in Africa. The oil boom has certainly made Angola’s economy better off; thereby making it a middle-income economy. But the poor are still poor which means that the gains from oil only go to ‘well-placed’ people. Angola, though theoretically a rich country, is practically poor. If richness is measured by the amount of oil reserves and diamond a country has, and by the amount of revenues a country gets from minerals, then Angola is certainly a rich country. But this richness has not translated to well-being. So the people are still actually poor. Angola has a 68 percent poverty rate and its rankings in other social indicators are some of the world’s lowest (Hammond, 2011, p. 358). Angola has over 80 billion barrels of oil on its coasts, over 30 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and its oil revenues are expected to rise astronomically from US$16 billion to US$30 billion annually. The estimated 18 million Angolans who own these resources should be economically well-off. But their plight is not different from that of other Africans who have been plagued by resource curse. Given the interplay between foreign interests and the interests of Angolan elites, or oil nomenklaturas as they are called, most of the revenues from oil, gas and diamond are illegally siphoned and remain off-shores without even reaching Angola (Ferguson, 2005, p. 378). In Luanda, the capital of Angola, the gap between the rich and the poor ‘is like nowhere else in the world’ (Ghazvinian, quoted in Public Policy, 2007). Angola, in a nutshell, is euphemistically a ‘successful failed state’ (de Oliveira, 2007, p. 617). It is ‘successful at the purpose for which it is intended, enriching the elites, even as it fails to provide for the country as a whole’ (Hammond, 2011, p. 361). Comparing the Human Development Index rankings of Southern African countries, Angola only fares better than Malawi and Mozambique. Even countries like Lesotho, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe fare better than Angola. Beyond Southern Africa, as poor as Tanzania is, the East African country still fares better than Angola. Worldwide, Angola was ranked 162nd out of 177 countries. In the end, it is apt to say that oil and diamonds are not gifts to Angolans. They are Trojan Horses!

The complexity of resource curse 57 The quasi State of nature in DRC The DRC, like Angola and Nigeria, is abundantly endowed with natural resources. But like Angola and Nigeria, it is also resource-cursed. Its abysmal economic and political economy performance in spite of plentiful natural resources is, like those of Angola and Nigeria, another typical paradox of plenty. Like the Cabinda province of Angola and the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, the DRC’s Katanga region is so rich in natural resources that colonial geologists described it as a ‘veritable geological scandal’ (Jones, 2008, p. 8). For they had never seen one region so endowed with abundant natural resources of different kinds. Ironically, the region is now rife with different kinds of social, economic and political problems because of its natural resources. Resource curse in DRC can be traced back to one and half centuries ago, 1871. In that year, Sir Henry Stanley, an explorer of the British Empire, travelled on the River Congo route, explored the Congo and discovered that the Congo was abundantly endowed with natural resources (Carpenter, 2012, pp. 3–4). On hearing Sir Stanley’s discovery, the King of Belgium, King Leopold II, set up the Association Internationale Africaine in order to colonise the Congo (Ibid.), and of course, ultimately exploit its resources. King Leopold II owned the Congo as a private property rather than as a colony of Belgium. Even during the scramble for Africa and the resultant partitioning of Africa, the European imperialists and colonialists at the Berlin Conference of 1884/1885 respected King Leopold II’s ‘property right.’ It was only in 1908 that he made Congo a Belgian colony (Ibid.). Among other serious harms and damages, King Leopold II’s brutal oppression and exploitation resulted in the death of around 10 million people which was half or 50 percent of the population then (Ibid.). After independence in 1960 when Patrice Lumumba was democratically elected to head the new government, he strongly believed, and asserted in his inaugural speech, that political independence without economic independence will still leave the country in imperial chains. Not pleased with Lumumba’s resolve to make the country economically independent of imperial powers ‘which were hoping to keep their hold over the country’s resources,’ the United States of America and Belgium, as confirmed by the then (American) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) chief in Congo, plotted the assassination of Lumumba and then recruited and aided anti-Lumumba factions in Congo to carry out the assassination (Hochschild, 2001, p. 287). A Congolese historian, Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja (2011), says: Lumumba’s determination to achieve genuine independence and to have full control over Congo’s resources … was perceived as a threat to western interests …. US and Belgium used all the tools and resources at their disposal, including the United Nations secretariat

58  The complexity of resource curse … to buy the support of Lumumba’s Congolese rivals, and hired killers. (s.p.) Lumumba was assassinated on 17 January 1961 and this ‘heinous crime’ (Ibid.) has destabilised Congo ever since. The enormous negative impact of the assassination makes it, in Ludo de Witte’s (2001) view, the most important, albeit negatively important, assassination of the twentieth century. Lumumba was eventually succeeded by Joseph-Désiré Mobuto Sese Seko Koko Ngbendu Wa Ba Zanga whose coup d’état was ‘endorsed by the USA in 1965’ (Carpenter, 2012, p. 4; Olsson & Fors, 2004, p. 323). Despite his very long run oppression of his people and plunder of his country, not least the stashing away of US$4 billion in Swiss banks, Mobuto was referred to as ‘one of our most valued friends’ by President George Bush Sr. (Hochschild, 2001, p. 288; Carpenter, 2012, p. 5). Mobuto, who ruled for over three decades, effectively ruled DRC as if he were running his own private business. He plundered and squandered the resources of the country even as the Congolese were dying in conflicts and dying of poverty. After the overthrow of Mobuto, his successor, Laurent Kabila, merely followed his footsteps. The latter governed the DRC as if he came to power to accomplish, ironically, the mission which was begun by the man he overthrew. Alongside other conflicts, the DRC has experienced two protracted and wasteful civil wars. Nearly six million people have lost their lives due to these conflicts. Out of the 5.4 million people who lost their lives between 1996 and 2010 because of violent conflicts, 45 percent are children. Although the war has officially ended, 45,000 people still die monthly in the seemingly never-ending war that is ‘the deadliest war since World War II’ (Carpenter, 2012, p. 11). Regrettably, in the DRC an alarming number of people die every day in a never-ending war that is immediately caused by the government and various rebel groups that fight over minerals but remotely caused by MNCs that mine the solid minerals, foreign states whose MNCs mine the solid minerals and the global institutional order that legitimises the sale of the minerals that are gotten from this process. With this destructive war still raging, it is not any surprise that the DRC remains one of the poorest countries in the world. On every – and any imaginable – economic and political indicator or metric, the DRC performs dismally. The lives of its 60 million people, like the lives of those who have been sent to early graves, are wastefully, in Hobbesian terms, nasty, brutish and short. The conflicts in the DRC make the resources of the country a free-for-all affair which in turn fuels the already existing conflicts. Columbite-Tantalite, popularly known as coltan, particularly attracts plunderers to DRC which has 64–80 percent of the world’s deposit of coltan. It is: the most profitable natural resource the Congo possesses, more so than gold or diamonds, and one of the most cherished minerals in the world

The complexity of resource curse 59 …. It is fundamental in sustaining and developing our civilization as it is used in almost all modern technological devices. (Carpenter, 2012, p. 6) At the ‘formal’ end of the second civil war, which started in 1998 and ended in 2002/2003, no less than ‘seven foreign governments, sometimes in collusion with mining companies,’ were involved in plundering the country’s resources (Gilpin & Downie, 2009, p. 2). No wonder the second civil war was referred to as ‘world war.’ The DRC is home to around one-third of the world’s cobalt and about two-thirds of the world’s coltan. It ‘is also extravagantly endowed with copper, cassiterite (tin ore), diamonds, and gold. Yet this abundance of riches has led to war and poverty instead of peace and prosperity’ (Ibid.). The DRC, which is as huge as the whole of Western Europe, is home to minerals including uranium, diamonds, gold, tin, cobalt, coltan, etc. worth US$24 trillion which ‘equals the combined GDP of Europe and the United States’ (Carpenter, 2012, p. 5). In plundering and in trade, both legal and illegal, natural resources worth around US$6 million are shipped, flown, driven or taken out of the DRC every day (Carpenter, 2012, p. 5). In summary, in the DRC, if there is anything that has any practical meaning, surely it is not the United Nations (1962) Declaration which says that: The right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the interest of their national development and of the well-being of the people of the state concerned. (s.p.) Surely, if natural resources have not been blessings to Africa, then they have not been blessings to the DRC. If natural resources have been curses to Africa, then they have been curses to the DRC. If oil is the Devil’s excrement in Nigeria, coltan is the Devil’s excrement in the DRC. If oil and diamonds have not been gifts to Angolans, then coltan and other resources have not been gifts to Congolese. And if oil and diamonds are Trojan Horses to Angolans, then coltan and other resources too are Trojan Horses to Congolese. Why Equatorial Guinea is less of an Equatorial Country and more of an Equatorial business Some past and present African heads of state (in some cases fathers are predecessors and sons are successors), their allies, and warlords who are notorious for international resource privilege include General Ibrahim Babangida and General Sanni Abacha of Nigeria, José Eduardo dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi of Angola, Joseph-Désiré Mobuto Sese Seko Koko Ngbendu Wa Ba Zanga, Laurent-Désiré Kabila and Joseph Kabila of DRC, Samuel Doe

60  The complexity of resource curse and Charles Taylor of Liberia, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah and Johnny Koroma of Sierra Leone, Omar Bongo Ondimba and Ali Bongo Ondimba of Gabon, and Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo and Teodorin Nguema Obiang Mangue of Equatorial Guinea. In Equatorial Guinea, the autocratic Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo who has been in power since 1979 has epitomised absolute dictatorship to the extent that he describes himself as the God of Equatorial Guinea. Having personalised the country and its oil wealth, Mbasogo feels like the God of the country. Africa’s third-largest oil exporter behind Angola and Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea as of 2007: has the fourth highest average income in the world: 15 percent higher than the per capita income of the United States [ …. Yet] raw sewage runs through the streets of the country’s capital, three quarters of the country’s people are malnourished, and the majority of its citizens survive on less than … $1 a day. (Wenar, 2008, pp. 7, 6) Since 1995, over two and half decades, the country’s average daily export of oil has been 400,000 barrels: a bonanza that has made the country wealthier, in terms of GDP per capita, than France, Japan, and the United Kingdom. Little of this wealth, however, has helped the vast majority of Equatorial Guinea’s 700,000 people; today, three out of every four Equatorial Guineans live on less than $2 a day. (Diamond & Mosbacher, 2013) Since oil was discovered in the 1990s, Equatorial Guinea has become a rich country; but a rich country with very poor people. Equatorial Guinea’s oil reserves are more than one billion barrels. Yet Equatorial Guineans are some of the poorest people in the world and the average Equatorial Guinean lives in abject poverty. Obiang, whose personal wealth was US$600 million in 2007, and expectedly far higher now, spent US$55 million to purchase a sixth private jet in addition to five private jets he already has, while Equatorial Guinea remains home of some of the poorest people in the world. In 2010, alarmingly, 75 percent of Equatorial Guineans lived on less than US$700 per annum while the country had Africa’s highest per capita income of about US$35,000 (Lawson-Remer & Greenstein, 2012). Like father, like son! Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mangue, who is the heir apparent to the ‘throne’ and the oldest of Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo’s sons, has followed the corrupt footsteps of his father. Apart from his wealth in Equatorial Guinea and Paris, he owned assets in Malibu, California which were worth US$71 million in October 2011 (Diamond & Mosbacher, 2013). No wonder John Ghazvinian describes Equatorial Guinea, and aptly so, as ‘a family business masquerading as

The complexity of resource curse 61 a country’ (Ghazvinian, quoted in Public Policy, 2007). After all, Equatorial Guinea is more of an ‘Equatorial Business’ than an Equatorial country!

Levels of analysis (levels of causality and responsibility) The danger of misdiagnosis (I) In this chapter, although I presented or reviewed some specific moral arguments, generally, I only engaged in a descriptive analysis of resource curse – I will apply cosmopolitism and statism to resource curse in Chapter 4. The descriptive analysis is very important because a misdiagnosis (an incorrect descriptive analysis) of the political economy context of natural resources and the political economy conditions of resource-rich states leads to incorrect prescriptive analysis and wrong moral prescriptions. Thomas Pogge’s (2005) prescriptive analysis (international resource privilege and international borrowing privilege) of natural resources in the context of resource curse and Leif Wenar’s (2016) prescriptive analysis (national ownership principle) of natural resources in the context of resource curse are very robust partly because descriptive analyses infuse all aspects of their prescriptive analyses. This does not mean that every prescriptive analysis of natural resources must be predicated on prior descriptive analysis in order to be theoretically plausible. Margaret Moore’s (2019) prescriptive analysis of natural resources in the context of ownership and Megan Blomfield’s (2019) prescriptive analysis of natural resources in the context of climate change are theoretically plausible without prior descriptive analysis. However, absent correct descriptive analysis of the political economy context of resource curse, some prominent statists and cosmopolitans have ended up within incorrect prescript analysis while others ended up with only partially correct prescriptive analysis. For instance, Rawls (1999) committed a huge analytical blunder of discounting the political economy context of natural resources and the political economy conditions of resource-rich states when he wrongly argued that the social and economic development of a society is based on its social and political culture rather than on the amount of natural resources it is endowed with or on how it is affected by international politics or international economy (pp. 74–77). Following this argument, then the responsibility to rectify socio-economic or politico-economic injustice in a society is that of the society itself rather than that of other societies (Rawls, 1999, p. 77). Like Rawls, Beitz’s too committed the aforementioned blunder, although in a different form. Rawls discounted the political economy of natural resources and its role in the conditions of natural resource-endowed states. Unlike Rawls, the early Beitz (1979) overvalued the positive role of natural resources and discounted their negative roles. While the latter Beitz (1999) is sceptical or even oblivious of the empirically robust proof of resource curse thesis in development economics. Beitz (1979) in Political Theory and

62  The complexity of resource curse International Relations, as already mentioned, extended Rawls’ (1971) theory of justice – as conceptualised in A Theory of Justice meant for domestic societies – to the global arena as a theory of global justice. He propounded two cosmopolitan principles of global justice, namely; the resource redistribution principle and global distribution principle. In the resource redistribution principle, he hypothetically imagines a scenario in which each state is self-sufficient, each absolutely depends on its own resources and labour and does not trade with any country. Furthermore, some states are well resource-endowed and manage their resource-endowment very well. But other states are not resource-endowed and this lack of resource-endowment negates all the positive efforts they make to be reasonably well-off. He thinks that in view of the resource redistribution principle, the resource-endowed and well-off states are to aid, that is, redistribute part of their resources, to the non-resource-endowed and worse-off states in order for the latter to be able to put in place the necessary political and economic structure to guarantee the well-being of their citizenry vis-à-vis to meet their basic human needs (Beitz, 1979, p. 137). Thus the resource redistribution principle assures individuals in societies that are not resource-endowed that their unfavourable fate will not be a hindrance to their realisation of economic conditions that will be enough for the sustainability of just social institutions and the protection of human rights (Beitz, 1979, p. 141). In the hypothetical scenario in the global distribution principle, like the hypothetical scenario in the resource redistribution principle, some states are well resource-endowed while others are not. The resource-endowed states are well-off because of their resources while the non-resource-endowed states are worse-off because of their lack of resources. But unlike the hypothetical scenario in the resource redistribution principle, these states are not self-sufficient, they are not closed-up and they engage in international trade. Given that this international or global connectivity and interaction entails international or global cooperation, he thinks this is a ground to argue for global distributive justice, namely global difference principle similar to the Rawlsian difference principle for domestic liberal societies. Moreover, presumably, the well-off states are well-off at least partly because of the benefits they derive from being part of the international or global cooperation (although this is not his explicit ground for global distributive justice or global difference principle). Hence, adopting and globalising Rawls’ difference principle, Beitz (1979) argues that the resources or wealth of the well-off states should be redistributed to assist the worseoff states (pp. 154–159, 161–162). Nevertheless, in the ‘Afterword’ to the second edition of Political Theory and International Relations (1999), he adopts a moderate view which I shall present as follows. He argues for what he refers to as ‘a cosmopolitan theory of international distributive justice’ (Beitz, 1979, pp. 198–199). He posits that there are two ways to argue for his theory. The first way he calls the strong thesis and the second way he calls the weak thesis. The theses draw

The complexity of resource curse 63 an analogy between domestic society and international relations and hold that the structures and factors that make distributive justice morally justifiable on the domestic level are analogously present on the global level. The weak thesis posits merely that since international relations resemble domestic societies in terms of their basic structures, international distributive justice morally applies to international relations. While the strong thesis posits that the particular moral principles that international relations should be subjected to are internationalised Rawlsian principles of distributive justice as formulated in A Theory of Justice (Ibid.). For Beitz (1979), given philosophical and practical considerations, the weak thesis seems more essential (p. 199). The weak thesis neither concerns itself with the most excellent or finest institutional structure that should obtain in international politics nor does it concern itself with how individuals ought to conceive their identities or how to identify themselves and their loyalties or who they ought to be loyal to. Rather, it concerns itself with the grounds on which we should justify or criticise institutions and practices (Ibid.). He terms the weak thesis moral cosmopolitanism (Ibid.) according to Pogge’s (1992) understanding of the term which says that every person ‘has a global stature as the ultimate unit of moral concern’ (p. 49). The crux of the weak thesis or moral cosmopolitanism, according to Beitz (1999), is that the unbiased consideration of the stance or argument of everyone that will be affected by institutions and policies determine our decisions regarding the sort of institutions we ought to create and the policies we should choose (200). Beitz divides his arguments for the weak thesis into three categories. In the first category, he contrasts the global society with domestic society. Under this category, he explains that in order to formulate principles of justice for domestic society, Rawls bases his baseline for gauging fair cooperation in the society on equality. Likewise, it might seem plausible to judge the logic of global justice based on the equality baseline (Beitz, 1999, p. 203). He goes on to say that to have a proper conception of distributive justice on the global level, we acknowledge that there are certain basic structures that are necessary due to the nature and extent of socio-economic integration, and then try to establish moral principles which are requirements that must be met by these structures in order for equal persons who are simultaneously free and moral to accept the principles. According to Beitz (1999), our current situation is far from this ideal (pp. 203–204). Because on different levels of political associations in our world, there are institution and norms that people are subjected to, for the most part, without them consenting, and their life prospects can be radically controlled by these institutions and norms (Beitz, 1999, p. 205). He termed his second category of arguments ‘determinants of the political and economic development of societies’ (Ibid.). In this category, he says it is possible to simultaneously accept in principle that moral principles demand that there is an economic threshold on the global level below which will be

64  The complexity of resource curse unjust for persons to live, and to accept that it is impossible, practically, to ensure this threshold globally (Ibid.). This is based on the Rawlsian argument that the social and economic development of a society is based on its social and political culture rather than on the amount of natural resources it is endowed with or on how it is affected by international politics or international economy (Rawls, 1999, pp. 74–77; Beitz, 1999, p. 205). Following this argument, Rawls (1999) thinks that the responsibility to rectify socio-economic or politico-economic injustice in a society is that of the society itself rather than that of other societies (p. 77). However, Beitz (1999) argues that we cannot confidently conclude that the presence or absence of natural resources necessarily leads to the development of a state or its underdevelopment, given that our current state of knowledge of the correlation between natural resources endowment and development is poor or uncertain (p. 205). Furthermore, he posits that we cannot argue plausibly that the development of a state depends on its socio-political or socio-economic culture rather than on its position in the global political economy. This is because it is practically unfeasible to separate international influence from domestic influence – both are intertwined – in the development of a society. Also, the international politico-economic structures, institutions and organisations that regulate the global economy impact poor countries negatively and contribute to shaping the domestic structures of these countries to a large extent. These countries have to be part of this structure which is essentially meant to benefit the wealthy (Beitz, 1999, p. 205). Hence, Beitz (1999) asserts that even if domestic circumstances and issues crucially determine the socio-economic development or under-development of a state, they may be considered to be necessary condition rather than sufficient condition for the development or under-development of a state (p. 207). Beitz (1999) terms the third category of arguments ‘the claims of compatriots’ (p. 208). In this category, although one might hold that cosmopolitan moral principles should guide international relations, however one can, at the same time, hold that whenever there is a conflict between the interests of compatriots and others, one should always give preference to compatriots (Shue, 1980, p. 132; Beitz, 1999, p. 208). Since giving preference to compatriots might lead one to prioritise ‘the less urgent needs of compatriots’ over ‘the more urgent needs of others,’ this is inconsistent with cosmopolitanism because it violates the core principle of cosmopolitanism – the principle of equality which says that everyone, irrespective of affiliations, should be treated equally (Beitz, 1999, p. 208). According to Beitz (1999), any justifiable form of the priority argument will have to be weakened to become different from what it already looks like in our common morality and be redefined to create room for global distributive justice (p. 214). Therefore, even if we grant that the interests of compatriots should be given preference, this will not be mutually exclusive with accepting the weak thesis on global distributive justice.

The complexity of resource curse 65 In the first edition of Political Theory and International Relations, he considered the disagreement between the morality of states and cosmopolitan morality as the most important and productive theoretical issue in international political theory (Ibid). Unlike cosmopolitan morality, the morality of states upholds the sovereignty of states, the principle of non-intervention and preference for the needs of compatriots (Ibid.). Contrary to his earlier view, in the ‘Afterword’ to the second edition, he thinks the resolution of the tension between social liberalism and cosmopolitan liberalism is the major issue that international political theory has to deal with (Beitz, 1999, p. 216). The international community is understood by social liberalism to be a community populated by domestic societies. On the one hand, the duty of the domestic societies is to ensure the welfare and safeguard the interests of their citizens. On the other hand, the duty of the international community is to ensure a milieu where domestic societies will thrive (Beitz, 2000, pp. 677–678). For social liberalism, international relations principles apply to domestic societies. Since international relations principles are only justifiable by the consideration of the primary interests of the societies which the principles apply to; international relations principles are only justifiable by the consideration of the interests of domestic societies (Ibid.). Cosmopolitan liberalism, unlike social liberalism, does not grant domestic societies any moral privilege over persons or individuals. Because, for cosmopolitan liberalism, on the deepest level our social world is not composed of domestic societies, states, nations, or peoples as Rawls would have it; it is rather composed of persons (Ibid.). Consequently, cosmopolitan liberalism holds that international relations principles are only justifiable by considering the primary interests of individuals (Ibid.). Beitz’s defence of the weak thesis reveals his preference for cosmopolitan liberalism over social liberalism. However, it is his shift from defending the strong thesis in the first edition of Political Theory and International Relations (1979) to defending the weak thesis in the second edition (1999) that also reveals that he became somewhat sceptical about cosmopolitanism. In the final analysis, Beitz (1999) concedes to political realists that: In the application of principles to practice, normative and empirical considerations interact in complex ways …. Basing decisions to act on normative principles without paying attention to these complexities is certain to yield bad decisions. (1999, p. 183) One might even argue that he seemed to drift towards what can be referred to as a weak statism. But this will be far too fetched. For what he drifted to is, accurately in his own terminology, ‘the weak thesis’ – cosmopolitan morality – which simultaneously argues for global distributive justice in general, but not the globalisation of Rawlsian distributive justice in particular; and upholds cosmopolitan liberalism but accepts its limitations.

66  The complexity of resource curse The danger of misdiagnosis (II) Unlike Rawls (1971) and the early Beitz (1979), the latter Beitz (1999) came close to an accurate diagnosis of resource curse when he rightly asserted that, as earlier mentioned, even if domestic circumstances and issues crucially determine the socio-economic development or under-development of a state, they may be considered to be necessary condition rather than sufficient condition for the development or under-development of a state (p. 207). In order to avoid the misdiagnosis of resource curse, in the descriptive analysis in this chapter, I showed the characteristics that make resource curse cases complex cases of global justice. Firstly, resource curse cases are neither purely due to domestic factors nor purely due to global factors. They are always due to both domestic and global factors. Hence, they are cases of global justice that allow us to do a multi-dimensional analysis. Secondly, resource curse cases are always products of multi-agencies rather than a single agency. Hence, they are cases of global justice that allow us to do a multi-level analysis. Thirdly, given the number of people living in resource cursed-countries, the numerous lives lost and the amount of resources wasted during conflicts because of resource curse, the lives at stake due to poverty that is caused by resource curse and the amount of money involved in resource curse, solving the problem of resource curse, surely, will help alleviate global poverty. Solving the problem of resource curse will not eradicate the problems of global poverty and injustice. However, it will go a long way to alleviate them. Fourthly, we can talk about global justice in terms of armed conflicts, humanitarian intervention, and so on. Many of these other areas are traditionally looked at ‘legally’ within the purview of international law and international justice, but can also, and are actually sometimes looked at ‘morally’ within the purview of international ethics or global justice. However, global justice is mainly global economic or distributive justice. When those who are resource-rich (who could have been called upon to help the less resource-rich or those who are not resource-rich) are yet poor despite their resources, one wonders whether it is morally justified to ask others (most of whom are not resource-rich and less resource-rich) to come to their aid. Relying on the descriptive analysis in the preceding sub-chapters, in this sub-chapter I will explain my approach to the prescriptive analysis of resource curse and explain the moral dimensions of the roles different agents play in resource curse. ‘Resource curse is a man-made phenomenon; it is caused by the activities of humans’ (Abumere, 2015a, p. 238). I will identify the different human agents and their different activities which cause resource curse. This will prepare the grounds for the detailed prescriptive analysis in Chapter 3 where I will discuss the causal roles played by different agents in resource curse and then tackle the complexity of resource curse and the multifaceted nature of the activities that cause resource

The complexity of resource curse 67 curse. As I have shown in the preceding sub-chapter, and as I shall show in Chapter 3, there are different factors and agents involved in causing resource curse. No singular agent or simple factor causes resource curse. In the causation of resource curse, every agent and factor plays a contributory role, although the roles some agents and factors play are more critical than the roles other agents and factors play. Combining all these roles, both the more critical roles and the less critical roles, the consequence is resource curse. In spite of the complex and multiple nature of the cause of resource curse, it is still possible to ascertain the specific roles different agents and factors play. Lumping all the factors and agents together and dealing with them merely as complex factors or seeing them only as multiple agents does not allow us to properly ascertain the causal role played by different agents and to assign responsibility to different agents based on their causal roles. It is for this reason that I analyse resource curse on different levels. Thus the levels of analysis or levels of causality and responsibility approach. In my analysis, the factors responsible for resource curse are the handiwork of the following agents: individual agents; collective agents; corporations; the state; and the global institutional order. In other words, the factors responsible for resource curse are the handiwork of human agents. The activities of these human agents can be analysed at the micro level and the macro level. The micro level consists of the individual, collective and corporate levels while the macro level consists of the state and the global institutional order levels. (Abumere, 2015a, p. 238) At the individual level, I deal with individuals. I consider persons who in their actions and omissions stand sui generis, independently, on their own accord in resource curse in Africa to be individuals (Abumere, 2015a, p. 240). While at the collective level, I deal with collectives. I consider a plurality of individuals, that is two or more individuals or a group of individuals, that act jointly in resource curse in Africa to be collective. So, collective refers neither to an institution, nor a group of individuals forming an institution, nor a corporation, and so on (Ibid.). At the corporate level, I deal with corporations. In resource curse in Africa, my consideration of what counts as a corporation is not restricted to MNCs in the extractive industry although comparatively, they have a more causal, contributory or constitutive role in resource curse than other corporations. Alongside mining, oil and gas companies in the extractive industry, I consider the following to be corporations: financial institutions (notably banks) and law firms which aid money laundry; lobby groups that lobby for the interests of the MNCs in the extractive industry; and media groups and public relations firms that launder the image of the MNCs in the extractive industry (Ibid.). At the state level, I deal with the state. The state refers to the particular resource-cursed country in Africa on whose behalf its government

68  The complexity of resource curse interfaces with the other agents of resource curse or levels of causality and responsibility. While at the global institutional order level, I deal with the global institutional order. What I consider to be the global institutional order are: the current set of political, economic, legal and social institutions, rules, regimes and norms which systemically, directly and indirectly regulate, shape and affect the relationships, interactions, competitions and cooperation among persons, collectives, peoples, states, corporations and organisations globally. In this sense, organisations such as the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), etc. are part of the global institutional order just as regimes such as free trade, intellectual property right, etc. are part of the global institutional order. Although different organisations and regimes carry different weights and are important to different degrees, fundamentally they are all part of the same global institutional order. (Abumere, 2015a, p. 248) In the above vein, the individual, who might be working for a corporation or the state, is said to have a causal role and a corresponding moral responsibility when her/his actions and omissions are analysed as the actions and omissions of an individual rather than as the actions and omissions of a corporation or the state. So too a corporation that is staffed and managed by individuals is said to have a causal role and a corresponding moral responsibility when its actions and omissions are analysed as actions and omissions of a corporation rather than as actions and omissions of individuals who acted or failed to act in the name of the corporation. The same analysis applies to collectives, the state and the global institutional order. In the next chapter I argue that any actor or agent that contributes to causing resource curse is morally responsible on the ‘level,’ and to the extent, the actor or agent contributes to causing resource curse. As shall be seen in the course of this discussion, the relevant actors or agents are individuals, collectives, corporations, the state and the global institutional order. Given that these actors or agents are not only morally responsible to the extent they contribute to causing resource curse, but are also morally responsible on the ‘analytic level’ they contribute to causing resource curse, my usage of levels of analysis is not value-neutral but laden with moral denotation and connotations. I am applying the notion of moral responsibility to corporations, the state and the global institutional order as if they were moral agents. One might argue that this sort of extension of the notion of moral responsibility is implausible or even totally wrong on the ground that corporations, the state and the global institutional order are not persons and it is only persons who can be moral agents. Nevertheless, before I applied

The complexity of resource curse 69 the notion of moral responsibility to corporations, the state and the global institutional order, I anthropomorphised or personified them, that is, I saw them as humans or persons. Hence it was possible and plausible to treat them as moral agents. The above anthropomorphising or personification of corporations, the state and the global institutional order is not out of place. Political realists treat states as rational actors in the international arena, and economists treat firms as rational actors in the market. Prima facie, states and firms are not persons, it is only persons that are rational, and so states and firms cannot be rational. Political realists and economists know this. But for theoretical purposes, they treat states and firms as if they were persons and ascribe rationality to them. So too for theoretical purposes I treat corporations, the state and the global institutional order as if they were persons, and ascribe moral responsibility to them. Adopting the levels of analysis approach, I contextualise it as levels of causality and responsibility. The two terminologies – ‘levels of analysis’ and ‘levels of causality and responsibility’ – have the same meaning and usage in this book. I am using the terminology ‘levels of causality and responsibility’ as a substitute for ‘levels of analysis.’ My preference lies in the former rather than the latter because the former has moral denotation and connotations while the latter does not. Hence, my substitution of the terminology ‘levels of analysis’ with ‘levels of causality and responsibility.’ The levels of analysis, or levels of causality and responsibility, approach is not a misnomer. Social scientists are used to analysing various levels in order to ascertain correlation or attribute causality to such levels. For instance, as Kenneth Waltz (1954) shows in Man, the State and War, this approach can be used to analyse the individual level (First Image) as classical realists have done, it can be used to analyse the role of the state (Second Image), and can also be used to analyse the role of the international system (Third Image). Waltz himself did all the above analyses although he favours the international system (Third Image) analysis. So too I am dealing with different levels of analysis or different levels of causality and responsibility. I will use the analysis in the individual, collective, corporate, the state and global institutional order levels to show that neither cosmopolitanism nor statism is enough to understand and deal with the problem of resource curse. Consequently, this approach justifies the need for fusion of horizons; fusing the horizons of the two theories together in order to be able to understand and deal with the problem of resource curse. Ultimately, this justifies my ‘general theory’ of global justice.

Notes

1. For the over-dependence of powerful foreign states on the natural resources of their colonies and some of the effects of such over-dependence, specifically climate change, see Blomfield (2019).

70  The complexity of resource curse

2. For instance, for the relationship between colonialism (external over-dependence) and the susceptibility of former colonies to climate change, see Blomfield (2019).

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The complexity of resource curse 71 Hodges, T. (2004) Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State. 2nd ed. Lysaker: Fridtjof Nansen Institute. Humphreys, M. et al. (eds.) (2007) Escaping the Resource Curse. New York, Columbia University Press. Jones, S. (2008) Sub-Saharan Africa and the ‘resource curse’: Limitations of the conventional wisdom. Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). Working paper number: 14. Krueger, A. O. (1974) The political economy of the rent-seeking society. American Economic Review, 64, 291–303. Lam, R. & Wantchekon, L. (1999) Dictatorship as a political Dutch disease. Economic Growth Centre, Yale University. Working paper number: 795. Lawson-Remer, T. & Greenstein, J. (2012) Beating the resource curse in Africa: A global effort. Africa in Fact, 3, 20–24. Leite, C. & Weidmann, M. (1999) Does mother nature corrupt? natural resources, corruption and economic growth. International Monetary Fund. Working paper number: 85. Mahtani, D. (2008) The new scramble for Africa’s resources. Financial Times. [Online]. Available from: https://www.ft.com/content/a6a63200-cad7-11dc-a960000077b07658 [Accessed 28th October 2011]. Mauro, P. (1995) Corruption and growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90, 681– 712. https://doi.org/10.2307/2946696 Moore, M. (2019) Who Should Own Natural Resources? Cambridge, Polity Press. Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. (n.d.) Overview. [Online] Available from: www.neiti.org.ng [Accessed, 1st June 2019]. Nzongola-Ntalaja, G. (2011) Patrice Lumumba: The most important assassination of the 20th century. The Guardian, 17th January. Olsson, O. & Fors, H. C. (2004) Congo: The prize of predation. Journal of Peace Research, 41 (3), 321–336. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0022343304043772 Pogge, T. (1992) Cosmopolitanism and sovereignty. Ethics, 103 (1), 48–75. Pogge, T. (2005) World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms. Cambridge, Polity Press. Pogge, T. (2010) Politics as Usual: What Lies Behind the Pro-Poor Rhetoric. Cambridge, Polity Press. Public Policy. (2007) ‘The Resource Curse’: Why Africa’s Oil Riches don’t trickle down to Africans. [Online] Available from: https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/ article/the-resource-curse-why-africas-oil-riches-dont-trickle-down-to-africans/ [Accessed 28th October 2011]. Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Harvard University Press. Rawls, J. (1999) The Law of Peoples: With The Idea of Public Reason Revisited. Cambridge, Harvard University Press. Revenue Watch Institute. (2010) Revenue Watch Index 2010. [Online] Available from: http://www.revenuewatch.org/ourwork/countries/angola.php [Accessed 28th October 2011]. Ross, M. L. (2003) Nigeria’s oil sector and the poor. [Presentation] Department for International Development (DFID), 23rd May. Sachs, J. D. & Warner, A. M. (1995) Natural resource abundance and economic growth. National Bureau of Economic Research. Working paper number: 5398. Sala-i-Martin, X. & Subramanian, A. (2003) Addressing the natural resource curse: An illustration from Nigeria. International Monetary Fund. Working paper number: 03/139.

72  The complexity of resource curse Shue, H. (1980) Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and US Foreign Policy. Princeton, Princeton University Press. Smith, A. (1776[1999]) An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. London, Penguin Books. Soros, G. (2007) Afterword. In: Humphreys, M. et al. (eds.) Escaping the Resource Curse. New York, Columbia University Press, pp. xi–xv. Strange, T. & Bayley, A. (2008) Sustainable Development: Linking Economy, Society, Environment. Paris, OECD. Tornell, A. & Lane, P. R. (1999) The voracity effect. American Economic Review, 89 (1), 22–46. Transparency International. (2018) Our Work in Nigeria. [Online] Available from: https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/nigeria# [Accessed 1st January 2019]. Tullock, G. (1967) The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies and theft. Western Economic Journal, 5, 224–232. Tullock, G. (1993) Rent-Seeking. Brookfield, Edward Elgar. United Nations. (1962) Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources. United Nations General Assembly. Resolution number: 1803. United Nations Environmental Programme. (2015) Integrating the Three Dimensions of Sustainable Development: How to achieve a Balanced, Ambitious and Inclusive Framework; UNEP Post 2015. UNEP. Note number: 1. Waltz, K. N. (1954) Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis. New York, Columbia University Press. Wantchekon, L. (1999) Why do resource dependent countries have authoritarian governments?. Yale University. [Working paper]. Wenar, L. (2008) Property rights and the resource curse. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 36 (1), 2–32. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2008.00122.x Wenar, L. (2016) Blood Oil: Tyrants, Violence, and the Rules That Run the World. Oxford, Oxford University Press. International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD). (n.d.) What is sustainable development?: Environmental, economic and social well-being for today and tomorrow. [Online] Available from: https://www.iisd.org/sd/ [Accessed 17th September 2014]. World Bank. (n.d.) What is sustainable development. [Online] Available from: www. worldbank.org/depweb/english/sd.html [Accessed 17th September 2014]. World Commission on Environment and Development (1987) Our Common Future. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

3

Resource curse as a complex case of global justice

Agents of resource curse: Micro level The individual level I shall start by looking at the individual level of analysis or the individual level of causality and responsibility where cosmopolitanism, or particularly interactional moral cosmopolitanism, is primarily applicable. In view of its principles, cosmopolitanism helps us to understand the causal role of the individual in resource curse. On the individual level, individual agents contribute to causing resource curse in various ways. I classify the various ways as follow. On the one hand, in terms of the individual qua individual: Individuals contribute to the causes of resource curse in Africa, when sui generis, they seek rent for themselves, corrupting or being corrupted for their own sake – giving or taking bribes for themselves. When the individual agents, sui generis, seek rent or give or take bribe for themselves, they place priority on their selfish needs at the expense of the rightful owners of the resources, that is, the citizens of the resource-rich states. (Abumere, 2015a, p. 241) On the other hand, firstly, in connection with corporations: Individual agents contribute to the causes of resource curse in Africa by acting as agents of rent-seeking MNCs. When the individual agent seeks rent on behalf of MNCs (often oil, gas and mining companies) she does not seek rent for herself. But by seeking rent for the corporations she represents, in the process or as a means of getting rent, she corrupts officials of the government or other sectors of the resource-rich state which is detrimental to the citizenry. By so doing, she is placing priority on the interest of the MNCs, in reality on the interest or profit of the share-holders of the MNCs, at the expense of the citizenry of the resource-rich state. (Ibid.)

74  Resource curse as a complex case Secondly, in connection with corporations: The individual can contribute to resource curse in Africa as an agent of financial institutions, e.g. banks, which aid money laundry and other financial transactions concerning resource course. Here, note that my focus for now is not on the financial institutions themselves, but the individual who acts on behalf of the financial institutions. As for the role of agents of financial institutions which aid money laundry and financial transactions related to resource curse, it is abundantly clear as a matter of historical fact that without their aid many corruption cases related to resource curse would not have been able to be executed. Infamous Swiss accounts, secret accounts in Seychelles, Cayman Islands, Panama, etc. aided by financial agents are some of the major routes for capital flight, money laundry and other illicit financial transactions concerning resource curse in Africa. (Abumere, 2015a, pp. 241–242) Thirdly, in connection with corporations: Individuals also contribute to the causes of resource curse in Africa as lawyers helping to facilitate corruption. This can be done legally by looking for loopholes in legal systems or illegally by helping companies escape prosecution from their activities that resulted in negative externalities, providing cover-ups to corrupt clients, etc. These lawyers may often represent their legal firms or act on their own. In any way they act, they are basically putting priority on the interest of their clients, firms and their own selfish interests to the detriment of the rightful owners of the resources from which the money is gotten by their clients. (Abumere, 2015a, p. 242) Fourthly, in connection with corporations: Individual agents can also contribute to the causes of resource curse in Africa by representing public relations companies, the media or a medium that misinforms or disinforms the public concerning the roles of certain actors in resource curse. For instance, when people are misinformed about the activities of a company that is causing resource curse, rather than taking action, say, protesting or suing the company, they might just decide not to act against the company believing the company is doing no harm. (Ibid.) Fifthly, in connection with corporations: Individual agents can also contribute to the causes of resource curse in Africa by lobbying on behalf of lobby groups or MNCs in order to

Resource curse as a complex case 75 get law makers and policy makers to make laws and policies that will benefit the MNCs even when those laws and policies will contribute to resource curse and will be detrimental to the citizenry. (Abumere, 2015a, p. 243) In the same vein, on the one hand, firstly, in connection with the state: Individuals can contribute to resource curse in Africa by acting as corrupt agents of the government or other sectors of the resource-rich state. When the individual agents as officials of the government or other sectors of the resource-rich state allow themselves to be corrupted in order to facilitate rent-seeking, they place priority on their selfish interests at the expense of the citizenry they are supposed to be representing. (Abumere, 2015a, p. 241) Secondly, in connection with the state: Individuals can contribute to resource curse in Africa as policy makers responsible for bad or poor policies that aid resource curse. Individuals are morally blameworthy if they intentionally make poor or bad polices to satisfy their own interests at the expense of the citizenry. Nevertheless, they can make poor or bad policies that lead to resource curse and yet not be morally blameworthy. This latter case does not seem very comprehensible; hence it needs a bit of explanation which I will do by citing an example. Every Dutch disease is an effect of a cause which is always bad or poor economic policy of lack of diversification of production. But this does not necessarily suggest that the policy makers that contributed to or caused a particular Dutch disease prioritised their own interests at the expense of their citizenry. Rather, it might just be that the policy makers were not good enough in making good economic policies or were not good enough to run the economy. (Abumere, 2015a, pp. 242–243) Thirdly, in connection with the state: Individual agents can contribute to resource curse in Africa as law makers responsible for laws that aid resource curse. This happens when the individual agents as legislators are part of the machinery that made a law that aids resource curse. For instance: sponsoring a bill that is passed into law, or voting for a bill, that allows oil companies to abnegate their corporate social responsibilities or community development in extraction areas or communities; or voting against bills that were meant to check the negative externalities of oil companies. The individual agents might be acting for different reasons. Some might act because they have been corrupted or they stand to benefit economically

76  Resource curse as a complex case from the law. In this case, we can say the individual agents are putting priority on their selfish interests at the expense of the populace. But others might act due to certain economic ideologies, political ideologies,1 political philosophies, etc. In this case, if for instance the individual agents believe that too much regulation leads to under-productivity and consequently non-competitiveness of the economy, intuitively we are likely to say they have the interest of the citizenry at heart albeit their ideology non-intentionally leads to resource curse. So they are not morally blameworthy. But if they defend such ideologies as a means of satisfying their selfish interests at the expense of the citizenry, then they are morally blameworthy. (Abumere, 2015a, p. 241) Fourthly, in connection with the state: as members of the judiciary, for instance judges miscarrying justice, individual agents can contribute to resource curse in Africa. This can be illustrated in the following simple way. The individual as a judge miscarries justice in order to let off the hook defendants who, beyond any reasonable doubt, have been proven to have engaged in gross illegalities which are connected to resource curse, and the judge must have acted due to ulterior motif. Then certainly she is blameworthy. (Ibid.) Fifthly, in connection with the state: Individuals can contribute to resource curse in Africa as law enforcement agents failing to enforce laws that mitigate resource curse, for instance failing to prosecute ‘suspects.’ When individuals as law enforcement agents failed to enforce the law, for instance, failed to prosecute people responsible for illegalities which resulted in resource curse, we would say they are blameworthy. But if the law is such that even egregious activities that result in resource curse are not illegalities, then the law enforcement agents will have no blame at all for standing by and watching such activities happen. In this latter case the problem is not with the inaction of the law enforcement officers, but the law itself, and hence the law would need to be changed. (Ibid.) On the other hand, finally, in connection with the global institutional order: Individuals can contribute to resource curse in Africa by acting as agents of a rent-seeking foreign government. The individual as an agent of a rent-seeking foreign government is not seeking rent for herself. Rather, the individual agent is seeking rent for the government which

Resource curse as a complex case 77 she represents. Since the government in turn represents its citizenry, by extension or ultimately the individual is seeking rent for the foreign citizenry. By so doing, she is not only placing priority on the interest of the foreign government at the expense of the citizens of the resource-rich state, but also she places priority on the foreign citizenry at the expense of the citizenry of the resource rich-state. (Ibid.) In spite of the above ways (i) to (xii) in which individual agents contribute to resource curse in Africa, it is difficult to expressly say these individuals are anti-cosmopolitan. If we look at the individuals and their activities, often we do not see anything to suggest that they are anti-cosmopolitan in the sense that they are not bigots, racists, supremacists, xenophobes, etc. As ordinary individuals or as singular individuals, they relate with anyone and everyone without any prejudice or discrimination. Yet one wonders how it is possible to say, on cosmopolitan grounds, these individuals share in the causality and responsibility of resource curse. Given that interactional cosmopolitanism assigns direct responsibility for the fulfilment of human rights to other individuals or collective agents, to understand how, although these individuals are not anti-cosmopolitan, but can be said to be part of the causality and responsibility of resource curse, their actions and omissions should be looked at from two angles. Firstly, their actions and omissions should be looked at as individual actions. Secondly, their actions and omissions should be looked at as collective actions (I deal with this argument extensively in The Collective Level section of this sub-chapter in which I do not only look at the individual actions but also the collective actions). As collective actions and omissions, they cause resource curse. And as individual actions, they are part of the collective actions that cause resource curse. Although it is difficult to see how the individual actors in their own right share in the causality and responsibility of resource curse in Africa without being anti-cosmopolitan, a look at their actions and omissions in relation to the principles of cosmopolitanism, namely individualism, universality and generality, will help in my analysis. Firstly, individualism holds that our ultimate units of concern ought to be human beings or persons (Pogge, 2010, p. 114). Where the individual agents fail is that their ultimate units of concern are not human beings or persons; for they are not really concerned about the victims of resource curse or anyone affected negatively due to their actions and omissions. Secondly, universality holds that we ought to attach equal status of ultimate unit of concern to every human being or person (Ibid.). And thirdly, generality holds that everyone ought to be an ultimate unit of concern for everyone (Ibid.). However, the individual agents are interested in their personal welfare, gains, profits, etc. to the detriment of the victims of their negative self-interest. As long as their actions and omissions ensure them of their desired goals, they do not care what harm the actions and omissions

78  Resource curse as a complex case cause the victims. In other words, there is negative self-interest in play. Also, to the detriment of the victims of resource curse, the individual agents are interested in the welfare of their entities – the entities they represent – be it companies, governments, etc. As long as they achieve the goals of their entities they do not care about the negative consequences these cause their victims. When the goals of the entities the individual agent represents have a lot in common with the common good or desires of the general population or victims, there is no harm or there is minimal harm. But when the goals and desires are invariably divergent, there is usually a high probability of grievous harm. But it is hardly the case that the goals of the entities the individual represents will have a lot in common with the goals of the populace. Because the aim of the individual agent is usually to help her entities subvert the goals of the populace. So, if both sets of goals had a lot in common, then there would be no need for subversion. In all the listed 12 scenarios [(i) to (xii)] above, at the expense of the citizenry of the resource-rich states, some individual agents prioritise the interests of the shareholders of their companies, some prioritise the interests of their foreign governments and compatriots, some prioritise the interests of their friends-in-crime or friends-in-immorality (fellow corrupt politicians, judges, CEOs, etc.), and some prioritise just their own interests. Yet others were merely bad or poor policy-makers, unfortunate ideologists or were just procedurally constrained by the law, and so on. Apart from the individuals who were constrained procedurally by law, or merely poor policy-makers or unfortunate ideologists, and so on, the rest – given my proof of culpability or moral responsibility in the last sub-chapter of this chapter – are morally culpable for their roles in resource curse. The culpable individual agents, in view of moral cosmopolitanism, have failed to uphold the principles that everybody weighs equally in moral consideration, no one should be discriminated against, and everyone should be an ultimate unit of moral concern. Because of their culpability, they have the pro tanto obligations which apply to culpable agents as I argue in the last sub-chapter of this chapter. They have the negative duty to refrain from their harm-causing actions and the positive duty to remedy the harm they have already caused. Finally, in view of moral cosmopolitanism, I paraphrase the three standard conceptions of responsibility (which I discuss in the last sub-chapter of this chapter) as follows. The first standard conception will be taken as saying individual agents have a duty to respect everyone as an ultimate unit of moral concern, and they will be blamed if they fail to do so. This blame even becomes apparent especially when the individual’s failure to respect everyone as an ultimate unit of moral concern contributes to the causation of resource curse. The second standard conception will be taken as saying that the individual agents have a duty to help remedy resource curse because of their role in the causation of resource curse. While the third standard conception will be taken as saying that the individual agents are blameworthy

Resource curse as a complex case 79 for resource curse because their deeds are part of the causation of resource curse. The point I am making through the standard conceptions of responsibility and their paraphrases become clearer if we look at the conceptions and paraphrases not as mere independent or separate conceptions and paraphrases. The point is clearer if we look at the conceptions and paraphrases jointly as an argument or specifically as a syllogism: the first conception (paraphrase) being the first premise; the second conception (paraphrase) being the second premise; and the third conception (paraphrase) being the conclusion. The collective level To reiterate, I consider ‘collective’ to be a plurality of individuals – two or more individuals or a group of individuals – who are bound together by a common goal or purpose and act jointly or jointly fail to act in resource curse in Africa. Whatever I said about the singular individual in the preceding section – The Individual Level – is also true of the plurality of individuals in this section. So, I shall simply discuss the collective level by ‘collectivising’ the individual or by ‘pluralising’ the ‘singular individual’ on the individual level. However, ‘I note that the actions or omissions of the individual acting alone or failing to act are not as powerful as those of a collective acting together or failing to act’ (Abumere, 2015a, p. 243) (emphasis in original). Here too, cosmopolitanism, particularly interactional moral cosmopolitanism, is primarily applicable. It helps us to understand the role of the collective. Like individual agents, collective agents can be said to contribute to the causes of resource curse in various ways which, generally, can be summed up in 12 ways. Just as I did in the previous section, I outline the 12 ways, neither by precedent nor antecedent, and neither in chronological, lexical nor in hierarchical order. I outline them below without any special order: i Collective agents contribute to the causes of resource curse in Africa, when sui generis, they seek rent for themselves, corrupting or being corrupted for their own sake – giving or taking bribes for themselves. ii Collective agents can contribute to resource curse in Africa by acting as corrupt agents of the government or other sectors of the resource-rich state or its government. iii Collective agents can contribute to resource curse in Africa by acting as agents of a rent-seeking foreign government. iv Collective agents contribute to the causes of resource curse in Africa by acting as agents of rent-seeking MNCs. v Collective agents can contribute to resource curse in Africa as agents of financial institutions, e.g. banks, which aid money laundering and other illicit financial transactions concerning resource course. vi Collective agents also contribute to the causes of resource curse in Africa as lawyers helping to facilitate corruption.

80  Resource curse as a complex case vii Collective agents can also contribute to the causes of resource curse in Africa by representing public relations companies, the media or a medium that misinforms or disinforms the public concerning the roles of certain actors in resource curse. viii Collective agents can contribute to resource curse in Africa as law-makers responsible for laws that aid resource curse. ix Collective agents can contribute to resource curse in Africa as law enforcement agents failing to enforce laws that mitigate resource curse, for instance failing to prosecute ‘suspects.’ x As members of the judiciary, for instance, judges miscarrying justice, collective agents can contribute to resource curse in Africa. xi Collective agents can contribute to resource curse in Africa as policy-makers responsible for bad or poor policies that aid resource curse. xii Collective agents can also contribute to the causes of resource curse in Africa by lobbying on behalf of lobby groups or MNCs in order to get law-makers and policy-makers to make laws and policies that will benefit the MNCs even when those laws and policies will contribute to resource curse and will be detrimental to the citizenry. Since what is true of the singular individual in the individual level section is also true of the plurality of individuals in this section, and since I am simply discussing the collective level by ‘collectivising’ the individual, or by ‘pluralising’ the ‘singular individual’ on the individual level, I will not rehash the various explanations and arguments in the previous section here. Therefore, I shall simply reiterate that the explanations in the previous section apply here and the arguments are equally valid here. Albeit all the while noting ‘that the actions or omissions of the individual acting alone or failing to act are not as powerful as those of a collective acting together or failing to act’ (Ibid.) (emphasis in original). The corporate level Many MNCs, especially the too-big-to-fail, are very powerful to the extent that even powerful states, that is, developed, high income and well-governed states, that seem to have the power to rein in the MNCs are very cautious when dealing with them or even rarely dare upset them. If the powerful states cannot rein in the MNCs, especially the too-big-to-fail, and if the MNCs seem to have their way in powerful states, then the MNCs can do whatever they want or almost whatever they want in Africa and developing countries such as Angola, DRC, Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria where bad governance is rife (Abumere, 2015a, p. 244). States are of concern to corporations because of the following principal roles states, according to Immanuel Wallerstein (2007), play. Firstly, states determine and regulate the importation and exportation of goods, services, capital and labour across their borders. Secondly, states make the rules that

Resource curse as a complex case 81 regulate property rights within their geographical jurisdictions. Thirdly, states make the rules that regulate the employment and remuneration of employees. Fourthly, states determine the internalisation and externalisation of costs by corporations. Fifthly, states determine the permissibility of monopoly and the types of economic processes in which monopoly is permissible and the extent to which monopoly is permissible. Sixthly, states levy taxes. Finally, in order to protect their local corporations, states ‘can use their power externally to affect the decisions of other states’ (Wallerstein, 2007, p. 46). Chris Brown and Kirsten Ainley (2005), in paraphrasing Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, aptly observe that international relations or international politics, that is, relationships between states, are no longer the only important, or sometimes even the most important, relationships in contemporary global politics. Non-state actors make decisions and act in ways that impact the lives of people to the same extent, and sometimes even to a greater extent, than states do. Consequently, the assumption that states, especially less powerful states, are always capable of effectively regulating powerful non-state actors is wrong. In principle, powerful states have the capacity to regulate powerful non-state actors. However, in practice, the former are unwilling to regulate the latter because of ‘the potential costs of so doing in economic, social and political terms’ (Brown & Ainley, 2005, p. 35). In dealing with states, MNCs can use ‘bribery, political pressure, exchange of advantages’ (Wallerstein, 2007, p. 50). But if a foreign corporation is based in a ‘powerful’ state, the corporation can get the strong state to pressurise the other (not powerful or less powerful) state to acquiesce to the demands of the corporation. According to Wallerstein (2007), ‘this process is central to the life of the interstate system’ (p. 50). MNCs might be involved in different lines of business (oil and gas, diamond, gold, coltan, uranium, banking, etc.), all these different lines of business are all means to one end; profit. Whatever the line of business MNCs are involved in, their common ideology is the maximisation of profit and the minimisation of costs and risks. In this vein, their modus operandi is cost/benefit analysis. MNCs might do a bit of corporate social responsibility, community development, community service, charity project, or they might follow the rules and regulations of the state, but these things are secondary. If the cost of, say, even following rules and regulations outweighs the benefit, they are likely not to follow the rules and regulations. On the other hand, if the benefit outweighs the cost, they will certainly follow the rules and regulations. Consequently, if the benefit derived from exploiting individuals and societies outweighs the cost, minimises cost and maximises profit, MNCs will be prone to exploit individuals and societies. MNCs, especially in Africa’s extractive industries, are incentivised to act illegally and, more often than not, immorally because the immobility of many natural resources entail that these MNCs cannot readily relocate or easily divest from one country to another. Therefore, in order to maintain their business

82  Resource curse as a complex case interests in resources-rich countries in Africa, MNCs are susceptible to colluding, and in fact seek to collude, with politicians through illegal and immoral practices especially political interference in the affairs of the state (Brown & Ainley, 2005, p. 157). Corporations have a causal, contributory or constitutive role in resource curse in Africa in many ways. Oil and gas companies, mining companies and other energy companies in Africa’s extractive industries play a causal, contributory or constitutive role in resource curse in Africa mainly either by seeking rent or by creating negative externalities or by doing both. Negative externalities are costs, ‘accruing to an individual or group – a third party – that is external to a market transaction’ (McConnell et al., 2009, p. 340). While MNCs in Africa’s extractive industries benefit from the negative externalities they create, the harmful burden is borne by the host communities, particularly local communities, and the country. The MNCs: exploit or use resources, e.g. the natural resources of the oil-rich communities, freely without any form of compensation. An oil or gas company in the process of drilling, or a copper, or gold, or uranium company in the process of mining, causes environmental pollution. When the activities of the companies are unchecked and the companies, as they often do, act irresponsibly with impunity, the environmental pollutions are devastating. Land, water and air are polluted, and the economic, health and social hazards are borne by the local communities. (Abumere, 2015a, p. 243) The MNCs, as the saying goes, privatise the profits from production and socialise the risks of, and losses from, production. In essence, in order to produce their goods, the MNCs freely pollute the environment of the local communities without compensation. On the one hand, the companies minimise their cost of production and maximise their profit. On the other hand, the economic, health and social well-being of the inhabitants of the local communities are minimised, even reduced to the barest minimum, and their poverty, diseases, sicknesses, pains and sufferings are maximised. So, the lives of the locals become, in Hobbesian terms, nasty, brutish and short. Committing acts of corruption, notably bribery, is usually the way through which MNCs seek rent. ‘Extractive industries are notoriously subject to bribe requests’ (Nichols, n.d., p. 10). Among the bribery phenomena that pervade the extractive industries in Africa, facilitating (grease) payments which are ‘bribes paid to secure routine, non-discretionary acts from government officials’ (Nichols, n.d., p. 1) are very common. Certain countries where MNCs are headquartered legalise and classify facilitating payments as tax deductibles or expenses of running business (Abumere, 2015a, p. 244) – ‘most affluent countries, until quite recently, allowed their firms to bribe foreign officials and even made such bribes tax-deductible’ (Pogge, 2005, p. 200). Australia is one example among many where such bribes

Resource curse as a complex case 83 are considered as tax deductibles. These sorts of bribes are called grease or facilitating payments. The United States of America, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), international anti-bribery conventions, etc. do not consider grease or facilitating payments as bribes (Nichols, n.d., p. 6). However, they are only not bribes in legal terminology. In effect, they are actually bribes, albeit legalised bribes – ‘the international regime does not require countries to criminalise the payment of these bribes abroad’ (Nichols, n.d., p. 1). Due to moral pressure on the OECD, it started considering the criminalisation of the legal bribe it has always considered to be grease or facilitating payment. The billion dollar- and multimillion dollar-corruption cases in Africa’s extractive industries are made possible by financial institutions (notably banks), financial practitioners (notably bankers), financial and business law firms and lawyers. While the mining, oil and gas companies remain primus inter pares among the corporations that are responsible for resource curse in Africa, banks and law firms aid and abet the crimes of the other agents of resource curse in Africa. The banks and law firms work in concert; the former do the financial transactions while the latter provide legal support or illegal cover-up for the financial transactions. Exploiting loopholes in the legal systems of African states or outright breaking the law, law firms assist mining, oil and gas companies, banks, collectives and individuals to legally or illegally facilitate the movement of money, escape prosecution from illegal activities, and so on (Abumere, 2015a, p. 244). Too many of the world’s financial centres enable the predators, who rely on offshore corporate vehicles to mask their identities, to loop their finances through exotic jurisdictions, while using prestigious law firms, accountants, financial advisers and public-relations firms to give their destructive behaviour a veneer of respectability. (Conde, 2013, s.p.) In addition to the aforementioned forms of rent-seeking, particularly corruption, other ways through which MNCs, collectives and individuals play causal, contributory or constitutive role in resource curse in Africa include tax evasion, transfer pricing and other forms of corporate opacity (Abumere, 2015a, p. 244). In resource curse in Africa, lobby groups are less visible than banks and law firms. Lobbying in the capital cities of African states is not an industry in itself as it is in Washington DC and Brussels. Even if lobbying in, say, Abuja, Luanda, Kinshasa and Malabo is not as sophisticated and coordinated as lobbying in Washington DC and Brussels, both kinds of lobbying have the same modus operandi and aim, namely, interfacing between their clients and government officials and convincing or even inducing the latter to serve the bidding or at least serve or protect the interest of the former. Lobby groups have a causal, contributory or constitutive role in resource

84  Resource curse as a complex case curse in Africa by representing law mining, oil and gas companies and then lobbying law-makers and policy-makers to make laws and policies that are beneficial to the companies even when such laws and policies have causal, contributory or constitutive roles in resource curse and consequently detrimental to the resource-rich African state and its citizens (Ibid.). During the Second World War, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the then president of the United States of America, said about lobbying; ‘Today’s threat to our national security is not a matter of military weapons alone. We know of new methods; the Trojan horse, the fifth column’ (Moser & Lietaert, 2012). That Roosevelt would consider lobbying just as a dangerous threat as military weapons to America’s national security during the Second World War shows how harmful lobbying can be. Furthermore, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, in his farewell speech as the Commander of the Allied Forces, warned against the military-industrial complex. In essence, he was warning against the lobbying which made the military-industrial complex possible; for without lobbying, the US Congress and White House would not have had enough reasons to make laws and policies that would engender the military-industrial complex. It is not every form of lobbying that is positive; in fact most forms of lobbying are negative. It is in the nature of lobbying that in Africa were states often have opaque, unaccountable and weak institutions and strong men rather than transparent, accountable and strong institutions, lobbying degenerates into outright corruption. Lobbying is one way through which agents of resource curse seek rent (Abumere, 2015a, p. 244). This is not to say that governments receive bribes when lobbying degenerates into bribery. Governments qua governments do not receive bribes as such. When I say a government or the public sector is corrupt, I mean the officeholders are corrupt. As Joseph Nye (1967) succinctly puts it, public sector corruption entails using, or more appropriately put, ‘abusing’ a public office or trust for the office holder’s personal benefit rather than public benefit. Moreover, a bribe can be defined as a transaction in which an official, especially a public official, abuses her office to render services in order to receive private benefit in return (Nichols, n.d., p. 2). In resource curse in Africa, unlike lobby groups, public relations companies seem to do a harmless job while the media pretend to be neutral. Public relations companies are not harmless and the media are not neutral because they disinform or at least misinform the public concerning the harmful activities of agents of resource curse. Public relations companies are hired by agents of resource curse to launder their image, therefore, public relations companies clearly lack objectivity. The media too become subjective when they are favourable to agents of resource curse – whether governments, MNCs, collectives or individuals. Moreover, some of these agents of resource curse own, control or are connected to some of the public relations companies and media (Abumere, 2015a, p. 243). Therefore, by their act of collusion, public relations companies and the media have causal,

Resource curse as a complex case 85 contributory or constitutive role in resource curse in Africa and as such, they too are agents of resource curse. In view of the standard conceptions of responsibility, just as individuals and collectives are to blame for their roles in resource curse, so too corporations are to blame for their role in resource curse. Just as individuals and collectives have negative and positive duties in preventing and remedying resource curse, so too corporations have negative and positive duties in preventing and remedying resource curse. As Robert Nozick says, ‘Individuals have rights and there are things you cannot do to them without violating their rights’ (Nozick, 1974, p. 9). To the above assertion, we may add that individuals and peoples, communities and societies have rights and there are things MNCs cannot do to them without violating their rights. MNCs have the negative duties to refrain from rent-seeking and the creation of negative externalities. Financial institutions have the negative duty to refrain from facilitating financial transactions that are connected to resource curse. Law firms have the negative duty to refrain from helping agents of resource curse get away with negative externalities and corruption. Lobby groups have a negative duty to refrain from lobbying law-makers and policy-makers into making bad laws and policies that aid resource curse. And the media and public relations companies have a negative duty to refrain from disinformation and misinformation. In addition, MNCs in the extractive industry, financial institutions, law firms, lobby groups and the media and public relations companies have the positive duty to remedy the damages they have already caused. Given the exploitative tendencies of MNCs, the role of the government and state is not only to make sure there are MNCs that provide goods and services or a viable economy and market. It is also, more importantly, to set a good basic structure2 to determine the relationship between corporations and individuals, corporations and fellow corporations, and corporations and the government and state. This is to ensure that: there is a fair distribution of the advantages and disadvantages from the relationships; and the relationships are mutually beneficial. The government ought to prevent MNCs from acting extra-basic structure or contrary to the basic structure. It is also the role of the state or government to sanction MNCs when they act contrary to the basic structure. So, when corporations are causing resource curse, we know that they are acting contrary to the basic structure and they ought to be sanctioned. If when they act contrary to the basic structure they are not sanctioned, then we know that the basic structure is ineffective and needs to be made effective. And if even when corporations cause resource curse, yet they are not judged to be acting contrary to the basic structure, that is, their actions that cause resource curse are actually in accordance with the basic structure, then we will know that the basic structure is bad and unjust and needs to be fixed. It is the role of the state, through its basic structure and otherwise, to ensure the following. Corporations do not produce undesirable consequences ab

86  Resource curse as a complex case initio. When corporations produce undesirable consequences, they are sanctioned or punished. The damages caused by the undesirable consequences are remedied. There is no production of more undesirable consequences in the future. Because of his commitment to liberalism, John Rawls’ (1977) stance is that we do not have any feasible rules which we can practically: impose on economic agents that can prevent these undesirable consequences. These consequences are often so far into the future, or so indirect, that the attempt to forestall them by restrictive rules that apply to individuals would be an excessive if not impossible burden. Thus we start with the basic structure and try to see how this system itself should make the corrections necessary to preserve background justice. (p. 160) For the above reasons, we need statism to help us fit MNCs into the basic structure of our societies. There is a particular limitation of statism when it is applied to corporations. This limitation is explained as follows. Some individual agents are not citizens of the resource-cursed state and some individual agents do not reside in the resource-cursed state. So too, some corporations are not registered corporations in the resource-cursed state. However, the case of MNCs is even more complex. Many of them are simultaneously registered corporations in the resource-cursed state and registered corporations in their home countries. While the resource-cursed state is seen as a host state, the country where the corporation is headquartered is seen as the home state. Some corporations are not even hosted in the resource-cursed state; they are registered elsewhere, headquartered elsewhere and hosted elsewhere. This creates a dilemma for statism in the following way. In the foregoing discussion, I have been talking about the corporate level as if it were merely domestic. Nevertheless, as just explained, it is also international or global. Here is one limitation of statism; it cannot deal with the international or global aspect of corporations. While, rightly, this aspect is left to the global institutional order, it reminds us that statism alone is not sufficient for the multi-level and complex analysis in this book. Although this aspect of corporation is not ‘the’ reason or ‘the only’ reason why we need a fusion of horizons, it is ‘part’ of the reason or it is ‘one of the’ reasons why we need a fusion of horizons – in the fourth sub-chapter, I explain the grounds for the fusion of horizons, and in Chapter 4, I expatiate on the grounds.

Agents of resource curse: Macro level The State level In resource curse in Africa, the state level is primus inter pares among the levels. It is the most critical level because the collapse of the constitutional framework or basic structure of the state or society leaves the state itself

Resource curse as a complex case 87 and other factors unchecked. In our contemporary world (just as it was in the modern world)3, the state is the principal protector of property rights, in most cases it is only the state that has the legitimacy to set the rules that govern economic, commercial or business activities, and ‘without some state guaranteed protections, the capitalist system cannot function at all’ (Wallerstein, 2007, p. 47). On the government and state factor, on the one hand when I look at government, I look at it in terms of its arms and functions. On the other hand, when I look at the state, I look at it as the unit which embodies or is supposed to embody the basic structure. Analogically, the government is the hub through which the state, the wheel, revolves around. The wheel is not rotational without the hub, but the hub is just a means to help the wheel be functional. The government is to the state what the hub is to the wheel. The government is the representative or face of the state. To see how the state or its government plays a causal, contributory or constitutive role in resource curse in Africa, we do not have to look very far, we only have to look at the arms of government and their critical functions, namely the legislature and law-making, the executive and policy-making and the civil service and policy implementation, and the judiciary and the interpretation of law. The legislature plays a causal, contributory or constitutive role in resource curse when, by commission or action, it ‘makes bad laws that aid resource curse. And by omission or inaction, it fails to make good laws that prevent or fight resource curse’ (Abumere, 2015a, p. 245). The executive and civil service play a causal, contributory or constitutive role in resource curse when, by commission or action, the executive makes bad policies (especially economic policies) and the civil service implements bad laws and policies (especially economic policies) that aid resource curse. And by omission or inaction, the executive fails to make good policies (especially economic policies) and the civil service fails to implement good laws and policies (especially economic policies) that can prevent or mitigate resource curse. In addition, the executive aids and abets resource curse: in terms of law enforcement when, by commission or action, it enforces bad laws that aid resource curse. And when by omission or inaction it fails to enforce good laws that can prevent or fight resource curse. (Ibid.) The judiciary plays a causal, contributory or constitutive role in resource curse firstly, when it is: inefficient or corrupt to such an extent that rather than being the last hope of the common person, it becomes a safe haven for corrupt individuals, collective agents, and companies involved in resource curse activities because the courts are always letting them off the hook. (Ibid.)

88  Resource curse as a complex case Secondly, when it sets bad judicial precedents that ensure that, in the future: perpetrators of activities that enable or engender resource curse will escape prosecution or; only procedural justice, rather than both procedural and substantive justice, is obtainable in cases of resource curse since the nature of the immoral activities that enable resource curse entails that such activities ab initio have fouled substantive justice. In the case of the failure of private markets, the state or government should have the role of correcting the failure. Failure to control certain market failures contribute to resource curse. The state or government’s failure to control these market failures is tantamount to it contributing to the causes of resource curse. One form of market failure is negative externalities and one form of negative externalities is pollution (McConnell et al., 2009, p. 335). In performing one of its duties, namely allocation, the government should not restrict itself to the production of public goods, but it should also correct negative externalities (McConnell et al., 2009, p. 340). Like corporations, some individuals and collectives have exploitative tendencies which can cause or engender resource curse. So, it is also the role of the government or state to check them. But the state or government is not immune from causing resource cause; it is a chief party to resource curse. Given the state’s role in resource curse, the conclusion I reach, in view of the standard conceptions of responsibility, is related to the conclusions I reached on the individual, collective and corporate levels. Just as individuals, collectives and corporations are to blame for their roles in resource curse, so too the state is to blame for its role in resource curse. Just as individuals, collectives and corporations have negative and positive duties in preventing and remedying resource curse, so too the state has negative and positive duties in preventing and remedying resource curse. The state has the negative duties to refrain from making bad laws, enforcing bad laws, making bad policies, implementing bad policies, and unfairly trying resource curse agents in law courts. Also, the state has the positive duties to make good laws, enforce good laws, make good policies, implement good policies and fairly try resource curse agents in law courts. Finally, the state has the positive duty to remedy the damage it has already caused. The global institutional order level To analyse how the global institutional order contributes to resource curse, I do not have to go into an unknown terrain or follow a road that has not been travelled. I only have to go into a terrain that is well known and follow a road that is well travelled by Thomas Pogge and Leif Wenar. A combination of Pogge’s analysis of international resource and borrowing privileges with Wenar’s analysis of national ownership principle will suffice. Before then, I will brief ly look at Hedley Bull’s (2002) analysis of ‘Order and Justice in World Politics’;

Resource curse as a complex case 89 this will provide a helpful background for the appreciation of Pogge’s and Wenar’s analyses. Ali Mazrui (1967) argues that the international system prioritises peace, order and stability at the expense of justice and human rights (pp. 36–38). Bull agrees with Mazrui. However, while Mazrui thinks the situation should be the other way around, Bull defends the status quo. According to Bull (2002): not only is order in world politics valuable, there is also a sense in which it is prior to other goals, such as that of justice. It does not follow from this, however, that order is to be preferred to justice in any given case. (p. 93) Just as in social life order is the precondition which if it exists, allows us to pursue other goals, so too international order is the precondition, which if it exists, allows us to pursue ideas of justice, human rights, sovereignty, etc. Nevertheless, he warns that although order is a priceless precondition for the realisation of justice and other values, order should not be seen as an overriding value. Moreover: to show that a particular institution or course of action is conducive of order is not to have established a presumption that that institution is desirable or that that course of action should be carried out. (Bull, 2002, p. 94) However, the fact that order is not an overriding value does not negate the fact that it is a precondition for justice. Since order is a precondition for justice, without global order human or cosmopolitan justice will be unrealisable (Bull, 2002, p. 93). He asserts that because of the primacy of order over justice, the structure of global order is hostile to human justice. The international order does not provide any general protection of human rights, only a selective protection that is determined not by the merits of the case but by the vagaries of international politics. (Bull, 2002, p. 86) Although the global society recognises human rights that citizens have and obligations that can legitimately be demanded against the state, generally the global society is restrained from making these claims effective, except discriminately and in a warped manner. For him, given that there might be situations whereby the prioritisation of different human rights will be problematic, therefore treating human rights or justice as primary and order as secondary is surely a recipe for disaster. If order were to be seen as secondary to human justice, this might become counterproductive to the extent of threatening or even eroding world order. It is for this reason that

90  Resource curse as a complex case the international society opts for the primacy of international order at the expense of human justice (Bull, 2002, p. 85). As he says: the institutions and mechanisms which sustain international order, even when they are working properly, indeed especially when they are working properly, or fulfilling their functions … necessarily violate ordinary notions of justice. (Bull, 2002, p. 87) For Bull, it is not that justice and order are incompatible as such. It is possible to have a society that provides the precondition of order and also sustains other secondary goals such as justice. There is no theoretical reason, or in principle there is no reason, to argue that we cannot have a global society that accommodates both global order and global justice at the same time. However, the problem is that the institutions and rules that sustain the current global order are incompatible with justice. The above incompatibility, for Bull, is due to the following. Firstly, advocating global justice entails the demolition of the current international society and its system. Secondly, the current international society or system can only be receptive of demands of human rights discriminately and in a warped manner. Thirdly, although the current international society or system is not essentially unreceptive of demands for interstate and international justice, it can only satisfy these demands insufficiently (Bull, 2002, p. 89). Therefore, Bull, not sanguine about the feasibility of cosmopolitan justice, argues that even if cosmopolitan justice is feasible, it can only be realised within a world society. Consequently, clamouring for cosmopolitan justice is tantamount to clamouring for a revolutionary change of the current world system. World order, as Bull (2002) puts it, ‘is preserved by means which systematically affront the most basic and widely agreed principles of international justice’ (p. 87). Although cosmopolitan justice and world order are not mutually exclusive, agitating for cosmopolitan justice necessarily conflicts with the current world order because the instruments by which the current world order is maintained are at variance with cosmopolitan justice (Bull, 2002, pp. 84–85). In view of the foregoing discussion, Bull explains that international law does not only sanctify the status quo. When there is a violation of international law and this violation results in a new situation – a feat made possible by force rather than justice – international law legitimises this new situation, and agrees with the forceful instruments through which it came to be. As Bull (2002) says: The conflict between international law and international justice is endemic because the situations from which the law takes its point of departure are a series of faits accompli brought about by force and the threat of force, legitimised by the principle that treaties concluded under duress are valid. (p. 88)

Resource curse as a complex case 91 Echoing Mazrui, Bull (ibid.) says international law initially denounces aggression, but once aggression is triumphant, international law stops denouncing it but rather recognises it as legitimate. Finally, he argues, it is not that the high propensity of international law to be very receptive of power politics was some accidental unfortunate fault that can be corrected easily if one wills. Rather, this characteristic of international law, which necessarily puts it in conflict with elementary justice, is essential to the functioning and effectiveness of international law. Absent this essential characteristic, international law cannot deal with the reality of the international system; hence, international law will become utterly redundant (Bull, 2002, pp. 88–89). This realpolitik nature of international law and its high propensity to be very receptive to power politics has devastating consequences for resource curse in Africa. I devote the remainder of this sub-chapter to discussing such consequences. Resource curse does not occur in poor countries because they are endowed with abundant natural resources. In itself, the abundance of natural resources is a blessing rather than a curse. Therefore, in his analysis, Wenar (2016) argues that resource curse is only partially about the abundance of natural resources in a country (pp. 74–76). The other part of the story is the revenue or foreign exchange dictators and corrupt regimes earn from exploiting these resources. Similarly, Pogge (2001) argues that irrespective of the means through which a group of soldiers or civilians or both seize power, such group is bestowed international recognition as the legitimate government of the state based on the following proviso (pp. 19–20). It must have the preponderance of the means of coercion or near monopoly of force within the state. Whether it exercises power in an authoritarian manner or is repressive, and even if the citizens oppose and reject the government, the international legitimacy bestowed on it is not withdrawn. Morally, that the citizens reject and oppose the government makes it illegitimate. However, de facto and de jure, the government, as far as the international community is concerned, represents the state. In this case, the legitimacy bestowed on the government by the international community is only de facto legitimacy and not normative legitimacy. This de facto legitimacy has devastating consequences for the state and its citizens because it entails two critical international privileges, namely international resource privilege and international borrowing privilege, which enable the government to sell the natural resources of the state and to borrow money in the name of the state (Pogge, 2001, p. 20). In Africa, the normatively illegitimate governments that came to power through undemocratic and illegitimate means are usually despotic, corrupt, opaque and unaccountable. Using their international resource privilege as collateral, they use their international borrowing privilege to borrow recklessly without considering the impact it will have on their states and citizens. Worse still, they use the money to perpetuate themselves in power and for other self-aggrandisements and for their cronies, without any

92  Resource curse as a complex case commitment to developing the country or making the plight of the population better. (Abumere, 2015a, p. 246) Alarmingly, as Pogge (2001) aptly points out, if a morally legitimate successor government refuses to pay the debt incurred by a morally illegitimate predecessor government, it will face the wrath of the complicit lenders, that is, banks and foreign governments. At least the morally legitimate successor government will be restricted from participating in international financial markets thereby losing its borrowing privilege. Consequently, it is rare for a morally legitimate successor government to refuse to pay the debt of a morally illegitimate predecessor government (Pogge, 2001, p. 20). In addition to banks and foreign governments, multilateral organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank Group and the World Trade Organization (WTO) compound the aforementioned problem. The WTO’s free-trade policy does not really reflect free trade as we know it in economics textbooks – it is not a free trade that is guided by an impartial invisible hand, it is a free trade that is manipulated by a partial visible hand. It is a trade policy that is skewed towards meeting the economic interests of powerful economic countries at the expense of poor economic countries, most of which are African countries. It is common knowledge that under the guise of free trade there are strings attached to doing ‘business’ with the WTO, and the calls for the WTO to adopt fair trade and clean trade are protests against the attached strings. Historically, the Bretton Woods institutions (IMF and World Bank) have even been more damaging to the political economies of African states than the WTO – I specifically mention political economies rather than economies because the damage goes beyond disastrous economic consequences to political upheavals and the fracturing of the social contract between the people and the state. Starting with the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), going through the Washington Consensus, and ending with the unfavourable conditionalities attached to loans, the damage the Bretton Woods institutions have wrought in Africa has condemned generations of citizens to poverty (Abumere, 2015b, p. 85). The global institutional order’s recognition of the normatively illegitimate government as the political entity that has the legal and valid power of control over the natural resources of the state is only one side of the international resource privilege. On the other side of the international resource privilege, the privilege involves the de facto and de jure recognition of the normatively illegitimate government by the global institutional order as the political entity that has the power and authority to transfer, legally and validly in international law, the ownership rights of the state’s natural resources to any willing buyer or to any recipient as favours (Pogge, 2001, p. 20). There is no doubt, as evident in Africa, that the government and their

Resource curse as a complex case 93 cronies enrich themselves through such lucrative deals while impoverishing the state and its citizens. Consider the following true case in Nigeria. For instance: a corporation that has purchased resources from … [General] Sanni Abacha,4 has thereby become entitled to be – and actually is – recognized anywhere in the world as the legitimate owner of these resources. (Ibid.) In fact, General Abacha allocated oil wells to himself and other members of the Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) – the highest organ of his military regime. General Abacha and some of the other PRC military generals sold their oil wells to oil and gas companies and such MNCs still have valid legal titles to the oil wells even 23 years after the death of General Abacha and the end of his military dictatorship. Equally, the military generals who chose to keep their oil wells still have valid legal titles to those oil wells even 23 years after the end of General Abacha’s dictatorship and 22 years after the end of military rule in Nigeria. The political economy and moral consequences of Pogge’s international privileges become horrific if all these political economy atrocities that are legal but immoral – what may be referred to as immoral legalities – are added to the billions of dollars members of General Abacha’s military dictatorship and their cronies stole from oil revenues or received from oil revenues sometimes legally and at other times illegally, but always immorally (Abumere, 2015b, p. 85). Juxtaposing the aforementioned international law case with a commercial law case, Pogge – and later, Wenar – invites us to deduce what is wrong with international law in contradistinction with what is right with commercial law. Imagine that in a commercial law case, ‘A group that overpowers and takes control of a warehouse may be able to give some of the merchandise to others, accepting money in exchange’ (Pogge, 2001, pp. 20–21). In commercial law, neither the group that exchanges the merchandise for money nor the group that exchanges money for the merchandise are the legal and rightful owners of the stolen merchandise. On the contrary, in international law, the normatively illegitimate government is seen as the legal and rightful owner of the state’s natural resources and the buyer is seen not to be having possession of stolen goods but as having property right on legally purchased goods. Rather than the transfer of mere possession, the transfer of ownership is deemed to have taken place, and the ownership rights of the buyer ‘are supposed to be – and actually are – protected and enforced by all other states’ courts and police forces’ (Pogge, 2001, p. 21). A juxtaposition of the international law case with the commercial law case shows that commercial law is aligned with principles of justice (justice within the state), whereas international law is a deviation from the principles of justice, especially principles of global justice (Abumere, 2015b, p. 85). As Wenar (2008; 2016) argues, a thief who steals a watch only has possession

94  Resource curse as a complex case of the watch but has no title to the watch. When the thief sells the watch, the buyer too will only have possession of the watch and will have no title to the watch because the transfer of the watch from the thief to the buyer is invalid, and consequently, illegal – what the thief sells is a stolen good and what the buyer buys is a stolen good. Therefore, the owner of the watch retains his or her title to the watch even though he or she has lost possession of the watch firstly to the thief and secondly to the buyer. The thief lacks the legal capacity to transfer (sell or give) the watch to another person because he or she has no ownership right in the watch and the owner has not authorised him or her to dispose of the watch, and consequently transfer the ownership right in the watch to another person. Therefore, both the thief’s and buyer’s or receiver’s titles are void. In law, nemo dat quod non habet – no one can give what he or she does not have. If the watch is retrieved from the thief by the owner, the thief lacks the locus standi to prosecute the owner in a court of law. However, Wenar (2008) admits that there are exceptions to the above legal rule or norm. When one is dispossessed of his or her possession through deception, brainwashing, fraud, etc. and the dispossessor sells the possession to someone else, the buyer – in legal parlance – has no void but voidable title to the watch. If the purchaser purchases the watch in good faith, believing that s/he was buying the watch from the rightful owner, not knowing that the seller got possession of it through fraudulent means – has cogent reasons to believe that the seller is the rightful owner – then her title might not be voided. However, if she buys the watch in bad faith, then she has no valid title and her title can be voided in a court of law. Bad faith means that she knows that she might not be buying the watch from the rightful owner. She knows or suspects that the seller got possession of it through fraudulent means. She has cogent reasons to believe that the seller is not the rightful owner of the watch (Wenar, 2008, pp. 12–19). Moreover, property rights, according to Wallerstein (2007), are the sine qua non of capitalism. The infinite accumulation of capital is impossible except the capitalist is guaranteed that she will be able to retain the capital she has accumulated (Wallerstein, 2007, p. 47). In Africa, military governments seize power through the barrel of the gun, that is, by force. Thus, they take possession of the state’s natural resources by force. Normatively illegitimate civilian governments come to power usually through fraudulent means, most notably stolen ballots, engineered amendment of constitution and tenure elongation (usually third term and beyond or even life presidency). Thus, they can be said to take possession of the state’s natural resources through fraudulent means, and in fact, they usually gain possession of the state’s natural resources through administrative opacity. Nevertheless, the global institutional order treats the normatively illegitimate government as if it has property right in the natural resources of the state even though the MNCs and foreign states that buy the natural resources are fully aware that they are ill-gotten (Abumere, 2015a, p. 247).

Resource curse as a complex case 95 Blinded by profit maximisation, the MNCs do not see anything wrong, or at least pretend that there is nothing wrong, with their trade. Likewise, blinded by national interest, the foreign states do not see anything wrong, or at least pretend that there is nothing wrong, with their international trade. Given the workings of the global institutional order, most times there is nothing legally wrong with the MNCs’ trade and the foreign states’ international trade. However, there is something always morally wrong with both the MNCs’ trade and the foreign states’ international trade. Therefore, even if such trades are procedurally legal, that is, meet the standards of procedural justice, they are not substantively legal, that is, they do not meet the standards of substantive justice (Abumere, 2015b, p. 86). For Wenar (2016), the violation of national ownership principle is a daily occurrence which is made possible by an outdated Westphalian principle of effectiveness, that is, might makes right (pp. 74–76). Citing relevant international covenants, Wenar shows why the trades discussed in the penultimate and preceding paragraphs are tantamount to a daily violation of national ownership principle. At the level of the United Nations (UN), that is, at the global level, Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that all peoples have the right to ‘freely pursue their economic … development,’ and ‘for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources’ (United Nations, 2002, 17ff). Whereas at the level of the African Union, that is, at the regional level, Article 21 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Banjul Charter) states that ‘All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. This right shall be exercised in the exclusive interest of the people. In no case shall a people be deprived of it’ (OAU, 1981). Considering the aforementioned articles, the natural resources of a country belong to the people of that country: this national ownership principle is recognised in international law; it is legitimated by UN declarations; in the case of Africa, it is legitimated by the Banjul Charter; and most states, except monarchies, enshrined it in their constitutions (Wenar, 2008, p. 10). Since merely recognising without respecting the national ownership principle is insufficient to protect the principle, in view of the aforementioned trades, Wenar thinks – as already mentioned – international law and international trade do not prohibit, but permit, the selling and buying of stolen goods. As exemplified by the exploitation of natural resources in DRC, many of the products sold and bought in international trade are stolen goods because they were either forcefully or deceptively taken away from the Congolese people (Wenar, 2016, pp. 54–55). To conclude this section, I will supplement Pogge’s and Wenar’s notions of property right vis-à-vis the global institutional order with an application of Ockham’s principle of property right to the global institutional order. Known for his razor, it is his principle of property right that seems to be more relevant to political philosophy and political theory. The principle states that if person A owns property B, then, firstly: A has authority over

96  Resource curse as a complex case B; and A retains the right to B. Secondly, no person C can use B without the consent of A. Even if C has A’s consent to use B, C must use B according to the intention of A; and A has the right to recall B from C if and when A wishes (see Kilcullen, 1999). Deductively, the similarity between this principle and Pogge’s and Wenar’s notions of property rights is that the people, rather than a normatively illegitimate government, own and retain the right in their natural resources. In the contemporary world, as long as sovereignty lies with the people – except in monarchies and theocracies – even normatively legitimate governments are mere agents of the people who always remain the principal. The agent cannot be a representative of the principal without the consent of the principal, and the agent should not act contrary to the intention of the principal. The agency of the agent is derived from the principal and the principal has authority over, and retains a right to withdraw, the agency. So the resources of the state belong to the people. It is the people who give the government agency to manage the resources on behalf of the people and for the interest of the people. When this agency does not come from the people or when the people cannot withdraw this agency or when the government utilizes the resources contrary to the intention of or against the interest of the people, then the agency is illegitimate or null and void. (Abumere, 2015b, p. 86) Fundamental to the contemporary global order, the French Revolution transformed the concept of sovereignty, rather than seeing sovereignty as residing in the monarch or legislative assembly, it saw sovereignty as residing in the people. From that moment, in the global order, the monarch or legislature was no longer the locus of sovereignty; they ceased to be the locus of sovereignty. The people became the locus of sovereignty (Wallerstein, 2007, p. 51). Since the people are the sovereign, in African states the normatively illegitimate governments are illegitimate agents while the people are the legitimate principal. Therefore, the global institutional order violates the ownership right of the people when it treats illegitimate governments as if they were the rightful owners of the natural resources of African states. I think the global institutional order can mitigate its causal, contributory or constitutive role in resource curse in Africa and thereby minimise the causes of resource curse and alleviate the consequences of resource curse in Africa if it respects Pogge’s and Wenar’s notions of property right and Ockham’s principle of property right (Abumere, 2015b, p. 86). In terms of causal, contributory or constitutive roles in resource curse in Africa, when the global institutional order level is eliminated, then half of the macro level is eliminated and one-fifth of the entire levels is eliminated. This thinking is based on the following calculation. Firstly, rent-seeking

Resource curse as a complex case 97 behaviour is likely to reduce. Secondly, the negative effectiveness of the threefold-curse is likely to reduce drastically since incidents of two of the curses (civil conflicts and proneness to authoritarianism) are likely to reduce drastically (Ibid.). Having failed to respect Pogge’s and Wenar’s notions of property right and Ockham’s principle of property right, the global institutional order has done something wrong. When it is determined that the global institutional order has done something wrong through its actions or omissions, the global institutional order’s consequent responsibility is not a mere politico-legal responsibility but more importantly moral responsibility. The more the global institutional order observes this moral responsibility, the more just our world will be. However, according to Nagel (2005), ‘the idea of a just world for Rawls would have to be the idea of a world of internally just states’ (p. 15). In spite of this Rawlsian and Nagelian claim, we know from the fallacy of composition that, that something is true of, or good for, a part, some parts, or every single part does not necessarily mean that it is also true of, or good for, the whole as a unit. Therefore, a Rawlsian or Nagellian world populated by internally just states is not necessarily a just world. I readily concede that the requirement that individuals and institutions adhere to moral principles, without any politico-legal structure, is not an effective and practical way to manage the global institutional order. Nevertheless, this does not obliterate the moral responsibility of the global institutional order. Having established that the global institutional order plays a causal, contributory or constitutive role in resource curse in Africa, I hold the global institutional order morally responsible for its role. Given the standard conceptions of responsibility (as already highlighted in the preceding sub-chapter and in the preceding section), the global institutional order has negative and positive duties that are pro tanto and commensurate to its causal, contributory or constitutive role. Like individuals, collectives, corporations and the state at the previous levels, the global institutional order simultaneously has a negative duty to refrain from causing, contributing to or having a constitutive role in resource curse in Africa and a positive duty to remedy the harm it has already done (Abumere, 2015b, p. 87) in resourcecursed African states.

The problem of contributory roles In this sub-chapter, I extend the prescriptive analysis in the penultimate and preceding sub-chapters by examining the moral relationship between causality and responsibility on different levels in the context of resource curse in Africa. I have three goals in this sub-chapter. Firstly, I aim to resolve some moral quandaries concerning causal and constitutive roles that are contributory rather than necessary or sufficient, or necessary and sufficient. Secondly, I aim to prepare the grounds for resolving some moral quandaries concerning degrees of responsibilities in relation to contributory causal and

98  Resource curse as a complex case constitutive roles. Thirdly, I intend the first and second goals to serve as means to an end in Chapter 4; the determination of the applicability of cosmopolitanism and statism to resource curse in view of contributory causal and constitutive roles and degrees of responsibility. Now, I turn to my first aim. To ascertain the roles of individuals, collectives, corporations, the state and the global institutional order in resource curse in Africa, I do not rely on ‘causal’ explanation alone and I do not rely on ‘constitutive’ explanation alone; I rely on a combination of both forms of explanation. Concerning causation and constitution, Alexander Wendt (1999) says positivists think causal explanation is the only sort of causation science is concerned about; but scientists are not only concerned about causal explanation, they are also concerned about constitutive explanation. For him, one thing that contributes to the divide in social science is that: on the one hand, positivists give precedence to causal explanation because they think natural science is not concerned about constitutive explanation; on the other hand, post-positivists give precedence to constitutive explanation because they think social science should not be concerned about causal explanation. ‘But in fact, all scientists do both kinds of theory’ (Wendt, 1999, pp. 77–78). The difference between causal and constitutive explanations is that they ask different questions. On the one hand, causal explanations mainly ask ‘why?’ and to a certain degree also ask ‘how?’ On the other hand, the questions asked by constitutive explanations are ‘how-possible?’ and ‘what?’ According to Wendt (1999), the above questions are not restricted to any one form of explanation; the questions asked by causal explanations are not limited to causal explanations, and the questions asked by constitutive explanations are not limited to constitutive explanations. Thus answers to constitutive questions about the social world will have more in common with answers to constitutive questions about the natural world than they will with answers to causal questions about social life. This is true even though constitutive theorists might use different methods when thinking about the natural versus social world. (Wendt, 1999, p. 78) In causal theory, or when we do causal theorising, ‘in saying that “X causes Y” we assume that: (1) X and Y exist independent of each other, (2) X precedes Y temporally, and (3) but for X, Y would not have occurred’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 79) (emphasis in original). In constitutive theory, or when we do constitutive theorising, we recognise that: natural and social kinds can be constituted in two ways. One is by their internal structure …. Internal structures do not cause the properties associated with them, in the sense of being antecedent conditions for independently existing effects, but rather make those properties possible. (Wendt, 1999, p. 83)

Resource curse as a complex case 99 However, ‘when we account for the properties of natural and social kinds by reference to their internal structures we are engaged in “reductionism”’ (Ibid.) (emphasis in original). Apart from the first way in which natural and social kinds are constituted, that is by their internal structures, social kinds (perhaps some natural kinds too) can also be constituted in a second way. They can be constituted in a: holist fashion by the external structures in which they are embedded …. the claim is not that external structures or discourses “cause” social kinds, in the sense of being antecedent conditions for a subsequent effect, but rather that what these kinds are is logically dependent on the specific external structure. (Wendt, 1999, p. 84) (emphasis in original) But when we account for the properties of social kinds by reference to the external structures in which they are embedded we are engaged in ‘holism.’ In ascertaining the roles of individuals, collectives, corporations, the state and the global institutional order in resource curse in Africa, I do the following. I avoid reductionism and holism by recognising that social kinds are constituted neither by their internal structures alone nor by their external structures alone; they are constituted by both their internal and external structures. I avoid being ‘positivist’ and being ‘post-positivist’ by recognising that both causal and constitutive explanations are needed to understand the complex and multifaceted roles of the different agents and actors involved in resource curse. When isolated as singular factors or agents, the factors or agents responsible for resource curse may neither be necessary nor sufficient conditions for resource curse. Nevertheless, when all these factors or agents are not seen in isolation, but are seen holistically, then we can see how together they cause resource curse. In other words, resource curse is ‘up to the actors’ collectively, therefore they ‘have a collective causal responsibility for’ (Pogge, 1989, p. 276) resource curse. But how can an agent or actor be said to have caused resource curse when his/ her/its actions are not causality if causality is understood as a necessary and sufficient condition for an effect? In my argument, the actor’s actions are not a necessary and sufficient condition for resource curse. The actor’s actions are not the cause of resource curse; but they are part of the cause of resource curse. Let us assume that the actor in question is an individual called General Sanni Abacha or an oil company called Shell. Traditionally, the idea of causation is often looked at from the angles of necessity and sufficiency (necessary and sufficient conditions) (Epp, 2004, pp. 25–26). But to see General Sanni Abacha’s or Shell’s role in resource curse, it is not enough to ask whether his/its actions are simultaneously necessary and sufficient condition for resource curse. Initially, we have to ask four questions rather than one. If unsatisfied, then we can even ask further questions. So, General Sanni

100  Resource curse as a complex case Abacha and Shell will not be exonerated from resource curse just because their actions have passed the first test, that is, the first question. They also have to pass the second, third and fourth tests, that is, the second, third and fourth questions, and even further tests or questions. Even if their actions might not be necessary and sufficient condition for resource curse, they can still have a causal and constitutive role in resource curse depending on the results of the other tests or questions and any further tests or questions. The first question is: are General Sanni Abacha’s or Shell’s actions (hereafter A) necessary and sufficient condition for an effect (hereafter E), namely resource curse? The second question is: is A necessary but insufficient for E? The third question is: is A unnecessary but sufficient for E? And the final question which is an inverse of the first question is: is A simultaneously unnecessary and insufficient for E? First, assuming A is simultaneously necessary and sufficient for E, therefore; i If A then E. ii If not A then not E. iii That there is the consequent E necessarily implies that the antecedent A is present. iv That there is not the consequent E necessarily implies that the antecedent A is not present. Second, assuming that A is necessary but insufficient for E, therefore; i That there is the consequent E necessarily implies that the antecedent A is present. ii That there is the antecedent A does not necessarily imply that the consequent E is present; apart from A’s presence, other condition(s) is/are needed to cause E. Third, assuming that A is unnecessary but sufficient for E, therefore; i If A then E. ii That there is the consequent E does not necessarily imply the presence of the antecedent A; for the consequent E can be caused by other antecedents apart from the antecedent A. Fourth, assuming that A is simultaneously unnecessary and insufficient for E, therefore; i That there is the antecedent A does not necessarily imply that the consequent E is also present. ii That there is the consequent E does not necessarily imply that the antecedent A is also present.

Resource curse as a complex case 101 iii That there is not A does not necessarily imply that E is also absent. iv That there is not E does not necessarily imply that A is also absent. So, A is: first, not simultaneously a necessary and sufficient condition for E; second, not a necessary condition for E; third, not a sufficient condition for E and; fourth, simultaneously not a necessary and not a sufficient condition for E. Then it might be argued that A ought to be exonerated from E. Nevertheless, A can still be seen as having a role in E in other ways I show below. Analogously, General Sanni Abacha’s or Shell’s actions are: first, not simultaneously a necessary and sufficient condition for resource curse; second, not a necessary condition for resource curse; third, not a sufficient condition for resource curse and; fourth, simultaneously not a necessary and not a sufficient condition for resource curse. Then it might be argued that they ought to be exonerated from resource curse. Nevertheless, their actions can still be seen as having a role in resource curse in various ways I show below. First, the actions – on their own – are simultaneously not necessary and not sufficient (passing the first and fourth tests or eliminating the first and fourth questions), neither necessary (passing the second test or eliminating the second question), nor sufficient (passing the third test or eliminating the third question) to cause resource curse. But combining the actions with all the factors that cause resource curse, the conditions of necessity and sufficiency might be present or the condition of either necessity or sufficiency alone might be met. Second, we can see their actions as contributory factors to the causation of resource curse. The actions can be seen as contributory factors if, seen as antecedents, herald a consequent – resource curse – and alteration to the antecedent leads to alteration in the consequent. So, although the actions are not simultaneously necessary and sufficient, and are neither necessary nor sufficient, yet they can be contributory factors to the causation of resource curse. If their actions are actually contributory factors to the causation of resource curse, then General Sanni Abacha or Shell ought not to be exonerated from resource curse. Borrowing the idea of John Leslie Mackie (1965; 1974), we can see their actions as INUS conditions. By INUS, he means ‘an insufficient but necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result’ (Mackie, 1965, p. 245), in other words, ‘an insufficient but non-redundant part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition’ (Mackie, 1974, p. 62). He asserts that our idea of causation implies insufficient but non-redundant parts of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the occurrence of the effect (Ibid.). To illustrate the INUS condition, he uses his famous short-circuit or fire example. For instance, a house caught fire but the fire was put out so the house did not get totally burnt. Fire fighters, having investigated the cause of the fire, concluded that the fire was caused by a certain short circuit in the house. But the fire fighters, by their conclusion, do not mean that the short circuit was a necessary condition for

102  Resource curse as a complex case the fire; they know that another short circuit or other factors, if they had happened, could have caused the house to burn. Also, they do not mean that the short circuit was a sufficient condition for the fire. They know that if there were no inflammable materials nearby to fuel the fire caused by the short circuit the house would not have caught fire. And even if there were inflammable materials near the short circuit but there were some automatic fire extinguisher or water sprinkler at the right place and it worked efficiently, the fire would not have occurred. Although the short circuit was not simultaneously a necessary and sufficient condition, and was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the fire, the fire fighters have concluded that it caused the fire. What they mean is that the short circuit is ‘an insufficient but necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient …. the other conditions which conjoined with it, form a sufficient condition’ (Mackie, 1965, p. 245) for the fire. According to Mackie (1965), when people talk about the cause of a particular event, they are often referring to the short circuit-causation, that is, an INUS condition (p. 245). If we see General Sanni Abacha’s or Shell’s actions like Mackie’s short circuit, and resource curse like the burning of the house, then we will have no problem comprehending the role their actions in particular and other factors/agents/actors in general play in resource curse. Moreover, as Pogge (1989) says, there is systemic injustice that cannot be traced to individuals’ or collectives’ or institutions’ ‘manifestly unjust actions …. Our causal contribution to suffering is extremely indirect and intermixed with the causal contributions of others’ (pp. 11–12). In this case, although we cannot trace resource curse to any manifestly unjust actions of General Sanni Abacha or Shell, their causal and constitutive contributions are indirect and intermixed, hence systemic. To see General Sanni Abacha’s or Shell’s role as part of a systemic one which causes resource curse, we can also borrow the idea of George Lakoff (2012). According to him: A systemic cause may be one of a number of multiple causes …. It may be indirect, working through a network of more direct causes. It may be probabilistic, occurring with a significantly high probability. It may require a feedback mechanism. (Lakoff, 2012, s.p.) He says in social and economic systems, and in other systems such as biological systems and ecosystems, causation tends be indirect (Lakoff, 2012). Some arguments might be raised against my conclusion as reached above. First, it can be argued that in most of the scenarios above, if it were not the particular actor A or B or C, or if it were not the particular group of actors ABC or XYZ, some other actors would have taken their places and done the same immoral deeds because the structures, system or

Resource curse as a complex case 103 institutions are such that there will always be some actors to do the exact deeds. However, this does not negate the fact that the actors that actually did the deeds are blameworthy. What it shows is that the institutions, structures or systems are also blameworthy. When someone has committed a crime or moral wrong, we do not say that the person is not to blame because others would have done that crime or moral wrong. For instance, when there is a vicious and violent xenophobia in a community, the targets will be prone to crimes being committed against them and moral wrongs being done to them. But we do not exonerate a xenophobe from his morally wrong act or crime of killing someone because if he did not do it someone else would have done it. Perhaps a stronger argument against my conclusion regarding General Sanni Abacha and Shell will say that individual or collective agents – unlike the global institutional order, the state and corporations – merely act as agents of corporations, governments, etc. Hence it is these corporations, governments, etc. that should be held morally responsible rather than the individuals or collective agents. However, holding the individual and collective agents morally responsible does not negate holding the corporations, governments, etc. they represent morally responsible. Ultimately, the corporations, governments, etc. are responsible for the deeds done on their behalf with their approval. But as moral agent(s), the individual and collective agents are morally responsible for their part in the deeds – for helping to do the deeds. They could have opted not to do the deeds, but they did not. In summary, the individual and collective agents face a two-count moral charge namely action and inaction or commission and omission. When they act, for instance, seek rent, they are guilty of contributing to the causes of resource curse. When they are in a position, say, have the legislative power to make laws that can prevent resource curse but fail to do so, or have the power to prosecute perpetrators of illegalities but fail to do so, they are also guilty of contributing to the causes of resource curse. There are exceptions in which although the individual or collective agents contribute to the causes of resource curse, they will not be held morally responsible. For instance, in the case of non-intentionality of a non-astute economic policy-maker whose poor economic policies contributed to resource curse but she actually intended those policies to yield positive results for the citizenry. On consequentialist grounds such a policy-maker would be deemed morally at fault. But moral cosmopolitanism is not hinged on consequentialism and my construal of cosmopolitanism is not Singer’s consequentialist conception of cosmopolitanism. Another instance is the case of a judge who finds an oil company that has done a lot of negative economic externalities that contribute to resource curse not guilty, then discharges and acquits it because the activities of the company are legal although immoral. If intuitively we think there is something wrong with the judge’s verdict, then there should be a call to amend that section of the constitution which aids negative economic externalities.

104  Resource curse as a complex case There are other instances of non-intentionality outside the resource curse context that are not morally blameworthy – such instances buttress my point in the cases of the non-astute economic policy-maker and the judge. I shall mention two of such instances, but first of all, remember that if isolated as singular factors or agents, no singular factor or agent may be necessary or sufficient condition for resource curse. Also, note that often the actions of these factors or agents are not intended to cause resource curse although they inadvertently cause it. Consider the popular bank run example; individual account holders, out of fear of losing their money, simply withdraw their money and close their accounts. The bank collapses, not just as a result of one individual’s action as an individual but as a result of the collective actions of the individuals as a collective. A similar but less popular example is that of traffic jam. Individuals simply drive onto a road to drive on it, but so many individuals doing that at the same time result in traffic jam on a road that does not have the capacity to accommodate so many cars at the same time and still be free-flowing. Note that in the above two examples of bank run and traffic jam the underlying factor is not intentionality but self-interest. In the first example, the bank-runners have no intention to cause a bank to go bankrupt or collapse, but they only have the self-interest of safeguarding their money and the subsequent bankruptcy or closure of the bank is an unintended consequence or a collateral damage. In the second example, the individuals have no intention of causing a traffic jam, they only have the self-interest of getting to their various destinations and the resultant traffic jam is just an unintended consequence. So too, in resource curse, although the non-astute economic policy-maker and the judge do not have the intention to cause resource curse, the resultant resource curse is just an unintended consequence of their actions. However, in resource curse, although some of the actors do not have the intention to cause resource curse, their actions, which are propelled by self-interest, result in it and a host of negative consequences. Actors are not to be narrowly construed to only mean individual and collective agents, but by actors, I also mean corporations, the state and the global institutional order. Just as the underlying factor in the bank run and traffic jam examples is not intentionality, so too the underlying factor of these actors in resource curse is not intentionality. Also, just as self-interest is the underlying factor in the bank run and traffic jam examples, self-interest is the underlying factor in the actions and omissions of these actors in resource curse. Nevertheless, the difference between the bank run and traffic jam examples and the resource curse case – the problem with the resource curse case – is that while the self-interest in the examples cannot be said to be a negative one in the moral sense of the word, the self-interest in the resource curse case is a negative one morally. On the one hand, ceteris paribus, a depositor withdrawing her deposit or a driver driving on the road is a morally neutral incident. On the other hand, ceteris paribus, incidents – such as corruption

Resource curse as a complex case 105 or rent-seeking – which cause resource curse are immoral incidents. Thus, the resource curse case is a moral negative. As a moral negative, it is not immune from moral criticisms unlike the interest of the bank-runners and road-users. According to Paul Collier (2013), ‘the resource curse happened because of strong forces of self-interest’ (s.p.). He is partially right. The Dutch disease aspect of resource curse is not a result of self-interest. But rent-seeking is due to self-interest. Here, I understand self-interest to be negative self-interest, that is, self-interest that is detrimental to the good of others. This kind of self-interest is very prevalent in resource curse cases because it is almost a glorified vice. For instance, if we ask why rent-seeking is the order of the day in resource-cursed countries, the main answer, among other answers, is self-interest – self-interest that is rational but unreasonable. But why is self-interest prevalent? Because the system rewards it! When self-interest or rent-seeking are rewarded, they are basically being reinforced, and when they are reinforced they become strong and stronger. If they were to be punished, they would be discouraged, and then become weak and weaker. This implicit, and sometimes explicit, approval of negative self-interest suggests that there is collaboration among some agents of resource curse. While on the one hand, there is competition among the extractive industry companies, on the other hand, there is collaboration among the companies, state officials, banks and other financial institutions, law firms etc. So the competition is a competition within a system of collaboration. Usually, individuals do not collaborate except they have some common goal(s) or interest(s). So too they do not compete except when they have a goal which both are interested in and their interests clash. In resource curse, the players – say, Shell against Exxon-Mobil – compete for more allocation of oil wells (that is the common goal). For example, two decades ago, the United States of America would compete against China to buy more barrels of oil, say, from Nigeria – so on and so forth. But what allows the collaboration is the realisation by all involved that they all have (negative) self-interests (although there are other factors such as coercion, intimidation, threat, etc. that can be involved in one player agreeing to collaborate with another player, negative self-interest is the ultimate factor). The extractive industry companies that bribe know that they have an end, namely self-interest, to achieve and bribery is the means to that end. Also, they know that there are those who also have self-interest and their means of achieving that self-interest is collecting bribes or facilitating money laundry. The financial institutions or law firms that facilitate the laundry of the corrupt money know that they have self-interest to achieve and the means is the facilitation of money laundry or bribery. They also know that there are others that have self-interest and their means of achieving their self-interest is either by giving or taking bribe. Furthermore, the state officials who

106  Resource curse as a complex case collect the bribes know that they have self-interest to achieve and the means is through collecting bribes. They also know that there are others with self-interest and their means is either by giving bribe or facilitating bribe and money laundry. In short, the givers, receivers and facilitators of bribes know that bribery is a means to an end which is ultimately conditioned by negative self-interest. There is a lot of herd behaviour in resource curse. When corporations or individuals get to areas of resource curse they often do what other corporations or individuals are doing there. They are socialised into the culture of bad behaviour. In areas of resource curse, the unfortunate necessary ingredients for bad behaviour are rife and plentiful. Therefore, corporations and individuals easily join the bandwagon of bad behaviour. For instance, one reason why certain oil companies behave well in the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France and Italy but behave badly in Nigeria is the following. They simply join the culture of good behaviour in the former where there are few unfortunate conditions for bad behaviour and simply join the culture of bad behaviour in the latter where every imaginable condition for bad behaviour is available. In other words, there are political economy, legislative and regulative structural deficiencies in the Nigerian extractive industry. As Kenneth Waltz (1979) argues, structures work their effects in two ways. The first way in which structures work their effects is through a process of socialization that limits and moulds behaviour. The second way is through competition …. Socialization encourages similarities of attributes and of behaviour. So does competition. Competition generates an order, the units of which adjust their relations through their autonomous decisions and acts. (p. 76) He uses the shoe-store example to illustrate his point. Imagine I want to open a shoe-store but wondering which part of town to locate it. Then I notice that shoe-stores are usually clustered in one area of town. Applying standard economic rationality, I will assume that market forces make the businesses of those who place their stores at the right place profitable, while those who place their stores at the wrong place suffer losses. Following this economic rationality, I will open my shoe-store in the cluster (Waltz, 1979, pp. 77–78). In other words, I have been socialised into opening my shoe-store in the cluster. But by opening a new shoe-store in the cluster, I will increase the competition in the shoe market. In the resource curse ‘business,’ agents are just as ‘economically rational’ as shoe-store owners. The higher the reward, the bigger the cluster! The bigger the cluster, the more the extensity, intensity and velocity of resource curse activities!! The more the extensity, intensity and velocity of resource curse activities, the greater the causal roles of agents!!! The greater the causal roles, the greater the corresponding moral responsibility!!!!

Resource curse as a complex case 107

The problem of degrees of responsibility Moral agents can be simultaneously causally responsible in actions or in omissions and have no corresponding moral responsibility for the consequences of the actions or omissions. Equally, moral agents can have moral responsibility for events, conditions or situations even if the moral agents do not have causal responsibility for the events, conditions or situations (Abumere, 2019, p. 130). However, in the following discussion, I am only concerned with the relationship between actions and omissions (causal responsibility) and the consequences generated by the action or omission (corresponding moral responsibility). Therefore, in the following discussion, the concept of ‘responsibility’ should be understood in the context of the relationship between causal responsibility and the corresponding moral responsibility. The concept of responsibility is always difficult to define. This difficulty is usually resolved by proving that: first, a particular agent caused an undesirable incident or failed to prevent an undesirable incident; second, then the action or omission is shown to be against certain laws, rules, norms, codes or principles. When these two conditions of proof are met, then the agent is said to be responsible for the undesirable incident. This is usually the standard way of resolving the difficulty of defining responsibility in the context of the relationship between causal responsibility and the corresponding moral responsibility. Prosecutors use a constitution or legal code as their frame of reference when proving the guilt of accused persons in the court of law. With the presence of a constitution or legal code, the remaining task for the judges and juries is only to interpret the law in relation to the accused persons and their actions or omissions. But in the court of moral philosophy there is neither a written nor an unwritten constitution, and there is no particular guidebook or material code that moral philosophers should interpret when proving the responsibility of a moral agent. In moral philosophy, there is no canonical conception of moral responsibility. (Ibid.) As Paul Ricoeur (2000) says, the concept of responsibility is ‘not really well-established within the philosophical tradition’ (p. 11). However, when proving the moral responsibility of morally blamed persons (moral agents), ‘there are standard conceptions of moral responsibility which serve as the Owl of Minerva to moral philosophers’ (Ibid.). I shall outline the standard conceptions of moral responsibility in the following lexical order: i moral responsibility may refer to prospective responsibility whereby a moral agent has a certain moral role (Williams, n.d.), for instance, a moral duty to care for or attend to a person or a thing, and failure to perform this duty leads to blame or punishment;

108  Resource curse as a complex case ii moral responsibility may refer to retrospective responsibility which is a situation when the actions of a moral agent are judged to be morally wrong, and the moral agent thus deserves to be blamed or punished for the actions (Ibid.); iii while theories of moral agency tend to regard an agent as either responsible or not, with no half-measures, our everyday language usually deploys the term “responsible” in a more nuanced way …. One way we do this is by weighing degrees of responsibility, both with regard to the sort of prospective responsibilities a person should bear and a person’s liability to blame or penalties (Ibid.). Summing up the three standard conceptions of responsibility, essentially, they ‘conceive responsibility to be moral culpability for one’s actions or omissions which cause moral harm (Abumere, 2019, p. 131). Having established the contributory roles of agents in causing resource curse in the preceding sub-chapter, and in view of the standard conceptions of responsibility, my conclusion is that such agents are morally responsible for resource curse. Firstly, given that resource curse is ‘up to the agents’ collectively, and therefore they ‘have a collective causal responsibility for’ resource curse, ‘this causal responsibility gives rise to a moral responsibility, which is a collective responsibility for [their] collective role in’ (Pogge, 1989, p. 276) resource curse. Secondly, and of equal importance as the first, contributory causal and constitutive role or INUS condition (as discussed in the preceding sub-chapter) implies partial blameworthiness, which in turn implies partial responsibility. Linking contributory causal and constitutive role with partial responsibility suggests that the principle of commensurability is in application. It is with the help of the principle of commensurability that we are able to gauge the exact or approximate relationship between contributory causal and constitutive role and the corresponding partial responsibility. Given the contributory causal and constitutive role or the INUS condition roles the agents play in causing resource curse, and given the principle of commensurability, it is only fair that they are prima facie morally responsible to the extent or degree that they are causally and constitutively responsible. In spite of the principle of commensurability, the agents’ moral responsibility, commensurate with their causal and constitutive role, should only be a pro tanto obligation. Because, for instance, the individual being a citizen may have a duty concerning resource curse that goes beyond the extent of her causal and constitutive role in resource curse. Therefore, by seeing the individual’s responsibility as a pro tanto obligation, there will be enough room left for more demanding obligations. But, here, I do not concern myself with such obligations because they are not part of my subject matter. The foregoing discussion has not considered cases of exception. By this I mean it has not considered cases whereby although agents have contributory causal and constitutive roles in resource curse, they may still be deemed

Resource curse as a complex case 109 not blameworthy because of certain circumstances. This raises issues such as the following situations: i A situation of taking up the slack; although one has done her fair share, does she have the duty to take up the slack when others cannot or refuse to do their own part? ii Are persons – children who have not attained the age of reason, mentally retarded persons, etc. – (always) morally responsible for what they caused? iii Are there situations in which we can be morally responsible even if we have no part in the cause? iv What do we have to say about determinism, compatibilism, free will and freedom of choice? The list of issues can go on and on. Nevertheless, these are issues that are not within the purview of this book. So, their resolutions were assumed. Here are some of the key assumptions made by my argument in the foregoing discussion. It assumes that agents are not taking up any slack. It assumes that agents are neither mentally retarded persons nor children who have not attained the age of reason. Some of the other critical assumptions are as follow. To say that agents have moral responsibility is already a presupposition that fatalism5 and determinism6 – especially hard determinism7 – have been negated. Furthermore, responsibility, in the standard conceptions, is not based on compatibilism.8 Neither is it based on teleology.9 Nor is my understanding of moral responsibility in the foregoing discussion based on consequentialism. Even on consequentialist grounds, actions and omissions which contribute to the causes of resource curse will be deemed morally wrong by consequentialists; because, the negative consequences of such actions and omissions outweigh the ‘positive’ consequences. Here I am only referring to the benefits that accrue to agents of resource curse as positive consequences for the sake of consequentialism. Just as my understanding of moral responsibility is not consequentialist, so too, it is not based on that paramount form of consequentialism, namely, utilitarianism. Even on utilitarian grounds, actions and omissions which contribute to the causes of resource curse will be deemed morally wrong by utilitarians because such actions and omissions benefit few people and harm more people, and cause more pain than pleasure. Furthermore, neither act utilitarianism nor rule utilitarianism has a place here in my understanding of moral responsibility. It will be apt to assume that my understanding of moral responsibility in the foregoing discussion is based on deontology which is a view that as moral agents we have certain duties or obligations, and these obligations are formalised in terms of rules. Whether the consequences of our actions are positive or negative do not determine their moral rightness or wrongness. What determines the moral rightness or wrongness of our actions is whether

110  Resource curse as a complex case we act or fail to act in accordance with our duty or duties. Bracketing different assumptions, my argument is simply following the standard conceptions of responsibility. When different assumptions such as the aforementioned ones are bracketed, ceteris paribus, moral agents are morally responsible for their actions and the consequences of their actions. Consequently, agents are morally responsible for resource curse in commensuration to the extent of their causal and constitutive role. However, so many objections are bound, plausibly or legitimately, to arise due to the above conclusion which seems to be a hasty conclusion or a hasty generalisation. For instance, a utilitarian might argue that although an agent causes resource curse, as long as there are more people who benefit from the curse than there are people who suffer from it, the agent is morally praiseworthy rather than blameworthy. I shall make three statements relating to the utilitarian objection in particular and other objections in general. First, even if we accept the utilitarian premise, it is common knowledge that more people suffer from resource curse while less people benefit from it. So even on utilitarian grounds, the agent is still blameworthy. Second, I shall neither rehash the literature on utilitarianism nor delve into the consequentialist, deontological and teleological debates. Third, although there are other possible objections alongside the utilitarian one, I shall only focus on what I consider the most potent objection. The counter-arguments I shall proffer in defence of the conclusion I reached in the foregoing discussion shall clarify that the conclusion is neither a hasty conclusion nor a hasty generalisation. The most potent objection might be in the following way. Given that there are agents whose actions only resulted in unintended consequences, on what grounds are the agents morally responsible? As discussed earlier, the actions of the agents are not like those actions in the examples of the bank-runners and road-users; they are actions based on negative self-interest. We can look at the actions from various theories and the agents will still be morally responsible from all theories. For instance, let us look at the objection from the following theory which seems to be one of the strongest ways to frame the objection. The objection can be strongly framed in this form. Certain agents, although had negative self-interest, did not know that their actions would cause harm; it was only after seeing the harm that they realised that their actions were capable of causing such harm. In effect, the agents did not know the right thing to do; they were morally ignorant. The objection continues, holding the agents morally responsible is tantamount to adopting the legal principle of ignorantia juris non excusat or ignorantia legis neminem excusat (ignorance of the law does not excuse or ignorance of the law excuses no one). This principle or its equivalent, according to the argument, if adopted, will be arbitrary since morality does not equal legality or ethics does not equal law. Therefore, according to the objection, the ‘ignorant’ agents cannot be held morally responsible for resource curse.

Resource curse as a complex case 111 I shall rebut the above objection in two ways. The first rebuttal – which consists of six arguments – is as follows: i The harm of resource curse is so enormous that the sort of singular action or few actions that will bring it about will be very enormous; ii It takes a long time and repeated several actions to bring about the harm of resource curse; iii In the case of the economic aspect of resource curse, one might ignorantly make a big error – in policy area or other areas – which will be responsible for resource curse; iv In the case of the economic aspect of resource curse, one might ignorantly repeat an error several times or commit several different errors which will be responsible for resource curse; v However, in the case of the political economy aspect of resource curse such ignorant big errors or repeated several errors are non-existent because rent-seeking, corruption, etc. are always intended to benefit agents at the expense of the principal – citizenry; vi Even if such ignorant big errors were existent in the case of the political economy aspect of resource curse, for the agents that are in a position to cause resource curse to be so ignorant is to be grossly negligent. Imagine an agent who is ignorant that rent-seeking benefits her at the expense of society! The failure of the agent to give enough moral consideration to her actions, and the society the action will affect, is the only plausible explanation for this sort of gross negligence. This sort of gross negligence is itself a moral culpability; because, it is a failure to give somebody or something the maximum care which is rightly deserved. The second rebuttal will assume that the agents were actually ignorant of the fact that their actions were capable of causing or engendering resource curse. If the agents were actually ignorant but only realised that their actions were capable of causing harm, then after seeing the harm and having realised they have caused harm, they should be remorseful. When one realises that due to ignorance she has caused harm, especially a serious harm like resource curse, remorse is the natural emotional reaction that one feels. To be remorseful is to acknowledge that one has done something wrong or bad, and then be extremely sorry for it. One who is remorseful holds herself morally responsible for her actions. Naturally, she will intend not to repeat the actions. In view of the foregoing discussion, it is either agents were ignorant of the consequences of their actions or they were not ignorant. If they were not ignorant, then they are morally responsible. But if they were ignorant, having realised they have caused resource curse, then it is either they are remorseful or not. If they are remorseful, then they already hold themselves morally responsible for their actions. If they are not remorseful, then this suggests they have no moral consideration for their actions and the

112  Resource curse as a complex case consequences of their actions. So, society should even be more eager to hold them responsible for their actions. Counter-arguing against my use of the notion of remorse, one might ask us to imagine the following scenario. An assassin who is a friend of a notoriously corrupt politician was paid by the politician to assassinate two innocent persons – a political opponent who lives in Abuja and an investigative journalist who lives in Lagos. The assassin assassinated the political opponent but did not assassinate the journalist. So the journalist was able to investigate the corrupt activities of the politician and publish a report on them. Consequently, the politician was arrested, charged, tried, convicted and sentenced to 31 years in prison. Then the assassin is ‘remorseful’ that: i he did not assassinate the journalist; ii the politician is jailed; iii his not assassinating the journalist led to the jailing of the politician – if he knew that his decision not to assassinate the journalist was going to lead to the jailing of the politician he would have assassinated the journalist. The question is: is the assassin morally responsible for failing to assassinate the journalist and for the jailing of the politician? I answer ‘No.’ The argument is, if he cannot be held morally responsible, then remorse does not suggest moral responsibility. However, I contend that the word ‘remorse’ is incorrectly used in the above scenario. Although the assassin feels sorry, he is not remorseful, he is merely regretting. Remorse has to do with morality, and unlike remorse, regret is a neutral term. If we juxtapose regret with remorse, we will see that the key moral words ‘wrong’ and ‘bad’ are absent in regret while present in remorse. Due to this special character of remorse, my use of remorse in describing the moral responsibility of agents in relation to resource curse is apt. To summarise the foregoing discussion in this sub-chapter, agents are morally responsible, albeit commensurately, for resource curse. By implication, as already mentioned, they have pro tanto obligations which leave enough room for the possibility of more demanding obligations. The pro tanto obligations can be summed up into a negative and a positive duty. On the one hand, the agents have a negative duty to desist from their activities that cause resource curse in Africa. On the other hand, they have a positive duty to make amends for the harm they have already caused.

Notes

1. I use ‘ideology’ in the neutral sense rather than in the negative or pejorative sense. 2. According to John Rawls (1999), ‘the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society...the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation’ (p. 6).

Resource curse as a complex case 113





3. Chronologically, in the context of world history, I use the term ‘modern,’ that is, modern world or modern period, to refer to the period from 1500 AD to 1945 AD. While I use the term ‘contemporary,’ that is, contemporary world or contemporary period, to refer to the period from 1945 to the current time. 4. Former Nigerian military dictator, who came to power through a coup d’etat in 1993 and remained in power until his sudden death in 1998. 5. A view that we could not have acted otherwise or we cannot act otherwise because having been fated by some supernatural or super external forces to act, we have no power to act otherwise. In other words, we were, or are, doomed to act the way we did, or do, in a certain way in the future. 6. A view that certain external conditionalities have determined us to act in certain ways and we cannot act otherwise. 7. A view which, holding determinism to be correct, says freewill is incompatible with determinism. 8. A view that free will is possible in spite of determinism. 9. A view that humans have a telos, an end or a final cause and they are supposed to act in view of the realisation of that telos, end or final cause.

References Abumere, F. A. (2015a) Resource curse: Micro and macro analysis. African Research Review, 9 (4), 237–248. Abumere, F. A. (2015b) The global institutional order and the problem of resource curse. Indian Journal of Commerce and Management Studies, 6 (3), 81–87. Abumere, F. A. (2019) A political conception of pandemics and epidemics in Africa. In: Tangwa, G. B. et al. (eds.) Socio-Cultural Dimensions of Emerging Infectious Diseases in Africa: An Indigenous Response to Deadly Epidemics. Cham, Springer, pp. 121–133. Brown, C. & Ainley, K. (2005) Understanding International Relations. 3rd ed. New York, Palgrave Macmillan. Bull, H. (2002) The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. 3rd ed. London, Palgrave. Collier, P. (2013) Tax and transparency: Why the G8 agenda matters. Global Policy. [Online] Available from: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/ tax-and-transparency-an-agenda-for-the-g8/ [Accessed 31st May 2013]. Conde, A.. (2013) Africa’s transparency agenda. Project Syndicate. [Online] Available from: https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/generating-support-for-africa-s-transparency-agenda-by-alpha-cond?barrier=accesspaylog [Accessed 12th July 2013]. Epp, S. S. (2004) Discrete Mathematics with Applications. 3rd ed. Boston, Brooks, Cole-Thompson Learning. Kilcullen, J. (1999) The political writings. In: Spade, P. V. (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Ockham. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 302–325. Lakoff, G. (2012) Global warming systematically caused Hurricane Sandy. [Online] Available from: http://blogs.berkeley.edu/2012/11/05/global-warming-systemically-caused-hurricane-sandy/ [Accessed 4th May 2013]. Mackie, J. L. (1965) Causes and conditions. American Philosophical Quarterly, 2 (4), 245–265. Mackie, J. L. (1974) The Cement of the Universe: A Study of Causation. Oxford, Clarendon Press.

114  Resource curse as a complex case Mazrui, A. (1967) Towards a Pax Africana. London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson. McConnell, C. R. et al. (2009) Economics: Principles, Problems, and Policies. New York, McGraw-Hill/Irwin. Moser, F. & Lietaert, M. (2012) The Brussels business. [Online] Available from: https://www.visualantics.net/Project/the-brussels-business/ [Accessed 1st January 2013]. Nagel, T. (2005) The problem of global justice. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 33 (2), 113–147. Nichols, P. M. (n.d.) Who allows facilitating payments. [Online] Available from: https://www.google.de/search?q=Who+Allows+Facilitating+Payments [Accessed 16th September, 2013]. Nozick, R. (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia. New York, Basic Books. Nye, J. (1967) Corruption and political development: A cost benefit analysis. American Political Science Review, 61 (2), 417–427. https://doi.org/10.2307/1953254 Organisation of African Unity (OAU). (1981) African (Banjul) charter on human and people’s rights. [Online] Available from: https://www.achpr.org/legalinstruments/detail?id=49 [Accessed 1st October 2011]. Pogge, T. (1989) Realizing Rawls. New York, Cornell University Press. Pogge, T. (2001) Priorities of global justice. Metaphilosophy, 32 (1–2), 6–24. https:// doi.org/10.1111/1467-9973.00172 Pogge, T. (2005) World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms. Cambridge, Polity Press. Pogge, T. (2010) Cosmopolitanism and sovereignty. In: Brown, G. W. & Held, D. (eds.) The Cosmopolitan Reader. Cambridge, Polity Press, pp. 114–133. Rawls, J. (1977) The basic structure as subject. American Philosophical Quarterly, 14 (2), 159–165. Rawls, J. (1999) A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition. Cambridge, Harvard University Press. Ricoeur, P. (2000) The Just. Pellauer, D. (trans.). Chicago, The University of Chicago Press. United Nations. (2002) Human Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments. Vol. 1. New York, United Nations Publications. Wallerstein, I. (2007) World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction. Durham, Duke University Press. Waltz, K. N. (1979) Theory of International Politics. Reading, Addison-Wesley. Wenar, L. (2008) Property rights and the resource curse. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 36 (1), 2–32. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2008.00122.x Wenar, L. (2016) Blood Oil: Tyrants, Violence, and the Rules that Run the World. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Wendt, A. (1999) Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511612183 Williams, G. (n.d.) Responsibility. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. [Online] Available from: http://www.iep.utm.edu/responsi/ [Accessed 28th July 2014].

4

General theory of global justice

The grounds for a General theory In Chapter 3, I used resource curse in Africa to contextualise the complexity of global justice. What makes resource curse a global justice issue are the following: 1 There are rights and duties involved in resource curse. 2 The rights and duties in (1) are not only domestically distributed but are also globally distributed. 3 Hence, there is global cooperation involved in resource curse. 4 There are advantages resulting from the global cooperation in (3). 5 The advantages in (3) are not only domestically divided but are also globally divided. 6 The divisions in (5) are not only domestically determined but are also globally determined. (Abumere, 2017, p. 36) In other words, the agents linked with the poverty of the resource-cursed states are both domestic and global. The agents are not only domestic and global but are also interactional and institutional. Broadly put, the agents are individuals, collectives, corporations, the state (or its government), and the global institutional order – including foreign states, global institutions, etc. Looking at the multiple and complex factors responsible for resource curse, one sees that, on the one hand, some factors are interactional, and other factors are institutional. The interactional factors are the individual and collective agents, while the institutional factors are the corporations, state (governments) and the global institutional order. Also, on the other hand, some factors are local or domestic and other factors are transnational, international or global. Some individuals, collective agents and corporations act only on the domestic level, some act only on the global level, and others act both on the domestic and global level. Therefore, we have: (1a) interactional domestic individual agents; (1b) interactional global individual agents;

116  General theory of global justice (1c) interactional domestic and global individual agents; (2a) interactional domestic collective agents; (2b) interactional global collective agents; (2c) interactional domestic and global collective agents; (3a) institutional domestic corporations; (3b) institutional global corporations; (3c) institutional domestic and global corporations; (4) institutional state (government); (5) global institutional order. The combination of different agents as interactional and institutional, and as domestic and global, means the agents are just as complex as they are multiple. As G. H. von Wright (1951) says, ‘in normal scientific practice we have to reckon with plurality rather than singularity, and with complexity rather than simplicity of conditions’ (p. 135). In view of this multiplicity and complexity, I averred that neither statism nor cosmopolitanism is completely right or wrong; they are partially right and partially wrong. I do not base my argument for their rightness and wrongness on how similar to and different from each other they are. I base my argument on how helpful or unhelpful they are in the theorisation of global justice. Do they give us a better comprehension of global justice? Are they helpful in the resolution of global injustice? Can they resolve complex cases of global justice such as migration and resource curse? These are the metrics that determine the helpfulness or unhelpfulness of theories of global justice. To reiterate, in Chapter 1, I conceded that there might be particular and simple cases of global justice in which one theory, cosmopolitanism or statism alone, might just be simultaneously necessary and sufficient. Nevertheless, I contended that, generally, cases of global justice are usually complex, and in these cases, none of the theories is simultaneously necessary and sufficient. Having a simple case in which one theory is simultaneously necessary and sufficient is an exception rather than the norm. While having complex cases in which none of the theories is simultaneously necessary and sufficient is the norm rather than the exception. Therefore, when I talk about the necessity and sufficiency of theories of global justice, I am talking about them in relation to the norm, rather than in relation to an exception, in global justice. As already mentioned, confirming the complexity of global justice, Thomas Nagel (2005) started his influential article, ‘The Problem of Global Justice,’ with the concession that our world is unjust. He added a caveat that there is no comprehensible view on what international or global justice might mean and what its requirements might be or what its principles might entail (Nagel, 2005, p. 113). Nagel’s description of global justice reflects the complexity of the subject. Any attempt to simplify the subject is largely likely to be tantamount to reductionism just as any attempt to proffer a simple solution to the complex problems of global justice will be a project

General theory of global justice 117 in futility. Theories of, or approaches to, global justice, whether cosmopolitanism or statism, relational or non-relational and minimalism or egalitarianism, are only properly applicable to special cases of global justice. The problem with these theories and approaches is that: some are useful for interactional (micro) analysis while others are useful for institutional (macro) analysis; and some are applicable to some cases while others are applicable to other cases. Hence, they are special theories and approaches for special cases. Since, standing alone, each special theory or approach lacks the characteristics of a general theory (as explained below), no singular theory is sufficient for the theorisation about global justice. The crux of the discussion in this sub-chapter is that to deal with the complexity of global justice, we need a general theory or approach that is an intermediary and neutral theory or approach between the extremes of statism and cosmopolitanism, relational and non-relational approaches, and minimalism and egalitarianism. While the extremity of these hitherto theories and approaches means they cannot be applicable to cases and issues which their opposite theory or approach is applicable to, the intermediariness and neutrality of the general theory or approach makes it applicable to cases and issues on both sides. Due to its general applicability, I refer to it as a general theory or approach while I refer to the hitherto theories and approaches as special theories and approaches due to their limited applicability. However, is the general theory of, or general approach to, global justice plausible? On the one hand, answering in the negative, many theorists may argue that the general theory or approach is implausible. On the other hand, answering in the affirmative, I argue that the general theory or approach is necessary and plausible because it has the following characteristics. Firstly, it is not applicable to only special cases; it is also applicable to general cases. Secondly, it is not useful for only interactional (micro) analysis or only institutional (macro) analysis; it is useful for both interactional (micro) and institutional (macro) analyses. Thirdly, it can use the strengths of one theory or approach to compensate for the weaknesses of its opposite theory or approach. One way to arrive at the general theory and tackle the complexity of global justice is to opt for the fusion of horizons between statism and cosmopolitanism. However, the question is, can there be a plausible fusion of horizons between statism and cosmopolitanism? Statists and cosmopolitans think that such fusion of horizons is implausible. I think such fusion of horizons is simultaneously plausible and necessary. Therefore, I argue for a position in which, given the strengths and weaknesses of both statism and cosmopolitanism, the horizons of the two theories will be fused in order to have a better understanding of global justice and a better solution to issues of global justice especially complex cases of global justice such as resource curse. In this fusion of horizons, I use the strengths of cosmopolitanism to compensate for the weaknesses of statism and use the strengths of statism to compensate for the weaknesses of cosmopolitanism.

118  General theory of global justice In a nutshell, to reiterate my explication of the grounds for a general theory in Chapter 1, although each theory is necessary, a singular theory is insufficient to deal with the aforementioned multiplicity and a simple theory is insufficient to deal with the aforementioned complexity. For this reason, I turn to fusion of the horizons of statism and cosmopolitanism to resolve the complexity of resource curse by applying statism and cosmopolitanism to the different levels of causality and responsibility discussed in Chapter 3. I shall reiterate the following deducible conclusions from the foregoing discussion in this book. Firstly, concerning the necessity and sufficiency of cosmopolitanism and statism, what I mean by the two key concepts of ‘necessary’ and ‘insufficient’ is as follows. On the one hand, by ‘necessary’ I mean the strengths of cosmopolitanism in interactional analysis and the strengths of statism in institutional analysis. On the other hand, by ‘insufficient’ I mean the weaknesses of cosmopolitanism in institutional analysis and the weaknesses of statism in interactional analysis. Secondly, as the discussions in Chapter 3 and the next sub-chapters show, the situation with dealing with complex cases of global justice as shown in the case of resource curse in Africa is that while cosmopolitanism and statism are individually necessary but individually insufficient, they are simultaneously jointly necessary and jointly sufficient. Nevertheless, I am conscious of the fact that things that are jointly necessary are not always jointly sufficient too, just as things that are jointly sufficient are not always jointly necessary too. Jointly necessary does not equal jointly sufficient, just as jointly sufficient does not equal jointly necessary. Thirdly, as the discussion in Chapter 3 shows, as shown on the levels of causality and responsibility, cosmopolitanism and statism are simultaneously jointly necessary and jointly sufficient for the following reason. Cosmopolitanism is necessary for the individual and collective levels of causality and responsibility. Statism is necessary for the corporate, the state and the global institutional order levels of causality and responsibility. Together, cosmopolitanism and statism suffice for these five levels of causality and responsibility. Since this jointly necessary and jointly sufficient condition is arrived at through a fusion of horizons, I deem fusion of horizons to be an appropriate solution to the individually necessary but insufficient condition of cosmopolitanism and statism respectively. Due to the above explanation and assertions, I take cosmopolitanism and statism to be properly special theories while I take the combination of cosmopolitanism and statism, that is, the fusion of the horizons of cosmopolitanism and statism, to be a general theory that combines the two special theories. Fusion of horizons compensates for the weaknesses of cosmopolitanism by using the strengths of statism, and it compensates for the weaknesses of statism by using the strengths of cosmopolitanism. In other words, it combines the two special theories in order to make them more robust. But does this qualify fusion of horizons to be a general theory? And what, in the first place, is fusion of horizons? To answer these questions properly, I need

General theory of global justice 119 to answer some preliminary questions: What, exactly, is a theory? What does a theory do? I turn to all these questions in the next sub-chapter.

Fusion of horizons Generally, theories are ‘system[s] of ideas based on general principles designed to organise thought and to explain or justify something’ (Rizzo & Whitman, 2003, p. 549). Specifically, theories can be defined in two ways. On the one hand, theory is a set of laws, that is, a collection of laws about a particular behaviour or phenomenon. On the other hand, theory is a statement that explains laws (Waltz, 1979, pp. 4–5). In short, the main function of law is prediction. But the main function of theory in the first sense of my definition is description. While the main function of theory in the second sense of my definition is explanation. In this book, my conception of theory is not law-like, because global justice is not about prediction. Between descriptive theory and explanatory theory, my preference is the latter rather than the former. This is because in global justice description is not enough; we must also be able to explain matters in order to know what moral prescription to offer. Moreover, according to Kenneth Waltz (1979), the essence of theory is to perform explanatory functions (pp. 6–10). Laws are either true or false because predictions either come to pass or fail to come to pass. If a law is true, then it deserves its place as law. But if it is false, then it does not even deserve to be called a law in the first place. In a theory, I am not interested in what is true or what is false; rather I am interested in whether it is helpful in explaining matters or unhelpful in explaining matters. In this sense, theories are neither true nor false, but are either helpful or unhelpful (Waltz, 1979, p. 6). Therefore, to know whether a theory is ‘worth its salt’ we simply ask whether the theory is helpful or unhelpful in explaining matters (Ibid.). If it is helpful, then it is ‘worth its salt’ and deserves its place as a theory. But if it is unhelpful, then it is ‘not worth its salt’ and does not deserve to be called a theory. According to Waltz (1979): to form a theory requires a pattern where none is visible to the naked eye …. A theory must then be constructed through simplifying …. Simplifications lay bare the essential elements in play and indicate the necessary relations of cause and interdependency – or suggest where to look for them. (p. 10) The essence of simplification is: to try to find the central tendency among a confusion of tendencies, to single out the propelling principle even though other principles operate, to seek the essential factors where innumerable factors are present. (Ibid.)

120  General theory of global justice Just as simplification is simultaneously the sine qua non and condicio per quam in the formulation of theory, so too it is the main problem. It represents ‘the difficulty of moving from causal speculations based on factual studies to theoretical formulations that lead one to view facts in particular ways’ (Ibid.). Nevertheless, this problem is remedied through the process of isolation, abstraction, aggregation and idealisation. Isolation helps us to see the ‘actions and interactions of a small number of factors and forces as though in the meantime other things remain equal’ (Ibid.). Abstraction helps us to put ‘some things aside in order to concentrate on others’ (Ibid.). Aggregation helps us to put ‘disparate elements together according to criteria derived from a theoretical purpose’ (Ibid.). Whereas idealisation helps us to act ‘as though perfection were attained or a limit reached even though neither can be’ (Ibid.). In Robert Cox’s (1981) view, there are two kinds of theory; problem-solving theory and critical theory. Problem-solving theories, as the name suggests, are aimed at solving particular problems in our world. They accept general or certain assumptions of our world and work within that paradigm to solve problems pertaining to those assumptions, that is, within that paradigm. But critical theories do not aim at solving problems and do not accept assumptions of our world. So, rather than working within the aforementioned paradigm of problem-solving theories, they work outside it. While problem-solving theories uphold the paradigm, critical theories challenge the paradigm and seek to overthrow it (Cox, 1981, pp. 88–90). My understanding of theory is neither necessarily problem-solving nor necessarily critical. I have a foot in both camps, and I am flexible enough to do that. While Cox is committed to the distinction between problem-solving theories and critical theories, and Waltz is committed to the assertion that the essence of theories is to perform explanatory duties, in my fusion of statism and cosmopolitanism to arrive at the general theory, my conception of theory is normative rather than explanatory. In other words, my discussion of the explanatory function of theories, especially in the Waltzian sense, serves as the nexus between my descriptive analysis of resource curse and my prescriptive analysis of theories of global justice. Therefore, the only commitment I have to Cox’s distinction is: to the extent that problem-solving theories and critical theories successfully perform explanatory duties, they are helpful; but to the extent that problem-solving theories and critical theories fail in their performance of explanatory duties, they are unhelpful. Finally, my use of theory does not only have an explanatory function, it also has a prescriptive function. More accurately, for me, theory has an explanatory-prescriptive function. Neither does it only explain how the relevant actors and agents act and fail to act in the context of global justice and global injustice, nor does it only prescribe what the relevant actors and agents ought to do and ought not to do in the context of global justice and global injustice. It simultaneously explains how the relevant actors and agents act and fail to act in the context of global justice and global injustice,

General theory of global justice 121 and prescribes what the relevant actors and agents ought to do and ought not to do in the context of global justice and global injustice. Hence, my conception of theory has both explanatory and prescriptive or moral denotation and connotations. General theory of global justice (fusion of horizons as general theory of global justice) should be taken to be an ideal type. Max Weber (1949) says: an ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasised viewpoints into a unified analytical construct. (p. 90) (emphasis in original) Weberian ideal type is fundamentally and entirely a representation and portrayal of a model phenomenon which cannot only be imagined but crucially also sufficiently represents the realities it portrays. While ideal type may not be realistic, nevertheless the realities it represents or actual cases are approximated to it. But ideal type neither stands for ‘perfection’ nor is it the ‘average’ of what it represents (Weber, 1949, pp. 90–92). General theory of global justice, as an ideal type, may not be realistic, and it neither stands for perfection nor is it the average of: (i) cosmopolitanism and statism; (ii) interactional and institutional analyses; (iii) the activities, actions and inactions, commissions and omissions of actors and agents; in global justice and global injustice. But it is to it that the ‘realities’ of: (i) cosmopolitanism and statism; (ii) interactional and institutional analyses; (iii) the activities, actions and inactions, commissions and omissions of actors and agents; in global justice and global injustice are to be approximated. General theory of global justice, like the Weberian ideal type, does not stand for perfection and it is not the average of what it represents. Nevertheless, while the Weberian ideal type does not necessarily denote or connote what morally ought to be and what morally ought not to be, general theory of global justice denotes or connotes what morally ought to be and what morally ought not to be. Furthermore, while the Weberian ideal type is a social science analytical tool, general theory of global justice is a particular way of reasoning about or dealing with global justice and global injustice or theorising about global justice and global injustice in political philosophy and political theory. In Chapter 3, I engaged in a prescriptive analysis of resource curse. My purpose of the prescriptive analysis was to explain the primary and secondary applicability of cosmopolitanism and statism to resource curse. To achieve my purpose, I examined the moral relationship between causality and responsibility on different levels in the context of resource curse. I resolved some moral quandaries concerning causal and constitutive roles that are contributory rather than necessary or sufficient, or necessary and

122  General theory of global justice sufficient. I resolved some moral quandaries concerning degrees of responsibilities in relation to contributory causal roles. Then I explained the primary and secondary applicability of cosmopolitanism and statism to the different levels of causality and responsibility in resource curse. Based on the grounds I laid in Chapter 3, in this chapter: (i) the combination of cosmopolitanism and statism is what I refer to as general theory; and (ii) fusion of horizons is the mechanism through which I arrive at the general theory. In view of the stipulations in (i) and (ii), I explain the concept of fusion of horizons in the remainder of this sub-chapter. The fusion of horizons compensates for the weaknesses of cosmopolitanism by using the strengths of statism, and it compensates for the weaknesses of statism by using the strengths of cosmopolitanism. In other words, it combines the two special theories in order to make them more robust. So far, I have only explained how I am using fusion of horizons and what it is doing for me. So, what does the concept of fusion of horizons mean? Evidently, the concept of fusion of horizons has two keywords; fusion and horizon. On the one hand, horizon can be understood as the point beyond which we cannot see. On the other hand, fusion can be understood as the combination or joining together of two or more things. The above definitions have some connotations in the way I am employing the concept of fusion of horizons. However, I am not employing the concept in the above ordinary language sense of it. Rather I am employing it technically. Now, I shall turn to Hans-Georg Gadamer, who, although did not originate the concept and its technical use, is rightly notable for his use of the concept as the pivot of his hermeneutics. Gadamer’s (1989; 1992) notion of fusion of horizons is situated in his hermeneutics. He argues that ‘hermeneutical consciousness is involved neither with technical nor moral knowledge’ (Gadamer, 1992, p. 315). Moreover, he clarifies that his ‘real concern was and is philosophic: not what we do or what we ought to do, but what happens to us over and above our wanting and doing’ (Gadamer, 1992, p. 28). He explains that: hermeneutic philosophy understands itself not as an absolute position but as a way of experience. It insists that there is no higher principle than holding oneself open in a conversation. (Gadamer, 1977, p. 189) Then he says that by hermeneutics he means the ability of the self ‘to listen to the other in the belief that the other could be right’ (Gadamer quoted in Grondin, 2003, p. 250). Within his hermeneutics, his notion of fusion of horizons is derived from his account of dialogue. According to Gadamer (1992): To reach an understanding in a dialogue is not merely a matter of putting oneself forward and successfully asserting one’s own point of view,

General theory of global justice 123 but being transformed into a communion in which we do not remain what we were. (p. 379) According to this account, it is possible for a reader to have a dialogue with the text he or she reads; dialogue represents an active language or a language in action; and the fusion of horizons is the end result of any successful dialogue (Vessey, n.d.). Gadamer (1992) says: what I described as a fusion of horizons was the form in which this unity actualizes itself, which does not allow the interpreter to speak of an original meaning of the work without acknowledging that, in understanding it, the interpreter’s own meaning enters in as well …. Working out the historical horizon of a text is always already a fusion of horizons. (pp. 576, 577) Building his hermeneutics on the foundation laid by Edmund Husserl’s and Martin Heidegger’s phenomenology, Gadamer sees fusion of horizons as the ideal way to conduct a dialogue. While Husserl focused on perception, Gadamer focused on linguistics. Hence the latter’s concern with dialogue (Vessey, n.d.). Gadamer (1989) says that: Undoubtedly the concept and phenomenon of the horizon is of crucial importance for Husserl’s phenomenological research. With this concept, which we too shall have occasion to use, Husserl is obviously seeking to capture the way all limited intentionality of meaning merges into the fundamental continuity of the whole. A horizon is not a rigid boundary but something that moves with one and invites one to advance further. Thus the horizon intentionality that constitutes the unity of the flow of experience is paralleled by an equally comprehensive horizon intentionality on the objective side. For everything that is given as existent is given in terms of a world and thus the world horizon is given with it. (p. 245) Husserl (1931) opines that: Perception has horizons made up of other possibilities of perception, as perceptions we could have, if we actively directed the course of perception otherwise: if, for example, we turned our eyes that way instead of this, or if we were to step forward or to one side, and so forth. (p. 44) Furthermore, he argues that there are three types of horizons, namely; internal horizon, external horizon and temporal horizon. Internal horizons are those characteristics that an object necessarily has because they are in the nature of the object. External horizons are those horizons that establish the relationship between an object and its environment. Temporal horizons

124  General theory of global justice denote the temporal nature or circumstances of the object. In other words, the internal horizon denotes the existence of the object – its nature. The external horizon denotes the special relations of the object to the environment. Whereas the temporal horizon, cum the internal and external horizons, denotes the spatio-temporal nature of the object and its relations to time, space, other objects and its environment (Vessey, n.d.). The temporal horizon, for Husserl, is more important than the internal and external horizons. He sees it to be the most important horizon because we see all objects as temporal objects, as objects that are not only extended in space but also in time. Given that the inner horizon is made known to us by our common expectations of future disclosures about the object, and given that the outer horizon is made known to us as how the object relates to its surroundings, therefore temporality is the vital link between objects and other horizons. Furthermore, he argues that future disclosures and relations, including the history of the object that made the object the sort of object that it is and put it in the place where it is, are in essence temporal. Hence, he argues that it is the temporal horizon that makes other horizons possible (Ibid.). In the vein of Husserl’s temporal horizon, Heidegger (1996) argues that time is ‘the possible horizon for any understanding of being’ (p. 19). Heidegger (1982) defines horizon as ‘that towards which each ecstasis1 is intrinsically open in a specific way … the open expanse towards which remotion itself is outside itself’ (p. 267) (emphasis in original). Gadamer (1997) says his hermeneutic is an attempt ‘to take up and elaborate this line of thinking from the later Heidegger’ (p. 47). Moreover, in line with Heidegger’s notion of ecstasis, Gadamer (1985) thinks that ‘Understanding is made possible because thinking continuously “points beyond itself”’(p. 186) (emphasis in original). But Gadamer (1997) would later argue, 37 years after Truth and Method (his magnum opus) was first published, that the argument for the importance of temporal distance was not helpful in talking about the importance of ‘the otherness of the other’ and the essential role that language plays as conversation (p. 45). For him, interpretive distance needs not always be a historical distance, and it is not always temporal distance that helps us defeat erroneous memories and images and their resonance and warped uses. But temporal distance is still very helpful because it is only through temporal distance that certain changes are made apparent to us and certain differences become observable (Ibid.). Horizon, according to Gadamer (1989), is ‘the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point’ (p. 302). It is important to have a horizon, according to him, because ‘A person who has no horizon does not see far enough and hence overvalues what is nearest to him’ (Ibid.).But it is not enough to have a horizon. It is even more important to fuse one’s horizon with other horizons. As he says: Every finite present has its limitations. We define the concept of “situation” by saying that it represents a standpoint that limits the possibility

General theory of global justice 125 of vision. Hence essential to the concept of a situation is the concept of a “horizon.” (Ibid.) (emphasis in original) So, the mere changing of standpoints entails the possibility of having different horizons and the mere stepping out of our horizons entails the possibility of having broader horizons. It is apt to say that the technical sense of horizon entails the possibility of the gradual expansion of our range of vision. Consequently, it helps us not to be ‘limited by what is nearby, but to see beyond it’ (Ibid.). Gadamer (1992) says that ‘In understanding we are drawn into an event of truth and arrive, as it were, too late, if we want to know what we are supposed to believe’ (p. 490). After all, flexibility rather than rigidity is the defining characteristic of horizon. As Gadamer (1989) succinctly puts it, rather than being a non-shifting border line, horizon actually shifts with us and encourages us to go forward (p. 245). Ultimately, Gadamer (1989) argues that: the historical movement of human life consists in the fact that it is never absolutely bound to any one standpoint, and hence can never have a truly closed horizon. The horizon is, rather, something into which we move and that moves with us. Horizons change for someone who is moving. (p. 304) In a nutshell, fusion of horizons simultaneously rejects objectivism and universalism. It rejects objectivism whereby the self objectifies the other’s horizon and discounts the self’s or at the expense of the self’s. It rejects universalism whereby a singular horizon is the sole holder of the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the whole truth. Consequently, it asserts that we are not closed-up in a closed horizon. But fusion of horizons is not Hegelian dialectics of, say, being + nothingness = becoming or thesis + antithesis = synthesis which itself becomes a new thesis. Nevertheless, fusion of horizons occurs when individuals understand that the context of their discourse can be seen from a different perspective in order to reach a new conclusion (Vessey, n.d.). The acquisition of novel information, or the development of a novel perception of the existing information, makes individuals re-evaluate their previous conclusions, make individuals aware of the limitations of their previous conclusions, help individuals gain a novel understanding of their discourse, and supposedly leads to a fusion of the horizons of the individuals who are involved in the discourse (Ibid.). Hence, the limitations of the previous conclusions are at least minimised, previous understanding is improved, new perspectives are formed and the formerly limited horizon becomes a broadened horizon (Ibid.). For Gadamer (1989), ‘it requires a special effort to acquire a historical horizon’ (p. 305). So, fusion of horizons is not a simple task. Naturally,

126  General theory of global justice given our high valuation of our stance, we would like to hold on to our stance even when rigorously challenged. It is only when we humbly realise that our stance is not, or should not be, absolute that we begin to entertain the possibility of fusion of horizons. Just as our stance is not or should not be absolute, so too the other’s stance is not or should not be absolute. So we are not invited to jettison our stance for the other’s stance, just as we are not asked to jettison the other’s stance for ours. We are only asked to fuse the two stances. Here it is assumed that both stances are not so absurd that they are worthless. They are assumed to be reasonable to the extent that there are plausible and positive elements within them that are worthwhile fusing. On the road to fusion of horizons, our attempt at understanding: always involves rising to a higher universality that overcomes not only our own particularity but also that of the other. The concept of “horizon” suggests itself because it expresses the superior breadth of vision that the person who is trying to understand must have. To acquire a horizon means that one learns to look beyond what is close at hand— not in order to look away from it but to see it better, within a larger whole and in truer proportion. (Gadamer, 1992, p. 305) (emphasis in original) Eric Donald Hirsch Jr. (1967) arguably poses the strongest criticism against the Gadamerian concept of fusion of horizons (Vessey, n.d.). He argues that the Gadamerian concept of horizon negates the possibility of any fusion of horizons. According to Hirsch Jr., it is impossible for a person to fuse her own horizon and that of the text together. For such a fusion to happen, she must have understood the original perspective of the text and integrate it into her own perspective. Given that fusion of horizons cannot happen without her understanding the original perspective of the text, and given that once she understands the original perspective of the text it is automatically no longer beyond her horizon, then fusion of horizons is impossible. As Hirsch Jr. (1967) puts it, if the original perspective of the text is beyond our horizon, then we cannot understand the text. If this is the case, then fusion of horizons is impossible. As long as we are limited by our own horizon, then we cannot break the barrier of this limitedness in order to fuse our horizon with that of the text. Saying that we can break the barrier of this limitedness in order to fuse our horizon with the text is tantamount to saying that we were not in the first place limited at all. If so, then there was no horizon in the first place (Hirsch Jr., 1967, p. 254). Hirsch Jr. would be right if Gadamer used horizon in the ordinary language sense of the word. But, like Husserl (1913) did in his phenomenology, Gadamer reconceptualised horizon to play a technical role in his hermeneutics. Like Husserl, Gadamer did not lay emphasis on the meaning of horizon as a limit. Rather, he emphasised horizon as that which we can

General theory of global justice 127 enlarge, as that which gives us pointers to something else and somewhere else and as that which we can go outside of in order to reach some new place. Moreover: the “horizon” is the larger context of meaning in which any particular meaningful presentation is situated. Inasmuch as understanding is taken to involve a “fusion of horizons”, then so it always involves the formation of a new context of meaning that enables integration of what is otherwise unfamiliar, strange or anomalous. In this respect, all understanding involves a process of mediation and dialogue between what is familiar and what is alien in which neither remains unaffected. (Malpas, 2009) (emphasis in original) So, while horizon designates our particular limit at a particular time and place, it does not confine us to that limit. It leaves us the opportunity to walk ahead and see further (Vessey, n.d.). As Gadamer (1992) says, ‘real fusing of horizons … means that as the historical horizon is projected, it is simultaneously superseded’ (p. 307). Although fusion of horizons is a mere value-neutral hermeneutic methodology, I adapt it to a moral theory or approach in order to use the strengths of cosmopolitanism to compensate for the weaknesses of statism, and to use the strengths of statism to compensate for the weaknesses of cosmopolitanism. For the purpose of my applied use, I tilt Gadamer’s fusion of horizons from hermeneutics to global justice in the following way. I am not using it as a mere hermeneutic theory of interpretation which is primarily aimed at helping us conduct dialogues and which sees a ‘successful’ dialogue as an end in itself. Consequently, the fusion of the horizons of cosmopolitanism and statism is not an end in itself but a means to determining or ascertaining causal, contributory and constitutive roles and assigning moral responsibilities in complex cases of global justice. My adaptation of fusion of horizons from a mere value-neutral hermeneutic methodology to a moral theory or approach works as follows. Rather than use it as a mere value-neutral hermeneutic methodology for the interpretation of texts, my usage of it is moral laden because global justice is inherently a moral issue. As earlier noted, in my application of fusion of horizons to global justice, I am not employing the concept in the ordinary language sense of it. Rather I am employing it technically. I am not following Gadamer dogmatically. In this case, although my use of the concept is an extension of Gadamer’s, the proper way to understand my use of the concept is to note the following. My use is flexible rather than rigid. It is an adaptation rather than the original. Most importantly, it is an application rather than a transfer or transposition, and a conversion rather than a transportation, of Gadamer’s fusion of horizons to global justice.

128  General theory of global justice In the next sub-chapters, I reiterate the benefits of the general theory and the benefits of combining statism and cosmopolitanism to deal with the different levels of causality and responsibility. Then I continue my explanation of why fusion of horizons should be seen as general theory of global justice and while statism and cosmopolitanism should be seen as special theories of global justice. To lay the grounds for my explanation of how statism and cosmopolitanism can be appropriately applied to the different levels of causality and responsibility, I begin the next sub-chapter by engaging in a brief discussion of the following. I will explain the different actors in social affairs and the moral agents of the occurrences of the social world and the different ways in which we do the moral analysis of social affairs and the occurrences of the social world.

Interactional moral analysis and institutional moral analysis The two distinct actors in our social affairs or the two distinct agents of the occurrences of our social world are individuals and institutions.2 I use the concept of ‘individuals’ to refer to natural persons or human persons while I use the concept of ‘institutions’ in two different senses, namely the sociological sense and the organisational sense. In the sociological sense of the concept, institutions are, on the one hand, former rules and organisations and, on the other hand, informal rules and norms (Steinmo, 2008, pp. 123–124). As a sociological concept, institutions are ‘a relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behaviour for specific groups of actors in specific situations’ (March & Olsen, 1998, p. 948). While as an organisational concept, institutions are large important organisations that have a particular purpose. Generally, my institutional analysis is concerned with institutions as a sociological concept. However, when I refer to corporations as institutions, I am specifically concerned with institutions as an organisational concept. Generally, there are two schools of the origins or development of institutions. One school is functionalism which says that institutions are specifically developed by societies to solve specific problems in societies (Eichengreen, 2009). In other words, it is because societies face certain problems, or it is when societies face certain problems, that certain institutions are developed to perform the function of solving those problems. The second theory or school says institutions evolve historically; it is because certain past occurrences led to the development of certain institutions, that we have those institutions today. In other words, institutions are social conventions, norms or rules that are enduring and persistent. Hence, it is difficult to change them or they are slow to change (Ibid.). In my analysis of the causal and moral responsibilities of institutions in resource curse in particular and global injustice in general, I do not see the relevant institutions in a merely functionalist way and I do not see them in

General theory of global justice 129 a merely historical way. I see them as a combination of both functionalist and historical factors. Now, focusing on the two distinct actors in social affairs and agents of the occurrences of the world, I will discuss how the moral analysis relating these actors or agents to their activities is done. Pogge (2010a) says we do the moral analysis of our social affairs or the occurrences of our social world in two distinct ways, namely interactional moral analysis and institutional moral analysis. On the one hand, when we do interactional moral analysis, we see the social affairs or the occurrences of the social world ‘interactionally: as actions, and effects of actions performed by individual and collective agents’ (Pogge, 2010a, pp. 14–15). On the other hand, when we do institutional moral analysis, we see the social affairs or the occurrences of the social world ‘institutionally: as effects of how our social world is structured and organised – of our laws and conventions, practices and social institutions’ (Ibid.). Before proceeding, let us note that interactional moral analysis and institutional moral analysis in moral philosophy, social philosophy, political philosophy or political theory are not the same as process tracing per se especially as it is understood in political science in particular and social science in general. Although interactional moral analysis and institutional moral analysis involve process tracing, the emphasis is not on the mere evidential, descriptive and sequential nature of the independent, dependent and intervening variables involved in the process. Rather the emphasis is on the moral nature of the evidence, description and sequence of the independent, dependent and intervening variables. Process tracing is: the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analysed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator …. an analytic tool for drawing descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence – often understood as part of a temporal sequence of events or phenomena. (Collier, 2011, pp. 823–824) Its cornerstones are evidence, description and sequencing. Firstly, it is concerned with causal-process observations. Secondly, it: inherently analyses trajectories of change and causation, but the analysis fails if the phenomena observed at each step in this trajectory are not adequately described. Hence, what in a sense is “static” description, is a crucial building block in analysing the process being studied. (Ibid.) Thirdly, it is especially attentive to the sequences of independent variables, dependent variables and intervening variables.

130  General theory of global justice On the one hand, process tracing relies on the straw-in-the-wind, hoop, smoking-gun and doubly decisive tests to judge whether a causal inference is historically at once necessary and sufficient, necessary but insufficient, unnecessary but sufficient, or at once unnecessary and insufficient for certain event(s), occurrence(s) or situation(s). On the other hand: in interactional moral analysis, we focus on the morality, immorality or amorality of the actions and omissions of certain individual(s) or collectives in light of a given event, occurrence or situation. (Abumere, 2016, p. 17) This individual level of analysis (i.e., analysing the individual and collective agents) is not methodological individualism which says: social phenomena must be explained by showing how they result from individual actions, which in turn must be explained through reference to the intentional states that motivated the individual actors. (Heath, 2010, s.p.) It is just: a level of analysis which says analysing the role of the individual helps in determining to what extent the individual agent qua individual agent causes anything or collective agents qua collective agents cause anything and to what extent they should be assigned responsibility. (Abumere, 2016, p. 17) It recognises that there are other levels of analysis, and there are other ways we can analyse social, political and economic activities and domestic and global activities. In both interactional moral analysis and institutional moral analysis, we use the same method. However, in interactional moral analysis, we are concerned with individuals and collectives as moral agents of our social world; whereas in institutional moral analysis, we are concerned with institutions as moral agents of our social world (Ibid.). In institutional moral analysis, just like in interactional moral analysis, we do not rely on the straw-in-thewind, hoop, smoking-gun and doubly decisive tests to judge whether our causal inference is historically at once necessary and sufficient, necessary but insufficient, unnecessary but sufficient, or at once unnecessary and insufficient for certain event(s), occurrence(s) or situation(s). When we do: institutional moral analysis, we focus on the morality, immorality or amorality of the existing features of certain institutions or even the institutions themselves qua institutions in light of a given event, occurrence or situation. (Ibid.)

General theory of global justice 131 Interactional moral analysis and institutional moral analysis play crucial roles in global justice analysis because they are directly linked to statism and cosmopolitanism. When we do interactional moral analysis we mainly rely on cosmopolitanism and to some extent statism. But when we do institutional moral analysis we mainly rely on statism and to some extent cosmopolitanism. Firstly, statism and cosmopolitanism tell us whether certain agents have certain moral responsibilities on certain levels, namely the interactional level and the institutional level. Secondly, statism and cosmopolitanism tell us how the failure of moral responsibility on each level can cause harm. Thirdly, statism and cosmopolitanism tell us what consequent responsibilities agents should have given the agents’ failure in their initial responsibilities. (Ibid.) In Chapter 3, to analyse the different roles of the different agents of resource curse in Africa, I deemed it helpful to look at them on different levels of causality and responsibility. Here is where statism and cosmopolitanism come into play as will be shown in the next sub-chapter. Firstly, the theories tell us whether certain agents have certain moral responsibilities on certain levels. Secondly, the theories tell us how the failure of moral responsibility on each level can cause resource curse. Thirdly, the theories tell us what consequent responsibilities agents should have, given the agents’ failure in their initial responsibilities.

The primary and secondary applications of statism and cosmopolitanism Statism is primarily applicable to institutional moral analysis while cosmopolitanism is primarily applicable to interactional moral analysis. By applicability, I simply mean the global (in)justice domain or remit within which statism and cosmopolitanism can appropriately be used as theories of global justice. Here, the notion of applicability is simultaneously descriptive and prescriptive. It is descriptive because it tells us which theory is used in a certain domain. More importantly, it is prescriptive because it tells us what statism and cosmopolitanism in their respective domains require of actors and agents (Abumere, 2016, p. 19). The assertion that statism is primarily applicable to interactional moral analysis and cosmopolitanism is primarily applicable to institutional moral analysis is evident from the explanation that statism is primarily concerned with institutions while cosmopolitanism is primarily concerned with individuals. I use the word ‘primarily’ to suggest that both statism and cosmopolitanism also have secondary applications. For instance, statism – as the concept suggests – is primarily concerned with

132  General theory of global justice the institution of the state, but it is also applicable beyond the institution of the state as shall be shown below. Although cosmopolitanism is primarily concerned with individuals, it is also applicable beyond individuals as shall be shown below. Statism’s primary concern with institutions, especially the institution of the state, is based on four desiderata. In the first desideratum, statism’s aim is to determine the institutional grounds – rather than the interactional grounds – for cooperation within the state. In the second desiderata, statism’s aim is to determine how the advantages and disadvantages that emanate from the institutional cooperation in the first desideratum are divided. In the third desideratum, statism’s aim is to determine the moral principles guiding the relationship between the state and other states. Then in the fourth desideratum, statism’s aim is to determine the moral principles guiding the behaviour of the state towards other states. Consequently, based on the four desiderata, statism: is internally concerned with the state and its institutions and externally concerned with what, if any, the relationship of the state and its institutions should be with other states and their institutions …. it is not concerned, or at least it is not directly concerned, with individuals. (Abumere, 2016, p. 20) What makes cosmopolitanism more suitable – compared to statism – for interactional moral analysis is also what makes it less suitable – compared to statism – for institutional moral analysis. On the one hand, it is because cosmopolitanism is primarily morally concerned with individuals that it is more suitable for interactional moral analysis, that is, it is used primarily for interactional moral analysis. On the other hand, it is also because cosmopolitanism is primarily morally concerned with individuals that it is used only secondarily to analyse institutions. ‘Cosmopolitanism is appropriately primarily applicable to individuals because all the three principles of cosmopolitanism are individual-centric’ (Abumere, 2016, p. 18). Pogge (2010b) famously asserts that individualism, universality and generality are the three principles which all cosmopolitan positions – whether legal cosmopolitanism or moral cosmopolitanism and whether interactional moral cosmopolitanism or institutional moral cosmopolitanism – have in common (p. 114). The principles of individualism, universality and generality respectively are sui generis concerned with the individual – they are individual-centric. The first principle is self-evidently about the individual, and the second and third principles are qualifiers of the first principle (Abumere, 2016, p. 18). Firstly, according to Pogge (2010b), the principle of individualism asserts that ‘the ultimate units of concern are human beings, or persons’ (p. 114) (emphasis in original). Prima facie and ipso facto, the principle of individualism is concerned about ‘the individual; for it is individuals that are

General theory of global justice 133 the ultimate units of concern and not corporations, the state, the global institutional order or institutions’ (Abumere, 2016, p. 18). Secondly, according to Pogge (2010b), the principle of universality asserts that ‘the status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to every living human being equally’ (p. 114) (emphasis in original). Like the principle of individualism, the principle of universality is, prima facie and ipso facto, concerned about the individual; ‘It is to individuals that the status of ultimate unit of concern is attached and not to corporations, the state, the global institutional order or institutions’ (Abumere, 2016, p. 18). Thirdly, according to Pogge (2010b), the principle of generality asserts that everyone is an ultimate unit of concern for everyone (p. 114). Once again, like the principles of individualism and university, the principle of generality is, prima facie and ipso facto, concerned with the individual: It is “every individual” that is an ultimate unit of concern for “every individual.” The principle of generality neither says everyone is an ultimate unit of concern for corporations, the state the global institutional order or institutions. Nor does it say that corporations, the state, the global institutional order or institutions are ultimate units of concern for everyone. (Abumere, 2016, p. 18) (emphasis in original) The three principles show that cosmopolitanism is aimed at ensuring that individuals are justly and fairly treated in society, whether domestic or global society. Whether in interactional moral cosmopolitanism or in institutional moral cosmopolitanism, it is the moral agent (who is an individual or a collective in the case of interactional moral cosmopolitanism or an institution in the case of institutional moral cosmopolitanism) who has the moral obligation to ensure that individuals are justly and fairly treated in both domestic and global societies. While interactional moral cosmopolitanism places the onus on individuals, institutional moral cosmopolitanism places it on institutions. For the former, individuals – in their interactions with other individuals – ought to treat other individuals justly and fairly as demanded by the principles of individualism, universality and generality. For the latter, institutions – in their relationships with individuals – ought to treat individuals justly and fairly as demanded by the principles of individualism, universality and generality. These institutions, in the context of resource curse in Africa, are corporations, the state and the global institutional order. But cosmopolitanism is only concerned with them to the extent that they impact individuals. So, the appropriate domains of cosmopolitanism are the individual and collective levels of causality and responsibility. However, cosmopolitanism can also be applied to the corporate, the state, and the global institutional order levels of causality and responsibility. In other words, cosmopolitanism is primarily applied to the individual

134  General theory of global justice and collective levels while it is secondarily applied to the corporate, the state and the global institutional order levels. When we apply cosmopolitanism primarily to the individual and collective levels, we employ interactional moral cosmopolitanism. But when we apply cosmopolitanism secondarily to the corporate, the state and the global institutional order levels, we employ institutional moral cosmopolitanism (Ibid.). Despite the adjective ‘institutional,’ institutional moral cosmopolitanism is not primarily concerned with institutions but individuals. It is only concerned with institutions to the extent that institutions affect the well-being of individuals. To the extent that institutions treat individuals justly and fairly or unjustly and unfairly, institutional moral cosmopolitanism will appraise those institutions as morally good or morally bad. The following illustration suffices to clarify the above assertion: In a free-market system or mixed economy system, although a few corporations might be owned by the state, most corporations are usually owned, managed and staffed by individuals or collectives. So, even if we cannot primarily apply cosmopolitanism to corporations because they are not individuals, we can secondarily apply cosmopolitanism to corporations because they are owned, managed and staffed by individuals or collectives. (Abumere, 2016, p. 19) Legally, that is, in the eyes of the law, corporations are legal or juridical persons as opposed to natural persons. As legal or juridical persons – the operative word here being persons – corporations have legal duties and legal rights (Ibid.). Beyond being legal or juridical persons, they are also moral agents, and beyond their legal duties and rights, they also have moral duties and rights as moral agents. While the government, regulatory agencies or courts of law impose legal sanctions on corporations if they fail in their legal duties, institutional moral cosmopolitanism imposes moral sanctions on corporations if they fail in their moral duty. To expatiate on the aforementioned moral sanction, note the following: The primary aim of the owners or shareholders of companies is to make profit for themselves. While the primary aim of the managers and entire staff is to make profit for the owners or shareholders. Hence, corporations are quintessentially profit-seeking and profit-making entities. In the course of seeking profit, these corporations (or owners, shareholders, managers and staff) by their actions or omissions positively or negatively affect the well-being of individuals, communities, societies or even our entire world. It is this relationship between (owners and staff of) corporations and the persons that are affected by the actions of the corporations that cosmopolitanism is concerned with. (Ibid.)

General theory of global justice 135 In view of cosmopolitanism, on the state and global institutional order levels, firstly, the actors involved in the resource curse problem are looked at as individuals although they are representatives, heads, etc. of supranational institutions, regional organisations, sub-regional organisations, foreign governments, and state governments (ministries, parastatals, from the executive, legislature, judiciary, security agencies, civil service and so on). Secondly, the state and the global institutional order as institutions ‘are judged based on how their actions and omissions harm their victims’ (Ibid.), namely the victims of resource curse in a particular resource-cursed state. Given its principles, cosmopolitanism helps us to understand the role of the individual and collective on the individual and collective levels of causality and responsibility. ‘Cosmopolitanism tells us, primarily, how individuals should treat or relate to other individuals. And, secondarily, how institutions should treat or relate to individuals’ (Ibid.). In the context of resource curse, it tells us how corporations, the state and the global institutional order should relate to or treat individuals. However, cosmopolitanism, precisely institutional moral cosmopolitanism, does not stipulate what the moral principles guiding the relationship between one institution and another institution should be, that is: (i) how a corporation should relate to other corporations, the state and the global institutional order; (ii) how the state should relate to other states, corporations and the global institutional order; (iii) how the global institutional order should relate to the state and corporations. (Ibid.) Therefore, in my analysis of the various levels, in order to analyse the individual and collective levels, I use cosmopolitanism primarily to ascertain the moral responsibilities of individuals and collectives vis-à-vis global justice. And in order to analyse the corporate, state and global institutional order levels, I use cosmopolitanism only secondarily to ascertain the moral obligations corporations, the state and the global institutional order owe individuals vis-à-vis global justice (Ibid.). In view of the above explanation, I think it is clear why it is simultaneously possible and plausible to use cosmopolitanism secondarily for institutional analysis. In the context of resource curse, we can secondarily apply cosmopolitanism to the corporate, the state and the global institutional order levels. Moreover, as Pogge (1989) says: Institutions are not only “staffed” and enforced by humans (are complex patterns of human conduct); they are also created, shaped, perpetrated, or changed by us. Property and promises, money and markets, governments and borders, treaties and diplomacy – all these do not occur naturally but are invented by human beings and continuously evolve through human conduct. Such institutions are “up to us,” collectively,

136  General theory of global justice and we therefore have a collective causal responsibility for existing institutions …. this causal responsibility gives rise to a moral responsibility, which is a collective responsibility for our collective role in imposing existing institutions upon, in particular, their most disadvantaged (and involuntary) participants. (p. 276) To reiterate, what makes statism more suitable – compared to cosmopolitanism – for institutional moral analysis is also what makes it less suitable – compared to cosmopolitanism – for interactional moral analysis. On the one hand, it is because statism is primarily morally concerned with institutions (especially the institution of the state) that it is more suitable for institutional moral analysis; that is, used primarily for institutional moral analysis. It is also because statism is primarily morally concerned with institutions – especially the institution of the state – that it is used only secondarily to analyse individuals and collectives. Statism is not concerned with interactional moral analysis, so it is not directly applied to interactional moral analysis or the individual and collective levels of causality and responsibility. However, what it tells us about interactional moral analysis or the individual and collective levels of causality and responsibility: is that when and where there is a good basic structure, there is the following. Individuals and collectives are likely to act better rather than worse; and individuals and collectives are likely to be better-off rather than worse-off (after all, the essence of the basic structure is to make society – and individuals and collectives – better-off on all levels). Conversely, when and where there is no basic structure or there is a bad basic structure: individuals and collectives are likely to act worse rather than better; and individuals and collectives are likely to be worse-off rather than better-off. (Abumere, 2016, pp. 20–21) Having shown how and why the primary constituencies of cosmopolitan analysis are the individual and collective levels, and how and why statism can still be secondarily applied to the individual and collective levels, it is very simple to decipher why and how primarily the state level is the constituency, remit or domain of statist analysis. Nevertheless, deciphering whether statist analysis or cosmopolitan analysis is primarily suitable for the corporate level is a bit difficult compared to how simple it is to decipher that statist analysis is primarily suitable for the state level and cosmopolitan analysis is primarily suitable for the individual and collective levels. On the one hand, since: cosmopolitanism is primarily concerned with individuals rather than institutions, it follows that we can only secondarily apply it to the corporate level because corporations are (organisational) institutions. (Abumere, 2016, p. 23)

General theory of global justice 137 On the other hand, since: cosmopolitanism is only secondarily applied to the corporate level, given that statism is primarily morally concerned with institutions, and given that corporations are (organisational) institutions, then it follows that statism can be primarily applied to the corporate level. (Ibid.) I say the corporate level is primarily analysed by statism because corporations are institutions, albeit institutions in the organisational sense rather than institutions in the sociological sense. This is clear when we understand corporation as a big significant organisation that has a specific aim, and we understand institution as an organisation or a set of organisations that is/are accepted by law as a distinct entity or distinct entities. Corporations acquire their legal or juridical personhood when they are registered by appropriate government agencies. Having become legal or juridical persons, they are regulated by appropriate governmental regulatory agencies and are bound by laws of the state (it does not matter whether they are bound by laws of a certain tier of government and are regulated by a regulative agency of a certain tier of government). Ultimately the state sanctions the existence of corporations and regulates the affairs of corporations. For the above reasons, we need statism to help us fit MNCs into the basic structure of our society. In the analysis of the corporate level, we need statism and cosmopolitanism because of two reasons. Firstly, corporations are part of economic institutions that ought to be fitted into a well-arranged basic structure of the state, and this is within the remit of statism. Secondly, corporations are properties owned by individual shareholders (and in some cases jointly owned by the government and the private or solely owned by the government, regardless of the tier of the government), and then: managed and staffed by individual persons, whose individuality must not be assigned more, or less, moral value or weight than assigned to other individuals – or whose collective agencies must not be treated as morally superior to other collective agencies. (Ibid.) On the primary applicability of statism to the state level, I explained in Chapter 1 that in view of the vertical relationship between the state and citizens, statism posits that, in the state, justice is at once theoretically plausible, practicably realisable and in fact is a required element. The state guarantees justice through its justice apparatus, namely principally the government or the arms of government (the judiciary notably, the executive and the legislature) and governmental ministries, departments, agencies and parastatals. Put differently, the justice apparatus protects the basic structure of the state which in turn serves as the regulative principle for the vertical relationship

138  General theory of global justice between the state and its citizens (and the horizontal relationships among citizens). In this sense, in the state, the vertical relationship is a ground of justice, the basic structure of the state is the determinant of the scope and extensity of the justice, and the justice apparatus is the mechanism through which the state guarantees the justice (Abumere, 2016, p. 20). Deductively, the state level is statism’s primary constituency, domain or remit of analysis. Statism, by default, is readily applicable to the state level (Ibid.). So, statism, on the state level of causality and responsibility helps us to understand the role of the state. As already mentioned in Chapter 1, different statists have used statism to argue for different positions ranging from (i) states have no duty vis-à-vis global justice, (ii) states have limited duty vis-à-vis global justice, to (iii) states have only humanitarian or charitable duty vis-à-vis global justice. Here, I am not interested in this ‘use’ of statism. What I am interested in is the other way statists have also used statism, that is, to show ‘that the onus is on the domestic state to ensure distributive justice domestically’ (Ibid.). In the case of resource curse in Africa, as already shown, when the state fails in this duty then resource curse is the consequence. However, within the state intra-nationally, as far as the vertical and horizontal relationships in the state are concerned, statism and cosmopolitanism have the same goal but what differentiates the two theories is that they have different means of achieving their common goal. Their common goal is justice. While statism uses the basic structure as a means to achieving justice, cosmopolitanism uses its three principles. Essentially, statism posits that if there is an appropriate moral arrangement of the social institutions within the state in a just and fair basic structure, there will be justice (Ibid.). Moreover, Rawls (2005) argues that ‘The role of the institutions that belong to the basic structure is to secure just background conditions against which the actions of individuals and associations take place’ (pp. 266–267). But (institutional) cosmopolitanism essentially posits that if the social institutions in every state respect the equality of the moral worth of every individual both intra-nationally and inter-nationally irrespective of citizenship, there will be justice within the state intra-nationally and outside the state internationally, in short, there will be justice globally, that is, global justice (Abumere, 2016, p. 18). In what counts as a critique of both statism and cosmopolitanism, Amartya Sen (2009) asks some fundamental questions which he originally directed at the ideal theory in opposition to the ideal theory and in support of non-ideal theory. He asks: whether the analysis of justice must be so confined to getting the basic institutions and general rules right? Should we not also have to examine what emerges in the society, including the kind of lives that people can actually lead, given the institutions and rules, but also other influences, including actual behaviour, that would inescapably affect human lives? (Sen, 2009, p. 10)

General theory of global justice 139 On the one hand, for statists, as long as the basic structure of the state is just, as long as the social institutions are well arranged or organised within the state, then there is justice within the state and it does not matter whether there is justice or injustice outside the state. On the other hand: For the cosmopolitan, no matter how just the basic structure is and no matter how well the social institutions are arranged or organised, injustice is still the order of the day if the following situation is the case. The equal moral value of everyone is not upheld. Certain individuals still suffer avoidably or unnecessarily especially because of who they are, where they come from, and how powerless they are economically, politically and socially. (Abumere, 2016, p. 21) On the global institutional order level, statism is at variance with cosmopolitanism. Since some statists think that outside the state justice is totally inapplicable, some think it is only partially applicable and others think what is applicable outside the state is only duty of charity, consequently, statism does not see how the global institutional order has causal, contributory or constitutive role in resource curse in Africa and subsequently moral responsibility for resource curse in Africa. I am concerned with the obligations the global institutional order, because of its causal and constitutive role in resource curse, owes the victims of resource curse. Surely, this obligation is not charitable or humanitarian obligation.” (Ibid.) Neglecting the role of the global institutional order in resource curse in Africa and subsequently exonerating the global institutional order from moral responsibility for resource curse in Africa is an important theoretical and moral weakness of statism as a theory of global justice. To exonerate the global institutional order from its role in resource curse in Africa is equivalent to simultaneously neglecting morally undesirable institutional consequences in the global institutional order and claiming that all the causal, contributory and constitutive roles in resource curse in Africa emanate from and are to be found within the concerned African state, be it Nigeria, Angola, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Sierra Leone or any other resource-cursed African state. In effect, this is tantamount to what Pogge (2010a) refers to as explanatory nationalism, that is, the ‘tendency to explain poverty and hunger exclusively in terms of causal factors that are domestic to the societies in which they occur’ (pp. 24–25). Arguendo, let us assume that statism acquiesces to the argument that the global institutional order has a causal, contributory or constitutive role in resource curse in Africa and consequently has a moral responsibility

140  General theory of global justice for resource curse in Africa. However, since statists claim that there is neither coercion nor coercive apparatus outside the state, they will still argue that justice-claims cannot be realised outside the framework of an order (Bull, 2002, p. 83). In other words, since the moral obligations of the global institutional order in view of its causal, contributory or constitutive role in resource curse in Africa are obligations of justice rather than obligations of charity, the corresponding claims are claims of justice rather than claims of charity. Statists continue, absent order at the global level (this is not to be confused with global order in international relations), such justice obligations and justice claims are mere theoretical obligations and claims rather than practicable obligations and claims since neither the obligations nor the claims can be met (Abumere, 2016, p. 21). In other words, statism will still end with an equivalence of the claim that outside the state there is no justice. Arguendo, let us assume that statism is right that the global level lacks the necessary conditions (coercion and coercive apparatus or order) for justice, and consequently we acquiesce to statism’s claim that justice based on those conditions is unrealisable at the global level. However, the global institutional order still has a moral case to answer for its role in resource curse in Africa because the kind of justice statism says is absent at the global level is fundamentally politico-legal justice rather than moral justice. That statism’s politico-legal justice is absent at the global level does not mean that moral justice, moral right and moral wrong are also absent at the global level (Ibid.). The global institutional order only has a moral obligation for resource curse in Africa because ab initio it failed to observe its negative duty to refrain from having any causal, contributory or constitutive role in resource curse in Africa. The coercive apparatus and institutions of the state may prevent or deter us from violating our negative duties – for practical purposes, absent such coercive apparatus and institutions of the state the violation of negative duties will be statistically higher than when such coercive apparatus and institutions of the state are present. However, such coercive apparatus and institutions of the state are not a necessary condition for us to refrain from violating our negative duties. Even Nagel (2005), a quintessential, hard-core and one of the most prominent statists concedes that ‘We do not need institutions to enable us to refrain from violating other people’s rights’ (p. 131) (emphasis added). In other words: The presence of structures or institutions, whether state-like or not, and whether domestic or global, does not bring into existence moral justice, moral right and moral wrong. It only brings into existence politico-legal justice. And the absence of structures or institutions, whether statelike or not, or domestic or global, do not cease the existence of moral justice, moral right and moral wrong, but only ceases the existence of politico-legal justice. (Abumere, 2016, p. 22)

General theory of global justice 141 Even in a Hobbesian state of nature, neither moral justice or moral right nor moral injustice or moral wrong is absent, what is absent is politico-legal justice. Moral justice precedes the leviathan, and as such, the leviathan or the institution of the sovereign does not bring into being moral justice. The institution of the sovereign only precedes and brings into being politico-legal justice. Any action or omission that is morally just or morally unjust, morally right or morally wrong, is said to be so due to its nature, but not because of the law, decree or edict of any sovereign. So, moral justness, moral rightness or moral wrongness is not conferred on actions and omissions by a sovereign; rather the sovereign only has the power to confer politico-legal lawfulness on actions and omissions. Morality is independent of the sovereign or leviathan. What the laws, decrees and edicts of the sovereign bring into existence is politico-legal justice …. Neither the sovereign nor the laws, the decrees and the edicts of the sovereign, can bring into existence moral justice, moral right and moral wrong. Because moral justice, moral right and moral wrong pre-exist, and are independent of, the sovereign and the sovereign’s laws, decrees and edicts. (Abumere, 2016, p. 21) In resource curse in Africa, there is no doubt that politico-legal justice is at stake and very important. But my point is that beyond politico-legal justice, moral justice is also at stake and very important in resource curse in Africa. What happens to victims of resource curse in Africa is that their negative rights and basic rights are violated and I contend that this should not happen to them because, at least, we do not need the institutions of the state to refrain from violating other peoples’ negative rights. Moreover, once again, even Nagel (2005) concedes that negative rights and basic rights: set universal and pre-political limit to the legitimate use of power, independent of special forms of association. It is wrong for any individual or group [or institution] to deny such rights to any other individual or group. (p. 127) Looking especially at the nasty, brutish and short lives of the worst affected victims of resource curse (Abumere, 2016, p. 81) in Nigeria (especially the Niger Delta), Angola (especially Cabinda), the DRC (especially Katanga) and Equatorial Guinea as described in Chapter 2, without doubt, their basic rights and negative rights have been violated by the actors in Chapters 2 and 3 who have failed in their most basic duties. Hedley Bull (2002) hints at the distinction between moral justice and politico-legal justice when he says ‘ideas about justice belong to the class of moral ideas …. Considerations of justice, accordingly, are to be distinguished from considerations of law’ (p. 75). My distinction between moral justice and politico-legal justice creates grounds for holding the global

142  General theory of global justice institutional order morally liable for its causal, contributory or constitutive role in resource curse in Africa in spite of the protestation of statism (Abumere, 2016, p. 23). Since this role directly affects the lives of individuals in the Niger Delta (Nigeria), Cabinda (Angola), Katanga (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, and so on, therefore, I can correctly conclude that despite the word ‘institution’ in the global institutional order, cosmopolitanism is applicable to the global institutional order. However, since the global institutional order is an institution rather than an individual, or it is institutional rather than interactional, it is not the natural constituency of cosmopolitanism. Therefore, I only apply cosmopolitanism to the global institutional order to the extent that the actions and omissions of the global institutional order affect individuals (Ibid.), in this case, victims of resource curse in Africa. Using institutional moral cosmopolitanism, and doing institutional moral analysis, we can trace the sufferings of victims of resource curse in Africa to the causal, contributory or constitutive role played by the global institutional order. In other words, we can trace the sufferings of individuals to certain harms done to them, and trace the causes of these harms to the global institutional order. Then we ask, could the global institutional order have been shaped differently without causing any comparable harm? If yes, then a reform is needed. In a nutshell, the proper way to employ institutional (moral) cosmopolitanism in my analysis is as follows. Using institutional cosmopolitanism or institutional moral analysis, we can look at individuals or collectives who are suffering the effects of resource curse and trace the cause to corporations. We can find out that the corporations have prioritised the interests of their shareholders – profit maximisation – to the detriment of individuals and collectives. In other words, if the corporations were to assign equal moral value to the suffering individuals and collectives as they assign to the shareholders, the harm that causes the suffering would have been avoided. Therefore, we ask counterfactually; could the corporations have acted differently without causing any comparable harm? If yes, so there is a need to reform the activities of the corporations. So too we can trace the sufferings of individuals and collectives to certain harms done to them, and trace the causes of these harms to the state. Then we ask; could the state have acted differently without causing any comparable harm? If yes, then a reform is needed. Finally, we can trace the sufferings of individuals and collectives to certain harms done to them, and trace the causes of these harms to the global institutional order. Then we ask; could the global institutional order have been shaped differently without causing any comparable harm? If yes, then a reform is needed. In view of the foregoing discussion, I have shown how and why: i In the analysis of the individual level: cosmopolitanism is primarily applicable; while statism is only secondarily applicable.

General theory of global justice 143 ii In the analysis of the collective level: cosmopolitanism is primarily applicable; while statism is only secondarily applicable. iii In the analysis of the corporate level: statism is primarily applicable; while cosmopolitanism is only secondarily applicable. iv In the analysis of the state level: statism is primarily applicable; while cosmopolitanism is only secondarily applicable. v When applied to the global institutional order, statism tells us why we should not expect ‘too much’ from the global institutional order. While cosmopolitanism tells us at least there is a cogent reason to hold the global institutional order morally responsible for certain facts and situations of our world. (Abumere, 2016, p. 24) However, given Pogge’s (1992) application of institutional cosmopolitanism to sovereignty, one might argue that my assertion that cosmopolitanism is only secondarily applied to institutions is wrong. I hold that my assertion is right because I think Pogge, in his application of cosmopolitanism to sovereignty, overstretches institutional cosmopolitanism beyond its limits. In the application in question, the core of Pogge’s institutional cosmopolitanism is the ‘wide vertical dispersal of sovereignty.’ To arrive at this core, Pogge: firstly, presents his conception of sovereignty; secondly, defines absolute sovereignty; thirdly, criticises the current Westphalian system; and then, fourthly, proposes his ‘wide vertical dispersal of sovereignty.’ In Pogge’s (1992) conception of sovereignty: A is sovereign over B if and only if: 1 A is a governmental body or officer (‘agency’), and 2 B are persons, and 3 A has unsupervised and irrevocable authority over B (a) to lay down rules constraining their conduct, or (b) to judge their compliance with rules, or (c) to enforce rules against them through pre-emption, prevention, or punishments, or (d) to act on their behalf vis-á-vis other agencies (ones that do or do not have authority over them) or persons (ones whom A is sovereign over, or not). A has absolute sovereignty over B if and only if: 1 A is sovereign over B, and 2 No other agency has any authority over A or over B which is not supervised and revocable by A. (p. 57) (emphasis in original) Relating the above conceptions of sovereignty and absolute sovereignty to the Westphalian system, Pogge (1992) describes the system as follows:

144  General theory of global justice Central to contemporary political thought and reality is the idea of the autonomous territorial state as the preeminent mode of political organization at a single level; it is states and only states that merit separate colours on a political map of our world. For nearly every human being, and for almost every piece of territory, there is exactly one government with preeminent authority over, and primary responsibility for, this person or territory. And each person is thought to owe primary political allegiance and loyalty to this government with preeminent authority over him or her. National governments dominate and control the decision making of smaller political units as well as supranational decisions, which tend to be made through intergovernmental bargaining. (pp. 57–58) In what seems to be a syllogism, taking the definition of cosmopolitanism and the various distinctions therein as a major premise, and taking the conceptions of sovereignty and absolute sovereignty and the description of the Westphalian system as a minor premise, Pogge (1992) draws the following conclusion: From the standpoint of a cosmopolitan morality – which centres around the fundamental needs and interests of individual human beings – this concentration of sovereignty at one level is no longer defensible. What I am proposing instead is not the idea of a world state, which is really a variant of the preeminent state idea. Rather, the proposal is that governmental authority – or sovereignty – be widely dispersed in the vertical dimension. What we need is both centralization and decentralization, a kind of second-order decentralization away from the now dominant level of the state. Thus, persons should be citizens of, and govern themselves through, a number of political units of various sizes, without any one political unit being dominant and thus occupying the traditional role of state. And their political allegiance and loyalties should be widely dispersed over these units; neighbourhood, town, county, province, state, region, and world at large. People should be politically at home in all of them, without converging upon any one of them as the lodestar of their political identity. (p. 58) Pogge provided some salient arguments for his wide vertical dispersal of sovereignty and institutional cosmopolitanism. I shall not rehash the arguments here. Rather, I shall present some arguments why Pogge’s application is not viable. Let me reiterate what is by now a banal criticism of institutional cosmopolitanism. Critics of institutional cosmopolitanism may argue that cosmopolitanism is not a political theory or an international relations theory, say, political realism, liberalism, etc. that is meant to guide the conduct of states or international relations. Rather, it is a moral doctrine that guides the interactions or relationships among individuals. Given that Pogge adopts a wide vertical dispersal of sovereignty in place of the current

General theory of global justice 145 Westphalian system, the above criticism might not be very potent in his framework. However, the criticism still carries some weight because the institutions Pogge is proposing are state-like to some extent although they are not states as we understand states in the current Westphalian system. As framed by Pogge, his application is a ‘Catch 22.’ I call it ‘Catch 22’ because it simultaneously seeks to replace the Westphalian dispersal of sovereignty with a wide vertical dispersal of sovereignty and to avoid a world government. It cannot totally replace the Westphalian dispersal of sovereignty with a wide vertical dispersal of sovereignty without having a world government. It either has to be Westphalian-like at its apex or be a world government. For Pogge, the Westphalian dispersal of sovereignty that exists in our current world does not help the cause of global justice, it rather militates against it. Hence he proposes a wide vertical dispersal of sovereignty. However, except a wide vertical dispersal of sovereignty ends up at its apex with a world government it is always going to be Westphalian-like at its apex. Pogge (2005) argues that in his vertical dispersal of sovereignty: when some political units turn tyrannical and oppressive, there will always be other, already fully organized political units – above, below, or on the same level – which can render aid and protection to the oppressed, publicise the abuses, and, if necessary, fight the oppressors. (p. 183) (emphasis in original) To systematise the above argument, when one sovereignty errs on one level in the wide vertical dispersal of sovereignty: i There will be a higher sovereignty on a higher level to chastise the erring sovereignty. ii When there is no higher sovereignty on a higher level there will be other sovereignties on the same level with the erring one which will help publicise the undesirable activities of the erring sovereignty, an act which may help in making the erring sovereignty amenable. iii When there is no higher sovereignty on a higher level, and when there are no other sovereignties on the same level, there will be other sovereignties below the level of the erring one which will help publicise the undesirable activities of the erring sovereignty, an act which may help in making the erring sovereignty amenable. Regarding (i) above, I have already argued that except a wide vertical dispersal of sovereignty ends up with a world government, it will always be Westphalianlike at its apex. Regarding (ii) above, in the current Westphalian system, states can also help publicise the undesirable activities of erring states which may also help make the erring states amenable. Regarding (iii) above, it is simply practically unfeasible that lower sovereignties will be in a position of power to discipline higher sovereignties. Even if this sometimes happens, it will be

146  General theory of global justice an exception rather than the norm. Hence the argument in (iii) might be plausible in theory but rarely possible in practice. Therefore, there is neither necessary nor sufficient reason to swap the Westphalian dispersal of sovereignty for the wide vertical dispersal of sovereignty. This is by no means a justification of the Westphalian dispersal of sovereignty in itself. Rather, it is an explanation of why, contra Pogge, it is not necessary to replace the Westphalian dispersal of sovereignty with the wide vertical dispersal of sovereignty. Whether we look at Pogge’s application of institutional cosmopolitanism to sovereignty through the lenses of Pogge’s wide vertical dispersal of sovereignty, the lenses of the Westphalian dispersal of sovereignty, or the lenses of institutionalism, the picture remains the same. The question is not whether we are short-sighted or long-sighted, for we have already seen the problem as it is. On the one hand, we already have a multiplicity of institutions around the world. We can re-orient them to make them work better; we do not really have to set up new ones. On the other hand, if cosmopolitanism is committed to individualism, and in fact in Pogge’s conception it is, then institutions cannot be the hinge on which cosmopolitanism revolves around. If institutions become the centrality of cosmopolitanism, then this will be tantamount to an erosion of individualism. Pogge’s application is more of institutionalism than individualism. However, it is individualism, not institutionalism, that is a principle of cosmopolitanism.

Notes

1. Ecstasis or ekstasis stands for transcendence or transcendental. 2. Note that because I am concerned with social affairs, it is only these two agents or actors that count. So, I discount ‘nature’ and ‘divine will.’

References Abumere, F. A. (2016) The combinatorial use of statism and cosmopolitanism in theories of global justice. The Romanian Journal of Society and Politics, 11 (1), 7–26. Abumere, F. A. (2017). A synthetic approach to the grounds of global justice. Studies in Global Ethics & Global Education, 8, 34–53 Bull, H. (2002) The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. 3rd ed. London, Palgrave. Collier, D. (2011) Understanding process tracing. PS: Political Science and Politics, 44 (4), 823–830. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096511001429 Cox, R. W. (1981) Social forces, states and world orders: Beyond international relations theory. Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 10 (2), 126–155. https:// doi.org/10.1177/03058298810100020501 Eichengreen, B. (2009) Historical perspective on the global economic crisis: A conversation with Barry Eichengreen. [Interview] The Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 22ndJanuary. Gadamer, H.-G. (1977) Philosophical Hermeneutics. Linge, D. E. (trans.). Berkeley, University of California Press.

General theory of global justice 147 Gadamer, H.-G. (1985) Philosophical Apprenticeships. Sullivan R. R. (trans.). Cambridge, MIT Press. Gadamer, H.-G. (1989) Truth and Method. New York, Crossroad. Gadamer, H.-G. (1992) Truth and Method. 2nd ed. Weinsheimer, J. & Marshall, D. G. (trans.). New York, Crossroad. Gadamer, H.-G. (1997) Reflections on my philosophical journey. Palmer, R.E. (trans.). In: Hahn, L. E. (ed.) The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer. Chicago, Open Court, pp. 1–63. Grondin, J. (2003) Gadamer: A Biography. Weinsheimer, J. (trans.). New Haven, Yale University Press. Heath, J. (2010) Methodological individualism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. [Online] Available from: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/methodological-individualism/ [Accessed 1st October 2011]. Heidegger, M. (1982) The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Bloomington, Indiana University Press. Heidegger, M. (1996) Being and Time. Stambaugh, J. (trans.). Albany, SUNY Press. Hirsch, E. D. Jr. (1967) Validity in Interpretation. New Haven, Yale University Press. Husserl, E. (1913[1990]) Ideas. Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers. Husserl, E. (1931[1973]) Cartesian Meditations. Den Hague, Martinus Nijhoff. Malpas, J. (2009) Hans-Georg Gadamer. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. [Online] Available from:  https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/gadamer/ [Accessed 1st October 2011]. March, J. G. & Olsen, J. P. (1998) The institutional dynamics of international political orders. International Organization, 52 (4), 943–969. Nagel, T. (2005) The problem of global justice. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 33 (2), 113–147. doi.org10.1111/j.1088-4963.2005.00027.x Pogge, T. (1989) Realizing Rawls. New York, Cornell University Press. Pogge, T. (1992) Cosmopolitanism and sovereignty. Ethics, 103 (1), 48–75. Pogge, T. (2005) World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms. Cambridge, Polity Press. Pogge, T. (2010a) Politics as Usual: What Lies Behind the Pro-Poor Rhetoric. Cambridge, Polity Press. Pogge, T. (2010b) Cosmopolitanism and sovereignty. In: Brown, G. W. & Held, D. (eds.) The Cosmopolitan Reader. Cambridge, Polity Press, pp. 114–133. Rawls, J. (2005) Political Liberalism. 2nd ed. New York, Columbia University Press. Rizzo, M. J. & Whitman, G. D. (2003) The camel’s nose is in the tent: Rules, theories, and slippery slopes. UCLA Law Review, 51 (2), 539–592. Sen, A. (2009) The Idea of Justice. Cambridge, The Belknap Press. Steinmo, S. (2008) Historical institutionalism. In: della Porta, D. & Keating, M. (eds.) Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 118–138. Vessey, D. (n.d.) Gadamer and the fusion of horizons. [Online] Available from: www.davevessey.com/gadamer_Horizons.htm [Accessed 1st October 2011]. von Wright, G. H. (1951) A Treatise on Induction and Probability. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul. Waltz, K. N. (1979) Theory of International Politics. Reading, Addison-Wesley. Weber, M. (1949) The Methodology of the Social Sciences. Shils, E. A. & Finch, H. A. (trans.). Glencole, The Free Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511801938

5

The robustness of the general theory

Accommodating the complexity of resource curse In Chapter 4, I explained what fusion of horizons is and how I adapted the concept to suit the global justice discourse. I explained what a theory does, and argued that fusion of horizons should be seen as general theory of global justice while cosmopolitanism and statism should be seen as special theories of global justice. In this chapter, I summarise the benefits of fusing the horizons of cosmopolitanism and statism. I discuss the plausibility and implausibility of fusion of horizons. In other words, I examine possible arguments for and against my fusion of the horizons of cosmopolitanism and statism. Firstly, I present the argument for plausibility which says that fusion of horizons accommodates the complexity of resource curse. Secondly, I examine the first kind of arguments for implausibility namely mutual exclusivity, incompatibility, relativism, neutrality and aerial view. Thirdly, I examine the second kind of arguments for implausibility namely motivation, slippery slope, international system and consensus. Finally, since there might be a possible misconception that my adopted fusion of horizons is a new theory of global justice that negates statism and cosmopolitanism, I disclaim the notion that my adopted fusion of horizons is a new theory of global justice that negates statism and cosmopolitanism. However, I argue that fusion of horizons is general theory of global justice which partly relies on statism and partly relies on cosmopolitanism. In finding a resolution to complex cases of global justice – or global injustice in the case of resource curse in Africa – I opted for fusion of horizons on the following grounds. Neither cosmopolitanism nor statism is simultaneously necessary and sufficient. Neither cosmopolitanism nor statism is simultaneously unnecessary and insufficient; neither cosmopolitanism nor statism is unnecessary but sufficient. However, cosmopolitanism and statism are each necessary but each insufficient (Abumere, 2017, pp. 48–49). As shown in the global injustice case of resource case in Africa, the result is that although each theory is insufficient, a combination – in the form of fusion of horizons – of the two theories is sufficient to analyse and resolve complex cases of global justice.

The robustness of the general theory 149 Prior to this chapter and specifically this sub-chapter, to prove the aforementioned conditions of necessity and sufficiency and necessity, one notices the employment of logic, sometimes implicitly but at other times explicitly, in arguing for my position. In this chapter and specifically this sub-chapter, I will use logical analysis resembling logical models to argue for my position. Relying on logical analysis helps to prove the validity of my arguments. Moreover, when arguments made in natural language are summarised in the formal language of logic, their validity or invalidity becomes apparent. In other words, it becomes easy for the reader or listener to prove the validity or the invalidity of the arguments as presented by the writer or speaker. Ordinarily, especially in classical logic: a logic consists of a formal or informal language together with a deductive system and/or a model-theoretic semantics. The language has components that correspond to a part of a natural language like English or Greek. The deductive system is to capture, codify, or simply record arguments that are valid for the given language, and the semantics is to capture, codify, or record the meanings, or truth-conditions for at least part of the language. (Shapiro, 2013, intro.) (emphasis in original) Having explicitly stated my reason for relying on logical analysis, I devote the remainder of this sub-chapter to proving the validity of my arguments. Firstly, in resolving complex cases of global justice, if cosmopolitanism alone were simultaneously necessary and sufficient, there would be no need for statism. This is because if cosmopolitanism (C) were simultaneously necessary and sufficient, whenever we apply cosmopolitanism to such complex cases we will have a necessary and sufficient resolution (NSR) for the problems. Ceteris paribus, we will have an NSR. We will only fail to have an NSR if, and only if, we do not apply cosmopolitanism well enough.1 Assuming C is simultaneously necessary and sufficient for NSR, therefore: i ii iii iv

If C then NSR. If not C then not NSR. That we have NSR necessarily implies that we have applied C. That there is not NSR necessarily implies that we have not applied C.

So too in resolving complex cases of global justice, if statism alone were simultaneously necessary and sufficient, there would be no need for cosmopolitanism. This is because if statism (S) were simultaneously necessary and sufficient, whenever we apply statism to such complex cases we will have a NSR for the problems. Ceteris paribus, we should have an NSR. We will only fail to have an NSR if, and only if, we do not apply

150  The robustness of the general theory statism well enough. Assuming S is simultaneously necessary and sufficient for NSR, therefore: i ii iii iv

If S then NSR. If not S then not NSR. That we have NSR necessarily implies that we have applied S. That there is not NSR necessarily implies that we have not applied S.

Secondly, in resolving complex cases of global justice, if C were simultaneously unnecessary and insufficient, therefore: i That we have applied C does not necessarily imply that we have NSR. ii That we have NSR does not necessarily imply that we have applied C. iii That we have not applied C does not necessarily imply that we do not have NSR. iv That we do not have NSR does not necessarily imply that we have not applied C. So too in resolving complex cases of global justice, if S were simultaneously unnecessary and insufficient, therefore: i That we have applied S does not necessarily imply that we have NSR. ii That we have NSR does not necessarily imply that we have applied S. iii That we have not applied S does not necessarily imply that we do not have NSR. iv That we do not have NSR does not necessarily imply that we have not applied S. Thirdly, in resolving complex cases of global justice, if C were unnecessary but sufficient, therefore: i If C then NSR. ii That we have NSR does not necessarily imply that we have applied C. For we can also have NSR by applying S (assuming that C and S are the only applicable theories). So too in resolving complex cases of global justice, if S were unnecessary but sufficient, therefore: i If S then NSR. ii That we have NSR does not necessarily imply that we have applied S. For we can also have NSR by applying C (assuming that S and C are the only applicable theories). Finally, since in resolving complex cases of global justice, C is necessary but insufficient, therefore:

The robustness of the general theory 151 i That we have NSR necessarily implies that we have applied C. ii That we have applied C does not necessarily imply that we have NSR. Apart from the application of C, we also need the application of S in order to have NSR (assuming that C and S are the only applicable theories). So too since in resolving complex cases of global justice, S is necessary but insufficient, therefore: i That we have NSR necessarily implies that we have applied S. ii That we have applied S does not necessarily imply that we have NSR. Apart from the application of S, we also need the application of C in order to have NSR (assuming that S and C are the only applicable theories). The situation with dealing with complex cases of global justice, as shown in the case of resource curse in Africa, is that while cosmopolitanism and statism are individually necessary but individually insufficient, they are simultaneously jointly necessary and jointly sufficient. Although, things that are jointly necessary are not always jointly sufficient too, just as things that are jointly sufficient are not always jointly necessary too. Jointly necessary does not equal jointly sufficient, just as jointly sufficient does not equal jointly necessary. As shown on the levels of causality and responsibility, cosmopolitanism and statism are simultaneously jointly necessary and jointly sufficient because of the following. Cosmopolitanism is necessary for the individual and collective levels of causality and responsibility, while statism is necessary for the corporate, the state and the global institutional order levels of causality and responsibility; and they both suffice for these five levels of causality and responsibility. Since this jointly necessary and jointly sufficient condition is arrived at through a fusion of horizons, I deem fusion of horizons to be an appropriate solution to the individually necessary but insufficient condition of cosmopolitanism and statism respectively. In a nutshell, fusion of horizons helps us to avoid almighty formula, cope with limitedness, accommodate systemic structures and take advantage of systemness. Almighty formula sees everything from the cosmopolitan lenses or statist lenses alone; it sees each theory as if it were a silver bullet to solve every global justice problem. In terms of limitedness, even on one level, cosmopolitanism or statism does not even tell the whole story; it needs the other for secondary support. Regarding fusion of horizons’ capacity to accommodate systemic structures, the factors of resource curse put together become systemic and need to be seen as a system rather than seen from ‘myopic’ cosmopolitan lenses or ‘myopic’ statist lenses. When all the agents, factors and facets of resource curse are joined together, they become greater and even different from the mere sum of

152  The robustness of the general theory each of them; cosmopolitanism alone on its own and statism alone on its own fail to capture this. Finally, fusing the horizons of cosmopolitanism and statism together helps us to take advantage of systemness. Systemness, according to Kenneth W. Kizer, is defined as: a functional state of diverse, interconnected, discrete parts that behave predictably and consistently as a coherent whole in ways that are distinct from and superior to the sum of the parts. (quoted in Lerner, 2013, p. 1) In other words, systemness, according to Casey Seiler (2012), is ‘the coordination of multiple components that, when working together, create a network of activity that is more powerful than any action of individual parts on their own’ (s.p.). Fusing the horizons of cosmopolitanism and statism together is much more effective, than cosmopolitanism or statism alone, in dealing with systemic structures. Just as when all the agents, factors and facets of resource curse are joined together they become greater and even different from the mere sum of each of them; so, too when the cosmopolitan and statist theories or horizons are fused together they become a greater ‘theory’ or a broader ‘horizon’ and even different from the mere sum of each of them. Hence, fusion of horizons provides a systemic solution to a systemic problem. Surely, the systemic complexity of resource curse calls for systemness which fusion of horizons offers.

Arguments of the first kind The mutual exclusivity argument Certainly, there are possible arguments against fusion of horizons as I have used it on the different levels of causality and responsibility. In other words, there are possible arguments against the fusion of the horizons of statism and cosmopolitanism in dealing with resource curse in Africa. The arguments are of two kinds. On the one hand, arguments of the first kind are primarily concerned with the fusion of the ‘horizons’ of cosmopolitanism and statism. On the other hand, arguments of the second kind are concerned with different issues at the different levels of causality and responsibility. Starting with arguments of the first kind and ending with arguments of the second kind, I devote this sub-chapter and the next sub-chapter to discussing them. Chief among the possible arguments against the plausibility of the fusion of the ‘horizons’ of cosmopolitanism and statism is the mutual exclusivity argument. There are two categories of critics who hold the mutual exclusivity banner. The first category is those who argue that statism and cosmopolitanism are mutually exclusive. They do so because they misconstrue

The robustness of the general theory 153 statism (as understood in political philosophy and political theory – as a theory of global justice) to be political realism (as understood in International Relations [IR] – as a theory of IR). The above argument is rebuttable in two ways. The first way is to show that statism is not political realism. The second way is to show that even if statism were political realism; there are elements within political realism itself, as William E. Scheuerman (2011) has shown, that are not absolutely anti-cosmopolitan. The second category is those who argue that statism is the logical opposite of cosmopolitanism, hence they are mutually exclusive. The first category of critics are easily misled because they focus on the similarities between statism and political realism without giving due consideration to the differences between the two. On the one hand, they compare the hierarchical structure of domestic politics with the basic structure of the state, and focus on the similarities in the comparison. On the other hand, they contrast the above with the anarchical structure of the international system and the absence of (or the presence of only partial) basic structure at the global arena and focus on the differences in the contrast. Then they are led to think that statism is political realism and political realism is statism. The strongest singular similarity between statism and political realism is that generally both can be said to deny morality in general, and justice in particular, a place in the international system. Nevertheless, a brief overview of political realism will show, evidently, that despite this general similarity, statism and political realism are based on different principles. Political realism has no canonical form (Beitz, 1999, p. 185). There have been different distinctions of political realism, some are historical and others are thematic. Such divisions include classical realism, neo-realism or structural realism, defensive realism and offensive realism, descriptive realism and prescriptive realism, and even global reformist or progressive realism. Nevertheless, Beitz (1999) outlines three elements or tenets of political realism as it has been conceived in the last century. The three tenets are as follows. First, political realism is a sceptic of the role of moral principles in IR(Beitz, 1999, pp. 185–186). Second, political realism is ‘an analytic paradigm for international behaviour; it holds, roughly, that international events are best explained as outcomes of the strategic interactions of self-interested states’ (Beitz, 1999, p. 186). Third, political realism is heuristic in that it promotes a cautious idea of the function or position that should be assigned to ethical deliberation in practical reasoning about IR (Ibid.). At this juncture, let us turn to the various strands of realism namely, descriptive realism, prescriptive realism, classical realism, neo-classical realism or structural realism, progressive realism, etc. Having accepted the aforementioned three tenets, descriptive realism says that is how the international system is. In other words, it is the nature of the international system to embody the above tenets. While prescriptive realism says states

154  The robustness of the general theory ought to be pursuing the above tenets. Classical realism, originally propounding the tenets, thinks that actually it is due to human nature that states act according to the tenets. Being governed by humans, and human nature always being aligned to or seeking the above tenets, condition states to behave in line with those tenets. In Man, the State and War, Kenneth Waltz (1954) argues that international conflicts are primarily neither due to man (human nature) nor the state; rather, international conflicts are primarily due to the international system. Furthermore, in neo-realism or structural realism which he propounded in Theory of International Politics, Waltz (1979), having accepted the above tenets, provides a systemic explanation of the international system. He asserts that the international system determines systemically the behaviour, actions and reactions of states at the international system. For him, the only way states can ensure their security is by behaving, acting or reacting according to the dictates of the systemic structure at the international system. Although Waltz actually clearly formulated this neo-realist or structural realist strand in his Theory of International Politics, a rudimentary form of it can be found in his earlier work Man, the State and War. Defensive realism opines that international security is absolutely a zero-sum game; as state A increases its security, the security of state B correspondingly diminishes. State B, reacting to its diminishing security, increases its security which in turn diminishes the security of state A. This scenario of power-balancing which is on-going destabilises the international system. Given the anarchical2 structure or nature of the international system – ‘that is to say, the absence of hierarchy’ (Abumere, 2019, p. 10) in the international system – states fear for their security and hence see the maximisation of security as the primary aim of states. In opposition to defensive realism, offensive realism opines that the best way for a state to defend itself is by attacking its opponent in order to destroy the offensive capabilities of the latter. Offensive realism, like defensive realism, accepts the basic tenets of realism and believes that the buffering of a state’s security is necessary. However, it differs from defensive realism because it holds that offence, rather than defence, is the better security option for states. Thomas Hobbes’ (1651) description of international politics as a state of nature seems to be the leading foundation for realism. According to Hobbes (1651): in all times, kings, and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms; and continual spies upon their neighbours; which is a posture of war …. To this warre of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be Unjust. The notions of Right

The robustness of the general theory 155 and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have there no place. Where there is no common Power, there is no Law: where no law, no Injustice. (ch. 13) However, rather than Hobbes’s Leviathan, Thucydides’3 (431 BC) History of the Peloponnesian War (hereafter History) is considered to be the first scientific book on IR in general and political realism in particular. Suffice it to say that History is still famous today not because it is the first scientific book on IR but because it is the first book on political realism. Hence, unsurprisingly, political realists revere it as their ‘holy book’ while liberals4 seem to abhor it. In my discussion of History in the ensuing paragraphs, it suffices to summarise the analysis I did in ‘The determinant of the westerness and non-westerness of international relations theories’ (Abumere, 2018). In the analysis, I explained the following. History documents the 27-year-war that was fought between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians in the late fifth century BC. Given that Thucydides narrates events of the war chronologically, the temptation is always to analyse History in a chronological order. However, I think analysing it thematically is helpful since Thucydides was not interested in merely documenting the events of the war as historical occurrences but he was much more interested in telling his readers why the war ‘actually’ happened and why future wars might happen. There are four themes that can be easily identified in History. The first is Thucydides’ juxtaposition of what can be referred to as the ‘official cause’ with the ‘real cause’ of the war. The second is the juxtaposition of power with right. The third is the juxtaposition of peace/security with justice. The fourth is coalition. In juxtaposing the official cause with the real cause of the war, he argues that official reasons given for fighting the war were actually not the reason why the war was fought. Thucydides (431 BC) described the violation of some legal codes and many other reasons which were cited for the reason for fighting the war; he argued that actually those reasons were neither necessary nor sufficient to fight the war (bk. 1, ch. 1). Such reasons were only given by the Peloponnesians because they wanted to appear, and be perceived as being, objective in their decision to fight their neighbour – Athens. For Thucydides (431 BC), the war was actually waged by the Peloponnesians for a selfish reason (bk. 1, ch. 1, para. 24). Hence the reason was concealed. Having observed the non-ceasing growth of Athens, the Peloponnesians were afraid that someday Athens would grow so strong that it would be able to easily destroy the Peloponnesians if it wanted. Hence the Peloponnesians decided to wage a preventive war – to fight Athenians now that Athens is still relatively weak rather than when it becomes too strong. Note that Thucydides assumes poleis are rational and self-regarding. This can be seen in the case of the Peloponnesians who waged a preventive war. It can also be seen in the case of Athens that ‘would attack’ the Peloponnesians when it was capable. This is the first lesson that political realists learned from Thucydides; that states will always be rational and self-regarding even

156  The robustness of the general theory to the detriment of other states. The issue that will always be debated is whether the Athenians would have actually attacked the Peloponnesians. However, being rational, the Peloponnesians did not have to wait to see what the Athenians would actually do; they had to act fast. This leads us to the second theme. The second theme which is the juxtaposition of peace/security with justice can be seen in the Melian Dialogue (Thucydides, 431 BC, bk. 5). The strong Athens had come to take over the weak Melos. The Athenians gave the Melians two options; either to surrender peacefully or put up a resistance and face being destroyed. The Athenians urged the Melians to opt for the former rather than the latter. But the Melians declined because they thought the Athenians were waging an unjust war against them. Furthermore, the Melians believed that if they were attacked, the gods would come to their aid because they were not the aggressors and they were only, in justice, resisting the Athenians. However, as it turned out, the Melians were destroyed without the gods coming to their aid. Political realists have drawn one conclusion from the above juxtaposition or theme. In the international system, peace and security should be preferred to justice. Taken over Melos was essential for the Athenians in order to have a chance of winning the war, and winning the war would ensure the peace and security of Athens. Hence, although it was unjust, the Athenians had to destroy Melos. For the Melians, opting for peace and security would have averted the destruction while opting for justice did nothing to help them. The third theme which is that of the juxtaposition of power and right is a continuation of the second theme which in turn is a continuation of the first theme. Put simply, it is an explication of the first and second themes. The Peloponnesians had no right to attack Athens, but they did because they had the power. So too Athens had no right to attack Melos, but it did because it had the power. Melos had the right to defend itself, but the right did not count; the only thing that counted was the power of Athens. The fourth theme is ‘coalition.’ In this theme, Athens – on the one hand – entered a coalition with a couple of poleis to form the Delian League which was led by Athens. The Peloponnesians, on the other hand, formed the Peloponnesian League which was led by Sparta. The big lessons here for political realists are those of balance of power, bandwagon and balancing. Although Thucydides (431 BC) – in the introductory pages (bk. 1, ch. 1) – says he intended to write an objective book that will last forever, what he actually did was to propound the doctrine of political realism that may last forever. Giving the foregoing analysis, one might conclude that Thucydides and his fellow realists are either saying to states that when states set out to act on the international scene, they should not ask the ‘wrong’ question: What is the right thing to do? Rather they should ask the ‘right’ question: What is the rational thing to do? When the latter question is asked or the former question is not asked, justice is discounted. So, political realism is totally not concerned with justice.

The robustness of the general theory 157 Evidently, as can be deduced from the foregoing overview of political realism, statism is not political realism. For it is political realism, and not statism, that is characterised by principles such as balancing or balance of power, bandwagon, containment, detente, rapprochement, etc. and notions such as hegemon, challenger, etc. Even if statism were political realism, there are political realists, namely progressive realists/global reformist realists, who are not absolutely anti-cosmopolitan. Convinced that the nationstate is outdated, progressive realists argue for an extensive reform of the international system (Scheuerman, 2011, p. vii). They think the only way to attain this reform is to have a world community or a supranational community. For them, any worthwhile, attractive and workable post-national or post-Westphalian system of governance must be based on a parallel post-national or post-Westphalian world that has the ability to carry out essential integrative roles similar to the essential integrative roles that viable states carry out (Ibid.). Progressive realists go on to argue that the fact that a global state is presently unrealisable does not mean that it can never be achieved. In view of this claim, they think that to keep on aspiring for a viable global state is a reasonable thing to do and the realisation of a global state remains a reasonable and feasible goal (Scheuerman, 2011, p. ix). For this reason, progressive realists engage in the deconstruction, re-interpretation and re-conceptualisation of international politics, international justice and international morality. Even more important is that they interpret the main principles of political realism such as the balance of power, national interest, security dilemma, etc. in such a way that these terms allow ample room for reforms in the international system (Scheuerman, 2011, p. viii). In the foregoing discussion, I have been dealing with the category of critics who hold the mutual exclusivity banner because they think that statism and cosmopolitanism are mutually exclusive based on their misconception of statism to be political realism. I rebutted such argument by showing that: statism is not political realism; even if statism were political realism, there are political realists that are not absolutely anti-cosmopolitan. Now, I shall deal with the category of critics who hold the mutual exclusivity banner because they think that statism is the logical opposite of cosmopolitanism. I aver that although statism is the theoretical opposite of cosmopolitanism, statism is not the logical opposite of cosmopolitanism in the sense in which A is the logical opposite of non-A. In other words, although statism and cosmopolitanism are opposites as theories of global justice, they are not logical opposites as A and non-A are. This is because, despite the many inverse-differences between the two theories, they still share a few common grounds or have some few similarities. Since statism is not the logical opposite of cosmopolitanism, to say that statism and cosmopolitanism are not mutually exclusive is not a logical contradiction (Abumere, 2017, p. 48). To conclude the rebuttal of the argument of the above critics, let us assume for a moment that statism is actually the logical opposite of

158  The robustness of the general theory cosmopolitanism. Even if statism were the logical opposite of cosmopolitanism, to say that statism and cosmopolitanism are not mutually exclusive is not a logical contradiction of identity. The first rule of logic says a thing must be identical to itself; a thing cannot be A and non-A at the same time – it is either A or non-A. For the critics, the faulty reasoning is that since statism is the ‘opposite’ of cosmopolitanism, to say they are not mutually exclusive is to break the first rule of logic (Ibid.). However, to say statism and cosmopolitanism are not mutually exclusive is not to say that statism is cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitanism is statism. Rather, it is to say that although both are opposites, they can still be moderately employed to work together. Moreover, opposites are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For instance, man is the opposite of woman, yet both of them cooperate in many ways including bringing into existence other men and women.’ (Abumere, 2017, p. 36) (emphasis in original) Other arguments of the first kind The mutual exclusivity argument is radical. Its moderate form is the incompatibility argument which holds that statism and cosmopolitanism are incompatible; hence their horizons cannot be fused. For instance, referring to cosmopolitanism and statism, Nagel (2005) says, ‘I find the choice between these two incompatible moral conceptions difficult’ (p. 126). However, why I agree that there are specific tenets of cosmopolitanism and statism that are incompatible, generally statism and cosmopolitanism are compatible. As we have seen on the levels of causality and responsibility: in some cases, I employed statism as the primary tool of analysis and cosmopolitanism as the secondary tool of analysis; and in other cases, I employed cosmopolitanism as the primary tool of analysis and statism as the secondary tool of analysis. Moreover, for instance, we saw that resource curse is caused neither only by states nor only by individuals. Among other factors, these two factors combine to cause resource curse. Hence, statism can be employed as I did to look at the statist factor, and cosmopolitanism can be employed as I did to look at the individual factor. In view of the Husserlian temporal horizon and the Heideggerian time horizon as presented in Chapter 4, one might opine that ‘it is just a matter of time’ before statism opens up to global justice. Before the Westphalian system, there were no states as we understand them today. Although the Greek city-states had existed, and there were other monarchies, sovereignties, or some sort of administrative entities that might claim some sort of statehood, they were not states as we understand states today. Perhaps, some would even say likely, in the near future, even if in the far future, or just in the future, we might not have states anymore and we may have state-like

The robustness of the general theory 159 entities or some entities totally different from states. If such entities look more and more like the world of the cosmopolitans, then perhaps statists might welcome a fusion of horizons with the cosmopolitans. Now that our world is still very ‘statist,’ perhaps the onus is on cosmopolitans to fuse their horizons with the statists. Following the incompatibility argument is the relativism argument. The relativism argument holds that fusion of horizons falls into relativism in which the truth of global justice is relative to each theory; the statist position is true for the statist and the cosmopolitan position is true for the cosmopolitans. Consequently, there is no such thing as objective ‘global justice’; global justice is what the statists and cosmopolitans subjectively say it is. However, I contend that by fusing the horizons of statism and cosmopolitanism, I am not falling into relativism; I am merely avoiding universalism. Moreover, if I were favouring relativism: first, I would have no need for fusion of horizons; and second, even if I were to fuse the horizons of statism and cosmopolitanism, I would totally accept every argument, or the whole position, of both theories. The neutrality argument holds that having been presented with two options, namely statism and cosmopolitanism, fusion of horizons opted for a safe and easy escape by being neutral rather than committing to either statism or cosmopolitanism. However, to argue that I ought to have chosen either statism or cosmopolitanism over the other is to argue that things are always either/or. Things are not always either/or. Things are either/or if the options are A and non-A; that is if one is necessarily correct, the other being the opposite, must be necessarily wrong. But if the options are A, B; they can be neither/nor if both are wrong; but it can also be A and B if both are right. Furthermore, either of them can be fully or partially right or wrong. So things can also be partially A and partially B, partially A and fully B, or fully A and partially B. Therefore I can be right to see the answer to the problem of global justice as partially statist and partially cosmopolitan. Fusion of horizons does not seek any safe or easy way out of the statist/cosmopolitan dilemma. Rather it painstakingly assesses the merits and demerits of each theory, upholds the merits on both sides and criticises the demerits on both sides. The aerial view argument holds that fusion of horizons captures the whole picture without concrete details. That is, fusion of horizons lumps all the properties of statism and cosmopolitanism together without exploring the details of each individual property. In other words, fusion of horizons does not respect the separateness between statism and cosmopolitanism and the differences between the tenets of the two theories. However, the aerial view argument is false on the following grounds. I did not start my analysis by fusing the horizons of statism and cosmopolitanism together. I started with resource curse and then explored various ways in which cosmopolitanism and statism can be applied to it. I actually dealt with five different levels, and dealt with two different possible applications, namely

160  The robustness of the general theory primary and secondary, of statism and cosmopolitanism to those levels. By so doing, I addressed the problem of details and differences, before turning to the solution of fusion of horizons. Finally, the easiness argument criticises the fusion of cosmopolitanism and statism on the grounds of the ‘sort’ of cosmopolitanism that was used and the ‘sort’ of cosmopolitanism that was not used. The argument says that in fusing the horizons of cosmopolitanism and statism, on the side of cosmopolitanism I leaned towards Beitz and Pogge which made my task very easy. The argument is that on the one hand, since both of them have a Rawlsian background and framework, that is their theories or approaches started from Rawls, then it was easy for me to fuse their cosmopolitanism with the statism of Rawls and Nagel (whose statism is very Rawlsian) in particular and statism in general. On the other hand, if I used the cosmopolitanism of utilitarians, libertarians, etc., it was going to be very difficult, more difficult or at least less easy to fuse with statism. In response to the above criticism, note that I did not lean towards Beitz and Pogge because it is easy, or easier, to fuse their cosmopolitanism with statism. One key reason why I leaned towards Beitz and Pogge is because, as already discussed in Chapter 1, arguably relational cosmopolitanism is more prominent than non-relational cosmopolitanism, and ‘Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge are the most well-known authors of relational cosmopolitanism’ (Maffettone, 2013, p. 131). I did not use utilitarianism, libertarianism, etc., not because they will be more difficult to fuse with statism, but because they are neither mainstream of cosmopolitanism nor popular versions of cosmopolitanism. Moreover, as Rawls (1999, pp. 21–23) and Nozick (1974, p. 33) argue, utilitarianism does not respect the separateness of persons. Since cosmopolitanism is based on individualism, then utilitarianism itself is an affront to cosmopolitanism. Furthermore, as already discussed in Chapter 4, even on utilitarian grounds the sort of harm we are concerned with will still be deemed immoral. As for libertarianism, even Nozick who is the chief priest of libertarianism has accepted the implausibility of the libertarian thesis. Although Nozick did not argue for cosmopolitanism in his defence of libertarianism, his subsequent acceptance of the implausibility of the libertarian thesis goes a long way to show that already cosmopolitan libertarians or libertarian cosmopolitans have shaky arguments.

Arguments of the second kind The motivation argument The motivation argument is partly based on the grounds that humans or persons are self-interested and partly based on the supposition that empirically we cannot convince people to act justly when they are fixated on acting unjustly. If these two assumptions are true, the crux of the motivation

The robustness of the general theory 161 argument is that then global justice is impossible. To deal with the motivation argument, consider the following questions posed by the motivation argument: empirically, how do we motivate people or individuals to act justly?; what if people say rent-seeking is part and parcel of their sociological practice, how do we motivate or convince them to do otherwise, that is, act justly? To answer these questions, firstly let us note the extreme positions of statism and cosmopolitanism. Statism views human nature as selfish and egocentric; statists think humans are egoists. Cosmopolitanism views human nature as altruistic; cosmopolitans think humans are altruistic. But literature in cognitive psychology shows that human nature is both selfish and altruistic; hence it is simultaneously possible and plausible to argue for an intermediate position between statism and cosmopolitanism. Moreover, there are normative arguments in philosophical literature which say that in order to motivate people or individuals to act justly, we appeal to reason. Of course, this supposes that we are rational beings and have the capacity to be reasonable. Thirdly, if we look at institutionalism, we will see that there is no one way of explaining what motivates individuals to act. Institutionalism emphasises ‘the role institutions play in structuring behaviour’ (Steinmo, 2008, p. 123). Rational choice institutionalism sees human beings as ‘rational individuals who calculate the costs and benefits in the choices they face’ (Steinmo, 2008, p. 126). It says institutions are only important ‘because they frame the individual’s strategic behaviour’ (Ibid.). In other words, ‘we cooperate because we get more with cooperation than without it. We follow rules because we individually do better when we do so’ (Ibid.). Sociological institutionalism views human beings as: fundamentally social beings …. “satisficers” who act habitually …. institutions frame the very way in which people see their world and are not just rules within which they try to work. (Ibid.) (emphasis in original) For sociological institutionalism: rather than following rules to maximise their self-interest, humans … follow a “logic of appropriateness” …. the important institutions (rules) are social norms that govern everyday life and social interaction. (Ibid.) (emphasis in original) While historical institutionalism argues that ‘human beings are both norm abiding rule followers and self-interested rational actors. How one behaves depends on the individual, on the context and on the rules’ (Ibid.) (emphasis in original). Now I shall answer these questions: (i) How do I motivate people or individuals to act justly?; (ii) What if people say rent-seeking behaviour is part

162  The robustness of the general theory of their sociological practice, how do I motivate or convince them to do otherwise – that is, how do I motivate them to act justly? In this book, I am not seeing individuals and people through the lenses of rational choice institutionalism alone, through the lenses of sociological institutionalism alone, or even through the lenses of historical institutionalism alone. I am seeing individuals and peoples through a combination of the lenses of rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism and historical institutionalism. In addition, Robert Keohane’s (1984) explanation of what can motivate actors to be interested in the welfare of others is helpful in dealing with the motivation argument. Although Keohane was concerned about states in the global political economy, his explanation is applicable here. Since his explanation suffices to deal with the motivation argument, it is worth citing him at length here. According to Keohane (1984), firstly, although states (in our case individuals), may not be concerned about other states’ (in our case individuals’) welfare, this is only the situation in a single-play, rather than in iterated, Prisoner’s Dilemma (p. 122). Global politics is a world of iterated-play rather than single-play, so too our social world is more a world of iterated play and less a world of single-play. In a world of iterated-play, whether in the political world or in the social world, states or individuals have enlightened self-interest to be concerned about the welfare of others. Secondly, he argues that states (in our case individuals) may be interested in the welfare of other states (in our case individuals) egoistically for instrumentally interdependent reasons, that is, only if the other states or individuals have the capacity to act in ways that can affect them adversely (Ibid.). Thirdly, then he says that states (in our case individuals) may be interested in the welfare of other states (in our case individuals) egoistically for situationally interdependent reasons, that is, ‘because improvements in others’ welfare improve their own, and vice versa, whatever the other actor does’ (Keohane, 1984, p. 123). Finally, he concludes that states (in our case individuals) may be interested in the welfare of other states (in our case individuals) altruistically for empathetic interdependent reasons, that is, for the sake of the other states or individuals even when there are no instrumentally interdependent or situationally interdependent reasons to do so. He thinks that even though, generally, governments give aids for egoistic reasons, this is truer for powerful states (for instance, the United States of America, China, Russia, Germany, the United Kingdom and France) and less true for small states such as the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway that seem to give aids altruistically and even manifestly false in the case of voluntary agencies such as Oxfam and Care that evidently give aids altruistically (Ibid.). In terms of non-state actors, the works of humanitarian agencies such as the Red Cross, Medecins San Frontieres and Caritas are a testament to empathetic interdependence.

The robustness of the general theory 163 The slippery slope argument Given my recommendation at the global institutional order level, political realists would argue that if other states are not to respect the international resource and borrowing privileges of, say, General Sani Abacha, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, etc., then there might be a domino effect. In the domino effect, some states will be dictating to other states, for instance, some states might be telling other states that human rights, gender equality, etc., must be respected. In a nutshell, there will be a slippery slope of interference and even intervention. Consequently, the argument goes, my recommendation will be promoting liberalism or idealism, particularly liberal institutionalism, and even liberal interventionism. In responding to this criticism, I will start by saying that, firstly, for political realists; states are the prominent actors in IR, so the different levels of analysis employed in this book do not matter to political realists. But as we have seen in the case of resource curse, it is not only states that matter, other ‘levels’ or actors and agents matter too. Secondly, the sort of issues I am concerned with are harmful issues. As long as these practices by authoritarians and dictators cause harm to citizens, they stand to be morally culpable. Thirdly, I am not promoting liberalism or idealism, and I am not particularly promoting liberal institutionalism or liberal interventionism. The United Nations (UN) Conventions, African Charter, etc., that I mentioned in support of my case are already in place; they only need to be implemented or enforced, respected or observed. For instance, the following UN resolution and declaration support my argument. According to the UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962 (Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources), peoples and nations have the right: to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources [which] must be exercised in the interest of their national development and of the well-being of the people of the state concerned …. (United Nations, 2002, p. 81) In addition, according to Article 1 of the UN Declaration on the Right to Development (Resolution 41/128 of 4 December 1986), peoples have the ‘inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth and resources …. ’ (United Nations, 2002, p. 454ff). Furthermore, the following articles also support my case. According to Joint Article 1.2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, all peoples have the right to ‘freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources’ (United Nations, 2002, p. 7ff). In addition, according to Article 21 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ‘peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. This right shall be exercised in the exclusive

164  The robustness of the general theory interest of the people. In no case shall a people be deprived of it’ (Organisation of African Unity, 1981). Fourthly, as Alexander Wendt (1992) says, ‘Anarchy is what states make of it’ (p. 1). So, political realists may be right or wrong on seeing the anarchical international system as negating moral principles and practices; but they are not necessarily right. After all, there are different views on the workings of the international arena; this is typified by the different IR theories. The difference is not only among the different IR theories, it also abounds within the different theories. But let us assume that each theory has a uniform view, although what each theory really has is an umbrella view. Yet realism or neo-realism has a different view, just as liberalism or neo-liberalism has a different view. Also, constructivism or social constructivism has a different view just as the English School or International Society has a different view. So too critical theories – Marxism, feminism, postcolonial, etc. – all have different views. Moreover, there is no one way of looking at the workings of the international arena in terms of its organisation, arrangement, constitution or behaviour. Hedley Bull (1995) says in modern world history, the international system is characterised by three competing traditions of IR theory, namely the Hobbesian or realist tradition, the Kantian or universalist tradition and the Grotian or internationalist tradition (p. 23). In the Hobbesian or realist tradition, states exist in a state of nature, therefore their IR are a war of all against all. In the Kantian or universalist tradition, IR take place in a potential universal community of mankind in which perpetual peace reigns. While in the Grotian or internationalist tradition, IR take place in an international society or society of states (Ibid.). Bull (1995) argues that while the Hobbesian or realist tradition is one extreme, and the Kantian or universalist tradition is another extreme, the Grotian or internationalist tradition is the intermediate point between the two extremes. According to Bull (1995), in opposition to the Hobbesian or realist tradition, the Grotian or internationalist tradition disagrees that states exist in a state of nature and are engaged in a war of all against all. International theorists of this tradition think that states share common rules, norms and institutions which regulate their relationships and thereby limit the frequency and degree of their conflicts. However, in opposition to the Kantian or universalist tradition, the Grotian or internationalist tradition agrees with the Hobbesian or realist tradition that states, rather than non-state actors such as individual human persons, are the principal actors in international politics (Ibid.). While in the Hobbesian or realist tradition international politics is characterised by ‘complete conflict of interest between states,’ and in the Kantian or universalist tradition international politics is characterised by ‘complete identity of interest between states,’ in the Grotian or internationalist tradition international politics is characterised by economic interactions, ‘a game that is partly distributive but also partly productive’ (Ibid.).

The robustness of the general theory 165 In addition, looking at Martin Wight’s (1991) traditions of international theory, the international arena is characterised by three traditions, namely Realist/Machiavellian, Rationalist/Grotian and Revolutionist/Kantian. Like Wight, Alexander Wendt’s (1992; 1999) international arena has three characteristics. He calls his characteristics cultures of anarchy. They include the Hobbesian culture, the Lockean culture and the Kantian culture. Therefore, Wight’s three traditions and Wendt’s three cultures show, or at least suggest, that there are at least three possible ways of looking at the international arena (Abumere, 2018). The ‘International system’ and ‘Consensus’ arguments The international system argument says there is no such thing as the international system; the international system does not exist, there are only states that act in their own interests. Hence, there is no such thing as the global institutional order. This argument is based on the premise that the international arena is anarchical. However, first of all, note that the global institutional order is not limited to states, it is more than states. Secondly, although the international arena is anarchical, fundamentally this does not equal the non-existence of the international system; it only equals the absence of hierarchy at the international arena. Moreover, even Waltz (1954), the founder of neo-realism, in his analysis in Man, the State and War does not only accept the existence of the international system but also argues that the international system is the principal determinant of the behaviour of states in international politics. In his analysis, there are three images in international politics namely the first image (man), the second image (the state) and the third image (the international system). He argued that while the first and second images play some roles in international politics, the most important image is the third image because it is the international system that determines, more than man and the state do, the behaviour of states in international politics. Further examples of the existence of the international system include: Waltz’s (1979) distinction in Theory of International Politics between ‘structure’ and ‘systemic’ and how ‘systemic’ applies to the international system; Hedley Bull’s (1977) notions of international system and international society as propounded in The Anarchical Society; arguments in liberal internationalism and liberal institutionalism, for instance Robert Keohane’s (1984) After Hegemony; and finally ‘systemness.’ In terms of systemness, when states interact with one another at the international arena, their relationships become greater and even different from the mere sum of each of them; hence the international system. Systemness is defined as a condition in which the behaviour of the ‘whole’ as a singular entity is different from the behaviour of the individual parts (the different entities) that make up the whole. In other words, systemness is ‘the coordination of multiple components that, when working together, create a network of activity that is

166  The robustness of the general theory more powerful than any action of individual parts on their own’ (Seiler, 2012, s.p.). Unlike the international system argument, the consensus argument does not dispute the existence of the international system. But it disputes that the global institutional order has any role in the poverty and underdevelopment of resource-cursed states. According to the consensus argument, there is a consensus among development economists that causes of, and problems to solutions of underdevelopment, lies primarily with the country where the problem is. Therefore, according to the consensus argument, to argue that the global institutional order is to blame for the underdevelopment of countries such as Nigeria, Angola, DRC and Equatorial Guinea is to ignore the empirically-based consensus of development economists. However, my argument is not that the global institutional order is solely or totally responsible for the underdevelopment. My argument is that the global institutional order is part of the cause of the problem. The other parts are the state, corporations, collectives and individuals. That is why I have five levels of causality and responsibility which include the level of the global institutional order, rather than only one level with the global institutional order. To think that the global institutional order has no role in the problem, and to think that it is the country alone that is responsible for the problem, is to be guilty of what Thomas Pogge (2010) calls explanatory nationalism, that is, the ‘tendency to explain poverty and hunger exclusively in terms of causal factors that are domestic to the societies in which they occur’ (p. 242). In the global justice discourse, in order to avoid explanatory nationalism, we need a substantial ‘focus on the causal and moral analysis of the global institutional order against the background of its feasible and reachable alternatives’ (Ibid.).

The negation of cosmopolitanism and statism? A possible misconception Let me quickly note a possible misconception here. There might be a possible misconception that my adopted ‘fusion of horizons’ is a new theory of global justice that negates cosmopolitanism and statism. In this sub-chapter, I will disclaim the notion that my adopted fusion of horizons is a new theory of global justice that negates cosmopolitanism and statism. I will argue that fusion of horizons is general theory of global justice which partly relies on statism and partly relies on cosmopolitanism. After all, the crux of the entire argument in this book is that statism and cosmopolitanism should be seen as special theories of global justice while fusion of horizons should be seen as general theory of global justice. Before proceeding with the subject matter of this sub-chapter, I shall reiterate or reassert the following deducible conclusions from the foregoing discussion in this book. Firstly, concerning the necessity and sufficiency

The robustness of the general theory 167 of cosmopolitanism and statism, what I mean by the two key concepts of ‘necessary’ and ‘insufficient’ is as follows. On the one hand, by ‘necessary’ I mean the strengths of cosmopolitanism in interactional analysis and the strengths of statism in institutional analysis. On the other hand, by ‘insufficient’ I mean the weaknesses of cosmopolitanism in institutional analysis and the weaknesses of statism in interactional analysis. Secondly, as the discussion in Chapter 4 shows, the situation with dealing with complex cases of global justice as shown in the case of resource curse is that while cosmopolitanism and statism are individually necessary but individually insufficient, they are simultaneously jointly necessary and jointly sufficient. Nevertheless, I am conscious of the fact that things that are jointly necessary are not always jointly sufficient too, just as things that are jointly sufficient are not always jointly necessary too. Jointly necessary does not equal jointly sufficient, just as jointly sufficient does not equal jointly necessary. Thirdly, as the discussion in Chapter 4 shows, as shown on the levels of causality and responsibility, cosmopolitanism and statism are simultaneously jointly necessary and jointly sufficient for the following reason. Cosmopolitanism is necessary for the individual and collective levels of causality and responsibility. Statism is necessary for the corporate, the state and the global institutional order levels of causality and responsibility. Together, cosmopolitanism and statism suffice for these five levels of analysis or levels of causality and responsibility. Since this jointly necessary and jointly sufficient condition is arrived at through a fusion of horizons, fusion of horizons is deemed to be an appropriate solution to the individually necessary but insufficient condition of cosmopolitanism and statism respectively. General theory of global justice, meaning the way I applied fusion of horizons, is not a negation of cosmopolitanism and statism. I am using the term ‘negation’ in its classical logic sense in which negation is a unary operation which results in the value of a proposition being the exact opposite of its operand. For instance: p is the negation of ¬p; when p is true, ¬p is false; and when p is false, ¬p is true. General theory is not a new theory of global justice that has come to negate, displace or replace the old ones. It is an endeavour to bridge perspectives! General theory is only an observation about the existing theories and an attempt to correct the apparent limitations of the existing theories as observed. Therefore, general theory of global justice is only possible because of the existing theories, namely cosmopolitanism and statism. Without the existing theories, there will be no general theory of global justice or fusion of horizons; because there will simply be no horizons to fuse together. General theory simultaneously owes its possibility and actuality to the existence (and the observed strengths and weaknesses) of the existing theories. Given the limitations of cosmopolitanism and statism, and the way fusion of horizons compensates for those limitations, it is appropriate to see fusion of horizons as general theory of global justice while seeing cosmopolitanism

168  The robustness of the general theory and statism as special theories of global justice. In this case, cosmopolitanism is seen as special theory for interactional analysis while statism is seen as special theory for institutional analysis. Then fusion of horizons is seen as general theory for both interactional and institutional analyses. Or cosmopolitanism is seen as special theory applicable to the individual and the collective levels while statism is seen as special theory applicable to the corporate, the state and the global institutional order levels. Then fusion of horizons is seen as general theory applicable to all levels. To reiterate, fusion of horizons is an endeavour to bridge the cosmopolitan and statist perspectives! The adjectives general and special or the phrases general theory and special theory bring to mind Albert Einstein’s special theory of relativity and general theory of relativity. Nevertheless, my proper analogues are not Einstein’s theories of relativity. My proper analogues are to be found in John Maynard Keynes’ (1936) The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. In reaction to the works of classical economists as typified and pioneered by Adam Smith’s (1776) An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Keynes asserts that his own theory is fit for general application while that of the classical economists is only fit for special application. According to Keynes (1936): I have called this book the General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, placing the emphasis on the prefix general. The object of such a title is to contrast the character of my arguments and conclusions with those of the classical theory of the subject, upon which I was brought up and which dominates the economic thought, both practical and theoretical, of the governing and academic classes of this generation, as it has for a hundred years past. I shall argue that the postulates of the classical theory are applicable to a special case only and not to the general case, the situation which it assumes being a limiting point of the possible positions of equilibrium. Moreover, the characteristics of the special case assumed by the classical theory happen not to be those of the economic society in which we actually live, with the result that its teaching is misleading and disastrous if we attempt to apply it to the facts of experience. (p. 3) (emphasis in original) There are things that are not possible, for instance, a dream-attempt to compare myself and my work to Keynes and his work is not possible. Even in Alice in Wonderland, it is still not possible! Avoiding any outrageous attempt to compare myself and my work to Keynes and his work – not even the widest stretch of imagination will produce any iota or atom of comparison – let me do the following analogy for the sake of a better comprehension of what general theory of global justice is. In what follows, I shall emphasise the differences between Keynes’ objective and that of fusion of horizons. Just as Keynes was brought up in classical economic theory, so too was I brought up in the cosmopolitan and statist theories of global justice. Just

The robustness of the general theory 169 as classical economic theory dominated the economic thought of Keynes’ generation, so too cosmopolitan and statist theories dominate the global justice thought of my generation. While Keynes totally argued that all the characteristics of classical economic theory are not those of the society in which ‘we’ live, I only partially argue that some of the tenets of the cosmopolitan theory on the one hand and the statist theory, on the other hand, blur our vision of the multifaceted nature and complexity of global (in) justice cases. Furthermore, while Keynes argued that classical economic theory ‘is misleading and disastrous if we attempt to apply it to the facts of experience’ (Ibid.). I observe that although the cosmopolitan theory on the one hand and the statist theory, on the other hand, are limited (hence their insufficient conditions), they also have merits (hence their necessary conditions). Just as Keynes argued that classical economic theory is only fit for special application, so too I argue for the following. The cosmopolitan theory is primarily fit for interactional analysis and primarily applicable to the individual and collective levels. The statist theory is primarily fit for institutional analysis and primarily applicable to the corporate, the state, and (although with serious caution) the global institutional order levels. However, I also argue for the following. While cosmopolitanism is not primarily applicable to institutional analysis, it can be used secondarily for institutional analysis. Consequently, it can be applied secondarily to the corporate, the state and the global institutional order levels. While statism is not primarily applicable to interactional analysis, it can be used secondarily for interactional analysis. Consequently, it can be applied secondarily to the individual and collective levels. Finally, Keynes aimed at contrasting his theory with the classical economic theory. So too fusion of horizons is aimed at showing the limitations of the cosmopolitan and statist perspectives. But fusion of horizons is also aimed at showing the strengths of cosmopolitanism and statism. Fusion of horizons goes further to use the strengths of cosmopolitanism to compensate for the weaknesses of statism and vice versa. Using Keynes as an analogy, as I did above, shows us the following. It shows how fusion of horizons would have approached the global justice debate if the aim was to create a new theory of global justice that negates cosmopolitanism and statism. By definition, fusion of horizons implies that there are already existing horizons, and these already existing horizons are insufficient on their own, but are necessary to form a new horizon and may be jointly sufficient when fused together as a new horizon. So, comparing and contrasting fusion of horizons with Keynes, as done in the above analogy, makes it evident that fusion of horizons does not negate, displace or replace cosmopolitanism and statism, unlike Keynes who aimed his economics to negate, displace or replace classical economics. In view of the above analogy, fusion of horizons is general theory of global justice that does not negate cosmopolitanism and statism but not a

170  The robustness of the general theory new theory of global justice that negates cosmopolitanism and statism. In fact, it is not an original theory of global justice: for it is not the result of a lofty ambition but the work of a humble and, hopefully, careful observation. Moreover, as mentioned in Chapter 4, fusion of horizons – at least as applied in this book – is not Hegelian dialectics of: being + nothingness = becoming; or thesis + antithesis = synthesis; and this synthesis is itself a new thesis, a different thesis, or in short, a thesis. Having already said that fusion of horizons, as I used it, is neither an original theory nor a new theory but general theory – an endeavour to bridge the perspectives of cosmopolitanism and statism – because fusion of horizons comes from cosmopolitanism and statism; it would appear that both cosmopolitanism and statism are still separate even after fusing their horizons. Consequently, in other words, the two theories have not been reduced to a singular theory. Nevertheless, I am not using ‘fusion’ in the literal sense that when two things are fused they become inseparable, or in the sense that when two things are fused they become a new singular thing in which the original parts are no longer distinguishable. I am using fusion of horizons in the sense of a ‘combination,’ ‘joining’ or ‘merging’ of the cosmopolitan and statist theories.5 General theory of global justice, fusion of horizons as used in this book, is rather analogous (I use the word analogous cautiously) to Sebastiano Maffettone’s (2013) liberal internationalism. I share his concern about absolute poverty and I share his sufficientarian arguments for positive duties and basic rights or meta-rights. But I go further to ask: what, if any, are the contributory roles of individuals, collective agents, corporations, the state and the global institutional order in resource curse in Africa?; and given the contributory roles of individuals, collective agents, corporations, the state and the global institutional order in resource curse in Africa, what, if any, are their responsibilities? Therefore, general theory of global justice is simultaneously in various ways similar to, and different from, Maffettone’s (2013) liberal internationalism. In one notable way, it is similar to his juxtaposition of cosmopolitanism and statism. According to Maffettone (2013): one can play cosmopolitan in combination with statist features and vice versa. This is not because either cosmopolitans or statists are right. The intention is rather to avoid the pitfalls of both statism and cosmopolitanism by presenting a fresh start under the label of liberal internationalism. (pp. 125–126) Similarly, general theory of global justice tries to avoid the pitfalls of cosmopolitanism and statism. It is for this reason that it uses the strength of the one to compensate for the weaknesses of the other and vice versa. In short, it accounts for both the strengths and weaknesses of cosmopolitanism and statism.

The robustness of the general theory 171 In another notable way in which we can talk about similarity between my general theory and Maffettone’s (2013) liberal internationalism, he seeks a middle point on the spectrum between cosmopolitanism and statism and thinks that ‘This intermediate option creates a kind of continuity between “0” global justice and “1” global justice’ (p. 126) (emphasis in original). In fact, he simultaneously seeks a middle point between, and an alternative to, cosmopolitanism and statism. He maintains that there is a third possible alternative which is simultaneously more realistic or practical than the cosmopolitan alternative and more theoretical or utopian than the statist alternative (Ibid.). Similarly, I seek a position that is moderate compared to the radical positions that cosmopolitans and statists argue for. And I seek an intermediate position rather than the extreme positions that cosmopolitans and statists argue for. But my position is the fusion of the horizons of cosmopolitanism and statism. One notable difference is that Maffettone emphasises positive duty. While I, like Pogge (2005), emphasise negative duty. Another notable ‘difference’ is that Maffettone emphasises basic rights or meta-rights. While I, like Pogge, emphasise contributory roles. It is for these reasons that, as already mentioned, having shared Maffettone’s concern about absolute poverty and having shared his sufficientarian arguments for positive duties and basic rights or meta-rights, I went further to ask the following questions. What, if any, are the contributory roles of individuals, collective agents, corporations, the state and the global institutional order in resource curse? Given the contributory roles of individuals, collective agents, corporations, the state and the global institutional order in resource curse, what, if any, are their responsibilities in resource curse? Another notable way in which my position is different from Maffettone’s position is that we used different phenomena for our different positions. In addition, the way we used our different phenomena for our different positions is different. While Maffettone uses regionalism, I use resource curse. By using regionalism, Maffettone’s argument seems to be geographical and geopolitical [three] concentric circles. Cosmopolitanism is the largest and outermost geographical and geopolitical circle. Statism is the smallest and innermost geographical and geopolitical circle. Regionalism is the medium and intermediate geographical and geopolitical circle. In Maffettone’s approach, when regionalism contracts towards statism: the more our world looks like the statist’s world; and the less it looks like the cosmopolitan’s world. But when regionalism expands towards cosmopolitanism: the more our world looks like the cosmopolitan’s world; and the less it looks like the statist’s world. Rather than using a phenomenon like regionalism, I am concerned generally with complex cases of global justice. (Abumere, 2016, p. 15)

172  The robustness of the general theory Resource curse is only a particular example of complex cases of global justice. So the resource curse phenomenon can be substituted for other complex case phenomena of global justice. But regionalism, the way Maffettone uses it, seems not to be substitutable the way resource curse is.

Conclusion To reiterate the fundamental differences between my position and those of Beitz, Pogge, Rawls and Nagel (as explained in Chapter 1); my position is an intermediate position while their positions are extremes. Beitz and Pogge are at the cosmopolitan extreme of my intermediary position while Rawls and Nagel are at the statist extreme of my intermediary position. Although my position accommodates some, but rejects other, claims made by Beitz and Pogge, while they see cosmopolitanism as necessary and sufficient to deal with complex cases of global justice, I argue that it is necessary but not sufficient. Furthermore, although Rawls and Nagel also allow room for some cosmopolitan claims, Rawls creates room for only peoples at the international realm while Nagel even goes further to assert that only humanitarian duty or duty of charity exists on the global level. Unlike Rawls’ position, my position also has room for individuals on the global level. Also, my position, unlike Nagel’s position, has room for duties of justice on the global level. I especially disagree with Nagel because global injustice is a man-made phenomenon; it is caused by humans. To think that there is nothing that can be done about the human activities, actions and inactions, or commissions and omissions, which cause global injustice, is to reify them; this thinking is tantamount to sheer reification. Reification is: the apprehension of the products of human activity as if they were something else than human products – such as facts of nature, results of cosmic laws, or manifestations of divine will. Reification implies that man is capable of forgetting his own authorship of the human world, and further, that the dialectic between man, the producer, and his products is lost to consciousness. The reified world is … experienced by man as a strange facticity, an opus alienum over which he has no control rather than as the opus proprium of his productive activity. (Berger & Luckmann, 1966, p. 89) (emphasis in original) Finally, general theory of global justice – fusion of horizons as adopted in this book – is not consistent with a monist view of value; rather, it is consistent with a pluralist view of value. On the one hand, monist views of value – for example eudaemonism, rational eudaemonism, rational deontologism, utilitarianism, etc. – argue that there is a summum bonum which we can reduce every value to. On the other hand, generally, pluralist views of value argue that there is no summum bonum which we can reduce every value to. My view is pluralist in the sense that I argue that neither cosmopolitanism

The robustness of the general theory 173 nor statism alone is sufficient to deal with complex cases of global justice or global injustice; hence, we need a pluralist account, that is, the use of both cosmopolitanism and statism in order to deal with complex cases of global justice or global injustice.

Notes 1. In the following formalisation of my argument, I am mainly following the model I used in ‘A synthetic approach to the grounds of global justice’ (2017). 2. Anarchy, in International Relations theory, ‘is an ordering principle, which says that the [international] system comprises independent states that have no central authority above them’ (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 30). 3. An Athenian historian and general who fought in the Peloponnesian war on the side of Athens against the Peloponnesians. Athens led the Delian League while Sparta led the Peloponnesian League. 4. Liberals as used here refers to proponents of the International Relations theory of liberalism. 5. For this paragraph and the following paragraph, I am very grateful to Domenico Melidoro for his very helpful insights.

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Index

Abacha, General Sanni 93 Africa 46 Angola 37, 46, Cabinda, 54–6 authoritarianism 47; dictatorship 47 Auty, Richard 41 basic needs 8 basic structure, of society 3 Beitz, Charles 4, 18–19, 32–4, 61–5 Bretton Woods Institutions 92; International Monetary Fund (IMF) 92; World Bank 92 Bull, Hedley 88–91 causality 69 citizen, of the world 1 civil conflict: civil war 47–8; coup d’etat 47–8 coercion: coercive apparatus 11 collective 67, 79–80, 133–4 contributory role 97 cooperation: cooperative apparatus 11 corporation 67, 133–4; multinational corporations (MNCs) 44, 80–6 cosmopolis 1 cosmopolitanism 1–2, 131; institutional moral 8–9, 17; interactional moral 8–9, 17; legal 8–9, 16; moral 8–9, 16; non-relational 8–9; relational 8–9 Cox, Robert 120 Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 37, 46; Katanga 57–9 difference principle 3 Diogenes, of Sinope 1; cynic 1 distributive justice 2, 6; domestic 6; global 6 Dutch disease 43

duty: humanitarian 6; justice 6; natural 18; negative 7, 171; positive 7, 171 egalitarianism 1, 8 equality principle 3 Equatorial Guinea 37, 46, 59–61 fair equality of opportunity principle 3 fusion of horizons 117 Gadamer, Hans-Georg 122–3 general theory 115–17, 168–71 global institutional order 67, 88, 133–4, 139 global justice 2, 6; approaches to 41; global injustice 41; theories of 41 Heidegger, Martin 123 Hobbes, Thomas 10, 154–5, 164 horizon 122–7; external 123; internal 123; temporal 123 horizontal relationship 11 Husserl, Edmund 123 ideal theory 1–2 Ideal type 121 individual 67, 73–9, 132–3 institution 132–5 institutional analysis 35; institutional moral analysis 128–31 institutionalism: historical 161; rational choice 161; sociological 161 interactional analysis 35; interactional moral analysis 128–31 international privilege: international borrowing privilege 91; international resource privilege 91 internationalism: pluralist 32–4

176  Index justice 2; extensity of 9; procedural 2; scope of 9; substantive 2 justice as fairness 2–3 Law of Peoples 12, 19–30 Legitimacy: de facto 91; moral 91 levels of analysis 61–8 liberty principle 3 macro: analysis 35; level 35 Maffettone, Sebastiano 18–19, 32–4, 170–1 Mazrui, Ali 89, 91 micro: analysis 35; level 73 Miller, David 8, 18–19, 32–4 minimalism 1, 8 Nagel, Thomas 18–19, 32–4 nationalism 14 Nigeria 37, 46; Niger Delta 37, 52–4 non-ideal theory 1–2 non-relational approach 1, 9 Ockham, William of 95–7 original position: first 22; second 22; third 22 Pogge, Thomas 4, 18–19, 32–4, 88, 93, 96–7, 143, 171 polis: poleis 1 poverty 4–5 principle of associational justice 13 property right 95–7 Rawls, John 3, 4, 18–32 realism: defensive 157; descriptive 157; offensive 157; political 157; prescriptive 154; progressive 157 realities of human nature 9

realities of our world 8 reciprocity 12 reification 172 relational approach 1, 8–9 rent 42–3; rent-seeking behaviour 42–3 resource curse 2, 41 responsibility 70; degrees of 107–8 restricted universality: fallacy of 7 Ricardo, David 42–3 Risse, Matthias 18–19, 32–4 Sen, Amartya 138 Smith, Adam 42 sovereignty 96, 143 special theory 35 state 67–8, 86–8, 132 statism 1–2, 131; Hobbesian 10; Nagelian 10; Rawlsian 10 sustainable development 50 theory 119; critical 120; explanatory 119–20; function of 119; predictive 119; problem-solving 120 A Theory of Justice 3 Thucydides 155–6; Delian League 156; History of the Peloponnesian War 155; Melian Dialogue 156; Peloponnesian League 156 underdevelopment 49 unsustainable development 49–52 vertical relationship 11 Waltz, Kenneth 119, 154 Weber, Max 121 Wenar, Leif 88, 93–5, 96–7 Westphalian system 145 World Trade Organization (WTO) 92